THE EMERGENCE OF THE IMMATERIAL SPIRIT THROUGH THE MATERIAL PSYCHE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE SANTAYANA

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ABSTRACT

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Santayana's mature philosophical works depends on the animal faith philosophy locating the action at the centre, which he view as an honest approach for philosophy, and on the realms of being locating matter and essence at the centre. In these works, what initiates the adventure of human being in the world of action or the realm of matter is the fact that s/he has a psyche.

The psyche plays a so active role in the integrity between nature and our actions that her role paves the foundation for the emergence of the immaterial spirit. A highly organized psyche within animal conditions is an essential condition for this foundation. Within this context, the most significant concept employed by Santayana is animal faith. The object of

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intent directed by the animal faith and the intuition of essence directed by

psyche play key role for the emergence of the spirit. Although being a

materialist, Santayana is able to deal with spirit in the material existence

without reducing it to the realm of matter on the grounds of animal faith

emerging here. From this point of view, though spirit remains attached to

the conditions of psyche to the end, that Santayana argues that spirit is an

immaterial realm of being without going beyond the boundaries of

materialism is worthy of consideration.

In the light of these considerations, the main question, which the present

study will seek an answer, is that: how does the immaterial spirit through

the material psyche rise in the material existence?

Keywords: Animal Faith, Matter, Essence, Psyche, Spirit.

V

GEORGE SANTAYANA'NIN FELSEFESİNDE MADDİ CAN ARACILIĞIYLA MADDİ OLMAYAN TİNİN DOĞUŞU

HAMDİOĞLU, Yakup Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İNAM Şubat 2015, 161 Sayfa

Santayana'nın olgun dönem eserleri, felsefe için dürüstçe bir yaklaşım olarak gördüğü eylemi merkeze alan hayvani inanç felsefesine ve öz ve maddeyi merkeze alan varlık alanlarına dayanır. İnsanın eylem dünyasında veya madde alanındaki serüvenini başlatan unsur, bu eserlerde, onun bir cana sahip oluşudur.

Can, doğa ve eylemlerimiz arasındaki bütünlükte öyle aktif bir rol oynar ki onun bu rolü maddi olmayan tinin ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlar. Hayvani koşullar içinde yüksek derecede organize olmuş can bu zemin için zorunlu bir koşuldur. Santayana'nın bu bağlamda başvurduğu en önemli kavram hayvani inançtır. Hayvani inancın yönlendirdiği niyetin objesi ve canın yönlendirdiği özün görüsü tinin ortaya çıkmasında kilit rol oynarlar. Santayana, materyalist olmasına rağmen burada beliren hayvani hayata dayanarak tini maddi varoluş içinde madde alanına indirgemeden ele

alabilmiştir. Bu bakış açısı içinde tin, canın maddi koşullarına sonuna kadar

bağlı kalmasına rağmen Santayana'nın maddeciliğin sınırları dışına

çıkmadan onun maddi olmayan bir varlık alanı olduğunu iddia etmesi dikkat

çekicidir.

Bu düşünceler ışığında, bu çalışmanın yanıt arayacağı başlıca soru şudur:

maddi can aracılığıyla maddi olmayan tin maddi varoluş içerisinde nasıl

ortaya çıkmıştır?

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hayvani İnanç, Madde, Öz, Can, Tin.

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To Melisa and Onur Eymen

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Primary Sources

LRI The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. Introduction and Reason in Common Sense.

RE The Realm of Essence: Book First of Realms of Being, 1927.

RM The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being, 1930.

RS The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being, 1940.

SAF Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy.

SELS Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies.

Secondary Sources

AFSL Lachs, John, editor. Animal Faith and the Spiritual Life.

GS Lachs, John. *George Santayana*.

PGS Schilpp, Paul Arthur, editor. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The present study, as its title conveys, is pertinent to the concept of spirit, upon which Santayana bases the material life of psyche. Its aim is to show how his philosophical theories provide a remarkable solution for the emergence of spirit in the material existence. Such an aim requires looking into his comprehensive philosophy, which provides insights into various philosophical problems, from a wider perspective. For this reason, in order to properly understand what Santayana says about the material roots of spirit, his materialism or naturalism, his philosophy of animal faith and his theory of being based on this philosophy should be properly analysed. Unless we manage to carry out this analysis properly, it is impossible to comprehend his claims about the relationship between psyche and spirit. Final purpose of this thesis is, in one sense, to explore the immaterial spirit based on the material life of psyche, which manifests itself in Santayana's philosophical works, on the basis of this analysis.

Although Santayana clearly states that his thoughts are within the borderline of materialism, he is recognized as a perplexing philosopher because he developed an ontology, which follows the lead of his theory of essences, in his mature period works and he employs his own brand of naturalism based on this ontology. However, criticizing philosophers, who undertake the

investigation of any philosophical problem as Santayana, in terms of consistency may not necessarily yield positive results to understand them. The present study, above all, evaluates his philosophical inquiry in this way: As a philosopher, he attempts to explore the life with dead-ends in it, and for him, this idea bears more significance than reaching a consistent philosophy. In my opinion, throughout his philosophical oeuvre, Santayana approached sophisticated philosophical problems with a plain language, and clearly presented arguments, which he developed against those problems. In this perspective, "his proof of a philosophical proposition is usually by analogy rather than logic. This tendency is confusing to philosophers, but to the general reader it is a perpetual source of satisfaction." Santayana does not wish to trail his readers, but wants to encounter and meet them on some points in common. This valuable attitude, which is hard to be understood by the academicians, but which contains both philia and agape, has been one of the most important pillars of philosophical investigation since Ancient Greek. These statements which belong to Dominations and Powers is invaluable for us to understand Santayana's mind:

I am content to stand where honest laymen are standing, and to write as I might talk with a friend in a country walk or sitting at a tavern. Otherwise I should be undermining the conventional assurance that my readers exist at all, or that reported historical facts about which I am writing.²

Santayana's philosophy offers both naturalist and materialist points of view to the problems of philosophy, so naturalism and materialism are generally intertwined in his works. Those who take an eager interest in philosophy

¹ Howgate, George W., *George Santayana*, A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., New York, 1961, p., 224.

² Santayana, George, *Dominations and Powers*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1995, p., 7.

know well that when the core problems of philosophy cannot be solved anymore, thinking patterns begin to fall under problems. In this sense, it is not possible for the philosophical problems to be free of presuppositions.³ The question whether it is possible to philosophize without any theories is now such a big problem that no one wants to face with it. As in any other parts of life, preferences, in a sense, are also available in this place. We can approach the relationship between naturalism and materialism, presented by Santayana, in this sense. However, he writes these utterances in Scepticism and Animal Faith: "In the past or future, my language and my borrowed knowledge would have been different, but under whatever sky I had been born, since it is the same sky, I should have had the same philosophy."⁴ In addition to this, the most remarkable opening contention of this book provides us with important clues about why he is disposed to philosophize from a naturalistic perspective: "I stand in philosophy exactly where I stand in daily life; I shouldn't be honest otherwise." Actually, his naturalism or materialism points at more than just a philosophical preference. In his materialism, he conceives human beings "in the midst of a vast natural world"6 as living creatures. This means that they are animal organisms, which live in a real habitat, in the nature including their material body and their material action.

Santayana thinks that philosophy takes its initial source from a material starting point. That is to say, the material roots of life provide sufficient

³ For example, the debate over the relationship between appearance and reality is the clearest indicator of this situation. The key question of this discussion is whether the thought forms a concept by itself without perceptual basis. Dualism/materialism or physicalism debate comes into being in this question.

⁴ Santayana, George, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1955, p., x. Hereafter called as SAF.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p., vi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 149.

sources for philosophizing. Though these sources to which Santayana attaches enormous importance does not express any significant change in his career, his terminology exhibits a sort of tendency to a constant change from The Sense of Beauty (1896) to Dominations and Powers (1951). All the same, some scholars have analyzed Santayana's philosophy in two separate periods by giving his naturalistic point of view developed by his works a central role. From this point of view, "the first begins with his *The* Sense of Beauty (1896) and continues through the five volumes of The Life of Reason (1905-1906) until after Santayana's resignation from teaching in 1912." In this period, human creative activity is at the core of his thoughts and his humanistic thoughts come into prominence in his works more dominantly. The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress, which is the prominent work in this period, consists of five books: common sense, science, art, society and religion. Another important work in this period is Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, which consists of a number of papers. "The second period begins with the publication of Scepticism and Animal Faith in 1923 and culminates in the four volumes of The Realms of Being (1927-40)."8 In this period, Santayana presents a fertile ground for his epistemology and ontology. Naturally, there are some differences between these periods with regard to terminology. However, I argue that the changes in his terminology are not radical and rooted enough to cause axial shifts in his philosophical orientation.9

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⁷ Lachs, John, *George Santayana*, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1988, p., 19. Hereafter called as GS.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ In this point, I agree with Lachs. He says that "for the most part, Santayana's ideas remained unchanged through the years." According to him, in Santayana's system, we find "the same thought decked out in different garb, a little like the same actor playing different parts." (Ibid., p., 20-21)

Throughout all of his works, Santayana presupposes that the only reality as the principle of existence is nothing but matter itself which is the matrix or the source of everything. The most significant concept in Santayana's philosophy ranging from the first period works to maturity period works is psyche. This concept, which can be related to the mechanical working of the animal body in the works of his first period *The Sense of Beauty* and *The Life of Reason*, reaches her technical structure as the central concept of his philosophy in *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* and afterwards the works of his mature period. He explains the involvement of living creatures in the material environment with this concept, which emphasizes the role of our active nature as a unified animate center of power within the nature. The power of matter referring to the material roots or the immediate flux, "in which all objects and impulses are given" links our psyche with the natural processes, which is generative of psyche and action in the material environment.

According to Santayana, psyche with her mysterious face darkly present herself in every facet of our experience. This indicates that she is within and at the center of all relationships and involvements ensured between the living organisms and the material world. In his works, Santayana analyses these relationships and involvements of psyche, ensuring the organization of animal life, at different dimensions. His concept of animal faith, which overly comes into prominence in his mature philosophy, and his fourfold ontology, which especially indicates the conceptual framework of his philosophy of animal faith, are directly related to the concept of psyche in this sense. Therefore, the material psyche having a rich content bears great importance for understanding the subtleties of Santayana's philosophy. That

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¹⁰ Santayana, George, *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. Reason in Common Sense*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920, p., 32. Hereafter called as LRI.

is to say, she is the key concept to his claims on naturalism or materialism, thoughts on the realm of values, theory of mind-body, the philosophy of animal faith, and the fourfold ontology. That is the reason that she is formed of different components and these special components open the doors of different opportunities in the life.

In Santayana's philosophy, the most significant opportunity, which psyche offers to the living creatures, is that she provides the emergence of conscious awareness. In order to understand how this opportunity is realized, the material processes behind the adventure of psyche in the material world or the field of action, the concept of animal faith and the realms of being should be accurately understood. Within these processes, psyche expresses herself as a predetermining force of the body's work and consciousness. Santayana calls consciousness, which is tightly connected to the material psyche, as the natural and immaterial spirit, which is "attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total inner difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead."11 Therefore, because the psyche is material and the spirit is immaterial, there emerges the very interesting relationship between psyche and spirit. Although Santayana thinks of them in separate realms, he makes reference to such an expression in order to give mention about the relationship between them: "reciprocal involution." For this natural connection, he writes the following: "the body is an instrument, the mind its function, the witness and reward of its operation." Therefore, spirit doesn't affect the life directly. According to him, it only witnesses to the animal life of psyche. In this regard, the primary aim of the present

¹¹ Santayana, George, *The Realm of Spirit: Book Fourth of Realms of Being*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, p., 18. Hereafter called as RS.

¹² LRI, p., 206.

¹³ Ibid.

study is to investigate how spirit emerges within the adventure of animal psyche in the material world and the nature of the relationship between them.

Santayana claims that the theory of matter and essence argued by him provides solid supports for the compelling relationship between the material psyche and the immaterial spirit. In this perspective, he insists in his argument that spirit actually is impotent and does not play an active role in the material existence because it is closely tied to the material roots. For this reason, in the second chapter, we will investigate how Santayana characterizes the material existence, in which we live, in the light of his materialism. In the third chapter, our focus will be on the living creatures and here, we will evaluate how the concept of animal faith and the material psyche in his system play a role in their life in the material existence. Santayana characterizes the life of spirit in direct proportion to the relationship between psyche and spirit. Here, the fact that spirit, by any means, is not driven by any goal of gaining dominance over the material life of psyche is shown as the demonstration of the impotency of spirit or conscious awareness. In the history of philosophy, the philosophers theorizing on the life of spirit see the prerequisite of its possibility primarily in the separation of pure spirit and the nature. Is it possible to attain the origin and place of spirit in the nature, if this separation does not take place? If possible, Santayana's arguments provide a different way of the life of spirit as a part of the material life of psyche to us. In the last chapter, we will try to exhibit Santayana's theory of the psyche-spirit relationship and how he holds the nature of spirit based on this theory.

