

URBAN TRANSFORMATION AS POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
INTERVENTION IN SPACE: A CASE STUDY IN DİYARBAKIR

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ABSTRACT

URBAN TRANSFORMATION AS POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IN SPACE: A CASE STUDY IN DİYARBAKIR

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This thesis examines urban transformation in old city center of Diyarbakır, *Suriçi* as case study to discuss the different paths of urban transformation in Turkey. The study argues that although the phenomenon of urban transformation is predominantly determined by the economic reasoning of the neoliberal regimes, it cannot be reduced to that. The main question of this study is that if the transformation of space in late-capitalism is directly linked with the rescaled position of the state in urban governance, how can we include the primary features of politics in our inquiry of the phenomenon? Based on this question, the thesis brings *Suriçi* case from southeast Turkey in order to show the specificity of political aspects of urban transformation through a sociological inquiry. Based on participant observations as well as in depth and semi-structured interviews from the field, the study analyzes the urban transformation in *Suriçi* with its different aspects, implementations, and impacts in order to frame how the transformation of space is becoming a focal point for the state, which should be considered both an economic and a political subject in the era of neoliberalism.

Keywords: urban transformation, neoliberalism, urban space, displacement, dispossession, ethnosociology, Diyarbakır

ÖZ

MEKANA POLİTİK VE İDOEOLOJİK BİR MÜDAHALE OLARAK KENTSEL DÖNÜŞÜM: DİYARBAKIR ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, Diyarbakır'ın tarihi merkezi olan *Suriçi* bölgesinde gerçekleştirilen kentsel dönüşümün analizi çerçevesinde Türkiye'de kentsel dönüşümün aldığı farklı çehreleri tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, kentsel dönüşüm olgusunun her ne kadar ağırlıklı olarak neoliberal rejimin ekonomik boyutları tarafından belirlenmiş olsa da sadece bu koşullara indirgenemeyeceğini savunmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel sorunsalı, geç kapitalizm döneminde devletin pozisyonunun yeniden ölçeklenmesiyle doğrudan ilişkilenen mekanın dönüşümünün incelenmesine siyasetin temel unsurlarının hangi yollarla dahil edileceğidir. Bu sorunsal çerçevesinde çalışma Türkiye'nin güneydoğusunda yer alan bir yerleşim birimi olan *Suriçi*'ni merkezine alarak kentsel dönüşümün siyasal yönlerini sosyolojik bir sorgulama yolu kullanarak göstermektedir. *Suriçi* bölgesinde uygulanan kentsel dönüşümün farklı boyutlarını, uygulamalarını ve etkilerini sahada yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler ve katılımcı gözlemler yoluyla analiz ederek neoliberal dönemde mekanın dönüşümünün devlet açısından nasıl hem ekonomik hem de politik bir odak haline geldiğini çerçevelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: kentsel dönüşüm, neo-liberalizm, kent mekanı, yerinden etme, mülksüzleştirme, etnososyoloji, Diyarbakır

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Urban transformation is one of the significant phenomena that most cities in Turkey have experienced at certain degrees for the last two decades. According to official resources, 248 urban transformation projects implemented in 20 provinces only the years between 2003 and 2010 in Turkey, under the name of “Renovation of Squatter Areas and Urban Renewal Projects”.¹ As the title of the projects shows, these projects have been presented by those who lead them from a developmentalist view with the claims of producing a better urban space for those who live in those places. Contrary to this view, these projects produced various critical responses. However, especially those that were conducted in big metropolises of these projects attracted more attention in the public agenda and these were highly debated and criticized in the academic milieu, while some others remained out of public and academic attention. Many critical scholars, focusing on metropolitan areas, have studied the urban transformation in relation to neoliberal projects, and analyzed the economic reasoning of these projects to explain the new regimes of capital accumulation.

During the last few years, some new projects come to our attention with their distinct qualities from the usual path of urban transformation in the metropolises of Turkey. These new projects targets urban transformation in numerous towns, cities and neighborhoods located in the southeastern regions of Turkey. This thesis investigates one of these areas, *Suriçi* district in Diyarbakır, as a case study of one of the different paths of urban transformation in Turkey.

In the thesis, I argue that although the phenomenon of urban transformation is predominantly determined by the economic reasonings of the neoliberal regimes, it can

1 Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ), *Building Turkey of the Future*, 2011, p.46.

not be reduced to that. According to the perspectives that only focuses on this economic reasoning, the emergence of this phenomenon is directly linked with the accumulation of wealth, creating urban rent and marketing urban lands. This thesis, on the other hand, brings a case study from southeast Turkey in order to show the specificity of political aspects of urban transformation through a sociological inquiry. The main question of this study is that if the transformation of space in late-capitalism is directly linked with the rescaled position of the state in urban governance, how can we include the primary features of politics in our inquiry of the phenomenon? What follows, how the political and ideological aspects can be positioned into analysis of the urban transformation? In which ways do the planning and coordinating activities of state in urban space produce political and ideological effects as key determinants? In order to answer these questions, my study discusses the peculiarities of this case to open up different perspectives to approach social and material transformation of urban space as related with the political and ideological aspects. The case of *Suriçi* might help us to see the effectivity of these aspects, without reducing the phenomenon of urban transformation to economic features; hence, can open us another perspective to study this phenomenon at large.

1.1. A Brief Background of the Case

Suriçi is the historical inner-city center of Diyarbakır, with a population around 70.000. Being the ancient center of the city, *Suriçi* has been one of the main targets of urban transformation projects in Diyarbakır. The first “urban renewal project” in Diyarbakır, for example, was declared after the protocol signed between TOKİ (*Toplu Konut İdaresi*) and Governorship of Diyarbakır on 31.03.2008. This project included Alipaşa, Lalebey and Cevatpaşa neighborhoods, all of which are located in *Suriçi*. The project proposed destruction of 1596 structural units in order to “clean” the area from “squatter settlements” and to build “residences, hotels, cafes, restaurants and green areas for touristic function” (Çatalbaş, 2012, p.51). The existing inhabitants of those neighborhoods, moreover, proposed to be transferred to the houses that would be constructed in Çölgüzeli area located in the far periphery of the city. This project and

following versions were interrupted many times with strong objections raised by local administrations, civil society organizations, and residents of the neighborhoods since the very beginning (Aslan, 2013). The objections obliged inurement of an additional protocol on 14.10.2009 which included a revision of “urban conservation plan” regarding the “preservation of historical heritage and cultural landscape” (Kejanlı & Dinçer, 2011). This revised version of the project was also affirmed by the Metropolitan and the Sur Municipalities of Diyarbakır. However, on 16.5.2012 government passed Law No. 6306 addressing the “transformation of areas under disaster risk”. This law provided absolute authority to state to implement projects in any desired area, meanwhile excluding all possible legal objections from local administrations and institutions as well as the inhabitants. Just after some months, on 22.10.2012, Ruling No. 3900 declared the entire area of Suriçi as “risky area” and “urban transformation site”.

The trajectory of *Suriçi* took a different dimension following the collapse of the “peace process” proceeded for the Kurdish question, which gave rise to a period of relative political stability in Diyarbakır. Starting from August 2015, “state of emergency” rules began to be deployed in the cities located in the southeastern regions of the country. There have been a dozen of round-the-clock curfews declared in 15 neighborhoods located in *Suriçi* since September 2015. The longest one lasted more than three months and the entire area located inside of the city walls was entirely blockaded. More than 20.000 residents, especially those who lived in Cevatpaşa, Dabanoğlu, Fatihpaşa, Savaş, Cemal Yılmaz and Hasırlı neighborhoods, were forcibly displaced by coercive implementations without any provisions for housing or essential amenities (OHCHR, 2017; Amnesty International, 2016). The operations consequently resulted in destruction of at least 5.000 buildings in *Suriçi* (TMMOB, 2017). After the cessation of the armed conflicts, the Council of Ministers passed Bill No. 8659 on 21.03.2016 for the requisitioning of 6292 parcels out of 7714 in *Suriçi* as well as the expropriation of their owners. As a result, 82% percent of entire area in *Suriçi* passed into public

ownership (TMMOB, 2017). This was made possible by means of the declaration of the area, once again, as an “urban transformation site” by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization based on Law No. 2942, which addressed the “urgent expropriation of risky areas for national defense”. Eventually, on 12.04.2017, the governor office announced “the immediate evictions and demolishment” of the houses and streets located in Lalebey and Alipaşa neighborhoods within the scope of urban transformation project. Focusing on this last phase of urban transformation in *Suriçi*, this dissertation aims to demonstrate how the historically specific conjuncture is essential in understanding the phenomena of urban transformation.

1.2. Historical Background of the Case in a Neoliberal Context

During the second half of the 20th century, pervasive structural changes triggered radical transformations regarding economic, administrative and socio-spatial configurations around the globe. In relation to this, the neoliberalization of economy through successive laws in mid 1980s transformed the relations of the political center with local state institutions and local elites in Turkey (Yüksel, 2011; Şenses, 2012; Ozbay et al., 2016). In the southeast regions of the country, furthermore, the transition to liberal economy coincided with the outbreak of a “civil war” in this era during the late 1980s and the 1990s (Barkey & Fuller, 1998; Olson, 1996; Bozarslan, 2000; Ibrahim & Gürbey, 2000). Accordingly, many argued that political, economic and spatial strategies regarding these regions developed within a context of war economy, and assimilatory and exclusionary policies directed to Kurdish populations (Bozarslan, 2001; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014). Therefore, the neoliberalization process and the policies targeted to Kurdish issue evolved in tandem in Turkey (Saraçoğlu, 2011; Yüksel, 2011). Within this context, during the 1980s and the 1990s, spatial state strategies served to the construction of the southeast Turkey both materially and discursively as an “underdeveloped region” and a “zone of terror” (Yeğen, 1996, 2009; Jongerden, 2007). While the plan and coordination of economic and social activities in the form of regional development programs were implemented to address the

“underdeveloped” conditions of the region (Çarkoglu & Eder, 2005; Özok-Gündoğan, 2005; Harris, 2008, 2012), the demographic structure of the region was intervened especially by means of population movements and forced migration (Ayata & Yüksek, 2005; Çelik, 2005; Kurban et al., 2007). These policies were specific to the areas marked by the Kurdish unrest and they have played a major role in the particular sort of localization of neoliberalism in southeast Turkey (Yüksel, 2011, 2013; Gambetti & Jongerden, 2015).

The turn of the century, witnessed another tremendous structural change regarding urban governance in Turkey under the newly emerging rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP). Many scholars have argued that the phenomenon of “urban transformation” during the 2000s is deeply related to the radical transition from populist to neoliberal approaches in the urban governance and housing policies in Turkey (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Kayasü & Yetişkul 2014; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011). Most of these studies notify neoliberalism of the 2000s as forming a new urban regime and therefore, they discuss urban transformation projects as the main mechanisms through which the neoliberal system is instituted in incompletely commodified urban areas such as informal housing zones and inner-city slums in Turkey (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.1).

By various researchers neoliberalism as “a programme for destroying collective structures in favor of pure market logic” (Bourdieu, 1998, p.1) is used as a theoretical framework to emphasize the rescale of the power/function and position of state in organization of urban space (Brenner, 2015; Brenner et al., 2009; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Peck et al., 2009). Neoliberalization, in this sense remarks a variegated form of regulatory restructuring that produces geo-institutional differentiation across places and territories around the globe. It imposes various forms of regulatory landscapes but also evolves and develops through space and spatial interventions. In this sense, what differentiates the neoliberal configuration of space from earlier forms of economic spatial frames is the fact that urban policies

became one the central instrument of intervention to remedy and confront spheres of socio-economic and political configurations. Urban renewal project in *Suriçi* emerged from such framework, yet neoliberal processes have evolved through space by creating outcomes at different scales in different geographies of the country. The rupture in 2015 marks the trajectory of *Suriçi* district as becoming an exceptional space where different power relations also begin to influence the drives, implementations and impacts of the urban transformation process.

1.3. The Contribution of the Thesis and the Research Questions

This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by examining *Suriçi* case to frame how the transformation of urban space is becoming a focal point for the state, which should be considered both an economic and a political subject in the era of neoliberalism. Based on this perspective, this thesis analyzes the urban transformation in *Suriçi* with its different aspects, implementations, and impacts in order to evaluate how urban space is produced by existing relations of capital and power.

From this perspective, this study aims to discuss urban transformation in *Suriçi* through the following research questions: What are the core premises, implementations and impacts of recent urban transformation projects? What are the administrative, institutional and discursive processes that the projects are legitimized through? What are the impacts of the projects over the existing social, economic and political relations in urban space? What are the social, economic and political background of the residents who were settled in transformation sites? In which ways are they included in or excluded from these processes? Last, but not least, to what extend are these projects evolved as governmental mechanisms to extend control over urban space both in economic and political senses?

1.4. Research and Methods

The case of urban transformation in *Suriçi* in this study is analyzed through quantitative and qualitative data extracted from existing resources as well as ethnographic field

researches conducted in *Suriçi*.² Several personal ethnographic field trips were conducted to transformation sites at compromising different times between 2018 and 2019, which were accompanied by visual materials, participant observations as well as in depth and semi-structured face-to-face interviews with various subjects on urban transformation process. In order to approach the phenomenon with different aspects, these interviews conducted with the respondents from different backgrounds and positions. Specifically, I conducted interviews with TOKİ engineers, residents with different profiles, architects and Diyarbakır chair of TMMOB, and spokesman of Sur Conservation Platform. In total I made 15 in-depth interviews, along with semi-structured conversations by some of the residents in the field. The field study, in this sense, embraced complex as well as tense relations with different subjects in the process of urban transformation. On the one side, the field research was conducted with implementers which consists of administrators and local subcontracting holders, and, on the other side, with the residents of the area. In addition to this, interviews with the local civil society organizations were part of the field research who provided critical views on urban transformation. During the field research of the study, the themes addressed by these three subfield of groups –residents, experts and implementors — enabled me to better understand complexity of the process in its details. Rather than focusing on one group, and developing a representational analysis of that, I talked to people in different positions to see the different statements and viewpoints of them along with the aim of the thesis. I invited all respondents to comment on urban space and urban transformation with open discussions on their experiences according to their positions in the process. During my field research, I also have taken various pictures in order to better demonstrate the implementations and impacts of transformation projects in urban space.

2 I first moved to Diyarbakır to study high school in 2003. During my first years in the city, I lived in *Bağlar* district which is another huge *gecekondu* area in Diyarbakır. In 2005, my parents, who are both primary school teachers, also moved to Diyarbakır. I left the city for my university studies in 2007. However, during my university years, I have always visited my family in Diyarbakır and I never skipped to visit *Suriçi* as well.

In addition to the data that I collected throughout my field trips, I used various public reports published by different non-governmental organizations, research centers as well as some international organizations on different aspects of socio-spatial transformations in *Suriçi*. Such reports were important for my analysis to understand the urban transformation projects as a large process. These resources include the reports of the Chamber of Architects and Engineers in Turkey (TMMOB), Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality (DBB), Amnesty International (AI), Social and Political Research Center (SAMER). These reports are collectively produced by professionals including social scientists, lawyers, unionists, human right and urban activists, architectures, archeologists, and independent researchers. They have various perspectives and concentrations on the issue and provide an empirical database that would be referred to answer research questions within the scope and aim of the thesis. Finally, I have also made use of the existing researches and studies that analyze different aspects of Diyarbakır as well as *Suriçi*. Such studies were helpful for me both to test my own findings and to have a better sense of the historical and social background of the case that I analyze.

1.5. Outline of the Thesis

The following chapter of this thesis reviews critical studies in urban literature in order to have a theoretical framework to approach the urban transformation in *Suriçi*. Instead of using a singular theoretical framework, I try to include various questions of the literature in order to open up different perspectives along with the aim of thesis. From the perspective of the theoretical framework, chapter three begins to discuss historical, economic and political background of Diyarbakır in order to provide how *Suriçi* emerged from these conditions as suburb in the city. Chapter four discusses first economic and social conditions of *Suriçi*, and then, focuses on the urban transformation with its drives, implementations and impacts in its relations to socio-economic aspects. Chapter five discusses the implementation of the transformation process regarding the relations of power in the urban space and the reactions of the inhabitants towards this

process. Eventually, the concluding chapter summarizes the arguments and findings in each sections while demonstrating that how urban transformation process in *Suriçi* facilitate political and ideological intervention in space as a peculiar phenomenon which is effected by complex and specific historical conjunctures.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The phenomenon of the transformation of urban space often come to the scene of theoretical discussions and these discussions include different positions from various disciplines. This section of the thesis will review critical perspectives in urban literature in order to have better understanding of the different aspects of urban transformation projects. Critical perspectives, mainly emphasize and insist that the organization of space is not free from economic, political and cultural foundations and should be approached by their relations to each other. In this sense, they differ fundamentally from what might be termed as “mainstream” urban theory for example the approaches inherited from the Chicago School of urban sociology that approach the current condition of cities as the expression of bureaucratic rationality or economic efficiency (Park, 1915; Wirth, 1938; Park et al., 1967). These approaches mainly based on the idea of the city as a mere subject of progress and technical intervention. Whether in an explicit or subtle way, they propose the power of institutional apparatuses or systems as having a legitimate right to interfere, intrude the city in favor of progress and development. Based on this progressive template these approaches produce weak analyses that overlook the complexities of social relations in production of urban space. As my aim is to develop multiple perspectives on the issue, following the complexity of the phenomenon, I prefer to use the critical approaches to have a comprehensive analysis of the specificities of urban transformation in Diyarbakir as production of space.

2.1. Critical Urban Theories

The critical urban theory is used as a reference to the writings of radical urban scholars during the post-1968 period such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, Manuel Castells,

Peter Marcuse and some other theorists who have been inspired or influenced by them. While involving the critique of power, inequality, injustice, and uneven developments within and among cities, they emphasize that urban space is “politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and therefore malleable” (Brenner, 2009). These approaches emphasize the continual (re)construction of urban space as a site and outcome of historically specific relations of social power (Brenner, 2009, p.198).

The so-called *spatial turn* in social sciences and humanities initially sparked by the transformative spatial perspectives during the 1960s, mainly derives from the works of Lefebvre and his contribution to approaching to organization of space as a material product, with the relationship between social and spatial structures of urbanism, and with the ideological content of socially created space (Soja, 1989). Lefebvre insists on the “decisive” and “pre-eminent” role of spatial structural forces in modern societies, and underline that all social activities are also about space as an integral factor in everything we experience (Soja, 1989, p.76). Based on these premises, the early efforts of some scholars such as David Harvey (1973) and Manuel Castells (1972) were to develop a spatially explicit form of Marxist analysis which would build upon the conceptualization of spatial relations, rapidly expanding through the literature on radical urban and regional political economy (Soja, 1989, p.77). According to these approaches, the organization of space is a social product and the political organization of space not only express social relationships but also react upon them (Harvey, 1973, p.306).

Lefebvre's theory, contains insightful observations on the relationship between states, space, and territory. In his early writings, he distinguishes the prominence of spatial relations as follow:

In our societies, there is a 'problematic' of space (conceptual and theoretical), and an empirically observable practice. This 'problematic' to employ the language of philosophy, is composed of interrogations of mental and social space, their connections, their link with nature and logic, etc. Observable in architecture, in 'town planning' [*urbanisme*] (to employ the official language),

in the effective planning of thoroughfares and places, in everyday life—in short, in urban reality, spatial practice is distinct from this problematic but cannot obviously be separated from it (Lefebvre, 2009, p.197).

Lefebvre's early approach productively raises the issue of how space is actually constructed and reproduced through spatial practices. According to Lefebvre (1991), each society to which history gave rise within the framework of a particular mode of production, is shaped its own space, which bore the stamp of that mode of production's inherent characteristics. In this sense, the space of any society might justifiably be described as a “work” and “spatial practice” and always be “empirically observable” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.412-13). Brenner & Elden (2009) summarize Lefebvre's theoretical inquiry as follow:

In a remarkable sequence of books from this period—especially *The Survival of Capitalism* (Lefebvre 1973, 1976); *The Production of Space* (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]); and *De l'État* (Lefebvre 1976–1978)—Lefebvre offers a detailed analysis of state strategies to manage the crisis-tendencies of modern capitalism through the production of space. Indeed, each of these books advances the shared proposition that space must be a central element within the critique of political economy. *The Survival of Capitalism* does this in polemical and political form; and *The Production of Space* does so in a more theoretically nuanced, systematically philosophical form. But it is only within the volumes of *De l'État*, where the state's role in the production of (capitalist) spatiality is more systematically explored, that Lefebvre elaborates his fully developed, mature approach to this problematic (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p.357).

As it is observable in the above passage, their reading of Lefebvre is distinct in the sense that they underly “the role of the state” in the “production of (capitalist) spatiality”. In its most direct ways, they underline that Lefebvre conceptualizes “space” as “privileged instrument” of the state. In this regard, it should be noted here that this “role of the state” underlined in Lefebvre's understanding of the space is invaluable for an analysis of the subject of this study because *Suriçi* case illustrates various aspects of state-led urban planning and transformation process. Lefebvre's early effort to determine the position of the state in the discussions of urban spatiality should be

notified as one of his important contribution to the critical urban studies since then.

Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* was translated into English by the presentation of David Harvey in 1991 and after that the debates on urban space once again become a hot topic among scholars. This time, however, the conceptual framework also began to be introduced with the general discussions on the conditions of the late capitalism in the world scale. The end of the Cold War finds its echoes in the discussion on two main trends of newly emerging world system: Neoliberalism and Globalism. These two frameworks have profoundly affected critical urban studies and shaped their prominence in academic writings throughout the cities of the world. Many scholars strongly argue that the emergence of new urban rationale reflects general tendencies of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007; Peck et al., 2009), while others emphasize the globalism as the main determiner in urban conditions in late capitalism (Sassen, 2004). Yet both perspectives share the basic proposition that the spatial organizations of society is significantly associated with specific aspects of the political, social, economic and cultural features of the correlated mode of societal organization (Budd & Gottdiener, 2005). These critical perspectives are important to approach the case of study to understand how complex relations associated with different aspects of the phenomenon significantly affects configurations of urban transformation projects in *Suriçi* as production of space.

