

RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE:
EUROPEAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bestami Sadi Bilgiç (İpek University, IR) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Şengül Yıldız

Signature :

ABSTRACT

RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE: EUROPEAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA

Yıldız, Şengül

M.S., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç

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Since the start of the Syrian Crisis in 2011, there has been an emergence of unprecedented number of foreign fighters pouring to Syria especially from Europe, Middle East and North Africa with the aim of joining radical groups. This unprecedented number of foreign fighters has increasingly sparked a debate on the concept of radicalization due to the fact that this development has created great security threats regarding what causes people to be radicalized and to become foreign fighters. For this reason, this thesis aims to answer two interrelated questions: What causes European citizens to be radicalized to the degree that they get involved in the civil war in Syria as foreign fighters and what are the internal dynamics of different countries or sub-regions causing them to produce higher number of foreign fighters than others? Europe will be specifically taken as a region to be analyzed since the emergence of foreign fighters has created a great challenge in this region where a considerable number of Muslims live in. Lastly, this thesis has discussed that the Nordic countries as a sub-region in Europe have produced higher percentage of foreign fighters relative to their Muslim population than Western Europe and the Southeastern Europe. The reason of this situation are tried to be answered by examining socioeconomic conditions, integration problems and radical networks of European Muslims in comparison to Western Europe.

Keywords: Radicalization, Foreign Fighters, the Syrian Conflict, Islam in Europe, the Nordic Countries

ÖZ

AVRUPA'DA RADİKALLEŞME: SURİYE'DEKİ AVRUPALI YABANCI SAVAŞÇILAR

Yıldız, Şengül

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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2011 yılında başlayan Suriye Krizi'yle birlikte, Suriye'deki radikal örgütlere katılmak amacıyla Avrupa, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'dan Suriye'ye giden çok fazla sayıda yabancı savaşçı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu derece fazla sayıdaki yabancı savaşçının ortaya çıkması ise radikalleşme kavramı üzerine yapılan tartışmaları alevlendirmiş ve bu gelişme neyin insanların radikalleşmesine ve yabancı savaşçı olmasına neden olacağı konusunda ortaya çıkan ciddi güvenlik tehditlerini gündeme getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda; bu tez, hangi sebeplerin Avrupa vatandaşlarının yabancı savaşçı olarak Suriye'deki iç savaşa katılabilecek derecede radikalleştiğini ve belirli ülkelerde ya da alt bölgelerde diğer ülkelerden ve alt bölgelerden fazla oranda yabancı savaşçı oluşmasına neden olan iç dinamiklerinin neler olduğu açıklamaya amaçlayan iki ilişkili soruyu cevaplamaya çalışmaktadır. Oldukça fazla sayıda Müslümanın yaşadığı Avrupa ise yabancı savaşçıların ortaya çıkması bu bölgede ciddi bir sınama yaratması bakımından bu tezde incelenmektedir. Son olarak, bu tez Nordik ülkelerinin kendi Müslüman popülasyonuna oranla Batı Avrupa ve Güneydoğu Avrupa'dan daha fazla oranda yabancı savaşçı ortaya çıktığı tartışılmıştır. Bu durumun nedenleri Avrupalı Müslümanların sosyoekonomik koşulları, entegrasyon problemleri ve radikal bağlantıları incelenerek cevaplandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikalleşme, Yabancı Savaşçılar, Suriye Krizi, Avrupa'da İslam, Nordik Ülkeleri

The dedication of this thesis is split two ways:
to my loving family and
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FFs	Foreign Fighters
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
ICSR	International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MPI	Multiculturalism Policy Index
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
TSG	The Soufan Group

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Objective of the Research

Since the start of the Syrian Crisis in 2011, there has been an intensifying debate on the concept of radicalization due to the fact that the Crisis has caused the emergence of unprecedented number of foreign fighters all over the world. Although the emergence of foreign fighters has been experienced in other conflicts, like in Afghanistan in the 1980s or in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, the scale of the foreign fighters' involvement in the Syrian Civil Conflict is historically unprecedented in numbers¹. This situation has increasingly raised security concerns especially for European countries as the estimated number of foreign fighters from Europe is much greater than in other conflicts.²

Although the issue foreign fighters has not been a new issue³, its nature and scope have changed together with its transnational identity and fighters' religious aspirations due to the fact that insurgents groups in Syria such as ISIL or Jabhat al-Nusra render the jihad and Islamic militancy appealing all over the world. In this context, an increasing number of foreign fighters pouring to Syria especially from Europe, Middle East and North Africa have created a great concern concerning the potential security threats of foreign fighters' involvement in the crises. In this context, Barak and Cohen, Sela and Fichette, and Malet as experts on the foreign involvements in intrastate conflicts, claim that the flowing of

¹ Stuart Casey-Maslen, ed. *The war report: Armed conflict in 2013*, OUP Oxford, 2014, 322.

² Ibid.

³ Barak Mendelsohn, "Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends," *Orbis* 55.2 (2011): 189.

foreign volunteers to join the insurgent groups influences the course of events during the conflicts. The reason for it is that the foreign fighters might ‘forge alliances with non-state actors within the state and external actors in the neighboring states’, thus both affecting domestic politics as well regional politics as by persuading external actors to involve in the insurgencies, too.⁴

Against this backdrop, this thesis will search for an explanation to the question of what causes and internal dynamics of a country or a region have played a role in making people radicalized and becoming foreign fighters since the Syrian Conflict starting 2011. This thesis aims to answer two interrelated questions: What causes European citizens to be radicalized to the degree that they get involved in the Civil War in Syria as foreign fighters and what are the internal dynamics of different countries or sub-regions causing them to produce higher number of foreign fighters than others?

This thesis has found that the percentages of foreign fighters among the Muslim populations of the Nordic countries, namely Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark as being both the most democratic⁵ and the most prosperous countries⁶ in the world, are considerably higher than the percentages in the Western European countries. In other words, radicalization in the sense of the emergence of foreign fighters joining the Syrian Conflict since 2011 is considerably higher among the Muslim populations of the Nordic countries than those of the Western European countries although the Nordic countries have produced less foreign fighters in terms of total number. In that sense, this thesis will attempt to comparatively analyze what causes radicalization with respect to the emergence of

⁴ Dan Miodownik and Oren Barak, eds. *Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 4.

⁵ According to Global Democracy Index as of December 15, 2015, Norway ranks first, Sweden ranks third, Finland ranks fourth, and Denmark ranks fifth in the world. http://democracyranking.org/ranking/2015/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2015_letter.pdf.

⁶ According to the Legatum Prosperity Index in 2015, Norway ranks first, Denmark ranks third, Sweden ranks fifth, and Finland ranks ninth in the world in terms of economy, governance, health, safety, security, personal freedom, education etc. <http://www.prosperity.com/#/>.

foreign fighters both in Western Europe and Nordic countries. By doing so, it will examine the concepts of radicalization, extremism, jihadism and their repercussions in Europe in order to evaluate the root causes of radicalization within the European context.

With this aim, this thesis will focus on possible socioeconomic problems of communities with immigrant backgrounds, the integration problems including identity discontent of Muslim communities and states' integration policies or attitudes such as assimilationist, multiculturalist or exclusionist models; and radical social networks, which are very effective in the recruitment process of foreign fighters, as the causes of radicalization. As a comparative analysis of radicalization in Western Europe and Nordic countries, it will examine abovementioned causes in these regions separately in order to substantiate the main argument. In this respect, it will argue that socioeconomic problems, integration problems, and the presence of radical network groups operating within Europe are the major root causes for the emergence of European foreign fighters both in Western Europe and Nordic countries. However, in order to understand the reason for why the Nordic countries have produced higher percentage of foreign fighters from among their Muslim populations than that of Western Europe, this thesis will argue that the main reason lies with the Nordic countries reliance on softer and less security measures against radicalization with the aim of protecting the delicate balance of security and personal freedoms compared to Western European countries. This is to say, these countries do not favor a repressive approach and strict preventive security measures which are the case in France⁷ or Belgium. Their standards of democracy leaving more space for radical organizations to function and their security understanding that relies on soft measures might enable radical groups to disseminate their views and activities more freely than they can in Western European countries. Consequently, these

⁷ "Foreign fighters: Member States' responses and EU action in an international context," *European Parliament Briefing*, 2015, 8. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-548980-Foreign-fighters-FINAL.pdf>.

two situations might result in further exclusion and marginalization among the Muslim communities which might catalyze the emergence of foreign fighters more than it is the case Western Europe.

1.2. Delimitation of the Research

First of all, as the focus of the study is about the emergence of foreign fighters in Europe following the Syrian Conflict which started in 2011, this thesis generalizes foreign fighters as the individuals do not join any specific group in Syria, rather any insurgent groups in the region. Moreover, the term of ‘foreign fighter’ will be used rather than labeling them *jihadists* since the motivations of foreign fighters vary and might not necessarily be religious; thus, the usage of ‘foreign fighters’ is more objective and neutral in examining all foreign fighters flowing to join insurgent groups in the region. Additionally, the main focus of this thesis is to analyze what factors cause these people to become foreign fighters at the expense of their life and not to evaluate diverse motivations of foreign fighters due to lack of concrete information regarding the profiles of foreign fighters travelling to Syria.

Secondly, since the start of Syrian Conflict and the rapid advance of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have attracted a considerable number of Muslims all over the world, the foreign fighters flowing to Syria are assumed to be Muslim and all statistics are made with this assumption in this thesis. Moreover, the converts to Islam, who also become foreign fighters in Europe, remains low in number, for this reason, this thesis excludes their numbers in the statistics used throughout the thesis. Furthermore, the statistics are set by selecting particular countries which produce highest number of foreign fighters since 2011. The countries such as Iceland or Portugal as well as Eastern European countries are not included in the thesis due to very low number of foreign fighters originating from these countries. Lastly, the estimated Muslim populations of the countries are used in the statistics in order to find out the percentage of the number of foreign fighters among the Muslim population in a given country. However,

although the data of the number of foreign fighters are based on 2015 statistics of ‘The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence’, the date for the estimated Muslim population is based on the year of 2014 of the book of “Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol.5” since it was not possible to find the data for the year of 2015 from the same source.

Lastly, as the thesis is about the causes of radicalization in Europe in relation to the emergence of foreign fighters, the examination of the possible causes remains at macro level in general. This is to say, in analyzing the causes such as the existing integration problems and states’ integration policies, thesis will not go into further details regarding the policy implementation; instead will generally make a cross-country comparison.

1.3. Methodology

In order to examine the concept of radicalization as a general framework to better understand the issue of foreign fighters, this thesis uses quantitative and qualitative methods. To do so, both quantitative analysis by using available statistics on foreign fighters from the abovementioned regions and qualitative analysis including comparative analysis are used in order to gain better understanding regarding the emergence of European foreign fighters. Additionally, the thesis is built on cross-regional and cross-country comparative analysis to explain the causes of radicalization either in a specific region or a country.

For quantitative analysis, this thesis uses certain data and statistics about foreign fighters pouring to Syria and Iraq regardless of what insurgents group they join. By doing so, this thesis also uses comparative analysis in analyzing the regions and specific countries with regard to what factors are the most influential throughout the process of radicalization. For qualitative analysis, this thesis mainly benefits from secondary sources such as journal articles and books.

Methodologically, this thesis is limited by data constraints due to the lack of information regarding the profiles of foreign fighters; nevertheless, online sources such as newspapers, interviews at the blogs are also used in order to collect information. The dataset used in this thesis concerning the number of foreign fighters are based on two prominent think tanks focused on radicalization, terrorism and specifically the phenomenon of foreign fighters which are 'The Soufan Group' and 'The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence'. It should be noted that as their data are estimates, the numbers are elusive; however, they are accurate in relative terms and enable to compare and contrast the numbers in a country-specific manner.

Thus; in the second chapter, this thesis will elaborate on the issue of foreign fighters by examining the concepts of radicalization, extremism and jihadism. Together with this, the process of radicalization and the possible root causes of radicalization will be addressed in order to better understand the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In this context, socioeconomic, ideological and psychological causes, the lost identity of immigrant people in Europe, and socialization in the radical networks will be discussed as the main root causes of the radicalization.

In the third chapter, the issue of foreign fighters Europe and their statistics in a given country or a given region will be analyzed. Furthermore, Islam in Europe will be discussed with the aim of understanding the relations between Islam and Europe.

In the fourth chapter, the causes of radicalization in Western European countries will be explained by examining socioeconomic structures of European Muslims, integration problems in these countries, and the presence of radical organizations as causes of radicalization. The same analysis will be made for the Nordic countries in the fifth chapter and will be searching for an explanation why the Nordic countries have produced more foreign fighters relative to their Muslim populations than the Western European countries.

In conclusion, this thesis will conclude that even though all of the aforementioned factors are influential in radicalization in the Nordic countries just like in Western Europe, socialization in the radical networks seem to stand out since their liberal democratic political structures leave more space for such organizations to function.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The second chapter will introduce the concepts of foreign fighters, radicalization, extremism and jihadism in order to conceptualize them for this study. Additionally, it will examine the literature on the process of radicalization and the root causes of radicalization with the aim of applying them to the cases of Western Europe and the Nordic countries.

2.1. The Issue of Foreign Fighters

There is no generally agreed definition of the concept of foreign fighters. Also, there is no abundant literature on the phenomenon of foreign fighters and each conflict that attracts recruitment of foreign fighters reflects specific dynamics and contexts. Nevertheless, David Malet, in his recent book of *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts* defines foreign fighters as an ‘individual and non-citizen of conflict states who fight in the insurgencies during civil conflicts’.⁸ However, in order to better understand the phenomenon, Thomas Hegghemmar has tried to establish a much more clear definition and narrow Malet’s definition by differentiating local insurgencies and transnational actors from foreign fighters. Hegghemmar defines foreign fighters as an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or any kinship links, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization,

⁸ David Malet, *Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.

and (4) is unpaid.⁹ Some scholars like Cilluffo, Cozzens, and Ranstorp argue that ‘Western foreign fighters’ or simply, the term ‘foreign fighters’ refers to violent extremists who leave their Western states of residence with the aspiration to train or take up arms against non-Muslim factions in jihadi conflict zones.¹⁰ However, it is easy to say that the issue of foreign fighter is not necessarily confined to fight against non-Muslim factions as it is the case in the Syrian Conflict. As it stands, the issue of foreign fighter can simply be defined as volunteers who leave their home in order to take part in insurgencies in a foreign site.

This is hardly a new issue.¹¹ Throughout history, foreign fighters’ involvement in the transnational conflicts can be seen in many cases in different contexts. For instance, the Palestinian Arab revolt against the British Mandate and the Jews between 1936 and 1939, and the foundation of the State of Israel between 1947 and 1949 (in other words, the First Arab-Israeli War) attracted many foreign volunteers or fighters as well.¹² Also, during the foundation of the State of Israel, around 5,000 foreign fighters, mainly American Jews, took part in the Israeli side as ‘Machal’ – the Hebrew word for volunteers outside Israel whereas approximately 6000 Arab foreign fighter fought on Palestinian side.¹³ Likewise, the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) which waged between Spanish Republican governments side and the Nationalist General Franco,¹⁴ appealed between 35,000

⁹ Thomas Hegghammer, "The rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalization of jihad," *International Security*, 35:3, 57-58.

¹⁰ Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp. "Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories and Conflict Zones," Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, (2010), 3.

¹¹ Mendelsohn, "Foreign Fighters: Recent Trends," 189.

¹² Miodownik and Barak, eds. *Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts*, 4.

¹³ David Malet’s data on his website, see David Malet. *The Foreign Fighter Project*, online data base, http://davidmalet.com/The_Foreign_Fighter_Project.php, accessed on November 2nd, 2015.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 25-26

and 50,000 foreign fighters¹⁵ who joined the International Brigades in order to support the Republican side. On the other hand, 19,000 foreign fighters from Germany and 80,000 fighters from Italy came to fight with the Nationalist and Fascist General Franco against the ideology of communism and socialism that the Republican government held.¹⁶ Thus, the Spanish Civil War presents a case of foreign fighters' involvement purely on the basis of ideological affiliation.¹⁷ However, the largest-scale recruitment of foreign fighters arose with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and attracted many Western foreign fighters to join the conflict in the name *jihad*. This was a turning point in terms of foreign fighters' motivations and goals since foreign fighters' involvement in the Afghan war posits a different type of motivational change, specifically, the emergence of new ideological movement: *jihad*.¹⁸ The war in Afghanistan has precisely increased use of violence in the name of jihad; for that matter, it led to both states (e.g. Saudi Arabia) and individuals to rely more extensively on religious justifications to facilitate Muslim support and volunteers.¹⁹ Thus, it is possible to say that the Afghan war may have triggered concern and suspicion over Muslims as having more potential to be foreign fighters although the phenomenon of foreign fighter is by no means confined to Islam and Islamic countries as it can be seen in the Spanish Civil War or the Israeli War of Independence.²⁰

¹⁵ Erica Vowles, "What history teaches us about foreign fighters," *the ABC News*, July 31, 2015. <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/tackling-foreign-fighters/6619606>

¹⁶ Miodownik and Barak, eds. *Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts*, 26.

¹⁷ Malet, "*Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts*," 9.

¹⁸ Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," 71.

¹⁹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The new global threat: transnational salafis and jihad," *Middle East Policy* 8.4 (2001): 22.

²⁰ Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," 53-54.

Additionally, as the issue of foreign fighter is transnational in its nature due to the fact that it displaces national affiliation,²¹ Hegghammer argues that the large-scale mobilization of foreign fighters during Afghan war empowered transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida.²² The reason of this argument lies in the fact that many al-Qaida members began their militant activities as war volunteers in the Afghan War and they imported their radicalized skills in the training, socialization, and networking conducted by the Arab Afghans.²³ Later, those trained and radicalized militants became the trainers of future *jihadists*, foreign fighters, in other insurgencies in Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya in the 1990s.²⁴

When the Syrian Crisis erupted in 2011 after non-violent protests turned into a brutal civil conflict, the phenomenon of foreign fighters has become a matter of international politics once again as many were afraid that the with jihadist ideology would spread to all over the world.

To sum, for the purposes of this thesis, the term of foreign fighter is used for a person who has voluntarily traveled to Syria since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 with the aim of joining any fighting factions or groups in Syria and take an active role either in violent or non-violent ways.

²¹ David Malet, "Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflict," Paper at 2008 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association.

²² Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," 53.

²³ Mohammed M. Hafez, "Jihad After Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32.2 (2009): 77.

²⁴ Hafez, "Jihad After Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans," 77.

2.2. Radicalization

The term ‘radicalization’ has been recently emerged. It has been increasingly used since 9/11 and specifically the London bombings in July 2005 when the emergence of ‘home-grown’ terrorism shattered Europe.²⁵

Similar to the definition of ‘terrorism’, the term of ‘radicalism’ or ‘radical’ is contested and there is no consensus on the precise definition of the term. Delving into the literature on the term of radicalization, it is known that the term traced back to the study of Ted Robert Gurr who gave an explanation of why people use violence in his book titled as ‘*Why Men Rebel*’. In his landmark book, he argues that people turn to violence because of ‘frustration-aggression mechanism’.²⁶ This mechanism is initiated by the relative deprivation or ‘the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’ of collective value dissatisfaction’.²⁷ This means that those who are unable to meet their expectations can create a frustration which can trigger to adopt violence. So, Gurr’s main point is that ‘men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations.’²⁸ The end result of this process is displayed as act of violence.

Yet, in a broader sense, radicalization is perceived as an ‘embedded individual process’ that occurs in the individual within a specific social and environmental context.²⁹ In a specific way, radicalization is a process by which “individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages

²⁵ Mark Sedgwick, “The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22.4 (2010), 480.

²⁶ Robert Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton NY: Princeton University Press, 1970), 36-37.

²⁷ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 23.

²⁸ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 58.

²⁹ Tinka Veldhuis and Staun Jørgen, *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009), 3.

movement from moderate, mainstream belief towards extreme views.”³⁰ As an explanation of this confusion upon its definition, Sedgwick argues that some scholars consider the radicalization as a ‘state of mind’ while others focus on the radicalized ‘behavior.’³¹ In other words, there is a difficulty to determine when a person becomes radicalized in what ways.³² For this reason, the literature is divided into two different approaches in a sense that one side sees radicalization as a process of changing mindset in adopting non-violent and radical thought while others consider radicalization as a process of changing actions by engaging violent and radical behaviors. In other words, there is a distinction between ‘non-violent radicalization’, which signifies a process of holding radical views without undertaking terrorist activity and ‘violent radicalization’, which refers a process of engaging terrorist acts.³³

For the discussion of non-violent radicalization, McCauley and Moskalenko descriptively explain the terms of radicalization as a process of engaging a violent act. They define as such;

“radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group.”³⁴

³⁰ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed* (Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009), 1.

³¹ Sedgwick, “The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22.4 (2010), 479.

³² R. Kim Cragin, “Resisting violent extremism: A conceptual model for non-radicalization,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26.2 (2014), 338.

³³ Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller. “The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent radicalization,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24.1 (2012), 2.

³⁴ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism,” *Terrorism and political violence* 20.3 (2008), 416.

Similarly, Dalgaard-Nielsen uses ‘radicalization’ as a ‘growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching change in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order.’³⁵ However, although radicalization can be considered as a precursor to terrorism and pure acts of violence, it does not necessarily cause violence or terrorism.³⁶ For instance, according to Global Futures Forum (GFF) report, ‘radicalization is a process, not an end unto itself, and it does not necessarily lead to violence.’³⁷ This means that radical people cannot be necessarily terrorists or committed to terrorist activities. Instead, radical people are inclined to embrace extremist ideas and beliefs which ‘might’ lead to violence.

Nevertheless, it should be born in mind that radicalization can encompass both mindset and action in which a person engages either a violent act by changing its actions or a non-violent act with the changes in the mindset.³⁸ For instance, Rahimullah, Larmar and Absalla argue in a broader sense that ‘radicalism is a process whereby individuals or groups are indoctrinated to a set of belief that adopts acts of terrorism that can be displayed in their behaviors and attitudes.’³⁹ Likewise, in a broader sense, Wilner and Dubouloz clarify the terms as such,

“radicalization is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It

³⁵ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33.9 (2010): 798.

³⁶ Thomas M. Pick, Anne Speckhard, and Beatrice Jacuch, *Home-grown terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*, Vol. 60 (Ios Press, 2009), 102.

³⁷ Global Futures Forum, *Radicalisation, violence and the power of networks*, (Report of the Autumn 2006 Brussels Workshop, 2006), 6.

³⁸ R. Kim Cragin, "Resisting violent extremism: A conceptual model for non-radicalization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26.2 (2014), 338.

³⁹ Rahimullah, Riyad Hosain, Stephen Anthony Larmar, and Mohamad Abdalla, "Understanding Violent Radicalization amongst Muslims: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science* 1.1 (2014), 20.

is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates and individuals to pursue violent behavior.”⁴⁰

In general, the radicalization starts with the change in the opinions and might move forwards to engage in radical actions in the end. In other words, as McCauley and Moskalkenko also argue that, the most significant transition or turning points of radicalization in turning an action after holding radical opinions is that ‘from doing nothing to doing something; from legal action to illegal action; and from illegal action to killing civilians.’⁴¹ However, in this thesis, radicalization is not only confined to ‘doing illegal actions’ or ‘killing civilians’; instead, it does not necessarily require to do illegal action that results in killings civilians; in other words, a person can be radicalized in search for adventure or as a result of political grievance or religious reasons; nevertheless, this might not lead to terrorist acts.

In other words, in this thesis, the term of radicalization will be used as a process whereby individuals hold extremist ideas in their thinking, and these ideas can result into non-violent action or turn out to be violent acts. In addition to this definition, in this thesis, the term of radicalization will be conceptualized as the first step of becoming extremists and namely ‘foreign fighters’. Therefore, it ascribes radicalization as adopting both radical thoughts and behaviors in a certain way. In the literature, radicalization as a change in beliefs and opinions is generally based on the narrative of ‘global jihad’⁴² that mainly assumes that Islam and Muslims are persistently attacked and humiliated by the West⁴³ This narrative

⁴⁰ Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization.” *Global Change, Peace and Security* 22.1 (2010), 38.

⁴¹ McCauley and Moskalkenko, “Toward a profile of lone wolf terrorists: What moves an individual from radical opinion to radical action,” 73.

⁴² McCauley and Moskalkenko, “Toward a profile of lone wolf terrorists: What moves an individual from radical opinion to radical action,” 70.

