

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGAINST EOKA IN CYPRUS
1945-1960

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ABSTRACT

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGAINST EOKA IN CYPRUS, 1945-1960

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This thesis analyses the role of British intelligence activities in the fight against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960. In the study, the concepts of intelligence and intelligence failure as well as development of British intelligence system will be examined. Based on these preliminary Works, this thesis will seek to answer how British intelligence played a role against EOKA in Cyprus with respect to intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action.

Keywords: intelligence, intelligence failure, Cyprus, EOKA

ÖZ

EOKA'YA KARŞI MÜCADELEDE KIBRIS'TA İNGİLİZ İSTİHBARATI, 1945-1960

Erkan, Nihal

Doktora:Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, 1945 ve 1960 yılları arasında, İngiliz istihbaratının EOKA'ya karşı Kıbrıs'taki faaliyetlerini analiz etmektedir. Çalışmada istihbarat ve istihbarat hatası kavramları ile birlikte İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin oluşumu incelenmektedir. Bu öncül çalışmalar kapsamında, bu tez İngiliz istihbaratının Kıbrıs'ta EOKA'ya karşı nasıl bir rol oynadığını, istihbarat toplama, istihbarat analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve örtülü faaliyet bağlamında değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: istihbarat, istihbarat hatası, Kıbrıs, EOKA

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abwehr	Germany's Military Intelligence
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working Class
CA	Covert Action
CI	Counterintelligence
CIC	Cyprus Intelligence Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Command Intelligence Operations Center
CISC	Cyprus Internal Security Committee
CO	Colonial Office
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CoS	Chief of Staff
CS	Cypher School
CYBINT	Cyber Intelligence
DIC	District Intelligence Committee
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMAK	National Liberation Front of Cyprus
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIS	Foreign Instrumentation Signals
GCHQ	The Government Communications Headquarters
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
HUMINT	Human intelligence

IC	Unites States Intelligence Community
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IRD	Information Research Department
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KITEM	Cyprus Turkish Resistance Union
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MI5	Military Intelligence Section 5
MI6	Military Intelligence Section 6
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
OHEN	Christian Youth Movement
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PEON	Pancyprian National Organisation of Youth
PEK	Panagrarian Union of Cyprus
PEKA	Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agona
RAF	Royal Air Force
SB	The police Special Branch
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIME	Security Intelligence, Middle East
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
SLOs	Security Liaison Officers
SOCMINT	Social Media Analysis
SOE	Special Operations Executive
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VHB	Very Heavy Bomber
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI	World War 1
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The subject matter of this thesis is the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle) conflict on the island of Cyprus, from the perspective of intelligence. Cyprus, the third biggest island in the Mediterranean region after Sicily and Sardines, is located at the midpoint of Asia, Europe and Africa. Because of its unique geographical location, it has been subject to ceaseless conflicts throughout the history.¹ Major powers of any historical period got interested in capturing the island to gain dominance over trade and power politics in the region. As a result, the geopolitical importance of the island forced it to be ‘a beautiful conflict zone’².

The roots of the Cyprus question date back to 1878, when the British empire took control of the island from the Ottoman Empire. Soon after the seizure of the island, the challenge of *enosis* movement backed by the Church of Cyprus had started. The conflict because of the increased demand for *enosis* by the Greek Cypriots started to escalate in 1950s. The *enosis* movement had been disregarded by the British authorities

¹ Joseph S. Joseph, “Cyprus: Domestic Ethno-political Conflict and International Politics”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15, no.3, (2009): 377.

² Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence in the Cold War and the Twilight of the Empire*, (London: HarperPress, 2013), 304.

until EOKA had started its campaign of terror on 1st April 1955. Then, the attention had been turned to the British intelligence mechanism for two reasons: to put the responsibility of the failure of forewarning and to require intelligence to fight against EOKA. This thesis intends to explore the role of British intelligence in Cyprus regarding the EOKA activities.

The terror campaign by the underground organisation of EOKA, supported by the Church, not only contested the British rule on the island but also ignited the long-lasting Cyprus problem. EOKA cruelly targeted the British natives as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots causing deaths of hundreds in four years. By 1958, the Greek Cypriot aspiration for *enosis* (*union of the island with Greece*) and the Turkish Cypriot desire of *taksim* (*partition*) to counterforce it resulted in an inter-communal strife that risked a war between NATO members. Although the British intelligence and security forces could not have destroyed the EOKA, a political solution was achieved when the Cyprus Agreements (the Treaty concerning the establishment of Cyprus, Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance) were signed on 16th August 1960 at Nicosia.

1.1. The Research Question

The research question of this thesis is “how did British intelligence play a role regarding the EOKA conflict in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960?” This study aims to examine the functioning of British intelligence system in Cyprus before and throughout the EOKA crisis.

The study especially concentrates on the time period between the end of World War II (WWII) in 1945 and the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The end of WWII had brought a new international context where the British had to reformulate their foreign and security policies. In the new security environment, the Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA) emerged as new great powers challenging the British imperial interests. In 1945, Winston Churchill defined the transformation in the dimension of powers at Yalta Conference by stating “a small lion [Britain] was talking between a huge Russian bear and a great American elephant.”³ This statement reflects the British acknowledgement of the hegemonic transition from British to Americans in the international order. Although Britain wished to maintain the war alliance with the Americans in the post-war era, their ideological differences over colonialism drifted them apart. The American liberal economy model in support of the decolonisation challenged the British colonial economic welfares.⁴ In response to these challenges, the British policy-makers attached greater importance to the preservation of imperial power, especially in the Middle East. The Suez crisis was a major turning point for British policies in this region as it caused a further decline of British international power. The Joint Intelligence Committee reported that the USA would take a neutral stance against Israeli-British operations on Suez. Contrary to their faulty

³ Kori Schake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony*, (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2017),15.

⁴ Ibid. 16, 269.

assessment, the Americans pressurised the British to withdraw the Canal.⁵ This miscalculation of American reaction to an attack on Egypt had brought a high cost effect on British policies, involving “the loss of self-confidence, the acceleration of decolonisation”.⁶ In addition to the worries of loss of imperial power, the threat of nuclear contest and expansion of communism in the British territories were regarded as the main security challenges. Accordingly, these perceived economic and political risks shaped the requirements from the intelligence system. The British intelligence agenda concentrated on the conventional military threats that would be set off by the Soviet Union and the unconventional threats of anti-colonial movements in British territories. Since 1945, Britain had faced major colonial uprisings in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus and after 1960s, Aden, Dhofar and Northern Ireland that challenged British foreign and security policies. Many of these anti-colonial movements caught up the British surprised such as the EOKA terrorism in Cyprus⁷. The British tried to suppress the revolt, however, the

⁵ James Barr, *Lords of the Desert: The Battle between the United States and Great Britain for Supremacy in the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 285.

⁶ George C. Peden, “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power”, *The Historical Journal*, 55, no.4 (2012):1073-1074.

⁷ Terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives” in NATO glossary of terms and definitions. <https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc> (Accessed on 15th January 2019). For many authors, the EOKA is a terrorist organisation and its activities in Cyprus are characterised as a terror campaign. Bruce Hoffman describes the characteristics of a terrorist group and addresses how EOKA used terrorism to achieve its political aims. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2006), 40, 53-57. Also, see

“success that British were having in Kenya and Malaya were not to be repeated in Cyprus.”⁸ EOKA had retained a considerable power until a political solution had been achieved in 1960.

The thesis addresses the influence of intelligence mechanism on the British policy objectives concerning the Cyprus conflict. Intelligence mechanism had been argued to have a part in the inefficiency of counterinsurgency policies while some argue that British intelligence was effective in fighting against EOKA. The research objective of the study is to realize a comprehensive analysis of the role of British intelligence in Cyprus with respect to intelligence production, intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action between 1945 and 1960. The study utilises the intelligence cycle as well as the parameters of the counterintelligence and the covert action for the analysis.

1.2. Contribution of Study

This thesis aims to contribute to the intelligence studies on Cyprus problem by providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the British intelligence in Cyprus after the WWII. In this manner, the study concentrates on identifying the reasons for and causes of strengths and

Anthony James Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 304.

⁸ John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 88.

limitations of the British intelligence system in Cyprus under the light of archival documents examined at the British National Archives in London.

The literature on the Cyprus problem is rich, as many academics have researched the political, diplomatic and military history of the subject. The Greek, Turkish and English language historiography have produced numerous publishing concerning the origins and outcomes of EOKA violence. The Cyprus case has been studied from the inter-state and inter-communal relations perspective widely.⁹ Although it is one of the most investigated subjects in regard of other disciplines such as history, sociology and international relations, there is a gap in the intelligence studies on Cyprus case. In general, intelligence has barely been accepted an academic discipline and it has been widely neglected in the theoretical discussions. Subsequently, intelligence is mostly the “missing dimension” of international relations history.¹⁰ Another reason for the lack of intelligence on Cyprus is the availability of limited sources. As

⁹ See Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus: 1954-1959* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978). Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *The Cyprus Question, 1878-1960: The Constitutional Aspect* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2002), David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, (London: IB Tauris Publishers, 1999), Andreas Varnavas, *A Brief History of the Liberation Struggle of EOKA, 1955-1959* (Nicosia: EOKA Liberation Struggle 1955–59 Foundation, 2001), Ulvi Keser, *Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs 1913-2013* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2013).

¹⁰ See Christopher Andrew and D. Dilks, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984).

‘secrecy’ has been accepted as the intrinsic nature of intelligence, especially in the British understanding; the information related to intelligence has been rarely available for any discussion or investigation. This has been changing in the last decade as more official documents have become available after the release of the colonial administration records including the intelligence reports by the National Archives in 2012.

It is also necessary to note that there are three types of publication addressing the British intelligence activities in Cyprus based on primary sources, on secondary sources, or on both types of sources (mixed source). Richard Aldrich’s book entitled *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, is a mixed-source study that principally addresses the intelligence relationship between the British and the American governments. In his study, Aldrich used the archival sources, personal papers as well as the secondary sources. He focused on the hidden hand of intelligence through mainly the covert actions against the communism and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1963. He devoted a chapter to the EOKA case in which he argued that the British intelligence in Cyprus was successful in the fight against EOKA. Another scholar Stephen Dorril used mainly secondary sources in his comprehensive book *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Intelligence Service*. He provides information about secret intelligence activities in Cyprus and argues that intelligence got better when MI5 and MI6 involved more in the intelligence operations after 1958. However, some of the statements about the intelligence operations were not given

any reference to any source. These two books analyse the British intelligence activities during the Cold War years and Cyprus was not the focus but related to the main theme. Another scholar Rory Cormac, in his recent work, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* focuses on the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the British counterinsurgency campaigns. He examines four case studies with insurgencies in Malaya, Aden, Cyprus and Dhafor. He analyses how these colonial conflicts had an effect on the development of the JIC. He concludes that the importance of the colonial intelligence had increased as it became a part of broader strategic intelligence understanding after the end of WWII. Therefore, his emphasis was on the impact of the conflict in Cyprus on the changing nature of the JIC regarding the colonial conflicts and the post-war conditions. There are also publications that directly observe the British intelligence operations in Cyprus with a narrow scope. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, in his article “British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959”, focuses particularly on the British intelligence gathering efforts about EOKA by using the primary sources partially. David French, in his *Fighting EOKA*, analyses the origins, course and consequences of the British counterinsurgency campaign with a hint of intelligence. He points out the “structural weakness of the intelligence organization and a failure of imagination” as well as the shortcomings of intelligence gathering.¹¹

¹¹ David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015):74, 122-150.

Still, there are avenues of research with much to contribute to the intelligence studies on the Cyprus question. The goal of this study is to present an analysis of the role of the British intelligence before and during Cyprus emergency, which has remained largely undisclosed and under-theorised in the academic studies. Hence, it intends to provide a comprehensive and systematic analysis of intelligence side of the Cyprus issue between 1945 and 1960 based on mainly the primary sources. In this manner, the British intelligence organisation and EOKA's intelligence system have been analysed with respect to the elements of intelligence- intelligence production, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action in the time period of 1945 to 1960. The intelligence cycle is the main framework for the analytical work. Also, the parameters for counterintelligence and covert action are determined and used in the study.

The thesis develops on the following assumptions: First, intelligence has four main functions which are intelligence (production), intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. Second, intelligence failure can occur within every function of intelligence. Lastly, the effectiveness of intelligence is based on its contribution to the achievement of policy aims. Based on these assumptions, this study argues that; the British intelligence machinery failed to forewarn about EOKA attacks between 1945 and 1955 while it proved to be relatively ineffective with respect to intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action regarding the EOKA activities between 1955 to 1957, and it continued to be ineffective against EOKA but had been slightly

effective during the negotiations for a political settlement between Greece, Turkey and Britain between 1957-1960.

1.3. Methodology and Sources

This thesis adopts a documentary analysis of primary and secondary sources of data. Principally, the data include the information drawn from the declassified archival documents of the Colonial Office (CO), War Office (WO) and Foreign and Colonial Office (FCO) in the British National Archives.

Document analysis is a form of qualitative research that involves the examination and interpretation of the documents as a result of which the analysed data gain a meaning within the context of main research subject.¹² Documents of all types are regarded important inputs that “help the researcher uncover the meaning, develop understanding and discover insight relevant to the research problem”.¹³ In this regard, the quality of the documentary sources is of great importance for a research on social sciences. John Scott provided four fundamental quality control criteria of the documents, which are authenticity, credibility,

¹² Glenn A. Bowen, “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method”, *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no.2 (2009), 27-40.

¹³ Sharan B. Merriam, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009), 163.

representativeness and meaning.¹⁴ Authenticity refers to the genuineness and reliability of the origin of the data used in the research. Credibility refers to the independence of the data, meaning the documentary data is produced independent of the research and is free of distortion. One of the advantageous of document analysis is that documents are “exact, stable and non-reactive” and therefore, unaffected by the research process or the researcher’s intervention.¹⁵ Representativeness indicates whether the used documentary data represents the totality of the relevant documents. Meaning refers to the value of the document in terms of comprehensiveness. Scott argues that the significance of the data is reconstructed in the analysis phase based on its face-value meaning.¹⁶ The bits and pieces of information usually gains a real meaning in the theoretical context of the research.

The archival research in London has provided invaluable data for this study that concentrates on the intelligence aspect of the Cyprus question. The documents used in the thesis are of quality that meet all criteria discussed above. In this study, an interpretative content analysis is adopted. It involves the analysis of the content of a wide range of official documents such as Cyprus Intelligence Committee Reports, the Joint Intelligence Committee Reports, telegrams and letters of the directors of

¹⁴John Scott, *A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 1-2.

¹⁵ Bowen, *Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method*, 31.

¹⁶ Scott, *A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research*, 28-35.

intelligence units and the officials of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office as well as situation reports of the Special Branch and reports of the War Office and etc. The content analysis of these documents enabled the researcher of this study to trace how intelligence and policy actions were linked or not linked. Documents are argued to be a means of tracking change and development.¹⁷ Likewise, the document analysis has made it possible to observe the changes or continuities in the approaches to the intelligence requirements as well as in the level of effectiveness of the British intelligence system in the time period between 1945 and 1960. The examination of the documents also enabled the researcher to track the development of British colonial intelligence system in Cyprus from 1945 to 1960. As a result, the data from these documents are examined and then organised under major themes and categories through the content analysis.

The information drawn from these documents were put through interpretative content analysis and gained meaning under the theoretical framework of the research. In order to provide a theoretical framework and a discussion of the background of the Cyprus case, a critical approach is followed for the analysis of secondary sources such as books, articles and internet-based information as well as primary sources where appropriate. A wide and deep research on the secondary sources has been fulfilled and then, the information derived have been critically scrutinised particularly to provide a theoretical framework for intelligence and failure relationship. Then, the data obtained has been

¹⁷Bowen, *Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method*, 30.

synthesised within the theoretical context. The excerpts, quotations and when necessary, the entire passages from the official documents are used in the study to consolidate the arguments of the research with original data.¹⁸

To conclude, this thesis is an outcome of a comprehensive research and analysis of the original data. The released official documents in the British National Archives are the main ingredients of this thesis that provided the data otherwise unobtainable. It mainly develops on the intelligence reports and other type of documents including intelligence information produced by the responsible governmental units, individual of groups of officials. These kinds of documents about the intelligence often contain sensitive information which governments usually wish to keep classified. As the subject is studied mainly on primary sources, the information presented is bounded with the availability of the sources. The intelligence related declassified documents from Secret to Top Secret level have been fully used to examine the roles of British and the EOKA intelligence systems. Still, there are many files remained classified. For example, the file entitled as Reports by Cyprus Intelligence Committee (1957)-CO 926/673/1 is closed for 80 years until 1st January 2038, or Cyprus: Intelligence Reports, 1959-1960 - FCO 141/4524 is closed for 75 years until 1st January 2036, or the file Cyprus-human rights committees in Cyprus- FCO 141/3797/1 is closed for 124 years and the record opening date will be 1st January 2083, or Cyprus:

¹⁸These are accepted as as natural outcomes of document analysis. See Adri Labuschagne, "Qualitative Research - Airy Fairy or Fundamental?", *The Qualitative Report* 8, no.1, (2003):100-103.

counterpropaganda measures-FCO 141/3511/1 is closed for 80 years until 1st January 2039.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis entitled “British Intelligence in Cyprus, 1945-1960” is composed of five chapters. Each chapter has its own research topic related to the main research question of “How did British intelligence play a role against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960?”

In order to conduct a meaningful examination of the British role in Cyprus case, the intricacies of the various concepts of intelligence and intelligence failure need to be examined. Consequently, *Chapter 2 - Intelligence and Failure* provides a theoretical framework about the relationship between the concepts of intelligence and intelligence failure. The chapter aims not to provide a definition of intelligence, but the parameters to answer the question of “How is intelligence defined?” This study argues that intelligence is composed of four main functions which are intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. The level of these functions adopted within an intelligence system is discussed to be dependent on the type of government, the security environment and the technological developments. Next, the chapter examines the question “How does an intelligence failure occur?” with respect to the main functions of intelligence. The purpose is to analyse whether a set of parameters can be achieved to analyse effectiveness of an intelligence system. Therefore, the reasons for the

failure in each of the functions-intelligence (gathering), intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action- are analysed in detail. As a result, the aim of defining the sets of causes for failure in each function within an intelligence system is achieved. These sets of causes of failure are used to analyse the role of the British intelligence in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960.

The *Chapter 3 - Development of British Intelligence System* addresses the evolution of British intelligence system from the first practices of British intelligence until 1960. It concentrates on the question of “How had British intelligence been developed until 1960?” to analyse whether the British intelligence system of the referred time period had been consistent with the theoretical argument of this study in the Chapter 2. The chapter examines how the British intelligence system had progressed with the main functions of intelligence in the historical period. The “type of government, security environment and technological developments” had been influential on the development of British intelligence system. Followingly, the Chapter outlines the organisation of British intelligence from the end of WWII until the establishment of Republic of Cyprus. This study discusses that there had been a dual system of intelligence composed of national intelligence machinery and colonial intelligence machinery. The chapter concludes with the examination of the intelligence organisation in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960.

Chapter 4 - British Intelligence in Cyprus, 1945-1960 begins with an analysis of how British rule on the island started. Then, it develops with the exploration of the post-war security environment that shaped the intelligence requirements based on British perception of threats and interests on the island. Then, with reference to the archival documents, the functions of British intelligence are analysed with respect to the time intervals of between 1945 and 1955, between 1955 and 1957 and between 1957 and 1960. The structure and the intelligence and counter-intelligence mechanism of EOKA are also analysed in order to provide a better understanding of the British intelligence functioning. The analysis of primary documents enabled to track the changes regarding the British strategies on Cyprus and the changes in the intelligence mechanism on the island and to compare the consistency of intelligence mechanism to serve the British political ends in the respective time intervals.

This study argues that the British intelligence machinery failed to forewarn about the impending EOKA terrorism on the island in the first period. In the second period of 1955-1957, the British intelligence system is argued to support British policies on the island ineffectively because of the flaws within its functions- intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of British intelligence system are analysed in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. In the last period, despite the improvements in the functions, the intelligence machinery was under the level of full operational capacity. In general, the British intelligence machine could not have been geared to eliminate EOKA. The main

reason behind the ineffectiveness was the difficulties in setting up an efficient intelligence system such as the lack of coordination between intelligence units, the shortcomings in counterintelligence measures and the lack of competent intelligence gathering mechanism. The chapter ends with an outline of the impact of intelligence on the Agreements of Zurich and London signed in 1959.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion discusses the main findings of the study. The outcomes of the thesis are synthesised with the theoretical framework presented in the Chapter 2. The argument of the thesis is grounded with the analysis of primary sources, supplemented with the theoretical explanations. In the study, the intelligence cycle proved useful to locate the reasons for failure within the intelligence production. The failures of British intelligence collection and analysis about EOKA are demonstrated on the intelligence cycle. The parameters set for the failure of counterintelligence and covert action in the theoretical discussions are explanatory in the analysis of British counterintelligence activities and propaganda actions against EOKA.

CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE AND FAILURE

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of the chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the entire research: first, on the development of British intelligence and then on the activities of British intelligence in Cyprus from 1945 to 1960 regarding the *enosis* movement. The role of British intelligence in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960 will be down to the ground in light of the theoretical framework. The concepts of “intelligence” and “intelligence failure” are examined thoroughly.

The bitterness of intelligence profession shows itself when an intelligence failure occurs. The appreciation for an intelligence success comes mostly in silence while any failure is discussed out loud and someone to blame is looked for. Walter Laqueur wrote that;

it is thought that to fail in intelligence is to fail utterly. ...intelligence successes frequently remain unknown for a long time, whereas failures usually become known soon after they are recognised.¹⁹

¹⁹ Walter Laqueur, *A World of secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* (New York:Basic Books, 1985), 139.

There have been many intelligence failures that remarked a turning point in the history. For example, the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 was regarded as an intelligence failure of Soviet commanders and the German intelligence. It was a “surprise attack” to the Soviet Union due to the dismissal of the warning intelligence concerning the German military build-up for invasion. Stalin ignored the intelligence warnings, of which he believed arisen from German disinformation and provocation.²⁰ On the other hand, the surprise attack of the Operation Barbarossa in 1941 had been an intelligence success if only the Abwehr (Germany’s military intelligence) could have assessed the Soviet capabilities correctly. The decision of Hitler for the operation, who had been convinced by the Abwehr’s assessment of Soviet capabilities but inaccurately, had cost the Germans a victory and changed the fate of the WWII. The Yom Kippur War (1973) was another example of a surprise attack because of intelligence failure. Convinced that the war was unlikely due to their biased minds about the possibility of the war, the Israeli intelligence disregarded the warning signals and failed to forewarn of it.²¹ The Srebrenica genocide of 1995 has been considered a surprise attack because of the intelligence failures on the part of Dutch,

²⁰ To read on the details of Operation Barbarossa; see David E. Murphy; *‘What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa’*, (London: Yale University Press, 2005). Also, to see photographs from Operation Barbarossa; Ian Carter, “Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Failure in the Soviet Union”, Imperial War Museum, London, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/operation-barbarossa-and-germanys-failure-in-the-soviet-union> (Accessed on 18.01.2019)

²¹ To read an analysis of the cognitive biases behind the surprise attack starting the Yom Kippur War, Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski, “Intelligence failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise”, *Political Psychology*, 24 no.1 (March 2003):75-99.

American and United Nations.²² Surprise attacks do not necessarily involve only conventional security actors but also terrorist groups or cyber-enemies. After the surprise terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) was accused of failures at several levels from undermining the scope of terrorist threat to ignoring to share the intelligence. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, backed by the American and British intelligence reports on the alleged presence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was another example of intelligence failure because of “politicization”. The Chilcot report stated that British intelligence on Iraq’s WMD had been exaggerated to justify the invasion. Indeed, this case was an unfortunate example to how the politicization of the intelligence could lead to intelligence failure:

Intelligence and assessments made by the JIC about Iraq’s capabilities and intent continued to be used to prepare briefing material to support Government statements in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging the limitations of the intelligence.²³

The American intelligence was also flat-out wrong while assessing “[in the view of most agencies] Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons

²² To read further, see Cees Wiebes, *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992–1995* (Munster: Lit, 2003). Also, the official Dutch Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) report on Dutch role in the Srebrenica reveals of the intelligence failure aspect of the genocide: Srebrenica- Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area. (10 April 2002) <https://www.niod.nl/nl/srebrenica-rapport> (Accessed on 19.01.2019)

²³ Chilcot Report, 117. The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, known as Chilcot Report, was released on 6 July 2006. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry>. (Accessed on 20.01.2019)

program.”²⁴ Both intelligence systems were criticised for providing intelligence from sources with lack of credibility and for failing the duty of accurate intelligence assessments.

These examples present that there is a wide range of reasons leading to an intelligence failure. Regardless of a nation’s massive experience and reported intelligence efficiency, the intelligence failures happen even in the most experienced intelligence organisations. This chapter is aiming to analyse “How does an intelligence failure occur?” The objective is to discover the reasons for the failure at different levels of intelligence. The concept of “intelligence” is highly disputable itself. So, first of all, the chapter starts with the discussion on “How is intelligence defined?” in order to provide a better understanding for the scope of intelligence failure.

2.2. The Concept of Intelligence

Although ‘intelligence’ is an old term that was even referred in the religious texts²⁵ and in the ancient but the fundamental works on strategy

²⁴ National Intelligence Estimate, 2002, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001075566.pdf. (Accessed on 18.01.2019)

²⁵ The former CIA Director Allen Dulles, in his book *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967) states that the earliest sources of intelligence were prophets, seers, oracles, soothsayers and astrologers’ and gives examples in a wide range including the references to the Bible and Herodotus (pp.1-17). Also see, Philip Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century* (New York:

and warfare²⁶, the task of defining it is not an easy one. When intelligence is mentioned, everyone has an idea of what it is about – spies, secret missions, secret organisations, clandestine operations, interception, surveillance etc. built on James Bond and similar movies, TV shows, memoirs and novels composed of facts and fiction.²⁷ In 1932, Winston Churchill once wrote in his “My Spy Story” that;

In the high ranges of Secret Service work, the actual facts in many cases were in every respect equal to the most fantastic inventions of romance and melodrama. Tangle within tangle, plot and counterplot, ruse and treachery, cross and double cross, true agent, false agent, double agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party

Norton,1987) and for a comprehensive work on world intelligence history; see Christopher Andrew, *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence* (London: Yale University Press, 2018).

²⁶ Intelligence is much referred in the historical works of Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist, in his *The Art of War* and of Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military theorist, in his *On War*. However, these strategists differ in their approach to intelligence: Clausewitz was sceptic about the value of intelligence in the warfare while Sun Tzu encouraged the use of intelligence and covert action for achieving victory.

²⁷ On MI5's website, there is a “Fact or Fiction” quiz section with the aim of clarifying the features of MI5 intelligence that are mixed up with James Bond fiction. One of the True or False questions asked on the website is if “MI5 has a secret training facility under Baker Street tube station.” and the provided explanation is: “Unlike SIS in the Bond movie “Die Another Day”, MI5 doesn't have any secret underground facilities.” See “Quiz Gallery” MI5, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/quizzes> (Accessed on 11.11.2018) Popular culture and fictional presentations of intelligence have been influencing the public understanding of intelligence. During Cold War, KGB defector claimed that the Soviet leadership's perception of British intelligence had been shaped by Bond movies and he was asked to obtain the devices used by James Bond in the movies. To read on the issue, Jeremy Black, “The Geopolitics of James Bond”, *Intelligence and National Security*, 19 (2), (2004): 290-303. To read further on this issue; Nigel West, “Fiction, Faction and Intelligence,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 2 (2004):275-289. and John D. Stempel, Robert W. Pringle Jr and Tom Stempel, “Intelligence and the cinema,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*,15, 1 (2002):115-124.

were interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true.²⁸

After the end of WWII, academic studies on finding a definition for intelligence have been densified and mostly built up on the works of Sherman Kent.²⁹ For the last seventy years, many alternative definitions for intelligence have been suggested by the authors addressing the issue.³⁰ (See Appendix A-Some Definitions of Intelligence) Mark Lowenthal observes it as follows:

Virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what ‘intelligence’ means, or at least how the author intends to use the term.³¹

²⁸ Winston Churchill, *Thoughts and Adventures* (London: T. Butterworth, 1932), 87-88.

²⁹ Sherman Kent is called as the ‘father of intelligence analysis’ in the CIA. He was believed to make the greatest contribution to the intelligence by developing the formal tradecraft for analysis in CIA. See, “News and Information” CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/sherman-kent-the-father-of-intelligence.html> (Accessed on 18.11.2018)

³⁰ Intelligence as a subject matter became an attractive one since the terrorist attacks in the beginning of 21st century in New York, London, Madrid and Istanbul. It brought more attention especially from academia with the support of intelligence organizations in the USA and the UK. To read further on definition and theory of intelligence studies, see Peter Gill, S. Marrin and M. Phthyian (eds) *“Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates”* (London: Routledge, 2009); Len Scott, “Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View”, *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 2 (2007):185-205. and David Khan, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence”, *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 3 (2001):79-92.

³¹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd edition (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003),1.

Consequently, there are numerous definitions of intelligence spanning from a narrow to broad scope; yet, these definitions are fragmented and hardly integrate with each other. As Michael Warner notes ‘we have no accepted definition of intelligence’ despite these considerable research and debate.³² Even the intelligence professionals hardly define the intelligence. There is not one common definition of intelligence on the websites of world intelligence services or in the laws regulating the national intelligence systems.

The duty of defining intelligence is like taking an *elephant test* indeed. The description of intelligence is based upon the perception of the author shaped by his/her research subject. Mostly, each author researching on the same concept of intelligence comes up with different definitions of a part of intelligence. Although these are generally valid and credible on their own, a complete description can hardly be derived by combining the separate information on it. It can be concluded that intelligence has been approximately described but has not been fully defined yet.

Intelligence has been regarded an essential part of national security and defence systems. The *raison d’etre* of intelligence derives from its ability to provide for the security and defence and strategic objectives of a state. In contemporary world, it is believed that intelligence organisation is an “inevitable a part of modern states as armies,

³² Michael Warner gives a plenty of different definitions of intelligence in his “Wanted: A definition of “Intelligence”, *Studies in Intelligence* 46, 3 (2002):15-22.

telephone and postal services and a system for collecting taxes.”³³ Despite their common tasks, roles and functions, each intelligence system is unique with its *modus operandi* and organisation. Even the states with similar rules and values develop their distinctive intelligence systems. The divergent perceptions of intelligence result in different intelligence systems.³⁴ The chief of the Office of Strategic Services of the USA stated in 1943, that;

we have learned a great deal from the aid the British SIS have given us... and we have modelled a lot of our methods upon them, but we have changed them to correspond to the peculiar characteristics of our own country ...³⁵

The reasons for divergent national concepts of intelligence can be analysed with respect to the governmental type, the strategic environment and the technological developments. A very effective variable on conceptualising intelligence is the government type and statecraft legacy. The French intelligence system, for instance, reflects

³³ Thomas Powers, “Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks”, *The Atlantic*, (August 1979) <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1979/08/inside-the-department-of-dirty-tricks/305460/> (Accessed on 23. 12.2018)

³⁴ See Philip H.J.Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence, Divergent National Concepts and Institutions”, *Harvard International Review* 24, 3 (2002): 62-67.

³⁵ The statement of William Donovan in a lecture at the US Army&Navy Staff College in Washington DC is quoted from Jon Lellenberg, “The Secret War, 1939-45, Churchill’s North America”, 29th International Churchill Conference, Toronto. https://www.bsiarchivalhistory.org/BSI_Archival_History/Toronto.html (Accessed 14th December 2018)

the French state culture³⁶ and the Turkish intelligence has had its own characteristics bounded up with the nature of the Turkish state.³⁷ The regime of the state also affects the understanding of the intelligence scope. Imperial totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic regimes have their characteristic types of intelligence systems. It is argued that “non-democratic states mostly develop security services rather than intelligence services” in order to secure the regime against internal threats primarily.³⁸

The strategic environment, where a state defines its threats and interests, is another variable effecting the perceptions of intelligence. The threat situations, either real or perceived, in differentiated strategic environments in different regions of the world have an impact on the

³⁶ See Douglas Porch, “French intelligence culture: A historical and political perspective,” *Intelligence and National Security* 10, no.3 (1995): 486-511.

³⁷ See Hakan Fidan, “Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Comparison of British, American and Turkish Intelligence Systems”, (Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University,1999). To read further about comparative study of national intelligence understandings, i.e:Chinese, Iranian, Indian intelligence etc., see Philip Davies and Kristian Guftanson (ed) *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside Anglosphere* (Georgetown University Press, Washington DC. 2013).

³⁸ Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence”., Roy Godson, “Intelligence: An American view” in *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* ed. K. G. Robertson (New York: St Martin’s, 1987), 6. See also, Michael Warner, “Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems” in *National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects*, (ed), Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),30.

understanding of intelligence.³⁹ To demonstrate, Israeli intelligence has a central role for the state and is one of the highest funded one in the world because of Israel's perception of perpetual threat to its existence in the strategic environment. Therefore, "a nation's allocation of scarce resources for intelligence activities" is determined according to the defined objectives and its adversaries in the security environment.⁴⁰ In general, the changes in the international security environment have caused a shift in the understanding of intelligence. In the twenty-first century, the asymmetric and hybrid wars, involving international terrorism and cybercrimes, required new approaches to intelligence. Reorganisation and reform efforts have been in progress in order to broaden the functions and roles of intelligence such as counterterrorism as well as to realize the legal arrangements for an increased role of intelligence.⁴¹

³⁹ Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006): 1-20.

⁴⁰ Loch K. Johnson, "Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16,no.4 (2003),639.

⁴¹ To read further on the intelligence in the 21st century, see Andrew Rathmell, "Towards postmodern intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security*, 17, no.3 (2002):87-104.; Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer "Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic Warning in an Age of Reflexive Intelligence", *Security Dialogue*, 40,2 (2009)-123-144. For an American perspective on reformation of intelligence system, see Richard K.Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007) and, Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). For reform and British intelligence system, see Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* (Abingdon: Frank Cass,2001). Also, for intelligence reforms in developing democracies (such as Romania, Slovakia and Latin American states and so on), see Florina Cristina Matesi and Thomas C.Bruneau, "Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies",

Lastly, technological developments are important to understand the scope of intelligence in the strategic environment. Generally, it has been expanded by the advancements in technology. During the World Wars and the Cold War, the advancement in the aerial intelligence as well as the overseas communications and signals intelligence provided for game changing advantages of the technology owners.⁴² Likewise, the innovations in information and communications technologies have extended the scope of intelligence activities to cyber sphere; i.e. cyber intelligence and counter-cyber intelligence. Consequently, a nation's intelligence understanding is also shaped by its capability to exploit the technology available.

These variables of government type, security environment and the technological capability are influential in the emergence of divergent national concepts of intelligence collectively. Within this framework, the pursuit for a common definition of intelligence can be an endless task. To that reason, this study aims to answer the question of “how is intelligence defined?” by exploring the parameters relevant for a definition of intelligence. The argument is that bounded with government type, security environment and the technological capability,

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 24, no.4 (2011), 656-691., Kirean Williams and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁴² To read on the secret signals practices of ENIGMA, ULTRA, Room 40 and other examples, see Peter F. Matthews, *SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence in the World Wars*, (Gloucestershire: History Press, 2013).

intelligence can be defined in terms of its role, function and structural characteristics.

The role of intelligence confers to whether it is a power to or an instrument of decision-, or policy-making. There is an on-going debate whether intelligence is a certain type of power to shape the policy or an instrument to serve the policy. From the latter perspective, intelligence is an instrument for governments to serve their policies. Then policy shapes the intelligence⁴³ and intelligence role is to serve the policy with all its aspects. Peter Gill and Mark Pythian describe intelligence as “a means to an end”, which is security.⁴⁴ Similarly, David Khan states that intelligence is about optimizing one’s resources for security needs.⁴⁵ Therefore, intelligence, an instrument for security policies, is a defensive reaction against the security threats and vulnerabilities. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) of the USA exemplifies this standpoint as the intelligence was listed as an instrument of national

⁴³ Adrian Wolfberg and Brian A. Young, “Is Intelligence an Instrument of National Power?” *American Intelligence Journal* 33,1 (2016):26-30

⁴⁴ Peter Gill and Mark Pythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 1.

⁴⁵ David Kahn, “An historical theory of intelligence” in *Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates*, ed. Peter Gill and S. Marrin (London: Routledge, 2009), 8-10. Kahn determines three principles of intelligence as *the purpose of intelligence is to optimize one’s resources, intelligence is an auxiliary element in war and intelligence is a defining characteristic of defensive war.*

power along with the diplomacy, economy, law enforcement, and military to support the US policy of fighting terrorism.⁴⁶

A former British intelligence officer and academic Michael Herman, on the other hand, states that organized intelligence constitutes its own particular kind of state power which is *intelligence power*.⁴⁷ He makes a reference to Sherman Kent's description of intelligence – ‘a kind of knowledge, the organisation which produces the knowledge and the activity pursued by the intelligence organisation’⁴⁸ and emphasizes that the outcome of organised intelligence is “knowledge” as a distinctive type of power. Intelligence is, thus, about the organized efforts of gathering and processing of knowledge. David Tucker also commends that “intelligence is important because it is information; information is important because, like knowledge, it is power.”⁴⁹ According to this standpoint, intelligence is a power, based on knowledge that can shape the policy, -or decision and contributes to the relative power of the state. Gill and Phytian assert that intelligence is “...aimed at maintaining or

⁴⁶ “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003”, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. (Accessed on 14.11. 2018)

⁴⁷ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

⁴⁸ Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), xxiii.

⁴⁹ David Tucker, *The end of intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press:2014), 5.

enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats ...”.⁵⁰ Intelligence is generally organised to gain relative security advantage against the threats and adversaries with the information provided by it. To sum up, intelligence is understood as “the knowledge and ideally foreknowledge sought by nations in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests”⁵¹ and this knowledge constitutes a form of power, which can contribute to the policy-making process.

Although these ideas on the role of intelligence are contrasting, both aspects are defining intelligence correctly, indeed. Intelligence is both a kind of power and an instrument of state power. Intelligence is, where deemed, an instrument to serve with the knowledge, organisation and activities and a power to add on to the policymaking with its knowledge, organisation and the activities. Danny Steed (2016) stated that “intelligence is ‘the knowledge, organisation and the activity undertaken, in secret, to produce privileged insights of relevance to the formulation and implementation of government policy.’⁵² However, intelligence should only provide the knowledge of what have been required from it but this should not involve the ultimate decision, or policy. Intelligence

⁵⁰ Gill and Phythian, “*Intelligence in an Insecure World*”, 7.

⁵¹ Loch Johnson, “Intelligence” in *Encyclopaedia of US Foreign Relations*, eds. Bruce W. Jentleson & T.G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), 365.

⁵² Danny Steed, *British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 6.

with all its means should not involve the decision, or policy. The policy to be made should be under sole discretion of the decision-, or policy-maker. Accordingly, “intelligence should not tell ...what to do. The decision to take action is the privilege—and under the responsibility—of the decision-maker.”⁵³ Consequently, intelligence is a power to provide knowledge to the policy and an instrument for implementation of the policy.

The different perceptions on the role of intelligence lead to another discussion on the functions of intelligence. On one account, intelligence is supported to engage in information gathering only. Intelligence should not involve the analysis of that information. It is argued that analysis should pertain to decision-making level. Therefore, intelligence collection should be the only function assigned to the intelligence system. According to others, intelligence should involve analysis of the information to provide foreknowledge to the decision-makers. Therefore, intelligence should not only concentrate on collecting information but also, undertake appropriate analytical process on that information to provide foresight. Intelligence should focus on future and aim to present the highest probabilities.⁵⁴ In the competitive strategic environment, foreknowledge, about existing or possible threats, is of great importance

⁵³ Kristan Wheaton and Michael T. Beerbower, “Towards a New Definition of Intelligence”, *Stanford Law and Policy Review* 17, no.317 (2006): 329.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 324.

to the decision-, or policy-makers. To maintain relative power, “decision-makers want intelligence to tell them something that is based on fact but allows them to plan for the future with a reasonable expectation of success.”⁵⁵ Therefore, valuable intelligence should provide not only descriptive information but also reasonable foreknowledge into future. Intelligence of this quality can enable decision-makers to produce responsive action on time. As Robert Clark highlights, good intelligence can reduce the level of uncertainties.⁵⁶ Then, *surprise* may not be inevitable for the policy-makers.⁵⁷ The key is a good intelligence analysis that generates probabilistic/predictive assessments contributing to the decision-making process. The main challenge of controlling the uncertainties in the strategic environment can be manageable in the existence of foresight about the unknown. Therefore, the analysis of the collected intelligence is complementary to the other intelligence functions. Intelligence analysis is one of the main functions of intelligence system.

In addition to collection and analysis discussion, another debate of intelligence raises on the counterintelligence and covert-action. There

⁵⁵ Ibid., 330.

⁵⁶ Robert Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 19.

⁵⁷ Glenn P. Hastedt, “Towards the Comparative Study of Intelligence”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 11, no.3 (1991):64

are supporters of the idea that intelligence should involve neither of them. Because covert operations and counterintelligence are “informed by intelligence rather than integral to it.”⁵⁸ On the other hand, counterintelligence is argued among the core functions of intelligence. In basic terms, counterintelligence is about protecting the state and its secrets against adversaries. From Mark Lowenthal’s point of view, “intelligence exists because governments seek to hide information from other governments, which in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret.”⁵⁹ Therefore intelligence is all about secret information and the core functions of intelligence are gathering secret information of others while protecting nation’s secret information with counterintelligence means. Counterintelligence is, therefore, a core function of the intelligence.

Moreover, some argue that intelligence functions contain intelligence and counterintelligence but not covert action.⁶⁰ They argue that intelligence is about clandestine activities but should not involve covert action. The aim of intelligence should be limited with gathering

⁵⁸ Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence”, *Intelligence and National Security*, 28, no.5 (2012): 687.

⁵⁹ Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. (Washington DC:CQ Press, 2003):1.

⁶⁰ To read on covert action, Gregory F. Treverton, “Covert Action and Open Society”, *Foreign Affairs*, 65, no.5 (1987): 995-1014., Len Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy”, *Intelligence and National Security* 19,no.2 (2004):322-341.

information for decision-makers. These intelligence gathering activities can include clandestine activities of “passive intelligence collection, or information gathering operations” to support the policy-making process.⁶¹ However, intelligence should not undertake covert action, which means the implementation of the policy-decided. It is argued that covert action is certainly an intelligence related instrument of state power but it should not be an integral function of intelligence. Among the supporters of this idea, Michael Herman argues that covert action does not have to be done by intelligence.⁶² He gives the example of Special Operations Executive which was a separate body to conduct British covert actions during WWII. The critics of the covert action base their argument on its legitimacy, effectiveness, morality and accountability.⁶³ Intelligence is argued not to take action but provide the required intelligence to other bodies to take action. There are suggestions of treating covert action as a separate instrument of foreign policy in the

⁶¹ The definition of “clandestine activities” is cited from Michael E. De Vine and Heidi M. Peters, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief” Congressional Research Service, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45175.pdf> (last modified 17 April 2018)

⁶² Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 55.

⁶³ To read further, Michael Herman, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after 2001’, *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no.2 (2004):342-358.

same manner as diplomacy, economic sanctions and the use of military force.⁶⁴

On the contrary, covert action is argued a main function of intelligence. For many intelligence professionals and academicians such as Roy Godson and Abram Shulsky, covert action contributes to the security of the state and evolves in secrecy. Therefore, it is one of the main elements of intelligence.⁶⁵ Covert action is an act of policy. It is “the process of taking secret and deniable methods in pursuit of political ends.”⁶⁶ It aims to influence the adversary by means that are deniable and non-attributable to its perpetrator. For the advocates of the covert action, intelligence is not something passive and should include active tasks. Intelligence should be tasked with covert action because it is an important instrument of statecraft.⁶⁷ It is a policy tool like open diplomacy, and it may be necessary when open diplomacy has its limitations. Therefore, states may employ covert action to attain their

⁶⁴ Glenn P. Hastedt, “Towards the Comparative Study of Intelligence”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 11, no.3 (Summer 1991): 57

⁶⁵ Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 1.; Abram N. Schulsky and Gary Schmitt, G., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 3rd Edition, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2002), 8.

⁶⁶ Philip Davies, “Intelligence”, 343.

⁶⁷ Tucker, *The End of Intelligence*, 2.

policy objectives. Richard Aldrich describes intelligence as ‘operations to influence the world by unseen means-the hidden hand’.⁶⁸ Likewise, James Der Derian defines intelligence as “the continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another.”⁶⁹ Hence, covert action can be a useful tool to support the government’s policy goals. It is an integral function of the intelligence system that shares common objectives and values with other intelligence functions.

Covert action is regarded as one of the intelligence domains in many intelligence systems of countries such as the USA, France, Israel and the United Kingdom.⁷⁰ In the Article 2 of the Intelligence Services Act (1994), the functions of the British secret intelligence service are stated to be “exercisable only in the interests of national security... or economic well-being of the United Kingdom...”⁷¹ And, the functions of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) are stated as;

⁶⁸ Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), 5.

⁶⁹ James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1992), 21.

⁷⁰ Roy Godson “Intelligence and Security”, in Schultz, R.H. (et al eds). *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, (Washington D.C: Brassey’s, 1997), 335.

⁷¹ The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 regulates the functioning of Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). “Intelligence Services Act”, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents> (Accessed on 15.11.2018)

... its functions shall be,
(a) to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and
(b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons.⁷²

The scope of “other tasks” remains unclear but the article definitely authorizes the SIS for covert actions.⁷³ Likewise, the National Security Act (1947) assigns covert action to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Act defines covert action as:

an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly...⁷⁴

Covert action is an important intelligence instrument for implementation of the policy which is necessary for national security and vital interests. Gill and Phtyhian underline that intelligence is more than the production

⁷² Article 1, “Intelligence Services Act 1994”.

⁷³ An example to British covert action is based on the statements of David Shayler, a former MI5 officer, SIS (MI6) was alleged to pay to members of Al Qaeda for the plot and try to assassinate Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 1996 who was the Libyan leader by then. See Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Service*, (New York:Simon&Schuster, 2002). To read about SIS covert operations, Philip H.J. Davies, “From Special Operations to Special Political Action: The Rump “SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability 1945-1977”, *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no.3 (2000):55-76, R. Aldrich , *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray,2001); Rory Cormac, *Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2018).

⁷⁴ National Security Act of the USA, 1977, Sec. 503. [50 U.S.C. §413b]

of knowledge and must include covert operations that can influence the action and/or policy.⁷⁵ Intelligence, therefore, should be entitled for covert actions such as propaganda, deception or even paramilitary operations or secret operations for a policy-based purpose. However, there have to be a proper mechanism for the control and oversight of these actions. Also, the boundaries of covert action should be specified regarding what to include and not to include. Consequently, the functions of intelligence should involve covert action as long as control and oversight mechanisms work as required.

To sum up, an effective intelligence system is possible when intelligence analysis provides guidance to collection and counterintelligence, counterintelligence protects intelligence collection and covert action is based on effective collection, analysis and counterintelligence.⁷⁶ Godson argues that “covert action, counterintelligence, analysis and collection benefit the entire intelligence system, and at the same time the entire intelligence system benefits each of them.”⁷⁷ Glenn P. Hastedt also states concisely that “The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, analysis and estimates, covert action, and

⁷⁵ Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, “What Is Intelligence Studies?”, *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 18, no.1 (2016): 5-19.

⁷⁶ Roy Godson (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The US, the USSR, the UK and the Third World* (Washington DC:Pergamon-Brassey's,1988),2.

⁷⁷ Godson, “Dirty Tricks”, 6.

counterintelligence”.⁷⁸ Therefore, intelligence is not only about information gathering but also analysis, counterintelligence and covert action.

Another dispute concerns with the secrecy notion of intelligence. According to the traditional opinion, secrecy is a defining characteristic of intelligence. Intelligence is intrinsically associated with secret information, obtained with secret methods from secret sources as well as through secret operations. Hence, secrecy is the distinguishing feature which separates intelligence information from other forms of information and information gathering processes. Abram Shulsky recognizes that intelligence organisations have to conduct all of their activities in secrecy. Because it is linked with providing relative security advantage, intelligence itself is the subject of a ‘silent warfare’. It is an inaudible struggle to hide, discover or manipulate the secret information.⁷⁹ This warfare by its very nature urges secrecy as a working principal for the intelligence organizations and their activities. Therefore, secrecy is an essential characteristic of intelligence. Likewise, Michael Warner is certain that “without secrets, it is not intelligence”⁸⁰

⁷⁸ See Glenn Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem,” in *Controlling Intelligence*, ed. Glenn Hastedt, (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 6.

⁷⁹ Abram N. Schulsky and Gary Schmitt, G., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 3rd Edition, (Washington, D.C.:Potomac Books,2002), 1-3, 171-176. The authors emphasize the importance of secrecy in every level and related works of intelligence including collection and analysis, covert action, counterintelligence and management.

⁸⁰ Warner, “Wanted a definition”, 20.

and concludes that intelligence is “secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities”.⁸¹ This definition implies both the knowledge production and covert operation aspects of intelligence, indeed and places secrecy at the core of its functions.

On the contrary, the ones supporting less secrecy of intelligence argue for an increased accountability and publicness of intelligence activities. Secrecy is believed to provide a shield to the intelligence system from control and oversight. The problem with it is that secrecy may conceal the abuse of intelligence information or an unnecessary violation of the law or rules. Consequently, secrecy should not be an essential element of intelligence. Alan Breakspear defends that secrecy is not and should not be a defining element of intelligence whereas the decision made on it can be secret.⁸² Intelligence cannot be free from secrecy and secrecy is necessary for effective intelligence indeed. Secrecy is an inherent element of intelligence; however, it is not an impediment against control and oversight on intelligence. In fact, it is not the secrecy notion but the regime type and government culture that shape the control and oversight level on intelligence system.

In conclusion, different definitions of intelligence handle different aspects of intelligence. These definitions do not build up on each other, but contradict each other most of the time, if not always, with respect to

⁸¹ Warner, “Wanted: a definition”, 21.

