

PAX BRITANNICA AND THE ANTI-SYSTEMIC MOVEMENT OF
VICEROY MEHMET ALI PASHA OF EGYPT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

OKYANUS AKIN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Yaşar Kondakçı
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen (Ankara Uni., IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Okyanus Akın

Signature:

ABSTRACT

PAX BRITANNICA AND THE ANTI-SYSTEMIC MOVEMENT OF VICEROY MEHMET ALI PASHA OF EGYPT

Akın, Okyanus

M.S., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur

December 2019, 234 pages

The Pax Britannica, as a system, defined the political-economy of the nineteenth century. Throughout this period, the state and the market became increasingly liberal, the “political” and the “economic” became further interdependent, and interests of the dominant Powers were extended throughout the world. Great Britain turned out to be the leading state in this context and, with her ever-increasing power, embarked upon setting the systemic norms. Her strength relied on the will and ability to synthesise instruments of state, commerce, and capital. She would not only determine the course of the Pax Britannica, but would also derive from the impulse to re-systematise any trajectory deviating from that course. The present study attempts to analyse one of such examples: the anti-systemic movement, which, embodied by Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha, challenged the system’s fundamentals in multiple directions from Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth century. In this regard, the study addresses the following: how the said entity would be placed under the spotlight of the system in terms of its characteristics as well as its ambitions; the damage it would produce on the functioning of the system at the regional and international levels; and the inevitable reaction by the various forces of the system against Mehmet Ali’s movement. The thesis essentially examines the incompatibility between the

Pax Britannica and Mehmet Ali as an anti-systemic entity; tries to question the Pax Britannica's function in the rise and fall of Mehmet Ali's Egypt; and addresses Egypt's re-orientation within the system in its post-Mehmet Ali form.

Keywords: Pax Britannica, Mehmet Ali Pasha, Monopolies in Egypt, Cotton in Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha's revolt in the Ottoman Empire.

ÖZ

PAX BRITANNICA VE MISIR VALİSİ MEHMET ALİ PAŞA’NIN SİSTEM KARŞITI HAREKETİ

Akın, Okyanus

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur

Aralık 2019, 234 sayfa

19. yüzyıl siyasi iktisadı, bir sistem olarak *Pax Britannica* tarafından belirlenmiştir. Bu dönem süresince, devlet ve piyasa daha da liberalleşmiş, “siyasi” olanla “ekonomik” olan birbirine daha fazla bağlı hale gelmiş, başat güçlerin çıkarları dünya sathında şekillendirilmiştir. Büyük Britanya, bu bağlamda öncü rolü üstlenmiş ve her alanda artan gücüyle sistemik normları büyük oranda tasarlayabilmiştir. Britanya’nın gücü, devlet, ticaret ve sermayenin araçlarını sentezleme arzusu ve maharetinden kaynaklanmıştır. *Pax Britannica* yolunu belirlerken, aynı zamanda, oluşacak herhangi bir anti-sistemik gidişata müsaade etmeme ve bunu sisteme yeniden dahil etme güdüsüyle hareket etmiştir. Mevcut çalışma, bu duruma örnek teşkil eden hususlardan biri olan, 19. yüzyılın ilk yarısında, sistemin temellerini Mısır’dan, muhtelif yönlerden sınayacak ve Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın şahsında tezahür edecek sistem karşıtı hareketin durumunu incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, anılan anlayışla, şu konulara değinmektedir: bu hareketin nitelikleri ve amaçları temelinde nasıl sistemin odak noktası haline geldiği; sistemin bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeylerdeki işleyişine verdiği zarar; sistemin, muhtelif erkleriyle söz konusu harekete yönelik kaçınılmaz tepkisi. Bu çalışma esasen *Pax Britannica* ve sistem karşıtı bir hareketin lideri olarak Mehmet Ali Paşa arasındaki uyumsuzluğu ele almakta, *Pax Britannica*’nın,

Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın Mısır'ının yükseliş ve çöküşündeki işlevini sorgulamakta, ayrıca Mehmet Ali sonrası Mısır'ın *Pax Britannica* içerisinde yeniden konumlandırılmasına değinmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Pax Britannica, Mehmet Ali Paşa, Mısır'da tekelleilik, Mısır'da pamuk, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Mehmet Ali Paşa isyanı.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to express his utmost gratitude to his supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Fatih Tayfur, whose guidance and encouragement for this long overdue work have been of paramount importance. The author cannot thank him enough for it has been his patience and understanding that helped realise the present thesis.

The author would also like to thank the examining committee members, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı and Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen, who graciously spared their time to assess this study.

In all gratefulness, the author is wholeheartedly indebted to the following beloved people, who extended every invaluable support throughout the making of this research: Hüsam Akın, Funda Akın, Atlas Akın, Şeniz Çelebioğlu, Reyhan Çelebioğlu, Cemil Çağdaş Yıldırım, Levent Kızılbağı, Mehmet Akyıldız, Hüseyin Alper Özcan, Umut Topcuoğlu, Beste Gülgün, and his dear Denil Ertuğ. Their assistance has been very precious and will always be treasured.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS	xiii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Objective	1
1.2. Delimitation.....	4
1.3. Methodology	5
2. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTOURS OF THE POST-1815 WORLD	9
2.1. Institutions: Systemic Parameters	9
2.1.A. The Liberal State.....	10
2.1.B. The Liberal Market	12
2.1.C. The Global Extension of Interests.....	14
2.1.D. The Interdependence between Peace and Trade	16
3. THE PAX BRITANNIC EXERCISE	22
3.1. Global Patterns Set by Political-Economic Clout	24
3.1.A. State Power for Shaping Global Markets to Britain’s Benefit... 24	
3.1.B. Increasing Merchant Activity in an Informal Empire	31
3.2. Cotton: The Primary Instrument of British Commercial Expansion. 37	
3.3. Geopolitics of the British Approach vis-à-vis the Near East	45
3.3.A. The Mediterranean as a Pathway to India.....	46
3.3.B. The Mediterranean as a European Issue.....	48
4. THE ANTI-SYSTEMIC MOVEMENT IN EGYPT	56
4.1. Mehmet Ali: From Tobacco Merchant to the Vali of Egypt	59

4.2. Mehmet Ali's Ambitions	65
4.3. Mehmet Ali's Methods.....	70
4.3.A. The Vali's Rule	72
4.3.B. The Vali's Military.....	76
4.3.C. The Vali's Economy	83
5. THE SYSTEM CHALLENGED BY THE VALI	91
5.1. The Primary Instrument for Mehmet Ali's Expansion: Cotton.....	93
5.2. The Jumel Cotton	97
5.3. Extensive Plantation, Increasing Trade, Rising Income.....	101
5.4. The Inevitable Clash of Interests	110
6. THE VALI SUBJUGATED BY THE SYSTEM	123
6.1. The Convention of 1838	126
6.2. The Confrontation of 1839	141
6.3. The Resettlement.....	154
7. THE SYSTEM TAKES OVER	160
7.1. The Increasing Trade of Cotton.....	164
7.2. The Changing Nature of Merchant Activity.....	173
8. CONCLUSION	186
REFERENCES.....	190
APPENDICES	
A. RULERS OF EGYPT UNDER THE MEHMET ALI DYNASTY ..	202
B. THE MAIN TEXT OF THE CONVENTION OF 1838	203
C. THE TEXT OF THE QUADRUPLE TREATY OF 1840	206
D. THE "NEW HANDS" IN EGYPT'S COTTON TRADE.....	214
E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	216
F. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM	234

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – UK Exports & Imports, Geographical Distribution, 1785-1845..	27
Table 2 – Cotton Goods Exports, “Old” and “New Markets, 1784-1856....	40
Table 3 – British Exports of Cotton Goods to the Eastern Med., 1824-50..	41
Table 4 – British Exports to the Eastern Mediterranean, 1814-50.....	43
Table 5 – Production Areas of Crops for the Egyptian Market in 1844	87
Table 6 – M. Ali’s Revenue and Expenditure Estimates, 1821-38.....	104
Table 7 – Volume and Value of Egyptian Cotton Exports, 1821-49	106
Table 8 – M. Ali’s Agricultural Monopolies Profits, 1834-35, 1836	107
Table 9 – Machine Cotton Spinning throughout the World, 1830-40	108
Table 10 – Number & Average Size of British Cotton Mills, 1797-1850..	115
Table 11 – Estimates on British Cotton Exports to Egypt, 1825-49	117
Table 12 – Volume of Egyptian Cotton Exports to England, cantars	170
Table 13 – Ship Arrivals in the Port of Alexandria, 1850-1872	179

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – A 1840s Depiction of Mehmet Ali	62
Figure 2 – Mehmet Ali’s Government Cotton Profits, 1834-40	107
Figure 3 – Progress of the Egyptian Jumel Cotton Exports, 1820-41.....	114
Figure 4 – British Cotton Exports to Egypt, declared values in £..	165
Figure 5 – Egypt’s Foreign Trade, 1841-79.....	168
Figure 6 – Egypt’s Cotton Exports, 1838-59	169
Figure 7 – Volume of Egyptian Cotton Exports to England, cantars.....	170
Figure 8 – British-Egyptian Trade, 1854-79, annual averages in value.....	171
Figure 9 – Cargoes: Alexandria, Izmir, Piraeus & the West Med. Ports ...	178
Figure 10 – The Geographical Extent of the M. Ali Dynasty	188

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS

The author, in formulating the present work, paid due attention to refer to the names of people, cities, places, titles, and any word that have been transliterated from Ottoman, Turkish, or Arabic into English, in a way such words are written in his mother-tongue, Turkish. In so doing, the author also included the widely-used, transliterated forms of such words in English in brackets, such as, for the term Mehmet Ali, “*Mehemet Ali, Mohammed Ali, or Mohammed ‘Ali* in several resources in English” or “Vali (wali)”. In addition, the author also included some brief explanations in footnotes for this kind of choices, such as the term “eyalet”.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Objective

Researchers who are inquisitive about the history of Egypt as an eyalet¹ of the Ottoman Empire have always had a lot to discover. True, from its conquest by the Ottoman forces in 1517 to its occupation by Britain in 1882, Egypt's story as such an administrative unit under the rule of the Ottoman Porte offers a myriad of curious topics to dwell on.

One particular stage throughout that time-span of four centuries has also raised substantial interest among those who try to examine the nineteenth century form of Egypt as the foundation of a modern independent state. A matter of true interest, the period in question concerns Egypt under the rule of Kavalalı² Mehmet Ali³ Paşa⁴ and his descendants. The dynasty they would

¹ Turkish/Ottoman for the word province. The word eyalet is used interchangeably with the word province in the present text.

² Literal meaning of the Turkish word Kavalalı is that who is from Kavala. It is the place of birth of Mehmet Ali Paşa and a port city in modern day Greece. In most of the Ottoman/Turkish discourse concerning the history of this period, the word Kavalalı on its own indicates Mehmet Ali.

³ Also, *Mehemet Ali*, *Mohammed Ali*, or *Mohammed 'Ali* in several resources in English.

⁴ The Ottoman/Turkish word for the rank that is mostly transliterated into English as “Pacha” or “Pasha”. In the context of the Ottoman Empire, it indicates a state servant of high rank or office, granted to military as well as civil officials on a personal basis. Practically, as in the example of Mehmet Ali, an Ottoman Paşa could be appointed governor of an eyalet.

constitute was to remain effective in various forms of governmental regimes until the 1950s.

From the time he was proclaimed Vali (also *wali*; additionally, referred to as Viceroy in quite many resources)⁵ in 1805, Mehmet Ali embarked upon a comprehensive attempt to reinvigorate Egypt as an eyalet under his rule. This aim entailed political, military, economic, social, educational, and cultural reform and development. The progressive course initiated by Vali reached its saturation point after the 1830s, when Mehmet Ali's methods of action turned against his suzerain and attracted external intervention which would curb his endeavours. When he died in 1849, Mehmet Ali had already established a hereditary regime, led by his descendants to rule Egypt.

In many researches, we see that this process is analysed from a limited perspective. Most of these are built on a reductionist understanding of Egypt's trajectory and take the easy way out in prioritising a cause-and-effect explanation for the rise and the fall of the Vali. In so doing, they take use of similar political themes and mainly suggest that the Vali's efforts to develop Egypt under his rule were curbed because he had threatened the British interests; that from the time he assumed power, the Vali had designs to demolish the Ottoman Empire and rebuild it under his rule; that the Vali had never intended to overthrow the Ottoman dynasty at the Porte, yet was dithering over his position within the greater Ottoman realm; that he was doomed to fail for he had miscalculated his power and capabilities, and so on.

One can also identify confusion in such research as to the Vali's ambitions concerning Egypt. Whereas the majority of the works in question suggest that

⁵ The Turkish/Ottoman word *Vali* refers to governor. It is also written as "wali" in some resources. The word *Viceroy* on the other hand is taken use of in many researches on the period in question and interchangeably with *vali/wali*. In the context of the Mehmet Ali dynasty, the word *khedive*, a title of Persian origin, is frequent as well in reference to the abovementioned words, hence *khedivate* for *vicerealty*. Note that it would be one of Mehmet Ali's descendants, Ismail, to be officially permitted to change his title from *pasha* to *khedive* in 1867, with no change in function from that of the *vicerey* in Egypt.

he had been seeking independence to establish a kingdom under his rule, some others indicate that he formulated a state mechanism to further his personal gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and deepen this mechanism under a dynastic framework to the extent possible for the good of his family. In the extremes, Mehmet Ali is even taken as the founding father of the modern Egyptian state, who is argued to have helped the masses in the eyalet realise their true identity and initiate a course of Egyptianisation.

This thesis suggests that the above-mentioned set of approaches remains traditional as a method to understand Mehmet Ali's success and failure. The work at hand finds that the traditional approach overlooks one key fact pertaining to the reasons behind the relative failure of the Vali's *modus operandi*. In this regard, this thesis argues that the course of Egypt under Mehmet Ali's rule and its aftermath may be assessed best by thoroughly examining the eyalet's position as to the dominant political-economic system of the nineteenth century world, the Pax Britannica.

The thesis particularly argues that in trying to consolidate his extensive plan for personal aggrandisement under the guise of a state mechanism⁶, the Paşa ran afoul of the system's strategic and economic fundamentals and was eventually forced to reorient in line with the system's direction. In other words, Mehmet Ali would become a bug in the system, to which the response came from the system's operators in a potent, multi-layered, and ultimate blow. This would take place in a way that Egypt could not embrace such an anti-system form again, for that response was to commence the eyalet's gradual transformation into a dependent unit of the Pax Britannica.

⁶ The present study argues that even though how institutionalised it was and it had a state-like look, for the eyalet of Egypt was an Ottoman province, it should not be considered a *state* on its own during Mehmet Ali's rule. The study therefore defines its particular situation under Mehmet Ali as a "state mechanism" and takes use of such words as the "administration" or the "eyalet" to refer to it.

1.2. Delimitation

First and foremost, the present study is focused on the political, economic, and military choices, which Mehmet Ali effected in his peculiar administration over the eyalet of Egypt, as well as multi-dimensional repercussions of such choices. Since these matters are essentially addressed with a view to understanding their position in the Pax Britannica as a system and the reasons why they attracted heavily negative reaction on the part of the leading actor of the system, i.e. Great Britain, the study's focus is narrowed to certain facets of the above-mentioned way of rule.

For instance, in dealing with the characteristics of his administration, its absolutist, one-man dimensions are prioritised, rather than the relative involvement of the immediate entourage of the Vali in his decision-making or the multi-national profile of the staff Mehmet Ali employed in governmental affairs. In the same vein, as the thesis attempts to identify the factors that engendered British hostility against Mehmet Ali, be it local or international, political or economic, agricultural or industrial, and so on, it assesses these links in a both horizontal, i.e. chronology of his progress, and a vertical fashion, i.e. multiple layers of his power. In certain examples, these two are synthesised so as to question the reason why the Pax Britannica countered Mehmet Ali. One of such examples of combination between ostensibly separate aspects of the Paşa's rule was his notorious monopolies. This economic arrangement was fuelled by a crop so strategic for both Britain and Egypt, cotton. It poured wealth in Mehmet Ali's treasury; enabled him to raise a powerful army, with which he threatened the successful operation of the Pax Britannica in the Near East.

Secondly, notwithstanding that the rule of Mehmet Ali in Egypt lasted from 1805 until 1848, the study does not address every stage and dimension of his governorship. Accordingly, when dealing with his military expansion, his expedition in 1811 to Hijaz, invasion of the Sudan in 1820, or involvement in

1824 in the Greek War are not addressed in detail. This is because the thesis defends that Mehmet Ali attracted systemic reaction most consistently throughout the 1830s, when his military action had seemed to be in the course of resulting in highly interconnected results against the British. For example, in relative terms of the era, whereas the Sudan was mostly thought of a source of slave troops and minerals, Syria was a fortune in terms of its location in the Eastern Mediterranean, population with diverse origins, natural resources and so forth. Therefore, the occupation of Syria by Mehmet Ali would attract more attention than that of the Sudan.

Last but definitely not the least, even though the thesis deals with an historical issue, it by no means claims to extend any historical proposition, for it is aware of much of what took place throughout Mehmet Ali's reign in Egypt awaits its proper historian. What the study tries to realise instead is a thorough questioning of Egypt's political-economic trajectory from a systemic perspective. Therefore, its assumptions are limited to the extent that the components of the political-economic system in question overlap, one way or another, elements evident in the trajectory imposed upon Egypt by the ambitious Vali.

1.3. Methodology

The thesis depends on certain qualitative and quantitative data to examine the nature of Mehmet Ali's Egypt and its interaction with the dominant forces of the Pax Britannica. In so doing, though, it encounters a problem with the number and objectivity of academic record available in this subject. Even though there is a quite many references on the Near East vis-à-vis the nineteenth century world politics and history, political-economy accounts on Mehmet Ali's Egypt are limited. Even more, when cotton is considered in relation to its place in the Vali's Egypt, the number of resources plummet sharply.

Nonetheless, in searching for its data set, the thesis takes use of some official and private reports, published in the first half of the nineteenth century in English or French, by Europeans on Mehmet Ali's Egypt in general or certain aspects of his rule in particular. It also draws increasingly from rather newer resources that also compile such historical data or refers to publications in Arabic realised during the Vali's time.

The problem with qualitative data is two-fold: Language and objectivity. The thesis is limited in its command of resources published in Arabic, where the author faces a language barrier. The problem with Arabic is not solely related to access; contemporary reports or modern research that takes use of Arabic resources are dependent on certain accounts over Mehmet Ali's regime, whose objective approach remains questionable. Even more, a certain portion of today's resources published in Egypt or by Egyptians as well offers a deliberate perspective of the period in question – penned in an anti-Ottoman sense, they seem to be on track of deviation from the reality and Egyptianise the story of Mehmet Ali. For instance, such a problem identified in the nationalist Egyptian historiographic discourse is with regards to an overpraise of a regional despot as the saviour Egypt, who actually did not care *at all* about the masses he ruled.

Quantitative data used are not free of issues too; yet this does not constitute an essential problem for the thesis. Statistics concerning Mehmet Ali's numbers in general were generated in a perfunctory manner back in the time. There is not any conformity even among the notable reports on Egypt published in the first half of the nineteenth century. The widely acclaimed works by Westerners on the subject suffers from the same problem. However, as the thesis is not to produce a work of, say statistics or mere economics, the limited quantitative data set is employed when seen fit. In addition, on a case-by-case basis it suffices to display proportional changes, for example; growth rates, pace in the accelerating trends in trade, size of areas under cultivation and so forth. However, the study does not try to set parity between, for

example, the nominally and really differing price ranges and currencies of the time. Weights, measures, and coins are part of the same problem and the present text attempts to explain those to the extent of reference.

In this regard, the present thesis is divided into eight chapters: The second chapter defines the notion and the bases of the dominant political-economic system of the nineteenth century political-economy. The information regarding the concerns of the system, the Pax Britannica, is examined in the third chapter in relation to its practical aspects. In so doing, the emphasis is put on Great Britain that overarchingly spearheaded the system.

The fourth chapter takes a look at the fundamentals of Mehmet Ali's regime erected in Egypt after 1805. It attempts to provide the sources and the fashion with which Mehmet Ali's Egypt progressively turned into an anti-systemic entity. The fifth chapter focuses on one of the most crucial aspects of the anti-systemic challenge posed incrementally against the British interests in the region across where Mehmet Ali was politically and economically expanding: It analyses the substance and extent of a novel form of long-staple cotton, introduced in 1821 by the Vali, in terms of its trade and profits.

The sixth chapter constitutes an attempt to analyse the two-layered response to the political, economic, and military challenge posed by Mehmet Ali, i.e. the way the Vali caused unsettling in functionality of the system in the region. The chapter understands that one part of the response contained a strong fiscal and economic measure against Mehmet Ali, whereas the other part addressed this challenge rather more politically. They together composed the system's inevitable reaction to Mehmet Ali, brought about his efforts' failure and paved the way for Egypt's ultimate integration, synchronisation, and subordination within the system.

The penultimate chapter addresses the aftermath of that reaction and takes use of quantitative data compiled from various resources. By focusing on changes

in the cases of cotton and merchant activity in Egypt, it sets forth that the system's response to Mehmet Ali proved increasingly effective in time.

The thesis concludes that Egypt under Mehmet Ali's peculiar regime should be examined in an integrative understanding. Provided that its geopolitical positioning was paramount and would always be a matter of contention in the dominant forces of any given time, the political-economic preferences imposed upon this land would direct its course to either success or failure. The thesis argues in this regard that Mehmet Ali's design was so extra-systemic to succeed that it could have only been consolidated if it was put in practice in an alternative paradigm.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTOURS OF THE POST-1815 WORLD

2.1. Institutions: Systemic Parameters

The nineteenth century was in essence an epoch. It was a produce of turbulence; the era for the “great transformation”⁷; the culmination of a political-economic management led by states and encouraged by merchants; the initial stages of an international regime laden with both explicit and implicit rules⁸; the moment of national, international and imperial systems; the period of the hundred years’ peace; the long nineteenth-century⁹; the century of the Pax Britannica.

The momentum of transformation in this period was due mostly to a multi-dimensional political reconfiguration brought about by the Congress of Vienna in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat in 1815¹⁰. One such dimension gradually became determinant in shaping this time-span’s trajectory – it is that the driving force behind the nineteenth century emanated from certain

⁷ K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Massachusetts, 2001, p. 3.

⁸ J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2014, p. 397.

⁹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire 1875-1914*, Vintage Books, New York, 1989, p. 6.

¹⁰ D. Bogart, M. Drelichman, O. Gelderblom, J. L. Rosenthal, ‘State and private institutions’, in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe Volume 1*, S. Broadberry & K. H. O’Rourke (eds), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p. 81.

harmony between institutions and instruments. Augmenting Polanyi's suggestions as to the civilizational framework of the mentioned period, these may be enumerated as (1) the flourishing liberal state; (2) the expanding liberal market; (3) the instruments to extend the domestic market to the international field; and (4) the increasing interdependence between peace and trade.¹¹

This study approaches them as overarching systemic parameters of the nineteenth century. Their combination would generate the essence of the Pax Britannica and set the standard for modernity. The following sections, in this regard, examine each of them in an attempt to understand their causal relation to the political-economic currents which determined the course of the 1800s.

2.1.A. The Liberal State

The *primus inter pares* in that harmony was the liberal state. During the period prior to the nineteenth century, in the face of the relative weakness of states without proper institutions, the lack of good political and economic governance produced the need for a powerful and more central government. That, in return, necessitated an effective mechanism to protect the internal from the tides of the external, e.g. international trade, and to sustain the state from within, e.g. with protectionism. No matter how simplistic the definition of this course looks, the mentioned process, with all its complexities, hinted imperatively at an entity with institutional agility. In this regard, it was the liberal state that appeared apt in its capacity to accommodate varying internal and external circumstances with minimal transitional friction and discomfort.¹²

¹¹ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 3.

¹² J. Mokyr, H.J. Voth, 'Understanding growth in Europe, 1700-1870: theory and evidence', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe Volume 1*, S. Broadberry & K. H. O'Rourke (eds), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p. 26.

Thereafter, that entity came to be dedicated to a series of functions in the nineteenth century. Examples include, but are not limited to the following: It conducted the profound evolution of political institutions as well as constitutional regimes (different instances of Holland, German states; Austria and Piedmont; Britain; France¹³); it effected the rise of national states; it facilitated the integration of legal, fiscal and military mechanisms into administrative formations, and thereby consolidated expropriative (or appropriative) powers; it carried and protected a wide spectrum of individual/public political and economic rights; it executed influence over broad political-economic development with state intervention, for instance in the fields of transportation and communication, et cetera.¹⁴

Such examples could easily be multiplied – however, the early stages of this period witnessed the state’s central authority remarkably increasing over social and economic institutions, in addition to the political sphere. The rising power of the administrative centre set forth the promotion of economic dynamism, and integration from within the markets helped increase total economic growth. In cyclical exchange, the instruments employed to sustain this trend, e.g. military activity, fiscal reforms, legal measures, infrastructure projects, required further strength in the power of the executive. Saving for variation in individual examples, this cycle became the general pattern practiced by the dominant Powers of contemporary Europe.¹⁵ In norm, form, and function, it was the liberal state, having progressed into the nineteenth-

¹³ D. Bogart, M. Drelichman, O. Gelderblom, J. L. Rosenthal, *State and private institutions*, p. 76.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 71-94.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

century, which would prove able to address arising challenges in the “political and legal environment framed by the institutions devised”.¹⁶

2.1.B. The Liberal Market

Another essential tenet of this era was a specific form of market. Suggested to be the “fount and matrix of the system”¹⁷, the market gained vividly liberal traits. It entailed a utopian endeavour of economic liberalism¹⁸, but was realistically apt in its self-regulation. As such, it also consolidated the generation of the liberal state as well as the eventual institutional configuration of that age.

The significance of the liberal market stemmed from a number of factors, but some of them are more primary in line with the substance of the present study. Firstly, the markets of the era turned into scenes of interaction between numerous forces, including states, firms, merchants, finance, and produce. Further, with this powerful interaction enabling the accumulation of industrial capital, this type of markets attained a particularly transformative role. As a matter of fact, the embedded capital, skills, networks and institutions, powers of new forms of technology, and the eventual upswing in wealth came to influence the extent and the direction of the modern political world.¹⁹ Also importantly, the increasingly potent and interconnected movement of people, capital, and goods throughout the globe were those that made the

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁷ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 3.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁹ S. Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2014, p. xv.

transformation of capitalism possible, hence the transformation of the world in the nineteenth century.²⁰

The market mechanism of this period also had an incessantly-capital-generating nature. With the novelties in law and administration that met contemporary needs, advances in production and transportation technologies, as well as the increasing outreach of entrepreneurs and manufacturers encouraged by their states, the liberal market mechanism had capital linked to certain industrialised state actors. In exchange, that situation was compounded with the liberal state as an institution gaining a more central role; it quickly became a very durable, powerful and rapidly expanding formation.²¹ That those actors, who became able and willing to embrace industrial capitalism in the final stages of the nineteenth century and to look after their capitalists ended up as becoming very powerful actors on the global political-economic scene is a notable example of a product delivered by the state-market-capital conformity of the age.

At this point, answering how the interplay between the state and the market came to alter the world that had been known until the nineteenth century appears essential. It is suggested that it was the way the power of industrial capital was united with the power of state, which brought about the global political-economic complexities of the period.²² This approach may be complemented by taking a look at the other two bases of the global political-economic system of the nineteenth century. In other words, if the liberal state and the liberal market mechanism were the defining tenets of the era, then the instruments to extend this configuration into the rest of the world and to

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

maintain the balance between peace and trade, i.e. politics and economics, were their primary functions.

2.1.C. The Global Extension of Interests

Armed with the eagerness to expand politically, economically, and militarily, European statesmen and capitalists came to the fore in the nineteenth century. They were at the right place (state and market combined), during the right time (imperial/colonial/commercial expansionism) to formulate comparative advantage for the extension of their interests. They were not only capable of so doing; but also, given greater technologies and novel inventions, apt and enthused to reform and prevail over the international market.²³

Particularly, within the course of the “extension process”, this certain group of actors depended on a ready-made global configuration: the Eurocentric trade web; the ability to project hard and fiscal power into the further ends of the world; the almost ubiquitous financial institutions; the reformed legal code providing global investments security; the global alliances between merchants and entrepreneurs of links of families and trade; the available land and labour ensuing tides of slavery and so on.²⁴

During this stage, the state arose in a certain form. It did stimulate and protect its domestic market, established access into remote markets around the world, and brought about necessary bases for manufacturing. This combination turned out to be a distinctive feature to transform the international arena; by laying down the legal and administrative prerequisites for markets and labour, it facilitated the travel of industrial capitalism throughout the globe. And the picture was complete with the addition of the conformity between the statesmen and the capitalists. Industry was their source of fortune, prosperity

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

was their goal. Striving to construct an industrial society, the capitalists, following the example of Britain, often operated with state actors that favoured industrialisation as a means to strengthen the state. In so doing, they forged a new dynamic of relationship between national territory and economic activity. These states, in tandem with their bureaucrats and capitalists, would penetrate territories at legal, bureaucratic, infrastructure and military levels, generate conditions for long-term investments, expand foreign and domestic markets, and preserve national industries from the volatile tides of the global economy.²⁵

It is particularly important to note that, despite having completed their transition into industrial capitalism, the instruments and methods employed during this course of global activity by the coalition of statesmen-capitalists did not solely rest on the modern gains of the industrial era. In fact, actors involved were also able to profit from the means dedicated to the imperial growth of the state. They came to easily nip in the bud the issues of markets, labour and raw materials throughout the imperial territories. Strengthened by its institutional and financial gadgets, this form of state appeared competent to enforce different kinds of political, legal, and economic institutions in accordance with its interests in multiple parts of the world.²⁶

In any case, with the extension of domestic systems into overseas and colonial territories, “land and its produce were finally fitted into the scheme of a self-regulating world market”²⁷ and this new form of capitalism, put forth by statesmen, manufacturers and merchants would have dominated the globe by the final stages of the nineteenth century. In using proper methods and industries, what this group caused during the most of this period was the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁷ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, p. 188.

“great divergence”, the peculiar disparity between Europe (and the United States) and the rest of the world in terms of state power and capital accumulation.²⁸ One fine example of a reflection of this discrepancy is found in this study.

2.1.D. The Interdependence between Peace and Trade

Finally, as a notion and a political and economic goal, peace was a dominant component of that transformative scheme. It was significant not solely as a political need, but also with other types of interests embedded within. Provided its varying forms during the nineteenth century, such as the peace between Great Powers, the peace between Great Powers and relatively great Powers, or the peace between a Power and its dependent, peace itself required a practical approach.

The considerable success of what is taken as “pragmatic pacifism”²⁹, which culminated in the “hundred year’s peace” provides a good example. It is known that this period was not totally a frame of time without clashes. The pressing situation was that a new peace interest emerged which eventually necessitated the re-organisation of political-economic life. Under shifting forms and ever-changing ideologies³⁰, attaining the same and definite “goal” was dependent on the functioning of definite instruments.

The practical notion that brought about the framework in which all such instruments came into operation was the balance of power mechanism. Notwithstanding confusions as to its definition, taking it as a situation, the balance of power indicates an objective arrangement that connotes relatively

²⁸ K. Pommeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000.

²⁹ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 5.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

extensive satisfaction with the way power is distributed among actors of a given system. In this situation, states are not overtly concerned about security. In addition, should the members of a given system are threatened by a disturber of the balance or an actor appearing able to challenge international hegemony, those members would take countervailing action so as to resettle the balance. It is within this framework that state leaders are thought to be universally tended and vigilant to act collectively against a disrupter of the equilibrium.³¹

Thereby the classical operation of the balance of power system was solidified by setting “peaceful business as a universal interest”.³² In other words, prevalent actors of the era would come to adopt a new perspective of the system. After all, the balance of power system was planned in the wake of 1815 essentially as a mechanism to avert any potential attempt by a state to threaten the rest.³³ On the other hand, the rising tide of the Industrial Revolution and the relevant embedded interests of those, who would be threatened by conflicts in Europe and its vicinity, pushed the acute interest in peace to the fore. This situation found “support both in the ferocity of the recent popular forms of warfare and in the tremendously enhanced value of peace under the nascent economies.”³⁴

³¹ J. Dougherty, R. L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Pearson, New York, 2001, pp. 41-42.

³² Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 7.

³³ C. K. Webster, ‘The Pacification of Europe 1813-1815’, in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, A. W. Ward & G. P. Gooch (eds), The Macmillan Company, 1922, pp. 464, 519.

³⁴ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 7.

Another tactic utilised for the maintenance of a certain form of peace was based on ways found during the forming of the Concert of Europe to avert wars among the Great Powers, and, when it came to the small actors, to remove causes of wars. In such cases, this resulted in the mutual interest of peace by presenting a narrow margin of liberty to the small powers and maintaining the benefits of the Great Powers.³⁵

In these margins, an anonymous factor also helped facilitate the underlying peace interest. Named “haute finance” by Polanyi, this institution is suggested to have constituted the key link between the political and the economic configuration of the world, acting behind the scenes as a permanent agency.³⁶ Importantly, it operated independent of individual governments and of central banks, yet was in touch with them all: “There was intimate contact between finance and diplomacy; neither would consider any long-range plan ... without making sure of the other’s goodwill.”³⁷ One of the examples Polanyi suggests as to haute finance is the case of the Rothschilds³⁸. This could be increased by taking a look at the Philips, Rathbone, or Rallis families – who eventually ended up constructing their global network of “agency houses”. Throughout the century, these actors would develop and extend their existent investments at a global scale and specialise in more than one industry.³⁹ Of further note is that haute finance was not intentionally formed as an instrument of peace but turned out to become one by accident. In pursuing its motive to gain, it built on the vague distinction between economic and

³⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

³⁹ S. Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War I*, The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2002, pp. 118-119.

political purposes of the state; where governments aimed at achieving political-economic ends through national power, haute finance provided them with national finance, capital, and banking.⁴⁰

In this regard, with the increasing precedence of power over profit, haute finance was apt to influence the European Powers in a way that was consistently favourable to their unique take on peace. Its influence was to the extent that the governments were in need of cooperating with haute finance in a multitude of directions.⁴¹ This pattern of absolute interaction, was noticeable in forces of the Pax Britannica, which often projected power militarily and more frequently dominated the scene by pulling the threads of the international financial network.⁴²

Within this broad framework, a glance at the political-economic contours of the post-1815 world indicates that the functioning of the system was a result of the circular and causal relation between the generation of capital and national power. The proper functioning of trade necessitated a stable international monetary system, which could not operate in a war. Trade required peace and that its maintenance was the Great Powers' goal. Politics too needed economics to provide peace. Therefore, entered interdependence between trade and peace.⁴³

At the end of the day, this pragmatic system helped peaceful business operate by guarding against political and military clashes. Peace itself was sustained through both the mechanisms of state and the organised agencies working for

⁴⁰ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 12.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁴² Ibid., p. 14.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 16.

general interests. And for that, the balance of power system succeeded in maintaining peace on a global scale in a defined way, while haute finance was forming the political-economic links between the dominant components of the system.⁴⁴ In fact, it was this new configuration of political-economic life, which founded the origin of the “hundred years’ peace” – as the international economic system was in need for peace for proper functioning, the balance of power mechanism was there to serve it.⁴⁵

One could but infer that the structure described above connotes the way how the British expanded their state machinery to the level of empire. In fact, it turns out that the fundamentals of the British political-economic strategy in the post-1815 world were in essence what constituted part and parcel of the Pax Britannica.

In this understanding, an assessment of any political-economic event that took place in the nineteenth century would be incomplete without thoroughly considering the practical aspects of the Pax Britannica. This system, as the preceding paragraphs indicated, comprised a thriving liberal state, with strong disposition towards free-trade. The system was put to use in extending this combination to the international level and the global countryside. Commerce became the primary means for their furthering, whereas the goal of peace per se started to entail multiple dimensions, both political and business. In shifting from war capitalism to industrial capitalism, it also preconditioned specific ways to maintain diverse versions of peace.

Based on the foregoing, the present thesis displays an example on how an international political-economy system was able to exert power throughout the world and in a given region. The thesis examines the system in question, the Pax Britannica, as to how the integration between a multitude of political-

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 16-18.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

economic factors produced a virtually omnipotent configuration headed by Britain and did exercise, determine and direct the course of the nineteenth century-international relations. In so doing, in order to present the way power was exercised by the system, it touches upon the case of an anti-systemic entity, rising in one of the regions where the system had vested interest. Within this framework, it attempts to display the reasons underneath the following account, which was reported by a contemporary British Consul concerning that very anti-systemic actor:

The hostility of the British Government paralyses all my efforts ... with the English for my friends, I can do everything; without their friendship I can do nothing ... wherever I turn she is there to baffle me ... if England be only with me, let all the world be against me.⁴⁶

That was a statement by Mehmet Ali Paşa of Egypt, who, with his peculiar regime, would fall at odds with the British and have to face counter-action by forces of the Pax Britannica. His career, designs over Egypt as well as regional political intentions form the main bulk of the present work. Arousing the system's hostility in a time-span of less than 40 years, Mehmet Ali was to have a very steady rise to power and his failure would be precipitated by the very dynamics that sustained his progress.

Building on the rather abstract framework provided in this chapter, the following chapter examines the practice of the Pax Britannica, mostly in the way it was put into effect by its spearhead, Britain. It chiefly details the economic/commercial and political facets of the system so as to provide a groundwork for illuminating the bases of incompatibility between the Pax Britannica and Mehmet Ali's Egypt.

⁴⁶ F.O. 78, 192. From Barker (Cairo), No. 9 of March 8, 1830; No. 11 of June 2, reporting the very words (*ipsissima verba*) uttered by Mehmet Ali of Egypt during one of the audiences they had. Cited in H. Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, Longmans, Green and Co., 1936, p. 91.

CHAPTER 3

THE PAX BRITANNIC EXERCISE

The British were to profit the most from the political-economic system named after their Empire. The Pax Britannica provided their statesmen and merchants with powerful instruments to shape political-economic spheres to their liking at local, regional, and global levels.⁴⁷

As noted in the introduction, this course of action was put in effect through some definite methods: (1) a modern capitalist economy at home and overseas, enabling economic wealth throughout the empire; (2) an increasing Great Power influence over international engagement, the more inseparable matters of foreign policy and imperial commitments, which multiplied power and difficulties at the same time; (3) a growing variety of political, governmental and constitutional institutions and their extension throughout the dominions, if not the attempted extent of the globe itself; (4) an entangled and imperial cultural development, i.e. social, institutional, religious, and intellectual transformation of Britain and its subjects.⁴⁸

As the present study draws from a case of the functioning of the Pax Britannica in the Near East, it is best to address on which grounds the “shaping” could have taken place therein. In so doing, the study refers to the forces of the system as practiced heavily by Great Britain.

⁴⁷ E. Rhodes, J. M. Dickey, S. S. Milburn, T. C. Walker, *Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of Military Force and Political Influence*, Lexington Books, 2003, p. 41.

⁴⁸ A. Porter, ‘Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century’, in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, A. Porter (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 1.

In general terms, Britain's preferences firstly focused on "peace with honour". This encompassed the employment of the balance of power instrument in Europe so that communications with India were maintained and free trade facilitated. This required Britain to prevent gains by other Powers in the region, while avoiding waging war with them. It also pushed Britain to the position of not entertaining any deed that could disturb the balance in the wider area. This principle was to uphold peace without unilateral concessions or sacrificing prestige at an ideal.

Then came "prosperity". In toying with the consolidated idea of free trade, the British calculated the prospects for investment in the mentioned region. It was with particular attention paid to the already established and planned trade routes to India. Therefore, communications with the sub-continent became a moving factor in policy-making regarding the eastern Mediterranean.

The third part of the shaping was "progress", which meant the morally and economically enterprising attitude the British had. It aimed at furthering their own visions to bring about civilisation and economic development in the distant ends of the world. Naturally, these ideas were motivated by the imperative for the free navigation of the seas in order to maintain the development of reliable trade, which in return would add up to peace.⁴⁹

Against this backdrop, the succeeding sections evaluate the commercial/financial and geopolitical foundations of the Pax Britannica, in an attempt to examine the basis of its relation to the Near East during the nineteenth century.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

3.1. Global Patterns Set by Political-Economic Clout

3.1.A. State Power for Shaping Global Markets to Britain's Benefit

Prior to the nineteenth century, for the end of facilitating exports to external markets, the Great Powers depended on hard power, diplomacy, and mutual commercial arrangements in synchronised operation. Britain was in the forefront of this endeavour, and in an age when international trade was directed in a manner that prioritised promoting exports and restricting imports, instruments of war enabled the British commercial power to thrive.

This mercantilist drive on the part of the British would last for a time, and even during the French Revolution, when calls for free trade had been increasing, leaders in London would not act any inclined to give up on the long-lasting practices for mercantilism as a determinant in foreign commerce. Moreover, such barriers against liberal international trade as blockades, tariffs, or state-sanctioned privateering would remain and increase until the Congress of Vienna in 1815.⁵⁰

The year 1815 marked the beginning of the British global supremacy, heralding their hegemony in terms of economy as well as finances, international political standing and naval dominance. Great Britain stood at the centre of a vast and complex network of power and patronage and dominated global politics. The empire was the largest the world had ever known; essentially global in reach, it encompassed continents and oceans, territories in Asia, North America, Australasia, the Middle East, and southern Africa, and therefore shaped the lives of millions of people.⁵¹

⁵⁰ P. O'Brien and G. E. Pigman, 'Free trade, British hegemony and the international economic order in the nineteenth century', *Review of International Studies*, 18, 1992, pp. 92-93.

⁵¹ D. Bell, 'Victorian visions of global order: an introduction', in *Victorian Visions of Global Order*, D. Bell (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 1-3.

For another hundred years, the empire's overseas economic relations would span the globe and around the three-fifths of its total foreign trade would be with extra-European markets. With a broader pattern of commerce and movement of people and capital, the British Empire would combine its imperial politics with the spirit of free-trade cosmopolitanism and the unleashed forces of economic liberalism. At the end, the cosmopolitan success was to reach such an extent that politics and economics would be adjoined in imperial articulation.⁵² Particularly, during the apex of the empire, roughly in mid-nineteenth century, Britain's *pax* would enable the volume of world trade to grow by about two and a half times. With the Pax Britannic multilateral network of commerce strengthened, world trade would increase tenfold in the following sixty years. It was in these conditions that the British Empire would expand rapidly throughout the world. The extent of its economic influence during the nineteenth century was to range quite beyond the limits of sovereign control.⁵³

The role of "empire" in British international economic affairs throughout this period was vital. That notion came into being in its British form as an economic entity with multilateral political engagement and achieved a central position in policy patterns. This configuration was strengthened with the financial mechanisms of the Pax Britannica resting on London's solid loyalty to free trade, which made pound sterling universally available and the key currency of the international system. Consequently, commerce with the British market meant having access to that currency as well as gaining a place in the Pax Britannica system.⁵⁴

⁵² P. J. Cain, 'Economics and Empire: The Metropolitan Context', in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, A. Porter (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 31-32.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 42, 51.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

In this framework, given the rising rates of trade between Britain and the vast stretches of territory, mostly the extra-European markets (Table 1), British commercial interests must have influenced any foreign policy consideration on the part of their empire. The fact that the exports of the United Kingdom increased 250% and its imports around 127% between 1825 and 1850⁵⁵ produces a through and solid reason to point to this end.

Additionally, the increasing trade of certain manufactured articles and raw materials prove the necessities such consideration might have entailed. Take the principal item of British international trade during this time, cotton, whose exports increased more than 66% from 1825 until 1850 and amounted to almost 50% of Britain's total exports throughout this period. The great increase observed in the imports of definite items as raw silk, sheep and lamb's wool, and cotton wool as well as the rates of such increase⁵⁶ augment the sustainability of this argument.

The steady expansion of trade broadened the horizons of British merchants and of the Foreign Office as to commerce. The policy-makers were increasingly forced to address the needs of the trader and support him in his goals.⁵⁷ In this understanding, the British inked multiple trade treaties with Prussia in 1826, Austria, France, certain states in Latin America and Sweden through 1823 and 1827 as well as Greece in 1837, and secured a most favourable status for their merchants. Nonetheless, proportionate decline in terms of trade barriers, including tariffs, did not produce an extensively successful outcome, for all such actors in Europe clung to preferential treatment. The British also failed in widening their network of treaties

⁵⁵ F. E. Bailey, 'The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol 12 No 4, 1940, p. 457.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 456-458.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 458.

throughout and integrating the remaining units of European commerce. Thereby, in the face of its colonial, imperial, and global configuration of rule, British foreign policy formulation had to prioritise economic ambitions. Note that it was the age of a fixation with the gospel of free trade, while merchants of an “informal empire” were establishing themselves within the global economy.⁵⁸

Table 1⁵⁹

<i>UK Exports and Imports, Geographical Distribution, 1785-1845</i> (per cent; England, Scotland and Wales data only for 1785-1815)				
	1785	1805	1825	1845
Europe				
exports	46.9	44.2	46.1	44.4
imports	43.8	45.8	40.6	36.8
North America				
exports	25.8	26.1	18.3	16.5
imports	7.4	10.1	16.0	23.9
Latin America and West Indies				
exports	10.3	19.7	22.3	14.9
imports	22.5	27.0	20.5	13.2
Asia and Near East				
exports	12.8	6.9	11.6	19.8
imports	25.6	16.3	21.4	19.4
Africa and Australia				
exports	4.2	3.1	1.7	4.4
imports	0.7	0.7	1.5	6.6

That situation had the British state power directed progressively towards reforming global markets for its own advantages. In fact, with the increasing infusion of the global countryside and the infrastructure projects accelerating the movement of goods, merchants from Britain “mobilised collectively to use state power to shape global markets to their benefit ... Their industrial

⁵⁸ O’Brien and Pigman, *Free trade, British hegemony and the international economic order in the nineteenth century*, p. 94.

