

THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY: WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER

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ABSTRACT

THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY: WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER

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Considering comparative studies in philosophy, the relationship between philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger has a remarkable place in history. In this thesis, I attempt to discuss their philosophies to reveal their common suggestion to philosophy, which could be understood as a cure to the misleading formulations of philosophical problems. Their philosophical method begins with giving attention to the pre-theoretical attitude of human beings in ordinary life, in evaluating the philosophical notions. To explain, by way of beginning with this pre-theoretical attitude, both attempts to expose the bases of philosophical problems. The core point is to reveal that the insight of the starting point of the Heideggerian philosophy could be correctly apprehended by considering him as a Wittgensteinian therapist. Despite the commonalities of these two philosophers, there are considerable differences between them because of their aims and backgrounds in philosophy. Because of these differences, Heidegger provides the therapeutic philosophy with an “existentialist dimension. That is to say, Heidegger goes one step further, after emphasizing everyday life in approaching the

problems and complexities of our language and thought. This step can be understood by questioning one's actions in daily life. Thus, it goes beyond exactly where Wittgenstein left off, turns to our tool of dissolution (everyday life) itself, and questions what we do with it in order to reveal the fundamental being of Dasein and its world. When this is considered a treatment of “inauthentic” being, the existential dimension of therapy is added to the picture.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, therapeutic philosophy, fundamental ontology, philosophical illnesses

ÖZ

TERAPÖTİK FELSEFE: WITTGENSTEIN VE HEIDEGGER

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Karşılaştırmalı felsefe çalışmaları kapsamında Heidegger ve Wittgenstein arasındaki ilişki önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu tezde amaçlanan, tarihteki felsefi problemlerin formüle edilmiş biçimlerindeki hataları ele alarak terapötik bir felsefeyi bu iki felsefe üzerinden araştırmaktır. Onların felsefi metotları felsefi kavramları değerlendirirken, günlük hayatta insanların kuram-öncesi tavrına dikkat çekmeleri ile başlar. İşin özü, Heideggerci felsefenin çıkış noktasının ruhunu anlamanın ve yorumlamanın en doğru yolunun, onu bir Wittgensteinci terapist olarak düşünmek olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Öte yandan, bu iki felsefecinin ortaklıklarına rağmen, felsefedeki amaçları ve arka planları dolayısıyla aralarında azımsanamayacak farklılıklar da bulunmaktadır. Bu farklılıklar dolayısıyla, bahsettiğimiz terapötik felsefeye Heidegger “varoluşçu” bir boyut kazandırır. Şöyle ki, Heidegger fenomenlerin gündelik açığa vuruluşundan ve gündelik konuşmanın ötesine, temel ontolojiyi iddiası ile geçmektedir. Bu sebeple, ortak çıkışlarının ötesinde, dilimizi ve düşüncemizdeki sorun ve karmaşıklıkları, gündelik hayata dönerek ortadan kaldırdıktan sonra, Heidegger bir adım öteye gider. Bu adım, insanın bu gündelik

hayattaki yapıp-etmelerini sorgulamasıyla anlaşılabilir. Dolayısıyla, Wittgenstein'in tam da bıraktığı yerin ötesine geçip, çözüm aracımızın (gündelik hayat) kendisine döner ve onunla ne yaptığımızı insanın ve dünyanın temel varoluşunu açıklama amacıyla sorgular. Bu da “inotantik” varoluşun bir tedavisi olarak düşünüldüğünde, terapinin varoluşçu boyutu da resme eklenmiş olur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, terapötik felsefe, temel ontoloji, felsefi hastalıklar

To my parents Fatma Aydođdu and Halil Temizler

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the history of philosophy, there are a lot of inquiries of almost every possible subject of human interest. Along with the ethical, the epistemological, the existential and the metaphysical subjects, philosophers also make self-reflection on their inquiries and interrogate its limits. As a matter of fact, this nature of philosophy makes it unique. This characteristic of philosophy is intrinsically related to its internal structure. David Wood begins his *Philosophy at the Limit* (1990), with the following words:

Philosophy is an everlasting fire, sometimes damped down by setting itself limits, then flaring into new life as it consumes them. Every field of inquiry is limited, but philosophy has an essential relation to the question of limits, to its own limits. (Wood, 1990, xiii)

Due to the fact that philosophy can question its own limits and set limits to itself, meta-philosophical inquiries are capable of altering or even of destroying the most fundamental bases of philosophical systems. Thus, one could (and should) ask what these bases are, for the purpose of dealing with philosophical problems. That is, these so-called fundamental bases are the unquestioned and conceptual definitions from which traditional philosophical problems have originated. This is also a necessary inquiry to understand the need for setting the limits.

The Platonic philosophy is a remarkable starting point in the search for the first bases of unquestioned metaphysical assumptions. First of all, Plato makes a distinction between two modes of existence: *being* and *becoming*. In *Timaeus*, (1888) he argues that as the former, it is always free from change, is permanent and self-governing,

which means that it is always as it is. On the other hand, the latter belongs to the tangible and visible world we live in, which is ever-changing. (Plato, 1888, 28A) This separation has its bases in presupposing the existence of permanent and unchangeable realm of existence. To secure this presupposition, human beings from the physical world with ever-changing tangible nature should have a special capacity of knowing which is free from any sensible affect. Following this, some well-known epistemological issues emerge related to this distinction. For example, since these two planes of existence are different in kind, their knowledge should also be different. In other words, dividing existence into two realms leads to certain division within human knowledge. Accordingly, different knowledges can be grasped by distinct faculties. Thus, Plato claims that apprehending the plane of being, one needs reason and intelligence; the way to conceive the plane of becoming is to make judgements based on senses. He states that the knowledge of the latter is obtained by the opinion (*doxa*), which is based on senses and without reason and the former by understanding (*noêsis*) based on reason without senses. (Plato, 1888, 29B) Once these dualisms are accepted, it leads one to construct separations to solve the possible epistemological problems such as the obscurity of conditions of the possibility of knowledge of the unchangeable, e.g. the ideal world. That is to say, the problem is that Platonic philosophy should give an account of how human beings obtain knowledge of the unchangeable, while they are in the changeable world. As it is indicated, to secure the aforementioned presupposition (that ideal and unchangeable world exists) philosophers need to construct a link between the gap which arises because of two realms with radically different natures. The only way of attaining the knowledge of the unchangeable is to get out of the human view which is always mingled with senses and so, having God-like eyes. For this reason, the abovementioned separation becomes necessary, to wit, for the postulation of the intelligence as entirely free from senses.

In the history, the profound influence of this dualistic tradition became the most dominant tendency of doing philosophy. Mostly, philosophers were not critical to bases of this tradition, instead they use the similar conceptualizations and explanations. For instance, they tried to secure the knowledge of unchangeable or to

obtain an infallible knowledge with carrying the similar presupposition that there is a gap between senses and intelligence. Therefore, they maintain this dualism in different ways in their philosophical systems by taking it for granted. For instance, Descartes defined substances and stopped doubting the undeniable existence of thinking subject. He began to philosophize along with an investigation for a substance which cannot be suspected, and he stated this undoubted substance with his quite famous words “cogito ergo sum.” Thereby, at the very beginning, Descartes had concepts burdened with tradition such as *subject*, *thinking*, *existence*. Naturally, when he formulated the certainty of existence of the human subject substantially apart from the outside world, the existence of the latter becomes a problematic. The problem springs from the difficulty of constructing a link between two separated existences he introduced. The method of doubting existence of the outside world is quite strong and convincing. The reason of this, we are not capable to prove even that we are not in a dream. However, his starting point carries the presupposition of taking notions, e.g. the subject, to be mere present entities. To explain, he overlooks that the human subject cannot be thought apart from its activities in life. Furthermore, entities with which the subject dealt with, cannot be understood apart from their usages in everyday life. For these reasons, formulation of the Cartesian problems is quite problematic, at the beginning. As a solution for doubting everything, an important figure in the history, Immanuel Kant attempted to solve the problems of the Cartesian philosophy. A motivation of his philosophy could be to secure the legitimacy of scientific knowledge. Let us introduce how Kant reverses the basis of the idea of Descartes on the relationship between the subject and the world.

The radical movement of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant against the skepticism is his attempt to indicate the limits of human reason. He explains that the experience of the outside world is formed by the universal form of human intuition. Since he depicts that space and time as are two forms of intuition of human beings, and they do not belong to the physical world as before argued, the Cartesian doubts on the existence of physical entities disappear. Thus, we can know for sure that the things-in-themselves are not knowable since as far as objects affect us, they are shaped by

the forms of intuition. In other words, the senses are affected by physical objects but what one did intuit is the appearances of objects formed by the pure forms of intuition, not object's themselves in their absolute reality. (Kant, 1992, pp.27-168) Similar to the Cartesian philosophy, Kant carries the same bifurcation between the physical world and the subject. To explain, we know entities from their images which are in our minds. Thus, even though it is possible to claim that Kant avoids Cartesian doubts, he accepts the impossibility of knowledge of the outside reality in itself. For this reason, the same theoretical presuppositions about the nature of the physical world and the subject remain. These presuppositions could be understood as the subject and entities in the world are in different planes, and for this reason, there is an unbridgeable gap between natures of them. The main problem of their philosophies is the difficulty of dealing with this gap, i.e., to figure out the possibility of knowledge. In other words, they always strive to give a legitimate account of how the subject creates the images of entities, and of the reliability of senses. Related to the gap between natures of the subject and physical entities, the coherence between the reality and the image of an entity always remains as being open to question. The Kantian claim is that the legitimacy of the knowledge could be secured by drawing a strict boundary between things-in-themselves and appearances. To explain, the human knowledge is restricted by appearances, things in their absolute reality is certainly unknowable. However, he states that doubting of their existences is also meaningless since the human intellect is capable to derive that there should be an effecter if there is an effect.

Nevertheless, in this manner, Kantian arguments on Cartesian doubts are restricted by their epistemological status. That is to say, he attempts to make the knowledge legitimate, but the ontological gap between mind and physical entities remains. For this reason, it is possible to claim that he carries the presuppositions as mentioned earlier, so we can question the limit he drawn to human reason. Thus, the question is: "what is missing in all those philosophies?" The answer is that they never turn their faces to everyday life to pursuit grounds and meanings of their foundational notions. That is to say, they do not evaluate the concepts they used through a point of view intertwined with everyday life. Related to this, they cannot be independent of the

theoretical presuppositions the former philosophers had. Instead, they begin with taking entities and the subject as they are pure presences. To question these presuppositions is important since at first and foremost, we face disclosures of entities in everyday life.

For this reason, disregarding ordinary life of human beings and attempting to give an account of the subject and its relation to the world, veils a significant part of the nature of them. For instance, while Kant is setting limits to reason, he presupposes that there is a bifurcation of things-in-themselves and appearances. By claiming this, he accepts the existence of things-in-themselves, and their nature as being speakable through the speculative reason — this dualism rooted in the fundamental Platonic differentiation between the *intellect* and *doxa*. The former is ideal knowledge free from physical effects, and the latter is the knowledge of the physical entities grasped by sensibility. In traditional philosophy, the absolute and unchangeable field is understood as it is superior to the field of changeable and sensible. However, as it is indicated above, this sort of approaches burdened with metaphysical presuppositions lead philosophy to an impasse; that is, repetitive problematics such as the unbridgeable gap between the subject/object, the mind/body, the reality/appearance, the opinion/intellect or the sensation/reason.

In the 20th century, two philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein turn their faces to ordinary life of human beings to overcome those repetitive problematic presuppositions of philosophy. Before indicating their therapeutic aims in philosophy, it is important to mention the Socratic tradition. In *Apology*, Socrates states that his aim is to find out whether a man has virtue or not, regardless what he says, and to show them the truth and to help him to take care for the perfection of their souls. (Plato, 2005, 109) He states his aim as: “I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth.” (Plato, 2005, 109) This means to cure beliefs of the men of Athens, i.e., to show them what is really important for their wellness of souls. On this issue, Robert D. Stolorow and Robert Eli Sanchez indicate the similarity between this therapeutic aim and philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger in their article

named “*Psyches Therapeia: Therapeutic Dimensions in Heidegger and Wittgenstein.*” They state that the process of therapy is to expose inadequacy of our moral assumptions according to the Socratic philosophy, (Sanchez & Stolorow, 2013, 69) while “for Heidegger, it entails a stripping away of everyday delusions and an unveiling of the concealed ground of our Being”. (Sanchez & Stolorow, 2013, 69) He also states that Wittgensteinian philosophy agrees with them in understanding philosophy as a human activity and in aiming a clarity for philosophical problems. (Sanchez & Stolorow, 2013, 72) Thus, seeing philosophy as a therapy has a long history. It is not the purpose of this thesis to write down the whole of this history. However, it is important to realize that philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger could be considered as an attempt to cure for their era’s problems, as Socrates aimed from completely different era, background and purposes. Thus, if we think of philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger together, and follow their similarities and differences, we could reveal a suggestion to cure for errors of human thought, language and life.

Considering the relationship between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, many academicians highlight their similarity for various purposes. On their similar treatment to philosophical errors, Richard Rorty writes a chapter named “Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Reification to Language” in *the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*. (2006) He states,

From the point of view of both *Philosophical Investigations* and *Being and Time*, the typical error of traditional philosophy is to imagine that there could be, indeed that there somehow must be, entities which are atomic in the sense of being what they are independent of their relation to any other entities. (e.g., God, the transcendental subject, sense-data, simple names) (Rorty, 2006, 347)

His idea is that both philosophers agree that definitions and explanations on this sort of entities cannot be made. Thus, the error of both the Cartesian and the Kantian philosophies is that they begin with e.g. the existence of a subject independent from other entities. From the parallelism between their thought, Stephen Mulhall reveals their possible contributions to each other’s philosophy into consideration. He writes, “Heidegger’s system of thought can be seen to be grounded upon an acknowledgement of just those features of experience highlighted by Wittgenstein.”

(Mulhall, *On Being in the World*, 2014, 3) Moreover, Charles Guignon seeks to reveal the similarity between their philosophical methods by focusing their responses to philosophical problems in the tradition. In his article named “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Question of Phenomenology,” he draws attention to that they “suggest a new and innovative way of doing philosophy.” (Guignon, 2013, 97) This new suggestion could be understood as turning their faces towards the practical field. That is to say, both begin to question problems in philosophy by taking the ordinary life of human beings and their practical purposes into consideration. Thus, their philosophies are not grounded in definitions of abovementioned present entities which exist apart from any other entity. Instead of this, they attempt to expose the errors of traditional philosophy arise from these “atomic entities” by searching for their grounds in ordinary life.

The parallelism between their responses to traditional philosophy which will be an important issue for this thesis also highlighted by some thinkers. Edward Minar’s “Understanding the Being of the ‘We’: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Idealism,” (2013) indicates their attempt to overcome idealism by postulating dependency of the world to the human understanding in a radical fashion. That is, before any idealistic or realistic approach, both philosophers show that there are grounds of the understanding cannot be apart from “we” which is “not for philosophy to ascertain or to decide.” (Minar, 2013, 114) In line with Rorty’s exposition of their common treatment to philosophical errors, the ground that they hold for fixing errors is “we,” which could be understood as the shared ordinary life of human beings. Thus, instead of explaining world by theorizing about such entities e.g., transcendental subject, they suggest stepping back from “philosophical reflection” which “exercises a certain kind of intellectual control over everydayness.” (Minar, 2013, 100) As an instance of philosophical errors, Herman Philipse discusses the “external world skepticism” and its solutions in traditional philosophy in its relation to idealism. He indicates that Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian responses should be taken into consideration to expose overlooked grounds of this problem. Heidegger’s “destruction” and Wittgenstein’s “dissolution” could be adequate to overcome, if we use their ideas together. (Philipse, 2013, 129)

The comparative studies on philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger could make discussions on philosophical methods quite fruitful. Firstly, they draw attention to the overlooked field of ordinary life, and secondly, they argue that the grounds of philosophical problems lie before us in this field. However, traditional philosophers have been disregarded life, so they make themselves blind to the intrinsic grounds of so-called problems. If we see these grounds, then it would be possible to question and then find a cure to misleading presuppositions of philosophy. This is the uniqueness of their treatments to philosophical problems. Furthermore, on this issue, Heidegger credits Wittgenstein's philosophical achievement. He says in *Heraclitus Seminar* as follows:

Wittgenstein says the following. The difficulty in which thinking stands compares with a man in a room, from which he wants to get out. At first, he attempts to get out through the window, but it is too high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the chimney, which is too narrow for him. If he simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all along. (Heidegger, 1966)

I suggest reading the quote by considering 'a man' who is a philosopher trapped in 'a room' full of philosophical errors, desiring to solve the problems of philosophy. Therapeutic philosophy which will be examined in this thesis is their search for grounds of these errors in everyday life of human beings. Thus, both agreed in the fact that philosophers should turn their faces to ordinary life at the beginning, to see that "the door was all along." On the other hand, Wittgenstein writes about the philosophy of Heidegger in a parallel manner in *Philosophical Review* as follows;

I can very well think what Heidegger meant about Being and Angst. Man has the drive to run up against the boundaries of language. Think, for instance, of the astonishment that anything exists [das etwas existiert]. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer to it. All that we can say can only, a priori, be nonsense. Nevertheless, we run up against the boundaries of language. (Wittgenstein, 1965, 68)

This thesis will be focused on their methodological suggestion to philosophy; therapeutic approach to problems by means of usages of words in every-day life. To explain, according to them, metaphysical assumptions make philosophers blind to the disclosures of entities in ordinary life. Although they underly the importance of ordinary level understanding of human beings for different agendas, both agree that

philosophical problems should be re-formulated. That is to say, they claim that misleading presuppositions of philosophical doctrines could be dissolved by revealing and questioning their roots in human life. For this purpose, they do not focus on the foundational meaning of a concept inherited by the philosophy in a way tantamount to the tradition; instead, they search for how those concepts have their present meanings. In other words, they endeavor to see the roots of philosophical theories, to wit, the abovementioned presuppositions. From this character of them, it is possible to argue that they try to cure disregarded problematic presuppositions, instead of dealing with the existing problems in philosophy. Let us consider the unquestioned presuppositions of the past which are blind to what is before us in ordinary life, as “illnesses”. With relation to this consideration, the best way to refer their method is using the notion of “therapy,” inspired by Wittgenstein’s analogy. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §133)

Let us give some examples from their texts to reveal their therapeutic method. Firstly, Heidegger sets forth his philosophical method in *Being and Time* within an ontological horizon (that is also differentiating him from Wittgenstein). He states his arriving point as follows:

We do not *know* what “Being” means. But even if we ask, “What *is* ‘Being’?”, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies. (Heidegger, 2001, 25)

In this quote, Heidegger indicates that before asking the question of Being – that is the main theme of the whole book – the fundamental understanding of the meaning of “is” should be illuminated. In other words, there is a deeper ground of this question, so dealing with the question itself thoroughly necessitates to expose the non-prominent grounds. Nevertheless, as a bearer of the understanding of being, conceptualizing the meaning of “is” is not possible. Thus, as it is stated above, he attempts to reveal the meaning of “being”, without using the concepts burdened with the understanding of “being”. In other words, he does not deal with the issues in philosophy with an unquestioned acceptance of “being.” Similar to this idea, Wittgenstein suggests investigating different usages of “is” in language with various examples to see what the meaning of each is, in *Philosophical Investigations*. (2009)

The meaning of this sort of an investigation for Wittgenstein is as follows: rather than giving a fixed account of “is”, he exemplifies that there is no fixed conceptualization for “is” in language, akin to the Heidegger’s idea. What Heidegger means by “the fundamental understanding of Being” is very similar to Wittgenstein’s consideration, that is, the essential features escape from our eyesight since we are always attached to them in practical life. That is to say, according to Heidegger, the understanding of Being is the most fundamental aspect that belongs to human beings, which cannot be formulated but it makes this questioning possible. Thus, the very hidden and unnoticed understanding before every conceptual and theoretical knowing is the key point for both philosophers. This is the main character of therapeutic philosophical method. Before indicating the negative sense of “everydayness,” Heidegger stresses the ordinary dealings of human beings as the fundamental step towards exposing the question of Being in a broader sense. In line with this, Wittgenstein writes in *Philosophical Investigations* (2009) as follows:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) ... And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §129)

Wittgenstein suggests that the primary aim of philosophy should be to look and to see “the most important aspects of things” which one always disregards but also already knows, which is akin to Heidegger’s dealing with the question of Being. While investigating the usages of language, Wittgenstein dissolves and re-formulates many significant philosophical problems, including the assumption of the separated existence of the subject and the object. This kind of understanding cannot give the essential account of the world, in order to grasp the nature of these phenomena, one should investigate their usages in everyday life, accordingly the usages of words in ordinary language. In a nutshell, Wittgenstein avoids adopting a usage of a word as the absolute meaning by which any possible usages are essentially explained.

Furthermore, there is an important implication about the nature of the existence of human beings, especially within the scope of his critique of the ostensive teaching

process. That is to say, human beings are naturally in the world – world refers to a web of meanings and relations.¹ He states as follows;

[A]n ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear... One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §30)

Thus, before being able to speak of a question about meaning or definition of an entity, one must already have known about the role of usages of the name of that entity within the language. We should recall Heidegger’s fundamental question of “Being”; if I may ask the abovementioned question, I must already be familiar with the role (or meaning) of the “Being” in the world. Thus, they share the same emphasis on our ordinary language. I suggest reading this move from theoretical to a practical understanding of Being, together with Wittgenstein’s notion of *language games* to expose their similar suggestions to philosophy. That is, they highlight that by fixing our way of expressing ideas employing ordinary language, it is possible to fix illusory formulations of philosophical problems. By this way, we can overcome the abovementioned philosophical problems by curing “illnesses of philosophy”. The illnesses refer to metaphysical presuppositions and theoretical thinking, which philosophers accept without questioning their meaning in ordinary life. Similar to the aim of this thesis, Lee Braver searches ramifications of these two thinkers to philosophy in a book named *Groundless Grounds: A Study on Wittgenstein and Heidegger*. The critical issue he showed is that by taking every-day life of human beings into account, both philosophers achieve “theoretical dis-engagement” from traditional thinking. He writes, “they strive to construct a new conception of reason itself – one that is free of the illusions of the past, one that is appropriate to the kind of beings that we are.” (Braver, 2014, 11) This strive that Braver draws attention to reveals their therapeutic philosophical method. Thus, my purpose is to show that their ideas support each other in their dealings with philosophical problematics in the tradition. Very parallel to the subject of this thesis, Storolow and Sanchez indicate

¹ According to both philosophers, the world could be read as the “web of meaning” in which entities become meaningful. It is not possible to consider the world as a physical entity or a location in which entities are placed.

the Heideggerian therapeutic aspects in philosophy, in the article named “Philosophy as Therapy: The Case of Heidegger.” (2009) They divide *Being and Time* into two parts to reveal this therapeutic philosophy. At first, they state that Heidegger discloses average everydayness of Dasein by curing illnesses of traditional metaphysics (Storolow & Sanchez, 2009, 128) and then being authentic by eliminating losing one’s self in this average everydayness. (Storolow & Sanchez, 2009, 129) They write,

Division I is devoted to unveiling the holistic structure of average everyday existence, covered up by traditional metaphysical dualisms, especially Descartes’s (1641), transformed by history into Western common sense. (Storolow & Sanchez, 2009, 128)

This unveiling of average everydayness becomes clearer and is supported by reading it with the Wittgensteinian understanding of therapy which will be stated in detail.

In line with the issues indicated above, at the beginning, I will describe what Wittgenstein means by illnesses in philosophy and what the meaning of therapy to the philosophical problems is. To do this, as Wittgenstein suggested, firstly I will clarify the basic idea and stance of his early period and secondly, his late philosophy with contrast to the former. After grasping Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as a cure primarily for traditional philosophical problems, I will introduce a limited part of the Heideggerian early philosophy and its similar therapeutic aspects to Wittgenstein. Then, I will show the peculiar and further movement of Heidegger: that is, he expands Wittgensteinian therapy focused on ordinary language, to human beings’ different responds before ordinary life. To explain, after the aforementioned parallel suggestions to philosophy, Heidegger turns his face critically to their common ground and instrument for the therapy, that is, *everydayness*. That is to say, he critically approaches to our dealings in public life. This issue will be discussed in the final section by introducing two ways of being in the world: *authentic* and *inauthentic*. The claim of this thesis is that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to the traditional philosophy coincides with the early Heidegger to a certain extent. On the other hand, this approach supports Heidegger’s further step regarding his reflection on average everydayness of human beings in the world.

