

“A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF NARRATIVES
CONCERNING THE EMERGENCE OF CIVILIZATION:
NIETZSCHE AND FREUD”

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ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION OF NARRATIVES CONCERNING THE EMERGENCE OF CIVILIZATION: NIETZSCHE AND FREUD

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In this MA thesis, I will investigate understandings concerning the emergence of civilization which can be traced to ancient thought, but which is clearly taken into account by the modern thinkers, especially Hobbes and Rousseau. First, I will present Hobbes' and Rousseau's narratives concerning the development of civilization and then I will problematize their approaches by introducing Nietzsche's and Freud's understandings which inherently criticizes Hobbes' and Rousseau's accounts. Another reason why I will concentrate on these philosophers is that they all depict a hypothetical condition of the human being before civil society and try to give an account of the condition of the human being after the establishment of civil society. Then, I will attempt to offer a reading of Nietzsche's and Freud's interpretations of the emergence of civilization as a dynamic process in relation to the alterations of the human being. By focusing on the struggle, namely *agon*, between 'noble' and 'slave' forces in Nietzsche's understanding and by focusing on the antagonism between the death drive and the life drive in Freud's understanding, I will concentrate on their account of the emergence of civilization in relation to the changes in the human being which is *sans telos* according to both thinkers. Finally, I will discuss to what extent Freud's understanding significantly diverges from Nietzsche's thinking.

Keywords: civilization, forces, *agon*, the death drive, the life drive.

ÖZ

UYGARLIĞIN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞINA İLİŞKİN ANLATILAR HAKKINDA KRİTİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME: NIETZSCHE VE FREUD

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Bu Yüksek Lisans tezinde, izlerinin antik düşünceye kadar takip edilebilen fakat açıkça modern düşünürler, özellikle Hobbes ve Rousseau, tarafından ele alınan uygarlığın ortaya çıkışı üzerine anlayışlar incelenecektir. İlk olarak Hobbes ve Rousseau'nun uygarlığın gelişimi üzerine anlatıları sunulacak ve sonra bu açıklamaların eleştirisini kendiliğinden içeren Nietzsche'nin ve Freud'un anlayışları gösterilerek sorunsallaştırılacaktır. Bu düşünürlere bir arada yoğunlaşılmasının bir başka sebebi de bu düşünürlerin uygar toplum öncesi varsayımsal bir durumu betimlemeleri ve uygar toplumun ortaya çıkışından sonra insanın durumunun hesabını vermeye çalışmalarıdır. Ardından, Nietzsche'nin ve Freud'un uygarlığın ortaya çıkışının insanın değişimi ile ilgili olarak dinamik bir süreç olduğuna dair bir okuma önerilmeye çalışılacaktır. Nietzsche'nin anlayışında 'soylu' ve 'köle' kuvvetleri arasındaki mücadeleye, yani *agon*'a, Freud'un anlayışında ise ölüm ve yaşam dürtüleri arasındaki antagonizmaya yoğunlaşarak; onların uygarlığın ortaya çıkışı hakkındaki açıklamalarına, *sans telos* olan insanın değişimi bağlamında odaklanılacaktır. Son olarak Freud'un anlayışının Nietzsche'nin düşüncesinden ne ölçüde ayrıldığı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygarlık, kuvvetler, *agon*, ölüm dürtüsü, yaşam dürtüsü.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Curiosity about the origin of the human societies, body politics - broadly civilization - lies at the heart of the religious, philosophic, political inquiries. Although a lot of thinkers focus on the emergence and development of civilization, very few have been able to change the course of the history of thought and shed light on the issues of today's civilization as Freud and Nietzsche did. Even though these thinkers introduce great novelties into the world of thought and our way of life, they inherited a tradition whose beginnings lie in ancient thought even though the question concerning the emergence of civilization is more clearly defined in the modern period, especially in Hobbes' *Leviathan*¹, Rousseau's *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*² and Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*³. These prominent thinkers, Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke, attempt to find what the preconditions for the emergence of civilized society might have been and thereby they create narratives about the transformation of human beings from their natural state to their civilized state. Inheriting this tradition, but in a critical way, Freud and Nietzsche narrate a hypothetical condition of the human being before civil society and try to give account of the condition of the human being after the establishment of civil society as well. Therefore, hypothetical approaches to the natural state of human beings enable us to examine their narratives together.

In this connection, this thesis elaborates Nietzsche's and Freud's critiques of the narratives of the emergence of civilization in Hobbes' and Rousseau's thoughts which approach the natural state and the civilized state of human beings

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. C.B. Macpherson (Ed.). London: Penguin, 1968.

² Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in G. D. H. Cole (Tr. and Ed.), *The Social Contract and Discourses*. London: Everyman, 1913.

³ John Locke, "Second Treatise of Government", C.B. Macpherson (Ed.). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980.

through concepts that are oppositional. Hence, I will refer to Hobbes' and Rousseau's approaches as 'oppositional approaches'; what I mean by 'the oppositional approach' will be elaborated in the Nietzsche chapter. In a very simple and a reductive way, on one hand Hobbes ascribes evilness to the state of nature and goodness to the civilized society, on the other Rousseau claims the exact opposite⁴. By examining Nietzsche's and Freud's understandings, I will demonstrate how Nietzsche and Freud overcome this oppositional approach to the transformation of the human being. In addition to that neither Hobbes nor Rousseau construe and interrogate the value of morality in the emergence of civilization but for both Freud and Nietzsche, morality, which is a major cause of today's human beings' discontentment, is intertwined with the process of civilization.

In this attempt, I will briefly introduce and problematize Hobbes' (2.1) and Rousseau's (2.2) accounts based on *Leviathan* and *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* respectively. In addition, I will interrogate other problems inherent in their narratives by pointing out Nietzsche's and Freud's responses (2.3).

In the second chapter, I will problematize the emergence of civilization from a Freudian perspective. Freud presents an account of civilization, which arises out of the antagonistic relation between organic drives, namely the life drive (qua *Eros*) and the death drive (qua *Thanatos*), regarding the psychic constitution of the human being. For this reason, I will first elaborate Freud's theory of drives (3.1) and then focus on the constitution of the human psyche (3.2) in relation to his theory of drives. Then, I will take into account Freud's narrative, which expands Darwin's conjecture in a myth of the primal horde in order to demonstrate the emergence of the last partition of the human psyche, the superego (3.3) which has one of the preeminent roles in the process of civilization. After these preparatory sections, I will delineate the interrelation of these drives during

⁴ I will focus on especially Hobbes' and Rousseau's understandings (not Locke's) in order to show the critique of Nietzsche and Freud clearly. In addition, I will give place to Freud's and Nietzsche's critique on the natural and the social contract theories clearly. Therefore, Locke's account will have its own share although I will not refer to his text.

the emergence and development of civilization (3.4) and during the transformation of the human being. Freud rejects the idea of an original moral capacity that distinguishes good things from bad ones. He further claims that the emergence of morality, which is related to the constitution of the superego in the human psyche, is concomitant with the process of civilization (3.5). Next I will emphasize and detail the strict relation between the transformation of the human being and the emergence of the institutions of civilized society (3.6). In conclusion of this part (3.7), I will briefly discuss Freud's suggestions for dealing with the problematic situation of the human being in civil societies.

For Nietzsche, the focal point of the debate lies in his understanding of the productive, on-going strife (qua *agon*) between forces – especially the agonistic structure of 'noble' and 'slave' forces. In order to understand this strife between these forces, I will briefly introduce Nietzsche's dynamic interpretation of the world (4.1). Next, I will focus on the struggle between 'noble' and 'slave' forces in relation to the articulation of bodies – such as civil society – with the analysis of which the alteration in the dynamics of forces in the process of civilization will be elucidated (4.2). By concentrating on Nietzsche's narrative, which comprises 'noble' and 'slave' typologies or impersonal happenings developed through history, I will delineate the emergence of a specific, reactive faculty of memory, *the memory of the will* (4.3) that forms the basis of the first contractual relationships (4.4). In the process of development of civilization, the emergence of the priestly mode of existence as a result of the internalisation of human drives signifies alterations both on the individual level – i.e., inhibition of the natural drives of the human being, and the emergence of the feelings of bad conscience and guilt– and on the societal level – i.e., the domination of reactive values among human beings (4.5). When presenting this account, I will elucidate the relation between the development of morality, as a slave morality, and the development of civilization (4.6). Before moving to the relation between the understanding and establishment of truth, and the emergence of civil society and its institutions (4.8), I will try to present a possible counter model in which the human being affirms its

animality and in doing so, surmounts the problematic side of the slave triumph (4.7). In addition to the problematic establishment of truth, the excess knowledge of history, which is demanded in today's civilized societies leads to the hypertrophy of the sense of history (4.9). In the conclusion of this part, I will draw the conclusion of Nietzsche's narrative and, in the light of what I have discussed in the previous parts, I will emphasize the points he inherently criticizes about the narratives of Hobbes and Rousseau (4.10)

In the last part of this thesis, in concluding remarks (5), I will put emphasis on what makes the narratives of Nietzsche and Freud distinct and novel. Then I will draw attention to the points Freud more or less reduplicates. Finally, I will interrogate to what extent Freud diverges from Nietzsche's understanding.

CHAPTER II

THE NARRATIVES OF CIVILIZATION IN THE MODERN PERIOD

2.1. HOBBS

Engaging a complicated phenomenon by using a simpler one, in *Leviathan*⁵ Hobbes begins with human beings in the state of nature to give the account of the formation of political and social structures, and civil society – broadly the emergence of civilization, the narrative of which is the main concern of this thesis. In order to show the transition from the state of nature to body politic and effects of the civilized society on human beings in Hobbes' account, I will follow the steps in his narrative⁶.

In his narrative account of history, Hobbes first tries to study the idea of a human being in the primitive state, the so called state of nature, in which there is no government, no external laws at all. The state of nature is a hypothetical state, because it is a possibility introduced by Hobbes⁷. He tries to postulate elementary factors about the human being in this state in order to reach logically correct conclusions about the development of civilization. In other words, in this hypothetical state Hobbes tries to delineate the natural condition of humankind without any social construction, i.e., without culture, society etc.

Hobbes claims that human beings would be considered as equals in the state of nature, because even if there are some individuals who are stronger or have a quicker mind than others, other people can come together and subdue the stronger or the clever. In addition to that, he depicts that human beings are driven by self-preservation – which is the fundamental instinct, destructiveness to others and the

⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. C.B. Macpherson (Ed.). London: Penguin, 1968.

⁶ Chapters XIII, XIV, XVII, XVIII, XXI, XXVIII, and XXIX in *Leviathan* are focused on in the thesis.

⁷ Murray Forsyth, "Hobbes's Contractarianism", in David Boucher and Paul Kelly (Eds.), *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*. New York: Routledge, 1994, p.45.

desire for recognition which yields conflict in the state of nature, because without any external impediment, when human beings are absolutely free, they have liberty to use their power on anything against their preservation and they would be destructive to each other to acquire fruits, products and others' recognition. In this regard, human beings, by nature, have the right – i.e., the right of nature (qua *Jus Naturale*) to exert their own power over any other human being.

In the state of nature, different from, there are also other sources of conflict between human beings than the drive for self-preservation: they use violence in order to make themselves masters of other people – namely competition, secondly to defend the things and persons they keep– namely diffidence, and thirdly to gain the good opinion of others – namely glory⁸. Hereby there is no idea of private property – i.e., no *Mine* and *Thine* distinction⁹ – and of justice and injustice, because there is no common power, which is capable of keeping them safe and away from violence. There is always the danger of a united force of other people which tries to dispossess and deprive the person not only of her possessions but also of her life. Fourthly, human beings are in competition for honour and dignity that causes the feelings of envy and hatred among human beings, because some human beings win and some do not¹⁰. Fifthly, in contrast to other creatures, human beings are endowed with reason and some people think themselves wiser than others and, thereby, the existence of reason also leads to a conflict between human beings¹¹. In addition to that, human beings can distinguish between injury and intentional damage, and one of them leads to a struggle among human beings. In detail, nonhuman animals do not have the capability to harm one another intentionally. And even if they do, other nonhuman animals are unable to realize whether it is intentional or not. However, according to Hobbes' narrative, human beings, in contrast to other animals, have the ability to do intentional damage and

⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XIII, p.185.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.188.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XVII, p.225.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, XVII, p.226

to distinguish it from injury, which leads to conflict between human beings. Lastly, there is no natural agreement that promotes harmony and peace among human beings contrary to the members of other species, which have an agreement by nature. In conclusion, the state of nature is a state in which there is a continual fear of death so that Hobbes calls this state ‘the state of war’¹².

Apart from their instincts and desires, as discussed above, human beings have a developed reason, which can find out the laws of nature, according to Hobbes’ account. As such, every human being ought to seek peace if they can set a peaceful situation, because by nature human beings have the right to use their power for the preservation of their own nature – that is to say, of their own life¹³. Contrary to the law of nature, a person is always in danger in the state of nature. For this reason, she ought to struggle for peace. Thus, she must be ready to lay down her right of fight or war if others are also ready for this. In this sense, found out by reason, which is motivated by the drive of self-preservation, the law of nature leads to the mutual transferring of the natural right to act in accordance with one’s instincts without any restriction, to a common power, so called sovereign that forbids human beings to act destructively towards each other. In other words, human beings get themselves out of the state of war - in other words ill condition¹⁴ –, by agreeing upon a covenant, the so called ‘social contract’, and transferring their rights to the sovereign. A sovereign power is required because the bonds of words alone cannot secure the mutual transferring of the right. In conclusion, the civil society, in which human beings are secure and which thereby is required, has its basis in human beings’ equally transferring their rights to a sovereign.

When a person renounces her right of nature and transfers it to someone else, she promises to obey the one whom she grants her right. Accordingly, since the covenant is between those who give their rights to someone or some assembly,

¹² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XIII, p.185.

¹³ *Ibid.*, XIV p.190.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, XIII, p.188.

not between the sovereign and other individuals, they no longer have their rights to war or to break the peace and they thereby cannot break the contract¹⁵. Acting otherwise will be a contradiction so that it means violating the right and, thereby, considered as an act of injustice. In other words, for Hobbes, human beings as rational beings promise to give their rights to the sovereign and once they give their rights they no longer have them so that breaching the contract is an irrational act, which is contradictory for the human nature so that it is injustice. In this sense, the origin of the judicial system in civil societies is this transferring of one's right of nature to the sovereign. In other words, the emergence of the judicial system in Hobbes' narrative is based on the act of promising by rational subjects. Consequently, with the social contract, the civil society emerges and individuals are subject to the sovereign, e.g., monarch, which oppresses human beings' desire for destructiveness or aggressiveness against others in order to preserve people's lives. Moreover, as Martinich puts forth, the origin of justice and punishment is this mutual transferring of natural rights, because with the social contract the rights to protect themselves and to punish are left to the sovereign¹⁶. For Hobbes, legislating and enforcing laws must be under the sovereign's control¹⁷. In the light of these, the emergence of civil society emancipates human beings from the state of war, but it puts human beings in a situation in which human beings' instincts are oppressed by an authority according to Hobbes. However, for Hobbes this oppression is a necessary one and truly free people are people who see the necessary connections between causes and events.¹⁸, so under the power of the sovereign individual human beings have the liberty to do what their reasons suggests – e.g., free to buy, sell, trade things and to educate their children. In this context, human beings transfer their right to protect themselves to the sovereign. With the establishment of civil society, punishment of an individual is inflicted by a public authority and is no longer the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, XVIII p.230.

¹⁶ Aloysius Patrick Martinich, *Hobbes*. Brian Leiter (Ed.). New York: Routledge, 2005, p.56.

¹⁷ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.366.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, XXI, p.263.

result of private feuds or the expression of subjective feelings. In civil society, the harm done to a guilty individual must be in accordance with the law and not be less than the benefit¹⁹.

In conclusion, the state of nature Hobbes depicts is not a condition lying in the remote past but a condition we are constantly inclined to fall into. On this account the state of nature is a hypothetical state, which pictures what life would be like in the absence of civil order and authority. It is an ahistorical condition in the sense that it represents a fall from civilized society. It seems that, in his account, freedom and other natural capacities of human beings are treated as alienable property, and civil society is considered in terms of a collection of naturally free and equal individuals who are related to each other as possessors of their natural capacities. Civil society is considered to be attained by reason, and is considered as a device that protects the private property and maintains the relations of exchange. In this sense, for Hobbes, rationality, conscience, etc. are taken for granted in human beings as natural capacities. Hobbes neglects the fact that these capacities are acquired or formed through a historical process. Similarly, a historical account of the existence and legitimacy of a sovereign is missing.²⁰ Another problematic aspect of Hobbes' narrative is that he hierarchizes the drives of human being and takes the drive of self-preservation into account as the primary drive without giving an account. Besides, all the laws of nature and all political obligations are derived by reason from the human beings' right to self-preservation. Therefore, the laws, which are posited as laws of nature, are in fact laws of reason, because by means of the laws of nature human beings deal with the irrational pursuit of self-preservation in the state of war and act in accordance with the social contract which is established in terms of rational maxims of action²¹. In other words, the human being does not deduce the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XXVIII, p.263.

²⁰ Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.23.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.59.

laws of nature from their observations of nature, these laws, which are already the laws of reason, are posited as the laws of nature.

In Hobbes' narratives, not only the oppression of drives but also their elimination is necessary for the peaceful situation in civilized society. However, as Nietzsche points out, people whose wills are too weak to exercise any restraint on a desire choose the methods of castration and eradication²². In other words, they need a gap between themselves and passions so that they can declare hatred and hostility against passions and desires. For this reason, Nietzsche considers "the inability *not* to react to a stimulus, is itself just another form of degeneration"²³.

In addition, Hobbes proposes a civil society in which there is no conflict and struggle, but life itself consist of struggles or – if we go a step further – is itself struggle. As Nietzsche states

You give up the great life when you give up war ... In many cases, of course, 'peacefulness of the soul' is just a misunderstanding, - something else is really happening, but without knowing what to call itself. A couple of cases, bluntly and without bias. 'Peacefulness of the soul', for instance, can be the gentle diffusion of a rich, animal nature into a moral (or religious) sphere. Or the beginning of fatigue, the first shadow of evening, of any type of evening²⁴.

In conclusion, giving up war, struggle, conflict mean giving up the possibility of living a great life. Nietzsche relates the diffusion of the rich animal nature into a moral sphere with the peacefulness of soul. Consequently, this peacefulness brings a sort of weakness or laziness to our desire, our will.

²² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §2.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §3.

2.2. ROUSSEAU

Attempting to give an account of inequalities among human beings in civilized societies, in *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Rousseau tries to show how things must have been in the state of nature, how civil societies must have emerged and how things must have changed²⁵. For this reason, his method, similar to Hobbes's, involves conjectures and reasoning which are necessary to achieve knowledge of human being in the state of nature. Therefore, Rousseau's approach should be conceived as a hypothetical one with which he distances himself from other traditional narratives such as a biblical account or, merely narrative account of history as the story of events and 'facts'²⁶.

What differentiates Rousseau from his predecessors is his sceptical understanding of human being in their natural state. Rather presuming human beings to be naturally sociable or naturally aggressive in the state of nature – in contrast to Aristotle and Hobbes— he attempts to strip away the characteristics of human beings` acquired in society, to be able to identify human nature in the state of nature. Contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau argues that even human rationality has to be explained in terms of a process of socialization²⁷, because he thinks that in the state of nature, the human animal would neither have a need for social obligations nor be conscious of death or have a fear of death. For this reason, Rousseau holds that the notions of property, which, according to Hobbes, cause conflict between human animals, develop in the process of socialization of the human animal - in other words, in the process of civilization.

Rousseau depicts the human animal in the state nature as an animal that is driven by its instincts or sentiments, which provide the only and necessary

²⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in G. D. H. Cole (Tr. and Ed.), *The Social Contract and Discourses*. London: Everyman, 1913. Hereafter DI.

²⁶ Timothy O'Hagan, *Rousseau*. London: Routledge, 1999, 40.

²⁷ Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.61.

guidance for them to survive so that they all care for their self-preservation. Rousseau puts these instincts into two groups or classifies them as two natural instincts or sentiments. The first one is self-interest (*amour de soi*) and the second active instinct or sentiment is called compassion (*la pitié*), which is an “innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer”²⁸. This natural compassion does not come from comparing itself with the other, but it arises out of a spontaneous physical sensation; thereby it is ‘good’ or innocent. On the other hand, in society, the human being who experiences pity at the sight of pain and suffering is yielded to corruption²⁹, because it does not arise from pure physical sensation and loses its original goodness. In this context, the human animal is reluctant to harm other living bodies. In contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau claims that human animals would injure each other only in those cases where it is necessary for their self-preservation. Passions such as vanity, pride or glory are not natural inclinations of the human animal in the state of nature.

In addition to these naturally active instincts or sentiments, human beings also have inactive faculties of "development" or self-improvement and "choosing" - i.e., the ability to will or not to will—which can be triggered into becoming active³⁰. Thus, Rousseau describes human being in the state of nature as a savage being which is nevertheless differentiated from animals by these potential faculties of “development” or “choosing”—which he calls “perfectibility”. However, as long as these distinctive faculties are not activated, there is no conceptual or reflective thinking in Rousseau’s state of nature, in contrast to Hobbes’s understanding. Thereby anticipation of the future is unattainable, the concepts of death and recognition are not conceivable for savage human beings. Since human beings do not have the capacity to make plans, they must come together like an animal herd and be faithful to each other while dealing with something that one cannot cope with on one’s own so that it becomes common

²⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, p.75.

²⁹ Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*, p.66.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.69.

interest³¹. Apart from such situations, human beings are dispersed and they do not live together so that in the case of a danger they can leave their place and run away. In this sense, the human animal lives in solitude and is the only observer of its acts so that there are no comparative evaluations of values between human animals. Thus, there is no place either for hatred or for revenge, which are passions depending on a sense of injury. In Rousseau's portrayal of the state of nature - contrary to Hobbes' *homo homini lupus est* - human beings live happily, or at least content, and in peace rather than living in fear of death. By virtue of this peacefulness, rather than being a creature that is morally bad just because it does not know what it is to be good, the human animal is good because it is ignorant of vices³². In other words, in the state of nature the human animal is in an isolated and asocial state in which wickedness is absent since its mental faculties are not developed. Therefore, the human animal is innocent and good by nature according to Rousseau's account.

In his conjectural method, Rousseau asserts that, as indicated before, in the state of nature the human animal lives in solitude and isolation. It has only natural needs that must be satisfied. Then, the inactive faculties of human beings are triggered after difficulties arise so that the development of conceptual thinking necessarily begins, and then human beings start to live together and develop characteristics which enable them to form societies³³. In this new state, which I would like to call "the second state of nature", human beings are equally restrained by their instincts and reason. In this second state of nature, there is no law so that morality is the sole guidance for human beings and the injury done by an individual causes contempt, rather than sentiments such as resentment, the feeling of revenge etc³⁴. Therefore, in this second state of nature, human beings are equal, autonomous, and live in peace.

³¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", p.87.

³² *Ibid.*, pp.72-73.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.89.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.91.

