

**ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY ACTOR IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: THE MIDDLE
EAST PEACE PROCESS**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

MARCH 2010

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ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ACTOR IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

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March 2010, 288 pages

The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 international security environment. The thesis investigates the congruity between the role that the EU aspires to play as a foreign and security actor (role conception) and its actual foreign and security policy actions and decisions (role performance) in a specific case of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in the post-9/11 era. The role conceptions of the EU are identified by analyzing the content of the general foreign policy speeches delivered by the principal EU foreign policy officials and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU. The congruity between EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance is tested in the case-study of the MEPP. As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that although the EU encountered some constraints when performing some of its self-proclaimed roles, this moderately weakened its effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era, all in all, as observed in the case of the MEPP, the decisions and actions carried out by the EU while enacting its self-identified roles outweighed its deficiencies in its role performance. Despite some inconsistency problems the EU has encountered while performing its self-identified roles, its overall balance sheet as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era is fairly positive.

Keywords: European Union Foreign and Security Policy, Role Theory, Role Conceptions, Role Performance, the Middle East Peace Process.

ÖZ

11 EYLÜL SONRASI DÖNEMDE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN BİR DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI AKTÖRÜ OLARAK ROLÜNÜN ANALİZİ: ORTA DOĞU BARIŞ SÜRECİ

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Tez Yöneticisi: Doç Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

Mart 2010, 288 sayfa

Bu tezin amacı, AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan yeni uluslararası güvenlik ortamında bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak rolünün analiz edilmesidir. Bu tez, AB'nin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak oynamak istediği rol (rol kavramları) ile dış ve güvenlik politikası eylem ve kararları (rol performansı) arasındaki uyumu 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde incelemektedir. AB'nin rol kavramları önde gelen AB dış politika yetkililerinin yaptıkları genel dış ve güvenlik politikası meselelerine değinen konuşmaların ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikası ile ilgili resmi dokümanların içeriklerinin analiz edilmesiyle tespit edilmektedir. AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı rol kavramları ile gerçek rol performansı arasındaki uyum Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. İnceleme sonucunda AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı bazı rolleri yerine getirirken karşılaştığı bazı kısıtlamaların AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak etkinlik ve uluslararası güvenilirliğini kısmen zayıflattığı sonucuna varılmaktadır. Esasında, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci örneğinde görüldüğü gibi AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı bazı rolleri uygularken yerine getirdiği karar ve eylemler rol performansındaki yetersizlikleri telafi etmektedir. AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı rolleri yerine getirirken karşılaştığı bazı tutarsızlıklara rağmen 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak bilançosu oldukça olumludur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliđi'nin Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Rol Kuramı, Rol Kavramları, Rol Performansı, Orta Dođu Barış Süreci

To my wonderful wife – Aslıgöl – with endless love and adoration

and

To my parents – Tuna and Cevdet – with gratitude, love and sincere thanks

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure for me to express my gratitude to those who made this thesis possible with their contributions. First of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Associate Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman for her supervision, comments, criticism and guidance, which helped me refine my ideas and arguments. I am also grateful to the members of my thesis supervising committee: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı and Associate Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin for taking time out of their busy schedules to participate in the meetings of my thesis supervising committee and their invaluable comments and criticisms. I also wish to thank the members of my thesis examining committee: Associate Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür and Assistant Prof. Dr. Bahar Hurmi for their comments and criticisms.

I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Adrian Hyde-Price and the University of Leicester for providing me an invaluable opportunity to spend an academic year as a research student at the Politics and International Relations Department of the University of Leicester. I am also grateful to the British Council for awarding me the British Chevening Scholarship, which enabled me to conduct my PhD research at the University of Leicester. I would also like to thank Jane Russell for all her help and patience during my stay in Leicester.

My gratitude also goes to Dr. Annika Bergman Rosamond for her helpful comments and criticisms on my thesis proposal. My special thanks go to Dr. Costanza Musu for sending me the proofs of her unpublished articles which provide me very useful insights about the EU's role in the Middle East Peace Process.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to my interviewees in Brussels, who took time out of their busy schedules to answer my questions and provide me very insightful information about the EU's role in the Middle East Peace Process.

I am heartily thankful to Prof. Dr. Nergis Mütevellioglu for her invaluable support, encouragement and confidence in me.

My last words of thanks are reserved for the persons to whom this thesis is dedicated, my parents, Tuna and Cevdet and my wife, Aslıgül. I remain eternally grateful to my parents for their unwavering support, encouragement, love and confidence in me. Words fail me to express my appreciation to my wonderful wife whose unfaltering support, encouragement, patience, enduring love and confidence in me have proven invaluable. This thesis would not have been possible without their support and encouragement.

Finally, I would like to thank everybody who supported me in any respect during the completion of this thesis, as well as expressing my apology that I could not mention personally one by one.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The Research Problem, the Purpose, Research Questions	6
1.1.1 The Research Problem of the Thesis.....	6
1.1.2 The Purpose and the Research Questions of the Thesis.....	6
1.2 Organization of the Thesis	7
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS	10
2.1 Role Theory in Analyzing Foreign Policy	10
2.2 Role Theory in Analyzing European Foreign Policy	22
2.2.1 European Foreign Policy Analysis.....	23
2.2.2 Role Theory and European Foreign Policy Analysis.....	25
2.3 Research Design and Methodology.....	28
3. THE EU’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN THE POST–9/11 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT...	41
3.1 Force for Good	41
3.2 Force for International Peace, Security and Stability.....	44
3.3 The Provider of Development Aid	50
3.4 Promoter of its values and norms	54

3.5 Promoter of Effective Multilateralism	56
3.6 Partner for the UN	59
3.7 Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors	61
3.8 Conclusion.....	62
4. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EC/EU’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE MEPP IN PRE-9/11 ERA	66
4.1 The Quest for a European Common Position in the 1970s	66
4.1.1 Early Attempts to Develop a Common Position towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Schumann Document of 1971, the Brussels Declaration of 1973 and the London Declaration of 1977.....	70
4.1.2 The Camp David Peace Process and the EC	77
4.1.3 The Venice Declaration of 1980	82
4.2 The Quest for a European Peace Initiative in the Middle East in the 1980s	89
4.3 The Quest for a Pro-Active European Role in the MEPP in the 1990s....	98
4.3.1 The Maastricht Treaty and the Launch of the CFSP	99
4.3.2 The Madrid Peace Process and the EU	101
4.3.3 The Oslo Peace Process and the EU	109
4.3.4 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.....	114
4.3.5 The Years of Stalemate in the Peace Process and the EU (1996-2001).....	118
4.4 Conclusion.....	127
5. THE EU’S ROLE PERFORMANCE IN THE MEPP IN THE POST-9/11 ERA.....	131
5.1 The EU and the MEPP in the Post-9/11 Era: A General Overview	132
5.1.1 Peace Efforts in the Immediate Post-9/11 Era and the EU	132
5.1.2 The Creation of the Quartet and the Launch of Road Map for the Middle East.....	135

5.1.3 The EU Election Observer Mission for the Presidential Elections in the West Bank & Gaza Strip	142
5.1.4 The Israeli ‘Security Fence’ and ‘Disengagement Plan’ and the EU	143
5.1.5 The European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah).....	149
5.1.6 The European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	150
5.1.7 The EU Election Observer Mission for the Palestinian Legislative Council Election of 2006.....	152
5.1.8 EU Member States’ Contribution to UNIFIL	154
5.2 Analyzing the EU’s Role Performance in the MEPP in the Post-9/11 Era	157
5.2.1 The EU’s Role Performance as Force for Good	157
5.2.2 The EU’s Role Performance as Force for International Peace, Security and Stability	169
5.2.3 The EU’s Role Performance as the Provider of Development Aid.....	187
5.2.4 The EU’s Role Performance as Promoter of its values and EC	202
5.2.5 The EU’s Role Performance as Promoter of Effective Multilateralism, Partner for the UN and Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors	216
5.3 Conclusion.....	225
6. CONCLUSION	232
BIBLIOGRAPHY	241
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	267
B. CURRICULUM VITAE	287

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1 Basic Typology of EU's Role Conceptions in the Post-9/11 Era Emerged from Preliminary Role Analysis	33
Table 2 EU's Role Set in the Post-9/11 Era.....	41
Table 3 The Relationship Between EU's Role Conceptions	65
Table 4 EU's Financial Support for the Palestinians during the period between 2001 and 2006.....	190

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EC	European Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EOM	European Union Election Observer Mission
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU BAM Rafah	European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point
EU	European Union
EUCOPPS	EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUFP	European Union Foreign Policy
EUPOLCOPPS	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUSR	European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process
Fatah	Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Palestinian National Liberation Movement)
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
Hamas	Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MEDA	Mesures d'Accompagnement (Accompanying Measures)
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MERCUSOR	Mercado Comun del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MFO	Multinational Sinai Force and Observers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEGASE	Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique (European Mechanism of Support to the Palestinians)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
REDWG	Regional Economic Development Working Group
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TIM	Temporary International Mechanism
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNRWA
US
USSR

United Nations Relief and Works Agency
United States
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since 1999, the EU Member States have strove to consolidate the EU's CFSP and the EU has become an important foreign and security policy actor in global politics. At the Cologne European Council on 3-4 June 1999, the defence dimension of the EU's foreign and security policy, the ESDP was introduced. In the post-9/11 era, the CFSP and the ESDP have gained substance and momentum. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler have put forward that 9/11 made the case for the ESDP even more compelling.¹ In this area, significant elements of integration emerged. Institutional struggles were left behind and a range of EU actors and agencies started to work together to develop a coherent political approach to the crises.² In the post-9/11 era, the EU started to become one of the key foreign and security policy actors in the global arena which has the ability to use a full range of instruments including military ones in addition to civilian ones for crisis management and conflict prevention. Michael Smith called this as the process of hardening of European foreign and security policy. He argued that particularly since the late 1990s, there was a process of hardening which has led to an injection of hard as opposed to soft security into the European foreign and security policy process, particularly through the elaboration of the ESDP.³

In the post-9/11 era, the ESDP was operationalized. Several operations in the framework of the ESDP have been carried out since 2003. Until now 23 operations have been carried out under the aegis of the ESDP and more is under consideration and planning.

¹ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, "The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy", in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (eds.), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 15.

² Ibid.

³ Michael Smith, "The Shock of the Real? The Trends in European Foreign and Security Policy Since September 2001" on European Foreign and Security Policy: Key Issues and Debates", in Giovanna Bono (ed.), *The Impact of 9/11 on European Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2006), p. 40.

These operations demonstrated that in the post-9/11 era, the EU became more deeply committed to crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts in different parts of the world including Africa, the South Caucasus, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Asia by using its civilian and military instruments.⁴ This demonstrated that in the post-9/11 era, as Michael Smith put forward that there is a widening of the geographical scope of European foreign and security policy which meant that more regions entangled in European foreign and security policy.⁵

In the post-9/11 era, the EU and its Member States officials' efforts to increase the coherence of the EU's foreign and security policy instruments have increased. Intensification of the coordination between the EU and its Member States officials in terms of external deployment of resources including development aid, humanitarian aid, judges, diplomats, military forces etc. in their relations with the so-called 'failed states' or post-conflict-states such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo was observed.⁶ The threat of terrorism was identified as one of the main reasons for the acceleration of the coherence of the EU instruments for external action.⁷ In the post-9/11 era, European Council's suggestion that all the activities carried out under the CFSP can be considered as a contribution to the long-term actions for the prevention of terrorism represented a radical departure from the notion that was at the heart of the EU that external economic development had to be fostered for the benefit of humanity and be geared to principles of need and removing of regional and global inequalities.⁸ In the post-9/11 era, the link between the external economic development and European security was increasingly highlighted by the EU.

In the post-9/11 era, the EU's first-ever security strategy: "A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy" was prepared by the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and adopted by the EU leaders at Rome European Council on 12-13 December 2003. In Peter Van Ham's words, the ESS has

⁴ Giovanna Bono, "The Impact of 11 September 2001 and the 'War on Terror'" on European Foreign and Security Policy: Key Issues and Debates", in Giovanna Bono (ed.), *The Impact of 9/11 on European Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2006), p. 14.

⁵ Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

⁶ Bono, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁷ Bono, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁸ Bono, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

offered an *acquis stratégique* by establishing priorities and setting clear policy goals.⁹ The document primarily offers a common view of the nature of current international security environment (post-Cold War and post-9/11 international security contexts), the EU's role within it, the shared perception of the most serious threats, the most important opportunities in that security environment and appropriate policy responses that the EU should adopt in dealing with them.

In the ESS, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime were identified as key threats to European security in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international security context. In the ESS, a comprehensive approach to security is identified as the most effective way to manage these security threats. The comprehensive security approach refers to the combined use of full range of available security policy instruments, including both civilian and military.¹⁰ As a part of its comprehensive security approach, the EU recognizes that transnational threats cannot be dealt with by using traditional security instruments such as military force, these threats have root causes and military force is not an appropriate means to manage their root causes. In the post-9/11 era, the EU prefers a security strategy which combines civilian and military instruments and addresses the root causes of transnational threats.

It was noted in the ESS that the new threats in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 period are not purely military and they cannot be tackled by purely military means; each needs a mixture of instruments. In addition to that, it is stated that European states need to use the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at their disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities in pursuing their strategic objectives. It is also noted that the European states need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention, to be able to undertake operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. Javier Solana also argued

⁹ Peter Van Ham, "Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the EU's Geopolitical Maturity", 09.01.2004. <http://www.aicgs.org/c/vanham.shtml>.

¹⁰ Pernille Rieker, "Europeanization of Nordic Security: The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* (Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004), p. 370, and Sven Biscop, "Opening Up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehensive and Cooperative Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security", *Security Dialogue* (Vol. 34, No. 2, 2003), p. 185.

that the EU's comprehensive approach to security, that is part civilian, part military, corresponds to the needs of today's complex security crises.¹¹

The nexus between security and development, which was developed in the 1990s and was manifested in an increasing interest in the human security agenda, has assumed a new dimension since 9/11.¹² In the ESS, for the first time in the EU history, underdevelopment in non-European states was identified as a threat to the security of Europeans.¹³ In the post-9/11 era, underdevelopment, which provides a breeding ground for insecurity, is identified by the EU as one of the contemporary challenges to European security.

In the ESS, it is also stated that European security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is accepted as the objectives of the EU Member States. The latter are committed to upholding and developing international law. The UN Charter is considered as the fundamental framework for international relations, and the consolidation of the UN's international role and responsibilities remain a European priority. It is also noted that the EU Member States demand international organizations, regimes and treaties to be more effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must be ready to act when their rules are broken. The document also emphasizes that it is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. It is acknowledged that the EU Member States have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organization and in supporting new ones like the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are regarded as the best means of strengthening the international order.

¹¹ Javier Solana, 27 January 2006, Salzburg.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹² Bono, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

¹³ Bono, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

In the ESS, key threats to European security are identified as common threats, shared with all the EU's closest partners. By relying on this, building multilateral cooperation in international organizations and partnerships with key actors is identified as a necessity for dealing with these threats and pursuing the objectives of EU. In the ESS, it was stated that the EU needs to develop an effective and balanced partnership with the US, since transatlantic relationship is identified as indispensable for the EU. It was also noted that the EU needs to continue to develop closer ties with Russia which is identified as very crucial for security and prosperity of the EU. It was pointed out that the EU has to develop strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India and with all those countries who share the same goals and values with the EU.

In order to implement the defence aspects of ESS, Britain, France and Germany proposed the formation of EU 'Battlegroups' in February 2004.¹⁴ At the Brussels European Council on 17-18 June 2004, the EU Member States agreed on Headline Goal 2010 which also included the EU 'Battlegroups concept'. At the 22 November 2004 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference convened in Brussels, the EU Member States agreed on the formation of 13 'EU Battlegroups' and it was decided that first Battlegroups will reach full operational capability in 2007. It was also decided that Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of Petersberg tasks as listed in the TEU Art.17.2 and those identified in the ESS, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size. Battlegroups have to be sustainable until mission termination or until relief by other forces. They should be sustainable for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately.

It is within this context, the thesis aims to investigate the congruity between the role that the EU aspires to play as a foreign and security actor and its actual foreign and security policy actions and decisions in a specific case of the MEPP in

¹⁴ The proposed EU battlegroups consist of highly trained, battalion-size formations (1,500 soldiers each) including all combat and service support as well as deployability and sustainability assets. These should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crises areas (i.e. failing states), under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate, and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile environment (mountains, desert, jungle, etc). As such, they should prepare the ground for larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces, ideally provided by the UN or the Member States. (Gerrard Quille, "'Battle Groups' to Strengthen EU Military Crisis Management", *European Security Review* (No. 22, April 2003).

the post-9/11 era. The correspondence between EU's foreign and security policy rhetoric and the EU's foreign and security policy behaviour has been examined in the thesis.

1.1 The Research Problem, the Purpose, Research Questions

1.1.1 The Research Problem of the Thesis

As seen in the introduction part, the EU has emerged as a prominent foreign and security policy actor in global politics in the post-9/11 era. The role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era has become a major focus of academic interest, because it is considered as necessary to fully explain and understand EU's overall influence and impact in this new international security environment. Academic studies examining the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era has merely focused on the EU's actual decisions and actions which reflected its role performance as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era. However, in order to explain, analyze and understand the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era in a profound and critical manner, it is crucial to investigate both the roles the EU aspires to play (role conceptions), its actual actions and decisions which reflected its role performance as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era and the congruity between these two. Thus, while there is some knowledge about the EU's role performance, there is very little knowledge about the role the EU aspires to play (role conceptions) and the congruity between the EU's role conceptions and role performance.

1.1.2 The Purpose and the Research Questions of the Thesis

The overall purpose of the thesis is to identify the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions defined in the post-9/11; to evaluate the EU's role performance in a specific case of the MEPP in the post-9/11 era; and to examine the congruity¹⁵ between the EU's role conceptions and its role performance in a specific case. The thesis aims to analyze both self-conceptualization of 'what the EU is' (role conception), 'what the EU does' (role performance) and the congruity between these

¹⁵ In the thesis, congruity refers to the situation when an actor's (the EU) role performance is judged as appropriate and convincing according to the norms provided by actors' role conception. In the role theory literature, this judgement is based on a qualitative analysis of the evidence available regarding role conceptions and role performance. (Stephen Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", in Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.), *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, p. 179).

two. The thesis seeks to analyze the proclaimed intentions of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor, its foreign and security policy practices in a specific case and the level of congruity between these two.

The thesis addresses two main research questions:

- Which role(s) does/do the EU define for itself as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era?
- Is there a congruity or incongruity between the EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance in a specific case of the MEPP in the post-9/11 era? If there exists an incongruity between EU's role conceptions and its role performance what are the main reasons behind this?

1.2 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters. It begins with this introductory chapter, which outlines the necessary background to understand and conceptualize the thesis. This introductory chapter begins with an overview of the context and background that frames the study, which makes an analysis of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 international security context. This chapter presents the research problem, the purpose, accompanying research questions of thesis, which demonstrate why this research should be undertaken, what the main objectives of the research are and the questions the thesis seeks to answer.

Chapter two presents conceptual framework for analysis of the thesis, a review of the literature on the analysis of the European foreign policy and the research design and methodology which will guide the research in the thesis and is organized in three parts. In the first part, the conceptual framework for analysis, on which the thesis is based, will be presented. In this part, application of role theory in analysing foreign policy and why the role theoretical approach was selected as conceptual framework for analysis of thesis and two key concepts, which are associated with role theory and used to inform the analysis in thesis (role conception and role performance) will be evaluated. The second part provides a review of the literature on the analysis of the European foreign policy, which presents the main approaches in the analysis of the European foreign policy, and describes potential contributions of the thesis to the existing literature in order to locate the thesis in the literature on the analysis of European foreign policy. The final part specifies the research design and methodology which will guide the research in the thesis. This

part of the chapter demonstrates how qualitative content analysis has been applied for identifying the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions and why the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy officials concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU were selected as source of data collection for identification of the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions. Furthermore, this part of the chapter presents why the MEPP was selected as a specific case study and why the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 was selected as the focus of analysis.

Chapter three presents the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions in the post-9/11 era. In this chapter, the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions in the post-9/11 era will be identified by analyzing the content of the general foreign policy speeches delivered by the principal EU foreign policy officials during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 and selected EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU. As a result of content analysis, seven role conceptions have been identified: 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its norms and values', 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors'. This chapter provides an outline of main roles at work within the EU's role set in the post-9/11 era.

Chapter four provides a historical overview of the EU's involvement in the MEPP, which will help better to understand and analyze the EU's role performance in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era. This analysis enables to reveal the change and continuity in the EU's policy concerning the MEPP. This chapter is organized in three parts which respectively provide a historical overview of the evolution of the EU's policy towards the MEPP from the 1970s up to 1990s.

Chapter five provides an analysis of the EU's foreign and security policy role performance and the congruity between EU's role conceptions and role performance in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era. It is divided into two parts. The first part provides a general overview of the EU's involvement in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era. After general overview, the EU's foreign and security policy role

performance and the congruity between EU's role conceptions and role performance in a specific case of the MEPP in the post-9/11 era will be analyzed.

Finally, chapter six provides the summary of the thesis and conclusions obtained from this research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The objective of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for analysis for the thesis, a review of the literature on the analysis of the European foreign policy and the research design and methodology which will guide the research in the thesis. The chapter is organized into three parts. In the first part, application of role theory in analysing foreign policy and why the role theoretical approach was selected as theoretical framework for analysis and its two key concepts, which are associated with role theory and used to inform the analysis in thesis, role conception and role performance, will be evaluated. The second part provides a review of the literature on the analysis of the European foreign policy and describes potential contributions of the thesis to the existing literature in order to locate the thesis in the literature on the analysis of European foreign policy. The final part specifies the research design and methodology which will guide the research in the thesis. This part of the chapter demonstrates how qualitative content analysis was applied for identifying the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions and why the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy officials concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU were selected as sources of data collection for identification of the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions. Furthermore, this part of the chapter presents why the MEPP was selected as a specific case study and why the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 was selected as the focus of analysis.

2.1 Role Theory In Analysing Foreign Policy

The thesis uses a conceptual framework for analysis based on role theory. What this effectively means that the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in a specific case of the MEPP in the post-9/11 era has been analyzed by using role theory as conceptual framework for analysis.

In this part of the chapter, I have summarized the key features of role theory. Particularly, I have clarified the meaning of the key concepts which are associated with role theory and are used to inform the analysis: role conception and role performance. Since the main focus of the thesis is on the role theory and its application in analysing foreign policy, this part of the chapter does not provide a review of foreign policy analysis literature.

Stephen Walker argued that as a scientific explanation of social phenomena, role theory tends to be conceptually rich and methodologically poor.¹⁶ He further asserted that role theory has served more as a conceptual framework within which scholars from various disciplines have conducted research using range of methodologies.¹⁷ Bruce Biddle also argued that role theory shows the promise of relevance, richness of conceptual structure, and the vigour of empirical research.¹⁸ Christer Jönsson and Ulf Westerlund identified role theory as a research orientation or framework.¹⁹ According to Bruce J. Biddle, role theory concerns one of the most important features of social life, characteristic behaviour patterns or roles. It explains roles by presuming that persons are members of social positions and hold expectations for their own behaviours and those of other persons.²⁰ Biddle identified role theory as a science concerned with the study of behaviours that are characteristic of persons within contexts and with various processes that presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those behaviours.²¹

Role theory has its origins in the discipline of social psychology. The concept of role, which was borrowed from theatre, referred to certain characters in a story rather than to the actors or players who played them.²² The utility of the

¹⁶ Stephen Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", in Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.), *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 176.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Bruce J. Biddle, *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities and Behaviors* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 16.

¹⁹ Christer Jönsson and Ulf Westerlund, "Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis" in Christer Jönsson (ed.) *Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics* (Great Britain: Frances Pinter Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 124.

²⁰ Bruce J. Biddle, "Recent Developments in Role Theory", *Annual Review of Sociology* (Vol. 12, 1986), p. 67.

²¹ Biddle, "Role Theory: Expectations, Identities and Behaviours", *op.cit.*, p. 4.

²² Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", *op.cit.*, p. 173.

concept of role and its connotations for understanding real world behaviour as well as behaviour on the theatrical stage depends on the resemblance between the two arenas.²³ For the social psychologists whose observations are guided by the concept of role, the object of study is the enactment of the role by persons in social settings.²⁴ Role theory provides a perspective for discussing or studying many social issues.²⁵ Role theory has been employed by social scientists for studying social phenomena, because role theory provides many concepts, which enables investigators to study different and competing explanations for human conduct, and as many of the terms appearing in role theory are drawn from the common language, they seem natural and easy to measure.²⁶ Carl Backman argued that role theory as used in behavioural sciences has descriptive, organizational and explanatory value. For him, the concept of role has helped to integrate knowledge relevant to three levels of abstraction: culture, social structure and personality. He put forward that research and study at each of these levels suggest some interesting analogues, possibly helpful for making sense of international relations.²⁷

Role theory was borrowed from social psychology and applied to foreign policy analysis by Kalevi Jacque Holsti in 1970 with his seminal study, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy'. In his cross-national study, Holsti analysed the general foreign policy statements of highest level policy-makers in order to form a typology of national role conceptions. He built a typology of role conceptions including seventeen role conceptions identified by content analysis of speeches and statements of the highest level policy-makers of seventy-one states during the period extending January 1965 to December 1967. In his study, he adopted an inductive strategy for the identification of role conceptions. He adopted a bottom-up perspective rather a top-down one. What this effectively means is that instead of building an 'ideal type' role concept and using it to explain and understand

²³ Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", *op.cit.*, p. 173.

²⁴ Theodore R. Sarbin and Vernon L. Allen, "Role Theory", in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.) *The Handbook of Social Psychology 2nd edition Vol. 1* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968), p. 489.

²⁵ Biddle, "Recent Developments in Role Theory", *op.cit.*, p. 68.

²⁶ Biddle, "Role Theory: Expectations, Identities and Behaviours", *op.cit.*, p. 13.

²⁷ Carl W. Backman, "Role Theory and International Relations: A Commentary and Extension", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 14, No.3, September 1970), p. 311.

the international role of states, he preferred to construct a role typology by content analysing the speeches and statements of the highest level policy-makers of states.

Holsti focused on national role conceptions, which he defined as the policy-makers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems.²⁸ According to Holsti, national role conceptions are context bound. They are bound to the social-psychological context of the policymakers. National role conceptions reflect policymakers' own perceptions of their states' position, functions and behaviours in international system. In his analysis, social context is 'international system' and states are members of social positions and holding expectations for their own behaviours within the system. Highest level policy-makers identify social position of their state and expectations for the behaviour of their state within the international system. Holsti focused on the 'subjective' dimension of foreign policy rather than a universally applicable vision of international relations commonly held by all international actors.²⁹ Holsti argued that actual role performance (foreign policy actions and decisions of states) in international politics principally stemmed from the policymaker's role conceptions, domestic needs and demands and critical events or trends in the external milieu.³⁰ Holsti's analysis was based on the assumption that role performance results from and is consistent with policymakers' conceptions of their nation's directions and duties in international system or regional systems.³¹ Thus, for Holsti, national policy-makers will act consistently with what they perceive and conceive as appropriate for their states' position, functions and behaviours in international system or regional systems.

As Carl Backman argued, Holsti's study illustrated the explanatory value of the role theory in analysing foreign policy. He argued that Holsti's study demonstrated how the concept of role can be used in explaining regularities in

²⁸ Kalevi Jacque Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 14, No.3, September 1970), pp. 245-246.

²⁹ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis", in Ole Elgstrom and Michael Smith (eds.) *The European Union's Role in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 11.

³⁰ Holsti, *op.cit.*, p. 243.

³¹ Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", *op.cit.*, p. 244-245.

relations between basic analytical units of international system, the governments.³² According to Naomi Bailin Wish, since most of the previous studies focusing on decision-makers' perceptions comprise only perceptions of the external environment, especially enemy characteristics and actions, and very few examine decision-makers' perceptions of their own, Holsti's focus on self-defined role conceptions to study foreign policy fills a gap in the foreign policy analysis literature.³³

Naomi Bailin Wish argued that although Holsti hypothesized that national role conceptions are strongly related to the role performance, he examined only relationship between role conceptions and one type of foreign policy behaviour, the level of international involvement or participation. She further argued that Holsti never tested his hypothesis with a systematic measure of participation or involvement in the international system.³⁴ She put forward that in case of systematic categorization, national role conceptions, which she defined as foreign policy maker's perceptions of their nations' positions in the international system, can be a powerful tool for explaining variations in many types of foreign policy behaviour.³⁵ She noted that national role conceptions provide norms, guidelines, and standards which affect many aspects of decision making.³⁶ Wish set out to find the relationship between national role conceptions and foreign policy behaviour and determine the factors underlying the entire set of role and behaviour variables by using quantitative techniques. As a consequence of her analysis, she concluded that many national role conception characteristics are strongly related to foreign policy behaviour.³⁷ Through her analysis, she found greater similarities among role conceptions expressed by leaders from the same nations than from differing nations, although they were in power at different times and therefore experienced a changing international system. For her, this brings longevity and stability to the role conceptions. By relying on research results, she concluded that these results showed the value of analysing role

³² Backman, *op.cit.*, p. 311.

³³ Jönsson and Westerlund, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

³⁴ Naomi Bailin Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 24, No.4, December 1980), p. 535.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 546.

conceptions which provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behaviour.³⁸ She argued that longevity and stability of role conceptions are assets when trying to explain long-term patterns of foreign policy behaviour rather than single decisions.³⁹ She argued that her findings demonstrated the potential utility of national role conceptions for explaining and possibly eventually predicting patterns in foreign policy behaviour.⁴⁰

Stephen Walker argued that Holsti's inductive strategy for the identification of role conceptions differed from the efforts from previous studies, which deduced roles from the implications of classical balance of power theory and its derivatives.⁴¹ Walker put forward that there emerged an apparent gap between idiosyncratically based or domestically based national role conceptions and the role expectations consistent with a balance of power system. Holsti identified the reason behind this incongruity as the previous international politics theorists' tendency to focus on the activities of the major powers and ignore regional systems outside Western Europe where cooperative ventures were very significant.⁴² Walker argued that balance of power theory was insufficient in scope and required to be modified or replaced with a theory that would include the variety of foreign policy phenomena exposed by Holsti's use of role as a concept to study foreign policy.⁴³

In addition to Stephen Walker, Lisbeth Aggestam argued that Holsti's inductive strategy for the identification of role conceptions differed from traditional approaches in international relations theory, especially realism. In realist approach, the sources of roles are predominantly systemic and based on material factors, thus state's general role is studied deductively in terms of state's position within a structure.⁴⁴ According to Aggestam, the novelty with Holsti's study was that roles

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 547.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 547.

⁴⁰ Naomi Bailin Wish, "National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation Model" in Stephen G. Walker (ed), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 95.

⁴¹ Stephen Walker, "Role Theory and the Origins of Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 271.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 13.

are not unfolded from abstract theoretical discussions, but analysed inductively in terms of the roles perceived and defined by policy-makers.⁴⁵ Aggestam emphasized that Holsti's approach has great strengths in the sense that it set out to take careful account of political reality as it is experienced by the policy-makers, who construct it in a dynamic interaction between rules and reasons.⁴⁶ Holsti's study demonstrated that the practitioners of foreign policy has defined different and numerous roles than general roles stipulated deductively by academics.

Philippe Le Prestre while elaborating on the utility of the concept of role in analysing foreign policy, made a similar evaluation with Walker and Aggestam and stated that using the concept of role enables to go beyond the traditional or realist, explanation of foreign policy, which is based on security or on national interest defined by prudent quest for power.⁴⁷ For Le Prestre, roles help define national interests and divorce them from power. Le Prestre also put forward that role conception can help explain the general direction of foreign policy choices. The expression of a national role reveals preferences, operationalizes an image of the world, generates expectations and affects the definition of the situation and of the available options. He also suggested that the concept of role helps explain visible anomalies in the conduct of states. What this effectively means, the concept of role can help explain why some states conduct its foreign policy in a contradictory manner with their national interests. According to Le Prestre, the concept of role enables to explain foreign policy behaviours which structural realism, that asserts that capacities are the only determinate factor for the definition of a role, remains inadequate to explain. Le Prestre gave the example of structural realism's failure to explain Japan and Germany's choice not to bear greater responsibilities through a leadership role commensurate with their power. Le Prestre argued that in anarchic system roles impose obligations on states and help shape their interests. Thus, the concept of role helps us expand the definition of national interest beyond more basic geopolitical factors that are linked to national survival. In addition to Le Prestre, Richard Adigbuo also argued that the concept of role helps explain visible anomalies

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Philippe G. Le Prestre, "Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War" in Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed.), *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), p. 13.

in the conduct of states.⁴⁸ Adigbuo gave the example of impossibility of explaining decision of Nigeria, which had one of the lowest incomes per capita in the world, sent aid to the Soviet Union or sponsored liberation movements abroad through its national interest. He argued that this example showed that a role can lead a state to act contradictorily with its national interest – thus enabling analyst to separate interests from power.⁴⁹

Moreover, Le Prestre put forward that the concept of role enables the reconciliation between different levels of analysis (the individual, the society and the system) and provides a means of assessing the interaction between internal and external variables. Role conceptions can also help explain foreign policy continuities. As Naomi Wish argued, role conceptions, which provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behaviour, help explain long-term patterns of foreign policy behaviour.

Stephen Walker argued that that some important foreign policy questions can be examined by using a combination of concepts from role theory and methods inspired by cognitive dynamics literature.⁵⁰ Walker put forward three reasons for utilizing role analysis for analysing foreign policy behaviour: its descriptive, organizational and explanatory value.⁵¹ Descriptively, the concepts associated with role analysis provide a vocabulary of images which can focus upon foreign policy behaviour at the national level of analysis, shift down the individual level of analysis and also move up to the systemic level of analysis. He puts forward that the ability to make a distinction between coherent and incoherent foreign policy across different levels of foreign policy decisions shows the potential descriptive and normative utility of role theory in monitoring and assessing the conduct of foreign policy.⁵² Christer Jönsson and Ulf Westerlund also emphasized the multilevel descriptive power of role theory. By relying on the assumption that the international political system is stratified like other social systems, they noted that in international politics

⁴⁸ Richard Adigbuo, “Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions”, *Politikon*, (Vol. 34, No. 1, April 2007), p. 90.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵⁰ Walker, “National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes”, *op.cit.*, p. 204.

⁵¹ Stephen G. Walker, “The Relevance of Role Theory to Foreign Policy Analysis” in Stephen G. Walker (ed), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 2.

⁵² Walker, *op.cit.* “National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes”, p. 204.

research, role theory can be applied at state, interstate and systemic levels.⁵³ The concept of role not only has a multilevel descriptive power, but also a multidimensional scope in its application to foreign policy behaviour. Role conception goes beyond the narrow conceptualization of foreign policy behaviour as a continuum of cooperative and conflictual behaviour. Organizationally, the concepts associated with role analysis enable to adopt either a structure-oriented or a process-oriented perspective. It is possible, to focus on the structure of a set of roles at the national level of analysis or on the structure of a set of roles which define the relations among a group of nations. Concerning the role theory's explanatory utility and its potential for providing policymakers with a policy relevant theory, Walker argued that the explanatory value of role theory depends on whether its concepts are theoretically informed either by an appropriate set of self-contained propositions and methods, or by the specification of an appropriate set of supplementary limiting conditions and rules linking these conditions with role concepts. Appropriateness is a function of context defined as a particular domain of behaviour. Although Walker noted that its explanatory utility and its potential for providing policymakers with a policy relevant theory is less clear, he argued that role theory's focus on cues and expectations as sources of influence on a nation's foreign policy may eventually produce empirical generalizations that can be translated into short-term policy prescriptions.⁵⁴ Moreover, he asserted that role theory possesses potentially a high value as an analytical tool for linking individual and systemic generalizations.⁵⁵

James Rosenau argued that role theory has organizational value in analysing foreign policy. He put forward that the concept of role meets the need for a unifying dimension across the source variables for international action – individual, governmental, societal and systemic.⁵⁶ According to Rosenau, in his study, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" although the role concept was a central feature of the formulation, its scope was limited to the attitudes, behaviours and expectations that attach to top positions in the foreign policy making process. The

⁵³ Jönsson and Westerlund, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

⁵⁴ Walker, *op.cit.* "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", p. 204.

⁵⁵ Walker, *op.cit.* "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes", p. 205.

⁵⁶ James N. Rosenau, "Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy" in Stephen G. Walker (ed), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 45.

various role variables were considered as competing with individual, governmental, societal and systemic source variables for international action. In the Pre-theory, role variables have been discussed primarily at the level of individual decision-makers and been contrasted with idiosyncratic or personality variables.⁵⁷ For him, this kind of formulation seemed too vague as a means of achieving a theoretical link between micro and macro-phenomena. For him, the main problem is the lack of common dimensions across source variables which could provide a basis for comparing among them. He stated that in the Pre-theory, societal and systemic variables consist of forces operating on top officials; governmental variables involve institutional practices to which they must accommodate; individual variables are comprised of pre-acquired values which predispose them in certain directions; the various sources, practices and values are in endless tension among themselves and with the expectations attached to the top roles. The concept of role provides a common dimension for all these source variables for international actions. For Rosenau, adopting role concept as the unit of analysis enables to achieve a theoretical link between micro and macro-phenomena.⁵⁸ As Gauvav Ghose and Patrick James argued that role theory has a descriptive, organizational and explanatory value. For them, role theory has considerable potential to be utilized to explain foreign policy decisions and outcomes by connecting different levels and units and, in the process, providing a unified analysis.⁵⁹

Charles F. Herman also emphasized explanatory value of the role theory in analysing foreign policy. He suggested that role concept, which he defines as decision makers' expectations about the pattern or configuration of foreign policy activity that their government will pursue in certain situation in support of their beliefs, enables to explain and predict foreign policy actions and decisions of national governments.⁶⁰ He noted that national governments have certain roles that

⁵⁷ Jönsson and Westerlund, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

⁵⁸ Stephen Walker, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis: An Evaluation" in Stephen G. Walker (ed), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 244.

⁵⁹ Gauvav Ghose and Patrick James, "Third-Party Intervention in Ethno-Religious Conflict: Role Theory, Pakistan, and War in Kashmir, 1965", *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Vol. 17, 2005), p. 429.

⁶⁰ Charles F. Hermann, "Superpower Involvement with Others: Alternative Role Relationships", in Stephen G. Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 220.

they assume in world affairs and if we have knowledge about these roles, which national governments actually act to fulfill, the actions and decisions of those governments can be predicted and explained.⁶¹

Lisbeth Aggestam emphasized the analytical utility of role theory for analysing EU foreign policy. She asserted that role theory is potentially very productive analytical tool for analysing EU foreign and security policy. She defined role conception as the normative expectations that the role be-holder expresses towards itself, that is, the ego-part's own definition.⁶² According to her, a role conception defines responsibilities and obligations in foreign policy.⁶³ Role conceptions belong to the subjective dimension of foreign policy⁶⁴ rather than a universally applicable vision of international relations commonly held by all international actors. Role conceptions show the intention and motives of foreign and security policy actor.⁶⁵ When analysing EU foreign policy, a role conception refers to images that foreign policy-makers hold concerning the general long-term function and performance of the EU in the international system.⁶⁶ Aggestam emphasized explanatory value of the role concept in analysing EU foreign policy and argued that a role conception provides a clearer view of the reasons for the EU's adoption of a particular orientation and approach in international relations.⁶⁷ Just like Philippe Le Prestre, Aggestam argued that focusing the concept of role enables to transcend the traditional or realist, explanation of foreign policy as the prudent quest for power. For her, the concept of role helps understand obligations and commitments that an actor perceives beyond only considerations to maximize its material interests. For her, a European role conception reflects norms about the purpose and orientation of the EU as an actor in the international system.⁶⁸

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁶² Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 19.

⁶³ Lisbeth Aggestam, *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*, Stockholm Studies in Politics 106, (Doctoral Dissertation, Stockholm University: Department of Political Science, 2004), p. 64.

⁶⁴ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 19.

⁶⁵ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 19.

⁶⁶ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 20.

⁶⁷ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 21.

⁶⁸ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "Role Theory and European Foreign Policy", p. 25.

In the thesis, two key concepts, which are associated with role theory, have been used to inform the analysis: role conception and role performance.

Role Conception: In the context of the thesis, the concept of role conception refers to the EU's own conception and definition of its general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions and orientations as a foreign and security policy actor in the 9/11 international security context, which has been extracted from the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy officials including the High Representative for the CFSP of the EU/Secretary General of the Council of the EU, Javier Solana (1999-2009) and the EU Commissioners for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy), Chris Patten (1999-2004) and Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004-2009) concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, and the EU official documents (belonging to the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006) concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, including ESS, statements of the Council of the European Union, European Commission's communications and Founding Treaties of the European Union.

Role Performance: Role performance refers to the decisions and actions of a foreign and security policy actor (in my case, the EU). In the context of the thesis, the concept of role performance refers to actual foreign and security policy behaviour of the EU in a specific case of the MEPP in the post-9/11 international security context. The EU's role performance during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 has been investigated.

In the thesis, role theory was selected as a conceptual framework for analysis due to three main reasons. The first reason is the conceptual richness of role theory which enhances its explanatory and analytical utility in analysing foreign policy. Two key concepts associated with role theory (role conception and role performance) have helped explain and analyse the EU foreign and security policy in the thesis. As Aggestam previously argued, EU foreign and security policy role conceptions have provided a clearer view of the reasons for the EU's adoption of a particular orientation and approach in international relations. The EU's foreign and security policy role performance could provide a clearer picture of how effectively the EU has carried out its adopted foreign and security policy orientation and approach in international relations. Analysing the congruity between the EU's role

conception and role performance enables to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in a more precise way.

In addition to Aggestam, Naomi Bailin Wish also emphasized on the explanatory and analytical utility of role theory in analysing foreign policy. As Naomi Bailin Wish previously argued role conceptions provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behaviour, and longevity and stability of role conceptions are assets when trying to explain long-term patterns of foreign policy behaviour rather than single decisions. By relying on this argument, it can be said studying EU's role conceptions have the potential utility in explaining and possibly eventually predicting the general direction of foreign policy choices of the EU and long-term patterns of EU's foreign policy behaviour.

The second reason is that role theoretical analysis of foreign policy enables to transcend traditional explanation of foreign policy which facilitates to analyse and explain a non-traditional and unique foreign policy actor, the EU, whose foreign policy cannot be explained through traditional approaches in international relations theory, especially realism.

The third reason is that as Lisbeth Aggestam argued the inductive strategy, which was firstly used by Holsti and then adopted by other scholars studying role conceptions for the identification of role conceptions, has enabled to take careful account of political reality as it is experienced by the policy-makers, who construct it in a dynamic interaction between rules and reasons when compared to roles that are revealed from abstract theoretical discussions. For this reason, I selected role theoretical analysis which enables to take careful account of political reality in analysing the EU foreign policy when compared to deductive strategy used by academics for constructing 'ideal type' role concepts or conceptual frameworks for explaining and understanding the EU foreign policy. What this effectively means that inductive strategy used in role theoretical analysis has greater potential in reflecting political reality than deductive strategy used by academics for constructing role concepts.

2.2 Role Theory in Analyzing European Foreign Policy

The objective of this chapter is to locate my study in the literature on the analysis of European foreign policy and suggest potential contributions of my study to the existing literature.

2.2.1 European Foreign Policy Analysis

There are several conceptualizations of European foreign policy and accordingly different conceptual approaches to its analysis. Ole Elgström and Michael Smith identified this as ‘analytical heterogeneity’ and asserted that the reason behind this heterogeneity is the EU’s status of being an ‘unidentified international object’ with a rather mercurial existence and impact.⁶⁹ Studies concerning European foreign policy analysis are more about the EU’s actorness in global arena. There are various studies concerning European foreign policy. Some scholars such as Brian White⁷⁰ and Elke Krahnmann⁷¹ have a systemic and multilevel understanding of European foreign policy; they have identified European foreign policy as the aggregate of the foreign policy both of Member States and the EU and offered a multilevel and systemic analysis of it. Some scholars such as Karen Smith⁷² and Hazel Smith⁷³ took the EU as an actor which has a foreign policy of its own and offered a single level analysis of European foreign policy, that is the EU level. In these studies, the unit of analysis is the European Union Foreign Policy. Studies which analyze the EU as a foreign policy actor can be classified under two sets of studies: the first sets of studies are those which emphasized the state-like features of the EU and offered the analysis of the EU’s foreign policy just like a nation-state. Such studies can be identified as state-centric analysis of European foreign policy⁷⁴; the second sets of studies are those which emphasize distinctive and unique

⁶⁹ Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, “Introduction”, in Ole Elgstrom and Michael Smith (eds.) *The European Union’s Role in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 1.

⁷⁰ Please see Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Brian White, “The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis”, *European Journal of International Relations* (Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999); Brian White, “Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* (London: Sage, 2004).

⁷¹ Please see Elke Krahnmann, *Multilevel Networks in European Foreign Policy*, (England: Ashgate, 2003).

⁷² Please see Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World 2. Edition* (Polity Press: UK, 2008).

⁷³ Please see Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy, What it is and What it Does* (England: Pluto Press, 2002).

⁷⁴ Please see Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy, What it is and What it Does* (England: Pluto Press, 2002).

characteristics of the EU and offered alternative concepts for the analysis of the EU's foreign policy⁷⁵.

This thesis is located in the second set of studies which took the EU as an actor with a foreign policy of its own and highlight distinctive and unique characteristics of the EU and offered alternative concepts for the analysis of the EU's foreign policy. Brian White identified the studies in this tradition as 'the European Union-as-actor' approach which concentrates on the impact of Europe on world politics.⁷⁶ Roy H. Ginsberg and Michael E. Smith divided studies on EU foreign policy into two essential areas: the internal dimensions and external dimensions of EU foreign policy.⁷⁷ These studies focusing on external dimensions of EU foreign policy, which deal with the EU's impact on specific problems outside the EU itself, rather than the internal dimensions of the EU foreign policy which deal with institution building, policy-making and the influence of EU foreign policy on EU Member States, belong to studies examining external dimensions of EU foreign policy.

Brian White argues that scholars such as David Allen and Michael Smith, Gunnar Sjostedt, Bretherton and Vogler, François Duchéne and Ian Manners and Richard Whitman have moved beyond a state model to identify distinctive non-state but nevertheless collective entity, with the European Union providing the actor focus

⁷⁵ Please see David Allen and Michael Smith, "Western Europe's Presence: in the Contemporary International Arena", *Review of International Studies* (No. 16, 1990); David Allen and Michael Smith, "The European Union's Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator, or Manager?", in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community* (Boulder-Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 31, No.3, September 1993); Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, "Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU's Network of Relationship", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 21, No. 2, 1998); Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, "The 'Difference Engine': Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union", *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 10, No. 3, June 2003); François Duchéne, "Europe's Role in World Peace", in Richard Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972); François Duchéne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Independence", in Max Hohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.) *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Community* (London: Macmillan Press, 1973); Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002).

⁷⁶ White, *op.cit.*, "Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe", pp. 16-17.

⁷⁷ Roy H. Ginsberg and Michael E. Smith, "Understanding the European Union as a Global Political Actor: Theory, Practice, and Impact", in Sophie Meunier and Kathleen McNamara (eds.) *The State of the European Union, Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 268.

of analysis.⁷⁸ Ben Tonra put forward that these approaches had strove to deconstruct state-centric views of world politics by shifting analysis away from how state-like the EU's foreign policy is towards analysis of its presence, actorness.⁷⁹ These approaches are holistic approaches to analysis which focuses on singleness and unitariness of the EU. In these studies, the EUFP has been analysed at the EU level, so in these studies the EU is taken as the level of analysis. Accordingly, the object or the unit of analysis is the EUFP. In these, the main objective is to find out how the EU's role in global politics can be best conceptualized and characterized. In these studies, deductive strategy was used for identification and conceptualization of the EU's international role. In these studies, first of all, an 'ideal type' role concept or a conceptual category was constructed and then it was used to explain and understand the global role of the EU. The EU's role literature can be classified as: the EU as a presence, the EU as an actor, the EU as an international identity, the EU as a civilian power and the EU as a normative power. After presenting different conceptual approaches to European foreign policy analysis, the next section will discuss the application of role theory to European foreign policy analysis and describe potential contributions of the thesis to the existing literature.

2.2.2 Role Theory and European Foreign Policy Analysis

Lisbeth Aggestam⁸⁰ for the first time employed role theory in analysing European foreign policy. She employed role theory in order to analyse the foreign policies of the three largest Member States of the EU: Britain, France and Germany in the post-Cold War Europe. She carried out a comparative analysis of British, French and German conceptions of identity and role in order to find out the role the state performs as an agent of foreign policy action in Europe during the period between 1990 and 1999. On the basis of her comparative role analysis of British, French and German foreign policies, Aggestam found that during the 1990s as result of the process of Europeanization, the foreign policy role sets of Britain, France and

⁷⁸ White, op.cit., "Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe", p. 17.

⁷⁹ Ben Tonra, "Conceptualizing the European Union's Global Role", in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 124.

⁸⁰ Please see Lisbeth Aggestam, *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany*, Stockholm Studies in Politics 106, (Doctoral Dissertation, Stockholm University: Department of Political Science, 2004).

Germany has been transformed. Thus, she concluded that at the end of 1990s, policy-makers of the three largest Member States of the EU gradually converged on a common role conception of Europe as an ethical power. In her study, the main aim is to investigate the changing role of the state as the agent of foreign policy action; hence she took the state as an agent of foreign policy action in Europe rather than the EU itself.

Following Aggestam, Ole Elgstrom and Michael Smith in their study “The European Union’s Roles in International Politics” applied role theory to the analysis of European Foreign Policy. Unlike Aggestam’s study their analytical focus is the EU itself. Their study for the first time took the EU as an agent of foreign policy. They argued that the previous studies on the analysis of the EU foreign policy had not referred to the role theory as deployed in the foreign policy analysis literature as used in Holsti, Walker and Le Prestre’s studies.⁸¹ They put forward that role theory has the potential analytical utility in analysing the EU foreign policy. Their innovative study showed the utility of role theory as an analytical framework in the analysis of the EU foreign policy and paved the way for further studies.

Drawing upon Ole Elgstrom and Michael Smith’s argument, the thesis takes the EU foreign and security policy as the object of analysis and role theory as conceptual framework for analysing it. In the thesis, the analytical focus is the EU level and the EU is analysed as an actor which has a foreign and security policy of its own. What this effectively means that the thesis examines the EU as an actor which has a foreign and security policy more than the sum of the foreign and security policies of its Member States. For the purposes of the thesis, EU’s foreign and security policy refers to the official politico-security rhetoric (role conceptions) and actions and decisions (role performance) of the EU formulated and implemented by the authorized agents of the EU (The High Representative for the CFSP and the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) and directed towards the external environment of the EU with the purpose of promoting the domestic values and interests of the EU. In the thesis, as the analytical focus is the EU level discourse, the speeches of principal EU foreign and security policy officials, and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the

⁸¹ Elgström and Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 124., p. 5.

EU are analysed in order to identify role conceptions of the EU. Elgstrom and Smith, in their study have argued that there exists a gap between role conceptions and role performance in EU's foreign policy, and they called it as 'conception-performance gap'. In the thesis, the relationship between the EU's role conception and its actual role performance has been analysed and whether there is a 'conception-performance gap' in the EU's foreign and security policy regarding the MEPP in the post-9/11 era has been explored.

Since the thesis focuses on the EU's own definitions of its role as a foreign and security policy actor, main emphasis is on agency rather than structure or interaction. Drawing on this point, the thesis focuses on the intentional sources of roles, mainly on the self-defined role conceptions of the EU, rather than structural or interactional sources of roles. Walter Carlsnaes, in his article "Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going?" mentioned about four perspectives in foreign policy analysis: structural perspective; socio-institutional perspective; agency-based perspective and interpretative actor perspective. For him, interpretative actor perspective is based on the reconstruction of the reasoning of individual or group policy-makers.⁸² Carlsnaes argued that the interpretative actor perspective can be utilized for penetrating the teleological links between intentions and foreign policy actions.⁸³ The thesis, which focuses on the relationship between the roles the EU aspires to play and its actual foreign policy decisions and actions, belongs to the interpretative actor perspective among these four perspectives.

When compared to previous studies on the analysis of the EU foreign policy, the thesis is innovative in terms of its objective and methodology. Unlike previous studies, the aim of the thesis is not to construct an 'ideal type' role concept or a conceptual category and use it to explain and understand the international role of the EU, but to test congruity between the EU's self-defined role conceptions and its role performance. In the thesis, as a methodological strategy for the identification and conceptualization of the EU's international role, bottom-up perspective is preferred to a top-down perspective. The EU's role conceptions and categories are

⁸² Walter Carlsnaes, "Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going", *European Union Politics* (Vol: 5, No. 4, 2004), p. 505. Walter Carlsnaes "European Foreign Policy", in Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark Pollack and Ben J Rosamond (eds.) *Handbook of European Union Politics* (London: Sage, 2006), p. 556.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 506.

inductively constructed in terms of how the EU's roles are defined in the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy officials concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU. What this effectively means is that role concepts, which are identified as appropriate for the EU to perform in international politics, are defined by the EU.

Studying the congruity between the EU's role conceptions and its actual role performance would contribute to the literature on the analysis of the EU foreign policy by diverting the attention from how to best characterize the EU's role in international politics to assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor.

2.3 Research Design and Methodology

In addition to Stephen Walker's assertion that role theory has served more as a conceptual framework within which scholars from various disciplines have conducted research using range of methodologies, Bruce Biddle identified role theory as methodologically neutral and he further argued that role concepts have been studied with nearly all of the methodological tools used by social scientists.⁸⁴ In the thesis, qualitative content analysis and case study method has been utilized as methodological tools.

Content analysis is a method which enables researchers to examine human behaviour in an indirect way, through an analysis of their communications. In content analysis, usually, but not necessarily, written contents of a communication is analyzed. The contents of virtually any type of communication can be analyzed, including essays, newspapers, magazine articles, political speeches, etc.⁸⁵ In the thesis, content analysis is used as a methodological tool to identify the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions defined in the post-9/11 era. Content analytic method is appropriate for the identification of role conceptions because as Carl W. Backman, by referring Holsti's study, argued inductive approach through content analysis provided a much richer classification of roles.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Biddle, "Role Theory: Expectations, Identities and Behaviours", *op.cit.*, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen, *How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education 6. Edition* (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2006), p. 483.

⁸⁶ Backman, *op.cit.*, p. 311.

There are six main stages in content analysis: determining objectives of the content analysis, defining the population, determining the sample (developing a sampling plan), specifying the unit of analysis, formulating coding categories and interpreting content analysis data.

Accordingly, in the first stage of the research, the objective of the content analysis was determined. Determining the objective is crucial for energy and time saving, because by determining specific objectives we want to accomplish, we can confine our analysis to a certain aspect of communication rather than examining all its aspects.⁸⁷ The objective of the content analysis in the thesis is to find out which role(s) does/do the EU define for itself as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era? In other words, the objective is to identify the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions, the roles that the EU aspires to play as a foreign and security actor, in the post-9/11 era.

In the second stage of the research, the population for the study was defined. The population is the set of units to which the researcher wishes to generalize.⁸⁸ For content analysis, the population, which is often a set of messages, serve the basis for any sampling.⁸⁹ In the thesis, the population, from which the sample was withdrawn, was defined as the speeches of principal EU foreign and security policy officials and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU referring to the EU's general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions, duties and orientations as a foreign and security policy actor and belonging to the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006.

In the third stage of the research, the sample, which would be used in the analysis, was determined. Determining sample is the process of selecting a subset of units for research from the larger population.⁹⁰ By using the method of purposive sampling⁹¹, the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy

⁸⁷ Nuri Bilgin, *Sosyal Bilimlerde İçerik Analizi: Teknikler ve Örnek Çalışmalar* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006), p. 11.

⁸⁸ Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (USA: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 74.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Purposive sampling is a deliberative and non-random sample selection method. In purposive sampling, researcher selects a sample with a purpose in his/her mind. In accordance with this purpose, he/she attempts to obtain a sample, which he/she thinks would help achieve his/her research objectives.

officials including the office holder of the High Representative for the CFSP of the EU/Secretary General of the Council of the EU Javier Solana (1999-2009); the office holders of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Chris Patten (1999-2004) and Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004-2009) referring to range of foreign and security policy issues rather than speeches referring to specific foreign and security policy issues during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 were sampled. In addition to principal EU foreign policy officials' speeches, the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, including ESS, statements of the Council of the European Union, European Commission's communications and Founding Treaties of the European Union were sampled.