At this point, let us continue with the early Wittgenstein and his dissolution to philosophical problems.

CHAPTER 2

EARLY WITTGENSTEIN: PHILOSOPHICAL ILLNESSES AND THEIR DISSOLUTIONS

2.1. Isomorphic Trinity: World-Thought-Language

In his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein uses a sort of an impressive and at the same time odd writing style. That is, he writes quite short propositions or paragraphs with a systematic listing. In total, the book consists of seven sections, but in between these sections, there are interconnected decimal numbers which are written as comments and explanatory propositions to the former ones. He starts with depicting the logical structure of the world and language by using words as bricks of a well-formed house. Every brick was placed on the walls very regularly and consistently for each room. Despite this well-formed structure, at the very end of the book, Wittgenstein suggests the reader to pull down the thoughtfully and elegantly constructed house. This suggestion has refined implications for philosophy, yet I will tackle with this last movement of him in the following section. Before passing this part, firstly, the isomorphic trinity—the language, the thought and the world—is needed to be formulated.

Wittgenstein illustrates the structure of the world in the first two sections. At the very beginning he writes as follows: “The world is all that is the case” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §1) and “The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §1.1) At these two sections, the important point is that although he gives a definite structure to the world, this does not imply a physicalist reduction. In other words, his

world consists of facts in which objects are related and joining together. From this point, the question is what the meaning of *fact* is. He writes as follows:

What is the case—facts—is the existing state of affairs. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2)
A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things) (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.01)
The totality of existing state of affairs is the world. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.04)

Thus, there are some possible combinations of things that one is able to think of, and the totality of ones that exist are the world. From this point on, we have three situations for a state: (1) possible and not exist, (2) possible and exist, (3) not possible at all. Repeatedly, the sum totality of the states in (2) is the world. When it comes to the states in (1), they are the limits of possibilities that we think of in the logical space. A state in which a human being has four legs could be an example to this. One can combine these two things—a human being and having four legs—together, but there is no such a state, i.e. this is obtainable but not obtained.

Another fundamental idea of Wittgenstein is that logical space determines all the possible circumstances of objects. In this manner, there are no other possible circumstances for an object to exist in state of affairs. This means that every possible combination of a word is pre-determined, too. This idea proposes that Wittgenstein has an essentialist understanding of objects and their possible combinations which refers to state of affairs, so accordingly, facts. He states as follows:

If I know an object, then I also know all its possible occurrence in state of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of nature of the object.)
A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.0123)

In a nutshell, he draws the picture of the world basically in the following way: first, the existing state of affairs are the facts, and all that is the case—facts—is the world. Second, a thing and its all the possible situation in the world is pre-determined. Thirdly, the as the basic constituents of state of affairs, objects are simple. However, in the *Tractatus*, there is not a clear definition of those simple objects. Based on his notebooks, P. M. S. Hacker writes:

[i]t is clear from his notebooks, both before and after writing of the book, that the kinds of things he had in mind are spatio-temporal points, simple unanalyzable perceptual qualities (minimally discriminable shades of color, sounds, degrees of hardness, etc.) as well as relations. (Hacker, 1999, 318)

I will leave this point here without giving more details for the sake of focusing on the theme of the thesis. However, it is important to bear this point in mind to understand the atomism he describes, to wit, every whole consists of its simplest elements (atoms). This idea echoes in the heart of his construction of both language and the world.

From now on, the *Tractatus* seems like a well-formed puzzle in which all propositions are interwoven, and it is a very closed system in which there is an immanent logic such as the world he projected. When he continues with its picture as the thought and language, the immanent logic behind the world will be clear. Until now, Wittgenstein has spoken of mostly the structure and components of the world, but what about its knowledge or representation? He begins listing the arguments on thought and language as the picture theory in the 2.1st proposition. Subsequently, he develops the theory in the 3rd and the 4th sections. He gives attention to the representation of the world which is the one and one correspondent picture of it. He writes,

We picture facts to ourselves. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.1)

A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.11)

Logical picture of facts are thoughts. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §3)

In line with these propositions, it is possible to say that he gives an account of a representational theory without any subjective aspect. His understanding of the subject does not have an individualistic character. Instead, it is codependent with the logical structure of the language and the world. That is to say; what is expressed in language has an internal relation to its resemblance in the world. In her thesis, Sibel Oktar clarifies this isomorphic relationship with the help of G.H. von Wright. Before reading von Wright's car accident analogy, let us to credit the Oktar's reasoning on this issue:

Therefore, there must be a correspondence with reality and thought. Furthermore, because the proposition is the connection of thought and reality and language is the medium that we express a proposition, there must be a link between language and reality, thus between language and thought. (Oktar, 2008, 40)

The relation between language and reality, language and thought are indicated by G.H Von Wright as follows:

He [Wittgenstein] was in a trench on the East front, reading a magazine in which there was a schematic picture depicting the possible sequence of events in an automobile accident. The picture there served as a proposition: that is, as a description of a possible state of affairs. It had this function owing to a correspondence between the parts of the picture and things in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein that one might reserve the analogy and say that a proposition serves as a picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. The way in which the parts of the proposition are combined – the structure of the proposition – depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs. (Von Wright, 2001, 8)

That is to say, what is expressed in language has an internal relation to its resemblance in the world. For this reason, the logical space limits both what could be thought of, and accordingly, what could be spoken of. These propositions can be true or false regarding their relation to the reality in the world. However, before their truth value, the more primary criteria for Wittgenstein's idea led us, is the fact that some propositions are totally out of this space, to wit, they cannot even be true or false. This argument will be the core tool for the elimination of philosophical problems in the following section.

Therefore, the primary logical limitation for a proposition and what it represents in the world, whether it is obtainable or not, is within the possible state of affairs. Moreover, the limits of the language are the limits of all the possible combinations of the objects (which means every obtainable or non-obtainable state of affairs) and vice versa. In addition, the determiner of those limits is the shared logical space. He describes this isomorphism with a musical analogy as follows:

The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4.014)

As it is seen from the former quotes, the obtainable propositions are pictures of the possible worlds,² in other words, representational models of what can be the case. Thus, there is strict and immanent parallelism between the world, the thought and the language through the medium of them, that is, they share the logical space, i.e. logico-syntactic structure such as the musical thought, the score and the waves of the sound. They stand together in a perfect harmony, and this harmony cannot be expressed solely by writing down the notes. This is the same for the immanent logic of the language, too. Peter Hacker (1999) gives a quite accurate summary of this interwoven picture as follows:

The logico-syntactical form of a simple name mirrors the metaphysical form of the object in reality that is its meaning. So, the logico-syntactical combinatorial possibilities of names mirror the metaphysical combinatorial possibilities of objects. Hence, what can be described in language coincides with what is possible in reality. (Hacker, 1999, 319)

In a nutshell, the scheme Wittgenstein drew could be expressed as follows: Briefly, the words are the simplest elements, and they should ultimately be attached to the objects, and possible combinations of them which could be finitely drawn are the propositions. Moreover, the thoughts are uttered by way of propositions with a sense, and they refer to the state of affairs, and finally the totality of all existing state of affairs—facts—are the world. In line with the picture theory, there is an immanent logic between language and the world. Thus, if something is unsayable, the reason is not its being false, rather, if Wittgenstein says that one cannot speak of something, this is because it is neither true nor false, it is senseless. This issue is the core idea of the arguments about the philosophy which is the subject of the following section.

2.2.The Problematic Aspects of Philosophical and Logical Propositions

After bearing the schema of the *Tractatus* in mind, the question becomes what is there outside of the limits of language? The first clue about the answer of this question is at the decimals of the 2nd section as follows: “A picture cannot, however,

² I used the expression of “obtainable proposition” interchangeable with “thought” since in the 4th section of his book he writes that “A thought is a proposition with a sense”. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4)

depict its pictorial form: it displays it.” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.172) The claim is that a picture cannot draw its own form, it can only show it by having this form. This idea echoes in his arguments on logic and on philosophy. Firstly, even though Wittgenstein is a philosopher who is considered among the Logical Positivists which includes the famous logician and philosopher Russell,³ his ideas on logic are quite different from them. According to Wittgenstein, all the propositions about the logic are senseless. Let us recall the analogy of musical harmony; a piece of music consists of notes, rhythm, and the musical thought. These elements are organized harmonically; but the harmony they have cannot be expressed by the musical score. This example is quite parallel to the problems of propositions about the philosophy and the logic.

Regarding propositions about logic, Wittgenstein states that since they are expressions of logical properties, they do not say anything about the world. The reason they say nothing is that the logical propositions are not about what the reality *is*. The logic shows what *can be* real in the possible meaningful worlds. He writes as follows:

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no ‘subject-matter’. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4)

As he writes, Wittgenstein poses logical propositions to be representations of the “scaffolding of the world.” That leads us to the key insight of the *Tractatus*; the difference between *saying* and *showing*. Wittgenstein’s famous last proposition of his book indicates, “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §7) As we have seen, the logical propositions cannot say

³ At the Cambridge times, Wittgenstein has many conversations with Logical Positivists, and mostly known with his relationship with Russell who is a very successful and prestigious professor in that time. After Russell had written the preface of the *Tractatus*, and after he had given a good credit to Wittgenstein as a genius, Wittgenstein became well-known lecturer.

anything meaningful about the world, yet, they can show the limits of the world if one knows the “logical syntax of any sign language.”⁴

When it comes to philosophy, he argues that almost all philosophical propositions are nonsensical. To be nonsensical means that philosophical propositions cannot depict a picture that has something common with a possible reality. In other words, those non-sensical propositions could not represent any possible combination of things. For this reason, problems arise from non-sensical thoughts which have nothing common with the reality. Hence, it is pointless to form philosophical propositions and so to deal with so-called problems. According to Wittgenstein, they are only confusions spring from the misunderstanding of language. The reason for philosophy to be out of the limits of meaning, in other words, to be out of the logical space stems from Wittgenstein’s understanding of possible worlds and the reality. In the previous chapter, we discussed the idea of the limits of meaningful combinations of things. Thus, propositions formed to represent out of the limit, are neither true nor false, but they are nonsensical. That is to say, the limit of being meaningful covers the precise existence and non-existence of state of affairs, not beyond these two situations. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4.1) Thus, false propositions are the ones that are logically possible since they have the elements of reality, let us say that a state of affair is colored and in space and time, but they do not exist in the world. Regarding true propositions, let us recall the 1st proposition of the *Tractatus*, which says that true propositions represent what the case is. Furthermore, Wittgenstein states that: “The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science. (or whole corpus of the natural sciences)” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4.11) This means, since philosophy is not a discipline that works as natural sciences, problems arise when philosophers suppose that they depict a picture of the reality such as natural sciences. However, it is not possible because their ingredients are completely different. That is to say, the notions which makes philosophical problems arise, are not in the sphere of the meaningful world.

⁴ See the last sentence of the section 6.124 in the *Tractatus*.

Early Wittgenstein states that ordinary language we use is suitable neither for sciences nor for philosophy. Furthermore, it veils the logical structure of language because of its nature. That is, its nature is full of nonsensical propositions which actually means something in everyday life. In ordinary language, a sign might mean many different things; and, this causes complications and misunderstandings in philosophy, too. Wittgenstein exemplifies this issue with the usage of copula both for equality and existence. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §3.23) Here the problem is that it has no unique meaning. Thus, to understand the meaning of a copula in a sentence depends on the context which could be interpreted in various ways. For this reason, the logical structure behind language is concealed by non-linguistic elements of communication. Thus, even it is perfect as it is, for the purpose of having a crystal-clear language free of mistakes and confusions, we should eliminate all the ambiguous elements from language. Lee Braver points out this issue in *Groundless Grounds*:

To sum up, while everyday language successfully describes the world, the fact that it conceals its structure causes a certain form of confusion, what most of us just call “philosophy.” (Braver, 2014, 17)

Regarding philosophy, he states that the concept of “subject” is not used in a legitimate sense. Thus, the problem of, e.g., the subject solipsism arises since the subject that philosophers postulated does not exist within the limits of the world. That is the metaphysical subject which has neither psychological nor biological sense. Philosophers define it with many attributes with a claim of the picture they drawn is the universal account of it. In face of this kind of postulations, Wittgenstein asserts that the metaphysical subject cannot be found in any state of affairs. Let’s say, the subject has a metaphysical existence apart from the world, and so, it obtains knowledge from representation of entities in mind. Thus, the subject has only images of reality. From this depiction of the metaphysical subject, a possible epistemological solipsist argument could lead one to be uncertain of the physical reality of both her body and the external world. This argument based on the supposition that the experience is restricted with the representation of physical entities in mind. This means that the reality is independent from the subject which is beyond its access. Therefore, the object of experience known through the content of mind might not

exist at all. As a result, one could argue that physical entities do not exist, but they are simulated in brain by a computer program. Thus, according to this idea, any possibility remains to be assured of the real existence of neither the physical body nor the external world. However, if we take the Wittgensteinian account into consideration, the premise does not have a legitimate sense, i.e., it does not exist in any state of affairs. Hence, the problematic conclusion that is derived from the assumption of the metaphysical subject also has no sense. That is to say, the metaphysical subject that philosophers do postulate is misleading since it does not represent any element that can be found in world. Thus, any proposition about this so-called philosophical problem cannot be even formulated. This reformulation will be clarified within the context of the following section. For this point, the question is limited with philosophy's boundaries. That is, Wittgenstein credits philosophical inquiries but he attempts to reveal that bases of most problems that philosophers deal with have no sense. Thus, if this is the case, does he condemn philosophical inquiries to be completely nonsensical? Wittgenstein's answer to this question would be no. The reason for this is that his suggestion is to bring these bases into question, and to reformulate task of philosophy to be exposing senselessness of these so-called problems. He writes,

The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it. (Wittgenstein, 1996, §5.64)

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject is the limit of the world – not the part of it. (ibid. §5.641)

According to the first quote, the metaphysical subject is considered as a point of sight, so it determines what can be seen and what cannot. Subsequently, he continues by saying that this is the limit of the world. These arguments may resemble common sensical thoughts. To explain, if I will say that I have my own perspective for a certain issue, and this is my world, this "I" will be the limits of the world. However, in the frame of the *Tractatus*, it has the meaning of being the limit of the logical

structure, not the world in a common sense, e.g. contextual world. Thus, propositions about the metaphysical subject cannot be spoken of logically.

Until now, we have dealt with the problematic aspects of philosophical and certain logical questions and propositions. To conclude, it can be said that philosophy cannot form meaningful propositions, and misuse of language is the cause of most of the philosophical problems. Hence, these facts might lead one to wrong conclusions such that Wittgenstein considers philosophical activities and studies as being in vain which is not the case for his understanding. Within the frame of the next chapter, we will investigate how he dissolves the philosophical problems under the light of his postulation of mistakes of philosophers and what the task of philosophy is.

2.3. Dissolution to Philosophical Problems

Wittgenstein's early philosophy could be considered as an attack to metaphysical doctrines and propositions. In spite of this attack, he gives a crucial task to philosophy. This task is to make language crystal clear and free of confusions. To achieve this task, he suggests understanding philosophy as being an activity rather than a doctrine. Hence, philosophy should not work like sciences. As it is indicated in the previous section, philosophical propositions cannot be similar to propositions of natural sciences since the focus of philosophy is not identical with sciences, i.e. not phenomena in the world. As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein indicates that philosophical arguments cannot be spoken of meaningfully, but they can show the limits of the world. To grasp this idea, it is crucial to bear in mind that the world and language have an isomorphic relationship. Also, the natural sciences deal with empirical entities in the physical world, therefore they can produce meaningful propositions, true or false. On the other hand, Wittgenstein understands philosophy in relation to logic regarding to its content. For this reason, philosophy should show the limits of the logical space and eliminate nonsense from language. The meaning of the suggestion of showing is that: instead of producing new ideas on entities from the god's eye view, as the traditional philosophers did, philosophy should make the human thought explicit by showing its limits. According to him, the content of philosophy is unspeakable within the limits of language, so there cannot be

philosophical doctrines full of propositions. For this reason, most part of traditional philosophy needs elimination. He states as follows:

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §4.112)

Evidently, Wittgenstein tries to cure the human thinking (including philosophy) by showing the boundaries of language. The crucial task he attributes to philosophy is this dissolution which will be developed by him in his late period and will be *therapeutic*. Even though there is a contrast between his two periods, it is possible to find traces of his late period in this remarkable status of philosophy as the cure for "cloudy and indistinct" thoughts. Thus, philosophy is also a necessary condition for sciences. Wittgenstein's suggestion to philosophy is quite mystical since the meaning of *showing* is not clear. However, the same therapeutic approach could be revealed from the examples from the *Tractatus*. I will leave this discussion to the following section since it has important implications on therapeutic aspect of the late philosophy.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein discusses the problems of skeptic philosophy in some sections of *Philosophical Investigations*. Abovementioned solipsist arguments spring from so-called irrefutable doubts on existence of the outside world and even of one's own body. He indicates that the basis of those problematic postulations of the world and body lies in metaphysical postulation of the subject. Nevertheless, the metaphysical subject cannot be found in the world, but it is the limit of the world. He suggests a reformulation to bases of such arguments with "the eye and the field of sight" analogy. As a cure to the presuppositions of skeptics, he writes,

Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §5.633)

From this quote, it becomes clear what traditional philosophers mistakenly do is to theorize, and to construct systems that are consisted of propositions that cannot be formulated. The mistake is the abstraction of propositions from the factuality of possible worlds. However, Wittgenstein does not let us to speak of things beyond the logical space. Hence, he responds that skeptical arguments are not irrefutable, but they are nonsensical since they try to answer questions that cannot be formulated at the very first place. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §6.51) If the postulation of isomorphic relationship between the world and the human thought-language is considered, this is a quite expected answer from such a philosopher. As Wittgenstein elaborated in his eye and field of the sight analogy, it is not possible to speak of the nature of one's own perspective. In his *Notebooks*, he writes that "I am placed in [the world] like my eye in the visual field" (Wittgenstein, 1984, 73e) In other words, as a human being, one has a horizon which gives her a picture of the world. Since no entity in the world tells the fact that this is a particular horizon, one cannot depict picture of the horizon itself. Thus, the reason for commonsensical and (mostly philosophical) claims about the un-answerability of skeptical doubts is that they are not meaningful questions. Nevertheless, according to Wittgenstein if a question can be asked, it should be answered too, otherwise, the question is not meaningful. He elaborates this issue step by step:

For doubt exists only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something *can be said*. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §6.51)

Therefore, most of the unanswered questions do not cause meaningful problems. They are unanswered because they are not *answerable* within the limits of language, in accordance with this, of the world. All one can do is to show the limits. According to early Wittgenstein, there could not be any further step for philosophy. We can see this from the "ladder analogy." That is, he suggests the reader, to pull down the house that is studiously and elegantly constructed. He writes this analogy as follows:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it) (Wittgenstein, 1961, §6.54)

At this point, the meaning of describing the book as a ladder and reasons for throwing it is very crucial to grasp his understanding of philosophy in both early and late periods. That is, we can use philosophy as a tool like a ladder. It could be used to achieve the task of clearing language from non-sensical propositions. However, as he reveals with the analogy discussed above, we should not grasp it as a universal doctrine or theory on the nature of world. Regarding the analogy, if one climbs the ladder and goes beyond it, then one would see things factually, and the ordinary language as nonsensical. After depicting such a restricted picture of language, Wittgenstein addresses that the propositions which are uttered in the *Tractatus*, are beyond the limits that they have drawn. It is possible to claim that all propositions in the *Tractatus* are consistent within the system and accordingly its purpose until the ladder analogy—analogy is also not allowed for the language which is aimed to construct. Regarding the late period, philosophy is also considered as an activity, in a completely different sense. He points out the impossibility of exhausting the inquiry on any phenomenon in life, in the preface of the book in his late period, named *Philosophical Investigations*.

After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination—And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought— The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and meandering journey. (Wittgenstein, 2009, 3)

From this quote, and parallel with the meaning of his ladder analogy, the world and language that the *Tractatus* depicts seems like one of those sketches in the endless landscape. Thus, if we turn back to the problem of the limits of the language and the world, the possibility of drawing the limit to language must be questioned by taking the fact that there is no possibility to take a step out of language into consideration. Moreover, the same problem arises when the world is considered. Let us say that if one names the world as “my world,” it is quite challenging to accept that she can speak of limits since she cannot take a step out of that world. In this case, to be able to draw limits, one should pass beyond those limits, or stand at the edge. However, language does not end at any point in history, and it is like a living organism

interconnected with life. Thus, as long as life endures and varies, any conceptualization cannot exhaust language. From this point of view, propositions by which limits of language have drawn turns to be nonsensical since it has to be already passed those limits.

However, Wittgenstein has shown that there is no possibility to pass the limits and to remain meaningful. Since the limits of language are expressed with language, propositions concerning the limits lead to the paradoxical conclusions. Similarly, it is quite odd to attempt for one to see the limits of sight when there is no possibility to get out of that sight one has. The cure of the philosophical problems is placed in the abyss between *showing* and *saying*. After he writes the *Tractatus*, he is invited to a society of logical positivists named the Vienna Circle.⁵ However, different from their expectations, they faced with his intense interest in discussions on poetry and religion. (Pulido, 2009, 25) His interest shows that being nonsensical does not mean being less valuable than natural sciences. When thinking of both the world and language he depicted and the mystical elements together, what is unsayable but showable is quite critical regarding to his late philosophy, too.

Despite the fact that he has a tendency towards mystical elements, (as something which cannot be said, but shown) considering the *Tractatus*, the logical structure of language does not let the existence of any poetic expression which lead the imagination for producing new meanings. In other words, the poetic elements could be speculatively produced considering the last sections, but even in this case, they cannot be expressed. The picture theory brings the ontological determinism for all possible meanings of a word in the state of affairs.⁶ As Benjamin R. Tilghman writes:

⁵Recall the discussion on logic above, Wittgenstein claims that not logic, but the logical propositions are nonsense. Thus, the theories on logic also belong to the field of *unsayable*. His elucidations on logic is not a sort of theory, but rather it is the exposition of logical form of the all possible worlds.

⁶Recall what Wittgenstein writes: "If I know an object, then I also know all its possible occurrence in state of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (Wittgenstein, 1961, §2.0123)

Given the correspondence between language and the world, the sentence and the fact that it pictures, we should expect a logical equivalent for the ontological claim about objects: If I know a word (name), then I know all the possibilities of its occurrence in sentences. There is no possibility in this scheme for new and imaginative uses of languages and thus no room for poetry. (Tilghman, 2003, 191)

The possibility of a poetic language could be possible by erasing the logical formality from the world, so that what is mystical—life—becomes the core element which dissolves philosophical problems. From point of view of ordinary life, restricted fields of the *Tractatus* become apparent. For this reason, to follow his journey from the early period to therapeutic philosophy in *Philosophical Investigations* is helpful. In line with the contrast between two colors makes one and other more visible, the contrast between two ways of thinking helps to grasp his suggestions to philosophy in the late period, vividly.

In a nutshell, the philosophy of Wittgenstein⁷ could be considered as an attempt to cure and to dissolve problematic aspects of human thinking—accordingly philosophy. For the first period of his philosophy, his method is clarification of language, rather than taking a side within the limits of disputes such as skepticism vs pure realism. One can still argue on the indistinctness of the meaning of *showing*, yet Wittgenstein clearly attempts to reveal what cannot be done, not what should be done. At the very end, he leaves issues concerning life in a mystical position which is the most important element of his late period. Even though he attempts to dissolve the metaphysical problems in the early philosophy, he still contains unquestioned assumptions like traditional philosophers. That is, the existence of logical space and elementary propositions. While setting limits between saying and showing, and elucidating the isomorphic relation between language, thought and the world; in the late period, he opens new horizons to philosophy by focusing on the mystical aspect of the *Tractatus*. That is to say, he continues to give importance to seeing and showing, but different from the early period, his late philosophy is based on everyday life.

⁷ This is true for the both early and late period even if the methods are completely different.