Deviation from the second state of nature, which occurs as a result of the emergence of agriculture and metallurgy – and the development of human faculties, makes human beings heteronomous, i.e., dependent and enslaved; because dealing with these arts requires division of labour which also means that individuals require each other for production. Distribution of production according to the division of labour gives rise to the first rules of justice. In this sense, economic motivations form the basis for justice in society which is, thereby, not moral or legitimate in Rousseau's understanding. In addition, property, which is just a means for self-preservation in the state of nature, becomes something human beings strive after because human beings henceforth are able to produce more than they actually need – in other words, they have the surplus. They desire not only to use the things they produced but also to possess and control these things. They reach a state in which they have conflicting interests in accumulation of property, which, as a result, forms different classes, e.g., the rich and the poor in society. The conflict between these classes inevitably creates violence in society. For this reason, in contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau calls the civilized society as “the state of war”. He also assesses that the rich try to impose law and punishment on the poor to protect their properties and they achieve their goal by convincing the poor to agree on the social contract. The social contract is a trick that gives more power to the rich, because the poor make a covenant with the rich although the poor have nothing in return for giving up their freedom, which is the only good they have. The emergence of civil society or civilization based on the social contract does not have a legitimate basis. Therefore, all forms of established rule and government is enforcement of unjust and oppressive inequalities in power³⁵.

Moreover, Rousseau states that seeing each other frequently leads to preference and feelings of jealousy and love in civil society³⁶. In this regard

³⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, p.66.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.76.

amour-propre, which can be considered as the desire for recognition and need for self-esteem, emerges in civil societies – in contrast to Hobbes.

[T]he passions of [human beings] insensibly change their very nature; why our wants and pleasures in the end seek new objects; and why, the original [human being] having vanished by degrees, society offers to us only an assembly of artificial [human beings] and factitious passions, which are the work of all these new relations, and without any real foundation in nature³⁷.

The human being's desire for reputation – which Hobbes called glory, pride, etc. are not natural, according to Rousseau, and arise as a result of the process of civilization. In detail, in this process, human beings become accustomed to living together, and everybody begins to think about the opinions of the rest and to wish to be considered as the handsomest, the strongest, best singer, etc. so that “the first distinctions arose on the side of vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy”³⁸. Rousseau envisions that the conflict between individuals does not come to an end in civil society, because the origin of civil society is the false contract between the rich and the poor³⁹ and the process of civilization leads human beings to develop hostile feelings against others, which, in turn, lead to disorders and inconveniencies. After it will cause primitive anarchy and then tyranny⁴⁰. Consequently, equality between human beings will be restored but they will lose their autonomy and freedom.

“[D]espotism wherever it prevails, admits no master... This is the last term of inequality, the extreme point that encloses the circle... Here all private persons return to their first equality, because they are nothing; and, subjects having no law but the will of their master”⁴¹

In conclusion, Rousseau's account differs from Hobbes' by demonstrating that human species have a history of sentiments and instincts which undergo changes through the process of civilization. He uses the concept of history not in

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.115.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.90.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.99.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.113.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.114.

order to abandon the idea of natural law but to delineate that thinkers like Hobbes take what is actually ‘social’ as ‘natural’. Hobbes construes the human being as inherently aggressive and desiring for domination over others. On the contrary, Rousseau claims that the desire for domination over others is a result of the development of civilization. Nevertheless, he still privileges certain sentiments or instincts such as *amour de soi* (self-interest) and *la pitié* (compassion) over others although he ventures to strip away all the characteristics of the human being, which are acquired in the process of civilization. In his picture of the state of nature, the human animal still has the sentiment of pity and natural goodness or innocence with which he criticizes and challenges Hobbes’ construal of the state of nature. Rousseau considers compassion as a sentiment which is prior to all reflection and which makes all the later virtues and the social relations between human beings possible. In other words, he takes compassion as a natural instinct, which is prior to the human being’s reason and socialisation. In accordance with Hobbes’ understanding, Rousseau also thinks that civilization or civil society is arises out of a complicated process, but this time it is put forth as a corrupted state in which human beings are unequal, mutually dependent and immoral. Ansell-Pearson emphasizes that for Rousseau it is implicitly emphasized that civilization is problematic because it does not lead to “a moral end: namely, [human being] as an ethical, self-legislating and autonomous agent”⁴².

2.3. Concluding Remarks on Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s Narratives

The first problem in Rousseau’s thought is that it postulates an unmediated opposition between the state of nature, which is related to the goodness of the human animal and civil society, which emerges as a result of the corruption of this goodness⁴³. Although Rousseau claims something else, it seems that overthrowing

⁴² Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*, p. 77.

⁴³ It may be pointed out that he does mediate them in *The Social Contract*, but my remarks are confined to *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*.

or reforming the institutions formed in the process of civilization could lead to the emergence of the goodness of the human animal. Rousseau blames civil society for the suffering of human beings and he yearns for a state of universal sameness, because Rousseau is unable to find the source of his suffering in the civil society. As Nietzsche states

Men like Rousseau know how to employ their weaknesses, deficiencies and vices as it were as manure for their talents. If he bewails the depravity and degeneration of society as the deplorable consequence of culture, he does so on the basis of a personal experience; it is the bitterness deriving from this that gives to his general condemnation the sharpness of its edge and poisons the arrows with which he shoots; he unburdens himself first of all as an individual and thinks to seek a cure that, operating directly upon society, will indirectly and through society also be of benefit to him himself⁴⁴.

In this regard, Rousseau problematizes the relationship of the self with the other. Blaming civil society, in which the 'problematic' inequality emerges, is a result of Rousseau's effort for seeking universal sameness or an absolute identity. In his account, the origin of the corruptness in civil society begins when the differences between human beings come in sight. The notion of equality is inherent in Hobbes' account as well. He also construes human beings as equals in the state of nature. During the transition to civil society people give their rights equally to a person or an institution in order to preserve their lives – in other words, to escape from the situation in which their lives are at stake. With the establishment of the social contract, they equally guarantee their security and, thereby, they are equals under the sovereign power. In contrast to Rousseau, for Hobbes, equality is the main notion that civilization is based on. Therefore, both Hobbes and Rousseau do not affirm difference, which is a problematic idea for them but Rousseau goes a step further and resents it, ascribes emergence of evil to it. Contrary to Rousseau and Hobbes, for Nietzsche the demand of equality is a sign of decline, because for him what characterizes the strong age is "the myriad

⁴⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human All too Human*, 'Man Alone with Himself', §617.

number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out - that which I call the *pathos of distance*"⁴⁵.

In this connection, for both Hobbes and Rousseau there is an opposition between the state of nature and the state of civil society. As discussed before, in their oppositional approaches Hobbes and Rousseau ascribes goodness or evilness to the state of nature and the state of civilized society. Rousseau ascribes goodness to the state of nature and according to his account civilization is problematic because it emerges as a result of the deviation from the good natural state. In other words, he ascribes the corruptness of civilization to its divergence from the goodness of the primitive state. Contrary to Rousseau, Hobbes associates the state of nature with evilness, because for him it is an ill state in which human beings are in a continuous war with each other. The emergence of civil society, which rescues human beings from this ill state, is construed as a good state in which people do not have constant fear of getting killed by someone so that they all can have the things necessary for commodious living. However, for both Rousseau and Hobbes, the body which is the collective of moral individuals and which is embodied in society or state is the goal of humankind. On the contrary, Nietzsche and Freud demonstrate that the emergence of morality in the process of civilization is the primary cause for the experiences of unhappiness and discontent. In addition to that, in the narratives of Nietzsche and Freud there are no fixed and immutable qualities of 'good' and 'evil'. Both Nietzsche and Freud advocate amoral ways in order to surmount the problems brought within civilization. Comparing to their account, both Hobbes and Rousseau disregard the fact that morality – goodness or evilness – is formed historically within the process of civilization.

⁴⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'Skirmishes of an Untimely Man', §37.

CHAPTER III

FREUD

Freud's "Civilization and Its Discontents"⁴⁶ charts the monumental changes, which the human being both as an individual being and as a species underwent from prehistoric to historic times. He attempts to interpret the shifts in history – e.g., the emergence of civilization – as signalling an equally momentous development or change in the constitution of the human being. In this regard, in order to understand the situation of the human being in civilized society, Freud endeavours to give an account of the emergence of civilization in relation to the change of the human being. In order to examine the change of the human being, Freud's theory of drives must be examined and clarified first, because Freud endeavours to give an account of the organic life by presenting his drive theory⁴⁷. For Freud, the vicissitudes of the drives are historical vicissitudes so that the dynamics of these drives builds and constructs the human being.

⁴⁶ Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents", in Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (eds.), Volume 12 *Civilization, Society and Religion: Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other Works*. London: Penguin, 1991.

⁴⁷ The term '*der Trieb*' is used as 'drive' in this work so it must be distinguished from the term '*der instinkt*'. *Der instinkt* is used by Freud to designate rigid, innate behaviour, while drives express themselves in a variety of ways. In the following sections, I elucidate the vicissitude of drives, while an *Instinct* could not have a vicissitude. In other words, it has a fixed pattern of behaviour. On the other hand, as Carel states, Freud uses the term 'drive' is such a way that it refers to a physiological force that creates pressure on an organism to behave in a way that will relieve the pressure, but the way it relieves is not prescribed by the drive and depends on cultural, social and environmental constraints. As Laplanche and Pontalis notes the Freudian conception of *Trieb* – a pressure that is relatively indeterminate both as regards the behaviour it induces and as regards the satisfying object – differs quite clearly from theories of instinct.

Cf. Havi Carel, *Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger*. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2006. pp.9-10.

Cf. J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973. p.214.

3.1. Theory of Drives

At the earliest stage, Freud constructs his theory of drives around the antagonism between the sexual drives and the ego drives which are respectively about sexuality and self-preservation. In his early works, Freud thinks that the subject avoids sexuality when the sexual drives threaten the preservation of life. Here Freud considers specifically external threats such as parental and environmental threats so that the libido and the ego are pitted against each other. According to his early account, plasticity is the distinguishing character of the sexual drives from the ego drives.

The sexual [drives] are noticeable to us for their plasticity, their capacity for altering their aims, their replaceability, which admits of one instinctual satisfaction being replaced by another, and their readiness for being deferred, ... We should be glad to deny these characteristics to the self-preservative [drives], and to say of them that they are inflexible, admit of no delay, are imperative in a very different sense and have a quite other relation to repression and to anxiety⁴⁸.

As Marcuse points out in *Eros and Civilization*, the sexual drive is first only one specific drive (or, rather, a group of drives) which is restricted to and defined by its specific object⁴⁹.

However, Freud later decides that the strict distinction or the opposition of the ego drives and the sexual drives is not valid. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, he notes that psychoanalysts have observed that the libido is regularly withdrawn from the object and directed onto the ego and in the studies on the early phases of libido development in children, in the case of first narcissism⁵⁰, they found out

⁴⁸ Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Tr. W. J. H. Sprott. New York: Norton, 1933. p.130.

⁴⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon, 1974. p.22.

⁵⁰ Freud presents the first narcissism as one of the phases of a healthy sexual development of a subject. To him narcissism was a normal maturational phase of healthy development in all children. Freud claims that before they are able to invest their libidinal energy on other people, they undergo a process or a phase in which their libidinal cathexis is not given off to objects, because they are egocentric and cannot take other people's standpoints and perspectives.

that the ego is the reservoir of the libido⁵¹. Henceforth the ego is considered to be among the sexual objects and, thus, the narcissistic libido – the libido which is directed onto and resides in the ego – is a manifestation of energy on the part of sexual drives which is identified with the self-preservation drives⁵².

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud identifies a concealed tendency in living organisms: “the compulsion to repeat”. By focusing on this crucial concept, he modifies his earlier theory and concludes that organic life arises out of the inorganic. Here Freud explains how he identified “the compulsion to repeat” as he was trying to understand clinical phenomena of traumatic neurosis of war. He argues that there seems to be no way to explain such phenomena in terms of the functioning of the pleasure principle and this leads him to postulate a new principle in order to explain the propensity for the unpleasurable. In detail, he recognizes that although it gives unpleasure to the organism, the organism has a propensity to re-experience what is unpleasurable. ...

As Ricoeur points out, the compulsion to repeat is a process that is prior to other principles such as the pleasure principle, the reality principle etc. Repetitions of the same act are actually attempts to master the stimulus which gives unpleasure to the organism⁵³ and it re-establishes the earlier state of the mental apparatus. Freud realizes that the aim of this process is to change the state of the mental apparatus from a free flowing state into a quiescent one. For instance, Freud realizes that, in traumatic neurosis, there are abnormal activities that directly attack the mental apparatus. He realizes that the repetition of this traumatic experience is the psyche’s own attempt to heal itself by trying to return

Cf. Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction”, in Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson (eds.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works: Volume XIV On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works*. Toronto: The Hogarth Press, 1962, pp.75-76.

⁵¹ Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, in Angela Richards (eds.), *Volume 11 On Metapsychology the Theory of Psychoanalysis*. London: Pelican, 1984. p.325.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.325.

⁵³ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*. Savage D (ed.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1970. p.285.

to its initial state. Although Freud observes this tendency to repeat in the mental life of individuals at first, by observing other living things, he eventually arrives at a theory according to which it is a feature of all organic life. For Freud, this tendency indicates a universal attribute of drives according to which a drive “is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things”⁵⁴. Therefore, Freud recognizes “an expression of the conservative nature of living substance”⁵⁵ in drives. They are toward repetition, conservation rather than change and development.

In connection with this perspective, “the living entity would from its very beginning have had no wish to change; if conditions remained the same, it would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of life... Those [drives] are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending towards change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal of life”⁵⁶ which is the oldest state of things, an initial state, death which is the most quiescent state. In this regard, life itself is, rather than the will to develop or to change, will to death and/or will to conserve⁵⁷. Since changes are external to life and the phenomena of life itself arise out of the original course of things by external influences or disturbing forces, the first drives – so called death drives, emerge to return life to the inanimate state⁵⁸. In order to resist the perpetual influence of the external, the secondary drives – the so called life drives or *Eros* – endeavour to conserve the present state of life. In connection with this, as Marcuse points out, the findings of infantile sexuality and unlimited erotogenic zones of the body anticipate the recognition of the libidinal parts of the self-preservation drives and prepare the ground for the final interpretation of sexuality in terms of *Eros*, the life drive⁵⁹. Therefore, life, which is comprised of these

⁵⁴ Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, p.308.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.309.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.310.

⁵⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*, p.290.

⁵⁸ Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, p.311.

⁵⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.23.

drives – i.e., *Eros* and the death drive, is the only way which makes possible the deferment of the return to an inorganic state⁶⁰. In other words, Freud modifies his theory in such a way that the monism of sexuality seems to turn into a monism of death.

According to Freud's drive theory, on one hand, the death drive, *Thanatos*⁶¹, strives to return to the initial state, on the other the life drive, *Eros*, tries to preserve life for a period of time. Therefore, an antagonism between *Eros* and the death drive inevitably arises. On the level of organisms, *Thanatos* leads organisms to death but by its life-preserving and rejuvenating effect *Eros* endeavours to neutralize the effects of the death drive⁶². "If death is the aim of life, all of life's organic developments are but detours toward death, and so called conservative [drives] are but the organism's attempts to defend its own fashion of dying, its particular path to death"⁶³. For this reason, wherever the death instinct is at work, the life instinct is at work. In short, "life goes toward death, but sexuality is a great exception in life's march toward death"⁶⁴. Therefore, the meaning of the life drive, *Eros*, as a factor that resists the death drive is revealed by the death drive. In accordance with their purpose, the death drive, seeks "to dissolve large units and to bring them back to their primeval, inorganic state. That is to say, as well as *Eros* there was [a drive] of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two [drives]"⁶⁵. Under the restriction of *Eros*, *Thanatos*, instead of destroying itself, is diverted towards the external world as a drive of aggressiveness and destructiveness. In addition to the discovery of their antagonistic structure and of their common conservative nature,

⁶⁰ Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Freud and Nietzsche*. Tr. Collier R. L. London, New York: Continuum, 2000. p.88.

⁶¹ The term *Thanatos* was never used in any of Freud's writing, but he used the term occasionally in conversation according to Freud's colleagues. Cf. J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, p.447.

⁶² Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", p.323.

⁶³ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*, p.290.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.291.

⁶⁵ Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents", p.310.

as Marcuse states, Freud also assumes a “displaceable energy, which is itself neutral, but is able to join forces either with an erotic or with a destructive impulse”⁶⁶. For this reason, “the two kinds of [drives] seldom – perhaps never – appear in isolation from each other, but are alloyed with each other in varying and very different proportions”⁶⁷.

3.2. Human Psyche

Another preparatory section will be about the human psyche. In order to fully understand the changes of the human being that leads to the emergence of the civilization, we need to focus on the partitions of the human psyche, especially the superego.

It is important to note that the psychical topography of the mental or psychical apparatus has nothing to do with the anatomy of the brain⁶⁸. The mental apparatus Freud describes comprises systems which are divisions based on their functions, characters and methods of operating. According to this approach, the first and the most primitive part of the psychic apparatus is the id which, as Freud states, is comprised of unknown and uncontrollable forces – e.g., passions, drives etc. It is thus an unknown and unconscious system in the mental apparatus⁶⁹. In this sense, the id, which contains instinctual cathexis seeking only to discharge, has no judgments of value, no evil and no good, in other words no morality⁷⁰.

⁶⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.28.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.310.

⁶⁸ Freud, Sigmund, “Moses and Monotheism”, in Angela Richards (ed.), Volume 23 *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 1964. p.97.

⁶⁹ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, in Angela Richards (eds.), *Volume 11 On Metapsychology the Theory of Psychoanalysis*. London: Pelican, 1984. p.362.

⁷⁰ Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Tr. W. J. H. Sprott. New York: Norton, 1933. p.59.

The ego, which is a secondary partition of the psychic apparatus, arises out of the id as a result of the direct influence of the external world. It is formed later than the id both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. “The ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id”⁷¹. In detail, while the human being is under the control of passions and drives which are urged on the human animal in accordance with the pleasure principle, the human being suffers from the direct influence of the external world; because the direct satisfaction of drives is inhibited by external obstacles. In reaction to this, the id has been modified by this influence and the ego is constituted as a part of the id⁷². The ego emerges with the reality principle. In other words, the mutability of the drives is the mutability of the mental apparatus in civilization⁷³.

Under the effect of the external world, the human animal becomes a human being through the transformation of its nature which leads to the differentiation of not only the aims of drives inherent in the human being but also the “values” of these drives⁷⁴. The governing value system is changed from immediate satisfaction, joy, receptiveness and absence of repression to delayed satisfaction, restraint of pleasure, productiveness and security. Freud describes this transformation as the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle.

Unlike the pleasure principle, which aims at direct satisfaction of drives and passions, the reality principle endeavours to avoid suffering and to postpone present satisfaction because of a possibility of pain and/or for future satisfaction or to suffer at the moment in order to avoid from a huge amount of suffering. When the pleasure principle comes into opposition with its environment, the

⁷¹ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, pp.363-4.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.363.

⁷³ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.11.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.12.

human being realizes that full and painless satisfaction of its desires is impossible. The pleasure principle is no longer in domination. The reality principle takes the place of the pleasure principle: the human being begins to abandon uncertain and destructive pleasure for postponed, restrained, but “assured” pleasure⁷⁵. With the establishment of the reality principle, the human being strives for the useful without damage to itself. In this sense, as Marcuse asserts, the human being develops the function to test the reality, to determine the good and bad, useful and harmful so that it acquires the faculties of memory and judgment – i.e., reason⁷⁶. Thus, the reality principle is a sign of the emergence of calculation, thinking in causal relations – in other words, the loss of instincts’ control and the domination of the intellect. Therefore, as Freud points out, the emergence of the ego with the development of the reality principle may also be conceived as the development of reason and common sense⁷⁷. As Ricœur asserts, the reality principle, which is a roundabout path to satisfaction, is the correlate of consciousness⁷⁸. Thus, the ego, which emerges because of the externality over against the demands of the id, endeavours to direct the id to act in accordance with the external world so that the ego is an internalized external world and/or a representative of the external world.

Finally, introducing the unconscious faculties of self-criticism and conscience, which are carried out by neither the ego nor the id, Freud draws our attention to the requirement of another partition of the mental apparatus different from the ego and the id. He shows that when the object towards which the drives of the id turn, is lost, it is set up inside the ego⁷⁹ – “that is that an object-cathexis⁸⁰

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.13.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.14.

⁷⁷ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, p.364.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.268.

⁷⁹ Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, in Angela Richards (eds.), *Volume 11 On Metapsychology the Theory of Psychoanalysis*. London: Pelican, 1984. pp.257-8.

⁸⁰ The investment of libidinal energy in an object. Cathexis is an economic concept referring to a certain amount of psychical energy which is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a part of the body, to an object, etc.

Cf. J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973. p.62.

has been replaced by an identification”⁸¹. In other words, when a sexual object is lost, the feeble ego can only repress the strong excitation arising out of the id by setting up an object inside itself. Only under this condition can the id give up its object. For instance, for Freud, when a boy’s developed object-cathexis for his mother is inhibited, he deals with this situation by internalization of his father – i.e., by identification of himself with his father, whose sexual wishes in regard to the boy’s mother are not inhibited. Freud claims that identification and the emergence of the superego are in a causal relation.

The ego, which is formed as a result of external influences, is an apparatus of thought that aims at satisfying instinctual demands in the face of obstacles, hindrances etc. Let us turn to those cases in which the ego is held back from satisfying the drives on account of an extrinsic source of hindrance in obedience to the reality principle and those cases in which it is impossible to satisfy the drives, the renunciation of drives leads to “a lasting tension owing to unpleasure, if it were not possible to reduce the strength of [drives themselves] by displacement of energy”⁸². During the psychic development of a human being, some of the inhibiting external forces, figures are necessarily incorporated as an agency in the ego which is formed corresponding to these forces and figures as a result of painful processes and experiences in which the human being is confronted with the cases described above. The incorporated forces or figures comprising a new partition of the mental apparatus “confront the rest of the ego in an observing, criticizing and prohibiting sense”⁸³. This agency, which is constructed as a result of an *identification* procedure, is called the superego. The ego hereafter undertakes not only the instinctual satisfaction demanded by the id and the dangers of the external world but also the opposition of the superego, which has more ground for refraining from satisfying drives.

⁸¹ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, p.367.

⁸² Freud, Sigmund, “Moses and Monotheism”, in Angela Richards (ed.), Volume 23 *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 1964. p.116.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.116.

Based on this perspective, we realize that the superego is aligned with two separate drives. On the one hand, it has a defensive role against the impulses of the id which cannot be satisfied. It thus secures the unity and development of the ego under the reality principle against external dangers (which in the early age of a child is her parents), and thus operates under the service of *Eros*. On the other hand, it attains its objectives by addressing the ego against the id and directing the destruction drive against a part of personality so that it destroys and splits the unity of personality under the service of the death drive. Consequently, the human being which seems inherently self-restricting – i.e., which seems to be in control of her drives – has actually acquired this character as a result of an identification procedure that causes the repression or internalization of drives. In this regard, the moral side of the human being, which keeps her drives under control is actually this diverted destructiveness, which is considered as the most valuable feature of the civilized individual.

