

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY AND
TURCO-GERMAN RELATIONS

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY AND TURCO-GERMAN RELATIONS

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The conception of the English School Theory of International Relations (E.S.) – international society is so far prevalently applied to the totality of a group of states and their interactions, and recently for regional interactions. However, E.S. notes less on the interactions among states. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to fill this gap and bridge the conception of international society and its institutions with bilateral state relations, through a case study of Turco-German relations. To this end, the dissertation utilizes five systemic institutions defined by Hedley Bull: Balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war, and great power management. This effort aims to contribute to the existing literature by shifting the focus of the E.S. towards state-level analysis, and by providing a novel template for the analysis of bilateral state relations. The study asks how Germany and Turkey take international society's five systemic institutions into consideration while conducting their bilateral relations, and examines the Turco-German relations from 1701 to 1945, in three distinct periods. The main argument is as follows: Despite the fact that bilateral state relations in general, and Turco-German relations in particular are constrained and contoured by the institutions of international society; when individual and/or collective state interests come into conflict with these institutions, states tend to resist and transcend this institutional structure by producing alternative policies. However, these alternatives are not able to escape

from the boundaries of international society's institutional framework, and emerge as policy substitutions within the same institution or policy-shifts towards other institutions.

Keywords: English School, International Society, Institutions, Turco-German, Bilateral Relations

ÖZ

İNGİLİZ OKULU KURAMI VE TÜRK-ALMAN İLİŞKİLERİ

Demirel, Murat

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev

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Uluslararası İlişkilerde İngiliz Okulu Kuramının “uluslararası toplum” kavramsallaştırması, devletler topluluğunun bütününe ve toplum bazındaki etkileşimlere odaklanmıştır. Son yıllardaki çalışmalar, ilgili varsayımları bölgesel etkileşimler üzerine geliştirilmiştir. Yine de mevcut İngiliz Okulu literatürü, devletler arasındaki etkileşimlere yeterince değinmemektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, bu açığın kapatılmasına katkı sunmaktır. Bu bağlamda çalışmada, Türk-Alman ilişkileri örnek olay olarak incelenerek uluslararası toplum ve bu topluma ait kurumlar ile ikili devlet ilişkileri arasında bir bağ kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışmada Hedley Bull’un tanımlamış olduğu sistem düzeyinde etkin beş kurumdan faydalanılmıştır: kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimi. Bu tez, mevcut literatüre hem İngiliz Okulu’ndaki analiz düzeyini devletler seviyesine indirgeyerek hem de ikili devlet ilişkilerinin incelemek için yeni bir şablon ortaya koyarak katkı sunmaya çalışmıştır. Çalışma, “Türkiye ve Almanya, ikili devlet ilişkilerini yönetirken Bull’un sistem düzeyinde işlediğini öne sürdüğü uluslararası toplumun kurumlarını ne şekilde hesaba katmışlardır?” sorusunu yöneltmiştir. Bu soruya, Türk-Alman ilişkilerini, 1701-1945 dönem aralığından seçtiği üç farklı dönemde inceleyerek cevaplamaya çalışmıştır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı şu şekildedir: Genel olarak ikili devlet

ilişkileri, özelde de Türk-Alman ilişkileri uluslararası toplumun sistem bazında işleyen kurumları tarafından biçimlendirilmiş ve sınırlandırılmış olsa da, devletlerin müşterek ya da münferit çıkarları bu kurumlar ile çeliştiğinde, devletler alternatif politikalar üreterek kurumların belirlediği bu yapıya direnmek ya da bu yapıyı aşmak için eğilim gösterirler. Bu alternatifler, kurumların çizdiği sınırları aşamayıp ya aynı kurum dahilinde ikame politikaları olarak ya da diğer kurumların içerisinde telafi politikaları olarak şekillenme eğilimindedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İngiliz Okulu, Uluslararası Toplum, Kurumlar, Türk-Alman, İkili İlişkiler

To my Elif,

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Theory is often defined as a systematized knowledge that utilizes distinctive filters to alter existing practices into a methodological framework with explanatory and predictive capacities.¹ In this respect, the English School of International Relations (E.S.)² has produced its own filters while analysing the historical practices of International Relations (IR). The E.S. scholars have developed a pluralist theoretical structure of IR with a basic concentration on the concept of international society³, which also paves the way for calling the theory as ‘international society approach’.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, III.: Waveland Press, 2010), 6-7; Ersel Aydın, Erol Kurubaş, and Haluk Özdemir, *Yöntem, Kuram, Komplo: Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Vizyon Arayışları* (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2009), 40-47; Scott Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, 5th ed., ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 16-19.

² The name of the school is of a discussion in the literature as to whether it is a “British” or an “English” School. The connotation of ‘British’ signifies a wider geography and a deeper history. As a common point of the E.S. scholars, all have their educational background within boundaries of the former British Empire, exceeding today’s England. (For instance, Hedley Bull graduated from the University of Sydney with a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Philosophy in 1952. See: Meredith Thatcher and Coral Bell, eds., *Remembering Hedley*, vol. 170 of *Canberra Papers On Strategy and Defence* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 17) Additionally, the school’s distinctive group of theorizing within a committee was also called as ‘The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics’. However, the trademark of ‘English’ has been widely spread and accepted in academic circles, which seems to have been consolidated in the recent decades. Thus, the term ‘English School’ is preferred in this study.

³ Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014), 7.

According to the E.S. scholars, the fundamental idea of the international society is so simplistic that such as the individuals in a society, “states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by”.⁴ International society, of which the primary actors are states in an anarchic nature, does not present a chaotic and conflictual formulation of “everyone against everyone” status but an evolved order.⁵ This order is sustained by these sovereign states on a volitional basis, motivated by common values and interests, through established structures called institutions.

The debate as to these evolved institutions such as balance of power, sovereignty, diplomacy seems to be the innovative contribution of the E.S. for the literature of IR, which requires further elaboration. The one aspect of the institutional debate might be on bilateral state relations. Even though the conception of international society casts states into the role of primary actors for theorizing, it has so far neglected the interactions of these main actors with one another - bilateral state relations. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to fill the gap between the institutions and the bilateral state relations through focusing on the correlation between these state-level interactions and the systemic filters of international society.

It is obvious that the current literature of the E.S. has been abundantly concentrated on systemic assumptions rather than focusing on lower levels of analysis. The major publications of the E.S. reflect this tendency: Martin Wight’s *Power Politics* (1946), *Systems of States* (1977), *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (1990), or the cardinal work of Hedley Bull – *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977), or *Diplomatic Investigations* (1966) which is the opus magnum of

⁴ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 12-13.

⁵ Hedley Bull, “Order vs. Justice in International Society,” *Political Studies* 19, no. 3 (1971): 269-72.

the British Committee on Theory of International Politics.⁶ As these studies reflect, the assumptions of the E.S. depend heavily on the pivotal role of 'state' with an effort to explain the change and continuity at the systemic level.

In parallel, the backbone of the E.S. – international society is so far prevalently applied to the totality of a group of states and their interactions. The concept has also been recently used for regional interactions, leading to regional international societies.⁷ However, while analysing systemic or regional interactions in IR through states, E.S. notes less on the interactions among states. This study claims that the E.S. is likely to provide more about the interactions, namely the relations, between the states. Bearing in mind that the concept of international society is first and foremost related to inter-state relations, the main objective of this study is to adapt the conception of international society and its institutions for analysing the bilateral state relations through a case study of Turco-German relations. To this end, the dissertation utilizes five systemic institutions defined by Hedley Bull and assumed to operate within the borders of the conception of international society: Balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war, and great power management.

This task appointed for the dissertation is of an ambitious one with regard to its level of analysis. The core attempt of the study is to import a conception from system-level to the state-level, similar to what has already been done for the regional level. The aforesaid task has its own limitations while configuring a transition from system level dynamics to the state level interactions. Definitely, this framework is open for criticism. However, this attempt with its limited scope is a

⁶ See Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad, and Jack Spence (New York: Continuum :, 2002); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*; (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966).

⁷ See Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

candidate to be a promising starting point for further discussions, which requires to be developed in conjunction with the progress of the institutional debate in the E.S..

In the light of this background, this dissertation formulates its main research question as follows: “How do Germany and Turkey take international society’s five systemic institutions into consideration while conducting their bilateral state relations?” This main question is supported by the following supplementary questions: “How do Turco-German relations contribute to the functioning of Bull’s five systemic institutions?” and “How do Turco-German relations tend to react to Bull’s five systemic institutions when their interests are challenged by these institutions?”

In this regard, Turco-German relations are examined throughout the study to find out whether Bull’s institutions influence the decisions of Turkey and Germany in their foreign policies towards one another. To this end, this study exemplifies the sequence of events and facts on which the systemic institutions have shown clear impacts. In the light of this research agenda, it adopts both theoretical assumptions of the E.S. and the practices of Turco-German relations, with certain limitations from the vast range of assumptions of the E.S., and from the numerous events of the Turco-German history. This study does not focus on a single period of time, due to the fact that it is neither a foreign policy analysis of a certain period, nor a chronology of historical events. The primary aim of this exemplification is to show the correlation between Bull’s five systemic institutions and the Turco-German relations within the period between the eighteenth century and the mid-twentieth century.

The subject of this work requires the clarification of three issues: The adaption of Bull’s conception of international society and institutions among other key concepts of the E.S., the selection of Turco-German relations rather than any other bilateral state relations, and the temporal limitations of the case study. The reason for concentrating on Bull’s conception of international society and institutions is drawn from the fact that Bull seems to have developed the accumulation of the E.S. one

step further on a theoretical structure, and contoured the distinctive borders of the E.S. with his conceptualisations. His definition of international society has reflected the crux of the E.S. which has become the flagship for further analysis:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.⁸

For Bull, the conception of international society along with its institutions present the main structure of IR in practice. The society in his opinion has an imperfect nature that causes not always peace but war, not always justice but injustice, as well. However, this society produces regularity, predictability and prevents a tyranny of a universal state.⁹ International society exists with volitional participation of states, in which they are bound by a set of rules to conduct their relations. Bull argues that the overriding status of this society is ‘order’ under the anarchical condition of IR along with both conflict and cooperation.¹⁰ The order is not based solely on power and coercion but on the coordination of interests and on patterned expectations, which are a set of evolved habits and practices called institutions. Bull has triggered the discussion about these evolved institutions by utilizing five of them: balance of power, great power management, diplomacy, international law, and war, which are selected for the intended analysis in this dissertation. The assumptions and the conceptions put forth by Bull have produced repercussions not only in the literature of the E.S., but also in the theoretical discussions of IR. As a result, Bull’s conception of international society on the one

⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

⁹ Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 5, no. 1 (May 1959): 47.

¹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 47, 60.

hand, and his conceptualisation of the institutions on the other hand have become a landmark in theoretical debates of IR.

Bull's theoretical structure summarized above has not been utilized for analysing the interactions among states, but with a primary focus, for the systemic interactions. This study argues that Bull's framework, which is designed to examine the international society at macro-level along with the crucial role attached to the states, could also provide theoretical perspectives at micro-level for the interactions of these states. Analysing bilateral state relations with Bull's assumptions is a neglected part of the literature to be developed, which could not only provide deeper historical and sociological analysis but also serves as an alternative to escape from 'presentism' of realism.

In order to conduct a research about state interactions with the conception of international society, two potential states need to be selected from the members of the same international society. Turkey and Germany, as two members of the European international society have engaged in continuous bilateral relations and created a good pattern of correlation and continuity in their interactions. These two states, in line with Bull's five institutions, have not only provided a consolidated diplomatic network, but also wage common wars against enemies, take part in great power management, playoff in balance of power politics, and act in international law within the historical evolution of the international society since the 18th century. The reason behind selecting these two states among others is the lack of literature as to the Turco-German relations within the discipline of IR. The under-researched status of the Turco-German bilateral relations, despite some amount of accumulation in the discipline of history, has motivated the writer of this dissertation to fill this gap and to provide more from Turco-German historical practices for the core of IR theoretical discussions.

Another point to be highlighted is the temporal limitation of the case study. This dissertation takes three periods - the second half of the 18th century, the second half of the 19th century until the end of the World War I, and the period from 1923 to

the end of the World War II (1923-19145) in order to examine the Turco-German relations in three distinct layers. First of all, it is clear that the history of Turco-German relations dates back to earlier periods of the 18th century. Turco-German relations are said to have started in the 12th century during the third Crusade targeting the lands of the Seljuk Empire in Anatolia.¹¹ This interaction continued in the following centuries. Especially, in the 17th century before the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, it is recorded that the Ottoman Empire was in interaction with several Protestant German Princes to curb the power of the Catholic Habsburg Empire.¹²

Even though German and Turkish societies have engaged in military or diplomatic contacts since the Crusades, the permanent diplomatic relations between the two states were initiated in the 18th century¹³, which is pinned as a starting point for the objectives involved in this study. Since, in parallel to the assumptions of the conception of international society, this dissertation aims to focus on the modern state system that emerged with respect to the relationship between territory and men after 1648. This era is closely related to the principle of sovereignty which evolved and gradually consolidated through the 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly, the diplomatic records show that the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia initiated their diplomatic interaction at the beginning of the 18th century, after the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 within the European international society with cooperation, in an apt to their state interests. Thus, the 18th century, with the emergence of both Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic relations, and the consolidation of

¹¹ For further analysis, see M. Nail Alkan, “Hayranlık, Dostluk ve Çıkar Üçgeninde Türk-Alman İlişkileri,” *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 34, (April 2015): 35-36.

¹² For further details about the relationship between the Protestants in Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, see Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, “Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Constrction of Modern Europe” (Master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005), 82-93.

¹³ Kemal Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul University Press, 1985), 2-4.

a working international society with its functioning institutions - balance of power, international law, war, great power management, diplomacy fulfils the criterion for the analysis involved in this dissertation.

The evolution of the international society itself along with its primary institutions have fingerprints on Turco-German relations, especially in the second half of the 18th century. It is obvious that along with the trade agreement signed in 1761, the relations through institutions became intensive in Turco-German relations, leading to the 1790 Treaty of Alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. The following time-period was selected from the second half of the 19th century, starting from 1871 onwards until 1918, during which the Ottoman Empire was said to have joined the European international society formally after the Crimean War in 1856 in Paris.¹⁴ The following Congress of Berlin in 1878 also consolidated functionality of the institutions of international society from Bull's perspective in Turco-German relations with regard to diplomacy, balance of power, international law and great power management. This era was followed by the period, during which the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire engaged in the World War I collaboratively. As two states, which have never waged war against each other, presented the functionality of war in their bilateral state relations. In sum, the time-period from 1871 to 1918 provides a rational ground for analysing the Bull's institutions in harmony with the main argument of the study.

The last period of the case study is dedicated to the period after the World War I, during which the practices of Bull's institutions appeared boldly. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey on one hand, and the Weimar Republic on the other hand, despite their isolationist foreign policies to recover, created a new momentum especially in diplomacy and international law. This period particularly contributed to the efforts of the new-state formation in Turkey to a great extent. The following period of the Third Reich (Hitler's period, 1933 – 1945) also underlined the

¹⁴ Adam Watson, "Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies," *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 148.

institutions of balance of power, war and great power management on the road to the World War II along with other institutions. The periods between 1939 and 1945 provided not only the mechanism of war but also numerous examples for the other institutions to focus within the historical chronology of Turco-German relations.

Another point to be discussed is the exemption of the period after 1945. The reason to end the research in 1945 also stems from the fact that after the World War II, Turco-German relations on the one hand and the institutions of the international society on the other hand have become so complex to fit the main objectives of the study. Indeed, the main research question of the dissertation requires clear cases for the institutions involved. There is no doubt that the Turco-German relations intensified after 1945 in all sectors, however, they also became more complex to examine. First of all, the international society after 1945 has been consolidated to prevent wars. This fact disables any observable case of war with regard to Turco-German relations. Similarly, the great power management changed its status, in which Germany and Turkey both lost their status of great power in comparison to former periods. This fact also directly prevented any clear observable relations with regard to balance of power after 1945, during which Germany survived in a divided status between the two poles of the Cold War. On the other hand, starting from the 1960s, the flow of immigrant workers – *gastarbeiters* from Turkey to Germany created a complexity which was beyond the assumptions of Bull. Additionally, the evolution of the European Union (EU) just after the World War II, and the Turkish bid for the membership after the 1960s created another complexity for bilateral relations. It has become henceforth difficult to examine Turco-German bilateral state relations as a distinct dynamic regardless of the Turkish-EU process.

In line with the main research question of the dissertation, to investigate the correlation between the institutions of international society and the Turco-German relations, three periods are scrutinized: the second half of the 18th century, the period between 1871 and 1918, and the years between 1923 and 1945. In these three different centuries, along with its institutions, the international society itself was in a progress of evolution and displayed different dynamics. In order to show the

essential method of the dissertation – historical reading, this study historicizes the institutions of international society and the related Turco-German relations within their own contexts. In these three layers, Turco-German relations are examined to contribute to the existing literature by producing a new E.S. lens for analysing bilateral state relations.

As a result, this dissertation argues that Turkey and Germany, as the two members of the European international society have engaged in continuous interactions since the 18th century in correlation with Bull's five systemic institutions. Turkey and Germany have taken these institutions into consideration while conducting their bilateral relations towards one another. The institutions of balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war and the great power management provide the context in which these states act.

This study argues that there could be a harmony between the five systemic institutions and bilateral state relations within international society. It is seen in the Turco-German relations that despite some disagreements, the states tend to manage their interactions in line with the five systemic institutions while relatively contributing to the maintenance of their functioning. However, when individual and/or collective interests are challenged, states attempt to resist and react to Bull's five systemic institutions. In such cases, states try to transcend and overcome the limitations of these institutions. Indeed, they cannot proceed due to the constraints of the established institutional structure. When challenged by a specific institution, states try to create a new policy-path within the spectrum of the same institution or generate alternative bilateral policies within the framework of another systemic institution. In this context, the main argument of the dissertation can be summarized as follows:

Despite the fact that bilateral state relations in general, and Turco-German relations in particular are constrained and contoured by the systemic institutions of international society; when individual and/or collective state interests come into conflict with these institutions, states tend to resist and transcend this institutional

structure by producing alternative policies. However, these alternatives are not able to escape from the boundaries of international society's institutional framework, and emerge as policy substitutions within the same institution or policy-shifts towards other institutions.

The Contribution of the Dissertation:

This dissertation, along with its main argument aims to contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, since its foundation, the E.S. literature has attempted to explain systemic level interactions with a holistic approach. In this context, this dissertation contributes to the existing literature by shifting the focus of the theory towards state interactions, and state-level analysis. The study with its limited scope is an attempt to project the systemic assumptions of the E.S. for analysing bilateral state relations. Within this format, this study seeks to contribute to the further discussions of the interaction between systemic and state-level dynamics.

Secondly, this dissertation validates that Bull's definition of international society is a minimalist one, when applied to the analysis of the bilateral state relations and Turco-German relations in particular. The dissertation by using the conception of 'international society' in Turco-German relations attempts to examine the nature of the international society along with its correlation with state interactions. In this sense, as another contribution, this study presents that Bull's international society; along with its five systemic institutions reflect a pluralist and a minimalist international society in essence in consideration with the examination of Turco-German relations. This pluralist conception of international society is formulated for the purpose of co-existence. The rules and institutions provide the structure of this coexistence that has emerged as a result of mutual recognition of states as independent and equal members of the international society along with a reliance on self-preservation and self-help, which leads to state freedom to seek interests

within the constraints of the minimalist conception of Bull. The requirements for forming an international society can be counted as obeying the rule of *pacta sunt servanda*, respecting to sovereignty and to the principle of non-intervention, and providing immunity for diplomats. In the same vein, international society has a minimalist definition to an extent that even during wars; the society itself does not cease to survive. Hedley Bull's international society is a minimalist conception and works in practice within this minimalistic context. States tend to obey the minimalistic rules in a continuous trend. Turco-German relations, reflects the validity of this argument.

Finally, this dissertation aims at contributing to the existing literature and the future analysis of any bilateral state relations with explanatory and predictive capacities through its novel template, within the complexity of bilateral state relations with economic, military, cultural, political, historical dimensions. Through arguing that Turkey and Germany conduct their bilateral relations, even when contradicted by their state interests, within the borders of Bull's five systemic institutions –balance of power, great power management, diplomacy, international law, and war– is a candidate to be a peculiar path for further analysis within the literature of E.S..

The Structure of the Dissertation:

The dissertation is composed of six chapters including the introduction and the conclusion chapters. The introduction chapter outlines the scope and the objective of the study, and also presents the main research question and the main argument of the dissertation along with its contribution to the literature.

The second chapter aims at establishing a theoretical framework for the dissertation. This chapter overviews the potent of the E.S. for analysing the bilateral state relations with a special reference to Hedley Bull. Initially, the chapter examines the historical evolution, the key concepts and the main assumptions of the E.S.. In the succeeding parts, the chapter concentrates on the conception of 'international

society' along with its institutions as defined by Hedley Bull, which are assumed to be the functional mechanisms of IR with their status of "being evolved rather than designed". Having noted the main discussions about institutions within the literature of the E.S., this chapter analyses Bull's five institutions in succession - Balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war, and great power management. This last part of the chapter examines the institutions involved with regard to their definitions, functions, types and their correlation with bilateral state relations, which this dissertation aims to utilize.

After having discussed the theoretical background and the literature utilized in this dissertation, the following chapters focus distinctly on Turco-German relations and their linkage with Bull's five institutions of the international society in line with the main research question of the study: "How do Germany and Turkey take international society's five systemic institutions into consideration while conducting their bilateral state relations?". These chapters begin with a brief presentation of the main characteristics of the international society and its institutions for each period focussed. This historicism aims to prevent presentism in the research, and tries to link the Turco-German relations with the ongoing characteristics of the international society for the era involved. The chapter three focusses on the second half of the 18th century, chapter four examines the period between 1871 and 1918, and chapter five, through an examination of the 1923-1945 period, provides the reader with essential facts and a sequence of events of the Turco-German relations, and links them with Bull's five institutions. Within this framework, 'Germany' is used to refer to all the German polities after the 18th Century; for the Kingdom of Prussia in the 18th century, German Empire after 1871, and Weimar Republic after the World War I. Correspondingly, 'Turkey' refers to the Ottoman Empire and the succeeding Republic of Turkey. The dissertation finally ends with an overall conclusion in chapter six, recapitulating its main argument and answering its basic questions.

CHAPTER 2

ENGLISH SCHOOL AND THE CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse the conception of ‘international society’, along with its systemic institutions supposed to operate in IR and facilitating order within international society. In order to give a background for further analysis, the first section of the chapter is reserved for a brief introduction to the E.S. along with its historical evolution, distinctive assumptions, key concepts, and methodology. After this background, the chapter focuses on the conception of international society which has become the backbone of the E.S., by emphasizing the linkage between its components - common values, common interests, common rules and common institutions. Thereafter the chapter examines the existing literature as to the evolved institutions in IR put forth by the E.S. The chapter peculiarly focuses on the institutions defined by Bull - balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great power management and war, which have triggered the existing institutional debate and provided the cardinal characteristic of the international society – ‘order’.

2.2. Brief Introduction to English School Theory of International Relations

The E.S. has recently come to reserve a chapter in the prevalent textbooks of IR as a distinct theory. A significant number of textbooks accepts the E.S. as a full theoretical structure that has the capacity to analyse the reality of IR similar to other mainstream theories such as realism and constructivism.¹⁵ Whilst, another group of textbooks still lacks an E.S. chapter, but only refers to its conception of ‘international society’ on a limited scale.¹⁶ This situation reflects simultaneously a valuable amount of consensus about its existence in IR literature while questioning its capacity for analysis.

The sparks of the E.S. emerged with essential academic works of the forerunners such as Charles Manning, Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, during which the discipline of IR was at the outset of recognition and consolidation as an autonomous subject to study.¹⁷ After World War II, with systemic academic efforts, E.S. strengthened its foundations through a group-theorizing in a committee called “the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics”.¹⁸

¹⁵ For textbooks with a distinct chapter on English School of IR, see: Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, 84-109; Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 135-156; Jennifer Anne Sterling-Folker, ed., *Making Sense of International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 303-326.

¹⁶ For instance, only ‘The Evolution of International Society’ has been examined under the title of ‘Historical Context’ with several references to E.S. in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, sixth ed. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), 35-49.

¹⁷ For additional discussions of the discipline in this period, see: Brian C. Schmidt, "Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (September 1998): 433-459; William T. R. Fox, "Interwar International Relations Research: the American Experience," *World Politics* 2, no. 1 (October 1949): 67-79.

¹⁸ This intellectual discussion group was first intended to be a parallel body of an American committee which was initiated by The Rockefeller Foundation in 1954 for theoretical questions

This committee, which started to meet in 1958 to discuss the theory of international politics¹⁹ functioned until the dismantlement in 1985 with the unexpected death of Hedley Bull. This group-effort seems to have constituted the core ideas of the E.S. theory. The initial committee members consisted of professionals from different disciplines ranging from history, diplomacy to journalism.²⁰ The committee “marched with the domains of the political theorist, the international lawyer, the diplomatic historian, the student of IR, and the strategic analyst.”²¹ As Bull argues, the theorization itself marched with the philosophy, law and history²², and utilized other disciplines such as economics and finance in this committee. As a group for theorizing, the forerunners and the major following members constituted an

about International Relations. Kenneth Thompson, as one of the coordinators of the American committee suggested a similar group in the U.K. Upon this proposal, a group of British-rooted scholars convened to initiate preliminary talks about the theory of IR in 1958. This group was named by the Rockefeller Foundation as the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. For details, see: Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, 11. For further details about the committee, see also T. Dunne, *Inventing International Society: a History of the English School (St Antony's Series)*, 1998 ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Roger Epp, “The British Committee and International Society,” in *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, ed. Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green, Guides to International Studies (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 25-36.

¹⁹ Daniel M. Green, “Introduction to the English School in International Studies,” in *Guide to the English School*, ed. Navari and Green, 1; Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, 11.

²⁰ Initial figures of the committee were Martin Wight (Historian), Herbert Butterfield (Historian), Sir William Armstrong (From Treasury Department), Adam Watson (Diplomat), Desmond Williams (Diplomatic Historian), Michael Howard (Military Historian), Donald Mackinnon (Philosopher), Donald McLahlan (Journalist), and G. F. Hudson (Political Historian). Hedley Bull was later invited to the group, as a student of the department of IR. See Adam Watson, *The British Committee for the Theory of International Politics: Some Historical Notes*, November, 1998. Available at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/watson98.pdf> (31.07.2016); Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, 90-94, 116-17.

²¹ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, 11.

²² Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” *World Politics* 18, no. 3 (April 1966): 361.

educationally and professionally-linked group, as an example, including professors and their students.²³

The members of the committee met regularly at three-weekend meetings a year²⁴ and produced academic works. In 1966, the book entitled as ‘Diplomatic Investigations’ became the outcome of these intense discussions.²⁵ As underlined by the content of this book, the committee discussions were generally held around the topics of the nature of the states-system, the assumptions and ideas about diplomacy, the principles of foreign policy, the ethics of international relations and war.²⁶

Ole Waever sums up the evolution of the E.S. by four distinct phases. The first phase began with the initiation of the committee and ended with the publication of *Diplomatic Investigations* (1966). This period presented the accumulation of the efforts to concentrate on the conception of international society, and to theorize international politics. The second phase lasted between 1966 and 1977, along with Bull’s *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, and Wight’s *Systems of States*, during which international society was under investigation in

²³ This intellectual group consisted of professors and their students, sharing the same or similar academic engagements and educational backgrounds. For instance, Charles Manning and Martin Wight are two former chairmen of the department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Hedley Bull and Hidemi Suganami were their students. The tradition of this succession continued within the committee as well. The committee was chaired by Herbert Butterfield (1959-1967), by Martin Wight (1967-1972), by Adam Watson (1972- 1979) and lastly by Hedley Bull (1979-1985) until the dismantlement of the group with Bull’s unexpected death. For details, see Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, 89-135, and Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds., *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years* London: Millennium Publishing Group, 2003.

²⁴ Adam Watson, *The British Committee for the Theory of International Politics: Some Historical Notes*, November, 1998. Available at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/watson98.pdf> (31.07.2016)

²⁵ See Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1966.

²⁶ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, 11.

terms of its existence and nature. Third phase began after 1977 with a new generation of writers who used the frameworks of Bull and Wight for further analyses. In this period, many discussions occurred about the capacity of the E.S. like ‘Jones, Grader and Wilson debate’ between 1981 and 1989.²⁷ Waever argues that the fourth phase started with the 1990s, along with novel publications such as the special issue of *Millennium* journal on the E.S.²⁸ In this post-Cold War period, there was a willingness to engage insights and approaches of the E.S. in new challenges and theoretical researches²⁹, which then followed by the attempts to reconvene the E.S. academic club through reviving the aforementioned heritage.³⁰

The historical evolution summarized above has gradually evolved the main assumptions, the key concepts, and the inquiry method of the E.S.. Within this context, an embedded pluralism with triadic conceptualization, and the method of historical reading (interpretivism) prevail as the distinguished characteristics of the theory. E.S. offers a pluralist framework which understands/explains IR with a trilogy. This trilogy consists of the conceptions of ‘international system’, ‘international society’, and ‘world society’ which are also reflected in parallel to Wight’s three epistemological paths known as three R’s: realism, rationalism, and revolutionism.³¹ From the E.S. point of view, these three systemic frameworks

²⁷ Roy E. Jones, “The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure,” *Review of International Studies* 7, no. 1 (1981): 1-13; Shelia Grader, “The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation,” *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 1 (1988): 29-44; Peter Wilson, “The English School of International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 1 (1989): 49-58.

²⁸ See the special issue published after the LSE Conference on “Beyond the International Society”: *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 21, no.3 (1992).

²⁹ Ole Waever, “Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue,” in *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, ed. B A. Roberson (London: Continuum, 2002), 85-86.

³⁰ In 1999, Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Ole Waever tried to reconvene the E.S. See University of Leeds, “Research: English School of International Relations Theory”, available at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school/> (27.08.2016)

³¹ Martin Wight and Gabriele Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight, Brian Ernest Porter, and Hedley Bull (New York: Holmes & Meier for the Royal Institute of

coexist, interact and cross-fertilize each other and re-produce the reality of IR. These converging concentric circles function in interstate, transnational, and inter-human domains.³²

Within the triadic pluralist formulation of the E.S., international system is formed “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on another’s decisions to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.”³³ International system, known also as Hobbesian, Machiavellian or realist framework is about power politics and puts the international anarchy at the centre of its arguments. Buzan argues that it is state-centred and functions with power politics.³⁴ It is generally seen parallel to the realist and neorealist understanding of IR. International system is based on the ontology of states, and examined generally through a positivist epistemology, rationalist and materialist methodologies and structural theories.³⁵

On the other hand, as Bull suggests, when states, conscious of their certain common interests and values act volitionally within the borders of common set of rules operated by certain evolved institutions, it formulizes an international society.³⁶ The fundamental idea of this societal approach is simplistic that just as individuals living

International Affairs, 1992); Ian Hall, *The International Thought of Martin Wight*, The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought Series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 133-156.

³² Richard Little, “Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment,” *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (March 1995): 15-16; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, *International Society and the Middle East*, 231.

³³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 9.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7.

³⁵ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 12.

³⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

in a society, states as well live in an international society which they shape and are reshaped by. International society is voluntaristic, and institutionalized by the will of its members through the historical process. It is also called as Grotian or rationalist framework, or the society of states which concentrates on shared norms, rules, and institutions which highlight the mutual interest and common values among states. This perspective has become the main focus of the E.S. with the emergence of the modern state system.³⁷

The third circle of the trilogy - world society which is also called as Kantian or revolutionist framework “takes individuals, non-state organizations and the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts transcendence of the state system at the centre of IR theory”.³⁸ Bull conceptualizes the world society as the total of global social interactions.³⁹ The world society is mostly told as universalist cosmopolitanism. It clearly does not rest on ontology of states but, also does not entirely on individuals. The world society emerges for common ends or values of the universal society of all mankind, whose constituent members are individual human beings. It is mostly capturing the non-state aspects of the system.⁴⁰ While Bull argues that the world society is not a reality but an ideal – a utopia⁴¹, it seems capable of examining the pre-modern period of IR to some extent, in which state sovereignty still not prevailed.⁴²

³⁷ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 13.

³⁸ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 13.

³⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 269.

⁴⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 81; Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 13; Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 21.

⁴¹ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 36.

⁴² For a detailed discussion, see Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu, “A Re-Assessment of the World Society Conceptualization” (PhD diss., Middle East Technical University, 2016).

E.S. seeks to analyse IR by using this trilogy as a set of lenses for analyses. In Wight's words:

...the three traditions are not like three railroad tracks running into infinity. They are not philosophically constant and pure like three stately, tranquil and independent streams flowing...They are streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their own river bed. They are, to vary the metaphor, interwoven in the tapestry of Western civilization. They both influence and cross-fertilize one another, and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity.⁴³

This triadic pluralist approach opens an innovative path for analysing IR beyond the traditional realist versus liberal rhetoric, which is called a middle-way approach, or via media. This via-media approach functions to overcome the dichotomist understanding of the reality such as peace versus power politics, national interests versus cosmopolitan rights, national sovereignty versus global interdependence.⁴⁴ Tim Dunne summarizes this perspective as avoiding the conflict “either, or choices” of realism versus idealism, and explaining versus understanding by maintaining a new path that combines agency and structure, theory and history, morality and power.⁴⁵

This middle way approach was inspired by the works of Grotius, Locke, Hume, Burke and de Tocqueville.⁴⁶ Hugo Grotius is a dominant figure in this list, who was a Dutch legal scholar of the 17th century that wrote “De Jure Belli ac Pacis” (On the

⁴³ Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, 260.

⁴⁴ Jörg Friedrichs, *European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions*, The New International Relations (London: Routledge, 2004), 90.

⁴⁵ Tim Dunne, “The English School,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 268-271.

⁴⁶ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 6.

Law of War and Peace), emphasizing “the society of states”.⁴⁷ The Grotian tradition stands between realist and revolutionist thought. According to the Grotian view, states are not in struggle as described by realists, and also the utopian approach of the revolutionists does not reflect the reality of IR. By contrast, this approach describes international politics as an international society, in which states are not free of moral or legal restraints.⁴⁸ This view refrains from extremes and offers a middle way in understanding the reality IR, by claiming an order under anarchy.

In addition to this pluralistic view, the methods of the E.S. for seeking the reality is matter of discussion in the literature. If method is a recipe, such as a set of instructions for baking a pie⁴⁹, the recipe of the E.S. in question is an unclear one. According to Cornelia Navari, not only the outsiders but also the insiders of the E.S. have complained about the fact that the E.S. does not have a clear methodology. For instance, as Navari notes, Robert Keohane’s criticism about neglecting causal propositions, and Martha Finnemore’s emphasis on the lack of the methods seem to be the candidates for the outsiders.⁵⁰ Additionally, James Mayall’s words that E.S. is best when ‘it wears its methodology lightly’⁵¹, or the Robert Jackson’s concern with methodology that it is positively harmful to the school’s cognitive goals⁵² are manifestations from E.S. scholars as the insiders for

⁴⁷ For a detailed analysis of Hugo Grotius, see Hugo Grotius, *Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace*, student edition, ed. Stephen C. Neff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds. *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

⁴⁸ Hedley Bull, “Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture,” *International Studies* 2 (1976): 105.

⁴⁹ Cornelia Navari, ed., *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.

⁵⁰ Navari, *Theorising International Society*, 12.

⁵¹ James Mayall, “The Limits of Progress: Normative Reasoning in the English School,” in *Theorising International Society*, ed. Navari, 209.

⁵² Navari, *Theorising International Society*, 1.

the matter involved.

There are two obvious facts about the research techniques which E.S. has used. Firstly, the main methodological stance of the E.S. includes traditional methods, in Bull's terminology 'classical' ones⁵³. The scholars of the E.S. reveal their own path in *Diplomatic Investigations* as "The British have probably been more concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with principles than policy".⁵⁴ This feature has become the distinctive structure of the school under the heavy dominance of behaviourism/scienticism⁵⁵ in American IR. During this discussion, especially in the 1960s, the E.S. scholars distinguished themselves from American social scientific conception of IR. Bull criticized the behavioralists harshly and negated their efforts to import methods from physical-natural sciences such as empirical verification and falsifiable hypothesising. Instead, Bull argues, the synopsis of the E.S. needs to embrace 'philosophy', 'history' and 'law' which is noted also as the intellectual triangle.⁵⁶ He underlines the weaknesses of the behaviroalist trend, what he names "scientific approach", by calling them as the "Victorian nunnery from the study of sex".⁵⁷

The second point about the methodology of the E.S. is the dedication to the historical reading as their prominent research technique. They mainly focus on the

⁵³ See Bull, "International Theory," 361-77.

⁵⁴ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, 12.

⁵⁵ These concepts are used as a pair in Suganami's article, see Hidemi Suganami, "The Structure of Institutionalism: an Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations," *International Relations* 7, no. 5 (1983): 2364.

⁵⁶ Chris Brown, "The Development of International Relations Theory in the United Kingdom: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories," *International Studies* 46, no. 2 (2009): 221-22.

⁵⁷ Bull, "International Theory," 366.

historical and societal dynamics rather than only crediting empirical, observable and ahistorical components. Buzan summarizes that "...much more so than either realism or liberalism, it opens the door to studying international and world history in terms of the social structures of international orders." He notes that several influential historians has an influence on the evolution of the school and the conception of the international society such as Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Arnold Toynbee, and Michael Howard. E.S. perceives the knowledge of history as useful and necessary in order to understand the reality of IR. The view of the E.S. does not accept that history can predict or explain the present in a mechanical way but only gives a "perspective helpful to informed speculation about present and future events, and processes and roles."⁵⁸

Realists, for instance, isolate themselves from history by claiming a timeless wisdom of domination of power and survival motives in an anarchy in which balance of power is a hidden mechanism. On the other hand, E.S. scholars are concerned with the historical contingency and a broader incentives of state policies and systemic structures.⁵⁹ The E.S. scholars tend to grasp the meaning of the concepts through concentrating on their evolution with the processes attached to this period, by rejecting to take them as a given and fixed variables.⁶⁰ For instance, the concept of 'state' itself, from the E.S. point of view, cannot be accepted as an ahistorical, non-living thing such as the billiard balls as noted by Kenneth Waltz.⁶¹

In parallel, today's international society has become an entity comprising not only the present interactions of states, but also of the accumulation of the past

⁵⁸Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 43

⁵⁹Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 29.

⁶⁰ Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, 139.

⁶¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1. For methodological criticism of the ahistoricism, see Navari, *Theorising International Society*, 53-54.

interactions. The concepts evaluated and the inferences made by the E.S. are to be interpreted within their historical context. Nuri Yurdusev's understanding of 'historicism' fits what the E.S. scholar implements for the historical analyses:

By 'historicism' I mean an understanding of man in society who acquires his existence, knowledge and abilities within the historical process in continuity, which is nothing but men's life in socially organized collectivities in the world as we know it." ... "historicism...does not lead to any 'laws', fixed and applicable to the whole historical process...it does recognize patterns, because human knowledge and thinking depend upon generalization and thus patterning and these cognitive processes of men are not independent of his sociality, but rather moulded by it.⁶²

While seeking these patterns, the E.S. scholars tend to focus on not only similar or parallel series of structures and commonalities but also on peculiarities of sequence of events, units, figures, path-breaking existences and contexts during this historical reading. In Bull's own words:

Historical understanding is essential in the first place because there are international political situations which have to be seen not merely as cases or illustrations of one another general proposition but as singular events: there comes a point where, to understand course of events or to appreciate the moral dilemmas to which it gives rise, we have to know about how international systems undergo transformations but, for example, about how our present international system was affected by the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945; not about the characteristic behaviour of small states but about Switzerland; not about the foreign policy role of national leaders but about Charles De Gaulle; not about how just wars may be distinguished from unjust wars but about the moral choices that confronted the Israeli cabinet in 1967.⁶³

These peculiarities within their historical context also give impetus for finding more inclusive and wider patterns for generalizations. From an E.S. point of view, via

⁶² A. Nuri Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 35.

⁶³ Hedley Bull, ed., "The Theory of International Politics 1919 - 1969," in *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. Andrew Linklater, Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: Routledge, 2000), 56.

‘classical’ method along with ‘historical interpretation’, the conception of ‘international society’ exemplifies a generalization. It seems to be a club with some rules of membership, which is a candidate for analysing IR.

In line with the aforesaid methodology, this iconic conception clearly has been analysed with an emphasis on its evolution with the embedded processes. At his point, the name of the book of Adam Watson (1992) presents a symbolic meaning for the matter involved, with the title of *The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historical Analysis*.⁶⁴ Similar to Watson, the E.S. scholars tend to search all the concepts through a historical reading which rejects scienticism and ahistoricism. This effort seems to have started with the conception of ‘international society’, which reserves the centric concentration of this study to be discussed in the following section along with its institutions.

2.3. Conception of ‘International Society’ and Hedley Bull

E.S. concentrates generally on developing an understanding of IR around the concept of international society.⁶⁵ Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, who initiated the first meetings of the ‘British Committee on the Theory of International Politics’ explains their major focus on “not the limits and uses of international theory, nor the formulation of foreign policy, but the diplomatic community itself, international society, the state's-system.”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historical Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

⁶⁵ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 7.

⁶⁶ Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 12.

Prominent scholars of the E.S. have used the conception of international society to indicate a certain club for possible cooperation under anarchic characteristic of the international political system. In contrary to Wight and Butterfield who used the concepts of international system and international society interchangeably, Bull conceptualized and operationalised the terms via underlining a distinction between 'system' and 'society'.⁶⁷ Bull maintains that states tend to conduct their relations in two different modes. When at least two states have a sufficient contact, which means a regular interaction requiring the consideration of other's decisions while acting, this framework portrays an international system. However, when group of states, conscious of certain interests and common values conceive themselves bound to act within a set of norms and rules via common institutions, it is international society. From Bull's point of view, an international system can exist without a society but vice versa is not valid. This basic distinction has become the one of the major contributions of Hedley Bull to the literature, and consolidated the definition of international society along with several criticisms.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ For a detailed analysis, see Tim Dunne and Richard Little, "The International System – International Society Distinction," in *Guide to the English School*, ed. Navari and Green, 91-108; Richard Little, "The Balance of Power and Great Power Management," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 104-105; Adam Watson, "Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies," *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 147-53.

⁶⁸ The criticisms are generally concentrated on the blurred demarcation of the distinction and the transition from system to society. For detailed discussions, see Navari, *Theorising International Society*, 45; Jones, "The English School of International Relations," 4; Alan James, "System or Society," *Review of International Studies* 19, no. 1 (January 1993): 269-288. As noted before, Wight, for example, does not distinguish the conceptions of international society and international system and nor does he make any reference to world society. Instead, he tends to amalgamate the terms in the concept of a states-system. The Greek city states, for example, are identified as a states-system. In using this term, there is no doubt that Wight saw each city state as forming an international system, in the sense that each city-state took the behaviour of other city-states into account when making their own calculations. Wight claimed the Greek city states as an international society bound together by common rules, interests and institutions as well. See also Richard Little, "International System International Society and World Society: A Re-evaluation of the English School" in *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, ed. in B. A. Roberson, (London: Pinter Pub., 1998), 60.

While conceptualizing the ‘international society’, Bull chose a middle-way approach and noted: “the conception of international society I have in mind may be called the Grotian conception.”⁶⁹ Bull notes:

society of states (or ‘international society’) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.⁷⁰

Bull seems to have borrowed from the practice of the system of the Commonwealth for his analysis. In his article called “What’s the Commonwealth?” in 1959, he clearly expressed that IR is more complex than ‘everyone against everyone’ – power competition.⁷¹ Hedley Bull attaches great importance to the structure and functioning of the Commonwealth, which seems to shed a light on his intellectual path towards the conception of the international society. As a systematic, functional structure, the Commonwealth is a model for Bull to conceptualize the backbone of the E.S. - international society. Commonwealth indicates a group of sovereign states of which dependencies associated by their own choice and linked with common objectives and interest.⁷² Bull seems to have focused on two major characteristics of the ‘Commonwealth’ as an asset for his analyses. Firstly, he concentrates on the common objectives and interests for which a group of states is likely to cooperate. Secondly, he implies that ‘common culture’, is not a prerequisite for further cooperation. He gives India and Pakistan as clear examples, which have contrasting interests in terms of economy, military, and culture but also

⁶⁹ Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society”, in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 51.

⁷⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

⁷¹ Hedley Bull, “What’s the Commonwealth?,” *World Politics* 11, no.4 (1959): 578.

⁷² *Britannica*, s.v. “Commonwealth,” available at: <https://global.britannica.com/topic/commonwealth-political-science> (28.08.2016)

committed to cooperate under the umbrella of Commonwealth even including the sharing of intelligence with one another.⁷³

Within the framework of his analysis, Bull refers to five examples of international society in the past. These are the Greek city-state system; the international system formed by the Hellenistic kingdoms in the period between the disintegration of Alexander's empire and the Roman conquest; the international system of China during the Period of Warring States; the state's system of ancient India; and the modern states system, which arose in Europe and is now world-wide.⁷⁴ The E.S. emphasizes that the “European international society” with key practices and norms of behaviour expanded to the globe as a foundational type of IR via historical practices such as imperialism and colonization.⁷⁵

Stanley Hoffman argues that Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* draws our attention to ‘the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states’.⁷⁶ This basic focus on ‘states’ seems to be significant for Bull’s tendency to work initially on the inter-state domain of IR. For Bull, obviously “the starting point of international relations is the existence of *states*... each of which possesses and asserts sovereignty in relation to a portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population”⁷⁷ Bull’s main framework refers to the following:

...the master concept and distinguishing marker of the E.S. is ‘international society’, conceived of as a now-global society in which states are the primary

⁷³ Bull, “What’s the Commonwealth?,” 578-79.

⁷⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 15.

⁷⁵ For detailed analysis of the expansion, see Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

⁷⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, XXV.

⁷⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 8.

actors, collectively producing the rules and accepted practices by which they manage their interrelations.⁷⁸

Hedley Bull evaluates the notion of ‘anarchy’ as the central fact of IR and an asset for theorizing. Bull defines ‘anarchy’ with a comparison: “Whereas men within each state are subject to a common government, sovereign states in their mutual relations are not”.⁷⁹ In other words, Bull rejects the argument of what he calls ‘domestic analogy’ and notes that the “conditions of order among states are different from what they are among men”. Bull disagrees with the fact that in international relations, states, such as the citizens of a state, only under a supreme world government might eliminate the ‘everyone against everyone’ condition. This argument presents a state of nature in which states exist without binding obligations for relations with one another.⁸⁰ He also adds that the realist paradigms do not fit with realities in world politics, which the mutual relations of states are not inherently antagonistic. He believes that co-operation among states is possible within this framework of anarchy.⁸¹

For Bull, this possibility is owing from the concept of order, on which Bull’s writings about the international society concentrate. For Bull, without any goal or objective, ‘order’ ceases to exist. The concept itself does not have a systematic template to apply for different cases. Despite the fact that, as Bull notes, “A row of books on the shelf displays order whereas a heap of books on the floor does not”, order itself requires an objective to be defined. The same books on the shelf with a

⁷⁸ Daniel M. Green, “Introduction to the English School in International Studies”, in *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, ed. Navari and Green, 1.

⁷⁹ Hedley Bull, “Society and anarchy in International Relations,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 35.

⁸⁰ Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 53.

⁸¹ Bull, “Society and Anarchy,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 36-38.

thematic order are far from an order for a researcher seeking for an alphabetical order. The key issue as a prerequisite for an 'order' is to designate a goal from the beginning. Without a logical goal or objective linked with 'order', the concept seems meaningless.⁸²

Hedley Bull notes that within the international society, order is the consequence not merely of contingent facts, but of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life; rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals; and institutions that help to make these rules effective.⁸³ As long as the states - as the basic units of the international society- have similar and same primary goals, they tend to cooperate voluntarily and to sacrifice for the sustainability of the system itself. It follows from his writings that without a common goal or interest, or a consensus about primary goals, states could not provide an 'order'. The international society maintained by Bull rests upon the existence of common interests. Within this scope, Bull clarifies the elementary goals of the international society as the following: First, it is dedicated to preserve the system, international society itself. Second, it seeks to maintain the external sovereignty and the independence of individual states. Third, the international society aims to have peace. Lastly, it targets the elementary goals of the social life: i. the limitation of violence against death or bodily harm, ii. the keeping of promises, iii. Stabilisation of possession by rules of property.⁸⁴

Bull's intellectual framework can be summarized as the following: Bull maintains that the "order" is the overriding status to be analysed in international politics which sheds a light on the functional mechanism of the international politics as a whole. According to Bull, states form a society and interact volitionally on the basis of

⁸² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 3.

⁸³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 63.

⁸⁴ Bull, "Order vs. Justice," 270-71.

common goals and interests through common rules committed to some set of institutions, at the end of which the overriding status of the system – order is provided. These common goals and interests are minimalistic in Bull’s writings and presents the minimal behavioural rules for co-existence. Limitation to violence, securing of property rights and *pacta sunt servanda* seem to provide this infrastructure, which also preserve the pluralist framework of Bull’s thesis.⁸⁵ Within this framework, the reality of IR lays on the conception of international society and its institutions on which the discussion has been triggered by the E.S. scholars.

2.4. Institutions of the International Society

For ontology, or in other words ‘what to study’, English School views IR as a distinct and autonomous subject to study with attaching a supreme position for states. From the view point of the E.S., “...despite the anarchic world order, sovereign states do not have to subordinate to the will of a higher power. They have a freedom of act and can volitionally form a society in which they enjoy high level of order and rather than violence.”⁸⁶ This order is expected to be maintained on the basis of the structure of relations between what they habitually call ‘sovereign nation-states’.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ For a detailed comment, see Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society,” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 78-81.

⁸⁶ See Hidemi Suganami, “English School in a Nutshell”, *Lecture Notes* (Ritsumeikan University: 2010): 15-28, available at: <http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.9/02Hidemi%20Suganami.pdf> (28.08.2016)

⁸⁷ Jones, “The English School of International Relations,” 1.

State, in the writings of Hedley Bull, means an independent political community with a government on a designated population.⁸⁸ The states are the principal actors in the international society to monitor and to guarantee the efficiency of common rules under anarchy, without a supreme authority. Due to the fact that every rule depends on the human factor in societies, they are open to changes and interpretations. In order to protect rules and to adapt them to the changing circumstances, some mechanisms are required to regulate the system as a whole. States tend to carry out this mission via mechanisms called ‘institutions’. These institutions consist of set of habits and established practices which are voluntarily accepted by states to regulate the system.⁸⁹

In the literature of IR, there is a tendency to think of organizations such as United Nations, NATO, or OECD as institutions. Wight refers to these designed international organizations and regimes as pseudo institutions⁹⁰, and Buzan calls them secondary institutions.⁹¹ What E.S. refers is clearly different from the institutions of regime theories: “....liberal theories of IR...seek to describe cooperation between states under...anarchy. A particular branch is the regime theory, which looks at the more specific nature of cooperation in international organizations or regimes...this involves conceptualizing states as rational agents attempting to maximize gains.”⁹² This category does not match what E.S. refers to as primary institutions. For the E.S., ‘institutions’ are what historians and sociologists mean: “Recognized and established usages governing the relations

⁸⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 8.

⁸⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 68-73.

⁹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, xxxvii.

⁹¹ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 17.

⁹² Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull,” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 75-78.

between individuals or groups' like 'property', or 'marriage'.⁹³ For Suganami, institutions are "social rules, conventions, and practices that provide its members with a framework for identifying what is the done thing and what is not in the day-to-day management of their interactions."⁹⁴ These are the institutions, which are assumed to be evolved rather than designed as functioning mechanisms of the reality of IR throughout the history.

Robert Keohane, in his article entitled as 'International Institutions: Two Approaches' (1988) briefly exemplifies various perceptions as to what is understood from institutions in IR. These are the international organizations such as the United Nations or World Bank, or the regimes like 'the international monetary regime' and 'the international trade regime', or Stephen Krasner's 'particular institutional structures of sovereignty'⁹⁵, or the evolved institutions as defined by Bull. Keohane generalizes institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations".⁹⁶ In sum, institutions seem to present the evolved patterns in the international society, which are supposed to manage the dynamics of the nature of the society, indeed the interactions of the states.

This distinctive institutional debate of the E.S. derives from Bull's point of view which defends that international society functions in an 'order' in history. The functioning mechanism of this order depends on the tools which have been evolved through history rather than designed. For Bull, common goals and interests, as the

⁹³ Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, 140-41.

⁹⁴ Hidemi Suganami, "British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years On," *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003): 253.

⁹⁵ For details, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, No.1 (1988): 66-94.

⁹⁶ Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, No. 4 (1988): 383.

reflection of their identity or/and the result of the primary goals shared, galvanize states to regulate their relations via common rules committed to some set of institutions, at the end of which the overriding status of the system – order is provided. Bull sets these institutions as balance of power, international law, war, great powers and diplomacy.⁹⁷ State interactions play on the ground of these institutions for providing the minimal rules of co-existence. Bull's institutions of international society are obviously interrelated, interconnected and supplementary in terms of reflecting the singularity of the historical events and facts. These institutions does not act also independently but most of the time collaboratively during the stream of historical events. To be more precise, as Stanley Hoffman notes:

...indeed when he examines the interaction among states, Bull is interested in things other than the relations of power: common concerns, rules and institutions. This allows him to examine wars not only as the frequent outcomes of power clashes, but also as possible instruments of order, aimed at curbing the ambitions and excesses of trouble-makers since limited wars are tools for the balancing power. It also allows him to examine patterns of order that are neither the balance of power nor war: diplomacy and international law.⁹⁸

According to Suganami, Bull appears to have borrowed from H.L.A. Hart's theory of law. According to Hart, a legal system consists of primary rules about how people ought to behave. Secondary rules exist for how to identify, administer, and change them. This is Hart's definition of how a legal system functions in a complex society.⁹⁹ In similar to these arguments, Suganami argues that Bull clarifies institutions as the secondary rules that communicate, administer, interpret, enforce, legitimize, adapt, and protect the rules. In other words, "...interactions between states are carried out on the expectation that problems arising between states can be

⁹⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 71.

⁹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, viii.

⁹⁹ For Hart's arguments, see H.L.A. Hart, *The concept of Law*, (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1961)

managed or controlled with reference to a set of ‘rules’ and through the functioning of the five ‘institutions’”.¹⁰⁰

Buzan argues that “the institutional structure of interstate relations is a defining feature of the E.S.”, which has consolidated as a matter of discussion by Bull’s five iconic institutions: balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war, and great power management.¹⁰¹ Buzan also claims that the primary institutions are the “core idea” of the E.S.¹⁰², which differentiated the school from mainstream, rationalist, neo-liberal institutionalist and regime theories.¹⁰³

The institutions discussed in the literature have some common characteristics. They are durable and recognized practices structured around the shared values. They are neither permanent nor fixed and play a constitutive role in players or the rules of the game in IR. Buzan notes that one cannot appoint a list of primary institutions which are valid for all times and places.¹⁰⁴ He sketches out the list of the institutions discussed in the E.S. such as the following:¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Suganami, “The Structure of Institutionalism,” 274-76.

¹⁰¹ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 161,166.

¹⁰² Barry Buzan, “Not Hanging Separately: Responses to Dunne and Adler,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no.1 (2005): 190.

¹⁰³ Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull,” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 167,172.

¹⁰⁵ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 173.

Table 1. *Candidates for primary institutions of international society by author^c*

Wight	Bull	Mayall ^a	Holsti ^b	James	Jackson
Religious sites and festivals					
Dynastic principles					
Trade			Trade (P)		
Diplomacy	Diplomacy	Diplomacy (I)	Diplomacy(P)	Diplomacy	Diplomacy
Alliances					
Guarantees					
War	War		War (P)		War
Neutrality					
Arbitration					
Balance of Power	Balance of Power, Great power management	Balance of Power (I)			
International Law	International Law	<u>International Law</u> (I)	International Law (F)	International Law	International Law
Sovereignty	<u>The State</u>	Sovereignty (P) Territorial Integrity (P) Nonintervention (P) Self-Determination (P) Non-Discrimination (P) Human Rights (P)	The State (F) <u>Sovereignty</u> (F) Territoriality (F)	<u>Sovereignty</u> Political boundaries	<u>Sovereignty</u>
			Colonialism (P)		Colonialism

Notes: ^a for Mayall (I) = institution and (P) = principle

^b for Holsti (F) = foundational institution and (P) = procedural institution

^c words underlined are where the author identifies an institution as 'principal', or 'master' or 'bedrock'.

The remarkable point is that Wight, Mayall, Holsti, James, and Jackson each have identified number of primary institutions during their researches on international society, similar to Bull.¹⁰⁶ For instance, Martin Wight notes several institutions for the pre-modern period: festivals, messengers, congresses, diplomatic language, trade, diplomacy, alliances, arbitration, and war.¹⁰⁷ However, Bull's five institutions have failed to reach consensus. There seems to be a commonality on international law, diplomacy and war. On the other hand, institutions such as colonialism, nationalism and the market seems to be challenging candidates for primary institutions. Balance of power on the other hand is both strongly supported and contested, while great power management lacks a consensus.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Laust Schouenborg, "The English School and Institutions", in *Guide to the English*, ed. Navari and Green, 81.

¹⁰⁷ Peter Wilson, "The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions," *International Studies Review* no. 14 (2012): 568-69.

¹⁰⁸ Buzan, "Rethinking Hedley Bull," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 85.

According to Bull, the functions of the institutions are ideal fictions that can sometimes regret to match the realities due to two main reasons in Bull's writings: the questioned rationality of states, and the uncontrollable character of social events that produce unexpected outcomes. For Bull, the hypothesis for the rationality of states does not reflect the historical realities. "Hedley Bull was no believer in the ordinary rationality of states, nor in the usefulness of developing prescriptions for rational action...stupidity, folly, miscalculations and mischief were always possible" in decision making.¹⁰⁹ Secondly, Bull emphasizes the unpredictability of the events and cases and the high potential for change in social sciences. The human factor with 'less stability and high change' seems apparent in Bull's writings, which criticize the automated and robotic processes with certain income and outcome equations. Indeed, in the E.S., which tends to focus on the continuity and consolidated patterns rather than the changing ones, is likely to limit these extraordinary cases at margins. It is a possibility to have unexpected consequences, but the flux of the history of IR seems to regard them as exceptions.

There is also a set of criticisms about Bull's institutions. Some of these criticisms directly target Bull's five institutions, while some of them questions the institutional structure as a whole. All of these critiques can be briefly summarized as the complexity in the conceptualization of the term "institution", the minimalist and pluralist nature of Bull's institutions, inadequate number of institutions in Bull's analysis, the lack of segmentation in institutions, and the lack of information about the evolution and the change of the institutions.

First, the definition of the institutions is not clear and does not have clear-cut borders for inclusion and exclusion. The set of institutions are considered as the component of rules of coexistence, indicating the minimum behavioural conditions for a society. However, there is no clear-cut definition of an 'institution' where it

¹⁰⁹ Stanley Hoffman, "Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations", *International Affairs* 62, No.2 (Spring 1986): 180.

begins and ends.¹¹⁰ Thus, the discussion is open for many new institutions. Keohane summarizes the common points for the definitions in question, which “involve persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”¹¹¹ Bull’s definition of “evolved set of habits and practices for managing the rules” seems to be an understudied version of this institutional structure, which requires to be detailed. For instance, Duffield attempts to clarify the institutions in the reality of IR under four distinct conceptualizations: Institutions as formal organizations, institutions as practices, institutions as rules, and institutions norms, along with examples ranging from United Nations to marriage.¹¹² According to Duffield, institutions of Bull requires to be detailed, categorized and further clarified. For the clarification involved, Peter Wilson attempts to link the institutions of IR with the Chicago School of sociology for a synthesis of a new theoretical framework called ‘Grounded Theory of international Institutions’. This is an attempt to blend the institutions of E.S. with sociological inquiring methods. In other words, Wilson tries to link the grounded theory which is a qualitative research method first developed in sociology with the institutions of the E.S.¹¹³

Secondly, Bull’s institutions are criticized to reflect a pluralist and minimalist framework which does not match with the realities of IR. For instance, Buzan assesses that the minimalist rules for co-existence for states, and the related pluralist framework of respecting the sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, do not always match the praxis on the field and narrow down the possible contributions

¹¹⁰ Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull,” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 78-81.

¹¹¹ Keohane, “International Institutions,” 383.

¹¹² John Duffield, “What are International Integration,” *Internatioanl Studies Review* 9, (2007):1-22.

¹¹³ Wilson, “The English School Meets the Chicago School,” 580.

of the arguments of the institutional structure.¹¹⁴ In the same vein, Michael Onuf defends that Bull's minimalist formulation is ambiguous. He notes "[c]learly the institutions in question consist of rules. Yet, by his reckoning, institutions exist only to make rules work. Bull adopted this view because he thought that rules have only one function that matters: they make order in society".¹¹⁵ Bull's institutions, in this sense, are criticized about being static and narrow.¹¹⁶

Thirdly, Bull's five institutions are criticized to be inadequate to meet the reality of IR. Buzan claims that Bull failed to consider potential institutions such as sovereignty, the market, nationalism, and human rights. For instance, James Mayall prevails "nationalism" as a main institution in the history of IR. Mayall's approach is said to disrupt the functioning of Bull's five institutions and "expose an essential historical dynamic in the interplay of institutions."¹¹⁷ Keene, on the other hand, accepts "colonialism" as a major institution in IR.¹¹⁸

The fourth criticism is about the segmentation of the institutions. Bull does not make any segmentation or departmentalization of institutions. However, by their nature, many scholars tend to divide institutions into groups. Mayall differentiates institutions from principles, and evaluates diplomacy, international law as institutions, and adds great power concert, balance of power, sovereignty and war

¹¹⁴Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Hedley Bull," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 94-96.

¹¹⁵ Nicholas Onuf, "Institutions, Intentions, and International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 28, (2002): 222.

¹¹⁶ Buzan, "Rethinking Hedley Bull", in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 91.

¹¹⁷ Buzan, "Rethinking Hedley Bull in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 89-91. See also James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 145-52.

¹¹⁸ Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, Lse Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 60-144.

to this list with a question mark. He argues for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-determination, non-discrimination, human rights, balance of power as principles.¹¹⁹ Duffield, for instance, inspired by sociological studies, argues for functional and ontological classifications for institutions horizontally, also for further departmentalization vertically, such as in the forms of subjective norms, combinations of norms and rules, and formal rules:¹²⁰

TABLE I. Typology of International Institutions

Functions	Ontological Forms		
	Intersubjective Norms (Includes Customary International Law, Spontaneous Regimes)	Combinations of Norms and Rules (Includes But Not Limited to Codified Customary International Law and Some Negotiated Regimes)	Formal Rules (Includes Imposed Regimes and Some Negotiated Regimes)
Constitutive	Sovereignty statehood, racial equality	Status of diplomats and diplomatic missions (e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations)	IGO constitutions (for example, IMF Articles of Agreement, ICAO Convention)
Regulative (includes regime norms and rules)	Traditional laws of war (for example, Just War doctrine)	Codified laws of war (for example, Geneva Conventions), General Assembly declarations	Interstate regulatory agreements (for example, 200 mile limit, GATT trade rules, postal conventions, Open Skies Treaty)
Procedural (includes regime procedures)	Norms of consensus, unanimity, and sovereign equality (one state, one vote)	Procedures for treaty negotiation, ratification, and interpretation (e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)	Formal IGO procedures (for example, Security Council voting rules, WTO dispute resolution procedure)

¹¹⁹ Schouenborg, “The English School and Institutions”, in *Guide to the English School*, ed. Navari and Green, 82.

¹²⁰ Duffield, “What are International Integration,” 15.