⁸² Breakspear, “A New Definition”, 678-693.

the roles, functions and structure of intelligence. The divergent concepts of intelligence hinder founding a common definition of intelligence. This chapter is aimed to analyse the reasons for the differentiation in the concepts of intelligence. In this respect, the key variables in the understanding of intelligence are examined in terms of type of government, strategic environment and technological developments. Collectively, these variables affect the definition of intelligence in terms of its role, function and structure. With respect to its role, intelligence is both a special kind of power and an instrument of the state power. With the intelligence knowledge, it has a role in shaping the policy and with a secret tool of implementing policy to achieve certain goals. Accordingly, intelligence can be defined as an organised secret activity to provide foreknowledge to decision makers and to perform covert actions when deemed necessary. At the same time, the effective counterintelligence provides a shield against secret activities of adversaries; such as terrorist organisations, subversive undertakings and economic, scientific and cyber sabotages. To conclude, in the modern world, presuming the democratic rule, advanced information and communication technologies and under uncertainties in the strategic environment, intelligence should be tasked with “intelligence gathering and analysis, counterintelligence and covert action”. Intelligence should remain a secret activity, concerned with the secret information and its *modus operandi* should be in secrecy. However, secrecy notion should not impede on the control and oversight of intelligence. Secrecy is a necessary but not a divine characteristic of intelligence. The chapter continues with the analysis of reasons for intelligence failure. Intelligence failure is not only concerned

with intelligence gathering and analysis. Failure can occur at each function of the intelligence and each function is analysed with respect to the reasons for failure.

2.3. Failure in the Intelligence System

In the Oxford dictionary, failure is explained as “1. Lack of success, 2. The neglect or omission of expected or required action 3. The action or state of not functioning”. Accordingly, failure of intelligence can be defined as lack of intelligence success, the neglect or omission of expected or required intelligence or, the action or state of intelligence not functioning. As discussed in the previous section, intelligence has four components, which are; intelligence gathering and analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. Hence, a failure of intelligence is likely to involve a failure within any of its constituents.

For a successful intelligence mechanism, intelligence should function successfully with respect to its all aforementioned elements. Since they are complementary of each other, a malfunction of any of the element can be a cause for breakdown of the intelligence system. Consequently, if “intelligence system” fails to be successful, the reason for it can be failures of intelligence production, counterintelligence or covert action. The counterintelligence function, for example, provides for the security of intelligence and covert action functions, intelligence is significant in operationalising covert actions and covert actions can contribute to the intelligence and counterintelligence. This symbiotic relationship leads to

the conclusion that any failure with respect to these functions will result in the failure of intelligence system. This section aims to analyse how a failure of intelligence occurs. It focuses on the causes of and reasons for failures regarding each function of intelligence. Subsequently in the next chapter, the findings of this chapter are applied to the case study of Cyprus conflict that involves some apparent failures of intelligence. The reasons behind the failures are discussed in terms of intelligence failure, counterintelligence failure and covert action failure respectively.

2.3.1. Intelligence Failure

Cited from Sherman Kent, intelligence is widely described as “the knowledge, the organisation that produces the knowledge, and the activities carried out by that organisation for the knowledge.”⁸³ Similarly, Lowenthal defines intelligence as a process, as a product and as an organisation.⁸⁴ Therefore intelligence is a knowledge product, resulting from a certain type of intelligence process which is undertaken by the efforts of an intelligence organisation.

One of the essential functions of an intelligence mechanism is to generate intelligence products, namely intelligence reports on specific subjects, to meet the needs of decision-makers. Although all intelligence is not always actionable, the desired end product is ideally actionable

⁸³ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy*, xiii.

⁸⁴ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8.

intelligence. The purpose hereof is to enhance the decision-maker's ability to choose a course of action under favour of the intelligence received. To this end, the provided intelligence should be accurate, timely, reasonable and objective/unbiased, truthful, free from politicisation. These are the essential features of intelligence as a product. Harry Truman underlined the importance of timely and accurate intelligence of wartime as⁸⁵:

The war taught us this lesson – that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.

The timely, accurate, understandable and objective intelligence that supports the decision-maker to act or react in advance is efficient. Thus, intelligence failure can occur in the absence of needed intelligence on time or in the presence of inaccurate, unwise or biased intelligence. As history shows, these failures can have disastrous results.

In addition, the intelligence failure has another side to be taken into consideration. Apart from the production level, the “use of intelligence” can be prone to errors. In the *Silent Warfare*, Schulsky and Schmitt defines an intelligence failure as “any misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are

⁸⁵ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume 2: Years Of Trial And Hope* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956): 75.

inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests.”⁸⁶ This misunderstanding can occur not only due to the failure of the intelligence-related problems but also the mistakes of decision-makers to act on the intelligence appropriately. Therefore, the success of intelligence also depends on the “complementary action by the decision maker and operational arms of their government.”⁸⁷ Decision maker’s ability to act on the intelligence provided is also influential on the success or failure of the intelligence. Consequently, the use of intelligence is as significant as its production for success or failure. The inadequate intelligence knowledge is a reason for failure but the inability to make sound policy led by intelligence and implement it is also a reason for it. Hence, intelligence failures occur because of either a failure of intelligence production, or a failure of use based on that intelligence.

Another argument takes into consideration the organisational and bureaucratic limitations. According to them, the problem is the defective bureaucracy; the intelligence is not shared or coordinated sufficiently. Amy Zegart who studied the US intelligence community argues that the roots of failure should be traced to the organizational structure. She asserts that the structure of intelligence organisation can impede its

⁸⁶ Schulsky and Schmitt, “*Silent Warfare*” ,63.

⁸⁷ John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed”, *Political Science Quarterly* 123, no.2 (2008):248.

ability to collect, analyse, disseminate or use the intelligence.⁸⁸ Hence, the weaknesses in the organisational structure can hinder operational capability, which in turn, may cause intelligence failures. Walter Laqueur, in his *World of Secrets*, emphasized that intelligence failures can be related to the intelligence system, or to the bureaucratic structures connecting intelligence and policy makers, or to the policy makers.⁸⁹ Laquer also believed that intelligence failures are inevitable and the main reasons behind failures encompass inadequate knowledge, deception, biased opinion and general incompetence.⁹⁰ Gill and Phythian suggests six indicators of the success of an intelligence organisation:

1. Predictive success
2. Absence of predictive failure
3. Maintenance of (customer) trust
4. Maintenance of public trust
5. Maintenance of effective partnerships with allied intelligence organisations
6. Maintaining or enhancing the customer's relative advantage.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Amy B. Zegart, "9/11 and the FBI: The Organizational Roots of Failure", *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no.2, (2007):165-184., Also, see Amy B. Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, The FBI and the Origins of 9/11*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁸⁹ Laqueur, *A World of Secrets*, 258-269.

⁹⁰ Laqueur, *A World of Secrets*, 258.

⁹¹ Gill & Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 18.

On the contrary, John A. Gentry identifies six types of intelligence-related failures:

- a. threat warning failure by intelligence agencies;
- b. leaders' failure to respond effectively to threat warnings;
- c. opportunity warning failure by intelligence agencies;
- d. leaders' failure to effectively exploit opportunities;
- e. failure to recognize one's own vulnerabilities in the context of other actors' intelligence and operational capabilities,
- f. failure to ameliorate one's self-known vulnerabilities to physical attack and non-violent manipulation.⁹²

When compared, Gill and Phythian's indicators 1, 2 and 6 and Gentry's categories of a, c, e and f are in coherence, with respect to the evaluation of an intelligence organisation's performance. Accordingly, intelligence as an organisation should bear the responsibility for the threat warning failure which can result in a disastrous surprise. The widely recognised form of intelligence failure is "surprise attack" and it is this type of failure this study focuses on. In his lecture of "The History and Lessons of Intelligence Failure" notes, Tom O'Connor states that "the worst kind of intelligence failure is surprise attack" and summarises the root causes of intelligence failures as "overestimation, underestimation, subordination of intelligence to policy, lack of communication, unavailability of information, received opinion, mirror imaging, over-

⁹² Gentry, *Intelligence Failure Reframed*, 249.

confidence, complacency, failure to connect the dots.”⁹³ Hence, warning intelligence is necessary to avoid any surprise attack.

While Gill and Phythian do not mention on the responsibility of decision maker for intelligence success, Gentry recognises possible responsibility of the decision-maker for intelligence failure in his indicators of b and d. Betts also considers the mistake leading to intelligence failure is made by the decision-makers:

In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have been made... most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services. ... Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.⁹⁴

Betts explains that there are three phases of warning such as political warning based on the increase in tensions, strategic warning based on indications that enemy is mobilizing and deploying forces and tactical warning when the initial movements of the attack are detected.⁹⁵

⁹³ Tom O'Connor, lecture notes on "History and Lessons of Intelligence Failure" (2005) on <https://www.ics.uci.edu/~ucrec/intranet/miscdocs/HSclassnotes/class5.html> (Accessed on 19 January 2019)

⁹⁴ Richard Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable." *World Politics* 31, no. 01 (1978), 61.

⁹⁵ Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1982), 4-5.

According to him, strategic surprise occurs when one fails to obtain these warnings, or fails to respond to any warning.⁹⁶

Apart from decision-maker's responsibility, providing warning, which is of intelligence organisation-related, failure can happen at tactical or strategical level. Tactical intelligence is intelligence collected on the capabilities, vulnerabilities or reactions of the adversary.⁹⁷ It is valuable while carrying out tactical operations that require current intelligence. It represents the puzzle-solving mission of the intelligence.⁹⁸ The lack or failure of tactical intelligence that is unable to meet the "current intelligence needs" can impede on the success of action against the adversary.

Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, concerns with knowledge in support of policy and strategy making. The required intelligence generally covers a macro level of information that can provide

⁹⁶ Ibid,5.

⁹⁷ David Thomas, "US Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New Challenges", in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* ed. Roger Z.Geroge, James B. Bruce, (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 144. Also, "Tactical Intelligence," in Unites States Joint Chief of Staffs, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), (22 October 2013), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf (Accessed on 10 March 2019)

⁹⁸ Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence Analysis: Between Politicization and Irrelevance" in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* ed. Roger Z.Geroge ,James B. Bruce, (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 99.

understanding of the issue. The aim is to provide foresight about the thinking processes, intentions, balance of capabilities and limitations and possible courses of action against the threat or adversary.⁹⁹ The failure in the strategic intelligence may constrain the development of situational awareness, which in turn, may cause an error of judgment in policy making. It is generally supposed that intelligence failure occurs only at a strategic level. However, it does not mean that having strategic intelligence is enough to prevent intelligence failure. It is possible that tactical warning can be absent although the strategic intelligence on the issue was comprehensive.


There are two types of warning failures; Type II- either missing an actual threat or, Type I-warning of dire events that do not in fact occur.¹⁰⁰ Type II is Pearl Harbour, Type I is WMD in Iraq.

Consequently, intelligence is not necessarily the raw information collected but is the end product of intelligence process. This product of intelligence is expected to meet the intelligence needs of the decision-, or policy-makers accurately, timely and objectively. Mark Lowenthal provides a useful definition of intelligence as follows; “intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy

⁹⁹ Don McDowell, *Strategic Intelligence: A handbook for practitioners, managers and users*, (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 10-28.

¹⁰⁰ John A Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon, *Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 18-19.

makers and has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those needs”.¹⁰¹ It indicates that intelligence is a specific form of information transformed through an intelligence process. This intelligence process is usually expressed as the “intelligence cycle”. The origin of the intelligence cycle is obscure but the US Training Manual of 1948, *Intelligence for Commanders* by LTC Philip Davidson and LTC Robert Glass is widely referred to present the first graphic of the intelligence cycle. (See Figure 1)




*Figure 1 - The First Drawing of Intelligence Cycle*¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 1.

¹⁰² The drawing is available online at Kristan Wheaton, “Let’s Kill the Intelligence Cycle- Part 4: The Traditional Intelligence Cycle and its History” (23 March 2012) on <http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com/2012/03/part-13-whole-picture-lets-kill.html> (accessed on 26th January 2019)

The intelligence cycle explains how intelligence is developed in a simplistic way and is applicable to civilian, military and law enforcement intelligence. It describes the nature of intelligence. It was augmented with inclusion of analysis stage and is composed of five interrelated stages which are *Planning and Direction*, *Collection*, *Processing*, *Analysis* and *Dissemination and Use*.



*Figure 2 - Intelligence Cycle*¹⁰³

¹⁰³ See Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, “From Intelligence Cycle to web of intelligence: complexity and the conceptualisation of intelligence” in *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* (ed) Mark Phythian (NewYork: Routledge, 2013). The intelligence cycle has been criticised of being outdated in the information age and challenged by alternative cycle proposals. Robert Clark’s “target-centric intelligence cycle”, Gregory F. Treverton’s “real intelligence cycle”, Gill and Phythian’s “funnel shape intelligence cycle” and Arthur Hulnick’s “matrix model” are the most discussed ones to improve the intelligence process.

The image of intelligence cycle depicts a step-by-step intelligence process. However, the stages of the cycle do not operate sequentially but rather concurrently, indeed. There are no clear-cut boundaries between the tasks and they can overlap or coincide. The expected output of the intelligence cycle is relevant, accurate and timely intelligence that fulfils the needs of policy- or decision-makers. In this manner, the intelligence failure can occur in the absence of timely and/or accurate and/or objective intelligence. So, how does an intelligence failure occur? Lowenthal puts it well out that

An intelligence failure is the inability of one or more parts of the intelligence process -collection, evaluation and analysis, production, dissemination- to produce timely and accurate intelligence on an issue or event of importance to national interests.¹⁰⁴

Therefore, the main causes for an intelligence failure are unavailable or inaccurate intelligence; or misuse of intelligence. Illustrating the intelligence process from production to use of it, intelligence cycle helps locating the failure as well. One can conclude that intelligence failure has two aspects regarding; the intelligence available to decision, or policy makers and the use of intelligence by them. The reasons behind intelligence failure can be discussed with respect to the stages of intelligence cycle.

¹⁰⁴ Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Burdensome Concept of Failure," in *Intelligence: Policy and Process*, ed. Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 51.

Planning and Direction is the initial phase of the intelligence process, where intelligence requirements of the intelligence customers are determined, and then, prioritised according to relative importance and urgency. It is the key stage for operating the intelligence process. Then, the intelligence objective is to meet these intelligence needs. The cycle starts with external direction where intelligence requirements are delivered from the customers. This is also called “tasking” of the intelligence. Next, comes the internal direction, where planning of the next stages of intelligence cycle is decided, according to the requirements.¹⁰⁵ After the priorities for the intelligence needs are set, planning how to allocate the limited resources to the intelligence requirements is next.

In some practices, priorities for targeting can be determined by the intelligence services themselves. However, this may cause the intelligence organisation to become a “state within a state.”¹⁰⁶ Directions to be given to the intelligence organisation are more preferable to be as they are in British intelligence system. In the British understanding, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is responsible for setting requirements and priorities for MI6 and GCHQ. The role of JIC is “... to contribute to the formulation of statements of the requirements and priorities for

¹⁰⁵ Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00 (JDP 2-00): Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 3rd Edition, Ministry of Defence: Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011, 3-6.

¹⁰⁶ Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 63.

intelligence gathering and other tasks to be conducted by the intelligence agencies...”.¹⁰⁷ This stage is to ensure that assets are devoted to targets in line with the requirements of the customers with clear direction. A failure can occur at this stage if the requirements are determined inappropriately or the allocation of resources for the task is inefficient. To avoid misdirection of the intelligence process, decision-, or policy makers or the intelligence customers in general should ask the right intelligence question with realistic expectations.

Collection is the second stage of the cycle. Once the intelligence requirements are delivered, priorities are established and direction is provided, the intelligence cycle continues with the stage of collection. This phase involves the allocating of sources to obtain information with appropriate methods and delivery of the collected information for processing. The efficient collection necessitates the best match between the sources of information and methods of collection. To this end, identifying which sources are the most capable of presenting the required intelligence is of importance.

The sources for intelligence collection can be a person, an object, a process or a system from which information can be obtained.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is “a cross-government committee, based at the Cabinet Office, providing intelligence assessments about security, defense and foreign affairs.” <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee> (accessed on 10.03.2019).

¹⁰⁸ JDP 2-00, 3-14.

Intelligence collection methods are called collection disciplines and comprise of human intelligence, technical intelligence and open source intelligence.

*Table 1: Examples of Intelligence Collection Disciplines*¹⁰⁹

Intelligence Collection Disciplines	
HUMINT Human Intelligence	Overt HUMINT Clandestine HUMINT
SIGINT Signals Intelligence	COMINT (Communications Intelligence) ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) FIS (Foreign Instrumentation Signals)
MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence	Nuclear MASINT RADINT (Radar Intelligence)
IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)	GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence)
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)	SOCMINT (Social Media Analysis) CYBINT (Cyber Intelligence)

¹⁰⁹ To read on the main disciplines of intelligence collection, see Mark Lowenthal and Robert Clark, *The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection* (Washington D.C:CQ Press, 2016), for social media analysis, see Ravi Gupta and Hugh Brooks, *Using Social Media for Global Security* (Indiana:John Wiley&Sons, Inc:2013), for cyber intelligence, Robert D. Williams, "(Spy) Game Change: Cyber networks, Intelligence Collection and Covert Action", *The George Washington Law Review* 79, no.4 (2011), 1162-1200.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from human sources and is the oldest method of espionage. The sources of HUMINT are defectors or moles, walk-ins, undercover agents and informants. A much debated but much used method especially in counterterrorism -against terrorist targets, interrogation is also a form of HUMINT. Interrogation as a method of information collection is a divisive topic. Many argue that in counter-terrorism, “important information comes from the interrogation of terrorists and their supporters.”¹¹⁰

Technical intelligence has become a collection discipline only in 20th century with developments in technology. The covert methods of technical surveillance and interception of communication have become possible then. In 21st century, the advancement in information and communication technologies supplied new sources of information that required innovative collection methods. The states have been mostly invested in SIGINT capabilities as it is regarded as the effective source of current intelligence. SIGINT has been argued to be superior to HUMINT in terms of reliability. “SIGINT can provide a sense of reliability that HUMINT cannot always match.”¹¹¹ However, HUMINT is considered to be more efficient against specific targets of subversive and terrorist threats. IMINT is the use of photographic surveillance to monitor targets.

¹¹⁰ Daniel Byman, “The Intelligence War on Terrorism”, *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 6 (2014): 844.

¹¹¹ Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 71.

Although intelligence is sometimes described as the collection of solely secret information, intelligence information gathering focuses on both overt and covert information sources. Intelligence in this age cannot be limited to covert sources only. The advancement in information and communication technologies has brought up new sources of information and new threats to national security. Therefore, intelligence is much more than just collecting secret information.¹¹² Capability of collecting information from open sources is of importance to the intelligence professionals. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is based on the information on public domain. It is open source information, available to everyone with no specific arrangements. Open source information is not a part of intelligence for those who favour secrecy as an essential element of intelligence. On the other hand, it is argued that the secrecy should be respected, regarding the outcome of intelligence product, not the information source. Intelligence as a process and a product should not be limited with discovering secret information of others. Considering the wide range of open sources in the information age of ours, a focus on collection of exclusively secret information is outdated. Moreover, OSINT is regarded less costly and proportionately efficient in the intelligence process. It is a general saying that almost ninety per cent of intelligence comes from open sources. Therefore, open sources are significant as much as covert ones for collection and what matters is the ability to combine these effectively in the intelligence process.

¹¹² Robert David Steele, "The Importance of Open Source Intelligence to the Military", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 8, no.4 (Winter 1995), 457-470.

The failures of collection impede the efficiency of whole intelligence process. Therefore, intelligence collection attracts more attention in the studies of failure. Steele argues that secret intelligence collection has fails due to a wide range of reasons but one of the major inefficiency is the failure to collect on socio-economic, ideo-cultural, techno-demographic or natural-geographic matters.¹¹³ The malfunction of the collection level may result in a lack of or inaccurate information. It may stem from deception or disinformation by the adversaries or poor tradecraft or mismanagement of resources by the intelligence organisation. If the information gathered is inaccurate, then an intelligence failure is likely to happen. The common cause of inaccurate intelligence is deceptive disinformation operations. Disinformation refers to the spread of untrue information deliberately to deceive the adversary. The aim is to gain information advantage against the rivalry by making the enemy “quite certain, very decisive, and wrong.”¹¹⁴ Disinformation is part of the deception operations which aim to create misperceptions and subsequently perturb the intelligence system of the enemy or the rival.¹¹⁵ It drives on the basic assumption that any

¹¹³ Ibid, 463.

¹¹⁴ Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, MA:Center for Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 135.

¹¹⁵ To read on deception, Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (eds), *Strategic Denial and Deception:The Twenty-First Century Challenge* (New York:Routledge, 2017)., Jon Latimer, *Deception in War* (New York:The Overlook Press, 2001), Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz, *Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security*, (Norwood, MA:Artech House, Inc.,2007); Bowyer J. Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16, no.2 (2003): 244-279., Michael Howard,

communication channel that transmits the true information can also transmit the misleading and deceptive information. It was reinvented as a First World War term and Germans were the first to institutionalise it as German general staff created a special Disinformation Service.¹¹⁶ In the Second World War, Hitler resumed this activity against the Soviets, and it has been in use since then. Disinformation is widely practiced for propaganda and subversive activities. Democracies, authoritarian regimes, regimes in transition and non-state actors employ deception operations in the 21st century.¹¹⁷ The risk of deception has increased as a result of diversified communication channels and growth in the speed and availability of the information.

Another problem of collection stage is the lack of information. The lack of the required intelligence information is sometimes called an intelligence gap,¹¹⁸ which can lead to intelligence failure. Intelligence gaps refer to absence of information due to the inability of the

British Intelligence in the Second World War: Strategic Deception, volume 5 (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990).

¹¹⁶ Barton Whaley, *Stratagem*, 17. The Russian Bolshevik Cheka adopted the technique of disinformation (as *dezinformatsiya*) in 1920s.

¹¹⁷ Roy Godson and James J.Wirtz (eds), *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 4-7.

¹¹⁸ The term “intelligence gap” is mostly used by CIA. It is defined as “collection gaps on intelligence targets that were not being adequately covered ...”. James Risen, *State of War:The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006),89.

intelligence organisation to collect information about the target. The inability to collect information may stem from lack of sources or the method used. An intelligence gap is possible when the target of collection has a secretive nature, or the necessary means of collection is absent. The targets such as terrorist organisations are categorised with secretive nature that are hard to penetrate. The conformity between sources and methods forms the essence of an intelligence organisation's collection capabilities. Deploying, or when necessary developing, the effective method targeting the appropriate source is important. Failing to do so, may cause mismanagement of sources that will end up in intelligence gaps or failures. Besides it requires expertise with respect to all collection disciplines.

Despite the attempts to regard intelligence as a science, it is still an art that takes a unique form according to the capabilities of the intelligence organisation and its professionals. Any intelligence organisation should discern their own tradecraft, harmonising skills and expertise, to operate effectively. Laquer states that, "intelligence performance depends on those who perform it".¹¹⁹ In this regard, the abilities of the practitioners should be enhanced by the appropriate trainings of such as language and culture. Laquer also maintains that the intelligence officers should have a well-founded intellectual education in the social sciences, especially history and geography.¹²⁰ The poor training of personnel, insufficient

¹¹⁹ Laqueur, *A World of Secrets*, 318.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

methods of collection and lack of operative tradecraft will hamper intelligence gathering capacity, thus cause intelligence failures.

Processing is the stage where exploitation of the information collected happens. Processing is dependent on the quality and quantity of the collected information at this stage. It refers to the conversion of the collected information into structured data in suitable formats. Therefore it is kind of preliminary analysis in the transformation of raw data into intelligence. This phase usually begins with collation of the masses of information, continues with evaluation of the reliability of source as well as credibility and validity of information obtained. Therefore, this stage is the examination and comparison of the collected information against unreliable, untrue or invalid ones. The collected information is scrutinized against deception, disinformation or biases. Therefore, the efficacy of processing contributes to the coherence and consistency of intelligence to be provided. In the age of information, the “big data” process requires special databases and software. Still, the bulk of data is sometimes more than what an analyst could exploit, and the bulk of data can lead to processing deficiency. The failure at processing may result in loss of useful information, or transmission of disinformation that may result in intelligence failure inevitably. In addition, improper evaluation of source and data reliability and credibility can distort the analysis of the information which can cause intelligence failure.

At the *intelligence analysis* stage, the analytical process of the collected and processed information begins. In the end, information is transformed

into usable intelligence. Intelligence is not only the organized collection of targeted information but also the process of determining what the information means.¹²¹ LeFebvre describes intelligence analysis as “the process of evaluating and transforming raw data acquired covertly into descriptions, explanations, and judgements for policy consumers.”¹²² He also states that it “describes what is known... it highlights the interrelationships that form the basis for the judgements...it offers a forecast.”¹²³ Therefore, intelligence analysis provides an understanding of the subject; including foresight -predictive judgments- about the future. Hence, it is the synthesis of the knowledge and foreknowledge of the subject for decision makers, whom Lefebvre called as “policy consumers”. This “understanding” refers to the “acquisition and development of knowledge to enable insight (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and foresight (anticipate what may happen)”.¹²⁴ Robert Clark underlines the importance of intelligence analysis for strategic decision-making that is able to develop “precise,

¹²¹ Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 3.

¹²² Stephane Lefebvre, “A Look at Intelligence Analysis,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17, no.2 (2004):236.

¹²³ Ibid, 112.

¹²⁴ JDP 2-00, 1-7.

reliable, and valid inferences (hypotheses, estimations, conclusions or predictions).”¹²⁵

The foresight is about probabilities, therefore; intelligence analysis is not searching for the truth, as Lowenthal states¹²⁶, but the draw analytic conclusions which are “close to truth” supported by the available data. Therefore, the intelligence analysis is to provide for knowing the adversaries with approximate realities.

In the literature, there is an ongoing debate of whether the intelligence is to find out secrets or solve the mysteries. Joseph Nye provides the distinction between them as such, “a secret is something concrete can be stolen by a spy or discerned by a technical sensor ... A mystery is an abstract puzzle to which no one can be sure of the answer.”¹²⁷ There are no definitive answers to the mysteries, but intelligence analysis can provide approximate answer. In summary, secrets are to be revealed, puzzles are to be solved and mysteries are to be predicted. Intelligence analysis is the fullest extent of all these and expected to provide knowledge and foreknowledge about the subject in question.

¹²⁵ Robert Clark, *Intelligence Analysis*, 19.

¹²⁶ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2006, 6.

¹²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Peering into the Future”, *Foreign Affairs*, 73, no.4, (1994):88.

Despite the availability of enough or more information, intelligence failures can still occur at analytical level. Any possible reasons for poor analysis include misinterpretation or disregard of the information, an error of judgement (overestimation or underestimation of the threat), subordination of intelligence to policy, or psychology of intelligence analysts (cognitive biases and mind-sets), or poor tradecraft (lack of expertise and training). In addition, deception by the enemy can lead to a faulty analysis.¹²⁸

The risk of failure arises when intelligence is to be subordinated to policy. The politicisation of intelligence refers to the subordination of intelligence to support a certain policy.¹²⁹ This politicization of intelligence is best demonstrated by recalling Iraq's invasion based on alleged presence of WMD. Intelligence systems in the USA and the UK were deliberately asked for intelligence indicating evidence of WMD in Iraq. Gannon argues that there is two types of politicisation which are; distortion of analysis and analytical bias. He describes the former as "the wilful distortion of analysis to satisfy the demands of intelligence bosses or policymakers" and the latter as "a subtle but pervasive influence

¹²⁸ Erik J. Dahl, "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28, no.1 (2005), 33-34.

¹²⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, "Intelligence Analysis: Between 'Politicization' and Irrelevance," in *Analyzing intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovation*, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 93-95. He identifies five distinct form of politicisation of intelligence which are "direct pressure from policy, house view, cherry picking, question asking and shared mindset".

based on unconscious exertion of pressure.”¹³⁰ Intelligence is expected only to support the policy. However, under pressure, intelligence makers are likely to supply intelligence to suit policy. Thus, it becomes a policy-led intelligence, rather than an intelligence-led policy.

The quality of analysis is also based on its distance to biases. Richard J. Heuer Jr., argues that mental mind-sets and presumptions and cognitive biases lead to faulty judgments that cause the intelligence failures.¹³¹ Handel also argues that the most common cause for intelligence failure occurs because of psychological limitations of the human nature. The biased understanding and preconceptions are the limiting factors of human mind. Handel asserts that “Most intelligence failures occur because intelligence analysts and decision-makers refuse to adapt their concepts to new information”.¹³² These embedded opinions cause overestimation or underestimation of adversary’s intentions. The result is an inevitable error in judgment.

Poor tradecraft may cause incorrect or inadequate analysis of the information. The advancement in collection technologies results in

¹³⁰ John C. Gannon, “Managing Analysis in Information Age” in George, Roger Z. *Analyzing Intelligence* (Washington ,DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008),221-222.

¹³¹ Richards J. Heuer Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, D.C. :Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999)

¹³² Michael I. Handel, "Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980's," in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates*, ed. Roy Godson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 103.

bulks of information. And intelligence analysis is the intellectual effort of making sense of this data. However, the advancement in collection methods will not contribute to the quality of intelligence product unless effective analytic tools are developed. In this manner, employing appropriate software contributes to the quality and timing of the analysis. As it is an intellectual work, the analysts should be qualified for the required skills. In addition, training thereof is also important.

Another problem, regarding the intelligence analysis, stems from the mass of available data. The quantity of data is not always an indicator to a successful analysis. It is rather the proportion of relevant data to irrelevant one that demonstrates a successful analysis. It is not wrong to suggest that larger the volume of information, the higher the possibility of noise. Hence the overload of information and data is not only a problem of collation but also of analytical capability. Therefore, the main focus of the intellectual work of analysis is first to identify and distinguish the relevant data and information from the bulk of unrelated information. Wohlstetter addressed this problem in her work and identified the relevant information as signals whereas irrelevant ones as noise.¹³³ Based on the case of Pearl Harbour, she studied the problem of “signals-to-noise ratio” with respect to the surprise and the mechanism of warning intelligence. She discovered that it was the ratio of noise to signals that made the analysis difficult. According to her suggestion,

¹³³ See Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

intelligence failure can occur in case of misinterpretation or disregard of the signals among the excess of noise. In her examination of Pearl Harbour case, she concluded that the reason of failure was not the lack of relevant materials but the abundancy of irrelevant ones.¹³⁴

Therefore, signals are the necessary intelligence units for warning. The 11 September 2001 attacks have also been explained with respect to her signals to noise ratio.¹³⁵ It was advised to the US intelligence community to improve its ability to analyse and understand the obtained information- the signals. Although Wohlstetter's work of "signals-to-noise ratio" has been generally accepted as the "first law of intelligence failure", it has inadequacies to explain the deception. There is no separation between irrelevant information and disinformation in her model. Whaley criticises Wohlstetter's model that it was unable to cope with deception operations because it locates both misinformation and disinformation in the category of "noise".¹³⁶

Once the analytic process is completed, the expected ideal intelligence assessment report should involve "warning intelligence of potential threats, understanding of the strategic environment of the threats,

¹³⁴ Ibid, 387.

¹³⁵ See Charles F.Parker and Eric K.Stern, "Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise", *Political Psychology* 23, no.3 (2002): 601-630.; and Erik J. Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbour to 9/11 and Beyond* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

¹³⁶ Whaley, *Stratagem*, 18.

knowledge of the capabilities and foreknowledge of intentions of the threats or adversaries. Then it can be disseminated to decision-, or policy-makers who are also called as customers of intelligence or policy consumers.

In some practices, on the other hand, analysis is not regarded as an essential part of the intelligence process. Analysis is excluded from the intelligence cycle because intelligence concept is concentrated on the collection function. In British understanding, for example, analysis is regarded as a different action that is not necessarily involved in the intelligence production cycle. Also, the decision-makers themselves undertake their own research and analysis on a particular issue. Davies argues that this analysis efforts of decision-makers are performed in a biased manner, aimed to support their own ideas on a particular subject of intelligence question.¹³⁷

The final stage of intelligence cycle is the *dissemination and use* of the intelligence. The product of intelligence should be delivered to the customer in an appropriate and timely way. Intelligence can be presented to its consumer in various formats such as verbal or written intelligence reports, databases, trend analysis reports and imagery products. The intelligence report should include “anticipatory, timely, accurate, usable,

¹³⁷ Jack Davis, “Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts and Evidence”, *Occasional Papers: Sherman Kent Centre for Intelligence Analysis*, 2.no.2, (2003):1-8. Also available online <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no2.htm> (accessed 12.02.2019)

complete, relevant, objective, available” intelligence.¹³⁸ Also, determining who needs to receive the intelligence report is important. In many intelligence systems, dissemination has traditionally been conducted based on “need to know” principle.

Despite the presence of timely, accurate and actionable intelligence, the failure can still occur at dissemination level. Because the bureaucratic obstacles hampering the interconnection between the intelligence producers and end users of it, the poor communication among them may impede on the access to and arrival of intelligence. In addition, the inefficient reporting styles used in the reports such as lack of clear expression, ambiguities or vagueness in the assessments may cause misperception or ignorance of the intelligence.

Moreover, the failure to share the necessary intelligence can also cause intelligence failure. The poor coordination between intelligence agencies -law enforcement, security and foreign intelligence- may result in insufficient information sharing and this will result in unavailability of information. The reasons for poor coordination may arise from competition between agencies or unconsciousness to share intelligence. The studies of failure in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks reveal that the lack of intelligence sharing mechanism resulted in ignorance of the necessary and available intelligence about the Al-Qaida. In the Joint Inquiry Report, it was stated that “Given the CIA’s failure to

¹³⁸ These are called “attributes of intelligence excellence” in JP 2-0, II-7.

disseminate in a timely manner, intelligence information...[to unravel the September 11 plot] never materialized.”¹³⁹ The report also concluded that “Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11.”¹⁴⁰ As a result, the faults of sharing intelligence can result in the disregard of important intelligence. Different intelligence bodies can work on different parts of the same target and effective coordination for the dissemination of intelligence crucial to have an efficient intelligence-sharing mechanism.

Despite an effective dissemination mechanism, a failure of use of intelligence can still occur. Intelligence is expected to provide actionable intelligence that empowers the decision-, or policy-maker’s ability to choose a course of action in the face of threats or opportunities. “Intelligence, once carefully collected, analysed and disseminated, will give policy-makers a more accurate picture of the world and help them determine the most rewarding courses to pursue.”¹⁴¹ Once this intelligence is made available effectively and timely, it is the decision-

¹³⁹ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001. House Report 107-792. The Us Government Publishing House, December 2002. <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/107th-congress/house-report/792>. (Accessed on 11.03.2019)

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., xvii.

¹⁴¹ David Charters, A.S.Farson & G.P. Hastedt (ed), *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment* (Oxon:Farnk Cass, 1996), 50.

maker's choice and responsibility to whether to act or not under favour of the intelligence. Although the intelligence requirements are met successfully, the intelligence failure can also occur during the use of intelligence.

The ignorance or misuse of intelligence assessment can result in the failure. Betts argues that "the principal cause of surprise is not the failure of intelligence but the unwillingness of political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch."¹⁴² Although both intelligence and decision-, policy-making mechanism are believed to be in the work of supporting a nation's security and well-being, they often exist as if they were from different worlds. Because of the competition at the high-levels of government, intelligence and policy-making fails to fit together harmoniously.¹⁴³ If the intelligence received does not support the policy sought by the policy-maker, it can be ignored or rejected most of the time. The misperceptions, overconfidence, mind-sets or all of these make the policy-makers doubtful of the intelligence. Therefore decision-, policy- maker is likely to ignore intelligence which contradicts his ideas, policy or perceptions. David Charters provide a strong criticism of policy-makers;

¹⁴² Betts, *Surprise Attack*, 4.

¹⁴³ Charters, Farson and Hastedt, *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment*, 50.

Senior policy makers, considering themselves experts on world developments, are hesitant to accept the views of often unknown intelligence officers, especially if the latter's judgments seem to challenge their own present assumptions. Decision-makers think intelligence is great when it can be used to support or help sell their own particular positions.¹⁴⁴

The scholars investigating the reasons for the historical intelligence failures contend that they were mostly experienced when policy-makers refused to accept the warning assessments. Gentry and Gordon asserts that “many historical cases indicate that analysts reached accurate conclusions about the course of future events but did not persuade decision-makers to decide or to act, leading sometimes to intelligence failures.”¹⁴⁵

Once an intelligence failure occurs, the government or the decision - maker body usually continue to do the wrong things to handle the situation, which was wrongly interpreted in the first place.¹⁴⁶ Although the misuse or ignorance of the intelligence can also cause the failure, the intelligence process is the first to be looked for to blame. Nevertheless, intelligence failure has two facets; the producer and the consumer of the

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. ,51.

¹⁴⁵ Gentry and Gordon, *Strategic Warning Intelligence*, 17.

¹⁴⁶ Shulsky and Schmidt, *Silent Warfare*, 63.

intelligence. And a very harsh criticism suggests that better consumers of intelligence are needed rather than better producers of intelligence.¹⁴⁷

2.3.2. Counterintelligence Failure

Counterintelligence (CI) is an old practice like intelligence. The objective of CI is as simple as protecting one's intelligence against other's intelligence. The development of CI is based on the intelligence structure shaped by the political system and the threat environment. Consequently, CI structures differ with respect to their scope, competences, tasks and operational powers. For example, European CI is defined in a narrow sense as the prevention of foreign espionage while the American CI involves wider tasks of counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, counter-sabotage, etc.¹⁴⁸ It is not only in Europe but in a worldwide manner, counterintelligence is often associated with only counter-espionage that aims for protecting the secrets of intelligence sources and methods and of the intelligence products. Thereby, CI is conceived of a supportive instrument and less important stepson¹⁴⁹ of intelligence.

¹⁴⁷ Charters, Farson and Hastedt, *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment*, 52.

¹⁴⁸ Gasper Hribar, *The Foundations of Counterintelligence: Definition and Principles in The Anatomy of Counterintelligence: European Perspective* (Sharjah: Bentham Science Publishers Ltd, 2016), 25.

¹⁴⁹ Avner Barnea, "Counterintelligence: stepson of the intelligence discipline", *Israel Affairs*, 23, no.4 (2017):715-726.

On the other hand, CI is discussed to be more than counter-espionage to have its own aims and unique tasks. CI contains not only reactive measures for preventing national secrets but also proactive engagements for providing knowledge advantage. Steele and Clark assert that CI should actively penetrate, control, manipulate or deceive the adversary's intelligence system. Accordingly, CI has defensive and offensive methods to achieve its goals against the adversary's intelligence.¹⁵⁰ The defensive CI is "investigation and detection of hostile intelligence collection efforts" while the latter is "the offensive practice of trying to penetrate an adversary's intelligence and espionage system and operations." It is also called counter-espionage.¹⁵¹ According to Steele, the defensive counterintelligence involves covert surveillance of individuals or group of people or institutions that are related to foreign intelligence entities, while offensive counterintelligence aims to infiltrate the adversary's intelligence structures.¹⁵² The offensive CI activities include "detecting, uncovering, exploitation and manipulation of foreign intelligence activities."¹⁵³ The effective defensive CI provides protection

¹⁵⁰ Clark, *Intelligence Analysis*. Robert David Steele, *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political :Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption*. (Virginia: OSS International Press: 2002).

¹⁵¹ Philip H. J. Davies, "Intelligence" in *Encyclopaedia of Power*, ed. Keith Dowding (London:Sage, 2011), 343.

¹⁵² Steele, *The New Craft of Intelligence*.

¹⁵³ Iztok Podbregar and Teodora Ivanuša. *The Anatomy of Counterintelligence: European Perspective*. (Sharjah:Bentham Science Publishers Ltd, 2016), 35.

from activities of foreign agents, deception, disclosure or leaks of secret information, and other covert operations. The offensive CI can offer its best by destruction of the adversary's intelligence system, but it is still considered successful if it succeeds at exploitation. Knowledge of foreign intelligence is of importance for protecting one's own secrets while unlocking other's secrets.¹⁵⁴ Offensive methods include detection, manipulation and neutralization. Counterintelligence organisations can employ these offensive methods to detect, harm, weaken or destroy the enemy; to acquire counterintelligence insight; to deceive or to plant double agents or moles.¹⁵⁵ Thus, CI guards against adversarial intelligence efforts of intelligence collection, counterintelligence and covert actions by means of defensive and offensive methods. Defensive measures of deterrence and detection constitute one half of CI practice while offensive activities of deception and neutralisation constitute "the real contest".¹⁵⁶

Counterintelligence is sometimes misunderstood to be a security structure. It is a part of the national security structure. CI and security services are working actively for national security within the country. The difference is, CI focuses against foreign intelligence threats (i.e.

¹⁵⁴ Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, 226.

¹⁵⁵ Podbregar and Ivanuša, *The Anatomy of Counterintelligence*, 45.

¹⁵⁶ Hank Prunckun, *Counterintelligence Theory and Practice*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield 2019), 46.

penetration and deception) whereas security service focuses against other forms of threats such as terrorism, sabotage or organised crime. Hence, counterintelligence operations cover the intelligence activities of foreign powers, terrorist groups and other entities while security measures apply to non-intelligence aspects of these threats. On the other hand, cooperation between these is necessary against the complex nature of the threats. For example, foreign intelligence services can engage in non-intelligence activities -sabotage and subversive activities- as a form of covert action. Also, CI plays a significant role in supporting security services in the fight against terrorism. Terrorist groups can use intelligence networks in their terrorist attacks. These necessitate effective collaboration between counterintelligence, law enforcement and security services. Therefore, these are separate but interconnected spheres of national security. In some practices, security and counterintelligence are joined under the cover of one single structure. Then, the agencies of this understanding are mostly called as “security services” that function against all types of threats.¹⁵⁷ These threats can be of external nature, such as espionage or of internal nature, such as subversion, treason and leaks of the secrets.¹⁵⁸ In the US Marine Corps Counterintelligence book, CI is described to include active and passive methods to protect against intelligence, espionage, sabotage, subversion

¹⁵⁷ Podbregar and Ivanuša, *The Anatomy of Counterintelligence*, 32-34.

¹⁵⁸ Secrets cover “secret governmental information, commercial secrets, intelligence sources and methods, covert operations.”

and terrorism threats. The active methods are employed for counter-espionage, counter-cyberespionage¹⁵⁹, counter-sabotage, counter-subversion and counter-terrorism while passive methods are used for protection of intelligence, material, personnel, installations and networks.¹⁶⁰ In British understanding, counterintelligence is defined as “those activities that identify the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organisations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism or other non-traditional threats.”¹⁶¹ Hence the security service undertakes activities of counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, counter-sabotage and so on.

The efficient CI produces mutual advantages for all functions of the intelligence. To recall, intelligence has three main objectives: to support decision-making with timely, accurate and objective intelligence; to protect national secrets through counterintelligence and to promote national interests with covert action. These objectives are contingent on the efficiency and capability of a nation’s intelligence,

¹⁵⁹ Cyber network vulnerability is a new frontier for counterintelligence. Cyber counterespionage is about protecting cyber networks from subversive or terrorist attacks or hostile penetration.

¹⁶⁰ US Marine Corps, *Counterintelligence*, (2016) 1-7.
[https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCRP%20210A.2%20\(Formerly%20MCWP%202-6\).pdf?ver=2016-06-01-135919-697](https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCRP%20210A.2%20(Formerly%20MCWP%202-6).pdf?ver=2016-06-01-135919-697)
(Accessed 18.02.2019)

¹⁶¹ JDP 2-00, 2-15.

counterintelligence and covert action. These are the separate but closely interrelated functions of the intelligence and counterintelligence is the common ground to all other functions. Counterintelligence depends on and supports intelligence, while it protects and utilises some form of covert action.

Counterintelligence is regarded as the other side of the intelligence coin. The objective of CI is the provision of counterintelligence insight that can supply advantage in developing capabilities to counter enemy's intelligence. In addition, CI plays a crucial and sensitive role in support of intelligence. According to Prunckun, counterintelligence is one of the most intellectually challenging areas.¹⁶² As one of the main CI tasks, counter-espionage can exploit the "paradox of fiction" which means altering one's perception about illusions and realities.¹⁶³

These threats can come from the foreign intelligence services of foreign states or similar organisations of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Therefore, one's intelligence success is the other's counterintelligence failure. CI operates to secure the intelligence, to maintain the secrecy of intelligence system and to exploit other's intelligence system to create surprise effect on the adversary. Thus,

¹⁶² Prunckun, *Counterintelligence Theory and Practice*, 3.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 45. Types of illusion are camouflage, auditory, temporal, taste or combination of them.

intelligence supports the decision-making while CI supports intelligence function. Without effective CI, intelligence cannot function effectively.

With respect to covert actions, CI can have its own aims and tasks or can support the planned operation. CI can contribute to other types of covert operations by making up of covers and providing technical support such as safe houses, help of transport for required materials and means of data transmission.¹⁶⁴ The reveal of secret information or plans to an adversary may breach operational security through possible counter-measures taken by the adversary. The effectiveness of covert op. is contingent upon the successful maintenance of “plausible deniability”. But if the perpetrator’s involvement is discovered, the consequences can be catastrophic. This failure to protect secrets can risk the lives or mission failure. These risks can be mitigated by effective CI methods. Hence, the main purpose of CI is to protect secrecy of all intelligence functions, so these functions can achieve the surprise effect on the adversary.

Counterintelligence is defined as the “covert detection and prevention, exploitation, and manipulation of foreign intelligence activities pursued by individuals, groups, organizations or states”.¹⁶⁵ Counterintelligence also considers the protection of the national security system and national interests from the effects of foreign intelligence. In Johnson’s words, CI

¹⁶⁴ William R Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to be a Counterintelligence Officer* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 20-35.

¹⁶⁵ Podbregar and Ivanuša, *The Anatomy of Counterintelligence*, 31.

is aimed against “intelligence, against active, hostile intelligence, against enemy spies.”¹⁶⁶ These CI methods altogether aim for preventing enemy to gain access to secrets, penetrating to intelligence mechanism by moles or double agents; for detecting and neutralising efforts of adversary’s intelligence, collection, sabotage, subversion and terrorism efforts; for exploiting vulnerabilities in adversary’s intelligence mechanism through misleading efforts of feints, ruses, disinformation, which are deception. Deception is one of the hardest and dangerous, but promising if successful, method of offensive CI. Abram Shulsky describes deception as;

the attempt to mislead an adversary’s intelligence analysis concerning the political, military, or economic situation he faces and to induce him, on the basis of those errors, to act in a way that advances one’s own interests rather than his. It is considered a form of counterintelligence because it attempts to *thwart a* major purpose of the adversary’s intelligence operations; in addition, it often involves counterintelligence methods, such as double-agent operations.¹⁶⁷

Barton Whaley also reveals two ways of disinformation:

...by planting it with double agents and by leaving it (usually in the form of documents) where the enemy service is known to have gained access through his agents. Among the more rare and exotic variations are such things as planting authentic information on a “blown” or otherwise thoroughly discredited agent.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies*, 2.

¹⁶⁷ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 132.

¹⁶⁸ Whaley, *Stratagem*, 23.

In summary, CI is an indispensable function of intelligence through offensive and defensive methods aimed at providing protection against foreign penetration to intelligence mechanism and reveal of secrets; promoting knowledge advantage through manipulation, exploitation and deception and detecting and uncovering of foreign intelligence activities. Counterintelligence is the goal-keeper of the intelligence system.¹⁶⁹ It aims to provide knowledge and understanding of the prevailing situation to keep the privileged information secret, the equipment secure and the personnel safe.¹⁷⁰

It is argued that CI failures are unavoidable because intelligence failures are inevitable. It is a zero-sum game where the intelligence success of one means the counterintelligence failure of the other. Michel Herman also explains that intelligence failure is the success of the enemy's counterintelligence.¹⁷¹ The principle target of CI operations is the intelligence activities of the adversary whose objective is obtaining information on one's vulnerabilities, capabilities, structure, operations and future intentions. Therefore, CI failure means failure to prevent the adversary from gaining access to intelligence system, or failure to protect the secrets of any intelligence manifestation, or to be deceived.

¹⁶⁹ Prunckun, *Counterintelligence Theory and Practice*, 38.

¹⁷⁰ JDP 2-00, 2-15.

¹⁷¹ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 221.

Targets of adversary's intelligence efforts include intelligence institutions, personnel who are responsible for the formulation and implementation of national policies and also the network between them. The main cause of CI failures is adversary's penetration to the intelligence system, through treason and betrayal. The causes of betrayal can be a result of addictions or motives of money, ideology, coercion, ego, etc. The failure of CI may result in hostile penetration to national secrets by activities of double agents or moles.¹⁷² Historical examples of treason include the Cambridge Five spy ring penetrating the British intelligence system and turning over the secrets to Moscow during the Cold War.¹⁷³ The leaks by Edward Snowden in 2013 revealed secret methods and sources of National Security Agency of the USA.¹⁷⁴ Although CI failures are unavoidable, they should not paralyze the intelligence system. Besides, the best defence is usually said to be a good offence. For some, any intelligence failure should be retaliated by launching offensive operations.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² To read a study on reasons for betrayal, see Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow, "Cold War Spies: Why they spied and how they got caught", *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 2 (1997): 101-125. The authors created a database of 139 Americans who were officially charged with spying and they studied on the motivations of them to spy and how they got recruited.

¹⁷³ To read the autobiography of ringleader, see Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968).

¹⁷⁴ To read further, Edward Jay Epstein, *How America Lost its Secrets: Edward Snowden, The man and the Theft*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017).

¹⁷⁵ Prunckun, *Counterintelligence Theory and Practice*, 45.

In conclusion, counterintelligence is a main function of intelligence that aims to protect and support the intelligence system. It depends on and supports the intelligence collection and analysis while it protects and utilises the covert operations. Counterintelligence objectives are “deterrence, detection, deception and neutralization” against the adversary’s intelligence efforts and operations. With offensive and defensive methods, CI guards the intelligence system from penetration, manipulation, leaks or influence; protects the secrecy of the operations; and assists intelligence system by means of detection and exploitation (manipulation, disinformation, deception) of the adversary’s intelligence structure. Secrecy is the main element of CI activities. CI failures are likely to occur because of deception, betrayal or treason, or because of the errors to identify, neutralize or exploit the other’s intelligence efforts.