⁵⁹ Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain*, p. 6.

policy, in effect, was global. And it was the most global for British merchants and manufacturers.”⁶⁰

There is a side of the debate, which approaches the role of state in the entirety of this transformation as a limited one. It accordingly argues that the government did not play a transformative role in the industrial development of Britain, had no policy as such, employed laissez-faire policies in an increasing manner, remained a “night watchman” with minimal responsibilities, and so forth. The contrasting state-centred view, on the other hand, is taken to have a dual origin: (1) the roots in the fiscal-military nature of the state, i.e. the creation of a financial-military nexus which would counter challenges of global and technological wars; and (2) the political and legal institutional nature, which enabled the functioning of the market, the development of overseas trade and the rise of technological inventions.⁶¹

In this regard, even though the relationship between the spheres of the state and the economy could appear ambiguous, it may be suggested that the reconciliation between the two was a chief factor in the “shaping” of the global markets. The state, it is argued,

seems to have surfaced almost everywhere in the economy. It not only regulated markets but also created them ... It did not either own enterprises or leave them to be owned by private individuals, but was also a partner in joint public-private undertakings, be they new modes of transportation or new imperial conquests. It seems more appropriate to speak now of the state within the economy rather than of the state and the economy.⁶²

⁶⁰ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, pp. 236-237.

⁶¹ R. Harris, ‘Government and the economy, 1688-1850’, in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, R. Floud, P. Johnson (eds), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 205-206.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 235.

As a matter of fact, it was the increasingly active role assumed by the British government for the extension of commercial interests of their own merchants. In other words, the British entrepreneurs' solid calls for the need for administrative reform, the dismantling of monopolies, and the removal of internal duties in their destinations of trade had a true impact on foreign policy formulation.⁶³

Another factor that proved principal in the needed reconciliation between the forces of the state and of the market was to do with Britain's trade relations with the rest of Europe. By the time the British had emerged as the industrial leader and advocate of free trade, their counterparts in the rest of Europe turned rather conscious of their relatively backward situation and sought a new and more defensive form of mercantilism by applying protectionist policies.⁶⁴ After the 1820s, the European states would increasingly erect such barriers in order to consolidate their own industrial development against England, and this step would limit the trade between the two sides.

For example, in the fields of industry and commerce post-1815, France took the lead and extended its protectionist measures into textiles with high duties. The German Zollverein had tended to keep up taxing foreign manufacturers; British trade channels with the Germanies operated mainly through Belgium, Holland, and the Hans towns. The Austrian lands were also under the protection of high tariffs.⁶⁵ In the meantime, the dynamism for the search by the British of further market opportunities throughout the world continued. It

⁶³ R. Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2009, p. 91.

⁶⁴ P. Bairoch, 'European trade policy, 1815-1914', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Volume VII The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies*, P. Mathias, S. Pollard (eds), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1989, p. 14.

⁶⁵ Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50*, p. 459.

was a by-product emanating from further industrialisation and specialisation in production.

This situation illuminates the reason, as noted above, why the primary markets of the British foreign trade became extra-European during a considerable part of this period. Not being able to totally expand its network of commerce throughout the Continent, in the interest of free trade, the British opted for extending hegemony over underdeveloped regions. Thereby, the majority of foreign demand for British products too became colonial, and helped Britain increase its abilities to control the global countryside.⁶⁶ In addition, English factories enjoyed a steady increase in the outward flow of their goods, and London's primary object in executing commercial diplomacy was directed towards the maintenance of limited trade with Europe.

This also contributed to the situation that most of the states, irrespective of their level of advancement, found increasing levels of British political-economic activity meddling in their independence. Whereas some societies were able to come up with measures compatible with the British influence, state actors mostly in the overseas domain found it increasingly difficult to meet the British enterprise's demands for unencumbered access and commercial freedom. Particularly, the extension of the metropolitan capital's aspiration to the global scale eventually exacerbated eventual competition at international level, if not spawned new ones.⁶⁷

Among such underdeveloped units were the Ottoman Empire whose territories were to receive bulks of British manufactured goods with increasing rates and frequency: The trade figures for the second quarter of the

⁶⁶ M. Berg, 'Consumption in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, R. Floud, P. Johnson (eds), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2008, p. 358.

⁶⁷ Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 7-8.

nineteenth century, for instance, show a positive trend in trade relations with Turkey.⁶⁸ In fact, “between 1825 and 1850 exports to Turkey increased seven fold, [whereas] imports were reasonably steady with some increase after the signing of the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty [of 1838].”⁶⁹ In addition, with these developments, Britain’s Asiatic and African possessions came to be much more essential as destinations for massive quantities of English manufactures.

3.1.B. Increasing Merchant Activity in an Informal Empire

The components outlined above present that the British policy formulation, in its commercial/economic undertakings, prioritised a modern capitalist economy at home and its extension abroad. Given the imperial urges of the age, access to new territories and the drive for freer trade became both necessary and inevitable. This reconfiguration of the global political-economic setting by Britain to its benefits did not solely rest on the state formulating its policies towards this goal or adopting a conciliatory track towards the sphere of economy.

In the nineteenth century, the European commercial activity started to increasingly pervade the Middle East. This situation had the key effect of bringing particular segments of the region’s economy within the compass of the world economic system. As such, fluctuations in the European business cycle would directly affect a multitude of spots therein; their commercial and agricultural activity fell under the influence of global price of commodities and availability of credits.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50*, p. 459.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 460.

⁷⁰ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 92.

This entire process took place rather more within the “informal imperial” context that British trade and investment enjoyed remarkable growth in many parts of the world. It gained tremendous pace owing to the “links created by trade, investment or diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention, to draw new regions into the world-system of an imperial power.”⁷¹ Advances in the means and steadfastness of communication would further consolidate this setting and draw from the development of steamships, railways, telegraphs, and postal services.⁷² The spread of the English language, the improvement in business organisation, banking and stock enterprise, government’s subsidies for secure and rapid mails, and, by the end of the century, the Suez Canal were to additionally aid the sustainability of the imperial network. In fact, the progress achieved in the sphere of transport was a stimulant for the expansion of European commerce. Examples include the steady fall in ocean rates, the improvements in river transportation in the region or regular steamship routes coming into effect between the Levant and Egypt in the 1830s.⁷³ Essentially, it was the introduction of steamships and its clear-cut advantages over sailing ships that led most Europeans into fierce competition for the control of the seas and of cargo and passenger transportation throughout the Mediterranean.⁷⁴

In any case, as the century progressed, with the conscious determination of its government and regular patterns of the invisible hand, Britain turned out to be engaged in a wide spectrum of political-economic relationships with societies throughout the world. This situation comprised a range from

⁷¹ J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol 112 no 447, 1997, p. 614.

⁷² Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 6-7.

⁷³ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, pp. 89-90.

⁷⁴ G. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 32-33.

colonies to wholly independent states as well as the intermediate category in between, the areas of control without responsibility.⁷⁵ The British expansion back then owed much to the private British interests, settler, commercial, and missionary in particular. It was based on their firm attempts to turn the extra-European peripheries into an extension of Britain within the margins of the “informal empire”. This was accurate for many regions where establishing a “formal empire” remained near impossible.⁷⁶

Ultimately, the expansion which underpinned the empire-construction of Britain reached such levels that it merchants were to suggest that “their country [was] more than ever the entrepôt for the world”.⁷⁷ However, this condition was not simply because of British dynamism; many other parties took benefit from it and helped drive the growth of the global economy. Britain was both incorporating new partners into its expanding economy and being integrated by others:

The resources of other countries or regions, the adaptability of their people and institutions, as well as their physical environments, combined to shape not only the emerging world economy and Britain's place within it, but also the evolution of her Empire. The strength of local or regional economies was often such that British expansion was conditional on them. British trade was often conducted on others' terms, and frequently assumed only a modest role when compared with the volume of local economic activity.⁷⁸

In this framework, in addition to state’s determined direction for imperial expansion, one particular novelty of the era that would develop into a decisive

⁷⁵ Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 8.

⁷⁶ Darwin, *Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion*, p. 617.

⁷⁷ Letter from C. B. Skinner to C. H. Brown, 18 June 1863, Jardine Skinner Papers, Cambridge University Library, cited in Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 9.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

factor for international trends was the sharp increase in the number of European merchants swarming around the major trade ports. That way, links with local intermediaries and retailers were established in the global countryside, and the exchange between Western European capitalism and the Near East was facilitated in terms of goods and information.⁷⁹

As a matter of fact, the alliance, cooperation or sometimes contention between statesmen, merchants, manufacturers, and the pressure groups proved to be an underlying prerequisite for the shift in the global economic order's outlook; it was one of the primary factors that facilitated the world-scale mobilisation of state institutions, capital, and technology. It also took use of networks outside the market itself, and relied on credit, information and trust exchanged among merchants. True, global trade had already been built on social relations by the advent of capitalism; what differed in the transformation based on this group was not solely their aptitude to consolidate and streamline capital, or their discernible access to information. They thoroughly enjoyed their capacity to construct and carry forward their "networks of trust based on extended family ties, geographical proximity, and shared religious beliefs, ethnic identities, and origin."⁸⁰

Moreover, in the risky tides of the seas of trade stretching across vast distances, survival required reliability, which needed trust in social links. The result of this equation was what is suggested to be "relational capitalism".⁸¹ It is in fact similar to the modern Asian model of capitalism, in the sense that the nineteenth century undertaking had a unique preference for informal and relational forms of economic regulation and ordering between private firms

⁷⁹ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 89.

⁸⁰ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, pp. 230-231.

⁸¹ O. Pétré-Grenouilleau, 'Les négoce atlantiques français. Anatomie d'un capitalisme relationnel', *Dix-Huitième Siècle*, no 33, 2001, p. 38.

as well as the peculiar intra-regional, ethnically driven trading and financial networks.⁸² This phenomenon was indispensable as it made the features of the nineteenth century trade rest more on extra-market social relations than on the market rules.

Here again were the ready, willing and able merchants of the era. They were to grasp the changing opportunities of the world economy and generate their own and new forms of enterprise. In particular, the driving force behind the British merchant enterprise to survive in greater strength than its western counterparts included their networks of international trade houses at the continental, agency houses at the regional and home trade houses at the domestic levels. These merchants contributed to the maintenance of the commercial configuration of the Pax Britannica with intentional designs and directions. They aimed at extending their global trading networks through familial and social contacts and led to a synthesis of old loyalties and new cultures within a supra-national outlook. In addition, with the increasing employment of the extended group of families or co-religionists, every major trading port would become a focus of family networks where good and credit were to move with a degree of assurance. The dispersed members of the family would not only inherit expertise and fortune, but also build on the strength of their international connections. For example, the Huguenot in London, Amsterdam, Geneva and Frankfurt, were able to conduct a simultaneous operation in a multitude of major financial centres.⁸³ A result of this highly interconnected network was the secure and reliable flow of goods, credit, and, very importantly, information. Such kinship networks also

⁸² M. Dowdle, 'The regulatory geography of market competition in Asia (and beyond): a preliminary mapping', in *Asian Capitalism and the Regulation of Competition*, M. Dowdle, J. Gillespie & I. Maher (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 20.

⁸³ Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain*, p. 32.

mobilised capital; they successfully pooled family wealth and skills, bringing about local industries that would transcend their traditional standards.⁸⁴

The merchant activity would also tremendously increase its effectiveness with solid financial houses, and based on capital in transition from Europe and America, some of the strongest merchant houses were to benefit from the advantage of British lead in trade, notable in the domain of textiles. Examples include such well-to-do Greek, American and German migrant families as Rallis, Souchay & Co., Brown Shipley, and Schunk that would subsequently advance to greater size.⁸⁵

The practical results of the embeddedness of such networks in global economy and trade could be understood by the final example of the industrial pressure groups. Those in Britain, for example, achieved considerable influence to direct the course of their country's economy and trade. They had just reason to act as such: By 1830, Britain achieved the lead in manufacturing over its rivals in the Continent. At that time, the per capita level of industrialisation in Britain exceeded that of the rest of Europe by 250 per cent. With that, they easily became the spearheads advocating for a more effective system of free trade. The foundation of the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838 and the repeal of the notorious Corn Laws of Britain in 1846 provides a fine case for this.⁸⁶ Drawing from the British example, pressure groups of economists and manufacturers would also be established as proponents of free trade in the Continent. Examples include the *Societe d'Economie Politique* and the *Journal des Economistes* in France; the *Association Belge pour la*

⁸⁴ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 148.

⁸⁵ Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain*, p. 290.

⁸⁶ Bairoch, *European trade policy, 1815-1914*, p. 10.

Liberte Commerciale and the *Congres des Economistes* in Belgium; or the *Freihandelsverein* as an association favourable to free traders in Germany.⁸⁷

3.2. Cotton: The Primary Instrument of British Commercial Expansion

We see that the Pax Britannica's progress was thanks to powerful states which attempted to structure global markets to their advantage. This was to be followed in the furthering of the interests of manufacturers and merchants by the help of governments. The goal was difficult yet direct: securing a reliable source of raw materials, establishing a global market for their products, and maintaining a manufacturing economy. With their fast rates of growth and aggressive competition, European states did seek to "transform the global countryside simultaneously into a supplier of materials for their industrial enterprises and into consumers for the resulting products."⁸⁸

This framework, as indicated, illuminates the pattern in which Britain rose to global political-economic dominance. In the wake of the industrial revolution, as an international trader of manufactures and services, Britain's competitive advantage was developing remarkably and its economic influence was spreading around the world. With trade exercised via relational networks globally, there emerged a cosmopolitan community.⁸⁹ And the expansion of that community was due substantially to a conspicuous factor: the increasing growth of the cotton industry. In fact, what the contemporary cotton capitalists were motivated towards was cosmopolitan in essence, they were after transforming the global countryside into a cotton-growing complex.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

⁸⁸ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 238.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 234.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 124.

In this regard, it may be argued that the course of cotton trade's expansion was essentially parallel to the political-economic progress of Britain throughout most of the century. Here in this section the thesis tries to display the bases of that progress.

It would not be much of an exaggeration if one states that it was the cotton trade that enjoyed industrial dynamism of the nineteenth century the most. Indeed, it came to be one of the greatest factors behind the industrial revolution, and transformed Britain's political, economic, societal and class-driven state of affairs.⁹¹ The apparent extent of this crop's defining dominance over Britain's political-economic trajectory would undeniably have impacts on the substance of its commerce within the Pax Britannica.

In particular, the late-eighteenth century innovations in cotton spinning would contribute heavily to the development of British trade. Whilst advanced methods of production were increasingly enabling British firms to extend their control over export markets with cheaper manufactures, the cotton industry's vital need for raw material engendered a substantial import trade with various parts of the world.⁹² True, Britain's technical leadership in cotton textiles was a chief source of growth in exports, but the trade pattern encompassed other influences, such as the rapid growth of population. This situation increased inexorably the demand for raw materials and food, and, as the world market was functioning on an elastic basis, British imports increased. In this consideration, cotton's requirement for massive imports of raw materials was clear. Accordingly, other traditional industries of exports

⁹¹ C. K. Harley, 'Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, R. Floud, P. Johnson (eds), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2008, p. 186.

⁹² Ibid.

were also to be utilised to the ends pertinent with cotton textiles so that the growing import demand on the part of Britain was met.⁹³

Consequently, British cotton textiles alone would represent between 30 percent and 40 percent of all British exports in the course of the nineteenth century; and 40 to 50 percent from the beginning of the century to the mid-1840s. This was the most evident in the European market, which received almost 60 percent of British cotton exports by the end of the Napoleonic War in 1815 and 30 percent in 1855.⁹⁴

In any case, the potentials of this industry reached such a crucial level that in the mid-1850s, cotton production was to be described by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce as “neither surpassed in extent nor in usefulness by any other manufacturing pursuit.”⁹⁵ There was in effect genuine momentum behind such an assertive statement, as British cotton industry would start its remarkable expansion after 1815. In particular, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain’s cotton production

increased by 5 percent annually, and its exports by 6.3 percent. By 1820, British entrepreneurs operated 7 million spindles, and by 1850, 21 million. By the 1830s, weaving was also increasingly mechanized, and with the spread of power looms, weavers moved into factories as well. By 1835 there were roughly fifteen hundred cotton manufacturers ... and by 1860, four thousand manufacturers owned cotton mills in the British Isles.⁹⁶

⁹³ Harley, *Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology*, p. 187.

⁹⁴ Cain, *Economics and Empire: The Metropolitan Context*, pp. 31-32.; L. G. Sandberg, ‘Movement in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports, 1815-1913’, *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol 28 No 1, 1968; Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain*, p. 6.

⁹⁵ The Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures at Manchester, for the Year 1855 (Manchester: James Collins, 1856), 15, cited in Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 165.

⁹⁶ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, pp. 164-165.

In addition, by the time of Waterloo, most of Britain's export markets had been outside its empire: Europe, the United States and Latin America constituted around 98 percent of all exports of cotton goods. After 1815, as referred to above, with rising tariffs in Europe and the United States, cotton exporters were forced further afar and sought other market opportunities.⁹⁷ In this regard, Britain's use of colonial and semi-colonial markets of the world to the end of cotton trade was essential in its expansive moves. Throughout the 1850s, more than 50 percent of all cotton produce of the United Kingdom were exported. Furthermore, in this period, Asia and Latin America turned into the most rapidly growing export markets, and particularly, Asia's share in this setting increased in a rapid manner.

Table 2⁹⁸

<i>Cotton Goods Exports, "Old" and "New" Markets 1784-1856 in £m</i>				
	Old markets	New markets	Total	New as % of total
1784-6	0.8	0	0.8	0
1794-6	3.4	0	3.4	0
1804-6	15.2	0.7	15.9	4.4
1814-16	17.0	1.7	18.7	9.1
1824-6	12.3	4.5	16.9	26.6
1834-6	15.0	7.4	22.4	33.0
1844-6	13.2	12.6	25.8	48.8
1854-6	16.0	19.0	34.9	54.4

One of the primary reasons behind this situation was that the external commerce configuration geographically surrounding Britain convinced decision-makers and investment-generators of the time about the need to bypass the closer and stronger actors of trade. With that, those who could exercise protective measures on their own developing industries were

⁹⁷ Cain, *Economics and Empire: The Metropolitan Context*, p. 34.

⁹⁸ S. D. Chapman, *The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution*, Macmillan Education Ltd., London, 1987, p. 43.

avoided, and the British opted for markets which were incapable of politically resisting their offensive (Table 2).⁹⁹

The urge to circumvent the stronger actors and putting the relatively less advanced parts of the world to economic, productive and commercial use was becoming very apparent in a specific region during the 1830s. Throughout this period, the nature of trade between Europe and the Middle East was witnessing vital changes. For example, the pattern based on the French trade in the Mediterranean was almost completely terminated following the Napoleonic wars and the initial phases of the Industrial Revolution. With the French gradually pushed out of the region, the British grasped the opportunity for a perfect opening. They also seized the chance to profit from their status as allies of the Ottomans against the French, and had some definite restrictions of their trade in the Turkish lands removed.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, all these changes, as Owen argues were actually the beginning for the Near East to open up as a market where increasing numbers of British goods would increasingly arrive at.¹⁰¹

Table 3¹⁰²

<i>British Exports of Cotton Goods to the Eastern Mediterranean, 1824-50, £ declared values, annual averages</i>			
	Turkey	Syria/Palestine	Egypt
1824	567,112		
1825-6	465,761		
1827-9	326,497		27,939
1830-4	824,576		81,968
1835	1,062,781		131,672
1836-9	1,199,943	112,155	198,120
1840-4	1,365,657	430,194	179,328

⁹⁹ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁰ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 84.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 85.

<i>(Table 3 cont'd)</i>			
1845-9	1,833,197	358,456	307,114
1850	1,975,059	271,457	354,427

In fact, in the face of the post-Napoleonic blockade against free trade in Europe, the Middle East turned out to be a very opportune destination. The Mediterranean, in this context, proved to be one of the most promising choices for exports – it was the region where cotton was the driving force that pushed the British commercial expansion (Table 3). By the first year of the 1815 Peace, British exports to the Levant were worth £300.000, of which around £190.000 were cotton goods. The post-war boom, furthermore, increased their value to £800.000, with cottons amounting to £500.000. Through the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, British exports to the Middle East were to reach on average over £3 million per annum, with three-quarters of which were cotton articles.¹⁰³

The push for increasing British products would have wide-ranging effects in the markets of Ottoman Turkey and Egypt. They were to constitute almost 15 percent of the global market for British cotton exports (Tables 3 & 4). In fact, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the substantial majority of Britain's trade took place through the ports of Anatolia (most notably, the major markets and distribution centres of Istanbul and Izmir), and with another chief source of industrial raw materials in the Middle East, Egypt. As discussed in the succeeding sections, it would take the demolition of the monopoly system – which was imposed over Egypt after 1805 – for this Ottoman eyalet to come to the fore as a British-exports-market.¹⁰⁴

In this framework, the sector of cotton played a significant part in the increasing exposure of the Middle East to European trade. Particularly in terms of local production of certain cash crops, including cotton, silk, wool

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 84-85.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

or fruit, researchers indicate identifiable changes at the expense of Middle Eastern industry. The attraction of the European demand led to a diversion of the finite local supply into production for the international markets rather than the domestic. The pull by the international market enabled a very rapid increase in output of specific cash crops, e.g. cotton, at the local level in a short period of time. The scale of British activity was one of the notable and deriving factors behind that pull.¹⁰⁵

With that in mind, it is safe to emphasise that British cotton became a foreign economic policy determinant. This was not only due to the active policy choice (liberalism and free trade) or the willing and able actors (statesmen, merchants and manufacturers) to extend the British interests. These factors also contributed to the expansion of the above-mentioned cosmopolitan network, which, in return, facilitated access to raw materials, appropriate means of transportation, and efficient production plants. At the end, it was inevitable that that British cotton products had prevalence in terms of quality over those produced in the rest of the world. Consequently, Britain's superiority in quality cotton production became its stepping stone to secure firm footholds in tastes of consumers around the world.¹⁰⁶

Table 4¹⁰⁷

<i>British Exports to the Eastern Mediterranean 1814-50, £ declared values, annual averages</i>			
	Turkey	Syria/Palestine	Egypt
1814	153,903		
1815-19	460,661		
1820-4	566,315		
1825-6	600,543		
1827-9	428,655		49,377
1830-4	1,036,166		130,138

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁰⁶ Chapman, *The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution*, p. 60.

¹⁰⁷ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 85.

<i>(Table 4 cont'd)</i>			
1835	1,331,669		269,225
1836-9	1,466,569	119,753	200,844
1840-4	1,564,447	441,107	237,444
1845-9	2,350,184	382,219	494,824
1850	2,515,821	303,254	648,801

Furthermore, British cotton also became an instrument for the due application of foreign trade orientation: the demand for the British cotton products in the extra-European markets was on the rise, and this contributed to the choices to evade protectionism imposed from within the Continent. As such, Beckert suggests that the case of cotton displays how the British succeeded against the protectionist trend in Europe. Firstly, the focus of British manufacturers was on high-end goods, most notably in the case of cotton textiles, with which technologically less advanced manufacturers were unable to compete.¹⁰⁸ The succeeding sections address this issue in a more detailed manner; but it is of importance to note here that, the British focus on high-quality produced the bases of their accomplishments in the trade of cotton:

[t]he foundations of the success of cotton in the Industrial Revolution lay in a consumer society with seemingly unsatiable appetite for new fashion, and a corps of entrepreneurs with the ingenuity, versatility and resource to feed that demand and then to sustain the growth of the industry by increasing overseas sales, first in traditional markets and then in distant parts of the world.¹⁰⁹

In essence, one end of this spectrum stimulated the other. The demand for the high-end British cotton increased Britain's reliance more and more on colonial and/or semi-colonial markets throughout the world.¹¹⁰ At the end, even though it was able to circumvent the leading competitors in this industry throughout the world, the "mighty" Britain would still need to remove the stones on the road. Particularly in the Near East, it would end up dealing with

¹⁰⁸ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁹ Chapman, *The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution*, p. 61.

¹¹⁰ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 165.

problems against her plans as to cotton. Britain would face an absolutist actor that seemed on track to thwart her imperial designs and end up having the casting the vote against that absolutist one.¹¹¹

3.3. Geopolitics of the British Approach vis-à-vis the Near East

The preceding sections are of an attempt to display the fundamentals of the Pax Britannica with regard to the scope of the present study. They touch upon the conciliation between statesmen and capitalists, the flourishing liberal state with its free trade gospel, individuals' increasing activity in an informal empire as separate issues. In this regard, it could be suggested that if the synthesis of these matters led to British dominance throughout the world in a number of areas, including cotton production, then their culmination in an interplay between dominant issues in the consolidation of the Pax Britannica was to take place in the Near East.¹¹²

The British policy towards the Near East was formed with concerns pertaining to imperial geopolitics, trade, and prestige.¹¹³ Two regions were central in these considerations: the Mediterranean and India. In fact, starting from the seventeenth century, Britain's influence in the former had been indispensable to the claims to great power status in Europe. It was again in these margins that by 1800, due to concerns that domination of the Near East, either by France or Russia, would pose threats to British supremacy in India,

¹¹¹ Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 93.

¹¹² Note that the term Near East is used interchangeably with the Middle East throughout this study. This is line with the choice of work published in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given the politico-commercial context of mid-nineteenth century, what the study means with the term Near East encompasses the region centred on the Eastern Mediterranean, surrounded by Egypt, the Levant and the Ottoman Empire's Anatolian territories.

¹¹³ Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 5-6.

the British diplomatic interest was extended into a vast security zone from Gibraltar to the eastern frontiers of Persia.¹¹⁴

However, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the novel interest in the Mediterranean was also based on the industrial changes of the era. These included, as noted above, the need for more raw materials and particularly for new and larger markets. The exchange of raw materials in return for manufactured goods needed a shorter route as well as a speedier means of transportation. In addition, finances too were a concern- as the state-of-the-art steam vessels required so much fuel and water for long voyages. Thus, compared to the other limited options, such as the route around the Cape, the Mediterranean became ever more indispensable as a pathway to the east with frequent stops as deemed necessary.¹¹⁵

Therefore, given the scope of the present thesis, two outstanding geopolitical issues in the nineteenth century politics of Britain concerning the Near East are addressed in this section: the Mediterranean as a pathway to India, and the Mediterranean as a European issue.

3.3.A. The Mediterranean as a Pathway to India

Keeping approaches to India as secure as possible had for a very long time been a central issue in the British imperial policy formulation. By the nineteenth century, consolidation of Britain's power in India had already started to stimulate many evident consequences in the sphere of international relations. The question of India, protection of its northern-western frontiers and of the sea routes from Britain to the shores of the sub-continent

¹¹⁴ Darwin, *Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion*, p. 622.

¹¹⁵ Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-50*, p. 453.

constituted a matter of great concern.¹¹⁶ At the end of the day, India was the *ultima ratio* of extra-Europe British dominions and reckoned as the key to British expansion east and south of Suez.¹¹⁷

The consolidation of British rule therein mattered significantly in the sense that India contributed considerably to the global balancing of Britain's international trade. The phase of expansion was not just limited to that; there were also financial relations established, private investments utilised, and India's military forces were taken under imperial use.¹¹⁸

For that reason, securing and maintaining approaches towards India as well as meeting the need for more direct communications, overland and maritime, with the sub-continent were of paramount importance. That motive was strengthened with the advent of rail communications and steam navigation.¹¹⁹ A contemporary account on this matter summarises the extent of the imperial priority attached to India:

The most important question connected with India ... is that of defence ... the loss of India would be a crushing blow to our trade, if our rule were succeeded by that of a protectionist country ... It would constitute, moreover, so grave an encouragement to our enemies in all parts of the world ...[for] a rapid growth of separatists feeling ... Besides trade there is the interest upon capital, and India remits so much money for various purposes to England that ... a peaceful and friendly India seems almost necessary to our existence ...¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ G. Davies, 'The Pattern of British Foreign Policy 1815-1914', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol 6 No 3, 1943, p. 370.

¹¹⁷ Darwin, *Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion*, p. 624.

¹¹⁸ Porter, *Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁹ F. R. Hunter, 'Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali', in *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2 Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, M. W. Daly (ed), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1998, p. 182.

¹²⁰ C. W. Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1890, pp. 3-4.

Essentially, the issue of India in the eyes of the British was multifaceted. The sub-continent was to become a pole of British world power. It would enjoy an exceptionally large bulk in the Britannic/Victorian world-system of the nineteenth century; and, as a *sui generis* colony, it would shed light on rather more limited extent of territorial expansion by the British elsewhere in Afro-Asia.¹²¹ The sub-continent's significance in the British empire was so extensive that routes, both overland and maritime/river, and communications between Europe and the East were as fundamental. In fact, it was reckoned that whoever was present in areas close to India would be found very near the British door; and those exerting political or economic control over routes to the sub-continent could strike at the heart of British imperial interests.¹²²

That strike could be precipitated from the Mediterranean- the region that the British considered tranquil after the map of Europe had been rearranged and its politics reconfigured at Vienna in 1815. Soon enough, the unfolding events in the region would prove that it had only been a false sense of assessment.

3.3.B. The Mediterranean as a European Issue

Britain had not been primarily concerned with the Mediterranean after the beginning of the eighteenth century. It had done little more than to continue rapprochements with local actors in a perfunctory manner. For a very long time indeed, there had not been a solid reason for an active policy formulated vis-à-vis the stillness of the region. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Britain was handed with such strategic positions as Malta, the Ionian Isles, and Gibraltar that secured a passage through the region. In addition, the eventual exhaustion at the European level after the long wars led to a lack of

¹²¹ Darwin, *Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion*, pp. 624-625.

¹²² D. Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography*, Yale University Press, Connecticut, 2011, pp. 215, 224.

motive for new initiatives and brought about a policy of *laissez-faire* in eastern affairs.¹²³

Nonetheless, a series of developments was to considerably disturb the calm in the Mediterranean and lead to a long period of rivalry both within and beyond this area.¹²⁴ As noted previously, thanks to advances in the means of communication and transport, the British trade was on a track of stable expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. This situation raised British interests in the Near East, in dynamics of relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and in the fate of Turkey, which had been deemed critical for access to Suez, the Red Sea and Asia.¹²⁵

The problem was that the Great Power activity in the region was one of competition and a threat to the balance of power therein. In particular, Russia was casting its shadow over the Ottoman Empire and extending its involvement in Asia, through gaining footholds in Afghanistan and Persia; France, on the other hand, was investing in new alliances in the Middle East to the end of exerting naval hegemony in the Mediterranean.¹²⁶ Additionally in the 1820s, such instances as the Greek rebellion against the Ottomans and the eventual intervention by the Europeans at Navarino in 1827, the French seeing prospects to regain some prestige in the Mediterranean and acting towards the Barbary states, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29 as well as the eventual Treaty of Adrianople, and the rise of Mehmet Ali in Egypt, who

¹²³ H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, Longmans, Green and Co., Philadelphia, 1928, p. 129.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ P. R. Ziegler, *Palmerston*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2003, p. 47.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

appeared at odds with his suzerain and was generally taken as a French protégé increased fears for a disruption in the balance of power.¹²⁷

These issues led to changes in British policy, the most important of which would take place as regards the Ottoman Empire. After all, the Turkish could extend commercial privileges or withhold them arbitrarily over a vast territory. They could also grant or refuse rights of passage to India through any of the nearer route.¹²⁸ This was evident in Viscount Palmerston's correspondence, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs¹²⁹ during the crises in the Near East throughout the 1830s. For example, as to acts that would imply the dismemberment of Turkey, the Viscount stated that they could not entertain such a prospect, for Turkey was an important occupier of the road towards India, better than any active sovereign in the Arabia could ever be. For that reason, he suggested that the British reckon ways to aid the Ottoman Sultan could still hold his ground.¹³⁰

All relevant actors differed on this issue, notoriously known as the Eastern Question: Russia gradually encroaching over Ottoman territory, Austria favourable to keeping the status quo, and France and Britain acting on similar lines- favouring status quo in their preferred versions, of course. In addition, although the French and the British prioritised the rule of maintaining the Ottoman empire, they had a margin of acquiescence as to specific provinces seceding and becoming independent. The extent of that contingency turned

¹²⁷ Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, pp. 129-142.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 135.

¹²⁹ Born in 1784, Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston was one of the remarkable statesmen Great Britain produced in the nineteenth century. He was elected to the House of Commons in 1806, became Secretary of State in Lord Grey's cabinet, and carried on with this role -on and off- until the end of his life.

¹³⁰ H. L. Bulwer, *The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: with Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence Volume II*, Richard Bentley, London, 1871, p. 145.

out to be the chief factor determining the British foreign policy of the Victorian period.¹³¹

Importantly, the British addressed this regional concern with no direct reference to its “eastern” aspect and instead, given that it entailed decisions regarding Egypt, Turkey, France and Russia, came to take it as a most important matter in all European diplomacy.¹³² In essence, the situation in the Mediterranean made it difficult to separate the Asiatic facets of the Eastern Question from the European aspect. The British held the firm belief that the European peace was dependent on keeping the Ottoman Empire as a European power.¹³³ That said, even though the Eastern Question as a problem concerned the fate of the Ottoman Empire, it also touched nerves in most European capitals. It laid down a primary example where the British displayed proficiency in pursuing their interests above all else, whilst avoiding becoming entangled in any long-term international commitment.¹³⁴ The goal to maintain efficiently the interplay between politics and trade in the areas within and surrounding the Ottoman Empire proved to be a particular case of that disposition.

The year 1833 was fundamental in portraying an example of how political-economic changes in matters concerning British interests in the region could radically alter the course and priorities of British foreign policy. In essence, the early years of Viscount Palmerston’s term in Foreign Office witnessed attention being diverted to events nearer home, which are suggested to have

¹³¹ R. B. Mowat, ‘The Near East and France 1829-1847’, in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783 – 1919 Volume II 1815 – 1866*, A. W. Ward, G. P. Gooch (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1923, p. 161.

¹³² Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 61.

¹³³ Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, p. 136.

¹³⁴ Ziegler, *Palmerston*, p. 47.

blinded decision-makers to matters in the Mediterranean. Moreover, some exceptions notwithstanding¹³⁵, the British public too had considerably little interest in Turkish affairs during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and a few was cognisant of Turkey's geographical importance across trade routes of the Mediterranean. British indifference was found natural given the fact that, in the late 1820s,

only 3 per cent of British imports came from the Ottoman Empire, and exports to Turkey amounted to less than 2 per cent of Britain's total exports. By the same token British interest in Turkey twenty-five years later (1852) can be explained in large measure by the fact that Britain's exports to Turkey had increased from £1,078,920 to £8,489,100 and amounted to more than 3 per cent of Britain's total exports.¹³⁶

Then came the Near East crisis of the 1830s, which was a strong strike at the centre, stability, and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, precipitated by one of the vassals of the Sultan. It led to some substantial modifications in the "indifference" included in the broader British strategy.¹³⁷ The moment of change would take effect when the Russians, with a bilateral treaty with the Porte, the Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty, gained a foothold in the Ottoman Empire in 1833 (discussed in the sixth chapter).

With that the British policy regarding the Near East would have an abrupt and broad change in a multitude of ways. Realising likely political and commercial dangers, the alarm rung in 1833 developed a more pro-active interest on the part of the United Kingdom in the maintenance of the Ottoman

¹³⁵ Bailey gives the examples of David Urquhart and David Ross in Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy*, p. 451.

¹³⁶ Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy*, p. 451.

¹³⁷ D. Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography*, p. 176.

Porte¹³⁸ and in consolidating determination not to leave the Mediterranean vulnerable to Russian encroachment.¹³⁹

And it would be within these parameters that the Pax Britannica would address the unfolding crisis into the 1840s in the Near East. The relevant aim was to determine a common course of action lest the peace in Europe would be in danger in relation to the two fundamental questions lingering in the region¹⁴⁰: (1) maintaining the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the question of Constantinople; (2) focusing on the detaching of particular parts of the Empire and fine-tuning the power of the detaching forces, i.e. the question of Alexandria.¹⁴¹

In sum, the bases of British policy towards the Mediterranean in the broader understanding would aim at averting any disruption of the Ottoman Empire, the suppression of the Russian encroachment, and preventing a political-economic combination between actors against the British interests as well as the Ottomans.¹⁴²

*

The first quarter of the nineteenth century gives us the ascent of the Pax Britannica as a political-economic system, with its multiple forces effectively unleashed. Spearheaded by Britain, the system enabled state power to transform global markets in accordance with needs and objectives defined by

¹³⁸ Bailey, *The Economics of British Foreign Policy*, p. 452.

¹³⁹ Ziegler, *Palmerston*, p. 34.

¹⁴⁰ F. S. Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841*, The University of Illinois, Urbana, 1924, p. 79.

¹⁴¹ Mowat, *The Near East and France 1829-1847*, p. 162.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

governments and markets. They were strengthened by liberal economic vigour and relatively freer trade regimes. Even though, erected were trade barriers in between European capitals, the British merchant activity was notably present almost anywhere in the world. They were operating in an informal empire which expanded with international trade of strategic commodities, such as cotton.

As showed above, the Mediterranean became paramount for the British political-economic interests as to their geopolitical power vis-à-vis both the East and the West, and against their foes or anyone other than allies. This, in return, necessitated a free and independent Ottoman Empire. An excerpt from “Turkey and its resources”, penned in 1833 by David Urquhart (who was part of the aforementioned minority within the contemporary British public that paid attention to Turkey) summarises this situation:

We have an immense stake in Turkey ... Exasperate her, all your prospects vanish; you have no means of reprisal if she seriously intends to injure you; and you throw her into a dependence on others equally injurious to you and revolting to her ... Turkey is a country ... raising every variety of produce, having unrivalled facilities for transport, opening innumerable communications with countries further to the east with all which our traffic is carried on ... But all the advantages that may accrue to us from so favourable a state of things, is contingent on her tranquillity and political re-organization.¹⁴³

By the time these words were published in London, it was crystal clear that in order to make sure that the Pax Britannica as a political-economic order lasts throughout the world and most importantly in territories under its control, the British needed influence over an area that laid extensively astride the route from Europe to the East. That area would be found in the Ottoman province of Egypt. By the same time, however, another story had already started to unfold in this part of the Ottoman realm. Practiced in an anti-Pax

¹⁴³ D. Urquhart, *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade; The State and Prospects of English Commerce in the East, The New Administration of Greece, Its Revenue and National Possessions*, Saunders and Otley, London, 1833, pp. 214, 216-217.

Britannic manner, it was to eventually lead to regional crises commencing with 1833 and put standing British interests in harm's way in the Near East.

This chapter tried to analyse the practical side of the Pax Britannic system, which granted the United Kingdom the entitlement and ability to project global political-economic power. In fact, the exercise of the Pax Britannica constituted in essence the way such power was asserted throughout the world. This would define the “norm” of the system, which actually connoted conformity with the British interests. Any action beyond the limits of such interests would be treated by the system as a-normal, to which the Pax Britannica would powerfully react.

The succeeding chapter focuses on the emergence of an ambitious entity in the Near East, which in time would develop an anti-systemic nature. In so doing, it details the composition of its substance, in an attempt to evaluate the factors and patterns underneath what would be considered running contrary to British interests.

CHAPTER 4

THE ANTI-SYSTEMIC MOVEMENT IN EGYPT

It was again the residents of Alexandria who would witness anew initial phases of a very long and complex process to substantially transform this Ottoman eyalet of Egypt. In playing out, the ensuing drama would prove much more real than the depicted and illusive plans of Mark Antony and genuine than his deceptive ears could understand.¹⁴⁴ This time, it was the Napoleonic expedition that marked the beginning of the transformative tides in Egypt.

The French arrived in Alexandria on July 1, 1798, the port of a destitute, far-flung and confined country, an unkempt eyalet of the Ottoman Empire, whose fortunes were ruined by the Mediterranean trade routes shifting to the Atlantic.¹⁴⁵ Their expedition, however, marked the beginning of a power vacuum and heralded Cairo's attempted expansion from one of Istanbul's subjects to a semi-regional actor, which would contend against its suzerain as well as a couple of Great Powers.¹⁴⁶

The impacts of the brief French occupation over Egypt could be understood with a multitude of lenses: it may be taken as the great and necessary

¹⁴⁴ The portrayal by the Alexandrian Greek poet, Constantine Cavafy may be recalled here. His work, *The God Forsakes Antony*, describes how Marcus Antonius/Mark Antony was deserted by his gods in Alexandria. Note that Cavafy's family would become one of those involved in the commerce of Egyptian cotton.

¹⁴⁵ C. Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, Oxford University Press, London, 1947, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶ E. Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, Penguin Group, London., 2012, p. 87.

discontinuity in the eyalet; in “orientalist” historiography, as a static direction toward modernity; as the first major intrusion of western imperialism; or as the first intentional, prolonged and purposeful western violation of Islamic Egypt’s genuineness.¹⁴⁷ Irrespective of varying positions on this matter, the present study argues that the French occupation started a period by which Egypt would transmogrify into a scene for the exercise of local, regional and international political-economic struggle. The reason behind this is that the presence of the French in Egypt was short, and their occupying successors, the British remained there without an intent of staying or restructuring the eyalet.¹⁴⁸

After the departure of the French and that by the British in sequence, the situation in Egypt was again ripe for re-establishing effective control and addressing the problem of authority in Cairo. It would be recalled here that the particular Treaty of Amiens of March 1802, which was signed between Britain and France, acknowledged the Ottoman Sultan’s sovereignty over Egypt and resulted in the departure of the British expeditionary forces from Egypt in 1803. However, thereafter, the scene in the eyalet was set by the competition between locally dominant socio-political forces that generated short yet substantial chaos. With that, it was almost impossible to realise a shift back to the status quo ante of 1798.¹⁴⁹ There appeared a severe contention for power between the residual Mamluks; the independent, insubordinate, rebellious and fierce Albanian contingent, which was among the Ottoman forces sent to the eyalet to fight the French; and the Turkish

¹⁴⁷ D. Dykstra, ‘The French occupation of Egypt, 1798-1801’, in *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2 Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, M. W. Daly (ed), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1998, p. 115.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 134.

janissary and *nizami* forces commanded by the Ottoman grand vizier himself.¹⁵⁰

It is important to note at this point that the defined pattern of rule in Egypt over the past ages had already been consolidated by collaboration between the elite and certain classes in society, e.g. the mamluk beys, the ulama, the *ojakat*, the *tujjar*, the Ottoman janissaries, the artisans and so on. The eyalet was one component in a sea of conflicting political and economic currents; yet it was not a free agent to determine its will. The internal dynamics of this land and the meddling by external influences always proved to become instrumental in determining the course of Egypt.¹⁵¹ In terms of socio-political/economic bases, the successive stages in the early nineteenth century history of Egypt would not differ significantly from the preceding eras. In fact, following the restoration of the post-Napoleon Ottoman rule, this pattern of rule was there to persist. And no rule in Egypt would be able to survive without taking into account inner dynamics within this eyalet and among the segments of the local populace.

The present chapter focuses on a shrewd military man, who would prove able to manipulate the post-Napoleon power vacuum as well as competing local forces to his own advantage. It attempts to examine how he would end up as the master of the eyalet and thereby embark upon a peculiar path to develop an autocratic structure emanating from Egypt in its entirety. In so doing, the chapter focuses on his ambitions and methods, with a view to identifying issues underneath of what would turn him anti-systemic.

¹⁵⁰ K. Fahmy, 'The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848', in *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2 Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, M. W. Daly (ed), The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1998, p. 143.

¹⁵¹ A. L. Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1994, p. 34.

4.1. Mehmet Ali: From Tobacco Merchant to the Vali of Egypt

The recurrent power vacuum in Egypt could have only be filled by those who were cognisant of the eyalet's unique conditions and in possession of information on tendencies of its masses.¹⁵² One self-made Ottoman military man, born in 1769 in the port city of Kavala of the Empire and entered the Porte's service in 1798 as a soldier, would become able to exercise this art to his advantage. Irrespective of his background, with no political-military support, or his lack of sufficient fortune, this adventurist Ottoman troop would "carve his way to power and fame by his own indomitable courage, perseverance and sagacity".¹⁵³ He was Kavalalı Mehmet Ali, the son of a tobacco merchant, a junior officer in the Ottoman army with no formal notion of military, except for experience in fighting bandits and pirates.¹⁵⁴ That same man, initially the second-in-command of the above-mentioned Albanian regiment, would use this small force "to establish his own control at the expense of the Ottoman sultan and [thereby became able] to usher in an increasingly independent rule that lasted for over forty years."¹⁵⁵ This pattern was to persist and seemed for a time very close to setting up a "personal empire" in the Near East.

A 1835 account likens him to Napoleon Bonaparte, who was born in the same year with Mehmet Ali: "Alike distinguished for military genius, the characters of these chieftains, are equally marked by insatiate ambition, and unreposing activity ... he who would ... rise to the throne of an extensive empire, can be no ordinary man, and may bear some comparison with the

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ F.O. 78/804. Murray to Palmerston, 6 August 1849, cited in *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ A. Goldschmidt Jr., R. Johnston, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2004, p. 267.

¹⁵⁵ Fahmy, *The Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 142.