Similarly, Holsti groups the institutions in two camps: foundational ones and the ‘process’ ones. He adds ‘state’, territoriality, sovereignty and international law as foundational institutions while noting diplomacy and trade as process institutions.¹²¹ Within the same context Ruggie classifies the institutions as constitutive and regulative ones.¹²² Schouenborg also categorizes the institutions as constitutive functional ones and regulative functional ones. His scheme is as the following¹²³:

TABLE 7. Schouenborg’s Constitutive Functional Category and Institutions

Legitimacy and Membership	Sovereignty Dynasticism Popular will Nationalism Communism Liberal democracy Standard of civilization Capacity to govern Peace-loving nation Human rights
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TABLE 8. Schouenborg’s Regulative Functional Categories and Institutions

Regulating Conflicts	War Great power management Alliances
Trade	Relay trade Tribute systems Free trade
Authoritative Communication	Messengers Diplomats Embassies
International Organization	Religious sites and festivals Conferences and congresses Multilateralism

¹²¹ K. J. Holsti, “Theorising the Causes of Order: Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society*,” in *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, ed. Cornelia Navari, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 138.

¹²² John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays On International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998), 22.

¹²³ Laust Schouenborg, “A New Institutionalism? The English School as International Sociological Theory,” *International Relations* 25, No.1 (2011):34-39.

Lastly, Bull's institutions are criticized for the lack of information about their evolution and their possible change. Holsti underlines the situation by asking "When, how, and why did these institutions arise? Have all the institutions survived? Which ones have become obsolete and why? Are these nascent institutions emerging in the contemporary society of states?"¹²⁴ In a similar vein, Buzan argues that despite Bull's emphasis on the possibility of change for institutions, it seems to exist a transformation in these fixed five institutions. Buzan notes that Bull "does not seem to consider the possibility of movement and change in institutions".¹²⁵

Within the context of these criticisms, before delving into Bull's iconic five institutions which consolidated the institutional debate in the literature of the E.S., some points are to be underlined. First of all, Bull does not argue for the institutions that they have the capacity of explaining and understanding IR as a whole. He has a minimalistic approach focussed on the order of the international society, which is only an overriding status within this society. His arguments are beyond claiming to answer all questions within the reality of IR.

On the other hand, what Bull aims to answer through institutional structure does not necessarily work every time and for every single action. He bases his arguments on a volitional participation of states, which exempts states from taking action automatically. This option also paves the way for states to act not only in rational grounds but also irrationally. It is clear that there exists the possibility for states to act against the working of any institution, when their interests are challenged in particular. In addition to this fact, in line with the core argument of the study, the questioned rationality of states or the uncontrollable consequences of the social events are likely to motivate states to generate alternative policies within the lane

¹²⁴ Holsti, "Theorising the Causes of Order," in *Theorising International Society*, ed. Navari, 138.

¹²⁵ Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Hedley Bull" in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 81-82.

of the same institution if possible, or with a substitution policy in another institution. For instance, a failed balance of power mechanism is likely to re-establish a new balance of power mechanism, or to give birth to the functioning of the tools of the other institutions - war, great power management, international law, diplomacy.

Following Wight, Bull initiated boldly the institutional structure for the analysis of IR within the framework of the E.S. This initiation was made with a general conceptualization which needs further elaboration. With regardless of the aforesaid discussions, the prevalent characteristics of the institutions are their status of being 'evolved' rather than 'designed', and their connection with rules. The debate around to the conceptualization of the term - institution is a potent for reviving new institutions as well. However, the starting point seems to remain Bull's five iconic institutions in these debates to which this study adopts itself.

The following criticisms about Bull's minimalist and pluralist version seems to be a foundational criticism for Bull's theoretical ideas indeed. The fact that Bull attaches great significance to states' sovereignties and the principle of non-intervention provides the ground for these critiques. Additionally, his focus on one particular status of international society – order, and his credit for the voluntarism of states pave the way for debates within this context. Without denying the solidarist version of the praxis and the possibility of disorder within the flux of history of IR, Bull seems to welcome these criticisms as well. Bull, needless to say, does not claim to explain every single mode and status of the reality of IR.

Bull's framework encapsulates the sovereign nation-states as the main actors in the international society with a freedom of will for founding the society involved. This simplistic argument takes sovereignty, territoriality and state as the prerequisite rather than a form of institution to talk about an existence of the international society of states. For neglecting other institutions, such as nationalism, colonialism and economy, Bull has partial answers. For economy, as noted in the following parts, Bull incorporates economy into the institution of balance of power. He evaluates the economic tools as the tools of the balance of power mechanism. However, the

other institutions which are not put fore by Bull such as colonialism and nationalism, gives the dynamism for further discussions within this institutional debate which was initiated by Bull.

The segmentation and departmentalization of the institutions is another part of the critique which gives a depth to the debates. In cooperation with other disciplines like sociology, philosophy and political science, Bull's simplistic approach has come to become more complex. This complexity is a candidate to question the evolution of these institutions and the change embedded to them. For further inquiries about Bull's institutions, there is a need for accumulation of historical knowledge of IR to analyse these institutions. This dissertation is a candidate for the matter involved by exemplifying the functioning of the related institutions from the 1700s to 1945 in a particular bilateral state relation.

The institutional debate in the E.S. seems likely to continue to theorize the primary institutions for explaining/understanding the reality of IR. The effort for theorizing the primary institutions tends to start from Bull's minimalist and cohesive understanding limited to three foundational pillars: "security against violence, observance of agreements, and rules about property rights".¹²⁶ With regard to the institutional debate, Buzan concludes that empirical approach seems likely to be a guide for the research, for which E.S. needs to clarify the definition and identification of the primary institutions. In his own words: "Given the centrality of this concept to English School theory, both structural and normative, and the ever unfolding landscape of primary institutions in practice, this is certain to remain a core subject of discussion."¹²⁷ In sum, the road map for this institutional debate seems to continue with Bull's initial institutions, which was the consolidated point for examining the reality of IR. Despite all criticisms, Bull's minimalist and pluralist institutions are likely to shed a light for further analysis. Before delving

¹²⁶ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 174.

¹²⁷ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 178.

into historical interpretation of the Turco-German relations, the next part of the study will overview the starting point of this institutional debate - Bull's institutions through focussing on their definitions, their roles, types in the international society, and their connections with state interactions.

2.4.1. Balance of Power

There is a vast literature on the concept of *balance of power* in the discipline of IR.¹²⁸ For instance, Kenneth Waltz notes that the balance of power politics dates back to the ages from ancient China to India, from Greek to Italian city states.¹²⁹ Similarly, Yongjin Zhang argues that one of the leading contributions of the Chinese School of IR to the discipline is about the concept of balance of power, whose origins date back to the early ages of the Chinese history.¹³⁰

In the English School literature, there is a remarkable emphasis on the balance of power politics as well. The magnum opus of the British Committee on the Theory

¹²⁸ For cardinal resources, see: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, The Norton Series in World Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); Edward Hallett Carr, *Harper Torchbooks*, 2d ed., vol. 1122, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). See also: Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Curti Wohlforth, eds., *The Balance of Power in World History* (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Paul T. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).

¹²⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 341.

¹³⁰ Yongjin Zhang, Conference presentation, TD27: European and Chinese Perspectives on IR, 8th Pan – European Conference on International Relations, 18-21 September 2013.

of International Politics – *Diplomatic Investigations* has two distinct chapters for the matter involved, written by Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. Wight, for instance, argues that the term ‘balance of power’ has been historically used for distinct meanings. Within this bulk of meanings¹³¹, he highlights the one which he thinks, fits the original understanding of ‘to balance’ in international politics: “...an even distribution of power, a state of affairs in which no power is so preponderant that it can endanger the others.”¹³² This definition seems to be interpreted similarly by Hedley Bull while building his own assumptions.

Hedley Bull, in his cardinal book *Anarchical Society* (1966), reserves a chapter for the institution of the balance of power. In this chapter, Bull reveals that his aim is to define the balance of power, to highlight its contribution to the international order, and to examine its relevance to the maintenance of the present international order.¹³³ After accepting a particular definition of the concept, Bull declares certain types and functions of the concept through the discussion of its presence in the international order. Thereof, he exemplifies some historical periods, such as the Cold War with an emphasis on nuclear arms, to outline how this institution is relevant to the existing system. Within this structure, Bull seems to display much from the founders of the E.S. for the aims indicated. His definition of the concept is similar to what Wight and Butterfield noted. Bull owns Vattel’s definition of

¹³¹ Martin Wight argues that balance of power means: 1. An even distribution of power, 2. The principle that power ought to be evenly distributed, 3. The existing distribution of power. Hence, any possible distribution of power, 4. The principle of equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak, 5. The principle that our side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed, 6. (When governed by the verb ‘to hold’) A special role in maintaining an even distribution of power, 7. A special advantage in the existing distribution of power, 8. Predominance, 9. An inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power. See Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 151.

¹³² Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 151.

¹³³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 97.

‘balance of power’, which is "a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others".¹³⁴

Bull does not believe in the automatic existence of a balance of power and emphasized the volitional participation of states for the matter involved. This institution functions in Bull’s lenses only if states feel themselves bound to act within a set of rules and regulations. He explains this argument as follows:

Doctrines which contend that there is, in any international system, an automatic tendency for a balance of power to arise do derive from a ‘power-political’ theory of this kind. The idea that if one state challenges the balance of power, other states are bound to seek to prevent it, assumes that all states seek to maximise their relative power position. This is not the case....But the doctrine I have been expounding does not assert any inevitable tendency for balance of power to arise in the international system, only a need to maintain one if international order is to be preserved. States may and often do behave in such a way as to disregard the requirements of a balance of power.¹³⁵

For Little, Bull’s common goal of the balance of power is to render an anarchic distribution of power in the international society for all states to secure their autonomies, and to prevent any rising power to endanger it.¹³⁶ In this vein, Little’s historical interpretation of the notion of sovereignty and nationalism seems vital to the evolution of Bull’s perception of institutions. He claims that before the emergence of these terms, territory and the people occupying a territory were seen as the property of the ruler that could be exchanged upon the will of the emperor. He states that even during the Congress of Vienna (1815), the issue of sovereignty was not consolidated clearly as a principle. During the Congress, the word ‘territory’ was decided to be a matter of negotiation that could be divided or joined to establish a just equilibrium. Thereafter, in the following decades of the 19th

¹³⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 312.

¹³⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 107.

¹³⁶ Richard Little, “The Balance of Power and Great Power Management,” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 101.

century and onwards, the balance of power along with the attached significance to sovereignty has presented a stronger consolidation.¹³⁷ Therefore, Bull's belief in the functioning of the balance of power institution coincides with the same centuries which are underlined above. Bull suggests that the idea of the preservation of this institution as a common goal by the whole of the international system proceeded in the 17th and early 18th centuries, during the balancing efforts towards the aggressive Louis XIV that turned out to be the essence of the preamble of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.¹³⁸

Starting from these periods, the balance of power has been a shaping and well-functioning mechanism of the international society. What would be then the functions of this institution in an international society such as to have a central status in practice? Bull summarizes the functions of the balance of power as preventing the system from transforming into a universal empire by conquests. Similarly, it aims also to guarantee the independence of states, by local balances of powers in particular areas to prevent any domination or absorption by a preponderant power. Within this framework, the primary function of the balance of power is not to preserve peace, but to protect the states-system. It is noted that the preservation of the balance of power sometimes "requires war, when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially dominant state can be checked".¹³⁹

For Bull, 'balance of power' is the most fundamental institution, therefore, the master one.¹⁴⁰ Bull argues that by preserving the sovereignty of the states, by

¹³⁷ Richard Little, "The Balance of Power and Great Power Management," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 116.

¹³⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 102.

¹³⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 103. Similarly, Wight notes: "Is then the balance of power the guarantee of the independence of nations? Or it is the occasion of war? The only answer is that it is both." Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 174.

¹⁴⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 102.

preventing any rising aggressive power to dominate the system, the balance of power is supposed to serve for the functioning of other institutions and the international society. Bull notes:

International law, the diplomatic system, war and the management of the international system by the great powers assume a situation in which no single power is preponderant in strength. All are institutions which depend heavily on the possibility that if one state violates the rules, others can take reciprocal actions. But a state that is in a position of preponderant power may disregard international law, the rules and the diplomatic intercourse...¹⁴¹

He refers to Lord Acton whose famous dictum is “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”¹⁴² while defending his arguments about the balance of power. Bull claims that the power which can endanger the international order cannot be contained by treaties but only by a countervailing power.¹⁴³

By seeking a countervailing power, Bull identifies four different types of balances of power: the simple versus complex balance of power; the local versus general balance of power; the subjective versus objective balance of power and the contrived versus fortuitous balance of power. He differentiates the simple balance of power from the complex balance of power, where there exists only two competing powers in the simple one and more than two in the complex one. For the simple balance of power, he exemplifies the clash of France and Habsburg, Spain/Austria of the 16th and 17th century, and also the Cold War politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that his book “Anarchical

¹⁴¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 102.

¹⁴² Lord Acton, “Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887” published in *Historical Essays and Studies*, edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1907), available at <http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/165acton.html> (28.08.2016)

¹⁴³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 107.

Society” was written in 1977 during the Cold War, he mentions the period as an example of a complex balance of power. He seems to have considered the relative mitigation of the tensions by the détente period and illustrates the world politics at that time in a different juncture, during which China came to obtain the capacity to join the great powers - the United States and the Soviet Union. For Bull, Japan and Western Europe might follow the list as the potential fourth and the fifth great powers. He adds that there is, historically, fewer chances to have a perfectly single balance of power, nor a perfectly complex one. He believes that any potential power’s possible engagement in the balance of power mechanism is likely to complicate the balance. Bull interprets the potential membership of China, Japan, and Western Europe to the league of great powers as a result of his ‘many chess-boards’ perspective that considers not only military and political capacities but also many other parameters such as economic and ideological calculations.

Secondly, Bull distinguishes the local balance of power from the general one. Apart from the general balance of power in the system, he suggests that other balances can exist in different parts of the world, for instance in Eastern Europe or the Caribbeans. This distinction between local and general balances should not be confused with the dominant and subordinate balances. The involvement of the great powers at the managerial level in local or regional politics can be renamed as the participation of great powers in the subordinate ones. For instance, Bull notes the affairs between the Soviet Union and the United States as the dominant balance in the world, which the local balances of the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent and South-East Asia are subordinate to them in the Cold War period.¹⁴⁴

Thirdly, Bull suggests the existence of subjective and objective balance of power. In addition to objective material capacities and capabilities, Bull believes that there is a prerequisite to have a subjective general belief on the existence of this balance. In other words, from the standpoint of Bull, the balance of power can only be achieved by articulating these two components. Without a belief or a capacity, a

¹⁴⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 98-99.

balance of power cannot exist in practice. For instance, it was believed to exist a general balance of power in Europe in the 1930s. After the great expansion of Germany during the World War II, this belief collapsed. It turned out that the balance of power in this period was a subjective one, rather than being an objective one. Indeed, the actual balance of power only emerges along with the combination of both objective and subjective bases.¹⁴⁵

Fourthly, Bull maintains a contrived balance of power vs. the fortuitous balance of power. While the latter indicates a naturally-evolved state of affairs, the former means a balance of power, for which it should strive. The contrived balance of power seems to be an outcome of organized and achieved acts and efforts. Bull's account for the contrived and fortuitous balances of power reflects a model that evaluates the history of the IR as the combination of both. Bull argues that the balance of power has not been a robotic mechanism that can exist by itself as a result of the fortune without any efforts and consents of the states; or the will, intention and efforts of the states are not fully capable of producing and designing the practice of the balance of power alone.¹⁴⁶

Another significant point underlined by Bull is the complex character of the concept of 'power' in the balance of power institution. Bull describes this complexity as 'many chessboards' of the international politics. He notes that "...it is from this interrelatedness of the various chess-boards that we derive the conception of overall power and influence in international politics..."¹⁴⁷ Bull clarifies:

Clearly, in international politics moves are made on 'many chess boards.' On the chess-board of strategic nuclear deterrence, the United States and the Soviet Union are supreme players, China is a novice and Japan does not figure at all. On the chess-board of conventional military strength the United States and the Soviet Union, again are leading players because of their ability to deploy non-nuclear

¹⁴⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 99.

¹⁴⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 100.

¹⁴⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 109.

armed force it has can be deployed only in his own immediate vicinity, and Japan is only a minor player. On the chess-boards of international monetary affairs and international trade and investment the United States and Japan are leading players, the Soviet Union much less important and China relatively unimportant. On the chessboard of influence derived from ideological appeal, it is arguable that China is the pre-eminent player.¹⁴⁸

As noted above, one of the prevalent chess-boards of the reality in international society is ‘economy’, which is a part of the institution of the balance of power. In detailed readings, it appears that Bull is clearly aware of the influential dynamism of the market economy and economic relations between states in the international society. Economy was not be seen by Bull as sufficient as to be credited to form a main institution in the international society such as other five institutions. However, it seems to have reserved a place in Bull’s institution of balance of power. The significance expressed by Bull for the economy and trade in bilateral state relations is obvious in the book titled as “The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945” (1986) edited by William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull. Editors analyse the Anglo-American bilateral state relations under five main themes: history, defence, economy, the non-European world, and the Commonwealth. The economic relations are underlined to explain this particular relationship, which shows that Hedley Bull sees economic ties as an essential component of bilateral state relations.¹⁴⁹ In his essay called ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Bull refers to trade promotion and understanding of the economy, along with political settlements and the balance of power, as measures to create confidence in working toward a change in international society.¹⁵⁰ As a

¹⁴⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 108-09.

¹⁴⁹ See William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986).

¹⁵⁰ Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 21, no. 2 (December 1982): 156.

result, for Bull, economy is a component of the balance of power institution which leads to the proper functioning of the international society.

What is prevailing in Bull's arguments regarding the balance of power and the order of the international society is its key status for other institutions to function, volitional operationalisation of the balance by states, and the complexity of the power in question. Without the consent of states, the balance of power would not automatically serve for state survival in the international society. Having a balance of power, in Bull's words, prevents the preponderant power to dominate the system as a whole, and the creation of a universal empire within this context.

2.4.2. International Law

Bull argues that International law is referred to a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another.¹⁵¹ Within this definition, the significance attached to the status of law requires further elaboration in terms of enlightening the institution of international law in the international society. Bull argues that international law operates at the normative level and poses rules.¹⁵² This body of rules are effective and authoritative instructions, which consist of imperative propositions within the flux of the social progress, and have an impact on the behaviours of states in IR.

Without a capacity of sanction, the status of law of the international law is questionable as well. Bull argues in line with the opinions of Hans Kelsen who defends that violation of a norm ought to be followed by a sanction in the rule of law. 'Law' is differentiated from other kinds of social order such as the religious

¹⁵¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 122.

¹⁵² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 122-23.

orders based on supernatural sanctions, or the moral orders based on voluntary obedience, by its character as having a 'coercive order'. This order highlights the dictum of Hobbes 'where there is no common power, there is no law'.¹⁵³

How these normative assumptions affect the reality of IR under anarchy, which means the lack of an overarching authority, is another point to be discussed. The effect of the institution of international law on state behaviour grows out of not only volitional participation of the states but also out of a coercive power. Bull argues that international law has its own kind of sanctions thereabout.

In this sense, the municipal law and international law have different structures. "The law within the modern state is backed up by the state authority, including its power to use or threaten force, international law is without this kind of prop."¹⁵⁴ Despite the fact that there is no hierarchy and a central mechanism to produce sanctions, international law, as an evolved institution rather than designed, has its own dynamics to contribute to the order within the international society. Even in the municipal law, despite the existence of the state power that impose sanction, punishment and enforcement; the right of self-defence is given to the individuals under certain circumstances to operate self-help. In international law, this mechanism seems to operate not as a centralized but a decentralized mechanism with an essential tool of self-help for states. Sanctions and enforcements exist in the international society, as evolved behaviours. In international society, sanctions are likely to be applied by individual members of the society according to the principle of self-help, which include reprisals and war.¹⁵⁵

It is for this reason that balance of power plays a prevailing position within the institutions of international society, and particularly for the functioning of the

¹⁵³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 123-25.

¹⁵⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 125.

¹⁵⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 125.

institution of international law. "It is only if power, and the will to use it, are distributed in international society in such a way that states can uphold at least certain rights when they are infringed, that respect for rules of international law can be maintained."¹⁵⁶ Breaking of the rules of the international law is also observable. Where one state is preponderant, it is likely to disregard the rights of other states, without any fear. Thus, "a law of nations can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of power between the members of the family of nations."¹⁵⁷

In a similar vein, Hedley Bull notes that "[i]nternational law is a social reality to the extent that there is very substantial degree of conformity to its rules; but it does not follow from this that international law is a powerful agent or motive force in world politics".¹⁵⁸ This fact is one of the limitation of the institution which is its lacking of capacity for producing an international order by itself, unlike some other institutions such as great power management or balance of power. It works as a vehicle and instrumentality for specific purposes within the international order. In this spectrum, international law as an institution operates with the support of other institutions, especially with the help of balance of power.

There are three fundamental functions of international law which produce impacts on behaviours in international society. International law first operates to strengthen the international society with divided states consisting of particular men and territory. This modern system of states reflects the universal political organisation which has a supremacy in the world as a whole. This first function seems to consolidate and promote the 'statist' nature of the system in general.¹⁵⁹ Secondly,

¹⁵⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 127.

¹⁵⁷ L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 1st edn (London: Longmans, 1905) Vol. I, 73 quoted in Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 104.

¹⁵⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 133.

¹⁵⁹ See, Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (Fall 1979): 111-23; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 134-35.

international law sets the basic rules of coexistence between states and other actors. These are mainly related to three core areas: the restriction of violence among states and other actors, the agreements between them, and the sovereignty or independence attached to them.¹⁶⁰ The third function of international law is to “help mobilise compliance with the rules of international society”.¹⁶¹ Bull concludes that the institution of international law is far away from strengthening of the element of order in international society. However it succeeds in bolding the existing framework of international society. In other words,

[t]he international law to which, in some measure, all states in the global international system give their formal assent still serves to carry out its traditional functions of identifying the idea of a society of states as the operational principle of world politics, stating the basic rules of coexistence and facilitating compliance with those and other rules.¹⁶²

Most states obey most agreed rules of international law most of the time. For Bull, any state which engages in peaceful relation to at least one other state, is likely to be bound to obey the rules of the international law, such as conducting diplomatic relations, exchanging money, good and visitors. In particular cases, rules of law are violated or disregarded, but these cases do not prove that international law is inefficient.¹⁶³ Temporary or local breakdown of rules are often but they do not turn into a general collapse of the international legal system as a whole. In practice, this obedience to international law grow not only out of a willingness to preserve the system but also owing from a calculation for their own interests.¹⁶⁴ However, when

¹⁶⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 135.

¹⁶¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 135.

¹⁶² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 154-55.

¹⁶³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 131.

¹⁶⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 133-34.

their major interests and the legal obligations get into conflict, instead of being confirmed by them, these obligations are often disregarded by states.¹⁶⁵ States have the freedom to disregard the instructions of the international law, by rational or irrational grounds in this regard. When state interests challenged by the institution of international law, states tend to use this freedom and seek alternative policies to substantiate the involved international law praxis.

Indeed, the definition of international society highlights the significance of international law:

Society of states emerges when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.¹⁶⁶

Bull argues that states in an international society are volitionally bound themselves with common set of rules. The major portion of these rules codified by or even operated by the tools of the institution of international law. The nature of international society emphasizes the significance of international law in this respect and enables us to analyse the behaviours of states which are bound by the instructions of international law.¹⁶⁷

There are also some limitations for the institution of international law. Bull maintains that international law is not a prerequisite for an order in IR. In historical context, there are some periods in IR without the existence of international law. Bull notes some Greek city-state system, the system of Hellenistic kingdoms that arose after the death of Alexander, the ancient Indian system of states- were without

¹⁶⁵ Hoffman, "Hedley Bull and His Contribution," 187.

¹⁶⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

¹⁶⁷ Allan G. B. Fischer, "Review: The Nature of International Society", *International Affairs* 38/3 (1962): 374.

the institution of international law.¹⁶⁸ However, it is remarkable that these historical examples clearly presents the period before the emergence of the modern state system and the international society. In Bull's writings, it is hard to find any international order without international law in the modern era.

Another limitation is that international law is not by itself sufficient to bring about an international order. International law is likely to contribute to the international order by working for the basic rules of coexistence among states. Within this framework, the change and stability in the international society depends on the common working of institutions. During this complex working of institutions, the institution of international law is also likely to work against the functioning of other institutions, or at least to hinder measures maintain international order. For instance, any preponderant power in the international society may likely to disregard the rules of international law, if it is in a position to 'lay down the law to others'. The balance of power mechanism of great powers generally tend to interfere into the domestic policies of lesser powers despite the fact that international law prohibits any modes of forcible or dictatorial intervention.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, *pacta sunt servanda* rule of the international law is likely to be violated and resulted in a war or violence in contrary to the rules of the same institution. The capacity of the institution cannot resist to stop violation of its own rules. A non-aggression pact between two states is likely to be violated by these states, and the institution of international law might not be capable of stopping a war between them. For instance, Germany attacked Soviet Russia despite the fact that they signed a non-aggression pact on the eve of the World War II. Soviet Russia and Germany engaged in operating the institution of war rather than preserving the status quo in the institution of international law.

¹⁶⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 137.

¹⁶⁹ For details, see Hedley Bull ed., *Intervention in World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

While acting in the international society, the institution of international law is in a complex relationship with the existing institutions. It is also remarkable that the institution of international law tries to regulate a wide range of series of relations, even the war itself, which break out with a violation of an international law regulation. International law has traditional guidelines to restrict the behaviours in a war, at least as to how to end it with a peace treaty, or how to preserve the non-combatants from violence.¹⁷⁰ While international law is seeking to restrict violence by confining the resort to legitimate violence among sovereign states, it is mostly unclear or blurred to identify which side is the law-breaker. For example, in any reprisal or war, in any attempt to operate international law by forceful tools, it is hard to decide what is just and legitimate.¹⁷¹ In the Korean War, both sides were complaining about the opposite side's unjust behaviours and evaluated the other side as the violator of the international law, which weakened the rules of restricting violence at practice.¹⁷²

The articulation of non-state factors to the international law seem to be the one emerged after the World War II. Until this date, for Bull, international law operated within the margins of inter-state interactions and regulated the state relations with a static view prevailing the consent of the states with a respect to their sovereignty. The fundamental functions of the international law strengthens this 'statist' core of the institution and first consolidates the status of state as the primary ground for the reality of IR. The other functions of the institution also empowers the position of states with an emphasis on the basic rules of coexistence among states in international society. These rules relate to three core areas: restriction of violence among states, *pacta sunt servanda* and other rules regarding the international

¹⁷⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 150.

¹⁷¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 127.

¹⁷² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 151-52.

agreements among them; and the rules relating to sovereignty or independence.¹⁷³ Within this context, until 1945, international law seems to prioritize states as the primary actor in the reality of international society and affects the behaviour of states in their relations among each other.

The crucial point about the institution of international law is that as the part of the social reality, states consider international law in their formulation of their policies and tend to shape their decisions in relation to an agreed body of legal rules.¹⁷⁴ These legal rules indeed are intellectual constructs by states themselves and “there is some degree of resemblance between the behaviour prescribed by the rules, and the actual behaviour of states and other actors in international politics.”¹⁷⁵ Bull’s argument is structured on states and their interactions among each other in terms of the rules of coexistence. The institution of international law tends to find body with international treaties and with respect to general principles such as ‘pacta sunt servanda’ in international society, particularly in state interactions. It is clear that the institution of international law with its nature and content is part of the reality of IR, and plays an important role in the working of the international society along with an emphasis on the role of states. This role, however, derives from the volitional participation of the states and highlights the possibility for states to act against the international law as well.

¹⁷³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 135.

¹⁷⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 124.

¹⁷⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 131.

2.4.3 Diplomacy

Diplomacy plays a crucial role in international society. It seems to be the network of almost all the acts of change and stability in international society. For this reason, Wight claims that ‘diplomacy’ is the master institution of the international society.¹⁷⁶ Similarly Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, who have focused on the diplomatic corps in their book about diplomacy and the international society, note that “within diplomatic theory, we get a straightforward, if largely implied, account of corps”.¹⁷⁷ Adam Watson, evaluates the diplomacy in a nutshell as follows:

The diplomatic missions in a country not only represent their own individual governments: they are also colleagues, with certain interests in common. Together they protect the immunities and privileges necessary for their work more effectively than when they act alone. Professional solidarity is particularly useful to consular corps, whose members have to deal with regional authorities less familiar with diplomatic practice. More important, embassies collectively symbolize and indeed represent the international system or society to which their governments and the host governments belong. The diplomatic corps is, like all diplomacy, part of the lubricating oil of an international society. For some three centuries now, in Europe and those countries that have adopted the European system, the diplomatic dialogue has been continuous and all-embracing; whereas the use of force is sporadic and localized. War, and even strong disapproval, breaks off the direct dialogue with the enemy; but contact often continues discreetly and indirectly through third parties. Here again a neutral embassy, acting for international society as a whole, provides a line of communication.¹⁷⁸

Similar to the definitions above, Bull argues that diplomacy is the conduct of relations between states and other entities in the world politics by official agents, and by peaceful means. What is specific to diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of

¹⁷⁶ Wight, *Power Politics*, 113.

¹⁷⁷ Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds., *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 265.

¹⁷⁸ Martin Wight, “Foreword”, in Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds., *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution*, xi.

relations. For instance, war is also an institution carried out by professional official agents, however diplomatists differ from soldiers by confining themselves to peaceful means.¹⁷⁹ These professionals have a symbolic status, represented by notes, letters of credence and with various representative means. Another distinguishing factor of diplomacy is that diplomatists use professional methods for their job. For instance, they manage the international relations of states by negotiation, which is perpetrated by ambassadors and envoys in practice. For Bull, this act is also the art of the diplomatist. This diplomatic performance is also tactful and subtle in order to defend the state interests.¹⁸⁰

The institution of diplomacy has several functions. First of all, it facilitates a communication between the political leaders of states- and other entities in world politics. To be a messenger is one of the essential characteristics of the diplomats working for their own states.¹⁸¹ Bull argues, there is direct communication through direct meetings of political leaders of different states without the mediation of professional diplomats. Bull refers to letter, cable, telephone, and telepointer and radio telephone as other techniques for exchanging of messages.¹⁸²

The second function of the diplomats is to negotiate the agreements between states. To have an agreement on issues, states have to feel some points on which their interests overlap. Otherwise, the playground of IR would be full of hostile encounters and fleets. Bull notes that “the conclusion of agreements by heads of states or foreign ministers is often only the climax of a long process of reconnoitre,

¹⁷⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 157.

¹⁸⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 156.

¹⁸¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 163-64.

¹⁸² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 172.

probing, testing of proposals and preliminary negotiation, carried out by professional diplomats.”¹⁸³

One of the prevalent method for diplomatic negotiations is the multilateral platforms. The defence questions are discussed in the framework of the NATO, while economic and development issues are held in the OECD or World Bank. The international organizations has become platform for diplomatic interactions as the most convenient platform than ever in the 20th century. On the other hand, multilateral conferences have a specific share in the institution of diplomacy. For instance, the Congress of Vienna (1815) founded a diplomatic system which was the outcome of an agreement of the European powers. The participants of the multilateral conferences also symbolize the equality of states in diplomacy not in power-calculation but in legal terms. For instance, the incorporation of Turkey, China, Japan, Korea and Siam into the European diplomatic mechanism at the second half of the nineteenth century was an example for this equality.¹⁸⁴

A third function of diplomacy is the gathering of intelligence from the hosting country. This fact enables a flow of information from foreign countries. In line with the definition of international society, diplomacy supposes to inform the decision makers about the feelings and opinions of the components of the society. Otherwise, it would not be possible to arrange the external policies of states in line with common interests and values. Despite the fact that states are reluctant to give information about themselves, they are eager to learn about their counterparts.¹⁸⁵

The diplomatic methods seem to be changing as well. Formerly, the resident ambassador was the only or at least the principal source of information about a foreign country. However, in the 20th century information was provided by media,

¹⁸³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 173-74.

¹⁸⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 158-60.

¹⁸⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 164-65.

by scholars and writers, by exchanges of private visitors, as well as through specialist intelligence agents and by technical means such as aerial and satellite photography.¹⁸⁶ In the contemporary era, it is clear that new facilities such as internet have given impetus to this diplomatic flow of information for the matter involved.

The fourth function of the institution of diplomacy is its role for minimisation of friction in IR. The history of IR has been full of frictions, crises and wars. One of the principle function of diplomacy is to prevent the frictions and tensions. Sometimes, the discord and friction does not lay on 'true' interests of the parties involved. Diplomacy always seeks to persuade and resonate rather than to bully or threaten. Diplomacy tries to produce 'win and win' calculations and overlapping of interests. In this framework, diplomacy prefers to speak about rights rather than demands. These rights tend to be present as owing from the rules and principles which both states agree on. Diplomatic profession in this sense, adopts this mission and embodies traditions and conventions for the task involved.¹⁸⁷

Lastly, the institution of diplomacy plays a significant symbolic role. The existence of diplomacy represents a large-scale acceptance of a working international society. Diplomacy even in the primitive form of messengers represent the existence of rules to which states and other entities in the system pay allegiance. In the modern version, the existence of diplomatic corps at the capitals of states, are concrete evidence of the existence and survival of an international society as a factor at work in IR¹⁸⁸ Within this context, Bull notes:

The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures

¹⁸⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 174.

¹⁸⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 172-175.

¹⁸⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 166.

that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visible indications of universal acceptance of the idea of international society.¹⁸⁹

All of these functions have evolved in the history and become more concrete by the development of the international society. The important stage in diplomacy is the institutionalization of diplomatic relations. The emergence of resident embassies in the fifteenth century in Italy, their spread to whole Europe in the sixteenth century, the recognition of the extraterritoriality of ambassadors in foreign services in the period of Louis XIV. The emergence of diplomatic corps in the eighteenth century were crucial steps for the matter involved. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, during which European powers recognized the equality of states and a system for diplomatic precedence consolidated the diplomatic traditions to a certain extent. In the twentieth century, Vienna Convention of 1961 codified traditional state-to-state diplomatic practice on a worldwide scale.¹⁹⁰

Bull argues that in the 20th century, diplomacy is at least in a highly institutionalized form. This fact symbolizes that there exists an international society rather than an international system in Bull's lenses. The exchanging diplomatic missions of states are the providers of the diplomatic networks. Within this framework, states share complex rules and conventions. These practices from a minimalist perspective consists of the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs and the diplomatic immunity for the corps. Within this context, states commit that their diplomatists will not interfere into the domestic politics of the receiving countries. On the other hand, the receiving states accept the immunity of the diplomatists, and also of the staff, the mission and the communications from constraints. The host country

¹⁸⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 176-177.

¹⁹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 158-60.

accepts the protection of the missions from all kinds of attacks and guarantees the condition for proper working conditions.¹⁹¹

For state interactions and particularly for bilateral state relations, diplomacy itself does not only find inputs for foreign policies but also conducts them. Bull argues that the nature of diplomacy also changed during the 20th century. Formerly, two states without any diplomatic contact were supposed to have hostile relations or the lack of significant economic relations to construct diplomatic network among each other. However, in the 20th century, states in contact were prone to preserve their bilateral state relations even they were hostile to each other.¹⁹² This fact seems to be also owing from the interdependency of economic relations between states in the international society. The existence of economic relations is considered to be one of the effective ground for having a diplomatic contact. In consideration with bilateral state relations, diplomacy focuses more on cooperation and does not necessarily lead to a political warfare any more. The diplomatic networks tend to work for the maximization of common interests.¹⁹³

The concentration on diplomatic corps to understand the operational patterns of the institution of diplomacy prevails the bilateral state relations to which diplomats devote themselves to conduct. This peaceful conduction of affairs by the professional diplomats create wide networks among the states. The division between consular and diplomatic branches is also of great significance for bilateral state relations as well. In this sense, the diplomatic relations represent the relations between the governments, while the consular relations arrange the interactions of the private citizens and their relations with the government of the country. By these two branches, the diplomatic network aims to provide five cardinal role of the

¹⁹¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 161.

¹⁹² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 167.

¹⁹³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 166-68.

diplomacy: “Communication, negotiation, information, minimisation of friction, and the symbolic function”.

In sum, in order to conduct all the acts of the international society by peaceful methods, diplomacy emerges as an institution. The constituent actors of the international society – states, in order to fulfil the aforesaid functions, carry out diplomatic actions. The pattern in the institution of diplomacy to be carved out from the history of IR is a candidate to portray the functioning of the international society as a whole as well. Such as the vessels of a body, diplomacy itself seems to carry the footprints of the international society, especially for the bilateral state relations.

2.4.4. War

War is explained by Bull as an organized violence carried on by political units against each other. Every kind of violence is not a type of war if they are not carried out by political units. Also, any violence carried out by a political unit is not considered a war if it does not target another political unit, which might be a tribe, an ancient empire, a feudal principality. Within the modern state system, it is the organised violence of sovereign states in which these states use their monopoly of the right of legitimate use of force against each other.¹⁹⁴ Bull applied principally the orthodox version of inter-state wars. For Bull, these wars are directly related to the balance of power among great powers and the international law to be developed.¹⁹⁵ As Hoffman notices, from Bull’s point of view, state’s adherence to the international law does not mean a compulsory respect for it. Bull evaluates war

¹⁹⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 178-79.

¹⁹⁵ Charles A. Jones, “War in the Twenty-first Century: An Institution in Crisis” in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 162.

as an ordinary instrument of state policy rather than as a crime in international society or such a sanction enforcing the principles of the international society.¹⁹⁶

Michael Howard emphasizes the relativity of war and its significance for the bilateral state relations and the international society as follows:

We know certainly, that war is only called forth through the political intercourse of government and nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into quiet different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general feature of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place.¹⁹⁷

In consideration with the functioning of the international society, the institution of war has a dual aspect. Taking the common values, rules and institutions into account, war both serves to contribute into the international society's purposes while also existing as a threat to the order in international society. On the one hand, it is a threat to be limited and contained which is clearly a manifestation of a status 'all against all'. This option can be referred to as problematic which could pave the way for the breakdown of the international society. On the other hand, war is also an instrument of state policy which shapes and reconfigures the order in international society.¹⁹⁸ Bull argues:

...in the perspective of international society, war is a means of enforcing international law, of preserving the balance of power, and, arguably, of promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just. The rules and institutions which international society has evolved reflect the tension between the perception of war as a threat to international society which must be contained, and the perception of

¹⁹⁶ Hoffman, "Hedley Bull and His Contribution," 186.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Howard, "War as an Instrument of Policy" in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 194.

¹⁹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 181.

it as an instrumentality which international society can exploit to achieve its purposes.¹⁹⁹

These two options have concrete reflections in world politics particularly as international law arrangements and practices of international organizations. The League of Covenants, Kellog-Briandt Pact, the charter of the United Nations can be given as examples which limit and restrict the institution of war. Through similar mechanisms, international society put some restrictions on war in four ways. First of all, it confines to wage war to sovereign states. Then it restricts the conduction of wars, the spread of wars, and the reasons and causes of wars.²⁰⁰

Whilst, international society also attaches a positive role to the institution of war in the reality of IR. Firstly, it evaluates the war as a possible means of enforcement of international law. At the absence of a central government under anarchy, international law can be enforced by particular states through using arms on their own behalf. At its minimum, this act of war as law enforcement relates to the self-defence which aims to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state in question, which is violated by an attacker. At its maximum, for preserving the right of self-defence or other rights, the war is conducted by a third party to defend the victim's legal rights. Secondly, at least starting from the eighteenth century, international society considers the institution of war as a means for preserving the balance of power, which indicates that no one state is preponderant to be able to lay down the law to others. Within this framework, to provide the general balance of power, war has likely to play a crucial role in international society as well.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 181-82.

²⁰⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 182.

²⁰¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 182-83.

Thirdly, the institution of war might act to protect the legal order and the balance of power, and produces a just change in the system. This status of 'just' is questionable but according to Bull international order is lacking of mechanisms of peaceful change. The international society seems to be dependent on war as the agent of just change. This point is blur as to the requirements of the justice in IR. However, in some historical examples, there has occurred a widespread feeling that use of force or threat of force has been a just one.²⁰²

In the literature, there are also opposing views about the 'just' status of war. For instance, Oppenheim argues that law should deal with the outcome of what states do, in this sense the conduction of war whether it is lawful or unlawful, just or unjust process; Grotius defends that a just war can only be waged by a just cause. These causes can be three: defence, the recovery of property, and the infliction of punishment.²⁰³ Bull gives the wars of liberation of colonial territories from metropolitan powers as the examples of just change.²⁰⁴

From the standing point of Bull, the 'just war', 'natural' and 'objective' existence of morality are intractable concepts to discuss. Bull, in his own writings emphasized the role of states within the international society against any injustice. The solidarism and pluralism discussion in this sense is worth to mention about the responsibility to intervene in to the domestic politics of a state in which injustice arises.²⁰⁵ As a result, for what reason it is gone, war has been an institution in

²⁰² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 182-83. See also, Bull, "Order vs. Justice," 269-83.

²⁰³ For a detailed comparative analysis of the arguments of Oppenheim and Grotius, see, Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 51-73.

²⁰⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 192.

²⁰⁵ For details about solidarism-Pluralism debate, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, "Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 72, no. 1 (Jan 1996): 91-107; Matthew S. Weinert, "Reframing the Pluralist—Solidarist Debate," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 1 (Sep. 2011): 21-41; John Williams, "Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory," *International Relations* 19, no. 1 (March 2005): 19-38;

international society which have arranged the balance of power mechanism, which also have produced international law structures. Whether it is just or unjust, wars have been an institution for sovereign states which they have resorted in the flux of the history with rational or irrational calculations.

For states, war is an option and an instrument of policy in order to achieve its objectives. However, this way of attaining the national interests are not always the case. States also tend to engage in war by irrational motives, miscalculation or by accident. The modern states do not always wage war against each other²⁰⁶ to justify Clausewitz's definition of war - 'an act intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. Sometimes the public opinion instigates states to wage war as well. War is very often served not for rational or intelligent purposes. Rather it is embarked upon by primitive tribes as a form of ritual, by Christian and Saracen knights in fulfilment of a chivalric code, by modern nations to test their cohesion and sense of identity, and throughout the history for blood and conquest. The process of a war is also by nature unacceptable to an extent that it is likely for a state to lose the original ends for which the war was begun.²⁰⁷ However, such as the cases of Frederick the Great's wars to make Prussia a great power, or England's wars to wrest Empire from France, and Bismarck's wars to unify Germany, there are many examples that the wars embarked upon produced the intended results in the history.²⁰⁸

One of the important point highlighted by Bull is about the reasons of waging a war. Bull argues that "states are reluctant to embark upon war except to achieve

João M. Almeida "Hedley Bull, 'Embedded Cosmopolitanism', and the Pluralist-Solidarist Debate", in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 51-72.

²⁰⁶Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 180.

²⁰⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 180.

²⁰⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 181.

objectives of security.”²⁰⁹ With Bull’s point of view, security is a complex term and also includes keeping secure of the economic assets enjoyed. In Bull’s lenses, in similar to the argument that economy is an input for the calculations of balance of power, it is also of great significance for deciding on a war as well. According to Bull, wars are waged not only for economic reasons such as the case in colonial wars, but also for security reasons like the Peloponnesian War or for ideological reasons such as Napoleonic wars and crusades.²¹⁰

For what reasons they might have to wage, wars cannot be easily distinct from peace. War in the material sense, on the other hand, is sometimes hard to distinguish from peace. Between the two states of affairs there are some gradations: when does a blockade become an act of violence? When does a rebel band take on the character of a political unit?” These questions have some blurred areas to answer.²¹¹ In considering this fact, the declaration of war is critical both in terms of the international law and for calculating the further acts in practice. Any mode of violence or threat of violence can be considered as an insufficient act for declaring a war. For instance, the German warships of Goeben and Breslau after having sailed through the Turkish Straits bombed the Russian harbours and ships in the Black Sea which was a clear offence and attack to be credited as a *casus belli* during the World War I. However, the immediate reaction of the Ottoman government was to decrease the tension and prevent any declaration of war. After following considerations, the Ottoman Empire declared a war on Entente Powers including Russia.²¹² The critical point was that the processes of violent acts and use of force

²⁰⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 189.

²¹⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 188-89.

²¹¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 179.

²¹² Tilman Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 51-54.

do not directly mean a declaration of war even they are carried out by a political unit against a political unit.

The invention and use of nuclear weapons have changed the doctrine of war in the literature. Where nuclear weapons are involved, the costs may include a total destruction. The balance of power has a new shape after this invention. The limited wars are highly discussed in the literature but the nuclear weapons have paved the way for political deadlocks in IR as well. For instance, the nuclear confrontation of the Soviet – American polarization during the cold War produced deadlocks. Among the great nuclear powers, it is the threat of war rather than war itself that shapes the interactions among them. “Mutual deterrence as between the great powers rules out unlimited war as a means of resolving disputes between them.”²¹³ The involvement of nuclear affairs has changed the dynamics of war. For instance, in taking the Soviet-American nuclear polarization, it was unlikely to have an actual war in the Cold War. Limited war was seen risky and the parties could not produce any solutions to the existing problems such as the case in Berlin crisis of 1958-61.²¹⁴

Starting from the first grand debate of the discipline of IR, as to how to end wars²¹⁵, wars have been always an effective institution in the praxis of IR. Sovereign states, in Bull’s analysis, tend to go on a war for their own objectives and interests. It is likely that these objective are not only rational ones, but also irrational ones. In his own words, miscalculation, even stupidity could result in wars.²¹⁶ What Bull highlights is the relation between the institution of war and the institution of balance

²¹³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 190.

²¹⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 190-91.

²¹⁵ See Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘first Great Debate’,” *Review of International Studies*, 24, no. 5 (Dec. 1996): 1-16.

²¹⁶ Hoffman, “Hedley Bull and His Contribution,” 180.

of power. The pacts, coalitions, alliances have been formed to wage war or to prevent war. These two options have been always transitional within their boundaries. Whether it is a just one or an unjust one, war is one of the influential component of the international society, not as a crime but also as an institution for producing an order. Within the complexity of working of primary institutions, war reserves a room as an instrument in bilateral state interactions.

2.4.5. Great Power Management

Great power management is one of the prevalent components of the international order from a Bullian perspective. Bull notes three basic characteristic of this mechanism. Firstly, the international society is greatly likely to have great powers rather than having a unique one. Secondly, the clear common feature of great powers is a superior military strength. Thirdly, being a great power is not only owing from certain capacities but also requires a recognition for having some special rights and duties.²¹⁷

Bull maintains that great powers are a club with a certain membership rules. The term of great powers find body with at least more-than-two actors. The logic of Bull's writing is generally based on a policy of a 'balance'. An eventual unique great power would deteriorate operational rules of the international society. This possibility would result with a hegemony, and abolish the reciprocity in limiting the actors' actions and sphere of influence. "How come an international society could act with a conscious policy of restriction with a common set of rules reflecting common interests?" would be an unanswerable question with a one great power dominating the system in Bullian lenses.

²¹⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 194-96.

Secondly, the superior status in military strength is the second characteristic of a great power. Bull does not agree with the statement of Ranke who maintains that military status of a great power is self-sufficient and independent of allies. Ranke notes: “a country is a great power when it can maintain itself against all others, even when they are united against it.”²¹⁸ Bull notes that there can be some exceptions about the superior status in military strength like the status of Japan, of which military power is underscoring while its political influence is increasing. This fact seems to prove that any country without superior military strength is likely to rank political superiority for being a great power. This argument is also valid for states having strategic nuclear weapons.²¹⁹ Bull argues that no nuclear strategic weapon can prevent others from attacking. “In this sense, no state today can assure its own security unilaterally”.²²⁰

Third, “great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and ‘to have, certain special rights and duties.’”²²¹ “Great powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole.”²²² For instance, “States which, like Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany, are military powers of the front rank, but are not regarded by their own leaders or others as having these rights and responsibilities, are not properly speaking great powers.”²²³

²¹⁸Theodore H Von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 203.

²¹⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 195.

²²⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 195.

²²¹ For detailed examples of the special rights and duties of a great power, see Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

²²² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 196.

²²³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 196.

However, Nazi Germany seemed to be an irresponsible state that is questionable to be called as a great power in the system. This study considers the Nazi Germany as a great power of its period in consideration to its capacities and its clear powerful position to be able to change the current balance in world politics. The problem about being irresponsible is also relative for this study proving that Nazi Germany acted with responsible policies on part if its allies, for instance for Italy, and maintained the required balance of power for the international society until the end of the war.

Since the World War II, the term ‘great power’ has been replaced by the term ‘superpower’. This term was first used by W.T.R. Fox in 1944 when he applied it to Britain as well as to the United States and Soviet Union.²²⁴ Similarly, Bull equals the term of superpower to great power as well.²²⁵ Under the light of these definitions, which states could be recognized as a great power? Bull, in the 1970s answered this question as follows: “At most, the United States, the Soviet Union and China are great powers: Japan is only a potential great power; and Western Europe, while it is not amalgamated in a single state, is not a power at all. We have also to recognise that China is less clearly a great power than the other two.”²²⁶

According to Bull, states are unequal in power in an international society. This fact causes an unequal position in which the demands of certain state at praxis are not considered, while the interests of the strong ones are recognised to be the only ones relevant to the issue in question. This is owing from the relative power capacities of states in an international society. In other words, the great powers prevail while the others go under while producing the pattern of IR. The relations among the great powers also reflect the story of the international society in this sense. Bull credited

²²⁴ See William T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers: the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union--their Responsibility for Peace*(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944).

²²⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 194.

²²⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 197.

the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War as great powers. Bull notes that the U.S. was the leader, and had the primacy position in Western alliance, which kept the conflicts limited within the block. On the other hand, the Soviet Union as the leader of the counter block, did the same. The decisions and opinions of these two states were of critical for the decisions of other states within the whole system.²²⁷

There are two certain ways that the great powers contribute to the international order: “by managing their relations with one another, and by exploiting their preponderance for giving a central direction to the affairs of the international society as whole.”²²⁸ The functions of the great powers are also crucial for the survival of the international order, in which they act. Great powers contribute to international order in two main ways: by managing their relations with one another; and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to produce a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole. More particularly, great powers manage their relations with one another in the interests of international order by

(i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence, and (vi) joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium.²²⁹

Bull highlights that these functions and roles are those that the great powers can do, rather than what they actually do.²³⁰ The theory and the practices involved are likely

²²⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 199-200.

²²⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 200.

²²⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 200.

²³⁰ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 200.

to mismatch for the roles attached to the great powers. “In fact great powers, like small rather than order; they seek to upset the general balance, rather than to preserve it, to foment crises rather than to control them, to win wars rather than to limit them, and so on.”²³¹

The first and the cardinal contribution of the great powers in an international society is their way of managing their relations one another by preserving a balance, during which other powers recognize their rights to use some special rights and duties. For the general balance involved, great powers tend to act with collaboration and contrivance generally. Great powers also tend to avoid and control crises in an international order through a balance of power configured by them. However, this balance does not necessarily mean peaceful relations among great powers. The management of great power relations contains also the danger of war against one another. On the other hand, Bull also notes that the great powers sometimes deliberately produce crises, or come to the brink of the war in order to achieve a diplomatic victory. When a war occurs, the great powers tend to control the process as well.²³² However, these circumstances contain risks for the survival of the international society. For instance, the great powers came brink to the war in the crisis management of “Cuban Missile Crisis” in 1962.

While avoiding and limiting crises, the great powers tend to refrain from intervening unilaterally within one another’s spheres of influence. They tend to avoid direct confrontation of armed forces. Also, they sought to restrain their allies in local disputes. Additionally, they hesitate to engage in involving the crisis in the third party regions. Sometimes, the great powers in the international order coordinate and concert efforts to mitigate tensions in crisis.²³³

²³¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 201.

²³² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 201-02.

²³³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 204.

Great powers may contribute to the international order by avoiding war, or limiting war if it occurs. For avoiding a war, they try to prevent the wars to be occurred by accident or miscalculation. They tend to reduce misunderstandings and misinterpretation by the great powers of one another's words and actions. Great powers also exert efforts to settle or contain political disputes between themselves by negotiation. They are supposed to control competition in armaments, and also to prevent war among lesser powers which may expand to embrace great powers, if they occur; to limit them geographically and to end them quickly. In order to limit the wars, great powers tend to seek for a clear distinction between a conventional war and a nuclear war, create effective communication channels in the course of the war among themselves, and preserve effective command and control of forces so as to reduce the danger of unintended expansion of war.

Great powers are also assumed to contribute to the international order by their "unilateral exercise of their preponderance in particular areas of the world or among particular groups of states."²³⁴ Hegemony can be given as an example for the matter involved. According to Bull, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states during the Cold War was a hegemonic relationship. The Soviet Union used force in East Germany to challenge the German Democratic Republic in 1953, to overthrow Hungarian government in 1956, and to overthrow the Czechoslovakian government in 1968. The Soviet Union recognises the ordinary rights of sovereignty, independence and equality of these states. However, with the initiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, it "limits or qualifies these rights by stipulating that an internal and external threat to any socialist country, involving the danger of a return to capitalism, is a threat not only to that country but to the Socialist Commonwealth as a whole."²³⁵

²³⁴ For different types of unilateral exercise of preponderance power, see Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 207-09.

²³⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 209-10.

Another function of the great powers in the international order is to agree on creating sphere of influence, interest or responsibility. Within these spheres, each great power is supposed to provide stability, and to avoid collision or friction. The clearest example of these spheres are the ones created by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Without having a written contract, there seemed to be an operational rules defining the borders of the sphere of influence during the Cold War. For instance, in 1956 the United States and the NATO bloc did not interfere into the affairs of the Soviet occupation of Hungary, due to the fact that this country was under the sphere of the Soviet Bloc.²³⁶

Another function of the great powers within the international order is to join their forces in promoting common policies throughout the international system as a whole. Bull argues that the ‘concert’ is the best term for the description of the historical model of joint management of great powers, in consideration with the historical praxis of “concert of Europe”. Bull gives examples from the Cold War by noting some common policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, such as their cooperation in 1970 in formulizing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, despite some joint attempts, for Bull, “there has been no attempt to formalise a Soviet – American concert.”²³⁷

The international order provided by the great powers does not necessarily serve equal justice for all states. This order might be an unequal one. The great powers tend to manage their relations with one another and seek to secure and maintain their special privileges for themselves, rather than providing an equal platform for the all the states.²³⁸ These great powers simply shape the structure and the functioning of IR. They have the capacity to decide on “what is significant in the

²³⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 212-18.

²³⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 218-19.

²³⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 220.

system” through their own perspectives. Thus the states are assumed to manage their bilateral state relations in accordance with the status of the great powers management.

However, the effectiveness of this great power management grows out of the acceptance of the states. A large portion of the international society shows consent for the legitimacy of the great power management. Otherwise, this institution would have a limited capacity to shape the international society, and also the bilateral state relations within the society. International society is an anarchic order which has no hierarchical order. The great power management in this sense may not explicitly act against this structure. International society, formed by the volitional participation of states, endures the special rights and duties of the great powers.²³⁹

On the other hand, international society might have an order without a perfect justice. In practice, the order comes prior to the justice in an international society. The great powers seeking neither for order nor for justice could erode their positions.²⁴⁰ In this regard, as great responsibilities, great powers are expected to solve the problems in the international society. The demands of the poor countries, the racial justice could be noted as examples, on which the great powers are expected to focus.

Also, the great powers tend to take support from partners. In parts of the world where the political position of the great powers is limited, the great powers may seek to accommodate secondary powers as partners in the management of the regional balance concerned. Bull notes, in the 1970s, Britain, France and West Germany are leading middle powers in Europe and the Mediterranean (the former two in Africa also), while Japan is a 'great indispensable' in any attempt to manage

²³⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 221.

²⁴⁰ Bull, “Order vs. Justice,” 283.

the balance of Asia and the Pacific, in consideration with the Western block of the Cold War politics.²⁴¹

Great powers are restrained by the existence of an international society and simultaneously help to reproduce the society as well.²⁴² The more international society consolidates, the less international society needs for great power management. The rules and institutions of the international society, including the secondary institutions such as the United Nations, the states in their bilateral state relations refer less to the great power management as an observation. In this sense, it is also remarkable that while international society has widened from Western Europe to the whole world, there has been a steady reduction in the number of Great Powers, from eight great powers before 1914 to the big two of the Cold War.²⁴³ As a result, great power management which highly intertwined by the balance of power institution acts in order to function numerous tasks as mentioned. The primary task of the great power management is to render the balance in the international society with cooperation or competition. State interactions are highly likely to be influenced by the guidelines of this management and shows a significant portion of respect to this mechanism in order to sustain the international order.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter first overviewed the main assumptions, key concepts, historical evolution and the methodology of the E.S. to give an insight about its navigation

²⁴¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 222.

²⁴² Richard Little, "The Balance of Power and Great Power Management," in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 110.

²⁴³ Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 167.

among the theoretical debates of IR. The pluralist approach of the E.S. along with a trilogy presents its rich lenses for analysing the reality of IR, in the meanwhile by posing a challenge what to focus within the borders of the school. However, the evolution of the school itself, and the further discussions have consolidated the conception of ‘international society’ as a gravity point for theorizing. The inter-state domain with a Grotian understanding centralizes this conception to an extent that the E.S. is called also as the ‘International Society Approach’ in the literature.

The remarkable point highlighted in the chapter is the research method of the E.S. – historical reading, to find out patterns at systemic level. Rather than discussing the concepts, arguments ahistorically, E.S. attaches great significance to the process in which these conceptions have evolved. This feature draws a clear path for the further analysis in the subsequent chapters, especially about how to analyse the case study respectively: Turco-German relations.

The intellectual contribution of Hedley Bull to the literature of the E.S. has also been examined throughout this chapter with a specific concentration on his conceptualisation of international society along with its institutions. International society, as the backbone of the school has been examined with a particular focus on the volitional participation of states to form a society, their freedom of act even against the rules of the international society on rational and irrational grounds, and the institutions as the mechanisms to create the overriding status of the international society- order.

The next part of the chapter has illustrated the framework of the discussion of the institutions in the E.S. literature. Despite many criticisms about its capacity, the five institutions defined by Bull – balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great power management seem to be the consolidated starting point for the further analysis as shared by the participants of this institutional debate. These institutions are assumed to operate the reality of IR and provide its cardinal characteristic – ‘order’.

Before delving into the analysis of the Turco-German relations with this infrastructure in the following chapters, all of these institutions have been investigated from Bull's point of view with regard to their definition, functions, types and their linkages with state interactions. Balance of power is the master institution among them which enables other institutions to operate. Without a balance in the international society where a preponderant power can lay down law on others, order in the international society ceases to survive. This balance is held and managed primarily by the great powers, which have certain rights, privileges and also responsibility for the continuation of the order. This balance tends to be structured on the tools of the institution of international law, with the assistance of diplomacy which turned out to be the vessels of the body of the international society. War, on the other hand, emerges as the institution threatening substantially the working of the international society, while having the capacity to reconfigure and re-order it.

Within this framework, Bull emphasizes the fact that the functions of the institutions reflect what states can do, rather than what they actually do and reserves a maneuvering room for states, capable of acting freely. The volitional participation of states are vital for operating these institutions which represents the non-automatic working of the international society.

On the other hand, the intertwined and inter-related activity of these institutions is likely to pose difficulties for analysing the cases in the light of these institutions distinctly. Despite this challenge, the institutions of the international society seem to propose a template for analysing IR, through examining the state interactions. In consideration the fact that the E.S. reaches systemic arguments as the reflection of the interactions of states, it seems likely to serve for the bilateral state relations within the conception of international society. In sum, this chapter as a whole has presented a road map to fulfil this gap and serves as a background for applying the conception of international society to bilateral state relations, which is to be taken up via Turco-German relations in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE TURCO- GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse how Turkey and Germany took the institutions of the international society into account while conducting their bilateral state relations in the 18th century, with a special focus on the second half of the century. The following section of the chapter briefly discusses the evolution of the international society in the 18th century along with its five institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management. After noting the main characteristics of the institutions and the nature of the international society in this period, the next section analyses the series of events and facts in Ottoman-Prussian bilateral interactions along with their correlation to these five institutions. This section highlights the definition and the functions of the institutions within their sphere of functionality, and tries to present their impacts on the Ottoman-Prussian relations. In addition to the harmony between the working of the institutions and the bilateral relations in question, this section also exemplifies the events during which the institutions challenged the interests of these states. The conclusion of the chapter summarizes the main outcomes and findings as to the

correlation between the Turco-German relations in the 18th century and the institutions of the international society in practice.

3.2. International Society and the Institutions:

After 1648, the settlement of Westphalia formulated a kind of a commonwealth of sovereign states, members of which were independent externally and had a control over their internal affairs.²⁴⁴ Along with the consolidation of states in the emerging international society, the eighteenth century, from the Utrecht settlement to the French Revolution, became a period of order and progress in Europe. In this period, “an international society of states, or princes, functioned well, with rules and institutions and underlying assumptions which its members accepted.”²⁴⁵ The first sparks of the evolution of the international society could be tracked by the functioning of some institutions. As Hedley Bull argues:

[o]ne of the elements in this process was the exchange of diplomatic representatives on a permanent basis, beginning with *ad hoc* envoys and leading to the establishment of resident missions and the adoption of common protocol and procedure. Another was the adoption common forms of international law, at first indicated in practice in the making and observance of treaties according to common procedures, and later recognised by international legal publicists who spoke of the expansion of ‘the family of nations’. A further element was the representation of states at those periodic multilateral conferences that have marked the evolution of modern international society from the time of the Peace of Westphalia.²⁴⁶

This volitional participation of states in the evolution of the international society coincided with the global expansion of European powers. This expansion along with rules and values, began at the fifteenth century and lasted until the end of the

²⁴⁴ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992), 86.

²⁴⁵ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 198.

²⁴⁶ Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 120-21.

World War II continuously, under the umbrella of the “expansion of European international society”.²⁴⁷ The eighteenth century witnessed the continuation of the expeditions overseas and expanding across steppes, while the international society was in progress to consolidate the states as the main actors of the international relations. This century gave birth to two prominent principles for the consolidation of the rules and institutions of the international society. The first one was the fact that member states were to be regarded as equally sovereign, with regardless of their power capacities. The second principle was that the sovereignties of the member states were absolute to be respected.²⁴⁸ These two principle were influencing the machinery of the international society, under a complex network of balance of power, along with the rise of new great powers such as Prussia and Russia in Europe. This period also coincided with the global competition of British and French forces all over the world, particularly in the American continent.

According to Watson, in this period, international society worked under the overarching framework of balance of power regulated by four institutions, in his own terms. These are the international law, along with its rules and codes of conduct derived from a common culture; legitimization of powers through dynastic power and treaties; continuous diplomatic network conducted through permanent resident embassies; and lastly the limited wars as ultimate source of adjustment.²⁴⁹

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the great powers were active to manage the institution of balance of power. In this period, despite the global superiority of Britain and France, the configuration of the international society became less bipolar. Balance of power appeared to work in a multilateral form through the interactions of five great powers: France, Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia. The

²⁴⁷ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 6-7.

²⁴⁸ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 120-23.

²⁴⁹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 202.

recent great powers – Prussia and Russia were not satisfied by the distribution of territory on the grounds that it was not reflecting their increased relative power.²⁵⁰ The Ottoman Empire on the other hand was still a great power which continued to be the part of the balancing. Ottoman Empire, for most of the period, “controlled up to a quarter of geographical Europe and bulked large in the strategic and economic calculations of the Europeans”.²⁵¹ In sum, the British-French global competition, traditional territorial conflicts, intractable demands and interactions of the newcomer great powers all had an impact in shaping the international society of the period.

To explain the correlation between the balance of power institution in Europe and the Prussian-Ottoman relations, general focus on the evolution of the institution requires to be noted for the date of 1718. The general balance of power in Europe evolved after the Treaty of Westphalia, after which France emerged gradually as the most prominent power in Europe. Henceforth, the period of Louis XIV instigated the European powers to function the balance of power institution in order to limit the superior power of France. The death of Louis XIV opened a new phase in Europe with a significant decline in the military power of France. This fact paved the way for two other rising powers: Britain and Austria.²⁵² The 18th century started with a global competition between France and Britain along with a balance of power institution in Europe. With the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, balance of power mechanism was accepted to be a major component of European politics.²⁵³ With

²⁵⁰ At this point, Adam Watson believes that the Ottoman Empire, despite being part of the system, remained outside the rules and institutions evolved by the Europeans in contrary to the author of the dissertation. See Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 200.

²⁵¹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 136.