2.3.3. Covert Action Failure

Covert Action (CA)¹⁷⁶ is an integral function of the intelligence system. CA along with the other intelligence functions of collection and analysis and counterintelligence, operate to achieve strategic national objectives. These intelligence functions are all related and dependant on each other. Godson asserts that “the four major elements of intelligence -collection,

¹⁷⁶ Covert action is also called as Special Operations, Special Activities or, Special Political Action, or as shorthand names of covert ops or black ops. The Soviet Union intelligence called “active measures”.

analysis, counterintelligence and covert action- are symbiotically related to each other and to overall policy and strategy.”¹⁷⁷

CA both supports and depends on other functions of the intelligence. To start with, CA both relies on and supports intelligence collection and analysis. Without efficient intelligence, CA cannot operate successfully. A successful CA depends on the knowledge regarding the adversary, knowledge of the current situation and foreknowledge of the influence sphere of the planned CA. Taplin argues that, as a principle of intelligence “Special activities must involve knowledge of the national groups toward which they are directed.”¹⁷⁸ Hence, the success of the CA is contingent upon the intelligence capable of these knowledge needs. In addition, CA can also support the intelligence collection. Treverton asserts that CA involved in political measures such as support to labour unions or political parties have contributed to intelligence collection in return, to CIA.¹⁷⁹ Sometimes, intelligence collection and CA practices are intertwined and inseparable. CA can be a method of intelligence

¹⁷⁷ Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, xxvii.

¹⁷⁸ Winn L. Taplin, “Six general principles of Intelligence”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 3, no.4(Winter 1989):475-491. Taplin sets the other principles of intelligence as “intelligence derives from international conflict or rivalry; conduct or use of intelligence involves secrecy; clandestine collection of intelligence is the fundamental activity of intelligence; truth must be the basis of intelligence; intelligence in a vacuum is of no value; tardy intelligence is of no value.”

¹⁷⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert action: the CIA and American Intervention in The Postwar World* (New York: I.B. Tauris,1988), 234.

collection. Michael Herman refers to the Cold War practice of diplomats and embassies that provided cover for covert intelligence collection operations about the communists.¹⁸⁰

The target of CA can be the government of a country, the society or a certain part of society. The purpose of covert action is to influence individuals, groups, events or institutions for a certain policy aim in a covert manner. For example, propaganda campaigns to influence the elections are mostly employed covert action types. Godson defines CA as “the practice of trying to influence events, decisions, and opinions covertly in other states with a measure of plausible deniability.”¹⁸¹ Shulsky and Schmitt defines CA as “...some secret activity to influence the behaviour of a foreign government or political, military, economic or societal events and circumstances in a foreign country.”¹⁸² In the CIA’s glossary, covert action is defined as:

An operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Herman, Michael. “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001” in *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no.2, (2004): 345-356.

¹⁸¹ Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, 19.

¹⁸² Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 75.

¹⁸³ CIA, *Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence* (Washington, DC :CIA, 1995), 52.

CA is expected to press the right button when diplomacy is not working and military action is too dangerous.¹⁸⁴ Hence, CA has been legitimised as a “third option”¹⁸⁵ or “middle option”¹⁸⁶ between diplomacy and war. It can be violent than diplomacy but less drastic than warfare. In Richard Helmes’ words;

Covert action has been referred to as the third choice”- an activity more aggressive than conventional diplomatic manoeuvring and less drastic than military intervention. ... At its best, covert action should be used like a well-honed scalpel, infrequently, and with discretion lest the blade lose its edge.¹⁸⁷

To obtain its specific ends, CA can employ a variety of activities ranging from propaganda to paramilitary activities. Treverton lists three CA types as follows; propaganda, political action and paramilitary

¹⁸⁴ Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, 65.

¹⁸⁵ Lowenthal, *From Secrets to Policy*, 181.; Arthur S. Hulnick, “US Covert Action: Does It Have a Future?”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 9, no.2 (Summer 1996), 154.

¹⁸⁶ Bruce D. Berkowitz and Alan E. Goodman, *Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000), 126; James M. Scott & Jerel A. Rosati, “‘Such Other Functions and Duties’: Covert Action and American Intelligence Policy” in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), *Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence and the Quest for Security, Vol. 3: Covert Action: Behind the Veils of Secret Foreign Policy* (London: Praeger, 2007), 84.

¹⁸⁷ Former DCI Richard Helmes, *A look over My Shoulder* (2003) cited in Charles E. Lathrop, *Literary Spy: The ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage & Intelligence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 80.

operations.¹⁸⁸ Godson adds another type and describes four types involving propaganda, political action, paramilitary operations and intelligence assistance.¹⁸⁹ Lowenthal explains a wider range of CA as paramilitary operations, coups, economic activities, political activities and propaganda.¹⁹⁰ He analyses the categories of covert actions with respect to their level of violence and degree of plausible deniability. He regards propaganda as the least violent and the highest deniability level covert action. Shulsky and Schmitt provides a detailed account for CA methods according to their aims: covert support of a friendly government through non-intelligence assistance or intelligence support; influencing perceptions of a foreign government by agents of influence or disinformation; influencing perceptions in a foreign society by agents of influence, forgeries or propaganda; support for friendly political forces through material support (technical and financial assistance); influencing political events by violent means such as supporting coups, paramilitary activities, assassinations.¹⁹¹

Covert action has two steps; the planning and the execution. In the planning phase of CA, there must be a good coordination of policy to

¹⁸⁸ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1987), 13.

¹⁸⁹ Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, 3.

¹⁹⁰ Lowenthal, *From Secrets to Policy*, 129-131.

¹⁹¹ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 77-90.

which it is projected to serve. A solid and rational foreign policy and security policy is the main factor for the planning phase with respect to setting the objectives and deciding on the methods to achieve the objectives. Another important factor is the available intelligence on the target of CA, and the environment which the CA is to take place. In execution of CA, the main risk is the exposure of the one's sponsorship for the CA and the risk of unwanted outcomes as a result. The non-attributable character -the plausible deniability-of the CA should be maintained throughout the operation. Once the link between the CA and the responsible is discovered, the CA is usually subject to failure. In addition, the risks of counterintelligence operations of the adversary such as deception, penetration or treason also affect the success of CA. These risks to secrecy can occur at any level of planning or execution of the CA. Altogether the risks are so high that a failed CA may cause embarrassment, deterioration of the international relations, a possible retaliation, and loss of lives during the operation.

As a result, covert action can be successful on two conditions: a well-coordinated policy and plausible deniability. A “well-coordinated policy” is an essential prerequisite for a successful CA. Then the expected results and the means to achieve these results can be managed in coherence.¹⁹² CA depends on a clear set of objectives and how these objectives are to be realized. In addition, secrecy is an essential feature of CA to maintain the plausible deniability. The sponsor or “the hidden

¹⁹² Godson, *Dirty Tricks*, 121.

hand”¹⁹³ of the CA has to remain in secret. Consequently, intelligence collection and analysis support the preparation phase while counterintelligence backs the implementation phase of the CA by securing the secrecy of CA.

The failure of CA, then, can result because of poor-coordinated policy and the loss of plausible deniability. The main reason for a CA failure is the poor policy to which it serves. The objectives of the CA, comprehension of the conditions and the appropriate environment to achieve these objectives are not free of human interpretation. The errors of judgment can lead to faulty policies.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, the poor policy due to fallible human interpretation can affect the success of the CA. The unavailable or poor intelligence can also disaffect the policy objectives of the CA. Another risk stems from the use of third parties for CA. To maintain the deniability, CA usually makes use of third parties such as political organisations, paramilitary groups, traitors or those willing to provide help.¹⁹⁵ However, this reliance on third parties can lead to failures because these third parties are not under direct control of the intelligence organisations. The main risk is the leaks of secrets and loss

¹⁹³ The phrase is excerpted from Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002). He wrote about extensive covert operations during Cold War that “...operations to influence the world by unseen methods-the hidden hand-...”.

¹⁹⁴ Shulsky and Schmidt, *Silent Warfare*, 84.

¹⁹⁵ Wetering, Frederick L.: “(C)over Action: The Disappearing ‘C’”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16 (2003): 562.

of deniability of the CA. Another reason for loss of secrecy and thus a failed CA is ineffective counterintelligence measures.

Cold War was a scene for covert actions.¹⁹⁶ CIA admitted in 2013- formally for the first time- that it played a key role in the American and British jointly planned covert political action for the fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh (codenamed Operation TPAJAX by CIA and Operation Boot by SIS) in 1953.¹⁹⁷ This operation has been argued to be successful if measured by “mission accomplished” but to be counterproductive with respect to its “negative short-term and long-term consequences”.¹⁹⁸ Many argued that Operation TPAJAX was not well-founded regarding its policy outcomes. Another CIA¹⁹⁹ covert operation

¹⁹⁶ To read further on covert actions during the Cold War, see James Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2010).

¹⁹⁷ To see the released documents by CIA in 2017 that reveals the planning ,execution phases of Operation TPAJAX, Central Intelligence Agency, History, *The Battle for Iran* by Claud H. Corrigan (undated (c.mid-19070s) on National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4404303-Document-3-Central-Intelligence-Agency-History> (Accessed on 03.03.2019)

¹⁹⁸ To read further on the coup against Mohammed Moassadegh, see Andreas Etges, “All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran”, *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no.4 : 495-508.

¹⁹⁹ CIA was given the responsibility of CA by the National Security Act in 1947. Some argue that involvement of CA in the intelligence collection may lead to rivalry within the organisation and undermining of collection efforts. To read further about the issue, see Haviland Smith, “Intelligence Collection and covert action: time for a divorce?” in *American Diplomacy*. (2009) <http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2009/03/intelligence-and-covert-action/> (Accessed on 03.03.2019)

was designed to remove Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo in 1960 under direction of President Eisenhower. It was another controversial CA on whether assassination of the Prime Minister was a common plot of American and Belgian execution.²⁰⁰

Some CA attempts had undesirable outcomes for the sponsor. The Bay of Pigs operation (Operation Zapata) is mostly referred as an embarrassing covert action failure of CIA. The planning was poor because of wrong assumptions and biased intelligence, the plausible deniability was not possible, throughout the execution of the operation and more wrong doings. As a result, the outcome of the Operation Zapata was totally different than the planned one. The covert action was exposed on the media, an embarrassment for Kennedy government of the USA, end of career for CIA's Director Allen Dulles and a long-lived administration of Fidel Castro in Cuba.²⁰¹ Another joint American-

²⁰⁰ From the eyes of CIA's officer who received the official authorization to assassinate Lumumba in Congo, see Lawrence Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). For CIA's perspective, David Robarge, "CIA's Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960-1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents", *Studies in Intelligence*, 58, no.3 (2014), , <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-58-no-3/pdfs-vol-58-no-3/Robarge-FRUS%20and%20the%20US%20in%20Congo-1960-68-12Sep2014.pdf> (accessed on 05.03.2019) On Belgian account, see Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*, (London: Verso, 2002). Also, Stephen R. Weissman, "What really happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu", *Foreign Affairs*, 93, no.4. (2014), 14-24.

²⁰¹ See Peter Kornbluh, "The Top Secret CIA 'Official History' of the Bay of Pigs: Revelations", *The National Security Archive*, (Accessed on 05.03.2019) <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/> See also, Lucien S. Vandenbroucke,

British covert action to overthrow the Communist government of Enver Hoxha in Albania (codenamed BGFIEND and OBOPUS by CIA and VALUABLE by SIS) failed disastrously in 1954 as a result of the betrayal of Kim Philby, an MI6 officer and Soviet mole in Washington.²⁰²

“Anatomy of Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs”, *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no.3 (1984): 471-491.

²⁰² See Nicholas Bethell, *The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s Biggest Coup* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984) and Nicholas Bethell, *The Albanian Operation of the CIA and MI6, 1949-1953: Conversations with Participants in a venture betrayed* (North Carolina: McFaland&Company, 2016).

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

3.1. Introduction

This thesis aims to explore the role of the British intelligence machinery against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960. To this end, a comprehensive analysis of the British intelligence understanding and institutionalisation process of “intelligence machinery” will provide the necessary framework. Hence, the chapter initially aims to examine “how has “British way of intelligence” been developed?”.²⁰³ Next, the institutionalisation process of British intelligence system will be analysed with respect to the British concept of intelligence. Collectively, the peculiar characteristics of British intelligence in the respective time period will be presented.

Within the framework of Chapter 2, definition of intelligence relies on the perception of the role, function and structural characteristics of intelligence. Intelligence is composed of four main elements which are intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. A nation’s concept of intelligence depends on the government type,

²⁰³ Michael Goodman, “The United Kingdom” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, Robert Dover, M. Goodman and C. Hillebran (eds) (New York: Routledge, 2014), 135-145, 135.

strategic environment and technological developments that determine the gravity of each of these elements in the intelligence system. Because of divergent national concepts of intelligence, the intelligence institutions also take shape in different forms.²⁰⁴ Then, this chapter focuses on the development of ‘British way’ in intelligence, especially from 1945 until 1960.

British intelligence system is presented as one of the most experienced and capable intelligence systems throughout the history. It is not one of the oldest, but it has a deep-rooted history²⁰⁵. The very early practices of espionage and intelligence networks without permanent institutions had been seen in the Britain of 16th century. Intelligence, especially in Europe, had been argued to gain importance in that century because of “the development of international exchange, opening of new trade routes, printing press, the Reformation, the founding of public postal system and the intensification of human relations”.²⁰⁶ The British intelligence scope was limited then compared to other powers of the time. For example, the Ottomans were successfully planting networks of

²⁰⁴ Philip Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions”, *Harvard International Review* 24 , no.3 (2002): 65.

²⁰⁵ The first recorded intelligence was attributed to the War of Kadesh in 1294 BC in Rodney Carlisle (ed), *the Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (New York:Sharpe Reference, 2005).

²⁰⁶ Emrah Sefa Gürkan, “The Efficacy of Ottoman Counter-intelligence in the 16th Century”, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum* 65,no.1 (2012):1-2.

agents in wide geographies to provide information to central government as well as undertaking effective counter-intelligence against rivals' penetration efforts.²⁰⁷ British intelligence was then conducted on an unstructured manner. In the 17th century, diplomatic institutions were used for intelligence gather in almost all of Europe. In the 18th century, the British officials were capable of intercepting domestic and foreign correspondence and deciphering the secret codes planted in the mails. In 19th century, the very first attempt of institutionalisation of intelligence was carried out under the reign of Queen Victoria. The Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office had become responsible for intelligence gathering from overseas, for example. The primary role of intelligence was to protect the reign, so that the management of the intelligence was held by the hands of the ruler only. In the 20th century, it is argued that "the modern state required enhanced intelligence-gathering bureaucracies"²⁰⁸ and there started "a tendency toward greater reliance on facts and logic".²⁰⁹ For British, the intelligence failure in the Boer

²⁰⁷ Gürkan, 3-34.

²⁰⁸ Tammy M. Proctor, *Female Intelligence: Women and Espionage in the First World War*, (New York: New York University Press, 2003). She argues that the manpower needed to fulfil the requirements of this new bureaucracies, females were employed in the WWI as the men were at front lines of war.

²⁰⁹ David Kahn, "An Historical Theory of intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no.3 (2001), 89.

War (1899-1903) triggered the modernisation of intelligence by the establishment of Secret Service Bureau in 1909.²¹⁰

3.2. Development of British “Intelligence Machinery”

The British intelligence machinery was composed of two parallel intelligence systems between 1945 and 1960: the national intelligence system and the imperial/colonial intelligence system. Consequently, the chapter aims to provide a contextual analysis that focuses on how British dual intelligence system took shape rather to give a detailed historical account. With this aim, it starts with examination of the development of British national intelligence system and continues with the features of colonial intelligence system in Cyprus. The communication and coordination between two systems is also analysed.

It is stated that British conceptualisation of intelligence is based on precedents and conventions.”²¹¹ From this point of view, starting from the early practices of British intelligence should support the study on revealing the founding dynamics of ‘British way’. Hence, the examination of the British intelligence understanding should start by exploring the origins of British intelligence.

²¹⁰ For an analysis of British intelligence in the Boer War and what was learnt from it, see Thomas G.Fergusson, *British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The Development of a Modern Intelligence Organisation* (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984).

²¹¹ Philip Davies, *Ideas of Intelligence*, 63.

3.2.1 The Origins of British Intelligence

Intelligence is generally understood as a matter of warfare that it provides vital information about the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Intelligence in the meaning of "knowledge to events, communicated by or obtained from another, especially military" had been in the dictionary since the middle of fifteenth century.²¹² British armies in need of reconnaissance in the field were using scoutmasters to obtain information on the enemy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²¹³ Apart from military intelligence collection, the early British intelligence efforts were aimed for protection of the crown from the plots. Sir Francis Walsingham was referred as the spymaster of Queen Elizabeth I, to be the first to employ an agent network for intelligence collection and operations in the mid-16th century. He created an espionage system abroad, operated covert actions such as propaganda and disinformation and conducted communication surveillance by intercepting letters and code breaking during his mission term between 1573 and 1583.²¹⁴ His

²¹² Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9.

²¹³ Proctor, *Female Intelligence*, 8. To read on British intelligence in the Middle Ages, see Brian Parrit, *The Intelligencers: British Military Intelligence from the Middle Ages to 1929* (Yorkshire:Pen&Sword Military, 2011).

²¹⁴ See Stephen Budiansky, *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage* (New York:Penguin Books, 2006). Allen V.Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World*, (New York:Harper&Row, 1965), 18-20.

efforts had been aimed to collect information on the activities of Catholic plotters and naval movements of King Philip II of Spain against the queen.²¹⁵ Although his success was a result of personal effort rather than an organized intelligence, his activities seeded the roots of British intelligence understanding.

In addition to personal crafts of espionage, diplomacy had been the main institution for governments to gather foreign intelligence from 16th century onwards. Embassies were natural cover for secret agents and ambassadors were regarded as licenced spies while all the other diplomatic staff was seen as valuable sources of political information.²¹⁶ Diplomatic institutions were to collect information on social, political and economic activities of the foreign state through informants, tradesman or other diplomats. However, this practice led to a tangled web of diplomatic and intelligence works²¹⁷ and also hampered the development of expertise on intelligence.

In the absence of proper intelligence institutions, the intelligence needs were to be met substantially by information collection efforts through

²¹⁵ Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire and Graham Macklin, *British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources* (Kew, London: The National Archives, 2008), 51.

²¹⁶ Jeremy Black, "British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth Century Crisis", *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no.2 (April 1987), 223 and Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 11.

²¹⁷ Black, *British Intelligence*, 223.

diplomatic institutions. These efforts were supplemented by other espionage activities such as establishing networks of agents and undertaking postal interception and deciphering. The Post Office, established in 1657, was argued to be the first permanently established intelligence organisation in Britain.²¹⁸ The Post Office consisted of two offices: Private Office for interception of domestic correspondence and the Foreign (Secret) Office for interception of overseas correspondence and deciphering the secret codes in mails.²¹⁹ This mechanism of intercepting and deciphering was a well-found method of obtaining information about foreign policies of other powers, perceptions of British politics and policies and the links between foreign diplomats and the opposition British politicians.²²⁰ By mid-18th century, the British were able to decode the posts which belong to other states such as Portugal, Austria, France, Spain, Denmark, Russia, etc.²²¹ Moreover, the Admiralty was monitoring the naval bases of France and Spain through agent networks and informants. They even gave codenames to their agents by the year of 1737. For example; the French envoy was a British

²¹⁸ Twigge et al., *British Intelligence*, 10.

²¹⁹ Twigge et al., *British Intelligence*, 239.

²²⁰ Black, *British Intelligence*, 210-229. To read further about the British interception mechanism through the Post Office, see K.L. Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Administrative History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).

²²¹ Black, *British Intelligence*, 213.

agent with the code name 101.²²² The strategic environment of international system was shaping the British intelligence efforts. The focus of intelligence efforts was particularly on revealing the French intentions and capabilities. It was not only the British officials utilising all available methods of espionage but also there were other European powers spying on the Britain, decoding its correspondence and trying to thwart its espionage efforts.²²³ Intelligence practices were on ad-hoc basis, without permanent, specific intelligence settings. Moreover, the control and evaluation of intelligence collection was carried out only by the monarch. Then he assessed the obtained information and drew conclusions about an enemy's intentions. For monarchs, intelligence as part of the statecraft was inseparable from the exercise of power.²²⁴

The origins of the British intelligence were based on primarily secret intelligence collection through network of agents, diplomatic efforts and interception and decoding of correspondence. The purpose of intelligence was to guard the monarch by “stealing secrets from rival heads of state and their associates” through a small number of sources²²⁵

²²² Ibid.

²²³ See, Rhodi Jeffreys-Jones, *In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence*. First edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

²²⁴ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 13.

²²⁵ Kristan J. Wheaton and Michael T. Beerbower “Towards A new definition of intelligence”, *Stanford Law and Policy Review* 17, no.317 (2006), 321.

and the only responsible authority for management and evaluation of the obtained intelligence was the monarch. Intelligence activities were carried out on ad-hoc basis, without any particular intelligence institutions. The intelligence was targeted against the internal and external rivals and enemies of the monarch. Intelligence was neither a specialised nor a professionalised activity and limited with individual capabilities and the vision of the monarch.

The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were two milestones in modern European history that have transformed the political, economic and social dynamics. The effects of these revolutions had changed almost every aspect of human life including warfare. And the changes in the warfare triggered wider and more complicated intelligence needs. Then, intelligence was claimed to play a major role in war.²²⁶ The advancement of military technology led to larger armies, increased mobilisation and logistics that caused the intelligence organizations to grow rapidly since then.²²⁷ Therefore, the changes in the monarchy, the changes in the strategic environment and the technological advancements affected the perception of intelligence that in turn promoted the development of modern British intelligence system.

²²⁶ Kahn, *A Historical*, 80-81.

²²⁷ Michael Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security* 3, no.3 (1988), 3-39.

3.2.2. Modernisation of British Intelligence

In 1988, Phillip Knightley stressed that “the spy is as old as history, but intelligence agencies are new”.²²⁸ The observation also describes the British intelligence system. Although intelligence on ad-hoc basis dates back to the 15th and 16th century, the permanent institutionalisation of intelligence had started in the 19th century. Herman contends that intelligence as an institution was an innovation of Victorian era. The specialised permanent intelligence institutions emerged; yet, the intelligence was still to be “stored by Queen exclusively”.²²⁹

Technological developments following the Industrial Revolution had enabled the use of new weaponry, railways and enhanced logistics. Together with innovations of communication such as the telegraph, these developments expanded the warfare scale in terms of bigger armies, bigger warfare in bigger areas. The advancement in the quantity and quality of warfare technologies required a methodical collection of information about potential opponents and their weaponry.²³⁰ Besides, the changing security environment in Europe because of German

²²⁸ Philip Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession* (New York: Norton, 1987), 3.

²²⁹ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 9, 15.

²³⁰ Herman, *Intelligence Power* 18. Michael Herman regards this as starting point for scientific character of intelligence collection. The intelligence collection methods are distinguished as human intelligence (HUMINT) and scientific and technical intelligence that comprises of signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

aggression was threatening the British imperial interests. Collectively, the need for enhanced intelligence increased to gain knowledge power in the power politics of Europe, against the threat of war, and also, to adapt the military capabilities to the new warfare scale. The need to know about the opponents' forces, intentions and capability required an organised intelligence that led to the creation of specific institutions for intelligence. Consequently, Intelligence Branch within the War Office was formed in 1873²³¹ with the main task of providing information of their own and foreign forces to commanders. It was the first permanent military intelligence establishment then and its staff duties were described as;

Firstly, the collection, sifting and arrangement of all information required by governments and military authorities to enable them to take such measures in peace as will insure the rapid commencement and vigorous prosecution of war whether at home or abroad. Secondly, the diffusion of necessary or useful military information through the army and the country, during peace or war.²³²

Moreover, the Indian Army's Intelligence Branch was formed in 1878 with the task of collecting statistics, geographical and strategic data to be

²³¹ Twigge et al., 11. The Intelligence Branch had become the Directorate of Military Intelligence in 1888.

²³² Major C. B. Brackenbury R.A., D.A.Q.M.G "The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home", *Royal United Services Institution Journal* 19, no.81, (1875): 242. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847509415968> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

used in war.²³³ In addition, the naval power was very important in securing British trade and interests; therefore, naval intelligence also grew. The Admiralty created the Foreign Intelligence Committee in 1882 which evolved into the Naval Intelligence Department in 1887. Therefore, the first permanent intelligence institutions were created within the military command.

Consequently, the imperial regime, the strategic environment and the technological developments had affected the development of the concept of British intelligence. The first intelligence institutions were designed according to traditional British understanding of intelligence to provide information to the ruler. With professionalisation in intelligence, it gained a role in policy and strategy making in the late 19th century. Lord Salisbury, a Victorian statesman regarded intelligence as an essential ingredient for the formulation and execution of foreign policy.²³⁴ For example, the British policy-making on the Middle East was dependant on the intelligence obtained regarding the relation between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1870s and the developments in the Eastern Europe and Balkans. The British officials willing to utilise the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875 tasked the intelligence to obtain military and

²³³ John R. Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 21.

²³⁴ Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy* 8-15.

political intelligence about Russian Empire.²³⁵ Therefore, in the Victorian era, the term ‘intelligence’ started to be associated with special government institutions for intelligence activities.

In the meantime, ‘secret policing’ was also becoming professional. Police forces were developing scientific arrangements for surveillance, informants and mail interceptions.²³⁶ In 1883, Metropolitan Police Special Branch was established as a specialised policing unit over internal threats. It was created specifically to gather intelligence on Irish ‘Fenian’ terrorism but later on tasked with collecting and assessing intelligence as well as taking executive action, where necessary, against subversion, public disorder and terrorism.²³⁷

Although the institutionalisation of the British intelligence started in the late 19th century, the development of modern intelligence organisations was a phenomenon of the 20th century. The main reason for developing professionalised intelligence organisations was the spectre of war in the beginning of the century. The perceived failure of intelligence in the Boer War (1899-1903) opened up the discussions for a better

²³⁵ Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy* 9, 17.

²³⁶ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 19.

²³⁷ Twigge et al., *British Intelligence*, 18.

intelligence mechanism.²³⁸ Also, the escalating aggression of Germany in European affairs was threatening the British imperial interests, so the policy-makers were wishing for more intelligence in advance to keep up with the balance of power in the international politics.²³⁹ In addition, the public opinion was in favour of a professional intelligence agency because of the chatters about German spies in Britain. The novels claiming that British lands had been full of foreign spies were fussing the public about security.²⁴⁰ All of the factors revealed the need for a sophisticated intelligence service on the eve of the war. Thus, the Secret Service Bureau was formed in 1909 as a result of joint efforts of the Admiralty and the War Office. The Secret Service Bureau was assigned with two functions, which were “to determine the nature and scope of espionage that was being carried out by foreign agents; and to build up and direct the work of British agents.”²⁴¹ Hence it was tasked with

²³⁸ The Committee of Imperial Defence instructed Sir James Edmonds to undertake a report on the intelligence failure during the Boer War. In his report, he recommended the creation of a secret service in 1909. See Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2014), 193.

²³⁹ Kahn, *A Historical*, 86.

²⁴⁰ The novels were *The Riddle of the Sands* (1903) by Erskine Childers which was about plans for a German invasion of Britain and *The Invasion of 1910* (1906) and *Spies of the Kaiser* (1909) by William Le Queux. Although it was only based on fictive stories then, the perceived threat of German espionage undertakings and fear of German subversive actions, the British government felt the public pressure to ask the Committee of Imperial Defence to examine the aspects of German threat. After all, the Committee underlined the Germany's potential espionage threat and suggested the creation of secret service. Twigge et al., 17-22.; David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), 24-26.

²⁴¹ Twigge et al., *British Intelligence*, 11.

espionage overseas and counterespionage at home. The Secret Service Bureau was the first truly secret intelligence organisation. The Service was given the role of foreign intelligence and counterespionage against the perceived German threat. The Secret Service was also claimed to undertake covert action such as sabotage missions, opening of diplomatic bags²⁴² and assassination of Russian Monk Grigori Rasputin in 1916.²⁴³

The Service was split into foreign (or Naval Group) and home (or Army Group) sections, which were specialised in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence respectively. The Service was low on resources, staff and facilities when the WWI started but the war forced these intelligence branches to develop their skills and techniques quickly. During the war, the technological innovations of military and communication methods widened the battlefields and diversified the needs and resources of intelligence. As a result, the flow of information during war also included imagery intelligence through photographs taken by airplanes and signals intelligence through radio communications to be captured by signals intelligence specialists.²⁴⁴ Especially the signals intelligence

²⁴² Michael Smith, *Six: A History of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service-Part 1: Murder and Mayhem, 1909-1939* (London: Dialogue, 2010), 124, 160.

²⁴³ See Andrew Cook, *To Kill Rasputin: The Life and Death of Grigori Rasputin*, (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2010).

²⁴⁴ Jeffrey T. Richelson, *A Century Of Spies: Intelligence In The Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 31.

enhanced British capabilities of vital intelligence that changed the game. The Admiralty's Room 40 had played an important role in intercepting and decoding German diplomatic and military telegrams. The Zimmerman telegram, decoded by Room 40, was used to persuade the USA to enter the war in 1917.²⁴⁵ In 1919, the Room 40 was transformed into the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) to function during peace time with the mission of "Construction, Destruction and Instruction". GC&CS provided advice on the "security of British governmental codes and ciphers; the study of the methods of encryption used by foreign powers; and the training of British officials in the use of secure communications".²⁴⁶

Consequently, the British intelligence system was capable of collecting technical intelligence by the end of WWI. In addition, to increase the efficiency of intelligence, a reorganisation was carried out during WWI, by which the army section had become the Directorate of Military

²⁴⁵ In 1917, Britain's cryptanalysis success enabled to decode the German proposal to Mexico of Texas territory in return of its support to Germany. The Room 40 decoded this message before it reached to Mexico and gave a copy to the USA. It was regarded as the most important intelligence success in the WWI that brought the US to the war. To read further; David Kahn, 'Edward Bell and His Zimmermann Telegram Memoranda', *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no.3 (1999):143-159. And Peter Freeman, "The Zimmerman Telegram Revisited:A Reconciliation of the Primary Sources", *Cryptologia* 30,no.2 (2006): 98-150. To read about how British used intelligence sharing to draw the US to the War II and emerging Aglo-American intelligence relationship; Alan Harris Bath, *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence*, (Lawrence:Kansas University Press, 1998).

²⁴⁶ Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ, *Beginnings* section (2015) <https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/beginnings> (Accessed on 25 November 2018)

Intelligence Section 5 (MI5) while the foreign section became the Directorate of Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6), both under the War Office. These intelligence services were expected to provide information on military (i.e.; German troop movements) and political developments within Europe, Ottoman Empire and Russia. The WWI stressed the importance of intelligence as a significant instrument of war once more.

During the interwar years, the British intelligence agencies were reduced in size and budget because of post-war economic problems.²⁴⁷ Meanwhile, MI6 merged into the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1921 with the responsibility of foreign intelligence. Also, the internal intelligence needs for counter-intelligence and counter-sabotage led to the creation of Security Service (MI5) in 1931. Hence “security intelligence” was also professionalised complementary to the foreign intelligence. Therefore, the British intelligence system gained the foreign, security and signals intelligence capability by the 1930s. Moreover, the Army and the Navy maintained their own intelligence branches.²⁴⁸ By 1930s, the primary objective of all these intelligence agencies was to counter the communist and fascist subversive activities against the UK. However, all of these intelligence agencies were

²⁴⁷ After the end of war, the British intelligence and security services had to concentrate on Irish republican movements. With the outbreak of civil war in Ireland, intelligence officers had become targets to Irish Republican Army (IRA) members. On 21 November 1920, fourteen British intelligence officers were assassinated in Dublin. Twigge et al., 28.

²⁴⁸ Michael S. Goodman, “Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21, no.1 (2008):40-56.

operating individually. The lack of communication and coordination among them caused duplicated tasks and ineffectiveness, consequently. Also, the intelligence failures such as capturing the warning signals of Palestinian movement until the break out of Arab Revolt in 1936²⁴⁹ or, deterring Soviet infiltration to British intelligence²⁵⁰ brought out the need for a better coordinated intelligence structure. Then, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)²⁵¹ was set up in 1936, with the mission of providing national intelligence assessment by integrating and making judgments of the departmental intelligence information. JIC was composed of the deputy directors of intelligence of three agencies and from 1938, a delegate of the Foreign Office. JIC was to work for setting intelligence priorities, preparing intelligence assessments and coordinating intelligence works of the British intelligence agencies.²⁵² Hence, the operatives of intelligence agencies became demand-driven to

²⁴⁹ John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, (New York:St Martin's Press, 2015), 6.

²⁵⁰ After the Russian civil war ended in 1920-21 with the Bolshevik victory, the Soviets with their expanding intelligence services, penetrated Whitehall and obtained information harmful to British national security. See Victor Madeira, "Moscow's Interwar Infiltration of British Intelligence, 1919-1929", *The Historical Journal* 46, no.4 (2003):915-933.

²⁵¹ Originally, its name was Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) which was amended to Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in 1948.

²⁵² Cabinet Office, *Notes on the Central Intelligence Machinery division of Cabinet Office records and other intelligence-related Cabinet Office records*, Revised 2nd November 2010. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60940/notes-on-cim-division.pdf, (Accessed on 15.12.2018)

make the direction and collection efforts to be more focused. In addition, the intelligence and policy-making were aimed to be coordinated as JIC was tasked to provide ‘integrated intelligence’ comprised of military, naval, air, political and economic analysis put forth to comprehend the enemy as a whole.²⁵³ Consequently, the British “national intelligence system” took its shape in the eve of WWII and the committee approach to the management of national intelligence formed its basis.²⁵⁴ The professional British intelligence system was to involve national collection and assessment agencies of MI5, MI6, GC&CS and the JIC.

In 1930s, the British intelligence agencies were expected to provide for information about the perceived threats of German fascism and the Soviet communism. They were mainly tasked regarding the military capabilities, power level and intentions of these governments. The security needs of the new strategic environment led to a higher number of and more sophisticated intelligence requirements. Intelligence was then, expected not only to provide quantitative information but also qualitative predictions about the adversary that would be supportive for policy-making. Especially in the time period of 1933 to 1941, intelligence was “fundamental to the formulation of policy by the great

²⁵³ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 25.

²⁵⁴ See Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac, and Michael S. Goodman, *Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

powers.”²⁵⁵ However, the British intelligence agencies were not fully capable of meeting the challenges of impending WWII. Wesley K. Wark argued that British intelligence assessments of German power were faulty and biased in 1930s. And the errors of judgment in intelligence reports misled the British policy-making.²⁵⁶ Moreover, the German covert action of the Venlo Incident, where two British agents were kidnapped by the Germans, in November 1939 was a disaster and embarrassment for the British intelligence.²⁵⁷ When Winston Churchill²⁵⁸ became Prime Minister, he gave special importance to the advancement of intelligence capabilities. He had been a spy himself in the 1890s and he was giving much value to the role of intelligence in policy-making. Soon after he took the office, he instructed the creation of a new agency, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in 1940 with the mission of “setting Europe ablaze”.²⁵⁹ The SOE was responsible to Minister of

²⁵⁵ Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy*, 105.

²⁵⁶ Wesley K.Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010), 23-30.

²⁵⁷ The Germans managed to capture two British Secret Intelligence Service agents at the Dutch-German border in Venlo, the Netherlands on 9th November 1939. To read further, see Captain S. Payne Best, *The Venlo Incident: True Story of Double-Dealing, Captivity and a Murderous Nazi Plot*, (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016).

²⁵⁸ Winston Churchill played an active part in the creation of Britain’s modern intelligence community since the Secret Service Bureau, See David Stafford, *Churchill and Secret Service*, (New York: The Overlook Press, 1999)

²⁵⁹ Stafford, 208. Also, see W. J. M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940–45*, (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000)

Economic Warfare²⁶⁰ and engaged in a range of covert operations such as “agents of influence, political activities, propaganda, sabotage and other paramilitary operations” in the territories of adversaries.²⁶¹ SOE was given the mission of sabotage, guerrilla warfare and paramilitary activities in Europe, Africa, Middle East and Far East.²⁶² Philip Davies calls covert action as “special activities”²⁶³ and argues that covert actions of British intelligence transformed from “special operations” to “special political action” and to “disruptive action”.²⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the SIS was undertaking intelligence collection activities under Foreign Secretary

²⁶⁰ The Ministry of Economic Warfare responsible for monitoring German industry and spotting its vulnerabilities, the Political Warfare Executive, to carry out black propaganda, MI9 with responsibility for escape and evasion, and British Security Coordination which supervised intelligence operations in the United States. Twigge et al., 12.

²⁶¹ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 55.

²⁶² Philip Davies, *MI6 and The Machinery of Spying* (London: Routledge, 2004), 120-121. To read further on SOE operations, see Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organisation* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992); Peter Wilkinson, *Foreign Fields: The Story of a SOE Operative*, (London: IB Taurus, 2002) and David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive with Documents*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).; Christopher J. Murphy, *Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5 during the Second World War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

²⁶³ Davies, *Intelligence*, 343-344.

²⁶⁴ Philip H.J. Davies, “From Special Operations to Special Political Action: The Rump “SOE” and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability 1945-1977”, *Intelligence and National Security* 15, no.3 (2000):55-76.

and it was not really obliged to provide intelligence to SOE.²⁶⁵ As a result, covert action was not an integral part of British intelligence system. Moreover, SIS and SOE were claimed to be in conflict because of rivalry and jealousy. Yet, these two separate units managed to cooperate on particular cases. For example; in Norway, they worked in liaison as they “worked with the same Norwegian authorities in London, shared the naval base in Shetlands, exchanged intelligence and shared the clandestine radio stations”.²⁶⁶

Another example to SOE’s activities is found in a *Top Secret* letter from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff dated 4th December 1945, which was about some propaganda activities of SOE. The Foreign Office was requiring suspension of SOE activities in Austria and Germany while supporting continuation of some covert propaganda activities in the Middle East:

So far as the Middle East is concerned, we recognise that there are certain special activities undertaken by SOE which we should like to see continue for the present. These are:

1. Sharq el Adna broadcasting station;
2. Arab news Agency;
3. Work of Assistant Press Attaché, Tehran, in influencing Persian press;

²⁶⁵ David Stafford, “Secret Operations versus Secret Intelligence in World War II: the British Experience” in *Men at War: Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Timothy Travers and Christon Archer (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1982), 123.

²⁶⁶ Ian Herrington “The SIS and SOE in Norway 1940–1945: Conflict or Cooperation?” *War In History* 9, no. 2, (2002): 94.

4. Ownership of the newspaper “The Iraq Times”;and
5. Britanova news agency in Turkey.²⁶⁷

While covert operations were predominating, SIGINT and IMINT also played a significant role during the WWII. In 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Intelligence Branch was established. Besides, British SIGINT capability contributed to the allied victory against Germany once more²⁶⁸. The successful codebreaking on German Enigma, through Ultra program²⁶⁹, provided significant intelligence regarding German intentions. Hinsley argued that timely and accurate flow of intelligence primarily from SIGINT and also other sources of HUMINT and IMINT, provided intelligence superiority to the Allied powers and “intelligence shortened the war by perhaps 4 years”.²⁷⁰ After the end of WWII, the British signals intelligence capabilities were brought to a national level under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) as an

²⁶⁷ TNA CAB 121/305 Copy of a letter dated 3rd December, from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4th December 1945.

²⁶⁸ To read on Ultra, see Harry Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, (Cambridge University Press: 1988).; Harry Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds) *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).; Maria Robson, “Signals in the Sea: The Value of Ultra Intelligence in the Mediterranean in World War II”, *Journal of Intelligence History* 13, no.2 (2014): 176-188 and Roy Conyers Nesbit, *Ultra versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives*, (Yorkshire: Pen&Sword, 2008).

²⁶⁹ Enigma, thought to be unbreakable by Germans, was an integral unit of the German Army communication system. Meanwhile, the British described any intelligence obtained from Enigma as Ultra.

²⁷⁰ Harry Hinsley, “British Intelligence in the Second World War: An Overview”, *Cryptologia* 14, no.1 (1990):1.

individual body.²⁷¹ The need for a separate special operations agency in the post-war period was also discussed in the Whitehall. In a report, ordered by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, that addressed the future of war time intelligence organisations, it was stated that;

The Special Operations Executive had built up a considerable intelligence organisation of its own. This was the inevitable result of its separate existence. Moreover, since it is an organisation which employs agents, it is natural that a considerable flow of intelligence from foreign countries has found its way into SOE headquarters. Arrangements are made for this information to be available for other organisations, but only on the condition that it is distributed to those organisations by SIS. ... Despite the real contribution that SOE has made during this war, we cannot believe that the experiment of running special organisations as a separate military function outside the direct control of the Chiefs of Staff and under the direction of a non-service Minister, will be repeated. We understand that it is likely to be proposed that the nucleus of a Special Operations Organisations should be maintained within SIS. With this proposal we cordially agree...²⁷²

The government listened out the recommendations and the SOE was merged under SIS in 1946. There were a number of special etudes and reports addressing the future of war time intelligence agencies such as MI6 and JIC with respect to their functions during peace time. In the post war period, the British intelligence system was composed of

²⁷¹ To read further on the development of British Signals Intelligence, see Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Agency* (London: Harper Press, 2010) and John Ferris, "The Road to Bletchley Park: The British Experience with Signals Intelligence 1892-1945" *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no.1 (2002):53-84 and John Ferris, "Before 'Room 40': The British Empire and Signals Intelligence, 1898-1914." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12: 4 (1989):431-57.

²⁷² TNA CAB 163/6, The Intelligence Machine, Report to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 10th January 1945, 15.

consolidating intelligence bodies of intelligence collection and assessment, counterintelligence and covert action.

Another important feature of the British intelligence system was the 'secrecy' notion. British historians Christopher Andrew and David Dilks underlines the importance of secrecy by defining intelligence as 'information which policy makers cannot acquire by more conventional methods.'²⁷³ It was conceived of an inherent and undisputable element of the intelligence business to a point that even the existence of the intelligence services was secret. The British intelligence and security services were not officially acknowledged and thereby, intelligence related things were closed to any questioning then. Accordingly, nothing related to intelligence should be exposed unless it is not intelligence-based information. As Michael Howard lamented; "... the British security and intelligence services do not exist. Enemy agents are found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought in by the storks."²⁷⁴ Until 1990s, the British governments sought to preserve the convention of all-embracing secrecy in the matters of intelligence.²⁷⁵

The Cold War years was described as spying war between the Western and the Communist powers. The Cold War was called as "the

²⁷³ Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 5.

²⁷⁴ Christopher Andrew, "Intelligence, International Relations and Under-theorisation", *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no:2 (2004):171.

²⁷⁵ Len Scott, "Sources and Methods in the study of intelligence: A British view", *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no.2 (2007): 185-205.

intelligence war *par excellence*".²⁷⁶ To counter against the Soviet threat and communist expansion, the Western powers were trying to enhance their technical intelligence capabilities and cooperation while the Soviet Union established the largest intelligence system in response to the threat of subversion and encirclement. The strategic environment, technological developments and government types were shaping the intelligence systems of these rivals. Besides, covert operations became the defining feature of Cold War through deception, defection, betrayal and penetration activities. Like the rest of West camp, the main intelligence questions of British government were about the Soviet Union's nuclear capability and intentions as well as containment of communism. In 1950s, however; the intensive Soviet security measures were hampering SIS activities to a great extent;

... recruiting of agents for penetration of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries is becoming increasingly difficult...In such circumstances, ... SIS and its officials have been unable to uncover the highly guarded secrets of the Soviet Union. ... In peace time the physical difficulties confronting the SIS's efforts to send agents beyond the Iron curtain are very formidable. The important centres of the Soviet Union are extremely inaccessible. ... in every field of intelligence, the SIS is confronted with very difficult problems. ... unless there is an unexpected stroke of luck, it is hard to foresee any rapid change.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Philip Davies, "Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualizing the Intelligence Community", *Public Policy and Administration* 25, no.1 (2010): 29-46.

²⁷⁷ TNA CAB 301/133, The Secret Intelligence Service – Report of Enquiry by Sir Horace Seymour, June 1952, 10.

Despite these presented difficulties, the British were claimed to exploit the technological developments to enhance their intelligence collection methods through SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT. However, the British counterintelligence was not very effective with respect to guarding the intelligence system against the Soviet penetration, leaks and moles. The Soviets were very successful at planting double agents, infiltrating agents and converting British officials to betray their states. The most publicised treason of Kim Philby and Cambridge Five spy ring cost heavily on British intelligence activities.

In the period after 1945, the intelligence requirements were mainly about the Soviet related threats but also about the imperial problems due to escalating unrest in the colonies. The Soviet Union was the main threat, in a military aspect. Also, there were the internal threats of espionage, subversion and sabotage. Despite the weakness of counterintelligence measures and intelligence failures, the British was proud of their intelligence collection capabilities. The British intelligence was argued to spy on almost every state in the world: “America during the war of independence; Spain, Germany, France and Russia from the age of Armada to the two world wars; China, the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe during the Cold War; the countries of the Middle East and central Asia during the ‘Great Game’; and most states in Africa following European decolonisation.”²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ Twigge et al., *British Intelligence*, 9.

The intelligence was an important ingredient in the policy-making level, however; only to provide the raw information. In British way, intelligence analysis was regarded as a form of another governmental activity, performed by civil service employees. Philip Davies asserts that in British understanding, intelligence analysis is “no more than the ordinary work of government departments and ministries”.²⁷⁹ He gives the example of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) which was, by itself, a huge assessment machine.²⁸⁰ Intelligence was seen as a kind of information which contributed, along with other sources of information, to the analysis business. This understanding prevailed in the 21st century. Intelligence collected by the three agencies can be passed directly to governmental departments and together with other types of information, it supports the longer-term analysis.²⁸¹

Thus, the professional intelligence system has been mainly tasked for intelligence collection only. Since 18th century, there has been no change in the primary role of British intelligence system, which is to provide the relevant and timely information to the decision makers.

²⁷⁹ Philip Davies, “Ideas of Intelligence” in *Secret Intelligence: A Reader*, ed. C.Andrew, ,R. Aldrich and Wesley K. Wark (London: Routledge, 2009), 13-14.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery*, (London:The Stationary Office, 2001), 15.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250868/0114301808.pdf (Accessed on 18.12.2018)

In the post-war period, the role of intelligence was to collect information, engage counterintelligence measures and conduct covert tasks in total secrecy while the all-source analysis was primarily left to other government bodies. SIS official J.Bruce Lockhart asserted the British view of intelligence as;

‘Intelligence’ is an umbrella word covering a wide field of different activities and skills. ... The five main areas of intelligence are as follows:

- a) The laying down by governments of their information requirements and priorities,
- b) The gathering of information, as required by the government, by overt, secret and technological methods.
- c) Counter-intelligence and security.
- d) Covert action: the extension of government policy by secret and non-attributable means.
- e) The analysis and evolution of all the information gathered.²⁸²

Therefore, the British understanding of intelligence concentrates on secret information collection. In the British perspective, intelligence is only a specific type of information.²⁸³ And the intelligence process is designed “to transform the raw material of intelligence so that it can be assimilated in the same way as other information provided to decision-makers at all levels of government”²⁸⁴. To illustrate, the Americans

²⁸² John Bruce Lockhart, ‘Intelligence: A British View’ in *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (ed) K.G. Robertson (New York:St. Martin’s,1987), 37.

²⁸³ Davies, *Ideas of Intelligence*.

²⁸⁴ “Butler Report”, Butler of Brockwell, Frederick Edward Robin Butler. *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*. (London: Stationery Office, 2004),14

regard intelligence as a product of a particular analytical production but in British understanding, intelligence is the raw information collected.²⁸⁵ Raw data is routinely communicated to policymakers without an intervening stage of all-source analysis.”²⁸⁶ The all-source analysis of raw (intelligence) information, together with the types of information (i.e.; information from open sources, diplomatic sources), are performed by the relevant governmental body. Lord Butler described the processing of intelligence as validation, analysis and assessment. Validation (of the source and method) is carried out by the relevant collecting agency. Analysis is the examination of information by subject matter experts who “assembles individual intelligence reports in to meaningful strands, whether weapons programmes, military operations or diplomatic policies. Intelligence reports take on meaning as they are put into context.”²⁸⁷ Then, the national assessment of intelligence is carried out in consultation with the relevant departments under coordination of JIC. Therefore, there was and is a decentralised intelligence analysis mechanism in the British way of intelligence. This mechanism has been

²⁸⁵ Davies, *Ideas of Intelligence*.

²⁸⁶ Patrick Major and Christopher R. Moran (eds.) *Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 16.

²⁸⁷ Butler Report, 9-10.

believed to increase the “signals to noise ratio” of the information to be used.²⁸⁸

Herman contends that British hold a narrow approach to intelligence focusing on intelligence collection and covert action.²⁸⁹ Furthermore, in the British understanding, information to be collected as intelligence has to be ‘secret’. “Intelligence is the secret collection of other people’s secrets.”²⁹⁰ Intelligence is defined in Cabinet Office’s paper as:

Secret intelligence is information acquired against the wishes and without knowledge of the originators or possessors. ... Intelligence provides privileged insights not usually available openly.²⁹¹

Consequently, secrecy was and is the defining element of British intelligence system.²⁹² While the secrecy of the intelligence activities

²⁸⁸ David Charters, Stuart Farson and Glenn P.Hastedt, *Intelligence Analysis and Assessment* (Oxon: Frank Cass, 1996), 128.

²⁸⁹ Herman, *Intelligence Power*.

²⁹⁰ Ken G.Robertson, “Intelligence,Terrorism and Civil Liberties”, *Conflict Quarterly* 7, no.2 (1987): 47.