In connection with this, the feeble human child, while internalizing parents, also internalizes and incorporates the cultural rules mainly taught by parents as parts of her superego. In this regard, the categorical imperative, (or let me say established rules,) that the superego enforces remains an imperative of self-destruction – against the unity of personality – for the sake of the social existence of an individual⁸⁴. Since the aggressiveness of the superego is the internalized aggressiveness of the human being's aggressive drive, "the more a person checks [her] aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe – that is aggressive – [she] becomes in [her] ego-ideal"⁸⁵. Therefore, in the simplest term, the construction of the superego in the ego, which is a result of the process of internalization, is the source of the moral tendencies.

⁸⁴ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.53.

⁸⁵ Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id", p.395.

3.3. The Superego and Civilization

Freud gives the account of the superego and then the emergence of civilization by expanding on Darwin's conjecture and constructing his myth of the father of the primal horde⁸⁶. According to Freud's hypothesis, "no date can be assigned to [the state of primal horde], nor has it been synchronized with the geological epochs known to us" and he claims that the events he describes occurred to all primitive human beings⁸⁷. In this myth, there is a primal family in which "violent and jealous father keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up"⁸⁸. The primal father is a model that is envied and feared. The sons' feelings towards the father are ambivalent: on the one hand, they admire their father and envy his strength; on the other they hate him who hinders them from satisfying their sexual desires. In other words, aside from their hatred of and fear toward their father, they also honour him as a model whose place each son wishes to take. One day these sons come together, kill the father and devour him. "In the act of devouring him they accomplish their identification with him, and each one of them acquires a portion of his strength"⁸⁹. Their deed exacerbates their ambivalent situation. After the act of devouring, they satisfy their hatred and are left with the feeling of remorse. Then a sense of guilt emerges and it causes them to revoke their claim to the women. As a result of this sense, these primal brothers renounce their drives and institute the law against incest – the first taboo which can be considered the beginning of every civilization – and they substitute the

⁸⁶ Freud develops his narrative on the development of the civilization by presenting a hypothetical state or condition that he cites from Darwin's primal horde. In this hypothetical state, "the patriarchal had only one enemy whom he should dread ... a youthful band of brothers living together in forced celibacy, or at most in polyandrous relation with some single female captive. A horde as yet weak in their impubescence they are, but they would, when strength was gained with time, inevitable wrench by combined attacks, renewed again and again, both wife and life from the paternal tyrant".

Cf. Freud, Sigmund, "Totem and Taboo", in Alber Dickson (eds.), Volume 13 *Civilization, Society and Religion: Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism and Other Works*. London: Penguin, 1990, p203.

⁸⁷ Freud, Sigmund, "Moses and Monotheism", p.81.

⁸⁸ Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo", p.202.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.203.

deed of devouring the father with the devouring of a totem animal which can be considered as the beginning of every religion. Thus, the first religion appears in the form of totemism in which there is a worship of a totem animal which is a father substitute and which was linked with social regulations and moral obligations.

The first identification of a human being occurs in childhood and it is general and lasting. Freud claims that this first identification leads us back to the origin of the superego⁹⁰. In accordance with the theory of the Oedipus complex, or with the repetition of the similar relation between family members, when a boy develops an object-cathexes⁹¹ for his mother, the boy must abandon his mother as the object of his drive so that the satisfaction of the drive is prevented, since the child is afraid of being castrated by the father. Thus, the mental apparatus is forced to give up its object and then the ego produces a father-identification so that the father-identification preserves the object-relation to the mother⁹². As a result of the identification, the ego modifies and constructs the superego. In this sense, the superego retains the character of the father. In other words, the father is interiorised as an agent in the human psyche. As Freud states, although the superego is open to later influences, it preserves the character derived from the Oedipus complex, because in the childhood the ego is feeble so that the father complex is very effective throughout the individuals' lives⁹³. As Ricoeur points out, the father complex is not localized in a particular time and it keeps coming to the surface of in the shape of incestuous fantasies and neurosis⁹⁴. As a result of the sufficient number of the repetition of the primal crime, or killing the father, and/or the identification with the father in every family, the superego is constituted in the psyche of every individual.

⁹⁰ Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id", p.370.

⁹¹ The investment of libidinal energy in an object. Economic concept: the fact that a certain amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a part of the body, to an object, etc.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.373.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.389.

⁹⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*, p.273.

3.4. The Drive Theory and Civilization

In the light of this information, the present development of the human being as in the case of other living beings can be explained by the drive theory. Freud claims that the foundation of civilization is twofold: “the compulsion to work, which was created by the external necessity, and the power of love, which made the [human being] unwilling to be deprived of its sexual object”⁹⁵. In this sense, *Eros* and *Ananke* are the sources out of which civilization arises. The cooperation of them leads human beings to have control over the external world, as a result of the compulsion to work, and to come together to form the community and to extend the number of people included in it⁹⁶. Freud considers love as one of the foundations of civilization, because sexual love “afforded [the human being] the strongest experience of satisfaction, and in fact provided [the human being] with the prototype of all happiness”⁹⁷. “Freud expressly assigns to *Eros*, to the libidinal bond, the cohesion of ever wider human groups and more particularly of organized and artificial groups, such as church and army”⁹⁸. In regard to the drive theory, *Eros*’s purpose is to unify and/or to make one out of more than one.- “Civilization is a process in the service of *Eros*, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of [humankind]”⁹⁹.

On the other hand, *Thanatos*, the death drive, which is the primary drive, manifests itself as the aggressive drive in the relations of human beings. For this reason, for human beings the other human being is not only potential a helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on her¹⁰⁰. This inclination to aggression, which is hostility of each against all and

⁹⁵ Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.290.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.290.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.290.

⁹⁸ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*, p.292.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.313.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.302.

of all against each, thus disturbs the relations of human beings, forces civilization into “high expenditure”¹⁰¹ and opposes Eros and thus the programme of civilization¹⁰². Since the counter forces of aggressiveness leads to war and disintegration, civilization “has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to [the human being’s] aggressive [drive] and to hold the manifestation of them in check by psychical reaction-formations”¹⁰³.

In this connection, civilization, which has been constructed by the domination of *Eros*, as Drassinower points out, posits unifying force against the forces of death. Drassinower also adds that what holds the society together is libidinal ties¹⁰⁴. In this regard, civilization demands mainly the renunciation of aggressiveness from individuals. It obtains mastery over the aggressiveness by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within the human being. As Ricoeur states, the struggle of the life drive against the death drive means that civilization “comes upon the scene as the great enterprise of making life prevail against death: its supreme weapon is to employ internalized violence against externalized violence; its supreme ruse is to make death work against death” by implementing an agent¹⁰⁵. In this transformation, the death drive is brought into the service of the life drives by providing energy from the death drive for the continuous mastery and the alteration of nature to the advantage of humankind. However, Freud emphasizes that “if these forces are turned to destruction in the external world, the organism will be relieved and the effect must be beneficial. This would serve as a biological justification for all the ugly and dangerous

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp.302-3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp.313-4.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp.302-3.

¹⁰⁴ Abraham Drassinower, *Freud’s Theory of Culture: Eros, Loss and Politics*. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. p.54.

¹⁰⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy an Essay on Interpretation*, p.309.

impulses against which we are struggling. It must be admitted that they stand nearer to Nature than does our resistance to them”¹⁰⁶.

In addition to the restriction of the death drive, in later phases of the development of civilization, the sexual life of individuals in society is restricted to strengthen the communal bond. In other words, “civilization is obeying the laws of economic necessity, since a large amount of the psychical energy which it uses for its own purposes has to be withdrawn from sexuality”¹⁰⁷. For the continuation of labour practices, the energy of drives is deflected and modified by adding more restrictions on the individual. In addition to that, in this process, the sexuality of the individual is organized in such a way that it is channelled into monogamous institutions, and some erogenous zones are partially or completely desexualized. In this way, the process of civilization achieves the desexualisation of the body and the libido is concentrated in one part of it so that the rest of the body is free for use as the instrument of labour. Because of these restrictions on the drives, there is always a danger of the revolt of the suppressed elements. For this reason, in civilized societies precautionary measures always become stricter¹⁰⁸. In accordance with this, the legal and penal systems arise in order to impose restrictions on primarily the aggressiveness and secondarily the sexuality of human beings.

In the development process of the individual, a person first seeks to find satisfaction according to the programme of the pleasure principle, which is called the egoistic urge of the ego towards happiness. However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, in the process of civilization the aim is to create a unity out of diverse individuals, their diverse drives and passions. Thus, the aim of happiness is pushed to the background although it is not out of the program of civilization¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁶ Sigmund Freud, “Why War”, in Angela Richards and Alber Dickson (eds.), Volume 12 *Civilization, Society and Religion: Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other Works*. London: Penguin, 1991. p.358.

¹⁰⁷ Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.293.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.294.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.334.

In consequence, a conflict between the individual and society, which makes the individual discontented, inevitably arises.

Apart from his ontogenetic account, Freud also presents a phylogenetic account of the development of civilization as well¹¹⁰. In the primal horde, although the primal father establishes an order for his own benefit, without this order primal family would dissolve, because he does not only protect the family but also creates the first preconditions for the organized labour force for the family. For this reason, the primal father embodies the necessity of the reality principle¹¹¹. Since the father satisfies his desires, the sons wish to replace and imitate him, so that they identify themselves with him, with his pleasures as well as his authority and power¹¹². As discussed before (3.3), the sons have ambivalent feelings – feelings of love and hate at the same time – toward their father. Because of their feeling of hatred for the father whom they also love, from the very beginning, the sons have the sense of guilt. In addition, when their feeling of hate is satisfied in their act of devouring the father– in other words, when their aggressive drive discharges – their sense of guilt is heightened and then they implement an order which is more oppressive than the preceding one by imposing taboos and rules inherited from the primal father. Since the father is internalized and identified with, the domination is restored in a more relentless way by substituting the primal father with rules and then institutions. The rebellion for the liberation of drives is followed by the establishment of an intensified domination – in other words the restoration and strengthening of the father’s rule – which might be considered as the beginning of the civilization.

¹¹⁰ Freud’s ontogenetic account of the development of civilization is related to the events occur during the period of early childhood and submissions to the reality principle is enforced by the parents and other educators. Submissions on the individual level, is continuously reproduced. His phylogenetic account of the development of civilization is related to the events occur first in the *primal horde*, when the *primal father* monopolizes power and pleasure and enforces renunciation on the part of the sons and submission on the generic level that is also continuously reproduced. The generic and the individual are intertwined in Freud’s narrative, but in order to show the development of civilization in detail they are treated as being separated from each other.

Cf. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.15.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.62.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.62.

Freud provides a hypothesis called ‘the return of the repressed’ with which he elucidates the psychology of religion in order to explain the development of civilization. According to this theory, the repetition of the same crime, the murder of the father or the revolt of the repressed drives, occurs in different and modified forms throughout history. According to Freud’s systemic approach, with the process of repression, instinctual satisfaction is refused for the sake of the avoidance of a danger with the process of repression, but the things which are repressed are conserved in the unconscious part of the mental apparatus and can be reawakened by some new precipitating cause so that they come to light as symptoms¹¹³. Freud gives the life of Christ as an example for his theory, the return of the repressed. Freud asserts that Christ appears as a message of liberation: the overthrow of the law, which is established by the renunciation of instincts. In this sense, the message of Christ, the Son, is an order of love and peace against the preceding order, but his sacrifice – the Son’s deed – results in his transubstantiation and the institutionalization of Christianity which had been, contrary to the messages of Christ, an organization cruel to people – for instance witches and their defenders – not belonging to them¹¹⁴. In other words, when repressed feelings emerge as the revival and discharge of aggressive impulses against the order, the sense of guilt increases and, then the heightened sense of guilt leads to the sublimation¹¹⁵ of the sexual drives, which is Christ’s message, love and peace. However, as Marcuse points out, after the sublimation the life drives, *Eros*, no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructive elements¹¹⁶. Then as a result of the renunciation of the life drives, the death drives gain ascendancy over them and an order which is more oppressive and more destructive than that of the preceding one, is re-established.

¹¹³ Sigmund Freud, “Moses and Monotheism”, p.127.

¹¹⁴ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.71.

¹¹⁵ Although Freud does not explain the mechanism of sublimation clearly, he points out that Sublimation is a process by means of which the libido - here especially the energy of the sexual drives – is diverted from sexual objects or “the renunciation of the specifically sexual aim” to non-sexual ones – e.g., philosophical, scientific, artistic efforts. Cf. J. Laplanche and J-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, p.239.

¹¹⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.83.

Similar to religion, in the process of civilization, we observe that science and scientific reasoning, which are regarded as liberating antagonists of religion, have been the most destructive engagements of human beings. Science has become more oppressive than religion and a source of fear, from which it initially promised freedom. As a result of the progress of domination in the process of civilization, from the primal horde to the system of institutional authority and scientific reason, the domination become universal, objective and impersonal; also increasingly rational, effective and productive. In detail, with the establishment of institutions, which aims to preserve the life of individuals in society, individuals' desires are oppressed for the sake of the organization. Rebellion against this organization appears as the crime against the whole of humankind. Therefore, the repression of drives has its rational ground now. In this connection, under the rule of industrialized society; the economic and political authorities give form to the superego so that the superego henceforth is less individualized. In other words, since everybody is exposed to the same political and economic authorities – the same social structure of repression, everybody has the same generic superego. As Marcuse states “The repressive organization of the instincts seems to be *collective*, and the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extra-familial agents and agencies”¹¹⁷ such as internet, radio, television, pre-school education, etc. According to this mechanism, the father-image has gradually disappeared and the institutions have substituted him so that the father is not the first object of aggression anymore. As a result, the administrative power has been depersonalized and turned into an anonymity, and the guilt has become a collective guilt created by the institutionalized system. With the establishment of this system, values and institutions have been created so that the oppressive authority has become omnipresent and directed against not only drives of human beings but also individuals who are different from the whole. In conclusion the development of civilization, as a result of the struggle against domination, the

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.97.

sense of guilt and the level of domination increases so that overcoming of oppression become almost impossible.

3.5. Morality and Civilization

Freud rejects the idea of the existence of an original moral capacity to distinguish what is good from what is bad. At first, “what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with the loss of love” of a person that an individual is dependent on, the authority¹¹⁸. At this stage, people allow themselves to do bad things that seem to be a source of enjoyment so long as they are not caught by the authority. Therefore, at this stage, a sense of guilt originates from a fear of loss love – i.e., the love of parents. Freud also calls this sense of guilt as ‘social’ anxiety, because the place of parents can be taken by larger human communities¹¹⁹. In the second stage, after the internalization of the authority, the superego is established. From now onward, since both doing something bad and intending to do cannot be hidden from the superego; they do not differ. The individual feels guilty even if it does not act in a way that can be considered as bad. In this way, the sense of guilt turns into ‘bad conscience’, which is a state of mind in which the human being always feels guilty because of its intentions, passions, instincts etc. In this regard, for Freud, a moral human being is the one who possesses a strict and vigilant conscience. In addition to that, people who call themselves “sinners” – e.g., priests, saints – are actually the ones that expose a high degree temptation to instinctual satisfaction¹²⁰.

Freud asserts that the source of religion is also this special kind of sense of guilt. The human being tries to find the reasons for the misfortunes that befall them. The primitive human being does not search for the source of misfortune in

¹¹⁸ Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.316.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.317.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.318.

itself and it does not throw the blame on itself, but on its fetish so that it does not punish itself. As Freud emphasizes, “primitive people used to depose their gods or even castigate them, if they failed to do their duty in securing them victory, happiness and comfort ¹²¹”. However, the civilized human being, because of its unconscious agent – i.e., the superego--, searches for the reason behind these misfortunes in itself, in its soul and creates the idea of Divine Will, which punishes it because of its misdeeds, intentions, passions etc. Moreover, “[human beings] produced the prophets, who held up their sinfulness before them; and out of their sense of guilt they created the over-strict commandments of their priestly religion”¹²². Therefore, the human being always punishes herself and restrains herself from satisfying her desires.

The first sense of guilt which originates from the feelings towards the authority is fundamentally a result of the conflict between *Eros and Death*¹²³. In the Oedipus complex, the ambivalent feeling of sons towards their father establishes the first sense of guilt. After they devour their father, their sense of guilt intensifies and “the first form of a social organization [comes] about with a renunciation of [drives], a recognition of mutual obligations, the introduction of definite institutions, pronounced inviolable (holy) – that is to say, the beginnings of morality and justice”¹²⁴. By virtue of this hypothesis, only through the intensification of this sense, do human beings feel guilty about their aggressive instincts and then “an internal erotic impulsion which causes human beings to unite in a closely-knit group”¹²⁵ leads to the emergence of civilization. In conclusion, the process of civilization transforms human beings into moral creatures which torture themselves with their internalized feeling of conscience, which, in other words, is the price human beings pay for their advance in civilization.

¹²¹ Freud, Sigmund, “Moses and Monotheism”, p.112.

¹²² Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.319.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.325.

¹²⁴ Sigmund Freud, “Moses and Monotheism”, p.82.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.326.

In this connection, with the occurrences of the first forms or institutions of civilization human beings begin to renounce their instincts and the religion which occurs with prohibitions – for Freud, with the prohibition against making an image of God¹²⁶ – develops more and becomes the religion of instinctual renunciation. Religion demands sexual abstinence or a restriction of sexual freedom with the ideal perfection of God according to which it becomes ‘purified’ and transformed into the ideal of ethical perfection. In accordance with this, as Freud stresses, prophets always declare that God demands a just and virtuous conduct of life – abstention from every instinctual satisfaction – from its people¹²⁷. Thus religions demand from people not only the renunciation of aggressive drives but also sexual drives. For instance, totemism regarded as the earliest form of religion, is based on commands and prohibitions – e.g., worshipping the totem animal, not killing or injuring it and exogamy – which have no other meaning than renunciation of sexual desire toward the mother and sisters and of aggressiveness against each other. In this tradition, as Freud presents, once a year brothers come together in a ceremony which every male must attend, and devour the totem animal. Therefore, the totemism and the ceremonial repetition of the killing of the totem animal are regarded as one of the first social orders, which have no significance without their moral laws and religious acts fundamentally based on the instinctual renunciation.

3.6. From the Individual to Society

Freud draws an analogy between the process of civilization and the path of individual development. For Freud, the theory of civilization grows out of his psychological theory. Since, shifts in history are results of the path of individual development, which perpetually repeats itself, “it can be asserted that the community, too, evolves a super-ego under whose influence cultural development

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.118.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.119.

proceeds”¹²⁸. Freud claims that the superego of civilization and that of an individual have a similar origin. Similar to the individual superego, which arises after the death of the primal father, the superego of civilization emerges out of the impressions left behind by the great leaders. As Marcuse expresses, “the societal authority is absorbed into the “conscience” and into the unconscious of the individual as [its] own morality”¹²⁹. Freud goes further and claims that there is a phylogenetic relation between the process of civilization and the path of individual development. As Marcuse points out, neither the unreasonable severity of the superego, the unconscious need for punishment, the intensification and continuation of the sense of guilt through maturity nor the individual reactions to early traumata can be explained by the experiences of an individual¹³⁰. Freud asserts that they manifest themselves from individuals’ reactions to genetic events.

The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. Thus, in the id, which capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existence of countless egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of the former egos and be bringing them to resurrection¹³¹.

In this context, the mental apparatus and the structure of personality cannot be analysed without the history of the genus. To put it differently, the determining childhood experiences are linked with the experiences of the humankind. As Marcuse asserts, “the individual lives the universal fate of [humankind]”¹³² so that the individual psychology itself is the group psychology itself. In detail, according to Freud’s theory, what happened and is forgotten is not extinguished but only repressed so that they cannot establish communication with intellectual

¹²⁸Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.335.

¹²⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.46.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.56.

¹³¹ Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, p.378.

¹³² Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, p.58.

hypothesis; they are inaccessible to consciousness. Thus, the human being has unconscious memory traces of her childhood and of earlier generations, which become conscious when the anticathexis of these memory traces is decreased by pathological processes or the instinctual element receives a special reinforcement or a similar experience takes place. For instance, the behaviour of children toward their parents can be elucidated by the repressed experience of the Oedipus complex which is repeated often enough so that it became strong memory traces and the activation of the complex through the confrontation of a similar event in every family. In virtue of this theory, mental apparatus comprises memory traces of earlier generations so that it can be considered as a living substance of history. The archaic heritage, which is retained in the id of an individual is transferred to the super-ego during the transformation of some part of the ego, which is a differentiation of the id into the superego. For this reason, the gulf, which is assumed to be between individual and group psychology, turns out to be illusory so that the individual super ego and the cultural superego are strictly connected, and, as the individual superego does, the cultural superego “sets up strict demands, disobedience to which is visited with the ‘fear of conscience’”¹³³. It sets its own ideals and demands which regulates the relationship between human beings and repress their instinctual tendencies under the name of religion or ethics. These restrictions, which are brought as a consequence of the development of civilization, thus make human beings discontented.

3.7. The Conclusion of Freud Chapter

In conclusion, Civilization, which originates from *Eros*, first makes life prevail against death, *Thanatos*, by internalization of violence. In addition, the sexuality of human beings is restrained in the benefit of civilization for obeying economic laws of necessity. As a result of this violent process, the sense of guilt, a

¹³³ Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”, p.336.

loss of happiness, is for Freud, the price that we pay for the advance that emerges in civilization. Thus, as Ricoeur states, the discontentment of civilization is the sense of guilt, which prohibits and restricts our drives, and which is produced in the process of the emergence of civilization¹³⁴.

For Freud, with the improvement of reason or the intellect – or generally the improvement of the ego – the human being will be able to control the struggle between the drives in a healthy way although Freud remains sceptical about the ability of rational thought. Moreover, as Ricoeur states, the ego behaves like the physician, which considers the external world while dealing with the drives of the id¹³⁵. Freud also asserts that the improvement of the civilization leads to the development of reason¹³⁶ so that human beings would control their instinctual drives through their reason¹³⁷. Freud thus considers that the improvement of civilization can be transformed with the transformation of education or pedagogical practices. History is the history of the antagonism between death and the life manifesting itself in various ways in and through civilizational demands from generation to generation¹³⁸, and the superego is formed through the relations of generations, which comprises the history of childhood. In this regard, for Freud, the aggressiveness of the superego, which is created in every generation, can only be changed by a psychoanalytically enlightened education. Thus, Freud claims that psychoanalysis has the potential to change the direction of this continuous and interminable struggle of drives. In other words, psychoanalysis is the key that can provide the access to the changeability and fluctuation of childhood experiences.

I must mention it because it is so exceedingly important, so rich in hopes for the future, perhaps the most important of all the activities of analysis. What I

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.309.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.279.

¹³⁶ Sigmund Freud, “Why War”, p.362.

¹³⁷ Alfred I. Tauber, *The Reluctant Philosopher*, p.168.

¹³⁸ Abraham Drassinower, *Freud's Theory of Culture: Eros, Loss and Politics*, p.146.

am thinking of is the application of psycho-analysis to education, to the upbringing of the next generation¹³⁹.

In this way, psychoanalytic education reveals the helplessness of the human being in her childhood and, at the same time, the fact that the human being forgets this helplessness. With the intervention of psychoanalysis, neurosis and the discontentment of the human being will be minimized and the human being will learn to control her drives by embracing them without very strict restrictions but also without non-interference.