⁴³ Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," 798.

of ‘global jihad’ has generally four points; individuals change their opinions and radicalize on the basis of these four points. These points;

“(1) Islam is under unjust attack by the West, specifically by the US; (2) individuals, called jihadists, are defending Islam against the West; (3) the actions taken by jihadists are proportional, just, and religiously approved; for this reason, (4) all necessary actions for this end are the duties of good Muslims.”⁴⁴

Thus, radicalization is not sufficient to commit any kind of acts of terrorism; however, it is a precondition for terrorist actions. Similarly, Pick, Speckhard and Jacuch generate a definition which I subscribe it in the thesis. They define radicalization as an ‘increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or behavior of individuals and/or groups of individuals.’⁴⁵ Additionally, radicalization does not necessarily occur before joining the extremist groups since the people might join for numerous reasons such as seeking for an adventure or a simply status.⁴⁶

2.3. Extremism

For the sake of the clarity of the concepts that are used in this thesis, radicalization can be regarded as the first step of extremism. Sedgwick argues that extremism is used as a term in opposition to ‘moderate’.⁴⁷ Regarding the definition of

⁴⁴ Christian Leuprecht, et al. "Narratives and counter-narratives for global jihad: Opinion versus action." *Countering violent extremist narratives* (2010): 58-71. Also see David Betz, "The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19.4 (2008), 520.

⁴⁵ Pick, Speckhard, and Jacuch, *Home-grown terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*, 111.

⁴⁶ Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegler, "Examining the role of religion in radicalization to violent Islamist extremism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35.12 (2012), 850.

⁴⁷ Sedgwick, "The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion," 481.

radicalization in relation to the issue of foreign fighters, there is a necessity to clarify what the extremist ideas or actions refer in the process of radicalization.

To begin with, the term of 'extremism' is related with the sense of being at the margins or edges in terms of adopting extremities.⁴⁸ Also, very similar to the confusion on the concept of radicalization, there is a blur distinction between 'extremism of thought' and 'extremism of method'.⁴⁹ Considering 'extremism of thought', Peter Neumann as a prominent scholar on the issue argues that the most ambiguous part is to identify the radicalization through the term of extremism which has several meanings. According to him, the term of extremism might be defined as holding certain '*political ideas*' which are diametrically opposed to the very core values of a given society;⁵⁰ for instance, these extremist political ideas in the literature are generally perceived as conflicting with the values of a liberal democracy. Thus, extremism might be considered as several forms of racial or religious supremacy of a certain ideology that rejects basic human rights or democratic values.⁵¹ Besides holding certain political beliefs or opinions which refers to 'extremism of thought', extremism might also refer to the method that be used by extremists or radicals.⁵² For the sake of achieving extreme political aim, radical actors can 'show intolerance towards all views other than their owns' and 'disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others'.⁵³ In that sense,

⁴⁸ Douglas Pratt, "Religion and terrorism: Christian fundamentalism and extremism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22.3 (2010), 439.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Peter R. Neumann, "The trouble with radicalization," *International Affairs* 89.4 (2013), 874.

⁵¹ Neumann, "The trouble with radicalization," 874-875.

⁵² Neumann, "The trouble with radicalization," 875.

⁵³ Roger Scruton, *The Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of political thought* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 237.

extremism, other than holding radical thoughts, has potential to be conducive to the acts of terrorism.⁵⁴

At the end of the day, it can be said that the linkage between the concept of radicalization and the concept of extremism is that radicalization is simply a ‘product of extremist thinking and/or behaviors which generate a threat to fundamental aspects of an existing and valued social order.’⁵⁵

Additionally, both the terms of ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ in the literature can also be used in relation to militant Islam or global jihad which is based on a narrative that assumes that Islam and Muslims are being persistently attacked and humiliated by the West⁵⁶ since insurgents groups in Syria like ISIL or Jabhat al-Nusra influence masses through this narrative.

Considering the motivations of becoming foreign fighters, not all foreign fighters are religiously motivated or ideologically driven radicalized individuals; instead, they might have non-violent and non-religious motivations such as seeking for adventure or becoming hero. Nevertheless, as these individuals constitute a minority, the motivations of foreign fighters in this thesis will be generalized on the basis of ideology of global jihad as sub-branch of extremism leading to becoming foreign fighter. In that sense, there is a necessity to mention the concept of *jihad* as it constitutes a base for the issue of foreign fighting.

⁵⁴ Anthony Richards, “From terrorism to ‘radicalization’ to ‘extremism’: counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?” *International Affairs* 91.2 (2015), 371.

⁵⁵ Pick, Speckhard, and Jacuch, *Home-grown terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*, 107.

⁵⁶ Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” 798.

2.4. Jihadism

The word 'jihad' emanates from the Arabic verb of *jahada* which means to strive, to struggle or to exert oneself in the path of God.⁵⁷ Jihadism or global Jihad generally means a revolt against the Westphalian order of world politics⁵⁸ and it hopes to replace the Westphalian world order with an Islamic one.⁵⁹ In the literature, jihadism predominantly refers to Sunni Muslim militancy calling for armed struggle 'in the cause of God' (*al-jihad fi sabil Allah*) with the aim of establishing Islamic regimes where God's rules, will prevail the Caliphate.⁶⁰ In the context of jihad, the world is divided between 'Dar al-Islam' -the land of Islam governed by Islamic law which is *al-sharia*- and the 'Dar al-harb'⁶¹ (the regions of war which are not under Muslim control) or 'Dar al-kufr' which is 'the land of unbelief'. However, jihad does not necessarily require fighting with non-Muslims until all territories in the world becomes *Dar al-Islam*. Although the governments in Dar al-harb are not considered as legitimate entities, Muslims do not fight with them all the time since jihad cannot imply conversion by force⁶² as also Qur'an (2:256) states that "There is no compulsion in religion."⁶³

Intellectual source of 'jihad' is based on the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb and his writings in 1960s. He evoked a revolutionary 'vanguard' of true believer in

⁵⁷ John C. Zimmerman, "Jihad, Theory and Practice: A Review Essay," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19:2 (2005), 279.

⁵⁸ Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism* (Routledge, 2014), the Introduction and part I.

⁵⁹ Bassam Tibi, "Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam," in *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses*, ed. Hillel Frisch et al. (Routledge, 2007), 19.

⁶⁰ Petter Nesser, "Ideologies of Jihad in Europe," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23.2 (2011), 174.

⁶¹ Nesser, "Ideologies of Jihad in Europe," 175.

⁶² Michael G. Knapp, "The concept and practice on Jihad in Islam." *Parameters* 33.1 (2003), 83.

⁶³ Knapp, *The Concept and Practice on Jihad in Islam*, 83.

order to excommunicate and fight the *jahiliyyah* (the ignorant Egyptian regime) since *jahili* regime failed to establish Islamic law of *Sharia* by practicing Western institutional structure in the 1960s.⁶⁴ Later, the internationalization of jihadism happened in 1980s with participation of the Arab mujahedin⁶⁵ (a person who engages in jihad) to anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. With this development, as Nesser argues, Egyptian socio-revolutionary ideas which traced back to Sayyid Qutb combined with the Saudi branch of Salafism based on Wahhabi doctrine in the course of time and ‘Salafi-jihadist’ movement evolved and expanded with its networks throughout the Muslim world as well as in the West and in Europe.⁶⁶ Thus, the world has witnessed the internationalization of jihadism as a movement.

Considering the issue of foreign fighters as a global reflection of jihad, it is necessary to mention about the way how to perform jihad and warfare globally. As Wiktorowicz mentions, there are mainly two types of global jihad in Islamic jurisdiction which are ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ jihad.⁶⁷ The offensive jihad purposes the spread of the religion of Islam through the *dar al-harb* (domain of war) whereas the defensive jihad (*jihad al-dafa’a*) is about self-defense of the faith of Islam and promotes ‘just war theory’.⁶⁸ The offensive jihad is collective action of all Muslims (*fard kafiye*) whereas the defensive jihad is all about the responsibility of each individual Muslim (*fard ayn*) to react and to struggle on the basis of just war theory (which refers to religious justification and legitimization for engaging war in the definition of jihad) when or if Muslim communities (*ummah*) are threatened.⁶⁹ Today’s jihad as it is case in the participation of foreign

⁶⁴ Nesser, “Ideologies of Jihad in Europe,” 174.

⁶⁵ It is also referred as the ‘Arab Afghans’.

⁶⁶ Nesser, “Ideologies of Jihad in Europe,” 174.

⁶⁷ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A genealogy of radical Islam,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28.2 (2005), 83.

⁶⁸ Wiktorowicz, “A genealogy of radical Islam,” 83.

⁶⁹ John C. Zimmerman, “Jihad, Theory and Practice: A Review Essay,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19.2, 280.

fighters to ISIL is mostly related with the defensive jihad which embraces the responsibility of an individual Muslim to jihad and religious justification of jihad.

It is equally important to mention ‘salafi-jihadism’ in the context of the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq following the Syrian Crisis in 2011 in order to understand one of the motivations of these people. Nesser categorizes the salafi-jihadism into two types which are ‘classical jihad’ and ‘global jihad’. Whereas classical jihad aims to build Islamic regimes and states by struggling against *Dar al-harp* or *Dar al-kufr* which was the case in the Afghan War of Liberation in the 1980s, the global jihad is the armed struggles against all the enemies of the Muslims in the world specifically with the aim of eliminating the Western (the U.S. and Europe) interference in the Islamic states.⁷⁰ For instance, today’s world has been witnessing ‘global jihad’ with the rapid advance and truly global appeal of the so-called Islamic State in the Levant. Furthermore, since jihad itself is considered as the religious duty of all Muslims in the name of *Allah*, *hijra* becomes significant in expressing this duty. Hijra as an Arabic word historically means ‘emigration’ evoking the Prophet Muhammad’s escape from Mecca as a land of fear to Medina as a land of safety in the name of establishing an Islamic State.⁷¹ This event of the Prophet Muhammad’s escape becomes an inspiring symbol for foreign fighters to take action for their journey to insurgent groups in Syria, such as ISIL.

2.5. Literature on the Process of Radicalization

Although the subject of foreign fighters is not a new issue, the literature on this issue is not extensive due to some limitations such as lack of information about the profiles of foreign fighters. For this reason, the literature that theorizing the radicalization is generally conceptualized without any reference to empirical

⁷⁰ Nesser, “Ideologies of Jihad in Europe,” 175.

⁷¹ Anita Perešin, “Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9.3 (2015), 34.

evidence such as the interviews with extremists in the field.⁷² For this reason, studying the literature in the radicalization processes of extremists, like a member of terrorist networks or homegrown terrorist can give an insight regarding what causes or conditions lead one to become radicalized. For this respect, this chapter attempts to explain firstly what has been written regarding the process of radicalization and then certain approaches that clarify the root causes of radicalization in order to find out what causes are more influential in transforming someone into foreign fighters and what roles internal dynamics of certain countries or regions play in the process of radicalization, as well.

Indeed, there is no universal explanation regarding how a person becomes radicalized and adopts acts of violence; however, the literature on the process of radicalization might enable us to understand what dynamics might play a role in radicalization process, other than theorizing the radicalization. In this respect, the literature mainly consists of two approaches in explaining these processes as either a process of *behavioral radicalization* or of *cognitive radicalization*. Whereas behavioral radicalization is seen as the process leading to acts of violence, cognitive radicalization, so-called ‘other relate radicalization’, is considered as a process which ‘individuals support political ideas diametrically opposed to a society’s mainstream belief.’⁷³

For instance, Borum proposes in his article of ‘*Understanding the Terrorist Mindset*’ four stages in explaining how a person becomes radicalized and his analysis is based on psychological explanations of radicalization. According to him, the moment that person identifies some unfavorable conditions by opposing something as saying ‘*it is not right*’; it constitutes the first stage of the

⁷² Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher, "Examining the role of religion in radicalization to violent Islamist extremism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35.12 (2012), 849.

⁷³ Marcello Flores, “Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A Historical Survey,” *Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond*, TMC Asser Press, 2016, 2.

radicalization.⁷⁴ This opposition or rejection might emanate from economic (e.g. unemployment or economic discrimination) or social (e.g. governmental restriction on individual freedom) reasons. Next stage is to frame these undesirable conditions as an ‘injustice’ or ‘*as being not fair*’.⁷⁵ Then, for this unjust or unfair condition, individuals start to blame specific groups with the feeling of resentment and come to the third stage of ‘*it is your fault*’. Lastly, he argues that these individuals generate negative feelings towards specific groups and consider them as responsible for all the injustice that they experienced. For this reason, these individuals describe a responsible party as ‘evil’ (you’re evil) and demonize the enemy: thus, violence and aggression towards them becomes legitimized in their eyes.⁷⁶

Similarly, Silber and Bhatt, two senior analysts from NYPD’s Intelligence Division, also propose a four-stage model of radicalization based on Jihadi-Salafi ideology by analyzing five prominent homegrown terrorists in North America and Western Europe. They proposed four distinct phases: ‘*self-radicalization*’, ‘*self-identification*’, ‘*indoctrination*’ and ‘*jihadization*’. First phase of ‘*self-radicalization*’ refers to an individual’s prior experience that has possibly urged radicalization. Silber and Bhatt assume that these individuals are likely to be young, male, from middle-class families, often educated, second or third generation immigrants or recent converts to Islam.⁷⁷ Second phase is ‘*self-identification*’ which is largely influenced by certain personal factors such as economic (e.g. losing a job), social (e.g. alienation, identity crisis), political (e.g. international conflict involving Muslims) or personal (e.g. death in the close

⁷⁴ Randy Borum, "Understanding the terrorist mindset," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (2003), 7.

⁷⁵ Borum, "Understanding the terrorist mindset," 8.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, and Senior Intelligence Analysts, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: Police Department, 2007), 23.

family) reasons.⁷⁸ Third phase of ‘*indoctrination*’ is about the intensification of Jihadi-Salafi ideology without question as the suitable ground exists after the self-identification stage. With the indoctrinated radical views, individuals are getting to be inclined to extremism in the line of Salafi ideology.⁷⁹ And, at final stage of ‘*jihadization*’, individuals declare themselves to be ‘holy warrior or mujahedeen’ and accept jihad as an individual obligation.⁸⁰

On the other hand, Wiktorowicz finds that a process of persuasion lies at the heart of extremist people’s decision to join the Islamist movement.⁸¹ He tried to theorize one’s decision to join radical Islamic movement through the cases of the members of Al-Muhajiroun movement (Britain-based and banned Salafi jihadi terrorist organization). He does not use a word of ‘radicalization’ in his explanations; instead, he defines four processes that lead to join an Islamist group in the UK; and, these are cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization.⁸² ‘*Cognitive opening*’ is about surfacing of prior socialization crisis which might be categorized as economic (losing a job), social/cultural (racism, humiliation, sense of cultural weakness), or political (repression, political discrimination).⁸³ These experiences can make one receptive to alternative or extremist ideas. In the second stage, he assumes that cognitive opening leads to ‘*religious seeking*’ which is a process in which person finds satisfactory paths in

⁷⁸ Silber and Bhatt, and Senior Intelligence Analysts, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 30.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 36.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 43.

⁸¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam,” *The Roots of Islamic Radicalism conference, Yale. Devji, F (2005) Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality and Modernity (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. 2004)*, 1.

⁸² Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam,” 1.

⁸³ Ibid, 8.

religion to resolve certain discontent and resentment.⁸⁴ Through finding meaning in religion, a person arrives at the third stage which is '*frame alignment*' which means that person starts feeling close to the groups' ideas and worldviews. At the last stage of '*socialization and joining*', he assumes that person gets fully involved in the groups' activities by deeply learning the movement's ideology through study group, one-on-one interactions, discussions, or protests.⁸⁵

Sageman also proposes four stages of radicalization: '*a sense of moral outrage*' which is about perceiving events as moral violations such as killings or rapes of Muslims, '*a specific interpretation of the world*' which is more likely the interpretation that the West is engaging in a war against Islam, '*a resonance with personal experience*' like experiencing discrimination or deprivation, and lastly '*mobilization through networks*'.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ John Lofland and Rodney Stark, "Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective," *American Sociological Review* (1965), 868.

⁸⁵ Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam," 10.

⁸⁶ Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618.1 (2008), 223-231.

Table 2.1 Models of Radicalization⁸⁷

Author	Stages or Factors
Borum (2003)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Social and Economic Deprivation 2. Inequality and Resentment 3. Blame and Attribution 4. Stereotyping and Demonizing the Enemy
Wiktorowicz (2004)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cognitive Opening 2. Religious Seeking 3. Frame Alignment 4. Socialization
Silber and Bhatt (2007)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pre-radicalization 2. Self-identification 3. Indoctrination 4. Jihadization
Sageman (2008)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sense of Moral Outrage 2. Frame Used to Interpret the World 3. Resonance with Personal Experience 4. Mobilization through Networks

As Table 2.1. displays, these findings demonstrate that there is no one single, precise pathway to radicalization because of the fact that the nature of

⁸⁷ Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23.4 (2011), 605.

radicalization is multifaceted. Also, it is obvious that there may be various different determinant causes that make a person more inclined to be radicalized or extremist.

2.6. Literature on the Root Causes of Radicalization

This part will focus on the available literature on the root causes of radicalization. As there is no one precise pathway to radicalization with respect to becoming foreign fighters, there are several causes in the process of radicalization of an individual. While some scholars focus on socioeconomic and psychological problems of an individual and certain ideology as a root cause for radicalization, others claim that the lost identity or having particular social networks that the individuals live in might result in radicalization. Therefore, this study will group possible causes of radicalization as follows: ‘*socioeconomic, ideological and psychological causes*’, ‘*the lost identity*’, ‘*socialization in the radical networks*’, and ‘*empiricism*’.

2.6.1. Socioeconomic, Ideological and Psychological Causes of Radicalization

Stewart argues that existing horizontal inequalities, having economic, social and political dimensions, among the groups affect immensely individuals’ well-being, economic efficiency and social stability; for that matter, these inequalities might lead to violent conflicts among the groups.⁸⁸ Especially, socioeconomic disadvantages or inequalities that Muslim communities have faced with in Europe such as low level of income, unemployment, deficiency in education and housing as well as the lack of cultural recognition in terms of national holiday or cultural dress code have huge impact on discontentedness of a person.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Frances Stewart, “A global view of horizontal inequalities: Inequalities experienced by Muslims worldwide,” (2009), 4.

⁸⁹ Stewart, “A global view of horizontal inequalities: Inequalities experienced by Muslims worldwide,” 7.

Additionally, some scholars like Atran and Davis point to the relevance of ideologies as one of the causes of radicalization by arguing that ‘unembodied ideologies and doctrines, such as established texts or pronouncements, appear to have little relevance to understanding the formation and development of terrorist acts.’⁹⁰

For psychological causes of radicalization, some scholars like John Horgan⁹¹ and Randy Borum try to explain radicalization and terrorism by looking at the psychology of individuals. As this approach is based on the ‘individual-actor’ explanation, it attempts to clarify ‘how grievances and vulnerabilities of an individual are transformed into hatred and impetus for violence.’⁹²

According to Horgan, engaging in terrorist activities or joining in jihadist movement is a complex psychosocial process in which three distinct phases exist; becoming involved, being involved and disengaging.⁹³ For Horgan’s explanation of the root causes to become involved in terrorist activities, ‘the presence of some emotional vulnerabilities’ like the feeling of alienation or exclusion from the society, ‘the dissatisfaction with the current political activities in a given society’, ‘the identification with victims’ (for instance, personal victimization with ISIL victims in the Syria Crisis), or ‘the existing kinship or social ties with terrorist activities’ might be one of the psychosocial root causes of radicalization.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Scott Atran and Richard Davis, “Executive Summary,” in *Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization: Understanding the Evolution of Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe Pathways to Violence in Marginalized Diaspora*, August 2009. In Daniela Pisoiu, “Coming to Believe “Truths” About Islamist Radicalization in Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25.2 (2013), 249.

⁹¹ John Horgan, “Understanding Terrorist Motivation: A Socio-Psychological Perspective,” *Mapping Terrorism Research. State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (2007), 106-126.

⁹² Randy Borum, “Understanding Terrorist Psychology,” in Andrew Silke (ed.), *The Psychology of Counterterrorism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 5.

⁹³ Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” 80.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 84-85.

2.6.2. The Lost Identity as a Cause of Radicalization

Some scholars, most famous of whom are Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar, and Olivier Roy claim that radicalization is not a result of any classical socioeconomically marginalization emanating from economic deprivation, the lack of education or any political repression that people reside in. Instead, they argue that radicalization occurs as individuals seek to ‘reconstruct lost identity in a perceived hostile world.’⁹⁵ This approach is highly related with the cognitive radicalization of a person who radicalizes against the society which s/he lives in.

In French sociology, scholars such as Olivier Roy explicitly reject any explanation of the radicalization based on poverty, exclusion, racism or acculturation as they are not specific enough.⁹⁶ Though he accepts that frustration is apparently a key element or factor in the process of radicalization, he insists that psychological reasons are meaningful and significant than social or economic dimension.⁹⁷

As the analysis of this approach applies in Europe, the French sociology tries to give explanation within the context of Europe. For instance, this approach argues that especially second and third generation of Muslim immigrants in Europe have problems in adopting themselves to the European society due to cultural differences between where they reside in and where they originate from. For this reason, within French sociology, it is claimed that these Muslim immigrants are in identity crisis due to the fact that they do experience various form of ‘discrimination’ and ‘socioeconomic disadvantages’ and Khosrokhavar⁹⁸ and Roy⁹⁹ labelled this as ‘a double sense of non-belonging.’¹⁰⁰ Thus, within French

⁹⁵ Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” 799.

⁹⁶ Olivier Roy, “Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe,” *European Islam. Challenges for public policy and society*, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (2008), 55.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 55.

⁹⁸ Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs* (UK: Pluto Press, 2005), 185.

⁹⁹ Olivier Roy, “Den globaliserede Islam [L’islam mondialisé, 2002], oversat af Manni Crone,” *Preben Neistgaard Hansen & Kamma Skov, København: Forlaget Vandkunsten* (2004), 193.

sociology, global jihad is an answer and cure to the existing problem of search for an identity, meaning and dignity as ‘substitute identity’.¹⁰¹

Additionally, Olivier Roy argues in his book of ‘*Globalized Islam*’ that since one third of the world Muslims live in the Western countries, this constitutes a ‘deterritorialization of Islam’ which leads to an ‘individualization of a faith’ as the individuals interpret Islam by one’s own and these individuals embrace wide range of different identities other than ‘being foreigner’ in Western countries.¹⁰² Similarly, he argues that “there is a stress on the self, a quest for personal realization and an individual reconstruction of attitudes towards religion; so, faith is more important than dogma.”¹⁰³ At the end, embracing different identities and individualization of religion might turn into fundamental actions of these individuals. Also, this individualization of faith in a fundamental manner might explain the reason why well-off, middle-class and well-educated people like Muhammed Emwazi (so-called Jihadi John)¹⁰⁴ in the UK became radicalized and ended up being foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Therefore, the contribution of Kepel, Roy, and Khosrakhavar to literature on the radicalization specifically in Europe is the ability to explain why radical Islam also appeals to the members of a well-off, seemingly well-integrated Muslim

¹⁰⁰ Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” 800.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 801.

¹⁰² Gertjan Dijkink, “Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah,” *GeoJournal* 67.4 (2006), 377-379.

¹⁰³ Dijkink, “Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. The Search for a New Ummah,” 377-379.

¹⁰⁴ Muhammad Emwazi labelled as ‘Jihadi John’ after he joined ISIL and showed up in the ruthless beheading videos of ISIL with his British accent. He was born in Kuwait in 1988 and went to the UK in 1994. grew up in West London and graduated from college with a degree in computer programming from the University of Westminster in 2009 (For more information see, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/jihadi-john-the-islamic-state-killer-behind-the-mask-is-a-young-londoner/2015/02/25/d6dbab16-bc43-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html and <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31641569>)

middle classes and individuals with no lack of education, job opportunities, or resources to engage in politics.¹⁰⁵

2.6.3. Socialization in the Radical Network as a Cause of Radicalization

Another group of scholars, such as Quintan Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman, claims that radicalization occurs in a social network and is highly related to ‘who you know.’¹⁰⁶ For this approach, social relations such as friendship, kinship, relations with terrorist organizations or specific organizational affiliation are keys for radicalization of an individual as radicalization easily realizes in a like-minded group which the shared ideas, perceptions and thinking can easily be transmitted. Similarly, in the book *‘Leaderless Jihad: Terror Network in the Twenty-First Century’* in which the individuals affiliated with Osama bin Laden were examined, Sageman rejected the views that radicalization occurs due to predisposed characters or psychological disorder of individuals or simply societal dynamics where they live. Instead, he argues that radicalization comes to light within social networks¹⁰⁷ through close personal bonds like friendship or kinship and this takes place in the four stages.

As seen in the radicalization stages offered by Quintan Wiktorowicz, he also inquires the process of radicalization within social movement theory. Similar to Marc Sageman, Quintan Wiktorowicz claims that ‘engaging in violence or acts of any kind of terrorism requires social network in order for perceived cost-benefit calculation’;¹⁰⁸ moreover, socialization is utmost important in the radicalization as it enables to ‘diminish self-interest and increase the value of group loyalty of a

¹⁰⁵ Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," 800.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 801.