2.2. Neoliberalism and Urban Transformation

Since the 1990s, the discussions on urban transformations have become more and more related to the neoliberal shifts across the globe. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism” was written by David Harvey in 1989, and became one of the most referred articles among urban scholars who focus on changing role of the state in urban processes. Harvey’s analysis opens up the shifting role of the state in market-driven economic relations in modern capitalist cities, where the state frames itself as an “entrepreneur” by having and

imposing its own agenda to accumulate and distribute wealth through urban space. As strongly influenced by the Marxist analysis of capital, Harvey's analytical inquiry on urban governance is relied on the historical materialist approach in the sense that market/class relations-structure shape the social relations-super structure in the last instance.

In addition to Harvey's conceptualization of the state as an entrepreneur, neoliberalism, defined as "a programme for destroying collective structures in favor of pure market logic" (Bourdieu, 1998), is used as a theoretical framework by many other scholars to emphasize the rescale of the power/function and position of state in organization of urban governance (Brenner et al., 2009; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Peck et al., 2009). Most of these scholars view neoliberalization as a variegated form of regulatory restructuring that produces geo-institutional differentiation across places and territories. They define neoliberalism as the creation of "utopia" of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference, while "in practice, it has entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.5). Based on these perspectives, Pinson & Journal (2016) argue that urban scholars should move on towards a role in "building up concepts able to unveil hegemonic projects behind spatial changes" and they emphasize the embeddedness of neoliberalism and urbanization as follows:

However, the process of neoliberalization of urbanism has been progressively completed and accelerated by a process of 'urbanization of neoliberalism'. With the financialization of the economy, urban assets, built environments have become increasingly central and even crucial in the current forms of capitalist accumulation. Neoliberalism does not only land in cities or impact urban governance; cities are basically crucial cradles of neoliberalization, provide fundamental material bases for this process, but also for its contestation (Pinson & Journal, 2016, p.139).

According to these perspectives, neoliberalism affects urban planning through a variety of ways, where public space losing its publicness and ceases to be a material good. It

can be defined as a restructuring of the relationship between private capital owners and the state, which rationalizes and promotes a growth-first approach to urban development (Sager, 2011, p.149). In this sense, the urban plans made by the public authorities used to direct urban development in the extent that privately initiated building projects have first priority, and that whatever exists of public plans are modified accordingly (Healey, 1992). In most of the cases, renewal locations have been considered by the public and private sector as areas of risk and uncertainty followed by surveillance, monitoring, and discrimination in urban space. In this sense, privatization, control, and exclusion should be treated as different aspects of the same neoliberal policies for managing urban land (Sager, 2011, p.173). These perspectives are important to approach different aspects of urban transformation in Diyarbakır as related with the regulatory restructuring of urban space which reveals many of discussed features of neoliberal configurations regarding the shifting role and position of the state in urban governance.

2.3. Literature on The Political Economy of Gentrification

In the last decades, the notion of gentrification is widely used to analyze urban transformation. The literature on gentrification consists of case studies in different parts of the world and mainly follows Lefebvre's attention to the "empirically observable spatial practices". Gentrification is generally defined as the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential or commercial use (Lees et al., 2008). Since the time when its first implementations were observed in London, England and in a number of east coast U.S. cities in the 1950s and 1960s, gentrification has gradually spread around the globe and attracted widespread attention of diverse groups and sectors (Lees et al., 2008, p.1). Without a doubt, it is also one of the more popular topics of urban inquiry and in the academic world and has been a central research theme in many subdisciplines of urban social science. The phenomenon of gentrification captures the attention of geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, housing economists, and political scientists, and resulting in a substantial and diverse international literature (Lees et al., 2008, p.1). Also, the scholars

from various disciplines comment on it as “a valuable lens” through which one might examine a variety of intersecting phenomena in a city and/or neighborhood context.

The conceptual meaning of gentrification, its origins and characteristics, however, has become the subject of dispute (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005). Early interpretations such as of Laska & Spain (1980) comment on gentrification as a “back to the city” movement of middle-class groups based on the demand of better proximity to jobs and the cultural and recreational infrastructure that were hard to find on city peripheries. This approach was criticized by some scholars with the assertion that gentrification should be analyzed as the movement of capital rather than as the group of people (Smith, 2002). The distinction between “back-to-the-city movement of capital” and “back-to-the-city movement of people” has persisted in the gentrification literature in various guises such as production/consumption, capital/culture and so on (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005, p.6). These perspectives are important to approach urban transformation in *Suriçi* as form of gentrification as revealing specific configurations of the movement of capital rather than movement of people.

Gentrification literature evolves after the 1990s through positioning itself in a much broader discussion on neoliberalism and its effects on urban governance. Scholars begin to refer to gentrification as one of the key characteristics of contemporary geoeconomics under neoliberal states (Smith, 1996). In this context, gentrification has been understood as part of neoliberal urban development (Butler, 2007; Hackworth, 2007; Smith, 2002; Wilson, 2004), aiming to bring investment, capital as well as middle class people back to the central parts of the city through “creative destruction” of city centers in order to extract economic value and profit from the city (Weber, 2002, 2010).

In its early discussions since the early 1990s, gentrification discussed mainly as a phenomenon which express the key aspects of current economic and social restructuring of western society. In this sense, it was related to the general trends of deregulation and privatization in many areas which were traditionally under the purview of government (Van Weesep, 1994; Hamnett, 1991). Especially among urban geographers,

gentrification was a crucial topic debated as a perspective to analyze social change and its spatial effects. Van Weesep (1994), for example, distinguishes the two perspectives as the “human agency approach” and “social structure approach” in classical gentrification literature. The first one is based on the thesis that gentrification is a result of freedom of choice (Ley, 1986), while the second one considers social structures as an ultimate cause of gentrification (Smith, 1979, 1982; Smith & Katz, 1993; Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Human agency approach tends to present the process at the scale of the individual and emphasize the sociocultural side of gentrification while connecting it to the decision makers and small groups of people who share residential preferences (Butler, 1997; Butler & Robson, 2003). Structuralist approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the politico-economic and large-scale aspects of gentrification while suggesting that the gentrification process emanates from the reciprocal processes of economic, demographic and sociocultural restructuring in society (Rose, 1984; Smith 1987, 1996; Warde, 1991). Smith (1996), for example, has argued that middle-class pro-urbanism has now been replaced by a desire for revenge on the poor and the socially marginal. This “revanchism” has taken the form of middle classes re-occupying, and re-appropriating the central core of the city. This is made possible through the operation of the property market, gentrification, and, sometimes by the use of the police and legal agencies (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005, p.6). These perspectives are significant to evaluate in which senses urban transformation in Diyarbakır restructures economic, demographic and sociocultural aspects of the society as a form of gentrifying practice.

It should also be noted here that gentrification literature has been subject to some criticisms for underestimating how the divergent urban processes produce displacement and dispossession. Some scholars comment on these critics as they are referring primarily to what is known to be “classic gentrification” and they envision a prototype of gentrification built on an imagined western model of gentrification (Shin et al., 2016). According to them even the etymology “gentry” is singled out as evidence for the inability of gentrification as a concept to travel across cultural boundaries; for gentry

is a class category that is too specific to England and the term is therefore susceptible to poor translation into other languages³

One of the basic aim of gentrification literature since then is to locate it in non-Western contexts by emphasizing neoliberal and global tendencies across the globe (Smith, 2002; Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Lees et al., 2015). Scholars of gentrification point out the achievement of comparative scholarship in recent years by the abstraction of gentrification from conjunctural factors, contesting 'time-space delineation' that associated gentrification with a particular point in time and space, that is, inner London in the 1960s. These conjunctural factors and their effects in different configurations of gentrification emphasized by scholars as follow:

We have moved far from that time and place, and come to understand that gentrification as a concept refers to the commodification of space accompanying land use changes in such a way that it produces indirect/direct/physical/symbolic displacement of existing users and owners by more affluent groups. Conceptualized in this way, it is only logical to think of various conjunctural factors that produce particular forms of gentrification around the globe (Shin et al., 2016, p.3).

According to Shin et al., these perspectives also emphasize the gentrification process as conjoined by other processes as follows:

It is also logical to understand that the gentrification process is conjoined by other processes in order to ensure the facilitation of this transformation, including the use of police forces to suppress resistance, the co-optation of opposition forces, and the imposition of dominant ideologies on subordinate classes. And, these are processes not just seen in countries belonging to regions outside of the so-called Global North, but currently happening in the Global North too, as the state-led gentrification and social cleansing of public housing and the poor attests (ibid, 4).

These perspectives are important to demonstrate how gentrification through urban transformation in Diyarbakır conjoined by different processes that reveals the conjunctural factors that are specific to the geographical and historical peculiarities of

3 For different concepts employed in countries other than Britain see Lees (2012, p.157–158).

the case study. One of the main aim of this thesis to evaluate in which senses the case of the study overlaps or differentiates from the other configurations of the phenomenon around the globe.

At this point, some critics of classical gentrification literature should also be considered for a better understanding of the extend of the discussions on gentrification processes. Wacquant (2008), for example, criticizes economic explanations of gentrification as they leave out the role of politics, and the state in urban processes. He suggests that “the primary engine behind the (re)allocation of people, resources and institutions in the city is the state”, arguing that critics have paid less attention to “the crucial role of the state in producing the urban space” (Wacquant, 2008, p.202). To emphasize this role, Wacquant refers to Bourdieu's *The Social Structures of the Economy* (2005), to underline housing as “the product of a double social construction, to which the state contributes crucially”, by shaping the universe of builders and sellers via fiscal, banking and regulatory policies, on the economic side, and by molding the dispositions and capabilities of house buyers (including the propensity to rent or buy), on the social side (Wacquant, 2008, p.202). His critic of gentrification literature in this sense is pointing out the overemphasis of economic structures while underestimating the role of politics, policy and the state. In his own words:

The trajectory of gentrified districts in the twenty-first century is *economically underdetermined and politically overdetermined*. It behooves us, then, to restore the primacy of the political in our efforts to analytically dissect and practically redirect the social transformation of the neoliberal city (Wacquant, 2008, p.203).

As a parallel perspective, Ward (1980) also emphasizes the same “instead of being economic” thesis as follow:

It is now clear, in 1980, that instead of being economic, the manifest crises that plague inner-city minorities are founded in a problem of control. The so-called “gentrification” of the inner-cities, the lack of rehabilitation financing for inner-city families, the massive demolition projects which have transformed once-stable neighborhoods into vast wastelands, the diminishing

inner-city services, such as recreation, health care, education, jobs and job-training, sanitation, etc. [...] are all rooted in an apparent bone-chilling fear that inner-city minorities are uncontrollable (Ward, 1980, p.3).

By the contribution of these critics, “state-led gentrification” become a key concept during time among gentrification scholars to underline their efforts to take a critical position regarding the classical definitions and premises of early gentrification literature (Lees et al., 2010). The shift toward the concept of “state-led gentrification” in the literature is substantial to approach urban transformation in *Suriçi* to discuss in which ways the gentrification imposed as a state-led project in the district.

In order to evaluate various features of urban transformation in *Suriçi*, Wacquant's perspective is significant in the sense that it provides comprehensive discussion on political and hegemonic aspects of the phenomenon. Wacquant explores the “triangle of urban transformation” with class, race and state as its vertices and paves the way for a properly sociological (re-)conceptualization of neoliberalism . By adapting key notions from Pierre Bourdieu such as social space, bureaucratic field, and symbolic power, he proposes to forge new concepts “to dissect the emergence of the urban precariat and its punitive management by the neoliberal Leviathan” (Wacquant, 2014, p.1690).

Wacquant develops and construct a comprehensive theory to approach urban condition through his trilogy of *Urban Outcasts* (2008), *Punishing the Poor* (2009) and *Deadly Symbiosis* (2011). The first book elucidates the nexus of class, race, and dispossession in the lower districts (*bas-quartiers*) of post-industrial metropolis in its phase of socio-spatial polarization. He emphasizes the historic transition from the “communal ghetto”, confining all blacks in a reserved space that both entrapped and protected them, to the “hyper-ghetto”, a territory of desolation that contains only the unstable fractions of the African-American working class. He diagnoses the rise of advanced marginality in the city through the collapse of the black ghetto in America and dissolution of working-class territories in Europe, along with the “class-race” axis as angled by state structures and policies (Wacquant, 2014, p.1692).

The two-way relationship between class transformation and state re-engineering in its social and penal missions is the main topics of the second book which covers the “left-hand side” of the “deadly triangle” in determining the destiny of the urban precariat. He charts the “invention and deployment of punitive containment” as a technique to govern problem areas and populations along the “class-state” axis which are stamped by ethno-racial or ethno-national divisions. Finally, the last book of the trilogy disentangles the relationship of reciprocal imbrication between penalization and racialization as kindred forms of dishonor and reveals “how class inequality intersects and inflects the state-ethnicity axis” (Wacquant, 2014, p.1691). In his own words:

We cannot understand the organization of urban hierarchies, including whether and how powerfully they get ethnicized, without putting into our explanatory equation the state as a classifying and stratifying agency (Wacquant, 2014, p.1699).

Through these arguments, Wacquant provides comparative sociology of the “regulation of poverty” and the “(de-)formation of the post-industrial precariat” which he regards as “historical anthropology of the neoliberal Leviathan” (Wacquant, 2012). He defines neoliberalism as a transnational project, an actual “revolution from above” that cannot be reduced to market relations but necessarily encompasses the institutional means required to bring these relations into being: namely, “disciplinary social policy” and “the diligent expansion of the penal system” (Wacquant, 2010). From such a perspective, he argues that government structures and policies should be placed back at the heart of sociological inquiry of the city, where relationships between class and ethnicity are situated at the bottom of the spatial structure (Wacquant, 2014, p.1963). Consequently, he details his theoretical approach as follow;

In turn, the structure of social space becomes objectified in the built environment (think segregated residential neighborhoods and the differential distribution of amenities across districts) and embodied in the cognitive, affective and conative categories that steer the practical strategies of agents in everyday life, in their social circles, on the labour market, in their dealings with public institutions (police staff, welfare offices, housing and fiscal

authorities, etc.), and therefore shape their subjective relationship to the state (which is part and parcel of the objective reality of that same state) (Wacquant, 2014, p.1699).

Wacquant's perspective and conceptual framework on transformation of urban space is precious to approach the urban transformation in *Suriçi* in order to demonstrate the complexities of the phenomenon which includes different frames into discussion such as how the phenomenon is racialized and ethnicized through disciplinary policies of the state.

2.4. Urban Planning as Social Control

This thesis aims to discuss the urban transformation process in *Suriçi* not only with its economic aspects but also as a repressive mechanism of social control. I suggest that recent changes in urban practices have made it necessary to redefine the role of the state (and its conceptualization) during urban transformation/planning processes. This study strikes attention that in recent urban transformation projects, the state as an actor goes beyond the economic function and pursues its own preferences regarding the ideological, hegemonic and political domination and intervention in urban space. In other words, the urban planning/ transformation facilitated by the state as a political and ideological apparatus to pursue its own agenda over the certain urban territories. Some theoretical perspectives are significant in order to evaluate the “planning power of the state” as a distinct category that can be used to analyze the case of *Suriçi*. The role and practices of state through planning in urban space discussed by many scholars in different contexts (Yiftachel, 1998; Dovey, 1999; Njoh, 2007; Lewi & Wickham, 1996; Harris, 2011; Metzger et al., 2017). Dovey (1999), for example, suggests that the architecture and urban design act as mediators of social practices of power. In parallel with this perspective, some scholars evaluates urban planning policies and projects as tools to facilitate the accomplishment of broader goals of the colonial enterprise, including but not limited to self-preservation, cultural assimilation, political domination, social control, territorial conquest, and the perpetuation and consolidation of colonial

rule (Njoh, 2007, p.11). Some other scholars address oppressive functions of urban planning while re-conceptualizing it as an integral arm of the nation-state apparatus which tends to advance social control, repression, constraint, exploitation and oppression (Yiftachel, 1998). While others propose to evaluate urban design with political processes that generates particular urbanistic policies and preferences that advance certain political goals (Wright, 1991). In what follows, taking into consideration these perspectives, the analysis of *Suriçi* will be constructed upon discussion of the actual practices of the state during transformation processes through some of the key phenomena as constraint, surveillance and destruction where the state enhance its own power throughout the urban space. By this way, this study hopes to shed light on the coercive and constraining aspects of urban transformation through analyzing the ethnographic observations from the *Suriçi* case.

2.5. Urban Transformation Studies in Turkey

Thus far, I provide different critical theoretical perspectives which are relevant and can be useful to approach changes in urban dynamics and spatial structures across different frameworks. With bearing mind of these general discussions in the literature on urban transformation, this part of the chapter will briefly overview existing studies on urban governance and transformations in Turkey during the last decades.

As many scholar have argued, urban transformation in Turkey is related in many ways with the emergence of squatter/*gecekondu* areas in main cities of the country after the 1960s (Karpat, 1976; Bugra, 1998; Erman, 2001; Adaman & Keyder, 2006; Balaban, 2011). These studies demonstrate that the rapid spread of these areas derived from rural-urban migration waves triggered by various economic and social factors during the decades. In most of the cases, urban transformation projects target these neighborhoods and its populations with the use of legislative and coercive force of the state, in favor of capital accumulation and creating economic profit (Türker-Devecigil, 2005; Karaman, 2013; Demirtaş-Milz, 2013; Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014). Türker-Devecigil

(2005, p.659), for example, demonstrates that urban renewal used as a governmental tool to transfer lands from *gecekondu* dwellers to the state and its affiliated contractors, thereby turning these lands into “formally governed tradable assets”.

In the meantime we can distinguish the emergence of discussions around the concept of “gentrification” among scholars as well as civil society organizations especially regarding the transformation projects those took place in central areas of big cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir among some others. In most of the cases they highly resulted in displacement of existing working class population settled in inner-city areas, in favor of capital holders, business sector and upper classes (Ünsal & Kuyucu, 2010; Uzun, 2003; Islam & Sakızlıoğlu, 2015).

Many scholars have admitted that urban governance and housing policies in Turkey went through a radical transition from “populist” to “neo-liberal” mode during the 2000s (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011; Harris & Işlar, 2014; Topal et al., 2015). Most of these studies notify “a new urban regime” and discuss urban transformation as “state-led property transfer” through an analysis of urban renewal cases. According to their findings, urban transformation projects are “the main mechanisms through which a neoliberal system is instituted” in incompletely commodified urban areas such as “informal housing zones” and “inner-city slums” in Turkey (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.1). In most of these cases, the main drive of transformation projects seems as displacing poor working classes from their neighborhoods that “they formed with so much effort and labor”, as well as “market their living areas to the upper classes” (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.2). Lovering & Türkmen (2011) comment on the phenomena as “bulldozer neoliberalism” while referring to the context of the global spread of “authoritarian neoliberalism”.

As a parallel perspective, Kayasü & Yetiskul (2014) discuss urban development patterns in Turkey with a particular reference to neoliberalism as it was considered being the basis of capital accumulation processes where redistributive policies have

ensured investments through the privatization of public land and the production of the built environment. They discuss the recent changes in the urban policy framework, through analyses of “neoliberalism as a political rationality” and the ways in which it affects urban development and planning system in Turkey (Kayasü & Yetiskul, 2014, p.209). They also emphasize that centralization of power embodied in a central government institutions, i.e. TOKİ, revealed in proliferating urban transformation policy (ibid, 218). Kayasü and Yetiskul (2014) consequently argue that the power dynamics have often worked in favor of those actors who hold power in the distribution process of urban rent throughout the evolution of Turkish neoliberal urban policy.

Mutman & Turgut (2018) notify that many cities have experienced a rapid urban transformation that reflects social restructuring processes in Turkey, which intensified during the last decades by the government decisions to boost “economy” and “development” with a top to down approach. They examine the process of “gentrification as social and spatial restructuring” for the old-city housings of the Istanbul, as part of a larger urban transformation phenomenon in Turkey (Mutman & Turgut, 2018, p.164). While other scholars discuss gentrification as a neoliberal instrument utilized by conservative/Islamist local governments to intervene in the urban space for economic purposes (Tok & Oğuz, 2013). According to these arguments, urban space is approached and restructured by authorities to engender more marketable areas for generating urban rent as turned into a major mechanism for capital accumulation (Tok & Oğuz, 2013, p.62). These perspectives are important to frame the emergence of the phenomenon around the country as well as its configurations in different contexts. However, it should be also noted here that most of the studies on urban transformation in Turkey concentrates on big metropolises of the country as subject of analysis which cause an oblivion regarding the conjunctural localizations of neoliberal framework in mid or small scale cities. In this sense, this thesis contribute urban transformation literature in Turkey with discussing various aspects of urban transformation in *Suriçi*, as a peculiar case from southeast of the country.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND OF DİYARBAKIR AS CASE STUDY

In order to approach the recent urban transformation projects in Diyarbakır, *Suriçi* we should first evaluate the historical, political and socio-economic background of the city prior to the process. Such kind of analysis is important to demonstrate how long-term conjectural peculiarities of the case study significantly effects upon the orbit of transformation process.

