

A COMPARISON OF THE IDEAS OF ZİYA GÖKALP AND YUSUF  
AKÇURA ON TURKISM

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## ABSTRACT

### A COMPARISON OF THE IDEAS OF ZİYA GÖKALP AND YUSUF AKÇURA ON TURKISM

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The aim of this thesis is to compare the ideas Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura on Turkism. The idea of nationalism emerged first in Europe in 18<sup>th</sup> century and then moved to the rest of the world. Naturally, towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire influenced by Western nationalist movements. As a result, The Serbs then Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians demanded their right of independence. In order to prevent the collapse of the state, Ottoman Officers began to modernize the state structure. Despite the failure of the modernization attempts in some aspects, it speeded the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Therefore, Turkish nationalism went parallel to the modernization attempts of the Ottoman reformers. The Young Ottomans, graduated from Western type of schools which were the outcomes of modernization attempts, was the first group to increase the nationalist sentiment among the Turks. Inspired by Turkology studies, they paid special emphasis on Turkish culture, language and history. In this sense, Turkish nationalism at the time of Young Ottomans was associated with cultural nationalism. Thereafter, the Young Turks, with the help of Russian Turks transferred Turkish nationalism into a political movement.

Gökalp and Akçura played a key role in the direction of Turkish nationalism during the transition from a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a modern Turkish nation-state. Additionally, after the foundation of the Turkish nation-state, they shaped the content of the reforms of the new state with their nationalist way of

thinking. In this respect, they served as the intellectual sources of Turkish nationalism.

The thesis consisted of three main related parts. The first part focused on the theoretical development of nationalism. In the second part, the emergence of Turkish nationalism was analyzed in the historical context. The third part dwelt upon the ideas of Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura on Turkism. The main purpose of this part is to examine the ideas of the two scholars on a comparative basis and aims to reveal the differences and similarities in their ideas.

Keywords: Nationalism, Turkism, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura

## ÖZ

### ZİYA GÖKALP VE YUSUF AKÇURA’NIN TÜRKÇÜLÜK DÜŞÜNCELERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

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Bu tezin amacı Ziya Gökalp ve Yusuf Akçura’nın Türkçülük düşüncelerini karşılaştırmaktır. Milliyetçilik fikri 18. yüzyılda Avrupa’da ortaya çıkmış ve daha sonra dünyanın geri kalan bölgelerine yayılmıştır. Doğal olarak 19. yüzyılın sonlarına doğru, sınırları içerisinde pek çok etnikli Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da batıdaki milliyetçilik hareketlerinden etkilendi. Bunun sonucunda Sırlar, Yunanlar, Bulgarlar ve Ermeniler bağımsızlıklarını talep ettiler. Devletin dağılmasını engellemek için Osmanlı bürokratları devlet yapısında modernleşme hareketlerine başladılar. Modernleşme hareketleri pek çok açıdan eksikliğine rağmen Türk milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkmasını hızlandırmıştır. Modernleşme hareketleri kapsamında kurulan batı tipi okullarda mezun olan Genç Osmanlılar, Türk milliyetçiliğini yükselten ilk gruptur. Türkoloji çalışmalarından etkilenerek Türk kültürü, Türk dili ve tarihi alanlarında çalışmalar yapmışlardır. Bu açıdan Genç Osmanlılar zamanında Türk milliyetçiliği kültürel milliyetçilikle ilişkilendirilebilir. Türk milliyetçiliği o dönemde daha ziyade kültür odaklıdır. Daha sonra Genç Türkler Rusya’dan gelen Türk entelektüellerinin de etkisiyle Türk milliyetçiliğini politik bir harekete dönüştürdüler.

Gökalp ve Akçura pek çok etnik yapıyı barındıran Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan modern, Türk devletine geçiş sürecinde Türk milliyetçiliğini yönlendirmede lider asli oynamışlardır. Bununla beraber Türk-ulus devletinin inşasından sonra devletin yaptığı reformları milliyetçilik fikirleriyle şekillendirmişlerdir. Bu açıdan Türk milliyetçiliğinin fikri kaynağı olarak kabul edilmektedirler.

Bu tez birbiriyle ilgili üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm milliyetçiliğin teorik gelişmesi üzerine odaklanmıştır. İkinci bölüm Türk milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkışını tarihsel süreç içerisinde analiz etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise Ziya Gökalp ve Yusuf Akçura'nın Türkçülük düşüncesi üzerinde durmuştur. Bu bölümün temel amacı bu iki düşünürün düşüncelerini karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemek, farklılık ve benzerliklerini ortaya çıkarmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Türkçülük, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura

*To My Family*



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Nationalism, referring to a sentiment or an ideology, has been a real force in world politics for the last two centuries. Actually, the emergence of a nationalist sentiment in the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a statement about the collapse of the imperial system consisting of several ethnic and religious groups, leading to a period of nation-state formation. This marked the transition to a new era in the world political order.

There are many different arguments about the emergence of the nationalist sentiment. The first argument considers nationalism as a modern ideology which developed parallel to the modernization and industrialization processes. This group does not accept the essential link between ethnicity and nation since in their views nations are recent creations. Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson are the most well known scholars of this line of argument.

The second approach is named as primordialism which accepts the nationalist sentiment as natural rather than a novel one. According to this tradition of thought, nationalist feelings have existed since ancient times. Thus, scholars in this group pay special attention to the cultures and languages of nations since these are the most crucial characteristics that differentiate nations from each other.

The third approach aiming to combine these two approaches is ethno-symbolism which emphasizes the ideological dimension of nationalism. This school accepts the existence of national feelings in the past, but further states that nationalism as an ideology was born with the French Revolution. Smith and Kohn are the well-known theoreticians of this approach.

“Whether a novel feeling or not, it is a fact that national sentiment has its effects since its inception that was pervasive throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century up to now” (Oğuz, 2005: 1). Due to this impact, nationalism has become one of the significant issues for social scientists. Studies on nationalism have shown the fact that the world has witnessed two types of nationalist movements. The first type is the West European model of nation-state formation. As seen in France and England, nationalist movements began to develop from the grass roots level, i.e., a revolution led by the bourgeoisie against the existing social and political system and the desire to construct a nation- state based on liberty and equality among citizens. In this part of Europe, the establishment of nation-states and the creation of nations went hand in hand. Thus, it can be claimed that the state creates a nation to a large extent. In this respect, as Mienecke states, nationalism can be seen as a state-nation building process (in Snyder, 2003: 58).

In opposition to the West European model, in Eastern countries nationalist feelings emerged before the idea of establishing nation-states. In other words, the creation of a nation which awakens its distinct cultural, historical and linguistic richness was the primary aim of those who wanted to build a new state. This type of nationalism developed on the basis of romantic premises which were totally different from the ideas characterizing the Enlightenment period. Thus, nationalism in these countries was “concerned with myths of the past and dreams of the future- devoid of immediate connection with the present” (Snyder, 1968: 119). Therefore, as Snyder states, this type of nationalism can be defined as the nationalism of nation-state, not of state-nation (in Oğuz, 2005: 24). In this form, intellectuals aimed to abolish the existing social and political structures. In this sense, the rise of nationalism in these countries can be perceived as reactionary movements against the old social structures. According to Waldron, “in this formulation, nationalism functions as a universal solvent, something that breaks all the bonds- of family, of local place, of creed and so on and prepare the way for a new and overarching identity” (1985: 425).

Naturally, towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman Empire with many different ethnic groups within its borders was influenced by Western nationalist

movements. Serbians, then Greeks, Armenians and Arabs revolted against the Ottoman State and desired to gain their independence. In reality, this brought the end of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the events that prepared the collapse of the Ottoman Empire can be regarded as the events triggering Turkish nationalism. As Keyder states, Turkish nationalism reacted against these competing nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire (Keyder, 2005: xv). In this sense, Turkish nationalism developed much later than other nationalist movements within the borders of the Ottoman society since the main objective of the Turkish elites was to provide social and political unity in the Ottoman Empire. For that purpose they supported all the modernization attempts starting with the *Rescript of Gülhane* [known as the *Tanzimat* (Regulation) period] in 1839. Thus, it is important to view the rise of Turkish nationalism and the modernization attempts of the Ottoman authorities as simultaneous developments. In order to prevent the collapse of the state, Ottoman officials began to “demolish old institutions which were found be incompatible with corresponding modern institutions and establish new ones on the European models” (Berkes, 1959: 17). However,

two factors led to the unsatisfactory application of this idea. First, this movement required a radical change in the ruling institutions. That is, a despotic monarchy had to democratize itself. The second fact was the inevitable economic and political consequences of the contact of a medieval society with the full grown European expansionist economy and politics. Under these circumstances, the leaders of the *Tanzimat* failed to pursue wholeheartly their programme of modernization (Berkes, 1959: 18).

On the other hand, the rise of a new generation, the Young Ottomans, graduating from the modern schools of the *Tanzimat* era, was one of the most important outputs of these modernization attempts. They appeared as the first group to elevate Turkish consciousness in the cultural field. Thereafter, during the Young Turks period, Turkism gained a political meaning.

The origins of political Turkism can be traced back to the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 (Hanioglu, 2006: 3). Before then, Turkish nationalism developed together with the policy of Ottomanism and Islamism. However, since Ottomanism and Islamism did not solve the internal problems of the Ottoman

society, the Ottoman intellectuals began to search for the cultural, literary and linguistic roots of the Turks' identity.

Scholars like Kohn and Smith claim that Turkish nationalism carried similar characteristics with German nationalism. Even though Turkish nationalists borrowed most of their ideas from French philosophy, their nationalism was strongly influenced by the German type. The question why Turkish nationalism took German nationalism as a model was related to the historical processes both countries went through. Germany could not succeed in becoming a nation until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, French and English identities were already formed, whereas German identity was yet to develop. Therefore, German nationalism progressed with the efforts to form a nation. The same situation was valid for Turkish nationalism since like the Germans, Turks were not able to form a Turkish identity until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, similar to German nationalism Turkish nationalist movement focused on cultural characteristics of the Turks. Researching Turkish history, language and culture before Islam and emphasizing the superiority of Turkish identity was the inevitable result of this process. Thus, 'returning to Turk' was a way for becoming a nation-state at that time (Türkdoğan, 2007: 124). In this process, Turkish intellectuals like Namık Kemal, Şinasi, Hüseyinzade Ali, Ahmed Ağaoglu, Ziya Gökalp, İsmail Gasprinski and Yusuf Akçura played a crucial role in the rise of Turkish nationalism.

In this study Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura are chosen for their significant impact on the Turkish intellectual life. Both Gökalp and Akçura played a leading role in the direction of Turkish nationalism during the transition from a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a secular and modern Turkish nation-state. Additionally, after the foundation of the Turkish nation-state, they shaped the content of the reforms of the new state with their nationalist way of thinking. In this respect, they served as the intellectual sources of Turkish nationalism. Gökalp and Akçura are still influential today since their ideas are being debated in certain circles, including the universities and political groups. In fact, the issues which they disputed at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are in parallel with the issues which are being discussed today. The issues such as the place of Islam,

modernism, tradition, secularism and culture were actually discussed by Gökalg and Akçura about a hundred-year ago. Like their contemporaries, Gökalg and Akçura alleged very serious ideas about the issues mentioned above and shaped the political arguments in that period. In this context, to understand the basis of some of the issues that are being debated in the 2000s in Turkey, it is so much significant to analyze both Gökalg and Akçura's ideas who lived at the beginning of the 20th century. For this reason, they are the scholars to be paid attention to while working on Turkish nationalism.

The main purpose of this thesis is to offer an analytical framework for understanding the peculiarities of Gökalg and Akçura's nationalist thoughts during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. In this context, this thesis examines the ideas of the two scholars on a comparative basis and aims to reveal the differences and similarities in their ideas since Gökalg and Akçura developed a distinct Turkic ideology. However, it should not be overlooked that they also claim similar ideas in many ways. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that their ideas are mutually exclusive.

Gökalg supported the idea of Ottomanism at the beginning of his intellectual life since he lived within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, like his contemporaries he aimed to prevent the collapse of the state. Therefore, for Gökalg Ottomanism was the possible way to overcome disintegration of the Ottoman state. Akçura on the other hand, did not deal with the unification of the empire. His main objective was to provide unity between Russian and Ottoman Turks. Only, after the Balkan wars Gökalg advocated Turkism as the main ideology like Akçura.

Since Gökalg aimed to provide the unification of the state, he developed a synthesizing approach among three different ideologies, namely *Turkism*, *Islamism* and *Modernism*. In his view, they were not opposite ideologies; instead they were complementing each other. Differentiating culture from civilization helped Gökalg achieve a balance among Turkism, Islamism and Modernism. In this sense; civilization and culture (*hars*) are two crucial terms to understand



Gökalp's Turkism. According to him, culture belongs to nations. It shows the special characteristics of one particular nation. However, civilization has international characteristics. That is, it is created by different nations.

Akçura on the other hand, was not interested in merging these three ideas. Rather he adduced that only one of the three political streams can be chosen to save the state. In his pamphlet *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy), Akçura analyzed the benefits and costs of these three policies and emphasized that Turkism was the most acceptable ideology. Therefore most of the historians accepted him as 'a father of Pan-Turkism' (Zenkovsky, 1960: 332). In this sense, it can be stated that Akçura has a more revolutionist understanding than Gökalp.

Synthesizing approach of Gökalp indicates that the Islamic component in Gökalp's perspective is stronger than assumed. For Gökalp, impressed with Durkheim's philosophy, Islamic philosophy forms the basis of social solidarism and unity. In this respect, Islam was one of the most crucial parts of his cultural Turkism (Parla, 1993: 85). Akçura on the other hand, from the beginning of his intellectual life had a more secular Turkic ideology. According to him, Islam should be national and serve for Turkish nationalism (1998a: 34). Gradually, Gökalp shared similar ideas with Akçura and focused on the national character of Islam.

In the same way, compared to Akçura, Gökalp strongly supported cultural Turkism. Gökalp's definition of a nation indicates his cultural nationalism since he defined nation as a cultural community. In his view, a nation is not based upon race, ethnic family, geographic or political volitional ties. Instead, sharing the same language, culture and religion formed the basis of a nation. Compared to Gökalp, Akçura preferred to define nation with the term 'race' which did not relate with Islamic terminology. In his view, race is one of the most crucial determinants of the nation. While using the term race whether Akçura refers to blood relations or not is still questionable due to the fact that the meaning of this concept has changed in time.

In the light of aforementioned explanations, this thesis will analyze the ideas of Gökalg and Akçura on Turkism. For this purpose, in Chapter Two I will discuss the mainstream theories of nationalism. I will focus on how nationalism emerged in the West and how it was transformed in non-Western countries. I will also map out the main debates in the literature on nationalism with a focus on the central concepts of each model. On this basis, I will compare the different approaches to Eastern and Western forms of nationalism. This will enable one to understand the characteristic aspects of Turkish nationalism, which can be defined as a form of Eastern nationalism.

In Chapter Three, the political conditions of the late Ottoman period will be discussed. Moreover, the emergence of Turkish nationalism will be explained with respect to the intellectual activities of the Ottoman and Russian Turks. This will be followed by a discussion about how Turkish nationalism evolved into a new stage after the proclamation of the Second Constitution in 1908. This discussion covers the transformation of Turkish nationalism from a cultural content developed by the Young Ottomans to a political content developed by the Young Turks. At this point, Turkology studies and the activities of the Russian Turks will also be discussed.

In Chapter Fourth, the ideas of Gökalg and Akçura on Turkism will be examined comparatively. Before analyzing their Turkic ideologies the different socio-political conditions which shaped their ideas on Turkism will be examined in detail. Moreover, how the ideas of other contemporary intellectuals influenced their arguments will also be discussed. While analyzing their Turkism, the articles written by Gökalg and Akçura will be used as primary sources. In addition, I will make use of many secondary sources written on Gökalg and Akçura.

In the concluding chapter the main arguments and the findings of the thesis will be summarized.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature on nation and nationalism and discuss the central concepts regarding this subject. Since the notion of nationalism is a highly broad and complex, scholars cannot come to an agreement on what nationalism really is. That is, why there are varieties of theories of nationalism today in Western literature. Since the main concern of this thesis is to examine the development of Turkish nationalism during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, only the major debates and approaches which can explain Turkish nationalism best will be mapped out in this section.

One of the theories that this chapter deals with is the nature and the origins of nation and nationalism. Sociological literature on this issue includes three distinct approaches, namely modernist, primordialist and ethno-nationalist. The first approach associates the emergence of nationalism with the socio political changes which occurred in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. The second view, on the other hand, states that the idea of nation is God given so it existed from the ancient times. The last approach combines these two ideas and supports the idea that although the notion of nationalism can be found in history, in the modern context it emerged with the French revolution.

Depending on these discussions, a group of scholars who can be regarded as ethno- symbolists stated that nationalist movements in Western and Eastern worlds followed different paths. The existence of two different historical movements of nationalism in Europe and in the non-Western world was the main concern of Kohn for the first time. Following him, Meinecke and Smith developed this dichotomy by adding new dimensions to it. Later, on the basis of

Kohn's argument, Snyder developed the concept of *New Nationalism* to explain the nationalist movements in non-progressed countries in 1980s. According to their view, state and nation-building went together in the West, while nation-building is the primary goal of nationalism in Eastern part of the world. In other words, nationalism was conceptualized in connection to the state; therefore, it must be named as state- nation" (in Oğuz, 2005: 2).

In Eastern countries, on the other hand, nationalism moved in different directions since nation was not correlated with the state. Rather, "political organization was organized in relation to the nation. Therefore, nationalist movement can be called as a nation-state" (in Oğuz, 2005: 3). These countries gave a special importance to the cultural traits of their own nations. In this sense "history, language, folklore, territory, culture and religion were used to as a means of demonstrating the past traditions of a nation, symbolic evidence of its historic continuity and hence its authenticity" (Woolf, 1996: 2). Kohn and his followers specifically emphasized the importance of cultural elements for the nationalist movements in these countries. Also they highlighted the key role of the intellectuals in the rise of nationalism in Eastern countries.

In the light of these ideas, in order to understand in which context Turkish nationalism can be understood the invaluable ideas and approaches of Anthony D. Smith, Hans Kohn, and Louis Snyder will be rewarding.

## 2.2. Theoretical approaches towards nationalism

Nationalism as a political force has been shaping human history since the last quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. As Smith notes, “nation-states with their flags, capitals, educational systems, anthems, military parades, national museums and embassies have been recognized as only political organizations of the contemporary world” (1986: 219). As a result of the idea of nationalism which domineers the last two centuries, every nation in the world has had the idea of establishing its own state.

In the literature on nationalism, the majority of scholars accepted the idea that the development of a nationalist sentiment is the political consequence of broader historicist movements which emerged first in Europe and then moved to the rest of the world (Smith, 1976: 19). As Smith argues, “this view grew on the basis of the idea of Rousseau’s call to flee urban corruption and return to nature to recover a lost innocence” (2001: 51). Actually, the emergence and ascendance of nationalism in Europe cannot be limited only to one event in history. Rather, as Kedourie pointed out, there were several significant events which contributed to the advent of nationalism. In this respect, special events which occurred in the years of 1775 (the first partition of Poland), 1776 (the American Declaration of Independence), 1789 and 1792 (the commencement and second phase of the French revolution), and 1807 (Fichte’s addresses to the German Nation) can be accepted as signals of advancing nationalism (in Hutchinson, & Smith, 1994: 5). Actually, all these events accelerated the process of turning a population into a nation (Smith, 1976: 6).