In the thesis, the content of general foreign policy speeches delivered by the principal EU foreign policy officials, Javier Solana, Chris Patten and Benita Ferrero-Waldner referring to the EU's general roles as a foreign and security actor in global context rather than speeches referring to its role in specific issues during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 was reviewed. The speeches examined were limited to pronouncements of these three principal EU foreign policy officials, because they are principal officials in the formation, preparation and the implementation of the EU's foreign and security policy, for the reason that it could be confidently assumed that their speeches tend to reflect general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions, duties and orientations of the EU in foreign and security policy. To say it in another way, it was assumed that their speeches would represent the institutional self-conception and self-definition of the EU's general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions, duties and orientations as a foreign and security policy actor. As argued by Henrik Larsen, in his article "The EU: A Global Military Actor", the discourse of the high representative, Javier Solana, was assumed to represent the language of the Council context, because he has acted within the Council sphere as he legally has acted by the delegation of the Council.⁹² In a similar way, it can be assumed that the discourse of

⁹² Henrik Larsen in his article analysed the dominant EU discourse concerning the EU's international actorness in the year 2000. Particularly, he tried to find out whether the EU articulated itself as a civilian power, and whether its geographical focus was global or regional by using constructivist discourse analysis. In his study, the analytical focus was the discursive construction at the EU level. In other words, he set out to analyze EU level discourse. For that reason, he selected EU Council documents and the speeches of High Representative for the CFSP of the EU, Javier Solana, as sample

the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy represents the language of the Commission context, because he/she has acted within the Commission sphere as he/she legally has acted by the delegation of the Commission. The speeches were obtained mostly from the official homepage of Javier Solana, official webpage of the European Commission and other internet sources.

Furthermore, the selected sample was confined to general foreign policy speeches setting out broad outlines of the EU's foreign and security policy and embraced a variety of issues, rather than speeches referring to the EU's role in a specific geographical region like the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa, or specific issues like the conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa. Moreover, the sample is confined to speeches referring to the EU's foreign and security policy roles in a global context rather than referring to EU's role in global political economy like the EU's role as a model of regional integration and its role as promoter of inter-regionalism.

The EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU were also sampled in order to complement the principal EU foreign policy officials' speeches. Since the EU's foreign and security policy has an intergovernmental character, the general purpose and orientation of the EU's foreign and security policy is determined by the EU Member States by consensus. On foreign and security policy issues, the European Council composed of heads of state and government of EU Member States defines the general policy guidelines for the EU's foreign and security policy and GAERC composed of foreign ministers of the EU Member States take the necessary decisions for defining and implementing the EU's foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council. Because of this, in the EU context in order to identify role conceptions for the EU in the area of foreign and security policy, the content of the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy was analysed in addition to speeches of the principal EU foreign policy officials.

I selected the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU, such as ESS, statements of the Council of the European Union, European

for discourse analysis. (Henrik Larsen, "The EU: A Global Military Actor?", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* (Vol. 37, No. 3, 2002)).

Commission's communications and Founding Treaties of the European Union for identifying role conceptions, because although these documents are prepared by the EU foreign policy officials, they are adopted by the EU leaders on the basis of consensus, therefore it could be confidently assumed that their contents tend to reflect the role conceptions for the EU shared by all EU Member States. To say it in another way, it was assumed that these documents would represent the EU Member States' collective or shared conception and definition of the EU's general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions, duties and orientations as a foreign and security policy actor. It was assumed that the EU official documents represented common language and understanding in the EU context. Just like the speeches, the selected sample of official documents were limited to general foreign policy documents setting out broad outlines of the EU's foreign and security policy and embraced a variety of issues, rather than documents referring to the EU's role in a specific geographical regions or issues.

In the fourth stage of the research, the unit of analysis was specified. In content analysis, a unit is an identifiable message or message component, which serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a sample; on which variables are measured; or which serves as the basis for reporting analysis.⁹³ Units can be words, characters, themes, interactions, or any other result of "breaking up a 'communication' into pieces".⁹⁴ In the thesis, words, phrases and sentences referring to the EU's general foreign and security policy roles were specified as unit of analysis.

In the fifth stage of the research, coding categories were formulated. In content analysis, there are two means of categorization. The first one is coding data by using predetermined categories. The second one is coding data by using categories that emerge as data is reviewed.⁹⁵ In this research, the latter was employed. Since the objective of this research is to identify the EU's self-identified roles, by relying on Kalevi Jacques Holsti and Lisbeth Aggestam's methodology⁹⁶, rather than coding data into predetermined categories, I preferred to develop

⁹³ Neuendorf, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

⁹⁴ Neuendorf, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

⁹⁵ Fraenkel and Wallen, *op.cit.*, p. 507.

⁹⁶ Please see Holsti, *op.cit.* and Aggestam, *op.cit.*, "A European Foreign Policy?".

categories based on the data and then code the data through a preliminary reading of the speeches and official documents. This preliminary reading was carried out by reading speeches and official documents and noting role statements expressed in the speeches and official documents with reference to the EU's general long-term responsibilities, obligations, functions, duties and orientations as a foreign and security policy actor. In this preliminary reading, I sought to single out statements which contained themes giving evidence of the presence of role conceptions. As a result of this preliminary role analysis carried out in the initial stages of research, a basic typology of role conceptions around which analysis revolved emerged. This typology was then refined as the research process progressed, but its basic structure did not fundamentally change. As seen from table 1, for some role conceptions, several alternative role statements were determined and as the research process progressed they were refined and reduced to one role conception. These basic roles constitute the coding categories used in the analysis.

Table 1.

Basic Typology of EU's Role Conceptions in the Post-9/11 Era Emerged from Preliminary Role Analysis

1. Force for Good
2. Force for International Peace, Security and Stability, Net Exporter of Stability, Enabler for Peace Security and Stability
3. Developer, Provider of Development Aid, Key Donor
4. Promoter of its values and norms, Promoter of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance
5. Promoter of Effective Multilateralism
6. Partner for the UN, Supporter for the UN
7. Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors, Global Ally

In the sixth stage of the research, content analysis data was interpreted. In content analysis, common mean of interpreting content analysis data is frequency analysis, which is carried out by counting the incidences of certain words, phrases, symbols, or other manifest content and measuring the percentage and/or proportion of particular incidences of them to total incidences in the selected sample.⁹⁷ However, this research does not aim to measure the frequency of the role statements

⁹⁷ Fraenkel and Wallen, *op.cit.*, p. 491.

in the speeches and official documents. The objective of this research is to identify the EU's foreign and security policy role conceptions defined in the post-9/11 era, therefore, frequency analysis of the role statements including counting words or phrases referring to role statements and measuring the percentage of their incidences to total incidences was left out of this research. Rather than focusing on quantitative, proportional or percentage analysis of data, this research focused on qualitative analysis of data.

As a result of the qualitative content analysis of data, seven role conceptions were identified: 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its values and norms', 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors'. At this stage, sixty speeches and official documents which included words, phrases and sentences referring to one or more of the above outlined roles were selected and coded by me. In this analysis, either manifest or latent content of the speeches and official documents were coded.

Manifest content of a communication refers to the obvious, surface content – the words, pictures, images, and so on that are easily discerned by the naked eye or ear. No inferences as to underlying meaning are necessary.⁹⁸ In my analysis, direct references in speeches and official documents to the words (coding units), like 'force for good' or 'the provider of development aid', constitute clear examples for coding the manifest content of a communication, which are directly detectable by the naked eye without need to refer to the meaning underlying what is said or written.

Latent content of a communication refers to the meaning underlying what is said and shown.⁹⁹ In my analysis, latent content of the speeches and official documents were also coded. The words, phrases and sentences inferring the EU's role conceptions rather than obviously referring to them were examined. For instance, in one of the speeches, the sentence "we have the declared ambition to contribute to peace and stability worldwide through the complementary deployment of a wide array of instruments (trade; aid; technical assistance; police training, etc)

⁹⁸ Fraenkel and Wallen, *op.cit.*, p. 488.

⁹⁹ Fraenkel and Wallen, *op.cit.*, p. 489.

including, where appropriate, military assets”¹⁰⁰ infers the EU’s role conception as ‘force for international peace, security and stability’. In another speech, “our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions. (...) This is where I come to the title of today’s conference, our contribution to the “quest for a multilateral world”. However, for a multilateral system to work, multilateral institutions must function properly and must be up to the challenges of the 21st century. So our quest should not only be for a multilateral world, but for effective multilateral institutions to govern it”¹⁰¹ infers the EU’s role conception as ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’.

While method of coding manifest content provides the researcher an advantage of ease of the coding and reliability – another researcher is likely to arrive at the same conclusions (coding manifest content provides high intercoder reliability¹⁰² scores), method of coding latent content provides the researcher an advantage of getting at the underlying meaning of what is written or said, but carries the risk of having lower reliability scores – another researcher is probably to arrive at different conclusions (the problem of external coder or intercoder reliability).¹⁰³ In order to deal with reliability problem, I utilized both methods and tried to keep the method of coding latent content to a minimum as possible as I could.

Since speeches and official documents were selected in accordance with their availability and evidence of presence of role conceptions, it was very difficult for me to keep the balance between speeches and official documents, and between speeches of three principal EU foreign and security policy officials. As the speeches and official documents containing themes indicating role conceptions were selected and those lacking role conceptions were discarded, there existed an unbalanced selection among speeches and official documents, and speeches of three principal EU

¹⁰⁰ Javier Solana, 24 July 2002, Rome.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁰¹ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, 4 July 2005, China Institute of International Studies, Brussels.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_414.htm

¹⁰² Intercoder reliability means the amount of agreement or correspondence among two or more coders. (Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (USA: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 71.

¹⁰³ Fraenkel and Wallen, *op.cit.*, pp. 489-490.

foreign and security policy officials, which did not result in a decrease in the validity and reliability of content analysis.

After identifying role conceptions, the congruity between EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance was tested by using case study method. In order to test the congruity between EU's role conceptions and its role performance; the MEPP was selected as a specific case study. In order to analyse the congruity between EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance, I focused on the EU's role performance in the MEPP during the same period in which role conceptions were defined; the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006.

The MEPP was selected as a specific case study, because the Middle East is a prominent region for both the EU and its Member States. The Middle East, specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent peace process has been a foreign policy priority for the EU since it was first able to act as a (more or less) coherent international actor with the introduction of EPC.¹⁰⁴ In the ESS, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is identified as the strategic priority of Europe and it is stated that the EU must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. It is identified by the EU officials as 'mother of all conflicts in the Middle East'.¹⁰⁵ It is considered as a single strategic threat to Middle Eastern security, with which the solution of other conflicts is bound up.¹⁰⁶ There are three main reasons for this.

The first one is the geographical proximity of the region to Europe; any social and political instability or insecurity like the rise of radical Islamism and terrorism in the Middle East would adversely affect the EU's internal social and political stability and security due to spill over effect. In terms of internal social and political stability, the presence of important Jewish and Muslim minorities in some of European states results in European concerns about disastrous impact of hardening of

¹⁰⁴ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.167.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

the Arab-Israeli conflict on internal social cohesion.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, uncontrolled migration flow from the region is perceived by Europeans as a challenge to their security and stability. Particularly in the post-Cold War era, EU policy makers started to consider stability in the Middle East as an integral part of ‘security in Europe’.¹⁰⁸ This is confirmed by the EU officials that security in Europe is directly related with security in the Middle East.¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, they have sought to create cooperative schemes with the Mediterranean-rim countries of the Middle East to encourage and support economic development and growth with the expectation to help reduce refugee flows from the Middle East to Europe and prevent regional conflicts like Arab-Israeli Conflict being exported to the EU.¹¹⁰

The second reason is related with energy security. European states are largely dependent on Middle Eastern oil and natural gas. European states wanted to ensure sustained flow of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices.¹¹¹

The third reason is that some of EU Member States, Britain and France have a special relationship with the region because of their status of being former colonial powers in the region. Due to these reasons, preservation of the security, stability and peace in the Middle East is very crucial for the EU Member States and the EU. That is why they have sought to actively involve and play an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the MEPP since early 1970s.

The EU has managed to actively involve in the MEPP in the 1990s and its involvement has increased in the post-9/11 era. The EU is one of the members of the Quartet on the Middle East, which was designed for mediating the peace process and composed of the EU, the US, the UN and Russia. In addition to that, the EU has continued to be the largest donor of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority and the

¹⁰⁷ Dorothee Schmid, et.al., “Mapping European and American Economic Initiatives towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and their Effects on Honest Broker Perceptions”, *EuroMesco Papers* (No. 61, October 2006), p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Pinar Bilgin, “A Return to ‘Civilizational Geopolitics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era”, *Geopolitics* (Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2004), p. 274.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009 and interview with Gwenda Jeffreys-Jones, Desk Officer for the MEPP, Directorate-General External Relations, European Commission, 27 October 2009.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

¹¹¹ Pinar Bilgin, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 140.

MEPP. The EU supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. The EU supported the Palestinian reform process in areas of the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, the security sector reform, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free and fair elections, developing a modern education system and media based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding, the promotion of pro-peace civil society.

The EU also increased its role in the security dimension of the MEPP with the launch of two ESDP operations: EUPOLCOPPS and EU BAM Rafah. In the post-9/11 era, the EU remained to be committed to a negotiated settlement resulting in two states, Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 1967 borders and in the framework of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, basing on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1515, the terms of reference of Madrid Conference of 2002 and the principle of 'land for peace'. Thus, it can be observed that the EU actively involved in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era. Due to this fact, I select this issue as a specific case study in order to test congruity between the EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance.

Although I focus on the EU's role performance in the post-9/11 era, I also investigate the EU's involvement in the MEPP from the 1970s up to 1990s as an historical overview in order to better understand and analyze the EU's role performance in the Middle East Process in the post-9/11 era. This historical overview is worth analyzing and evaluating, since it will help better understand and analyze the EU's role performance in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era as well as to uncover the change and continuity in the EU's policy.

Due to practical difficulties of analysing a much longer period within the confines of a PhD thesis, I put a time limit of 5 years on my analysis, the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006. This period was selected as the focus of analysis due to several reasons. First of all, during this period, particularly since 9/11, the US policy towards the MEPP changed and the US decided to adopt a multilateral approach to the peace process, with cooperation with

European governments.¹¹² As a result, the Quartet on the Middle East, which provided multilateral framework for the EU's participation in the political and diplomatic dimension of the MEPP, was established. The EU has played an active role in the political and diplomatic dimension of the peace process. Furthermore, during this period the EU started to play a prominent role in the security dimension of the peace process through its ESDP operations. During this period, we observed an increase in international recognition of the EU as a significant player in the political, diplomatic, security dimension of the Middle East conflict. Secondly, during this period, we observed a revival of peace process which was blocked since the second half of 1990s.

Despite continuing mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians especially, since the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, with the launch of the Road Map by the Quartet in April 2003, blocked road to the peace in the Middle East opened. Despite the international community's efforts, at the end of 2005, which constituted the deadline set by the Road Map for the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the Road Map stuck in gridlock. The Israeli unilateral actions including construction of Security Fence and Disengagement Plan and continuing mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians decreased the prospect of the successful implementation of the Road Map and led it into a dead end. Moreover, in 2006, significant events, which had decisive effects on the MEPP, had taken place. First one was Hamas's sweeping victory in the Palestinian legislative election of 2006, and the Quartet's decision to boycott the Hamas-led Palestinian Government when it refused to meet and implement the three principles put forward by the Quartet on the Middle East including non-violence comprising the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. The EU also decided to impose sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government and suspend its direct aid. Due to the escalation of violence in the region, the EU's two ESDP operations in the Palestinian Territories have been temporarily suspended. Second one was Israel-Lebanon War of 2006 and subsequent huge military contribution of EU Member States to the expanded UNIFIL by providing the

¹¹² Costanza Musu, "The EU and the MEPP: A Balance", *Studia Diplomatica* (Vol. IX, No. 1, 2007), p. 21.

backbone of the force, which enabled the EU Member States' significant military presence in the region. All-in-all, this 5-year period, in which we observe a revival and then gridlock in the peace process as well as an increase in the EU's presence, involvement and role in the political, diplomatic, security dimension of the Middle East conflict, was considered as the appropriate period of time in order to test the congruity between EU's role conceptions and its role performance.

CHAPTER 3

THE EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN THE POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The objective of this chapter is to identify the roles that the EU aspires to play as a foreign and security actor in the post-9/11 era. It was carried out by analyzing the content of the general foreign policy speeches delivered by the principal EU foreign policy officials and the EU official documents. The empirical study of roles in this chapter was conducted inductively in terms of how the EU's roles are defined in the speeches delivered by three principal EU foreign and security policy officials and the EU official documents. As a result of content analysis, seven role conceptions were identified: 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its values and norms', 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors'. These seven role conceptions provide an outline of main roles at work within the EU's role set in the post-9/11 era (Table 2).

Table 2.

EU's Role Set in the Post-9/11 Era

1. Force for Good
2. Force for International Peace, Security and Stability
3. The Provider of Development Aid
4. Promoter of its values and norms
5. Promoter of Effective Multilateralism
6. Partner for the UN
7. Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors

3.1 Force for Good

This role conception implies the EU's responsibility and duty to make the world a better place for everybody by making the world freer, more peaceful, fairer, more prosperous, more secure and more stable.

This role conception refers to universal ethics which is the 'global common good'.¹¹³ The High Representative for the CFSP of the EU, Javier Solana in one of his speeches noted that the EU's global role should be to work for the global common good. He pointed out that

The EU has a responsibility to work for the "global common good". That is a fitting way of describing the EU's global role and ambition.¹¹⁴

This role conception points to the belief that the foreign policy objectives of the EU are based on the universal promotion of peace, security, stability, democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance, and multilateralism besides the protection of the EU's citizens and self-interests. Javier Solana emphasized the ambition of the EU to act as a force for good in his speeches. He stated that

The idealism behind the EU's foundation is vital to defining who and what we are today. And it helps to appreciate the value of the European Union as a force for good in the world. We have carefully built a zone of peace, democracy and the rule of law of more than 500 million people. Now we have to extend that zone further. And to answer the call for Europe to act. To promote peace and protect the vulnerable. That is the aim of the CFSP. It is also my personal mission. It may be hard for some to imagine that in Asia, Africa and Latin America, people speak with great admiration of the European experience.¹¹⁵

This role conception holds that the EU's foreign and security policy should not be understood as altruistic and other-serving or other-regarding. The EU's foreign and security as a force for good is not based on altruism and moral absolutism in terms of self-sacrifice at all times, nor is it devoid of interests. Material interests and ethical considerations tend to be interlinked. So, it should be recognized that the EU, like any other international actor, has mixed motives.¹¹⁶ The motives behind the EU foreign and security policy are both other-serving (other-regarding) and self-serving (self-regarding) and self-interested. The EU, as a force for good, acts

¹¹³ Lisbeth Aggestam, "Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?", *International Affairs* (Vol. 84, No.1, 2008), p. 6.

¹¹⁴ Javier Solana, "Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy", 24 January 2005, Brussels.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹¹⁵ Javier Solana, 23 November 2005, The Hague.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹¹⁶ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

for the well-being of both its citizens and others. The EU as a force for good is expected to defend both its citizens and others rather than to defend against others. According to this role conception, while pursuing European interests more cohesively, the EU is also contributing to a better world by strengthening justice (human rights) and order (effective multilateralism). Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués argued that in order to be a force for good, there is need for balance and equilibrium between material interests and ethical considerations. There is a need for ethically balanced policy. For them, in order to be a ‘force for good’, the EU needs to balance member and non-member concerns and satisfy the preferences of all actors involved.¹¹⁷ The preference equilibrium would result in collective welfare.¹¹⁸ Javier Solana in his speeches underlined the EU’s need to develop ethically balanced policy, in which equilibrium exists between material interests and ethical considerations, as a force for good. He stated that “The rationale is double: to advance our interests and protect our citizens. But also, and I insist, to have Europe act as a force for good in the world”.¹¹⁹

In the article 2.5 of the Draft Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the EU’s need to develop ethically balanced policy was emphasized. It was noted that

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.¹²⁰

The EU as a force for good is expected to use its force for the good of the community of peoples as a whole, namely, in the universal pursuit of peace,

¹¹⁷ Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’: the European Neighbourhood Policy”, *International Affairs* (Vol. 84, No.1, 2008), p. 85.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Javier Solana, “Europe’s International Role”, 9 November 2005, Bratislava.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹²⁰ Article 2.5 of the Draft Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

prosperity, democracy and human rights.¹²¹ This role conception puts emphasis on duties and responsibilities to others. According to the article 2.1 of the Draft Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the EU's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples".¹²²

The EU as a force for good should work on the basis of the interests of the community of peoples as a whole rather than solely those of its own interests. According to Lisbeth Aggestam, the EU's role as a force for good represents a conceptual shift in the EU's role and aspirations from what it is to what it does; from simply representing a power of attraction and a positive role model to proactively working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the global common good.¹²³ The vision of global common good refers to the EU's duties and responsibilities to make the world a better place for the whole community of peoples including both the Europeans and non-Europeans by making the world freer, more peaceful, fairer, more prosperous, more secure and more stable. This vision is reflected in the EU's universal promotion of peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and multilateralism.

3.2 Force for International Peace, Security and Stability

This role conception first of all refers to the EU's status of being a zone or pole of stability, security and peace in the world. Javier Solana emphasized the EU's status of being a pole of stability, security and peace in his speeches. He pointed out that

In this new geo-political landscape the European Union is an attractive pole of stability, democracy and prosperity. We have maximized our status as a "net exporter of stability" by acknowledging legitimate aspirations to join our Union; while emphasizing that this is dependent on a commitment to our common values.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹²² Article 2.1 of the Draft Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

¹²³ Aggestam, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

¹²⁴ Javier Solana, "Europe's Place in the World", 23 May 2002, Copenhagen.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

This role conception emphasizes the necessity of exporting the EU's stability, security and peace to both the EU's neighborhood and wider world by using the EU's various foreign policy instruments including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development instruments. Javier Solana in one of his speeches stated that the EU has the declared ambition to contribute to peace and stability worldwide through the complementary deployment of a wide array of instruments (trade; aid; technical assistance; police training, etc) including, where appropriate, military assets.¹²⁵

The scope of the EU's promotion of stability, security and peace is not limited to only EU's near abroad rather it has a global scope. This role conception is expressed in statements of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, she argued that the EU has the obligation to export peace, stability and prosperity which Europeans enjoyed in the EU to its Eastern and Southern neighbours, because otherwise the EU in the long run import instability from its neighbourhood.¹²⁶ Thus, she asserted that exporting stability, security and peace the EU has enjoyed to its neighbours is the enlightened self-interest of the EU.¹²⁷ This means that while the EU is acting to further the interests of others, ultimately it serves its own self-interest. It is based on the belief that "do well by doing good".

It is also emphasized in the ESS that it is in the EU's interest that countries on the EU's borders are well-governed and due to this fact the EU should extend its benefits of economic and political cooperation to the EU's neighbours in the East and tackling political problems there by using full-spectrum of instruments. In the ESS, the EU's promotion of security, stability and peace is identified as some form of self-defence. It is stated that with the new threats in the post-Cold War era, the first line of defence will often be abroad that is beyond the EU's borders. The EU's promotion

¹²⁵ Javier Solana, 24 July 2002, Rome.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹²⁶ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Quo Vadis Europa?", 14 December 2005, Strasbourg. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/797&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Managing Globalization – the Case for a European Foreign Policy", 10 February 2006, London. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/75&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

of security, stability and peace is seen as self-serving. The EU's promotion of security, stability and peace refers to a positive-sum and win-win situation in which both the EU and its neighborhood mutually enjoys peace, security and stability with the EU's promotion of security, stability and peace. This argument is based on the idea that the world is interdependent and the EU should deal with the situations which in the future may adversely affect the EU's security and stability. According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, enlargement and ENP are two key tools for promoting the security, stability and peace the EU has enjoyed beyond the EU's borders.

Enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful and effective foreign policy tools for promoting peace, security and stability within Europe. Enlargement is a process which helps the democratic and economic transformation of the candidate countries by encouraging extensive political and economic reforms in candidate and potential candidate countries. The EU with enlargement has successfully used its membership conditionality to export its economic and political models to first Southern Europe in 1980s and then to Central and Eastern Europe in 1990s. The carrot of the EU membership helped to transform Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe into modern, stable, prosperous, well-functioning democracies. So, through enlargement the EU by using its transformative power have extended peace, security and stability in Europe. Javier Solana emphasized the importance of enlargement as a policy tool for promoting peace, security and stability within Europe in his speeches. He noted that

We want to make Europe safer, more stable. The European Union's fundamental policy of inclusiveness has made enlargement inevitable: it has brought peace and prosperity to all countries who have become its members, and has brought stability to the region.¹²⁸

Javier Solana in his another speech identified the enlargement as vital for promoting peace, security and stability as well. He pointed out that

Enlargement is essential for stability. This is not only a historical or even "moral" duty. It is also a process fundamental for stability and security in Europe. Membership of the Union, beyond reforms and economic development, means stability for the countries concerned. The prospect of accession has contributed decisively to stabilising central and eastern

¹²⁸ Javier Solana, 25 March 2002, Bruges.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

Europe, which is the primary objective of our policy. Through enlargement the Union creates stability around it by using its force of attraction.¹²⁹

The ENP is a key instrument for the promotion of security, stability and peace in the EU's eastern and southern neighbours including Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, North Africa and the Middle East. The ENP, which is the EU's newest foreign policy tool, has the objective of sharing the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation. The ENP is designed to prevent the emergence of a sense of exclusion on the part of the neighbours of the enlarged EU and to prevent enlargement to act as a divisive and destabilizing factor in the enlarged EU's neighbourhood, so it is an inclusionary process which aims to enable the EU's neighbours to utilize some benefits of EU membership without being a full member. It is a policy for encouraging stability, security and prosperity beyond the borders of the EU through regional integration.¹³⁰ The ENP aims to improve security at the borders of the enlarged EU and to promote stability and prosperity beyond.¹³¹

The ENP is not about enlargement, thus, does not offer prospect of membership. With ENP, the EU offers its neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values including the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and market economy principles and sustainable development. The ENP offers a deeper political relationship and economic integration. The level of ambition and pace of development of the relationship between the EU and each partner country will depend on the extent to which these values are effectively shared. In return for commitment to shared values,

¹²⁹ Javier Solana, 'The CFSP in an Enlarged Union', 1 March 2001, Paris. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=246&BID=107&DocID=65840&insite=1

¹³⁰ Sevilyay Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions* (Vol. 10, Winter 2005), p. 2.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

the EU offered each partner country increased market access and functional cooperation in a wide range of areas.¹³²

In the ENP, the emphasis is on creating a secure and stable neighbourhood rather supporting the transition.¹³³ The ENP is based on the logic of stabilization, which is related with the need for secured and properly managed external EU borders.¹³⁴ The main aim of the ENP is to stabilize the neighbourhood of the enlarged EU. With the ENP, the EU has adopted a stabilization approach based on region-building, progressive economic integration and closer political cooperation, while excluding the prospect of membership.¹³⁵ In the East where the enlarged EU shares a land border with the new neighbours, the EU is faced with many soft security challenges such as illegal trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, so it needs to manage its external borders.¹³⁶ The EU Member States recognized that they cannot fence off instability behind ever tighter borders and this forced them to make a choice: whether to export stability and security to its near neighbours, or risk importing instability from them.¹³⁷ The security interdependence with its neighbours and task of extending zone of security, stability and prosperity across Europe is the main driving force behind the launch of the ENP.¹³⁸ William Wallace emphasized the EU's security interdependence with its neighbors and put forward that the EU's strongest self-interest lies in investing in stability and cooperation around its borders, since the costs of defending the EU from its unstable neighborhood would be much higher than those of promoting prosperity and security beyond its borders.¹³⁹

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³⁷ Marise Cremona, "The Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", *CDDLRL Working Papers* (No. 25, 2 November 2004), p. 3.

¹³⁸ Kahraman, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

¹³⁹ William Wallace, "Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", *Notre Europe Policy Papers* (No. 4, July 2003), p. 19.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy emphasized that the ENP serves the enlightened self-interest of the EU. She noted that

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is founded on the premise that by helping our neighbours we help ourselves. It provides us with a new framework and new tools for promoting good government and economic development in the EU's neighbourhood. And it utilises the valuable experience we have already gained of assisting countries in transition ... ENP is a win-win policy, based on mutual interest and shared values. We share our neighbours' desire to press forward with reform and become more prosperous and stable. We want to increase our security, prosperity and stability, and theirs. And we want to tackle our citizens' most pressing concerns – security, migration and economic prosperity.¹⁴⁰

Benita Ferrero-Waldner in her Guest Editorial published in *European Foreign Affairs Review* stated that “ENP will help make the European Union and its neighbourhood an area of peace, security and stability. And in so doing will bring a brighter future for both our citizens and those of our neighbours”.¹⁴¹

In addition to the EU's soft power instruments (enlargement and ENP) for promoting peace, security and stability, Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, emphasizes the importance of ESDP civilian and military crisis management operations carried out in different parts of the world such as Africa, the South Caucasus, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Asia. These operations have demonstrated the EU's commitment to the promotion and protection of global peace, security and stability. Javier Solana emphasized the importance of the ESDP as a policy tool for promoting peace, security and stability within Europe in one of his speeches as follows. He noted that

Let me be clear: what we are doing is not about replacing NATO. Nor is it about militarizing the Union. It is about effective crisis management. About

¹⁴⁰ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: helping ourselves through helping our neighbours’, 31 October 2005, London. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/658&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

¹⁴¹ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006).

increasing the role of the European Union as a promoter of stability and security.¹⁴²

In another speech, Solana pointed out that through ESDP operations the EU has been able to act as a key enabler for peace and stability in the world:

Last year, the European Union conducted 10 operations with around 10 000 men and women serving in them. The global reach and the scope of these different operations is striking. Across three continents, they cover the spectrum from 'pure' military operations - through security-sector reform and institution building - to police and rule-of-law missions. And their impact is significant. From Aceh to Rafah, and from Kinshasa to Sarajevo, the EU is providing the key enablers for peace and stability.¹⁴³

As it can be seen, the EU became a capable foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era, which can mobilize both civilian and military instruments for promoting peace, security and stability.

3.3 The Provider of Development Aid

This role conception refers to the EU's development cooperation which has the aim of eradicating poverty in the context of sustainable development including the pursuit of the UN Millennium Development Goals¹⁴⁴. This role conception emphasizes the EU's commitment to the UN Millennium Development Goals. This role conception emphasizes the EU's commitment to meet its responsibility as a union of developed countries to help developing countries in their fight to eliminate extreme poverty, hunger, malnutrition and pandemics such as AIDS; in achieving universal primary education; in promoting gender equality and empowering women; in reducing mortality rate of children; in improving maternal health; in achieving

¹⁴² Javier Solana, "Europe's International Role", 9 November 2005, Bratislava.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁴³ Javier Solana, 29 January 2007, Berlin.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁴⁴ The UN Millennium Development Goals set out in the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted by 189 UN members during the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. The UN Millennium Development Goals are eight goals to be achieved by the year 2015 which include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; developing global partnership for development.

sustainable development which includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects.

In the Joint Statement by the Council and Representative of Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, titled as ‘The European Consensus on Development’, the central importance of the EU’s development policy in the EU’s external relations was emphasised as follows:

Never before have poverty eradication and sustainable development been more important. The context within which poverty eradication is pursued is an increasingly globalised and interdependent world; this situation has created new opportunities but also new challenges. Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries. In such a world, we would not allow 1,200 children to die of poverty every hour, or stand by while 1 billion people are struggling to survive on less than one dollar a day and HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria claim the lives of more than 6 million people every year. Development policy is at the heart of the EU's relations with all developing countries.¹⁴⁵

This role conception put emphasis on the EU’s standing of being the world’s greatest donor of financial aid. The EU and its Member States spend an estimated €47 billion in 2006 in public aid to developing countries, of which about €7.5 billion is channeled through the EU.¹⁴⁶ Javier Solana in his speeches emphasized the EU’s status of being the world’s largest donor of financial aid:

The Union and its Member States together represent more than half of all financial aid to developing countries. This aid takes a variety of forms: grants, loans, technical and humanitarian assistance. It has sometimes to be recalled that even the financial assistance paid out by international institutions like the IMF or the World Bank is to a very large extent European money.

The US is the largest single member country in these institutions, but the EU is the largest payer. This does not mean that we could not be more generous. We certainly should be more generous, and the EU has subscribed

¹⁴⁵ Council of the European Union, “The European Consensus on Development”, *Joint Statement by the Council and Representative of Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission*, 22 November 2005, Brussels, p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ http://europa.eu/pol/dev/overview_en.htm.

to the commitment of the Monterrey Conference last March to make finally significant steps towards increasing development assistance.¹⁴⁷

In addition to Solana, Benita Ferrero-Waldner also referred to the EU's status of being the world's largest donor of financial aid:

Our soft power promotes stability, prosperity, democracy and human rights, delivering concrete results in the fight to eradicate poverty and in achieving sustainable development. The European Commission alone provides aid to more than 150 countries, territories and organisations around the world. We are a reliable partner over the long term, and as the world's biggest donor we help bring stability and prosperity to many parts of the world.¹⁴⁸

As seen in the above quotation, the EU's development cooperation also corresponds to its soft power. The EU's role conception as the provider of development aid is closely connected with the EU's role conception as a force for international peace, security and stability, because peace, security and stability are identified by the EU as indispensable for the development and also, development is seen as indispensable for them. It is argued that they can best be accomplished through development and development through them. Underdevelopment, which provides a breeding ground for insecurity and instability, is identified by the EU as one of the contemporary challenges to global security. For this reason, the EU grants central importance to development cooperation in its foreign and security policy. Javier Solana emphasized the link between security and development:

Security is a precondition for development. We must re-double our efforts to combat the great ongoing challenges of extreme poverty, hunger and the new pandemics, breaking the cycles of insecurity and tackling bad governance, corruption and disregard of rule of law.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Javier Solana, 16 October 2002, Warsaw.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁴⁸ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The EU in the World", 2 February 2006, Brussels.

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/59&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=enhttp://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_313.htm

¹⁴⁹ Javier Solana, "The Voice of Europe on Security Matters", 26 November 2003, Brussels.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

Besides Solana and the ESS, Benita Ferrero-Waldner also emphasized the link between security and development. She pointed out that

The philosophy underlying the EU's approach to security, as outlined in the Security Strategy, is that security can best be attained through development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other.¹⁵⁰

As it can be understood from the above quotation the ESS can be identified as the framework document which lays down a linkage between security and development:

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.¹⁵¹

As it was mentioned in the introduction part, in the ESS, for the first time in the EU history, underdevelopment in non-European states was identified as a threat to the security of Europeans. In the post-9/11 era, underdevelopment, which provides a breeding ground for insecurity, is identified by the EU as one of the contemporary challenges to European security.

In another document, the link between security and development and their indispensability for each other was emphasized by the European Commission. It was stated that

Development is crucial for collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other. There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism, often linked to poverty, bad governance and the deterioration and lack of access to natural resources.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The EU's role in protecting Europe's security", 30 May 2006, Brussels. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/331&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

¹⁵¹ ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels.

¹⁵² Commission of the European Communities, "Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission", *Communication From the Commission to the Council and*

In the Joint Statement by the Council and Representative of Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, titled as ‘The European Consensus on Development’, the link between security and development was emphasised. It was pointed out that

Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. (...) Achieving the Millennium Development Goals is also in the interest of collective and individual long-term peace and security. Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur. Development is also the most effective long-term response to forced and illegal migration and trafficking of human beings. Development plays a key role in encouraging sustainable production and consumption patterns that limit the harmful consequences of growth for the environment.¹⁵³

The European Commission in one of its communications reemphasized the link between security and development and noted that “the EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures”¹⁵⁴.

3.4 Promoter of its values and norms

This role conception put emphasis on the EU’s standing of being a community of shared values. This role conception points to the belief that the EU is founded on values and norms such as respect for human dignity, liberty, fundamental freedoms, democracy, equality, rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and minority rights, which are also at the core of the EU’s relations with the

the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 13 July 2005, Brussels, p. 8.

¹⁵³ Council of the European Union, “The European Consensus on Development”, *op.cit.*, pp. 14, 15.

¹⁵⁴ Commission of the European Communities, “Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating Progress Towards Attaining the Millennium Development Goals”, *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee*, 12 April 2005, Brussels, p. 10.

rest of the world. These values and norms are not specific to the EU; they are widely shared by liberal democratic states, hence are universal in nature.

The EU's relations with the wider world are informed by these values and norms. The universal promotion of these values and norms through the world is identified as one of the main objectives and priorities of the EU's foreign policy:

For now let me just reiterate that our goal will remain delivery of concrete achievements – the building blocks of Europe that Schuman spoke of - and promoting what we stand for around the world – global solidarity, multilateralism, democracy and human rights.¹⁵⁵

The promotion of these values and norms are accepted to be closely connected with the protection of the security of the EU. This role conception emphasizes the necessity of promoting the EU's values and norms and establishing well-governed democratic states for the protection of the security of the EU and the strengthening of the international order. So, the promotion of the EU's values and norms is seen by the EU as its enlightened self-interest. The motive behind the EU's promotion of its values and norms is seen as both other-serving and self-serving. In the ESS, the link between the EU's promotion of values and the protection of the security of the EU was emphasized:

The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.¹⁵⁶

The EU uses wide-range of instruments including political, diplomatic instruments, economic instruments, financial instruments, aid and enlargement for the promotion of its values and norms through the world. Benita Ferrero-Waldner referred to the EU's use of wide-range of instruments for the promotion of its values and norms.. She pointed out that

¹⁵⁵ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The EU in the World", 2 February 2006, Brussels.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/59&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_313.htm

¹⁵⁶ ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels.

The respect for universal human rights, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy have for decades been at the very core of EU foreign policy. We use our foreign policy tools – aid, trade, and economic agreements - to promote human rights and good governance in every corner of the globe.¹⁵⁷

Besides Ferrero-Waldner, Javier Solana also referred to the EU's use of enlargement for the promotion of democracy. He noted that

For the European Union, the desire to promote democracy comes natural. The Union is based on a shared attachment to democracy. And through enlargement we have built an ever-widening area of freedom, democracy and stability across Europe. The European Union is also a model of what societies can achieve for their citizens. A source of inspiration, enticing governments to change the way their countries work. To support the momentum towards democratic change, the Union has developed an extensive set of policies and instruments.¹⁵⁸

3.5 Promoter of Effective Multilateralism

Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen Smith put forward that effective multilateralism for the EU seems to imply making international organizations and agreements more effective.¹⁵⁹ According to the European Commission's communication,

An active commitment to an effective multilateralism means more than rhetorical professions of faith. It means taking global rules seriously, whether they concern the preservation of peace or the limitation of carbon emissions; it means helping other countries to implement and abide by these rules; it means engaging actively in multilateral forums, and promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not limited to a narrow defence of national interests.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Working Together as Global Partners", 1 June 2005, Washington DC. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_313.htm

¹⁵⁸ Javier Solana, "The Role of the EU in Promoting and Consolidating Democracy in Europe's East", 4 May 2006, Villinius. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁵⁹ Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, "Introduction – The European Union at the United Nations: Leader, Partner or Failure?", in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms* (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2006), p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities, "The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism", *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, 10 September 2003, Brussels, p. 3.

This role conception emphasizes the EU's commitment to the establishment of an effective multilateral system in which a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order plays a central role. Javier Solana in one of his speeches emphasized the EU's commitment to the establishment of an effective multilateral system:

It is not enough to say we support multilateralism. We must be prepared to make it work. Making it work means extending the scope of international law. It means strengthening multilateral institutions. It means developing closer regional co-operation. I passionately believe that the security of the EU in the face of global threats can only be safeguarded if the fundamental values enshrined in the UN Charter and other international regimes and treaties are woven into an extensive web of multilateral instruments. And where international order is based on agreed rules, we must be prepared to ensure the respect of these rules when they are broken.¹⁶¹

Benita Ferrero-Waldner also emphasized the EU's ambition of creation of multilateral world governed by multilateral institutions. She maintained that

Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions. (...) This is where I come to the title of today's conference, our contribution to the "quest for a multilateral world". However, for a multilateral system to work, multilateral institutions must function properly and must be up to the challenges of the 21st century. So our quest should not only be for a multilateral world, but for effective multilateral institutions to govern it.¹⁶²

In the ESS, the EU's commitment to the establishment of an effective multilateral system was identified as a necessity for the maintenance of its own security and prosperity. It was noted that

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Javier Solana, "The Voice of Europe on Security Matters", 26 November 2003, Brussels.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁶² Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World", 4 July 2005, China Institute of International Studies, Brussels.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_414.htm

¹⁶³ ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels.

The EU identified the UN as the main expression of effective multilateralism.¹⁶⁴ The UN lies at the centre of this multilateral system and it is accepted as the prime multilateral institution. The UN Charter and other international regimes and treaties constitute fundamental values and norms which are used to govern world that is based on an effective multilateral system. Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasized the EU's commitment to the establishment of an effective multilateral system with the UN at the centre. She stated that

The EU is convinced that only an effective multilateral system can adequately address the new and complex challenges the international community faces today. For that reason, the EU has made effective multilateralism with the UN at its core a central element of its external action. Effective multilateralism is more essential now than ever, and that is why it is one of the major priorities within my portfolio.¹⁶⁵

The EU sees effective multilateral system as the best mean to guarantee its prosperity and security, thus it is committed to the proper functioning of multilateral institutions which is essential for the working of rule-based order. This role conception holds that the main objective of the EU's foreign policy is to improve the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, predominantly the UN. Effective multilateralism is identified as the guiding principle of the EU's foreign and security policy. In Communication entitled "The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism", the Commission identifies effective multilateralism as the guiding principle of the EU's foreign and security policy:

The European Union's commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy. Taking international co-operation as a precondition for meeting numerous global challenges, the EU has a clear interest in supporting the continuous evolution and improvement of the tools of global governance.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Roberto Menotti and Maria Francesca Vencato, "The ESS and the Partners", in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), *The EU and the ESS* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 104.

¹⁶⁵ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The Future of the UN: Results of the Kofi Annan High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change", 8 December 2004, Brussels.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/speech04_524_en.htm

¹⁶⁶ Commission of the European Communities, "The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism", *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, 10 September 2003, Brussels, p. 3.

This role conception notes that in order to effectively deal with contemporary global challenges and promote the EU's security, there is a need to cooperate with the EU's strategic partners such as the US and other regional organizations ASEAN, MERCUSOR and African Union.

3.6 Partner for the UN

This role conception is closely connected with the EU's role conception as promoter of effective multilateralism. As the EU is committed to the establishment of rule governed effective multilateral system, the UN is seen by the EU as the most important partner for the establishment of such system. Javier Solana emphasized the importance of the UN for the multilateral system to which the EU is committed to. He stated that

The European Union, as you know, is an organization that believes in multilateralism and therefore we believe in the United Nations and we are supporters of the United Nations as one of the most important priorities. The centre of gravity, the heart of the multilateral system ...¹⁶⁷

The EU is committed to upholding the universal values, norms, goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and supporting and strengthening the UN's efforts for the protection and promotion of regional and global peace, security, stability and prosperity. This role conception emphasizes the EU's responsibility to support and to strengthen the UN in order to fully enable the UN to fulfill its role effectively in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its Charter.¹⁶⁸ In the ESS, it was noted that

Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. (...)
The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Javier Solana, 24 January 2007, Brussels.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁶⁸ The European Union, "The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter", Belgium, January 2004. http://www.medeo.be/files/EU_and_UN_1_2004.pdf

¹⁶⁹ ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner also emphasized the EU's commitment to the establishment of an effective multilateral system with the UN at the centre. She stated that

We in the EU believe that the UN lies at the heart of the multilateralism we espouse. It must be fully enabled to play its rightful, pivotal role in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems.¹⁷⁰

The EU is devoted to strengthen its partnership with the UN in carrying out its global responsibilities. Javier Solana in his speeches emphasized the strengthening and deepening partnership between the EU and the UN in a range of areas. He noted that

It is safe to say that our working relations with the United Nations are deeper and closer than ever before. Our presence in Bosnia responds to a request from the UN. It has generated a network of contacts which has deepened and strengthened our partnership at all levels. As the European Union becomes operational in new areas, this partnership can only deepen.¹⁷¹

Benita Ferrero-Waldner also emphasized the increasing cooperation between the EU and the UN in a wide-range of areas. She stated that

The European Commission and the UN have enjoyed increasingly close cooperation over the years, and I would like to see this cooperation intensified during my mandate. Our current cooperation spans the fields of development cooperation and conflict prevention - we support one another's activities in the field; provide financial support (the European Commission contributes some €700 million per annum to the UN's budget); and involve one another in crisis management operations.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The Future of the UN: Results of the Kofi Annan High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change", 8 December 2004, Brussels, p. 7.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/speech04_524_en.htm

¹⁷¹ Javier Solana, 21 May 2003, Dublin.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

¹⁷² Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The Future of the UN: Results of the Kofi Annan High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change", 8 December 2004, Brussels.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/speech04_524_en.htm

3.7 Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors

This role conception also is closely connected with the EU's role conception as a promoter of effective multilateralism. This role conception points to the EU's belief that contemporary global and regional problems and threats are common problems shared by the humanity thus cannot be dealt with through unilateral initiatives. In the ESS, the necessity to develop multilateral cooperation for dealing with contemporary global and regional problems and threats was emphasized. It was pointed out that

There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors.¹⁷³

This role conception places an emphasis on the EU's preference to pursue its foreign and security policy objectives through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through building partnership with other important global and regional actors. Javier Solana emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation with the EU's strategic partners. He stated that

But improved consistency and capabilities will not be enough unless Europe strengthens relations with its strategic partners. Better cooperation with them is the key to effective multilateralism. Threats are never more dangerous than when the international community is divided. For this reason in particular, the transatlantic link is irreplaceable. Our security and the effectiveness of the common fight against threats depend on the strength and balance of that relationship.¹⁷⁴

This role conception emphasizes the EU's intention to form global alliances to handle the contemporary global problems and threats and also to form regional alliances to handle regional problems with key regional actors and regional organizations. The US and NATO are identified by the EU as the most important

¹⁷³ ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003, Brussels.

¹⁷⁴ Javier Solana, "The EU Security Strategy: Implications for Europe's Role in a Changing World", 12 November 2003, Berlin.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

strategic partners for handling the contemporary global problems and threats. The EU grants utmost importance to the transatlantic partnership. Moreover, the EU identifies regional powers Japan, China, Canada, India and Russia, Latin America and regional organizations such as ASEAN, MERCUSOR and African Union as potential strategic partners for dealing with regional problems and threats. The EU also emphasizes the establishment of partnership with the other great geographical centers such as the Arab world and Africa in their search for stability and development. Javier Solana in one of his speeches highlighted the importance of building partnership with regional actors. He pointed out that

In a world where partnership and co-operation is crucial to success, our relationships will take many forms. In the Western Balkans, with NATO, especially in preparation for the take-over from SFOR. With regional powers such as Japan, China and India; with regional organizations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. Europe's history, geography and culture connect us globally. In our own neighbourhood, we must work for closer relations with Russia, building a strategic partnership through respect for common values. Our ambition is a Europe more active and more capable; an articulate and persuasive champion of effective multilateralism; a regional actor and a global ally.¹⁷⁵

3.8 Conclusion

The EU's role set is composed of role conceptions which are not mutually exclusive, but in most cases closely interrelated. The relationship between the EU's role conceptions can be seen in table 3. Since the EU's role conception as 'force for good' is more comprehensive than the other role conceptions in the role set, it is at the top of the table. There is some kind of hierarchical relationship between the EU's role as 'force for good' and the other six role conceptions in terms of comprehensiveness. The EU's commitments, responsibilities and objectives as 'force for good' coincided with the commitments and responsibilities of other six role conceptions. The EU's commitment and responsibility to make the world a better place for everybody by universally promoting peace, security, stability, democracy, and human rights, rule of law and good governance, and multilateralism coincided with the commitments and responsibilities of other six role conceptions. Thus, this

¹⁷⁵ Javier Solana, 8 January 2004, Dublin.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/list.asp?cmsid=256&BID=107&page=arch&lang=EN

makes ‘force for good’ as an all-inclusive role conception and places it at the top of the table.

On the left hand side of the table, another hierarchical relationship can be seen between the EU’s role as ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ and the other two role conceptions: ‘the provider of development aid’ and ‘promoter of its values and norms’. The EU’s role conception as ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ is more comprehensive than the other two role conceptions. The EU’s commitments, responsibilities and objectives as ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ coincided with the commitments and responsibilities of the other two role conceptions.

The hierarchical relationship between ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ and ‘the provider of development aid’ can be elucidated in such a way that peace, security and stability are identified by the EU as indispensable for the development and also development is seen as indispensable for them. It is argued that security, stability and peace can best be accomplished through development and development through them. Underdevelopment, which provides breeding ground for insecurity and instability, is identified by the EU as one of the contemporary global challenges to global security.

The hierarchical relationship between ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ and ‘promoter of its values and norms’ can be explicated in such a way that promotion of its values and norms and establishing well-governed stable democratic states through the world are identified by the EU as a necessity for the protection of both international security and its own security and for strengthening of the international order. It can be seen that in area of foreign and security policy these two role conceptions seem to be instruments for promoting peace, security and stability.

On the right hand side of the table there is another hierarchical relationship between the EU’s role as ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ and the other two role conceptions: ‘partner for the UN’ and ‘builder of effective partnership with key actors’. The EU’s role conception as ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ is more comprehensive than the other two role conceptions. The EU’s commitments, responsibilities and objectives as ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ coincided with the commitments and responsibilities of the other two role conceptions.

The hierarchical relationship between ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ and ‘partner for the UN’ can be elucidated in such a way that while the EU as a ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ is committed to the establishment of a rule governed effective multilateral system with the UN at the centre, the UN is seen by the EU as the most important partner for the establishment of such a system.

The hierarchical relationship between ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ and ‘builder of effective partnership with key actors’ can be explicated in such a way that the EU identified contemporary global and regional problems and threats as common problems shared by all the world, which cannot be dealt with through unilateral initiatives. That is why the EU emphasized the need for multilateral cooperation in international organizations and building partnership with other important global and regional actors to deal with these issues.

In the post-9/11 international security environment, the EU identified itself as a ‘benign force’ which claims to act on the basis of the interests of the whole community of peoples in the world. This effectively means that in its foreign and security policy, the EU not only claims to act in its own self-interest and the interests of its citizens, but also act in the interests of others, non-Europeans. The EU’s foreign and security policy is understood as both self-serving (self-regarding) and other-serving (other-regarding). In other words, the EU claims to act for the global common good. While acting to promote the interests of others, ultimately the EU claims to serve its own self-interest. The EU’s role conceptions are directly related with its enlightened self-interest. The EU’s philosophy in its foreign and security policy is based on the belief that “do well by doing good”. The EU’s foreign and security policy can be identified as a ‘foreign policy without tears’, which effectively means that the EU tries to serve the interests of all but does not want to harm anybody.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Elena Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 8, Iss. 3, 2003), p. 311.

Table 3.

The Relationship Between EU's Role Conceptions



CHAPTER 4

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EC/EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE MEPP IN PRE-9/11 ERA

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent peace process have been one of the most strongly debated issues by EU Member States since the establishment of EPC in early 1970s.¹⁷⁷ The EU has issued numerous joint declarations and adopted joint actions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the MEPP and they have always been on the top of agenda of the EU's foreign policy.¹⁷⁸ The objective of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the EU's involvement in the MEPP. This historical overview is worth analyzing and evaluating, since it will help better understand and analyze the EU's role performance in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era as well as to uncover the change and continuity in the EU's policy. The chapter is organized into three parts which respectively provide a historical overview of the evolution of the EU's policy towards the MEPP from the 1970s up to 1990s.

4.1 The Quest for a European Common Position in the 1970s

In the 1950s and 1960s, the European states had a significant presence neither individually nor collectively in the region. After the failure of the UK and France, the two prominent European colonial powers in the region, during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the two super powers, the US and the Soviet Union, became the major powers in the region. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, France and the UK sought to regain their status as a major player in the region through their collective efforts under the framework of EPC. EPC was used by the two former colonial powers as a tool to reintroduce themselves in the Middle East.¹⁷⁹ France and the UK, the so-called 'Channel Axis', were the two actors within the EC, which promoted the EC's political involvement in the Middle East.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 11.

¹⁷⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 11.

¹⁷⁹ Alain Dieckhoff, "Europe and the Arab World: The Difficult Dialogue", in Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler (eds.), *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p. 258.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

In the late 1960s, EC Member States adopted divergent positions¹⁸¹ towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the eve of the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, the European leaders convened in Rome to discuss the situation in the Middle East. West Germany regarded the Rome Summit as a rare opportunity to speak with a single voice about the tense situation in the Middle East.¹⁸² The driving force behind the Rome Summit during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was EC Member States' intention to coordinate their foreign policies, because they differed from each other in terms of their positions on important global issues like the Middle East conflict. The EC had no procedures or mechanisms to coordinate foreign policy positions of its Member States and occasional intergovernmental summits were the most suitable places for the coordination of EC Member States' foreign policies.¹⁸³

During the Rome Summit, despite efforts to make a joint community declaration, EC Member States were not able to agree on a common declaration due to their divergent positions.¹⁸⁴ After the Summit, German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger said that "I felt ashamed at the Rome Summit. Just as the war was on the point of breaking, we could not even agree to talk about it."¹⁸⁵ During the war, France supported the Arabs and condemned Israel in the UN debates. Although West Germany declared its neutrality, in fact it supported Israel. Italians were divided among themselves while the Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani adopted a pro-Arab position, the majority of Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the President Giuseppe Saragat backed Israel. Belgium and Luxembourg tried to find a solution in UN institutions. The Netherlands supported Israel.¹⁸⁶ Instead of Community deliberations, the French President de Gaulle, in January 1969, offered a four power

¹⁸¹ The Netherlands and Luxembourg adopted a pro-Israeli position; Belgium and Germany adopted an impartial or balanced position; France and Italy adopted a pro-Arab position.

¹⁸² Michael E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 63.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁸⁴ Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy* (Avebury: Aldershot, 1987), p. 420.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 420 and Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: An Israeli Perspective" in David Allen and Alfred Pijpers (eds.), *European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), p. 132.

¹⁸⁶ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 131 and Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 420.

summit including France, the USSR, the UK and the US to discuss a settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the US rejected this.¹⁸⁷ The EC Member States' different traditions and interests in the Middle East, different intensity of ties with Israel and with the Arab world, and the failure to agree on a political role for Western Europe beside the US contributed to the EC Member States' failure to agree on a common position.¹⁸⁸

EC Member States' failure to coordinate their positions and policies and respond adequately to a major world crisis, such as the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War, led them to set up mechanisms or procedures for foreign policy coordination and consultation among them. In April 1969, de Gaulle resigned and Georges Pompidou took the French Presidency and Pompidou started new initiatives for foreign policy cooperation. Pompidou initiated the Hague Summit on 2 December 1969 to discuss enlargement, economic and monetary union and political union. At the Hague Summit, the leaders of EC Member States decided that they were ready to "pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and mission."¹⁸⁹ At the Summit, the responsibilities of taking step towards political union by harmonizing foreign policies of EC Member States was discussed¹⁹⁰ and the leaders of EC Member States

...agreed to instruct their ministers of foreign affairs to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the context of enlargement the ministers would be expected to report before the end of July 1970.¹⁹¹

A Committee composed of Political Directors of EC Member States' foreign policies headed by the Belgian Political Director, Viscount Etienne Davignon drafted the report which was requested at the Hague Summit. Davignon submitted the report at the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers on 27 October 1970

¹⁸⁷ Michael E. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

¹⁸⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 12.

¹⁸⁹ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.66, Michael E. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 69 and Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy Key Documents* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 72.

¹⁹⁰ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹¹ Hill & Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

and it was approved. This report was named as the Luxembourg Report or Davignon Report and created EPC. According to the Luxembourg Report, the aims of EPC are

...To ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems and to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonization of their views, the coordination of their positions and where it appears possible or desirable, common actions.¹⁹²

After the introduction of EPC, the Arab-Israeli conflict became one of the two areas of priorities of EPC beside the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These two issues were selected as two areas of priority of EPC, because at the time, preservation of security and stability in Europe's eastern and southern neighbourhood was considered as strategically crucial for Europe's own security and stability.¹⁹³ Since the first EPC ministerial meeting held in Munich in November 1970, the Arab-Israeli conflict had been nearly a permanent feature of EPC discussions.¹⁹⁴ Because at the time, France, under the leadership of Georges Pompidou, sought to discuss the Middle East conflict under EPC and bring its EC partners closer to the French position and by this way strengthen European support for the Arab cause and assert European independence of the US foreign policy.¹⁹⁵ Pompidou wanted EC to play the role of a third force alongside the two superpowers. For him, EC should develop a third course, beside the imperial logic of the US and the Soviet Union and would take up its own stance in order to protect its interests in the region, without relying on powers external to the Middle East.¹⁹⁶ This was supported by West Germany which wanted to improve its relations with the Arab world without attracting criticism from Israel or the US.¹⁹⁷

Since the launch of EPC, EC Member States had gradually developed a joint position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. EC Member States issued a series of common declarations concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict under the framework of EPC including Schumann Document of 1971, the Brussels Declaration of 1973, the

¹⁹² Michael E. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

¹⁹³ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 259.

¹⁹⁴ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 14.

¹⁹⁵ Simon J. Nuttall, *European Political Cooperation* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992), p. 56.

¹⁹⁶ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 259.

¹⁹⁷ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 56.

London Declaration of 1977, the Venice Declaration of 1980, which symbolized the culmination of the EC Member States' joint position towards the conflict. It can be said that during the 1970s, EC Member States pursued a declaratory policy.