3.1. Historical Background and Early Configurations

Diyarbakir is located in Northern Mesopotamia, known also as Fertile Crescent that remarks the region between Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. It is situated on the east side of a wide plateau, 700m high from the sea, lying along the west bank of the Tigris, surrounded by mountains in the north and plain areas in the south. The inner castle assumed to be built around 3000 B.C. by Hurrites-Mittanis and since then the city host dozens of civilizations such as Medes, Assyrians, Persians, Romans and Ottomans, which also deeply embedded in its historical architecture.⁴ The city became the administrative center and headquarters since the 16th century as the governorship of the broader region. It had always played a crucial geo-political role as administrative capital of the province and the region inherently crucial for many powers to control during its long history. The walls that encircle the city built by Romans in 297AD by using black volcanic basalt stones from nearby volcanic mountain named as *Karacadağ*, *Karasch Dağh*, *Qerejdağ*. There are four main gates and 82 watchtower on the walls which still

⁴ In *Suriçi* there are 595 registered cultural monuments, 147 of them are examples of monumental architecture, and 448 of them are examples of civil architecture. The old city including its fortress has been registered as the “Diyarbakir Urban Conservation Area” in 1988. (see Soyukaya, 2017)

standing since today. Four main doors on the walls named according to their connection functions to the other cities and geographies: Dağkapı (Mountain Door) on North; Urfakapı on West; Mardinkapı on South; Yenikapı/Diclekapı(New Door/Tigris Door) on east (Figure 3.1.1).



Figure 3.1.1 Aerial caption of Suriçi in 1939

(Source: Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi, *Suriçi Çatışmalar Sonrası Kültürel Miras Hasar Tespit Raporu*, 2016)

The main boulevards intersect each other in the center of the city where there located Grand Mosque, Hasanpaşa Inn and Ancient City Bazaar. Urban structure within the city walls consist of a square in the center of town that is surrounded by labyrinth of streets as well as alleys running crisscross through the city. The intersecting arteries divide the city into four equal slices where remarkable city walls harboring a formerly central quarter. Relatively low apartment buildings border the main trade roads by residential labyrinths of serpentine alleys and low-storey houses as a real enclave. From geo-

sociological point of view, it has always been at the very origin of intersecting historical routes connecting East to West, North to South or vice versa. The figure above demonstrates that how this “connecting function” play significant role in the historical planning of the city which remain intact during a long period.

Since its antique establishment the city has been historically placed at the crossroads of different geographies with many different religions, languages, ethnicities and cultures meets, merge and dissolve. When we consider the religious, cultural and linguistic distribution of population prior to the establishment of the republic, Diyarbakır is significant in the sense that it reflects heterogeneous dynamics of its historical past. To a significant degree the various communities with different ethnical and religious background lived in mixed neighborhoods historically.⁵

As many researchers have pointed out, in the twentieth century the demographic composition, cultural patterns as well as economic configurations of the city has been predominantly shaped by political struggles that is organized around the ethnic identities (Van Bruinessen, 1992; Jongerden, 2010; McDowall, 2000; Üngör, 2011; Olson, 2013; Hakan-Yavuz, 2001).

One of the important rupture that interrupt the heterogeneity of the city was mass-scale deportation of non-Muslim population in 1915, which hit all Christian communities of the city although the Armenians were often particularly singled out for immediate destruction. Gambetti (2009) points out that during this period, an inconspicuous process of effacement and neglect directed against the traces of non-Muslim presence in the city. As a result the spaces of existence, worship and memory of the non-Muslim population, mainly Armenians, Syriacs and Chaldeans shrink drastically in transition to Republican era. She points at another important historical rupture that result in destruction of the local fabric of Diyarbakır which began directly after the crushing of the rebellion of the Kurdish leader Sheik Said by the forces of the Republic in 1925. She

5 For a more detailed analysis see Jongerden & Verheij (Eds.). (2012). *Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbakır, 1870-1915*. Brill.

shows that during this period the central government exiled hundreds of members of the most powerful Kurdish families in Diyarbakir to western Turkish cities. The East of the Euphrates River was declared “a forbidden zone” by the government authorities and, in 1931, part of the historical walls surrounding the city demolished by the decision taken by the local governor of Diyarbakir (Gambetti, 2009, p.103).

Üngör (2009) highlights that the Young Turk regime, from 1913 to 1950, subjected Eastern Turkey to various forms of nationalist population policies aimed at ethnically homogenizing the region and incorporating it into the nation state. He points out that during this period the city subjected by the regime through “facilitating technologies of social engineering” such as “genocide, deportation, spatial planning, forced assimilation, and memory politics”, to increase “ethnic and cultural homogeneity within the nation state” (Üngör, 2009, p.17). Öktem (2004) similarly emphasizes that these “spatial strategies of homogenization” incorporated a large multi-ethnic territory into the nation-building project through the purification of the “cosmopolitan heritage of the place” (Öktem, 2004, p.7).

3.2. Political Background: 1960-1980

Many researchers identify that from the beginning of the 1950s the city began to be politicized as an important focal point for the pro-Kurdish movement (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997; Watts, 2007; Gunter, 1990,1997; Gürbey, 1996). During the 1950s and 1960s, a new form of Kurdish political dynamism began to rise especially among the young Kurdish university students in western metropolises. During this period, the students as well as intellectuals engaged in a considerable political activism as being inspired both from the Kurdish revolt in Iraq and leftist trends in the world. Eastern Meetings spread from such kind of activism as a form of protest that is characterized by the widespread collective political actions from the different sectors of society (Beşikçi, 1967; Gündoğan, 2005, 2011). The socialist Kurds acting in the Turkish Labor Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* or the TLP) and the nationalists wing who founded the Democratic

Party of Turkish Kurdistan (*Partiya Demoqrata Kurdistanê Tirkîye* or the DPTK) were the two groups that organized the meetings in seven cities across the southeast in the fall of 1967. Eastern Meeting in Diyarbakır took place in the square located in the center of *Suriçi* at 3 September 1967. However, 12 March 1971 military coup impeded the formations of autonomous contentions Kurdish movement, and resulted in imprisonment of many Kurdish leaders while the Diyarbakır prison became a site for discussion and debate around the radicalization and also the fragmentation of the Kurdish movement (Günes, 2012; Bozarslan, 1992).

Around a decade later, the city again became a focal point during and aftermath of 1980 military coup. Many scholars argued that during the coup, the systematic torture that held place in Diyarbakır Prison played a significant role in the development of various resistant movements (Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014; Fırat & Topaloğlu, 2012). This period has an important place in the Kurdish social memory and in the discourse of Kurdish nationalism (Aydın, 2013). The practices in Diyarbakır Prison played a crucial role in the crystallization of nationalist secessionist ideas and the radicalization of a generation of Kurds (Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014). Large numbers of prisoners, for example, went on to join the ranks of the militant Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), which launched an armed struggle in 1984 with the aim to establish an independent Kurdish state.

Under these conditions, the 1990s went through severe clashes between Turkish state forces and PKK especially in rural areas of the southeast Turkey (Olson, 1996; Bozarslan, 2000; Gürbey, 1996; Ibrahim & Gürbey, 2000). According to government figures, by the end of 1999 a total of 378,000 persons had been “evacuated” by the security forces from 3,165 rural settlements in the southeast, while other reports estimate the total number of displaced Kurdish population as between 2,5 and 4,5 million (Ayata & Yüksek, 2005; Çelik, 2005; Kurban et al., 2007). As a result, the population of Diyarbakır nearly doubled by waves of in-migration during the 1990s (Erkan & Bağlı, 2005; Öztürk, 2013; HIC, 1996). *Suriçi* as the central city overflow by

recently displaced rural population while new buildings began to appear inside and outside of the historical city walls (Tattara et al., 2013).

3.3. OHAL and GAP as Space Making Strategies in Southeast 1980-2002

During the second half of the 20th century, pervasive economic changes on a global scale triggered radical transformations regarding economic, administrative and socio-spatial structures around the globe. Based on this framework, many scholars argue that the liberalization of economy through successive laws in mid 1980s have radically transformed the role of the municipalities and, thereby, the relations of the political center with local state institutions and local elites in Turkey (Şenses, 2012; Ozbay et al., 2016; Yüksel, 2011). In the southeast region of the country, the transition to a neoliberal economy coincided with the increasing political conflicts (Bozarslan, 2001; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997; Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014). As claimed by scholars, space is constructed both materially and discursively and each form of this construction affects the other (Massey, 1984; Allen et al., 1998). In this sense, spatial state strategies served in the construction of southeast Turkey both materially and discursively as an “underdeveloped region” and a “zone of terror” (Yeğen, 1996, 2009; Jongerden 2007). During this period two institutional frames Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP) and the Emergency Rule (OHAL) became significant in the discursive and material construction of the region (Yüksel, 2011). Under these conditions, the planning and coordinating of economic and social activities took the form of regional development programs and interventions in the demographic structure of the region through population movements or forced migration that have played a major role in the particular sort of localization of neoliberalism in southeast Turkey (Yüksel, 2011; Gambetti & Jongerden, 2015).

In its initial phase, GAP was a state-run regional “development project” in southeast Turkey, which consisted of a set of infrastructural investments and social projects in the region. These practices are situated within the discourse of “development” that emerged in mid of the century and was transformed in the 1980s under the neoliberal

restructuring of world economy and politics where “development” has operated as a globally hegemonizing discourse of national states to manage populations within their territories (Escobar, 2011; Silvey & Rankin, 2011; Kothari & Minogue, 2001). Overlapping this framework, according to Yüksel (2011), the development projects in southeast Turkey were not limited to technical programs aiming at greater production but entailed an effort to intervene and control of social and economic spheres in the region where their population, processes of capital accumulation, natural resources, agriculture, trade, administration, and cultural values became the object of explicit calculation and governance. As Yüksel (2011) argues, through these development programs all aspects of the social body became targets of direct intervention accompanied with insertion of regime of thought and practices that form a specific kind of governmentality which concealed the state attempts to control their populations under the guise of “fight against the poverty”. However, these governmental development practices and efforts turned to be as part of the ruling elites’ strategies to establish their control and authority over the region and its population (Yüksel, 2011, p.95).

As suggested by scholars, the development practices of GAP deeply related to the state’s attempts to deal with the Kurdish question and manage populations and territories in the southeast Turkey (Nestor, 1995; Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2005; Harris, 2008, 2012; Özok-Gündoğan, 2005). As Özok-Gündoğan (2005) argues these developmental projects function simultaneously as a legitimization process:

The provision of the basic needs and the improvement in living conditions through a set of social policies entailed an effort by the state to gain legitimacy in a region where it was represented to a great extent by its military forces. Social projects, which were predominantly carried out through GAP, would provide a realm within which the state would gain another form of visibility, more as a caring, curing and protecting body than as a disciplinary and punishing military entity. (Özok-Gündoğan, 2005, p.98)

In this sense, GAP was turned into the major means for the governmental spatial strategy in southeast Anatolia during the 1990s. The social services of GAP would

provide an institutional mechanism for the expansion of state power in the region where the “development” project ends up performing political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power under a cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object (Özok-Gündoğan, 2005, p.103). As I show in the following chapters, such developmentalist discourse is effective in urban transformation projects in *Suriçi* as well.

During the 1990s, the mentioned developmentalist economic frame was continuously accompanied by OHAL as a highly centralized and oppressive spatial regime (Bozarslan, 1992; Barkey & Fuller, 1998; Jongerden, 2007; Van Etten et al., 2008; Jacoby, 2005). First declared in 1987, OHAL spread to Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Adıyaman, Bitlis and Muş while in 1990 the number of cities under OHAL increased to more than a dozen. Yüksel (2011) argues that OHAL served as an institutional mechanism to frame the southeast cities as zones of disorder and chaos where the internal border separating order from disorder provided the government with legitimate grounds in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. She points out that such a state of exception gave ample privileges and authorities to the OHAL governor and military forces to rule the cities as well as the urban economies in the region as part of the economic elite structure (Yüksel, 2011, p.445). During this period, one hand massive out-migration by the upper middle classes occurred along with an economic insecurity and instability in Diyarbakır, and on the other hand the livelihood of local business circles depended heavily on their relations with the OHAL governor and the central government (Yüksel, 2011; Jacoby, 2005; İçduygu et al., 1999). The tense atmosphere and strict political polarization had a major impact on Diyarbakır’s local economy as characterized by long periods of stagnation and recession (Yüksel, 2011, p.442).

In this period, Diyarbakır has been hit by a flood of migrants from neighboring towns and villages. Less than a decade the annual growth rate of the population of the central district hit to 86.2 which was the highest peak during the last century, and as a result,

the population of the city nearly doubled and grew to more than 700,000 (Table 1; Table 2).

Table 1 Total population, urban and rural population ratios of central district of Diyarbakır

Census years	Total population	Urban population ratio (%)	Rural population ratio (%)
1927	97,997	31.9	68.1
1935	100,432	34.5	65.5
1940	66,429	64.1	35.9
1945	64,703	63.5	36.5
1950	74,790	60.3	39.7
1955	94,665	64.7	35.3
1960	132,520	60.3	39.7
1965	163,691	62.7	37.3
1970	216,963	68.9	31.1
1975	244,686	69.3	30.7
1980	323,448	72.8	27.2
1985	409,127	74.8	25.2
1990	468,830	81.3	18.7
2000	721,463	75.7	24.3

Source: Öztürk (2013), based on TÜİK, 2013

Table 2 Annual growth rates of the population of the central district of Diyarbakır between 1927-2000

Period	Annual growth rates of population (‰)	Period	Annual growth rates of population (‰)
1927-1935	30.6	1965-1970	56.3
1935-1940	-82.6	1970-1975	24.0
1940-1950	23.7	1975-1980	55.8
1950-1955	47.1	1980-1985	46.9
1955-1960	67.2	1985-1990	27.2
1960-1965	42.2	1990-2000	86.2

(Source: Öztürk (2013), based on TÜİK, 2013

Following the village evacuations the new suburbs inhabiting internally displaced persons expanded throughout the city as well as urban poverty became drastically visible (see Figure 3.3.1). Habitat International Coalition (1996) reports that aftermath of the village evacuations there were 100.000 homeless people in Diyarbakır, which

explains the rapid suburbanization throughout the city by self-constructed houses (*gecekondu*) of internally displaced people (Figure 3.3.2). According to research carried by Metropolitan Municipality in 2007, 80.000 people were living in 10.000 self-constructed houses in the city. The research shows that %61.6 of these households' monthly income is below 350 TL, while %15.1 of them does not have anyone working in the family.⁶




Figure 3.3.1 Ben ü Sen suburbs adjacent to city walls.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

6 Sarmaşık Yoksullukla Mücadele ve Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Derneği (2007), *Diyarbakır Kent Yoksulluk Haritası*, Gün Matbaası, İstanbul.



Figure 3.3.2 *Ben ü Sen* suburbs adjacent to city walls.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

Yüksel (2011) points out that arrival of internally displaced population to a stagnant economy marked a burden on not only the villagers who were evacuated but also the city itself which went through a rapid urbanization. Furthermore, she shows that this process was accompanied by the formation of a local elite structure and a newly emerged entrepreneurial class of rural migrants and small merchants. As a consequence she argues internally displaced population have gone through not only a “horizontal displacement”, but also a “vertical and downward displacement” (Yüksel, 2011, p.443).

3.4. Urban Neoliberalism and Contested Urban Space in 2000s

As discussed in previous section, during 1980s and 1990, the neoliberal spatial strategies was mainly was centered on the rural areas in southeast Turkey, while in 2000s, the general shift in the formations of the global neoliberalism trigger urban space as core for the spatial arrangements both from central state and the local actors. This time the different phase of the neoliberal turn will take its toll mostly on the rural

backgrounded migrants and the urban poor in the city. This section discusses how the political, economic and cultural aspects in the city is framed by different actors with various strategies during the 2000s.

Yüksel (2011) argues that, during this era, the structural economic inequalities forced many cities in the region including Diyarbakır to employ cultural strategies in order to survive in the heightened inter-local competition. As studies demonstrate, during 2000s, the space has become an instrument for not only the state, but also for various actors including the Kurdish political movement and local businessmen through which urban space and meanings of urban life are contested and deliberated (Gambetti, 2009; Güvenç, 2011; Yüksel, 2011).

Gambetti (2009) argues that the PKK's unilateral ceasefire in 1998 and Turkey's aspiration to become a full member of the European Union, as well as the change of direction and strategy within the Kurdish movement itself, have enabled the city's transformation into a site of activism and Kurdish cultural expression. In 1999 pro-Kurdish party HADEP-DEHAP took over the municipality of Diyarbakır by taking %62.48 of total votes in the city, which was the first time that a political party representing the Kurdish movement took hold of a state institution through local power (Gambetti, 2009; Watts, 2006; Dorronsoro & Watts, 2012; Özdoğan & Ersanlı, 2011). According to Gambetti (2009), during this period, the DEHAP municipality played a central role in shifting the axis of struggle from "the political to the cultural" or, it can be regarded also as "politicizing Kurdish culture at the local level" through rearranging the cityscape and opening up "spaces of expression and activity" (Gambetti, 2009, p.110). For example, in the early 2000s, the municipality mobilize several state institutions and civil initiatives around a project to restore the ancient city walls as representing history that went unacknowledged in mainstream discourse and historiography (Gambetti, 2009; Öztürk, 2013). Gambetti (2009) asserts that through this project Diyarbakır is constituted as "a monument, a place that compels admiration and respect" where the consecration of the ancient walls facilitated in constructing

“local pride” where identity of Kurdishness de-articulates itself from the big “Other”. She argues that the pro-Kurdish municipalities relatively managed to convert the urban space into an area which was appropriate for creating the counter-hegemonic narratives. Accordingly, the re-articulation of the city during these times provided the Kurdish movement to narrate Kurdish identity in terms of historicity and monumentality. This was the reason, according to Gambetti, that attributed to Diyarbakır being the symbolic charge of “a homeland, a home city” instead of being narrated in terms of violence, exile or oppression. According to many scholars, the efforts of municipalities in this period can be seen as an initiative to conserve the historical heritage of multicultural city center by opening the way to a complete reinvention of historical heritage (Gambetti, 2005, 2009; Öztürk, 2013; Güvenç, 2011). As Öztürk (2013) argues the pro-Kurdish municipalities in Diyarbakır have not only emphasized on the Kurdish identity, but also have brought the cultural and historical heritage of non-Muslim “others” to the light to reverse the state’s strategy of neglecting the non-Muslim heritage in the city.

Table 3 Rates of received votes and represented political parties in municipal elections of Diyarbakır between 1999-2019

Date of local election	Represented Political Party	The Rate of Received Votes (%)	
		Metropolitan Municipality	Sur Municipality
18.04.1999	DEHAP/HADEP	62.48	69.40
28.03.2004	SHP	58.30	56.60
29.03.2009	DTP	65.14	65.40
30.03.2014	BDP / DBP	55.07	54.40
31.03.2019	HDP	62.93	60.76

Güvenç (2011) points out that Kurdish nationhood as “a political and cultural form” has been institutionalized in Diyarbakır through the everyday practices of its residents. This

new political and cultural form has been built through “the urban experience of collectivity” in diverse socio-spatial and political encounters, rather than solely through top-down interventions (ibid, 25). When we consider the high rates of votes that pro-Kurdish parties took in local elections in the city since 1999, at least it can be argued that these municipalities achieved an extensive popular support among the residents (See Table 3).

Finally, in 2015, trajectory of the city took another phase when several municipalities in the region including Diyarbakır declared demand for local autonomy which eventually followed by state of exception and state of emergency rules (OHCHR, 2017; Kaczorowski, 2016; Baser et al., 2017). The rising political tension turned into armed conflicts and it was followed by the round-the-clock curfews in many cities and towns located in the region.⁷ *Suriçi* as one among of them lost nearly half of its infrastructures and population during the military operations that last more than three months⁸. Aftermath of this process, the elected chairs of municipalities in the city replaced by appointed trustees by the government while the Council of Ministers passed Bill No. 8659 on 21.03.2016, a resolution for the requisitioning of 6292 parcels out of 7714 in *Suriçi* as well as the expropriation of their owners (TMMOB, 2017). By this decision, nearly entire area of district requisitioned by the state as “urban transformation sites” by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, depending on Law No. 2942, regarding the “urgent expropriation of risky areas for national defense”.

7 See Union of Southeastern Anatolia Region Municipalities (GABB) (2016), *Damage Assessment & Forced Migration Report Aftermath the Urban Armed Conflicts in Southeast of Turkey*.

8 See Amnesty International (AI) (2016). *Displaced and Dispossessed Sur Residents' Right to Return Home*.

CHAPTER 4

URBAN TRANSFORMATION AS ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN SURIÇİ

The previous chapter outlines how the historical, political and regional configurations had influenced urban dynamics in the city of Diyarbakır. In the light of these developments, this chapter focuses on economic and social aspects that are significant for urban transformations projects in *Suriçi*. The analysis of these aspects is crucial to understand both the implementation of the projects and their impacts on the local residents.

4.1. The Configurations of the Neighborhoods of *Suriçi*

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, one of the significant social factors that shape the position of *Suriçi* in the city is the change of demographic conditions due to forced migrations that took place in the 1990s throughout the southeast regions. According to the survey conducted with 445 households in the district by Metropolitan Municipality in 2010, 52% of the residents come to the district by migration. A local resident who was born in 1964 in *Suriçi* and still living in the Alipaşa neighborhood has witnessed this change in population, told me:

Now, there had been over 200 families came to this neighborhood in the 1990s. They came from a big village close to Mazıdağı, Mardin, few others come from Batman, some others from Bingöl. (R1)

Another resident who moved to *Suriçi* in 1990s pointed out that even they come from various places, the spatial integrity of the *Suriçi* provides a solid base for them to build up a strong community based on proximities in rural as well as family backgrounds. These proximities are also sealed by similarity of previous experiences that consequently result in strong solidarity among the members of the community.

We had a distinct world here, an especial one, neighbor relations, human relations, everyone was acting sensitively with each other, it was a humanly life, everyone was sharing what they have, it was respectful and lovely, we were unified here, everyone was knowing each other, it was solidarity, it was like becoming a single body. (R2)

Such statements made by the residents show us the communal role of the space in their perception. The space turns into a binding factor in the formation of these communities as well as identifications of their members with their relations to each other and as well as with the space itself. The appropriation of space by the newly comer population is significantly dense while through time it creates a new sociality where space itself becomes the focal reference point. In other words, *Suriçi* becomes more and more organic by close proximities of its residents who form a peculiar social body reflecting existential formation of socio-spatial communities in recently arrived urban habitats.