Among those incidents, the French revolution was a turning point in the rise of nationalist ideas since as Kedourie states “this movement was the cause of social breakdown occasioned by a collapse in the transmission of the traditional values, and the rise of a restless, secular, educated generation” (1994: 47). This rising generation desired to limit the authority of aristocracy as well as assure an ever widening scope to the rights and liberties of individuals in the Western world (Snyder, 1968: 112). As a result of their attempts, religion lost its significant role

among the social and political spheres. Instead of loyalty to the church and religion, nation-states became the new key institutions towards which people felt strong loyalty (Snyder, 1968: 114). This was the radical change in the minds of people, since previously the medieval men identified themselves not as Frenchmen, German, or Italian, but as faithful sons of the Roman Catholic Church. In other words, “his loyalty was only towards to the ecclesiastical state” (Snyder, 1968: 15). In a world of nation-states, on the other hand, people started to identify themselves with a distinct national identity (Snyder, 2003: 15). In this respect, it can be meaningful to claim that “nationalism reflects the chaos of history” (Snyder, 2003: 3).

As a historical phenomenon, nationalist movements show variation in intensity, duration, extension, force and clarity among countries (Smith, 2001: 7). That is, “it is multifaceted, disheveled, murky, and irreducible to common denominators” (Snyder, 2003: 3). Its different face arises from different understanding of nationalism in different countries which have distinct historical, political and social context. Therefore, Snyder seems right while pointing out that “nationalism and nationalism may not be the same thing, always depending upon the historical traditions and the political climate in which each arises” (1968: 117). For that reason, “we see the working of nationalism in multiplicity forms, some sharp and undisguised, some vague and hidden; some directed to cultural integration, others to political ends; some democratic in aspect, others veering toward authoritarianism” (Snyder, 2003: 3-4). The example of nationalist movement in Germany and in the Ottoman Empire clearly demonstrates the different fluxes of nationalism. While in Germany nationalism accelerated unification, it caused the breakdown of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into its constituent parts. These different appearances of the phenomenon complicated the definition of the concepts of nation and nationalism. Although several generations of scholars devoted their time to clarify the meaning and nature of these terms, they have not been able to reach to an agreement. Hence, in the literature there appears to be a hot debate on what constitutes a nation and how nationalism should be defined.

The first area of discussion among scholars is whether patriotism and nationalism can be used interchangeably. Many scholars defend the idea that nationalism and patriotism refer to the same meaning, while some others are strongly against this idea. Hayes is one of those scholars who claim that “nationalism is a sentiment in which patriotism is fused with nationality, or to put it another way, a belief that an individual should be loyal to his nation, its land, its values and its state” (in Schafer, 1972: 15). Connor, on the other hand, rejects this view by stating that these two concepts reflect totally different meanings since patriotism means loyalty to the larger territorial state and its institutions, while nationalism signifies a psychological bond of ancestral relatedness, stemming ultimately from kinship sentiments (in Smith, 2001: 14). By claiming this, Connor gives a psychological dynamics to the concept of nationalism. Correlatively, Snyder sees patriotism and nationalism in a different way and expresses that “nationalism is primarily related to the independence and unity of the nation”, whereas “patriotism is more specifically the passion that influences the individual to serve the object of his devotion- his country, either in defending it from invasion, or in protecting its rights, or in maintaining its laws and institutions in vigor and purity” (1968: 149). Snyder goes on his argument by stating that apart from this etymologic difference, these two concepts are also chronologically different since, while patriotism existed in the past and still exists in the present, nationalism is a very recent creation (1968: 149). Connor reaches to a similar conclusion with Snyder and accepts the idea of G. de Bertier de Sauvigny who argued that “it first appeared in literature in 1798 and did not reappear until 1830. Its absence from lexicographies until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests that its use was not extensive until much more recently” (1994: 41).

In the light of these explanations, it seems more plausible to separate patriotism from nationalism in order to understand the nationalist movements of the last two centuries because unlike nationalism, the feeling of patriotism did not give people the idea of establishing a new state. For this reason, different ethnic groups had lived in the same state for centuries since, as mentioned above, patriotism refers to love of one's country. However, nationalism is a psychological concept which refers to loyalty to kinship relations. Therefore, people with common

ancestors desire to live together in the same country and glorify their past. Therefore, just when nationalism emerged, not the idea of loyalty to a homeland, but the idea of establishing a nation-state started to dominate people's mind. Because of this reason, it is wrong to use nationalism, which resulted in the establishment of a number of nation-states in the twentieth century, in place of patriotism. If nationalism and patriotism have the same meaning, it is necessary to answer the following two questions: Why did not the idea of establishing a nation-state become the most important goal of people in earlier times and why did states with different ethnic groups played their own roles in history for centuries as big political powers?

The second discussion among the scholars of nationalism arises from to which period we should properly assign the origins of nation and nationalism. This is one of the debates which is still being debated in the literature on nationalism. Three compatible approaches emerged from this discussion in the nationalist discourses.

Modernist approach is the first approach dominating the field of nationalism. According to this theory, the emergence of modern nation-states is associated with the socio-political changes which occurred in the last quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, they do not accept the essential link between ethnicity and nation since in their views nations are both recent and novel. As Brubaker notes, they dismissed ethnicity as a variable and conceptualized it in opposition to nationhood. Hence, they ignored ethnicity as a component which shapes nation-building process (1992: 81). Smith summarizes the modernist argument as follows,

the nation is an innovation, a creation of the modern epoch, a response to, as well as a product of the equally novel historical process of modernization-capitalism and industrialism, rapid urbanization, the bureaucratic state, mass democracy, public education and secularization (2004: 54)

Hobsbawm, Gellner and Anderson are the most eminent scholars of this line of argument. For them, nation and nationalism are the creation of modernism alone.



As Smith states, Hobsbawm “believes in the insistence of discontinuity between pre modern ethnic identities and modern nationalism because he sees every nation as socially constructed therefore, should be understood as a modern cultural artifact of relatively recent provenance” (2004: 54). In Hobsbawm’s view,

pre-modern religious, linguistic and regional communities cannot be regarded as ancestors or progenitors of modern nationalism because they had or have no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a nation today (in Guibernau & Hutchinson, 2001: 12).

Gellner on the other hand, offers the most sophisticated account of nationalism with an emphasis on culture. He claims that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (in Eriksen, 1993: 97). Therefore, “nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism...it is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round” (Gellner, 1994: 66). From this point of view, Gellner concludes,

the emergence of nationalism is not accidental; rather it was sociologically necessary since modernization and industrialization processes produced division of labor. Industrial division of labor created new type of society depending upon a homogenizing high culture, mass literacy, and an educational system controlled by the state (1983: 57).

Through this argument, Gellner emphasizes the main characteristics of the modern industrial state which prepared the ground for the creation of nations, which are culturally homogenous unit (1983: 46).

The second approach is primordialism which sees the nationalist sentiment as natural rather than a novel one. In other words, the idea of nationalism has been held since the ancient times. Proponents of this view argue that “ethnicity, nationalism and proto-nation states predate the modern period; therefore, it cannot be argued that nationalism is a quite modern” (Breuilly, 2001: 33). More particularly, in this view, “nations exist in the first order of time and originate everything” (Smith, 2001: 51). Abbé Siéyès, inspired from this idea, asserts that “nations must be conceived as individuals outside the social bond, in

the state of nature, they exist only in the natural order” (in Smith, 2001: 51). Herder was the most renowned scholar of this line of argument. In his view, “a nation is as natural as a plant, as a family, only with more branches” (Guibernau, 1996: 49). Herder goes on his idea as follows,

nations are not created because they are the natural units of history. Every person carries with him through life attachments derived from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social practices that are natural for him, spiritual in character, and that provide a basis for an easy affinity with other peoples from the same background (in Brass, 1994: 83)

Therefore, Herder strongly states that “every nation must construct their own national state without being mingled with other ethnic groups” (in Kedourie, 1971: 51-52). This idea later prepared a fertile ground for the emergence of pan or irredentist movements which aim to unite all the people who share the same geography, race, religion and language (Kazemzadeh, 1968: 365).

Ethno symbolist approach, claiming that the notion of nationalism is simultaneously a pre-modern and modern phenomenon, is another approach in the literature on nationalism. Although they share the ideas of the modernists, they also claim that the idea of nation dates back to ancient times (Waldron, 1985: 426). Smith, Kohn and Armstrong are the most known scholars who argue along this line of thought. They are against the notion that “nations are recent political formations which represent the break with earlier ethnic communities” (Guibernau, & Hutchinson, 2001: 2). More specifically, “nations are constituted by usually pre modern ethnic myths, memories, symbols and cultures and national formation must be understood in *la longue durée*” (Guibernau, & Hutchinson, 2001: 2). By claiming this, they emphasize the relation between ethnicity and nation. Especially Smith assigns a special role to ethnicity while explaining the ideological dimension of nationalism, as will be mentioned in the following pages.

According to the scholars who argue that nation is not a modern phenomenon, ethnic groups such as Hebrews and Greeks living in ancient times developed patriotic feelings in their times. There is strong evidence that they evoked a strong

feeling to their local traditions and established territorial authority. In this context Kohn argues that “the idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on the common stock of memory of the past, hopes for the future and nationalist messianism came from these people” (Kohn, 1955: 11). However, until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, nationalism was not recognized in the modern sense (Kohn, 1955: 12). Under the light of this idea, Kohn defines nationalism as “an act of consciousness of a large majority of people recognizing the nation state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being” (1955: 10).

Similar to Kohn, Coleman characterizes nationalism as “consciousness of belonging to a nation (existence or in the realm of aspiration) or a nationality, and a desire, as a manifest in sentiment and activity, to secure or maintain its welfare, prosperity and integrity, and to maximize its political economy” (1965: 425). Parallel with their ideas, Guibernau states that although the roots of nationalism can be seen in the past, “nationalism as an ideology is closely related to the rise of modern nation-states and it is bounded up with the ideas about popular sovereignty and democracy brought about by the French and American revolutions” (1996: 3).

Smith is known for relating nationalism with ideology. According to him, nationalism as an ideology places the nation at the centre of the political structure and seeks to promote its well being. For Smith, nationalism as an ideology seeks to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and create a national identity (2001: 9). In more concrete terms, “citizen self government, a territorial home and a distinctive ethnic history, are the three fundamental goals of nationalist movements in every continent and nation” (Smith, 1976: 2).

The concept of national autonomy refers to the idea of self-regulation. Actually, this concept signifies the political freedom of every nation. National autonomy in Smith’s understanding is closely related to national unity. As he worded, “national unity is provided by creating centralized economic and political territory and a single public culture.

In order to achieve this goal individual member should feel an intense bond of solidarity and act in unison on all matters of national importance” (2001: 26-27). The last purpose of nationalism for Smith is to create a national identity. National identity has recently gained popularity in the contemporary world. At the beginning, it referred to a national character; however, currently, it is used widely refers to the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations and the identifications of individuals with the pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements (Smith, 2001: 18). Myths, symbols and memories are three important dynamics which create this identity.

Rousseau was the first scholar who focused on the national character in the history. In his view, every nation must have a character. He states that if national character lacks, we must start by endowing it with one. Thereafter, Herder focused on the importance of national identity by claiming that each nation had to follow its own peculiar national genius. His idea later exhorted Germans to return to their native cultural traditions and literary genius (Smith, 2001: 27).

Thus, following Herder’s idea, “historians of the German school of history tried to uncover an authentic past, musicologists aimed to play early music in an authentic style, and modern archeologists and art historians seek to authenticate ancient objects” (Smith, 2001: 29). We see that these three purposes play a vital role in the birth and rise of Turkish nationalism as it is the case all over the world. Setting out with Herder’s idea, Turkish nationalists tried to form a Turkish identity as a reference from the past.

All these paradigms, in the literature on nationalism, help us explain the nature of nation and nationalism, but the last approach seems to provide more useful insight since this view successfully merges the claims of the two fundamental approaches mentioned above and clearly separates the ideological dimension of nationalism from the pre-modern patriotic feelings.

### 2.3. Western versus Eastern type of nationalism

Nationalist studies have been carried out through a Eurocentric perspective for a long time. Smith explains this as follows,

in theory, we require our societies to assume a single shape. In practice, we are content with a formal declaration of intent, while our societies assume all manner of shapes. It is, of course, easy to write the whole business off as a case of Western myopia: we have equated the nation and the state because that is the form they took in the two historically influential societies-England and France-at the moment when nationalism burst forth (1986: 228).

Under the impact of this idea, scholars of nationalism state that the other parts of the world imitate a rather singular model, which Western countries experienced before. This idea led to regard that nationalism followed similar path throughout the entire world. Thus, nation-state is defined as “a state with clear boundaries in which homogenous ethnic group existed and all the inhabitants of a state possess and identical culture” (Smith, 1986: 230). Smith seems right while saying that if this definition is true, we can assume only a few states as a nation-states because more than about 90 percent of existing states do not fit into this definition (1986: 286). Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the processes of nation-state building in the East and West in a comparative framework to be able to grasp the different causes and consequences of the process of nation-building.

As will be discussed below, Kohn was one of the first historians taking into consideration the existence of two different form of nationalism, namely the Eastern and Western types. Thereafter, Meinecke, in similar vein, separated nationalist movements into two types. The first is defined as nation-state formation, whereas the other is defined as state-nation formation. Depending on his dichotomy, Snyder developed the idea of *New Nationalism* in order to explain nationalism in non-Western countries. Lastly, Smith added the ethnic dynamics to their dichotomies.

Their classifications seem comprehensive within the context of nationalist studies since their attitude clearly show us why the nationalist processes in the East and West progressed differently, taking a different shape in these two different geographies. As a result of their explanations, it is understood that in addition to Germany which is foremost, in Eastern countries the priority was given to establishing a nation first and the state second. However, in the West, the ideas of setting up a state and a nation went hand in hand. In this way, the fallacy of the Eurocentric prospective was understood more clearly.

As explained above, Kohn was the pioneer in taking the different characteristics of nationalism into consideration. He strongly believes that, a study of nationalism needs a comparative method since the comparison of different forms of nationalism all over the earth will facilitate our evaluation (1944: ix-x). Inspired by this idea, he compared nationalist movements in different parts of Europe and as Smith states,

he makes a sharp dichotomy between what he terms the civic, rationalist and associational type of nationalism prevalent in France and also England and America, and a more traditional, organic, even mystic kind of nationalism found in Germany, Italy and Western Europe (1976: 72).

In Kohn's view,

Western forms of nationalism were based on the idea that the nation was a rational association of citizens bound by common laws and a shared territory, whereas Eastern varieties were based on a belief in common culture and ethnic origins, and as such tended to regard the nation as an organic, seamless whole, transcending the individual members, and stamping them from birth with an indelible national character (in Smith, 2001: 40).

As understood from the explanations above, in Western countries the concept of nation was defined differently compared to the definitions in Eastern countries. In this part of Europe, nation is defined mostly in terms of political sense, based on voluntarist (subjective) nationality. In this tradition of thought which defined nation in terms of voluntarist approach, it is claimed that "individuals have

same latitude; although they must belong to a nation in a world of nations and national states, they can in principle choose to which nation they wish to belong” (Smith, 2001: 40).

Renan formulated a political sense of a nation for the first time by claiming that “a nation is a solidarity sustained by a distinctive historical consciousness. It is a daily plebiscite” (in Hutchinson & Smith, 1994: 15). According to him, “a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle which constitute a common possession by a people of a rich heritage of memories, as well as the actual agreement, the desire to live together, the will to continue to make a reality of the heritage they have received in common” (in Schafer, 1972: 14). Actually, Renan gave priority to the importance of historical memories. In his view,

the nation even as the individual is the product of a long period of work, sacrifice and devotion. The worship of ancestors is understandably justifiable, since over ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, of great man, of glory (I mean the genuine kind), that is the social principle on which the national idea rests. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation. One loves in proportion to the sacrifice which one has approved and for which one has suffered. One loves the house which he has built and which has made over. The Spartan chant: ‘we are what you make us; we are “what you are” is simply the abbreviated hymn of the fatherland (1994: 17).

However, he further stressed “the importance of political action and institutions along with historical memories, expressed the role of the past, of their history and memory of nations” (in Smith, 2001: 38). With this idea, he clearly emphasizes the subjective dimension of the nation.

As Kohn states, the definition of the concept of nation according to the subjective criteria in Western countries is related to the historical process Western countries went through. According to him, in Western Europe

the Renaissance and Reformation period created a new society which helped secularized bourgeois to gain power. Hence, without creating a link

between the rise of the nationalist movement and a complete revision of the position of the ruler and ruled, of classes and castes, we can not explain the rise of nationalist movements in the West (1961: 4).

This new class revived the patriotic feelings of the ancient Hebrews and Greeks and developed nationalism on the basis of their idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on the common stock of memory of the past, hopes for the future and nationalist messianism (Kohn, 1955: 11). Enlightenment ideas such as liberty, freedom, rationalism and patrie had significant influence on this new class. Under the influence of these ideas, they attributed superiority to reason over mysticism and tried to understand the world within this perspective. Thus, religion lost its importance over the social and political sphere and national sovereignty became the new ideology of society. As Kohn argues,

the bible explained all that is; everything must be deduced and proved from the Holy Scriptures. They formed unquestioned basis of all justice. Even kinship by divine right derived its justification thence. Atheism was the deadly sin in this society, denial of religious authority was the great scandal which shook society (1969: 7)

In this respect, as explained above, “nationalism was born out of the struggle by the people for liberty, constitutionalism, tolerance, and a society of free citizens based on laws” (Snyder, 1968: 119). During the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and during the 18<sup>th</sup> century, people became the nation and the nation began to become the object of supreme loyalty (Schafer, 1972: 10). Contrary to universalisms of the Roman Empire and Middle Ages, nationalism glorified national differences. In his report to the national convention on national festivals on the eighteenth Floréa, 1794, Maximillian Robespierre expressed this new feeling as follows,

yes, this delightful land which we inhabit and which nature caresses with love is made to be the domain of liberty and happiness. This sensitive and proud people are truly born for glory and virtue. Oh my fatherland, if fate had caused me to be born in a foreign and distant country, I would have addressed heaven continuously for thy prosperity; I would have been moved to tears by the recital of thy combats and thy virtues; my attentive soul would have followed with a restless ardor all the movements of thy glorious revolution; I would have envied the fate of thy citizens; I would have envied that of thy representatives! I am French, I am one of thy



representatives!... oh sublime people! Accept the sacrifices of my whole being, happy is the man who is born in your midst; happier is he who can die for your happiness (Kohn, 1955: 26-27).