CHAPTER II

THE PROMINENCE OF THE EXISTENTIAL REALITY OF THE IMMEDIATE FLUX

2.1. Santayana's Materialist or Naturalist Point of View

2.1.1. The Central Role of the Concept of the Nature

Santayana regards naturalism as a primary system for his philosophical investigation. ¹⁴ In the most general sense, his naturalism can be seen as a criticism of the traditional Western philosophy, especially the idealism in which spirit, mind, self or soul has been presupposed as a preeminent value. In the history of Western Philosophy, especially after the substantial difference between thinking thing (*res cogitans*) and extended thing (*res extensa*) in Cartesian philosophy, material and immaterial processes clearly separated from each other. What lies behind this separation is a general understanding that the immaterial mind has a structure out of the phenomenal existence where we live. To this respect, idealism presents a cosmology, which is based on the idea that this enormous world is created by human mind. Santayana thinks that those who tied to this incredible and fantastic cosmology are facing facts dishonestly, and drift apart from the

¹⁴ "Naturalism is a primary system...." Santayana, George, *Obiter Scripta*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936, p., 214.

truth. In comparison with idealism, Santayana gives the material existence priority: "...I believe, compulsory and satirically, in the existence of this absurd world; but as to the existence of a better world, or of hidden reasons in this one, I am incredulous, or rather, I am critically sceptical..." ¹⁵

It is not wrong to say that philosophical traditions are full of theories, which are hard to be understood, and even close their doors for the ordinary readers. Such theories present technical solutions to almost all points of the human life, the nature and the universe. Santayana does not embrace the tradition, but philosophical problems, and he attempts to find solutions for them on the track of daily practices in the existence of the material world. Hence, concepts such as daily life, common sense, flux of appearances, need, desire, interest, satisfaction etc., which are generally kept in the background by majority of philosophers, have great significance for the conceptual structure that he portrayed. According to him, practice or action marks the life of common sense. In this perspective, for him, common sense rightly regards "nature as the condition of mind and not mind as the condition of nature." This means that experience is not the substance of nature, which is a structure in thought, but the order of nature is the substance prior to experience. Santayana puts:

There is indeed a circle of material events called nature, to which all minds belonging to the same society are responsive in common. Not to be responsive to these facts is simply to be stupid and backward in the arts; those who explore and master their environment cannot help learning what it is.¹⁷

¹⁵ Santayana, George, *Person and Places. The Middle Span. Vol. II.*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1945, p., 155

¹⁶ LRI, p., 104.

¹⁷ Santayana, George, *The Realm of Essence. Book First of Realms of Being*, Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1928, p., vi. Hereafter called as RE.

Santayana presupposes that nature is both impulsive and feeding element of the internal structure of living creatures, so is the key concept for understanding both processes like life, experience, reason, reflection, etc., and different types of facts. It constitutes the principal source of the flux of appearances. It "is then the sum total of its own conditions; the whole object, the parts observed plus the parts interpolated, is the self-existent fact."18 According to him, the immediate flux in material events is the substance to the order of nature and "nature has appropriated the order, the constant conditions, the causal substructure, disclosed in reflection, by which the immediate flux is explained and controlled." For him, this reality, which is deeply embedded in external material world or physical world, has been ignored by idealist philosophers. He never keeps track of the idea that living creatures are natural organism in this natural world. In this world or order, "raw experience, then, lies at the basis of the idea of nature and approves its reality."²⁰ This order ignored by idealists is accurately termed as "the realm of matter" in Santayana's works. He defines his own borderlines based upon this order; and according to this, the life within this order is directed by the very same order.

2.1.2. Living Creatures

Before anything else, Santayana's naturalism or materialism presupposes that there is a common ground existing independently of the human mind, and by means of the subtle state of the inner psychic world, living creatures are conditioned by this ground. The basic grounding of his materialism is

¹⁸ LRI, p., 103.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 126.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 127.

based on both this and the idea that "existence is essentially groundless." Because the material existence is essentially meaningless, the world we find ourselves is irrational, but, according to him, "it is not mad" because we cannot live without assuming a common ground in it.²¹ In his philosophy, this common ground is "a single field of action in which humans must search struggle to find their way."²² Santayana states,

Assuming such a common world, it is easy to see how animals may acquire knowledge of it and may communicate it. Material events will arouse in them intuitions conformable to their several stations, faculties, and passions; and their active nature (since they are animals, not plants) will compel them to regard many of the essences so given in intuition as signs for the environment in which they move, modifying this environment and affected by it.²³

From the perspective of Santayana, going beyond the assumption of the common world so as to search for a ground for the existence results in obtaining numerous fictions, but the material environment is philosophically efficacious for its ground. For him, as for Spinoza, nature has not any plan, so it is in itself morally neutral. However, all the living creatures in living nature need to adapt themselves to their natural environments in order to survive. Our own standards are directly related to our needs and purposes. Santayana puts in the following: "naturally, there is a reason, but not a moral one; for it lies in the physical habit and necessity of things. The reason is simply the propulsive essence of animals and of the universal flux,

²¹ Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed., *The Philosophy of George Santayana*, The Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, Illinois, 1971, p., 505. Hereafter called as PGS.

²² Lachs, John, *On Santayana*, Thomson Wadsworth, the United States of America, 2006, p., 26.

²³ RE, p., vii.

which renders forms possible but unstable, and either helpful or hurtful to one another."²⁴

Upon the question where the place of human is, Santayana answers that human is a product of the nature as well and for this reason his place is the flux like the stars shining in the sky, plants and other animals: "...man is a part of nature and her organisation may be regarded as the foundation of his own..."25 In his philosophy, "man is, first of all and most generally, a body"²⁶, and he believes that we have an irrational and psychophysical ground that accompanies nature, i.e. comes as its part. According to Santayana, "nature and evolution have brought life to the present form"²⁷, so he regards them as the fundamental place of impulse, need and interest and the ground of preferences or judgments. Human body's being a living organism is the sign of nature's influence on the body. Nature's influence is not passive but impulsive as it particularly leads to the experience of pleasure and pain on the animal organism. For Santayana, its impulsive influence motivates the organism to embody specific forms and functions. In this perspective, living creatures do not have a universal principle, which manages their preferences independently from their needs and desires.

Nature presents living creatures environmental conditions, but gaining full control over the nature is beyond their abilities. In order for them to survive, they are always in tendency to fortify their control over the objects within their natural environment by regarding whatever they find propitious in their

²⁴ Santayana, George, *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. Reason in Science*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1921, p., 216.

²⁵ LRI, p., 288.

²⁶ Arnett, Willard E., *Santayana and The Sense of Beauty*, Indiana University Press, 1957, p., 20.

²⁷ LRI, p., 277.

endeavors as good, and whatever they find hostile to them as evil.²⁸ At the end of this adaptation process, the living body converts the nature into an environment in which it produces materials serving in its struggle for survival. In this perspective, Santayana substitutes the concept of living creature for human nature. According to this point of view, we can say that human nature is related to the nature of a single human being in his philosophy because he underlines that there are no universally valid and specific instructions about how we are to order our lives, what we ought to do, and what we should prefer. Consequently, his concept of living creature is a point of view, which does not degrade all human beings in a single concept, but refers to the biological, social and cultural aspects of human life. It puts forward the importance of the diversity of human life on the earth in which each individual needs to focus on his/her own nature. Santayana implies that there seems to be no philosophical problem; on the contrary, this is a general truth about who we are.

2.1.3. Epiphenomenalistic Approach to Mind and Body

Santayana uses a clear literary style in his works, but this clarity brings some vague points together with itself. The reason is that he does not develop his philosophical foundations through knowledge but through mechanism. For this reason, according to him, the body is an organism living in the nature and our active nature is the name of the power enabling the renewal of the bodily organism and the mind-body integration. In the light of these considerations, Santayana insists that we could not talk about the intelligence without giving priority to a material impulse in an animal body. We may define this material impulse as a motivating mechanism, which is indicative of an instinct, a need, an interest, a belief or a habit that

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²⁸ Ashmore, Jerome, *Santayana*, *Art*, *and Aesthetics*, The Press of Western Reserve University, Ohio, 1966, p., 53.

propels the living organism within the natural processes in a certain direction. According to Santayana, instincts are the responses of the organism to the natural impulses in its natural environment. The animal organism converts them into the action. If all organisms including humans did not have a capacity to develop a skill to transform them into activities, they could not survive. On this basis, Santayana asserts that humans or living creatures are not completely dependent on a lack of control in their life. That is, a living creature "looks before and after, he regrets and desires; and the moments in which prospect or retrospect takes place constitute the reflective or representative part of his life, in contrast to the unmitigated flux of sensations in which nothing ulterior is regarded."29 S/he also has the capacity to recall. Reflection is not only the name of the motivation enabling us to imagine our past experiences in our brain but also the ability to change our future on the basis of these experiences. According to Santayana, finding ourselves in the material flux causes us to acquire the ability to act in a goal-directed fashion. In this perspective, the natural impulses are the source of our experiences and preferences. Accordingly, Santayana argues that the mind is not an accessory to life, but vital to it and continues:

The relation of mind to body, of reason to nature, seems to be actually this: when bodies have reached a certain complexity and vital equilibrium, a sense begins to inhabit them which is focused upon the preservation of that body and on its reproduction. This sense, as it becomes reflective and expressive of physical welfare, points more and more to its own persistence and harmony...Nature is reason's basis and theme; reason is nature's consciousness; and, from the point of view of that consciousness when it has arisen, reason is also nature's justification and goal.³⁰

²⁹ LRI, p., 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 205.

Santayana asserts that there is no mystery about the generation of mental facts from the nature since it is their perfect garden. If so, how? Santayana thinks that the human organism is not a structure isolated against the threats that it encounters within its own environment. Its struggle to survive gives it a natural mental faculty that enables it to immediately apprehend simple symbols (e.g. pain and pleasure) and thus to become aware of complex symbols (e.g. sentences and propositions). According to him, concepts of perception, reflection, imagination, comparing and knowing are the different sides of this reality. It shows that the mind is a fruit of natural processes because living organisms are in tendency to adapt their own environment in harmony with the effects of nature on themselves. Correspondingly, Santayana argues that the mind is the first activity of the animal organism in the nature, not the result of the material body, because the details of the material life by which living creatures individualized in one or another organism shape is determined by the nature.

Santayana insists that the natural impulse from the material environment is the opportunity to have mental facts. He counts this functioning of the natural impulse as "a dead end in the causal processes of nature." ³² Because he sees the mind as an impotent outcome of the natural process by underlining the role of these processes within the body, scholars have regarded him The central as an epiphenomenalist. thesis epiphenomenalism is "that all conscious acts are brought into existence by events in the body and that none of them has an effect on itself, on other mental acts, or the physical world."33 It is unquestionable that Santayana adopts epiphenomenalism and he has developed his arguments against the

³¹ *Ibid.*, p., 282.

³² GS, p., 13.

³³ *Ibid.*, p., 90.

mind-body problem within the axis of its central thesis. epiphenomenalism bases on such an argument that gives clues about his materialism. He clearly thinks that mind and body have a mutual interconnection, and it is impossible to talk about one without the other, because they are conditioned by the same root - in other words, the immediate flux or the flux of existence. In this connection, he thinks that the mind, which is the first entelectly of the body, is "a value which accrues to the body when it has reached a certain perfection."³⁴ He also writes "the basis of mind lies in the body's interests than in its atoms." We could not think of both elements in separate fields. Santayana uses the expression "reciprocal involution" to describe the interaction between them. This means that he tends to study on both of these fields by not degrading one to the other. His main objective is to bring the ground, which holds both of them together, into the forefront. This ground is the flux of matter for him and the mind is not the host of the matter within the material body, but its guest. This is the most prominent side of his thoughts regarding the relation between mind and body. That is, the matter cannot, by transposition of its particles, become the mind, and also the mind cannot become its own occasions or determine its own march.³⁶ Santayana's epiphenomenalism here is vital for our understanding of the background of emergence of spirit or consciousness in his system. After dwelling on his theory of essence and matter, we will clearly ask the question how the spirit manifests itself in the material existence.

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³⁴ LRI, p., 206.

³⁵ Santayana, George, *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. Reason in Science*, p., 148.

³⁶ LRI, p., 206.

2.2. The Realm of Essence: Eternal and Impotent Essences

2.2.1. Criticism of Scepticism

Santayana has developed his philosophical arguments against philosophical problems within the axis of a naturalist point of view referring to a philosophical preference that he tries to preserve until the end. For this reason, his arguments do not refer to a simple worldview eliminating the non-responded sides of the philosophical problems, but an *ethos*, which is based on the fundamentals that do not ignore the dynamic or material reality in which we live. This is a philosophical attitude reminding us of the wise men of the Ancient Greek who try to sincerely investigate the philosophical grounding of human's relation with the life. At the outset, it is possible to deal with Santayana's scepticism in this perspective.