Figure 4.1.1 Peculiar architecture of streets in *Suriçi*

(Source: Photo taken by author)




Figure 4.1.2 Peculiar architecture of streets in *Suriçi*

(Source: Photo taken by author)

Suriçi provides the necessary frame for such communal relations through its historically built narrow streets (see Figure 4.1.1; Figure 4.1.2) and the lively social environment, for the families to form strong local social communities. The physical environment in *Suriçi* constructs and also reflects the vivid social life of local communities based on strong social ties inside and outside of the households. Thanks to the common narrowness of the streets that any vehicles can not easily passed through, the alleys of the district also evolved in a way that families were using them as communal public spheres.



Figure 4.1.3 Typical architecture of Avlu in Suriçi

(Source: Photo taken by author)

The architecture of *Suriçi*, in its last instance merge the neighborhoods as organic units organized as a big integral social body deriving mainly from intimate proximities in space. More than 80% of the buildings in *Suriçi* consists of one or two floor self contained houses commonly centered by open air yards or gardens located *in* the houses

(Figure 4.1.3), which are named as *avlu*⁹. These open spaces commonly shared by members of families and neighbors as main areas where everyday domestic needs met in more collective ways, including but not limited to cooking, washing, cleaning, rising the children and so on.

As Öztürk (2013) demonstrates, the residents of *Suriçi* mostly work in daily-based or seasonal, and mostly informal jobs, in service, agriculture and construction sectors. This type of occupations keep the residents more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The livelihood of *Suriçi* is essential to afford the burden of building up a life in urban space. According to Aslan (2013), before 2015 in *Suriçi*, 58% of residents lived in their own houses while 31% of them lived as tenants in the houses owned by others. This statistical data suggests us that aftermath of migration from rural areas, *Suriçi* people relatively managed to create possessions in urban space and integrated to the urban habitat. When we consider low incomes that is common among the residents, this fact can also be related to the strong family and community ties that would create basic local socio-economic ties which are based on sharing and mutual aid. Moreover, through time these social ties also evolved as neighbor relations based on proximities in urban space, rather than depending merely on family backgrounds. According to the same survey, 51% of the residents state that their neighbors are the most closest people they feel in their lives. While 36% of the residents address their relatives as closest people, which is still high but stayed significantly behind the neighbors. This composition of the neighborhoods becomes more significant only when we consider the conditions of poverty existing in the neighborhoods.

4.2. Socio-economic Conditions of *Suriçi*

In my interview with him, a spokesperson of Sur Conservation Platform emphasized the socio-economic conditions of *Suriçi* as follows:

9 For more detailed analyzes of the peculiarities of architectural structure see Dalkılıç & Aksulu (2001) and Oruç (2017).

The residents in the neighborhoods are consciousness on their position as determined by poverty. However, they are considering these concepts of poor or rich with a different perspective than our modern ways. [For them], that is the collective, communal identity which built upon the reciprocal trust what makes their perspective different. For example, they can define the use of streets as communal space as a richness while considering the life in another district as a fearful experience. (R3)

In this regard, the social community and collectivity seem to be an indispensable and existential factor for the inhabitants in the district, not only in terms of their communal relations with each other, but also it is vital for their living conditions in urban space.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the consolidation of neoliberal economy in the region and in the city overlapped some institutional frameworks. As a result of these processes, the residents of *Suriçi* become more and more precarious in terms of their economic conditions (Kurşuncu, 2006; Doğan & Çelik, 2012; Ersoy & Şengül 2002). It is important to understand that the urban poverty in *Suriçi* is directly related with the regional spatial configurations which affect both the city's economy in general and the socio-economic conditions of *Suriçi* in particular. When the work status of the people of *Suriçi* in the labor force is examined, it can be noticed that the rate of those who have insurance coverage is very low with 28.72% (Aslan, 2013). People who can work in paid labor force are uninsured, temporary or unregistered. The wages they receive by this type of work commonly not the equivalent of their manual labor. In addition to this, it is also important to note that 24.3% of the people are unemployed in the district, while 56% of the resident's yearly income is less than 5.000 TL, which is significantly below the minimum wage index, which was 7.190 TL back then across the country (Aslan, 2013, p.315). The domestic unpaid labor of women, moreover, is commonly excluded from this existing statistics.

According to the research that was carried in Diyarbakır by Erkan & Bağlı (2005) on the conditions of poverty and its relation with the forced migration, 39% of residents living in these suburbs were working in daily based jobs in informal sectors mainly as construction and peddling, while %17 of them working as craftsmen. If we consider the

educational levels of the residents in the district, %60 percent of the residents who came to the districts by migration from rural areas only get elementary school education, while %21 of them are illiterate, much significantly above the average rates. Furthermore, %85 of residents' household monthly income is under 400 TL while %51 of them is under 200 TL which is defined as "absolute poverty" where the inhabitants cannot meet their basic needs with their given income (Erkan & Bağlı, 2005, p.115). All these conditions explain resident's strong resistance not to leave their houses in the neighborhoods. One of the interviewed resident point out the fact as follow:

I do not have anywhere to go neither a house or an income to build-up a life, I am poor. They can demolish our houses when we are inside and burry us with them, if we leave our houses we would be dead in anyways. (R4)

Although the urban transformation projects are presented as a developmentalist project in the district by the authorities, the residents of the district experience it as regressive process mainly because of their poor economic conditions that prevent them to build up a new life in another place in the city. Relying on previous researches, and through my research we can suggest that through the gradual increasing economic deprivation in time, the space is becoming more and more important as the only leftover social material as well as social capital that low-income inhabitants significantly dependent on through their survival in the city.

4.3. Urban Transformation as Displacement and Dispossession

The economic restructuring of the region has been predominantly organized as a policy and carried out as a TOKİ project similar to what we observe in different parts of Turkey. For that reason, this section will open up the legislative and structural premises of state authority through some passages from the booklet published by Prime Ministry and Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) with the title of '*Building Turkey of the Future*'.

With a business structure closely modeled after a company in the private sector, TOKİ is a government administration uniquely positioned to reduce bureaucratic red tape and maximize efficiency (ibid, 9). TOKİ reports directly to the Prime Minister's Office rather than being part of the general administrative bureaucracy...The Administration acquires the necessary land from the government without cost and grants credits to finance the building of homes and businesses and cooperatives...Providing TOKİ primarily with land allocations rather than direct financial investment, the Turkish Government has created a strong platform for the various business models the Administration derives benefit...As TOKİ's accounts are not consolidated into the state budget, the Administration follows standard business practices and is immune to any changes in the methods of accounting used by the Turkish Government (TOKİ, 2011, p.80).

The model was also guaranteed by a set of legislative regulations in order to facilitate extraction of "valuable assets" in inner-city areas through "expropriation and transfer of the previous title holders and occupants to settlements upon an empty, unoccupied lands", which are commonly located in peripheries of the cities (TOKİ, 2011, p.46).

In order to ensure that TOKİ had the necessary authority to take charge of large urban renewal projects, the Parliament gave the Administration the legal backbone it needed. The ability to expropriate private land to identify, plan, finance and build urban projects, were several of the most important legal tools with which TOKİ was entrusted (TOKİ, 2011, p.9).

When the government issued the bill in 31 March 2008 regarding "squatter transformations" in Alipaşa and Lalebey neighborhoods, 1025 title holders were identified as the legal owners of the small parcel lands where 850 housing units built upon (Aslan, 2013). According to the survey conducted in the neighborhoods by Metropolitan Municipality, 43% of inhabitants refuse to take the agreement compelled by the state. However, based on the expropriation law that I pointed out above, they compelled to sell their ownerships to the state by significantly low fixed prices which do not correspond to their use nor market value¹⁰.

10 For detailed analysis of TOKİ's strategy to expropriate inner-city urban estates by fixed low prices during transformation processes see Kuyucu & Ünsal (2010).

According to Shin et al. (2016), development-induced urban projects facilitate to promote private development by creating exclusive spaces. Furthermore, informal occupation of urban land and residents' informal nature of employment propel such residents to face multiple vulnerabilities including chances of direct and indirect displacement. One of the interviewed residents and a titleholder from *Suriçi* summarizes the process as follows:

We moved to another district. We pushed to a new life, a relentless life. It was nice here, 15-20 TL was enough for us to afford one day, now it is 60-70 TL per day in there. Air money, doorkeeper money, water money, electricity money, that money this money...So to say, it is a pitiless life, a savage life for us who do not steal, do not pursue only profit, do not loose themselves. (R5)

Shin et al. (2016) also shows that these urban development projects commonly suggests that displaced residents may contribute to densification of other equivalently affordable neighborhoods proximate to or afar from their original neighborhood. In the case of *Suriçi*, residents proposed to lend money from the state to buy an apartment in “social housings”, which are planned to be constructed in an empty area located at the far periphery of the city. My interviewee that I quoted above is an experienced manual construction worker. He criticizes the process as follows:

Now, today, the turnkey construction cost of an 2+1 flat is 43.000 TL, 43.000 TL. They are selling us from 145.000 TL, 150.000 TL. Well, this is already named as 'social housings', so to speak, if it is called as “social” they should not get profit from me, ok, let them take 5-10.000 TL as profit, the flat is costing 43.000 TL then give it us from 60.000 TL, no! 150.000 TL...we could not get it either. (R6)

Kuyucu & Ünsal (2010) points out that, urban renewal projects are likely to create widespread dispossession and displacement of the urban poor. According to these scholars, these projects suffer from a total lack of social projects and economic program for the inhabitants, which is creating a serious risk of displacement, dispossession and geographical relocation of poverty. Furthermore, Shin et al. (2016) argues that the process of dispossession of people's rights and their properties act as a precursor that

leads to the displacement of local residents who lose their decades-long attachment to residential spaces and social networks.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Council of Ministers passed Bill No. 8659 on 21.03.2016 for the requisitioning of 82% percent of entire area in *Suriçi* as well as the expropriation of their owners (SAMER, 2017). In this way, the socio-economic regression of the residents of *Suriçi* also corroborated by the legislative force of the state. During the interviews my respondents consistently compare their previous neighborhoods with their new life, in the sense of how their economic conditions get worsened after they forcibly left to the other parts of the city:

In there, we were going to work 20-25 days to pick up nuts in Ordu during the summer, then we were getting our basic supply and spending the winter in the house. We were earning enough for all the winter in 20 days. We were not paying any rent, because the house and all the other thing was belonging to us, we were in peace there. Now, we are working 12 months during the whole year, it means nothing. For example, I was working 10 days in a coffee shop, I was getting approximately 100-150 TL, then I was not working for two months, now we are putting 100 TL in our pocket it is not enough even for one week. (R7)

Such statements made by the residents show us that the state's reclaim of the land in the neighborhoods results in a dramatic decline in the socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants. As I showed in the previous section, the urban poverty in *Suriçi* deepened aftermath of former displacements that forced rural population into the city during the 1990s. In addition to this, what I would like to emphasize here is that the low income residents of *Suriçi* are significantly vulnerable to the development-induced urban renewal projects that create another cycle of widespread dispossession and displacement which deepens their already existing conditions of poverty in urban context.

4.4. Urban Transformation as Gentrification

Ley & Teo (2014) emphasize gentrification as a conceptual category that provides theoretical coherence to physical and social change incorporating dispossession and

displacement. Moreover, many scholars argues that entrepreneurial local states as de facto landowners resort their state power to help expropriate properties from existing users and owners, and turn them into commodities for further accumulation. From these perspectives this section will discuss gentrification as one of the key component of the urban transformation projects in *Suriçi*.

As I portrayed in the introduction section, the urban renewal project in *Suriçi*, in its first configurations, can be regarded as a gentrification process, especially when we consider it as the transformation of a working-class area at the center of the city into commercial use (Lees et al., 2008). The project proposed destruction of houses located in the neighborhoods in order to “clean” the area for construction of “hotels, cafes, restaurants” for “touristic function” .¹¹ In its first phases, urban renewal projects in *Suriçi* legitimized through a discourse of “touristic attraction” by the main actors, who were state authorities as well as technocrats from the related fields of urban planning.¹² Such discursive structuring veil the problematics of the transformation project by means of emphasizing the future contributions that it would make to the touristic function of the city. While referring to the historical background of the district they categorized the urban poor as responsible for the physical degradation of *Suriçi*.¹³ This discourse mainly functioned as two-fold mechanism, first, it veiled the institutional spatial frames that resulted in urban poverty in *Suriçi*, and, the second, it legitimized the process in a way that it would “save” the “historical heritage” in *Suriçi* from the “clandestine” population who were in fact subjects of displacement and dispossession during the process.

Such kind of discourse also differentiates itself from middle-class pro-urbanism in the sense that it also embraces a desire for the revenge on the poor and socially marginal

11 See Çatalbaş, 2012, *Suriçi bölgesi kentsel dönüşüm projesi ve Diyarbakır turizmine katkısı. Bozok Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1(1), 47-65. At this point we should consider the fact that the author is also occupied as High Urban Planner at Diyarbakır Provincial Directorate of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

12 See <https://emlakkulisi.com/diyarbakir-sura-10-butik-otel-insa-edilecek/609811>

13 See <https://emlakkulisi.com/diyarbakir-Suriçi-bolgesi-kacak-yapilardan-ariniyor/139738>

(Smith, 1996). This “revanchism,” as it was observed in different contexts too, might take the form of dominant groups forcibly re-occupying, and re-appropriating the central core of the city through the operation of the gentrification and by other means, for example, the use of the police and legal agencies (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005, p.6). My interview with one of the TOKİ engineer who works in transformation project reveals such kind of “revanchism” in its most directed ways. I asked him what will happen those people who were previously living in the transformation sites, he answered as follow:

If you ask my opinion it will be no shit happen to young people there, however, things will happen the elder people who born and lived in there. When you expel an old person from his homeland his death will accelerate. There are men who come to transformation sites with tears in their eyes...but there's not so much to do. This is a process that must continue without being reconciled with the economy or something else. They are not letting those narrow streets in there anymore. (R8)

In a similar vein, another interviewee who is also working in this urban transformation project as a construction officer, remarked that he saw the residents in the neighborhoods as related with criminal activities so that they were deserving to be forced from the district. Such statements which are made by the state officials who works in projects show us that the urban transformation in *Suriçi* goes beyond the middle-class pro-urbanism in the sense that it also embraces a desire for the revenge on the poor and socially marginal.

The interviewed member of Sur Conservation Platform explicates in which ways the transformation process is conducted in the neighborhoods:

The property transferred by force, as can be defined by a rule that when you destroy it will become yours. They are forcing residents to sell their houses for significantly low prices for 30.000 - 40.000 TL. However they are planning to sell newly built houses for maybe 1.000.000 TL, for example, those which are located in streets seeing the city walls. This is the most efficient area for them to gain economic profit and rent. (R9)

If we look closer to the quotation above, it would be clear to suggest that the case of *Suriçi* overlaps what is termed as state-led property transfer through urban transformation which displace lower class residents from neighborhoods while aiming to market their living areas to the upper classes (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010). In this sense, the neighborhoods are approached and restructured by authorities to engender more marketable areas for generating urban rent that is turned into a major mechanism for capital accumulation (Tok & Oğuz, 2013). Thus, as it is claimed by many scholars, urban transformation is concurrently restructuring economic, demographic and sociocultural elements in the city (Rose, 1984; Smith, 1987, 1996; Warde, 1991). My interviewee, who is a member of Sur Conservation Platform, emphasized the following:

There are many aspects which are fundamentally changed in these neighborhoods. For example the mostly low income residents who had to sell their lands to state would not be able to afford to go to the restaurants or touristic places planned to be built. They are systematically excluded from their previous living spaces with many ways. (R10)

As emphasized by many scholars, in order to ensure the facilitation of this transformation, the gentrification process may be conjoined by the use of force to suppress resistance, the co-optation of opposition forces, and the imposition of dominant ideologies on subordinate classes (Shin et al. 2016). Same interviewee points at multiplicity of techniques that go along with this urban transformation project:

In the first place they are trying to make it by consent from the residents through TOKİ agreements by using a threatening discourse, for example threatening the residents with their political identities, and when this is not working this time the instruments of force are stepping in. (R11)

The work on gentrification emphasize that another aspect of gentrification process is to produce a new economic wealth and to ensure its distribution mechanisms (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Shin et al., 2016; Islam & Sakızlıoğlu, 2015). The role of the state in determining the space of consumers and producers of housing is a double social construction which the state contributes crucially by shaping the universe of builders

and sellers via regulatory policies on the economic side, and, by molding the dispositions and capabilities of house buyers (including the propensity to rent or buy), on the social side (Wacquant, 2008, p.202). From this perspective, the universe of builders and sellers in *Suriçi* are significantly regulated by the “invitation” method in appointment of subcontracting companies that implement the projects in the district. As one of my respondents who is an engineer in subcontracting company emphasized, in order to be invited in these projects it is obligatory to have close relations with the authorities. In *Suriçi* this double production is also guaranteed by fixing the prices of newly built houses as the previous residents would never able to afford to rent or buy.

At this point the responds of residents to these processes are critical in the sense that urban transformation is a double penetration that on the one side, deepening the poverty through the displacements and destructions, and on the other side, perverting this fact by means of recreational implementations accompanying with the veiling discourse of rehabilitation. Below the account of a *Suriçi* resident who shared with me in my interview with him:

Recently, ‘mister’ minister in his budget talk showed that they repaired cover of a sewer sewage near the Ulu Cami, just like that our ‘flower municipality’ is planting and changing the flowers every week. For god’s sake! You are displacing thousands of people that you are not mentioning but you are coming and saying that you repaired a simple cover of a sewage. At the same time, you’re the one who broke it with your panzers, TOMAs and vehicles. Meanwhile, the people here is hungry, starving, if you are giving *ekşi ayran* (rotten beverage) to a hungry person what will happen, he will suffer. There are lots of deficiencies here, despite, they are making a ‘flower tender’ giving 9 million dollar, 13 million dollar to flowers. Look at the nonsense here, is it such nonsense! What is the point here about flowers, cloves, and so on, what is the point about İstanbul companies or Ağaoğlu in here! (R12)

These critics of interviewed resident is remarkable in many senses because it opens up various questions about the issue. First of all, my interviewee notifies that the public authorities veiling and perverting the actual socio-economic problematics that they created through discourse of recreation. The ‘flower issue’ in this sense is both real and

metaphoric.¹⁴ The resident, in this sense, is aware that the authorities are spoiling the public agenda with manipulative discourse of recreation while veiling the actual problematics of transformation projects. As Dovey (1999) also suggests, manipulation is a common fact where distorted representations of architectural and urban design projects are used as a form of coercion which operates mainly by keeping the subject uninformed where the exercise of power is made invisible to its subject. Secondly, my interviewee notifies how the urban transformation is utilized to facilitate accumulation and transfer of wealth and property to affiliated comprador firms through the tender system. Although it is not direct aim of this thesis to investigate the details of the ways in which the relations of capital between state and affiliated firms are functioning, it can be underlined that the residents are also having concerns about this distribution mechanism and its impact on themselves. In other words, it is important to see how the gentrification is conceived from a class perspective by those who are disadvantaged through this project.

Although the destruction and construction practices are persistent throughout the all district, the effect of gentrification is more significant in the main boulevards of *Suriçi*, which are named as *Melik Ahmet* and *Gazi*. These two main arteries are crosscut the district lying alongside with many shops, workplaces, markets and so on. The recreations in these two boulevards are massive and they totally changed the fabric of the district regarding the architectural as well as social peculiarities which were authentic to the area as the antique settlement. Through destructions, constructions, as well as compulsory arrangements from up to down, these two boulevards turned to be the main subjects of gentrification process in the district (Figure 4.4.1).

¹⁴ See <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/buyuksehir-4-milyon-yazlik-mevsimlik-diyarbakir-yerelhaber-2738269/>
See <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/74937/firatin-ote-yakasinda-35-milyon-tlik-yolsuzluk-iddiasi>



Figure 4.4.1 Urban transformation site in Melik Ahmet boulevard in *Suriçi*.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 4.4.2 Urban transformation site of historical bazaar of *Balıkçılarbaşı* in *Suriçi*.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

Many small shops and markets on these boulevards were previously owned by small-scale local merchants as well as craftsmen. However, they recently expropriated by the mentioned laws. Furthermore, these practices differentiate the function of these markets and shops, which are mainly used by low income groups beforehand, and transferred them into gentrified assets to engender economic profit and urban rent through capital accumulation (see Figure 4.4.2). For example, while the state is conducting the transformation projects, some new luxurious restaurants begin to emerge on the main arteries of *Suriçi*. As one of them, 500 years old *Vahap Ağa Hamamı* is turned into a luxurious restaurant named *Fırın-ci* while one of the walls of the *hamam* which sees the main road is replaced with a glass wall.¹⁵ The transformation of this place can best summarize the different phases of gentrification in the district: first property transferred from previous owners to the state by means of expropriation, and second, the recreational practices standardize the built environment, and finally, the property transferred to the affiliated private entrepreneurs to accumulate urban rent and wealth through urban assets.

4.5. Urban Transformation as Effacing Historical and Cultural Heritage

Many scholars have discussed the effects of urban transformation on historical and cultural heritage (Dinçer, 2011; Garcia-Hernández et al., 2017). Some argued that destruction of cultural heritage can be seen as an element of either “ethnic cleansing” or “cultural genocide” (Silverman & Ruggles, 2007; Coward, 2008). In addition to these studies, the worldwide recognition of cultural/historical heritage has led international institutions to develop projects to protect these significant settlements from a possible destruction. With the aim of such projection UNESCO’s list of cultural heritage plays a significant role. Below is some features of cultural heritages as defined by UNESCO:

¹⁵ For recently opened luxurious place under *Vahap Ağa Hamamı* see: <http://firin-ci.com/>.