²⁵² For a detailed analysis of the period, see Paul Kennedy, *Türkiye İş Bankası. Kültür Yayınları; Genel Yayın No*, vol. 22, *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş Ve Çöküşleri: 1500'den 2000'e Ekonomik Değişme Ve Askeri Çatışmalar* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1996), 87-131.

²⁵³ Henry Kissenger, *Dünya Düzeni* (İstanbul: Boyner Yayınları, 2016), 48-49.

this peace treaty of 1713, the Kingdom of Prussia which was founded in 1701 was recognized as a balancing European power by the other states.

In the same period, the continuous regression from European lands following the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 started to change the Ottoman policies in Europe. The wars precipitated in 1714-1718 against Habsburg Monarchy of Austria and Republic of Venice presented both success and failures, and ended with the Passarowitz Treaty (1718).²⁵⁴ The Prussian-Ottoman diplomatic relations sparked in this period. The first letters were exchanged between the Prussian King and the Ottoman Sultan just after this treaty to offer friendship and alliance.²⁵⁵ The initial diplomatic contact between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire emerged as a policy to set up a friendship policy within the European balance of power mechanism.

This first diplomatic contact was also a general reflection of the functioning of the balance of power institution in European international society along with the increasing significance of the concept of state sovereignty in the 18th century. While two great powers of the time - Great Britain and France were competing globally, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia, contributed into the general functioning of this balance of power and also arranged their relations upon the working of this balance. In other words, while constructing the aforesaid balance of power institution in Europe, the policies of these two states were also guided by this institution as well.

The idea was simple indeed for the second half of the eighteenth century, which shaped almost all the interactions of the member states in the international society.

²⁵⁴ For a detailed analysis of The Peace of Passarowitz, see Charles Ingrao, N. Samardžić, and J. Pešalj, eds. *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718* (United States: Purdue University Press, 2011).

²⁵⁵ Kemal Beydilli, *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1988-2013), s.v. "Prusya.", available at <http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=340357> (28.08.2016)

It was to ensure the sovereignty of smaller states with a tendency to prevent any hegemonic power that can lay down law on others. The eighteenth-century statesmen were “in efforts to prevent the accumulation of such power, and so preserve both the independence of the member states of the system, great and small, and also something close to peace.”²⁵⁶ Balance of power became a feasible practice in the second half of the eighteenth century. This tendency seemed to be a result of an experience of former centuries, such as the heritage of Louis XIV. It was clear that “Louis XIV’s bid for hegemony was broken by a coalition of states in which no one was dominant. There was no successor to Louis’s claims, and no state felt strong enough to challenge the prevailing assumptions against hegemony and in favour of balance.”²⁵⁷

In order to sustain a balance within the international society, the statesmen of the era tended not to act with the instructions of the emotions such as religion, race and loyalty to a dynasty. The territories were transferable and the rulers were changeable. The main motive was to render a balance of power machinery. States attached great significance to various forms of interactions such as creating multilateral balance of trade for the matter involved.²⁵⁸ The economic sector also gave birth to new series of tools within the institutions of international society such as increasing the number of diplomatic missions or signing of new trade treaties.

The interactions in the second half of the century tried to be based on a functioning network of diplomacy and international law. “The content of diplomacy and the law of nations was more or less ideologically neutral and oriented to patterns of trade and influence, which were not dependent upon any particular principles other than

²⁵⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 201.

²⁵⁷ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 199.

²⁵⁸ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 200.

the pragmatics of competition.”²⁵⁹ In these decades, the practices were codified into a set of regulatory rules of war and peace, which became international law.²⁶⁰ The idea that states were equal in rights emerged after the middle of the eighteenth century.²⁶¹ This juridical equality and the respect to the sovereignties required specific codifications and codes of conducts among states within the international society.

Additionally, new forms of international law agreements seemed to emerge in this period. The term of “the most favoured nation” became to be status given by bilateral treaties, which served most advantageous conditions to the signatory states especially in economic sector. The first examples of this type of treaties were seen between Britain and France in 1713 and 1786.²⁶² It is remarkable that Turkey and Germany also signed similar treaties before the World War I and gave the status of most-favoured nation especially to foster their economic relations.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the tradition of natural law was dominant within the institution of international law. The rhetoric of the institution accepted that the sovereignties of the states were limited only by natural law. This argument was leaded by Hugo Grotius who was known to be the one of the prominent founders of the international law. “Grotius’s famous account of the natural law requirements of the conduct of war is perhaps the founding text of

²⁵⁹ Ian Brownlie, “The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 359.

²⁶⁰ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 24.

²⁶¹ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, “Introduction,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 7.

²⁶² Hüzeyin Pazarcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1997), 46.

international law.”²⁶³ It is also remarkable that Bull referred to Hugo Grotius in conceptualising his own way of understanding as to the international law. This thought had an impact on Bull and emphasized the incapability of the institution of international law to merely produce an order within the international society. Bull’s tendency for the natural law might have the roots from his orientation to the understanding of the social realities through the lenses of the evolved dynamics rather than the designed ones.

It is remarkable that the practices of this era referred to one prominent lawyer-diplomat, whose arguments were utilized also by Bull to theorize the conception of international society. It was Vattel, who was a Prussian subject from Switzerland that became a statesman in Saxony. He introduced the ethical and regulatory aspects for the ‘laws of nations’ in his terms. Vattel’s prevailing contribution was the juridical equality of states. He evaluated a small republic as equal to a powerful kingdom in juridical sense, unless these sovereignties were protected by a balance of power.²⁶⁴ The aforesaid law of nations in the second half of the eighteenth century based on following mechanics of state relations: “The definition of the state and its appendages, such as the territorial sea; the mechanism of establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations; the forms of treaty-making; the law of war and neutrality”²⁶⁵

With regard to the Ottoman-Prussian relations, international law tended to continue on the basis of the capitulations. However, this age witnessed the first sparks of the break-down of the Ottoman unconventional way of perpetuating international law and diplomacy. For the Ottomans, the most characteristic tool of the institution of

²⁶³ Craig Reeves, “Natural Law,” in *International Law*, ed. Tony Carty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), published online. Available at: <http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0024> (05.03.2017)

²⁶⁴ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 203.

²⁶⁵ Ian Brownlie, “The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 359.

international law was to sign capitulations. These were the codifications about “trade and residence for Europeans in the empire. These were, as their name indicates, *capitula* or chapters of detailed rules mainly concerned with the regulation of trade and extraterritorial jurisdiction. In origin they were unilateral Muslim formulations of rules to govern relations with citizens of infidel states.”²⁶⁶ Following to the fact that Europeans became more powerful at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, these capitulations were modified in favour of the European interests specifically as to the investment of capital and immunity from Ottoman law.²⁶⁷

The institution of international law also paved the way for an expanding diplomatic network. It is known that after the Utrecht settlement at the beginning of the century diplomacy became a permanent dialogue. The continuous diplomatic dialogue was accomplished by the network of resident embassies and other missions, and through the interchange of personnel in the capitals.²⁶⁸ The communication was carried out by bilateral confidential exchanges through these resident ambassadors along with negotiating and reporting.²⁶⁹ In this era, diplomatists, in each capital or court recognized each other as colleagues. They accepted themselves responsible for exchanging judgements and information, and coordinated action in line with their states’ interests. They also acted as brokers and created a system of brokerage for mediation within the international society.²⁷⁰

In consideration with these aforesaid characteristics of the nature of the diplomacy in the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire seemed to be a distinct player of the

²⁶⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 217.

²⁶⁷ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 217-18.

²⁶⁸ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 25.

²⁶⁹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 205.

²⁷⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 205.

international society. The Ottoman diplomacy, almost until the end of the 18th century was unconventional in a sense that it could not suit totally with the practices of the systemic institution of diplomacy. Nuri Yurdusev clarifies the issue such as the following:

Ottoman diplomacy... had many 'unconventional' characteristics. The Ottoman Empire did not establish resident ambassadors abroad to reciprocate the actions of the European states that sent envoys to reside in Istanbul from the beginning of the sixteenth century. The first Ottoman resident ambassador was established, in London, only in 1793. Until about the eighteenth century, the Empire did not recognize the principle of the equality of sovereignties. Ottoman statesmen did not participate in the multilateral conferences that were held from the late fifteenth century onwards. The Empire was frequently uncomfortable with the rules of procedure and protocol common in Europe. Though the ambassadors in Istanbul were granted immunities and privileges under the capitulations, from time to time they were put in the prison of the Seven Towers. The capitulations themselves were, after all, unilateral rather than bilateral instruments. Precedence within the diplomatic corps in Istanbul was a function of the whim of the Sultan or Grand Vizier. And finally, a body of professionally trained diplomatists, fluent in the diplomatic language of the time and adept in the conventional styles and manners of diplomacy, did not seriously begin to emerge before the mid-nineteenth century. These are some of the more obvious of the so-called 'unconventional' features of Ottoman diplomacy and those on which attention is customarily focused.²⁷¹

The Ottoman Empire, as an imperial system did not recognise the notion of equality until the eighteenth century. The reflection of the judicial equality of states evolved to be consolidated in the Ottoman diplomatic system throughout the century. All the expenses of the foreign envoys, whether they were temporary or permanent, were paid by the Ottoman government from the moment they entered into Ottoman territory until they left the country. In theory, they were all considered to be the guests of the Sultan. This tradition was preserved until 1794. This tradition turned

²⁷¹ A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Introduction," in *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*, ed. A Nuri Yurdusev, Studies in Diplomacy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 2-3.

out to be so popular with a saying that “If in other capitals, ambassadors lived like princes, in Constantinople they lived like the kings”.²⁷²

As noted, it is a very late tradition on part of the Ottoman Empire to send ambassadors abroad to represent the state on behalf of the Sultan.²⁷³ It was the preference of both European states and the Ottoman Empire not to send resident ambassadors before the 18th century.²⁷⁴ It was the late eighteenth century that the Ottoman resident embassies were opened in Europe. This policy became a part of the reform process only when the Empire began to lose its power in comparison to European states.²⁷⁵ However, the Kingdom of Prussia had become the prevalent country to which the Ottoman Empire felt bound to have regular diplomatic contacts in a very early period.²⁷⁶

In this era, it became common to manage the “affairs of the European international society by means of congresses of interested sovereigns or delegates, at which treaties to conclude wars were supplemented by agreements on general rules and institutions. The three principal congresses were those concluded in Westphalia in

²⁷² Philip Mansel, *Constantinople City of the World's Desire 1453-1924* (London: John Murray, 1995), 194.

²⁷³ It is a tradition for European states not to send permanent ambassadors to non-European world until the nineteenth century. See, A Nuri Yurdusev, ed., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*, Studies in Diplomacy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 27.

²⁷⁴ For a comprehensive analysis for the Ottoman diplomatic tradition before the Sultan Selim III, who opened the resident embassies in Europe in the late 18th century, see G.R.Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III”, in A Nuri Yurdusev, ed., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*, Studies in Diplomacy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 114-30.

²⁷⁵ Nuri Yurdusev, “Turkey’s Engagement with Europe: A History of Mutual Management”, in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins, St Antony's Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 280.

²⁷⁶ For a summary of early diplomatic relations, see Edip Öncü “The Beginning of Ottoman-German Partnership: Diplomatic and Military Relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire Before the World War I” (Master's thesis, Bilkent University, 2003), 5-10.

1648, in Utrecht in 1713, and in Vienna in 1815; and a number of lesser congresses were also held. Non-European states were not invited. Even the great congress of Vienna, the climax of the European society, was attended only by Christian European powers.”²⁷⁷ By these components of the institution of diplomacy, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Europe came to be regarded as a single diplomatic commonwealth of states which were resembling each other.²⁷⁸

The diplomatic engagement to conduct affairs by peaceful methods became inclined to cease for new adjustments of order. The “balance of power preserved the liberty of the member sovereigns of the European system, and especially of the smaller ones, but it did not always keep the peace.”²⁷⁹ The general status of the society, which was ‘close to peace’ witnessed several wars as well within the international society, in the second half of the eighteenth century. These wars, in general, were not the ones waged for religious causes or for creating a hegemonial order in the society. These wars seemed to be wars of adjustment: “the final means, after other pressures and inducements had not succeeded, of compelling those modifications of the balance between the states of the system which the logic of changing power dictated.”²⁸⁰ The British French global competition²⁸¹ instigated this potential in Europe and gave impetus to the institution of war. The Seven Years’ War could be one example for the matter involved, which increased the Ottoman-Prussian interactions as well.

²⁷⁷ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 24-25.

²⁷⁸ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 25.

²⁷⁹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 206.

²⁸⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 198.

²⁸¹ Adam Watson, “The European International Society and Its Expansion,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 24.

These wars began to be held by professional paid armies in uniform in which the casualties were kept to minimum.²⁸² Only sophisticated and wealthy states were in a capacity to produce and sustain such kinds of armies in this era. Western Europe became a model for these armies with an infrastructure. This model had not only arsenals to manufacture arms, but also a tax system to sustain, a bureaucracy to maintain, a social organization to support wars. “The only way to beat the Europeans turned out to imitate them, particularly through necessary military reforms.”²⁸³

3.3. Turco-German Relations:

The second half of the 18th century witnessed considerable Turco-German bilateral interactions within the dynamics of the European international society. Bull’s institutions functioned as the main regulatory mechanism for the bilateral state relations in question. In order to sketch out the relationship between Bull’s institutions and the Ottoman-Prussian relations, this part of the study concentrates on the initiation of the diplomatic relations, the wars perpetuated, the repetitive and revisioned balance of power politics under the influence of great powers, the codification of rules and commitments through treaties along with references to the principles of international law in the second half of the 18th century. However, in order to make a historical interpretation for the period involved, the foundations of these interactions in the first half of the century need to be elaborated briefly.

In the first half of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia initiated their diplomatic affairs. The exchange of letters continued with the

²⁸² Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 206.

²⁸³ Michael Howard, “The Military Factor in European Expansion”, Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 36.

appointment of Prussian special envoys for further dialogue. During this preparatory stage, due to the diplomatic rules as discussed in the previous chapter, the Ottoman – Prussian diplomatic contact was provided through the hospodar of Moldavia - tribute-paying vassal of the Ottoman Empire, or the Swedish and French missions in Istanbul. The second half of the 18th century witnessed first direct Prussian-Ottoman diplomatic dialogue via special envoys in Istanbul, then the appointment of the Prussian Ambassador to Istanbul in the 1760s and lastly the resident Turkish Ambassador in Berlin in 1797. The consolidation of the diplomatic representation in Ottoman-Prussian relations had its roots in the first half of the 18th century.

In line with the initiation of the diplomatic affairs, the Prussian and the Ottoman rulers began to negotiate upon first codification of the treaties each other. Although the parties did not sign any bilateral agreement in this phase, they prepared the ground for signing a treaty beyond the format of a capitulation. This rapprochement seem to have originated from the need for sustaining a balance of power in the European balance of power. Thus, the diplomatic negotiations and the codes of conduct within the institution of international law concentrated on a possible alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia, which were the great powers of the period actively involved in the region of the European international society. These two states also cooperated and co-acted with the global great powers – Britain and France. Rising military power of the Kingdom of Prussia and the powerful army of the Ottoman Empire played a significant role in configuring their bilateral relations with respect to the functioning of another institution - war. In accounting all of these interactions, the first half of the 18th century turned out to be a preliminary stage for Turco-German relations in operating the Bull's institutions in the European international society in the coming centuries.

The first bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire were provided just after the foundation of Prussia under the reign of Friedrich I in 1701. The Ottoman Empire sent a fifteen-member delegation headed

by the Ottoman diplomat – Asım Said Efendi to Berlin as a diplomatic gesture to the new Prussian King.²⁸⁴ According to the historical records, following to the contact of 1701, one of the earliest correspondence noted between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia dated back to 1718 in which the Treaty of Passarowitz was signed. In this period, the Ottoman bureaucracy was seeking to keep in diplomatic contact with the European powers, after the undeniable defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which formally stopped the Ottoman expansion toward Europe. The Ottoman Grand Vizier Nişancı Mehmet Paşa sent a diplomatic letter to the Prussian King Wilhelm Frederick I in order to foster cooperation between each other.²⁸⁵ The Prussian King responded both to the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman Sultan with distinct letters in 1720.²⁸⁶ This first attempt was furthered by the appointment of the Prussian bureaucrat Johannes Jurgowsky to İstanbul in order to communicate directly with the Ottoman rulers. This mission was carried out secretly, with the declared goal of buying horses during which the British envoy Abraham Stanyan mediated. This first spark of the diplomatic relations resulted with the expression of friendship, without any codified agreement or commitment.²⁸⁷

These initial interaction within the institution of diplomacy continued and consolidated throughout the following centuries. The main reason behind the initiation of the Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic relations seems to have emerged for

²⁸⁴ Kemal Beydilli, “Colmar von der Goltz Paşa’nın gelişine kadar Prusya-Almanya-Osmanlı siyasi ve askeri münasebetlerine kısa bir bakış,” in *20. Yüzyıl Başına Kadar Türk Askeri Eğitiminin Tarihi Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1983), 13.

²⁸⁵ Joseph v. Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanisches Reiches, Band 7* (Graz: Akademische Druck – U. Verlagsanstalt, 1963), 246.

²⁸⁶ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 2.

²⁸⁷ Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanisches Reiches, Band 7*, 257; Joseph V. Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi 7* (İstanbul: Üçdal Hikmet Neşriyat, 2003), 263; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Yeditepe Yayınevi*, 1.baskı ed., vol. 150., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011), 619-20; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 2-4.

the goal of articulating into the current balance of power machinery in the European international society. Especially until the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the Kingdom of Prussia was in course of consolidating its superior military power. In the meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire were hesitant to engage fully in the balance of power politics in Europe. From the Ottoman point of view, Prussia's increasing power and the related balance of power in Europe might be fragile.²⁸⁸

During this period, Frederick the Great²⁸⁹ ascended to power in the Kingdom of Prussia in 1740, which was the leading kingdom of 'German Land' at that time. He tried to expand the territory of Prussia and warred against Austrians, Holy Roman-German Empire and also with the Russian Empire and France. He conquered the Land of Silesia (located mostly in today's Poland).²⁹⁰ With the victories, The Kingdom of Prussia became one of the leading powers by its military capacity. Prussia began to be told as "An army with a state, rather than being a state with an army" in this period.²⁹¹

During the reign of Frederick the Great after 1740, the bid for a friendship and cooperation agreement with the Ottoman Empire was strengthened and the Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic affairs intensified.²⁹² In this phase, the correspondences and the negotiations were conducted with the mediation of the

²⁸⁸ Yavuz Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri: (1923-1945)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993), 2.

²⁸⁹ For a biography of Frederick the Great, see Mary Kittredge, *Frederick the Great*, World Leaders Past and Present (New York: Chelsea House, 1987).

²⁹⁰ Kennedy, *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş Ve Çöküşleri*, 131.

²⁹¹ P W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 32. For the military system of Prussia, see Walther Hubatsch, *Frederick the Great of Prussia: Absolutism and Administration* (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1975), 127-137.

²⁹² For a detailed examination of the image of Frederick the Great on part of the Ottoman Empire, see Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), 67-80.

hospodar of Moldavia who was a tribute-paying vassal of the Ottoman Empire and located geographically close to the Kingdom of Prussia. For instance, in 1740, the Prussian King, Frederick the Great sent letters to the hospodar of Moldavia who was the authorized official for conducting the Ottoman diplomatic relations in the region. Moldavia's hospodar Ghica transmitted the Prussian letters to Istanbul and acted in line with the orders of the *Bab-ı Ali*.²⁹³

Beyond the channels of communication, as discussed in the institution of diplomacy, the inevitable component of diplomacy - appointing envoys emerged as an element of Turco-German diplomatic relations in this period. The Prussian King appointed a special envoy - Seewald to improve the Prussian-Ottoman bilateral relations. Seewald exerted efforts to provide a ground for signing an Ottoman-Prussian treaty of friendship in the early years of the reign of Frederick the Great through the hospodar of Moldavia.²⁹⁴

As another tool of the institution of diplomacy, Ottoman-Prussian relations used mediators for consolidating their diplomatic relations in the first half of the 18th century. For example, before contacting directly with Istanbul, in 1745, the Kingdom of Prussia used the mediation of the Swedish mission for the Prussian-Ottoman relations involved.²⁹⁵ It is also remarkable that the Swedish mission in Turkey once again played the role of mediation and provided communication between Turkey and Germany after the World War I until the signing of the Lausanne Treaty (1923), when two countries had to suspend their diplomatic relations. During this period of time, it is known that Swedish diplomats served for the continuation of the Turco-German diplomatic affairs in the building of the German mission. After the liberation of the diplomatic relations in 1924, German

²⁹³See Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 12.

²⁹⁴ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 45; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 12.

²⁹⁵ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 15-16.

Embassy began functioning again, and the Swedish flag at the German Embassy in Istanbul was replaced with the German one.²⁹⁶

War was another active institution of the international society in the 18th century. As Bull notes, the wars were waged in relation to the balance of power politics among the great powers and pave the way for the development of the international law in this century.²⁹⁷ In the first half of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire waged successful wars in Europe. The Ottoman success in the wars against Russia and Austria in 1736-39²⁹⁸ proved its great power status, blocked the Russian expansionism and Austrian attacks in the meantime. During this period, the Ottoman Empire captured the territories from Austria it had lost in 1718, and prevented any Russian influence in the Black Sea. This period concluded with two consolidated enemies for the Ottomans: the Russian Empire and the Austrian Empire, which directly affected the institution of balance of power in the European international society.

In 1737, during the Ottoman war against Austria and Russia, the Grand Vizier Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa wrote a letter to the Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm I to prevent any Prussian contribution into any allied forces against the Ottomans. In his letter, he also requested from the Prussian King to influence other German-rooted princes for the matter involved.²⁹⁹ This attempt was the reflection of the

²⁹⁶ Cemil Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 1923-1939: İki Dünya Savaşı Arasındaki Dönemde Siyasal, Kültürel, Askeri Ve Ekonomik İlişkiler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 11.

²⁹⁷ Charles A. Jones, “War in the Twenty-first Century: An Institution in Crisis”, in *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, ed. Little and Williams, 162.

²⁹⁸ Virginia Aksan, ed., “War and Peace,” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba, vol. v. 1, *The Cambridge History of Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 101-102; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich*, 14.

²⁹⁹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 5.

Ottoman will to cooperate in the institution of European balance of power by cooperating with Prussia in the same polar.

In this course of time, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia was in favour of a cooperation to sustain the balance of power in Europe according to their interests. In the late 1740s, Frederick the Great was foreseeing a possible attack from Austrians, and perceiving threats from Russians as to the claims on Sweden. Prussian policy was to form a counter-block against Austria-Russia and the Great Britain coalition. During this period of time, A Prussian envoy called Johann de Sattler actively engaged in contacts with the Ottoman officials in order to provide a ground for signing a bilateral treaty of friendship and trade.³⁰⁰ In 1747, along with Sweden and France, the Kingdom of Prussia was seeking for the participation of the Ottoman Empire into this block. The working balance of power politics and the possibility of a great war in Europe increased diplomatic network and provided new international law commitments in Ottoman-Prussian relations. Frederick the Great contacted the French mission in Istanbul to conduct negotiations for the possible French-Prussian-Ottoman-Swedish coalition and exerted efforts particularly for a Prussian-Ottoman cooperation.³⁰¹

The institution of balance of power in these decades presents a series of alliances, codified by the institution of international law, through diplomatic mechanisms in order to sustain the a proper functioning of a balance of power. The balances in this period in some occasions prevented possible wars, while they also paved the way for the wars. For instance, in 1711 the Russians signed a treaty with the Ottoman Empire with the 'defeated' status.³⁰² At the end, they did not obey the rules of the treaty and a new war was waged by the Ottomans against the Russian Empire in

³⁰⁰ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 7, 501-02.

³⁰¹ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 18-19.

³⁰² Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 47-48.

order to dictate the articles of the signed treaty. On contrary, Turkish-Swedish alliance treaty in 1740 against Russia worked in favour of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that Russians were successful at war³⁰³, in 1739, Russians were bound to give concessions to the Ottomans at the end of the war.³⁰⁴ From the standpoint of the Ottoman decision makers, the balance of power was required and should be consolidated by international law via alliance treaties. In this vein, the Ottoman Empire and Austria in the same year agreed to renew their peace treaty. The Ottoman decision makers were not eager to engage in a new war in these years peculiarly against Austrians. In this complex network of relations, the institution of war was totally integrated into the process of decision making. The balance in question was also often re-arranged by the wars in that century. From the Turco-German perspective, Ottoman hesitance to engage in an alliance treaty was also owing from Ottoman unpreparedness for a war. Any political movement for an alliance with Prussia could spark new potential wars in Europe.³⁰⁵

In Bull's perspective, the balance of power is the master institution in an international society that enables other institutions to work and survive, as discussed in the previous chapter. Turco-German relations in the second half of the 18th century also approves this argument and presents a solidified Ottoman-Prussian bilateral interactions which based upon the machinery of the institution of balance of power configured by the volitional participation of states. In this period, the objective of sustaining a balance of power with regard to the common interests of Turco-German relations intensified diplomatic relations and produced codes of conduct within the institution of international law. All of these efforts were executed with the consideration of the policies of the global great powers - Britain and France and the great powers in the region – primarily Austria and Russia. In

³⁰³ Russia regained Azov in 1739. For the series of events in Russo-Turkish relations, see Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great: A Biography* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 97-98.

³⁰⁴ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 7, 48.

³⁰⁵ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 48.

addition to these facts, the waging wars or the possibility of waging wars played a major role for affecting the decisions in the international society. Turco-German relations in general considered the flow of these institutional practices and tried to generate alternative policies when their interests were challenged by these institutions.

The reign of Frederick the Great during 1740-1786 presented the mainline of the Ottoman-Prussian bilateral relations in this half of the century. The Kingdom of Prussia fought wars with Russia and Austria during this period of time and tried to ally with the Ottoman Empire which also perceived these two empires as hostile. The expectation for a military alliance with the Ottomans, on part of the Kingdom of Prussia, lasted in the 18th century to provide the balance of power in favour of the Prussian interests. The Ottoman – Prussian relations intensified in 1761 when a ‘Treaty of Trade and Friendship’ was signed; in 1762 when an attempt for a military alliance was about to be accomplished; in 1790 when ‘The Provisional Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire’ was signed.³⁰⁶ The revisions in the configuration of the balances such as the Prussian-Russian approachment in 1762 compelled the parties to create alternative policies principally within the framework of the Bull’s institutions. The eagerness of the parties for considering the institutional flow also owed from the changing interests and power capabilities in this century, which underlines the volitional participation of states in the international society. For instance, after the obvious defeat of the Ottomans to Russians, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 changed the roles and shifted the bid for forming a Turco-German alliance from Prussians to the Ottomans. This century presented that the trajectory of the Ottoman-Prussian relations considered primarily the working the institution of the balance of power in Europe. Two states took part in this institution against common enemies, particularly against Austria and Russia. If this alliance confronted by challenging

³⁰⁶ İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi V.4* (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2011), 97-98.

interests for the Kingdom of Prussia or the Ottoman Empire, these states tended to engage in different balance of power configurations, or inclined to produce substitutional policies within the lanes of other institutions.

The institution of the balance of power produced two major wars in the mid-1700s: Austrian Succession Wars (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). These two wars were to a significant extent the outcomes of the Franco-British global rivalry for colonization, trade and naval dominance, and the Prussian-Austrian struggle for territory and military superiority in central Europe. The latter competition was known to be 'German Dualism'³⁰⁷ evolved around the Prussian and Austrian rivalry for dominancy over German-Speaking territories. In this dualism, the fundamental territorial conflict was the Land of Silesia which lasted for decades and had been a great matter for the European balance of power.³⁰⁸

The Austrian Succession Wars in which most of the European powers engaged ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). This treaty appeased the Anglo-Franco rivalry temporarily, but on the other hand instigated the Austrian-Prussian hostility. This period served a fragile balance of power in Europe. According to this treaty, Silesia was given to Prussia, and disappointed the Austrian Empire which afterwards intended to conquer the land back. Following the treaty, Austria consolidated its cooperation with one of the prevailing military power of that time – France. In the coming years, France and Austria signed a defensive alliance in 1756.³⁰⁹ In this period, the crises between Prussia and Russia escalated, and the Prussian policy for allying the Ottoman Empire made peak against any possible war in 1750. In 1752, Frederick the Great was trying to influence the France to drive the

³⁰⁷ German dualism is a long-standing conflict and rivalry for supremacy in Central Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries over German-Speaking people.

³⁰⁸ Robert-Hermann Tenbrock, *A History of Germany*, 2d, rev. ed. (München: M. Hueber, 1979), 139-149.

³⁰⁹ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion, 2010), 108.

Ottomans into a war against the common enemies which were Austrian and Russian Empires.³¹⁰ However, these so-called enemies were hesitant to create any friction with the Ottoman Empire that might lead to a war. Despite the Austrian-Russian pact, Austrians were not willing to help Russians in case of a Russian-Ottoman war.³¹¹ The significance of these developments in accordance with the Prussian-Ottoman relations clarified the polars for the institution of balance of power at the beginning of the second half of the 18th century: Prussia was seeking an Ottoman cooperation against the Austrian-Russian block, which might be supported by a global great power – eventually by France. However, for the Ottoman-Prussian alliance; neither the policy of the Ottoman Empire, nor the Austrian and Russian policies were clear to each other in order to adopt this polarization.

On the eve of the Seven Years' War which was the war of survival for the Kingdom of Prussia, Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic affairs intensified by the appointment of Prussian special envoys for a possible treaty of alliance considering an eventual war in the European international society. Due to the Ottoman reluctance for a military alliance with Prussia, and the ongoing pacific Ottoman-Russian and Ottoman-Austrian relations, Frederick the Great decided to engage in direct diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire to foster the alliance. Following the death of Sultan Mahmud I in 1754, the Prussian king sent a special envoy immediately to Istanbul in order to improve Ottoman-Prussian relations. This envoy was the one who appointed as the first resident Prussian Ambassador to Turkey later: Gottfried Fabian Haude, or Adolf von Rexin - with his name attained for the mission. Rexin could not succeed in convincing the Ottoman decision makers for signing an alliance treaty. His first visit was lasted between the years of 1754 and 1755.³¹²

³¹⁰ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 81-82, 136-39; Kemal Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı: (Meydana Gelişi-Tahlili-Tatbiki)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1984), 4-5.

³¹¹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 22.

³¹² His actual name was Haude. However, he was called as Rexin for the mission involved. This name was belonging to a former king of Pomerania. For further details, see Uğur Kurtaran, "Osmanlı Prusya İlişkilerinin Gelişiminde Prusya Elçisi Karl Adolf Von Rexin 'in Faaliyetleri (1755-1761)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 12, no. 47 (2015): 119-121; Uğur Demir, "1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı

Following Rexin, Frederick II sent a second envoy - Varrene to İstanbul to foster a treaty for alliance in 1755.³¹³ In 1755, at the brink of the Seven Years' War, the Prussian King prepared a draft of an alliance treaty to be proposed. This treaty consisted of defensive and offensive provisions against Austria and Russia. According to the draft treaty, if the Ottoman Empire or the Kingdom of Prussia was going to be attacked, these two states were bound to retaliate together against the aggressor.³¹⁴ The history of the conjuncture in the European international society which led to this proposal was as the following:

Until 1756, the Habsburg and Bourbon (Austria and France) dynasties were hostile to one another. After the collapse of the Prussian-French cooperation, the Kingdom of Prussia signed the Westminster Alliance Treaty³¹⁵ with Britain which complicated the situation for the Ottoman-Prussian relations, in accounting the traditional cooperation between France and the Ottoman Empire.³¹⁶ After that, the dynasties of Bourbon and Habsburg signed the Treaty of Versailles and formed an alliance. Russia, afterwards joined this alliance in the same year. This trilateral alliance was endangering the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Prussia.³¹⁷ This

Diplomasisi (1756-1768)" (Ph.D. diss., Marmara University, 2012), 23; Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 188-89, 285-87.

³¹³ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 32-33.

³¹⁴ Uğur Demir, "1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi," 103-04; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 27.

³¹⁵ For a detailed analysis, see Karl W. Schweizer, *War, Politics, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Prussian Alliance, 1756-1763* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), 10-41. See also H M. Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756-1775*, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 29-31.

³¹⁶ French traditional policy in the 18th century aimed to create a barrier to the Russian westward expansion. This policy involved support for Sweden, the Ottoman Empire and Poland. See. Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers*, 64. See also, Demir, "1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi," 37-44.

³¹⁷ Schweizer, *War, Politics, and Diplomacy*, 14-19; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 34.

friction in Europe along with the British-Franco global rivalry resulted in the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, when Prussian forces pre-emptively attacked the Austrian-French and Russian block. Once again, as Bull emphasizes, the change in the balance of power created a major war in European international society for constructing a new order in the international society. The great power management played a great role in this war and changed the configuration of the balance of power. The Seven Years' War lasted between 1756 and 1763, which was known to be the first global war, fought in Europe, in India, and in America under the competition of two leading great powers: Britain and France.³¹⁸ This war involved all the great powers of that time in Europe except the Ottoman Empire, but became a significant factor which Turco-German relations took into consideration.

This change, and the harsh conditions of the war in Europe temporarily suspended the intensive efforts for the Prussian-Ottoman alliance. The Prussian special envoy Rexin in Istanbul exerted efforts once more to convince the Ottomans for an alliance against Russia and Austria. During these talks along with the Prussian draft treaty, a permission for Rexin as a resident ambassador was demanded in 1757.³¹⁹ By this pace, the failure in signing of a treaty of alliance for the institution of the balance of power tried to be substituted with an advance in the institution of diplomacy by upgrading the level of representation in Turco-German relations. The first Ottoman reaction was to ignore this demand and to declare a verbal friendship with Prussia. The ongoing peace treaties of the Ottoman Empire's with the aforesaid enemies-with Austria and Russia, and the ambiguity about the future of the Seven Years' War seemed to be effective in this reaction. The repeated Prussian proposal in this period to sign the treaty was again procrastinated in 1757 by the Ottoman bureaucracy. While warring with Austrians and Russians, the Kingdom of Prussia

³¹⁸ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 144-48.

³¹⁹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 36.

was offering collective attacks in Europe which could expand Ottoman borders especially in central Europe.³²⁰

After intensive negotiations in the light of Prussian demands for a treaty of alliance treaty, the Ottoman Empire decided only to sign a treaty of trade and friendship with the Kingdom of Prussia. The latest version of the treaty was agreed in early March 1761 which included articles as to bilateral trade, tariffs, trafficking rights, and consular rights. The exchange of notes for the treaty was carried out with a diplomatic ceremony in Istanbul on 22 March 1761.³²¹ The Frederick the Great approved the treaty on 30 May 1761 and Mustafa III approved on 27 July 1761 as an *Ahidname* (capitulation) similar to those which signed with other European powers. This treaty has the same format with those which the Ottoman Empire signed with Sicily in 1740 or with Denmark in 1756.³²² However, it was crucial that the related treaty was beyond a text of a trade agreement and included provisions for a possible political and military cooperation in the future, article 8 of which was envisioned a spill-over effect on political alliance.³²³

During this process, the Ottomans increased gradually the level of Prussian representation in Istanbul and tried to satisfy, substitute and compensate Prussian demands within the institution of diplomacy. After the exchange of the text of the signed treaty, Rexin was welcomed by the Ottoman Sultan – Mustafa III as the resident representative of the Kingdom of Prussia.³²⁴ The treaty also paved the way

³²⁰ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 40. For the detailed examination of Prussia during the war in 1757, see also A.J. Szabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763*, (Harlow, England:Pearson/Longman, 2008), 89-147.

³²¹ For detailed information about the agreement, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ed., *Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları*., 6th ed., vol. 4/2, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Xiii. Series 16 d2e 13 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011), 345-50.

³²² Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 7, 58-59.

³²³ Uğur Demir, “1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi,” 108-12.

³²⁴ Hammer, *Almanca Nüsha*, c.8, s.240,241 [Joseph v. Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanisches Reiches*, Band 8 (Wien: C.A. Hartleben's Verlage, 1832)] in Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı*

for the increase in the number of the Prussian diplomatic missions in the Ottoman land. In 1761, it turned out that the treaty with the codes of conduct about Ottoman-Prussian trade was far away from putting into effect in Walachia and Moldavia due to the lack of a harbour or a trade station in these lands. The Kingdom of Prussia demanded opening of Prussian consulates in these lands in the 1780s. As a result, the treaty (1761) in question has become the milestone for the further consular affairs in Turco-German relations. The number of consular missions to open had been a matter of fact at negotiation table in the coming decades. For instance, it follows from the related negotiations and the exchanges of notes that the Ottoman Empire bargained for a codified and signed collective defence agreement in return for opening more Prussian consulates in the Ottoman cities, when Ottoman interests turned out to be in favour of signing a treaty of alliance with the Kingdom of Prussia.³²⁵ In the coming decades, parallel to the developments in the 1760s, the Turco-German consular affairs advanced gradually.

These diplomatic missions which increased in number especially after the 18th century were the reflection of the one of the prominent characteristics of the institution of diplomacy as mentioned in the previous chapter. The diplomatic missions have a symbolic role which consolidate the existence of a working international society. Within this perspective, Turco-German relations seemed to take this fact into account while managing their relations, and also contributed to the functioning of the institution of diplomacy in the international society.

The Treaty of Trade and Friendship (1761) strengthened the will of the Kingdom of Prussia to sign a further treaty of alliance with the Ottoman Empire. This bid was sustained by continuous Prussian diplomatic efforts under the heavy circumstances of the Seven Years' War. The dynamics of the European international society was

Tarihi 4/2, 235; Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6, 625. See also Thomas Campbell, *Frederick the Great His Court and Times* Vol. III (London: Henry Colburn Publisher, 1843), 350-51 and Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 60.

³²⁵ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 144-45.

presenting a vibrant balance of power. Prussians and Ottomans had common enemies, who were primarily Austrians and Russians. These enemies were also posing a general threat to the stability in Europe.³²⁶ The Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire considered the ongoing status of the balance of power in Europe and tried to arrange their level and mode of relations within this framework.

It was clear that the ongoing balance of power led Turco-German interactions to improve their diplomatic relations at the highest level. Several letters exchanged between the Prussian King Frederick the Great, and the Ottoman Emperor Sultan Mustafa III and the Grand Vizier Koca Ragıp Paşa. For instance, in June, 1761, Frederick the Great sent letters both to the Sultan and the Grand Vizier. These letters were sent during the heavy conditions of war, which was still lasting for six years. The Prussian Ambassador Rexin was sent to İstanbul with the full authority of the Prussian King to sign a treaty of alliance.³²⁷ The Prussian King's demand for signing an alliance in the balance of power institution with the Ottoman Empire was explained in the aforesaid letters such as the following:

The aim of the common enemies of the Prussian and Ottoman Empires – Austria and Russia were not only aiming to defeat Prussia and but also to invade the Ottoman land. The lands in the Central Europe under the control of these enemies did not have defensive capacities clearly, which were also under the sphere of the Ottoman influence like the territories of Hungary and Transylvania. These enemies were pretending to seek a peace due to two reasons; one of which was the weak-position of France which could not even easily further a support to her partners, and the other one was the aim to prevent the Ottomans to involve in this balance in favour of Prussia, which would result with a total defeat for Austrian-Russian frontier. On the other hand, Russians tended to provide a reign of a Russian-prone

³²⁶ Salahaddin Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," *Belleten* 10, no. 38 (April 1946): 273.

³²⁷ Başbakanlık Arşivi, Mektup Defteri 1. Quoted in Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 273.

ruler in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and create a sphere of influence on this country (Poland), which would totally be against the articles of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) at the disadvantage of the Ottomans. Similarly, Ottoman-Russian international treaties of 1711 (Pruth) and 1720 Ottoman-Russian Treaty had articles about the protégé of the Ottomans over Polish Government.³²⁸ In 1761, the Russian Empire was already preserving the existence of their troops since five years in Poland in contrary to the international treaties signed with the Ottoman Empire.³²⁹

One of the minimalist rules for co-existence in an international society is the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (keeping of promises), which was highlighted by Bull also in the international law. In these aforementioned treaties, this principle was noted as the criterion which would pave the way for wars in case of a violation. In addition to that, with a simplistic view, the preference of the Ottoman Empire to sign a treaty of friendship and trade with the Kingdom of Prussia rather than signing a treaty of alliance was a clear proof of the respect attached for the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* in Turco-German relation in this period. If this principle had not been valued to a great extent, a Turco-Prussian treaty of alliance would have been signed without any deeper consideration, with regardless of its binding character. Turco-German relationship in this sense was particular about respecting this principle of international law.

The Ottoman Empire was asked by the Kingdom of Prussia to mobilize the Crimean Tatars against the Russian expansionism, to mobilize a military operation in Edirne - *Adrionapolis* (Ottoman city at the border of the European continent) to menace the Austrians. The Kingdom of Prussia also asked for an Ottoman declaration of immunity and protection for the Prussian diplomatic representation in Istanbul granted by the Sultan, as a diplomatic menace to the French-Austrian-Russian

³²⁸ Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 45-57.

³²⁹ Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 273-77.

block.³³⁰ In the meanwhile, the Polish Government demanded support from the Ottoman Sultan against any possible Russian invasion, during which the Russian forces were heading to Warsaw for a transit-passing with 50.000 soldiers.³³¹

In the second half of the 18th century, the institution of war worked with a great influence on the institution of balance of power, along with a huge impact on the great powers. The portrait of the Seven Years' War substantially reflected this fact. Inspired by the global rivalry between France and Great Britain, the Austrian-Russian-French alliance waged war against the Kingdom of Prussia to seize the Land of Silesia back and to limit the Kingdom of Prussia to its historical boundaries constricted to Brandenburg. Prussians, on the other hand, embarked upon war against Swedish forces in the Pomeranian War (1757-1762) and against Austrians at the Third Silesian War (1756-1763). The battles succeeded each other and increased the complexity of the relations within the international society.³³²

The calculation of the balance of power made by the Ottoman Empire was also considering the post-Seven Years' War era. There was the probability of the defeat of the Kingdom of Prussia in this Seven Years' War, which could create more powerful enemies - Austria and Russia for the Ottoman Empire.³³³ At this period, the defeat of the Prussian forces in the battle of Kunersdorf in 1759, and on 23 June

³³⁰ Başbakanlık arşivi, Hattı Hümayun tasnifi 314 quoted in Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 273.

³³¹ Başbakanlık arşivi, Cevdet tasnifi, . Hariciyye 1130 in Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 278.

³³² For a detailed examination of the period, see Franz A.J. Szabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756 -1763*, (Harlow, England:Pearson/Longman, 2008).

³³³ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 47.

1760 at the battle of Landeshut were factors for the decisions taken in the Ottoman-Prussian relations.³³⁴

The other consideration was the possibility of an emergence of a peace between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian-Russian coalition. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman Empire could engage in a difficult position after the war within the institution of balance of power.³³⁵ This probability, for the Ottoman Empire, could have the risk of confronting Prussian-Austrian-Russian block after the war. The Ottoman aim was to contribute to the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe regarding the Ottoman interests, rather than having a preponderant power or a block endangering the survival of the Empire. During this period, Turco-German relations were regulated by taking the present and the possible future configurations of the balance of power into account.

In consideration with the possibilities, the Prussian demands were not totally rejected. The Ottoman Empire decided to carry on a military practice in *Edirne* under the name of a hunting organization. This movement was supposed to become a sign of a clear alliance with Prussia to menace the common enemies of the Ottoman-Prussian block. The Ottoman response to the Prussian demands turned into a positive framework, during which the Ottomans did not want to leave the Kingdom of Prussia alone against the common enemies.³³⁶

However, this alliance could not be achieved fully for all intents and purposes, for which about 50 years afforded. The main reason behind this fact lays on the unexpected change of throne of the Russian Empire in 1762. The Empress of the Russian Empire - Tsar Elizabeth died at that year and succeeded by Tsar Peter III.

³³⁴ Hubatsch, *Frederick the Great of Prussia*, 123-24; Uğur Demir, "1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi," 105-08; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 44.

³³⁵ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 48.

³³⁶ Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 279-80.

The new Russian Emperor was adoring powerful policies of the Prussian regime and changed the Russian strategy in favour of Prussia. First, after ascending to the throne, Peter III withdrew Russian troops immediately which had formerly invaded vast Prussian territories including Berlin. This event is called as ‘miracle’ – *‘Mirakle des Hauses Brandenburg’* in German literature.³³⁷ The new ruler of the Russian Empire signed a peace treaty with the Kingdom of Prussia on 5 May 1762 and a following treaty of alliance on 19 June 1762. This pact changed the direction of the institution of balance of power in Europe, in which Prussian-Russian forces began collectively attacking the Austrian forces.³³⁸ As seen, the Russian Empire was no longer perceived as an enemy by the Prussian regime.

Until this unexpected event, the main objective of the Ottoman Empire was to balance Russia, through a cooperation with the Kingdom of Prussia, rather than standing against the Austrians. This policy was assumed to be crucial for protecting the status of Poland and for preventing any Russian aggression along the Ottoman borders. The Russian-Prussian unexpected rapprochement changed the Prussian discourse. The Prussians tried to convince the Ottoman decision makers to ally against Austria rather than targeting Russia. The Ottoman policy was revised under these circumstances and began to question the Prussian cooperation. Even, the policy of the new Tsar towards the Ottomans, whether it was going to be hostile or friendly, was not clear yet to re-act.³³⁹

Upon this development, the Prussian King took an initiative for the Ottoman-Russian rapprochement. In case of an Ottoman-Prussian-Russian pact, it was guaranteed by the Prussian delegations that the Russian Empire was going to obey

³³⁷ Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers*, 37-44; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 67.

³³⁸ David R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 75; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 68.

³³⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/2, 235-36.

the articles of the Treaty of 1711, and to remain neutral in case of an Austrian-Ottoman war.³⁴⁰ With the mediation of the Crimean Khan, the Ottomans were assured that the Russians were going to collapse their own castles on the Ottoman borders, to give the Castle of *Azak* (Azov) back to the Ottomans, and to give considerable amount of Turkish-rooted captives from Caucasus back to the Ottomans.³⁴¹ Upon this development, Ottomans requested an official note of approval for these proposals from the Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire.³⁴² This demand also was a clear indicator that Turco-German relations were inclined to obey the instructions of the institutions of diplomacy and international law. They hesitated to act without the guarantees of the codified documents of the international law and the methods of the diplomacy.

The possible Prussian-Russian-Ottoman cooperation was thought to work for the Ottoman interests in İstanbul. Any war to be waged against Austrians was likely to result with recapturing of former Ottoman lands back in Europe. The discussed alliance between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire, with the support of the Russian Empire was about to be finalized.³⁴³ The proposal in 1762 was that the Ottoman Empire was going to dispatch the Crimean army for the interests of Prussians and initiate a war against Austrians in central Europe. A draft treaty for the alliance was again prepared for the Prussian-Ottoman relations.

³⁴⁰ Tansel, “Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında,” 286-87; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 74.

³⁴¹ Tansel, “Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında,” 282.

³⁴² Başbakanlık Arşivi, Emiri tasnifi, Siyasi karton, 11989 in Tansel, “Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında,” 283.

³⁴³ It was of a great discussion to sign an alliance treaty with a Christian empire which required ratification of the bureaucratic and religious authorities of the Ottoman political system. After intensive discussions, The Sublime Porte responded positively to Prussians and decided to act with Prussia in the balance of power institution of Europe at that time. Demir, “1768 Savaşı öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi,” 108-11.

However, at this period of time, The Russian Emperor Peter III was dethroned and the future of the Russian policies became ambiguous.³⁴⁴ At the end, the Ottomans officially refused to sign a treaty of alliance in December 1762. The unclear and changing policies of Russia, the pacific relations with the Austrians, the pragmatic but unreliable Prussian standpoint declined the possibility of a Prussian-Ottoman alliance.³⁴⁵ The ambiguous cooperation between Prussia and Russia had a negative impact on the Sublime Porte, and the possible alliance on table was procrastinated by the Ottoman Empire before signing on 14 October 1762.³⁴⁶ The Ottoman Sultan and the Ottoman bureaucracy at the end decided to wait and act in accordance with the future of the Prussian-Russian relationship which would have a great impact on the institution of balance of power in Europe.³⁴⁷

This event could also be noted for the Turco-German relations as considering the relations among great powers – Russia and Prussia, and the related balance of power politics. During this process, it was clear that the working of the institution of balance of power did not fully satisfy the needs of the Turco-German relations. The unclear position of the Prussian strategy towards the Russians and the following Ottoman reluctance due to the reasons mentioned above motivated Turco-German relations to find out alternative policies within the dynamics of the international society. The increased level of Prussian requests was then replied with an alternative policy. During this phase, the Ottoman Empire proposed the

³⁴⁴ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 74-75.

³⁴⁵ For the details of the vibrant Prussian-Russian relations following the Russian coup in 1762 during which Peter III was dethroned by his own wife, Catherine II - the following Tsarina, see H.M. Scott, "Frederick II, the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Russo-Prussian Alliance of April 1764," *European Studies Review* 7, (1977), 157-58. See also Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 77.

³⁴⁶ Scott, "Frederick II, the Ottoman Empire," 164; Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 285.

³⁴⁷ Başbakanlık arşivi, Hattı Hümayun tasyifi, 2987 quoted in Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 288.

participation of the great power - Great Britain in the aforesaid alliance with the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. The institution of balance of power, from the Ottoman perspective could be effective only with the support of the Great Britain, in case of a possible confrontation by France. In order to eliminate this threat with the help of the British Empire, the Ottomans gave their consent to sign the treaty of alliance in a multilateral form as Turco-Anglo-Prussian version.³⁴⁸ Britain and France in those years were already fighting in different territories of the world as a part of the colonial competition. Being aware of the current balance of power, the Ottoman Empire tried to re-configure the Turco-German relations and the alliance in question in line with the parameters of the institution of great power management in those years. However, this alternative configuration of the institution of balance of power was not accepted by the British decision makers.³⁴⁹

The Seven Years' War became so destructive and unsustainable for all states.³⁵⁰ The heavy economic burden of the war revealed that the parties could not cover the expenses of the war-time. The war ended in February 1763 with two treaties; one of which was the Treaty of Paris between France, Spain and Great Britain, and the other one is Treaty of Hubertusburg between Saxony, Austria and Prussia.³⁵¹ As a result, Prussia consolidated as a new European great power with its strong military capacity and preserved the Prussian suzerainty over Silesia.³⁵² Butterfield argues about the further developments as the following, which he refers the period as one of the clearest example of a balance of power:

³⁴⁸ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 42-43.

³⁴⁹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 44.

³⁵⁰ Kennedy, *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş Ve Çöküşleri*, 131-136; Başbakanlık arşivi, Emiri tasnifi, siyasi karton, 11989 quoted in Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 283.

³⁵¹ Hubatsch, *Frederick the Great of Prussia*, 126.

³⁵² Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 144-48.

After 1763, when both Russia and Prussia had emerged greatness, you had a curious triangle of forces in Eastern Europe – Austria, Russia, Prussia all poised against one another, all crouching like tigers ready for a spring. If one gained an advantage the other two would draw together to redress the balance and secure, compensation – there was constant switching and interchange amongst the three ballet dancers- it is the most intensive application of the principle of the balance of power I have ever seen in the history. But if those three Powers ever agreed on a policy, the Western states, England and France, for example – could never stop them in Eastern Europe. And that is how the partition of Poland was able to take place – there might be a balance in Eastern Europe, but there was a defect in the overall European balance-system.³⁵³

During the process of all of these events, the Ottoman Empire became bound to understand the Prussian possible policies in the near future in accordance with the institution of balance of power in the international society. For the matter involved, the Ottoman Empire sent Ahmed Resmi Efendi to Berlin to understand the sincerity and will of Frederick the Great about any Ottoman-Prussian alliance, taking the Prussian-Russian rapprochement into account. This Ottoman act was out of the traditional diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire. It was neither a special occasion such as ascending to the throne, or a wedding nor a course of signing a treaty after a war. The immediate alliance with the Russian Empire and the sudden change of the Russian throne created risks for the Kingdom of Prussia. Frederick the Great was in risk of being isolated in case of an emergence of Russian animosity. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing similar conditions and seeking for cooperation to survive in the institution of European balance of power.

In order to understand the Prussian strategy, The Ottoman Government sent Ahmed Resmi Efendi as the first Ottoman envoy (not with the status of ‘ambassador’) to Berlin for the required negotiations in May 1763.³⁵⁴ Ahmed Resmi Efendi with his delegation with seventy three members was accepted to be hosted by Berlin. The Ottoman delegation entered to the city of Berlin with a ceremony on 7 November

³⁵³ Herbert Butterfield, “The Balance of Power,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 144.

³⁵⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/2, 233-35.

1763 and stayed in Berlin for six months.³⁵⁵ This date was selected to be celebrated as the 250th year of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany in 2013.³⁵⁶ However, the first resident ambassador of the Ottoman Empire became later Ali Aziz Efendi who was sent to Berlin in 1797.³⁵⁷

In his memoirs, Ahmed Resmi Efendi explains the details of his diplomatic visit to Berlin, and gives details about the protocol rules of the Prussian Kingdom which was the leading Kingdom of the German land at that time, and his negotiations.³⁵⁸ Before departing from Berlin, the Prussian King gave him the letter for exchange to be submitted to the Ottoman Emperor. He completed his visit and returned to Istanbul in 1764 after one year.³⁵⁹

At this phase, Turco-German relations began to exchange envoys in order to activate the institution of diplomacy. As the reciprocal counterpart of the resident Prussian diplomatic representation, the Ottoman Empire used a special envoy to fulfil the functions of the institution of diplomacy: to gather information about Prussian strategies and to negotiate a possible cooperation. It follows from Ahmed

³⁵⁵ Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), 114-15; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 80-83.

³⁵⁶ Die Bundesregierung, Mitschrift Pressekonferenz, "Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem Ministerpräsidenten der Türkei, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", 31.10.2012. available online at <https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2012/10/2012-10-31-merkel-erdogan.html> (01.04.2016); Deutsche Welle, "Büyükelçiliğin açılışını Erdoğan Yapacak", 29.10.2012. Available at <http://www.dw.de/b%C3%BCy%C3%BCkel%C3%A7ili%C4%9Fina%C3%A7%C4%B1%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1n%C4%B1-erdo%C4%9Fan-yapacak/a-16341120> (16.08.2016)

³⁵⁷ Ercüment Kuran, "1793-1811 Döneminde İlk Osmanlı Mukim Elçilerinin Diplomatik Faaliyetleri", in ed. İsmail Soysal, *Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. VII. Dizi*, vol.

³⁵⁸ Virginia H. Aksan, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage*, vol. 3, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 67-99; Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi'nin Viyana Ve Berlin Sefaretnameleri*, trans. and edited by Bedriye Atsız Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, 1980), 63-71.

³⁵⁹ Efendi, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi'nin*, 70-71.

Resmi Efendi's memoirs that the Ottoman Empire, in the 18th century was following diplomatic rules and codes with the Kingdom of Prussia and engaged in volunteer efforts to take part in the functioning of the systemic institution of diplomacy in the European international society. The official visit of Ahmed Resmi Efendi fostered the negotiations for signing a treaty for alliance as well. At this time, Turkish-Austrian peace treaty was to cease and the Russian involvement in Poland was problematic for the Sublime Porte. The Ottomans were eager to take part in the institution of balance of power in Europe within this context.³⁶⁰

However, on the other hand, Prussia was in efforts to manipulate the Russian foreign policy with using the affairs with the Ottoman Empire. According to Scott, hosting of Ahmed Resmi Efendi in Berlin for a long stay became enough to produce a spectre of an Ottoman-Prussian alliance from the Russian point of view. Frederick the Great in this sense seemed to have used the 'Ottoman trump card' through negotiations with the Ottoman internuncio to shape the great power management and the related balance of power in this period. Prussian support was an essential prerequisite for the Russian success in the future of Poland in contrary to the Ottoman needs. On the other hand, Frederick the Great was exerting efforts to gain a secured alliance with Russia. With this insurance, Prussia was planning to prevent any Austrian attack in the foreseeable future which might occur as a revenge of the Seven Years War. As a result, Catherine II's fear of Ottoman – Prussian alliance paved the way for a Russian treaty with Prussia.³⁶¹

The Kingdom of Prussia signed an alliance treaty with Russia on 11 April 1764. This alliance treaty created doubts in Istanbul for further Ottoman-Prussian affairs. Bab-ı Ali considered the Prussian-Russian alliance as a potential threat for the

³⁶⁰ Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 290.

³⁶¹ Scott, "Frederick II, the Ottoman Empire," 165-70.

Ottomans, which they thought that it could work against the Ottoman Empire.³⁶² During this period, the Russia was still in tendency to cooperate with Austria. The issue of Poland raised simultaneously, which was of a crucial problem for the Ottoman foreign policy in Europe. The Russian demands in Poland, the Prussian unclear strategy posed risks to the ongoing order. In this process of uncertainty, the demands for an Ottoman-Prussian alliance could not meet sufficiently.

During this turmoil with regard to the institution of balance of power, the Ottoman reluctance towards an Ottoman-Prussian pact continued. The defeat of the Prussian army in a battle in December 1764 also cultivated this process, and certainly effected the Ottoman decision. Indeed, the main focus of the Prussian King was to benefit from the Russian-Prussian rapprochement as a tool to mobilize the Ottomans against Austria.³⁶³ The Ottoman procrastination for signing an alliance treaty with the Kingdom of Prussia, and Prussian decreasing demand for an Ottoman alliance after the Prussian-Russian rapprochement curtailed the possibility of the alliance. In the succeeding period, the Ottoman cabinet, along with the approval of the Sultan refused the Prussian demand for an alliance officially in 1765.³⁶⁴ The process of negotiations for signing an alliance treaty failed. Regin was re-called from Berlin in 1765. Within this process, it is certain that the successes and failures in the institution of wars were considered by the Ottoman-Prussian relations. The more the parties gained successes in the battles, the more the tendency occurred for cooperation in bilateral state interactions. Besides the fact that the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire never waged wars against one another, these two states kept following their performance at wars during the century in order to understand their power capabilities for the adjustment of their bilateral relations. The similar event also happened in the 1790 period during which

³⁶² Scott, "Frederick II, the Ottoman Empire," 157-58; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 92.

³⁶³ Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 290-291.

³⁶⁴ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 8, 255; Tansel, "Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında," 292.

the Ottoman successes and resistance at battles motivated the Kingdom of Prussia to sign the treaty of alliance, which will be analysed in the further parts.

Following the failure of signing of an alliance treaty, Ottoman-Prussian relations were reshaped by the new reconfigurations of the institution of balance of power in the European international society during the period of 1768-1774. The power competition over Poland paved the way for an Ottoman-Russian war between 1768 and 1774.³⁶⁵ During this period of time, the Turkish bid for signing an alliance with the Kingdom of Prussia increased. Formerly, the Ottoman Empire was to a great extent reluctant to form an alliance with the Kingdom of Prussia during the 1756-65 period. However, the balance was changed in favour of the Prussians with the assistance of the Prussian-Russian alliance. Under these circumstances, the Kingdom of Prussia hesitated to engage in a pact with the Ottoman Empire, in order not to erode the Prussian-Russian relations. On the other hand, this policy had its own limitations for Prussia. A stronger Russia in the future might threaten the Kingdom of Prussia in the following years. The optimal solution for the Prussian was to render a balance of power politics for the matter involved, in a way that the Russian Empire was not going to be likely to be a preponderant power in the coming years. Otherwise the dominance of Russia in the region could also pose substantial risks for the survival of Prussia within the European international society. In accounting these facts, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire seemed to have a consensus on the proper functioning of the institution of balance of power to prevent any Russian preponderance in the region.³⁶⁶

This policy clearly reflected the core of the conception of the balance of power in Bull's lenses. The basic motivation for providing the balance of power, as discussed in the theory chapter, is to preserve a state of affairs that no one power is in a

³⁶⁵ For further details about the 1768-1774 period, see Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*, Modern Wars in Perspective (Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2007), 130-60.

³⁶⁶ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 98.

position to be able to lay down law to others and become preponderant. This status is assumed to be achieved by the volitional participation of states, in consideration the fact that without the balance of power machinery, the international law has the risk to be inefficient to sustain the order. In this case, Ottoman-Prussian decision makers volitionally and gradually agreed on a common policy in order to prevent the Russian Empire to become preponderant within the international society.

During the 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian war, the demands of the Russian Empire came to threaten the Austrian territories. Upon the threats both from the Russian Empire and its well-known enemy – the Kingdom of Prussia, Austrian Empire reconciliated with the Ottoman Empire and signed a bilateral agreement to have the Ottoman financial assistance. Despite this détente, due to the ambiguous series of alliances, Austrian Empire did not constrain herself from increasing the number of troops in Austrian-Ottoman borders in contrary to the aforesaid rapprochement. The lack of trust was clear for these turbulent years, during which states engaged in various pacts and alliances and re-arranged the institution of balance of power repetitively. At this point, in line with the Bull's argument, states did not trust merely on the institution of international law in their bilateral relations, but also tried to empower their capacities to play on the ground of balance of power, by being aware of the fact that international law was not sufficient to preserve the order without the institution of balance of power.

The Prussian King, in the course of the aforementioned Ottoman-Russian war, acted against one of the vital interests of the Ottoman Empire and proposed the partition of Poland, for the first time in the history (1771-1772). The traditional Ottoman influence over Polish Government turned the issue into a great matter of tension. Through this partition, the Prussian aim was to mitigate the tension in the region particularly between Austria and Russia by giving them Polish territories.

At the end, the first partition of Poland was undertaken by Prussia, Russia and Austria.³⁶⁷

The successor of Frederick the Great – Frederick Wilhelm II participated into the second and third partition-division and sharing of Poland and tried to consolidate good relations with the Russian Empire. On the other hand, to have a victory against France, Prussia engaged in cooperation with Austria. This framework within the institution of balance of power was totally at the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire.³⁶⁸ The Ottoman concerns on Poland and the Prussian close relationship with two primary enemies of the Ottoman Empire – Russia and Austria changed the nature of the Ottoman-Prussian relations. In this period, the Ottoman-Prussian bilateral relationship was constructed in a peculiar path by taking these developments into account. Within the rapid changes in the international society, it was hard to identify the camps, or blocks for future policies.

It is remarkable that the Ottoman-Prussian relations were not cooperative until the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca which ended the Turco-Russian war officially and gave independence to Crimea. The land of Crimea had gradually become a conflictual land for which several wars waged between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire in the following decades, such as the wars in 1783 or in 1856. The starting point of this continuous trouble which had effected the working of the institution of balance of power and war was the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), on which the Kingdom of Prussia was said to have played a mediator role in favour of the Ottoman Empire before its approval.³⁶⁹ After the

³⁶⁷Scott, *The Emergence of the Eastern Powers*, 211-224. For a general overview of partitioning of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, see also Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia to 1855 V. 1* (New York –Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 247-51.

³⁶⁸ Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar: Berlin Antlaşmasından Harb-i Umûmîye Kadar Avrupa-Almanya Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1999), 40.

³⁶⁹Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6, 661-73; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 101-04.

approval of the treaty, the Kingdom of Prussia continued to play a mediation role between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. However, it turned out that Prussian policies were heavily dependent on the behaviour of the aforesaid “miracle” provider Russian Empire. Frederick the Great was in close cooperation with Catherine II – Empress of Russia and even prepared an invasion plan for Russians to be used against the Ottoman Empire. This plan was implemented by the General Rumenzov in the following years.³⁷⁰ In 1777, Prussian-Russian Alliance treaty was renewed, as a sign of their collaboration³⁷¹, which complicated the institution of balance of power for the Ottoman Empire and the regarding Ottoman-Prussian relations as well.

After long series of conflicts, Aynalı Kavak Treaty ended the Russian-Ottoman conflict on 13 May 1779.³⁷² After this date, considering the clear alliance and cooperation between Prussia and Russia, the Ottoman policy makers came to foster a Prussian-Russian-Ottoman alliance. Within this context, it was aimed to eliminate the Russian threats and the Austrian aggression simultaneously through a revision in the institution of balance of power institution in favour of the Ottomans.³⁷³ The negotiations between Prussian and Ottoman officials resulted with a draft treaty in Berlin. This alliance was formulated as a defensive alliance. The articles of the treaty was referring to a collective defence upon any aggression to any of them. This treaty was agreed to be a secret one. The draft was proposed to the Russian Empress- Catherine II by the Prussian envoy Graf Panin. However, the draft was not only refused by the Russian Empress but also eroded the future of Russian-Prussian relations. The certain opposition of the Russian Empress for any kind of

³⁷⁰ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 106.