Hero of France.”¹⁵⁶ In fact, the strategy employed by Mehmet Ali in his rise to power was multifaceted. From 1803 to 1805, the Kavalalı consolidated his power base at the expense of the Ottoman governor of Cairo, the commanders of the other Ottoman regiments, and the major Mamluk beys. He openly courted the support by the Cairene notables, who had grown weary after political and economic instability since the French occupation. At the end he would emerge as the king-maker in Egypt, who strived to become king himself.¹⁵⁷

In local power-politics, Mehmet Ali first convinced the remnants of Mamluks into helping the Ottomans and his Albanian troops against the French. Then, he played the ulama and Mamluk beys against the Ottoman governors, first Hüsrev and then Hurşit Ahmet Paşas (Khusrev and Khurshid).¹⁵⁸ Lastly, Mehmet Ali, assisted by the leading ulama, merchants and notables of Cairo, turned against the Mamluks, manipulating their age-old rivalry between factions. In the meantime, Ottoman governors did not assert power to provide order in Cairo and eventually lost control of the city to Mehmet Ali. The support extended to Kavalalı by the notables and the ulama increased to such a level that they pleaded that Mehmet Ali be appointed the Vali of Egypt.¹⁵⁹

The developments in Cairo were under scrutiny by the Porte, which took Mehmet Ali both as a troublemaker as well as a talented and ambitious figure to be utilised for the Empire’s advantage in the face of threats to the Ottoman’s integrity, e.g. the situation perpetrated by the Wahhabis in Arabia. Pleas from Cairo for his appointment as governor of Egypt in 1805

¹⁵⁶ *Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Ali, Pacha of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia*, City of Washington, Washington, 1835, p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, p. 81.

¹⁵⁸ Goldschmidt Jr., *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, p. 267.

¹⁵⁹ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 144.

notwithstanding, the Porte named him governor of the Hijaz, thereby promoting him to the rank of Paşa – eligible to serve as governor in any imperial province. Mehmet Ali, on the other hand, stayed in Cairo, kept up conspiring with his allies to put further pressure on Istanbul for his governorship of Egypt. Ultimately, in May 1805, the Cairenes rose in protest against the incumbent Ottoman governor in town and laid a month-long siege in the renowned Citadel of Cairo. On May 14, 1805, Mehmet Ali became the first governor to be appointed thanks to by popular acclaim¹⁶⁰; then the orders from the Sublime Porte reached Egypt on June 18, 1805, confirmed Cairenes' choice of governor and proclaimed Mehmet Ali master of Egypt.¹⁶¹

The chaotic scene that facilitated the rise of Mehmet Ali was not something fundamentally particular to the early nineteenth century Egypt. It was a common theme in the political history of the eyalet. In fact, as briefly noted above, political and administrative configuration of this land entailed a road of continuity which was based on a recurring phenomenon of governmental cycles from strong central control to much less direction from centre. It had its examples witnessed under both Mamluks and Ottomans, in terms of various individual and collective military, notable, and societal actors, each attempting to consolidate an independent source of power.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ S. J. Shaw, E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, p. 10.

¹⁶¹ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, p. 83.

¹⁶² F. R. Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1999, pp. 9-13.



Figure 1 – A 1840s Depiction of Mehmet Ali. Image taken from “*The Life of Mohammed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, to which are appended, the Quadruple Treaty and the Official Memoranda of the English and French Ministers*” published in 1841 by E. Churton.

That Mehmet Ali was proclaimed Vali of Egypt did not automatically connote the restoration of authority or centralisation of power. At the end, his was a precarious victory; the Vali had no proper financial resources, and no standing army with permanent bonds of loyalty. Even though the native elites, ulama and tujjar included, declared their support for Mehmet Ali, they were not able to raise money for the Vali on an indefinite basis, and, given their inability to fight for him against the Ottomans or the Mamluks, could not make his rule permanent. Therefore, the problems that led to the demise of the previous Ottoman governors did change only in appearance; and were there to stay in essence. Mehmet Ali’s defects were not dissimilar to those previously experienced. After 1805, that set mainly included the following: the Mamluk opposition, and how to overcome it; the Ottomans, and how to maintain their acquiescence to his rule in Egypt; finances, and where to locate its sources to

pay for *his* soldiers on whom the Vali was dependent for retaining control over the territory.¹⁶³

On the other hand, what would differ throughout Mehmet Ali's rule and sustain his control of Egypt was the main pillars of his internal policy based on order.¹⁶⁴ Even if the Vali's actions resembled the pattern formed by previous centralisers, including the Mamluk rulers, Mehmet Ali succeeded where they could not.¹⁶⁵ Beneath this direction lied the Vali's conception of Egypt as a *mulk*, an asset he gained by the sword. However, he was neither a legitimate nor a secure monarch, had strong doubts concerning the continuity of his line, and impulses to take steps for instituting its endurance.¹⁶⁶

To this end, Mehmet Ali would go on to re-establish political order in Egypt, resolve the issue of the *iltizam*, i.e. tax farming, as a first step for economic centralisation, and found the basis for a new kind of autocratic state in this Ottoman eyalet. In this regard, to the chagrin of the coalition of actors that contributed to his ascend, Mehmet Ali mobilised his forces to impose order and worked against parties that were still able to consolidate public opinion to his disadvantage. In his search for the key factor to sustain his rule, i.e. revenues, Mehmet Ali started to tax *iltizam* lands of Mamluks and the ulama, and when protested, acted against them and dismantled their power by 1809. He further eliminated the Mamluks as a political factor in Cairo by massacring their *beys* in 1811. Their removal paved the way for a new ruling

¹⁶³ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 58, 61.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁶⁵ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 14.

¹⁶⁶ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 100.

combination and the centralisation of administration.¹⁶⁷ In other words, by 1811, a radical change in power elites had occurred. The preceding coalition of

mamluks, ulama and *tujjar* to contain the *wali* ... was now destroyed. In its place arose an alliance between the *wali* and his officers and bureaucrats, a select group of *tujjar* and a smaller and more select group of ulama. The previous fluid system of manipulations and shifting alliances ... for ad hoc purposes, such as taxation or trading in some commodity, was becoming institutionalized into a government hierarchy as the sole repository of power from whom emanated all rewards.¹⁶⁸

It could be suggested that what was experienced during the tumultuous period leading to the Mehmet Ali's governorship foreshadowed the essentials of the post-1805 Egypt under his rule. The rest of his tenure and the legacy of his dynasty would leave a solid mark in the eyalet's history in terms of local, regional, and international power politics, shifting alliances, changing bases of civilian and military power as well as actors of interests. The course of Egypt would also be an item in the greater diplomatic agenda, as in varying efforts by the British and the Ottoman to keep Egypt under control and to encounter French and Russian attempts to encroach.¹⁶⁹

At the end, these motivations would light the fuse for a long and winding road for Egypt, that would successively include these stages: administrative and economic centralisation; territorial and political aggrandisement; transformation into an anti-system entity at odds with the fundamentals of the Pax Britannica; incorporation into the Europe-dominated world economy; and ultimate subordination. The basic tenets of this transformation were laid

¹⁶⁷ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 14.

¹⁶⁸ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 73.

¹⁶⁹ Dykstra, *The French Occupation of Egypt 1798-1801*, p. 132.

by Mehmet Ali himself, for the state mechanism he had envisaged, and for the ambitions he had aspired to achieve.

4.2. Mehmet Ali's Ambitions

Multiple statesmen were named the Ottoman governor of Egypt since 1517; but what mattered the most was how to actually govern this eyalet. As noted above, Egypt's political and administrative history had mostly been of recurrence from centralisation to diversification of power. The phase that started in 1805 was an attempt to deviate from this course. Compared to the other valis of Egypt, who attempted to streamline their authority and autonomy at the expense of the Porte, Mehmet Ali was exceptional. He was able and effective, and also became aware of necessities of modernisation and reform. Once his position as the ruler of Egypt was secure, he went on to realise them.¹⁷⁰

Mehmet Ali Paşa imposed his mastery in ruling over the province in an unprecedented manner. He was able to monopolise the wealth of Egypt and divert these resources into setting up a powerful military and a centralised, bureaucratic state. The Paşa built on his army for territorial expansion under his command and, according to some accounts, made Egypt the centre of an empire on its own.¹⁷¹ But what was his primary motive that made his state mechanism to become at odds with the Pax Britannica and led to its eventual demise?

Different explanations could be offered for various aspects of his motivations for further centralisation and extension of power. Providing some general remarks that relate to his grand scheme of "expansion" is found useful. In brief, it is mostly believed that Mehmet Ali's motivations were driven by

¹⁷⁰ M. Abir, 'Modernisation, Reaction and Muhamad Ali's 'Empire'', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol 13 No 3, 1977, p. 295.

¹⁷¹ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 83.

unique historical causes, which made his expansive attempts unique in reason. One thing that enjoys consensus was that Mehmet Ali always had the desire to extend his dominions beyond Egypt and held a penchant for seizing chances to this end.¹⁷² For example, despite the fact that he had appeared as a zealous servant of the Ottoman Sultan during the first twenty years of his rule, his obedience is found essentially unreal.¹⁷³ In fact, ever since the idea of taking over the government of the eyalet occurred to him as a feasible end, “he had probably always nursed the thought of ruling, not on behalf of another but as an independent sovereign.”¹⁷⁴

Another frequently suggested idea as to Mehmet Ali’s aims is that he embarked upon a path to found modern Egypt, with novel institutional developments he designed and implemented. This understanding also takes into account a number of public projects realised in the fields of education, health, industry and military. In this regard, the Vali is seen to have improved Egypt’s finances, advanced the efficiency of its bureaucracy and laid the bases for the “Egyptian” take-off.¹⁷⁵ Thus, he is taken as an “innovator” who put the eyalet on a path of reform, building on the European example.¹⁷⁶ This perspective is strengthened if attempts by Mehmet Ali to modernise the province are considered to be a grand-plan for development not only for the end of “modernisation”, but also of detaching from the Ottoman Empire as

¹⁷² K. Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2002, p. 42.

¹⁷³ H. Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali*, The Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1931, p. 39.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, p. 83.

an independent state. This view is suggested by Fahmy to be an “experiment” given the extent of his ambitious modernisation plan.¹⁷⁷

The “experiment” approach is employed mostly in the Egyptian nationalist historiography.¹⁷⁸ It comes hand in hand with a view to see the period in question as a “chapter” in the eyalet’s history. That so-called chapter is suggested to be

the lifting of Egypt from the pre-modern, feudal rule under the Ottoman Empire to "catch up" with modern, capitalist Europe. In effect they argue that if it were not for European intervention Egypt would have continued her ambitious modernization efforts, efforts that were begun in earnest by Mehmed Ali from as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century and before any other country outside Europe.¹⁷⁹

Taking the “experiment” understanding one step further, other relevant accounts are concerned with portraying Mehmet Ali as the “national hero” of Egypt. Accordingly, under Mehmet Ali’s administration, the basis of a state and its apparatus were created; law and order were provided, bureaucracy developed; the army was modernised and strengthened; the “country” was eventually Egyptianised and the first steps were taken toward the Egyptian national-identity.¹⁸⁰ It is further posited that Mehmet Ali and the administration he formed were oriented towards independent statehood as well as recognition as a distinct from compared to other Ottomans or Muslims.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, p. 12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 262-265.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 265.

The present study shares the critical view of Fahmy as to the “nationalist” reading of the Egyptian history on the basis of Mehmet Ali and in terms of the Vali’s goals for modernisation. In fact, remarks attributed to the Paşa, contemporary reports on Egypt and Europeans’ audiences with him, how he was perceived in Istanbul, or how he thought of his suzerain are not always in conformity to produce a thorough “nationalist” or “Egyptian” reading of Mehmet Ali’s career and this makes it difficult to assess any conclusion in a singular direction.

Anyhow, it should be noted that even though the changes Mehmet Ali initiated could have paved the way for the emergence of a modern nation-state and thus the label of moderniser appears seemingly fit, this approach overlooks many traditional aspects of his regime. In certain basic matters, Mehmet Ali drew upon the policies of his predecessors and was in pursuit of the goals of the former “modernisers” of Egypt. At the end, for example, the attempt to control the Nile valley from Cairo was not something new in itself. This way the touch with the past was always maintained and it made him a “link between the eighteenth century and the later nineteenth century, for he continued and expanded the trends of the eighteenth century and modified them into those of the nineteenth century.”¹⁸² The success of his case was that the Vali took use of traditional strategies which, when applied in the novel political-economic conditions of the nineteenth century, had transformative effects on the province.¹⁸³ What further differed with Mehmet Ali was the nature of control imposed throughout Egypt, in accordance with the continuous, meticulous, and uniform kind of power.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 74.

¹⁸³ K. M. Cuno, *The Pasha’s Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 103.

¹⁸⁴ T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, University of California Press, London, 1991, pp. 34-35.

True, there were times when the Vali openly stated his intentions for independence, and this was opposed (or encouraged to an extent) in European circles. Claims suggesting that all his steps were hinting at independence go even back to the immediate aftermath of 1805.¹⁸⁵ On the other hand, it is also a fact that when the situation was opportune to secede his eyalet as an independent unit, Mehmet Ali dithered to seize the chance, remained cautious, and halted, for example, the 1833 military advance into Istanbul. Reasons behind this could be multiple; but the Vali's ambivalence about hostilities he had started against the Porte, his fears for the reaction by the European powers, or basically that he was afraid to be labelled a rebel seem feasible to entertain. After all, the Paşa was at heart and in culture an Ottoman, his rule was in the Ottoman world, which he was threatening unprecedentedly.¹⁸⁶

Chiefly in accordance with the direction set and limited by the dominant political-economic forces of the time, the ambitions, which Mehmet Ali pursued, differed in name and in extent. Once it comprised attempts to centralise, it became a rebellion and a cause for independence; once blocked by external factors, it turned out to be a yearning for reconciliation between Cairo and Istanbul as well as the European powers.

It could be true that with his talents to compromise, Mehmet Ali, throughout his manoeuvres kept his steps fixed towards the goal of independence. But the way this fact is perceived is what makes the difference in assessing his motives. It is argued here that, as seen with cases below, the Vali's longing for independence was in essence for *himself* and for *his* family; it was motivated to strengthen his dynastic ruling organisation economically,

¹⁸⁵ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 80.

¹⁸⁶ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 167.

militarily, and politically.¹⁸⁷ At the end, it had been known by the first half of the nineteenth century that the Vali did not rise to power with a full-fledged design to regenerate Egypt. His position was in essence to consolidate his status as the one-man of the eyalet and to block attempts to overthrow his rule.¹⁸⁸

Perhaps what he actually desired and fought to achieve had always been the promise that “Egypt and its inhabitants would be given to him and his descendants to govern.”¹⁸⁹ The present study too finds it safe to posit that Mehmet Ali, in essence, was driven towards maximising *his* and *his* family’s gains through territorial expansion, political alliances and economic and administrative centralisation. This was to take place under a dynastic and hereditary administrative mechanism, seemingly aiming at independence. The methods employed to this end is addressed in the following section.

4.3. Mehmet Ali’s Methods

It is undoubted that the Vali was an innovator – perhaps not the first ruler of the province to entertain thoughts of reform, but definitely the most successful one to implement them until his time. He founded the first mass army in the Near East, exercised one of the earliest strategies for manufacturing outside Europe, transferred the novelties of the Industrial Revolution into arms and textiles. Mehmet Ali also dispatched education missions to European capitals and established direct relations with the Great Powers.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 99.

¹⁸⁸ A. Goldschmidt Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt*, Infobase Publishing, New York, 2008, p. 66.

¹⁸⁹ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 176.

¹⁹⁰ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 83.

The account by the contemporary British traveller/journalist James Augustus St. John, published in 1834 offers a thorough questioning of what had been implemented during the thirtieth-year of rule by the Vali and of its results. Assessing that Egypt was in a truly extraordinary position, St. John stated that

new ideas, feelings, wants had been generated: society ... seemed ready to assume any new form into which the genius of the times might mould it; but what that new form was to be, no man, whether high or low, appeared competent to discover. Of those Europeans who had long resided in the country, and who might for that reason be supposed capable of communicating instruction to a stranger, numbers decried every measure adopted by the Pasha ... Here I saw, naked and undisguised, the effects of the Pasha's policy ... I could not refrain from acknowledging the difficulties which surrounded their Ruler. Was it ambition, or was it necessity, that involved him in the struggle with the Sultan, which inflicted on Egypt all the evils I witnessed? Upon the answer to this question hinges the whole inquiry, whether the Pasha is to be considered a just though despotic prince, or a selfish adventurer, sacrificing wantonly the happiness of millions to his own personal aggrandisement?¹⁹¹

The present thesis suggests that it was the selfish adventures and personal aggrandisement by Mehmet Ali's end that would transform the eyalet. It was those adventures that brought him into adopting delicate methods to streamline Egypt's fortunes to secure his personal position. For that purpose, the Paşa had to dedicate much of the state's revenues, raise its agricultural productivity, and buy out or expropriate many of the landowners from the preceding period. The accumulated wealth would produce the resources necessary to form a military and naval power that served Mehmet Ali's overarching purpose of personal gains.¹⁹²

In this regard, the following section attempts to examine three main aspects of the Vali's rule in Egypt, which facilitated his adventures for "independence". The fundamentals of his eyalet mechanism were based on

¹⁹¹ J. A. St. John, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali; or travels in the Valley of the Nile*, Longman, London, 1834, pp. x-xii.

¹⁹² G. E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 99.

certain administrative/political, military, and economic characteristics. What was essential was that their functioning was taking place in a remarkably intertwined fashion. The application of one necessitated that of the other; the integration of them all produced the unique form of his style. When considered altogether, these aspects are found to become the reasons which would turn Mehmet Ali's course for reform into a course of subjugation.

4.3.A. The Vali's Rule

The way the audience between the British Consul in Alexandria, John Barker and Mehmet Ali took place in 1826 is widely referred to as an example of how the Vali thought of himself and tried to influence his visitors with a certain line of discourse. In this specific example, when Barker proceeded to Mehmet Ali's palace in Alexandria to present his letter of authorisation, the Vali did not condescend to open the imperial firman and, instead, entered into a monologue about his childhood. It was observed at this moment that the message Mehmet Ali had delivered was that no one had ever contradicted him, taken any meddling in his businesses, and that advancing step by step as a one-man, he had become the Vali of one of the richest Ottoman provinces. According to the Consul's description, Mehmet Ali said the following:

“and now here I am” — (rising a little on his seat, and looking out of the window which was at his elbow, and commanded a view of the Lake Mareotis) — “and now here I am. I never had a master,” — (glancing his eye at the roll containing the Imperial firman).¹⁹³

It is evident that the Vali was intent to circulate messages that he would not be awed by the Ottoman Sultan or other third parties, and that he was the sole ruler of Egypt. His attempts to theatrically¹⁹⁴ impress upon such visitors

¹⁹³ *The Life of Mohamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. To which are appended the Quadruple Treaty and the Official Memoranda of the English and French Ministers*, E. Churton, London, 1841, p. 9.

¹⁹⁴ Fahmy explains quite well Mohammad Ali's imposition of a *certain* image of his in such *theatrical* performances: “The themes of light and darkness, of shadows and hypnotic gazes,

notwithstanding, he technically and legally was only a vali of an Ottoman province. These attempts could at best remain as a manipulative tool to compound his image abroad. But in any case, how and why did Mehmet Ali deem it necessary to distribute a definite image of his? To what extent the pomp and glamour evident in such awe-inspiring figure were solid and feasible?

As noted previously, the Vali consolidated his power through conciliating or removing the primary political elements in the province. In so doing, thanks to the reforms to be implemented throughout his tenure, he developed his own independent bases of strength. What is significant here is that such reforms, which culminated in the building of a modern army and a centralised administration, were dependent on and stemming from his one-man rule. His reform agenda also included streamlining the wealth of Egypt to finance these measures, which actually promoted a quasi-dynastic idea, and elevated his family and followers into a new and permanent nobility that would support the Vali himself and his descendants.¹⁹⁵

Mehmet Ali's control of Egypt was therefore based on the rise of a new ruling configuration and the emergence of a centralised administration. This setting partially replaced the former concessionary administration of Egypt and achieved an increasingly hierarchical character in time. His bureaucratic reforms divided the eyalet into twenty-four parts, which were arranged into sub-districts, districts, departments and provinces. The Vali's line of command ran from Cairo to the villages, and his orders were carried out by officers who were responsible politically as well as administratively. This

figure prominently in [his visitors] accounts of the encounter with the enigmatic Pasha" or "... these European travellers were audience to a constituted part of a scene/act that was well rehearsed and carefully produced" in *All the Pasha's Men* (pp. 2, 6). See the book's introductory chapter for a detailed account.

¹⁹⁵ Shaw, Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, p. 10.

attempt to centralise was a unique application in the wider Ottoman realm and the Near East, for it attempted to imitate European, and particularly Napoleonic models of organisation.¹⁹⁶

Nonetheless, the impetus to re-organise Egypt towards centralisation and his reforms were only justified by the calls for “progress” and “civilisation”. What was actually in the making was to take advantage of the up-to-date forms to rule so as to succeed in an ultimate goal: “the reconstitution of power in his own hands and its imposition upon the rest of society.”¹⁹⁷ Mehmet Ali himself proved to be the lynchpin of the entire process, continually supervised state affairs by his Privy Council, through personal orders and directives as well as regular inspection tours throughout Egypt.¹⁹⁸

At the heart of this setting remained a household government. After 1805, the new political order in Egypt relied on a single man and a house of personal retainers to run the government and eventually constitute the state itself. The government would still be consisted largely of the direct exercise of power by the Vali as well as members of his family. Technical advice and ideas were provided by Europeans, and the bulk of the ruling class was made up of Turkish military men imported from abroad.¹⁹⁹ The household elite is explained to be of four types: the Vali’s blood relatives, his in-laws, mamluks

¹⁹⁶ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, pp. 17-22.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁹⁸ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 72.

¹⁹⁹ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 23.

as well as freed slaves, and those that had joined his service by private arrangements or by means of household association.²⁰⁰

This specific way to form a ruling elite would help Mehmet Ali create a class which was dependent on the Vali, who, in return, aimed at keeping them at their positions and preventing them from establishing ties with the Egyptian society. In addition, having combined the household elite with a new, centralised, and hierarchical bureaucracy, Mehmet Ali was to construct a virtually limitless autocracy. With the Vali's rule, the major causal force in Egypt's socio-political evolution was once again the state, which emanated from the ruler and his men in the military, the administrative elite and all other aspects of government employment.²⁰¹ This was the form of rule by which the Vali that introduced disciplinary measures in modern Egypt; Mehmet Ali, called the *Wali al-Ni'am*, the benefactor, re-established law and order, centralised the administration, and established what is suggested to be a "benevolent autocracy".²⁰²

Specifically, the modern administrative system the Vali built remained committed to the goal to reform, centralisation, as well as autocracy on French lines. Within the parameters of the new system, Mehmet Ali replaced tax farmers with salaried officials under direct state control; for efficient farm management, created large estates for himself, members of his own family,, and other members of the ruling class; for the maintenance of the salaried bureaucracy, built a network of secular schools with European instructors; and for the extension of the system's authority throughout the eyalet, issued a comprehensive system of law codes to increase the power of the bureaucracy under his direct control. In sustaining his rule, Mehmet Ali

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Hunter, *Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali*, p. 180.

²⁰² Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 99.

remained dependent on the Turko-Circassian aristocracy, which would act as a powerful support of his dynasty as well as share control of Egypt with the foreign merchants and bankers.²⁰³

Therefore, in contrast with the initial phases of his governorship, where his increasing authority owed to Cairo's *ulama* and *ashraf* as well as to the complicity of the countryside, the strong and unique administration he built, which was in unison with the powerful and centralised army (see the following section), enabled the Vali in time to rule not necessarily with popular support but with a larger degree of autonomy.²⁰⁴

4.3.B. The Vali's Military

Within Mehmet Ali's household government, reforms were not planned only for centralising administration or improving the Vali's direct political rule. To the ends of imposing, consolidating, and maintaining his power over Egypt, Mehmet Ali extended his own style of innovation to the field of military as well. His move to reform and then recreate the army would reach such an extent that, the Vali would be described as the "most spectacular military modernizer in the Middle East before World War I, [given that he] appeared at the time to have unlocked the puzzle of effective modernization."²⁰⁵

To begin with, Mehmet Ali combined ambition with shrewdness to a greater extent compared to the other rulers of the region in the nineteenth century or his predecessors in Egypt. In a bid to confirm himself and his heirs in

²⁰³ Shaw, Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, p. 12.

²⁰⁴ J. Batou, 'Nineteenth-Century Attempted Escapes from the Periphery: The Cases of Egypt and Paraguay', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol 16 No 3, 1993, p. 302.

²⁰⁵ J. C. Hurewitz, 'The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis', *Middle East Journal*, Vol 22 No 2, 1968, pp. 144-145.

hereditary possession of Egypt, he at first contended with recognising nominally the suzerainty of the Sultan, as long as there remained practical autonomy. Particularly, though, the Vali was conscious of the need to have an army and a navy equipped and trained on western lines, so as to seize and maintain such a position.²⁰⁶

Compared to the former army structure based on mamluks or mercenaries that fought in Egypt, Mehmet Ali's army in the early nineteenth century was of Albanian troops, Turkish troops, mamluks that joined his administration, new recruits from the Ottoman Empire as well as Maghribis, including Tunisians and Algerians, and Bedouin auxiliaries. Numbered in personnel and obeying their individual superiors, these units fought in their own style, there was no unified command, weaponry or ammunition. This composition proved unruly; loyalty was exercised within personal lines of command and discipline was lax.²⁰⁷

In this framework, by the time he grasped the need to develop a more elaborate military establishment, Mehmet Ali had already been in the course to modernise what resembled an organisation of mercenaries and the Ottoman corps at hand. For this, the Vali planned to regroup French deserters to command slaves, take use of Mamluk and Greek officers to execute the operation, and bring in European advisers to train the army as early as in 1815.²⁰⁸ As a matter of fact, Mehmet Ali did not have any external source of troops: In an attempt to eradicate any mamluk revival and to contain the ambitious Vali, the Porte had imposed an embargo on the import of military slaves from the Caucasus to Egypt in 1810. That notwithstanding, he needed

²⁰⁶ Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 76.

²⁰⁷ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 126

²⁰⁸ Shaw, Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, p. 10.

to draw from Egypt's population.²⁰⁹ However, the introduction by the Vali of the European modes of exercise among the troops caused discontent, and the Ottoman soldiers' reluctance to accept the up-to-date ways undermined his reform attempt.²¹⁰ Particularly in 1811, some of the troops even attacked his residence and went on a rampage until they were dispersed. The once loyal Albanian troops also appeared insubordinate and led to an added cause for changing the formation of the army and bringing about a more disciplined fighting body.²¹¹

The Vali found pretext in the rioting by a couple of hundred soldiers in Cairo, on their way back to Egypt from the Hijaz campaign in 1815, and ordered the creation of a new, disciplined and modernised army.²¹² To this end, Mehmet Ali took the examples of the *nizam-i cedit* (the New Order army, founded by Ottoman Sultan Selim III in his reforms programme) and the Napoleonic *levée en masse*.²¹³ It is additionally argued that Mehmet Ali would have liked to obtain such troops from Britain, for he had always respected the British might as a sea-power. However, as seen above, Britain's main imperial principle "was already the maintenance of the British position in India, and to this the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East ... [Once] his

²⁰⁹ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, p. 89.

²¹⁰ Shaw, Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, p. 11.

²¹¹ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 73.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

²¹³ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, pp. 89-90.

overtures to Britain were declined, Mohammed Ali turned for material help and guidance to France.”²¹⁴

For the British declined Mehmet Ali’s calls, the Vali ended up drawing on French military experts for his army’s training, yet modelling the Egyptian *nizam-i cedit* on the Ottoman example.²¹⁵ Particularly, the Ottoman *nizam-i cedit* meant training and organising a new infantry corps in accordance with the novel techniques formed by the Prussians and the French. Its Egyptian version too would be established with the help of the French officers and engineers who fled France after the fall of the Napoleonic empire in 1815.²¹⁶ The European help was direct and pervasive: A French colonel (the renowned Süleyman Paşa, also known as Colonel Sèvres) was engaged to reorganise and train Mehmet Ali’s army; another Frenchman structured and organised the naval dockyard, quite others travelled to Egypt as doctors and surveyors, and administrators of multiple factories founded by the Vali. Besides, the military cadets were sent to France to receive technical training.²¹⁷

By the early 1820s, Egypt had become the first Ottoman province to introduce successfully a new kind of army. Barracks and training camps had been built and regulations issued for a standard practice. The barracks, the discipline, and the instruction were all novel motivations for the formerly “mercenary-based” army of Egypt.²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 76.

²¹⁵ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, pp. 89-90.

²¹⁶ Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 35.

²¹⁷ Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 77.

²¹⁸ Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 35.

In time, Mehmet Ali's army would number over 100.000 men; the senior officers were all Ottoman, the rank and file and the younger officers up to the rank of captain remained Egyptian. The nucleus of this army was of fellahin, former mamluks and some slaves from the Sudan. Throughout this course, the military was not only streamlined but also armed with modern weaponry. The modernisation attempt came hand in hand with an expanding programme of education as in staff college, engineering corps, medical surgeons and veterinary surgeons.²¹⁹

Particularly, despite the extensive third-party influence in the re-structuring of his army, Mehmet Ali, as in other functions of his administration, had a very central role in the formation of the eyalet's military. The Vali himself extended minutiae supervision. Upon even the slightest alteration by some officers in organisation of the regiments and battalions, he would send orders to his "minister of war" as well as all the army officers and warn that those who allowed departure from established patterns were to be punished at an instant. Of importance, the Vali's perception of Egypt as his *mulk* and its people as an asset were also evident in the rules he set for military promotions. Even if only the literate among the rank and file could be promoted to the higher ranks, Egyptians were never promoted beyond the rank of first or second lieutenant.²²⁰

At the end, the reform in the military would have profound consequences for Egypt. With the innovated methods of the *nizami*, Mehmet Ali would create a military force more than four times the size and strength armies previously stationed in the eyalet.²²¹ The establishment of this force would enable Cairo

²¹⁹ A. L. Marsot, *A History of Egypt from the Arab Conquest to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 68.

²²⁰ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 130.

²²¹ Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. x.

to form an “empire” in the region, whose territories would stretch from Hijaz and the Sudan to Greece and thereafter the Levant. Nonetheless, local opposition and European intervention would lead to problems in this personal undertaking by the Vali; and it was military power which was “subsequently redeployed to set up and police the geographical boundaries that created Egypt as a politico-spatial entity.”²²²

Of further significance is that what the military reform also brought about was in essence an integrated programme. His plans for military reorganisation and the pressing need to pay for it led the Vali into further political, economic, and social reforms which turned out to be a comprehensive and centralist development scheme. The abolition of tax farms, administrative reorganisation and estate reassignments as well as the inclusive monopoly he built over the external and the internal commerce of Egypt could be linked to these plans.²²³ With schools opening in the *eyalet* and educational missions dispatched abroad for training in technologies, the army also became the incentive for a wider plan of a new, secular kind of education.²²⁴

Even more, the push for a very centralised understanding for army reform also resulted in a rigid structure that envisaged “invisible control” over the masses. It was based on a widespread system of discipline, designed to harmonise the minds and bodies of the people and entrench in them a sense of implicit obedience. This was paramount in the sense that the invisible

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Hurewitz, *The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis*, p. 146.

²²⁴ Marsot, *A History of Egypt from the Arab Conquest to the Present*, p. 68.

control was to be extended eventually into the eyalet-wide state organisation.²²⁵

In any case, briefly put, the Vali's reform act in the military conspicuously connoted his ulterior motives. As a matter of fact, the Vali could have sufficed to organise and develop the army existent in Egypt by the time of reforms, and that would have met the needs for maintaining the rule over the eyalet. His choice for a new army thus appears to indicate that he had larger ambitions, including, perhaps, the conquest of the entire Ottoman domain or reviving the Empire under his leadership.²²⁶ In particular, whereas a military force of around 20,000 troops was enough to maintain his rule, as in the case of the mamluks, an army of over 100,000 seems to have been intended for imperial purposes, with an increasing appetite for expansion."²²⁷

Therefore, military modernisation appears to be the primary means Mehmet Ali employed in the attempt to build his personal empire. In fact, regardless of its primary or secondary effects, Mehmet Ali's programme in its triumphant season was designed to realise the singular purpose of expansion.²²⁸ The Vali's military contributed to this purpose not only by providing a strong-armed force, but also, given dire necessities for economic growth, making the Vali seek opting for a-normal methods under the guise of pride and self-aggrandisement.²²⁹

²²⁵ Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 175.

²²⁶ Shaw, Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, p. 11.

²²⁷ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 128.

²²⁸ Hurewitz, *The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis*, p. 148.

²²⁹ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 200.

4.3.C. The Vali's Economy

The deficits of previous efforts in attempts to centralise administration and form powerful militaries were outstanding factors in hastening the failure of the Vali's predecessors. The lessons drawn from the Mamluk experience were there for Mehmet Ali see. His case was not substantially different from them in terms of methods introduced to extend control over the state and its resources²³⁰ as well as goals embraced: to keep the rule over Egypt as independent as possible of the Ottomans, become the sole master of that land, and aim at seizing the opportunity, once it arises, to proclaim independent. Mehmet Ali's self-aggrandisement scheme was more or less the same, it included a circuit which was energised by the correlation between the costly expansionist motives and the pressing need to increase revenues.

Similar goals entailed similar methods and eventually similar problems. For some time after 1805, the persistent need to pay his soldiers and to compete with the Mamluks to gain Istanbul's support, the Vali needed to build on every chance available to raise cash. Following suit of his predecessors, Mehmet Ali at first resorted to conventional measures, repeatedly put levies on merchants in towns and expropriated cattle and crops. His traditional methods remained insufficient to meet the needs of a large army and Mehmet Ali looked for ways out of it.²³¹

For that purpose, he calculated a strategy based on the reaction to an emergent determinant in the history of the region, which was the expansion of the European market for agricultural produce. The case of the Eastern Mediterranean was no different, it too was being attracted centrally into the core of the world market. This was to the Vali's understanding that he had

²³⁰ Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, p. 103.

²³¹ R. Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, p. 17.

recognised that “Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean were enmeshed in a European-dominated system of economic relations. His policies reflected his recognition of that reality”.²³²

By the time the Vali had consolidated his rule over Egypt, the land composition in the eyalet had already been proven conducive for state-sanctioned programmes. During the early years of his rule, Mehmet Ali had already abolished all private tenure of land and restarted the assumption of regal ownership of the territory, resembling the aftermath of the Turkish conquest back in 1517. As such, the Vali had summoned every land-holder to present proof of their titles; having seized their documents, he declared them null and void against himself.²³³

Furthermore, the Vali introduced regulatory measures for effective control of land tenure and increasingly reduced village autonomy. Now that he had had not a secure hold on control nor power over Egypt during the early years of his governorship, the Paşa exercised an incremental process to strengthen the portion of the land tax. In this regard, he introduced a radical reform that concerned the abolition of the *iltizam* system of rural administration, which contained a tax farming-mechanism and had been the case in Egypt ever since the sixteenth century. Instead of that, he gradually tightened control and set up a more direct and centralized organisation for assessing and collecting the land tax. This process was reflected in the cadastral survey of 1813-1814, which helped divide the cultivated land into distinct groups according to

²³² Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, p. 2.

²³³ D. A. Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century or Mehemet Ali and His Successors until the British Occupation in 1882*, Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1898, p. 85.

quality, process registrations in the village community's name and distribute the chunks among the fellaheen.²³⁴

The endeavour to centralise authority was intuitive in this regard, which in turn could pave the way for effective economic ventures. That way, advancing agriculture as well as commerce so as to maximise revenues appeared handy. To this end, the Vali chose monopolist practices in Egypt, put the state in control of commerce, promoted agriculture and industry, and restrained the flow of imports lest they cause an unfavourable balance of trade.²³⁵ The resolution designed was fixed towards reforming the eyalet's economy into a monopolistic scheme. It was a political-economic response to the environment of the Levant, with the slight nuance in the Vali moving beyond the example of his predecessors: the establishment of state control of production and internal distribution as well as absolute control of exports.²³⁶

It firstly took effect in purchasing and selling certain local and imported products, with grants on payment of a fixed sum to definite officials, merchants or any party who could come up with some fresh item to control. Specific crops that appear to be delivering profitable demand were often totally monopolised and sold outside of Egypt by agents designated by Mehmet Ali. Other products were given only to merchants that Mehmet Ali would have liked to deal. All such endeavours were associated with the goal to keep prices high.²³⁷

²³⁴ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 18.

²³⁵ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 164.

²³⁶ Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, p. 104.

²³⁷ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 19-21.

Mehmet Ali himself defined the limits of agricultural activity, from deciding on what crops should be grown, prioritising those exportable at a good rate to lending seeds to and funding cultivators. The goal was to accumulate agricultural surplus singularly into the control of an overarching state with entrepreneurial characteristics. With that the Nile Delta, in its entirety, was transformed into a large state estate for agricultural practice. Cash crops, including cotton, were grown rapidly, and dynamic efforts in bettering irrigation and transport facilitated the accumulation of significant resources.²³⁸

It was within this context that the Vali was to take over the produce of the land itself and command its trade, defensively industrialise, exercise a corvée labour regime as well as practice extreme taxation on the cultivating population, and regulate land, agricultural and crops administration.²³⁹ The Vali's system was instrumentalised to guarantee that the product in question flows as much as possible into the eyalet's warehouses for export, whilst prices were being manipulated to provide him with the highest profit possible. As a matter of fact, thanks to such measures, Mehmet Ali generated considerable upsurge in the eyalet's income- an increase of roughly 650-900% from 1798 until 1812.²⁴⁰

This measure eventually resulted in a trend of constant increase in terms of the cultivated and cropped areas in Egypt. Exports originating from the agricultural sector, notably cotton, would produce the cash needed for various

²³⁸ Batou, *Nineteenth-Century Attempted Escapes from the Periphery: The Cases of Egypt and Paraguay*, p. 283.

²³⁹ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 15.

²⁴⁰ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 20-21.

sections of the Paşa's state mechanism.²⁴¹ For example, this trend would lead the portion allocated to cotton production in the Delta to make up 44% of total irrigated areas in 1844 (Table 5).

Table 5²⁴²

<i>Production Areas of Crops for the Egyptian Market in 1844</i>	
The Delta Region	
Cotton	94,080 hectares
Rice	41,160 hectares
Sesame	52,836 hectares
Indigo	25,284 hectares
TOTAL	213,360 hectares

These circumstances also provided Egypt with agricultural reform. Productivity in this sector was raised in the eyalet “from the miserable state to which nearly five hundred years of misrule had reduced it”.²⁴³ The agricultural structure would enter a new phase during the 1820s; with that, much of Egypt's Delta was converted to perennial irrigation and there would be profound increase in the production of profitable summer crops. At this time, numerous canals were constructed for perennial irrigation in place of the artificial methods; the change in technique produced profitable returns in terms of indigo, flax, rice or most notably, cotton. Particularly, between 1824-1840, the size of the cultivated area grew 25%.²⁴⁴

Mehmet Ali's mercantilist government also moved forward with a modern industry composed of iron foundries, bleaching establishments, a printing

²⁴¹ Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, pp. 2, 5, 103, 106.

²⁴² J. Batou, ‘Muhammad-‘Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century?, in *Between Development and Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800-1870*, J. Batou (ed), Libraire Droz, Geneva, 1991, p. 190.

²⁴³ Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 99.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

press, tanneries, and cotton factories. The Paşa was aware of fruits European industrialisation and production delivered, most notably power and comfort. In fact, as this process appeared as a prerequisite for an independent and powerful state, Mehmet Ali associated building an industrial complex with a means to develop his military, generate his wealth, consolidate prospects for independence and strengthen the eyalet's state apparatus. In addition, he had a model ready to follow, developed by the French during their brief stay in Egypt. His industrial scheme was influenced by the guidance provided by the French savants in line with their expectation that Egypt could be turned into part of industrial and commercial composition of Europe.²⁴⁵

The first examples realised in Mehmet Ali's industrial initiative were inter-related in the sense of a military industry complex of arsenals, shipyards, factories, hospitals and schools.²⁴⁶ These were all monopolised, private production slowly ceased to exist and the government would draft workers into the factories to increase productivity in government production plants.²⁴⁷ However, one should not fail to note the importance of this complex's civilian, i.e. agricultural, aspect that had to do with the production of indigo, sugar, paper and glass, but most importantly, cotton cloth.²⁴⁸

In fact, all these novel steps came hand in hand with the introduction in 1821 of the Jumel cotton and revolved around this specific cash crop. The discovery and cultivation of that type of a long-staple cotton would quicken the conversion of much of the arable land into perennial irrigation with new

²⁴⁵ P. J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991, p. 59

²⁴⁶ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 165.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 164-165.

²⁴⁸ Batou, 'Muhammad- 'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century?', p. 184.

canals dug, older ones deepened, and the corvée providing the labour. With these reformative steps, the early years of Mehmet Ali's rule in Egypt witnessed the progressive emergence of agrarian capitalism in the eyalet.²⁴⁹ The indispensability of cotton production was such that "cotton spinning and weaving (nearly 30 mills together) were the base of the modern sector."²⁵⁰

The economic leap in Mehmet Ali's Egypt included an attempted diversity in terms of material and produce, most of which are not part of the scope of the present study. After all, in addition to cotton and cotton-driven goods, Mehmet Ali's industry was involved in a wide array of goods from food production to metallurgy and chemicals. That diversity based on forced industrialisation and supported by farming and trade monopolies enabled Egypt to conduct a policy of growth.²⁵¹

That being said, the Vali's economy, taken together with his absolutist rule and centralised military, presented intrinsically the pillars of his strategy for personal aggrandisement. His focus on developing these branches of the eyalet was not only an end but also a means to accomplish greater objectives, including establishing the independent rule of his family in Egypt as an "empire" in the middle of the Mediterranean²⁵². His target was as straightforward as controlling the whole of Egypt's economy and directing it into maximum profit:

It was the Government which very largely decided what was to be grown; the Government which provided the necessary capital; the Government

²⁴⁹ Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, p. 105.

²⁵⁰ Batou, 'Muhammad- 'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, *A Command Economy in the 19th Century?*, p. 184.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 191.

²⁵² Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, p. 104.

which was the sole intermediary between merchant and cultivator ... Not only was [Mehmet Ali] able to make high profits from the sale of primary produce, but he was also able to increase or decrease the amount grown of a particular crop according to how well it was selling. [The Government] could also use the Egyptian market to sell the crops grown and the products manufacture under its supervision, and as it was itself the largest purchaser ... it could protect local production by ensuring its sale.²⁵³

Having examined the Vali's ambitions and methods in the present chapter, what is argued is that irrespective of the varying phases of his rule's consolidation, Mehmet Ali's directions would ultimately cause him to end up in discord with the Pax Britannica. In other words, the way the Paşa effected his unique eyalet mechanism was in essence the reason he posed an existential threat to the system's designs over the Near East. His ruling style, overgrown military, and monopolies-based economy were suggesting an entity tremendously at odds with the standards of the Pax Britannica, in a region where the system's interests were superlative and multi-faceted. As a result, once Mehmet Ali clearly appeared up and running against the political-economic dynamics of the system, his attempt was going to be contained within the Pax Britannica and curbed by the Powers led by Britain.

In this regard, this study suggests that the failure of Mehmet Ali's eyalet was put in place not because he posed a sectoral or singular threat in the region or – no matter how impressive his army became – he was to militarily challenge the forces of the Pax Britannica. It was anyway clear that his grand design could have caused problems for Britain who had grander imperial designs concerning the Near East. That being said, the clash was in fact strategic, and based on the system's geopolitical and economic positioning. The following chapter presents an attempt to identify the links between the two aspects mentioned, and it proposes a cause to be detected in a rewarding cash crop, cotton.

²⁵³ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 24.

CHAPTER 5

THE SYSTEM CHALLENGED BY THE VALI

Mehmet Ali's was a pursuit to establish an industrialised, closed, mercantilist economy and, drawing from resources accumulated in the state-controlled process, to expand at the expense of the Porte in Istanbul. It was the Vali who, to this end, tore down the Mamluk dominance over Egypt, provided security and order, set up the course for the development of industry and agriculture, exported crops, mostly cotton, and attempted to put the eyalet on a progressive trajectory.

The mechanism he founded was a result of what he needed the most: to provide the political and financial basis of a future, independent dynasty. It comprised the structure of a functional government, organised public businesses, enjoyed educational, cultural, scientific and artistic reform. Moreover, that the Paşa was the primary landowner and single merchant in Egypt, he efficiently revolutionised internal government and set up an operational bureaucracy to manage an eyalet-scale agricultural activity, in addition to industrial and commercial monopolies.²⁵⁴ This mechanism also converted Egypt into a vast farm, on rent by Mehmet Ali from the Sultan, from which the Vali generated his usufruct. This farm was supervised by the Vali's bureaucrats, served by the population of Egypt.²⁵⁵

In these margins, Mehmet Ali is suggested to be the first ruler to proceed with massive economic development in Islamic lands by transforming the eyalet's

²⁵⁴ Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, p. 52.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

economy in the nineteenth century. As assessed in the preceding chapter, refurbishing and expanding agriculture as a major source of Egypt's wealth and practicing large-scale industrial activity helped the Paşa increase commercial capabilities, trade, and thus tax revenues as well as consolidate the prospect of political-economic "independence" of his government. In so doing, Mehmet Ali moved forward with a state-controlled, monopoly-driven economic development plan and took no heed of the free trade and liberal economic spirit of the Pax Britannica.²⁵⁶

Mehmet Ali's agricultural, commercial, industrial, and even educational designs may be assessed as a comprehensive endeavour to develop Egypt's resources. In line with the then-universal tendency to attach priorities to military strength, the army was a basis for the Vali's understanding of national power too. Nonetheless, unlike his contemporaries, Mehmet Ali's disposition towards foundational monopolies seems to suggest that he must have seen that a strong economy appeared more of a solid and secure basis than an army or a navy.²⁵⁷

Particular to matters of economic strength, by the time the Pax Britannica had started to increasingly dominate global political-economy, heralding the age of free trade and private enterprise, Egypt was being turned into an exceptionally large, monopolistic agricultural estate, where all efforts were devoted to raising the most profitable crop of contemporary foreign commerce, cotton. Vital was that Mehmet Ali's peculiarly monopolistic eyalet mechanism directly barred the liberal, free flow of this produce in and out of Egypt. Not only was he unsuited to the systemic fundamentals of the

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁵⁷ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 56.