CHAPTER 3

LATE WITTGENSTEIN: THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY

3.1. On Language

Considering the *Tractatus*, a world full of utterly nonsensical expressions appears since the language we use in ordinary life and in philosophy contains infinitely many propositions on good, evil, bad, beautiful etc. Naturally, a willing philosopher who follows Wittgenstein's early suggestion might take as a duty to eliminate this nonsense and indistinctness from human thinking and language. It might be done with a language in which all words have only one definite meaning and by considering the logical picture of the world precisely identical with the facts and with their expressions in that language. Presumably, one would achieve this task of elimination if language was not used and if the world was abandoned. However, there is no such a world. In his late period, on the other hand, instead of eliminating nonsense from language, his method is to see what usages of language show about the world within the limits of language and life. That is to say, he stops excluding life and begins to investigate aspects of human beings' ordinary discourse. Thus, the limits of language drawn by the *Tractatus* disappear since the various usages of words in everyday life cannot be limited in such a way. Hence, nothing essential remains, i.e., he understands even the use of "language" similar to use of "table" (Wittgenstein, 2009, §97).

Regarding the new understanding of language, with an awareness that the language in the *Tractatus* is not capable of comprising all the functions and aspects of language, it might be possible to be convinced of the existence of such a usage of

language. So, this awareness dissolves the possible problems about “language-without-life” before they arise. That is to say, the problem could not arise in the first place because the need for arguing against, for instance, the limited scope of the picture theory before the complexity of life, disappears. This dissolution will lead us to the therapeutic aspect of his philosophy which is different from his early period. Within the frame of this chapter, the fundamental notions of *language game*, *form of life*, *rule-following* and *family resemblance* will be illustrated to grasp the therapeutic philosophy. The attempt to clarify these notions is more complicated than it seems because instead of definitive, he uses a descriptive language in the late period. For this reason, I will illustrate them in contrast to his early period as he suggested in the preface of *Philosophical Investigations*.

To begin with, it is important to underline that he draws a radically different picture of language in the late period. In the early period, the understanding of language had a metaphysical aspect which mirrors in all the possible meaningful facts, while *Philosophical Investigations* takes it to be a social phenomenon. He uses the notion of *language game* to which all meaning belongs. Wittgenstein begins with a quotation from Augustine’s *Confessions*. Augustine’s claim is as follows: Words name objects, and people combine those words within sentences in order for expressing their desires (Augustine, *Confessions*, 1.8). That is to say, words have meanings, and they are used in terms of their meanings; and first, one learns the meaning of a word and then in accordance with its meaning, one learns how to use it to express feelings or needs. Wittgenstein claims that Augustine postulated merely a language game as if it could capture the whole of language and language learning-teaching processes. Thus, this sort of an attempt is like defining the games only by taking the board games into account. He describes another sort of usage between the workers A and B. In this example, A says “slab” and points out the object, and B brings that object to A (Wittgenstein, 2009, §2). Here, the function of the word “slab” is “bring me a slab,” but regarding the context, A and B can communicate without saying it. There is nothing to give the account of this activity of language within the frame of ostensive understanding. Undoubtedly, both A and B know the

reference of “slab”, but the Augustinian definition of language cannot suffice to comprise the activity of uttering the word within this game of bringing a slab.

Wittgenstein has never defined the notion of language games but in the 7th section of *Philosophical Investigations*, he describes it with examples as follows:

In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher—both of these being speech-like processes.

We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.

And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the “language-game.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §7)

As it is seen from quotes, the scope of the notion of “language games” is highly broad and comprehensive. That is to say, it comprises both the children games and the primitive language at the same time. The grounds both of them have are not different regarding to rigidity, according to Wittgenstein. No dictionary or fixed reference-word relation can exhaust the activity of using language. The similar Augustinian idea of language exists in the *Tractatus*; within the frame of his early period, names are the simplest elements of language, and they refer to objects in the world. Moreover, they are used in propositions and thus gain their meaning, in this way they represent reality (the world). This idea is a sort of correspondence theory of language which has a dominant role in history. However, according to Wittgenstein in the late period, both Augustine’s ostensive language and his old way of explanation are sufficient for comprising language, learning and using processes only partially, as they can only be one of language’s many functions. Thus, instead of providing a fixed and stable picture, he indicates that the meaning of a word must be dealt within the frame of the language game it belongs. It is quite fascinating that he writes “language game is the original home of words.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §116)

Thus, what is the source of language games? Are they chosen for such and such purposes or randomly? Wittgenstein's answer emphasizes on everyday life and does not allow any individualistic interpretations. That is, the meaning of an expression is determined by conventions of human beings in everyday life, not by individuals. He describes that these conventions spring from the contextuality of the living world. By the way of his emphasis on the ordinary life, the discussions on language move to a non-theoretical field which will be recalled under "The Therapeutic Philosophy" section below. The meaning of what one says can only be generated within language games, that is, based on *forms of life*. Wittgenstein writes as follows:

And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §19)

What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §241)

Thus, language cannot even be imagined without a form of life. To be meaningful one must belong to a form of life, i.e., at least there should be two people to share a life. The idea here is that there is no meaningful activity independent from the others and the customs of life. In other words, human beings are born to a world full of meaning, and they learn various usages of expressions—both verbal and non-verbal—in the context of different circumstances. Thus, he indicates that even the so-called private inner states are not private. Briefly, the meaning of a sensation depends on its meaningful expression. It seems like a quite radical idea that without its behavior, senses have no meaning. Furthermore, he indicates that speaking of the existence of inner senses is itself meaningless as well, inferring from the previous claim. This idea is crucial to understand his objection to the skeptical arguments such as the doubts on the existence of the external world. I will recall and illustrate this argument with his objection within the frame of the next section.

Another issue indicated in the previous quote is that there is a radical change in his understanding of truth and falsity. Instead of making them conclusive and definitive functions, he draws a conventionalist picture. However, this picture does not imply that there are no grounds. The ground is the forms of life of human beings, that is to

say, even though they are untraceable and unstable, they have a history. More precisely, there are countless number of forms of life in which all words gain their meanings, so that no fixed correspondence remains.

Besides, he also does not allow the claim that a word has an essential meaning. According to him, there are some commonalities of a word within its usages in different language games; Wittgenstein describes it comparable to the resemblances among the members of a family. Furthermore, he indicates another characteristic, in that, there are specific rules followed within the games. The critical fact is that there is no way to define these rules and resemblances in the absolute sense; one can only learn to follow rules and investigate common aspects of a word among different language games in practical field. Until now, the picture he has drawn is quite complicated, but all the above-mentioned notions are interwoven, so it will be more precise when their relations are shown.

First of all, a definition cannot exhaust all the usages of a word. The implication of his introducing the notion of *family resemblance* is that the words have different meanings in different language games, yet there is a kind of *indefinite* similarity between the words just like the resemblance between a family's members. In his own words:

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblance'; for the various resemblance between members of a family—build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap and criss-cross in the same way—And I shall say: 'games' form a family." (Wittgenstein, 2009, §67)

Thus, there is no possibility of finding out a definite rule for the resemblances of the family members, but certainly, it is possible to follow the patterns in actual life. This leads us that there is no the essential and fixed meaning of a word by which one can give an essential account of the concept named by it. Therefore, Wittgenstein suggests philosophers another kind of philosophizing in which one proceeds not with explanation or definition to comprise every possible meaning of an entity, but with description. When one describes an entity, there remains always a room for another kind of description from different eyes, such as the case for the similarity between the family members. The same word could be used in various games, and there could

be a sort of parallelism between those different usages. In line with this indefiniteness, the notion of family resemblance prevents the essentialist ways of thinking. That is, the different uses of the same word do not bear an essential meaning beyond the practical life. This issue will lead us to his therapeutic philosophy in the late period which has a completely non-essentialist character. Before this, let us proceed with illustrating another element of his philosophy.

Up until now, his philosophy seems not to have any restriction. However, he introduces the notions of *rule* and *rule following* as an addition to language games which is such an inclusive concept that it seems that there is no restriction to its function. However, to use the words in language games, there are specific rules that we need to follow to be meaningful to others. That is, each game, in order to be a game, should have rules, but following them is problematic for Wittgenstein. To explain, the problem begins with the following question: how do we learn those games? Is knowing the rules of a game sufficient to be able to play it? In other words, how does one learn to follow the rules? What do we need in order to be able to play it? Wittgenstein raises many questions of this kind, and he does not answer in a way that makes everything crystal clear. Instead, he demonstrates a way which leads us to practice and publicity. To exemplify, let us postulate a situation in which one is given the list of the rules of a game, e.g., chess. If she already knew the meaning of being a pawn, then she can act on the rules. Relatedly, to teach her that such and such shaped stone is called pawn requires the ostensive definition. Also, the ostensive definition requires mastery of language (Wittgenstein, 2009, §20). Regarding games, there must be something further than the ostensive teaching of the rules and the pieces; one should learn how to follow each rule within the specific context. This contextuality leads us to the necessity of sharing the same form of life. Then, this necessity brings about the impossibility of a private language. He begins by introducing the following paradox about the rules:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with a rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with a rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And, so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §201)

In brief, Wittgenstein avoids acting on rules individually. In other words, it is not the case that one can intentionally choose the activity of following or not following rules, alone. The action of following rules can be the exhibition of the habits or customs in life. What is mystical—life—considering the *Tractatus* becomes the crux for this point. Thus, Wittgenstein prevents us from thinking of accord or conflict with a rule privately. Thus, as a matter of fact, he still seems to carry the understanding of the rule (that is grammar in language), which is not open to the individual interpretation. He proceeds as follows:

That's why 'following a rule' is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that's why it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately'; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §202)

Therefore, the rules of a game exist in a definite fashion, but what a rule is has completely changed in his late philosophy. That is to say, the rules are not determinant and absolute terms; they can change in time or regarding the different language games. The core idea is that rules are not separated from the act of following. In a nutshell, the essential circumstance for learning the rules is to be a part of practical life.

Therefore, while in the *Tractatus* he postulates language as the universal ontological basis together with the world, in the late period, language is analogous to a tool box. The ground of meaning and reality is not comprised of logical structures but forms of life which is neither individualistic nor formal. The crux is that there is no possibility to define the pattern of determination of the usages of words regarding rules, even he preserves the concept of rule. That is, the understanding of grammar as the rules of the language still remains, but they assume a non-logical structure. In line with its relation to life, language does not have an end in any place or at any time, like forms of life of human beings; some meanings can be arisen, and some of them can be forgotten. He describes this issue with an old city analogy as follows:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §18)

Thus, Wittgenstein indicates that language is not a complete entity. For this reason, it is not possible to draw a limit to the field of being meaningful as he attempted in the *Tractatus*. Nevertheless, he keeps the idea of the form of expressions. This form is exhibited by the usages of language, not by the logico-syntactic structure. He writes that “grammar is our form of representation” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §122). As it is mentioned above, the meaning of the form of representation is different from the *Tractatus*, namely, it is not ultimate and definitive. The following quote exposes the contrast between his early and late thought considering the grammar:

Grammar does not tell how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes, and in no way, explains the use of signs. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §496)

To grasp this idea that grammar cannot show the usages of the signs, the analogy of the chess game would be helpful. Let us say that chess players have certain well-known strategies. Analogous to most of the board games, chess has a center at the beginning related to the board and players strategize regarding the center of the board. However, it is possible to change the center of the game during the play, so that the strategy and the priorities within the game could change. For example, a pawn is generally less valuable than a queen. However, when the center of the game is shifted, a pawn placed nearby that new center can be more important than a queen, and it might even be the most important piece in the game. In spite of this alterability, the possible movements of these pieces are determined by the rules, and they cannot be changed by players. If these rules are changed, in relation to this, the game cannot remain the same, i.e., it cannot be named “chess” anymore. He exemplifies this issue as follows:

But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a game—say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so? (Wittgenstein, 2009, §200)

In concordance with the last question of the quote, Wittgenstein indicates that there is no right to say so because he does not allow the existence of private language and

restricts the individual interpretations of rules. However, these rules do have neither essential and nor ontological nature like the logical structure to be the determinant ground of limits of meaning. As the rules of language, from the grammar “the essence is expressed” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §371) and it “tells us what kind of object anything is” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §373). The essence of language which is expressed in grammar is not apart from the forms of life, so it always has a contextual reference. For this reason, he does not postulate the essence as having a fixed nature. Since it is a part of life, they could not be understood as a determiner of meaning. Instead of this, they are a part of meaning which springs from forms of life. In a nutshell, Wittgenstein, with an emphasis on life, indicates the impossibility of theoretical grasping of language. Based on this non-theoretical conception of language, he suggests philosophers to take a step back from the systematic and theoretical way of thinking. He points out to the problematic aspects of philosophy by regarding them as illnesses arising mostly from the misuse of language. In the next chapter, what Wittgenstein means by philosophical illnesses will be explained in order to reveal his prescription to cure them.

3.2. The Philosophical Illnesses

To begin with, one of the most striking impacts of Wittgenstein on philosophical inquiry is that he leads philosophers to question the commonly accepted foundations of philosophical problems. He attempts to overcome this by changing the philosophical language. This change is presented in his own expressions in *Philosophical Investigations*. That is, he uses a descriptive language with various examples to show how bizarre the challenging historical questions are. He indicates a cause of illness as follows: “A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §593). The crux is that if one starts to philosophize by taking mostly a single explanation of a concept as granted, then their way of thinking becomes unidirectional. To explain, philosophers reduce the meaning of a concept to a strange usage, which is no grounded in usages in ordinary life. Furthermore, they use these concepts as constituent elements of their philosophical systems and theories by

holding these strange usages. This could be said of the metaphysical usage of a word. Wittgenstein avoids metaphysical explanations, which amounts to using words in order to give essential definitions to things. When they do so, they disregard various usages and functions of words in everyday life. Thus, their doctrines become misleading. Wittgenstein emphasizes ordinary life since it is a core part of human understanding which is already and always before eyes. When this is the case, philosophers deal with bizarre pictures of reality as if they are the universal and essential pictures of world.

He begins to indicate the task of showing the strangeness of metaphysical uses of words as follows: “What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”⁸ (Wittgenstein, 2009, §116). Thus, considering philosophical inquiries, Wittgenstein refers to metaphysical usages of a word by way of posing the infection of “one-sided diet”. To explain, that sort of usages does not belong to any form of life, so as a result, they follow long paths without noticing that from the very beginning it is a dead-end pursuit. Think of the question of what the knowledge is. For instance, the Cartesian philosophy defines the knowledge (*scientia*) as it “is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason.” (Descartes, 1991, 147) Richard Popkin states that Descartes’s aim was to avoid the sceptic uncertainty on the criteria of knowledge which leads one to be unable to “distinguish truth from falsehood” (Popkin, 1964, 178) That is, because of the sceptic arguments which are dominant in his period, we become unable to discover truth since everything turns to a matter of probability. Thus, in philosophy, religion and science the idea that “reducing all views to mere opinions to be judged by their plausibility” (Popkin, 1964, 178) becomes dominant. To deal this and to secure the truth, Descartes searches for the ground for knowledge which cannot be doubted. (Popkin, 1964, 179) His definition of knowledge means that knowledge is distinguished from other beliefs by means of its undoubtable foundational reasons. However, if this definition is postulated as a universal and an essential character of human knowledge, then it should be able to explain every possible usage of

⁸ This quote will be analyzed in the next chapter in depth.

“knowing”. However, this explanation cannot cover all the usages of “knowing” contrary to its universality claim. In life, we use “I know” in various ways which cannot be explained with the Cartesian definition. For instance, knowing is used in place of memorizing in everyday speech. If someone says that “I know this poem,” we do not understand this as she is so convinced in the poem. That is, in this example, we do not speak of being so convinced that the opposite cannot be true. Here, “I know” means that I memorize it. There could be numerous examples in this kind. It also could be used as speaking of a prediction, i.e., “I know that you are going to do such-and-such move next.” Thus, if there are some examples which cannot be explained by a universal definition, then its universality cannot remain.

Wittgenstein’s claim is that, the usages of words in life is the essential factor that determines the meaning of it. Thus, meanings of things are disclosed through and within forms of life, and subsequently, their meanings cannot be isolated from the ground on which they are practiced. In Wittgenstein’s own words, “the original home” of words are language games. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §116) Hence, illnesses in philosophy arise by assuming that the philosophical systems could be established by using a single method in which words are used without considering language games they belong with. Within the frame of this sort of a system, there is no possibility to take a step back from the metaphysical assumptions, too. If we could not make this step possible, the problems keep arising because even the potential oppositions will convey the same problem through another metaphysical assumption; a different sort but still a one-sided diet.

Let us turn to the abovementioned skeptical arguments which are linked to acceptances on knowing and the objections to them. Pulido points out this issue with its relation to the difference between saying and showing. He writes,

All opponents of the skeptic are likewise attempting to state what cannot be said, but only shown: the very rules governing the existing language-game make certainty undeniable, but it does not make what we are certain of irrefutable true. (Pulido, 2009, 29)

Thus, skeptic doubts can be neither true nor false. That is to say, their truth value depends the language game the expression in question belongs. Thus, the Cartesian

definition of “knowing” as being free of doubts can be neither universal nor distinctive feature of it. The reason for this, the meaning of the expression of “being free of doubts” is determined by the existing language game. For this reason, denying them by way of claiming the opposite means to be in the same vein with them. The basic Wittgensteinian idea is that the problem of skepticism and objections to them is that they construct their arguments by abstracting words from where they belong, that is, language games.

Let us continue with the other minds problem. Briefly, the problem could be formulated as follows: the commonsensical thoughts lead human beings to believe that others possess mind so that they can think and feel. However, how is it possible to know this for sure? In modern philosophy, Rene Descartes is known for his attempt of finding undoubtable knowledge with the method of doubt. Parallel with his understanding of “knowledge”, he follows this method, and keep questioning until finding an undoubtable source for knowledge. In the 2nd *Meditation* (1984), he brings forth the uncertainty of the human senses and the imagination. Briefly, he concludes that there is nothing certain but only “I” since thinking subject is the source of this doubt. In other words, because I can doubt or convince myself of the existence of physical entities, as the bearer of them, “I” exists. The answer to the question above is that there is no way to know whether the others I see around are automata or real human beings since my senses could always deceive me. He indicates this doubt and the certainty of this doubt’s bearer as follows:

But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind. (Descartes, 1984, 8)

But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. (Descartes, 1984, 4)

In line with these cases, there are fundamental philosophical presuppositions: the mind is like a private container that preserves, e.g., the faculties of “imagination,” and “sensation,” and the subject receives the knowledge of the physical world

through representing them in mind. Firstly, instead of opposing against, e.g., the uncertainty of the external world, and claiming that the external world exists for such and such reasons, these presuppositions should be critically analyzed. Unless philosophers take this critical step, the illnesses which means disregarding everyday usages of words, cannot be cured. Further than this, the possible solutions would also be infected by those presuppositions. With this regard, before critically analyzing the abovementioned problems from the Wittgensteinian point of view, let us remind the Kantian reversal on grasping the physical world. That is, his critical philosophy could be understood as a solution to the Cartesian doubts, and yet, it disregards everyday life in the same way with Descartes.

Briefly, Kant defines the subject in a quite different but similar to the Cartesian philosophy, i.e., in a metaphysically burdened way. Firstly, he changes the structure of “sense perception.” The form of the physical world, to be in a time and a space, becomes the forms of intuition. That is to say, physical entities are grasped in *time* and *space*, not because it is their real nature. The reason for their appearing in time and space is that sensible intuition has these forms of time and space. (Kant, 1992, 27) By this way, the phenomena one grasps become already shaped by intuition. As a second step, we produce judgements about those already shaped appearances. Thus, when we say “this table is brown” we speak of a feature of an *appearance*, not the real nature of it. By this way, Kant makes undoubtful that we cannot know the real nature of outside world. He illustrates this issue as follows:

That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only conditions of existence of things as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of understanding, and consequently no elements for the knowledge of things, save in so far as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts; and that we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is an appearance. (Kant, 1992, 27)

In sum, neither physical world nor the transcendental subject can be known in their true nature since intuition of both is already shaped by the forms of intuition. That is to say, we grasp them as appearances in a certain time and place. Thus, since the knowledge of them becomes already shaped by the forms of sensible intuition, *things in themselves* are cannot be known. By this way, it could be asserted that the skeptic

doubts are no longer the case. As it is stated, it is certain that we do not know how things are in their real nature.

From the Wittgensteinian perspective, the metaphysical acceptances which are apart from life remains in the Kantian solution to skeptic doubts and external world problem. Firstly, similar to Descartes, Kant holds the idea that human beings obtain knowledge of entities by their representations. According to Wittgenstein, he misleads the fact that an essential part of the human knowledge comes from dealings in life. Thus, by disregarding this, he attempts to give another universal and absolute account of human knowledge. However, this sort of an attempt is a dead-end pursuit for Wittgenstein. The illness of both Cartesian and Kantian philosophies springs from their not asking what people *do* with those words. For instance, there is a radical difference between scientific knowing and to know how to meaningfully behave in the society. The former could mean to know the number of electrons and protons of an element, while the latter could mean to be able to understand jokes. Let us remind the notion of family resemblance. Between the different usages of words, there could be only unsteady resemblances. For this reason, Wittgenstein points out all the essentialist approaches to philosophical concepts as the sources of problems, and these are also like diseases that we need to avoid. There are two quite different philosophical treatments: the Cartesian and the Kantian philosophies. Both have the same disease even if they are radically different characters; that is, treating the notion of “knowing” by postulating a gap between the subject as the knower and the object as the object of knowledge. From this postulation, both tackles with securing knowledge either drawing a limit to reason or making certain the knower by the existence of doubt. Thus, the same objection to the Cartesian account of knowledge could be directed to Kant. That is, “I know this poem,” “I know that there is a table there,” “I know how to behave according to social rules” etc. have different meanings. According to Wittgenstein, the only way to be meaningful and to recognize the different usages of them is sharing a form of life. Wittgenstein writes,

My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend, e.g., “Take the chair over there,” “Shut the door,” etc. etc. (Wittgenstein, 1975, §7)

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. - So I don't know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion "I am here", which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself. (Wittgenstein, 1975, §10)

These quotes and examples indicate that there is not an essential and privileged meaning of a word. According to Wittgenstein, all the meanings of a word depend on its various occurrences in life. As he illuminates in the previous quotes, we know facts from our actions in life, so it is not possible to question their meaning or existence apart from our actions. In other words, I know that there is a table there because I am putting my mug on it. Therefore, the illness that leads philosophy to depict bizarre pictures of world is; (1) giving universal definitions and explanations without having any reference to life, and (2) not questioning those explanations' presuppositions while adapting them as essential truths.

In sum, the illnesses he means arises when philosophers use, e.g., the word "know" as representing entities in the mind and holding this definition as if it is the ultimate definition of knowing. In this way, the possibility of deceiving by senses arises as a philosophical problem. However, for Wittgenstein, knowing does not have to be understood as it is a process of representing entities in mind. This understanding should be tested in everyday life. As for doubting whether other human beings are automata or not, Wittgenstein writes as follows:

But can't I imagine that people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual? – If I imagine it now – alone in my room – I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business – the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to hang on to this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others – in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism." And you will either find these words becoming quite empty; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §420)

Here, Wittgenstein illustrates how the well-known skeptic idea becomes empty when it is evaluated in ordinary life. This method he uses could be employed as a cure to the abovementioned disputes. By this way, his philosophy cannot be placed on either

side. The purpose of treating an illness requires to bring the matter to the ordinary level, e.g., what the usages of “being conscious”, or of “knowing” are. Regarding this, Wittgenstein’s opposition to the Augustinian ostensive teaching process indicates that human beings do not know like drawing the picture of the reality. In *Blue Books*, he writes,

There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, the term “leaf”, has thereby come to possess a kind of general picture of a leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves. He was shown different leaves when he learnt the meaning of the word “leaf”; and showing him the particular leaves was only a means to the end of producing 'in him' an idea which we imagine to be some kind of general image. (...) This again is connected with the idea that the meaning of a word is an image, or a thing correlated to the word. (Wittgenstein, 1958, 17-18)

Briefly, words do not relate to things as correspondence, and they do not create a universal and conceptual image of an entity “in mind”. Thus, when someone points to an entity and call its name, we might understand its name, shape, color, trait etc. The core fact is that to postulate something like the image “leaf-ness” in general, can only be another game in language, not the unquestioned truth of this entity. Thus, in ordinary life we can differentiate the various usages of words, so the meaning of an entity could be an expression of an emotion or a purpose for a job depending on the context. That is to say, human beings have a shared life with each other and they learn the meanings there. One knows how to relate words to objects, or how to doubt since she already has the language. Thus, as Wittgenstein suggests, one should “[r]egard the sentence as instrument and its sense as its employment” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §421) when doing philosophy. Hence, the other mind problem cannot meaningfully arise since the language is not private. Wittgenstein writes in *On Certainty* that “If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (Wittgenstein, 1975, §15). The crucial idea is that even “to doubt something” is a sort of game in language, and repeatedly, language is not private.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein presents that there is no hierarchy between the uses of words. They belong to language games and do not have an essential meaning but usages in life. This is the same for the philosophical concepts. Thus, the

philosophical disputes between, e.g., the skeptics and the transcendental idealists, exist only because of disregarding what we are already familiar with. Wittgenstein reveals this strangeness through the examples of inner states. He indicates how strange to doubt or know something we have inwardly, that is, the feelings, emotions or beliefs. He exposes that the doubt on the others' having pain could be meaningful in some cases (however, it is useless as it is exposed above). However, doubting the certainty of the knowledge of inner states are completely odd. Parallel to the idea in *On Certainty*, he writes in *Philosophical Investigations* as follows:

In what sense are my sensations private? — Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. — In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I— It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I *am* in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations *only* from my behavior —for I cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §246)

Subsequently, he continues with,

Only you can know if you had that intention.” One might tell someone this when explaining the meaning of the word “intention” to him. For then it means: *that* is how we use it.