All of these processes experienced in Western countries during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries resulted in a new political form, i.e. the modern centralized sovereign state. More specifically, during the French revolution, the idea of nationalism was infused into this political form and there was a common understanding that all citizens could share, which made the political and cultural integration of the masses into the nation possible (1994: 162). As Kohn points out,

with the advent of nationalism, the masses were no longer in the nation, but of the nation. They identified themselves with the nation, civilization with national civilization, their life and survival with the life and survival of the nationality. Nationalism thenceforward dominated the impulses and attitude of the masses, and at the same time served as the justification for the authority of the state and the legitimization of its use of force, both against its own citizens and against other state (1994: 162)

However, a new and counter nationalism evolved in Germany and then moved to other Eastern countries. German romantics had a profound impact on this type of nationalism. According to Hayes, “These philosophers developed a concept of the people as linguistically and culturally defined group, with primordial origins and a being unique and God created. In other words, the nation and nationalism are understood in terms of ‘culture’ and the ‘spirit of folk’” (1968: 231). As Kohn states, their main aim was to mystify the past (1955: 34-35). In this respect, “history, language, folklore, territory, culture or religion were used to as a means of demonstrating the past traditions of a nation, symbolic evidence of its historic continuity and hence its authenticity” (Woolf, 1996: 2). Herder was leading figure defending these ideas. His emphasis on cultural national individuality, tradition and language deeply influenced nationalists in Eastern countries later (Kohn, 1955: 32). According to Herder, “men only could be creative though the medium of their folk language and traditions. Each man could be himself by thinking and creating in his own mother tongue” (in Kohn, 1955: 32). By claiming this, he stresses the importance of language on binding people to the territory since it produces a unique set of traditions, customs, values and experience that

gave them a sense of cultural difference from other people. Under this influence, “German romantics began to edit the medieval sagas and poetry folk songs and fairy tales. Medieval castles appealed to their imagination as reminder of past national glory and beauty” (Kohn, 1955: 33-36). Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and then Ernst Arndt (1769-1860) can be regarded as significant intellectuals following Herder’s idea on language. They believe in the superiority of their pure German language. Arndt centered upon language as the factor constituting a nation. Frederich Ludwig Jahn, ‘Father Jahn’ glorified the originality of the German folk (Kohn, 1955: 33-36).

Analyzing aforementioned explanations, it is understood that nation was associated with culture so nationalists believed that people having a similar history, culture, religion and language form a common nation. In this organic conception, “no such choice is possible. Individuals are born into a nation, and wherever they may migrate, they remain intrinsic part of their nation of birth” (Smith, 2001: 40). Stalin best summarized this understanding. As he worded, “a nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a common culture” (in Smith 2001: 11)

Kohn again related this understanding to the historical process followed by Eastern countries which was different than the Western pattern. According to him,

nationalism in these countries arose not only later but also generally at a more backward stage of social and political development; the frontiers of existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern-not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands (1994: 164).

Due to the ‘backwardness’ of these states and the existence of strong central governments in the East, the rise of bourgeoisie class was prevented. Strong centralized structure did not allow nationalists to revolt against existing social and political structures. Thus, nationalism emerged only as “a cultural movement

based on the ideas and hopes of scholars and poets unsupported by public opinion which scholars and poets tried to create by using education and propaganda” (Kohn, 1955: 29-30). Kohn expresses this fact by claiming that,

where the third estate was still weak and only in a budding stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in Germany, Italy and among the Slavonic peoples, nationalism found itself predominantly in the cultural field. Among these peoples at the beginning it was not so much the nation-state as the *volkgeist* and its manifestations in literature and folklore, in the mother tongue and in history, which became the center of the attention of nationalism (1961: 4).

Therefore, nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe created an ideal fatherland which was closely linked to the past, lacked any immediate connection with the present and expected to become a political reality in the future. Thus, they were free to adorn it with traits which they did not have an immediate responsibility for realizing them. However, this affected the nascent nation’s wishful image of itself and of its’ mission (Kohn, 1994: 164). Western nationalism was in accordance with the notion of individual liberty and represented nations in their political life, whereas the new nationalism was not based on political and social reality and lacked self assurance (Kohn, 1995: 30).

Friedrich Meinecke, the German historian, reached to a similar conclusion with Kohn and made a separation between state-nation building process in the Western countries and nation-state building in Eastern worlds. According to his view, “the nation developed within the chrysalis of the state” (in Snyder, 2003: 58). In the Western type of nationalism, “state-nation represented a new cultural synthesis which rose above ethnic differences and in which nationality was usually regarded as a matter of individual” (in Snyder, 2003: 58). More specifically, in this type, nations were formed by the state. In the East, on the other hand, according to Meinecke, states were formed by the nation. According to Meinecke,

the nation could grow only within the chrysalis of the individual culture. Here, ethnic and political frontiers coincided, and nationality was regarded as reflecting ethnic identity. The nation is defined in terms of cultural characteristics. The growth of national consciousness created a demand for

the nation-state. The idea of national spirit was the basis of this understanding. This national spirit was supposed to be an objective force whose increasing motion produced the unique culture of each nation. Thus nation-states represented that states formed from the nation (in Snyder, 2003: 58).

In these countries, as Fichte states, as a result of the idea of having to possess your own state to be a real nation, state was established afterwards (in Snyder, 2003: 58).

Classical theory of nation-state has been applied to the study of new nationalism developed by Snyder. Similar to Meinecke's idea, Snyder used the concept of *New Nationalism* in order to explain the movement in 'non-progresses' countries. According to Snyder,

nationalist movement tended to look back upon memories of past glory, the sharing of which was an important foundation for the existence of a nation. It further laid strong emphasis on language and culture as essential criteria in affiliation with the nation: the boundaries of the nation those of the people speaking the same language and possessing the same culture" (in Kushner, 1977: 7).

In Eastern countries, political organization was organized in parallel with the nation. In other words, national elements determine the borders of the state. In new nationalism; the state is a transcendental ideal which may not match with the existing political reality. Due to different emphasis on the nation-state, new nationalism can be defined as the nationalism of nation-state, not of state-nation (in Oğuz, 2005: 24).

These classifications based on the idea of state-nation and nation-state can explain the nature of Turkish nationalism to a large extent. However, at this point it is important to note the patterns of nation formations developed by Smith in order to grasp the ethnic dimension of Turkish nationalism.

According to Smith, there are four patterns of nation building.

*The Western Pattern of Nationalism:* In this kind of nationalism state and nation emerge *pari passu*, with dynastic and territorial states being built up around a definite ethnic core, to which other ethnic and regional groups and communities are successfully attached by alliance, marriage, coercion and administrative intervention. Actually, this type of nationalism was later named as Civic Nationalism. Kohn, on the other hand, named this as Western type of nationalism.

*The Immigrants Pattern of Nationalism:* In this pattern, small parts of ethnic are beneficiaries of a state of their own, with or without a struggle. Their main objective is to absorb and assimilate waves of new immigrants from different cultures into what become increasingly a territorial nation and a political community, as in America, Argentina and Australia.

*The Ethnic Pattern of Nationalism:* Before the advance of modern, rational state and of nationalism, ethnic exists in varying degrees of completeness and self consciousness. Then the formation of state which is appropriate to the existing ethnic becomes necessary. This demand, in turn, gives rise to a drive for autonomy and statehood, as a means for creating a nation. In this type, the emphasis was commonly on race, culture and language. Turkish nationalism is similar to this kind of nation-state formation, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.

*The Colonial Pattern of Nationalism:* In this type a modern, rational state is imposed from above on populations which are divided into many different ethnic communities and categories in order to achieve an independent statehood under the aegis of a state-wide nationalism. This territorial state and its nationalism are used to create a unified nation out of these divergent ethnicities (Smith, 1986: 242).

As this categorization suggests, Smith attributed a special importance to ethnies which signifies “a named human community connected to a homeland, and possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (2001: 13). According to him, ethnies is the significant category through which communities generate “common myths of descent, shared historical memories, a common culture, an association with a recognized territory and a sense of solidarity” (2002: 15). Smith states that ethnic communities can move towards a nation. In this respect, ethnic communities are viewed as self-reproducing cultural entities and in a sense, as seeds of potential nations (Connor in Tokluoğlu, 1995: 27).

As mentioned briefly above, ethnic type of nation formation can explain the Turkish case best since before the formation of the Turkish republic, what nationalists first tried to achieve was the revival of Turkish identity. To foster the development of Turkish consciousness among people was the main purpose of the Turkish state builders since Turks subordinated their identity in favor of Ottomanism and Islamic identity. This was done through an extensive study of Turkish history, language and literary. Hence, Turkish nation had been already created before the republican period later which the new state tried to shape the Turkish nation according to the ideology of the new state.

According to Smith, this kind of nationalism which includes the Turkish case, requires myth-making. Myths are used to legitimate the needs and special interests of ethnic groups or of particular strata within them (1984: 99). According to Smith, “in order to create a nation, spokesmen should advance a case which rested, at least, in part, on the conviction of ethnic ancestry and common history” (1984: 98). For that reason, intellectuals who followed the ethnic pattern of nation formation have made frequent appeals to their alleged ancestry and histories in their struggle for recognition, rights and independence of their country. It is clear that Smith attributes important duties to intelligentsias for rediscovering the unique genius of their nation and restoration of the authentic cultural identity. According to his view, conceptual frameworks for finding out who we are, when we began, how we grew can be achieved with the help of intellectuals. More

specifically, intellectuals provide a framework for social solidarity and a resolution of the crisis of insecurity through the provision of collective identities (Smith, 1984: 99). In addition to this, through them, the images and representations of national identity can be disseminated (Smith, 1984: 27). This assertion points to the fact that nationalism like other ideologies requires intellectuals and scholars in order to elaborate and systematize it (Smith, 1976: 21). In this respect, professionals can be regarded as the backbone of the development of nationalist ideologies. According to him,

the link between nationalism and intelligentsia stretches back to the fifteenth century, when the word nation began to be used in something like its modern sense in the universities. In seventeenth century England and eighteenth century France it was mainly professional classes-doctor, artist, journalists- who evolved the puritanical ideas behind nationalist doctrines. In Germany, poets and professors were among the foremost apostles of an ardent, romantic nationalism, partly because it afforded a wider, worthier theatre for an educated public claiming a voice in civic affairs than the kleinstaaterei of the petty despotism with which they had to come to terms (in Bruford, 1965: 22).

Likewise, Kohn emphasizes the contributions of elites to pervade the nationalist idea and he argues that “elites formed in more rapid succession and grew more skilful in manipulating the hopes and the fears of the masses” (in Snyder, 1968: 120). For this reason, one can claim that nationalism became a political movement rising on the shoulders of the bourgeois class and elites and “nations grew up as unions of citizens, by the will of individuals expressed in contracts, covenants, and plebiscites. Integration was almost always around a political idea, a common future achieved by common effort” (Snyder, 1968: 120).

In this chapter, my concern was to map out the major theoretical approaches in the literature which can best explain the development of Turkish nationalism. Briefly, Kohn and his followers separated nationalist movements into two. Those defined as ‘state-making’ and others as ‘nation-building’. As Linz states, though state-making and nation-building are parallel processes, they signify two different political patterns (1993: 360). State-making process is the result of historical developments specific to Western countries. As seen from the historical

records in the West, first there were medieval monarchies and then came the period of absolutist monarchies. After the French revolution, we witness the development of constitutional monarchies, which was followed by the process of democratization which laid the ground for the formation of modern nation-states (Linz, 1993: 360). This was the process which resulted in the creation of state-nations based on egalitarian citizenship. In this sense,

the state was regarded as work of art since its beginnings had an artificial quality. It is no accident that in describing that process, architectonic terms and images were invoked and that with the development of modern physics it came to be seen as a machine. The state building process does not have the connotations of an organic growth and it is not seen with a biological imagery that would prevail in the discussion of nationalism. The state is not associated with the idea of nature, of being born, but rather of being created (Linz, 1993: 356).

On the other hand, nation-building process arose much later than the state-building process which took place in Western world. In non-Western countries, due to the strong influence of the primordialist approach, nations were thought of as natural beings, so they were not seen as artificial creations. They existed for time immemorial. In this respect, nationalism existed hand in hand with a strong emotional identification, language, religion or set of values of the past (Linz, 1993: 359). This kind of movement prepared also the fertile ground for the rise of pan-movements, which can be defined as an idea to unite the societies who have common ethnic and cultural ties.

I now discuss the characteristic aspects of early Turkish nationalism within the context of the discussions developed in this chapter. In the following chapter, I will mention political and social background that prepared the fertile ground to the rise of Turkish nationalism. Then, I will focus on how Turkish nationalism developed in cultural field then transformed into political one.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE RISE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

#### 3.1. Introduction

The discussion developed in this chapter points out the emergence and ascendance of Turkish nationalism during the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican period. In this context, the conditions under which Turkish nationalism developed become the main issue which is dealt with in this chapter. The main objective of this part is to determine which concepts were at the centre of the discussions during the period in which Turkish nationalism emerged and developed. Additionally, in which context the Turkish intellectuals used these concepts will be the main focus of this section.

Analyzing Turkish nationalism, it is seen that from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century to the announcement of the Second Constitution in 1908, Turkish nationalism went parallel to the modernization attempts of the Ottoman reformers. Thus, the relation between the modernization process and the emergence of Turkish nationalism should be read carefully. Young Ottomans, graduated from Western type of schools which were the outcomes of modernization attempts, were the first group to increase the nationalist sentiment among the Turks. Inspired by Turkology studies, Young Ottomans prepared a fertile ground for the rise of cultural nationalism. Thereafter, Young Turks, with the help of Russian Turks gave a new meaning to the movement and transferred Turkish nationalism into a political movement.

In the light of aforementioned explanations, this chapter analyzes Turkish nationalism under three sub-sections. In the first section, the political and social conditions which prepared the ground for the emergence of Turkish nationalism will be studied. To be more specific, under which conditions the idea of Turkism arose in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century will be the main focus of this part. In the second

section, the genesis of Young Ottomans and their contributions to the development of cultural nationalism will be examined. Finally, in the last section the rise of political Turkism in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic will be discussed. In this sense, how the Young Turks transferred cultural movement into a political one will be specifically emphasized. Additionally, to what extent the Turkification project implemented in the Young Turks era as well as early Republican period can be regarded as a nation-building project will also be discussed in this section.

### 3.2 Political and social background of Turkish nationalism

As discussed in the previous chapter, the world entered a new era with the French Revolution which led the rise of new concepts such as liberty, equality, freedom, nation and nationalism. These ideas gradually influenced multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. The Serbs was the first ethnic group which was affected by these nationalist movements. Later, the Greeks, Bulgarian and Armenians began to think of themselves not as Ottomans, but as Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians and demanded their right of independence (Göçek, 2002: 25). Why these ideas first affected the non-Muslim communities appears to be a critical question. The answer is in the economic and social structure of the Ottoman Empire. Non-Muslim concurrent subjects were mainly dealing with trade and industry, while government, war, religion and agricultural activities were left to Muslim communities. This division of labor gave the non-Muslim communities a chance to establish a closer contact with the Western world. As a result, they became aware of their separate national identity (Göçek, 2002: 25). Definitely, this endangered the unity of the Ottoman Empire consisting of many different nationalities which resulted in Civil Wars between 1815 and 1918.

Moreover, the political and social structure of the Ottoman Empire based on the *millet system* facilitated the rise of these nationalist struggles in the Ottoman society with a long tradition of a dominant state controlling the social fabric of a multi-religious and multi-ethnic empire (Toprak, 1988: 119). *The Circle of Justice* and *the Millet System* implemented by the state were two complementary ideas to control the communities. The main objective of *The Circle of Justice* was to create a harmonious social order among the different ethno-religious groups. According to Mardin, the main ideology behind this idea was that “the maintenance of the state requires an army, the maintenance of the army requires wealth, wealth is produced by the *Reaya* (subjects), the *Reaya* needs justice in order to produce, and justice is sustained by the state” (in Akman, 2004: 32).

The ideology of *The Circle of Justice* was practiced in real life with the help of the *millet system* which provided the organization and integration of different social and ethnic groups in the empire (Akman, 2004: 33). In this system, major differentiating factor among the different *millets* was religion (Cesur-Baykan, in Tokluoğlu, 1995: 24). By implementing this system, the purpose of the state was to preserve the general order, while keeping each ‘order’ in its traditional place, both spatially and socially (Berkes, 1964: 133). Therefore, the state did not interfere with their internal affairs. Instead, she preferred to provide autonomy to each *millet*. Reflecting this policy,

each intensively regulated its domain of everyday conduct, issues of family, marriage, culture, education, training and electing of religious personnel, communal chiefs, etc. Furthermore, the collections of revenues, security maintenance, at the communal level, and later even prisons for ordinary criminals were regulated by the millet organization (Cesur-Baykan in Tokluoğlu, 1995: 24).

As a result, this system prevented minorities from developing social ties with the Muslims through marriage, inheritance, and attending same places of worship. Such restrictions preserved the boundaries of minorities as a separate group (Göçek, 2002: 19). As Karpat aptly claims, “this kind of political organization created a serious of nations and nationalities which prepared fertile ground for the later growth of nationalism” (in Tokluoğlu, 1995, 24). In this respect, Western type of nationalism cannot explain the Ottoman case. Instead, Kohn’s argument which sees the seeds of nation and nationality prior to the French revolution can be the best theory to explain the kind of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire (Tokluoğlu, 1995: 24). As noted before, Kohn pointed out that in Eastern countries, contrary to Western worlds, nationalities had already been identified clearly. Parallel to this situation, the *millet system* which was based on differences among groups, served to operate as the basis of nationalities in the Ottoman Empire since they did not associated themselves with the state directly (Cesur-Baykan, in Tokluoğlu, 1995: 27).

Regarding the emergence of Turkish nationalism, “it was a relatively late development” (Hanioglu, 2006: 3). This meant that Turks was the last group developed nationalist feeling within the borders of the empire. Why the Turks developed a national identity much later than other *millets* is the essential question that should be highlighted. The reason for the delay for the rise of Turkish nationalism can be explained by Lewis’ words,

Turks subordinated their identity to the Islamic one. Until the nineteenth century, they thought themselves primarily as a Muslim. Among the different peoples who embraced Islam none went further in sinking their separate identity in the Islamic community than the Turks. Within the ottoman Islamic empire the dominant group was Turkish but there is only sporadic evidence of any sense of Turkish national identity. The first Turkish converts to Islam, identified themselves with their new faith and seem to have forgotten their separate Turkish past with astonishing rapidity and completeness (1968: 329-330).

Three important events in the Ottoman history caused the subordination of Turkish identity Islam. In his view, the conquest of Constantinople, conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516-1917 and of Iraq in 1534 made the Turks more conscious of an imperial identity rather than a tribal one. These caused the Turks to the bearers of their Islamic imperial heritage and mission (Lewis, 1968: 332). For a long time, they had not regarded themselves as a separate ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 1968: 2). As a result of this, during the period of Ottoman decline, they devoted their efforts to answering the question how to save the state (Zürcher, 2000: 152) In other words, instead of developing a sense of ethnic identity, Turkish intellectuals tried to protect the state from the intervention of great European powers and to prevent the influence of separatist nationalist movements.

For that purpose, they supported the policy of Ottomanism and Islamism before the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. However, since Ottomanism and Islam did not solve the internal problems of the Ottoman society, the Ottoman intellectuals began to search for the cultural, literary and linguistic roots of the Turks’ identity during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In this context, I will examine the evolution of Turkish nationalism in relation to the political conditions in the late Ottoman Empire. The 16<sup>th</sup> century was the time when the Ottoman Empire was in decline due to the lag between economic and social standards of Western countries and Ottoman dynasty. The great changes in the areas of military, economic, politics and social structures in Western world could not be followed by the governors of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, “she had remained to a medieval state, with a medieval mentality, medieval economy, with the added burden of bureaucracy and army” (Lewis, 1968: 36). As a result of this, after the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman state had already begun to lose her military and economic power both inside and outside the Empire. Under this situation the Ottoman statesmen forced themselves for a rapid modernization process.