4.1.1 Early Attempts to Develop a Common Position towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Schumann Document of 1971, the Brussels Declaration of 1973 and the London Declaration of 1977

The Schumann Document¹⁹⁸, which constituted the first common position of EC Member States on the Arab-Israeli conflict, was unanimously approved by the Foreign Ministers on 13 May 1971. The Schumann Document marked the beginning of a distinctive and collective position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁹⁹ It managed to unite the attitudes of EC Member States towards Arab-Israeli conflict and served as the basis for the EC's future attitude towards the Middle East.²⁰⁰ The Schumann Document contained the establishment of demilitarized zones in the 1967 lines, in which international forces would be stationed; an overall Israeli withdrawal from Occupied Territories with minor border adjustments; the internationalization of Jerusalem; the postponement of any conclusive solution regarding the sovereignty of East Jerusalem; the choice, for the Arab refugees of either returning to their home or being compensated; the approval of the Jarring mission.²⁰¹ The Schumann document was consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242, and, in line with the Resolution, it referred to the Palestinians as Arab refugees.²⁰²

The Schumann Document was a confidential document; it would not be publicized due to West German and Dutch objection and Italian reservations. However, it was leaked to the German press and the German public opinion and Israel strongly criticized the West German foreign minister Walter Scheel. As a

¹⁹⁸ The name came from French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann, who was the spiritual father of the document.

¹⁹⁹ Simon J. Nuttall, "Two Decades of EPC Performance" in Regelsberger, Elfriede, de Schoutheete de Tervant, Philippe and Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.), *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 25.

²⁰⁰ Soren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, *The European Union and the Middle East* (Sheffield Academic Press: Great Britain, 2002), p. 82.

²⁰¹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", 133.

²⁰² Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", 133 and Ben Soetendorp, *Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Pearson Education Limited, the UK, 1999), p. 99.

result, Scheel played down the significance of the document, by declaring it only a working document to serve as a basis for further discussions.²⁰³ The Schumann Document led to disarray among EC Member States, especially France. It deteriorated EC Member States' political relations with Israel and marked the start of the Europeans' acquisition of a pro-Arab reputation, one which was to lodge in the minds of the Israeli political establishment. This led to Israeli resistance to any formal European involvement in future attempts at peace-making. It also revealed the challenge of policy harmonization within the EU and the difficulty of maintaining a common position in the event of sustained public criticism.²⁰⁴

Between May 1971 and October 1973, there was no other joint EPC document on the Middle East. EC Member States did not take any initiative on Middle East policy publicly or made any serious effort to bring their positions closer together after the Schumann Document.²⁰⁵ At the outbreak of Yom Kippur Arab-Israeli War in 1973 (6-26 October 1973), just like the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War, EC Member States adopted divergent positions. The initial reactions of EC Member States to Yom Kippur War was fragmented and varied considerably.²⁰⁶ France and Italy adopted a pro-Arab position. West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands supported Israel. Especially France and the Netherlands adopted opposite positions. While France expressed some understanding for the Arab attack on Israel, the Netherlands held Egypt and Syria responsible for the beginning of the war.²⁰⁷

Under the pressure of the UK and France, EC Member States issued a joint statement on 13 October 1973 which called for a ceasefire and negotiations on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242. On 16 October 1973, Gulf States announced that until Israel returned to its pre-1967 borders and the Palestinians were able to exercise their right to self-determination, the price of the oil would be raised by 70%. On 17 October 1973, Arab members of OPEC decided on a monthly 5% cutback in oil production. On 20 October 1973, Saudi Arabia declared a total

²⁰³ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 421.

²⁰⁴ Philip Robin, "Always the Bridesmaid: Europe and the MEPP", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. X, No. 2, Winter/Spring 1997), p. 72.

²⁰⁵ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 93.

²⁰⁶ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 101.

²⁰⁷ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 101.

embargo on oil exports to the US. On 4 November 1973, Arab members of OPEC announced production cutbacks of 25% on September levels with further monthly 5% cuts and created three categories of consumers: friends, enemies and neutrals.²⁰⁸ Regarding EC Member States, the UK and France were categorized as friends and received normal supplies of oil, however the Netherlands, like the US, was accepted as enemy and was completely embargoed and other EC Member States were accepted as neutrals and were subjected to monthly 5% reduction in oil exports.²⁰⁹

After the Arabs' selective use of oil embargo against EC Member states, European political leaders decided to counter this by a common action and issued a joint declaration on 6 November 1973 in Brussels which was known as the Brussels Declaration. The Brussels declaration was based on a French-British text and it brought EC Member States' position very close to the French position which was a pro-Arab one. With this declaration, EC Member States moved away from their previous rather unconditional support to Israel and explicitly broke with the US vision.²¹⁰

The Brussels Declaration was a step forward when compared to the Schumann Document. With the Brussels Declaration, EC Member States for the first time referred to the Palestinians rather than 'Arab refugees' and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.²¹¹ EC Member States also declared the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force rather than emphasizing minor border adjustments mentioned in the Schumann Document and re-emphasized the necessity for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since Six-Day War of 1967.²¹² The Brussels Declaration emphasized the UN rather than the Geneva Conference as the forum for negotiations.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 94.

²⁰⁹ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, Two Decades of EPC Performance, p. 25 and Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 94.

²¹⁰ Aoun, *op.cit.*, p. 291.

²¹¹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", pp. 134-135 and Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 101.

²¹² Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", pp. 134-135 and Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 101.

²¹³ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 95.

On 14-15 December 1973, the leaders of EC Member States met in Copenhagen. At the Copenhagen Summit, European political leaders confirmed the Brussels Declaration of 6 November. At their meeting on 26-29 November 1973 in Algiers, Arab States launched an appeal to the EC stating that Europe was linked to the Arab world through the Mediterranean by profound affinities of civilization and by vital interests which can only be developed within the framework of confidence and mutually advantageous cooperation.²¹⁴ By relying on Arab States' appeal to the EC, a delegation of Arab foreign ministers came to Copenhagen to propose to EC Member States to start a dialogue on these lines.²¹⁵ EC Member States accepted this offer and called for entering into negotiations with the Arab members of OPEC. At the Copenhagen Summit, European political leaders declared their willingness to enter into negotiations with oil producing countries on comprehensive arrangements comprising cooperation on a wide scale for economic and industrial development, industrial investments, and stable energy supplies to the member countries at reasonable prices.²¹⁶

On 6 March 1974, EC Member States declared their readiness to launch the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Arab States agreed to launch the dialogue at the meeting in Tunis on 28 April 1974. Two sides of the dialogue had different motivations for launching the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The main motive of the Europeans was to secure European oil imports while making a major effort to help Arab economic development.²¹⁷ The objective was to promote extensive Euro-Arab cooperation in every economic field: Europe would invest large sums in Arab industrial, agricultural and development, while the Arabs would promise to supply their oil without any interruption and at reasonable prices.²¹⁸ The main motive of the Arabs is to create a political linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and economic issues.²¹⁹ They wanted to politicize the dialogue and use it as an instrument in their war against Israel. They asked Europeans for two major concessions: to give up the free trade

²¹⁴ Nuttall, op.cit., European Political Cooperation, p. 96 and Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, op.cit., p. 86.

²¹⁵ Nuttall, op.cit., European Political Cooperation, p. 96.

²¹⁶ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 431.

²¹⁷ Ian Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler, *Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 34.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 34.

²¹⁹ Hazel Smith, op.cit., p.174.

agreement signed with Israel in 1975 and to allow an independent representation of the PLO in the dialogue's general commission and the expert committees.²²⁰

After the conclusion of the Camp David Agreements, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and a rift emerged among Arab States and this led to the suspension of the Euro-Arab-Dialogue in April 1979 upon request of the Arab League. The main reason behind the Arab states' decision to suspend the dialogue was that they were not satisfied with the progress on the political aspects of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and they considered that it was not worth to continue the dialogue which did not make adequate progress in political aspects. During the meetings of the General Committee, Arab States strove to politicize the Euro-Arab Dialogue by putting the Arab-Israeli conflict on the agenda. However, EC Member States refused to discuss the political issues including the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Euro-Arab Dialogue. EC Member States were determined to exclude from the agenda of the Euro-Arab Dialogue two important issues: the oil problem, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.²²¹ Moreover, Arab States pressed EC Member States to recognize the PLO, yet EC Member States did not recognize the PLO. After the suspension of the Euro-Arab Dialogue in April 1979, EC Member States attempted to revive the dialogue, but these attempts were failed. Especially in 1989, although the French President Jacques Chirac tried to reactivate the dialogue and an agreement was made to pursue new economic, social and cultural projects, the agreed restructured Euro-Arab Dialogue did not materialize.²²²

The Euro-Arab Dialogue to some extent had played a determining role in the evolution of EC Member States' joint position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in the second half of the 1970s. During the period between 1973 and 1980, the Arab political pressure on EC Member States had been one of the factors in their gradual adoption of a pro-Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As will be seen from the London Declaration of 1977, EC Member States located the Palestinian problem at the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized the right to a homeland for the Palestinian people which would give effective expression to their national identity. They also called for the participation of the representatives of the

²²⁰ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, Europe's Middle East Dilemma, p. 34.

²²¹ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 435.

²²² Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.175.

Palestinian people in the peace negotiations. EC Member States in their further declarations criticized and condemned Israel's policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories and identified it as the main stumbling block before the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. The pressure put by the Arab States at the fourth General Committee meeting held at Damascus on 9-11 December 1978 forced EC Member States to distance themselves from the Camp David Treaty. As will be seen from the Venice Declaration of 1980, EC Member States emphasized the necessity for the Palestinian people to exercise fully their right to self-determination for a comprehensive peace settlement. In addition to that, although EC Member States did not only recognize the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people, but also called for its association with the peace negotiations as an important representative of the Palestinian people.

The Euro-Arab Dialogue has provided a sometimes sporadic forum for multilateral political and economic consultation between European and Arab States.²²³ It provided Arab States an opportunity to negotiate with Europe on an equal basis, to put their collective views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, to create an atmosphere of acceptability around the PLO, whose officials were participating, and to exploit possibilities of future Euro-Arab economic cooperation, given that oil reserves are not finite.²²⁴ Although EC Member States did not recognize the PLO, they allowed the PLO to open information offices supervised by staff operating within the framework of Arab League offices. As a result, the PLO obtained an information presence in Italy, France, the UK, Belgium and Germany and an opportunity to conduct dialogue with the authorities of these countries.²²⁵ The PLO's information offices and the presence of the PLO delegates among the Arab delegation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue enabled to familiarize the officials of EC Member States with the PLO.²²⁶

Between November 1973 and June 1977, the EC did not carry out any diplomatic activity or issue a declaration on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict

²²³ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.168.

²²⁴ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 438.

²²⁵ Ahmad Sidqi Al-Dajani, "The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue", *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. 9, No. 3, Spring, 1980), p. 93.

²²⁶ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 450.

except starting the Euro-Arab Dialogue. At the European Council meeting in London on 29-30 June 1977, the European political leaders issued a joint declaration concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. This declaration was a restatement of the positions of EC Member States which had been accumulated since the early 1970s.

The London Declaration was a step forward when compared to 1973 Brussels Declaration concerning the rights of the Palestinian people. By stating that the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would be to recognize the right to a homeland for the Palestinian people, EC Member States located the Palestinian problem at the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Granting Israel secure borders was no longer the essential feature of a peace settlement.²²⁷ Beside the recognition of a right to a homeland for the Palestinian people, the call for the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people is another new feature of the declaration when compared to the previous one. In addition to the 1973 Brussels Declaration's emphasis on just and lasting peace, the London Declaration emphasized comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The London Declaration demonstrated the fact that the EC came gradually to align itself with the French position, particularly as regards the Palestinian problem.²²⁸ EC Member States as a whole supported the French belief that the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians is the key to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²²⁹ The London Declaration was another crucial step which moved EC Member States towards a pro-Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although EC Member States tried to balance the declaration by emphasizing that the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries in response to the Israeli recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Israel strongly rejected the idea of granting a homeland to the Palestinian people, locating the Palestinian problem at the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people in a peace settlement on an equal footing with sovereign states.²³⁰ Although the Arab

²²⁷ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 138.

²²⁸ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 441.

²²⁹ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 103.

²³⁰ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 138.

States and the PLO found the London Declaration inadequate, they considered it as a positive development.²³¹ They found it inadequate, because despite their demand from EC Member States to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, in the London Declaration, EC Member States did not refer to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.²³²

Between 1977 and 1980, EC Member States strove to stick to the London Declaration as the main referent document concerning their positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people were emphasized by EC Member States during this period. Moreover, between 1977 and 1980, EC Member States increasingly adopted a more pro-Arab position and increased their criticism towards Israel. For instance, the Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet, while addressing to the UN General Assembly in September 1977 on behalf of EC Member States as the President of the EC Council of Ministers, criticized and condemned the Israeli acts in the Occupied Territories and expressed EC Member States' concerns over the illegal measures taken by Israel in the Occupied Territories and called these measures as an obstacle to the peace process.²³³ Between 1977 and 1980, at the UN, EC Member States adopted a pro-Arab stance and increased their criticism towards Israel and supported the texts condemning the Israeli occupation and the methods used by Israel in Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories.²³⁴

4.1.2 The Camp David Peace Process and the EC

In the Autumn of 1977, an important event happened in the Middle East and consequently, the London Declaration lost its importance and EC Member States were sidelined and marginalized in the region and on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On 19 November 1977, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Israel. This visit launched the Egyptian-Israeli peace process which was resulted with the Camp David Peace Accords. With the start of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, the US became a major player in the Middle East and excluded other external actors.

²³¹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 138.

²³² Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, Foreign Policy in the European Union, p. 102.

²³³ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 442.

²³⁴ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 139.

Thus, EC Member States' attempt to play a political role in the quest for peace in the Middle East was sidelined and marginalized by the Camp David peace process culminating in the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel under the auspices of the US government.²³⁵

As a result, the London Declaration lost its importance, because this declaration could only have worked if the EC were to act as a major player in the Middle East. However, in the new context the US became the major player and excluded the EC from the process. Sadat's visit changed the context in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The London Declaration was issued in a context in which no Arab country had recognized Israel and no one was ready to talk with it. But after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, not only had Egypt, the most important Arab country, recognized Israel, but it also began negotiating with it about a solution of the Palestinian problem. The solution in the Egyptian and the Israeli mind for the Palestinian problem was not related with the concept of homeland for the Palestinians, but with autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²³⁶ The initiation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process following Sadat's visit was also contrary to the London Declaration's call for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was rather based on a step-by-step approach to the settlement of conflict which would lead to separate peace between Israel and Egypt. Sadat's initiative led to a split among Arab countries. All except Sudan and Oman strongly criticized and condemned Sadat's initiative.

France expressed its doubts about Sadat's initiative, because of its unpopularity in the Arab world and its unfavorable implications on French policy.²³⁷ On the other hand, other EC Member States were faced with a dilemma. Although they considered this initiative favorable and did not want to jeopardize this first opportunity given to peace in the Middle East, they also did not want to impair their good relations with the Arabs, which had been developing with difficulty since 1973.²³⁸ After an EPC ministerial meeting on 22 November 1977, EC Member States

²³⁵ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.168.

²³⁶ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 139.

²³⁷ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 158.

²³⁸ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 140.

agreed on a joint declaration, known as November 22 *Communiqué*. With this, EC Member States expressed their support for the President Sadat's bold initiative and the unprecedented dialogue started in Jerusalem. EC Member States expressed their hope that the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue would open the way to a comprehensive negotiation leading to a just and lasting overall settlement taking account of the rights and concerns of all parties involved. They pointed out that it is a matter of urgency that genuine peace at last be achieved for all the parties in the region, including the Palestinian people, on the basis of principles recognized by the international community and embodied in the London Declaration of 1977.²³⁹ They also expressed their hope that it would be possible to convene the Geneva conference in the near future.²⁴⁰ In the *Communiqué*, although EC Member States declared their support for Sadat's initiative and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace process, they reemphasized their commitment to the need for a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for a homeland for the Palestinians. EC Member States adhered to the London Declaration as the main referent document concerning their positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Until the conclusion of Camp David Agreements on 17 September 1978, EC Member States did not issue a declaration on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, EC Member States had been subject to pressure from both Egypt and other Arab countries. The Egyptian president Anwar Sadat exerted pressure upon them to support the Egyptian-Israeli peace process on the contrary; Arab countries pressed them to renounce the process. Despite these pressures EC Member States adopted a wait and see policy, and issued no other declaration until the conclusion of the Camp David Agreements.

Two days after the conclusion of Camp David Agreements on 17 September 1978, EC Member States issued a declaration in which European political leaders congratulated the US President Jimmy Carter, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for their successful peace effort. They once again reemphasized their attachment to a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement and recalled the London Declaration of 1977. In this declaration, European political leaders expressed their hope that the outcome of the Camp David

²³⁹ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 159 and Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 444.

²⁴⁰ Nuttall, *op.cit.*, European Political Cooperation, p. 159 and Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 444.

conference will be a further major step on the path to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace, and that all parties concerned will find it possible to join in the process to contribute to that end. EC Member States expressed their strong support to all efforts to achieve such a peace.²⁴¹ EC Member States gave a conditional support to the Camp David Treaty as they announced that they would support it on the condition that this would not be a separate peace settlement but instead a first major step toward a comprehensive peace settlement in which all the parties to the conflict should be involved. After the Camp David Peace Treaty, EC Member States firmly adhered to the principles of the London Declaration and called for a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and a homeland for the Palestinian people. The German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, while addressing to the UN General Assembly in 26 September 1978 on behalf of all EC Member States, once again emphasized EC Member States' call for a comprehensive settlement for the conflict. He pointed out that all parties concerned must be involved in the peace process and that no obstacles should be placed in the way of this peace process which should be kept open and should through further development and wider participation lead to a comprehensive settlement.²⁴² Genscher also emphasized that a peace settlement should take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.²⁴³

European political leaders' favorable attitude towards the Camp David Treaty began to change after the forth meeting of the General Commission of the Euro-Arab dialogue held in Damascus on 9-11 December 1978. At this meeting the Arab countries pressed EC Member States to end their support for Camp David and to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Despite this, EC Member States did not accept these demands and did not recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but they refrained from restating their conditional support for Camp David.²⁴⁴ In the final *Communiqué* of the meeting, EC Member States agreed that the Palestinian problem

²⁴¹ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 445.

²⁴² Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 445.

²⁴³ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 446.

²⁴⁴ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 141 and Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 446.

is central to the Arab-Israeli conflict and that a peaceful, comprehensive and just settlement of the conflict, including obviously a solution of the Palestinian problem, was not only a matter of vital importance to the Arabs but also of great concern to EC Member States in the view their close relations with the Middle East.²⁴⁵

On 26 March 1979, EC Member States issued another declaration concerning the Camp David Treaty. In this declaration, EC Member States first of all, expressed their appreciation for the will of the US President Jimmy Carter for peace and efforts of the Egyptian President Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Then they noted that while a difficult road remains to be trodden before UN Security Council Resolution 242 is implemented in all its aspects and on all fronts, they identified the Camp David Treaty as a correct application of the principles of that resolution, but solely for the Egyptian-Israeli relations.²⁴⁶ In this declaration, EC Member States recalled the London Declaration of 1977 and called for the establishment of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, which must be based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, translating into fact the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland.²⁴⁷ The declaration did not approve Camp David Treaty but instead emphasized the London Declaration of 1977 which called for a comprehensive settlement and right of the Palestinian people to a homeland. The declaration also identified Israel's policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories as the main stumbling block before the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement. The declaration was a cool and reserved reception of the Camp David Treaty and a polite but frank insistence on the positions of EC Member States as defined in the London Declaration of 1977.²⁴⁸

After 26 March Declaration they once again identified Israel's policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories as the main stumbling block before the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement and incompatible with UN

²⁴⁵ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 446.

²⁴⁶ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 446.

²⁴⁷ Nuttall, op.cit., European Political Cooperation, p. 161.

²⁴⁸ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 446.

Security Council Resolutions and a violation of international law.²⁴⁹ EC Member States also condemned the Israeli attacks on South Lebanon.²⁵⁰

During the autumn 1979 and the spring of 1980, EC Member States came to a conclusion that the Camp David process had come to a standstill and would not be successful to make progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and it is necessary to launch a European Middle East Peace Initiative. Moreover, during this period the Middle East had become more unstable, due to several important events including the fall of Shah of Iran in 1979, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the second energy crisis of 1978-1980 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. These events increased European concerns over the secure flow of oil to the Europe and led them to question the US credibility and ability as a guarantor of security and stability in the Middle East.²⁵¹ The EC's doubts about the US ability to maintain security and stability in the Middle East also led EC Member States to believe that there was a need to launch a European Middle East Peace Initiative. At the time, EC Member States believed that the US, which was preoccupied with the Iranian crisis (seizure of hostages in the US embassy) and with the coming presidential elections, were unable to provide another strategy after Camp David revealed its limits. As a result, there emerged a political vacuum in the region.²⁵² EC Member States believed that the American setback provided a favorable and requisite circumstance for launching a European Middle East Peace Initiative which would fill in the blank spaces in American diplomacy.²⁵³

4.1.3 The Venice Declaration of 1980

Until the Venice Declaration of June 1980, the US, Israel and Egypt strove to prevent EC Member States to issue a new declaration concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict which might start a process diverging from the Camp David process. Especially the US president Jimmy Carter, who wanted to be reelected in the coming

²⁴⁹ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 448 and Greilsammer and Weiler, op.cit., "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 141.

²⁵⁰ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 448 and Greilsammer and Weiler, op.cit., "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 141.

²⁵¹ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 452.

²⁵² Dieckhoff, op.cit., "Europe and the Arab World", p. 263.

²⁵³ Dieckhoff, op.cit., "Europe and the Arab World", p. 263.

presidential elections, pressed EC Member States not to take an initiative deviating from Camp David, because he wanted to use Camp David as an asset in his election campaign. Carter threatened EC Member States that he would use the US veto right in order to prevent any modification of UN Security Council Resolution 242.²⁵⁴ In the early 1980s, the EC Member States and the US administration have different approaches to the settlement of the conflict. While the US administration favored a gradualist or step-by-step approach envisaging separate bilateral peace agreements between Israel and the Arab states as reflected in the Camp David peace process, the EC Member States favored comprehensive settlement of the conflict within the multilateral framework of an international peace conference with the participation of the all parties to the conflict. Moreover, while the Camp David granted a marginal place to the Palestinian problem by envisaging autonomy for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, EC Member States located the Palestinian problem at the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the right to a homeland for the Palestinian people.²⁵⁵

In addition to the US administration, the Israeli government was also against any European initiative deviating from Camp David. The Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared that any European initiative based on the right of the Palestinians to self-determination would immediately be rejected by Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited European capitals to convince EC Member States that the new declaration they were planning to issue would be particularly inopportune and not welcomed by Israel.²⁵⁶ In addition, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat warned EC Member States that any European initiative should be complementary to the Camp David Treaty and not be against it. He also stated that this initiative should respect that the Camp David is the corner-stone for a comprehensive peace, not just a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace; no outside interference should weaken this process and any European initiative must win the US support before it could achieve tangible results.²⁵⁷ Under this diplomatic pressure, in

²⁵⁴ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 456 and Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 142.

²⁵⁵ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the Arab World”, p. 279.

²⁵⁶ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 456 and Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 142.

²⁵⁷ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 456.

order to reassure the Americans, Emilio Colombo, the President-in-office of the EC Council, visited Washington and explained to the US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie that EC Member States did not want to oppose Camp David and that they only wished to be constructive.²⁵⁸ The German Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that the EC did not want to propose a change in UN Security Council Resolution 242. After this assurance the US eased its pressure on the EC. So, as seen from the declaration the US, the Egyptian and the Israeli pressure became effective, because EC Member States issued a much more moderate declaration than had been expected before these pressures.²⁵⁹ It had been expected that the coming declaration of EC Member States would challenge the Camp David process and identify it as inadequate for achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, call for a change in the UN Security Council Resolution of 242 by replacing the word 'refugees' with the word 'Palestinians', call for recognition of the PLO as the only representatives of the Palestinian people and the participation of it in the peace negotiations. As will be seen in the below, the Venice declaration did not meet these expectations.

At the European Council meeting in Venice on 12-13 June 1980, the leaders of EC Member States issued a joint declaration concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which they emphasized that the growing tensions affecting the Middle East constituted a serious danger and made a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict even more necessary and pressing. They also stated that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East obliged them to play a special role and required them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.

European political leaders declared that their declaration was based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the positions they had expressed in the previous declarations, and the speech delivered by the Irish Foreign Minister Michael O'Kennedy²⁶⁰ at the UN General Assembly in 26 September 1979 on behalf

²⁵⁸ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 456 and Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 142.

²⁵⁹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 142.

²⁶⁰ The Irish Foreign Minister Michael O'Kennedy while addressing to the UN General Assembly in 26 September 1979 on behalf of all EC Member States reemphasized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including the right to a homeland and the right to play its full part in the negotiations of a comprehensive settlement through its representatives. In his speech, he referred to

of all EC Member States. EC Member States proclaimed that there was a need to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples which implied the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.²⁶¹ By equating the Israeli security needs and the Palestinian rights as parallel objectives of the peace process, the EC Member States adopted a balanced and comprehensive approach.²⁶²

European political leaders announced that the necessary guarantees for a secure and peaceful settlement with recognized and guaranteed borders should be provided by the UN. They also declared their preparedness to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground, that is, with troops and observers. EC Member States referred to the Palestinian problem in the declaration and asserted that there is a necessity to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem which is not just a refugee problem. They argued that the Palestinian people must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination. EC Member States for the first time collectively pronounced themselves for the Palestinian right of self-determination.²⁶³

European political leaders proclaimed that the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement required the involvement and support of all the

the PLO and it was mentioned for the first time in a text of EC Member States. He stated that in the view of all EC Member States, it is necessary that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 be accepted by all those involved –including the PLO– as the basis for negotiation of a comprehensive settlement in which all the parties will play their full part. So, EC Member States declared that they would support the participation of the PLO in peace negotiations and its role, as the representative of the Palestinian people, but only when it accepted Israel's right to exist in an internationally agreed settlement. In September 1979, EC Member States defended the mutual recognition of the Israel's right to exist and the Palestinians' right to self-determination. In his speech, O'Kennedy referred to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people by stating that "it is essential that there be respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people ... who are entitled, within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right for their own future as a people". Moreover, O'Kennedy declared that EC Member States did not accept any unilateral moves claiming to change the status of Jerusalem. (Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy* (Avebury: Aldershot, 1987), p. 448).

²⁶¹ A Survey, *op.cit.*, p. 356.

²⁶² Ellen Laipson, "Europe's Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities", *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 1990), p. 11.

²⁶³ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 460.

parties concerned including the PLO. Here, EC Member States distinguished the Palestinian people and the PLO. The latter was being characterized as an organization which did not necessarily represent all the Palestinians.²⁶⁴ Although EC Member States did not recognize the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people, they called for its association with the peace negotiations as an important representative of the Palestinian people. EC Member States emphasized that they would not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the holy places. EC Member States asked Israel to end the territorial occupation it had maintained since 1967 Arab-Israeli War and identified the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories as a serious obstacle to the peace process and as illegal under international law. EC Member States called for putting an end to violence and asserted that only renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties could create a climate of confidence in the region which was the basic element for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. EC Member States declared their decision to make necessary contacts with all the parties concerned with the objective of ascertaining the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in the Venice declaration and in the light of the result of that consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.²⁶⁵

Israel strongly rejected the Declaration. The Israeli government on 15 June 1980 issued a communiqué stating that nothing would remain out of the Venice Declaration but a bitter memory. The Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin likened the declaration to the “Munich surrender” of 1938.²⁶⁶ The Venice declaration marked a low-point in Israel- EC relationship from which it has never fully

²⁶⁴ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 460.

²⁶⁵ A Survey, *op.cit.*, p. 356.

²⁶⁶ Begin stated that for the peace that would be achieved with the participation of that “organization of murderers”, he meant the PLO; a number of European countries were prepared to give guarantees, even military ones. Anyone with a memory must shudder, knowing the result of the guarantee given to Czechoslovakia in 1938 after Sudetenland was stolen from it, also in the name of self-determination. He asserted that any man of good will and every free person in Europe who studies the Venice declaration would see in it a “Munich surrender”, the second in our generation, to the totalitarian blackmail and an encouragement to all those elements which seek to undermine the Camp David Treaty and bring about the failure of the peace process in the Middle East. (Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 460; Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 142 and Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, *op.cit.*, p. 98).

recovered.²⁶⁷ For nearly a decade until the Madrid peace conference of November 1991, Israel strongly opposed any European endeavor to play an important role in the peace process in the Middle East.²⁶⁸

On the other hand, moderate Arab countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia welcomed the declaration although the PLO leadership found it as insufficient and unsatisfactory. The PLO asserted that the Declaration was the product of “American blackmail” and that it represented a European attempt to save the US sponsored Camp David Treaty.²⁶⁹ Apparently, the Venice Declaration did not meet the high expectations of the PLO. In fact, the Palestinians were hoping for a call to change UN Security council Resolution 242 and a clear assertion that the Camp David framework was insufficient for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.²⁷⁰ They were also hoping that the PLO would be recognized as the only representative of the Palestinian people.²⁷¹ Still, the Egyptian Minister of State Butros Ghali identified the declaration as a positive contribution to the peace process. He found it compatible with the goals of Camp David, because both are based on UN Security Council Resolutions of 242 and 338.²⁷² The US was also satisfied with the Declaration and showed a moderate reaction to the Declaration. The US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie declared that the text did not seem to directly challenge the Camp David process or divert efforts of the parties to the Camp David process from their work.²⁷³

The major aim of the Venice Declaration was to promote an active role for the EC in the Arab-Israeli conflict, instead of a purely declarative one: the term ‘European initiative’ was used to define the process set into operation by the

²⁶⁷ Joel Peters, “Europe and the MEPP: Emerging from the Sidelines” in Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis and Neville Waites (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s* (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 299.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

²⁶⁹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 145.

²⁷⁰ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 145.

²⁷¹ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”, p. 146.

²⁷² Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 466.

²⁷³ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 467.

Declaration.²⁷⁴ The Venice Declaration marked the emergence of a distinct and common European stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and outlined a collective position on the steps to be taken for its peaceful resolution.²⁷⁵ Venice Declaration outlined the basic principles of the EC's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and these principles still constitutes the basis of the EC's policy.²⁷⁶

To sum up, as discussed previously, throughout the 1970s, EC Member States gradually developed a joint position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Venice Declaration of 1980 marked the peak point of this development. During the 1970s, EC Member States had gradually developed a pro-Arab position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU's pro-Arab position can be observed in the EC's declarations concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, the speeches of the representatives of the EC at the UN General Assembly and their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. During the 1970s, EC Member States' dependence on oil produced by the Arab states in the Middle East and the Arab political pressure on them were the most important factors in their gradual adoption of a pro-Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. EC Member States located the Palestinian problem at the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. They called for a comprehensive peace settlement in which the Palestinian people would be located in a position to exercise fully their right to self-determinations. They also called for the association of the PLO with the peace negotiations as an important representative of the Palestinian people. EC Member States in their declarations criticized and condemned Israel's policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories and identified it as the main stumbling block before the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

During the 1970s EC Member States pursued a "declaratory policy". The Brussels Declaration of 1973, the London Declaration of 1977 and the Venice

²⁷⁴ Ilan Greilsammer, "Reflections on the Capability of the European Community to Play an Active Role in an International Crisis: The Case of the Israeli Action in Lebanon", in Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler (eds.), *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p. 286.

²⁷⁵ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 298.

²⁷⁶ Joel Peters, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Declaration of the European Council of Berlin and Beyond", in Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2000), p. 154.

Declaration of 1980 were three important declarations in the development of the EC's position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Although in the 1970s, EC Member States managed to overcome initial divergences among them and developed a joint position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, as will be discussed later in the section of the EU's role performance in post-9/11 era, the lack of consistency between EU positions and those of its Member States has still continued to be a constraint on the EU which hinders its ability to act as an effective mediator for the settlement of the conflict.

4.2 The Quest for a European Peace Initiative in the Middle East in the 1980s

After the Venice Declaration, in the early 1980s, EC Member States attempted to launch their own Middle East peace initiative. In accordance with the Venice Declaration, in order to know the position of the various parties toward the principles outlined in the Venice declaration and to determine the form of the European peace initiative in the light of the results of consultations with the parties, EC Member States sent two fact-finding missions to the Middle East (Thorn mission and Van der Klaauw mission) to make necessary contacts with all the parties concerned.²⁷⁷

Israel adopted a negative attitude towards these two missions and any European peace initiatives. The Israeli denial of any European peace initiative as one of the parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict made it impossible to start any European peace initiative. After the failure of these missions, EC Member States did not launch any European peace initiative in the Middle East.

During the second half of 1981 and first half of 1982, several important developments prevented the launch of a European peace initiative in the Middle East. The first development was the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

²⁷⁷ The first mission was the Thorn mission and it was headed by Gaston Thorn, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg and the President-in-office of the EC Council. The Thorn mission in autumn 1980 visited the countries in the region including Tunisia, Israel, the Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Although the Arab States adopted a positive attitude toward a European peace initiative, Israel adopted a negative stance and rejected any European Peace initiative. Israel's negative stance against any European peace initiative prevented EC Member States to launch their own peace initiative. The second mission was the Van der Klaauw mission and it was headed by Christoph Albert Van der Klaauw, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands and the President-in-office of the EC Council. Van der Klaauw visited the countries in the Middle East including Syria, Iraq, Israel, the Lebanon and Egypt during the spring 1981. The Klaauw mission shared the same fate with the Thorn mission. Although most of the Arab countries approached favorably to any European peace initiative, Israel denied it completely.

on 6 October 1981. EC Member States decided to wait for Sadat's successor and his attitudes toward European peace efforts. The second development was the change of the Presidency in France and a change in French Middle East policy. In spring 1981, François Mitterrand became the French President and after his election the French attitude towards a European peace initiative changed. Mitterrand's France stopped supporting a European peace initiative. Another important development was the publication of the Fahd Plan in August 1981. In August 1981, Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia launched a peace plan for the Middle East and this led to hesitation on the part of Europeans about how to respond to this plan and to reconcile the Fahd²⁷⁸ and Venice plans.²⁷⁹ After their political cooperation meeting of 13 October 1981, the EC foreign ministers decided to support the Fahd plan. However, the plan was rejected by both the Arab States at the Arab Summit at Fez and Israel.

During this period, some EC Member States, such as the UK²⁸⁰ and France, started to pursue their own national initiatives in the Middle East rather than supporting a European initiative. This further prevented the emergence of a European peace initiative in the Middle East. Especially, France under the Presidency of Mitterrand started to carry out its own national diplomatic initiatives.

During this period, four of EC Member States including France, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands decided to participate in the Multinational Sinai Force and

²⁷⁸ The Fahd Plan, which was proposed by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia of on 7 August 1981, was an eight point proposal to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This plan included the eight points: Israeli withdrawal from 1967-captured territories, including East Jerusalem, dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, guarantees of freedom of worship for all in the holy places; the Palestinian people's right to self-determination; indemnity for Palestinian refugees not exercising the right of return; West Bank and Gaza placed under UN control for a transitional period (a few months), establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital; subsequent Security Council guarantee of peace among all states in the area, including the new Palestinian state; and the Security Council guarantee of the above principles. Modified form of this plan was adopted by Arab leaders at the Fez summit on 9 September 1982.

²⁷⁹ Greilsammer and Weiler, op.cit., "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", p. 155.

²⁸⁰ During this period, the Thatcher government decided to adopt a somewhat higher profile in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The main reasons behind this are: the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington's success in the settlement of the Zimbabwe issue which created both expectation of, and a greater confidence in, a more positive policy under his leadership; the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, which inevitably giving greater attention to the Middle East than required by oil and trade; the loss of momentum in the Camp David Peace Process which created an impetus for the Europeans to launch their own initiative; and the fact that the British would take the EC Presidency in the second half of 1981. (Geoffrey Edwards, "Britain" in David Allen and Alfred Pijpers (eds.), *European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), p. 52).

Observers which was based on the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Peace Treaty. On 26 October 1981, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson declared the French determination to participate in the international peace-keeping force to be established in the Sinai in April 1982. On 23 November 1981, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands also declared their decision to participate. On 24 November 1981, other EC Member States approved these four countries' decision on the condition that their participation would facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all states in the region and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination.²⁸¹ These conditions confirmed that these four EC Member States wanted to participate in the MFO on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration. These four states informed the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin about the conditions for their participation. However, Israel rejected the participation of the Europeans on the basis of the principles which contradicted Camp David and asserted that their participation should be based on the Camp David Treaty.²⁸² EC Member States accepted Israel's demand and assured the Israelis that their participation in the MFO would not depend on any political condition, whether stated previously in Venice or elsewhere. After this assurance, Israel approved their participation. As a result of these developments during early years of 1980s, any possibility to launch a European peace initiative faded away.²⁸³

Israel invaded Lebanon on 5 June 1982 as part of Peace in Galilee operation. On 9 June 1982, the EC foreign ministers met in Bonn and issued a declaration condemning the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. They identified the Israeli invasion as obvious violation of international law and they called for Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon with all its forces.²⁸⁴ EC Member States also warned Israel that if Israel continued not to comply with the UN Resolutions which called for the Israeli armed forces' immediate and unconditional

²⁸¹ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 494.

²⁸² Ifestos, op.cit., p. 496.

²⁸³ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 496.

²⁸⁴ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 505.

withdrawal from Lebanon, they would examine possibilities for future action.²⁸⁵ This phrase implied sanctions against Israel. On 14 June 1982, the EC sent a document to Israel which asked for assurances on ten points: the recognition of Lebanese sovereignty, a commitment not to occupy or annex any part of Lebanese territory, non-interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon, cooperation with the UN Secretary General, commitment to non-hostility towards the Palestinian people, commitment to non-aggression against neighboring countries including Syria, observance of the cease-fire established in the territory, the application of the Geneva Convention particularly in respect of the Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners, commitment to grant normal facilities to the press, commitment to allow humanitarian organizations to carry out their work without hindrance.²⁸⁶ Israel found this list of demands to be unacceptable and rejected them.

At the European Council meeting in Brussels on 28-29 June 1982, the European political leaders issued a joint declaration concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. They repeated their strong condemnation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and called for a simultaneous withdrawal of the Israeli and the Palestinian forces from Beirut and the rapid withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the whole of Lebanon.²⁸⁷ They declared that the return of the Lebanon to lasting peace requires the total and rapid withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Lebanon, as well as the departure of all foreign forces, excepting those authorized by a legitimate and widely representative Lebanese government, whose authority has been entirely reestablished over the whole of its national territory.²⁸⁸ They also re-emphasized that peace negotiations should be based on the principles of security for all states and justice for all peoples. Moreover, Israel could achieve this security by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, which must be able to exercise its right to self-determination with all that this implies.²⁸⁹ They also stated that Israel could not achieve the security to which it was entitled through the use of force and presenting

²⁸⁵ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 505.

²⁸⁶ Bichara Khader, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1973-1983: An Arab Perspective" in David Allen and Alfred Pijpers (eds.), *European Foreign Policy-making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), p. 177.

²⁸⁷ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 508.

²⁸⁸ Khader, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

²⁸⁹ Khader, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

other parties with a *fait accompli*.²⁹⁰ They noted that in order for negotiations to be possible, the Palestinian people must be involved and represented.²⁹¹ EC Member States wanted the Palestinian people to be able to promote their claims and demand by political means. The satisfaction of these claims must take account of the need to recognize and respect the existence and security of all parties involved.²⁹² The Brussels Declaration of 1982, unlike the Venice declaration, used the phrase the right to self-determination with all that implies for the Palestinian people rather than emphasizing the principle of the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.

Concerning the sanctions against Israel, European political leaders decided to adopt sanctions which could not have any practical effect on Israel.²⁹³ They decided to freeze both any-high level contact between EC officials and the Israeli government, not to convene the Council of Cooperation provided by the 1975 Cooperation Agreement and the two 1977 protocols. They also decided to put off the signing of the second Financial Protocol (48 million ECU).²⁹⁴ Nevertheless, through the freeze the contacts between EC officials and the Israeli diplomats continued. As the two 1977 protocols had a very limited scope, the freeze of this protocols did not have a significant effect of Israel. Since the amount of EC funds promised to Israel with the second Financial Protocol was very small, its postponement did not have a practical effect on Israel.²⁹⁵

During the summer 1982, EC Member States did not take any collective initiative. France and Egypt carried out a diplomatic initiative during the summer 1982. On 1 September 1982, the US President Ronald Reagan announced his peace plan for the Middle East. The Reagan Plan envisaged total autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza population, but in association with Jordan, free elections for the Palestinian authorities in the Occupied Territories, an immediate freeze of the Israeli settlement policies in the Occupied Territories, gradual transfer of authority over five

²⁹⁰ Khader, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

²⁹¹ Khader, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

²⁹² Khader, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

²⁹³ Greilsammer, "Reflections on the Capability of the European Community", *op.cit.*, p. 291.

²⁹⁴ Greilsammer, "Reflections on the Capability of the European Community", *op.cit.*, p. 291.

²⁹⁵ Greilsammer, "Reflections on the Capability of the European Community", *op.cit.*, p. 292.

years to the elected authorities.²⁹⁶ This plan was an extension of Camp David and diverged from EC Member States' position on three points: first of all, it did not envisage self-determination for the Palestinian people; secondly, it did not envisage association of the PLO in the negotiations; and thirdly, this plan put forward that the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians would be associated with Jordan, but EC Member States emphasized that this should be decided by the Palestinians depending on the principle of self-determination.²⁹⁷ Nonetheless, in September 1982, EC Member States issued a declaration and welcomed the Reagan Plan. They declared that this plan offered an important opportunity for peaceful progress on the Palestinian question and a step towards the reconciliation of the parties' conflicting aspirations.²⁹⁸ However, the Reagan Plan was rejected by both the PLO and Israel.

On 9 September 1982, Arab leaders met at the Fez summit and adopted their own peace plan for the Middle East. This plan included the eight points:

- The Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including East Jerusalem;
- the dismantling of the Israeli settlements on the Arab territories after 1967;
- the guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious ceremonies for all religions in the holy places;
- the reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-definition and the exercise of its imprescriptible and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative, and indemnification of all those who do not desire to return;
- placing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under the auspices of the UN for a transitory period not exceeding a few months;
- the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital;
- the guarantee of the UN Security Council for the peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state;

²⁹⁶ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 511.

²⁹⁷ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 511.

²⁹⁸ Ifestos, op.cit., p. 511.

- the guarantee of the UN Security Council for the respect of the above-mentioned principles.

EC Member States welcomed the Fez Plan and called all the parties to seize the present opportunity to initiate a process of mutual rapprochement leading towards a comprehensive peace settlement. EC Member States highlighted the significance of the Fez Plan. EC Member States identified it as an expression of the common will of the participants of the Fez summit, including the PLO, to work for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East encompassing all states in the region including Israel.²⁹⁹ However, the Fez Plan was strongly rejected by Israel.

In the later part of 1980s, EC Member States did not attempt to launch their own collective Middle East peace initiative. They began to pursue a common policy of supporting the Reagan Plan, the Fez Plan and the Franco-Egyptian diplomatic initiatives while relegating the Venice Declaration to the background.³⁰⁰ They continued to emphasize their commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the right to existence and security of all states in the Middle East, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, with all that implies, the association of the PLO with peace negotiations. They called on Israel to end its territorial occupation which it has maintained since 1967 war.

Toward the end of 1980s, especially after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987, European political leaders called for the convening an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN for the solution of the conflict, which would represent the suitable framework for the necessary negotiations between the parties directly concerned. They pronounced their preparedness to play an active role in bringing the positions of the parties concerned closer to one another with a view to such a Conference being convened.³⁰¹ They affirmed their readiness to contribute to the search for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian problem, in accordance with the 1980 Venice Declaration. They announced their preparedness to cooperate fully in the economic and social development of the people of the Middle

²⁹⁹ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 512.

³⁰⁰ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, Europe's Middle East Dilemma, p. 91.

³⁰¹ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 528.

East. With these statements, EC Member States emphasized their willingness to move from common declarations to common diplomatic action. In December 1988, the EC Member States appointed a contact group of foreign ministers assigned with the task to promote the principle of a peace conference.³⁰²

In summary, after the Venice Declaration of 1980, in the early 1980s, although EC Member States had attempted to launch their own collective Middle East peace initiative and set their own path, independently of the US, they had failed. During this period, individual EC Member States mainly the UK and France carried out their individual peace initiatives. Still, EC Member States collectively issued common declarations recalling the EC's previously agreed principles and rhetorically supporting other peace initiatives or condemning the Israeli acts in the Occupied Territories and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. During the 1980s, EC Member States continued pursuing a declaratory policy. During the 1980s, the EC's policy was based on 'declarations rather than action' or 'declarations and call to action'. As a result, EC Member States remained as bystanders in successive peace initiatives³⁰³ while the US became the major player in finding peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Especially after the Camp David, the US became the main mediator in the MEPP as the EU just played a supplementary and subordinate role to the US diplomatic efforts.³⁰⁴ EC Member States supported the US diplomatic initiatives, such as the Reagan Plan. Ellen Laipson argued, during the 1980s, the EC had not played a major role in the Middle East either as a crisis mediator or peacemaker.³⁰⁵ In addition to Laipson, Hazel Smith also rightly put forward, during the 1980s, the EC failed to play a significant part in securing the amelioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict or in making any noteworthy contribution to peace.³⁰⁶

During the 1980s, the EC was sidelined and marginalized; this was mainly due to the Israeli and the US denial of the EC to play an active role in the quest for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler argued in spite of various declarations, visits, participations in multinational

³⁰² Aoun, *op.cit.*, p. 292.

³⁰³ Robin, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

³⁰⁴ Ifestos, *op.cit.*, p. 515.

³⁰⁵ Laipson, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

³⁰⁶ Hazel Smith, *op.cit.*, p.169.

forces and all the rest, the EC did not have a visible impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁰⁷ They added that the US directly, and the Soviet Union indirectly acted as the major actors, with Venice and its aftermath not really producing a real European presence.³⁰⁸ As Joel Peters argued, the positions and diplomacy adopted by the EC throughout the 1980s did little to advance its ambitions of playing an important role in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁰⁹

During the 1980s, there were three reasons which prevented EC Member States to play an effective and active role in the mediation efforts in the MEPP. First of all, the EC's pro-Arab stance reflected in its declarations made it an unacceptable honest mediator in the eyes of Israel. Secondly, the EC did have little neither the capacity nor any decisive influence over the parties and bring them to the negotiating table.³¹⁰ Especially, EPC's institutional deficiency prevented the EC to play an effective and active role in the mediation efforts in the MEPP. EPC did not possess a permanent and central institution like the General Secretariat of the Council for the EC, which would enable the EC to swiftly respond to and intervene in international crisis, like the Middle East conflict.³¹¹ The lack of administrative secretariat, which would have enabled the Presidency to organize meetings, prepare the topics debated and ensure the political tasks are following up, prevented European political leaders from agreeing on a joint position in times of crisis.³¹² For instance, it took one month to agree on the Brussels Declaration of 1973. The institutional weakness of EPC made it highly reactive process with declaratory outputs lacking operational capacity.³¹³ Although European political leaders made joint statements, they were unable to concretize these statements due to their lack of tools for that purpose.³¹⁴ For example, the Venice Declaration of 1980 emphasized the Palestinian's right to self-determination and the need to involve the PLO in any negotiations, but the

³⁰⁷ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, Europe's Middle East Dilemma, p. 103.

³⁰⁸ Greilsammer and Weiler, *op.cit.*, Europe's Middle East Dilemma, p. 103.

³⁰⁹ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 300.

³¹⁰ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 300.

³¹¹ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World".

³¹² Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", pp. 275-276.

³¹³ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 277.

³¹⁴ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 277.

declaration could not provide concrete proposals to put these ideas into action.³¹⁵ Hence, EPC's limited potential for crisis management acted as a considerable impediment and prevented the EC to play an effective and active role in the mediation efforts in the MEPP.³¹⁶ Thirdly, the US did not want to share driving seat in the MEPP³¹⁷ and reserved for itself the role of a major player.

4.3 The Quest for a Pro-Active European Role in the MEPP in the 1990s

During the 1990s, EU Member States went beyond just issuing common declarations on the Arab-Israeli conflict. They began to emerge from the sidelines and play an active role in the MEPP. As put forward by an EU official, the EU became a player in the MEPP in the 1990s. He noted that since the early 1990s, the EU has got involved in the game.³¹⁸ The EU participated in the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process. The EU acted as the chair or gavel-holder of Regional Economic Development Working Group, one of the working groups of multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process. In the 1990s, the EU became the largest donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP. In the political dimension of the peace process and in bilateral negotiations, the US continued to play the role of the sole mediator of the peace process and although the EU played a significant role in the economic dimension of the peace process, it was still sidelined and excluded from the political dimension of the peace process. The Israeli rejection of any country except the US to play the role of the sole mediator of the peace process and the EU's lack of military capabilities and sufficient political instruments forced the EU to focus the economic dimension of the peace process.³¹⁹ The EU played a key role in the construction of the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis.³²⁰ In 1995 the EU launched the EMP which was seen by many as complementary to the MEPP. The EMP provided a multilateral forum for the conflicting parties, the Arabs and the Israelis to sit on the same table and discuss.

³¹⁵ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 277.

³¹⁶ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 278.

³¹⁷ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP", p. 16.

³¹⁸ Interview with Wolfgang Barwinkel, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 4 November 2009.

³¹⁹ Mesut Özcan, "European Union's Middle East Policy and Turkey", *Avrasya Etüdleri* (No. 27-28, Sonbahar-Kış 2005).

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

During the second half of the 1990s, the EU appointed its special representative for the MEPP in 1996. In 1999, Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative for the CFSP. These two appointments enhanced the EU's presence and visibility in the MEPP in the late 1990s.

4.3.1 The Maastricht Treaty and the Launch of the CFSP

During the early 1990s, the Cold War which shaped international politics since the early 1950s ended and the security environment in Europe changed. The Soviet Union no longer posed a threat towards Europe and the bipolar character of international politics faded away. The new security challenges for Europe can be listed as political and economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, destruction of environment, organized crime, spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of human rights.³²¹ In the Post-Cold War period, two important events convinced EU Member States to further their cooperation in areas of foreign and security policy and to launch the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty. These events were the Gulf War in 1991 and the Yugoslav Conflicts in the early 1990s.

During the Gulf Crisis and War, EU Member States failed to maintain a common position on the crisis due to the diverging domestic political considerations and varying national interests of EU Member States. Especially, on the issue of European hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, unilateral initiatives³²² of France, Britain and Germany undermined the coherence of EU Member States. The Gulf Crisis and War significantly affected the negotiations over the EU's CFSP. The Gulf Crisis and War changed the course of discussion on a common foreign and security policy. Before the war, the EU's foreign policy laid on peaceful lines. The trend of history laid in disarmament and dismantling of military alliances and it was accepted that the EU's contribution to the new security environment in Europe was through non-military means as a civilian power.³²³ However, the Gulf War obliged the Member States to

³²¹ Helene Sjurson, "The CFSP: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?", *Arena Working Papers*, (99/34) <http://arena.uio.no> and Jannis Sakellariou, and Tamara Keating, "Safeguarding Multilateralism: The Urgency of European Defence", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Vol. IX, Iss. 2, Winter/Spring 2003), p. 84.

³²² For further information please see Taylan Özgür Kaya, *The CFSP: The European Union's Quest for Being a Coherent and Effective Actor in Global Politics* (Unpublished MSc. Thesis, Middle East Technical University: The Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2004).

³²³ Simon J. Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy* (United States: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 147.

confront their global responsibilities in the post-Cold War world, and the security and defence dimensions of the CFSP gained more importance.³²⁴

During the breakdown of ex-Yugoslavia, EU Member States also lacked coherent approach especially, on issues of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and military intervention. Therefore, EU Member States were not able to stop the conflict and bloodshed in the region. Their lack of coherence during the crisis undermined the EU's effectiveness and international credibility, because EU Member States were not able to stop civil war in Yugoslavia and bloodshed continued until the UN got involved in the conflict, and although in the early days of the conflict, Jacques Poos declared it was the hour of Europe not of the Americans, and that the Yugoslav conflict could only be solved by the Europeans, it could not turn into reality, the hour of Europe had lasted 14 months.³²⁵

These two events demonstrated EU Member States that they needed to adopt and maintain a coherent position in order for the EU to become an effective international actor and have an impact on international events. The recognition crisis³²⁶ during the Yugoslav Conflict and the hostage crisis during the Gulf War demonstrated the limits of EPC's ability in coordinating the foreign policies of Member States and motivated them to form a common foreign policy rather than a coordination of foreign policies of Member States. Furthermore, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav Conflict broke the deadlock on security and defence issues in the ongoing Maastricht negotiations. EU Member States realized the risk of serious security and defence problems in the Post-Cold War era and the deficiencies in the ability of EPC to influence the foreign policies of most powerful Member States like Germany. Moreover, the reluctance of the US to be involved in the conflict led the Europeans to believe that they should take more responsibility for their own security in the Post-Cold War era.³²⁷

The Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union was signed by EU Member States on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³²⁶ For further information please see Taylan Özgür Kaya, *The CFSP: The European Union's Quest for Being a Coherent and Effective Actor in Global Politics* (Unpublished MSc. Thesis, Middle East Technical University: The Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2004).

³²⁷ Michael E. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 179.

following its ratification by all Member States. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community took the name of the European Union and it was constructed on the three pillars. These pillars are the European Community, the CFSP and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. With the Maastricht Treaty, a single institutional framework was established and all three pillars were put under a single institutional framework. With the introduction of the CFSP, cooperation in areas of foreign and security policy was replaced by a common policy. With the Maastricht Treaty, all questions related to the security of the EU were put under the CFSP. In order to ensure concerted and convergent action of Member States, two new instruments of action was introduced: common positions and joint actions. With the Maastricht Treaty, the old Ministerial Meetings of EPC was replaced by the General Affairs Council (Foreign Ministers) as the only decision-making body at the ministerial level for all matters concerning foreign affairs. EPC Secretariat merged with the General Secretariat of the Council. The EU Presidency was tasked with representation of the EU in matters related to the CFSP, implementation of common measures and expressing the position of the EU in international organizations and international conferences.

The main reason behind the EU Member States' launch of the CFSP was to achieve a CFSP which would enable the EU to project onto global arena the combined power of the EU Member States. Because it was hoped that by this way, the EU would carry more weight and influence in international affairs than the power exercised by each member state independently.³²⁸ The creation of the CFSP symbolized acceleration in the process of European political integration and in the transformation of the EU into a global actor, increasing its aspirations of playing a more relevant role in the Middle East.³²⁹

4.3.2 The Madrid Peace Process and the EU

In the Autumn of 1991, the US took another Middle East peace initiative. In the Autumn 1990, the US administration promised a peace process for the Middle East in order to get the Arab countries to join the international coalition against Iraq or persuade them to stay on the sideline.³³⁰ After its success in the Gulf War in early

³²⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 17.

³²⁹ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 17.

³³⁰ Bilgin, *op.cit.*, Regional Security....

1991, the US administration decided to establish a framework for negotiations, which could lead to a comprehensive peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.³³¹ The US President George Bush after the US success in the Gulf War, declared that the campaign to contain Iraqi aggression and force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait should be understood in the context of a “New World Order”, in which international disputes would be settled through peaceful means.³³² In March 1991, the US President George Bush declared achieving the Arab-Israeli peace on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and through an exchange of land for peace as one of the four objectives of the US Middle East policy.³³³ After this speech, US Secretary of State James Baker visited the Middle East and stated that the US would propose a series of confidence building measures as a prologue to the Arab-Israeli peace talks to be held under the co-sponsorship of the US and the Soviet Union.³³⁴ On 19 October 1991, the US with the Soviet Union sent a letter of invitation to the parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict including Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians, which invited them to come together and hold a peace conference in Madrid. The invited parties accepted the invitation and the Madrid Peace Conference was convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991. The USSR was the co-sponsor of the conference with the US. Delegations from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel participated in the conference; the Palestinian representatives participated as a part of the Jordanian delegation, because Israel rejected their participation as a separate entity. The EU with the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council attended to the conference as observer.

At the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 28-29 June 1991, the leaders of EU Member States declared their firm support for the US peace initiative. As a participant, they declared that they aimed to make their full contribution to the success of the peace conference and to the negotiations between parties. They also declared their determination to contribute to the economic and social development of all peoples in the region once the prospect of peace was clear. On 10 October 1991,

³³¹ Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, op.cit., p. 120.

³³² Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 749.

³³³ Ibid., p. 750.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 750.

the leaders of EU Member States issued a declaration on the MEPP which reiterated their full support for the US and the Soviet Union's Middle East peace initiative. They welcomed the agreement in principle of all parties of the conflict to the approach proposed by US Secretary of State James Baker. They declared their determination to give all possible support to efforts to convene a Middle East Peace Conference and to play an active role as a full participant in such a Conference alongside the US and the Soviet Union.

At the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991, the leaders of EU Member States reiterated their commitment to make an active contribution to progress in the multilateral track of negotiations on regional cooperation. They emphasized that multilateral and bilateral negotiations should run in parallel and be complementary with each other. They also reemphasized their commitment to do all they could to promote significant steps toward a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement for the Middle East.