(And here “know” means that the expression of uncertainty is senseless.) (Wittgenstein, 2009, §247)

The sentence ‘Sensations are private’ is comparable to “One plays patience by oneself.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §248)

Similar to his opposition against the attempts to refute the skeptical arguments as Moore did,⁹ he suggests that language is capable of displaying its senselessness. Thus, a sentence like “I know that I am in pain” does not say something meaningful since (1) inner states are not like physical object to possess and (2) language cannot be private. Thus, I can say that I know or doubt the pain others have through the form of life we share. In other words, the conventional pain behavior makes these claims meaningful. However,

⁹ Wittgenstein gives the example of Moore's answer to the skeptical arguments in the *On Certainty* to show it is also senseless. Briefly, Moore begins with his own body and by way of lifting and showing his own hand he says that “this is one hand.”

See Moore, *Proof of an External World* and *A Defence of Common Sense*.

for my inner states, it does not do a job in life, to wit, saying that I know my pain does spin the wheel while nothing turns as a result of it. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §271)

On the other hand, in the former case, the problem is the indistinctness of language, and the aim is to make it clear and distinct. Let us recall the indistinctness problem in the *Tractatus*. Early Wittgenstein assigns philosophy the duty to eliminate the indistinctness in the language by way of showing the limits of language and the world. In the late period, he also problematizes this matter, but the formulation of it has a different sense. In fact, to make it distinct in a way which is the case for the *Tractatus* is another illness of philosophy since there is no possibility to capture language conceptually as an entity in which words have fixed meanings. On the other hand, in the late period, this indistinctness is rooted in the abovementioned misusages or its being isolated from the usages of words. Subsequently, philosophical diseases arise by way of overlooking various functionings of words. He states this issue within the context of his famous analogy of “toolbox” in which he compares the language with a toolbox. He writes,

Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy! (Wittgenstein, 2009, §11)

Thus, Wittgenstein treats philosophical problems by way of showing the various meanings (usages) with various examples from everyday life. Through the meaning of philosophical illness, we can presume what the therapy is. There is no precise definition of this term; still, it could be understood as his way of handling philosophical problems. In the next section, I will follow the traces of Wittgenstein’s views mainly within the frame of *Philosophical Investigations* to elucidate what the way is.

3.3. Philosophical Therapy

As a summary of the late philosophy of Wittgenstein on the issue of life, he illustrates that we are already in a meaningful world and, we learn how to use words by way of dwelling in it, i.e., actively watching and responding human actions. Subsequently, we understand what a word means with respect to a form of life we

have and share with others. This also means that language games and forms of life are the roots of meaning. Therapeutic philosophy is a term used by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* which basically means non-theoretical, non-conceptual and non-essentialist philosophizing. He declares his aim as “[t]o show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §309) This also points out that Wittgenstein shows the fly that it is surrounded by a fly-bottle. According to him, many disputes had arisen because of disregarding the existence of the bottle around, viz., the metaphysical assumptions springing from the misuse of language. The illnesses in philosophy that we stated in previous chapter becomes clear with this analogy. That is to say, as the way out of the fly-bottle is always before fly’s eyes, every-day usages of words, accordingly functions of entities always before our eyes. Thus, philosophy should show this way out by way of curing the errors in our language by taking usages of words in everyday life into consideration.

When it comes to treating philosophical problems, Wittgenstein proposes that there cannot be a single method in philosophy. He writes: “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §133) Disregarding this issue causes philosophers to start investigation with the burden of metaphysical presuppositions. Thus, they remain merely with an essentialist postulation of the world or end up with doubts which arise from misleading definitions or explanations of entities. Then, they carry on with philosophical systems while preserving the belief that it represents the entire landscape of the world and the language. What they have disregarded is that the world and the language have an endless nature. Thus, a single theory or method cannot be capable of giving a complete account of them. According to Wittgenstein, philosophers should investigate various usages of these metaphysically burdened concepts in everyday life, instead of attempting to re-define them and taking a single explanation as the essence of it. He states this point as follows:

When philosophers use a word – “Knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?

What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §116)

Most philosophers have never taken a step back from the metaphysical uses of philosophical notions as Wittgenstein suggested in the quote above. They commonly began from one sort of definition of, for example, “name”, and then proceeded with theories as if they expose the fundamental truth. Nevertheless, this cannot be done according to Wittgenstein. A definition cannot exhaust all usages of a word, and there is no privileged usage which is able to cover all the other usages. Let us recall how Wittgenstein describes those similarities with the analogy of *family resemblance*. Between the different usages of words, there could only be unspecifiable similarities in different ways like the resemblance of family members. And, philosophers could only describe them. Thus, this kind of descriptive approaches prevents philosophers from ending up with conclusions burdened with theoretical thinking independent from practical life. What is true about entities is exposed from their usages in language. Their truth does not spring from any metaphysical sphere beyond and superior to the world we live in. He indicates this issue as follows:

We (philosophers) may not advance any theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and the description must take its place. And this description gets its light—that is to say, its purpose—from the philosophical problems. These are, of course not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized—despite an urge to misunderstand them. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §109)

This quote is a clear disclosure of the therapeutic aspect of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In one sense, therapy means dissolving the problems (treating the illnesses) while working on their way of expressing in *language games*. Wittgenstein's understanding of language is strictly bound with the forms of life of human beings which are also groundless. Thus, one should treat the philosophical problems by way of looking at how things happen in everyday day life. Let us recall the fundamental idea of the *Tractatus*; names are the simplest elements of language, and they refer to the simplest elements in the world, to objects. Moreover, they are used in the propositions and represents the reality (the world). However, according to Wittgenstein in late period, it is not the fact that former explanations are adequate to

cover the language. Instead, they could only be a function of language. He states as follows:

Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language in this system. And one has to say this in several cases where the question arises “Will that description do or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it will, but only for this narrowly circumscribed area, not for the whole of what you were purporting to describe. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §3)

Afterwards, he uses many examples and thought experiments in order to show the insufficiency of Augustine’s explanation, only valid for a language game, not for the language altogether. They can be found primarily in the first forty sections of *Philosophical Investigations*. Moreover, the meaning of understanding philosophy as an activity of therapy could be seen in those sections. Wittgenstein does not argue against the system of Augustine; instead, he criticizes systems in general, and he has opposed to the grounds of that kind of philosophizing. Thus, as it is stated above, instead of proceeding with explanations, he suggests description. Lee Braver writes in his book *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger* (2014) as follows:

Without our normal mastery of words and things bizarre pictures and theories step in to command our assent and guide our philosophizing; the cure is to remind us of what we already know. (Braver, 2014, 10)

As Braver pointed out, “the cure” of problems lies in the look at what we are already doing in the everyday life. Furthermore, in *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein states that the methods of sciences—explanation, definition, theorizing—are not appropriate to philosophy. He writes,

I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’. (Wittgenstein, 1958, 18)

In line with this idea, the way he suggests in order to avoid the darkness of metaphysics in philosophy is to leave reductionist approaches and to use a “purely

descriptive” method. Hence, if one grasps any answer to be the exhaustive and definite meaning of “subject,” his philosophy will be infected by one-sided dogmatism. That is to say, the Cartesian usage of the “subject” could only be a single way to understand the phenomenon of the subject. And, there is something common in all usages of this word, but it is not the case that this commonality could be enough to define it completely. As it is stated above, what they share in common is like the resemblance between family members: they cannot be formulated since there is no systematic pattern. Therefore, instead of giving definite answers to these questions, Wittgenstein suggests us to *look and see* what is happening before us. Thus, he makes us look at the same phenomenon from different perspectives that are therapeutic for the traditional philosophy. This philosophical method prevents us from taking any possible answer for granted. Thus, as he suggests in the preface of *Philosophical Investigations*, after curing the language and thought, we could only have “sketches of a landscape,” not the complete and ultimate picture of the world.

His opposition against the grounds of any absolutist or essentialist approach echoes in the heart of pragmatism. It is worth mentioning this parallelism since pragmatism could support the Wittgensteinian therapeutic method. Let us indicate Wittgenstein’s mention of William James as a good philosopher. (Rush, 1981, 68) The reason of this could be understood by way of hearing the following expressions of James:

Meanwhile the very fact that they [usages of ‘religion’] are so many and so different from one another is enough to prove that the word ‘religion’ cannot stand for any single principle or essence but is rather a collective name. (James, 1902, 351)

In this quote, we see that James rises a strong opposition against the dogmatic and essentialist approaches to the nature of religion. His idea echoes in the Wittgensteinian investigation of meaning, that is, the meaning of a word sprung from its usages in language games and the relationship between the usages of words is in line with the resemblance between family members.

Thus, there is nothing essential beyond the usages of a word. Similarly, conceptual analysis cannot bring us any further place since everything is present before our eyes. There is no need for abstracting a word from its usages in the very first place. The

reason for this idea is that there is no essence, so-called noumena, beyond the presences in the world. That is to say, there is nothing hidden in life. The only reason for failure to notice this fact is to have a one-sided approach. Metaphysical assumptions and burdens should be removed from philosophy. James continues the previous quote as follows:

The theorizing mind tends always to the over-simplification of its materials. This is the root of all that absolutism and one-sided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been infected. (ibid.)

In line with James, therapeutic philosophy of Wittgenstein suggests avoiding the absolutism and “one-sided diets”. By way of describing the absolutely defined concepts from various horizons with diverse examples from ordinary life, Wittgenstein attempts to cure human thought. The crucial aspect is that, one cannot consider any of these descriptions as giving the complete nature of the object. Therefore, the task of a philosopher is to avoid passing beyond of these descriptions and taking one of them to be an absolute foundation of any “one-sided diet.”

Another example to therapeutic approach is in “Lecture on Ethics” (1929), which is published only 7 years after the *Tractatus*. (1922) There he exposes the misuse of language in terms of ethics and aesthetics. This lecture includes both the characteristics of the early and the late periods. He uses the notion of “family resemblance” which will be one of the basic notions of *Philosophical Investigations*. Briefly, he suggests investigating various expressions on ethical and aesthetical judgements. To explain, there are many propositions about “good,” “bad,” “beautiful.” However, philosophers treat the problem of the meaning of “good” while not looking into different uses of it in life. For this reason, they misuse those words. He shows how the philosophical problems have arisen because of that misuse. In other words, the underlying cause of philosophical problems remains hidden because of linguistic illusions. Thus, therapeutic method of Wittgenstein suggests philosophers to fix misuses in language, thus our thought could be cured too. By this way, curing philosophical illnesses becomes possible. This is what Wittgenstein understands from philosophical therapy. Philosophical illusions that cause illnesses will be clearer with examples from “Lecture on Ethics.”

Now the first thing that strikes one about all these expressions is that each of them is actually used in absolute sense on the other. If for instance I say that this is a good chair this means that the chair serves a certain predetermined purpose and the word good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon. In fact, the word good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard. Thus, when we say that this man is a good pianist, we mean that he can play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity. And similarly, if I say that it is important for me not to catch cold, I mean that catching a cold produces certain describable disturbances in my life and if I say that this is the right road, I mean that it's the right road relative to a certain goal. (Wittgenstein, 1929, 1)

He shows the bizarreness of the systematic explanations on such a so-called vital problem on the definition of the notion of “good.” The achievement of his method is that the ability to show them in an astonishingly simple way. That is to say, he simply points out uses of “good” in the ethical language game. He indicates these uses of “good” as follows: “what is valuable,” “what is really important,” “the meaning of life,” “what makes life worth living,” “right way of living.” (ibid.) The impressive idea is that there is no hierarchy among different uses of a word, so it is not possible to formulate a doctrine on the best way of using “good.” Within the frame of ethics, this is quite unusual since it destroys the grounds of one-sided ethical systems. That is, they are based on a single usage of “good” as if it is independent of the usages in language games. As it is stated above, there is not an absolute meaning, but only usages of a word which are not superior to one another.

The flaw of traditional philosophy is to disregard the fact that there is no hierarchy between the language games. However, in the direction to define a word, traditional philosophers forget that those words already have been used in life before any definition. The systematical philosophies such as the Kantian philosophy, handles the “good” while not considering its different uses, in those philosophies it is handled in the absolute sense. For example, according to Kant, “The law then determines the will directly, the action conforming to it is in itself good, and a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is good absolutely, in every respect, and is the supreme condition of all good” (Kant, 1992, 84). Here, good act is defined as an act which is done in accordance with laws of the reason and which is not affected by any bodily will, but which directs them. And the practical law is absolute, a priori and universal for any rational being. So, merely from this quote, the question where Kant speaks

from should be asked. According to early Wittgenstein, it is certain that to speak of such an absolute good is impossible, even though we all have a tendency to do so. Thus, Wittgenstein would answer the question as indicating that Kant speaks from the outside of possible state of affairs and that he says which is unsayable. In the “Lecture of Ethics,” he states,

I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. And let me, before I go on, illustrate this by a rather obvious example. The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge. (Wittgenstein, 1929, 3)

Furthermore, to express an ethical judgment in a proposition is also impossible because any proposition cannot have higher value (Wittgenstein, 1961, §6.42). If there is such a higher value, it should not belong to the phenomenal world, or it cannot be a being in the world. Kant and early Wittgenstein are agreed on the idea that the ethical values are not in the phenomenal world. Wittgenstein has formulated it as the following: “It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics are transcendental.” (Wittgenstein, 1961, §6.421) As it is seen, it is possible to say that Kant has gone a step further and, defined “good” as an act which is done for the sake of duty which calls us through the reason as an imperative of the reason. Let’s suppose that another definition of the highest good as the pleasure of human being. It will be possible to justify such a definition, and to systematize it as follows: Pleasure determines the will directly; the action conforming to it is in itself good; and a will whose maxim always serve for the sake of pleasure is absolutely good, in every respect, and is the supreme condition of all good. Thus, these two opposite ethical systems could be both logically possible and consistent. For this reason, philosophers should not construct theories. It is possible to construct, e.g., ethical theories in opposed directions and purposes in equally consistent way. Arguing against them has

no sense according to Wittgenstein since they always have a pre-determined purpose, as it is the case in the philosophy of Kant. That is to say, Kant tries to give the account of an ethical system which consists of purely laws of reason. Thus, his theory cannot be disputed without speaking of its purpose. Wittgenstein's position is equidistant to these two and all other possible ethical systems. As he states in *Philosophical Investigations*:

The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose. If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §127-§128)

Different from the idea in the *Tractatus*, he reveals also in *Philosophical Investigations* that ethics and aesthetics are not transcendental, but as it is stated above, they are language games. Thinking otherwise is “a main cause of philosophical diseases – a one sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §593) In “Lecture on Ethics”, he has the same idea. That is, he gives different examples and shows the different uses of the “good” in various cases without any essentialist treatment.

To conclude, Wittgenstein suggests a new way of philosophizing which stands for a treatment to philosophical illnesses. These illnesses are exemplified in the previous section. To avoid and to cure them, he suggests leaving all pre-defined questions unanswered, and instead looking at meanings in everyday life. As he indicates in the Preface, all that is to be found are mere sketches in *Philosophical Investigations*. As of guidance to philosophers, he writes,

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §129)

From this quote, therapeutic philosophy of Wittgenstein can be summarized in the following way: According to him, philosophers have handled issues without looking at how these issues are used within the events of the life of human beings, so they

have left many aspects as if they were hidden. For this reason, their philosophies are blind to many aspects of things which are foundations of their philosophical systems. For example, if we take epistemological issues into consideration, the meaning of “knowing” cannot be fully understood without looking into usages of the word “knowledge”. The reason of this is that, the phenomenon of “knowledge” is shaped in every day usages in life, so knowledge has roots in there. As Wittgenstein states that these usages are the “most striking and most powerful” (Wittgenstein, 2009, §129) aspects of things that are familiar to us. Thus, disregarding them causes unsolved problems and misleading philosophical systems. Also, one single philosophical dispute has been continued for years because of the “one-sided diet” which means to oppose or to agree one’s thought from only one point of view. Furthermore, philosophers mostly take only one usage of as it is the conclusive and definitive account of this phenomenon. By doing this, they make hidden while there is nothing hidden. Richard Rorty clarifies Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s awareness of this error as follows:

Early Heidegger and late Wittgenstein set aside the assumption (to their respective predecessors, Husserl and Frege) that social practice—and in particular the use of language—can receive a noncausal, specifically philosophical explanation in terms of conditions of possibility. More generally, both set aside the assumption that philosophy might explain the unhidden on the basis of the hidden, and might explain availability and relationality on the basis of something intrinsically unavailable and nonrelational. (Rorty, 2006, 347-348)

In sum, this awareness of and setting aside the habit of taking the true meaning or ground of phenomenal entities as if they are hidden make their philosophy therapeutic. The therapeutic method suggests that we need to (1) fix our language by focusing usages of words in ordinary life, (2) reformulate philosophical problems by taking these usages into consideration. Finally, fixing errors in language provides us a treatment for misleading ways of thinking. With the help of this treatment, bizarre pictures of world will also be cured. As is seen in the afore-mentioned “fly-bottle” analogy, philosophy of Wittgenstein aims to “show the way out” from the bizarreness of philosophy, by revealing “groundless grounds” of philosophical problems from a horizon of everyday life.

Until now, we have dealt with the philosophical Wittgenstein and his therapeutic dealing with philosophical illnesses. Very parallel with his philosophy, the early philosophy of Martin Heidegger shows a path which is very similar to that of Wittgenstein. That is, he underlines the importance of everyday life and our pre-theoretical attitude towards concepts. Similar to Wittgenstein, he indicates that in philosophical inquiries, we seek solutions to philosophical disputes but always disregard disclosures of entities in our lives while they are always before us. As Lee Braver states, this new method which was introduced by Wittgenstein can also be seen in the philosophy of Heidegger, (Braver, 2014, 10) Wittgenstein's emphasis on the consideration of philosophy as an activity related to human life echoes in the Heideggerian search for fundamental ontology.

That is, Heidegger takes the same step directed to non-theoretical field apart from the traditional philosophy. Related to this, they both agree that “[t]hought necessarily rests upon nonrational and ultimately unjustifiable factors like our socialization and our particular susceptibility to socialization.” (Braver, 2014, 11) Parallel to Wittgenstein, this ordinary level “socialization” is the beginning of Heideggerian search for Being of beings. To explain, Heidegger begins by stating that appearances of entities in ordinary life are also intrinsic parts of their meanings. He introduces two notions: “ready-to-hand” which means practical purposefulness of a being and “present-at-hand” which means to take beings in their mere presence. Briefly, these are two essential disclosures of beings. However, traditional philosophers forget that practical aspects of beings are another essential character of them, and thus they begin by treating the existence of entities and human beings as if they are mere presences.

Until this point, philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger support each other; the former highlights therapeutic method in language and avoids going any further, while the latter searches for the fundamental Being of beings under the light of the same emphasis on life. Thus, reading Heidegger together with Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy makes the grounds of his fundamental ontological investigation crystal clear. Furthermore, it could be very fruitful to consider them together, to grasp the second step of the philosophy of Heidegger which carries the

Wittgensteinian therapy to an existential sphere. This issue will be the main subject of the following section. In brief, Heidegger goes beyond this by envisaging everydayness and publicity of human beings from a different horizon. Awareness of practical purposefulness as an essential and intrinsic character of beings suggest a new understanding of the world and the language, which is in parallel with by the Wittgensteinian postulation. After introducing these issues and taking a very similar postulation of the world and the language as the ground, Heidegger searches for what we can do with this new understanding. Further than Wittgenstein's suggestion, after curing human thought with carrying the understanding of practical life as an essential character for philosophical notions, he tackles with the question of what one ought to do in everyday life. In other words, he deals with the problem of how we live in everyday life. To take this a step further, he uses the therapeutic method very similar to that of Wittgenstein. This further step will be revealed with the notions of "anxiety." In accordance with this notion, he postulates two ways of living in the world: *authentic* and *inauthentic*. These notions will be the crux of the final section of this thesis. At this point, I leave this issue aside but note that the Heideggerian philosophy leads to a therapy different from the one that Wittgenstein aimed, and he gives it an existentialist insight. Before going into details of this issue, the preliminary notions of *Being and Time* will be introduced in the next section.

CHAPTER 4

EARLY HEIDEGGER

4.1. Basic Notions of *Being and Time*

Martin Heidegger is another important 20th century philosopher who emphasized and problematized the methods in philosophical inquiry. He begins with the claim of reminding the forgotten and the most critical question of philosophy, that is, the question of Being. According to Heidegger, the last philosophers who attempted to answer this question were the ancient Greeks. After that, the modern understanding of Being which is the emptiest one, for Heidegger, arises. Modern philosophers only ask what it means *to be* such and such. Subsequently, their theories and systems fall short of understanding being of the world since they never question the meaning of being and act upon unquestioned conceptions of being. Firstly, Heidegger introduces that prior to determining what it means to be as such, human beings should already have an understanding of Being. In other words, beings become intelligible through an understanding of Being, so philosophy should begin with revealing the primary step. This step lies in everyday life and discourse as it is the case for Wittgenstein, too. For instance, an epistemological question could be formulated as follows: “what is knowledge?” and the ethical one: “what is good?” In these cases, they already assume an unquestioned *to be*, which is the most fundamental question for Heidegger.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger starts with the analytic of everyday Dasein. Then, he approaches its being through two perspectives: (1) world-hood and (2) Dasein’s existential structure. After that, he proposes the temporality as the meaning of Dasein’s Being. Finally, he reverts to the beginning and states the whole process

from a new horizon, which includes authenticity. The first step could be considered as Wittgensteinian therapy to the illnesses of the traditional philosophy. Regarding their commonalities and his therapeutic approach to the modern philosophy, I will introduce the distinction between revealing of “beings” and his description of the human being as *Dasein*.

First of all, Heidegger makes a distinction between disclosures of beings; *present-at-hand*¹⁰ and *ready-to-hand*.¹¹ This difference is quite crucial since his claim of fundamental ontology is related to it. That is, philosophers act like scientists and disregard the first and the most primary disclosure, that is the *equipmentality* of things. Overlooking the different disclosures causes the essentialist views (e.g. Cartesian philosophy) on notions such as being, subject and knowledge. Traditional philosophers treat these concepts as if they reveal themselves in solely present-at-hand nature, viz., abstracted from the context that they are in. In other words, traditional philosophy does not notice the aspects of a particular phenomenon in ordinary life for human beings. Apparently, in everyday life, entities are not revealed as entities concerning specific properties such as having a particular height and weight, or as entities being solely objects of examination. For instance, in ordinary life, a cat is not considered as a predatory mammal. Instead, it may show itself as an old symbol of the goddess in the Egyptian world, or a close friend for many people today. Thus, human beings can treat entities as they are presented before them, but there is a sort of operation in this case. A vet should treat the cat as a mere object to examine and, e.g., to perform surgery on her; however, the essence of being a cat is not reducible to this treatment. Heidegger writes,

If this kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this ‘Nature’¹² itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails us and enthralls us as landscape,

¹⁰ *vorhanden* in German literally means *before the hand* which signifies that a disclosure of being that is not at hand for any use. (See ...)

¹¹ *zuhanden* in the German language. It means *ready at hand* which means that a disclosure of being that is at hand for any use.