Pax Britannica, the Vali was also motivated to extend his monopoly over the fertile soil of Egypt and the Levant.

Therefore, when Mehmet Ali's self-aggrandisement scheme was neutralised, it came with a multi-faceted response to the peculiar characteristics of his rule, military, and economy, i.e. outright anti-systemic factors that proved incompatible with the Pax Britannica. In this regard, the present chapter focuses on one of those facets, the case of cotton in Mehmet Ali's progress, and questions how principal this crop was in shaping the interaction between the Vali and the system. It is accordingly proposed that it was reactionary on the part of the British to develop a specific method to handle Mehmet Ali's Egypt. This is argued to have been initiated in the face of the Vali's success in developing a very fine, distinct, and quality version of, monopolies over, illiberal production and mercantilist trade of cotton- which was at the same time a strategic commodity in the British commercial expansion. To address this matter, such points as how the Vali benefited from his cotton monopolies, the profitable traits of the long-staple cotton cultivated in Egypt after 1820s, figures pertaining to increasing income thanks to cotton exports are examined here. Briefly put, it is argued that multiple aspects of the Egyptian cotton were combined in such a way that the mechanism, i.e. monopolies, turning this strategic asset into loads of cash was to become the essential source of Mehmet Ali's power. Checking it would be detrimental to the Vali.

5.1. The Primary Instrument for Mehmet Ali's Expansion: Cotton

Cotton is a moderate temperature plant. For complete development, it needs hot summers that last for a considerable time. The warm climate Egypt enjoys on a very regular basis have proven apt for the cultivation of this very crop both in Upper and Lower Egypt since time immemorial. In fact, cotton crop had been known there for a very long time; cultivation and the manufacturing of cotton textiles began in Egypt between 332 BC and 395 AD²⁵⁸. Given its

²⁵⁸ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 10.

location, laying astride the trade routes from the East to the West, it also has been a place for the crop's trade that even during the sixth century BC: Egypt was among the stops for the trade of the Indian cotton. Merchants of the ancient times brought it to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ports, and from Egypt by Greek Merchants to Europe.²⁵⁹

Even though former periods had such interesting traits as to the case of cotton in Egypt, accurate history of this crop prior to early nineteenth century is found to be minimal. The cotton grown in Egypt before then had not constituted an important crop for commerce or was not renowned.²⁶⁰ In fact, as stated by a report published in 1841, the cotton cultivated in the Nile valley before the 1820s, i.e. the *Belledi* type, was small in quantities and mainly channelled into local consumption. It was not a rarity, only to fit the scant capacity of the masses.²⁶¹ The breakthrough in the crop's history in Egypt overlapped the establishment of the Kavalalı lineage. It was Mehmet Ali himself, who dedicated tremendous energy to the rebirth of Egyptian agriculture as well as the reorganisation of commerce and invited the assistance of a series of European technical experts for that purpose. It was during the Vali's reign that cotton would become a primary staple of Egypt's exports.

The agricultural-economic structure the Vali established in Egypt was the basis for cotton's journey into becoming an actor in its own merit to determine the course of the eyalet. As noted previously, inasmuch as he was an absolutist in his rule, the Vali was a trade monopolist and set Egypt his personal farm. He controlled a total monopoly of all the primary Egyptian produce, bought grain directly from the fellaheen at prices set by himself, and freely speculated

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁶⁰ C. H. Brown, *Egyptian Cotton*, Leonard Hill Limited, London, 1953, p. 14.

²⁶¹ G. R. Gliddon, *A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt*, James Madden & Co., 1841, p. 7.

wholesale for export. The Vali took whole grasp of the harvest, had it transported to his shops, whence the sale is executed for the direct profit of the treasury. In this regard, Mehmet Ali became the greatest merchant in Egypt in direct contact with buyers; this way of trade went both ways for exports and imports as well as for industrial produce.²⁶²

Notably, prior to economic change pertinent to the discovery of the Egyptian long-staple cotton, Mehmet Ali's eyalet had already developed an urge for cotton industrialisation. By the time of the discovery, there had been an organised irrigation network upon which a grand project could have been based. In particular, from 1817 to 1821, 33% of the cards, 24% of the jennies, and 70% of the looms had been established in Egypt. Cairo had 1250 looms, 584 cards, and 436 mule jennies. The number of mule jennies was to increase to 1962 after the introduction of long-staple cotton, and 1194 cards were to spread throughout 30 different establishments. In addition, and most particularly, the area of cotton production was expanding from its traditional location, the Egyptian Delta.²⁶³

Moreover, the waves of monopolisation had already been extended to cotton crops in late 1810s. By then, Mehmet Ali had already undertaken the monopoly of the native cotton industry through dismantling local workshops, abolishing the corporation of weavers, setting up looms in government establishments, and forcing the former cotton artisans to enter these institutions as the Vali's employees. More significantly, cotton produce delivered by this mechanism were to be held by the administration, if not sold to specific merchants, authorised to trade in the confined economy of Mehmet

²⁶² Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century or Mehemet Ali and His Successors until the British Occupation in 1882*, pp. 125-126.

²⁶³ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 170.

Ali. This pattern did forbid private weaving and in time was extended to include all textiles in addition to cotton cloth.

Thereafter, Mehmet Ali's textile industry underwent reorganisation along European lines. Particularly, a silk factory was established at the Khurunfish district of the nineteenth century Cairo 1816, only to be converted into a cotton mill in 1818 under Swedish supervision. Mehmet Ali established a second mill at Boulaq (part of the current western quarter of downtown Cairo, by the Nile), supplied it with the state-of-art European equipment. In addition to three more mills initiated in 1820, a bleaching factory, two dyeing establishments, and a foundry were put in operation.²⁶⁴

The Vali's project was an ambitious one. At times it seemed to contemporaries that it was a motive to save funds by resorting to import-substitution. Mehmet Ali operated on a rather forthright logic; seeing that he needed to spend a many great sum to import European goods, he dwelled on the idea to produce these goods in Egypt. This alone might have provided the essential impetus to industrialise, for we know the fact that all the factories he put in the making produced articles which had been previously imported.²⁶⁵

All such initiatives notwithstanding, the eyalet's income was in dire straits by the beginning of the 1820s. In particular, Egypt's gains from foreign trade conditions were falling, prices of crops were decreasing, the losses from inconvenient debts were pressing the need to raise further revenues. This was exacerbated by the lack of a self-regulating market which enabled the Vali,

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

for example, to hold off the produce of the 1819 crop due to predominantly low prices, where lower rates in 1820 risked efficient return of investment.²⁶⁶

Therefore, Egypt under Mehmet Ali's rule needed an alternative basis of revenue that could support the Vali in his dealings of self-aggrandisement in Egypt as well as against the Porte and the Great Powers. The opportune moment was to be realised in the discovery of a novel type of cotton, which would help Mehmet Ali embark upon a transformative course for the eyalet.

5.2. The Jumel Cotton

The beginning of the modern Egyptian cotton's history is marked in the 1820s with the discovery of a new type of long-staple cotton. Its story in essence started in late 1817, when a French textile engineer, Louis Alexis Jumel (1785-1823), signed a contract with a representative of Mehmet Ali in Geneva, through which he agreed to move to Cairo in order to take charge of a spinning and weaving factory. This was actually the famous "Malta" factory (named after the nationality of its spinners recruited from abroad), set up in Boulaq and would produce enthusiastic stories for European observers of the time.²⁶⁷

Jumel would set on a course to dwell on the possibilities of improving the cotton crop already available in Egypt. His attempt was successful, and the novel Jumel cotton (*Cotton Jumel* as called by the contemporary French spinners), originally found growing for ornamental purposes in a Cairo garden, was to be entertained by his patron as a commercial asset.²⁶⁸ As put

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁶⁷ G. Dardauid, 'Un Ingénieur Français au Service de Mohamed Ali: Louis Alexis Jumel (1785-1823) D'après les documents inédits des archives du consulat de France du Caire', in *Bulletin de L'Institut d'Égypte*, XXII, Session 1939-40, p. 61.

²⁶⁸ International Federation of Cotton and Allied Textile Industries, *Cotton Growing in Egypt, report by Arno Schmidt, Secretary of the International Cotton Federation*, Taylor, Garnett, Evans and Co., Ltd., Manchester, 1912, p. 11.

in retrospect by one of the officials of King Fouad I of Egypt, a direct descendant of Mehmet Ali, Monsieur Jumel

utilising the seed of a tree probably of Sudanese origin, which he discovered in the garden of Mohamed el-Orfali Bey, at Cairo, suggested in 1820, to Mohamed Ali the extension of the cultivation of this seed. The discovery was put into practical realisation, which revolutionised the agricultural system of Egypt. Attracted by the high prices paid in Europe for the Sea Island American Cotton, Mohamed Ali introduced this variety in to Egypt during the early years of his reign, and subsequently, year by year, different seeds from North and South America were introduced and tried.²⁶⁹

With the support of the Vali, Jumel moved forward with a path to develop that strain further so as to harvest it in larger quantities. The engineer was allowed time away from the Malta factory, exempted from land tax, and even provided by the Vali with successive grants for further research into the new crop of this type.²⁷⁰

The process was not an easy one yet would prove extremely rewarding. It had tremendous effect on Egypt's agriculture and economy, with multiple sectors involved. As explained by an article published on the New York Times in 1864, this agricultural escapade faced enormous difficulties at first. Because the subject was exclusively novel in Egypt,

a foundation for the various departments of the labor to be applied had to be created as it were. Persons skilled in the culture were imported, working hands were instructed, the soil prepared and drained, and, after some failures, finally success crowned the zealous efforts ... [When] success came, it was neither stinted nor uncertain, but burst, as it were, into full bloom at once. The cotton thrived, spread from point to point

²⁶⁹ M. A. R. Hafez, *The Alexandria Cotton Market*, Fouad I University Press, Cairo, 1946, p. 1.

²⁷⁰ Dardaoud, *Un Ingénieur Français au Service de Mohamed Ali*, pp. 63-64; Owen estimates that one French franc was worth 2.5 piastres in 1822 in *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 383. That would make the sum granted to Jumel roughly 50,000 francs at that time.

over the land and ... gave to Egypt the principal source of revenue enjoyed by her at the present time.²⁷¹

This early nineteenth-century process delivered impressive results which led Mehmet Ali into additional experiments. The first produce of Jumel, three bales, were shipped to Trieste (chances are that it could also be Marseille) and brought about pleasing advices in European quarters.²⁷² This also provided the drive that facilitated the introduction of a number of various types of cotton from other parts of the globe, including the Sea Island of the American Atlantic coast. Even so, given the suitable climactic conditions, the genes of Sea Island origin were incorporated, and even a new type of cotton was almost developed in the same *Gossypium bardanese* species.²⁷³

In any case, Mehmet Ali was cognisant of the lucrative potentials this type of cotton carried. Given its distinct and quality characteristics, the Jumel cotton appeared ideal for a monopoly product. Just like it was remarked as early as 1845 by a European nobleman, who came to wander around Northern Africa, in cotton Mehmet Ali would find a true gold mine, the cultivation of which was to produce the most enormous revenues raised in Egypt.²⁷⁴ Even more, it enjoyed successful demand in Europe; the crop reached a price roughly 150 to 300% higher than the regular short-staple cotton traditionally produced in Egypt.²⁷⁵ In fact, by 1823, when Jumel died in Egypt, Mehmet Ali had

²⁷¹ The New York Times, *Egyptian Cotton; Its Modern Origin and the Importance of the Supply*. June 26, 1864. Accessed on October 1, 2019 at <https://www.nytimes.com/1864/06/26/archives/egyptian-cotton-its-modern-origin-and-the-importance-of-the-supply.html>

²⁷² Gliddon, *A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt*, p. 12.

²⁷³ C.H. Brown, *Egyptian Cotton*, p. 14.

²⁷⁴ Prince Puckler Muskau, *Egypt, and Mehemet Ali, Vol III*, T.C. Newby, London, 1845, p. 126.

²⁷⁵ Dardaoud, *Un Ingénieur Français au Service de Mohamed Ali*, p. 65.

launched in effect an eyalet-scale campaign to spread cotton based on the French engineer's invention. Even though growers faced compulsion to entertain this initiative, public interest was on the rise. The Vali maintained cotton cultivation throughout the entire eyalet, and with that, the Jumel cotton was planted on and around the Nile valley, only to become the staple crop of the region. It was set to be produced, traded, and sold in a monopolist way.

This crop, in this regard, set a comprehensive example of Mehmet Ali's peculiar practice. For instance, it included coercing peasants into cultivation on state-owned estates for them to meet the yearly forced-labour tax, the *corvée*. Furthermore, the fellaheen were also forced to conduct plantation in defined methods, sell the crop to the state, and even work with no pay. Another example is that, as early as the 1810s, during when diminishing rates in the grain sales were observed and new commodities for trade appeared necessary, the British increased their exports to Egypt so as to pay for the grain they bought from the Vali. In this framework, they initiated an influx of cheap cotton products, contemporarily known as Indian muslins. This took place at the expense of local manufacturing workshops, which closed down due to their inability to compete with the cheaper produce from Britain. In return, the Vali extended an embargo against British textiles, aiming at preserving the local market from their cheap cloth. These measures against the British exports started to increasingly protect the Egyptian textile industry and low- and mid-level Egyptian produce began to dominate the local market. It would be exported to the Cairo-controlled portions of the Red Sea, Sudan, Syria and Anatolia.²⁷⁶

However, what was even more striking was that this picture remained totally unfit vis-à-vis the liberal trade standards defined by the Pax Britannica. Mehmet Ali's course would run highly against the systemic impulse adopted by the British to expand commercially into the global countryside. Therefore,

²⁷⁶ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 167, 171.

the more cotton Egypt produced under Mehmet Ali's orders, the more the British would be attracted to the eyalet.

5.3. Extensive Plantation, Increasing Trade, Rising Income

In the 1820s, the Vali's Egypt accelerated into becoming one of the primary actors in the world trade of cotton. Mehmet Ali's methods employed in this regard were aimed at appropriating the bulk of the rural surplus, and his eyalet-wide monopolistic scheme enabled the Vali to curtail foreign influence over the local patterns of the crops. Control of the land helped Mehmet Ali push the government monopoly to its limits and combine regulation, fixed prices, and taxation. In so doing, the Vali on his own became the producer, the middleman, the merchant, the organiser, and the profiteer in the field of cotton trade.²⁷⁷

As noted, Egypt's cotton crop was produced on an extended scale. Owen estimates that some 100,000 to 150,000 feddans²⁷⁸ were under effect of this operation in early 1820s.²⁷⁹ The area dedicated to Jumel cotton's cultivation back then would equal in size, around 60% (roughly 630,000 square kilometres) of the current territory of Egypt now. In addition, the Vali improved his exercise with experts brought from Syria and Asia Minor- each assigned to a series of villages which made sure that the peasants were under the Vali's complete control. The peasants were also provided with credit and cotton gins throughout the villages. It is known that the Vali also executed a

²⁷⁷ Owen, *The Middle East*, p. 66.

²⁷⁸ The size of feddan had been of a contentious issue during the nineteenth century in Egypt. Several cadastral surveys throughout the century estimated varying data. The first time it was officially defined in the eyalet was in 1861, which stipulated that the size of a feddan be fixed at 4,200.833 square metres; equivalent to 1,038 acres. See Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 381 for weights, measures and coins of Mehmet Ali's time.

²⁷⁹ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 29-30.

series of training programmes to disseminate the proper and systematic methods of cultivation. Nonetheless, one should not mistake the engagement with the peasants as a factor favourable to the masses. As put by a contemporary account, such changes “cannot be said to have produced any sensible effect on the numbers of the Population!”²⁸⁰

These methods of innovation would progressively continue. Particularly, the exercise based on centralised irrigation both in Upper and Lower Egypt turned more and more effective and was combined with a certain ministerial form of public works administration in 1835. In this regard, by the early 1830s, the area reached by summer water thanks to irrigation canals in the Delta was to increase to 600,000 feddans.²⁸¹

This situation delivered such fruitful outcome that by 1823, the amount of cotton produced in Mehmet Ali’s Egypt had an upsurge far beyond 200,000 cantars of 94 lbs.²⁸² The material produced was such high quality that it changed the trends in British imports from the region, which shrank in volume. Concerning this situation, an analysis from 1886 regarding cotton trade of Great Britain states the following:

The imports from the Mediterranean ... subsequently became more important than ever, owing to the establishment of the cotton culture in Egypt by Mehemet Ali in 1821-22. Prior to this date the imports were chiefly from the European and Asiatic dominions of Turkey, and principally from Smyrna. The first shipment from Alexandria took place in 1821, in which year the exports amounted to 944 cantars of 94 lbs. each, including 235 cantars to England ... The first recorded import into Liverpool took place in April, 1823 ... Messrs. Marriott and Rogers, [in 1823], said, “This cotton has already been used as a substitute for Brazils with considerable success; and when it shall be more carefully gathered,

²⁸⁰ J. Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston, Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.*, W. Clows and Sons, London, 1840, p. 35.

²⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 29-30, 49.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 30.

and its nature more generally understood by our manufacturers, there is every probability of its becoming a useful and valuable substitute for the lower qualities of Sea Island.”²⁸³

Mentioned measures in cotton cultivation, which led to increasing revenues, is also pertinently described by a 1840 report submitted to Lord Palmerston. Penned by Colonel Patrick Campbell, the Queen’s then-Consul General at Cairo, the mechanism was put in operation in the following fashion:

In the Provinces most adapted for growing that article, the “Moudirs” order the renters of the land to plant a certain number of Feddans with cotton. Those who have not good seed of their own, can obtain it from the Government Agents ... When the crop is gathered and cleaned, it is carried by the peasants to the “Shouna” or principal Depot of the Province, where it is weighted, and an account made of the value, at 200 piastres per Cantar of 36 okes, from which are deducted the “Miri” or rent of the land charged by the government, the cost of cattle, or other articles received by the Cultivators and their personal taxes. Should there be any balance in favour of the latter, it is never paid in cash, but is carried forward ... or compensated by the debts of some other individual in the province- so that the peasants are entirely destitute of money to provide their families with the necessaries of life ... This obliges them very often to sell their cotton underhand ... Were the Pacha to throw open that branch of Commerce, the immense capitals now locked up in the coffers of his principal officers, would soon be applied to the cultivation of cotton ... Under the present system, it affords no remuneration to the peasant, and being forced upon him, he confines the cultivation to the lowest possible extent of land. Were the Pacha to give grants of land to his principal officers ... they would have a stronger hold in the Country ... Many Europeans would no doubt be induced to apply themselves to agricultural pursuits were the restrictions now existing removed.²⁸⁴

The conglomeration of these steps proved successful in terms of increasing profits derived from cotton, which would always have a cardinal position in Mehmet Ali’s economy. The profits generally comprised the difference between the price the Vali paid to the fellahin and the rate he obtained from the foreign merchants, less the cost of transportation from the provincial

²⁸³ T. Ellison, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain*, Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, London, 1886, p. 88.

²⁸⁴ Rodkey, F. S. 1929, ‘Colonel Campbell’s Report on Egypt in 1840, with Lord Palmerston’s Comments’, *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol 3 No 1, p. 110.

warehouses to the port of Alexandria. These profits had first and foremost constituted an indispensable portion of the Vali's treasury. In particular, when a sum of £600,000 to £700,000 was generated, it meant two-thirds to three-quarters as much as the land tax collected (Table 6). Also, for example, in the year 1834, cotton profits constituted approximately 6.3% of total revenues, and approximately 13.8% in 1838.²⁸⁵

Table 6²⁸⁶

<i>Mehmet Ali's Revenue and Expenditure Estimates, 1821-38</i>						
	Land-Tax		Total revenue		Total expenditure	
	Purses	Francs	Purses	Francs	Purses	Francs
1821	132,309	26,461,752	239,941	48,028,500	189,400	37,880,000
1826			400,000	100,000,000		
1829	110,780	19,400,000	511,200	89,463,000		
1830	225,000	£1,406,250	498,794	£3,118,951	421,970	£2,661,187
1833⁽ⁱ⁾			506,000	76,000,000		
1833⁽ⁱⁱ⁾	187,500	28,125,000	418,525	62,778,750	333,000	49,951,900
1834-35	281,000	35,125,000	622,820	77,853,500	611,200	76,400,000
1835-36	320,000	40,000,000	612,860	76,607,500	575,751	71,967,815
1838			720,000	90,000,000		

Cotton profits not only added into treasury funds, they also served as a significant source in funding the absolutist state machine of Mehmet Ali. They were taken use of in financing the Vali's various grand-scale projects in the 1820s, including new factories, the enlargement of the army, the purchase of a new fleet, and so on.²⁸⁷ As a matter of fact, cotton proved "a brutal though successful way of exploiting Egypt's underdeveloped resources of labour and land."²⁸⁸ Moreover, looking at cotton export trends provides us with a view of how embedded this crop was in the functioning of the Vali's eyalet. In

²⁸⁵ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 68.

²⁸⁶ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 43. (*i* and *ii* on the table signify differing historical data).

²⁸⁷ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 40.

²⁸⁸ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 68.

assessing their extent, Owen, in one of his extensively cited works, suggests that the periods of high prices and good harvests, the two notable ones, 1825-6 and 1835-6, may have made up roughly between a fifth and a quarter of the eyalet's total revenue. In less fruitful terms, this proportion must have shrunk to a tenth. Also, mostly in good years, cotton constituted the most profitable of the crops cultivated in Mehmet Ali's monopoly system. The example of 1834-35 suggests that cotton provided £E320,000²⁸⁹, or 50% of the revenue generated by the sale of agricultural commodities; in 1836, its contribution increased to 85%. (Tables 7 & 8) In addition, given the crop's indispensability, the fluctuating rates of cotton profits are suggested to have also acted as a disruptive factor in the finances of Egypt. Owen cites year 1837 as a clear example: Mehmet Ali previously relied heavily on cotton profits to meet some pressing expenses, such as but not limited to paying the fellahin in cash for their produce, paying off arrears due for sailors, adding into the Tribute to the Porte. Given this heavy weight of cotton profits in the general budget of the eyalet, any lack of balance in payments would have put the Vali in a tumultuous position, e.g. the year 1837, when the crop's sales were suspended. Cotton crops also acted as a medium of payment in the face of the depreciation of Egyptian and Ottoman moneys, covering European imports and overseas balances when encashed in a relevant foreign city.²⁹⁰

In another perspective, the export trends of Mehmet Ali's cotton also hint at how susceptible this absolutist economy would become in time to the eyalet's international political-economic dealings. *Figure 2* accordingly sheds light on a twenty-year period of Egyptian cotton's exports. It is particularly evident

²⁸⁹ The £E signifies the Egyptian pound. See the following information provided by Owen in *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development* in p. 34, footnote c: "Strictly speaking, the Egyptian pound was not introduced until 1885, but a number of sources use it for units of 100 piastres (Pt. 100) before that date. According to the monetary tariff fixed by Muhammad 'Ali in 1835, £1 (sterling) was to equal Pt. 97½."

²⁹⁰ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 41-44.

that from the time the Jumel cotton was introduced into the Egyptian soil in 1821 until the death of Mehmet Ali in 1849, the eyalet's cotton exports enjoyed remarkable success, with a rate of 90.2% increase in between. The same data set also presents that that the greatest rate of increase in proportionate terms occurred in between 1821-5 and 1825-9. Accordingly, this period of time indicates the first couple of fruitful harvest cycles that Jumel cotton cultivation delivered in the 1820s. In addition, we see rates decreasing in between periods (1830-4 and 1840) when Mehmet Ali was conducting his north-bound expansionist military campaigns. In addition to that, the sharp decrease in transition from 1835-9 to 1840-4 explains the immediate effect of the anti-monopolies Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 over Egypt.

Table 7²⁹¹

<i>Volume and Value of Egyptian Cotton Exports</i> (estimates for the period between 1821 and 1849, annual averages in periods)			
	Volume (cantars of 94 lb)	Change, previous period compared	Value (Egyptian pound)
1821-5	124,252	N/A	
1825-9	186,641	+ 50.2%	
1830-4	180,610	- 3.23%	
1835-9	228,939	+ 26.7%	780,933
1840-4	195,653	- 14.5%	393,450
1845-9	236,392	+ 20.8%	427,347

We know that the share of cotton in generating profits from agricultural monopolies was paramount. Even so, once Mehmet Ali extracted Pax Britannic attention to the anti-systemic treatment of cotton produce, monopolies were a direct target. In this understanding, the below table provides how grand the share of cotton in generating profits from agricultural monopolies. In particular, the share of cotton products in monopolist profits during the given periods of 1834-35 was 50.9%, and, at strikingly higher level, 85.1% in 1836 in terms of piasters.

²⁹¹ Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 67.

Table 8²⁹²

<i>Mehmet Ali's Agricultural Monopolies Profits, 1834-35, 1836</i>		
	1834-35 piastres	1836 piastres
Long-staple cotton	32,500,000	58,379,520
Short-staple cotton	250,000	
Sugar	1,000,000	
Indigo	3,000,000	2,200,001
Opium	300,000	302,493
Flax and flax-seed	4,000,000	1,360,850
Tobacco	5,000,000	
Rice	2,600,000	2,148,864
Wheat	13,000,000	291,390
Beans		456,444
Barley		973,323
Others	1,630,000	2,415,105
Total	64,280,000	68,564,000




Figure 2 - Source: Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 41

In addition, notwithstanding the inability to convert currencies in a single take or the lack of data that could reflect both real and nominal prices, diplomatic reports from the nineteenth century are found to be producing the most useful information on this matter. The below figure is one of such compilations of information that offers a visual glimpse of Egypt cotton profits' track. Here too we observe a sharp drop in the late 1830s, indicating the susceptibility

²⁹² Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1941, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 42.

between the crop's trade and international developments. The mentioned drop ensues anti-monopolies measure imposed on Mehmet Ali in 1838.

The industrial background attached to cotton production also deserves attention. Even though we find unreliable and contradictory reports on the factories in terms of numbers, volume of production, revenues provided, it has been mainly stated that Mehmet Ali's industrial power had ascended to its peak by mid-1830s and showed a trend of decline thereafter. In 1837, 29 cotton factories operated in the eyalet and this number fell to 15 by 1840.²⁹³ Batou provides a rather more precise account on this matter. Asserting that among industrial branches the cotton sector was the most significant one in definite terms, "with 300,000 to 400,000 spindles, more than 2,000 looms (200 to 400 of which were steam-driven), and 15,000 to 20,000 workers [it] could produce some 2,000 to 3,000 tons of yarn per year, and perhaps 10 million sq. m. of cloth."²⁹⁴

Table 9²⁹⁵

<i>Machine Cotton Spinning throughout the World, 1830-40</i>			
Country	Year	Spindles	Spindles/1000 pop.
Great Britain	1834	10,000,000	588
France	1834	3,000,000	90
United States	1834	1,400,000	97
Spain	1840	1,200,000	80
Austria-Hungary	1834	800,000	28
Russia	1840	700,000	12
Germany	1836	626,000	22
Switzerland	1836	588,478	265
Egypt	1834	400,000	80
Belgium	1834	200,000	49
Mexico	1842	125,000	17

²⁹³ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 172.

²⁹⁴ Batou, *Nineteenth-Century Attempted Escapes from the Periphery: The Cases of Egypt and Paraguay*, pp. 283-284.

²⁹⁵ Batou, 'Muhammad- 'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century?', p. 185.

Batou additionally provides data as to Egypt's comparison with the rest of the cotton producers in the world in terms of number of spindles. Egyptian industrial cotton spinning, accordingly, was the fifth in the world in relative terms in the 1830s (and the ninth in machine spinning – Table 9).²⁹⁶ Elementary calculation suggests that throughout the given time-span in the table, compared to the other parts involved, Great Britain had roughly 52% of all spindles, Egypt commanded 2% of them. However, what made the difference as to Egypt's involvement in this industry was the number of spindles thought in relation to the unit's size. This gives an important perspective regarding Egypt's standing under Mehmet Ali among the major actors of the world cotton industry. In particular, Egypt, having 80 spindles per 1,000 inhabitants was the fifth and it followed Great Britain with 588, Switzerland with 265, the United States with 97, and France with 90 spindles.

In any case, during the heyday of agriculture and industrial monopolies, Mehmet Ali's factories delivered increasing output of cotton spun. A sizeable sum of this produce was exported, whereas the Vali's industry was protected from foreign competition:

Not only did his army and navy provide an assured market for anything he wished to produce, but he had the power to force his subjects to purchase all the cotton goods his factories manufactured. By the same token, he could interfere with the sale of imported goods if he wished, either by imposing internal tariffs or by physically preventing transactions between the merchants and their customers. He could even undercut the price of imported cottons by selling his own goods at a loss.²⁹⁷

The situation was emboldened by the fact that the Egyptian Jumel cotton reached such quality that it reportedly met the Lancashire and European spinning standards and made the Egyptian cotton gain a key role in supplying

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 283.

²⁹⁷ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 46-47.

European manufacturers during the first half of the nineteenth century. As provided by Beckert based on the proceedings of one of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce meetings, in 1825,

British factory owners noted [back then] that such exports had “materially checked the advances which lately occurred in the prices of all other Cottons.” But the prime value of Egyptian cotton, they argued, was that it could substitute for American long-staple Sea Island cotton, which they considered important “in the event of any political event depriving us altogether of the Cotton of the United States.”²⁹⁸

In sum, Mehmet Ali’s Jumel cotton came to entail two primary characteristics in relation the present study. First, it became an integral, if not vital part of the eyalet’s economy and any negative step targeting that crop in Egypt would have atrocious chaos for Mehmet Ali’s political-economic power. Such volatility must have been inevitable, because of the second given characteristic that the large-scale cultivation of cotton brought about a produce oriented towards European markets. The trade of this crop presented a stably increasing export trend. That way, the Egyptian cultivator turned out be considerably entrenched in the world market and the eyalet’s economy grew increasingly susceptible to international economy.²⁹⁹ It was in this framework that when the international political-economic conditions turned against Egypt and his methods to manipulate cotton was targeted, the Vali would enter a tumultuous period that heralded his administration’s collision course.

5.4. The Inevitable Clash of Interests

The success of the Egyptian cotton was evident at the local level as well as – following Mehmet Ali’s military campaigns against Istanbul – the occupied portions of Hijaz, Sudan and Syria. The Vali was also exporting to the rest of

²⁹⁸ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 132.

²⁹⁹ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 178.

the Ottoman realm, Austria, Greece and Tuscany as well in increasing volumes. However, the setting established by Mehmet Ali for the production and trade of this crop was unfit vis-à-vis the liberal trade standards defined by the Pax Britannica. It would also run strongly against the systemic impulse to expand commercially into the global countryside in the nineteenth century.

In fact, the actor topping all sorts of lists to do with cotton, Great Britain, was the one mostly interested in Mehmet Ali's cotton. One particular account is offered by Sir John Bowring, formerly a Member of the British Parliament and a later governor of Hong Kong. Bowring, after having spent a year in Egypt as an emissary of Lord Palmerston to assess the Mehmet Ali's wide-ranging political, agricultural, industrial plans, penned a thorough analysis of Egypt under the Vali's rule. His 1840 report to the Viscount presents us the fact that the British public opinion entertained the idea that the Egyptian cotton could be in competition with British commerce in the region surrounding Mehmet Ali. Bowring particularly questioned how the Egyptian cotton came to injure commercial interaction on the part of Britain, and in so doing, he indicated the Vali's industrial development schemes: "for it appears that England sends these articles far less frequently, especially cloths of low quality; and India muslins, formerly so much used, are now scarcely at all sent to Egypt since muslins have been woven in the new factories."³⁰⁰

A similar view was entertained in the *Asiatic Journal for British and Foreign India* as early as 1831. The following was an entry concerning Egyptian manufacturers:

An Arab ship arrived from the Red Sea has brought 250 bales of cotton yarn, the manufacture of Ali Pacha at his spinning mills near Cairo. It is reported that he has sent 500 bales to Surat, 1,000 to Calcutta, and that he intends next season to send long cloths, madapollams, &c. having

³⁰⁰ Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, p. 35.

established steam power-looms! ... What will the mercantile community say to this new competitor?³⁰¹

The said journal also echoed complaints raised by the British merchants in India, in June of the same year:

... we noticed a new of article of commerce, Egyptian cotton yarn; and we have now to state, that importations of this production into Calcutta have, as anticipated, taken place. In October last, the Arabian ship *Fyzarobany* brought here 200 bales ... and the Arabian ship *Nasseer*, from Judda and Mocha has imported 300 bales ... We are assured, by competent judges, that this twist is of superior quality, even surpassing that imported here from England ... Through the information of a very intelligent Arabian merchant, we learn that about 10,000 bales of cotton yarn and piece goods of various descriptions have been exported from Egypt during the present year, the greater part of which has been sent to Persia and Arabia ... and our informant adds, that the pacha has the means of executing orders to any extent, and with great despatch ... to any pattern required, either European or Indian.³⁰²

It is within this regard that the British were alarmed by the prospective competition stemming from the quality of the Egyptian cotton:

Considering these facts, it may be apprehended that the manufacturers of Egypt are likely to interfere with similar productions imported into this country from Great Britain ... as the pacha of Egypt monopolizes the trade, in the event of any serious change in the government of that country affecting the pacha personally (not an improbable occurrence), the manufacturers would in all probability cease, or not be prosecuted with the same enterprizing spirit which he evinces. This idea may, in anticipation, allay the alarm which the pacha's speculations might otherwise excite among the mercantile community.³⁰³

³⁰¹ 'Egyptian Manufactures', in *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australia*, Vol IV, January-April 1831, p. 133.

³⁰² 'Egyptian Cotton Yarn', in *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australia*, Vol V, May-August 1831, p. 62.

³⁰³ Ibid.

Other markets were concerned in a similar fashion with the progress achieved by Mehmet Ali. As quoted by Batou, the German paper, *Ausland* stated the following in 1831:

For a year [the Vali] has been flooding Arabia and Persia with cotton cloths from his mills, and India with his yarn whose quality is higher than that of the best English products. Indian weavers ... prefer Egyptian to English yarn. Of late, two shiploads of these products have arrived in Calcutta, greatly perturbing English merchants. They will certainly try to upset the plans for this fierce competition by higher customs tariffs; all the same the British Government must —on several counts—behave very prudently towards the Pasha. In particular, it must not provoke him to sell cotton to France alone, because this would give a remarkable advantage ... to French over English mills. It is interesting that a barbarian has achieved within a few years what Napoleon and the entire continent were unable to accomplish since the beginning of the century, despite all possible efforts, i.e. to successfully compete with the British in the production of cotton.³⁰⁴

The Vali's cotton exports displayed a remarkable trajectory, the majority of which were destined principally to ports on Europe. The below excerpt from an 1841 report on Egypt's cotton, penned by one of the US consuls in the eyalet, explains that situation. It was accordingly reported that of the amount of yearly cotton exports destined to Great Britain

Liverpool is, out of all proportion, the port which consumes the bulk of Egyptian produce; but occasionally small cargoes are sent to Glasgow, Greenock, and London: and of the Cotton included in the yearly shipments to sundry ports, small portions have incidentally found their way to Belgium, Venice, Constantinople, Smyrna, and once to Tarsous.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴ *Ausland*, 1831, issue 1016 cited in Batou, 'Muhammad-'Ali's Egypt, p. 200.

³⁰⁵ Gliddon, *A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt*, p. 58.




Figure 3

Generated for the present study, based on the data set in terms of bales, provided by G. Gliddon, A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt, James Madden & Co., London, 1841, pp. 45-58. This figure does not include a series of few export cycles for Sea Island-seed cotton cultivated in Egypt. Net weight of a bale is 219 lbs.

* Date available for Sea Island cultivated in Egypt, after 1827.

** Unavailable data for Leghorn and Genoa, and Sundry Ports.

In addition, *Figure 3* offers a linear reflection of the diversity of export destinations mentioned above, for the period 1820-41. It is evident that during the period of monopolies, the Vali had been dealing mostly with Britain, France, and Austria.

In any case, the accounts referred to above are particularly remarkable in the sense that Mehmet Ali's success regarding the Egyptian cotton coincided with a time when the sector of cotton was also remarkably expanding in Britain. As touched upon in the introductory sections of this study, it is known that the cotton industry, in addition to influencing the national economy, led the British textile manufacturing in terms of technology, factory development and standardised production techniques. Also, not only with regard to its domestic market, the British produce enjoyed superiority in quality and earned a solid

foothold as to consumer preferences throughout the world.³⁰⁶ Table 10 presents the pace of the sector's growth in Britain in terms of cotton mills.

Table 10³⁰⁷

<i>Number and Average Size of British Cotton Mills, 1797-1850</i>			
	Number of spinning factories	Approximate annual import of cotton in the UK, million lb	Average annual input per factory, lb
1797	c. 900	30	33,000
1833-4	c.1,125	300	270,000
1850	1,407	600	430,000

The trend of expansion of that industry in Britain was indicative of a series of developments. As suggested by Hobsbawm, it was the British cotton industry which developed earlier and continued to grow faster compared to the rest of the sectors in national economy. It would not be much of an exaggeration to suggest that the mentioned industry was the backbone of British economy's growth. In fact, in a quarter century after 1815, when the mentioned sector witnessed growth rates of 6 to 7% on a yearly basis, British industrial impetus reached its pinnacle; whereas, when the sectors' growth rate dropped to 0.7% per annum, as in the case of the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the whole British industry sagged.³⁰⁸

Moreover, cotton's contribution to Britain's foreign trade was massive. After 1815, around one-half of the value of all exports from the United Kingdom comprised cotton products; raw cotton made up one-fifth of total net imports

³⁰⁶ Chapman, *The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 58-60.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

³⁰⁸ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*, The New Press, New York, 1999, p. 47.

in mid-1830s. The wealth accumulated thanks to this industry had remarkably positive effects on British exports-imports balance sheet.³⁰⁹

That the British imperial expansion quite powerfully stemmed from cotton-driven progress was to become one of the most serious obstacles in Mehmet Ali's road to ensure sufficient outlets for his exports. The eyalet was already in a disadvantageous position in the face of the harm done to Egyptian industry due to the Ottoman tariff policy with Britain effective in early nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, his monopolistic scheme of production and sale was in direct contrast with the idea and the substance of the commercial treaties the Ottoman realm was subject to. Most notable among the British sanctioned instruments was the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809, also known as the Treaty of the Dardanelles, which stipulated for British goods into the Ottoman lands that the tariff be fixed at 3 per cent. Many of other major commercial powers would make similar treaties with the Porte, and despite such enforcement, Mehmet Ali's customs would levy a higher rate in several occasions.³¹⁰

Additionally, the British trade offensive, facilitated by decreasing costs in transportation would prove to become another challenge. Its effects were very much obvious in the case of Egypt, given the progressively increasing rates of British cotton exports to the eyalet (Table 11).

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, pp. 24-25.

Table 11³¹¹

<i>Estimates on British Cotton Exports to Egypt, 1825-49, average yearly figures</i>					
	1825-9	1830-4	1835-9	1840-4	1845-9
Worth, in 1,000£	15.4	82.0	156.2	176.6	307.1
Volume, sq.m. per capita	-	-	1.0	1.7	3.5

Egypt's importance as a market was clear and the Vali's design over the eyalet was in contrast with British standards. In fact, in their bid to damage Mehmet Ali's protectionist attempts, the British were to take either diplomatic, economic or military measures.³¹² There are several indications that Britain would not welcome an Egypt under the rule of Mehmet Ali, who seemed to be on track to endanger London's cotton investment in a vast area. It was published in retrospect in 1908 for extra-British cotton production throughout the world in the nineteenth century that

the English Government, while very friendly to cotton raising in her possessions and countries where her influence is paramount, is unfriendly to cotton manufacturing in those lands. Local cotton factories would, other things being equal, have quite an advantage over Lancashire by having no freight and no duty to pay. To counterbalance this, the English Government, through the influence of Lancashire, placed an excise tax, equal to the duty, on the production of all cotton mills in such countries.³¹³

By late 1830s, such unfriendliness on the part of the British vis-à-vis Mehmet Ali was to culminate in a position against the Paşa's monopolies. True, the eyalet, only in a couple of decades, had become rife with anti-systemic characteristics in most of its aspects, from administration to economy. Nonetheless, it is argued that Mehmet Ali's monopolies were one of the most primary factors that would exacerbate the British animosity towards the Vali.

³¹¹ Batou, 'Muhammad-'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, *A Command Economy in the 19th Century?*, p. 201.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ W. A. G. Clark, *Cotton Textile Trade in Turkish Empire, Greece, and Italy*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1908, p. 48.

This was so because cotton monopolies had not only negated the British attempt to penetrate commercially Egypt, but they also were paramount in financing the Vali's political-economic force.

That state of affairs was comprehensively assessed in Sir John Bowring's above-mentioned report, where he emphasised the Vali's competitive aims concerning cotton. In comparing the price of cotton produced in England and in Egypt, Bowring recounted one of his audiences with the Paşa:

[It] is the opinion of the pacha ... that he will be able, in a few years, to produce them as cheaply as they could be supplied from hence. On one occasion, when I pointed out to his highness some of the reasons why he could not compete with our fabrics- such as the perfection of our machinery, the aptitude of our artisans, the low rate of interest, the state of the artistical and chemical arts, he answered; "You had your beginnings as I have, and they were expensive to you as they are to me; I do not expect to begin with much success but I shall succeed by and by."³¹⁴

Anti-monopolies recommendations that concerned the trade of the Egyptian cotton were also available back in the 1830s. In the said report, Bowring enclosed a British assessment on the agriculture and manufactures of Egypt, dated 1837, which had suggested that monopolies be abolished for the introduction of cotton to be considerably successful. Accordingly, cotton profits would then have surpassed the level that they had been at by that time. In addition, it was estimated that the abolition of monopolies would deliver more effective results in the cultivation and gathering of cotton, increasing its quantity and quality, and thereby enhancing its value throughout Egypt in its entirety.³¹⁵

Bowring, in the same report, outlined the composition of Mehmet Ali's revenues item by item. The set he compiled from the eyalet's budget of 1833 offers a striking proportion: Total revenues calculated for the mentioned year equal 505,145 purses. In this framework, whereas total land-tax (miri) made

³¹⁴ Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, pp. 42-43.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

up 44.5% and capitation tax (ferdeh) 13.8%, profits accumulated from cotton and cotton goods account for 20.1%- much more than any other industrial produce.³¹⁶ The data set does not offer the margin to separately evaluate customs at Alexandria and total municipal duties, but it could be confidently suggested that direct and indirect gains generated from cotton production included, that 20.1% would well extend and radically increase in accordance with the surge in total cotton trade.

In sum, the trade substitution and embargos in Egypt, which enabled Mehmet Ali's centralised economy to display this picture, appear to have become a strong concern for British manufacturers in particular and for the proponents of the free trade movement. The Vali's practice was in utter contrast with dynamics of free trade, which called for expansion into the global countryside in a certain manner. Even more, these concerns were multiplied by the success of the long-staple cotton, which bolstered the Vali's economy and, as valued by English textile-makers, "caused the industrialists to fear that in time it would all be used up locally."³¹⁷ After all, the aggressive export policy practices by the British throughout the 1830s conflicted Mehmet Ali's monopolistic expansion, which dumped Egyptian goods over British produce in the territories he held under control in the Levant, Hijaz, and Africa. That posed a risk to British cotton exports, for Mehmet Ali seemed on track to close off the eastern part of the Mediterranean to Great Britain.

It goes without saying that reports referred to above must only offer a glimpse of material within the grand torrent of information concerning Mehmet Ali and Egypt, both during the Vali's tenure and its aftermath. Given the scope and mission of these accounts – having been penned by state officials such as Gliddon, or under the orders of a high-level member of a government, as in the case of Bowring's report – examining their neutrality may not help any efficient exercise. Besides, in certain instances, they were also drafted under

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 44.

³¹⁷ Marsot, *A History of Egypt from the Arab Conquest to the Present*, p. 75.

semi-admiration for Mehmet Ali and the progress he directed for Egypt in a time span of around 40 years. We know for example that in his original drafts, Bowring often cited Mehmet Ali as “king” or “sovereign” of Egypt; he appeared very pro-Mehmet Ali in feeling, and even recommended that Britain recognise his independence³¹⁸ (These words were replaced with “pasha” or “governor” by Palmerston before the report’s publication³¹⁹ and such exaggeration of praise omitted³²⁰).

Nonetheless, the overarching concern they are all deriving from, more or less essentially, is one which is pertinent to the general idea that Mehmet Ali was building up a regional powerful actor and this could threaten British interests therein. The engine of growth was his extensively monopolistic eyalet, fuelled by the produce delivered in the sector of cotton. In fact, the Vali was not only menacing British commercial interests in Egypt, but he had seemed on the brink of extending his monopolistic “empire” from the southern banks of the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the Mesopotamia, and even the heart of Anatolia.

For England, Egyptian cotton was the most important item raised in Egypt; and that crop too was part of Mehmet Ali’s anti-systemic combination of forces. It was that with which the Vali was reported to have overtly claimed to be the single proprietor of Egypt’s soil, the exclusive disposer of its products, and the subjective regulator of its commerce and markets.³²¹

³¹⁸ V. J. Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1935, p. 74.

³¹⁹ Rodkey, *Colonel Campbell’s Report on Egypt in 1840, with Lord Palmerston’s Comments*, p. 102.