The Madrid Peace Conference launched the Peace Process which was composed of two tracks: bilateral and multilateral tracks. The EU was sidelined and excluded from bilateral political talks between Israel and Arab states, but was given a more prominent role within the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process by the US, because the US policymakers expected the EU to contribute a substantial share to the funding of the peace process.³³⁵ A Palestinian diplomat put forward that that the Europeans were 'sitting in the last seat of the conference' and did not play a political role in the Madrid Peace Process. He maintained that there is an absence of the EU as a political actor in the Madrid Peace Process.³³⁶

Bilateral talks took place under the auspices of the US in Washington, but the EU was not invited to participate in the bilateral talks. Bilateral talks concentrated on the political issues of territorial control and sovereignty, border demarcations, security arrangements and the political rights of the Palestinians.³³⁷

³³⁵ Ben Soetendorp, "The EU's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building of a Visible International Identity", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 7, Iss. 3, 2002), p. 286.

³³⁶ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

³³⁷ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 300.

The US took the monopoly on high politics, the bilateral political talks between Israel and Arab states.³³⁸

The EU participated in the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process, which was opened in Moscow in January 1992. The first purpose of the multilateral talks was to facilitate progress at the bilateral talks of the peace process by creating a separate forum in which Israel and the Arab states could discuss technical issues of reciprocal concern, which in turn would serve as confidence-building measures between the parties.³³⁹ The second purpose of the multilateral talks was addressing region-wide problems at a regional level.³⁴⁰ Multilateral talks concentrated on a range of primarily non-political issues which extend across national boundaries, and the resolution of which is essential for the promotion of long-term regional development of security.³⁴¹ Multilateral talks mainly focused on low politics issues, such as water resources, environment, regional economic development and refugees.

The Multilateral talks were different from bilateral talks. They have provided Israel and the Arab states an alternative diplomatic area to engage in low-risk communication and exchange, to develop new forms of cooperation, and to generate creative solutions and plans for the future on a regional level.³⁴²

The idea of a multilateral track was grounded in a functionalist and liberalist approach to international cooperation and peace: the entangling of the states in the Middle East in an ever-widening web of economic, technical and welfare interdependencies would drive them to leave behind their political and/or ideological rivalries.³⁴³ The process of continuing cooperation in areas of reciprocal concern would blur long-held hostilities and would create a new perception of shared needs. Continuous interaction would be accompanied by a learning process which would promote a fundamental change in attitudes and lead to a convergence of expectations

³³⁸ Alain Dieckhoff, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Journal Inroads* (Iss. 16, Winter-Spring 2005), p. 54.

³³⁹ Joel Peters, *Pathways to the Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 5.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁴² Joel Peters, "Can the Multilateral Middle East Talks be Revived?", *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal* (Vol. 3, No. 4, December 1999), p. 4.

³⁴³ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 302.

and the institutionalization of norms of behaviour.³⁴⁴ Out of progress in the multilateral domain would emerge a vision of what real peace might entail and the benefits that would accrue to all parties, thereby facilitating progress in bilateral talks. Drawing parallels from the experience of European integration process, it was believed that functional cooperation would eventually spill over into regional peace.³⁴⁵ Moreover, the multilateral talks indicated the emerging concept of cooperative security in the post-Cold War era, with a greater emphasis on dealing with the root causes of conflict and promoting confidence, rather than relying primarily on deterrence and containment.³⁴⁶

Multilateral talks encompassed five working groups, on water resources, environment, refugees, arms control and regional security, and regional economic development.³⁴⁷ The EU acted as the gavel-holder (chair) for one of five working groups, Regional Economic Development Working Group. The EU as a gavel-holder has the responsibility to ensure the smooth functioning of the meeting and exert authority only if discussions become too disorderly.³⁴⁸ As the gavel-holder, the EU actively promoted ideas and ventures for future economic cooperation among the parties of the region.³⁴⁹ REDWG was the largest and most active of the five working groups both in terms of the number of participants and in terms of the number of projects and inter-sessional activities.³⁵⁰ The purpose of the REDWG was to bring together the regional parties and to draw the international community into the peace process.³⁵¹ The REDWG was for the creation of a new set of mutually beneficial relations between the parties and the building of a new era of economic prosperity for the Middle East as a whole.³⁵² It was believed that sustainable peace in the Middle East could only be achieved if bilateral agreements, once concluded, were

³⁴⁴ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 302.

³⁴⁵ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 6.

³⁴⁶ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Can the Multilateral Middle East Talks be Revived?”, p. 1.

³⁴⁷ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 10.

³⁴⁸ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 11.

³⁴⁹ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 303.

³⁵⁰ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 46 and Rory Miller, “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel”, *Israel Affairs* (Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2006), p. 643.

³⁵¹ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 303.

³⁵² Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 46.

accompanied by a long term process of economic cooperation among all the parties of the region.

The first three rounds of talks of REDWG took place in Brussels from May 1992 to May 1993. During these rounds a list of ten areas of activity was determined and “shepherds” were assigned to take responsibility for the running in each of these ten areas of activity. Most of these areas of activity focused on infrastructural development or on sectoral coordination. These areas included communications and transport led by France, energy led by the EU, tourism led by Japan, agriculture led by Spain, financial markets led by the UK, trade led by Germany, training led by the US, networks led by the EU, institutions, sectors and principles led by the Egypt and bibliography led by Canada. At the fourth round of talks that took place in Copenhagen in November 1993, the Copenhagen Action Plan was adopted. This plan formed the working basis of the activities of the REDWG. At the plenary meetings held in Rabat in June 1994 and Bonn in January 1994, the participating countries responsible reported on the various activities undertaken and announced new initiatives within their respective areas of activity. In order to finance these activities the EU declared that it would allocate \$6 million for the preparation of feasibility studies and a further \$9.2 million for the preparation of studies and the running of inter-sessional activities for the rapid implementation of the Copenhagen Action Plan.³⁵³

The EU encouraged the regional parties to explore ideas about the future long-term nature of their economic relations and to develop a vision of potential institutional mechanisms and frameworks to support and sustain their efforts towards regional cooperation. At the plenary meeting at Rabat in June 1994, regional parties agreed on a number of guidelines and principles; they recognized that there was a need for the pooling of common capacities and joint tackling of common problems through coordinated efforts; the removal of obstacles to private sector’s ability to play a more prominent role; the promotion of regional trade; the facilitating of investment and the development of infrastructure; the encouragement of the free flow of people, goods, services, capital and information within the region.

³⁵³ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 47.

At Rabat it was also decided to establish a Monitoring Group composed of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians which would take a more direct role in implementing the Copenhagen Action Plan, in organizing the various sectoral activities and in developing a set of priorities and identifying future projects for the working group. The Monitoring Group was composed of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, the EU, the US, Russia, Japan, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Norway and co-chaired by the EU and four core regional participants including Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. In order to effectively coordinate extensive range of activities of the working group, at the Amman Economic Summit in November 1995, it was decided that a permanent Secretariat would be established in Amman. After its establishment, the Secretariat organized several regional meetings and workshops focusing on practical programmes, often of a technical nature, aimed at promoting regional economic cooperation. The establishment of the Secretariat was an important, qualitative step in the institutionalization of the multilateral process, and in leaving responsibility for directing process of regional cooperation in the hands of the regional parties themselves.³⁵⁴ At the time the REDWG Secretariat was the first and only functioning regional institution, produced by the MEPP and headed by the EU, in which the Egyptian, the Israeli, the Jordanian and the Palestinian officials could work together on a daily basis.³⁵⁵

Bilateral talks came to a halt after the change of government in Israel and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister of Israel in 1996. Both talks and the activities of the REDWG came to a halt. There were three main reasons behind the halt of both bilateral and multilateral talks. First, Arab policy-makers thought that there had not been enough progress in the bilateral talks. Second, Arab policy-makers were concerned about the Israeli domination in the economic and technological fields if they agreed to strengthen Middle Eastern regionalism. Third, Arab policy-makers were frustrated with the US double standards. They thought that while ignoring the Israeli failure to implement UN resolutions on Palestine, the US used threat of air attacks against Iraq which failed to cooperate with the UN inspection team.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Can the Multilateral Middle East Talks be Revived?", p. 5.

³⁵⁵ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP...", p. 306.

³⁵⁶ Bilgin, *op.cit.*, Regional Security..., p. 155.

Multilateral talks played a complementary role to the bilateral talks and mainly provided a forum for the discussion of areas which are primarily technical in nature.³⁵⁷ The multilateral talks allowed the states in the region to attend to long-term issues that should be dealt with if and when a settlement is reached.³⁵⁸ The multilateral talks also enabled the states in the region to begin to develop a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures to govern the nature of their future regional economic, social and cultural relations.³⁵⁹ The multilateral talks also enabled active participation of the international community in securing a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The multilateral talks in general, REDWG in particular, enabled the states in the region and international community to promote a unique partnership among them in promoting the conditions for a new era of regional cooperation in the Middle East.³⁶⁰ REDWG facilitated political ties and cooperation between the Arabs and the Israelis.³⁶¹

The EU, as the gavel-holder of the largest and most active one of five working groups, played an important role in the multilateral and economic dimension of the Madrid Peace Process which was a process complementary to the bilateral talks. The EU with its historical experience in solving interstate conflicts and achieving peace through economic cooperation helped the states in the region to establish a dialogue on the future regional and multilateral economic cooperation among them.

The Madrid Peace Process was the confirmation of a position long-defended by the EU that it was necessary to convene an international peace conference for finding a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would represent a suitable forum for the direct negotiations between the parties concerned. The EU's another long-defended position; the necessity of the participation of the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people in the

³⁵⁷ Joel Peters, "The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Peace Talks and the Barcelona Process: Competition and Convergence?", *International Spectator* (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1998), p. 68.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³⁶⁰ Peters, *op.cit.*, Pathways to the Peace..., p. 60.

³⁶¹ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, "The EU's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", p. 287.

peace negotiations was realized by the Oslo Process in which Israel and the PLO recognized each other and carried out direct negotiations.

4.3.3 The Oslo Peace Process and the EU

During 1993, the officials of Israel and the PLO carried out secret direct negotiations in Oslo, Norway under the sponsorship of the Norwegian government, which culminated in the Oslo Peace Process. This process led to a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli Conflict when Israel and the PLO reached an agreement on 20 August 1993 and signed the Oslo Accords, the so called Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington on 13 September 1993. The EU was excluded from these direct negotiations. Although the EU was represented at the signing ceremony in Washington by the Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes for the EU Presidency and the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, their role was limited to issuing of statements of support.³⁶² The Oslo Peace Process represented the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO which was one of the long-defended positions of the EU since late 1970s and early 1980s. It confirmed the EU's basic assumption that negotiations could not be proceeded without prior mutual recognition by two parties to the conflict.³⁶³ The Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO's chairman Yasser Arafat signed a series of mutual recognition letters on 9 September 1993 by which Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist and also renounced terrorism, violence and its desire for the destruction of Israel. The Oslo Accords were the materialization of the EU's long-standing call for association of the PLO with the peace negotiations as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Oslo Accords provided a framework for a future peace settlement. It envisaged the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority³⁶⁴,

³⁶² Alicia Martin-Diaz, "The MEPP and the European Union", *European Parliament Working Paper* (POLI-115 EN, May 1999), p. 32.

³⁶³ Ghassan Salamé, "Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era", *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994), p. 231.

³⁶⁴ The Palestinian interim self-government was to be materialized in phases. Until a final status accord was established, West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones: Area A would be under full control of the Palestinian Authority; Area B would be under Palestinian civil control and

an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a interim period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on the UN Resolution 242 and the UN Resolution 338, an integral part of the whole peace process.

In order that the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would govern themselves according to democratic principles, the Oslo Accords envisaged direct, free and general elections to be held for the Council. According to the Oslo Accords, the five-year interim period would begin with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent status negotiations would begin as soon as possible between Israel and the Palestinians, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period. Permanent status negotiations, which would start as soon as possible, would cover the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest. The Oslo Accords envisaged the transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians in areas of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Palestinian Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats as well as the responsibility for overall security of the Israelis to protect their internal security and public order. The Oslo Accords envisaged the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programmes identified in the protocols. The Oslo Accords also envisaged the redeployment of the Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

After the signing of the Oslo Accords the EU started to become the largest external donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority. The EU invested €3.47 billion in the Palestinian Authority during the period between 1994 and 2001.³⁶⁵ This aid has been mainly directed toward projects in the field of

Israeli security control; and Area C, which covered the areas of Israeli settlements and security zones, would be under full Israeli control, except over Palestinian civilians.

³⁶⁵ Miller, *op.cit.*, “Troubled Neighbours”, p. 644.

housing, micro-credit and the assistance of small-scale businesses and education, the Palestinian economic and social infrastructure building and the Palestinian institution building.³⁶⁶ The logic behind this aid was that it was expected that this aid would trigger sufficient private sector investment flows to bring the living conditions of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip up to acceptable levels.³⁶⁷

On 13 September 1993, the leaders of EC Member States issued a declaration on the MEPP. They appreciated the vision and courage of the Israeli and the Palestinian leaders who signed the Oslo Accords. They also declared their political support and readiness to participate in further international arrangements arising in connection with the implementation of the agreement. They also declared their intention to continue to be the largest financial contributor to the Occupied Territories. They reiterated their commitment to a comprehensive peace. They declared their hope that progress would be accomplished in other bilateral negotiations and in multilateral talks of future cooperation. Finally, as the gavelholder of REDWG, they declared their preparedness to contribute to all forms of regional economic cooperation.

On 19 April 1994, the EU Council adopted the Joint Action³⁶⁸ in support of the MEPP. In the Joint action it was stated that in order to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the EU would participate in international arrangements agreed by the parties to guarantee peace in the context of the Madrid Peace Process. It was also stated that the EU would use its influence to encourage all the parties to support the peace process unconditionally on the basis of the invitations to the Madrid Conference and work for the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights and make its contribution to defining the future shape of relations between the regional parties in the context of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. The EU would also develop its role in the Ad hoc Liaison Committee responsible for the coordination of international aid to the Occupied Territories, maintain its leading role in the REDWG and develop its participation in

³⁶⁶ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ...”, p. 163.

³⁶⁷ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

³⁶⁸ 94/276/CFSP: Council Decision of 19 April 1994 on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J (3) of the Treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East Peace Process.

other multilateral groups and consider additional ways in which it might contribute towards the development of the region.

The EU would pursue confidence building measures, which it has submitted to the parties, pursue démarches to the Arab States with the aim of securing an end to the boycott of Israel and closely follow the future of the Israeli settlements throughout the Occupied Territories and pursue démarches to Israel about this issue. It was emphasized in the joint action that in order to contribute actively and urgently to the creation of a Palestinian Police Force, the EU would provide assistance; the EU Presidency, in close cooperation with the Commission, would facilitate coordination through an exchange of information between Member States on their bilateral assistance. The EU would allocate a maximum amount of 10 million ECUs for the provision of assistance for the creation of a Palestinian Police Force. The EU would, at the request of the parties, participate in the protection of the Palestinian people through a temporary international presence in the Occupied Territories, as called for in Security Council Resolution 904. The EU, at the request of the parties, would implement a coordinated programme of assistance in preparing for and observing the elections in the Occupied Territories prefigured by the Oslo Accords.

Israel and the PLO continued their negotiations after the signing of the Oslo Accords and these negotiations resulted in the signing of Cairo Agreement on 4 May 1994. Cairo Agreement marked the beginning of the self-government interim period for the Palestinians, and can be identified as the first application of the Oslo Accords.³⁶⁹ The EU only attended the signing ceremony of Cairo Agreement, represented by the Vice-President of the European Commission Manuel Marin, who informed Yasser Arafat that the European Commission would be contributing €10 million to help finance the Palestinian police force.³⁷⁰ At the Corfu European Council on 24-25 June 1994, EU Member States welcomed the Cairo agreement and identified it as an important step towards the full implementation of the Oslo Accords. EU Member States also welcomed the creation of a Palestinian police force and reiterated the EU's willingness to provide further assistance to move the peace process towards a successful conclusion.

³⁶⁹ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³⁷⁰ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

On 26 October 1994, Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty near Aqaba and the EU was represented at the signing ceremony by the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel for the EU Presidency and Hans Van den Broek for the European Commission.³⁷¹ Following the Israeli-Jordan Treaty of Peace, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II Agreement) was signed in Washington on 28 September 1995. The agreement envisaged the expansion of the geographic borders of the Palestinian self-government on the West Bank and the election, the transition period, of a Palestinian Council which would be vested with legislative and executive powers.³⁷² The EU was represented at the signing ceremony by the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales for the EU Presidency, who signed the Treaty as a witness.³⁷³

The EU welcomed both the Israeli-Jordan Treaty of Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During the post-Oslo period, the EU has continued its financial contribution to the peace process, but was still sidelined from bilateral political negotiations. The US had continued to play the role of main mediator in the bilateral talks among the parties of the conflict. The EU had continued to play a supplementary and subordinate role to the US diplomatic efforts. The EU had provided the basic economic foundation of the peace process.³⁷⁴

The EU Foreign Ministers at the General Affairs Council meeting on 2 October 1995 emphasized the historic importance of the Interim Agreement. They declared that they considered it necessary to contribute towards the success of that agreement and that economic and social development was a key factor for achieving just and lasting peace. They pronounced their determination to strengthen cooperation by the EU with the Territories covered by the peace agreement. They invited the European Commission to start explanatory talks with the Palestinian Authority with a view to the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement as soon as circumstances permit. They called upon the Commission to take necessary measures to enable the Territories covered by the peace agreement to

³⁷¹ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³⁷² Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

³⁷³ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

³⁷⁴ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 19.

benefit from increased aid. They called upon the European Investment Bank to allocate 250 million ECUs in the form of appropriation for projects for developing the Territories covered by the peace agreement. They announced that for the observation of the election for the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Council and the Commission had set up the European Electoral Unit and 10 million ECUs had been allocated for it. This declaration demonstrated the EU's determination to financially contribute to both the Oslo Peace Process and the Palestinian Authority.

In accordance with the Oslo Accords, the election for the Palestinian Legislative Council was held on 20 January 1996 in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The EU had financially and politically contributed to the elections. The EU donated 17 million ECUs via CFSP, 7 million ECUs were allocated for the preparation of the technical aspects of the elections, such as the establishment of polling stations, funding a voter education campaign and setting up a press center, and 10 million ECUs were spent on ensuring international monitoring of elections.³⁷⁵ The EU deployed EU Electoral Unit composed of 300 observers under the chairmanship of the former Swedish Minister of Justice, Carl Lidbom to observe elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, scheduled for 20 January 1996. After the elections Lidbom issued a press release which stated that although not perfect the elections were reasonably free.³⁷⁶ After the elections, the EU Presidency issued a declaration on 22 January 1996 on behalf of EU Member States in which it congratulated the candidates elected and the Palestinian people for the political maturity they had shown in their approach to democracy.³⁷⁷

4.3.4 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The progress in both the multilateral and bilateral tracks of the Madrid Peace Process and the signing of the above-mentioned treaties and agreements provided a favourable environment for the EU to launch the EMP. The EMP, or the so-called Barcelona Process, was launched at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995. Along with the fifteen Member States of the EU, twelve Mediterranean countries including Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia,

³⁷⁵ Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, *op.cit.*, pp. 136-137

³⁷⁶ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

³⁷⁷ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

Turkey and the Palestinian Authority are the members of the EMP. The EMP was the successor of the GMP³⁷⁸, which was launched by EC Member States at the Paris Summit on 19-20 October 1972. The GMP reflected the EC's regional and economic approach to the Mediterranean region. With the GMP, the EC for the first time addressed the Mediterranean nonmember countries as a region, within a single policy framework.³⁷⁹

In mid-1990s, the main motivation behind the EU policy-makers' launch of the EMP was to help maintain security in its southern periphery by the way of encouraging inter-state cooperation and increasing regional interdependence as a means of maintaining stability in the Mediterranean.³⁸⁰ The EMP aimed to establish a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the EU and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean. It was designed to build a comprehensive political, economic and social partnership between the EU Member States and the Southern Mediterranean countries. The EMP is designed to develop regional cooperative frameworks in the region.³⁸¹ There are three main objectives of the EMP: to establish a comprehensive political and security partnership which refers to the establishment of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue on a regular basis, to establish a comprehensive economic and financial partnership which refers to the

³⁷⁸ The GMP consisted of a legal framework to regulate relations between the EC and all the Mediterranean nonmember countries on matters of mainly trade and aid. (Federica Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Toward the Mediterranean* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 63) As the GMP was designed to establish a global approach in all EC's relations with the Mediterranean nonmember countries, it sought to put the multiplicity of bilateral relations and agreements that existed between the EC and the Mediterranean nonmember countries individually into a single and coordinated framework. (Christopher Piening, *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 72) The main aim of the GMP was to regulate relations between the EC and all the Mediterranean nonmember countries, with a view to the eventual creation of a Mediterranean free trade. (Christopher Piening, *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 74) Within the framework of the GMP, the EC concluded bilateral cooperation agreements with the Mediterranean nonmember countries in the 1970s, including Algeria (26.04.1976), Morocco (27.04.1976), Tunisia (25.04.1976), Egypt (18.01.1977), Lebanon (03.05.1977), Jordan (18.01.1977), Syria (18.01.1977) and Israel (11.05.1975). These agreements aimed to set up free trade and economic cooperation between the EC and all the Mediterranean nonmember countries. (Soren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, *The European Union and the Middle East* (Sheffield Academic Press: Great Britain, 2002), p. 94) These agreements envisaged cooperation in commercial, financial and economic, and social matters.

³⁷⁹ Federica Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Toward the Mediterranean* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 63.

³⁸⁰ Bilgin, *op.cit.*, p. 271.

³⁸¹ Peters, *op.cit.*, The Arab-Israeli Multilateral.

construction of a shared zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade area by the year 2010 and to establish a comprehensive partnership in social, cultural and human affairs which refers to the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding between different cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The EMP was the EU-only initiative in which the US did not take part, this enhanced the EU's profile, presence and visibility in the region.

Although the EMP was not designed as an instrument for the MEPP and was supposed to be independent from it, it made significant contributions to it. The EMP provided a complementary diplomatic multilateral forum in which tensions could be reduced between Israel and the Arab states.³⁸² The EMP, to a certain extent, imitated and expanded the model of the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process.³⁸³ Most of the issues discussed in the multilateral talks such as water resources, industry and energy policy, tourism and environment, found resonance in the follow-up meetings to the EMP. Most of the security issues discussed at the EMP were built upon the ideas developed within the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group.³⁸⁴

The EMP provided a framework in which, among other processes, the parties to the Middle East conflict would be able to build trust and institutionalize their relations in the political, economic and societal spheres as well as in the security field.³⁸⁵ It served the aim of peace-building and long-term regional stabilization by laying the foundations for economic development and regional integration.³⁸⁶

The EMP provided a multilateral regional forum for dialogue between the parties of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, notably Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Until the Barcelona Process, Syria and Lebanon refused to participate in both bilateral and

³⁸² Peters, *op.cit.*, The Arab-Israeli Multilateral, p. 71.

³⁸³ Roland Dannreuther, "The Middle East: Towards A Substantive European Role in the Peace Process", in Roland Dannreuther (ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 158.

³⁸⁴ Peters, *op.cit.*, The Arab-Israeli Multilateral, p. 71.

³⁸⁵ Muriel Asseburg, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacles to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", in Annette Jünemann (ed.), *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics* (Great Britain: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 179.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

multilateral tracks of the Madrid Peace Process, because they considered it as a cover for the normalization of relations with Israel before a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been reached. Syria and Lebanon argued that the Arab world should not discuss regional cooperation with Israel until a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been reached at the bilateral level.³⁸⁷ However, Lebanon and Syria participated in the EMP and signed the Barcelona Declaration along with Israel. The EU managed to bring Syria and Lebanon to the negotiating table with Israel in a multilateral forum, which the multilateral track of peace process had failed to do.³⁸⁸ Moreover, the EMP enabled the Palestinian Authority to participate as an equal Mediterranean partner and thus a quasi-national actor, which was a fact of high symbolic value with regard to the Palestinian self-determination. Also, with the EMP, the Arab States accepted Israel as a partner in the process, thus allowing Israel to begin to break out of its regional isolation.³⁸⁹

Moreover, the EU through MEDA Programme, the main financial instrument for the implementation of the EMP, provided financial and technical aid to the parties of the Middle East conflict, notably Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Particularly, the EU through its aid to the Palestinians made a crucial contribution to their institutional, economic and social reforms toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, which was later on identified by the Road Map as a necessary step towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The EMP reflected the EU's regional, multilateral and economic approach for promoting peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The EU's prominent role in the multilateral track of the MEPP in the 1990s was complemented by the EMP. Although the EU intended the two processes to be independent from each other, the Barcelona Process and the MEPP followed a parallel development. Progress in both the bilateral and the multilateral track of the MEPP facilitated a progress in the Barcelona Process and the stalemate in the peace process had a

³⁸⁷ Robin, *op.cit.*, p. 81 and Peters, *op.cit.*, The Arab-Israeli Multilateral, p. 69.

³⁸⁸ Peters, *op.cit.*, The Arab-Israeli Multilateral, p. 70.

³⁸⁹ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict", *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11*, p. 179.

negative spill over effect on the Barcelona Process in the second half of the 1990s. The stalemate emerged in the peace process between 1996 and 1999 hindered progress in the Barcelona Process. Moreover, after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and the escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Barcelona Process was deadlocked. The Marseilles meeting of Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers in November 2000 was cancelled, because Syria and Lebanon refused to sit around the same table with Israel in protest at the Israeli military reaction to the Al-Aqsa Intifada.³⁹⁰ The “Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability” which was expected to be signed at the Marseilles meeting had to be cancelled.³⁹¹

The Barcelona Process was the EU-only initiative in the region. Previous extra-regional initiatives in the region were launched by the US, however, the EMP initiative was launched by the EU, and the US was excluded from this process. Its main contribution to the peace process was that it provided a multilateral regional forum for the parties involved in the MEPP to meet in a different context from that of the difficult and comprehensive negotiations on political and security issues.³⁹² The EU’s launch of the EMP was both an important indicator of its multilateral approach for promoting peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean region and a consistent act with its commitments and responsibilities as a promoter of effective multilateralism.

4.3.5 The Years of Stalemate in the Peace Process and the EU (1996-2001)

During the late 1995 and early 1996 period, the Arab-Israeli relations deteriorated and the Oslo Peace Process came to a halt, due to several important events including the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 by an Orthodox far-right student who was against the Oslo Peace Process; ascending of the Palestinian terror attacks against the Israeli targets in early 1996; the launch of the Operation of Grapes of Wrath by the Israeli Military Forces

³⁹⁰ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, “The EU and the Middle East Conflict”, *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11*, p. 174.

³⁹¹ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, “The EU and the Middle East Conflict”, *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11*, p. 174.

³⁹² Costanza Musu, “The Madrid Quartet: An Effective Instrument of Multilateralism?”, in Roby Nathason and Stephan Stetter (eds.), *The Monitor of EU-Israel Action Plan* (Berlin: Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006).

in April 1996 against Lebanon; the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Israeli Prime Minister in May 1996, who was critical about the Oslo Peace Process; the opening of an entrance to an ancient tunnel (Hasmonean Tunnel) running under part of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in November 1996.

In the second half of 1996, EU Member States were determined to revive the stalemated Oslo Process and to increase the EU's political involvement in the MEPP in order to match their economic and financial role. They intended to play not only the role of the payer but also that of a player. In order to contribute to the revival of stalemated peace process, enhance the EU's political involvement and presence in the MEPP and make the EU's political role more visible in the MEPP, the EU Foreign Ministers decided to appoint a special European envoy to the peace process at the General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 28 October 1996. The Council of Ministers appointed Miguel Angel Moratinos, the former ambassador of Spain to Israel, as the EU Special Envoy for the MEPP³⁹³ on 25 November 1996. As Joel Peters argued

the presence of a European special envoy has enhanced Europe's political standing, has afforded it a more prominent profile in the peace process and has allowed European Middle East policy to become more visible to regional and extra-regional actors, to become more flexible and responsive to developments in the peace process and to identify specific areas where Europe can undertake practical measures to help build confidence between the parties and support agreements reached.³⁹⁴

The EU Special Envoy for the MEPP has allowed the EU to play a more active political role in the peace process. Moratinos became a valuable partner to the US Special Envoy Dennis Ross in helping mediate political agreements between the

³⁹³ The mandate of the special envoy would be: to establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process, other countries of the region, the US and other interested countries, as well as relevant international organizations, in order to work with them in strengthening the peace process; to observe peace negotiations between the parties, and to be ready to offer the EU's advice and good offices if the parties request; to contribute where requested to the implementation of international agreements reached between parties, and to engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements; to engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law; to report to the Council's bodies on possibilities for EU intervention in the peace process and on the best way of pursuing EU initiatives and ongoing Middle East peace process-related EU Business including the political aspects of relevant EU development projects; to monitor actions by either side which might prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

³⁹⁴ Peters, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ...", p. 160.

Palestinians and the Israelis, using the leverage the EU had with the Palestinians.³⁹⁵ During the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations which led to the Hebron agreement envisaging the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Hebron, Dennis Ross acted as the mediator and the Moratinos worked behind the scenes and complemented his mediation efforts. During these negotiations, while the US had sent letters of assurances to both sides, the EU sent Arafat another letter of assurance stating that the EU would use all its political and moral weight to ensure that the agreement would be fully implemented.³⁹⁶ It was the first time that the EU was actively involved in the US peace diplomacy and was able to show its value to the peace process.³⁹⁷ Moreover, in 1997, Moratinos carried out efforts to revive negotiations between Syria and Israel and he pursued a shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Jerusalem to this end.³⁹⁸ The EU started to play a supportive and complementary role to the US in bilateral political negotiations between the Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the late 1996 and early 1997, and this role has increased in the course of time.

In addition to its mediation efforts, Moratinos also launched a number of practical, small-scale initiatives aiming at building confidence between parties and has identified several areas, namely water and refugees, in which the EU might contribute to final status negotiations. The EU, under the auspices of Moratinos, has set up an EU-Israeli Joint Dialogue in which European and Israeli experts meet regularly in five separate working groups (passage of goods and peoples, labour issues, financial and fiscal issues, Gaza Port, long-term economic development) to discuss ways of overcoming obstacles to the Palestinian economic development. Furthermore, the EU, under the auspices of Moratinos, developed an assistance programme which aimed to train the Palestinian security forces to support the Palestinian Authority in helping prevent terrorist activities in the territories under its control, and set up a forum in which representatives of the Palestinian security forces

³⁹⁵ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, “The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process”, p. 289.

³⁹⁶ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 312.

³⁹⁷ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, “The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process”, p. 290.

³⁹⁸ Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 312.

meet regularly with their counterparts from the EU with the aim of developing joint cooperation on security issues.³⁹⁹

At the European Council meeting in Amsterdam on 16-17 June 1997, the leaders of EU Member States issued the “Call for Peace in the Middle East”. They called on the peoples and governments of the region to revive the spirit of mutual confidence established in Madrid and in Oslo in order to raise hopes for achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. The EU identified peace as necessary and urgent in the Middle East. They declared stagnation on the Palestinian, the Syrian and the Lebanese tracks as a permanent threat to security of all in the region. They reemphasized that the peace settlement should be based on the right of all States and peoples in the region to live in peace within safe, recognized borders; respect for the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to decide their own future; the exchange of land for peace; the non-acceptability of the annexation of territory by force; respect for human rights; the rejection of terrorism of all kinds; good relations between neighbours; and compliance with existing agreements and the rejection of counterproductive unilateral initiatives. They called upon the Israeli and the Palestinian leaders to continue the negotiations to foster the implementation of the Oslo Accords and Hebron Agreements and to carry on permanent status negotiations. In this declaration, they reiterated their call for mutual recognition of Israel’s legitimate right to exist within safe and recognized borders by the Palestinian people and the Palestinians’ right to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a state. They also emphasized their commitment to human rights, democracy and the promotion of civil society in the Arab-Israeli context and condemned violations of those rights. They declared their determination to continue their efforts for the continuation of the peace process through the efforts of the EU’s Special Envoy for the MEPP, through the EU’s diplomatic relations and economic involvement, and through the EU’s relations of friendship and trust with the various parties, to work together with the US, Russia and the relevant parties in the region.

During 1998, the US continued its diplomatic efforts to resume the peace process and the EU continued to play its complementary role to the US efforts. As a result, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Wye River Memorandum on 23

³⁹⁹ Peters, “Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ...”, p. 161.

October 1998 in Maryland, the US. The Memorandum envisaged a further withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the West Bank. According to the Memorandum, both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides promised to take measures to prevent any acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities against the other side. The US President Bill Clinton, played the role of the main mediator between the parties in Wye talks and the EU was not invited to Wye talks. The EU was once again excluded from the bilateral political talks.

On 26 October 1998, the EU issued a statement which welcomed the signing of Wye River Memorandum. The EU called on the parties to complete negotiation on remaining issues under the Interim Agreement which are not settled yet as soon as possible. The EU also asked the parties to begin final status negotiations without delay and meanwhile to avoid all the unilateral acts which could prejudice the final outcome, thus building confidence which is essential for a lasting peace in the region. The EU also declared its determination to continue to play its full part in the success of peace process and to continue its economic and technical assistance to the Palestinian people.

On 20 December 1999, the Israeli government suspended the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. After its suspension; the opposition Labour party withdrew the 'safety net' for the government in Knesset, which it had been providing pending implementation of Wye and this led a vote of no confidence being passed.⁴⁰⁰ The Netanyahu government was forced to hold general and prime ministerial elections on 17 May 1999. On the other hand, in early 1999, the President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat contemplated about the proclamation of the Palestinian State on 4 May 1999, the formal deadline for the Oslo Accords' five-year interim period, if there would be no progress in the peace process.⁴⁰¹ The EU and the US were against any unilateral proclamation of the Palestinian state at that time, because they wanted a change of the Israeli government which would facilitate the continuation of the peace process. However, they believed that any unilateral declaration of statehood would lead to an outbreak of violence and a formal annexation of the Occupied Territories which would increase Netanyahu's chance of reelection. The EU and the US strove to dissuade Arafat to proclaim the Palestinian

⁴⁰⁰ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

⁴⁰¹ Martin-Diaz, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

state before the Israeli elections.⁴⁰² They were eventually able to convince Arafat to postpone the unilateral proclamation of the Palestinian state. On 29 April 1999, the PLO Central Council decided to postpone the proclamation of statehood.

At the Berlin European Council held on 24-25 March 1999, the EU leaders issued a declaration concerning the MEPP. They reiterated their support for a negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict which would be based on the principles of “land for peace” and ensure both collective and individual security of the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. They called upon parties to implement fully and immediately the Wye River Memorandum. They also called upon the parties to resume final status negotiations as soon as possible and on an accelerated basis. The EU leaders reemphasized the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and declared that they looked forward to the early fulfilment of this right. They declared that this right appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The EU leaders declared that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of the existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The EU leaders also declared their readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above. With this declaration, EU Member States for the first time declared their readiness to recognise the Palestinian State which would be established on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations. EU Member States also denied any veto against the Palestinian proclamation of state.

Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO was appointed as the High Representative for the CFSP for five years by European Council on 18 October 1999 and started his new occupation in November 1999.⁴⁰³ Solana was chosen,

⁴⁰² Peters, *op.cit.*, “Europe and the MEPP...”, p. 312.

⁴⁰³ In order to strengthen the cohesion in EU's external representation and give EU a single visible voice in international system, with the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999) the post of High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary General of Council of the EU was introduced. The holder of the post can be viewed as “Mr. or Mrs. CFSP”, ‘Monsieur Politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne (PESC)’ or ‘telephone number of Europe’. According to Article J.16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, “the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy

because he is a high profile, respected, competent diplomat and administrator. The appointment of Solana further fostered the EU's visibility and presence in the MEPP. His appointment clearly improved the external performance of the EU and thus increased the political impact of the EU in the MEPP.⁴⁰⁴ Since his appointment, Solana together with the EU Special Envoy of MEPP acted as the voice and face of the EU in the MEPP. As argued by EU officials, since his appointment, Solana became a recognizable figure in the MEPP.⁴⁰⁵ The Israelis identified Solana as a visible and important figure and argued that he has increased the EU's visibility in the Middle East and acted in a way as the face and voice of the EU.⁴⁰⁶ In addition to its major financial and economic role in the peace process, the EU increasingly sought to get involved in the political dimension of the peace process.

Ehud Barak from the Labour Party was elected as the Prime Minister of Israel in the May 1999 elections and he strove to resume the peace process which was stalemated during the Netanyahu government. Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon security zone in 22 May 2000. On 11-25 July 2000, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat met at Camp David under the sponsorship of the US President Bill Clinton to negotiate final status negotiations. The Camp David Summit did not lead to an agreement between the parties. After the failure of the Summit, Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 and this increased the tension between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This visit resulted in the outbreak of the Second Intifada or the so-called Al Aqsa Intifada. The wave of the Palestinian violence and the Israeli counter attacks resulted in the suspension of negotiations and security cooperation. In order to stop the escalation of violence and put the peace process back on track, the US President Bill Clinton invited the parties to hold a summit meeting. The summit meeting was held at Sharm al-Sheikh in Egypt on 17 October 2000 with the participation of the representatives of the

decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties". Moreover, according to Article J.8, "the Presidency shall be assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP".

⁴⁰⁴ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, "The EU's Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", p. 294.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with Avivit Bar-Ilan, Counsellor, Mission of Israel to the European Communities, 13 November 2009.

Americans, the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the Palestinian Authority, the UN and the EU. The EU was represented by Javier Solana at the Summit. Solana's participation in the summit increased the EU's political involvement, visibility and presence in the MEPP.

At the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit, it was decided to establish an international fact finding commission with the task of proposing recommendations to stop violence, to prevent its recurrence and to find a way back to the peace process.⁴⁰⁷ International fact finding commission was established under the chairmanship of former US Senator George Mitchell and was named as Mitchell Commission. Mitchell commission was composed of the Former President of Turkish Republic Süleyman Demirel, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjørn Jagland, the former US Senator Warren B. Rudman and the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.

The US President Bill Clinton on his last days in office strove to revive the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. He offered a 'bridging proposal' to the parties to carry out further talks in Washington and Cairo and then in Taba, Egypt in order to stop the Al Aqsa Intifada on 23 December 2000. The parties accepted this offer and they first met at Washington and then Cairo. After these two meetings, on 21-27 January 2001, the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations met at Taba. Although the Taba talks did not yield an agreement between parties, it was crucial for the EU's political involvement, visibility and presence in the MEPP. The EU Special Envoy of MEPP, at the time Miguel Moratinos, participated in the Taba talks as the only third party. Moratinos was assigned by both parties to keep accurate record of what took place. Moratinos and his team, after consultations with the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, prepared an unofficial report about the Taba talks and presented it to the parties. This unofficial report was accepted by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. In order to find ways to come to joint positions, the report drew attention to the extensive work which had been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and

⁴⁰⁷ Dosenrode and Stubkjaer, *op.cit.*, p. 149.

security.⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, it demonstrated that there were serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which would have to be overcome in future negotiations.⁴⁰⁹ From that point of view, the paper uncovered the challenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also demonstrated that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of the other side and that solutions were possible.⁴¹⁰ At the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit and the Taba Talks, the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana and the EU Special Envoy of MEPP Miguel Moratinos through their personal intervention and good offices efforts played an important role in bringing the sides close to a definitive agreement.⁴¹¹

After the Taba Talks, on 6 February 2001, the Likud party under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, who refused to meet the President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, won the elections and became the new prime minister of Israel. On 30 April 2001, the Mitchell Commission delivered its report and recommended three steps to be taken: ending the violence, rebuilding confidence and resuming negotiations. The Bush Administration, which was committed to selective engagement in global diplomacy at the time, showed relatively little interest in involving in Middle East Affairs and did not attach importance to the Mitchell Report.

Following the failure to implement the Mitchell Report, in order to end the Israeli-Palestinian violence and resume negotiations, the Director of US CIA George Tenet proposed a Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire and Security Plan (Tenet Plan) which would have been taken effect on 13 June 2001. At the European Council meeting in Goteborg on 15-16 June 2001, EU Member States welcomed the Tenet Plan and declared that there was a need for an effective commitment to bring about sustainable progress in security situation and the lifting of closures. Although the Tenet Plan proposed that a period of seven days free of violence was a condition for resuming

⁴⁰⁸ EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba.
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=130196&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "EU Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Much of an Actor", *European Security* (Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2008), p. 110 and Judy Batt, et al., "Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for A Wider Europe", *Chaillot Papers*, no. 64, (Paris, Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2003), p. 95.

negotiations, the mutual violence did not end. Thus, the Tenet Plan was not implemented. After the failure to implement the Mitchell Report recommendations and Tenet Plan, until the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, there were no significant initiatives to stop mutual violence and put stalemated peace process back on the track.

4.4 Conclusion

Since the introduction of the EPC in the early 1970s, EU Member States began to develop a common position towards the MEPP. Within EPC, the EU has brought out an *acquis politique* with regard to the MEPP.⁴¹² Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, EU Member States collectively pursued a declaratory policy towards the MEPP. During these years, EU Member States issued a series of common declarations concerning the MEPP first under the framework of EPC until 1993 and then under the framework of the CFSP since 1993, including the Brussels Declaration of 1973, the London Declaration of 1977, the Venice Declaration of 1980 and the Berlin Declaration of 1999. These declarations were milestones in the evolution of the EU's position towards the MEPP.

The EU's position towards the MEPP has demonstrated continuity and consistency. All throughout, the EU has defended a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict with the participation of all parties including the PLO in the peace process as the representative of the Palestinian people. As noted by EU officials, the EU has a regional approach concerning the MEPP. The EU considered it as a regional issue rather than a process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Therefore the EU defended the involvement of all regional actors in the MEPP.⁴¹³ The EU also maintained that the peace settlement in the Middle East should be based on the principles of exchange of land for peace; the non-acceptability of the annexation of territory by force; respect for human rights; the rejection of terrorism of all kinds; good relations between neighbours; and compliance with existing agreements and the rejection of counterproductive unilateral initiatives. The EU defended that the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict should be based on the UN Security Council Resolutions and international law. The EU has also emphasized the mutual recognition of Israel's legitimate right to exist

⁴¹² Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the Arab World", p. 275.

⁴¹³ Interview with Gwenda Jeffreys-Jones, Desk Officer for the MEPP, Directorate-General External Relations, European Commission, 27 October 2009.

within safe and recognized borders by the Palestinian people, and the Palestinians' right to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a state by Israel. The EU has persistently criticized and condemned Israel's policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories and identified it as the main stumbling block before the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. The EU has emphasized that they would not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem. The EU identified the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations as the best guarantee of Israel's security.

The EU has played a complementary role to the US in the MEPP while the US has played the role of the sole mediator. The EU supported the US peace initiatives in the Middle East. However, the EU was sidelined and excluded from the political dimension of the peace process and bilateral negotiations in which the US has been dominant. While the US reserved for itself the leading role, the EU confined itself to a supporting role. The reason behind the EU's exclusion was the Israeli and the American objection against the EU's participation in the bilateral peace negotiations as an active mediator. On the one hand, Israel considered the EU as pro-Arab and rejected its participation; on the other hand, the US wanted to be the only mediator in the peace process and excluded the EU from the bilateral peace negotiations. The EU has mainly played a significant and active role in the economic and multilateral dimension of the peace process through its participation in the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process and its status of being the largest donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP. The EU also launched the EMP in 1995 which was a complementary multilateral initiative to the MEPP and provided a multilateral forum for the conflicting parties, the Arabs and the Israelis to sit at the same table and discuss. Although with the significant and active role it played in the economic and multilateral dimension of the peace process, the EU gained a higher profile and significant stake in the peace process in the 1990s than before, it was still not at the heart of the peace process. The main negotiations over the peace process were conducted between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the US.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁴ Stelios Stavridis and Justin Hutchene, "Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 5, Iss. 1, 2000).

In the second half of the 1990s, the appointment of Miguel Angel Moratinos as the EU Special Envoy of the MEPP and the appointment of Javier Solana as the High Representative for the CFSP enhanced the EU's presence, visibility and political involvement in the MEPP. These two figures have acted as the voice and face of the EU in the MEPP. In addition to its major financial and economic role in the peace process; the EU increasingly involved in the political dimension of the peace process. For instance, Javier Solana participated in the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit as the representative of the EU and he was also one of the members of Mitchell Commission which was established at the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit. The EU's political involvement and presence on the ground in the MEPP would continue to increase in the post-9/11 era with the EU's membership of the Quartet on the Middle East, which was designed for mediating the peace process in the Middle East and composed of the EU, the US, the UN and Russia. The High Representative for the CFSP of the EU/Secretary General of the Council of the EU, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the foreign minister of the member state holding the Council Presidency has represented the EU in the Quartet.

As Alain Dieckhoff and Stephan Stetter rightly argued, the EU played a modest role in the MEPP in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴¹⁵ The EU had developed guidelines for a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East and supported peace initiatives, mostly through its financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority.⁴¹⁶ However, in the 1990s, the EU's role, visibility and presence in the MEPP increased and the EU began to play a more assertive and active role. As Joel Peters argued, the EU emerged from the sidelines and carved out a role and presence in nearly every dimensions of the peace process.⁴¹⁷ The EU has promoted the development of the Palestinian institutions, supported agreements and promoted regional economic development.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 53 and Stephan Stetter, *EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 109.

⁴¹⁶ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 53.

⁴¹⁷ Peters, *op.cit.*, "Europe and the MEPP..." and Peters, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ...".

⁴¹⁸ Peters, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ...", p. 167.

After giving a historical overview of the EU's involvement in the MEPP in the pre-9/11, the following chapter will examine the EU's involvement in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era by testing the the congruity between the EU's self-defined role conceptions set out in the third chapter and its actual role performance.

CHAPTER 5

THE EU'S ROLE PERFORMANCE IN THE MEPP IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

In the post-9/11 era, the EU's political role and presence in the MEPP increased with its membership of the Quartet on the Middle East, which was designed for mediating the peace process in the Middle East and composed of the EU, the US, the UN and Russia. The EU continued to be the largest donor of financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority is the world's largest recipient of the EU's financial aid. The EU supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. The EU supported the Palestinian reform process in areas: the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, the security sector reform, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free and fair elections, developing a modern education system and media based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding, the promotion of pro-peace civil society. The EU also increased its role in the security dimension of the MEPP with the launch of two ESDP operations: EUPOLCOPPS and EU BAM Rafah. In the post-9/11 era, the EU remained to be committed to a negotiated settlement resulting in two states, Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 1967 borders and in the framework of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1515, as well as the terms of reference of Madrid Conference of 2002 and the principle of 'land for peace'. This chapter starts with a general overview of the EU's involvement in the MEPP before evaluating the EU's role performance in the post-9/11 era.

5.1 The EU and the MEPP in the Post-9/11 Era: A General Overview

5.1.1 Peace Efforts in the Immediate Post-9/11 Era and the EU

After 9/11, the US administration concentrated on the MEPP in order to secure the ‘coalition against terrorism’.⁴¹⁹ After 9/11, the US initiated a ‘global war on terrorism’ and within this framework, it was preparing for an operation against al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan. The Bush administration wanted to secure Arab countries’ support for its operation in Afghanistan, so it focused its attention on the MEPP. Within this context, the US President George Bush declared his support for a Palestinian State and sent retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni to broker a cease-fire between the Israelis and the Palestinians and implement the Mitchell Report recommendations and Tenet Plan. The EU Member States welcomed the US decision to send Zinni to the Middle East and declared their readiness to support his efforts through the EU Special Envoy of MEPP, Miguel Moratinos. However, Zinni’s mission failed due to the escalation of mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians. On 17 October 2001, the Israeli Minister for Tourism, Rehavam Zeevi was assassinated by the Palestinian militants in Jerusalem. Israel initiated a military operation against the cities of West Bank and this led to the escalation of mutual violence. In the early months of 2002, suicide bomb attacks of the Palestinians against the Israeli cities and the Israeli retaliation against the Palestinian cities continued.

In February 2002, France took the initiative to revive the stalemated peace process and offered a ‘Non-paper on the Revival of a Dynamics of a Peace in the Middle East’. This Non-paper envisaged the holding of elections in the Palestinian Territories based on the theme of peace and the recognition of the Palestinian state as a starting point of a negotiation process. The French proposal called for the creation of a Palestinian state first and discussions on refugees, the capital of state and settlements at a later stage.⁴²⁰ However, Germany and the UK did not support French proposal. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer noted that before focusing on reinjecting political momentum into the MEPP, it was necessary to deal with

⁴¹⁹ Costanza Musu, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”, *A Strained Partnership: European-American Relations and the Middle East from Suez to Iraq*, in Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer (eds.), (the UK: Routledge, 2009), p. 2.

⁴²⁰ Shada Islam, “Plans on the Table”, *Middle East International*, 8 February 2002, p. 10.

security issues in the region. He told that “terrorism and violence have to end, that is the precondition for everything. We have to find a durable ceasefire”.⁴²¹ The British Foreign Minister Jack Straw did not want to take an initiative independent from the US and he advocated that the EU could not break ranks with US policy in the Middle East.⁴²² Italy and Belgium offered the organization of an international economic recovery conference for the region.⁴²³ The Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique, as the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency, tried to regroup different ideas into a coherent EU approach. He offered a guideline for EU policy in the Middle East which called for an urgent need to restore an approach based on political action and an urgent implementation of security measures, including peace formulas proposed by the Mitchell Report and Tenet Plan.⁴²⁴ Spain presented this guideline to the EU governments and asked them to support “contacts and dialogue going in the direction of the early establishment of a Palestinian state” including a joint peace drive by the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Ahmad Quray, the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council.⁴²⁵ The Spanish proposal envisaged the establishment of a Palestinian state before the start of permanent status negotiations.⁴²⁶ Josep Pique also called for a joint peace effort by the US, the EU, the UN, Russia and the Arab League.⁴²⁷ However, the EU Member States did not agree on a common strategy for the peace process.

While the EU Member States tried to develop a common EU position towards the MEPP, mutual violence continued in the region. In retaliation against increasing suicide bomb attacks against the Israelis, on 29 March 2002, the Israeli Defence Force initiated a large-scale military operation against cities in the West Bank, which was called as ‘Operation Defensive Shield’. Israel Defence Force invaded the Palestinian cities including Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Betlehem, Jenin and Nablus. The Israeli Defence Forces surrounded headquarter of the President of the

⁴²¹ Shada Islam, “EU Blueprint on Ice”, *Middle East International*, 22 February 2002, p. 6.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴²³ Islam, *op.cit.*, “Plans on the Table”, p. 10.

⁴²⁴ Islam, *op.cit.*, “EU Blueprint on Ice”, p. 6.

⁴²⁵ Islam, *op.cit.*, “EU Blueprint on Ice”, p. 6.

⁴²⁶ Islam, *op.cit.*, “EU Blueprint on Ice”, p. 6.

⁴²⁷ Islam, *op.cit.*, “Plans on the Table”, p. 10.

Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat in Ramallah and confined him to his headquarter, the Muqata. At the Barcelona European Council held on 15-16 March 2002, the EU leaders issued a declaration concerning the MEPP. The EU leaders called on parties to take actions to stop the bloodshed in the region. They called on the Israel to lift immediately all restrictions on the freedom of movement of Arafat. They declared their determination to play the EU's role together with the countries in the region, the US, the UN and Russia in the pursuit of a solution, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and on the principles of the Madrid Conference, Oslo and subsequent agreements, which would allow two states, Israel and Palestine, living in peace and security and play their full part in the Middle East. They declared their objective on the MEPP: the creation of democratic, viable and independent Palestinian State, bringing to an end the occupation of 1967 and the right of Israel to live within safe and secure boundaries, guaranteed by the commitment of the international community, and in particular Arab countries.

During the 'Operation Defensive Shield', the EU carried out a crisis management activity toward the settlement of a microsecurity crisis, the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.⁴²⁸ The EU through Miguel Moratinos, Javier Solana and the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique, as the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency, brokered an agreement on the release of the Palestinians holed up in the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem in April 2002. On 2 April 2002, the Israeli Defence Forces surrounded the Church of Nativity in order to capture the Palestinian militants, and the siege of the Nativity Church lasted until 10 May 2002. The siege ended with the agreement reached between the Israelis and the Palestinians when the EU offered asylum to 13 of the Palestinians who were wanted by Israel for allegedly organizing terror operations.⁴²⁹ The men designated for expulsion were to be sent to six European countries, including Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Finland and Cyprus. For the EU circles, the resolution of the Bethlehem siege has been seen as a diplomatic coup for the EU, whose interventions in the Middle East have tended to be overshadowed by the US.

⁴²⁸ Richard Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), p. 152.

⁴²⁹ Christian Century Foundation, "Arafat pays Visit to Church of the Nativity", 22 May 2002. Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_11_119/ai_87080208/.

In April 2002, Javier Solana and the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique visited the region in order to broker a ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians. They met with the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, but they were not allowed by the Israelis to meet with Arafat who was besieged in his headquarter in Ramallah. Javier Solana and Moratinos were able to meet with Arafat at Muqata on 24 April 2002. After EU Member States' failure to agree on a common strategy for the peace process and a failed diplomatic mission of Solana and Pique, the EU Member States decided not to take a peace initiative independent from the US and stepped back from earlier plans to play a more active role in seeking to end mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians.⁴³⁰ The EU Member States decided to support US Secretary of State Colin Powell's Middle East peace mission. Miguel Moratinos, Javier Solana and the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique's involvement in the security dialogue and humanitarian action during the worst stage of conflict in spring 2002 increased the EU's visibility and presence.⁴³¹

5.1.2 The Creation of the Quartet and the Launch of Road Map for the Middle East

On the diplomatic side of the MEPP another important development occurred in April 2002. On 10 April 2002, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique and the High Representative for the CFSP of the EU Javier Solana met in Madrid to discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Madrid Quartet on the Middle East⁴³² which was composed of the EU, the US, the UN and Russia emerged with this meeting. The Quartet was established with two main aims: to help to broker a solution to the Middle East conflict and in the intermediate to allow the Quartet members to take collective actions in response to

⁴³⁰ Shada Islam, "Falling Short Again", *Middle East International*, 19 April 2002, p. 13; Musu, *op.cit.*, "The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?".

⁴³¹ Batt et al., *op.cit.*, p. 97.

⁴³² Marc Otte identified the Quartet as a contact group or a consultation mechanism for creating a conducive atmosphere for peace negotiations. (Interview with Marc Otte, the European Union's Special Representative for the MEPP, 3 November 2009). According to a British diplomat, the Quartet brings international coherence in the case of the MEPP by setting up key principles of international community and bringing the views of international community together. It enables systematical cooperation of approaches. (Interview with Alexander Naqvi, Desk Officer for the MEPP, UK Permanent Representation to the European Union, 11 November 2009.)

events on the ground.⁴³³ After the first meeting held on 10 April 2002, the Quartet members issued a common statement which expressed their great concern about the present situation, including the mounting humanitarian crisis and the growing risk to regional security. They called on the parties to move towards a political resolution of their disputes based on U.N. Security Council resolution 242 and 338, and the principle of land for peace - which formed the basis for the Madrid Conference of 1991. They emphasized that there was a need to find a peaceful solution to the dispute which should be based on two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders. They called on Israel to halt immediately its military operations. They called for the immediate, meaningful ceasefire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian cities, including Ramallah, specifically including Chairman Arafat's headquarters. They asked Israel to fully comply with international humanitarian principles and to allow full and unimpeded access to humanitarian organizations and services. They asked Israel to refrain from the excessive use of force and undertake all possible efforts to ensure protection of civilians. They called on Chairman Arafat to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to stop terror attacks against innocent Israelis including suicide bombs which was illegal and immoral and has given severe harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

With the creation of the Quartet, the EU and US approaches to the peace process formally converged.⁴³⁴ In the view of an EU official, due to the Quartet, Europeans and Americans began to adopt similar positions concerning the peace process.⁴³⁵ In the view of another EU official, the Quartet is a formal tool for bringing European and American positions together.⁴³⁶

On 24 June 2002, the US President George Bush made a speech on the situation in the Middle East and declared his vision concerning the peace process: two states, living side by side, in peace and security. He declared that in order to

⁴³³ Urfan Khaliq, *Ethical Dimension of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 282.

⁴³⁴ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP", p. 25.

⁴³⁵ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁴³⁶ Interview with Wolfgang Barwinkel, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 4 November 2009.

achieve the peace, there was a need for a new and different Palestinian leadership. He demanded the removal of Arafat from the Palestinian leadership. He stated that when the Palestinian people had new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the US would support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty would be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East. He emphasized that there was a need for a Palestinian reform. For him, new political and economic institutions based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism was necessity for the peace in the region. He criticized the concentration of power in the hands of few in Palestine and called for the preparation of a new constitution which would separate the powers of government. According to this constitution, the Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively. Bush declared that the US, along with the EU and Arab states, would help the Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework and a working democracy for the Palestinian people, for instance through helping them organize and monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year with national elections to follow.