The first deliberate modernization effort began during the reign of Mahmud II. These reforms included various objectives ranging from the modernization of army, central bureaucracy and education to the reinforcement of the state control in the provinces. Administrative and military centralization was necessary to achieve this goal (Yasamee, 1996: 7). The abolition of the *Janissaries* and the establishment of a modern army, the abolition of the *Timar System* and the implementation of the new *Land Code*, reduction of the power of the *Ulema* over the education system and the establishment of the *Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice* were counted as the major reforms executed during the rule of Mahmud II.

Thereafter, the *Tanzimat Edict* (The Rescript of the Rose chamber) was announced in 1839, under the reign of Abdulmecid. The Tanzimat officers set in motion a series of administrative reforms in order to modernize the empire (Rogan, 1999: 4). By implementing modern reforms, Tanzimat reformers aimed to create a unity among its subjects under the Ottoman dynasty by giving to her citizen’s equal rights before the law. For this aim, they executed common civil rights in which all the Ottoman subjects could be gathered around. Actually, equality before the law was a radical arrangement which would force the mind of the bureaucrats to adapt to this new condition since following these developments, the Ottoman

Muslims were not considered as different from other Ottoman minorities (Lewis, 1968: 107). In this sense, the *Tanzimat Edict* can be regarded as the reform movement which offered its subjects a new kind of loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland (Kushner, 1977: 3). This indicated that Ottoman reformers implemented a modernist projects without presenting them in a national format. They instead attempted to develop the idea of Ottoman citizenship (a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity with a constitutional monarchy) and Islam as containers of their reformist projects (Akman, 2004: 39). This ideology was broadened with the Edict of Reform (*Islahat Fermanı*) which was announced in 1856. The following sentence of Mahmud II shows the official ideology of the Ottoman Empire at that time period,

I distinguish among my subjects, Muslims in the mosque, Christians in the church, Jews in the synagogue, but there is no difference among them in any other ways (Davison, 1973: 31).

Actually, the above mentioned idea was the reflection of the idea of Ottomanism which emerged out of the Tanzimat era (Deringil in Ülker, 2005: 616). Reforms supporting the idea of Ottomanism favored a state which included all the people who shared a defined land, a common citizenship and a common political culture such as the Ottoman nation (Karpát, 2001: 9). According to Karpát,

the concept of the citizenship preempted the old idea of *Din-U Devlet*, that the state served the faith, and presumably the state was expected to serve its citizens, the total of whom constituted the *millet*. All this deprived the state of legitimacy and undermined the theoretical bases of its supremacy, opening the way for a functional, service-oriented notion of the state (2000: 6).

The non-Muslim communities benefited from these reforms and gained more rights; however, their loyalty was still towards independence; thus, the Turks showed a strong reaction and began to develop their own identities (Kushner, 1977: 4). In this aspect,

Turkish nationalism learned from, reacted against and was constrained by competing nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire. Emerging out of the

collapse of the Ottomanist project of the modernizing the imperial state, Turkish nationalism was shaped in competition with the rival nationalism of Christian millets (Keyder, 2005: xv)

Under these conditions, Abdulhamid gave a new content to Ottomanism through his Islamist policies (Karpas, 2001: 315). The reason of this policy change for Hanioglu is that although the policy of Ottomanism was to provide loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland, apart from a few communities such as “Greek Phanariots, Jews and Kutzo-Vlachs, other ethnic groups in the society demanded autonomy from the Ottoman state” (2002: 86). Mardin, too, argues that this was the most significant reason leading for the re-formulation of the principle of Ottomanism (in Ülker, 2004: 74).

The Ottoman victory against Greece in 1897 facilitated the implementation of the pan-Islamist policies of Abdülhamid. By supporting the idea of unity of Islam, he idealized the Islamic character of the state (Karpas, 2000: 19). By this way, “he hoped both to acquire a political advantage in his dealing with European powers and to foster loyalty and support for his regime at home” (Kushner, 1977: 4). However, the loss of a significant proportion of the territories of the empire in the Balkan region, together with the imposition of a British administration in Cyprus and the revolt of the Arabs against the Ottomans, ended the idea of pan-Islamism. Consequently, the idea of Turkism started to become popular among the Turkish intellectuals and officers.

### 3.3. The emergence of cultural Turkism

As pointed out above, Turkish nationalism developed at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, there were attempts for the development of Turkish consciousness especially in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. As Lewis states,

it was at this time that the Ottoman Sultan assumed the old Turkish title of khan; the cattle-brand of the Oğuz Turkish tribe of Kayı, from whom the Ottomans claimed descent, appeared as an emblem on Ottoman coins, and



Ottoman historians and poets elaborated the Oğuz legend, which linked the Ottoman ruling house with a quasi-mythical Turkish antiquity and became the official account of the origins of the dynasty. At the court of Murad II (1421-51) and his successors, Turkish poetry flourished and the study of Turkish antiquities was greatly in vogue. Even in the literature poets tried to write in pure and simple Turkish (1968: 9).

Kushner parallel to Lewis' argument states that those attempts aiming to discover the roots of ethnic Turks go back to 14<sup>th</sup> century. He states that at that time Turkish poets started to use Turkish in their poems. However, "these efforts linked to a period of cultural revival that was taking place in Central Asia among Eastern Turks. They were sporadic and did not affect the main stream of Ottoman literature and historiography" (1977: 2). Therefore, we cannot talk about the development of a kind of political Turkish nationalism as witnessed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe (Kushner, 1977: 2). As a result of this, scholars of nationalism accepts 19<sup>th</sup> century as the turning point of the rise of Turkish nationalism. At the beginning of process of reviving Turkish identity in 1860s, the idea of Turkism was limited to a small circle of intellectuals. As Kushner notes,

the new European-originated concepts mentioned found their way into the thinking of some members of the Ottoman elite by means of the contacts that were now established through Ottoman embassies abroad, student missions to Europe, and foreign instructors and teachers invited to Turkey to manage and staff new schools (1977: 3).

Communication through the newspapers and the telegraph and railroad systems prepared a fertile ground for the rise of Turkism among the intellectuals who were all trained in the Western style institutions which were the centers for all reform movements carried out throughout the Empire. These intellectuals became increasingly conscious of their ethnic identity (Akşin, 1987: 11-13).

As noted above, the rise of Turkish nationalism went parallel to modernization attempts. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman bureaucrats considered modernity as a goal to overcome the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism and Islamism were the sub-ideologies of the state, which were essential for its survival. Despite their failure, in some aspects, these policies speeded the

emergence of Turkish nationalism (Karpas, 2000: 1–3). Karpas argues that,

Ottomanism and Islamism became the unintended means of the elite's Turkification since these ideologies created a new intelligentsia who contributed to the discussion with their Western-originated ideas and notions such as nationalism, liberalism and the idea of fatherland (2000: 10).

The new elites, i.e. the Young Ottomans, by introducing Western liberal ideas into the Ottoman intellectual life and society made a profound influence on Turkish nationalism. According to Göçek, “as journalists and columnists in the newly emerging newspapers and periodicals both in the Empire and abroad, and as novelists, essayists, poets, and actors, they all disseminated the idea of Turkishness to the ordinary people” (1996: 124). Under the impact of Western style education, opposition elites believed that the epistemological origins of knowledge were not found in Islamic moral principles, but in the secular and rational maxims of the Enlightenment ideology (Göçek, 1996: 124). In this sense, they were considered as the pioneers of importing the concepts of the European philosophical heritage to the Ottoman society (Kaplan, 2007: 7) Due to the influence of European thought, “the growth of the sentiment of Turkish identity was connected with the movement away from Islamic practice and tradition, and towards Europe” (Lewis, 1968: 3).

The influence of Turkology studies on the Turkish nationalists should not be overlooked. As Kushner states, “Turkology studies were the main source of inspiration for the new Ottomans in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century” (1977: 9). European Orientalists' works such as *Histoire Generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongoles, et Autres Tartares Occidentaux* by Frenchman Josph De Guignes (Paris, 1756-1781), *A Grammare of the Turkish Language* (London, 1832), by Arthur Lumney Davids, *Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie* (Paris, 1896) by Leon Cahun and *Les Turcs Anciens Et Modernes* published in 1869 by Mustafa Celaledin increased the interest in the history and language of the Turks both within the country and abroad (Kuran, 1991: 113-115). The first work is about the role of Turks in the history of Asia before their conversion to Islam. The second

book analyzes the structure of Turkish language. The third one “described the positive features of the early Turks and their cultural endeavors” (Kushner, 1977: 10). Finally, Celaleddin Pasha specifically discusses the contribution of the Turks to the world civilization. By doing this, he aimed to discuss that Turks and Europeans belonged to the one great ‘Touro-Aryan’ race (Kushner, 1977: 9). In addition to these studies, the Hungarians’ activities, especially Vambery, affected the Turkish nationalists to a great extent. He stated that there was an ethnic and linguistic link between the Turks and Mongols and argued that the Turks, Hungarians, Finnish and Estonians were ancestrally related nations; all of them constituted the Turanian groups which refer to linguistic family called Ural Altaic (Kushner, 1977: 10).

All these studies were investigated by students who were sent to European countries by the Ottoman government. When they returned, they began to publish and translate these works in order to provide a newer vision of the Turks. Under the influence of these Turkology studies, the Young Ottomans attempted to change the negative meaning associated with the term ‘Turk’ As Kushner explains, this term had referred to “the ignorant nomad or peasant of Anatolia often with a definite derogatory connotation until the 19<sup>th</sup> century” (1977: 2-3). As George Arnakis explains further,

the old practice of associating the name “Turk” with the uncultured and uncouth peasant or nomad of the plains still persisted in the 1880s and a sharp distinction was drawn between the city Turk, who called himself an Osmanli, and the man from the countryside (Arnakis, 1960: 25)

The change in the meaning of the words *millet* (nation) and *vatan* (homeland) can be regarded as another important contribution of the Turkology studies. The word *vatan* referred to the place of birth and residence. In other words, “a men’s *vatan* might be a country, a town or a village” (Lewis, 1968: 334). In this sense, *vatan* could inspire loyalty to homeland but ‘the word had no more political significance than the English word home’ (Lewis, 1968: 334). In the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the word ‘patrie’ began to be used in a similar meaning with *vatan*. In the same way, the word *millet* was used in the meaning of a religious community

until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. In general, the term applied to the organized and legally recognized religious communities such as the Greek Christians, the Armenian Christians and the Muslim *millet*s in the empire (Lewis, 1968: 334-335). Later, due to the influence of Turkology studies, some poets and writers like Namık Kemal used the concept of *millet* in similar meaning to nation for the first time. Only after the wide usage of these words by the Young Ottomans, connoting *millet* and *vatan* in the modern sense, they were accepted to be used for nationalist aims (Lewis, 1968: 335).

The aforementioned explanations indicate that the profound influence of Turkology studies should not be ignored since they shaped the form and nature of Turkish nationalism. However, Turkish nationalism at the time of Young Ottomans was not yet associated with political nationalism. Rather, it was mostly culture oriented. Ziya Pasha, Ali Suavi, Namık Kemal and Şinasi were leading figures of the Young Turks (Lewis, 1968: 335). The most coherent option for them was to create a common Ottoman fatherland in which all Ottoman subjects could live in harmony. In the works of Namık Kemal, a well known poet, this idea is best expressed. Because of his fervid writings about Turkish nationalism, he became one of the idols of the young nationalists (Alkan, 2000: 90). Gündüz expresses his influence on Turkish nationalism by stating that we commemorate him (Namık Kemal) since he is one of the first intellectual who showed us Western thought so he is the greatest ideologue of us (1955: 105).

The love of fatherland is the most crucial and impressive idea of Kemal (Tarhan, 1955: 105). In his plays and poems he mainly praised the nation and fatherland aiming to prove that all people could live in harmony in the Ottoman fatherland. In his view,

the fatherland does not consist of imaginary lines on a map by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe: it is a sacred idea, sprung from the union of the many lofty sentiments, such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth...(in Lewis, 1968: 337).

For Kemal, the concept of fatherland went beyond the Ottoman lands, including all Islamic realms united by the memory of a common and impressive past. He had a different concept of fatherland claiming the superiority of all Islamic realms. In this context a common past meant more than the Ottoman territories itself. Lewis summarizes his ideas as follows,

Namık Kemal's vision of a fatherland was influenced by nostalgia and romanticism. Nevertheless, despite his strong emphasis on Islam as the basis of his patriotism, Namık Kemal did not exclude non-Muslim elements of the Empire from his construction of the fatherland. He was strongly committed to the feasibility of a pan-Ottoman union, which would include the Empire's non-Muslim communities. In Namık Kemal's opinion, the different religions, languages, and races existing in the Ottoman Empire did not form an obstacle to the formation of an Ottoman nation (1968: 328).

According to Kemal, differences among the subjects in the Ottoman Empire cannot be regarded as the cause of the weakness of the state. Rather, it can even be used as a factor to develop wiser policies. For example, since Islam served as a bond to unite the Muslims, the Arabs may have decided to remain as part of the Ottoman Empire due to their loyalty to Islamic brotherhood. As for Christians, they would not prefer to leave the country since it would not be feasible for them to do so (in Lewis, 1968: 339). Kemal's ideas on these issues influenced Gökalp's early writings.

Like him, many other Young Ottomans such as Şemseddin Sami, Ali Suvai, Şinasi, and Ahmed Vefik Pasha supported the idea of Ottoman fatherland and gave special attention to Turkish language and history in the cultural sphere. Ottoman scholars had serious discussions about Turkish identity through their studies on Turkish history and language. Purifying Turkish from foreign words was one of the topics the intellectuals emphasized at that time. According to Kushner, "the great increase in the number of Ottoman publications, together with the development of the press, considerably contributed to the modification and purification of the literary language" (1977: 57). The Ottoman intellectuals tried to use simple Turkish in their writings to make it easier for the common people to understand.

The idea behind this purification process was that language was regarded as an essential criterion in differentiating people from one another. In this respect, they saw language as the basis of creating a national culture. The preservation and promotion of Turkish language were considered as a precondition to the preservation of the nation itself. Süleyman Pasha expressed this idea by saying that the Ottoman was the name of the state and should not be used in reference to the Turkish language or literature (Kushner, 1977: 59). Şemseddin Sami parallel to his idea states,

each people and nation, whether big or small, strong or weak, must work to consolidate its spiritual existence. The first symbol of a nation and a race, its foundation, and its common property, shared equally by all its members, is the language in which it speaks. People speaking one language constitute one nation and one race. Each people and nation must therefore first off all bring order into its language. ....We shall not give up crying out, let us simplify our language, usually but not necessarily, correlated with its simplification now became an important goal in itself (Kushner, 1977: 63-70).

Ahmet Vefik Pasha was another scholar and statesman who devoted himself to the revival of the Turkish language. In his thought, “the Turks and Turkish were not merely Ottoman, but were also Western” (Keyder, 2000: 21). His main contribution to the Turkish language was the translation of *The Evşal-i Şecere-i Türk-i*, written by Eb’ul Gazi Bahadır Han, including a chapter on Turkish history (Akçura, 1998b: 31).

Turkish history, as explained above, was another area which attracted the attention of Turkish scholars. As Kushner aptly states,

the traditional Ottoman histories dealt with only the history of the Ottomans prior to the establishment of the dynasty in Anatolia and ignored the history of the Turks before their adoption of Islam. Instead of giving the place to the Turks, Ottoman historians mainly traced their genealogy to the tribe of Kayı Khan, a branch of the Oğuz Turks, according to legend, descendance of Japhet, son of Noah (1977: 27).

In fact, by doing this, they wanted to connect the Ottoman dynasty to a mythological origin. The reason behind this can be found in the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman state. Hence, throughout the Ottoman regime, ethnic Turks, contrary to the Serbs, Greeks and Arabs, had not possessed the political memory of an ancient ethnic state. Their only historical memories were limited to their Ottoman past. Especially, pre- Islamic Turkish history remained unknown to the general public until the press and literature began to describe the Ottoman past as Islamic and ultimately as Turkish (Karpas, 2000: 11).

In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, many scholars, writers and poets paid attention to the contribution of the Turks to the Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of Turkology studies, Turkish historians and scholars began to glorify their ancient past. They believed that the distinctive characteristics of the history of a nation separate that nation from the others. Thus, the earlier understanding of history based on descriptive and narrative methods of traditional historiography was replaced with a romantic understanding of historical events. As a result, the Turks began to praise their Turkish past in a nostalgic admiration (Behar, 1996: 51-56). Reinterpretation of history with a romantic understanding played a crucial role in the emergence of Turkish nationalism. By looking at the past and to glorify it, scholars tried to show the contribution of the Turks to the Islamic civilization and to the Ottoman Empire. The best example of this thought is provided by Ebuzziya Tevfik. According to him,

the Turks and not the Arabs caused the ottomans to spread their rule over East and West. Moreover, the ones to protect the Arab nation, whose national power suffered weakness and injury for many reasons, were Turks. No Arab poems were recited in the wars about these soldiers, but rather Turkish poems. Those who waved the ottoman banner on the Indian seas were not Arabs but Turks... those who bound hundreds of different peoples to the ottoman sultanate were not Arabs but Turks (in Kushner, 1977: 34).

Inspired by these ideas, Ali Suavi saw the Turkish race as superior to other races, as well as to the other Central Asian Turkic races. Suavi argued that the greatest civilization was created by the Turks. Ahmed Vefik Pasha and Süleyman Pasha

were other prominent figures dealing with the Turkish character of the Ottoman Empire. The former strongly believed that Islamic history was being ruled by two *millets*, namely the Arabs and Turks. The Ottoman Empire restored unity and vitality to Islam due partly to its Turkism (Kushner, 1977: 28). The latter, on the other hand, studied Turkish history and a section of pre-Islamic Turks in his historical writings for the first time (Keyder, 2000: 21). In the work entitled *Universal History*, he devoted a large section to the history of ancient Turks (Kushner, 1977: 28).

In the light of these evidences, the profound influence of the Young Ottomans on Turkish nationalism in the areas of literature and culture can be seen clearly. As expected, Abdülhamit did not welcome the activities of the Young Turks and attempted to control the members of the movements through censorship. He prohibited the publication of the books such as as *Kamus-i Turki* (Turkish Dictionary), *Seyahatname* (Travel Book) and *Türk Tarihi* (Turkish History). There was also censorship on some newspapers like *İkdam*, which was published by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. However, this restriction did not prevent the Turkish intellectuals from using Turkish language. They continued to use Turkish in order to increase the ethnic consciousness of the Turks living inside and outside of the empire (Parmaksızoğlu in Oğuz, 2005: 54). Thereafter, Young Ottomans were organized under the organization of the Committee of Union and progress against the regime of Abdülhamid. Later they were named as the Young Turks. In the following section, I discuss the rise of political Turkism among Turkish nationalists.