³²⁰ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 74.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

This monopolistic scheme was the base of Mehmet Ali's power. From the Pax Britannic point of view, it had to be contained, and the British State Secretary, Viscount Palmerston was determined to attack it in the 1830s.³²² Throughout the phases during which Mehmet Ali conducted such expansion, the British were not hesitant to act. As a matter of fact, even as early as 1825, the Ottoman external trade tariffs were invoked against the Vali by a group of British merchants. In 1829, he was forced to deal with all foreign merchants in similar terms; in the 1834-35 period, the Ottoman Sultan heeded to British pressure and instructed the Vali to reverse his plans to extend Egypt's trade system with occupied Syria.³²³

Most notably, though, the ultimate blow Mehmet Ali would suffer was to come in the late 1830s. Targeting monopolies on the territories and dependencies of the Ottoman Empire, the Anglo-Turkish Convention of Baltalimani in 1838 would constitute the first wave for the undoing of the Vali.

*

The present chapter focused on the example of cotton, which formed the power base of Mehmet Ali's "personal empire" and, when attracted the free-trader attention in London, hastened the failure of the eyalet. The quality of the cotton developed in Egypt was remarkably high and it was the result of an aggressive endeavour. Through adding into Mehmet Ali's profits, it facilitated the Vali's political and commercial expansion in the Near East, and thereby presented a direct challenge to the Pax Britannica's essentials. In fact, cotton became decidedly ingrained in furthering and maintaining Mehmet Ali's anti-systemic power that targeting the device, which helped the Vali reap the benefit of this crop, would be tactical to demolish his personal

³²² Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 174.

³²³ Batou, 'Muhammad- 'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century?', p. 201.

empire. The Pax Britannica's strategy against Mehmet Ali was to draw from that targeting.

As seen above, the way cotton was taken use of in Mehmet Ali's Egypt was among the primary factors that put the Vali in discord with the prevalent political-economic system of his time. Once it had become undoubted that the Vali had to be kept under a tight rein for the Pax Britannic system to continue operating in the Near East, his monopolies, as the most solid basis for power, would be attacked the first. The succeeding chapter examines the ultimate period when Mehmet Ali jolted the Pax Britannica once again, yet was overwhelmed irreparably this time.

CHAPTER 6

THE VALI SUBJUGATED BY THE SYSTEM

Throughout the first four decades of the nineteenth century, Mehmet Ali's eyalet would cause a series of bugs for the system to rectify. His aggressive acts, which the present thesis considers an integrated political-economic-military attempt, considerably unsettled primary aspects of the Pax Britannic balance in the Near East.

The basis of this matter stemmed from the Vali's monopolies, which financed his military, and the strength of monopolies, as explained above, was a result of the agricultural reform revolving around cotton. With the formidable army he set up, deriving from the fortunes he had collected through monopolies, the Vali fought the Ottoman Sultan as well as the European powers, aimed at absorbing the Porte's dominions and reached a point close enough for a final march towards Istanbul. True, during the early years of Mehmet Ali's rule, it was the military that enjoyed true attention – not agriculture or industry. And this, as examined throughout the study, was to consolidate his power and polish his rule; every developmental plan entertained or to be thought of was related to this desire. In essence, the Paşa's army laid the basis for the entire reformation of Egypt that all aspects of European innovation were “to be a corollary and complementary activity to fill the needs of the new military institution ... the Pasha thought of [European civilization] as a set of devices to organize, arm and maintain his army, which in turn, was the best guarantee of his independence.”³²⁴

Building up on his armed forces, Mehmet Ali had expanded his “personal empire” into southern Anatolia, thereby disturbed inter-Great Power

³²⁴ Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, p. 56.

diplomacy, widened the gap between their interests concerning Ottoman Empire and this southern eyalet of the Porte. The Vali, furthermore, had subdued his suzerain, pushed him further strikingly into Russia, sought to have his cravings for independence remedied, and attempted to manipulate the “jealousies & divisions between the powers of Europe.”³²⁵

Most particularly, with the one-man band he formed, Mehmet Ali’s long career saw him gain the ability to threaten the Porte existentially. The Paşa established a very powerful administrative unit within the Ottoman realm, introduced European norms, agents and methods of change to transform Egypt into an Islamic-European one. The eyalet had extensive effect throughout the Levant and, having expanded from the Sudan to Hijaz and Syria, fragmented the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Cairo became in effect separate from Istanbul, controlled its own political axis, and in defiance of the Porte’s imperial prerogatives, undermined Ottoman sovereignty.³²⁶

However, in a thirty-five-year period ensuing his assumption of governorship in Egypt, Mehmet Ali, given most of the aspects of his unique state mechanism, was on a collision course with the essentials of the Pax Britannica and would turn out to be at a loss. His imperialist expansion into the heart of the Ottoman Empire put Mehmet Ali in confrontation with Britain, whose more ambitious imperialist designs as to Asia, India, and Istanbul were challenged by the Vali.³²⁷ But why was it the case that in the Near Eastern crisis, the powers led by Britain, opted for defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and imposed their settlement on the Vali? Had not Egypt already developed functional relations, including fruitful trade with Europe by then?

³²⁵ D. Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography*, p. 218.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³²⁷ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, p. 22.

This chapter attempts to understand Mehmet Ali's undoing from the assumed standpoint of the Pax Britannica. Throughout the mentioned aggressive process Mehmet Ali kicked off, it arguably became natural from the British point of view that the Paşa's designs towards expansion and independence had to be aborted. The present study suggests that it was not a single dimension that led the British policy formulation into this conclusion. Egypt carried notable relevance in the British strategy more than it meets the political eye. It rose from a strategic locale, threatened the Porte's welfare, caused heavy Russian presence in the region, and thereby challenged entire British interests. Therefore, after a series of demarches and clashes in the Mediterranean and the Levant, the British-led settlement of 1840-41 finalised the subversion of Mehmet Ali's system.

In this context, this chapter examines particular developments in the 1830-1841 period, based on such milestones of the crisis in the Near East as the 1833 Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty, the 1838 Baltalimani Convention, and, of course, the 1840-41 Settlement against Mehmet Ali. In so doing, it attempts to illuminate the synchronisation between the forces at play at political and economic levels, and how interests of Istanbul and London matched concerning the downgrading of Mehmet Ali.

The chapter asserts that the conclusion of this period took place with an apt intervention to reset the disturbed balance between the above-mentioned questions of Constantinople and Alexandria in the case of Mehmet Ali. It is accordingly proposed that in addition to curbing Mehmet Ali's geopolitical venture against the regional balance of power, the 1838 Convention and the 1840-41 Settlement also economically neutralised the absolutist Vali via undermining his state monopoly complex. This combination checked Mehmet Ali's military expansion and caused the most fundamental need for increasing revenues disappear. Once the 1840-41 settlement took total effect, the eyalet had no more of a motivation to take use of its rich cotton potential specifically in a monopolistic fashion to sustain its overgrown army. The mentioned combination thereby forced Egypt into export-orientation,

radically enfeebled the eyalet as well as paved the way for the eventual British occupation. The argument this chapter formulates is that how Mehmet Ali's absolutist and expansionist eyalet mechanism was first weakened and then aborted signifies the highly inter-connected functions of Pax Britannic political-economy.

6.1. The Convention of 1838

It is explained above that the British were frustrated by Mehmet Ali's strengthening. This position was embodied in Viscount Palmerston during his tenure as the British state secretary in the periods of 1827-29, 1830-34 and 1835-41. As pointed out in the very beginning of this study, this time-frame signified the increasing interaction between politics and commerce in Great Britain, which was ready, should it deem necessary, to defend and to extend their commerce by war.³²⁸

By then, the British motivation to expand trade into overseas – mostly underdeveloped regions – was powerful; yet, now that the contemporary European markets were not accessible to British goods, the British manufacturers had to continue operating on “shirts for black men and brown men and for the muslim world”.³²⁹ Palmerston was driven by this matter; basing his views on the commercial power of Britain, he held the belief that London could meddle, direct or indirect, in third parties affairs if British interests seemed at stake. We know that as early as 1830s, Palmerston was in preparation to exert this practice against Mehmet Ali, in line with British industrialists' demands, and embark upon a course to remonstrate strongly against monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire entirely.³³⁰ In this framework, it was underscored by the principal British officers that within

³²⁸ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 109.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 108.

³³⁰ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 237; Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 32.

that realm it was Mehmet Ali of Egypt who “claimed to be the universal monopolist, and to buy from the native growers and sell to the foreign traders at the prices he thought proper”.³³¹ This led the British approach into seeking an opportune moment to enforce an empire-scale abolition of the monopolies.

The chance to be seized by the British Government against Mehmet Ali arose when it became certain that the Vali threatened the British regional interests not only with his monopolist economic power, but also in practical belligerence against the Ottoman Empire, through which he would pave the way for Russian encroachment and thereby disturb the regional balance of power. The events that unfolded in this direction should be noted here.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, a series of episodes had already weakened the Ottoman Empire, politically and economically, and unsettled the regional balance to the detriment of the Pax Britannica. In particular, by 1838, the Porte had signed the Treaty of Edirne with the Russians after a chunk of Eastern Anatolia had been invaded by the Czar; Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia and Greece had been detached from the Empire; the Porte had been at a loss at the Battle of Navarino and lost in most part its navy; the loss of Greece had been confirmed; Ottoman forces had been defeated in the Battle of Konya by Mehmet Ali, who had believed his booty from the Greek War, Crete, was insufficient; and his son, Ibrahim Paşa’s troops had reached Kütahya which resulted in Russian presence on the banks of the Bosphorus.

The final one was one of the stages of Mehmet Ali’s revolt against the Porte. It began in November 1831 and produced a triumphant Mehmet Ali in Palestine, Acre, Lebanon, Damascus, and Aleppo. The Paşa was also the victor in Konya in late 1832, which caused significant irritation for the Pax Britannic balance. In the face of the passive involvement of Powers in this issue -the British were occupied with the Belgian Question, and the French seemed sympathetic to Mehmet Ali- the Porte moved on with increasing

³³¹ Bulwer, *The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: with Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence Volume II*, p. 258.

rapport with the Russians. In the meantime, Mehmet Ali's move continued towards Kütahya, roughly 200 kilometres from Istanbul, and it was by this time the Europeans had extended their interference. Following a series of demarches with and between the Porte and Mehmet Ali, the 1833 Peace of Kütahya was signed on May the third of that year.

With this arrangement, Mehmet Ali was reinvested as the Vali of Egypt (the position which he had been divested of in 1833) and granted with the Hijaz, Acre, Tripoli, Damascus, Aleppo and Crete provinces. He also was conferred the right to collect taxes of the north eastern Mediterranean port city of Adana. The Peace certainly ended hostilities between the two sides but was under no political guarantee; either side could re-start belligerence when conditions seemed opportune. That notwithstanding, the significance of the 1831-1833 period in a particular political-economic perspective was that the Vali's first war in Syria led Sultan Mahmud II to obtain aid from the Russians, who rushed their forces to Istanbul in December 1832. By February 1833, a Russian squadron had already been present in the Bosphorus, a Russian army camp was set up on the Asian shore, and thereafter, 5000 Russian troops arrived at Büyükdere, an area on the European side, close to central Istanbul of the time.³³²

In exchange of their war-time assistance, the Ottoman Sultan was forced to sign the notorious Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty with Russia on 8 June 1833, which was set to last for eight years, unless renewed. The Treaty established a consultative mechanism for defence and security between Istanbul and St. Petersburg, included the Russian commitment to the Sultan for military assistance if the need arises, and, with a separate and secret Article³³³,

³³² Mowat, *The Near East and France 1829-1847*, p. 165.

³³³ The secret article's translation is available in Mowat, *The Near East and France 1829-1847*, pp. 165-6. It states:

"In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two High Contracting Parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty

stipulated the closure of the Straits, during peacetime, for the warships aiming entrance to the Black Sea. Therefore, developments provoked by the Vali through 1831 and 1833 were not only limited to an increasing Russian encroachment in the Near East or their furtherance of commercial advantages throughout Ottoman dominions, but from a systemic point of view, caused Russia to turn out “the only power with overwhelming influence in the Porte and above all ... nearly impregnable to [external assaults].”³³⁴ In other words, in citing a British portrayal of the situation, the Treaty enabled the Russian Government to control the foreign policy of the Ottomans, for St. Petersburg could appeal to the Treaty’s terms and make sure that any Turkish treaty incompatible with Hünkâr İskelesi be repudiated.³³⁵ That state of mind was evident in Palmerston’s instructions to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, in December 1833:

What the objects of the Treaty are, & what its tendency must be, none can doubt, but those who are wilfully blind. Against those objects and that tendency the British Govt. has protested, and for the present we rest upon the ground which we have thus taken, & wait to see the course of events. Preparations, however, have been made, and are still making, to enable H.M.'s Govt. to deal with future circumstances, according to the view which may be taken of the exigencies of the moment.³³⁶

In any case, the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was to determine the course of the British policy vis-à-vis this region for the rest of the 1830s. As a matter of

the Emperor of All the Russians, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it. The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.”

³³⁴ M A S Badri, *The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power*, PhD Thesis, Bilkent University, 1996, p. 159.

³³⁵ Mowat, *The Near East and France 1829-1847*, p. 166.

³³⁶ R. L. Baker, Palmerston, ‘Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi’, *The English Historical Review*, Vol 43 No 169, 1928, p. 87.

fact, the British “could never rid themselves of the erroneous idea that it allowed Russian naval vessels to exit through the Straits into the Mediterranean, and to return through the Straits to a privileged sanctuary in the Black Sea.”³³⁷

It was under the gloomy look of these conditions that the Reis Efendi, the Foreign Minister of the Ottomans, Mustafa Reşit Paşa was instructed by the Sultan to attempt to find common ground with the British. In this regard, the Ottoman Minister toyed with the idea of a commercial convention between Istanbul and London. Such an undertaking would help reform Turkey, increase its revenue, improve its army, and help convince Great Britain to extend support to the Sultan in crushing Mehmet Ali.³³⁸

Concurrent with diplomacy between Great Britain and Turkey, during a conference he convened with the consuls of the principal powers on 25 May 1838, Mehmet Ali declared his intention to proclaim Egypt and Syria as an independent and hereditary kingdom. He is even reported to have offered to pay the Sultan three million pounds sterling as its price. However, by then, the British had already started entertaining the plan to contain the Vali by sapping the financial sources of his strength. After all, post-1833, the British government had not only become Russophobe, but also Egyptophobe. In addition to threatening the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Mehmet Ali “sat doubly athwart the short route to India – at Suez, and in Syria too, a potential block to the Euphrates route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.”³³⁹ London consequently reckoned that if Mehmet Ali was rendered devoid of his monopolies, he would definitely have less of a chance to embolden his

³³⁷ R. Davison, ‘Britain, the International Spectrum, and the Eastern Question, 1827-1841’, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No 7, 1992, p. 26.

³³⁸ N. Anick, *The Embassy of Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople, 1833-1841*, PhD Thesis, McGill University, 1970, p. 173.

³³⁹ Davison, *Britain, the International Spectrum, and the Eastern Question, 1827-1841*, pp. 26-27.

army with.³⁴⁰ It should be kept in mind that by the mid-1830s, the Vali was in control of not only Egypt, but other important outposts in the Mediterranean, including Crete and Syria. Therefore, his ambitions, if realised, would have meant the ultimate detachment of these dominions from the Porte's control into a rigid monopolistic scheme, hence the loss of an area where the British had already been trading with in very advantageous terms. It must have been known also by then that the Vali had no hesitation to extend his monopolies to these regions in the fertile crescent of the Levant and the plains of Syria.³⁴¹

As a matter of fact, the sources of revenue for Mehmet Ali's army and navy had already become a principal problem in the international circles by 1838. Puryear, in citing an article published by *Revue des deux mondes* on 1 January 1838, categorises three sources for the eyalet's revenues: taxes, customs, and the surplus from monopolies over agriculture and industry. Accordingly, even though taxes showed higher figures, monopolies had been reported to be the most important single source. They particularly furnished 84,500,000 piasters in 1835 over a total budget of 311,000,000 piasters; whereas, the land and sea forces costed Mehmet Ali 145,000,000 piasters. In this framework, if taxes and customs were to meet other expenses of his administration, the abolition of monopolies could radically deprive the Vali of a considerable portion of the surplus remaining for his military.³⁴² What is even more important in this scheme was that "the most important monopoly was of cotton, although all important branches of indigenous agriculture (sugar, indigo, opium, tobacco, and grains)"³⁴³ were part of the Vali's earnings.

³⁴⁰ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 238.

³⁴¹ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 114.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

Given such circumstances, the British set on a course to manipulate the Sultan's intention to reprimand his menacing Vali as a lever to advance their political and commercial interests over the Porte. According to Pamuk, though, a convention calling for "freer trade" between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire would anyway be signed, given the decreasing political, military and financial power of Istanbul.³⁴⁴ At the end of the day, despite the growing trade volume between the British and the Ottomans throughout the 1820s, the British merchants were discontent with interventions and obstacles exercised by Istanbul in bilateral trade. It is therefore suggested that it was not the substance yet the timing when the stars would align for such a treaty to be effected.

That opportune moment would be seized in the face of possible harm to Britain's interests regarding the Ottoman realm. In the wake of Mehmet Ali's second offensive against the Sultan, Palmerston instructed Ponsonby on 6 February 1838 to press the Porte for a new³⁴⁵ commercial convention and to draw their attention to the negative outcome the abolition of monopolies could have over the personal aggrandisement scheme of Mehmet Ali.³⁴⁶ This was very well summarised by the then-new Secretary of the British Embassy to the Porte, and a future British ambassador to the United States, Henry Lytton Bulwer, who took over duties in Istanbul in mid-1837:

[Negotiations] had been going on for five or six years respecting a commercial treaty, and when I arrived, there was not the slightest approach towards a termination ... More favourable circumstances, not unconnected with the state of Egypt, now arose; Rechid was in power,

³⁴⁴ Ş. Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2007, p. 207.

³⁴⁵ The Baltalimani Convention to be signed in 1838 was not an entirely novel bilateral agreement. As put by Puryear, in *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 118: "The treaty really resulted from a prolonged discussion of the Anglo-Turkish tariff of 1820. The capitulations from time to time were supplemented by schedules of specific duties which interpreted what was three per cent ad valorem on the various items of trade ... An Anglo-Turkish tariff was concluded in 1805, and another in 1820. Still another would have been signed in 1834."

³⁴⁶ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, pp. 73, 79.

reform popular, and thus the plan of a new convention was again taken up, and Lord Ponsonby entrusted me with the task of considering the mode of arranging it, of consulting with ... the various merchants, whose relations were most extended, and whose interests were most concerned.³⁴⁷

We also know for a fact that as early as May 1838, Lord Ponsonby conveyed to London the idea that an entire revision of the Ottoman commercial system would be detrimental to Mehmet Ali, and to this end, if a convention or treaty was signed between Istanbul and London, the British would also earn the entitlement to demand it be executed in Egypt as well as elsewhere within the Ottoman country. Temperley suggests that this assessment by the British side was the final one to encourage Sultan Mahmud II into further rapprochement with England. The Porte was accordingly troubled by an estimate of a new attack from Mehmet Ali and supposed that a commercial convention would also increase the likelihood of a political alliance with Great Britain. In fact, the mere existence of a powerful army on the part of the Vali was a constant threat to Turkey.³⁴⁸

At the end, what the British attempted with the general substance of their commercial proposals was that they in part persuaded the Ottoman Sultan to take it as a way to bring Europe and his rebellious Vali into differences for the end of the destruction of monopolies. They would succeed in that in a very short period of time and, as reported by a contemporary British statesman, the Ottoman Sultan agreed to the 1838 Convention on the strong belief that it would devastate Mehmet Ali.³⁴⁹ Particularly, even though the Sultan's revenues would also be considerably affected by the new measures introduced, the Porte assessed that crumbling the rise of Mehmet Ali would

³⁴⁷ H. L. E. Bulwer, *A Despatch from H. L. E. Bulwer, Baron Dalling and Bulwer, "on various matters connected with the Turkish Convention of 1838"*, Foreign Office, London, 1843, p. 3.

³⁴⁸ Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 36; Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 71.

³⁴⁹ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 84.

come at a price. In this regard, it is argued that Sultan Mahmud's consideration of the 1838 Convention was almost as a potential weapon against Mehmet Ali. It was this approach that must have led to the assessment on the part of the Porte that if the Paşa of Egypt refused to abolish his monopolies, Britain would be obliged to take measures forcing Mehmet Ali to implement the Convention in the eyalet. In a similar vein, if the Vali remained defiant, London would need to proceed to reduce him.³⁵⁰ A similar understanding was also entertained by Lord Ponsonby in Istanbul that the abolition of Ottoman monopolies would deteriorate Mehmet Ali's sources of power in Egypt and Syria, as, if the agreement was turned into a treaty between the Porte and Britain, that abolition in Egypt must entail the use of force and the exercise of influence by Britain to ensure its execution by the Paşa.³⁵¹

In particular, in early 1838, the Reis Efendi entered negotiations with the British Ambassador in Istanbul, opted for seeking assistance from Great Britain and hoped to extract political support in exchange of economic concessions. Even though the Ottoman Foreign Minister had not accomplished realising the military support, Mustafa Reşit fixed with Britain the terms of an agreement to strike at Mehmet Ali's monopolies. This process resulted in the Convention of Baltalimani (also referred to as Balta Liman Treaty, Balta Liman Convention or the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838), signed on August 16th, 1838, between Great Britain and the Porte, at the residence of the Reis Efendi in the Baltalimani quarter in Istanbul.

The Convention ostensibly addressed methods the Ottomans exercised in foreign trade, including monopolies, special restrictions, and additional taxes. Prior to 1838, the Porte had been able to monopolise the trade of a product, and mostly its exports, in a single merchant. It also had used to enjoy the

³⁵⁰ Anick, *The Embassy of Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople, 1833-1841*, p. 173.

³⁵¹ Ponsonby to F. Pisani, 17 April 1838; enclosure Ponsonby to Palmerston, 21 April 1838, cited in *ibid.*, p. 161.

prerogative to restrict exports of certain raw material or food products, should they seem insufficient in dire conditions. For instance, in war-time, the Porte could comfortably levy taxes in external commerce. With Baltalimani, such monopolies were abolished, and the Porte renounced its right to extraordinary restrictions or taxes.³⁵²

The Baltalimani Convention enabled instead the British to achieve a definite and uniform low rate for all sorts of commerce with the Ottoman Empire. Generally, it granted Britain a most-favoured nation status that enabled its merchants to enjoy all tariffs established with Russia or other powers, which had been lower than those in the complementing new British rates with Turkey. The British also furthered their right to unrestrained trade throughout the Ottoman lands. Its terms, which were suggested to have included all Palmerston had hoped or desired³⁵³, particularly stipulated that all foreign goods be admitted on payment 3% duty as well as an *ad valorem* interior duty of 9%. In addition, the duty levied on foreigners for exporting Turkish goods was set at 3% and an interior duty of 2% was defined. By this measure, whereas local merchants had to continue paying for interior duties, foreigners gained an exemption, hence an important comparative advantage at the expense of the Ottomans. Baltalimani additionally confirmed “all rights, privileges, and immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of Great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties”³⁵⁴ once again in 1838 and, as stated in Article I of the Convention, “for ever”.

The above is the way the Convention looks in form and writing as an economic arrangement. The present study, in addition, takes it as a direct political response to the unsettling power Mehmet Ali accumulated. This way, it had been thought, Mehmet Ali would not be able to challenge the British

³⁵² Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*, p. 205.

³⁵³ Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 36.

³⁵⁴ Article I of the Convention. The main text of the Convention is available in the appendices.

again or the regional balance. In this sense, as remarkable as it could get, the Convention, in line with the British plans, banned all monopolies and prohibitions as well as “trade permits” necessity for trade in *all* dominions of the Ottoman Empire, and that included, no matter how nominal it seemed as an Ottoman unit yet an *ipso facto* part of the empire, Egypt.³⁵⁵ It sure did have a negative impact on an extensive part of the Porte’s revenues, but also constituted a straightforward attack at Mehmet Ali, who derived power from monopolising Egypt’s economy. For example, it was suggested in 1838 by the then French ambassador in Istanbul, Albin Reine Roussin, that Baltalimani signified new views on the part of Great Britain with regard to Mehmet Ali, and the terms of the Convention were defined to initiate a commercial revolution.³⁵⁶

It is of necessity to emphasise that Palmerston was also adamant concerning the implementation of the 1838 Convention. Accordingly, if Mehmet Ali seemed “so ill-advised as to oppose any obstacle to the full and faithful execution of the treaty in the provinces of which he is governor, means would easily be found to convince him of his error.”³⁵⁷ The British Secretary is reported to also have made it clear that London would not let any objection by Mehmet Ali’s end to occur vis-à-vis the full and complete practice of the

³⁵⁵ Article VI of the Convention stipulates the following: “*It is agreed by the Turkish Government, that the Regulations established in the present Convention shall be general throughout the Turkish Empire, whether in Turkey in Europe or Turkey in Asia, in Egypt, or other African possessions belonging to the Sublime Porte, and shall be applicable to all the subjects, whatever their description, of the Ottoman Dominions; and the Turkish Government also agrees not to object to other foreign Powers settling their trade upon the basis of this present Convention.*”

³⁵⁶ Roussin to Molé, 16 August 1838, cited in Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 85.

³⁵⁷ Palmerston to Sebastiani, 20 September 1838, F.O. 195 to 148, cited in Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 91.

relevant stipulation in the 1838 Convention, as to the abolition of monopolies throughout the Ottoman realm.³⁵⁸

The spectacle of the Baltalimani Convention as a political-economic event does not merely emanate from its terms, conditions or impacts over Istanbul and/or Cairo. After all, we cannot comprehensively analyse its immediate effects over Egypt: even though the Convention was to take to effect in March 1839, the firman declaring its introduction had reached Egypt when the Vali was at war with his Sultan, again. The enforcement of its content was to become a priority with the 1841 settlement of the Egyptian question, during the “undoing” of Mehmet Ali’s “personal empire”. That is a focus of the following section.

Putting aside the Convention’s technicalities, the present study argues that Baltalimani carries significance because it was, in quintessence, the first phase of the culmination of Pax Britannic efforts to rid of an anti-system actor in the Near East. That act was embodied in Mehmet Ali’s governorship which threatened commercial, political and military interests of Britain, to which the Convention contained a multifaceted response deriving from the general parameters of the Pax Britannica.

In substance, the 1838 Convention had a definite “liberal” tenet in line with calls for the system’s particular version of free trade. It was directly targeting the monopolistic nature of the market remnant in the Ottoman realm, orienting this country more in the orbit of British foreign commerce, and, thereby, extending and reaffirming London’s political-economic influence over Istanbul. Baltalimani was also one of the primary examples of a defined version of peace interdependent with a certain way of economy. The commercially concessionary nature of the Convention enabled the British to extract gains from the Porte and resettle the regional balance of power; in exchange, yet not in total reciprocity, the Ottomans were provided with a set

³⁵⁸ Palmerston to Aston (at Paris), 15 September 1838, F.O. 195 T 148, cited in Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 91.

and short-term version of regional peace and stability. In this regard, it appears reasonable to link Baltalimani with Polanyi's suggestion concerning one of the functions of the Pax Britannica where "wars were sometimes avoided by deliberately removing their causes, if the fate of small Powers only was involved. Small nations were checked and prevented from disturbing the status quo in anyway which might precipitate war."³⁵⁹ In Mehmet Ali's case, the 1838 Convention was the prerequisite for the removal of such causes, and the process would be sealed by the 1841 Settlement, which guaranteed the former's enforcement in Egypt.

In practice, the Convention was a result of synthesis between the attempt by merchants as well as publicists to use state power to dictate their will and the preference of those who favoured a negotiated settlement of a commercial dispute. It was a clear-cut reaction to a process of local assertion in the form of monopolies and tariffs to raise income, which was in absolute contrast with interests embedded in the network of statesmen, merchants, and entrepreneurs. In other words, the Convention was quite clearly "part of a world-wide movement of European self-assertion, spearheaded by a coalition of merchants, military men and politicians."³⁶⁰

Additionally, in laying the bedrock for the Convention, the British commercial interest was directly involved and perhaps became the most vigorous force, when combined with geopolitical considerations. As a matter of fact, this understanding was evident in one of Bulwer's reports concerning the 1838 Convention that preparations for took place in consultation with "the

³⁵⁹ Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 8.

³⁶⁰ R. Owen, 'The 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention: An Overview', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol 7, p. 7.

various merchants, whose relations were most extended, and whose interests were most concerned.”³⁶¹

Particularly for Great Britain, it carried a political meaning that regards fortifying the policy to maintain the Ottoman Empire in its post-1833 Hünkâr İskelesi form. In fact, in the case of the Empire’s partition due to Russian encroachment or an internal strike by the insidious Vali, significant economic losses would have occurred on the part of Britain. In fact, as avidly put in retrospect in 1853 by Lord John Russel, who served as Prime Minister during the early Victorian period, the subversion of Turkey’s independence and well-being would not only bring about a great change in the territorial arrangements of Europe or a derangement of power distribution, but it would also cause a “great diminution of British commerce, now fostered by the moderate tariff of the Turkish Empire.”³⁶²

Therefore, in the given conditions of 1838, maintaining the integrity of Turkey was also correlated with British political and commercial opposition to the Vali of Egypt. The Convention, in essence, signified “a determination of Great Britain to oppose Mehemet Ali by forcing him, if advice failed, to accept the new terms governing commerce, and ... presaged British participation in a limitation of the territorial power of the pasha.”³⁶³ On the other hand, Mehmet Ali, though resisted at first place to execute the Convention as far as the abolition of monopolies in the eyalet was concerned, gave in to British pressure over the Convention. The Paşa declared to the Austrian, British, and French consuls in September 1838 that he would permit

³⁶¹ H. L. E. Bulwer, *A Despatch from H. L. E. Bulwer, Baron Dalling and Bulwer, “on various matters connected with the Turkish Convention of 1838”*, p. 3.

³⁶² Lord John Russel’s address from Newcastle-on-Tyne on the Independence of Turkey, published in *The Examiner. A Weekly Paper, on Politics, Literature, and the Fine Arts, for the Year 1853*, The Examiner of 5 Wellington Street, London, 1853, p. 244.

³⁶³ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 91.

it to operate in Egypt when it would come into force throughout the Ottoman realm in March 1839.³⁶⁴

In sum, we see that this Convention was in essence a stark and multi-layered undertaking, firmly relevant with the form and the spirit of the Pax Britannica. It may be argued that it was one of many issues, in which Palmerston's high hopes for a rapid change in international politics could take place in line with the rise of liberalism.³⁶⁵ On top of all issues involved, it was a response to calls by Istanbul against Mehmet Ali which enabled the furtherance of British political-economic presence throughout the Near East. The Sultan, sensing the menace posed by his rebellious Vali and probable consequences another clash with him would generate as far as the Russian influence concerned, did, one way or another, reconcile with such a concessionary pact. Notwithstanding, as history presented and foreseen cleverly by Mehmet Ali whilst he was making way for Baltalimani's execution in Egypt³⁶⁶, even though the 1838 Convention proved practical as a means of frustrating the Vali's expansion, it was the most detrimental in the longer-term for the Ottoman finances compared to the Egyptian eyalet.

On a deeper level, in an attempt to synchronise the Ottoman economy and trade mechanisms with the standards of the Pax Britannica, it stipulated the abolition of commercial monopolies. This was directly against Egypt and targeted the diminishing of the Vali's revenues which had previously been pooled for military expansion that caused an unsettling in the system. Once the Russians set foot in Istanbul, Britain's European and Asiatic designs were perceived to be in danger.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

³⁶⁵ Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography*, p. 189.

³⁶⁶ Puryear states "He gave as his reason the belief that in the long-run the convention would be prejudicial to the Ottoman Empire." in Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 92.

And in essence, underneath this setting, a strategic commercial asset appears to be the primary motive of the Convention. It was that by which Mehmet Ali increased his revenues, furthered his exports and, with a fortune engendered, expanded his “empire” at the chagrin of the Porte and of the standards of the Pax Britannica. This was the Egyptian cotton, the fuel of the Vali’s adventurist engines which pumped his industry and military, and overshadowed London’s hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Vali’s cotton profits, which came to be regarded utmost precious by the Vali as well as British officials and merchants, were the reason why “[by] ruthlessly weakening the Egyptian state, Britain showed that it did not expect Egypt to voluntarily agree to being reduced to the position of a mere peripheral country.”³⁶⁷

Nonetheless, the Convention on its own was not the final strike against the Vali. The way paved by Baltalimani was directed towards definite ends; but it would take time to thread on that. By the time the Convention entered into force in March 1839, Mehmet Ali had already been at war against his Sultan. With the 1838 arrangement, the Rubicon was crossed and the scene was set for the ultimate coup de grace. It would take the total defeat of the Vali at the hands of a British-Ottoman alliance in 1840 for the eyalet’s ultimate orientation with the Pax Britannica.

6.2. The Confrontation of 1839

The Convention of 1838 notwithstanding, the problem of the anti-systemic Paşa was there to hang over like the sword of Damocles in the Near East. Even more, particularly problematic for the Pax Britannic system was that there had not been any political settlement dealing with the Vali directly; the 1833 Peace of Kütahya was not a permanent arrangement, signed neither by the Sultan nor the Vali, and its terms were subject to renewal each year.

³⁶⁷ Batou, *‘Muhammad-‘Ali’s Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century?*, p. 207.

In line with what had produced this settlement back then, in late 1830s, Mehmet Ali had seemed on the brink of becoming able to assert near absolute control throughout the Red Sea, the Euphrates area, and the entire Mediterranean coast, from Adana to Alexandria clockwise. With rigid control over shipping, commerce, and protectionism, such expansion would have meant, in practice, turning the entire region inaccessible for British goods at a time when London was seeking new markets. It would also indicate domination over maritime and overland approaches to India as well as trade with the Levant. When considered also with having put British strategic commercial interests in harm's way due to his extensive projects over cotton, Mehmet Ali had been steadfastly progressing in a collision course.

This was, however, too much to appease, accommodate, or contain for the Pax Britannica. The Eastern question, with Mehmet Ali's Egypt being an integral part of it, was far from resolution and prone to becoming fatal for the European equilibrium.³⁶⁸ As a matter of fact, Mehmet Ali's strategy progressively became a zero-sum game. By 1839, his incessant territorial claims for consolidating the eyalet's finances had made the Vali retract from his formerly moderate temperament: he had no more of any conciliatory course between defeat and victory.³⁶⁹ A late nineteenth century account draws from this matter in a fine way that in 1833

Mehemet Ali was master of Syria and Egypt, but held no firman as to his dynasty. In 1841 he lost Syria, but obtained the inheritance of Egypt for his family. In the former year he was triumphant, and had imposed himself on Europe. In the latter he had been publicly disgraced, humbled, and stripped of that military prestige which he had so laboriously acquired. On the whole, therefore, he must have made some serious mistakes in his foreign or internal policy, perhaps in both, during the interval.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁸ Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography*, p. 218.

³⁶⁹ Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 103.

³⁷⁰ Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century or Mehemet Ali and His Successors until the British Occupation in 1882*, pp. 165-166.

Such mistakes would be best followed by its proper historian, but we could confidently suggest that the way Mehmet Ali reached the 1840s as an anti-systemic regional power left a quite negative effect on the eyalet vis-à-vis the British understanding. This was because, by 1839, the British policy concerning the region had significantly definite dimensions: preventing any further disruption of the Ottoman Empire by the Vali; reversing the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and thereby destroying the Russian domination over Turkey as well as preventing a renewal of Russian intervention in Turkish affairs³⁷¹; and blocking alliances which France could develop at the expense of Britain in the Near East.³⁷²

Mehmet Ali's plans were in stark contrast with all of these, either because of their direct repercussions or indirect consequences. The course he entered would conclude with his eyalet's undoing by the Pax Britannica, as a result of which the regional balance was settled, and Egypt's course was synchronised with that of the system. In this regard, this section examines the downfall of Mehmet Ali's personal empire in a three-fold manner: (1) It suggests that the time-frame from the Vali's declaration of his intention to

³⁷¹ Palmerston, referring to the 1831-33 crisis in the Near East and the eventual Russian intervention in 1833, states the following, outlined in his instructions to the British Ambassador to the Porte, Lord Ponsonby, in a letter dated 6 December 1833, in F.O. Turkey, 78/220, No. 23, cited in Baker, Palmerston, op. cit. (italics added):

"The recent events in the Levant have indeed, by an unfortunate combination of circumstances, enabled [Russia] to make an enormous stride towards the accomplishment of her designs upon Turkey, and it becomes an object of great importance for the interests of Great Britain, to consider how Russia can be prevented from pushing her advantage further, and to see whether it be possible to deprive her of the advantage which she has already gained."

He furthermore questions the way the Russian influence over the Porte came into effect in the face of threats posed by Mehmet Ali:

"It may be represented to the Turkish Govt., that by contracting this Russian Alliance the Sultan, while he endeavours to escape from one danger, exposes himself to another Danger, greater, and far more certain; that by placing himself thus under the Protection of Russia, he will soon find himself under her absolute Control; and that the example of Poland may serve as a warning to shew, how rapid is the Transition from Dependence, to Subjugation, and Partition."

³⁷² Mowat, *The Near East and France 1829-1847*, p. 170; Baker, Palmerston, *Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi*, p. 84.

proclaim independence in mid-1838 until the renewal of hostilities between the Porte and Mehmet Ali in 1839 constitutes the period for attempted pre-emption. It was during this period when Powers tried to persuade the Sultan not to take military action against the Vali, and Mehmet Ali to be on the defensive. (2) After the Battle of Nizip in 1839 starts the second period of diplomatic demarches, when the Pax Britannic structure led by Britain aimed at severing interaction between the newly enthroned, young Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecit and the seasoned Vali of Egypt, who had displayed excess in his demands of aggrandisement. And finally (3), ensuing the recalcitrance displayed by the eyalet's administration in 1840, the period of intervention begins and results in what would deny Mehmet Ali the majority of gains accumulated in a 35-year process. All three periods were channelled into the same end of redressing the Pax Britannic design over the Eastern Mediterranean, which made sure that the Ottoman Empire was maintained, approaches to India were secured, any intervention by the Russian Tsar averted, a grand-scale market for British exports was sustained, and the capabilities and instruments of such a regional actor to compete with British strategic commodities were thoroughly curbed.

Firstly, with Russia towering above the Porte after 1833, there was heavy uneasiness about the anticipation that the Near East fall increasingly under chaos. This was the most obvious in the statements by Palmerston. The British Secretary spoke very lowly of the Vali as the precipitator of this entire course and the reason to menace the British reckoning over the region. In 1839, uttering his hatred of Mehmet Ali, Palmerston stressed that he was "nothing but an ignorant barbarian, who by cunning and boldness and mother-wit, has been successful in rebellion; ... I look upon his boasted civilization of Egypt as the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and oppressor as ever made a people wretched."³⁷³ It had been quite clear by then that any future attempts on the part of Mehmet Ali to either self-aggrandise, threaten the Porte or move forward with independence would definitely be taken extra

³⁷³ Palmerston to Granville, 10 June 1839, cited in Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, p. 89.

systemic³⁷⁴ and be rendered obsolete in the face of Pax Britannic pervasiveness. As a matter of fact, this position was well-established as early as 1833 after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. Accordingly, should the Sultan be alarmed once again by the Vali,

Great Britain can effectually control the Pasha, and protect the Sultan from such Danger; and it may be added that so long as the Ottoman Empire continues really Independent, and does not become the Satellite of any other Power, the Disposition of Great Britain to assist the Sultan, will always be equal to her Power of doing so. But if the British Govt. should ever be reduced to the necessity of choosing between the Establishment at Constantinople of the Power of Mehemet Ali, or the subjection of that Capital to the Power of Russia, it would be impossible that we should not prefer the former of these alternatives.³⁷⁵

Specifically, by the end of the 1830s, diplomatic reports from Istanbul had already started to refer to the Sultan's intention to fight Mehmet Ali once again. This was highly possible in the lack of any permanent settlement for the Egyptian affair. The 1833 Peace of Kütahya was just a cease-fire and a temporary arrangement that appointed Ibrahim, Mehmet Ali's commander son as governor of occupied provinces. In fact, the post-1833 situation concerning the Porte and the eyalet could be altered at any given time.

Mehmet Ali's administration approached the matter in a similar understanding and took the 1833 arrangement as a non-permanent one, another stop for his self-aggrandisement track.³⁷⁶ The Vali was convinced that he needed an extensive hinterland to the north so as to defend the expanded Egypt. For that, he needed Adana and entire Syria, from Aleppo to Damascus; for independence, he required self-sufficiency in men-power, industry,

³⁷⁴ Badri, *The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power*, p. 156.

³⁷⁵ Baker, Palmerston, *Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi*, pp. 88-89.

³⁷⁶ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 232.

commerce, produce and material.³⁷⁷ As a matter of fact, it was reported by Campbell in late 1838 that Mehmet Ali had told him that

he had been toiling during 52 years to arrive at his present name and power ... that he could not quit this life without having settled ... their future state; that he could not permit that his name should be cursed after his death; and that it should be said that Mehemet Ali had laboured for himself alone ... The Pasha then said, that it was in his power to raise up all Turkey, and that he had only to lift up his hand, and all Roumelia and Anatolia would follow him.³⁷⁸

This was internationally vital in the sense that the British was concerned with a prospect of another Russian intervention in such a conflict between the Sultan and his vassal, because of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi; and that France, the ambiguous patron of Mehmet Ali favoured the maintenance of the 1833 Peace of Kütahya against the loss of Syria by the Vali.³⁷⁹ The Powers also shared the goal of preventing another war between the Sultan and the Vali, yet differed in the ways to achieve it. For instance, the British discouraged Mehmet Ali and relayed that any endeavour to extend power over the Persian gulf would be resisted by the British fleet.³⁸⁰ As to the Porte, Britain prepared to “press strongly on the Sultan, that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali, it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.”³⁸¹ The French, in contrast, tried to deviate the

³⁷⁷ Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, pp. 101-103.

³⁷⁸ Campbell to Palmerston (Extract.), 17 July 1838, Communications with Mehemet Ali, 1838. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of her Majesty, 1839, in *Accounts and Papers: Twenty-One Volumes (21) Admiralty Court; Slave Trade; Commerce and Navigation: &c &c.*, T. R. Harrison, London 1839, p. 9.

³⁷⁹ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 147.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³⁸¹ Foreign Office, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, Vol I., T. R. Harrison, London, 1841, p. 4.

Porte's course from developing any countering plan to push Mehmet Ali out of Syria.³⁸²

Anyhow, in view of the imminent danger of a change in status-quo defined by the Peace of Kütahya, such as the Vali proclaiming independent, all interested Powers developed a pre-emptive position on the issue. They were mutually worried by the prospect of a regional, if not an all-out great war due to vested interests in the prosperity of the Porte or the advancements by Mehmet Ali.

Particularly, in late 1838, the British were firm to dissuade the Porte from aggression against Mehmet Ali, citing differences in military capabilities. They were also hesitant to give promises to the Porte for an assault against the Vali, for the British had aimed at avoiding confronting France or Russia. The Russians too were particularly uneasy due to the terms of the Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty that they might have had to dispatch forces to Istanbul, which could have easily caused a rupture between Russia and other Powers. With that in mind, the Russian officials in Istanbul were ordered to convey to the Sultan that in case the Ottomans were found precipitating conflict, no assistance would have been provided in line with the 1833 Treaty. On a similar note, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt also encouraged the Vali to withdraw the eyalet's forces from Syria and have them in defence. Metternich too made it clear diplomatically that the Porte could be left to its own devices if any conflict between the Sultan and the Vali is started because of Turkish aggression.³⁸³ Not the least, France was in the pro-status-quo camp, yet in a way to side with Mehmet Ali and prevent the Porte from taking over Syria.

³⁸² Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, pp. 147, 149.

³⁸³ Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia*, pp. 76-78.

Such diplomatic activity was taking place in Alexandria in the same direction as well. For instance, it was officially relayed to the Vali by the British Consul in Egypt that the British navy would counteract against any attempt by Mehmet Ali in case he commenced another course of territorial expansion. As a matter of fact, it had now been the planned strategy concerning Mehmet Ali's intentions that London was to support Istanbul in case it fell under menace again. It was declared time and again to the Paşa in the final years of the 1830s that if he was to execute his design at the expense of the Porte, and if hostilities were to "break out thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan, and for the purpose of preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire".³⁸⁴

These waves of pressure seemed to prove useful when Ottoman forces crossed the Euphrates river southward, effectively into the eyalet-controlled area on 21 April 1839, and the commander of the eyalet's forces, Ibrahim Paşa, in a prudent fashion, was not permitted by his father to confront them. Mehmet Ali is reported to have given his word that in the case of Ottoman withdrawal northbound, he would have dispatched an instruction for backward movement down to Damascus. The Vali is said to have seemed open to evacuating partially Syria and entertaining an ultimate arrangement that pertains to his intentions concerning Egypt, only in condition that England, France, Russia, and Austria guarantee his hereditary possession of the eyalet.³⁸⁵

Nonetheless, while the western Powers were debating on the substance and method of an ideal settlement to seal this risky chapter, for example concerning administrative and territorial claims by the Vali, hostilities between the Porte and Cairo renewed in June 1839. It was the end of the

³⁸⁴ Palmerston to Campbell, 7 July 1838, Communications with Mehemet Ali, 1838. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of her Majesty, 1839, in *Accounts and Papers: Twenty-One Volumes (21) Admiralty Court; Slave Trade; Commerce and Navigation: &c &c.*, T. R. Harrison, London 1839, p. 7.

³⁸⁵ Rodkey, *The Turco Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841*, p. 83.

period of attempted pre-emption when Ottoman forces attacked Mehmet Ali's forces in Nizip, near today's Gaziantep, and faced a huge loss at the hands of the eyalet's military. The commander of the eyalet's forces was hardly convinced not to further an offensive into Anatolia.³⁸⁶

Thereafter, fearing Russian intervention, the Ottoman fleet defected to Alexandria in July. Panic prevailed at the Porte when the then-Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II passed away in late June, and his son, the young Sultan Abdülmecit I took over control with a couple of seasoned Ottoman Paşas. The Ottoman state was facing an extreme internal threat to its existence with neither a military nor a navy remaining to defend the Porte.