¹⁰⁷ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

¹⁰⁸ Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.”

person'.¹⁰⁹ However, social movement and network theory do not offer precise empirical explanation regarding what factors leads to radicalism. Instead, it gives utmost importance to the social ties and social processes in the path to radicalization.

2.7. Empiricism

As the patterns of radicalization change case by case and depend on various determinants such as the inspiration of a particular terrorist organization, civil war, crisis or simply religious reasons, case-study-driven approach or empiricism comes to the forefront. This approach argues that micro-level, systemic and empirical studies are needed to understand radicalization; thus, this approach does not embrace any particular theoretical framework and generalization. Instead, it contributes with additional empirical data and country-by-country assessments on factors and processes of radicalization.¹¹⁰ Although the biggest limitation of this approach is to get information and data regarding the profiles of radicalized individuals and what factors are penetrative in their inner world or their tendency towards radicalization, empiricist scholars like Peter Nesser, Slootman and Tillie, Frank Buijs, Frooukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy try to collect data from a number of cases in particular region or country based on observable factors and try to reach a conclusion on a specific case.

For instance, Peter Nesser studies radicalization across Europe whereas Slootman and Tillie pick a certain country –the Netherlands- in search for what factors can be decisive or triggering factors in a single country. As each region or country is solely examined in empiricism or case-study-driven approach so as to reflect different patterns of radicalization, it is possible to say that empiricist approach do offer a more nuanced view of different motivations of radicalization; thus, they do

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," 806.

contribute more than the other approaches in order to better assess different explanations of the process of radicalization in a particular region or country.

In this respect, Peter Nesser, one of the earliest empiricists, states that ‘stressing single factor explanations such as socioeconomics, psychological predisposition, brainwashing, mental programming and so forth causes oversimplification in analyzing radicalization,’ so, he argues that ‘different types of terrorist become radicalized for different reasons and in different ways.’¹¹¹ According to the argument of Peter Nesser, radicalization is a combination of causes in Europe. He assumes that combinations of ‘personal problems, social frustrations and grievances, deprivation and yearning for identity, adventure and youth rebellion, and political grievances related to Europe, the Muslim world as well as global politics cause radicalization.’¹¹²

Considering the root causes of radicalization, Peter Nesser was able to identify certain type of profiles or personalities who radicalized in Europe. He makes an in depth analysis of four different personality types which helps to understand internal dynamics of jihadist cell structures in Europe. He identifies the *entrepreneur/leader*- who makes things happen with his/her charismatic personality with an activist mindset and ideas rather than personal complaint and is, the *protégé*- who is someone that the entrepreneur trusts to give responsibilities, the *misfit*- who has criminal or trouble background and has tendency for violence and radicalization; and lastly, the *drifter*- who is unconsciously going with the flow; in other words, someone who is not ideologically driven in the process of radicalization.¹¹³ Thus, these typologies that Peter Nesser pointed out show that different personality for different reasons can

¹¹¹ Petter Nesser, “How does Radicalization Occur in Europe,” *Second Inter-Agency Radicalization Conference. US Department of Homeland Security. Washington, DC. Vol. 10. (2006), 1.*

¹¹² Nesser, “How does Radicalization Occur in Europe,” 3-4.

¹¹³ Petter Nesser, “Structures of Jihadist Terrorist Cells in the UK and Europe,” *Proceedings of the joint FFI/King’s college conference on “The Changing Faces of Jihadism. (Kings College: London, 2006), 2-3.*

be radicalized in different paths. For the motivations of these personalities, he says that for the *misfits* and the *drifters* are motivated to be radicalized because of social grievance emanating from the lack of social, political and economic integration of particularly the alienated and disfranchised immigrants¹¹⁴ whereas the entrepreneur or the leader as leading force in recruiting others is committed to social issues, politics and demands respect from his surroundings. For these reasons, he argued that ‘politics is the most significant driving force behind jihad in Europe’¹¹⁵

Similarly, Weggemans, Bakker and Grol also prefer to study radicalization in the Netherlands by collecting concrete empirical data and examples through interviews of certain individuals in order to gain better understanding of the radicalization processes for engaging in violence. They studied five Dutch jihadist foreign fighters who joined jihad in Syria and attempted to provide explanatory study regarding their motivations, ethnic background, percentage, percentage of converts to Islam, socioeconomic background and region of residence.¹¹⁶ They found for Dutch jihadists that ‘an increased interest in religion, low level socioeconomic background and living in bad neighborhood, being exposed to traumatic experiences and the feelings of apathy together with the lack of meaningfulness in their life’ are generally common features in the radicalization process.¹¹⁷

Although the explanations offered by ‘*socioeconomic, ideological and psychological causes*’, ‘*the lost identity*’, ‘*socialization in the radical networks*’, and ‘*empiricism*’ seem varied and have certain differences, they should not

¹¹⁴ Nesser, “Structures of Jihadist Terrorist Cells in the UK and Europe,” 5.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol, “Who Are They and Why Do They Go? The Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8.4 (2014), 100-110.

¹¹⁷ Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol, “Who Are They and Why Do They Go? The Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” 107-108.

necessarily be taken as competing approaches or causes in explaining radicalization; instead, all of them should be seen as complementary due to the fact that the process of radicalization has complex nature and there are no one single paths or causes to radicalization. Rather, it is a complex combination of different, several causes. Similarly, McCauley and Moskalenko say that there is unlikely that any single approach on the causes of radicalization can integrate all the causes that result in radical actions because of the fact that in every individual's trajectory to radicalization is diverse and multiple in its nature.¹¹⁸ However, it is very clear that some factors may be more influential than the others in a certain country or region in the process of radicalization. By applying different approaches outlined in this chapter, this thesis will try to pinpoint which factors seem to be more influential in generating the Nordic countries' high percentage of foreign fighters per Muslim population.

¹¹⁸ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism," *Terrorism and political violence* 20.3 (2008), 429.

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA

3.1. The Issue of Foreign Fighters in Europe

This chapter will trace the evolution of foreign fighters in Europe after the Syrian Conflict erupted in 2011. After a short introduction to the Syrian Conflict, the chapter will analyze the issue of foreign fighters in Europe by breaking the available data on regional and sub-regional basis. Thus, it aims to provide a clearer picture of the situation at hand. Finally, the chapter will survey the current debate on ‘Islam in Europe’ and will examine the impact of increased presence of Islam on the rise of far right in Europe.

3.1.1. The Syrian Conflict of 2011

Following the waves of Arab Spring starting from the year of 2010 in Tunisia, Syria also experienced the vast, peaceful demonstrations and protests in demand of more representation in a democratic environment in March 2011. All the peaceful demonstrations and protests that were carried out in the Southern city of Daraa of Syria turned into the bloody internal conflict between the forces of the Assad regime and those who opposed to his authoritarian and repressive rule. In a short period of time, the situation has been worsened by a staggering death toll as the anti-regime protest turned into an insurgency. Considering the horrifying humanitarian costs, the UN Human Rights Data Analysis Group has reported by June 2013 that 92,901 killings were identified during the conflict.¹¹⁹ However, the

¹¹⁹ Megan Price, et al. “Updated statistical analysis of documentation of killings in the Syrian Arab Republic,” *Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Geneva* (2014). <https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/HRDAG-Updated-SY-report.pdf> [accessed at 06.03.2015]

number climbed up to more than 191,300 by August 2014, according to the United Nations.¹²⁰ In addition to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, the Syria Crisis has proven that it led to highly complex socio-political problems caused by a combination of dissatisfied and unpleasant Syrians, Western powers that were frustrated with the Syrian government policies and allies, an opportunist East and thousands of jihadists, according to Khashanah.¹²¹ Therefore, the Syrian Crisis has produced far-reaching consequences on the surrounding region with the deadly confrontation between the Assad forces and the opposition groups in Syria and the mass refugee influx to the neighboring countries. Additionally, the Syrian government has not been so successful to provide stability to the region; instead, the region has experienced the chaotic power vacuum which flourished the advance of the offensive and armed insurgencies led by either ISIL or al-Nusra Front. These developments have influenced not only neighboring countries or the region but also entire world since the militancy resulted from the Syria's worsening civil war has appealed to many people all around the world in terms of foreign involvement into the ongoing conflict and fostered deeper radicalization with the emergence of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq. To sum, the Syrian Conflict has become an incubator for transnational terrorism with the effects on the influx of foreign fighters to Syria and their eventual return to their home countries and their strong radical appeal to the world.

3.1.2. The Number of Foreign Fighters Flowing to Syria

According to the report of the Central Intelligence Service in September 2014, the number of foreign fighters joining ISIL could be between 20,000 and 31,500,

¹²⁰ "Syrian civil war death toll rises to more than 191,300, according to UN," *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/syria-civil-war-death-toll-191300-un> [accessed at 06.03.2015]

¹²¹ Khaldoun Khashanah, "The Syrian Crisis: A Systemic Framework," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 7.1 (2014), 2.

coming from approximately 80 various countries.¹²² In February 2015, the New York-based Soufan Group¹²³ and the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)¹²⁴ assumed that nearly 5000 of those foreign fighters joined ISIL from major Western European countries such as Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. In April 2015, the UN estimated the latest number of those who have flowed to join the militant groups in Syria and Iraq as being which more than 25,000 foreign fighters from 100 nations and this number soared by %71 between mid-2014 and March 2015.¹²⁵ In order to provide a clear understanding of this complex issue of foreign fighters who have join fighting in Syria, the data presented in the Table 3.1 below have been gathered from various available sources. All of the numbers of foreign fighters are taken from ICSR in order to be consistent throughout the study. Similarly, despite the fact that there is lack of statistics on Muslim or other religious/ethnic minorities living in Europe, especially the Nordic states, the number of Muslims population living in European countries are taken from the book of “Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol.5” published in 2014. As mentioned above, the major difference of this particular study which differentiate it from other recent studies that focus on foreign fighters in Europe and elsewhere, it focuses on the percentage of foreign fighters in the Muslim population of a given country rather than ranking countries according to their rough number of foreign fighters. Therefore, while the second group of studies find that France has

¹²² Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford, and Chelsea J. Carter, “ISIS can 'muster' between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters, CIA says,” *CNN*, *September 12* (2014). <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/>.

¹²³ Richard Barrett, *Foreign fighters in Syria*, The Soufan Group. (2014).

¹²⁴ Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” *ICSR Insight* 25 (2015), 26. <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/>.

¹²⁵ “UN says '25,000 foreign fighters' joined Islamist militants,” *BBC News*, April 2, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541>.

produced the highest number of foreign fighters to date¹²⁶, this study finds out that Finland has generated the highest number of foreign fighters from among its own Muslim population.

Table 3.1 The Number of Foreign Fighters of a given Country and Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslims Population (%)

Country	FFs	Total Population	Estimated Muslim Population ¹²⁷	Estimated Percentage of Population that is Muslim ¹²⁸	Estimated Percentage of FFs in Muslim population %
Finland	50-70	5.400,000	60,000-65,000	just above 1%	0.096%
Belgium	440	11,323,973	410,000-450,000	4%	0.093%
Denmark	100-150	5,600,000	250,800	4.5%	0.049%
Ireland	30 ¹²⁹	Around 5 million	65,000	1.1%	0.046%
Sweden	150-180	9,550,000	350,000-400,000 (375,000)	4%	0.044%
Norway	60	5,000,000	220,000	4.5%	0.027%

¹²⁶ The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, 12.

¹²⁷ Nielsen, Jørgen, et al., eds. *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*. Vol. 6. (Brill, 2014).

¹²⁸ These figures are based on estimates that calculate immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration.

¹²⁹ It is negligible amount of FFs in comparison to other European countries.

Table 3.1 (continued)

Netherlands	200-250	14,775,862 ¹³⁰	825,000	5.8%	0.027%
France	1200	66,553,766	4,704,000	7.5	0.025%
Austria	100-150	8,333,330	500,000	6%	0.025%
Serbia	50-70	7,498,001	239,658	3.2%	0.025%
United Kingdom	500-600	56,250,000 ¹³¹	2,700,000	4.8%	0.020%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	3,871,643	1,548,657	40%	0.019%
Germany	500-600	80,854,408	3,800,000- 4,300,000	3.7%	0.013%
Switzerland	40	8,200,000	450,000	5.5%	0.0088%
Kosovo	100-150	1,815,606	1,742,981	96%	0.0071%
Spain	50-100	Around 47 million	1,335,419	2.8%	0.0056%
Albania	90	2,800,000	1,646,236	58.79%	0.0054%
Italy	80	60,000,000	1.5-2.2 million (1,850,000)	2.5%- 3.5%	0.0043%
Macedonia	12	2,022,547	660,492	31%	0.0018%

¹³⁰ The Netherlands does not hold a census of its population; instead, certain institutions do have a long tradition of statistics. The numbers are mainly based on self-identification surveys. Jørgen Nielsen, et al., eds. *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, Vol. 6, (Brill, 2013), 439.

¹³¹ It excluded Northern Ireland and Scotland. Jørgen Nielsen, et al., eds. *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, Vol. 6 (Brill, 2014), 681.

As the numbers show, the amount of foreign fighters pouring to Syria from Europe is very substantial to deepen the security threat further in Europe due to existence of a considerable number of Muslims in Europe. This situation has also alarmed the world because foreign fighters' mobilization in Syria has surpassed the large mobilization in Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s¹³² which had had the greatest impact on foreign fighters' ideology, operational tactics including advance technology for urban warfare,¹³³ and recruitment propaganda with improved communications technology up until now.

3.1.3. The Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim Population in Given Countries

As indicated above, the majority of foreign fighters traveling to Syria come from four Western European countries: France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Belgium. Despite of the fact that Western European countries have produced the highest number of foreign fighters in Europe, some smaller countries such as Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Netherlands have produced more foreign fighters proportional to their Muslim population as indicated in the table below. It can be concluded that although Western European countries have the highest number of foreign fighters in total, abovementioned countries (mainly Nordic countries) seem to have more potential to produce foreign fighters relative to their Muslim population.

In order to better examine the issue, this chapter will look into the foreign fighters' percentages in a given Muslim populations of the sub-regions in Europe: mainly the Southeastern Europe, Western Europe and Nordic countries.

¹³² Neumann, "Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s," 26.<http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/>.

¹³³ Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, *Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq*, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper 34 (2014), 5.

In the Southeastern Europe, there are 617 estimated foreign fighters¹³⁴ as shown in the Table 3.2 below. Out of this number, around 50-70 fighters come from Serbia, 330 fighters from Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 100-150 fighters from Kosovo, 90 fighters from Albania and 12 fighters from Macedonia. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina have produced the highest foreign fighters in number, Serbia ranks at the top in a sense that it has produced more foreign fighters in percentage among its Muslim population. Considering the total number of foreign fighters in the Southeastern Europe (617) and its proportion to Muslim populations of the Southeastern European countries (around 5,838,024 Muslims), the estimated percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of these countries is 0.010% which makes the Southeastern Europe region the least radicalized sub-region of Europe in comparison to Western Europe and Nordic countries.

Table 3.2 The Foreign Fighters Numbers in the Southeastern Europe and Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim Population in a Given Country

The Southeastern Europe	The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters	Estimated Muslim Population	Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim population in a given country
Serbia	50-70	239,658	0.025%
Bosnia	330	1,548,657	0.019%
Kosovo	100-150	1,742,981	0.0071%
Albania	90	1,646,236	0.0054%
Macedonia	12	660,492	0.0018%
Total	617	5,838,024	0.010%

¹³⁴ Neumann, "Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s," 26.

Secondly, for Western Europe, there are 3285 estimated foreign fighters. When ranked according to the percentages of foreign fighters in their Muslim population as displayed in the Table 3.3 below; Belgium ranks first with around 400 fighters which is the highest percentage of foreign fighters compared to other countries in the region with 0.093%. Ireland comes the second with 30 fighters (having second highest percentage in the region with 0.046%; but, it must be noted that the amount of foreign fighters is negligible in comparison the other Western European countries). They are followed by around 200-250 fighters from the Netherlands with 0.027%, 1200 fighters from France with 0.025%, around 100-150 fighters from Austria with 0.025%, 500-600 fighters from United Kingdom with 0.020%, around 500-600 fighters from Germany with 0.013%, 40 fighters from Switzerland with 0.0088%, around 50-100 fighters from Spain with 0.013%, and 80 fighters from Italy with 0.043%. Considering the total number of foreign fighters in Western Europe (3285) and its proportion to its Muslim populations of the Western European countries (around 16,876,419 Muslims), the estimated percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of these countries is 0.019%. This number shows that radicalization is more likely to occur in Western European countries than the Southeastern European countries.

Table 3.3 The Foreign Fighters Numbers in Western Europe and Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim Population in a Given Country

Western Europe	The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters from Western Europe	Estimated Muslim Population	Estimated Percentage of FFs in Muslim Population %
Belgium	440	410,000-450,000	0.093%
Ireland	30 (negligible)	65,000	0.046%
The Netherlands	200-250	825,000	0.027%

Table 3.3 (continued)

France	1,200	4,704,000	0.025%
Austria	100-150	500,000	0.025%
United Kingdom	500-600	2,700,000	0.020%
Germany	500-600	3,800,000- 4,300,000	0.013%
Switzerland	40	450,000	0.0088%
Spain	50-100	1,335,419	0.0056%
Italy	80	1.5-2.2 million (1,850,000)	0.0043%
Total	3285	16,876,419	0.019%

Final sub-region is the Northern Europe and the Nordic region which presents a puzzle of this thesis since it has produced the highest percentage of foreign fighters in Europe with 0.047% despite of a low number of foreign fighters in total which is 410. When ranked according to the percentages of foreign fighters among their Muslim populations as displayed in the Table 3.4 below; with around 50-70 fighters, Finland has the highest percentage of foreign fighters among other countries in the region with 0.096%. It is followed by around 100-150 fighters from Denmark with 0.049%, around 150-180 fighters from Sweden with 0.044%, and 60 fighters from Norway with 0.027%. Considering the total number of foreign fighters in this region (410) and the proportion to the Muslim populations of these four countries (around 862,800 Muslims), the estimated percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of this region is 0.047% which is the highest proportion in all Europe.

Table 3.4 The Foreign Fighters Numbers in the Nordic Countries and Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim Population in a Given Country

Nordic Region	The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters	Estimated Muslim Population	Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim population in a given country
Finland	50-70	60,000-65,000	0.096%
Denmark	100-150	250,800	0.049%
Sweden	150-180	350,000-400,000 (375,000)	0.044%
Norway	60	220,000	0.027%
Total	410	862,800	0.047%

For this reason, this thesis will attempt to comparatively analyze the causes of radicalization by taking two sub-regions in Europe with the highest proportions in terms of producing the highest foreign fighters' percentage. In other words, it will try to examine the causes of radicalization comparatively both in Western Europe and in the Nordic region mainly by analyzing socioeconomic structures, integration problems, states' policies towards people with immigrant backgrounds, and the role of radical networks in recruiting foreign fighters. Before doing so, this chapter will provide a general discussion on the rise of Islam and far rise in Europe.

3.2. Islam in Europe

In order to better understand the dynamics between Islam and Europe, this part tries to situate Islam within the European context by also analyzing the European perception of Islam.

Historically, the relationship between Islam and Europe has been ‘principally based on a dual foundation of conflict and distrust’.¹³⁵ It seems that this existing distrust and conflict are both in cultural and political senses. For instance, Shyrock claims that many Europeans today consider the increasing Muslim existence in their countries as an invasion of their cultural spaces where are historically Christian and politically secular.¹³⁶ It can be said that this cultural and political divergences in nature contributes to the creation of defining themselves for Europeans as ‘self’ and Muslims as ‘other.’ In this context, Laskier argues that ‘European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.’¹³⁷ For this reason, it can be argued that European spirit has been formed to position itself against ‘Oriental other’; thus, Muslim communities in Europe have been part of this ‘foundational exclusion of Oriental other.’¹³⁸ This ‘Oriental other’ simply refers to the ‘Muslim other’ within the European context and it is criticized on two areas that clash with European core values.¹³⁹ First one is that there is a suspicious in European perception in a sense that Muslims are unwilling to embrace democracy and

¹³⁵ Barrie Wharton, “Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam,” *Global Change Peace & Security* 20.1 (2008), 44.

¹³⁶ Andrew Shryock ed. *Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the politics of enemy and friend* (Indiana University Press, 2010), 15.

¹³⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3.

¹³⁸ Stringberg and Wörn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance*, 172.

¹³⁹ Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, eds. *Islam in Europe: Diversity, identity and influence* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77.

secularism because these values are foreign to Islam.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Vöcking also claims that

“Islam . . . is often viewed as religion which incompatible with the fundamental principles of European society such as democracy, secularism or human rights.”¹⁴¹

Second one is regarding the equality between men and women. The structure of the Islamic family is perceived by European society as authoritarian, patriarchic and being inclined to domestic violence as opposed to the liberated European family model.¹⁴² In relation to that, Marranci argues that the West in general and Europe in particular represent Muslims as ‘barbaric culture of a threatening transnational society in which people stone women, cut throats, beat their wives’.¹⁴³ Similarly, Shyrock claims that Europeans are culturally and historically inclined to perceive Islam and European Muslims as ‘being violent extremists, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian, hostile to democracy and equality of men and women, and committed to establishing Islamic law around the world.’¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, Muslim immigrants in Europe found themselves in a society where Judeo-Christian tradition predominates in an extremely secular way.¹⁴⁵ It seems that it is not easy to adopt an Islamic way of life in this secularized society for the Muslim immigrants in Europe where there is an ‘exclusion of Muslim

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Vöcking, *Religion and the Integration of Immigrants*, 9-22 (Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), 14.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Gabriele Marranci, “Multiculturalism, Islam and the clash of civilizations theory: rethinking Islamophobia,” *Culture and Religion* 5.1 (2004), 107.

¹⁴⁴ Shryock, *Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the politics of enemy and friend*, 2.

¹⁴⁵ Tuula Sakaranaho, *Religious freedom, multiculturalism, Islam: cross-reading Finland and Ireland* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 6.

communities from the commonality of European values.¹⁴⁶ For this reason, it may be assumed that Muslim existence in the European society might not be gain public acceptance whereas European Muslims feel out the place in Europe. Also, it is possible to say that these conflicting views constitute challenge for the societal order in Europe.

The Muslim presence in Europe mainly resulted from the massive influx of labor and other migrants from the Middle East and former colonies in Africa and Asia.¹⁴⁷ It dates back to the second half of the twentieth century. Many Muslims in the most Western European countries were recruited within the framework of either the 'guest worker' or 'postcolonial' schemes up until the mid-1970s.¹⁴⁸ This process of migration to Europe began mainly after the Second World War when Germany recruited them mostly from Turkey, France from the Maghreb, and Britain from the Commonwealth countries such as India.¹⁴⁹ Since then, most Muslim immigrants gradually came to Europe through the family reunification of the guest workers. Currently, Europe has experienced an emergence of the second and third generation of Muslims who do not have any tie with their parents' country of origin.

Now, considering the growing number of Muslim immigrants in Europe, Vöcking argues that European society has somehow become 'multireligious society, which, conversely, was neither expected nor desired.'¹⁵⁰ Today, Islam constitutes the second largest religion in Europe.¹⁵¹ By 2010, Muslim population constituted about 6% of Europe's total population and by 2030; Muslims are expected to

¹⁴⁶ Wharton, "Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam," 48.

¹⁴⁷ Frank Buijs and Jan Rath, *Muslims in Europe: The state of research*, IMISCOE, 2003, 3.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 4.

¹⁴⁹ Sakaranaho, *Religious freedom, multiculturalism, Islam: cross-reading Finland and Ireland*, 2.

¹⁵⁰ Hans Vöcking, *Religion and the Integration of Immigrants*, 9-22. Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999, 11.

¹⁵¹ Sakaranaho, *Religious freedom, multiculturalism, Islam: cross-reading Finland and Ireland*, 2.

account for 8% of Europe's population with more than 55 million Muslims, according to Pew Research Center.¹⁵² However, Muslim communities in Europe have posed a big challenge to Europe in a sense that there is a huge difficulty regarding the incorporation of these Muslim immigrants into European societies. In this context, Jonathan S. Paris claims that nowhere in the world is the "encounter between Muslims and the West sharper than in Western Europe"¹⁵³ where the immigration of Muslims is immense.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary to mention European fear of Islam with respect to the recent terrorist attacks and Islamophobia and the rise of far-right in order to understand the current dynamics between Islam and Europe.