### 3.4. The emergence of political Turkism

Analyzing the nationalist outlook of the Young Turks is important while studying the rise of Turkish nationalism since their activities gave a new direction to the movement. Emerged first among the students in the Western type higher education schools in Istanbul, the Young Turks like their predecessors started a campaign of agitation and subversion to overthrow the autocratic Sultan Abdülhamid II and



establish a constitutional and parliamentary regime in 1908. Their intention was to cut the impact of the nationalist separatist movements in the society (Zürcher, 2000: 151).

Centered around the Committee Of Union And Progress they came to dominate Ottoman politics after the 1908 Revolution. This was a turning point in Turkish history since it gave rise to the politicization of the ethnic factor in Turkey as separate from Ottomanism and Islamic identity. In other words, it paved the way for the development of a political Turkish nationalism.

Political Turkism of the Young Turks can be analyzed in two different periods, the 1908-1913 period and 1914-1918 period. In the first period, the Young Turks supported the idea of Turkism under the banner of Ottomanism since they saw it as the most suitable ideology for the salvation of the empire. This lasted until the Balkan wars. However, their interpretation of Ottomanism was considerably different from previous one defended by the Young Ottomans. What the Young Turks understood from the concept of Ottomanism was to create a core nation consisting of Turks. In other words, the Turks were placed at the center of the empire. According to Hanioglu, all ethnic groups were tried to be kept under the patronage of the Turks. From this point of view, it can be claimed that their view of Ottomanism was distinguished by the increasing stress on the formula that the Turks were the dominant nation in the Empire (2001: 295–302).

This idea was expressed by Grand Vizier Ibrahim Hakki Pasha as follows,

coming to the point of being a citizen, learning Turkish has greatest importance since a person who does not know Turkish will be deprived of some rights. For example, he will not be able to be elected as a deputy. However, there is one more important thing. What is this? Citizens should have the same opinion on matters that are connected to the life of the state. Namely, they should interpret and view the future of the state in the same manner and they should possess the same sentiments. This is absolutely the objective which the Government and the *Kanun-i Esasi* are looking for. Homogeneity in education and culture (*terbiye*) is what is desired (in Ülker, 2005: 619)

Until the Balkan wars, the journals which were close to the Young Turks and ideologists of Turkish nationalism like Gökalp highlighted Ottomanism, giving priority to the union of all ethnic groups in the empire under the leadership of Turks (Ülker, 2005: 618). According to Ülker, only a relatively marginal group of Turkish nationalists like Akçura, who was a Tatar-Turkish immigrants from Russia repudiated Ottomanism in favor of the pan-Turkist project (2005: 618).

The loss of Macedonia and Thrace and the Albanian revolts against the empire caused the transformation of the already existing Turkish consciousness of the Young Turks into a project of nationalization (Ülker, 2005: 622). This process began especially after the revolt of the Albanians who were always loyal to the empire (Karpas, 2001: 369). Young Turks concluded that it was not possible to maintain the empire through an Ottomanist policy which would bring different interests together and make the Turks the core of the nation (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 289). Thus, Turkism was regarded as the only way for the salvation of the state.-In other words, political Turkism appeared as a reaction to the failure of the ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism (Oğuz, 2005: 72).

At this point, the contribution of Russian Turks to the development of political Turkism should be highlighted. The flow of intellectuals from Russia to the Ottoman Empire gave a new impetus to Turkish nationalism. Russian Turks were politically oriented towards Turkish nationalism, which had a cultural dimension. This was due to different nationalist experiences the Russian emigrates had experienced in a wider context. From the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, together with the emergence of the new bourgeois class among the Muslim Turks of Russia, the intellectuals started to react to the projects of Russification and Christianization which the Russians imposed on the Turks. In contrast to Turkish nationalism which emerged to protect the multi-ethnic Ottoman State, Russian Turks struggled to protest their Turkish identity against Russia's oppressive policies. These circumstances naturally enabled them to develop the ideology of pan-Turanism which aimed at uniting the Turks living in Russia under the banner of the idea of Turkism. This idea was not yet developed in the Ottoman society. However, it became a popular doctrine among the Ottoman intellectuals

following the migration of the Russian Turks to the empire. In this respect, it can be claimed that Russian Turks transferred the East European type of nationalism into the Ottoman Empire (Oğuz, 2004: 72).

Some well-known figures in this group were Ismail Gasprinski, Yusuf Akçura, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey and Ahmet Agaoglu who supported to the idea of pan-Turanism (Lewis, 1968: 348). They emphasized the importance of modernization in traditional Muslim schools and tried to encourage the use of the spoken languages of different Turkish groups in their modern literary works (Kushner, 1977: 12).

İsmail Gasprinski can be regarded as one of the most outstanding figures of the above mentioned movement. Since he lived in Russia and studied in Paris, he witnessed the development of nationalist movements both in Russia and Europe. All these enabled him to play a vital role in shaping the future of Turkish nationalism which began to take shape towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. His close relations with the Young Ottomans like Namık Kemal, Şinasi and Ziya Pasha allowed him to disseminate his ideas about the linguistic and spiritual unity among all Russian Turks (Kazemzadeh, 1968: 369). The other important subject for Gasprinski was the idea of the modernization of Muslim schools which would bring about educational advancement. He founded the newspaper named *Tercüman* (Interpreter) in order to disseminate his ideas. As Landau argues, “The unity of language, thought and action” was the most popular motto of this newspaper (1981: 345). With this slogan, his aim was to express the unity of the fictive nation of all the Turks in the world. He believed that this could be achieved only by providing a linguistic unity among all the Turkic groups in the world. Finally, he aimed to achieve a unity in action and to this end he tried to familiarize the younger generations with the idea about liberating the Turks from foreign domination (Landau, 1981: 345).

Ahmed Agaoglu was another Azerbaijani intellectual who saw the Western type of education as the only way to elevate a national feeling among the Turks. Similar to Gasprinski, he used the media as the medium of disseminating his ideas.

For that purpose, he began to publish *İrşad* (Guidance). In his several articles published in this newspaper he strongly defended that Western civilization should be adopted directly since Turkish nationalism could be developed only by this way (Karakaş, 2007: 145).

Hüseyinzade Ali Bey (1864-1941) is another figure who had a significant impact on Ottoman intellectuals. According to him, the most urgent issue for the Turks should be the adoption of modern European sciences. As Heyd notes, “The only way to fulfill this was through Turkification, Islamization and Europeanization. This triologicistic program later became the slogan of Ziya Gokalp as well” (1950: 149). Yusuf Akçura was the last preeminent scholar who shaped the Turkish nationalist movement through his ideas. The following section will give detailed information about his ideas in general and about pan-Turanism in particular.

As a matter of fact, after the loss of the Ottoman territories during the Balkan wars, the pan-Turkist doctrine of Russian Turks was seen as a more feasible policy by the Young Turk leaders. This idea was given out by several journals and associations such as *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association), *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens), *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Country) and *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Heart) for the development of political Turkism. Yusuf Akçura, Veled Çelebi and Necib Asim established the *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association) to struggle for the development of Turkish literature. They also aimed to rise the level of national education, improve the economy and scientific studies. They dealt with the current problems of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the current situation in the broader Turkish world (Özdoğan, 2002: 78).

The journal of *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) published by Ziya Gökalp, Ali Canip and Ömer Seyfeddin in Salonica in 1911 was the second significant organ of publication of the Young Turks. In these journals they disseminated the idea of Turkism. The association of *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Heart) was founded in 1912 and the journal of *Türk Yurdu* became the publication organ of *Türk Ocağı*. After the Balkan Wars started, the writers of *Genç Kalemler* joined the association of *Turkish Heart* and began to write in the journal *Türk Yurdu*. Also Enver and

Talat Pashas, who were the leading members of the Ottoman government, gave support to the *Turkish Heart* and the association eventually became connected to the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihad Terakki Cemiyeti*), which was the committee founded by the Young Turks who led the 1908 Revolution (Aydın in Oğuz, 2005: 77). The articles published in the journal *Türk Yurdu* attempted to shape Turkish national identity further. Therefore, these journal articles mostly examined the states, cultures and traditions of the Turks in pre-Islamic times (Hanioğlu, in Oğuz, 2004: 77).

Hence, all these developments gradually transformed cultural Turkism into a political movement. For the Turkists, the main objective was to unite all the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire, as well as those living in other countries, around the consciousness of Turkism. With this purpose in their minds, state-makers aimed to create a Turkish nation as their first task. In this context, Turkish language was accepted as the official language of the new state. Additionally, Turkish language became the language of instruction in elementary schools. Lastly, forming political associations based on racial and national differences was banned by law (Law on Associations issued on the 23th of August, 1909). These developments most clearly demonstrated the aim of creating a Turkish nation (Ahmad, 1995: 85). By implementing these laws, state-makers desired to create a homogenous Turkish nationality by transforming the cultural, economic and political spheres.

Overall, scholars attributed a significant role to the Turkification project which was seen as the main tool for establishing a Turkish nation. Indeed, building of a nation required a cultural and linguistic revival. This was done through the intellectuals and scholars. Intellectuals contributed to rediscovering the unique genius of the (Turkish) nation and restore its authentic cultural identity through their works (Smith, 2001: 27). According to Smith, only the intellectuals can provide us with the conceptual frameworks for finding out who we are, when we began, how we grew and. They can also help to convey and disseminate the images and representations of a national identity (2001: 27). In other words, “they provide symbolic kinship link between all members of the present generation of the community” (Smith, 1984: 98). In this respect, intellectuals, scholars,

letters, and poets devoted their time to constructing an unbroken ethnic history reaching back to a mystical past in an alien geography. As Keyder expresses,

according to this myth present day Turks are direct and uncontaminated descendance of a people who inhabited a territory in a distant land, Middle East or Central Asia which furthermore was supposed to have undergone a major ecological transformation that caused the Turks to leave. In other words, the land of origin could only be imagined; it was irreclaimable not only because it was distant, but also because it was irreversibly altered. In nationalist writings and history books this imagined land was assigned crucial importance as the spatial referent of the nation (2005, p. 8).

As understood from this argument myths of origin have played a particularly important role in the shaping of Turkish national identity (Smith, 1984: 98). The important aim for Turkish nationalists was to establish a link with an ideal of fatherland. This mystic land was the dream of people (Özkırımlı, 2000: 42). Keyder parallel to Özkırımlı's argument states that

Turkishness was constructed which glossed over real diversity in an attempt to present the remaining population as homogenous. This was done through the construct of an unbroken ethnic history reaching back to a mystical past in an alien geography. According to this myth present day Turks are direct and uncontaminated descendance of a people who inhabited a territory in a distant land, Middle Asia or Central Asia which furthermore was supposed to have undergone a major ecological transformation that caused the Turks to leave. In other words, the land of origin could only be imagined; it was irreclaimable not only because it was distant, but also because it was irreversibly altered. In nationalist writings and history books this imagined land was assigned crucial importance as the spatial referent of the nation (2005: 8)

During the early Republican Period, the nation-building process went hand in hand with the state-building process. Naturally, the main objective of the elites was to determine the boundaries of the country's territories, as well as to establish national sovereignty within the defined borders at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Due to these objectives, the republican elites intentionally aimed to develop the virtues of nation-state, Turkishness and Turkish identity. In this respect, Karpat describes these turbulent times as attempts of new national and cultural identity (1959: 327). In line with this purpose, the republican government

abolished the Ottoman monarchy in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924. The reason behind such drastic actions was the desire to break with the Ottoman past and modernize Islam. By aiming this, they sought to create a Turkish national identity rooted in the popular lore. As Karpat words it, “it stemmed from to desire to break free from historical romanticism, nostalgia for the past grandeur and irredentism” (2000: 27). As Ahmad clarifies, the Turks believed that they had the right to live as a nation due to their success in the World War I (1993: 46). The main target was to construct a territorial nation-state based on the Turks in Turkey; this would be the land of the Turks. In fact, this new ideology shows the transformation from a pan-Turanist ideology, which aimed to unite all the Turks in the world, to a territorial nation-state. Instead of pan-Turanism, the new regime preferred to unite all the people living in Anatolia under the banner of Turkism. Parallel to this aim the new regime promulgated radical laws related with language. It founded the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) and Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) in order to show the dignity of Turkish language and history. The main objectives of the studies carried out by these institutions was to celebrate the pre-Islamic past of the Turks since it was believed that pre-Islamic Turkish era was the origin of all civilizations. Therefore, instead of taking the Ottoman history as a point of reference, Sumerians and Hitities were regarded as the origins of the Turkish nation (Tunçay, 1981: 383).

In the light of these explanations, it can be claimed that Turkish nationalism was heavily influenced by Eastern type of nationalism. As Smith states, in several countries such as Poland, Russia and Ottoman Empire nationalism idealized a return to an ethnic past (2001: 40). Kohn’s argument is similar to Smith’s claim who expresses the idea that Turkish nationalism can be a good example for the kind of nationalism in the Third World. In this respect, it can be argued that, as in Eastern countries, the main objective of Turkish nationalism was to build a core Turkish nation.

Here, it should be emphasized that after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, state and nation-building processes went hand in hand; Thus, the terms state and nation were defined as the same as was the case in France. In accordance

with this objective, some legal arrangements were carried out. However, the focus on cultural and ethnic homogeneity moved the Turkish case closer to Germany and away from France (Brubaker, 1992).

The question why Turkish nationalism and German nationalism both focused on culture was related to the historical processes both countries went through. Germany could not succeed in becoming a nation until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For this reason, it could not keep up with the political and economic developments that took place in the West. At that time French and English identities were already formed, whereas Germany it was yet to develop. Therefore, German nationalism progressed with the efforts to form a nation. The same situation was valid for Turkish nationalism since like the Germans, Turks were not able to form a Turkish identity until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. To save the Ottoman state, the projects of Ottomanism and Islamism gained importance which delayed the formation of a Turkish identity. As the identities of Islamism (*Müslümanlık*) and Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*) were mingled with Turkish ethnicity, the idea of turning to Central Asian Turkism appeared to be promising. In this context, Turkish identity progressively became a point of reference among the intellectuals in the Ottoman society. Thus, the notion of culture started to play an important role similar to the German case (Sezer, 1988: 226-232). With the aim of providing cultural and/or ethnic unity, Turkification project which started during the Young Turk era continued to be effective during the early Republican period. At that time, “Turkishness was constructed which glossed over real diversity in an attempt to present the remaining population as homogenous” (Keyder, 2005: 8). The main requirements of Turkism were defined as sharing the same language, ideals and culture. Thus, religious and ethnic differences were ignored and the nation was conceived as an indivisible and homogenous whole. Accordingly, all of the different elements, i.e. ethnic, religious or cultural, were accepted as Turkish. In this respect, it can be claimed that Turkification project was at the same time a nation-building project (Ülker, 2005: 613). From these points, one can reach to the conclusion that Turkish nationalism progressed with the aim of forming a new a nation which was based on the German model.



## CHAPTER 4

### TURKISM IN ZİYA GÖKALP AND YUSUF AKÇURA

#### 4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, the emergence of Turkish nationalism during the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period was analyzed. Particularly, the conditions under which Turkish nationalism developed and how Turkish intellectuals contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism were the main issues. This chapter, on the other hand, focuses on the ideas of the two legendary figures i.e., Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, on Turkism.

Gökalp and Akçura played a key role in the development of Turkish nationalism. As claimed by many scholars, Gökalp, as an official ideologue of the Young Turks, developed an ideology of Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Likewise, Yusuf Akçura, an émigré from Russia, also directed the path Turkish nationalism would follow. His receptive inference enabled him to see Turkism as the best policy to save the state. At an earlier date in 1904 when cultural nationalism was dominant, he brought forward ‘Turkism’ as one of the most suitable politics for the salvation of the state. By claiming this, he triggered political Turkism. However, despite his contributions to Turkish nationalism, his ideas were not recognized as much as Gökalp’s. Therefore, little research was conducted about him.

In order to understand both Gökalp and Akçura’s Turkism in the best way, it is crucial to grasp the social and political milieu that shaped their ideas. Therefore, the social and political conditions will be analyzed briefly under the first heading. Then, the ideas of Gökalp and Akçura on Turkism will be examined comparatively. The main purpose is to offer an analytical framework for

understanding the peculiarities of Gökalp and Akçura's nationalist thoughts during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.

## 4.2. The influence of the social and political milieu on Gökalg and Akçura's ideas

The last days of the Ottoman Empire can be regarded as a time of revolution that signifies the pulling down of the old values and invention of the new ones (Arai, 1992: 42). During that time, which can be summarized as the modernization period, a distinct Turkish identity was formulated by Turkish intellectuals for the first time. Particularly, they tried to identify “who a Turk is and how this national identity should be understood in relation to Islamic and Ottomanist identities” (Davison, 1995: 190). Why did Turkish intellectuals devote their efforts to identify Turkish national identity? It is because of the fact that Turkish nationalism was not a movement beginning from grassroots, then spreading upwards. Contrary to this, Turkish nationalism was developed by the intellectuals and then it was spread to the people. In this sense, as claimed in the previous chapter, Turkish nationalism shares similar characteristics to Eastern type of nationalism which emerged as the hope and dream of scholars (Kohn, 1955: 30). The celebrated Turkish scholars such as Namık Kemal, İsmail Gasprinski, Yusuf Akçura, Hüzeyinzade Ali Bey, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Süleyman Paşa, Şinasi, and Ziya Gökalg, having many works in the fields of history, literature, philosophy, were the ones instigating the idea of Turkish nationalism through their articles and poems.

Although the influence of all the above-mentioned Turkish intellectuals on Turkism is accepted, in this study Ziya Gökalg and Yusuf Akçura are chosen for their significant impact on the Turkish intellectual life. Both played a leading role in the direction of Turkish nationalism during the transition from a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a secular and modern Turkish nation-state. Gökalg and Akçura alleged very influential ideas about the issues such as the place of Islam in modern Turkey, relations with the West, and the link between culture and modernity. With their very influential thoughts, they shaped the content of the nationalist movements both during the Ottoman Empire and the early Republican era.

Their ideas are still being discussed in the 2000s. Thus, grasping Gökalp and Akçura's ideas can enable us to apprehend the content of Turkish nationalism during the early republican period. However, the literature on Turkish nationalism mostly focuses on the influence of Gökalp compared to Akçura. According to Georgeon, ideological reasons bring about this fact. Gökalp's Turkishness was based on the idea of solidarism which the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic needed. Akçura, on the other hand, ground his theory on the fact of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and argued that separation of non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman society was going to be inevitable in the near future. Naturally, it was impossible for the Ottoman Turkish intellectuals to accept his idea. In addition to this, due to his close relation with Russian communists, Akçura's ideas were thought to be closer to the left wing intellectuals (Georgeon, 1986: 7). Therefore, the intellectuals of the right wing did not adopt his ideas and thus, he became a "forgotten man" (Berkes, 1985: 209; Georgeon, 1986:137).

Georgeon's claim can be partly meaningful but it should not be forgotten that due to his coherent and systematic Turkish ideas, "Ziya Gökalp still stands as the most original and influential nationalist thinker among the other nationalists of the twentieth century" (Berkes, 1954: 375). As Parla rightly puts it, "Gökalp could form a reasonable comprehensive cognitive map for Turkey's transition from a six-hundred year empire to a new nation-state" (1985: 22). In this sense, he is the only person who could go beyond the narrow ideological design to a systematic theoretical structure (Parla, 1985: 22). In Parla's view, with him loose ends come together; eclecticism is replaced by synthesis and the inconsistency between what is prescribed and what is practiced becomes smaller; (1985: 22).