Bush stated that the US, the international donor community and the World Bank were ready to work with the Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The US, the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would oversee reforms in the Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing. The US and members of the international community were ready to work with the Palestinian leaders to establish, finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary. He also called for rebuild and reform of the Palestinian security services in order to enable the Palestinian leaders to engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. This reform would aim to create a security system which must have clear lines of authority and accountability, and a unified chain of command. He stated that if the Palestine fulfils these conditions successfully, final status negotiations including the final borders, the capital and other aspects of this state's sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties. He declared that before the start of final status negotiation, there was need for a political, administrative, economic, financial and security reform in the

Palestine. Bush went on by stating that a stable, viable, democratic and peaceful Palestinian state was necessary for security of Israel. He called on Israel to withdraw to the positions held before 28 September 2000. He called on Israel to stop settlement activities in the Occupied Territories in accordance with the Mitchell Report recommendations and take concrete steps to support the emergence of a stable, viable, democratic and peaceful Palestinian state. He noted that in order to achieve a real peace there was a need to end the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with the Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders. This speech formed the basis of the 'Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict'.

At the Seville European Council, held on 21-22 June 2002, the EU Member States issued a declaration on the Middle East which run parallel with Bush's vision concerning the peace process. They declared that settlement to the dispute should be achieved through negotiations. According to them, the aim of negotiations should be an end to the Israeli occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian state, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end result of the negotiations should be two States living side by side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. Just like Bush, they identified the political, administrative, economic, financial and security reform of the Palestinian Authority as a necessity and they declared their willingness to support these reforms.

At their meeting in New York on 16 July 2002, the Quartet members welcomed the US President Bush's speech of 24 June 2002 and declared their strong support for the principles and objectives outlined in the speech. In their next meeting in New York on 17 September 2002, the Quartet Members released a statement outlining a three-phase plan toward a final peaceful settlement of the Middle East Conflict. This plan formed first draft of the Road Map for peace in the Middle East. EU Member States played a crucial role in the preparation of the Roadmap. As noted by EU officials, the Europeans wrote the Road Map and it was a European

document.⁴³⁷ Based on the German Foreign Minister Fischer's 'Idea Paper for the Middle East'⁴³⁸, the Danish EU presidency proposed a three-phase roadmap to the EU foreign ministers at Helsingor meeting and they agreed upon it at this meeting.⁴³⁹ This had a great influence on the Quartet statement of 17 September 2002. Moreover, the EU played a key role in keeping the US working on finding a common approach which at the time had different priorities such as continuing 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan and forthcoming war against Iraq.⁴⁴⁰

At their meeting in New York on 16 July 2002, the Quartet members agreed to intensify their efforts in support of their shared goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on their common vision, as expressed by the US President Bush in his speech of 24 June 2002. They declared that they would continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities to seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict based on UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, the Madrid terms of reference, the principle of land for peace, and implementation of all existing agreements between the parties. The Quartet declared that they would work closely with the parties and consult key regional actors on a concrete, three-phase implementation roadmap that could achieve a final settlement within three years. The Quartet members emphasized that for the success of the plan, comprehensive security performance is essential. In order to be successful; the plan should address political, economic, humanitarian, and institutional dimensions and should spell out reciprocal steps to be taken by the parties in each of its phases. In this approach, progress between the three phases

⁴³⁷ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009 and Interview with Marc Otte, the European Union's Special Representative for the MEPP, 3 November 2009.

⁴³⁸ Joschka Fischer's 'Idea Paper for the Middle East' envisaged a peace conference to conclude negotiations on all unresolved issues within two years and calls for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the clearing of settlements. The Israelis and Palestinian would recognize each other's right to exist and "any country which continues to support terrorism or its organizations or members will be completely isolated, politically and economically". (Stephen Castle, "EU dismisses Sanctions and Backs Powell's Peace Mission", *The Independent*, 16 April 2002. Accessed from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/eu-dismisses-sanctions-and-backs-powells-peace-mission-657362.html>).

⁴³⁹ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict", *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11*, p. 185.

⁴⁴⁰ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict", *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11*, p. 185.

would be strictly based on the parties' compliance with specific performance benchmarks to be monitored and assessed by the Quartet.

The Road Map was published and presented to the Israeli and the Palestinian Prime Ministers on 30 April 2003 along the lines with the US president Bush's speech of 24 June 2002 and the Quartet's 16 July and 17 September 2002 statements. It offered a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks targeting at progress through mutual steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The objective is to achieve a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005 in three phases as outlined in the Quartet Statement of 17 September 2002.

The first phase of the Road Map (Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions), which extend until May 2003, contains performance-based criteria for comprehensive political reform in the Palestinian Authority including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and holding of free, fair and open elections. It called for the Israeli withdrawal to the positions held before 28 September 2000, freezing of settlement activity in the Occupied Territories and the restoration of the status quo that existed on 28 September 2000 by two sides, as security performance and cooperation progress. It also called on Israel to help the Palestinians normalize their life and build their institutions. The second phase (Transition), which would extend between June 2003 and December 2003, envisaged the creation of an independent and democratic Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on a new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. The final phase (Permanent Status Agreement and End of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict), which extend between January 2004 and December 2005, envisaged consolidation of reform and stabilization of the Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status solution in 2005, which would signify the end of the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397.

Permanent Status Agreement would also include an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of

Jerusalem that would take into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and would protect the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and would fulfill the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.

Although the Palestinians had some reservations concerning the Road Map, they judged that in the prevailing geopolitical climate they had no option other than accepting it.⁴⁴¹ Thus, the Palestinians accepted the Road Map without reservations. The Israelis also had some reservations concerning the Road Map.⁴⁴² Only after the US Administration guaranteed that they would ‘fully and seriously’ address the Israeli Government’s reservations concerning Road Map, the Israelis accepted it with reservations.

The US had taken the lead in launching the Road Map. In June 2003, the US President Bush met with the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas at Aqaba, Jordan in order to persuade them to commit to the Road Map. At this meeting, Bush was able to achieve their commitment to the Road Map. The Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas denounced any kind of terrorism against the Israelis and promised to end the armed intifada. Ariel Sharon, promised to resume direct negotiations in accordance with the steps outlined in the Road Map and dismantle unauthorized settler outposts.⁴⁴³

Although the EU was included in the Road Map, the EU did not take part in these negotiations. The EU was once again sidelined and excluded from bilateral

⁴⁴¹ The Palestinians had concerns about the language and the emphasis on the conditionality rather than reciprocity. They feared that the Israeli government would be able to exploit the inherent ambiguities in the text to ensure that negotiations would be subject to obfuscation and delay. (A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, (London: Europa Publications Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), p. 300) In the mean time, Israel would continue to create the facts on the ground which would prejudice final outcomes.

⁴⁴² Israeli Governments had reservations concerning the absence of guarantees on conditionality. Israeli Government was reluctant to engage with the process, including the demands for a settlement freeze without the Palestinian Authority’s disarming and uprooting of the Palestinian militias. They were not ready to recognize Palestinian state until Palestinians renounce their right to return. (A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, (London: Europa Publications Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), p. 301)

⁴⁴³ A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, (London: Europa Publications Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), p. 302.

political talks by the US.⁴⁴⁴ Nevertheless, at the Thessaloniki European Council held on 19-20 June 2003, the EU leaders welcomed the Israeli and the Palestinian decision to accept the Road Map and reiterated their commitment to contribute in all aspects of the implementation of the Road Map. Moreover, on 21 July 2003, the Council adopted a Joint Action which appointed Marc Otte, the former ambassador of Belgium to Israel, as the EU Special Envoy of MEPP in replacement of Miguel Angel Moratinos.

On 29 June 2003, radical Islamic Groups in Palestine including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades announced a three-month cease-fire (Hudna) which included suspension of all attacks on the Israeli targets within Israel and in the Occupied Territories in return a halt to acts of aggression against the Palestinians and the freeing of the Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.⁴⁴⁵ Although the mutual violence decreased significantly, it did not halt. The Israeli assassination against leaders of radical Islamic Groups and radical Islamic Groups' retaliation through suicide bomb attacks against the Israeli targets continued.

5.1.3 The EU Election Observer Mission for the Presidential Elections in the West Bank & Gaza Strip

On 11 November 2004, the President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat died. On 14 November 2004, the Palestinian officials scheduled presidential elections for 9 January 2005. On 22 November 2004, the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner decided to deploy an EU Election Observer Mission to observe the Presidential Elections in the West Bank and Gaza scheduled for 9 January 2005. The European Commission identified the decision as a concrete expression of the EU's effort to support the development of democratic institutions and stability in the Palestinian Territories. They emphasized that the presence of the EOM and the reporting of its observers would help increase transparency and build confidence in the election process. The EOM for the Presidential elections in the West Bank & Gaza Strip began to work on 10 December 2004. The EU sent the biggest ever observation mission with 260

⁴⁴⁴ Ruth Margolies Beitler, "The European Union and The Middle East: The Benefits of Soft Power", in Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson, Christina Schweiss (eds.), *Old Europe, New Security: Evolution of A Complex World* (England: Ashgate, 2006), p. 125.

⁴⁴⁵ A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, (London: Europa Publications Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), p. 303.

observers to monitor the Presidential elections. The main objective of the mission was to give the Palestinian society a chance to hold meaningful and credible elections to provide democratic legitimacy for the institutions on the road to statehood. According to European Commission, some €14 million had been allocated since 2003 to prepare the elections and €2.5 million of this was allocated to the EOM.⁴⁴⁶ Mahmoud Abbas won the elections and became the new president of the Palestinian Authority. On 10 January 2005, the EOM, headed by Member of the European Parliament and the former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard reported that the Palestinian presidential elections proceeded in a satisfactory manner despite the difficult circumstances. The President of European Commission José Manuel Barroso identified the presidential elections as an important step towards the creation of a democratic and viable Palestinian state.

5.1.4 The Israeli ‘Security Fence’ and ‘Disengagement Plan’ and the EU

In summer 2002, on the basis of its right to self-defence and security concerns -in order to prevent intrusion of suicide bombers and illegal immigrants and car thieves into the Israeli cities-, the Israeli government decided to construct a separation barrier, called by the Israelis as the ‘security fence’,⁴⁴⁷ partly along ‘Green Line’ which demarcated the border between Israel and West Bank.⁴⁴⁸ After the

⁴⁴⁶http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/westbank/ip04_1462.htm.

⁴⁴⁷ The ‘security fence’ is consisting of a network of fences with vehicle-barrier trenches surrounded by an on average 60 meters wide exclusion area (90%) and up to 8 meters high concrete walls (10%). The ‘security fence’ is still under construction and it is expected to be completed by 2010.

⁴⁴⁸ Although the ‘security fence’ was intended to be built along the ‘Green Line’ (the 1949 armistice line which constituted the border between Israel and Jordan before 1967), due to topographic difficulties in some places, Israel, its construction route diverged from the ‘Green Line’ in some places. This led to criticism on the part of International Community. The reason behind this is that it encroaches and envelops Occupied Palestinian Territory. According to 2007 Report of UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism, 80% of the Fence is built within the Palestinian Territory itself and in order to incorporate the Ariel settlement block, it extends over 20 km into the West Bank. Once completed, over 60000 West Bank Palestinians will reside in a ‘closed zone’ -the area between the Green Line and the Fence-, which also includes many of the West Bank’s most valuable water resources. Nearly one-third of all the Palestinians living in the West Bank need a permit to exit to the ‘closed zone’, in order to tend their lands, visit relatives or to get to their places. (Urfan Khaliq, *Ethical Dimension of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 327). Regarding the construction route of the Fence, the International Court of Justice decided that the Fence violates international law. It severely hinders the Palestinian’s right to self-determinations; violates a number of international human rights and humanitarian law obligations incumbent on Israel; and was tantamount to de facto annexation; and took a route which was not necessary for security reasons. (*Ibid.*, p. 330).

approval of the construction by the Israeli cabinet in August 2002, the construction of the security fence started.

EU Member States opposed the construction of the 'security fence' and identified it as an obstacle before the implementation of the Road Map, a threat which would make the implementation of a two-state solution physically impossible and a source of misery to thousands of Palestinians.⁴⁴⁹ They called on Israel to stop the construction of the security fence along with the settlement activities and land confiscations in the Occupied Territories. Javier Solana identified the construction of the security fence as a threat to the creation of a viable Palestinian state.⁴⁵⁰

At the Brussels European Council, held on 16-17 October 2003, the EU Member States declared that although they recognized the Israeli right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, the envisaged departure of the route of the security fence from the 'Green Line' would prejudice future negotiations and make the two-state solution physically impossible to implement. It would also cause humanitarian and economic difficulties to the Palestinians. Thousands of Palestinians living on the west side of the fence were being cut off from essential services in the West Bank, the Palestinians living on the east side of the fence would lose access to land and water resources. For the EU, the major problem is that it is unilaterally establishing a permanent border, which illegally annexes the Palestinian Territories, denies the Palestinian right to self-determination and makes the creation of a politically and economically viable Palestinian state far more difficult to achieve.⁴⁵¹ In their later declarations, although EU Member States called on Israel to end the construction of the security fence, the construction of it still continues.

In addition to 'security fence', in order to reduce terrorism as much as possible, and grant the Israeli citizens the maximum level of security, on 18 December 2003, the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his unilateral 'disengagement plan'⁴⁵² which envisaged the Israeli withdrawal from 21 settlements

⁴⁴⁹ Shada Islam, "Mixed Messages", *Middle East International*, 24 October 2003, p. 10.

⁴⁵⁰ Shada Islam, "Talking Tough", *Middle East International*, 19 December 2003, p. 16.

⁴⁵¹ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 336.

⁴⁵² There are two reasons behind the disengagement plan. The first one was to deal with the demographic challenge to Israelis. According to demographic trends, Israeli Jews would become a decreasing minority in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The Disengagement Plan was thought to be a good way to maximize Israeli land annexation while minimizing the number of Palestinians included in it. The second reason was to find an alternative to a

in the Gaza Strip and from 4 settlements in the northern West Bank, including Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh by the end of 2005. Sharon, in his address to the Herzliya Conference on 18 December 2003, argued that the process of disengagement would lead to an improvement in the quality of life, and would help strengthen the Israeli economy. The US Administration approved and supported the Disengagement Plan. The EU identified disengagement plan as a significant step, offering the best chance of sustained peace in the region for many years.⁴⁵³ The EU's support to the Disengagement Plan was conditional. The EU declared that it could support it on the condition that it should coincide with the Road Map. At the Brussels European Council, held on 25-26 March 2004, the EU Member States declared that the Israeli unilateral withdrawal in the framework of Disengagement Plan should represent a significant step towards the implementation of the Road Map. They set out five conditions which the Disengagement Plan should carry. First, withdrawal should take place in the context of Road Map; second, it should be a step towards a two-state state solution; third, it should not involve a transfer of settlement activity to the West Bank; fourth, there should be an organized and negotiated handover of responsibility to the Palestinian Authority; fifth, Israel should facilitate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Gaza. The EU added that it would not recognize any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties. It began to be implemented on 15 August 2005 and completed on 12 September 2005 with the end of the Israeli military presence in Gaza.

The EU Presidency issued a declaration on 25 August 2005 which emphasized that disengagement should be a significant step towards implementing the Quartet Roadmap. They called on two parties to continue their cooperation on the remaining steps to complete disengagement. At the GAERC meeting on 3 October 2005, European foreign ministers once again welcomed the Israeli withdrawal as a significant step towards implementing the Road Map. They declared their readiness

negotiated two-state solution. It would be unilateral and would not need a Palestinian partner. It would abandon less territory; keep Israeli effective control on the peace agenda, especially on the issues of Jerusalem and refugees. (Nathalie Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 109).

⁴⁵³ Commission of the European Communities, "EU-Palestinian Cooperation Beyond Disengagement – Towards a Two-state Solution", *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, 5 October 2005, Brussels, p. 2.

to help the Quartet Special Envoy for disengagement, James Wolfensohn for resolving the outstanding issues on disengagement, especially concerning the economic viability of Gaza and confidence-building at Gaza's southern border. They emphasized the importance of reaching an agreement on access to Gaza for people and goods through land borders, a port and airport.

The European Commission adopted a Communication entitled as 'EU-Palestinian Cooperation Beyond Disengagement – Towards a Two-state Solution' on 5 October 2005 in order to define the priorities for EU engagement after the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the Northern West Bank, *inter alia* in support of the reform and institution-building efforts of the Palestinian Authority. The European Commission proposed that in the post-disengagement period, the EU's financial assistance should focus on the promotion of institution-building by the Palestinian Authority. The institution-building should contain establishing a functioning judiciary, effective enforcement of legislation and strengthening the rule of law; strengthening institutions and reinforcing administrative capacity and building on the progress already made in establishing an accountable system of public finances.

The European Commission set out actions and priorities required to pave the ground for the creation of a politically and economically viable Palestinian state. In order to achieve political viability of the future Palestinian State, the Commission set out the following priorities:

- Reinforcing legitimacy and accountability through supporting electoral process.
- Strengthening the rule of law through assisting the Palestinian reform efforts in the judiciary; develop short-term strategy for consolidating the rule of law including the fight against corruption and organized crime.
- promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms through continuing to address the issue of incitement in political dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and supporting civil society initiatives for human rights.
- Improving security through complementing EUSR's work on transformation of civil police.
- Engaging civil society through promoting civil society initiatives in support of the MEPP.

- Making public administration more effective through supporting the Palestinian public administration reform efforts.
- Developing a strategy of assistance for East Jerusalem.
- Addressing the refugee issue beyond immediate humanitarian needs through contributing discussions on future role of the UNRWA.

In order to achieve economic viability of the future Palestinian State, the Commission set out the following priorities:

- Developing bilateral and regional trade relations through improve market access for the Palestinian products, providing technical assistance, facilitating dialogue to overcome administrative and regulatory obstacles, developing scenarios for economic arrangements with Israel and encouraging integration of the Palestinian economy in the region.
- Building up a customs administration through providing support to customs administration; consider seconding experts; offer to provide third party presence.
- Reconstructing and rehabilitating the West Bank and Gaza Strip through providing funds for quick-start infrastructure projects; promote a renewed inflow of investment.
- Creating the enabling environment for private sector investment through assisting the Palestinian efforts to review legal framework.
- Supporting the private sector through working with the European Investment Bank to combine loan and grant resources for private sector investment and providing assistance and training to SMEs to improve management capacity and performance.
- Improving the management of public finances through supporting the Palestinian efforts to modernize revenue administration and providing assistance for further development of financial control.
- Developing a knowledge-based economy through examining options for support to roll-out of broadband applications.
- Addressing the social dimension through contributing to social welfare programmes, in particular the World Bank's Social Safety net reform programme.

These political and economic priorities provided a road map for the EU's engagement with the Palestinian Authority in the latter's effort to build a politically and economically viable state.

In November 2005, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the Special envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East James Wolfensohn have brokered the negotiations on 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' between the Israelis and the Palestinians. On 15 November 2005, the agreement was signed by the Israelis and the Palestinians. The main objective of the agreement was to promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The details of the agreement were outlined in two documents: 'Agreement on Movement and Access' and 'Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing'. The latter document envisaged the presence of a third party on the ground which would have the authority to ensure the compliance of the Palestinian Authority with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of this agreement. In case of non-compliance the third party would have the authority to order the re-examination and reassessment of any passenger, luggage, vehicle or goods. The third party would assist the Palestinian Authority to build capacity, including training, equipment and technical assistance, on border management and customs. With the agreement of the two parties, the EU was assigned to the task of the third party on the ground which would carry out these tasks.

The EU welcomed the agreement and accepted the third party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border. The EU High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the British Foreign Minister Jack Straw, representing the EU Presidency, issued a joint statement on 15 November 2005 welcoming the agreement. They stated that the issues addressed in the agreement were fundamental to improving the humanitarian situation on the ground in Gaza as well as essential for promoting peaceful economic development and they expressed their hope that both sides will now make every effort to ensure that the commitments made are now translated into reality. They also expressed the EU's willingness in principle to provide assistance with the operation of crossing at Gaza/Egypt border at Rafah. They noted that they were undertaking the necessary preparations and planning.

Moreover, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, issued a statement welcoming the agreement. She stated that this agreement would open the way to much needed greater mobility for the Palestinians and with the EU presence they would be able to manage the border between Gaza and Egypt. She added that the European Commission was already active in capacity building on border issues, and in supporting the modernization of the Palestinian customs services. She noted that a €40 million infrastructure facility was launched during her last visit to the region. She expressed her hope that it would also be possible to release €25million which she had earmarked for building a new cargo terminal for the Gaza airport. At the GAERC meeting on 21-22 November 2005, the foreign ministers of EU Member States decided to launch a civilian crisis management mission, named as European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) within the framework of the ESDP to monitor the operations at the Rafah crossing point.

5.1.5 The European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)

The Palestinian Authority on 20 November 2005 and the Israeli government 23 November 2005 sent letters of invitation to the EU to establish EU BAM Rafah. The Council adopted the Joint Action of 12 December 2005 which established the EU BAM Rafah. The aim of the mission was to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community's institution-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Israeli and the Palestinian Authority. The mandate of the mission included actively monitoring, verifying and evaluating the Palestinian Authority's performance with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing and ensuring the Palestinian Authority's compliance with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing. The mandate of the mission was determined as one year. The operational phase of the mission started on 25 November 2005. Between 26 June 2005 and 25 June 2006, 279,436 people crossed

through Rafah Crossing Point with EU monitoring.⁴⁵⁴ After an Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured by Hamas militants on 25 June 2006, Rafah Crossing Point has been closed for normal operations and opened on an exceptional basis only. As a result of EU BAM Rafah's efforts to keep open the Rafah Crossing Point; it remained open for 83 days between 25 June 2006 and 13 June 2007, allowing nearly 163,632 people to cross.⁴⁵⁵ Immediately after Hamas takeover of Gaza forcefully on 13 June 2007, the Rafah Crossing point was closed and the operations of EU BAM Rafah mission were temporarily suspended. Despite this, the mandate of the mission has been extended several times and on 10 November 2008, its mandate was extended until 24 November 2009. Since June 2007, EU BAM has continued its presence on the ground in Ashkelon, Israel and remained on standby; ready to engage at short notice in the case of the re-opening of the Rafah Crossing Point. It is noted by the EU officials that following the re-establishment of the Palestinian Authority's control over Gaza, the EU expects it to be reopened.⁴⁵⁶

5.1.6 The European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

In addition to EU BAM Rafah, at the GAERC meeting on 7 October 2005, foreign ministers of EU Member States decided to launch within the framework of the ESDP, a Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories to build on the work of "the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support"⁴⁵⁷, which would have a long-

⁴⁵⁴ Esra Bulut, "EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)", in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years* (France: EU ISS, 2009), p. 302.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁴⁵⁷ EU COPPS started to work in January 2005 with 4 senior EU police advisors in the West Bank and Gaza. It was officially established on 20 April 2005 in Ramallah. The mandate of EU COPPS was to assist the Palestinian Authority in developing modern and effective civil police service. The aim of it is to reduce crime and insecurity and help create the conditions for economic recovery. It would also help the Palestinian Authority to meet its Roadmap commitments regarding the consolidation of its security services and the reform of its institutions. (http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/newsletter/english/default.asp?edt_id=17&id=248) EU COPPS supported the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order and provided the Palestinian Authority with vehicles, personal protective gear, communication equipment, office equipment and infrastructure repairs. (<http://www.wsibrussels.org/gaza.htm>)

term reform focus and would provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.⁴⁵⁸

There are two main reasons behind the launch of EUPOL COPSS. The first one is to help the Palestinian Authority in rebuilding institutions and capacities that were largely destroyed during the Israeli ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ in 2002.⁴⁵⁹ The rise of a security chaos following the destruction of the Palestinian security infrastructure, the inability of the Palestinian justice and prison systems to cope with this chaos and the lack of rule of law necessitated the launch of EUPOL COPSS. The second one is to enhance the effectiveness of the security organs by reforming the highly fragmented and opaque structures inherited from the Arafat era that did not have transparent hierarchies, clear competencies and political oversight.⁴⁶⁰ EUPOL COPSS has been a significant element of the EU’s efforts to assist and facilitate the Palestinian Authority to live up to its Road Map obligations in terms of restoring law and order in the Palestinian Territories and fight terrorism effectively.⁴⁶¹

The Council adopted the Joint Action of 14 November 2005 which established the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories. The aim of the mission was defined as contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under the Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Community’s institution building programmes as well as Security Sector reform including Criminal Justice Reform. The mandate of the mission included assisting the Palestinian Civil Police in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan by advising and closely mentoring senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system, coordinating and facilitating EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police, and advising on police-related Criminal Justice elements. The mandate of the mission was determined as three years. The operational phase of the mission started on 1 January 2006. The

⁴⁵⁸ Euromed Synopsis, Issue 334, 10 November 2005, p. 1.

⁴⁵⁹ Muriel Asseburg, “The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPSS, EUBAM Rafah): Peace through Security”, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.), *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence: A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2009), p. 84.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

mandate of the mission was extended until 31 December 2010 with the Joint Action of 16 December 2008. Since Hamas takeover of Gaza forcefully on 13 June 2007, EUPOL COPSS has been operational only in the West Bank, because the EU refused to work with Hamas.

5.1.7 The EU Election Observer Mission for the Palestinian Legislative Council Election of 2006

On 21 November 2005, the European Commission decided to deploy in mid-December 2005 an EU Election Observation Mission for elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, scheduled for 25 January 2006. The Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasized the importance of the mission and stated that

free and fair elections are essential steps on the way to a viable Palestinian State as foreseen in the Road Map. Impartial observation can help create confidence in the democratic process and highlight areas where further improvements are necessary. By working with the Palestinians, the EU is helping to lay the foundations for a modern accountable administration and a more peaceful future for the Palestinian people.⁴⁶²

The mandate of the EOM was determined as assessing whether the electoral process is conducted in accordance with international standards. The mission would assess the whole election process, including the legal framework, the political environment and campaign, electoral preparations, voting and counting as well as the post-election period. It issued a preliminary statement shortly after Election Day. The EOM for the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in the West Bank & Gaza Strip began to work on 12 December 2005. The EU sent 240 observers to monitor the elections. The main objective of the mission was to give the Palestinian society a chance to hold meaningful and credible elections to provide democratic legitimacy to the Palestinian Parliament on the road to statehood. According to Commission, some €17 million had been allocated since 2003 to prepare the elections and €3 million of this was allocated to the EOM.⁴⁶³ Hamas won the elections with a decisive majority. Hamas won 74 seats of the 132-seat legislative council, the ruling Fatah only won 45 seats. This provided Hamas the ability to form a majority government on their own.

⁴⁶²http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_observ/westbank/legislative/index.htm.

⁴⁶³http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_observ/westbank/legislative/index.htm.

On 25 January 2006, the EOM, headed by Member of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries Véronique de Keyser, reported that the elections for Palestinian Legislative Council were successfully conducted. This reflected an open and fairly-contested electoral process that was efficiently administered by a professional and independent Palestinian Central Elections Commission. According to the report, these elections marked another important milestone in the building of the Palestinian democratic institutions, which is a fundamental component in the peace process foreseen in the 2002 Road Map. The EU High Representative Solana issued a statement on 26 January 2006 which welcomed the peaceful running of the Palestinian elections. At the GAERC meeting on 30 January 2006, the foreign ministers of EU Member States welcomed the holding of elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council and congratulated the President Abbas and the Palestinian people for a free and fair electoral process. They emphasized that violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes and called on winning Hamas and all other factions to renounce violence, to recognize Israel's right to exist, and to disarm. They also called on the new Palestinian government to commit to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict with Israel based on existing agreements and the Roadmap as well as to the rule of law, reform and sound fiscal management. At their meeting in New York on 30 January 2006, the Quartet members issued a statement which once again called on the new Palestinian government to commit to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. They called on both parties to respect their existing agreements, including 'Agreement on Movement and Access'.

After the establishment of the Hamas-led Palestinian Government in March 2006, the EU continued to call on the government to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence including the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. The EU made its future financial aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government conditional on the recognition of the above-mentioned principles. At the GAERC meeting on 10-11 April 2006, foreign ministers of EU Member States concluded that the Hamas-led Palestinian Government did not commit itself to the above-mentioned principles and decided to suspend direct aid to

the Hamas-led Government. Although they decided to suspend direct aid to the government, they underlined their determination to continue to provide necessary assistance to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian people.

On 9 May 2006, the Quartet on the Middle East addressed the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian Territory and asked the EU to propose a ‘Temporary International Mechanism’ which would be limited in scope and duration and operate with full transparency and accountability and enable direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people while bypassing the Hamas-led Palestinian government. The mechanism was developed under the patronage of the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner. At the European Council in Brussels on 15-16 June 2006, the EU leaders approved the proposal for the establishment of TIM. On 17 June 2006, the Quartet on the Middle East approved the EU’s proposal for the establishment of TIM. The objective of TIM was to relieve the current socio-economic crisis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to ensure continued delivery of essential social public services to the Palestinian people and to facilitate the maximum level of support by international donors and the resumption of the Palestinian revenue transfers by Israel. Between June 2006 and March 2008, the EU provided €455.5 million through TIM to the Palestinian people. In March 2008, TIM was replaced by a new mechanism called the European Mechanism of Support to the Palestinians (PEGASE⁴⁶⁴).

5.1.8 EU Member States’ Contribution to UNIFIL

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah militants located in the Southern Lebanon crossed the Israeli border and killed 8 Israeli soldiers and captured 2. Then the Israeli Defence Forces started a military operation against Hezbollah strongholds in the Southern Lebanon and targets in Beirut, including Beirut International Airport. In retaliation, Hezbollah launched rocket attacks against the Israeli cities and towns. The military conflict between Hezbollah militants and the Israeli Defence Forces ended on 14 August 2006 after both parties to the conflict accepted the UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

From the outset of the war, the EU called on both parties to calm down and refrain from any action which led to the escalation of already tense situation in the

⁴⁶⁴ French acronym for Mécansime “Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-Economique”.

region. The EU called for an immediate cessation of the conflict. On 13 July 2006, the Finnish EU Presidency issued a statement on behalf of the EU and expressed the EU's concern about the disproportionate use of force by Israel in Lebanon in response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel. The Presidency condemned the loss of civilian lives and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. They noted that the imposition of an air and sea blockade on Lebanon cannot be justified. They emphasized that actions, which are contrary to international humanitarian law, could only exacerbate the vicious circle of violence and retribution could not serve anyone's legitimate interest. The Presidency called on Hezbollah to release the captured Israeli soldiers immediately and unconditionally, and to cease all attacks on Israel. The Presidency also called on the government of Lebanon to do its utmost to prevent such attacks.

During the war, the EU representatives carried out diplomatic efforts. The Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana visited the region in July 2006 and met with the Israeli, the Palestinian and the Lebanese senior figures. They called on Hezbollah to release the Israeli soldiers held hostage immediately and conditionally and end rocket attacks against the Israeli towns and cities. While recognizing Israel's right to self-defence, they called on Israel to use its force in response to Hezbollah attacks in a way which is proportionate and measured and fully respect its obligations under international humanitarian law.

During the war, in order to relieve the worsening humanitarian situation in Lebanon, the EU provided a humanitarian aid for the victims of the conflict in Lebanon. During the conflict, the EU had provided over €108 million humanitarian aid in monetary terms. In addition, the EU had also provided substantial amount of aid in kind in the form of food, medicine and shelter. The EU also provided €11 million from Rapid Reaction Mechanism for helping the evacuation and repatriation of around 10000 citizens of developing countries. With the consular cooperation between the EU Member States and the EU institutions in Beirut, around 40000 EU citizens were evacuated and repatriated.

After the end of the war, the EU Member States made the most significant military contribution to the expanded UN Interim Force in Lebanon. The expansion

of UNIFIL was requested by the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted on 11 August 2006. In order to implement expanded mandate of UNIFIL, the UN Security Council called for an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum 15000 troops. At the Extraordinary GAERC meeting on 25 August 2006, foreign ministers of EU Member States gave their full support to the swift implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1701 and committed to provide half of the expanded force. Although the political decision to contribute to UNIFIL was adopted by the Member States, this would not be an operation under the framework of the ESDP.⁴⁶⁵ The EU Member States did not assign EU Council General Secretariat the role of a clearing house for the management of the national contributions directly to UNIFIL; the Member States would make their individual contributions to the force.⁴⁶⁶ Since it was not an EU operation, the EU institutions did not take the political responsibility of the operation. The political responsibility of the operation was in the hands of the UN Security Council.

The EU Member States has provided the backbone of the force by providing 7000 troops, crucial military components and the operational command for UNIFIL⁴⁶⁷.⁴⁶⁸ France and Italy has taken the lead in taking the responsibility of the operational command of the force. Until February 2007, French General Alain Pellegrini had been in charge of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. In February 2007, Italian Claudio Graziano took over the command of UNIFIL from General Pellegrini.

⁴⁶⁵ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 185.

⁴⁶⁶ Nicoletta Pirozzi, "UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Europe's Contribution", *European Strategic Review*, (No. 30, September 2006), p. 3.

⁴⁶⁷ The EU Member States' contributions to the UNIFIL: Italy contributed up to 3,000 soldiers, the Garibaldi aircraft carrier and three disembarkation and patrol ships; France contributed 2,000 men and a squadron of 13 Leclerc tanks and heavy material; Spain contributed marine infantry unit 800-1,000 strong and 30 to 40 tanks; Poland contributed 280 soldiers; Belgium contributed 400 soldiers, including de-mining experts and medical teams; Luxemburg contributed a de-mining team within the Belgian contingent; Finland contributed 250 men; Sweden contributed two ships; Denmark contributed three warships; Greece contributed a frigate, a helicopter and special forces; Portugal contributed number of troops not specified; UK contributed two AWACS reconnaissance planes, six helicopters and a reconnaissance ship, as well as the use of its military basis in Cyprus; Germany and the Netherlands contributed ships for the surveillance of the Lebanese coast; Slovenia contributed 10 to 20 soldiers and de-mining experts; Bulgaria contributed number of troops not specified; Cyprus contributed via logistics. (Pirozzi, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3)

⁴⁶⁸ Matthias Dembinski, "Europe and the UNIFIL II Mission: Stumbling into the Conflict Zone of the Middle East", *CFSP Forum*, (Vol. 5, Iss. 1, January 2007).

The strategic and operational command of the force has been in the hands of the EU Member States.

The EU Member States' presence in Lebanon enabled them to be more proactive in the Middle East peace efforts. In November 2006, the Israeli Defence Force started the 'Operations Autumn Clouds' and entered into the Gaza Strip in order to stop rocket attacks against the Israeli cities and towns from the Gaza Strip. Following the operation, three EU Member States, France, Italy and Spain (three largest contributors to UNIFIL), launched a new Middle East Peace Initiative. In the words of the Italian Prime Minister these three countries took their presence in Lebanon as a starting point to develop the operational and concrete aspects of a wider initiative in the Middle East in order to give a real contribution to the pacification of the whole Middle East region.⁴⁶⁹ Their five-point peace proposal called for an immediate ceasefire; formation of a national unity government by the Palestinians that can gain international recognition; an exchange of prisoners, including the Israeli soldiers whose seizure sparked the war in Lebanon and fighting in Gaza in summer 2006; talks between the Israeli prime minister and the Palestinian president; and an international mission in Gaza to monitor a ceasefire.⁴⁷⁰ Israel and the US did not endorse the proposal. The Palestinians declared that they would welcome any initiative, but they did not endorse it warmly. As the other EU Member States did not back the plan, the peace initiative failed.

5.2 Analyzing the EU's Role Performance in the MEPP in the Post-9/11 Era

5.2.1 The EU's Role Performance as Force for Good

On the issue of MEPP, the EU Member States discursively constructed the EU as force for good or positive force. At the Brussels European Council, held on 20-21 March 2003, the EU Member States declared their intention to act as a force for good by emphasizing that the EU would work to achieve peace in the Middle East to the benefits of both the peoples of the region and international peace and stability. In this statement, the EU Member States did not emphasize the importance of settlement of the conflict for their self-interest in terms of European energy security and settlement of a conflict which has the potential of a negative spillover

⁴⁶⁹ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP", p. 28.

⁴⁷⁰ Brian Whitaker and Agencies, "European States Offer Middle East Peace Plan Without UK", *Guardian*, 17 November 2006. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov/17/israel.eu>.

effect on European security and stability. Rather, they emphasized the importance of the settlement of the conflict for the global common good, which is the benefit of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability.

In order to evaluate the performance of the EU's role as a force for good in the MEPP, there is a need to test whether the EU is to measure up to its self-image as a force for good. We should assess whether the EU has pursued ethically balanced policy. It is necessary to evaluate whether there exists a balance between the EU's interests and ethical considerations, whether there exists a balance between member and non-member concerns and whether the EU's actions satisfy the preferences of all the actors involved. Thus, in order to evaluate the EU's role performance as a force for good, we should evaluate whether the EU's actions and decisions advance the global common good or not.

The EU has adopted a balanced and comprehensive approach toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The EU's equating of the Israeli security needs and the Palestinian rights as parallel objectives of the peace process since the 1970s reflected its balanced and evenhanded approach. The EU has emphasized the right to existence and to security of all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples which implied the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Another indicator of the EU's evenhanded approach is the EU's continuous criticism and condemnation of the Palestinian terrorist attacks against the Israeli targets and the Israeli policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories, the Israeli military incursions, excessive use of force and the extrajudicial killings, forms of collective punishment and the construction of the Israeli 'Security Fence' and restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinians. The EU regarded them as the main stumbling blocks before the achievement of a negotiated settlement of the conflict resulting in two states, Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 1967 borders and in the framework of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The EU's emphasis on achieving a comprehensive peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in which all the parties to the conflict can be involved reflected its comprehensive approach. The EU's balanced and evenhanded approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict matched with the EU's rhetoric as a force for good.

Since the Berlin European Council of 1999, the EU Member States has emphasized that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of the existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security. Later on in the post-9/11, the US administration agreed on this term and identified a stable, viable, democratic and peaceful Palestinian state as necessary for the security of Israel. With the launch of the Road Map, this became the official position of the international community. In order to contribute to the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, the EU provided financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and supported the Palestinian reform process in areas of the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, the security sector reform, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free and fair elections, developing a modern education system and media based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding, the promotion of pro-peace civil society. Moreover, the EU has continued its status of being the largest external donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP in the post-9/11 era. This aid prevented the Palestinian economy from collapse; without this aid the Palestinian Authority would not have been able to finance even the basic functions of governance.⁴⁷¹ The collapse of the Palestinian Authority might have resulted in the escalation of conflict.⁴⁷² The EU's contribution to the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State through its aid to the Palestinian Authority and support to the Palestinian reform process clearly matched with the EU's rhetoric as a force for good. Since the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state is a best guarantee for the Israeli security, the EU's contribution to it serves to the benefit of both parties to the conflict and international community.

The EU's third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point through EU BAM Rafah is consistent with the EU's rhetoric as a force for good. Through its

⁴⁷¹ Michelle Pace, "The EU as a 'Force for Good' in Border Conflict Cases?", in Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds.), *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 213.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

third party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border, the EU facilitated the implementation of ‘Agreement on Movement and Access’ and ‘Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing’. Furthermore, the EU has contributed to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Israeli and the Palestinian Authority. The EU through its presence has contributed to the reconciliation of the Israeli security concerns with both the Palestinian demand for an autonomous border management and the requirements of Gaza’s economic recovery, which predisposes open borders.⁴⁷³ By meeting both parties’ concerns, EUBAM Rafah enhances the EU’s standing of a force for good in the conflict.

During the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006, in order to stop the conflict, the EU representatives including the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana carried out diplomatic efforts. They visited the region in July 2006 and met with the Israeli, the Palestinian and the Lebanese senior figures. They acted as facilitators for the cessation of the conflict. Moreover, in order to relieve the worsening humanitarian situation in Lebanon, the EU provided humanitarian aid in monetary terms and in kind in the form of food, medicine and shelter for the victims of the conflict in Lebanon. The EU also provided €11 million from Rapid Reaction Mechanism for helping the evacuation and repatriation of citizens of developing countries. After the end of the war, the EU Member States made the most significant military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL. The EU Member States has provided the backbone of the force by providing 7000 troops, crucial military components and the operational command for UNIFIL. The EU’s diplomatic efforts, provision of humanitarian assistance and military contributions enhance the EU’s standing of force for good in the Middle East. Through its efforts the EU acted for the benefit of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability.

The EU also in its relations with the two sides of the conflict refrained from resorting negative conditionality or coercion except the Hamas case. The EU generally prefers political dialogue and engagement rather than confrontation and coercion in its relations with the parties to the conflict. The EU has refrained from

⁴⁷³ Raffaella A. Del Sarto, “Wording and Meaning(s): EU-Israeli Political Cooperation According to the ENP Action Plan”, *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007), p. 70.

using sanctions against Israel which would be harmful for both sides. Israel has been the one of the biggest EU trading partners in the Euromed area ranking as the EU's 25th major trade partner.⁴⁷⁴ The EU's total trade with Israel was more than €25 billion in 2007. The EU has a trade surplus with Israel; while the EU imports from Israel were at €11.3 billion, EU exports to Israel totaled €14 billion in 2007. Thus, any trade and economic sanctions against Israel would be detrimental for both sides. It would mean some kind of self-inclined punishment for the EU.⁴⁷⁵

Moreover, the EU's use of economic and trade sanctions would undermine its political credibility in Israel and would result in the loss of its status as legitimate interlocutor.⁴⁷⁶ The EU's imposition of sanctions against Israel would result in rising the Israeli perception that the European states were biased against it. The EU thus refrained from using sanctions against Israel which would have detrimental effects on both its material interest and in contrast with its rhetoric as force for good. The EU has even refrained from using sanctions even when Israel systematically violated human rights and international humanitarian law through its conducts in the Occupied Territories, such as excessive use of force and the extrajudicial killings, forms of collective punishment, the construction of the Israeli 'Security Fence' and restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinians through closures, checkpoints and curfews. Here, the EU tried to strike a balance between European and the Israeli concerns. However, this resulted in an intra-role conflict for the EU. The EU's role as force for good holds conflicting expectations for the performance of this role. This effectively means that on the one hand, the EU's role as force for good urged it to refrain from using sanctions against Israel; but on the other hand, it simultaneously urged it to promote human rights and international humanitarian law including the use of sanctions against the violators.

A clear example of intra-role conflict for the EU was 'the rules of origin' issue in which the EU refrained from using sanctions against Israel even in the case of the Israeli breach of international humanitarian law and the EU-Israeli Association Agreement. The EU-Israeli Association Agreement applies only to industrial and

⁴⁷⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/israel/index_en.htm.

⁴⁷⁵ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 60.

⁴⁷⁶ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 61.

agricultural goods produced in the EU and Israel.⁴⁷⁷ The territorial scope of the agreement has been limited to `the territory of the State of Israel`, thus excluding, on the basis of the international humanitarian law, the territories under the Israeli occupation since 1967, including West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights.⁴⁷⁸ As the agreement did not specify any detailed definition of territorial scope of the agreement, Israel has considered some of these territories as a part of the State of Israel and issued certificates of origin accordingly.⁴⁷⁹ In determining the origin of its exports, Israel has not distinguished between goods produced in Israel and in the Occupied Territories.⁴⁸⁰ This led to the preferential treatment of goods produced in the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and made these products eligible for customs reduction that the Israeli goods have enjoyed under the Association Agreement.⁴⁸¹ This was a material breach of both EU-Israeli Association Agreement and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

The EU asked Israel to stop labeling any goods produced in the Occupied Territories as `made in Israel`, since the Occupied Territories are not part of Israel on the basis of the Fourth Geneva Convention and are not entitled to be subject to customs reductions that the Israeli goods have enjoyed under the Association Agreement.⁴⁸² However, until November 2003, Israel, by relying on the argument that as the EU recognized the Paris Agreement which created a customs union between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, refused to distinguish between goods produced in Israel and in the Occupied Territories and accept the treatment of goods produced in the Occupied Territories differently from goods produced in Israel.⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁷ Wybe Th. Douma, "Israel and the Palestinian Authority", in Steven Blockmans and Adam Larowski (eds.), *The European Union and Its Neighbours* (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institut, 2006), p. 446.

⁴⁷⁸ Nathalie Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 117.

⁴⁷⁹ Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 446.

⁴⁸⁰ Tocci, *op.cit.*, The EU and Conflict Resolution, pp. 117-118.

⁴⁸¹ Tocci, *op.cit.*, The EU and Conflict Resolution, p.118.

⁴⁸² Dorothee Schmid, et.al., "Mapping European and American Economic Initiatives towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and Their Effects on Honest Broker Perceptions", *EuroMesco Paper* (No. 61, October 2006), p. 15.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

During the course of time, despite the Israeli breach of EU law and international humanitarian law, the EU did not use any sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against Israel. Thus, the EU put itself in the position of facilitating the infringement of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which was prohibited by the Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention⁴⁸⁴. The EU tried to solve the issue through dialogue and negotiations with Israel. As a result of negotiations, the ‘rules of origin’ issue was settled with an agreement between the EU and Israel on a technical arrangement in 2004 which entered into force on 1 February 2005. With this agreement Israel agreed to specify the place of production by naming localities of production on the proofs of origin of its exports to the EU.⁴⁸⁵

This arrangement provided satisfactory solutions for both Israel and the EU, with this arrangement the EU was able to strike a balance between its own and the Israeli concerns. First of all, by enabling the EU customs authorities to identify which exported goods originate from the Israeli settlements in Occupied Territories and which from Israel and treat them accordingly⁴⁸⁶, the arrangement enabled the EU to prevent breach of the EU law and international humanitarian law. Secondly, this arrangement enabled Israel to continue to use word ‘Israel’ to describe the location of settlements in the Occupied Territories⁴⁸⁷ and represent all localities as situated within the State of Israel including settlements in the Occupied Territories and to issue proofs of origin for products produced in the settlements⁴⁸⁸. However, the arrangement’s entitlement of Israel to represent all localities as situated within the State of Israel would result in the EU’s recognition of the Occupied Territories within Israel’s territorial scope.⁴⁸⁹ As a result of this, Israel’s occupation would become enshrined in the EU law, which in turn, would constitute an infringement of the EU Member States’ duties under international law.⁴⁹⁰ In the rules of origin issue,

⁴⁸⁴ Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prevents any state or its nationals from participating in or facilitating the Convention’s violation.

⁴⁸⁵ Tocci, *op.cit.*, The EU and Conflict Resolution, p.118.

⁴⁸⁶ Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 449.

⁴⁸⁷ Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 448.

⁴⁸⁸ Tocci, *op.cit.*, The EU and Conflict Resolution, p.118.

⁴⁸⁹ Michael Emerson, et.al., “The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood”, *CEPS Working Document* (No. 223, July 2005), p. 26.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

the EU's refrainment from using sanctions against Israel and its ability to find a satisfactory solution for both Israel and itself matched with the EU's rhetoric as a force for good, however its inability to promote international humanitarian law even with the use of sanctions against the Israeli infringement of the Fourth Geneva Convention was incongruent with the EU's rhetoric of force for good.

The EU has been the largest external donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority. This aid prevented the Palestinian economy from collapse; without this aid the Palestinian Authority would not have been able to finance even the basic functions of governance. The EU, aware of the detrimental effects of sanctions on the Palestinian Authority, refrained from using sanctions even when the Palestinian Authority failed to progress in areas of political and economic reform. However, in March 2006 when the Hamas-led Palestinian Government failed to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence including the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map, the EU decided to boycott Hamas and impose sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government. In Palestine and in the wider Arab world, the EU's imposition of sanctions on the Palestinian Authority was interpreted as an imposition of a severe and inhumane regime of sanctions against the Palestinian people under occupation.⁴⁹¹ The EU's imposition of sanctions on a democratically elected Hamas-led government with free and fair elections is incongruent with the EU's rhetoric of force for good.

By imposing sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government, the EU did not serve good of neither the Palestinian people nor itself. The sanctions resulted in a grave economic crisis which threatened the collapse of the Palestinian Authority without necessarily harming Hamas, in terms of either finance provision or of public support.⁴⁹² Although deteriorating economic and social conditions in the Palestinian Territories forced the members of the Quartet to launch TIM which enabled direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people while bypassing the Hamas-led Palestinian government, TIM represented a drop in the ocean⁴⁹³ related to the scale

⁴⁹¹ Pace, op.cit., "The EU as a 'Force for Good' in Border Conflict Cases?", p.214.

⁴⁹² Tocci, op.cit., The EU and Conflict Resolution, p.121.

⁴⁹³ According to the World Bank, real GDP Growth in the Palestinian Territories has been zero percent, which in the face of a rapidly increasing population, led to a further decrease in the per capita income. In mid-2008, per capita income has been forty percent less than before the Second Intifada.

of challenges facing the Palestinian Territories and did not prevent a significant increase in the poverty levels amongst the Palestinians.⁴⁹⁴ TIM's support was small in scale and it only covered a small part of medical needs and salaries.⁴⁹⁵ This situation increased the Palestinian people's dependence on Hamas for basic services. With the introduction of TIM, EU aid to Palestine began to shift from development projects and institutional reform to humanitarian and emergency aid.⁴⁹⁶

The EU's imposition of sanctions on the Hamas-led government did not serve the interests and good of the EU either. The EU lost much popularity and good will amongst the Palestinian people and the wider Arab world.⁴⁹⁷ The EU's imposition of sanctions on a democratically elected government undermined its credibility as a promoter of democracy. Sanctions increased suspicions about the EU's commitment to support the democratization of the Palestinian Authority. The EU's imposition of sanctions negatively affected trust of the Palestinian people and the wider Arab world in the EU's good will as well as in the whole process of reform, transformation and the belief in principle of democracy.⁴⁹⁸ The Palestinians and the wider Arab world regarded the EU's refusal to deal with the democratically elected Hamas government as a clear demonstration of political insincerity.⁴⁹⁹ The EU's imposition of sanctions on a government which was elected with a fair, free and transparent election was regarded by the Palestinians as the EU's ignorance of the democratic expression of the Palestinian people (although the EU had made democracy one of the conditions for its financial aid to the Palestinian Authority) and deprivation of many Palestinians of their livelihood: in effect a contradiction – although Hamas had a legal mandate to govern through a fair, free, and transparent vote, it is

Official unemployment rate has been twenty three percent in the Palestinian Territories. Thirty five percent of the Palestinians living in Gaza have been living in absolute poverty. (Muriel Asseburg, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach", *SWP Research Paper* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2009), p. 37)

⁴⁹⁴ Richard Youngs, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?", *FRIDE Comment*, March 2007.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ Lena Kolarska-Bobinska and Magdalena Mughrabi, "New Member States' Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Case of Poland", EuroMesco, p. 13.

⁴⁹⁷ Youngs, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?".

⁴⁹⁸ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁴⁹⁹ Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

considered as a terrorist organization by the EU and the US.⁵⁰⁰ Furthermore, imposition of sanctions interrupted the long process of confidence building between the officials of the Palestinian Authority and the EU.⁵⁰¹ Although the Palestinian people took an important step towards democratization, the EU's reaction to the Hamas victory stand in stark contrast to EU's discursive practices regarding the importance of fair, free and transparent elections as crucial dimensions of much needed democratization momentum on the Palestinian side for a possible resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁵⁰²

Moreover, by imposing sanctions and cutting off relations with Hamas and preferring a policy of isolation rather than engagement, the EU has lost the chance of strengthening the more moderate wing of Hamas, which prefers the domestic governance of Palestine to confrontation with Israel and is therefore interested in continued EU support.⁵⁰³ By undermining moderates, who are willing to continue peace negotiations with Israel, this policy only strengthened those groups believing in violence as the only effective tactic. The EU's policy of isolation against Hamas prevented it from positively influencing the divisions within Hamas leadership, moderates and hard-liners.⁵⁰⁴ The EU's lack of engagement with Hamas has strengthened the radical wing of Hamas.⁵⁰⁵ The strengthening of radical wing of Hamas which favored confrontation with Israel resulted in the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the EU's imposition of sanctions also had detrimental effect of the MEPP. It acted to the disadvantage of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability. In the meantime, the internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah and the separation of Palestine between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Israeli conflict with Hamas-controlled Gaza demonstrated the detrimental effect on strengthening of radical wing of Hamas.

⁵⁰⁰ Michelle Pace, "Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: The Limits of EU Normative Power", *Democratization* (Vol. 16, No. 1, February 2009), p. 46.

⁵⁰¹ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁵⁰² Pace, *op.cit.*, "The EU as a 'Force for Good' in Border Conflict Cases?", p.214.

⁵⁰³ Sven Biscop, "For a 'More Active' EU in the Middle East: Transatlantic Relations and the Strategic Implications of Europe's Engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine", *Egmont Paper 13* (Brussels: Academia Press, March 2007), p. 15.

⁵⁰⁴ Michael Emerson, Nathalie Tocci and Richard Youngs, "Gaza's Hell: Why the EU Must Change Its Policy", *CEPS Commentary*, 13 January 2009.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Moreover, the EU's continuing financial aid to unelected Fatah administration in the West Bank, while isolating elected Hamas administration in Gaza further aggravated the situation. In doing so EU aid did not act as an encouraging tool for the Palestinian internal reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the Palestinian democracy.⁵⁰⁶ This did not positively induce moderation within Hamas and aggravated polarization between internationally supported Fatah and the boycotted Hamas.⁵⁰⁷ Although the EU with good intentions tried to strengthen a moderate Palestinian leadership through its support to unelected Fatah administration in the West Bank, its policy of isolation towards elected Hamas administration in Gaza contributed to the deepening of the Palestinian internal divisions and actually further weakening of Fatah.⁵⁰⁸

Muriel Asseburg also put forward that the EU's policy of isolation has not only sought to isolate Hamas but also has backed the Israeli embargo on the Gaza Strip and put the Gazans under massive pressure to change their political preferences by imposing measures of collective punishment. This policy has been both contrary to the EU's norms and aims of state and institution-building, and has cost European taxpayers immensely, because more funds have been required to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of embargo.⁵⁰⁹

The EU's imposition of sanctions on the Hamas-led government deteriorated the EU's image amongst Middle Eastern countries. Some Middle Eastern countries began to perceive that the 'rules of the game' are biased against the Arab world. As a result, those who would like to drive a permanent wedge between the West and the Arab world exploited this situation. As an example for this, Jordan's active pro-Islamist movement turned the unresolved Palestine question and the perceived bias of the US and the EU against the Hamas government into an argument against Jordanian civil society accepting EU funds for projects in the country. The EU started to face difficulty in finding receivers for its funds for value promotion in Jordan.⁵¹⁰ Moreover, the EU's stance has also reinforced the Middle

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Tocci, op.cit., The EU and Conflict Resolution, p.125.

⁵⁰⁸ Almut Möller, "After Gaza: A New Approach To Hamas", *AIES Focus*, February 2009.

⁵⁰⁹ Muriel Asseburg, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach", *SWP Research Paper* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2009), p. 35.

⁵¹⁰ Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p. 94.

Eastern countries' belief that the EU's lack of understanding/misreading of the Middle Eastern affairs rather than its normative stance dominates its foreign policy agenda.⁵¹¹ The EU is considered as a timid spectator in the unfolding of the Middle Eastern events, awaiting the US to give its green light for any move in the Middle East.⁵¹²

In the Hamas case, the EU faced a difficult political dilemma to handle. On the one hand, there was democratically elected Hamas government. On the other hand, democratically elected Hamas was on the EU's list of terrorist organizations⁵¹³ and refused to meet and implement the three principles put forward by the Quartet on the Middle East including non-violence comprising the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. EU Member States faced a hard choice between upholding the principle of democracy and safeguarding the EU's credibility and standing as an actor in the MEPP by maintaining its commitment not to deal with organizations that have been labeled as 'terrorist' by the international community.⁵¹⁴ Faced with a hard choice, the EU preferred to impose sanctions on the Hamas government in order to force it to meet and implement three principles. The EU's failure to find satisfying solution for both the Palestinian people and itself in respect of the Hamas electoral victory has compromised what the EU claimed to stand for, to act as a force for good in the conflict.

To conclude, the EU can be identified as a limited force for good in the case of the MEPP. The EU's balanced and comprehensive approach to the conflict, its contribution to the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, its provision of financial and technical

⁵¹¹ Michelle Pace, "Interrogating the European Union's Democracy Promotion Agenda: Discursive Configurations of 'Democracy from the Middle East'", Paper Presented at EUSA Conference 2009, Los Angeles, 23-25 April 2009.

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ On 27 December 2001, Council of the EU adopted a Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, through with the EU Member States decided to freeze funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts. The terrorist wing of Hamas, Kata'ib al-shadid Izz al-din al-Qassam', was added to the list of terrorist organizations. On 29 November 2005, the Council also added the political wing of Hamas to this list. The EU imposed sanction on the Hamas-led Palestinian government on the basis of this list of terrorist organizations. (Almut Möller, "After Gaza: A New Approach To Hamas", *AIES Focus*, February 2009)

⁵¹⁴ Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p. 94.

aid to the Palestinian Authority and support for the Palestinian reform process, its contribution to the mediation efforts demonstrated that the EU to some extent struck a balance between the EU's and conflicting parties' concerns. The EU's actions and decisions in some measure can be said to be satisfactory for the preferences of all actors involved in the conflict. The EU actions served the benefit of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability. However, the EU's decision to impose sanctions on democratically elected Hamas-led Palestinian government was incongruent with the EU's role conception as force for good. As discussed above, the EU's decision to impose sanctions on Hamas acted both to the detriment of all actors involved in the conflict. The paradox that EU faced between its policy of promotion of democracy, refrainment from using coercion against parties to the conflict and its security considerations in terms of refraining from dealing with a terrorist organization, which refused to renounce violence, prevented the EU to act in a satisfactory manner for both the Palestinians and itself. The Hamas case put limit on the EU's role performance as force for good which claims to act for global common good. Furthermore, intra-role conflict, which the EU faced on the issue of employing sanctions against Israel, put a further limit on the performance of the EU's role as a force for good.