One thing is certain that SAF, which has the most significant place in Santayana's maturity period works, one more time reveals how important sceptical approach is for philosophy. For him, the importance of scepticism in philosophical inquiry is far more different from the method of doubt in Cartesian philosophy. Descartes believes that scepticism is a technique of methodological doubt to achieve the explicit warrant. In so doing, Descartes' main aim is to search for foundations of knowledge. Actually, Descartes deals with scepticism in a new point of view, which is differed from the previous sceptic tradition based on Pyrrho's scepticism. For him, scepticism has instrumental importance for philosophizing, and after he had obtained the explicit warrant that gets out of doubt, he went away from sceptical position. In this sense, Descartes' doubt ends up with indubitable proposition 'cogito ergo sum'. The contrast, Santayana thinks that the enforcement of such an assurance is not viable for the living creatures with

³⁷ Descartes, Rene., *A Discourse on The Method*, trans. Ian Maclean, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2006, p., 28.

an animal life in the ever-changing world. The ones in search of certainty misunderstood both their own nature and the function of knowledge for themselves. According to Santayana, against the perspective of the rationalist criterion of knowledge, "a true sceptic will begin by throwing over all those academic conventions as so much confessed fiction; and he will ask rather if, when all that these arbitrary tendencies to feign import into experience has been removed, any factual element remains at all."³⁸

Santayana explicitly believes that "all change is illusion." This means that there is not any first principle that provides a basis for getting rid of illusion. For this reason, he does not approve the use of scepticism for the certainty or the validity of a criterion by the true sceptic. There is sole alternative for true sceptic against sceptical challenges arising from illusion: "solipsism of present moment." Santayana supposes that solipsism of present moment is nothing but an honest position so as to fight with these challenges. However, according to him, given the realities of social and laborious character of the life, the meaning of solipsist's judgment is true only to the solipsist. This extreme form of scepticism, which denies the possibility of any knowledge other than of one's own existence, proves that s/he fails to do justice to his/her own daily life. However, Lachs says, "standards are best developed from the activity in which we engage, taking due account of our capacities. If a fruitful certainty cannot be attained and if our inquiries can flourish without it, we would be wise to settle for what we can get." "40"

Santayana implies that the ultimate scepticism or solipsism of the present moment as a way of life is untenable. It is obvious that he is determined to

³⁸ SAF, p., 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 50.

⁴⁰ Lachs, John, On Santayana, p., 15.

turn the position of sceptic upside down. On this score, he does not charge with scepticism. According to him, one thing is certain that scepticism is irrefutable. It is both "an exercise, not a life" and "the chastity of the intellect."41 This means that scepticism is not used to reach for the extreme points. On the other hand, if its relationship with our ordinary practices is explored, then it leads us "to justify our ordinary practices with their sound and ordinary standards of knowledge."42 On that account, Santayana's scepticism does not aim to be only provisional. He states: "...the scepticism I am defending is not meant to be merely provisional; its just conclusions will remain fixed, to remind me perpetually that all alleged knowledge of matters of fact is faith only, and that an existing world, whatever form it may choose to wear, is a questionable and arbitrary thing." ⁴³ Santayana's scepticism provides him with a significant basis for his method of philosophical investigation. This can be summarized as: It is impossible to refute the illusory nature of the change by means of the certain knowledge, but if the ultimate scepticism is unfeasible in everyday activities, then this illusion may be accepted openly as an illusion. Santayana argues that this non-deceptive illusion is beyond doubt for the ultimate sceptic in this perspective. From his point of view, since sceptic doubts all existence, he is doomed to failure in his attempt to discover it. He puts: "What will remain of this non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth, and a truth the being of which requires no explanation, since it is utterly impossible that it should have been otherwise."44

⁴¹ SAF, p., 69.

⁴² Lachs, John, *On Santayana*, p., 16.

⁴³ SAF, p., 49.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 73.

The ultimate position of sceptic indicates explicitly that the illusory nature of the world is not in fact deceiving, but it can by no means be conceived in another form. From this standpoint, Santayana thinks that the datum of the non-deceptive illusion is itself non-existent. It does not exist because we see clearly in the ultimate scepticism: "It will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse of it: for no date will be written to on it, no frame of full or empty time will shut it in."⁴⁵ Santayana argues that it refers to nothing beyond itself and it does not propose anything other than its appearance. By this he means that I am directly aware of something, which does not enter into any external and dynamic relations with anything else. According to Santayana, this nondeceptive illusion, which is momentary and solitary, in the ultimate scepticism is the discovery of an essence. He puts as follows: "my scepticism at last has touched bottom, and my doubt has found honourable rest in the absolutely indubitable. Whatever essence I find and note, that essence and no other is established before me. I cannot be mistaken about it, since I now have no object of intent other than the object of intuition."⁴⁶

2.2.2. Essences: Pure Possibilities

Santayana thinks that essences or pure possibilities have their own realm and within this realm, they are just about mental processes. He states: "this object of pure sense or pure thought, with no belief superadded, an object inwardly complete and individual, but without external relations or physical status, is what I call essence." Essences are not destroyed in time and they

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 73 – 74.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 74.

⁴⁷ Lachs, John, edited by, *Animal faith and Spiritual Life; Previously Unpublished and Uncollected Writings by George Santayana with Critical Essays on His Thought*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967, p., 176. Hereafter called as AFSL.

don't give reference to anything except for themselves. They haven't got a privileged position as metaphysically and epistemologically. Santayana puts it as follows:

The realm of essence is not peopled by choice forms or magic powers. It is simply the unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of all the characters possessed by such things as happen to exist, together with the characters which all different things would possess if they existed. It is the sum of mentionable objects, of terms about which, or in which, something might be said. Thus although essences have the texture and ontological status of Platonic ideas, they can lay claim to none of the cosmological, metaphysical, or moral prerogatives attributed to those ideas. They are infinite in number and neutral in value.⁴⁸

The fact that essences are limitless in point of quantity and neutral in terms of value make impossible for them to authorize over existence. The principle of essence in its own realm, Santayana says us, is identity. The being of each essence is entirely exhausted by its definition. In this perspective, he does not mean its definition in words, "but the character which distinguishes it from any other essence. Every essence is perfectly individual. There can be no question in the realm of essence of mistaken identity, vagueness, shiftiness, or self-contradiction." Every essence has a specific identity and this identity both distinguishes it from other essences and places it in a specific position. Santayana puts: "This inalienable individuality of each essence renders it a universal; for being perfectly self-contained and real only by virtue of its intrinsic character, it contains no reference to any setting in space or time, and stands in no adventitious

⁴⁸ SAF, p., 77-78.

⁴⁹ RE, p., 18.

relations to anything. Therefore without forfeiting its absolute identity it may be repeated or reviewed any number of times."⁵⁰

Santayana tackles the notion of essence together with many different concepts and, at the same time, tries to define it with variable equivalents. We can say that he generally tries to portray the reality of essence around the concepts such as idea, datum, image, appearance, and form. It is no doubt that the realm of essence includes all possible terms within the mental processes about intuition and feeling. In this perspective, the reason why Santayana distinguishes essences as a different realm of being is that he wishes to give their eternal structure prominence. Lachs puts the eternity of essences in Santayana's thought across to us in a plain language. He says that we, first of all, must draw a distinction between the eternal and the everlasting in order to understand Santayana's theory of essence. As atoms or the subatomic ultimate parts of matter, the everlasting is what exists in the time-bound world of our bodies and our hopes, and never ceases to do so. "The eternal, by contrast, never truly exists in time at all. It is exempt from the changes endemic to the world: while physical objects have a history of gradual and continued alteration, such eternal objects as the color yellow, when they appear in the spatiotemporal flux, do so like timeless apparitions without substance and without a past, ever untouched by the swirl of things."51

An individual essence is non-existent, passive, eternal and self-identical form. Santayana believes that the fact that it has these characteristics, which do not mean to imply that it needs to be anything beyond itself, makes it impossible for it to exert physical power. In this perspective, because of the fact that it does not get involved in the external relations it is not possible

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ GS, p., 66

for it to have a mission such as servicing to a predetermined purpose. It is something discovered but "not something invented or instituted for a purpose; it is something passive, anything that might be found, every quality of being." Therefore, there are, in the realm of essence as a whole, an infinite number of essences, which can be intuited. In SAF, Santayana describes the realm of essence as "a vast costumer's gallery of ideas where all sorts of patterns and models are on exhibition, without bodies to wear them, and where no human habits of motion distract the eye from the curious cut and precise embroideries of every article." It is not dependent on mind or matter in its intrinsic nature, but intuited by mind or embodied in matter. Although they are not either mental or material, "the mental and the material are possible only by borrowing from the realm of essence and displaying their relevant and appropriate characteristics." Therefore, there are basically three different types of essence:

- 1. The essence of the object or essence which is embodied in matter
- 2. The essence of intuition or essence which is revealed in intuition
- 3. The essence which is neither embodied in matter nor revealed in intuition.

Such an important question manifests itself in this point: Where do these essences come from? Santayana states: "...in my system as the name for the *intrinsic ideal possibility of all things* is essence, so the name for the *existing potentiality of specific things* is matter." He does not make

⁵² SAF, p., 78.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p., 71

⁵⁴ GS, p., 65.

⁵⁵ RS, p., 24

reference to a source for essences⁵⁶, but we need to strongly emphasize that essences manifest themselves in material processes even if the realm of essence and the realm of matter are portrayed separately in his philosophy. Essences referred by third type which are not either revealed in intuition or embodied in matter do not exist because they are not involved in the realm of matter. They are eternally available for embodiment. From the standpoint of their intrinsic nature, they are timeless, unchangeable and, more importantly equivalent. "None is more worthy of embodiment than any of the others and none, once instantiated, can earn continued existence by its excellence. This makes the embodiment of essences a function of contingency for matter and choice for human beings." ⁵⁷

The discovery of essence is immensely important for the development of Santayana's philosophy. Eternal essences bring freedom to his philosophical investigation, and this situation protects him from struggling in an awkward philosophical theory. Even if it seems that there are three different types of essence, his system doesn't separate these essences from each other. Identity between them is the most basic subject of his philosophy. According to him, identity doesn't appear by referring to the realm of essence themselves, but the realm of matter. The most important contribution of the criticism of scepticism is that it provides both the discovery of essence and the position of essence in existence. The nature of essence within existence does not provide the opportunity to move from the essence towards the existence. The removal of distinction between the aforementioned the first type essence and the second type essence is impossible to provide by means of resorting to essence. For this reason, it seems to have due significance to investigate how Santayana characterizes the relationship between these

⁵⁶ "In themselves essences have no genesis..." SAF, p., 132.

⁵⁷ GS, p., 69.

essences. This chapter is only an introduction for his thought on the realm of essence. In the subsequent subtitle, in which his thought on the realm of matter will be investigated, the nature of the first type essence will be better understood. The relationship between the first type essence and second type essence will be investigated in the following chapter with his concepts of animal faith and psyche.

2.3. The Principle of Existence: The Realm of Matter

2.3.1. Matter

As discussed above, Santayana considers human beings in the nature as living organisms. He portrays their life in the light of the nature. Besides, because he has a very strong faith in the power of material reality, he stands against the opinion of having determinative effects of their minds over their material environment. In *the Dialogues in Limbo*, he writes "the universe is my sufficient companion. Who was ever more faithful than that silent friend?" This statement invites us to think on these questions: Can we talk on the universe regardless of natural processes? Can human mind reach to secrets of the universe and reach to definite results about how it's running? Santayana's philosophy presupposes that human mind based on material roots will not go into such an effort. Even if the mind hasn't got enough equipment to go beyond the immediate flux, according to him, if we analyze our experiences well, we will find an opportunity for explaining existence more accurately.

According to Santayana, the relationship between the material environment and the material action points the most general features of the world that help us think clearly about elements of which it is made. In this perspective, he believes that whatever living creatures encounter their experience is

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⁵⁸ Santayana, George, *Dialogues in Limbo*, Constable and Co. Ltd., London, 1925, p., 88.

clearly not nothing. That is to say, they have to accord their beliefs, which they gained from their actions, with nature in order to survive in the physical world. Santayana separates four realms of being involved in our lives from each other on the grounds of the animal action and the experience of material things: essence, matter, truth and spirit. He states: "The Realms of Being of which I speak are not parts of a cosmos, nor one great cosmos together: they are only kinds or categories of things which I find conspicuously different and worth distinguishing, at least in my own thoughts."59 These are features and structures in the material world that match up to our experience, action and thought. Because they are not things or world-portions, the question "how do they relate to one another to make a whole?" is beside the point. Lachs explains this situation as follows: "They do not constitute the world, but serve as tools for understanding it. Conceptual orientation of the sort they provide is useful in reflecting on the fundamental characteristics of reality and in sensitizing us to the rich diversity of being."60 The purpose of Santayana's ontological investigation is to comprehensively analyse them in detail. According to his ontology, we inevitably presuppose them in our experience, action and thought. Here, Santayana insists that the realm of matter is the sole source of everything. It is also the principle of existence outside us. According to him, animal finds itself in the material world and there is no way to establish the existence of material things apart from faith rooted in its animal nature. On this basis, in RM, Santayana clearly states that "belief, in its very soul, is belief about nature; it is animal faith. To entangle belief in anything non-natural, or avowedly tangential to action, would be cheat at the game."61 This claim

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⁵⁹ SAF, p., vi.