[What] the first task of education is [:] The child must learn to control [her] [drives]. It is impossible to give [her] liberty to carry out all [her] impulses without restriction. To do so would be a very instructive experiment for child-psychologists; but life would be impossible for the parents and the children themselves would suffer grave damage, which would show itself partly at once and partly in later years. Accordingly, education must inhibit, forbid and suppress... But we have learnt from analysis that precisely this suppression of [drive] involves the risk of neurotic illness... Thus education has to find its way between the Scylla of non-interference and the Charybdis of frustration¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁹ Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p146.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p149.

CHAPTER IV

NIETZSCHE

Rather than reductive approaches – for instance, those oppositional approaches of Hobbes and Rousseau which conceive the human being in transparent (albeit different) states, with stable and opposite terms, Nietzsche’s approach is based on the agonistic understanding of nature of which human beings are a part. Nietzsche does not consider humankind as a homogeneous whole. For him, as Foucault puts it, rather than inviolable identity, there is always a conflict between things and difference from which phenomena – including human beings – originate¹⁴¹. In his analysis of the formations and the transformations of human life, he draws our attention to a turning point, which is the emergence of civilization. As Vanessa Lemm suggests, the effects of this change on the human animal can be investigated through Nietzsche’s discourse on culture and civilization which must be conceived in an antagonistic relation¹⁴². On this basis, I will try to investigate Nietzsche’s understanding of the human animal related to his narrative concerning the emergence of civilization.

In my view, in order to examine Nietzsche’s understanding of the human animal in relation to the emergence of the body politics, it is necessary to understand his analysis of the body and his genealogical reading of history in regard to dynamics of forces. First, I will introduce the Nietzsche’s understanding of the world in general. Then, I will focus on the analysis of the body, which enables us to see the relationship between forces that constitute the body including the human being. As the body is the world of becoming, the analysis of history is also situated here, within the articulation of the body. Thus, the examination of this analysis is not independent from and will be preparatory for the next part in

¹⁴¹ Foucault, Michel, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in Rabinow Paul (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin, 1984. p.79.

¹⁴² Lemm, Vanessa, *Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being*. New York: Fordham University, 2009. p.10.

which I will examine Nietzsche's genealogical reading of history in relation to the ontology of the human being, because the investigation of the mechanism, the so called "play of domination of forces" in the process of the development of civilization, will enable us to trace the values which are dominant as constitutive elements of the human animal before and after civilization. Finally, I will elucidate Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical truth, which also forms the foundation of civilization.

4.1. Nietzsche's Interpretation of the World

Nietzsche puts forward a dynamic interpretation of the world. In contrast to the dominant or agreed views and descriptions of the world, such as the mechanistic descriptions of it, Nietzsche rejects the idea that physics provides us an ultimate explanation for the way the world is. Physics demonstrates the orderly arrangement of natural phenomena, but explains none of them. Rather than this merely descriptive rendition of the world, he offers a dynamic interpretation of the world, which, he claims, will come to dominate the mechanistic one.¹⁴³ According to his dynamic account, the "victorious" concept, "force", must be complemented by an inner will which he designates as "will to power", "i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc... One is obliged to understand all motion, all "appearances," all "laws," only as a symptoms of an inner event and to employ [human being] as an analogy to this end"¹⁴⁴. In contrast to Hobbes' understanding of natural laws (broadly natural law theories), Nietzsche ventures to demonstrate that there is no law as the cause of the succession of events or any sequence of certain phenomena. Rather, he finds behind those laws, the will to power that accounts for them. However, it is not an essence or a quiddity behind them. The

¹⁴³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*. Trs. Walter Kaufmann and Reginal J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 1968, §618.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, §619.

sequence of certain phenomena and recurrence of a succession of results are power relationships between forces, i.e., the Will to Power.

Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word "accident" has meaning¹⁴⁵.

According to Nietzsche's understanding, the power relationships are between the stronger forces and the weaker ones. The stronger force masters the weaker one in so far as the latter cannot claim a degree of independence from the stronger one. The question of every event, in this sense, is the relation between the degree of resistance and the degree of superior power¹⁴⁶. In this regard, there is no law, no cause and effect, there is only struggle between the elements with unequal powers¹⁴⁷.

In this connection, Nietzsche claims that experience occurs within a world of becoming as multiple surfaces, variety of which cannot be embraced by a single thing, a single concept or a single feeling. The formless and unformulable world of the chaos of sensations is not conditioned by another thing. Here Nietzsche takes our attention to a different endeavour, exploration of or *return* to the 'realm of appearance' once again, but this return is a transformative repetition which is an inquiry into the matter of thinking anew¹⁴⁸. While we believe that things retain an identity in the form of a concept which establishes the possibility or necessary conditions of the repetition of an experience, the material or the condition of experience, which flows, fluctuates and becomes ground for the instantiations of the concept, is non-repeatable. Therefore, the concept can only give an account for the form that is a possible actualization, but it cannot account

¹⁴⁵ Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Gay Science*. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, §109.

¹⁴⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §634.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, §633.

¹⁴⁸ Jill Marsden, *After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.9.

for the existence of any real comprehension or realization¹⁴⁹. Nietzsche emphasizes that the process through which things are constituted cannot be explained or construed in terms of such things as concepts. In this sense, Nietzsche interprets the world in a way that intrinsically opposes the mechanistic view of the world as calculable by concepts, unities, things, laws etc. While questioning how a vital effect is generated, Nietzsche ends up with the notion of differentiation as a positive principle of production. After the elimination of unities, concepts – e.g., the concept of number, the concept of thing (substance), the concept of deed (separation of cause and effect) – the material difference of “dynamic quanta” in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta - the Will to Power, remains¹⁵⁰.

The Will to Power is the last instance which we could go back to but in contrast to substance or a substrate, it is more than just a power or force behind all forms, it is always the will for more power¹⁵¹. As Alphonso Lingis states, it is the continual sublation of all telos, breaching of all ends and production of all contradictory meanings, valuations and interpretations¹⁵². The Will to Power does not function or operate as the reason that provides and justifies the order of essence. Rather, it is an abyss or a groundless chaos that leaves the whole system of essences groundless. "Will exists in the relationship between commanding will and an obeying will"¹⁵³. In this regard, force is not something transmitted to a passive matter; it is rather exercised on another will and transformed into something else. In other words, it is force itself, which is formed. With this understanding, Nietzsche offers an understanding that refuses metaphysical concepts – essences, substance and accidents, telos – behind the sensorial configurations. This is because "whatever is real, whatever is true, is neither one

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §635.

¹⁵¹ Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power', in David B. Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1977, p.38..

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.41.

nor even reducible to one"¹⁵⁴. However, while emphasizing difference, Nietzsche does not completely disregard similarity. To see differences is not only a matter of seeing gradations of divergence, but also seeing lesser or greater similarity. As Lingis emphasizes, succeeding appearances differ from but are similar to preceding ones, otherwise one would not state that this one diverges from that one¹⁵⁵. Therefore, there is a continual differentiation, which can be conceived as ceaseless unfolding of new divergent appearances and continual assembling, assimilation of all that appears. To comprehend in a metaphysical way is to set the identical in this continual differentiation and then to impose a distinction as if there are orders of realities: things having transient existence and the order of ideals or the ideal. This metaphysical paradigm can be observed in the Christian epoch as the separation of the appearances from the source of the world, the ground of all existence and of all intelligibility – in other words, God. In the modern epoch, the transcendental ego is considered as the source and the foundation of the reality.

Nietzsche criticizes the understanding, which posits the *perspective* of the subject or consciousness and that is therefore a subjective fiction¹⁵⁶. He reads the traditional philosophy or western metaphysics in this paradigm. In this tradition, values are considered subjectively and they are possessed by a subject. Similarly, in the substance and accidents model, a substance is the underlying thing, which does not change, and the accidents, which are changing, are borne by it. That is to say that the accidents are secondary to the substance. The same problematic pattern can be observed in the linguistic typologies of most of the languages, which are structured subject-verb-object or agent-verb-object - in other words, the sentence structures of these languages are based on the separation of the deed from the doer. The deed is conceived as generated by a doer or an agent. Therefore, the deed is seen as secondary to the doer. In this way, the world of

¹⁵⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §536.

¹⁵⁵ Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power', p.39.

¹⁵⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §636.

change and/or becoming is considered as ontologically deficient. However, Nietzsche does not conceive life in this paradigm. Contrary to the subjective way of interpreting the world, especially in the anthropocentric way – conceiving the world or life in human terms—he defends a kind of perspectivism by virtue of which the world is construed by every centre of force from its own viewpoint. He constructs his perspectivism not in a subjective way but in a value dependent way according to which the intersection of forces are nodal points of values. In other words, in Nietzsche's thought values are conceived as the product of impersonal forces, which are in perpetual strife to become master, to enhance their existence and to force back all that resist them.

The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos – in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms. Judged from the point of view of our reason, unsuccessful attempts are by all odds the _rule, the exceptions are not the secret aim, and the whole musical box repeats eternally its tune which may never be called a melody—and ultimately even the phrase "unsuccessful attempt" is too anthropomorphic. and reproachful¹⁵⁷.

Contrary to the understandings which claim that there is a "higher" world which is comprised of eternal, unchanging, perfect being - and which do not require to become and do not perish, Nietzsche vindicates the world which is the struggle of impersonal forces. The described being or the rubric of those beings is against our bodily existence, which comes to be and then perishes. In other words, our body is temporal and destined to be decomposed, disintegrated or dead. Nietzsche presents us a physiological thinking, which valorises matter, the body, the drives and the senses. His physiological thinking, rather than having a stance opposite to the understanding of the other-worldly understandings, shows that the other-worldly understandings and their opposites - i.e., all oppositional way of thinking or nihilism - are contained in the monism of life which is comprised of the play or struggle of forces, i.e., will to power.

¹⁵⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, §109.

We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? ... But no! *with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world*¹⁵⁸.

That is to say that all these struggles – including all positions and all oppositionalities which seem to be taken up outside of life - are articulations of life itself and "from the perspective of life: life itself forces us to posit values"¹⁵⁹. As Marsden states, evaluation supposes values, which are conceived as the orientations of life - perspectives of life - rather than determinations of being, according to which phenomena are judged¹⁶⁰. As Nietzsche emphasizes, "when we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us *when we establish values*"¹⁶¹. In this sense, evaluations are ways of being - the conditions of life - they also work as principles for the values that evaluators use. Therefore, rather than considering and judging a phenomenon in terms of self-identical beings or things, we need to consider evaluations or interpretations within life, because there are only interpretations and interpretations of interpretations. In other words, as Lingis points out, instead of persons, egos, selves, self-identical egos, there are masks and masks of masks, which continually creates a sequence of masks¹⁶².

In this connection, Nietzsche introduces a new understanding of the world in terms of *physiology* and devoid of rationalization and of sentimental idealization. As Michel Haar states, he ventures to show the possibility of progressing in the acceptance of instincts and drives which is the accepting of "naked nature" which is the expression of nature without goodness or evil, without morality¹⁶³. This fact has been ignored so that the human body has been

¹⁵⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, Tr. Judith Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 'How the 'Real World' at last Become a Myth', §6.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 'Morality as Anti-nature', §5.

¹⁶⁰ Jill Marsden, *After Nietzsche: Notes Towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy*, p.15.

¹⁶¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5.

¹⁶² Alphonso Lingis, 'The Will to Power', p.42.

¹⁶³ Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Tr. Michael Gendre. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p.125.

mistreated, despised and misunderstood for centuries. Therefore, Nietzsche describes living cells, nutrition, digestion, indigestion etc., while addressing life and the social existence of the human being as well. In this respect Nietzsche grasps life as a “faculty” of incorporation.

Nietzsche still thinks that we should be guarded against all aesthetic anthropomorphisms which lead us to think that the world is a living being which is modelled on the concept of the organic, because, in consonance with Freud's thinking, Nietzsche underlines that the organic is exceedingly derivative, rare, recent and accidental. Nevertheless, Nietzsche also rejects the strict distinction between the inorganic and organic by stating that the Will to Power rules in both organic and inorganic worlds. Specifically, he rejects the strict distinction between the organic and the inorganic as a prejudice and emphasizes that we are composed of the same elements that nature has¹⁶⁴. Moreover, Nietzsche does not conceive death in opposition to life. By stating that "the living is merely a type of what is dead, and very rare type"¹⁶⁵, he foreshadows Freud and points out that the living arises from the dead. Nevertheless, Nietzsche states that "our entire world is the *ash* of innumerable *living* beings: and, as rare as the living, by comparison with the whole, it remains that everything has already once been converted into life"¹⁶⁶. In detail, in an infinite time, the finite quantum of inorganic forces give rise to an infinite number of organic bodies; the formation of organic bodies arbitrarily emerging out of inorganic forces necessarily occur infinite times. By virtue of this eternal recurrence understanding, the present state of the world or the living is an exception and what is inorganic now has already been organic before. Therefore, Nietzsche's understanding, differs from that of Freud in that he does not pose the question of the priority of the inorganic/dead or the organic/living in the same way. They are equally eternal. In this sense, when we examine our body, there is a strong similarity between the body and the inorganic solar system. There are a

¹⁶⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §655.

¹⁶⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §109.

¹⁶⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, 9:11 [84], pp.472-73. Quoted in Didier Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, p. 273.

countless number of events taking place in both the body and the solar system. We also realize that sensations and thoughts are extremely insignificant in relation to these events. For instance, “[p]leasure and pain are very rare and scarce appearances compared with the countless stimuli that a cell or organ exercises upon another cell or organ”¹⁶⁷. Thus, there could be with a high degree of probability forces upon the distribution and motion of which human beings are dependent.

For Nietzsche, the tensional dynamics is not a being or a becoming; it is “a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and an affecting first emerge”¹⁶⁸. As Marsden states, after the death of God, the task is to diagnose which forces are operative in a given phenomenon¹⁶⁹. Forces - the struggle of forces are immanent to life itself, and according to their expenditure power, seek to be master over each other. Forces which have low power of expenditure articulate themselves in a self-preservative way. For Deleuze, this difference between forces is qualified according to their quantity as active and reactive¹⁷⁰. Reactive forces are the inferior ones, which exercise their quantity of force by fulfilling the functions of conversation, utility and adaptation - in a broader sense, the task of self-preservation. Active ones try to reach out for power, to dominate, to give shape to and to create forms by exploiting their environment. Nietzsche calls these forces “noble”, because these ones have the energy to transform their environment and they are the energy capable of transforming themselves. Therefore, they are ready to expend themselves in the process of transformation, in other words creation. The critical point is that *high* and *base*, *noble* and *slave*, “are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives”¹⁷¹. *High* and *base* are not fixed points on a scale of evaluations. They are characterized as the type and degree of confrontations or, as

¹⁶⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §676.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, §635.

¹⁶⁹ Jill Marsden, *After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy*, p.10.

¹⁷⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.40.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

stated earlier, relation of domination, which is operative in the struggle of forces - determinative conditions of life in determined state. Therefore, no state or no phenomenon can be interpreted in a way that is independent from forces.

In this context, "what defines body is the relation between the dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political"¹⁷². Values, which are nodal points of forces, are incorporated and, thus, constitute the body. For instance, over the course of the centuries of western societies' history humanist or subjective values continue to retain their cultural worth as they are incorporated as such. In this regard, human being as a body is incorporation of values. As Marsden points out, 'the human' is just an adjective for Nietzsche and the case is not that the human being is intrinsically life-negating or life-affirming¹⁷³.

In this connection, for Nietzsche every particular body strives to dominate and to become master over all space and extend its force – its will to power. It faces similar efforts on the part of other bodies and comes to an order with those of them which are sufficiently related to it and the process goes on. In general, Nietzsche defines life as "an enduring form of process of establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally"¹⁷⁴. In other words, body or an organ is constructed as a result of determination, limitation and variations of power. In this way, according to the dominant force or forces, the value of a growing organ or body is interpreted. Therefore, organic processes comprise interpretations and, thereby, the body is the relation of forces – the relation between dominant and dominated forces. Consequently, forces that construct the body are not the basis for the stability of its form, but for new, plural forms of themselves.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p.40.

¹⁷³ Jill Marsden, *After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy*, p.10.

¹⁷⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §642.

4.2. Body in Relation to the Noble and the Slave

As stated earlier, in Nietzsche's analysis of the body, in Deleuzian terms, there are active and reactive forces, which constitute the body and are different from each other. Active forces are those which command, act, and form; reactive forces are those which obey and fulfil the task of conversion, adaptation and utility¹⁷⁵. Within the struggle of these forces phenomena finds its meaning¹⁷⁶ and the primordial quality of forces, so called will to power, can be either affirmative or negative depending on the type of force which dominates the other¹⁷⁷. This quality of forces characterizes the mode of becoming. On this basis, what Nietzsche calls *noble* is the affirmative will and what he calls *slave* is the negative will. In other words, the noble and the slave are the modes of impersonal happenings and existence within life. Therefore, as a body, the human being, which is constituted by the relation of forces, cannot be conceived separated from impersonal happenings. In this regard, Nietzsche attached the function of guiding thread to the body, since "the clarification of the body is inseparable from the combined understanding of eternal recurrence, the will to power, and the revaluation of values"¹⁷⁸. Therefore, the analysis of a body will surely lead us to determine the character of the force that is constitutive for the body, or as Nietzsche calls, the innermost essence of being: the will power. The will to power as "inner will" of the victorious force, which is within force itself, wants or wills in such a way that the victorious one might defeat the others. The will to power is thus that through which forces enter into relations, as dominant and dominated. It is a synthetic principle that makes the junction of forces or wills, - which constitute the body - possible. Therefore, as previously stated, by the analysis of the body, the dominant and the dominated forces are determined.

¹⁷⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Tr. Hugh Tomlinson. London: Continuum, 2006. p.40.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.46.

¹⁷⁸ Didier Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, Trs. Bettina Bergo and Philippe Farah. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012 p.129.

Body as Nietzsche emphasizes, is neglected, despite the fact that it is our most certain being. For this reason, he ventures to expose that body is totally imprinted by history and in the process of history the body is destructed. As Foucault states, “history becomes effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself”¹⁷⁹. Accordingly, throughout the history, “it has never occurred to anyone to regard [her] stomach as a strange or, say, a divine stomach: but to conceive [her] ideas as “inspired,” [her] evaluations as “implanted by a God””¹⁸⁰. However, for Nietzsche, as for Freud, body precedes consciousness. In addition to that, most of the bodily motions and changes are not tied to consciousness. Sensations and thoughts have role only in extremely rare or insignificant events among countless number of them occurring every moment. As Nietzsche states, “[o]f the numerous influences operating at every moment, e.g., air, electricity, we sense almost nothing: there could well be forces that, although we never sense them, continually influence us”¹⁸¹.

We consider that it is by a premature conclusion that human consciousness was for so long taken to be the supreme stage of organic development and most astonishing of terrestrial things, [and] even as their flourishing and their goal. What is more astonishing is rather the *body*: we endlessly admire how the human *body* became possible: how such a prodigious unification of living beings, all dependent and obedient, but in another sense commanding and acting by their own will, can live as a whole, grow and subsist for a certain time –: and this obviously does not happen through consciousness! Of this ‘miracle of miracles,’ consciousness is but an ‘instrument’ and nothing more – in the same sense in which the stomach is an instrument¹⁸²

As noted earlier, we can trace the noble and the slave forces in a body (Nietzsche uses the noble and the slave interchangeably for the characterization of forces and will). For instance, Nietzsche, in consonance with Freud's approach, opposes the approaches that consider the drive of preservation as the primal or

¹⁷⁹ Foucault, Michel, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p.82.

¹⁸⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §659.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, §676.

¹⁸² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, 6:37 [4], pp.576-77. Quoted in Didier Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, p. 134

cardinal drive. According to Nietzsche's account, the drive of preservation is a *passive/base* or a *slave* one, because it cannot move forward. Instead, it is an act of resistance and reaction. In other words, the will which is appropriated by the slave tries to escape from the flux of becoming and to resist the change. In this sense, its first speech act is no-saying to life, the *active* or the *noble* one, who, in contrast to the *base* or the *slave*, tries to reach out for power rather than to preserve its power.

The Weaker presses to the stronger from a need for nourishment; it wants to get under it, if possible to become one with it. The stronger, on the contrary, drives others away; it does not want to perish in this manner... The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present...The will to power in every combination of forces, defending itself against the stronger, lunging at the weaker¹⁸³.

Nietzsche points out that an organic creature wants above all to "discharge its force"¹⁸⁴. In cases such as procreation, hunger etc., will to expenditure no longer achieves mastery, because, instead of the drive to discharge energy, the drive of preservation becomes the dominant drive. Procreation, which is considered as a type of preservation, is, for Nietzsche, the consequence of an impotency or a weakness. "A protoplasm divides in two when its power is no longer adequate to control what it has appropriated"¹⁸⁵. When the material cannot be organized or cannot organize itself, a force which has an opposing stance carries out the separation of the material.

Contrary to slave forces seeking for preservation, the noble forces try to acquire more power, produce a burst of creativity and try to overcome itself so that it is ready to expend itself in accordance with "the horizon of becoming", life. In this sense, the action of self-overcoming and the creativity of noble forces are the acts of will which are not only changes within life or nature, but also the

¹⁸³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §655.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, §650.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, §654.

affirmation of life, which is the horizon of becoming. In this sense, the first speech act of the noble force is yes-saying to life, to differentiation and change, and more importantly, to itself.

As noted earlier, according to Nietzsche's analysis, phenomena find its meaning within the struggle of forces, namely *agon*. The struggle of noble and slave forces constitutes the human being, as a body, as well as communities, societies - in general the body politic. In this regard, the transformation of the human being and the constitution of the body politic can be elucidated by focusing on the dynamic relation between forces, *agon*. In this connection, Nietzsche, in *On the Genealogy of Morality*¹⁸⁶, presents us a genealogical reading of the history of the triumph of reactive forces. As Acampora puts it, Nietzsche's genealogical approach provides us a story of the emergence of the human animal and how it came to be what it is, "entwined with an aetiology of moral concepts"¹⁸⁷. Analogous to his ontology of life which comprises of noble and slave forces, Nietzsche introduces a conjecture in which there are noble and slave types of human beings. The noble and the slave are expressions of will to power, which are impersonal happenings, but Nietzsche uses them to re-substantialize and to show the degeneration of life clearly. In this context, I will follow Nietzsche's narrative in order to explicate the emergence of civilization and the change of the human being regarding the dynamic relation between forces. In detail, based on his ontogenetic account I will focus on the transformation of drives and the changes in the human being and, on the other hand, based on his phylogenetic account, I will concentrate on the social typologies and their transformation in Nietzsche's narrative in order to elucidate the emergence of civilization.

¹⁸⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Tr. Maudemaire Clark and Alan J. Swenson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998.

¹⁸⁷ Christa Davis Acampora, "On Sovereignty and Over humanity: Why It Matters How We Read Nietzsche's *Genealogy* II:2", in Christa Davis Acampora (ed.), *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. p.150.