The fact that Sultan Abdülmecit was ready to give the Vali the hereditary control of Egypt, in addition to granting him pardon for his wrongdoings against the Porte sounded alarm bells in European capitals and commenced the period of demarches. Even though this was contingent on the condition that Mehmet Ali leave the occupied parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman navy joining that of the eyalet and the eventual power vacuum at the expense of the Porte pushed the British increasingly into resolute steps, including effective diplomatic/military collective action. In particular, these developments, connoting total-failure of the Porte, directed Palmerston's course towards seeking a substantial and mutual agreement to be endorsed by all the five Powers of Europe.

The result was the joint note of 27 July 1839, submitted to the Porte by the British, French, Russian, Austrian and Prussian embassies to Istanbul. In a show of support for the Sultan, the five Powers collectively severed the line between Abdülmecit and Mehmet Ali and blocked effectively the latter's attempt to manipulate the situation to his advantage.³⁸⁷ However, this

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 104.

³⁸⁷ The line in the mentioned note is available in Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 156 and is read as follows: "The undersigned, conforming to the instructions of their respective governments, have the honor to inform the Sublime Porte that an accord between the five governments on the

initiative too would not produce any breakthrough in the deadlock realised on south-eastern Anatolia. The period of demarches would slowly come to an end in the aftermath of the note and make way for the build-up necessary for the systemic political and military intervention in the crisis.

There is a multitude of reasons that diplomatic interaction between the Powers, the Porte, and Mehmet Ali failed, and that the Vali continued his attempt to take advantage of the military success in 1839. This section narrows them into a singular track and argues that the way the French acquiesced partially to Mehmet Ali's power encouraged him to stick to his ground. In particular, the British and the French differed concerning the fate of Mehmet Ali.

It should be remembered that France, in general, had been exercising a policy in favour of the Vali. The French encouraged Mehmet Ali to keep his eyalet "virtually independent", as sanctioned by the 1833 Peace of Kütahya and direct his efforts to a non-belligerent governorship. In particular, the difference between London and Paris was pertinent to the question of Mehmet Ali's independence, which the former opposed to and the latter took as a factor to balance the British naval supremacy in the region.³⁸⁸

They had functional basis to exercise such action. The French mark on the progress of Mehmet Ali's army was noticeable. Many French officers were involved in restructuring and training the eyalet's army. Such Frenchmen were said to have thought the Paşa open and sometimes familiar, who confided in them and looking for their counsel.³⁸⁹ The French in addition were

Eastern Question is assured, and they are charged to engage it to abstain from any definitive deliberation without their support and to await the effect of the interest which they are extending."

³⁸⁸ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 158.

³⁸⁹ V. de Guichen, *La crise d'Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l'Europe*, Émile-Paul Frères, Paris, 1921, p. 3.

content with Vali's attempt that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was stated to have rejoiced with Mehmet Ali, who was taken as a power to be collaborated with for interests in the Mediterranean.³⁹⁰ In all, as put back in 1840, Paris had been exerting tremendous effort to become the patron of the entire southern coast of the Mediterranean into the Taurus mountains. They accordingly were extending support to Mehmet Ali for his control in Egypt, Syria and the rest of the Near East.³⁹¹

Anyway, through August 1839, Mehmet Ali's forces headed by Ibrahim were planned to march through the Taurus, with a view to reaching Konya- which was strictly overruled by the Vali, who opted for a wait-and-see as to the Powers' reaction concerning his victories, rather than further bloodshed. The Vali's demands, at this given time, were extensive. Trying to leverage his military victory, in addition to the recognition of Egypt as an independent kingdom under the Vali's hereditary rule, Mehmet Ali demanded the same rights in Adana and Syria as well as secure boundaries south of the Taurus mountains, and north of Syria, including the modern-day Diyarbakir and Urfa provinces. The territories claimed were not only strategically important, but also economically dear, situated on the east-west trade routes. Such extent would enable him to enjoy dominion over northern Iraq as well as both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.³⁹²

Seeing that the Europeans were not in functional unison to secure the Porte, Mehmet Ali insisted in his demands concerning territorial and sovereign privileges. Insistent was the Porte too that did not give in to Mehmet Ali's unequivocal demands for hereditary rule in Egypt and in Syria. The irreconcilability between these two ends would start the third and final period

³⁹⁰ Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 78.

³⁹¹ An extract from an article, published by the Examiner on 23 August 1840, cited in Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia*, p. 234.

³⁹² Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 241-242.

of this story, that of the intervention, and would mark how the redressing was put in execution.

Particularly, in the face of dragging yet inconclusive negotiations for the Vali's withdrawal from occupied portions of Syria as well as the return of the Ottoman fleet to Istanbul, Palmerston submitted in January 1840 to the Powers a draft convention to deal with the question of Mehmet Ali for good. It significantly addressed assistance for the Ottoman Sultan should he ask for aid to confront an offensive by the Vali of Egypt. The draft was subject to months-long talks and saw the French not taking part in it. They were rather in favour of direct settlement between Istanbul and Cairo so as to extend gains on the part of the Mehmet Ali, where as Russia, Prussia and Austria joined Great Britain for concerted efforts which both the Sultan and the Vali would be required to accept.³⁹³

Eventually, on 15 July 1840, the four Powers composed of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant³⁹⁴ that set the terms for a settlement between the Porte and Mehmet Ali. The Convention also included a separate act, addressing how coercion may be employed in case the Vali did not accept the terms.

The Convention particularly offered the Vali hereditary rule over Egypt and lifetime rule over Damascus in the condition that his forces withdraw from Syria in 10 days after he was notified of this term. Failing that, Mehmet Ali would still have the chance of hereditary rule over Egypt if he abided by the terms in a total of 20 days post-notice. Failing that too, the Sultan would move to withdraw the offer concerning Egypt and follow a separate course. The Vali was also forced to return the Ottoman fleet immediately, to pay a yearly

³⁹³ Puryear, *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*, p. 172.

³⁹⁴ See appendix for the text of the 1840 Convention as well as its integral components.

tribute, and to enforce all treaties and laws of the Sultan throughout the parts of the Empire under his control.

Mehmet Ali did not abide by these and received an ultimatum from the Sultan to withdraw from Syria, Adana and Crete. In the meantime, there was vigorous preparation going on in Istanbul to group a joint Turco-British force, with display of support extended by the remaining Powers except for France. In particular, the four Ambassadors to the Porte signed another joint note in August 1840 and assured the Sultan that he would be protected in case Mehmet Ali rejects the 1840 Convention.³⁹⁵

The Vali's position of defiance would not change. He did not even discuss it thoroughly with the European Consuls in Egypt or the Porte's envoy, Rifat Paşa, and failed honouring the total 20-day period defined by the Convention. Thereafter, the joint Turco-British military force started an operation and defeated Mehmet Ali's military in various spots in Syria. Also, the British fleet reached the Levant in September 1840; landing personnel distributed pamphlets, calling for revolt against the despotic Vali. The displeased peoples of the region took heed of this call, and when riots broke out across Syria, the joint Turco-Austrian-British fleet bombarded Egyptian positions in Beirut on 11 September 1840. The eyalet's military reversed back to Cairo from Adana, Latakia and Tripoli without any clashes. Acre too was surrendered to the Ottoman-European forces, who would eventually extend their control throughout the entire coastline.³⁹⁶

Mehmet Ali still seemed insubordinate, yet the remainder of his forces in Syria were in harm's way. The British, now represented by Commodore Napier in Alexandria, head of the British fleet of six sail positioned off the said Egyptian port, issued another ultimatum. It proved fruitful and led to the

³⁹⁵ Anick, *The Embassy of Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople, 1833-1841*, p. 251.

³⁹⁶ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 246; Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, pp. 80-81.

Commodore – Boghos Bey³⁹⁷ Convention of 27 November 1840. Consequently, Mehmet Ali submitted to withdrawing from Syria and, contingent on the firman to reinstate him as Vali of Egypt, to return the Turkish fleet to Istanbul.³⁹⁸

The Sultan's firman that promulgated the Vali's re-investiture was issued on 1 June 1841. It granted him lifetime rule over the Sudan, in addition to his family's hereditary rule over the eyalet. With the firman it was set forth that Mehmet Ali reduce his military forces to 18,000 troops and that, bearing in mind the 1838 Convention of Baltalimani, all treaties that came into and will come into force between the Porte and the third parties be entirely effected in the eyalet.³⁹⁹ With that the period of intervention came to an end, the Vali recognised the sultan once again as his suzerain and, as a symbol of inferiority and allegiance, agreed to an annual tribute to the Porte.

6.3. The Resettlement

The 1841 firman not only marked the end of the period of intervention in redressing the menace the eyalet caused for the system and the region, but also the conclusion of an overly dramatic phase in the Vali's venture. The outcome was a product of balance and reorientation with the system.

In particular, with the 1841 firman, even though the *de jure* jurisdiction of Istanbul was preserved, the eyalet reached effective autonomy within the Ottoman imperial configuration. This administrative unit was to enjoy *de facto* independence, with its governmental structure recognised, and its army legitimised. Even more, the eyalet government was now officially competent

³⁹⁷ The then "Foreign Minister" of the Vali.

³⁹⁸ Badri, *The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power*, p. 234.

³⁹⁹ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 175.

to pursue individual policies and coin its own money (bearing the Sultan's name in most part) as long as it honoured sufficiently the Porte's priorities.

This degree of autonomy was checked by the stipulation to totally apply the laws of the Porte in the eyalet, including the 1838 Convention of Baltalimani as well as the 1839 Tanzimat Firman.⁴⁰⁰ One of the disadvantages that remained for this peculiar formation was that the 1838 Convention had irrevocably become an integral part of what granted Mehmet Ali's Egypt legitimacy. With fortunes of Syria lost, his army shrinking in size, barriers protecting his agricultural and industrial produce torn down, and his monopolies outlawed, the eyalet of Egypt would now be unable to threaten the Porte existentially, the Pax Britannic designs concerning the Near East, or the British vested interest in the region. Nonetheless, now with the hereditary rule sanctioned and the eyalet being recognised as a *de facto* sovereign unit in the Ottoman realm, which was able to practice relations with third parties, it would be still able to follow a personal course, develop political and financial touch-base with Europeans and function as an autonomous actor in the Pax Britannic system until its occupation by the British in 1882.⁴⁰¹

For this specific matter, the present work adopts a critical view of works that analyse the 1833-1841 period in the Eastern/Egyptian question with an emphasis on Egypt as a *unit* or an *actor*. Influenced by the Egyptian national historiography, such accounts are inclined to take Mehmet Ali as the founding father of the modern Egyptian state in essence, upgrade that "state" to the level of practical independence, and address the crisis in the Near East as a play between equally effective actors. However, that line of thought neglects

⁴⁰⁰ Literally meaning the reordering decree, the Tanzimat Firman was issued on 3 November 1839. It was based on a three-fold reform programme that pertained to the extension of guarantees to the subjects of the Empire in terms of life, honour, and property; the establishment of a regular system for tax assessment and levying; and the development of new methods for fair conscription, training, and maintaining the troops of the Ottoman army. Shaw and Shaw in op. cit., pp. 59-61, present a detailed account on the substance of the firman.

⁴⁰¹ Goldschmidt Jr, *A Brief History of Egypt*, p. 70; Badri, *The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power*, p. 238.

the impact of the impediment Mehmet Ali faced in the 1830s, which was a systemic opposition formulated in Europe, led by Britain and its Foreign Secretary Palmerston, to the Vali's scheme of aggrandisement.⁴⁰²

In one sense, inferring from the example of Syria, the scheme of expansion the Vali aspired for may be argued to have been designed in an utterly anti-British way. Given the characteristics this example entailed, the success of Mehmet Ali's expansionist plans would have meant the extension of his peculiar resources of and methods for power, i.e. agricultural and commercial monopolies as well as self-aggrandisement. Such characteristics, as outlined above and which could also be found in the cases of Hijaz, the Sudan, or Crete, are taken by the present study as the internal contrasts with the Pax Britannic system.

In another sense, examining the matter on one of the bases of the Pax Britannica, i.e. the balance of power, Mehmet Ali's expansion, if realised, would also have produced further disequilibrium in pushing the Porte into the brink of failure. After all, Mehmet Ali had already become a "disturber" against the maintenance of the European balance of power, an anti-systemic determinant in 1833 by having threatened the Ottoman Empire existentially, heralded increasing Russian impact throughout the Ottoman dominions, and inviting French preponderance in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁰³ The impact which the Vali's expansion had left/seemed to leave on regional/international balance of power, as steered by the Pax Britannica, is argued to become the external contrasts with the foundations of the system.

The internal and the external aspects had together stimulated another aspect of the way in which Mehmet Ali's Egypt, as a political-economic unit, incrementally became an anti-systemic entity. The saga of the 1839-41 period

⁴⁰² Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, p. 21.

⁴⁰³ Badri, *The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power*, p. 194.

was the culmination of this process and would result in the Vali's failure. In other words, by driving the system's regional political-economic fundamentals into turbulence, the second wave of crisis Mehmet Ali caused in the Near East turned into a venomous threat to the system's operation. Now that it was inescapably engrained in the dynamics of it, the unsettling act by the rascal Paşa could have solely been redressed by the system *per se*.

Therefore, the present study, in contrast with the reductionist view, argues that the failure Mehmet Ali faced was a result of his governorship falling at odds with the Pax Britannica and becoming an essentially and practically anti-systemic enterprise. After all, his was not the only case of "rebellion" in the Ottoman realm against the Porte nor the only attempt for independence. The case of Greece in the 1820s provides a striking example to be compared with that of Mehmet Ali. It too was a secessionist call, threatened the well-being of the Porte, even caused massive defeat for the Ottoman navy, where Russians were actively present. The substantial difference between the two was the extent of conformity with the dos and do-nots subjectively of the Pax Britannica.

With despotic methods to rule, illiberal means to direct a centralised economy, monopolistic means to produce and trade agricultural and industrial commodities, raising an army beyond the level required to sustain his rule, and ultimately, translating this combination into war-mongerism, the expansionist and self-aggrandising patterns Mehmet Ali presented could not be accommodated by the Pax Britannica. It was the reason why the system directly redressed this anti-systemic flaw; the economic and financial power of the Vali, monopolies and their source of energy, cotton, was checked with 1838 Baltalimani Convention, his political configuration was disempowered with the 1840-41 settlement.

In this broader context, the present study argues that it was not Egypt as a unit that became anti-systemic, but the combination of forces, which embodied in the person of Mehmet Ali. It may anyway be true that Egypt itself was a primary contribution to the Vali's strengthening. After all, the eyalet had

tremendous riches; it was one of the populous provinces of the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed a very opportune climate for cotton production as well as ideal geo-location for international trade, and enabled its ruler, with geographical distance from the Porte, yet ideal location for an adventurist expansion north- and north eastern-bound, to undertake an attempt for an autonomous course. However, the Vali manipulated Egypt and its people for the end of increasing *his* and *his* dynasty's power. Mehmet Ali was not an Egyptian, nor an Egyptian nationalist; little attention, if not none of it did he pay to the welfare of Egyptians. The military was *his* to fight for the personal ends defined by the Vali *himself*. *His* troops carried the flags and were cast with commemorative medals which bore nothing but *Mehmet Ali's name*. When contemporary reports referred to the anti-systemic problem of the Egyptian question, it was not the eyalet as an imperial unit or its populace, but the notion culminated in the rule of Vali who himself was the essence of the issue.

At the end, what the Vali strove to accomplish was carving a strong military power out of the eyalet, dedicating finances toward that end and thereby securing an individual position over Egypt. Mehmet Ali was cognisant of debilitated Ottoman Empire and therefore attempted to take use of the Porte's weaknesses. Even though unable to proclaim independent, the Vali gained what he had always coveted. Egypt, in this understanding, may be assessed solely as its ruler, who, at the end, achieved what he sought for a very long time, i.e. the eyalet was *his*, for *himself* and for *his* descendants.⁴⁰⁴

In sum, the present chapter argues that the anti-systemic factor that produced the Egyptian question was signified in the governorship of Mehmet Ali and his disempowerment would ensure that the eyalet turns from a challenge to the Pax Britannica into an integrated, sub-unit of the system. In other words, if the 1838 Convention had deprived the Vali of fiscal strength and put the

⁴⁰⁴ Goldschmidt Jr, *A Brief History of Egypt*, p. 70; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, pp. 241, 305, 311; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, p. 67; Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 99.

commercial status of his eyalet in question, the Settlement of 1840-41 would be the one to curtail his international power and embed Egypt as a controllable unit of the Pax Britannica. The Vali's attempts at economic self-sufficiency, industrialisation and aggrandisement were to be arrested, and in their stead, the eyalet would be assured of a permanent flow of foreign capital and goods, which would unquestionably deprive it of any prospect for independence.⁴⁰⁵ As a matter of fact, if we could suggest that the 1805-1841 period in the case of Egypt (dependent on its Vali) was of deviation from the Pax Britannic ideals formulated for the Near East, then the post-1841 trajectory, in general, would wholly be an attempt to rectify that, increase Egypt's interaction with the system, and eventually integrate the eyalet with the nineteenth century political-economic order of the world.

⁴⁰⁵ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 247.

CHAPTER 7

THE SYSTEM TAKES OVER

The previous chapters display how the Vali of Egypt progressively threatened the fundamentals of the Pax Britannica in the Near East and how this system reversed the progress Mehmet Ali achieved in almost a four-decade-long period of time.

The Conventions of 1838 and 1840 were a direct response to the multi-faceted danger the Vali posed to the functioning of the Pax Britannica in the Near East. These arrangements made sure that Mehmet Ali be stripped of expansionist means and capabilities and Egypt -under his descendants- would not be able to project such level of power. On the contrary, the post-1841 Egypt would become a scene where the European powers were able to extend political and commercial influence and contribute to the destruction of the Vali's absolutist and mercantilist system of rule and economy.

Mehmet Ali's monopolistic way of production and trade was so central to the development of his economy, and over-dependence on a single mode of production and commerce essentially brought about the causes for its own dismantlement. By the early 1840s his resources had already been overstrained, and in the face of that fact the combination of 1838 and 1840 Conventions became excruciating for his eyalet mechanism. Administrative decentralisation, the abandonment of monopolies, and attempts to reinvigorate a free market in agriculture followed. At the end, the European merchant was able to finally found direct interaction with the Egyptian cultivator.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁶ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 57.

As a result, by the 1850s, the domination of the eyalet's government in Egypt's trade and market had effectively started to diminish in size and effect, enabling the rapid commercialisation of the formerly inaccessible parts of it. This process would accelerate in time and be culminated in the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. It would, by then, have integrated the eyalet in the international political-economic system as a colonial unit based on agricultural production.

In deviation from what Mehmet Ali had in mind for Egypt, the cultivated area was to be further expanded thanks to increasing canals and dams; production would be specialised in a single crop, cotton; cultivators, now free of the overload of eyalet-imposed monopolist taxes, were able to make the most of the land. In addition, the province would become much more accessible by land and sea, European entrepreneurs, merchants, traders, and technicians would immigrate in Egypt to seize its fortunes; yet, due to foreign competition, the majority of the domestic industries, which had been limited anyway, would eventually disappear. Given this outlook, it was just natural that Egypt would enter a cycle of lack of production and increasing debts; in fact, it had already been suffering a large foreign debt crisis by the time of the British occupation.⁴⁰⁷

When we examine the post-Mehmet Ali Egypt, we see the eyalet growing in numbers, but becoming increasingly unable to address the core of its problems. True, the gradual integration into the British-led world political-economic order would not let this hereditary administration follow the path of their founding father. However, the successive rulers of the Mehmet Ali dynasty were also there to put to blame. They were over-ambitious, and, so as to realise such ambition without a solid and sustainable economy, over-concessionary.

In fact, during the cotton boom of the 1860s, which was due to the American Civil War constituting a barrier in the flow of Southern cotton to England,

⁴⁰⁷ Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, p. 12.

and forcing the British manufacturers into high prices from alternative sources, Egypt was among a few to grow the crop on a relatively larger scale and sold Europe its cotton at increasing prices. For a brief period, the eyalet's (a khedivate after 1867, in an attempted extension of autonomy) economy was to prosper, European investors and bankers would rush in for public and private investments. This was the brief moment when the post-Mehmet Ali transformation practiced in Egypt was marvellous. However, increasing public services notwithstanding, that transformation could not deliver in the long-run and for the entire population. Major cities and ports were gaining a sense of Europe with hotels, burgeoning railroad network, telegraph lines or piped water, yet such changes benefited just a limited portion of upper class and remained artificial. The rest of Egypt was still in arrears.⁴⁰⁸

The increasing preference for investments in European technologies and opting for risky ventures eventually failed either the investors, the government, or both. Given the capacity to produce added value suffered by the rulers of Egypt, each round of political and economic concession extended to Europeans made them increasingly susceptible to encroachment by Europe.⁴⁰⁹

As such, instances of how the successors of Mehmet Ali brought about their own undoing are quite as many. Most notable of them is how the Suez Canal project resulted in a massive indemnity bill for the khedivate, and, even in the face of that, how the opening ceremony of the Canal in 1869 became a show of extravagant spending and vanity, based on credits extended by Europeans. Note that the eyalet had to declare bankrupt in 1876.

These examples could be multiplied only to arrive in similar conclusions: The downfall of the Mehmet Ali dynasty would take place in an incremental and decisive fashion. That process too was in effect led by the ever-strengthened

⁴⁰⁸ Goldschmidt Jr, *A Brief History of Egypt*, pp. 77-80.

⁴⁰⁹ Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, pp. 98-101.

dynamics of the Pax Britannica, of which Egypt as an administrative, political, and economic unit was increasingly becoming an integral part. In other words, having been deprived of its political and financial base of power due to the Conventions of 1838 and of 1841, the eyalet would experience a set of structural transformations and turn from a semi-independent to a dependent, peripheral unit in the Pax Britannic system. Whereas back in late 1840s, it was legally an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, with no colonial governor nor foreign occupation forces. In less than half a decade, though, Egypt under the successors of Mehmet Ali would be relegated to a semi-colonial dependency of Great Britain.

It was during this time that significant structural changes would occur in the Egyptian economy, which not only delinked it with the past but also stood out significantly in transforming the eyalet's political-economic development into the twentieth century. There was a series of them, in fact, which proved particularly determinant in conditioning the eyalet's integration into the international economy system as an agricultural unit and set the pattern of growth that led Egypt into dependence.⁴¹⁰ The present study chooses two of those that signify how the driving forces of the Pax Britannica would absorb Egypt and render its trajectory increasingly parallel to that of the system.

In this regard, this penultimate chapter briefly focuses on the case of cotton trade of the eyalet in Egypt's post-monopolies configuration and the changing nature of the merchant activity running in and towards Egypt. Based on the mentioned examples, it argues that the Pax Britannica proved successful after it reacted to the anti-systemic entity in the making in Egypt and gradually "corrected" the eyalet according to the system's conditions and standards. Once such commercial and financial integration was complete, the British vested interest in Egypt would turn out to be so dear that it could not be left in harm's way, hence the 1882 British occupation of the eyalet.

⁴¹⁰ P. M. Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, PhD Thesis, University of Hull, 1989, p. 189.

7.1. The Increasing Trade of Cotton

The economic effort in Egypt would decelerate when Mehmet Ali's peculiar configuration, which was based on a monopolistic market, embargoes, and an army, larger than what the Vali's contemporaries might have needed, was hampered in 1838 and 1840. In other words, once the reduction of the eyalet's military was enforced, the basis to financially sustain that institution turned extensively weakened. The formerly restrained market would transform into one increasingly dependent on exports of raw agricultural material, and Egypt would become another destination for finished European products, whose origins were actually produced in the point of destination.

The post-monopolies situation in Egypt stripped the administration of significant income, and future attempts to re-impose the extended control over the production and sale of major agricultural produce would not thrive, for example, when Abbas Paşa was in rule as the third descendant in that position (1849-54, see appendices). As the government's control over economic activity in the eyalet loosened, the interaction between Egypt's cultivators and the world market increased through merchants, ginneries, or even usurers who functioned as intermediaries. All the more, the government's diminishing capability of enforcing the purchase of the locally grown crops, -those that had previously powered Mehmet Ali's monopolies, such as cotton- would increase imports from major producers, notably Great Britain.⁴¹¹

Evidently, after the 1840s, the level of proactive energy that surrounded Cairo to contribute to the eyalet's development was a far cry from the earlier aspiration to compete with imports from Europeans one day. Even more, the results of a period of monopolistic overstretching of the eyalet's resources, human or agricultural, when combined with the undoing enforced in 1841, would set the scene for European manufacturers and merchants dominating

⁴¹¹ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 246-247; Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, pp. 74-75; Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 32.

the domestic market, and Egypt turning into a primary market for British goods after Mehmet Ali.⁴¹² The below figure, which visually represents Table 3, marks the acceleration of cotton exports from Britain to Egypt, with exponential rates of increase in the immediate post-Mehmet Ali period.



Figure 4 - British Cotton Exports to Egypt, declared values in £. Source: Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, p. 85.

On the other hand, after the state purchase monopoly had been officially scrapped during the reign of Said Paşa (1854-63), who enforced the abolition of all obstacles in Egypt against free trade, cotton production was directed increasingly into exports, rather than local consumption. It was Said's orders that let cultivators grow whatever they wished, sell however and to whomever they wanted.⁴¹³ It was also during this period of time when other liberal steps were taken in the economy, including reducing exportation taxes. This picture helped the Egyptian produce gain further renown in terms of its qualities, length, and fineness. Standing out among other varieties of cotton produced or processed in multiple industrial spots, Egyptian cotton gained a significant position in global commerce, thereby its exports increased noticeably. The mentioned situation would pave the way for a period of time when Egypt's economy would eventually depend on cotton exports and activities driven

⁴¹² Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*, pp. 76, 86.

⁴¹³ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 68.

from this measure, in terms of the processing, trading, transporting, and financing of this crop.⁴¹⁴

As seen in the preceding chapters, even though cotton products of Egypt had been a major source of revenues, it constituted only a part of the eyalet's income during Mehmet Ali's rule. The time-frame after his death, however, witnesses cotton reaching the status of dominance within the eyalet's economy. Furthermore, with barriers against free trade torn down, interaction between the world market and the Egyptian cultivator revived, and the export-orientation of the economy increased, cotton production in Egypt was to unleash several initiatives in the eyalet, in terms of the construction of added port facilities, upgrades in canals and waterways, as well as the extension of transportation networks. It would also galvanise administrative restructuring as to the increasing number of officials hired, the reorganisation of governmental departments, and even the establishment of new governorates.⁴¹⁵ Just like the period dominated by Mehmet Ali's monopolies, the aftermath of the 1840s was also driven in relation to this strategic commodity and the entire eyalet was to function in line with whatever was to surround cotton.

For example, the enforced, yet relative removal of free trade barriers, which had started with Mehmet Ali and included allotting swathes of uncultivated lands to the Vali's relatives, entourage as well as to peasants (3 to 5 feddans, though with no legal ownership) was improved in time. Individual responsibility at the level of village taxation, instead of collective responsibility was favoured with a cadastral survey in late 1840s. Property transfers and mortgages were allowed in 1846, a 1858 decree permitted land purchase by foreigners, and even more, in the face of heavy fiscal arrears,

⁴¹⁴ Hafez, *The Alexandria Cotton Market*, p. 2; Radwan, S., *Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967*, Ithaca Press, London, 1974, p. 233.

⁴¹⁵ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 37.

absolute property rights were extended in 1871 to those who would paid a six-year-period of taxes in advance.

These developments came hand in hand with expansion of area under cultivation: extension of 55.50% - from 3,050,000 feddans in 1813 to 4,743,000 in 1877. The proportion of cotton in these areas had been in an upward trend. As noted, infrastructure of Egypt was among the beneficiaries of the expanding cotton agriculture after the 1840s. Only during the rule of Said and of Ismail (1863-79), the length of the canals dug reached 8,400 miles. In addition, as this very crop required proper transport, building on Mehmet Ali's legacy which witnessed the connection of Alexandria to the Nile with the Mahmoudia (or Mahmudiye, after the then Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II), his descendants extended the rail network between Cairo and Alexandria, thereby turning the eyalet into a significant link in the overland route to India. These initiatives would gain tremendous pace in the second half of the nineteenth century, and just by the British occupation, the eyalet had more than 1,300 kilometres of railroads and 5,200 kilometres of telegraph lines.⁴¹⁶

In this sense, it seems safe to argue that cotton had not only empowered Mehmet Ali and thereby indirectly contributed to the demise of his government, it had also played a major role in the development of the eyalet in its post-monopolies form. Cotton had not solely been the reason that Egypt attracted the Pax Britannica's attention; it was also the instrument through which the system synchronised Egypt's trajectory in earnest with the directions of the world's political-economy.

This provided the first component of Egypt's increasing synchronisation with the currents of the international economic system: The steadily increasing foreign trade of Egypt with the rest of the world post-1838, of which cotton was an integral part. As examined above, the conditions imposed by the 1838

⁴¹⁶ I. Al-Khafaji, *Tormented Births: Passages to Modernity in Europe and the Middle East*, I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 43.

and 1840-41 conventions paved the way for the abolition of certain barriers against free trade in the eyalet. True, Mehmet Ali himself and the immediate remnants of his regime after the Vali's death attempted to resist the thorough enforcement of and bypass such measures. Nonetheless, in a span of less than ten years that motive would be long gone. A glimpse at Egypt's foreign trade trends after 1841 would exhibit the ever-increasing export orientation of the eyalet. A heavy drawback of this situation was that these exports were almost entirely transferring raw material, cotton in this case, and thereby subordinating the eyalet's priorities to the interests of the Pax Britannica.




Figure 5 – Source: Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 168. Owen suggests that these are only rough figures and must be taken to give a general idea.

In particular, thanks to the increasing flow of foreign trade following the Baltalimani Convention, the volume of Egypt's cotton exports also increased around 110% until 1859; while the upward trend that took place in the same time-span in terms of values constituted a 55.36% increase. It should be additionally noted that the trend in the pace of increase in both exports and

volumes was steep and steady immediately after Mehmet Ali had left the administration of the eyalet to his son in 1847-48⁴¹⁷ (Figure 6).




Figure 6 - Source: Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 73.

It would be furthermore recalled that the initial phases of the eyalet's exports of long-staple cotton had numerous destinations (Figure 3), including Liverpool, Marseilles, or Trieste. Britain was the first chief recipient, where the introduction of long-staple cotton and its efficient output met the growing demand by the British for raw materials in the course of the commodity boom of mid-1820s. In a short period, imports of Egyptian cotton by France and Austria competed in extent with Britain. That notwithstanding, England had steadily increased its share once again and began to dominate the international market for the eyalet-produced version of this crop from about the mid-1840s. Owen suggests that this was primarily due to the extension of the mill capacity in the United Kingdom throughout the 1850s. As a result, whereas England's share of the Egyptian cotton in 1859 was 65%, it would rise to over

⁴¹⁷ Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 73.

75% in 1869.⁴¹⁸ The below table and figure (both based on the same data⁴¹⁹) indicate clearly the exponential pace of British imports of Egyptian cotton exports to England. It is further intriguing to see the breaking points in the linear angle especially after the 1840s, which overlap the aftermath of the 1838 and 1840 Conventions.

Volume of Egyptian Cotton Exports to England, cantars

Table 12




Figure 7

There sure had been other parties involved in Egypt's cotton trade; however, given that Britain had become the pioneer in this interaction, further relevant data are found to be necessary in displaying the correlation between political-economic events and the eyalet's commerce of cotton, now free of monopolies. In other words, that Egypt was increasingly becoming a dependent unit in the Pax Britannic world of foreign trade is argued to be most evident in the way its cotton was purchased and sold. Therefore, taking into account the proportion of cotton-driven trade, which increasingly dominated the eyalet's economy and finances after the 1840s, its movement as to Britain must indicate how it was turned into an exporter of raw- and receiver of manufactured-cotton.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 160-162.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., p. 161.

In this regard, we see a progressive increase in British exports to Egypt from the 1820s until the 1850s, which was stemming from the firm rise in exports of manufactured cotton goods. In each cycle set in annual averages from 1827 until 1852, mentioned exports provide more than half of the trade. Then comes the term of rapid advances, where Egypt's imports from the United Kingdom increased more than 50%. This took place in a time when the eyalet's post-monopolies order coincided with a period of expansion for Britain's exports and the British were seeking decidedly new venues for their goods and additional opportunities to exploit the eastern Mediterranean's trade-wise opportunities. Thereafter, the expansion in Anglo-Egyptian trade would reach such an extent that by 1848, Britain had become the eyalet's chief trading partner, supplying 43% of Egypt's imports and receiving 45% of its exports. Subsequently, from 1854 and 1879, the volume of Britain's imports from Egypt would be based nearly completely on raw cotton imports, in a radical increase of around 1385% from 1854 until 1865-69 in annually average terms, and an overall increase of around 815% from 1854 until 1875-79⁴²⁰ (*Figure 8*). Note that the increasing pace continues even after the end of the American Civil War.




Figure 8 - Source: Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, p. 177.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., pp. 174-177.

Statistics concerning Egypt's cotton trade and its foreign commerce could be multiplied depending on the subject matter. This thesis particularly provides that after the Jumel cotton had been introduced in 1821, Egypt's cotton exports and profits stemming from this crop significantly increased. It was in this same framework too that the eyalet's foreign trade with Great Britain, the leading political and commercial power of the era was on the rise throughout the nineteenth century. The case was the same for the proportion of cotton in this interaction and most evident in the immediate aftermath of the 1840s. In this regard, given that the engine of Britain's economic growth was driven by this very crop and the global cumulative economic progress during the nineteenth century was parallel to that of Britain, one may confidently argue that, now in its post-monopolies, post-barriers form, the more cotton Egypt traded with the United Kingdom, the deeper it integrated with the world economy.

Therefore, the present study suggests that in the course of the 1800s, cotton was most transformative in the successive stages the eyalet was subject to: It powered the aggressive rise of the eyalet from 1805 until 1840-41. Having sourced the eyalet's monopolies, it attracted the British interest in the anti-systemic project ongoing in Egypt. Once the malicious element of illiberal forms of trade was excised from Egypt by force generated by the prevalent free- and liberal-trade discourse, this very crop also helped further unleash the potential of the eyalet and contribute to its integration with the world. Considering together the official reporting on Egypt and statistical data provided throughout the text, the most important of which details the eyalet's foreign trade as well as its direction and pace, the thesis finds is safe to posit that cotton was indeed a matter of primary concern in the Pax Britannica's reaction to Egypt and in the long-term British strategy planning regarding the eyalet. Thus, the first suggested leg of Egypt's increasing integration with the Pax Britannica after the 1840s is argued to be present in its foreign trade and, notably, that of cotton.

The ever-bourgeoning waves of foreign trade of Egypt and the commerce of cotton were not the only novel factor in the eyalet's subordination within the Pax Britannica. In a simple manner, if the crop itself was the reason that generated an integrative course, then the merchants were its instruments.

7.2. The Changing Nature of Merchant Activity

The impact of monopolies on Egypt's commercial dealings and the way they attracted reaction from the Pax Britannica have been examined in detail in the preceding chapters. The British commercial hostility, which was a by-product of this process, had targeted the independent-like status of and solid reforms by Mehmet Ali. It was the Vali, who prevented international merchants from establishing operational touch with production- and consumption-wise aspects and forced them to practice commerce in Egypt through his mechanisms. Nonetheless, after the terms of the 1838 and 1840-41 Conventions had paved the way for Egypt further opening up to forces of global liberal trade, European merchants turned out able to considerably extend purchases from the cultivators directly.⁴²¹

That way, the irrevocable integration of the post-1841 Egypt into the Pax Britannica would also be deepened with the merchant activity which would become increasingly intensive and assume a multi-layered characteristic to transform Egypt. In line with this forceful aspect of the Pax Britannica, the European merchants would take up the fragmented pieces from the centralised economy and commerce that had been culminated in Mehmet Ali's governorship. Their operations would be in such fields as investment, banking and finance, industry, internal and external commerce, telecommunications and transportation, and, surely, agriculture. In addition, such integration would only be natural in the face of increasing population

⁴²¹ Fahmy, *The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848*, p. 175; Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, p. 32.

and thus demand for diverse needs in Egypt. As a matter of fact from 1821 until 1876, Egypt's total population grew by 106%.⁴²²

In any case, it should not be assumed that the Mehmet Ali period was totally free of merchant involvement in Egypt's commerce. The illiberal characteristics of the eyalet's economy before 1838 notwithstanding, Mehmet Ali's government had essentially taken use of certain figures in establishing the eyalet's foreign trade.

Such actors included the Syrian Christian Bocti family in Egypt, one of whose descendants would become the Swedish consul, act as an intermediary between Egypt and Sweden, and even establish cotton and silk factories; or such Greek merchants, who had migrated to Egypt in early 1810s, as the Tossizza (also cited as Tossitsas), Zizinia (also Zizinias), Anastasi (also Anastassy), and Casulli families. Branches of these families were to take part in the trade of cotton, Egyptian navy, or diplomacy⁴²³ - with Michael (Michalis) Tossizza becoming the first Greek Consul-General in Egypt in 1833-34⁴²⁴, Etienne Zizinia as the Consul-General of Belgium, or D'Anastassy as the Consul-General of Sweden.⁴²⁵ Moreover, this situation established the first basis of the network of extra-social relations, which would contribute to the transformation of the eyalet after mid-nineteenth century. As such, even back in early nineteenth century, the relation between the eldest of Tossizza brothers, Michael, and Mehmet Ali went way back to Kavala, and the two would develop their business interaction upon the Tossizzas' migration to Egypt. A similar example was seen in Mehmet Ali's

⁴²² Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, p. 198.

⁴²³ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p. 167.

⁴²⁴ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, p. 93.

⁴²⁵ Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day*, p. 56.

relations with the Zizinia family, with whom the Vali developed a business partnership when Stefanos Zizinia, who had been a French citizen, acted as an intermediary in the purchase of two French battleships and donated them to Mehmet Ali in 1825. Stefanos, in exchange, would be granted the property rights to an expensive land chunk in Alexandria, which would become a European quartier of the town in the 1850s.⁴²⁶

On the other hand, the significant impact that this type of international merchants, most notably of Greek origin, would leave on Egypt was to gain momentum increasingly in the post-monopolies and freer-trade period. By the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the certain actors that had Mehmet Ali's blessing, the eyalet already had a distinctive, operational, and international network of trade. Building on that, the abolition of restrictive measures in trade facilitated the growth of that network. It attracted increasing numbers of European tradesmen to Egypt, helped the burgeoning of Egypt's trade links, and consequently, facilitated the European capital's penetration into and control of the eyalet's economic affairs.

This direction was effectively evident in a couple of aspects as to the eyalet's dealings with the international economy. Basically, beginning with the late 1840s, Egypt was to become an important crossroads of international trade thanks to world-wide services extended to and from the eyalet. In other words, if the changing trends in the cotton trade of the eyalet provided the framework for Egypt's integration into the world economy, it was because of the transforming merchant activity in and towards Egypt that this integration would culminate in the British occupation of 1882.

The momentum behind this progress was of course emanating from a multitude of factors, but the present study suggests that it was most apparent in the case of the increasing involvement of Europeans in Egypt in international trade and shipping. The origins of these foreigners were many,

⁴²⁶ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 95-97.

from Britain and Italy to Prussia to Austria. Nonetheless, it is argued that the case of the Greeks is the most thought provoking.

By the nineteenth century, the Greeks as a merchant and shipping community had been on the world-stage for centuries. In the 1800s too, they were present in the major ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, Istanbul, Izmir and Alexandria. As they did in Istanbul and Izmir, the Greeks had operated in a special setting also in Egypt, their presence culminating in Alexandria. With their extensive familial networks established therein, the Greek merchants gained a privileged status in the Egypt of Mehmet Ali through their involvement in cotton trade and became one of the largest groups of foreign merchants therein.⁴²⁷

These people were, as conveniently put by Marsot, the “old hands” that participated in Mehmet Ali’s peculiar economic configuration. They were to achieve a privileged position given their ability to accumulate great sums of fortune thanks to their rapport with Mehmet Ali. In exchange, with such old hands Mehmet Ali would develop special business relations, such that, till 1829, he would sell cotton on his own account in Europe by means of Greeks that had solid commercial links as intermediaries.⁴²⁸ Until the 1830s, three of the above-mentioned Greek families were involved in the eyalet’s cotton trade with Marseilles and Trieste: Tossizza, Anastasi, and Zizinia. With their established contacts in Europe, these families were able to provide the Vali with forecast concerning fluctuations in the prices of cotton in the European markets and thus increased Egypt’s cotton profits.⁴²⁹ In this regard, echoing the pre-1838/1840-41 economic setting of the eyalet, they were part of Mehmet Ali’s set of illiberal restrictions over foreign trade, which took place

⁴²⁷ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 233.

⁴²⁸ Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day*, p. 50.

⁴²⁹ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, p. 263.

with a limited number of actors, in definite standards. As such, 33% of the cotton export market in Alexandria had been under Greek merchant-control by 1839, where the Tossizza family, the largest of them was exporting 11% of Egypt's cotton.⁴³⁰

Nevertheless, as observed in various aspects of the eyalet's political economy, the Pax Britannic reaction to Egypt in the first half of the nineteenth century had its effects also on the way merchant activity was conducted. The three families mentioned above provide a useful example of this situation. The important status which they had used to enjoy as to cotton trade degraded after Mehmet Ali's demise. Particularly, in addition to the loss of monopolies, cotton exports' direction shifted further westward, as noted above, with Britain becoming the most dominant recipient of this commodity. Those that had no prior touch with Britain would turn out to be at a loss in the face of growing British penetration into the eyalet's economy. Among them were the mentioned three, who were unable to confront the challenge posed by the groups that had been on profitable terms with Britain and able to assert themselves in Alexandria. Most of those that would prove successful were Greeks as well – but with an unsubtle difference in their international dealings: They were either cooperating with the British commercial interests or capital; had links with the powerful financial centres of Britain and France.⁴³¹

As noted, starting onwards 1850s, the most observable change in the nature of the merchant activity in the eyalet was the increasing access to the eyalet's own cultivators of cotton. The difference brought about by the transformed type of merchants, signified by other Greek networks, was that they were highly successful in establishing as well as furthering links between international capital and Egypt's cotton growers, and European

⁴³⁰ Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*, p. 233.

⁴³¹ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, p. 263.

manufacturers-consumers and Egyptian cotton. The cotton trading firm of the Greek Ralli family was a primary example of this situation. Operating simultaneously in London, Manchester, Marseilles, Odessa, and of course Alexandria as well as Cairo, the Ralli brothers were among the primary intermediary actors that brought Egypt into the orbit of Pax Britannica's powerful dynamics.⁴³²

This list could be extended by including such notable names, who had merchant, banking, and industrial functions, as Cavafy, Choremis, Averoff, Salvagos, Benakis, Kotsikas or Zerbini, only by taking a look at the Greek involvement in the transformation of Egypt's cotton sector and thereby the fundamentals of its economy. What is paramount is not a concern of ethnicity or origin, yet the scale and extent of activity that originated from and operated in Egypt. The transformation in the foreigners' involvement in Egypt's economy truly signifies another impact of the Pax Britannica over the eyalet: whereas under Mehmet Ali, commerce was conducted in a singular and wholistic fashion, its post-Mehmet Ali form was diverse and multi-faceted. In the particular case of cotton, monopolies did provide profits but not transformation. And as the eyalet's economy had been operating under the solid grip of the Vali, the post-Mehmet Ali situation was of a vacuum to be filled by a diversity of actors with vested economic interests. The arrival of such merchants with established networks in the major ports of the Pax




Figure 9 - Source: Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day*, p. 8.

⁴³² M. R. Cohen, *Cotton Capitalists: American Jewish Entrepreneurship in the Reconstruction Era*, New York University Press, New York, 2017, p. 9.

Britannica was to further subordinate Egypt's interest into the expanding British political-economic design.

In addition to the Greek impact, changes observed in some particular sectors related to the merchant activity deserve attention to signify Egypt's transformation after Mehmet Ali (saving for agriculture, which, on the basis of cotton, is thoroughly dealt with above). First of all, a very basic yet visible example of this trend was manifest in the maritime transportation, of which Egypt was a more important part in the second half of the nineteenth century. Building up on the legacy of Mehmet Ali, this would be one of the particular fields that attracted European investment. As such, a British enterprise named Greenfield and Elliot practiced improvements in the port of Alexandria at a cost of 5% of all state expenditure on public works. The results of this undertaking were evident in the number of cargoes and ships stopping by Alexandria (*Figure 9* & Table 13). In particular, from 1850 until 1872, the number of ships arriving in the port of Alexandria would increase 76.5%.

Table 13⁴³³

Ship Arrivals in the Port of Alexandria, 1850-1872		
Year	Ships	Increase in %
1850	1,807	
1860	1,996	10.5
1862	2,576	29.1
1863-72 (yearly averages)	3,190	23.8

This area was one of the primary instances revealing the extent of Egypt's integration to the world economy by the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, Egypt had been connected to a wide array of international ports by 1873: There were three Egyptian lines, two between Alexandria and Istanbul, and one between Suez and Massawa of today's Eritrea; five British lines were connecting Alexandria, Southampton, Suez, Calcutta, and Bombay; five French lines in between Marseilles and Port Said and Suez (Marseilles was even connected to Hong Kong by way of the Egyptian ports); four Austrian

⁴³³ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, p. 206.

lines between Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Istanbul, and Trieste; two Italian lines between Alexandria and Genoa as well as between Genoa and Bombay by way of Port Said and Suez; a Russian line between Alexandria, Istanbul, and Odessa; and one Ottoman line between Istanbul and Basra through Port Said and Suez.⁴³⁴ These 21 lines operated by an international network, centred on Egypt, and functioning directly from Great Britain in the West and India in the East suggest how integral Egypt was to become in international trade by the end of the century.