²⁹¹ Cabinet Office, *National Intelligence Machinery, Annex A: UK Government Intelligence - Its Nature, Collection, Assessment and Use* (November 2010).
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61808/nim-november2010.pdf [Accessed on 03.11.2018]

²⁹² To read about secrecy notion of British intelligence, David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832-1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).


and the product is maintained, the secrecy over the existence of intelligence agencies was lifted by the end of 1980s. The existence of British Intelligence agencies was officially accepted and given a statutory footing with The Security Services Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. In addition, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provided the basis of legislative warrants and powers to the intelligence agencies to conduct their secret activities lawfully. The nature of British intelligence collection agencies is still subject to secrecy and covertness. Today, the professional intelligence machinery is consisted of three main agencies: The *Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6)*²⁹³ with the task of intelligence collection and covert activities abroad in support of British government objectives, through use of human and technical sources and liaison with other intelligence and security services.²⁹⁴ The *Security Service (MI5)* with the task of domestic intelligence collection and surveillance activities in order to protect the UK against threats to national security through the activities of intelligence collection from human source, intrusive surveillance, interception of communications and cooperation with other intelligence and security services.²⁹⁵ The *Government Communications Headquarters*

²⁹³ To read on history of SIS, see Gordon Corera, *MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service* (London: Phoenix, 2012).; Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret intelligence Service, 1909-1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold war Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001).

²⁹⁴ See SIS's website <https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do.html>.

²⁹⁵ See MI5 website, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk>

(*GCHQ*), responsible for signals intelligence to intercept and break the communications of the targets through defensive methods to secure British communications from eavesdropping and offensive methods of cyber-attacks.²⁹⁶



*Figure 3 - Key Agencies of British Intelligence*²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ Defence Secretary Philip Hammond noted in 2013 that Britain was ‘developing a full spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike capability. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit> (Accessed on 18 February 2019)

²⁹⁷ Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) provides strategic intelligence support to the Ministry of Defence. It has collection and analysis capabilities to contribute the central intelligence system. See Defence Intelligence website, <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence>.

There are two main changes with respect to the secrecy and oversight of the British intelligence system. The intelligence agencies still work in secrecy but they are publicly acknowledged and their records are available. Also, they are subject to parliamentary oversight with respect to their administration, expenditure and operational activities.²⁹⁸

In the British government website, intelligence analysis and national security and intelligence are listed separately under the title of “Departments, agencies and public bodies”. Intelligence Analysis department is listed under “High Profile Groups” while secret Intelligence Service and the Security Service is listed under “Agencies and other public bodies.” Intelligence Analysis is described as part of Civil Service, the professional intelligence analyst’s role is defined as “... a key role in the intelligence community as they are able to put together diverse pieces of information and place them in a context which is useful for decision makers.”²⁹⁹

In summary, the origins of the British intelligence system were observed in the 15th century, started due to military needs of intelligence. Then, the need of intelligence for the security of the monarch against internal and external threats was met with ad-hoc, disorganised intelligence

²⁹⁸ For details, see the website of Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament at <http://isc.independent.gov.uk> (Accessed on 15 March 2019)

²⁹⁹ Intelligence Analysis, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-intelligence-analysis-profession> (Accessed on 18 February 2019)

activities until the 19th century. By the second half of the 19th century, the first institutionalisation of intelligence was actualised by the establishment of the permanent intelligence bodies within the military command of the War Office. The changes in the strategic environment and technological developments caused a shift in intelligence understanding on the dawn of 20th century. A specialised intelligence organisation was required to meet the threats and to exploit the opportunities for the British national interests.




Figure 4 - British intelligence structure³⁰⁰

The creation of Secret Intelligence Bureau in 1909 was the start of modernisation of British intelligence system. Throughout the 20th century, the British intelligence gained a more civilian, specialized and a national characteristic. With the establishment of permanent intelligence

³⁰⁰ Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 31.

institutions of Security Service (MI5), SIS (MI6), GCHQ and JIC, the ad-hoc basis was transformed into a systematised and coordinated intelligence organisation. The British main intelligence requirements were edited according to the perceived threats and opportunities in the strategic environment, which was portrayed by German aggression first, then the Soviet and communism threat as well as imperial problems such as the Irish problem and the subversive activities in the colonies. The insurgencies in the colonies were not only inspired by communism but also nationalism, like Cyprus. The colonial problems were another important aspect that required well-founded intelligence capabilities. Intelligence was important to provide warning regarding any threats to imperial authority. Especially, intelligence gathering was a primary power of colonial policy-making. The development of colonial intelligence system, especially in Cyprus is discussed in the next section.

3.2.3. British Colonial Intelligence System

Before analysing the intelligence structure in Cyprus, it will be helpful to understand the dynamics of British imperial intelligence system in its colonies. Although the literature on British colonial intelligence aspect is very limited in comparison to the available resources addressing the central British intelligence system during Cold War, the archival documents and the available secondary sources provided valuable information to understand the dynamics of British colonial intelligence system.

Intelligence and empire were argued to be “linked in a symbiotic relationship, the growth of one nourishing the consolidation of the other.”³⁰¹ The objective of the colonial intelligence system was to promote and secure the imperial interests. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote to Prime Minister Anthony Eden that;

In the British colonial territories, our objective, I suggest, should be to identify the principal anti-British interests at work in each territory and, on the basis of proper intelligence, take such counteraction is required to maintain our own interests and defeat the enemy.³⁰²

The political and security intelligence on the colonies was important to British policy-making to maintain order in the colonial governance. Its main role was to anticipate and then patrol the unrest and subversive activities and thus maintain the order in the colonies. It was more of a security service structure in the colonies rather than a foreign intelligence organisation. In this manner, the colonial intelligence system was given the main roles of intelligence collection, counterintelligence and covert action.

With respect to colonial intelligence collection, the conventional understanding of gathering information about foreign powers overlapped

³⁰¹ Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (London: University of California Press, 2007), 14.

³⁰² TNA PREM 11/1582, Policy for countering subversive activities throughout World, from H.Macmillan to Governor A. Eden, 19th October 1955.

with the internal security intelligence against subversive activities. The colonial security intelligence, however, was different from the national security intelligence because “colonial rule was not rooted in consent, self-determination, or popular will”.³⁰³ Thomas Martin called the colonial states as “intelligence states” and stated that the intelligence obtained by the colonial intelligence was “critical to the maintenance of order” in the colonies. To this end, the useful intelligence was expected to involve information about the colonial people and dynamics of the society. The required intelligence was mostly derived from human sources such as local people working governmental bodies. Hence, HUMINT provided the valuable information about the dependant population. Thomas argues that it was only HUMINT that can provide warning intelligence about mobilization of the opposition against the colonial rule.³⁰⁴ The information about the socioeconomic activities, customs, law and political attitudes of the colonial people was significant for colonial intelligence that provided intelligence for central policy-making. This kind of political intelligence was expected to provide warnings of changes in the ideas, development of new political parties and reactions to economic conditions. Thomas also argued that the “environmental intelligence (maps and topographic information) was critical to maintenance of colonial rule”.³⁰⁵ As a result, the colonial

³⁰³ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 18.

³⁰⁴ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 23.

³⁰⁵ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 21, 29.

intelligence system had to obtain information about the colonial people and environmental intelligence in order to maintain the colonial rule. The colonial problems were usually regarded as internal problems of colonial government. Hence, the intelligence was also a tool of the colonial government to handle the colonial problems. British tried to protect their regional economic and strategic interests in colonies against interference by other powers and internal subversion.³⁰⁶ So, the counterintelligence efforts aimed to detect and deter the external interference and internal subversion threats against the colonial rule.

Since the end of WWII, the British policy makers had to face the challenges of international politics of Cold War. The British governments had to deal with the Soviet threat and communism related subversive threats in the colonies. Although colonial intelligence affairs were left to the colonial government management traditionally, the change in strategic environment in the aftermath of WWII modified the intelligence perception on the colonies. The intelligence system was directed on the perceived threat of the Soviet military attack and the expansion of communism in the colonies because the British policy-makers, who wished to hold a central, unified policy in colonies against these threats, were in need of strategic intelligence. Therefore, central intelligence system had become more important to the British

³⁰⁶ Andrew Porter and A.J. Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and decolonization 1938-64: Volume 2:1951-64*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 54.

government.³⁰⁷ Then, the central intelligence system got involved in colonial intelligence in a wider scope while the CO maintained its traditional administrative intelligence business.

The security environment of the Cold War posed new security threats to British imperial interests, but the imperial intelligence machinery remained under shadow of the central system. As the colonial problems were regarded strategic to British imperial interests and its prestige in the international environment, they a more centralised intelligence approach had been adopted. This approach harboured the competition between the governmental bodies of Colonial office (CO), Foreign Office (FO) and the JIC. Cormac argues that it was the CO that resisted to cooperation with the JIC and integration to the central intelligence machinery.³⁰⁸ The JIC was the coordinating unit of the central intelligence machine while the CO was the head of imperial intelligence. In addition, the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, India Office, Central Africa Office and Ministry of Defence were related to the imperial intelligence system. The CO was the main substance of colonial administration that was connecting London and the colonies. However, the CO and the JIC were often in conflict, rather than coordination. The conflict was

³⁰⁷ Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: Hurst&Co, 2013). Cormac analyses the JIC activities of assessing and coordinating intelligence to meet the demands of Cold War and colonial counterinsurgencies.

³⁰⁸ Rory Cormac, "A Whitehall 'Showdown?', Colonial Office-Joint Intelligence Committee Relations in the Mid-1950s", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39, no.2 (2011): 261-263.

reflected in interdepartmental turf wars between these two bodies.³⁰⁹ While the professional intelligence system was progressing and consolidating under coordination of JIC, the imperial system remained in parallel to it under the lead of the Colonial Office (CO). The competition among these systems hampered effective coordination of central and imperial intelligence.

About countersubversion policies in the colonies, Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared in his memorandum on “counter-subversion” that;

The term counter-subversion is used to mean clandestine activities, whether propaganda or by operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism. ... Counter-subversion is an instrument of policy, not an end in itself. Its role is to support and supplement the Government’s overt policy-in relation to foreign countries, its foreign policy; in the Colonies, its Colonial Policy. The Foreign Secretary must be responsible for all counter-subversion in foreign countries, the Colonial Secretary must be similarly responsible for counter-subversion in the colonies.

Subject to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary should retain sole control over C’s organisation [SIS]. ... To the extent that C operates, with the Foreign Secretary’s approval, in the colonies, his activities in support of colonial policy should be subject to the Ministerial control of the Colonial Secretary.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ Cormac, *Confronting Colonies*, 6-15.

³¹⁰ CAB 21/6006, Memorandum by Prime Minister on Counter-Subversion, 14th December 1955.

The countersubversive activities that Eden mentioned were to involve policing, intelligence sharing, protective security, security training, propaganda and other covert action.³¹¹ These activities were undertaken by MI5, SIS (MI6) and Information and Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office. As central approach gained importance, MI5 involved more in colonial intelligence mechanism. Especially after the WWII, MI5 established an imperial security network by stationing Security Liaison Officers (SLOs).³¹² MI5 was given the responsibility of defensive counter-subversive activities such as collecting security intelligence and protective security. Normally, SIS had no official role in the empire, but it was linked to many intelligence activities because of interconnected threats. Hence, there were occasional joint operations between MI5 and SIS. During WWII, SIS gathered intelligence within the empire³¹³. After the end of war, it was also assigned with special operations when SOE was ended task. Then, SIS started to undertake covert operations in areas which were normally under the preserve of the Security Service such as Palestine and Cyprus.³¹⁴ The colonial

³¹¹ Chikara Hashimoto, *The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1948-63* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 7.

³¹² See MI5 History, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/the-british-empire-and-commonwealth>

³¹³ See Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010)

³¹⁴ Jeffrey, 688-697. Philip Murphy, "Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The view from Central Africa 1945-1965", *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no.3 (2002): 131-162.

intelligence system also utilised the covert action, for example, propaganda activities and “coercive interventions” when deemed necessary.³¹⁵ The propaganda activities were pursued by the IRD where SIS was responsible for other types of covert action such as paramilitary activities. Hence, facing with Cold War challenges in its colonial territories, the British policy makers aimed to fortify colonial intelligence system by incorporating these two systems. Despite the efforts to strengthen colonial intelligence system, it has been widely argued that the central and imperial intelligence systems failed to fulfil the intelligence needs of policymakers to manage the process of decolonisation.³¹⁶ They mostly failed to pick up on the warning signals of emerging subversive activities. The main reason for the failure was the misperception of the relationship between the Cold war, nationalism and decolonisation.³¹⁷

3.2.4. British Intelligence System in Cyprus

The colonial intelligence system in Cyprus had been neglected until the end of WWII. After 1931 revolt, it was discussed whether to appoint an

³¹⁵ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 6.

³¹⁶ Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, 449-465, 474-475. David French, *The British Way in Counter Insurgency 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6-7, 19-33.

³¹⁷ Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies*.

intelligence officer in Cyprus to overview and report domestic intelligence on a daily basis. But this proposition was objected with respect to its financial cost and lack of any officer with the necessary qualifications such as language knowledge, local customs and political landscape.³¹⁸

When the British policy makers started to regard the importance of Cyprus to their interests under Cold War conditions, they realized the need to fortify the colonial intelligence system on the island. A security advisor from MI5 was appointed to Cyprus to this end. The inadequacies and suggestions to overcome them were first reported by Alex MacDonald, the first MI5 officer seconded to the Colonial Office as security intelligence adviser in 1954. A. Macdonald had spent three weeks in Cyprus in August 1954, and submitted a detailed list of “measures necessary to improve the machinery for the collection, collation and dissemination of security and political intelligence in the colony”.³¹⁹ On his observation, he stated the main problems as the lack of coordination and cooperation among the political and security intelligence units (the administration, the police and the security liaison officer) and lack of a properly trained and equipped Special Branch on the island. Up until 1954, there was not a central mechanism to give

³¹⁸ Paangiotis Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to Middle East Crises* (London:I.B. Tauris, 2010),65.

³¹⁹ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- The Report on Organisation of Intelligence in Cyprus by A.M.Macdonald, 21st August 1954.

direction, collection and evaluation of security intelligence.³²⁰ Accordingly, he suggested establishment of Cyprus Intelligence Committee (CIC) and District Intelligence Committee (DIC) as well as tasking Special Branch with security intelligence, protective security and counter-espionage for the maintenance of internal security on the island.³²¹ Supposing his recommendation list on the reorganisation of security intelligence in Cyprus were to be approved, he had envisaged that “it should be possible to have an effective organisation working within a year.”³²²

His proposals were approved, and the Special Branch was set up in 1954, to be headed by George Meikle. The assignment of a security intelligence adviser was appreciated in terms of that:

... the Security Service have co-operated extensively and promptly on the Special Branch side. This being the first fruit of the appointment of a Security Intelligence Adviser.³²³

³²⁰ David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20.

³²¹ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers-The Report on Organisation of Intelligence in Cyprus by A.M.Macdonald, 21st August 1954.

³²² TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers-The Report on Organisation of Intelligence in Cyprus by A.M.Macdonald, 21st August 1954.

³²³ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports by Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr.MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus- December 1955, the note on the file dated 8th December 1954.

However, before the renewed “intelligence organisation had time to find its feet”, the EOKA terror broke out on the island. Security intelligence advisor to the Colonial Office, A. Macdonald revisited Cyprus in March-April 1955 and suggested the appointment of a Director of Intelligence from MI5, enhancement of Special Branch and In May 1955, Donald Stephens from MI5 was appointed the first director of intelligence on the island.³²⁴ After his visit, the Security Service adviser to the Cyprus Police Special Branch prepared a report on the functions of Special Branch where he also stated of CIC’s working as such:

...[recommendations] were made to make CIC a live intelligence assessing and appreciating body, more independent and less of a “rubber stamping machine”. To this end, arrangements were made for it to produce its own monthly intelligence report, ... to present an appreciation of current intelligence as well as an account of past matters of intelligence interest.

It is hoped that both Government and JIC(ME) among others, will increasingly make known to the CIC their requirements for appreciations and papers on a variety of intelligence problems which properly fall within the CIC terms of reference. In addition it should be the practice of the Committee itself to require of its members draft papers, to be finalised in full Committee, on the subjects of intelligence importance on which it feels that government should be informed.³²⁵

³²⁴ West, 153.

³²⁵ TNA, CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers-Final Report by the Security Service Adviser to the Cyprus Police Special Branch, May 1955.

The colonial intelligence system in Cyprus had been under efforts for reorganisation throughout the fight against EOKA. The intelligence system was mostly ignored on the island up until the start of the revolt.

In 1955, after the first attacks of EOKA, the measures for reorganisation to strengthen the intelligence system has been started to be taken. The police power had been regarded important for colonial security intelligence; however, there was no special branch for intelligence in Cyprus. On the suggestion of security advisor from MI5, the Cyprus Special Branch was established in 1955. Then, the Cyprus intelligence system was composed of the Director of Intelligence, The special Branch, Military Intelligence Officer and the Security Liaison Officer for collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence.³²⁶ The lack of coordination among these intelligence units prevailed till the end of EOKA conflict although the Cyprus Intelligence Committee (CIC) and the District Intelligence Committee (DIC) were set up to overcome intelligence coordination problems.

³²⁶ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports by Security Intelligence Advisers: report on organisation of intelligence in Cyprus by A.M. Macdonald, December 1955.

CHAPTER 4

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN CYPRUS, 1945-1960

4.1. Introduction

The value of intelligence to the decision-making process is the provision of actionable intelligence. Cyprus was one of the colonies that British officials were giving importance and expecting less conflict. In 1954, tensions were increasing, and the impending uprising was known to “everybody and even to the police”³²⁷ but the colonial government and the Whitehall in London was ignoring the signals of problem. Up to 1st April 1955³²⁸, the enosis movement did not constitute a serious threat for British policy-makers. Only after the concurrent bombings at one night, the British realised they were facing a well-organised terrorism. British intelligence system was accused of failure of warning on the organisation of EOKA. Unfortunately, there had been a lack of “actionable” intelligence on EOKA -that began its activities almost three years ago indeed. It was nearly six months later when the Cyprus Intelligence Committee presented an intelligence report on EOKA’s structure and members. Thereafter, the lack of sufficient intelligence on

³²⁷ James Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith Imprint, 2008), 102.

³²⁸ On 1st April 1955, 18 bombings had targeted the police stations, government buildings and military installations across Cyprus.

EOKA hampered the British counterinsurgency efforts throughout the EOKA campaign. As the failure of intelligence means the success of the enemy's intelligence, EOKA can be argued to have an effective intelligence system than the British intelligence machinery.

This chapter aims to analyse how British intelligence machinery played a role against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960. The British intelligence activities are examined with respect to three time intervals from 1945 to 1955, 1955 to 1957 and 1957 to 1960. This study argues that the British intelligence machinery was ineffective to forewarn about impending EOKA terrorism on the island in the first period. In the second period of 1955-1957, the British intelligence is argued to support British policies on the island ineffectively because of the inadequacies within its functions, namely intelligence collection, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert action. In last period of despite the improvements in the functions, the intelligence machinery was under the level of full operational capacity. Therefore, British intelligence mechanism was ineffective, if not failed, with respect to providing forewarning in prior to EOKA terrorism on the island and assisting British counterinsurgency throughout EOKA campaign.

The chapter develops on three main sections. The first section analyses how British rule started on the island because of its envisaged strategic value to British foreign and security policy in the Middle East. Next section deals with the reasons for the decline in the strategic value of island and emergence of first substantial *enosis* movement between 1878

and 1945. Followingly, the period between from the end of WWII to the end of British rule on the island is studied under three subsections. This section first analyses the post-war security environment that shaped the British perception of threats and interests on the island. Then the first sub-section examines how British intelligence failed with respect to warning intelligence about the impending violence on the island, prior to 1st April 1955 when EOKA terror had started. Next sub-section examines the role of British colonial intelligence machinery between 1955 and 1957 with respect to the main intelligence functions of intelligence collection, analyses, counter-intelligence and covert action. The intelligence mechanism of EOKA is also analysed in order to provide a better understanding of the British intelligence functioning. Finally, the time period of 1957 to 1960 is analysed with respect to changing British strategy on Cyprus and British intelligence functions.

4.2. The Start of British Rule on Cyprus

Since the prehistoric ages, Cyprus had been inhabited by various civilizations from Assyrians, Egyptians and Persians to Romans, etc. It was 12th century when British possessed the island for the first time. In 1191, Richard I of England captured the island and later sold it the Knights Templar and then, in 1192 the Templar resold it to a French knight-Guy Lusignan. The island was ruled by the Lusignan Family until

falling into Venetian hands in 1489.³²⁹ In 15th century, the island also had become a strategic interest to the Ottoman Empire. The very first but unsuccessful attempt to conquer the island was made by Sultan Bayezid II in 1488. The rule of Venetians on the island had been a threat to the imperial interests of Ottomans in the Middle East. Then, the Ottomans conquered the island in 1571 and the Ottoman rule on the island had continued for the next three hundred years.




Figure 5-Map of Cyprus by Piri Reis (*Cezire-i Kıbrıs* 1526)³³⁰

³²⁹ For a detailed examination of the history of Cyprus, see George Hill, *The History of Cyprus*, 4 Volumes: Volume 1: *To the Conquest by Richard Lion Heart* (first published in 1940), Volume 2: *The Frankish Period, 1292-1432* (first published in 1948), Volume 3: *The Frankish Period, 1432-1571* (first published in 1948), Volume 4: *The Ottoman Province, The British Colony, 1571-1948* (first published in 1952) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³³⁰ Piri Reis. *Kıbrıs Adası Haritası*. *Bilim ve Teknik Dergisi*, 543. (June 2013) <http://www.bilimteknik.tubitak.gov.tr/sites/default/files/posterler/kibris.pdf> (Accessed on 2nd April 2019)

In the 19th century, the powerful colonial British Empire had been interested on the island. After taking the strategic territories of Gibraltar and Aden under control, the British foreign and security policy had prioritized gaining control over Suez Canal, securing the sea route to the most important colony of India and countering Russia's expansionist policies towards Mediterranean and Asia. To this end, the Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was thinking of Cyprus an important base in the Mediterranean. He wrote to Queen Victoria in 1876 as such:

If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by Porte and England ... enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the ... key of Western Asia.³³¹

British were convinced that Cyprus would have been a vital colony to serve the strategic ends of British political, military and economic interests. In this manner, the British took advantage of the war-exhausted and power losing situation of Ottomans against Russia by 1878 and made a secret offer of support on the condition of seizure of Cyprus, which would have been on a temporary base. However, it was not. Sultan II. Abdulhamid took the offer and accepted British support to Ottomans against Russia in return for making reforms for Christians in

³³¹ Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus 1878-1915* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 85.

the Anatolia and turning over Cyprus to British rule.³³² On 4th June 1878, the Cyprus Convention was signed. British government achieved its aim of securing a military and naval base in the Mediterranean in line with their foreign and security policy.



Figure 6-Map of Cyprus in 1878³³³

However, the seizure of island had brought up severe criticism. The liberal opposition and the media criticised the government of having inadequate and obsolete information about the island because the island

³³² For articles of the Cyprus Convention signed on 4th June 1878, see Murat Metin Hakkı, *Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 3-5.

³³³ "Map of Cyprus, 1878", Robert Hamilton Lang, *Cyprus: Its History, Its Present Resources And Future Prospects*, (London: Macmilland and Co, 1878). Available at British Library website: http://access.bl.uk/item/viewer/ark:/81055/vdc_00000003661E#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=9&xywh=-950%2C-1%2C4753%2C2319 (Accessed on 12.12.2018)

appeared not to be a suitable military base regarding its geographical setbacks. On the newspaper Punch, the convention with the Ottomans was regarded as “*a stain on British politics, embarrassment to British national prestige*” and along with other newspapers described Cyprus policy as a fiasco.³³⁴

4.3. The British Rule on Cyprus, 1878 -1945

The general intention of the British for overtaking Cyprus was to secure Mediterranean route to the colonies and to assure a military base against the Russians. However, the geographical limitations of the island and seizure of Egypt in 1882 showed that the strategic value of island was not much of envisioned. As the island lacked a deep-water port to host British major warships, it could not have been a major naval base. Besides, the military and strategic value of the island was put under question soon after the seizure of Egypt in 1882.³³⁵

Without any strategic value to the British, Cyprus had become a war issue with the outbreak of WWI. The British government waged war against the Ottoman Empire on 5th November 1914 and declared the 1878 Convention *null and void*. Then, Cyprus was annexed by Britain,

³³⁴ See Andrekos Varnava, “Punch and the British Occupation of Cyprus in 1878”, *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 29, no.2 (2005), 167-186.

³³⁵ Cihat Göktepe and Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, “İngiliz Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Kıbrıs (1945-1974)”, *Bilig-Türk Dünyası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 68 (Winter 2014):142.

whom later offered the island to Greece during the war. Greeks rejected the British offer of Cyprus. After the war, Turkey recognized the British annexation of the island with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Later, Cyprus was declared a British crown colony in 1925.

Cyprus had no vital strategic or military value to British policies during or after the WWI. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, welcomed the British rule on the island in 1878 for the hope of *enosis*.³³⁶ The British rule generated excitement among the elites of Greek Cypriots for their aspiration of *enosis*.³³⁷ The British were not keen on the idea of *enosis*, because of the risk that the region would have fallen under communism. Although the island was of no significant strategic value, the British policy on Cyprus was aimed to avoid the fall of island to the hands of another hostile power in the region.³³⁸ By 1940, the imperial general

³³⁶ The idea of Enosis dates back to the establishment of Greek state in 1830. It takes its basis from the "*Megali Idea- the doctrine of Greek irredentism whereby all the lands of Classical and Byzantine Hellenism should be reclaimed for the reborn nation*". See Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece* (New York: Pella, 1986), 119. To read on the emergence and development of the idea of *Enosis*, see Anita Walker, "Enosis in Cyprus: Dhali, A Case Study", *Middle East Journal* 38, no.3 (1984): 474-494.; Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1979).; Salahi Sonyel, *The Turco-Greek Conflict* (Lefkoşa: Ulus Ofset, 1985).

³³⁷ Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account Of The Struggle For Union With Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 23-25.

³³⁸ Diana Markides, "Cyprus 1878-1925: Ambiguities and Uncertainties" in *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006* (eds) Rubert Faustmann and Nicos Peristianis, (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2006), 25.

staff assessed that Cyprus would have been a potential next target of an axis invasion.³³⁹

The first substantial movement for *enosis* occurred in 1931 with the Greek Cypriot revolt on the island. The anti-colonial revolt was set off due to aggravated economic conditions on the island and backed by Bishop of Kitium to advocate *enosis*. The riots continued for a week and the British Government House was burned down.³⁴⁰ The Turkish Cypriots remained quiet and the Greek government under Eletherios Venizelos did not back the riot.³⁴¹ The British intervened and subdued the rioters with strict security measures including a large collective fine, suspension of constitution, ban of Greek flags and prohibition of ringing of church bells.³⁴² They also suspended the 1882 Constitution and then started to rule by decree.³⁴³ According to Holland, 1931 revolt was the

³³⁹ Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great war to Middle East Crises* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 26.

³⁴⁰ See Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-5.

³⁴¹ Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great war to Middle East Crises*, 21.

³⁴² John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), 89.

³⁴³ A very first political demand of the Greek Cypriots was self-government when British took over island in 1878. The British allowed for a Legislative Assembly for Cypriots with the Constitution of 1882. See Edward Johnson, "Britain and the Cyprus Problem at the United Nations, 1954-58", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no.3 (2000):113-114.

“most humiliating blow” to British rule between the two world wars and British “never entirely recovered from the blow.”³⁴⁴The British suppressed the uprising and assessed it would not have an impact on British rule on. The 1931 revolt, however, was an important sign of the changing political nature in Cyprus.

The changing international scene after the end of WWII increased the importance of the island. Cyprus regained a strategic status due to the changes in British foreign and security policies in the Middle East. In the new world order, Middle East had become of the top concern for British domestic and foreign politics and respectively, Cyprus gained a strategic and military importance after 1945. In the meantime, the *enosis* movement was gaining a momentum which would grow into an unpredicted level of terror campaign on the island. Inevitably, the intelligence system on the island was held responsible for the lack of intelligence on the imminent EOKA troublesome.

4.4. British Intelligence in Cyprus

As discussed in the previous chapters, British intelligence system has been a demand-driven one and the intelligence demand, or the intelligence requirements, had been shaped in accordance with national perception of threats and objectives in the security environment. British strategy on Cyprus took shape with respect to the perceived threats and interests in the new international order. Thereby, to understand the role

³⁴⁴ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959*, 4.

of intelligence in this period, it is helpful to examine the strategic environment for the British policy-makers in the aftermath of WWII.

4.1.1 The British Strategy

Cyprus was an unimportant asset until 1945, and the British policy on Cyprus was only to avoid the fall of the island to the hands of other powers in the region. However, the British Empire had faced new challenges after the end of WWII that forced the British policy-makers to reformulate their strategy on Cyprus regarding political, military and intelligence objectives in the new security environment. First and foremost, the post-war British foreign and security policy was bounded with diminishing economic and military power. Next, Britain had been overshadowed by the Cold War superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the new international context. As a result, the imperial power was eroding despite the unwillingness of British policy-makers to comprehend it. At the same time, the threat of Soviet expansionism and the regional challenges such as the Middle Eastern crises, - the Arab-Israeli dispute, the rise of Arab nationalism and rise of anti-British movements in the colonies- were on the agenda of the British policy makers in London. Being blindsided, Britain had to face immediate colonial uprisings for self-determination and national liberation just after the war.³⁴⁵ Under these conditions, the politically and

³⁴⁵ Alexis Alecou (ed) *Acceleration of History: War, Conflict and Politics* (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 114.

economically weak Britain had to grant India Independence in 1947 and to withdraw from Palestine in 1948. The following insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya had taken British by surprise.

Within the new strategic environment, the key threats were perceived of the Soviet military attack and the expansion of communism in the British territories. And the British main post-war strategy was to uphold its status as a great power by maintaining the current status-quo, especially in the Middle East. British were still thinking of the Middle East under the exclusive British zone of responsibility, intervention and interest.³⁴⁶ Cyprus was considered of a major contributor to the British geostrategic priorities in the Middle East. As Britain was keen on restoring its great power status after the war, Cyprus would project the British power to the world.³⁴⁷

In addition to power projection, Cyprus became useful for the planning of an air campaign against the Soviet Union.³⁴⁸ As Britain managed to acquire nuclear power in 1952, the British security and defence policy

³⁴⁶ Alecou, *Acceleration of History: War, Conflict and Politics*, 114.

³⁴⁷ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Cold War Pressure, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 195-1960", *The Journal of Military History* 73, (2009):1153.

³⁴⁸ Hatzivassiliou, "Cold War Pressure", 1143. And see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "British Strategic Priorities and the Cyprus Question," in *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-colonialism, 1878-2006* Faustmann, R. and N. Peristianis (eds.), 200-207.

had been reshaped with a focus on Royal Air Force (RAF). RAF increased its striking capability with the production of Canberras and very heavy bombers (VHB). Having an airbase in Cyprus was believed to provide great strategic advantage because of its geostrategic location.³⁴⁹ Thereby, in 1954, the construction works for a RAF base started in Akrotiri. “RAF was provided with the strategic capability for nuclear armed bombardiers stationed there to range as far as the Gulf in time of international crisis.”³⁵⁰ Thus, the air bases in Cyprus increased its strategic importance in British defence strategy against the Soviet Union.

Cyprus had also become an intelligence site for intelligence gathering and covert action in the region. British held covert facilities and elaborate listening stations, all targeting the Soviet Union and the Middle East.³⁵¹ In the 1950s, Cyprus was a significant SIGINT centre targeting the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The bases on the island were tracking the Soviet strategic weapons in order to provide warning in advance of a possible Soviet attack.³⁵² Also, a secret ELINT project

³⁴⁹ Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), 568.; Hatzivassiliou, “Cold War Pressure, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline”, 1147.

³⁵⁰ Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus*, xv.

³⁵¹ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 567.

³⁵² Richard Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: HarperPress: 2010), 321.

Zinnia was under development since 1955 on the island.³⁵³ In addition, British developed overt and covert broadcasting capabilities on the island to conduct propaganda operations targeting Middle East. The strategic value of the island intensified when the regional SIS headquarters was moved to Nicosia and the British Middle East headquarters to Episkopi.³⁵⁴ Consequently, Cyprus had become a strategic intelligence base for spying on Middle East and the Soviet Union.³⁵⁵

Collectively, these developments had increased the importance of Cyprus in the domestic politics as well. The Colonial Office was urging the maintenance of Cyprus in line with the traditional colonial policy whereas the Foreign Office was claiming that Cyprus issue was prone to political problems between Greece, Turkey and Britain.³⁵⁶ Even some

³⁵³ It was initially developed by scientific Intelligence, by the help of GCHQ in order to achieve the capacity of surveillance of aircraft and missiles. The project continued with Project Sandra in 1960s, that was a highly successful ELINT system of early warning. See Aldrich, *GCHQ*, 321-323. For governmental records of projects Zinnia and Sandra, see TNA AVIA 6/17569, DEFE 44/93, and T 225/2198.

³⁵⁴ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 567.

³⁵⁵ Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great war to Midde East Crises*, xv. Cyprus was also an important American SIGINT base as the USA held a radio intercept station, USF-61 (Codename: APPLESAUCE) near Nicosia with the consent of British. See Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand* and *GCHQ*, 568.

³⁵⁶ Corum, *Bad Strategies*, 101.

SIS officers were advising for acceptance of the *enosis* claims.³⁵⁷ Meanwhile, the conservative government under Winston Churchill that took office in October 1951, did not want to be in a position of losing another colony after Egypt.³⁵⁸ The British leaders were willing to demonstrate at home and overseas that Britain was “resolved to hold its position as the dominant power” in the Middle East.³⁵⁹ Therefore, the colonialist policies were less questioned in their era. The Colonial Office was opposing a change of status in Cyprus on the basis of its strategic importance.³⁶⁰ On 28th July 1954, the Minister of State for colonial affairs, Henry Hopkinson stated of Cyprus that:

it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent. ... the question of abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise-that British sovereignty will remain.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 570.

³⁵⁸ Göktepe and Bilgiç, “İngiliz Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Kıbrıs (1945-1974)”, 145.

³⁵⁹ Andreas KARYOS, “Acceleration of History and Decolonisation in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus, 1945-1959” in *Acceleration of History: War, Conflict and Politics* (ed) A. Alecou (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 115.

³⁶⁰ TNA CO 926/91/19, Cyprus: Proposed constitutional development, Colonial Office Paper, 1953.

³⁶¹ House of Commons, “Cyprus: Constitutional Arrangements”, Hansard 28 July 1954, vol 531 cc504-14, Digitised version on <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1954/jul/28/cyprus-constitutional-arrangements> (Accessed on 22 November 2017)

In addition to the Colonial Office, the Chief of Staff (CoS) were stressing the strategic importance of Cyprus that Britain should maintain its full sovereignty. They insisted on the military and strategic importance of the island and persuaded the Whitehall for retention of the island in 1950, 1954 and 1955-57.³⁶²

While the British concern for Cyprus boosted, the campaign for *enosis* had been accelerated among Greek Cypriots in the island with the support of Greece. However, the British stand against any change of the island's status was firm. In September 1945, Archbishop Damaskinos made an offer of bases in Cyprus or in Greece in return for the acceptance of *enosis*, which Britain rejected. In January 1947, Britain disregarded a resolution in favour of the *enosis* by the Greek parliament.

In 1950, the plebiscite organised by the Church of Cyprus (Etnarchy)³⁶³ had no impact on British Cyprus policy. In 1951, the Greek government re-offered bases both in Cyprus and Greece in exchange for granting *enosis*. However, these offers of deal over Cyprus got on the nerves of the British officials. In November 1951, during a NATO summit in Rome, the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza in a private meeting

³⁶² Hatzivassiliou, "Cold War Pressure", 1151.

³⁶³ The archbishop had been recognised as the ethnarch (ethnic political leader) of the Greek Cypriot community in the 17th century. Therefore, the religious leader also became the political leader. This practice continued until the formation of Republic of Cyprus in 1960.

that; “the British Empire was not for sale and the issue of Cyprus was not only closed but non-existent”.³⁶⁴

In 1953, Eden re-told the prime minister of Greece, Marshall Alexandros Papagos that there existed no Cyprus problem for British government.³⁶⁵ The Greek government appealed to the United Nations (UN) in 1954 for the grant of self-determination right to Cyprus. With this move the Greek officials were hoping to put international pressure on London to accept negotiations on enosis.³⁶⁶ While the Greek government was striving hard for *enosis*, the Turkish government argued that “there had been no question of Cyprus because of British sovereignty on the island.”³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ Tossizza Evangelos Averoff, *Lost Opportunities: the Cyprus Question, 1950-1963* (New York: A.D.Caratzas, 1986), 22.

³⁶⁵ Robert F. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt 1954-1959* (New York:Oxford University Press, 1998), 69.

³⁶⁶ Karyos, “Acceleration of History”, 116. See Edward Johnson, “Britain and the Cyprus Problem at the United Nations, 1954-58”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no.3 (2000): 118-119.

³⁶⁷ The successor government had followed a more active policy on Cyprus issue that contributed to the formation of Republic of Cyprus in 1960. See Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1990), 101-123.




Figure 7-British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus³⁶⁸

To sum up, after the end of WWII, the British foreign and security policy was based on maintaining its great power status in the Middle East, deterring Soviet aggression and expansion of communism in the British territories. Within this context, Cyprus emerged as an indispensable territory for British government in terms of political and military aspects. On the other hand, the period of 1940s and 1950s was marked by the growth of *enosis* movement. Despite the aspirations of Greek Cypriots for *enosis*, Britain was reluctant to agree to any development that could lead to further retreat from the empire.³⁶⁹ Cyprus was the only territory in the region under full British sovereign control

³⁶⁸ BBC Four, Documentary: Britain's Treasure Islands, Galleries: The Maps <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03q65nv/p03q0x0c> (Accessed on 11 January 2019)

³⁶⁹ Robert F. Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 218.

that served to British imperial prestige. To this end, the British policy on the island was to maintain the full sovereignty and any change to the island's status was unacceptable. For British officials, Cyprus was out of question. With the policy of "no Cyprus question", they were determined to reject any proposal to end colonial rule over Cyprus.³⁷⁰

4.4.2. British Intelligence and *Enosis* Movement (1945-1st April 1955)

On 1st April 1955, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) carried out a series of bombings targeting government installations in Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta and Limassol. At the same time, the first EOKA leaflets were distributed stating that the organization started a struggle to "*throw off the English yoke and consequently liberate Cyprus.*"³⁷¹ The attacks were a "surprise" to the colonial government and to London. There was no warning intelligence in the advance of the EOKA sabotages, neither was any information about EOKA. The colonial intelligence system could not foresee the upcoming armed revolt on the island. The attacks of EOKA can be regarded as a result of an "intelligence failure". The reasons for the intelligence failure can be analysed in terms of intelligence cycle comprising intelligence collection, analysis and use of intelligence.

³⁷⁰ Holland, "Britain and the Revolt", 20-54.

³⁷¹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 95.

In British way of intelligence, the intelligence production starts with intelligence requirements and priorities set by the decision-makers. Under Cold War dynamics, the British strategy on the island was to maintain the status-quo at all costs. Thereby, intelligence system was required to target all subversive activities against the British rule. The Soviet aggression and communism related subversive activities on British territories were the main perceived threats to British interests. As counter-subversion³⁷² was adopted as an instrument of colonial security policy, the central and colonial intelligence systems were directed on potential subversive movements. Likewise, the intelligence systems were required of warning intelligence against Soviet aggression and countering against subversive activities on the island. Because of Cold War mindset, the intelligence systems prioritised the communism related threats such as the activities of AKEL on the island.

The first Communist Party of Cyprus had been established in 1920s and banned after 1931 riots. However, the party went underground and re-opened in October 1941 as the Progressive Party of the Working Class (AKEL).³⁷³ By 1945, AKEL was regarded a strong political force as well

³⁷² Frank Kitson made a difference between insurgency and subversion, that the latter means "all measures short of use of armed force to overthrow the government" while the first means "the use of armed force by a section of people against the government". See Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* (London: Cluys Ltd St Ives Pic, 1991), 3.

³⁷³ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 89-90.

as a major threat to British rule over Cyprus.³⁷⁴ The Colonial Office was in fear of losing the control of the island to the communists if war had broken with the Soviet Union. Hence, the agenda of colonial government was the communist threat on the island. A *Top Secret* archival document, recalling 23rd June 1951, states that;

The [Cabinet Ministerial] Committee [on communism] is at present discussing with the Colonial Office the question of Communist activities in Cyprus....³⁷⁵

Then, after the WWII, the colonial government and intelligence officers were concentrating mainly on the plans and activities of AKEL. Some intelligence reports were stated to indicate that AKEL was forming fighters' group for a war against colonial rule.³⁷⁶ Although the intelligence focused on AKEL, the colonial government was reporting to Joint Intelligence Committee that there had been a lack of intelligence about the inner circle of AKEL.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Ibid 90.

³⁷⁵ TNA CAB 134/2, The Work of the Official Committee on Communism, (Overseas)-Memorandum by the Chairman of the Official Committee 23rd June 1951.

³⁷⁶ Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus*, 67.

³⁷⁷ Ibid 42.

While the administration and intelligence concentrated on communist threats, the 1950s started on the island with a deepening nationalist *enosis* movement backed by the Church. In order to maintain its public support, AKEL also adopted a rhetoric of “*Enosis, Only Enosis!*” However, AKEL was outmanoeuvred and marginalised in *enosis* movement as it condemned resorting to arms while nationalist movement of *enosis* gained a level of public support.³⁷⁸ Concerning AKEL’s discourse of *enosis*, Cyprus Intelligence Committee (CIC) reported in September 1956 that;

AKEL’s commitment to *enosis* was purely opportunistic. It was “designed primarily to enlist popular support. No political programme which did not call for *enosis* would gain any significant following.”³⁷⁹

In 1950, the nationalist movement for *enosis* gained a momentum with the election of a new Archbishop- Michael Christodoulou Mouskous³⁸⁰. He took the pseudonym of Makarios III and made his oath exposing his commitment to *enosis*:

³⁷⁸ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 97.

³⁷⁹ TNA CO 926/526, Cyprus Intelligence Committee-CIC (56), A survey of Communism in Cyprus since August 1955 , 21 September 1956.

³⁸⁰ For his biography, see Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981).

I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of annexing Cyprus to mother Greece.³⁸¹

Committed to his political objective, Makarios followed a strategy to consolidate the political influence of the church, internationalise the Cypriot problem and adopt an armed campaign against British rule.³⁸² His aim was to put pressure on the Britain to accept *enosis*. The colonial government's political situation report was stating about this new Archbishop as of a low-key performance based on demagogic speeches.³⁸³ It would appear soon that the British were wrong to undermine the capability of Makarios, whom together with Georgios Grivas launched an armed revolt against British rule on the island in 1955. Aldrich described the Cyprus incident as small and personal, generated by two men, Georgios Grivas and Archbishop Makarios III.³⁸⁴

At a secret meeting in Athens in 1952, Makarios authorised Grivas to form an underground and armed group to be ready to fight the British if necessary. Thereafter, Grivas started his secret activity of forming an

³⁸¹ Salahi R. Sonyel, *The Turco-Greek Conflict* (Lefkoşa:Ulus Ofset, 1985), 70.

³⁸² Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 91-92.

³⁸³ CO 537/6235, Political Situation Report, October 1950.

³⁸⁴ Aldrich, 570. Grivas and Makarios had known each other from the times of Khi, the underground organisation established by Grivas to fight against communists in Greece.

underground armed organisation. He went to Cyprus a few times to set up his plan of sabotage campaign, to form the command structure of his organisation and establish intelligence networks.³⁸⁵ The organisation started to operate in Greece by the support of Greek government that assisted Grivas with provision of the arms covertly.³⁸⁶ Grivas raised money, recruited, trained terrorists for the armed attacks and smuggled weapons, explosives and trained fighters to Cyprus. He established his network of agents among the ranks of security and military forces and civil servants, whom provided an effective flow of intelligence about British intentions and operations.

In the meantime, Makarios was setting up the political base of the *enosis* movement. He created the Pancyprian National Organisation of Youth (PEON) on the island. PEON provided the effective means of propagandizing and mobilizing young Cypriots for self-determination efforts. PEON was banned in 1953 but it continued its activities underground. Later, many of its members joined the Church-controlled Christian Youth Movement (OHEN). In addition to PEON and OHEN, Makarios had the support of PEK (the Panagrarian Union of Cyprus). For his terror campaign and intelligence network, Grivas largely

³⁸⁵ Corum, *Bad Strategies*, 97

³⁸⁶ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 570.

recruited from PEK in the villages, from OHEN and PEON in the towns.³⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the intelligence reports were stating of minor incidents under *enosis* title such as situation reports of Greek independence days, speeches of Makarios and demonstrations on the island.³⁸⁸ According to British assessments, another revolt of a scale similar to 1931 could have been expected, but the Cypriots were not considered capable of conducting an armed uprising. The “embedded opinions” on Cypriots hindered them to realize the potential of conflict on the island. The British were quite sure that the Greek Cypriots were not capable of armed resistance.³⁸⁹ Even in the case of armed conflict, the Cypriots were believed not to support it.

The British later had to acknowledge that;

the Greek Cypriot population provided an ideal breeding ground for a militant nationalistic organisation. Largely a peasant community, they responded quickly to the call of *enosis* especially it was backed by the church,...³⁹⁰

³⁸⁷ Corum, *Bad Strategies*, 95. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 93. TNA WO 33/3726, A History of EOKA 1954-1959, 8.

³⁸⁸ TNA FCO 141/3227, Weekly Intelligence Reports from the Commissioner of Police 1952.

³⁸⁹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 88. Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus*, 74.

³⁹⁰ TNA WO 33/3726, A History of EOKA 1954-1959, 5.

As the threat perception had been shaped within the Cold War understanding, intelligence machinery was targeting subversive activities with communist roots on British territories. In Cyprus, the enosis movement was tracked but the security intelligence concentration was widely on AKEL. The biased assumption of Greek community on the island and the Cold War mindset distorted the assessment of available but limited signals of the upcoming violence on the island.

In January 1955, SIS station in Athens shared intelligence about a vessel, smuggling a large quantity of arms and explosives to the island.³⁹¹ The Royal Navy caught the vessel, St. George (caique *Ayios Georghios*), intercepted the arms shipment and arrested the men involved. Among them, there was an EOKA member, Socrates Loizides, on whom some documents indicating an armed underground group were found. These documents were first substantial indication of an organised and armed underground group plotting against the colonial rule.³⁹² However, the British officials considered the conspiracy was halted successfully by interception of the vessel. Far from alerting the colonial government, the officials thought that, with the discovery of the *caique Ayios Georgios*,

³⁹¹ Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, 2nd Edition* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2014), 153.

³⁹² Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571.

“the problem had been nipped in the bud”.³⁹³ Another report of Special Branch in 1954 was stating about the import of Greek ex-soldiers to the island for a solid reason:

A vague report of the arrival of these arms, coupled with a rumour that Greek ex-officers were prepared to come to CYPRUS to organise violence, was received by Special Branch at this time, but the official comment on this was that it was probably a story put about by the ENOSIS faction to foster a war of nerves.³⁹⁴

Although it proved to be accurate and valuable later on, little action was taken based on this intelligence. The officials assessed that the threat, would be originating from Greece, had been suppressed and any further subversive threat within Cyprus would not be likely to emerge. The British undermined the capability of Makarios to create an organised campaign including violence in the name of *enosis*. They also undermined the signals of imminent conflict because of their biased minds. As a result, EOKA attacks on 1st April 1955 took them up with a big surprise.

To sum up, the first EOKA attacks can be recognised as an outcome of British intelligence failure. The reasons for the intelligence failure can be examined with respect the phases of intelligence cycle. To start with “*direction and planning*”, as the primary concern was the threats

³⁹³ Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service*, (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2002), 551.; Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 95. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571.

³⁹⁴ WO 33/3726, 23-24.

emanating from Soviet Union and communism, the intelligence mechanism was also prioritising the communist threat rather than nationalist movements on the island. Intelligence was subordinate to British government policy and was asked to concentrate on the communist threat on the island. With their focus on communist threat and AKEL, the British were undermining the nationalist movement for *enosis*. Then, at “*intelligence collection*” level, as the communism related threats were prioritised, the other potential threats were widely undermined. There were intelligence reports of *enosis* movement which were not more than descriptive situation reports of the incidents on the island. There was no available information about the other suspected subversives or anti-British nationalist groups in Cyprus. Though, the intelligence mechanism was able to deliver some reports on signals of the impending violence on the island. Despite the limited but valuable intelligence, the British officials could not make a worthy *assessment/analysis* built up on them. The very first reason was their biased minds of the Cold War settings as well as the habitual of Greek Cypriots. Even any subversive threat of *enosis* movement was described in terms of communism. Although EOKA was right wing and had no dealings with the communists, the British policy makers was afraid of that “any transition might offer opportunities to the communists on Cyprus, whom it considered 100% Kremlin controlled.”³⁹⁵ In addition, they undermined the signals that indicative of the change in the political nature of the island and of the concentration of underground efforts for

³⁹⁵ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571.

organised violence. For instance, the plebiscite, that showed the gradual raising of right-wing Greek- Cypriot movement as well as leading role of the Church, did not have an alarming effect for British officials.³⁹⁶ In addition, the interception of the vessel carrying arms to the island and the reports of the Special Branch stating of efforts to organise violence on the island, were undermined by the officials with biased mindsets. First, the threat of violence had been assessed to be only possible if imported from Greece. Also, the Greeks could not become vicious because of their believed peaceful national characteristics. In addition, the British were contemplating that the Cypriots were content with British rule, and assessing that, apart from demonstrations for *enosis*, there was no evidence of unrest on the island.

4.4.3. British Intelligence and EOKA (1st April 1955- 4th November 1957)

By the consent of Makarios, Grivas ordered EOKA to start its terror campaign on 1st April 1955. There occurred 18 bombings at one night, targeting the police stations, government buildings and military installations across Cyprus.³⁹⁷ Thereafter, the British had to fight against EOKA for the next four years.

³⁹⁶ Dimitrakis, *Military Intelligence in Cyprus*, 70.

³⁹⁷ See Appendix B: The List of Major Incidents in Cyprus since 1st April 1955. TNA FCO 141/4160, CIC (55) Twenty Seven (Final) of 18th October 1955- Major Incidents since 1st April 1955.