5.2.2 The EU's Role Performance as Force for International Peace, Security and Stability

The Arab-Israeli conflict, settlement of which was perceived by the EU as crucial for European energy security and its potential to adversely affect the EU's internal social and political stability and security due to spillover effect, was a good case for the evaluation of the performance of the EU's role as a force for international peace, security and stability. The settlement of the conflict can be identified as some form of self-defence for the EU as identified in the ESS document. Bringing peace, security and stability to the region, which is geographically very proximate to Europe, by contributing to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the enlightened self-interest of the EU. First of all, the settlement of the conflict would bring security, stability and peace to the region and would be beneficial for the countries in the region. Secondly, settlement of the conflict would relieve the above-mentioned security concerns of the EU. Thus, while the EU is acting to further the interests of the countries in the region and promote international

peace, security and stability, ultimately it serves its own self-interests. Settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be therefore identified as a positive-sum situation for the EU, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and other countries in the region.

The EU's role performance as a force for international, peace, security and stability in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era can be evaluated by examining to what extent the EU is to measure up to its self-image. I focus of the EU's actions and decisions towards the negotiated settlement of the conflict resulting in two states, Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 1967 borders and in the framework of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, basing on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1515, the terms of reference of Madrid Conference of 2002 and the principle of 'land for peace'.

The EU has used various foreign policy instruments including political, diplomatic, military and civilian and development instruments towards the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU has contributed through its diplomatic efforts towards the settlement of the conflict, carried out two ESDP operations and militarily contributed to the UNIFIL, used ENP (two parties to the conflict are partners of the EU under the framework of ENP), provided financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and supported its reform process towards the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state.

In the immediate post-9/11 era, in order to stop mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the EU representatives and the representatives of EU Member States have played an active role in the mediation efforts and carried out several diplomatic missions. Although, they have attempted to broker a ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians, their mediation had a limited success and did not succeed to stop mutual violence between two sides. In this period the EU could only play a complementary role to the US mediation efforts, the EU representatives played a crucial role in the settlement of a microsecurity crisis, like the issue of the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. On this issue, during the Israeli 'Operation Defensive Shield' in 2002, the mediation efforts of Miguel Moratinos, Javier Solana and the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique contributed to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. As the Spanish Foreign

Minister Josep Pique noted that without the EU efforts, the Church of the Nativity would remain under siege and the Israeli troops would remain on the streets of Bethlehem. Moreover, during the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006, the EU representatives carried out diplomatic efforts in order to stop conflict. The Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja as the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency, the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana visited the region in July 2006 and met with the Israeli, the Palestinian and the Lebanese senior figures. Their mediation efforts contributed to the settlement of the conflict. As it is emphasized by EU officials, the EU was able to calm down the atmosphere in the Middle East. It was able to contain the conflict and situation in the region.⁵¹⁵ Diplomatic efforts of the EU representatives demonstrated the EU's willingness to play an active role in promoting and preserving peace, security and stability in the Middle East.

The EU has been one of the members of the Quartet on the Middle East since April 2002. The Quartet provided the EU a formal framework to participate in the diplomatic and political dimension of the peace process alongside the US, Russian Federation and the UN. The EU has played an active role in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map. German and Danish proposals formed the basis of the Road Map agreed by the Quartet on the Middle East in September 2002. The EU has played the role as the facilitator for the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU has contributed to the normalization of Palestinian Life and Palestinian institution- building. The EU supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state which was identified by the Quartet members as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict. The EU supported the Palestinian reform process in the areas of drafting a new constitution, the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, the security sector reform, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free, fair and open elections, developing a modern education system and media based on

⁵¹⁵ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

peace, tolerance and mutual understanding, the promotion of pro-peace civil society. The EU facilitated the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel which would lead to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As noted by a British diplomat, helping the Palestinians in building an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state is the EU's part in the implementation of the Road Map.⁵¹⁶ Despite the EU's efforts, the Israeli unilateral actions including construction of the Security Fence and the Disengagement Plan and continuing mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians decreased the prospect of the successful implementation of the Road Map and led it into a dead end.

The ENP: Although the EU's use of the ENP as a foreign policy tool for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East is not directly related with the EU's efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it has indirectly contributed to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. Both actors to the conflict, Israel and the Palestinian Authority are partners of the EU under the framework of the ENP. Both actors signed Action Plans with the EU. The Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed Action Plans with the EU in 2004. These Action Plans included a political dialogue and agreed governance reforms and measures preparing both partners for gradually integrating in the EU's internal market.⁵¹⁷ In this part, rather than going into details of the ENP partnership of these two actors with the EU, I prefer to focus on the relevance of the ENP with the EU's contribution to the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

In the Action Plan for Israel, the EU and Israel agreed on several priorities for action which are directly related with the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of these priorities is to enhance political dialogue and co-operation, based on shared values, including facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. In order to fulfill this priority, under the heading of situation in the Middle East, the EU and Israel agreed on several actions. These actions include strengthening political dialogue and identifying areas for further co-operation on progress towards a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict; bilateral

⁵¹⁶ Interview with Alexander Naqvi, Desk Officer for the MEPP, UK Permanent Representation to the European Union, 11 November 2009.

⁵¹⁷ Schmid, et.al., *op.cit.*, p. 15.

cooperation between the EU and Israel towards the comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with Road Map; supporting the Palestinian Authority's efforts to stop terrorist activities and violence; facilitating the secure and safe movement of civilians and goods, safeguarding, to the maximum possible, property, institutions and infrastructure while recognizing the Israeli right of self-defence, the importance of adherence to international law, and the need to preserve the perspective of a viable comprehensive settlement, minimizing the impact of security and counter-terrorism measures on the civilian population; improving economic and social conditions for all populations; further improving access and co-ordination to facilitate the implementation and delivery of humanitarian and other forms of assistance and facilitate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure; pursuing efforts to support and facilitate reforms, transparency, accountability and democratic governance in the Palestinian Authority, and the consolidation of all security services; promote a climate conducive to the resumption of co-operation in all areas; and taking concrete actions against incitement to hatred and the use of violence from all sources.

This Action Plan envisaged a bilateral political cooperation between the EU and Israel for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. In addition to its efforts within the multilateral framework of the Quartet, the EU also tried utilize ENP's bilateral framework for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, some features of the Action Plan prevented the EU to use it effectively to facilitate the settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Road Map. First of all, the Action Plan is mostly a declaration of mutual objectives and commitments. Actions are little more than declarations and intentions and they lack concreteness.⁵¹⁸ Secondly, the political commitments demanded from Israel in return for its participation in the EU's internal market are vague.⁵¹⁹ The reason behind the vagueness is to enable both parties to agree on a document which they can present it as a clear achievement for themselves, while understating the concessions which were granted.⁵²⁰ Due to this vagueness, the EU and Israel maintained different interpretations of the Action Plan. For the EU, it represented Israel's official acceptance of the EU's involvement in the

⁵¹⁸ Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 457.

⁵¹⁹ Del Sarto, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

⁵²⁰ Del Sarto, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

Middle East peacemaking, along with the principles of Road Map.⁵²¹ The EU granted as much importance to the political dimension of the partnership as the economic one. However, Israel tried to separate bilateral economic relations with the EU from political ones and focused on the economic dimension. For Israel, Action Plan represented the upgrading of bilateral economic relations, and gradual economic integration of Israel in the EU's internal market, but not an instrument for the settlement of the conflict.⁵²²

Israel has been successful in excluding the issues related with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue from its bilateral talks with the EU. For instance, although there was an official political dimension to the institutional EU-Israel framework, there has never been such kind of political discussion within the daily dialogue between Israel and the European Commission concerning the Palestinian dimension.⁵²³ Although both sides reiterated their commitment to the trilateral EU-Israel-Palestinian trade group, which aims to examine ways to improve trade flows and cross-border movements of the Palestinian goods between Gaza, the West Bank, Israel and the EU, most of the bilateral talks concern how Israel could be integrated better in the internal market.⁵²⁴ Only one occasion in 2005, EU, Israel and the Palestinian Authority attempted to cooperate in energy and transport, but Hamas victory prevented the application of the joint initiative. In this case, although the European Commission backed joint activities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the form of financial and political support for joint Israel-Palestinian Energy Offices to improve coordination in electricity and gas networks; after Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 all activities were halted.⁵²⁵

The declaratory character of the Action Plan; the contracting parties' different interpretations of the Action Plan; the Israeli success to exclude issues related with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue from its bilateral talks with the EU; the EU's reluctance to exert any form of conditionality toward Israel even when Israel failed to fulfill its commitments within the framework of Action

⁵²¹ Del Sarto, op.cit.

⁵²² Del Sarto, op.cit.

⁵²³ Schmid, et.al., op.cit., p. 15.

⁵²⁴ Schmid, et.al., op.cit., p. 15.

⁵²⁵ Schmid, et.al., op.cit., p. 15.

Plan prevented the EU to use the ENP as an effective tool for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Road Map. While the ENP strengthened the economic partnership between the EU and Israel, this did not lead to a bilateral political partnership for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with the Road Map.

The EU has utilized the ENP as a tool for assisting and facilitating the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map especially with regard to the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. Unlike Israel, the EU has used ENP as an effective tool for the achievement of the objectives set by the Road Map in the Palestinian case.

In the Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority, the ENP was identified as part of EU's response to the Palestinian Authority's political and economic reform process towards the consolidation of democracy, accountability, transparency and justice in the Palestinian Territories. In the Action Plan, the EU and the Palestinian Authority agreed on several priorities for action which are directly or indirectly related with the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. First priority is directly referred to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. First priority of the Action Plan is to facilitate efforts to resolve the Middle East Conflict and alleviate humanitarian situation in Palestine. Other priorities are indirectly related with the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; they are related with the EU's support to the political and economic reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state which was identified by the Road Map as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict. These priorities are directly related with EU's efforts to facilitate the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel which would lead to the settlement of the Conflict. These priorities include progress on establishing a functioning judiciary and effective enforcement of legislation; strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; strengthening institutions and further reinforcing administrative capacity, holding of elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in accordance with international standards, building on progress made in establishing an accountable system of public finances. These priorities are

related with the Palestinian political and economic reform process in the areas of the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free and fair elections and developing a modern education system and media based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding.

In order to fulfill these priorities, under the heading of “Political Dialogue and Reform–building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian State”, the EU and the Palestinian Authority agreed on several actions. These actions include:

- Strengthening political dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the Palestinian Authority in resolving the Middle East conflict through intensifying efforts to facilitate the peace process and bring about the implementation of the Quartet Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- taking measures to facilitate improving the overall humanitarian situation;
- ensuring respect for international law, in particular international humanitarian law;
- fighting against terrorism;
- strengthening EU-Palestinian Authority cooperation on the Palestinian reform programme;
- establishment of an independent, impartial and fully functioning judiciary in line with international standards and strengthen the separation of powers;
- holding of transparent general and local elections according to international standards;
- acceleration of constitutional and legislative reform including finalization of work on the drafting of a democratic Constitution and consultation with wider public;
- carrying out public administration and civil service reform;
- strengthening legal guarantees for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association in accordance with international standards,

- ensuring the respect of human rights and basic civil liberties in accordance with the principles of international law;
- fostering a culture of non-violence, tolerance and mutual understanding;
- continuing efforts to establish a modern and well-functioning system of financial control in line with international best practices;
- continuing work to improve transparency of the Palestinian Authority's finances and to take concerted action to tackle corruption within public institutions and to fight against fraud;
- developing a modern education system based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding;
- continuing efforts to establish a modern and well-functioning system of financial control in line with international best practices;
- continuing work to improve transparency of the Palestinian Authority's finances and to take concerted action to tackle corruption within public institutions and to fight against fraud;
- ensuring transparency of public procurement operations; putting in place a modern and financially sustainable pension system.

This action plan envisaged intensified bilateral political and economic cooperation between the EU and the Palestinian Authority for the continuation of the Palestinian political and economic reform process towards the creation of a democratic, economically and politically viable and sovereign Palestinian state. Unlike the Israeli case, besides its efforts within the multilateral framework of the Quartet, the EU effectively utilized ENP's bilateral framework for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Palestinian case. However, after the Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006, the EU's policy of boycotting the Hamas-led Palestinian Government and then the internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah and the separation of Palestine between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank made the implementation of the ENP objectives impossible. This situation impeded the continuation of intensified bilateral political and economic cooperation between the EU and the Palestinian Authority.

ESDP OPERATIONS

The EU carried out two civilian crisis management operations under the framework of the ESDP in the Occupied Territories in order to contribute to the

promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. These two missions also directly related with the EU's commitment to assist and facilitate the implementation of the Road Map, of which the EU has regarded as the only way to the settlement of the conflict. Both ESDP operations have raised the profile of the EU in relation to the sensitive border, policing and rule-of-law dimensions of the conflict.⁵²⁶

EUBAM Rafah

The first mission, EU BAM Rafah was established upon the invitation of the two parties to the conflict, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. It aims to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point between Gaza and Egypt in order to contribute to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and build up confidence between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, in cooperation with the Community's institution-building efforts. The mandate of the mission is to actively monitor, verify and evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance with regard to the implementation of the 'Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing' and to ensure the Palestinian Authority's observance of all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of the 'Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing'. In addition to the supervision of the implementation of the 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the mandate of EU BAM Rafah also included contributing to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah through mentoring, and contributing to the liaison between the Palestinian, the Israeli and the Egyptian authorities in all aspects regarding the management of the Rafah Crossing Point.

In order to contribute to the Palestinian capacity building in all aspects of border management at Rafah, the EU BAM Rafah has tried to develop training programmes, designed to meet the training needs in a variety of border management fields, and evaluation systems. In addition to actively monitoring and mentoring the Palestinian Authority's border management at Rafah, the EU BAM Rafah has also provided support to the EU's other ESDP operation in the Occupied Territories, EUPOL COPPS in areas of auditing the Palestinian Civil Police and the preparation of training courses. In the area of auditing, EUBAM Rafah officers have assisted

⁵²⁶ Bulut, "EUBAM Rafah", *op.cit.*, p. 289.

EUPOL COPPS advisers to observe several Palestinian Civil Police districts, headquarters and police stations in the West Bank in order to identify training and support needs. In the area of training, the EUBAM Rafah has produced Border Police and Customs input which EUBAM officers would deliver during a Public Order training course to be run by EUPOL COPPS at the Jericho Training Centre.⁵²⁷

The EU BAM Rafah is the EU's first ESDP operation with the specific aim of monitoring borders abroad.⁵²⁸ The EU BAM Rafah was very crucial for the EU's role in the MEPP. The EU BAM Rafah enabled the EU to play a significant role in the security dimension of the peace process. For the first time, EU military personnel, under the command of an Italian general, supervised an area of security concern for Israel.⁵²⁹ The EU BAM Rafah has provided benefits for both sides of the conflict and served the achievement of the objectives of the Road Map. First of all, it has contributed to the confidence-building between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Secondly, it provided the Palestinians freedom of movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza Strip which would improve their living conditions and pave the ground for the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state. Thirdly, it provided the Israelis a sense of security against threats which would come through Rafah Crossing Point including possible weapons transfers and uninhibited return of exiled extremist leaders and terrorists. As the Israelis perceived Rafah as a door of danger⁵³⁰, the EU BAM Rafah provided them some kind of border security. Moreover, since the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state is a best guarantee for the Israeli security, the EU BAM Rafah's contribution to the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state would indirectly contribute to the security of Israel.

⁵²⁷ EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point, *European Union Factsheet*, March 2009. Available at <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1022&lang=en>.

⁵²⁸ Maria A. Sabote, "EU BAM Rafah: A Test for the EU's Role in the Middle East", *CFSP Forum*, (Vol. 4, Iss. 4, July 2006), p. 9.

⁵²⁹ Musu, *op.cit.*, The EU and the MEPP, p. 26.

⁵³⁰ Tovah Lazaroff, "EUBAM Head: Keeping Rafah Open is the Trick", *The Jerusalem Post*, 6 February 2009. Accessed from <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1233304702298>.

EUPOL COPPS

The second mission, civilian police mission EUPOL COPPS was established in order to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under the Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Community's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform.

The mandate of the mission included assisting the Palestinian Civil Police in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan by advising and closely mentoring senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system, coordinating and facilitating EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police, and advising on police-related Criminal Justice elements. The main aim behind the launch of the mission was to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order in the Palestinian territories by improving the Palestinian Civil Police and law enforcement capacity.

During its mandate, EUPOL COPPS has focused on two areas of activity. First of all, it contributed to the capacity building of the Palestinian police through providing infrastructures, vehicles, computers, equipment and training. Secondly, it provided public order training to the Palestine police in order to teach them how to act as a democratic and accountable police force while managing peaceful and hostile demonstrations. In public order training, the Palestinian police officers have learned public order management techniques, including minimum use of force while arresting. In addition to equipping and training the Palestinian police, EUPOL COPPS has coordinated and facilitated financial assistance, whether from EU countries or other international donors, to the Palestinian Civil Police.

In order to reform the Palestinian Criminal Justice System, the rule of law section of EUPOL COPSS was established besides advising section in October 2007. The rule of law section focused on advising, programme planning and project facilitation for the Palestinian Criminal Justice Sector. As a part of the EU's aim to support to a comprehensive approach to creating security for the Palestinians, the EU decided to treat the Palestinian Criminal Justice Sector as a whole. Thus, they decided to expand the rule of law section with additional personnel in May 2008. The

rule of law section has been working for the development of a comprehensive strategy for the Palestinian Justice Sector in close coordination with the Palestinian partners and existing coordination mechanisms. It has been advising on and monitoring the legal situation through the Palestinian Ministry of Justice, prosecutors' offices and courts.

EUPOL COPPS has served the achievement of the objectives of the Road Map. EUPOL COPPS has been an important element of the EU's efforts to assist and facilitate the Palestinian Authority to live up to its Road Map obligations especially with regard to institution building and security. With regard to institution building, it was an important step towards the creation of a politically viable Palestinian State, which was one of the goals of the Road Map. The EUPOL COPPS has contributed to the Palestinian Authorities' efforts to create a sound Palestinian criminal justice system and a modern, democratic, accountable and effective Palestinian police organization with a clearly identified role, operating within a sound legal framework, capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service, responsive to the needs of the society and able to manage effectively its human and physical resources. With regard to security, EUPOL COPPS has bestowed benefits on security of both sides of the conflict. First of all, it has made a crucial contribution to the improvement of the security of the Palestinian territories through improving the Palestinian civil police's law enforcement capacity. By consolidating the Palestinian civil police's capacity in policing and fighting crime, EUPOL COPPS contributed to the reestablishment of law and order in the Palestinian territories. By this way, it contributed to an improvement in the safety and the security of the Palestinian population and served the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law. Secondly, by contributing to the creation of politically viable Palestinian state, it would contribute to the security of Israel.

In addition to these two ESDP operations, the EU Member States' significant military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL and their leading role in the UN force, which was discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, enhanced the EU's profile, presence and visibility as the promoter of peace, security and stability in the region. Beside the EU BAM Rafah, EU Member States' military presence in the region through UNIFIL demonstrated the increased international recognition of the EU as a significant security player in the Middle East conflict. As it is maintained by

EU officials, with EUBAM Rafah and UNIFIL, the EU began to play a key role in the Israeli security. On the one hand, EUBAM Rafah has provided security for the southern border of Israel; on the other hand, UNIFIL has provided security for the northern border of Israel.⁵³¹

The EU's provision of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, has been one of the most important contributions of the EU to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East. The EU's aid to the Palestinian Authority has made significant contributions to the continuation of the MEPP. First of all, this aid prevented the Palestinian Authority from collapse; without this aid the Palestinian Authority would not have been able to finance even the basic functions of governance. The prevention of the collapse of the Palestinian Authority facilitated the continuation of the peace process. Secondly, this aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU through its aid to the Palestinian Authority has assisted and facilitated the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state.

The EU's support to the Palestinian political and economic reform process, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, has been another significant contribution of the EU to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East. The EU through its support to the political and economic reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state has facilitated and assisted the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU facilitated the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel which would lead to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

In conclusion, the EU can be identified as a 'constrained' force for international peace, security and stability in the case of the MEPP. On the one hand, the EU has played a significant role in the peaceful settlement of the conflict through some successful mediation efforts and diplomatic missions of EU and national representatives, like in the issue of the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in

⁵³¹ Interview with Gwenda Jeffreys-Jones, Desk Officer for the MEPP, Directorate-General External Relations, European Commission, 27 October 2009.

Bethlehem. It has carried out two ESDP operations. It has signed ENP Action Plans with both sides. It has made significant military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL. It has provided financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and supported the Palestinian reform process towards the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. Moreover, the EU has been the most active member of the Quartet on the Middle East in the promotion of the Road Map. Nevertheless, the EU as a force for international peace, security and stability has faced two kinds of constraints which prevented it to always act as an effective mediator for the peaceful settlement of the conflict: internal and external.

Internal constraints are related with the EU's lack of both vertical⁵³² and horizontal⁵³³ coherence, the EU's inability to act as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. In the area of foreign and security policy, the Member States are the key players and decisions are made through consensus. Diverging national interests and preferences prevented EU Member States from agreeing on a common position and acting effectively in conflict situations. As seen in the early months of 2002, EU Member States did not agree on a common strategy to revive the stalemated peace process, hence they did not take any European initiative and finally decided to support the US initiative. Their diverging preferences constrained the EU's ability to act as an effective mediator for the settlement of the conflict. The EU's inability to act prevented it to take an initiative which would have ended mutual violence and put the stalemated peace process back on track.

Moreover, some EU Member States' unilateral diplomacy and their diverging voices undermined the EU's effectiveness and international credibility as force for international peace, security and stability. Italian government's attitude towards the Israeli construction of security fence can be given as an example for the lack of internal cohesion within the EU. During its EU Presidency in 2003, Italian government declared its support to the Israeli construction of security fence through the Occupied Territories in the West Bank by declaring it as an act of self-defence on

⁵³² Vertical coherence refers to the coherence between the Member States and the EU.

⁵³³ Horizontal coherence refers to the coherence within the EU, mainly the coherence between the intergovernmental CFSP and the supranational EC and the achievement synergy between these policies.

the part of Israel. However, the EU declared it as illegal under international law and identified it as an obstacle before the implementation of the Road Map, a threat which would make the implementation of a two-state solution physically impossible and a source of misery to thousands of Palestinians. Italian unilateral declaration undermined the EU's credibility in the eyes of the Israelis and prevented the EU to put pressure upon Israel to stop the construction of the security fence. Moreover, in order to please Israel, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in June 2003 refused to meet with the President of the Palestinian Authority Yaser Arafat despite the EU's decision to maintain contacts with Arafat.⁵³⁴ It is acknowledged by EU officials that the Achilles' heel of the EU in the case of the MEPP is their inability to speak with one voice and thereby send a coherent message.⁵³⁵ EU Member States' different interests and positions to the conflict and their diverging relations with Israel, Hamas and the Arab world made it difficult to craft a credible common EU position towards the MEPP.⁵³⁶ The lack of 'vertical coherence' undermined the EU's credibility as a neutral arbiter between the parties in the eyes of the Palestinians. In two cases, Italian unilateral acts and break of the Union line undermined the EU's credibility and effectiveness.

In addition, its institutional complexity has resulted in a lack of 'horizontal coherence' and put further constraint on the EU's ability to act as an effective mediator for the settlement of the conflict. The multiplicity of actors participated in the formulation and implementation of EU Foreign Policy, including the European Council, the GAERC, the European Commission and the European Parliament, and this makes development of a common foreign policy quite difficult.⁵³⁷ Due to this complex nature of EU's institutional structure, the representatives of EU Member States mainly the foreign ministers of the country holding the EU Presidency, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, the EU Special Representative for the MEPP, the

⁵³⁴ Shada Islam, "Enter Berlusconi", *Middle East International*, 11 July 2003, p. 13.

⁵³⁵ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009, Interview with Wolfgang Barwinkel, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 4 November 2009 and Interview with Alexander Naqvi, Desk Officer for the MEPP, UK Permanent Representation to the European Union, 11 November 2009.

⁵³⁶ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁵³⁷ Dannreuther, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, have involved in the formulation and implementation of the EU's policy towards the MEPP. A clear example for this is that the EU was represented by three EU actors in the Quartet on the Middle East, including the EU High Representative for the CFSP, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency. Alvarez De Soto, the former UN Secretary General's Envoy to the Quartet put forward that the representation of the EU by three actors in the Quartet hampers the EU's ability to present its position forcefully.⁵³⁸ Furthermore, in the post-9/11 era, diplomatic efforts of the EU towards the negotiated settlement of the conflict were carried out by the above mentioned three actors plus the EU Special Representative for the MEPP.

The participation of a multiplicity of actors in the formulation and implementation the EU's policy towards the MEPP, further constrains the EU's ability to act as an effective mediator for the settlement of the conflict, in the case of these actors' failure to speak with one voice and act coherently. As seen in the Italian case, governments' diverging stance from the EU in 2003 while they were holding the EU presidency undermined the EU's effectiveness and international credibility as force for international peace, security and stability and prevented the EU to act as an effective mediator for the settlement of the conflict. Multitude of different diplomatic initiatives promoted by the EU High Representative, the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency and the EU Special Representative for the MEPP led to a confusion on the part of the Israelis and the Palestinians.⁵³⁹ As a divided and misleading body, the EU was perceived as less efficient and harder to deal with than the US by the Israelis and the Palestinians.⁵⁴⁰ This resulted in the EU's marginalization as an effective mediator for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

External constraints are related with the Israeli and the American reluctance towards the EU's participation in the bilateral peace negotiations as an active mediator. Israel and the US wanted the EU's role supportive and complementary to the US in bilateral political negotiations and be limited to the economic dimension of

⁵³⁸ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 285.

⁵³⁹ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.33.

⁵⁴⁰ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.33.

the peace process, mainly to the provision of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority. For them, the EU's role should be limited to facilitating the implementation of the Road Map, supporting the Palestinian state-building and economic reconstruction. They wanted the EU to remain as payer not the player in the peace process.

Israel, which has perceived the EU as pro-Palestinian, had rejected the EU's participation in the bilateral negotiations as an active mediator. Israel wanted the US to be the only mediator in the bilateral peace negotiations. Israel wanted the EU's role to be limited to the development of governmental, military and civil society institutions as part of the new Palestinian state.⁵⁴¹ Israel wanted the EU to act as an advisory body or even as a transition administration filling the vacuum between the Israeli withdrawal and full Palestinian statehood.⁵⁴² While perceiving the EU's role in the peace process as institution and government builder of the new Palestinian state, Israel perceived the US role as potential peacekeeper and implementer.⁵⁴³ In the words of an EU official, the Israelis do not want the EU to be around except money.⁵⁴⁴ In the post-9/11 era, this situation seemed to change with the US pressure on Israel. Although with the US pressure, Israel began to accept the EU as an active mediator in the peace process, it has not still considered the EU as a mediator on par with the US.

In the post-9/11 era, the US accepted internationalization of the MEPP through the creation of the Quartet which provided a multilateral framework for the peace process by officially bringing other major global actors, the UN, Russia and the EU into the peace process. However, this did not mean that the US would share its role as the main mediator with the EU. The US continued to act as the main mediator in the bilateral political talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. As Nathalie Tocci has argued, the Quartet has predominantly provided a multilateral

⁵⁴¹ David Newman and Haim Yacobi, "The EU and the Israel/Palestine Conflict: An Ambivalent Relationship", *EU Border Conflicts Studies Working Paper No. 4*, January 2004, p. 42.

⁵⁴² David Newman and Haim Yacobi, "The Role of the EU in the Israel/Palestine Conflict", *EU Border Conflicts Studies Working Paper No. 12*, 2004, p. 40.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

cover for continuing US action in peace process.⁵⁴⁵ In June 2003, the US President George Bush himself took the initiative to launch the Road Map. In order to persuade the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to commit to the Road Map, Bush held a meeting with them at Aqaba in which the other members of the Quartet including the EU did not participate. Although the EU was included in the Road Map, the EU did not take part in these talks. Moreover, the EU was sidelined and excluded from the Annapolis process in November 2007. Although the EU and its Member States played a crucial role in reviving the Road Map in early 2007 and in the run-up to the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, the EU was excluded from the preparation of the conference.⁵⁴⁶ Although the EU as a member of the Quartet participated in the conference it maintained a low profile, essentially supporting the US action.⁵⁴⁷ The US played a primary role in the Annapolis Conference and the conference was primarily an American initiative.⁵⁴⁸ The EU once again was sidelined and excluded from bilateral political talks by the US and reduced to its traditional role as ‘sponsor with limited political say.’⁵⁴⁹ In the post-9/11, despite the creation of the Quartet, the US sought to reserve a primary role for itself in the bilateral talks while granting a secondary role to the EU. These two constraints put limits on the performance of the EU’s role as force for international peace, security and stability in the case of MEPP in the post-9/11 era and prevented it to act as an effective mediator for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

5.2.3 The EU’s Role Performance as the Provider of Development Aid

The EU’s role as the provider of development aid took the form of provider of financial and technical aid in the context of the MEPP. Since Israel is a quite wealthy country, the EU’s financial and technical aid has been directed to the

⁵⁴⁵ Nathalie Tocci, “The Widening Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, *CEPS Working Document*, (No. 217, January 2005), p. 13.

⁵⁴⁶ Almut Möller, “Europe and the Annapolis Process: Israelis and Palestinians are Back at the Negotiating Table”, *CAP News*, 23 February 2008. Accessed from <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2008/annapolis.php>.

⁵⁴⁷ Musu, *op.cit.*, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”.

⁵⁴⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”.

⁵⁴⁹ Christian-Peter Hanelt, “After Annapolis: What is Europe’s Role in Facilitating the Implementation of a Two-State Solution”, in Christian-Peter Hanelt and Almut Möller (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East II* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008), p. 210.

Palestinians.⁵⁵⁰ The EU has been the largest external donor of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the main financial supporter of the MEPP since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The EU has been tirelessly attempting to build peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians through aid;⁵⁵¹ in Chris Patten's words, "the Road Map paid for in Euros".⁵⁵² The EU's status as the largest external donor of the financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority resulted in the recognition of the EU's role in the peace process as the 'payer'. Its role has also been identified as the 'cash cow' to the Palestinian Authority.⁵⁵³ As identified by a Palestinian diplomat, the EU has been the banker of the Palestinian Authority.⁵⁵⁴ Especially, the EU has acted as the most prominent 'paymaster' of the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP in the post-9/11 era.⁵⁵⁵

In the post-9/11 era, the EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinians was provided with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian situation of the Palestinians, preventing the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and helping it in its institutional reform toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, which was identified by the Road Map as a necessary step towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict.⁵⁵⁶ In Chris Patten's words, the EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinians has both kept going essential services in health and education in the Palestinian territories and ensured the continuing existence of a viable negotiating partner for Israel.⁵⁵⁷ The motive behind the EU's provision of financial aid to the Palestinians has been the EU's conviction that social development, the creation of employment possibilities, the related stability and hope would result in establishment

⁵⁵⁰ Douma, Youngs, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?"

⁵⁵¹ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.12.

⁵⁵² Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 646.

⁵⁵³ European Voice, "MEPP Tests EU's Foreign Policy Ambition", (vol. 6, No. 42, 9 November 2000).

⁵⁵⁴ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

⁵⁵⁵ Möller, "Europe and the Annapolis Process", *op.cit.*

⁵⁵⁶ Muriel Asseburg, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 8, Iss. 2-3, Summer 2003), p. 180.

⁵⁵⁷ Chris Patten, "Coherence and Co-operation: The EU as Promoter of Peace and Development", 4 December 2001, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. Available at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Conflict/Conflict_DocD_eng.htm

of a conducive environment for the Palestinians to engage with their Israeli neighbours in their peaceful negotiations towards a resolution in their conflict.⁵⁵⁸ In this part of the chapter, by evaluating the EU's role performance as the provider of financial and technical aid, I focus on how effectively the EU has used this instrument for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The financial and technical aid has been mainly used for direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, support for the Palestinian infrastructure and institution building, support for the Palestinian refugees through United Nations Relief and Works Agencies for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, humanitarian and food aid, support for pro-peace civil society and peace process and emergency support after the EU's suspension of direct aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian Government. During the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €1617.78 million in the Palestinian Authority. The components of this amount of aid are shown in Table 4.

The EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority has made significant contributions to the survival of the MEPP. First of all, this aid prevented the Palestinian Authority from financial collapse; without this aid the Palestinian Authority would not have been able to finance even the basic functions of governance. The prevention of the collapse of the Palestinian Authority facilitated the continuation of the peace process, because the collapse of the Palestinian Authority might have resulted in the escalation of conflict and the interruption of the peace process. Secondly, this aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU through its aid has laid the ground for the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. An EU official put forward that creating a functioning Palestinian state is the EU's way of facilitating the peace process.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁸ Michelle Pace, "The Construction of EU Normative Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 45, No. 5, 2007), p. 1046.

⁵⁵⁹ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

Table 4.**EU's Financial Support for the Palestinians during the period between 2001 and 2006**

	€ MILLION						
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTAL 01-06
Direct support to Palestinian Authority	40	120	102	90.25	76		428.25 % 26.5
Infrastructure Projects	0.97	38.3	0	0	40.55		79.82 %5
Institution-building	5.76	21.50	12	6	17	12	74.26 %4.6
Support to refugees through UNRWA	57.25	55	57.75	60.65	63.67	64.41	358.73 %22.1
Humanitarian and food aid	41.95	69.24	61.61	61.11	65.28	104	403.19 %25
Israeli/Palestinian civil society and support for peace process		10	7.50	10	10		37.50 %2.3
SMEs, East Jerusalem, Human rights, NGOs, other projects	2.55	11.86	30.04	26.22	5.86	17.75	94.28 %5.8
Emergency support including TIM						141.75	141.75 %8.7
TOTAL	148.48	325.90	270.90	254.23	278.36	339.91	1617.78

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/palestinian_authority/index_en.htm

The first component of the EU's aid to the Palestinian Authority, direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority has helped the Palestinian Authority to alleviate and offset the disastrous consequences of the fiscal crisis caused by Israel's withholding of the Palestinian tax and custom revenues it had collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and the escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It is acknowledged by a Palestinian diplomat that the EU's aid prevented the Palestinian Authority from collapse and thereby enabling it to remain afloat.⁵⁶⁰ This aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to secure expenditures such as public service salaries, social, educational, health and core functions of the Palestinian Authority in the absence of regular monthly transfers of revenues from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. In Chris Patten's words, without the EU's financial and technical aid "there would have been no Palestinian interlocutor for the negotiations now under way".⁵⁶¹ As put forward by a British diplomat, by enabling service provision by the Palestinian Authority, the EU's aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to maintain its legitimacy as a negotiating partner in the MEPP.⁵⁶²

As shown in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €428.25 million in the Palestinian Authority and it constituted the highest percentage (%26) of total aid directed to the Palestinians. The EU did not invest any direct support to the Palestinian Authority in 2006. This is because the EU suspended direct budgetary support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government in March 2006 when the Hamas-led Palestinian Government failed to meet and implement the three principles, which the EU made its future financial aid conditional on the recognition of them, including non-violence including the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map.

The second and third components of the EU's aid to the Palestinians; support for the Palestinian infrastructure and institution building, have been crucial for the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and

⁵⁶⁰ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

⁵⁶¹ Newman and Yacobi, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Israel/Palestine Conflict", p. 31.

⁵⁶² Interview with Alexander Naqvi, Desk Officer for the MEPP, UK Permanent Representation to the European Union, 11 November 2009.

democratic Palestinian state. The EU through its financial support for the Palestinian infrastructure and institution building has played the role as the facilitator for the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU has contributed to the normalization of Palestinian Life and Palestinian institution-building.

The EU's aid has been the most effective instrument of the EU in its efforts to facilitate the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel which would lead to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As shown in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €74.26 million in the Palestinians in the form of support for the Palestinian institution building and it constituted %4.6 of total aid directed to the Palestinians.

The EU through its financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority has also supported infrastructure projects in the Palestinian territories, including construction, development and rehabilitation of water, wastewater and sanitation networks, public buildings and roads; procurement and replacement of solid waste containers and vehicles. The EU has also funded important infrastructure projects like the rebuilding of Gaza seaport and airport. As illustrated in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €79.82 million in the Palestinians in the form of support for the Palestinian infrastructure building and it constituted %5 of total aid directed to the Palestinians.

The EU's support to the UNRWA has been defined by the EU as an essential component of its strategy for the MEPP.⁵⁶³ The EU has financially contributed to the regular budget of the UNRWA, which was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons who had been forced to flee their homes in Palestine as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and started to live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UNRWA has been the main provider of basic services such as education, health care, social, micro credit and shelter services and assistance to over 4.6 million registered Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. The European Commission and EU Member

⁵⁶³ Newsletter of the European Commission Technical Assistance Office For the West Bank and Gaza, Iss. 1, January-March 2007), p. 5. Available at: http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/previous_editions.htm.

States have been the largest donor to the UNRWA. The EU through its financial contribution to the UNRWA has contributed to the improvement of economic and social conditions of the Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria since 1971. The UNRWA's specific programme towards the alleviation of poverty within the refugee population, which has provided food and cash aid to vulnerable refugees, mothers and babies, has been largely funded by the EU. Moreover, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Directorate General (DG ECHO) has been one of the main financial supporters of the UNRWA's emergency aid for the poorest Palestinian refugees, which was provided whenever crisis has evolved like the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006 and was consisted mainly of the provision of food aid and temporary job creation. The EU has also provided support to a number of auxiliary special projects in the Palestinian territories and the region, including projects related to water and sanitation and student academic scholarships in order to improve the living conditions of refugees. As illustrated in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €358.73 million in the Palestinians in the form of support to the Palestinian refugees through the UNRWA and it constituted %22.1 of total aid directed to the Palestinians.

Beside its financial contribution to the UNRWA, the EU has also provided humanitarian and food aid to the Palestinians in order to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories. As illustrated in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €403.19 million in the Palestinians in the form of humanitarian and food aid and it constituted second highest percentage (%25) of total aid directed to the Palestinians. The EU's humanitarian and food aid has been provided by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). The amount of EU's humanitarian and food aid gradually increased following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, because the strict regime of closures and curfews imposed by Israel following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada impeded the movement of the Palestinian people and goods and negatively affected employment and investment opportunities throughout the Palestinian territories and this made the Palestinian's access to basic goods and services much more difficult. Under these conditions, in order to alleviate humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories, the EU gradually increased the

amount of its humanitarian and food aid to the Palestinians. As it was acknowledged by a Palestinian diplomat the EU's aid prevented the emergence of a humanitarian catastrophe in the Palestinian territories.⁵⁶⁴

In the post-Al-Aqsa Intifada period (post-September 2000 period), there has been a gradual shift in EU's aid to the Palestinian Authorities from development projects and institutional reform to humanitarian and emergency aid.⁵⁶⁵ Both withholding of the Palestinian revenue transfers by Israel and the escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians resulted in the deterioration of humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories. In order to alleviate the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people and prevent the emergence of a humanitarian crisis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the EU has provided increasing amount of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in the post-Al-Aqsa Intifada period. The EU's efforts have mainly focused on damage limitation exercises by striving to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian and political situation, as opposed to improving it *per se*.⁵⁶⁶ As illustrated in table 4, the amount of the EU's humanitarian aid to the Palestinian Authority peaked in 2006 (€104 million). The reason behind this was the deterioration of humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories after the EU's imposition of sanctions on the Hamas-led government and withholding of direct budgetary support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government. In order to mitigate the deterioration of socio-economic and humanitarian situation of the Palestinians which was resulted from sanctions imposed, the EU decided to increase the amount of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. However, this did not prevent deterioration of socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinians; it only represented a drop in the ocean related to the scale of socio-economic and humanitarian challenges facing the Palestinian Territories.

In order to relieve the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip resulting from sanctions imposed on the Hamas-led Palestinian government, and to ensure continued delivery of essential social public

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

⁵⁶⁵ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁵⁶⁶ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 369.

services to the Palestinian people and to facilitate the maximum level of support by international donors and the resumption of the Palestinian revenue transfers by Israel, the EU has also provided humanitarian and emergency aid under the framework of new mechanism TIM. TIM was established in June 2006, because the EU could not deal with the Hamas-led Palestinian government at the time as Hamas refused to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence including the laying down of arms, recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. TIM enabled the EU to address the basic social needs of the Palestinian people and focus on delivering aid to the poorest Palestinians, while bypassing the Hamas-led Palestinian government. TIM had utilized financial resources of the European Commission, EU Member States and other donors to deliver essential services and financial support to vulnerable Palestinians.⁵⁶⁷ The European Commission, 15 EU Member States, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Australia had contributed to TIM.

Between June 2006 and March 2008, €615.94 million was provided to the Palestinian people through TIM and €455.5 million of this amount has been provided by the European Commission. The European Commission has been the largest donor to TIM. In March 2008, TIM was replaced by a new mechanism called the PEGASE. TIM represented the highest point in the gradual shift in EU's aid to the Palestinian Authorities from development projects and institutional reform to humanitarian and emergency aid. Although the EU provided a significant amount of aid through TIM, the latter was not adequate to prevent socio-economic and humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories. The aid provided through TIM represented a drop in the ocean related to the scale of challenges facing the Palestinian Territories.⁵⁶⁸

The EU's financial support to peace-oriented NGOs in Israel and Palestine is another component of the EU's aid which is directly related with the MEPP. The main objective of the EU's financial support to peace-oriented NGOs on both sides has been to create the conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region by providing support for pro-peace initiatives that combat violence and strengthen civil

⁵⁶⁷ Newsletter of the European Commission Technical Assistance Office For the West Bank and Gaza, op.cit., (Iss. 1, January-March 2007), p. 6.

⁵⁶⁸ Youngs, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?", op.cit.

society, in particular with groups in both the Israeli and the Palestinian society that seek a solution for peace and dialogue across cultures.⁵⁶⁹

The EU provided financial support to peace-oriented NGOs on both sides by using the European Partnership for Peace Programme. The EU through the European Partnership for Peace Programme supported local and international civil society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non violence in the Middle East in order to contribute to the rebuilding of confidence within and between the Israeli and the Palestinian societies. The main objective of the programme is to strengthen civil society actions in peace building and conflict transformation.⁵⁷⁰ The programme has focused on promoting initiatives in areas which are likely to have an impact on people's everyday lives and welfare, including practical activities which would promote communication and understanding by demonstrating the advantages of working together for mutual benefit and tangible results. By promoting communication and understanding through demonstrating the advantages of working together for mutual benefit and tangible results, these initiatives would broaden the base of support for the MEPP. The programme has been jointly managed by the EC Delegation in Tel Aviv, the EC Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza and the EC Delegation in Jordan. Under the framework of the European Partnership for Peace Programme, the EU funded projects having both an Israeli and Palestinian partner, including "Building Business Bridges", "Words Can Kill", "Civic Action Groups for Peace and Social Justice" and Penultimate Jerusalem: Overcoming the Obstacles to Final Status in Jerusalem". The EU through the European Partnership for Peace Programme has facilitated the Palestinian and the Israeli civil society to keep channels of communication open at a time when political dialogue was frozen. As illustrated in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €37.50 million in the Palestinian Authority in the form of financial support to peace-oriented NGOs in Israel and Palestine and it constituted %2.3 of total aid directed to the Palestinians.

⁵⁶⁹ Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 454.

⁵⁷⁰ Newsletter of the European Commission Technical Assistance Office For the West Bank and Gaza, (Iss. 3, July-September 2007), p. 5. Available at: http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/previous_editions.htm.

The EU has also provided financial support to the Palestinian private sector mainly the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises which are in need of urgent financial assistance due to devastating effect of crisis emerged after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; to development projects in East Jerusalem like projects for development of social services, health services and education; to projects for the promotion and protection of human rights like projects for promotion of death penalty, women's and children's rights and good governance and projects for the provision of rehabilitation to torture victims; to numerous Palestinian NGOs and service institutions that has been assuming a number of functions in the areas of healthcare, education, housing, job creation, women's empowerment, human rights advocacy, legal aid, charity and welfare, all serving the needs and interests of the Palestinian people. As shown in table 4, during the period between 2001 and 2006, the EU invested €94.28 million in the Palestinians in the framework of support for SMEs, East Jerusalem, Human rights, NGOs, other projects and it constituted %5.8 of total aid directed to the Palestinians.

In summary, the EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority has been its principal instrument for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-9/11 era. The EU has acted as the largest financial supporter of the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP. The EU has successfully played the role as key donor or the largest payer of the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP. In the post-9/11 era, the EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority has made three main contributions to the MEPP.

Firstly, the EU's financial and technical aid in the form of direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority facilitated the latter to stay financially afloat after the Israeli withholding of the Palestinian tax and custom revenues following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. By keeping the Palestinian Authority financially afloat, the EU also kept the peace process afloat, because the financial collapse of the Palestinian Authority might have resulted in the escalation of conflict, violence, chaos and the interruption of the peace process.

Secondly, the EU aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU aid has facilitated the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, which was identified by the Road Map as a necessary step towards

the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Especially, the EU's financial support to the infrastructure projects in the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian institutional reform process has been very crucial. Furthermore, the EU's financial support to the Palestinian private sector mainly the SMEs, development projects in East Jerusalem, projects for the promotion and protection of human rights and the Palestinian NGOs and service institutions have been other crucial contributions of the EU to the creation of a economically and politically viable Palestinian state.

Thirdly, through its financial aid to the peace-oriented NGOs and civil society initiatives on both sides the EU has promoted communication and understanding among the Palestinians and the Israelis by demonstrating the advantages of working together for mutual benefit and tangible results. By this way the EU has contributed to the creation of a positive environment for the peaceful settlement of the conflict and broadened the base of public support for the MEPP. The EU has utilized its financial aid to strengthen civil society actions in peace building and conflict transformation. In addition to the EU's financial contribution which has provided direct benefit to the MEPP, the EU through its financial support to the UNRWA, its humanitarian and food aid to the Palestinians and the TIM has contributed to the alleviation of the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian people. Especially, in the post-9/11 era, a gradual shift in EU's financial aid to the Palestinian Authorities from development projects and institutional reform to humanitarian and emergency aid has been observed. This trend has reached its peak point in 2006 when the EU imposed sanctions on the Hamas-led government and withheld direct budgetary support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government.

Although the EU has gradually increased the amount of humanitarian and emergency aid, it was not adequate to alleviate dire socio-economic and humanitarian situation facing the Palestinians in the post-9/11. The ongoing mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the destruction of the Palestinian civilian infrastructure by the Israeli operations, the EU's withholding of direct budgetary support to the Hamas-led Palestinian government, the Israeli withholding of the Palestinian tax and custom revenues, the Israeli construction of 'Security Fence' and the Israeli imposition of restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian people and goods through closures, checkpoints and curfews have further

deteriorated the scale of socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinians to a point which the EU's humanitarian and emergency aid could not completely alleviate.

A Palestinian diplomat ascribed the deterioration of the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions of the Palestinians to the Israeli occupation. He defended that although the EU's aid to the Palestinians is crucial for preventing the Palestinian Authority from collapse and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the Palestinian territories (mainly in the case of TIM and PEGASE), it is not sufficient as the Israeli occupation continues. According to him, under the Israeli occupation the EU's aid does not help the Palestinians build their infrastructure and institutions and create a sustainable Palestinian economy. He pointed out that the Israeli construction of 'Security Fence' and imposition of restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian people and goods through closures, checkpoints and curfews prevents this aid from bringing sustainable development to the Palestinian territories. Therefore, owing to the Israeli occupation, the EU's huge aid is not able to prevent the Palestinians from becoming poorer.⁵⁷¹

The provision of humanitarian and emergency aid to the Palestinians presented a dilemma on the part of the EU. On the one hand, the deterioration of socio-economic and humanitarian situation of the Palestinians necessitated the EU's provision of aid due to humanitarian imperative; non-provision would have led to a humanitarian catastrophe in the occupied Palestinian territories. On the other hand, by providing humanitarian and emergency aid to the Palestinians living in the territories under the Israeli occupation, the EU has taken over the humanitarian duties of Israel as the occupying power, under international humanitarian law⁵⁷² towards the

⁵⁷¹ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

⁵⁷² According to the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Occupying Power is under legal obligation to provide emergency relief and basic services to civilian population living in the occupied territory. According to articles 55, 56, 59 and 60 of the Convention, Israel as the Occupying Power is under obligation to bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied Palestinian territories are inadequate; to ensure and maintain, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied Palestinian territories; to agree to relief schemes, consisting of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing, on behalf of the Palestinian population, and facilitate them by all the means at its disposal if the whole or part of the Palestinian population is inadequately supplied. According to article 60 of the Convention, delivery of relief to the Palestinian population does not relieve Israel, the Occupying Power, of the above responsibilities.

Palestinian people as the population in the Occupied Territories.⁵⁷³ By relieving Israel of its legal obligations towards the Palestinian people, the EU undeliberately has subsidized the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories and thus helped and facilitated Israel to continue the state of occupation, closures and curfews in the Palestinian territories, rather than working actively against it.⁵⁷⁴ The EU's continuing aid to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories due to humanitarian imperative has enabled Israel to prolong its occupation in the Palestinian territories, while refraining from financial responsibilities as the occupying power. By this way, the EU's humanitarian and emergency aid has acted to the detriment of the peace process.

Last but not the least, the EU's financial support to the Palestinian development projects and institutional reform process towards the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state is consistent with the EU's conviction that security, stability and peace can best be accomplished through development. Since the EU identified development as crucial for collective and individual long-term security and peace, the EU strove to wipe out breeding ground for insecurity and instability especially terrorism in the Palestinian territories through its support to the Palestinian development projects and institutional reform process. The EU has maintained that the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state is a best guarantee for the Israeli security since Berlin European Council 1999. This was later on adopted by international community and was identified by the Road Map as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict.

In spite of the EU's efforts, the continuation of vicious cycle of mutual violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the post-9/11 era resulted in the continuation of conflict. The continuation of mutual violence led to the continuation of the Palestinian underdevelopment and the continuation of the Palestinian underdevelopment has provided a breeding ground for insecurity and instability, especially the prevalence of radical Islamic terrorism among the Palestinian population. Since there is an apparent correlation between economic deterioration, increasing poverty and unemployment and political radicalization, the increasing

⁵⁷³ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict", *Mediterranean Politics*, p. 181.

⁵⁷⁴ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict", *Mediterranean Politics*, p. 181.

number of unemployed people in Palestine – where young jobless people constitute the majority of the population – has provided a fertile ground for radical Islamic groups who take political advantage of suffering, need and desperation of the Palestinians.⁵⁷⁵ The prevalence of radical Islamic terrorism among the Palestinians resulted in an increase in the Palestinian terrorist attacks against the Israeli targets, to which Israel has given harsh responses through military operations against the Palestinians territories. The Israeli response, in some cases its disproportionate use of force, resulted in the destruction of the Palestinian civilian infrastructure and served the continuation of the Palestinian underdevelopment. In addition, the Israeli construction of ‘Security Fence’ and the imposition of restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian people and goods through closures, checkpoints and curfews as a countermeasure against intrusion of suicide bombers into the Israeli cities hindering human and social development in the Palestinian territories, have been another factor causing the continuation of the Palestinian underdevelopment.⁵⁷⁶ In the post-9/11 era, this vicious cycle of mutual violence and the Israeli construction of ‘Security Fence’ and the imposition of restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian people and goods have been two important factors that have prevented the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian case clearly demonstrated the complementary relationship between sustainable peace and sustainable development. It makes it obvious that as identified in ‘The European Consensus on Development’: “without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur”⁵⁷⁷. It also substantiates that as identified by the European Commission “there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism”⁵⁷⁸.

⁵⁷⁵ Ghassan Khatib, “The Arab Peace Initiative as a Vision for Peace with the State of Israel: Steps Toward Realization”, in Christian-Peter Hanelt and Almut Möller (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East II* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008), p. 173.

⁵⁷⁶ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, *op.cit.*, p.24.

⁵⁷⁷ Council of the European Union, “The European Consensus on Development”, *op.cit.*.

⁵⁷⁸ Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission”, *Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, 13 July 2005, Brussels, p. 8.

5.2.4 The EU's Role Performance as Promoter of its values and norms

In the case of the MEPP, EU's role performance as promoter of its values and norms can be evaluated through assessing to what extent the EU has promoted its foundational values and norms in relations with the two parties to the conflict, Israel and Palestine. In the case of the MEPP, since Israel is a well-governed and democratic country, the EU has diverted its support to the establishment of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state, which the EU has identified as a best guarantee for the Israeli and regional security and a precondition for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. What this effectively means is that, the creation of a well-governed democratic Palestinian state ensured the continuing existence of a viable negotiating partner for Israel in the peace negotiations. The continuing existence of Palestine as a viable negotiating partner for Israel would be the best guarantee for the viable peace process. This was later on adopted by international community and the creation of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state was identified by the Road Map as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict. The EU through its support to the Palestinian reform process strove to facilitate the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel which would lead to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

Since 2002, the EU has also been one of the members of International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, which was composed of representatives of the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN Secretary General), Norway, Japan, the World Bank, and the IMF. International Task Force on Palestinian Reform has the role of monitoring and supporting implementation of the Palestinian civil reforms, and guiding the international donor community in its support for the Palestinians' reform agenda. In addition to its own individual support to the Palestinian reform process towards the establishment of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state, the EU has also worked within the multilateral framework of International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.

Concerning the Palestinian Authority, the EU has given priority to the promotion of democracy and good governance. The EU has supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority towards the creation of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state. In its efforts, the EU prioritized

- the progress on establishing a functioning judiciary and effective enforcement of legislation;
- strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- strengthening institutions and further reinforcing administrative capacity, holding of elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in accordance with international standards,
- building on progress made in establishing an accountable system of public finances;
- establishment of an independent, impartial and fully functioning judiciary in line with international standards and strengthening of the separation of powers;
- holding of transparent general and local elections according to international standards;
- acceleration of constitutional and legislative reform including finalization of work on the drafting of a democratic Constitution and consultation with wider public;
- carrying out public administration and civil service reform;
- strengthening legal guarantees for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association in accordance with international standards, ensuring the respect for human rights and basic civil liberties in accordance with the principles of international law, and foster a culture of non-violence, tolerance and mutual understanding;
- continuing efforts to establish a modern and well-functioning system of financial control in line with international best practices;
- continuing work to improve transparency of the Palestinian Authority's finances and to take concerted action to tackle corruption within public institutions and to fight against fraud;
- ensuring transparency of public procurement operations; putting in place a modern and financially sustainable pension system.

In 2001, the EU has prepared a reform plan for the Palestinian Authority including ratifying and enacting a Palestinian constitution, Basic Law and the Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, establishing a Constitutional Court and a High

Judicial Council, abolishing State Security Courts, holding general elections, redistributing competences between the President and cabinet, ensuring transparency of public finances and restructuring municipalities, the civil service and security sector.⁵⁷⁹ The ‘100-day’ reform plan was endorsed by the President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat in June 2002.

With the adoption of the Plan, the Palestinian Authority began to implement the reform process aiming at strengthening good governance and democracy. During 2002-2003, the Palestinian Constitution, Basic Law, was adopted, Prime Ministerial post was established, the Cabinet was streamlined and reorganized, and a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary was passed. In order to improve the transparency of the Palestinian Authority’s finances and to take concerted action to tackle corruption within public institutions and to fight against fraud, all sources of the Palestinian Authority’s revenues were consolidated in a single treasury account under the Finance Ministry, which is closely monitored by the IMF. The consolidation also ensured the full and effective responsibility of the Finance Ministry for transparently managing the Palestinian Authority’s payroll and ensured the maintenance of a public sector hiring freeze and strict expenditure limit for an austerity budget. Moreover, in order to enhance transparency in public finances, president’s funds have been taken under control through shifting its control from the presidency to the finance ministry.⁵⁸⁰ Especially, in areas of judicial and financial reform, the EU’s aid conditionality has played a crucial role.⁵⁸¹ During 2002-2003, the EU’s threat to withhold budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority acted as leverage in encouraging the Palestinian Authority to carry out judicial and financial reform.⁵⁸² In the Palestinian case, the EU’s most powerful policy instrument has been the conditional promise of financial and technical aid and this exerted considerable leverage on the Palestinian Authority. Particularly, concerning the democratization of

⁵⁷⁹ Tocci, op.cit., “The Widening Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p.15.

⁵⁸⁰ Tocci, op.cit., The EU and Conflict Resolution, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁸¹ Tocci, op.cit., “The Widening Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p.16.

⁵⁸² Tocci, op.cit., “The Widening Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p.16.