Finance and banking sectors offer a series of rather more striking examples to compare the Mehmet Ali and post-monopolies periods in Egypt. As it would be recalled, it was the “old hands” that used to finance Mehmet Ali’s treasury whenever the need arose. These actors were those that combined commerce with money lending to Mehmet Ali, and thereby maintained their privileges. The extent of their involvement in the financial and commercial undertakings of Mehmet Ali’s Egypt was among the notes of Bowring in his 1840 report. Palmerston’s emissary back then stated that

the finances of Egypt are in a more prosperous state than they were a few years ago, when it was the habit of the government to contract for the delivery of its produce a long time before it was ready for shipment, and to find resources in the large advances made by foreign merchants ... But of late no such anticipated drafts on coming harvests have been necessary ... [the Paşa] found no difficulty in raising considerable sums on temporary loan at a very moderate rate of interest. In fact, Alexandria is now the seat of many commercial houses, who, by themselves and by their connexions, are quite competent to make advances to the Egyptian government.⁴³⁵

As a matter of fact, that combination had enabled the monopolist Mehmet Ali to avoid public debt and release in advance the future generations from financial burdens of the past. And Bowring further suggested was that, if the

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston, Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.*, p. 48.

Vali's descendants were to follow suit, they would have had no hindrance in extravagance.⁴³⁶

However, that British man's description was contingent on holding command of the centralised economy and finances, as it had been under Mehmet Ali until 1848, which necessitated keeping merchants and bankers under strict control. In contrast, with agriculture being forcefully commercialised and the 1838 Convention enforced, European merchant-bankers would be eventually set free of strict control and expand their operations in Egypt, in the form of the petty-merchants of the villages and the large merchant-bankers of Alexandria. As a result, Europeans would penetrate the rural mechanisms and facilitate the extensive cultivation and shipping of cotton; develop commercial banks on exchange with Paris and London; and concentrate power and wealth in their hands, by, for example, lending credits to Egypt's cotton cultivators and arranging state loans. Notable outstanding financial institutions of that time included but were not limited to the Bank of Egypt (1856, Greek venture), the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (1864, joint French-Greek-British venture), the Bank of Alexandria (1872, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank). Once the transformative cycles started spinning, their impact on Egypt would be unabated. This was an existential problem concerning the structure of the banker-merchant activities. In particular, even though the shareholders of these houses were mostly Egyptians if not the Egyptian administration on its own; it was the European capitalists that administrated them. Also significant was that despite the fact that in many instances the majority of the capital was generated within Egypt and by its administration, it was exclusively managed by the European finance capital.⁴³⁷

Several more examples could be provided here to signify the direction Egypt was got to adopt in its post-Mehmet Ali configuration. These may include the

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 47.

⁴³⁷ Glavanis, *Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 216-219.

internal agricultural expansion in terms of area cultivated and cropped, of the improvements in irrigation practices, of the introduction of novel crops; shifts in the sectors of transportation and telecommunications, as to the rail and road networks, the river and sea practices, the postal set-up; changes in internal commerce and external trade; or retail and manufacturing.⁴³⁸

Irrespective of the number of these examples as to the changing look of Egypt in the second half of the nineteenth century, one thing is argued to appear vividly clear: The barriers erected by Mehmet Ali to protect the eyalet from the political-economic forces of the Pax Britannica were undoubtedly anti-systemic. In fact, their removal by the Pax Britannic system through the 1838 and 1840 Conventions would create such deep vacuum that when it was sufficiently filled in by the dominant forces of the time – foreign trade, merchants, and bankers in the case of the present chapter – Egypt would be irreversibly subordinated to the world political-economic system of the nineteenth century.

In sum, there were definitely other sources at play which contributed to this transformative stage; yet the two mentioned above are found to be most effective in changing Egypt's course in line with what the Pax Britannica rendered convenient. As a matter of fact, akin to the development of Mehmet Ali's state mechanism, cotton and the way it was traded were determinant in directing the post-1830/1840 course of Egypt. The difference, however, was not pertinent with cotton's centrality in this context. The removal of barriers against free trade was the cause of change; the effect was to be found in the exponential growth of this crop's trade as well as the inexorable shift from "old hands" to "new and multiple hands"⁴³⁹, who would conduct the commerce of cotton and diversify their relevant investments.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., pp. 192-229.

⁴³⁹ See appendix.

The remarkable transformation experienced after Mehmet Ali was not solely limited to agriculture or commerce. Whereas Mehmet Ali's dynasty was emboldening their hold of power, the Egyptian state mechanism was on track of institutionalisation with expanded administration and burgeoning bureaucratic elite, now having a portion of the indigenous population. Thanks to developments in commerce, banking, transportation, and services, European penetration was on the rise. It was reflected in those who appropriated Egypt's rural surplus, self-asserted and, under the guise of consular action, intervened in the eyalet's/khedivate's affairs, lent credit to cultivators, merchants, and the administration, and therefore facilitated the build-up of a tremendous debt owed to them.⁴⁴⁰ These were the general look of political and economic changes experienced under Abbas, Said, and Ismail, who were to rule after Mehmet Ali.

These factors would conclusively converge in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and this would prove painful for Egypt. Whereas during the first half of the century, there were no banks, minimal investment, and no credit in Egypt (and in their stead, moneylenders, hoarding and usury), the banking sector would expand disproportionately in the second half. In practice, the pressing issue of debts, combined with political, fiscal, and legal uncertainty would lead to the establishment of international body (*caisse de la dette*) to control Egypt's finances, composed of bondholders' representatives and imposed upon Ismail in 1876. The establishment of the Mixed Courts in 1876 to deal with cases involving foreigners in Egypt signified a similar trend. Worse, foreigners would keep command of international business relations, where local savings and entrepreneurship were almost non-existent. Therefore, the attraction on the part of foreign banks to Egypt was not to contribute to the generation of any added value, but to help grow cotton cultivation, increase such construction works as the Suez

⁴⁴⁰ Hunter, *Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali*, p. 180.

Canal, and sustain khedival expenses.⁴⁴¹ It was within this framework that the Europeans were to engender a state within a state; thereby further their control over Egypt, destroy the viceroy's autocratic powers, and "take over the state itself – the prize and object of power."⁴⁴²

Based on what is examined above, the study argues that after the 1838 and 1840 Conventions, the practical destruction of autocracy on the part of the viceroy was outstanding among many symbols that indicated the maximum in the upward trend of the Pax Britannic reaction to Mehmet Ali and his dynasty. Egypt, as argued above, had no more of a political or fiscal protection after 1840. The consequential vacuum was to be manipulated by the forces of the system. This was to radically differ from what the anti-systemic Mehmet Ali planned for Egypt in terms of political and economic expansion at the expense of Great Powers and the Porte. On the contrary, the extent of dynamic transformation would prove very costly for the post-Mehmet Ali configuration of Egypt. In the face of their politics, commerce, and finances, their place in the Pax Britannic orbit would become so deep-seated that when Egypt was found once again at stake from the systemic point of view, they would lose sovereignty with the British occupation in 1882.

In this regard, the thesis argues that the 1838 and 1840 Conventions were the zenith of the Pax Britannica's reaction to an anti-systemic entity in a region paramount for the system's operation. The aftermath of Mehmet Ali was of a period when the system, having torn down political and economic barriers of Egypt, progressively corrected the faults of the anti-systemic era and synchronised the eyalet with its forces in terms of liberal trade and extensive merchant activity in an overarching informal empire. Thereafter, the loosening control of state, the vacuum of authority, and the resultant political-economic uncertainty were to result in the ultimate stage of the way the Pax

⁴⁴¹ J. O. Ronall, 1967, 'Julis Blum Pasha, An Austro-Hungarian Banker in Egypt 1843-1919', *Tradition: Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie*, Vol 13 No 2, 1968, pp. 60-61; Hunter, *Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali*, p. 195.

⁴⁴² Hunter, *Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali*, p. 180.

Britannica addressed Egypt, which was of integration and subordination. In essence, that stage would be the conclusion of how Egypt was entirely synchronised with the system.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The machine Mehmet Ali engineered had been powered by eyalet-scale cotton production which was operational hand in hand with his commercial monopolies. The wealth generated within the centralised economy funded his eyalet mechanism, which in turn strengthened his military and navy for a territorial and economic self-aggrandisement scheme. The Vali was pursuing personal ends and seizing every opportunity available against the enfeebled Porte.

The Vali did not only politically or existentially loom over the Porte. His demeanour also caused strong, yet temporary Russian interference in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. Territorially expanding and arguably forming a “personal empire” (*Figure 10*) the Vali also put British political and economic interests and designs in danger over the Porte and in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, Mesopotamia, and Asia. In addition to turning the British hostile against himself, Mehmet Ali swayed increasingly towards France, became able to play one Power against another, and eventually, also with thanks to France’s extra-system conduct of favouring the Vali as a counter-balancing factor in the Mediterranean, visibly disturbed the European concert. Thereafter, being subjected to joint action, Mehmet Ali’s centralised, absolutist, and despotic governorship was dismantled at the hands of a coalition led by Britain.

In this regard, the present thesis was of an attempt to develop an alternative perspective on the nineteenth century question of Egypt as well as its impact on the country of Egypt, the region, and European politics of the period in question. To this end, this study was driven by the aim to analyse one of the most heated episodes in the nineteenth century history of Egypt from a

systemic perspective, whose limits were pertinent to such issues as the interplay between politics and economics, peace and trade, or statesmen and merchants. It took Egypt as a vast land with fruitful resources, considerable population, and a significant geo-strategic location – which are considered to be of paramount importance in the trajectory adopted by Mehmet Ali. It should be highlighted that in its approach to the subject matter, the thesis did not consider the nineteenth century Egypt *per se*, its people, or its resources independent of the state, the group, or the dynasty ruling it.

In so doing, the thesis examined the rise and fall of Mehmet Ali as an anti-systemic entity *vis-à-vis* the Pax Britannica in a region where high strategic stakes were embedded. As highlighted in the introductory sections, this examination was in total consideration of the essentials of the political-economic strategy of the most prominent Power of the nineteenth century, Great Britain. The jigsaw of the thesis was therefore identifying the position of that *sui generis*, state-like unit with regard to prevalent political-economic forces of the era in their interplay in the Near East.

In this framework, the thesis practically focused on the political and economic fault lines that concerned the region from where the anti-systemic entity in Egypt rose. Briefly put, for the former, we found the British foreign policy strategies defined for the region. These include but are not limited to maintaining the political and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against third parties, including Russian encroachment; preventing any political-military alliance from taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean, either between France and Russia or France and Mehmet Ali; keeping overland and maritime approaches to India safe and secure, ensuring that access to regional markets be permanent, ceaseless, and unhindered. As to the latter, it was the liberal state as well as the liberal market, the gospel of free trade, increasing merchant activity throughout the world in an “informal empire” setting, commercial expansion towards the global country-side. Given the specific sense of the era that produced intricacies in terms of the interaction between the “political” and the “economic”, some of such fault

lines were of a fluid structure and had effects on both sides. Cotton was one of those examples. The Near East, if considered as a factor or a target, would fall in the same category.



Figure 10 – The Geographical Extent of the Mehmet Ali Dynasty. Source: Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*, p. 79.

The thesis found that the entity formed in Egypt by Mehmet Ali was in sharp contrast with all of these in terms of its administrative, military, and economic characteristics and ambitions. It thus would run afoul with the general design of the Pax Britannica concerning the region. Therefore, it was the system that reacted to this anti-systemic process, in a progressive manner, and put a long-term strategy in operation. It centred on the fundamentals of what empowered Mehmet Ali; notably, and simplistically, his cotton, commercial monopolies, military, and his set of autocratic powers which made expansion based on these three forces possible. Particular to the Vali's configuration, these factors were operational individually and at the same time able to interact with each other. In other words, their synchronised functioning was the basis of Mehmet

Ali's anti-systemic practice. The thesis, in this respect, proposed that the way the Pax Britannica addressed the issue of Mehmet Ali was of a multi-layered and strategic reaction, which culminated in the Conventions of 1838 and 1840, and dealt with all three outstanding problems associated with Mehmet Ali.

With sources of its strength significantly hampered, the Mehmet Ali dynasty would no more be able to challenge Britain's *pax* in the Near East. In the aftermath of Mehmet Ali would come the period of what the present study terms as correction and synchronisation. Post-Mehmet Ali, Egypt was not a political problem; and economically, dynamics of free trade were pervasive, cotton trade between Egypt and Europe, most particularly Britain, was expanding exponentially, and the involvement of merchants in this configuration was remarkably evident. The vacuum brought about with the dismantlement of central authority was so powerful that the way it was manipulated by external actors would integrate Egypt very solidly with the Pax Britannic system. And thereafter, the European vested interest in Egypt would increase to a remarkable extent that it could not be left in harm's way in any case. Once the system detected anew the prospect of anti-systemic deviation in Egypt, it opted for intervention again, this time with the British occupation in 1882 for Egypt's subordination.

The present thesis has therefore concluded that the attempted establishment of an alternative for Egypt had been doomed to fail not because of a sole, singular factor, but because of what could turn out when its strengths were taken use of concurrently and a powerful anti-systemic formation seemed on the rise. It would be the integrated forces of the Pax Britannic system at play to heavily counteract and write off gains of all sorts on the part of such anti-systemic formation. This had been the case of Egypt under Mehmet Ali and would be so for Egypt until mid-twentieth century. As a matter of fact, this vicious cycle could only be broken when the paradigm of the dominant global system was to change in the 1950s.

REFERENCES

- Abir, M. (1977). Modernisation, Reaction and Muhamad Ali's 'Empire'. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 295-313.
- Al-Khafaji, I. (2004). *Tormented Births: Passages to Modernity in Europe and the Middle East*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Anick, N. (1970). The Embassy of Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople, 1833-1841, PhD Thesis. McGill University.
- Badri, M. A. (1996). The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power, Phd Thesis. Bilkent University.
- Bailey, F. E. (1940). The Economics of British Foreign Policy. *The Journal of Modern History*, 449-484.
- Bairoch, P. (1989). European trade policy, 1815-1914. In P. Mathias, & S. Pollard, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VIII, The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies* (pp. 1-137). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
- Baker, R. L., & Palmerston. (1928). Palmerston on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. *The English Historical Review*, 83-89.
- Batou, J. (1991). 'Muhammad-'Ali's Egypt, 1805-1848, A Command Economy in the 19th Century? In J. Batou, *Between Development and*

Underdevelopment: The Precocious Attempts at Industrialization of the Periphery, 1800-1870 (pp. 181-218). Geneva: Libraire Droz.

Batou, J. (1993). Nineteenth-Century Attempted Escapes from the Periphery: The Cases of Egypt and Paraguay. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 279-318.

Beckert, S. (2014). *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*. New York: A. Knopf.

Bell, D. (2007). Victorian Visions of Global Order: An Introduction. In D. Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (pp. 1-25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berg, M. (2008). Consumption in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain. In R. Floud, & P. Johnson, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860* (pp. 357-387). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Bogart, D., Drelichman, M., Gelderblom, O., & Rosenthal, J.-L. (2010). State and private institutions. In S. Broadberry, & K. H. O'Rourke, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe Volume 1* (pp. 70-95). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bowring, J. (1840). *Report on Egypt and Candia. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Palmerston, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.* London: W. Clows and Sons.

Brown, C. H. (1953). *Egyptian Cotton*. London: Leonard Hill.

Brown, D. (2011). *Palmerston: A Biography*. Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Bulwer, H. (1843). *A despatch from H. L. E. Bulwer, Baron Dalling and Bulwer, "on various matters connected with the Turkish Convention of 1838."*. London: Foreign Office.

Bulwer, H. (1871). *The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: with Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence Volume II*. London: Richard Bentley.

Cain, P. J. (1999). Economics and Empire: The Metropolitan Context. In A. Porter, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cameron, D. A. (1898). *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century or Mehemet Ali and His Successors until the British Occupation in 1882*. London: Smith, Elder & Co.

Chapman, S. (2002). *Merchant Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War I*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Chapman, S. D. (1987). *The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution*. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.

City of Washington. (1835). *Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Ali, Pacha of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia*. Washington: City of Washington.

Clark, W. A. (1908). *Cotton Textile Trade in Turkish Empire, Greece, and Italy*. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Cohen, M. R. (2017). *Cotton Capitalists: American Jewish Entrepreneurship in the Reconstruction Era*. New York: New York University Press.

Communications with Mehemet Ali, 1838. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of her Majesty, 1839. (1839). In *Accounts and Papers: Twenty-One Volumes (21) Admiralty Court; Slave Trade; Commerce and Navigation; &c &c*. T. R. Harrison.

Cuno, K. M. (1992). *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dardaoud, G. (1939-40). *Un Ingénieur Français au Service de Mohamed Ali: Louis Alexis Jumel (1785-1823) D'après les documents inédits des archives du consulat de France du Caire*. Cairo: Bulletin de L'Institut d'Egypte.

Darwin, J. (1997). Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion. *English Historical Review*, 614-642.

Davies, G. (1943). The Pattern of British Foreign Policy 1815-1914. *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 367-377.

Davison, R. (1992). Britain, the International Spectrum, and the Eastern Question, 1827-1841. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 15-35.

de Guichen, V. (1921). *La crise d'Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l'Europe*. Paris: Émile-Paul Frères.

- Dilke, C. (1890). *Problems of Greater Britain*. London: Macmillan and Co.
- Dodwell, H. (1931). *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press.
- Dougherty, J. E., & Pfaltzgraff Jr., R. L. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. New York: Pearson.
- Dowdle, M. W. (2013). The regulatory geography of market competition in Asia (and beyond): a preliminary mapping. In M. W. Dowdle, J. Gillespie, & I. Maher, *Asian Capitalism and the Regulation of Competition* (pp. 11-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dykstra, D. (1998). The French occupation of Egypt 1798-1801. In M. Daly, *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (pp. 113-138). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
- Egyptian Cotton Yarn. (1831, May-August). *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australia*.
- Egyptian Manufactures. (1831, January-April). *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China, and Australia*.
- Ellison, T. (1886). *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain*. London: Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange.
- Fahmy, K. (1998). The era of Muhammad'Ali Pasha, 1805-1848. In M. Daly, *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2 Modern Egypt, from 1517*

to the end of the twenieth century (pp. 139-179). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambrdige.

Fahmy, K. (2002). *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

Foreign Office. (1841). *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant, Vol I*. London: T. R. Harrison.

Glavanis, P. M. (1989). Aspects of the Economic and Social History of the Greek Community in Alexandria During the Nineteenth Century, PhD Thesis. University of Hull.

Gliddon, G. R. (1841). *A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt*. London: James Madden & Co.

Goldschmidt Jr., & Johnston, R. (2004). *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*. Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press.

Goldschmidt Jr., A. (2008). *A Brief History of Egypt*. New York: Infobase Publishing.

Hafez, M. A. (1946). *The Alexandria Cotton Market*. Cairo: Fouad I University Press.

Harlaftis, G. (1996). *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day*. London: Routledge.

Harley, K. C. (2008). Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology. In R. J. Floud, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain* (pp. 175-203). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Harris, R. (2008). Government and the economy, 1688-1850. In R. Floud, & P. Johnson, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700–1860* (pp. 204-237). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Hershlag, Z. Y. (1980). *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1999). *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*. New York: The New Press.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1989). *The Age of Empire 1875-1914*. New York: Vintage Books.

Hoskins, H. (1928). *British Routes to India*. Philadelphia: Longmans, Green and Co.

Hunter, F. R. (1998). Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali. In M. Daly, *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (pp. 180-197). Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Hunter, F. R. (1999). *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

Hurewitz, J. C. (1968). The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis. *Middle East Journal*, 144-158.

International Federation of Cotton and Allied Textile Industries. (1912). *Cotton Growing in Egypt, report by Arno Schmidt, Secretary of the International Cotton Federation*. Manchester: Taylor, Garnett, Evans and Co.

Issawi, C. (1947). *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*. London: Oxford University Press.

Kirk, G. E. (1957). *A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Marsot, A. L. (1994). *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Marsot, A. L. (2007). *A History of Egypt from the Arab Conquest to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, T. (1991). *Colonising Egypt*. London: University of California Press.

Mokyr, J., & Voth, H.-J. (2010). Understanding growth in Europe, 1700-1780: a theory and evidence. In S. Broadberry, & K. H. O'Rourke, *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe Volume 1* (pp. 7-42). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mowat, R. (1923). The Near East and France 1829-1847. In A. W. Ward, & G. P. Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783*

– 1919 Volume II 1815 – 1866 (pp. 161-198). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

N/A. (1841). *The Life of Mohamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. To which are appended the Quadruple Treaty and the Official Memoranda of the English and French Ministers*. London: E. Churton.

O'Brien, P., & Pigman, G. A. (1992). Free trade, British Hegemony and the International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century. *Review of International Studies*, 89-113.

Osterhammel., J. (2014). *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Owen, R. (1969). *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Owen, R. (1992). The 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention: An Overview. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 7-14.

Owen, R. (2009). *The Middle East and the World Economy 1800-1914*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

Pamuk, Ş. (2007). *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Pétre-Grenouilleau, O. (2001). Les négoce atlantiques français. Anatomie d'un capitalisme relationnel. *Dix-Huitième Siècle*, 33-48.

Polanyi, K. (2001). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Massachusetts: Beacon Press.

Pommeranz, K. (2000). *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Porter, A. (1999). Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century. In A. Porter, *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: Nineteenth Century* (pp. 1-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prince Muskau, P. (1845). *Egypt and Mehemet Ali, Vol III*. London: T.C. Newby.

Puryear, V. J. (1935). *Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834-1853*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Radwan, S. (1974). *Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967*. London: Ithaca Press.

Rhodes, E., DiCicco, J. M., Milburn, S. S., & Walker, T. C. (2003). *Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of Military Force and Political Influence*. Lexington Books.

Rodkey, F. S. (1924). *The Turco Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841*. Urbana: University of Illinois.

Rodkey, F. S. (1929). Colonel Campbell's Report on Egypt in 1840, with Lord Palmerston's Comments. *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 102-114.

Rogan, E. (2012). *The Arabs: A History*. London: Penguin Group.

Ronall, J. O. (1968). Julius Blum Pasha, An Austro-Hungarian Banker in Egypt 1843-1919. *Tradition: Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie*, 57-80.

Russel, L. J. (1853, April 16). Independence of Turkey. *The Examiner. A Weekly Paper on Politics, Literature, and the Fine Arts, for the Year 1853*. London.

Sandberg, L. G. (1968). Movements in the Quality of British Cotton textile Exports, 1815-1913. *The Journal of Economic History*, 1-27.

Shaw, S., & Shaw, E. (2002). *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and republic: The Rise of modern Turkey, 1808-1975*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

St. John, J. A. (1834). *Egypt and Mohammed Ali; or travels in the Valley of the Nile*. London: Longman.

Temperley, H. (1936). *England and the Near East: The Crimea*. London: Longsman, Green and Co.

The New York Times. (1864, June 26). Egyptian Cotton; Its Modern Origin and the Importance of the Supply. Retrieved from

<https://www.nytimes.com/1864/06/26/archives/egyptian-cotton-its-modern-origin-and-the-importance-of-the-supply.html>

Urquhart, D. (1833). *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade; The State and Prospects of English Commerce in the East, The New Administration of Greece, Its Revenue and National Possessions*. London: Saunders and Otley.

Vatikiotis, P. J. (1991). *The History of Modern Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Webster, C. K. (1922). The Pacification of Europe 1813-1815. In A. W. Ward, & G. P. Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919* (pp. 392-521). Cambridge: The Macmillan Company.

Ziegler, P. (2003). *Palmerston*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

APPENDICES

A. RULERS OF EGYPT UNDER THE MEHMET ALI DYNASTY

Referring to kinship only if an immediate descendant assumed power.

1. Mehmet Ali Paşa, Vali, ruled 1805-1848, sons: Tosun, Ibrahim, Said.
- 2. Ibrahim Paşa, son of Mehmet Ali, Vali, ruled 1848.
- 3. Abbas I, son of Tosun, grandson of Mehmet Ali, Vali, ruled 1848-1854.
- 4. Said Paşa, son of Mehmet Ali, Vali, ruled 1854-1863.
- 5. Ismail Paşa, son of Ibrahim, grandson of Mehmet Ali, Vali, Khedive, ruled 1863-1879.
- 6. Tewfik Paşa, son of Ismail, Khedive, ruled 1879-1892.
- 7. Abbas II, son of Tewik, grandson of Ismail, Khedive, ruled 1892-1914.
- 8. Hussein Kamel, son of Ismail, Sultan, ruled 1914-1917,
- 9. Fuad I, son of Ismail, Sultan, King, ruled 1917-1936.
- 10. Farouk I, son of Fuad I, grandson of Ismail, King, ruled 1935-1952.
- 11. Fuad II, son of Farouk I, grandson of Fuad I, King, regency 1952-1953.

B. THE MAIN TEXT OF THE CONVENTION OF 1838

The below is taken from *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East*, authored by Z. Y. Hershlag, and published by E. J. Brill in 1980 in Leiden. Pages 308-309 contain the main part of the Baltalimani Convention of 1838.

“Convention of Commerce and Navigation between Her Majesty and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Signed at Balta-Liman, near Constantinople, August 16th, 1838

Article 1. All rights, privileges, and Immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of Great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties, are confirmed now and for ever, except in as far as they may be specifically altered by the present Convention: and it is moreover expressly stipulated, that all rights, privileges, or immunities which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other foreign Power to enjoy, shall be equally granted to, and exercised and enjoyed by, the subjects and ships of Great Britain.

Article 2. The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, or their agents, shall be permitted to purchase at all places in the Ottoman Dominions (whether for the purposes of internal trade or exportation) all articles, without any exception whatsoever, the produce, growth or manufacture, of the said Dominions; and the Sublime Porte formally engages to abolish all monopolies of agricultural produce, or of any other articles whatsoever, as well as all *Permits* from the local Governors, either for the purchase of any article, or for its removal from one place to another when purchased; and any attempt to compel the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty to receive such *Permits* from the local Governors, shall be considered as an infraction of Treaties, and the Sublime Porte shall immediately punish with severity Vizirs and other officers who shall have been guilty of such misconduct, and render full justice to British subjects for all injuries or losses which they may duly prove themselves to have suffered.

Article 3. If any article of Turkish produce, growth, or manufacture, be purchased the British merchant or his agent, for the purpose of selling the same for internal consumption in Turkey, the British merchant or his agent shall pay, at the purchase and sale of such articles, and in any manner of trade therein, the same duties that are paid, in similar circumstances, by the most favoured class of Turkish subjects engaged in the internal trade of Turkey, whether Mussulmans or Rayahs.

Article 4. If any article of Turkish produce, growth, or manufacture, be purchased for exportation, the same shall be conveyed by the British merchant or his agent, free of any kind of charge or duty whatsoever, to a convenient place of shipment, on its entry into which it shall be liable to one fixed duty of nine per cent. *ad valorem* in lieu of all other interior duties.

Subsequently, on exportation, the duty of three per cent., as established and existing at present, shall be paid. But all articles bought in the shipping ports for exportation, and which have already paid the interior duty at entering into the same, will only pay the three per cent. export duty.

Article 5. The regulations under which Firmans are issued to British merchant vessels for passing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, shall be so framed as to occasion to such vessels the least possible delay.

Article 6. It is agreed by the Turkish Government, that the regulations established in the present Convention shall be general throughout the Turkish Empire, whether in Turkey in Europe or Turkey in Asia, in Egypt, or other African possessions belonging to the Sublime Porte, and shall be applicable to all the subjects, whatever their description, of the Ottoman Dominions; and the Turkish Government also agrees not to object to other foreign Powers settling their trade upon the basis of this present Convention.

Article 7. It having been the custom of Great Britain and the Sublime Porte, with a view to prevent all difficulties and delay, in estimating the value of articles imported into the Turkish Dominions, or exported therefrom, by British subjects, to appoint, at intervals of fourteen years, a Commission of men well acquainted with the traffic of both countries, who have fixed by a tariff the sum of money in the coin of the Grand Signior, which should be paid as duty on each article; and the term of fourteen years, during which the last adjustment of the said tariff was to remain in force, having expired, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to name conjointly fresh Commissioners to fix and determine the amount in money which is to be paid by British subjects, as the duty of three per cent upon the value of all commodities imported and exported by them; and the said Commissioners shall establish an equitable arrangement for estimating the interior duties which, by the present Treaty, are established on Turkish goods to be exported, and shall also determine on the places of shipment where it may be most convenient that such duties should be levied.

The new tariff thus established, to be in force for seven years after it has been fixed, at the end of which time it shall be in the power of either of the parties to demand a revision of that tariff; but if no such demand be made on either side, within the six months after the end of the first seven years, then the tariff shall remain in force for seven years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding seven years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive period of seven years.

Article 8. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of four months.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed their seals thereunto.

Done at Balta-Liman, near Constantinople, on the sixteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight.

(L.S.) Ponsonby.

(Signed in Turkish Original)

(L.S.) Mustapha Reshid

(L.S.) Mustapha Khianee

(L.S.) Mehmed Nouree

(Source: *Parliamentary Papers*, 1839, Vol. L, pp. 291-295)."

C. THE TEXT OF THE QUADRUPLÉ TREATY OF 1840

The below text is taken from “*The Life of Mohamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. To which are appended the Quadruple Treaty and the Official Memoranda of the English and French Ministers*” published by E. Churton in London in 1841. Pages 50 to 63 of the mentioned book contain the Text of the Quadruple Treaty, i.e. the 1840 Settlement that ultimately checked Mehmet Ali’s military, political, and economic power.

“QUADRUPLÉ TREATY

1. Copy of the Convention concluded between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and the Sublime Porte.
2. Acte séparé annexed to the said Treaty.
3. Protocol signed the same day, reserving the rights of the Porte to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.
4. Secret Protocol (Protocole réservé), signed the same day.

CONVENTION

Concluded between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte of the other, for the Pacification of the Levant; signed at London, the 15th July, 1840.

IN the name of the most merciful God.

HIS Highness the Sultan having had recourse to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to reclaim their aid and their assistance in the midst of the difficulties in -which he finds himself placed in consequence of the hostile conduct of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt— difficulties which threaten to injure the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the independence of the throne of the Sultan; their said Majesties, united by the sentiment of sincere friendship which subsists between them, animated by the desire to watch over the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, in the interest of consolidating the peace of Europe, faithful to the engagements which were contracted by the note transmitted to the Porte, by their representative at Constantinople, the 27th July, 1839; and desiring, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which the continuation of the hostilities lately

broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha and the subjects of his Highness occasion;

Their said Majesties and his Highness the Sultan have resolved, with the above end, to conclude between them a convention, and have named for that purpose for their plenipotentiaries— namely,

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Most Honourable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, Peer of Ireland, Member of her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, Member of Parliament, and her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, Philip, Baron de Nieuman, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Cross of Civil Merit, Commander of the Order of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the second class of Russia, Aulic Counsellor, and Plenipotentiary near her Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty the King of Prussia, Henry William, Baron de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the first class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the second class, and of St. Waldemir of the fourth class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe Weimar, his Chamberlain, Privy Counsellor, Actual Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near her Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Philip, Baron de Brunow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the first class, of St. Stanislaus of the first class, of St. Waldemir of the third class, Commander of the Order of St. Etienne of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, his Privy Counsellor, and Envoy Extraordinary near her Britannic Majesty.

And his Most Majestic and Most High Majesty Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, of the Order of Nichan Iftchar of the first class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Counsellor of Foreign Affairs, his Ambassador Extraordinary near her Britannic Majesty.

Who, having reciprocally interchanged their full powers in good and due form, have agreed on and signed the following articles:—

Art. I.—His Highness the Sultan, being agreed with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of his Highness to allow to Mehemet Ali—conditions which will be found specified in the separate act hereto annexed—their Majesties engage

themselves to act with perfect accord, and to unite their efforts to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to this arrangement, each of the high contracting parties reserving to itself to co-operate to this end with the means of action which each of them can dispose of.

Art. II.— If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to adhere to the said arrangement, which shall be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of their said Majesties, the latter engage to take, at the requisition of the Sultan, the measures concerted and agreed on between them, for the end of putting this arrangement into execution ; in the meantime the Sultan having invited his allies to join him to assist in interrupting the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the expedition of troops, horses, arms, ammunition, and munitions of war of all kinds from one part of these provinces to the other, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to this effect the necessary orders to the commanders of the naval forces in the Mediterranean; their said Majesties promising, moreover, that the commanders of their squadrons, according to the means of which they can dispose, shall give in the name of the alliance all and every assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan, who may manifest their fidelity and obedience to their Sovereign.

Art. III.—If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement abovementioned, should direct his forces by land or sea towards Constantinople, the high contracting parties, on the requisition made by the Sultan to their representatives at Constantinople, are all agreed in such case to answer the invitation of that sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne, by means of a co-operation concerted in common for the purpose of putting the two straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman empire, secure against all aggression. It is likewise agreed that the forces which, in consequence of such attempt, receive the destination above indicated, shall remain employed as long as their presence be required by the Sultan; and when his highness shall judge that their presence has ceased to be necessary, the said forces shall retire simultaneously, and enter respectively into the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

Art. IV.—It is always distinctly understood that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding article, and destined to place temporarily the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman capital, under the safeguard of the high contracting parties, against all aggression of Mehemet AH, shall not be considered but as a measure exceptional, adopted at the express desire of the Sultan, and solely for his defence. But it is agreed that this measure will derogate in nothing to the ancient law of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it has been in all times prohibited to vessels of war of foreign powers to enter into the straits of the Dardanelles and the

Bosphorus; and the Sultan, on his part, declares by the present act, that, with the exception of the eventuality above-mentioned, he has the firm resolve to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient regulation of his empire, and as long as the Porte is at peace not to admit any foreign vessel of war into the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. On the other part, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, engage to respect that determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the principle above declared.

Art. V.—The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at London, within the space of two months, or sooner, if possible.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 15th of July, in the year of Grace 1840.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON. [CHEKIB.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.

“ADDITIONAL ACT

Additional Act (acte séparé) annexed to the Convention concluded at London, the 15th July 1840, between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte of the other.

HIS Highness the Sultan has the intention to record and to make known to Mehemet Ali the conditions of the arrangement subjoined.

I.—His Highness promises to accord to Mehemet Ali, for him and for his descendants in line direct, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt; and his Highness promises, moreover, to accord to Mehemet Ali, during his life, with the title of Pacha of Acre, and the command of the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, of which the limits are designed by the following line of demarcation :—

This line drawn from the Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the shores of the Mediterranean, extending from thence directly to the mouth of the river Seisaban, northern extremity of the Tiberias, along the western coast of the said lake, following the right bank of the river Jordan and the western coast of the Dead Sea, extending from thence in a right line as far as the Red Sea, and resting on the northern point of the Gulf d'Akaber, and following the western coast of the Gulf d'Akaber and the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

Nevertheless, the Sultan in making these offers, attaches to them the condition that Mehemet Ali accepts them within the space of ten days after the communication has been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of his Highness ; and that at the same time, Mehemet Ali deposits in the hands of that agent the necessary orders to the commanders of his forces by sea and land, to retire immediately from Arabia, and all the holy cities therein situated ; from the island of Candia, the district of Adana, and all the other parts of the Ottoman empire which are not comprised in the limits of Egypt, and in that of the Pachalic of Acre, such as they are above designed.

II.—If within the space of ten days above fixed, Mehemet Ali does not accept the said arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalic of Acre; but his Highness will still consent to accord to Mehemet Ali, for him and his descendants in line direct, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt, provided that this offer be accepted in the space of ten days following, that is to say, in the space of twenty days, counting from the date of the communication made to him; and provided that he likewise deposits in the hands of the agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his commanders by land and by sea, to retire immediately within the limits and within the ports of the Pachalic of Egypt.

III.—The annual tribute to be paid the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned more or less to the territory of which the latter will obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second ultimatum.

IV.—It is moreover expressly understood, that in the first, as well as in the second ultimatum, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the term fixed of ten or twenty days) shall be bound to send back the Turkish fleet, with the crews and *armamens*, to the care of the Turkish authority, who shall be charged to receive them—the commanders of the allied squadrons assisting at this restoration (remise).

It is understood that in any case Mehemet Ali cannot charge in account, nor deduct from the tribute payable to the Sultan, the expenses of keeping up the Ottoman fleet during the time that it has remained in an Egyptian port.

V.—All the treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman empire shall be applicable to Egypt and the Pachalic of Acre, such as it be above designed, as well as to every other part of the Ottoman empire ; but the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of tribute above mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall levy imposts in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of his Highness in the provinces of which the administration is to be to him confided. It is further understood that on the condition of receiving the above taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall provide for all expenses of the civil and military administration of said provinces.

VI. —The land and sea forces which the Pacha of Egypt and of Acre may maintain, shall form part of the forces of the Ottoman empire, and shall always be considered as kept up for the service of the state.

VII.—The present separate act shall bear the same force and value as if it were inserted word for word in the convention of this day. It shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at London, the same time with those of the said convention.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 15th of July, in the year of Grace, 1840.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON. [CHEKIB.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.

“PROTOCOL RESERVING THE RIGHTS OF THE PORTE

*Protocol signed at London by the Plenipotentiaries of their Majesties, &c.,
15th July, 1840.*

IN affixing his signature to the convention of this day, the plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte has declared—

That in stating, in the Fourth Article of the said convention, the ancient law of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it is prohibited at all times to foreign vessels of war to enter in the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to herself, as heretofore, to deliver firmans to light vessels under the flag of war, which are employed, according to custom, in the service of the correspondence of the legations of friendly powers.

The plenipotentiaries have taken note of this present declaration, to bring it to the knowledge of their courts.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.

“SECRET PROTOCOL

Secret Protocol, signed at London the 15th July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of their Majesties, &c.

THE plenipotentiaries of their Majesties, &c, having, in virtue of their full powers, concluded and signed, this day, a convention between their respective Sovereigns for the pacification of the Levant;

Considering, that from the distance which separates the capitals of their respective courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the exchange of the ratification of the said convention could be effected, and that orders founded on that act could be put into execution;

And the said plenipotentiaries being profoundly penetrated with the conviction, that looking at the actual state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, and the grave considerations of European policy, which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the powers signing the said convention of this day, imperiously require the prevention as much as possible of any delay in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said transaction is destined to attain.

The said plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, agree between themselves that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said convention shall be put into execution at once, and without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications, consent formally by the present act, with the assent of their courts, to the immediate execution of their measures.

It is agreed on besides by the said plenipotentiaries that his Highness the Sultan shall proceed to address to Mehemet Ali the communication and the offers specified in the separate act annexed to the convention of this date.

It is agreed, moreover, that the consular agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, will put themselves in communication with the agent of the Sultan to address to Mehemet Ali the communication and offers above mentioned ; that the said consuls will give to this agent all the assistance, and all the aid in their power ; and they will employ all their means of influence on Mehemet Ali to the purpose of determining him to accept the arrangement offered to him by order of his Sublime Highness the Sultan.

The admirals of the respective squadrons, in the Mediterranean, will receive the necessary instructions to place themselves in communication with the said consuls.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.”

D. THE “NEW HANDS” IN EGYPT’S COTTON TRADE

As suggested in the present thesis, Egypt’s transformation in terms of cotton commerce would be radical after the removal of trade barriers with the 1838 and 1840 Conventions. As a matter of fact, from the time of the monopolist Mehmet Ali, with a few merchants practicing cotton trade by his side, Egypt would turn into a multinational cotton market in a little bit more than half a decade. The level of change is apparent in the table below, which sheds light on the early twentieth century composition of the said sector. It is taken from Owen’s *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, published by the Clarendon Press in 1969 in Oxford (page 386).

<i>List of Alexandria Cotton Exporters, during the 1911-12 period</i>		
	Exports (bales)	
	Great Britain	All countries
Choremi Benachi & Co.	98,752	140,141
Carver Bros. & Co. Ltd.	101,827	128,343
R. and O. Lindemann	42,094	108,564
Peel & Co. Ltd.	79,300	106,719
J. Planta & Co. Ltd.	21,118	57,086
G. Frauger & Co.	24,222	53,837
F. Andres & Co.	13,400	45,995
Mohr and Fenderl	11,392	42,293
G. Pilvachi & Co. Ltd.	34,578	37,841
Reinhart & Co. Ltd.	16,596	30,661
E. Mallison & Co.	4,073	29,702
H. Bindernagel	22,819	26,397
Andritsakis Barsoum & Co.	15,169	19,872
Hahnloser & Co.	8,814	18,943
G. Riecken	4,672	15,134
W. Getty & Co.	7,982	14,448
J. M. Mezger	10,272	10,292
N. G. Casulli	9,865	10,107
Behar Barki & Co.	4,649	8,217
Moursi Brothers	4,382	7,787
Seeger Bros & Co.	3,961	7,486
N. Huri & Co.	5,670	7,437
Hess and Carcas	4,213	6,497
The Duckworth Co.	3,841	3,999
G. M. Coury & Co.	351	3,271
B. Tilche and Figli	2,998	3,230
G. Petracchi & Co.	485	3,130
Pinto & Co.	416	2,646

Rodocanachi & Co.	2,487	2,487
Sasson Israel & Co.	1,542	2,410
Anglo-Egyptian Bank	1,489	1,489
Moise Tilche Fils	419	1,292
Wm. Trapp & Co.	37	1,279
Deutsche Orient Bank	600	839
Credit Franco-Egyptien	487	487
Others	1,887	3,883
TOTAL	566,229	964,301

E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

19. yzyıl siyasi iktisadı, bir sistem olarak *Pax Britannica* tarafından belirlenmiřtir. Sz konusu dnemde, devlet ve piyasalar daha da liberalleřmiř, “siyasi” olanla “ekonomik” olan arasındaki iliřki giderek kuvvetlenmiř ve birbirine daha fazla baėlı hale gelmiř, aynı zamanda, dnemin bařat gçlerinin ıkarları, dnya sathında řekillendirilmiřtir. Byk Britanya, bu baėlamda nc rol stlenmiř ve her alanda artan gcyle sistemik normları byk oranda tasarlayabilmiřtir. Britanya’nın bu gce ulařmasına imkan tanıyan temel unsur, siyasi-iktisadi hedeflerinin temininde devlet, ticaret ve sermayenin aralarını sentezleme arzusu ve maharetinden kaynaklanmıřtır. Bu sre ayrıca, sanayi devrimiyle bir stratejik meta haline dnřen pamuėa iliřkin tasarrufları, aynı zamanda *Pax Britannica*’nın Avrupai kaygılarının uzantısı konumunda bulunan Doėu Akdeniz’e dnk stratejide de etraflıca tatbik edilmiřtir. Britanya’nın nderliėinde srdrlen bahse konu sre, 19. yzyılın ortalarına doėru Mısır’da, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pařa’yla filiz bulan, sistem karřıtı bir hareket tarafından sınanacaktır.

Mevcut tez, Mehmet Ali’nin doėrudan řekillendirdiėi sz konusu hareketin, ynetim tarzı, askeri dzeni ve ekonomik teřkilatlanması ve bu alanlarda benimsediėi hedefler temelinde nasıl sistemin odaėı haline dnřtėn; mezkur hareketin hayata geirdiėi eřitli uygulamaların, *Pax Britannica*’nın zelde Doėu Akdeniz’de, genelde ise Avrupa diplomasisi dzeyindeki iřleyiřine verdiėi zararı; bu hareketin bilahare, sistemin muhtelif erkleri tarafından maruz bırakıldıėı, esasen kaınılmaz ve ok boyutlu tepkiyi incelemektedir. Bu alıřma, anılan sreci, sistemin esasları ve Mehmet Ali’den kaynaklanan sistem karřıtlıėı arasındaki uyumazlık temelinde ele almakta; Mehmet Ali’nin Mısır’ının ykseliři ve kř ile Kavalalı sonrası Mısır’ı sistemle uyumluluk/uyumsuzluk ltleriyle deėerlendirmekte; Mısır’ın 19. yzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren *Pax Britannica* ierisinde yeniden konumlandırılmasına odaklanmaktadır.