Buildings or built environments can be designated as comprising the physical heritage of a particular culture (be that a national/ethnic culture or the more generic culture of humanity) by national governments and/or international governmental organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). These procedures produce the so-called ‘heritage lists’ that comprise a canonical designation of the cultural heritage of both nations and, in the case of UNESCO, humanity (Coward, 2008, p.26).

As I discussed in chapter three, historical background of *Suriçi* deeply embedded in its peculiar monumental as well as civil architecture. Soyukaya (2017) emphasizes the architectural peculiarities in *Suriçi* as follow:

The old city has been designed in a way where the magic fortress, specific civil architecture and street fabric, religious buildings consisting of mosques, churches and synagogues, and other public buildings such as caravansaries and traditional baths can be observed and experienced as cultural assets in one settlement area. (Soyukaya, 2017, p.1)

UNESCO inscribed “The Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape” in world heritage list in 2015. Nevertheless, as many researches as well as public reports emphasize, the conflicts and following urban transformation process significantly impacted the historical and cultural fabric of *Suriçi* (Sevim et al. 2016, Soyukaya 2017, DBB 2016, TMMOB 2017). This section will discuss effects of urban transformation on historical and cultural heritage through some interviews and observations from the field.

During my field research I made an interview with a high rank TOKİ engineer who came to the city to audit the urban transformation projects. His main job is to control whether urban transformation projects are implemented by subcontracting companies according to master plans prepared by TOKİ beforehand. These controls are vital for subcontracting companies to get their payments from TOKİ, which is called *hakediş* money. This group interview was arranged by a local construction engineer who was working in one of the local companies implementing the projects. Below is a part of the interview:

Local Engineer: I was just telling him how you are killing Sur (with a sense of irony).

TOKİ Engineer: We are not killing Sur, it was done before, we are trying to make it.

Local Engineer: But in wrong ways.

TOKİ Engineer: What are the right ways to do it?

Local Engineer: The right way is if you would let us to do it by ourself, we could have made it as it was before.

TOKİ Engineer: Do you know Fernand Braudel, he has books on Mediterranean cities.

Local Engineer: We do not want it to be Toledo¹⁶.

TOKİ Engineer: I learned their names, the state is not letting those *Kuşes* in Sur anymore.

Local Engineer: What?

TOKİ Engineer: *Kuşe*.

Local Engineer: It is *Küçe*, *Küçe*¹⁷. You learned it but you learned it wrong.

TOKİ Engineer: In here people are even naming these narrow streets *Kuşe* or *Kuşe* I don't know. From my side they do not have any names. I am calling them “cat ways”, what else should I call. They do not have any meaning from my side. (R13)

This dialog between the two construction engineer reveals the main contradictions of recent urban transformation projects regarding their effects on local architectural and cultural fabric. During the recent urban transformation process, the authentic architectural peculiarities in *Suriçi* were switched to designed facades that efface the local architecture and culture (Figure 4.5.1; Figure 4.5.2).

16 See Prime Minister's statement on the issue at <https://emlakkulisi.com/diyarbakir-sur-toledo-gibi-olacak/448552>

17 The narrow streets in *Suriçi* named as *Küçe* in local culture, and in Kurdish as well.



Figure 4.5.1 Transformed facades of buildings in Melik Ahmet Boulevard *Suriçi*.
(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 4.5.2 Transformed facades of buildings in Melik Ahmet Boulevard *Suriçi*.
(Source: Photo taken by author)

In an interview I made with the same TOKİ engineer, he raised this problem as follows:

For example, in transformation sites, there are some buildings which are preserved as monumental heritage, actually which means nothing to me. Have you ever saw Konya Meram? So when we finish it will look like there. (R14)

In here, the engineer is mentioning architectural peculiarities of other geographies that has nothing to do with authentic architecture of *Suriçi* where mainly dark colored materials are used. It is significant here to note that the antinomy between white and black is turning to be reflecting antinomy between local historical features on the one side, and external as well as imposed architecture on the other. One of the residents that I interviewed, who is a shop owner in the transformation site, reveals this antinomy as follows:

They changed color of all these buildings to the white, they made it compulsory to paint outside of your building and shop to white. We also knew how to paint the buildings with white, however, we didn't prefer to do it. There is a reason why we were using dark colors in buildings. Diyarbakır is a city in the mid of the desert with so much sand and earth. Now these buildings are seeming white and fancy, but two years later come and see how they will be all darkened again. Such a nonsense. (R15)

The chair of Chamber of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB) also notified some of the key problems regarding these newly built structures in *Suriçi* in my interview with him:

The structures built by TOKİ, do not meet any characteristics of the local nor the vicinity. The buildings, the plannings and the projects are highly standardized. You can not see any architectural features of Diyarbakır in the buildings which are constructed in Diyarbakır, so we can call it as standardization. Now in Sur, the state is subcontracting some companies, implementing and constructing buildings which have nothing to do with traditional architectural features of Diyarbakır houses. Projects are drawn in Ankara completely by their own. For example, we recently published a report as TMMOB. We are proposing since the beginning that the buildings constructed in Sur must commit the technical peculiarities of the preservation plan which is prepared by municipalities beforehand (R16)

These critics are important to understand how transformation projects are planned and implemented centrally and practiced totally as an up-to-down process without taking consideration of neither local needs nor architectural peculiarities. In addition to this, here there is an important concept which my interviewee emphasized as “standardization of the spatial environment.” Standardization is one of the significant components of urban transformation projects in the district (Figure 4.5.3; Figure 4.5.4). There are dozens of newly constructed buildings in the transformation sites which are planned to be finished during the following months. One of the interviewed construction officials in the transformation sites states that it would not be easy to sell these buildings because their architectural plans are not suitable for proper family living. They were built as separated units divided by walls which makes it impossible to conduct any social interaction between the households.



Figure 4.5.3. Construction site of transformation project in Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 4.5.4. Construction site of transformation project Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 4.5.5. Construction site of transformation project Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

This is one of the reasons that why my interviewees consistently emphasize that the houses are feeling like “open prisons” by their architectural features (Figure 4.5.5). These residences are obviously not constructed for any aesthetic premises that can be marketed as “touristic” nor “luxury.” They seem as totally sealed units, as my interviewees emphasized, many times they feel like they are in “a coffin with no balcony,” where there is “no open space,” and “no social interaction”.

CHAPTER 5

FRAMING POWER IN URBAN SPACE

One of the main specificities of the current urban transformation of *Suriçi* mainly stems from the massive destruction of the city during and aftermath of the armed struggles in 2015. Thus, in this particular case of urban transformation in *Suriçi* one may be able to identify the coercive forces of the state more easily than in other cases. In this chapter, I analyze how the coercive forces of the state may play a specific role in cases of urban transformation. These forces are not always seen as clear as *Suriçi* in other cases of urban transformation. Therefore, the literature on urban transformation has more focus on the economic reasoning of these processes and they point out the role of the state more as an economic actor or as a source of legitimation. The case of *Suriçi*, however, does not allow this kind of veiling because of the long lasting political tensions experienced in the settlement. In other words, in *Suriçi* case this legitimacy of the state's role behind economic reasoning is not successfully achieved. For this reason, *Suriçi* provides an interesting window to see how the coercive forces may play a decisive role in the urban transformation projects. In the following, first, I lay out the specific characteristics of the settlement by focusing on the ethnicized background of the urban transformation process. Then I analyze the operation of coercive forces of the state by concentrating on their implementations. And finally, I focus on the responses of the local people on these state practices and their perception of the current political/spatial situation.

5.1. Urban Transformation as Apparatus of Social Control

Many scholars have discussed urban transformation as related with aspects of power, as a mechanism of social control, which is exercised in the forms of repression, constraint,

exploitation and oppression (Yiftachel, 1998; Dovey, 1999; Njoh, 2007; Lewi & Wickham, 1996; Harris, 2011; Metzger et al., 2017). These studies emphasize multiple aspects of power which are embedded in urban planning and transformation processes.

Yiftachel (1998), for example, argues that the oppressive impact of spatial policies has been strongly evident in ethnically-dominated “homeland states” that can also be termed as “ethnocracies.” In these state forms, inter-ethnic conflicts are present at any moment.

In such states, even when governed by formal democratic regimes, territory becomes a key group resource, for asserting ethnic control, collective identity and economic superiority. Governments in such states have used their planning powers to manipulate ethnic spatial relations in an attempt to protect the dominant ethnic group from peripheral challenge (Yiftachel, 1998, p.5).

As I discussed in chapter three, the long history of ethnic politicization of the southeast region in Turkey turns the urban transformation project into a state mechanism. Therefore, these projects have consequences of excluding and marginalizing some specific groups that are othered by state projects. In my field research I listened plenty of statements by the local people who perceived the military operations and urban transformation projects as an *interlocked* ethnic/spatial policy. For example, a member of the Sur Conservation Platform explained his ideas in the following words:

The transformation of space in Sur begins by the curfews declared in 2 December 2015 and goes on since today by the urban transformation projects. In this sense these projects cannot be understood without taking consideration the ethnic, political and class identities of the people who were living in there. When we consider this fact, it can be said that the thing we are confronting in Sur is even goes beyond the militarization of space. Rather it can be regarded as fascism which stakes spatial fraction, demographic partition, disjunction and displacement of the population previously living in there. In international law, if you entirely destroy the space that is mainly inhabited by a certain ethnic group, it also means the genocide of this group. If you consider the background of the population in the district, they mostly come this district during the conflicts in the 1990s. Since then, they preserve their Kurdish rural background as a significant part of their political and also cultural identity in their urban life. The urban transformation in Sur cannot be

really understood without taking this fact into consideration. It is important to see that in these geographies we have never experienced something like this before, urban transformation as a parallel procedure with security policies deployed by the state. In this sense the urban transformation in Sur is mainly a political phenomenon where the state has a specific orientation towards this peculiar space while following its security-based policies in the region. (R17)

The interviewed member of Sur Conservation Platform also emphasized the peculiarities of these projects while comparing them with the other urban transformation projects implemented in different cities around the country.

The phenomenon of urban transformation is an original topic especially when we consider the previous urban conflicts that took place in this region. We discussed this topic with people who come from different geographies and tried to understand it. The urban transformation here is not like the others implemented in different regions of the country. In this region the citizens are not even able to defend their basic property rights, in order not to be labeled as “terrorist” by the state that threatening the residents to put them in the jail. In this sense, urban transformation in here can also be regarded as punishment targeting not only the space but also the citizens who are living in this space. (R18)

My interviewee also emphasized that the urban transformation in *Suriçi* has significantly related with the political preferences of the residents in the neighborhood as they commonly vote for oppositional pro-Kurdish parties. He sees the whole process as a “spatial punishment” of the people who are already stigmatized as “rebellious” through a set of discursive mechanisms. The account of this respondent goes along with Wacquant’s notion of “territorial stigmatization”. Wacquant suggests this notion as follows:

Once a place is publicly labelled as a ‘lawless zone’ or ‘outlaw estate’, outside the common norm, it is easy for the authorities to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the effect, if not the intention, of destabilizing and further marginalizing their occupants, rendering them invisible or driving them out of a coveted space (Wacquant, 2007, p.69).

Especially during and after the operations in 2015, many government figures as well as mainstream media branches systematically referred *Suriçi* as a “zone of terror” that should be “cleaned”. This discourse stigmatizes the district as a “lawless zone” and this stigmatization was used by the authorities to justify the urban transformation while systematically marginalizing the residents. The sense of marginalization was very frequent among the people I met in the area. The residents that I interviewed in the district asserted that the transformation projects were conducted by the authorities to follow their “own benefits” while criminalizing as well excluding them from a regular life. In various cases, I have observed that the residents linked the current processes to the past events that they had experienced with the security forces especially during the 1990s. Whenever I asked about the urban transformation in the district they were coming up with a specific story to point out the fact that they had been already excluded, targeted and marginalized through their previous experiences. Below is an example of these accounts:

In 1994, while our house was still in here this neighborhood, during the night around 02:30 our door knocked harshly. I just wake up and said to my children that this is not seeming as a guest, it is the police, put some clothes on you, these people do not respect any privacy. We prepared ourselves and I went to open the door. As soon as I opened the door, they rush and made me lied on the ground and handcuffed my hands in back. They put and light big projectors in our roof and on surrounding houses. They raid the house while their shoes were still on. I said put out your shoes, this is my house my elders are making their religious rituals (*namaz*) on this ground, we can be poor but we are still honorable family. They yelled at me saying “Aren’t you an Armenian, what about the *namaz*!” They took me to the police station and kept me there for 42 days under custody, while beating me every single day, all naked. In the end, one of them said again that you are an Armenian, I said that I am muslim not an Armenian. He asked me, what are the five condition of to be Muslim then. I answered that it is three for me because I am a poor guy who don't have to fulfill the rest. Then they gave me a cigarette and did not beat me up for following two days. (R19)

Similarly, another resident whom I asked her opinions on urban transformation, told me about how she came to *Suriçi* after her village evacuated by the soldiers in 1993. She

recounted me that all her neighbors had been beaten up in the village and forced to leave their houses. She also told that, now she was again forced to leave her house because of the urban transformation. These testimonies of the residents demonstrate that urban transformation in the *Suriçi* district goes as a parallel process for them which follows their previous confrontations with the state. These personal stories show us the effects of the specificities of past experiences of political confrontations in the region on the perception of the urban transformation by the residents.

Dovey (1999) argues that spatial domination through exaggerated scale or dominant location are overt signifiers of latent force that often use the memory of a past use of force by the state to signify such future possibility. From this perspective, I suggest that one of the reasons that my interviewees commonly referred to their previous experiences with the state in different contexts is that urban transformation in *Suriçi* was accompanied by installation of flags and symbols in dominant locations, which reminded them the memory of past use of force by the state. These symbols were inserted in the district after the operations in 2015, but they stayed during the urban transformation process as well. Within this context, the developmentalist discourse of urban transformation hardly achieves a legitimization process in the region because of the long lasting political tensions experienced in the settlement.

5.2. Urban Transformation as Spatial Constraint and Surveillance

The specific characteristic of the urban transformation in *Suriçi*, as being started after a military operation, has significant effects on the implementation of the whole project. East half of the district has been declared as a “forbidden zone” and remained as such during the transformation process. After the military operation in the area, according to public resources 72% of the buildings in “forbidden zone” are destructed (TMMOB, 2017, Figure 5.2.1).



Figure 5.2.1 Aerial caption of destruction in forbidden zone in *Suriçi*.

(Source: TMMOB Diyarbakır İl Kordinasyon Kurulu, Sur Raporu, 2015-2017)

The destructions of the buildings, which included historical/cultural sites, continued even after the operation was over (TMMOB, 2017; DBB, 2016). I have observed in the field that the large scale of the destruction of the region has come along with a new configuration of the space through security policies. These policies have produced various constraints on the action of the people living in the region.

Relating to the notion of constraint with urban policies, Dovey defines the notion of constraint as the “use of force in built form” such as walls, doors, fences and security devices which prevent access and the action by enforcing spatial practice, spatial confinement and spatial exclusion (Dovey, 1999, p.10). I observed that the spatial constraints in *Suriçi* started to take place while entering the district through security

checkpoints. These checkpoints are constructed upon each of the few entrances through historical city walls. In this way, each and every citizen entering or going out from can be controlled by the officials though video recordings, ID checks and interrogations. The encampment of the district through checkpoints segregate it from the rest of city and giving it an exceptional state of being (Figure 5.2.2)¹⁸.



Figure 5.2.2 Security checkpoint in *Çiftkapı* on entrance of *Suriçi*.

(Source: Online resource <https://nedir.ileilgili.org/images/43/9/43995/sur.jpeg>)

The construction of several “security bases” is significant in the operation of control over urban space because they accompany the urban transformation processes not only in *Suriçi* but also in other districts of the city. Throughout my research, I saw some of the construction sites of these “security encampment” in the city as well. I observed that, many of these bases were constructed as having ultimate dominance upon the urban space. The security bases in districts planned to be constructed in a crossroad of highly dense neighborhoods while to “clean” their construction site dozen of previous

¹⁸ These security checkpoints initially deployed during the operations in 2015. However they were still persistent in the main entrances of *Suriçi* during my field research in the district. I used image to better demonstrate the encampment of the district during urban transformation process as well.

apartments evicted and demolished. Their proximity to the settlement areas are significantly high. I observed that the surrounding settlements and the private spaces, where residents having their everyday activities, were constantly under control all the time. Hence, the construction of these solid security bases made the control constant in urban space. Above are some pictures that I took from the construction sites to exemplify this form of control (Figure 5.2.3).



Figure 5.2.3 Construction site of security base in *Bağlar* district.

(Source: Photos taken by author)

This constant surveillance through these security towers show us how Foucault's famous panopticon model operates at the urban transformation projects. To remember, Foucault defines the concept as follows:

This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each

individual is constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings, all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism (Foucault, 1977, p.197).

Spatial practices of the state, in this sense, employs architecture as a disciplinary technology whereby disciplinary power transforms human beings into subjects through the “gaze” which is a practice of disciplinary control through asymmetrical visibility (Dovey, 1999, p.3). The gaze of surveillance is locating, fixing, controlling and constricting the everyday life of the residents in urban space as a form of institutionalized power. Not knowing whether a guard is present, the subject must always act as if it were. Therefore, according to Dovey, here lies the key to efficiency where the discipline is self-enforcing and power relations are internalized (Dovey, 1999, p.3). The agents of such discipline can see without being seen, while the subjects are seen but cannot see (Dandeker, 1990). Such kind of power that is written into spatial practice of the state has major advantages to be continuous, decentralized, efficacious, and difficult to target (Fraser, 1989) while it drives power underground, makes its operations invisible as it utilizes the subject’s capacities in the task of their own oppression (Dovey, 1999, p.20). Through construction of these security bases coercion of the state manifested itself in built form through surveillance to the extent that such a spatial arrangement placed residents under the constant “gaze of the state” (Njoh, 2007, p.8).

The photographs that I took in clearly demonstrate how urban transformation in the city reflects what is defined above as a “compact disciplinary mechanism where all movements of the residents would be under control and surveillance” (Figure 5.2.4). This study brings construction of these bases into attention because it is important to demonstrate that during the urban transformation process in the city, the surveillance and control is becoming a cornerstone with the deployment of these security bases, and this situation significantly overdetermines the urban space. The state’s urban planning scheme in *Suriçi* foresees construction of several of these security bases in the district. The surveillance of the everyday activities of the residents is accompanied by the



Figure 5.2.4 Security base in urban transformation sites in *Suriçi*.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 5.2.5 Security base in urban transformation sites in *Suriçi*.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

domination of space by the security forces in the transformation sites, which consolidates state power in urban space (Figure 5.2.5). Alongside with these security towers, the plan of recently constructed buildings shows us another technology of disciplinary power. The newly constructed buildings are positioned along with wide and well-aligned streets that formed a grid pattern and prescribed ample distances between houses based on two requirements as wide streets and spaced-out houses. As Njoh argued in another context, such configuration of the plan functions as tools of power and control that facilitates surveillance (Njoh 2007:69).

During the course of my field research the east half of the district was already prohibited as “unpermitted zones” that no one can enter except the state officials. The area was only observable from top of the high structures which were close to it. All of this region was surrounded by the concrete block walls placed in entrance of the each street (see Figure 5.2.6; Figure 5.2.7; Figure 5.2.8). When I tried to look closer to get a better view of this region between the walls, I was warned several times by the local people as well as by security forces that it can be “dangerous” to be nearby these zones.



Figure 5.2.6 Concrete block walls separating the forbidden zone in *Suriçi*.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 5.2.7 Concrete block walls separating the forbidden zone in *Suriçi*.
(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 5.2.8 Concrete block walls separating the forbidden zone in *Suriçi*.
(Source: Photo taken by author)

The level of domination and control by the state security forces through these “restricted areas” was overwhelming because even to look beyond these walls could be perceived as a “threat” and could have devastating results regarding the “safety.” Because of these reasons, I could not enter this forbidden zone in the district, but, I was able to observe Alipaşa and Lalebey neighborhoods, which are located at the west side of the district and adjacent to historical city walls. Unlike the forbidden zone, this part of the district is partially observable where the everyday life and transformation is going side by side. The “first stage of the transformation project” takes place in these neighborhoods. The construction site of transformation project is completely encamped and encapsulated by long metal fences (see Figure 5.2.9).



Figure 5.2.9 Construction sites of transformation project in Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)



Figure 5.2.10 Construction sites of transformation project in Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

The fence segregates the space into two sections: one is the construction, the other is the deconstruction sites (Figure 5.2.10). As I know from my previous experiences, this place was the living habitat of many people. I observed that the effect of this encampment and the huge scale of destruction and construction for the residents was devastating. The earlier residents of the neighborhoods cannot even physically get close to their previous streets or their previous houses that they spent most of their lives. During my field research, I talked with many people who were often coming to the transformation sites during the day to try to see their previous life sites behind the fences.

I observed that urban transformation in *Suriçi* was accompanied by concrete constraints, such as walls, fences, barricades and security checkpoints that constantly interrupting mobility of the residents in the urban space. I have witnessed that such constraints were producing a general unrest among the inhabitants in the area. The physical enclosure though these walls, fences and barricades in *Suriçi* reveal the “inside/outside dialectic” that is ordered along the lines of enclosure/openness and safety/danger (Dovey, 1999, p.43). One of the resident that I interviewed pointed out this fact as follows:

I could not go to my old neighborhood for one year. Sometimes it comes to my mind to go there, it is my old neighborhood that I can definitely find a way to enter but what you will say when police catch you, then it will come punishment. They are saying it is “forbidden zone,” if you are catch in there they can say that you are a “terrorist” and they will shoot you. (R20)

The statement of my interviewee testifies that these spatial constraints are perceived by the inhabitants as a form of “threat of force” that significantly dominates the residents’ mobility in the urban space. Following Dovey, these spatial constraints operate as “coercive forces” that prevent the inhabitants to develop any kind of resistance. Here one could observe that coercion operated not as an explicit use of force, but as “the threat of force”. This was embedded in the spatial practices in *Suriçi* which operate through enforced spatial confinement in the forms of walls, fences and barriers. These “applications of force in built forms” (Dovey, 1999) significantly involves the

manipulation of elements of built environment through the use of visible objects which “enclose, enframe and circumscribe” the residential areas in *Suriçi* (Njoh, 2006).