3.2.1. European Fear of Islam

Firstly 9/11 and then Madrid Bombing in 2004 and London Bombing in 2005 have been watershed moments to resurface Islamic fear and antagonism generally in the West and particularly in Europe where a considerable number of Muslims live in. In addition to London and Madrid Bombings, Europe has shattered with the attacks organized by homegrown terrorists who have links with the ISIL or homegrown extremists in general. Recently, on January 7, 2015, three lone wolves or homegrown extremists attacked the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, as the cartoonists in this magazine depicted the Prophet Muhammad in their cartoons and this attack left 12 dead people behind.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, in the same year, on the night of Friday November 13, the simultaneous, deadly attacks in a stadium, restaurants and bars were organized in the very heart of Paris and these

¹⁵² "The Future of the Global Muslim Population, Region: Europe," *Pew Research Center*, January 27, 2011. <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/>.

¹⁵³ Jonathan S. Paris, "Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe," in *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses*, ed. Hillel Frisch et al. (Routledge, 2007), 121.

¹⁵⁴ "Paris Charlie Hebdo Attack: January 7 as It Happened," *The Telegraph*, January 7, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11332098/Paris-Charlie-Hebdo-attack-January-7-as-it-happened.html>.

attacks left 130 people dead and hundreds wounded.¹⁵⁵ Likewise, only four months later, on March 22 in 2016, this time Brussels' airport and subway system were targeted and attacked by the militant Islamists connected with ISIL, and resulted with 30 people dead.¹⁵⁶ It can be said that these events have again shattered European security system and resurfaced an existing prejudice against Muslims in popular media, discriminatory governmental policies or hate crimes.¹⁵⁷ This situation has proved a 'Europe's cycle of terrorism and Islamophobia',¹⁵⁸ by showing the challenges of integration culturally diverse populations into society. In that sense, terror events have degenerated into what can be called as 'Islamophobia' with harsh anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric which is also used by the far-right parties in Europe to gain electoral support.¹⁵⁹

Concerning the term of Islamophobia, it is described by Marranci as a 'form of racism against Muslims as well as an unfounded fear and hatred of Islam.'¹⁶⁰ Broader definition provided by Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia;

Islamophobia is an "unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against

¹⁵⁵ "Paris Attacks: What Happened in the Night," *BBC News*, December 9, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>.

¹⁵⁶ "Brussels: Islamic State Launched Attacks on Airport and Station as It Happened," *The Guardian*, April 7, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/mar/22/brussels-airport-explosions-live-updates>.

¹⁵⁷ Donald Ernst and Brian H. Bornstein, "Prejudice against Muslims," in *Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and explaining individual attitudes*, ed. Marc Helbling (Routledge, 2013).

¹⁵⁸ Jamil Jivani, "Europe's Cycle of Terrorism and Islamophobia," *The Huffington Post*, March 25, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamil-jivani/europes-cycle-of-terrorism-and-islamophobia_b_9548190.html.

¹⁵⁹ Jocelyne Cesari, *The securitisation of Islam in Europe*, Vol. 15 (CEPS, 2009), 14.

¹⁶⁰ Marranci, "Multiculturalism, Islam and the clash of civilizations theory: rethinking Islamophobia," 105.

Muslim individuals and communities, and exclusion of Muslims from main- stream political and social affairs.”¹⁶¹

In addition to the definition of Islamophobia, Runnymede Trust Commission suggests eight features of Islamophobia;

1. Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change.
2. Islam is seen as a separate ‘other.’ It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them.
3. Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist.
4. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a Clash of Civilizations.
5. Islam is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.
6. Criticisms made of 'the West' by Islam are rejected out of hand.
7. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
8. Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal.¹⁶²

In the light of these features of Islamophobia, Yilmaz argues that the extreme right-wing parties are very successful to establish Islam as ontologically and culturally incompatible with the West and to keep national focus on immigrations as an imminent threat to the Western values.¹⁶³ Also, the extreme right-wing parties have gained its popularity by using the problems of immigration,

¹⁶¹ Runnymede Trust, “Islamophobia: A challenge for us all,” *London: Runnymede Trust* (1997), 4.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 4-5.

¹⁶³ Ferruh Yilmaz, “Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe,” *Current sociology* 60.3 (2012), 368.

‘explicitly linking it to unemployment and multiculturalism as dangerous to national cohesion.’¹⁶⁴ In that sense, it can be argued that with the effect of terrorist attacks, there is a growing Islamophobic perception in Europe. In this respect, it can be said that the deadly attacks organized by Muslim people with the immigrant background in Europe has fueled European fear of Islam and this has paved the way for the rise of far right parties in Europe.

3.2.2. The Rise of Far Right in Europe

According to Hans-Georg Betz, confrontation with Islam in Europe is a central driving force in the political mobilization of various right-wing parties in Europe.¹⁶⁵ In the recent polls, far-right parties in Europe are on rise.

In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), founded in 2013, which has the manifesto of ‘Islam does not belong in Germany’, has been gaining significant ground on a wave of public discontent over the refugee crisis and homegrown terrorist attacks since the outbreak the Syrian Crisis.¹⁶⁶ While AfD won 4.7 % vote in the 2013 federal election, it won up to 25 % of the votes in Germany state election in March, 2016.¹⁶⁷ Besides in the political sphere, in the public sphere newly emerging movement called PEGIDA has emerged as xenophobic and racist movement in Germany and it claims to be against the Islamization of Germany

¹⁶⁴ Jessica Sprague-Jones, “Extreme right-wing vote and support for multiculturalism in Europe,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34.4 (2011), 539.

¹⁶⁵ Hans-Georg Betz, “Mosques, Minarets, Burqas and Other Essential Threats: The Populist Right’s Campaign against Islam in Western Europe,” in *Right-wing populism in Europe: politics and discourse*, ed. Wodak, Ruth, (A&C Black, 2013), 71.

¹⁶⁶ Justin Huggler, “Germany’s Far-Right AfD Party Has More Public Support than Ever,” *The Telegraph*, May 5, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/05/germanys-far-right-afd-party-has-more-public-support-than-ever/>.

¹⁶⁷ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right,” *The New York Times*, May 22, 2016.

with the growing influence of the immigrants.¹⁶⁸ According to Betz and Johnson, the rise of far right in the recent years in Europe has been attributable to the challenges resulted from the ‘integration problems of Muslim immigrants, which have been used as a justification for exclusion for the sake of the preservation of their Islamic identity.’¹⁶⁹

Similarly, France’s far-right party, Front National (FN) represents the highest percentage of support in the public with 28% of the votes in the first round of the local election in 2015 by exceeding its votes in 2012 which was 14%.¹⁷⁰ And in the UK, Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party, as being the right-wing and third-largest party of the UK took 13 % of the vote in elections for the British Parliament in 2015.¹⁷¹

Nordic countries have also experienced the rise of far-right parties. For example, in Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) which emerged from the Neo-Nazi movement have increased its votes due to growing frustration regarding the refugee flow to the country, government’s asylum policy and multiculturalist integration, and Muslim presence in the country.¹⁷² In the recent election in 2014, SD gained 13% of the votes while it had taken only 6% of the vote in 2010.¹⁷³ In Sweden, there is the rise of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrants sentiments with the rise of SD; for example, SD says that ‘We don’t feel at home any more, and it’s

¹⁶⁸ “Why are Thousands of Germans protesting and Who are Pegida?” *BBC*, January 13, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/30694252/why-are-thousands-of-germans-protesting-and-who-are-pegida>.

¹⁶⁹ Hans-Georg Betz and Carol Johnson, “Against the current—stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9.3 (2004), 317.

¹⁷⁰ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right.”

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Phoebe Greenwood, “Sweden Asylum Policy Fuels Support for Far-Right Nationalist Party,” *The Guardian*, November 24, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/swedish-asylum-support-far-right-nationalist-sweden-democrats>.

¹⁷³ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right.”

their fault,” by referring to Muslim immigrants in Sweden.¹⁷⁴ Likewise, Denmark’s right-wing party’s Danish Peoples Party won 21% of the votes in 2015 whereas it had taken 12% of the votes in 2011.¹⁷⁵

Furthermore, the role of media should be taken into consideration in the radicalization of European Muslims and in the formation of one’s identity which might have an impact on being ‘other’ and ‘marginalized’. Both in the UK and Germany, it cannot be easily said that mainstream media is not biased especially towards Muslim communities. According to the study of Kabir, ‘if the national media targets one particular group through constant derogatory depictions in reporting, images, headlines, that group feels marginalized.’¹⁷⁶ With this respect, the way how mainstream media depicts one particular group or issue is utmost important both in shaping public perception and in creating backlash coming from the immigrants of Muslim descendants. According to Whitaker, British media depicted Muslims in a certain way and analyzed that British press are based on ‘four very persistent stereotypes which tells us that Muslims are intolerant, misogynistic, violent or cruel, and finally, strange or different.’¹⁷⁷ It is not so different in Germany media, too. Muslims in Germany has been seen as a threat to the German culture, ‘*Leitkultur*’, and exclusively dangerous¹⁷⁸ so that Muslims are portrayed in the same way in the media. Thus, media in these countries are not immune to biased understanding of Islam which enables an environment where

¹⁷⁴ David Crouch, “The rise of the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats: ‘We don’t feel at home any more, and it’s their fault,’” *The Guardian*, December 14, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/sweden-democrats-flex-muscles-anti-immigrant-kristianstad>.

¹⁷⁵ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right.”

¹⁷⁶ Nahir Afrose Kabir, “*Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*,” (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 112.

¹⁷⁷ Brian Whitaker, “Islam and the British Press after September 11,” *Al-Bab*, June 20, 2002. <http://www.al-bab.com/media/articles/bw020620.htm>.

¹⁷⁸ Rolf Shieder, “Muslims as a Mirror,” *Der Spiegel*, August 26, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/muslims-as-a-mirror-germany-s-unhealthy-obsession-with-islam-a-781577.html>.

Muslim communities can feel as ‘other’ and segregated. In other words, media also might provoke Muslims to radicalize and have sympathized with extremist ideas due to feeling alienated from the society they live in. According to Tibi, like in the media, the discrimination and exclusion of young Muslims from the society in Germany make them susceptible to the appeal of political Islam.¹⁷⁹ And, he argues that European must stop the ‘othering’ of young Muslim community¹⁸⁰ by adopting real integration process, not a superficial one.

To sum, firstly, it can be argued that Europeans perceive the immigrant societies in Europe through the lens of religion and particularly Islamophobic understanding, which in return breeds radical attitudes among the immigrant background societies in Europe. Secondly, it might be argued that intricate relations between general perception on Islam and the existing identity crisis have led Muslim communities to soul-searching in their life with the necessity of being accepted due to their existing alienations from the society they live in. In this regard, the search for self-realization and self-fulfillment can be one of main tendencies of people to join extremist groups and to become foreign fighters. More broadly, their alienation, and segregation from the society of which they are part and their grievance make easier to be lured by the extremist ideologies and groups at the end of the day.

¹⁷⁹ Tibi, “Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam,” 29.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 30.

CHAPTER 4

THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN WESTERN EUROPE

4.1. Causes of Radicalization in Western Europe in relation to the emergence of Foreign Fighters

This chapter will attempt to scrutinize the possible causes, which might play significant roles in triggering radicalization and extremism in Europe in relation to the emergence of foreign fighters flowing to Syria since 2011. In this respect, this thesis argues that specifically for Europe, integration problems that both immigrant Muslim societies and the European states have experienced, come the forefront causing radicalization. For the integration problems, this chapter covers both identity crisis that people with immigrant background experience and the state's policy choices in terms of integration policies. Furthermore, together with integration problems, socioeconomic difficulties of the immigrant Muslim communities are also considered as significant causes. Lastly, this chapter argues that the radical social networks are also very influential in indoctrinating European Muslims with radical views in the process of recruitment. Therefore, it seems that all these causes have impacts on radicalization of European Muslims and becoming foreign fighters.

4.1.1. Socioeconomic, Ideological and Psychological Causes of Radicalization in Western Europe

The insufficient socioeconomic conditions of European Muslims migrating from commonly less-developed countries might cause radicalization and to become foreign fighters. In this context, Robin argues that generally radicalization and particularly Islamic extremism in Europe has been fed by the increasing alienation

and frustration caused by poverty, high level of unemployment, social and economic marginalization.¹⁸¹ Similarly, Yükleven argues that the social and economic disadvantages of Muslim immigrants in Europe play significant roles in making them religiously more radicalized.¹⁸² In the same line, Al-Azmeh and Fokas argue in their book titled *'Islam in Europe: Diversity, identity and influence'* that the socio-economic conditions of European Muslims in terms of the unemployment rate, the lack of education, the social differences are very vital in making European Muslims more fragile in receiving radical ideas and opinions.¹⁸³ Beside the existing socio-economic marginality, the residential segregation of European Muslims increases their receptiveness, as well.¹⁸⁴ As part of discussion on the residential segregation, Heath, Rotheron and Kilpi also argue that in most European societies, immigrant societies are inclined to reside in the areas of relatively high socially deprived neighborhoods.¹⁸⁵ Together with the existing residential segregation of immigrant societies, second generation immigrants in Europe have also difficulties and disadvantages in educational and occupational attainment as well as entry into the labor market.¹⁸⁶ However, Nesser, one of the supporters of case-driven approach, opposes to point the socioeconomic disadvantages as the causes of radicalization. He claims that

“... uncovered jihadi cells in Europe have usually consisted of a diversified group of individuals, encompassing multiple different

¹⁸¹ Robin Niblett, "Islamic extremism in Europe," *statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, April 5 (2006), 3-4.*

¹⁸² Ahmet Yükleven, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, Syracuse University Press, 2011, 37.

¹⁸³ Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, eds. *Islam in Europe: Diversity, identity and influence.* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 59.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Anthony F. Heath, Catherine Rotheron, and Elina Kilpi, "The second generation in Western Europe: Education, unemployment, and occupational attainment," *Annu. Rev. Sociol* 34 (2008), 224.

¹⁸⁶ Jessica Sprague-Jones, "Extreme right-wing vote and support for multiculturalism in Europe," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34.4 (2011), 538.

nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, ages, professions, family backgrounds and personalities. Because of this diversity, it is hard to establish the degree to which, or whether, social background variables matter in the recruitment process.”¹⁸⁷

Besides economic deprivation of Muslim communities in Europe, Yükleven argues that European Muslims have also suffered from social discrimination due to their religion which leads to further isolation within the society; thus, this situation fosters religiosity of European Muslims as the way to bolster their identity.¹⁸⁸ In that sense, the role of religion in shaping the mindset of European Muslims seems very significant.

4.1.2. Integration Problems as Causes of Radicalization in Western Europe

Irrespective of any specific European country, governing religious and cultural diversity in Europe has been a tough issue for many years. Regardless of whether a country chooses multiculturalist policies, like in the UK, and the Netherlands or different types of integration policies, as in France – so to say assimilationist policies-, generally migrants’, or exclusionist integration policies like in Germany specifically Muslims’ inclusion into societal and political life has hit the wall in many instances.¹⁸⁹ Similarly, firstly Merkel in 2010¹⁹⁰ and then Cameron¹⁹¹ and Sarkozy in 2011 announced the failure of ‘multiculturalism’ and identified

¹⁸⁷ Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe; recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe,” *Paths to Global Jihad* (2006), 11.

¹⁸⁸ Yükleven, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, 88.

¹⁸⁹ Andrea Kazan, “Homegrown Terrorist Attack: Is Europe at a higher risk than US?” *Human Security Centre*, April 10, 2015. <http://www.hscentre.org/latest-articles/homegrown-terrorist-attacks-europe-higher-risk-us/>.

¹⁹⁰ “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed,’” *The Guardian*, October 17, 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>.

¹⁹¹ “After Merkel, Cameron too says multiculturalism has failed,” *Euroactive*, February 7, 2011.

segregation and separatism as a key issue behind Islamic extremism and radicalism in Europe.¹⁹²

For years, Europe has been facing up challenges of Islamic radicalism in terms of security, including the radicalization of young Muslims, and the integration of Muslims into European societal values. In relation to Islamic radicalism and homegrown terrorism in Europe, Rabasa and Benard points out in their recent book, '*Eurojihad*' that

“Some second-generation Muslims in Europe to join extremist movement is especially alarming not only because it signals a profound rejection of societal values by individuals raised and educated in the West but also because these homegrown terrorists present a particularly difficult counterterrorism challenge.”¹⁹³

Beside homegrown terrorist threat, mainly 9/11 and then its European versions of London and Madrid bombings have cultivated the deepening distrust towards Muslim communities and problematized multiculturalist, assimilationist or exclusionist integration policies in Europe.¹⁹⁴ Also, it can be argued that these events have had a huge impact on Muslim image in Europe. According to Nachmani, Europeans perceive Muslims as 'having extreme political ideologies, of practicing religious radicalism and of resorting to wanton terrorism.'¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² “Nicolas Sarkozy joins David Cameron and Angela Merkel view that multiculturalism has failed,” *Daily Mail*, February 11, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html>.

¹⁹³ Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, *Eurojihad* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 56.

¹⁹⁴ Tahir Abbas, “Muslim minorities in Britain: Integration, multiculturalism and radicalism in the post-7/7 period,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 28.3 (2007), 288.

¹⁹⁵ Amikam Nachmani, *Europe and Its Muslim Minorities: Aspects of Conflict, Attempts at Accord* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 43.

4.1.2.1. The Lost Identity as a Cause of Radicalization in Western Europe

The emergence of European foreign fighters over the fallout of Syrian conflict in 2011 has put Muslim immigrants on the spotlight once again and fueled suspicion regarding Muslim communities in Europe.¹⁹⁶ The growing number of European foreign fighters has triggered the existing debate on the identity of European Muslims once again whether their sense of alienation from the society, if exists, leads to extremism as an alternative way of belonging.¹⁹⁷

Jonathan S. Paris explains both the clash between Muslims and the Westerners, and the radicalizing European Muslims by looking at the two factors: identity crisis that Muslim communities experience in Europe and a ‘growing global Muslim solidarity, connectedness and pride’ specifically after 9/11.¹⁹⁸ For the discussion of the ‘identity crisis’ of European Muslims, according to several scholars like Bassam Tibi and Jonathan Paris, the most visible cause of radicalization of European Muslims is highly related with the identity vacuum which European Muslims feel in Europe. European Muslims have been struggling to identify themselves as they are in limbo between their traditional form of identity that their families brought from where they migrated and the European form of identity that they have to live with. According to the article, ‘Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe’ authored by Paris, one of the reasons of the existing identity vacuum among European Muslims is also related to the decline of nationalism in Europe.¹⁹⁹ During the last three decades or more, Europe has significantly experienced the decline of nationalism as basic characteristics of civic culture during the last three decades owing to the attempt to create a

¹⁹⁶ Basia Spalek and Robert Lambert, “Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A critically reflective approach to engagement,” *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 36.4 (2008), 263.

¹⁹⁷ “For Muslims in U.K., not feeling ‘British’ can lead some to extremism,” *PBS*, January 26, 2015. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/muslims-uk-conflict-of-identity-isolation/>

¹⁹⁸ Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 121.

¹⁹⁹ Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 121-122.

European consciousness and identity, and the rise of individualism.²⁰⁰ In other words, besides being French or a German, there is a new identity formation in Europe which is ‘being European.’

Within the context of the identity vacuum of European Muslims, a vague national identity in Europe becomes problematic. European values are to be absorbed by European Muslims, who have already been in confusion to adopt either traditional ethnic roots of their families or European values.²⁰¹ Here, the question is how the identity crisis results in engaging in radical acts. As it exists in the literature, the network theory and socialization might provide some help explain the issue. According to Paris, extremist ‘preceptors’²⁰² such as imams, spokespersons of certain groups or recruitment places try to persuade, indoctrinate, seduce and then mobilize the people who have already potential to be radicalized.²⁰³ In this context, the important aspect of radicalization in Europe is that radicalization does not purely come from jihadist narratives or ideology that influence people’s hearts and minds; but also, it is highly related with the persuasion from preceptorals in recruiting grounds like it happens in European mosques. For example, according to the report of TSG, there is an evidence of community-recruitment in countries which produce the highest number of foreign fighters in Western Europe like the ‘Molenbeek neighborhood in Brussels’²⁰⁴ where many Moroccan Muslims live.

²⁰⁰ Mattei Dogan, “Nationalism in Europe: Decline in the West, Revival in the East.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3.3 (1997), 66.

²⁰¹ Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 122.

²⁰² “Preceptorism is a term coined by the Yale social scientist Charles E. Lindblom in the 1975 classic *Politics and Markets*, to describe intense ideological indoctrination using persuasive messages to mobilize cadres of true believers. Preceptors include charismatic orators who rely on **persuasion** to gain the voluntary enthusiasm of their disciples rather than on fear and command. Hitler, Mao, Nasser, Khomeini, Nasrallah and Ahmadinejad are preceptors. Stalin and Saddam Hussein were plain old dictators.” In Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 123.

²⁰³ Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 123.

²⁰⁴ The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, 13.

Some might argue that the identity crisis emanating from social exclusion or alienation, the decline of national or ethnic attachment, economic-social deprivation of European Muslims might be occurring in other parts of the world in another form. All these problems can be experienced in Africa or Middle East due to different reasons such as the lack of democratic representation in Tunisia where the youth are seeking for the participation in jihadi Salafi networks since they rejected a perceived hypocrisy among state actors in which they cannot find a space for their demands.²⁰⁵ For Europe, Paris argues that the catalyst for the radicalization of European Muslims is notably related to the second factor which is the ‘pull of Muslim solidarity’ in relation with an influential wave of global jihad sweeping the globe in the post 9/11.²⁰⁶ It is argued that in the line of globalization, Islam is a globally powerful element in the formation of identity and in the creation of solidarity among different groups which are separated by different states and cultures for Muslims in Europe.²⁰⁷

It seems that one of the important root causes of generally radicalization, particularly becoming a foreign fighter in Europe derives from the discontent of the young Muslim population because of the identity crisis they experience. However, what should be borne in mind here is that being a foreign fighter might be end result of prior experience and views of a person. It does not happen overnight. It might also depend on an attitude of a country towards its own citizens as much as it is highly related to potential radical view of a person.

4.1.2.2. State’s Integration Policies as Causes of Radicalization

As an attitude of a country towards its own citizens, integration problems of the immigrant societies in Europe can be a significant cause for ‘home-grown’ extremism or radicalization of people with immigrant background in a broader

²⁰⁵ Marks, “Youth politics and Tunisian Salafism: understanding the Jihadi current,” 110-111.

²⁰⁶ Paris, “Explaining the Causes of Radical Islam in Europe,” 130.

²⁰⁷ Al-Azmeh and Fokas, *Islam in Europe: Diversity, identity and influence*, 56.

sense. For instance, different integrationist models in European countries have been developed in order to deal with the integration of immigrant communities to the European societies; for example, France opting for assimilation (*assimilationnisme* where Muslims may become full citizens only by shedding their pristine identity,²⁰⁸ Britain for integration (or British multiculturalism where Muslims are defined by a distinct ethno-cultural identity²⁰⁹) or the Netherlands for multiculturalism. Still, fundamental problems of belonging and attachment to the society which are relatively the most important root causes of radicalization and marginalization were not properly addressed with aforementioned integrationist policies.²¹⁰ Although some scholars, like Olivier Roy, argue that ‘the level of radicalism has nothing to do with state’s policy; instead it results from the global perception of the state of *ummah* (the establishment of the community of Muslim people in the world),’²¹¹ integration problems still remain a key factor in individuals’ resentment towards the European society.

According to Carolin and Al-Hashimi, Great Britain and the Netherlands seem to be more willing to incorporate their Muslim communities to the society with the efforts to allow the construction of their worship places, providing fund for Islamic education within the context of multicultural integration policy while Germany and France are more restrictive towards their Muslims immigrants with regards to public Muslim demands. However, statistics above show that the estimated percentage of foreign fighters in the existing Muslim population of a certain country does not clearly refer to the certain type of integration model as

²⁰⁸ Roy Olivier, “Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe,” in Amghhar, Samir, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds.), “European Islam- Challenges for Society and Public Policy”, Brussel, *Center for European Policy Studies* (2007), 56.

²⁰⁹ Olivier, “Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe,” 56.

²¹⁰ Michael Laskier, “Islamic Radicalism and Terrorism in the European Union: The Maghrebi Factor,” *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses* (2008), 93.

²¹⁰ Anders Stringberg and Mats Wärn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2011), 171.

²¹¹ Olivier, “Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe,” 56.

the most or the least problematic in terms of causing radicalization. For instance, the estimated percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim population in Belgium which opts for multiculturalist integration policy is 0.093% whereas it is 0.020% in the United Kingdom which has also claimed to have multiculturalist integration policy. Meantime, France as having assimilationist model of integration policy is in between with 0.025%. This picture means that it cannot be precisely said that there is a specific integration policy which causes radicalization the most or the least. Besides that, it can be said that there is no clear-cut boundary between assimilationist, multiculturalist and exclusionist integration models; and they are not opposing each other in a specific context. In other words, one cannot solely say that certain type of integration policy results in more radicalization challenges; instead, it is much more plausible to say that the integration policies can be triggering cause generally of the emergence of radicalized movements and specifically that of the foreign fighters.