⁶⁰ GS, p., 65.

⁶¹ Santayana, George, *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being*, Constable and Company, Ltd., London, 1930, p., 6. Hereafter called as RM.

shows that we cannot directly intuit the realm of matter, that is, this realm "by nature cannot be data of intuition but must be posited (if recognized by man at all) by an instinctive faith expressed in action." Santayana puts in the following:

The realm of matter, then, from the point of view of our discovery of it, is the field of action: it is essentially dynamic and not pictorial. Moreover, our action is interpolated in a world already in existence. Our existence and purposes are things of yesterday; they were evidently drawn from that very world on which they react. From the point of view of origins, therefore, the realm of matter is the matrix and the source of everything: it is nature, the sphere of genesis, the universal mother. ⁶³

The life of living creatures is shaped in the sphere of genesis. Contrary to Western philosophical tradition, without placing the mind in a privileged position, Santayana tries to show us how the organism gives shape to its life in the nature. In his philosophy, as discussed above, the mind is an impotent element in the life of matter. Therefore, he writes: "the mind cannot pursue the roots of things into the darkness; it cannot discover why they exist; it must be satisfied with noting their passing aspect, which is but an essence..." For him, the realm of matter is not a realm of being, which we can research directly, but this doesn't mean that there is simply a complete lack of any evidence for it. Its evidence is right here, in the material body of living creatures and especially in the network of their activities. Actual things formed from the matter and form are in a constant state of flux. Consciousness, discerning this change through essences, works in tandem with essences. In this perspective, "intuitions are acts of consciousness

⁶² SAF, p., 54.

⁶³ RM, p., xi.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 103 – 104.

directed upon essences. The essences, or forms, are immediately present to the mind and constitute, along with the acts of awareness, self-contained units of sentience." They are self-contained and self-identical units, so they cannot independently change by themselves. Relatedly, matter is the name, which is the power providing intuition from one essence to another. Santayana states:

The flux is...always tracing some path through the realm of essence, and at every point assumes an assignable posture: that is to say, while each natural moment enriches the flux with its intrinsic quality, the existence of that moment comes by a transformation of the substance which flows through it and unites it in a determinate trope with its antecedents and its consequents.⁶⁶

Santayana extracts the realm of matter from the immediate flux and tells us its place within our material life. The power of the flux to actualize things on the material plane is just belong to life of the matter. The matter is in a constant flux, and he says that "the principle of constancy, or perhaps of inconstancy – the selective principle – is matter; yet whatever way it may turn, it must embrace one essence or another." The realm of essence points to all of the possible forms waiting for a selection to be incorporated into existence. In comparison with Western philosophical tradition, Santayana replaces the "matter" (energeia or potentiality) with the "form" (dunamis or actuality) in his own terminology and brings a different dimension to the theory of matter and form. According to his theory, the realm which is actual and dynamic is the realm of matter, so there could be no

⁶⁵ Lachs, John, On Santayana, p., 60.

⁶⁶ RM, p., 103

⁶⁷ RE, p., 15.

manifestation of form, whether in nature or in discourse⁶⁸, without it. "The priority of the realm of essence is therefore not temporal or dynamic. It is an infinite field for selection; evidently it cannot select or emphasize any part of itself."⁶⁹ Matter, which is actual and dynamic, drives forms or essences to intuition and renders them existent. Santayana thinks of matter simply as the source or the indefinite potentiality of all things rather than the power holding the potential elements passively in order to pass in the process of the material existence.

2.3.2. Material Categories: Existence and Substance

Essences which are embodied in matter are given to consciousness directly, but, this givenness does not offer any evidence, which will directly reveal the link between them and the realm of matter. However, there is an evidence here indirectly for the material categories and our animal nature posits them on the basis of this evidence. Santayana states:

Material categories such as existence, substance, and change, none of which are applicable to pure data, are thus insinuated by the animal intellect into contemplation. They transform intuition into belief; and this belief, as if it would reinforce essences when they appear and annul them when they disappear, ultimately posits an imaginary shuffling of sensible existences-hypostatised essences-dancing about us as we watch the scene.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ "In ordinary language this word is used to refer to extended discussions or expositions. Santayana's meaning is similar, though restricted to consciousness. For him, in its broadest signification, discourse is the sustained movement of attention from essence to essence, what other thinkers have called the flow of ideas in the mind. In a narrower sense, discourse is the directed process of tracing implications or surveying evidence. The latter is a dialectical activity designed to enable us to reach conclusions about matters of interest to us." GS, p., 55-56.

⁶⁹ RE, p., 15.

⁷⁰ SAF, p., 114.

Santayana features and portrays the realm of matter as a substantial reality in point of its relationships with living creatures. Living creatures live in this substantial reality within their field of action. "The notion of substance, therefore, is primarily epistemological-practical in importance and derivation."⁷¹ The realm of matter, which is the background of the notion of substance, is not primarily epistemological but ontological. "Its function is to help us understand the different modes of being, not to call attention to the nature of the world in whose bosom we live. The ontological idea of matter is a necessary ingredient in the fully developed notion of substance; all substance, Santayana points out, is material."⁷² He believes that there is nothing based on an independent basis from the material reality, without excluding immaterial processes. His materialism is a kind of materialism tending to understand natural life and mental processes on the basis of the realm of matter. He states that "...my materialism...is not metaphysical. I do not profess to know what matter in itself."⁷³ His purpose is not to have a grasp of secrets of the material reality. He is mostly interested in how the natural processes link to the ontological idea of matter. He tackles concepts of substance and existence in such a manner. In this perspective, the ontological idea of matter is a totally unformed and unconscious realm containing the power rendering the essences existent:

Existence itself is a surd, external to the essence which it may illustrate and irrelevant to it; for it drags that essence into some here and now, or some then and there; and the things so created, far from being identical with their essence at any moment, exist by eluding it, encrusting it in changing relations, and continually adopting a different essence; so that nothing accurate can be said of

⁷¹ GS, p., 73.

⁷² *Ibid*.

⁷³ SAF, p., vii.

a thing supposed to bridge two moments of time. Yet to bridge two moments, in some sense, is indispensable to existence.⁷⁴

Santayana distinguishes the relationship of essences, which are embodied in matter, and the matter itself from each other and by saying the existence is "surd", he wants to express that there is a power out of all definitions. In this sense, he regards the notion of matter as an irrational reality we cannot understand totally. His ontological idea of matter and theory of essence presupposes that we live in an existential reality opened by the power of matter. It is not possible for us to reach its ultimate knowledge. He states: "matter is the invisible wind which, sweeping for no reason over the field of essences, raises some of them into a cloud of dust: and that whirlwind we call existence."⁷⁵ In this perspective, there is no way to grasp and to pack up the existence and turning it into a research object is out of our competences and abilities. Nevertheless, Santayana argues that the invisible wind or the impulsive force of mechanical processes spreading all over the world enables us to infer that there is a substantial evidence. Although it is not given directly to our consciousness, instinctive belief in it is inevitable for us. Santayana puts: "...I shall attribute existence to a flux of natural events which can never be data of intuition, but only objects of a belief which men and animals, caught in that flux themselves, hazard instinctively."⁷⁶

Essences, which are given directly, appear in intuitions and later, disappear. Thus, we realize that the world, which is external to our mind, is in a constant state of flux. But, there should be a "stuff" knitting our experiences within this change or the immediate flux. So, if we move by linking our

⁷⁴ RE, p., 109 – 110.

⁷⁵ RM, p., 94

⁷⁶ SAF, p., 49.

experiences each other, this means that we always bring forward a constant substance. This constant substance addresses to "the formed physical world or to significant parts of it; as in Santayana's master, Aristotle, this substance is a compound of form and matter." We can understand the concepts of existence and matter well in conjunction with substance. This quotation makes Santayana's position clear:

Existence...is a passage from potentiality to act, the order of its moments being determined by the direction of realisation within each of them. Before and after are not relations in a pure time, but organic, like up and down or right and left. They presuppose a centre, a focus into which matter flows and from which it is dispersed; and this concretion, like a spark or a blow, is irreversible, and separates its occasion and materials on the one hand, in which it was potential, from its effects and remains on the other, in which its potentiality is that of other things. Thus existence is not simply a series of essences solidified, nor a juxtaposition of phenomena; it is the career of a hereditary substance, it is the Life of Matter.⁷⁸

According to Santayana, we have to bring the substance forward, or else it is not possible for us to survive. In this sense, he argues "experience brings belief in substance (as alertness) before it brings intuitions of essences." We confront with substances in our actions. They are mixed in our life in such a manner that we live a substance life in our material environment. Santayana says "...belief in discourse involves belief in substance." We bring a substance forward in our all actions. "Something not essence, then actualizes and limits," says Santayana, "the manifestation of every essence

⁷⁷ GS, p., 73.

⁷⁸ RM, p., 93 – 94.

⁷⁹ SAF, p., 188.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 187.

that figures in nature or appears before the mind. To this dark principle of existence we give the name of substance; so that substance, by definition, is the soil, the medium, and the creative force..."⁸¹ In the event that some thinks that the substance has a metaphysical context, Santayana clearly expresses that it is a physical substance. And he continues: "If substance were some metaphysical principle, some dialectical or moral force, it might be expected to 'explain' existence as a whole; but it ought not then to be called a substance."⁸²

Santayana assumes that the matter, which is irrational by itself and contingent in every aspect, is both the stuff for existence and the substantial reality for living creatures. He tries to explain it by offering all its components, which signifies the material categories presenting the portrayal of the reality we live in. He uses the term *substance* to show how this reality forms our life. He states: "matter is properly a name for the actual substance of the natural world, whatever that substance may be." The actual substance has an epistemological-practical importance in its connection with action. "By "action" he means the primarily physical but adaptive and sometimes intelligent interplay of the individual with his or her environment. Action in this sense is an observable feature of the world."

The basis of Santayana's assumptions is the entities which he explored as a result of his criticism of scepticism and which he calls as essences. According to Santayana, constructing a relationship between the first type essence and second type essence, which we mentioned in the previous part,

⁸¹ RM, p., 14.

⁸² SAF, p., 208.

⁸³ RM, p., 140.

⁸⁴ GS, p., 45.

can be possible not by relying on these essences themselves but by relying on the substance which manifests itself within the realm of matter which we directly take as reference in our actions. The prominent motto of SAF "nothing given exists", which means that the only thing which is given in intuition is an essence and this essence does not exist, is about this point. For this reason, entering into the dark sides of existence is not possible for us in the light of the essence of intuition. On the other hand, our instinctive reactions, which we develop against the material impulses, are the indications of the reality that we move by approving of the existence out of our minds. Santayana clarifies the situation with these utterances: "Experience, at its very inception, is a revelation of *things*; and these things, before they are otherwise distinguished, are distinguishable into a here and a there, a now and a then, nature and myself in the midst of nature."