¹² He does not use the term ‘Nature’ as abstracted presence before us. Rather, he uses it as possible appearances, i.e., encountered environment.

remains hidden. The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' which the geographer establishes for a river is not the 'springhead in the dale'. (Heidegger, 2001, 100)

In line with this quote, to grasp something "in its pure presence-at-hand" presupposes a hidden world of significance. Thus, Heidegger indicates that nothing can be understood without the context that they are in¹³. They are grasped with their practical function for a specific concern of human beings. That is to say, according to Heidegger, in everyday life, entities are mostly revealed as ready-to-hand beings. When we treat them to be only present-at-hand beings—in the way the traditional philosophy and the sciences do for constructing theories—the multiplicity of the meaning in the world always remains hidden. As it is the case in the example above, if one considers the meaning of being a cat like a vet who has the purpose of performing the surgery, then it means that any other aspect of being a cat is disregarded. Disregarding those aspects obscures the fact that a phenomenon has various disclosures. Then, the cat becomes a sort of presence substantially determined by some objectifiable aspects. For this reason, he suggests philosophers to think in a non-theoretical way to prevent such a misleading which veils the foundational character of beings. In short, Heidegger takes this issue into account after he unveils the overlooked aspects, hence, he exposes the constitutive characteristics of them: the everydayness and worldhood. As a second step, he problematizes the *authenticity* considering the ways of making choices. This issue will be discussed within the frame of the limit of the similarity between the philosophies of Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

Let us continue with another basic notion of Heidegger. At the very beginning, to disclose ontological character of entities, he suggests investigating the ground of the understanding of Being, that is, human beings. He introduces the notion of *Dasein* in place of the human subject, to change its reference in the traditional philosophy. Different from the tradition, he does not grasp human beings as abstracted from the environment that they belong. Instead of this, Heidegger describes the notion of *Dasein* existentially and ontologically cares about entities

¹³ This is also the case for the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

and other human beings in its environment as well as its own being. The basis of existential care is the meaning of Da-sein and Dasein literally means *being there* or *being-in-the-world*. (Heidegger, 2001, 83-84) However, he does not use “in” to refer to a spatial field. Heidegger indicates that the meaning of “in” is originated from *innan*. The origin of *innan* is clarified by him as follows: “(...) ‘in’ is derived from ‘innan’ — ‘to reside,’ ‘habitare,’ ‘to dwell.’ ‘An’ signifies ‘I am accustomed,’ ‘I am familiar with,’ ‘I look after something.’” (Heidegger, 2001, 80) and “‘Being alongside’ the world ... is an existentiale founded upon Being-in.” (Heidegger, 2001, 80-81)

Thus, according to Heidegger, “I am” means that I have a kind of familiarity with the world, I dwell alongside the world; in other words, I care about worldly entities. What Heidegger achieves at this point is to lead one to be critical to the prejudices that apprehend the object and the subject as separated. That is, *Being-in* and *the-world* cannot be understood and cannot have an existence without one another. Dasein is a “gathering” of the world and the subject, so as a collection, it is more than its components. That is to say, by using the notion of Dasein, Heidegger brings two separated so-called substances together, and in the first step, eliminates the essentialist associations with their nature. This elimination is related to the fact that Dasein is neither burdened with the traditional presuppositions of subjectivity, nor of the understanding of the world as a physical space. Human beings come to the world made up of meaning; that makes Dasein historical and social. Subsequently, people construct themselves regarding the pre-determined meanings throughout their lives. To explain, parallel with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, in ordinary life one should follow the rules of the world and hence others¹⁴ to be meaningful. The similarity here is related to the fact that Wittgenstein also maintains that one should follow the rules of language games, or forms of life to be meaningful. Thus, the rules of the world one lives in specify the conditions of acting meaningfully. For instance, let us assume that there is a world in which holding hands refers to a manifestation of love and

¹⁴ Heidegger names the society as ‘Das Mann’, which is necessary but the inauthentic way of being of Dasein. Inauthenticity has a negative reference in the philosophy of Heidegger, this will be indicated within the frame of their differences.

respect. Thus, if one wants to show these feelings then it is not possible for her to jump before someone to show love and respect. She can perform these movements; however, others cannot understand what she aimed to do. Thus, we are thrown into a web of signification to which we need to conform. Heidegger writes,

The Being of this entity, readiness-to-hand, thus stands in some ontological relationship towards the world and towards worldhood. In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. (Heidegger, 2001, 114)

Therefore, this pre-discovered world determines the possible choices that one could make. To explain, Dasein as *being-in-the-world*, in which the world and being cannot be separated has historical and contextual nature. As a matter of fact, worldhood discloses historical and social aspects of Heideggerian philosophy. He continues as follows:

When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its "involvement". With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontological definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of usability. With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement : with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast ; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather ; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being. (ibid., 116)

Hence, Heidegger argues that usability and purposefulness of an entity belongs to its ontological character. The hammer has its meaning within the activity of hammering. This activity is done in order to achieve a purpose concerning the world. As it is stated, this fact leads us to the fact that Heidegger's philosophy has a distinct position in the history of philosophy. That is, instead of being placed in either idealist or realist camps in philosophy, he dissolves the fundamental presuppositions of philosophy, such as the understanding which separates the subject and the object, and the abovementioned epistemological problems by way of introducing the notion of *Dasein*. This issue will be clarified within the context of its therapeutic aspect with its relation to the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

In a nutshell, the investigation ends up with the following: *Dasein* manipulates entities for the sake of specific purposes or projections; besides, the world in which it has been thrown already has meanings independent from any individual interpretation. Arguing against the postulation of entities in merely present-at-hand mode, which is the crucial failure of, e.g. Cartesian philosophies, he writes,

But if we never perceive equipment that is ready-to-hand without already understanding and interpreting it, and if such perception lets us circumspectively encounter something as something, does this not mean that in the first instance we have experienced something purely present-at-hand, and then taken it *as* a door, *as* a house? This would be a misunderstanding of the specific way in which interpretation functions as disclosure. In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. (Heidegger 2001, 190)

Thus, any project of *Dasein* is made through the meanings which are already in the world into which one is thrown. In other words, the meaning is assigned to the entities for a certain life project by *Dasein*, but the public world has a history and existing meanings. Thereby, *Dasein* could understand and become understood within the world because it is already familiar with the web of meaning since it is thrown into world. Furthermore, since this worldhood character of *Dasein* is ontological, it is not possible to speak of the correspondence theories on the relationship between words and their references. That is, most of the modern philosophical systems grasp the human subject and its relation to the world abstracted from the fundamental and primary involvement in the world. For this reason, the real nature of entities is obscured. Approaching problems with very burdened concepts and with many presuppositions, one of the most important facts of human existence is misunderstood: it is supposed that humans understand the meaning of Being before any definition and theoretical approach to individual beings.

Up to now, I referred to a quite limited part of the philosophy of Heidegger to show how he deviates from theoretical approaches of traditional philosophy. He follows a twofold method; firstly, he shows the world through the horizon of the understanding of human beings. Second, he indicates the understanding of human beings through

the historically determined world of significance. As he stated at the very beginning, these two ways cannot be thought of separately. He writes, “The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole” (Heidegger 2001, 78) This unbreakable ontological link between the understanding and the object of it is one of the radical steps he has taken back, against the Cartesian mind-body and subject-object dichotomy, in the first part of *Being and Time*. In the light of these fundamental insights of the Heideggerian philosophy, I will show Heidegger’s similar therapeutic approach to philosophical problems and thus, with critical reading it with that of Wittgenstein leads us the further position. That is, Heidegger gives an existentialist dimension to the therapeutic approach to errors of human thought and philosophy, which is not the case for Wittgenstein.

4.2. Heidegger as a Wittgensteinian Therapist

Before further elaborating on the therapeutic aspect of the philosophy of Heidegger, let us remind the remark of Wittgenstein on Heideggerian philosophy. He indicates that Heidegger reveals astonishment before the existence, which is unsayable but showable. Wittgenstein says regarding this astonishment that all one can say about it is that it’s being nonsense. However, he adds that in the direction of trying to speak of it, we face “the boundaries of language.” (Wittgenstein, 1965, 68) On the other hand, Heidegger also credits the Wittgensteinian understanding of philosophy. In “Heraclitus Seminar” he summarizes Wittgenstein’s cure for the traditional problems in philosophy, as well as human thought in general, to be an indicator of what is already before them. He writes that Wittgenstein suggests: “If he simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all along.” (Heidegger, 1966)

In line with this reference, it is possible to state that both philosophers struggle with the same problem in philosophy with the therapeutic method. Wittgenstein attempts to cure the philosophical problems by way of forbidding the one-sided, dogmatic and theoretical systems by way of indicating pre-reflective dwellings of human beings in ordinary life. Heidegger seems to follow the same method at the beginning of his

philosophical path. In the lectures he gave in 1929-1930, he emphasizes that philosophy is an activity of *philosophizing*. He says the following:

Philosophy itself-what do we know of it, what and how is it? It itself is only whenever we are philosophizing. *Philosophy is philosophizing*. That does not seem very informative. Yet however much we seem merely to be repeating the same thing, this says something essential. It points the direction in which we have to search, indeed the direction in which metaphysics withdraws from us. (Heidegger, 1995, 4)

Heidegger argues that metaphysics prevents us from following the right direction, by way of covering the essence of philosophy, that is, its being an activity. Wittgenstein expresses a similar idea:

The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §111)

Hence, the task of philosophy should be an activity in the direction of uncovering what is withdrawn by metaphysics. As David Egan states, philosophy is “a matter of calling us back to the ungroundedness that we have always already known and always already forgotten” (Egan, 2013, 79) This is the fundamental factor which shows the parallel between the therapeutic methods of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Let us indicate Braver’s idea to support therapeutic aspects of both philosophers. He writes,

As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of and cure for philosophy arise from the contrast between the taken-for-granted understanding embodied in our mundane use of language and the queer ideas fostered by disengaged contemplation – the same division that underlies Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. (Braver, 2014, 35)

From this, the main argument of this thesis reveals. That is, we can read the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger together to be integral elements, as one supports another, and this reveals both philosophies as a cure to traditional philosophy. I will investigate this parallelism in the next three sections. First, Heidegger’s destruction to the Cartesian subject/object dichotomy will be clarified and the grounds of the disputes between idealism and realism will be critically questioned considering the so-called epistemological problems. Second, I will indicate that he gives reference to the everyday language and life at the beginning of

his discussions on language. That is the implication of another therapeutic influence of Heidegger to this issue, which echoes Wittgenstein's way of curing the Augustine-like understanding of language. Finally, under the light of his respond to the idealism/realism opposition, I will claim that Heidegger's understanding of temporality also includes this therapeutic implication. This is an important issue to avoid misleading interpretations such as considering him as a transcendental idealist about time. With these three issues, the starting point of the Heideggerian search for fundamental ontology will be revealed with its similar emphasis on everyday life of human beings. In other words, grounds of the Heideggerian existential philosophy could be understood better, if we handle his starting point as a Wittgensteinian therapy.

4.2.1. Dissolution of Epistemological Problems: Cartesian Dichotomy

On the way to reveal the fundamental ontology, Heidegger deals with the presuppositions of the Kantian and the Cartesian philosophies in *Being and Time*. To expose their slippery grounds, he rejects unquestioned acceptances and questions their primordial character. This section concentrates on his discussions concerning the Cartesian philosophy.

In line with his revolutionary move to replace the understanding of the subject with *being-in-the-world*, the Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object loses its significance. Since Heidegger argues that they are parts of a unified phenomenon and interconnected, the grounds of the problems concerning the knowledge of external world vanishes. In his article "Heidegger and Wittgenstein on External World Skepticism", Herman Philipse points out a possible Heideggerian answer to the external world skepticism. He writes,

Philosophers then wondered how physical objects could cause this deceptive awareness of secondary qualities in us, and generalized the resulting representational theory of perception to our perception of primary qualities. In this approach, the perceiving subject is understood as a passive part of a causal network, and our perceptions are conceived of as a passive part of a causal chains. Heidegger would say that these philosophers fall prey to *Verfallen* because they conceptualize the perceptual relation between a thing in the world and us as a relation between entities that are all present-at-hand (*vorhanden*). (Phlipse, 2013, 124)

As Philipse argues, the illness can be cured if one sees that the relationship between the world and Dasein is between the present-at-hand entities. However, Dasein can never be treated as mere presence, it is the source of present-at-hand disclosure of entities. That is to say, Dasein is already and existentially a worldly being, so it is not possible to doubt the existence of the world since Dasein cannot *be* without the world. Therefore, arguments of the skeptics, idealist and realists become equally odd. In short, Heidegger argues that the reality of entities belongs to the structure of Dasein. He claims that this reciprocal relationship is ontological, so every possible discussion on reality presupposes worldhood. Thus, as he puts it, “Reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care.” (Heidegger, 2001, 255) According to Heidegger, the Cartesian philosophy, on the other hand, sees the physical world and the thinking subject as distinct entities. Heidegger writes,

The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right-an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand. (Heidegger, 2001, 129)

In line with the fact that entities in the world are present by way of being “permitted to present”, he indicates that the presupposed and unquestioned “something” which makes entities present, is the understanding of Dasein. However, the illness which is described in the previous chapters is to postulate both the human subject and its world as constantly present entities. Heidegger continues by indicating what would follow if Dasein has not existed:

In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, not can it be said that they are not. But *now*, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities still continue to be. (Heidegger, 2001, 255)

Hence, if the unified structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world is disregarded, Heidegger could be considered as an idealist who postulates the reality of the world as belonging to minds, unlike a Wittgensteinian therapist. However, as stated above, for Heidegger the relation between the world and human understanding is not like the relation between two separated parties: both the world and human understanding

construct each other. For this reason, the idea that reality belongs to the understanding of Dasein cannot be interpreted as a unidirectional relation between Dasein and entities. Let us note that Dasein is the basis of the understanding of Being. However, Dasein includes the world. The rejection of the subject-object dichotomy springs from this existential state in which ‘the world’ and ‘being-in’ cannot be separately understood. Hence, one cannot speak of Dasein without the entities by which it is surrounded, nor can one speak of the being of entities without the understanding of Dasein. The distinctive significance of Dasein comes from its being already alongside the world, and its understanding Being. (Heidegger, 2001, 95)

By the step back he took from the unquestioned grounds of philosophical disputes, he achieves destructing the dichotomy’s itself. To explain, he reveals the phenomena from various horizons instead of constructing a one-sided theory, and that is very parallel to Wittgenstein’s method which named as therapy in the previous chapters. As McManus puts it, the philosophical confusions do not spring from only the fact that the present-at-hand postulation of Dasein and entities around it; but also, they arise from the fact that they are “tempting us to overlook the diverse forms of Being that characterize the entities they describe.” (McManus, 2013, 53) Thus, the Early Heideggerian philosophy could be considered as a cure to metaphysical illnesses such as the presupposition of the existence of Cartesian-like subject. He describes the world as depending on the understanding of Dasein, that which makes him sound like an idealist. However, since he does not define Dasein as a present-at-hand entity, this dependency is not an idealist idea. This will be apparent from his own words on idealism and realism. After stating an idea which may sound similar to idealism, he writes:

But as long as idealism fails to clarify what this very understanding of Being means ontologically, or how this understanding is possible, or that it belongs to Dasein's state of Being, the Interpretation of Reality which idealism constructs is an empty one. Yet the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities and that Reality is possible only in the understanding of Being, does not absolve us from inquiring into the Being of consciousness, of the *res cogitans* itself. (Heidegger, 2001, 251)

In the same place Heidegger says the following concerning realism:

In so far as this existential assertion does not deny that entities within-the-world are present-at-hand, it agrees – doxographically, as it were – with the thesis of realism in its results. But it differs in principle from every kind of realism; for realism holds that the Reality of the ‘world’ not only needs to be proved but also is capable of proof. In the existential assertion both of these positions are directly negated. But what distinguishes this assertion from realism altogether, is the fact that in realism there is a lack of ontological understanding. Indeed realism tries to explain Reality ontically by Real connections of interaction between things that are Real. (ibid.)

Hence, it appears that Heidegger’s rejection of realism is in parallel with the Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy. That is, both of them grasp the traditional metaphysical formulation of philosophical problems in question as the primary problem. As Denis McManus puts it, according to both Heidegger and Wittgenstein “philosophical confusion arises out of a failure to reckon with what one might call the ‘life’ behind the words we use, the ‘activities’ and ‘forms of life’ within which those words have their meaning and a determinate subject matter.” (McManus, 2013, 51) Against the perplexities of philosophy, Heidegger provokes us to see the nearest and the hidden fundamental characteristic of things in life, as a dissolution to any one-sided theoretical approach. He achieves this task by way of indicating that philosophies such as the Cartesian philosophy conceal the foundation of the meaning of Being because their departure point was burdened with mistaken acceptances. In Wittgenstein’s jargon, this is an illness in philosophy. In the philosophy of Heidegger, we find a more fundamental inquiry formulated in terms of Dasein. The reason why it can be seen as a Wittgensteinian therapy is that (1) Heidegger begins with life and (2) he does not move forward with theoretical explanations of entities. Rather, he exposes the forgotten, hidden, but more fundamental characteristics of being which lies in everyday life. Heidegger argues that there is no such thing as a closed and autonomous subject whose nature can be investigated independently of its relations and life because there is no such fixed essence which precedes its existence. Heidegger points out to forgotten aspects of ordinary life, and thus to unquestioned presuppositions of traditional philosophy. In this way he shows a way to dissolve traditional epistemological problems which spring from the subject/object and mind/body dichotomies. He writes:

Knowing the world – or rather addressing oneself to the ‘world’ and discussing it – thus functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-

the-world does not as such get conceived. But because this structure of Being remains ontologically inaccessible, yet is experienced ontically as a 'relationship' between one entity (the world) and another (the soul), and because one proximally understands Being by taking entities as entities within-the-world for one's ontological foothold, one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being—namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand. (Heidegger, 2001, 85-86)

In line with Wittgenstein, Heidegger refuses to see the mind as a closed box with which human beings create vivid pictures of the external world. As noted in the previous paragraphs, for Heidegger reality does not exist independently. Ontically, one could postulate such a world but as a “primary mode of Being-in-the-world,” human beings are already *in* the world. For this reason, Dasein, which is ontologically and already in the world, cannot be placed outside the world and subsequently to conceive it. That is, every individual Dasein is always and already in a social and historical world, so, its ontological character cannot be understood separated from its practices in a *public* world. This issue becomes visible from Wittgenstein’s “private language” argument, which indicates that language cannot be thought independent from others, and Heidegger’s depiction of the human subject as “being-in-the-world.” Lee Braver indicates this idea as follows:

All Dasein are, by definition, engaged in roles that are derived from their communities and that largely define them. In order to be a self at all, we need a community to provide a repertoire of roles, as well as the equipment and institutions necessary for their practice... As Wittgenstein’s “private”-linguists can only introspect with public tools, so for Heidegger “knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with. (Braver, 2014, 165)

If Dasein cannot be defined apart from its roles in the world that it shares with other Daseins and neither language nor mind can be private, then the Cartesian postulation could only a particular way of understanding it. That is to say, the postulation concerning the separation of the world and the mind takes only one aspect of the reality as its complete landscape. For Heidegger, the world cannot be grasped as a mere presence. Instead of this, the meaning of every entity is grounded in everyday dealings of Dasein. Charles Guignon states in the “Introduction” of *the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* that understanding the human existence and physical entities independent from each other is an outcome of theoretical approach which is not capable of covering both. That is to say, according to Heidegger, we have ability

to “think of ourselves as minds located in physical bodies”, however this is not adequately comprehensive account of either human existence or physical entities. (Guignon, 2006, 10) Instead of this inadequate explanations or theoretical approaches, Heidegger begins from the practical purposefulness of human beings in a public world. Guignon explains this using Heidegger’s “hammering” example as follows:

In his now-well-known example of hammering in a workshop, he suggests that what we encounter when we are absorbed in such an activity is not a “hammer-thing” with properties to which we then assign a use value. On the contrary, what shows up for us initially is the hammering, which is “in order to” nail boards together, which is “for” building a bookcase, which is ultimately “for the sake of” being, say, a person with a neat study. (Guignon, 2006, 10)

As Wittgenstein asserts in *On Certainty*, one knows the existence of physical entities by living with and using them, (Wittgenstein, 1975, §7), the Heideggerian sees the world-hood of the world as equipmentality of the entities within it. Thus, to attempt to prove or disprove of the existence of the world arises from philosophers’ confusions.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein indicates the strangeness of postulating mind and inner states by means of a “closed box” example. In *Philosophical Investigations*, he writes:

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! — Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these people's language? — If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. — No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (Wittgenstein, 2009, §293)

Thus, Wittgenstein seems to question the Cartesian postulation of the mind as standing before the presence of an entity. If one attempts to express the inner states of a human subject with a system like the language of the *Tractatus*, or referring to the Augustinian conception of language, then, Wittgenstein claims that one will come up with an irrelevant result. This view leads to an unbridgeable gap between the physical world and the subject; hence the disputes on the existence of the external or internal world between realists and idealists arise. Let us recall Wittgenstein's therapeutic step: he says that philosophers should turn their faces to life and take the usages of such expressions in language games into account. Heidegger seems to hear this suggestion, he writes: "State-of-mind¹⁵ and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by *discourse*." (Heidegger, 2001, 172) Since discourse essentially belongs to ordinary life as of human beings' speech, it is possible to take it to be a very similar therapeutic approach. This issue will be discussed within the frame of the next section.

In brief, both Heidegger and Wittgenstein expose the fundamental and primary misunderstandings of the Cartesian philosophy. Heideggerian philosophy follows a similar therapeutic method in Wittgenstein's sense since it also takes the same step back from metaphysical prejudices on the world and human beings. In the following section, the links between the Heideggerian discourse and the language games will be investigated. The core issue to be handled will be the parallel in these philosophers' references to everyday discourse.

4.2.2. Heidegger on Everyday Discourse

Heidegger begins to discuss language with its relation to everyday life of Dasein. In line with the two disclosures of Being, he sees language as interconnected with Being-with and being-in life. Beings (or entities) disclose themselves as either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand in compliance with the concerns of Dasein. As discussed

¹⁵ Translators state that they translate 'Befindlichkeit' as 'state-of-mind', which literally means "the state in which one may be found". In the English translations this expression includes the word 'mind', which is not the case for German. Thus, it could be understood as its usage is close to the sensation or inner state regarding the fact that Wittgenstein uses the German term 'Empfindung' to express inner states which is also not used with any reference to the mind.

in the previous section, disregarding the former (which is the most primary disclosure in life) cause the abovementioned philosophical problems. This is also the case for Heidegger's discussions on language. The first encounter with language before any theorizing is discourse or speech. Heidegger understands discourse as *logos*, which means "letting something to be seen." (Heidegger, 2001, 51) In Heidegger's words; "The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk." (Heidegger, 2001, 203) He says that discourse is the articulation of intelligibility, (Heidegger, 2001, 204) and that it shares the same nature with Dasein, that is, *worldliness*. In other words, discourse is Dasein's speech with others with certain purposes in which the "totality of significations" in the world is revealed. He writes,

Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the totality-of-significations". (Heidegger, 2001, 204)

In the following paragraph, he continues:

Language is a totality of words – a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. (Heidegger, 2001, 204)

In line with Wittgenstein's opposition to the Augustinian pictures of language, Heidegger argues against postulation of language as having only the present-at-hand nature, in the same therapeutic sense. He argues that there is an aspect of language that has such a present-at-hand nature composed of words, however, the prior and more fundamental ground of it is discourse. For this reason, it is not possible to exhaust the language with this aspect while disregarding life. After stating that language has a worldly and ready-to-hand character, he writes,

Language can be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand. Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness is Articulated according to significations, has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world – a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the 'world'. (Heidegger, 2001, 204)

In line with the nature of language stated in this quote, discourse cannot be grasped by representational approaches which reduce the discourse mere present-at-hand word-Things. As “letting things to be seen”, the meaning of Being is articulated in everyday discourse. In a narrow sense, language composed of words is a tool for communication, it is used for various purposes such as making assertions. Thus, Augustin-like representations of language make one sort of appearance of discourse language itself. However, this aspect of language cannot be understood to be “conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, *from interior of one subject into the interior of another.*”¹⁶ (Heidegger, 2001, 205) In line with Wittgenstein, Heidegger states that state of mind is not *in* a subject. Thus, according to both, communication does not mean linking two “private containers” to one another.