As Parla states above, naturally, his ability to adapt the idea of nationalism systematically to the Turkish society puts Gökalp in a more advantaged position as compared to Akçura. In fact, Parla confirms the ideas of Berkes who claims that

of course, there had been others shaping the dimensions of the Turkish nationalist movement but his uniqueness lay in the fact that he was able to

discuss Turkish nationalism in terms of an intellectual framework and draw a certain conclusion, setting them up as formulae for a cultural and political policy (1954: 376).

This made him marked in the Turkish intellectual world with his contributions to the Turkish nationalist movement during the transition from a multi-ethnic empire to the Turkish nation-state. However, polemical distortions are common about Gökcalp's ideas since his ideas alter depending on the changing political conditions. Additionally, those who studied Gökcalp interpreted his ideas according to their own political perspectives. Also, regarding the changing political and social climate, the interpretations on Gökcalp's ideas have changed accordingly. Therefore, even today, the essence of his thought has not been adequately explored by intellectuals. As a result, Gökcalp is thought as a racist by some, while others think that his ideas are based on humanism, integration and democracy. Heyd is one of those scholars who can be put in the first category. He accepted the fact that Gökcalp supported national democracy, parliamentary, independence of science and religion from politics, but despite this, Gökcalp's closeness to German nationalism caused his collectivist, exclusive and irrational nationalist ideas to be more dominant (in Davison, 1995: 193). Parla, on the other hand, advocated that "Gökcalp was pluralist, democratic, tolerant, non-expansionist, rational, anti-racist, non-chauvinist and a humanist thinker" (in Davison, 1995: 193).

Like Gökcalp, ideas of Akçura are still inadequately known due to the fact that he modified his thoughts several times following the changes that took place in his time. In his early writings, he supported pan-Turanism which sees the Finns, Hungarians and other Turkish nations as forming a union. However, in his later works he started to emphasize democratic Turkism. Additionally, due to his close contact with the Russian intellectuals, the rightist intellectuals in Turkey have neglected his thoughts for a long time. Thus, little research was carried out about his works. The studies about him were generally written as memories. Only François Georgeon published a detailed study about his ideas on Turkism. In order to understand Gökcalp and Akçura's Turkism, it is important to analyze the political and social background that shaped their Turkism. Thus, before

explaining their ideas on Turkism, this section provides a brief summary of the influence of the social and political milieus that shaped their horizons.

Gökalp, whose real name was Mehmet Ziya, was born on March 23, 1876 in Diyarbakır, which was a province distant from the Ottoman capital and was largely populated by non-Turkish citizens such as the Kurdish and Armenians. In addition to this, the city was also a place of exile for the people rebelling against the state (Heyd, 1950: 21). In this respect, as Karakaş states, Diyarbakır was a political centre for the opposition movements which helped Gökalp detect the problems of the state and meet the main arguments of the opponents of the Ottoman state (2008: 437).

Besides this, Gökalp's family played a crucial role in his intellectual development. He used to follow the official newspaper published by his father closely and was informed about the political developments in Istanbul. Additionally, he benefited from his father's library since he had a large one containing a great number of geographical atlases and other reference works. Through these books, Gökalp learned about the philosophy of the East and West. Furthermore, his uncle, Hasip Efendi, introduced him to Islamic mysticism (Mardin, 2007). During his childhood, his participation in a lycée (*İdadi-i Mülki*) gave him a significant chance to have information about the political and social developments taking place in the world. Yorgi effendi, a Greek physician and his teacher of biology, and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, a key representative of Western secular materialism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, had a long lasting on his intellectual development.

After graduating from *İdadi*, Gökalp went to Istanbul and entered the Veterinary School. Istanbul affected Gökalp's thoughts just like Diyarbakır since the close relationship he established with the Committee of Union and Progress strengthened his ideas further (Mardin, 2007). While staying in Istanbul, his interest in Turkology studies gradually increased. Even reading introduction to the book *A L' Histoire De L' Asie* by Cahun contributed to shaping his ideas on Turkism. In this sense, Istanbul had an important role in shaping Gökalp's political and intellectual life. Karakaş states that when Gökalp came to

Istanbul, he had the opportunity to establish a political connection with the Committee of Union and Progress party. This became a turning point in Gökâlþ's intellectual life (2008: 441).

Salonika was the other province which played an important role in Gökâlþ's horizon. Gökâlþ, who was exiled to Diyarbakır after the imprisonment sentence in 1900, was invited to Salonika as the local delegate for the Young Turks Congress in 1909 as a result of his success in organizing the protestors against Sheikh Ibrahim<sup>1</sup>. While traveling back and forth between Salonika and Diyarbakır, he allocated time for increasing his knowledge on Western philosophy and sociology in Salonika where he read books coming from Europe. In Salonika, Gökâlþ's political vision became more pronounced and his interest in Turkology studies started to shape his Turkism (Karakaş, 2008: 445). Gökâlþ's arrival in Salonika allowed him to be part of a new culture and detached him from the traditional surrounding which he belonged to. In Fındıkođlu's expression, until he came to Salonika his life in Diyarbakır was dominated by religion and by Islamic mysticism. He dissociated himself from Diyarbakır both financially and spiritually (in Karakaş, 2008: 446)

The biggest change in Gökâlþ's intellectual life was his growing interest in social sciences, especially in sociology. According to him, sociology could be used as a solution to social problems. To be more specific, for Gökâlþ "sociology was the best way to build a natural harmony and equilibrium among various elements which formed the Ottoman society" (Inalcık, 1964: 210). Therefore, he began to teach sociology in Salonika and established relations with the journal *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens). According to Heyd, This journal focused on linguistic issues since "the creation of a Turkish national language was regarded as a necessary condition to all cultural progress" (1950: 33). Gökâlþ wrote many articles and poems in this journal and supported the purification of Turkish

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<sup>1</sup> In 1907, Gökâlþ was a leader of a group of protestors who sent a collective telegram to the Sultan and wanted him to stop the degradation of a local tribal sheikh who was taking advantage of his position as a quasi-gendarme to fleece the local population. His ability to organize people was appreciated by the leaders of the Committee of Union and progress (Mardin, 2007)

language. Furthermore, in his article “New Life and New Values” (*Yeni Hayatlar ve Yeni Kıymetler*) published in this journal, he defended the idea that the real revolution should be a social one which would embrace the whole society. This suggests that “Gökalp always focused on social problems and searched for the new world under the guidance of sociology” (Inalcık, 1964: 210). His studies enabled him to gradually move from the ideology of Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism (Heyd, 1950: 32).

On the other hand, Akçura, a Crimean Tatar, lived in a completely different political and social surrounding. His life can be divided into two periods. In the first period he lived under the control of the Russian government and in the second he migrated to Istanbul, which was under the regime of Abdülhamit (Georgeon, 1986: 6). Akçura, born in 1876, was most probably a Volga or Kazan Tatar who were both economically and culturally more developed compared to the other Turkic groups living under the control of the Russian Empire. Like Diyarbakır, Kazan had an important strategic position in terms of its intensive economic relations with the East and West. This position made the Tatars politically more powerful compared to the other Turkish groups in the region. Indeed, their role was similar to the case of the Rums (Greeks of Turkish origin) in the Ottoman Empire. Just like the Orthodox, Tatars established an economically and culturally strong bourgeoisie. This new class was the initiator of the Tatar modernization against the Russification project (Georgeon, 1986: 8). The Russian project to conquer Central Asia, which started in 1865, had almost been completed by 1876. With the conquest of Central Asia, the policy of Russification was started. The Tatars, who were economically the strongest group at that time, were very adversely affected by the assimilation policy of the Russian Empire. Thus, at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Tatars started a major reform campaign, which was the modernization of language, religion and culture (Georgeon, 1986: 13). This endeavor laid the groundwork for the improvement of Turkism among the Tatars (Georgeon, 1986: 8). Additionally, this movement influenced the Pan-Turkic ideology of Akçura since Akçura believed in the importance of a national bourgeoisie and a powerful economic structure (Georgeon, 1986: 13).



After his father's death, Akçura went to Istanbul with his mother. This event can be seen as a turning point in his life since he now had the chance to observe the Western world as well as the political opposition movements against the Ottomans. In addition, Akçura frequently visited Russia which gave him the opportunity to observe the Russian Turks. On one of these short visits he lived among the *Başkırt* Turks, who led a life far from Russian urban culture. There he had the opportunity to observe the *Başkırt Turks* commitment to their own language and traditions and their emotional attachment to the Ottoman Turks, although they were far away from the Ottoman geography. In addition, he closely observed the *Asım* and *Kreşin* Turks situations. During these visits, Akçura realized that Turks living under the sovereignty of Russia had a stronger sense of national consciousness than the Ottoman Turks (Georgeon, 1986: 16-17). As a result of his these visits, Akçura reached the idea of uniting Russian and Ottoman Turks (in Karakaş, 2007: 176). With this idea in his mind, he started writing about uniting the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire with those living in Russia. For this reason, he was known as the "symbol of the unity of the Eastern and Western Turks" (Hostler, 1957: 143).

When Akçura was at the Military School in İstanbul, he was involved in the Young Turk movement; therefore, he was exiled to Tripoli. However, he escaped to Paris. When he was in Paris, he attended to the *L'Ecolnces Politiques*. He continued with his education for three years where he became familiar with the concept of nation (Karakaş, 2007: 178). By the time he was in Paris, he did not lose contact with his friends who were also exiled from the Ottoman Empire. He also participated in the various activities of the Young Turk group who were still active in the French capital (Thomas, 1978: 131). At that time there were certain disagreements between the Young Turks. For example, some of them adopted liberal policies under Prince Sebahattin's leadership and were discussing the importance of Europe's support, whereas the other group under the leadership of Ahmet Rıza strongly opposed to any effect originating from Europe. In this period, Akçura was among the adherents of the group formed around Ahmet Rıza (Georgeon, 1986: 18).

In addition to his studies on politics, Akura followed the lectures of Durkheim and Tarde. When he completed his education, he temporarily settled in Russia and wrote his most famous article entitled *Üç Tarz-i Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy), in 1904. This article was quite important for the pan-Turkists just like the *Communist Manifesto* was important for the Marxists (Hostler, 1957: 145).

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, he was elected as a member of the parliament with Atatürk's initiative and served in this position for ten years. In this period, he continued to give lectures in the Faculty of Law at the Ankara University. Being the chair of the *Turkish Historical Society* and his studies on Central Asian Turkish history contributed to the rise of Turkish Nationalism (Çakmak & Yücel, 2002: 25).

#### 4.3. An analysis of the ideas of Gökalp and Akçura on Turkism

As mentioned in the previous section, since Gökalp lived within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, his main objective was to prevent the collapse of the state. However, Akçura was not interested in the unity of the state. Rather, he saw Turkism as the only way for the salvation of the Turks. Akçura preferred to focus on the problems of all Turks living in the world. Actually, this was a common interest among the Turks who originated from Middle Asia. These groups were less interested in the idea of the territorial unity of the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, Akçura was not attached to the Ottoman state like Gökalp was. In his view, a project which could save the Middle Asian Turks from their problems should be based on Turkish nationalism. Thus, he focuses on the idea of developing Turkish nationalism rather than saving the Ottoman Empire from a breakdown (Karakaş, 2007: 178). In line with these ideas, when he was in Paris, he learned economy and its impact on social events from Théophile Funck-Brentano; public psychology from Emile Boutmy and new ideas about the concept of nation from Albert Sorel. Furthermore, he followed the lectures of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Espinas, Tardé, Hautmant (founder of positivist history) and Charles Seignobos (Georgeon, 1995: 30). Thus, he concluded that the unity of the Ottoman Empire would be secured since it appeared to be inevitable to prevent the spread of

nationalist feelings within the boundaries of the Empire. For this reason, he put forward the idea that the only solution for the Turks was Turkism. Akçura, who could foresee the future ten years before his contemporaries, brought a different dimension to Turkism which was based only on the cultural field at that time.

Contrary to Akçura, the importance of the notion of nationalism was acknowledged at a later period by Gökalp since his prior concern was about maintaining the power of the state. Therefore, as Özyurt states, Gökalp's idea of Turkism was gradually built (2005: 181). He regarded the ideology of Ottomanism as necessary for the continuation of the Ottoman Empire at the first stages of his nationalist project. At the second stage, he put forward the idea that reviving the soul of Turkism was essential for the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. At this stage, he supported the idea that a core Turkish nation should be formed within the Ottoman society. At the last stage, he defended the idea of Turkism like Akçura did (Özyurt, 2005: 181).

Since Gökalp's primary concern was the unity of the state, he benefited from those theories which attributed a major role to the state. At earlier times, Gökalp was interested in the writings of Gabriel Tarde, Gustave Le Bon, Bergson, and Alfred Foulliéé. The ideas of Gabriel Tarde and Fouille formed part of Gökalp's theoretical foundations. Additionally, Gökalp took the idea of creative evolution from Bergson. (Mardin, 2007).

Although the above mentioned philosophers influenced Gökalp's horizon, he was strongly affected by Durkheim's works. Gökalp believed that Durkheim's theory, which was based on solidarism, was the most appropriate theory to overcome the problems of the Turkish nation. To what extent Durkheim influenced Gökalp's ideas is still a controversial topic among the Turkish social scientists.

Heyd argues that Gökalp did not do much original thinking; he only accepted and paraphrased Durkheim's theories. On the other hand, Parla claims that Durkheim's notions were successfully adapted to the Turkish society by Gökalp (in Davison, 1995: 193).

As will be seen in the following pages, Parla's claim seems more comprehensive since Gökalp introduced new concepts in addition to the ones he adopted from Durkheim.

According to Gökalp, there were two ways of explaining social phenomenon. One was historical materialism proposed by Karl Marx and the other one included social ideals of Emilé Durkheim. At first glance, these two systems of explaining social phenomenon are considered as similar since they both indicate that social phenomenon is the result of natural causes. In other words, they should obey the natural laws like physical, biological and psychological facts. From this point, these two approaches started to diverge from each other. Marx's theory is based on class struggle. Also Marx's theory is mostly based on economic explanations. However, Durkheim states that economic factors are not enough to interpret the social facts; therefore, other social facts should be taken into consideration. Gökalp in the same way believed that social phenomena are explained with the help of ideas. Therefore, he preferred to choose Durkheim's theory. According to Gökalp, class consciousness emerged after the emergence of national consciousness. Therefore, Marxist sociology cannot explain the phenomenon within the Ottoman Empire (Gökalp, 2004b: 107-110). Due to these reasons, for Gökalp, Durkheim's theory based on solidarity was the best theory to provide social and political unity of the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey (Karakaş, 2008: 447).

Inspired by Durkheim, Gökalp accepted that societies go through the stage of evolution from mechanical to organic solidarity. Based on this logic, Gökalp stated that industrial, political and economic changes were the results of structural and functional differentiation in two levels of human organization (Davison, 1995: 201). As Davison explains,

the first was within culture-nations where the advanced division of labor creates an occupational group structure within which individuals were incorporated. These occupational groups, (family or professionals) would function independently yet reciprocally in order to provide harmony in the society. The second level was the level of civilization which Gökalp

understood as the supranational grouping to which different nations belonged and within which they are related (1995: 201).

As will be mentioned in the following section, by claiming this, unlike Durkheim, Gökalp would differentiate between culture and civilization and so it would help him overcome the problems of merging modernization with Turkism and Islam.

In addition, Gökalp adopted the *idea of consciousness* and *collective representations* from Durkheim. For Gökalp, social life is not a product of physiology or psychology and so could not be explained in that way. On the contrary, the spiritual life, actions and culture of the individual are products of collective conscience (*Maşer'i Vicdan*). In other words, social life is nothing but a product of the activities of the individuals keeping touch with each other (Inalcık, 1964: 214). Gökalp claims that the collective conscious of the nation determines what is acceptable or unacceptable by the society. According to Mardin, “Gökalp's use of collective representations as mental patterns which are common to members of a society expressed through symbolism is closer to the Durkheimian use” (2007). Davison states that with this concept, “Durkheim means that each group within a differentiated group structure from the family to the civilization manifests itself through its shared ideals (1995: 202). In this context, Heyd notes that “Gökalp translates ideal by mefkure (ülkü)” (1956: 49). In his view, these ideals have long existed in the minds of people in the form of hidden longings. The only thing that should be required is to discover them. Again according to Heyd, “All expressions of the soul of the society, from fairy tales and religious beliefs to moral, legal and even economic conceptions are regarded as ideals” (1950: 50). In this respect, ideals are the product of supra individual society which unite a nation by implying common cultural heritage rather than political will to build a common future (Heyd, 1950: 62). These ideals are dependent upon certain social causes for the rise, growth, decline, and disappearance by changes in the constantly evolving social structures (Davison, 1995: 202).

Expressing his positivist idealism, Gökalp believed that scientific studies and evaluation can explain the processes related to socio-structural changes and

the ideals. With this perspective, he was of the opinion that an objective reading of the conditions under which Turks found themselves was necessary since it could show how Turks underwent a transformation from a multi-national empire to an independent nation-state. This made a prescription possible for the ideals essential to live within them (Davison, 1995: 202). Thus, for Gökalp, the most important duty of a sociologist is “to discover national consciousness existing at the unconscious level and to bring them up to the conscious level”<sup>2</sup> (in Davison, 1995: 201).

As understood from aforementioned statements Gökalp gave a priority to the unification of the state. Therefore, he developed his theory based on solidarism and corporatism. For Akçura, on the other hand, the reference point was *halk* (the people). That is, rather than the state, how the unity of Turkishness would be achieved became Akçura’s primary concern. According to him, through the human history, all nations asserted that their own folk or tribe was superior to than the others and they tried to show their strength to other nations. He believed that this idea was the first step for nationalism (Akçura, 1998b: 18). For him, nationalism belongs to the West. This newly emerging idea was imported from Europe but Turks adopted it totally without constructing a new theory. This idea was applied as a top-down policy followed by governors (Akçura, 1998b: 22). Actually, Akçura, contrary to Gökalp, states that nationalism should be the ideology of the public. Otherwise, with top-down policies success could not be reached. He claimed that nationalism, started by the top-down policies of the elites, was only for the protection of state, so it did not address to the emotions of public (Akçura, 1998b: 18). Therefore, Turkish consciousness should not only be developed in intellectuals minds. This consciousness needs to include the public, too since nationalism raised by intellectuals only cannot be effective. According to Akçura, intellectuals should have a close relationship with the public and understand their wishes and problems. Only by this way, a communication between the public and intellectuals could be achieved. According to Akçura,

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<sup>2</sup> These ideas can be found in Gökalp’s articles entitled as *İctimai Neviler* (Classification of Social Sciences) written in 1914, *Milli Terbiye* (National Education) in 1916, *Milli İctimaiyat* (National Sociology) in 1917, *Cemaat Ve Cemiyet* (Community and Society) in 1918.

Tatar modernization was achieved in this way. The close relationship between intellectuals and the public spread nationalist sentiment among the public in Russia. That is why the term “public” has a significant meaning for Akçura.