³⁷¹ Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (London: Phoenix, 2002), 378; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 104.

³⁷² Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 159-60; Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, (London: Phoenix, 2002), 386; Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı*, 24-27.

³⁷³ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 109-13.

rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire eliminated the chances for a new balance of power on the axis of a Prussian-Russian-Ottoman alliance.³⁷⁴ This initiative was also a clear example for the functioning of the institution of diplomacy, during which the Kingdom Prussia played a key diplomatic role to mitigate Turco-Russian tension.

This intractable status of the institution of the balance of power emerged while the global great powers of the time France and the Great Britain were competing in the American continent and waging the American wars. The global British and French wars prevented their intervention into the European competition during this time. They were not in a position to manage the relations in Europe, and even found themselves in seeking a mediation from the rising great power - Russian Empire.³⁷⁵ Considering the fact that great power management could not fully manage the ongoing institution of balance of power in Europe during this time, Prussian-Ottoman relations survived for a while via regional dynamics, without any clear impact of the British-French axis. However, the institution of great power management started to work and affect the dynamics on the European continent after the peace treaty between France and Britain which was signed in 1783 in Paris routing their global competition. After this point, France began to balance the Russian aggressions. The Ottoman – French diplomatic negotiations entered into a new phase along with a new Spanish-Turkish trade agreement, which became the sparks of the new balance in Europe.³⁷⁶ On the other hand, Russian Empire was in

³⁷⁴ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 9, 23-24; Kemal Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul University Press, 1985), 117; Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 40. For the details of the related Russian policy, see also Isabel De Madariaga, *Catherine the Great a Short History*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), 80-90.

³⁷⁵ Dominic Lieven, *The Cambridge History of Russia Volume II Imperial Russia, 1689-1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 511-12; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia to 1855 V. I* (New York –Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 251-52; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 126.

³⁷⁶ Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6, 251-52; Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 129-130.

contact with the Austrian Empire to ally against the Ottoman Empire. The Kingdom of Prussia, on the other hand, was seeking a detente and peace process, not to allow any of the powers to be preponderant in Europe which could work at the disadvantage of Prussia. The Ottoman Empire, perceiving an animosity from the Russian Empire and the Austrian Empire, tended to cooperate with the Kingdom of Prussia.³⁷⁷ As seen, the great powers of the era produced the dynamics of the balance of power and tried to give a central direction to the international society. These great powers involved were active in utilizing the institutions of the society as discussed in the previous chapter.

The aforementioned great power management paved the way for another rapprochement in Ottoman-Prussian relations within the institution of balance of power. In this period, following the rapprochement between Austria and Russia, Grand Vizier of the time Kara-Vezir Seyyid Mehmet Paşa considered the Austrian-Russian alliance as one of the most dangerous threat against the Ottoman state.³⁷⁸ The Ottoman Empire's only possible ally could be Prussia. On the other hand, Frederick the Great was aware that Russia in the near future, if cooperated with the Austrians, could turn into a hegemonic enemy for Prussia in Europe as well. Thus, Prussian King did not hesitate to render friendly relations with the Ottomans during this period of time, by taking the risk of eroding Prussian-Russian relations. In this vein, the Ottoman Empire tried to cooperate with the Kingdom of Prussia and to strengthen its military power for a possible war in the future. In 1782-1785 period, the first time in the history, The Prussian army was taken as a model for the Ottoman army. The official demands of the Ottoman Empire from the Kingdom of Prussia for hosting Prussian military experts in Turkey was rejected due to the vulnerable Prussian-Russian relations.³⁷⁹ As noted in the introduction part, the spirit of the

³⁷⁷ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 122. For the dynamics before the 1787-1792 Ottoman-Austrian-Russian War, see also Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 9, 41-73.

³⁷⁸ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 123.

³⁷⁹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 125.

century accommodated limited wars for the order in the international society in this era. The Ottoman-Prussian rapprochement came to produce military cooperation during this period, in order to be ready for a possible war in the international society.

In these years, the Ottoman army was fighting against the Austrian and Russian forces in the same war. The Prussian officials were estimating the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and kept their distance for signing a treaty of alliance with the Ottoman Empire in the first years of the 1780s. Prussian decision-makers could not foresee the capabilities of the warring states correctly and noted: “No one could imagine that an Ottoman Army could resist and protect its frontiers along the river of Danube against a well-equipped 300.000 troops of Austrian-Russian block.”³⁸⁰ However, the Ottomans were expecting support from the Prussian forces after the declaration of the Ottoman war against the Austrian-Russian block, which was agreed to be a block of common enemies. The Ottoman successes at the battlefield changed the situation gradually. Especially after the Ottoman successes of the battles of *Muhadiye* and *Şebeş* against Austrian forces between the dates of 30 August 1783 – 7 September 1783, a Turco-German rapprochement occurred.³⁸¹ Again, in this example, the success at the battlefields, or in other words the institution of war, considered in Ottoman-Prussian relations and led to a possibility of an alliance in the near future.

In the following years, against the common threats perceived from Austria and Russia, Ottoman-Prussian rapprochement re-emerged by the reign of the new Prussian King – Frederick Wilhelm II in 1786.³⁸² The new King of Prussia-Frederick Wilhelm II and the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid I agreed to increase the level of the Prussian resident diplomatic representation in 1787. In this period, the

³⁸⁰ Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6, 474.

³⁸¹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 166-68.

³⁸² Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/1, 559.

trajectory of the Prussian consular missions in the Ottoman Empire was as the following: Sultan Abdulhamid I accepted the opening of the Prussian Consulate in Jassy in 1786 as a gesture to the new Prussian King. The opening of the several consulates followed this development. Until the end of the reign of Abdulhamid I - 1789, the Ottoman Empire allowed for Prussian consulates in Aleppo, Cyprus, İzmir, Crete, Saida, Morea, Tripoli, Alexandria, Euboia, Thessalonica, Baghdad, Chios and Rhodes.³⁸³

It is remarkable that in the next century, German consulates in the Ottoman territory increased in number and spread widely. For instance, in 1842, a German consulate was opened in Jerusalem. Before the World War I, in 1912, the number of German consulates on the Ottoman land was about 20. Three of them located in Mesopotamia (Mosul, Baghdad and Basra), seven of them in Syria and Lebanon (Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem), two of them were in Adana and Mersin, and two of them in the Black sea region (Samsun and Trabzon).³⁸⁴ All of these consulates consolidated the consular affairs with special immunities provided a solid base for further political cooperation in Turco-German relations gradually after 1761.

The balance of power in Europe was fragile. By the Herzberg Plan, the Kingdom of Prussia was seeking to shape the European politics in favour of the Prussian interests. This plan was also tried to be used as a way of intermediation which was totally to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. The sovereignty over Poland was challenged, and the share of the Ottoman adjacent lands was proposed to Russian Empire. In order to convince the Ottoman Empire for the plan and the possible detente, the Prussian envoy Colonel von Götze was appointed to held negotiations

³⁸³ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 147-51. (see also footnotes)

³⁸⁴ Cenk Reyhan, "Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı (1878-1914)," *Belleten* 69, no. 254 (April 2005): 13.

in Istanbul.³⁸⁵ At the end, the Kingdom of Prussia decided to play the role of mediation at the negotiations of a peace treaty at the end of the Russian-Austrian-Ottoman War³⁸⁶, through a consensus between Ottoman and Prussian delegations in 1789. The next year, a complicated alliance treaty was signed between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire.³⁸⁷ This period faced a gradual improvements in the institution of diplomacy by upgrading the representation levels, providing meditations, negotiations for balance of power.

In line with the instructions of the institution of diplomacy, Prussian envoys used the tools of diplomacy efficiently. The Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic communication based on a subtle and tactful techniques as noted in the previous chapter. For instance, in 1788, following to the Austrian-Russian-Ottoman War, on the eve of intensive peace talks, the Prussian envoy implied that the Kingdom of Prussia could ally with Russia in the near future, which would eventually threaten the Ottoman Empire drastically.³⁸⁸ During this period, indeed, the Kingdom of Prussia was seeking for a cooperation with the Ottoman Empire to prevent any Russian aggression against herself. As a result, the Kingdom of Prussia was seen as an unreliable partner by the Ottomans. The Bab-ı Ali perceived that Prussian shift from Prussian-Ottoman to a Russian-Prussian alliance was possible in the near future.

The Ottoman supreme consultant committee '*meşveret meclisi*' advised the Sultan to take the current great power management into account and to side with French-

³⁸⁵ For further details about the mission of Goetze, see Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6, 465- 523.

³⁸⁶ Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 160-67.

³⁸⁷ Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi* 7, 236.

³⁸⁸ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 173.

Spanish block or the British-Prussian block for the future.³⁸⁹ Upon this advice, the demand for operating the institution of balance of power was decided to be provided by an articulation of an alternative policy. The Ottoman Empire asked for the articulation of Great Britain³⁹⁰ into this Ottoman-Prussian treaty of alliance and tried to use the institution of the great power management to strengthen and consolidate the Prussian-Ottoman relations. This was a tactic that was used in the talks for the failed alliance in the 1760s. The same policy was put on the agenda towards the Prussians in order to guarantee the commitments given by the will of another great power- Britain. As a result, it was decided to support the British-Prussian block, and a draft treaty was proposed to the Prussian Kingdom, under the following conditions:

- 1) The Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire will sign a treaty of alliance.
- 2) War compensation will be given to the Ottoman Empire by the Austrian Empire
- 3) The Great Britain and Flemenk along with Sweden will join Prussian-Ottoman alliance
- 4) Great Britain will prevent Russian navy's accession to the Mediterranean Sea
- 5) Prussians will approve the Ottoman claim on Crimea.
- 6) Prussians will share the burden of the war
- 7) Austrian and Russian trade ships will be blocked in the Black Sea³⁹¹

As seen, this proposal seeks to consider the functioning of the institution of great power management, by preserving a general balance of power. British-French competition maintained to be the backbone of the rivalry. The proposed alliance also aimed to limit the ongoing war and manage the crisis involved. It also targeted a certain amount of local preponderance, such as the Ottoman one over Crimea. In consideration with the blockade and restriction of Russian ships in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, this proposal was also managing the great power

³⁸⁹ Enver Ziya Karal, ed., *Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları*., 9th ed., vol. 5, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Xiii. Series 16 e8 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011), 18; Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı*, 57-60.

³⁹⁰ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 177.

³⁹¹ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 179.

politics by respecting the sphere of influences among the great powers. The proposal as a whole, seemed to operate the most of the assumed functions of the great power management.

The tensions between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire increased in the following period, and a war was declared on 17 August 1787 between them. The Austrian Empire joined the war on 9 February 1788 against the Ottoman Empire. These developments produced an alliance between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire in 1790 against the historical enemies of Austria and Russia.³⁹² However, the Prussian reluctance to war with the Russian Empire in particular, and the efficient Prussian menace over Austria prevented a greater war between the blocks.³⁹³ The critical point here is that, the Ottoman-Prussian relations in this period of time was indexed to the possibility of war. The success and failures of the German or Turkish forces also had an impact on the Turco-German relations. The successes in the battle fields created more tendency for cooperation in Turco-German relations throughout the history.

Another crucial year for understanding the role of the institution of balance of power in Turco-German relations in the 18th century is the year of 1790. The signing of a treaty of alliance between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire in 1790 enabled the parties to involve in common policies in the balance of power institution in Europe. Cooperation against Austria was fruitful and operated the balance of power in favour of these two countries. On the other hand, Prussian's bifurcated policy towards Russia limited the gains of the Ottomans in this period.

³⁹² Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/1, 560-61; Namık Sinan Turan, *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi Osmanlı Diplomasisinin İzinde* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 265-66; Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı*, 67-70.

³⁹³ Kemal Beydilli, *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1988-2013), s.v. "Prusya.", available at <http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=340357> (28.08.2016)

The treaty of alliance in 1790 became a milestone in Ottoman-Prussian relations.³⁹⁴ From that date on, not only for wars but also for the preparation of wars, these two states began to cooperate. The military capabilities, and the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire was assisted by the Kingdom of Prussia for further cooperation. For instance, The Prussian demand for observing the commanding centre of the Ottoman Army was discussed at high level Ottoman bureaucracy and refused by the military officials. In order to satisfy the Prussian king, at last, Prussian experts were accepted to enter into headquarter of the Ottoman army secretly as Prussian doctors to give medical support.³⁹⁵

The treaty of alliance was both for defensive and offensive goals. During this period, the balance of power institution, contributed by Prussian-Ottoman alliance worked against Austria but not exactly against Russia. Despite the fact that Ottoman Army fought Austrians in line with the Prussian demands, Prussians did not mobilize their army at Russian frontiers and disappointed the Ottoman expectations from the alliance which could be a chance to recapture Crimea.³⁹⁶ The crucial point about the treaty of 1790 was the Prussian reluctance to wage war with the Russian Empire despite the instructions of the treaty signed which reflected the significance of the freedom of act of states in the international society. The volitional participation of the states imposed a direct confrontation to the automatic configuration of balance of power, even they are guaranteed by the codes of conducts by the institution of international law.

The complex Ottoman-Prussian relations intensified the diplomatic interactions. The Ottoman Sultan sent an experienced Ottoman envoy to the Prussian King for

³⁹⁴ For the full text of the treaty, see Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı*, 144-48.

³⁹⁵ Beydilli, *Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar*, 186. For the list of Prussian military officials of the 18th century in the Ottoman Empire, see Veli Yılmaz, *1 nci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk-Alman İttifakı ve Askeri Yardımlar*, (İstanbul:Cem Ofset, 1993), 34.

³⁹⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/2, 237.

understanding the Prussian policy line. This envoy became the first resident ambassador of the Ottoman Empire to Prussia - Ali Aziz Efendi in 1797. These series of events concluded with Treaty of Sistova – *Ziştovi* and Treaty of Jassy – *Yaş*. Austria-Turkish War (1787-1791) ended with the Treaty of *Ziştovi*, and the Treaty of *Yaş* concluded the Russian-Turkish War (1787-1792).³⁹⁷ Despite the fact that the Ottomans could re-gain some territory in the central Europe from the Austrians, Ottoman policy to recover the failures of the 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian War, and the possibility to annex Crimea failed.³⁹⁸ With these settlements, it is argued that the Ottoman Empire entered into the phase of disintegration by the Treaty of *Yaş* (1792).³⁹⁹ The Ottoman Empire ceased to play a determining role in European balance of power. This period coincided with the ‘French Revolution’, and the Ottoman Empire engaged into preserving the integrity of the Empire, by trying to suppress the national insurgents in the Empire.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has focused particularly on the second half of the 18th century, while making first an introduction to the initiation of the Ottoman-Prussian relations in the first half of the century. In general, the bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire seemed to render in harmony with the evolution of the international society and its institutions.

³⁹⁷ Caroline Finkel, *The History of the Ottoman Empire Osman's Dream*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 384-87.

³⁹⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* 4/2, 186.

³⁹⁹ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 1, Empire of the Gazis: the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808* (Worcester: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 266-67.

As Bull notes, international society was not perfect in nature to exist always in peace. However, the ultimate goal of the member states to sustain the international society matched with the praxis of the 18th century, with regard to the Ottoman-Prussian relations. Common goal of this era was to preserve a balance of power, without a preponderant power which could impose law on others. Great powers of the era at this point led the process and tended to contribute into the sustainability of this order in balance. Existing European great powers – the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian Empire; two global rivals France and Britain; and the recently emerged Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire served to give a central direction to the European international society. When Ottomans were not certain to initiate an alliance with the Kingdom of Prussia, they requested Britain as the global great power to articulate herself to Turco-Prussian block as an insurance for the consolidation of the balance of power. In this respect, Turco-German relations tended to utilize from the great power management to sustain the balance of power within the society.

The incentive to preserve the balance also motivated the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia to improve dialogue in this century. The initial correspondences transformed into exchanging of envoys, then into appointing of resident ambassadors in this century gradually. Starting from the initiation of the exchange of letters after the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, this evolution was completed by the reciprocal appointment of Ali Aziz Efendi to Berlin as the Ottoman resident ambassador in 1797. The use of subtle and tactful methods, obeying the rules of the diplomatic protocols initiated in this century. This evolution of the representation and communication reflected the function of diplomacy which was to show the existence of the international society symbolically.

In line with the theoretical functions of the institution of diplomacy, the Ottoman-Prussian diplomatic mechanism served for gathering intelligence and information, and for negotiations throughout the century. In addition to that this diplomatic network aimed to minimise frictions and played the role of mediation especially for the Ottoman-Russian relations.

In order to conduct a policy for the continuity of the balance of power, this diplomatic network based on the institution of international law. The first rules for the Prussian-Ottoman bilateral relations occurred in this era which were accepted to be binding for the both sides. At this point, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Ottoman Empire carried out the negotiations for signing treaties very long and showed their intention for obeying the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Thus, the formal Ottoman-Prussian alliance could be achieved in 1790, despite the correspondences for a similar pact began after 1718.

The Treaty of Trade and Friendship of 1761, and The Provisional Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire in 1790 were two prominent codes of the institution of international law in Turco-German relations. In the first treaty, the Ottoman Empire was prone to render its traditional way of signing treaties with the non-Muslim state: capitulations with an open door to adapt the conventional instructions of the international law of the international society. In 1790, the treaty was signed as an ultimate form of contemporary text of the international law in the European international society. At the end of the evolution of the institution of international law in Turco-German relations, the tools of the modern international law became the regulated intercourse between these two states.

In the 18th century, it was clear that institution of balance of power was directly formulated for waging wars versus preventing wars. The institution of war was the prevalent character of the international society. The initiation of the Turco-German relations after 1718, was generally evolved around the possibility of war, or even about a balance of power to prevent a war. This century witnessed many wars, which were in nature limited wars to arrange the balance of power in the international society. The practice of war did not take place between one another for the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. They did never wage wars against one another in the 18th century. However, both sides followed each war to which her counterpart took part, in order to understand its power capacity, and to make adjustments in the bilateral relations. The successes and failures in the

battlefields were of great indicators both for the Ottomans and Prussians to converge and diverge their future plans within the configuration of the balance of power.

In line with the central direction sketched out by the great powers, for the sake of the institution balance of power, Turco-German relations in the 18th century reserved a considerable impact on the international society, in harmony with the functioning of its institutions. However, As Bull notes, the freedom of act for states and the related volitional participation for the international society in question reserved a room for manoeuvring. It is observable in the second half of the 18th century that, when the Ottoman or/and Prussian interests were challenged by the working of these institutions, these states had the capability to resist this institutional dynamics. The first reaction was to find an alternative path within the same institution, or to substantiate the policy with another institution. As an example, when Ottoman interests did not match with the Prussian ones to form an alliance, the Ottoman Empire offered an alternative treaty within the same institution - international law. As a result, despite the willing of the Prussians for signing an alliance treaty, these two states signed a Treaty of Trade and Friendship in 1761. When the pressures increased by the Prussians to sign a further alliance treaty, the Ottoman Empire provided a substitution policy within another institution – diplomacy, and increased the level of representation in the 1760s.

Another point to be highlighted is that the evolution of the Turco-German relations in the 18th century had a similar track of the evolution of the international society starting from the Renaissance period. In this sense, the Turco-German bilateral relations seemed to reflect a progressive transformation. The changing nature of the diplomacy from exchange of letters to sending envoys, then to the appointing of resident ambassadors; the evolution of the verbal guarantees into the advanced treaty of alliance were clear examples of this trajectory. This progress gradually enabled a fully-fledged institutions of the international society with respect to the Turco-German relations between 1871 and 1914 on the road to the World War I, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE TURCO- GERMAN RELATIONS FROM 1871 TO 1918

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse how Turkey and Germany took the institutions of the international society into account while conducting their bilateral state relations between 1871 and 1918. The chapter begins with an overview of the nature and the evolution of the international society in this era, along with a special focus on its five institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management. After noting the main characteristics of the institutions and the nature of the international society in this period, the next section analyses the series of events and facts in Ottoman-German bilateral interactions along with their correlation to these five institutions.

This section highlights the definition and the functions of the institutions within their sphere of functionality, and tries to present their impacts on the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire. The gradual intensification of Turco-German relations, since the unification of Germany, will be examined along with the dynamics of the international society under heavy influence of Bismarck's 'alliance system'. The trajectory of this specific bilateral relations on the path of the World War I and their cooperative interaction during the war despite some clash of interests will be subjected to the chapter. In addition to the harmony

between the working of the institutions and the bilateral relations in question, this section also exemplifies the events during which the institutions challenged the interests of these states. The conclusion of the chapter summarizes the main outcomes and findings as to the correlation between the Turco-German relations in the period of 1871-1918 and the institutions of the international society in practice.

4.2. International Society and the Institutions:

In 1815, at the beginning of the 19th century, during the Congress of Vienna, the great powers formed a European concert by which they claimed special responsibilities and rights that small powers did not have in order to sustain the order of the international society.⁴⁰⁰ This beginning consolidated and codified the roles of the great powers, which was primarily to preserve the existence of the international society. This objective could only be achieved through the proper functioning of the institutions. This tendency of 1815 survived during the 1856 Paris Conference which was followed by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The common point of these three multilateral conferences, which became a consolidated practice in the 19th century, indicated the common interest on sustaining the master institution of the international society- balance of power, and the related consensus on the role and responsibilities of the great powers.

The Ottomans were absent in the settlements of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna, which shaped and evolved the European international society substantially. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Ottoman Empire was one of the significant player within the international society that shaped the functioning of the institutions of the international society during this time period. The absence of the Ottomans became bound to be compensated by the settlement of 1856, during which the Ottoman-Russian war complicated the proper functioning of the

⁴⁰⁰ Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, 7.

European international society. In 1856, the Ottoman Empire was integrated to this multilateral form of great power management formally presented that “in Bull’s terms they conceived themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations and shared in the working of common institutions.”⁴⁰¹

The following phase of the European concert found body with the same nature, by the policies of Bismarck after 1871, which was called as ‘Bismarck’s European Order’ by Watson.⁴⁰² From 1871 to the end of the century, this concert was operated largely under the orchestration of Bismarck and functioned more consciously and responsibly again, particularly over areas outside Europe, revealed a mode of inelasticity in an age of nationalist self-assertion.⁴⁰³ In sum, the period between 1878 and 1914 became the story of the events which began with the predominance of Germany in Europe, and continued with the formation of two rival systems of alliances that divided the Continent, and finally resulted with the outbreak of a war in which all the great and many of the small powers in Europe were involved.⁴⁰⁴ Despite the tragic result of this process with the World War I, this process along with “war-scares and high levels of international tension”, it is worth noting that in terms of great power wars, the period between 1871-1914 represents the second-longest period of peace in the history of European state system, only surpassed by the ‘long peace’ after the Second World War”⁴⁰⁵

The nature of the international society driven by Bismarck maintained the European order by restraint and skilful diplomatic activity. He avoided confrontation either

⁴⁰¹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 217.

⁴⁰² Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 248.

⁴⁰³ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 255.

⁴⁰⁴ Nicholas Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War;: a Study in the European Balance, 1878-1914* (London-New York-Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1949), viii.

⁴⁰⁵ Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 135-36. See also Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 242.

with Russia or Britain by accounting the history of Napoleon. His initiation of the *Dreikaiserbund* (the League of Three Emperors), between the German Empire, the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary, balanced the relations with Russia. In addition to that the German reluctance to become involved in the Ottoman conflicts isolated Germany from the east. In this framework, Germany became a cooperative state within the balance of power of the European international society.⁴⁰⁶

The era after 1871 “was characterised by aggressive industrial and commercial rivalry, nationalism, imperialism, and growing military influence in the formulation of foreign policy goals.”⁴⁰⁷ Bismarck’s policy was to isolate France as much as possible. Italy was not an emerging great power during this phase, and the Great Britain concentrated on being an overseas empire rather than performing a military role in the continental Europe. Thus, Bismarck tried to accommodate Russia and Austria-Hungary in a series of codification of cooperation against France. The master institution of Bull, balance of power, which was dominated by the strategy of Bismarck until the last decade of the century, shaped the order in international via series of treaties which was called as the ‘alliance system’.⁴⁰⁸ The major treaties that found body in constructing the blocks of the balance of power in this period, and perhaps of which collapse resulted with the World War I in 1914 were as follows:

...The League of Three Emperors (that is, the emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia) of 1873, and the Alliance of the Three Emperors of 1881. Complementing the tripartite structures, and, by the end of the 1880s, replacing them, were separate treaty structures involving Germany and one of the two powers: the Triple Alliance of 1882, linking Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty, or , as we would say today, non-aggression pact, of 1887.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 249.

⁴⁰⁷ Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, 133.

⁴⁰⁸ Jonathan Sperber, *Europe, 1850-1914: Progress, Participation and Apprehension*, Longman History of Modern Europe (Harlow: Longman, 2008), 181.

⁴⁰⁹ Sperber, *Europe, 1850-1914*, 181.

The characteristics of this period, until the World War I was the management of the international society by a concert of great powers, the regulation of relations through diplomatic precedence and protocol, advances in the communication and transportation, professionalization of the institution of international law, the expansion of the European economic system, the rise of technical international organizations, rise of new ideas about disarmament and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.⁴¹⁰

Europe and the whole world began to be interwoven by a single global economy with the guidelines put forward by the European leadership. The dependency among states increased in this period to a large extent. In parallel to the growing economic network managed by the great powers gradually transformed the European international society into a global one, at least via common rules and institutions according to conduct of affairs in IR. As a result, the concert of Europe which was at the outset a diffused and collective hegemony of the five great powers transformed into an international society dominated by nation-states. This new configuration paved the way for a different mode of incentive which was out of the traditional motives of the international society. The sovereign peoples of these nation-states found “more in common with their nationals perhaps, but less in common with other nations. Nationalism pushed the European nation states further apart from each other, and statesmen increasingly reflected this alienation.”⁴¹¹ Triggered by this alienation, the European ideas of sovereignty, independence and juridical equality, which essentially provided the nature of the international society in 1900, came to reflect a *de jure* status, rather than the *de facto* situation. This gap between the theory and the practice became deeper in the 20th century clearly.⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰ Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, 125.

⁴¹¹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 274-75.

⁴¹² Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 275-76.

Within the international society, a remarkable change occurred with regard to the 'statist' nature of the practice. Up to the second half of the 19th century, there was no cultural or regional restriction on the recognition of the personality of states, and also there was no requirement of recognition for the sovereignties of states.⁴¹³ However, starting from the 1850s, the statist nature of the international society became bolder on the ground of nation-states and the recognition came to be more significant within the order of the international society.

Nationalism, in this sense, eroded the multi-national structure of the Ottoman Empire and the Austria-Hungary in the meanwhile. The increasing nationalist movements in the Balkans particularly paved the way for a new spirit for the international society. "While the conflicting positions of the great powers, and the clashing demands of the nationalist movements could ultimately be resolved, the underlying tensions would return in force after 1900 and be an important factor in leading up to the First World War".⁴¹⁴ After 1905, the series of crises, originating from the overseas competition and the clashes of interests in the Balkans became a cause or pretext of the confrontations on the road to the World War I.⁴¹⁵

Within this complexity of relations, the institution of diplomacy, on the other hand, gave impetus to the practice of holding international conferences. As an example, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was an outcome of this policy which aimed to activate the institution of diplomacy efficiently in order to sustain the balance of power in the European international society through new codifications of international law. This example is also of great significance for the Turco-German relations. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 was held by the mediation of Germany

⁴¹³ Ian Brownlie, "The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Bull and Watson, 361.

⁴¹⁴ Sperber, *Europe, 1850-1914*, 184-85.

⁴¹⁵ Sperber, *Europe, 1850-1914*, 302.

following the Russo-Turkish War. The process leading to the Congress of Berlin could be commented on part of the Ottoman Empire as follows:

Ottoman suzerainty in Europe gradually gave way to a number of feuding independent states. The rest of the empire was partially Europeanized, reformed and induced to progress, and involved in the rules and institutions of Europe. It was formally recognized as member of the European society of states in the Paris settlement. But in practice, the Europeans did not treat the Ottoman Empire as a European state. Capitulations continued, modified by the Europeans to ensure that their nationals and their trade were subject to European rules and practices, and that Ottoman administration observed some European standards in dealing with the communities under its jurisdiction.⁴¹⁶

In line with this tendency within the institution of diplomacy and international law, the international congresses increased in number in order for new codes of conducts with the participation of more states gradually. For instance, in order to foster peace and to sustain the related balance of power, twenty six states took part in the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 including two American (the United States and Mexico) and five Asian (China, Persian, Japan, Siam , and Turkey). The Second Hague Conference took place in 1907 with forty-four states, with an extra participation dominantly from Latin American Republics.⁴¹⁷

In parallel to the multilateralism in diplomatic practices, international organizations emerged in this era. Especially after the Paris settlement of 1856, some examples of the international organizations are as follows: the Danube Commission (after 1856), International Telegraph Union (1865), General Postal Union (1874).⁴¹⁸ These regimes could be counted as the pseudo institutions in Wight's words (or secondary institution in Buzan's terms), which were not as effective as the primary institutions. These regimes started to become effective relatively on the order of the

⁴¹⁶Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 270.

⁴¹⁷ Ian Brownlie, "The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Bull and Watson, 363.

⁴¹⁸ For details, see Volker Bath, "International Organisations and Congresses," European History Online. Available at <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/transnational-movements-and-organisations/international-organisations-and-congresses> (12.03.2017)

international society. This tendency gave birth to the foundation of the League of Nations after the World War I which could be noted as the most fundamental and effective pseudo-institution within the international society. The institution of international law, began to be operated also through these functioning international organizations.

In this period, the great powers of the era continued to give central direction to the international society. During the 19th century, France, Britain and Russia acted always as great powers. Spain, Sweden, Austria and the Ottoman Empire seemed to be the following ones, which were ‘waxed and waned’.⁴¹⁹ On the other hand, Italy and Germany seemed to act as the rising great powers after their unification. This configuration of the great power management was active to shape the international society and adjust the institution of balance of power in the era. As seen, the conventional number of great powers from six of the 18th century increased in number and complicated the relations in a conflictual direction along with an economic competition. “The conventional list of the great power for 1914 is nine, and includes two newcomers: Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the US.”⁴²⁰ These were the main military and economic powers of the international society and their clashing interests eroded the ongoing balance of power and resulted with the World War I.

The period between 1871 and 1918 also coincided with the rapid expansion of the international society by also forceful means. According to Michael Howard:

Three developments contributed into the European expansion in the mid-nineteenth century and the nature of war within the European society. “The first was steam transport and the associated transformation of the metallurgical industries. The second was the introduction of the quick-firing, long-range firearms made possible by the development of high explosive; and the third and perhaps most important of all was the growth of medical knowledge that gradually

⁴¹⁹ Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, 46.

⁴²⁰ Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, 49.

overcame the greatest enemy of all those that European armies had to contend with in 'savage' countries: disease..."⁴²¹

Instigated by this military infrastructure; in the 19th century particularly, codes of conduct of the institution of international law and the structure of the institution of balance of power produced not always peaceful outcomes but also wars. The alliances were held to preserve or to change the status quo often via the institution of war. The parties of an alliance were mostly likely to provide the block waging war against the enemy block, or the significantly states were made consensus to remain neutral if one ally waged a war against an enemy. Another option was to form alliances for the solidification of the warring sides during the preparation of a war. Or at least, the balances of power and the related international law tools emerged in line with the requirements of a future war which seemed possible in the near future, as a precaution to enable the participant states a freedom of manoeuvring.

The codes of alliances used to be decided secretly as a common tool of the international law during this era. Until the end of the World War I, the bargaining and negotiation processes were carried out along with a certain amount of secrecy. The period between 1871 and 1914 was categorized under title of 'The System of Secret Alliances' by Sidney Bradshaw Fay, in his book *The Origins of the World War* (1935) under three distinct era: 1871-1890, 1890-1907, 1907-1914. To give a general outlook about the abundancy of the secret commitments, and the general chronology of the events, it is worth to note the titles of these alliances and relations:

The first phase - Domination of the Eastern Empires (1871-1890) consists of The League of Three Emperors (1872-1878), The Near Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), The Austro-German Alliance of 1879, The Alliance of the Three Emperors (1881-1887), The Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty (1887-1890), The Triple Alliance of 1882, The Rumanian Alliance of 1883, The Breakdown of the Wire to Russia in 1890, Franco-German Relations (1871-1890). The second phase – Formation

⁴²¹ Michael Howard, "The Military Factor in European Expansion", in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Bull and Watson, 38.

of the Triple Entente (1890-1907) includes The Franco-Russian Rapprochement (1887-1891), The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, England of the Parting of the Ways (1890-1898), Mr. Chamberlain's Alliance Proposals to Germany (1898-1901), Italy's Dubious Loyalty to her Allies, The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, The Morocco Crisis of 1905, The Anglo-French Military and Naval Conversations 1905-1912, The Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. The third phase is subjected to the German Fear of 'Encirclement' after 1907, Anglo-German Naval Rivalry (1904-1909), Germany's Relations with France (1908-1911), Germany's Relations with Russia (1908-1911), The Agadir Crisis of 1911, The Haldane Mission of 1912, The Tightening of the Triple Entente (1912), The Renewal and Weakness of the Triple Alliance (1912), and the Effects of the Balkan Wars (1912-1914).⁴²²

As a result, the era between 1871 and 1918 also faced an evolution for the international society. However, the master institution- the balance of power seemed to set the fundamental dynamics of the period under an increasing competition within the great power management. The institution of diplomacy was more professionalized and exported to the multilateral forums. The institution of international law structured on a fragile ground along with secret alliances. The final session of the period, in contrary to the relative peace process enjoyed, ended with the World War I which reshaped the international society as a whole with its institutions.

4.3. Turco-German Relations:

After 1871, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire tended to conduct their relations to one another according to the working of the institutions of the international society. The unification of Germany under the rule of Bismarck changed the dynamics of the order of the European international society, which also reshaped its institutions. In this period of time, the great power management

⁴²² For a detailed examination of the cases, see Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1935), 50-352.

provided a fertile ground for the Ottoman-German rapprochement, and seeded the path for the configuration of the balance of power on the road to the World War I. Through series of events and developments, by taking these institutions into account, the Ottoman - German bilateral relations experienced a significant level of harmony, and undertook common initiatives within the international society, such as the monumental Baghdad Railway Project.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire tried to render its great power status. After 1871, the Ottoman Empire seemed to have no capacity to give a central direction to the international society but was still capable of taking part of the institution of balance of power. For instance, just before the unification of Germany, for which the Kingdom of Prussia along with the leadership of Bismarck waged war against France and the other German princes; Sultan Abdülaziz visited Paris in 1867. He had also the chance to compare the military powers of France and Prussia, which he believed in the superiority of the Prussians. In order to prevent the collapse of France and the destruction of the existing balance in Europe, the Sultan decided to offer an alliance and military help to France in case of a war against the Kingdom of Prussia.⁴²³ The crucial point in consideration with this event is that Turco-German relationship either with cooperation or confrontation was ready to preserve the ongoing balance of power, and tended to regulate these bilateral relations in consideration with the ongoing balance of power, which was the master institution of the international society, in Bull's terms.

1871 opened a new phase not only for the international society but also for the Turco-German relations. In this era, the primary objective of the Ottoman Empire was to pursue her sovereignty and preserve its territorial integrity; while the German Empire was consolidating its superior power within the European international society. The Turco-German relations after 1871 had two remarkable phases. The first period presented the reluctance of Bismarck to cooperate with the

⁴²³ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 45.

Ottoman Empire from 1871 to 1890. The next period witnessed closer Turco-German relations until the end of the World War I, initiated by the German Emperor Wilhelm II. These two phases of the Turco-German relations seemed to be the reflection of the dynamics within the international society.

It was clear that the nature of the master institution of the international society – balance of power changed drastically after the dismissal of Bismarck. Similarly, it follows from the arguments of Joseph Nye that the end of Bismarck's period was a landmark in the balance of power politics. While examining the balance of power, Nye indicated five distinct periods starting from 1815 to 1914; two of which were the 1870-1890 period and the 1890-1914 period. In the former one, Bismarck was noted to have played a balance of power politics through a flexible alliance system. In the latter one, there assumed to exist a growing polarisation in Europe exposed by this alliance system which led to the World War I.⁴²⁴ The dismissal of Bismarck not only changed the German policy towards the Ottoman Empire, but also the German policies within the international society, and re-shaped the dynamics of the international order.

The first phase after 1871 began with the unification of Germany. According to Jonathan Sperber, this period was an age of uncertainty. The political incentives that triggered dynamics of the international society were Bismarck's alliance system, the return of the Eastern Question, and the rise of the 'new imperialism'.⁴²⁵ Under these circumstances, Bismarck transformed the Kingdom of Prussia into the German Empire with the articulation of other German polities, which primarily changed the configuration of the institution of balance of power. For the matter involved, Bismarck who was heavily keen on the concert of Europe, initiated an 'alliance system' in the European international society.

⁴²⁴ Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 58.

⁴²⁵ Sperber, *Europe, 1850-1914*, 180.

John J. Mearsheimer reviewed the period of Bismarck as follows:

Although Germany was the most powerful state on the European continent during those two decades, it fought no wars and its diplomacy was concerned mainly with maintaining, not altering, the balance of power. Even after Bismarck left office, German foreign policy remained essentially the same course for another decade. Not until the early twentieth century did Germany's diplomacy turn provocative and its leaders begin to think seriously about using force to expand Germany's borders.⁴²⁶

The primary aim of Bismarck for the German foreign policy was to isolate France. In 1873, the League of Three Emperors – *Dreikaiserbund* was established between Germany, Austria and Russia.⁴²⁷ The aim of the alliance was to isolate France, to stop the import of the French Revolution in Europe and to preserve the status quo.⁴²⁸ In 1881 this alliance was renewed. In 1887, it was again revised on the basis of the German-Russian cooperation for a possible Russian-Ottoman war to be able to spark in the near future. In this event, it is observable that the ongoing balance of power imposed by the great powers of the era codified some codes of conduct within the institution of international law which had direct effects for the relations with the Ottoman Empire within the international society. This alliance, as a codified tool of the institution of international law, had direct provisions related to the Turco-German relations. The secret provisions of the treaty contented that “If Russia engaged herself to control the Black Sea on the basis of her interests, Germany was supposed to stay neutral and assist Russia in political and moral terms.”⁴²⁹ In addition to this alliance, Bismarck also signed a secret defensive

⁴²⁶ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 183-84.

⁴²⁷ For a detailed analysis, see William A. Gauld, “The ‘Dreikaiserbündnis’ and the Eastern Question, 1871-76,” *The English Historical Review* 40, no. 158 (April, 1925): 207-221.

⁴²⁸ Bismarck's Foreign Policy 1871-1890, available at <http://www.historyhome.co.uk/europe/bismarck.htm> (28.08.2016)

⁴²⁹ Nordwitshe Allgemeine Zeitung'un 12 Eylül 1919 tarihli ve c.1., nu.343, s12 in Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 53.

alliance with Austria, which was called as ‘dual alliance’⁴³⁰ in 1879, in order to balance Russia, which was also the partner of Austria and Germany in the aforesaid *Dreikaiserbund*. Bismarck believed in the fact that France in the future could ally with Russia against Austria and/or Germany as well. “It was necessary to forestall such an alliance, to secure from Russia that she should remain neutral in case of attack upon Germany or Austria.”⁴³¹ The signing of the *Dreikaiserbund* along with the Dual Alliance was supposed to serve for this goal.

As seen, the ongoing operationalisation of the institutions of the great power management, balance of power, diplomacy and the international law consisted of preparations for a presumption of a war. The articles of the *Dreikaiserbund* was similar: if the one of these three great powers engage in a war with a fourth great power, the other two signatory states of this treaty commit themselves to remain neutral against to the signatory-warring state and afford to limit the war in a regional context.⁴³² The regulations were all made with the ‘in the event of a war’ condition in this period. Considering the coming Russo-Turkish War in the 1877-78 period, the alliance system codified as the Three Emperor’s League was a candidate to work against the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and also at the expense of the Turco-German relations.

In general, Bismarck argued that the Turco-German relations were dependent upon the institution of balance of power in Europe. He sought to cooperate with Russia, even at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck accepted the wide influence of the Russians over Balkans and the Black-Sea region. Bismarck’s aim was to prevent the emergence of a British-French coalition with the support of the Russian

⁴³⁰ Emerson M S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 255-57.

⁴³¹ Serge Goriainov, “The end of the Alliance of the Emperors,” *The American Historical Review* 23, no.2 (January, 1918):234-25.

⁴³² Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 53.

Empire. It could pose a serious problem to the survival of the German Empire.⁴³³ Within this perspective, Bismarck tried to manage the relations with Turkey with regard to the policies of the Russian Empire. Bismarck noted that Turkey was of great importance for Germany, but also was a friend who carried the risk to transform Russian Empire into an enemy for the German Empire as well. In 1892, Bismarck had an interview published in a newspaper called - *Hamburger Nachrichten* and declared that the Russian Empire had the potential to become a future enemy for Germany. In that case, he argued, Turkey would be a significant player on the table for the matter involved.⁴³⁴

Bismarck's policy through this alliance system can be summarized as follows:

By providing that Russia would not join France in a war against Germany, it seemed to dispose of his coalition nightmare. More important, it provided the necessary check on Austria-Hungary, first by the mere fact of the treaty's existence, and second by an attempt to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence. Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sanjak were to be in the Habsburg sphere, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in the Russian. It also provided against any unilateral action by Russia in the Balkans in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. The implications are clear. By the Dual Alliance, Russia must not destroy Austria-Hungary. By the Three Emperor League's Russia must not destroy Turkey, and thereby threaten the Habsburgs. But also, Austria-Hungary must not destroy Turkey either, since that would involve Bismarck in a war with Russia which he did not want. The disputed territory must be partitioned. All that diplomacy could achieve, therefore, diplomacy had done."⁴³⁵

In the 1870s and the 1880s, under the influence of the Bismarck's alliance system, the Ottoman Empire was facing difficulty for finding reliable partners among the great powers. The German Empire, as the powerful great power of the era sought for a balance within the European international society to sustain the German interests, especially by a cooperation with Austria and Russia in the meanwhile.

⁴³³ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 86.

⁴³⁴ Karl Helfferich, "Die Deutsche Türkenpolitik", im *neuen Deutschland, Grundfragen Deutscher Politik* in. *Einzelschriften, Hrgb. Hermann Jordan*, (Berlin, 1921): 5.

⁴³⁵ L.C.B Seaman, *From Vienna to Versailles* (Northampton: Methuan & Co Ltd, 1964), 124.

The challenge occurred at this point for the Ottoman Empire which perceived direct threats both from these two states. Until the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman-German relations continued without a consolidated trust, but along with a common will to contribute into the balance of power status of the European international society. Thus, the Ottoman proposal to cooperate with the German Empire was first rejected by the German side. During the visit of the special envoy of the Sultan - Ali Nizami Efendi to Bismarck, the will of the Ottoman Empire to engage in an alliance with the German Empire was revealed. Bismarck responded that this alliance could only be achieved through the improvement of the Ottoman-Austrian relations.⁴³⁶

Ottoman Empire was not likely to have a rapprochement neither with Austria nor with Russia in this period of time. These two states had territorial claims on the Ottoman Empire and worked collaboratively to curb the Ottoman suzerainty particularly in the Balkans. For instance, Austria was seeking to seize Bosnia-Herzegovina in this period and tried to consolidate its position especially in the Balkans. In 1876, the rebellions took place in Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman rule. In order to suppress these movements, the Ottoman Government offered the Austrian regime to deploy Austrian troops to some strategic points in the Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for their help to suppress Serbia-Montenegro. However, the Austrians rejected this offer and cooperated with Russia, and signed the Treaty of Rechtsstaat which paved the way for the Austrian annexation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina region in the near future. This status was ratified later by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This event also showed that there could not be any Turkish Austrian cooperation in that period. Following these processes, Abdülhamid II asked France to sign an alliance in 1879. However, France rejected this request. France was seeking to challenge the German Empire through closer

⁴³⁶ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 51-52.

relations with the Russian Empire.⁴³⁷ As a result, under this isolation, the Ottoman Empire could not act within the great power management, derived from Bismarck's alliance system in the European international society. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire, in spite of the lack of cooperation, tried to conduct their bilateral relations by taking the ongoing balance of power politics into account, even by locating themselves at the opposite sides.

During this intractable status of the institution of the balance of power, Russo-Turkish War emerged. The process began with the Russo-Turkish War which was ended with the Armistice and the Peace Treaty of San Stefano, which also paved the way for the Congress of Berlin for adjustments in the institution of balance of power within the European international society. The process started with the Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877.⁴³⁸ Since the Crimean War, Russia was compelled to obey the militarily neutralization of the Black Sea and the cession of Southern Bessarabia. These 'two nightmares' attempted to be eliminated by this attack from the Russian point of view. The Russian fleet activated in the Black Sea without any veto from great powers through the help of the German-Russian consensus led by Bismarck. Russian neutrality in the Prussian-Franco war worked for the neutrality of Germany in this Russian attack, which was agreed during the London Conference in 1871. The ultimate aims of this attack were to control Istanbul and the pro-Russian revisions in the Balkans.⁴³⁹ Russian forces became successful and reached to the outskirts of Istanbul. However, the great power management of the era was not willing any further expansion of the crisis on in favour of Russia. Britain, for instance, "sent a fleet through the Dardanelles to

⁴³⁷ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 32.

⁴³⁸ David R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 130-36.

⁴³⁹ Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, 21.

check and to discourage any further Russian advance”.⁴⁴⁰ As a result, the Russian Empire dictated to the Ottoman Empire the Treaty of San Stefano, which is known to have projected ‘the greater Bulgaria’ and a consolidated Russian influence in the Balkans.⁴⁴¹ According to the treaty, the Ottoman Sultan was not only compelled to give substantial territories to Russia and her allies, but he had to accept the creation of the Principality of Bulgaria -to be actually a Russian-dominated, nominally an Ottoman vassal- “with an extensive territory embracing the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula and lying within easy striking range of Istanbul and the Straits.”⁴⁴² It is worth saying that the Russo-Turkish War, in line with the functions of the institution of war, became a means for the enforcement of international law. The settlement of Berlin in 1878 was a clear reflection of this fact, as Bull notes.

From the Ottoman point of view, the process of the Congress of Berlin not only stemmed from Russian aggression but also the conditions from which the Ottoman Empire was suffering: “...series of provincial revolts, power struggles at the centre of government, financial breakdowns and foreign wars which was to destroy much of the Crimean settlement and to leave the Empire externally weaker than any time since 1830s.”⁴⁴³ In addition to these problems, the Treaty of San Stefano brought about a great impact on the Empire. However, the institution of great power management attempted to change the process. The Treaty of San Stefano disturbed notably Austria and Britain owing from the fear that Russia would dominate the Balkans and Anatolia to an extent that the European balance of power could not remain. In order to find a solution to the problem, which was called also the ‘Eastern Question’, great powers along with the representatives of the Balkan peoples and

⁴⁴⁰ Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, 22.

⁴⁴¹ Fahir Armaoğlu, 19. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1789 - 1914* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2016), 507-13; Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, 22.

⁴⁴² F. A. K. Yasamee, *Studies On Ottoman Diplomatic History*, vol. 7, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1996), 18.

⁴⁴³ Yasamee, *Studies On Ottoman Diplomatic History*, 13.

governments took the Congress of Berlin⁴⁴⁴ in order to reshuffle the cards of the balance of power of the international society.⁴⁴⁵

The Treaty of Berlin signed on 13 July 1878, and became a milestone event for the 'Eastern Question' following the Ottoman-Russian war.⁴⁴⁶ This Congress cancelled not only the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878) which favoured Russia in the institution of balance of power among the great powers but also systematized a new range of relations among the great powers. While in the Treaty of San Stefano, the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire were decided to be shared by the Balkan powers with the influence of the Russian Empire, in the following Congress of Berlin, Bosnia-Herzegovina was decided to be given to Austria-Hungary, and Cyprus to the British Empire which to a certain extent balanced the territorial demands of the great powers at the end.⁴⁴⁷ The results of the Congress are as follows:

The Treaty of Berlin mitigated, but did not fully nullify, the provisions of San Stefano. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro still gained their independence, but the territorial gains of the latter two were much recued. An autonomous Bulgaria was created, but it was much smaller than originally envisaged and it was split in two along the Balkan mountain ridge, the southern part remaining an Ottoman province under a special regime, with a Christian governor. In Asia, most of Russia's acquisitions, including the port of Batum remained in place. Moreover, both Austria and Britain had exacted a price for their intervention, - Austria now occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina (which, technically, remained part of the Ottoman

⁴⁴⁴ Erich J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London-New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2004), 79.

⁴⁴⁵ For further analysis, see Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878: Die Politik der Grossmächte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982); For the details of the negotiations during the Congress of Berlin, see also the chapter 'The Berlin Conference' in W.N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 97-112.

⁴⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of the developments from the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War to the Treaty of Berlin, see Fahir H. Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789-1960*, 3rd ed., (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasi Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), 257-302.

⁴⁴⁷ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1986), 9.

Empire) and Britain did the same with Cyprus. The sultan had no choice but to acquiesce.⁴⁴⁸

The Congress of Berlin, in this regard seemed to fulfil the functions of the great power management as Bull noted: The Congress preserved the general balance of power, controlled the crisis occurred after the Russo-Turkish War, prevented any revisionist war in the near future, created sphere of influences among great powers especially on the Ottoman territories, and curbed the de facto Russian preponderance with the Treaty of San Stefano. All of these functions are observable in the process of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Turco-German relations, in this regard became bound to follow the instructions of this great power management, codified by the Congress.⁴⁴⁹

Another point to be discussed the correlation between the Congress of Berlin and the institution of diplomacy. The Ottoman Empire attended a multilateral conference under the leadership of Germany to be volitionally bound by rules and codes of conduct about her future. At the end of the day, as aforementioned, the Sultan acquiesced the process rather than having a consent about the outcomes of the Treaty of Berlin. Indeed, in the 19th century, there was a tendency of the Ottoman Empire

to be sceptical of multilateral international conferences, and to avoid them when possible. Experience had taught the Porte that European statesmen, when gathered,

⁴⁴⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 79.

⁴⁴⁹ For the full text of the Treaty of Berlin, see the website of the National Library of Australia, "The Treaty of Berlin" available at <http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/18830646> (05.03.2017); also see Henry F. Mundo (United States – Department of State), *The Berlin Congress*, (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1918) available at <https://archive.org/details/cu31924027836869> (05.03.2017)

would often like to solve problems at Ottoman expense, by favouring minority nationalities within the empire or by slicing off bits of Ottoman territory⁴⁵⁰

The destiny of the Congress of Berlin was similar. The Ottoman Empire, at the end was compelled to sign a treaty which was totally against her primary motive of the foreign policy – to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In addition to the essence of the problem, the institution of diplomacy was said to be treated in an unconventional way for the Ottoman Empire which was not tactful and kind. For instance, the first Ottoman plenipotentiary – Aleksandire Karatodori Paşa was said to be treated humiliating by the President of the conference – Bismarck. He was not allowed to present some documents and given short times for speeches in contrary to the diplomatic rules.⁴⁵¹

This settlement on the other hand was the attempt of the great powers which were no longer guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire within the European international society. For instance, Austria was in efforts to seize the territory between Vienna and Thessalonica while the Italians claimed some territories on Balkans and the Ottoman Africa, and the French were attempting to be sovereign on Tunisia and Syria-Lebanon.⁴⁵² This fact provided difficulties for the Ottoman Empire to act volitionally within the international society while her sovereignty and independence were not respected by the other members. In this sense, the minimalistic rules of coexistence in Bull's lenses seemed to be for the Ottoman Empire.

⁴⁵⁰ Roderic H. Davison, "Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy" in L. Carl Brown, *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint On the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 185-86.

⁴⁵¹ Peri Efe, "Millet-i Rum'dan Bir Münevver: Aleksandros Karatheodoris," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 193, (January, 2010): 87; Roderic H. Davison, "Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy" in L. Carl Brown, *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint On the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 186;

⁴⁵² İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Timaş, 2008), 54.

During this turmoil in accordance with the Ottoman territorial integrity, the chairman of the negotiations – Otto Von Bismarck attempted to open a new phase in Turco-German Relations. While saving the Ottoman future from the hands of the Russian suppressions, despite all the assaults on the Ottoman sovereignty, a new balance policy was tried to be put on the agenda. Germany sought to integrate the Ottoman Empire to the Three Emperor's League. However, due to the Russian goals over Istanbul and their dissatisfaction by the cancellation of the Treaty of San Stefano seemed to block this option. In this event, it is observable that rather than locating themselves in the opposite polar of the institution of balance of power, Bismarck did not disagree to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire in the same polar of the balance in question. The crucial point was that Turco-German relations were in efforts to be adjusted in accordance with the changing conditions of the institution of balance of power.

In this period, another factor which was effective on the Turco-German relations was the European pressure on the Ottoman regime for domestic reforms. Due to the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, Abdülhamid II abolished the Ottoman Parliament. The absolute monarchy of Abdülhamid II was criticized and used as a leverage for the interference into the Ottoman domestic policies by the European powers. The great powers with the exception of the German Empire were insisting on reforms for non-Muslim populations in the Ottoman Empire: the British for the Protestants, the French for the Catholics and the Russians for the Orthodox. They were also insisting on establishing a constitutional monarchy to guarantee these rights.⁴⁵³ On the other hand, German Empire had no demand from the Ottoman absolute monarch - Abdülhamid II. This attitude eased the way for a cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire after 1878.⁴⁵⁴ In Bull's

⁴⁵³ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 172.

⁴⁵⁴ For details, see İlber Ortaylı, "İkinci Abdülhamit Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları* 479 – 100. *Doğum Yılında Atatürk'e Armağan Dizisi* 24, (Ankara, 1981), available at <http://psi301.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/II%20Abdulhamit%20donemi%20Alman%20Nufuzu.pdf> (28.08.2016); Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express The Ottoman Empire and Germany's*

arguments, the external sovereignties and the independences of states seem to be prerequisites for a proper functioning of the international society. The state behaviours of the European great powers, either with territorial claims on the Ottoman Empire, or through interference on the domestic policies of the Ottoman regime curbed the willingness of the Ottoman Empire to act within the borders of the international society. However, Germany became an exception within this framework and served alternatives for the possible Turco-German cooperation by relatively respecting the Ottoman sovereignty after 1878.

The Congress of Berlin, as noted damaged the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Without respecting to the sovereignty, the international society could not be expected to operate. These were the first sparks of the deterioration of the Ottoman existence within the international society. However, this process was gradually changed and evolved into another direction with the emergence of the Turco-German alliance on the road to the World War I, especially after 1890. After 1878, the Ottoman Empire faced significant territorial losses:

Cyprus (British Administration under Ottoman sovereignty, 1878); Ardahan, Batum, Kars (to Russia, 1878); Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (all gaining independence, 1878); Bosnia-Herzegovina (Austro-Hungarian Occupation, 1878; Austro Hungarian annexation, 1908); Tunisia (French protectorate, 1881); Egypt (British occupation, 1882); Crete (Great powers impose autonomy, 1898); Kuwait (British protectorate, 1899); Bulgaria (independence, 1908); Tripoli (Italian annexation, 1912); Dodecanese Islands (Italian occupation, 1912); western Thrace (to Bulgaria and Greece, 1912); Aegean islands, including Chios and Mytilene (to Greece, 1912); Albania (independence, 1912); Macedonia (partitioned among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, 1912-13).⁴⁵⁵

In the following years, the Ottoman economy bankrupted. The Ottoman treasury was confiscated by the great powers of the period in 1881, and began to be

Bid for World Power (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 56-57.

⁴⁵⁵ Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5.

administered dominantly by foreign powers. Abdülhamid II referred to this implementation, as a “government inside a government”.⁴⁵⁶ The administration of the institution was composed of British, French, German, Italian, Austria-Hungarian officials and The Ottoman Bank members.⁴⁵⁷ The German share in the ‘*Düyun-i Umumiyye*’ was only 4.7 in 1881, but increased to 20.1 percent of the shares in 1914.⁴⁵⁸ German economic penetration in the Ottoman economy in this sense, also played a role in the level of German influence over Turkey. At the end, German shares increased at the expense of the British ones between 1881 and 1914. In Bull’s term, in the grand chess board of the power status, the Ottoman Empire was no longer an economic player. However, the increase of the German shares in the Ottoman treasury, the increasing level of Turco-German trade paved the way for envisaging Turco-German common goals within the international society.

In order to stop the aforesaid destructions, the Ottoman Empire sought to act within the playground of the balance of power of the era, which became vital for the survival of the Empire. For instance, in 1881, Abdülhamid II requested a military delegation from France to make reforms and to create a manoeuvring space for the Ottoman policy by cooperating with France. However, this request of signing a treaty for the matter involved was not welcomed by the French policymakers. Succeeding these events, Wilhelm I responded immediately and sent a military

⁴⁵⁶ Bedri Gürsoy, “100. Yılında Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi Üzerinde Bir Değerlendirme”, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, Ord. Prof. Şükrü Baban’a Armağan, İstanbul, 1984, 21 available at <http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuifm/article/viewFile/1023007563/1023007065> (28.08.2016)

⁴⁵⁷ For a detailed examination of the system, see Sait Açıba, *Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dış Borçlanması (1854-1914)*, (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2004), 103-09.

⁴⁵⁸ The British share in this budget was about 29 % in 1881, and 6.9 percent in 1913. However, Germany’s share increased from 4,7 percent to 20.1 percent from 1881 to 1913. The French share was about 40 percent in 1881 and became 49,5 percent in 1913. Vedat Eldem; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şatları Üzerine Bir Tetkik*, Ankara, 1994, 188 quoted in Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 44.

delegation from Berlin to Istanbul to foster relations of Turco-German partnership.⁴⁵⁹

This great power management revived two states for the Ottomans to cooperate: Britain or/and Germany. It was clear that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was not significant for the British Empire. It was known that the status of the Turkish Straits and Istanbul were of strategic significance for British interests. Russian claims over Istanbul were also giving birth to concerns for Britain. This possibility of a Russian dominance had the risk of changing the balance of power to the detriment of Britain. The Russian challenge in the British foreign policy and the historical Ottoman-British alliance during the Crimean War (1856) could provide a ground for Turco-British cooperation. However, in 1881, along with an internal uprising – Arab-i Paşa, The British Empire invaded Egypt. British Empire decided to guarantee the security of the Indian route and to create dominance in the Mediterranean Sea. British invasion of the Ottoman land - Egypt deteriorated the Turco-British relations.⁴⁶⁰ As a result of this development, within the framework of the great power management, any possible cooperation or alliance between Turkey and Britain disappeared.

Indeed, during this period, France was also competing with Germany. The French consent for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the preservation of the balance of power was nothing more than a requirement under the settlement of the Congress of Berlin. However, the French were also supporting the anti-German movements in the Balkans, and tried to prevent the German expansion. France was cooperating with Greece and Romania against German expansionism in the Balkans, with Britain and Italy for their interests in the Mediterranean Sea, and also with Russia for creating a French influence over Egypt and Tripoli. At the end of

⁴⁵⁹ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 61.

⁴⁶⁰ Fahir Armaoğlu, 19. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1789 – 1914* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2016), 535; Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 63-70. See also Ahmet Yaramış, “Mısır’da İngiliz Sömürgecilik Anlayışı: Cromer Örneği (1883-1907),” *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 9, no. 2 (December 2007): 123-25.

the day, French policy gained advantages at the expense of the Ottoman interests, and seized Morocco and had influence over Syria. The fact that French policy undermined the Ottoman sovereignty cultivated the Turco-German rapprochement as another factor.

Additionally, the institution of the great power management became more complicated in these years. The rise of the Russian Empire, along with its rapprochement with the German Empire created concerns for Britain as well. Britain also came closer to the triple alliance between Italy, Austria and Germany in 1887. It was an attempt to balance Russia in the east. According to this alliance, with the support of Britain, the Ottoman Empire was assumed to be the guardian of the straits with full sovereignty rights. Within this context, against the threat of Russian expansionism, Britain supported triple alliance (Austria-Germany-Italy) and supposed to act in favour of the sovereignty rights of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was also called to participate into this pact with these commitments. The German special envoy Radowitz sent to Istanbul to offer this pact to the Sultan. Abdülhamid II rejected this offer⁴⁶¹ due to the fragile ground of the relations in this decade. As noted, British policy in those years had some risks for the Ottoman Empire. In 1889, Britain and Italy agreed on a cooperation and signed a treaty on Balkans and Mediterranean on 12 February 1889. This was an agreement concerning mutual interests of Britain and Italy. In return for monitoring the rights of Britain in Egypt, Britain agreed upon the Italian rights and acts on Tripoli and Benghazi.⁴⁶² The proposal was made by the great powers of Britain and Germany collectively, and refused by the Ottoman Sultan. This was another clear resistance produced by the Turco-German relations against one peculiar development in the great power management. As Bull noted, when the state interests are challenged, the states have the freedom to resist the working of the

⁴⁶¹ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 83-85.

⁴⁶² Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 130.

institutions. The machinery of the international society apparently based on the volitional participation of states, which was also proved by this case, in which the Ottoman Empire resisted to the institution of the great power management, and the related combination of the balance of power.

Within the same period, in 1887, in German-British correspondences existed between the Prime Ministers: Bismarck and Salisbury. In these documents, Bismarck noted that the German goal was to strengthen any power against Russia to balance Russian preponderance. Any power in the region with the goal of balancing or neutralizing Russia, or to help Germany in case of a Russian-German war was of great significance for the German Empire. Or in any case, it became clear that if this power would enter a war with Russia, Germany was not going to help the Russian side. This framework implied that the German goal was to preserve the status quo against Russia. If the Ottoman Empire would wage a war with Russia in the future, Germany was not going to side with Russia.⁴⁶³ The earlier versions of the Russian-German cooperation at the expense of the Ottoman interests, now transformed into a reverse mode in the last years of the 1880s. It is remarkable that under these circumstances, in 1887, the German Empire and the Russian Empire signed a treaty of alliance with a secret article which guaranteed the neutrality of the German Empire in the event of a Russo-Turkish war.⁴⁶⁴ Even during this period, Bismarck was asking the Ottoman Empire to act together with themselves and in line with the Russian-German partnership.⁴⁶⁵ Bismarck's policy was neither to support fully Russian policies nor to ally with Turkey; his aim was to provide a balance in Europe, which could constrain the Russian Empire by consensus, and to render relations with Turkey to keep her on table in case of a problem with Russians. Despite the pressures of the ongoing great power management, Turkey resisted to

⁴⁶³ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 82.

⁴⁶⁴ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: the MacMillan Company, 1935), 77-79.

⁴⁶⁵ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 86.

the demands of the German Empire driven by Bismarck. The overall policy of Bismarck about the Ottoman Empire was clear in Bismarck's earlier letter to the Emperor Wilhelm II:

If Russia one day turns into an enemy for us, we cannot find any other state than the Ottoman Empire to fight for us against them. Turks can never be a threat for us in the future, but their enemies have the potential to have our enemies as well."⁴⁶⁶

In the last decades of the 19th century, after Bismarck's period, the Ottoman Empire sought cooperation with the German Empire to preserve its survival against other expansionist European powers. In this period, under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), especially following the visit of the German Kaiser to Istanbul in 1889, the Ottoman Empire became active certainly in the great power management and the balance of power in Europe. In that period, the control over the Ottoman territories had the capacity to change the balance of the power politics in the international society as a whole. Thus, the Ottoman Empire conducted a pragmatic policy of non-commitment and tended to play off one state over another by using its capacities as leverage.⁴⁶⁷ According to Butterfield, this policy enabled the Ottoman Empire to survive after it had become too weak to defend itself.⁴⁶⁸ Martin Wight expresses this period as the reflection of a clear balance of power machinery in the Middle East within the framework of the 'eastern question': "...was one of

⁴⁶⁶ Prens Hohenluhe hatıratı, "*Die Politische Denkwürdigkeiten, V.*," 302 quoted in Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 55.

⁴⁶⁷ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 129.