4.3. *Ressentiment and The Emergence of the Memory of the Will*

Nietzsche describes two distinct and antagonistic positions or modes of existence, which have been developed through the history of civilization: the noble and the slave¹⁸⁸. These two positions or modes of impersonal happenings are taken into account regarding their contrasting valuations. The noble is the assertive configuration which affirms itself, grows and act spontaneously and “it seeks out its opposite only in order to say “yes” to itself still more gratefully and more jubilantly”¹⁸⁹ so that it is active and self-affirmative. It does not wait to be called good. It refers to, names and describes itself as good. Here good qualifies activity, enjoyment and affirmation. It is thus powerful and feels, ranks itself and its doings as good, and more importantly it takes the right to create values for itself. Since, the negative of its values derived afterwards, or as Nietzsche says, “negative concept “low” “common” “bad” are only after-birth, a pale contrast-image in relation to [the noble’s] positive basic concept, saturated through and through with life and passion”¹⁹⁰, the noble configuration gives rise to carefreeness, naivety and happiness. The negative is only the result of the power of affirmation. In contrast to the noble, the slave is the reactive configuration which “says “no” to an “outside”, to a “different”, to “not-self”: and *this* no is its creative deed¹⁹¹ so that it always needs an opposite and external world. In other words, it needs an

¹⁸⁸ The distinction of the noble and the slave does not indicate two distinct groups of human beings or races. As noted earlier – few times – they are modes of impersonal happenings and existence within life. In addition to that they cannot be found in isolation from each other.

“There are *master morality* and *slave morality*; - I add immediately that in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other even in the same human being, within a *single* soul”

In this sense, although we may find these two positions within single soul according to the passage above, Nietzsche still describes them as externalized forms or independent subject in order to re-substantialize and to show that the degeneration of life clearly.

Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9, §260.

¹⁸⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, I, §10.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

external stimulus in order to be able to act. Thus, in contrast to the noble's active position, it has a reactive, negative position. Since the slave is weak and does not have the power to act, it tries to preserve itself. When this mode of becoming becomes dominant in the human being, one has only power to react and feel *ressentiment* against things – i.e., the external world (especially the noble) – that one cannot control. For this reason, the slavish ones first describe the noble as evil and then try to show that they are not like the noble and thereby they describe themselves as good. In this sense, their goodness and happiness are artificial because they need a mediator, the noble. However, the noble does not need the slave to affirm itself as good. Since nobles are powerful and carefree, they do not falsify the image of the powerless – i.e., the slave.

The noble mode of evaluation is characterized by the *pathos of distance*, which signifies an intensified sensibility for rich plurality. And Nietzsche describes the *pathos of distance* as "the rift between people, between class, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out"¹⁹². The noble type craves for the multiplicity not only in its relation with others, but also within itself¹⁹³. In other words, a human being, who acts in harmony with this mode of existence, craves not only different types of human beings but also different passions and drives within herself. Contrary to the noble's affirmative attitude, human beings which are dominated by the slave mode of existence – in other words, human beings which are incapable of acting and even of reacting to received excitation, blame their object as the source of their incapability. As Nietzsche states, these beings of *ressentiment* deny true reaction and, contrary to the noble's attitude, they say no to an outside, to a different, to a not-self. In other words, they consider their object as something on which revenge must be taken. In this regard, the human beings of *ressentiment* wait for the right moment and do not forget the misdeeds and the hostile acts of others. However, when *ressentiment* appears in the noble, it exhausts itself in an immediate reaction and it

¹⁹² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, 'Skirmishes', §37.

¹⁹³ Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche and the Political*, London: Routledge, 1997 p.38.

has an active power called forgetting, which is a formative, reconstructing and healing power that makes one forget and not consider others' misdeeds for a long time.

The emergence of the special type of memory — i.e., the faculty of promising — is one of the conditions of possibility of the human being of *ressentiment*. Before that the human being remains at the level of the first memory with which human beings can react to traces like other animals¹⁹⁴. Nietzsche characterizes this animal state in this way:

Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from morn till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure, and thus neither melancholy nor bored. This is a hard sight for [human being] to see for, though [she] thinks [herself] better than the animals because [she] is human [she] cannot help envying them their happiness - what they have, a life neither bored nor painful, is precisely what [she] wants, yet [she] cannot have it because [she] refuses to be like an animal. A human being may well ask an animal: 'Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at me?' The animal would like to answer, and say: 'The reason is I always forgot what I was going to say' - but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent: ... Thus the animal unhistorically: for it is contained in the present, ..."¹⁹⁵

At this level, the human animal has an active faculty called forgetting which operates as a dominant and healthy faculty. The function of this faculty – in other words, forgetting – is a sign of bodily healthiness, because it is an active letting go that makes room for new things and new experiences so that temporality is possible for the human being. Otherwise, the human being can no longer be able to get rid of an impression once she received it. The faculty of forgetting works in human body and keeps it in a healthy condition without us being aware of it. An interruption of the active function of forgetting causes sickness – memory as an unfinished digestion, like the interruption of the digestion in a body which entails the prevention of the nourishing of the body. From the perspective of the

¹⁹⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.115.

¹⁹⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, Tr. Reginal J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', §1.

dynamics of forces, the emergence of the faculty of promising is a sign of the triumph of reactive forces because the faculty of memory – as Nietzsche calls it, “*the memory of the will*”¹⁹⁶ - presupposes that there is no change and, thereby, the human being will stay identical to itself and one has a kind of command over the future in advance. As Nietzsche states, the human being henceforth “must have learned to separate the necessary from the accidental occurrence, to think causally..., to be able to reckon, to calculate, - for this, [the human being herself] must first of all have become *calculable, regular, necessary*”¹⁹⁷. In this regard, the faculty of memory ventures to suppress the temporal difference so that human beings begin to think in terms of timeless structures, which are against life that is the flux of becoming, and to become calculable, identical.

In addition, the notion of the active letting-go plays a crucial role in Nietzsche’s critique of slave morality because it is an active letting-go of the psychological effect of being harmed, which does not require forgiveness. Since the weak or slave human being has no capability to get rid of or to repel or to overcome anything, everything hurts her. As Nietzsche states “[the human being] and things obtrude too closely; experiences strikes one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound”¹⁹⁸. Thus, the slave type of human being is always in a pain and her memory traces are full of hatred, anger and lust for revenge. Every excitation sets the weak but freezes her, because everything she experiences invades her and causes so many cruel suffering. As a result, a few ideas become unforgettable and fixed so that the weak is forced to think in terms of these ideas.

How does this special kind of faculty emerge? Nietzsche draws attention to mnemo-techniques practiced in pre-history to create this faculty, which inevitably involve the infliction of terrible pain. He points out that the main insight to be gained from these mnemo-techniques is that, “one burns something in so that it remains in one’s memory: only what does not cease *to give pain* remains in one’s

¹⁹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §1.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, I, §3.

memory"¹⁹⁹. In his discussion of the creation of a memory for a will, Nietzsche questions the status of the impression that is actively reanimated and relived and that establishes the continuity of the will. Nietzsche gives examples from history to show how certain behaviours are sanctioned by cruel practices such as torture in the breeding of the human being as a tame animal. Thus, as Butler points out, we learn of the terror that constructs all primal promises. This terror causes an impression, which works as the mnemonic device whereby the will makes itself regular and calculable. Therefore, the emergence of this special faculty of memory and the hardening of consciousness take place, or as Nietzsche describes, “a people of thinkers” are bred as a result of cruel practices.

As in Freud's understanding - the transition the pleasure principle to the reality principle takes place when the human being cannot overcome obstacles. Reason thus emerges and develops reflection and mastery over affects, as a result of pain, blood and horror, with the help of this special kind of memory and fixed ideas with which identification and calculation are made possible. In detail, with the development of the faculty of memory, the human being becomes incapable of actively letting go so that the act of promising, which presupposes that there is no change and the body will stay identical to itself, is possible.

From the perspective of the dynamics of forces at first, *ressentiment* has a raw content and the slave or reactive forces escape the action of active or noble forces. According to Deleuze, in this way, reactive forces begin to prevail over active forces when the invasion of the memory traces begins²⁰⁰. Then, with the domination of the memory traces, the *memory of the will* develops and becomes preponderant faculty, instead of the faculty of forgetting. In this regard, in this process of the emergence of this specific will, so-called *the memory of the will*, the central moment is the emergence of the capacity to calculate, to think causally

¹⁹⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §3.

²⁰⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.114

and to reflect upon itself - which is nothing other than the development of consciousness.

In this connection, the development of consciousness is associated with the faculty of forgetting and the emergence of a special faculty of memory which Nietzsche describes as an unfinished digestion. The development of consciousness is also associated with the need for communication under the pressure of needs and distresses as well. In accordance with Rousseau and Freud, Nietzsche thinks that the human animal has a "capacity for communication" to which the strength of the consciousness is proportionate²⁰¹. As in Freud's interpretation, the external pressures - according to Freud's terminology the necessity, *Ananke*, imposed by the external world - on the human animal lead to a need for communication.

[C]onsciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings (particularly between those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it also developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility²⁰².

In this connection, the human animal, who lives like beast of prey or, in other words, in accordance with the noble mode of existence does not need the development of this capacity to the same extent. It is the weak, who needs the help of her peers that more strongly requires the development of it. She needs to learn her distress - in other words, she needs to know what she thought - and makes herself understood by others in order to preserve herself so that the conscious thinking with the forms of words and signs of communication arises from a need or a utility. With the urge to communicate with others, the ability to fix our sense impressions increases in order to have the means for being conscious of ourselves and to exhibit our sense impressions. Thus, the emergence of the consciousness is deeply attached to the human being's social nature. Nietzsche calls this social nature herd nature, because in the process of becoming conscious the human animal becomes conscious of not the individual but the average which

²⁰¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, §354.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

is the perspective of the herd²⁰³. This is because the human experience is deeply personal and individual, but the procedure of transforming it into consciousness involves generalization which eliminates the individuality of the experience. In this regard, "truth", which is acquired through consciousness as a result of a need, depends on generalization and falsification of individual experiences (The relation between "truth" and the development of civilization is discussed in section 4.8. in detail). In conclusion, the development of consciousness, which entrenches the social relations and, thereby, the foundations of civilization can be considered as a disease, from physiological perspective, for human beings.

4.4. The Organic Origin of the Contractual Relations

Nietzsche asserts that the human being is comprised of the cumulative outcome of natural drives and the prehistoric mastering of these drives. Therefore, civilized human being in a broad sense is a synthesis of the organic - i.e., our drives - and the normative so that the high valued characteristics which are considered to belong to only human beings originate in our animality and demands of life. As Hobbes and Rousseau state, Nietzsche points out that the contractual relations lie at the bottom of the emergence of civilization. Distinctly, as we saw in section 4.3, Nietzsche associated these relations with the emergence of a faculty of the human psyche, memory, in relation to our animality and demands of life.

Nietzsche elucidates the character of promise giving by first arguing that the German word *Schuld* may signify both *guilt* and *debt* – for instance *Schuldung* may mean both *being in debt* and *being guilty*. From the identical etymological origin of 'guilt' and 'debt', Nietzsche realizes that this first terror is caused by a promise in the relation between debtor and creditor according to which the failure to repay the debt awakens the desire for compensation in the creditor. He argues that the psychological concept of guilt is derived from the concept of debt which

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

is a practical and mercantile and, in general, economic one. Trading agents make a covenant, which, if breached, gives the creditor the right to inflict indignity and injury upon the body²⁰⁴. The creditor exercises her power on the debtor in order to enjoy the pleasurable feeling she has in her cruelty.

At first human beings embrace cruelty in such a way that it makes them happy. Nietzsche states that there is more health, fresh air and straightforwardness in ancient celebration of cruelty, because this original cruelty is regarded as innocent: it is how an eagle kills a mouse or a child tortures animals and “without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and the most ancient part of human history teaches – and in punishment there is so much festive”²⁰⁵. With this mechanism, Nietzsche is foreshadowing Freud’s theories of the primary aggressive drive or destructive drive. For both philosophers, the primary, proto-sadistic drive fulfils instincts so that it gives pleasure or makes the human being happy, contrary to Hobbes and Rousseau – Hobbes sees this as a source for immoral act and for Rousseau this is not a natural drive. When *Schuld* is transformed into a psychological-moral concept, as in the first essay of *Genealogy of morality*, the debtor’s humiliation, its indignation, its abasement and its lowering elevate the importance of the creditor, its vanity and pride. In other words, it is only this demonstrable indignation or weakness that makes the creditor feel more powerful or more important in turn. In this way, in contrast to the primary or original aggression which fulfils drives of an individual, the aggression of the creditor is secondary, a complicated and a convoluted kind²⁰⁶ emerging from the *ressentiment* of the suffering individual – i.e., the creditor who suffers from the debtor's breaching of the contract by the debtor. For this reason, Nietzsche finds the second aggressiveness unhealthy in contrast to innocent

²⁰⁴ Bornedal, Peter, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*, p.392.

²⁰⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §6.

²⁰⁶ Peter Bornedal, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*, p.405.

cruelty of the human being²⁰⁷. As in Freud's understanding, when the primary aggression, i.e., the death drive, follows its natural course, the organism is relieved but when it is turned around and directed away from its natural course, the organism becomes perverse and pathological.

Nietzsche also draws attention to the problematic idea of the penance of debt according to which there is always an equivalent pay off for every guilt. In other words, every injury has its equivalent in a determinable amount of pleasure. However, the notion of accountability cannot give the account of the desire of the creditor to punish the debtor in the circumstances of the broken contract. Nietzsche demonstrates that injury is inflicted in the moralized action by which the creditor holds the debtor morally accountable and pronounces him guilty. In order to elucidate this mechanism Nietzsche delves deeper into the notion of guilt and finds out that the underlying reason for the attribution of guilt is the presupposed contract, the existence of which presupposes the institution of promising. In the debtor-creditor case, the debtor fails to keep his promise – i.e., to protract his will – and discharge his word in the execution of an act.

4.4.1. The Origin of Justice

In this way the human being for the first time stepped up against a person and measured himself by another person. Measuring self in this way, the human being “arrived straightaway at the grand generalization ‘every thing has its price; *everything* can be paid off’ –at the oldest and most naïve moral canon of *justice*” which is the beginning of “good will” and “objectivity”²⁰⁸. For this reason, the foundation of the judicial systems in civilized societies is this relation between the debtor and the creditor.

²⁰⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *MA*, I, p.57. Quoted in Peter Bornedal, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*, p.394.

²⁰⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §8.

Purchase and sale, together with their psychological accessories, are older than even the beginnings of any societal associations and organizational forms: it was out of the most rudimentary form of personal legal rights that the budding feeling of exchange, contract, guilt, right, obligation, compensation first transferred itself onto the coarsest and earliest communal complexes (in their relationship to similar complexes), together with the habit of comparing, measuring, and calculating power against power²⁰⁹.

The problem here is that justice cannot be simply a retribution or a revenge with *a fair name*, because there is still the need of an explanation for the cruel punishment of the lawbreaker or wrongdoer, and the establishment of justice on the basis of resentment remains reactive. This sense of fairness would be overpowered by the truly active drives – e.g., lust for power, avarice – which are manifested by the opposing wrongdoer who acts in accordance to her drives and, thus, she is an active human being. In other words, this fundamental justice, which originates from a reactive origin, does not have a legitimate ground. In this regard, revenge, which is the origin of justice and the basis for the judicial institutions of civilized societies, is not related to any sense of justice or fairness. Therefore, "the active, the attacking, encroaching human is still located a hundred paces nearer to justice than the reactive one; [she] simply has no need to appraise his object falsely and with prejudice as the reactive human does, must do"²¹⁰.

With this connection, the debtor-creditor relation, which serves as a model for the most primitive or the archetype of social constitutions is a relation resting on an economic motive, i.e., credit. With the establishment of the contractual relationship, the human animal becomes measurable and accountable in civil society whose foundations are based on the emergence of the faculty of promising. Therefore, with the development of memory and the emergence of the idea that the human being has the ability to calculate the consequences of her actions, human beings are hereafter held to be responsible for their actions.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, §11.

4.5. The Emergence of Bad Conscience and Guilt

At this point, the questions, “how did the weak as weak or the slave as slave triumph?” and “how does the slave mode of existence dominate the noble mode of existence despite their passivity, weakness and inability to create values and to impose it upon other beings?” arise. For Nietzsche, the answers to these questions rely on another mode of existence or valuation called ‘the priestly type’, which branched off from the noble mode of existence and developed into its opposite.

In both Nietzsche's analysis and Freud's analysis, the crucial turn in the development of civilization is the process of the internalization of drives. In civilized societies based on the debtor-creditor relationship, in other words contractual relationships, human animals are forced to leave their "old leaders, the regulating drives that unconsciously guided them" and to think, to infer, to calculate, to establish the cause-effect relationship between events so that their drives are first reduced to their consciousness which is for Nietzsche their poorest and most erring organ.

Just as the water animals must have fared when they were forced either to become land animals or to perish, so fared these half animals who were happily adapted to wilderness, war, roaming about, adventure - all at once all of their instincts were devalued and 'disconnected'. From now on they were to go on foot and 'carry themselves' where they had previously been carried by the water: a horrible heaviness lay upon them²¹¹.

In detail, drives hereafter cannot be discharged outwards so that they are necessarily turned inward, since society does not allow the spontaneous discharge of drives. In this regard, the human being is forced to turn natural aggressiveness, as in Freud's narrative, back upon herself. Rather than discharging her aggressiveness towards her enemy, she starts to direct it against herself. In this way, the human being developed her soul and self-aggression.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, §16.

The entire inner world, originally thin as if inserted between two skins, has spread and unfolded, has taken on depth, breadth, height to the same extent that man's outward discharging has been obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which the organization of the state protects itself against the old instincts of freedom—punishments belong above all else to these bulwarks—brought it about that all those instincts of the wild free roaming human turned themselves backwards against [the human being herself]²¹².

In this way, Nietzsche presents us a model according to which aggression is internalized and an agency is set up in the human being so that aggression is turned against the drives of the human being and makes her feel guilty about these drives. From now on, the self-castigating practices of the human beings no longer require the external techniques of mnemonics. The mechanism of the self-castigation is internalized and the feeling of guilt, which is external to the human animal, becomes internal. Hereupon an inner sense of one's own fault, drives and responsibility for having done wrong, so called *bad conscience*, arises. Here Nietzsche's narrative is in concordance with that of Freud's, according to which the same procedure takes place and the internalization of aggression transforms itself into another division of the mental apparatus called "the superego" which turns the aggression of the human being against the ego.

From the phylogenetic perspective, Nietzsche sees the development of the priestly cast or the priestly mode of existence as a result of this internalization procedure. With the internalization of drives human beings develop their soul and, parallel to this development, the development of the priestly type takes place and "[the human being] becomes *an interesting animal*, only here did the human soul acquire *depth* in a higher sense"²¹³. In this regard, the changes in Nietzsche's phylogenetic account are parallel to the changes in his ontogenetic account as seen in Freud's understanding.

From this perspective, Nietzsche thinks that before the emergence of the priestly type of existence, human beings have natural relations with all things like

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ *Ibid.*, I, §6.

"in the time of the kings, Israel had a *correct*, which is to say natural relation to all things"²¹⁴. As a result of an incident which leads to a situation that they cannot overcome – according to Nietzsche, the incident takes place for Israeli people in a situation in which there are the pressures of the anarchy from the inside and of Assyrians from the outside²¹⁵ – their natural impulses are internalized and the priestly mode of existence which is the most powerless, spiritual type, emerges. The similar turn, which leads to the emergence of the priestly mode of existence, happens also in Greek culture. "One will already have guessed how easily the priestly manner of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite"²¹⁶. Before the turn, according to Nietzsche's interpretation, in Ancient Greece myths enable human beings to live in noble ways. For instance, after unfortunate events, rather than blaming themselves, they blame their gods, which are created by themselves. In other words, they do not present misdeeds as sin but as something caused by their gods.

[H]ow is it possible? whence could it actually have come, given heads such as we have, we [human beings] of noble descent, of happiness, of optimal form, of the best society, of nobility, of virtue?' - thus the noble Greek wondered for centuries in the face of every incomprehensible atrocity and wanton act with which one of [her] equals had sullied [herself]. 'A god must have beguiled [her],' [she] said to [herself] finally, shaking [her] head... This way out is typical of the Greeks... In this manner the gods served in those days to justify humans to a certain degree even in bad things, they served as causes of evil - in those days it was not the punishment they took upon themselves but rather more noble, the guilt...²¹⁷

In this sense, Ancient Greeks first value cruelty, joy in struggle, war and torture. After the Athenian triumph in the Persian wars there are no external enemies left and then the noble are enclosed within the peace of society which they cannot overcome. As a result, their natural drives cannot discharge so that they turn inside. At the end, the powerless priestly type, whose drives are not discharged

²¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity*, §25.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, I, §7.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, §23.

and, who cannot affirm its drives, emerges. In other words, “the priestly manner of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite”²¹⁸.

In connection with this, since the priestly type internalizes its drives, it does not have a powerful physicality, an overflowing health or strength and freedom for cheerful-hearted activities – in other words, it is the most powerless – so that it has a growing hate against the noble and out of its powerlessness it develops something enormous, “most spiritual and most poisonous”²¹⁹. That is to say that, as a result of the internalization, the priestly type of human being, which is weakened and sickly because of its inhibited impulses, emerges. Since it is branched from the noble it still has an ability of value creation. Thus, the internalized disposition of the priestly mode of existence opens up a way for new valuations. From its hatred against the noble, it re-values and reverses the created values of nobles by giving the slave's *ressentiment* a form, because it looks for a cause for its suffering, its powerlessness and it accuses everything active in life. Hence, it introduces the morality of *ressentiment* which is originated “out of a no to the [noble morality]”²²⁰. Without the revaluation of values by the priest, the slave would not have known how to step out from the raw state of *ressentiment*. For Nietzsche, the first revaluation of noble values is accomplished by the Judaist priests which are against the noble value-equation – i.e., “good=noble=beautiful=happy”²²¹. For this reason, they valorise the slavish and create a value system according to which the poor, the powerless, the sick and deprived are good; whereas the powerful ones, the cruel, the lustful - briefly the noble people - are bad and cursed. In this way the priest gives a direction to the *ressentiment* of the slave and sets it up against everything that is noble, active.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, §7.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity*, §24.

²²¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, I, §7.

By the interiorisation of the noble drives – for instance aggressive drives – which are also the source of pain and cruelty, pain becomes interiorised. The pain before its internalisation has an external meaning. For the noble that pain has one meaning, which is giving pleasure to someone who inflicts the pain. The noble considers pain and cruelty as part of "festival plays for gods"²²². However, after its internalisation the human being begins to suffer from her own drives. The priest gives a meaning to this internalized pain by inventing the notion of "Sin".

[The human being], suffering from [herself] in some way or other, physiologically in any case, somewhat like an animal locked in a cage, uncertain why, to what end? desirous of reasons—reasons alleviate—desirous also of cures and narcotics, finally holds counsel with one who also knows concealed things— and behold! [she] receives a hint; from [her] magician, the ascetic priest, [she] receives the first hint concerning the "cause" of [her] suffering: [she] is to seek it in himself, in a guilt, in a piece of the past, [she] is to understand [her] suffering itself as a state of punishment ... [She] has heard, [She] has understood, the unhappy one: now things stand with [her] as with then around whom a line has been drawn. [She] can no longer get out of this circle of lines: out of the invalid "the sinner" has been made ...²²³.