The argument about the worldly character of language is very parallel to Wittgenstein’s argument concerning the relationship between language games and forms of life in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Let us elaborate this issue in a more detailed way. For Heidegger, “significations” are always linked to the others, accordingly, to public life. This issue comes from the existential-ontological character of Dasein as having care. That is, Dasein is thrown into a world of significance as a being caring others, thus, its language springs from its discourse with others for such-and-such concerns. Hence, the everydayness of Dasein is “ontologically more primordial.” (Heidegger, 2001, 210) Under these circumstances, the usage of words in everyday life has a deeper significance than the present-at-hand word-Things. This is a remarkable parallelism between Wittgenstein and Heidegger, given that both stress the ordinary usages of words. Jonathan O’Rourke states this parallelism within the context of grammar as follows:

Understood as conceptual therapy, grammar is only interested in removing ailments, i.e., in removing conceptual disquiet. This situatedness within pre-existing problematics is one that Wittgenstein shares with Heidegger. For the latter, destruction does not begin in isolation, but in the conceptual light of the problem itself. (O’Rourke, 2018, 85)

¹⁶ Italics are added.

As O'Rourke puts it, both philosophers see the situatedness in already present problems. That is, there is no possibility to get out of the language while discussing the problems about it. According to the situatedness, language is investigated by both philosophers by considering its everyday usage. Heidegger seems to be arguing in a Wittgensteinian spirit in saying that before any theoretical or conceptual analysis, or before any interpretation, understanding cannot be independent from pre-existing meanings in the world. He writes:

The understanding which has thus already been "deposited" in the way things have been expressed, pertains just as much to any traditional discoveredness of entities which may have been reached, as it does to one's current understanding on Being and to whatever possibilities or horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual Articulation may be available. (Heidegger, 2001, 211)

In a nutshell, Heidegger suggests that discourse has a ready-to-hand nature and that the co-dependency between human beings is prior to and more fundamental than postulations in the present-at-hand nature. This reminds us the Wittgensteinian view of language as a game played in life and also could be used interchangeably with forms of life in a broader sense. Thus, like Wittgenstein, Heidegger takes everyday dealings of human beings into account in his considerations of philosophy to reveal the groundlessness of unquestioned philosophical claims. Accordingly, the forgotten nature and aspects of entities becomes revealed within the everyday discourse.

However, Heidegger takes a further step which looks discordant with the philosophy of Wittgenstein: although it is the most primordial and ontological character of Dasein, everyday discourse (he named it *idle talk*) has an aspect which hinders *authenticity*. This is a crucial point that marks a limit to the similarities regarding the therapeutic method. That is, Heidegger takes this therapeutic approach as a guidance to be an authentic Dasein. For this purpose, understanding his first step as Wittgensteinian therapy supports his final destination in *Being and Time*. That is to say, after unveiling the errors in traditional philosophy, language and human thinking as Wittgenstein did, he deals with the ways of handling this groundlessness. But before dealing with Heidegger's final step, his understanding of temporality as a cure to the Kantian idealism is an important issue to grasp therapeutic aspect of Heidegger. This issue will show that human existence is bounded with temporality

and temporality with human existence, in the same way with language. Thus, temporality should be understood in a position that is neither an idealist nor a realist.

4.2.3. Against Kantian Idealism on Temporality

Thus far, it is quite clear that Heideggerian philosophy has a therapeutic methodology as Wittgenstein, considering language and the Cartesian bifurcation. However, he introduces temporality as the meaning of Dasein's Being and the possibility of all understanding. At the first glance, this description could lead one come up with considering him as a transcendental idealist regarding time. There are some commentators such as Blattner who see his philosophy as a form of idealism, yet this seems to be impossible. This understanding is rooted in disregarding the nature of Heidegger's essential notions considered above. The suggestion to consider philosophy of Heidegger as using the therapeutic method of Wittgenstein, could prevent one from coming up with conclusions as such. For instance, William Blattner (2005) states in *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, as follows:

Heidegger and Kant are both transcendental idealists. The both take time to be transcendently ideal, or dependent upon the human mind/Dasein, when considered from the transcendental standpoint, Heidegger is, a Kantian, transcendental idealist about time. (Blattner, 2005, 247)

Because, there is a profound difference between handling time as it is dependent on human mind and dependent on Dasein. Before speaking of temporality, Heidegger writes the following about Kantian philosophy as follows:

We must in the first instance note explicitly that Kant uses the term 'Dasein' to designate that kind of Being which in the present investigation we have called 'presence-at-hand'. 'Consciousness of my Dasein' means for Kant a consciousness of my Being-present-at-hand in the sense of Descartes. When Kant uses the term 'Dasein' he has in mind the Being present-at-hand of consciousness just as much as the Being-present-at-hand of Things. (Heidegger, 2001, 247)

Hence, the former case (handling time as it is dependent on human mind) shows his transcendental idealism about time, whereas, the latter (on Dasein) does not. Such consideration as being dependent on Dasein amounts to being dependent on the

human mind is originated from a misinterpretation of the abovementioned worldly character of Dasein, and Heideggerian approach to *temporality*. That is, Dasein cannot have a present-at-hand character, Dasein is *Dasein* as long as it is *in* the world¹⁷; thus, Dasein does not cause *idealistic* interpretations apart from the world like the human mind.

Thus, what does *temporality* mean for Heidegger? As it is stated at the beginning that Heidegger re-describes the being of Dasein through new horizon with *temporality* and *anxiety*. Fundamentally, *temporality* is the meaning of Dasein's Being.¹⁸ As Dasein transcends both realist and idealist interpretations, temporality cannot be understood in terms of idealism as it is in the philosophy of Kant. The reason for this impossibility is that Dasein can never be understood apart from its world like the Kantian transcendental, ahistorical subject. It has been thrown into a world—a context of meaning—which is not determined by itself, and it can never *be* out of this world. The world in which one dwells determines one's *upon-which*¹⁹, Heidegger says: “As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.” (Heidegger, 1927, 185) Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which always exists while it is on the way to its future, in other words, it already turned its face to its future, upon its past. Heidegger states this as: “any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting.” (ibid.)

In this manner, Dasein's meaning of Being—temporality—cannot be dealt with in the Kantian way. In the philosophy of Kant, time is a form of intuition of the subject which determines the order of the perception and events. Thus, it is the condition of all possible human knowledge. Hence, there is an unequal relation within the process of determining the outside world's events and meanings. All the knowledge of the

¹⁷ It is important to remind that the meaning of “in” is to dwell and to be accustomed.

¹⁸ The primordial ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality, the articulated structural totality of Dasein's Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible. (Heidegger, 1927, 277)

¹⁹ Heidegger uses the term ‘upon which’ as the possibilities of a living world in which one has thrown into.

outside is determined by the structure of intuition which belongs to merely the subject. Therefore, ontologically the Kantian transcendental, ahistorical subject is prior to time. In other words, the primordial condition of the possibility of understanding events within time is that the subject has the concept of time. Kant writes,

If we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. (Kant, 1992, 168)

Through the perspective of Heideggerian philosophy, this idea could be true if it is formulated in this way: in order to become capable of speaking of time, Dasein should already *be* because as all Being belongs to Dasein's understanding, temporality belongs to Dasein's understanding. However, this is not a unidirectional relation, that is, Dasein also belongs to intersubjective world which is temporal. Again, if one thinks ontologically, the possibility of Dasein's existence is bounded with being temporal. In other words, Dasein's Being is always beyond itself and its present.²⁰ That is, its Being could be understood with its dealings in the world which are always directed to a purpose in one's life. This purpose which is always meaning of these purposes do not belong to an individual Dasein, thus its future purposes do not belong to it, but to the intersubjective world. It is always towards something which transcends what is already there, what is present, as long as Dasein *is*. Dasein is ontologically *ahead-of-itself*.²¹ In Heidegger's words:

The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in- (the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). (Heidegger, 2001, 237)

Thus, this quote makes clear that Dasein's ontological structure cannot be understood without temporality and intersubjective world. The possibilities of the world in which it has been thrown are already delivered ahead of itself, Dasein makes them

²⁰ Dasein is always "beyond itself" ["iiber sich hinaus"] ...as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. (ibid. 236)

²¹ In each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst vorweg] in its Being. (ibid.)

close to or far from itself, and makes the future present upon these possibilities. Without this temporal structure, Dasein has no meaning. If it has no meaning, it is not Dasein. In other words, Dasein cannot *be* apart from its temporal activities in the world which is already full of meaning. Dasein is an entity which makes the future present, from which it is already in its world; what is already in its world comes from its past.

Paul Hoffman elaborates this issue by way of taking the determinative aspect of the past into consideration. Thus far, it is clear that Dasein always thrown into a world in which the possibilities are predetermined by it. Thus, the past has a priority over the present and the future. (Hoffman, 2010) He says the following:

Since the future, and hence also projection and understanding, here temporalize themselves only in terms of the past, that is in terms of thrownness, thrownness determines the entire content of what is here understood by Dasein. (Hoffman, 2010, 408)

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes about temporality as if it has an existence apart from the understanding of Dasein.

Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the ‘ecstasie’ of temporality. (Heidegger, 2001, 377)

Temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. (Heidegger, 2001, 380)

Heidegger uses the notion of ‘ecstasis’ in a twofold way. In the footnote of *Being and Time*, the meaning of ‘ecstasis’ is clarified as follows:

The root-meaning of the word ‘ecstasis’ (German, ‘Ekstase’) is ‘standing outside’...Heidegger usually keeps the basic root-meaning in mind, but he also is keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word ‘existence’. (Heidegger, 2001, 377)

Thus, the existence of temporality spreads around, through its being. If we consider these quotes alone, temporality is a real entity which is independent from Dasein. In other words, temporality seems to have an autonomous character through being capable of temporalizing itself. However, as a matter of fact, there is no possibility of approaching the philosophy of Heidegger in a one-sided way.

In a nutshell, therapeutic aspect of Heidegger's philosophy is founded in the impossibility of locating aforementioned considerations in a position predetermined by either idealistic or realistic traditions. Furthermore, no part of his philosophy can be separately taken into account. All sides of Heidegger's philosophy are like sketches of a landscape.²² That is, the uniqueness of his philosophy is in parallel to that of Wittgenstein. However, these two philosophers have also quite different tendencies in their philosophies. As I have mentioned in the Introduction, Heidegger and Wittgenstein have very similar therapeutic methods, but these similarities have a limit. In the next chapter, I will indicate that Heidegger's aim takes their therapeutic method to a different existential position. After reading grounds of his philosophy together with Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy, the second step of the philosophy of Heidegger becomes clear. That is, after drawing a picture of world having everyday and practical meanings and purpose as essential characters of beings, Heidegger turns his face how we behave before these everyday dealings. With this turn, it becomes inadequate to take dealings in ordinary life as essential characters of meanings of entities. He suggests differentiating actions and ways of living before dealings in everyday life regarding its being *authentic* or *inauthentic*. That is, he points out the danger of "losing in everydayness," as being an inauthentic Dasein. This issue will be revealed with the notion of *anxiety* and consequently notions of *authentic* or *inauthentic*. Before elaborating this issue, it is important to tackle with the foundation of this differentiation. That is, the disagreement in aims of philosophies of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. In the following section, the "fundamental ontology" will be described to reveal this disagreement.

²² See Preface of the *Philosophical Investigation*. (Wittgenstein, 2009)

CHAPTER 5

FURTHER STEP OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER: EXISTENTIAL FEATURE OF THERAPY

5.1. Fundamental Ontology and Aims in Philosophy

Up to now, I have considered similar methodological aspects and parallel approaches of the philosophies of Heidegger and Wittgenstein and contrasted their views to traditional philosophy. The core idea is that both philosophers share the common interest, and that they move the so-called complex problems in history of philosophy to a quite simple field, namely, ordinary life. As it is seen in the previous sections, Wittgenstein does not have such an aim of going further than disclosures of entities and usages of words in ordinary life. That is to say, no hierarchy can be found between forms of life and language games in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Thus, there is not a more privileged position before meanings in language games.

Despite the similarities, the fundamental ontology of Heidegger aims to exhibit the unquestioned Being of beings, while Wittgenstein does not tend to go beyond ordinary life. In other words, disregarding his interest in aesthetic and mystical aspects of life, Wittgenstein does not see philosophy as a pursuit of the most fundamental and existential Being. He uses therapeutic method only for exposing the illnesses which spring from their disregarding their readiness to hand in Heideggerian jargon, and indicating that all philosophers should do is description, instead of explanation and theorizing. For this reason, although he mentions “the essence of language,” he does not go beyond the limits of publicity and normativity of forms of life. Wittgenstein does not have an aim to go further from the point he left, that is the “everydayness” in Heidegger’s jargon. That is, he does not attempt to

construct a new metaphysics to deal with being and non-being as Heidegger does. Heidegger states his aim in *Being and Time* as follows:

The analytic of Dasein, which is proceeding towards the phenomenon of care, is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology *the question of the meaning of Being in general*. (Heidegger, 2001, 227)

As he puts it, his aim is to lay the foundation of fundamental ontology which is the ground of all beings, that is, Being of beings. Hence, he claims that the forgotten characters of Dasein's everydayness should be the starting point to cure the confusions of philosophy. After showing the groundlessness of the metaphysical acceptances by way of exhibiting the more primordial character in everydayness, he proceeds to consider this everydayness through a new horizon. That is the way how one acts on before the groundlessness, either *authentic* or *inauthentic*. This separation invites the notion of *anxiety* which is a peculiar mood of Dasein. After introducing these notions as the ontological character of Dasein, Heidegger marks a sort of acting on this "situatedness" as a specific feature which is not the case for the philosophy of Wittgenstein. These notions will be clarified in the following section to reveal the second step of Heidegger's therapy which has an existential character. For now, let us note the different aims of these two philosophers as a preparatory step to reveal Heidegger's therapy on ways of living in ordinary life. Besides their similarities, Wittgenstein does not seek more primordial acting on public life. Rather he suggests noting the equally valuable aspects of phenomena in life, unlike the absolutist considerations of traditional philosophy. The common method of therapy in Heidegger and Wittgenstein is limited with showing the various appearances of entities and their usages in public life in order to save the human thought from the puzzling presuppositions of traditional metaphysics. Seeing Heidegger's first step from the Wittgensteinian horizon supports understanding of Heidegger's existential philosophy which leads us to live an authentic life. That is, by fixing the errors of language and thought of human beings and philosophy, the forgotten essential aspects of entities – practical purposefulness – becomes clear. Thus, fixing them by emphasizing on ordinary life together with Wittgenstein makes the Heideggerian notions of authenticity and inauthenticity apparent.

The notions of anxiety and authenticity will be introduced in the next chapter. They are crucial to grasp the reason of drawing a limit to the parallelism of the two philosophers' methods. It is possible to say that both philosophers give a crucial role to everyday speech of human beings in their philosophy for therapy. However, Heidegger takes a step further from everydayness and everyday discourse with the aforementioned special mood of Dasein (*anxiety*).

5.2. The Notion of Everydayness from the Horizon of Anxiety

Heidegger's method which reveals that phenomena could be disclosed through various horizons in everyday life is the common argument with the Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy. In this thesis, it is claimed that this parallel emphasis on everydayness makes his philosophy a therapy in Wittgenstein's sense. However, as it is stated in the previous section, even if they begin with using the same method, their aims in philosophy are not the same. The Heideggerian search for fundamental ontology leads him to an existential position from their common ground which could be formulated as revealing the everydayness of human beings as a primordial character of meanings. Let us continue by showing the limits of their similarity which means Heidegger's further step, with his understanding of everyday discourse under the light of anxiety.

First of all, Heidegger says that anxiety is Dasein's basic state of mind (mood) which has no mediation, and which discloses its own Being truly. (Heidegger, 2001, 229) Before introducing this mood, there is another notion which discloses the world-hood of the world. That is to say, we always care about entities for some practical purposes. However, we forget the reason why we care about them in everyday dealings. Heidegger writes,

[w]hen an assignment has been disturbed – when something is unusable for some purpose – then the assignment becomes explicit. (Heidegger, 2001, 105)

As a being that existentially cares about entities in the world, Dasein realizes the purpose of this care, in case of distortion or disappearance of the equipmentality of entities. By the disappearance of equipmentality, *un-readiness-to-hand*²³ is disclosed,

²³ This notion means that the disturbance of "constitutive assignment of the 'in order to' to a 'towards-this' which is embedded in one's existentially having the character of care. (Heidegger, 2001, 105)

and one faces the threat to the possibility of “toward-this,” which means the purpose of one’s dealings. That is to say, Dasein becomes aware that those meanings of worldly entities do have neither present nor intrinsic characters. They become meaningful entities in their purposefulness for our dealings in the world. According to Heidegger, in the case of un-readiness-to-hand, world-hood of the world is revealed. By this revelation, we become aware that entities do not have present meanings, beyond their disclosures for us, to wit, their meanings depend on our dealings in the world. This dependency is an essential character of them since Dasein existentially cares about the world. Therefore, since we existentially care about entities, they are meaningful; they do not have any meaning in themselves beyond our care. The cure for present-at-hand ontologies such as the Cartesian philosophy indicated above is the revelation that the world-hood of the world is dependent on Dasein’s dealings in life. Hence, the disclosure of un-readiness-to-hand leads Dasein to notice that purposes of its actions always depend on the fact that worldly entities have the character of readiness-to-hand. By this way, an essential disclosure of entities is realized. In other words, with this un-usability of the equipment in certain ways, the worldly character of equipmentality is unveiled. Heidegger writes,

In conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy, that which is ready-to-hand loses its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. But in our dealings with what is ready-to-hand, this readiness-to-hand is itself understood, though not thematically. It does not vanish simply, but takes its farewell, as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable. Readiness-to-hand still shows itself, and it is precisely here that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself too. (Heidegger, 2001, 105)

It is critical to recognize this issue to understand that anxiety is not a mood that is mediated by any worldly entity. Until introducing anxiety, on the level of worldliness, Heidegger discloses the real nature of entities. That is, they could not be handled as if they are mere presences since they have the character of readiness-to-hand; this character is discovered in the case of un-readiness-to-hand. However, for Heidegger, to approach the existence of Dasein, our search cannot be mediated by any worldly entity. For this reason, the therapeutic philosophy does not have an existential aspect, on their cure for understanding the world-hood of the world in Heidegger’s jargon. That is, the therapy begins with showing various disclosures of entities with their purposefulness in everyday life. By doing this, both philosophers

attempt to prevent us from misleading postulations of world by presenting forgotten aspects of entities. That is to say, the intrinsic character of entities which is disregarded by traditional postulations of the world becomes visible by the awareness of the readiness-to-hand, i.e., purposefulness of our activities. Also, language cannot be understood as a present-at-hand labels for these worldly entities. We need to investigate its readiness-to-hand, to wit, its various usages in ordinary life. For this reason, speech or everyday language of Dasein is an essential ground for the awareness of existential character of world. That is to say, meanings of worldly entities become visible in everyday discourse for Heidegger, language games for Wittgenstein. Thus, grounds of both philosophies begin with an emphasis on everyday life as an essential character of meanings in world.

However, Heidegger indicates that from “the worldly character of the ready to hand,” we cannot approach to Being of Dasein since it can never be understood as a present-at-hand entity (Heidegger, 2001, 226) different from worldly entities. For this reason, to cure present-at-hand ontologies on the nature of human beings, we cannot approach in the same way as we have used for revealing the world-hood of the world. The existential aspect of the philosophy of Heidegger is linked to this impossibility of understanding human beings to be present-at-hand entities, even though worldly entities could be disclosed as presences, for some purposes. For instance, for a repairer, a broken sink does not have a use-value as we have when using it in to wash the dishes. The repairman stands before the sink and takes it as a mere presence to solve the problem. In this case, the nature of being a sink is not limited to the approach of the repairman. The other and essential primordial character of it is that the sink is used as equipment in various ways in different forms of life. Heidegger cures present-at-hand ontology of world by reminding us of that the present-at-hand disclosure of an entity is not complete nature of it. Instead, it is a sort of disclosure which also depends on Dasein’s understanding. When it comes to Dasein, as we have stated above, it can never be understood as present-at-hand. Thus, from revealing the worldly character of the world which is unveiled by the un-readiness-to-hand, we cannot cure the present-at-hand ontology of Dasein and cannot reach the existential nature of it. Thus, Heidegger searches for how human beings behave before this awareness of the groundlessness of the worldliness that he

exposed with therapeutic philosophy. In other words, besides revealing that there is no present and absolute meaning which is independent from practical usages in everyday life, he also reveals different kinds of dealing with this awareness of readiness-to-hand.

To explain, with their common step back from the misleading postulations of the world which disregard everyday life, they eliminate the belief that certain definitions of entities are either absolute or entirely unknowable. By this elimination, we become aware of the groundlessness of all unchangeable definitions about the worldly entities. When the world is postulated in this way, i.e., having primordially ready-to-hand character, the human subject cannot also be understood in the same way with the tradition. As it is stated in the previous sections, taking the human subject to be an entity with such-and-such present and unchangeable substances call forth so-called philosophical problems, i.e., illnesses. As a cure for these illnesses, Heidegger indicates that there is no such a subject; instead, he introduces the notion of Dasein, to be ontologically “in” the world, not located in it.²⁴ To explain, he cures the bizarre postulation of the human subject as “standing” before the present-at-hand world. Instead, Dasein does have its practical dealings in the world that has ready-to-hand character. Thus, unchangeable and present substances beyond its dealings cannot be found. In this picture, the only reason for these dealings is that Dasein ontologically cares about its world and its own being. Thus, the abolishment of the domination of present-at-hand ontology reminds Dasein that it is a careful being. In other words, by curing metaphysical illnesses, the real nature of Dasein becomes visible to it.

As an example of the present-at-hand ontology of human existence is the postulation of the human subject as having a metaphysical substance, such as the immortal soul that endures eternally. By this definition, there is nothing anxious about our existence since everything becomes grounded in the metaphysical field. Thus, taking the world and the human subject as presences and explaining them by securing their grounds in

²⁴ See the pages 71-72.

a metaphysical area prevent us from seeing the real nature of both the world and the human subject.

Heidegger's existential philosophy could be seen as a therapy to misleading metaphysical explanations by revealing the essential character of Dasein. By this revelation, he destroys the secured construction of the human subject, which is understood as a mere presence. To explain, Heidegger unveils that all the meanings in the world belong to purposes and history of Dasein; and Dasein is existentially Dasein as long as it cares about worldly entities, i.e., without the contextual and historical world, it cannot be a Dasein. This understanding of human beings as not having present substances and the worldly entities as not having a meaning independent from Dasein and its such-and-such purposes becomes visible in the mood of *anxiety* since. In this mood, the world of significance completely falls apart. In addition, Dasein faces that the meaning of its existence is "being-towards-death." He writes,

[I]t [anxiety] amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end. Thus the existential conception of "dying" is made clear as thrown Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped. (Heidegger, 2001, 295)

In this formulation of our having a finite existence, he differentiates ontological "being-towards-death" from physical perishing or the awareness that one is going to die in the *future*. In the mood of anxiety, one faces its "being-towards-death" as always accompanying to it. Thus, this existential character is always with it, even if it forgets this in average everydayness. Therefore, the essential nature of Dasein can be neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; but it is a being always towards its completion to be as such, and since it is a finite being it can never be completed. Thus, as a being essentially cares about itself, it should make itself such-and-such, with the awareness that there is no ground or present substance of its existence. Thus, in the mood of anxiety, when this existential character reveals, we can hold for neither language games nor forms of life to be ground of meaning. Thus, Dasein should make itself when it is surrounded by groundlessness. The existential therapy lies in the differentiation of Heidegger regarding how Dasein behaves in the face of this revelation; either it *authentically* accepts the fact that there is nothing intrinsic

about meanings we hold for, or it *inauthentically* tries to secure these meanings by explaining to them as it is the case for present-at-hand ontologies.

As it is shown in the previous sections, Wittgenstein leaves us at this point, and he does not aim at clarifying what human beings should do with this awareness. The further step of Heidegger towards the existential therapy is unveiled with the notion of anxiety.