In this sense, the spatial practice in *Suriçi* reveals itself as “enforced confinement” in the form of spatial constraints that “prevent access” to ensure “power over” the subjects of any non-compliance (Dovey, 1999, p.10). As suggested by Dovey (1999), the “subtle forms of spatial coercion” linked to the Latin root *coercere* that means “to surround”. In *Suriçi* such kind of “spatial coercion” is significantly prevalent through drawing boundaries that frames everyday life by ordering certain forbidden spaces. These spatial constraints can be regarded as architectural strategies of domination and intimidation, which are enforced towards social control of residents that has been already stigmatized through discourse of “security” during the transformation processes. Urban transformation in this sense can be regarded “a system” designed to confine specific spaces delineated with walls, fences and barriers upon those considered to be “potential threat” to state order (Njoh, 2006, p.7). In this sense, spatial constraints in *Suriçi* are revealing the fact that urban transformation/planning implies a complex spatial strategy that is used as a tool for “power over” in order to dominate, coerce and control the population in the district.

5.3. The Impacts of the Coercive Urban Transformation on The Local People

Until now I have discussed the urban transformation in *Suriçi* focusing on its implementation through mechanisms of power. From the perspective of the inhabitants, I observed that this was a process of destruction of their places. Dovey (1999) conceptualizes place as aligned with a group of aspects such as identity, community, character, and home. From this perspective, it can be proposed that the destructive practices in the district is not only targeting the physical space, but also these related key aspects, which perform key roles in residents’ lives. Urban transformation, in this sense, is experienced by the inhabitants of the district as a repressive force, which segregates, restricts, and demolishes not only their living habitat but also their identity,

community, character, and home. The deconstruction in this sense could be seen as a process emerged from the general frameworks of control over targeted space with these related aspects.

I spent several days in these sites with the families at this critical moment of their lives where they had to watch destruction of their habitat (Figure 5.3.1). I observed that this leads to high degree of despair and resentment among the inhabitants. As this urban transformation is led by state institutions, they experience the mechanisms of power as a destructive machine of the state apparatus. The control in the urban space consolidated through the destructive power of the machine which is also equipped by legal enforcements that gives an unchallenged status-quo to the praxis of the same machine.



Figure 5.3.1 Destructions in urban transformation site in Alipaşa-Lalebey.

(Source: Photo taken by author)

During the course of my research, I observed more than dozens of moments of destruction and displacement while the residents are present at that moment. These were important moments to see that the residents experience the destruction of their living

space as a confrontation of oppressor and oppressed. During my interviews I asked many times to interviewees that “Why do you think this is happening”, and they almost always gave the same answer: “Because the state decided so”. The residents in the neighborhood use the concept of “the state” frequently to imply the main actor in urban transformation process.

Some of interviews that I conducted illustrated clear reactions of the residents. One of these interviews was the one that I conducted with a group of young people (between 18-25 years old) from the Alipaşa neighborhood. After seeing me several times while observing the urban transformation process, it came to a point that I asked this young group of residents for an interview when they were watching the destruction. In the beginning of the interview I asked their thoughts about the urban transformation. They immediately responded as follows:

What can we think about it, could there be such cruelty, such unscrupulousness. They throw all these people to street. People here are saying let us renovate, repair our own houses, the state is saying no you cannot, they are not letting us to do so. Most of the buildings that you see here have historical background, somehow preserved since today. Now the only thing we know is that the state is persecuting people here for its own benefits. It is aiming that people will not live here together anymore. Let me say you something, here the place that you see, there were at least two hundred houses before the destructions. We were living together, now the state is dispersing all these people to different places. They are playing with our lives, whoever making this we are cursing upon them. You see, my house was just here, now it is destructed, there is nothing but ruins instead, look I am still here, refusing to go anywhere else. It was not easy to destroy this neighborhood just like that, when people refuse to leave their houses they come this time with war, killing and so on, they force people to leave their houses, saying that if you are not leaving we will kill you. I was born in this neighborhood, look all of us born in this neighborhood, I was born in this house, isn't it shame that the state is displacing us. It has been five months that the state cut the electricity and the water in this neighborhood. They said us leave your house in last Friday, we did not, how can we, they come destroyed all. (R21)

Here one may notice that how they perceive the process targeting their communal being, and as a destruction of their whole livelihood. The reactions of these young people show us how they see the whole process as a total destruction. This observation goes along with the notion of urbicide that is frequently used in urban literature in the last decade. The term “urbicide” has been invoked by a number of commentators in order to draw attention to the need for a consideration of destruction of the built environment as a form of violence in its own right. The concept of urbicide was intended to indicate the manner in which the city, both as architectural form and socio-political experience, was under attack in through urban planning and urban renewal programs. Coward (2009) delineates urbicide as conceptual understanding of acts of deliberate destruction of built environment as distinct form of political violence, and as an attack on buildings as the condition of possibility of a plurality or heterogeneity.

Additionally, as young inhabitants also notify, the destructions in the district accompanied by stigmatization of the residents through legal enforcements.

Now if we are getting together as five people on the street they are labeling us as 'terrorist' and jailing us, taking us to the custody, why, because we do not want to leave our own houses, such a unjustness, such a cruelty, they are saying us go commit a crime, the state is not letting us another chance but only being a criminal. (R22)

Stigma is defined as a relationship loaded with attributes and stereotyping which is a representational practice that reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes the difference (Goffman, 1986; Hall, 1997). Many scholars point out that a stigmatized person regards his or her social identity as devalued or spoiled in the eyes of others, thus stigmatization is understood from the perspective of the stigmatized as dehumanization, threat, aversion and the depersonalization (Crocker et al., 1998). The interview with young residents of *Suriçi* demonstrates that they are experiencing a high level of despair because of the stigmatizing legal and discursive enforcements which are accompanying the transformation processes in the district.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The urban transformation processes in Turkey has become one of the most debated issues because many cities in the country have experienced this process in different scales during the last two decades. This thesis contributes to these debates with exploring the *Suriçi* case, which is a settlement from southeast region of Turkey. I suggest that the urban transformation process in *Suriçi* provides us a fruitful window to examine how neoliberal process of urban transformation is interlocked with the political and ideological determinants as key components.

This thesis discusses urban transformation in *Suriçi*, the old-town of Diyarbakir, as a recent phenomenon with its manifold aspects. As I discuss in literature review part of this study, the transformation of urban space is a global phenomenon that many scholars have approached with different perspectives. Majority of perspectives to urban transformation projects have emphasized urban transformation as a phenomenon related with the economic aspects deriving from the rescale of the power/function and positions of states in organization of urban governance. These perspectives, furthermore, underlined the role of states in urban transformation with their embedded relations with neoliberal configurations. As this vast literature underline, the organization of urban space is significantly related to economic, political, and cultural structures, and therefore, it should be approached by their relations to each other. One of the most important contributions of this thesis is to show that these structures are also related with the historically specific conjunctures which are essential to understand the specific cases of urban transformation process.

The peculiarity of the urban transformation in *Suriçi* derives from the fact that, unlike most of the other cases, the primary features of political and ideological frames impact

most of the other aspects of the phenomenon. The case study enable us to see the decisive role of political and ideological configurations in urban transformation process. Such kind of perspective does not exclude economic, social and cultural features of the phenomenon. Rather it emphasizes the preeminent position of political and ideological features in material and social production of space through the case study. The findings of the study testifies that the production of space in *Suriçi* not only underdetermined by capital relations but also politically overdetermined by complex relations of power which are specific to the historical conjunctures of the case study.

As I mainly analyzed in the third chapter, the specificity of *Suriçi* is rooted in regional configurations of the southeast Turkey. The transition to neoliberal economy policies in Turkey during the mid-1980s coincided with the increasing political conflicts in the southeast region of the country. Under these conditions, the urbanization dynamics of Diyarbakır, where *Suriçi* district is located, was significantly shaped by a set of spatial strategies and institutional frames that addressed southeast Turkey, and Diyarbakır in particular, both materially and discursively an “underdeveloped region” and a “zone of terror.” These configurations have played a major role in a specific sort of localization of neoliberalism in Diyarbakır. I showed in the third chapter that these regional configurations over the city of Diyarbakır, as being a central city in the southeast region, resulted in rapid suburbanization and emergence of urban poverty, which became one of the most important aspects of urban transformation in *Suriçi*.

The fourth chapter focuses on economic and social aspects of urban transformation in *Suriçi* which have been largely shaped by the particularities of the state policies over the southeast region within a context of neoliberal configurations in the country. In this chapter, I showed that one of the significant drives of urban transformation in *Suriçi* was to facilitate extraction of valuable assets in inner-city areas through expropriation. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that urban renewal in *Suriçi* was used as a governmental tool to transfer land from city dwellers to the state and its affiliated contractors, and thereby turning these properties into formally governed tradable assets.

This chapter also shows that the informal occupation of urban land along with *Suriçi* residents' informal forms of employment resulted in the residents to face multiple vulnerabilities during the urban transformation process. On the one hand, the low-income residents of *Suriçi* became significantly vulnerable to the development-induced urban renewal projects and this created widespread dispossession and displacement, deepening their already existing conditions of urban poverty. The state's reclaim of the land in the district, on the other hand, resulted in a dramatic decline in the socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants. Another socio-economic aspect of urban transformation in *Suriçi* is gentrification, which is a process incorporating dispossession and displacement. Urban transformation projects displaced lower class residents from neighborhoods while aiming to do marketing their living areas to the upper classes. The neighborhoods in *Suriçi*, therefore, were approached and subsequently restructured by state authorities to engender more marketable areas in order to generate urban rent that would turn into a major mechanism for capital accumulation. This process took the form of forcibly re-occupying and re-appropriating the central and ancient core of the city through the operations of gentrification which included the use of the police and legal agencies.

In chapter five, I showed how the coercive forces of the state played a specific role in urban transformation in *Suriçi*, as a particular case of urban transformation. In many other cases of urban transformation, the coercive forces of the state are not as visible as the case of *Suriçi*. The literature on urban transformation often have more focused on the economic reasoning of urban transformation by also underlining the role of the state as an economic actor and a source of legitimation. However, as my field research provides ample of examples from the accounts of *Suriçi* residents, in *Suriçi* case, a legitimacy of the state in urban transformation was not successfully achieved mostly because of the long political tensions experienced in the region. For that reason, *Suriçi* provides an invaluable opportunity to see how the coercive forces of the state are also vital in such urban transformation projects along with discursive state practices. In this

chapter I also focused on the specific characteristics of the settlement which largely influenced the implementations of urban transformation projects. In my analysis of practical implementations of urban transformation in *Suriçi* by the help of coercive forces, I tried to give a voice to the residents of the district to discuss the perceptions and reactions of the local people to the current situation in their livelihood. As their accounts clearly display, *Suriçi* residents perceived the military operations and urban transformation projects as an interlocked ethnic and spatial policy. As I understand, one of the important reasons for this perception is that urban transformation in *Suriçi* conjoined with security policies deployed in the region especially since 2015. In a similar vein, my ethnographic observations in *Suriçi* shows that the long history of ethnic politicization of the southeast region in Turkey turned urban transformation processes into a state mechanism which has consequences of excluding and marginalizing specific groups. These policies determines implementations of urban transformation as conjoined through constraints and surveillance in urban space. Additionally, this process in *Suriçi* also conjoined with stigmatization of the residents through legal and discursive enforcements. This strong relationship between security-based policies and implementations of urban transformation processes is one of the significant findings of this study. Relying on this, I argue that the intertwining of different state projects, which may be informed by different concerns of state agencies, frames some complexities of the phenomenon of urban transformation. Another aspect of this complexity is massive destruction of urban space through urban transformation processes. Urban transformation, in this sense, is experienced by the people the district as a repressive force, which segregates, restricts, and demolishes their living habitat.

This study contribute urban literature by building up a comprehensive perspective which able to unveil ideological and hegemonic projects behind the spatial changes. As I discussed in details through the thesis the urban transformation in *Suriçi* facilitates the imposition of the dominant ideologies and hegemony of the state in and through urban space. In this peculiar case, the state facilitate transformation projects as revanchist

mechanism which drives to revenge on counter-hegemonic local configurations that are embedded in historical, political and social compositions of the city. In this sense, the study contributes the existing literature while demonstrating the preeminent role of the political and ideological features in production of urban space.

The economy first approach to urban transformation derives from the fact that in most of the cases the “accumulation through dispossession” is primary motivation of many projects around the globe and in Turkey as well. The *Suriçi* case, on the other hand, contributes the urban literature by demonstrating that urban transformation can also facilitate political and ideological intervention in space, as the primary motivation that most of the other features are adjusted accordingly. The findings of this study directing us to reconsider political features of urban transformation projects which significantly effect drives, implementations and impacts of the whole process. Following Wacquant's attention, this study once again behooves us to restore the primacy of the political in our efforts to analytically dissect and practically redirect the social transformation of the neoliberal city.

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APPENDICES

A. REFERRED INTERVIEWS

R1. Şimdi buraya 90'lı yıllarda sadece bu etaba, yani birinci etaba hiç gelmediyse yaklaşık 200'ün üzerinde ev geldi. Mazıdağ'dan geldiler. Bir köy var geniş bir köydür. Mazıdağ kadar büyüktür. *Ora Birre* (köyün Kürtçe ismini söylüyor) diyorlar, ordan geldiler. Mardin'e bağlıdır. Batman tarafından tek tük geldiler. İşte Bingöl'den geldiler.

R2. Burda ayrı bir dünyamız vardı, apayrı bir dünyamız vardı, komşuluk ilişkileri, insanlık ilişkileri, herkes duyarlıydı, insanca bir yaşam vardı, herkesin aşısı birdi, saygı sevgi vardı, herkesin gücü burda birdi, herkes birbirini tanırdı, kenetlenme vardı, tek vücut olma vardı.

R3. Oradaki insanlarda böyle bir bilinç var, kesinlikle farkındalar, yani bir yoksulluk kimliği var, ama bu yoksulluk kimliğini pekiştiren bazı şeyler var, o da kollektif yaşam, yani yoksulluğuna razı olan bir tabaka var orada, yani biz belki şunu diyemeyiz yani tamamen kendini yoksul olarak da ifade etmiyor, yer yer aslında yoksulluk ve zenginlik kavramları biraz değişkendir yani. Mesela onlar biraz daha bunlara çok da modern tabirlerle yaklaşmıyorlar, yani, mesela sokağın kullanılmasını bir zenginlik olarak ifade edebiliyorlar, komşuluk haklarının kullanılmasını bir zenginlik olarak ifade edebiliyorlar, güveni mesela yine aynı şekilde. Yani modern yaşama karşı bir korku var onu çok net insan hissediyor yani konuştuğun zaman.

R4. Gidecek biryerimiz yok, yeni bir ev tutacak paramız yok, yoksuluz, evimizi biz içindeyken yıksınlar, bizi de içine gömsünler, burayı bırakıp gitsek biz zaten ölmüşüz.

R5. Oryıl'ın oraya taşındık. Yeni bir hayata itildik, vahşi bir hayata. Burası güzeldi, burası hiç olmazsa günde 15-20 liraya geçimimiz olurdu, şimdi orada günde altmış yetmiş lira. Hava parasıdır yok kapıcı parasıdır, su parasıdır, şu bu parasıdır... Yani vahşi bir hayat, vahşiler içindir, yani bizim için, bizim gibi kendini kaybetmeyen, kul hakkı ve haram yemeyen, ihale gözetmeyen için vahşidir, o manaya geliyor.

R6. Şimdi bugün 2+1 bir toplu konutun, bir dairenin bitene kadar maliyeti, anahtar teslim, 43 bin lira paradır, 43 bin lira. Bize satıyorlar 145 bin liraya 150 bin liraya. Yav bunun yani ismi üzerinde sosyal konutlar, yani sosyal denilince benden kar payı almamalıdır, hadi alsın kar payı alsın 5-10 bin lira alsın, 43 bin liraya mal olmuş 60 bin liraya versin, yok 150 bin lira, onu da alamadık.

R7. Bir de orası... sana yemin ederim biz sadece yazın 20-25 gün fındığa gidiyorduk Ordu'ya, kış oluyordu kışlık erzağımızı da alıp evde oturuyorduk. Bütün kışımızı 20 günde kazanıyorduk. Yani orada biz kira vermiyorduk, ev bizimdi, herşey bizimdi, kafamız kulağımız rahattı. Şimdi Senenin 12 ayı çalışıyoruz çalışıyoruz, hiç birşey yok. *Gülüyor*. Doğal gazdır, elektriktir, sudur, odur, budur elde hiç birşey yok. Hayat kolaydı yani. Sana bir şey söyleyem mi abi; ben 10 gün kahvede çalışıyordum, yani böyle 100-150 milyon para cebimde oluyordu, iki ay çalışmıyordum, o iki ay o para hiç bitmiyordu, bir haftada kazandığım para yirmi günde bitmiyordu, yiyordun yiyordun bitmiyordu. Orda hayat vardı yani, şimdi yüz lira cebimize koyuyoruz bir hafta olmadan bakıyoruz bitmiş.

R8. Bana sorarsan orada gençlere bir bok olmaz. Ama orda doğmuş büyümüş ihtiyaçlara olur. Yaşlı bir insanı yerinden yurdundan söküp attığın zaman ölümü hızlanır onun. Oraya gelip gözü dolan adamlar var. Yani yapacak çok da fazla bir şey yok. Bu sadece ekonomiyle, şunla bununla bağdaştırılmadan devam etmesi gereken bir süreç. Artık orada dar sokaklara izin vermiyorlar.

R9. Biz mesela şöyle bir kavram kullanıyoruz; mülkiyet el değiştirirken çok şey oluyor. Ve mülkiyet zora dayalı olarak el değiştiriliyor. Mesela biz bunu çok tartıştık kendi aramızda. Gerçekten de yıkıyor ve onun oluyor. Mesela şu anda yaptıkları evler, 30 milyara alıyor, 40 milyara alıyor, ama yaptığı evi 1 trilyona satacak, yani turistik caddesi var mesela surlara bakıyor, Sur'un rant açısından en verimli alanı diyebiliriz mesela.

R10. Orada köklü olarak değiştirilen bazı şeyler var yani mesela ben orada diyelim ki şu anda yeni yapılan bir yapının arazisini ya da arsasını satan bir adam, yani oradaki belki restoran olabilir orası yani butik otel olur ya da başka bir şey olur, yani belki o insan oraya giremeyecektir mesela. Yani yaşadığı yerden bu kadar uzaklaştırılan bir sistemle karşı karşıyayız yani.

R11. Orada işte ne yapıyor diyelim ki rızaya dayalı yapmaya çalışıyor ilk etapta, işte TOKİ sözleşme yapıyor işte, yurttaş da yani öncelikle şunu söylüyor TOKİ'nin kendisi bile tehdit ediyor, yani TOKİ'nin kendisi bile bir tehdit dili kullanıyor, eğer o olmazsa bu sefer zor aygıtları devreye giriyor.

R12. Geçenlerde bütçe konuşmasında bakan bey Ulu Cami'nin bu kapağını yapmış ya onu gösteriyordu, daha evvel böyleydi şimdi böyle olmuş. Hani bizim çiçek belediyesi her hafta çiçekleri ekiyor, değiştiriyor ya o misal. Yav sen binlerce kişiyi göç ettiriyorsun ondan bahsetmiyorsun, sen bir kapak değiştirmişsin gelip onu söylüyorsun. Onu da kıran sensin. Senin panzerinle, TOMA'larınla, arabalarınla kırılmış. Ondan sonra adamın karnı açtır, açlıktan karnı büzülmüş, aç kalan adama ayran içirsen ekşi ayran ne olur adam şişer. Bir sürü eksikler var, gitmişler 9 milyon dolar, 13 milyon dolar çiçeğe vermişler: çiçek ihalesi. Saçmalığa bak, böyle saçmalık olur mu (sesi yükseliyor). Bana nesi çiçekten, karanfilden, yok İstanbul şirkettir, Ağaoğludur yok bilmem nedir.

R13. Yerel Mühendis: Ben de ona Sur'u nasıl katlettiğiniz anlatıyordum.

TOKİ Mühendis: Valla Sur'u katletmedik Sur zaten hallolmuştu. Biz toparlamaya çalışıyoruz.

Yerel Mühendis: Ama yanlış bir toparlama.

TOKİ Mühendis: Doğrusu ne abi?

Yerel Mühendis: Doğrusu abi olduğu gibi bize bıraksaydınız biz yeniden yapardık.

TOKİ Mühendis: Fernand Braudel'i tanırsın. Onun şehircilikle ilgili kitapları var, akdeniz ile ilgili.

Yerel Mühendis: Biz Toledo olmasını istemiyoruz yani abi.

TOKİ Mühendis: Orada adını ezberledim öğrendim, orada artık kuşe'lere izin vermiyorlar.

Yerel Mühendis: Ne abi?

TOKİ Mühendis: Kuşe.

Yerel Mühendis: *Küçe* abi *Küçe*. *Küçe*'yi öğrenmişsin ama yanlış öğrenmişsin.

TOKİ Mühendis: Yani burda o dar sokağın bir adı var, küşe küçe artık ne bilim. Yani ben, benim, karşılığında bir adı yok onun. 'Kedi yolu' diyorum ona ben. Ne diyim yani bende bir karşılığı yok.