For this reason, despite the radicalization does not purely result from the states' integration policies, the classification of states' integration policies in accordance with these integration types can be helpful to make cross-country analysis in order to analyze the growing radicalization in Europe.

Although this chapter argues that the radicalization in the Western Europe is more or less related with repercussion or reflection of the existing identity crisis among immigrant Muslim societies and their frustration with the state's policies, societal attitude in a given country towards them, it is very obvious that each country in Europe reflects different patterns of radicalization and has its own unique dynamics that cause radicalization of its Muslim population within the context of the Syrian Crisis. For this reason, it is worth examining internal dynamics of specific countries having the highest rate of radicalization, such as societal and governmental attitudes' towards its own Muslim population or the links of European Muslims with any jihadist networks in order to better understand why

these countries have produced a relatively higher number of foreign fighters travelling to the Syria than the other European countries.

In this part, this thesis will apply Yükleven's classification of integration models in Europe. He generally assumes three types of integration model in Europe by looking at state institutions, such as educational system or social services whether they attempt to integrate the Muslim immigrants into the system. He argues that these models can be described as assimilationist model of integration policy such as France, multiculturalist model of integration policy such as the Netherlands and the UK, and partially exclusionist model of integration model such as Germany.²¹² These integration models are categorized by taking various determinants into account. The issue of citizenship is one of them. For instance, some countries in Europe such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland as having a more ethnic tradition of citizenship, put some barriers to make the immigrants full citizens such as demanding the absence of a criminal record or good performance in the market and are labelled as the exclusionist state model in terms of integration policies.²¹³ On the other hand, some countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden give easy access to full citizenship including the protection for their languages, cultures, or ethnic organizations²¹⁴ while some such as France and Belgium as having strict secularism are very reluctant to recognize any cultural rights to any specific ethnic or religious groups and are considered as pursuing assimilationist integration models.²¹⁵

In terms of incorporation of Muslim communities into European society, states' policies and attitudes towards their own Muslims might play another significant

²¹² Ahmet Yükleven, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands* (Syracuse University Press, 2011), 152.

²¹³ Gary P. Freeman, "Immigrant incorporation in western democracies," *International migration review* 38.3 (2004), 947.

²¹⁴ Ruud Koopmans, "Trade-offs between equality and difference: Immigrant integration, multiculturalism and the welfare state in cross-national perspective," *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 36.1 (2010), 20.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

role in causing radicalization in the mindset of European Muslims since they might not experience the recognition in their host countries. According to Çıtak, while Muslims have long enjoyed the institutional representation in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece, the West European countries have only begin the process of the recognition of Islam either officially or in unofficial ways since the 1990s²¹⁶ which represents a serious problem within the society due to being delayed to recognize the diversity.

For this reason, this part will attempt to analyze the models of integration policies and the attitudes of the European states whether they might have caused the radicalization of individuals who became the foreign fighters flowing to Syria.

Assimilationist Model of Integration Policy

To begin with, France is the most assimilationist state in Europe due to the fact that it does not officially or unofficially address the recognition of any ethnic or religious rights.²¹⁷ For instance, among European countries, France has produced the highest number of foreign fighters with 1800 individuals travelling to Syria as the country with the crowdest minority Muslim population in Europe.²¹⁸ In order to search for the root causes of this phenomenon and France practices on their Muslim communities, it is necessary to examine the internal dynamics of these countries and relations between Muslim communities and the state of France.

France is a unique country among other European countries in terms of its pattern of its Muslim communities and state's secular ideological foundation. Primarily, power relation between the state and Muslim communities plays a fundamental role in France since Muslim immigration to France based on colonialism; likewise, Stovall argues that the French attitudes towards especially the North

²¹⁶ Zana Çıtak, "Between 'Turkish Islam' and 'French Islam': The role of the diyanet in the conseil Français du culte musulman," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36.4 (2010), 623.

²¹⁷ Yükleyen, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, 152.

²¹⁸ Brittany P. Eisenhut, "Immigration in France: How French Perception Affects Muslim Integration," (2012), 23.

African immigrants is the ‘extension of the colonial ideological edifice’²¹⁹ which means that there is continuity of the colonial relationship between France and its Magrebhi immigrants. For this reason, it is possible to argue that this power relation has great impact in constructing the patterns of Muslim communities in France to great extent. In this context, Wharton argues that Muslim communities in France are generally socio-economically weak, a fact which has impact in shaping the self-awareness of Muslim communities in France.²²⁰ Also, Wharton argues that Muslim identity in France is externally imposed due to their colonial background.²²¹ Additionally, Stovall argues that the colonial legacy of France on its immigrant society generated the ‘racialization of the French discourse on immigrants’²²² on the basis of ethnic and religious discrimination by seeing the immigrants as the absolute ‘Other’.

Secondly, concerning the discussion of the state’s attitude for Muslim immigrants in France, one should examine the French type of secularism in relation to the concept of laïcité which means a firm separation of church and state. Belgium, as one of the largest exporters of foreign fighters in percentage, has also the same political culture like in France. An interesting thing is that France and Belgium, as two Francophone countries, are the top exporters of foreign fighters in the Western Europe. This urges to analyze them together in order to find commonalities that result in radicalization in these countries. According to the study conducted by Will McCants and Chris Meserole from the Brookings Institution, there is somehow a clear correlation between Francophone countries and radicalization in a sense that political approach of laïcité affects state

²¹⁹ Tyler Stovall, ed. *French civilization and its discontents: nationalism, colonialism, race*, Vol. 109 (Lexington Books, 2003), 206.

²²⁰ Wharton, “Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam,” 50-51.

²²¹ *Ibid*, 51.

²²² Stovall, ed. *French civilization and its discontents: nationalism, colonialism, race*, 210.

treatment of their Muslim population.²²³ Interestingly, this assumption is very valid for especially France and Belgium as Europe's Francophone countries. Thus, as Wharton also assumes, it can be argued that Muslim communities in France and Belgium are stigmatized due to the exclusionary mechanism of political and societal culture²²⁴ which has never fully accepted Muslim existence thanks to the strong endorsement of *laïcité*.

Multiculturalist Model of Integration Policy

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, multiculturalist model of integration policy has lost its popularity as an example of successful integration policy as it has proved its failure in incorporating people with immigrant background to the society.²²⁵ It is essential to note that, the concept of 'multiculturalism' is used in this study as a policy approach which aims to manage the equal coexistence of multiple cultures and their recognition within the society.²²⁶ For instance, Vertovec and Wessendorf criticize 'multiculturalism' as an integration policy due to the fact that it refuses common values of a given society; instead, it promotes ethnic, religious and cultural separatism especially in the UK and the Netherlands; and it stresses differences of the immigrant communities at the expense of shared national identity.²²⁷ For instance, the Netherlands, with pursuing multiculturalism as an integration policy, promotes

²²³ Zack Beauchamp, "New study: people from French-speaking countries are more likely to become jihadists," *Vox World*, March 29, 2016. <http://www.vox.com/2016/3/29/11326120/jihadism-francophone>.

²²⁴ Wharton, "Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam," 51.

²²⁵ Koopmans, "Trade-offs between equality and difference: Immigrant integration, multiculturalism and the welfare state in cross-national perspective," 2.

²²⁶ Bethany Paige Bryson, *Making multiculturalism: Boundaries and meaning in US English departments* (Stanford University Press, 2005), 27.

²²⁷ Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf, eds. *Multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices* (Routledge, 2010), 8-9.

and recognizes the ethnic and religious groups' rights directly through state support for separate school and media outlets for a long period of time.²²⁸

Additionally, the UK, historically speaking, has an integration policy based on the ideological foundation of multiculturalism which simply encompasses the recognition for one's particular identity, cultural differences and faith belief by refraining from making minority communities feel misrepresented and disfranchised.²²⁹ In other words, the UK has had 'liberal' practice on its integration policy which advocates tolerance and the recognition of cultural difference²³⁰ and it was pursued by the Labor Party in the 1960s in order to prevent any problem regarding discrimination and inequality towards immigrants. British governments have mainly pursued the practice of 'being a passively tolerant society' in the name of multiculturalism. However, in the course of time, its implications have appeared differently within the society. For instance, in the aftermath of London bombings in 2005, a new security discourse has appeared in the UK with the realization of the fact that the perpetrators were home-grown British citizens; in other words, they were British Muslims. Now, Muslims in the UK has started to be portrayed as 'enemies within'²³¹ which means that they are threatening 'our' culture, 'our' values, 'our' institutions and 'our' way of life.²³²

In the words of David Cameron, 'For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you

²²⁸ Yükleven, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, 153.

²²⁹ Kenan Malik, "Multiculturalism Undermines Diversity," *The Guardian*, March 17, 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/17/multiculturalism-diversity-political-policy>.

²³⁰ Caroline Howarth and Eleni Andreouli, "'Has multiculturalism failed?' The importance of lay knowledge and everyday practice," *Institute of Social Psychology Research Paper, The London School of Economics and Political Science Publications* (2012), 1.

²³¹ "Muslim Extremism in Europe: The Enemy Within," *Economist Special Report*, July 14, 2005. <http://www.economist.com/node/4174260>.

²³² Chris Allen, "Fear and loathing: The political discourse in relation to Muslims and Islam in the British contemporary setting," *Politics and Religion* 2.4 (2010), 222.

alone.’²³³ Yet, it seems that this policy is much more about state order rather than refraining from any sort of inequalities towards immigrants since tendency is to leave immigrants alone, isolated with their own culture and segregated from the rest of the British society as long as they obey the British rules. In this regard, Cameron, as a leader of the Conservative Party, has recently launched an attack to ‘state multiculturalism’ which cultivates extremist ideology and homegrown terrorism for him by stating;

“We have even tolerated segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values. All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and believe in can lead them to extremist ideology.”²³⁴

Even though David Cameron acknowledged the failure of multiculturalism in a sense that it triggers radicalism in the UK, he has come up with harsher anti-Muslim sentiments which possibly engender bigger mistrust on the part of British Muslim community. For instance, he has started pursuing ‘masculine liberalism’ which enforces the values of equality, law and freedom of speech across all parts of society; furthermore, he warned Muslim groups for losing all government funding unless they promote integration.²³⁵ It is apparent that his statements might have more potential to provoke and alienate immigrants of Muslim communities in the UK. As a result of that, Britain’s former minister for Faith and Communities, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi has warned the British government on

²³³ Wintour Patrick, “David Cameron to unveil new limits on extremists’ activities in Queen’s speech,” *The Guardian*, May 12, 2015.

²³⁴ Oliver Wright and Jerome Taylor, “Cameron: My war on multiculturalism,” *The Independent*, February 5, 2011.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

their tough actions and stated that ‘Cold War against British Muslims could backfire.’²³⁶

Additionally, though David Cameron has put blame on being ‘a passive tolerant society’ in triggering extremism in the UK by allowing Muslims to live with their values, being passive tolerant society interestingly contributed to counter terrorism strategy in Britain. Considering the UK’s approach to counter Islamic extremism, after 9/11 and 7 July London bombings, the UK has already been seeking vigilance with openness, on the principle that extremists are least threatening in places where they and their followers can be scrutinized and closely watch.²³⁷ It seems that the UK has generated a new security discourse which McGhee describes as a ‘new authoritarian integration discourse with draconian legislation as counter terrorism strategy.’²³⁸

For instance, this draconian legislation that attempts to make rigorous regulations in religious spheres of Muslim community, traced back to specifically to 2006 when ‘Prevent Strategy’ which has initiated in 2006 and released the program in 2007, called as ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: winning hearts and minds’.²³⁹ As a matter of fact, it was continuation of the existing counter terrorism strategy of what was called as CONTEST and developed by the Home Office in 2003 and it is one of its four pillars: Prepare for attacks, Protect the public, Pursue the attackers and Prevent their radicalization in the first place. But, in theory, specifically ‘Prevent’ strategy aimed at creating community cohesion by promoting shared values on the basis of respect for the rule of law. However, in terms of its practices, it was highly criticized and accused not only because it

²³⁶ Marie Khan, “Baroness Warsi warns ‘Cold War against British Muslims’ could backfire,” *International Business Times*, May 15, 2015.

²³⁷ “Muslim Extremism in Europe: The Enemy Within,” *The Economist Special Report*, July 14, 2005, <http://www.economist.com/node/4174260>.

²³⁸ Derek McGhee, *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights* (England: Open University Press, 2008), 11.

²³⁹ Department for Communities and Local Government, “Preventing violent extremism—winning hearts and minds,” (2007).

paved the way for creating a ‘suspect community’²⁴⁰ by treating Muslims and the institutions they are associated with as a target group but also it frustrated Muslims by seeking to have control on their faith.

Considering the main responses of the UK in this program with the aim of tackling with extremist threats, it is clear that the focus of the program was on Muslim communities, faith leaders and young Muslims in the schools. This focus might appear self-evident given the serious Islamist threat faced, but this monocultural approach towards all Muslims as if they are only suspicious community has been counterproductive and stigmatizing as opposed to community cohesion principles and policies which was the primary objective of this prevention program as Thomas argues in his book titled ‘Youth, Multiculturalism and Community Cohesion’.²⁴¹

Besides British counter terrorism approach has also been harshly criticized over its failure to stop home-grown terrorism²⁴² and radicalism, it seems that Britain’s way to tackling with radicalization is ironically the breeding ground for further extremism. In other words, although the Prevent strategy in the UK would supposedly turn people away from violent radicalism by affecting hearts and minds, it generated a backlash coming from the British Muslim community since they perceived Prevent strategy as a threat and attack to Islam and their identity.²⁴³ With this understanding, it is possible to argue that societal exclusion by being targeted can make minority communities, particularly Muslim, more

²⁴⁰ Dominic Casciani, “Analysis: The Prevent Strategy and Its Problem,” *BBC*, August 26, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28939555>.

²⁴¹ Paul Thomas, “*Youth, Multiculturalism and Community Cohesion*,” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 172.

²⁴² Holly Watt, “WikiLeaks cables: The British counter-terror programme that fails to stop extremists,” *The Telegraph*, February 3, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8302092/WikiLeaks-cables-The-British-counter-terror-programme-that-fails-to-stop-extremists.html>.

²⁴³ Jack Barclay, “The Extremist Reaction to the UK’s Prevent Strategy,” Hudson Institute, October 18, 2011. <http://www.hudson.org/research/9862-the-extremist-reaction-to-the-uk-s-prevent-strategy>.

vulnerable to ideological extremism since they feel alienation and lack of belonging to where they were raised and have been live. Thus, as Sara Wallace Goodman also argues, the root cause of why second and especially third generation in Britain became foreign fighters or tend to be poisoned by further extremism is not purely a problem of religion, rather a problem of immigration and integration.²⁴⁴

Exclusionist Model of Integration Policy

Yükleyen argues that Germany is in between assimilationist and multiculturalist models of integration policies, and therefore deserves to being partially labelled as an exclusionist model of integration policy.²⁴⁵ The reason for it is that Germany legally recognizes the religious groups' rights but politically discourages them to implement the legal rights that these groups have.²⁴⁶

As opposed to the UK, Germany historically has never claimed to be a 'land of immigration. As a political discourse, the Chancellors Willy Brandt in 1973, Helmut Schmidt in 1981 and then Helmut Kohl in 1983²⁴⁷ stated that 'Deutschland ist keine Einwanderungsland.'²⁴⁸ (German is not a country of immigration.) Although Germany has a great number of immigrants, Germany has never had an official multicultural policy orientation towards immigrants whereas Britain has long pursued multicultural integration policy. However, the main difference between these countries lies in different understandings of the term of

²⁴⁴ Sara Wallace Goodman, "The root problem of Muslim integration in Britain is alienation," *The Washington Post*, October 6, 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-root-problem-of-muslim-integration-in-britain-is-alienation/>.

²⁴⁵ Yükleyen, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, 153.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "Deutschland ist KEIN Einwanderungsland und Multi Kulti ist gescheitert!" Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Genscher, Merkel..., *Antiprop WordPress*, September 1, 2015. <https://antiprop.wordpress.com/2015/09/01/deutschland-ist-kein-einwanderungsland-und-multi-kulti-ist-gescheitertwilly-brandthelmut-schmidtgenschermerkel/>.

²⁴⁸ It means that Germany is not a country of immigration.

multiculturalism. Bernhard Santel, a senior public servant in North Rhine Westphalia's Ministry for Generation, Family, Women and Integration (2009) clarified that 'multiculturalism is understood as a cause of 'parallel societies' in the German context in which 'people live in their respective milieu according to their own rules, with little interchange across the groups.'²⁴⁹ Despite of many differences between Germany and the UK in immigration patterns, societal dynamics, and their attitudes to their own migrant, predominantly Muslim societies, they interestingly come up with the same number in terms of producing foreign fighters. This brings forth question what dynamics could be similar in these countries so that these people could be appealed by the Islamist terrorist organizations, so-called as ISIL or Free Syrian Army, and become foreign fighters at the expense of their life. In addressing the topic of radicalization and the phenomenon of foreign fighters either in Germany or in the UK, it is apparent that this is highly linked to the immigration problem in Europe. Thus, it is very relevant to briefly analyze immigration structure in order to better understand the radicalization process of foreign fighters.

Although Germany and the UK have historically different immigration process so as to pursue different integration policies, it seems that the problems of both British and German migrants experienced are notably similar at the end of the day.

Unlike the UK where immigration was the result of decolonization, Germany's immigration flow was of the labor shortage that country faced with in the 1950's. With the attempt of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a big wave of immigration started in the 1960's in Germany. In order to compensate Germany's labor shortage and to recover its war-torn economy after World War II, he signed many bilateral agreements with the southern European states to recruit 'Gastarbeiter' (guest worker), mainly from Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia. His attempts resulted in 'Wirtschaftswunder' ('economic miracle') for an economic recovery

²⁴⁹ Anna C. Korteweg and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, "Is multiculturalism dead? Groups, governments and the 'real work of integration'," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38.5 (2015), 670.

that followed the World War II; however, his foresight for temporary employment of *guest workers* did reversely materialize. Many guest workers turned out to be permanent settlers since then. Today, result is that every fifth person in Germany has an immigrant background and their number tends to increase, according to the figures conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office.²⁵⁰

Although Germany recruited many people from diverse countries, German officials had never thought that they were permanent settlers so that they considered them as ‘guest workers’ and then foreigners, but never ‘migrants’ up until the 2000s when Germany realized that nobody returned to their ‘home’ country.²⁵¹ Max Frisch’s aphorism (1965) perfectly described this situation which was ‘Wir haben Arbeitskräft gerufen, aber es sind Menschen kommen.’²⁵² (We recruited workers but they were people, too.) This aphorism shows both an unexpected situation that Germans faced and unprepared position of German policy makers to the situation. In this context, it was hardly possible to pursue any accurate integration policy by German policy makers for migrant inclusion to the society since they did not expect that ‘gastarbeiter’ turned out to be migrants in Germany. Thus, it can be argued that ‘guest workers’, then ‘foreigners’, then *permanent* ‘migrants’ have become an undesirable community in Germany.

Additionally, what happened in 9/11, Madrid bombing in 2004 and 7 July 2005 London bombing has made matters worse by adding religious dimension, which is Islam, to the existing integration debate. These events resulted in intolerance towards Islam and Muslim communities in Germany even though the Chancellor

²⁵⁰ “Record number of people with migrant background in Germany,” *Deutsche Welle*, August 3, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/record-number-of-people-with-migrant-background-in-germany/a-18623373>.

²⁵¹ Tali Kazan, “Clearly, the German Government Never Intended for These Guests to Stay,” *Internet-Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften*, Sektion 8.7, Nr. 17, February 2010. http://www.inst.at/trans/17Nr/8-7/8-7_kazan.htm.

²⁵² “Der Schweizer Schriftsteller Max Frisch 1965 zum Thema Immigration,” *Berliner Zeitung*, January 8, 2015. <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/der-schweizer-schriftsteller-max-frisch-1965-zum-thema-immigration-----und-es-kommen-menschen-.10810590,10247142.html>.

Merkel admitted that ‘Islam is part of Germany’²⁵³ to show tolerance towards Muslim migrants. However, the situation in German public is somehow different. A survey conducted in Germany on religious tolerance by the University of Muenster in 2010 (before the Syria conflict) showed that there is rigid and intolerant understanding of extrinsic religions in Germany with 66% Western Germans and 74 percent of eastern Germans in comparison with France, the Netherlands and Denmark, according to sociologist Detlef Pollack.²⁵⁴ This means that most Germans have clearly ‘negative attitude’ towards Muslims by the year of 2010. This negative attitude in Germany has not changed so much by the year of 2013. Another study in 2013 from the Allenbach Institute for Public Opinion Polling in Baden-Wuerttemberg revealed that only 22 percent of Germans²⁵⁵ agreed with Germany’s former president Christian Wulff’s statements which were ‘Islam was part of Germany’ and ‘Islam belongs to Germany’.²⁵⁶

However, not long after, anti-multicultural rhetoric became apparent when the Chancellor Merkel declared in 2010 that ‘Multikulti is dead’²⁵⁷ and it has utterly failed. Interestingly, this anti-multiculturalism rhetoric sounds hollow within the context of immigration history of Germany since Germany has never adapted a well-defined intentional policy of multiculturalism. Steven Vertoc, director of the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, told in his interview to Foreign Affairs that ‘this backlash discourse of the Chancellor

²⁵³ “Chancellor Merkel Says Islam is Part of Germany,” *The Huffington Post*, September 26, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/chancellor-merkel-islam_n_1917619.html.

²⁵⁴ Gregg Benzow, “Survey shows Germans negative about Muslims and Jews,” *Deutsche Welle*, December 12, 2010. <http://www.dw.com/en/survey-shows-germans-negative-about-muslims-and-jews/a-6289940>.

²⁵⁵ Mooneye, “European Attitudes Towards Islam & Muslims: Britain, Germany, France,” *Loonwatch*, January 28, 2013. <http://www.loonwatch.com/2013/01/european-attitudes-towards-islam-and-muslims-britain-germany-france/>.

²⁵⁶ Tom Heneghan, “Islam part of Germany, Christianity part of Turkey – Wulff,” *Reuters*, October 20, 2010.

²⁵⁷ “Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert,” *Der Spiegel*, October 16, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html#>.

Merkel regarding anti-multiculturalism is sort of political rhetoric where multiculturalism is imagined and constructed so it can be attacked.’²⁵⁸ In that sense, it is possible to argue that this anti-multiculturalism rhetoric has exacerbated an already burning debate on integration; even, it produced backlash since many Germans, particularly whose parents immigrated to Germany, complained that multiculturalism was not even tried, and people have never really welcomed.²⁵⁹ For instance, in terms of the issue of citizenship, although immigrants in Germany have been already satisfied with their civil, social, and cultural rights, they do not easily enjoy their political rights and right to political participation.²⁶⁰

On the other hand, other important cause is what Yükleven argues. It is not only state’s policies alienate the Muslim communities in Europe; but also European Muslims might alienate themselves by abstaining from getting integrated to the European society. He states in his book titled ‘Localizing Islam in Europe’ that ‘in some cases, Muslims distance themselves from the larger society while in some cases they react with the claims of being truly part of Europe as a Muslim.’²⁶¹ To sum, considering the number of foreign fighters and radicalization rates among these European countries, it seems that none of the countries has fully achieved an incorporation of the immigrants into societies through these integration models.²⁶²

²⁵⁸ James Angelos, “What Integration Means for Germany's Guest Workers,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 28, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2011-10-28/what-integration-means-germanys-guest-workers>.

²⁵⁹ John F. Jungclaussen, “Angela Merkel's attack on 'Multikulti' was misjudged: many believe it wasn't even tried,” *The Telegraph*, October 23, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/8082836/Angela-Merkels-attack-on-Multikulti-was-misjudged-many-believe-it-wasnt-even-tried.html>.

²⁶⁰ Yükleven, *Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands*, 157.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, 35.

²⁶² *Ibid*, 153-154.

4.1.3. Socialization in the Radical Network as a Cause of Radicalization in Western Europe

According to Strindberg and Wären, Islam in Western Europe cannot be analyzed without two intertwined inquires which are mainly the ‘structural situation of Muslim communities in Europe’ and the ‘motivational injects into these communities by Islamist groups located in Europe’.²⁶³ They argue that the discontented and dissatisfied situation of specifically the second or third generation European Muslims and the presence of Islamist organizations in Europe seeking to benefit from their discontent are two necessary issues to be analyzed and explained in order to come up with an explanation concerning the radicalization of European Muslims. It seems that these dynamics in Europe are facilitators to the emergence of foreign fighters since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis in 2011.