Heidegger indicates that in the mood of anxiety, the concerned being-in-the-world completely loses its significance. Harrison Hall writes on this issue in the 4th chapter named “Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and Time” in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (2006) as follows:

Anxiety for human beings is analogous to breaking down for pieces of equipment. Just as the breaking down of equipment can show its worldly character by revealing its place in a network of relations in which it has become dysfunctional, so anxiety can show the groundless character of human being by revealing the contingency of the network of purposes and projects and their background of intelligibility in which we are no longer involved by virtue of our having become “dysfunctional.” (Hall, 2006, 81)

That is, the meanings of the world one dwells in, lose their significance for an anxious Dasein. Accordingly, Dasein’s relationship to the public life is no longer there for it. Therefore, groundlessness and the null basis of the totality of significations are unveiled in the state of anxiety, that is, Dasein realizes that there is neither absolute nor genuine meaning of its “toward-this”; and that the world of significance has no ground. At this stage, there are two possibilities for Dasein, it either authentically accepts its ontological null basis or fall into the absorption in They, i.e., normativity in its public life. Heidegger describes the inauthentic absorption in They as “Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself” (Heidegger, 2001, 229)

Heidegger writes:

Both authenticity and inauthenticity belong to Dasein's own Being. Former means to choose itself and to win itself, in other words, to be true to its own self; latter means to lose itself in the average everydayness. (Heidegger, 2001, 68)

Hence, Heidegger conceives inauthenticity as losing of one’s own self. This shows the negative feature of “everydayness” even if it is an essential part of Dasein’s being. The existential aspect of his therapeutic philosophy lies in this separation of authentic and inauthentic Dasein. To explain, after showing the essential nature of it,

Heidegger investigates beyond the everydayness. David Egan (2013) puts the similarity between Wittgenstein and Heidegger in his article “The Authenticity of Ordinary”. He reads the Heideggerian notion of authenticity with the groundlessness of our attunement. Parallel with the reading of Wittgenstein’s non-absolutist philosophy in this thesis, according to Egan attunement that Wittgenstein holds as the ground of his philosophy “is itself ungrounded.” (Egan, 2013, 76) The problem for Wittgenstein “lies with taking this conformity [to social rules] as grounded in a source more stable and absolute than our mutual attunement.” (Egan, 2013, 76) This is also the key problem of traditional philosophy, and a part of the therapy shows that there is no absolute definition of any concept. We have only usages in language games and family resemblance between various usages of a word. Thus, for Wittgenstein, we can only describe them, to wit, their meaning cannot be exhausted with any definition or explanation. Egan states that this idea echoes in the heart of Heideggerian critical approach to taking entities to be only present-at-hand.

However, it is quite speculative to claim that “Wittgenstein rehearses the anxiety” (Egan, 2013, 76) as Egan puts it. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ungrounded-ness of attunement could only be understood as the ground of the existential project of Heidegger. On this issue, Egan states that “Wittgenstein wants us to recognize the importance of attunement, but he also wants us to be struck by just how remarkable it is that we are indeed mutually attuned.” (Egan, 2013, 75) Egan also says that this attunement is “ungrounded” for Wittgenstein. (ibid.) However, after this, he writes:

Even the firmest foundations are unstable. Recognizing this fact is, for Wittgenstein, a key measure in releasing us from feeling of compulsion certain philosophical pictures force on us. For Heidegger, it is a requirement of authenticity. In Division I of Being and Time, Heidegger explores anxiety as a crucial mood that signals to us ungroundedness of our forms of life. (Egan, 2013, 76)

As it is the major argument of this thesis, Wittgenstein releases us from the compulsion in question, by way of curing metaphysical illnesses. However, to say that the motivation for Heidegger’s introduction of the notion of anxiety is to show only “ungroundedness of our forms of life” seems to be a hasty conclusion. That is, for Heidegger, anxiety does not reveal only groundlessness of forms of life, but also as it is stated above, it unveils the essential ontological character of Dasein. In this

quote, Egan highlights the common point of these two philosophers by focusing on the *un-readiness-to-hand*. Still, we have seen that from un-readiness-to-hand, we cannot reach Being of Dasein that is the fundamental aim of his philosophy. For this reason, Heidegger's therapeutic ideas to traditional ways of thinking and speaking are not limited to exposition of the public life of Dasein. By distortion of equipmentality of equipment, the forgotten primordial disclosure of entities, namely the ready-to-hand, is uncovered. By this way, we become aware that there are no intrinsic and present meanings of the world, so any definition does not have a ground as traditional philosophers have claimed. This is exposition of errors of present-at-hand ontology. However, by introducing anxiety, Heidegger goes beyond discussing our forms of life in the public world. That is, after signaling to us that our forms of life are groundless, he investigates how we act before this awareness. Anxiety uncovers the null basis of everyday dealings from an existential horizon, to wit, Heidegger indicates that anxiety discloses Being in general. That is to say, in the mood of anxiety, neither equipmentality nor presences of entities do remain for an anxious Dasein. Thus, we are exposed to their Being without any meditation, e.g., any purposefulness in the public life. Heidegger writes,

Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement. (Heidegger, 2001, 231)

Thus, with disclosing the null-basis of Being, Heidegger has a deeper philosophical task in mind. This is afore-mentioned aim of uncovering the existential ontological character of Dasein. It could be understood from the fact that anxiety springs from that Dasein is a finite being. This leads one to realize that one is ontologically a *being-towards-death*. (Heidegger, 2001, 277) This is the further existential character of the philosophy of Heidegger. In other words, he does not only investigate the worldhood of Dasein. He also tries to describe Being of Dasein, by taking its groundlessness as the ground of his philosophy. Heidegger writes on this existential disclosure in *What is Metaphysics*, as follows:

Being held out into the nothing — as Dasein is on the ground of concealed anxiety makes man a place-holder of the nothing. We are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own decision and will. So profoundly does finitude entrench itself in existence that our most proper and deepest limitation refuses to yield to our freedom. Being held out into the nothing — as Dasein is — on the ground of concealed anxiety is its surpassing of beings as a whole. (Heidegger, 1998, 93)

In line with this characteristic of anxiety, the *ground* of the existential search for fundamental ontology is the common therapeutic aspect of Wittgenstein and Heidegger which is clarified in the previous sections. Thus, even though both emphasizes the groundlessness of attunement to cure misleading postulations of world, Heidegger has a project towards a new philosophy, basically aims to an investigation on the existential character of Dasein.

For this reason, when Egan states that Wittgenstein also recognizes anxiety as an indicator of this groundlessness (Egan, 2013, 77), he overlooks different backgrounds and tasks of these two philosophers. That is to say, Wittgenstein does not suggest any further step by way of revealing illnesses in philosophy. As he states in the introduction of *Philosophical Investigations*, philosophy's task is to describe the landscape through various horizons regarding ordinary life, and no sight has a privilege, for him. In sum, from the point Wittgenstein leaves, Heidegger takes a further step and elaborates ways of dealing with these everyday usages either in an authentic or inauthentic way. He critically handles the “dictatorship of the public realm [on language], which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as unintelligible.” (Heidegger, 2001, 242) This idea cannot be found in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. For this reason, besides their similar therapeutic approach to the traditional philosophy, peculiarity of Heideggerian attempt to uncover existential symptoms of the philosophical illnesses should be emphasized, as well. By this way, critically reading them together gives us both linguistic and existential therapy. By employing this therapy, we can give a direction to linguistic therapy that of Wittgenstein that towards uncovering of Being of Dasein.

That is, after exposing that everyday dealings of Dasein are the key point for the meaning, and the real nature of entities cannot be defined as if they are presences

before and independent from its purposes, Heidegger makes us critically turn to this context of meanings. He questions dictatorship of the They [Das Mann] as a determiner of meanings of entities. With the existential philosophy of Heidegger, the cure is not only revealing that we cannot be meaningful without sharing a language game which comes from a form of life, but also, it is a provocation to be an authentic Dasein. Briefly, being authentic means the unconcealment of the real nature of Dasein and releasing itself from the absorption in the average everydayness of Das Mann. That is, an individual Dasein is absorbed in the public world, and it needs to conform with the public rules to be meaningful. However, if this public world is not problematized, then it becomes absolute and determinative. That is to say, rules and meanings that belong to the public world, and that we need to conform to be meaningful are not unchangeable or present. While following these rules, if Dasein does not problematize and if it accepts them as already present, then this means that it is an inauthentic Dasein. That is, inauthenticity means fleeing from the groundlessness and living as if the world and itself have present-at-hand purposes, meanings and identities in themselves. However, as we have seen, this is not the case for natures of Dasein or the world. Neither Dasein nor the world has present, unchanged, absolute and fixed grounds. With anxiety it faces with the groundlessness of all the rules and meanings, and its real nature becomes visible which is concealed by the everydayness. In other words, by the mood of anxiety, all the context of meanings loses its significance and its finite being that is thrown into the null-basis world become visible. In this case, the question is how it will behave in face of this existential nature. He writes,

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being free for the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. (Heidegger, 2001, 232)

Thus, with completely vanishment of contextual world, both readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, the possibility of being an authentic Dasein is opened up. This means to be aware that our existential character can be understood as neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand. Both disclosures belong to our own existence. Thus,

present-at-hand postulations of traditional philosophy is not correct, and revelation of readiness-to-hand is not sufficient to grasp Being of Dasein. So this awareness brings the issue that how we, as finite beings thrown into a null-basis world, should live into question. In the end, he provokes us to be an authentic Dasein who accepts the real nature of both the world and itself that are disclosed by anxiety, and does not flee from the reality by holding metaphysical grounds as if they are absolute. By this way, the existential direction of all the revelation of therapeutic philosophy indicated in this thesis becomes explicit.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to clarify fundamental aspects of philosophies of Heidegger and Wittgenstein regarding their considerations on traditional philosophy. In other words, the focus of this thesis is their critical reflections on traditional problems. The peculiarity of their reflection is that they show groundlessness of these problems by pulling them into a pre-reflective sphere. This pre-reflective sphere is disclosed by “seamless state of being-in-the-world” (Braver, 2014, 40) in other words, by the understanding of ordinary life or everydayness. Thus, from a horizon grounded in pre-reflective point of view, they suggest eliminating these traditional problems by revealing their sources, namely unquestioned metaphysical conceptualizations. Hence, by eliminating traditional metaphysical conceptualizations and definitions, an alternative way of approaching these problems reveals.

We have named this alternative way as therapeutic and traditional and repetitive so-called problems as illnesses. In sum, unsolved problems spring from unquestioned metaphysical definitions of philosophical concepts such as “understanding,” “knowledge,” “subject,” “object” and “being.” For instance, both sceptics and their opponents postulate a gap between physical entities and the human subject, so that human subjects either cannot be sure or can be assured of the epistemological status of entities around, even of their very existence. We have seen that, as an opponent, Descartes attempts to secure knowledge by defining it in a particular way. However, the problem is the very way that they try to hold on. That is to say, they always have taken a particular definition into account as if it is the complete nature of phenomena in question. So, they end up with a conclusion which has misleading grounds at the

very beginning. That is, their common mistake is that they have never considered the pre-reflective understanding of human beings before any definition or conceptualization. Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's diagnosis is that the source of bizarreness and errors in philosophy is their negligence of everydayness. Hence, this leads philosophers to impasses, i.e., illnesses, which are carried by both sides of any dispute in question.

Thus, because of "present-at-hand ontology," metaphysical postulations of the world dominate the traditional philosophy that of Descartes' or Kant's. In other words, most philosophers handle problems by considering both physical entities and human subjects as if they are mere presences before them: as if each exists independent of one another. In line with arguments in this thesis, Lee Braver points out the parallelism between the Heideggerian and the Wittgensteinian objections against grounds of this traditional postulation. On Heidegger's respond to Descartes which is very similar to afore-stated Wittgensteinian respond to Augustine, he writes:

Descartes's "ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand" leads to his conception of knowledge as a disinterested beholding and of truth as what remains constant across variations of time, place, observers (...) Whereas Descartes argues that we must prove our own faculties before we can rely on them to know anything else, such as ontology, Heidegger responds that this very strategy presupposes a particular ontological structure, namely one that posits us subjects, the world as objects, and knowledge as the primary relationship between them. (Braver, 2014, 66)

Thus, this pre-positated ontological structure is shared by sceptics, Descartes and Kant. The corresponding influence that Wittgenstein and Heidegger made springs from the fact that they perform the therapeutic method, to wit, seeing philosophy as an activity of therapy rather than a body of doctrine. Thus, they attempt to cure the metaphysical illnesses which could be formulated as the unquestioned presuppositions of traditional philosophy, e.g., bifurcation of subject and object. That is to say, they dissolve the so-called problems of philosophy in a way that problematizes foundations of considering those issues as problematics in first place. For these reasons, even if they focus on the same problems, they cannot be considered as being on any defined side in the tradition. That is to say, it is possible to consider neither Heidegger nor Wittgenstein as they are in a camp such as an idealist or realist even if

they handle the same notions with them. This impossibility implies that the uncanniness of their philosophies is the dissolution to presupposed bifurcations and dichotomies in philosophy. I suggest reading Heidegger's dealing with particularly the Cartesian method, within the context of the Wittgensteinian therapy since both philosophers point out that traditional problems arise from unquestioned metaphysical postulations. As it is stated, these postulations lead them to impasses since pre-reflective understanding always goes unnoticed. Thus, when they argue either in support of or against a world picture, they share the same metaphysical conceptualizations which always overlook everydayness though it is always before their eyes. Their similar diagnosis and cure to this bizarreness of traditional philosophy offer a new perspective which carries the awareness of what is always already before our eyes, namely, everyday life. To achieve this therapeutic aim, both philosophers turn their faces to the ordinary life. If one does not overtake traditional burdens of problematic concepts, such as the concepts of 'subject' and 'object', one cannot even sufficiently formulate even the problem itself.

Furthermore, we have seen that in the philosophy of Heidegger, the foundational goal is not answering the epistemological questions as it is in, i.e., the Kantian philosophy, but to reformulate those questions to reach a fundamental ontology which could be known pre-reflectively. Even if this fundamental inquiry leads Heidegger to a position detached from the philosophy of Wittgenstein, to disclose Being of beings, he performs a method similar to the Wittgensteinian therapy as the beginning of his philosophical task. For instance, epistemological inquiries presuppose an independent entity apart from its knowability and an autonomous knower. Thus, it carries same ontological premises such as existences of the subject as knower and the object as knowable. In line with these epistemological and ontological conceptualizations, mostly, philosophers grasp the process of knowing as entities are represented in mind as they are the images of the reality. As a result of this consideration, the unbridgeable gap between the subject and the object arises. Then, as Braver states, knowing becomes "the primary relationship between them." (Braver, 2014, 66) However, Heidegger and Wittgenstein point out that neither

objects of knowledge nor human subject as the knower can be postulated independent from one and other, as two distinct present-at-hand entities.

The character of Being-with-others that both Wittgenstein and Heidegger underly prevents them from being another side in traditional disputes. For example, regarding both Kant and Heidegger's focusing on the same problems, Heidegger might be seen as on the same side with Kant. That is, both oppose the Cartesian doubts on the physical world. Their opposition is grounded in considering the understanding of the subject to which the physical world is dependent. However, the therapeutic aspect of the philosophy of Heidegger precludes him to be a Kantian. The discrepancy springs from the fact that Heidegger begins with curing the unquestioned assumptions on the bifurcation between the subject and the object; he does not consider this dependency as one-sided. In other words, he defines the subject as a being which cannot be apart from its world; he postulates the essential character of human beings with calling it as being-in-the-world. Thus, the traditional understanding of the human subject which is autonomous and has independent substance is destroyed. For this reason, it could be said that his philosophy transcends the fundamental conventions of traditional philosophy as of the Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy.

Nevertheless, those two philosophers have different backgrounds and purposes in philosophy. The fundamental ontological inquiry that Heidegger intends to achieve leads him a further position in the end. For this reason, formulating their similarities carries difficulties related to overlooking this difference. To explain, Wittgenstein uses notions always within the context of publicity. Moreover, he does not have an aim of going beyond the activities of human beings in public life. In practicing philosophy, his aim could be summarized in a way as he expresses in the preface of *Philosophical Investigations*. Let us remind the quote where he writes that "The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of this long and meandering journey." (Wittgenstein, 2009, 3) Thus, considering his suggestion of avoiding philosophical explanations and this quote together, he leaves the philosophical inquiry in the stage of describing sketches of landscapes from the horizon of ordinary life. This idea makes it impossible to consider any of these descriptions as having privilege over

one another. For this reason, there is no room for Heideggerian authenticity and inauthenticity in the philosophy of Wittgenstein as a reinterpretation of ordinary life. That is to say, Wittgenstein does not let us go beyond the publicity while Heidegger's purpose is to reveal Being of beings and the existential character of Dasein beyond everydayness, by focusing on dealings of Dasein in public life.

With this awareness, an existential therapeutic philosophy which is different from Wittgenstein's purposes could arise by reading Wittgenstein and Heidegger together: that is, revealing the possibility of being an authentic Dasein by the help of therapy. Furthermore, the Heideggerian jargon also helps to bring Wittgenstein's various sketches together. By their supportive contributions to each other, unnoticed and unclear arguments of them could be made crystal-clear. That is, whereas Heidegger does not exemplify the linguistic part of the therapy clearly, Wittgenstein does not provide a systematic path to be authentic. Thus, completing his task with Heidegger's philosophy gives us a path to follow to be an authentic Dasein. To explain, with the awareness of Wittgenstein's indication of what is always before us through postulating language as a game based on forms of life, it becomes possible to fix the errors in philosophical theories and conceptualizations. These errors arise out of the misuse of language and drive us to be inauthentic.

Thus, both philosophers expose that understanding of human beings is interdependent with the public world, there cannot be a one-sided relation between them. After this point, Heidegger critically reflects on everydayness, that is, he handles the awareness of pre-reflective understanding of human beings. According to him, with this critical reflection, we could cure the ways of living in the world. This therapeutic philosophy could be summarized as follows: at the beginning, they suggest us fixing the errors of our language, then in this way, it becomes possible to fix our thought. Metaphysically burdened conceptualizations cannot cause any problematic in this way since the ordinary level understanding of Dasein, or forms of life in which language games are rooted always eliminate such conceptualizations. Thus, e.g. external world problem cannot be the case for philosophy since we know that this table exists from our everyday dealings. That is to say, according to both philosophers, taking a table as if it is a presence independent from us leads us to

question its existence. However, before taking it as such, we have an essential relationship with it, e.g., it is equipment for such-and-such purposes. Thus, forgetting this primordial character of entities is the reason of bizarre pictures of the world. As it is seen in the previous sections, both Wittgenstein and Heidegger take a step back from this present-at-hand ontology with everydayness; that is, the pre-reflective way of understanding the world and one's own self. Thus, according to them, neither the external world is that outer, nor the inner world is that autonomous. By the further step of Heidegger towards critical reflection on everydayness, therapeutic philosophy could also cure inauthentic ways of living, instead of stopping philosophizing at the descriptive level as of Wittgenstein's. That is, by the mood of anxiety, Heidegger indicates that conforming with rules and meanings of public world without problematizing them prevents one from being authentic. Thus, one should also problematize the average everydayness of *Das Mann*. By this problematizing, the ontological character of *Dasein* is uncovered.

In a nutshell, both Heidegger and Wittgenstein take very parallel steps towards the ordinary life of human beings to expose the bases of philosophical notions. By doing this, they give a new insight into philosophical methods. Attempts to deal with new problems in philosophy could find a new way out from the future impasses in philosophy, by way of studying on their emphasis on the ordinary life. Even though they use very parallel methods, the discrepancy of their philosophical tasks and differences in their understandings of the same notions are also quite critical. For the future philosophical inquiries, a critical comparison between these two philosophers and their very similar step towards pre-reflective thinking could be beneficial, especially on the way to what we may call linguistic-existential therapy. Completing Wittgenstein's therapy to metaphysical conceptualizations and language with Heidegger's existential philosophy may open a possibility for a new philosophy which is free from illnesses stated in this thesis, which is grounded in life.

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APENDICES

A. TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY

Felsefe diğer tüm araştırma alanlarına karşın, doğası itibariyle olası her türlü konu ve alan hakkında akıl yürütebilen ve sorgulamada bulunabilen bir aktivitedir. Onu biricik yapan bu doğası, aynı zamanda sınırları hakkında konuşmanın zorluğunu da beraberinde getirir. Bu zorluk ve hiçbir çerçeve çizilemiyor olması durumu, bazı felsefeciler açısından bir problem olarak görülmüştür. Yani, olası her konuyu temeli yapabilen bir disiplin olarak kendi sınırları hakkında da akıl yürütmek yine felsefenin işidir. Bu da felsefecilerin, tarih boyunca felsefenin doğasını sorgulamalarına ve gerekli gördükleri yerlerde, sınırlarını belirlemelerine, başka bir deyişle çerçevesini çizmelerine yol açmıştır. Sınırların müphemliği, onları var etmeyi ya da etmemeyi felsefecilerin sorumluluğu haline getirmiştir. Bununla bağlantılı olarak, felsefi anlaşmazlıklara ve kavramlara yaklaşımı belirleyen temel unsur, felsefecilerin felsefeyi nasıl tarif ettiğiidir. Bu sebeple, meta-felsefi soruşturmalar kurulmuş olan felsefi sistemlerin en temel dayanaklarını değiştirebilir ve hatta onları ortadan kaldırabilir.

Bu amaçla felsefenin temel kavramsallaştırma ve ön kabullerini sorgulayan 20.yy. felsefecilerinden ikisi Ludwig Wittgenstein ve Martin Heidegger'dir. Her ne kadar düşüncelerinin çok farklı arka planları ve hedefleri olsa da bu iki filozof, karşılaştırmalı çalışmalarda büyük yer tutar. Bunun en temel sebebi, her ikisinin de geldikleri geleneğin temellerini sorgulamış ve dışına çıkmış olmalarıdır. Bunu yaparken, felsefi geleneğin uzun yıllarca genel geçer olarak kabul ettiği ikilik ve metafizik ön kabullerinin varlığını, günlük hayatı referans olarak alarak

sorgulamışlardır. Bu tezde, mevzu bahis sorgulanmayan ön kabulleri Wittgenstein'in analogisinden yola çıkarak hastalık, Wittgenstein ve Heidegger'in (Özellikle, *Varlık ve Zaman* kitabının ilk bölümünü dikkate alarak) günlük hayat üzerinden yeniden formüle etmelerini ise insan dili ve düşüncesine yapılan bir terapi olarak anacağız. Bunun ardından, Heidegger günlük hayatın kendisine dair yaptığı değerlendirmeler ile ve *Endişe* kavramı ile birlikte açılan *otantik* ve *inotantik* kavramlarıyla birlikte varoluşsal boyutunu katmıştır. Bu tezde, Wittgenstein'in geç dönemde olgunlaşmış terapötik felsefesini, onun ilk dönem felsefesiyle zıtlığı içerisinde değerlendireceğiz. Ardından, Heidegger'in onu Wittgenstein felsefesi ile çok paralel bir şekilde terapötik yapan yönlerini ortaya koyacağız. Fakat bütün bunların anlaşılır kılınabilmesi için öncelikle hastalıkların ne olduğuna bakmamız gerekir. Bunu yapmak için de başlangıç noktası olarak Platon felsefesini almak anlamlı olacaktır. Ardından, Descartes ve Kant ile devam ederek, hastalıkların devamlılığını göstermek mümkün hale gelecektir.

Öncelikle, Platon felsefesinde ontolojik iki mod vardır; *varlık* ve *oluş*. *Timaeus* diyalogunda, ilki her zaman değişimden azade ve daimi olan olarak tanımlanır. Öte yandan, ikincisi maddi ve fiziksel dünyaya aittir, yani daima değişir. Bu ayrımın temelinde kalıcı ve değişmez bir varoluş alanının kabul edilmesi vardır. Bu ön kabulü güvenceye almak için, fiziksel dünyadan olan insanların özel bir bilme yeteneği olmalıdır ki, etrafında gördüğü fiziksel dünyanın bilgisinden tamamen farklı olan, bu duyulardan bağımsız ve değişmez dünyanın bilgisine ulaşabilsin. Bunun ardından, Platon iki varlık alanı tanımladıktan sonra, iki tür bilme yetisi tanımlayarak devam eder. Böylece, ontolojik olan ikilik, epistemolojik bir ayrıma da götürmüştür. Ona göre, değişmez olan dünyanın bilgisini duyulardan bağımsız olan akılla elde ederken, değişen fiziksel dünyanın bilgisini duyularla elde ederiz. Bu doğrultuda, değişmez dünyanın bilgisini *episteme*, diğer varlık alanının yanılabilir bilgisini ise *doxa* olarak tanımlar.