In the first phase of the EOKA's campaign of terror, the British were hoping to settle the problem with diplomatic initiatives and constitutional reforms. Meanwhile, the security forces were required to eliminate EOKA in order to support these political initiatives. Throughout EOKA campaign of terrorism, the British strategy was based on the destruction of EOKA with the support of intelligence. However, there were certain setbacks for an effective intelligence system that could have supported the British strategies as expected. British intelligence had been ineffective with respect to intelligence collection and analysis, counterintelligence and propaganda activities in the first period.

4.4.3.1 British Diplomatic Strategy

When the EOKA campaign of terror broke out, Cyprus was still of vital importance to British political and security ends in the Middle East. Hence, the British strategy on Cyprus was based on maintaining the sovereignty over the island. In order to overcome *enosis* movement, British focused on political alternatives to reset the colonial order on the island while hoping for destruction of EOKA by security and intelligence forces.

Despite the attempts of Makarios and the Greek government for a UN granted self-determination solution, the British policy-makers were not keen on UN involvement in the issue but they considered internationalising it at NATO level. They called for a tripartite conference in London in September 1955 and were accused of playing

Greek and Turkish governments off each other in order to favour their solution of “self-government” on the island.³⁹⁸ While the security and intelligence units were in search of EOKA leader, *Dighenis* and other members, EOKA was intensifying its attacks island wide. As being the seat of Middle East Headquarters and a safe base for the deployment and supply of a strategic reserve and for staging aircraft, the island was a target-rich area for EOKA.³⁹⁹

While the British were striving to obtain a political solution to end the revolt, EOKA had been argued to distress the public confidence to British administration by autumn 1955.⁴⁰⁰ After the failed tripartite conference, Field Marshal John Harding was assigned the post of Governor in October 1955. As soon as he took the office, he had three objectives “to put British administration on war-footing, to open negotiations with Makarios and to take offensive against EOKA”.⁴⁰¹ He immediately started negotiations with Makarios to reach a settlement of the issue as well as focused on reestablishment of security on the island through severe security measures and operations against EOKA. He stated of his approach as follows;

³⁹⁸ William Mallinson, *Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War II* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 23. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 97. Karyos, 117.

³⁹⁹ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 572. TNA CAB 129/76, c(55) 94, “Memorandum by the Minister of Defence, 25 July 1955”.

⁴⁰⁰ Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 139.

⁴⁰¹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 98.

In my view the situation in Cyprus is likely to develop in one of two ways. Either I shall reach some basis of co-operation with Archbishop, in which case the emphasis will be on constitutional development and improvement in social and economic conditions, or there will be an open conflict involving a full scale emergency campaign... In either case we shall have to break up EOKA....⁴⁰²

He thought of four prerequisites to break up EOKA;

- (a) to prevent the smuggling of arms, ammunition and explosives into the island, and to stop the movement of agents, couriers etc. into and out of the island;
- (b) to maintain law and order in the towns and rural areas to enable that economic life of the island to continue, and the needs of the armed forces to be met;
- (c) to prevent interference by sabotage with the efficient functioning of the base;
- (d) to destroy the hard core of the terrorist organisation.⁴⁰³

From October 1955 to February 1956, a series of seven meetings were held between the British governor of the Cyprus Field Marshal Sir John Harding and Archbishop Makarios III without any solution. To demoralize the *enosis* supporters including EOKA, Makarios was deported to Seychelles Islands on 9th March 1956 based on his alleged

⁴⁰² TNA WO 32/16260, Telegram no.779 from Governor Harding to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 5th October 1955.

⁴⁰³ TNA FO 371/123939, Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18th November 1956: Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

relation to EOKA and Grivas.⁴⁰⁴ Nonetheless, EOKA intensified its terror activities including murder of government officials and servicemen, explosions in variety of places and attempts to the life of the governor of Cyprus. A state of emergency was declared in Cyprus on 26 November 1955 and Harding authorised very strict security and punishment measures such as “control of movement, detention of suspects of terrorism, collective punishment, fines and curfews, imposition of death penalty and life imprisonment”.⁴⁰⁵ However, these repressive measures were not enough to combat EOKA without “actionable” intelligence.

Another constitutional solution, the Radcliffe Report on a Constitution for Cyprus (1956), promoted a self-governing Cyprus. On 19th December 1956, British Secretary for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd stated in the Commons Sitings that the Radcliffe Report;

... envisaged a Constitution for a self-governing Cyprus under British sovereignty. As regards the eventual status of the island, Her Majesty's Government have already affirmed their recognition of the principle of self-determination. When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination.

When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's

⁴⁰⁴ TNA WO 33/3726. Aldrich, 573. Holland, “Britain and the Revolt”151-153. Makarios continued to communicate his guidance to EOKA through Bishop of Kitium Anthimos and the Greek government.

⁴⁰⁵ Karyos, *Acceleration of History*, 120. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 98.

Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options....⁴⁰⁶

As being determined to keep the status-quo on the island, the British were seeking for a political solution through constitutional reforms that envisaged self-governance at most. In order to strengthen the British position during negotiations with Turkey, Greece or Makarios himself, EOKA was ordered to be destroyed by security and intelligence units in the island.

4.4.3.2. British Intelligence and EOKA

After the start of EOKA sabotage campaign, the focus of intelligence was on the possible communist connection of EOKA. The investigation of the activities of AKEL was intensified to discover its relation to EOKA. Therefore, the focus of intelligence was still on communism related subversive activities on the island. It was because the intelligence assessment overestimated the capability of AKEL while underestimated the capability of nationalist movement for *enosis*.

⁴⁰⁶ House of Commons, Cyprus: Lord Radcliffes's Proposals, HC Deb 19 December 1956 vol.562, cc1267-79. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals> (Accessed on 27 March 2019)

In November 1955, a Colonial Office paper on “possible communism terrorism” reported about a secret terrorist organisation by communists, sourced by the EOKA agents who had penetrated the communist organisations. The same report also mentioned about the lending support of AKEL and its satellite organisations to EOKA. The official comment on these reports was approving the possibility of a communist terrorist organisation on the island to serve AKEL’s political ends and regain its popular support.⁴⁰⁷ Conditioned by the Cold War mindset, the British policymakers could not acknowledge that the roots of violence on the island were not somehow connected to communism.

A Cyprus Intelligence Committee (CIC) report on the “Appreciation of the situation by Digenis on 18th November 1955” revealed the Dighenis perception of communists on the island:

... the communists will seize any opportunity to foment strife provided it is not directly attributable to them. My supporters must be warned and I many have to take terrorist action against Communist Party leaders to deter them. Any attempt by Communists to join the ranks of EOKA and subvert my organisation must be guarded against and resisted.⁴⁰⁸

However, it was 1956 when the British officials finally convinced that the EOKA violence had not been connected with the rhetorical support

⁴⁰⁷ TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary’s Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA)-Cyprus Security/Intelligence: Possible Communist Terrorism, 17th November 1955.

⁴⁰⁸ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary’s Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957 -CIC Report (55) Twenty-eight (Final), 19th November 1955. See Appendix C: Appreciation of Situation by Dighenis.

of AKEL for enosis. In March 1956 Governor Harding wrote to Lennox-Boyd that:

There is no, (repeat no) direct evidence of communism complicity in murders of either Cypriots or expatriates... Reports of AKEL's preparation to commence terrorist activities and of some recent outrages have been the work of the communists have remained without confirmation. In the view of known anti-communists and Greek royalist sympathies of EOKA leadership, it is considered unlikely that the latter would consider any formal alliance with AKEL.⁴⁰⁹

The British officials were convinced of no connection between AKEL and EOKA, however, there was an intelligence gap on EOKA movement. The intelligence system failed to forewarn of EOKA cause before 1st April 1955; yet, still had not been able to provide operational or tactical intelligence on EOKA. No information about its members, its organisation, and its communication methods was available. Without effective intelligence, all military and police operations were either ineffective or counterproductive.⁴¹⁰ Obviously, the intelligence system was ineffective with respect to intelligence collection and counterintelligence to counter EOKA. Organisational setbacks also hindered effective assessment, dissemination and coordination of intelligence.

⁴⁰⁹ TNA CO 926/417, Telegram no.643 from Harding to Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, 24th March 1956.

⁴¹⁰ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 100.

To start with *Intelligence collection*, the lack of strategic intelligence caused the surprise on British on 1st April 1955. Afterwards, the lack of tactical and operational intelligence impeded the counterinsurgency measures and operations against EOKA. As not much known about EOKA's structure, leadership, members, communications, finance or logistics, or about change in the political dynamics of the island, or about the religious connection of EOKA, the political and security measures were taken in a blind zone.

A letter from D.M.Smith, a Colonial Office official to the Colonial Secretary of Cyprus mentions about the intelligence reports from Cyprus, referring Grivas and the Greek X organisation. They tried to obtain information about methods of this organisation with the hope of having help for forecasting future activities of the recent organisation in Cyprus. But being informed that information on X organisation would have been of little practical value, he got the suggestion of reading a book entitled "Apple of Discord" by C.M. Woodhouse and he passed this suggestion to the colonial government in Cyprus.⁴¹¹

The Colonial Office officially suggested the colonial government of Cyprus to read a book in order to extract some information about methods of EOKA. Among the archival documents of that period, there were documents titled "CIC Paper- Review of the activities of EOKA, May, 1955" which may be relevant to this letter. However, these

⁴¹¹ See Appendix D: The Book "APPLE OF DISCORD". TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA): A *Top Secret* Letter from D.M Smith to Fletcher-Cooke on 11th May 1955.

documents were removed from the file and cannot be seen.⁴¹² In another CIC document that referred to these removed files, it was stated that these were the CIC paper (Rs 163-149) reviewing the EOKA activities but they were not timely and somewhat outdated. The paper also affirmed that by June 1955, “[intelligence] information [on EOKA] is still woefully meagre” and “the identity of the leader Digenis remains unknown but it is believed that he is not a Cypriot.”⁴¹³

The handwritten note regarding the CIC paper on review of EOKA activities criticised it for being overtaken by EOKA events and on other aspects;

It is now mainly historical... since events have overtaken the preparation of the paper [48-38]. Whereas at the beginning of this week, when the paper was drafted, there was, as the paper indicates, occasionally any new intelligence, the situation has now, I gather, changed for the better.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this paper is, I suggest, that the machinery of the CIC is too cumbersome and that it ... named the belied if urgent ad hoc appreciations of this kind were prepared and submitted by the D. of Intelligence as his own personal appreciations (framed after consultation with the SB, SLO and Political Division of the Secretariat) rather than as Committee papers.

⁴¹² TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA), Reds 163-149 removed to X 097/E, Red 148 removed to Secret file S.23/DVII/54/II.

⁴¹³ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, CIC Report 13-1, 14th June 1955 and CIC Report (55)Seven, 15th June 1955.

I do not think the paper should go to the CISC⁴¹⁴ as it stands. It should be brought up to date by the D.of Intelligence and re-submitted as a personal appreciation and in so doing, he should be asked to consider what, if any, modification of his conclusions and recommendations is required in the light of

- (a)the statement from London about talks with Greece and Turkey, and,
- (b)the progress now made with breaking into the EOKA organisation with particular reference to the possibility of destroying that organisation without resort to emergency powers.⁴¹⁵

After the outbreak of EOKA incident, the intelligence requirements densified as British policy-makers had been working on how to overcome Cyprus problem. The intelligence machinery on the island could not cope with intensifying intelligence requirements. As not having the appropriate sources and methods, intelligence could not function properly because of work overload and incapability of intelligence collection and analysis. The intelligence assessment fell behind the developments on the issue. The colonial office official commented on 5th July 1955 on regarding the report (38-48) and the relevant note on it as such:

Events are moving so rapidly that the reform on 48-38 should be left and a new one submitted. ... We almost want something every day

⁴¹⁴ CISC was the Cyprus Internal Security Committee.

⁴¹⁵ See Appendix E: Handwritten Note on the CIC Report 13-1.TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, CIC Report 13-1, 14 June 1955.

now. For instance, we have had no report yet on public opinion in Cyprus following the announcements of 30/06.⁴¹⁶

These documents showed that intelligence machinery could not produce timely and accurate intelligence on EOKA. Even the identity of Dighenis remained undiscovered despite some suspicions on Grivas of being Dighenis. Although British officers could not find information on him or EOKA, Dighenis commented on his aims and purposes and activities of EOKA during his interview to journalist Alec Kitroeff on 31st July 1955.⁴¹⁷ The colonial secretary gauged the interview fictitious and asserted that

Indeed, it is by no means certain that there is any such person. The EOKA organisation may be directed by a committee, and Dighenis may exist only a symbol and as a signature on their pamphlets.⁴¹⁸

Consequently, there was a lack of effective intelligence gathering about EOKA in the island. The reasons for ineffectiveness of the intelligence collection can be analysed regarding the lack of competent personnel, the organizational structure and counterintelligence measures of EOKA.

⁴¹⁶ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, CIC Report 13-1, 14 June 1955.

⁴¹⁷ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, Dighenis Interview to Alec Kitroeff, International News Service, 31st July 1955.

⁴¹⁸ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, Top Secret Letter from Colonial Secretary to the Colonial Office 25th August 1955 on alleged interviews of journalists with Dighenis.

With respect to intelligence gathering methods in the counter-terrorism, the human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity was regarded vital to break into the terrorist organisation. Although the British officials in London were hoping for Cyprus intelligence officers to penetrate and destroy EOKA, HUMINT was not a strong side for them. The most important reason was that neither administrative nor security/intelligence people had the knowledge of Greek or Turkish language, or the cultural aspects of the population on the island. The British strategy was winning hearts and minds, but this strategy was lacking the intelligence support. The main requirements were to find and detect the terrorists, however; intelligence personnel struggled to find a way as they did not know the language or public dynamics or culture. The Director of Military Intelligence reported that “virtually no Colonial official nor staff spoke Greek or Turkish”.⁴¹⁹ It was also stated that the investigations of crimes by EOKA was not effective because “British detectives were unable to read or write Greek.”⁴²⁰ Besides, faulty insurgency policies and harsh counter-terrorism measures as well as EOKA’s attacks on British forces made it difficult for the British to recruit agents or to acquire intelligence from the Greek population.⁴²¹ Governor of Cyprus John Harding affirmed the significance of human intelligence that;

⁴¹⁹ TNA WO 216/889, 2.

⁴²⁰ TNA WO 33/3726, 71.

⁴²¹ Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 309.

the quantity and the quality of the information vouchsafed to the security forces by the general public varies directly and almost immediately with the successes of otherwise achieved in operations against the active terrorists.⁴²²

He also acknowledged the need for the “intelligence of quality” against EOKA terrorists. However, intelligence collection was rather dependant on the “gossip sources, cafes, coffee houses and so on which were totally inadequate. ... there was no clear information about EOKA, its strengths, its armaments, its tactics, or anything”.⁴²³

The Secretary of State for Colonies enquired for information about “the nature of the terrorist organisation or organisations in Cyprus, their political background and sources of direction.”⁴²⁴ Upon this prioritised requirement, an intelligence report on EOKA was submitted by CIC by the end of October, somewhat six months later of the first EOKA attacks.⁴²⁵ The report mentioned about a “suspected role of Grivas and

⁴²² TNA FO 371/123939, Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18.11.1956- Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

⁴²³ TNA CO 926/455, CIC (55) Twenty-seven (Final). Cyprus Intelligence Committee, The nature of EOKA, its political background and sources of direction, 18 October 1955.

⁴²⁴ TNA FCO 141/4160, Savingram No.1383 from the Secretary of State for Colonies to the Governor of Cyprus, 6th October 1955.

⁴²⁵ TNA FCO 141/4160, CIC (55) Twenty Seven (Final)-The Nature of EOKA, its political background and sources of direction, 20th October 1955.

the leader of EOKA styled Dighenis” and on his relation to Makarios that;

Nothing is known of [Grivas] communications with nationalist leaders in Cyprus, with the Ethnarchy or with Greece, or even whether such communications exist. Attacks on military installations and Police stations have shown a well developed intelligence system and careful planning as have some of the assassinations attributed to EOKA.⁴²⁶

On another case, the officials stated about the difficulties in detection of EOKA’s smuggling of arms and recruits into island in the absence of information.⁴²⁷ The lack of timely and accurate information also hampered the military operations against EOKA:

... military operations ... resulted in serious interference in the normal lives of the island’s Greek and Turkish inhabitants including disruption of communications, some inevitable damage to crops and vineyards, and a temporary restriction of grazing facilities for domestic animals. The great majority of successful operations were, in fact, carried out by small parties of soldiers accompanied by Special Branch personnel, sometimes with agents or guides, acting on accurate information.⁴²⁸

After dozens of ineffectual operations, the Operation Foxhunter at the villages of Spilia and Khandira was mounted with a relative success on 11th December 1955. In the first half of 1956, the British also conducted

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ TNA WO 33/3726, 4.

⁴²⁸ TNA WO 33/3726, 5.

major operations against EOKA, which produced little effect. Grivas narrowly escaped from British forces during the operation Pepper Pot and Lucky Alphonso in the Troodos mountains.⁴²⁹ But to his unlucky, British forces discovered his diary which provided valuable insight to EOKA that was otherwise unobtainable. The British authorities tried to identify and “hide their blind spots” against EOKA by the help of these diaries.⁴³⁰ Most importantly, the link between EOKA and Makarios was proved as a result of the captured documents. The diaries of Grivas and letters exchanged between Makarios and Grivas were of great value to prove the relationship between Makarios and EOKA. Because of the ineffective intelligence mechanism, not much was known about the structure and leadership of EOKA as well as cooperation between Archbishop Makarios and Grivas before the capture of Grivas diaries. The governor himself accepted the deficiency:

In the past, we have always been hampered in proving our case against Archbishop by the impossibility of publishing evidence from our own secret sources.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ French, 135. Mark Simmons, *The British and Cyprus: An Outpost of Empire to Sovereign Bases, 1878-1974* (Gloucestershire: History Press, 2015), 113. The British Army suffered the largest loss of 21 soldiers on 17th June because of the fire in the Paphos forest during ‘Lucky Alphonse’. It never came out whether EOKA or British troops started the fire.

⁴³⁰ TNA FCO 141/4352. Grivas called them “Diary of the National Movement”. The diaries covered the periods from 26 October 1954 to 9th June 1956. See Appendix F: Grivas’ Diaries and Other Belongings. TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, Grivas diaries, etc.-Telegram no.2211 from Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State, Grivas Diaries, 2 November 1956.

⁴³¹ TNA FCO 141/4225, Telegram No.1694 from Governor of Cyprus to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1956. See Appendix G: The Relationship between Makarios and Grivas.

By September 1955, the British were considering of deporting Makarios to Seychelles or Aden with the aim of curtailing the support to EOKA. In the telegram from the Secretary of the State for Colonies to Aden, was enquiring about possible arrangements in case a necessity arose in the next few days to deport Makarios and Bishop of Kyrenia for detention in the Seychelles.⁴³² In the beginning, intelligence was not available to support the political decision of deportation of Makarios to Seychelles. Yet, based on his alleged support to EOKA terror, Archbishop Makarios, along with the Bishop of Kyrenia, Stavros Papagathangelou and Polykarpos Ioannides, were exiled to Seychelles in March 1956. Although British took some time to prepare for deportation of Makarios, this was counterproductive on the British policies. There occurred a week-long general strike and 246 EOKA attacks, including an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Harding, by planting a bomb under his bed.⁴³³

The capture of Grivas diary enabled the Colonial and Foreign offices to provide evidence of the Makarios's support to EOKA's terror and hence, to justify his deportation. British officials publicised the relationship

⁴³² See Appendix H: Deportation of Makarios. FO 371/117657, Telegram No. 375 from the Secretary of State for Colonies to Aden on 9th September 1955.

⁴³³ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 102. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 574. Simmons, *The British and Cyprus*, 102.

between Makarios and Grivas based on the captured documents on 27th August 1956.⁴³⁴

The British also intended to use of Grivas diaries and personal belonging captured during the operations for propaganda activities at press conferences and even on a BBC TV show “Panorama” on 1st October 1956.⁴³⁵ Dighenis distributed another leaflet regarding the captured diaries for counter-propaganda.⁴³⁶ In the beginning, there was a suspicion on the authenticity of the diaries but later on, British were able to prove its originality.⁴³⁷ Besides, the arguments and the language of the distributed EOKA leaflet indicated that Grivas had written the diaries. He was asking questions such as the type of the receptacle in which they were contained and the places in which they were found.⁴³⁸ Hence, he accepted the existence of his diaries. These documents also contributed to EOKA’s propaganda campaign though. Grivas emerged as a “hero”

⁴³⁴ TNA FCO 141/4225, The Press Conference-EOKA and Archbishop Makarios, Revelations in captured documents, 27th August 1956.

⁴³⁵ See Appendix I: British Counter-Propaganda. TNA FCO141/4225, Telegram from Colonial Office to J.Reddaway, 5th October 1956.

⁴³⁶ See Appendix J: EOKA Leaflet, 4 October 1956. TNA FCO 141/4225, EOKA Leaflet distributed on 4 October 1956.

⁴³⁷ See Appendix G.

⁴³⁸ See Appendix K: EOKA Leaflet, TNA FCO 141/4225, EOKA Leaflet distributed in Greek at Nicosia on 29 August 1956 and in English at Kaimakli on 31 August 1956.

out of his captured diaries. But the real value of the diaries was the intelligence they provided to British officials on the support of Makarios church and the Greek government to EOKA, the financing of EOKA, use of school children for strikes and demonstrations.⁴³⁹

In the following August in 1956, Grivas announced a ceasefire on the advice of Greek government. Harding assumed the meaning of ceasefire was admittance of defeat by EOKA and Grivas.⁴⁴⁰ With no proof of having intelligence on EOKA's defeat, Harding called EOKA to surrender on in August 1956. EOKA replied it by resuming attacks again. In November 1956, there occurred 416 EOKA attacks that caused 39 people dead.⁴⁴¹ Once again, Governor Harding lost the opportunity of ending the insurgency because of the misassumptions.

In 1956, EOKA intensified its terror activities by mounting assassinations and sabotages.⁴⁴² From the daily intelligence reports of incidents, it could be concluded that during the times when EOKA was actively engaging terrorist and violent activities, the Greek Cypriots

⁴³⁹ FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA Documents, Grivas Diaries etc.

⁴⁴⁰ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 104.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid 104.

⁴⁴² See Appendix L: Sabotages and Ambushes by EOKA to understand how EOKA got intelligence based planning prior to their action of armed ambushes and sabotages. TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, undated.

were shot dead, sabotages and ambushes against British installations and personnel occurred almost every day.⁴⁴³




Figure 8- Photo of British soldiers uncovering an EOKA arms cache, 1956⁴⁴⁴

A disputable method of human intelligence was interrogation that was widely adopted by British intelligence to compensate ineffectiveness of other methods. Though the intelligence derived from interrogation of captured members of EOKA was of value for British officials. Although the interrogation methods and detention camps were criticised worldwide, British officials claimed it was disinformation by EOKA.

⁴⁴³ See Appendix M: A Daily Situation Report. TNA FO 371/123939, Cyprus and enosis: Daily Situation Report 436.covering period 9th-10th December 1956.

⁴⁴⁴ National Army Museum, London, NAM.1992-08-65-68.

It was in order to inhibit Special Branch interrogators which prompted [Grivas] to press for the establishment of the local ‘Human Rights’ Committees, and the worldwide publication of false allegations of brutality through the PEKA⁴⁴⁵ organisation.⁴⁴⁶



Figure 9-Photo of EOKA's reply to Harding with a donkey "My Marshall, I surrender" on Metaxa Square, 16th August 1956, Nicosia⁴⁴⁷

The inadequacy of trained personnel was also stated as an obstacle to effective intelligence work. For example, in 1956 CO reports, the lack of

⁴⁴⁵ PEKA (Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agona) was the Political Committee of the Cyprus Struggle.

⁴⁴⁶ TNA WO 33/3726, 74.

⁴⁴⁷ "My Marshall, I surrender". Library of the University of Cyprus. <http://hdl.handle.net/10797/2296> (Accessed on 18 March 2019)

interrogators on the island was stated one of the major problems of intelligence collection:

There is nothing more which we can do from this end except to continue our efforts to find good interrogators, the continued lack of which is one of the main obstacles to effective intelligence work in the island, whether directed at Eoka or Akel.⁴⁴⁸

Another letter from Governor Harding to Colonial Office was asking for provision of permanent security officers in Cyprus who would have been responsible for the protection of governmental installations against EOKA sabotages. He believed that if these required personnel had been supplied from the United Kingdom, the army units would have been freed of static guard duties and worked for destruction of EOKA, as long as good intelligence had been available.

The offensive counter to sabotage is the elimination of the few trained experts and of would-be saboteurs. This forms part of the destruction of EOKA as a whole and can only be done by active operations by mobile troops based on good intelligence, not by static guards.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr.MacDonald's Report On Cyprus-December 1955, Note by Colonial Office officer on 13th July 1956

⁴⁴⁹ TNA CO 1035/133, Intelligence and Security Department- Provision of Security Officers for Essential Services, Cyprus , 1954-1956, Letter from Sir John Harding, 18th November 1956 and TNA FO 371/123939, Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18 November 1956- Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

He was also commenting on the intelligence function that;

There has been a steady improvement in the efficiency and strength of the Special Branch and CID and in the quantity and quality of the intelligence. It mostly comes from the captured documents and from arrested suspects but there is also a trickle of useful information from members of the general public. This puts a premium on expert interrogators who still form the weakest element in the intelligence organisation.⁴⁵⁰

EOKA, on the other hand, was giving instructions to its members “regarding the techniques to be employed before, during and subsequent to interrogation. They were schooled in the preparation of suitable cover stories and the practice of shamming fits, fainting and the display of internal disorder.⁴⁵¹ In addition, political developments were also considered to hamper the intelligence collection efforts. The security intelligence advisor to the Colonial Office A.Macdonald stated that;

It is perhaps insufficiently appreciated that developments in the political sphere have marked repercussions on the flow of intelligence. Any suggestions of a settlement, or the grant of self-determination results in informants drying up and captured terrorists ceasing to co-operate (as they have done on a number of occasions). These fluctuations are inevitable, but they do increase the already formidable difficulties in securing reliable intelligence.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ TNA FO 371/123939, Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18 November 1956- Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

⁴⁵¹ TNA WO33/3726, 74.

⁴⁵² TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- Note on Security Intelligence Adviser's Visit to Cyprus, 12th July 1956.

Also, the Colonial Office officials were noting that “how recent “leakages” in the press of the UK about a possible settlement had caused captured terrorists who had up to then, been giving information and proving cooperative to shut up completely”.⁴⁵³

In March 1957, CIC report on the “present potential of EOKA as an armed force” presented an outline of the organisational structure of EOKA and leadership, channels of command, probable location of terrorists and number of its weapons by the time being. According to CIC assessment,

both EOKA’s manpower and weapon strength remained considerable, shortage of ammunition and explosives is unlikely of itself to cause EOKA to desist from violence, the morale of EOKA is high and EOKA is still capable of dominating the civil population.⁴⁵⁴

CIC suggested elimination of leadership as a prerequisite to terminate EOKA terror. The report also evaluated the possibility of destruction of EOKA on the condition of how many and which rank leadership eliminated. The names of the leadership of EOKA were given and it was detailed that elimination of four top leaders would cause EOKA decline

⁴⁵³ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr.MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus-December 1955, Note by Colonial Office officer on 13th July 1956.

⁴⁵⁴ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary’s Office Cyprus- CIC Report (57)-The Present Potential of EOKA as an Armed Force, 1st March 1957.

and better, elimination of all nine top leaders would cripple EOKA.⁴⁵⁵ The intelligence machinery could be said of shifting from defensive to offensive intelligence operations then. The CIC was capable of producing more comprehensive intelligence reports on EOKA.



*Figure 10-Photo from the Operation Black Mac*⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁵ See Appendix N: The CIC Report. TNA FCO 141/4160, Review of Activities of EOKA- CIC Report (57) Seven (Final), The Present Potential of EOKA as an Armed Force, 1st March 1957.

⁴⁵⁶ "Corporal Tom Westcott of the 2nds Battalion, Parachute Regime, looking at the opening in the floor of a kitchen in a mountain village house, which led to an underground room where six terrorists were hiding." IWM, The British Army in Cyprus, 1957, Object No. HU68967.

In January 1957, British security forces were able to mount successful operations against EOKA. Two leaders of EOKA, Afxentiou and Drakos were killed and large groups of EOKA were captured that disrupted EOKA. On 14th March 1957, Grivas declared unilateral ceasefire again because of Greek government's pressure. Again, EOKA had been said to be defeated but not yet destroyed.⁴⁵⁷

Makarios was released from Seychelles in April 1957, banned from returning Cyprus though, and EOKA went to inactivity in the summer of 1957. Indeed, Grivas had made a good use of ceasefire to guarantee the release of Makarios and to cover up his efforts for the reorganisation and reactivation of EOKA. Grivas made his strategies based on intelligence. He got the intelligence about British and American stand therefore he was able to ask for release of Makarios if he was to offer ceasefire. In the autumn of 1957, EOKA mounted serious sabotages against government buildings. The leaflets by EOKA were threatening again.

Another factor affected the intelligence collection adversely was the strict, mostly deathful countermeasures taken by EOKA against British intelligence efforts. Grivas had set up an intelligence system for EOKA which would not tolerate even the possibility of infiltration to the organisation. EOKA did not hesitate to use terror against Cypriot community or its own members who were suspected of being agent or informer. Under these circumstances as well as limited capability, British officials found it quite difficult to recruit informers:

⁴⁵⁷ TNA WO 33/3726.

... Any divergence from normal habits on the part of any villager immediately rouses suspicion and, in many cases, false suspicion resulted in the death of innocent peasants. The difficulties experienced in the handling of village informers were seemingly insurmountable. Even communication by letter was highly dangerous as it was of the case that the village postal agent was either a member of EOKA or working willingly or otherwise, under the orders of the organisation.⁴⁵⁸

The insufficient intelligence collection accompanied with organisational dysfunction of the intelligence system on the island. Collectively, these shortcomings affected operational capability and caused ineffectiveness in the coordination and analysis of the intelligence.

Organisational structure of Cyprus intelligence system is also analysed.

The organisational setbacks in colonial intelligence system caused inefficiency with respect to intelligence collection and counterintelligence mainly. Besides, the lack of coordination and communication between central and colonial intelligence mechanisms hindered effective management of intelligence against EOKA.

As discussed in the previous chapter, political and security intelligence were vital for maintaining the colonial rule. However, the colonial intelligence machinery was in poor condition in regard to intelligence production and coordination among the intelligence departments. As Chapter 3 details how British aimed to consolidate the intelligence system in the island, in 1954 the first security intelligence adviser A. Macdonald submitted a report on measures to improve the machinery for

⁴⁵⁸ TNA WO 33/3726, 5.

the collection, collation and dissemination of security and political intelligence. His suggestions had been followed but before the colonial intelligence system in Cyprus had time to find its feet, the EOKA terror broke out on the island. The Special Branch, a supposedly key unit for security intelligence, could not have gained efficiency yet.

In December 1955, adviser Macdonald sent another report to Governor of Cyprus suggesting on how to improve intelligence organisation against EOKA activities. He recommended “to enhance intelligence/operation coordination, to create Operational Intelligence Wing within the Special Branch, to improve intelligence dissemination among and within the intelligence departments.”⁴⁵⁹ By February 1956, the District Intelligence Committee was to be set up.⁴⁶⁰ According to the “Intelligence organisation Directive”, each district had to have its own District Intelligence Officer (DIO). The DIC, then, was composed of the DIO, intelligence representatives of military units and the Special Branch and the District Commissioner. DIC had to collect, collate and disseminate the intelligence within the district.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr. MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus- December 1955, Report on Organisation of Intelligence in Cyprus, 22 December 1955.

⁴⁶⁰ The British maintained the Ottoman district system of administration that involved six districts on the island.

⁴⁶¹ TNA FCO 141/4313, Chief of Staff to Her Majesty’s Government (COSHEG), Intelligence Organisation Directive, 3rd February 1956.

Despite these efforts, the intelligence system was not as effective as desired. For example, the Special Branch was not effective on gathering intelligence or penetrating EOKA.⁴⁶² Neither was the CIC. The intelligence on EOKA was still poor by autumn 1955 and no information was available about “Grivas’ communications within Cyprus or with Makarios and nationalist leaders, or with Greece”.⁴⁶³ And Macdonald was stating on the issue that “Despite severe setbacks the intelligence organisation is now developing, albeit slowly.”⁴⁶⁴ In another report on 12th July 1956, Macdonald was still stating that;

Everyone to whom I spoke, from the Governor downwards, was agreed that intelligence was improving, albeit slowly. The battle is a hard one,...⁴⁶⁵

The dysfunction of intelligence system also affected the intelligence assessment and analysis on EOKA issue. The rivalry between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office was reflected in the intelligence and hampered the interdepartmental intelligence coordination as well.

⁴⁶² Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571.

⁴⁶³ Dorril, *MI6*, 552.

⁴⁶⁴ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports by Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr. MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus- December 1955, Report on Organisation of Intelligence in Cyprus, 22 December 1955.

⁴⁶⁵ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports by Security Intelligence Advisers, Mr. MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus-December 1955- Note on Security Intelligence Adviser’s Visit to Cyprus, 12th July 1956.

These offices were also conflicting on Cyprus issue. The Foreign Office and Colonial Office were blaming each other for the outbreak of events. This also shows the insufficiency of a centralised intelligence analysis. The conflictual approach of the ministries also impeded the government to decide on the future of Cyprus policy. Sir Peter Wakefield, who was serving as First Secretary to the British Middle East Office in Cyprus by 1955 recalled that the JIC had asked them to prepare an independent report without the knowledge of the Cyprus government. This can be understood as a proof of the competition between the CO and JIC.⁴⁶⁶ He wrote a report saying that the era of colonialism had ended, the Cypriots had not been really willing to join with Greece and the talks should have been opened with Makarios for independence.⁴⁶⁷ However, his report was not agreed by the senior officials and a contrary report was sent to the JIC. After that troops were sent in Cyprus and he had been appointed to Cairo next year.⁴⁶⁸

The intelligence coordination among MI5, Special Branch and military intelligence within the island was ineffective either. There were certain setbacks in the dissemination of intelligence although the system was to be rational and effective based on the advices of security advisor. The

⁴⁶⁶ For the relationship between the CO and the JIC, see Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013), 6-15.

⁴⁶⁷ Sir Peter Wakefield interviewed by Louise Brodie (Section 1) on 8th September 2008. BL REF C408/30, British Library.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

Special Branch and the military were reluctant to share or coordinate intelligence with each other.⁴⁶⁹ Until the establishment of Cyprus Intelligence Committee in July 1958, the heads of intelligence services could not communicate or coordinate the intelligence work as they could not get access to all types of intelligence such as signals intelligence.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, the intelligence coordination between the CIC and DICs remained weak until the DICs were linked to the CIC directly in 1959. Also, French points out that the army units in Cyprus were not “intelligence-conscious”. Throughout the emergency, they failed to report the incidents, to identify the patterns of activities within their responsibility area and mostly they neglected the importance of an intelligence officer in the battalion.⁴⁷¹

In addition, the period of EOKA terror campaign from 1955 to 1957 had been reconciled with reforms on the JIC. As examined previously in Chapter 3, it is widely argued that Foreign Office had taken the lead in the JIC because of the irreconcilable attitude of the Colonial Office. Although the units of colonial intelligence machinery were producing intelligence information and disseminating it to the Colonial Office and

⁴⁶⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 127-130.

⁴⁷⁰ TNA FCO 141/4439, From G. Sinclair to Governor Foot, 9th July 1958. TNA CO 926/677 Popham to Reddaway, Monthly Report for December, 1 January 1959, Review of the Cyprus Emergency, 1st September 1959.

⁴⁷¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 129.

Foreign Office, each of these bureaucratic structures were having their own analysis and not sharing with others.

The ineffective communication between the colonies and the London was another reason for ineffective intelligence analysis. General Templer highlighted the importance of intelligence collation and assessment at imperial level in his report.⁴⁷² Macdonald also recommended more “co-ordination and co-operation with respect to compilation and routing of intelligence appreciations and summaries”⁴⁷³ between the relevant government bodies.

While the British intelligence system was struggling with deficiencies, EOKA was intensifying its terror attacks EOKA was targeting police and Cypriots working for the British administration. Indeed, EOKA successfully neutered the Special Branch. The security intelligence advisor A. Macdonald wrote to Governor Harding that “It would be futile to deny that the EOKA tactics of making Special Branch a primary target have in large measure succeeded, ...”.⁴⁷⁴ In the summer of 1955, EOKA was capable of successful assassinations of key personnel at

⁴⁷² See Rory Cormac, “Organising Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security”, *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no.6 (2010) 800-822.

⁴⁷³ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers- Mr.MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus- December 1955, Letter from Macdonald to the Governor of Cyprus on 21st August 1954.

⁴⁷⁴ TNA CO 1035/98, Reports By Security Intelligence Advisers, Mr.MacDonald’s Report On Cyprus-Letter from Macdonald to Harding on 22 December 1955.

police forces with the help of informers. Meanwhile, EOKA members including Grivas himself successfully escaped British operations. The British large cordon and search operations rarely resulted in arrests or the discovery of arms. Walton criticized the British for using out of date tactics such as these cordon and searches, which were ineffective against EOKA.⁴⁷⁵ It became clear that EOKA did have an effective intelligence apparatus able to forewarn of security force intentions.⁴⁷⁶ This indicates the success of EOKA's intelligence and British counterintelligence failure.

With respect to the *British counterintelligence failure*, in 1950s, the counterintelligence of British machinery was functioning with low efficiency. Even in the central intelligence machinery, there were many Soviet agents in the MI5 and MI6, at high ranks, i.e. Kim Philby and the Cambridge Five incident. Likewise, the colonial counterintelligence in Cyprus could not function to avoid penetration to administration or security and intelligence bodies by EOKA. Between 1954 and 1958, for example, there were as many as twenty active agents among Cyprus Police.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁵ Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 308.

⁴⁷⁶ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 100.

⁴⁷⁷ Corum, *Bad Strategies*, 98.



Figure 11- “Pepper grains in tube” used by EOKA terrorists⁴⁷⁸

On 8th September 1955, the JIC (ME) was commenting on the counterintelligence measures in Cyprus that;

Whilst it is true that at this moment the Special Branch have no sections specifically concerned with counterespionage in Cyprus, it should also be understood that the local organisations of the British

Intelligence Service are very actively engaged in counter-intelligence and counter-espionage throughout the whole of the Middle East, including Cyprus.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁸ EOKA terrorists used these pepper grains in glass tubes to “destroy their scent from the British tracker dog patrols in the hills.” IWM EPH 9999, Pepper Grains (in Glass Tube)

⁴⁷⁹ TNA FCO 141/4158, The State of Intelligence in Cyprus, 14th September 1955.

Yet, counterintelligence mechanism remained ineffective regarding protective security measures for counter-sabotage or counter-terrorism and offensive measures to detect and deter EOKA agents. As the counterintelligence failure means the efficiency of intelligence of the enemy, examining the intelligence system of EOKA will contribute to the understanding of whether British counterintelligence had been effective.

4.4.3.3. EOKA's Intelligence System

The structure of EOKA was quite tight from the beginning. By the time EOKA went into action in April 1955, it was composed of 5 main towns and 7 villages with around 80 members. At its strongest, it reached “7 mountain groups that was composed of the conventional guerrilla force, 47 town groups of assassination squads and 75 village groups of armed members with shotguns, with a total strength of around thousand men.”⁴⁸⁰ On 22nd September 1956, CIC was reporting that the mountain groups had been believed to be ten; the number of armed village groups and town groups had not been known.⁴⁸¹ CIC assessed by then, “the potential of EOKA as an armed force remains considerable.”⁴⁸²

⁴⁸⁰ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 93.

⁴⁸¹ TNA FO 371/123930, CIC Report (56) Twenty-Five (Final), The Present Potential of EOKA as an Armed Force 22nd September 1956.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

Compared to the British forces, EOKA remained a small force even at its strongest though. From the eyes of the Director of Operations in Cyprus, EOKA was regarded as;

...not principally a 'guerrilla organisation' of 'partisans' in the accepted sense, and its main strength was to be found in the towns and villages. It had a plentiful and constant supply of manpower and could call upon the support of at least 70% of the island's Greek Cypriot community. It was, in effect, the militant arm of the Greek Orthodox Church.⁴⁸³

The support of church and Makarios to EOKA and its influence on Greek population increased the popularity of EOKA. EOKA members were allowed to hide themselves or their arms in the monasteries. The priests were not only rhetorically backing EOKA but also encouraged and threatened the Greek Cypriots to join and support EOKA. Later, it was reported that. The Greek orthodox monasteries were EOKA centres for supply and communications.⁴⁸⁴ Kyokko Monastery was used by Grivas to lead his guerrilla groups in the Paphos Forest until the Operation Luck Alphonso in 1956. Director of Operations in Cyprus concluded that;

the topographical, ethnological, political and religious conditions prevailing in Cyprus during the emergency played a major part in assisting EOKA in their fight against the Security Forces. Without

⁴⁸³ TNA, WO 33/2736 and FO 421/352, A History of EOKA 1954-1959 (Nicosia: Director of Operations, 20th April 1960), 1.

⁴⁸⁴ TNA WO 33/3726.

these advantageous conditions prevailing in the island of EOKA would have been defeated at an early date.⁴⁸⁵

These issues of topography, ethnology, political and religious conditions should have been the subject of the Cyprus colonial intelligence machinery. If the security and political intelligence on the mentioned areas had been reported and analysed, the forewarning of EOKA terror could have been generated. Although the same document mentions about the importance of intelligence in fighting against underground organisations such as EOKA, it did not take into consideration the inefficiency of the intelligence against EOKA. If information about these issues were collected and analysed timely and accurately, the strategy of fighting against EOKA would have been effectively materialised.

While the British could not obtain successful tactical intelligence, its organisational structure and intelligence network were giving tactical superiority to EOKA. Grivas had founded EOKA on a cellular structure and many cells were established in the villages, Kyrenia and Troodos mountain ranges. It was a functional system until the end of the campaign that Grivas dispatched his orders to the cell leaders by couriers. In addition to vertical hierarchy, Grivas was also cautious on counterintelligence measures. Since it was a cell structure, British intelligence could not succeed to infiltrate to the cells or reach Grivas through individual members of cells or destroy EOKA without finding Grivas.

⁴⁸⁵ TNA WO 33/3726.

The *Strategy of EOKA* was to support the cause of enosis, or at least self-determination that would lead to enosis. Grivas was realistic that he could not defeat the British forces, on an open warfare. His strategy was to keep the enosis issue on the international agenda by EOKA activities that would eventually put pressure on British authority.⁴⁸⁶ In this manner, his strategy was “first to create the environment for guerrilla action and second to exploit that environment.”⁴⁸⁷ He aimed to blind the functioning of main British security intelligence body by pursuing offensive against police and punishing the Greek Cypriots whom were informers to British forces on EOKA issues. And then, he could have realised attacks on military installations and the troops without major impedimentum. The ultimate purpose was to draw attention to the efforts of EOKA. The War Office described EOKA sabotage activities as follows:

EOKA activities involved sabotage of British governmental installations, murder of expatriates, ambushes of military vehicles, or the execution of Greek Cypriot traitors, provocation of demonstrations and riots in order to keep EOKA before the public eye.⁴⁸⁸

Under guidance of Makarios, Grivas had sought its strategic objective by the support of his intelligence and counterintelligence system. At strategic level, EOKA took advantage of intelligence to get the

⁴⁸⁶ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 97.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid 96.

⁴⁸⁸ TNA CO 33/3726, 13.

knowledge of British political and military intentions on the island while used tactical intelligence to increase its members and form groups. Meanwhile, the counterintelligence mechanism provided EOKA of advantageous position. In order to maintain the security of the organisation, EOKA was aimed at intimidation of Greek Cypriots who opposed EOKA by threatening or assaulting and penetration to British governmental departments. While developing the organisational structure and strategy of EOKA, Grivas prioritised the network of intelligence from the beginning. He envisaged gaining comparative superiority by blinding British intelligence through attacks while strengthening his own intelligence system, i.e. through penetration of the police. Therefore, Grivas built up his strategy based on the intelligence whereas the British could not use the intelligence machinery to develop policy on the island.

EOKA had started its activities supported by effective *intelligence and counter-intelligence* mechanism. From the beginning of his strategy, Grivas knew that EOKA would need leaders, trained and committed men of intelligence to serve the organisation. Thus, in early 1955, he appointed Polycarpus Georghadjis as the head of EOKA intelligence and he first used the potential leaders of EOKA as agents:

During the period 1954 to early 1955, GRIVAS controlled only the nucleus of an organisation; his immediate plan was to increase its members and form groups. Whilst this was taking place, the future leaders were used as intelligence agents. They collected information from newly recruited members and transmitted it back to him. This task was then delegated to the new group leaders who in turn used their groups for the actual production of intelligence. GRIVAS also

appointed one of his senior leaders as head of his intelligence service. This man, Polycarpus GEORGHADJIS, who had many contacts in the Police and other Government departments was located in NICOSIA and... he was receiving information in regard to Security Force's movements and Police searches from Greek Cypriot Police Officers at varying levels.⁴⁸⁹

The sources of EOKA's intelligence collection were the agents penetrated into the police and other departments of government, its special groups for surveillance and reconnaissance of targets and informers who were EOKA members or supporters and employed in military and security installations and the youth groups such as PEON and OHEN. Grivas himself decided on the intelligence requirements and priorities of intelligence collection. He also instructed on how to organise information networks and successfully established the network of agents and informers and infiltrated to governmental intelligence and security branches. He planted agents in the Special Branch that enabled EOKA to follow up even the high-level security meetings.⁴⁹⁰ For example, George Lagoudontis was referred to be one of the EOKA spies in the Special Branch who provided warning of upcoming British operations against EOKA, tape-recorded British security meetings and stole secret documents.⁴⁹¹ Therefore, EOKA was able to receive strategic and immediate tactical intelligence. Also, penetration to Post Office

⁴⁸⁹ WO 33/3726, 67.

⁴⁹⁰ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571.

⁴⁹¹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 101. French, 58.

enabled EOKA to intercept postal communications of government officials while EOKA agents employed by Cyprus Internal Telecommunications Authority were able to monitor telephone calls between the officials.⁴⁹² The British never got successful of eliminating EOKA agents in the security forces.⁴⁹³

It was not only his success of implanting agents into governmental bodies but also the lack of effective counterintelligence among British forces and support of Greek Cypriots working at various positions within the reach of information that provided for sustainable EOKA intelligence throughout incident. The timely and accurate intelligence provided by those led to effective EOKA operations.

After the end of Cyprus case, the British officials evaluated EOKA intelligence network rather “successful” that:

EOKA was able to penetrate all Government departments and therefore obtain a constant flow of information about Government policy and such matters as impending operations, searches and arrests. One outstanding success obtained by their intelligence system was the foreknowledge of the Government Orders for the impounding of all shotguns in January 1956, which they anticipated by seizing over seven hundred of the best weapons.⁴⁹⁴ The task of their intelligence

⁴⁹² WO 33/3726, 68-69.

⁴⁹³ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 101.

⁴⁹⁴ EOKA received the information of the government’s intention to call in all shotguns on 24th January 1956. On the night of 23rd January 1956, EOKA succeeded in collecting 700 or more shotguns by sending armed groups around the villages. See WO 33/3726.

agents was made easier by the lack of security consciousness on the part of many members of the Forces and the Police, who failed to realise that they were living and often working amongst people such as servants, clerks, telephone operators, etc. who were either members of EOKA or actively sympathetic towards the cause. The incident of the bomb at Government House in which the death of the Governor was narrowly averted was an example of this.⁴⁹⁵

Moreover, Grivas was able to obtain up to date intelligence on political activities abroad and island wide developments sourced from intelligence reports and open sources such as radio news and letters. From October 1955 to June 1956, he used an intelligence clearing house located at the main Kyokko monastery.⁴⁹⁶ Grivas also aimed to set up intelligence collection centres under responsibility of certain EOKA leaders. According to the notes about the information in his diary, “he envisaged Rhodes an intelligence centre for the collection of information on British activities and communists and for the transmission and exchange of intelligence between Cyprus and Greece”.⁴⁹⁷

In the meantime, he took severe counterintelligence measures in order to protect the security of EOKA and maintain it underground. He revealed his strategy of maintaining EOKA’s security as such:

⁴⁹⁵ TNA WO33/3726, “EOKA Intelligence”, 19-20.

⁴⁹⁶ TNAWO 33/3726, 67.

⁴⁹⁷ TNA WO 33/3726, 66.

... The elimination of some police informers will strengthen my security and warn people not to talk. More care must be taken to ensure that those liable to fall into police hands are briefed on giving nothing of value away.⁴⁹⁸

By 1955, he appeared to achieve his objective of intimidation. In another *Top Secret* CIC intelligence review, the shooting of the detected informers by EOKA has an impact on Cypriot public:

[EOKA] aim is at present to reduce the Police to an ineffective force and to increase its own security by campaigning against Special Branch and CID personnel and would-be informers. ... a former Special Constable murdered in Nicosia had been adjudged an informer by his compatriots. His shooting was probably a deliberate attempt to dissuade others from giving information. ... there can be no doubt that such outrages have had an inhibiting effect... the public in general are even more unwilling than before to cooperate and the outrages have had a damaging effect on Police morale and the readiness of the police to expose themselves in collecting information.⁴⁹⁹

Grivas was ruthless to Cypriot informers to British forces and did not hesitate to use terror against them. Governor Harding reported to Secretary of State that in July 1956, EOKA killed 17 civilians including one English man and wife, one Maltese and one Armenian and Greek

⁴⁹⁸ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, CIC Report (55) Twenty-eight (Final) Appreciation of the situation by Digenis, 19th November 1955.

⁴⁹⁹ TNA FO 371/117653, CIC(55)- Sixteen (Final) Intelligence Review for the first half of August 1955, 23rd August 1955.