With this move, the priest gives a sensualized and spiritualised meaning to pain, which is internalised. From now on this internal sense is a consequence of a sin, a fault. In other words, the human being is in pain because she has sinned. In this way, the human being takes a position against her drives, instincts thereby against life. In other words, she has a tendency to consider pain as something against her existence. Therefore, she conceives in a reactive way – reactive to life. As Deleuze points out, the human being puts herself in the position in which she not only suffers but also no longer acts out our reactions²²⁴. In this way, the priest changes *the direction of resentment*²²⁵ for the second time and by after the invention of 'Sin' the human being must find the cause of her pain or suffering in herself.

²²² *Ibid.*, I, §7.

²²³ *Ibid.*, III, §20.

²²⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.130.

²²⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §15.

"That's right, my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it - *you alone are to blame yourself!*"²²⁶.

4.6. Morality and Civilization

The development of civilization is strictly related to the development of morality and religious institutions. As illustrated before, for Nietzsche, with the imposition of the debtor-creditor contractual relationship, the most primitive social organizations are formed and human beings are forced to be responsible for their actions. With the emergence of the slave morality the natural drives of the human being become something that one should be ashamed of and feel guilty about.

By the institutionalisation of the contractual relationship, which is based on the slave morality, the noble is forced to be responsible for its acts. Nietzsche demonstrates this point with an analogy in which the noble is represented by the birds of prey and the slave is represented by the lambs. The lambs describe the birds of prey as evil beings, feel anger towards them and for them whatever is opposite of birds of prey, the lamb, is good. However, the birds of prey love them because they eat them and find them tasty²²⁷. On the contrary, lambs are weak and demand that the birds of prey quit their acts as if it is possible for a subject to choose to be otherwise, as if hunting other animals is not the character of the birds of prey. Therefore, blaming them for their actions is nothing but cruel to the nature of the birds of prey. The idea that the subject could choose its act introduces the idea of responsibility and freedom of will. The slave exploits the belief that "*the strong one is free to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb*"²²⁸. However, the reason behind this belief is the weakness of the lambs/slaves. Since they cannot act in an 'evil' way as the noble does, in order to survive or to preserve themselves, they represent their impotency or incapacity of action as a moral

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, I, §13.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, §13.

code. By the slave triumph, which is led by the priest, they direct their *ressentiment* against the noble and impose the creditor-debtor, in other words contractual, relationship, which forms the basis of the first primitive form of civilization, upon the noble so that hereafter the noble is forced to be responsible for its acts.

In this regard, the first primitive structures, institutions and strictures, which are acquired by the slave revolt, confine the noble. With this realization the noble cannot discharge its drives.

[E]nclosed once and for all within the sway of society and peace...all at once all of their instincts were devalued and “disconnected.”... a horrible heaviness lay upon them. They felt awkward doing the simplest tasks; for this new, unfamiliar world they no longer had their old leaders, the regulating drives that unconsciously guided them safely...I do not believe there has ever been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort—and yet those old instincts had not all at once ceased to make their demands! It’s just that it was difficult and seldom possible to yield to them²²⁹.

From another angle, the transformation from the state of "nature" to so called "civil" society by enforced socialization makes the human animals restricted because impulses - especially aggressive impulses - of these animals cannot be discharged in civil society. Drives are not valorised anymore and they are suspended and controlled by new resources called consciousness and self-control. Since, the human animal cannot express its drives outwardly, they become internalized and inner-directed. The human being is thereafter obliged to redirect its impulsive energies against itself so as to breed itself in order to accommodate itself to the strictures of civil society. As shown in the previous section in detail, the soul, the inner world of the human being develops and becomes the very site of suffering. As a result of this process, one can no longer act in an aggressive way against someone else or in an unconventional way against something else. Therefore, in this long process of breeding memory and responsibility into the human animal, the human animal loses its nature and

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, II, §16.

becomes crippled and social convention or rule-governed behaviour becomes its second nature. In this way, the human being adheres to customs and social convention without a thought - in other words follows the law unconsciously. As foreshadowing Freud, Nietzsche purports that the prehistoric origins of fixed patterns of rituals, which are preconditions of human civilizations, arise out of the repression of drives. In other words, both Nietzsche and Freud demonstrate that customs, habits and communality, which are the beginnings of civilization, arise and are articulated out of the irrational, illogical sphere - namely, unconsciousness. In this sense, in the process of breeding, our irrational abilities receive their later elaboration. The long course of obedience to customs, habits and their concatenation of them creates tradition, which brings about social authority and a social order. Consequently, as Nietzsche points out in concordance with Freud's ideas on taboos, contrary to Hobbes and Rousseau, law does not receive its first formulation in the shape of reasoned statements about the meaning of questions of right and entitlement.

Among primitive peoples there is a category of customs whose sole aim seems to be custom itself: painstaking and ultimately superfluous ordinances (such as for example those among the Kamchadals never scrape off snow from boots with a knife, never with a knife to spear a live ember, never to lay sword in fire - death to whosoever offendeth against such particulars!), ordinances, however, that keep one ever mindful of the ever-nearness of custom and of continuous compulsion to enact custom, thereby confirming the great proposition with which civilisation begins²³⁰.

4.6.1. The Enclosure of the Noble

With the advent of religion discussed in the previous section, from the debt to the ancestor, *bad conscience* and guilt are transformed into the order of divine law or divine ordinance - i.e. *moralization of the guilt*. Therefore, the primitive order of civil or human law, which were external, becomes internalized. Henceforth, nature itself is considered to be evil because of its tremendous complex of arbitrariness. For this reason, the human being tries to impose regularity, laws into

²³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of morality*, 'Book I', §16.

nature – "[the human being] is rule, nature is irregularity"²³¹. As we discussed in a detailed manner the religious groups arise because of their undischarged drives. Their drives are restricted and placed under control so that their inner world becomes more or less regular in opposition to irregular nature. With this conflict between human beings and nature, human beings who are led by religious groups venture to impose rules on nature and create rituals – i.e., totems and taboos – in order to control nature. Therefore, there is no natural law that we derive from our passive observations of nature; rather there are norms, which are artificial. As Peter Sedgwick points out, law is a manifestation of socially mediated feeling that can be turned toward environmental demands and threaten with a view to their negation²³².

How can one exercise an influence over these terrible unknown powers, how can one fetter the domain of freedom? thus [she] asked himself, thus [she] anxiously seeks: are there then no means of regulating these powers through a tradition and law in just the way you are regulated by them? - The believer in magic and miracles reflects on how to impose a law on nature -: and, in brief, the religious cult is the outcome of this reflection... The meaning of the religious cult is to determine and constrain nature for the benefit of [humankind], that is to say to impress upon it a regularity and rule of law which it does not at first possess²³³.

The same rule is enforced on those human beings who do not comply with customs and laws. As in the case of irrational nature, those people who do not act in accordance with social order are subdued. In this regard, Religion emerges as the desire to control the nature that lies beyond the communal body so that the person who does not recognize any law is a threat to communal security. Those who are considered as outlaws for the community are actually alien, irrational, outsiders and, according to the others who are powerless, and incapable of coping with them, they must be controlled. Thus, as Nietzsche argues, the religious

²³¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, Tr. Reginal J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 'The Religious Life', §111.

²³² Peter R. Sedgwick, *Nietzsche's Justice: Naturalism in Search of Ethics*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, p.72.

²³³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, 'The Religious Life', §111.

response appears through rituals not only in order to regulate nature but also all human beings.

The problem these [human beings] pose themselves is intimately related to this one: how can the weaker tribe nonetheless dictate laws to the stronger, dispose of it, regulate its actions (so far as they affect the weaker)?²³⁴

According to Nietzsche's approach, to be moral is to act in accordance with custom and to be ethical is to act in an obedient way towards a law or tradition. However, the laws and regulations are imposed by the weak for their sake -i.e., for their self-preservation. In other words, in consonance with Freud's approach, the enactment of these regulations indicates the triumph of the self-preservative mode of existence over the self-expenditure mode of existence.

4.6.2. The Augmentation of Debt/Guilt of the Human Being

From the debtor-creditor mechanism, we as a collective body owe a debt to our ancestors for the present society. "Within the original clan associations - we are speaking of primeval times - the living generation always acknowledges a juridical obligation to the earlier generation, and particularly to the earliest one, which found the clan"²³⁵. For this reason, human beings worship their ancestors and they try to repay their debt through offerings, festivals, sacrifices and obedience to all customs as the work of the ancestors. In this regard, the debts and fear towards the founder of the clan or the primal ancestor, as in the narrative of Freud's, increases to the degree of power of the clan or the tribe. In the most powerful clans, the debt and fear of the progenitors grow into enormous proportions and become unbounded. In the end the primal ancestor is necessarily transfigured into a god²³⁶. In addition to that, with the increase of the debt, the

²³⁴ Ibid., 'The Religious Life', §111.

²³⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §19.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

discharging of the penance becomes impossible. As Nietzsche states, with the advent of the Christianity

God sacrificing himself for the guilt of [the human being], God himself exacting payment of himself, God as the only who can redeem from [the human being] what has become irredeemable for [the human being herself] - the creditor sacrificing [herself] for [her] debtor²³⁷.

First the sacrificing of God himself for human beings seems to provide a relief from the guilt but it is a "temporary relief" because in the last instance the human being causes the crucifixion of Jesus. The guilt of the crucifixion is added to the human being's guilt, which is already infinitized before the sacrifice. Henceforth, human beings are also responsible for the death of God for their sins. In this regard, Jesus' death temporally alleviates the suffering of the human being and in the long run it increases the human suffering by adding another cause for her suffering. Therefore, guilt becomes an instrument of self-torture for human beings who find in God the opposite of their animal instincts that cause them to act against the laws and customs and which, thus, are the sources of their sins. As a result, the human being says "no" to her drives, and so, "no" to herself, to nature, to naturalness²³⁸.

In this way, with the triumph of the *morality of resentment* over human drives, nature and, in general, life is devalued, because natural drives which belong to human nature become the source of one's sufferings. The priest, as stated before, preaches the annihilation of life but in return she must present something else, as Deleuze emphasizes, in order to make the suffering of bad conscience liveable, or rather, organised and propagated²³⁹. For Nietzsche, the Christian priest as the *ideologue* or the artist of pain and suffering invents the ideal of the afterlife as a reward for and, more importantly, a meaning to the suffering of the human being who says "no" to her drives, nature and the earthly life. The fiction of the afterlife is the annihilation of life in return for a beyond,

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, II, §21.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, II, §22.

²³⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.144.

thus, for a nothing. Hence, Nietzsche calls this world-beyond “an ascetic ideal” and the priest promoting this ideal the “ascetic priest”. In this regard, as Peter Bornedal emphasizes, the ascetic priest produces a doctrine of double nihilism according to which one must live against her natural drives so that one makes nothing out of this life in order to be rewarded with nothing in the yonder²⁴⁰. In this sense, the ascetic ideal is applied to the suffering who is thus sick and depressed but it makes her sicker rather than improving her condition. In concordance with Freud's understanding, since the ascetic ideal sustains the devaluation of drives and the repression of them; it creates a "religious neurosis" and, thereby, ruins the health of the human being.

[T]he ascetic doctrine of sin once again achieves a great success (religious neurosis appears as a form of “evil spirit”: there is no doubt about this. What it is? Quaeritur.) To put it bluntly, the ascetic ideal and its sublime-moral cult, this most ingenious, most unsuspected and most dangerous systematizing of all the instruments of emotional excess under the aegis of holy intentions, has inscribed itself in a terrible and unforgettable way into the entire history of man; and unfortunately not only into his history ... There is hardly anything else I could point out that has pressed so destructively upon health and racial robustness, particularly of Europeans, as this ideal; without any exaggeration one may call it the true doom in the history of European health²⁴¹.

The ascetic ideal not only ruins the health of the human being, but also has a negative stance toward alternative interpretations of the world so that it sustains its worldview as the only interpretation of plural and individual events. Thus, it interprets ages, societies and human beings according to one goal and refuses any other interpretation. It tries to sustain its will's privilege over every other will for one interpretation or, so to say, one *truth* - i.e., absolute truth, God which is the negation of drives and, in general sense, the body - according to which everything has its meaning and value.

²⁴⁰ Bornedal, Peter, *The Surface and the Abyss: Nietzsche as Philosopher of Mind and Knowledge*, Vol. 57. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010, p.410.

²⁴¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, §21.

The comprehensiveness of the world as such dates back at least to the platonic thought and continues today in scientific thought. The same overestimating of truth is the common character of scientific thought and morality. As morality, science has an unconditional faith in truth which is important for any other conviction.

There is, strictly speaking, absolutely no science “without presuppositions,” the thought of such a science is unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a “belief” must always be there first so that science can derive a direction from it, a meaning, a boundary, a method, a right to existence”²⁴².

In addition to that, the ground, the truth on which science rests is the same: "a certain *impoverishment of life*"²⁴³. Rather than focusing on life which means error, deception, simulation and delusion, science presupposes truthfulness (its relation with civilization is discussed in the next section) in life so that, in this ultimate sense, human beings, who have faith in science, "*affirm another world* than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, *our world*?"²⁴⁴. Therefore, through scientific thinking, which also negates and represses the human drives. Therefore, through scientific thinking, the ascetic ideal takes new form and continues to create discontents in human beings as a result of the repression of their drives.

From the perspective of the dynamic forces, in order to escape from action, the slave forces separate the noble forces from what they can do. At first, with the internalization of drives, the priestly type, which ceased to act in an active and an affirmative way, arises. However, as Deleuze states, in this first case, the reactive forces do not form a greater force than the active forces²⁴⁵. With the emergence of the priestly type, slave forces are turned against the active forces, intercepting the

²⁴² *Ibid.*, II, §24.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, II, §25.

²⁴⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, Book V, §344.

²⁴⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.124.

active manifestation of the noble mode of existence. In other words, the noble is treated as blameworthy. As discussed in previous sections in detail, the *ressentiment* is turned against the human drives. In this stage, the instincts and drives of the human being are depreciated and devalued. The priestly forces, which are branched off from the noble ones and which still have the capability to create, take the reactive projection and create the fiction of the super-sensible world in opposition to this world. With this change, the noble values are negated and reversed to its opposite values. In conclusion, these reversed values become dominant in the process of the development of civilization and formation of the current state of human being.

4.7. A Counter Model: The Antagonism of Culture and Civilization

While Nietzsche associates the breeding of the human being with the phenomenon of civilization; he also presents a counter model, which generally signifies the affirmation of these animalistic instincts and impulses. Lemm proposes to call this counter-model ‘culture’ and articulates Nietzsche’s approach to civilization through an antagonism of culture and civilization.

Culture and the state - let us be honest with ourselves here - these are adversaries: 'Kultur-Staat' is just a modern idea. The one lives off the other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is apolitical, even anti-political²⁴⁶.

Deleuze also claims that there is an antagonistic structure in Nietzsche’s approach to civilization, but he situates this antagonistic structure within culture. He analyses culture through three historical points of view. The prehistoric point of view is related to the training of the human being²⁴⁷. Culture, in the historical point of view, shows that history is the triumph of reactive forces and is the

²⁴⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'What the Germans Lack', §4.

²⁴⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.133.

degeneration of life²⁴⁸. Here, instead of a free and a powerful one, a sick domesticated human being emerges. On the other hand, Deleuze, in the post-historic sense, conceives culture as a movement which forms a free and powerful human being, because the faculty of promising which emerges in this process enables human being to make use of the future. According to the understanding of Deleuze, in this state of culture, the human beings liberate themselves from morality of customs and exercise formative activity²⁴⁹. According to Lemm, culture functions to show that rationalization and moralization of the animality are false overcomings, and to liberate human beings from the domination of civilization by trying to embrace life in all its forms²⁵⁰. In other words, culture has an affirmative stance towards all aspects of life – which is the noble quality of will to power – beyond a moral or rational conception.

However, affirming animality does not mean going back to nature, because, as Lemm explains, to “reject life in favour of another, supposedly better life, projected either into the past or into the future” signifies degeneration of life²⁵¹. In this regard, in my view, affirmation must be the affirmation of the whole, all dynamics of life, so that the tension between animal side and human side – in other words, the antagonistic structure of culture and civilization – must be preserved in order to overcome the human, in other words all-too-human form of life. Therefore, for Nietzsche, the transfiguration of humanity can be achieved by the enhancement of the type “human” that is accomplished by affirming the animality of this type.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.136.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.136-7.

²⁵⁰ Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being*, p.13.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.14.

4.8. 'Truth' and Civilization

In Nietzsche's understanding there is also a strong connection between the establishment of truth and the formation of social institutions so that the critique of civilization is entailed by Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical truth. I will also focus on the issue of truth in the context of the civilization-culture antagonism. Nietzsche sees the social contract as the fixation of the universally valid and binding 'truth', because the first laws of truth are also the laws of social formations²⁵². In this sense, Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical truth entails the critique of civilization. Therefore, there is a bio-political side of truth, which serves as a basis of civil society²⁵³.

In his analysis of the emergence of social formations, Nietzsche draws attention to a turning point in human history, which is the development of conceptual thinking and concepts, as a result of forgetting the irreducible and unique character of each and every case. Before this turn takes place human beings along with other animals think in terms of pictures or metaphors. In this state, the primitive power of imagination occasions a primitive world of metaphors, which enables the human animal to capture individualized primary experiences. In other words, the intuited world of metaphors is a world that comes toward the human animal rather than a world that is projected by the human being²⁵⁴. In this sense, the human animal is honest and cannot deceive anyone, because things appear to the human-animal as what they are and "it conceals nothing and at every instant appears as wholly as what it is"²⁵⁵. It lives unhistorically, because, as Lemm emphasizes, "forgetfulness draws the animal into the moment it absorbs the animal in the singular instant of time. As such,

²⁵² Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense", in R. Geuss ve A. Nehamas (ed.), L. Löb (tr.), *Writings from the Early Notebooks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 255.

²⁵³ Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1929. p. 113.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁵⁵ Nietzsche, F., "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense", p.131.

animals always live in the moment. The way they appear always truthfully reflects the way they are”²⁵⁶. As a result of their forgetfulness, the human-animal cannot dissimulate as opposed to the human being who does not live in truth and whose life is historical.

Another reason why Nietzsche praised pictorial and metaphorical thinking is that “it affirms the continuity of the human being with the totality of life” by imagining and creating as life itself does²⁵⁷. In other words, it is connected to life’s fundamental drive to create dreams, illusions and images. However, at one point, the first metaphor, so called intuitive metaphor, which is a result of the transformation of a nerve stimulus into an image, is reproduced in a sound, i.e. a word, according to Nietzsche²⁵⁸, as the second metaphor. In other words, only through oblivion of the primitive world of metaphors, words are formed in such a way that they are made of the residues of metaphors²⁵⁹.

Only through forgetfulness can [the human being] ever come to believe that [she] is in possession of a truth in the degree just described. If [she] is not content with truth in the form of tautology, i.e. with empty shells, [she] will for ever be trading truths for illusions²⁶⁰.

In addition to that, words are not intended to serve as an element of metaphorical or pictorial thinking, because they have to fit “at one and the same time countless more or similar cases which, strictly speaking, are never equal or, in other words, are always non-equal things”²⁶¹. As a result, every word is transformed into a concept through the process of the equalization of unequal

²⁵⁶ Lemm, V., *Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*, p. 114.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²⁵⁸ Nietzsche, F., “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, p. 256.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 256

things. Therefore, as Maudemaire states, concepts are twice removed from reality contrary to the view that concepts capture a reality inaccessible to perception²⁶².

The oblivion of our primary way of engaging with the world and the development of conceptual thinking leave the human being in a problematic situation. Firstly, the individual differences or distinguished features of things, cases and experiences are forgotten. Secondly, as Nietzsche elucidates, thinking with concepts presupposes a prototype according to which similar things are determined²⁶³ but we can only know about individual cases, not essential qualities of these cases. Thirdly, the concept does not exist in nature, it is imposed upon things by human beings, it is anthropocentric and “does not stem from the essence of things”²⁶⁴. In this regard, within the domain of reason, finding the ‘truth’ through concepts is finding actually something we hide²⁶⁵ because anthropocentric concepts do not contain a point which is true in-itself, i.e. real and universally valid apart from the human being. What is problematic here is that we claim to know something about things themselves with the ‘truth’ which is no longer regarded as an illusion or a metaphor and which, on the other hand, is acquired by anthropocentric concepts. Therefore, instead of a correct representation or a mirror to nature, the human intellect produces deceiving dissimulation with the understanding of ‘truth’²⁶⁶.

In this connection, acting truthfully hereafter means acting in accordance with the universalized, generalized rules so that the understanding of ‘truth’ in this sense is institutionalized and distinguished from the notion of the singular truth which is revealed and concealed in intuited metaphors. In other words, the universal and binding ‘truth’ constitutes and secures a social political order, which

²⁶² Clark, M., *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. p. 83

²⁶³ Nietzsche, F., “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, p. 257.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

²⁶⁶ Lemm, V., *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*, p.131.

is comprised legally and morally binding rules. As Lemm points out, conceptual language which is comprised of absolute, determined and fixed concepts, paves the way to the metaphysical truth that constitutes the social order²⁶⁷. As a result of the procedure of establishing the ‘truth’ from concepts or conceptual language, seemingly rigid and stable social formations emerge. Therefore, the establishment of the ‘truth’ is primordial for and linked to the process of the emergence of civilization.

In Nietzsche’s thought, what enables the establishment of such a structure of the domination of ‘truth’ is its life preserving function. As Lemm points out, in the development of the community and social structures which is a result of the process of establishing the ‘truth’, what cannot be shared – i.e., the singular cases – is ignored for the sake of the generality²⁶⁸. Therefore, there is a deception involved in the human valuation of the ‘truth’, because as Maudemaire emphasizes, there is a connection between the ‘truth’ and practical interests in this process against the assumption that the pure truth is independent of our practical interests²⁶⁹. Nietzsche depicts that by the development of the human intellect as a means of preserving the individual; lying, cheating, deception, wearing a mask etc. become dominant behaviours among human beings so that an honest and pure drive for truth becomes incomprehensible among them²⁷⁰. In other words, the human intellect, which seeks for the ‘truth’, is developed for survival, especially for the survival of the weak²⁷¹. For this reason, the value of the ‘truth’ or knowledge acquired by the intellect is determined by its utility for survival. Rather than being truthful, it is the ‘truth’ in so far as it is useful for the social and political organization of human life. In this regard, under the rule of civilization, the intellect which wills to acquire the ‘truth’ is unfree and imprisoned by the civilization, because it dissimulates to preserve the life form of the group and

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.140.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.142.

²⁶⁹ Clark, M., *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, p. 87

²⁷⁰ Nietzsche, F., “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, p. 254.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

functions as a tool for the preservation of society. In conclusion, Nietzsche criticizes the institution of ‘truth’ which is, thereby, at the origin of the foundation of society as a lie and an ideology rather than being the pure and honest truth which promises greater health and future life²⁷².