R14. Mesela orada anıt bina olarak saklanmış bir bina var, baktığın zaman hiç birşey ifade etmiyor bana. Konya-Meram'ı biliyor musun, işte projeyi bitirdiğimizde oralar gibi görünecek.

R15. Bütün bu binaları beyaza boyadılar, apartmanının, dükkanının dışını beyaza boyamak zorundasın. Binaları beyaza boyamayı biz de biliyorduk ama yapmadık, yani Diyarbakır çölün ortasında bir yer, tozu var toprağı var, şimdi, şekilli görünüyor, iki yıl sonra gel bak bu binaların hepsi yine toz topraktır.

R16. Yani TOKİ yörenin ya da yerelin hiçbir özelliğini karşılamayan yapılar yapıyor. İşte tektip yapılar, işte özellikle sosyal ilişkileri kesen, planlamalar projeler. Onun dışında hiç bir şekilde, mesela Diyarbakır mimarisi göremezsin, yaptığı yapıda özgün mimari göremezsin, hiç bir şekilde o yapılmıyor. Yani 'tektipleştirme'. İşte şu an Sur'da da TOKİ yapıyor, orada da, bizim özellikle eski Diyarbakır eviyle alakası olmayan, tamamen kendine göre, Ankara'da oturulup çizilen projeler doğrultusunda şu an uygulama yapılıyor. Şimdi biz mesela bir rapor hazırladık, TMMOB olarak, ilk günden beridir biz diyoruz ki, Sur'da yapılan yapılar, özellikle koruma amaçlı imar planında, bizim belediyeler döneminde hazırlanmış, o teknik özellikleri barındırması lazım.

R17. Sokağa çıkma yasaklarının başladığı tarih, 2 aralık 2015. Bu tarihten itibaren, yani mekansal olarak orda bir dönüşüm var, işte kentsel dönüşüm projeleriyle birlikte. Oranın mesela orada yaşayan yani o tarihi mekanın üzerinde yaşayan insanların, etnik kimliği çok önemli, politik kimliği çok önemli, sınıfsal kimliği çok önemli. Çünkü mesela Sur'a baktığımız zaman bir militarizasyondan öte, bir faşizm var mesela, mekansal kırılma, demografik bölünmeler parçalanmalar var, yer değiştirmeler var. Uluslararası hukukta etnik bir grubun yaşadığı bir mekansal alanı tümünden yıktığınız zaman bu aynı zamanda etnik bir soykırımdır, yani böyle bir karşılığı var. O mahallelerde oturanlara baktığın zaman, şimdi, çoğu 90'lı yıllarda gelmiş ve bu süreçte kırsal Kürt kimliğini kentte korumuş bir kesim var. Bunu gözardı ederek Sur'daki dönüşümü anlayamayız. Bu coğrafyalarda daha önce böyle bir şeyle karşılaşmamıştık. Devletin güvenlik politikaları ekseninde bir kentsel dönüşüm var, bu coğrafyalarda daha önce böyle bir şeyle karşılaşmamıştık. Bu anlamda Sur'daki kentsel dönüşüm politik bir meseledir, devletin bölgedeki güvenlik politikaları çerçevesinde Sur'a özel bir yönelimi var.

R18. Ben bu konunun, hani bu coğrafyada kentsel dönüşüm meselesinin, özellikle bu kent savaşlarıyla beraber özgün bir konu olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Mesela diyelim ki Karadeniz'deki bir dönüşüm gibi gitmiyor. Mesela biz bunu batıdan gelen arkadaşlarla tartıştık, anlattık, yani dedik ki buradaki kentsel dönüşüm öyle oradaki gibi işlemiyor. Yani düşün ya mesela o bir yurttışa ait bir ev var, bir mülkiyet var, onu bile savunurken bu benimdir demekte bile o kadar zorlanıyor ki. Ne konumuna düşüyor işte terör, terörist, işte hapisle tehdit ediliyor. Yani şimdi bu genelleştirici bir yaklaşım. Bu coğrafyadaki insanların mülkiyet hakkı bile savunulamıyor. Burada kentsel dönüşüm hem mekanın kendisine hem de bu mekan üzerinde yaşayan insanlara dönük bir cezalandırma politikası olarak gerçekleşiyor.

R19. Şimdi 94'te evimiz burdaydı, gece 2.30'ta kapı çalındı, rak rak rak! Ben hemen uyandım, çocuklara dedim bu misafir işi değil, polistir, hemen kalkın üstünüzü giyin, bunlarda namahremlik yok. Hazırlandık neyse, ben gittim kapıyı açmamla nasıl üzerime çullandılar ben anlayamadım. Hemen arkadan önden nasıl kelepçe yaptılar anlamadım, bizim dama çıkmışlar ellerinde projektör, caminin damına çıkmışlar. Neyse evi aradılar, eve girecekler ayakkabıyan ben karşı geldim. Dedim ayakkabıyla benim çulumla basmayın, fakir çulu olabilir ama, namuslu çuludur. Benim büyüklerim burda namaz kılıyorlar, ayakkabınız pistir. Dedi “siz ermenisiniz ne namazı ulan!” Neyse evi aradılar, beni dışarı çıkardılar, tekim, iki minibüs, dört tane taksi, bir sürü araba beni götürdüler. 42 gün gözaltında kaldım sabah akşam fasıl her gün dayak dayak dayak. En sonunda biri dedi ki siz ermenisiniz. Dedim ben ermeni değilim, ben müslümanım. Dedi peki müslümanlığın şartı kaçtır? Dedim bana mı kaçtır, bir tokat vurdu bana dedi senden başka kimse mi var. Dedim üçtür. Ya dedi ben demedim mi siz ermenisiniz, islamın şartını bile bilmiyorsunuz. Dedim bana üçtür. Dedi peki herkese beştir neden sana üçtür, senin ne özelliğin var? Tabi o sırada hep dayak, gözlerim kapalı, anadan doğma çırılçıplak. Dedim ben yoksul bir adamım hac ile zekat benden düşer, üç kalır. O üç beş dakika böyle düşündü düşündü. Sonra bana bir sigara verdi dedi al bu sigarayı

iç. İki gün beni dayağa çekmediler.

R20. Bir seneden fazladır gidemiyorum oraya. Arda bir rüyama geli, aklıma geli. Yav şimdi girmekte bir sıkıntı yok ama yav şimdi girsem polis yakalasa ne cevap verecem? İşin yoksa uğraş dur. Orası bizim mahalledir, öyle girmek kolaydır ha bir dakkalık bir şeydir. Aha bu Sur'un içinde dolan in aşağı kendine gez. Polisler yakaladığı zaman ama al sana ceza. Seninle yanlışlıkla uğraşsa, diyor yasaklı bölge, teröristsin, vurarım.

R21. Allah haklarını bırakmasın abi, bu kadar garibanı yetimi böyle sokağa attılar. Millet diyor kendi evimi ben yapayım diyor sen yapamazsın, izin vermiyor. Kamulaştırma. Bu evlerin hepsi tarihi. 150 yıllıktır. Tescilli mesela nasıl tescilli. Bir şekilde karışılmamış, değiştirilmemiş, bu karşıdaki ev yok mu, değişmemiş, hep tarihi taşlardır. Ama bu eve baksan mesela taşlar hep değişmiş. Valla şu an tek bildiğimiz şey devlet kendi çıkarı için millete, buradaki insanlara zulüm ediyor yani. Demek ki hiç allah korkusu yok bunlarda. Diyor ki millet birlikte yaşamasın yani. Sana birşey söyleyeyim burdan şu cadde başına kadar burada en az ikiyüz taneden fazla ev vardı. Bir sırada yüz tane ev vardı. Bu tarafta vardı. Şu tarafta vardı. Birlikte yaşıyorduk yani, şimdi diyor ki dağılın herbiriniz bir tarafa gidin. Şu an ona bile engel oluyor devlet. Çıkardılar TOKİ'yi çıkardılar. Bir şey diyeyim abi, biz gittik TOKİ'yi kendimiz de gördük, bu 500 evlerin ordaki var ya. Yemin ederim oradaki hayat değil. Şimdi burada bile ev yapıyorlar burdaki hayat değil. Yav ev yapmışlar 40-50 tane ev yapmışlar diyorlar ki tanesi 300-500 bin, hele de girsene oturmazsın yani. Biz gittik gördük abi. Bir oda, bir oda yanda, bir tuvalet bir banyo, mutfak da yok ha koridorun ortasında yani. Salonun ortasında. Valla kim milletin hayatıyla öyle oynuyor, allah onların belasını versin. He vallahi Allah onların belasını da verecek, he öyle bir ton milletin hayatıyla oynuyorlar. Benim evim ha burasıdır bak yıkılmış, gitmiyorum, bak burdayım. Yoksa bu mahalleyi yıkmak öyle kolay mı. Çok az kısmı öyle sonradan para gördüler

evlerini verdiler, çoğu insan burdan çıkmadı yani. Sonra ne oldu 500 milyarlık evi 30 milyara indirdiler. Onu da yapamadılar, baktılar herkes kabul etmedi, kalktılar bu sefer de bu şeyi çıkardılar, onu bunu öldürdüler, o çıktı bu çıktı savaş çıktı, millet kendi evinde rahattı, diyor çıkmazsan öldürürüz. alıyorlar götürüyorlar. Bir kişi iki kişi değil yani. Devletin yaptığı şey şu anda şudur kendine para kazandırıyor bizi borçlandırıyor, yaptığı şey budur yani. Vergiyi atıyor şunu atıyor bunu atıyor para kazanıyor.

R22. Şu anda beş kişi bir araya gelsen tutukluyor yani. Yani biz akşam burada beş kişi otursak bizim hepimizi terörist edecekler. Ne yapmışız yani. Ceza veriyor, bilmem ne yapıyor. İnsanı tahrik ediyor, diyor git suç işle. Devletin yaptığı şey budur biliyorsun abi. İnsanlara diyor git suç işleyin yani, başka birşey yapmayın. O fırsatı veriyor insana başka bir fırsat vermiyor. Yazıktır abi valla o kadar insanın ahını aldılar, o kadar insan çoluk çocuk perişan oldu. He valla bir sürü insan.

B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Şu anda hangi mahallede yaşıyorsunuz?

Daha önce hangi mahallede yaşıyordunuz?

Eğer evinizi değiştirdiyseniz nedenleri nelerdir?

Eğer evinizi değiştirmediyse nedenleri nelerdir?

Düzenli bir işiniz var mı, ne sıklıkta çalışıyorsunuz,?

Kentsel dönüşümden her hangi bir şekilde etkilendiniz mi?

Kentsel dönüşüm hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir?

Kamulaştırma hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir?

Eski eviniz kamulaştırma kapsamına girdi mi?

Kentsel dönüşümden önce mahallenizde gündelik hayatınız nasıl geçiyordu?

Eski mahallenizin evinizin sizin hayatınızdaki yeri nedir?

Eski mahallenizi ve hayatınızı düşündüğünüzde neler hissediyorsunuz?

Mahallenizi değiştirdikten sonra hayatınız ne ölçüde değişti?

Şu anda yaşadığınız ev kira mı yoksa size mi ait?

Eğer size ait ise evi ne zaman hangi koşullarda aldınız veya yaptınız?

Eğer değil ise ne kadar kira ödüyorsunuz?

Daha önce veya şu anda yaşadığınız evin belgeleri ve tapusu var mıydı?

Eski mahallenizde ne zaman yaşamaya başladınız?

Eski evinizden çıkmanıza neler sebep oldu?

Eğer imkanınız olsaydı eski mahallenize dönmek ister miydiniz? Neden?

Eski mahallenizde komşularınızla ve diğer mahalle sakinleriyle ilişkileriniz nasıldı?

Şu anda yaşadığınız eviniz ve mahalleniz hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Yeni mahallenizde komşularınızla ve mahalle sakinleriyle ilişkileriniz nasıl?

Mahallenizi değiştirdikten sonra gündelik hayatınız farklılaştı mı?

Mahallenizi değiştirdikten sonra hayatınıza bir ek harcama girdi mi?

C. ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
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11 ARALIK 2018

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Çağatay TOPAL

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız Diren TAŞ'ın "Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Etkileri: Diyarbakır Örneği Etnografik Olay İncelemesi" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2018-SOS-205 protokol numarası ile araştırma yapması onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımla bilgilerinize sunarım.

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Başkan

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Üye

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D. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TRKE ZET

Kentsel dnm son yirmi yıl ierisinde Trkiye'nin bir ok kentinde belirli llerde karımıza ıkan ve farklı boyutlarıyla tartıılan nemli bir olgudur. Resmi rakamlara gre sadece 2003-2010 yılları arasında “kentsel yenileme/ gecekondu dnm projeleri” adı altında 20 kentte 248 farklı proje yrrlge konulmutur. Bu projelerin İstanbul, Ankara ve İzmir gibi lkenin byk kentlerinde uygulananları kamuoyu ve farklı bir ok kesim tarafından eitli eletirilerin konusu olmu, orta ve kk lekli ehirlerde uygulananları ise oėu zaman dikkatlerden uzak kalmıtır. Bu tez, Diyarbakır'ın tarihi merkezi olan *Surii* blgesinde gerekletirilen kentsel dnmn analizi erevesinde, mekanın dntrlmesinin Trkiye'de aldıėı farklı ehreleri eletirel bir perspektif ile tartımaktadır.

“Diyarbakır Alipaa ve Lalebey Mahallesi Kentsel Yenileme (Gecekondu Dnm) Projesi” ilk olarak TOKİ (Toplu Konut İdaresi) ve Diyarbakır Valiliėi arasında 31.10.2008 tarihinde imzalanan protokol ile yrrlge konulmutur. Proje, ncelikli olarak bu mahallelerde planlanan turistik rezidanslar, butik oteller ve yeil alanların insası iin 1596 yapının yıkımını ve burada halihazırda yaayan insanların ise kentin uzak eperinde yapılacak olan toplu konutlara taınmasını ngrmtur. Sz konusu proje ve daha sonraki versiyonları yerel ynetimlerin, mahalle sakinlerinin ve sivil toplum kurulularının ciddi itirazları ile karılamıtır. Bu itirazlar kısmi olarak sonu vermi ve ilenin tarihi ve kltrel sit alanı olması gz nnde bulundurularak kentsel koruma planlı imar planının hazırlanması dahilinde bir ek protokoln yrrlge girmesini saėlamıtır. Ancak, 22.10.2012 tarihinde bakanlar kurulundan geen 6306 tarihli karar ile bu sefer btn *Surii* blgesi “Riskli Alanların Kentsel Dnm” kapsamına alınmıtır. *Surii*'nde uygulanan kentsel dnm projesi, Krt sorununa dair srdrlen “zm srecinin” bitmesiyle birlikte ortaya ıkan atımalı sre sonrasında farklı bir boyut almıtır. 21.03.2016 tarihinde bakanlar kurulunca alınan 8659 nolu karar ile birlikte “Milli Mdafaa Mkellefiyeti Kanunu” uyarınca

uygulanacak olan kentsel dönüşüm kapsamında *Suriçi*'nde bulunan 7714 yapının 6292'sine hazine tarafından acele kamulaştırma yoluyla el konulmuştur (TMMOB 2017). 12.04.2017 tarihinde Diyarbakır Valiliği, Alipaşa ve Lalebey mahallesinin kentsel dönüşüm kapsamı boşaltılmasını ve yıkımını ilan etmiştir. Bu tez, *Suriçi* bölgesinde uygulanan kentsel dönüşümün bu son aşamasının farklı boyutlarını, uygulamalarını ve etkilerini sahada yapılan görüşmeler ve katılımcı gözlemler yoluyla analiz ederek neoliberal dönemde mekanın dönüşümünün devlet açısından nasıl hem ekonomik hem de politik bir odak haline geldiğini çerçevelemektedir.

Bu çalışma *Suriçi*'nde uygulanan kentsel dönüşümü gerek literatürde mevcut bulunan, gerekse saha araştırması süresince toplanan nitel ve nicel verilerin analizi doğrultusunda incelemektedir. Olgunun çoklu boyutlarını içerebilmek için sahada yapılan görüşmeler farklı arka planlara ve pozisyonlara sahip çeşitli gruplarla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışma, özel olarak, projede çalışan TOKİ mühendislerini, aracı firma müteahhitlerini, sivil toplum örgütlerini ve çeşitli profillerdeki mahalle sakinlerini yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler aracılığıyla araştırmaya dahil etmiştir. Bu açıdan çalışma kentsel dönüşüm sürecinde uygulayıcılar, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve mahalle sakinleri arasındaki yoğun ve çoğu zaman çatışmalı ilişkileri içermesi bakımından kapsayıcıdır. Buna ek olarak sahada yapılan katılımcı gözlemler sırasında toplanan görsel materyal çalışmanın amaç ve kapsamı doğrultusunda yeri geldikçe kullanılmıştır.

Kentsel mekanın dönüşümü teorik alanda sıklıkla tartışılan bir olgudur ve bu tartışmalar çeşitli disiplinlerden farklı pozisyonlar içermektedir. Tezin literatür incelemesi bölümü, kentsel dönüşüm projelerinin farklı yönlerini daha iyi anlayabilmek için literatürdeki eleştirel bakış açılarını gözden geçirmektedir. Eleştirel perspektifler, mekanın üretimine ekonomik ve politik temeller ve bu alanların birbirleriyle ilişkileri dahilinde yaklaşılması gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır (Harvey, 1973, 1989; Castells, 1972; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1989; Brenner & Elden, 2009). Bu anlamda, eleştirel perspektifler, temelde ana akım şehir teorisi olarak adlandırılan ve şehirlerin mevcut durumunu bürokratik rasyonellik veya ekonomik verimlilik ifadesi olarak tartışan

yaklaşımlardan ayrılır (Park, 1915; Wirth, 1938; Park et al., 1967). Kentin bir teknik müdahalenin konusu olduğu düşüncesine dayanan bu yaklaşımlar esasen kurumsal aparatların veya sistemlerin kentlere müdahalesini ilerleme ve gelişme lehine meşrulaştırmaktadır. Bu ilerici şablona dayanarak, bu yaklaşımlar, kentsel mekan üretimindeki sosyal ilişkilerin karmaşıklığını göz ardı eden zayıf analizler üretmektedir. Diğer bir yandan, bu çalışmanın amacı olgunun karmaşıklığını takip ederek konuyla ilgili farklı bakış açıları geliştirmek olduğu için, Diyarbakır'daki kentsel dönüşümü eleştirel yaklaşımları kullanarak bir mekan üretimi olarak analiz etmeyi tercih ediyorum.

Kentsel mekanın üretimine/dönüşümüne eleştirel yaklaşım, kentler içerisi ve arasındaki güç ilişkilerini, eşitsizlikleri, adaletsizlikleri ve dengesiz gelişmeleri göz önünde bulundurarak, kentsel alanın “politik ve ideolojik olarak aracılık eden, sosyal olarak tartışmalı ve bu nedenle farklı yönlendirilebilir” yapısını vurgulamaktadır (Brenner 2009). Bu bağlamda, kent mekanın sürekli olarak (yeniden) inşasında tarihsel olarak spesifik sosyal güç ilişkilerinin belirleyici yönleri olgunun analizine temel oluşturmaktadır. Bu temel yaklaşım doğrultusunda bu çalışma *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümü, sermaye ve güç ilişkilerinin tarihsel ve mekansal olarak oluşturduğu yapı ve kurumların içerisine yerleştirerek tartışmaktadır.

20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında yaygın yapısal değişiklikler dünya ölçeğindeki ekonomik, idari ve sosyo-mekansal yapılandırmalarla ilgili radikal dönüşümleri tetiklemiştir. Bu duruma paralel olarak, Türkiye ekonomisinin 1980'lerde bir dizi ardışık yasayla neoliberalleşmesi, siyasi merkezin yerel devlet kurumları ve yerel seçkinlerle ilişkilerini büyük ölçüde değiştirmiştir (Yüksel, 2011; Şenses 2012). Serbest ekonomiye bu yönlü bir geçiş, ülkenin güneydoğusunda, 1980'lerin sonunda ve 1990'ların başında yaşanan çatışmalı dönemle çakışmıştır (Barkey & Fuller, 1998; Olson, 1996; Bozarslan, 2000; İbrahim & Gürbey, 2000). Yapılan birçok akademik çalışma, bu bölgelere ilişkin politik, ekonomik ve mekansal stratejilerin bölgede yaşayan Kürt nüfusa yönelik özümseyici ve dışlayıcı politikalar etrafında geliştiğini göstermektedir (Bozarslan, 2001;

Kirişci & Winrow, 1997; Güneş & Zeydanlıoğlu, 2014). Bu nedenle, Türkiye'de neoliberalleşme süreci ve Kürt meselesine yönelik politikalar eş zamanlı bir biçimde gelişmiştir (Saraçoğlu, 2011; Yüksel, 2011). Bu bağlamda, 1980'lerde ve 1990'larda mekansal devlet stratejileri Türkiye'nin güneydoğusunun hem maddi hem de söylemsel olarak “az gelişmiş bir bölge” ve “terör bölgesi” olarak inşasına hizmet etmiştir (Yeğen, 1996, 2009; Jongerden, 2007). Bu dönemde, bir yandan bölgenin “az gelişmiş” koşullarını merkezine alan bölgesel kalkınma programları ile ekonomik ve sosyal faaliyetlerin planlanması ve koordinasyonu yapılırken (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2005; Özok-Gündoğan, 2005; Harris, 2008, 2012), diğer yandan da bölgenin demografik yapısına nüfus hareketleri ve zorla göç yoluyla müdahale edilmiştir (Ayata & Yüksek, 2005; Çelik, 2005; Kurban et al., 2007). Bu politikalar, Türkiye'nin güneydoğusunda belirli türde bir neo-liberalizmin yerelleşmesinde büyük rol oynamıştır (Yüksel, 2011, 2013; Gambetti & Jongerden 2015).