Cypriots.⁵⁰⁰ During its terror campaign, EOKA killed 203 Greeks and 156 members of security forces.⁵⁰¹

The manner in which “traitors” were executed was in the majority of cases extremely brutal. A favourite method chosen by EOKA executioners was to kill their victim in public or in the presence of relatives, often in the village coffee shop or club, or at a wedding ceremony. The gunmen, wearing black hoods and long black cloaks, would appear out of the darkness, single out their victim, denounce him as a ‘traitor’ and then shoot him.”⁵⁰²

Despite the terrorisation of EOKA, some Greek Cypriots were willing to cooperate with British forces against EOKA. However, they were aware of the fact that the police could not be trusted and their lives were in danger.⁵⁰³ In general, the fear and terror created by EOKA’s ruthless manner even in suspicion of treason had blocked intelligence collection efforts of British authorities.

⁵⁰⁰ TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary’s Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA), Telegram No.1581 SECRET, From Governor, Cyprus to Secretary of State, 6 August 1956.

⁵⁰¹ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 571. See Appendix O: EOKA Killings 1955-1958. TNA WO 33/3726, “Annexure “J”-Deductions from EOKA/SF Killings Graph, 92-93.

⁵⁰² TNA WO 33/3726, 73.

⁵⁰³ See Appendix P: Unnamed letter from a Greek Cypriot. TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary’s Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA), Unnamed letter to Colonial Secretary, 14th July 1955.

Just as the support of population assisted EOKA in the collection of information, so it assisted in their counterintelligence measures. Where loyalty to EOKA was suspect, intimidation was used. Ruthless methods including murder and assault were employed on the slightest suspicion and the local population were terrified to such an extent that virtually no information was given voluntarily to the Security Forces. Much of the information obtained from ordinary informers related to low grade members only and rarely went higher than leaders of village groups or the equivalent. Information about the higher ranks was obtained as the result of interrogation of captured terrorists. Equally important was the information obtained from captured documents, such as GRIVAS diaries, the contents of which could almost invariably be treated as good information. Although GRIVAS endeavoured to impose the Communist cell system he achieved little success and it was fortunate that many terrorists had a very wide knowledge of the organisation and supplied a great deal of intelligence of value. On the other hand, it is almost unlikely that the whereabouts of GRIVAS at any time was known to more than one or possibly two people and even the most cooperative of the EOKA terrorist leaders captured were unable to disclose any information regarding his location.⁵⁰⁴

In addition to intimidation, some of other counterintelligence measures adopted by EOKA involved use of codenames by members, destruction of documents after reading, no use of telephone or open mail, use of couriers for communication, counter-interrogation techniques, loyalty test to new members (to detect British or communist penetration) and screening of EOKA recruits.⁵⁰⁵ In his diaries, for example, he called Archbishop Makarios as the general or Genokis.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰⁴ TNA WO33/3726, "EOKA Intelligence", 19-20.

⁵⁰⁵ TNA WO 33/3726, 73-76.

⁵⁰⁶ TNA FCO 141/4225.

For EOKA communications, Grivas had established an efficient and secure ‘courier system’ for internal communication. The courier system comprised “post boxes, dead letter boxes, contacts and cut-outs.”⁵⁰⁷ For external communication, “bonafide travellers between Cyprus and other countries as well as diplomatic bags by the help of consulates were used.”⁵⁰⁸ Wireless was never used for EOKA communication. Generally, EOKA’s communication system worked well without detection or interception by British intelligence. PEKA also contributed to counter-intelligence measures by watching carefully against British intelligence collection efforts. For example, PEKA distributed pamphlets of warning against British agents once detected:

A Van car No.P.309 has been selling dried figs in villages allegedly in aid of the families of detainees from the Tylliria area. If such persons appear in your areas, you should treat them as English spies (agents of the English).⁵⁰⁹

Thus, EOKA had established an intelligence system that enabled its leaders to get foreknowledge and forewarning of British intended political or security activities. In addition, based on the tactical

⁵⁰⁷ TNA WO33/3726, 84-91.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents-Order by PEKA, 25 July 1958.

intelligence, EOKA agents carried out many sabotages and assassinations island wide.⁵¹⁰

ANNEXURE "H" (contd)

Security

9. The policy laid down by GRIVAS was complex and entailed the use of "cut-outs", "dead letter boxes" and post boxes so that one courier should never know the name of his next link in the communication chain. Normal messages could pass through many couriers, post boxes and "cut-outs" before reaching their destination and took anything up to 24 hours. However, if necessary, urgent messages using special high grade couriers could be sent direct to anywhere on the island within 3 hours; It was one of the axioms of EOKA communications security that a message should be delivered on the same day as it was despatched. A typical example of the passage of a letter from a Guerilla Group Leader in the LEFKA area to another in the LIMASSOL area might be as follows:—

Journey	Courier	Time taken
Hide to dead letter box	Writer	say ½ hour
Delay in dead letter box		" 2 hours
Secret letter to village) post box.)	Shepherd	" 2 hours
Delay in village post box		" 2 hours
Village post box to) NICOSIA)	Bus-driver	" 1½ hours
Delay in NICOSIA		" 2 hours
NICOSIA to LIMASSOL post) box)	Taxi-driver	" 2½ hours
Delay in LIMASSOL post box.		" 2 hours
LIMASSOL post box to) Village post box)	Bus-passenger	" 1½ hours
Delay in Village post box		" 2 hours
Village post box) to dead letter box)	Forest-worker	" 2 hours
Dead letter box to hide	Addressee	" ½ hour
Total		20½ hours

Such a method using normal transport would necessitate a message between two towns (say 30 miles apart) travelling anything up to 100 miles.

10. When main roads were used for important deliveries, or for the sake of speed, a pilot car was employed which could warn the courier car to take evasive action. Instructions were continually issued by GRIVAS that all messages were to be burnt after reading. Fortunately this was not always obeyed.

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Figure 12-An example to working of EOKA communication by courier system⁵¹¹

⁵¹⁰ See Appendix Q: EOKA Terrorism Report by August 1956. TNA FO 371/123930, CIC Report (56) Twenty-Eight (Final), Intelligence Review For the First Half of September 1956, Annex B:Summary of EOKA Terrorsim, August 1956, 21st September 1956.

Grivas also took defensive and offensive counterintelligence measures to maintain the security of the organisation, the communications methods and the leadership. On the other hand, British counterintelligence was not effective to detect or deter information leakages or provide physical security of personnel or installations against subversive attacks of sabotages or murders.

EOKA had made use of intelligence system in support of its strategy. British intelligence system could not support the political strategy in the first period. The security and intelligence system was asked strategic, tactical and operational intelligence to destroy EOKA. The intelligence system was not effective regarding provision of the required intelligence. The ineffectiveness of British intelligence system occurred as a result of deficiencies in intelligence collection and analysis, organisation dysfunction and insufficient counter-intelligence measures.

4.4.3.4 Covert Action: Propaganda Wars

Covert action is an important intelligence instrument for implementation of the policy. As discussed in the Chapter 2, it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities. Propaganda is mostly pursued as being of the least violent and the highest deniability level covert action. A successful propaganda operation has two elements which are a well-coordinated policy behind it and maintenance of plausible deniability during operation. The objectives of the propaganda

⁵¹¹ WO 33/3726, "Annexure "H" - EOKA Communications/Couriers", 86.

operation should be set based on a solid and rational foreign policy and security policy. In addition, secrecy is an essential feature of propaganda and effective counterintelligence is necessary to ensure secrecy. The availability of intelligence about the target of covert action and knowledge of the environment where covert action is to take place is also crucial for effectiveness. (See Chapter 2: Covert Action)

This section aims to analyse the covert action with respect to propaganda operations on British and EOKA accounts. To start with EOKA's account, it is possible to conclude that EOKA had perpetrated a more effective propaganda campaign compared to British. The CIC admitted that EOKA's propaganda campaign was successful since the beginning of EOKA activities:

Since the emergence of EOKA its propaganda campaign, directed principally at the police and other Cypriot servants of Government has been unremitting. Backed by threats, murders, attempted murders, it has had a large measure of success.⁵¹²

EOKA was efficient in use of propaganda. The aim of propaganda activities was to convince international public that the cause of violence on the island was the British government's unjust and firm actions and the British could not solve the Cyprus problem. Grivas had set up his long-term strategy based on propaganda from the beginning:

⁵¹² TNA FCO 141/4160, CIC (55) Twenty Seven (Final)-The Nature of EOKA, its political background and sources of direction, 20th October 1955.

I [Grivas] cannot hope to achieve my object by force alone, my chief weapons are fear and propaganda. In this field my aim it to influence public opinion in the following ways:

(a) In Cyprus I must continue to stifle all opposition to the achievement of my object.

(b) In the United Kingdom the public must be convinced that Cyprus is of no value as a base and that the Government's policy towards Cyprus is unjust and illiberal and is damaging Britain's reputation abroad.

(c) In the United States the policy must be to convince the public that Cyprus is now no use as a base and NATO is being jeopardised if British colonialism jeopardised.

(d) In Greece the picture must continually be presented of Cypriots being oppressed and illtreated and that they are looking to Greece to achieve their liberation from British tyranny.⁵¹³

This record shows that he knew that he could not have won his objective of *enosis* by using force only and the propaganda was his significant weapon. He regarded the use of armed activities necessary to obtain materials for his propaganda.⁵¹⁴ He planned his use of propaganda in details that brought effectiveness on his psychological war.

The Cyprus Government must react to armed attacks by harsh and illiberal laws and the use of armed force, and through this incidents will occur which I can use as 'atrocities' stories and show the people abroad that the Cypriots are being oppressed and harshly treated, and so damage Britain's reputation.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹³ TNA FCO 141/4159, Appreciation of the Situation by Dighenis-CIC Paper (56), 5th July 1956.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

In accordance with his propaganda aims, he even used the schoolchildren in Nicosia against police. The British security forces foozled to call in army force. Then, Grivas got what he wanted as the British soldiers were photographed chasing schoolchildren.⁵¹⁶

Therefore, EOKA strategy of propaganda was to promote the legitimacy of their *enosis* aspirations and to publicise the cruelty of British government on the island internationally. They also conducted propaganda of human rights abuses on the island by interrogation methods of British security forces. He achieved of what he wanted from his propaganda activities aiming to damage British prestige. In one example, under counter-terrorism measures, on 9th August 1956 British hanged three EOKA terrorist for the third time that played into EOKA's supporters hands:

... Public reactions to these hangings [of three convicted terrorists] were in the form of strikes of labour and the shutting of shops ... Athens Radio has seized this opportunity to indulge in further intemperate outbursts such as 'The three young heroes marched to the gallows gallantly with the faith that their blood would irrigate the tree of liberty', and these hangings 'have thrown our beautiful island into mourning over the unjust loss of its beautiful youths'.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹⁶ Simmons, *The British and Cyprus*, 87.

⁵¹⁷ TNA FO 371/123930, Telegram No.1696, from Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22nd September 1956.

Newspapers, television and radio broadcasting were important tools for the propaganda. For example, on 1st September 1956, the Greek newspaper “Apogevmatini” had the banner lines and the whole front page about the “British Intelligence Service’s plan to stage an attack on the British embassy in Athens in order to create tension prior to UN debate on Cyprus”.⁵¹⁸ The newspaper of *Times of Cyprus*, issued in English language, was regarded as the most important propaganda organ of EOKA due to its influence on the press and public opinion in Cyprus, in the United Kingdom and overseas. It was described as a “dangerous and damaging EOKA propaganda organ”.⁵¹⁹ Hence, the British unsuccessfully attempted to proscribe the *Times of Cyprus*, which was seen as an open source for “the flow of intelligence between the colonial periphery and metropolitan centre”.⁵²⁰ The Athens Radio was another effective tool for enosis support by broadcasting its campaign of provocative and subversive propaganda. The British counter measure was the “jamming of Athens Radio”.⁵²¹ For his anti-terrorist campaign,

⁵¹⁸ TNA FCO 371/123922, Southern Department Greece. Telegram No.641 from Athens to Foreign Office, 1st September 1956.

⁵¹⁹ TNA FCO 141/3727, Counter propaganda: Draft Report on propaganda, information and publicity, 1958.

⁵²⁰ See Jonathan Stubbs, “Making Headlines in a State of Emergency: The Case of Times of Cyprus, 1955-1960”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no.1 (2017): 70-92.

⁵²¹ TNA FO 371/123939, Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18 November. 1956- Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

Harding was urging the continuous jamming of any other station broadcasting EOKA propaganda:

The same [jamming] applies to similar broadcasting in Greek from any other stations in any part of the world that can be heard in Cyprus. The cessation of provocative statements by allegedly responsible people and in the press in the United Kingdom and elsewhere would also have an important effect.⁵²²

The JIC also advised of jamming of the Athens radio so that;

one of the main links between EOKA and the ordinary citizen would be broken and the ordinary Cypriot, who has already shown some signs of being tired of the present situation, would return to being his normal and not very active and not very courageous self.⁵²³

However, the JIC advise was based on the misassumption that EOKA and enosis movement was imported from Greece because Grivas came to Cyprus from Greece in the beginning. Hence the aim was to break the link between Greece and Cyprus to terminate the EOKA campaign on the island.

Apparently, the press and media propaganda were influential in shaping the international debate on Cyprus. The leaflets were an important tool of the internal propaganda. PEKA also subsidised the EOKA's

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ TNA FO 371/123865/G1081/57, Minute by Patrick Dean, 11 January 1956. Patrick Dean was the chairman of the JIC by then.

propaganda activities with its leaflets. PEKA issued 16 leaflets and EOKA did 6 leaflets in September 1956.⁵²⁴ The British intelligence was blinded to PEKA as well, as understood from the intelligence reports:

There has been considerable activity on the propaganda front with a spate of leaflets in the names of both EOKA and PEKA, mainly the latter, which is increasingly assuming the role of a political propaganda wing of EOKA. The identity and composition of PEKA are not yet known, but it would appear that it is part and parcel of EOKA.⁵²⁵

Both EOKA and British officials aimed to utilise propaganda targeting the international public. Before the UN meeting in 1957, EOKA used the intense propaganda to promote *enosis*. EOKA sent a general order to its members to send cables to the UN and the Ethnarch:

The cables must be sent two days before the debate at UNO and should be continued during the debate. The organisation and the reporters of “Ethnos” and “Eleptheia” should be informed immediately after the cables are sent.

“TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL UNO NEW YORK. SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CYPRUS PEOPLE ONLY JUST SOLUTION. SIGNATURE”⁵²⁶

⁵²⁴ TNA FO 371/123930, PEKA Leaflet distributed on 3 September 1956. TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, Grivas diaries, etc. EOKA Leaflet signed by ‘The Leader Dighenis’, 15 March 1958.

⁵²⁵ TNA FO 371/123930, CIC (56) Twenty-eight (Final) Intelligence Review for the first half of September 1956, 21st September 1956.

⁵²⁶ TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, EOKA General Order, possessed on 7th December 1957.

The propaganda of EOKA was successfully contributed to create pressure on British officials. Since they did not have strategic sustainable strategy on Cyprus, EOKA had impact on its changing attitude. For example, after the deportation of Makarios, the British used the captured diaries to provide justification for his exile. But, EOKA had used the issue better on their side. EOKA declared suspension of its activities until 27th August 1956 on the condition that Makarios had to be released until that day. The Colonial Office thought of revealing the captured documents of Grivas diaries and other organisational documentation to prove Makarios support to EOKA's violence before 27th August 1956 not to lose their grounds. Grivas' menace urged them to take steps before the start of violence on the island that would put the responsibility on British side for not reconciling.⁵²⁷

Although the British were declaring "Makarios was not someone to negotiate with after revelation of the diaries"⁵²⁸, they later had to change their idea and let Makarios be back on the island. Besides, the Greek government considered the publication of diaries as a British all-out

⁵²⁷ TNA FO 371/123922, Telegram No.1710 from Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 24th August 1956.

⁵²⁸ TNA FO 371/123922, Reports on editorial in the New York Herald Tribune of the 28th August 1956 entitled 'Statement in Cyprus'.

campaign against the Greek government and a “libellous press campaign against Greece”.⁵²⁹

After the end of truce period, EOKA resumed on its terror activities that would certainly support its propaganda aims. On the other hand, British anti-terrorism policy based on security and intelligence objectives was of little value to the aim of destroying EOKA. CIC themselves admitted the success of EOKA operations and propaganda activities, of reported by September 1956 that;

EOKA has enjoyed a series of successes since the resumption of terrorism towards the end of August. ... by such successes has raised its own waning morale and convince the general public that it is still very much a factor to be reckoned with.. ... Little has been achieved during the period on the counter-terrorist front to offset these EOKA gains. It must, therefore, be regarded as notably stronger now than at the time of the suspension of its terrorist campaign in mid-August.

The tactical pattern of EOKA activities since the resumption of terror terrorism appears to have been aimed at achieving the maximum results, with particular emphasis on the propaganda value of its operations, ... Thus, there is now a concentration on the planting of time bombs in strategic targets, ... a powerful time bomb was exploded in the Government Printing Press within the guarded Secretariat perimeter in Nicosia. This was evidently intended as much for its propaganda value ... It certainly achieved its propaganda purpose.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁹ TNA FO 371/123930, Telegram no.680 From Athens to Foreign Office, 29th September 1956.

⁵³⁰ TNA FO 371/123930, CIC (56)Twenty-eight (Final) Intelligence Review for the first half of September 1956, 21st September 1956.

In sum, Grivas had set up its strategy of propaganda from the beginning of its terror campaign and EOKA had achieved a certain level of success to achieve its propaganda aims. Though the main objective of enosis was failed, EOKA had taken the attention of international public on Cyprus issue.

The British officials, on the other hand, were slow to conduct counter-propaganda against EOKA. Although diplomatic propaganda worked to convince UN not to take up the Cyprus case, in general, British officials failed to gain hearts and minds on the island, or the support of international public on maintaining sovereignty over the island.

British held overt (diplomatic, political) and secret propaganda activities to promote their constitutional offers; i.e. Secret or diplomatic meetings in Turkey and Greece with government officials or black propaganda operations. The “Operation Tea Party” was one of the black propagandas led By British Information Research Department (IRD). Charles Foley wrote about Operation Tea Party that;

the official introduction of sex into the Cyprus problem was another product of this period. Reporters were invited to “Operation Tea Party” in the Central News room and offered libations of everything but tea together with a handout declaring that schoolgirls had been “required to prostitute themselves with members of EOKA.”⁵³¹

⁵³¹ Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 104.

With counter propaganda operations against EOKA, the British officials aimed to create “psychological pressure on the terrorists and their leadership to convince them that they are fighting a lost battle”.⁵³² Also, they used press and media to present the EOKA terrorism and support of Church to terror and to justify their counter-insurgency measures on the island. Since the leaflets were main tool of EOKA for propaganda, the British also made use of leaflets. However, it was in 1956 when an organisation for production and distribution of British leaflets was set up. The main aims of leaflet propaganda were conferred as:

- (a) to discredit hostile leaflets and to confuse recipients of them.
- (b) to explain official policy to the people and to obtain their cooperation in fulfilling it.⁵³³

From this organisation, the British officials required an immediate the analysis of EOKA leaflets once distributed because the success of counterpropaganda was considered in regard of speed reaction:

As soon as these [EOKA and AKEL leaflets] are received translations they should be passed to Research Section for study. Research Section should put up as soon as possible a short analysis of the propaganda and suggestions for countering it.⁵³⁴

⁵³² TNA FCO 141/4217, A Top Secret and Personal letter from John Reddaway, 14th October 1958.

⁵³³ TNA FCO 141/3709, Leaflet Propaganda, Chief of Staff, 22nd May 1956.

⁵³⁴ TNA FCO 141/3709 Counter Propaganda Policy for the Rural Areas, Minute by Director-General of Information, 18th April 1956.

In May 1956, as a result of his examination of the leaflets, the operational propaganda officer was suggesting issuing a leaflet on how “British are getting more and more information”, thinking this would have kept EOKA on edge.⁵³⁵

Two types of leaflets, overt and covert, were used. The overt leaflets comprised rebuttal leaflets, opportunist leaflets and routine ones. The success of rebuttal leaflets depends on “the speed in which hostile leaflets can be reported” while for covert leaflets;

Success depends on the ability to persuade the recipients that they are derived from sources other than official sources and therefore the utmost care must be taken in the preparation and distribution and maximum security observed.⁵³⁶

The main source of the British counter-propaganda leaflets against EOKA was the captured documents during operations and the leaflets of EOKA. The “Operation Jackpot” was carried out on 19th September 1957 against an EOKA courier network in Nicosia conducted by Cyprus Police Force, under the command of Major G. McGowan, (MBE Regional Intelligence Officer) as a result of the information received.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ TNA FCO 141/3709 Counter Propaganda Policy for the Rural Areas, “Minute by Operational Propaganda officer, 23rd May 1956”.

⁵³⁶ TNA FCO 141/3709, Leaflet Propaganda, from Chief of Staff to the Governor, 22 May 1956.

⁵³⁷ TNA FCO 141/4226 EOKA documents Captured during the Operation Jackpot, Telegram No.2002-Note on Operation Jackpot from the Governor to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 19th October 1957.

The documents captured during the operation provided the information about the plans of EOKA in case of a potential inter-communal violence, continuing building up of arms stocks, activities of a British agent Ziartides and reorganisation attempts of EOKA during truce period. The captured documents were planned to be used for counter propaganda against EOKA, propaganda in the UN and submission to Human Rights Sub-commission, the organisations which EOKA targeted for its propaganda campaign.

To gain the support of international public, the British also held propaganda activities run by IRD. In autumn 1956, the Foreign Office financed a pamphlet titled “Cyprus- EOKA Campaign of Terror” produced based on the captured Grivas diaries, to be distributed abroad. The pamphlet was based on the information from the captured diaries of Grivas. The British aimed to promote counter propaganda against EOKA and also to boost their counter-insurgency measures such as detention centres and interrogation of prisoners. EOKA run an “effective campaign accusing British security forces of brutality and of running concentration camps in which torture was routinely used”.⁵³⁸ The local and international press was criticising of British alleged torturing during interrogations.⁵³⁹ The British claimed in the pamphlet that;

⁵³⁸ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 575.

⁵³⁹ For allegations of torture during interrogation, see David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 194-237 and Dorril, *MI6*, 553-354.

British Forces on the island have behaved with the greatest restraints and discipline. On the rare occasions that there have been any grounds for believing that force has been used illegally, the authorities have taken prompt action to punish the offenders. On 7th April 1956, two British officers were sentenced by court martial, and, as a result, were subsequently dismissed the Service for using force in an interrogation of an EOKA prisoner. Evidence from this court martial is one of the main standbys of Greek “atrocities” propaganda.⁵⁴⁰

Based on the released documents in the National Archives, no documents or records of torture of prisoners were available yet. Many criticised the British officials on the alleged destruction of colonial documents, which could shed the light on the issue. Calder Walton wrote that British interrogators were called by prisoners as “Her Majesty’s Torturers” and the known number of killed during interrogations was at least six people.⁵⁴¹ On this issue, Walton and French also referred to Harding’s statement that;

As far as ill treatment, rough treatment on capture, I think that it is something which inevitably does happen. ... I don’t think it happened to any serious extent in Cyprus, but certainly there were occasions when a captured EOKA man was pretty roughly handled in the course of his arrest. And that’s something which is perfectly natural, and to my mind, acceptable.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴⁰ TNA FCO 141/3500, Booklet ‘Terrorism in Cyprus’. The pamphlet was originally titled as ‘Terrorism in Cyprus’ which was later changed to ‘Cyprus-EOKA’s campaign of terror’ before publication.

⁵⁴¹ Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War and the Twilight of the Empire* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2014), 31. Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, 131.

⁵⁴² Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 312. French, “British Way”, 159. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 99.

Though, after the release of archival documents on Cyprus emergency, many ex-EOKA members or sympathisers rose up the issue of torture. Recently in January 2019, the British government stated to pay one million pound compensation to these Greek Cypriots that claimed the abuses of human rights by British during the Cyprus emergency:

In a statement that expressed regret, if not responsibility, for the actions of imperial officers, the minister of state for Europe, Sir Alan Duncan, announced the UK had reached an out-of-court settlement with 33 former members of Eoka, the armed guerrilla group that led the campaign to end British rule in Cyprus in the mid-1950s.⁵⁴³

The British officials also aimed at internal propaganda, to create a hatred of EOKA through the social programmes. In one case, the Governor invited the public of Cyprus to enjoy the music of philharmonic orchestra. PEKA immediately distributed a general order leaflet warning against these types of invitations by the government:

In their desperate attempts to destroy our untamable people, who are asking for nothing else but freedom, the organs of the depraved Ach-Nazi (? Governor) go about in villages where they invite villagers to “enjoy” the music of the philharmonic orchestra (? band) of one of the Arch-Nazi’s Nazi regiments.

⁵⁴³ The Guardian, “UK to pay £1m to Greek Cypriots over claims of human rights abuses, 23 January 2019” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/23/britain-to-pay-group-of-greek-cypriots-1m-after-claims-of-human-rights-abuse> (Accessed 18 March 2019) See also, “Cypriot veterans win right to claim damages over UK torture claims, 12th January 2018” (accessed on 18th March 2019) . <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/12/cypriot-veterans-win-right-to-claim-damages-over-uk-torture-claims>

It is certain that no Cypriot patriot would wish to respond to this propaganda stunt of the Gauleiter's vagabonds. Nevertheless, you are hereby ordered to enlighten the people appropriately as a precaution against any nefarious behaviour in this respect.⁵⁴⁴

On another occasion, EOKA ordered the Greek Cypriots to boycott the Government lottery. It was a secret propaganda campaign as understood from the order:

The organisation must not appear to have a hand in this matter, nor must any violence be used. We can then show this boycott as being a spontaneous manifestation of the people's will, in order that the Government's contention about the use of intimidation and of violence should thus be disproved. Consequently, I forbid the printing or distribution of any leaflet about this.⁵⁴⁵

To sum up, propaganda was a vital weapon for EOKA and its supporters as well as British authorities to influence the public opinion. The aim of this propaganda war was to "win political legitimacy in the eyes of the civil population."⁵⁴⁶ The EOKA propaganda was relatively more successful as it gained international sympathy than British propaganda against EOKA.

⁵⁴⁴ TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured Documents, General Order by PEKA, 22nd July 1958.

⁵⁴⁵ TNA FCO 141/4225, Documents Recovered From D. Chpistou Karayiannis at Limassol on 13 January 1958, Order by EOKA.

⁵⁴⁶ David French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2.

On 11th October 1956, for example, the British intelligence had found “poison” in a package posted from Athens to Archbishop Makarios who was exiled in Seychelles.⁵⁴⁷ The package contained strychnine. It is not known whether the poison was sent to kill Makarios or to be used by him to take on British.

4.4.4. British Intelligence and the Republic of Cyprus (4th November 1957- 16th August 1960)

4.4.4.1 Political Developments

When Governor Harding took the office, he stated of his confidence that;

... the destruction of EOKA as an effective terrorist organisation, which I had the vision of achieving at the turn of this year [1956], can be completed in the course of 1957.⁵⁴⁸

When he was leaving Cyprus, EOKA was still an effective terror organisation on the island. Harding’s cruel emergency policies were argued to increase the sympathy for EOKA, which helped EOKA to

⁵⁴⁷TNA FO 371/123939, Cyprus and enosis-Seychelles Intelligence Committee Report:Appreciation for the month of October 1956.

⁵⁴⁸ TNA FO 371/123939, Cyprus and enosis-Letter from Sir John Harding to Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of the State for the Colonies, 18th November 1956. Resources required for the successful conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign in Cyprus.

sustain its armed struggle with Greek public support.⁵⁴⁹ Harding was criticised of adopting excessive counter measures against Cypriot public that were counterproductive. The Greek Cypriots were argued to become more hostile to British rule as a result of Harding's strict counterinsurgency measures.⁵⁵⁰

Harding's strong-arm tactics, plus policy of throwing large numbers of poorly led, poorly trained police at the insurgency, were a spectacular failure.⁵⁵¹

On 4th November 1957, Harding left Cyprus and in December, Sir Hugh Foot took the office as new governor. Harding was believed to destroy EOKA and promote British interest on the island through maintaining colonial rule. Governor Foot was believed to achieve a political settlement. Like Harding, he was also an experienced official in colonial revolt. He had been an Assistant District Commissioner in Palestine during the Arab Revolt. The change of policy on Cyprus from insisting a permanent sovereignty over Cyprus to give independence to the island had influenced the change of Cyprus government.

The new governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot introduced a new constitutional offer that projected for a self-government constitution for 7 years and after this period, a final decision about Cyprus's international status would be decided by Turkey, Greece and Britain

⁵⁴⁹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 100.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid 99.

⁵⁵¹ Corum, 119.

with the consent of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The plan envisaged the separate exercise of the self-determination right for both ethnic communities. Moreover, Archbishop Makarios would be allowed to return Cyprus and the emergency measures would be revoked. On the other hand, British bases would be preserved under British sovereignty. The plan was opposed by both Turkish and Greek governments.

Meanwhile, Grivas announced a campaign of “passive resistance-boycotting of everything British” in March 1958. After his release, Makarios had tensions with Grivas over this campaign of “passive resistance” while Grivas doubted Makarios’ capability of handling Cyprus issue. On the other hand, the intercommunal tension was escalating. In June 1958, the worst intercommunal riots took place. In June and July, 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots were killed in the strife.⁵⁵² In this period, the British security and intelligence officers had to deal with prevention of civil war on the island, destruction of EOKA and surveillance of Turkish underground movement. The British were criticized of ignoring TMT activities whereas continuing of cruel measures against the EOKA.⁵⁵³ Newsinger was sure that the British “deliberately set out to use the Turkish Cypriot Community on the island and the Turkish government as a means of blocking the demand for

⁵⁵² Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 109.

⁵⁵³ Ibid 108.

enosis.”⁵⁵⁴ The intercommunal conflict had brought up the risk of a war between Greece and Turkey. Governor Foot proscribed TMT on 22nd July 1958.

In the meantime, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan presented a new plan for the settlement of Cyprus issue on 19th June 1958. According to his plan, the British sovereignty over Cyprus would continue for seven years and after the termination of this period, a shared sovereignty (condominium) between Britain, Greece and Britain would be in force. Therefore, there would be representatives of Greece and Turkey to assist the British governor in the administration. The Cypriots would maintain their British citizenship but also obtain the citizenship of Greece or Turkey. Macmillan’s plan was criticised on the ground that it had implicitly offered maintenance of British sovereignty or partition at the end of seven years.⁵⁵⁵ Indeed, the island was no more of strategic importance to British policies, but it was a problem of British prestige by 1958. Also, the political objective was shifted to the maintenance of SBAs on the island.

All of British constitutional offers were declined by the parties of the conflict since 1955. On 31st July 1958, Macmillan called for an end of the violence on the island to all parties. Interestingly, the Turkish and

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid, 109.

⁵⁵⁵ Karyos, *Acceleration of History*, 119.

Greek governments supported it and Grivas promised to end EOKA attacks on 4th August 1958.⁵⁵⁶ TMT also declared for suspension of its activities. The possibility of ending conflict was a surprise to British officials. The reasons for EOKA's ceasefire were mainly the pressure of Greek government, increased TMT activities and the possibility of partition of the island. The intelligence from "secret sources" indicated that EOKA was aware of the problems to sustain an indefinite struggle with both Turkish Cypriots and British security forces. Also, the Greek government, worried of a NATO conflict, was pressuring Makarios to stop the intercommunal violence on the island⁵⁵⁷

Towards end of 1958, a chance of political settlement had emerged. Although EOKA was carrying effective terror campaign by November 1958, a political settlement was about to be achieved. As Makarios agreed to give up his *enosis* ideal, Grivas had to reveal last ceasefire on 24th December 1958.

4.4.4.2. British Intelligence on EOKA

Despite the intended improvements in the intelligence machinery of the island, there were still setbacks hindering effective intelligence functioning. The organisational problems of coordination among the

⁵⁵⁶ TNA CO 926/592, Political Situation in Cyprus: Colonial Office to Governor Foot, 31 July 1958. TNA CO 926/941, Leaflets, Dighenis Clear, 4th August 1958.

⁵⁵⁷ TNA CO 926/897, Incidents involving terrorism in Cyprus: Goodall, The terrorist ceasefire, August 1958, 15th October 1958.

members of the CIC, lack of competent network of agents for intelligence collection on EOKA as well as the continuous need for interrogators were some of the difficulties that Foot government had to deal with.

In the second phase, British officials were aware that the success of counter-insurgency operations had been dependant on good intelligence. By the end of 1957, British intelligence machinery advanced the knowledge of EOKA as a result of captured documents and Grivas' diaries and interrogations. Despite of being a contested HUMINT method, interrogations provided better tactical and operational intelligence that resulted in more successful operations against EOKA, such as Operation Black Mac, Operation Brown Jack and Operation Red Knight ⁵⁵⁸ British forces were able to find the hide-outs and detain many EOKA members. The British were assessing that the men and arm power of EOKA had been curtailed by 1958. However, EOKA had been still a considerable power to continue its terror offensive on a reorganised structure. In the new phase of terror, EOKA was decentralised, operating more on local initiatives and more ruthless.⁵⁵⁹ EOKA was still capable of setting plots against British officials. On 26 September, they tried to blow up the car of British Director of Operations, Major General Kendrew.

⁵⁵⁸ For details of these operations, see David French, *Fighting EOKA*, 145-153.

⁵⁵⁹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 109.

The aim penetrating leading circle of EOKA and destruction of it was still on the intelligence agenda that required better intelligence sources. The captured diaries of Grivas and the other documents of EOKA were still the primary source of intelligence about EOKA. Interrogations also provide information about hide-outs or identity of EOKA members. Yet, the intelligence officials could not have been able to penetrate EOKA. According to Newsinger, the British were again on defensive side and had to re-formulise intelligence methods to obtain information. As still they could not have eliminated the leadership of EOKA, the plans were concentrating on developing “a sustainable, intensive and well-directed effort to penetrate the heart of the organisation in order to destroy its leadership.”⁵⁶⁰ As the intercommunal conflict was escalating, Special Branch was in need of manpower support. While the EOKA violence reached a peak by 1958, Foot aimed to reorganise the intelligence machinery. It is argued that “radical reform of intelligence was not undertaken until 1958”.⁵⁶¹ Governor Foot reported the weakness of intelligence as such:

We have been always been weakest on the intelligence side and our effort against EOKA cannot be fully effective until all intelligence work is pulled together and given better central direction.⁵⁶²

⁵⁶⁰ TNA FCO 141/4217, Cyprus:Countermeasures against EOKA-A Top Secret and Personal letter from John Reddaway, 14th October 1958.

⁵⁶¹ Aldrich, 576.

⁵⁶² Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 313.

A security intelligence advisor, John Harrison was sent to the island by the Colonial Office to review the intelligence machinery. He suggested for the expansion of Special Branch manpower and enhancement of the collation and dissemination of the intelligence.⁵⁶³ The Greek Cypriots especially in the SB were eliminated and Turkish Cypriots and British expatriates were recruited to take over their position. By 1958, 600 volunteers were recruited from police forces in Britain.⁵⁶⁴ These new recruits had formed the backbone of the Special Forces and Turkish Cypriot policemen were put very much in the front line against EOKA, which was regarded as a provocative act of British.⁵⁶⁵

Additionally, the heads of intelligence organs were changed. When Governor Foot took the office, he replaced Leslie Glass, the Director-General of Information with Peter Storrs in 1958. He was insisting on the change of him: “we have sent you a telegram 1966 on Psychological warfare suggesting that Lesslie Glass should come out.”⁵⁶⁶.. Kendrew, Director of Operations, was succeeded by Kenneth Darling in October.

⁵⁶³ TNA FCO 141/4439, Cyprus police force: reorganization and strengthening of Special Branch, Harrison to Foot, 16 June 1958. TNA FCO 141/4439, Harrison, Report on a visit to Cyprus, 14 May–4 June 1958, 30 June 1958.

⁵⁶⁴ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 101.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ TNA FCO 141/4217, Countermeasures against EOKA, Telegram No.1974 from Colonial Office to Governor of Cyprus, 19 November 1958.

Then, John Prendergast had become the Chief of Intelligence on 27th November 1958 with the task of enhancing collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence.⁵⁶⁷ Also, MI6 had become involved in the fight against EOKA when Stephen Hastings was posted as First Secretary at the political office of Middle East Forces in Cyprus.⁵⁶⁸ He described that “good intelligence was critically needed and woefully lacking” and also mentioned the continued rivalry and mistrust among the members of CIC.⁵⁶⁹

In addition, the British intelligence and security system was still in need of personnel with Cypriot-Greek language by 1958. The Governor of Cyprus had asked for Greek speakers as interrogators and Colonial Office, regarding it the most difficult thing, was planning to arrange language course for persons to be interrogation staff or police officers.⁵⁷⁰ The lack of competent interrogators hindered the outcome of operations on EOKA. For example, Operation Matchbox was not quite effective on neutralising EOKA although it resulted in detention of numerous

⁵⁶⁷ Dorril, *MI6*, 554.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid 554.

⁵⁶⁹ Leo Cooper, *The Drums of Memory, An Autobiography, Stephen Hastings, MC* (London:Pen&Sword Books, 2001), 185-186.

⁵⁷⁰ TNA FCO 141/4217, Countermeasures Against EOKA, Telegram No.1996 from Colonial Office to the Governor of Cyprus, 21 November 1958 and telegram No.1974 from Colonial Office to Governor of Cyprus, 19 November 1958.

suspects of EOKA. There were around 2000 detainees after the operation and the interrogation of them for actionable intelligence was taking ages because of the limited number of interrogators.⁵⁷¹ The operation was intended to disrupt the number of EOKA members and to obtain intelligence about its leadership, however; the operation was followed by an increased terror of EOKA and there was no intelligence of significant value after all.⁵⁷² By November 1958, EOKA was again carrying out effective terror campaign on the island. Meanwhile, the security forces were increasing pressure on civil public, frustrated by killings of British nationals by EOKA.⁵⁷³ While the British were aiming to surpass EOKA's intimidation on public, they also threaten the public with death sentence or alleged torture during the interrogations. Governor Foot was reporting to the Colonial Office that the prisoners of EOKA members were willingly giving information in exchange of their lives.⁵⁷⁴

While the diplomatic moves for a political settlement were undertaken by Governor Foot, MI5 suggested for a special operation of

⁵⁷¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 266-267.

⁵⁷² TNA CO 926/676, Reports by Cyprus Intelligence Committee- Special Branch, half-monthly intelligence report No. 14/58 for the second half of July 1958, 4 August 1958. TNA FCO 141/4489, Cyprus internal security, measures to restore law and order: from G.Sinclair to Governor H. Foot, 1st August 1958.

⁵⁷³ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 109-110.

⁵⁷⁴ TNA CO 936/497, Note from Foot to the Colonial Office, 15th March 1958.

neutralisation of Grivas in support of British political initiatives. When Foot agreed for the covert action, Bill Magan and Peter Wright from MI5 started for preparations of the Operation Sunshine by January 1959. With the technical support of MI6, the plan was to track Grivas down by surveillance of communications between him and Makarios. The aim was “to locate, isolate and, if necessary, assassinate him”.⁵⁷⁵ In February 1959, the exact whereabouts of Grivas was located under Operation Sunshine while there had started secret negotiations between the Greek and Turkish delegations.⁵⁷⁶ However, despite the criticism of MI6, the operation was halted as the politicians began to make progress for a political settlement.⁵⁷⁷ It is also argued that the Greek Foreign Minister Angelos Averoff had avoided execution of Grivas as he convinced Macmillan that the negotiations would have collapsed in case Grivas had been captured.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 313-314. West, *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence*, 532. Dorril, *MI6*, 555. Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (London: Dell, 1988), 145-157. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, 312-313.

⁵⁷⁶ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 578. Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 314.

⁵⁷⁷ Dorril, *MI6*, 555. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 576.

⁵⁷⁸ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 578. Holland, 312-313. Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 314.



Figure 13- Photo from the “Round up operation at Paramlymni near Famagusta, October 1958”⁵⁷⁹

4.4.4.3 EOKA’s Intelligence System

In this second phase EOKA still held effective intelligence collection networks despite leakages of its organisational documents. As the archival documents are examined, it can be concluded that EOKA suffered from its own faults of securing these documents which gave valuable intelligence to British officials. According the Grivas, British officials gained valuable intelligence about EOKA as a result of the

⁵⁷⁹ National Army Museum, NAM.1996-06-157-72

interrogation of captured EOKA members, informers and carelessness of EOKA members in abandoning personal equipment.⁵⁸⁰

EOKA continued its counterintelligence measures to protect the security of the leadership and the organisation. It still had the capacity to forewarn its members against British tactics and measures against EOKA's activities.⁵⁸¹ They often quickly discovered intelligence methods of British and warned EOKA members and public against them. From the archival documents of FCO, it is understood that, by the summer of 1958, the British intelligence officials were aggressively seeking for HUMINT sources. However, the EOKA and PEKA were also taking countermeasures against their efforts. They simply revealed the methods of British intelligence methods once detected and warned the Greek Cypriots against "agents". In one of the orders by PEKA, it was stated that Greek speaker agents of intelligence service were riding donkeys in search of the rebels (EOKA members) but pretending as bringing food to them and also paying telephone calls to suspected members of PEKA to obtain information about the organisation. It also listed the phrases used by these agents:

Telephone calls are made to young men of our organisation by 'agents' with the object of deceiving them by means of various phrases such as the following:

⁵⁸⁰ FCO 141/4159, Cyprus Intelligence Committee Paper (56)- Eighteen (Final), Appreciation of the Situation by Dighenis on 5th July 1956.

⁵⁸¹ FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA Documents, Grivas Diaries etc.

‘I have made arrangements for the leaflets. Now we must arrange for the arms. Where have you got them?’

‘Tell them to supply me with more leaflets, or else let me know where I can get them because I have not received those which have been sent to me.’

In this way they try to deceive our boys into making confessions on the telephone.⁵⁸²

As British intelligence was slow to use of the intelligence because of organisational setbacks discussed above, EOKA had found the chance to recover from the intelligence leaks. In comparison to British intelligence, Grivas directed EOKA’s intelligence system relatively effective until the end of his terror campaign.

By 1958, EOKA had to direct its intelligence efforts against Turkish Cypriot movement too. In a captured PEKA document, the relationship between British intelligence service and Turkish groups under Dr. Fazıl Küçük’s leadership was mentioned:

Englishmen of the Intelligence service, led by groups of Kuchuk’s rascals, go about the villages with “vourkers” (native leather bags carried by villagers on their back) in search of rebels to help them.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸² FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA Documents, Grivas Diaries etc. -Order by PEKA, 25 July 1958.

⁵⁸³ TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA Documents, Grivas Diaries etc. Captured Documents-PEKA, 30th December 1958.

Grivas also wrote to his diary that British intelligence officers assisted Turkish officers to form Volkan, and later Turkish resistance Organisation (TMT) secretly.⁵⁸⁴

The first Turkish resistance movements started in 1955, after a few months later of EOKA's start of terror on the island. It was a disarmed organisation, called KITEM (Kıbrıs'ın İstiklali için Türk Mukavemet Birliği).⁵⁸⁵ The CIC reported about these Turkish movements that; *"Cypriot Turkish activities had been little as KITEM and a new organisation VOLKAN had been spreading leaflets."*⁵⁸⁶

Director of Intelligence reported on "Turkish affairs" on the island as follows;

A third leaflet issued by the new Turkish organisation "VOLCANO" has come to notice appealing for material and spiritual support from the Turkish community and announcing a warning to their opponents with the words "do not disturb this lion."⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁴ Foley, *Legacy of Strife*, 203.

⁵⁸⁵ TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA), Telegram No.X 009, Translation of Undated Letter from KITEM to the Governor Armitage, 16th July 1955.

⁵⁸⁶ TNA FO 371/117653, CIC(55)- Sixteen (Final), Intelligence Review for the first half of August, 1955, 23rd August 1955.

⁵⁸⁷ TNA FO 371/117657, Interim Intelligence Report, 9th September 1955.

By 1958, inter communal conflict was escalating. While EOKA continued its campaign of terror for the cause of *enosis*, the small groups such as Volkan, Kara Çete and 9 Eylül Cephesi tried to give voice to Turkish Cypriots' desire of *partition* against *enosis*. The Turkish Cypriots started to pursue a more active role as they believed the British administration was not reliable for protection:

...the Turkish idea of 'partition' grew, and there is little doubt that Turkish leaders both in Cyprus and on the mainland, had begun to think that unless H.M. Government tackled the Greek Cypriot uprising in a more vigorous manner and were successful in suppressing it, there was a grave danger that the Turkish Cypriot minority would ultimately find itself under Greek Cypriot domination. Intercommunal relations deteriorated rapidly and culminated in violent strife between the two communities in 1958, following an open and vociferous demand for partition.⁵⁸⁸

The small armed groups accreted in 1957 under the name of "Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı-TMT)". On 26th November 1957, TMT distributed its first leaflets. Turkish government gave support to TMT to resist EOKA violence.

4.4.4.4. Zurich and London Agreements (1959-16th August 1960)

In February 1959, the Greek and Turkish prime Ministers met at Dodler Hotel in Zurich for Cyprus discussion. They achieved a deal of independent Cyprus that *enosis* and *partition* were excluded. The Zurich Agreement between Turkey and Greece envisaged a bicommunal

⁵⁸⁸ TNA WO 33/3726, 6-7.

constitutional framework on the island. A preliminary agreement was reached for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Final agreement was to be signed in in Room 325 of the London Clinic in London.⁵⁸⁹ Turkey, Greece, Britain, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots met in London to sign Cyprus Agreements on 19th February 1959. The London and Zurich agreements laid the foundations of the political structure of the new Cyprus state. Makarios returned Cyprus on 1st March and Grivas left island on 17th March 1959. Governor Foot lifted the state of emergency on 4th December 1959.⁵⁹⁰ Archbishop Makarios became the President and Fazıl Küçük became the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus on 13th December 1959. Finally, Cyprus became independent on 16th August 1960 when the constitution and the treaties were officially signed and went into effect immediately.

Although the Operation Sunshine was cancelled, MI6 and MI5 involved in surveillance of the political negotiations by bugging and wiretapping of the delegations.⁵⁹¹ In addition, Hastings was claimed to recruit an agent from the close entourage of Makarios.⁵⁹² Therefore, British obtained intelligence about the intentions of the parties of the

⁵⁸⁹ Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had a plane crash on landing Gatwick and was taken to London Clinic.

⁵⁹⁰ TNA FCO 141/4172, Emergency Measures. See Appendix R: End of State of Emergency in Cyprus.

⁵⁹¹ Dorril, *MI6*, 556.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*

negotiations. The focus of intelligence shifted from operations against EOKA to support of negotiations. Since a possibility of political settlement emerged, the Foreign Office was against any intelligence operations that would harm the negotiations. The Colonial office, on the other hand, was urging Governor Foot for resumption of the “special operations”.⁵⁹³

During London negotiations at Lancaster House, when an agreement was to be achieved, Makarios withheld his signature at the very last minute of the political deal. It was argued that Makarios had changed his opinion later and signed the agreement because he was blackmailed by MI6 with some documents obtained during Operation Sunshine, that showed the details of archbishop’s homosexual relationships, including one with a SIS source.⁵⁹⁴ The British were content with the outcome of the agreements which was supposed to bring an end to the conflict on the island. Also, they retained two sovereign bases on the island.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹³ Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, 576-577.

⁵⁹⁴ Dorril, *MI6*, 556. West, *Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence*, 323.

⁵⁹⁵ Cyprus is the only territory that Britain has sovereign base areas where its sovereignty was limited by the treaties of 1960. See Andreas Stergiou, “The Exceptional Case of the British Military Bases on Cyprus” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51:2 (2015):285-300.



Figure 14-Photo of Archbishop Makarios III, Governor Sir Hugh Foot and Dr. Fazıl Küçük signing the Treaty of Establishment⁵⁹⁶

After 1958, the aim of British government was to maintain the sovereign base areas that served for collection of SIGINT.⁵⁹⁷ Cyprus was of vital importance to British SIGINT efforts after having lost its stations in Iraq, Egypt and Palestine. They failed to defeat EOKA on intelligence or military terms but succeeded in inflicting a political settlement, although it did not last long.

⁵⁹⁶ Temsilciler Meclisi, Fotoğraf Arşivi <http://www.parliament.cy/tr/photos/declaration-of-independence-of-cyprus-16th-august-1960> (Accessed on 12 February 2019)

⁵⁹⁷ Aldrich, *GCHQ*, 320.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Cyprus was one of the colonies that the British officials were giving importance and expecting less conflict in the aftermath of WWII. Contrary to their expectation, the *enosis* movement gained a momentum in 1950s with the election of Archbishop Makarios III and transformed to an armed conflict on the island. To support the political aim of *enosis*, on 1st April 1955 EOKA had started a campaign of terror by a series of sabotage attacks targeting the police stations, the military installations and the government buildings in Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol and Larnaca. With no information about such an organisation and its intentions, the start of EOKA terror on the island had taken the British officials by surprise. As Cyprus was regarded a strategic colony to the British interests in the Middle East, British policy-makers aimed to maintain the sovereignty over the island and to eliminate EOKA. To this end, the intelligence system was required to support the British political and security objectives in Cyprus until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. To explore the *missing dimension* of intelligence in understanding the British fight against EOKA, this thesis addresses the question of “How did British intelligence play a role against EOKA in Cyprus from 1945 to 1960?”.

The research objective of this study is to analyse role of British intelligence against EOKA in Cyprus regarding the main intelligence functions of intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. The author examined these functions of the British intelligence system in Cyprus with respect to the parameters of failure in an intelligence system (see Chapter 2) under three time periods. The first period starts from the end of the WWII in 1945 to the first EOKA incident on 1st April 1955. The second period covers from 1955 to 1957 when Governor Harding was on duty to restore rule and order by eliminating EOKA on the island in order to support British policy of preserving the status-quo of Cyprus. The last time period scans from 1957, when the new governor Hugh Foot took the office, the British policy had started to shift away from maintaining the full sovereignty on the island to keeping sovereign base areas and the inter-communal strife escalated on the island, to 1960 when the Republic of Cyprus was established.