In this connection, the ‘pure and honest drive for truth’ first leads to the critique of the institutionalized ‘truth’. To put it another way, the affirmation of a plurality of singular truths contests the institution of ‘truth’ according to which we ought to live. Then, the ‘pure and honest drive for truth’ seeks a channel or a new area which it finds in myth and art²⁷³. Through these new areas, the intellect can reveal its artistic drive to create artistic metaphors, which deceive without harm. With this liberated drive, the intellect can play with concepts by smashing, jumbling up and ironically reassembling them, so it can escape from this binding and imperative order and transform it into colourful, irregular, delightful and eternally new world of dreams.

Owing to what myth assumes to be the continuous operation of a miracle, the waking day of a people in a state of mythical arousal, e.g. the ancient Greeks, is indeed more like a dream than the day of a thinker under the sobering influence of science. If every tree can speak like a nymph, or a god in the guise of a bull carry off virgins, ... - and the honest Athenian believed this – then anything is possible at any moment, as it is in a dream, and all nature swarms around [human being]... [The intellect] is never more luxuriant, richer, prouder, more adroit and more daring... Now it has thrown off the signs of servitude: while at other times it glumly strained to show a poor individual craving for existence the way and means, or set out like a servant in search of prey and booty for his master, it has now become the master and may wipe the expression of neediness from its face²⁷⁴.

Since our time is remote from the time of myths and return to that time would be the denial of life and would be return to the cruel and the crude²⁷⁵, endeavouring to return would drive us to a more problematic and feeble condition of human

²⁷² Lemm, V., *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*, p. 143.

²⁷³ Nietzsche, F., “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, p. 262.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

²⁷⁵ Lemm, V., *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*, p.14.

beings. However, through examining myths we can find in them new channels and new territories that would lead us to the emancipation of the intellect from its servitude for preservation. In this way, the intellect, the master of deception, cannot be reduced to a tool that merely operates to preserve life. In detail, this emancipation can be obtained by the prioritization of primary and creative ways of engaging with the world – in other words, the prioritization of intuition – as ancient Greeks did. In the guidance of intuitions, there is no way that leads to the realm of abstract structures and schemes. For the liberated intellect concepts become toys, which are smashed, ironically reassembled, joined with the most alien elements and words are not made for concepts²⁷⁶. That is to say, “[the human being] speaks in nothing but forbidden metaphors and outrageous combinations of concepts, in order to live up to the impression of the powerful present intuition in a creative manner”²⁷⁷. In this way, the human being, in its aesthetic relationality, can release itself from the domination of civilization and preponderant utilitarian side of the society – i.e., self-preservation. Therefore, by the powerful present intuition in a creative manner, as in art, the human being can affirm the difference and the singular so that it can affirm its continuity with other beings and affirm life itself.

As a consequence, for Nietzsche, the intellect, under the domination of the drive for metaphysical truth, leads us to a weak form of life in which for the sake of generality the singular is forgotten and subjected to violence. On the other hand, the intellect, which is emancipated from its servitude for the metaphysical truth – i.e., the foundation of society and civilization – by prioritization of intuition, creates “forbidden metaphors and outrageous combinations of concepts”²⁷⁸, as art does, under the guidance of the powerful and present intuition so that in its creative manner the intellect is oriented to create a new and healthy

²⁷⁶ Nietzsche, F., “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, p. 263.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.263.

form of life which affirms the singular, the difference and which enables human beings to affirm the continuity with other beings.

4.9. The Hypertrophy of the Sense of History

Nietzsche, by using words about the body, shows that human beings have lost their instinct or sense of history in the course of the development of civilization. Life demands, on the one hand, forgetting, which requires a great deal of strength, a delimited reason and a degree of unconsciousness, but on the other, an awareness of the past. However, the hypertrophy of the sense of history²⁷⁹ – i.e., an excess knowledge of history about the past which is more than one can possibly digest – which forces human beings and culture to treat the things in the past as compendiums of events so that the memory of human being has become preponderant instinct.

The reason is that [she] has lost and destroyed [her] instincts and, having lost [her] trust in the 'divine animal', [she] can no longer let go the reins when [her] reason falters and [her] path leads [her] through deserts. Thus the individual grows fainthearted and unsure and dares no longer believe in himself: [she] sinks into [her] interior depths, which here means into the accumulated lumber of what [she] has learned but which has no outward effect, of instruction, which does not become life²⁸⁰.

If historical knowledge has a preponderant role and dominates a culture or an individual, their creative powers – in other words, the plastic powers – diminish. The hypertrophy of the historical sense imposes limits on the unhistorical elements and prevents human beings from working on new things so that without the unhistorical condition which human beings strive and desire for, no painter will paint her picture, no people will attain freedom and most importantly, no

²⁷⁹ The hypertrophy of the sense of history means an excess of history, which is more about the past than the human being can possibly digest.

²⁸⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, Tr. Reginal J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of the History for Life', V, p.84.

great historical event takes place which rises as a suprahistorical vantage point²⁸¹. With an excess knowledge or truth of the past, human beings have become ‘walking encyclopaedias’ – all the values have become constricted into content but they stand without the binding and cover²⁸². Nietzsche, thus draws attention to the enormous growth of the positivist knowledge about the past. More material is available to people than they could possibly digest. The material lays on the stomachs of people heavily so that it leads to ‘lack of style’²⁸³, which directs them to a decadent culture. When a person cannot digest or take in historical knowledge, her inner and outer selves differ and are no longer in a congruity or harmony. The forms people impose on their artistic production in this way – by borrowing from the past which is considered as a storage – are no longer connected to people’s inner selves. “Knowledge, consumed for the greater part without hunger for it and even counter to one’s own needs, now no longer acts as an agent for transforming the outside world but remains concealed within a chaotic inner world”²⁸⁴. Therefore, this hypertrophy of historical sense reveals ‘eunuchs’²⁸⁵ which do not have the capability to produce new forms.

In this way, all other instincts of human beings are expelled by history and the human animal has been transformed into a kind of being which is a mere shadow and *abstractis*. No one tries to be as she is, but sails under false colours so that it masks itself as a cultivated human being, a scholar, a politician etc., in so called civilized societies. Universal education based on this understanding culminates the excess of historiography, which causes more history and events that the human being cannot surmount. Since, self-restrained knowing leads to no action, human being only thinks, writes and speaks about history but no one dares to fulfil the philosophical law in himself and no one lives philosophically so that the present-day universal education teaches human beings to deceive themselves

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I, p.64.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, IV, p.79.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, I, p.64.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, IV p.78.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, V, p.84.

and thereby become a walking lie – as Nietzsche says, they have become thinking-, writing-, and speaking-machines²⁸⁶. Therefore, as Nietzsche points out, there are no personalities to be seen²⁸⁷. Individuality has been lost and there has are free personalities.

In producing this effect, history is the antithesis of art: and only if history can endure to be transformed into a work of art will it perhaps be able to preserve instincts or even evoke them²⁸⁸.

Life has been dominated by knowledge so that maturity and congruity of personalities of human beings are of no importance. Under these circumstances, society demands from human beings to be ready for employment as soon as possible. Human beings are in factories before they are mature.

Some birds are blinded so that they may sing more beautifully; I do not think the [human beings] of today sing more beautifully than their grandfathers[/mothers], but I know they have been blinded²⁸⁹.

Civilized society has been demanding the labour of the greatest common utility but individuals in civilized society have become part of the mob and shared its needs. As Nietzsche states, 'the words 'factory', 'labour market', 'supply', 'making profitable', and whatever auxiliary verbs egoism now employs, come unbidden to the lips when one wishes to describe the most recent generation of [human beings] of learning'²⁹⁰. Therefore, the individual at this age – i.e., the human being of learning – has been descended to the level of the mob.

In this connection, the history has been writing from the standpoint of the masses or brotherhood and, as Nietzsche states, human beings try to derive laws that govern masses from the needs of these masses²⁹¹. The reason is to exploit others who are outside of these masses or brotherhood – non-brothers. In this way,

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, V, p.85.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, V, p.84.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, VII, pp.95-96.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, VII, p.97.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, VII, p.99.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, IX, p.113.

the mass drives are regarded as universal and the laws that are claimed to be of history of the human being are actually the laws of the great masses. As a result, the human being discovers its egoism, egoism of the masses and of the individuals in these masses. As Nietzsche points out that one egoism – an individual one or belongs to a group – studies history and becomes acquitted with the earlier imprudent egoism of masses. In this course, the world system of egoism devolves upon the state: that one egoism becomes “the patron of all the prudent egoisms”²⁹². Thereafter, it has a role to protect all the prudent egoism with its military and police forces. In this state, the strongest instincts and desire of youth – its defiance, unselfishness and fire – are suppressed and regressed to mature and counter-desire to be useful, ready, mature and quickly for the civil society and thereby, with the establishment of civilization, all individuals become old aged. Human beings that are raised in this situation become speedily employable human of science and thereby stand aside from life. Therefore, the process of civilization has anti-natural results such that it prevents the human being from feeling and acting *unhistorically*.

In conclusion, the process of civilization which is the excess knowledge – especially with excess knowledge of history – which attacks the youthfulness or youthful vigour – in other words, life’s plastic power. In this sense, “[history] no longer knows how to employ the past as a nourishing food”²⁹³ and human life becomes sick in civil society. Nietzsche closes his *Second Untimely Meditations* not with a proposed civilization which would stand in opposition to our own, decadent one, but rather with a call to forces of culture, which represent critical moments within this civilization. Nietzsche discusses unhistorical – e.g., the art and the power of forgetting – against today’s scientific understanding which treats things as eternal and, which thus hates forgetting– and suprahistorical forces which have the character of stable and towards art and religion as critical

²⁹² *Ibid.*, IX, p.114.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, X, p.120.

moments or antidotes of our decadent civilization²⁹⁴. Therefore, instead of the domination of excess knowledge which annihilates life so that annihilates itself with life, Nietzsche purports that these critical forces which are embodied in the figures of the artist, the philosopher and the saint and which represents the only possibilities of the rebirth of tragic culture in antagonistic relation with the civilization in today's societies.

4.10. The Conclusion of Nietzsche Chapter

In conclusion, the human being today is a sick animal which has become deep, self-conscious and guilty instead of superficial, unconscious and innocent. The value hierarchy has been turned around. As illustrated, what was before good - the impulses, drives of the human animal - is now evil and what was before bad - unhappy resentment is now good. For Nietzsche, this outcome is the triumph of the slave in the history of civilization. Thus, the civilization has an order, which, on one side, ensures the preservation of the weak, and, on the other, confines the strong human animal. The human being, on the other hand, has become more intelligent, calculating, clever and crafty. However, the human being has a fictitious relation with the world, and today, human being, including the weak, is sick and discontent - suffers from its own guilt for which there is no penance in this world. Moreover, the faculties such as consciousness, the faculty of promising are achieved and acquired later in the history of the human being so that they are surplus comparing to human drives. In this regard, they are more prone to make error and, thereby, must be held in check by human drives and instincts.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Both Nietzsche and Freud consider the emergence and the development of civilization as dynamic processes. Nietzsche gives the account of these processes with the struggle of forces, *Noble* and *Slave*, which are interpretations of *the Will to Power* that is life itself. In accordance with Nietzsche's understanding, Freud gives the account of these processes with the struggle between two drives, *Eros* and *Thanatos*, which are inherent in life and construct the life itself. Both philosophers construe the constitution of the human being, as a result of the struggle. However, in Freud's theory, organic life arises out of the inorganic by external effects so that drives, which aim to reach the inorganic life, i.e., death, are reactions to this external effect. In addition, these drives are not the source of change and difference; they are responses to these changes and alterations made by the external. There are two major problems in Freud's understanding. First, Freud assigns more primordial role to the inorganic and the external influence that give rise to the organic. In this sense, the organic (accident) is conditioned by the inorganic and the external (substance). Thus, Freud's account preserves the metaphysical tradition that Nietzsche criticizes (as discussed in 4.1 in detail). In addition to that, the conservative drives, which comprise life, are in opposition to change and difference, which are thereby not affirmed in his account. Second, life whose ultimate aim is the inanimate state – i.e., the inorganic, has a purpose or final cause. Thus, in Freud's understanding, life is a teleological life. In contrast, in Nietzsche, the notions of becoming, differentiation are considered as positive principles of production. The tensional dynamics – i.e., the struggle of forces or the will to power – is a pathos from which becoming and effecting emerge and which leads to the differentiation of forces themselves first.

Nevertheless, they both see a parallelism between the constitution of the human being and the emergence of civilization. In this context, the process of internalization is crucial in both understandings. According to Freud's account, in

parallel with Nietzsche's understanding, the development of the intellect – i.e., the emergence of the ego – takes place as a result of the first internalization. By the internalization of the effects of the external, the ego arises out of the id as a representative of the external world. In this context, in the process of the emergence of the superego, the child internalizes the father, because the child cannot overcome the prohibitions of this authoritative figure. By internalization of this figure, the human being creates a sense of guilt that appears against its own natural drives and passions. As a result of the repetition of the oedipal complex, the cultural superego emerges and sets its own ideals and demands which regulates the relationship between human beings and represses their instinctual tendencies. In Nietzsche's narrative, drives that cannot overcome external prohibitions cause suffering and give pain to human beings and then turn inward. The pain and suffering are also interiorized so that *bad conscience* emerges. *Bad conscience* is a kind of sense of guilt that the human being feels because of its natural instincts. Therefore, for both thinkers, the civil order based on restriction of our drives, passions and instincts is constituted.

Nietzsche in concordance with Freud, claims that our moral capacities and other features of the human being such as conscience, free will, and responsibility have a history and a genealogy instead of treating them as pre-given, contrary to the understanding of Rousseau which considers the human animal as good and moral in the state of nature. In this regard, he ventures not only to demonstrate the emergence of conditions, which forms the basis for the social contract, but also to interrogate the value of these conditions. In other words, the individual which takes part in the social contract is historically, gradually and materially constituted, not pre-defined or pre-given, as in Hobbes' understanding. As discussed in detail, the human being throughout the development of civilization has been altered in accordance with the transformation of the drives which comprise her. Therefore, the human being originates from her animality and the demands of life. Nietzsche's critique of morality and Freud's diagnosis of neurosis

are on the very same page in that they both point to the mechanisms of debt and guilt underlying the contractual relations.

For Nietzsche, health consists in spontaneous or impulsive thought and action which is engendered by the function of unconscious regulative drives. The drives which cannot expend themselves, in the last instance lead to a disturbance in the body - namely ill will. In accordance with this perspective, Freud also speaks of a pathogenic reminiscence caused by undischarged or suppressed energetic reactions, which give rise to neurosis and other mental illnesses, such as traumatic hysteria.

In conclusion, both Freud and Nietzsche consider that the emergence of civilization is problematic. They both suggest a philosophy of health in order to overcome the problematic situation of the human being. Their solutions to this problematic process are seemingly distinct. For Freud, the control of instinctual drives through reason – i.e., a rational ego – can reinstate the health of the struggle between drives. Nietzsche asserts that instinctual forces should be embraced and freed from a constricting rationality. However, neither Freud nor Nietzsche claims that reason or the drives should dominate the other. Freud points out that psychoanalysis has the potential to provide the means to manage the vicissitude of experiences in childhood so that the human being can have a healthy instinctual life. In other words, by embracing the helplessness of the human being in her childhood through psychoanalytical education, the human being can embrace her drives and the struggle of drives so that the construction of a new superego, which is not self-destructive or strictly repressive, is possible. Thus another type of civilization that does not cause discontentment among human beings is possible. Nietzsche also evaluates the internalization of drives critically and points out that the human being must affirm its animality in order to overcome slave morality. However, Nietzsche does not claim that this affirmation is only the affirmation of the animal side of the human being. On the contrary, it is the affirmation of all dynamics of life – i.e., the tension between animal and human sides.

From this perspective, both Freud and Nietzsche strive to provide an understanding that upholds the affirmation of all the dynamics of life. In contrast to Freud's rational approach, psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic education for the affirmation of life, Nietzsche, as discussed in section 4.8., demonstrates that an artistic interpretation of life or an artistic way of life enables the human being to affirm all the dynamics of life. Consequently, both thinkers draw attention to the same problematic aspects of civilization and the human being in civilization. However, their prescriptions for this same problem, although both aim the same consequences, are distinct from each other.

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TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY

UYGARLIĞIN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞINA İLİŞKİN ANLATILAR HAKKINDA KRİTİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME: NIETZSCHE VE FREUD

Bu Yüksek Lisans tezinde, izlerinin antik düşünceye kadar takip edilebilen fakat açıkça modern düşünürler, özellikle Hobbes ve Rousseau, tarafından ele alınan uygarlığın ortaya çıkışı üzerine anlayışlar incelenecektir. İlk olarak Hobbes ve Rousseau'nun uygarlığın gelişimi üzerine anlatıları sunulacak ve sonra bu açıklamaların eleştirisini kendiliğinden içeren Nietzsche'nin ve Freud'un anlayışları gösterilerek sorunsallaştırılacaktır. Bu düşünürlere bir arada yoğunlaşılmasının bir başka sebebi de bu düşünürlerin uygar toplum öncesi varsayımsal bir durumu betimlemeleri ve uygar toplumun ortaya çıkışından sonra insanın durumunun hesabını vermeye çalışmalarıdır. Ardından, Nietzsche'nin ve Freud'un uygarlığın ortaya çıkışının insanın değişimi ile ilgili olarak dinamik bir süreç olduğuna dair bir okuma önerilmeye çalışılacaktır. Nietzsche'nin anlayışında 'soylu' ve 'köle' kuvvetleri arasındaki mücadeleye, yani *agon*'a, Freud'un anlayışında ise ölüm ve yaşam dürtüleri arasındaki antagonizmaya yoğunlaşarak; onların uygarlığın ortaya çıkışı hakkındaki açıklamalarına, *sans telos* olan insanın değişimi bağlamında odaklanılacaktır. Son olarak Freud'un anlayışının Nietzsche'nin düşüncesinden ne ölçüde ayrıldığı tartışılacaktır.

İnsan topluluklarının, siyasal yapıların – genel olarak uygarlığın – kökeni hakkındaki merak dinsel, felsefi ve politik soruşturmaların kalbinde yer alır. Pek çok düşünür uygarlığın ortaya çıkışı ve gelişmesine yoğunlaşmış olsa da ancak çok az bir kısmı, Freud ve Nietzsche kadar, bu konu hakkında düşünce tarihinin gidişatını değiştirmiş ve günümüz uygarlığına ışık tutabilmiştir. Bu düşünürler düşünce dünyasına ve yaşam şeklimize çok önemli ve orijinal fikirler sunmuş olsalar da belli bir geleneği miras almışlardır. Bu geleneğin başlangıcı antik

düşünceye kadar uzansa da uygarlığın doğusu üzerine sorular modern dönemde – özellikle Hobbes’un *Leviathan*, Rousseau’nun *İnsanlar Arasındaki Eşitsizliğin Kaynağı* ve Locke’un *Yönetim Üzerine İkinci İncelemesi*’nde - açık bir şekilde ele alınmış ve tartışılmıştır. Bu önde gelen düşünürler; Hobbes, Rousseau ve Locke uygarlığın ve uygar toplulukların ortaya çıkmaları için gerekli önkoşulların nasıl olabileceğini sorgulamışlardır. Böylelikle, insanın doğa durumundan uygarlık durumuna geçişi sırasında değişimleri gösteren anlatılar yaratmışlardır. Bu geleneği miras alarak Freud ve Nietzsche varsayımına dayanan anlatılarıyla ele almış yalnızca insanın uygar toplumlardan önceki durumunu değil, aynı zamanda insanın uygar toplumların oluşmasından sonraki durumunun hesabını da vermeye çalışmıştır. Böylelikle bu düşünürlerin doğa durumuna varsayımına dayanan yaklaşımları onların anlatılarını ortak bir zeminde inceleme imkânı vermiştir.

Bu bağlantıyla, bu tezde Rousseau’nun ve Hobbes’un uygarlığın kökeni üzerine anlatılarının ve anlayışlarının Nietzsche ve Freud tarafından yapılan eleştirileri ayrıntılarıyla ele alınacaktır. Hobbes ve Rousseau doğa durumu ve uygar durumu karşıt kavramlarla ele almıştır. Yalın ve kısa bir şekilde söylemek gerekirse, Hobbes doğa durumunu kötülükle, uygar toplumları ise iyilikle ilişkilendirirken; Rousseau ise durumun tam tersi olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Hobbes için ilkel yani doğa durumunda insan bireysel olarak kendi hayatını koruma çabası içerisindeyken diğer insanlar için tehdittir ve karşılaşmaları ölüm tehlikesini de beraber getirir. Zira birbirilerine eşit derece tehlike arz eden insanlar benzer arzulara sahiptir ve bu durum benzer nesnelere yönelmelerine yol açmaktadır. Böylelikle aralarındaki çatışma kaçınılmazdır. Bununla beraber insan doğa durumundayken onur ve itibar kazanmak için çaba sarf eder. Hobbes’a göre bu durumdan dolayı insan ahlak sahibi değildir ancak donatıldığı us sayesinde diğer insanlarla sözleşerek güvende olabileceği toplumsal düzene geçer. Böylelikle Hobbes’a göre insan toplum sözleşmesiyle bu barışçıl düzene geçmesi için dürtülerini bastırmış hatta bu dürtülerden vazgeçmiştir. Yani doğa durumunda ahlaksızlığa neden olan dürtüler baskılanarak uygarlık durumunda bu ahlaksızlıktan çıkmanın yolu açılmıştır. Tam tersine, Rousseau için doğa

durumunda insan sadece kendisine yön veren hayvansal dürtüleri ve kendisini diğer hayvanlardan ayıran pasif bazı yetileri vardır. Öncelikle burada Rousseau'nun anlatısına içkin kendinden önceki anlatıların eleştirisi vardır. Hobbes için verili kabul edilen pek çok yeti Rousseau için uygarlığın oluşumu sürecinde ortaya çıkmış ya da gelişmiştir. Ve yine Hobbes'un anlayışını aksine onur ve itibar gibi tutkular doğa durumundaki insan için bir şey ifade etmemektedir. Yani insan doğa durumunda saf ve masumdur. Rousseau için pasif bir yeti olan us uygarlık sürecinde gelişmiştir ve bu yetinin gelişimiyle beraber insanlar toplum sözleşmesi fikrine ulaşırlar. Fakat toplum sözleşmesiyle beraber ortaya çıkan yeni düzende ise insan onur, itibar ve kendini diğer insanlardan üstün tutacak şeylerin tutkusu peşinde koşmaya başlar. Bu, insanlar arasında eşitsizliğe sebep olur. Böylelikle Rousseau için insan uygarlığın doğuşuyla birlikte ahlaksızlaşır. Yani iki düşünür, birbirilerine zıt bir biçimde de olsa, doğa durumu ve uygar toplum durumunu dolayumsuz bir karşıtlık içerisinde ele almışlardır. Nietzsche'nin ve Freud'un anlayışları incelenerek, bu tezde, insanın değişiminin nasıl bu dolayumsuz karşıtlık içeren anlatılar dışında incelenebileceği gösterilecektir.