Palestine, the EU has tried to use its financial and technical aid as ‘external democratization incentive’ towards the Palestinian Authority.⁵⁸³

In 2003, the Palestinian National Security Council, which has the responsibility to supervise all of the Palestinian Security Services, was established. Moreover, in 2005, the Palestinian Security Services have been reformed through the consolidation of three Palestinian security apparatuses (National Security, Interior, and Intelligence) under the Ministry of Interior, and through a facelift to the personnel service through the retirement of the Palestinian security officials, the training of forces and the recruitment of former militants.⁵⁸⁴ Within the context of security sector reform, the EU launched a civilian police mission EUPOL COPPS. The EU through this mission has assisted the Palestinian Civil Police in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan by advising and closely mentoring senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system, coordinating and facilitating EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police, and advising on police-related Criminal Justice elements. The mission has facilitated the Palestinian Authority to take responsibility for law and order in the Palestinian territories by improving the Palestinian Civil Police and law enforcement capacity.

In addition to creating and empowering the post of prime minister and shifting the control of the Palestinian finances and security from the Presidency to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior respectively, the EU has also deployed election observation missions to observe the Palestinian Presidential elections of 2005 and Legislative elections of 2006 as part of its efforts to support the development of democratic institutions. Through these missions the EU enabled the Palestinian society to hold free, fair and open elections to provide democratic legitimacy for the institutions on the road to statehood.

Empirical analysis demonstrated that while the EU has given high priority to promotion of good governance such as security sector reform, or creation and

⁵⁸³ Stephan Stetter, “Democratization Without Democracy? The Assistance of the European Union for Democratization Process in Palestine”, in Annette Jünemann (ed.), *Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: International, Regional and Domestic Dynamics* (Great Britain: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 154.

⁵⁸⁴ These reforms included the firing of top security chiefs, imposing an age limit on servicemen and forcing some 1000 ineffective members of the security forces to retire.

empowerment of a prime minister, or improving transparency of the Palestinian Authority's finances, or passing of a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, the promotion of genuine democracy has been neglected in the case of Palestine. Despite the EU's rhetoric on the desirability of integrating Hamas into democratic politics, the concrete substance of EU's strategy demonstrated that the EU regarded reform in terms of strengthening Fatah against Hamas.⁵⁸⁵ Although the EU supported the principle of Hamas's participation in the legislative elections scheduled for July 2005, the EU did nothing to defend that principle when elections were postponed until January 2006 by the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas in 2005.⁵⁸⁶ Moreover, the EU's disinterested stance towards the non-inclusiveness of the Palestinian political system, persistent exclusion of Islamic factions from both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority and the EU's reluctance to engage and support Islamic civil society and non-violent groups despite the fact that they represented the only credible opposition forces in Palestine, raised doubts about the EU's seriousness in promoting a genuine democracy in Palestine.⁵⁸⁷ Although the EU supported the development of political institutions required for democracy, it did not complement this with democratic consolidation in Palestine. The EU did not press for the promotion effective participation, party competition and pluralism in Palestine which constituted essential elements of genuine democratization process.

The EU's ambiguous stance towards the genuine democratization in Palestine was clearly seen in its reaction to Hamas's sweeping victory in the Palestinian legislative election of 2006. In the post-election period, the EU made its future financial aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government conditional on three principles: non-violence including the laying down of arms, the recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance and fulfillment of existing agreements and obligations, including the Road Map. Although the EU had previously made the provision of its direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority conditional on progress in areas of democracy and good governance, these three conditions did not include the standards of democratic governance or issues of civil rights in the

⁵⁸⁵ Youngs, *op.cit.*, Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11, p.168.

⁵⁸⁶ Youngs, *op.cit.*, Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11, p.168.

⁵⁸⁷ Tocci, *op.cit.*, The EU and Conflict Resolution, p. 122.

Palestinian territories.⁵⁸⁸ In March 2006 when the Hamas-led Palestinian Government failed to meet and implement the three conditions, the EU decided to boycott Hamas and impose sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government.

The EU's imposition of sanctions on a democratically elected government with a fair, free and transparent election undermined both the legitimacy of the EU's democracy promotion policy and its credibility as a promoter of democracy in Palestine and the Middle East. The EU lost much popularity and good will amongst the Palestinian people and the wider Arab world.⁵⁸⁹ The EU's use of sanctions increased suspicions about the EU's sincerity in its commitment to support for the democratization of the Palestinian Authority. It negatively affected trust of the Palestinian people and the wider Arab world in the EU's good will as well as the whole process of reform, transformation and the belief in principle of democracy.⁵⁹⁰

The Palestinians and the wider Arab world regarded the EU's refusal to deal with the democratically elected Hamas government as a clear demonstration of political insincerity.⁵⁹¹ The EU's imposition of a government which was elected with a fair, free and transparent election was regarded by the Palestinians as the EU's ignorance of the democratic expression of the Palestinian people (although the EU had made democracy one of the conditions for its financial aid to the Palestinian Authority): in effect a contradiction – although Hamas had a legal mandate to govern through a fair, free, and transparent vote, it is considered as a terrorist organization by the EU and the US.⁵⁹² Furthermore, imposition of sanctions interrupted the long process of confidence building between officials of the Palestinian Authority and the EU.⁵⁹³ Although the Palestinians took an important step towards a process of democratization, the EU's reaction to the Hamas victory stand in stark contrast to EU's discursive practices regarding the importance of fair, free and transparent elections as crucial dimensions of much needed democratization momentum on the

⁵⁸⁸ Youngs, op.cit., “The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?”, p. 4.

⁵⁸⁹ Youngs, op.cit., “The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?”, p. 1.

⁵⁹⁰ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, op.cit., p.13.

⁵⁹¹ Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p. 94.

⁵⁹² Pace, op.cit., “Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean”, p. 46.

⁵⁹³ Kolarska-Bobinska and Mughrabi, op.cit., p.13.

Palestinian side for a possible resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁵⁹⁴ Moreover, as discussed in details earlier in this chapter the EU's imposition of sanctions on the Hamas-led government deteriorated the EU's image in the Middle Eastern countries.

While imposing sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government, the EU has continued financial aid to unelected Fatah controlling the West Bank. Especially, after the separation of Palestine between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank in June 2007, the EU has continued to maintain political and economic support to Fatah administration in the West Bank in order to alienate Hamas from the Palestinians by promoting economic growth and political stability in the West Bank.⁵⁹⁵ As it is confirmed by an EU official, the main objective of the EU's policy of 'West Bank first' is to make the West Bank a success story and a center of attraction for those Palestinians living in Gaza by promoting economic and social well-being of the Palestinians living in the West Bank.⁵⁹⁶ The EU has channeled aid specifically to avoid the democratically elected Hamas administration while bolstering the unelected Fatah administration in the West Bank. This move illustrated that the EU pursued a policy of supporting Fatah administration which is capable of acting as a viable negotiating partner for Israel, but does not necessarily have to be democratic. Furthermore, this move demonstrated that the EU has not developed an explicit democracy promotion strategy and underlined the apparent double standards that exist when the EU favors stable regimes in the Middle East, even if these are undemocratic, over unstable but potentially more democratic regimes.⁵⁹⁷ Michelle Pace identified the EU's policy of isolating elected Hamas while continuing its support to unelected Fatah as clear evidence of a paradox in the EU's discourse on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁴ Pace, op.cit., "The EU as a 'Force for Good' in Border Conflict Cases?", p.214.

⁵⁹⁵ Möller, "After Gaza", op.cit.

⁵⁹⁶ Interview with Wolfgang Barwinkel, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 4 November 2009.

⁵⁹⁷ Gemma Collantes Celador, et.al., "Fostering an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform in the Mediterranean: Learning From Turkish and Palestinian Police Reform Experiences", *EuroMesco Paper* (No. 66, January 2008), p. 17.

⁵⁹⁸ Pace, op.cit., "Interrogating the European Union's Democracy Promotion Agenda".

Moreover, the EU's support to Fatah did not act as an encouraging tool for an internal reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the Palestinian democracy.⁵⁹⁹ The EU through its policy of isolating elected Hamas while continuing its support to unelected Fatah has reduced its policy of supporting democracy to 'supporting our kind of democrats'.⁶⁰⁰ The EU's policy can be identified as 'supporting reform means favoring moderate figures which are seen as the EU's allies'.⁶⁰¹

Muriel Asseburg argued that the EU's this policy has contributed both to the further devaluation of democratic process in Palestine and to the cementment of the Palestinian internal division. The two illegitimate governments have ruled in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both trying to assert and strengthen their hold on power in an authoritarian manner.⁶⁰² He also maintained that this policy made it impossible to realize a sustainable Palestinian institution-building. The presence of a two illegitimate governments, a defunct parliament, the security forces that are perceived to be taking sides in the power struggle made it simply impossible to build a security mechanism that would meet international standards and be under democratic control, nonpartisan, citizen-oriented and unified.⁶⁰³

An EU official made it clear that European politicians 'prefer the devil they know to the devil they do not know', that is why European leaders supported Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah although they have the problem of legitimacy. The EU prefers to support secular Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah rather than radical Islamist Hamas, which is already in the EU's list of terrorist organizations.⁶⁰⁴

After the Hamas victory, the EU has also started to pursue a policy of empowering the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas at the expense of the Hamas-led Palestinian government.⁶⁰⁵ The EU through its support to

⁵⁹⁹ Emerson, Tocci and Youngs, *op.cit.*, "Gaza's Hell".

⁶⁰⁰ Youngs, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?", p. 6.

⁶⁰¹ Youngs, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?", p. 5.

⁶⁰² Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East", p. 38.

⁶⁰³ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "The ESDP Missions in the Palestinian Territories", p. 97.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁶⁰⁵ Nathalie Tocci, "Has the EU Promoted Democracy in Palestine ... and Does It Still?", *CFSP Forum*, (Vol. 4, Iss. 2, March 2006), p. 9.

the President Abbas tried to stabilize the Palestinian leadership around him.⁶⁰⁶ With regard to TIM, the EU preferred Abbas as its partner in order to show to the Palestinians that he can promise and deliver on assistance from the international community, whereas Hamas cannot.⁶⁰⁷ By doing so, the EU tried to alienate Hamas from the Palestinians. Thus, besides alleviating the Palestinian suffering, one of the aims of TIM is supporting the President Abbas and the institutions under his control while trying to isolate the Hamas-led Palestinian government.⁶⁰⁸

This move was contradictory with the EU's previous policy of creating and empowering the post of prime minister and shifting the control of the Palestinian finances and security from the presidency to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior respectively.⁶⁰⁹ This U-turn both undermined the views expressed by the Palestinian electorate and reconstituted a highly centralized system around the presidency, which the EU had criticized and demanded to be changed during the Arafat's presidency.⁶¹⁰ With this move, the EU has equated its policy of 'supporting democracy' with 'supporting president's office'.⁶¹¹ This move undermined both institutions and offices the EU had played a prominent in creating and strongly financially supported like the Prime Ministerial post, which was now under the control of Hamas⁶¹², and the EU's credibility as the promoter of democracy in Palestine.

Michelle Pace put forward that the Hamas case clearly demonstrated the key paradox of the EU as the supporter of reform in the Middle East. According to her view, the EU harshly turned against the accomplishments of the Palestinian reform process when it resulted in unanticipated results. As Pace quoted from one of its interviewees, "The EU likes the ideal of democracy but they do not like its results".⁶¹³

⁶⁰⁶ Möller, "After Gaza", op.cit.

⁶⁰⁷ Khaliq, op.cit., p. 393.

⁶⁰⁸ Khaliq, op.cit., p. 393.

⁶⁰⁹ Tocci, op.cit., "Has the EU Promoted Democracy in Palestine", p. 9.

⁶¹⁰ Tocci, op.cit., "Has the EU Promoted Democracy in Palestine", p. 9.

⁶¹¹ Youngs, op.cit., "The EU and the MEPP: Re-engagement?", p. 5.

⁶¹² Khaliq, op.cit., p. 383.

⁶¹³ Pace, op.cit., "Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean", p. 47.

The policy of boycotting the Hamas-led Palestinian Government not only discredited democracy in the Middle East, but was also in violation of donor standards for security sector reform assistance and in violation of principles of good governance. With the boycott, the operations of two ESDP operations, the EUPOL COPPS and the EU BAM Rafah, became inoperable.⁶¹⁴

In the Hamas case, the EU faced a difficult political dilemma to handle. On the one hand, there was the democratically elected Hamas government. On the other hand, the democratically elected Hamas was on the EU's list of terrorist organizations⁶¹⁵ and refused to meet and implement the three principles put forward by the Quartet on the Middle East. The EU Member States faced a hard choice between upholding the principle of democracy and safeguarding the EU's credibility and standing as an actor in the MEPP, and maintaining its commitment not to deal with organizations that have been labeled as 'terrorist' by a number of Western countries and other bodies, including the EU itself.⁶¹⁶ The EU preferred to impose sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government in order to force it to meet and implement the three principles. The EU sacrificed upholding the principle of democracy in Palestine for the sake of safeguarding its own credibility and standing as an actor in the MEPP. The EU's decision to impose sanctions on democratically elected Hamas-led Palestinian government has compromised what the EU claimed to stand for, a promoter of democracy in Palestine. This move was inconsistent with the EU's role as promoter of its values and norms.

In addition to its failure in promoting genuine democracy in Palestine, empirical analysis demonstrated that the EU also failed to promote human rights and international humanitarian law in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Israel routinely and systematically violated human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories and international humanitarian law (the Fourth Geneva Convention) through its conducts in the Occupied Territories, in spite of the fact that the Occupied Territories are not part of Israel on the basis of Fourth Geneva

⁶¹⁴ Celador, et.al., op.cit., p. 16.

⁶¹⁵ The presence of Hamas on the EU's list of terrorist organizations made it difficult for the EU to do business with it, because it would cause a legal problem of for the EU. (Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.)

⁶¹⁶ Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, op.cit., p. 94.

Convention, the EU has refrained from using any kind of sanctions against Israel. Moreover, the Israeli measures in the Occupied Territories, such as the construction of the Israeli ‘Security Fence’ and restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinians through closures, checkpoints and curfews are also profoundly in contradiction to the EMP principles which aim to foster political, social, economic, and cultural links between the Mediterranean countries. Despite this fact, the EU has refrained from using sanctions against Israel and preferred a method of ‘discussion not threats’⁶¹⁷ when engaging with Israel, and thus failed to stand up for the very norms it seeks to export in the Middle East.⁶¹⁸ Michelle Pace also identified the Israeli conducts in the Occupied Territories, such as the construction of the Israeli ‘Security Fence’ and restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinians as a violation of the Palestinians’ democratic right to live in an independent country. She criticized the EU’s indifferent stance towards the Israeli breach of the Palestinians’ democratic right by stating that the Palestinians’ democratic right to live in an independent country remains absent from the EU’s ‘democratization’ efforts – apart from some repetitive statements about the EU’s aim at a Palestinian state in the context of the MEPP.⁶¹⁹ Despite these facts on the ground, the EU limited itself to rhetorical condemnation of the Israeli acts and calls on Israel to stop its acts in the Occupied Territories while refraining from directly sanctioning the Israeli violations of the Palestinians’ democratic and human rights, international humanitarian law and the EMP principles in the Occupied Territories.

One of the reasons behind the EU’s refrainment from using sanctions against Israel was its material interests. Israel has been the one of the biggest EU trading partners in the Euromed area ranking as the EU’s 25th major trade partner.⁶²⁰ Thus, any trade and economic sanctions against Israel would be detrimental for both sides. It would mean some kind of self-inclined punishment for the EU.⁶²¹ Moreover, the EU’s use of economic and trade sanctions would undermine the EU’s political

⁶¹⁷ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 342.

⁶¹⁸ Pace, *op.cit.*, “Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean”, pp. 47-48.

⁶¹⁹ Pace, *op.cit.*, “Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean”, p. 47.

⁶²⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/israel/index_en.htm.

⁶²¹ Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, “The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, p. 60.

credibility in Israel and would result in the loss of its status as legitimate interlocutor.⁶²² The EU's imposition of sanctions against Israel would result in raising the Israeli perception that the European states are biased against Israel. As a result, Israel would refuse the EU's further participation in any negotiations concerning the MEPP or at least try and relegate the EU to a secondary role.⁶²³ In order not to be sidelined, even as a member of the Quartet, in the peace process, the EU has refrained from using sanctions against Israel, which would have detrimental effects on its status of legitimate interlocutor in the peace process. For the EU, the peace process and its role in it take priority and the possibility of maintaining some influence over Israel comes first.⁶²⁴ Therefore, the EU Member States, aware of the detrimental effects of sanctions on their material interests, refrained from using any sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against Israel even when Israel routinely and systematically violated human rights and international humanitarian law. In this case, it can be argued that the EU's policy was based on lowest-common-denominator which indicated that the Member States cannot agree to impose far-reaching sanctions that might damage their own material interests, commercial or political.

Another reason behind the EU's refrainment from using sanctions against Israel was that the use of sanctions would be inconsistent with the EU's role as force for good. The EU's role as force for good and role as promoter of its values and norms hold incompatible role expectations. This effectively means that on the one hand, the EU's role as force for good urged it to refrain from using sanctions against Israel; but on the other hand, the EU's role as promoter of its values and norms simultaneously urged it to promote human rights and international humanitarian law even with the use of sanctions against the violators. Faced with this kind of inter-role conflict, the EU preferred to meet the expectations of its role as force for good, which was also beneficial for its material interests, but inconsistent with the EU's role as promoter of its values and norms. The EU's decision to refrain from using any sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against Israel even when it violated human rights and international humanitarian law has compromised what

⁶²² Dieckhoff, *op.cit.*, "The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 61.

⁶²³ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 340.

⁶²⁴ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 341.

the EU claimed to stand for, a promoter of human rights and international humanitarian law. This undermined the EU's effectiveness and credibility as promoter of its values and norms. This also undermined the EU's credibility as an effective international actor and put itself in a position of an ineffective international actor who failed to impose some sanctions in order to uphold human rights and international humanitarian law.

Another reason put forward by one of the Ex-Commissioners of the European Commission Manuel Marin-Gonzales is that pursuing a method of 'discussion not threats' when engaging with Israel put the EU in a better position to exercise a positive influence regarding all human rights related issues in the framework of the political dialogue.⁶²⁵ As it can be clearly seen, this strategy has not worked so far.

Another reason put forward by an EU official is that Israel is a friend of the EU and the EU cannot take a drastic action against its friends. Therefore, it is difficult for the EU to impose sanctions on Israel.⁶²⁶

Moreover, EU's imposition of sanctions on a democratically elected Hamas-led Palestinian government, while not using any sanctions against Israel despite its violation of human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories undermined the EU's credibility as promoter of its values and norms in the eyes of the Palestinian people. This action was interpreted by most Palestinians as the EU not being prepared to put equal pressure on Israel to recognize UN resolutions and the Palestinian rights (as well as pressure on Hamas to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept all previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority).⁶²⁷

In summary, the EU has played a limited role as the promoter of its values and norms in the case of the MEPP. The Israeli and the Palestinian cases clearly demonstrated the limits of EU's role as the promoter of its values and norms. In the Palestinian case, although the EU has supported the reform process towards the creation of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state through its financial and

⁶²⁵ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 342.

⁶²⁶ Interview with John Gatt-Rutter, Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 26 October 2009.

⁶²⁷ Pace, *op.cit.*, "Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean", p. 47.

technical aid to the Palestinian Authority, there has been much emphasis on the promotion of good governance, leaving aside genuine democratization. The EU's highly tolerant position towards the persistent exclusion of Islamic factions from both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, and its reluctance to engage and support Islamic civil society and non-violent groups, and its policy of isolating democratically elected Hamas while continuing its economic and political support to unelected Fatah undermined the EU's effectiveness and credibility as the promoter of democracy in Palestine. These policy moves constrained the performance of the EU's role as promoter of its values and norms.

In the Israeli case, the EU prioritized the promotion of its material interests over the promotion of humanitarian values and principles. The EU failed to act consistently with its role conception as promoter of its values and norms. Despite the Israeli violation of human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories, the EU did not use sanctions against Israel. The EU seemed to limit itself to a certain rhetoric in favor of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law rather than directly sanctioning violations. The Israeli case demonstrated that the political and commercial interests of the EU rather than values and norms are crucial in shaping its policy towards Israel. The Israeli case also revealed that the promotion of values and norms is not always the basic principle of the EU's foreign policy, as for the sake of the promotion of the EU's material interests, it can be sacrificed.

The Israeli and the Palestinian cases clearly demonstrated that although the EU tend to consider values and norms such as respect for democracy and human rights at the core of its relations with the rest of the world and the universal promotion of these values and norms through the world as one of the main objectives and priorities of its foreign policy, the EU's promotion of these values and norms seems more part of a political discourse than a priority of the EU's foreign policy actions. In conclusion, the Israeli and the Palestinian cases demonstrated that there has existed an inconsistency between the EU's role conception as promoter of its values and norms and its actual role performance, which undermined its effectiveness and international credibility as promoter of its values and norms. It can be concluded that the EU's record in practice in the case of the MEPP demonstrated

that the EU has not acted as a credible sponsor of values and norms of respect for democracy and human rights.

5.2.5 The EU's Role Performance as Promoter of Effective Multilateralism, Partner for the UN and Builder of Effective Partnership with Key Actors

Given that the EU's role performances as promoter of effective multilateralism, partner for the UN and builder of effective partnership with key actors are closely interlinked with and overlapped each other in the MEPP, I prefer to evaluate them under the same title. In the case of the MEPP, EU's role performances as promoter of effective multilateralism, partner for the UN and builder of effective partnership with key actors can be evaluated through assessing to what extent the EU has managed to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities.

In the case of the MEPP, the EU has a long established and enduring commitment to multilateralism. The EU has always advocated that the Arab-Israeli Conflict should be solved within a multilateral framework. Since the 1970s, the EU has advocated that, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict could be achieved through a multilateral and comprehensive approach, such as the multilateral framework of an international peace conference with the participation of the all parties to the conflict. The EU has always emphasized that the Arab-Israeli Conflict should be solved within the multilateral framework of the UN and on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1515. Costanza Musu argued that the reason why the EU has favored a multilateral approach to the peace process and emphasized the need for a greater role of the international community in the negotiations between the parties is possibly due to its own nature of multilateral framework and to the member states' habit of negotiating over every important issue.⁶²⁸ A similar evaluation is made by Roberto Menotti and Maria Francesca Vencato who argued that the EU has favored multilateralism, because the latter is naturally matched with the EU's own founding principle of multilateral cooperation and this assumption has been reinforced by the explicit adoption of effective multilateralism as the hallmark of the EU's external action.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The Madrid Quartet", p. 6.

⁶²⁹ Roberto Menotti and Maria Francesca Vencato, "The ESS and the Partners", in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), *The EU and the ESS* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 105.

In the early 1990s, the Madrid peace process was launched, and the EU had played a significant and active role in the multilateral track of the peace process. The EU acted as the chair or gavel-holder of Regional Economic Development Working Group, one of the working groups of multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process. In addition, the EU also launched the EMP in 1995 which was a complementary initiative to the MEPP and provided a multilateral forum for the conflicting parties, the Arabs and the Israelis to sit at the same table and discuss. In the post-9/11 era, with the creation of the Quartet on the Middle East, the MEPP was officially multilateralized. The EU as a member of the Quartet on the Middle East started to gain more effective presence in the political and diplomatic dimension of the peace process.

The creation of the Quartet in April 2002 symbolized the official multilateralisation and internationalization of the MEPP.⁶³⁰ The Quartet provided a multilateral framework for the peace process by officially bringing other major global actors, the UN, Russia and the EU into the peace process in addition to the old ones: Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the US.⁶³¹ Through its membership in the Quartet, the EU would gain visibility and influence in the MEPP, and would acquire a tool for influencing the US policies.⁶³² Indisputably, the EU played an increasingly important role in the peace process since the Madrid Conference of 1991, especially in the economic dimension, but the participation in the Quartet arguably gave the EU's role a higher political relevance and resonance.⁶³³ With its membership in the Quartet, the EU achieved its long-struggled aim to participate in the political and diplomatic dimension of the peace process as an equal partner alongside the US, the UN and Russia. A Palestinian diplomat maintained that with the establishment of the Quartet, the EU became a major political actor on par with the US.⁶³⁴ As Ben Soetendorp argued, "more than twenty years after the Venice declaration and ten years after the Madrid conference, the EU is at last fully involved in Middle East

⁶³⁰ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?".

⁶³¹ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?".

⁶³² Musu, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP", p. 23.

⁶³³ Musu, *op.cit.*, "The EU and the MEPP", p. 23.

⁶³⁴ Interview with Adel Atieh, Counsellor, General Delegation of Palestine to the European Union, 13 November 2009.

peacemaking”.⁶³⁵ The EU’s membership in the Quartet was an acknowledgement of the growing political role of the EU in the peace process and the legitimacy of the EU’s involvement as a major contributor to funding and institution building. Moreover, the EU has increased its involvement with Israel as a trusted interlocutor, not only in trade terms but also as a partner for political dialogue. Israel began to accept the EU as an active mediator in the peace process, although not on par with the US.⁶³⁶ The Quartet provided a formal framework for the EU’s role in the peace process and tied it to that of the US, thus easing Israel’s deep-seated reservations towards the EU’s involvement in the peace process.⁶³⁷

There are some criticisms concerning the Quartet’s effectiveness as an instrument of multilateralism. According to Costanza Musu, the Quartet is a ‘multilateral control framework’ for bilateral negotiations, which are supposed to aim at implementing pre-established steps agreed upon by the Quartet, rather than a real multilateral framework for negotiations. She argued that although in appearance the Quartet opened the peace process to multilateralism and created a multilateral framework for the negotiations; in substance, it created a contradictory multilateral control framework for bilateral negotiations.⁶³⁸ She argued that final goals and intermediate steps have been endorsed by the Quartet and then presented to the parties who are supposed to implement them, but the role of direct negotiations and the importance of achieving a negotiated settlement between the parties were clearly acknowledged.⁶³⁹ As can be seen in the Road Map, it called for bilateral negotiations aiming at implementing pre-established phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks targeting at progress through mutual steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields which were agreed upon by the Quartet rather than by the Israelis and the Palestinians. The two main parties to the conflict, Israel and Palestine, in fact were not involved in developing the Road Map, rather the Plan was published and presented to them for

⁶³⁵ Soetendorp, *op.cit.*, “The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process”, p. 293.

⁶³⁶ House of Lords European Union Committee, “The EU and the MEPP”, *26th Report of Session 2006-07*, (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 24 July 2007), p. 32.

⁶³⁷ Musu, *op.cit.*, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”.

⁶³⁸ Musu, *op.cit.*, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”.

⁶³⁹ Musu, *op.cit.*, “The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?”.

their approval. While looking at Musu's identification of the Quartet, it can be concluded that the Middle East Quartet can be identified as minilateral⁶⁴⁰ cooperation among four major global actors, the US, the EU, the UN and Russia, rather than a multilateral framework for negotiations. As it can be seen in the Road Map, the members of the Quartet agreed upon the Road Map and militarized their agreed plan by presenting it to the approval of the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Another criticism concerning the Quartet's effectiveness as an instrument of multilateralism came from Nathalie Tocci. She argued that the Quartet has predominantly provided a 'multilateral cover' for continuing unilateral US action in peace process.⁶⁴¹ Although the US accepted official multilateralisation of the MEPP through the creation of the Quartet by officially bringing other major global actors into the peace process in addition to the old ones, the US continued to act unilaterally as the main mediator in the bilateral political talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. As seen earlier, in June 2003, the US President George Bush has unilaterally taken the lead in launching the Road Map. In order to persuade the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to commit to the Road Map, Bush held a meeting with them at Aqaba in which the other members of the Quartet did not participate. Moreover, three members of the Quartet including the EU, the UN and Russia were excluded from Annapolis process in November 2007. The US played a primary role in the Annapolis Conference and the conference was primarily an American initiative.⁶⁴² The other three members of the Quartet were sidelined and excluded from bilateral political talks by the US.

In the post-9/11 era, despite the creation of the Quartet and official multilateralisation of the MEPP, the US has sought to reserve primary role for itself in the bilateral talks while granting a secondary role to the other members of the Quartet. In addition to Nathalie Tocci, Costanza Musu also expressed her doubts about whether the US administration is seriously committed to the Quartet as a form

⁶⁴⁰ Frederich Kratochwil defined Minilateralism as the creation of core groups and multilateralisation of their agreements. (Frederich Kratochwil, "Norms versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflectivist Approaches to Institutions – a Unilateral Plea for Communicative Rationality", in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 468).

⁶⁴¹ Tocci, op.cit., "The Widening Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p.13.

⁶⁴² Musu, op.cit., "The Middle East Quartet: A New Role for Europe?".

of multilateral exercise or the Quartet is supposed to give an illusion of international involvement in the peace process while the US maintains its primary role in the negotiations.⁶⁴³ Moreover, Alvarez De Soto, the former UN Secretary General's Envoy to the Quartet identified the Quartet as "a group of friends of the US – and the US does not feel the need to consult closely with the Quartet except when it suits".⁶⁴⁴ Christopher Hill also adopted a cynical perspective on the Quartet's effectiveness as an instrument of multilateralism and put forward that it is a way of keeping the EU and Russia compromised – and therefore quite – through giving to them a superficial share in US-sponsored mediation.⁶⁴⁵ Thus, the US' persistent unilateral actions have brought the effectiveness of the Quartet as an instrument of multilateralism into question. Although the Quartet has not been an effective instrument of multilateralism, it constituted a consistency in the EU's multilateral approach to the peace process and its active participation in any kind of multilateral initiative for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

In accordance with its commitment as the promoter of effective multilateralism, the EU strove to make international organizations and agreements more effective in the case of the MEPP. In the post-9/11 era, the EU has played a prominent and active role in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map, which has been the main plan for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. German and Danish proposals formed the basis of the Road Map agreed by the Quartet on the Middle East in September 2002. The EU has played the role as the facilitator for the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. The EU has contributed to the normalization of Palestinian Life and Palestinian institution- building. The EU supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority toward the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state which was identified by the Quartet members as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict. The EU supported the Palestinian reform process in the areas of drafting a new constitution, the promotion of judicial independence, promotion of

⁶⁴³ Costanza Musu, "The EU and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road to Convergence*, in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 116.

⁶⁴⁴ Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 282.

⁶⁴⁵ Piana, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

accountability and transparency in the fiscal system, the security sector reform, reform of administration and the executive, holding of free, fair and open elections, developing a modern education system and media based on peace, tolerance and mutual understanding, the promotion of pro-peace civil society. The EU facilitated the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel.

In accordance with its commitment to make international agreements more effective the EU launched a civilian crisis management mission within the framework of the ESDP (EU BAM Rafah) in order to facilitate effective implementation of the ‘Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza’ between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Agreement envisaged the presence of a third party on the ground which would have the authority to ensure the compliance of the Palestinian Authority with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of this agreement. With the consent of the two parties, the EU was assigned to the task of the “third party monitoring role” at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border. According to the agreement, the third party on the ground has the responsibility to ensure the compliance of the Palestinian Authority with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of this agreement and assist the Palestinian Authority to build capacity, including training, equipment and technical assistance, on border management and customs. In order to carry out the task of the third party monitoring role, the EU launched EU BAM Rafah.

In addition to its membership in the Quartet and the decisive role played in the preparation and implementation of the Road Map, since 2002 the EU has also been one of the members of another multilateral initiative concerning the MEPP, called International Task Force on Palestinian Reform. The Task Force has the task of monitoring and supporting the implementation of the Palestinian civil reforms, and guiding the international donor community in its support for the Palestinians’ reform agenda, was composed of representatives of the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN Secretary General), Norway, Japan, the World Bank, and the IMF. The EU has continued its support to the Palestinian reform process towards the establishment of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state within the multilateral framework of International Task Force on Palestinian Reform. The EU’s

membership to International Task Force on Palestinian Reform constituted another example for the EU's active participation in any kind of multilateral initiative for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Another indicator of the EU's multilateral approach to the MEPP is the EU's insistence on the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the multilateral framework of the UN and on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1515 and the EU's continual support to the UN efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict. This is consistent with the EU's role conceptions as a promoter of effective multilateralism and a partner for the UN. Firstly, this is consistent with the EU's commitment to make international organizations (in this case the UN) more effective as promoter of effective multilateralism. Secondly, this is consistent with the EU's commitment to upholding the universal values, norms, goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and supporting and strengthening the UN's efforts for the protection and promotion of regional and global peace, security, stability and prosperity. It is also congruent with the EU's self-proclaimed responsibility to support and to strengthen the UN in order to fully enable the UN to fulfill its role effectively in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its Charter.

Since the early 1970s, the EU has strengthened and deepened its partnership with the UN in the case of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The EU has supported and contributed to the UN activities mainly in the fields of development and humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping in the case of MEPP. In the post-9/11 era, the EU has acted as one of the most significant partners of the UN in the case of the MEPP both within the multilateral framework of the Quartet and on a bilateral basis through its support of the UN activities.

As discussed in detail earlier, the EU – European Commission and EU Member States - has been largest donor to the UNRWA. The EU through its financial contribution to the UNRWA has contributed to the improvement of economic and social conditions of the Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria since 1971. The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Directorate General (DG ECHO) has been one of the main financial supporters of the UNRWA's emergency aid for the poorest Palestine refugees, during crisis such as the Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israel-Lebanon War of 2006

and was consisted mainly of the provision of food aid and temporary job creation. The EU's support to the UNRWA is defined as an essential component of its strategy for the MEPP. The European Commission was identified by the UNRWA's Commissioner-General, Karen Abu Zayd as a reliable partner.⁶⁴⁶ The EU through its financial support to the UNRWA has acted as a prominent partner for the UN in alleviating the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The EU has acted as a real partner for the UN rather than only a donor to the UNRWA.

As discussed in detail earlier, EU Member States are major military contributors to the expanded UNIFIL, which was established following the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006. EU Member States have provided the backbone of the force by providing 7000 troops, crucial military components and the operational command for UNIFIL. France and Italy has taken the lead in taking the responsibility of the operational command of the force. EU Member States through their significant military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL and their leading role in the UN force have acted as prominent partner for the UN in the protection and promotion of regional peace, security, stability and prosperity in the Middle East. Concerning UNIFIL, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that "Europe (the EU and its Member States – emphasis added) had lived up to its responsibility and provided the backbone of the force".⁶⁴⁷ The EU and its Member States' support to the UNRWA and UNIFIL showed that they are strong supporters of the UN in the case of the MEPP. Their support to the UNRWA and UNIFIL demonstrated the considerable amount of inter-institutional cooperation and partnership between the EU and the UN.

The EU's membership to the Quartet and International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, and its bilateral partnership with the UN are also consistent with the its role conception as the builder of effective partnership with key actors. The EU's search for finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict within the framework of the Quartet and with the UN are consistent practices with the EU's belief that

⁶⁴⁶ Newsletter of the European Commission Technical Assistance Office For the West Bank and Gaza, op.cit., (Iss. 1, January-March 2007).

⁶⁴⁷ Richard Gowan, "The ESS's Global Objective: Effective Multilateralism", in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), *The EU and the ESS* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 54.

contemporary global and regional problems and threats are common problems shared by the entire world thus requiring multilateral initiatives to deal with. In the case of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the EU through its membership to the Quartet and International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, and its strong bilateral partnership with the UN preferred to deal with a regional problem which has global repercussions through building partnership with key global actors, including the US, the UN and Russia. It can be said, in the post-9/11 era, the EU has been one of the partners of a global alliance composing of the UN, the EU, Russia, and the US, which was formed for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this sense, the Quartet can be called as a Quartet of global partners for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To sum up, the empirical study of the EU's role performances as promoter of effective multilateralism, partner for the UN and builder of effective partnership with key actors showed that the EU has managed to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities in its actual practice. Concerning the EU's role performance as promoter of effective multilateralism:

- the EU's active participation in multilateral initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the conflict,
- the prominent and active role played by the EU in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map,
- the EU's active participation in the implementation of 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' by carrying out the task of the third party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border,
- the EU's insistence on the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the multilateral framework of the UN and through adherence to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions,
- the EU's persistent support to the UN efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict

are consistent with the EU's commitment to make international organizations and agreements more effective. It is safe to assert that the EU can sustain its commitment to effective multilateralism in the case of the MEPP.

Concerning the EU's role performance as partner for the UN, the EU's insistence on the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the multilateral

framework of the organization and through adherence to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and the EU's active support and contribution to the UNRWA and to the expanded UNIFIL are consistent with the EU's self-proclaimed responsibility to support and to strengthen the UN in order to fully enable the UN to fulfill its role effectively in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its Charter. It is safe to assert that the EU and the UN are real partners in the case of the MEPP.

Concerning the EU's role performance as builder of effective partnership with key actors, the EU's building of effective partnership with the UN, the US and Russia within the framework of the Quartet and its strong bilateral partnership with the UN are consistent with the EU's commitment to deal with contemporary global and regional problems through building partnership with key global and regional actors.

5.3 Conclusion

As can be clearly seen from the first part of the chapter, the EU's political role increased and its presence was increasingly felt in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era especially with its membership of the Quartet. As a member of the Quartet, the EU has played an active role in the political and diplomatic dimension of the peace process. During this period, we observed an increase in international recognition of the EU as a significant player in the political, diplomatic, security dimensions of the Middle East conflict. The EU started to play a significant role in the realms of conflict management, crisis mediation and conflict resolution. The EU through its prominent and active role in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map has played an important and active role in the realm conflict resolution.⁶⁴⁸ The EU through its representatives has played a crucial role in the settlement of a microsecurity crisis, like the issue of the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The EU through such successful mediation efforts and diplomatic missions of its representatives has played an important and active role in the realm of crisis mediation.⁶⁴⁹ Furthermore, the EU has started to play a prominent role in the security dimension of the peace process through its ESDP operations. The EU

⁶⁴⁸ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East", p. 45.

⁶⁴⁹ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East", p. 45.

through its ESDP operations and its active support and contribution to the expanded UNIFIL has played an active role in the realm of conflict management.⁶⁵⁰

The EU's status of being the largest external donor of financial and technical aid and the prominent supporter of the reform process of the Palestinian Authority enhanced its profile and presence in the MEPP. Although, the EU still played a politically and diplomatically supplementary and subordinate role to the US, it has been more and more internationally recognized as a prominent player in the post-9/11 era. As it was rightly put forward by an EU official, the EU's status of 'payer' started to change with its more involvement in political and security aspects of the peace process.⁶⁵¹

On the whole, the EU's role as a foreign and security policy actor in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era can be identified as more than a modest presence, but less than a robust actorness. Although the EU has moved beyond just a modest presence in the MEPP with an increase in its role, visibility, assertiveness and presence in nearly every dimensions of the MEPP, it still is not able to develop a robust actorness in the MEPP. Despite its actions which have enhanced its role and visibility on the ground and its presence in the political, diplomatic, economic, security dimensions of the peace process, the EU still does not have the clout to have a robust political role in the MEPP. It has continued to play a politically and diplomatically supplementary and subordinate role to the US, while the US has continued to play the role of primary mediator in bilateral peace negotiations.

In the second part of the chapter, the extent which the EU has managed to measure up to its self-images as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its values and norms', 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors' in its actual practice in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era is examined in order to test congruity between EU's role conceptions and role performance. As a result of the analysis, two major conclusions stand. First, concerning the EU's roles as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability' and 'promoter of its values and norms', the EU has, to a

⁶⁵⁰ Asseburg, *op.cit.*, "European Conflict Management in the Middle East", p. 45.

⁶⁵¹ Interview with Gwenda Jeffreys-Jones, Desk Officer for the MEPP, Directorate-General External Relations, European Commission, 27 October 2009.

limited extent, managed to measure up to its self-images in its actual practice. As will be discussed below, some constraints put limits on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities. This weakened the EU's effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the case of the MEPP. Second, concerning the EU's roles as 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors', the EU has more successfully performed these roles, which has strengthened the EU's profile, effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the case of the MEPP.

In the post-9/11 era, the EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinians, which aimed at alleviating the humanitarian situation and helping the Palestinian Authority in its institutional reform enhanced its profile as 'force for good', 'the provider of development aid' and 'force for international peace, security and stability'. This aid prevented the Palestinian economy from collapse; without this aid the Palestinian Authority would not have been able to finance even the basic functions of governance. The collapse of the Palestinian Authority might have resulted in the escalation of conflict.

Moreover, the EU's support to the reform process of the Palestinian Authority enhanced its profile as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its values and norms'. The EU has identified the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state as the best guarantee for the Israeli and regional security and a precondition for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. What this effectively means that, the creation of a well-governed democratic Palestinian state ensured the continuing existence of a viable negotiating partner for Israel in the peace negotiations. It would also be the best guarantee for the viable peace process. This was later on adopted by the international community and the creation of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state was identified by the Road Map as a precondition for the start of the negotiations for the final settlement of the conflict. The EU has supported the reform process of the Palestinian Authority with the aim to pave the way for the peaceful settlement of the conflict by facilitating the creation of a well-governed and democratic Palestinian state. The EU through its support to the

Palestinian reform process strove to facilitate the Palestinian Authority to get ready for the permanent status negotiations with Israel.

The EU's crisis management operations within the framework of the ESDP (EUBAM Rafah) enhanced the Union's profile as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability' and 'promoter of effective multilateralism'. The EU through its third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point through EU BAM Rafah has provided benefits for both parties and served the achievement of the objectives of the Road Map. First of all, it provided the Palestinians freedom of movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza Strip which would improve their living conditions and pave the ground for the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state. Secondly, it provided the Israelis with a sense of security against threats which would come through Rafah Crossing Point including possible weapons transfers and uninhibited return of exiled extremist leaders and terrorists. As the Israelis perceived Rafah as a door of danger, EU BAM Rafah provided them some kind of border security. Moreover, EU BAM Rafah's contribution to the creation of an economically viable Palestinian state would indirectly contribute to the security of Israel. Thirdly, it has contributed to the confidence-building between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the EU through EUBAM Rafah has facilitated effective implementation of the 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which is one of the commitments of the EU as 'promoter of effective multilateralism', to make international agreements more effective.

The EU Member States' major military contributions to the expanded UNIFIL and their leading role in the UN force enhanced the EU's profile as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability' and 'partner for the UN'. The EU Member States through their provision of the backbone of the force by providing 7000 troops, crucial military components and the operational command for UNIFIL significantly contributed the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. Through its efforts the EU acted for the benefit of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability. Their support to the expanded UNIFIL demonstrated the considerable amount of inter-institutional cooperation and partnership between the EU and the UN.

As discussed in detail previously, the EU's active participation in multilateral initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the conflict such as the Quartet and International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, the prominent and active role played by the EU in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map and its active participation in the implementation of 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' through carrying out the task of the third party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border, the EU's insistence on the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the multilateral framework of the UN and through adherence to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and the EU's persistent support to the UN efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict, the EU's active support and contribution to the UN activities mainly in the fields of development and humanitarian assistance in the form of its significant financial contribution to the UNRWA and peace-keeping in the form of its major military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL and the EU's building of effective partnership with the UN, the US and Russia within the framework of the Quartet enhanced the EU's profile as 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors'.

Although its actions and decisions enhanced the EU's profile as 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability' and 'promoter of its values and norms', some constraints put limits on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities in its actual practice. Concerning the EU's roles as 'force for good' and 'promoter of its values and norms', the EU's imposition of sanctions on a democratically elected Hamas with fair, free and open elections while continuing its economic and political support to unelected Fatah and its refrainment from using any kind of sanctions against Israel despite the Israeli violation of human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories put limits on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities and thus weakened its profile as 'force for good' and 'promoter of its values and norms'. In the Hamas case, the EU faced a political dilemma. On the one hand, there was democratically elected Hamas government with a fair, free and open election. On the other hand, democratically elected Hamas was on the EU's list of terrorist organizations and refused to meet and implement the three principles put forward by the Quartet on the Middle East. The EU Member States faced a hard

choice between upholding the principle of democracy and safeguarding the EU's credibility and standing as an actor in the MEPP by maintaining their commitment not to deal with organizations that have been labelled as 'terrorist' by the international community. Faced with a hard choice, the EU preferred to impose sanctions on the Hamas-led Palestinian government in order to force it to meet and implement the three principles. The EU sacrificed upholding the principle of democracy in Palestine for the sake of safeguarding the EU's credibility and standing as an actor in the MEPP.

In the Israeli case, two main reasons prevented the EU from using any kind of sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against it even when Israel violated human rights and international humanitarian law. The first one is the political and commercial interests of the EU. The EU refrained from using sanctions against Israel which would have detrimental effects on its political and commercial interests. The second one is the inter-role conflict between the EU's role as 'force for good' and role as 'promoter of its values and norms'. On the one hand, the EU's role as 'force for good' urged it to refrain from using sanctions against Israel; but on the other hand, the EU's role as 'promoter of its values and norms' simultaneously urged it to promote human rights and international humanitarian law even with the use of sanctions against the violators. Faced with this kind of inter-role conflict, the EU preferred to meet the expectations of role of 'force for good' which was also beneficial for its material interests.

Concerning the EU's role as 'force for international peace, security and stability', two kinds of constraints put limits on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities and prevented it from acting as an effective mediator for the peaceful settlement of the conflict: internal and external. The internal constraint is the EU's lack of both vertical and horizontal coherence, the EU's inability to always act as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. External constraints are the Israeli and the American reluctance towards the EU's participation in the bilateral peace negotiations as an active mediator and their insistence to limit the EU's role merely to facilitating the implementation of the Road Map, supporting the Palestinian state-building and economic reconstruction.

As Urfan Khaliq in his book "Ethical Dimension of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal" has argued that in order to better

understand the value of the EU's role in the MEPP, it is better to try to envisage the situation if the EU played no role in the MEPP at all than to consider its weaknesses and shortcomings.⁶⁵² On this basis, although due to limitations and inconsistencies outlined above, the EU's effectiveness, efficiency and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the case of MEPP in the post-9/11 was weakened moderately, on the whole it can be maintained that the EU through its decisions and actions has enhanced its role and visibility on the ground, and its presence in the political, diplomatic, economic and security dimensions of the peace process has been more and more felt in the post-9/11 era.

⁶⁵² Khaliq, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of the thesis was to explain, analyze and understand the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 international security environment (particularly during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006). The thesis did not attempt to evaluate the impact of the 9/11 on the EU's foreign and security policy, what this effectively means is that the thesis did not evaluate what would be the effects of the 9/11 on the EU's foreign and security policy or whether the 9/11 would lead to a change in the EU's role conceptions or not. The thesis preferred the post-9/11 era merely as a specific period of time to understand, explain and analyze the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. By relying on the belief that in order to explain, analyze and understand the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era in a profound and critical manner, it is necessary to investigate both its role conceptions and role performance as a foreign and security policy actor and the congruity between these two. Accordingly, the thesis endeavoured to find out the EU's role conceptions during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006; and whether there is a congruity or incongruity between the EU's self-defined role conceptions and its actual role performance during the same period. In order to carry out the congruity test, the thesis focused on the EU's role performance in the MEPP during the same period.

In the thesis firstly, in order to find out the role conceptions of the EU, contents of the general foreign policy speeches delivered by the principal EU foreign policy officials and the EU official documents concerning foreign and security policy of the EU have been analyzed. As a result of the content analysis, seven role conceptions referring to the EU's general roles as a foreign and security actor in the global context have been identified: 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability', 'promoter of its values and norms', 'the provider of development aid', 'promoter of effective multilateralism', 'partner for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors'.

Secondly, in order to uncover to what extent the EU has managed to measure up to its above-mentioned self-images in its actual practice in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era, the EU's role performance for each self-identified role in the MEPP during the period extending from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2006 has been examined.

The EU's self-identification as a 'force for good' implies the EU's responsibility and duty to make the world a better place for everybody by making the world freer, more peaceful, fairer, more prosperous, more secure and more stable. This role conception puts emphasis on duties and responsibilities to work for the 'global common good', which implies working on the basis of the interests of the community of peoples as a whole rather than solely those of its own interests. This role conception implies that the EU as a force for good needs to pursue an ethically balanced policy, in which an equilibrium exists between its material interests and ethical considerations. The EU needs to balance both member and non-member concerns and satisfy the preferences of all actors involved.

Concerning the issue of to what extent the EU has acted congruently with its self-image as a 'force for good' in its actual practice in the MEPP, it can be concluded that the EU has to a limited extent has managed to measure up to its self-image in its actual practice. On the one hand, the EU's balanced and comprehensive approach to the conflict, its contribution to the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state, its provision of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and support for the Palestinian reform process, its contribution to the mediation efforts demonstrated that the EU to some extent struck a balance between its own concerns and those of the conflicting parties. The EU's actions and decisions in some measure can be said to be satisfactory for the preferences of all actors involved in the conflict. The EU actions served the benefit of the peoples in the region and international peace and stability.

However, the EU's decision to impose sanctions on democratically elected Hamas-led Palestinian government was incongruent with the EU's self-image as force for good. The EU's decision to impose sanctions on Hamas acted both to the detriment of all actors involved in the conflict; it did not serve the 'global common good'. The paradox that the EU faced between its policy of promotion of democracy

and its refrainment from using coercion against parties to the conflict and its security considerations in terms of refraining from dealing with a terrorist organization, which refused to renounce violence, prevented the EU to act in a satisfactory manner for both the Palestinians and itself. Moreover, on the issue of using sanctions against Israel, the EU's refrainment from using any kind of sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against it even when Israel violated human rights and international humanitarian law demonstrated that the EU failed to pursue an ethically balanced policy; the EU was not able to find a balance between its material interests and ethical considerations. The promotion of the EU's material interests outweighs the promotion of humanitarian values and principles. The EU has refrained from imposing sanctions which would have detrimental effect on its commercial and political interests, even when Israel violated human rights and international humanitarian law. In the Hamas case, the intra-role conflict which the EU faced on the issue of employing sanctions against Israel and its failure to pursue an ethically balanced policy on the issue of employing sanctions against Israel put limit on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities as a force for good.

The EU's role conception 'force for international peace, security and stability' emphasizes the necessity of exporting the EU's stability, security and peace to both the EU's neighborhood and wider world in order to prevent the importation of instability from its neighbourhood. The EU has identified exporting its stability, security and peace to its neighbours as its enlightened self-interest. This means that while the EU is acting to further the interests of others, ultimately it serves its own self-interest. The EU's promotion of security, stability and peace refers to a positive-sum situation in which both the EU and its neighborhood mutually enjoy peace, security and stability.

As a result of analysis for finding out to what extent the EU acts congruently with its self-image as a 'force for international peace, security and stability' in its actual practice in the MEPP, it can be concluded that the EU has acted as a 'constrained' 'force for international peace, security and stability'. On the one hand, the EU has played a significant role in the peaceful settlement of the conflict through some successful mediation efforts and diplomatic missions of EU and national representatives, like in the issue of the Siege of the Church of the Nativity in

Bethlehem. It has carried out two ESDP operations. It has signed ENP Action Plans with both sides. It has made significant military contribution to the expanded UNIFIL. It has provided financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and supported the Palestinian reform process towards the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. Moreover, the EU has been the most active member of the Quartet on the Middle East in the promotion of the Road Map.

Nonetheless, internal and external constraints put limits on the EU's ability to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities and prevented it from acting as an effective mediator for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Internal constraint is the EU's lack of both vertical and horizontal coherence, the EU's inability to act as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. As previously discussed in details, Italian government's attitude towards the Israeli construction of security fence can be given as an example for the lack of vertical coherence within the EU. External constraints are the Israeli and the American reluctance towards the EU's participation in the bilateral peace negotiations as an active mediator and their insistence to limit the EU's role merely to facilitating the implementation of the Road Map, supporting the Palestinian state-building and economic reconstruction.

The EU's role conception 'the provider of development aid' emphasizes the necessity to help developing countries in their fight to eradicate extreme poverty, hunger, malnutrition and pandemics such as AIDS; in achieving universal primary education; in promoting gender equality and empowering women; in reducing mortality rate of children; in improving maternal health; in achieving sustainable development which includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects. As the EU has identified development as a precondition for security and underdevelopment as a breeding ground for insecurity and instability in the world, by helping developing countries in their fight against underdevelopment through providing development aid, the EU has contributed both its own security and international security.

In the case of the MEPP, the EU's self-image as 'the provider of development aid' reflects its actual practice. The EU's role as 'provider of development aid' took the form of 'provider of financial and technical aid' to the Palestinian Authority in the context of the MEPP. As the largest external donor of

financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the main financial supporter of the MEPP, the EU has effectively used this instrument for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The EU's financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority and the MEPP has made three significant contributions to the survival of the peace process.

Firstly, the EU's financial and technical aid in the form of direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority facilitated the latter to stay financially afloat after the Israeli withholding of the Palestinian tax and custom revenues following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. By keeping the Palestinian Authority financially afloat, the EU also kept the peace process afloat, because the financial collapse of the Palestinian Authority might have resulted in the escalation of conflict, violence, chaos and the interruption of the peace process.

Secondly, this aid enabled the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its obligations under the Road Map. This aid has assisted and facilitated the creation of an independent, economically and politically viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian state. The financial support to the infrastructure projects in the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian institutional reform process has been especially crucial. Furthermore, the EU's financial support to the Palestinian private sector mainly the SMEs, development projects in East Jerusalem, projects for the promotion and protection of human rights and the Palestinian NGOs and service institutions have been other crucial contributions of the EU to the creation of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state.

Thirdly, through its financial aid to the peace-oriented NGOs and civil society initiatives on both sides the EU has promoted communication and understanding among the Palestinians and the Israelis by demonstrating the advantages of working together for the mutual benefit and achieving tangible results. By this way, the EU has contributed to the creation of a positive environment for the peaceful settlement of the conflict and broadened the base of public support for the MEPP. The EU has utilized its financial aid to strengthen civil society actions in peace building and conflict transformation.

However, the EU's provision of humanitarian and emergency aid to the Palestinians put a serious constraint on the EU's ability to use the instrument of aid as an effective tool for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Although the EU has

provided aid to the Palestinian people as a humanitarian imperative, this has, however, resulted in its taking over of the humanitarian duties of Israel towards the Palestinian people under the international humanitarian law. Thus, by relieving Israel of its legal obligations towards the Palestinian people, the EU undeliberately has subsidized the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories and thus helped and facilitated Israel to continue the state of occupation, closures and curfews in the Palestinian territories, rather than working actively against it.

The EU's role conception 'promoter of its values and norms' put emphasis on its standing as a community of shared values. This role conception emphasized the EU's commitment to the promotion of its shared values and norms. This role conception emphasized the necessity of promoting the EU's values and norms and establishing well-governed democratic states for the protection of both international security and the security of the EU and the strengthening of the international order.

As a result of analysis for finding out to what extent the EU has promoted its shared values and norms in its relations with Israel and Palestine, it can be concluded that the EU has faced serious limitations in performing its role as the promoter of its values and norms. In the Palestinian case, even though the EU has supported the Palestinian reform process, there has been much emphasis on the promotion of good governance, leaving aside genuine democratization in its actual practice. The EU has adopted a highly tolerant position towards the persistent exclusion of Islamic factions from both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, and exhibited reluctance to engage and support Islamic civil society and non-violent groups, and pursued a policy of isolating democratically elected Hamas while maintaining its economic and political support to unelected Fatah. The EU's such position undermined its effectiveness and credibility as the promoter of democracy in Palestine.

In the Israeli case, despite the Israeli violation of human rights of the Palestinian people through its conducts in the Occupied Territories, the EU did not use sanctions against it. There are two main reasons behind the EU's refrainment from using any kind of sanctions or legal mechanisms of passive enforcement against it even when Israel violated human rights. The first one is the political and commercial interests of the EU, which might probably be damaged in case of imposing sanctions. The second one is the inter-role conflict between the EU's role

as ‘force for good’ and role as ‘promoter of its values and norms’. On the one hand, the EU’s role as ‘force for good’ urged it to refrain from using sanctions against Israel; but on the other hand, the EU’s role as ‘promoter of its values and norms’ simultaneously urged it to promote human rights and international humanitarian law even with the use of sanctions against the violators. Faced with this kind of inter-role conflict, the EU preferred to meet the expectations of its role as ‘force for good’ which was also beneficial for its material interests. To sum up, there has existed a gap between the EU’s role conception as ‘promoter of its values and norms’ and its actual role performance.

The EU’s role conception ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’ emphasized the EU’s commitment to build an effective multilateral system, which is governed by rules and monitored by multilateral institutions. The establishment of an effective multilateral system was identified as a necessity for the maintenance of both international security and the security and prosperity of the EU. In parallel with the former role conception the EU put special emphasis on the UN as the most important partner for the establishment of an effective multilateral system and places it at the center of such a system. The role conception ‘partner for the UN’ emphasizes the EU’s commitment to upholding the universal values, norms, goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and supporting and strengthening the UN’s efforts for the protection and promotion of regional and global peace, security, stability and prosperity. This role conception emphasizes the EU’s responsibility to support and to strengthen the UN in order to fully enable the UN to fulfill its role effectively in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its Charter. The EU’s role conception ‘builder of effective partnership with key actors’ emphasizes the EU’s preference to deal with global and regional problems and threats through cooperation with other important global and regional actors. This role conception places an emphasis on the EU’s preference to pursue its foreign and security policy objectives through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through building partnership with other important global and regional actors, mainly because the EU believes that by acting in this way the EU furthers both the interests of others and its own self-interest.