⁴⁶⁸ Herbert Butterfield, "The Balance of Power," in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 144.

the most famous essays in the balance of power- for more than a hundred years before Britain acquired in 1919 the lion's share of the Ottoman Empire.”⁴⁶⁹

The most suitable partner for the Ottoman Empire emerged as the German Empire. This potential cooperation seemed to be mutually beneficial. On the one side Germany, while seeking a colony as a late-comer for its industrial development, found the market of the Ottoman Empire which was also an access to the eastern world. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire could play off in the balance of power institution by allying Germany to survive.

From a German perspective, the German Empire after the unification sought several ways to compete with European colonizing powers (especially with France and Britain), through its technological advance especially in the military sector. However, the late industrialization of Germany and its weak imperial ties with the Middle East and Eastern part of the world directed Germany to find partners in the world affairs. The old empires with established capabilities prevailed for this policy: Russia, China, Iran and Turkey. The first German attempt was to seek cooperation with China and Russia. Russian efforts for industrialization in the 1870s developed German-Russian economic relations. However, the following protectionary measures of Russia in trade, and the further influence of British and French policy makers eroded the German-Russian harmony. Russia ceased to be a destination for the German colonial demands. The German involvement in China on economic and military terms also failed with the Chinese-Japanese war in 1894-1895.⁴⁷⁰ The defeat of China by the Japanese forces, and the inheritance of the British – Franco colonial policies prevented Germany from being effective in China as well. As a last resort, the German colonial policy considered the Ottoman Empire

⁴⁶⁹ Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Butterfield and Wight, 168.

⁴⁷⁰ German high-ranking military officials fought in the Chinese Army against Japan in the 1894-95 war. See, Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 20.

and Iran as two alternatives.⁴⁷¹ At the end, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire agreed to cooperate within the dynamics of the international society, which had its foundational roots in the following period of the Congress of Berlin.

In 1888, Wilhelm II ascended the throne of the German Empire. The visit of Wilhelm II in 1889 to Istanbul changed the traditional policy of Bismarck. After this visit, German policy seemed more prone to the Ottoman interests in order to act cooperatively in the institution of balance of power, which facilitated institutionalized projects, such as the Baghdad Railway Project.⁴⁷² Along with the potential of the Turco-German cooperation, the Ottoman Empire became more active within the playground of the institutions of the international society. The Ottoman Empire, until the end of the World War I, gradually consolidated its position as a player in the great power management and the related balance of power machinery, supported by an increasing level of diplomatic relations and codes of conducts of the international law.

In 1890, Bismarck resigned and replaced by General von Caprivi (1890-1894). Under the reign of Wilhelm II, The German Empire transformed its foreign policy from Bismarck's 'balanced' attitudes into a global strategy called 'Weltpolitik'.⁴⁷³ The Foreign Minister of the German Empire (after 1897), and later the Chancellor (1900-1909), Bernhard von Bülow was also supporting this policy. Bulow's strategy was in his own words remarkable: "we do not want to put anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun"⁴⁷⁴ The strategy was to penetrate into the Eastern geographies by peaceful methods. This goal found body with the

⁴⁷¹ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 19-21.

⁴⁷² Jonathan S. McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 28.

⁴⁷³ For detailed information about 'Weltpolitik', see Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, *Grundelemente der Weltpolitik: Eine Einführung* (München u.a.: Piper, 1977)

⁴⁷⁴ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 19.

'*Drang Nach Osten*' (Drive to the East) policy.⁴⁷⁵ Within this framework, the German Empire revised its Middle Eastern policy, according to the Turco-German common interests. By taking side with the Ottomans, Germany attempted to utilize from the Ottoman capacities and capabilities in a peaceful way for the sake of German interests, and tried to create a sphere of influence in Turkish and Iranian hinterland.⁴⁷⁶ As a result of this rapprochement, the Kaiser Wilhelm II declared himself later as "the protector of 300 million of Muslims" in Damascus, in 1898.⁴⁷⁷ As noted in the transition from the Bismarck's period of the 'alliance system', to the Weltpolitik, the institution of the balance of power changed through volitional incentives, such as the case occurred with the decisions of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The balance of power did not automatically put into effect, as Bull notes. The change in the German foreign policy, in this respect created a rapprochement between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

Turco-German relations, in the last forty years until the outbreak of the World War I was constructed through the institution of balance of power. During this time period, Turco-German relations seemed to have taken the political, military, and economic incentives into account as parts of the balance of power politics to arrange their mode and level. This consideration of the balance of power institution found body either with the possibility of cooperation or with confrontation in practice, for Turco-German relations. The rapprochement after 1889 turned out to function with series of cooperation within the playground of the institutions.

The institution of the great power management also influenced the trajectory of the Turco-German relations. After Bismarck; Britain, France and Russia were still

⁴⁷⁵ Lothar Rathmann, Berlin-Bağdat: *Alman Emperyalizminin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, trans. Ragıp Zaraklı Türkiye İncelemeleri Dizisi (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınevi, 1982), 17-22.

⁴⁷⁶ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 52.

⁴⁷⁷ Reyhan, "Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı," 11-12; Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 21.

aiming to expand their sphere of influence at the expense of the Ottoman territories. This expansion also targeted economic interests. The Ottoman Empire, within this framework was seen as a bridge between the industrializing European continent, and the raw materials and the markets of the East. Their efforts for colonialism directly targeted the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The situation was also challenged by the two late-comers: Italy and Germany. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman Empire became bound to use an anti-colonial discourse against these powers with the motto of 'Islam'. Ottoman Empire became closer and sought for cooperation with Germany, who was also seeking for partners against these competitive powers. These essential motivations resulted with the Turco-German rapprochement.⁴⁷⁸

Not only the Turkish foreign policy but also the German foreign policy was in risk to be isolated in this period. Bismarck's related concern was about to be realized with the Russian-French-British rapprochements.⁴⁷⁹ After 1890, French and British policies were tolerant about the Russian goals to penetrate into the Mediterranean Sea. By this policy, the preponderance of the German power was assumed to be prevented by the help of the Russian power. The island of Crete, by the assistance of Britain, rebelled against the Ottoman regime, and was seized by the Greeks. The British navy deployed in Crete – in the 'Suda' harbour.⁴⁸⁰ The British policy was to secure British interests from Iraq-Iran to Afghanistan and to connect Mediterranean Sea with a railway to India.⁴⁸¹ After having secured these goals, the British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury in 1895, made an offer to share the Ottoman territories

⁴⁷⁸ Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918* (New York: Caravan Books, 1989), 4; Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 50.

⁴⁷⁹ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 72.

⁴⁸⁰ For the history of the conflicts of Crete, see: Fahir H. Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789-1960*, 3rd ed., (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasi Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), 293-97.

⁴⁸¹ Reşat Sagay, *XIX. Ve XX. Yüzyıllarda Büyük Devletlerin Yayılma Siyasetleri ve Milletlerarası Önemli Meseleler*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1972), 72-73.

between Austria, Germany and Britain. However, this offer was rejected by the German Emperor, due to the ongoing Turco-German cooperation. In the following period, when the British interests clashed with the German ones, the British policy makers made a deal with the Russian Empire, and agreed on the partition and the sharing of the Ottoman Empire in Reval talks of 1908.⁴⁸² The Reval talks were carried out by the consent of Great Britain, Austria and Italy, and by the neutrality of Germany.⁴⁸³ In 1908, the Russian ambassador to Paris, Nehlidof reported that the European politics was divided into two camps. These polars consisted of Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side, and Britain and France on the other side. He argued that Italy was uncertain about which camp to join.⁴⁸⁴

The great power management of this period also seeded for the configuration of the balances of power that led to the World War I. In 1882, a “triple alliance” was founded between Austria-Hungarian and German Empire and Italy. This commitment was renewed three times in 1892, 1907 and 1912. This alliance referred to a collective defence against any other great power aggression. The further provisions of this triple alliance which were signed in Berlin on 6 May 1892 included detrimental articles about the future of the Ottoman Empire. According to the German-Italian consensus, Italy was assured to be able to invade Tripoli and Benghazi which was decided to be supported by the German Government. The fourth renewal of the triple alliance on 28 June 1902 conserved this provision upon the Italian insistence.⁴⁸⁵ The Ottoman Lands were put under threat by the codifications of the institution of international law in this period, most of which were secret commitments. Against this block, a French-Russian alliance was

⁴⁸² Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 78-79.

⁴⁸³ Suat Zeyrek, “Balkan Devletlerinin İttifak Arayışı ve Osmanlı Devleti,” *Tarih Dergisi* 1, no. 53 (2013): 71-72; Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 158.

⁴⁸⁴ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 104.

⁴⁸⁵ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 131.

founded in 1894. It was followed by Anglo-French alliance in 1904. These engagements were consolidated by an Anglo-Russian Alliance in 1907 and formally formed the ‘triple entente’ on the road to the World War I. Triple Alliance and Triple Entente felt bound to be tightened when the war began to be felt inevitable after 1909. Members of the each side were in efforts to know the military resources on which it could rely during the outbreak of the war.⁴⁸⁶ In 1914, Germany along with Austro-Hungary on the one side, the Triple Entente on the other side were ready to wage war.⁴⁸⁷ The Ottoman Empire and Italy seemed to be reluctant to choose their own side or to remain neutral.

As seen, the balance of power configured by the great power management evolved at the expense of the Ottoman territorial integrity and even of its survival. Great powers of the period produced policies to prevent each other’s preponderance by bargaining on the Ottoman lands. The great power management created confronting block gradually and gave a central direction towards a great war in this period. As the leading function of the management, great powers tended to sustain the balance of power in the international society. In line with the assumptions of the institution of balance of power, as discussed in the theory chapter, and the codes of conducts of the international law turned out to be inefficient to preserve order in balance. The member states of the international society sought for power adjustments by allying and creating blocks during which the triple entente and triple alliance were formed as the preparatory grouping of the World War I. The changing position of the members from one block to another was also the reflection of the theoretical assumption about the volitional participation of the members in the international society.

⁴⁸⁶ For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente blocking, see Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, 159-181.

⁴⁸⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), 195.

Within the dynamics of the balance of power politics, the relations between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire developed gradually on the basis of the network of the institution of diplomacy. It was observable in this period that Turco-German relations took the instructions of the institution of diplomacy fully into account with the principle of reciprocity. Actually, this reciprocity was being consolidated throughout the 19th century. According to İlber Ortaylı, the Ottoman Empire was one of the great powers of the 19th century to which European ambassadors were appointed. The agreements signed, and the capitulations given to the European states were all based on reciprocity. The privileges given to European citizens on the Ottoman lands were valid for the Ottoman citizens on the European lands abroad. For instance, an Ottoman citizen had some rights and privileges on Holland's Island of Java, or Britain's India. Ottoman Empire was neither a colony nor a semi-colony of any power. For instance, the people from European colonies such as Cava, if educated in the Ottoman Empire, was given an Ottoman passport. By these passports which were accepted as European passports, they became more privileged and had some immunity in their homelands.⁴⁸⁸

The diplomatic practices were held by the professional diplomatists, in Bull's words, from the very outset. The primary rule of the institution of diplomacy to exchange professional envoys was obeyed by continuous appointments since the 18th century. The representation of these diplomatic corps along with their immunity reflected the functioning of the international society in this era as well. The appointed Turkish or German diplomats engaged in negotiations for the interests of their own countries, and fulfilled the functions of the institution of diplomacy.

For instance, in 1883, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa was sent to Berlin as a special envoy to foster Turco-German relations. This diplomatic process was carried out under the reign of Wilhelm I and the Chancellor Bismarck. The bilateral exchange

⁴⁸⁸ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 76.

of military delegations for the reform of the Ottoman army was consolidated in this process.⁴⁸⁹ In Turco-German relations, diplomatic representation was consolidated to an extent that during some periods, the diplomats became so effective on the hosting state's decision makers. For example, until 1908 when Sultan Abdülhamid II was on power who had close ties with Germany. In this period, the German Ambassador to Istanbul Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein enjoyed great esteem from the Ottomans and also called as the 'Giant of the Bosphorus' in diplomatic corridors, meaning that he was so influential on the Ottoman policies.⁴⁹⁰

While doing their jobs, some of the envoys left the hosting country they had served, or they were recalled from their capital for a sign of protest or following diplomatic failures. For instance, in the process of the World War I, upon the uncertainty of the future of the war and the post war period, there emerged several disagreements between Germany and Turkey. In this period, Germany played off the Egyptian nationalists against the Ottoman Government. With German support, the Egyptian nationalists were protected in Switzerland and indoctrinated to accept the internationalization of the Suez Canal in favour of the German interests. These groups, who were also critical of the Ottoman Government was paid by the German officials. This German propaganda tried to be blocked by the Turkish Embassy in Bern. At the end, "Hakkı Paşa – the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin protested the whole affair at the Wilhelmstrasse. After having no success, he left the German capital temporarily as a gesture of protest."⁴⁹¹ As aforementioned, when a failure occurred, the diplomats tended to be recalled in Turco-German diplomatic relations as well. During the war in 1916, the Ottoman denouncement of the Treaties of Paris (1856), the London (1871) and the Berlin (1878) ended the carrier of the German

⁴⁸⁹ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 80.

⁴⁹⁰ Frank G. Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 6.

⁴⁹¹ Bernstorff to Foreign Ministry, Feb. 13, 1918, A.A. Aegypten No.3Bd. 90, No.A 5360 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 239.

Ambassador Metternich in Istanbul. He was recalled to Berlin.⁴⁹² The crux of the observation is that Turkey and Germany in their bilateral diplomatic history tended to obey the instructions of the institution of diplomacy in relation to the modes of activity of the diplomatic corps.

As another reflection of the proper functioning of diplomacy, Turco-German relations considered the rules of protocol, provided their networks for communication, reporting and negotiations. The high level visits in this era became prominent practices between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire. In this period, Turco-German relations experienced the top-level diplomatic visits. It is remarkable that German Emperor- Kaiser Wilhelm II visited İstanbul three times, in 1889, in 1898, and in 1917. In the first two visits, he was welcomed by the Sultan Abdülhamid II with great ceremonies.⁴⁹³ Following his third visit to Istanbul in 1917 during the harsh times of the World War I, a diplomatic requirement occurred to make a return visit to Germany. The health conditions of Sultan Mehmet Reşat did not allow for the visit involved. However, on behalf of the Sultan, the Ottoman Prince - Vahidettin visited Berlin as a sign of cooperation, solidarity and friendship between two empires during the dates of 15 December 1917 – 4 January 1918 at problematic times of the war.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹² Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 201.

⁴⁹³ After the second visit, Kaiser Wilhem II built the “German Fountain” to Sultanahmed Square as a gift to the Sultan in Istanbul. Today this monumental fountain is one of the touristic points symbolising the visit of the German Emperor and German-Ottoman friendship.

⁴⁹⁴ In this visit, the founder of the Republic of Turkey- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk accompanied the Ottoman Prince-Vahidettin as a military official. See, *İslam Ansiklopedisi Vol. 31* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1988-2013), s.v. “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” by Şerafettin Turan, 312 available at <http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=310312> (28.08.2016) Also, it is worth to mention that foreign visits were not part of the Ottoman diplomatic tradition. There is only one Emperor (Sultan Abdulaziz) and only one Crown Prince (Vahidettin) in the Ottoman history, known to have visited a foreign country. See *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Facts On File Library of World History (New York, NY: Facts On File, 2009), 5,371.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's second visit in 1889 was an attempt to consolidate the German influence in Turkish foreign policy. Traditionally, in Turkish foreign policy, France had reserved a special position starting from the reign of Francois I (1515-1547) until the Napoleon Bonaparte's attack to Egypt (1798-1801). The Ottoman diplomatic relations with the British Empire were also downgraded after the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882. Upon these developments, Turco-German relations developed gradually.

Diplomatic timing for the second visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II was remarkable. The conflicts about the Island of Crete, Macedonia, and the Armenian issue were of high political concerns in the Ottoman agenda. During this period of time, Abdülhamid II by welcoming the German Kaiser gave a message to Britain, Russia and France. The Turco-German friendship became a body of alliance in 1898 after this visit. Following the visit, Berlin –Baghdad railway project was given to the German entrepreneurship. In his second visit, the German Kaiser also went to Jerusalem and Damascus. In Damascus, in his favourite speech, he noted that “his majesty- the Ottoman Sultan and the Caliphate, and his subjects of 300 million of Muslims should know that German Kaiser is their best friend.”⁴⁹⁵ After this visit, Kaiser Wilhelm II was began to be called as “*Hacı* (Muslim Pilgrim) *Wilhelm*” in the Ottoman country.⁴⁹⁶

In these visits, the Ottoman Empire obeyed the traditional rules of the institution of diplomacy and organized ceremonies and well-arranged activities for the German Kaiser.⁴⁹⁷ On 18 December 1898, the Kaiser was welcomed to the Dolmabahçe Palace with a Turkish crowd chanting slogans for the Kaiser. The following day, the Kaiser was accompanied to the Turkish Museums in Istanbul. A reception was

⁴⁹⁵Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 97.

⁴⁹⁶ Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 39.

⁴⁹⁷ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 95. See also, Wallach, *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi*, 76-77.

held in the German Embassy in Kaiser's honour. The next day, the German Emperor visited the "Harem"⁴⁹⁸ section of the Ottoman Palace, on which he was said to be curious about. The third day of the visit began with a tour at the city walls of Istanbul and continued with a reception with the diplomatic corps in Istanbul. The third day of the visit lasted with comprehensive talks between two Emperors, and ended with a theatre play. At the fourth day of his stay, the German Kaiser visited the Turkish carpet factory. At the fifth day, the official reception was made with a ceremony at the Ottoman Palace by the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. Afterwards, a gala dinner was given. At the last day, a special celebration was organized for the birthday of the German Empress. On 22 December 1898 the Kaiser and his delegation departed from Istanbul to Haifa.⁴⁹⁹

German Kaiser Wilhelm II was overwhelmed by the gifts in this visit. Wilhelm also owned a real estate in Tarabya (Therapia) on the Bosphorus, which later served as the German Ambassador's summer residence. After the visit, the German Kaiser was convinced that Germany found an important political ally. After this moment, German Kaiser changed the reluctant policy of Bismarck towards the Ottoman Empire, and gave an impetus to the bilateral relations.

This volitional act for further cooperation in Turco-German relations developed on the basis of the institution of international law. Turco-German relations, in this respect followed the codes of the institution of international law, and based on codified commitments and rules. As a first step, on 26 August 1890, a new treaty

⁴⁹⁸ For detailed information about harem, see: Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Reina Lewis, *Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem*, Library of Ottoman Studies (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

⁴⁹⁹ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 95.

of trade was signed between German Empire and the Ottoman Empire. This treaty also expanded the rights of the merchants and trades-men mutually.⁵⁰⁰

The Baghdad Railway Project, despite its linkage to the private sector, in essence was a contract between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire. This contract was intensively negotiated by the bureaucrats and diplomats. The routes were negotiated by German and Turkish delegations, on the German and Turkish interests. The Ottoman officials insisted to guarantee their rights of postal services, recruitment capacities and rapid deployment of soldiers for security reasons. On the other hand, German interests were considered by providing wide range of economic utilities especially from Turkish forests and mines. After negotiations, the commitments were solidified for the project involved. For instance, all the railway officials were to wear Ottoman uniforms even they were Germans. In any case of conflict, the Ottoman courts were responsible and authorized for the settlements.⁵⁰¹ The details were codified and signed by the Turkish and German delegations for the Baghdad Railway Project with reference to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. The process of the period witnessed numerous codes of conduct within the institution of international law, in Turco-German relations as to various subjects mentioned above.

As Bull argues, the economic factors are also of a catalyst for the balance of power politics of the states. Within this framework, the play-offs in European power configuration on the one hand, and the colonial demands of the European powers over or through the lands of the Ottoman Empire on the other hand, economy became the milestone of the political calculations in this era. Thus, the Baghdad Railway Project, which was known to be a Turco-German project created a

⁵⁰⁰ McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 61; Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 57.

⁵⁰¹ Mustafa Albayrak, "Osmanlı – Alman İlişkilerinin Gelişimi Ve Bağdat Demiryolu'nun Yapımı," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarih Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 6, no. 6 (1995): 15.

playground for this balance of power competition, and a great incentive for Turco-German interactions.

Baghdad Railway Project reflected a process in which Turco-German relations considered the working of the institutions closely. This project paved the way for the intensification of diplomatic relations, provided codes of conduct in the institution of international law, became a significant input for the great power management, revised the conditions of the institution of balance of power, and lastly gave impetus the clashes of interests which resulted with the outbreak of the World War I.

This project is a symbol of a joint enterprise defending Turco-German interests against France, Britain and Russia in particular. According to McMurray “the Ottoman Empire used the Baghdad Railway Project to play off great power rivalries and safeguard its status as a sovereign state.”⁵⁰² British Historian Edwan Meade Earle noted that the German involvement in the Baghdad Railway construction not only upset the regional balance; it increased the Anglo-German hostility and became a catalyst for war.⁵⁰³ In parallel, Abdülhamid II evaluated the Baghdad Railway Project as a tool of balance of power. The Sultan considered France and Britain as states which were striving for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Belgium was thought as a satellite state of France. For the Sultan, Russia was also a rival power, and Austria as a dangerous state not to be counted on. Since the Germans apparently had no political plans in Ottoman territory, and respected the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the project was shared with the Germans.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰² McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 1.

⁵⁰³ Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: MacMillan, 1923), 17-18.

⁵⁰⁴ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 138; McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 21.

One of the cardinal strategies of the German colonialism was to invest on railways in this period. In 1912, 95 percent of the German railway infrastructure belonged to a national firm. In this period, the private railway companies were being nationalized.⁵⁰⁵ In this term, the German Empire was planning to use the railways as a tool of its foreign policy. This policy found body in the Baghdad Railway Project. ‘*Drang nach Osten*’ (Drive to the East) policy was reflected by the route of the project as well.⁵⁰⁶ The project was to build an overland express route of 2500 kilometres from Konya across Mesopotamia to Baghdad and on to Basra in the Persian Gulf. The Project, when finalized, would become a direct linkage between the Ottoman Eastern provinces, trade centres to Istanbul and the capital cities of Europe. This project was planned to run high speed German locomotives which would connect London and Bombay with an estimated time of three days. This project certainly could curtail the route of Suez Canal, known to be the regular way between Europe and India, which was under the control of Britain. The project was also referred to as a ‘shortcut to India’. The British superiority over the seas was thought to be prevented by this railway route which would provide rapid exchange of humans and goods comparatively. According to Earle; politically, the railway presented a direct challenge to Britain’s dominance of the seas and increased the tensions between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. By threatening the regional stability, the project forced Britain to cooperate closer to the Entente Powers of Russia and France, in order to prevent the German expansionism. Earle concluded that instigated by the ‘Baghdad Railway Project’, the British-German antagonism inevitably led to the war.⁵⁰⁷

However, Germans were not alone in the field of competition for the Ottoman railways. The Baghdad railway project was a part of a larger picture. The Ottoman

⁵⁰⁵ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 35.

⁵⁰⁶ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 188. See also, Rathman, *Berlin-Bağdat Alman Emperyalizminin*, 9-12, 38-44.

⁵⁰⁷ McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 2-5.

land was full of railway investments of the great powers of the era. The German superiority in the project was not reflecting the status of the overall picture. It is remarkable that the railway constructions in the Ottoman Land became one of the prevalent input of the balance of power politics. British, French and German entrepreneurs involved in these enterprises and competed each other to create their own sphere of influences in the Ottoman Empire. In 1898, the railway routes and projects of the Ottoman Empire were shared by these three major powers as follows: While Britain had the 440 km-long route, France had 1266 km, which was followed by the German investment of 1020 km. The superiority of Britain in the 1870s was replaced by France in 1914. In the 1890s, the railway investments owned by Germans were about 24.4 percent, but increased to 36.8 percent in 1914. However the leadership remained at the hands of France by owning the 49, 6 percent of the Ottoman railways investments in 1914.⁵⁰⁸ In line with Bull's argument that the great powers tend to create sphere of influences for themselves functioned on the Ottoman territories through these railway investments, which gave more rights than transportation to investors.

The Ottoman concern was the rapid losing of territories and gradual erosion of its survival.⁵⁰⁹ The Sublime Porte was in a position to be able to announce only formal protests for the losses involved.⁵¹⁰ The weaknesses triggered Turco-German cooperation with the logic that Germany had no territorial demand from the Ottoman Empire. The German Empire was also willing to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire in order to become a global power through utilizing Ottoman economic and political capacities. This cooperation between Turkey and Germany

⁵⁰⁸ Rathmann, *Berlin-Bağdat: Alman Emperyalizminin*, 71,140.

⁵⁰⁹The Ottoman Empire experienced major losses of territory in this period. France established a de facto protectorate in Tunisia in 1881, the Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, Bulgaria annexed the eastern Rumelia in 1885, Italy occupied Eritrea. Following these developments, 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War evoked.

⁵¹⁰ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 130.

had flavoured the monumental Baghdad Railway Project. Baghdad Railway Project did not drag the Ottoman Empire into the German orbit.⁵¹¹ In contrary, it served many utilities for Turkey. For the Ottomans, the project served as a mechanism for the rapid deployment of military forces on the vast geography of the Ottoman Empire, as a precaution for wars or uprisings along with its contribution to the Ottoman economic development.⁵¹²

German industrialization also played a significant role in the balance of power politics of the project. Not only for seeking economic benefits via Ottoman Empire but also Germany was in need of energy resources. The total consumption of petroleum in Germany multiplied ten times during the 1870-1906 period.⁵¹³ This demand could not only met only by Rumania. The petroleum resources in the Mesopotamia region of the Ottoman Land became a strategic point for the German policies.⁵¹⁴ At the beginning of the 1900s, the petroleum capacity of the south-eastern Anatolia, Iraq and Syria were being reported to the German Foreign Office. German Empire applied to the Bab-ı Ali to open a consulate in Mosul in 1904 that was rich in petroleum, in which no significant number of German citizens were living and no German trade existed.⁵¹⁵ This region including the Central Anatolia was of a strategic significance for German food imports as well. The route of the Baghdad Railway also supplied German investments for irrigation and food-trading. For instance, Philipp Holzmann Company from Frankfurt opened 200 kilometres of long canals and drained swamps in the Central Anatolia. Another firm from Dresden trained some Ottoman farmers and started planting cotton in Adana

⁵¹¹ McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 1.

⁵¹² Paul. K. Butterfield, "The Diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway, 1890-1914", PH.D. Dissertation, Göttingen, 1932 quoted in McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 5.

⁵¹³ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 67.

⁵¹⁴ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 67.

⁵¹⁵ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 153.

- Çukurova region. Specifically, the Baghdad Railway Project routed from the Central Anatolia via Southern cities of Turkey Konya, via Karaman-Ereğli to the city of Aleppo. It was planned to connect the lines of Hama- Homs- Tripolis-Beirut-Jaffa and Jerusalem. The whole project aimed to reach the Hejaz line. It follows from this route that Germany was not only curtailing British interests, supplying energy and import chain, but also seeking to have an influence on the Arabic peninsula.⁵¹⁶

The Baghdad Railway was first planned to connect İstanbul to Ankara. The construction rights of the project were given to the company called ‘The Anatolian Railway Company (ARC), led by German firms: Siemens and Kaulla. This enterprise both had the confidence of the Sultan and the Kaiser. Despite the obstacles such as the labour shortages, influenza, robbers, and dengue fever; the railway between Istanbul and Ankara was completed and began operating fully by December 1892. Upon the demand of the Sultan, the route was planned to extend to Baghdad.⁵¹⁷ This extension provided the engagement of more German entrepreneurs, which began to compete for taking the privileges for the construction of the railways. For instance, a German entrepreneur Felix Morat in 1895 gained the privilege of the Tehran-Baghdad Railway Project from the Ottoman Empire. The German policy was to extend this railway from Baghdad to Tehran.⁵¹⁸

This policy had an impact on the functioning of the institution of the balance of power. The British Empire was troubled with this German involvement into the region. For example, in 1903, in the House of Lords, Lord Ellenborough declared that “I prefer seeing a Russian fleet in Constantinople rather than seeing a German

⁵¹⁶ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 149-151.

⁵¹⁷ McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 28-29.

⁵¹⁸ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 23.

fleet in Basra".⁵¹⁹ France also expressed discontent about the project as to its potential to curtail the French political and economic interests in Syria. In addition to these countries, Russia was also uncomfortable about the project considering her goals in Iran and in the Eastern Anatolia. The first impact on Russia brought about by the trade figures. When the railway project reached to the Central Anatolia (Konya and Ankara), the Turkish amount of the import of grain from Russia diminished significantly. The railway project increased the yield of agricultural goods and made their transportation cheaper to Istanbul. Turkey became no more an importer of grain from Russia and Bulgaria.⁵²⁰

Between the years of 1893 and 1911, the total amount of fruits, vegetables and grain transported to Istanbul, increased about 1000 percent from the sanjaks of Ankara, Eskişehir and Konya.⁵²¹ As seen, the Turco-German relations improved at the expense of the interests of the other great powers of the era in the Baghdad Railway Project. The working of the institution of the great power management, with the exception of Germany and Turkey were against the project, and also opposing to the new balance of power occurred with this project in the region. In this period, it was clear that Turco-German relations had the capacity to challenge and revise the ongoing great power management and the related balance of power at the expense of other great powers. However, this contradiction without any doubt fuelled the spark of the World War I, into which the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire collaboratively engaged. The Turco-German history, in this sense, presented a flow within the borders of the Bull's institutions, ended by the institution of war.

⁵¹⁹ Ivar Spectar, *The First Russian Revolution, A Spectrum Book*, (Prentice-Hall Inc, 1962), 49 quoted in İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10th ed., vol. 29, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008), 23.

⁵²⁰ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 154-55.

⁵²¹ Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers*, 253-55.

While Turco-German relations could show a certain amount of resistance to the institutional working, when their state interests were challenged during the construction period; the institutions of the international society also posed resistances and challenges on the Turco-German cooperation on the project involved. In line with Bull's analysis, the member states act within the institutions of the international society which they shape, and which they are shaped by. In this example, the Turco-German relations considered the working of the institutions in adjusting their bilateral relations for the project involved, while the institutions were attempting to shape the Turco-German relations. The outcome was that the Baghdad Railway Project indeed could not be completed. From 1890 to 1896, the railway connected İzmit to Ankara, and Konya. In 1912, an extra route was built only from Konya to Karapınar about 290 km. To the South, the total construction was 59 km to Toprakkale-İskenderun, 453 km to İslahiye-Resulayn (1911-1914) and to Bagdad-Samarra connection (1912-14). At the end, the longest uninterrupted route was used in 1918 by German officials and their families to reach their own country, from Nusaybin to Istanbul at the end of the war. This was the first and the last train-travel on 9 October 1918.⁵²²

The Ottoman will to recover her great power status and to preserve its sovereignty was clearly assisted by the Baghdad Railway Project. On the other hand, starting from 18th century, the Ottoman Empire was in efforts to reform the Ottoman state structure with a special emphasis on the military sector for the matter involved. Since, the conditions of the era required continuous preparedness for wars. The balance of power institution, both at global scale or at the regional scale used to engage in wars and alliances at the expense of peace. To be prepared for a war in this period motivated states to invest in their armies. The Ottoman decision makers also imported military infrastructure from European great powers. The defeat of the French forces by the Prussian forces in 1870 which resulted with the unification of Germany, preceded the Prussian military influence on the Ottomans. The following

⁵²² Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 166.

defeat of the Ottoman armies in the Ottoman-Russian war in 1877-1878 increased the demand for foreign military experts to restore the Ottoman military with new reforms. Despite the fact that the Ottoman army was consisting of British, French and German infrastructures, after the Congress of Berlin, German influence came to dominate the Ottoman military system through increasing number of German military delegations and the import of German weapons. Until the end of the World War I, Ottoman army accommodated German experts and commanders for the related reforms in the Ottoman military system.⁵²³

In the 1890s, in parallel to the Turco-German rapprochement, Turco-German military cooperation prevailed. Within this framework, the Ottoman military officials came to be sent to Germany for training and education, and also a considerable number of German military experts were invited to initiate reforms in Turkey. The military committees involved were headed by General Kaehler (1882-1885), by Colmar Freiherr Von Der Goltz (1886-1895), and by Liman Von Sanders (1913-1918).⁵²⁴ After the death of General Kaehler, Colmar von der Goltz was appointed as the chief of the German military delegation to Istanbul. He worked for nine years at his first post, and then re-invited to Istanbul in 1910⁵²⁵ after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.⁵²⁶ During this period, military cooperation developed to a great extent. Mahmud Şevket Paşa, for instance, was invited to Germany as the

⁵²³ Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 18. For the list of prevalent German military officials, see İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 4th ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2014), 563-64.

⁵²⁴ For examples, see Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye’de Beş Sene* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2006); Colmar Goltz, *20. Yüzyıl Başlarında Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2012). For a detailed analysis of the Kaehler’s period, see Jehuda L. Wallach, *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi* (Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1985), 31-51.

⁵²⁵ Fahri Türk, *Türkiye ile Almanya Arasındaki Silah Ticareti, 1871-1914: Krupp Firması, Mauser Tüfek Fabrikası, Alman Silah Ve Cephane Fabrikaları* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2012), 102; Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 111.

⁵²⁶ For detailed information about Young Turks, see Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler Ve İttihat Ve Terakki*, 3.baskı. ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001); Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2016).

guest of Wilhelm II to participate into the military practices.⁵²⁷ On the other hand, Turkish military staff attended special military programmes in Germany. In 1895, Turkish Ambassador to Berlin - A. Tevfik Paşa noted 19 Turkish military officials attending German military programmes in Berlin.⁵²⁸

Cenk Reyhan argues that German policy was to use the Ottoman army during any possible Russian-German war against the Russian army.⁵²⁹ Thus, these military delegations were appointed to donate the Ottoman army with German arms. The German commanders were also demanded to command Ottoman military troops as much as possible. The preparation for a war, in this case, in terms of the possibility of the German-Russian war, influenced the foreign policy of Germany and provided a close military cooperation and arm-trade in Turco-German relations.

In this era, the half of the total budget of the Ottoman Empire was reserved for the Ottoman army and the Ottoman navy.⁵³⁰ The considerable amount of war materials and arms were imported from Germany to Turkey. According to the records, the German companies of Krupp, Mauser, and Loewe were the leading firms in this import channel. Turkish demands for weapons and ammunition increased according to the needs occurred in the Ottoman Wars. Starting from the 1870s, the German firms continuously exported war materials, light weapons, heavy weapons such as torpedoes, artillery systems, and ammunitions at an increasing pace. The Ottoman-Russian War in 1877, The Tripoli War in 1911, Balkans Wars in 1912 and the following World War I in 1914 increased the demands for German arms.⁵³¹ As an example, during the period of Goltz, The Turkish Straits were decided to be

⁵²⁷ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 196.

⁵²⁸ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 115.

⁵²⁹ Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 19.

⁵³⁰ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 104.

⁵³¹ For details, see Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 19-20.

empowered by more heavy weapons. The required military equipment and artillery systems were supplied by a German firm – Krupp.⁵³² In 1885, about 500 artillery systems were imported from Germany Krupp firm to Turkey. These figures increased, and British and French influence was gradually eliminated in military trade in the following years.⁵³³

The investment on arms, and the military reforms were not only for the preparation for wars but also for the battlefields. The institution of war worked on the road to the World War I, by eroding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. These wars until 1914 were limited and functioned to create limited adjustments to the ongoing balance of power. It is observable that the wars effected the trajectory of the Ottoman bilateral state relations in the 19th and the 20th century. The French occupation of Algeria and Tunisia, and the following British invasion of Cyprus and Egypt collapsed the status quo in the region. Italian invasion of Tripoli was the last event of this serial which put an end to the Ottoman sovereignty on the African continent. In 1911, the Tripoli war in Turkish history and the following Balkan wars had a great impact on Turkish foreign policy and the bilateral state relations of the Ottoman Empire. It turned out that neither France or Britain nor Germany and Austria-Hungary opposed to the Italian invasion of Tripoli. These developments, at the expense of the Ottoman sovereignty, occurred within the dynamics of European great power management. For instance, there was a Franco-Italian understanding that French invasion of Tunisia and the Italian invasion of Tripoli were all acceptable.⁵³⁴ In the first days of the invasion, the representatives of the great powers in Istanbul were asked to act against this

⁵³² Rifat Önsoy, *Türk-Alman İktisadi Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: Enderun Yayınları, 1982), 103; Selami Kılıç, “Birinci Dünya Savaşına Uzanan Süreçte Türk-Alman Yakınlaşması,” in Zekeriya Türkmen ed., *1914’ten 2014’e 100’üncü Yılında Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nı Anlamak* (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 2014), 97; Türk, *Türkiye ile Almanya Arasındaki Silah Ticareti*, 226-233.

⁵³³ Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, 116-17.

⁵³⁴ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 133.

aggression. The great powers including Britain and Germany advised the Ottoman Empire to compromise about the issue with the Italians.⁵³⁵ In the following days, Italian fleet also occupied the Ottoman “Dodecanese” islands.⁵³⁶ At the end, the islands of the Aegean Sea were shared by the Italians and Greeks.⁵³⁷

Following the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire sought for additional military support and military reforms. A German military committee with the leadership of Liman von Sanders was appointed to Istanbul. His contract was signed on 27 October 1913. Liman von Sanders arrived in Istanbul with 42 military officials on 14 December 1913.⁵³⁸ This development was perceived to be the consolidation of the Turco-German alliance and a menace to the Russian Empire.⁵³⁹ Liman von Sanders was first appointed as the commander of the Ottoman First Army. However, upon the pressures from Britain and other Entente powers, Bab-ı Ali changed his post as the inspector of the First Army.⁵⁴⁰ Despite the fact that Ottoman Fleet was agreed to be reformed by the British military experts, and the Gendarmerie to be reformed by the Italian and French military experts⁵⁴¹, the ground forces of the Ottoman Empire was agreed to be reformed by the Germans.

⁵³⁵ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 143.

⁵³⁶ Necdet Hayta, “Rodos ile 12 Ada’nın İtalyanlar Tarafından İşgali ve İşgalden Sonra Adaların Durumu (1912-1918),” (*OTAM*) *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 5 (1994): 131-144; Fahir Armaoğlu, 19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1789 – 1914 (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2016), 622-23; Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 149.

⁵³⁷ For a detailed analysis of the history of the Greek and Italian sovereignty over Aegean Islands, see Şerafettin Turan, “Rodos ve 12 Ada’nın Türk Hakimiyetinden Çıkışı,” *Belleten* 29, no. 113 (January 1965): 98-119.

⁵³⁸ Von Sanders, *Türkiye’de Beş Sene*, 23-26; Wallach, *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi*, 112-23.

⁵³⁹ Frh. VonEckardstein, *Die Isolg. Deutschland*, Leipzig 1921,V.2, p.180 quoted in Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 246.

⁵⁴⁰ Turan, *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi*, 503.

⁵⁴¹ Reyhan, “Türk Alman İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Arka Planı,” 22.

The ground forces without any doubt was the crucial and the largest portion of the Ottoman military capacity.

Despite the consolidation of the bilateral relations through the spectacular Baghdad Railway Project, and the consolidated military assistance from Germany, the Ottoman Empire felt still bound to find an alternative ally in order to balance its dependency on Germany and to take actively part within the institution of balance of power. In October 1911, the Ottoman Minister of Finance Cavit Bey wrote a letter to the British First Lord of the Admiralty – Winston Churchill asking for an Anglo-Ottoman alliance treaty. This request was rejected by Churchill on the ground that British Empire was not eager to sign new political commitments in that period.⁵⁴² Following this event, in 1913 The Ottoman Ambassador to London – Tevfik Paşa submitted a formal proposal for an Anglo-Ottoman treaty of alliance to the British Government. Despite the fact that this attempt was welcomed by the British Government, it could not produce any outcome.⁵⁴³ Even after the signing of the secret Turco-German alliance which became the ground for waging the World War I, the Ottoman officials were simultaneously seeking cooperation with the other great powers. The Ottoman Minister of the Navy - Cemal Paşa negotiated with the British Ambassador on 20 August 1914 about the possibility of an alliance between the Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which could not be achieved at the end.⁵⁴⁴

After being refused by the British Government, the Ottoman Empire sought for an alliance with France in 1914. During the military practice of the French navy, Cemal Paşa contacted with the French officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and proposed a plan for signing a Franco-Turkish alliance. This proposal was not

⁵⁴² Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, C.II, K. IV* (Ankara:1983), 619.

⁵⁴³ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa, C.II* (İstanbul:,Remzi Kitabevi, 1986), 505.

⁵⁴⁴ Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 235.

accepted by the French due to the possible reactions of the Russian Empire.⁵⁴⁵ Upon the refusal by French officials, the Ottoman Empire also asked the Russian Empire for an alliance as well in May 1914. When the Russian Tsar was in his summer house in Crimea, Talat Paşa offered an alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. This proposal was also rejected by the Tsar due to the existence of active German soldiers within the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴⁶

At the end, all of these refusals resulted with solidarity in Turco-German relations. After the beginning of the war, the Ottoman Empire sought alternative balances from the ranks of the opposite block, at least to maintain a neutrality. In return for this neutrality, the Ottoman Empire was claiming the Western Thrace and the Aegean islands back, and demanding the elimination of the capitulations.⁵⁴⁷ However, the Ottoman demands were rejected by the Entente Powers. At the end, The Ottoman Porte declared the abrogation of all capitulations unilaterally on 8 September 1914.⁵⁴⁸

On 6 August 1914, before the ratification of the Turco-German treaty, German Ambassador to Istanbul - Wangenheim gave a note to the Grand Vizier Sait Halim Paşa. This note was full of German commitments guaranteeing the interests of the Ottoman Empire in the post-war period. For instance, any peace treaty would not be accepted by the German side during the war, if one part of the Ottoman territory was under occupation by the enemy forces. Or if Greece was going to cooperate with the allied powers, Germany was going to work for the Aegean islands to be

⁵⁴⁵ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, C.II, K. IV* (Ankara:1983), 549-58.

⁵⁴⁶ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa, C.II* (İstanbul:,1986), 518.

⁵⁴⁷ Hasan C. Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, eds., *Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol.13*. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s.v. "Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914)." By Muzaffer Tepekaya, 75.

⁵⁴⁸ McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, 115.

re-annexed by the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴⁹ This event presents clearly that German Empire was seeking to convince Turkey to operate the institution of war collectively, through alternative channels of the international law by proposing additional agreements for the possible future.

The negotiations of the Ottoman Empire to embark upon the World War I was carried out by a small group, which even was not giving proper information to the Ottoman cabinet and authorized officials. It seemed to be under the control of Enver Paşa who tried to play off the ongoing balance of power in Europe. Enver Paşa urged the German Ambassador Wangenheim on the eve of the war that “if Turkey were rejected by the Triple Alliance, she would turn at once to the Triple Entente”⁵⁵⁰ During these intensive negotiations, World War I began. Upon the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand - the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on 28 June 1914, by a young Serbian nationalist,⁵⁵¹ in Sarajevo (Bosna), Austria-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia. The ally of Serbia, Russian Empire then declared mobilization on Austria-Hungary. Britain and France were also in efforts to help Serbia. As a response, the German Empire first declared a war on Russia on 1 August 1914. Two days later, the German Empire declared a war on France as well. During this period of time, on 6 August 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. Upon the refusal of the transition of the German forces over Belgium, Germany declared also war on Belgium on 21 August 1914. Upon this declaration, British Empire declared war on German Empire.⁵⁵²

⁵⁴⁹ Hasan C. Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, eds., *Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol.13*. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s.v. “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914).” By Muzaffer Tepekaya, 73.

⁵⁵⁰ Wangenheim to Foreign Ministry, July 22, 1914, given in Jaeckh, *Rising Crescent*, 12 quoted in Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent*, 63.

⁵⁵¹ Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War*, 217-18.

⁵⁵² Michael Howard, *The First World War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21-32.

After the outbreak of the World War I, On 2 August 1914, Turco-German Treaty of Alliance was signed⁵⁵³ which paved the way for the Ottomans to enter into the World War I at German flanks in the coming months. This was a result of negotiations taken with the tools of the institution of diplomacy as well. These negotiations were held in Istanbul in secrecy. The Grand Vizier Said Halim was not even revealing these negotiations to the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin Mahmud Mukhtar.⁵⁵⁴ Said Halim started negotiations on 27 July 1914 with the German Ambassador Wangenheim. They concluded the text of the Treaty of Alliance on 2 August 1914. The second article of the secret agreement was that against any Russian aggression towards Austria-Hungary or German Empire, The Ottoman Empire would open a war against the Russian Empire. The third article of the text clearly expresses that the German army was responsible to defend the Ottoman land as well.⁵⁵⁵

As noted above, the signing of the Turco-German Treaty of Alliance coincided with the outbreak of the World War I. Austria-Hungary started bombing Belgrade only four days before this alliance. According to the articles of the alliance, Turkey was bound to enter into the war, in the event of a war between the German Empire and the Russian Empire, caused by any Russian aggression on Austria-Hungary. Due to the Russian mobilization for an attack to Austria-Hungary, the German Empire declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914. This fact seemed to have fulfilled the criteria of the Turco-German Treaty of Alliance, which was binding for the Ottoman Empire to enter into the war. In this vein, it was first assumed that the

⁵⁵³ Veli Yılmaz, “1 inci Dünya Harbi ve 2 Ağustos 1914 Tarihli Türk-Alman İttifak Antlaşması,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no.9 (1992): 121-131; Hasan C. Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, eds., *Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol.13*. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s.v. “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914).” By Muzaffer Tepekaya, 71; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 59.

⁵⁵⁴ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 64.

⁵⁵⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Cilt 1-2: 1914 1995)* (İstanbul-Ankara: Alkım Yayınevi, 2004), 108-09; İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 570-71; Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye Bir Nazar*, 230-31.

Ottoman Empire immediately was going to declare war on allied forces. However, the treaty was not ratified by the Ottoman Government until 17 December 1914. Despite the close partnership in Turco-German relations, the Ottoman Empire hesitated to act in parallel with the German Empire during this period of time, and used the manoeuvring space provided by the international law as well, through ratifying the treaty lately.

This alliance was also a declaration for the Ottomans of the equal participation of the international society along with one of the great powers of Europe – Germany. This partnership was also an exit-way for the Ottoman Empire from the isolation noted. The sovereignty and independence of the Ottoman Empire, within the framework of the minimalist definition of Hedley Bull, seemed to have been respected. From the Ottoman viewpoint, the balance of power efforts for preventing the war collapsed, by the aforesaid refusals from France, Britain and Russia. This fact meant that the institution of balance of power at that period of time effected the trajectory of Turco German relations and as a result Ottoman Empire entered into the World War I with Germany later.

However, the signing of the Treaty of Alliance, which was yet not ratified, did not necessarily mean the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the World War I. The German Empire had the bid to integrate the Ottoman Empire into the war as soon as possible against the entente powers. Two German battleships Goeben and Breslau bombed the Algerian coasts on 3 August 1914 and then sailed to the Dardanelles on 10 August 1914. This attempt increased the tensions at the beginning of the war. However, during this time period, international law became flexible for the Turco-German relations, and two German warships - Goeben and Breslau arrived at the Turkish Straits on August 10 and were passed through. According to the Allied forces, this transit sail was a clear violation of the Paris and London Treaties of 1856 and 1871.⁵⁵⁶ To ease the tension, the Ottoman Government

⁵⁵⁶ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 71.

declared that they had bought these two warships in cooperation with the German Ambassador to Istanbul.⁵⁵⁷ The crew of the ships were put on Ottoman uniforms and a Turkish flag was raised on the ship. These battleships were re-named as ‘Yavuz’ and ‘Midilli’ in Turkish.⁵⁵⁸

In the following days in September 1914, the Strait of the Dardanelles was totally blocked by torpedoes by the Ottoman administration.⁵⁵⁹ This was a preparation for the coming war to secure Istanbul and to control the transit passes to the Black Sea. During this time period, another option for Turkey was to remain neutral in the war. The initial reaction of the Ottoman Empire for the war involved was being neutral. This neutrality was satisfying British and French sides, due to the fact that Turkish neutrality would keep the Turkish straits open for any Anglo-French support for their ally-Russia. Despite the fact that *İttihad ve Terakki* – Union and Progress Party was on power which was known to be a pro-German party, there were some opposing ideas within the government as well.⁵⁶⁰ The Ottoman Empire was not eager to enter into the war immediately at the beginning. The blurred balance of power in Europe, and the ambiguity about the future of the war paved the Turkish decision makers to consider alternatives.

The Ottoman Empire was not part of the war at the beginning of the December 1914. The institution of war was shaping the order in the international society with bombings in Europe, while the Ottoman Empire was trying to resist to take part in the war. The Ottoman Empire was complaining about the deficit in the Ottoman economy, and demanded financial support from Germany during this period of

⁵⁵⁷ Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: T.C. Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1984), 115.

⁵⁵⁸ Hasan C. Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, eds., *Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol.13*. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s.v. “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914).” By Muzafer Tepekaya, 73.

⁵⁵⁹ McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, 117.

⁵⁶⁰ Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, 113-133.

time. Germany was said to have sent about 500 millions of franks to the Ottoman Empire for the war-expenses during the time of the Ottoman reluctance.⁵⁶¹

On 29 December 1914, commanded by the German Admiral Souchan, *Yavuz* and *Midilli* (Goeben and Bresleu) attacked the harbours of Sevastopol, Odesa, Feodeisa and Vonrosiski, and also sank several Russian ships. The decision of bombing was taken without the permission of the Ottoman cabinet. Enver Paşa, as the Ottoman General Chief of Staff was known to have given the necessary commands to these two battleships to bomb Russian coasts and Russian ships in the Black Sea on 22 December 1914.⁵⁶² Even after this moment, there had been severe debates in the Ottoman Government. Some of the ministers resisted to enter into the war, and resigned.⁵⁶³ The first reaction of the Ottoman Government was to call Russian officials with a diplomatic note to open an investigation about the issue for the reconciliation of the relations. In this note, the Ottoman fleet was guaranteed not to sail in the Black Sea to meet Russian concerns. In line with the function of the institution of diplomacy, the Ottoman Government tried to minimise the friction through the tools of diplomacy. However, this offer clearly rejected by the Russian

⁵⁶¹ Hasan C. Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca, eds., *Türkler Ansiklopedisi Vol.13*. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s.v. “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914).” By Muzaffer Tepekaya, 75.

⁵⁶² Kemal H. Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2015), 100-01; Tepekaya, “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914),” 76. For further discussions, see also McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, 116-22.

⁵⁶³ The Minister of Finance - Cavit Bey, the Minister of Postal Issues – Oskan, the Minister of Agriculture – Suleyman El Sultani, the Minister of Labour Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa rejected to engage in war, against the block of Ministers: Said Halim Paşa, Enver Paşa, Cemal Paşa, Talat Paşa, the Minister of Justice - İbrahim Bey, the Minister of Education – Şükrü Bey, Seyh-ül İslam Hayri Efendi, The President of the Ottoman Parliament – Halil Bey. Kurt Ziemke, *Die Neu Türkei, Politische Entwicklung 1914-1929* (Berlin und Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags, 1930), 36-37 quoted in Tepekaya, “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914),” 77.

officials, which were supported by the Entente powers. Upon this development, Britain, Russia, and France declared war on the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁶⁴

The Ottoman Empire declared its unilateral abandonment of capitulations which would mean a signal for entering the war along with the German Empire.⁵⁶⁵ The Ottoman Empire, in line with the German-Ottoman interests declared a war on allies. The Ottoman Empire, along with the German Empire also operated the institution of war during the World War I. However, the spark of this declaration was still of a great debate in Turkish history about whether this decision was taken by very small number of decision makers leaded by Enver Paşa, or a common decision of the Ottoman ruling elite.⁵⁶⁶ According to Mustafa Aksakal, “rather than the pursuit of pan-Islamist or pan-Turkist objectives, examination of the official documentation and the political literature of the time suggest that the Ottoman leadership viewed the war as a ‘historic opportunity’ of a different kind”, at least to regain the Ottoman Empire’s security and independence.⁵⁶⁷

Ottoman Sultan (Muhammed) *Mehmet* Reşat V tried to mobilize all of the Muslim subjects of the Empire against British-French-Russian coalition. He announced “*cihad*” (jihad) against these powers on 23 November 1914.⁵⁶⁸ At this point, it is known that even Enver Paşa, who was seen as one of the most eager official to ally with Germany in the war, opposed the decision of declaring ‘jihad’. He argued, the declaration of jihad had to be directed against the ‘infidels’ powers, including

⁵⁶⁴ M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question: a Study in International Relations* (New York: Macmillan & St Martin’s Press, 1966), 314; Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 25-61.

⁵⁶⁵ Tepekaya, “Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914),” 75.

⁵⁶⁶ Aptülâhat Akşin, *Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. XVI. Dizi*, vol. 56, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri Ve Diplomasisi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 7-17.

⁵⁶⁷ Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War*, 17.

⁵⁶⁸ Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 146-47.

Germany. For him, allying with a Christian state under the discourse of jihad could not be an option. His proposal was to call upon the all Muslims for jihad against the powers of the Triple Entente.⁵⁶⁹ On the other hand, according to Sean McMeekin, Enver Paşa was one of the leading figure of the process, meeting daily with the German ambassador to İstanbul, and organizing the jihadist propaganda especially between the dates from the signing of the secret Turco-German alliance treaty on 2 August 1914, until the Ottoman declaration of War in December 1914. McMeekin also noted that the Turco-German jihadi propaganda started before August 1914, along with a considerable member of Turkish and German professional teams to foment the Islamist rhetoric in the Muslim world, including the regions such as Anatolia, Arabian Peninsula, Persia and India. The ‘Oppenheim’s jihad Bureau’ in Berlin provided communication via telegrams, and the Ottoman Porte ordered preaches in all Ottoman mosques for the victory of Germany in this period.⁵⁷⁰

The process showed that this holy war did not resonate fully as much as it was thought, in the all regions of the Arab world, which was assumed to be 300 million of Muslims. British dominance prevented the fully support of the Arab. Upon declaration of war against allied forces, The British Empire opened new frontiers in Dardanelles, Hejaz and Southern Iraq. The number of these frontiers increased during the war and the war extended for the Ottomans to Caucasus, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Sinai and Galicia as well. Tilman Lüdke argues that the announcement of jihad was also a policy of the German Empire in the World War I, in his book called – *Jihad Made in Germany*. The main argument of the book is as follows:

Germany overrated the power of Pan-Islam and falsely believed that an alliance with the Ottoman Empire would put this force at Germany’s disposal, to be used as a weapon against the Entente powers. Britain on the other hand, underrated Ottoman fighting strength and

⁵⁶⁹ Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War*, 16-17.

⁵⁷⁰ McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, 86-99.

internal cohesion, and overrated the appeal of Arab nationalism to gain the support of the Ottoman Arabs for Britain's ends.⁵⁷¹

When the systemic institutions are supposed to serve for the state interests, Turkey and / or Germany did not hesitate to operate the institutions together. In the World War I, Germany allied with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. However, this war also served for bilateral interests in Turco-German relations. The Ottoman Empire served to a considerable extent for the state interests of Germany, and also vice versa. Frank G. Weber notes:

...by its geographic position alone, the Ottoman Empire blocked Russia from communication with her allies, denied her badly needed materials, and finally brought her war effort to grief as the; Germans alone could probably have not done. Moreover, Turkish troops on several fronts tied down not only Russian but also British forces, while her espionage and guerrilla activities harassed the governments of Italy and France.⁵⁷²

While waging a common war, the interests of Germany and Turkey clashed many times during the World War I. The way of conducting the war became also a guideline for their bilateral state relations. Without considering the developments of the ongoing war, it was impossible to manage their bilateral relations. How Turkey and Germany took the ongoing war into account while conducting their relations could be examined through the historical records of the war:

When the war began, Egypt was officially the province of the Ottoman Empire, in line with the arrangements in 1882, despite the British colonialism over the land. While dominating Egypt, Britain had an actual control over the Suez Canal as well. The massing of Turkish troops and supplies at the Suez Canal with a Turco-German campaign was unacceptable from the British point of view for securing their

⁵⁷¹ Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, 1.

⁵⁷² Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 1.

connection with India. “Even though the recovery of Egypt was one of the most important of Turkish war aims, the German Government had clearly decided to reserve the area for itself against the claims of both friend and foe.”⁵⁷³ It follows from this argument that there was a disagreement about the future of Egypt between Germany and Turkey, even though they took a common military in Suez Canal. This campaign was mentioned as “a ridiculous failure” by Liman Von Sanders in his memoirs.⁵⁷⁴

During this high-tension discussions about the future of Egypt, there was a clear sequence of problems between the Ottoman Government and the Egyptian Khedive (Ottoman Ruler) Abbas Hilmi. While Germany was seeking for own interests, Abbas Hilmi was not acting in harmony with the instructions of the Ottoman Government. Upon the perceived risks for the route of India in the Red Sea, British pressure increased militarily in Egypt. Britain sent more than hundred warring ships to Red Sea and began to seize Ottoman weapons and eliminate Ottoman security forces under the rule of Abbas Hilmi. In the course of these events, Austrians rejected any common attack on the Suez Canal on the ground that this operation would undermine the status of Italy in Tripoli and encouraged Italy to side with the Entente Powers.⁵⁷⁵ As a result, the Ottoman Empire’s policy to galvanize and mobilize Austrian and German allies for the recovering of Egypt failed.

On 15 January 1915 Turkish fourth army began to march toward Egypt under the rule of Cemal Paşa. His forces were 22000 troops against the 185000 British troops. During this operation Turkish forces cooperated with German experts. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Kress von Kressenstein dug wells along the desert route to

⁵⁷³ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 88.

⁵⁷⁴ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 88.

⁵⁷⁵ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 114-21; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 92.

supply water during the operation.⁵⁷⁶ Campaign could not achieve its targets at the end. From the Turkish point of view, Egyptian campaign failed and could not recover the Ottoman interests in the region. However, from a German perspective, it was not totally a failure, the Turkish troops reached the significant targets through the desert successfully and obliged British troops to increase their numbers about more 100.000 soldiers in this region.⁵⁷⁷

During the World War I, the German and Ottoman interests continued to clash in more occasions. For example, one of them was about the Baghdad Railway Project, on which Germany invested a lot. The German aim was to use the Baghdad Railway as a leverage for the negotiations after the war. Jagow, for the German Foreign Ministry, insisted that this project had the chance to turn the railroad as a great menace to be used in negotiation table against British Empire.⁵⁷⁸ During the war, on side of the Germans, one of the crucial topic discussed was the extension of the route of the Baghdad Railway. In line with the plans of Ernst Jaeckh to tunnel Amanus and Taurus mountains, it was of great significance for arm supplies particularly for the Suez Canal – Sinai Peninsula and Syria. This Project was supported by Liman von Sanders while objected by the Ambassador Wangenheim. The Emperor William II and the General Chief of Staff Falkenhayn gave the order to strengthen the Baghdad line, without any certain decision about the extension of the route. German Representative - Helmut von Moltke was also sceptical about the project.⁵⁷⁹ This project also intensified the discussions in the Turkish bureaucracy,

⁵⁷⁶ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 98-99.

⁵⁷⁷ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 122; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 104.

⁵⁷⁸ Jagow to Emperor William, June 19, 1915, No. A19323 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 142.

⁵⁷⁹ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 137-41.

Talat Bey for instance, as the Minister of Interior affairs, arguing that the railroad was contributing to German strategical aims rather than the Turkish ones.⁵⁸⁰

Another clash of interest was about the status of Italy during the war. The Ottoman will to ensure sovereignty over Tripoli was ignored by the German foreign policy in order to provide at least the neutrality of Italy, not to turn her into an enemy. The common enemy was insisted to be the British forces. However, the methods to confront the British forces and the British dominance were bifurcated in the Turco-German alliance as well. For instance, in order to weaken the dominance of British forces in Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, German delegations were seeking for local uprisings against Britain while the Ottoman command under Enver Paşa offered direct destruction of the British oil refineries in Abadan and sinking of a British ship in the Shatt-el-Arab to menace in the Persian Gulf. This proposal was rejected by the German Government. Enver Paşa took action and showed the determinancy of the Ottoman strategy. Despite the opposition, Enver Paşa “had a tramp steamer sunk in the Shatt-el-Arab.”⁵⁸¹ The institution of war in this sense, was not carried out in full coordination of the Turco-German cooperation. The clash of state interests during the war provided resistance, challenges even within the borders of one single institution.

After the victories at the battles of Dardanelles and Kut-el-Amara, the Ottomans attempted to formulize independent policies from Germany, against the Entente powers.⁵⁸² During this period, the policies of the German Government and the Ottoman rule were not coordinated for the same goals, or at least for the same methods and tactics. For instance, the German policy to rebel the local people in Persian Gulf and Afghanistan failed, and the Germans had to withdraw from the

⁵⁸⁰ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 142.

⁵⁸¹ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 170.

⁵⁸² Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 178.

area. The deployment of Russian troops in Teheran in late November 1915 scattered the plans of Germany.⁵⁸³ During this period of time, the possibility of a peace treaty was being discussed in Istanbul through the mediation of the American mission. The President Wilson offered a secret diplomacy corridor to find out a peace solution between Entente and Central Powers in 1916.⁵⁸⁴

During the World War I in 1916, while the Ottoman troops were fighting in Europe and in the Middle East, upon the Russian invasion of Black Sea coast and the Eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman Government tried to find open doors to restore its policies. Through the Office of the Ottoman Minister of Interior Affairs - Halil Bey, the Ottoman Empire proposed the abrogation of the Paris Treaty (1856), the London Treaty (1871), and the Berlin Treaty (1878). All three documents were said to infringe upon Turkey's sovereignty over the Straits. This decision was also a potential impact on the Turco-German relations. Even during the war, the interests of these two states Germany and Turkey as two allies disagreed on operating the institution of international law. The Ottoman Sultan Mohammed V said that the treaties (capitulations) had been denounced, without any reference to Germany.⁵⁸⁵ Then, the Ottoman Empire offered Berlin a separate convention to compensate the German disadvantages. The proposal was about special rights to be given to the German citizens, which were more advantageous than those given to the citizens of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the Germans would be allowed to be employed in high Ottoman bureaucracy without renouncing their citizenship.⁵⁸⁶ These

⁵⁸³ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 172.

⁵⁸⁴ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 176-177. For further efforts of Wilson, see also Arrmaoğlu, 20. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 137-39.

⁵⁸⁵ For details, see Ozan Arslan, "1. Dünya Savaşı Başında Kapitülasyonların İttihad ve Terakki Yönetimi Tarafından Kaldırılması ve Bu Gelişme Karşısında Büyük Güçlerin Tepkileri," *Sakarya Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 10, no. 1 (2008): 261-78.

⁵⁸⁶ Erzberger to Foreign Ministry, Nov. 10, 1916, Türkiye Karton, no. A30422; Romberg to Bethmann, Nov. 20, 1916, Bd. 89, No.A31692 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 206.

promises never got beyond paper during the harsh times of the war. However, it is remarkable that the abolishment of the treaties of international law unilaterally by the Ottomans, was tried to be compensated by an alternative treaty proposed to Germans. This tactic worked same in the process of Montreux Convention to be analysed in the next chapter.

In 1916, Turkish Government offered to lend Turkish troops to the western front. At the end, seven Turkish divisions were placed in Galicia, Rumania and Macedonia.⁵⁸⁷ German Chief of Command, in the meanwhile, was interesting in the second Suez Canal campaign. The failure of Entente armies at the Dardanelles had naturally encouraged the Central Powers.⁵⁸⁸ This campaign became a catastrophic event by the loss of the half of the Turkish troops in the campaign between April and August of 1916.⁵⁸⁹ In 1916, the Russian troops were organized under the command of General Nikolai Yudenitsch who ordered his troops to invade the Ottoman city of Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia on 17 January 1916. Erzurum was occupied on 16 February 1916 by the Russian troops.⁵⁹⁰ On 18 April 1916 the Russian troops captured *Trabzon* (Trebizond). Yudenitsch then besieged the Turkish cities of *Muş*, *Bitlis* and *Erzincan*. Yudenitsch took all three cities by the beginning of August 1916 and triggered a panic in Istanbul exceeding what accompanied the first Entente bombardment of the Dardanelles forts.”⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁷ Yılmaz, *1 nci Dünya Harbi'nde*, 144-46.

⁵⁸⁸ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 179.

⁵⁸⁹ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 205.

⁵⁹⁰ For details, see Mevlüt Yüksel, “1. Dünya Savaşı’nda Erzurum’un ilk İşgal Günleri,” *A.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no.37 (2008): 259-87. See also, Yılmaz, *1 nci Dünya Harbi'nde*, 111; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 188.