Santayana reaches to a significant conclusion from his criticism of scepticism and from our connectedness to substantial reality in the realm of experience: "In reality, essence and the intuition of essence can never be identical." The essence of intuition or essence and the intuition of essence or intuition refers to two different realms of being. Within this context, essence which is revealed intuition does not exist, but its intuition belongs to the existential reality of the immediate flux. Santayana writes, "so the intuition will be an utterly different thing from the essence intuited: it will be something existent and probably momentary; it will glow and fade..." Therefore, there are never essence or non-existent, which is revealed in intuition, without its intuition which is existent. "The first existence, then, of which a sceptic who finds himself in the presence of random essences may

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⁸⁵ SAF, p., 189.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 128.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 130.

gather reasonable proof, is the existence of the intuition to which those essences are manifest."⁸⁸ According to Santayana, the things within the intuition do not belong to intuition and for this reason they are non-existent though they are real. In this perspective, to exceed the limits of the immediate intuition and to claim on the existence of objects out of our mental processes are, in one sense, a leap of faith. In this manner, from Santayana's point of view, it is not possible for us to link the intuited essences and essences of external objects without consulting to the animal faith. According to him, "perception is faith; more perception may extend this faith or reform it, but can never recant it except by sophistry."⁸⁹ He places the intuition on the flux of nature, and brings the part, which is added to the natural processes by our animal nature, into the forefront by approaching the realm of essence out of intuition. He puts it as follows:

The evidence of data is only obviousness; they give no evidence of anything else; they are not witnesses. If I am content to recognise them for pure essences, they cannot deceive me; they will be like works of literary fiction, more or less coherent, but without any claim to exist on their own account. If I hypostatise an essence into a fact, instinctively placing it in relations which are not given within it, I am putting my trust in animal faith, not in any evidence or implication of my actual experience. ⁹⁰

Santayana's criticism of scepticism has two consequences. First of them is the discovery of essence, which is the counterpart to "nothing given exists" and the other is the belief in substance, which is the counterpart to animal faith. According to him, "existence...not being included in any immediate

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 133.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 69.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 99.

datum, is a fact always open to doubt", but "...discovering nothing but essence, is itself animal faculty: it is called forth by material stress, or by passion."92 Even if he separates the essence and existence from each other, he offers their inseparable relationship in this context: "Essences, by being eternally what they are, enable existence to pass from one phase to another, and enable the mind to note and describe the change." Existence never appears in intuition and it is just a subject about belief. The material impulses lead us to believe in the existence of the external world which "is predicated only of a power of intuition that presumes to discourse about essences." On this basis, he regards intuition as a part of the material body, and asserts that the datum of experience, which, in its bare form, indicates that material reality exists independently of our mind, is nothing but an actual experience of the material organism. According to him, intuition is a concept, which requires a substantial reality, so its continuity is the operation of animal faith, which is a part of the material action. Because the substantial reality is the direct object of animal faith, intuition is a part of the relationship between animal faith and substance. For this reason, intuition is not direct object of substance, but it is the first concept explaining how the wakefulness of animal attention emerges in the material processes.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 39 – 40.

⁹² RE, p., 15 – 16.

⁹³ RE, p., 5.

⁹⁴ Butler, Richard, *The Mind of Santayana*, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, the United States of America, 1955, p., 72.

CHAPTER III

THE ANIMAL FAITH AND THE MATERIAL PSYCHE

3.1. The Place of Animal Faith in Santayana's Philosophy

3.1.1. Common Sense: The Reality of Human Action

From Santayana's point of view, the thoroughgoing sceptic resides in a place from which there is no escape because there is not any certain evidence or any rational argument, which denies the sceptical stance. For all that, despite the fact that the situation of sceptic thinker is incapable of being refuted from the perspective of any rational argument, it is not defendable from the standpoint of common sense. Non-scepticism in everyday life shows the resistance to scepticism. Santayana's position on this matter is obvious. He puts it as follows:

I think that common sense, in a rough dogged way, is technically sounder than the special schools of philosophy, each of which squints and overlooks half the facts and half the difficulties in its eagerness to find in some detail the key to the whole. I am animated by distrust of all high guesses, and by sympathy with the old prejudices and workaday opinions of mankind: they are ill expressed, but they are well grounded. What novelty my version of things may possess is meant simply to obviate occasions for sophistry by giving to everyday beliefs a more accurate and circumspect form. I do not pretend to place myself at the heart of the universe nor at its origin, nor to draw its periphery. I would lay

siege to the truth only as animal exploration and fancy may do so, first from one quarter and then from another, expecting the reality to be not simpler than my experience of it, but far more extensive and complex.⁹⁵

As a matter of fact, any philosophical inquiry has searched for the first principles both to begin right from the very beginning and to reveal the origin of things. Therefore, the question manifests itself: where is the starting point to reveal the origin of things? Santayana points out that sceptical challenges to knowledge proves that "if he (philosopher) begins in the middle he will still begin at the beginning of something, and perhaps as much at the beginning of things as he could possibly begin."96 This means that "there is no first principle of criticism." In this perspective, Santayana asserts that both empirical criticism and transcendental criticism of knowledge against the sceptical challenges are doomed to failure. When it comes to gaining certainty for philosophical investigation, they prove that standards are best developed from "common sense" or "everyday beliefs" in which we engage. He puts it as follows: "I have found that criticism has no first principle, that analysis involves belief in discourse, and that belief in discourse involves belief in substance; so that any pretensions which criticism might set up to being more profound than common sense would be false pretensions." And he continues, "philosophy is nothing if not honest; and the critical attitude, when it refuses to rest at some point upon vulgar faith, inhibits all belief, denies all claims to knowledge, and becomes dishonest; because it itself claims to know."97

⁹⁵ SAF, p., v − vi.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 2.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 187.

Santayana's criticism of scepticism ends up the discovery of the direct and indubitable essence in existence. However, there is a more impressive result: Philosophical honesty necessitates for reaping standards for knowledge from animal faith, which "posits existence where existence is." He writes, "that such external things exists, that I exist myself, and live more or less prosperously in the midst of them, is a faith not founded on reason but participated in action, and in that intent, which is virtual action, involved in perception." Because animal faith is always at work in the relationship between our animal instincts and the material environment in which we manage our own lives by avoiding dangers and making plans for future, we believe that there is a substantial reality where essence and matter constitute co-operatively. According to Santayana, common sense, which lives by presupposing that "there are recorded facts not to be doubted" to sactually nothing more than this animal faith.

The biological adaptation of human organism to the material environment has a central importance in Santayana's philosophy. Living creatures have the instinctive reactions in this process of adaptation. This is an animal reaction to nature, and so an instinctive belief in the existence of matter and common sense based upon this animal faith is inevitable for living creatures. They live within the same environment and their interactions with their environment directly affect their socializations and civilizations. Common sense points out the background of their moving within the material environment in a similar way. According to Santayana, this reality against scepticism says us that the existence is not directly known by common sense. In this perspective, he explicitly approves that realist attitude in the

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 104

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 106.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 12

inquiries for knowledge is indispensable. He states: "Knowledge is always about the not given, it is faith justified its material ground or by its material verification." ¹⁰¹

Santayana's realism asserts that essence is the only given and because we know essences directly, there could be no mention of any certainty except them. However, the evidence of existence is not apparent in the essence itself, but the not given, so essences are not objects of knowledge. Since we are, above all, living creatures at the same time we have "animal faith" in which matter or existence is posited. For this reason, we know material objects not as such but by means of symbols of them. That is to say, knowledge, which is concerned about existence, is mediated by essences or faith mediated by symbols and all knowledge is symbolic. This means "there is an important difference between symbolic cognition of the world and the picturesque representation of matter. The physical world is, for Santayana, fully formed: it embodies an essence or a set of essences in each of its parts. In using symbols to gain knowledge of it, we employ intuited essences to disclosed embodied ones." 102

According to Santayana, the reality of action is too complex to be explored through reasonable explanations or scientific laws. However, the possibility of action gives us important clues about the scheme that constitutes the basis of the relationship between the world and us. Animal action presupposes that there is the existence of a material world and this is a single field of action in which we live. In addition to belief in existence, belief in substance, belief in facts and truths, belief in memory and belief in other minds are the parts of the material reality. These tenets of animal faith "are simpler, more schematic, and more indeterminate than anything science

¹⁰¹ PGS, p., 514.

¹⁰² GS, p., 73

would find satisfactory. Animal faith is the relatively vague but operationally adequate common sense of the human race." Common sense gives to everyday beliefs a more accurate and circumspect form by way of animal faith. This presumption, which "expresses a prophetic preadaptation of animal instincts to the forces of environment" is the central commitment of Santayana's naturalistic ontology. The most significant role of the animal faith is that it indicates the total harmony of organisms with the environment. On this basis, it is possible to say that the animal faith occupies a prioritized position in our relationship with the external reality characterized by Santayana's naturalistic ontology.

3.1.2. Intent and Intuition

Santayana believes that the movement of substance or the physical objects acting in time and space are composed of two components: matter and essence. In this perspective, it cannot be denied that whatever that exists in the external world is reflected by intuition in its relation to the realm of essence. Nevertheless, the discovery of essence does not prove that there is nothing but essences. If so, it is impossible to talk about events, preferences and consequently life. Santayana argues that essence is certainly the indispensable form of reality, but it does not seem possible to accept the validity of discourse by placing essence into the center. He puts this as follows: "if I confine myself to the given essence without admitting discourse about it, I exclude all analysis of that essence, or even examination of it. I must simply stare at it, in a blank and timeless aesthetic trance." ¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p., 45.

¹⁰⁴ SAF, p., 104.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 121.

The definite separation between the matter and the essence and the idea that there is no certainty beyond the self-evidence of essence cause us not to have an accurate understanding of the existence. In order to examine glimpses of essences as the inevitable background of all reality, the contribution of the animal organism should not be ignored. This contribution emphasizes that the material conditions of intuition are indispensable parts of the life. According to Santayana, our animal life proves that we instinctively trust to a particular substance, which involves action, event, memory and expectation, in the way of the animal faith. Then, the aliveness of human beings has to do directly with the trust in the animal faith. Santayana asserts: "to take the leap from one intuition to another, and assert that they view the same essence, or have the same intent, I must take my life in my hands and trust to animal faith. Otherwise all dialectic would be arrested." This point is important for us to understand Santayana's approach to the relationship between matter and essence.

Santayana argues that we know the existence by using essences as symbols. For him, intuition is the passive mental act in which essence is given, "therefore is a view of essence, attention fixed upon it, and not that essence itself." On the other hand, the animal faith is intent "which might be called the 'active' mental act, through which the essence given is hypostatized or taken as a sign of a *Substance*, which is the transcendent object-(an object in) the independently existing physical world." Santayana strongly believes that material impulses provide the beginning of irrational processes imposed upon animal organism by the power of matter.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 117.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁸ Michelsen, John M., "Santayana on Scepticism and the Analysis of Experience", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 8, p.26-47, 1972, p., 44.

These stimulations are the irreversible processes, which cause the human organism to evolve rapidly in response to changing environment. This point gives us important clues about Santayana's materialism and epiphenomenalism. He states, "...matter is no model devised by the human imagination...but is a primeval plastic substance of unknown potentiality, perpetually taking on new forms; the gist of materialism being that these forms are all passive and precarious, while the plastic stress of matter is alone creative and, as far as we can surmise, indestructible." 109

In the light of the above considerations, in Santayana's philosophy, the passage from datum of immediate experience to essence of intuition does not regard as the ability of mind. Therefore, we need to centralize the animal faith or intent when we wish to research how the essence intuited is characterized in his philosophy. Essences are the indubitable features of data in the immediate experience shaping in the realm of matter and they are so attached to the animal life that they manifests themselves spontaneously in all experience that are symbol-cognitive as soon as the animal organism naturally evolves into intuition of essence. Santayana clearly expresses that "animal life is involved in the perusal of essence, just as animal faith is involved in the trust I put in demonstration." Therefore, cognitive processes in animal organism do not occur when the essence is intuited. That is to say, the factor which paves the way for the mental processes is the nature of the relationship between the animal organism and its environment. Santayana expresses this situation with the statement "perception is faith." According to him, the source of knowledge will not be associated with giving a reference about the essence itself or the given, but the not-given by way of the intent, which is the agent of animal faith. "What is given

¹⁰⁹ RM, p., 100.

¹¹⁰ SAF. p., 132.

becomes in this manner a sign for what is sought, and a conventional description of it; and the object originally posited by faith and intent in the act of living may be ultimately more and more accurately revealed to belief and to thought."¹¹¹ Intent or unthinking belief in the not-given unravels the mystery of object by giving external reality a reference. "Such tacit reference to what is not presented or what is yet to come is an essential condition of all perception, memory and science."¹¹²

The essence intuited is neither a part of reality, nor possesses a feature that can reveal the reality. Santayana puts: "By intuition...I do not mean divination...On the contrary, by intuition I mean direct and obvious possession of the apparent, without commitments of any sort about its truth, significance, or material existence." It does not symbolize the movements of substance without giving the animal faith credit for knowledge. From this point of view, intuition and intent are inseparably interwoven through the functioning of the symbolic cognition. Santayana puts: "animal faith...is earlier than intuition; intuitions come to help it out and lend it something to posit."114 Within this framework, essences are taken as symbols of the existence and thus, the knowledge of constantly changing aspects of the world is produced. Santayana's thoughts on how to shape the knowledge of the external world in the animal conditions are important for us to be able to evaluate his thoughts about the rise of intuition. He argues that "intuition is born smothered in intent; and intent is precisely assurance and expectancy turned towards the not-given." 115 His concept of animal faith draws our

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 81.

¹¹² AFSL, p., 262

¹¹³ RS, p., 92.

¹¹⁴ SAF, p., 107.

¹¹⁵ RS, p., 110.

attention on the role of animal organism on material processes, regarding the emergence of intuition. As soon as animal organism take the sense datum in the field of action, according to him, it starts to evolve to a new realm of being, the realm of essence, and encounters physical objects by taking essences as symbols of the existence. Here, Santayana indirectly attributes the emergence of intuition to intent. The most important reason why his system addresses human as a part of natural processes is his belief about the contribution of intent to the evolution of organism within natural processes in the field of action. Therefore, he says "intuition is the innocent expression of action."