Besides the identity crisis European Muslims experience, the activities of Islamists in Europe as a part of diasporic²⁶⁴ radicalization is coequally important to understand radical movements of Muslims in Europe. Historically, Islamic fervor in Europe through proselytizing movements intensified throughout the 1980s which turned primarily into social and cultural movements²⁶⁵ as it was the cases for *Tablighi Jama'at*, (means ‘Society for Spreading Faith’ founded in 1926 in India) which is a ‘global educational and missionary movement to encourage Muslims everywhere to be more religiously observant’²⁶⁶ including

²⁶³ Stringberg and Wären, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance*, 170.

²⁶⁴ In this context, the term of a ‘diaspora’ is used as what Olivier Roy defines in his article of ‘EuroIslam: The Jihad within?’. He defines the term as a ‘community of migrants maintains close links with its country of origin: continuing to speak the mother tongue; keeping in touch with national events; supporting extended family; continuing judicial link (dual nationality); often preserving the myth of a return to the home country’. See Olivier Roy, "EuroIslam: the Jihad Within?" *The National Interest* 71 (2003), 64-65.

²⁶⁵ Stringberg and Wären, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance*, 175.

²⁶⁶ Maha Azzam and Dilwar Hussain, "Muslim networks and movements in Western Europe," Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010.

Western Europe and also for *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Liberation Party), which is a ‘fundamentalist party based in London and originally founded as a Palestinian Islamic movement in 1953’²⁶⁷, as a non-violent but very radical movement especially in the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands. It can be argued that *Tablighi Jama’at* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir* only as being two examples of the Islamist movements (Armed Islamic Groups-Groupe Islamique Arme) in Europe have enabled to create supranational and ideological Islam in Europe.

Despite the fact that the supporters of the *Tablighi Jama’at* are mainly committing itself to personal devotion and spiritual self-renewal as being apolitical and pacifist movement²⁶⁸ and similarly the spirit of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood is based on ‘non-violent jihadist ideology with the aim of establishing the caliphate through political means and persuasion,’²⁶⁹ these jihadi networks in Europe have been accused of posing threats by ‘propagating radical jihadist views, rejecting democracy as incompatible with Islamic values and targeting to replace apostate regimes with Islamic ones’.²⁷⁰

However, it can be argued that this treat perception in Europe has intensified specifically in the atmosphere of insecurity and fear felt after 9/11, Madrid attack in 2004 and London attack in 2005.

The Bosnian War as a radicalization event in terms of both emerging Muslim discontent in Europe and influential injects from al-Qaida, was an influential

<http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-tablighi-jamaat/>.

²⁶⁷ Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” 67.

²⁶⁸ Azzam and Hussain, “Muslim networks and movements in Western Europe.” <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-tablighi-jamaat/>.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Nigel Inkster, “Chapter Four: Terrorism in Europe,” *Adelphi Paper* 50.414-415 (2010), 97.

beginning of politicization process of Muslim immigrants in Europe.²⁷¹ According to Stringberg and Wären, the Afghan War, the Bosnian War created a politicization of Muslim communities in Europe which increased polarization between Muslim communities and native Europeans.²⁷² It is not hard to say that this polarization and purification of Muslim identity paved the way for fertile ground for radical Islamist networks such as Tablighi Jama'at and Hizb ut-Tahrir to propagate their views in Europe. Likewise, Stringberg and Wären state that the success of Hizb ut-Tahrir or other jihadist networks in Europe (such as the Groupe Islamique Armé and Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et la Combat in France, influencing French Algerian population or al-Muhajiroun in the UK as a Salafist group) in terms of propagating their views and gaining ground among European Muslims is directly the 'consequence of the structural situation of Muslim communities, and in turn to facilitate militant action'.²⁷³

Likewise, Belgium, the highest contributor of foreign fighters in terms of their percentage among its Muslim population in the Western Europe, has a serious jihadist network problem with the establishment of the extremist group Shariah4Belgium in 2010 as an offshoot of the radical Salafist group al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK movements in the United Kingdom.²⁷⁴ This radical group Shariah4Belgium has advanced in quite short time in Belgium on the basis of implementing Sharia law. It has soon become a major source of Belgian foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq by indoctrinating young Belgian Muslims with a pro-

²⁷¹ Stringberg and Wären, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance*, 176.

²⁷² Ibid, 178.

²⁷³ Ibid, 179.

²⁷⁴ Guy Van Vlieden, "How Belgium Became a Top Exporter of Jihad," *The Jamestown Foundation*, May 29, 2015. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43966&no_cache=1#.V0n4g3gXd-U.

Sharia ideology.²⁷⁵ It seems that these jihadist organizations take advantage of frustrations and disappointments of Muslim immigrants' societies and cultivate further hostility towards European societies with their radical jihadist discourse.

Roy argues that 'there are many patterns in common with radical terrorists: a possible history of drug addiction, a lack of social life, the fabrication of a narrative through the internet, the recording of a video before taking action, search for fame, use of internet, the attribution of a collective responsibility to the targeted random victims.'²⁷⁶ However, the question here is that if these patterns are generally common, why radicalization is at the highest level in Europe from the beginning of the Syrian Crisis is a reasonable question to ask.

To conclude, this chapter argues that diminished socioeconomic situations of European Muslims and the impacts of integration problems on their identity as well as the presence of radical organization in Europe might increase radicalization of European Muslims in relation to becoming foreign fighters.

²⁷⁵ Melodie Bouhaud, "Sharia4Belgium Leader and Dozens of Others Militants are Sentenced to Jail Time," *Vice News*, February 12, 2015. <https://news.vice.com/article/sharia4belgium-leader-and-dozens-of-other-militants-are-sentenced-to-jail-time>.

²⁷⁶ Olivier Roy, "Al-Qaeda in the West as a youth movement: The power of a narrative" In Emerson, M. (ed.) *Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe's Muslim Communities*. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2009. Centre for European Policy Studies (2009), 25.

CHAPTER 5

THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

5.1. The Issue of Foreign Fighters in the Nordic Countries

This chapter will examine how and why the emergence of foreign fighters in the Nordic countries presents an interesting case in comparison to Western Europe. As the major finding of this thesis demonstrates, the Nordic region has produced the highest percentage of foreign fighters among their Muslim populations since the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis in 2011. This chapter will delve into analyzing the causes of this difference.

The Nordic region, consisting of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, is known as the most democratic countries in the world (indicated in the Table 5.2 below), the place where trust in political institutions and the states is the greatest in the world²⁷⁷ and the happiest place on Earth,²⁷⁸ represents an interesting case and puzzling since these countries generated a considerable number of foreign fighters to Syria, more than the Western, Eastern and Southeastern European countries.

Four Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, despite pursuing the welfare state policies, have a considerable share with approximately 470 the foreign fighters who join the insurgent groups in Syria. More importantly, relative to Muslim population sizes in these Nordic countries as opposed to

²⁷⁷ Grete Brochman, and Anniken Hagelund, *Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945-2010*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 1.

²⁷⁸ According to the Economist's 'Where to be born index'.

Western European countries, the percentages of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of these countries are the highest with 0.047% in comparison to other sub-regions such as Western Europe and the Southeastern Europe. Specifically, these percentages are 0.096% in Finland, 0.049% in Denmark, 0.044% in Sweden, and 0.027% in Norway as indicated Table 5.1 below.

Starting from 1960s, these countries have started to become ethnically diverse and multireligious through the immigration waves to the Nordic region where there was no or little experience on diverse societal structure due to having comparatively homogenous population.²⁷⁹ Although these countries share comparatively homogenous populations and similar inclusive welfare state models with strong egalitarian and universal values,²⁸⁰ they come up rather different strategies towards their immigrant populations²⁸¹ which might be influential on the radicalization of foreign fighters in the Nordic countries.

²⁷⁹ Bo Bengtsson, Per Strömblad, and Ann-Helén Bay, eds. *Diversity, inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 1.

²⁸⁰ Bengtsson, Strömblad, and Bay, *Diversity, inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia*, 1-2.

²⁸¹ Bengtsson, Strömblad, and Bay, *Diversity, inclusion and citizenship in Scandinavia*, 2.

Table 5.1 Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters per Muslim Population in the Nordic Countries

Nordic Countries	The Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters	Estimated Muslim Population	Estimated Percentage of Foreign Fighters in Muslim population in a given country
Finland	50-70	60,000-65,000	0.096%
Denmark	100-150	250,800	0.049%
Sweden	150-180	350,000-400,000 (375,000)	0.044%
Norway	60	220,000	0.027%
Total	410	862,800	0.047%

5.2. Causes of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries in Relation to the Emergence of Foreign Fighters

In this part of the thesis, radicalization in the Nordic countries with respect to the emergence of foreign fighters will be examined by analyzing socioeconomic and ideological causes, the integration problems and states' integration policies, and the presence of radical jihadist networks in these countries.

5.2.1. Socioeconomic, Ideological and Psychological Causes of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

Some scholars such as Benmelech and Klor, and Piazza argue that contrary to the popular hypothesis that poor economic conditions, high level of income inequality, poverty, unemployment, or inflation are generally main causes of radicalization and any kind of terrorist acts, there is no significant correlation

between any measures of economic development and terrorism can be found.²⁸² Specifically, Benmelech and Klor claim in their publication of ‘*What explains the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS?*’ that as opposed to popular belief, the proportion of the number of foreign fighters in the Muslim population of a specific country and economic development of the same country in terms of either Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Human Development Index (HDI) are positively correlated.²⁸³ This argument can be applied to the causes of radicalization and the emergence of foreign fighters in the Nordic countries if they are compared with Western European countries. Yet, the Nordic countries as being the most prosperous countries in terms of GDP and HDI, they still have the highest proportion of the number of foreign fighters in their Muslim populations. For instance, in terms of GDP per capita, the Nordic countries are well up on the list of World Bank dataset of 2015.²⁸⁴ For example; Norway ranks fourth, Denmark ranks seventh, Sweden ranks eleventh and Finland ranks seventeenth.²⁸⁵ Similarly, according to Human Development Index of 2014 conducted by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by taking several indicators such as life expectancy at birth or expected years of schooling or GDP per capita into consideration, the Nordic countries rank on the very top of the list which indicates to be ‘very high human development’. For example, Norway is on the first place and Denmark is on the fourth place while Sweden ranks fourteenth and Finland ranks twenty-fourth.²⁸⁶ In that sense, it can be said that even if diminished socioeconomic conditions can be influential on the radicalization of a person to some extent, it might not be the root

²⁸² James A. Piazza, “Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages 1,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18.1 (2006), 159.

²⁸³ Efraim Benmelech, and Esteban F. Klor, *What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?*, No. w22190. National Bureau of Economic Research (2016).

²⁸⁴ World Bank 2015 Dataset of GDP per capita (current US\$). <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report in 2014. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.

causes of radicalization in the case of the emergence of foreign fighters in the Nordic countries. It seems that the Nordic countries do not have poor economic conditions which might trigger radicalization as it is the case in the Western European countries. Even if the diminished socioeconomic conditions cause radicalization, it might be triggering cause in the Nordic countries, not the root cause of radicalization. Piazza also argues that variables such as ethno-religious diversity or increased state repression on the certain community can better explain the root causes of terrorism.²⁸⁷ As the Nordic countries have produced the highest proportion of foreign fighters flowing to Syria, it might be said that it is harder to assimilate and incorporate different cultures in to society in small welfare-states based on culturally, religiously and linguistically homogeneous histories, as it is the case in Nordic region.²⁸⁸

Additionally, the spread of jihadist ideology might be another root cause of radicalization in the Nordic countries. For instance, the expansion of jihadist ideology in Denmark dates back to the early 1990s with the arrival of few number of Egyptian jihadists to Denmark where was a safe haven for them; and they had succeeded to link Denmark with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, and Egypt since then.²⁸⁹ Jensen claims that the most important impact of the jihadists' networks such as the Egyptian network, the North African network, or some non-aligned jihadists in Denmark has been their success in ideologically polarizing the Muslim communities.²⁹⁰ Thus, it can be said that even though low level of socioeconomic condition do not seem to have an impact, ideology and ethno-religious diversity in the very homogenous Nordic societies might be triggering causes of radicalization in relation to the emergence of foreign fighters.

²⁸⁷ Piazza, "Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages 1," 167.

²⁸⁸ Ulf Hedetoft, *Multiculturalism in Denmark and Sweden*, DIIS (2006), 2.

²⁸⁹ Michael Taarnby Jensen, *Jihad in Denmark: An overview and analysis of Jihadi activity in Denmark*, No. 2006: 35. DIIS Working Paper (2006), 8.

²⁹⁰ Jensen, *Jihad in Denmark: An overview and analysis of Jihadi activity in Denmark*, 75.

5.2.2. Integration Problems as Causes of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

Similar to Western Europe, an integration of people with immigrant backgrounds can be another cause of radicalization in the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries are relatively considered as ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous countries.²⁹¹ In a similar line with Piazza's argument quoted in the previous section, in these homogenous societies of the Nordic countries, increasing diversity with the immigration waves might generate a sense of cultural anxiety and a feeling of fundamental values at risk and this perception might not only hinder specifically the incorporation of Muslims into the society but also stigmatize the Muslim communities in these countries.²⁹² In that sense, radical extremism within the context of the emergence of foreign fighter flowing to Syria from the Nordic countries are largely considered as largely a failure of social integration.²⁹³ In this context, this thesis finds that more homogenous countries such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have had the highest percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of these countries. The reason of this can be the fact that it is harder to assimilate and integrate Muslim immigrants with different cultural backgrounds in these countries which are ethnically and linguistically homogenous, as will be explained below.

5.2.2.1. The Lost Identity as a Cause of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

Due to the existence of relatively homogenous countries in the Nordic region, the immigrants with different cultural backgrounds in general and Muslims in

²⁹¹ Sven Tägil, *Ethnicity and nation building in the Nordic world* (SIU Press, 1995), 12-13.

²⁹² Anniken Hagelund, "Problematizing culture: Discourses on integration in Norway," *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale* 3.3-4 (2002), 412-413.

²⁹³ "Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement Programmes in Europe," *Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS)*, February 2012, 22.

particular might experience an identity crisis on account of not being accepted within the society. The lack of a sense of attachment to the society might also cause radicalization particularly in Muslim communities. Even though one can argue that this is a pervasive problem all over Europe, the case of the Nordic countries might present different challenge. According to Tägil, there is a clear split in the attitudes towards the Muslim communities in the Nordic countries in a sense that they consider Muslims as ‘other’ as they do have little or no knowledge about Islam and Muslims.²⁹⁴ This perception has even led to racialization with the increasing immigration, for instance, in Sweden, more ethno racially and relatively homogenous country in comparison to other Western countries.²⁹⁵ To illustrate this racialization, Hübinette and Lundström claim that

“In contemporary Sweden, the idea of being white without doubt constitutes the central core and the master signifier of Swedishness and thus of being Swedish, meaning that a Swede is a white person, and a non-white person is not a Swede.”²⁹⁶

It is necessary to note that the identity crisis is a ‘result of discrepancy between the individual’s already constructed identity or beliefs and the core values of new social environment.’²⁹⁷ As Pred also argues that there is ‘racism in even Sweden in a sense that it does not welcome the diversity which is seen as disturbing and

²⁹⁴ Sven Tägil, *Ethnicity and nation building in the Nordic world* (SIU Press, 1995), 311.

²⁹⁵ Tobias Hübinette and Catrin Lundström, “Sweden after the recent election: the double-binding power of Swedish whiteness through the mourning of the loss of “old Sweden” and the passing of “good Sweden”,” *NORA—Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 19.01 (2011), 45.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 44.

²⁹⁷ Fereshteh Ahmadi Lewin, “Identity crisis and integration: The divergent attitudes of Iranian immigrant men and women towards integration into Swedish society,” *International Migration* 39.3 (2001), 125-126.

threatening.²⁹⁸ In that sense, immigrants with different cultural backgrounds in Sweden might feel alienated with this strong sense of Swedishness.

Similarly, despite having the lowest share of Muslim population (just above 1% in the total population which is 5.4 million), multiculturalism and racialization of different ethnic and religious groups in Finland have also become a politically sensitive issue with the growth of immigration.²⁹⁹ The country's political landscape has been shaped with this sensitivity especially with the rise of the right-wing populist party of Finland, the True Finns Party, which became the second largest party in the last election in 2015.³⁰⁰ The manifesto of this party is highly based on mono-culturalist orientation rather than multi-culturalist in a sense that it declares that the immigrants with their different ethnic subculture will eventually threaten the indigenous Finnish culture.³⁰¹ In relation to this mono-culturalist approach in Finland, Cal argues that the Finns' perception towards immigrants is particularly more critical and xenophobic compared to other Nordic countries.³⁰² This might explain the fact that why Finland has produced the highest percentage of foreign fighters relative to its Muslim population as this exclusionist approach might have created a backlash within the Muslim communities.

²⁹⁸ Allan Pred, *Even in Sweden: Racisms, racialized spaces, and the popular geographical imagination*, Vol. 8 (University of California Press, 2000), 16.

²⁹⁹ Maarit G. Koskinen, "Racialization, othering, and coping among adult international adoptees in Finland," *Adoption Quarterly* 18.3 (2015), 170.

³⁰⁰ Jan Sundberg, "Who are the nationalist Finns Party," *BBC News*, May 11, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013>.

³⁰¹ David Arter, "The breakthrough of another West European populist radical right party? The case of the True Finns," *Government and Opposition* 45.4 (2010), 498-499.

³⁰² Carl Mars, "The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Finland: The True Finns," *Transform! European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue* (2011), 2.

Considering the fact that the notion of whiteness is essential in the formation of national identity in the Nordic countries,³⁰³ this idea of ‘white nation’ might fuel alienation and isolation of Muslims which might cause them to radically hold and interpret their Islamic values as a defense against the idea of whiteness in the Nordic countries. Additionally, this might generate a vicious circle that the existing fear of Islamization of the ‘white Nordic countries’³⁰⁴ causes the problem of identity crisis of Muslims in the Nordic countries. As it is also the case in the Western European countries, the conflict between the notion of ‘self’ and ‘other’³⁰⁵ seems to exist as a cause of radicalization in the Nordic countries, as well. However, the reason why the Nordic countries have produced the highest proportion of foreign fighters in their Muslim population (0.047%) in Europe also appears to be related with their self-perception as being excluded of Muslims due to relatively more homogenous nature of the Nordic countries and their fear of Islamization of the ‘white Nordic countries’.

5.2.2.2. State’s Integration Policies as Causes of Radicalization

It is not possible to argue which integration policy triggers the emergence of foreign fighters and radicalization more since radicalization occurs as a result of a combination of several causes. Yet, it is beneficial to study state’s integration policies in order to better understand internal dynamics of the countries by making a cross-country analysis. In the Nordic region, it is possible to talk about two types of integration models: assimilationist model in Denmark and multiculturalist model in Sweden, Norway and Finland.

³⁰³ Suvi Keskinen, “Antifeminism and white identity politics,” *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* (2013), 226.

³⁰⁴ Keskinen, “Antifeminism and white identity politics,” 228.

³⁰⁵ Karin Creutz-Kämpfi, “The othering of Islam in a European context: Polarizing Discourses in Swedish-Language Dailies in Finland,” *Nordicom Review* 29.2 (2008), 298.

Assimilationist Model of Integration Policy

Denmark has been producing a considerable number of foreign fighters for the Syria Civil War since 2011 despite of the fact that an UN-sponsored World Happiness Report in 2016 declared Denmark as the world's happiest place to live in terms of living expectancy, job market or democratic environment.³⁰⁶

It is claimed that Denmark, known as a traditionally liberal and tolerant country giving utmost importance to social equality and social cohesion promoted through a well-developed welfare state, has emerged potentially as one of the most culturally racist and assimilative country among other European countries.³⁰⁷ The understanding of liberal and welfare state model in Denmark has started to change with the arrival of refugees from Iran-Iraq war, the civil conflicts of Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia in 1980s and 1990s and this situation has raised concerns over mainly social problems such as high unemployment rate, language barriers and low level of education, and residential segregation.³⁰⁸ Indeed, the Social Democratic Government in 1999 introduced the first ever 'integration law' in order to provide equal opportunity to the immigrants in the political, economic and social life on the basis of the fundamental values of the Danish society.³⁰⁹ However, this 'integration law' was much more about restrictions other than the aim of integration in a sense that in order to reduce immigration and make it hard to get residency status, new legislative laws were introduced such as compulsory three-year program to get permanent residency which make eligible to apply for family-reunification.³¹⁰ In that sense, Mouritsen and Vincents argue that with the increase

³⁰⁶ John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs, eds. *World happiness report 2016* (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2015).

³⁰⁷ Karen Wren, "Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark?" *Social & Cultural Geography* 2.2 (2001), 141-142.

³⁰⁸ Per Mouritsen and Tore Vincents Olsen, "Denmark between liberalism and nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36.4 (2013), 694.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 695.

³¹⁰ *Ibid*, 695.

of refugees, Denmark has shifted from soft liberal understanding of integration to a ‘stricter civic integrationism based on a culturalized and national-identity-infused citizenship approach.’³¹¹

According to Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) scores (1980-2010), Denmark is the least multicultural country in terms of eight indicators which are ‘legislative affirmation of multiculturalism’, ‘the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum’, ‘the inclusion of ethnic representation in the media’, ‘exemption from dress codes’, ‘allows dual citizenship’, ‘the funding of ethnic group organizations’, ‘the funding of bilingual education or mother tongue’, and ‘affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups’.³¹² In terms of these four indicators, MCP Index, as indicated in the Figure 5.1 below, has found that Denmark does not provide these four indicators to its immigrant minority groups in any sense as of 2010. As mentioned above, first attempt to introduce the integration law in 1999 seems to remain inconclusive because of the fact that MCP Index score in 2010 shows that Denmark has not adopted all these eight indicators since 1999.

³¹¹ Ibid, 695-696.

³¹² Erin Tolley, “Multiculturalism policy index: immigrant minority policies,” *Queen’s University Publications, Canada* (2011), 9-10.




Figure 5.1 Multiculturalism Policy Index Score (1980-2010)

This situation has coincided with some events both in Denmark and in the world which might affect the perception of Denmark towards multiculturalism. This is to say that 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent events such as the cartoon controversy in 2005-2006 which was about depicting the Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist with a bomb in *Jyllands-Posten*,³¹³ have been watershed moments in the perception and conceptualization of religious and ethnic minorities in Denmark

³¹³ "Prophet Mohammed cartoons controversy: timeline," *The Telegraph*, May 4, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341599/Prophet-Muhammad-cartoons-controversy-timeline.html>.

and generated a decade of suspicion towards Muslim communities³¹⁴ and generally ‘Islamophobia’ in whole Nordic countries.³¹⁵ These events deepened the perception concerning Muslims in Denmark in a sense that Danish Muslims are seen as the ‘other’ against which ‘Danishness’ and national collective identities are constructed.³¹⁶ For instance, the cartoon controversy in 2005-2006 which was the publication of the Muhammad cartoons in *Jyllands-Posten* was perceived as a ‘visualization of an already existing political atmosphere between Danish Muslims and the natives.’³¹⁷ It is also argued that with this cartoon controversy on 2005-2006, Denmark’s reputation abroad has shifted from an ‘open society with a liberal integration policy to a more ‘racist and immigration critical country.’³¹⁸ The reason of this racist approach to the presence of immigrants might be that Denmark focuses on the formation of the cultural and identity-seeking monoculturalism within the society³¹⁹ which might create deep alienation among immigrant society in Denmark. In this regard, it is not too surprising to see how the right-wing party of Danish People’s Party has increased its votes to 21% in 2015 in comparison to 14% in 2011³²⁰ by benefiting from the viewpoints of

³¹⁴ Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen, “A decade of suspicion: Islam and Muslims in Denmark after 9/11,” *Ethnic and racial studies* 37.13 (2014), 2307.

³¹⁵ Marcel Maussen and Ralph Grillo, “Regulation of speech in multicultural societies: Introduction,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40.2 (2014), 181.

³¹⁶ Göran Larsson and Lasse Lindekilde, “Muslim claims-making in context Comparing the Danish and the Swedish Muhammad cartoons controversies,” *Ethnicities* 9.3 (2009), 364.

³¹⁷ *Ibid*, 365.

³¹⁸ Rytter and Pedersen, “A decade of suspicion: Islam and Muslims in Denmark after 9/11,” 2304.

³¹⁹ Karin Borevi, "Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency," *Identities* 21.6 (2014), 712.