As stated above, the modernization efforts of the Tatars was very influential on Akçura’s ideas since he understood the importance of the bourgeoisie class for social change and the key role played by economic relations in a society. As a result, he developed his theory on the basis of Marxian ideology. Similar to Marx, Akçura attached importance to economic factors and claimed that economic factors determined every aspect of social relations. Therefore, economic factors should be taken into consideration while explaining social phenomenon. As Georgeon noted, Akçura tried to discover the affect of hidden reasons for material and economic power behind ideals (1986: 50) Therefore, he benefited from Marxian terminology. In his writings in the journal of *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, he blamed the Ottoman intelligentsia for being far away from Marxism and declared that like politicians, materialist understanding is more beneficial than idealism for historians (Akçura, 1998b: 10). This idea clearly indicates Marx’s influence on Akçura. Especially, in his writings before 1908, this influence becomes more evident. Afterwards, material and the economic factors became vital in Akcura's nationalist thought (Ahmad, 1980: 553).

Although he was not totally a Marxist, he developed his methodology by adopting various factors from historical materialism and improved his theory based on class analysis which went a step further than other nationalists. He was opposed to all projects ignoring economic and social factors. For instance, in his scathing criticism he made for the study program of *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni* in the magazine *Küçük Muhtıra* in 1911, he claimed that while this program focuses on Sultans, Pashas and Sirs, it neglects the economic and social aspects of historical development. Instead of one sided explanation, Akçura supported the historical writings including ordinary people. At this point, Akçura developed his unique program *İnkılabi ictimai* (Social revolution) from Marx’s theory. According to him, the formation of a national bourgeoisie should be essential in order to be a national and democratic modern state. In his view, national and democratic

states should be based on bourgeoisie which had the only power to change the society. The reason why the Ottoman state was in trouble was that there was no bourgeoisie class (Çakmak & Yücel, 2002: 16). In 1913, in the first volume of the magazine *Halka Doğru* (Towards People), he strongly supported the idea that the modernization and survival of the Ottoman Empire is possible with the rise of a middle class. For him, liberalism but a kind of protectionism led by Frederich List in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which aimed the industrialization of Germany, was essential for the development of the bourgeoisie (Akçura, 1998b: 15).

In the same way, in the conference named *Çağdaş Türk Devleti ve Aydınlarla Düşen Görev* (Modern Turkish Nation and Responsibilities of Intelligentsias) (June 1924) Akçura criticized the feudal structure of the Turkish society. He stated that on the one hand there were imperialists and feudal lords and on the other hand there were tradesmen, workers and peasants in the society. The state should make an attempt to abolish the feudal structure completely. In other words, democracy and a complete independence should be the main responsibility of the state. With the application of this program, it is possible for national bourgeoisie to take part in the state. In the final analyses he stated that our national bourgeoisie should struggle for the sake of forming a modern Turkish state (Akçura, 2007: 22). From these explanations, it is possible to interpret that although Akçura used the notion of class struggle, he favored the bourgeoisie in contrast to Marx. The meaning Marx attributed to working class was attributed to the bourgeoisie by Akçura (Georgeon, 1986: 137). Actually it can be regarded as evidence that Akçura did not just paraphrase the theories he adopted from West.

Analyzing Akçura's ideas which were based on economic relations and class struggle, it is understood that he had a revolutionist understanding compared to the Ottoman intellectuals who were not aware of the fact of the importance of class structure within societies. Indeed, it was quite difficult to accept the term 'class' for Ottoman intellectuals since the principle of equality and brotherhood of Islam was against a class division in societies. Therefore, in the Ottoman state there were no clear boundaries between classes. Nevertheless, in the Tatar community, social classes like bourgeoisies, villagers and aristocracy were already existent.



Thus, at the beginnings of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of class was not unfamiliar to Akçura (Georgeon, 1986: 88).

The thought of Gökalp foregrounding solidarity of the state made him to think to combine these three ideologies, Islamism, Turkism and modernism. He expressed his thought in the articles Turkification, Islamization and modernization that he wrote in the journal *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) in 1912. In these articles, he claimed that Turkish nationalism did not contradict with Islam and modernization. On the contrary, these three factors could be in cohesion. He believed that the two crucial factors, Islamism and modernization would play an important role in the new policy (Karakaş, 2008: 457). According to Gökalp “we are a part of Turkish nation, the Muslim religious community and the European civilization” (in Heyd, 1959: 149).

At this point it is crucial to mention the ideas of Namık Kemal and Hüseyin Zade Ali since they were the scholars who focused on these three ideals for the first time and explained the relations among them. They claimed that these three phenomena were complementary and would never conflict with each other. More specifically, the main concern of Namik Kemal was to merge the modern aspects of Western civilization with Islamic religion and the moral and political institutions of the old Ottoman tradition. Namik Kemal states that,

There were no contradictions among them. Islam would provide the moral and legal basis of society; the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multi-religious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman (not Turkish) state; and Western civilization would furnish the material and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the contemporary world of power and economic progress (in Gökalp, 1959: 18).

While forming this trio-synthesis, Gökalp differentiated culture from civilization. Simply, Gökalp aimed to indicate a balance among Turkism, Islamism and Modernism with the help of differentiating between culture and civilization. Gökalp’s discussion on culture and civilization and his views on nation and nationalism constitute the core of his social philosophy (Heyd, 1950: 66).

To Gökalp, during the *Tanzimat* reform era, there were people with their own intimate and informal institutions, religion and art. Moreover, there were official organizations with its formal and artificial institutions. They remained alien and irreconcilable. To him, the reason for this anomalous situation was the lack of adjustment between two essential but distinct aspects of social life: culture and civilization. These two concepts are closely related and complementary traits of social reality (Gökalp, 1959: 23). Gökalp's understanding of civilization refers to the modes of action composed of traditions which are created by different ethnic groups. These are transmitted from one to another group while culture is composed of the mores of a particular nation; therefore, it is unique and sui generis (1959: 23). According to Gökalp, all feelings, judgments and ideals belong to culture, whereas methods and technology of rational and scientific knowledge are the parts of civilization (Heyd, 1950: 64).

More specifically, culture constitutes a system whose elements have an integral connection with one another on the basis of a peculiar logic which constitutes the ethos; civilization is a product of detachment from that logic. Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in human life only when they serve culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of mechanical imagination (Gökalp, 1959: 23). In Gökalp's view,

it is Japan that best makes a distinction between culture and civilization. They adopted occidental civilization on condition that they preserved their own religion and nationality, which helped them settle in European civilization in any aspect (1959: 23).

By giving Japan as an example, Gökalp stresses on the preservation of culture. To him, we could be influenced by the occidental culture, we can even admire their culture but the beauties that belong to other nations are only the exotic ones. While we admire them, we will never be enamored by them. It is never possible that we imitate any of these cultures (Gökalp, 1959: 23). Thus, he states that the material aspects of European civilization should be taken only from the West (in Berkes, 1959: 21). However, for Akçura, such a limitation was wrong. According to him, all material and spiritual aspects should be taken from the Western world

(Georgeon, 1986: 104). Gökalp later benefited from the distinction between culture and civilization in order to get rid of Ottoman identity. For Gökalp civilization is international and can be changeable without doing any harm to culture. There exists a one-sided relation among the civilizations. Certain civilizations expired and are replaced by new ones. Eastern civilization could not resist today's conditions and gave its way to Western civilization (Sezer, 1985: 237). From this point of view, he states that Ottomanism and Turkism existed as two different identities for ages, so these two identities can be separated. It has been advocated that denying Ottomanism does not necessarily do any harm to Turkish identity. Therefore, Ottomanism is against Turkish culture and it has been a necessity to get rid of it (Sezer, 1988: 230-31).

On these points, Gökalp is close to some of the German sociologists such as Tönnies and Alfred Weber (Berkes, 1936: 242). To Heyd, there is strong evidence that Gökalp took up the theory of culture and civilization from Tönnies's "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft theory" (1950: 66). Tönnies regards culture as,

the expression of an organic society or community (*gemeinschaft*) which is based on the natural will of its members and reflects their emotional characteristics while the free or arbitrary will, the product of the intellect to which it remains subject creates the artificial society (*gesellschaft*), its expression, and civilization (Heyd, 1950: 67).

This difference inspired Gökalp to take a step for distinguishing culture and civilization (Heyd, 1950: 67).

Gökalp's "Turkification, Islamization, Modernization" later transformed into his "The Principles of Turkism" (*Türkçülüğün Esasları*), which was used as an ideological frame for the nationalists of the Republican era. As discussed above, Gökalp's ideas underwent a change in time considering the changing political conditions. After his exile to Malta, the change in his ideas was quite evident in his writings. In these writings, Gökalp, who formerly regarded Ottomanism as a policy to be followed, later described it as an old civilization. At that time, for Turks who were in the Independence<sup>72</sup> War, the policy of Ottomanism had

already been over. In Diyarbakır, he contributed to write about the process of creating a new nation in the Republican era with his articles published in the journal *Küçük Mecmua* (Mardin, 2007).

Due to his writings in this journal, Gökalp was appointed to the Bureau in Charge of Publication and Translation. Afterwards, he devoted himself to promoting the ideology of the government through a brochure *Doğru Yol* (The Right Way) (Karakaş, 2008: 465). In this way, he began to play a similar role he had played in the Committee of Union and progress.

As discussed above, when Gökalp asserted that these there ideologies were not conflicting with each other, Akçura, with his work *Üç Tarzı Siyaset*, wrote that Turkishness was one of the ways for liberation. Contrary to Gökalp's synthesis-formula, Akçura preferred one of the policies out of three. Akçura had the ability to analyze the Russian Turks' situation in the best way since he was born among the Turks who struggled to survive in Russia. Thus, compared to Gökalp, Akçura had much information about the Turks out of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Akçura could make successful analysis related to the unity of the Turks in the world. He stated that just like the non-Muslims struggling for independence in the Ottoman state, the Turkish Muslims in Russia also fought for their freedom. In this respect, Akçura, who was half a Tatar, half Ottoman and half aristocrat, was the first person to see the parallelism between the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks in Russia. Thus, Akçura grasped the future of Turkish nationalism in Turkey before Gökalp did (Georgeon, 1986: 34).

In his essay, Akçura formulated three possible basis of unity in the Ottoman State and examined Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism in terms of their benefits to the Ottoman Empire. While doing this, he always addressed the reason, not emotions. Contrary to Akçura, Gökalp emphasized the dignity of the Turkish past and its contribution to civilization. Akçura, on the other hand, aimed to emphasize the reasons why the Turks preferred the Turkist idea (Georgeon, 1986: 34). By analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of these politics, he followed the

utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham<sup>3</sup> (Georgeon, 1986: 34). Actually, what he wanted was to persuade the officials of the Ottoman Empire to select a new policy. This idea brought a new dimension to Turkism. When Pan-Turkist movement is studied deeply, it is understood that Pan-Turkism had a cultural dimensions until Akçura. The most important contribution of him is to give a political dimension to the pan-Turkist movement. According to Georgeon, *Üç Tarzı Siyaset* written by Akçura is the first example of reflecting this fact (Georgeon, 1986: 2). In this respect, most of the historians accepted him as “a father of Pan-Turkism” (Zenkovsky, 1960: 332).

As noted above, Akçura pragmatically discussed the validity of Islamism, Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism under the political and social situations of his time. He pointed out that the Islamists and Ottomanists primarily maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and create an international block against European aggression (Berkes, 1959: 20). In his pamphlet, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, he defines Ottomanism as an attempt by the Ottoman government to use one-single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality and unity among all subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity and language (Karpat, 2000: 6). According to him, there is no Ottoman nation and it is a wasted effort to try and create one nation. That is, Ottomanism was only a fantasy since the Ottoman society was not similar to the United States. To pursue the policy of Ottomanism would degrade the position of the Turks in the society who were the ones controlling the Empire (Kushner, 1977: 96).

Pan-Islamism, on the other hand, emerged in the 1870s and became the policy for the interdependence among Islamic nations. Pan-Islamism for Akçura was also a utopia since the ascending national movements and feelings were against the existing religious feelings (in Oğuz, 2005: 69). Pan-Islamic policy, seeking a union of Islamic peoples, would be resisted by Christian powers successfully. Also

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<sup>3</sup> The theory of Utilitarianism developed by John Stuart Mills and Jeremy Bentham in 1880s holds that one should aim at maximizing the welfare of all people. Only by this way, happiness should be possible. *The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy* ed. Thomas Mautner <http://www.utilitarianism.com/jsmill.htm>

the Turks would gain nothing (Georgeon, 1986: 39). Therefore, as Berkes states, in the book *Turkish nationalism and Western Civilization*, Akçura proposed another “pan-idea” which was equally grandiose, but perhaps more effective and more modern, as well as more useful for the Turks (1959: 20). Only Pan-Turkism would save the state since “the only supporters of the state are Turks (Kushner, 1977: 96). Turkist policy would rally the loyalties of the dominant Turkish race within the Ottoman Empire and reinforce it with that of the many millions of Turks in Russia and elsewhere, beyond the Ottoman frontiers. The only thing which needed to be done was to inculcate the self-confidence of the Ottoman Turks and to recollect their strength of being a Turk (Akçura, 1928: 304–306). For such a policy, he argued that there were fewer internal obstacles than for Ottomanism, fewer external obstacles than pan Islamism (Lewis, 1968: 326). “The European powers that are in conflict with Russia will support the pan-Turanian plans of Turkey” (Kushner, 1977: 96). Also, stressing the association between the Turks and the Europeans would prevent the Balkan nations to attack the Ottoman State. Thus, articulating Touro-Aryanism could surpass the prejudice of European powers against the Turks (Akçura, 1928: 304–306). By claiming this he gives the feeling that he supported the ideology of Turkism. His emphasis on Turkism in his later works indicates this fact.

#### 4.4. Islam and secularism in Gökalp and Akçura

As aforementioned explanations suggest, Gökalp and Akçura developed different ideas about the place of Islam in the modern world. There is a hot debate about Gökalp’s ideas on religion and nationalism. While scholars like Heyd, Parla and Berkes claim that Gökalp had a weak understanding of religion; Arai and Dodd argue that religion had an important place in Gökalp’s works. According to the first claim nationalism and modernity were much more important than Islam for Gökalp (Davison, 1995: 197). The scholars who defend this idea claim that Gökalp’s thinking provided an intellectual framework for the Kemalist revolution. It is argued that being inspired by Gökalp’s ideas, Atatürk abolished the Caliphate in 1924 and abolished the Constitutional Clause stating Islam as the religion of the state in 1928 (Davison, 1995: 198). According to the second claim, the

Islamic components in Gökbalp's writings are strong. Thus, it is argued that Gökbalp supported the idea of retaining the Arab alphabet (a common feature of Muslim culture) and working on a common terminology for all Muslims (Davison, 1995: 200). He also promoted an 'umma-wide' congresses about common educational policies to establish a link among all Muslims nations and to keep the crescent as a the common symbol of all these countries (Mardin, 2007). Following the abolition of the Sultanate by the Kemalist regime, Gökbalp stated that religious institutions should only be concerned with matters of faith. (Mardin, 2007). Actually, since he was a student of Durkheim, Gökbalp maintained the idea that Islam included the philosophy which formed the basis of social solidarism and unity (Parla, 1993: 85). Parallel to Parla's view, Karakaş states that Islam, which is based on a moral philosophy and which is not individualistic, was the core of Turkism for Gökbalp (2008: 457). Although Gökbalp accepted Islam as the most important dimension of social life, he believed that Islam represents a purely ethical religion which is free from all political and social rules. Therefore, he was against Pan-Islamism which supports the unity of Muslims is in favor of the *ummah* understanding.

Akçura on the other hand, did not aim to merge religion and Turkism since the rise of national consciousness among the Russian Turks went hand in hand with the Islamic reform movement. As Beningsen states, the Tatar bourgeoisie understood that a new policy should be developed in order to resist Russian imperialism. With the help of the unity of language and religion among the Turks, Tatars tried to spread the Pan-Turkic ideology (in Georgeon, 1986: 14). Şehabeddin Mercani, Kayyum El Nasıri and Alimcan Barudi were the pioneers in of Tatar modernization (Georgeon, 1986: 23). Under the guidance of these religious authorities, modernization of Islam was initiated against the Russification project during the reign of Alexander III. Against the missionary activities of the Russians these leaders defended the idea of returning to pure Islam and claimed that Islam did not conflict with modern sciences. For that purpose, they founded the 'Cedidi Schools' where modern and theological sciences were taught simultaneously (Georgeon, 1986: 23-26). These reform movements in religion affected Akçura's idea of modernization very much. He thought that all the reform movements excluding religious institutions would

be unsuccessful. That is why he criticized the modernization movements which took place during the *Tanzimat* era (Georgeon, 1986: 25).

For Akçura Islam should be national and serve for Turkish nationalism like Protestantism and Anglicanism did in Europe (Akçura, 1998a: 34). To him, in order to nationalize Islam reform movements were necessary. Gökalp shared a similar idea with Akçura in his later works. Like Akçura he defended Turkism in religion (2004b: 227).

#### 4.5. Nationalism in Gökalp and Akçura: cultural versus ethnic nationalism

Gökalp in his book *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (The Principles of Turkism) presented a lifestyle in which Turkism was determinant in art, morality, religious life, economics, politics and philosophy. This suggests that he began to give more importance to cultural factors. In this book Gökalp explained the definition of a nation in a detailed way.

According to Gökalp, the primary factor in a nation's formation was not related to race, ethnic unity or symbiotic coexistence with other nations. This was because Gökalp thought that the concept of race was used basically in zoology. In other words, only animal species could be classified in accordance with their anatomical characteristics. The application of this term to human societies had no meaning since if we used the terms race and nation interchangeably, no nation in Europe would belong to a single race (Gökalp, 2004b: 41; Gökalp, 1959: 25). In other words, every nation is composed of different races. Therefore, it is pointless to use the concept of race when defining what a nation is.

For Gökalp, similarly, a nation cannot be equated with an ethnic group, i.e. a *kavim* which is a group of consanguine descending from same parents (Gökalp, 1959: 134). He also claims that ethnic groups were not ethnically pure even in prehistoric times. Through marriages, migrations and assimilation ethnic communities mix with each other. Therefore, there were no pure people



throughout the history. Gökalp writes that humans are born as asocial beings and social consciousness has not innate characteristics. In other words, humans do not born with a language, religion or ascetic feelings. He/she acquires all these later through education. That is, social traits are transmitted through education, not through biological inheritance. Therefore, ethnic unity does not play a crucial role in the formation of a nation (Gökalp, 1959: 134; Gökalp, 2004b: 42-44).

Gökalp claims that nations must have an ethnic base, but must undergo a process of transformation within supra-national formations and must experience the revival of a national consciousness under great events. Although nations turn to their ethnic past during this revival process and consider it as their continuation, they are no longer the same ethnic unit and cannot return to outdated conditions. According to Gökalp, ethnic societies having emerged as modern nations went through a kind of captivity in international politico-religious civilizations. In addition, they have appeared as completely new formations with the development of the process of secularization and democratization (Gökalp, 1959: 25; Gökalp, 2004b: 42-43).

Gökalp is opposed to scholars who define a nation as people living in the same geography or sharing the same religion. He states that there are sometimes several nations within the same geographical region and sometimes a certain nation may be dispersed in different geographical regions. For instance, today the Oghuz Turks live in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran and since their language and culture are the same, they should be accepted as constituting the same nation (Gökalp, 1959: 136). Likewise, there are different nations who share the same religion. For instance, the Arabs, Turks and Kurds all believe in Islam. Thus, they cannot be accepted as constituting the same nation.