Santayana's emphasis on the notion of intent as an agent of animal faith says us that lives of living creatures take form instinctively within the realm of existence, more precisely within its dangers. Its place in their animal life is to give warning of the impending dangers in the field of action. Their preparation for impending dangers and active vicissitudes in their animal organism starts directly the running of the active mental act, which refers to "consciousness of animal fear" and "a natural urge to live." This presupposition in Santayana's system is the crucial factor explaining their transition into intuition or passive mental act. He asserts that first characteristic of intuition is to be an actuality or an existence concentrated into the sense or idea of existence. In this perspective, he writes "then the mind engaged in action may begin to live by faith in the outlying conditions of life, and by an instinctive tension towards obscure events." Santayana's claim that intuition is existent is thus clarified. Although he asserts that intuition not only exists, but is the most intense form of

¹¹⁶ RE, p., 11

¹¹⁷ AFSL, p., 262.

¹¹⁸ RM, p., 12.

existence, its contents, essences, are not material, but entities which take their source from natural relations, and consequently involve by themselves in our life. Therefore, he writes: "Intuition crowns the bodily movements that underlie it by taking notice, by being a most acute ideal concentration and moral effect of those movements, so that they now cause clear data, quite unlike their own physical texture, to arise and vanish before pure spirit." ¹¹⁹

Santayana does not tackle material and immaterial processes as totally disconnected from each other. That is to say, his materialism emphasizes that immaterial processes are an inseparable part of material processes and this perspective indicates a different philosophical attitude from the reductionist perspective. The question whether something which is not given to physical senses is immaterial or not may give us a clue why this is the best way for Santayana to deal with the relationship between material and immaterial processes: What is the justification for such a claim pointing out that something which is not given to physical senses is immaterial? As far as I am concerned, this is one of the most important philosophical questions and Santayana thinks that we haven't got such a justification. Therefore, although essences constitute the objects of our mental life, he does not tackle them by separating from the external reality since he does not regard beliefs in animal faith as imperceptible acts. He puts in the following: "In intuition we have an instance of perfect actuality, a form of being that pre-eminently exists and moves (for it is a discovery, an experience) yet is precisely the act of arresting and defining some clear essence." Here, this question manifests itself: how is the relationship between objects of intent or substances and objects of intuition or essence

¹¹⁹ RS, p., 94

¹²⁰ RS, p., 95 – 96.

intuited established? The concept of psyche, which Santayana uses at this point, is of crucial importance for this relationship. He makes clear this situation in these utterances:

The Psyche's first care is to surround itself with outer organs, like a spider with its web; only these organs remain subject to her central control, and are the medium by which she acts upon outer things, and receives, in her patient labour, the solicitations and rebuffs of fortune. The psyche, being essentially a way of living, a sort of animated code of hygiene and morals, is a very selective principle: she is perpetually distinguish-in action, if not in words-between good and bad, right and wrong. Choice is breath of her nostrils. All the senses, instincts, and passions are her scouts. The further she extends her influence the more she feels how dependent she is on external things, and the more feverishly she tries to modify them, so as to render them more harmonious with her own impulses. ¹²¹

Therefore, she is not soil but seed, not surface but kernel, and with respect to her relationship with matter, Santayana states, she is "habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind." In this perspective, it is not soul but material principle of habits of living beings which links concepts, such as matter, human body, human organism, mind, nature, etc., to each other, and reveals complex patterns of the life. Hence, she is the most important concept, which we need to consider in order to understand how spirit manifests itself in the existential reality and consequently its nature. Her dynamic life, which is continually in flux, plays a central role for the connection between intent and intuition. In the following chapters, we will primarily deal with how she is characterized by Santayana and later how he establishes the relationship between this concept and spirit in his system.

¹²¹ Santayana, George, *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940, p., 222. Hereafter called as SELS.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p., 221.

3.2. The Principle of Bodily life: The Material Psyche

3.2.1. The Material Body and Animal Organism

Santayana asserts that the animal organism includes complicated processes, so it is not a system based on predetermined rules. On this basis, it is not a structure we can simply analyse. However, it is the structure of a natural body opening towards its own material environment and moving through developing. Before anything else, according to Santayana, being a living organism becomes possible through possessing a body. A living creature takes place between other living creatures and objects in phenomenal world with this material condition. For this reason, according to Santayana, it is not possible for the body to be treated "summarily and externally as gross units and dead weights." Living creatures have subtle physical substance in their animal body, as well. Hence, Santayana asserts that it is not possible for us to examine the body and organism through separating them from each other completely. He puts in the following:

This word (organism) still designates the body, since the organization of an organism must exist somewhere and on a particular scale, if it is to exist at all. But a body is an organism only by virtue of its vital power of nutrition and reproduction. By these functions bodily life becomes continuous with the ambient forces on which it feeds and theoretically with the whole dynamic universe. Thus an organism is both a closed system of vital tropes and a nucleus in the general cosmic process. 124

The animal organism cannot function without the material environment which influences its activities. The material environment is a physical environment due to being a place that the organism is included, and at the

¹²³ RS, p., 15.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*.

same time, it is the condition of the existence of the animal organism due to supporting it biologically. "In other words, the organism is both one with and quite distinct from its physical environment. But to be an enduring means that there must be some power which supports those special patterns and actions which render an organism distinct." The relationship between the animal organism and the material environment is one of the most important pillars, from which Santayana's philosophy arises. Therefore, he presupposes that the order of the life is something natural, not a fiction of mental discourse. That is the reason why he gives a special emphasis on the liveliness of living creatures. By placing the natural body and animal organism at the very centre of his philosophical works, he wants to assert that the mechanical processes are necessary and sufficient condition for the life on the grounds of the body's liveliness:

Mechanism is one habit of matter, and life is another habit of matter; the first we can measure mathematically and forecast accurately, the second we can only express in moral terms, and anticipate vaguely; but that the mechanical habit runs through the vital habit, and conditions it, is made obvious by the dependence of life on food, on time, on temperature, by its routine in health and by its diseases, by its end, and above all by its origin; for it is a habit of matter continuous with other inorganic habits, and (if evolution is true) arising out of them. In any case, life comes from a seed in which it lies apparently dormant and arrested, and from which it is elicited by purely mechanical agencies. On the other hand, the seed reacts on those agencies in a manner as yet inexplicable by what we know of its structure; and its development closely repeats (though perhaps with some spontaneous variation) the phases proper to the species. ¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Arnett, Willard E., Santayana and The Sense of Beauty, p., 20.

¹²⁶ SELS, p., 220.

With the concept of psyche, Santayana tackles the network of relationships among the body, the animal organism, the matter and the essence in a single research field. Also, concepts such as impulse, instinct, desire, need, interest, pleasure, pain and satisfaction, which are central notions of his system, are included in the boundaries of psyche. Therefore, he writes that "the psyche may be called a substance in respect to mental and moral phenomena which (I think) are based on modes or processes in matter, not on any material particle taken singly." Psyche participates in processes in the flux of existence by herself. In a sense, this means that the power from the matter reigns over the liveliness of the animal body. According to Santayana, as a power in her relation with the matter, psyche is "the selfmaintaining and reproducing pattern or structure of an organism." 128 She organizes organisms into specific forms and functions. For example, ripening of a wheat kernel toward wheatear and developing of a swallow fledging after hatching are the results of the material psyche which is directed by the power of material existence. Therefore, psyche signifies two interconnected but distinct aspects of the organism, or, there are two types of the psyche: vegetative and animal. Santayana explains this point with these utterances:

All natural organisms have psyches, and are at the same time in dynamic relations to the whole physical world. When the organism waits for favourable opportunities to unfold itself, the psyche is vegetative; when it goes to seek favourable opportunities, it is animal.¹²⁹

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, p., 221.

¹²⁸ RS, p., 15.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 16.

Naturally, the life is directly connected to the animal psyche. She is neither body nor organism, by herself. She is the core which feeds the cooperation between body and organism at the base of nature's impulsive power, which takes its source from the realm of matter, in the field of experience. The realm of matter which manifests itself in the immediate flux forms this inherited mechanism which is the self-maintaining and reproducing pattern or form. According to Santayana, "this is a true dynamic unit, forming and using the outer organs of the body, a system of habits relatively complete and self-centered; but it is only the fine quick organization within the material animal, and not a different thing." The material psyche within the material animal is the principle of habitual repetitions and the self-replicating system. She is not matter, so not substance itself; but "a mode of substance" or "a form of behavior" within the realm of matter. She brings plants, animals and human beings together under the same roof:

...by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behavior. This psyche is the specific from of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal; it will bend to circumstances, but if bent too much it will suddenly snap. The animal or plant will die, and the matter hitherto controlled by that psyche will be scattered. Such a moving equilibrium is at once vital and material, these qualities not being opposed to grow into organisms of a specific habit, producing similar seeds in their turn. ¹³¹

Santayana states "matter makes a vortex which reproduces itself, and plays as a unit amongst the other vortices near it." Therefore, he regards a

¹³⁰ SAF, p., 218.

¹³¹ RM, p., 139.

¹³² SAF, p., 219.

living body as a mechanical or material system, which acts in accord with the external material world or the orderliness of nature, and the life as a specific sort of system within the realm of causation. Psyche in living body has a mysterious internal dynamic with her dark sides. But, this mystery is understandable when tackled upon her links with the realm of matter. Together with her mysteries, "she is a mode of substance, a trope or habit established in matter..." According to Santayana, every event has a definite form which he calls essence. In this perspective, by distinguishing the form or essence of an event from the event itself, he gives to this form the name "trope." Psyche in the flux of nature is a set of embodied tropes: "The psyche as a set of embodied tropes is a relatively stable vortex in the universal flux. Each psyche is a system of vital events: each system of this sort is a material organism." 135

The material roots of the psyche enable her to manifest itself in the field of action or the realm of matter. By regarding her as a trope, "which defines a life, and marks its course from birth to death in some human creature", Santayana wishes to indicate that she moves in tendency of always repeating itself in the field of action. So, the mechanical flux of lives of living creatures in the realm of matter is the extension of psyche into physical time and place. Santayana puts: "Organisms are instruments of repetition; and they rely, for their existence and prosperity, on the repetition of opportunities for the repetition of their acts. Were this reliance not justified, or this mechanism unstable, there could be no life, experience, or art in the

¹³³ RM, p., 140.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 101 – 102.

¹³⁵ AFSL, p., 258.

¹³⁶ RM, p., 136.

world."¹³⁷ Psyche always interacts with her material environment and she reflects the hereditary habits to her environment. In this process, she not only changes with her material environment, but also forms it. Santayana puts: "Not knowing what we are, we at least can discourse abundantly about our books, our words, and our social actions; and these manifestations of the psyche, though peripheral, are faithful enough witnesses to her nature. She is that inner moving equilibrium from which these things radiate, and which they help to restore – the equilibrium by which we live, in the sense of not dying; and to keep us alive is her first and essential function."¹³⁸ Then, psyche is a system balancing itself and a biological condition for an organism both to have a life and to adapt to the different conditions. Santayana implies that her nature is concerned about providing of the appropriate conditions for her life and the more they are provided, her life becomes more prosperous in every way.

According to Santayana, psyche cannot have a context, which is independent from the material reality. In this perspective, he regards her as "a natural fact" and identifies her with "the self-defense" and "self-expression of a living organism." The material body is the center of the natural impulses, and the animal organism indicates an internal mechanism shaping these impulses. In this process, the adaption of living organism to its material environment, which drives it to act, starts. According to Santayana, animal faith posits the material thing as a product of the material substance, which is referred by the experience of the external reality, so makes way for intuition in which only essences are given. In this perspective, the unitary principle or the psyche bridges the gap between the not-given existence and the given essence within experience. In Santayana's

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 106.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 143 – 144.

system, psyche herself has such a capacity for locomotion through the favorable situations supporting the organism by imbuing essences with intent in order to survive against the environmental difficulties. This capacity shows that she belongs to the self-defense and self-expression of a living organism. Psyche's natural urge to protect herself and to live causes a living organism to develop co-operative links between the animal faith or the active mental act and the intuition or passive mental act and to establish a balance between essence and existence. Therefore, Santayana thinks that the concept of self takes its source from her efforts.