With respect to the first period between 1945 and 1960, the author argues that the British intelligence system failed to provide warning intelligence about the impending EOKA terrorism on the island. The major expectation from an intelligence system is to enhance the decision-maker's ability to choose a course of action by the delivery of timely, objective, accurate and actionable intelligence. However, the EOKA campaign of terror had been a surprise to the British authorities in the absence of intelligence. Then, there was an intelligence failure that resulted in the surprise attacks of EOKA. Based on the information

derived mainly from the primary sources, the reasons for this intelligence failure are examined on the intelligence cycle. As discussed in the Chapter 2, intelligence cycle is composed of five stages; planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination and use. The intelligence cycle helps to locate where the failure occurs in one or more of the stages. Regarding the EOKA incident, one of the reasons for the intelligence failure was the inefficiency of setting requirements and priorities at planning and direction stage. The intelligence requirements on communism related movements such as the activities of AKEL were prioritised rather than the nationalist movements on the island. With respect to collection level, the intelligence gaps were another reason for the failure. Also, the intelligence collection sources and methods were concentrated mainly on information gathering about the communist activities. For example, the attention was given to the intelligence gathering about the inner circle of AKEL while the *enosis* movement had been monitored through descriptive situation reports of the police. At analysis level, there was an ineffective assessment of the threat factors on the island. The cognitive biases in the analysis and the Cold War mindset caused for overestimation of the communism threat on the island and underestimation of the *enosis* movement. Because of the prejudices about Greek Cypriots manner, any conflict on the island was assessed likely to be outsourced, for example from Greece. Thus, these cognitive biases led to disregard of the indications of a change in the political nature of the island and the signals of an organised violence. Consequently, the first EOKA incidents on 1st April 1955 were a surprise to British officials.

In the second time period, from 1955 to 1957, the study argues that the British intelligence system supported the British strategy on the island ineffectively because of the flaws in the intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. Since the end of WWII, the British strategy on Cyprus was to maintain sovereignty at all costs to secure the British political, military and intelligence interests in the Middle East. To this end, the British officials aimed to settle the Cyprus problem with diplomatic initiatives and constitutional reforms. Meanwhile, the security forces and the intelligence system were required to eliminate EOKA in order to strengthen the hands of British at these political initiatives. Thus, the intelligence system was required of strategic, tactical and operational intelligence mainly. However, British intelligence system in Cyprus was not able to meet the intelligence requirements. The findings of the research indicate that there were certain setbacks in the intelligence system that caused ineffectiveness to produce timely and accurate intelligence.

First, the British intelligence system was ineffective regarding the intelligence collection and analysis. With respect to the planning and direction, the main intelligence question was about the relationship between EOKA and the communist movement on the island. The intelligence sources were directed on the exploration of this relationship. It was 1956 when the British officials got convinced that there had been no alliance between EOKA and AKEL. Meanwhile, there were intelligence gaps about the EOKA's leadership, structure, communication and financing methods. There was no information

available on the identity of Dighenis, or on the communication methods, or on the cooperation of EOKA with the nationalist leaders in Cyprus or Greece. Despite the lack of efficient sources and methods of intelligence collection, the intelligence requirements of the policy-makers in London intensified to obtain an insight and foresight of the EOKA movement. However, the intelligence system was not able to meet the requirements. Realising the absence of information sources on EOKA, the Colonial Office even suggested the Cyprus government officials to read a book entitled *Apple of Discord* to extract some information about the methods of EOKA. Neither human intelligence nor technical intelligence was full effective to penetrate the organisation or recruit informers or conduct surveillance of its activities. A main setback was the lack of competent personnel with knowledge of Greek or Turkish language or the culture of Cypriot life. Without effective HUMINT and TECHINT, the British officials largely relied on the interrogations to obtain intelligence on EOKA. However, interrogation was a counterproductive method of HUMINT that the British had to pay off. In addition, the intensive interrogations resulted in an overabundance of information that hampered the processing level. The lack of competent personnel with language skills and inefficient processing tools were the main reasons for ineffective processing. At the intelligence analysis level, the ineffectiveness continued because of the errors of judgement and the faulty assessments about the EOKA's capacity and intentions. The cognitive biases, the lack of expertise and the poor tradecraft impeded the efficiency of the analysis. The scope of the enosis movement and the capability of EOKA were underestimated. Governor John Harding

misevaluated the developments on the island in the absence of noticeable intelligence. For example, when EOKA announced a truce in 1956, Harding and other government officials assessed it as an admittance of defeat by EOKA with no ground intelligence supporting this assessment. This kind of errors of judgement disadvantaged the British policies on Cyprus. There were also indicators of the politicisation of intelligence. An intelligence officer, who worked in Cyprus, revealed how an intelligence report had been distorted to suit the policy objectives. (See Chapter 4) Lastly, there were obstacles in dissemination and use of the limited intelligence on EOKA. The bureaucratic rivalry, especially between the Foreign Office and the Colonial office impeded an effective intelligence coordination. The competition between the central intelligence and the colonial intelligence systems disaffected the dissemination and use of intelligence. Besides, the turf wars were reflected among the members of the Cyprus Intelligence Committee. As a result, “need to know” or “need to share” principles were disregarded in the dissemination of intelligence. The problem of sharing the intelligence was a lasting one throughout the struggle against the EOKA. Indeed, the shortcomings in the organisation of the colonial intelligence system in Cyprus was a major reason for the ineffectiveness. As discussed in the Chapter 3, there is a dual system of central and colonial intelligence system. Throughout the conflict in Cyprus, the officials constantly intended to improve the intelligence system to better its collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence. However, it could not have been geared to counter EOKA’s activities.

To continue with the function of counterintelligence, the British intelligence system was unable to conduct effective counterintelligence measures against EOKA. Counterintelligence is another important element of the intelligence system that serves to maintain the security and secrecy of the one's intelligence system and to exploit the other's intelligence system. Counterintelligence involves defensive and offensive measures. Defensive counterintelligence measures aim for the protection of secrets and the guard of the intelligence system against penetration or deception. Also, the physical security of the buildings and the personnel against sabotage or terrorism is a duty of counterintelligence. The offensive measures, on the other hand, intend to exploit, destroy or manipulate the other's intelligence activities. (See Chapter 2) A major counterintelligence failure occurs when these measures fail to detect, detect or neutralise an adversary's efforts of gaining access to one's intelligence system. Within this framework, the British counterintelligence was ineffective with respect to the defensive measures against EOKA's penetration, and the offensive measures of detecting, deterring and destroying the EOKA's intelligence activities. The protective security intelligence measures such as counter-sabotage and counter-terrorism remained insufficient, either. As discussed in the Chapter 2, one's intelligence success means the other's counterintelligence failure. Therefore, the author examined the intelligence structure of EOKA to discover the blind spots of the British intelligence system. EOKA remained a small force even at its strongest compared to the British forces. Despite its small size, EOKA was able to conduct sabotages and terrorist attacks while getting over the British

counter-operations. The main reason for this was the EOKA's effective intelligence system. From the beginning of EOKA, Grivas gave importance to the intelligence structure in his strategy of the underground movement. Grivas had prioritised the establishment of agent networks to obtain intelligence about the British activities. Thereby, EOKA usually got timely and accurate information on British undertakings and maintained a level of tactical superiority over the British forces. Besides, he had applied counterintelligence measures to protect the security of EOKA and its activities. EOKA had adopted defensive counterintelligence measures such as non-use of wires communication, use of codenames for its members, clearance tests for the new recruits and screening of the members as well as some offensive counterintelligence methods to blind the functioning of the security forces. In addition, EOKA largely adopted the intimidation methods, i.e. assassinations of the detected informers to the British forces. Therefore, EOKA was mainly able to detect and deter the British intelligence efforts to penetrate the organisation by the counterintelligence methods or intimidation. Consequently, Grivas had formed an effective intelligence system that provided an advantage of knowledge to EOKA about the British capabilities and intentions. EOKA was able to obtain foreknowledge and forewarning of the British activities against EOKA. The British counterintelligence measures, on the other hand, proved ineffective to eliminate the EOKA agents, especially in the police force totally. The British intelligence on the island was not able to penetrate to the EOKA leadership to destroy it.

With respect to the covert action, the study concentrates mainly on the propaganda activities. Both EOKA and the British government adopted overt and covert propaganda campaign to support their policy objectives. Based on the findings of the research, it is possible to conclude that EOKA conducted an intensive propaganda to support the political objective of enosis. Grivas regarded the propaganda as his major weapon against the British government on the island. He largely used the propaganda to gain national and international support to the EOKA's campaign. His aim was to influence the public opinion about the British inability to solve Cyprus problem. The British emergency measures, i.e. severe interrogations, death penalties, proscription of newspapers, etc. also served to the EOKA's propaganda efforts. EOKA made use of these measures in its propaganda of the abuse of human rights by the British authorities. The propaganda of EOKA can be argued to create pressure on the British policies. In contrast, British officials remained ineffective in their counter-propaganda efforts against EOKA. The only stronghold of the British propaganda was the captured diaries of Grivas. British authorities even conducted black propaganda operations to delegitimize EOKA. However, the findings indicate that the British propaganda efforts contributed little to the British political objectives on the island.

As a result, in the second time period between 1955 and 1957, the British intelligence system in Cyprus was not able to function in full efficiency. The setbacks with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action hindered the support of colonial intelligence system to the British policies against EOKA. EOKA, on the

other hand, established an effective intelligence system that served to the EOKA's political objectives.

In the last period of the conflict between 1957 and 1960, the efficacy of the British intelligence system remained limited. In this period, the British political strategy shifted from keeping the total sovereignty to maintenance of the sovereign base areas on the island. In addition, the increased clash between the Turkish resistance movement supporting taksim and EOKA in support of enosis brought up the risk of confrontation between the NATO members. As the inter-communal strife was escalating, the British politicians were striving for a political solution. Under these circumstances, the requirements from the intelligence system had been intensified and varied. But, the British security and intelligence forces were again on the defensive side. The new Governor Foot sought for an improvement in the intelligence system and for a reformulation of the intelligence methods against EOKA. The main requirement from the intelligence was still the neutralisation of the leadership of EOKA through penetration to the organisation. However, Grivas and EOKA managed to protect a certain level of influence and continue their terror campaign by 1958. Although the intelligence system remained relatively ineffective against EOKA, the British intelligence system showed better performance in support of British decision-makers during the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959.

In conclusion, this study presents that intelligence is both a power itself and an instrument of the state power. Intelligence is an essential part of policy-, or decision-making process. An intelligence system consists of four main functions which are intelligence (collection), intelligence analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. These functions are symbiotically related to each other. Consequently, the performance of an intelligence system is dependent on these elements on their own and collectively. In this study, the author studied the question of “how did British intelligence play a role against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960?”. The research was conducted principally on the primary sources regarding the British intelligence activities in Cyprus, enquired at the British National Archives. The analysis of the British intelligence activities has been realised with respect to the identified parameters of failure within an intelligence system. As a result of the comprehensive research and analysis, it is possible to conclude that the British intelligence system failed to forewarn about the EOKA attacks between 1945 and 1955. The British intelligence system remained ineffective with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action between 1955 and 1957. In the last period between 1957 and 1960, the British intelligence mechanism showed partial effectiveness against EOKA and slightly contributed to the British decision-making during the negotiations for a political settlement on the island.

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
APPENDICES

A: SOME DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

Definition	Year
<p style="text-align: center;">“Intelligence means knowledge.”</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Sherman Kent</p>	1949
<p>“Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and national security the conduct of nonattributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organisations concerned with these, against unauthorised disclosure.”</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Martin T. Bimfort</p>	1958
<p style="text-align: center;">“Intelligence is thus the effort of a government, or of a private individual group or body, devoted to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collection, analysis, dissemination and exploitation of knowledge and information affecting its own interests which related to any other government, political group, military force, movement, or individual; 2. 2. Protection against similar initiatives on the part of other governments, political groups, parties, military forces, movements, or individuals; 3. Secret activities to exploit its knowledge in affecting the composition, behaviour, and policies of such entities or individuals.” <p style="text-align: right;">Roy Godson</p>	1987
<p>“Intelligence refers to information relevant to a government’s formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries.”</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Abram N. Shulsky</p>	1991

<p>“Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed and provided to policy makers, the product of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.”</p> <p>Mark Lowenthal</p>	2002
<p>“Intelligence consists of all the information, both secret and open, that can be employed by a nation’s decision makers to reduce the risks to national security. The information is collected and analysed to establish foreknowledge of external and internal threats.”</p> <p>Rodney Carlisle</p>	2005
<p>“Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination- conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where deemed desirable, covert activities.”</p> <p>Peter Gill and Mark Phythian</p>	2006
<p>“Intelligence, then, is a process, focused externally and using information from all available sources, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decisionmaker.”</p> <p>K.Wheaton and M. Beerbower</p>	2006
<p>“Intelligence is any process producing knowledge that might be used in making a decision OR influencing the processes, knowledge, or decisions of competitors AND in the face of competitors’ efforts-real or imagined- to affect one’s own processes, knowledge, or decisions in matters of national policy.”</p> <p>Milton Diaz</p>	2010

B: LIST OF THE MAJOR INCIDENTS IN CYPRUS⁵⁹⁸



⁵⁹⁸ TNA FCO 141/4160, Cyprus Intelligence Committee Report (55) Twenty Seven (Final) of 18th October 1955 Appendix A:Major Incidents since 1st April 1955.

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- 28th April 1955. Fire at NAAFI Stores, FAMAGUSTA £20,000 damage.
- 24th May 1955. Attempted assassination of H.W. the Governor at PALLAS Cinema, NICOSIA.
- 25th May 1955. Bomb found at LARNACA Road Police Station, NICOSIA.
- 9th June 1955. Bomb exploded in Military Police billet at LIMASSOL. One injured.
- 19th June 1955. Grenades exploded in bars at NICOSIA (3) and FAMAGUSTA (1) and garden of residence of Commander CYPRUS District.
- 20th June 1955. Armed attack on LAPITHOS Police Station, (KYRENIA District). One raider injured.
Bomb exploded at AYIOS DOMEFIOS Police Station, (NICOSIA District). One constable injured.
Three bombs exploded at PAPHOS Court House.
Bomb exploded in grounds of C in C MBLF's residence, KYRENIA.
Two bombs exploded in Military Police billet, FAMAGUSTA. One injured.
Shots fired from Sten Gun at Military camp AGHYRDA (KYRENIA District).
Unsuccessful arson at NAAFI Garage, FAMAGUSTA.
Successful arson at NAAFI Furniture Store.
Bomb thrown at soldiers, FAMAGUSTA.
- 21st June 1955. Bomb exploded at NICOSIA Central Police Station. One killed, 13 injured.
Bombs exploded outside residences of Army and RAF Officers at NICOSIA (2), FAMAGUSTA (1).
Bomb thrown at soldiers, FAMAGUSTA.
Bomb exploded at FAMAGUSTA Power Station.
Bomb exploded at AYIOS NICOLAOS Police Station, LIMASSOL.
- 22nd June 1955. Armed raid on AMIANDOS Police Station (LIMASSOL District). Police Sergeant killed, one PC injured, 3 rifles less bolts stolen.
Raid on house of former District Commissioner, PAPHOS repulsed.
Bomb exploded at residence of Sir John Sterndale Bennett (B.M.E.O.) NICOSIA.

/ Bomb exploded

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Bombs exploded at houses occupied by Military personnel, NICOSIA (1), FAMAGUSTA (2).

Bombs exploded at Hotel in NICOSIA, Teachers' College, MORPHOU (NICOSIA District) and in street at LIMASSOL.

- 23rd June 1955. Auxiliary policeman assaulted (FAMAGUSTA).
Bombs exploded at houses occupied by Military personnel NICOSIA (1), FAMAGUSTA (2).
Bomb exploded at Teachers' Training College, MORPHOU (NICOSIA District).
- 24th June 1955. Attempted attack on KUKLIA Police Station, (PAPHOS District).
16 year old schoolboy arrested in possession of Sten Gun concealed in violin case.
- 26th June 1955. Unsuccessful attempt to attack AGROS Police Station (LIMASSOL District).
- 30th June 1955. Attempt to shoot Special Branch Constable in his house (NICOSIA).
- 4th July 1955. Unsuccessful attempt on Police Station, LIMASSOL.
- 9th July 1955. Bomb exploded in Military store, NICOSIA.
- 10th July 1955. Bomb exploded at Income Tax Office, Secretariat, NICOSIA. Considerable damage.
- 11th July 1955. Bomb found behind fireplace in Land Registry Office, NICOSIA.
Attempted murder of CID Constable, FAMAGUSTA.
- 13th July 1955. Attempted murder of Special Branch Constable, NICOSIA.
Unsuccessful attack on Police Station, (LIMASSOL District).
- 17th July 1955. Bomb exploded at house of Education Department official, NICOSIA.
Armed raiders destroyed motor boat by dynamite FAMAGUSTA.
- 21st July 1955. Bombs exploded in Army compound and Holiday Camp, FAMAGUSTA (2).
- 28th July 1955. Bomb exploded at home of Police Constable, LARNACA.
Bombs exploded homes of local Commandant of of Special Constabulary and RAF Officer, (KYRENIA District).

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- 29th July 1955. Bomb exploded at residence of Military personnel, (LARNACA).
- 31st July 1955. Attempt to shoot Police Constable (LIMASSOL District).
- 2nd Aug. 1955. General Strike.
Attempt to shoot Police Constable (LIMASSOL District).
- 5th Aug. 1955. Attack by masked men on RAF Police Auxiliary (LIMASSOL District).
- 10th Aug. 1955. Emergency Special Constable murdered.
Unsuccessful attack on KAMBOS Police Station, NICOSIA.
- 11th Aug. 1955. Two Special Branch Constables wounded FAMAGUSTA.
One died later.
- 12th Aug. 1955. AMIANDOS Police Station (LIMASSOL District) fired at. One wounded.
- 13th Aug. 1955. Police Sergeant AGROS Police Station (LIMASSOL District) fired at twice.
- 16th Aug. 1955. C.I.D. Police Inspector LARNACA fired at.
- 21st Aug. 1955. Attempt on Government offices, PAPHOS.
- 24th Aug. 1955. Auxiliary Policeman fired at, PYLA (LARNACA District).
- 25th Aug. 1955. Attempted murder of school teacher at LARNACA.
- 27th Aug. 1955. Bomb exploded in Police Barrack Room, FAMAGUSTA.
One injured.
- 28th Aug. 1955. Special Branch Constable murdered (NICOSIA).
- 31st Aug. 1955. Bomb exploded in Cyprus Broadcasting Station, NICOSIA. 2 injured. Second bomb found and removed.
Bomb exploded, Divisional Police Headquarters, NICOSIA.
- 1st. Sept 1955. Attempt on life of Communist leader, NICOSIA.
- 2nd Sept 1955. Armed attack on PARALIMNI Police Station, FAMAGUSTA District. 5 rifles, 2 guns stolen.
- 3rd Sept 1955. Two bombs exploded at AYIOS NICOLAOS RAF Camp, FAMAGUSTA District. 3 injured.
- / Attempted

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- Attempted attack supposed Police informer, MONI (LIMASSOL District).
- 5th Sept 1955. Arrest of two armed men intending to murder witnesses at murder trial, NICOSIA.
Special Constable assaulted, FAMAGUSTA.
- 6th Sept 1955. Shots fired at residence C in C'MEAF's house, KYRENIA.
- 7th Sept 1955. Two Military vehicles fired at LARNACA and FAMAGUSTA.
- 11th Sept 1955. Shot fired at LEFTKARA Police Station, LARNACA District.
- 15th Sept 1955. Sabotage by explosives of Military water pipe line, POLIMEDIA, LIMASSOL District.
- 17th Sept 1955. Riot in NICOSIA. British Institute burned down.
KYTHREA Police Station stoned, (NICOSIA District).
Constable fired at in DHORA, LIMASSOL District.
Attempted arson of Constable's home, LIMASSOL.
- 18th Sept 1955. Army officer fired at in NICOSIA.
KILANI Police Station stoned (LIMASSOL District).
- 19th Sept 1955. Attempted murder of civilian suspected informer, LARNACA.
- 21st Sept 1955. Armed attack in AKNA Police Station, FAMAGUSTA District. 5 rifles and 3 guns stolen.
Riot at AMIANDOS (LIMASSOL District). Troops fired, wounding one.
- 26th Sept 1955. Soldiers in civilian clothes assaulted, LIMASSOL.
- 27th Sept 1955. Riot in LIMASSOL, troops fired, killing one.
- 28th Sept 1955. Two bombs at Forestry Department Store, NICOSIA.
- 29th Sept 1955. General Strike.
- 30th Sept 1955. Attack on soldiers in civilian clothes, LIMASSOL.
- 1st Oct. 1955. Water pipe line blown up PAKHNA (LIMASSOL District.)
- 4th Oct. 1955. Armed attack on LEFTKONIKO Police Station, (FAMAGUSTA District). 9 rifles, 3 guns stolen.
Attempted murder of British Engineer at AMIANDOS, LIMASSOL District.

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
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- 5th Oct. 1955. Special Branch constable murdered, FAMAGUSTA.
- 6th Oct. 1955. Soldiers in plain clothes assaulted, LIMASSOL.
- 9th Oct. 1955. Attack on Military arms Store, FAMAGUSTA. Bren Guns, Stens, mortars and rocket launcher stolen.
- 11th Oct. 1955. Shots fired at sentry at Secretariat, NICOSIA.
- 18th Oct. 1955. RAF vehicles stoned and burned at village near LIMASSOL.

In addition to the above, there have been a number of minor acts of sabotage and innumerable incidents of Police and Military being stoned whilst on duty during the months of September and October.

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C: APPRECIATION OF SITUATION BY DIGHENIS⁵⁹⁹



⁵⁹⁹ TNA FCO 141/4160, Cyprus Intelligence Committee Paper, Review of the Activities of EOKA-CIC Report (55) Twenty eight (Final): Appreciation of Situation by Digenis on 18th November 1955.

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Europe and destroying the usefulness of CYPRUS as a NATO base.

6. My principal care in devising the tactics for this attack on public opinion will be to preserve the security of my organisation and to keep it underground. I shall avoid at all costs being forced out into the open where, as an identifiable military force, my organisation would stand no chance against the superior forces and organisation of the British. It is not part of my strategic plan to seize territory or to conduct open warfare.

7. POLITICAL.

- (a) Abroad. The present Greek Government wish to appear less intransigent over CYPRUS and will not provide material support which can be directly attributed to them.
- (b) At Home. The Archbishop may accept some compromise formula from BRITAIN with the acquiescence of the Greek Government but not by any means of all sections of the Greek people. This may well impair my influence on the Cypriot people.
- (c) Turkish Community. I must continue to avoid antagonising the Turkish Cypriot community.
- (d) Communists. The Communists will seize any opportunity to foment strife provided it is not directly attributable to them. My supporters must be warned and I may have to take terrorist action against Communist Party leaders to deter them. Any attempt by Communists to join the ranks of EOKA and subvert my organisation must be guarded against and resisted.

8. MORALE.

EOKA morale continued to be high following the events of 28th October and the successful theft of dynamite in spite of recent sentences for offences, police successes in arrests and the scale on which recent military searches have been carried out. Continued successes are needed to boost morale and some action to prevent KARAOGLIS' execution, or intimidation to make any future case more difficult for the authorities.

9. SUPPLIES.

My supply of arms is still below what I need and although the theft of Bren Guns was a windfall I lack the ammunition fully to exploit them. On the other hand my supply of explosives is adequate for the time being.

/ 10. OWN STRENGTH. ...

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10. OWN STRENGTH.

My own strength has not been seriously impaired by recent arrests and training is proceeding but searches by security forces are liable to interrupt this. I still have insufficient trained and equipped personnel for widespread raids in strength. Targets must therefore be carefully selected and yield dividends in terms of effect on public opinion. The use of schoolchildren for nuisance value disturbances must continue.

11. SECURITY.

The security forces are obtaining more information and the recent large scale search was based on intelligence they had received. This indicates that the enemy intelligence organisation is becoming more effective. Special Branch are getting stronger, and more active terrorism must be put into operation against any suspects as opportunity offers. The elimination of some police informers will strengthen my security and warn people not to talk. More care must be taken to ensure that those liable to fall into police hands are briefed on giving nothing of value away.

12. TIME.

It may be necessary to wreck the acceptance of any compromise solution that may be reached between the Archbishop and the British Government if this endangers ultimate Enosis. In that case I shall have to act quickly against those favouring such a compromise. If this action fails to prevent acceptance of the compromise, there will still be opportunities for me to render its implementation unworkable. If however the compromise is not likely to endanger the ultimate incorporation of CYPRUS in the Greek State then I shall not be compelled to step up the tempo of my activities. The emphasis in my efforts to influence public opinion would then shift from the principle of Enosis to the time of its realisation.

13. AREA FOR OPERATIONS.

AFXENTIOU's organisation is temporarily disrupted by the Security Force's action and also we have been active lately in the LIMASSOL and FAMAGUSTA areas. The security forces are watching these areas closely. It is time that the weight of our attack was shifted to other areas, targets should be selected where troops are not so thick or in areas which have been quiet recently. My special safe areas must however be avoided.

14. ENEMY STRENGTH.

The Army greatly strengthened, is now deployed and is co-operating very actively with the police and guarding some of their stations. The police force is more active, much more mobile and with better communications. I can reduce the Army effective strength for active operations by attacking

/ installations

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

installations, quarters, etc., to tie them down on guard duties. I can hamper their mobility by restricting the use of roads. As police stations have military guards, only those weakly defended or those with good stocks of ammunition should be selected as targets. Maritime activity has greatly increased the supply problem. Other methods of infiltration are confined to small specialised items. Either I must find an alternative method of supply possibly by air or rely on local raids.

15. TACTICS.

- PLAN A. Select a military establishment holding ammunition and raid this with the strongest force possible in order to provide me with supplies for further action.
- PLAN B. Attack several police stations to obtain supplies of ammunition.
- PLAN C. Widespread attacks on military targets and personnel.
- PLAN D. Kidnap or eliminate some high-ranking official to prevent KARAOLIS' execution.
- PLAN E. An intensified campaign against Special Branch informers and agents and against those engaged in prosecuting and hearing involving EOKA supporters.

16. Plan A is a big undertaking utilising all my resources with no guarantee of success and I reject this plan.

Plan B is within my powers but may yield very meagre results in the way of ammunition.

Plan C. These tactics achieve my aim at 4. The chief weapon is explosives which suits me, it will improve morale but pay no dividend in ammunition.

Plan D. I must make some gesture to satisfy my supporters over the KARAOLIS case. His application to the Privy Council has not yet been heard and therefore it is not necessary for me to act immediately which gives me time to plan an operation, possibly a kidnapping.

Plan E. I must take some action to improve my security and particularly against informers and agents.

/ 13. I favour

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 5 -

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TOP SECRET

17. I favour Plans C and D which to achieve the best results must be synchronised. The security forces are alert in FAMAGUSTA and LIMASSOL and the most suitable area for operations is NICOSIA which has been quiet recently and offers more opportunity for Plan D. Plan E is also essential but must also be synchronised with C and D.

(Signed) D. STEPHENS.

A.S. ALDRIDGE.

A.F.J. REDDAWAY.

T.P. AUBREY.

G. MEIKLE.


A.M. ROBERTSON.

D.J. HYLAND.

W.J. de BOIS.

TOP SECRET

D: THE BOOK "APPLE OF DISCORD"⁶⁰⁰



⁶⁰⁰ TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA): A Top Secret Letter from D.M Smith to Fletcher-Cooke on 11th May 1955.

E: NOTE ON THE CIC REPORT 13-1⁶⁰¹

From C.I.D., Police HQ 26.6.55
 To Director of Intelligence 28.6.55
 Received CTC(55) - Eleven (Final) 27.6.55
 per on 1.7.55. (4)

As 48-38 subd. There is his appreciation for which H.E. called a week ago. It is now of mainly historical interest since events have overtaken the preparation of the paper. Whereas at the beginning of this week, when the paper was drafted, there was, as the paper indicates, scarcely any new intelligence, the situation has now, I gather, changed for the better.

2. The main conclusion to be drawn from this paper is, I suggest, that the machinery of the C.I.C. is too cumbersome and that it would be better if urgent ad hoc appreciations of this kind were prepared and submitted by the D. of Intelligence as his own personal appreciations (formed after consultation with the S.B., S.O. and Political Division of the Secretariat) rather than as Committee papers.

⁶⁰¹ TNA FCO 141/4160, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus, CIC Paper-Review of the Activities of EOKA, 1955-1957, CIC Report 13-1, 14 June 1955.

3. I do not think the paper should go to the C.I.C. as it stands. It should be brought up to date by the D. of Intelligence and re-submitted as a personal appreciation and, in so doing, he should be asked to consider what, if any, modification of the conclusions & recommendations is required in the light of —

(a) the statement from London about talks with Greece & Turkey; and

(b) the progress now made with breaking into the EOKA organisation with particular reference to the possibility of destroying that organisation without resort to emergency powers.

4. I have held up distribution of the paper pending caution. of the above.

Adj. 2/7

(5)

Y.E.

Minute (4) and Refs 48-38 submitted
It is exactly a week ago since Y.E. called for
an urgent appreciation of EOKA. Action

F: GRIVAS' DIARIES AND OTHER BELONGINGS⁶⁰²

128
AAS

TELEGRAM

From GOVERNOR,
CYPRUS

To
Secretary of State

Dated 2. 11. 56

Sent at 1845 in cypher by EL/DFP

COPY NO. 2 OF 6 COPIES

IMMEDIATE
No. 2211 TOP SECRET

Your telegram 2018. — R127

Following for Henle from Stephens. Begins.

Grivas Diaries.

Original visa application forms (two) one original landing card and one original embarkation card follow by bag. Presumption regarding origin of these items is correct. Documents from Dr. Grivas' house in Nicosia were recovered in course of Police search. Major G.T. MacGowan now on leave in U.K. at 2, Morelands, Durham City, who is due back in Cyprus on 19/11 was in charge of the search and can supply details of search. You have four of these documents in original but remainder are being further examined for evidence of relationship between writer and addressee. Any of value will be forwarded to you.

2. Another volume of Grivas diary covering period 18/4/56 to 16/5/56 together with miscellaneous documents of same period were recovered in another glass jar 2 miles S.W. of Kykko during Operation Foxhunter just concluded. This volume is the one immediately preceding the one recovered on 10/6/56 in Grivas' satchel 2 miles N.W. of Kykko. No publicity is being given to these latest recoveries as it is still imperative to hide our blind spots while it is hoped further volumes may yet come to light. Photostat copies of all latest recoveries are being sent to you by bag in case they may be helpful as background for Strasbourg.

Governor

	Acting	Int	Gen
DLI			
AS			
C of S			
OAS			
CGI			
Secy			

Captured

⁶⁰² TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, Grivas diaries, etc.-Telegram no.2211 from Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State, Grivas Diaries, 2 November 1956. And Letter from Foreign Office to Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives, No.160 Intel:The Authenticity of the Grivas Diaries, 6 September 1956.

By Bag
CONFIDENTIAL
DAY 4 by Mr 108
old base
copies. Also all
Comm.

By Bag

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

No. 160 Intel
September 6, 1956
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
13SEP1956
TRY
FICE

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
R109
? no mention of
his "my headquarters"
reference to
Troodos.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE GRIVAS DIARIES

In view of denials by an official Greek spokesman and by the Greek press and radio of the authenticity of the diaries of Colonel Grivas captured in Cyprus, and some scepticism on the subject in the foreign press, it is important to stress that their authenticity has been established beyond all reasonable doubt.

2. The diaries in H.M.G.'s possession fall into three groups:

- (a) those captured in the Troodos hills in June last,
- (b) those captured at Lysi in August,
- (c) some obtained from a secret source.

All diaries have been written in the same hand. Those captured in the Troodos hills were found with a number of articles including a pistol, a Sam Browne belt and a cardigan which not only appear identical with those worn by Grivas in a photograph published at the same time, but have subsequently been identified as his personal property by captured terrorists associated with him. Further, a large number of captured terrorists have declared the handwriting of the Troodos diaries and the handwriting of other documents captured from time to time purporting to have been written by Digenis, the nom-de-guerre of the EOKA leader, to be in the handwriting of Grivas.

3. There is an entry in the diaries dated January 3, 1955 which shows that the writer could have been none other than Grivas. The text reads:

"He then gave me a bulletin of information of the local authorities from which it is quite clear that they are aware of my arrival".

Then there follows a copy of the bulletin referred to, which reads as follows:

"The fact that organisation in Greece might take an active part in Cyprus over the Enosis question was brought to the fore when information was received on November 24 from a previously untested informant that Colonel Grivas, a Cypriot-born naturalised Greek subject, who had been refused entry visa in June this year, had succeeded in landing secretly in Cyprus earlier in the month. The report added that Grivas was likely to be in the Paphos district that same night".

4. The diaries contain such a complete and detailed account of the organisation and build-up of EOKA that no-one but the leader of the movement could have written them. Digenis, it should be recalled, has been identified by Athens radio itself as Grivas.

/ 5.

G: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND GRIVAS⁶⁰³

From GOVERNOR, CYPRUS		To	Colonial Office.		Action/Info/Sec	
Dated 22.8.56				HE		
Sent at 2200		in Cypher		by JH/SL		
				A.S.		
				C of S		
				D.A.S.		
				D.G.		

IMMEDIATE
NO. 1694 TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 3 OF 6 COPIES

S-R.5

EOKA documents.

I hope during the course of to-morrow to let you have my views and suggestions on the difficult problem of handling Archbishop Makarios. Meanwhile, you should know that the Police have discovered within the last three days an important new hoard of EOKA documents relating to the early part of last year when the terrorist campaign was under preparation. There are about 1,000 separate documents and their translation and processing will take some time. But their importance is obvious from one item alone which is a "Diary of the National Movement" in the handwriting of Dicheia. The parts so far translated relate to the period of the "Ayios Georgios" arms smuggling case. The entries establish the complicity of the Archbishop and, through him, of the Papagos Government in a manner which should silence all those who have refused to believe the evidence we have produced from our own sources. In my next following telegram I am sending you the first few entries so far translated. You will, I think, agree that we could not have asked for more striking and conclusive corroboration of our own information.

2. In the past, we have always been hampered in proving our case against the Archbishop by the impossibility of publishing evidence from our own secret sources. There is no such security objection to the use of this new evidence and, coming from the enemy, it will be far more telling. The source through whom this new hoard was obtained is already in custody. The only objection on this score is that the publication of material from these documents will prompt EOKA to check up on the records they have deposited elsewhere, and this will expose the source through whom we obtained the other hoard of documents now being processed in London (Cyprus telegram No. 1679 refers). That source is exceptionally delicate and valuable, but I am satisfied that the balance of advantage lies in publishing the material now to hand.

3. The early publication of material such as that contained in my immediately following telegram would, it seems to me, be opportune at the present stage when H.M.G. are likely to come under increasing pressure to resume negotiations with Makarios and bring him back to Cyprus. If, as I most sincerely trust, we remain firm on refusing to negotiate with him in any circumstances and on refusing to allow him back in Cyprus unless

- (a) he has renounced violence for the future,
- (b) other, more responsible, Cypriots have first taken the lead in public affairs, and
- (c) we have taken action here to clip the political wings of the Archbishop and the Church generally,

it is the publication of this material which will provide exactly the justification we require. If you agree that

/...

⁶⁰³ TNA FCO 141/4225, Telegram No.1694 from Governor of Cyprus to the Colonial Office, 22 August 1956.

H: DEPORTATION OF MAKARIOS⁶⁰⁴

TOP SECRET **OUTWARD TELEGRAM**

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES *H. Thompson*
Wm. J. A. Thomson

TO ADEN (O.A.G.) *R*

Simplex MED 375/02

Sent 9th September, 1955. 21.15 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
No. 375 *RG 1081* *RG 1081/G 1010*

The necessity may arise in the course of the next few days to deport Archbishop Makarios and possibly the Bishop of Kyrenia from Cyprus for detention in the Seychelles. Consideration has been given to the best means of achieving this. A warship is likely to have the disadvantage that it would have to pass through the Suez Canal, and it is possible that the Egyptians might be able to cause trouble if this were tried. It is probable therefore that it will prove better to rely for part of the journey on an R.A.F. aircraft, probably a Hastings which could reach Aden from Nicosia in one stage.

2. I should be grateful if you would say whether you consider that it might be possible to detain these persons, and accommodate them and their escort suitably (the total number of the party not exceeding about 10), for a few days in Kamaran, which has been suggested as a possible place.

3. This enquiry is made without prejudice to the legal question arising from the unusual basis of an occupation of Kamaran, but that point will be considered here before any decision is reached. The present enquiry relates only to practical question of accommodation, guards to assist escort landing of aircraft etc..

4. It is not considered likely to be feasible to detain the Archbishop in Aden itself, but if you think that might be possible and preferable to Kamaran, please inform me.


5. Grateful for your earliest possible reply.

Distribution:-

H. 504	
Secretary of State	
P.S. to Minister of State	
Sir T. Lloyd	
P.S. to Parliamentary U/S.	
Sir C. Jeffries	
Mr. C. J. J. T. Barton	
Mr. K. H. Davies	
Sir J. Martin	
Mr. D. M. Smith	
P.S. to Prime Minister, 10, Downing Street	
Foreign Office -	P.S. to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
" -	Mr. J. A. Thomson
Ministry of Defence -	P.S. to Minister of Defence

⁶⁰⁴ FO 371/117657, Telegram No.375 from the Secretary of State for Colonies to Aden on 9th September 1955.

I: BRITISH COUNTER-PROPAGANDA ⁶⁰⁵



⁶⁰⁵ TNA FCO 141/4225, Telegram from Colonial Office to John Reddaway, 5th October 1955.

J: EOKA LEAFLET, 4th October 1956⁶⁰⁶

THE FORGERS

The two forgers, Eden and Harding, being unable to crush the resistance of the people of Cyprus with force !!! and being exposed to English public opinion because of their continuously unrealised promises to restrain our uprising within set time limits, have already had recourse to the only remaining means left to them; namely fraud, and plots, the corruption of consciences with large sums of money, slandering, and finally forgery.

It is a common 'secret' that the torturers of the Intelligence Service offer large sums of money - up to £200 !!! to tempt prisoners to give statements against eminent persons. The usual practice is for them show large bundles of notes and say, "Take as many as you want and tell us what you know against the Greek Government, the Archbishop, and the Bishop of Kitium."

Their programme also includes the forging of documents to incriminate the above-named, and to sow dissention among the people of Cyprus.

In our proclamations we have replied to the forgers of the so-called 'Dighenis Diary', and we put certain questions to them, which they have not answered. However, what answer can a forger give? What answer will the forgers give to our question as to where they found the documents, when on the morning of 27.8.56., the B.B.C. announced that the documents were found at Paphos, the Broadcasting station of Cyprus at noon the same day announced that the documents were found in a hide-out at Lyssi, and the English-language newspapers of Cyprus later published - after Government intimation, of course - that the documents were found at Troodos?

The Secretary of State, during the discussion on the Cyprus cause in the House of Commons on the 14th instant, in his arguments regarding the genuineness of the documents produced by him, said that they were examined by Government experts, and the report regarding the calligraphic character "was beyond any doubt satisfactory". We do not know which experts /

⁶⁰⁶ TNA FCO 141/4225, EOKA Leaflet distributed on 4th October 1956.

exper.

Mr. Lennex Boyd selected to compare the handwriting, instead of entrusting the work to experts of a neutral country, but we note the following, in order to prove the plot of the forgery of the documents:

1. The English newspaper, 'Observer', has published that the specimen of GRIVAS's handwriting was obtained from an Application for Visa form which he had submitted in Athens. So this is the handwriting which the experts have examined. In that case the forgers ignore the fact that applications for visas which are made to the English Consulate in Athens are in English, unless the forgers have themselves prepared such a form in Greek, with the graphic characteristics of their forged diary.
2. The Intelligence Service has in its ranks excellent forgers to whom forgery is a science, and a means to achieve its illicit objects. This was confirmed by the ex-Chief of Police in Greece, Mr. Panopoulos, in one of his articles in the newspaper 'Vema' of Athens. He knows them as well as anyone does, because he co-operated with them during the last war, when Greece and England were allies.
3. The disclosure of Mr. Efsthathopoulos, that the English Embassy in Athens attempted to bribe him to obtain handwriting of GRIVAS, and information concerning his habits, proves that preparations were long ago being made and studied for the forgery of the diary.
4. The forging, in Cyprus, of orders bearing the signature DIGHENIS, and proclamations said to emanate from E.O.K.A., proves that the forgery of such documents was included in the programme of the English Government, with a view to deceiving the people of Cyprus, and exposing E.O.K.A. to their faces.

We have given specific cases of this in one of our previous proclamations.

Finally, at some future date, I will reveal how the diary was forged with the aid of people now in the protective custody of the English.

Thus the attempt of the English Government to alter the Cyprus cause to an attack on the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios with the aid of forged documents, is in vain.

E.O.K....

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114
E.O.K.A. /

will always remain at the battlements, a fighting punisher. It is cowardly to strike at one's opponent through forged documents, when one has so many mechanical means of war at one's disposal.

It seems, however, that the forgeries have been proved a useless weapon for the English, against the fiery breast of the Cypriot combatants.

E.O.K.A.

THE
LEADER.

D I G H E N I S .

Distributed at Trakomas on 4.10.56.

K: EOKA LEAFLET⁶⁰⁷

82

E.O.K.A.

THE FORGER.

On the morning of the 27th August it was reported to me that the B.B.C announced the finding of my personal archives in Paphos, in which appeared the complicity of the Archbishop in the acts of E.O.K.A.

I hurried to circulate a proclamation which denied the above about the complicity of the Archbishop. When however I heard from the Cyprus Broadcasting Station the whole conspiracy of Boyd-Harding and I realised the satanic purposes which they intended, by the publication of the so called found documents, I considered it my duty to circulate the present one.

It is very easy to find rogues who will prepare such documents from which they will receive hundreds of thousands pounds, since the Cyprus Authorities are offering up to £200,000 for mere information incriminating important persons. We are not exaggerating. It is not therefore inexplicable how such archives can always exist, since a gang of swindlers or even the agents or leaders of the Intelligence Service can prepare them, so satisfying two satanic purposes: Illegal riches, and slader of persons.

But it is not difficult to the duo Boyd-Harding, in view of the stalemate to which they have arrived due to their senseless policy in Cyprus, and the outcry against them even from the British themselves and especially in Cyprus, to want to forge such documents or to substitute pages to possibly found documents, and to edit them according to their wishes and benefit, so that they may draw the attention of International public opinion to these facts, and come out of the mud and mire in which they have sunk. And besides they daily forge leaflets with the signature Digenis, and they circulate them in order to break the morale of the people with properly arranged phraseology and hints. (We have in hand many of these which circulated in Famagusta, Paphos and elsewhere)

Tangible proof, apart from others, are the latest happenings in Anafotia and Pyla villages, where disguised Auxiliaries of Harding presented a false order of mine with the signature Digenis to the effect that the population should surrender the arms of the Organization!!!! (See Cyprus newspapers of the 22/8/56). And all these happened when we had declared a truce!!

The purposes of the duo Boyd-Harding are obvious. They wanted to hit in two directions. The Greek Government and the representative of the Cyprus people Archbishop Makarios and the now substituting for him Bishop Anthimos of Kitium. And they thought they would succeed with the forged archives.

We are going to place before public opinion certain points so that they can judge, and other points to the duo Boyd-Harding to which they must reply.

1. A talk with the Archbishop is referred in the documents on three important points:

(a) The murder of the Middle East Field Marshal. (b) the placing of a bomb in Government House and (c) the murder of the Governor in the house of Chief Justice Hallinan. They admit however that the diary does not say why these attempts were not carried out. But is it possible in a diary in which so many happenings are written in detail to ignore why these attempts were not carried-out? Unless they discover..... now after the... study of all the archives, the reason why.

P.T.O.

⁶⁰⁷ TNA FCO 141/4225, EOKA Leaflet distributed in Greek at Nicosia on 29 August 1956 and in English at Kaimakli on 31 August 1956.

The truth is only one: That the forgers of the documents were only interested in incriminating the Archbishop, and they did not take in consideration or forgot to continue the events and give information for their natural development.

It is also written in the diary that there is a letter of the Archbishop addressed to me in which he congratulates me etc. Let this letter be published written by the Archbishop and bearing his signature. Such a letter does not exist, because it was never sent to me.

It is also written in one excerpt of my, as they say, diary that I 'have remained with those I brought from Greece'. It is not unknown to Boyd-Harding and to the whole of the Cyprus people, that none Greek subject from Greece was arrested fighting in our ranks, although some thousand were arrested all Cypriots.

I dare the gladerers to tell me whom they have arrested, or even name those who are in Cyprus and fight in the ranks of E.O.K.A.

This is why and how this story of the documents was forged. I am going now to put certain questions to the publishers of the documents, to which they must answer.

1. Does my signature appear in the Diary? I do not accept anything that does not bear my signature.
2. On what sort of paper are they written? Because I nearly always used a specific sort of paper.
3. When does the diary found start, and when does it end? (Dates)
4. Where was it found? (place or places). Because I declare that I did not hide in a hide-out at Lysi a diary.
5. Where was the archive contained? (boxes, glass or iron receptacles etc) and how many.

When the above information is given which is very useful for me, then I shall answer to reveal the whole conspiracy.

In conclusion I must declare the following:

Why do they consider a crime the participation of any Greek Cypriot in the struggle for his freedom? And why do they seek the guilty persons only in the face of Makarios and the Bishop of Kitium? And why do they not arrest collectively all the Greeks of Cyprus who are indeed E.O.K.A. members.


The Colonialists of London must know that it is a honour for everyone who fights against an oppressor in order to gain his freedom. The English themselves refer with national pride to their struggles for freedom, and even praise the murders of their compatriots, who according to Churchill, "who warmed their hands in the hearth of the conqueror".

But the English consider as lawful any unlawful act committed by them, and an unforgivable crime when committed by others. We are not interested in what the British will say to-day. We are interested in what HISTORY will say. And history will praise the heroic acts of the people of Cyprus, and will brand the cowardly and murderous acts of the English against women and children, and also the dishonest means they use for slamming our struggle.

Distributed in Greek at Nicosia
on 29.8.56, and in English at
Kaimakli on 31.8.56.

E.O.K.A.
THE
LEADER
D I G E N I S.

L: SABOTAGES AND AMBUSHES BY EOKA⁶⁰⁸



⁶⁰⁸ TNA FCO 141/4225, Captured EOKA documents, undated.

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED

SECRET

- 2 -

6. What measures have been taken to avoid our men when escaping falling into ambush of anyone coming to reinforce those attacked.

7. At what point and how many men will there be to take over arms of those withdraw^{ing} and at what distance from the ambush will arms be hidden.

Once again I recommend - as I did before the truce - the throwing of bombs as being more effective than armed ambush and less dangerous for ourselves. But you must submit ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS in your area and we will decide which one to carry out.

Copies to:

D of I
C of S
Pamagusta
CIW (4)

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

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FA/E/18

Envelope labelled:- TARGETS INANIMATE OR LIVE



= Barbed wire

= Entrance

1) = Small barred windows.

2) = Office door

3 = Office door

4 = Store door

5 = Tool store

6 = Garage

= Safe which we shall break... andvalue about £70.

(a) All doors must be forced, and petrol poured and oil poured. Two or three bombs must be placed, but not bombs that will do great damage because the foundations of the hut are of concrete. The bombs will make only a din and very little damage. The petrol and oil will cause more damage. The wooden (?supports) will be burnt and the hut just about brought down.

Nine men will take part; 2 scouts, one on one side and one on the other; three men to force the doors; two to make holes for the bombs; and two to pour the petrol and oil, to light the fuses to set fire; and then we go away.

DISTRIBUTION

- Director of Intelligence.
- Chief of Staff to the Director of Operations.
- Security Liaison Officer.
- C.I.W. (6)
- S.B. Famagusta.

RESTRICTED

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M: A DAILY SITUATION REPORT⁶⁰⁹

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM CYPRUS (O.A.G.)

En Clair

D. 10th December, 1956
R. 10th " " 15.40 hrs. (via W.O.)

RG 1681/2462/8
13 DEC 1956

IMMEDIATE
NOT NUMBERED


Daily Situation Report No. 436 covering period
9th/10th December.

1. Nicosia.
At 19.19 hours in Akaii R. 8264, electric-
ally detonated bomb exploded near police
vehicle. One Police Constable slightly
wounded. Slight damage to vehicle.
2. Limassol.
18.15 hours in Vouni R 5530, Greek Cypriot
shot dead.
3. Famagusta.
Reference situation report No. 435,
paragraph three. Man since died. Four
suspects detained. At 14.00 hours at
Cape Eloas 6886 pumping station damaged
by explosion.
4. Kyrenia/Larnaca/Lefka/Paphos/Troodos.
Nothing to report.

Incidents Report External Distribution sent

⁶⁰⁹ TNA FO 371/123939, Cyprus and enosis: Daily Situation Report 436, covering period 9th/10th December 1956.

N: THE CIC REPORT⁶¹⁰



⁶¹⁰ TNA FCO 141/4160, CIC Report (57) Seven (Final) The Present Potential of EOKA as an Armed Force, 1st March 1957.

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If still serviceable, available and properly distributed, sufficient pistols remain to arm leaders of mountain groups and members of killer groups. The number of active armed town groups is not known. Those formerly operating in NICOSIA and KYRENIA towns have recently been eliminated, but LIMASSOL, which was largely cleaned up three months ago is showing signs of revival. Potentially active armed groups also exist in the towns of FAMAGUSTA, MORPHOU and KTIMA.

7. It has not yet been possible to assess the stocks of ammunition in the same way, but there are reports that the terrorists are short in this respect. The mountain groups seem to have reasonable stocks of ammunition for their weapons, if recent recoveries are any guide, but it appears that one of the main shortages is of ammunition for the smaller automatic pistols. EOKA seems to be best supplied with 9 mm., 0.45 and 0.38 ammunition. The problem of ammunition supplies must be complicated by the multiplicity of types of weapons possessed by EOKA.

8. The increasing use of "chemists' shop" explosive mixtures suggests a shortage of high explosives. The use of the former is markedly less effective but as the ingredients are readily available they will continue to be used failing the acquisition of fresh stocks of more powerful explosives, such as TNT, the smuggling of which has recently come to notice.

LEADERSHIP.