Ne Hobbes ne de Rousseau ahlakın değerini sorgulamaya ya da anlamaya çalışmamıştır. İki düşünür de ahlaklı insan ve ahlaklı toplumu verili, belirli ve değişmez şeyler olarak ele almışlardır. Diğer bir deyişle, iyi ve kötü kavramları iki düşünür için önceden belirlenmiş ve değişmez anlamlara sahiptir. Ve iki düşünür için de toplumsal yaşamın ve bireysel yaşamın nihai amacı ahlaklı yaşam olmalıdır. Fakat hem Freud hem de Nietzsche için uygarlaşma süreciyle kaynaşmış olan ahlakın kendisi günümüz insanının mutsuzluğunun ve hoşnutsuzluğunun temel kaynaklarından birisidir. Kendilerinden önce gelen düşünürlerin ahlakın yaşam için değerinin sorgulamadığını iddia eder. Bunun yanında, Hobbes ve Rousseau için farklılık yerine eşitlik ulaştırılması gereken nihai amaçlardan biri olarak ele alınmıştır. Yani farklılığı ve farklılaşmayı olumlamak yerine ikisi de aynıya, eşit olana ulaşmaya çalışmış, farklı olanı ise kötü ile ilişkilendirmişlerdir.

Hobbes'un ve Rousseau'nun anlayışlarının aksine Nietzsche ve Freud için sabit ve değişmez iyi ve kötü sıfatları yoktur. İkisi için de 'iyi' ve 'kötü' kavramları uygarlığın doğuşu ve gelişimi sürecinde ortaya çıkmış ve değişmiştir. Yani bu ahlak kavramlarının da bir tarihi ya da Nietzsche'nin terimiyle bir soykütüğü vardır. Freud'a göre uygarlık, antagonist dürtülerin, yani yaşam (*Eros*) ve ölüm (*Thanatos*), ilişkisi sonucu insanın ruhsal oluşumu ve değişimi ile ilişkili olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Freud'un Darwin'in varsayımını genişletmesi ve dönüştürmesi sonucu ilkel kabile mitine dayanan yeni bir anlatı ortaya koyması ve bu anlatıyla birlikte insanın ruhsal yapısının değişimini ele alması onu öncüllerinden ayırmıştır. Zira bu anlatısıyla insanın ruhsal aygıtının ahlakla ilgili olan son bölümünün, yani süperegonun, uygarlığın gelişimi sürecinde nasıl ortaya çıktığının ve geliştiğinin hesabını vermektedir. Yani, Freud başlangıçtan beri var olan bir ahlak kapasitesinin olmadığını aksine bu kapasitenin uygarlığını doğuşuyla eş zamanlı olarak organik yaşamı oluşturan yaşam ve ölüm dürtülerinin ilişkisi içerisinde ortaya çıktığını ve geliştiğini iddia eder. Freud için uygarlığın ortaya çıkışında temel olan suçluluk duygusudur. Bu da en temel düzeyde ölüm ve yaşam dürtülerinin karşıtlığında kendini gösterir. Örneğin ödipus kompleksini ele aldığımız zaman suçluluk duygusu erkek çocuğun babaya karşı duyduğu ikircikli duygulanımında kendini gösterir. Erkek çocuk yaşam dürtülerinden cinsel dürtülerinin baba tarafından bastırılması sonucu babaya karşı nefret duyguları beslese de babanın güçlü konumuna özenir ve hatta ona karşı bir hayranlık besler. Babaya karşı duyduğu bu zıt duygularından, sevgi ve nefret duygularından, ötürü çocuk suçluluk hisseder. Babayı öldürmeyi isteyecek kadar çok olan nefret duygusu ona karşı hissettiği sevgi duygusuyla karşılaşınca bu nefret duygusundan ötürü çocukta bir tür suçluluk duygusu oluşur. İlkel kabilede ise babayı öldüren erkek çocuk grubunun babaya karşı olan nefreti son bulmuştur. Böylelikle, babaya karşı duyulan sevgi çocuklarda aşılabilir bir suçluluk duygusuna neden olmuştur. Çocuklar babanın koyduğu kuralları kendi kabilelerinin kuralları olarak benimsemiş ve babayı bu şekilde kurumsallaştırmışlardır. Yani suçluluk duygusunun yoğunlaşmasıyla birlikte insan dürtülerinden vazgeçmeye çabalar ve uygar toplumun temeli olan kurallara uymaya çabalamaktadır. Bu vazgeçişin – ya

da ilkel kabileyi kuran babanın kurallarının – idealleştirilmesiyle birlikte dürtülerden arındırılmış ‘saf’ bir tanrı imgesi oluşur. Bundan dolayıdır ki neredeyse bütün dinler dürtülerden sakınmayı ahlaklı yaşamın önkoşulu olarak kabul eder. Sonuç olarak, Freud’un anlatısına göre, uygarlığın temelinde ilk olarak saldırganlık dürtüsünün içselleşmesi yatar. Fakat içselleştirilen saldırganlık dürtüsüyle birlikte suçluluk duygusu insanı dürtülerine göre hareket ettiği her durumda vicdanıyla cezalandırır. Bu kuralların toplumsal kurallara dönüşümüyle birlikte insanın huzursuzluğu ve mutsuzluğu kaçınılmaz hale gelir.

Freud için bireyin gelişimi ile uygarlık süreci arasında paralellik vardır. Yani Freud’un uygarlık teorisi aslında onun psikoloji teorisinde köklenir ve gelişir. Tarihsek değişimler aslında bireyin değişimleriyle paraleldir. Freud bunu uygarlığın süperegosu ile bireyin süperegosunun ortak kökenden gelmesiyle açıklar. Nasıl ilkel babanın ölmesiyle birlikte birey düzeyinde süperego oluşur, toplum düzeyinde ise büyük, etkili bir liderin ölmesiyle uygarlığın süperegosu oluşur. Başka bir deyişle, toplumun otoritesi bireyin vicdanı ve bilinçdışı tarafından kendi ahlakı gibi içselleştirilir. Hatta Freud daha ileri giderek, uygarlık süreci ve bireyin gelişimi arasında soyolojikal bir ilişki olduğunu iddia eder. Bir başka deyişle çocukluk çağında gerçekleşen deneyimler insanlığın deneyimleriyle ilişkilidir. Zira yaşanılan ve unutulduğu sanılan geçmiş deneyimler aslında bastırılmış ve bilinçdışına aktarılmıştır. Böylelikle insan eski nesillerin yaşamış olduğu deneyimleri, bilincinde olmadığı anı izleri olarak ruhsal yapısında tutmaya devam etmiştir. Benzer deneyimleri yaşadığında ya da bu eski deneyimleri tetikleyen şeylerle karşılaştığında bu eski deneyimler bilince gelir. Örneğin defalarca tekrarlanan ödipal kompleksi, baba kompleksi ya da baba katli artık güçlü bir anı izi haline gelmiştir ve her ailede gerçekleşmesi muhtemel benzer bir olay ile karşılaşma durumunda hemen aktif hale gelir. Bu bağlamda aslında ruhsal aygıt geçmiş nesillerin anı izleriyle doludur ve yaşayan bir tarih maddesidir. Böylelikle ruhsal aygıtta id içerisinde bulunan bu izler, idin farklılaşması sonucu oluşan süperegonun oluşumu sırasında süperegoya aktarılır. Bu nedenle, aslında toplum ve birey psikolojisi arasında büyük bir boşluk kabulü Freud’a göre

aldatıcıdır. Bu nedenle toplumun süperegosu ve bireyin süperegosu birbiriyle sıkı bir şekilde bağlantılıdır. Bir başka açıdan ise, uygarlığın süperegosu bazı idealler ve taleplerde bulunarak din ya da etik adı altında insanların dürtülerinden vazgeçmelerini ya da bastırmalarını arzular. İnsanın bireysel süperegosu da bu kısıtlamalar ve kurallar sonucunda oluşur ve değişime uğrar. Böylelikle uygarlığın gelişimi ile birlikte ortaya çıkan bu kısıtlamalar, insanın huzursuzluğunun ve mutsuzluğunun kaynaklarından biridir.

Uzun ve entelektin gelişmesiyle birlikte, Freud'a göre, insan, dürtülerin çatışmasını kontrol altına alabileceği ya da sağlıklı bir şekilde ilgilenebileceği duruma gelecektir. Diğer bir deyişle, çocuklukta içselleştirilen ve yetişkinlikte hoşnutsuzluk yaratan saldırganlık dürtüsüyle psikanalitik bir eğitimden geçen insan daha sağlıklı bir şekilde ilgilenebilecektir. Böylelikle, Freud, psikanalizin ya da psikanalitik eğitimin insanın çocukluğundaki acizliğini olumlayacağını ve nevrozu ya da diğer ruhsal hastalıkları minimize edebileceğini iddia eder. Zira psikanaliz ile insan, dürtülerini ne katı bir şekilde kısıtlamalarla ne de başıboş bir şekilde bırakır. Böylelikle insan hem dürtülerini hem de doğal durumdan itibaren geçirdiği değişimi benimseyebilir.

Nietzsche için tartışmanın odak noktası onun kuvvetler arası süregiden yaratıcı mücadele (*agon*) – özellikle 'soylu' ve 'köle' kuvvetlerin agonistik yapısı – anlayışında yatmaktadır. Kuvvetler arasındaki bu mücadeleyi anlamak için Nietzsche'nin dinamik dünya anlayışı ortaya konmalıdır. Bu dinamik anlayışa göre, bütün hareketler, 'görünümler' ya da 'yasalar' içsel olayların bir semptomudur. Bu içsel olayların kaynağı sabit doğa kuralları değildir. Nietzsche için bu içsel olaylar, kuvvetler ve bu kuvvetleri tamamlayan güç istencidir. Fakat bu güç istenci bir töz ya da bir öz değildir. Belli görüngü dizileri ve birbirini izleyen sonuçlar aslında kuvvetler arasındaki güç ilişkileridir. Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche'ye göre deneyim tek bir kavramla ya da duyguyla kuşatılamayan ve anlaşılabilen, pek çok yüzeyi olan bir oluş dünyasıdır. Nietzsche için güç ilişkileri güçlü ve zayıf kuvvetler arasındadır. Her olaydaki mevzu, bu bağlamda, kuvvetlerin direnme derecesi ve üstün gelme derecesi arasındaki ilişkisidir. Bu

anlayışa göre, bir yasa ya da neden-sonuç ilişkisi yerine farklı güçleri olan elemanlar arasında mücadele vardır.

Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche rasyonelleştirmeden ve duyusal idealleştirmeden arındırılmış fizyolojiye dayanan, iyilik ve kötülüğün ötesinde dürtülerle ve içgüdülerle açıklanabilecek, yeni bir dünya anlayışı ortaya koymaktadır. Bu şekilde, bedenlerin – örneğin sivil toplumun, siyasi toplulukların – eklemlenmesiyle ilişkili olarak ‘efendi’ ve ‘köle’ kuvvetlerin agonistik yapısı ya da mücadelesine odaklanarak uygarlığın ortaya çıkış süreci ve gelişimi açıklanabilir. Böylelikle uygarlığın doğuşu ve gelişimi sırasında insanın geçirdiği değişim basitleştirici karşıt terimlere dayanan bir anlatı yerine, şeyler arasındaki çatışma, anlaşmazlık, farklılık ve farklılaşma ile anlaşılabilir.

Nietzsche’nin anlatısıyla tarih boyunca ‘efendi’ ve ‘köle’ tipolojilerinin ya da kişisiz-oluşlarının değişimine dayanarak, reaktif bir bellek yetisi olan ve ilk sözleşmecî ilişkilerin temelini oluşturan *istencin belleğinin* hesabını verir. Doğal ve aktif olan, yeni deneyimlere imkân sağlayan ve böylece sağlıklı olan, kayıtsızlık ya da unutkanlık yetisi acı dolu deneyimlerin, ya da ehlileştirme ve eğitim (*mnemo-technique*), sonucunda bu yeni belleğin, *istencin belleğinin*, tahakkümü altına girer. Bu yeni bellek yetisiyle birlikte insanlar birbirine söz verebilir ve yerine getirmedikleri sözlerden ötürü karşısındakine borçlanabilir. Yani alacaklı ve verecekli ilişkileri borçlu durumda olmanın (*Schuld*) yanı sıra suçlu olma durumunu (*Schuld*) da beraberinde getirmiştir. Böylelikle alacaklı borcunu alamadığı zaman borçlu suçlu duruma düşmüştür. Yani borçlu olma durumu artık psikolojik ve ahlaki bir kavram haline dönüşmüştür. Toplumsal düzeyde ise bu durumun yasalaştırılması alacaklının alacağına karşı borçlunun ceza çekmesi anlamına gelmiştir. Yani alacaklının aktif saldırganlık dürtüsü, reaktif hınca (*ressentiment*) dönüşmüştür. Bu durumda reaktif değerler uygarlığının doğuşu sırasında egemen olmuşlardır. Diğer bir deyişle doğal dürtülerin engellenmesi bireysel düzeyde kara vicdan ve suçluluk duyguları, toplumsal düzeyde ise reaktif değerlerin insanlar arasında egemen olmasına neden olur. Nietzsche bu durumun hâkim durum haline gelmesini köle ahlakının zaferi

olarak yorumlar. Zira soylu ve aktif olan dürtüler ve yetiler yerini yapay ve reaktif yetilere ve algılara bırakmıştır. İnsan hastalıklı bir hale gelmiş çünkü insanın önceden iyi kabul edilen doğal dürtülerinin yerini onu mutsuz ve hoşnutsuzluğa yönlendiren hınç duygusu almıştır. Böylelikle insan doğa ile aldatıcı ve suni bir ilişkilene içine girmiştir. Çünkü bugün zayıflığa, huzursuzluğa ve sağlıksıza yol açan değerler baskın hale gelmiş, insan kefareti olmayan bir suçluluk duygusuyla baş başa kalmıştır. Başka bir deyişle, insanın hayvansal yanı bastırılmış ve dışlanmış, yerine hakikat ve bilgi baskın değerler haline gelmiştir. Bu noktada Nietzsche hakikat ve bilginin peşinde koşan insan yetilerinin, usun ve belleğin, hata yapmaya daha elverişli olduğunu ve dürtüler tarafından sürekli kontrol altında tutulması gerektiğine işaret etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, uygarlığın gelişiminde, problemlili olan hakikate dayalı bir sistem ve insanın sindiremeyeceği aşırılıkta bir bilgi – özellikle tarih bilgisi – talep edilmeye başlanmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, hem Nietzsche hem de Freud uygarlığın doğuşunu ve gelişimini dinamik bir süreç olarak ele almaktadırlar. Nietzsche bu sürecin hesabını ‘efendi’ ve ‘köle’ kuvvetlerinin – yani güç istencinin yorumlarının – mücadelesi anlayışı ile vermektedir. Freud ise bu süreci iki dürtünün, *Eros* ve *Thanatos* dürtülerinin, mücadelesi olarak ele almaktadır. İki filozof da insanın oluşum sürecini bir çeşit mücadelenin sonucu olarak düşünmektedirler. Fakat Freud’un anlayışına göre, organik yaşam inorganik olandan dışsal etkiler sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır. Bundan dolayı, bu ilk ortaya çıkışta oluşan gerilimden meydana gelen dürtüler organik yaşamı oluşturmakla beraber inorganik olana dönmeye çabalamaktadır. Yani bu dürtüler değişimin ve farkın kaynağı değil, dışsal etkiyle meydana gelen bu değişime karşı olan tepkilerdir. O zaman Freud’un teorisinde iki büyük problem vardır. İlk olarak, Freud için inorganik olan ve dışsal etkiler organik olanın öncülüdür ve organik olanı meydana getirenlerdir. Bu anlayışla, organik olan inorganik ve dışsal olan tarafından koşullanmıştır. Yani organik olan ile inorganik arasındaki ilişki töz ile ilinek arasındaki gibidir. Freud’un anlayışı, sorunlu olan ve Nietzsche’nin eleştirdiği metafizik geleneği korumaktadır. Buna ek olarak, dışsal etkiye karşı olarak ortaya çıkan, konservatif dürtülerden oluşan

yaşam deęişim, fark, farklılaşma ile karşıtlık içerisinde. Bu anlayış içerisinde fark ve deęişim olunmamaktadır. İkinci olarak, Freud'un anlatısında yaşamın sürekli olarak cansız olana dönme çabası ve inorganik olanı nihai amaç olarak belirlemesi, yaşamın teleolojik, yani erekbilimsel, olduęu anlamına gelmektedir. Tersine, Nietzsche'ye göre oluş, deęişim ve farklılaşma düşünceleri yaratımın ya da üretimin pozitif ilkeleridir. Gerilimli dinamik – dięer bir deęişle kuvvetlerin mücadelesi ya da güç istenci – oluşun ve etkilenmenin ortaya çıktığı ve kuvvetlerin farklılaşmasına yol açan bir arzudur.

Yine de iki anlayışa göre uygar insanın ve uygarlığın ortaya çıkmasında bir paralellik vardır. Bu bağlamda, dürtülerin içselleşmesi iki düşünür için de önem arz etmektedir. Freud'a göre, Nietzsche'nin anlatısıyla paralel olarak, zihnin gelişmesi – ya da egonun gelişmesi – ilk içselleştirme sürecinin sonunda gerçekleşir. Freud'un terimleriyle ifade etmek gerekirse, dış etkilerin içselleştirilmesi sonucu, dış dünyanın bir temsili olarak ego id içerisinde, idden farklılaşarak oluşur. Süperegonun oluşması sürecinde ise çocuk ebeveyni, bu otoriter figürün kısıtlamalarını aşamadığı için ve çocuğun dürtülerini ebeveyn yaşayabildiği için, içselleştirir. Bu içselleştirme sonucunda, insan dürtülerine ve tutkularına karşı, bir çeşit suçluluk duygusu yaratır. Bu ödipal kompleksin sürekli olarak tekrarı sonucunda, kültürel bir süperego ortaya çıkar. Bu kültürel süperego insanların ilişkilerini düzenleyen ve insanların dürtülerini baskılayan, ideallerini ve taleplerini belirler, topluma ve bireylere yerleştirir. Nietzsche'de de aşılamayan dışsal engeller dürtülerin ve itkilerin gerçekleşmemesi sonucunda acıya sebep olur ve içe döner. İçselleşen bu acı doğal dürtülerden dolayı hissedilen bir çeşit suçluluk duygusuna, *kara vicdana*, sebep olur. Bu *kara vicdan* insanın doğal dürtülerinden ve içgüdülerinden ötürü duyduğu suçluluk duygusudur. Sonuç olarak, iki düşünür için de sivil düzel dürtülerin, tutkuların ve içgüdülerin baskılanması, kısıtlanması dayanır.

Nietzsche'ye göre, Freud'un anlayışına da uyan bir şekilde, bizim ahlaki kapasitemizin ve vicdan, özgür irade, sorumluluk alma gibi başka dięer yetilerimizin bir tarihi ve soy kütüğü var. Bunlar, Rousseau'nun düşündüğü gibi

önceden verili değildir. Yani insan doğa durumunda ne iyi ne de ahlaklıdır. Bu bağlamda Nietzsche toplum sözleşmesinin temelini oluşturan koşulları göstermeye çalışmanın yanı sıra bu koşulların değerlerini de sorgular. Başka bir deyişle, toplum sözleşmesinde taraf olan birey aslında tarihsel ve özdeksel olarak kurulmuştur. Hobbes'un anlayışında olduğunun aksine, insan önceden verili ya da önceden tanımlanmış değildir. Ayrıntılı bir şekilde tartışıldığı üzere, uygarlığın değişimi ve gelişimi sürecinde insan da değişime uğramış, onu oluşturan dürtülerde değişim meydana gelmiştir. Bundan dolayı, hayvansallıktan ve yaşamın taleplerinden ortaya çıkmıştır insan. Bu açıdan Nietzsche'nin ahlak eleştirisi ve Freud'un nevroz üzerine tanılması aynı sayfada olup iki düşünür de sözleşmecili ilişkilerdeki borç ve suç mekanizmasına işaret etmektedir.

Nietzsche için sağlık bilinçdışıdaki düzenleyici dürtüler tarafından yaratılan, kendiliğinden, dürtüsel düşünce ve hareketlerdir. Kendini harcayamayan, açılmayan dürtüler son tahlilde bedende rahatsızlığa ve bozulmaya sebep olacaktır. Bu bakış açısıyla uyumlu olarak, Freud'a göre de ruhsal aygıtta nevroza ve diğer ruhsal hastalıklara – travmatik histeri gibi – sebep olan patojenik kalıntılar boşalmamış ya da bastırılmış enerjik reaksiyonlar sonucunda ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Sonuçta, hem Freud hem de Nietzsche için uygarlığın doğuşu problemlidir. İkisi de bu problemin aşılması için bir sağlık felsefesi önerir. Bu problemlili sürece karşı önerdikleri çözümleri ilk bakışta birbirinden çok farklı görünmektedir. Freud için, içgüdüsel dürtülerin us – rasyonel ego – tarafından kontrol edilmesi dürtülerin mücadelesini tekrar sağlıklı bir yerden tekrar kurmayı sağlayabilir. Nietzsche'ye göre ise bu durumdan kurtulmanın yolu içgüdüsel kuvvetlerin benimsenmesinden ve kısıtlayıcı, sıkıştıran rasyonellikten özgürleşmesi ile gerçekleşebilir. Fakat ne Freud ne de Nietzsche usun ya da dürtülerin tek başına tahakküm etmesi gerektiğini iddia eder. Freud psikanalizin çocuklukta yaşanan kararsız deneyimlere müdahale potansiyeline işaret eder. Yani psikanaliz insana bu deneyimleri düzenleyecek ve idare edecek aracı ve yolu sağlayabilir. Başka bir deyişle, psikanalitik eğitimle insan çocuklukta acizliğini benimser ve böylelikle

dürtüleri ve bu dürtülerin mücadelesini de aynı şekilde benimsemenin yolunu açmış olur. Böylece kendini yıkmayan ve katı bir şekilde engelleyici olmayan yeni bir süperegonun kurulması mümkün olur. Bunun sonucunda, insanların huzursuzluğunu ve dürtülerinin bastırılmasında ötürü ortaya çıkan sağlıksız durumu minimuma indiren başka bir uygarlık olası hale gelir. Nietzsche de dürtülerin içselleştirmesi meselesini eleştirir ve insanların köle ahlakını aşmaları için öncelikle kendi hayvansallıklarını olumlamaları gerektiğine işaret eder. Fakat Nietzsche için bu olumlama yalnızca insanın hayvansal tarafını olumlama değildir. Aksine tüm yaşam dinamiklerini – yani hayvansal ve insansal tarafları arasındaki gerilimi – olumlamadır.

Bu bakış açısıyla şu sonuca ulaşırız: Freud ve Nietzsche yaşamın tüm dinamiklerini olumlayan ve benimseyen bir anlayış ortaya koymanın çabası içerisindedir. Freud'un rasyonel yaklaşım tarzından – psikanalizden ya da psikanalitik eğitimden – farklı olarak Nietzsche bu durumun ancak yaşamın artistik ya da estetik bir şekilde yorumlanmasıyla mümkün olacağına işaret eder. Ancak bu şekilde, yaşamın dinamiklerini olumlanabileceği kapı aralanabilir. Toparlamak gerekirse, iki düşünür de uygarlığın aynı problemleri yanlarına dikkat çekmeye çabalar. Fakat bu benzer problemler için farklı reçeteler sunarlar. Gerçi iki düşünür de aynı sonuçları elde etmeye çabalamaktadırlar.

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