Çalışmanın giriş bölümünde, araştırmanın temellerine ve amaçlarına değinilmektedir. Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa döneminin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bir eyaleti olarak Mısır'ın tarihinde bıraktığı ize yapılan vurguyla, bu sürecin, kimi araştırmalarda kısıtlı bakış açısıyla ve birbirine benzer temalara dayalı kısır bir yaklaşımla, bir etki-tepki konusu olarak ele alındığı; ayrıca, söz konusu araştırmalarda, Mehmet Ali'nin sistem karşıtı hareketinin emellerinin tespitinde de karmaşa yaşandığı ifade edilmektedir. “Geleneksel” olarak nitelenen bu araştırmalar bütününe, Mehmet Ali'nin yükselişi ve çöküşünde aslen başat öneme sahip *sistem* unsurunu gözden kaçırdığı belirtilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, Mehmet Ali'nin ve hanedanlığının yönetimindeki Mısır'ın gidişatının, eyaletin, 19. yüzyılın temel uluslararası siyasi-iktisadi sistemi olan *Pax Britannica*'daki konumu doğrultusunda anlaşılabileceği savunulmaktadır. Nitelikleri kendine münhasır bir devlet mekanizması çatısı altında, kişisel kazanımlarının güdümünde hareket eden Mehmet Ali'nin başarısızlığının, aslen bahis konusu sistemle uyumsuz hale gelmesinden kaynaklandığı, bir diğer deyişle, *Pax Britannica*'nın bölgesel yapılanmasındaki “hata” konumuna dönüşen Mehmet Ali'ye, keza bu sistemin önderleri tarafından, bu hatanın giderilmesi amacıyla, güçlü, çok katmanlı ve nihai bir tepki verildiği, değinilen bu tepkinin, Mısır'ın, yeniden sistemin hilafına hareket etmesini engelleyecek şekilde gerçekleştirildiği değerlendirilmektedir. Bu bölümde ayrıca, çalışmada tercih edilen bakış açısının kısıtlamalarına işaret edilerek, Mehmet Ali'nin siyasi, iktisadi ve askeri tasarruflarının, özellikle sistemi etkilediği/sistemce menfi karşılandığı açıyla değerlendirileceği kaydedilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, Mehmet Ali'nin *Pax Britannica* sisteminin, dolayısıyla Britanya'nın düşmanlığına nasıl konu edildiğinin incelendiği aşamalarda, yatay düzlemdeki kronoloji ile dikey düzlemdeki siyasi-iktisadi güç katmanları arasındaki ilişkinin tespit edildiği, bunun örneklerinden birinin hem Britanya hem de Mısır için stratejik niteliği haiz pamukta görüldüğü vurgulanmaktadır. İlaveten, çalışmanın tarihi bir konuda herhangi bir öneride bulunmaktan ziyade, Mısır'ın siyasi-iktisadi yörüngesini, *Pax Britannica* tahtında etraflıca ele almaya teşebbüs ettiği

belirlenmektedir. Giriş bölümünde son olarak, çalışma doğrultusunda istifade edilen kalitatif ve kantitatif veriye ilişkin özlü bilgi verilmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümüne, küresel düzeyde büyük siyasi-iktisadi değişim ile dönüşümlerin yaşandığı 19. yüzyılın akışında belirleyici niteliğe ulaşan hususun, aslen Viyana Kongresi'nin ardına denk gelecek şekilde, muhtelif kurum ve araçlar arasındaki ahenk olduğu vurgusuyla başlanmaktadır. Dile getirilen bu kavramlar, (1) liberal devletin ortaya çıkışı, (2) liberal pazarın büyümesi, (3) yerel pazarın uluslararası arenaya genişletilmesinde kullanılan araçlar ve (4) “barış” ile “ticaret” arasında, kavram ve uygulamada artan bağlılık olarak sıralanmaktadır. Çalışma bu unsurları, 19. yüzyılın sistemik parametreleri olarak niteleyerek, aralarındaki kombinasyonun *Pax Britannica*'nın özüne hayat verdiğini ve dönemin çağdaşlık ölçütünü belirlemiş olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. İkinci bölümde bu kapsamda, bahse konu ahenkte birincil öneme sahip unsurun liberal devlet olduğu kaydedilerek, devlet erkinin, bu yeni hali temelinde merkezi iktidarını ileriye taşımasıyla, ekonomik hareketlilik ve büyümeye de imkan tanıdığı, bu düzenden, öncelikle dönemin Avrupa'sındaki başat güçlerin yararlandığı belirtilmektedir. Bir diğer unsur olarak, “sistemin temelini” oluşturduğu ifade edilen liberal pazarın, devletler, şirketler, tüccarlar, sermaye ve ürünler arasında kuvvetlenen etkileşime sahne olduğu, özellikle sınai sermayeyle birlikte dönüştürücü rol üstlendiği; kişiler, ürünler ve sermaye arasındaki bağlantının kuvvetlenmesine yol açarak, kapitalizmin ve dolayısıyla 19. yüzyıl dünyasının dönüşümüne olanak yarattığı savunulmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, bahse konu dönüşümün devlet ve piyasa arasındaki güncel uyumdan kaynaklandığı ifade edilmekte, liberal devlet ve liberal pazar mekanizmaları, odaklanılan dönemin başlıca özellikleri olarak konumlanmakta, anılan düzeni dünyanın geneline yayan araçlar ise bu döneme işlev kazandırdığı belirtilmektedir. Öte yandan, ifade olunan araçlar arasında, başta devlet yöneticileri ile sermayedarlar arasındaki fonksiyonel ilişkinin öne çıktığı, bu kesimlerin birbirleriyle uyum içinde hareket ederek “siyasi” olanla “iktisadi” olan arasındaki bağlantıyı kuvvetlendirdiği, ortaya çıkan gücün, başta Britanya olmak üzere Avrupa devletlerine dünya çapında büyüme imkanı

tanıldığı savunulmaktadır. “Barış” ve “ticaret” arasındaki karşılıklı bağıllığın ise bir diğer aracı teşkil ettiği, her iki hususun da verimli işleyiş için birbirine muhtaç hale geldiği; barışa, büyük devletlerin tercihlerine göre şekil verildiği, siyasi güç dengesinin ise, esasen ticari çıkarların muhafazasında kullanıldığı belirtilmektedir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, 1815 sonrasında iyice şekillenen siyasi-iktisadi sistemin faaliyetinin, sermaye ve ulusal güç arasındaki dairesel ve nedensel ilişkinin bir sonucu olduğu, ticaretin barışa, siyasetin ise barışın temini için iktisada ihtiyaç duyduğu, bu karşılıklı işleyişin muhafazasının da büyük devletlerin başlıca hedefi haline geldiği vurgusuyla neticeye ulaşılmaktadır. Tarif olunan bu işleyişin, Britanya’nın nasıl büyük bir imparatorluk haline dönüştüğünü, dolayısıyla, *Pax Britannica*’nın temellerini tarif ettiği belirtilmekte, mevcut çalışmanın, bu düzen sayesinde nasıl dünyanın kimi bölgelerinde güç gösterisinde bulunulabildiğini ortaya koyan bir örneğe odaklandığı kaydedilmektedir.

Üçüncü bölüm, *Pax Britannica* sisteminin, uygulamada, ne şekilde faaliyete geçtiğini ve uluslararası/bölgesel siyasi-iktisadi dinamikleri nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede ilk olarak, devlet gücünün, küresel pazarı Britanya’nın çıkarları doğrultusunda yönlendirmek üzere kullanılması konusuna odaklanılmaktadır. 1815 yılını takiben başlayan süreçte emperyal gücünün doruğuna ulaşacak Britanya’nın iktisadi faaliyetinin küresel özellik edineceği, toplam dış ticaretinin yaklaşık beşte üçünün Avrupa dışında kalan pazarlarla gerçekleştirileceği, Britanya’nın 19. yüzyılın ortalarına doğru, giderek daha fazla güç kazanmasıyla temin ettiği istikrarın, küresel ticaretin yaklaşık 2.5 kat büyümesine olanak tanıyacağı, imparatorluk haline gelen Britanya’nın da dünya çapında büyüme yakalayacağı belirtilmektedir. 1825-1850 yılları arasında, Britanya’nın toplam ihracatının %250, toplam ithalatının ise %127 artması örneğinden hareketle, söz konusu dönemde, bu devletin ticari çıkarlarının, dış politika tercih ve kararlarında giderek daha etkili olmaya başladığı, pamuk ürünleri gibi temel ticaret kalemlerinin ise anılan tercih ve kararlara ulaşılmasında ziyadesiyle etkili olduğu savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, Britanya’nın, dönemin iktisadi ruhuna uygun olacak şekilde, büyük ticaret ortaklarıyla serbest ticaret

koşullarını ileriye taşımaya çalışmasına rağmen, bu aşamada Avrupa’da hakim olan korumacı ticaret anlayışının, Londra’yı alternatif pazarlara ve küresel pazarı kendi tercihleri ile tüccarlarına göre şekillendirme arzusuna yönlendirdiği kaydedilmektedir. Bundan hareketle, Britanya’nın, siyasi-iktisadi gücünü tam manasıyla kullanabileceği, görece zayıf/az gelişmiş taraflara yönelik faaliyetini kuvvetlendirdiği belirtilerek, Avrupa dışındaki pazarlar arasında sınıflandırılan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na yönelişi incelenmekte, Osmanlı’ya yönelik ithalatının, 1825 ile 1850 yılları arasında 7 kat arttığı örneği verilmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde ayrıca, yerel düzeydeki çağdaş kapitalist ekonominin, küresel düzeye taşınması ile Avrupalı tüccarların, küresel siyasi-iktisadi yapının yeniden şekillendirilmesinde üstlendiği rol tartışılmakta, bunda, devlet adamları, çıkar grupları, üreticiler, aracılar, tüccarlar ve tüketiciler arasındaki ilişkiler ağının taşıdığı öneme ve etkiye değinilmektedir. Devletin siyasi-iktisadi gücünün, nasıl münferit çıkarlara yönlendirildiği incelendikten sonra, Britanya’nın küresel ekonomik büyüyüşünde temel araç haline gelen pamuk üretimi/ticareti ele alınmaktadır. Özellikle Avrupa dışındaki pazarların devlet-sermaye uyumuyla kontrol altına alındığı, Britanya’nın siyasi-iktisadi nüfuzunun dünya sathına yayıldığı ve bu düzenden ziyadesiyle istifade eden tüccarların muhtelif sektörlerdeki faaliyetlerinin giderek hız kazandığı bir ortamda, tedricen kuvvetlenen pamuk sanayiinin büyümeye esas teşkil ettiği, hatta pamuk üretimi/ticaretinin, Britanya’nın ekonomik büyüme ivmesiyle koşut olduğu, 19. yüzyıl boyunca, Britanya’nın pamuk mamulü tekstil kalemlerinin, toplam ihracatının yaklaşık %30’u ile %40’lık dilimine hakim hale geldiği belirtilmektedir. Diğer yandan, bu dönemin başlarından itibaren Avrupa’da hakim olan korumacı ticari tavrın, Britanya’yı pamuk ticaretini farklı noktalara yönlendirmeye sevk ettiği, başta Yakın Doğu olmak üzere “yeni” pazarların, örneğin Akdeniz çevresinin ve Mısır dahil Osmanlı topraklarının payının arttığı ve bir ticaret kalemi olarak pamuğun, bahse konu bölgeleri, Avrupa kaynaklı ticarete giderek daha fazla maruz bıraktığı ifade edilmektedir. Değinilen bu gelişmelerden hareketle, pamuğun, her hal ve karda, Britanya’nın dış ticaret politikasının belirleyici unsurları arasına yerleştiği savunulmaktadır. Üçüncü

bölümde, son olarak, *Pax Britannica*'nın ekonomik/ticari boyutlarına ilaveten, jeopolitik olarak da etki kazandığı Yakın Doğu bölgesine odaklanılmakta; Britanya'nın bu bölgeye yönelik siyasetinin şekillendirilmesinde jeopolitik kaygıların yanı sıra, ticaret ve prestijin de nazara alındığı, bu esnada temel önceliğin Akdeniz ve Hindistan'daki çıkarlara atfedildiği değerlendirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda Akdeniz bölgesi, ilk olarak, Britanya'nın araştırmaya konu dönemdeki emperyal gücünün merkezi unsurları arasında bulunan Hindistan'a açılan bir kapı niteliğinde incelenmekte; Hindistan'a yakın bölgelerde, Britanya'nın kendisinin veya müttefikleri haricindeki tarafların siyasi-iktisadi nüfuz sahibi olmasının, Londra'da, Britanya'nın emperyal tasarılarına varoluşsal tehdit olarak algılandığı, Akdeniz'in de bu bölgeler arasında değerlendirildiği belirtilmektedir. Bu anlayıştan hareketle, Akdeniz'de barış ve istikrarın temininin, 1800'lü yıllarda Avrupa siyasetinin gündemine oturan bir mesele haline geleceği, esasen bir önceki yüzyılda, bölgeye büyük önem atfetmeyen Britanya'nın, Akdeniz'deki sükunetin, keza bölge kaynaklı olarak kaybolmasıyla, konuya ilişkin stratejisini yeniden değerlendireceği savunulmaktadır. Britanya'nın içine gireceği bu değişimde, özellikle Rusya'nın, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, dolayısıyla Akdeniz üzerindeki nüfuzunun artmasının bir hayli etkili olacağı, bu durumda, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun merkezine, istikrarına ve bütünlüğüne varoluşsal tehdit oluşturan "Doğu Krizi'nin" ve İstanbul ile Petersburg arasında 1833 yılında imza edilen Hünkâr İskelesi Antlaşması'nın belirleyici olacağı savunulmaktadır. Sonuçta, siyasi-iktisadi bir düzen olarak *Pax Britannica*'nın ileriye götürülmesinde, Britanya'nın, Avrupa ve Doğu arasında uzanan bölgede sürekli nüfuza ihtiyaç duyduğunun ortaya çıktığı, anılan ihtiyaca Mısır'ın cevap verebileceğinin tespit edildiği, fakat, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun söz konusu eyaletinde, bu dönemde sistem karşıtı bir hareketin şekillenmekte olduğu izah edilmektedir.

Mısır'da Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa'nın liderliğinde hayat bulan, *Pax Britannica* karşıtı bu hareketin temel nitelikleri, çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünün konusudur. Bu bölümde, Mısır'ın, Fransızlar tarafından 1798

yılında işgal edilmesi ile müteakiben başlayıp, 1803 yılında tamamlanan İngiliz mevcudiyetinin ardından, yerel düzeyde ortaya çıkan, kendine has dinamiklere sahip güç mücadelesinde galip gelen Kavalalı Mehmet Ali'ye ilişkin özet bilgi verilmekte; Kavalalı'nın Mısır Valisi ilan edilmesine ve ardından Mısır'da güç temerküz etmek amacıyla başlattığı katı sürece değinilmektedir. Bu noktada, Mehmet Ali'nin de dahil olduğu bahse konu güç mücadelesinin, aslında yalnızca 19. yüzyıl Mısır'ına mahsus olmadığı ve benzer siyasi karmaşanın eyaletin tarihinde çeşitli örneklerinin bulunduğu anlayışından hareket edilmektedir. Nitekim, Kavalalı'nın bilahare 1805 yılında Vali ilan edilmesinin, esasen, eyalette doğrudan merkezi güce ulaşması anlamına gelmediğine, Mehmet Ali'nin bu aşamada ne sağlam mali kaynaklara, ne de düzenli orduya sahip olduğuna dikkat çekilmekte, bununla birlikte, kendisinin döneminde, seleflerine kıyasla fark arz edecek hususun, idarede, mutlak kontrolü önceliklendiren, otoriter ve otokratik yönetim anlayışından kaynaklanacağı ve Mehmet Ali'nin siyasi düzen tesis edebileceği belirtilmektedir. Kendisinin bu anlayışının temelinde ayrıca, Mısır'ı savaş ganimeti ve şahsi mülkü olarak görmesinin yattığı savunulmakta ve siyasi ve ekonomik merkezileşme adımlarını aslen bu anlayışın ileriye taşınması amacıyla atacağı belirtilmektedir. Dördüncü bölümde, bu çerçevede, Mehmet Ali'nin siyasi gücün merkezileştirilmesi ve ileriye taşınması yönündeki tasarrufunun hedefleri saptanmaya çalışılmakta, bu konudaki araştırmalarda görüş ayrılığı bulunduğu değinilerek, bazılarının “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan bağımsızlık”, bazılarının da “modern Mısır'ın kuruluşu” yönünde oluşturulduğu kaydedilmektedir. Mevcut çalışma ise, Mehmet Ali'ye “ulusal” bir karakter biçen ve daha ziyade bu dönemi “Mısırlı” bir anlayışla okuyan yaklaşımlara karşı eleştirel bir tutum benimsemekte, Kavalalı'nın yakaladığı ivmenin, bu ülkede modern devlet oluşumuna sağladığı katkıyı, ayrıca, kendisinin de çoğu zaman “bağımsızlık” düşüncesiyle hareket etmiş olabileceğini teslim etmekle birlikte, Mehmet Ali'nin bağımsızlık yönünde gerçekleştirdiklerinin büyük çoğunluğunun, esasında *kendisi* ve *ailesi* için kurduğu ekonomik, askeri ve siyasi teşkilatın güçlendirilmesi ve bu teşkilatın kazanımlarının azami düzeye

çıkarılması niyetini taşıdığını, bu niyetin, görüntüde bağımsızlığı amaçlayan, özde ve uygulamada ise Vali ve hanedanlığının çıkarlarını koruyan, “tek adam” ilkesine dayalı bir yönetim mekanizması çatısı altında gerçekleştiğini savunmaktadır. Dördüncü bölümün devamında, Vali’nin söz konusu hedef doğrultusunda tercih ettiği idari, askeri ve ekonomik yöntemler ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle idari yöntemler incelenmekte, Mehmet Ali’nin gücünün temelinde merkezileştirilmiş, yeni bir idari teşkilatın ve salt kendi ellerinde topladığı siyasi kuvvetin yattığı kaydedilmektedir. Dönemin Fransız otokrasisinin reform çabalarından da esinlendiği kaydedilen söz konusu teşkilatın kurucu unsurunun bir “hane hükümetince” oluşturulduğu, yönetimin temel katmanlarının Mehmet Ali’nin ailesi, yakınları, dostları ve güven bahsettiği yabancılardan mürekkep olduğu ve yalnızca Kavalalı’ya bağlı yeni bir yönetici elit sınıfının doğduğu, Vali’nin böylece, toplumsal dinamiklerden neredeyse tamamen özerk hala gelebildiği savunulmaktadır. Mehmet Ali’nin askeri teşkilatına bakıldığında ise, şahsi hedeflerine ulaşmak için Batı ölçütlerinde teçhizata ve eğitime sahip bir kara ordusu ile donanmaya sahip olması gerektiğinin bilincine ulaştığı, bu çerçevede, çağdaş ve muntazam bir ordu hedefiyle yola çıktığı vurgulanmaktadır. Vali’nin bu hedefle, İstanbul’da halihazırda uygulamaya koyulmuş olan nizam-ı cedid programından ve Napolyon’ca tatbik edilmiş olan genel seferberlik (*levée en masse*) ilkesinden esinlendiği, yeni ordunun kuruluşu aşamasında ayrıca başta Fransızlar ve Prusyalılar olmak üzere Avrupalı danışmanlardan istifade ettiği, ayrıca, yeni ordunun tesis edilmesinin her safhasında doğrudan yer aldığı, her adımı bizzat tayin ettiği ortaya konulmaktadır. Neticede teşkil edilen, yaklaşık 100 bin kişiden müteşekkil ordunun, Mısır için bir hayli etkili sonuçlara gebe olduğu, aynı zamanda Vali’nin doğrudan açığa vurmadığı ve o dönemde zannedilenden daha farklı niyetlerine işaret ettiği, neticede “kişisel imparatorluğunun” kuruluşu ve genişletilmesi süreçlerinde başlıca unsuru oluşturduğu belirtilmektedir. Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünde son olarak, Mehmet Ali’nin ekonomik yöntemlerine değinilmekte, seleflerinin de takip etmeye çalıştığı, Mısır’ı İstanbul’un etkisinden mümkün mertebe muaf tutmak

hedefinin, ekonomik alanda da benzer gereklilikleri doğurduğu, bu durumun, uygun her vesilenin mali kazanca dönüştürülmesi anlayışını beraberinde getirdiği ve geleneksel yöntemlerin bu ihtiyaca cevap vermekte yetersiz kaldığı belirtilmektedir. Mehmet Ali'nin bu kapsamda tasarladığı stratejinin, Avrupalıların, zirai ürünlerin ve ham maddenin temini amacıyla küresel olarak yürüttüğü büyüme politikasına bir karşılık olarak belirlendiği, bunda, Mısır ile Doğu Akdeniz'in de Avrupa'nın güdümündeki ekonomik ilişkiler ağına sarıldığı tespitinin etkili olduğu açıklanmaktadır. Mısır'daki gayri menkul üzerindeki şahsi hakların Vali tarafından büyük oranda ilga edilmesi, mülk vergisinin kademeli olarak arttırılması ve vergi düzeninin merkezileştirilmesi, keza toprak yönetiminin tam manasıyla kontrol altına alınması gibi hususların, bu stratejinin uygulamaya geçirilmesine olanak sağladığı kaydedilmektedir. Mısır'ın siyasi idaresinde ortaya konulan merkezileşme hareketinin, anılan ekonomik stratejide de önemli yansımaları olduğu ve ziraat ile ticaretin, Vali'nin uygun gördüğü ölçüde ileriye taşınmasını mümkün kıldığı, yönetim mekanizmasının kazancının, merkezileşme anlayışıyla azami düzeye çıkarılabileceğinin görülmesiyle, ziraat, sanayi ve ticarete tekelleşmeye gidildiği, aslen Mısır ekonomisinin tamamının, Mehmet Ali'nin başkanlık ettiği büyük bir tekel haline dönüştürüldüğü savunulmaktadır. Kavalalı'nın bu çerçevede, zirai faaliyeti en ince ayrıntılarına kadar şekillendirdiği, üretimde hızlı büyüme trendi yakaladığı, nitekim 1798 yılına kıyasla, 1812 yılına gelindiğinde eyaletin gelirlerinde yaklaşık %650 ile %900 oranında artış sağlandığı, benzer bir yükselişin, başlıca zirai meta olan pamukta da gözlemlendiği, bu ürün için ayrılmış olan yetiştirme alanının her geçen gün büyütüldüğü, bir diğer deyişle, Vali'nin Mısır'da neredeyse zirai reform gerçekleştirebildiği vurgulanmaktadır. Benzer bir tablonun sınai atılımında da görüldüğü, bununla birlikte, Mısır'daki ekonomik hamlenin aslen, 1821 yılından itibaren üretimi başlatılan Jumel pamuğu etrafında şekillendirildiği kaydedilmektedir. Sonuç olarak, Mehmet Ali'nin tasarladığı ekonomik düzenin, mutlakçı yönetim anlayışı ve askeri teşkilatıyla birlikte, Vali'nin kişisel kazanım/büyüme stratejisinin kilit sütunlarını oluşturduğu, bu sayede, “kişisel

imparatorluğuna” dönüştürmeye çabaladığı Mısır’ın ekonomisini de kendi kontrolü altına alıp, azami kar üretimi hedefine yönlendirebildiği ifade edilmektedir. Dördüncü bölüm, söz konusu düzenin, bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Mehmet Ali’nin *Pax Britannica* sisteminin siyasi-iktisadi dinamikleriyle uyumsuz hale dönüşmesine sebep olacağı, bu uyumsuzluğun, Mısır’ın jeopolitik ve ekonomik konumu sebebiyle stratejik nitelik arz edeceği vurgusuyla sonuçlandırılmakta, bahse konu uyumsuzluğun ve Mehmet Ali için de başlıca ihracat dinamosu haline gelen pamuk üretimiyle tespit edilebileceği vurgulanarak tamamlanmaktadır.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümü, Mısır’ın pamuk üretimi, ticareti ve ihracatı konusunu incelemekte, bu meseleyi, Mehmet Ali’nin Britanya’nın stratejik çıkarlarıyla çatışır konuma gelmesine sebep olan bir husus olarak ele almaktadır. Bu bölümde, söz konusu gelişmenin ardında, Mehmet Ali’nin, bağımsız bir hanedanlık kurmak amacıyla gerçekleştirdiği siyasi ve mali temel arayışının bulunduğu tespit edilmekte; Paşa’nın bu suretle Mısır’da başlıca mülk sahibi ve tek tüccar haline dönüştüğü, eyalet sathında zirai faaliyet yürütebilmek için idari reform gerçekleştirip, bürokrasiyi işler hale getirdiği, ayrıca sınai ve ticari tekeller teşkil ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu girişimde dikkat çeken unsurun, Vali’nin liderliğindeki Mısır’ın istisnai büyüklükte –başta pamuk temelinde olmak üzere– bir zirai tekele dönüştürüldüğü aşamanın, *Pax Britannica*’nın küresel siyasi iktisat üzerinde tahakküm kurmaya başladığı ve serbest ticaret ile hür/özel teşebbüs çağının habercisi olan dönemle tesadüfı olduğu belirtilmektedir. Mehmet Ali’nin özgün tekелci şemasının, eyalette üretilen pamuğun, Mısır içi ve dışına serbest ticaretine müsaade etmemesinden hareketle, Vali’nin ekonomik yöntemlerinin, *Pax Britannica*’nın sistemik temelleriyle uyumsuz olması ile Mehmet Ali’nin bu tekелci düzeni Mısır dışına da taşıma motivasyonuna vurgu yapılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, bahse konu dönemde, kişisel kazanım güdüsüyle hareket eden söz konusu kompozisyonun etkisiz hale getirilmesinin, yalnızca çok boyutlu bir tepkiyle, bir diğer deyişle, Mehmet Ali’nin yönetim anlayışı, ordusu ve ekonomisini, yani Mısır’ı doğrudan sistem karşıtı hale dönüştürecek temel unsurlara yönelik bir adımla mümkün

olduğunun anlaşıldığı belirtilmektedir. Mısır'da yetiştirilen pamuğun da bu duruma bir örnek oluşturduğu, üretimi ve ticaretinin gerçekleştirildiği tekelci anlayışın, Vali'ye sağladığı mali ve dolayısıyla askeri avantaja işaretle, mezkur pamuk organizasyonunun hedef alınması durumunun, Mehmet Ali'yi ne kadar büyük bir hasara sürükleyeceği izah edilmektedir. Bu arka plan ışığında, çalışmanın beşinci bölümünde öncelikle, Mısır'da 1821 yılı itibarıyla geniş çaplı üretimi ve ticareti başlatılan, uzun lifli Jumel pamuğuna ilişkin teknik özelliklere değinilmekte, bu ürünün Avrupa'da büyük ticari başarı yakaladığı, Mısır'da daha evvelden üretilen kısa lifli pamuğa kıyasla %150 ila %300 oranında daha yüksek fiyatla satıldığı vurgulanmaktadır. Bir diğer yandan, bu ürünün eyalete sağlayacağı kazancın farkına varan Mehmet Ali'nin, üretiminin Mısır'ın tamamında gerçekleştirilmesi yönündeki girişimiyle, *Pax Britannica*'nın ticaret standartlarıyla giderek uyumsuzlaştığına vurgu yapılmakta, Mısır'daki Jumel pamuğunun uluslararası düzeyde yakaladığı başarıya ilişkin ayrıntılar da hesaba katılarak, Mehmet Ali'nin kontrolünde gerçekleştirilen pamuk üretiminin, aslen, eyaleti, Britanya'nın daha fazla dikkatini çekmeye sürüklediği savunulmaktadır. Beşinci bölümün devamında, Mısır'daki pamuk üretiminin coğrafi, zirai ve ticari diğer özelliklerine de yer verilmekte, örneğin 19. yüzyılın ilk yarısında, Mehmet Ali tarafından bu ürüne ayrılan toplam üretim alanının, Mısır'ın günümüzdeki sınırlarının yaklaşık %60'ına denk geldiği ortaya konulmakta, pamuk tekellerinden elde edilen gelirin, 1830'lu yıllarda eyalet bütçesinin yaklaşık %15'ini, eyaletin tüm zirai gelirin neredeyse %50'sini, tüm zirai tekellerden elde edilen kazancın ise neredeyse %90'unu oluşturduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Mehmet Ali'nin pamuk üretiminin, Mısır için teşkil edilen ekonomik düzenin ayrılmaz ve hayati bir parçası haline geldiği, bunu hedef alan menfi herhangi bir hareketin, Vali'nin siyasi-iktisadi gücü için karmaşa manasına geleceği, Mısır'ın pamuk ticaretinin rotasının daha ziyade Avrupa'ya çevrilmiş oluşunun da eyalet ekonomisini, uluslararası iktisadi dalgalanmaların etkisine soktuğu, bu cihetle, uluslararası siyasi-iktisadi koşulların Mısır'ın aleyhine dönmesi ve Mehmet Ali'nin pamuğa ilişkin tasarrufunun hedef alınmasıyla, Vali'nin

kendisini çalkantı içinde bulmasının mümkün olacağı savunulmaktadır. Beşinci bölümün devamında, bu sürece örnek teşkil eden gelişmeler ele alınmakta, Mehmet Ali'nin kontrolünde üretilen Jumel pamuğunun Avrupa'dan Hindistan'a muhtelif noktalarda ilgi çektiği ve hatta Britanya'ya ticari rekabet sinyali verdiği, bu durumun, bahse konu dönemde kaleme alınan özel ve resmi raporlarla da ortaya konulduğu, Mehmet Ali'nin tekelci ticari düzeninin, serbest ticaret akımının öncüsü İngiliz üreticileri/tüccarları, dolayısıyla Britanya dış politikasının yönlendiricilerinde rahatsızlık yarattığı belirtilmektedir. Beşinci bölümün sonunda, pamuğun beslediği tekelci düzenin, Mehmet Ali'nin gücünün temelini teşkil ettiği, Mısır'da pamuktan istifade edilme tarzının Vali'yi, *Pax Britannica*'yla her hal ve karda çatışmaya sürüklediği, nitekim eyaletteki tekelci sistemin, *Pax Britannica*'nın Yakın Doğu'daki işleyişini, kimi konularda doğrudan, kimi konularda ise dolaylı olarak tehlikeye soktuğu belirtilmektedir. Bu bölüm, Vali'nin tekelci düzeninin, Londra'da yarattığı rahatsızlık sebebiyle, Britanya tarafından etkisiz hale getirilmek üzere mercek altına alındığı ve Mehmet Ali'ye bu konudaki ilk darbenin 1830'ların sonunda vurulacağı açıklanarak neticelendirilmektedir.

19. yüzyılın ilk yarısı itibarıyla, *Pax Britannica*'ya karşı halihazırda farklı tehditler yönelmiş olan Mehmet Ali'nin "genişleme" ve "bağımsızlık" yönündeki tasarılarının, sistemik ve çok boyutlu bir tepki tarafından nasıl suya düşürüldüğü, bu çalışmanın altıncı bölümünde ele alınmaktadır. Bahse konu tepkinin neden tek bir yönde hayat bulmadığı sorusu, Mısır'ın yalnızca siyasi önem taşımadığı, buradan filizlenen sistem karşıtı bir hareketin, Britanya'nın bölgedeki stratejik çıkarlarını büyük ölçüde tehlikeye attığı hususlarına yapılan vurguyla cevaplanmaktadır. Altıncı bölümde, 1830 ile 1841 yılları gerçekleşen bölgesel gelişmelere odaklanılmakta, 1833 yılında imzalanan Hünkâr İskelesi ile 1838 yılında imzalanan Baltalimanı Antlaşmaları, ayrıca müteakip dönemde Mehmet Ali ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve diğer güçler arasında cereyan eden çatışmalar ve nihayet 1840-41 Düzenlemesi incelenmekte, bahse konu sürecin sonucunda, Mehmet Ali'nin hem siyasi hem de iktisadi olarak etkisiz hale getirildiği, böylece

Mısır'da yeniden sistem karşıtı bir hareketin oluşmasına imkan tanıyabilecek koşulların ortadan kaldırıldığı kaydedilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ilk olarak, 1838 Baltalimanı Antlaşması'na giden sürecin ayrıntılarına değinilmekte, Mehmet Ali'nin 1831'de İstanbul'a karşı isyan hareketinin bölgede sebep olduğu sonuçların, doğrudan İngiliz çıkarlarının hilafına konumlandığı belirtilmektedir. İsyanın sonucunda imzalanan ve Mehmet Ali'ye geniş kazanımlar sağlayan 1833 Kütahya Anlaşması'nın; ayrıca, Vali'nin askeri ilerleyişini durdurmak hedefiyle alınan Rus yardımı karşılığında, Osmanlı ile Rus İmparatorlukları arasında imzalanan, Petersburg'a, İstanbul üzerinde büyük nüfuz imkanı tanıyan 1833 Hünkar İskelesi Antlaşması'nın, Britanya'nın bölgedeki tasarılarını büyük tehlikeye sürüklediği kaydedilmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, 1833 yılının ardından İngilizlerin bölgeye dönük politikalarında büyük bir değişimin yaşandığı, bu gelişmenin, keza Hünkar İskelesi Antlaşması'nın etkisiyle, Osmanlı tarafının, Britanya'yla yeni bir işbirliği temelini yokladığı döneme denk geldiği, her iki tarafın çıkarlarının hem Rusya hem de Mehmet Ali karşısında belli bir ölçüde uyduğu, İngilizlerin bu durumdan, 1838 Baltalimanı Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla istifade ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Antlaşma'nın, İngilizlere, Osmanlı'yla gerçekleştirecekleri ticarette birçok ayrıcalık sağlarken, Osmanlı'nın Mısır dahil tüm topraklarında tekelleşmeye yasak getirerek, Mehmet Ali'nin gücünü de zarara uğrattığı belirtilmektedir. Ayrıca, Baltalimanı'nın içerikte, dönemin liberal ticaret ruhunu yansıttığı, hatta çalışmanın başlangıç bölümlerinde işaret edilen, barış ve ticaret arasında, büyük güçler tarafından tayin edilen dengeden emareler barındırdığı; uygulamada ise, serbest ticaret karşıtı, bölgesel bir harekete cevap niteliğinde olduğu kaydedilmektedir. 1838 Antlaşması'nın, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na varoluşsal tehdit teşkil eden bir hareketin gücünün temellerine yönelik yapısıyla, her hal ve karda çok boyutlu bir teşebbüs özelliği taşıdığı, nitekim Londra'nın İstanbul'daki siyasi-iktisadi gücünü arttırdığı, Osmanlı ekonomisini ve ticaret düzenini *Pax Britannica* ölçütleriyle uyumlaştırmayı hedeflediği kaydedilmektedir. Baltalimanı Antlaşması'nın özünün ise, tekelleri karşı geliştirilmiş olduğu cihetle, ticari düzeyde stratejik niteliği haiz

Mısır pamuğuna odaklanarak, İngiliz çıkarlarına karşı gelen bir harekete darbe indirdiği, söz konusu hareketin nihai başarısızlığına başlangıç yarattığı savunulmaktadır. Altıncı bölümün devamında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Mehmet Ali arasında 1839 yılında yaşanan çatışmaya değinilmekte, Mehmet Ali'nin bu safhaya varan süreçte ortaya koyduğu yayılmacı taleplerin, Britanya'nın Vali'ye ilişkin algısını bir hayli olumsuz hale getirmiş olduğu belirtilmektedir. 1833 yılının ardından bölgeye dönük İngiliz politikasının sınırlarının netlik kazanmış olduğu, bunlar arasında Osmanlı'nın Mehmet Ali tarafından daha fazla zarara uğratılmasının engellenmesi, Hünkâr İskelesi Antlaşması'nın iptali, Rusların, Osmanlı'nın işlerine yeniden karışmasına müsaade edilmemesi, Yakın Doğu'da İngiltere'ye karşı kurulabilecek ittifakların durdurulması hedeflerinin bulunduğu, Mehmet Ali'nin tasarılarının tamamının ise bu hususlarla tezat teşkil ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, 1839 yılıyla başlayan süreçte, ilk olarak, başta Britanya olmak üzere Avrupalı devletler tarafından hem İstanbul hem de Kahire nezdinde, iki taraf arasındaki olası çatışmalara karşı ön alınmaya çalışıldığı; Osmanlı'nın Nizip Savaşı'nda başarısızlığa uğramasının ardından, Mehmet Ali'nin aşırı taleplerine karşı diplomatik olarak harekete geçildiği; Vali'nin itaatsizliği neticesinde ise bölgeye doğrudan askeri müdahale gerçekleştirildiği ve Mehmet Ali'nin sistem karşıtı hareketinin sonunun getirildiği kaydedilmektedir. Konuya ilişkin olarak, bu sürecin tüm aşamalarında, Doğu Akdeniz'de, 1833 yılında sarsılmış olan sistemik dengenin yeniden tesisinin hedeflendiği, böylece Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun muhafazası, Hindistan'a uzanan kara ve deniz yollarının emniyet altına alınması, Rusya'nın, Osmanlı'ya yeniden müdahale etmesinin önlenmesi ve Britanya'nın bölgesel çıkarlarını zarara uğratabilecek bir aktörün başarısızlığa uğratılması amaçlarıyla hareket edildiği vurgulanmaktadır. Nitekim sürecin Mehmet Ali aleyhinde neticelenmesine imkan tanıyan 1840 Londra Antlaşması ve bu antlaşmayı Mısır'da tam anlamıyla hayata geçiren 1841 Düzenlemesi sonucunda, Mısır için dengeli ve eyaletin, *Pax Britannica*'yla yeniden özdeşleşmesi yolunu açacak bir sonuca erişildiği belirtilmektedir. Özel olarak, Vali'ye resmen özerklik tanınırken, bu duruma denge sağlamak adına,

1838 Baltalimanı Antlaşması'nın Mısır'da uygulamaya geçirilmesinin hükme bağlanması, böylece Mehmet Ali'nin iktisadi gücünün elinden alınması yolunun tercih edildiği; keza haddinden büyük ordusunun personel sayısının 18 bin düzeyine düşürülmesi ve askeri gerekliliklerin yarattığı aşırı mali baskının hafifletilmesinin, Mehmet Ali'nin tekelci üretim ve ticaret düzeninin muhafazasına yönelik arzuyu zayıflatmış olduğu açıklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, sistem karşıtı çizgiyle kalkıştığı hareketin sonucunda, sistemin oldukça güçlü reaksiyonuna maruz kalan Mehmet Ali'nin, 30 yılı aşkın sürede edindiği kazanımların neredeyse tamamını yitirdiği, bunun aslen bir ölçüde kaçınılmaz olduğu, nitekim sistemin temellerine yönelik her tehdidiyle, sistemin dinamiklerine iyice saplandığı, *Pax Britannica*'nın cevabının hataya mahal bırakmayacak şekilde gerçekleştiği savunulmaktadır. Altıncı bölüm, sonuç olarak, Mısır meselesine sebep olan sistem karşıtı hareketin, Mehmet Ali'nin şahsında vücut bulduğunu, bu dolayda, Vali'nin gücünün temellerinin zayıflatılmasının, Mısır'ın *Pax Britannica* karşıtı bir konumdan, sistemin bir alt ünitesine dönüşmesi yolunu açmış olacağını vurgulamakta; nitekim, 1838 Antlaşması'nın, Vali'yi mali gücünden ve ticari etkinliğinden yoksun bıraktığını, 1840-41 Düzenlemesi'nin ise Mehmet Ali'nin uluslararası siyasi gücüne darbe vurduğunu kaydederek, Mısır'ın *Pax Britannica*'nın geniş kapsamlı kontrolü altına alındığını kaydetmektedir. Çalışma bu noktada, söz konusu tepkiye yol açan 1805-41 sürecini, Mısır'da sistemin ideallerinden uzaklaşan bir gidişat olarak tespit etmekte; bu noktadan hareketle, Mısır'ın 1841 sonrası yöneliminin, sistemle daha fazla etkileşim ve birleşim üzerine kurulduğunu ileri sürülmektedir.

Çalışmanın yedinci bölümü, Mısır'ın, 1840-41 Düzenlemesi'nin ardından, üçüncü tarafların siyasi ve ticari nüfuzlarını ilerlettiği bir sahneye nasıl dönüştüğünü, bu kesimlerin Valilik makamının mutlak ve merkantilist idare anlayışının yok edilmesine hangi doğrultuda sebep olduğunu incelemektedir. Bu kapsamda, 1838-41 sürecinin ardından, idarede merkezi yapının zayıflaması, tekellerden kademeli olarak vazgeçilmesi ve özellikle ziraatta serbest piyasa koşullarına geçilmesiyle, üçüncü taraflar ile Mısırlı üreticiler arasındaki temasın artması, idarenin, eyaletteki etkisinin giderek zayıflaması

ve nihayet Mısır'ın Britanya tarafından 1882 yılında işgaline zemin hazırlaması süreçleri incelenmektedir. Bu çerçevede, Mısır ekonomisinde Mehmet Ali'nin ardından yaşanan büyük dönüşümün, eyaletin uluslararası iktisadi sisteme zirai bir birim olarak entegre edildiği ve Mısır'ı iktisadi bağımlılığa sürükleyecek koşullara sebep olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bahis konusu sürecin değerlendirilmesinde, örnek olarak, Mısır'daki pamuk üretimi ve ticaretinin, tekellerin ardından aldığı şekil ile Avrupalı tüccarların eyalet içindeki/eyalete yönelik faaliyetleri gözden geçirilmektedir. Bu çerçevede ilk olarak, öncelikle Baltalimanı Antlaşması'nı, bilahare Mehmet Ali'nin ölümünü takiben, Mısır'ın pamuk ticaretinde hacim ve değer olarak artış kaydedildiği, bu artışta Britanya'nın payının kayda değer ölçüde büyük olduğu, öyle ki Mısır'dan ihraç edilen pamuğun büyük kısmının İngiltere'deki fabrikalara yöneldiği, Mısır'ın toplam pamuk ihracatında Britanya'nın payı için 1859 yılında %65'lik bir orandan bahsedilirken, bunun 1869 yılında %75'e yükseldiği, hatta Mısır'dan alınan ham pamuğun 1854 yılından 1865-69 yıllarına kadar %1385 oranında arttığı ortaya konulmaktadır. Her hal ve karda, Mehmet Ali döneminde olduğu üzere, Mehmet Ali'nin ardından da pamuk ticaretinin Mısır için belirleyici ve dönüştürücü özellik kazandığı, bu hususun Mehmet Ali sonrası Mısır'da arz ettiği farklılığın ise, serbest ticaret karşısındaki tekeli engellerin 1838 Baltalimanı Antlaşmasıyla kaldırılmasının, eyaletin küresel ticaret düzeniyle entegrasyonunun bir hayli hızlandırmış olmasında yattığı vurgulanmaktadır. Diğer yandan, pamuğun, anılan entegrasyon sürecinin başlıca hızlandırıcısı olarak tespit edildiği bağlamda, Avrupalı tüccarların, bu sürecin araçları haline dönüştüğü savunulmakta, 19. yüzyılın ortalarından itibaren, Mısır'ın ticari faaliyetlerin, Vali'nin şahsında konsantre olmuş tekil bir yapıdan ziyade, çok milletli bir tüccar ağı tarafından yürütülmeye başlandığına işaret edilmektedir. Bu noktada, pamuk, deniz taşımacılığı, bankacılık, postacılık, demiryolu ulaşımı, perakende satış veya üretim gibi alanlarda “eski ve sayılı isimlerden” ziyade “yeni ve muhtelif isimlerin” etkili olmaya başladığına dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu dönüşümün yalnızca tarım veya ticaretten ibaret olmadığı, Mısır ekonomisinde üçüncü tarafların ve yabancı

yatırımcıların/tüccarların etkisinin bir hayli artmasının, eyaletin idari gücünü de yıprattığı, hatta Avrupalıların, bir “devlet içinde devlet” teşkil ederek, eyaletin yöneticilerinin otokratik kontrolüne son verdiği vurgulanmaktadır. Yedinci bölümde, özetle, *Pax Britannica*’nın Mehmet Ali’nin özgün eyalet yapılanmasına tepkisinin tepe noktasına, 1838 ve 1840 Antlaşmaları sayesinde tırmanıldığı, Valilik makamının otokratik niteliğinin yok edilmesiyle nihayete ulaşıldığı vurgulanmaktadır. Bu gidişatın ardında, söz konusu Antlaşmalar sebebiyle, Mısır’ın idarecilerinin siyasi ve mali korumadan yoksun bırakılmasının bulunduğu belirtilmekte; eyalette yaratılan zayıflığın, burada sistem karşıtı hale gelebilecek unsurların “düzeltmesini” kolaylaştırdığı, Mısır’ın, dönemin etkin koşullarıyla uyum içinde, serbest ticaret faaliyetleriyle uyumlu hale getirildiği savunulmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, idarenin, siyasi-iktisadi güç ve kontrolden mahrum bırakılmasının, müteakip otorite boşluğunun ve yapısal belirsizliğin, *Pax Britannica*’nın Mısır’a yönelik muamelesinde nihai aşamayı teşkil ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu sürecin, Mısır’ın sistemle birleştirilmesi, sisteme tabi kılınması ve sistemle tam anlamıyla uyumlu hal getirilmesi gibi aşamalardan oluştuğu ayrıca izah edilmektedir.

Bu çalışma sonuç kısmında, çalışmanın başlangıcından itibaren kaydedilen hususları kısaca tekrarlamaktadır. Mehmet Ali’nin liderliğindeki sistem karşıtı hareketin Mısır’ı ulaştırdığı düzey; bunun *Pax Britannica*’nın Doğu Akdeniz’deki genel işleyişine teşkil ettiği tehdit; sistemin bu duruma, Britanya’nın önderliğinde verdiği çok boyutlu ve stratejik karşılığın, Mehmet Ali’nin gücünü besleyen tüm unsurlara yöneltilmesi; Mehmet Ali sonrası Mısır’ın, bir kez daha sistem karşıtı konuma erişemeyecek düzeyde zayıflatılması; nitekim sistemin doğrultusundan uzaklaşan yeni bir gidişat ihtimaline, 1882 yılında işgalle cevap verilmesi gibi hususlar sonuç kısmında özetlenmektedir. Bu çalışma, anılan hususlardan hareketle, Mehmet Ali tarafından Mısır için öngörülmüş olan bu siyasi-iktisadi alternatif arayışının, aslen başından itibaren çökmeye mahkum olduğunu, bunun yalnızca tekil bir etkenden değil, eyaletin sahip olduğu muhtelif güçlerin eş zamanlı olarak bir araya getirilmesinin ortaya çıkardığı potansiyelin arz edeceği sistem karşıtı

nitelikten kaynaklandığını, nitekim *Pax Britannica*'nın birleşik kuvvetlerinin, neticede, Mehmet Ali'nin tüm kazanımlarını elinden aldığını savunmaktadır. Çalışma, bu döngünün 20. yüzyılın ortalarına dek süreceğini ve 1950'li yıllarda olduğu üzere, ancak küresel sistemde yaşanacak bir paradigma değişikliği sonucunda kırılabileceğini savunarak tamamlanmaktadır.

F. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Akın

Adı / Name : Okyanus

Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) :

PAX BRITANNICA AND THE ANTI-SYSTEMIC MOVEMENT OF VICEROY MEHMET ALI PASHA OF EGYPT

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master

☒

Doktora / PhD

☐

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.

☒

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. *

☐

3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. *

☐

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.

A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date 23 Aralık 2019