9. (a) The present principal organisers of armed activity are:

- i) George Theodorou GRIVAS (6) Leader
- ii) Antonakis Michael GEORGHIADIS (9) Assistant to Leader
- iii) Gregoris Pieri AFXENTIOU (7) Sub Hq ldr & District Leader (Pitsilia)
- iv) Yiannakis ARISTIDES (15) Sub Hq. Ldr. & Dist. Leader @ DROUSHIOTIS (Paphos)
- v) Kyriakos Christofi MATSIS (113) District Leader (Kyrenia)
- vi) Demos HADJI MILTIS (152) District Leader (Limassol)
- vii) Costas Petrou CHRISTODOULIDES District Leader (Famagusta)
- viii) Harilaos XENOPHONTIS (29) District Leader (Leika) or alternatively Asst. to District Leader (Paphos).
- ix) Michalakios Christos ROSSIDES (41) District & Mountain Gp. Leader (Larnaca).

(b) The elimination of all the above in a short period of time would cripple EOKA and armed activity would cease within weeks.

(c) The elimination of the first four would almost certainly cause armed activity to decline very appreciably and possibly to die down altogether.

(d) Although elimination of the last five would have a serious effect on EOKA, they could be replaced and the movement could be rebuilt, depending on what other inroads were made into EOKA personnel, weapons and ammunition consequent upon the elimination.

10. (a) Although elimination of one or more of the following group leaders would be a local set back to the organisation, they could be replaced from the rank and file of mountain groups:

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- i) Lefkios Christodoulou RODOSTHENOUS (13) (N.W. LIMASSOL)
ii) Savvas Christou PETRIDES (33) (PAPHOS)
iii) Photis PAPAPHOTIS (Kantara Forest FMA)
iv) Stelios PETASSIS (132) KYRENIA
v) Georgios DEMETRIU (17) LEFKA

(b) Their apprehension would however be likely to lead to the capture of a number of the personnel above and below them, and also arms and ammunition. It would therefore be at least a local set back to EOKA and would take time to repair.

RANK AND FILE.

11. The probable present distribution of wanted men other than those referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 is as follows, the figures quoted being tentative:-

- (a) Outside the principal towns (i.e. mountain or equivalent groups).
i) FAMAGUSTA "district" 15 men in two groupings, one in the North and one in the S.E. of the District.
ii) KYRENIA "district" 8 men in one Group
iii) MORPHOU "sub-district" 6 men
iv) LARNACA "district" 9 men
v) PITSILLIA "district" 12 men who are likely to form two groups.
vi) W. LEFKA "district". 7 men
vii) PAPHOS "district". 12 men in two Groups (one North and one centred).
viii) N. & W. LIMASSOL "district". 8 men
(b) In principal towns. 6.
(c) In GREECE. 4.
12. (a) From an S.F. point of view (iv) and (vi) are probably most easily dealt with at the present. The morale of (iv) and (v) is probably bad. (vii) and (viii) should become vulnerable as intelligence is collated. The elimination of (i), (ii) (v) and probably (vi) would, apart from other gains, yield considerable weapons.
(b) The elimination of (v) and (vii) would be the most damaging to EOKA.

MORALE.

13. EOKA morale is at present low. If given the opportunity it can recover remarkably quickly, however. It seems unlikely that Mountain Groups will engage in any operations entailing risk for some time to come - they are, however, capable of intimidating their fellow countrymen. Although desertions from EOKA are possible it seems unlikely, due to the ideological indoctrination, that there will be any significant number. Rather, deserters are more likely to hide from both EOKA and the S.F. It is considered that these remarks apply also to members of village groups and town groups.

CONCLUSIONS.

14. (a) Both EOKA's man power, despite recent substantial losses, and its weapon strength remain considerable.
(b) Shortage of ammunition and explosives is unlikely of itself to cause EOKA to desist from violence.

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- (c) EOKA is still capable of dominating the civil population, but is unlikely to engage in forms of attack involving serious risk.
- (d) Although depressed, the morale of the movement is unlikely to be broken unless the leadership is removed.
- (e) The apprehension of the leading nine terrorists still at large would terminate the campaign within weeks.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

15. It is recommended that:

- (a) All possible steps be taken to round up EOKA's remaining leaders, giving priority to the hunt for the topmost personalities.
- (b) Special precautions be taken to ensure that EOKA is not able to replace its lost leaders by escapes from detention.
- (c) Every effort be made to recover EOKA's outstanding stocks of arms, at the same time denying the terrorists opportunities to replace their losses.
- (d) Areas known to harbour terrorists be dominated by the Security Forces to inhibit movement of personnel and supplies, with a view to neutralizing terrorists located there and recovering their arms.
- (e) A review be made of the requirement of troops on static duties, particularly in some of the major towns, in order to release personnel for more offensive roles.
- (f) Every effort be made to re-establish the functioning of local government starting at village level.

(Signed)


D. STEPHENS.
J.F. SYMONS.
A.S. ALDRIDGE.
T.P. LUBREY.
L.W. WHYMARK
D.H. HALLIFAX
S. STIBBARD.

Appendices A, B, C, & D, attached.

Numbers in brackets after names mentioned in this Paper and Appendices refer to BL numbers (distributed in Cyprus only.)

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O: EOKA KILLINGS 1955-1958⁶¹¹



⁶¹¹ TNA WO 33/3726, "Annexure "J" -Deductions from EOKA/SF Killings Graph", 92-93.

P: UNNAMED LETTER FROM A GREEK CYPRIOT⁶¹²

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Lapithos, 14th July, 1955.

Hon. Colonial Secretary,
Hon. Sir,

Some time ago I wrote confidentially to the Lapithos Police on the subject of EOKA. The Officer-in-charge, instead of enquiring who the culprits were, asked who had submitted the application. As a result of this my life is in danger. How can we now give more information on recent criminal attempts against the Police? Here in Lapithos the Police cannot be trusted at all. They all come from this village and they tell the secrets of the Police to their relatives. In consequence a lot of trouble will arise here in Lapithos.

If a trustworthy policeman enquires into the matter you will be convinced of what I have written here.

I regret that I cannot give my name because my life is in danger from EOKA.

Yours
Citizen

RECEIVED
20 JUL 1955
ANTHONY
DOSOMEN
PIEZ DIA
ETISODIA
TOV ASTE
POMOTS;
A EDO
EIXE
OLOL XOPFIANOI
STAY

⁶¹² TNA FCO 141/4113, Colonial Secretary's Office Cyprus: Terrorist Organisations (Inc. EOKA), Unnamed letter to Colonial Secretary, 14th July 1955.

Q: EOKA TERRORISM REPORT BY AUGUST 1956⁶¹³

SECRET.

August, 1956.

Appendix "B" to
CIC(56) - TWENTY-EIGHT.

Summary of EOKA Terrorism.


Casualties caused by EOKA.

Division.	A.	B.	C.	D.	Total Incidents.	Mil.		Pol.		Civ.		Total.	
	Armed Attacks.	Attacks on Individuals.	Grenades.	Sabotage with Explosives.		K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.
1. NICOSIA	5	9	5	5	24	-	2	1	-	6	7	7	9
2. FAMAGUSTA	1	2	1	5	9	-	1	-	-	1	3	1	4
3. LARNACA	-	5	5	5	15	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1
4. LIMASSOL	-	1	1	9	11	-	-	-	-	4	4	4	4
5. PAPHOS	1	5	3	1	10	-	-	-	1	2	3	2	4
6. LEPKIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. KYRENIA	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	7	22	15	27	71	-	3	1	1	14	18	15	22

Casualties caused by A.		B.		C.		Total.	
-	2	1	-	1	2	2	4
-	-	-	-	12	12	12	12
-	1	-	1	1	4	1	6
-	3	1	1	14	18	15	22

⁶¹³ FO 371/123930, CIC Report (56) Twenty-Eight (Final), Intelligence Review For the First Half of September 1956, Annex B: Summary of EOKA Terrorism, August 1956, 21st September 1956.

R: END OF STATE OF EMERGENCY IN CYPRUS⁶¹⁴



⁶¹⁴TNA FCO 141/4172, Emergency Measures, End of State of Emergency in Cyprus on 4th December 1959.

S: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Erkan, Nihal

Nationality: Turkish

Date and Place of Birth: 29 August 1983 / Malatya

E-mail: nerkantez@gmail.com

EDUCATION

2012-2019	PhD	International Relations, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical University, Turkey
2007-2009	MA	Security Studies, School of Government, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom
2001-2006	BA	International Relations, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Middle East Technical University, Turkey
1997-2001		Çankaya Atatürk Anadolu Lisesi, Turkey

LANGUAGE SKILLS

English (Advanced)

French (Elementary)

T: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tezin çalışma konusunu, istihbarat bakış açısıyla Kıbrıs adasındaki EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston- Kıbrıslıların Milli Mücadele Örgütü) çatışması oluşturmaktadır. Kıbrıs adası, Akdeniz'deki en büyük üçüncü ada olup Asya, Avrupa ve Afrika kıtalarının kesişim noktasına yer almaktadır. Siyasi ve ekonomik politikalarda üstünlük sağlamak adına çatışan güçler, çağlar boyunca Kıbrıs adasını ele geçirmeye çalışmışlardır. Günümüze kadar süregelen Kıbrıs sorununun başlangıcı, 1878 yılında İngilizlerin adanın kontrolünü Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan almasına dayanmaktadır. Esasen Kıbrıs, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra İngilizlerin çok fazla önem verip çok az sorun beklediği bir kolonidir. Ancak adada İngiliz yönetimiyle baş gösteren ve kilisenin de desteklediği *enosis* hareketi, Makarios'un Başpiskopos seçilmesiyle 1950'li yıllarda silahlı çatışmaya dönüşmüştür. Bununla birlikte *enosis* hareketi, EOKA saldırılarının başladığı 1 Nisan 1955 tarihine kadar İngiliz yönetimi tarafından göz ardı edilmiştir. Ancak saldırıların başlamasından sonra gözler, istihbarat sistemine çevrilmiştir. Bunun iki sebebi bulunmaktadır: EOKA saldırılarının bir istihbarat hatası olarak sorumluluğun İngiliz istihbarat sistemine bırakılması ve EOKA'ya karşı mücadelede ihtiyaç duyulan istihbarat gereksinimlerinin karşılanması. Bu çalışma, EOKA faaliyetlerine karşı İngiliz istihbaratının rolünü incelemeyi hedeflemiştir.

EOKA, 1955 ve 1959 yılları arasındaki süre boyunca, İngilizleri ve Kıbrıslıları hedef alan ve yüzlerce kişinin ölümüne sebep olan terör faaliyetlerini sürdürmüştür. Kıbrıs'ta bu dönemde yaşananlar, yalnızca iç savaş riskini değil NATO üyesi ülkeler arasında savaş ihtimalini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Söz konusu dönemde, istihbarattan genel çerçevede beklenti EOKA'nın faaliyetlerine karşı koymak ve EOKA'yı yok etmek olmuştur. İngilizler için Kıbrıs adası Ortadoğu politikaları kapsamında stratejik öneme haiz olup adadaki egemenliği korumak temel hedef kabul edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda EOKA'nın yok edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Ancak 1960 yılında Kıbrıs Anlaşmalarının imzalanmasıyla bir siyasi çözüm elde edildiğinde bile EOKA belirli oranda gücünü koruyabilmiş ve önemli bir aktör olmaya devam edebilmiştir. Bu çerçevede, tezin araştırma çerçevesi “İngiliz istihbaratı Kıbrıs'ta, 1945 ve 1960 yılları arasında, EOKA'ya karşı nasıl bir rol oynamıştır?” sorusuyla çizilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, EOKA terörü başlamadan önce ve başladıktan sonra İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin işleyişini ve faaliyetlerini incelemektir. Bunun için özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitişine denk gelen 1945 yılı ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulduğu 1960 yılı arasındaki dönem analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma ile, İngilizlerin EOKA'ya karşı mücadelesindeki “eksik boyut” olan istihbari boyutu ortaya koymak hedeflenmiştir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ertesinde, İngilizlerin dış ve güvenlik politikalarını yeniden şekillendirmek zorunda kalacakları yeni bir dünya düzeni kurulmuştur. Yeni güvenlik anlayışı, dekolonizasyon ve yeni egemen güçlerin ortaya çıkmasıyla, İngilizlerin emperyal güç kaybı bu

politikaların şekillenmesinde etkili olmuştur. Muhafazakâr İngiliz siyasetçileri emperyal gücün korunmasını amaçlamış, özellikle Orta Doğu'daki İngiliz varlığına önem atfetmişlerdir. Ancak Süveyş Krizi, İngilizlerin uluslararası saygınlığına büyük darbe vurmuş, dekolonizasyonu ivmelendirmiş ve İngilizlerin özgüvenlerini kırmıştır. Ayrıca Filistin, Kenya, Malaya ve Kıbrıs'taki sömürge karşıtı ayaklanmalar İngilizler için güvenlik tehdidi olmuştur. Bunların yanı sıra, İngilizler için topraklarındaki komünizm tehdidi ve Soğuk Savaş'ın nükleer silah çekişmesi diğer güvenlik tehditlerini oluşturmuştur. Değişen güvenlik anlayışı, yeni risk ve tehditler, istihbarat gereksinimlerini de değiştirmiştir. Uzun yıllar ihmal edilen ve Soğuk Savaş koşullarında stratejik önem kazanan Kıbrıs'taki enosis hareketi ve İngilizler için “sürpriz saldırı” yla başlayan EOKA faaliyetleri de İngiliz istihbaratı için çalışma alanı olmuştur. Bazı çalışmalar İngiliz istihbaratının Kıbrıs'taki başarılarından söz ederken, kimi çalışmalar ayaklanmaya karşı koyma faaliyetlerinde İngiliz istihbaratının EOKA'ya karşı etkisiz kaldığını iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, İngiliz istihbaratının EOKA'ya karşı mücadeledeki rolü, istihbaratın temel fonksiyonları bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. EOKA hedefine karşı İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin etkinliği istihbarat toplama, istihbarat analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet kapsamında analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmanın temel verileri, Londra'daki İngiliz Ulusal Arşivi'nde incelenen orijinal resmî belgelerden elde edilmiştir. Bu belgeler, Kıbrıs İstihbarat Komitesi Raporları, Ortak İstihbarat Komitesi (JIC) Raporları, istihbarat birimlerinin yöneticileri ile Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Sömürge Bakanlığı yetkilileri arasındaki yazışmalar, Savaş Bakanlığı Raporları ve

Özel Birim (Special Branch)'in hazırladığı durum raporlarını kapsamaktadır. Eldeki veriler ışığında, çalışmada 1945 ve 1960 arasında, Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin gelişimi ortaya koyulmuş, EOKA'ya karşı İngiliz istihbarat faaliyetleri ve EOKA istihbarat faaliyetleri Kıbrıs politikasına etkileri bağlamında değerlendirilmiştir. Öte yandan, İngiliz Ulusal Arşivi'nde henüz erişime açılmamış ve dosyaların varlığı, çalışmanın kısıtını oluşturmaktadır.

Kıbrıs sorununa ilişkin literatür zengin olmakla birlikte, konuyu istihbarat bakış açısından inceleyen çalışmalar sınırlı sayıdadır. İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin faaliyetlerinin çoğunluğu birincil kaynak verilerine dayanan kapsamlı ve sistematik bir analiz ile ele alan bu çalışma, istihbaratın temel fonksiyonlarının Kıbrıs'taki EOKA sorunu üzerinden incelemekte ve istihbarat alanındaki çalışmalar katkı sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Tezin en temel varsayımı, istihbaratın istihbarat toplama, istihbarat analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet olmak üzere dört temel fonksiyonu olduğudur. İkinci varsayımı, istihbarat sisteminde hata bu dört temel fonksiyondan birinde veya birkaçında gerçekleşebilir. Üçüncü varsayım, istihbarat etkinliğinin ölçütü politika hedeflerine olan katkısıdır. Tüm bunlar ışığında, tezin argümanı; İngiliz istihbarat sistemi, 1945 ve 1955 yılları arasında EOKA saldırılarına karşı ikaz istihbaratı sağlayamamış, 1955 ve 1957 arasındaki dönemde EOKA'ya karşı istihbarat toplama, analiz, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet kapsamında yetersiz kalmış ve 1957 ile 1960 yılları arasında EOKA'ya karşı yetersiz istihbarat

etkinliğine rağmen Türkiye, Yunanistan ve İngiltere arasındaki siyasi çözüm görüşmelerinde İngiliz hükümetine istihbarat desteği sağlamıştır.

Bu tez beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde tezin araştırma sorusu, metodoloji ve kaynaklar, tez çalışmasının amacı ve tezin genel yapısına ilişkin bilgi verilmektedir. İstihbarat ve Hata başlıklı İkinci Bölüm 'de, istihbarat ve istihbarat hatası kavramları incelenmiştir. Tezin teorik çerçevesini oluşturan bu bölümde, “İstihbarat nasıl tanımlanır?” ve “İstihbarat hatası nasıl oluşur?” soruları araştırılmıştır. İstihbarat için genel kabul bir görmüş bir tanım elde etmek mümkün olamamaktadır. Var olan istihbarat tanımları arasındaki farklılık ise istihbaratın kavramsallaştırılmasında görülen farklılıklardan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bir ülkenin istihbarat sistemi, “yönetim şekli, teknolojik gelişmeler ile tehdit ve çıkarların tanımlandığı stratejik çevre” çerçevesinde şekillenmektedir. Bu faktörler altında şekillenen istihbarat sisteminin temel görev alanları da farklılık gösterebilmektedir. İstihbaratın bir politikayı şekillendirebilen bir güç ya da yalnızca politikanın uygulanmasında kullanılabilecek bir araç olmasına ilişkin farklı görüşler, istihbarata farklı misyonlar yüklemektedir. Örneğin istihbaratı bir güç olarak ele alanlar, istihbaratın yalnızca istihbarat toplama değil, istihbarat analizi de yaparak karar-alıcıya destek olmasını savunmaktadır. İstihbaratın bir politika aracı olduğunu savununlar ise, istihbarat sistemi tarafından gizli/örtülü faaliyet (covert action) yürütülmesini olağan karşılamaktadır. Bu görüşü savunanlar, “gizlilik” prensibini istihbaratın esası olarak değerlendirmektedir. Aksi görüştekiler ise istihbaratta “gizlilik” faktörünün tanımlayıcı olmadığını savunmaktadırlar. Bir diğer tartışma

alanı istihbarata karşı koyma faaliyetlerinin istihbarat sistemi tarafından yürütülmesine ilişkindir. Kimi görüşlere göre istihbarat yalnız istihbarat toplama ve analiz üzerine yoğunlaşmalı, istihbarata karşı koyma faaliyetleri ile gizli faaliyet yürütmemelidir. Öte yandan, bahse konu faaliyet alanları birbirini tamamlayan görevleri içermektedir. Örneğin, etkin istihbarata karşı koyma faaliyetleri, istihbarat toplama, analiz ve gizli faaliyetlerde etkinlik sağlanması için gereklidir. Benzer şekilde etkin istihbarat toplama ve analiz süreçleri gizli faaliyetlerin başarısını desteklerken gizli faaliyetler de bu iki fonksiyona bilgi akışı sağlayarak destek olabilmektedir. Sonuç olarak, bir istihbarat sisteminin istihbarat toplama, istihbarat analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet olmak üzere dört temel fonksiyonu bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu fonksiyonların bir istihbarat sistemi içerisindeki görev ağırlığı ise sistemin tabi olduğu yönetim şekli, teknolojik gelişmelere hakimiyet ve stratejik çevre koşullarına göre farklılık göstermektedir.

Bir istihbarat sisteminde hata, söz konusu dört temel fonksiyondan birinde veya birkaçında meydana gelebilir. Hataya sebep olabilecek sebepler, çalışmada her bir fonksiyon için ayrı ayrı değerlendirilmiştir. Temel fonksiyonlar olan istihbarat toplama ve analizi kapsamında, bir istihbarat sisteminden temel beklenti, zamanında, doğru ve eyleme dönüştürülebilir istihbarat üretmesidir. İstihbarat sürecine ilişkin aşamalar istihbarat çarkı üzerinde izah edilmektedir. İstihbarat çarkı, planlama ve yönlendirme, toplama, işleme, analiz, dağıtım ve kullanım olmak üzere beş aşamadan oluşmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak istihbarat hatasına sebep olan unsurlar, istihbarat çarkı üzerinde incelenmiştir.

Planlama ve yönlendirme aşamasındaki yetersiz ya da yanlış istihbarat sorusunun olması, istihbari önceliklerin yanlış belirlenmesi ve buna bağlı olarak istihbarat sisteminin yanlış yönlendirilmesi hataya sebebiyet verebilen hususlardır. Toplama aşamasında ise istihbari kaynakların yanlış yönetimi, yanlış metotların seçimi, dezenformasyon ya da aldatma operasyonlarına maruz kalma, istihbarat boşlukları, uzmanlık eksikliği ya da yetersiz bilgi ve beceriden kaynaklı hatalar meydana gelmektedir. Elde edilen bilgilerin tasnif edilip kıymetlendirildiği işleme aşamasında ise, zamana karşı yarışta incelenemeyen veri yığınları, yetersiz metodoloji, yanlış kıymetlendirme, uzmanlık eksikliği ya da verilerin saklanmasıdaki aksaklıklar hataya sebep olmaktadır. İstihbarat analizi aşamasında ise, bilişsel önyargılar ve yerleşmiş düşünce kalıpları, tehdidin küçümsenmesi ya da abartılması, yetersiz uzmanlık, istihbaratın siyasallaştırılması, verilerin göz ardı edilmesi, aldatma ya da dezenformasyon operasyonları hatalı analizleri doğurmaktadır. Bu aşamaların etkin bir şekilde işletilmesine rağmen üretilen istihbaratın dağıtımı ve kullanımı esnasındaki aksaklıklar da istihbarat hatasına sebep olmaktadır. Uygun olmayan formatta istihbarat raporları, “bilmesi gereken” ve “bilmesi gerektiği kadar” ilkelerinin göz ardı edilmesi, istihbaratın yanlış kullanıcıya dağıtımı ve bürokratik rekabetin yanı sıra karar- alıcının önyargıları, istihbaratı göz ardı etmesi ya da istihbarat rağmen eyleme geçmemesi sebebiyle istihbarat hataları oluşmaktadır. İstihbarat çarkının bir ve birden fazla aşamasındaki aksaklık veya hata, istihbarat hatasına sebep olmaktadır.

İstihbarata karşı koyma kapsamında ise, temel amaç bir istihbarat sisteminin gizliliğini ve güvenliğini korumak; aynı zamanda hedef istihbarat sisteminin gizliliğini ve güvenliğini aşmak için faaliyet yürütmektir. Aldatma ve dezenformasyon operasyonları, sızmalar ve bununla birlikte terör, sabotaj ve yıkıcı eylemlere karşı koyma faaliyetleri istihbarata karşı koymanın temel görevleridir. Genel kabul gören görüşe göre istihbarata karşı koyma hatalarını engellemek mümkün değildir. Bir istihbarat başarısı, diğer tarafın karşı istihbarat başarısızlığı olarak değerlendirildiğinde bu görüşte haklılık payı vardır. Dezenformasyon ve aldatma operasyonları, ihanet ve vatan hainliği, zayıf koruyucu güvenlik önlemleri, zayıf bürokratik yapılanma, sızma ve bilgi kaybına karşı istihbarata karşı koyma prensiplerinin göz ardı edilmesi gibi nedenler istihbarata karşı koyma hatası meydana getirmektedir.

Gizli operasyon (covert action), istihbarat sisteminin temel bileşenlerinden biridir. Diğer istihbarat fonksiyonlarının işleyişi ile bağıntılıdır. Bu bağlamda etkin gizli faaliyet becerisi, etkin istihbarat ve istihbarata karşı koyma faaliyetlerine bağlıdır. Aynı zamanda gizli faaliyet de diğer fonksiyonlara istihbari destek sağlar. Gizli faaliyet kapsamında propaganda, siyasi ve ekonomik faaliyetler, paramiliter operasyonlar ve istihbari destek faaliyetleri bulunmaktadır. Gizli faaliyetlerin başarısı, gizli faaliyetin destekleyeceği iyi planmış politika varlığına ve inandırıcı reddedilebilirlik (plausible deniability) ilkesine bağlıdır. Bu kapsamda gizli faaliyet planlanırken sonucunda elde edilecek politika hedeflerinin iyi belirlenmesi gerekmektedir. Ayrıca

gizli faaliyet yürütülürken inandırıcı reddedilebilirlik ilkesinin sürdürülmesi önem arz etmektedir. Gizli faaliyet sponsorunun deşifre olarak faaliyetin başarısızlığa uğraması fiyasko olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Gizli faaliyetlerde hata, siyasi utanç, uluslararası ilişkilerin bozulması, misillemeler ve can kayıplarına neden olmaktadır. Bu kapsamda politika hedefleri belirlenirken etkin istihbarat mekanizmasından faydalanmak, gizli faaliyet yürütülürken de istihbarat karşı koyma prensiplerinden azami ölçüde yararlanmak önemlidir. Böylece istihbaratın etkinliği ve istihbarat hataları için parametreler belirlenmiştir. Ardından, bu parametreler ışığında Kıbrıs'ta İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin faaliyetleri dört temel istihbarat fonksiyonu altında incelenmiştir. İngiliz İstihbarat Sistemi'nin Gelişimi başlıklı Üçüncü Bölüm 'de ise, "İngiliz istihbarat sistemin gelişimi nasıl olmuştur?" sorusu ele alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda yönetim biçimi, güvenlik anlayışı, algılanan güvenlik risk ve tehditleri ile bilgi ve iletişim alanındaki teknolojik gelişmelerin İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin gelişimine olan etkisi incelenmiştir. Ardından, 1945 ve 1960 yılları arasında Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz istihbarat birimlerinin organizasyonel gelişimi sunulmuştur. İngilizlerde ilk istihbarat uygulamaları 15. yüzyılda görülmüştür. Bu dönemde istihbarat ad-hoc biçimde olup, hükümdara karşı kurulan tuzak ve komplolara karşı bilgi derlemeyi hedeflemiştir. Modern İngiliz istihbaratının temelleri ise 19. yüzyılda atılmıştır. Kraliçe Victoria döneminde, askeri emir komuta zincirinde ilk istihbarat birimleri kurulmuştur. 20. yüzyılda devletlerin modernleşmesi ile istihbarat birimleri de modernleşmeye, profesyonelleşmeye ve sivilleşmeye başlamıştır. 1909'da kurulan Gizli Servis (Secret Service Bureau) bu

doğrultuda kurulmuş ilk birimdir. Bu yüzyılda yaşanan savaşlar, teknolojik gelişmeler ve stratejik çevre koşullarının değişmesi, İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin gelişiminde etkili olmuştur. İngiliz istihbarat sistemi gizlilik prensibini esas alan, istihbarat toplama ve analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet fonksiyonlarını içeren bir sisteme evrilmiştir. 1945 ve 1960 yılları arasındaki istihbarat sisteminin en belirgin özelliği, merkezi istihbarat sistemi ve emperyal istihbarat sistemi olmak üzere ikili bir istihbarat mekanizmasının varlığıdır. Bu iki sistem çoğunlukla birbirine paralel olarak faaliyet göstermiştir. Merkezi istihbarat sisteminde koordinasyon sağlanması amacıyla Ortak İstihbarat Komitesi (Joint Intelligence Committee) kurulmuş ve koordinasyon başkanlığı Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na verilmiştir. Bu durum Sömürge Bakanlığı tarafından rekabet olarak algılanmış ve sömürgelerdeki istihbarat işleyişi merkezi sisteme entegre edilememiştir. Sömürgelerdeki istihbarat işleyişi, idari işleyişe yönelik bilgi toplamaya yoğunlaşmıştır. Esasen, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından sömürgelerindeki İngiliz karşıtı ve yıkıcı faaliyetlere karşı koyabilmek için İngiliz yöneticiler sömürgelerdeki istihbarat işleyişini merkezi sisteme dahil ederek güçlendirmeyi istemişlerdir. Ancak güç kaybına uğramak istemeyen Sömürge Bakanlığı'nın direnci sebebiyle iki sistem arasında eşgüdüm sağlanamamıştır. Sonuçta emperyal istihbarat sistemi, merkezi istihbarat sisteminin gölgesinde kalmıştır. Yine de savaş sonrası dönemde özellikle MI5, sömürgelerde daha fazla faaliyet göstermeye başlamıştır. Genel bakışta ise, savaş sonrasında yaşanan finansman ve personel sıkıntısı nedeniyle sömürgelerde istihbaratın göz ardı edildiği söylenebilecektir.

Kıbrıs'taki istihbarat sistemi de, mali sıkıntılar ve personel eksikliği nedeniyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı sona erene kadar önemsiz kalmıştır. Bu durum, savaş sonrası dönemde adanın stratejik öneminin vurgulanmasıyla değişmeye başlamıştır. Savaşın ardından, Soğuk Savaş'ın getirdiği yeni stratejik koşullar altında Kıbrıs'taki istihbarat sisteminin güçlendirilmesi gündeme gelmiştir. Örneğin 1954 yılında, adadaki istihbarat mekanizmasının iyileştirilmesine yönelik olarak bir MI5 personeli danışman olarak Kıbrıs'ta görevlendirilmiştir. MI5 personelinin hazırladığı raporda, istihbarat toplama, tasnif ve kıymetlendirilmesi ve dağıtımı için önlemler listesi bulunmaktadır. Bir diğer aksaklık da adadaki istihbari birimler arasındaki koordinasyon eksikliğidir. MI5 personeli, önerdiği önlemlerin hayata geçirilmesiyle, Kıbrıs istihbarat sisteminin bir yıl içerisinde etkin faaliyet göstereceğini düşünmüştür. Ancak istihbarat sistemi etkinleştirilemeden adada EOKA terörü başlamıştır. EOKA'nın saldırılarının ardından, Kıbrıs istihbarat sisteminin iyileştirilmesine yönelik adımlara devam edilmiştir.

Kıbrıs'ta İngiliz İstihbaratı başlıklı Dördüncü Bölüm 'de ise, adadaki İngiliz yönetiminin kısa tarihçesi sunulmuş, savaş sonrası İngiliz politikalarında adanın stratejik önemini artıran faktörler incelenmiştir. Ardından EOKA'nın faaliyetlerine karşı adadaki İngiliz istihbarat sistemi, istihbaratın temel fonksiyonları olan istihbarat toplama, analiz, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet açısından üç dönemde incelenmiştir: Birinci dönem İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona erdiği 1945 yılı ile ilk EOKA saldırılarının gerçekleştiği 1 Nisan 1955 aralığını, ikinci dönem Kıbrıs Valisi John Harding'in Kıbrıs'ta katı önlemler

uyguladığı 1955 ve 1957 aralığını, üçüncü dönem ise Vali Hugh Foot'un göreve başladığı 1957 yılı ile Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulduğu 1960 yılı arasındaki dönemi kapsamaktadır. Bu üç dönemde EOKA'nın istihbarat mekanizması da İngiliz istihbaratının etkinliğinin incelenmesi açısından ele alınmıştır. Sonuç bölümünde, çalışmanın bulguları değerlendirilmiştir. Tez çalışmasının neticesinde İngiliz istihbaratının 1945 ve 1955 arasında EOKA'ya karşı ikaz istihbaratı (warning intelligence) üretemeyerek istihbarat hatası yaptığı, 1955 ve 1957 döneminde istihbarat toplama, analiz, istihbarat karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet kapsamında EOKA'ya karşı görece yetersiz kaldığı, 1957 ve 1960 döneminde EOKA'ya karşı politika hedeflerine katkısı bakımından EOKA'ya karşı yetersiz kaldığı ancak siyasi çözüm görüşmelerinde İngiliz karar alıcılarına destek verdiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Birinci dönem olarak ele alınan 1945 ve 1955 yılları arasında, İngiliz istihbaratı EOKA tehdidini öngörememiş ve EOKA'nın 1 Nisan 1955'teki saldırıları İngiliz yöneticiler için sürpriz olmuştur. Çalışmanın İkinci Bölümü'nde tartışıldığı üzere, bir istihbarat sisteminden en temel beklenti, zamanında, yansız, doğru ve eyleme dönüştürülebilir istihbarat sağlamasıdır. Ancak incelenen belgelere göre 1955 öncesinde EOKA terörü hakkında istihbarat bulunmamaktadır. Bir istihbarat hatası olarak kabul edilebilecek bu duruma sebep olan etkenler istihbarat çarkı üzerinde incelenmiştir. İstihbarat çarkı, beş aşamalı istihbarat sürecini şematize etmektedir. Bu aşamalar sırasıyla planlama ve yönlendirme, toplama, işleme, analiz ve dağıtım ve kullanım süreçlerini içermektedir. Bu kapsamda, istihbarat hatasına sebep olan kusurların hangi aşamada

gerçekleştirdiği istihbarat çarkı üzerinde analitik olarak incelenebilir. EOKA hakkında ikaz istihbarat eksikliğinin nedenleri arşiv belgelerindeki verilere göre incelendiğinde; ilk aşama olan planlama ve yönlendirmedeki yetersizlik dikkati çekmektedir. Adadaki ivmelenen milliyetçi *enosis* hareketine rağmen, yıkıcı faaliyetler kapsamında istihbarat, komünist tehditlere ve bu bağlamda adadaki komünist parti AKEL'in faaliyetlerine öncelikle yönlendirilmiştir. Dolayısıyla istihbarat toplama kaynakları da AKEL başta olmak üzere adadaki komünizm kaynaklı yıkıcı tehditlere yoğunlaşmıştır. Enosis hareketi kapsamındaki gösteri, söylem ya da buluşma gibi faaliyetler ise polis teşkilatı tarafından günlük durum raporları ile takip edilmekteydi. 1956 yılında kadar istihbarat AKEL ve EOKA arasındaki iş birliği tespitine yönelmiş, İngiliz yöneticiler ancak 1956 yılında böyle bir iş birliği olmadığına ikna olmuşlardır. EOKA saldırılarının ardından istihbarat taleplerinde artış olmuştur. Analiz seviyesinde ise, adadaki tehdit algısını oluşturan faktörler bilişsel önyargılardan sıyrılamamıştır. Soğuk Savaş düşünce yapısı altında komünizm kaynaklı yıkıcı tehditlere yönelik aşırı duyarlılık gösterilirken milliyetçi bir akım olan *enosisi* ise bir tehdit olarak algılanmamıştır. Ayrıca Kıbrıslıların tutum ve davranışlarına yönelik önyargılar neticesinde, Kıbrıslıların silahlı bir eylem düzenleyemeyeceğine olan inanış da EOKA faaliyetlerinin gözden kaçmasında etken olmuştur. Adadaki yıkıcı faaliyetlerin dış tehditler kaynaklı/destekli olabileceği algısı, adadaki terör oluşumunun örgütlenmesine ilişkin göstergelerin göz ardı edilmesine sebep olmuştur. Dolayısıyla istihbarat sürecindeki aksaklıklar nedeniyle EOKA'nın

oluşumu ve faaliyetleriyle ilgili istihbarat üretilememiş ve 1 Nisan 1955 saldırıları İngiliz hükümeti için sürpriz saldırı olmuştur.

İkinci dönem olarak incelenen 1955 ve 1957 yılları arasında, İngiliz istihbarat sistemi istihbarat toplama, analiz, istihbarat karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet açısından yetersiz kalmıştır. İstihbarat toplama ve analiz açısından, zamanında ve etkin istihbarat üretiminin sağlanmasında engeller bulunmaktadır. Adaya ilişkin İngiliz politikası, egemenliğin ne pahasına olursa olsun sürdürülmesi olup adadaki soruna ilişkin İngilizlerin lehine olabilecek çözüm, diplomatik girişimler ve anayasal reformlar ile aranmıştır. Güvenlik ve istihbarat güçleri ise bu siyasi çözüm girişimlerinde İngilizlerin elini güçlendirmek üzere, EOKA faaliyetlerine karşı koyma ve EOKA'nın süreçten elimine edilmesi ile görevlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda istihbarat sisteminden beklenti, stratejik, taktik ve operasyonel istihbarat sağlaması olmuştur. Ancak EOKA'ya yönelik istihbarat toplama sürecinde, temel istihbarat sorusu EOKA'yı ve *enosisi* anlamak yerine, adadaki EOKA ile komünist hareketler arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymak olmuştur. Bu nedenle istihbarat kaynakları bu ilişkinin tespitine yönlendirilmiştir. Ancak 1956 yılında, İngiliz yetkililer adada EOKA ve AKEL arasında bir iş birliği olmadığı hususunda ikna olmuştur. Öte yandan EOKA örgütünün liderlik yapısı, işbirlikçileri, finansman kaynakları, örgüt işleyişi ve iletişim yöntemlerine ilişkin istihbarat boşlukları süregelmiştir. Örgüte ve örgütün liderliği ile işleyişine yönelik istihbarat boşlukları nedeniyle, Sömürge Bakanlığı, Kıbrıs'taki yöneticilerine, örgüte ilişkin bir fikir edinmeleri için "Apple of Discord" isimli kitabı okumalarını önermiştir.

Teknik istihbarat (TECHINT) ya da insan istihbaratı (HUMINT) yöntemleri EOKA'ya nüfuz etmek mümkün olamamıştır. Kendi gelen muhbir ya da ajanlar (informer) ve tutukluların sorguya tabi tutulması İngilizler için bilgi kaynakları olmuştur. Yunanca ya da Türkçe dil bilgisine ve adadaki halkın yaşam biçimi ve kültürüne ilişkin bilgisi olan personel bulunmadığı için istihbarat bilgi toplamada sıkıntı yaşamıştır. Sorgu yöntemi ise işkenceye varan uygulamalar nedeniyle ada halkının tepkisini çekmiş, daha sonra İngilizler için de tazminat ödemelerini gerektiren bir husus olmuştur. Öte yandan yoğun sorgular, taktik ve operasyonel istihbari bilgi elde edilmesinde etkili olmuştur ancak söz konusu bilgi yığınının işleme aşamasında da sorunlar olmuştur. Özellikle Yunanca bilen personel eksikliği elde edilen verilerin işlenmesi ve istihbari bilgiye dönüştürülmesinde yetersizliğe sebep olmuştur. İstihbarat analizi aşamasında ise, EOKA örgütünün eylem ve etkinlik kapasitesine ilişkin önyargılar, EOKA'yı hafife alan bakış açısı, uzmanlığın olmaması ve yetersiz analiz teknikleri temel sorunları oluşturmuştur. Bu dönemde istihbaratın siyasallaştırılmasına (politicisation of intelligence) ilişkin örnekler de mevcuttur. Söz konusu dönemde Kıbrıs'ta görev yapan bir İngiliz istihbaratçı, mülakatında amirlerinin baskısıyla istihbarat raporunun politika hedefleri ile uyumlu hale geldiğini ifade etmiştir (Bölüm 4'e bakınız). İstihbaratın dağıtımı ve kullanımı aşamasında da verimsizliğe sebep olan unsurlar bulunmaktadır. Hükümet organları arasındaki bürokratik rekabet ve güç mücadelesi (turf wars), istihbarat koordinasyonunda etkinliğin sağlanmasına engel olmuştur. Ayrıca merkezi istihbarat sistemi ile emperyal istihbarat sistemi arasındaki uyumsuzluk ve rekabet de

istihbarat paylaşımında etkinliđi kısıtlamıştır. Bununla birlikte Kıbrıs'ta etkin bir istihbarat yapılanmasının olmayışı da istihbarat mekanizmasının verimli çalışabilmesine engel olmuştur. Kıbrıs'ta etkin bir istihbarat yapılanması için uğraşlar 1955 ve 1959 yılları arasında devam etmiştir ancak istihbari koordinasyon ve paylaşım konusunda verimlilik istenilen düzeyde artırılmamıştır. İstihbaratın kullanım aşamasında ise, karar alıcıların önyargı ve özgüvenleri yanlış değerlendirmelere sebep olmuştur. Örneđin 1956 yılında EOKA'nın ateşkes ilanını, Vali John Harding başta olmak üzere İngiliz yetkililer EOKA'nın yenilgiyi kabul etmesi olarak yorumlamışlardır. Bu değerlendirmelerini destekleyen istihbarata ise incelenen belgelerle rastlanılmamıştır. İngiliz yetkililerinin bu muhakeme hataları, EOKA'ya avantaj sağlamıştır.

İstihbarata karşı koyma kapsamında da, İngiliz istihbarat sistemi EOKA'ya karşı etkin önlemleri uygulamaya geçirememiştir. İstihbarata karşı koyma, istihbarat sisteminin gizliliđini ve güvenliđini korurken diđer istihbarat sistemlerinden kendi amaçları doğrultusunda faydalanmayı sağlayan faaliyetleri kapsamaktadır. İstihbarat karşı koyma biriminin görev kapsamını her türlü espionaj, sübversif ve sabotaj faaliyetlerine karşı yürütölen çalışmalar ve koruyucu güvenlik tedbirleri oluşturmaktadır. Bu tedbirler kapsamında savunma (defensive) önlemleri ve saldırı (offensive) yöntemleri bulunmaktadır. Savunma önlemleri ile amaç, istihbarat sırlarının sızma ya da aldatma operasyonlarına karşı korunması ve fiziki güvenlik ile personel güvenliđinin sağlanmasıdır. Saldırı yöntemleri ise karşı istihbarat sistemine yönelik tespit,

caydırıcılık, manipölasyon ya da yok etme amacı taşır. Başlıca istihbarata karşı koyma hataları, istihbarat sistemine sızmalar, dezenformasyon ya da aldatma operasyonlarının engellenememesi sonucunda meydana gelmektedir. Ayrıca bir istihbarat başarısı, diğer taraf için istihbarat ya da istihbarata karşı koyma başarısızlığı anlamı taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda EOKA'nın İngiliz yönetimi içerisinde haberci ve ajanlar vasıtasıyla bilgi derleyebilmesi, İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin istihbarat karşı koyma fonksiyonunda etkisizlik olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu kapsamda, İngiliz istihbarat sistemindeki zayıf noktaların tespiti amacıyla EOKA örgütünün istihbarat sistemi detaylı olarak incelenmiştir. Elde edilen verilere göre, İngiliz istihbarata karşı koyma önlemleri sınırlı düzeyde etkinlik gösterebilmiş olup EOKA terör örgütünün istihbarat mekanizmasına yönelik caydırıcılık ya da sistemi yok etme hedefleri tam olarak gerçekleştirilememiştir. EOKA saldırılarına karşı kontr-terör ve kontr-sabotaj önlemleri de yeterli seviyede etkili olamamıştır. Öte yandan istihbarata dayalı planlama yapabilen EOKA, 1960 yılına kadar etkinliğini korumuş, sabotaj ve suikast faaliyetlerini devam ettirmiştir. EOKA lideri Georgios Grivas, ilk başlangıçtan itibaren EOKA içerisinde istihbarat yapılanmasına önem vermiştir. Ajan ağlarının oluşturulması, kod isim kullanılması, şifreli iletişim, hücre yapılanması ve kurye sistemi başta olmak üzere etkin istihbarat işleyişi için gerekli önlemleri, yer altı örgütü kurma planlarının bir parçası olarak ele almıştır. Bu sayede EOKA, İngiliz politika ve güvenlik uygulamalarına, askeri operasyonlarına ilişkin ikaz istihbaratı elde edebilmiş ve İngiliz istihbarat sistemine karşı taktik üstünlük sağlayabilmiştir. EOKA lideri Grivas istihbarat toplama mekanizmasının

yanı sıra istihbarata karşı koyma önlemlerini de göreceli olarak etkin kullanmıştır. Koruyucu güvenlik tedbirlerinin yanı sıra, EOKA caydırıcı unsur olarak terörü kullanmış, “ihamet edenlere ya da şüphelilerine” suikastler düzenlemiştir. Ayrıca sızmalara karşı EOKA üyelerine yönelik klerans ve tarama testleri uygulamış, tespit edilen İngiliz istihbarat yöntem ve kaynaklarına ilişkin bilgilendirmeler yapılmıştır. İngiliz istihbaratının, EOKA’nın istihbarata karşı koyma önlemleri nedeniyle örgüte yönelik haberci veya ajan ağı oluşturamamış, örgütün çekirdek kadrosuna ilişkin haber alma ağı oluşturamamış, Grivas’ın günlükleri haricinde EOKA’ya ilişkin verimli ve kullanılabilir istihbarat sağlayamamıştır.

Gizli faaliyet kapsamında, çalışmada propaganda faaliyetleri incelenmiştir. EOKA, *enosis* politikası kapsamında yürüttüğü propaganda faaliyetleri ile İngiliz yönetiminin Kıbrıs’ta meşruiyetini yitirdiğini göstermeye ve *enosis* talebini uluslararası gündemde tutmayı hedeflemiştir. Grivas, EOKA faaliyetlerinde propagandayı en güçlü silahı olarak değerlendirmiştir. İngilizlerin adadaki idam cezası, gazete ve radyoların yasaklanması, işkenceye varan sorgu yöntemleri gibi baskıcı uygulamaları, EOKA’nın propaganda faaliyetleri için temel dayanak olmuştur. EOKA, sıklıkla İngilizlerin adada insan haklarına aykırı tutum ve davranışlarını uluslararası kamuoyu gündemine taşımada başarılı olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, EOKA’nın propaganda faaliyetleri ile İngiliz hükümeti üzerinde bir baskı oluşturduğu söylenebilecektir. İngiliz hükümeti de EOKA’ya karşı gizli ve açık propaganda faaliyetleri yürütmüştür. Karşılaştırmalı olarak incelendiğinde ise, İngilizlerin

EOKA'ya karşı-propaganda faaliyetlerinde daha az etkili olduğu söylenebilecektir. İngilizler, EOKA'ya karşı propaganda faaliyetlerinde daha geç başlamışlardır. İngiliz propaganda faaliyetlerinin en güçlü dayanağı ise Grivas'ın ele geçirilen günlükleri olmuştur. Ancak adada Kıbrıs hakimiyetinin sürdürülmesi şeklindeki siyasi hedefe destek kapsamında propaganda faaliyetlerinin katkısı sınırlı kalmıştır. Sonuç olarak, 1955 ve 1957 arasındaki ikinci dönemde, İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin, EOKA'ya karşı istihbarat toplama ve analiz, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyetlerinde EOKA faaliyetlerine kıyasla daha verimsiz olmuştur.

1957 ve 1960 yılları arasındaki son dönemde ise, İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin etkinliği sınırlı olmuştur. Bu dönemde, İngilizlerin adaya yönelik siyasi politikası değişmiş ve tam egemenliğin sürdürülmesi yerine, “egemen İngiliz üsleri” rinin muhafazası amaçlanmıştır. Adadaki Türk ve Yunan toplumları arasındaki çatışma hiddetlenmiş, NATO ülkeleri içine çekebilecek iç savaş tehdidi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu koşullar altında İngiliz karar-alıcılar, Kıbrıs adasında biran önce siyasi çözüme ulaşılmasını hedeflemişlerdir. İngiliz istihbarat sisteminden beklentileri de siyasi çözüme katkıda bulunacak stratejik ve taktik istihbarat olmuştur. EOKA'nın faaliyetlerine karşı koyulması ve siyasi sürece etkisinin elimine edilmesi de devam eden bir beklenti olmuştur. Bu dönemin Kıbrıs Valisi Hugh Foot, Kıbrıs'taki istihbarat yapılanmasını güçlendirmek için girişimlerde bulunmuştur. Ancak İngiliz istihbarat sistemi, bu dönemde de savunmada (defence) kalmış, saldırı (offensive) istihbaratında sınırlı kalmıştır. 1958 yılında EOKA, saldırı gücünü ve

etkinliğini büyük oranda muhafaza edebilmiştir. İstihbarat sistemi, politikaları destekleyen eyleme dönüştürebilir istihbarat üretiminde ya da politika hedefleri doğrultusunda eyleme geçmekte sınırlı etkinlik gösterebilmiştir. Öte yandan, bu dönemde taraflar Kıbrıs konusunda siyasi çözüme ulaşmak için istekli olmuştur. İngiliz istihbarat sistemi, EOKA'ya karşı mücadelede istenilen seviyede etkinlik gösterememiş ancak siyasi çözüm görüşmeleri boyunca İngiliz politikacılara istihbarat akışını başarıyla sağlamışlardır. 1959 yılında Londra ve Zürih görüşmeleri süresince, tarafların sürece ilişkin tutumları teknik ve insan istihbaratı yöntemleri ile takip edilmiş, İngiliz karar alıcılara sürecin yönlendirilmesinde destek verilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışmada istihbarat, politikayı şekillendirebilen bir güç ve politika hedeflerine ulaşmada kullanılan bir araç olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bir istihbarat sisteminin istihbarat toplama, istihbarat analizi, istihbarata karşı koyma ve gizli faaliyet olmak üzere dört temel fonksiyonu vardır. Bu dört temel fonksiyon arasında görevler bakımından ağırlık merkezi, istihbarat sistemin şekillendiren yönetim biçimi, teknolojik gelişmelere hakimiyet ve stratejik çevre koşullarına göre değişim gösterebilmektedir. Ayrıca her bir fonksiyonun etkinliği, diğer fonksiyonların etkinliği ile bağıntılıdır. Bu dört temel fonksiyonun verimlilik ve etkinlik seviyesi istihbarat sisteminin de etkinlik seviyesini ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bir istihbarat sisteminde hata istihbarat toplama, analiz, istihbarata karşı koyma ya da gizli faaliyet fonksiyonlarından birinde veya birkaçında meydana gelebilmektedir. Her bir fonksiyon için “hata parametreleri” çalışma çerçevesinde

belirlenmiştir. Ardından İngiliz istihbarat sisteminin Kıbrıs'ta EOKA'ya karşı faaliyetleri, dört temel istihbarat fonksiyonu için bu parametrelere göre değerlendirilmiştir. Varılan sonuca göre, İngiliz istihbarat sistemi 1945 ve 1955 yılları arasında EOKA ve faaliyetlerine karşı ikaz istihbaratı üretemeyerek istihbarat hatası yapmıştır. 1955 ve 1957 yılları arasında EOKA'ya yönelik politikaları desteklemede yetersiz kalmıştır. 1957 ve 1960 yılları arasında ise İngiliz istihbaratı EOKA'ya karşı faaliyetlerinde sınırlı etkinlik gösterebilmiştir.

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