As a result of analysis for finding out to what extent the EU acts congruently with its self-images as ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’, ‘partner

for the UN' and 'builder of effective partnership with key actors', it can be concluded that the EU has managed to live up to its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities in its actual practice. The below mentioned actions of the EU in the context of the MEPP confirmed that the EU has acted consistently with its self-proclaimed commitments and responsibilities:

- the EU's active participation in multilateral initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the conflict,
- the prominent and active role played by the EU in the preparation and the implementation of the Road Map,
- the EU's active participation in the implementation of 'Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza' by carrying out the task of the third party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border,
- the EU's insistence on the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the multilateral framework of the UN and through adherence to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and the EU's persistent support to the UN efforts towards the peaceful settlement of the conflict,
- the EU's active support and contribution to the UNRWA and to the expanded UNIFIL,
- the EU's building of effective partnership with the UN, the US and Russia within the framework of the Quartet.

In conclusion, despite limitations and constraints which resulted in a certain degree of inconsistency between some of the roles the EU proclaims it will perform and its actual role performance, it would be unfair to conclude that there exists a high degree of incongruity between its role conceptions and role performance. Evidence gathered from the EU's involvement in the MEPP in the post-9/11 era revealed that we could not talk about an apparent 'conception-performance gap' in the EU's foreign and security policy. On this basis, it cannot be maintained that the EU is an ineffective and inefficient foreign and security policy actor which totally lacks international credibility. Although the limitations and constraints the EU encountered when performing its self-proclaimed roles of 'force for good', 'force for international peace, security and stability' and 'promoter of its values and norms' moderately weakened its effectiveness, efficiency and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era, all in all, as observed in the case of the

MEPP, the decisions and actions carried out by the EU while enacting its self-identified roles outweighed its deficiencies in its role performance. Thus, even though the EU, whose foreign and security policy is still evolving, has encountered some inconsistency problems while performing its self-identified roles, its overall balance sheet as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era is fairly positive.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

11 EYLÜL SONRASI DÖNEMDE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN BİR DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI AKTÖRÜ OLARAK ROLÜNÜN ANALİZİ: ORTA DOĞU BARIŞ SÜRECİ

1. Giriş

Bu tezin temel amacı, 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde küresel siyasette önemli ve etkin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olma iddiasında olan AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde (11 Eylül 2001 – 31 Aralık 2006 arası dönem) bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak oynadığı rolün analiz edilmesidir. 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde AB'nin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak oynadığı rolün daha derin ve eleştirel bir şekilde inceleyebilmek için hem AB'nin dış ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramlarının hem rol performansının hem de her ikisi arasındaki uyumun incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle bu tez, 11 Eylül 2001 – 31 Aralık 2006 arası dönemde AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı dış ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramları ile aynı döneme ait rol performansı arasındaki uyumu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB'nin rol kavramları ve rol performansı arasındaki uyumu test edebilmek için bu tez AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde 11 Eylül 2001 – 31 Aralık 2006 arası dönemdeki rol performansı üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu tez iki temel soruya cevap aramaktadır: AB 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak kendisi için hangi rolleri tanımlamıştır?; AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde kendisi için tanımladığı roller ile gerçek rol performansı arasında bir uyum var mıdır?

Bu tez beş bölümden oluşmaktadır: giriş bölümünün hemen ardından gelen ikinci bölümde tezin kavramsal çerçevesi, araştırma planı ve tezin metodolojisi incelenmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde, 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı dış ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramları incelenmektedir. Dördüncü bölümde AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 öncesi dönemde (1970'lerin başından 1990'ların sonuna kadar geçen dönem) Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik politikalarının geçirdiği evrim incelenmektedir. Buradaki amaç AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci'ne yönelik politikasındaki değişim ve sürekliliği tespit edebilmektir.

Beşinci bölümde AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemdeki dış ve güvenlik politikası rol performansı Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde incelenmekte ve AB'nin rol kavramları ve rol performansı arasındaki uyum analiz edilmektedir.

2. Kuramsal Çerçeve

2.1 Dış Politika Analizinde Rol Kuramı

Bu tezde rol kuramı kavramsal çerçeve olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bruce J. Biddle'a göre rol kuramı, belirli bir ortamdaki kişinin karakteristik davranışları ve bu davranışları muhtemelen üreten, açıklayan ve onlardan etkilenen değişik süreçlerle ilgilenen bir bilimdir. Rol kuramı kaynağını sosyal psikolojiden alır. Gözlemleri rol kavramı tarafından yönlendirilen sosyal psikologlar için çalışmalarının nesnesi sosyal ortamlardaki kişilerin rolleri nasıl oynadıklarıdır. Rol kuramı birçok sosyal meseleyi incelemek için bir perspektif sunmaktadır. Rol kuramı, sosyal bilimciler tarafından sosyal olguyu incelemek amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Bunun nedeni rol kuramının araştırmacıya insan davranışlarına değişik açıklamalar getirebilmeye olanak sağlayan birçok kavram sunmasıdır. Ayrıca rol kuramının ortaya koyduğu birçok terim ortak dilden alınmıştır, doğaldır ve ölçümü kolaydır.

Rol kuramını sosyal psikolojiden devşirip dış politika analizine uygulayan Kalevi Jacques Holsti'dir. Holsti, 1970 yılında yayınlanan ve kendinden sonraki çalışmalara öncülük eden makalesinde (National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy – Dış Politika Çalışmalarında Ulusal Rol Kavramları) değişik ülkelerin en üst düzey siyaset yapıcılarının genel dış politika konusundaki konuşmalarını inceleyerek bir rol kavramları tipolojisi oluşturmuştur. Bu çalışmasında Holsti Ocak 1965 ve Aralık 1967 yılları arasında yetmiş bir devletin en üst düzey siyaset yapıcılarının yaptıkları genel dış politika konusundaki konuşmaları içerik analizi metoduyla inceleyerek on yedi rol kavramına ulaşmıştır. Bu çalışmasında Holsti rol kavramlarına ulaşırken tümevarım metodunu kullanmıştır. Holsti çalışmasında ideal bir rol kavramı oluşturup bu kavramı devletlerin uluslararası rolünü açıklamak için kullanmak yerine, en üst düzey siyaset yapıcılarının dış politika konusundaki konuşmalarını içerik analizi metoduyla inceleyerek kendi bir rol tipolojisi oluşturmuştur.

Holsti'nin çalışmasından sonra Naomi Bailin Wish, Stephen Walker, Christer Jönsson ve Ulf Westerlund, James N. Rosenau, Charles F. Herman, Philippe Le Prestre, Lisbeth Aggestam, Gauvav Ghose ve Patrick James, Richard Adigbuo

gibi birçok arařtırmacı rol kuramını dıř politika analizinde kullanmıř ve bu alandaki literatüre önemli katkılarda bulunmuřlardır.

Bu tezde rol kuramı üç nedenden dolayı kavramsal çerçeve olarak seçilmiřtir. İlk neden rol kuramının dıř politikayı analiz ederkenki açıklayıcı ve analitik kullanıřlılıđını artıran kavramsal zenginliđidir. Bu tezde rol kuramı ile yakından bađlantılı iki kavram olan rol kavramı ve rol performansı AB dıř ve güvenlik politikasını açıklamak ve analiz etmek için kullanılmıřtır. Lisbeth Aggestam'ın ileri sürdüđü gibi AB'nin dıř ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramları AB'nin uluslararası iliřkilerinde belirli yaklařımları ve yönelimleri neden benimsediđini daha iyi anlamamıza yardımcı olur. Bunun yanında AB'nin dıř ve güvenlik politikası rol performansı AB'nin uluslararası iliřkilerinde benimsediđi yaklařımları ve yönelimleri ne derece etkin uyguladıđını daha açık bir şekilde anlamamıza yardımcı olur. AB'nin rol kavramları ile rol performansı arasındaki uyumu analiz etmek AB'nin bir dıř ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak etkinlik ve güvenilirliđini daha iyi bir şekilde anlamamıza olanak sađlar. Aggestam gibi Naomi Bailin Wish de rol kuramının dıř politikayı analiz ederkenki açıklayıcı ve analitik kullanıřlılıđına vurgu yapmıřtır. Wish'e göre rol kavramları davranıřlar için uzun soluklu ilkeler ve standartlar sađlarlar ve rol kavramlarının bu uzun solukluluđu ve istikrarı, bir kez olan davranıřlardan çok, uzun vadeli dıř politika davranıř kalıplarını açıklarken faydalı olur. Buna dayalı olarak diyebiliriz ki AB'nin rol kavramları, AB'nin dıř politika tercihlerindeki genel yönelimi ve AB'nin dıř politikasındaki uzun vadeli dıř politika davranıř kalıplarını açıklama ve tahmin etme konusunda faydalı bir araçtır.

İkinci olarak dıř politikanın rol kuramı aracılıđıyla analiz edilmesi geleneksel dıř politika açıklamalarının ötesine geçmemize olanak sađlar. Bu sayede rol kuramı, dıř politikası uluslararası iliřkiler kuramındaki geleneksel yaklařımlarla açıklanamayan AB gibi geleneksel olmayan kendine has bir dıř politika aktörünün dıř politikasını açıklamamıza olanak sađlar.

Üçüncü olarak Lisbeth Aggestam'ın ileri sürdüđü gibi Holsti ve onu takip eden diđer arařtırmacılar tarafından rol kavramlarının belirlenmesinde kullanılan tümevarım tekniđi siyasi gerçekliđi daha iyi anlamamıza olanak sađlar. Çünkü bu sayede siyasi gerçekliđi soyut kuramsal yaklařımlara dayalı olarak ortaya çıkan rollerle deđil siyasi gerçekliđi kurallar ve akıl arasındaki dinamik etkileřim ile inřa

eden siyaset yapımcılarının deneyimlerine dayalı olarak anlarız. Bu nedenle, AB dış politikasını analiz ederken siyasi gerçekliği daha iyi yansıtan rol kuramına dayalı tümevarım tekniğini ideal tipte bir rol kavramı çerçevesinde AB'nin dış politikasını analiz etmekte kullanılan tündengelim tekniğine tercih ettim. Siyasi gerçekliği yansıtmada rol kuramına dayalı analizde kullanılan tümevarım tekniği tündengelim tekniğine göre daha büyük bir potansiyele sahiptir.

Bu tezde rol kuramı ile yakından bağlantılı iki kavram olan rol kavramı ve rol performansı analize yardımcı olması için kullanılmıştır.

Rol Kavramı: Bu tez kapsamında rol kavramı AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak kendisi için belirlediği uzun vadeli sorumluluk, görev ve yönelimlerini ifade eder. AB'nin rol kavramları önde gelen AB dış politika yetkililerinin (AB Dış Ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilcisi Javier Solana (2004-2009), AB Dış İlişkiler Ve Komşuluk Politikası Komisyoneri Chris Patten (1999-2004) ve Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004-2009)) 11 Eylül 2001-31 Aralık 2006 arası dönemde yaptıkları genel dış ve güvenlik politikası meselelerine değinen konuşmaların ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikası ile ilgili resmi dokümanların (Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi, Avrupa Konseyinin Bildirileri, Avrupa Komisyonunun İletişim Dokümanları, AB'nin Kurucu Anlaşmaları) içerik analizi metodu ile analiz edilmesi sonucu tespit edilmektedir.

Rol Performansı: Rol performansı bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörünün karar ve hareketlerini ifade eder. Buna göre bu tezde AB'nin rol performansı AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde (11 Eylül 2001-31 Aralık 2006 arası dönem) bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesindeki karar ve hareketlerini ifade eder.

2.2 Avrupa Dış Politika Analizinde Rol Kuramı

2.2.1 Avrupa Dış Politika Analizi

Avrupa Dış Politikası (ADP) çok farklı şekillerde kavramsallaştırılmış ve buna bağlı olarak farklı kavramsal yaklaşımlar kullanılmıştır. ADP'yi inceleyen çalışmalar genelde AB'nin küresel alandaki aktörlüğü üzerinde durmaktadır. ADP'yi inceleme konusunda farklı yaklaşımlar vardır. Brian White ve Elke Krahnmann gibi araştırmacıların ADP'ye yönelik olarak sistemik ve çok seviyeli bir yaklaşım benimsedikleri görülür. Bu iki araştırmacı, ADP'yi AB'nin ve onu oluşturan üye devletlerin dış politikalarının toplamı olarak kabul ederler ve buna bağlı olarak

sistemik ve çok seviyeli bir analizi tercih ederler. Diğer yandan Karen Smith ve Hazel Smith gibi arařtırmacılar AB'yi, onu oluřturan üye devletlerden bağımsız bir dıř politikaya sahip bir aktör olarak kabul ederler ve ADP'yi tek seviyede yani AB seviyesinde incelerler. Bu çalıřmalarda analiz birimi AB dıř politikasıdır. AB'yi bir dıř ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak analiz eden bu çalıřmaları iki grupta inceleyebiliriz. İlk gruptaki çalıřmalar AB'nin devlet benzeri özelliklerine vurgu yaparlar ve AB dıř politikasının aynı bir devlet gibi incelenmesi gerektiğini savunurlar. Bu tip çalıřmaları AB dıř politikasının devlet merkezli analizine dayalı çalıřmalar olarak adlandırabiliriz. İkinci gruptaki çalıřmalar, AB'nin kendine has özelliklerine vurgu yapan çalıřmalardır ve bunlar AB dıř politikasının analizi için alternatif kavramlar kullanırlar.

Bu tezi yukarıda bahsedilen çalıřmalardan AB'yi kendine ait bir dıř politikası olan bir aktör olarak kabul eden ve onun kendine has özelliklerine vurgu yapan çalıřmalar içinde sınıflandırabiliriz. Brian White bu gelenek içindeki çalıřmaları AB'nin dünya politikası üzerindeki etkisini inceleyen ve AB'yi bir aktör olarak ele alan yaklařımlar olarak tanımlamıřtır. Roy H. Ginsberg ve Michael E. Smith AB dıř politikasını inceleyen çalıřmaları iki ana gruba ayırmıřlardır. İlk AB dıř politikasının dıř boyutunu inceleyen çalıřmalardır. Bu çalıřmalar, AB'nin dıřındaki dünyada olup biten meseleler üzerindeki AB etkisini incelerler. İkinci grup çalıřmalar, AB dıř politikasının iç boyutunu inceleyen çalıřmalardır. Bu çalıřmalar, AB dıř politikasındaki kurumlar (bu kurumların nasıl oluřturulduđu ve çalıřtıđu), siyaset yapımı ve AB dıř politikasının AB üye devletleri üzerindeki etkisi üzerinde dururlar. Buna göre bu tezin de içinde yer aldıđu gelenek AB dıř politikasının dıř boyutunu inceleyen grup içinde yer alır. Brian White'a göre David Allen, Michael Smith, Gunnar Sjostedt, Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, Franois Duchene, Ian Manners ve Richard Whitman AB'yi analizlerinin odak noktası olarak kabul ederek devlet merkezli analiz modelinin ötesine gemiřlerdir. Bu arařtırmacılar, AB'nin dıř politikasını aıklamak için AB'nin bir devletten farklı kendine has özelliklerini aıklamaya yardımcı olacak kavramsal bir çereve oluřturmuřlar. Ben Tonra bu yaklařımları devlet merkezli dünya politikası görüřünü yıkarak analizi AB'nin devlet benzeri özelliklerinden çok varlıđına ve aktörlüđüne odaklayan çalıřmalar olarak adlandırmıřtır. Bu yaklařımlar bütüncül yaklařımlardır ve AB'nin tekliđi ve kendine özgülüđü üzerinde durmuřlardır. Bu çalıřmalarda, AB analiz düzeyi olarak kabul

edilmiş ve AB dış politikası AB seviyesinde analiz edilmiştir. Yine bu çalışmalarda analiz birimi AB dış politikasıdır. Bu çalışmalarda temel hedef AB'nin küresel siyasetteki rolünün en iyi şekilde nasıl kavramsallaştırılabileceğidir. Bu çalışmalarda ilk olarak ideal tipte bir rol kavramı oluşturup ve sonra bu kavram AB'nin küresel rolünün açıklanması için kullanılır. AB'nin küresel siyasetteki rolünün kavramsallaştırılmasında kullanılan temel kavramlar: varlık, aktörlük, uluslararası kimlik, sivil güç ve normatif güçtür.

2.2.2 Rol Kuramı ve Avrupa Dış Politika Analizi

Lisbeth Aggestam, rol kuramını Avrupa Dış Politika Analizine ilk kez uygulamıştır. Aggestam bu çalışmasında AB'nin değil, AB'nin üç büyük üye devleti olan İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya'nın dış politikalarını analiz etmiştir. Bu çalışmada AB değil, üç üye devlet bir dış politika aktörü olarak incelenmiştir. Bu devletlerin Avrupa çerçevesindeki rolleri Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde analiz edilmiştir.

Aggestam'ın ardından Ole Elgstrom ve Michael Smith "The European Union's Roles in International Politics – Avrupa Birliği'nin Uluslararası Siyasetteki Rollerini" başlıklı çalışmalarında rol kuramını bir kez daha Avrupa Dış Politika Analizine uygulamışlardır. Ancak Elgstrom ve Smith, Aggestam'dan farklı olarak bu kez üye devletlerin değil bizzat AB'nin kendi dış politikasını analiz birimi olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Çalışmalarında, AB'yi kendine ait bir dış politikası olan bir aktör olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Bu çalışmalarında, Elgstrom ve Smith, AB dış politikasını analiz eden bugüne kadar ki çalışmaların, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinde dış politikayı rol kuramına dayalı olarak analiz eden çalışmalardan farklı bir şekilde analiz ettiklerini ileri sürmüşlerdir. Bu iki araştırmacı rol kuramının AB dış politikasının analiz edilmesinde önemli bir analitik kullanışlılık potansiyeline sahip olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir.

Ole Elgstrom ve Michael Smith'in argümanına dayalı olarak bu tez AB dış ve güvenlik politikasını analiz birimi olarak kabul etmekte ve rol kuramını da AB dış politikasını analiz etmek için kavramsal çerçeve olarak kullanmaktadır. Bu tezde AB analiz düzeyi olarak kabul edilmekte ve AB kendine ait bir dış politikası olan bir aktör olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu amaçla bu tez, AB dış ve güvenlik politikasını, AB'nin değer ve çıkarlarını korumak ve geliştirmek amacıyla AB'nin yetkili organları tarafından oluşturulan ve uygulanan dışa ilişkin siyasi, diplomatik ve güvenlikle ilgili söylem, tutum ve davranışlar olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu tezde, AB

seviyesindeki söylem incelendiğinden önde gelen AB dış ve güvenlik politikası yetkililerinin yaptıkları konuşmalar ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikası ile ilgili resmi dokümanlar rol kavramlarını tespit etmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu tezde, 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde AB'nin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak oynadığı rolü daha derin ve eleştirel bir şekilde inceleyebilmek için AB'nin rol kavramları ve rol performansı arasındaki uyum 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde incelenmektedir.

AB dış politikasını analiz eden bugüne kadar ki çalışmalar ile karşılaştırıldığında bu tez, amaç ve metodoloji bakımından özgün bir çalışmadır. İlk olarak, önceki çalışmaların aksine bu tezin amacı ideal tipte bir rol kavramı oluşturup ve daha sonra bu kavramı AB'nin küresel rolünü açıklamak için kullanmak değil, AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı dış ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramları ile rol performansı arasındaki uyumu test etmektir. İkinci olarak bu tez, AB dış politikasını analiz eden bugüne kadar ki çalışmalardan farklı olarak AB'nin uluslararası rolünün analizi ve kavramsallaştırılmasında metodolojik olarak tündengelem değil tümevarım tekniğini benimsemiştir. Yani bu tez, ideal tipte bir rol kavramı oluşturup ve daha sonra bu kavramı AB'nin küresel rolünü açıklamak için kullanmak yerine, AB'nin rol kavramlarını tümevarım yöntemi yoluyla önde gelen AB dış ve güvenlik politikası yetkililerinin yaptıkları konuşmalar ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikası ile ilgili resmi dokümanları inceleyerek oluşturmuştur. Başka bir ifadeyle bu tezde tespit edilen rol kavramları, yani AB'nin uluslararası alanda yerine getirmesi gereken roller, AB'nin bizzat kendisi tarafından tanımlanmıştır.

AB'nin rol kavramları ile gerçek rol performansı arasındaki uyumun incelenmesinin, AB dış politikasının analizine ilişkin literatüre en önemli katkısı analizin odak noktasını AB'nin küresel siyasetteki rolünün en iyi şekilde nasıl kavramsallaştırılabileceğinden uzaklaştırarak AB'nin bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak etkinlik ve güvenilirliğinin analiz edilmesine yakınlaştırmasıdır.

2.3 Araştırma Planı ve Metodoloji

Bu tezde nitel içerik analizi ve örnek çalışma metodları kullanılmaktadır. AB'nin rol kavramları, önde gelen AB dış politika yetkililerinin (AB Dış Ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilcisi Javier Solana (2004-2009), AB Dış İlişkiler Ve Komşuluk Politikası Komisyoneri Chris Patten (1999-2004) ve Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2004-2009)) 11 Eylül 2001-31 Aralık 2006 arası dönemde yaptıkları genel

dış ve güvenlik politikası meselelerine değinen konuşmaların ve AB dış ve güvenlik politikası ile ilgili resmi dokümanların (Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi, Avrupa Konseyinin Bildirileri, Avrupa Komisyonunun İletişim Dokümanları, AB'nin Kurucu Anlaşmaları) içerik analizi metodu ile analiz edilmesi sonucu tespit edilmektedir. Daha sonra AB'nin rol kavramları ve rol performansı arasındaki uyumu test edebilmek için AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde 11 Eylül 2001 – 31 Aralık 2006 arası dönemdeki rol performansı AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı her bir dış ve güvenlik politikası rol kavramı için ayrı ayrı incelenmektedir.

3. AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 Sonrası Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası Rol Kavramları

İçerik analizinin sonucunda AB'nin küresel bağlamda bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak genel rollerine atıfta bulunan yedi rol kavramı tespit edilmiştir: 'iyilik için güç', 'uluslararası barış, güvenlik ve istikrar için güç', 'değer ve normlarının destekleyicisi', 'kalkınma yardımı sağlayıcısı', 'etkin çok taraflılığın destekçisi', 'Birleşmiş Milletlerin ortağı' ve 'kilit dünya aktörleri ile etkin ortaklıklar inşa eden güç'.

3.1 İyilik İçin Güç

Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin dünyayı daha özgür, daha barışçı, daha adil, daha müreffeh, daha güvenli ve daha istikrarlı yaparak herkes için daha iyi bir yer yapma sorumluluğuna vurgu yapar. Bu rol kavramına göre AB'nin dış ve güvenlik politikası amaçları, AB vatandaşlarının çıkarını korumak yanında barış, güvenlik, istikrar, demokrasi, insan hakları, hukukun üstünlüğü, iyi yönetim, çok taraflılık ilkelerinin yaygınlaştırılmasıdır. Bu rol kavramına göre AB, yukarıda bahsedilen değerleri yaygınlaştırarak dünyanın geri kalan kesiminin çıkarına hizmet ederken aynı zamanda kendi çıkarını da korur. Çünkü yukarıda bahsedilen değerlerin yaygınlaştığı bir dünya AB'nin güvenliğinin garantisidir. Yukarıda bahsedilen değerleri yaygınlaştırırken AB hem dünyanın geri kalanının iyiliği için hem de kendi vatandaşlarının iyiliği için hareket etmiş olur. Yani AB küresel ortak çıkar veya iyilik için hareket eder. AB sadece kendi çıkarı için değil bütün insanlığın çıkarı için hareket eden bir güçtür. Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués'a göre iyilik için güç olmanın gerekli koşulu dış politikada maddi çıkarlar ve etik değerler arasında bir denge kurabilmektedir. Yani dış politikayı yürütürken etik olarak dengeli

bir politika izlemek gerekir. Barbé ve Johansson-Nogués'a göre iyilik için güç olmak için AB, üye olanlar ve olmayanların çıkarları arasında bir denge kurmalı ve bütün aktörlerin istek ve tercihlerini tatmin etmeye çalışmalıdır. Bu tercih dengesi kolektif refaha ulaşmayı sağlayacaktır.

3.2 Uluslararası Barış, Güvenlik Ve İstikrar İçin Güç

Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin kendi bünyesinde oluşturduğu ortak barış, güvenlik ve istikrar alanını dünyanın geri kalanına yayma amacına vurgu yapar. AB, ortak barış, güvenlik ve istikrar alanını genişleterek kendisine komşu olan bölgelerde var olan AB'nin güvenlik ve istikrarı için tehdit oluşturabilecek durumları önlemeyi amaçlar. Yani AB istikrarsızlık ithal etmek yerine istikrar ve güvenlik ihraç etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB kendisine komşu olan bölgelere istikrar ve güvenlik ihraç etmeyi aydınlanmış kişisel çıkarı olarak görmektedir. Buna göre AB diğerlerinin çıkarlarına hizmet ederken aynı zamanda kendi çıkarına da hizmet etmektedir. AB'nin, barış, güvenlik ve istikrarı dünyanın geri kalanına yayması pozitif toplamı bir oyundur, bu sayede hem AB hem de AB'ye komşu bölgeler birlikte barış, istikrar ve refaha kavuşmuş olurlar. AB bu amacı yerine getirirken genişleme, komşuluk politikası ve AGSP gibi araçları kullanmaktadır.

3.3 Kalkınma Yardımı Sağlayıcısı

Bu rol kavramı, sürdürülebilir kalkınma çerçevesinde dünyada fakirliği ortadan kaldırma amacındaki AB'nin kalkınma işbirliğine vurgu yapar. Bu rol kavramı AB'nin gelişmiş ülkeler birliği olarak dünyada az gelişmişliği ortadan kaldırma sorumluluğuna vurgu yapar. Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin gelişmekte olan ülkelere en büyük mali yardımı sağlayan aktör olduğu gerçeğine vurgu yapar. AB ve üye ülkeler, 2006 yılında gelişmekte olan ülkelere €47 milyon yardımda bulunmuşlardır. AB'nin dünyada az gelişmişliği ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlamasının bir nedeni de AB'nin özellikle 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde az gelişmişliği küresel güvenlik, barış ve istikrar için en büyük tehdit olarak tanımlamasıdır. AB kalkınmışlığı güvenliğin önkoşulu olarak tanımlamaktadır.

3.4 Değer Ve Normlarının Destekleyicisi

Bu rol kavramı AB'nin değer ve normlar topluluğu olmasına yani değer ve normların üzerine kurulmuş bir topluluk olmasına ve aitliğin paylaşılan değer ve normlarla belirlenmesine vurgu yapar. AB özgürlük, eşitlik, demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları ve azınlık haklarına saygı gibi değer ve normların üzerine

kurulmuştur. Bu değer ve normlar AB'nin dünyanın geri kalanıyla ilişkilerinde belirleyicidir. AB dış politikası bu değer ve normların dünya üzerinde yaygınlaştırmasını amaçlamaktadır. Bu değerlerin yaygınlaştırılması AB'nin ve dünyanın geri kalanının güvenliği için gerekli görülmektedir. Bu değerlerin ve iyi yönetilen demokratik ülkelerin dünya üzerinde yaygınlaştığı bir dünya düzeninin hem AB'yi hem de dünyayı daha güvenli hale getireceğine inanılmaktadır.

3.5 Etkin Çok Taraflılığın Destekçisi

Etkin çok taraflılık AB için uluslararası örgüt ve anlaşmaların daha etkin hale getirilmesi anlamına gelir. Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin, güçlü uluslararası toplum, iyi işleyen uluslararası kurumlar, hukuka dayalı uluslararası düzene dayanan etkin bir çok taraflı sistem kurulmasına yönelik taahhütünü vurgular. Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin çok taraflı kurumlar tarafından oluşturulan ve denetlenen kurallarca yönetilen bir dünya yaratma idealini yansıtır. AB, böyle bir uluslararası düzenin kurulmasının hem kendisinin hem de dünyanın güvenlik, refah ve istikrarı için gerekli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. AB bu tip bir çok taraflı sistemin merkezinde Birleşmiş Milletlerin olması gerektiğini vurgular.

3.6 Birleşmiş Milletlerin Ortağı

AB, Birleşmiş Milletlerin merkezinde olduğu bir çok taraflı uluslararası sistemin kurulmasında Birleşmiş Milletleri en önemli ortağı olarak tanımlamaktadır. AB, Birleşmiş Milletlerin küresel sorunlara çok taraflı çözümler bulma, bölgesel ve küresel barış, refah, güvenlik ve istikrarı koruma ve geliştirme çabalarına tam destek verme taahhütünde bulunmaktadır. AB'nin, Birleşmiş Milletlerin küresel sorumluluklarını daha etkin bir şekilde yerine getirebilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler ile etkin bir ortaklık kurma taahhütünü vurgulamaktadır.

3.7 Kilit Dünya Aktörleri İle Etkin Ortaklıklar İnşa Eden Güç

Bu rol kavramı, AB'nin, günümüz küresel ve bölgesel sorun ve tehditlerinin bütün dünyanın paylaştığı ortak sorunlar olduğu ve bunların tek taraflı çabalarla değil, çok taraflı işbirliği ile çözüleceği inancını vurgulamaktadır. Buna göre bu rol kavramı, AB'nin, küresel ve bölgesel sorunların çözümünde küresel ve bölgesel çok taraflı işbirlikleri ve ittifakları tercih ettiğini vurgulamaktadır. AB, küresel ve bölgesel sorunların çözümünde çok taraflı işbirlikleri ve ittifaklar kurmanın hem kendi hem de dünyanın geri kalanının çıkarına olduğuna inanmaktadır.

4. AB ve Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığı ve Orta Doğu Barış Süreci: Tarihsel Arka Plan

1950'li ve 1960'lı yıllarda Avrupalı ülkeler Orta Doğu'da gerek bireysel gerekse kolektif olarak bir varlık gösterememişlerdir. 1956'daki Süveyş Krizinden sonra iki Avrupalı sömürgeci güç olan İngiltere ve Fransa'nın bölgedeki etkinliği sona ermiş ve onların yerlerini dönemin iki süper gücü olan ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği almıştır. 1970'lerin başında İngiltere ve Fransa bölgede eski etkin konumlarını tekrar kazanabilmek için Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği çerçevesinde çaba göstermeye başladılar. Bu amaçla Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliğini bir araç olarak kullanmaya başladılar.

1960'ların sonunda AB ülkeleri Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığına yönelik olarak birbirinden farklı duruşlara sahiptiler. AB devletlerinin özellikle 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşı sırasında yaşadıkları bölünmüşlük, bu devletleri dış politika alanında işbirliğini sağlayacak bir mekanizma oluşturmaya itti. Bu amaçla 1970 yılında Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği AB üyesi ülkeler arasında dış politika alanında bir işbirliği ve danışma mekanizması olarak oluşturuldu. 1970'lerin başından itibaren Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığı Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliğinin gündemindeki en önemli konulardan biri oldu. Bu dönemde Avrupa'nın güneyindeki istikrar ve güvenlik Avrupa'nın güvenlik ve istikrarı için hayati önemde görüldüğü için Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığı Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliğinin gündemindeki en önemli konulardan biri oldu.

Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliğinin oluşturulması ile birlikte AB ülkeleri Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığına yönelik olarak ortak bir pozisyon geliştirmeye başladılar. Geçen zaman içinde AB, Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği kapsamında Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığına ve daha sonra ortaya çıkan Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik olarak bir siyasi müktesebat geliştirdi. 1970'lerin başından 1990'ların sonuna kadar geçen sürede AB Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik olarak bildirelere dayalı bir politika izledi. Bu süre boyunca, AB ülkeleri 1993'e kadar Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği 1993'ten sonra ise Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası çerçevesinde Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik bir dizi bildire yayınladı. Bu bildirelerin başlıcaları: 1973 tarihli Brüksel Bildirgesi, 1977 tarihli Londra Bildirgesi, 1980 tarihli Venedik Bildirgesi ve 1999 tarihli Berlin Bildirgesi'dir. Bu bildireler, AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik pozisyonunun gelişimindeki önemli kilometre taşlarıdır.

Bu bildirgeler göstermektedir ki AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yönelik pozisyonu zaman içinde bir süreklilik göstermektedir. Buna göre AB, Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığına, Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü de dâhil bütün tarafların katılımıyla kapsamlı, adil ve uzun ömürlü bir çözüm bulunmasını savunmaktadır. Ayrıca AB uyuşmazlığın, barış için toprak, güç kullanımı yolu ile toprak ilhakının reddi, insan haklarına saygı, terörizmin tüm şekillerinin reddi, komşular arası iyi ilişkiler, mevcut anlaşmalara uyulması, sonuç vermeyen tek taraflı inisiyatiflerin reddi ilkeleri çerçevesinde çözülmesini savunmaktadır. AB uyuşmazlığın Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararları ve uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde çözümüne de vurgu yapmaktadır. AB, Filistin halkının İsrail'in güvenli sınırlar içinde meşru varoluş hakkını tanınmasını buna karşılık İsrail'in de Filistin'in devlet kurma hakkı da dâhil kendi kaderini kendi belirleme hakkını tanınmasını savunmaktadır. AB aynı zamanda İsrail'in işgal altındaki topraklardaki yerleşim politikasını sürekli bir şekilde eleştirmekte ve bunu Orta Doğu'da kapsamlı bir barışa ulaşılabilme önündeki en büyük engel olarak görmektedir. AB ayrıca Kudüs'ün statüsünü değiştirecek herhangi bir tek taraflı hareketi kabul etmeyeceğini sürekli vurgulamaktadır. AB mevcut anlaşmalara dayalı olarak kurulan demokratik, varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan, barışçı ve egemen bir Filistin devletinin İsrail'in güvenliğinin en büyük garantisi olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinde ABD tek arabulucu rolünü oynarken AB de onu tamamlayıcı, destekleyici bir rol oynamıştır. AB Orta Doğu'da ABD'nin barış girişimlerini desteklemiştir. ABD başroldeyken AB yan rolle yetinmek zorunda kalmıştır. 1970'ler ve 1980'ler boyunca AB, ABD'nin hâkim bir rol oynadığı barış sürecinin siyasi boyutundan ve ikili müzakerelerden dışlanmış ve adeta yedek kulübesine mahkûm bir oyuncu olmuştur. Bunun nedeni, AB'nin ikili barış müzakerelerine aktif bir arabulucu olarak katılması konusunda İsrail ve ABD'nin isteksizliğidir. İsrail, AB'yi Arap yanlısı olarak gördüğü için buna karşı çıkarken, ABD barış sürecindeki tek arabulucu olma statüsünü yani başrolü kaybetmek istemediği için buna karşı çıkmıştır. AB özellikle barış sürecinin iktisadi ve çok taraflı boyutunda önemli ve aktif bir rol oynamıştır. AB, 1990'lı yıllarda Madrid Barış Sürecinin çok taraflı boyutunda aktif bir rol oynarken aynı zamanda Filistin Otoritesinin ve Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinin en önemli mali destekçisi olmaya devam etmiştir. AB ayrıca Orta Doğu Barış Sürecini bütünleyen çok taraflı bir inisiyatif olan

Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığını 1995 yılında başlatmış ve bu inisiyatif çatışan tarafların – Araplar ve İsraililer– bir araya gelip aynı masada oturarak aralarındaki meseleleri konuşmalarına olanak sağlayan çok taraflı bir forum olmuştur. Ancak AB'nin barış sürecinin iktisadi ve çok taraflı boyutunda önemli ve aktif bir rol oynaması onu barış sürecinin merkezi bir aktörü durumuna getirmemiştir. Ana müzakereler yine İsrail, Filistin Otoritesi ve ABD arasında yürütülmeye devam etmiştir.

1990'ların ikinci yarısında, Miguel Angel Moratinos'un AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci Özel Temsilcisi olarak atanması ve Javier Solana'nın AB Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilcisi olarak atanmasından sonra barış sürecinin mali ve iktisadi boyutuna yaptığı önemli katkının yanında AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinin siyasi boyutuna katılımı artmaya başladı. Gerek Solana gerekse Moratinos süreçte AB'nin sesi ve yüzü olmaya başladılar ve AB barış sürecinde varlığını daha fazla hissettirmeye başladı. Örneğin, Javier Solana 17 Ekim 2000'de Mısır'da toplanan Şarm El-Şeyh zirvesine AB'yi temsilen katıldı ve bu zirvede kurulan Mitchell Komisyonunun üyesi oldu. Ayrıca Moratinos da bu dönemde ABD'nin arabuluculuk çabalarına destek oldu ve ABD özel temsilcisinin diplomatik çabalarını tamamlayıcı bir rol oynadı.

Alain Dieckhoff ve Stephan Stetter'in doğru bir şekilde ileri sürdükleri gibi AB 1970'li ve 1980'li yıllarda Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinde mütevazı bir rol oynamıştır. Orta Doğu'da barışın sağlanması için ilkeler ortaya koymuş, çeşitli barış çabalarına çoğunlukla mali ve teknik destek sağlayarak destek olmuştur. Ancak 1990'lara gelindiğinde AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecindeki varlığı daha fazla hissedilmeye başlanmış ve AB daha aktif ve iddialı bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır. Joel Peters'in deyiimiyle AB yedek kulübesinden oyuna girmiş ve barış sürecinin neredeyse her boyutunda kendine bir rol ve yer edinmiştir. AB bu dönemde Filistin kurumlarının inşasına katkıda bulunmuş, imzalanan anlaşmalara destek vermiş ve bölgesel iktisadi kalkınmaya destek olmuştur.

5. AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci Çerçevesinde 11 Eylül 2001 Sonrası Dönemdeki Rol Performansı

11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde özellikle Orta Doğu Dörtlüsü üyeliği ile birlikte AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinin siyasi boyutundaki rolü artmaya başladı. Orta Doğu Dörtlüsüne üye olduktan sonra AB barış sürecinin siyasi ve diplomatik boyutunda daha aktif bir rol oynamaya başladı. Bu dönemde AB'nin Orta Doğu

uyuşmazlığının siyasi, diplomatik, güvenlik boyutunda daha önemli bir oyuncu olarak ortaya çıktığını görmekteyiz. AB, Yol Haritasının hazırlanması ve hayata geçirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. AB ayrıca temsilcileri vasıtasıyla Betlehem'deki Doğu Kilisesinin İsrail askerleri tarafından kuşatılması gibi mikro krizlerin çözümünde etkin bir rol oynamıştır. Bunun yanında, AB AGSP kapsamında yürüttüğü operasyonlarla barış sürecinin güvenlik boyutunda da önemli bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır. AB'nin iktisadi ve siyasi olarak varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan, egemen ve demokratik bir Filistin devletinin kurulmasına yönelik olarak Filistin'e sağladığı mali ve teknik yardım ve Filistin reform sürecine verdiği destek AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Sürecindeki etkinliğini ve önemini artırmıştır. AB, 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde hala ABD'yi tamamlayıcı bir yan rol oynasa da uluslararası alanda artan bir şekilde önemli bir oyuncu olarak görülmeye başlandı.

AB'nin ne ölçüde İyilik için Güç rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareket ettiği sorusuna gelince AB, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci kapsamındaki faaliyetleri ile belirli bir noktaya kadar bu rol kavramının gereklerini yerine getirebilmiş ve bir takım sınırlamalarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. İlk olarak, AB'nin Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığına yönelik olarak benimsediği dengeli yaklaşım yani İsrail'in güvenlik çıkarları ve Filistin halkının haklarına eşit önem vermesi AB'nin iyilik için güç söylemiyle uyum gösterir. İkinci olarak, AB'nin iktisadi ve siyasi olarak varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan, egemen ve demokratik bir Filistin devletinin kurulmasına yönelik olarak Filistin'e sağladığı mali ve teknik yardım ve Filistin reform sürecine verdiği destek AB'nin iyilik için güç söylemiyle süreklilik gösterir. AB'nin gerek Orta Doğu Dörtlüsünün bir üyesi olarak temsilcileri aracılığıyla yürüttüğü diplomatik çabalar, Filistin topraklarında yürüttüğü AGSP operasyonları EUPOL COPPS, AB Polis Gücü, EU BAM Rafah, Refah Sınır Geçiş Noktasındaki Sınır Yardım Misyonu, AB'nin iyilik için güç söylemine uygun davranışlardır. Bunun yanında AB'nin taraflarla ilişkilerinde zorlayıcı tedbirlere yani yaptırımlara başvurmayışı AB'nin iyilik için güç söylemiyle uygunluk gösterir. Buna dayanarak şu sonuca varabiliriz ki AB bu faaliyetleri ile çatışma taraflarının talepleri arasında bir ölçüde bir denge kurabilmiştir. AB bu faaliyetleri ile hem bölge halkının iyiliği hem de uluslararası barış ve istikrarın lehine çalışmıştır. Yani AB'nin küresel ortak çıkar için hareket ettiğini söyleyebiliriz.

Ancak diđer yandan, AB'nin 2006 Ocaktaki Filistin Yasama Meclisi seçimlerinden sonra çoğunluđu elde eden Hamas'a karşı uyguladıđı boykot ve yaptırım AB'nin iyilik için güç söylemi ile çelişki göstermiş ve AB'nin Filistin halkı ve Arap âlemi gözündeki inandırıcılıđını yitirmesine neden olmuştur. AB, Filistin'de demokratikleşmeyi desteklerken adil ve serbest seçimlerle iktidara gelmiş olan bir siyasi aktöre karşı boykot kararı almıştır. Ayrıca uygulanan yaptırımlarla Filistin halkı ekonomik bir çöküşün eşiğine gelmiş; bu durum daha sonra Geçici Uluslararası Mekanizma ile giderilmeye çalışılmış ama pek fazla başarılı olunamamıştır. Hamas'a uygulanan ambargo hem AB'nin hem de Filistinlilerin aleyhine bir uygulama olmuş ve bu şekliyle AB'nin küresel ortak çıkar için hareket ettiđi iddiasına zarar vermiş ve AB'nin iyilik için güç rol performansını sınırlamıştır. AB'nin Filistin'de demokrasiyi destekleme politikası ve kendi terörist örgütler listesinde ismi olan ve şiddeti reddetmeyi kabul etmeyen bir örgütle ilişki kurmaktan kaçınması arasında yaşadığı ikilem AB'yi her iki tarafında çıkarına olabilecek şekilde hareket etmekten alıkoymuştur.

Hamas olayının yanı sıra, AB'nin, işgal altındaki topraklarda insan hakları ve uluslararası insani hukuku ihlal etmeye devam eden İsrail'e karşı herhangi bir yasal zorlayıcı tedbir uygulamaktan kaçınması AB'nin etik olarak dengeli bir politika izleyemediđini gösterir. Yani AB etik değerlerle maddi çıkarları arasında bir denge sağlayamamış ve bu da AB'nin iyilik için güç rol performansını sınırlamıştır. AB'nin ticari ve siyasi çıkarları, insani değerlerin ve ilkelerin korunup yaygınlaştırılması amacının önüne geçmiş ve bu nedenle İsrail'in ihlallerine rağmen ticari ve siyasi çıkarlarına zarar verecek herhangi bir hareketten kaçınmıştır. İsrail olayı da Hamas olayı gibi AB'nin İyilik için Güç rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareket etmesini sınırlamıştır. Bu nedenle AB'yi Orta Dođu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde sınırlı bir İyilik için Güç olarak tanımlayabiliriz.

AB'nin ne ölçüde Uluslararası Barış, Güvenlik ve İstikrar için Güç rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareket ettiđi sorusuna gelince AB, Orta Dođu Barış Süreci kapsamındaki faaliyetleri ile belirli bir noktaya kadar bu rol kavramının gereklerini yerine getirebilmiş ve bir takım sınırlamalarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Öncelikle AB'nin bir dizi faaliyetini Uluslararası Barış, Güvenlik ve İstikrar için Güç rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareketler olarak tanımlanabilir. İlk olarak AB, uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü için gerek kendi gerekse üye devletlerin temsilcileri

vasıtasıyla başarılı arabuluculuk çabaları (Betlehem'deki Doğu Kilisesinin İsrail askerleri tarafından kuşatılması meselesi gibi) yürütmüştür. İkinci olarak, AB, Filistin topraklarında AGSP operasyonları (EUPOL COPPS, AB Polis Gücü, EU BAM Rafah, Refah Sınır Geçiş Noktasındaki Sınır Yardım Misyonu) yürütmüş ve Lübnan'daki genişletilmiş Birleşmiş Milletler Geçici Görev Gücüne önemli bir askeri katkı sağlamıştır. Ayrıca AB, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası çerçevesinde hem İsrail hem de Filistin ile ortaklık kurmuştur. Bunun yanında, AB, iktisadi ve siyasi olarak varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan, egemen ve demokratik bir Filistin devletinin kurulmasına yönelik olarak Filistin'e mali ve teknik yardım sağlamış ve Filistin reform sürecine destek vermiştir. AB'nin bu tip faaliyetleri, AB'nin Uluslararası Barış, Güvenlik ve İstikrar için Güç söylemiyle süreklilik gösterir. Bunun yanında AB, Yol Haritasının hazırlanması ve hayata geçirilmesinde Orta Doğu Dörtlüsünün en aktif üyesi olmuştur.

Ancak diğer yandan AB, bu rol kavramının gereklerini yerine getirirken bir takım iç ve dış kısıtlamalarla karşı karşıya kalmış ve bu kısıtlar, uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü konusunda AB'nin etkin bir arabulucu olarak hareket etmesini engellemiştir. AB'nin karşılaştığı iç kısıt AB'nin her zaman iç bütünlüğe sahip tek sesle konuşan bir aktör olarak hareket edememesidir. Dış kısıt ise, AB'nin ikili barış müzakerelerine aktif bir arabulucu olarak katılması konusunda İsrail ve ABD'nin isteksizliği ve AB'nin rolünü Yol Haritasının hayata geçirilmesi ve yeni Filistin devletinin inşası ve Filistin'in iktisadi olarak yeniden yapılandırılması ile sınırlı tutma isteğidir. AB'yi Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde kısıtlı bir Uluslararası Barış, Güvenlik ve İstikrar için Güç olarak tanımlayabiliriz.

Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinde AB'nin faaliyetleri Kalkınma Yardımı Sağlayıcısı rol kavramının gerekleri ile uyum göstermektedir. Kalkınma Yardımı Sağlayıcısı rol kavramı, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde Filistin Otoritesinin mali ve teknik yardım sağlayıcısı rol kavramına dönüşmüştür. Filistin Otoritesinin ve Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinin en büyük mali ve teknik yardım sağlayıcısı olarak AB bu aracı uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü için etkin bir şekilde kullanmıştır. AB'nin Filistin Otoritesine ve Orta Doğu Barış Sürecine yaptığı mali ve teknik yardım üç önemli noktada barış sürecinin devamına katkıda bulunmuştur.

İlk olarak, Filistin Otoritesine AB tarafından yapılan doğrudan bütçe desteği, Filistin Otoritesinin düzenli vergi gelirlerinin İsrail tarafından Eylül 2000'de

patlak veren ikinci İntifada'dan sonra kesildiği bir dönemde mali açıdan Filistin Otoritesinin ayakta kalmasını sağlamıştır. Filistin Otoritesini mali açıdan ayakta tutarak AB barış sürecinin devamını sağlamıştır. Çünkü Filistin Otoritesinin mali açıdan çöküşü bölgede çatışma, şiddet ve kargaşanın tırmanması ve barış sürecinin kesintiye uğraması ile sonuçlanabilirdi.

İkinci olarak, bu yardım Filistin Otoritesinin Yol Haritası kapsamındaki yükümlülüklerini yerine getirebilmesini sağlamıştır. AB bu yardım sayesinde Yol Haritası tarafından uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü için gerekli olarak nitelendirilen iktisadi ve siyasi olarak varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan, egemen ve demokratik bir Filistin devletinin kurulmasına yardımcı olmaya çalışmıştır. Bu kapsamda Filistin topraklarındaki alt yapı projelerine ve Filistin'in kurumsal reform çabalarına verilen destek çok önemlidir. Ayrıca AB'nin Filistin özel sektörüne özellikle KOBİ'lere, Doğu Kudüs'teki kalkınma projelerine, insan haklarının korunması ve geliştirilmesi projelerine, Filistin'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarına ve hizmet kuruluşlarına verdiği mali destek AB'nin iktisadi ve siyasi olarak varlığını bağımsız olarak sürdürebilecek kapasitede olan bir Filistin Devleti yaratma hedefine yönelik olarak yaptığı diğer önemli katkılardır.

Üçüncü olarak AB hem İsrail hem Filistin tarafındaki barış yanlısı sivil toplum örgütlerine ve sivil inisiyatiflere Avrupa Barış için Ortaklık Programı kapsamında yaptığı mali yardım aracılığıyla birlikte çalışmanın faydalarını her iki tarafa da göstererek Filistinliler ve İsraililer arasındaki iletişim ve anlayışı geliştirmiştir. Bu yolla AB uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü için olumlu bir ortamın yaratılmasına katkıda bulunmuş ve barış sürecinin arkasındaki destek tabanının genişlemesine katkı sağlamıştır. AB mali desteğini barış inşası ve çatışma dönüşümüne yönelik sivil toplum faaliyetlerini güçlendirmek için kullanmıştır.

Ancak AB'nin Filistinlilere yapmış olduğu insani ve acil yardım AB'nin mali yardım aracını uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümü doğrultusunda etkin bir şekilde kullanabilmesini ciddi şekilde kısıtlamaktadır. Buna göre AB bu insani ve acil yardımı Filistin'deki giderek kötüleşen sosyo-ekonomik ve insani koşulları düzeltmek için yapsa da bu yardım sonucunda AB işgalci güç olan İsrail'in uluslararası insani hukuk (Savaş Sırasında Sivil Şahısların Korunmasına dair 1949 tarihli Dördüncü Cenevre Konvansiyonu) çerçevesinde Filistin halkına karşı olan yükümlülüklerini üstlenmektedir. Bu sayede AB istemeden de olsa Filistin

topraklarındaki İsrail işgalini sübvansede etmekte ve İsrail'e bu işgali herhangi bir mali ve insani yükümlülük altına girmeden sürdürme imkânını sağlamaktadır.

AB'nin Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde ne ölçüde Değer Ve Normlarının Destekleyicisi rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareket ettiği sorusuna gelince AB, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci kapsamında uyuşmazlığın her iki tarafı ile olan ilişkilerinde kendi değer ve normlarını yayma konusunda ciddi kısıtlamalarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Filistin'e yönelik olarak, AB her ne kadar iyi yönetilen, demokratik bir Filistin devletinin kurulmasına yönelik olarak mali ve teknik yardımları vasıtasıyla Filistin reform sürecine destek verse de gerçek demokratikleşmeden çok, iyi yönetişimi ön plana almaktadır. AB, İslami grupların gerek Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü gerekse Filistin Otoritesinden sürekli olarak dışlanmasına tolerans gösterirken İslami sivil toplum ve şiddeti bir araç olarak benimsemeyen İslami gruplarla da ilişki kurmamakta ve onları dışlamaktadır. AB, ayrıca 25 Ocak 2006'da yapılan ve kendisi tarafından da özgür, adil ve açık olarak kabul edilen Filistin Yasama Meclisi seçiminden sonra iktidara gelen Hamas'a karşı siyasi tecrit uygularken, seçimleri kaybeden El-Fetih'e siyasi ve iktisadi desteğini sürdürmektedir. AB'nin bu tutumu Filistin'de demokrasinin yerleşmesini destekleyen bir aktör olduğu imajını zedelemekte ve AB'nin bu konudaki güvenilirliğini azaltmaktadır.

İsrail konusunda AB, işgal altındaki topraklarda insan hakları ve uluslararası insani hukuku ihlal etmeye devam eden İsrail'e karşı herhangi bir yasal zorlayıcı tedbir uygulamaktan kaçınmaktadır. Bunun iki temel nedeni vardır. İlk olarak AB, İsrail'in ihlallerine rağmen ticari ve siyasi çıkarlarına zarar verecek bir şekilde İsrail'e yaptırım uygulamaktan kaçınmaktadır. İkinci neden AB'nin iyilik için güç ve değer ve normlarının destekleyicisi rol kavramlarının gerekleri arasındaki çatışmadır. Buna göre, AB'nin iyilik için güç rol kavramı onu İsrail'e karşı yaptırım uygulamaktan alıkoyarken, değer ve normlarının destekleyicisi rol kavramı da aynı zamanda AB'nin gerekirse ihlalcıye karşı yaptırım uygulayarak insan hakları ve uluslararası insani hukukun uygulanmasını sağlamasını teşvik eder. Böyle bir roller arası çatışma ile karşı karşıya kalan AB aynı zamanda kendi maddi çıkarları ile uyum gösteren iyilik için güç rol kavramının gereğini yerine getirmeyi tercih etmiştir. Sonuçta, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci çerçevesinde AB'nin ne ölçüde değer ve normlarının destekleyicisi rol kavramının gereklerine uygun hareket ettiği sorusuna

cevap olarak diyebiliriz ki AB'nin gerçek rol performansı ve rol kavramları arasında ciddi bir uçurum vardır.

Orta Doğu Barış Sürecinde AB'nin faaliyetleri birbirine bağlı üç rol kavramı olan Etkin Çok Taraflılığın Destekçisi, Birleşmiş Milletlerin Ortağı, Kilit dünya aktörleri ile etkin ortaklıklar inşa eden güç'ün gerekleri ile uyum göstermektedir. İlk olarak, AB, Orta Doğu Dörtlüsü ve Filistin'in Reformu için Uluslararası Görev Gücü gibi uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümüne yönelik çok taraflı girişimlere aktif olarak katılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, AB, Yol Haritasının hazırlanması ve hayata geçirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Üçüncü olarak, AB, 'Gazze'ye Giriş ve Hareket Anlaşması'nın uygulanmasına aktif olarak katılmış ve EU BAM Rafah, Refah Sınır Geçiş Noktasındaki Sınır Yardım Misyonu vasıtasıyla anlaşma gereğince Gazze-Mısır sınırındaki Refah sınır geçiş noktasında üçüncü taraf olarak gözlem ve denetim görevini üstlenmiştir. Dördüncü olarak, AB, uyuşmazlığın Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarına uygun olarak Birleşmiş Milletler çerçevesinde çözülmesini savunmakta ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin sorunun barışçı çözümüne yönelik çabalarına destek vermektedir. AB, Birleşmiş Milletlerin kalkınma ve insani yardım alanındaki çabalarına Birleşmiş Milletler Yardım ve Çalışma Ajansı bütçesine yaptığı mali yardım ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin barışı koruma çabalarına Lübnan'daki genişletilmiş Birleşmiş Milletler Geçici Görev Gücüne yaptığı önemli askeri katkı ile destek vermektedir. Beşinci olarak, AB, Orta Doğu Dörtlüsü çerçevesinde Birleşmiş Milletler, ABD ve Rusya ile uyuşmazlığın barışçı çözümüne yönelik olarak etkin bir ortaklık kurmuştur.

6. Sonuç

Sonuç olarak, AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı bazı rolleri yerine getirirken karşılaştığı bazı kısıtlamalara rağmen AB'nin rol kavramları ile rol performansı arasında önemli derecede bir uyumsuzluk olduğunu söyleyemeyiz. Orta Doğu Barış Süreci örneği göstermiştir ki AB'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasında gözle görülür bir "kavram-performans açığı"ndan söz edemeyiz. Buna dayalı olarak AB'yi uluslararası güvenilirliğini tamamıyla yitirmiş etkisiz bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak tanımlamamız yanlış olur. AB'nin kendi için tanımladığı bazı rolleri yerine getirirken karşılaştığı bazı kısıtlamalar AB'nin 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak etkinlik ve uluslararası güvenilirliğini kısmen zayıflatmaktadır. Esasında, Orta Doğu Barış Süreci örneğinde görüldüğü gibi AB'nin

kendi için tanımladığı bazı rolleri uygularken yerine getirdiği karar ve eylemler rol performansındaki yetersizlikleri telafi etmektedir. Sonuç olarak diyebiliriz ki, AB'nin, kendi için tanımladığı rolleri yerine getirirken karşılaştığı bazı tutarsızlıklara rağmen 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası dönemde bir dış ve güvenlik politikası aktörü olarak bilançosu oldukça olumludur.

APPENDIX B
CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU International Relations	2004
BA	Marmara University, Istanbul Political Science and International Relations	2001
High School	Antalya Anatolian High School	1996

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2002- Present	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

1. “Identifying the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy Roles”, *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law* (Vol. 3, 2010).
2. “Identifying the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy Roles”, *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* (Vol. 5, No. 17, 2009).
3. “A Coherent and Effective Foreign and Security Policy For the European Union?: The Cases of the Yugoslav Crisis and the Iraq Crisis”, *Journal of Yaşar University* (Vol. 3, No. 12, October 2008).

4. “The European Union on the Way to Become a Global Actor and Turkey” in Beril Dedeođlu and Füsun Türkmen (eds.), *L’Europe-Puissance et la Turquie* (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2006).
5. “Türk Akademisyenlerine Yönelik NATO Bilgilendirme Programı”, *Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi* (Vol. 6, No. 11, May 2006). ISSN: 1302-9975.
6. “Constituting the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The European Union’s Pursuit of Being a Coherent and Effective Foreign and Security Policy Actor in Global Politics”, *Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi* (Vol. 5, No. 9, May 2005).

ACADEMIC AWARDS

British Chevening Scholarship (2006-2007): Awarded to full scholarship for postgraduate study in the United Kingdom to conduct studies at the Politics and International Relations Department, University of Leicester.