Yüzyılın başlarında, Türkiye, yeni ortaya çıkan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) hegemonyası altında, kentsel yönetimle ilgili olarak başka bir büyük yapısal değişikliğe tanık oldu. Yapılan bir çok araştırma, Türkiye'de 2000'li yıllarda ortaya çıkan kentsel dönüşüm fenomeninin, kent yönetiminde ve konut politikalarında popülist yaklaşımlardan neo-liberal yaklaşımlara radikal geçişle ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011). Bu çalışmalar, 2000'li yıllarda neo-liberalizmin yeni bir kentsel rejim oluşturduğunu belirtmekte ve bu kapsamda kentsel dönüşüm projelerini, neoliberal sistemin gayri resmi imar bölgeleri ve şehir içi gecekondu bölgeleri gibi kentsel alanların metalaştırılmasını amaçlayan ana mekanizmalar olarak tartışmaktadır. Bu perspektiflerin birçoğu kentsel dönüşüm projelerini, geç kapitalizm döneminde devletin mekanın organizasyonuna ilişkin fonksiyon ve pozisyonunun yeniden ölçeklenmesiyle bağlantılı olarak genellikle ekonomik bir çerçeve içerisinde ele almıştır. Bu yaklaşımlar kentsel dönüşümün aynı zamanda küresel ölçekli neoliberal kurulumlara içkin olduğunu vurgulamaktadır.

“Saf piyasa mantığı lehine kolektif yapıları tahrip etmek için uygulanan bir program” (Bourdieu, 1998, p.1) şeklinde tanımlanabilecek olan neo-liberalizm, bir çok araştırmacı tarafından kentsel mekanın örgütlenmesinde devletin gücünün / işlevinin ve konumunun yeniden ölçeklenmesini vurgulamak için teorik bir çerçeve olarak kullanılır (Brenner, 2015; Brenner et al., 2009; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Peck et al., 2009). Neoliberalleşme, bu anlamda, dünyadaki yerler ve bölgeler arasında jeo-kurumsal farklılaşmayı üreten düzenleyici bir yeniden yapılandırma biçimine işaret eder. Bu anlamda neo-liberalizm, mekansal müdahaleler yoluyla gelişir. Neoliberal mekan konfigürasyonunu daha önceki ekonomik mekansal çerçevelerden ayıran şey, kentsel politikaların, çeşitli sosyo-ekonomik ve politik kurulumlara müdahalenin merkezi bir aracı haline gelmesidir. Bu tezin kent literatürüne yaptığı en önemli katkılardan biri, kentsel dönüşüm süreçlerinin incelenmesinde bu yapıların spesifik tarihsel konjonktürlerle iç içe geçen boyutlarının incelenmesidir.

Suriçi'ndeki kentsel dönüşüm projesi bu genel çerçevelerden doğmuştur, ancak neoliberal süreçler ülkenin farklı coğrafyalarında farklı ölçeklerde sonuçlar yaratarak gelişir. *Suriçi* bölgesinde uygulanan kentsel dönüşümün özgün yapısı, diğer örneklerin çoğundan farklı olarak, politik ve ideolojik temellerin fenomenin diğer boyutları üzerindeki belirleyici etkilerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu örnek olayın kapsamlı incelemesi, mekanın sosyal ve toplumsal üretimindeki politik özelliklerin öne çıkan yapısını vurgulamaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları, *Suriçi*'ndeki mekan üretiminin, sermaye ilişkileri tarafından ekonomik temelde belirlenmesinin yanı sıra, aynı zamanda fenomenin tarihsel konjonktürlerine özgü karmaşık iktidar ilişkileri tarafından politik olarak da belirlendiğini kanıtlamaktadır.

Bu tezin üçüncü bölümü bu belirlenimlerin kavranabilmesi açısından Diyarbakır'ın tarihsel, siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik altyapısını dört alt başlık şeklinde incelemektedir. İlk altbaşlık şehrin erken dönem kurulumlarını belirli bir heterojenliği barındırması açısından ele almaktadır. Yaklaşık 5.000 yıllık tarihiyle şehrin antik çekirdeği olan *Suriçi*, Med, Asur, Pers, Roma ve Osmanlı gibi bir çok imparatorluğun etkilerini

tarihsel ve mimari dokusu dahilinde yansıtmaktadır. *Suriçi*, bu tarihsel kurulumları ve farklı coğrafyaları birbirine bağlayan yapısıyla bir çok farklı din, dil, etnisite ve kültüre sahip grupların bir arada yaşadığı bir merkez olma özelliğini 20. yüzyılın başlarına kadar büyük ölçüde korumuştur. Söz konusu bu heterojenliğin kırılma noktaları olarak 1915'te gayri müslim popülasyona yönelik uygulanan tehcir politikaları, 1925 yılında Şeyh Said önderliğindeki Kürt isyanının bastırılması ve cumhuriyetin 1950'lere kadar süren mekansal homojenleştirme stratejileri öne çıkmaktadır.

Bu bölümün ikinci alt başlığı, 1960-1980 arasındaki dönemde, Diyarbakır'ın ülke genelinde mobilize olan Kürt yanlısı toplumsal hareketlerin odağı haline geldiğini tartışmaktadır. 1971 ve 1980 askeri darbeleri ve bu süreçlerde Diyarbakır Cezaevi'nde yaşananlar bir çok fraksiyon halinde örgütlenen bu toplumsal hareketlerin kırılma ve aynı zamanda radikalleşme momentleri olarak belirlemektedir (Gunes & Zeydanlioglu, 2014; Fırat & Topaloğlu, 2012; Aydın, 2013). Örneğin, çok sayıda mahkum, bağımsız bir Kürt devleti kurmak amacıyla 1984'te silahlı bir mücadele başlatan Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) 'nin saflarına katılmaya devam etti. Bu şartlar altında 1990'larda, özellikle güneydoğunun kırsal bölgelerinde, devlet güçleri ile PKK arasında ciddi çatışmalar yaşandı (Olson, 1996; Bozarslan, 2000; Gürbey, 1996; Ibrahim ve Gürbey, 2000). Resmi rakamlarına göre, 1999 sonunda, güneydoğudaki 3,165 kırsal yerleşim yerinden güvenlik güçleri tarafından toplam 378.000 kişi 'tahliye' edildi, yapılan araştırmalarda ise zorla yerinden edilen toplam Kürt nüfusun 2,5 ile 4 Milyon arasında olduğu tahmin ediliyor (Ayata & Yüksek, 2005; Çelik, 2005; Kurban et al., 2007). Bu sürecin bir sonucu olarak, Diyarbakır nüfusu 1990'lı yıllarda yaşanan göçler ile neredeyse iki katına çıktı (Erkan & Bağlı, 2005; Öztürk, 2013; HIC, 1996).

Bu bölümün üçüncü alt başlığında tartıştığım üzere, Türkiye'de neoliberal ekonomi politikalarına geçiş, ülkenin güneydoğusunda artan siyasi çatışmalarla çakışmıştır. Bu altbaşlık, Diyarbakır'ın kentleşme dinamiklerini, bölgenin bir dizi uzamsal strateji ve kurumsal çerçeve dahilinde hem maddi hem de söylemsel olarak “az gelişmiş bir bölge” ve “terör bölgesi” olarak yapılandırılmasıyla ilişkili olarak tartışmaktadır (Yeğen, 1996,

2009; Jongerden, 2007) . Bu dönemde bölgede uygulanan OHAL (Olağanüstü Hal) ve GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi) Diyarbakır'da belirli türde bir neoliberalizmin kurumsallaşmasında büyük rol oynamışlardır (Jacoby, 2005; Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2005; Harris, 2008, 2012; Özok-Gündoğan, 2005; Yüksel, 2011; Gambetti & Jongerden, 2015). Güneydoğudaki söz konusu bölgesel yapılandırmaların, özellikle 1990'lı yıllarda yaşanan zorunlu göç uygulamaları ile birlikte, Diyarbakır'da hızlı bir banliyöleşmenin ve *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümün en önemli yönlerinden biri olan kent yoksulluğunun ortaya çıkmasında temel neden olduğu görülmektedir.

Bu bölümün son alt başlığı, 2000'li yılları, Diyarbakır'da kentsel mekanın farklı aktörler tarafından uygulanan çekişmeli stratejilerin odağı haline geldiği bir süreç olarak tartışmaktadır. Bu dönemde Diyarbakır'da kent mekanı sadece merkezi yapıların değil yerel yönetimler yoluyla Kürt hareketinin de odağına girmiş, kent mekanı siyasal ve kültürel bir form olarak Kürt kimliğinin mobilizasyonu açısından dönüştürücü bir rol oynamıştır (Gambetti, 2009; Güvenç, 2011; Yüksel, 2011). Son olarak, 2015 yılında, Diyarbakır da dahil olmak üzere bölgedeki bazı belediyelerin yerel özerklik taleplerinin ardından artan siyasal tansiyon, kent merkezlerini de kapsayan silahlı çatışmalara dönüşmüş ve bir çok il ve ilçede sıkıyönetim, olağanüstü hal ve sokağa çıkma yasakları ilan edilmiştir. Bu alanlardan biri olan *Suriçi*'nde, en uzun üç aydan fazla süren askeri operasyonlar ve sokağa çıkma yasakları sonucunda nüfusun yarısından fazlası göç etmek zorunda bırakılmış ve ilçenin yarısı tamamen yıkılmıştır (OHCHR, 2017; Amnesty International, 2016; TMMOB, 2017,). Bu sürecin ardından bakanlar kurulu tarafından alınan kararla *Suriçi*'nin büyük bir kısmı kamulaştırılmış ve kentsel dönüşüm kapsamına alınmıştır.

Bu analizlerin ışığında, çalışmanın dördüncü bölümü, ülkedeki neoliberal yapılandırmalar bağlamında, güneydoğu bölgesi üzerindeki devlet politikaları tarafından büyük ölçüde şekillenen *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümün ekonomik ve sosyal yönlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bölüm öncelikle *Suriçi*'ndeki mahallelerin özellikle 1990'lı yıllarda yaşanan zorunlu göçlerle birlikte oluşan özgün yapısını sahada yapılan

görüşmeler eşliğinde tartışmaktadır. Yapılan analizler çoğu kırsal alanlardan göç etmiş olan mahalle sakinlerinin mekanı nasıl hayati ve kolektif bir alan olarak kurguladıklarını yansıtmaktadır. *Suriçi*'nin özgün mimari yapısı bu sosyal grupların gerek birbiriyle gerekse adapte olmaya çabaladıkları kent hayatıyla ilişkilenmelerinde temel bir faktör olarak belirginleşmiştir. Bu bölümün ikinci alt başlığı, mekanın mahalle sakinleri açısından bu vazgeçilmez yapısını kent yoksulluğu bağlamında tartışmaktadır. Bu kısım, *Suriçi* üzerine daha önce yapılan nicel çalışmalar dahilinde, çoğunluğu mutlak yoksulluk sınırının altında yaşayan mahalle sakinleri için yaşanan mekanın zamanla nasıl vazgeçilmez bir faktör haline geldiğini göstermektedir.

Bu açıdan, bu bölümünün üçüncü alt başlığının tartıştığı üzere, kentsel dönüşümün mahalle sakinleri üzerindeki en yıkıcı sosyal ve ekonomik etkisi yerinden edilme ve mülksüzleştirmedir. Sahada yapılan görüşmeler, kentin başka alanlarına zorla taşınmak zorunda bırakılan mahalle sakinlerinin sosyal ve ekonomik durumlarında görülen keskin düşüşü göstermektedir. Bu bölüm, ilçedeki kentsel dönüşümün önemli itici güçlerinden birinin şehrin iç alanlardaki değerli varlıklara kamulaştırma yoluyla el konulması olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu bölümdeki bulgular, *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel yenilemenin, şehrin merkezinde yer alan değerli alan mülkiyetlerinin şehir sakinlerinden alınarak devlet hazinesine devretmek ve dolayısıyla kentsel dönüşümün bu mülkleri resmi olarak yönetilebilir ticari varlıklara dönüştürmek için bir araç olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir. Bu bölüm ayrıca kentsel dönüşümün, çoğunluğu kayıtdışı istihdam alanlarında çalışan ve düşük gelir sahibi olan *Suriçi* sakinlerinin halihazırda var olan kentsel yoksulluk koşullarını yaygın bir yerinden etme süreciyle birlikte derinleştirdiğini göstermektedir. Diğer taraftan, kentsel dönüşüm çerçevesince uygulanan kamulaştırmaların ilçe sakinlerinin sosyo-ekonomik koşullarında çarpıcı bir düşüşe neden olduğu gösterilmektedir.

Bu bölümün dördüncü alt başlığının tartıştığı üzere, *Suriçi*'nde kentsel dönüşümün bir diğer sosyo-ekonomik yönü de, yerinden edilmeyi de içeren bir süreç olan soylulaştırmadır. Kentsel dönüşüm, çoğunlukla alt-sınıfa mensup mahalle sakinlerini

şehrin merkezindeki yaşam alanlarından, bu alanları üst sınıflara pazarlama amacı dahilinde uzaklaştırmıştır. *Suriçi*'ndeki alanlar sermaye birikimi için büyük bir mekanizmaya dönüşen kentsel rant ve daha fazla pazarlanabilir alan sağlamak için kentsel dönüşüm yoluyla devlet tarafından yeniden yapılandırılmıştır. Bu süreç yasal kurumların ve kolluk kuvvetlerinin kullanımını da içeren soylulaştırma operasyonları yoluyla şehrin merkezi çekirdeğini zora dayalı olarak yeniden şekillendirmiştir.

Bu bölümün son alt başlığı, *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümü ilçenin tarihi ve kültürel dokusu üzerindeki etkileri dahilinde analiz etmektedir. 2015 yılında, UNESCO tarafından “Diyarbakır Kalesi ve Hevsel Bahçeleri Kültürel Peyzajı Dünya Mirası” olarak tescillenen *Suriçi*'nin tarihsel dokusu gerek sokağa çıkma yasakları ve gerekse sonrasında gerçekleşen kentsel dönüşüm uygulamaları neticesinde büyük bir bozulmaya uğramıştır. Çalışmanın bu alt başlığı, TOKİ mühendisleri, aracı firma yetkilileri ve çeşitli sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla yapılan görüşmeler dahilinde kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarının ve proje dahilinde yapılan yenileme çalışmalarının bölgenin yerel karakteristik özelliklerine tezat ve tahrip edici yapısını tartışmaktadır.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümü, özgün bir örnek olarak *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümde devletin zora dayalı güçlerinin nasıl rol aldığını göstermektedir. Diğer pek çok kentsel dönüşüm örneğinde, devletin zora dayalı güçleri *Suriçi*'nde olduğu kadar görünür değildir. Bu sebepten, kentsel dönüşüm ile ilgili literatür, devletin genellikle ekonomik bir aktör ve bir meşruiyet kaynağı olarak rolünün altını çizerek kentsel dönüşümün ekonomik muhakemesine odaklanmıştır. *Suriçi* örneğinde ise, gerek sahada yapılan gözlemler ve gerekse mahalle sakinlerinin tanıklıklarından verilen örnekler, kentsel dönüşüm sürecinde devletin meşruiyetinin bölgede yaşanan uzun siyasi gerilimler sebebi ile tam olarak sağlanamadığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle *Suriçi* örneği, söylemsel devlet uygulamalarının yanında devletin zora dayalı güçlerinin bu tür kentsel dönüşüm projelerinde nasıl hayati bir önem taşıdığını göstermektedir. Bu bölüm, kentsel dönüşümün pratik uygulamalarının ve mahalle sakinlerinin genellikle zora dayalı bu uygulamalar karşısındaki tutumlarının kapsamlı bir analizine yer vermektedir.

Sahada yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler, *Suriçi* sakinlerinin, bölgede uygulanan askeri operasyonları ve kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarını birbirine sıkıca eklemiş etnik ve mekansal politikalar olarak değerlendirdiklerini göstermektedir. Bu algının önemli nedenlerinden biri, *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümün, özellikle 2015'den bu yana bölgede uygulanan güvenlik politikalarıyla paralel bir şekilde işlemesidir. Benzer bir şekilde, sahada yapılan katılımcı gözlemler, bölgede süregelen etnik ve politik kutuplaşmalar sonucunda kentsel dönüşümün belirli grupları dışlayan ve marjinalleştiren bir devlet mekanizması haline geldiğini göstermektedir.

Söz konusu güvenlik politikaları, kentsel dönüşümü kent mekanında eşzamanlı olarak uygulanan baskı ve gözetim mekanizmalarıyla birleştirmektedir. Bu mekanizmaların çok boyutlu yapısı, kent mekanında uygulandıkları biçimleri ile belirli temaların analizi yoluyla gösterilmiştir. Mekanın kısıtlanması ve kapatılması, *Suriçi*'nde sürdürülen kentsel dönüşümün önemli boyutlarıdır. Bu kısıtlama ve kapatma pratikleri kent mekanının belirli bölgelerini yasaklı alanlar olarak kodlayarak bu alanlara her türlü giriş ve çıkışı bariyerler, beton duvarlar, metal çitler ve benzeri somut materyaller yoluyla engellemektedir. Sahada yapılan gözlemler, *Suriçi*'nin aynı zamanda sürekli olarak yapılan video kayıtları, kimlik kontrolleri ve sorgulama gibi yöntemlerle sürekli olarak bir kontrole tabi tutulduğunu göstermektedir. Kent mekanında uygulanan bu kontrol aygıtlarının süreklileştiği en önemli biçimlerden biri bir çok yerde kurulan güvenlik noktaları ve merkezleridir. Beşinci bölümün birinci ve ikinci altbaşlıkları, sahada yapılan gözlemler, yapılan görüşmeler ve görsel materyaller aracılığı ile bu kontrol aygıtlarının kent mekanındaki uygulama biçimlerinin ilgili literatür eşliğinde ayrıntılı bir analizini sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın en önemli bulgularından biri kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarının güvenlik eksenli politikalarla iç içe geçen bu özgül yapısını ortaya koymasıdır. Bu bulgudan yola çıkarak, bu çalışma kentsel dönüşüm olgusunun, devletin muhtelif kurumları aracılığıyla uyguladığı çoklu tasarımların karmaşık yapısı içerisinde tekrar ele alınması gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

Beşinci bölümün son alt başlığı kentsel dönüşüm süresince *Suriçi*'nde uygulanan bu zora dayalı pratiklerin mahalle sakinleri üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu tümleşikliğin diğer bir boyutu da kentsel dönüşüm süresince kent mekanında uygulanan ağır yıkım sürecidir. Kentsel dönüşüm, *Suriçi*'nde yaşayan insanların, devlet kurumları tarafından yönlendirilen iktidar mekanizmalarını, iş makinalarının yıkıcı pratiği yoluyla deneyimlediği bir süreçtir. Kent mekanındaki kontrol mekanizmaları yasal yaptırımlarla donatılmış iş makinalarının yıkıcı gücü ile konsolide edilmektedir. Sahadaki araştırmam boyunca, kentsel dönüşüm alanlarında yaşayan ailelerle, evlerinin yıkılmasını izlemek zorunda kaldıkları yaşamlarının bu kritik anında bir çok gün geçirdim. Bu anlar çalışma açısından mahalle sakinlerinin baskıcı devlet aygıtları ile kentsel dönüşüm yoluyla yüz yüze geldikleri önemli momentlerdir. Bu yıkımlar sırasında yaptığım görüşmeler yıkıcı kentsel dönüşüm pratiklerinin mahalle sakinleri üzerinde ciddi bir rahtasızlık, keder ve umutsuzluğa yol açtığını göstermektedir. Bu görüşmeler aynı zamanda, bölgedeki kentsel dönüşüm süreçlerine eşlik eden zorlayıcı yasal ve söylemsel uygulamaların özellikle genç kuşak üzerindeki damgalayıcı ve dışlayıcı etkilerini göstermektedir. Bu açılardan bakıldığında, *Suriçi*'nde yaşayan insanlar kentsel dönüşümü yaşam alanlarını ayırtıran, kısıtlayan, ve tahrip eden baskıcı bir süreç olarak deneyimlemektedir.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma *Suriçi*'ndeki kentsel dönüşümü, mekansal değişimlerin ardındaki ideolojik ve hegemonik kurulumları ortaya çıkarabilecek bir bakış açısı ile tartışmaktadır. Bu özel durumda, kentsel dönüşüm projesi şehrin tarihi, politik ve sosyal kompozisyonlarına içkin olan yerel yapılara yönelik rövanşist bir mekanizma olarak işlevselleştirilmiştir. Bu anlamda, çalışma, mevcut koşullar altında politik ve ideolojik özelliklerin kentsel mekan üretimindeki önemli etkilerini göstererek mevcut literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Neoliberal hegemonya kentleri her ne kadar belirli bir ekonomik fayda, sermaye birikimi ve kentsel rant çerçevesinde dönüştürse de, mekanının dönüşümünü sadece bu ekonomik faktörlere indirgemek mümkün değildir. Kentsel dönüşümüne ekonomik yaklaşım, dünyadaki ve Türkiye'deki pek çok kentsel dönüşüm projesinde birincil olan

mülksüzleştirme yoluyla birikim motivasyonundan kaynaklanmaktadır. Öte yandan *Suriçi* örneği, kentsel dönüşümün, mekândaki siyasi ve ideolojik müdahaleyi temel motivasyon olarak içerdiği ve diğer özelliklerin çoğunun bu içerim çevresince düzenlendiğini göstererek mevcut literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, kentsel dönüşüm pratiklerinin itici güçlerini, uygulamalarını ve etkilerini önemli ölçüde etkileyen çok boyutlu politik ve ideolojik kurumları yeniden gözden geçirmeye yönlendirmektedir.

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