⁵⁹¹ Arrmaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 122; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 188-195.

German records show that during the war, German concern was to provide a suitable ground for the post-war period. Russian-German relations in this respect were of great importance. Also, the Armenian minority within the Ottoman Empire which were pro-Russian perceived to be held as an important tool to render German-Russian relations. The high level bureaucrats suggested to control Armenian districts in the Ottoman Empire to barter them to Russia in exchange for a timely peace.⁵⁹²

Until the Bolshevik Revolution took Russia out of the war in a manner that few Germans could have foreseen, many government departments in Berlin continued to propound this scheme of buying her out at Turkey's expense. The diplomatic correspondence indicates that besides the Wilhelmstrasse, the Chancellor's Office, the Navy Department, the Colonial Secretariat, the Roman Catholic Episcopate, and the German academic community favoured what amounted to betrayal of the Ottoman ally.⁵⁹³

The disagreements about the future of the war continued at the last year of the war. In September, the planned campaign to recapture Baghdad had been abandoned and most of the manpower was transferred to Palestine to stop a British advance up to the Syrian coast. Turkish army lost the battles in Gaza in November 1917.⁵⁹⁴ Similar to the collision of interests in war goals, there occurred a series of frictions and command problems between the Turkish and German generals between 1914 and 1918.⁵⁹⁵

While reaching the end of the war with defeats, German Ambassador Bernstorff insisted that the only possible solution was to put an end to the war and finished the

⁵⁹² Lepsius to Bethmann, Apr. 17, 1916, A.A. Türkei, No. A9943 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 187.

⁵⁹³ Pallavicini to Bruian No.14/p and No.19/p, Feb. 14 and Mar. 2, 1916, H.H.S.A. Türkei Karton 210 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 187.

⁵⁹⁴ For a detailed examination of the battles, see Von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Sene*, 217-19.

⁵⁹⁵ For the details of these problems, see Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 72-107.

alliance with the Ottoman Empire. “The Ambassador reasoned that the half of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire were now lost to the enemy and what remained promised little for German capitalism.” Moreover, the German capacity left to be kept to recover the German homeland rather than subsidizing the foreign enterprises.⁵⁹⁶

The end of the war was also shaped by the tools of the institution of international law. On 25 December 1917, German, Ottoman and Austrian delegations started peace negotiations with Russians at the Eastern Polish border- Brest-Litovsk. They signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in January 1918. According to this treaty, the Turkish cities of *Kars*, *Ardahan* and *Batum* were given back to the Ottoman Empire and the Turco-Russian frontier of 1877 was provided.⁵⁹⁷ On 17 October 1918, Izzet Paşa sent General Charles Townshend, who since Kut-el-Amara had been enjoying a comfortable captivity in Constantinople, to negotiate an armistice of Mudros with the commander of the British Mediterranean fleet, Admiral Somerset Gough-Calthorpe.⁵⁹⁸ The Mudros Armistice ordered all German and Austrian personnel out of the Ottoman Empire within a month. For instance, Ambassador Bernstorff was packed and ready to go three days before the document was signed. He suddenly turned very afraid of Entente revenge.⁵⁹⁹

Similarly, in order to operate the rules of the international law between Turkey and Germany, on the ground of a lawful implementation, Enver Paşa sought asylum from the German General Seeckt. Talat Paşa and Enver Paşa along with many

⁵⁹⁶ Pallavicini to Czernin No.11/p, Feb. 5, 1918, H.H.S.A. *Türkei Karton* 212 quoted in Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 235-36.

⁵⁹⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 139-40; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 241.

⁵⁹⁸ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 356-59; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 250.

⁵⁹⁹ Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 252.

young Turks were offered a place in a German ship and left the country.⁶⁰⁰ Even after the war, these three iconic Turkish leaders were asked to be extradited from Berlin, in line with the codes of conduct between Turkey and Germany. Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, Rıfat Bey applied to the German Foreign Ministry for the matter involved and had the response that Germany was going to obey the rules of ‘the Convention about Extradition’ signed between Turkey and Germany. The further correspondences about their extradition generally based on the related principles of the international law.⁶⁰¹ It is remarkable that even after the World War I, two defeated states Germany on the one hand, and Turkey on the other had been trying to operate the rules of the international law properly.

As a result, the period between 1871 and 1918 witnessed the proper functioning of the Turco-German relations within the borderlines of the institutions of international society, even along with clashes of interests between these two states. The polarisation within the society stemming out of the changing dynamics of the institution of balance of power, which generally emerged at the expense of the Ottoman Empire concluded with the World War I. This war not only turned into a catastrophe for the Turkey and Germany but also demolished very basis of the institutions of the international society and initiated a new order after the war. The significant point to be emphasized, rather by cooperation or confrontation, Turkey and Germany utilized from the institutions of the international society in adjusting their bilateral relations, even under the harsh conditions of war, which clearly presented the minimalistic framework of Hedley Bull contoured by minimal rules of coexistence.

⁶⁰⁰ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 359; Weber, *Eagles On the Crescent*, 253.

⁶⁰¹ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi Vol. 3 / 4: 1914-1918 Genel Savaşı-Savaşın Sonu* (Ankara, 1967), 779-783 and Hasan Ünal, “İttihat Ve Terakki Liderlerinin 1. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Yurtdışı Faaliyetleri 1918-1922” (master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 1985).

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has overviewed the Turco-German relations from 1871 to 1918 with reference to their correlation with Bull's five institutions of the international society. In general, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire seemed to have taken the institutional flow into consideration while conducting their bilateral relations to one another. In this period, these two empires either with cooperation or with confrontation tended to regulate their bilateral relations in consideration with the ongoing balance of power in particular, which was the master institution of the international society, in Bull's terms. When their interests were challenged collectively or individually, they also resisted to the instructions of the institutions involved and created alternative policies.

From 1871 to 1918, this chapter highlighted the following series of events and facts from the Turco-German history, with a particular focus on the great power management and the related balance of power in the European international society: Bismarck's period between 1871 and 1889 including the process of the Congress of Berlin, the initiation of the 'Weltpolitik' with the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II after 1889, limited wars occurred at the expense of the Ottoman territorial integrity, the treaties affected the Turco-German relations – Treaty of Berlin (1878), Turco-German The Treaty of Trade (1890) and the Turco-German Treaty of Alliance (1914), the emergence of the Turco-German alliance on the road to the World War I, the Baghdad Railway Project, the consolidation of diplomatic practices and the Wilhelm II's visits to Istanbul, Turco-German waging of the World War I along with clashing interests.

The essential motivation of the German Empire in this period was sustaining the balance of power in Europe. However, this policy was revised by the German eagerness to compete as a late-comer colonialist in the great power management. After 1889, along with Kaiser Wilhelm's visit to Istanbul, Turco-German relations flourished on a cooperative ground, which founded a Turco-German alliance approaching the World War I. On the other hand, from 1871 to 1918, the Ottoman

essential incentive was to stop destruction and dissolution in the empire, and to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This period began with Bismarck's alliance system which dominated the international society during which the German Empire was reluctant to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire, and even engaged in commitments at the expense of the Ottoman interest which might endanger the territorial integrity and the sovereignty rights of the Ottoman Empire during the 1871-1889 period. However, the volitional change of the German foreign policy within the international society converged the common goals of these two empires and facilitated cooperative initiatives such as the monumental Baghdad Railway Project after 1890.⁶⁰²

It is observed that the period between 1871 and 1914 witnessed a consolidated Turco-German consideration of the institution of diplomacy. The diplomats of the era, along with an immunity facilitated, were appointed and recalled upon the developments. They used a subtle and tactful discourse and behaviours and obeyed the rules of diplomatic protocols. The high level visits of the Kaiser Wilhelm II was particularly emphasized for the matter involved. The Turco-German diplomatic mechanism in this era not only fulfil the functions of 'negotiation, communication, information, minimisation of friction but also symbolized their existence of membership to the international society within this framework. Another point as to the institution of diplomacy was the Turco-German involvement of the multilateral conferences in this era, in parallel to the practices of the evolution of the international society. The notable example was the Congress of Berlin under the Chairmanship of Bismarck to which the Ottoman Empire participated. Turco-German diplomatic relations began to be shaped by the multilateral dynamics in this sense.

The Turco-German relations during this era, reflected the nature of the international society and operated through diplomatic precedence and protocol, advances in the communication and transportation, professionalization of the institution of

⁶⁰² McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, 38-39.

international law. The diplomatic mechanism afforded to codify the common interests during this era within the institution of international law. The Treaty of Berlin (1878), the Treaty of Trade (1890) and the Treaty of Alliance (1914) were three fundamental codes of conduct within the international society which regulated the Turco-German relations. In these treaties, two sides utilize from the principles of international law such as *pacta sunt servanda*, and *casus belli*. However, in line with Bull's argument that states can disregard the international law, Turco-German relations in this era attempted to utilize from the institution of international law within a framework of flexibility. The prominent argument of the E.S. that the international law could not fully regulate the affairs of the international society unless supported by the institution of balance of power. This fact creates a sphere of manoeuvring within the international law, which was observed especially at the beginning of the World War I, during which Ottoman Empire became reluctant for three months to enter into the war despite the already-signed Turco-German commitments of Treaty of Alliance.

The adjustments of the Turco-German relations took the institution of great power management and the related institution of balance of power into account in this time period. Bismarck period emerged as the one during which the Ottoman Empire was being isolated from the great power management. This management along with the Bismarck's alliance system, at first, neglected the Ottoman interests to a considerable extent, and attempted to balance the Russian and Austrian demands within the international society even at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Congress of Berlin in 1878 resulted with huge loss of territories for the Ottomans. As noted in the theoretical introduction of the chapter, the main motive of the Congress of Berlin was to sustain the master institution of the international society- balance of power, which took place at the expense of the Ottoman sovereignty. This fact also owed from the nature of the international society of this era in which nationalism pushed the European nation states further apart from each other and triggered nationalist movements of independence. The Ottoman concerns for territorial integrity clashed with this dynamic of international society, such as

the loss of Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire during and after the Congress of Berlin.

On the other hand, starting from 1889, Kaiser Wilhelm II initiated a new period under the policy of '*Weltpolitik*' tried to utilize from the Ottoman capacities and capabilities on a cooperative basis. The Ottoman Empire's will to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty, converged with the aim of the German Empire to have economic spheres of influences and political dominance as a late-colonizer. the dominant great power of the time – the German Empire, and the traditional great power with vast territories – the Ottoman Empire played crucial roles in the configuration of the alliance blocks evolved towards the World War I. Turco-German relations in this sense seemed to have considered the roots of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

This partnership, provided the Baghdad Railway Project, through which this chapter exemplified the Turco-German consideration of Bull's five institutions in a single event. Through this project, the study also approved Bull's argument that the economic relations were also the part of the institution of balance of power. The Baghdad Railway Project changed the dynamics of the institution of balance of power from essentially and countered the blocks of the balance in question on the road to the World War I.

The Baghdad Railway Project was also a crucial example for the level of impact of the Turco-German cooperation in the great power management and the related configuration of the balance of power. Since, the project was held despite the oppositions of the other great powers of the era: Britain, France and Russia. In this sense, it was a clear resistance to the other great powers within the international society, which changed substantially the dynamics of the balance of power of the coming crisis of the World War I. However, this challenge also imposed a deep impact on the project as well, which could not be completed. The longest and the last travel of the project carried the defeated German troops from Anatolia towards Germany, which was also symbolic for this study approving the proper functioning of the international society with its five institutions. Provided by the accumulation

of the institutions of diplomacy and international law, as a result of a long journey of challenging machinery of great power management and a balance of power; at the end, this project carried the ruins of the institution of war for a new order within the international society.

The institution of war on the other hand was the concentric point of the period. The relative peace period of the international society under the leadership of Bismarck, and the following fragile balance of power sustained by limited wars and secret alliances all considered by states as a stage of preparation for wars. At the end of the period, contoured by the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, the institution of war became inevitable on a large scale that fulfilled the function of institution as an agent of change in the order. In this period as well, the institution of war was a factor considered by the Turco-German relations in two phases: before the war and after the war. The preparedness for war required a Turco-German cooperation to invest on the Ottoman military capacities by the German firms and German expertise.

Another point to be discussed here is the remarkable appointment of the German military officials to the high ranking Ottoman military posts, such as Liman von Sanders to the command of the Fourth Army which was responsible to protect the Ottoman capital and the Turkish Straits. This fact did not clearly reflect Bull's sovereignty in his mind and complicated the minimalist and pluralist institutional structure. The volitional share of the decision making process was far beyond the Bull's theoretical assumptions. The same case occurred when Yavuz and Midilli (Goeben and Breslau) two battleships under the command of the German Admiral Souchon bombed the Russian costs, which became the main reason for declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire by the Entente Powers in the World War I. In Bull's design, states with freedom of act volitionally take decisions rationally or irrationally within the international society. However, an embedded German bureaucrats within the Ottoman decision making mechanism which gave birth to critical outcomes, blurred Bull's walls of 'sovereign states'.

The effort of the Ottoman Empire to remain neutral before the war, and even after the outbreak of the war by proposing counter-alliances at the expense of the German Empire was remarkable. The late participation of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I, after signing of the Treaty of Alliance three months ago was a clear indicator of this policy. Ottoman Empire in this period attempted to utilize the great power management and the balance of power machinery for an Ottoman neutrality. As a general comment, the working of the balance of power as the master institution of the international society seemed to have paved the way for the Turco-German alliance. At the end, the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire waged the World War I together against common enemies. This partnership was provided in the last minute after resorting all options within the balance of power mechanism by the Ottoman Empire. However the process of the war brought about many clash of interests in Turco-German relations. The Ottoman Empire and the German Empire, despite resisting each other by limited scales such as the case in ‘Yıldırım’, ‘Suez’ campaigns, succeeded in operating the war for common goals through a cooperation. The chapter provided examples from this time period in which Turco-German relations considered the developments within the institution of war, particularly an emphasis made after the successful Ottoman battles in Dardanelles and in Kut-el-Amara. The relative change of the Turkish-German relations in 1916 was a clear example of this fact.

Having noted the correlation between Bull’s institutions and the Turco-German relations between 1871 and 1918, the other findings of the chapter are that the institutions operate in practice interbedded and interdependently, and that the Turco-German relations had the capacity to shape the institutions while being shaped by them. An economic project, the Baghdad Railway Project, between Germany and Turkey was also a significant tool of balance of power and the great power management. Also, the arms trade turned out to be not only a tool of balance of power but also a seed for the institution of war clearly. The institutions acted interdependently to shape the reality in practice, or in other words they are the different mirrors of the single reality. On the other hand, Turco-German relations under the impact of these institutional flow, as the members of the international

society had the capacity to shape the institutions, such as the revision of the balance of power after 1890 fostered by the Turco-German cooperation; while the general working of the institutions continued to shape this cooperation, such as the disagreement in Turco-German relations about the Italian de facto dominance over Tripoli starting from 1911 to the end of the war.

The aforesaid correlation between the Turco-German relations and the institutions of the international society evolved into a new era after the World War I. This period witnessed new 'designed' mechanisms such as the League of Nations in addition to the evolved institutions. However, the settlement of the era turned out to be a new road for the World War II, and posed new dynamics for the Turco-German relations, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE TURCO- GERMAN RELATIONS FROM 1923 TO 1945

5.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse how Turkey and Germany took the institutions of the international society into account while conducting their bilateral state relations between 1923 and 1945. The chapter begins with an overview of the nature and the evolution of the international society in this era, along with a special focus on its five institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management. After noting the main characteristics of the institutions in this period, the chapter delves into the analyses of the series of events and facts in the Turco-German bilateral interactions, with peculiar references to the five institutions of the international society.

This section specially focusses on the interwar period, during which the Turco-German relations flourished on the basis of diplomacy and international law. The Hitler's rise to power changed the dynamics of the international society as a whole. The revisionist policies of Germany in this era gradually evolved the structure of the master institution – balance of power and gave a central direction to the international society towards the World War II. Under these circumstances, Turkey and Germany both were able to make revisions and sustained the survival of the international society in the meanwhile. This chapter seeks to answer how this

correlation between the Turco-German relations and the institutions of international society was managed. Trajectory of the Turco-German bilateral interactions will be examined for the periods before and during the World War II, along with referring to the disagreements occurred. This section also exemplifies the events during which the institutions challenged the interests of these states. The conclusion of the chapter summarizes the main outcomes and findings as to the correlation between the Turco-German relations in the period of 1923-1945.

5.2. International Society and the Institutions:

The World War I changed the formation of the international society to a great extent. The new period installed a new balance of power mechanism under the umbrella of the Versailles regime. This new formation aimed to be sustained by the pseudo institutions as well in addition to the primary ones, the leading of which became to be the League of Nations. The absolute common goal of the society was declared to be the elimination of wars and maintenance of a peace period. The professionalization of diplomacy and international law spread to the globe in this period, along with the expansion of the international society. The institutions of the international society as well functioned by the designed mechanisms rather than the evolved ones in comparison to the former periods. The international organizations, multilateral conferences, and the tools of the international law worked in advantageous to the victorious powers of the World War I, rather than respecting the pluralist nature of the society with the principle of equality. As a result, international society started to face an erosion. Watson called this process as ‘the destruction of the international society’. Watson argues that this destruction began

with the end of the World War I and continued with the settlement of Versailles in the next twenty years along with the League of Nations.⁶⁰³

The World War I collapsed the master institution - balance of power in the European international society. After the war, Austria-Hungary disappeared. The German Empire collapsed and faced a social unrest by the breakup of her traditional institutions. On the other side, France and Britain wounded more deeply than they themselves realized.⁶⁰⁴ The conditions required a new order within the international society. However, the settlement of Versailles was far away from consolidating a sustainable international society. In the absence of Russia and Germany, the settlement became inefficient. The great powers of the era aimed at producing a working settlement for Europe. For the matter involved they imposed rules and institutions capable of maintaining order and preventing war. However, in contrast to its predecessors - Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna, the settlement of Versailles became so defective for the international society and did not match the realities of the emerging needs and practices. The new order collapsed with the World War II and failed to fulfil its goals.⁶⁰⁵

The experiences in the evolution of the international society in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth were different from the one set up after the World War I. The rules and institutions of the European society became open not only for the European settler communities, but also for any state willing and able to comply with the rules of the international society. It was clear that the European great powers, including Russia and the United States were deciding who would join the club, when Europeans took this membership for granted. This tendency continued during this era along with the expansion of the

⁶⁰³ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 278.

⁶⁰⁴ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 281.

⁶⁰⁵ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 282.

international society.⁶⁰⁶ However, there was also an isolation for Germany within the society, of which independence was not fully respected despite its increasing power and the capability of regaining its great power status. The expansion of the international society to the non-European sphere, while suppressing the German interests to a considerable extent created a dilemma which instigated the revisionist aims of Germany.

The great power management of the era, first isolated Germany from decision making for the future of the international society. However, during the process, the number of the great powers increased in number, which were going to play a role in the coming World War II. Germany regained its great power status, which was criticized to be an irresponsible one. In 1939, there were seven great powers, giving a central direction to the trajectory of the international society, which were the main military and economic powers: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia / USSR, the US.⁶⁰⁷

The institution of balance of power during the interwar period was installed upon the settlement of Versailles, which was then challenged by Germany. The settlement of Versailles configured the following order:

The victors redrew boundaries, abolished states (notably the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires) and created new ones, and imposed financial indemnities, less wisely than their predecessors but visibly in the same manner. The design for the new global society, the League of Nations, perpetuated the practice of five great powers which, except in cases of open disagreement, were intended to constitute a sort of concert of the world by dominating the League Council. The design for the new global society also incorporated almost all the rules and practices which had developed in the European *grande république*, including its international law and diplomacy and its basic assumptions about the sovereignty and juridical equality of the states recognized as independent members of the society. Alongside these non-discriminatory European concepts, the new design left virtually intact the capitulations and other practices which the Europeans had collectively instituted in countries from Morocco to China, as well as the great

⁶⁰⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 258.

⁶⁰⁷ Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, 49.

imperial structures of dependent states controlled by the victors and certain neutrals.⁶⁰⁸

Indeed, the settlement of Versailles in 1918 clearly failed to dictate the terms of the peace. Wilson utilized from the principle of self-determination as the basis for his vision for the new order of the international society. He believed in the fact that there was no difference between the national self-determination and democracy. This idea served for a self-policing system of collective security instead of the traditional power politics.⁶⁰⁹ In this sense, this principle brought about two developments: "...first, equating the popular principle of sovereignty with the attack on the remaining dynastic empires in Europe...Secondly, it involved abandoning the constitutional mode of settling the disputed claims in favour of the political settlements."⁶¹⁰ Similarly, the disputes stemming out of these nationalist movements were attempted to be solved pragmatically. The use of the discourse of the national self-determination without re-drawing the map of Europe was the method of the international society in this era. The solutions did not reflect equality for all the cases but subjected to practicality and political interest.⁶¹¹

The new international order was initiated by President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points which had crucial reflections on the institution of international law. The codes of use of force by states, the initiation of the legal mandate system, peaceful settlement of disputes, regulation of minority regimes, and the codification of the international law.⁶¹² Supported by the President Wilson's points, this period was a revolutionary one for the institution of international law. There was a series of

⁶⁰⁸ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 282.

⁶⁰⁹ James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, 44.

⁶¹⁰ James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, 50

⁶¹¹ James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, 54.

⁶¹² Hüseyin Pazarcı, 54-57.

developments and innovations with regard to the forms and techniques of the international law:

The appearance of international organizations of states, the creation of a code of the law of war, the development of the procedures of arbitration and conciliation, the setting up of the first standing international court in 1922, the appearance of the first universal organization for the maintenance of peace, and substantial changes in the law relating to the use of force by states as an instrument of national policy.⁶¹³

The period of secret alliances and codes of international law were also restricted. The multilateral diplomacy and the multilateral forms of codifications in the institution of international law intensified. In these processes, without any secrecy, great powers and small powers participated into the multilateral platforms together with a legal status of equality. For instance, “the small powers had a role in the design of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the failure of the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 was the result of significant differences of opinion...”⁶¹⁴ Another example of this process was the Geneva Disarmament Conferences during which states signed binding conventions for the goal involved. The foundation of the League of Nations occurred in a similar fashion, which triggered a new period within the institution of international law and diplomacy. The common goal of the international society to sustain peace was attempted through pseudo-institution (secondary institutions), which were totally designed by the hands of the statesmen rather than the evolved ones.

Woodrow Wilson...regarded the pre-war international society as an anarchy of sovereign states. To rely only on the restraint of statesmen and the balance of power seemed to them a recipe for disaster. International order must be maintained by means of an overarching machinery of restraint. The machinery was not to be a world government but a league of states willing and able to prevent disturbances

⁶¹³ Brownlie, “The Expansion of International Society,” in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Bull and Watson, 365.

⁶¹⁴ Brownlie, “The Expansion of International Society,” in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Bull and Watson, 366.

of the peace. In practice that meant that the great powers of the day must lay down the additional rules and institutions of a new, more tightly structured international society, and where necessary enforce compliance with them.⁶¹⁵

“The Covenant of League of Nations was drafted in accordance with anti-hegemonial legitimacy, as the keystone of a society of sovereign states who voluntarily agreed to provisions for collective security.”⁶¹⁶ Indeed, this design ceased to function for the common goals of the international society and transformed into a mechanism working in favour of the interests of the victorious states of the World War I. While the League of Nations became null for the elimination of the path of the World War II, the evolved institutions of the international society continued to work for providing a new order within the international society. Within this framework, it was remarkable that the revisionism of Germany began with German volitional secession from international organizations and multilateral conferences.

Despite all the efforts, the institution of war became the outcome of the whole process from 1918 to 1939. This was not the order that the victorious great powers thought of after the World War I:

The statesmen of the era were dismayed and horrified by the carnage and ruin of the war, and by what they came to realize was the destruction of the European system. They concluded that major wars were no longer tolerable and that their most important task was to prevent another Armageddon by creating a system of security. In other words, they wanted to move away from the perils of uncontrolled multiple independences towards a tighter system, and especially to ‘outlaw war’.⁶¹⁷

However, the international society imagined without wars failed, in line with the arguments of Bull which he referred for the nature of the international society.

⁶¹⁵ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 283.

⁶¹⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 283.

⁶¹⁷ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 282.

“Hitler’s wilful and quasi-Napoleonic bid to dominate Europe, and the Japanese strike against the United States, led to a massive resumption of the warfare”⁶¹⁸ As a result, the evolved institutions of the international society between 1918 and 1945 worked for constructing a new order for the international society, and finalized by the World War II as an agent of change. This era, despite all challenges seeded the very basis of the today’s international society by attaching importance to the sovereignty and juridical equality of all member states with regardless of their size-large or small, through attaching importance to the memberships of international organisations and the formalities of diplomatic recognition.

5.3. Turco-German Relations:

At the end of the World War I, following the Paris Peace Conference, several treaties were signed by the participant states of the war. The victorious states; Britain, United States of America and France took the initiative in negotiations and dominated the decisions. On 28 June 1918 Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles. On 10 September 1919, Austria signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain. Bulgaria signed the Neuilly Treaty on 27 November 1919. Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920. The last peace treaty – Treaty of Sevres was signed by the delegation of the Ottoman Empire on 10 August 1920.

During the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations was founded upon Wilson’s principles. The charter of the organization was accepted on 28 April 1919. The foundation of the League of Nations could be accepted as a new normative implementation in the institution of international law. It was of a great debate that this organization turned into a mechanism for justifying the needs of the victorious states in the World War I rather than providing a just platform for the ongoing

⁶¹⁸ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 286.

problems in the international arena. For instance, according to the principles of the President Wilson upon which the League of Nations was founded, it was decided to prohibit war indemnity after the war. However, Germany and Turkey was exposed to high amount of compensation under the rule of the League of Nations.⁶¹⁹

The end of the World War I imposed several difficulties on Turco-German relations. First of all, the unique obvious period in Turco-German relations, during which the diplomatic relations had to be suspended is the 1918-1923 period.⁶²⁰ In accordance with the treaties signed after the World War I, as the members of the defeated side, Turkey and Germany were obliged to cut off their diplomatic relations. The Ottoman Empire became bound to cut off all kinds of relations with Germany with regard to the 23rd article of the Armistice of Mudros signed on 30 October 1918.⁶²¹ Similarly, Germany was forbidden to establish relations with the Ottoman Empire according to the 22th article's 4th paragraph, articles of 155, 258-261 and 434 of the Treaty of Versailles.⁶²² Also, according to the 275th article of the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920), which was not ratified by the Ottoman Parliament, all the treaties and conventions signed between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire were decided to be cancelled.⁶²³ The Treaty of Sevres, as noted

⁶¹⁹ For German reparations, see Alan Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking After the World War I, 1919-1923*, 2nd ed., The Making of the 20th Century (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 81-108.

⁶²⁰ See the 23rd article of the 'Mudros Armistice'. İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları* (1920-1945), Volume 1, Ankara, 1983, 14 and see the 22nd, 155th, 258th, 259th, 260th, 261st, 434th articles of the Versailles Treaty: Library of Congress, "Treaty of Peace with Germany (The Versailles Treaty)", available at <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf> (28.08.2016)

⁶²¹ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 14.

⁶²² Lothar Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, (Frankfurt: Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, 1964), 11

⁶²³ Ömer Budak, *Sevr Paylaşımı* (Ankara: Bilge Yayınevi, 2002), 196. For further details about the process of Treaty of Sevres, see also Osman Olcay, *Sevres Andlaşmasına Doğru (Çeşitli Konferans ve Toplantıların Tutanakları ve Bunlara İlişkin Belgeler)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981); Cahit Kayra, *Sevr Dosyası* (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları,

was null in accordance with the international law, which was not put into effect, due its lack of ratification by the Ottoman Parliament.

The foundation of Republic of Turkey gave impetus to the Turco-German diplomatic relations. Due to the applied sanction on Turkey and Germany, between 1918 and 1923, these two states could not engage in official diplomatic relations.⁶²⁴ On 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, following the Turkish War of National Independence.⁶²⁵ The British side approved the treaty on 16 July 1924, and it could only be put into effect on 6 August 1924. This treaty lifted the sanction over Turkey, for establishing diplomatic relations with the defeated states in the World War I. However, this sanction was not clearly abolished from the Treaty of Versailles which prohibited Germany from establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey.

This fact reminds the possibility that states are likely to disregard some instructions of international law. As discussed in the theory chapter, when the state interests are challenged by the working of one institution, states have the freedom of act to oppose, or to flex the existing codes. As aforesaid, international law is insufficient to create order within the international society unless supported by the balance of power. The post war conjecture was in propensity to assist Turkey and Germany to integrate themselves into the international society with all means and ends.

The interactions between Turkey and Germany started with alternative unofficial diplomatic contacts after the World War I. During these days, the Treaty of Lausanne was not yet ratified by the British Government, and the international

2004); Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Paylaşılması* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1986), 49-109.

⁶²⁴ Ramazan Çalık and Hatice Bayraktar, "Die Politischen Beziehungen Zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei in der Weimarer Republik (1918-1933)," in *Türkisch-Deutsche Beziehungen Perspektiven aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, ed. Claus Schöning, Ramazan Çalık and Hatice Bayraktar, (Berlin: Kalus Schwarz Verlag, 2012), 100-02.

⁶²⁵ For the consequences of the Treaty, see M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question: A Study in International Relations* (New York: Macmillan & St Martin's Press, 1966), 372-87.

society was not clear about allowing Turco-German relations to flourish again. Turco-German diplomatic relations were initiated through the dialogue mechanism provided by the Swedish Embassy on 5 January 1924, by the arrival of German Ambassador to Bucharest – Dr. Hans Freytag in Istanbul, with his authorization letter from Berlin. The official negotiations between Germany and Turkey was opened on 26 February 1924. These negotiations were not held in Istanbul but in Ankara. During this time period, Ankara had been already declared as the capital city. However, the European great powers including France and Britain were reluctant to transport their missions from Istanbul to Ankara. The carrying out the Turco-German negotiations in Ankara was symbolic for the German recognition of the related Turkish decision. Germany became also the first country to have started building an Embassy building in Ankara in the following months.⁶²⁶ During this period, Britain, France and Italy as the victorious states of the World War I were treating with reluctance in their diplomatic relations with the recently founded Republic of Turkey. They agreed to send new ambassadors to Turkey, particularly to Istanbul, but not accepted to send them to Ankara. This was an official protest for the decision which made Ankara the capital city.

The crucial point was that according to the common national interests, Turco-German relations were conducted with alternative ways within the borders of the institution of diplomacy. Turco-German diplomatic contacts were not provided on illegal meetings or illegal functioning of the German Embassy. Rather they found a way to obey the practices of the institution of diplomacy through the help of Swedish mission and maintained their contact. The diplomacy during the time of 1918-1923, continued with unofficial channels, but not through illegitimate ways.

On 24 July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne eliminated the aforesaid provisions, and gave right to Turkey to re-establish diplomatic relations with Germany. After this

⁶²⁶ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 14.

time, Turco-German efforts worked together to initiate diplomatic relations and to prepare a treaty of friendship. It is remarkable that the first step taken between Germany and Turkey was to formulate a new treaty as a new mechanism to cooperate within the borderlines of the institution of international law. As a result of these efforts, the German diplomat in Bucharest was appointed re-settle relations with Turkey and to engage in a new treaty of friendship with Turkey on 5 January 1924.⁶²⁷ The official negotiations between Turkey and Germany started on 26 February 1924 in Ankara.⁶²⁸ As a result, before the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish-German Friendship Treaty was signed in Ankara between the Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Minister Tevfik Kamil Bey and the authorized German diplomat Freytag on 3 March 1924. This treaty was declared on 13 April 1924 in the Turkish Parliament and put into effect after the exchange of notes on 16 May 1924.⁶²⁹ It is remarkable that the process of the treaty was finalized before the treaty of Lausanne had been put into effect.

During the process of the treaty involved, Rudolf Nadolny was given approval for his post by the Turkish Government on 8 May 1924 and took the title of ‘Ambassador’ in Turkey. Ambassador Nadolny was being accompanied by the Swedish Ambassador Wallenberg during this period of time. Indeed, the German Embassy had been used as the mission of Sweden after the 1918 – Armistice of Mudros. After taking his post, in German Embassy, the Swedish flag was replaced by the German flag, and the period of unofficial diplomatic representation ended. Nadolny started working in Ankara in a locomotive at the main train station of Ankara. Nadolny gave his credential to the President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on 16 June 1924. The reciprocal appointment by the Turkish government was made with Kemaleddin Sami Paşa to Berlin who gave his credential on 8 December 1924 after

⁶²⁷ Ramazan Çalık and Hatice Bayraktar, “Die Politischen Beziehungen...”, 103-104.

⁶²⁸ ABD’nin raporu”, (“Türkiye”), (Berlin, 02.02.1924, L 016309), AA, Abteilung III, Türkei, Po 2, Bd. 2 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 9.

⁶²⁹ Soysal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*, 7-9.

the Lausanne Treaty was put into effect. The normalization in Turco-German diplomatic relations was provided.⁶³⁰

Turco-German relations between 1923 and 1933 continued in cooperation and were in efforts to recover the damages of the war. While Germany was seeking to find alternatives and solutions to the problems which were imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, Turkey was striving for founding a new state mechanism to be sustained by social, cultural, economic and political reforms. For this period, it would be argued in general that both Turkey and Germany considered to be the part of the European international society, and tried to adapt their relations in line with the instructions of the ongoing balance of power.

The initiation of Turco-German diplomatic relations in the recently founded Republic of Turkey changed the dynamics of overall relations. The state building process in Turkey not only became an additional function in Turco-German diplomacy but also structured the bilateral relations on the institution of diplomacy. Numerous correspondences were made between the ministries of affairs of these two states via their embassies. Especially starting from 1923, many German civil and military officials were asked to come to Turkey for the establishment of public services and the reorganization of the bureaucracy. These German servants were paid by the Turkish Government. This cooperation ranged from i.e. state-planning to security issues, from health issues to husbandry, from agriculture to industrial development, from education to aviation.

For instance, two experts (with the names of Schmidt and Max Mühl) were appointed by the German Government to establish the human resources department of the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs and to rearrange the institution's

⁶³⁰Sezen Kılıç, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Türkiye'deki Alman Okulları (1852'den 1945'e kadar)* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2005), 122-23; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 11-15.

organizational scheme.⁶³¹ Similarly, in 1926, a contract was signed between the Turkish Government and Dr. Karl Julius Horn for a four-year term to work as a general inspector in husbandry.⁶³² A German expert, Fritz Neumann was invited to work at state-owned factories for the development of Turkish industry in 1926.⁶³³ Similarly, German engineer Herman Lüscher was appointed to Turkish General Directorate of cartography and worked until 1928.⁶³⁴

Also, a German Committee consisted of 14 experts were received by Turkish Government to establish agricultural institutions and laboratories in order to develop agricultural industry in 1928. This group of experts was contributed by Prof. Dr. Friedrich Falke from Leipzig University who had also stayed in Turkey between the years 1932 and 1938, and established new agricultural schools. He became the rector of Turkish Agriculture Institution. It follows from the records that approximately 30 German faculty staff worked in Turkish Agriculture Institution between 1933 and 1938. Last German agricultural expert left Turkey during the World War II in 1942.⁶³⁵

German experts also worked for the Turkish Government in the 1930s for the development of city planning and construction as well. For instance, German city planner's Jansen's city plan was approved by the Turkish Government to be

⁶³¹ "ADB'den Kemaleddin Sami Paşa'ya", (Berlin, 24.12.1924, Zu III o 1015-1063), AA, Abteilung III, Türkei Junge Verwaltung 10, BD. 1.) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 39.

⁶³² "ADB'den Aqlmanya'nın (eski) İstanbul Büyükelçiliği'ne, (8.2.1926 Tarih ve A 333 Sayılı yazı), (Bewrlin, 27.1/2.1926, III 0 332), AA , Botschaft Ankara,, BD . 727 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*,39.

⁶³³ "Türkiye'nin Berlin Büyükelçiliğinden ADB'ye, (Berlin, 30.10.1926), AA, abteilung III, Türkei Junge Verwaltung 10, Bd. I quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*,39.

⁶³⁴ "Almanya'nın (eski) Büyükelçiliği'nden ADB'ye (Dr. Lüscher'in Türk Hizmetinden Ayrılmasını Hakkında)", (İstanbul, Tarabya, , 4.10.1927, A 1941), AA, Abteilung III, Türkei Junge Verwaltung 10, Bd. 1.) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*,39.

⁶³⁵ "Prof. Dr. F. Falke'den Nadolny'e", (Leipzig, 12.12.1932), AA, Narkalp Nadolny, Varia II quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*,41.

implemented for Ankara in 1932. He worked until the end of 1938 as a consultant to the Turkish Government. He also prepared the plans other cities, such as İzmit, Mersin, Gaziantep and Adana.⁶³⁶ The German architect – Holzmeister, in the same period constructed the prevailing public buildings in Ankara.

Diplomatic correspondences were made also for the Turkish experts who were sent to Germany in order to import ‘know-how’ from the German bureaucracy to the recently-established Turkish Republic. For instance, a Turkish police officer was recorded to have worked in Berlin police station firstly for three months, and then extended to one year, following from the diplomatic correspondences between the Turkish Embassy in Berlin, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany. Education system in Turkey had been great need for lecturers, a considerable amount of this gap seemed to be met by German officials. This pattern was followed by Jewish citizens of Germany, flowing away from the Nazi regime as well. On the other hand, many Turkish students were sent to Germany for the university education. In 1932, there were 137 Turkish students enrolled in the German higher education system.⁶³⁷

The series of efforts for the state building in Turkey vitalized the Turco-German diplomatic relations. It is remarkable that all of the exchanges and arrangements were carried out by obeying the instructions of the ongoing systemic institution of diplomacy. Turco-German diplomatic functions worked for the Turkish state-building in this period. As a reflection of these this intensification of diplomatic relations, the institution of international law worked also to arrange these relations. The relations between 1923 and 1933 was structured on the basis of a cooperation for the state building process on part of Turkey, for a clear period of recovery for Germany. Turco-German cooperation in this sense, considered the practices of international law and paved the way for several treaties to develop the bilateral

⁶³⁶ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 44.

⁶³⁷ JK 4, (19.01.1931), 31 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 43.

relations. For instance, Treaty about Executed Residence in 1927, Turco-German Mediation - Judicial Resolutions and Referee Agreement in 1930, Turco-German Consular Treaty in 1931, Treaty on Extradition in 1932 were some of the aforesaid bilateral treaties.⁶³⁸

The institution of balance of power seemed to act in the 1930s apparently and provided the ground for other institutions to operate efficiently. British and French states tended to balance the German – Italian block. This balance reflected rivalry between the status-quo-prone versus anti-status-quo powers.⁶³⁹ Within this framework, Turkey aimed to remain neutral and to isolate itself from this rivalry and any risk of war as much as possible. In the mid-1930s, Germany's policy of expansion in line with the policy of '*Lebensraum*'⁶⁴⁰ (living space), and the use of German military power for changing the current borders began to change the status-quo in the international society. Germany's close cooperation with Mussolini's Italy, and the German bid for penetration into the Balkan region were the prominent incentives for the Turco-German relations in this era. In addition to that Germany's distance for the two fundamental Turkish demands which were to acquire full sovereignty on the Turkish Straits and the claim of sovereignty over Hatay posed negative impacts on Turco-German relations during this period.

Hitler came to power in 1933 and opened a new era for Turco-German Relations. Germany's great power status in these years and the German aims to revise the status-quo in Europe provided a ground for the Turco-German relations, especially in relation to the machinery of the institution of the balance of power. Germany's continuous confrontation with Britain and France, and her vibrant and unclear

⁶³⁸ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 35-36.

⁶³⁹ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 98.

⁶⁴⁰ Lebensraum means 'space of living'. The term became a motive and justification of German expansion – primarily to East. See, Alan Axelrod and Jack A. Kingston, *Encyclopedia of World War II: Facts On File Library of World History* (New York: Facts on File, 2007), 510.

affairs with Russia on the one hand; and the German expansionism on the other hand were responded by Turkey within the framework of the policy of 'active neutrality'. This tolerance paved the way for the Turco-German bilateral state relations to consider the institution of balance of power. The 1933-1939 period presented one of the most prominent balance of power politics in the diplomatic history and contained numerous examples as to the interconnectedness of Turco-German relations and the systemic five institutions.

Turkish Foreign policy in this decade was cooperative. The policy structured itself on founding partnerships to isolate the homeland from conflict zones. The establishment of friendly relations with Balkan Countries - Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania through the Balkan Pact, and similar cooperative relations with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan through the Sadabad Pact were the reflections of this policy. Germany seemed to be the state with best relations in 1938 in Europe, in consideration with economic and political sectors. Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America followed the list. Despite having perceived several threats, Turkey also tried to establish good relations with Italy. It was remarkable that Turkey ordered four Italian military ships in this period to modernize its military capacities.⁶⁴¹

However, on the other hand, Germany was seeking to make revisions within the international society at the beginning of the 1930s. As an initial policy to revise the Treaty of Versailles, in the autumn of 1933, Germany quitted from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and left the League of Nations. Turkey in response tried to convince German Government to render their membership both in the League of Nations and to the Geneva Conference for Disarmament. However, German Foreign Minister Neurath expressed their certainty about the decisions to the

⁶⁴¹ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 127.

Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşti Aras in a diplomatic negotiation.⁶⁴² As a result, Turkey's diplomatic efforts to call Germany to act within the diplomatic codes and the sphere of the international law of these international platforms failed.

Politically and strategically, Turkey asked Germany to obey the ongoing operational rules of the international law by re-engaging in the Geneva Conference and the League of Nations. On the other hand, Turkey was tolerant about German revisionist movements in this period. For instance, Turkey was not against the German decision to activate compulsory military service and recruitment, in contrary to the settlement of Versailles. Unlike other European powers, Germany was not perceived as a rival state in the balance of power politics. Turkey was tolerant for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in practice. It follows from the German diplomatic records that Turkey was eager to benefit from German military industry and experience as much as possible during the German revisionism in the 1930s.⁶⁴³

As a reaction, Turkey signed the diplomatic note of the League of Nations protesting the German policy and calling the German Government to rebound itself to the League of Nations and the other international treaties.⁶⁴⁴ On the other hand, Turkey in this period, tried to benefit from the current international political situation to revise the status of the Turkish Straits. The withdrawal of Germany from the Geneva Conference⁶⁴⁵ strengthened the claims of Turkey that during this new period of militarization there occurred a need for a new convention about the

⁶⁴² ADAP , “Alman Dışişleri Bakanı Neurath’ın Raporu” , Nr. 371, 03.12.1934 (2980/D 584 269-71) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 109.

⁶⁴³ ADAP, serie C: 1933-1937, Band IV, I, (1. April bis 13. September 1935), Göttingen, 1975 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 109.

⁶⁴⁴ İsmail Soysal, “ Türkiye’nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi (1934-1937),” *Belleten* XLV/I, no. 177 (Jan. 1981): 108.

⁶⁴⁵ Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, 285-86.

status of Straits. The concern for future security to some extent paved the way for an understanding in Europe to revise the status in Straits.⁶⁴⁶ In this period of time, Turkish policy was to a clear extent to remain silent in practice against the outlawing of the Treaty of Versailles and the international law, for the sake of Turkish state interests.

In this period, Germany was not only acting with use of force for the revision of the status quo in Europe, but also using the institution of international law as a tool for German goals. The Treaty of Munich for instance, gave the sovereignty rights of the Czechoslovakian district of ‘Sudetes’ to Germany. Also, the region called as ‘Memel’ was seized from Lithuania and given to Germany.⁶⁴⁷ It was clear that the revisionist German policy aimed to operate the institution of international law as much as possible for the German goals. Hitler’s Germany, apparently if not satisfied by the institution of international law, did not hesitate to resort to the use of force, in other words to the institution of war in this era.

The Hitler’s Nazi regime was carrying risks for the order of the European international society. The ultimate goal of the Nazi Regime was to revise the status quo imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. This goal was achieved gradually, even it required use of force. During this period, it was remarkable that Turkey was in efforts to revise the post-World War I status quo as well. The expansionist policies of Italy⁶⁴⁸ and Germany in Europe began to risk the ongoing balance of power mechanism and created new threats for Turkey. Especially the status of the Turkish Straits was the leading concern of the Turkish decision makers in this process. The revision on the regime of the Straits and the case of the Province of “*Hatay*” were two revisionist demands of Turkey. It could be argued that there was a ‘consensus

⁶⁴⁶ Armaoğlu, 20. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 343-44; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 110.

⁶⁴⁷ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 132.

⁶⁴⁸ For the Italian threats perceived by Turkey, see Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 415-16.

in silence' for the aforesaid revisions in Turco-German relations in the 1930s. The vital interests of both states were respected by each other, within the borderlines of the institutions of the international society. This policy produced a level of flexibility in understanding, implementing the instructions of the institutions of international law as well. As noted in the theory chapter, Turkey and Germany had the freedom to decide on their own policies, despite the demarcations of the international society imposed on them.

The German revisionist policies were in tendency to violate the codes of the institution of international law. On 7 March 1936, Germany announced its unrecognition of the related articles of the Treaty of Versailles and began to militarize the Rheine-Land. After this date, German soldiers came to be deployed in the region. At the same day, General Secretary of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu met with the German Ambassador Kellner in Ankara, and stated that this development was not directly related to Turkey in any sense. He also added that Turkey's only concern was the erosion of the ongoing peace in the international society. During this meeting German Ambassador demanded tolerance from Turkish media about the matter involved. During these years, the one-party system in Turkey was supposed to have the ability to control the mass media. As a response, Menemencioğlu ensured the German Ambassador about the tolerance as much as the Turkish government could pose under the diplomatic pressures of the Soviet Union and Britain for the matter involved.⁶⁴⁹

Ambassador Kellner reported to Berlin on 13 March 1936 that Turkey was for the opinion to remain neutral in the Rheine-Land problem. Despite the fact that, Turkey joined the proposal of the League of Nations that was condemning Germany for the related act violating the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.⁶⁵⁰ This case clearly

⁶⁴⁹ ADAP Serie C: 1933-1937, Band V, I, (5. Maerz bis 25. Maerz 1936), Göttingen, 1977 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 111.

⁶⁵⁰ Soysal, "Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi (1934-1937)," 124.

showed that in practice, there was a tendency in Turkish politics to tolerate the revisionist goals of Germany to the extent that they did not pose any danger to the Turkey's interests or to the general peace in the world. The efforts of Turkish Government to control the public opinion in favour of the German policies was an indicator of this policy. Turkey was playing its role within the institution of international law and protesting every single revisionist German policy through the tools of the international law, while tolerating them in practice with a flexibility.

Similarly, on 12 March 1938, German forces occupied Austria which was known as *Anschluss*⁶⁵¹, which did not face a serious protest from Turkey. These military operations could be seen as the operationalization of the institution of war as well. However, these offensive German military operations were not opposed substantially by Turkey.⁶⁵² Turkish authorities tended to act within the borders of the institution of international law and did not hesitate to join the protest notes of the League of Nations. The institution of diplomacy was utilized particularly to render Turco-German relations during these high-tensioned crises. The crucial point was that the date of the *Anschluss* coincided with the consolidation of the Turkish initiative of the Montreux Convention, to be analysed in detail in the following paragraphs.

Under these circumstances, in July, 1938, during the negotiations held by Menemencioğlu and Ribbentrop, Germany proposed to sign a bilateral treaty of alliance, and demanded from Turkey to initiate a common revisionist policy to recover the impacts of the World War I by acting together. This proposal was rejected by the Turkish Government on the ground of the Turkish will to maintain an 'active neutrality'. Turkey was seeking to preserve the ongoing balance of power in Europe to prevent the upcoming war, or at least to gain time. An official alliance with Germany could cost the collapse of the neutrality of the Turkish foreign policy.

⁶⁵¹ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980*, 407.

⁶⁵² Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 127.

Also, any alliance with Germany had greatly likely to erode relations with France, during which Turkey was in efforts to convince France to revise the status of Hatay Province collectively. Indeed, while rejecting Germany's proposal for a common revisionist policy, Turkey engaged in its own revisionist policy to reintegrate the province of Hatay to the homeland at the Syrian border. Due to the balance of power politics, and the hostility between France and Germany, Turkey particularly tried to balance its relations between these two powers.

It is also noteworthy that Germany as an irresponsible great power was seeking to sign a new codes of the institution of international law, an alliance treaty or a neutrality treaty with Turkey for German revisionist policies, on the eve of the World War II. In this period, Germany was at the highest level of its political and military power, and already undertook unlawful military operations in the last years in Europe such as the Anschluss, or the militarization of Rheine-Land.⁶⁵³ Turkey refused to sign a treaty of alliance with Germany, in spite of having similar alliance treaties with the Soviet Union, France, Italy and Hungary. It was defended that these kinds of neutrality treaties had been only signed with neighbouring states. Turkey had to explain the reason behind having signed a similar treaty with Hungary, while refusing a similar one with Germany, despite the fact that Germany and Hungary both were not neighbouring countries of Turkey. This situation was explained by emotional and ethnic reasons to the German counterparts by the Turkish officials.⁶⁵⁴ However, this reasoning was the clear presence of Turkish reluctance to engage in an alliance with Germany.

It was observable for the period of 1933-1945 that Turkey and Germany tended to act by utilizing the institution of international law. However, when their state interests were challenged, they sought for alternatives by primarily through alternative codifications of international law, if not satisfied, by a policy of

⁶⁵³ For the related German policies, see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 405-09.

⁶⁵⁴ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 129.

substitution within the lane of another institution. In this era, the Turco-German bilateral cooperation worked within the framework of institutions. Along with diplomatic tools, such as secret talks, negotiations, notes, verbal notes, statements, visits; a balance of power mechanism was carried out in a pendulum between peace and war on the eve of the World War II. International law was seen as the main track for bilateral state relations in this period. The violation of the international law seemed to be compensated or replaced even by a new codes of international law.

Within the framework of these dynamics, one peculiar case is worth to mention to analyse how Turkey and Germany took the institution of international law into account while conducting their bilateral state relations. Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits, in this regard, presented a prevalent example in the interwar period. On the eve of the World War II, Turkish Straits were of great strategic importance. Turkey did not have a full sovereignty on the Straits, because of the related provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1924. The Turkish demand for the revision of the status of the Straits became a critical dynamic for the Turco-German relations. This fact had a direct effect on the current balance of power, and provided a debate among all the great powers of the European international society.

The Montreux Convention was an agreement signed as an element of the institution of international law which was put into effect on 9 November 1936. The process started with a conference with participants which were signatory states of the Treaty of Lausanne. Italy resisted to join the conference. The United States of America also did not participate into the conference. Germany was not invited to participate, since it was not a signatory state of the Treaty of Lausanne. The main focus of the conference was to give full sovereignty to Turkey over Straits including the right of armament on the Straits, and to revise the rights of passage for military, civilian and trade ships for the coastal and non-coastal states of the Black Sea.

The process started in April, 1936 with the diplomatic notes of Numan Menemencioğlu, General Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the signatory states of the Lausanne Treaty, which included a demand for a change

in the status of the Straits. This note was also submitted to the German Government by the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin Hamdi Arpağ at the same day as an informative note, despite the fact that Germany was not a signatory state.⁶⁵⁵ Turkey was aware of the significance of Germany in the international society as a great power. Turkey was acting to incorporate Germany to the process for Turkey's national interest for the matter involved. Turco-German relations in this sense acted in line with the assumption of the great power management that great powers tend to give a central direction to the affairs of the international society. Without Germany, Turkey was aware that the Turkish initiative had the risk to be undermined.

German Government and Italian Government agreed to act together for a common response to the Convention. It follows from the diplomatic correspondences that the German Government was ready to recognize the Convention in return for providing the equal rights to Germany. German reports show that the demand for a revision in the status quo after the World War I could be acceptable, such as the fact that Germany had been doing for the Treaty of Versailles. For instance, the militarization of the Turkish Straits by the Turkish Armed Forces was perceived to be acceptable to a great extent by the German Government. As a European great power of that period, Germany was insisting on gaining some rights on Straits that would be of strategic importance for Germany. The negotiations were held by the German Ambassador Kellner and then Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüşti Aras. German demand was to involve into the Convention, or to revise the articles of the Convention to provide free movement of German Naval Forces in particular.⁶⁵⁶

German demands were refused by the Turkish Government on the grounds that Germany was not a signatory state of the Treaty of Lausanne, and Germany was not a coastal state of the Mediterranean Sea. In line with the current codes of the

⁶⁵⁵ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 112.

⁶⁵⁶ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 117-118.

international law, these two facts seemed to justify the Turkish arguments. German ambassador reported that the Turkish Government was reluctant about meeting the German demands, and was in efforts to gain time without any outcomes. German-Italian cooperation failed in the following days, and Italy agreed on recognizing the Montreux Convention on 2 May 1938. German policy to side with Italians and to convince Turkey for the recognition of German interests about the Straits failed. Italy, in contrary to the German demands, recognized the Convention.⁶⁵⁷

Germany did not participate into the Montreux Conference even as an observer. Germany was tolerant to the Turkish demand for a revision in the Treaty of Lausanne as to the Straits. However, on the road to a new world war, German demand was to reserve its rights for a convention which it did not take part. The Straits were of great strategic importance especially for the sailing of the Russian fleet and military capacities which could affect the future plans of Germany. Germany's concern was to face with a new regime of Straits to the detriment of the German interests. German strategic plans at that period was to surrender the Soviet Russia with the help of Italy in the Mediterranean Sea. The Convention at the end was not officially protested or did not produce any formal condemnation. The Montreux Convention was declared as "not a friendly act" by the German Government.⁶⁵⁸

When rejected by Turkish Government, Germany demanded to sign a Turco-German bilateral agreement to preserve German interests on the Straits. This policy shows that Germany tried to operate the institution of international law in carrying out its bilateral state relations with Turkey for German national interests. On the other hand, Turkish authorities also rejected these demands on the basis of the international law again. Menemencioğlu negotiated with Gaus and Weizsaecker

⁶⁵⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 345-46; Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 374; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 120-121.

⁶⁵⁸ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 113-15. See also Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 352.

from the German Foreign Office and insured that the Montreux Convention was not giving rights for the warring states to use Straits during a war. According to the Montreux Convention, a possible sailings of the Soviet Fleets were candidates to be direct threats to the German interests, evaluated by Hitler. Soviet Russian existence in the Mediterranean Sea would mean an encirclement of the German troops from South. Thus, Hitler heavily argued on the prevention of the Soviet fleet from the Straits.⁶⁵⁹ Turkish Government argued that the helping states to any warring state would not be allowed to use Straits according to the articles of the Convention. This diplomatic guarantee meant that in case of a war between the Soviet Union and Germany, no other country would be able to help Soviet Union by transiting Straits.⁶⁶⁰

The Montreux Convention was a crucial regime within the institution of international law, not only for peace times but also in war times. For instance, the transit passage through the Straits created problems during the World War II. The year 1943 caused serious problems about the German ships transiting from the Straits. According to the Convention, during any war in which Turkey was neutral, the Straits were bound to remain closed to any warships of the warring states. There were no limitations for the civilian ships. For the warships under 100.000 tons were unclear about their transit rights. The German warships, under civilian covers were claimed to be allowed to transit from Straits. Turkish Government was accused of ignoring these passages. Turkish Government's claim was that they were civilian ships.⁶⁶¹ However, a following inspection to one of the German civilian ship called 'Kassel' elicited the situation. This ship was a 9mm armoured military one. The

⁶⁵⁹ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014), 53.

⁶⁶⁰ For a detailed analysis of the Turco-German Relations during the Negotiations of the Montreux Convention, see Sezen Kılıç, "Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ile İlgili Almanya'nın Görüşleri ve İtirazları," *Akademik Bakış Dergisi* 33, (Nov-Dec 2012): 1-19. Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı. (available online at: <http://www.akademikbakis.org/eskisite/33/05.pdf> (14.08.2016)

⁶⁶¹ Erkin, *Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques*, p.292 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 243.

inspection committee detected sub-water bombs, tank lifting cranes, machine gun, two artillery systems, and submarine radar systems.⁶⁶² The crucial point in this case was that the institution of international law worked even during the war and affected the level and mode of the bilateral state relations. Turco-German relations as well, by the impact of the British pressures was effected by the implementation of the provisions of the Montreux Convention, with the 'Kassel' case in 1943.

However, the international conventions were also violated during the same war when the British Naval forces illegally used the Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean Sea in 1943 during the crisis of Rhodes and Dodecanese islands.⁶⁶³ In the following period, before the Yalta Conference, Turkish Government opened the Straits for the transit of Soviet ships carrying military equipment and arms as well. This was also against the Montreux Convention, but overlooked at the conjuncture in world politics.⁶⁶⁴ As seen, the international law was not always obeyed. The violations on the other hand did not create problems in every events. There was a kind of elasticity about the implementation of international law without deteriorating the main route of the institution of international law. In most cases, Turkey and Germany in particular tended to obey the rules of the international law. The point to be highlighted is the proposal of Germany to sign a similar treaty with Turkey, when German interests were challenged by the Montreux Convention. Turco-German relations sought to create an alternative within the institution of international law, when state interests were challenged by the systemic institution.

Such as the process of the Montreux Convention, Turco-German relations faced some disagreements in the 1930s, which had some reflections on the institution of diplomacy as well. The art of a diplomatist on words had the capacity to affect the

⁶⁶² W.Roskill, War at Sea, III, part I, p.317 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 245.

⁶⁶³ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 245.

⁶⁶⁴ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 257.

future of the bilateral state relations. The high-level declarations, the efforts to minimise frictions, providing correct information, and negotiations were all valid instruments, and to a great extent shaped the mould of the ‘Turco-German relations’ as well. Within this framework, these two states used to appoint ambassadors to one another and rendered their diplomatic relations in the international society. However, in some periods, despite the tradition of being represented at an ambassador level, when their interests are challenged, Turkey and Germany tended to resist this representation. This could be called as “empty chair crisis” in Turco-German diplomatic history.

When Turkish and German foreign policies were not in harmony or challenging to each other, the representation at the ambassador level became likely to be suspended in practice. However, this reluctance never turned into a suspension of diplomatic representation but only remained as procrastinations. For instance, German Ambassador to Ankara - Rudolf Nadolny, in 1931 was appointed to lead the German Delegation in Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1931. He had to stay in Genoa for the matter involved. In practice, until the date of 11 December 1933, his seat in the embassy in Ankara remained empty. German diplomatic corps in Ankara served without an ambassador at office approximately for two years, which was noticed by the Turkish Government as a negative record.⁶⁶⁵ In the same years, Turkish behaviour was in contrary to this tendency. Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, Kemaleddin Sami Paşa died in Berlin while he was continuing his mission on 15 April 1934. The ceremony was organized by the German Government and Göring participated into the ceremony. Turkey, on 5 May 1934, immediately after his death appointed Hamdi Arpağ as the new ambassador of Turkey to Berlin.⁶⁶⁶ In the following year, the German ambassador to Turkey - Rosenberg was retired in on 24 May 1935. Another empty chair situation occurred and the new .German

⁶⁶⁵ Neumark, *Boğaziçine Sığınanlar*, 124.

⁶⁶⁶ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 100.

ambassador - Kellner was not appointed immediately. He was appointed on 4 September 1935 and gave his credential on 28 September 1935. Approximately, the embassy was directed without an ambassador about more than four months.⁶⁶⁷ Another empty chair crisis occurred for five months when German Ambassador Keller retired from the mission on 22 November 1938.⁶⁶⁸

On the eve of the World War II, German mission in Ankara, engaged in a crisis for a short period. It was the years that Turkish foreign policy was not clear which side to support. Another appointment of the chief of mission was delayed by the German Government. Ribbentrop sent Franz Von Papen as the new ambassador to Turkey on 7 April 1939 - on the same day when the Italians invaded Albania.⁶⁶⁹ Goebbels visited İstanbul on 12 April 1939. In the following days, a Turkish delegation departed from Turkey to participate into Hitler's 50. birthday ceremony on 14 April 1939. Diplomacy was working for improving the relations. At the end, Franz von Papen was officially appointed on 18 April 1939.⁶⁷⁰

The crucial point was that, in some periods, when the Turco-German relations was engaged in ambiguities about common interests, or the national interest of one of them was challenged, they became reluctant for immediate appointments of ambassadors. However, the missions in the capitals had not ever ceased to function with their diplomatic corps. This fact shows that a certain amount of resistance

⁶⁶⁷ ADAP, "Kellner'den ADB'ye", Nr.559, 1.2.1939 (1593/384 433) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 105.

⁶⁶⁸ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 109.

⁶⁶⁹ Joachim Petzold, *Franz von Papen* (Berlin: Buchverlag Union, 1995), 259; Reiner Möckelmann, *Franz von Papen Hitlers ewiger Vasall* (Darmstadt, Der Philipp von Zabern Verlag, 2016), 144-50; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 354; Hüner Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası (1938-1950) İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012), 49-50.

⁶⁷⁰ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 120; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 139-40

occurred within the institution of diplomacy without damaging the fundamental functioning of the institution of diplomacy.

Not only in peace-time, but also in war times, the institution of diplomacy was active. Before a war, during a war, and after a war the diplomacy always tended to function with all means and purposes. During the World War II, the diplomacy worked and the Turco-German relations were shaped according to the nature and the outcome of the diplomacy. After the collapse of the French defensive ‘Maginot Line’ and the following German occupation of Paris, and in contrary the gradual success of the British Army in Europe complicated the situation during the war for Turkey. Turkey was exerting great efforts to maintain neutrality and to prevent the pressures of the Allied forces who demanded Turkish support. When Turkish authorities decided to make a clear declaration about Turkey’s policy to remain neutral and outside the war, the French diplomats were insisting on Turkish engagement in the war with the argument that it would have positive resonances especially in the Balkans, and the British diplomats were asking for adding the word of “for now” for the neutrality in the declaration.⁶⁷¹ İnönü wanted to make his declaration in the parliament with the note that this decision was taken in cooperation with the Allies. However, this demand was rejected by the British and French officials.⁶⁷² As seen, diplomacy, during the war was active, and negotiations were carried out even about one single word. All of these processes had a direct effect on Turco-German relations. Turkey had the potential to embark upon the war against Germany as well. At this period of time, Turkey was also perceiving threat from German expansionism for Turkey’s territorial integrity as well.⁶⁷³

⁶⁷¹ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 112.

⁶⁷² Foreign Office 371 / R 6269 / 58 / 22 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 118.

⁶⁷³ For the German plans to attack Turkey at the first years of the war, see Zehra Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2010), 132-34, 335; Cemil Koçak, *Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi*, 7. ed., Vol. 1. *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 572.

Diplomacy as a ‘give and take’ art functioned during the World War II. It follows from the British documents that Germany proposed Aleppo and the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea to Turkey in return for Turkish entrance into the war by the Axis Powers in 1942.⁶⁷⁴ It is remarkable that the British authorities proposed Aleppo and some Greek islands in the Aegean Sea before Germany in 1941 for the similar purpose, to integrate Turkey into the war by the Allied Forces.⁶⁷⁵

Besides the political dynamics, Turco-German economic relations were also at crucial levels for determining the balance of power mechanism in Europe in the 1930s. After the Nazi regime, the trade volume between Turkey and Germany clearly increased. In Turkish exports, while Germany was having the portion of 19 percent in 1933, in 1939 the total amount of Turkish exports to Germany was about 37 percent. In Turkish imports, Germany was also the leading country in the 1930s. While the percentage of the Turkish imports from Germany was about the 27 percent of the total Turkish imports, in 1939 this figure increased to the level of 51 percent. However, these figures did not create a mutual interdependency. In the 1930s, Germany’s export from Turkey fluctuated between the 0.7 to 2.9 percent in the total amount of the German imports. The share of Turkish goods in Germany’s total imports in the 1930s was similar. The German imports from Turkey was about 0.9 percent, and the figure increased only to 2.6 percent in 1938 according to the German records.⁶⁷⁶ While Turkey seemed to be dependent on Germany in economic terms, Germany was not. However, the scale of the trade of chromium created a significant interdependency of Germany on Turkey which will be discussed distinctly.

⁶⁷⁴ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War 1940-1941* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1953), 511; Foreign Office 371 / R 2363 / 486 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 186.

⁶⁷⁵ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 186.

⁶⁷⁶ For further details about the Turco-German economic relations between 1933 and 1939, see Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 79-90; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 243-45.