³²⁰ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right,” *The New York Times*, May 22, 2016.

homogenous and Christian Danish nation state on the negative construction of Danish Muslims as 'other'.³²¹

Yet, Denmark's conditions should be contextualized as they would gain meaning only in a comparative perspective. Denmark's some policies could still be preferable when compared to other European countries. For example, the most interesting thing within the context of Denmark is that Denmark provides greater opportunities to immigrants to maintain their distinct religious or cultural identities with private ethnic or religious schools, for example, than Sweden.³²² And, Jensen stated that among other European countries, Denmark ranks first in terms of 'having the largest share of publicly subsidized Muslim private schools relative to the population size.'³²³

Multiculturalist Model of Integration Policy

Although Sweden and Denmark have a similar understanding to welfare state universalism, they radically differentiate in their approaches to immigrant integration.³²⁴ The integration policies in Denmark have been considered as an exclusionist state model following liberal-nationalist path based on a Danish 'leitkultur', whereas Sweden has been considered as one of the most progressive European advocates of state-sponsored multiculturalism with the universal and egalitarian welfare state model from the late 1970s and 1980s.³²⁵ In 1968, Sweden officially declared that it provides the universal welfare system to immigrants in

³²¹ Karen Wren, "Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark?" *Social and Cultural Geography* 2.2 (2001), 153.

³²² Borevi, "Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency," 713.

³²³ Jensen, Tina Gudrun, "'Making Room': Encompassing Diversity in Denmark," (2010), 194. In Karin Borevi. "Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency." *Identities* 21.6 (2014): 708-723.

³²⁴ Borevi, "Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency," 709.

³²⁵ Larsson and Lindekilde, "Muslim claims-making in context Comparing the Danish and the Swedish Muhammad cartoons controversies," *Ethnicities* 9.3 (2009), 363. Also see Gary P. Freeman, "Immigrant incorporation in western democracies," *International migration review* 38.3 (2004), 947.

Sweden under the same conditions as the rest of the population in terms of employment, housing, social care and education.³²⁶ Sweden has been one of the early adopters of multiculturalist integration policies together with Canada and Australia.³²⁷ However, Brochman and Hagelund claim that Sweden abandoned its multiculturalist understanding towards its immigrants in a sense that it reinforced the separation between ‘us’ and them³²⁸ Swedish government argues that ‘freedom of choice did not refer to the freedom to choose not to be part of Swedish society.’³²⁹ In that sense, it might be argued that even Sweden as being among the first adopters of multiculturalism has experienced the difficulties to integrate different cultures into society.

For Finland, it can be said that multiculturalism is also problematic especially for Muslim communities since different religions are not regarded as equal to Protestant Christianity which enjoys great social and legal advantages in Finland.³³⁰ In this respect, Tuula states in his book of “*Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: cross-reading Finland and Ireland*” that,

“Lutheran traditions are in many ways a part of Finnish school life. For instance the Finnish calendar is shaped by the Lutheran-Christian year and hence the main holidays coincide with Christmas and Easter. The new law (the Freedom of Religion Act, 2003) does not bring any change with regard to these school traditions. On the other hand, while the Curriculum of Islam speaks of “acceptance” and “respect”, the curricula of other

³²⁶ Borevi, “Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency,” 710.

³²⁷ Mats Wickström, “Comparative and transnational perspectives on the introduction of multiculturalism in post-war Sweden,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 40.4 (2015), 513.

³²⁸ Grete Brochman, and Anniken Hagelund, *Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945-2010* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 20.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Tuula Sakaranaho, *Religious freedom, multiculturalism, Islam: cross-reading Finland and Ireland*, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 171.

religions simply refer to the “familiarization with” other religions and outlooks on life.”³³¹

Togther with this, Sakaranaho³³² argues that with the growth of Muslim presence in Finland starting from the 1990s, Muslims have been perceived as aliens and threatening to Finland especially in terms of culture. Furthermore, Pauha and Martikainen argue that the image of Muslims in Finland is conflict-oriented and about the half of the population (%52) has expressed their negative views towards the presence of Muslims in Finland.³³³ In that sense, it may be hard to say that multiculturalism is successfully being implemented in Finland either.

In Norway, politicians started to talk about ‘multicultural Norway’ by denouncing to refer to Norway as a homogenous society in 1980s.³³⁴ However, Hagelund argues that although Norwegian politicians have talked about multiculturalism as an integration policy in Norway, multiculturalist policies have been rarely implemented in Norway by problematizing cultural diversity in Norway.³³⁵ In addition to the unwillingness of Finland to implement multicultural integrationist policies, some events have raised the anxiety regarding the presence of especially Muslims in Finland and their radicalization in the public debate. Leirvik claims that public opinion regarding the Muslim presence in Finland has been shaped by some events which have increased the fear of radicalization of Muslim youth in Norway.³³⁶ The 2010 demonstration against the Prophet Muhammed’s cartoon and the 22nd of July 2011 terrorist attack have critically deepened the perception

³³¹ Ibid, 171-172.

³³² Ibid, 252-253.

³³³ Teemu Pauha and Tuomas Martikainen, “Finland,” in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*. Vol. 6 (Brill, 2014), 227.

³³⁴ Anniken Hagelund, “Problematizing culture: Discourses on integration in Norway,” *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale* 3.3-4 (2002), 402.

³³⁵ Ibid, 402-403.

³³⁶ Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Norway,” in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*. Vol. 6 (Brill, 2014), 470.

of Norwegians towards the presence of Muslims and has raised questions regarding the multiculturalist integration policies of Norway.³³⁷ It seems that mutual distrust between Norwegian society and Muslim communities in Norway has not given way to multiculturalist policies to be implemented fully in Norway, either.

It seems that the Nordic countries including Denmark have not been very willing to implement pluralist and multiculturalist integration policies towards its cultural and religious minorities. In the same line, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer also argue that with the effects of the 1990s decade of globalization together with the supposed decline of the nation-state, the Scandinavian countries returned to a 'nation-building idea of integration' by renouncing strong state-sponsored policies of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism.³³⁸

Overall, states' integration policies either assimilationist model or multiculturalist model do not tell much about which one causes radicalization more especially among Muslim communities for a specific country. As there is no single pathway to radicalization and no particular explanation of becoming foreign fighters, either multiculturalist or assimilationist integration policies may cause radicalization for specific reasons. For instance, multiculturalist integration policies might cause radicalization because of giving more space to radicalized people to disseminate their views; on the other hand, assimilationist integration policies might also cause radicalization because of creating a backlash among religious or ethnic groups by repressing them with state's policies.

³³⁷ Suvi Keskinen, "Antifeminism and white identity politics," *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* (2013), 225.

³³⁸ Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas B. Klusmeyer, eds. *Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 386.

5.2.3. Socialization in the Radical Network as a Cause of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

The role of jihadist network comes to the forefront as the root cause in the radicalization process of individuals in the Nordic countries. For instance, the Pan-Islamic radical networks in Denmark such as Kaldet til Islam which means 'The Call to Islam' or Hizb-ut Tahrir as a branch of Hizb-ut Tahrir Scandinavia, operate very actively among young Muslims with the aim of uniting all Muslims under a single caliphate.³³⁹ It seems that these extremist networks can also use the mosques including Islamisk Trossamfund (The Islamic Society of Denmark) or the Grimhoj Mosque to promote radical interpretation of Islam through these radical networks in Denmark, as well. For instance, with the appeal of ISIL, Grimhoj mosques in Aarhus, second largest city of Denmark, explicitly declares its support for ISIL³⁴⁰ which shows that it serves as a safe haven for Danish jihadists traveling to Syria and Iraq. However, an interesting aspect in Denmark in terms of allowing extremists is related with Denmark legal system which gives a space to these extremist groups to operate freely. In 2008, the Danish public prosecutor ruled that any member of these extremist organizations such as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir cannot be found 'guilty of participating in violent activities within the country as there were no legal grounds to ban the activities of the group or group itself.'³⁴¹ Now, Denmark is trying to introduce rehabilitation program, called as 'Aarhus model' for at-risk or radicalized individuals and returnees to eliminate extremist activities by creating a dialogue with them, offering employment and even treatment for injured people instead of taking them

³³⁹ "Denmark: Extremism and Counter-Terrorism," *Counter Terrorism Project*, n.d., 1. Accessed May, 2016, <http://www.counterextremism.com/countries/denmark>.

³⁴⁰ "Danish mosque openly backs Islamic State's campaign of terror," *Reuters*, September 2, 2014. <https://www.rt.com/news/184600-isis-denmark-support-mosque/>.

³⁴¹ "Denmark: Extremism and Counter-Terrorism," *Counter Terrorism Project*, 2.

in jail.³⁴² In a deeper sense, Aarhus model in Denmark is not associated with ideology, right-wing or left-wing policies or Islamophobic attitudes, and is not a security measure which stigmatizes the certain group of the people within the society; rather, it is anti- and de-radicalization security project which builds on the principle of 'inclusion' and 'participation' of individuals in common cultural, social and societal life.³⁴³ To this end, the Aarhus model consists of certain initiatives such as the 'InfoHouse' which initiates investigation, inquiries to give counseling with well-educated mentors, 'workshops' to show the threat of violent radicalization and to raise awareness of radicalization, 'dialogue' in order to build cooperation especially with Muslim communities, and 'exit programme' including providing fundamental life skills and identity formation in youth for de-radicalizing homecoming foreign fighters without doing nothing criminal.³⁴⁴ Thus, it can be said that the way to handle the problem of Denmark is rather different than other countries in Europe in a sense that Denmark attempts to embrace the radicalized people by relying on soft security measures.³⁴⁵ The main reason why Denmark chose this unique soft security approach towards the radicalized people instead of giving severe punishment is highly related with Denmark's position as a defendant of personal rights and freedoms of a person. The Danish government has set up a commission in order to look at whether the nation's anti-terror law has unintended effects on personal rights and freedoms of

³⁴² Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert and Nick Thompson, "Denmark offers some foreign fighters rehab without jail time, but will it work?" *CNN*, October 28, 2014. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/europe/denmark-syria-deradicalization-program/>.

³⁴³ Preben Bertelsen, "Danish preventive measures and de-radicalization strategies: The Aarhus Model," *Panorama Insights into Asian and European Affairs* 1 (2015), 242.

³⁴⁴ Bertelsen, "Danish preventive measures and de-radicalization strategies: The Aarhus Model," 243-245.

³⁴⁵ "Foreign fighters: Member States' responses and EU action in an international context," *European Parliament Briefing*, 2015, 8. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-548980-Foreign-fighters-FINAL.pdf>.

a person.³⁴⁶ In this context, Tax Minister of Denmark, Morten Østergaard, stated that

“In the words of former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, it is important that we don’t trample the same freedoms we are trying to defend. “It’s a good opportunity to ensure that central values like the rule of law, due process and personal freedom be combined with a strong defense against terror.”³⁴⁷

This understanding seems to result from the commitment to democratic values. According to the dataset of Global Democracy Ranking, the Nordic countries are among top five countries which make them the most democratic region in the world as indicated in the Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Global Democracy Ranking 2015³⁴⁸

Rank in the World (2013-2014)	Country	Total Score (2013-2014)
1	Norway	88.1
2	Switzerland	87.0
3	Sweden	86.6
4	Finland	86.0
5	Denmark	85.2

Similar to Denmark, Sweden advocates of liberal democracy, as can be seen in the table above, and liberal policies in a sense that Sweden has greatly tolerated the activities of radical networks for years. For this reason, the Swedish government has recently responded to counter the threat of radicalization particularly in the aftermath of a suicide bomb in December 2010 since it did not have training in

³⁴⁶ “Denmark to reconsider its terror laws,” *The Local*, August 12, 2014. <http://www.thelocal.dk/20140812/denmark-to-reconsider-its-terror-laws>.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Global Democracy Ranking. <http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/2015-full-dataset-2/>.

dealing either with religiously extremist groups or minority groups.³⁴⁹ In terms of the emergence of foreign fighters and their returns to ‘home’, Emrich discusses that similar to Denmark, Sweden has also opted for soft-handed approach which refers to ‘inclusive’ security measures or in both anti- and de-radicalization strategies.³⁵⁰ As also stated above, these measures include assistance in finding housing, offering employment, or receiving medical and psychological treatments.³⁵¹ In the same line with Denmark and Sweden, Finland has opted for a much softer approach for re-integration of radicalized people into society as well as for preventing them from being radicalized.³⁵² Also, Norway has invested in ‘soft’ counter terrorism measures such as religious dialogue, socialization, or education in tackling with extremism in order to keep balance between security measures and certain human rights concerns.³⁵³

For the Nordic countries, the importance of this soft-handed and inclusive approach in their counter terrorism strategies is twofold. First one is that it is crucial not to stigmatize European Muslims further and not perceive them as potential terrorists with the Islamophobic attitudes across Europe.³⁵⁴ Second one is related with liberal democratic values that they have adopted for years. These countries abstain from contradicting with their liberal democratic values by giving severe punishment in the process of de-radicalization of radicalized people or by creating suspicious community due to as preemptive security measures in the

³⁴⁹ “Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement Programmes in Europe,” 24-25.

³⁵⁰ Rudine Emrich, “Foreign Fighters: The Perils and Perks of Western Policy Responses,” *Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America* (2015), 6.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² Stefano Armenia, et al. “Fighting Foreign Fighters: But What about Wannabe and Returning Foreign Fighters,” (2015), 6. <http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2015/papers/P1094.pdf>.

³⁵³ Ellie B. Hearne, “The Norwegian Attacks and the Prevalence of the Sneaking Regarder,” *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses* (2011).

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

process of anti-radicalization.³⁵⁵ In other words, the Nordic countries as being the strong adherents of liberal democracy try to protect the delicate balance between personal freedoms and rights, and preventive security measures with this soft-handed security approach. In addition to that, all Nordic countries have provided an advance law to different religious groups when it comes to religious freedom.³⁵⁶

In short, the Nordic countries seem to be more cautious than their European counterparts in keeping the balance between freedoms and security. They try to implement security measures that fall short of spoiling individual rights and freedoms. The Nordic democratic standards seem to be preventing these states from restricting the available public free space, which radical organizations might easily use in order to carry out their proselytizing and recruitment activities. Therefore, other than the possible causes of radicalization in the Nordic countries, such as ideology, ethno-religious diversity, identity and integration problems, one particular factor related to networking seems to stand out. As the ‘most liberal democracies’ in the world, these countries opt for more democracy as opposed to more security. Thus they open more space for radical organizations to act relatively more freely. They get organized and carry out networking activities relatively more freely than they can in various other parts of the world, even Western Europe. This problem stems from the inherent dilemma between liberal democracy and restrictive security measures. In this respect, there appears to be a negative correlation between the soft security measures and emergence of high number of foreign fighters relative to their Muslim populations in the Nordic countries. It seems that in these countries soft security measures implemented to pay regard to liberal values such as personal freedoms and rights do not always prevent radicalization; rather, they might offer a space that radicalized people could spread their activities more freely and be organized with radical networks.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Sven Tägil, *Ethnicity and nation building in the Nordic world* (SIU Press, 1995), 311.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Since the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis in 2011, the emergence of foreign fighters has become a matter of international politics. The growing number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and joining radical groups such as ISIL or Jabhat al-Nusra in the region has created security threats in the wider region. Europe, where many Muslims reside, has particularly been alarmed on account of having produced a considerable number of foreign fighters flowing to Syria. Europe has been also worried about both the inspiration of this development on other European Muslims to attack in Europe and the security threats posed by returning foreign fighters to Europe. In this respect, the purpose of this thesis is to answer two interrelated questions throughout the thesis: What causes European citizens to be radicalized to the degree that they get involved in the Civil War in Syria as foreign fighters and what are the internal dynamics of different countries or sub-regions causing them to produce higher number of foreign fighters than others?

In order to better explain these two questions, the issue of foreign fighter as a form of radicalization and extremism is discussed. Since the literature on the foreign fighters is recently emerging, the literature on the concepts of radicalization, extremism, and jihadism are studied with the aim of understanding the causes of becoming foreign fighters.

The main puzzle of this thesis is to explain why the Nordic region as a sub-region in Europe has produced higher percentage of foreign fighters relative to its Muslim population than other sub-regions, such as Western Europe and Southeast

Europe. This thesis has tried to explain this situation by analyzing the socioeconomic conditions, integration problems including immigrant's identity crisis and states' integration policies, and the presence and activities of radical networks in these regions as causes of radicalization in relation to becoming foreign fighters flowing to Syria from the year of 2011.

Although each country or each region has unique internal dynamics that trigger the emergence of foreign fighters, the above analysis for Western Europe reveals that low level of socioeconomic conditions together with the failure to incorporate Muslim immigrant communities to the European society and the influential radical extremist networks in indoctrinating people to be radicalized have played roles in radicalization process of European Muslims. On the other hand; the root causes of the emergence of foreign fighters in the Nordic countries vary from the Western European countries in terms of societal pattern and democratic nature of these countries. First of all, socioeconomic insufficiencies do not necessarily cause radicalization as it is the case in the Nordic countries. In terms of GDP and HDI, the Nordic countries are very developed which means that poor economic conditions and low living standards do not necessarily cause radicalization with respect to emergence of foreign fighters. Furthermore, it seems that more homogenous countries such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have had the highest percentage of foreign fighters in Muslim populations of these countries. The reason for this can be that it might be harder to assimilate Muslim immigrants with different cultural backgrounds in these countries which are ethnically and linguistically more homogenous than the Western European countries. Besides, in terms of states' integration policies, it seems that the countries attempting to implement multiculturalist integration policies such as Sweden, Norway, Belgium or the Netherlands appear more likely to cause radicalization with respect to generating relatively higher percentage of foreign fighters than the countries, as indicated in Table 3.1, which are less multicultural such as France or Germany as in indicated in the MCP Index above. Considering this situation, one might argue that multiculturalist policies might have caused a

more exclusionary notion of national identity by leaving minority groups to live in ‘parallel and segregated communities’³⁵⁷; as a result, these policies might further trigger the feeling of exclusion and alienation of Muslim communities in these countries and can cause further radicalization with respect to the emergence of foreign fighters. However, Denmark, which is the least multicultural country as indicated in MCP Index above, has also produced a high percentage of foreign fighters relative to its Muslim population. In this respect, claiming that there is a positive correlation between multiculturalist policy and radicalization of immigrants or a negative correlation between assimilationist or exclusionist policies and radicalization is hardly possible.

Other than the exclusionist idea of ‘white nation’, their advance democratic systems stand out as the determining factor in the Nordic case because it generates different outcomes as far as networking is concerned. The main difference between Nordic and Western European countries seems to be that the Nordic countries rely on more soft and inclusive security measures as a counterterrorism strategy. Main concern of these countries is to preserve the delicate balance between security and personal freedoms. Since these countries are the most democratic countries in the world, they rely on liberal democratic values which also affect their security understanding and the way they take security measures. In this respect, due to advocating liberal democratic values, the Nordic countries have opted for opening up more space for the minority groups more space to enjoy with their cultural and religious rights which in turn enables radical extremist groups both to disseminate their views and to indoctrinate people in this relatively free environment.

Consequently, this thesis has concluded that the main reason of why the Nordic countries have produced the highest percentage of foreign fighters relative to their Muslim populations than the Western European countries seems to be related to

³⁵⁷ Irene Bloemraad, “The debate over multiculturalism: Philosophy, politics, and policy,” *Migration Information Source* (2011).

their democratic structure which precludes them from taking strict security measures against radicalization.

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APPENDICES

A.TURKISH SUMMARY

2011 yılında başlayan Suriye Krizi'yle birlikte, Suriye'deki radikal örgütlere katılmak amacıyla Avrupa, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'dan Suriye'ye giden çok fazla sayıda yabancı savaşçı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu derece fazla sayıdaki yabancı savaşçının ortaya çıkması ise radikalleşme kavramı üzerine yapılan tartışmaları alevlendirmiş ve bu gelişme neyin insanların radikalleşmesine ve yabancı savaşçı olmasına neden olacağı konusunda ortaya çıkan ciddi güvenlik tehditlerini gündeme getirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu tez hangi sebeplerin Avrupa vatandaşlarının yabancı savaşçı olarak Suriye'deki iç savaşa katılabilecek derecede radikalleştiğini ve belirli ülkelerde ya da alt bölgelerde diğer ülkelerden ve alt bölgelerden fazla oranda yabancı savaşçı oluşmasına neden olan iç dinamiklerinin neler olduğu açıklamaya amaçlayan iki ilişkili soruyu cevaplamaya çalışmaktadır. Oldukça fazla sayıda Müslümanın yaşadığı Avrupa'da ise yabancı savaşçıların ortaya çıkması bu bölgede ciddi bir sınama yaratması bakımından bu tezde incelenmektedir. Son olarak, bu tez Nordik ülkelerinin kendi Müslüman popülasyonuna oranla Batı Avrupa'dan ve Güneydoğu Avrupa'dan daha fazla oranda yabancı savaşçı ortaya çıktığı tartışılmıştır. Bu durumun nedenleri Avrupalı Müslümanların sosyoekonomik koşulları, entegrasyon problemleri ve radikal bağlantıları incelenerek cevaplandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu çalışma giriş bölümünde tezin konusunu, araştırma sorularını ve bu çalışmayı yaparken kullanacağı araştırma yönteminden genel olarak bahsedilmiştir. Bununla beraber, yabancı savaşçı olgusunun araştırılması konusundaki limitleri dile getirerek tez araştırma konusunun hangi çerçevede yapılacağı açıklanmıştır. Bu

bağlamda, öncelikle bu çalışmada yabancı savaşçı kavramının kullanımı cihatçı olarak değil genel olarak yabancı savaşçı olarak kullanılması gerektiğinden bahsetmiştir. Bundaki temel sebep yabancı savaşçıların motivasyonlarının sadece dini sebeplerden değil çok farklı sebeplerden kaynaklanabileceği olmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, Suriye İç Savaşı'na katılan kişilerin yabancı savaşçı olarak adlandırılmasının ve bu kavramın tez boyunca kullanılmasının daha nötr bir söylem olacağına değinilmiştir. Bununla beraber, bu tezin temel odağının kişilerin hayatları pahasına farklı bir ülkeye çatışmaya veya savaşmaya gitme sebeplerinin terk ettikleri bölge veya ülke dinamiklerini göz önünde bulundurarak analiz etmek olduğundan bahsedilmiştir. Bu anlamda, bu tezin konusu yabancı savaşçıların oluşmasındaki motivasyonları araştırmak değildir, ki bunun bilinmesi yabancı savaşçıların hakkındaki bilgi yetersizliğinden dolayı pek de mümkün olmamaktadır. Aynı zamanda, bu tezde Suriye İç Savaşı'na katılan yabancı savaşçıların bölgedeki dinamikler düşünüldüğünde gidenlerin çoğunun Müslüman olduğu varsayılmıştır. Her ne kadar İslam'a dönen kişilerin de olduğundan bahsedilse de bu sayısının toplam sayı düşünüldüğünde analizlerde çok fark yaratmayacağı düşünülerek ülkelerin veya bölgelerin Müslüman nüfuslarına bakılarak hesaplamalar yapılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri, Portekiz ya da İzlanda gibi ülkeler bu tezin analiz tablolarında bulunmamaktadır. Bunun nedeni ise bu ülkeler hakkında yabancı savaşçı bilgisi edinilememesi ya da bu ülkelerdeki var olan yabancı savaşçı sayılarında oldukça az olmasıdır. Son olarak, bu çalışmada yabancı savaşçı meselesiyle ilişkili olarak radikalleşme nedenleri bölgelerin ve ülkelerin iç dinamiklerine bakılarak araştırılmış ve analizler daha çok makro seviyede yapılmıştır. Araştırma yöntemi olarak ise, bu tez yabancı savaşçı meselesini anlamak için hem kalitatif hem de kantitatif araştırma tekniklerinden yararlanarak karşılaştırmalı analiz kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışma, kantitatif araştırma tekniğini radikalleşme oranını bulmak adına yabancı savaşçı verilerini ve bölgelerin veya ülkelerin Müslüman nüfuslarını oranlayarak kullanırken, kalitatif araştırma tekniğini ikincil kaynakları araştırarak kullanmıştır.