Nationality, in the same way, cannot be defined by individual choice. Gökalp states that a nation is not a voluntary association like a political party at which he/she may join with his/her own desire (Gökalp, 1959: 136; Gökalp, 2004b: 42-43).

Shortly, a nation does not mean *ummah* or an ethnic group. Gökalp thinks that the modern nation is a community with a unique complex of cultural values. Modern nation is also a reflection of a society based on organic solidarity, division of labor and functional differentiation (Gökalp, 1959: 25; Gökalp, 2004b: 46-47). For him, a nation is not based on racial, ethnic, geographic or political ties, but it is a group consisting of individuals sharing a common language, religion, morality and ascetics. Every individual belongs to a particular nation in terms of his/her feelings. A definition of a nation given in the 1931 Programme of the Republican People's Party was similar to that of Gökalp's since there too a nation was described as a political and social body consisting of citizens bound together by unity of language, culture and a common ideal (Heyd, 1950: 63). In other words, the Republican People's Party did not use the word race when defining the concept of nation, but used a definition similar to Gökalp's.

Gökalp states that culture and education determine one's nationality. In other words, nation means sharing the same culture and the same feelings. In a more general sense,

Nation is a group composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in language, religion, morality and ascetics. The Turkish folk express the same idea by simply saying: the one whose language is my language, and whose faith is my faith, is of me. Men want to live together, not with those who share the same language, and the same faith. Our human personality is not our physical body but our mind and soul. If our physical excellences come from our racial traits, our moral virtues come from the society in which we are raised .....Thus, it is absurd to base nationality on lineage. It is only shred education and ideals which are most essential to nationality (Gökalp, 1959: 137).

From these explanations, Gökalp reached the conclusion that there are citizens whose grandmothers or grandfathers belong to the Arab lands or Albania. However, they were educated as Turks and remained loyal to the Turkish ideals. Thus, it is not possible to exclude them from Turkish nationality (Gökalp, 1959: 137). As clearly seen above, education has a crucial place in nationalism for Gökalp. In his view, nationalism can be achieved through education since the most

important function of it is to socialize the individuals. In other words, education provides the internalization of moral and cultural norms in a society so that the person turns from his individuality to a social personality. In this sense, Gökalp is strongly opposed to those blaming him for being Kurdish.

Gökalp's ancestors came from Çermik, a small town close to Diyarbakır. To prove his Turkish origin, Gökalp claims that Çermik, surrounded by Kurdish villages, had always been inhabited by Turks. Nevertheless, Gökalp's political opponents maintained that he had a Kurdish origin. For instance, Ali Kemal, who published article in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* asserts that Gökalp' ancestors were Kurds of the Zaza tribe. Gökalp refutes this statement and states that when he first came to Istanbul in 1896, he felt like a Turk. He also adds that even if his ancestors had a Kurdish origin, he would have regarded himself as a Turk since education and feelings determine the nationality of a man instead of his racial origin. He admits that his doubts related to his national origin were among the main reasons which urged him to examine his true nationality afterwards (Heyd, 1950: 21). In relation to this, Heyd pointed out that whatever his origin is, there is no doubt that he grew up in a Turkish milieu. Although Gökalp spoke Kurdish and even did some research on this language, his mother tongue was Turkish (Heyd, 1950: 22).

Thus, it can be stated that Gökalp did not built his statements on ethnic nationalism. Although there was an emphasis on Pan-Turanism in his early ages, his nationalism in his adulthood was based on cultural nationalism. Actually, it is obvious that Gökalp imagined such a unity as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Parla, 1993: 76). As İnan states, Gökalp believed that an individual is attached to the community in which he grows up since the ideal of the community appeals to his/her soul (1976: 57). For Gökalp, through national manners, a nation can get rid of captivity and believes that it will live independently. In order to achieve this aim, the language and methods of national education should be national as well (İnan, 1976: 28).

As for Akçura, he specifically emphasizes a new Turkish state based on the Turkish race in his pamphlet *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. According to Georgeon, Akçura's emphasis on race indicates his differences from other Turkish nationalists. Before Akçura, the terms like *Ummah* and *Neseb* were used to differentiate the Turks from Arabs. These traditional terms were kind of words which define the Turks as a part of Islamic *umma*. Throughout their histories, Turks had served for Islam and tried to define themselves with Islam. By using the word "race", Akçura pointed out an ethnic Turkish nation which was not equated with Islam. To Akçura, Turks should not associate themselves with Islam (Karakaş, 2007: 246). He claims that religions should serve for the races. Therefore, Islam should serve for Turkish nationalism just as the Orthodoxy in Russia, the Protestantism in Germany and Anglicanism in England served for their own nationalism (Akçura, 1998a: 34). Actually, these discussions show the secular understanding of Akçura compared to other Turkish nationalists.

However, contrary to Gökalp who clearly defines the terms such as race, gender, tribe and *umma* while defining nation, Akçura's definition of a nation is not clear. While Akçura was stating that a Turkish nation should be formed on the basis of a Turkish race, it is not clear whether he referred to the unity of the people with the same ethnic origin. Actually, it is difficult to grasp what Akçura meant by race. In his pamphlet Akçura states that Turkism would bring together the Turks sharing the same race, religion, custom and language (Akçura, 1998a: 33). In 1925, in the conference named *Çağdaş Türk Devletinde Aydınlarla Düşen Görevler* (Modern Turkish Nation and Responsibilities of Intellectuals) after the rebellion of Şeyh Said, Akçura defined a nation as a community with a similar culture and language. According to him, they have the same legal, moral and ascetics feelings (Akçura 2007: 2). Additionally, in his book *Türkçülüğün Tarihi* (the History of Turkism) in 1928, he defined a nation as a society which shares the same language and race (1998b: 18). Georgeon and Karakaş claim that the meaning Akçura attributed to nation is the same with the meaning anthropologists attributed to *Budun*, which refers to a common cultural heritage to a large extent. In this sense, they state that Akçura was not in favor of ethnic nationalism (Georgeon, 1986: 43-44; Karakaş, 2007: 251). For them, Akçura did not lay the

foundation of Turkish nation on only race, but emphasized that the unity of language, custom and religion are also important. Therefore, his definition was actually similar to the definition of Germans and Slavs (Georgeon, 1986: 43-44; Karakaş, 2007: 251). Berkes, parallel to their ideas, emphasizes that what Akçura meant by the notion of race had nothing to do with blood relationship. He states that while Akçura was discussing the historical relationship among the Turkish, Slavic and Cermen *kavims* or races, there were no Turkish translations for the words like *kavm* or *race* in the Ottoman Empire at those times. Therefore, like the French, he used this term in the meaning of nationality (Berkes, 1985: 212).

Actually, what race meant during that period might not be evident; however, if Akçura had wanted he would have clarified the concepts one by one like Gökalp did and would have conveyed with which meaning he used the word “race”. Nevertheless, Akçura chose not to describe these concepts clearly. This can be explained by claiming that Akçura was definitely not a theorist of Turkish nationalism. He was interested particularly in the social dimension of Turkism. That is, rather than Turkism, Turkishness was crucial for him (Georgeon, 1986: 44). According to Georgeon, since Akçura did not have the concern for defining what he understood with the term Turkism, he could not make a systematic explanation like Gökalp did (1986: 44). In this respect, as Berkes states, he was like a swimmer swimming sometimes on the water and sometimes under the water. For this reason, people working on his works have difficulty in understanding his ideology. For this reason, as Berkes highlights, Akçura is more meaningful for racist nationalists instead of Gökalp (Berkes, 1985: 212).

In this part, I focused on the characteristic aspects of Gökalp and Akçura’s nationalist thoughts and aimed to discuss the differences and similarities between their Turkism. Analyzing their works, it is argued that they did not develop a totally different ideology on Turkism.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

With the Renaissance and Reformation movements, dramatic changes had started in the political, economical and social spheres in West European countries. Naturally, these changes were the result of the rapid developments in technology, population growth, education, secularization of the intelligentsia and new the techniques developed for collecting information and making propaganda. All of these developments triggered the idea of nation and nationalism (Tak, 1997: 4).

Actually, the emergence of nationalism was the manifestation of the gradual downfall of big empires and the establishment of small nation-states. The existence of over 200 nation-states in the world corroborates this fact. Although due to the globalization process the boundaries between countries blurred and similarities became more prominent than differences, the newly emerging nation-states which gained their independence with the collapse of communism are an illustration of the strength of nationalist sentiments even at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As Chirot states, “In the wake of communism’s collapse, nationalism appeared as the primary concern in the realignment of Eastern European politics and identity” (in Calhoun, 1993: 214). Considering Europe, reactions against the supranational European Union still exist. The parties especially emphasizing racial and cultural discrimination increased their vote to a large extent in Belgium, Holland and France. Therefore, nationalism still is a powerful force shaping the present world politics.

Nationalist movements that have directed world politics for such a long time developed in two different ways. In Western countries, the creation of nation and the building of the state went hand in hand. A nation in these countries was defined as the people having the same rights before the law formulated by the state (Minoque, 1974: 34). At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, nationalist movements

that were transferred to Central and Eastern Europe had entirely different traditions and social structures. In these lands nationalism became a trend towards collective self-assertion and emphasized the natural peculiarities of different nations. Moreover, there was a focus on the role of intellectuals, artists and humanity's yearnings for the infinite. In this sense, human emotion and self expression were at the center of this kind of nationalism. Furthermore, a special emphasis was given to the need of finding one's own identity through gaining authentic experience. Discovering one's roots and true nature was quite crucial as well (Kedourie in Hutchinson, & Smith, 1994: 5). Turkish nationalism was quite influenced from this type of nationalism. Thus, like in Germany, during periods of great change and crises, the intellectuals of the Ottoman State needed to find a formula and a new equilibrium to balance the unrest which was caused by the domestic upheaval. Thus, in Ottoman history, the reaction of New Ottomans in 1856 against the influences of West was in fact an indicator of this necessity (İnalçık, 1964: 209). In this respect, it is meaningful to claim that at the very beginning nationalism started as an elite movement in the Ottoman Empire. The manifesto which took a start with intellectuals like Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa was introduced by Young Turks who were gathered during the period of Abdülhamid II (İnalçık, 1964: 209).

The rise of Turkish nationalism went parallel to modernization attempts of the Ottoman officials. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman bureaucrats considered modernity as a goal to overcome the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism and Islamism were the sub-ideologies of the state, which were essential for its survival. Despite their failure, in some aspects, these policies speeded the emergence of Turkish nationalism (Karpas, 2000: 1–3). Young Ottomans who graduated from Western type of schools and who were the outcomes of modernization attempts were the first group to increase the nationalist sentiment among the Turks. Inspired by Turkology studies, they paid special emphasis on Turkish culture, language and history. Thereafter, the Young Turks, with the help of Russian Turks gave a new meaning to the movement and transferred Turkish nationalism into a political movement.

Analyzing the rise of Turkish nationalism two legendary figures, Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, became prominent since both Gökalp and Akçura shaped the nature of Turkish nationalism which had important consequences for the newly established Turkish state. In this respect, they can be accepted as the spiritual fathers of Turkish nationalism. Although they developed different theories of Turkism, they share similar ideas in many ways. The best way to grasp their Turkism is to analyze their social and political environments in which they lived. Since he lived within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire; therefore, the main objective of Gökalp was to protect the unity of the state.

Akçura on the other hand, was not concerned with the current borders of the empire since he believed that the separation of non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman society was going to be inevitable in the near future. According to him, the time was to form nation-states; therefore, the most logical way was to establish a Turkish-nation state. This idea enabled him to go one step further than other intellectuals of his time. As a result, he influenced from the German-romantic theories of nationalism, he mostly studied the Turkic elements throughout Europe and Asia (Thomas, 1978: 132). In this respect, he was more likely to be named as a Pan-Turkist.

Gökalp however, in his early writings was a proponent of the idea of Ottomanism rather than Turkism. He aimed to indicate a balance among Turkism, Islamism and modernism. He claimed that Turkish nationalism did not contradict with Islam and modernization; on the contrary, these three factors could be in cohesion (Karakaş, 2008: 457). Gökalp synthesized these three policies with the help of differentiating culture from civilization. In his view, civilization were created by different ethnic groups and transmitted from one to another. Culture (*Hars*) on the other hand, refers to mores of a particular nation; therefore, it is unique (Berkes, 1954: 384). For him, as culture and civilization are two distinct fields of study, one would follow a policy, which favors the West. Since Turkism and Islamism have national and international characteristics, they do not conflict with each other (Özyurt, 2005: 182). Later, under the leadership of Gökalp's ideas, a group



of nationalists tried to combine Turkism and Islamism. His book entitled *Turkification, Islamization, Westernization* has become a source of inspiration for the idea known as Turkish-Islam synthesis starting from the early Republican era up to the present (Inalcık, 2005: 14).

The main objective of Russian origin nationalist Akçura on the other hand, was a more secular understanding of Turkism. As Karal states, his pamphlet, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, (Three Ways of Policy) can be regarded as the declaration of his secular idea (Karal, in Akçura, 1998a: 11). Contrary to Gökalp's synthesis-formula, Akçura pragmatically discussed the validity of Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism. Again, unlike what Gökalp has argued, Akçura stated that Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkism were separate ideologies. Therefore, only one of these three ideologies can be chosen as the path to be followed. In his final analysis, Akçura accepted Turkism as one of the most appropriate policy for the salvation of the Turks.

According to him, Turkism would rally the loyalties of the dominant Turkish race within the Ottoman Empire and reinforce it with that of the many millions of Turks in Russia and elsewhere, i.e., beyond the Ottoman frontiers. In contrast to Gökalp's idea, Akçura stated that Islam should serve for Turkish nationalism just as Orthodoxy in Russia, Protestantism in Germany and Anglicanism in England did (Akçura, 1998a: 16). With this idea in his mind, he actually argued that Islam should have a national character. Gökalp in a similar way, in his later works, emphasized the importance of national Islam. His emphasis on Turkism in Islamic religion indicates this fact.

The main reason why Gökalp developed a synthesis was to maintain the continuity of the state. Therefore, he defined nation in terms of cultural elements. Emphasizing the cultural unity of the nation Gökalp aimed to form a theory based on solidarity that the state needed. Gökalp clarified terms such as race, *kavim* (ethnic family), tribe and *umma* (religious community) while defining a nation. Nation is not based upon racial, ethnic, geographic or political volitional ties, but

it is a group consisting of individuals sharing a common language, religion, morality and ascetics. In other words, nation means sharing the same culture and the same feelings. In his view, education determines one's nationality since the most important function of it is to socialize the individuals. As inferred from these explanations, Gökalp was in favor of cultural nationalism. As Tanyu states, the sole purpose of his Turkism was based on providing cultural unity in Turkey (1962: 84). His dream was to integrate all of the ethnic groups living in Turkey just like it is in the United States of America (Ülken, in Inalcık, 2005: 12). Gökalp followed a Turkic policy to bring about integration, not assimilation. He used the term "Türkiyelilik" which is another expression of Gökalp's cultural nationalism. He summarizes his cultural Turkism as follows,

I am from Turkey in terms of my nationality, I am a Turk in terms of my *hars*, and a nation is an *harsi* class. The apparent indications of *hars* are language and religion. Thus, Turkish nation is consisted of Muslims speaking Turkish (Tanyu, 1962: 83).

However, in his work *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, Akçura talks about a Turkish state based on the same race (1998a: 23). However, he did not clarify the meaning of this term. Therefore, there has been a debate on whether he was favor of ethnic nationalism or not. If the concept of race that Akçura used in his definition of a nation is understood as blood connection, Akçura can be thought as a racist nationalist. However, it should not be overlooked that the meaning of this word has changed in time. As Berkes stated with reference to France, this term referred to nationality at that time, but with the rise of Nazism in Germany the word 'race' began to be used in the meaning of blood relations. Berkes claims that Akçura used this word in the meaning of nationality. Therefore, he was not favor of ethnic nationalism.

However, unlike Akçura, Gökalp, has much more clear definitions and concepts in his systematic theory. At a time when Akçura defined a nation on the basis of the concept of race, Gökalp preferred to define a nation in terms of cultural elements. According to him, "a nation is a group composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in

language, religion, morality and ascetics” (Gökalp, 1959: 137). In his definition he clearly defined such terms like race and *kavim* (ethnic family). In Gökalp’s view, nation is not based on race since the concept of race is basically used in zoology. Actually this indicates Gökalp’s ability to form a systematic theory of Turkism compared to Akçura. In his later works Akçura added two significant factors in his definition, language and a custom, and defined a nation as a community sharing the same race, language, and customs (in Georgeon, 1986: 43). It is logical to explain this situation with his realization of the existence of other ethnic groups who struggled for independence together with Turks. Therefore, he needed to include racially different groups in his definition of a nation.

Having in mind the conditions of that period, the ideas of Gökalp were meeting the demands of the new Turkish Republic to a greater extent. Gökalp’s cultural Turkism was more suitable to bring peace to Turkey right after the Independence War. To be more specific, cultural nationalism of Gökalp was providing solidarism which met the needs of the young Turkish state. Therefore, the officials of the new Turkish republic took reference of Gökalp’s cultural nationalism.

The ideas of Akçura on the other hand, reawakened especially after the collapse of Soviet Union. Before that, Akçura’s name was almost forgotten. It will not be wrong to say that the same reasons which made Gökalp unforgotten applies to Akçura’s being forgotten. Kuran summarizes these reasons by stating that firstly, Akçura dignified Mogol Empire and assumed Cenghis Khan as a Turk. Secondly, for the development of Turkish history he did not give an important place to Islam. Lastly, he was inclined to socialism. Most of the Turkish historians did not accept Mongolians as Turks after the 1940s. Instead of socialism, they were inclined towards the Turk-Islam synthesis. Moreover, his being a contemporary of Ziya Gökalp was a bad luck for him. Although he was well-informed, Gökalp’s idealism was captivating Turkish intellectuals (1987: 48).

Akçura’s closeness to the ideas of Marxism, his positive attitude towards the Russian Revolution, his people-centered ideas and economy-based explanations caused him to be perceived as a communist among the Turkish

intellectuals; thus, his ideology was less accepted by the intellectuals. His being one of the founders of the National Constitutionalists Party together with Mustafa Suphi, who established Turkey's Communist Party later in 1910, reinforced this idea. This party was influenced by the socialist ideology strongly (Georgeon, 1986: 64).

Therefore, the rightists remained distant from Akçura. However, as noted above, the collapse of Soviet Union reminded the fact that Russia originated ideas of Akçura should be re-considered.

The explanations aforementioned indicate that Gökalp and Akçura as two distinguished ideologists still have an influence on the content of Turkish nationalism. Thus, they deserve to be scholars whose ideas need to be re-evaluated since when we examine the ideas of Gökalp and Akçura, we see that although Akçura and Gökalp lived 100 years ago, they argued about issues which are being still discussed in Turkey. The role and place of Islam, Westernization, cultural conservatism, modernity, traditions and secularization are the issues which are still hotly debated in non-governmental organizations, universities and the media. Thus, Gökalp's Turkism which was organized around cultural unity and Akçura's Turkism built on a people-centered understanding will enlighten the contemporary discussions about nationalism.

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