German diplomatic records (1939) indicate that 80 percent of the industrial investments were made by the help of German experts and German goods in Turkey thus far. German companies had also monopoly in some sectors such as the aviation. For instance, Lufthansa was given monopoly of the control of the Turkish air trafficking by the agreements signed in 1939. The first plan was to initiate flights between Berlin and İstanbul, then to Ankara and Adana. Due to the outbreak of the World War II, this schedule could not work, but the flights from Berlin to İstanbul were carried out even during the wartime. On the eve of the war, the trade agreements are of great significance for the balance in the region, and the Turkish Government tends to engage in trade agreements due to the political reasons. Trade mechanism between Turkey and Germany was arranged continuously with succeeding treaties of trade. Starting from the early years of the Turkish Republic, both states always had engaged in negotiations for these trade agreements to improve the relations. For instance, succeeding to the treaty of trade in 1933, in 1936, on similar bases, Germany and Turkey signed a new treaty of trade. Diplomacy also worked for the related codifications continuously. For instance, The Treaty of Trade in 1936 was negotiated by Turkish and German delegations more than a month partly in Berlin and partly in Ankara between the dates of 7 April 1936 and 19 May 1936. The next year negotiations started on 6 July 1937, and were finalized with the text of a treaty on 30 August 1937 which was going to be valid for the coming one year. A succeeding treaty of trade was signed on 26 July 1938. This agreement was going to be valid until 31 August 1939.⁶⁷⁷

The prolongation of the last treaty was negotiated in May 1939. However, on 24 May 1939 German Government decided to cease the related talks. It is remarkable that the outbreak of war happened at the next day of the official termination of the trade agreement. When Germany declared war on Poland, and when the World War II officially started, Turco-German trade had also officially stopped. However, the

⁶⁷⁷ Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 352-53; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 205-222.

trade between Germany and Turkey, after the talks in 1941 officially gained impetus.

Before the war, according to the document of ‘Turkish-German Economic Relations’ of the German Foreign Office, the payment mechanism of ‘clearing’ in Turco-German trade was noted to be significant for increasing the German political influence in Turkey.⁶⁷⁸ According to the German resources, Germany was dominating the Turkish import of fabric, wool and textile about 78 percent, iron and steel about 69.7, machinery and manufactured goods about 61 percent, and chemicals about 54.4 percent, in return for having the Turkish export of raw wool about 75 percent, raw cotton and chromium about 70 percent in 1937.⁶⁷⁹ The trade figures were also the part of balance of power politics in those years. Britain could not substitute Germany in Turkish exports and imports in the conflictual years of the war. After the ceasing of the Turkish-German trade in 1939 and in 1940, Britain could only met the 5 percent of the Turkish-German trade volume. Between 1940 and 1944 Great Britain imported no amount of raw cotton from Turkey.⁶⁸⁰ Similarly the trade of chromium was also of a balancing policy during the World War II. Turkey continued to sell chromium to Germany which was the raw material of war industry. On the other hand, during the war, the British pressured Turkey to replace their export of chromium, from Germany to Britain which was accomplished to a large extent after 1943.⁶⁸¹

Despite the figures in favour of the Turco-German trade volume, Turkey strived for developing her trade with Great Britain. This was a policy of balancing these two

⁶⁷⁸ D.G.F.P. Series D. Vol. 5, No:545 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 21.

⁶⁷⁹ W. N. Medlicott, *Economic Blockade*, Vol.1, (London:1952), 270-71.

⁶⁸⁰ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, “II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk-Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset,” *Belleten* 25, no. 97 (Jan 1961): 100.

⁶⁸¹ Kurat, “II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk-Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset,” 101.

polar Germany and Britain. In the mid of 1930s, this policy turned out to be providing investment opportunities in Turkey. In 1936, a steel and iron manufacturing plant was given to British entrepreneur instead of the German Krupp company. In 1938, Britain and Turkey signed a credit agreement for providing a financial assistance to Turkey.⁶⁸² These developments disturbed the German government and caused tensions in consideration with the balances of the international society. Britain and Germany were distinctly trying to convince Turkey to side with them in a possible war, or at least to guarantee its neutrality in favour of them. Within this period of time, this conjuncture seemed as a potential risk for the near future for Germany.

During the negotiations of Turkish-German economic relations in Berlin (30 June 1938 – 25 July 1938) Menemencioğlu offered a similar agreement to German counterparts and stated that Turkey was also ready to have German credits in a similar framework.⁶⁸³ In December 1938, Menemencioğlu visited Berlin to negotiate a similar agreement with Germany. At the end, a new credit agreement between Turkey and Germany which committed to supply 150 millions of mark to Turkey, was signed in Berlin on 16 January 1939.⁶⁸⁴ This agreement was ratified by the Turkish Parliament on 9 May 1939.⁶⁸⁵ The balance of power politics yielded in this sense, and the German demand was satisfied by operating the same institution- balance of power in economic sense. However, the political conjuncture and the ongoing rapprochement between Turkey and Britain resulted with a German hesitance to ratify the agreement.

⁶⁸² Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 44; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 24.

⁶⁸³ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 233-34.

⁶⁸⁴ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 86; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 25.

⁶⁸⁵ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 238.

This period also deteriorated the proper functioning of the economic relations in Turco-German interactions. The Turkish spending for defence in 1938 was about the 43 percent of the total budget.⁶⁸⁶ These spending were also dependent heavily on the imports from Germany. However, due to the political crises in the balance of power occurred with the Turco-Anglo-French pact and the Nazi-Soviet Pact Germany implemented a covered arms embargo on Turkey in 1938-1939 by cancellations or procrastinations or some halts of delivery. Whereas Turkey paid for the related military materials, and the German government had already given guarantees for the supply. In order to prevent any Turkish cooperation with Western allies, Germany was implementing a sustained arms embargo on Turkey.⁶⁸⁷

Despite the fact that one of the German military submarine ‘Saldıray’ was sent from Kiel to İstanbul⁶⁸⁸, in May 1939, Ribbentrop first stopped the delivery of all military equipment to Turkey, and then Hitler suspended any military contract signed.⁶⁸⁹ During the same days, Göring blocked the delivery of heavy artillery bought by the Turkish Government due to the current political and military situations.⁶⁹⁰ As a response to these developments, Saraçoğlu declared that Turkey would feel herself bound to stop the chromium export and the related payments to Germany.⁶⁹¹

Turkish policy was to play off the German supply to the British in order to increase the volume of the trade which were essential for Turkey’s survival such as military equipment. In return for Turkish interests, Turkey was also exerting efforts to meet

⁶⁸⁶ Foreign Office:371/E 7363/ 373/ 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 36.

⁶⁸⁷ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 113-14.

⁶⁸⁸ JK 6, (16.04.1939), 72 quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 192.

⁶⁸⁹ Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 45.

⁶⁹⁰ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Millî Şef Dönemi*, 417.

⁶⁹¹ ADAP, “Papen’den ADB’ye”, Nr. 475, 05.06.1939 (1625/388 828-30) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 194.

the demands of both British and German delegations in Turkish economic sector. For instance, on the eve of the war, upon the demand of the German officials, Turkey increased the amount of the chromium export from 15.000 tons to 100.000 tonnes in one year in 1939.⁶⁹²

The trade of military goods and the chromium in this respect reserves a crucial role for the balance of power in the international society. Turkey was rich in chromium, which was the raw material of the military industry. Without chromium, any war could not be waged. It was clear that the trade of chromium was of strategic importance for the both camps in the war. Thus, The British and German officials were in competition to have the larger portion of the Turkish chromium supply during the war. Turkey did not hesitate to play off this advantage and tried to resist the demands of the both sides by using its chromium reserves as a bargaining stake. The trade of chromium created its own leverage of balance of power, while serving for the general balance of power in the world on the eve and during the World War II. It is apparent that this trade effected the trajectory of Turco-German relations and prevented any side from supporting an opposing state. The arms trade and the export of chromium enabled a continuous interaction between Turkey and Germany. Despite many problems, due to these trade of military goods, these two states were always reluctant to cut off their relations which also prevented them from being enemies at opposing sides.

While Turkey was exporting chromium in 1925 with the volume of 5.000 German Mark, in 1938 this amount increased to 3.048.000 German mark which equals to the 52 percent of the German need. This percentage made peak by meeting over 60 percent of the German need in 1939. In this year, Turkey exported about 115.000 tons of chromium to Germany. In those years, Turkey was producing the 17 percent of the world's total production of chromium. A German official was reporting that only 'chromium' was vital on part of Germany in Turco-German trade. Similarly,

⁶⁹² Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 25.

the German official at the department of economic relations of the German Foreign Ministry – Wiehl reported in 1939 that any halt of raw material, particularly chromium would result in indispensable negative results for German current policies.⁶⁹³ Germany hesitated to cut off the overall trade and particularly the trade of chromium with Turkey in 1939 because of the German need for the chromium on the eve of the World War II.⁶⁹⁴

Upon the signing of the German –Soviet Pact, despite the Turkish commitment to increase the amount of the export of the chromium, Turkish side became reluctant to improve the chromium trade. Turkey did not renew the agreement in 1939. Upon political pressures, Menemencioğlu declared that Turkey was planning to limit the amount of chromium export in June 1939.⁶⁹⁵ Turkey decreased the amount of the export of chromium and slowdown the regarding transportation.⁶⁹⁶

In this period, Turkish-British rapprochement emerged for the trade of chromium. In London, the parties signed an agreement for the export of Turkish chromium about 200.000 tons to Great Britain yearly. In October 1939, in return for that, Turkey was committed not to sell any more chromium to Germany. However, in the coming process, Turkish government increased their demands and sold many other items with chromium with a policy created by Numan Menemencioğlu. The trade goods were sold as packages. Chromium and other strategic goods were sold with under-demanded goods such as dried fruits. Great Britain became bound to buy chromium with some other agricultural goods in these years. However, the lack

⁶⁹³Nuri Karakaş, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye’nin Krom Satışı Ve Müttefik Politikaları,” *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 15, no. 2 (December 2010): 452-54; Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 224-230.

⁶⁹⁴ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 224.

⁶⁹⁵ ADAP, “Papen’den ADB’ye”, Nr. 495, 08.06.1939 (1625/388 931-38) quoted in Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, 227.

⁶⁹⁶ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 115; Karakaş, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye’nin Krom Satışı,” 453; Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 127-28.

of British chromium orders in spite of the aforesaid Turkish-British agreements galvanized Turkish foreign policy to contact with Germans again for the sale of chromium. In July 1940, Turco-German treaty of trade was renewed. As a result, trade figures, particularly for chromium and other strategic goods once became the matter of balance of power politics. The current situation in the institution of balance of power in world politics also effected the figures and variety of trade between Germany, Turkey and Britain in this regard.⁶⁹⁷

As partly emphasized, Turco-German relations continued to consider the working of the institution of the balance of power and the developments in the institution of war during the World War II. Upon the rapprochement of Turco-German Relations in 1941, and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, the trade of chromium between Turkey and Germany was re-negotiated under new conditions. Turkish continuous demand for exporting chromium in return for having military equipment and arms was satisfied by the German delegation by approving selling of German heavy artillery system to Turkey. There was only one obstacle in the negotiations. Due to Turkish-British contract on chromium trade, Turkey committed herself only to sell chromium to Britain until 1943. Turco-German chromium negotiations were carried out in a positive atmosphere. However, Turkey was clear and determined as to the fact that the trade of chromium to Germany could only began after 1943. As a result of the negotiations, Turkey guaranteed to sell 90.000 tons and in 1944 45.000 tons of chromium to Germany.⁶⁹⁸ However, in practice, in 1943, the total amount of chromium exported to Germany from Turkey became 13.564 tons in actual. This figure increased to 56.649 tons.⁶⁹⁹ On 19 April 1944, the United States of America and the Great Britain gave a note to Turkish Government to cut-off the

⁶⁹⁷ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 26-27.

⁶⁹⁸ Karakaş, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye'nin Krom Satışı," 469-77; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 162-164.

⁶⁹⁹ Kurat, "II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk-Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset," 102.

chromium trade to Germany.⁷⁰⁰ It is remarkable that the decreasing level of cooperation at the political arena with Germany, the economic relations, especially in strategic materials such as chromium was in an increasing trend. Despite the fact that German was in decline at the last phase of the war, Turkey continued to sell chromium to Germany in 1944 as well.

After having noted the significance of the economic interactions, the process of the World War II also witnessed series of codifications within the lane of the institution of international law. The treaties signed during this period affected not only the future of the war, but also the dynamics of the bilateral state relations. The states, in parallel to the arrangements of the international law tend to come closer or to keep distance through the playground of the international law. The three treaties signed had direct effects on the Turco-German relations in this era. The bilateral interactions between Germany and Turkey from 1939 to 1945 acted with consideration of the Soviet-German Pact (1939), Turco-Anglo-French Pact (1939), and Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship (1941). These were the years that the Turkish Foreign Policy of ‘active neutrality’ was about to collapse, and galvanized Turkey closer to the camps occurred.

First of all, the Nazi-Soviet Pact changed the dynamics of the process, on the eve of the World War II.⁷⁰¹ The pact was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939, one week before the outbreak of the war which started by the German attack on Poland⁷⁰² on 01 September 1939. This pact changed the flow of the Turco-German relations as well. The risk of being threatened by the Soviet Russia, Turkish foreign policy felt itself bound to cooperate with the Allies. However, even upon this pact,

⁷⁰⁰ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 242. See also Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 324-25.

⁷⁰¹ Herry Kissinger, *Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), 330-48; Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 417-18.

⁷⁰² Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 409.

Turkey exerted efforts to create a mediation between the Soviet Union and the western allies, particularly with France and Great Britain. It follows from the records that Soviet Russia and Germany in this process tried to incorporate Turkey into the war on their side. This event created a complexity in Turco-German relations.

In order to compensate the disagreements occurred after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Germany proposed an alternative policy within the institution of international law. On 5 September 1939 before the visit of Şükrü Saraçoğlu-Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Moscow, German Ambassador to Moscow demanded a preparation for signing a Turco-Soviet pact in the coming days that would also monitor the German interests.⁷⁰³ At the same time, the British diplomacy was in efforts to sign a similar pact with Turkey in order to strengthen the position of Turkey with the Allied powers.⁷⁰⁴ Turkey, in line with the instructions of the President İsmet İnönü and the delegation of Turkish Foreign Ministry tried to play off the situation as a leverage. While keeping on continuous contact with the German delegations, Turkish diplomats were demanding a high amount of monetary support from Great Britain and a considerable amount of military and civic equipment for the war conditions. British diplomats were reporting that Turkey was about to join the Nazi-Soviet coalition in this period.

At the first stage, the pact was only paraphrased on 30 September 1939 before the aforementioned Turkish visit to Moscow. Turkish first aim in this visit was to understand the Russian objectives for the war and to try to bridge the Russian demands with the Allied powers in order to have a mediation role during which Turkish interests could be prevailed. However, the Russian aim was in contrary what was planned in Ankara. The Russians were seeking to convince Turkey to side with Germany and themselves in the war. Saraçoğlu visited Stalin, during which

⁷⁰³ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 418-22.

⁷⁰⁴ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 56; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 83.

Stalin offered a draft for Turkish-Soviet Pact. According to the proposal, Turkey was demanded to change the Anglo-Turco-French pact which was paraphrased. The aim was to alter the provision indicating Turkey's commitment to help French and British Governments into a framework of 'consultancy'. Additionally, Turkish commitment was to be nullified if British-French coalition would open a war against the Soviet Union. Another significant proposal was to sign a Turco-Soviet pact to defend the Straits jointly. The Soviet common defence proposal to Turkey was supposed to become null if the Germans would attack Turkey. This last article of the proposed Soviet-Turkish pact was crucial for Turco-German relations. This proposal was rejected by the Turkish delegation.⁷⁰⁵

Turkish visit to Moscow finalized by the disappointment of both Turkish and Soviet sides. Turkey sought for alternatives on the ground of the institution of international law. As a reaction to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Turkey was convinced to ratify the Anglo-Turco-French pact which was signed on 19 December 1939 in return for financial credit, and civic-military equipment. According to this pact, Britain and France were bound to help Turkey if attacked. On the other hand, Turkey did not have any commitment to help French and British states in case of a war they engaged. Turkey was agreed to remain its active neutrality in the war. In return for this pact, Turkey received 16 millions of pounds equated gold bars, 25 million pounds of credits for war materials, and 3.5 million pounds of credit. President İnönü was considering Anglo-French-Soviet pact was the best of the worst⁷⁰⁶ for Turkey's interests. As a result, after the Soviet-Nazi pact, Turkey signed a pact with the opposing side, and guaranteed its neutrality. The only condition to put Turkey in a war restricted to the condition of 'to be attacked'.⁷⁰⁷ As seen, Turco-German

⁷⁰⁵ Nurettin Gülmez, Ersin Demirci, "Von Papen'in Türkiye Büyükelçiliği," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* XIII, no. 7 (Autumn 2013): 236-37.

⁷⁰⁶ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 9. ed. Vol. 2. (İstanbul: Remzi, 2001), 109.

⁷⁰⁷ For the text of the Turco-Anglo-French Pact, see Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 271-80.

relations, even by locating themselves to the opposing sides, considered the institution of balance of power in this period.

The World War II also faced many unexpected and miscalculated events as noted by Bull for the social events. The British thought that the famous French defensive frontier – Maginot Line⁷⁰⁸ was powerful enough to deter German forces from any attack. However, it collapsed in a month and the French navy was seized by the German forces. The ‘*Blitzkrieg*’ (lightning war) tactic of the Germans also destroyed the Polish forces in three weeks at the beginning of the war as well.⁷⁰⁹ The sudden expansion of the German forces with unexpected successes in Europe collapsed the ongoing balance of power and undermined the status quo sustained by the codifications of the institution of international law. The alliance treaties and commitments became null after this German success.

Upon the Turco-Anglo-French Pact, the German Ambassador to Turkey – von Papen proposed a Turco-German Treaty of Alliance in 1940. In this draft, Turkey was asked to approve the commitment to remain neutral against the Allies and also to serve no help and facilitation during the war especially in the Straits, in Thrace and Caucasus.⁷¹⁰ After this proposal, Italians entered into the World War II on 10 June 1940, which changed the balance of power dynamics and the ground for the institution of international law. In this period, Italian diplomats in Turkey were ready for cutting off diplomatic relations and sent already their families to their homelands. However, on 20 June 1940 Turkey signed a Treaty of Trade with Germany.⁷¹¹ According to the German Ambassador von Papen, the signing of this

⁷⁰⁸ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 410.

⁷⁰⁹ Liddell Hart, *II. Dünya Savaşı Tarihi I* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004), 35-41; Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü’nün Dış Politikası*, 45; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 79.

⁷¹⁰ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 102.

⁷¹¹ Özgüldür, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1945*, 150-59.

trade treaty just 9 days after the Italian entrance into the war showed the Turkish bid for developing relations with the Axis Power during the war.⁷¹² This events clearly presented that Turco-German relations utilized from the tools of the institution of international law to further cooperation.

The Soviet pact with Germans, immediate defeat of the French forces in Europe, and the approaching catastrophe for the Great Britain changed the essential components of the Turkish foreign policy. At this moment, the British policy was trying to convince Turkish authorities to enter into this war of survival with all means, while Turkish resistance appeared despite the signed Anglo-French-Turkish pact. This pact was such a life insurance for Turkey to play off for her survival.⁷¹³

In general, the diplomatic behaviours during the war has great impacts on the bilateral relations as well. These negotiations and the outcomes of these intensive talks were also being followed carefully by the German authorities. Turco-German relations were so sensitive in this period of time. Turkey sought to create a new rapprochement with Germany especially against any Russian threat. Hitler wrote a letter to İnönü on 1 March 1941 and declared that the German forces in Bulgaria was out of the question to pose a threat for Turkey. Hitler, personally assured İnönü that he ordered his troops to keep distance from the Turkish borders. For Hitler, this operation was only for deterring the British forces in Greece.⁷¹⁴ The reply of İnönü to Hitler included a policy of balance of power between Britain and Germany. Turkish thesis was to approve that Turkey had no commitment during the war, the only objective was to protect the homeland. İnönü's words kept a distance from both Axis and Allied Powers and emphasized the independence of Turkey about projecting her future. İnönü noted that Turkey could not project its own territorial

⁷¹² D.G.F.P.; D IX No:434, p.568 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 124.

⁷¹³ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 4-5.

⁷¹⁴ See Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 537-38; D.G.F.P.D Vol.XII, No: 133, pp.201-202 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 140.

integrity and independence with regard to other states' political and military engagements, Turkey was determinate to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty against any aggression.⁷¹⁵ These examples also showed that Turco-German relations considered the utilities served by the institution of diplomacy including the exchange of notes and high-level direct communication in adjusting the mode of the bilateral state relations.

The following flow of the World War II, by the Italian invasion of Greece was of crucial for Turco-German relations. On 28 December 1940 Italian forces attacked Greece. According to the guarantee, the Great Britain was bound to give military support to Greece. The day the Italians attacked Greece, Turkey gave a note to the Bulgaria that if they were going to wage war on Greece, Turkey would open a war on Bulgaria. This act was strategical and prevented the collapse of the Greek army. Turkey with this policy, with the Bulgarian hesitance to help Axis powers, stopped the Italian expansionism with limitations in Greece. This policy included the risk of having German protests. However, Turkish Foreign policy was aiming to isolate war from the Turkish homeland.⁷¹⁶ It was challenging in this period that in November 1940 Hitler sent ten German divisions to support Bulgaria against Turkey.⁷¹⁷ This case was an example that the institution of war was another input for the Turco-German bilateral relations in this period, with regardless of its scale, even when it was a limited one.

The Italian entrance to the war on June 11, seemed also binding for Turkey. Considering the third article of the Anglo-Turco-French Pact of 1939, Turkey was also committed to enter into the war against Italy. However, Turkey did not. At this stage, British politicians also ignored the process and did not put pressure on Turkey

⁷¹⁵ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 93; Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* V.1 (İstanbul:İletişim, 2015), 541-42; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 142.

⁷¹⁶ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 130-132.

⁷¹⁷ Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War 1940-1941*, 109.

to obey the rules of the pact. This behaviour was highly criticized in the British cabinet. British officials evaluated Turkish foreign policy as non-trustable for the future.⁷¹⁸ On 22 June, the French Government also signed an armistice with the German Government.⁷¹⁹ These developments challenged the status quo in Europe and collapsed the order designed by former codes of conduct within the institution of international law. Under this challenging situation, Turkey managed to eliminate the pressures of the allied forces.

At this point it was clear that the institution of war posed a great impact on Turco-German relations. On the other hand, as emphasized in the theory chapter, Turkish argument was to preserve the sovereignty during this process in order to survive within the international society and to have the right for manoeuvring within the limits of the institutions. During this chaotic days, the Allied Powers argued that according to the Turco-Anglo-French Pact, upon the Italian entrance into the war, Turkey was bound to embark upon the war. However, Turkey did not.⁷²⁰ This decision was held by Turkey to maintain the Turco-German relations positively. Declaration of war against Germany by Turkey was not realized. Turco-German relations in this sense was benefited from the elasticity within the institution of international law. As defined by bull, the institution of international law could not create an order by itself unless supported by the institution of balance of power.

Turkey sought for an alternative policy to solve the conflict between the Axis and the Allied Powers. The counter argument of Turkey for the British-French block was that Turkey implemented the Second Additional Protocol of the Anglo-Turco-

⁷¹⁸ Foreign Office 371 / R 7400 / 764 / 19 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 128. For further analysis for the regarding Turkish decision, see Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 73-76.

⁷¹⁹ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994*, (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 132.

⁷²⁰ Baskın Oran ed., *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar V.1 1919-1980* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 384; Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994*, (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 149-50; Sezen Kılıç, *Hitlerin Gizli Dosyalarında Türkiye* (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2012), 297.

French Pact, within the boundaries of the institution of international law. The second protocol was giving right to Turkey not to engage in any policy that would spark a war against Soviet Russia. Laying down their arguments on this protocol, Turkish officials declared that they were in contact with the Soviet Russia and did not have any intention to engage in hostile politics with them. French and British officials protested Turkish decision and announced that Turkey had been violating the provisions of the pact.⁷²¹ In British documents, Turkish argument of using the second protocol was evaluated as a pretext for not supporting the British-French coalition in the war.⁷²² On June 26, Turkish Parliament declared the Turkish neutrality and consolidated its position outside the war.⁷²³ This declaration was as the following:

The Republic of Turkey has considered the situation evoked by the Italian entrance to the war and has decided to implement the second protocol... Turkey is committed to render its neutral position for its own security. While carrying on our military preparations, we should be more careful than ever. We hope that our position will eliminate all provocations and provide peace for our neighbour countries.⁷²⁴

Upon this declaration, the German Ambassador to Ankara Von Papen sent a message to Berlin as “The game was won”.⁷²⁵ Turkey was decisive about staying

⁷²¹ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 116-117. See also, Zeki Kuneralp, *İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaseti* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1982), 39-41.

⁷²² Foreign Office 371/ R 6459/ 542/ 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 117.

⁷²³ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 74; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 119.

⁷²⁴ Foreign Office 371 / R 6510 / 316 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 119.

⁷²⁵ D.G.F.P; D.X No: 424, p.25 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 119.

neutral with a clear-cut program. In 1940, İnönü stated that Turkish airspace and territorial waters are closed for the all warring states.⁷²⁶

A similar development in the war which created a new crisis for Turkish foreign policy was the German attack on Rumania on 7 December 1940. This act was clearly fulfil the conditions of the third article of the Anglo-Turco-French Pact of 1939, which included Turkish commitment to go on war with Allies against the Axis powers. However, experienced from the former events, Great Britain at this moment preferred not to create a pressure over Turkey. The British policy in this incident could be summarized as “to have a friendly neutral country rather than having a reluctant ally”.⁷²⁷ Turco-German bilateral relations, found safe rooms in this sense, by using the machinery of the institution of balance of power, and substituted the instructions of the institution of the international law.

As a result of the steps taken by the Axis Power, Turkey was suppressed to ally with the Allied powers to confront Italia-German expansionism. However, Turkey was seeking to develop her relations with Germany in this process and tried to created alternative policies for tackling the troubles occurred. Turkey had also the risk of being attacked by the Germans as well during the process. The General Chief of staff of Germany, in his daily noted on 26 December 1940 that in order to have clear result from the war, “Turkey and Bulgaria should be suppressed. Turkey should be disciplined in this regard, even it requires use of force.” With this method, the routes for Syria over Straits were planned to remain open for German interests.⁷²⁸

⁷²⁶ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality*, Lse Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 105.

⁷²⁷ Foreign Office 371 / R 7912 / 316 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 129.

⁷²⁸ Generaloberst Halder, *Kriegstagebuch*, Vol. II, p.191 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 134.

On the other hand, the institution of war on part of the Axis Powers had the capacity to destroy the Turco-German relations through occupying Turkey. This option was negotiated by the Prime Minister of Italy Ciano and Hitler. Some German reports presented that Germany prepared military plans for the occupation of Turkey. The destruction of 50 Turkish military divisions were on target. The German Ambassador Von Papen was trying to convince the German decision makers in Berlin to use only diplomatic efforts to utilize from Turkey for the vital German interests. Von Papen reported that “It is a must to eliminate Turkish 50 military divisions for further German interests. However, the goal can also be achieved by diplomatic ways.”⁷²⁹ It is also clear that German military headquarter checked their capacities for any possible invasion of Turkey. General Jodl for instance reported that in consideration with the harsh conditions of the ongoing war, German contemporary capacities at hand would not be enough for the operation involved.⁷³⁰ In parallel, according to the records of the talk between Hitler and the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, these two leaders negotiated about the invasion of Turkey. In this occasion, Hitler found this option dangerous and refused any attack-plan on Egypt through Turkey.⁷³¹ German reports revealed that the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was in favour of declaring a menace to Turkey as to “German capacities could delete Turkey from the maps in three weeks.”⁷³²

In 1941, the war was in progress at the expense of Turkish interests. Turkey was surrounded by the frontiers of the war. The Bulgarian participation into the Axis Powers, Yugoslavia and Greece’s occupation by Germany increased the level of threats perceived by Turkey. Britain was insisting on Turkey to enter into the war

⁷²⁹ D.G.F.P.D. XII No:161, 230-231 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 146.

⁷³⁰ D.G.F.P.D. XII No:161, 53 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 146.

⁷³¹ Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 435 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 146. See also, Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War 1940-1941*, 115.

⁷³² Kılıç, *Hitlerin Gizli Dosyalarında Türkiye*, 421; D.G.F.P.D. XII No:161, 230-231 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 146.

by their side, which might change the destiny of the war in the Balkans. The British demands to infiltrate British soldiers as civilians in Turkey, and the settlements of three fighter aircrafts and seven bomber aircrafts in Turkish airports were rejected by Inonu.⁷³³ The British were so eager to convince Turkey for the war. However, these proposals meant a war against Germany. Turco-German relations were fragile to these developments. In the same days, Germany was also asking Turkey to join their frontiers. In order not to provoke Germany on the one side, and to render the special relationship with England, Turkey produced an alternative policy to isolate herself from the war. The first step was to alternate the options of war with new arrangements within the institution of international law. Before the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian coupling with Germany, on 17 February, Turkey signed a common declaration for non-aggression with Bulgaria.⁷³⁴

In 1941, the great powers and the principal competitors - Britain and Germany were at the heart of the war, and the battleground was about to surrender Turkey. In March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis Powers. The German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia in May 1941 changed the status quo to the detriment of Turkey. The war was totally concentrated at the western frontiers of Turkey. Syria on the other hand, was under the influence of the German dominance, the pro-German forces undertook the control in Iraq. The Soviet Russia and Iran were the only two states which were not under the control of Germany. In 1941, Turkish foreign policy had also threat perceptions from the Soviet Russia. The only country left was Iran, to be invaded by an Anglo-Soviet operation in the near future. Under these circumstances, Turkish official ally Britain was totally at defence in every frontier of the war. Turkey felt itself alone to provide its own security. The great powers of Germany and England, in 1941 was in enormous efforts to convince Turkey to enter

⁷³³ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 91; Generaloberst Halder, *Kriegstagebuch*, Vol. II, p.191 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 138.

⁷³⁴ İsmail Soysal, *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları ile birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları V.1*, (Ankara:Türk Tarih Kurumu,2000), 639-41.

into the war in their coalition.⁷³⁵ Upon German attack on the Soviet Russia, The Great Britain declared full support to the Soviet regime. During this time period, Turkey had already signed a Treaty of Friendship with Germany and evaluated the Anglo-Soviet rapprochement negative for Turkish interests. The clear Soviet demands from Turkey especially about the Straits was the main factor of Turco-Soviet distance.

In İnönü's own words: "If Germany is prepared not to enter into any engagements directed against Turkey with any power, Turkey is prepared to pledge herself never to undertake anything against German interests, or to enter into conflict with Germany".⁷³⁶ The primary demands of the German party was to have the right for the free transit of German arms and military equipment and arms through Turkey. German offer was to sign an additional secret protocol for the matter involved. For an unrestricted permission of these arms and war materials, German delegation was given authority to give the concessions of re-arrangement of the borders of the city of Edirne (Adrianapolis) and one island in the Aegean Sea at the negotiation table.⁷³⁷ After intensive debates, a Treaty of Friendship was signed on 18 June 1941 as a non-aggression pact, guaranteeing territorial integrity and independence of both Germany and Turkey.⁷³⁸ By keeping the pacta sunt servanda principle, Turkey and Germany consolidated their further cooperation after 1941. For instance, Turkey

⁷³⁵ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 107; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 136.

⁷³⁶ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 95; "No. 1 Papen to Ribbentrop, Telegram, May 14, 1941" in *German Policy in Turkey (1941-1943)*, by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1948), 7-8.

⁷³⁷ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 443; DZA Potsdam, AA, Pol, no 61172, Bl. 35 in Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propogandası* (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, [1976]), 147; "No. 3 Ribbentrop to Papen, Telegram, May 17, 1941" in *German Policy in Turkey (1941-1943)*, by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1948), 10-12; Kılıç, *Hitlerin Gizli Dosyalarında Türkiye*, 401-02, 406-09.

⁷³⁸ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları V.1*, 152; Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 442-45.

did not hesitate to sell chromium to Germany, which was the crucial raw material of the military industry until May 1944.

The fundamental principle of the Turkish foreign policy during the World War II was recorded in the British documents as to remain neutral in line with the Turco-Anglo-French Pact and the Turco-German Friendship Treaty unless being attacked by any side.⁷³⁹ “Active neutrality” was first used by Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu at a speech on 6 August 1942. In his words, Turkey was in efforts to struggle for staying outside the war. But this objective could not be achieved by a passive neutrality but an active neutrality.⁷⁴⁰ Selim Deringil attached a note that this conceptualization was produced by the then General Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry – Numan Menemencioğlu indeed.⁷⁴¹

In 1942, the World War II began to be complicated by the Japanese entrance into the World War II. German forces were fighting in the deeper Soviet territories. Turkey declared to the British Ambassador in 1942 that Turkey perceived treats about being attacked by the German forces.⁷⁴² In 1943, after the Adana Conference⁷⁴³, British insistence on the quick completion of the “Hardihood” operation and the deployment of British warring capacities in Turkey or at least the use of Turkish airports by the British forces found provoking for the German forces and which might risk the Turco-German bilateral relations. Turkish and British

⁷³⁹ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 39-40.

⁷⁴⁰ Foreign Office 371 / R 5200 / 810 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 177-78.

⁷⁴¹ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 178. (in footnote)

⁷⁴² Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 174-75.

⁷⁴³ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 121-26. For the text of the Turco-Anglo protocol of the Adana conference, see Kılıç, *Hitlerin Gizli Dosyalarında Türkiye*, 641-42.

governments were conscious that this act could result with the invasion of cities of Istanbul and Izmir, by the German forces in Bulgaria and in the Aegean Sea.⁷⁴⁴

In 1943 and onwards, the World War II came to challenge the Turco-German relations. The ongoing status of the war had an impact on the flow of the Turco-German Relations. After the Italian collapse, and the diminishing power capacities of Germany, Great Britain was in favour of incorporating Turkey into the war with her wing. Under these circumstances, the Italian *de facto* withdrawal from the war raised the tensions in the Aegean Sea. Italy deployed its military capacities in Rhodes Island. Churchill was in favour of attacking the Rhodes Island as soon as possible to convince Turkey for the British goals involved. With the elimination of military threat from the surrounding of Turkey, it was assumed that Turkey could enter into the war voluntarily and quickly. Churchill in his own words: “We need to make military operation to Rhodes as soon as possible, I need this success for the negotiations with Turkey.”⁷⁴⁵

The total number of Italian forces of 30.000 soldiers was surrounded by the German forces of 7.000 manpower in Rhodes.⁷⁴⁶ The British forces in the island had to flee. On 13 September 1943 the island of Rhodes became totally under the control of the German forces.⁷⁴⁷ This operation became a clear German victory against British forces. Also, it was the consolidation of the German forces as a powerful asset in the region. In this conflict, the British forces in Rhodes, after the German victory, were assisted by Turkey. Evacuation of the British forces were carried out in

⁷⁴⁴ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 204. For further details of the Adana meeting, see also Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, 451-54.

⁷⁴⁵ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945* (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1973), 162-65.

⁷⁴⁶ Foreign Office 371 / R 10301 / 55 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 208.

⁷⁴⁷ Necdet Hayta, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Ege Adaları Sorunu,” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, (1996): 828-31.

cooperation with Turkey. Additionally these forces were supplied not only food but also gasoline, ammunition and military equipment, through Turkish railways and territorial waters. The Turkish fishermen also helped the logistics of British forces in the Rhodes Island.⁷⁴⁸ From the Turkish perspective, German capacity to invade Rhodes in a short time was also deterrent for Turkey. Turkish assessment was that Turkey was not in a condition to defend herself against such a German attack. The threat was felt by the Turkish authorities very close to the Turkish land, in the Aegean Sea.

Turkey and Germany took the conditions of the World War II into account while conducting their foreign policies to one another. The fundamental principle of the Turkish foreign policy during the war was to remain neutral and outside the war.⁷⁴⁹ Despite the German and British pressures to involve into the war on their sides, Turkey resisted. Numan Menemencioğlu, in this respect revealed to the German ambassador Von Papen that the goal of Turkey's foreign policy is to preserve the right of having her own decisions. He said: "If we engage in war, we will certainly lose our authority to give our own decisions, which we will have no gain at the end." In parallel, Menemencioğlu again stated to von Papen that "we only wage war for our own self, we are self-centred"⁷⁵⁰

At the last days of 1943, Turkey was a state which already accepted to enter into the war with the Allies, but which was also hesitant and reluctant about the issue, in order not to provoke Germany against herself. The Turkish demand of being equipped by the Allied forces were in huge numbers. Turkey was demanding 500

⁷⁴⁸ Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, 115-116; Foreign Office 371 / R 10301 / 55 / 44 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 209-210.

⁷⁴⁹ Mücahit Özçelik, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası," *Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 29 (2010/2): 253-269; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 407; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 1.

⁷⁵⁰ Documents in German Foreign Policy (D.G.F.P., series D, Vol. XII. No.231, p.491 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 5. See also, Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994*, (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 146-48.

shermann tanks, 216 spitfire fighting aircrafts and 66.800 tonnes of gasoline. These figures were perceived as irrational and considered as pretexts to resist the Allied forces.⁷⁵¹

Even, at the beginning of 1944, according to the Turkish account of the current military capacity done by the Turkish General Chief of Staff summarized as “Even a dead Germany could beaten Turkey”. In comparison to the German air forces, Turkish air forces were so underdeveloped and weak. There were only 300 aircrafts at Turkish stocks only one third of which could fly. The staff of anti-aircraft batteries were totally untrained. It was reported that German had the capability to destroy the cities of İzmir and İstanbul only in 24 hours.⁷⁵²

Great Power Management in 1943 also affected the Turco-German Relations. British policy was to have Turkey embark upon the war on their side against the German forces. This plan was foreseen particularly for the Balkan region. However, the United States was hesitant about this project, especially on the ground that there were great difficulties in equipping Turkish military infrastructure. The Soviet foreign Minister Molotov also insisted on the advantage of the Turkish participation into the war. For Russians, the use of Turkish airports and headquarters were nothing more than symbolic contributions.⁷⁵³ In the following conference in Teheran, the American delegation was reluctant to equip Turkey with military equipment and arms, due to the ongoing preparations for the Normandy campaign. The Soviet Union was relatively silent about their demands from Turkey in this process. On the other hand, Churchill repeated the British will for Turkish entrance into the war.⁷⁵⁴ On 7 June 1945 the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow - Selim Sarper

⁷⁵¹ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 234-235; Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman*, 253.

⁷⁵² Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 233.

⁷⁵³ Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman*, 249-50; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 213.

⁷⁵⁴ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü’nün Dış Politikası*, 136-39; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 221.

visited the Soviet Russian Foreign Minister Molotov. During this meeting, a second verbal note was given to Sarper about the annexation of Ardahan and Kars to Soviet Russia and the revision of the Montreux Convention to enable Soviet Russia to deploy Russian armed forces in the Straits.⁷⁵⁵

At the end of the negotiations, in the Moscow Conference, Anglo-Soviet delegations declared their demand for Turkey to enter into the war at latest in 1943. Before this date, it was demanded from Turkey to open its airports and headquarters for the Soviet and British forces.⁷⁵⁶ In Cairo, the British delegation asked Turkish authorities to enter into the war in one month.⁷⁵⁷ Upon pressures during the Eden-Menemencioğlu discussions, Turkish Government accepted to enter into the World War II officially in principle on 17 November 1943 in Cairo.⁷⁵⁸ In return for this policy, a plausible time period to be given to Turkey was accepted in order to be equipped for the war involved. The information of the Turkish decision to declare in the near future, which was confidential, was gathered by a German spy in the British Embassy in Ankara.⁷⁵⁹ The German Ambassador Von Papen warned the Turkish officials about a possible German attack on Turkey upon any declaration of war supporting the Great Britain.⁷⁶⁰ The succeeding Conference in Cairo again

⁷⁵⁵ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 415; Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 161. See also Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 303-07.

⁷⁵⁶ USFR, *Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, 124 quoted in Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 214.

⁷⁵⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, 412-13; Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 216-217; Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 134.

⁷⁵⁸ Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman*, 247-48.

⁷⁵⁹ This event is known to be the “Cicero Case” in Turkish political history. See, Joachim Petzold, *Franz von Papen* (Berlin: Buchverlag Union, 1995), 260-62; Savaş Sertel, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'de Yürütülen Casusluk Faaliyetleri Yürütülen Casusluk Faaliyetleri,” *The Journal of Academic Social Science* no. 25 (March 2016): 110-11; Necip Azakoğlu ed., *Franz von Papen'in Anılarından* (İstanbul-Ankara: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2015), 455-62.

⁷⁶⁰ Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, 100-03.

became the peak of the pressures of the Allied Forces to galvanize Turkey into the war. İnönü proposed a detailed plan which divided this process into two: preparation process and cooperation process. After engaging into the cooperation period, Turkey committed herself to fight in her own sphere of influence by the British and American forces.⁷⁶¹ In this course of time, German officials were following the events and the German Ambassador to Ankara, Von Papen urged Turkish officials regarding the plans in Cairo and revealed that the “before the landing of the first British airplane to any Turkish airport, that airport will have been destroyed by the German forces.”⁷⁶² At the end of the Cairo Conference, Churchill was reported to demand from Turkey to enter into the war on 15 February 1944 at latest with an off-the-record verbal note.⁷⁶³ At the end, the Turkish Parliament declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945.⁷⁶⁴

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the years between 1923 and 1945 to find out the correlation between the Turco-German relations and the institution of the international society. In general, Turkey and Germany seemed to conduct the

⁷⁶¹ Zeki Kuneralp, *İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaseti* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1982), 69-71; USFR, Conferecnes of Cairo and Teheran, 696 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 229.

⁷⁶² Von Papen, *Memoirs*, 513-5 quoted in quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 231.

⁷⁶³ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 138; Interview with Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, Turkish Cabinet Member, by Selim Deringil, on 29.10.1977 quoted in Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 232.

⁷⁶⁴ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 159; Sina Akşin, “Turkey's Declaration of War on Germany at the End of World War II” *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 33 (2002): 285-291.

bilateral relations in harmony with the functioning of the institutions of the international society, with certain exceptions in which their state interest(s) were challenged.

The relations between 1924 and 1933 presented a nature during which these two states primarily improve their relations within the lanes of the institution of diplomacy and international law. Their diplomatic network gradually improved in this era and produced many codes of conduct through treaties, to which the process of state formation in Turkey gave great impetus. In this period, both states were trying to recover as soon as possible out of the syndromes and destructions of the World War I. Germany and Turkey was exerting efforts to consolidate their positions as the members of the international society emerged after the war with a new balance of power mechanism.

Master institution of the international society configured a balance of power in which the victorious states of the World War I had a preponderant concert to give a central direction to the international society. This mechanism was solidified by the foundation of League of Nations, which was a designed pseudo institutions in Wight's term. The process turned out that the League of Nations failed to prevent the World War II, in line with Bull's hypotheses that the effective institutions of the international society are only the evolved ones rather than the designed ones.

Turco-German relations primarily considered the institutions of great power management and the balance of power. In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany and changed the dynamics of the international society on the one hand, and the Turco-German relations radically on the other hand. Hitler's revisionist policies in the 1930s produced a new balance of power in which Germany regained a great power status. This status had never turned into a hegemony for Turkey, despite the Turkish high economic dependency on Germany.

In this period, Turco-German bilateral relations depended on a mutual understanding. Germany did not block any Turkish revisionist foreign policy issue in spite of its clear superiority in Europe, which was sustained by the invasion of

Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. For instance, despite the fact that Germany did not have a consent to revise the status of Straits by the Montreux Convention, or even the German demand to involve into the Treaty was not met at all, Germany kept her neutrality for the matter involved. On the other hand, as an example, spectacular expansionism of Germany, its monopoly of trade on Romania, its aggressive policies towards Poland and Prague were not met with remarkable protest from the Turkish side as well. Even when Germany was a great power, and the Turco-German relationship had conflicting policy goals, these two states maintained their sensitivity not to block any of counterpart's policies and became tolerant to their revisionist policies as long as they did not assault on their vital interests.

In this period, the consideration of the institution of diplomacy in Turco-German bilateral relations presented a gradual evolution. After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey and Germany initiated their formal diplomatic representation, and signed a treaty immediately and fostered the diplomatic connection. Turco-German relations performed the functions of the institution of diplomacy continuously by appointing ambassadors and diplomatic corps, carrying out negotiations, gathering of information, and the minimizing of frictions. Even during the war, at the highest degree of problems, diplomacy worked properly between Germany and Turkey. After 1943, even during the discussions about the possibility of German invasion of Turkey, or in the course of the battle took place in Rhodes during which Turkey supplied help to British forces; Turco-German interactions utilized the machinery of the institution of diplomacy at the highest level. The exchange of letters between Hitler and İnönü could be examples for the case involved. However, without transcending the boundaries of diplomatic codes and rules, in some periods Turco-German relations procrastinated to be represented or presented reluctance for the matter involved. The "empty chair crisis" in Turco-German diplomatic history is a good example of such phenomena in which the diplomatic relations continued without an ambassador in practice. These two states

did not cease to their diplomatic representation, but in some periods became reluctant to represent their countries at an ambassador level.

Turkey and Germany, starting from the very early days of 1924 tended to produce international treaties consisted of binding rules, within the framework of *pacta sunt servanda* to serve for the bilateral relations. The number of Turco-German treaties increased in numbers during the process related to different sectors ranging from finance, health, education to alliance. This practice used even during the war as a tool to affect the ongoing balance of power. Three treaties in this regard shaped the nature of the Turco-German relations essentially: the Soviet-German Pact (1939), Turco-Anglo-French Pact (1939), and Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship (1941). These treaties seemed to have changed the direction of Turco-German relations. On the other hand, Turco-German relations utilized from the elasticity of the codifications of the treaties, or sometimes violated some of them in order to preserve their state interests. As Bull argues, the institution of international law is not sufficient to provide order in the international society, unless supported by the institution of balance of power. This fact enabled a space for manoeuvring in Turco-German relations. Especially during the World War II, Turkey tried to exploit this fact as much as possible in order not to declare war on Germany. At the end, despite all British pressures, Turkey turned out to be a country which signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1941, sold chromium to Germany until 1944, and declared the war in 1945. Turkey as an “ally of the British, friend of the Germans” manage the process of war by utilizing from this elasticity, supported by changing positions in the balance of power with an efficient network of diplomacy.

The institution of war was another institution which was considered by the Turco-German relations during the 1923-1945 period. However, the concept of war, as Bull argues, is a relative concept and hard to distinguished in some examples from the status of peace. The post-World War I period was designed to end the wars in the international society. However, the revisionist policies of Hitler began to undermine this goal. The Nazi Regime did not hesitate to use of force in the 1930s to achieve German expansionist goals according to the German policy of

‘Lebensraum’ (Living Space). Turkey evaluated these limited invasions as tolerable unless it targeted the Turkish homeland. It is remarkable that Turkey perceived direct and indirect threats from Germany for her security during the World War II as well. In addition to this fact, the World War II became the central gravity of the nature of the Turco-German relations. The German unexpected rapid success at the beginning of the war, and the German failures after 1943 had direct effects on Turco-German relations. The trajectory of the war provided rapprochement and caused distances in Turco-German relations clearly.

When the state interests were challenged, Turco-German relations tended to produce an alternative policy within the same institution. If this alternative could not be realized, Germany and Turkey found a substitutional policy within the lane of another institution in this period. The Montreux Convention is a clear demonstration of the Turco-German relations in this regard. Germany used its diplomatic leverages to prevent the Convention, especially by pressuring German allies like Italy in the 1930s. This resistance failed at the end, and the Convention was signed also by Italians. Turco-German relations engaged in producing an alternative policy within the same institution, or to compensate the situation with a policy of another institution of the international society. Within this framework, a proposal was given by Germany to Turkey to sign a similar Turco-German Convention in order to protect the interests of Germany, which meant an alternative within the institution of international law. At the end, Germany was satisfied by a Turkish verbal declaration of guarantee for the German interests which was clearly an alternative policy of the institution of diplomacy.

The ultimate goal of the Nazi Regime was to revise the status quo of the Versailles Treaty. This goal was achieved gradually, even it required use of force by the German regime. During this time period, it is remarkable that Turkey was in need of the revision of the post- World War I status quo as well. Turkey was playing its role in the institution of international law and protesting every single revisionist German policy through the tools of the international law, while tolerating them in practice with a flexibility. The expansionist policies of n Germany in Europe began

to risk the ongoing balance of power mechanism and created new threats for Turkey.

Especially the status of the Turkish Straits was the leading concern of the Turkish decision makers in this process. The revision on the regime of the Straits and the case of the Province of “*Hatay*” were two prevailing reflections of the revision demands of Turkey. It could be argued that there was a “consensus in silence” for the aforesaid revisions in Turco-German relations in 1930s. The vital interests of both states were respected by each other, within the borderlines of the institutions of the international society. This policy produced a level of flexibility in understanding, implementing the instructions of the institution of international law as well. As noted in the theory chapter, Turkey and Germany had the freedom to decide on their own policies with a freedom, despite the demarcations of the international society imposed on them.

Turkey and Germany tried to conduct their relation in consideration with the master institution of balance of power throughout this period. This mechanism embraced various economic tools for the institutions involved. The trade balances of Turkey with Germany and Britain primarily were of great significance for the balance in question. The strategic goods, such as the military arms and equipment, or the trade of chromium were used as tools for balancing. The credit agreements between Turkey and Germany on the one hand, and Turkey and Britain on the other hand were played off one another to drive Turkey into the World War II. The procrastination, reluctance in exporting or importing the chromium became a crucial element of the ongoing balance of power, which was taken into account in Turco-German relations.

As a result, in line with the instructions of the institutions of the international society, Turco-German relations between 1923 and 1945 performed intensively by widening and consolidating a diplomatic network, through signing international treaties on different sectors. The great power management, and the related balance of power especially in the 1930s, concentrated on the revisionist policies of Germany. Within this period, Turkey and Germany monitored the flow and both of

them tried to maximize their state interests by revisions at different scales without isolating themselves from the institution of international law. At the end, the institution of war functioned with changing conjectures every single year between 1939 and 1945. The balance of power was considered as the master institution in conducting the Turco-German relations as well. In this period, these two states tolerated limited amount of violation of international law, utilize from economic relations, and intensified diplomatic communications to render the balance. Even during the war, international society did not cease to exist and imposed instructions through the institutions, which were considered by Turco-German relations. When their state interests were challenged, Turco-German relations found again alternatives within the borders of the institutional structure.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The E.S. has long provided its own patterns and theoretical filters to understand/explain IR. Within the bulk of these alternatives, such as focussing on economic, military, cultural, political, and historical aspects, this study has sought to analyse bilateral state relations through five institutions of the international society conceptualized by Bull: balance of power, great power management, diplomacy, international law, and war. As a result, this study, in Bull's own words, has been 'an artistic enterprise' aimed to contribute to the 'very practice of theorizing' within the reality of IR.

In light of Bull's formulation, this dissertation has become an attempt to find out the correlation between the systemic institutions of international society and the Turco-German bilateral state interactions. For the research involved, the study has tried to answer the question of "How do Germany and Turkey take international society's five systemic institutions into consideration while conducting their bilateral state relations?" This main question was supported by the following supplementary questions: "How do Turco-German relations contribute to the functioning of Bull's five systemic institutions?" and "How do Turco-German relations tend to react to Bull's five systemic institutions when their interests are challenged by these institutions?"

In order to answer these questions, this study reviewed Turco-German historical relations from the early periods of the 18th century to the mid-twentieth century

through the sequence of events and cases. Germany and Turkey conducted their bilateral state relations by taking Bull's institutions of international society into account between the years 1701 and 1945. These two states not only engaged in continuous diplomatic relations, waged wars, took part in great power management, experimented in balance of power, and complied with international law, but also shaped their bilateral relations in accordance with the working of the institutions involved.

Despite the existing disagreements, they were inclined to perform the functions of the institutions and contributed to the proper working of the international society. Additionally, when a change occurred in the direction or nature of the systemic institution, Turco-German relations tended to adapt to new circumstances. On the other hand, if the state interests of Turkey and/or Germany were challenged by one of this systemic institutions, these two states, individually or collectively had the capacity to resist. At first, this resistance turned out to be first a procrastination or a postponement of the related imposition or instruction of the systemic institution. Against this systemic input, the other option for Turco-German relations was to produce an alternative policy within the same institution. If this framework could not meet the expectations of the states in consideration with their state interests, they tended to compensate the situation with a substitutional policy within another institution of the international society.

Given the operational structure of Turco-German bilateral relations within the institutions of Bull, the basic finding of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: Despite the fact that bilateral state relations in general, and Turco-German relations in particular are constrained and contoured by the systemic institutions of international society; when individual and/or collective state interests come into conflict with Bull's institutions, states tend to resist and transcend this institutional structure by producing alternative policies. However, the produced alternatives are not able to escape from the boundaries of international society's institutional framework, and emerge as policy substitutions within the same institution or policy-shifts towards other institutions.

In parallel to the argument above, the general outcome of this study suggests that the relations between Germany and Turkey tended to act by taking the working of Bull's institutions into consideration from the early 18th century up until the end of the World War II in 1945. The findings of this study are in relation to each institution as follows:

The institution of diplomacy, similar to the phases of its evolution in the international society, presented a progress in Turco-German relations starting from the 18th century. However, some of the tools of diplomacy, such as the multilateral conferences, were utilized in Turco-German relations later than it was consolidated in the international society. The evolution of the institution of diplomacy with its established rules and practices in the modern state system coincided with the unconventional diplomatic practices of the Ottoman Empire⁷⁶⁵, and the official integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European international society was accepted to take place in the 19th century. For instance, the use of multilateral conferences to give a central direction to the international society along with a negotiated balance of power became a practice starting from the settlement of Westphalia to the settlement of Utrecht, while Turco-German relations came to use this practice in the 19th century following the Crimean War in 1856 and in the Congress of Berlin of 1878.

Turco-German relations exercised the diplomatic rules in the 18th, 19th, and the 20th centuries. The gradual upgrade of the diplomatic representation, the continuous existence of embassies in the capitals and the exchange of diplomats were all observations within the study. It is a clear fact that, despite the existing disagreements between them, Turkey and Germany acted within the boundaries of the institution of diplomacy, even during the war times. The first initiatives taken

⁷⁶⁵ For a detailed analysis of the engagement of the Ottoman and European diplomatic history, see Nuri Yurdusev, "Turkey's Engagement with Europe: A History of Mutual Management," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins, St Antony's Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 277-99.

were the exchange of letters, correspondences, sending of *ad hoc* envoys in the 18th century. This period was followed by the appointment of the resident ambassadors, Adolf Rexin in the 1760s to Istanbul, Ali Aziz Efendi to Berlin in 1797. After the 18th century, Turkey and Germany, under different names of polities⁷⁶⁶ in the history rendered their continuous diplomatic relations. Turco-German relations used the rules and instructions of the institution of diplomacy. For instance, the delegation of Ahmed Resmi Efendi in his visit to Berlin in 1763 consisted of 73 members. The first and second visits of the Kaiser Wilhelm II to Istanbul were hosted with a high protocol of rules. The continuous diplomatic relations between Germany and Turkey had only exceptional break-offs. The diplomatic relations were bound to be cut off after the World War I in 1918, until 1923 when the Treaty of Lausanne gave the right to re-establish the diplomatic relations. Similarly, in 1944 Turkey cut off the diplomatic relations with Germany, and in 1945 declared a war against Japan and Germany.⁷⁶⁷

The definition of the term of diplomacy which means the conduct of relations with professional diplomats by peaceful methods has been illustrated through the Turco-German history, without any wars waged against each other. These two states have engaged in continuous diplomatic relations since the 18th century. Even during the wars, such as the case in the World War II, when Turkey and Germany had conflictual interests towards each other, the institution of diplomacy was followed with all purpose and intents in conducting the bilateral state relations.

In general, Turco-German relations took the institution of diplomacy into account in their interactions and performed the functions for the maintenance of the international society, such as ‘communication, negotiation, information, minimisation of friction, and symbolic existence as a reflection of the existence of

⁷⁶⁶ These states that have been evaluated through this study were: the Ottoman Empire and its successor the Republic of Turkey on the Turkish side; the Kingdom of Prussia, the German Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich on the German side.

⁷⁶⁷ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü’nün Dış Politikası*, 152-55.

international society'. "Diplomacy as an institution of European international society, among other things, involves resident embassies, rules of protocol, reciprocity, rights and immunities of ambassadors, multilateral conferences and mediation."⁷⁶⁸ In its historical flow, Turco-German relations have taken these arrangements into account, and within this framework acted in regard to the common interests, and respected the diplomatic immunity of the counterpart representatives in their countries, played the mediator role for the minimization of frictions during the crises, engaged in multilateral conferences, and transmitted continuous information and intelligence from hosting countries to adjust future configurations of the bilateral interactions. Through the established consular and diplomatic missions in Turkey and Germany since the 18th century, these two states proved the symbolic meaning that Turkey and Germany were part of the European international society, as well.

When the state interests of Turkey and/or Germany were challenged by the systemic institution of diplomacy, these two states had the capability to choose to resist individually or collectively. For example, Turkey and Germany rendered their diplomatic representation continuously for centuries. The only exception for the suspension of diplomatic relations were the war times between 1918 and 1923, and a temporary process in 1945. However, without transcending the boundaries of diplomatic codes and rules, in some periods the Turco-German relations procrastinated to be represented or presented some reluctance for the matter involved. The "empty chair crisis" in Turco-German diplomatic history is a good example of such phenomena in which the diplomatic relations continued without an ambassador in practice. These two states did not cease their diplomatic representation, but in some periods became reluctant to represent their countries at an ambassadorial level.

⁷⁶⁸ Nuri Yurdusev, "The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International Society," in *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 75-76.

This diplomatic network used the institution of international law as a fertile ground for conducting bilateral state interactions. The main incentive to form an alliance between Turkey and Germany reflected continuity from the early 18th century until the last years of the World War II. The Turco-German treaties of alliance formed the substantial goal of the bilateral cooperation. The volitional participation of the Turco-German relations in the institution of international law was first initiated by the Treaty of Trade and Friendship in 1761 and the Treaty of Alliance in 1790. The unconventional way of Ottoman practice within the institution of international law was to sign capitulations, which were assumed to be unilateral commitments of the Sultan until the 18th century but turned out to be a unilateral tool of the imperial great powers for imposing laws on the Ottoman Empire in the following centuries. The first reciprocal treaties were signed in the 18th century concerning the Turco-German relations in this regard. The number of treaties in the coming centuries increased in numbers and presented a progress beyond the issues of trade and security, in which the functions of the restriction of violence, *pacta sunt servanda* and respect for sovereignty and independence were observable.

Turkey and Germany during these three centuries seemed to have attached great significance to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* of the institution of international law. These two states undertook long negotiations before signing treaties and tried to limit themselves to the provisions involved. However, they tended to find out a manoeuvring space within the interpretation of provisions of the treaties, or through violating or denying their own commitments, aware of the fact that international law merely could not determine the trajectory of the working of the international law, unless supported by the institution of balance of power. Turkey's relations with Germany during the World War II, as 'the ally of the British, and the friend of the Germans' was achieved through this flexibility, in spite of the commitments made by international treaties.

The Montreux Convention is another clear milestone example of Turco-German relations in relation to the systemic institution of international law. As mentioned before, if the state interests of Turkey and/or Germany, were challenged by the

systemic institution of international law, these two states, had the capacity to resist individually and/or collectively. Germany used its diplomatic leverages to prevent the Convention. This resistance failed at the end and the Convention was signed. The following option for the Turco-German relations was to produce an alternative policy within the same institution, or to compensate the situation with another institution of the international society. In line with this argument, a subsequent proposal was given by Germany to Turkey to sign a similar Turco-German Convention in order to protect the interests of Germany. In this event, Turco-German relations sought to create an alternative within the institution of international law because state interests were challenged by the systemic institution. At the end of the diplomatic fluctuations, Germany was satisfied by Turkish verbal declaration of guarantee for the German interests which was clearly an alternative policy derived from the institution of diplomacy.

Turco-German relations seemed to take the great power management into account and considered the working of the balance of power machinery. The Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Prussia and the following German Empire on the other, both were the great powers starting from the 18th century until the World War I. Germany regained its great power status under the Third Reich, with a question mark on the assumed great power responsibilities. On the other hand, until the end of the World War II, Turkey acted not as a great power but a member of the international society with the capacity to play-off within the general balance of power. In consideration with their military capacities, Turkey and Germany's effective capacity to shape the general balance of power in the international society, their ability to create a sphere of influence and preponderance at regional level, their capability of avoiding and controlling crises, and limiting and containing wars; these two states performed the functions of the great power management throughout the time period under investigation. In addition, Turco-German relations seemed to follow the other great powers and their interactions continuously to adjust their bilateral state relations.

In the 18th century, the great powers were Britain and France which were in a global competition; Austrian Empire and the Ottoman Empire as the regional traditional ones; the Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire as the recently emerged ones. After 1871, the configuration of the great powers gradually evolved around the triple Entente and the triple alliance, which instigated the process of the World War I. This period provided the states such as France, Italy, Austria and Britain with territorial demands from the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Germany became a partner of the Ottoman Empire in this process with a clear show of respect for the Turkish sovereignty and independence. In the succeeding period while incorporating into the World War I, the Turco-German relations operated the general pattern of the great power management of this period. Lastly, in the 1930s, on the eve of the World War II, along with Hitler's Germany; Britain, France and the Soviet Union seemed to be the prominent great powers of the era. Turco-German relations resisted to take part in World War II, which was the reflection of the great power management. These great powers gave a central direction to the international society through providing a balance of power, by which the member states were engaged.

On the other hand, if the state interests of Turkey and/or Germany were challenged by the systemic institution of great power management, these two states resisted individually or collectively similar to the cases of previously discussed institutions. The Turco-German relations were also assumed to produce an alternative policy within the same institution, or to compensate the situation with a policy of another institution of the international society as a response to such case. The World War II period consisted of clear examples for these alternative attempts. The 1939 Turco-Anglo-French Pact and the following 1941 Turco-German Treaty played a significant role as the elements of the institution of international law in this resistance. Another example was the alternative policy generated within the boundaries of the balance of power, which was Turco-German chromium trade and the trade of arms. Especially the trade of chromium provided a tool for resistance

by balancing the contrasting demands of the great power management to galvanize Turkey into the two sides of the war.

In line with the institution of great power management, Turco-German relations served for the proper functioning of international society by performing the functions of the institution of balance of power, as well. The balance of power, meaning the prevention of any preponderant power to dominate the system, was a significant factor that shaped the Turco-German relations. The Prussian-Ottoman cooperation during the 18th century in order to provide a balance in favour of their state interests, was a clear example for the matter involved. The further attempts to provide the balance in the 19th century, especially after the Congress of Berlin (1878) were remarkable. Turco-German alliance before the World War I, was consolidated by the Baghdad Railway Project, which was another phase of this policy. The efforts of the Turco-German relations to sustain the balance of power in the 1930s in favour of the Turco-German joint interests, and the following collapse of the balance with the outbreak of the World War II, were the periods during which Turco-German relations acted within the boundaries of the institution of balance of power by performing its functions.

In order to analyse the correlation between the Turco-German relations and the institution of the balance of power, the 18th century presented practices that suit the core argument of the dissertation. For instance, Turco-German relations tended to adapt itself to the new circumstances, when a change occurred in the direction or nature of the balance of power, the ascendance of the new Russian emperor during the Seven Years' War resulted with a Prussian –Russian cooperation. Under this new circumstance, Turco-German relations adapted the new condition and tried to act for the balance of power through an alliance with Russia. When their state interests were challenged, procrastinated the process of signing an alliance treaty, as well. Yet, as a result of the efforts since the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia could sign an alliance treaty in 1790. Especially, due to the changing position of the Prussian-Russian relations, and the

existing Russian threats toward the Ottoman Empire, Turco-German relations procrastinated and resisted to sign an alliance treaty in the 18th century, until 1790.