Bu çalışma ikinci bölümünde, Suriye Krizi'yle beraber Avrupa vatandaşlarını bu savaşa katılmaya yönlendiren sebepleri anlamak için bu tez öncelikli olarak literatürdeki radikalleşme, aşırıcılık ve cihat kavramlarını irdelemiştir. Bu kavramları incelemekteki temel amaç insanların radikalleşme süreçlerinin nasıl olduğu ve bu süreçte ne tür sebeplerin etkili olduğunu anlamaktır. Yabancı savaşçı kavramı ne kadar yeni bir mesele olmasa da bu olgu üzerinde literatür çok da fazla olmadığından bu çalışmada, radikalleşme ve aşırıcılık kavramlarını yabancı savaşçı meselesiyle ilişkili olarak incelemeye çalışmıştır. Yabancı savaşçı olgusu ne kadar da tarihte farklı olaylarda vuku bulmuş olsa da literatürde bu kavramın tanımı konusunda henüz uzlaşma sağlanamamıştır. Yabancı savaşçı konusunda uzman olan Malet; yabancı savaşçıları, vatandaşı olmayan bir ülkenin içinde bulduğu kriz ya da iç savaş esnasında o ülkedeki çatışmalara katılmak ve savaşmak için giden kimseler olarak tanımlarken bu konudaki bir başka uzman Hegghemmar ise daha detaylı bir tanımla yabancı savaşçı olgusunu açıklamaktadır. Hegghemmar; yabancı savaşçıları başka bir ülkedeki çatışmalara giden ve etkin şekilde çatışmalarda yer alan, o ülkenin vatandaşı ya da akrabalı olmayan, herhangi bir resmi askeri örgütün üyesi olmayan ve gittiği için para almayan kişiler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Öte yandan, Cilluffo, Cozzens ve Ranstorp; özellikle Avrupalı yabancı savaşçıları, Müslüman olmayan gruplara karşı silahlanıp cihatçı gruplarla beraber savaşmak amacıyla yaşadıkları ülkelerini terk eden kişiler olarak tanımlamaktadırlar. Ancak tarihsel olarak bakıldığında yabancı savaşçı meselesinin sadece cihat amaçlı ortaya çıkmadığı 1936 ve 1939 yılları arasında gerçekleşen İspanya İç Savaşı veya 1947 ve 1949 yılları arasında İsrail Devleti'nin kurulma süreçleri esnasında da ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir. Bu yüzden, cihat yabancı savaşçıların oluşma amasındaki temel sebep olarak değil sadece bir sebebi olarak değerlendirilmelidir. Dolayısıyla, bu tez yabancı savaşçı olgusunu 2011'de başlayan Suriye İç Savaşı'ndan itibaren bölgedeki herhangi bir gruba katılmak ve şiddet içeren veya içermeyen bir şekilde bu gruplarda aktif görev alan kişiler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Aynı zamanda; bu tezde, radikalleşme kavramını yabancı savaşçı meselesini daha iyi anlamak adına irdelenmektedir.

Terörizm tanımında olduğu gibi, radikalleşme kavramının tanımı konusunda da tam anlamıyla uzlaşma sağlanamamıştır. Bazıları radikalleşmeyi şiddet içermeyen radikal ve aşırı düşüncelerin ve davranışların benimsendiği bir süreç olarak görürken bazıları da sonunda terörist veya şiddet içeren eylemlerle sonuçlanacak bir süreç olarak tanımlar. Ancak, bu tez yabancı savaşçı meselesiyle ilişkili olarak radikalleşmeyi kişilerin aşırı fikirleri benimsedikleri ve bu fikirlerin şiddet içeren veya içermeyen eylemlerle sonuçlanabileceği süreç olarak kullanmaktadır. Radikalleşmeyle bağlantılı olarak ve bu tezde kimi zaman aşırıçılık, radikalleşmenin ilk adımı olarak kavramlaştırılmıştır. Aşırıçılık temel olarak düşüncelerde ve eylemlerdeki radikalleşmeyle bağlantılıdır. Bu bağlamda, aşırı fikirler dendiğinde toplumun temel değerlerine taban tabana zıt fikirlerin benimsenmesi anlaşılmalıyken aşırı eylemler dendiğindeyse şiddet içeren ve terörist eylemlere yol açan eylemler düşünülmelidir. Aşırıçılıkla beraber, cihat kavramı kişilerin başka bir ülkeye gidip savaşmak için motive eden bir neden olarak irdelenmiştir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda, Avrupa'daki radikalleşme ve yabancı savaşçıların ortaya çıkma nedenlerini anlamak için literatürdeki radikalleşme süreçlerini ve radikalleşmedeki temel sebeplerin ne olabileceğini araştırmıştır. Temel sebepler olarak sosyoekonomik, ideolojik ve psikolojik sebeplerin yanında kişilerin kimlik karmaşalarının ve radikal örgütlerin endoktrinasyon eylemlerinin radikalleşme üzerinde önemli rol oynadığını tartışmaktadır. Bununla beraber, radikalleşme dinamiklerinin bölgeden bölgeye veya ülkeden ülkeye değişiklik gösterebileceğini vurgulayarak ampirik çalışmanın da yapılabilirliğini tartışmıştır.

Hem kalitatif hem de kantitatif araştırma yöntemlerin kullanan bu çalışma, üçüncü bölümde 2011 yılından Suriye'de patlak veren Suriye İç Savaşı'yla beraber bölgedeki gruplara Avrupa bölgesinden katılan yabancı savaşçıların varsayılan sayılarını kullanarak analiz yapmaya çalışmıştır. ABD Merkezi İstihbarat Teşkilatı'nın (CIA) 2014 tahminlerine göre, 2011 yılından bu yana 80'den fazla ülkeden bölgedeki radikal gruplara katılan toplam yabancı savaşçı sayısının 20,000 ile 31,500 olduğu varsayılmaktadır. New York merkezli düşünce kuruluşu

olan Soufan Grup ve Londra merkezli olan Uluslararası Radikalleşme Çalışmaları Merkezi (ICSR) Şubat 2015 tahminlerine göre bu sayıdan 5000 kişinin yabancı savaşçının olarak bölgeye gittiğini öngörmektedir. Suriye İç Savaşı ve krizin dinamikleri düşünüldüğünde yabancı savaşçı olarak radikalleşen kişilerin Müslüman olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Her ne kadar sonradan Müslüman olan kişilerin de katılımın olduğu söylene de bu düşünce kuruluşlarının istatistiklerine göre bahsedilen kişilerin sayılarının az olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu sebeple, bu tezde ülkelerin varsayılan yabancı savaşçı sayılarına ve bu sayıların yine aynı ülkelerin Müslüman nüfuslarına oranına bakarak analiz yapılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu tezde yapılan bu analizin göre sayıca en fazla yabancı savaşçı üreten ülkeleri 1200 yabancı savaşçıyla Fransa, 500-600 arasındaki yabancı savaşçıyla Almanya, 500-600 arasındaki yabancı savaşçıyla Birleşik Krallık ve 440 yabancı savaşçıyla Belçika oluşturmaktadır. Buna karşılık, Avrupa'daki ülkelerin Müslüman nüfusuna varsayılan yabancı savaşçıların sayısı oranlandığında sırasıyla 0.096% ile Finlandiya, %0.093 ile Belçika, 0%.049 ile Danimarka, %0.044 ile İsveç, %0.027 ile Norveç ve %0.027 ile Hollanda şeklinde bir sonuçla karşılaşılmaktadır. Bununla beraber, aynı analiz Avrupa'daki farklı bölgelerin dinamiklerini incelemek ve hangi sebeplerin daha fazla yabancı savaşçının oluşmasına neden olduğunu anlamak için Avrupa'nın üç alt bölgesi için de karşılaştırmalı olarak da yapılmıştır. Bu üç bölgenin incelenmesindeki temel sebep ise Avrupa'dan Suriye İç Savaşı'na katılan yabancı savaşçıların en çok bu bölge ülkelerinden gittiğinin bilinmesi ve yine bu bölge ülkeleri için verilerin mevcut olmasıdır. İncelenen bu bölgeler sırasıyla Balkanlar, Batı Avrupa ve Kuzey Avrupa ülkelerini kapsayan Nordik bölgesidir. İlk olarak, Sırbistan, Bosna Hersek, Kosova, Arnavutluk ve Makedonya ülkelerinin incelendiği Balkanlar'dan Suriye'deki radikal gruplara katılan toplam yabancı sayısı Uluslararası Radikalleşme Çalışmaları Merkezi tahminlerine göre 617'dir. Bahsi geçen ülkelerdeki tahmini yabancı savaşçı sayıları yine bu ülkelerin sahip oldukları Müslüman popülasyonuna oranlanmıştır. Ve ortaya çıkan tablo, Avrupa'nın diğer iki bölgesi ile karşılaştırıldığında Balkanlardaki Müslüman nüfusu içindeki

yabancı savaşçı oranı %0.010 en düşük olarak tahmin edilmesidir. İkinci bölge ise Belçika, İrlanda, Hollanda, Fransa, Avusturya, Birleşmiş Krallık, Almanya, İsviçre, İspanya ve İtalya ülkelerinden oluşan Batı Avrupa bölgesidir. Bu bölgelerden Suriye'deki radikal gruplara katılan toplam yabancı sayısı Uluslararası Radikalleşme Çalışmaları Merkezi tahminlerine göre 3285'dir. Balkanlar'da olduğu gibi Batı Avrupa bölgesi için de toplam yabancı savaşçı sayısı yine bu ülkelerin sahip oldukları Müslüman nüfusuna oranlanmıştır. Batı Avrupa bölgesi içinse bu oran %0.019 olarak bulunmuştur. Son olarak; Finlandiya, Danimarka, İsveç ve Norveç ülkeleri Nordik bölgesi adı altında incelenmiştir. Bu bölgelerden giden toplam yabancı savaşçı sayısı 410 olmasına rağmen bu sayı bu bölgedeki Müslüman sayısına oranlandığında ortaya çıkan oran %0.047'dir. Diğer bir deyişle, Nordik bölgesinde ortaya çıkan bu oran en yüksek radikalleşmenin bu bölgede ortaya çıkmasını göstermesi bakımından oldukça ilginç bir sonuç ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu sebeple, bu tez en yüksek radikalleşmenin ortaya çıktığı Nordik bölgesini ve Batı Avrupa bölgesini radikalleşmeye en hangi dinamiklerin sebep olduğunu karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemeyi hedeflemiştir. Dolayısıyla, üçüncü bölümde Batı Avrupa bölgesindeki iç dinamikler ve dördüncü bölümde Nordik ülkelerindeki iç dinamikler irdelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Daha spesifik olarak, yabancı savaşçı oluşması açısından radikalleşme nedenleri bu bölgelerde sosyoekonomik yapıya, entegrasyon problemlerine, ülkelerin göçmen politikalarına ve bu ülkelerdeki radikal hareketlerine bakılarak karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. Ve bu tez, sonucunda Nordik ülkelerinin neden Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden daha fazla oranda radikalleşmeyle karşı karşıya kaldığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Karşılaştırmalı analizden önce üçüncü bölümde hem Batı Avrupa ülkelerindeki hem de Nordik ülkelerindeki iç dinamikleri ve aynı zamanda İslam ve Avrupa arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamak adına bu tez Avrupa'da İslam algısını, Avrupa'nın İslam korkusu ve yükselen sağ açısından irdelenmiştir. İslam'ın Avrupa'daki yeri ve Avrupa'nın İslam algısı özellikle Avrupalı Müslümanların radikalleşmesi açısından incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Tarihsel olarak İslam'ın Avrupa toplumu

içinde yeri olmadığı düşüncesi ve İslami değerlerin Avrupa'nın değerleri ile örtüşmediği algısı Avrupa'da yaşayan Müslümanların kendilerini Avrupa toplumunun bir parçası olarak görmemesi ve topluma entegre olamaması konusunda önemli olduğu analiz edilmiştir. Bunun yanında, bu tezde önce 9/11 saldırısı sonrasında da 2004 Madrid bombalaması ve 2005 Londra bombalaması Batı'da ciddi derecede İslam korkusu ve düşmanlığı açısından donum noktası olduğu tartışılmıştır. Kısa bir süre önce gerçekleşen Charlie Hebdo saldırısı ve 13 Kasım 2015'te gerçekleşen ve 130 kişinin ölümüyle sonuçlanan Paris saldırıları hali hazırda var olan İslam karşıtlığını alevlendirmiştir. İslam karşıtlığının siyasi alanda yansımaları ise göçmen karşıtı popülist sağ partilerin Avrupa'nın birçok ülkesinde yükselişte olmasıdır. Almanya'daki 2013 yılında kurulan Almanya için Alternatif Partisi bunun bir örneği olup "İslam'a Almanya'da yer yok!" söylemiyle gittikçe oyunu attığı görülmektedir. Aynı şekilde, Fransa'da Ulusal Cephe 2012 seçimlerinde aldığı %14 oyunu, 2015'te %28'e çıkartarak yükselişte olduğunu göstermiştir. Aşırı sağ partilerin yükselişte olmasını benzer bir şekilde Nordik ülkeleri de deneyimlemektedir. Örneğin, göçmen karşıtlığı söylemleriyle İsveç'te Sosyal Demokrat Parti, Danimarka'da da Danimarka Halk Partisi son seçimlerde oylarını gittikçe arttırmışlardır. Bu bağlamda, bu bölümde genel olarak Avrupa'da İslam algısının Avrupalı Müslümanların radikalleşmeleriyle ilişkili olarak yansımaları analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Dördüncü bölümde, Avrupa'nın bir alt bölgesi olan Batı Avrupa bölgesindeki ülkelerde Müslümanları radikalleşmeye iten sebepleri ülkelerin iç dinamikleri ve İslam'a bakış açıları çerçevesinde açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Yabancı savaşçı meselesiyle ilişkili olarak radikalleşme sebepleri Müslüman toplumların yetersiz sosyoekonomik koşulları, ideolojik sebepler, ülkelerin entegrasyon politikaları ve bu politikaların Müslüman toplumları üzerindeki etkileri çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Aynı zamanda, Batı Avrupa'daki radikal örgütlerin varlığının da radikalleşmeyi arttıran ve Avrupalı Müslümanların endoktrinasyonunda fazlaca etkili olduğu tartışılmıştır. Az gelişmiş ülkelerden Batı Avrupa'ya göçen Müslümanların içinde bulunduğu yetersiz sosyoekonomik koşulların

Müslümanları ekonomik ve sosyal yönden ötekileştiren bir durum olduğundan bahsedilmiştir. Düşük işsizlik oranı, düşük eğitim seviyesi ve Avrupalı Müslümanların göreceli olarak yoksul bölgelerde yaşıyor olması gibi durumların Avrupalı Müslümanların sosyoekonomik ayrışmasında etki olduğu anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu durumun ise Avrupalı Müslümanların radikal fikirlere karşı daha meyilli olabileceği konusunda varsayımında bulunulmuştur. Bununla beraber, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin entegrasyon politikalarının da Avrupalı Müslümanların ötekileşmesinde rol oynadığından bahsedilmiştir. Entegrasyon problemleriyle ilişkili olarak, Avrupa'daki Müslümanların radikalleşmesinde kimlik krizinin de etkili olduğu ve Avrupalı Müslümanların kendilerini ne Avrupalı ne de geldikleri ülkelerin vatandaşı olarak gördüğü meselesine değinilmiştir. Avrupalı Müslümanların içinde bulunduğu bu kimlik krizinde ülkelerin uyguladığı entegrasyon politikalarıyla da ilişkili olduğuna değinilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Batı Avrupa ülkeleri, çok kültürlülük yanlısı olan ülkeler, asimilasyonist ve dışlayıcı entegrasyon politikaları güden ülkeler şeklinde değerlendirilmiş ve bu politikaların Avrupalı Müslümanlar tarafından nasıl algılandığı tartışılmıştır. Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin entegrasyon politikaları incelendiğinde ise hiçbir entegrasyon politikasının Avrupalı Müslümanları Avrupa toplumuna tam olarak dahil edemediğinden bahsedilmiştir. Bu durumda Avrupalı Müslümanların kendini öteki olarak görmesine neden olacağı ve dolayısıyla radikalleşmeye daha eğilimli olacağı varsayılmıştır. Son olarak da, *Tablighi Jama'at*, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* ya da *Islam4UK* gibi radikal İslamist grup ya da örgütlerin Avrupa'da oldukça etkin olduğundan ve Avrupalı Müslümanların radikalleşmesinde çok önemli bir rol oynadığından bahsedilmiştir.

Beşinci bölümde de, Kuzey Avrupa ülkeleri olan Danimarka, Norveç, İsveç ve Finlandiya'dan oluşan Nordik ülkelerindeki radikalleşme sebepleri Batı Avrupa ülkeleriyle karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Dünya'nın en demokratik ve refah seviyesinin en yüksek olduğu bu bölgede radikalleşmenin Avrupa'nın diğer alt bölgelerine göre daha fazla olması analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Nordik ülkelerinden Suriye'deki radikal örgütlere katılan toplam

yabancı sayısı Uluslararası Radikalleşme Çalışmaları Merkezi tahminlerine göre 470'tir. Bu sayı, Batı Avrupa'dan Suriye'deki gruplara katılan yabancı savaşçı sayısına kıyasla az olmasına rağmen, Nordik ülkelerindeki yabancı savaşçı sayısı yine bu ülkelerin sahip oldukları Müslüman popülasyonuna oranlandığında Nordik ülkelerindeki radikalleşmenin %0.047 olduğu görülmektedir. Nordik ülkelerinde ortaya çıkan bu durum, bu ülkelerin iç dinamikleri, entegrasyon politikaları, toplumsal yapıları, bu ülkelerin radikal örgütlere karşı tutumu ve güvenlik anlayışı çerçevesinde incelenmeye çalışılmış ve Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden farklı olan dinamikler ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Öncelikli olarak, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde Avrupalı Müslümanların yetersiz sosyoekonomik koşulları radikalleşmeye neden olan sebepler arasında gösterilebilirken, Nordik ülkelerinde bu durum farklılık göstermektedir. Dünya sıralamasında refah seviyesi en yüksek olan bölgede yer alan Nordik ülkelerinde yetersiz sosyoekonomik koşulların radikalleşme üzerindeki etkisindeki bahsetmek çok da açıklayıcı olmayabilir. Bir başka deyişle, Benmelech, Kolar veya Piazza gibi uzmanların iddia ettiği gibi yetersiz ekonomik koşullar, yüksek seviyede gelir eşitsizliği, işsizlik veya enflasyon ile terörizm veya radikalleşme arasında ciddi bir korelasyon olmadığı hipotezi Nordik ülkeleri için yabancı savaşçı konusunda geçerli olacaktır. Nordik ülkelerin entegrasyon problemleri hakkında ise Batı Avrupa'da olduğu gibi ülkelerin problemleri entegrasyon politikalarından bahsetmek mümkündür. Bu durum özellikle bu ülkelerde yaşayan Müslümanlar üzerinde ötekileştirici bir etki yarattığından bahsedilmesi mümkündür. Buna ek olarak, Nordik ülkelerin Batı Avrupa ülkelerine göre daha homojen topluma sahip olması bu ülkedeki göçmenlerin toplumda daha belirgin bir şekilde algılanmasına ve ötekileştirilmesine etkisi olacağından bahsedilmiştir. Bu sebeple, göçmenlerin çeşitlilik ve farklılık yarattığı düşüncesinin Nordik ülkelerinde Batı Avrupa ülkelerine kıyasla daha endişe verici olarak görüldüğü ve bunun da Müslüman göçmenlerin kendilerini toplumdan izole edip radikalleşmeye daha fazla neden olabileceğinden bahsedilmiştir. Son olarak da, Nordik ülkelerindeki radikalleşmenin Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden daha fazla olmasının arkasındaki temel

sebebin Nordik ülkelerinin daha demokratik bir yaklaşımla yumuşak güce dayalı terörizmle mücadele strateji gütmesi gösterilebilir. Nordik ülkelerinin bu güvenlik anlayışındaki en önemli hassasiyetinin güvenlik ve bireysel özgürlükler arasındaki ince çizgiyi koruması olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu durum ise, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin aksine Nordik ülkelerinin bahsedilen yumuşak güce dayalı bu güvenlik anlayışının bu ülkelerdeki radikal gruplar tarafından daha çok kullanıldığına değinilmiş ve bu sebeple bu radikal gruplar Nordik ülkelerinde daha rahat örgütlenebilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tezin temel sorunsalı, Avrupa’da bir alt bölge olarak Nordik bölgesinin Batı Avrupa ve Güney Doğu Avrupa gibi diğer alt-bölgelerden neden Müslüman nüfusuna göre daha yüksek oranda yabancı savaşçı ortaya çıkardığını açıklamaktır. Bu tez, söz konusu bölgelerdeki bu durumu, bölgelerin sosyoekonomik koşullarını, göçmen kimlik krizi ve devletlerin bütünleşme politikaları gibi entegrasyon sorunlarını ve son olarak radikal örgütlerin bu bölgelerdeki varlığını ve etkinliğini analiz ederek 2011 itibariyle Suriye giden yabancı savaşçılar özelinde radikalleşmenin sebepleri açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Her ne kadar her ülke ya da bölgenin yabancı savaşçıların ortaya çıkışını tetikleyen kendine has iç dinamikleri olsa da, Batı Avrupa’nın tezde belirtilen şekildeki analizi, düşük seviyedeki sosyoekonomik koşulların Müslüman göçmenleri Avrupa toplumuna entegre etmede yaşanan başarısızlıklar ve etkili radikal aşırı örgütlerin insanları radikalleştirmesi ile birleştiğinde Avrupalı Müslümanların radikalleşmesi sürecinde önemli rol oynadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Diğer taraftan, Nordik ülkelerinde yabancı savaşçıların ortaya çıkmasında etkili olan temel sebepler dikkatle incelendiğinde görüleceği üzere; Nordik bölgesi, Batı Avrupa bölgesinden toplumsal yapı ve bu bölgenin demokratik doğası açısından oldukça farklıdır. Öncelikle, Nordik ülkeleri özelinde gözlemleneceği gibi, sosyoekonomik yetersizlikler radikalleşmenin başat sebebinin oluşturmamaktadır. Gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla (GSYİH) ve İnsani Gelişmişlik İndeksi (IGI) açısından, Nordik ülkelerinin oldukça gelişmiş olması, zayıf

ekonomik koşulların ve düşük yaşam standartlarının yabancı savaşıların ortaya çıkışı açısından doğrudan radikalleşmeye sebep olmadığı görülmektedir.

Dahası, görece homojen toplumlara ve dolayısıyla daha homojen sosyoekonomik ilişkilere sahip olan Finlandiya, Danimarka, İsveç ve Norveç gibi ülkelerde yaşayan Müslüman toplulukların yabancı savaşı üretme oranının en yüksek seviyede olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durumun sebebi, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden etnik ve dilsel olarak daha homojen bir yapıya sahip olan bu ülkelerde farklı kültürel geçmişlere sahip Müslüman göçmenleri asimile etmenin daha zor olması olabilir. Bunun yanı sıra, devletlerin entegrasyon politikaları açısından, çok-kültürlülük yanlısı entegrasyon politikalarının uygulamaya çalışan İsveç, Norveç, Belçika ya da Hollanda gibi ülkelerin, Fransa Almanya gibi çok-kültürlülük yanlısı politikaları daha az savunan ülkelere göre daha yüksek oranda yabancı savaşı üretmeleri açısından bakıldığında, Tablo 3.1’de işaret edildiği gibi, radikalleşmeye daha yatkın olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Bu durum düşünüldüğünde, çokkültürlülük yanlısı politikaların azınlık gruplarını paralel ve ayrılmış toplumlarda yaşamaya terk etmesiyle aslında daha ayrımcı bir ulusal kimlik nosyonunu yarattığı savunulabilir. Sonuçta, bu politikalar, bu ülkelerde yaşayan Müslüman toplulukların daha ileri seviyede dışlanmışlık ve yabancılaşma hissetmesine neden olmuş olabilir ve bu da gün sonunda yabancı savaşıların ortaya çıkmasına bakıldığında daha fazla radikalleşmeye sebep olmuş olabilir.

Yine de çokkültürlülük yanlısı politikaları en az savunan Danimarka örneği incelendiğinde, Müslüman topluma oranla yüksek yabancı savaşı yüzdesine sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çokkültürlülük yanlısı politika ve göçmenlerin radikalleşmesi arasında bir pozitif korelasyon olduğunu savunmak da asimile edici veya dışlayıcı politikalar ve radikalleşme arasında bir negatif korelasyon olduğunu savunmak da eşit derecede problemlidir.

Bunun yanında, Nordik ülkelerini Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden ayırarak temel fark, Nordik ülkelerinin daha çok yumuşak güç kullanması ve terörizmle mücadele stratejisi olarak kapsayıcı ya da başka bir ifade ile kucaklayıcı güvenlik önemleri

alması olarak gösterilebilir. Bu ülkelerin temel endişesi güvenlik ve bireysel özgürlükler arasındaki hassas dengeyi korumak olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Dünyadaki en demokratik ülkeler arasında parmakla gösterilen bu ülkeler, eninde sonunda kendi güvenlik anlayışlarını ve güvenliği ele alış biçimlerini de şekillendiren liberal demokratik değerleri politika yapım sürecinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görmektedirler. Bu bağlamda, liberal demokratik değerleri savunarak, Nordik ülkeleri azınlık gruplarına kendi kültürel ve dini haklarını yaşayabilecekleri alanlar sağlarken, aynı zamanda radikal gruplara hem görüşlerini yayma hem de insanları görece özgür bir ortamda endoktrine etme şansını da sağlamış olmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez, Nordik ülkelerinin Müslüman nüfuslarına oranla, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinden neden daha fazla yabancı savaşçı ürettiği sorusunun cevabını, söz konusu ülkelerin sahip oldukları demokratik yapı ile radikalleşme karşısı sert güvenlik önlemlerinden imtina etmeleri olarak göstermiştir.

B.TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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Soyadı : Yıldız

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Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

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