3.2.2. The Material Self

Santayana includes the concept of psyche into his works upon being inspired by Aristotle. Aristotle regards her as an animating principle of matter which is an active part of *genesis*. As a matter of fact, in the Ancient Greek world, she does not contain overtones of spirit which is thought to be immaterial in modern philosophy. For the ancients, she is not the complete opposite to matter, namely, she is not incorporeal. She is a tenuous matter that cannot be touched, but can be discerned. Therefore, she does not contain mind/body dualism. In this sense, Santayana uses her by referring the Ancient Greek world as opposed to the concept of soul. The soul is English counterpart of the psyche. It is a name which means "a substantial entity believed to be that in each person which lives, feels, thinks and wills" and derives from Old English "sawol" which means "spiritual and emotional part of a person, animate existence; life, living being." 140

¹³⁹ Soul, Harper, Douglas, Retrieved From

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=soul&allowed_in_frame=0, at December 2013.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

Santayana makes clear why he prefers the term "psyche" to the term "soul" in these utterances:

...indeed, that soul was material, was once taken for granted both in India and in Greece. On the other hand, the Platonic and Christian tradition has come to identify the soul with a bodiless spirit, a sort of angel, at fist neglecting and afterwards denying the biological functions which were the primitive essence of the soul; until in modern times the soul has been discarded altogether and its place taken by consciousness, something which in reality is the last and most highly conditioned of the works of a natural soul...The psyche is not another name for consciousness or mind...is a natural fact... ¹⁴¹

According to Santayana, the psyche is neither another name for the soul nor the counterpart to conscious awareness. He thinks that she is the organizing principle of a living material body which is an active part of the immediate flux. She is not a substance but "a mysterious habit in matter" which "forms the human body and human mind." Her own substance is the material body, in other words, she dwells in the material reality. By designating it as the organization of the body, Santayana tries to show that "psychic phenomena' are crudely material, and 'psychical research' has for its object, not spirits in another world, but the habits of matter that produce apparitions." Psyche is moving together both with the body and the organism; in other words, she directs biological functions of the body and enables the organism to adapt to the environmental conditions in a constant state of flux. For Santayana's philosophy, the concept is so central that it is

¹⁴¹ RM, p., 137-139.

¹⁴² SELS, p., 220

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p., 221.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*.

not possible for us to deal with other concepts by keeping out it. Therefore, while he is portraying how she indicates a reality, he also handle her with regard to the concepts which is directly associated with her. That is to say, in SAF, he considers her as self. According to him, psyche is deeply attached to the self. In this book, he writes: "...the self posited by the sense of shock is a living psyche." And also, in RM, he expresses his thoughts about the relationship between them with these utterances:

The psyche is the self which a man is proud or ashamed of, or probably both at once: not his body in its accidental form, age, and diseases, from which he instinctively distinguishes those initial impulses and thwarted powers which are much more truly himself. And this is the self which, if he lives in a religious age, he may say that he wishes to save, and to find reviving in another world. Yet this self is far from being a stranger to the body; on the contrary, it is more deeply and persistently the essence of the body than is the body itself. It is human, male or female, proper to a particular social and geographical zone; it is still the fountain of youth in old age. 146

In that case, because 'the self' is the essence of the body, it indicates to a reality, which is different from and exceeds the material world. The self's transcendence appears on moments that the psyche separates the body, in which she lives, from the external world. In the ordinary life, psyche lives in the human body by immersing herself in the external world. Then, how can we become aware of ourselves as an individual self or distinguish ourselves from the existence of material things? According to Santayana, "shock is the great argument of common sense for the existence of material things, because common sense does not need to distinguish the order of evidence

¹⁴⁵ SAF, p., 147.

¹⁴⁶ RM, p., 146.

from the order of genesis." 147 Shock springs from "an external origin" and points out "the impact of external things." What shocks prove is that we are something different from the material world in which we become wholly absorbed. "This notion of a material, physical self which is separate from the world and yet is continuous with it, is the broadest and most general meaning which Santayana gives to 'psyche'." Then, in this point, a question cannot be ignored when the relationship between physical self and conscious self is considered: how is this relation established? The role of the working psyche in the development of bodily awareness is not argued. But, do the biological and behavioural developments in the material body offer us satisfying answers, which will remove queries about the reality of conscious awareness? Here, the most basic claim of Santayana is that psyche has clearly a material content and this feature of her is supported by both our biology possessing the power to develop and our experiences possessing the power to survive. He writes: "...as a mental symptom or expression, self-consciousness gives infallible renderings of the agitation beneath. We may therefore use it, in so far as we can recollect it or reconstruct it, to describe the psyche and her passions..." Therefore, Santayana understands the concept of self-consciousness in a place between a natural body possessing the power to live and the psyche in act. The most important philosophers of Western tradition try to show us that the mind is more than just having a physical reality because it has immaterial contents which can exist independently of the world which we experience. They argue that it makes its way for the immaterial self. In contrast to this tradition, Santayana claims that there is an inextricable link between the

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¹⁴⁷ SAF, p., 145.

¹⁴⁸ McDonald, Douglas M., "Matter over Mind", Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 12, p. 291 – 310, 1976, p., 293.

¹⁴⁹ RM, p., 152 – 153.

psyche in act and the self. More clearly, two concepts coincide exactly with each other within the boundaries of the material conditions. Therefore, in order to argue that human phenomena is rooted in our psychic processes and physical self, he asserts that psyche is "a set of embodied tropes", "the specific form of physical life" and "the material set of preferences" within the material reality. He puts in the following:

The psyche is herself a trope, not a substance: but a trope so imbedded in substance as to execute itself energetically, when it has a chance, and not merely to be exhibited passively, by a concourse of other tropes. The psyche is a definite potentiality rooted in a seed, and exhibited unswervingly in the development of that seed, if suitably nourished and allowed to mature. ¹⁵⁰

In Santayana's philosophy, the notion of psyche takes an important place in order to struggle with mind/body problem. By putting the soul, which is regarded as immaterial by the tradition, and the material body to the same side, Santayana wants to characterize the self as a material activity which cannot take its source from anything which is out of the material flux. By providing organisms with certain implicit perfections of form and action, psyche as a self-actualizing potentiality gives a structural basis to their self. That is to say, our psyche as a trope grows and develops in our interaction with our material environment. Then, that she is seen as material self in existence indicates that she keeps beliefs in animal faith up in the continuity of discourse. Material self, in this sense, rises from the material world through the agency of animal faith. For this reason, psyche does not live independently from the realm of substance. Santayana puts it as follows:

...my psyche is animate; she is the source and seat, as I have learned to believe, of all my discourse; yet she is not different, in any observable respect, from the psyches of other animals, nor is

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¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

she composed of a different sort of substance from the common earth, light, and air out of which she has arisen, and by which she is fed; she is but one in the countless generations of living creatures. Accordingly the analogy of nature would suggest that the other living creatures in the world are animate too, and discourse privately no less assiduously and absurdly than I do. 151

Therefore, it is impossible to make reference to self without psyche. More precisely, it is impossible to make reference to a self without a substantial reality independent from intuition, on which animal faith is directed. Within this scope, Santayana asserts that substance is neither the source of intuition nor its possible object. Intuition belongs to appearances of physical objects. Santayana says "appearances are at least conventional transcripts of facts; they are expressions of substance which may serve as signs of its movements...That substance should be capable of attaining to expression in appearance is a proof that substance is fertile, not that it is superfluous." ¹⁵² In this perspective, the data or ideas¹⁵³ transferring the expressions of substance from object to subject appear in intuition. Santayana asserts that appearances of ideas in intuition are objects of intuition or essences and they belong to the realm of essence. However, intuition of essence, which refers to substance, is existent, so it belongs to the realm of matter. This point is important in terms of understanding how the concept of psyche has prepared the ground for Santayana's ideas on spirit. In his opinion, the relationship of the psyche with the substance is not established through objects of intuition. On the contrary, the role played by the psyche on the intuition, with regard to her direct relationship with the substance, determines the character of essences. Santayana puts: "the life of psyche, which rises to intuition,

¹⁵¹ SAF, p., 250.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p., 212-213.

¹⁵³ The datum is an idea, a description. *Ibid.*, p., 35.

determines all the characters of the essence evoked..."¹⁵⁴ Psyche as the material self, who is a mode of substance or a habit in the field of action, has a key role in determining the characters of essence. She forces intuition to intuit essences by accepting them as echoes of facts or appearances of substantial and dynamic world on the basis of beliefs in animal faith.

Intuition would be impossible without an underlying animal life, a psyche; for how should the sheer light of intuition actualise itself, or choose the essence on which it should fall? A psyche, the hereditary organisation and movement of life in an animal, must first exist and sustain itself by its "intelligent" adaptations to the ambient world: but these adaptations are not conscious until, by virtue of their existence, intuition arises; and intuition arises when the inner life of the animal, or its contact with external things, is expressed in some actual appearance, in some essence given in feeling or thought. ¹⁵⁵

The psyche enables organisms to think of what is not given in the intuition of essence and allows them to retain their memories, which refer to their past events. She is, therefore, regarded as a material self or material agent that forms the field of action within Santayana's system. It is impossible to understand the relationship of the psyche with the self and how she forms the matter by removing the substance from the network of relationships. Therefore, it can be seen intuition of essence as "active intuition" in the relationship between psyche and substance in the continuity of discourse or the life of self. Santayana writes: "...the self involved in discourse is a thinking mind." Substance and intuition of essence are two key concepts for the animal life of psyche or self on earth. Therefore, the animal life of

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 130.

¹⁵⁵ RE, p., 9.

¹⁵⁶ SAF, p., 147.

psyche, which is dependent on substance, becomes the potentiality of mind by means of her active role on intuition.

3.2.3. The Psyche as Potentiality of Mind

There is no doubt that, in Santayana's philosophy, the source of intuition is the psychic processes. He doesn't take the intuition independently from the living psyche: "...living psyche...is the organ of the intuition and of the projection."157 She is enlivened or animated with intuitions, which construct her material self. Santayana puts it as follows: "By animation... I understand material life quickened intuitions, such as, if rehearsed and developed pertinently, make up a private experience." ¹⁵⁸ By approaching the intuition on the basis of the material life of psyche, he finds an appropriate ground in his terminology for both the direct accessing of the substance in the flux of matter and the eternal essence. Psyche lives in the field of action and characterizes a form of animal life. That is to say, she not only characterizes the external life of a living creature, but also characterizes his/her inner life. According to Santayana, she serves as a passageway from the animal life to the grasping of essences. However, the grasping of essences is not the ability of psyche, but the intuition. Santayana expresses the relationship between psyche and intuition with these utterances:

...intuition is not a material organ of the Psyche, like a hand or antenna; it is a miraculous child, far more alive than herself, whose only instinct is play, laughter, and brooding meditation. This strange child – who could have been his father? – is a poet; absolutely useless and incomprehensible to his poor mother, and only a new burden on her shoulders, because she can't help feeding and loving him. ¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 151.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 242 – 243.

¹⁵⁹ SELS, p., 223.

Santayana does not address intuition alone. In his system, intuition finds a meaning in its relationship with both the intent and the psyche. Intent comes up before intuition, which is indirect object of animal faith, since the external reality as an essential part of the data of the immediate appearance is posited, at the outset, by animal faith. Intent does not reveal the intuition; however, it acts together with the intuition within the animal life. The life of psyche within substantial reality enables them to be woven together within the continuity of discourse. In this perspective, Santayana says, "intuition is an event, although it reveals only an essence; and in like manner discourse is an experience, even when its deliverance is mere dialectic." ¹⁶⁰ This means that intuition of essence indicates an event in the material existence from the point of psyche other than an essence itself. Santayana writes: "The psyche below is busy selecting her food, fortifying her cave, and discriminating her friends from her enemies; and in these meanderings of mine over the realm of essence, in spite of myself, I am only her scout." The functional adaptation of organisms to the environment is the result of the active psyche, which is involved in the mechanical operation as unformed.

All functions of the internal nature of the living body have an effect on the animal organism. Santayana argues that this internal nature is triggered by the nature and the organism has a function of regulating these impulses. These impulses have a central role on the psyche and consequently the cognitive processes. Santayana says that "nature is the basis, but man is the goal." The principle of constancy in nature is a feature of the selective power of matter and this power directly reigns over the organism together

¹⁶⁰ SAF, p., 138.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*.

¹⁶² Santayana, George, *The Sense of Beauty*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1896, p., 165

with psyche, which is the primary phase of cognitive processes. Santayana distinguishes three objects of cognitive processes from each other: the external object, which is "not given" posited by animal faith, the essence of this external object, which is "the given" in intuition, and the intuition of this essence. It is important to say that Santayana's epistemology or theory of knowledge takes essences as an important part of transitive knowledge. In SAF, he writes "...essences are indispensable terms in the perception of matters of fact, and render transitive knowledge possible." ¹⁶³ From this framework, essences possess a character, which simply symbolizes the reality, in other words, they are neither a part of the reality, nor possess a feature that can reveal the reality. They symbolize the movements of substance. According to Santayana, "intuition of essence, to which positive experience and certitude are confined, is therefore always illusion, if we allow our hypostatizing impulse to take it for evidence of anything else." ¹⁶⁴ Therefore an essence becomes the knowledge of object when the hypostatizing impulse has been transformed into the quality of a thing in the flux of substance by the animal faith. In this perspective, Santayana asserts:

Transitiveness in knowledge has two stages or leaps: the leap of intuition, from the state of the living organism to the consciousness of some essence; and the leap of faith and of action, from the symbol actually given in sense or in thought to some ulterior existing objects. ¹⁶⁵

The role of psyche in the acquisition of knowledge reveals itself in ensuring transitions at this point. If we can clarify this point, we can also understand the effect of psyche in the emergence of mind. Santayana says "all that is

¹⁶³ SAF, p., 80.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 100.