The other option for Turco-German relations was to produce an alternative policy within the same institution, or to compensate the situation with a policy of another institution of the international society, when their state interests were challenged. Within the framework of the institution of the balance of power, the further challenges produced an alternative in the institution of international law, and the Ottoman-Prussian Treaty for Trade and Friendship was signed in 1761, with an article to further the level of cooperation in the balance of power in the future. Another alternative policy was to invite Britain to the alliance treaty at hand, which aimed to operate the great power management as an alternative policy in another institution. The Ottoman Empire also upgraded the diplomatic representation of the Kingdom of Prussia in Istanbul, and accepted a resident representative.

Similar to this clear example, between the years of 1871 and 1914, Turco-German relations performed the functions of the balance of power in order not to allow one power to dominate the international society. Turco-German relations were executed according to the dynamics of the balance of power, as well. Most prominent example for this fact was the Baghdad Railway Project, which was used as a balancer of the British policies. A similar balance of power was effective on Turco-German relations during the World War II. Turkish export of chromium as a tool served to contribute to the systemic institution of balance of power. On the other hand, when state interests were challenged, Turco-German relations engaged in alternatives in the institution of international law by signing two distinct treaties consequently, which changed the mode and role of the bilateral relations: the Turco-Anglo-French Pact and the Turco-German Pact.

Turkey and Germany, within the historical flux of their relations have taken the institution of war into account, and have arranged their level and mode of interactions in accordance to this input. On the one hand, war was a path of implementing interests of states, on the other hand the institution of war served for

the international society, by creating balance of power, and creating an impetus for implementing or changing international law as well. The threat of wars and the preparation for wars seemed to be also factors within the institution of war. States in line with their interests tend to provide security measures for countering any possible war or attacks, or for embarking upon a planned war. Turco-German relations in the last three centuries have been in contact to cooperate for the preparation of wars as well. The success and failures in the battles and large scale wars to which Germany and/or Turkey took part seemed to have an impact on providing rapprochement or keeping distance in Turco-German relations. It is remarkable that these two states have not waged war against one another in the history. The declaration of war against Germany by Turkey in 1945 was nothing more than a procedural one, rather than being an actual war.

However, Germany and Turkey embarked upon wars and operated the institution of war against common enemies in the history, with World War I being the leading example of such phenomena. Especially in the 18th and 19th centuries the institution of war was effective on Turco-German relations. The functions of the war, to enforce new international law arrangements and to initiate new balance of power mechanisms, were all accompanied by the series of Turco-German relations. A crucial point is that the existence of the institution of war in international society, also paved the way for a requirement for states to be prepared for a possible war. This fact, specifically in Turco-German history provided a continuous cooperation and coordination from the 18th century to 1945, during which Germany had provided numerous numbers of war materials and expertise to Turkey. The backwardness of Turkish military infrastructure and the bid for Turkish military modernization, along with Germany's respect for Turkey's territorial integrity provided cooperation between Turkey and Germany within the boundaries of the institution of war.

World War I, during which Turkey and Germany operated the institution of war by taking the same side has been a critical example for this study. The argument of the study puts forward that despite some level of disagreements, Turco-German

relations tended to act within the boundaries of the institution of war. The Turkish and German interests during the war were not identical. Sometimes, these two states disagreed even on the frontiers of the war. The World War I, itself began with a disagreement in Turco-German relations. The German ships Goeben and Breslau under the German command bombed the Russian targets in the Black Sea on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. In this period German policy was to incorporate the Ottoman Empire into the war with all means. However, the disagreement was clear at that period. The Ottoman Empire entered the war three months after this event.

During the war, these disagreements continued, as well. For instance, the campaign which was planned to recapture Baghdad from Britain was cancelled upon German demands, and the soldiers were mobilised to the Palestinian frontier against the British forces. Additionally, the Ottoman attacks on Syria could not receive support from the German forces. Disagreements about the Galician frontier, or about the Italian dominance over Tripoli and the Egyptian campaign were other examples. The crucial point was that Turkey and Germany did not cease to operate the institution of war commonly until the last minute of the war in 1918. For instance, after 1917, when the fall of the German forces became clear, many Ottoman politicians demanded early withdrawal from the war. Despite some dissents during the war, Turco-German relations executed the phases of the war in collaboration and respected limitations of the institution of war, and remained on the same side. They also paid the costs of the war together in the interwar period.

On the other hand, if the state interest/s of Turkey and/or Germany, were challenged by the systemic institution of war, these two states, individually or collectively showed the capacity to resist. During World War II, Turkey was careful on sustaining its relations with Germany as much as possible. During these turbulent years, Turkey's strong position about resisting to declare war against Germany became one of the milestones of Turco-German relations, which seems remarkable. Turkish resistance to declare war against Germany continued until 1945, when the war in practice ended in all frontiers. Turco-German relations during World War II created some other alternative policies. Germany failed to convince Turkey to enter

the war on her side. Turkey was seeking to maintain the neutrality at all costs. The alternative policy was provided by the institution of international law by signing the Turco-German Treaty of Trade and Friendship in 1941, which was of a great significance for the ongoing balance of power dynamics, and included provisions about the trade of chromium as a substitution, as well.

As noted, Bull's framework is a minimalist and pluralist international society, which is assumed to respect the sovereignty of states and provide a freedom of act in relation to their interests within the international society. The significance attached to the sovereignty and independence of states, respecting the minimalist rules of the society such as *pacta sunt servanda*, the principle of non-intervention, and the act of providing immunity for diplomatic corps, have been the confirmation of the existence of Bull's minimalism in the actual network of social interactions among states. This minimalistic and pluralist international society has been founded upon the volitional participation of states. The members of the society in this sense have the freedom to act in making decisions, as well as in their bilateral state relations. The institutions in this regard presents the textbooks of what states can do, rather than what they actually do. There always seems to be room for exceptions within the flow of the history of IR, according to Bull. This freedom of act could also be originated from a miscalculation or irrational motives so that states tend to not only act in harmony with the institutions but also are likely to react and resist them. These exceptions seem to be far away from the general patterns of the international society but give states a manoeuvring space within the borders of the institutions. This theoretical structure, in parallel to the finding of the dissertation, has also some limitations for analysing the bilateral state relations:

The broader picture of Bull's international society lays a great emphasis on the sovereignty rights of the states and the principle of non-intervention. However, in practice, as proved by the Turco-German case, these two principles- sovereignty and non-intervention do not work clearly in the formulation of the bilateral relations. It is clear that states tend to act in line with the instructions of the Bull's institutions within the international society. When their interests are challenged,

they have the capacity for manoeuvring within this institutional framework, too. However, when these two states invest into each other's domestic policy or have the right to have a say in another's bureaucracy, or create an amount of dependency while making decisions, Bull's framework seems to insufficiently explain the nature of the bilateral relations. The dependency of the one side on another in decision-making over specific sectors complicated the functioning of the bilateral relations within the dynamics of the international society. In the Turco-German case, when high-level military officials began to command the Ottoman armies in the World War I, the Ottoman Empire's freedom to act was put under question according to the vital decisions taken within the dynamics of international law. For instance, the bombings of 'Goeben and Breslau' which were sailing by the orders of German Admiral Souchon became the source of Ottoman integration into the World War I, while the significant portion of the Ottoman ruling elite was in favour of maintaining neutrality. This event was a controversial case, to the extent that the Ottoman Empire made the decision to enter into the World War I by herself within the international society. On the other hand, further studies are required for the exceptions as to the connection between the institutions of Bull and the sovereignty of states.

Another limitation to Bull's approach seems to be the economic factor, which could not find adequate room in his systemic institutional approach to IR. The institutional framework of Bull does not neglect the economic relations, and accommodates it within the institution of balance of power. However, concerning the findings of the study, the theoretical assumptions about the economic relations need to be developed within the dynamics of Bull's institutions. There seems to be a huge gap between the existing role of the economy in practice, and the amount of assumptions in Bull's framework. In the Turco-German case, the economic interactions based upon the Baghdad Railway on the one hand, and the trade of the chromium on the other hand, and the continuous trade of military equipment and arms seemed to have played vital roles primarily in the balance of power politics which was seen as the master dynamic of the international law, and also in the institutions of diplomacy, international law, great power management and war.

Bull's theoretical framework poses another difficulty in terms of the theory-practice linkage. Bull, indeed by his work, divides the flow of events in the history into five categorical institutions. A single case, which could have elements from more than one institution, is simplified to be investigated under five distinct categories called institutions. These institutions seem to be interbedded and interdependent in practice. The reality observed is to be composed of series of events and the evolution of processes in complexity. Signing of a treaty, which is assumed to be part of the institution of international law cannot easily distinguished from the negotiations or representation at the same time, which reflects the insufficient functioning of the institution of diplomacy. Moreover, any alliance provided is certainly a contributor to the balance of power, and could be a consequence of the institution of great power management in the meantime. From Bull's point of view, these processes and institutions, of course, are all parts of a whole – the reality of IR. However, the historical interpretation of events through Bull's institutional framework reflects a complexity in theory-practice linkage in this sense.

In sum, this dissertation was an attempt to adapt the conception of international society to the bilateral state relations through the case study of Turco-German relations. The substantial finding of the dissertation is the fact that the bilateral relations in general, Turco-German relations in particular tend to act within the framework provided by the institutions of the international society. As discussed throughout the study, the five institutions seem to be capable of providing the essential ground for the trajectory of bilateral state relations. This assumption contributes not only the theoretic debates of the E.S. through focussing on state interactions with systemic institutions, but also to the literature on bilateral state relations by providing a new template for further analysis. It is likely that the 'institutional debate' of the E.S. will intensify and the bilateral state relations will be complicated. The prominent limitation to be overcome seems to be the minimalist and pluralist conception of the international society, which is a challenging argument for today's complexity of IR. The sovereignty and the independence of states have been blurred, unlike the periods before 1945 as discussed in the study. The further research on the nature of the current international

society, which has been 'more evolved, and more designed than previous ones', would probably be a key factor to elaborate more on the state interactions. In this sense, the merge of the conception of international society with the bilateral state relations, as a theory-practice combination, seems to be a promising framework for further analysis.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Çalışmaya temel teşkil eden İngiliz Okulu kuramı, uluslararası ilişkileri çoğulcu bir yaklaşımla ele alırken “uluslararası toplum” kavramında yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu kavramın tanımlanması, kuramın ana önermeleri ile örtüşmüştür. Bunun sonucu olarak İngiliz Okulu teorisine literatürde “uluslararası toplum yaklaşımı” ismi de verilmiştir. Bu tezin ana amacı İngiliz Okulu kuramı kapsamındaki “uluslararası toplum” kavramının ikili devlet ilişkilerini incelemeye nasıl kullanılabileceğini bir örnek olay ile tartışmaktır. Bu kapsamda, çalışma uluslararası toplum kavramını ve içeriğini ikili ilişkilere uyarlayarak, hem kuram içerisindeki analiz seviyesini değiştirmeyi, hem de ikili devlet ilişkilerini anlama ve açıklamada alternatif bir bakış açısı sunmayı hedeflemiştir.

Uluslararası toplumun özünde devletlerin de insanlar gibi bir toplum içinde var olması bulunmaktadır. Devletlerin de, uluslararası ilişkilerin bütünü içinde etkileşimde bulunurken, bu toplumdan etkilendikleri aynı zamanda da toplumu şekillendirdikleri varsayılmaktadır.⁷⁶⁹ Uluslararası toplum tanımlaması, başat aktör olan devletlerin birbirlerine karşı sürekli bir çatışma ve rekabet ortamı içinde bulunmadıklarını, üst bir otorite olmamasına rağmen devletlerin evrimleşen bir düzen içinde var olduklarını iddia etmektedir.⁷⁷⁰ Bu düzenin ise, egemenliğine sahip (*sovereign*) devletlerin gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak, ortak değer ve çıkarlar ile güdülenmiş ve uluslararası ilişkiler tarihi içerisinde evrilen “kurum”

⁷⁶⁹ Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School*, 12-13.

⁷⁷⁰ Bull, “Order vs. Justice,” 269-72.

adı verilen yapılar aracılığı ile sürdürüldüğü savunulmaktadır. Diplomasi, egemenlik hakkı, kuvvetler dengesi gibi literatürde bahsi geçen bu kurumların uluslararası ilişkileri anlamada ve açıklamada önemli katkılar sunabileceği İngiliz okulu kuramının bir argümanıdır ve giderek bu görüş perçinlenmektedir.

Kuramın omurgası olarak nitelendirilebilecek olan “uluslararası toplum” kavramının tanımı Bull tarafından netleştirilmiştir. Bull’a göre uluslararası toplum, bir grup devletin, bilinçli ve gönüllü bir şekilde belirli ortak çıkar ve ortak değerler etrafında bir araya gelerek kendilerini bir dizi ortak kural ile bağlamaları ve bu yapının idamesini sağlayacak ortak kurumların işletilmesi yönünde irade göstermeleri ile mümkündür.⁷⁷¹ Bugüne kadar bu kavramsallaştırma, devletler topluluğunun bütününe ve onların toplum bazındaki etkileşimleri üzerine odaklanmıştır. Son yıllardaki çalışmalar, bölgesel etkileşimler⁷⁷² üzerine geliştirilmiştir. Analiz düzeyindeki bu indirgeme her ne kadar gelişme gösterse de, mevcut İngiliz okulu literatürü devletler arasındaki etkileşimlere yeterince değinmemektedir. Bu çalışma, bu açığın kapatılmasına katkı sunmayı hedeflemiştir. Bu kapsamda, uluslararası toplumun öncelikle ve yoğun bir biçimde devletlerin birbirleriyle etkileşimleri neticesinde meydana geldiği görüşüyle, uluslararası toplum kavramını ve kurumlarını ikili ilişkilere uyarlayarak Türk-Alman örnek olay nezdinde incelemiştir. Çalışma, bu kapsamda uluslararası toplum dinamiklerini işlettiği varsayılan Bull’un beş kurumundan faydalanmıştır: kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimi.

Bu bağlamda, çalışma şu araştırma sorusunu cevaplamayı hedeflemiştir: “Türkiye ve Almanya, ikili devlet ilişkilerini yönetirken Bull’un sistem düzeyinde işlediğini öne sürdüğü uluslararası toplumun kurumlarını ne şekilde hesaba katmışlardır?” Bu temel araştırma sorusunu destekleyen diğer sorular ise şunlardır: “Bull’un bahsi

⁷⁷¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

⁷⁷² Örnek çalışma için, bkznz. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

geçen kurumları, Türkiye ve / veya Almanya'nın çıkarları ile ters düşerse, Türk-Alman ilişkileri nasıl bir tepki gösterme eğilimindedir?"

Bu soruları cevaplayabilmek için 18. yüzyıldan başlayarak 1945 sonuna kadar olan dönemden Türk-Alman ilişkilerine ait üç tarihi kesit tahlil edilmiştir. 18. yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu – Prusya Krallığı ilişkileri (özellikle 18. yüzyılın ikinci yarısı), 1871-1918 Alman İmparatorluğu – Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1923-1945 Weimar Cumhuriyeti ve takip eden 3. Reich (1933-1945 Hitler Dönemi Almanya'sı) ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti ilişkileri incelenmiştir. İlgili tez bir kronoloji, bir dış politika analizi ya da siyasi tarih çalışması olmadığı için, bu dönemlerde meydana gelen olaylardan, çalışmaya temel teşkil eden vakalar esere dâhil edilmiştir. Çalışmanın bu örneklem ile varmak istediği nokta, kuramsal çerçeve içindeki kurumlar ile Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin bağlantısını ortaya çıkarmaktır.

Tezin merkezinde bulunan uluslararası toplum kavramı ve bu toplumu işlettiği varsayılan kurumları, Bull'a göre uygulamada uluslararası ilişkilerin ana yapısını oluşturmaktadır. Bu toplumun doğası her zaman barış ve adalet getiren değil, savaş ve adaletsizliğe de neden olabilen kusurlu bir karakterdedir. Yine de evrensel bir tiranlığın oluşmasını engelleyen, önceden hesaplanabilir bir düzen içinde işlediğini söylemek mümkündür.⁷⁷³ Uluslararası toplum, devletlerin gönüllü katılım esasına dayanan, eylemlerini sürdürme konusunda kendilerini bir dizi belirli kural ile sınırladıkları bir yapıyı işaret eder. Bull'a göre, hem çatışma hem de işbirliğini barındıran uluslararası ilişkilerin anarşik doğası içerisinde bu sistematığın en önde gelen özelliği, bir "düzen" içinde var olmasıdır.⁷⁷⁴ Bu düzen, sadece güç ve zor kullanmaya değil, çıkar koordinasyonlarına ve kalıplaşmış hareket tarzlarına dayanır. Bu dayanağın ise "kurum" adı verilen evrilmiş bir dizi tutum ve uygulama olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bull, ilgili tartışmayı beş kurumdan faydalanarak

⁷⁷³ Hedley Bull, "Disarmament and the International System," 47.

⁷⁷⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 47, 60.

ortaya attığı sistematığı çerçevesinde alevlendirmiştir: kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimi. Uluslararası ilişkiler teori tartışmalarında, Bull'un uluslararası toplum kavramı ve kurumları bir mihenk taşı olmuştur. Bahsi geçen kavramsallaştırmalar, bu çalışmanın da yapı taşlarını teşkil etmiştir.

Devletlerarası ikili ilişkileri, uluslararası toplum kavramı çerçevesinde incelemek için, aynı uluslararası topluma ait iki ülkeyi seçme gerekliliği bu çalışmada Türkiye ve Almanya ile karşılanmıştır. Söz konusu bu iki devlet, tarih boyunca sürekli ve düzenli bir ilişki içerisinde bulunmuştur. Bull'un perspektifinden bakıldığında da, bu iki devletin diplomatik ilişki bağlarını kurup sürdürdüğünü, ortak düşmanlara karşı savaşa girdiklerini, büyük güçler yönetiminde bizatihi yer alarak rol oynadıklarını, kuvvetler dengesi ilkesini işlettiklerini ve uluslararası hukuk çerçevesi içerisinde eylemlerde bulunduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bu ilişki ağını, uluslararası toplumun gelişimine paralel olarak 18. yüzyıl ile birlikte ilerlettikleri de diğer bir husustur. Bu iki devletin araştırma için seçilmesinin temel nedeni Türk-Alman ilişkileri hakkında uluslararası ilişkiler yazınındaki boşluğu doldurma isteğidir. Bu çerçevede, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin tarih disiplinindeki mevcut birikimini, uluslararası ilişkilerin kuramsal tartışmalarına taşıyarak literatüre katkı sunmak hedeflenmiştir.

Tezde incelenen örnek olay için açıklığı kavuşturulması gereken diğer bir nokta ise Türk-Alman ikili ilişkilerinin incelenmesi için seçilen dönemlerdir. 18. Yüzyıldan başlayarak İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonuna kadar olan süreç inceleme için seçilmiştir. Bu uzun dönem içinde de, Bull'un tanımladığı kurumların Türk-Alman ilişkileri açısından yoğun olarak gözlemlenebildiği üç zaman aralığı çalışmanın üç bölümünü teşkil etmiştir. Bu çalışmanın neden 18. yüzyıldan başlatıldığının ana nedeni uluslararası toplumun Türk ve Alman ilişkilerine çerçeve olarak ortaya çıkmasının bu yüzyılda gerçekleşmesidir. Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin tarihi 12. yüzyıldaki Haçlı Seferlerine kadar dayandırılrsa da, bu erken dönemler, Bull'un penceresinden bakıldığında uluslararası toplumun bizatihi kendisinin var olmadığı dönemlerdir. Modern devletler sisteminin 1648 Westfalya düzeni ile ortaya yavaş

yavaş çıkması, ülke sınırları ile üzerinde yaşayan insanların bağlantısının güçlenmesi, devlet egemenliğinin 18. ve 19. yüzyıllarda kuvvetlenmesi ile uluslararası toplum gelişme göstermiştir. Bu gelişmeye paralel olarak Türk-Alman ilişkileri de evrilerek çalışmaya konu olan 18. yüzyılda diplomatik ilişkilerine başlamışlardır. Bu yüzyılın hemen başında kurulan Prusya Krallığı (1701) ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ikili ilişkilerine hemen başlamış, karşılıklı daimi elçiliklerini yine bu yüzyıl içerisinde kurarak diplomatik ilişkilerini sağlamlaştırmışlardır. Dolayısıyla çalışma, bu yüzyılı başlangıç olarak alarak uluslararası toplumun Türk-Alman ilişkileri açısından işleyişini bahsi geçen kurumlar bazında gözlemlemiştir.

Çalışma üç döneme yayılmış, üç farklı düzlemde Türk-Alman ilişkilerini araştırmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, ikinci yarısına odaklanılan, 18. yüzyıldır. Bu dönemde uluslararası toplum nezdinde başlayan ilk Türk-Alman ilişkileri konu edilmiştir. Bu zaman aralığında, 1761’de imzalanan Osmanlı-Prusya Dostluk ve Ticaret Antlaşması ile 1790 yılında imzalanan Osmanlı-Prusya İttifak Antlaşmasına ilave olarak İstanbul ve Berlin’de daimi elçiliklerin işler hale gelmesi, çalışmanın hedefleri bakımından dönemin araştırma için uygunluğunu kanıtlar niteliktedir. Bu dönemi müteakip seçilen 1871-1918 dönemi ise, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun uluslararası toplum içerisinde daha net bir şekilde Alman İmparatorluğu ile işlevde olduğu bir dönemdir. 1878’deki Berlin Kongresi ile beraber artan şekilde diplomasi, kuvvetler dengesi, uluslararası hukuk ve büyük güçler yönetimi kurumları bu ikili ilişkilerde gözlemlenmiştir. Bu dönemin sonunda işlenen Birinci Dünya Savaşı ise Türk-Alman ilişkilerini savaş kurumu nezdinde incelendiği kısım olmuştur. Çalışmadaki üçüncü dönem ise Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesi ile başlayan dönemdir. Versay Antlaşması ve Mondros Mütarekesi gereği Türkiye ile Almanya, 1918’de diplomatik ilişkilerini askıya almış, diplomatik ilişkilerine kaldığı yerden ancak Lozan Antlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonra 1923 yılında devam edebilmiştir. Dolayısıyla çalışmanın üçüncü araştırma düzlemi 1923-1945 arası döneme adanmıştır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti ile Weimar Cumhuriyeti arasında başlayan ilişkiler Türkiye’deki ve Almanya’daki kalkınma hareketlerinin yansımasıyla diplomasi ve uluslararası hukuk alanında cereyan etmiştir. Özellikle

Türkiye’deki yeni devlet oluşumu Almanya ile işbirliğini artırmıştır. 3. Reich dönemi olarak da bilenen Hitler döneminde (1933-1945) uluslararası toplumun kurumları açısından daha yoğun bir ilişki denklemine girilmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşına uzanan yolda ve savaş esnasında sadece savaş kurumu değil, Bull’un diğer tüm kurumları aktif bir şekilde Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde rol oynamıştır.

Çalışmanın kapsamının 1945 yılında İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra kesilmesinin temelinde hem Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin hem de kurumları ile beraber uluslararası toplumun, çalışmanın amacı açısından karmaşık bir hale dönüşmesi bulunmaktadır. Çalışma Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin tetkikinde bahsi geçen kurumların açık bir şekilde gözlemlenebileceği olaylar silsilesine ihtiyaç duyarken, Soğuk Savaş dinamikleri pratikleri karmaşıktır. 1945 dönemi sonrasında Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin yoğunlaşarak devam ettiği açık bir unsur olmasına rağmen, bu durumun tahlil edilebilmesi güçleşmiştir. Öncelikle, İkinci Dünya Savaşının sonlanması ile oluşan yeni süzen, savaş kurumunun işletilememesi üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Buna ek olarak, hem Almanya hem de Türkiye büyük güç (süper güç) tanımlamasından çıkarak büyük güçler yönetimi kurumunda rol oynama gücünü yitirmişlerdir. Almanya’nın bu süreçte ikiye bölünerek tek ve birleşmiş bir devlet statüsünü kaybetmesi ve iki parçalı halinin kuvvetler dengesi kurumu içerisinde birbirlerine zıt olarak konumlanması ise durumu daha da karmaşıktır. 1960 sonrasında Türkiye’den Almanya’ya başlayan işçi göçü Bull’un sistematığının ötesinde, analiz edilmesi gereken bir durumu ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin aynı dönemde başlayan Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olma süreci Türk-Alman ilişkilerini ikili ilişkiler düzeyinde incelemenin zorlaştığı bir döneme sokmuştur.

Çalışmanın tek metodu olarak gözüken tarihi okuma (Tarihsel yorumlama) yöntemine uygun olarak, bu üç dönemde, hem uluslararası toplumun kurumlarının gelişimi hem de Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin gelişimi betimlenmiştir. Çalışmada odaklanılan kuramsal ve pratik bulguların, gelişme evreleri vurgulanarak çalışmaya katılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, örnek olayın anlatıldığı her üç bölümde, ilgili zaman aralığındaki Türk-Alman ilişkileri incelenmeden önce, o dönemde Bull’un tanımladığı uluslararası toplum ve beş kurumunun nasıl işlediği tartışılmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma Türkiye ve Almanya'nın, uluslararası toplumun iki üyesi olarak 18. yüzyıldan 1945'e kadar birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini yürütürken Bull'un beş kurumu olan kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimini dikkate aldığını savunmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin gidişatı ile bu kurumlar arasında bir uyum olabileceği yönünde bulgular mevcuttur. İlgili dönemlerde Türk-Alman ilişkilerindeki çeşitli anlaşmazlıklara rağmen bu uyumun sürdürülme çabasının mevcut olduğu görülmektedir. Münferit ya da müşterek olarak Türkiye ve/veya Almanya ilgili kurumların işleyişini çıkarlarına ters bulduklarında, Türk-Alman ilişkileri bu kurumlara direnme ya da tepki gösterme yolunu seçmişlerdir. Bu tarz durumlarda, bu iki devlet Bull'un kurumlarının çizdiği çerçeveyi ve dayattığı kısıtlamaları aşmayı denemişlerdir. Yine de bu kurumların belirlediği hareket sahasının sınırlarının dışına çıkamadıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Bir kurumun bu ikili ilişkilerde seyreden çıkarlar ile çatıştığı durumlarda; Türkiye ve/veya Almanya, ya bu kurumun kapsamı dahilinde alternatif bir politika geliştirerek ya da diğer bir kurum içerisinde bir telafi politikası üreterek olayı tazmin etme eğiliminde bulunmuşlardır. Bu kapsamda, çalışmanın ana argümanı aşağıdaki gibi şekillenmiştir:

Genel olarak ikili devlet ilişkileri, özelde de Türk-Alman ilişkileri uluslararası toplumun sistem bazında işleyen kurumları tarafından biçimlendirilmiş ve sınırlandırılmış olsa da, devletlerin müşterek ya da münferit çıkarları bu kurumlar ile çeliştiğinde, devletler alternatif politikalar üreterek kurumların belirlediği bu yapıya direnmek ya da bu yapıyı aşmak için eğilim gösterirler. Bu alternatifler, kurumların çizdiği sınırları aşamayıp ya aynı kurum dahilinde ikame politikaları olarak ya da diğer kurumların içerisinde telafi politikaları olarak şekillenme eğilimindedir.

Bu çalışma, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri de dahil olmak üzere altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümü çalışmanın kapsamını ve amaçlarını kapsamakta, çalışmanın temel sorusunu, ana argümanını ve literatüre olan katkılarını açıklamaktadır. Çalışmanın takip eden bölümlerinin içeriği özet olarak aşağıdaki gibidir:

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü tezin alt yapısını destekleyen kuramsal bölümdür. Bu bağlamda, İngiliz Okulu kuramının ikili devlet ilişkilerini inceleme konusundaki mevcut potansiyelini, Hedley Bull’a atıf yaparak tartışılmıştır. Bu bölümde öncelikle İngiliz Okulu’na kısa bir giriş yapılmakta ve kuramın tarihsel gelişimi, temel varsayımları ve kavramları tartışılmaktadır. Takip eden bölümde tezin temelini teşkil eden “uluslararası toplum” betimlenmektedir. Uluslararası toplumun işlemlerini sağladığı varsayılan kurumlardan tezin bu kısmında bahsedilmektedir. Bu kurumların, uluslararası örgütler gibi aktörler tarafından bilinçli bir şekilde dizayn edilmiş unsurlar olmadığı, tarihin evrelerinden süzülerek doğal bir süreç içinde gelişmiş yapılar olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bu noktada kurumlar hakkında ayrıntılı bir tartışmaya yer verilmiş, İngiliz Okulu teorisinden uluslararası ilişkilerin kuramsal tartışmalarına katkı sunan bu kurumlar hakkında literatürde var olan tartışmalar özetlenmiştir. Bu genel açıklamaları takiben, çalışmaya temel teşkil eden Bull’un beş kurumu – kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimi – ayrı ayrı aşağıdaki konu başlıkları göz önüne alınarak incelenmiştir: kurumun tanımı, uluslararası toplum içerisindeki fonksiyonları, kurumun uygulamadaki versiyonları ve ikili devlet ilişkileri ile bağlantıları.

Çalışmanın üçüncü, dördüncü ve beşinci bölümleri Türk-Alman ilişkilerini üç farklı dönemde inceleyen kısımları ihtiva etmektedir. Bu bölümlerin ana amacı “Türkiye ve Almanya’nın ikili ilişkilerini yürütürken uluslararası toplumun Bull tarafından tanımlanmış beş kurumunu nasıl dikkate aldığını” incelemektir. 18. yüzyıl, 1871-1918 dönemi ve 1923-1945 dönemi için bu soruya cevap aramaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu inceleme yapılırken “Alman” ya da “Almanya” ifadesi, Prusya Krallığı, Alman İmparatorluğu, Weimar Cumhuriyeti, the Third Reich (Hitler Dönemi) dönemlerini ifade etmekte; “Türk” veya “Türkiye” ise Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dönemlerini kapsamaktadır.

Örnek olayı içeren bu bölümlerin kendi içerisinde bir şeması mevcuttur. Her bölüm içerikte neler anlatılacağını not eden bir giriş kısmı ile başlayıp, o bölümdeki temel bulguları ve neticeleri özetleyen bir sonuç kısmı ile bitirilmiştir. Giriş kısmını takiben, her bölüm, araştırdığı zaman dilimi içerisinde uluslararası toplumun nasıl

işlediğini anlatan bir betimleme kısmı ile başlamaktadır. Bu kısım kullanılan kavram ve varsayımların İngiliz Okulu'nun yöntemi olan tarihsel yorumlama ile kullanıldığının bir yansımasıdır. Bu şekilde beş kurum dahil olmak üzere uluslararası toplum kavramsallaştırmalarının sabit ve değişmez olmadığını vurgulamakta, bu kavramların ilgili dönemde ne ifade ettiğini ve nasıl işlediğini çalışmaya eklemektedir. Bu kısımdan sonra ilgili dönem için Türk-Alman ilişkilerindeki kurumlarla bağdaştırılan olaylar silsileleri ya da öne çıkan hususlar işlenmiştir.

Altıncı bölüm ise tezin sonuç bölümüdür. Bu kısımda tezin ana argümanı, temel bulguları özetlenmiştir. Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin 1701'den 1945'e kadar seyrini üç farklı dönemde inceleyen bu tez, Türkiye ve Almanya'nın ikili ilişkilerini yürütürken, var olan anlaşmazlıklara rağmen, Bull'un bahsettiği kurumları dikkate alarak hareket ettiğini savunmaktadır. Bu hususa ek olarak, bir kurumun gidişatında ya da yapısında beliren bir değişiklik karşısında, Türk-Alman ilişkileri kendisini bu duruma adapte etme eğiliminde olmuştur.

Diğer taraftan, ilgili kurumlar bu devletlerin herhangi birine ya da müşterek olarak bu iki tarafın çıkarına ters bir gidişat ortaya koyarsa, Türkiye ve/veya Almanya'nın bu gidişata karşı koyma kapasitesi de mevcuttur. Bu muhalefet ilk etapta, ilgili kurumun empoze ettiği hareket tarzına karşı ayak direme, eyleme geçmeden sürüncemede bırakma, erteleme gibi siyaset tarzları olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır. Bazı antlaşmaların şifahi olarak söz verilmesine rağmen imzalanmaması, ya da sürüncemede bırakılması, veyahut imzalanmasına rağmen geç onaylanması bu duruma örnektir. Diğer bir opsiyon ise aynı kurumun sınırları dahilinde benzer başka bir politika üreterek ortak bir çıkarda buluşma arayışları olmuştur. Örnek olarak Montrö Boğazlar sözleşmesinden hoşnut olmayan Almanya'ya karşı yine uluslararası hukuk kurumu dahilinde Alman çıkarlarını gözetken benzer hükümlü bir ikili sözleşmenin, Türkiye tarafından teklif edilmesi, bu hususa örnek olarak verilebilir.

Kurumların işleyişinin iki devletin çıkarlarına tam olarak uymadığı durumlarda karşımıza çıkan son seçenek ise, ikili devlet ilişkilerinin karşılaştığı bu zorluk

karşısında başka bir kurum vasıtası ile telafi politikaları geliştirmesidir. 1718 Karlofça Antlaşması sonrasında beliren, 1756-1763 Yedi Yıl Savaşlarında oldukça yoğunlaşan, daha sonraları da ya Prusya Krallığı ya da Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından zaman zaman gündeme getirilen Osmanlı-Prusya ittifakı ancak 1790 yılında imzalanabilmiştir. Bu süreçte, kuvvetler dengesi ve uluslararası hukuk kurumlarının işaret ettiği bu ittifak, devletlerin değişen çıkarlarına tam olarak uymamış, iki taraf da bu sorunsal diplomasi kurumundaki temsiliyetleri artırarak telafi etme eğilimine girmiştir. 1761 yılını takiben Prusya Krallığı'nın İstanbul'da daimi temsilciliğe geçmesi, 1763 yılında geleneğin dışında olarak hem müzakere etmek hem de bilgi edinme ve niyet öğrenme amacı ile Osmanlı elçisi Ahmed Resmi Efendi'nin Berlin'e yollanması bu seçeneğin bir tezahürüdür.

Çalışmanın ana argümanı göz önünde tutulduğunda Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin analizinin kurumlar ile bağlantılı bulguları aşağıdaki şekildedir:

Diplomasi kurumu, uluslararası toplumun geçirdiği evreler gibi, Türk Alman ilişkilerinde de gelişim göstermiştir. Genel olarak modern devletler sistemi içerisinde diplomatik uygulamaların geliştiği bir safhada Osmanlı İmparatorluğu kendi gelenekleri doğrultusunda ancak alışılmışın dışında (*unconventional*) bir diplomasi yürütme eğiliminde olmuştur. Her ne kadar 1699 Karlofça Antlaşmasını takiben güçsüzleşmeye başlayan Osmanlı Devleti 18. yüzyılda genel kabul görmüş diplomatik teamülleri kabul etmeye başlasa da, Avrupa uluslararası toplumun diplomasisine resmi olarak 19. yüzyılda entegre olmuştur. 1790'larda başlayarak önce Londra'da, daha sonra Paris, Viyana ve Berlin'de daimi büyükelçiliklerini açan Osmanlı Devleti'nin diplomatik seyri bunu kanıtlar niteliktedir. Genel hatları ile Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde diplomasi kurumunun gelişimi geç takip edilmiştir. Örneğin, Avrupa devletlerinin Westfalya antlaşmaları ile başlayıp (1648) Utrecht düzenlemesi ile (1713) devam ettirdiği, uluslararası konferanslar nezdinde işletilen diplomasi ile uluslararası toplumun geleceğini şekillendirme uygulamasına, Türk-Alman ilişkileri ancak 1878'deki Berlin Kongresi ile iştirak etmiştir.

Diplomasi, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde 18. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren dikkate aldığı bir kurum olmuştur. İlk diplomatik münasebetler, görev bazlı ve geçici (*Ad*

Hoc) ziyaretler, kısa süreli heyet ve elçiler, mektup ve nota teatileri ile şeklinde başlamıştır. 1761 Osmanlı-Prusya Antlaşmasının imzalanması sürecinde Prusya daimi elçisi olarak İstanbul'da ikamet etmeye başlayan Rekzen ile başlayan usul Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından geç karşılık bulmuş ve Ali Aziz Efendi 1797 yılında Berlin'e daimi elçi olarak atanmıştır. 1763 yılında Berlin'e 73 kişilik bir heyet ile yollanan Ahmed Resmi Efendi ise Türk-Alman diplomatik ilişkilerinin önemli bir safhasını yansıtmıştır. Bir sonraki yüzyılda, Kayzer II. Wilhelm'in İstanbul'u ilk iki ziyaretindeki işletilen diplomatik kaideler ve protocol, diplomasi kurumunun işleyişini açıklamıştır. Türkiye ve Almanya'nın, istisnai durumlar haricinde, diplomasi kurumunu kesintisiz bir şekilde işlettiği söylenebilir. Neredeyse 250 yılı kapsayan bu uzun ilişki sürecinde iki istisnai dönem olmuştur. Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında imzalanan antlaşmalar gereği ilişkilerin 1918'de kesilmesi, 1923 yılında Lozan Antlaşmasının imzalanmasına kadar sürmüştür. Akabinde, yenilen Almanya ile diplomatik ilişkilerini 2 Ağustos 1944 tarihinde kestiğini açıklamış, savaşın fiili olarak sona ermesinden sonra da, 1945 yılında Almanya'ya karşı savaş açtığını duyurmuştur.⁷⁷⁵

Diplomasinin, uzman diplomatlar tarafından ilişkilerin barışçıl yollarla sürdürülmesi şeklindeki tanımı Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde süreklilik arz eden bir şekilde vuku bulmuş, bu iki devlet barışçı ilişkileri bırakarak birbirlerine karşı fiiliyatta savaşa girişmemiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı gibi zor bir dönemde bile aksi yöndeki tüm şartlara rağmen Türkiye ve Almanya birbirlerine karşı son ana kadar savaş ilan etmemiş, ilgili diplomasi kurumunu dikkate alarak barışçı bir şekilde ilişkilerini sürdürmenin yolunu aramışlardır. Bu bağlamda, bu ikili ilişki ağı “iletişim kurma, müzakere etme, bilgi toplama, anlaşmazlıkları ve sürtüşmeleri minimize etme ve uluslararası toplumun varlığını fiilen kanıtlama” şeklindeki diplomasi kurumunun fonksiyonlarını da yerine getirmiştir. Avrupa uluslararası toplumunun işleyen bir kurumu olan diplomasinin yansımaları olarak karşımıza çıkan “daimi elçiliklerin işlemesi, protokol kurallarının uygulanması, karşılıklılık

⁷⁷⁵ Tuncer, *İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, 152-55.

esasının tatbiki, elçilere çeşitli haklar ve dokunulmazlık verilmesi, çok taraflı konferansların gerçekleşmesi ve arabuluculuk faaliyetlerinin yürütülmesi”⁷⁷⁶ Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde gözlenen unsurlar olmuştur.

Diğer yandan, Türkiye ve/veya Almanya’nın çıkarlarına diplomasi kurumunun işleyişi ters düşerse bu devletler münferit ya da müşterek olarak bu kurumun işleyişine karşı bir direnç gösterme kapasitesine sahiptirler. Türkiye ve Almanya, 1918-1923 ve kısa bir süreliğine 1945 sonrasında Türk-Alman diplomatik ilişkilerini askıya almıştır. Bu dönemler haricinde ilişkiler süreklilik arz etse de, çeşitli olaylarda ayak diremelere sahne olmuştur. Çalışmada “boş sandalye krizleri” olarak tanımlanan, büyükelçi makamlarının çeşitli dönemlerde fiilen boş kalması, atamaların geç yapılması ya da fiiliyatta büyükelçilerin ofis görevlerini yürütmemeleri bu duruma örnek gösterilebilir. Bu devletler, diplomatik temsili hiçbir zaman kesmemekle birlikte, ikili ilişkilerde sorunların olduğu dönemlerde büyükelçilerin görev başında bulunmalarını aksatmış, aktif görev üstlenmelerini engellemiştir.

Bu yoğun ve sürekli diplomatik ilişkiler, uluslararası hukuk temelinde inşa edilen taahhütlerin üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu kapsamda 18. yüzyılın başlarından 1945 sonuna kadar olan dönemde Türk-Alman ilişkileri, uluslararası hukuk kurumunun işleyişini göz önüne alarak işleyişini sürdürmüştür. İlk dönemden beri devletler arasında süregelen ittifak antlaşması yapma eğilimi uluslararası hukuk temelinde işbirliğini artırmıştır. Türk-Alman ikili antlaşmaları 1761 yılında imzalanan Osmanlı-Prusya Dostluk ve Ticaret Antlaşması ve 1790 yılında imzalanan Osmanlı-Prusya İttifak Antlaşması ile başlamıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun, geleneksel olarak Müslüman olmayan devletler ile imzaladığı, ahidname denilen kapitülasyonlar, karşılıklı taahhütleri içeren modern uluslararası hukuk metinleri değildir. 1790 yılında imzalanan Osmanlı-Prusya antlaşması; bu denklemin dışına çıkan, kapitülasyon olarak imzalanmayan ilk metin olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

⁷⁷⁶ Nuri Yurdusev, "The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International Society," in *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 75-76.

Bu yüzyıldan sonra Türk-Alman ilişkilerindeki uluslararası hukuk alanındaki metinler ticaret ve güvenlik konularının ötesine geçmiştir. Bu metinlerin özünde uluslararası toplumu ayakta tutan birlikte var olma kuralını sağlayacak asgari ilkeler gözetilmiştir. Bu prensipler güç kullanımının sınırlandırılması ya da yasaklanması, ahde vefa ilkesinin korunması ve devletlerin egemenlik ve bağımsızlıklarına saygı olarak şekillenmiştir.

Uluslararası hukuk kurumu dikkate alınırken, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde belirgin şekilde gözetilen uluslararası hukuk prensibi ahde vefa ilkesi (*pacta sunt servanda*) olmuştur. Bu iki devlet antlaşmalar imzalanmadan önce uzun müzakereler ile detayları tartışmış, imzalandıktan sonra da taahhütlere uymak için dikkat göstermişlerdir. Yine de uluslararası hukuk metinleri içerisinde kendilerine manevra alanları sağlamışlardır. Bu devletler, Bull'un ifade ettiği üzere uluslararası toplumdaki ilişkilerin sadece uluslararası hukuk tarafından düzenlenemeyeceğinin bilincinde olarak ve kuvvetler dengesi kurumunun baskın niteliğini hesaba katarak hareket etmişlerdir. Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda izlediği "İngilizler ile müttefik, Almanlarla dost" olma politikası, tüm uluslararası hukuk taahhütlerine rağmen ancak bu şekilde mümkün olabilmıştır.

Türk-Alman ilişkilerinde uluslararası hukuk kurumunun etkinliğini gösteren diğer bir olay ise Montrö Boğazlar sözleşmesi olmuştur. Almanlar tarafından dostane bulunmayan sözleşmenin imzalanması neticesinde, Türk-Alman ilişkileri yine uluslararası hukuk kurumu dahilinde benzer bir Türk-Alman sözleşmesi imzalanması seçeneğini türetmiş, bu opsiyonun gerçekleşmemesi üzerine de şifahi garantiler verilerek diplomasi kurumu içerisinde bir telafi politikası gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu örnek, uluslararası hukuk kurumunun Türk-Alman ortak çıkarlarına ters düştüğünde ortaya çıkan neticeleri göstermesi bakımından kıymetlidir.

Türk-Alman ilişkileri, büyük güçler yönetiminin baskın olarak belirlediği kuvvetler dengesi kurumunun işleyişini dikkate alan bir seyir izlemiştir. Bu bağlamda bu iki kurum, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin kurgulanmasında ve işletilmesinde önemli iki faktör olmuştur. 1. Dünya Savaşı sonuna kadar Prusya Krallığı ve takip eden Alman

İmparatorluğu bir yanda, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu diğer bir yanda uluslararası toplumda var olan iki büyük güç (süper güç) olarak varlıklarını sürdürmüşlerdir. Büyük güçlere atfedilen sorumlulukları yerine getirmediği söylene de; Almanya, bu büyük güçler kulübüne 3. Reich döneminde (Hitler Dönemi) geri dönmüştür. Türkiye ve Almanya'nın uluslararası toplumda var olan genel kuvvetler dengesini yönlendirme durumları, bölgesel anlamda etki sahaları oluşturmaları, krizleri önleme ve sınırlandırmadaki yetileri, ve savaşları sınırlandırma ve bertaraf etme konusundaki kapasiteleri incelenmiştir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında büyük güçler yönetimi Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin gidişatında önemli bir faktör olmuştur.

Bu kapsamda, 18. yüzyılda, küresel rekabet yürüten büyük güçler olan Fransa ve İngiltere, bölgelerinde etkin olan Osmanlı ve Avusturya İmparatorlukları, dönemin yeni büyük güç olmuş devletleri Rusya ve Prusya'nın etkileşimleri ikili ilişkilerde gözetilen unsurlar olmuştur. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na gidilirken ittifak ve itilaf devletlerinin önder ülkeleri, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na uzanan 1930'larda ise Sovyet Rusya, İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya'nın politikaları, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin seyrinde dikkate alınan büyük güçler yönetiminin bir yansıması olmuştur. Diğer taraftan, bu büyük güçler yönetimi denklemi içerisinde Türk ve / veya Alman çıkarlarını zedeleyecek politikalar ortaya çıktığında, tezin temel argümanında belirtildiği üzere, kurumlar içerisinde alternatif siyasetlere başvurulduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Türkiye'nin savaş endüstrisinin hammadde olan kromu savaşan iki tarafa da, büyük güçler yönetiminin kurguladığı kuvvetler dengesinin gidişatına göre sırasıyla satması bu alternatif politikaya örnek olarak gösterilebilir.

Kuvvetler dengesi kurumunun tanımı, uluslararası toplum içinde baskın bir şekilde tahakküm kuracak tek bir güçlü aktörün var olmaması şeklinde yapılabilir. Bu kapsamda Türk-Alman ilişkileri de bu kuvvetler dengesinin gereğini işletmek üzere işlemiştir. 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya arasındaki işbirliği, 1878 sonrası Avrupa'daki denge siyaseti içerisindeki Türk-Alman ilişkileri bu varsayıma örnektir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde başlayıp, savaşın önemli bir dinamiği haline gelen Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi ise başlı başına bu kuvvetler dengesi kurumu düşünülerek inşa edilmiştir. 1930'larda mevcut kuvvetler dengesinin

çökmesine neden olan ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı tetikleyen süreçte de, Türk-Alman ilişkileri bu kurumu gözetmiştir.

Diğer bir husus ise uluslararası toplum içerisinde var olan kuvvetler dengesinde meydana gelen değişikliklere Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin adapte olma eğilimidir. Yedi Yıl Savaşlarının sonuna doğru Rusya'da aniden III. Petro'nun tahta çıkması ve Alman tarihinde “mucize” olarak değerlendirilen bir değişiklik ile Prusya'ya karşı savaşan birliklerini geri çekip Prusya-Rusya işbirliğini başlatması, mevcut kuvvetler dengesini de değiştirmiştir. Daha önce ortak düşmanlar olan Avusturya ve Rusya'ya karşı işbirliği yürüten Türk-Alman ilişkileri de bu olaydan etkilenmiştir. Bu olayda önem arz eden nokta ise, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin bu kırılma noktasında yeni kurguya uyum sağlamaya çalışması ve Osmanlı-Prusya-Rusya ittifakını gerçekleştirebilmek için ciddi bir sürece girmiş olmasıdır. Kuvvetler dengesi kurumu göze alındığında, tezde aynı yüzyılda vurgulanan diğer bir örnek ise çıkarlara ters düştüğünde bu kurumlara direnç gösterebilme yetileridir. 1718'de resmi olarak başlayan Osmanlı-Prusya ittifak arayışları ortak çıkarlarda buluşulamamasından ötürü ancak 1790 yılında imzalanabilmiştir. Bu örnek de, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin çıkarlarına ters düştüğünde kurumlara karşı gösterebileceği direnç görülebilir. Bu süreç zarfında, uluslararası toplum içerisinde kuvvetler dengesi ve büyük güçler yönetiminde ittifak etmesi beklenen Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Prusya Krallığı'nın, çıkarlarındaki uyumsuzluk nedeni ile geciktirilen antlaşmayı, başka kurumlarda ilerleme kaydederek telafi etmeye gayret ettiği gözlemlenmiştir. Örneğin 1761'de istenen ittifak antlaşmasının yerine bir ahidname olarak imzalanan 1761 Ticaret ve Dostluk antlaşması, bu süreçte seviyesi yükseltile ve nitelik olarak geliştirilen Türk-Alman diplomatik ilişkileri birer örnek olarak tezde işlenmiştir. Osmanlı-Prusya işbirliğini bazı durumlarda büyük güçler yönetimi içerisinde konumlandırma çabaları da gözlemlenmiştir. Örneğin, ikili ittifak antlaşması yönünde tarafların çekinceli olduğu dönemlerde, İngiltere'nin de ittifaka katılması durumunda ittifak antlaşmasının imzalanabileceği yönündeki Osmanlı talepleri dikkate değerdir. Bull'un perspektifinden yapılacak bir okumada, ikili ilişkilerin kuvvetler dengesini dikkate alarak işbirliği yapamadığı durumlarda, büyük güçler yönetimi içerisinde

kurgulanan alternatif bir politika geliştirildiği gözlemlenmiştir. 18. yüzyılda gerçekleşen bu örneklerle paralel olarak, kurumlar arasında türetilen alternatif politikalarla Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin kuvvetler dengesi ile bağdaştırılma çabası, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi ile İkinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde ise Türk-İngiliz-Fransız Paktı'nı takiben imzalanan Türk-Alman Antlaşması ile de görülmüştür.

Türk-Alman ilişkileri, tarihin akışı içerisinde savaş kurumunu da göz önünde bulundurmuş ve bu ilişkilerin seviyesini ve niteliğini savaşlara göre ayarlamıştır. Savaş kurumunun, teori kısmında tartışıldığı üzere, hem uluslararası toplumun işleyişine zarar verdiği, hem de uluslararası topluma yeni uluslararası hukuk düzenlemeleri ile yeni bir kuvvetler dengesi kurgusu getirebileceği varsayılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, savaşı bu gözle değerlendirmiş ve uluslararası toplumun doğasında bulunup onu işleten bir kurum olarak nitelemiştir. Savaşların sadece vuku bulma süreçleri değil, savaşlara hazırlık yapma ve savaşlara karşı hazırlıklı olma amacıyla yapılan askeri ittifaklar da ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir yer tutmuştur. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin savaş kurumu düşünülerek 1945'e kadar sürekli olarak yoğun bir ilişki içinde olduğu söylenebilir. Türkiye'ye gönderilen Alman askeri uzmanlar, bu ilişki ağının önemli bir parçasını oluşturmuştur. Diğer yandan, savaşlar esnasındaki tarafların aldığı başarı veya başarısızlıklar ikili ilişkileri yönlendirmiş, ilişkilerin yakınlaşması ya da daha mesafeli olması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Çalışmada vurgulanan diğer bir husus ise 1700'lerde başlayan Türkiye ile Almanya arasındaki ilişkilerin karşılıklı olarak hiçbir zaman savaşa dönüşmemiş olmasıdır. İki ülke, tarihinde birbirlerine karşı hiç savaşmamışlardır. 1945'te Türkiye'nin Almanya'ya karşı deklare ettiği savaş fiiliyatta savaşın sona ermesinden sonra alınmış sembolik bir karardır.

Tezdeki zaman aralıkları değerlendirildiğinde, savaş pratiğinin 18. ve 19. yüzyılda ikili ilişkileri kurgularken dikkate alınan önde gelen bir kurum olduğu söylenebilir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk-Alman ittifakı, iki devletin savaş kurumunu birlikte işlettikleri en önemli örneği teşkil etmektedir. 20. yüzyıldaki ilişkilere damgasını vuran bu savaştaki beraberlik, savaş esnasında çıkan çıkar çatışmalarına rağmen

devam ettirilmiştir. Bu anlaşmazlıkların en belirgin örneklerinden biri Yavuz (*Goeben*) ve Midilli (*Breslau*) isimli Alman gemilerinin Rus hedeflerini vurmasından 3 ay kadar sonra Osmanlı Devleti'nin savaşa girmiş olmasıdır. Var olan anlaşmazlıklar ve uluslararası toplumun diğer faktörleri, cihat ilanını geciktirmiştir. Savaş esnasında ise bu anlaşmazlıklar devam etmiştir. Bağdat'ı kurtarmak için planlanan sefer hazırlıklarında, Filistin cephesinde, Suriye'deki hareketlerde anlaşmazlıklar yaşanmıştır. Galiçya, Trablus ve Mısır'da cereyan eden gelişmelerde de ortak bir siyasette anlaşılamadığı görülmüştür. Tüm bu fikir ayrılıklarına rağmen, müttefikliğin bozulmadan savaş sonuna kadar devam etmiş olması ise başlı başına Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin savaş kurumunu dikkate alarak kurgulandığının bir göstergesi olmuştur. Bu beraberlik, savaş sonrasındaki uluslararası toplum içerisinde de, Türkiye ve Almanya'ya, kendilerini birçok yönden güvende hissetmedikleri yeni bir düzen bırakmıştır.

Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin gidişatını İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın nasıl şekillendirdiği ise çalışmada yerini bulan diğer bir kısımdır. Savaş esnasında Türkiye, Almanya'ya karşı savaş ilan etmemek için son savaş sona erece kadar kararlı bir politika izlemiştir. Diğer taraftan Almanya Türkiye'yi savaşa sokmak için ikna etmeyi başaramamıştır. Aktif tarafsızlık politikasını icra eden Türkiye, krom ticareti ve 1941 yılında imzalamış olduğu ticaret ve dostluk antlaşması ile Almanya ile dengeli bir ikili ilişki tesis edip savaş dışında kalabilmiştir. Bahsi geçen tüm bu kurumlar ile ikili devlet ilişkilerinin bağıntısı genel olarak değerlendirildiğinde, aşağıdaki hususlar ön plana çıkmaktadır:

Öncelikli olarak göze çarpan husus tezin analiz düzeyi ile ilgilidir. İngiliz Okulu kuramı uluslararası ilişkilere bütüncül bir şekilde yaklaşarak sistem düzeyindeki etkileşimleri analiz etmiştir. Bu bağlamda tezin önde gelen katkısı, odak noktasını sistem düzeyinden devletler arası düzeye indirgemesi olmuştur. Bu tez sınırlı kapsamı dahilinde, İngiliz Okulu varsayımlarını, ikili devlet ilişkilerini incelemek üzere kullanmıştır. Bu çalışma sistem düzeyindeki dinamikler ile devletler arası düzeydeki etkileşimler arasında bir ilişki kurarak, bu araştırma düzeyleri arasındaki

bağlantı hakkında gerçekleştirilecek ilerideki çalışmalara katkı sağlamayı hedeflemiştir.

Bu tez aynı zamanda Bull'un kuramsal yaklaşımlarını uygulamaya aktarıp Bull'un varsayımlarının işleyişi hakkında bilgiler sunmuştur. Kurumlar nezdinde işlenen Türk-Alman ilişkileri, Bull'un uluslararası toplum tanımının minimalist ve çoğulcu (*pluralist*) bir yapıya sahip olduğunu doğrular niteliktedir. Çoğulcu yaklaşımın temelinde devletler nezdinde birlikte var olma (*co-existence*) güdüsünün bulunduğu, bunun için de devletlerin karşılık olarak birbirlerinin bağımsızlıklarını ve egemenliklerini tanımalarının gerektiği söylenebilir. Uluslararası toplumun kurulması bu perspektiften bakıldığında birlikte var olmanın şartları ile şekillenmektedir. Bunlar da ahde vefa (*pacta sunt servanda*) ilkesinin sürdürülmesi, devletlerin iç işlerine müdahale edilmemesi, egemenlik haklarına saygı duyulması ve diplomatlara dokunulmazlık haklarının verilmesi gibi temel prensiplerdir. Benzer şekilde, bu işleyişin minimalist gereklilikleri beraberinde getirdiği de açıktır. Savaş zamanları da dahil, devletlerin uluslararası toplumun işleyişini aksatmamaya gayret göstermeleri bu minimalist alt yapının bir göstergesidir.

Bu denklemde devletlerin uluslararası toplum nezdinde yasal olarak eşit oldukları, bu sistematığın de kendi kendini koruma ve kendi kendine yardım etme yetileri (*self-preservation, self-help*) ile kurgulandığı söylenebilir. Bull'un bakış açısında devletlerin eylemlerine karar verirken özgür iradeleri ile çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket edebileceklerini öngördüğünü belirtmek gerekir. Çünkü bahsedilen kurumlar devletlerin nasıl hareket edebileceğini ortaya koyarken, tam olarak gerçekte nasıl davrandıklarının değişmez şablonunu ortaya koymamaktadır. O yüzden çalışmada da, devletlerin ikili ilişkilerini kurgularken zaman zaman kurumların işleyişine karşı direnç gösterdikleri, kurumların devletler için belirlediği hareket tarzlarına uymadıkları, devletlerin özgür iradeleri ile alternatif politikalar üretmekten sakınmadıkları ortaya konmuştur. Kurumlar ikili ilişkilerin gidişatına genel bir çerçeve çizseler de, devletler uluslararası toplum içinde ikili ilişkilerini yürütürken bir esnekliğe sahip olmuşlardır. Bahsi geçen bu özellikler, diğer bir

ifade ile uluslararası toplumun çoğulcu ve minimalist bir yapıda işlediği yönündeki sav, bu çalışmadaki Türk-Alman ikili ilişkilerindeki bulgular ile de teyit edilmiştir.

İlgili çalışmanın ana sorusu çerçevesinde açıklayıcı olmakta kısıtlı kaldığı durumlar da söz konusudur. Bunların bazıları, uluslararası toplum tanımının egemenlik haklarına saygı ve iç işlerine karışmama ilkeleri üzerine inşa edilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Türk-Alman ilişkileri göz önüne alındığında, bazı dönemlerde egemenliğin kullanılması ve iç işlerine karışmama hususları sorgulanabilir niteliktedir. Birbirlerinin bürokrasisi içinde insan kaynaklarına sahip olduğu dönemlerde, ya da dış politika kararlarında baskın bir şekilde fiiliyatta etkin olunan dönemlerde Bull'un sistematığı Türk-Alman ilişkilerini açıklamada zayıf kalmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Osmanlı bürokrasisi içerisinde yüksek düzeylerde görev yapan askeri heyetlerin varlığı, bunların ülkeler arasında savaş çıkarabilecek eylemlerde bulunmalarının fiilen mümkün olması, Bull'un ortaya koyduğu şablonu karmaşıklştırmıştır. Örneğin Alman Amiral Souchan'ın kontrolünde seyreden Yavuz ve Midilli savaş gemilerinin Rusya'yı hedef alan bombalamalar yapması fiiliyatta Osmanlı Devleti'ni savaşa sürükleyen en önemli olay olmuştur. Osmanlı Devleti'nin kendi içinde yaptığı tartışmalar, bu bombalamanın devlet bürokrasisi tarafından sağlıklı bir şekilde kararı alınmış bir durum olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu tarz durumları açıklığa kavuşturmak için Bull'un analizinin derinleştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Bull'un varsayımları eşliğinde çalışmada kısıtlı kalan diğer bir husus, ikili devlet ilişkilerindeki ekonomik faktörün yeridir. Şurası vurgulanmalıdır ki, Bull'un analizlerinde ekonomi açık bir şekilde ortaya konan bir faktör değildir. Bull, diğer bir yandan, ekonomiyi göz ardı etmiş de değildir. Kendi çalışmalarında ekonomiyi, kuvvetler dengesinin bir unsuru olarak kabul etmiştir. Bu tezde de bu yaklaşım kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada, özellikle Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi, askeri yardımlar ve krom ticareti gibi kısımlar göreceli olarak daha ayrıntılı işlenmeye çalışılarak bu eksiklik giderilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu olaylar silsilesinin, sadece kuvvetler dengesini değil aynı zamanda diğer kurumların işlemesine de katkılar sunduğu ortaya konmuştur. Ekonomik faktör, uluslararası toplum kavramsallaştırması

içerisinde yapılacak ikili devlet ilişkileri çalışmalarında ağırlıklı olarak üzerinde durulması gereken bir husustur.

Bull'un kurumları çerçevesinden ikili devlet ilişkilerini incelerken karşılaşılan diğer bir zorluk, kuram ile uygulamayı birleştirirken ortaya çıkmıştır. Bull kendi bakış açısında tarih içerisinde cereyan eden olayları beş kurumun penceresinden yorumlamıştır. Ancak bahsi geçen tek bir olayın birden fazla kurumla bağlantılı olabilmesi, çalışmayı yaparken de zorluklar doğurmuştur. Aynı olayın, beş kurumun da nüvelerini taşıyabiliyor olması, kurumları Türk-Alman ilişkileri nezdinde incelerken karmaşık bir yapı ortaya çıkarmıştır. Örneğin, uluslararası hukuk kurumunun bir parçası olan ikili bir antlaşmanın yapılması sürecini, antlaşma için yapılan müzakerelerden ya da süreci işleten diplomatik temsilden ayırmak mümkün olmamaktadır. Ayrıca yapılan bir antlaşmanın büyük güçler yönetiminin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkması da, yeni bir kuvvetler dengesi doğurma ihtimali de mevcuttur. Bull'un gözünden tüm bu kurumlar ve yaşanan süreçler tek bir bütünün, uluslararası toplumun tamamının işleyişinin birer parçasıdır. Ancak, bu kuramsal çerçevenin uygulamada karmaşık bir yapıda olduğunun altını çizmek gerekir.

Bu tez, ayrıca uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründeki ikili devlet ilişkilerine yeni bir bakış açısı sunmayı da amaçlamıştır. İkili devlet ilişkileri mevcut kaynaklarda değerlendirilirken ekonomik, askeri, kültürel, siyasi, tarihsel boyutları ile ele alınmıştır. Bull'un beş kurumunun ikili devlet ilişkilerinin gidişatını analiz etme hususunda bir zemin teşkil edebileceği savunulmuştur. Bu karmaşık düzlem içinde, bu çalışma yeni bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. İlgili devlet çıkarları çatıştığında dahi, ikili devlet ilişkilerinin; kuvvetler dengesi, diplomasi, uluslararası hukuk, savaş ve büyük güçler yönetimi kurumlarının çizdiği sınırlar ve yönlendirmeleri ile sürdürüldüğü iddiası bundan sonraki çalışmalar için literatüre katkı sunacak yapıda gözükmektedir.

Bull'un uluslararası toplum tanımının pluralist ve minimalist yapısı, devletlerin egemenliklerine ve bağımsızlıklarına karışılmadığı durumların kuramsal bir şablonudur. Bu noktada ikili ilişkilerde, devletlerin kararları özgür iradeleri ile

kendilerinin aldığı, iç işlerine müdahalenin kapsam dışı tutulduğu ve gönüllülük esasına dayalı bir şekilde uluslararası toplumun işleyişine katkı sundukları düşünülmektedir. Bu çerçevede pratikte daha karmaşık bir yapıda ilerlemektedir. İç politika ve dış politika ayrımının giderek erimesi, devletlerin egemenlik haklarını daha kompleks bir şekilde kullanmaya başlaması, ilerleyen çalışmalarda üzerinde durulması gereken noktalar. Genel itibarı ile, İngiliz Okulu kuramının, uluslararası toplum kavramsallaştırması ile devletler arasındaki etkileşimi açıklama hususunda önemli katkılar sunabileceği, bu çalışmanın ilerleyen çalışmalarda geliştirilmesi gereken en önde gelen iddiasıdır. İngiliz Okulu'nun içerisinde gelişen kurum tartışmaları ile, uygulamada daha da karmaşık yapılar haline bürünen ikili devlet ilişkileri geliştirilmeye müsait bir teori-pratik birlikteliğidir.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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PUBLICATIONS

1. Demirel, Murat. “Avrupa Birliği’nin Kendi İçindeki Ayrılıkçı Hareketlere Karşı Politikaları: Kuzey İrlanda ve Bask Sorunu Örnekleri” in *Avrupa ve Avrupa Birliği: Teori, Güncel İç Gelişmeler ve Dış İlişkiler*, ed. Cengiz Dinç (Ankara:Savaş Yayınları, 2015), 117-40.

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : DEMİREL
Adı : MURAT
Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

TEZİN ADI : THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY AND TURCO-
GERMAN RELATIONS

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

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