Bu ayrım, felsefe tarihinin en temel ikiliklerinin dayandığı yer olarak görülebilir. Bu değişmez dünyanın duyulardan tamamen bağımsız olan bilgisinin güvenceye alınma çabası, fiziksel olanla değişmez olanın ayrımı ve değişmez olanın varlığı ile ilgili tartışmalar, felsefe tarihi boyunca devam etmiştir. Sorunların başında, insan fiziksel

bir varlık olarak, her daim deęişen dünyaya ait yařarken, bu bilgiye nasıl ulařacaęı vardır. Bir bařka deyiřle, Platon'un çözümlü insana tamamen duyularından baęımsız bir bilme yetisi atfetmek olmuřtur. Çoęunlukla, filozoflar felsefe yapma geleneęinin bu temelinde eleřtirel yaklařmamıřlar ve benzer kavramsallařtırma ve aıklamalarla insan bilgisini, dūřüncesini, yetilerini, dünyasını, vb. anlamlandırmaya çalıřmıřlardır. Platonik geleneęe karřı dahi olsalar, en temel hastalık olarak görebileceęimiz dünyayı kavramlarla aıklama, ögelerini tanımlama ve yukarıda bahsedilen insanın fiziksel doęasının ötesindeki bilgiyi ve varlıęı, bu dünyaya ait olan insanın perspektifinin dıřında, tanrı benzeri üstün bir görüře sahipmiř gibi yaklařma eęilimini çoęunlukla bırakmamıřlardır.

Çok farklı bir yüzyılda yařayan Fransız filozof Rene Descartes da, hastalık olarak tarif ettięimiz bu ikilik ve kavramsallařtırma biçimini, bambařka bir mizala devam ettirmiřtir. O, felsefesinde řüphe yöntemini kullanarak mutlak bilgiye ulaşmayı ve onu güvenceye almayı amaçlamıřtır. řöyle ki, deęişen ve yanıltıcı olan fiziksel dünyanın ve duyuların dıřında, řüphe edilemeyecek bir töz arayıřıyla bařlamıř ve bu tözün řüphe eden özne olduęu sonucuna varmıřtır. Görüleceęi üzere, Descartes yine benzer bir řekilde dünyasından baęımsız ve řüphelerin ötesinde olan mutlak bir varlık temelinde felsefi sistemini kurar. Böyle yaparak, yařadıęı dünyadan tamamen baęımsız olarak varlıęı bilinebilir kılınan özne, esasen dıř dünyanın bilgisini de tamamen güvenilmez kılar. İnsanı, dünyasından ve yařamdaki aktivitelerinden baęımsız, metafizik bir varlık olarak kabul eden bu gelenek, dıř dünyanın bilgisini ve hatta insanın kendi fiziksel varlıęını da bir yanılsama olarak görmenin imkanını aar. Wittgenstein ve Heidegger'in vurgu yaptıęı yer tam da burasıdır. Ne dünyadaki varlıklar ne de insan, birbirlerinden baęımsız olarak dūřünülebilirlerdir. Buradaki Kant'ın felsefesinde de göreceęimiz ve felsefenin hastalıęı diyeceęimiz anlayıř tam da bu birbirlerinden baęımsız varlıklarını varsaymalarıdır. Bunun yanında, Alman filozof Immanuel Kant, Descartes ve dięerlerine karřı Wittgenstein'a göre aynı hastalıęa sahip denilebilecek dahi olsa, alternatif bir yaklařım ile felsefede devrim nitelięinde bir sistem kurmuřtur.

Kant'ın sisteminde, Descartes'a göre řüphe edilen dıř dünyanın varlıęı, kesinlikle bilinemez olarak ortaya konulmuřtur. řöyle ki, o zamana kadar çoęunlukla dıř

dünyaya ithaf edilen uzay ve zaman Kant'a göre insanın görüşünün formlarıdır. Bu sebeple, algılarımızı etkileyen şeylerin kendinde nasıl olduğu bilinebilir değildir. Böylece insan aklının sınırlarını belirlemek için yola çıkan Kant, bu amacı doğrultusunda şeylerin kendinde varlığını bilinmez kılıp, onların bilgisini de görünün formunda şekillenmiş, yani zaman ve uzaydaki varlıklar olarak algıladığımızı iddia eder. Yani, Kartezyen şüpheciliğin imkanını ortadan kaldırır, şeyleri yalnızca imgeler üzerinden bilebiliriz; bu imgeler ise görümüzün formları tarafından şekillendirilirler. Bilgi ise, kavramsallaştırma ile mümkündür, yani bu görüşleri akıl yargılayarak bilgi haline getirir. Burada da görüldüğü üzere, insanın yaşamdaki aktivitelerinden bağımsız ve kendinden menkul bir özne ve imgesi öznenin görüşüne bağlı olarak şekillense de, dışarıda bilgisi imkansız olan ve bizi etkileyen kendinde şeyler vardır. Dolayısıyla, geleneksel felsefe yapış biçimi ve hastalık olarak tarif ettiğimiz kavramsal ve teorik düşünme alışkanlığı, metafizik varsayımlar Kant felsefesinde de görülür. Örneğin, dünyasından bağımsız ve etkilenmeyen evrensel yasalarla işleyen akıl sahibi özne ve ondan doğası gereği ayrı olan kendinde şeyler. Bir başka deyişle, görü ile akıl ikiliği ile bahsettiğimiz ön kabuller devam ettirilmektedir. Bu ön kabullerin temeli, özne ile dünyadaki mevcudiyetlerin ayrı varlık alanlarında olması olarak anlaşılabilir. Bu sebeple, temel sorun Kant felsefesinde de insanın mevcudiyet alanından doğası ondan farklı olan dış dünyaya nasıl ulaşacağıdır. Kant bilgiyi güvenceye almanın yolunu, imge ile kendinde şeylerin arasına net bir sınır çizmekte bulur. Farklı olarak, bilgi akıl ve görü ile mümkündür, yani dış dünyanın kendinde bilgisi şüphe götürmez bir şekilde imkansızdır. Öte yandan, kendinde şeye dair bilgi sahibi olamasak da varlığına dair şüphe etmek de anlamsızdır, çünkü duyular etkilendiğine göre, onu etkileyen bir şeyin de olması gerektiği çıkarımını insan aklı yapabilir.

Şu ana kadar bahsettiğimiz felsefe yapış biçimlerinde temel yaklaşım, insan ve dünyasının ilişkisine dair kavramsallaştırmalar ve teoriler ile sistem kurmadır. Öte yandan Wittgenstein (geç döneminde) ve Heidegger (erken döneminde), teori öncesi alanı temellerine alırlar. Öncelikle Wittgenstein'dan başlarsak, o erken döneminde dünya, dil ve düşünce arasında izomorfik bir ilişki kurar. Özetle, kelimeler dilin en sade elemanlarıdır ve şeylere bağlanırlar. Onların olanaklı tüm kombinasyonları

önergeleri oluştururlar. Düşünceler önermeler ile ifade edilir ve olgu durumlarına gönderme yaparlar. Ve var olan olgu durumları, yani olgular, dünyadır. Yani aralarında içsel bir mantık ile bağlıdırlar; aynı mantıksal alanı paylaşmaları itibariyle, birbirleri arasında kesin ve net bir paralellik vardır. Dolayısıyla, söylenemeyen şey Wittgenstein'a göre yanlış değil, anlam alanının dışındadır. Bu düşüncesini temele alarak, felsefenin bir doktrin değil aktivite olduğunu iddia eder. Öyle ki, genellikle felsefi önermeler doğru ya da yanlış olarak değerlendirilemez, onlar anlam alanının dışındadırlar. Bu aktivitenin amacı, felsefenin söylenemeyeni söylemeye çalışmasından dolayı ortaya çıkan hataları elimine etmektir. Yani, söylenemez olan, dünyadaki olası olgu durumlarının hiçbirine göndermesi olmayan, metafizik özne gibi kavramlar hakkında formüle edilen tüm önermeler anlamsızdır, böylece sorunlara cevap vermek bir teorinin karşısında durmak yerine, felsefecinin işinin bu sorun ve doktrinlerin anlamsızlığını göstermek olduğunu ortaya koyar. Bunu yapmasının yolu da yukarıda bahsi geçen izomorfik ilişkiyi göstermek, dilin dolayısıyla düşünce ve dünyanın sınırlarını çizmektir.

Geç döneminde ise, aktivite olduğu fikri devam etmekle birlikte, yöntemi kesin ve net sınırlar çizmek ve böylece yine metafizik olduğu iddia edilebilecek “mantıksal alan” gibi kavramlar kullanmak yerine, kavramların günlük hayattaki kullanımlarını vurgular. Dil üzerine temel düşüncesi kelimelerin anlamlarının aranması gereken yer, *yaşam biçimlerimiz* ile bağlı olarak kullandığımız *dil oyunlarıdır*. Bunu aynı ifadenin çok farklı biçimlerde kullanılması ile örneklendirerek anlatır. Birbirimizi anlamamızın koşulu yaşam biçimlerinde ortaklaşabilir olmamız ve dolayısıyla oyunda bir taşın hangi durumda ne anlama geldiğini bilmemizdir. Dolayısıyla, dilin kurallarını bilmek onu anlamak demek değildir, kuralları da yaşam biçimlerinden doğar. Bunları bilmek ve onlara uymak bir zorunluluk olsa dahi, dili öğrenmek ve kullanmak için yeterli olamazlar. Dil öğrenme süreci, bir yaşam biçimini ötekilerle paylaşp, dil oyunlarını izleyerek ve onları oynayarak gerçekleşir. Bu doğrultuda, mesela bilginin ne anlama geldiğini ait olduğu oyunlardan soyutlayarak, tanımlamak ve üzerine bir felsefi sistem kurmak anlamlı değildir. Bu teorik olmayan dil anlayışıyla birlikte, Wittgenstein felsefecilere teorik, tanım ve kavramsallaştırmaya dayalı düşünme biçiminden günlük hayata doğru geri bir adım atmalarını önerir.

Dolayısıyla, olguları anlamaya çalışırken de yaşamımızdaki aktivitelerden bağımsız ya da garip bir kullanımıyla kabul edip, buna göre teorize etmek felsefede hastalık diye tabir ettiğimiz problemlere yol açar. Bunun tedavisi de Wittgenstein'a göre onları günlük hayattaki kullanımlarına çekerek değerlendirmektir. Örneğin, dış dünyanın varlığı sorunu aslında gerçek bir sorun değildir. Şöyle ki, yukarıda bahsettiğimiz iki farklı filozof: Descartes'in ve Kant'ın çözümlerini hatırlayacak olursak, biri dış dünyanın varlığını şüphe edilebilir olarak tanımlarken, ikincisi varlığını güvence altına alsa da kendinde nasıl olduklarının şüphe edilemez biçimde bilinemez olduğunu ortaya koyarak radikal bir adım atmıştı. Fakat, genel olarak hastalık, bilginin nesnesi ile öznesinin anlamlarını birbirlerinden farklı olarak tanımlamaktan kaynaklanır. Böylece, karşımda bir masa olduğu bilinebilir çünkü duyular ondan etkilenir; ya da bilinemez çünkü duyular yanıltıcıdır ve yalnızca aklıma güvenebilirim gibi yargılar anlamlı olmaktan uzaktır. Wittgenstein'ın bunlara tedavisi şöyle bir yaklaşımla mümkündür: karşımda bir masa olduğunu bilirim çünkü fincanımı koymak için onu her gün kullanıyorum. Öte yandan, bilmenin anlamı da dışarıdaki şeylerden etkilenecek ve onların temsillerini zihinde temsil etmek gibi bir tanım ile tüketilemez. Böylece, Wittgenstein'a göre dil anlayışındaki hataları düzeltmek yanıltıcı düşünme biçimlerinin ve felsefenin tuhaf dünya resimlerinin tedavisini mümkün kılar. Bir başka deyişle, terapi felsefi problemlerin temellerinin aslında bu hatalı ve tuhaf dil kullanma, düşünme ve buna göre de bir dünya kurgulamaktan kaynaklandığını gösterir.

Wittgenstein'ın terapötik bir felsefe önerisiyle çok paralel olarak, Martin Heidegger de erken döneminde Varlık arayışına benzer bir yol izleyerek, felsefi kavramlara karşı teori öncesi tutumun önemini vurgulayarak başlamıştır. Bir varlığın pratik kullanılabilirliğini ifade eden “el altında varlık” [Zuhanden] ve yalnızca mevcudiyetini ifade eden “mevcut varlık” [Vorhanden] kavramlarını tanıtmıştır. Kısaca, bunlar varlıkların kendilerini iki temel açma biçimleridir. Heidegger temel ontolojiyi soruştururken, geleneksel felsefecilerin genel olarak ilkinin unuttuğunu ve şeylerin yalnızca mevcudiyetinden yola çıkarak sistem kurduklarını öne sürer. Öte yandan, insanı metafizik bir kavramsallaştırmayla dış dünyadan bağımsız, belirli öze veya özlere ve evrensel niteliklere sahip bir özne olarak tanımlamak yerine, *Dasein*

nosyonuyla tarifler. Bu da tam olarak “burada olan” ya da “dünyada olan” varlık olarak çevrilebilir. Özetle, burada olmak, fiziksel olarak bir yerde konumlanmak anlamına gelmez. Bunun yerine, dünyada ikamet eden, dünyasına aşına olan ve dünyalı varlıkları önemseyen anlamına gelir. Wittgenstein felsefesinde olduğu gibi içeriden dışarıyı anlamaya çalışmak yerine, insan anlayışı ve dünyalı varlıklar birbirlerini anlamlı kılacak şekilde ve kapsayıcı olan *Dasein* kavramıyla tariflenir. Böylece, Heidegger’in özne ve nesnesinin iki ayrı töz olduğu ile ilgili felsefi teoriler ve bu anlayıştan dolayı ortaya çıkan anlaşmazlıklar (mesela dış dünyanın bilgisi mümkündür/mümkün değildir) başlangıçta elimine ettiği söylenebilir. Bu başarı, kullanılan kavramların nesnelere yalnızca birer mevcudiyet olarak alarak değil, onların elde-hazır varlıklar olarak kendilerini açmalarının ilksel açılışları olduğunu vurgulayarak mümkün olmuştur. Şöyle ki, şeyler kendilerini *Dasein*’ın şu ya da bu amacına göre, birer araç olarak açarlar. Aynı zamanda, *Dasein* da anlamların kurulu olduğu bir dünyaya atılmıştır. Bu ikisini birlikte düşünecek olursak, *Dasein* kendisini dünyasında, ondan çok önce yerleşmiş olan anlamlara göre kurarken, dünyanın varlığından da onun anlayışına sahip olan *Dasein* olmaksızın düşünülemez. Bu da Wittgenstein’in, örneğin dış dünyanın varlığının bir sorun olmasına karşı felsefi terapi dediği aktivite ile örtüşmektedir. Bu hususta, her iki filozof da dış dünyanın varlığını ya da yokluğunu kanıtlamak yerine, her daim ve her zaman birbirleriyle ilişkisi içerisinde var olduklarını gösterir. Ayrıca, Wittgenstein’da olan toplumsallık vurgusu (özel dilin imkansızlık argümanı ile açığa çıkan) Heidegger felsefesinde de önemli bir unsurdur. Şöyle ki, yukarıda bahsi geçen önceden kurulmuş anlamlar yine öteki *Dasein*’lar ile paylaşılan anlam dünyasına aittir. Bu sebeple, diğerleriyle paylaştığı anlam dünyası olmadan var olamayan *Dasein*, kendinden menkul salt mevcudiyet olarak anlaşılabilir. Buradan yola çıkarak, Heidegger örneğin Kartezyen dünya kurulumunun temelinde olan zihni adeta kapalı bir kutu gibi düşünme eğilimine karşı, bunun şeylerin yalnızca karşıda duran mevcudiyetler olarak anlamının yol açtığını söyler. Wittgenstein’in terapötik felsefesinin ufkundan ele alacak olursak, Heidegger’in çabasının da metafizik varsayım ve kavramsallaştırmaların, Wittgenstein jargonuyla düşünürsek hastalıkların temelini, günlük hayatta varlıkların *Dasein*’ın amaçsallığı doğrultusunda kendilerini açmalarını ve ötekilerle paylaşılan anlam dünyasını temel olarak tedavi etmek

olduğu söylenebilir. Yani, kendimizi fiziksel bedenlerin içerisindeki zihinler olarak düşünmemiz mümkün olsa dahi, her iki filozof için de bu mutlak ve evrensel gerçeklik olarak ele alınamaz. Aynı zamanda, şeyleri bilmenin yolunun zihinde dış dünyadaki varlıkların imgelerini temsil etmek olduğunu düşünmek mümkün olsa dahi, bu bilmenin nihai tanımı olamaz. Çünkü her kelime, kavram ve olgunun anlamı paylaşılan anlam dünyasına dayanır. Yukarıdaki olası yaklaşımlar, Wittgenstein'a göre ancak bir dil oyunu olabilir.

Böylece, bu iki filozofu birlikte okumak ve onların felsefelerini birer terapi olarak görmek, felsefi çıkmazlara yeni bir bakış açısı getirmenin önünü açabilir. Bunun sebebi, felsefeyi günlük hayatla bağlantılı bir aktivite olarak görmeleridir. Geleneksel insan özneyi otonom ve bağımsız bir töz sahibi olan varlık olarak görme eğilimini ve bunlardan dolayı sürekli tekrarlanmış olan sorunların temellerinin hatalarını ortaya çıkarmışlardır. Böylece, kendilerinden önce gelen filozofların, her ne kadar zıt kamplarda olsalar dahi paylaştıkları yukarıda bahsedilen metafizik varsayımların temelsizliğini göstermişlerdir. Fakat Heidegger'in felsefedeki amacı, Wittgenstein'inkinden çok daha farklıdır. Wittgenstein'ın günlük hayat bağlamında kullanımların ötesine gitmek gibi bir niyeti yokken, Heidegger temel Varlık sorusunu cevaplamaya çalışır. Heidegger, birbirleriyle paralel olarak ilerleyen terapötik felsefelerine, günlük hayattaki anlamların domine etmesine karşı otantik ve inotantik olmayı göstererek varoluşçu bir boyut katar. Şöyle ki, Heidegger'e göre *endişe (Angst)* yalnızca *Dasein*'in varoluşsal karakterinden kaynaklanan, dolaylımsız olan özel bir moddur. Özetle, kaygı durumunda *Dasein* varoluşun bir dayanağı olmadığıyla ve kendisine her zaman eşlik eden *ölüme-doğru-olma* gerçeğiyle yüzleşir. Bu ifadede Heidegger'in bahsettiği ölüm, fiziksel olan ve bir gün gelecek olan bir olay ya da olgu değildir. Burada, onun sınırlı varlığının her zaman onunla olduğu ifade edilir, yani ileride bir gün ölecek olması ile değil, kendi varoluşunun sınırlı ve ölüme doğru olduğu hakikatiyle karşılaşır. Aynı zamanda, bütün anlam dünyası yıkılır ve onun temeli olarak aldığı ne varsa ortadan kalkar. Burada önemli olan, bu hakikati görmekten ortalama gündelikliğinin de alıkoyuyor olmasıdır. Yani, tamamen anlamın çekildiği bir dünyada kendini ölüme doğru bir varlık olarak bulan *Dasein*, Heidegger'e göre, kendi gerçekliğiyle karşılaştığında, her zaman kaçma

eğilimindedir. Aynı zamanda, onun bu ontolojik karakterin üstü gündelik hayatta örtülür ve unutulur. Dolayısıyla, Dasein'in Varlığı ne mevcudiyet ne de el altında olarak anlaşılabilir; o *endişe* ile görünür olan hiçbir mutlak anlamın olmadığı bir dünyada, kendini tamamlamaya doğru olan fakat sınırlı bir varlık olarak asla tamamlayamayacak bir varlıktır.

Endişe durumunda, her zaman ontolojik olarak şeyleri ve öteki *Dasein*'leri önemseyen Dasein'in iki seçeneği vardır; ya *otantik* olup kendi gerçeğini, yani atılmış bir varlık olduğu, kendi varlığının sınırlı olduğunu ve bir temeli olmadığını ve dünyada da mutlak ve özsel bir anlam olmadığı gerçeğini kabul edecek ve yine de bunun farkında olarak kendini şu ya da bu şekilde kuracak; ya da *inotantik* olarak, dünyasındaki anlamların ve kendisinin bir temeli olduğuna inanarak, kendi gerçeğinden kaçacaktır. Buradan da açıkça görüldüğü üzere, yukarıda Wittgenstein ile paralel olarak anlatılan terapinin ötesinde, varoluşsal terapi amaçsallığın ve gündelik hayatın kendisini de sorgulayarak sonunda temel ontolojiyi açığa çıkarmayı amaçlar. Bu da Heidegger'in Dasein'in sıradan gündelikliğinin ötesinde, Dasein'in varoluşsallığını ortaya koyma çabasıdır. Felsefi terapi ile her zaman karşımızda olan ve felsefi sistemlerin görmezden geldiği ve aslında insan ve dünyasının varoluşunun temeli olan gündelik hayat görünür kılındığını görmüştük. Bu şekilde çoğu kavramların yanlış kullanımından (bu yanlış kullanımlar gündelik hayatı görmezden gelmenin, şeyleri ve insan varlığını salt mevcudiyet olarak ele almanın sonucunda ortaya çıkarlar) kaynaklanan dilimiz ve düşüncemizdeki hastalıkları, hataları elimine etmek mümkün kılınır. Böylece, şeyleri mevcudiyetiyle ele alan geleneksel ontolojisinin ötesinde teori öncesi ve sistem olarak değil aktivite olarak anlaşılacak bir felsefe gösterilmiş olur. Fakat ne mevcudiyet ne de el altında varlık olarak anlaşılamayan *Dasein*'a gelince, bu resmin ötesine gitme ihtiyacı ortaya çıkar. Bu tezde konu edilen felsefi terapinin aracı olarak anlaşılacak gündelik hayata Heidegger'in eleştirel yaklaşımı ise, buna varoluşsal bir boyut kazandırır. Bu boyut, felsefede şeyleri salt mevcudiyet olarak almak; gündelik hayatta ise anlam dünyasının temellerini mutlakmış gibi kabul edip problematize etmeden hareket etmek olarak anlaşılacak *inotantik* varoluşa karşı bir çare ya da tedavi olarak düşünülebilir. Böylece terapötik felsefe zenginleştirilmiş ve çok farklı bir boyut

kazanmış olur. Yani, Heidegger'e göre *endişe* ile birlikte kendi gerçekliğiyle karşılaşan *Dasein*, bunun sorumluluğunu almak yerine, bir takım nihai tanım ve kavramsallaştırmaları temel olarak alıp, kendi temelsizliğinden kaçma eğilimindedir. Heidegger felsefesinde, ortalama gündelikliği problematize etmeden kabul etmek ve onun varoluşu dayandırabileceği ya da açıklayabileceği bir temel olarak görmek, *Dasein*'i *otantik* olmaktan, yani kendi ontolojik karakterini açığa çıkarmasından alıkoyar. Felsefede de bu *inotantik* kaçış şeyleri yalnızca mevcudiyetlermiş gibi ele alarak, onları güvenceye alacak tanımlar yapmak ve bu tanımları temel olarak ele alıp insan varoluşuna dair teorik açıklamalar vermek ya da bunun imkansızlığını ve bilinemezliğini benzer ön kabullerle sistematikleştirmek olarak görülebilir.

Sonuç olarak hem Heidegger hem de Wittgenstein, felsefi sistemlerin üzerine kurulduğu temelleri ortaya çıkarmak için insanların gündelik yaşamına doğru çok paralel adımlar atmışlardır. Bunu yaparak felsefi yöntemlere yeni bir bakış açısı kazandırmışlardır. Felsefede yeni problemlerle başa çıkma girişimleri, gündelik yaşam üzerinde çalışarak, felsefede gelecekte ortaya çıkabilecek tartışmalara yeni bir çıkış yolu bulabilir. 20.yy'da yaşamış ve çok farklı amaçlarla felsefe yapmış bu iki filozof oldukça paralel yöntemler kullansalar da felsefi görevlerinin uyuşmazlığı ve aynı kavramları anlamalarındaki farklılıklar da oldukça kritiktir. Gelecekteki felsefi araştırmalar için, bu iki filozof ve onların reflektif-öncesi düşünmeye yönelik benzer adımlarının, özellikle de dilsel-varoluşçu terapi olarak adlandırabileceğimiz felsefelerini kavramsallaştırma yolunda karşılaştırılması faydalı olabilir. Wittgenstein'in metafizik kavramsallaştırmalara ve dile uyguladığı felsefi terapisini, Heidegger'in varoluş felsefesi ile tamamlamak, pratik hayata dayanan ve bu tezde belirtilen hastalıklardan arınmış yeni bir felsefe için bir olanak açabilir.

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