¹⁶⁵ AFSL, p., 188.

called knowledge of the world, of human nature, of character, and of the passions is a sort of auscultation of the psyche." This point is vital important for us. We hereby claim that the psyche is located within the system as the potentiality of mind, due to her impact in the act of intuition. We describe the act of intuition as the ideal object. We can list once again as follows the realities pointed by Santayana's system regarding the objects of the cognitive process we mentioned above:

- 1. The real objects: the physical objects posited by animal faith
- 2. The objects of intent: substances.
- 3. The ideal objects: all acts of intuition, which is existent.
- 4. The objects of consciousness: the non-existent essences.

Santayana claims against scepticism that the fourth type objects are given in the intuition, yet they do not exist. Then, we can ask this question: How do the third type objects appear? This question can be replied as follows: the ideal objects are grasped in the mind as a reflection of the unity and identity of the psyche as soon as an essence awakens intuition within the psyche. How does an essence awaken intuition? According to Santayana, we grasp it by means of feelings: "The intuition of a simple essence is called a feeling; and the essence given in a primitive feeling is likely to be some truly simple, quite stupid, essence, such as sheer intensity." This does not mean that the feeling itself dwells in the essence, but it manifests itself in the animal organism, which is brought up by accident in connection with the external reality. Here, the contribution of the intuiting organism or psyche to the feeling is not ignored. That is to say, psyche perceives the feeling as the

¹⁶⁶ RM, p., 143.

¹⁶⁷ RE, p., 146.

material impulse or the stimulation coming from the outside. Hence, she adds "some concomitant motion" to the feeling before the essence manifests itself in intuition. The ideal objects containing certain characteristics, which is supposed to have passed over from physical objects to their appearances, comes into being in this perspective. Santayana puts it follows:

All the appearances of matter including the geometrical, are *relatively* true of it, since it evokes them; but they are all conventional and qualified by the nature of the animal psyches in which they are evoked. These psyches are organizations in matter, seeing they are reproduced by seeds and sustained by food; and it is the marvellous physical energies released in well-knit and healthy psyches that produce those revolutions in the world which activists attribute to their mighty spirit. ¹⁶⁸

According to Santayana, psyche is neither mind nor intuition. Nevertheless, he addresses the animal life of psyche as their underlying ground. This is an approach that is highly compatible with his description of the material reality. The dynamic life of psyche is shaped in the light of material effects. She lives within external reality, however, Santayana separates the fact that she lives within external reality and the effects of external reality on her. In other words, the feelings caused by the material impulses on her emphasize a different kind of reality within the material world. These effects cause the intuition to occur. He asserts: "intuition presupposes reactive adjustment, psychic inertia or propulsion, and therefore an elaborate hereditary life such as only a most delicately-balanced cosmos could contain." Animal organisms begin to be aware of the external reality by virtue of intuition. In this perspective, "the intuition, not the datum, is the fact which occurs; and this fact, if known at all, must be asserted at some other moment by an

¹⁶⁸ PGS, p., 508-509

¹⁶⁹ RE, p., 145.

adventurous belief which may be true or false." What is effective in this outcome is not the non-existent objects. Before they appear within the intuition, the psyche is engaged in an interaction with the substance. That is to say, animal faith is effective from the beginning of process and it constantly supports the psyche in the emergence of mind.

Santayana believes that the movement of the psyche in the field of action is characterized by the substance diversifying the field of nature. It offers suitable conditions, which lead her to constitute a natural habitat. At the same time, it is not limited to physical conditions. That is to say, mental facts themselves, which do not have direct physical effects upon events according to Santayana, are manifestations of substance. In addition to these, because they are parts of a total natural event, they are relevant to action as signs in the immediate flux, which belongs to movements of substance. According to Santayana, it is impossible for us to know substance directly. It cannot be the direct object of intuition as our relationship with the substance is through actions. Since substance is posited by animal faith, it is the epitome of intentional object or the bare object. At this point, Santayana tells us that substances are signs for material things. He puts: "Their perpetual variety indicates the phases through which the flux of matter is passing in the self, or those which the self is positing in the field of action to which it is responsive." ¹⁷¹

The position of psyche allows a direct effect in addressing the objects of intent together with acts of intuition. It is impossible for the relationship between the objects of intent and the objects of intuition to be otherwise, because the objects of intuition are essences. Psyche as a trope and the organization of matter in living creatures or the habit in matter contributes

¹⁷⁰ SAF, p., 45.

¹⁷¹RM, p., 43.

to the objects of intent, which is posited by animal faith, by maintaining the relationship between the animal body and the material environment. Her most significant contribution to living organisms manifests itself in the process in which the essences given in intuition are taken as signs of the external reality by referring to the objects of intent. Substance's propulsive drive on the psyche within the field of action enables her to feed the intuition during this process. In that case, it is neither substance nor intuition that leads to the emergence of mind. The fact that the psyche is a trope moving within the field of action in a way, which allows the relationship between the objects of intent and the intuition of essence to happen, paves the way for the circumstances that activate the mind. Santayana puts in the following: "The mind notices and intends; it cannot incorporate or reproduce anything not an intention or intuition. Its objects are no part of itself even when they are essences, much less when they are things."172 Therefore, its contents are not its objects, so the ideal objects are not composed of its contents. Accordingly, Santayana defends epistemological dualism: knowing subject or mind and known objects or material objects are qualitatively two different entities. However, the qualitative difference between knowing subject and known objects does not mean that mind is not completely independent from nature. Although Santayana tends to study on both of these fields in order to show that they are different from each other by not degrading one to the other, his main objective is to bring the animal capacity, which holds both of them together into the forefront. According to him, material objects, which are radically different from thoughts known directly, are presented to us indirectly. They are real entities which are fully independent from images, senses and reasoning. Therefore, they unavoidably need mediators or essences in order to be known. According to

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¹⁷² SAF, p., 179-180.

Santayana, essences in themselves are what they are, but they can be taken as symbols for knowledge acquisition in animal life. Santayana puts:

A symbol has a transitive function which its object, being an ultimate fact, has not; the symbol may therefore very properly or even necessarily have a substance, status and form different from those of its object. This diversity is not an obstacle to signification, but a condition of it. Were the representation a complete reproduction – did the statue breathe, walk, and think – it would no longer represent anything: it would be no symbol, but simply one more thing, intransitive and unmeaning, like everything not made to be interpreted.¹⁷³

We indicated above that the intuition is a passive mental act, yet its relationship with the psyche is an active one. The reason is that intuition does not intuit essences without the underlying psychic components, which is a stream of animal responses to the material impulses. In this perspective, "the peculiarity of the human psyche...is her great relative plasticity." The complexity in her potentiality is actually one of the leading reasons for the emergence of mind in Santayana's system. He regards her potentiality or her great relative plasticity as primitive, earthliness and mystery. Her potentiality is not intelligence, but rather an ability to make spontaneous impulses into goal-directed activities. Hence, her spontaneous actions originate the essence of material body or the individuality. Santayana states: "Belief in a world of events, and especially of those parts to it which are near the self, tempting or treating it. This belief is native to animals, and precedes all deliberate use of intuitions as signs or descriptions of things."

¹⁷³ Santayana, George, *Obiter Scripta*, p., 138.

¹⁷⁴ RM. p., 150.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 137.

¹⁷⁶ SAF, p., 179.

These signs serve as names for physical objects, and also their terms in knowledge in animal life, because the liveliness and direction of the psyche in her current reactions determines the sensibility at any moment. Santayana continues:

Things are thereby "known" in the sense that they are named, and distinguished by their rough aspect and occasions; they are not known at all in the sense of being disclosed in their inner nature, either totally or partially. The specious essence intuited is the *name* given by the psyche to the material force encountered or exerted; it is a spontaneous symbol, not abstract even in its origin; as the word cat is not drawn out of the domestic animal, yet serves to designate in its entirety, and is much simpler. ¹⁷⁷

Intuition does not evaluate the situation of beliefs in animal faith, but scrutinizes passive and immediate data of appearance. In this situation, internal psychic life converts the mind into an organ of inquiry and belief. Santayana says "the function of mind is rather to increase the wealth of the universe in the spiritual dimension, by adding appearance to substance and passion to necessity..." Therefore, the mind or the mental state could not be pure intuition, because intuition carried by intent and the outgrowth of material psyche work together over here. In this perspective, the concept of mind plays a passive role in the animal life. Since it is not the active faculty of cognition, it cannot become its own occasions or determine its own march. According to Santayana, "the whole of life is a predicament, complex and prolonged; and the whole of mind is the cry, prolonged and variously modulated, which that predicament wrings from the psyche." 180

¹⁷⁷ RE, p., 35.

¹⁷⁸ RM, p., xiii.

¹⁷⁹ LRI, p., 206.

¹⁸⁰ RM, p., 160.

Because knowledge is possible to a mind only by the animal faith mediated by some feeling, image, or concept at the exact center of psyche's life, the mind cannot discover absolute knowledge or universal truth, but "can only *think* the rest and believe in it (the reality of which we are a part, but cannot, in body or mind, be or become any other part)." ¹⁸¹

In this chapter, we focused on how the psyche was effective in the relationships between the objects of intent, the intuition of essence and the mind. existential reality described by Santayana epiphenomenalism have thus been clarified. Within epiphenomenalism, he preferred the concept of immaterial spirit instead of the concept of consciousness. In this study, we claim on the basis of his ideas mentioned herein that it is a significant contribution to philosophy as he claims that spirit results from within existence although it is immaterial. The reason for such a claim is that he considers spirit by placing the material life of the psyche at the core. Spirit is neither a reason for nor an outcome of the psyche's adventure on earth. It is just a fruition of psyche whenever it finds the opportunity to emerge contingently. Then, how does it join the psyche's life and what kind of a relationship do they have? In the next chapter, we will be addressing the nature of spirit, as well as the relationship between the psyche and the spirit in company with these questions.

¹⁸¹ PGS, p., 518.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMMATERIAL SPIRIT IN THE MATERIAL LIFE OF PSYCHE

4.1. The Life of Psyche in Its Entirety

4.1.1. The Hidden Life of The Psyche is At Work

The belief in substance and the discovery of essence is at the core of Santayana's epistemology. For him, substance and essence shape the unity of experience, so are indispensable parts of his theory of knowledge. These concepts are deeply essential to his naturalist ontology at the same time, because they refer to the realm of matter and the realm of essence, respectively. Since they are of special importance both for epistemology and for ontology, his epistemology and naturalist ontology is deeply attached to each other. This thesis specifically focuses on how they have a function in the emergence of spirit in the life of psyche. Therefore, in our study, we have tried to deal with them in conjunction with the living psyche. That spirit exists in the material existence as a function of psyche is a clear assertion of Santayana's system. This thesis explicitly explores the background of this assertion in his philosophy.

In this chapter, we will primarily consider the life of psyche in its entirety through using the results we have obtained so far. The integrity of her life shows that she is highly organized within the realm of matter. So, how is it possible for moments of spirit to emerge from the activities of the psyche organized within material field? This study argues that this question, which

manifests itself in Santayana's system, can be answered by putting two different functions of psyche to the center. The first of these, psyche as "a movement in the material world" takes an active role in the emergence of intuitions or ideal objects. In this sense, she is "a habit in matter", "a mode of substance" and "a system of tropes." As for the second of these, psyche is a willful or a highly organized agent that forms the matter and puts it into the life within physical existence. The willful psyche as an agent in experience plays a key role in emerging of the objects of consciousness, which we considered as the objects of forth type of the cognitive process in the previous section. Spirit starts to be effective within the material world when they are noticed by it. Here, it represents the capability of entering into intuitions. For this reason, Santayana as an epiphenomenalist thinks that consciousness is the second entelechy of the material body. The first entelechy of the natural body is the mind because matter and essence becomes actual in it. Therefore, we can understand the nature of the relationship between psyche and spirit when we understand how psyche takes part between the ideal objects and the objects of the consciousness within Santayana's system.

As discussed above, materialism or naturalism of Santayana does not discuss human being within a conceptual framework. In his system, s/he is considered within the framework of her/his biological adaptation to the nature as a living creature. Most importantly, the conceptual structure of his philosophy is based on this framework. Santayana develops naturalist ontology based on the material relationship of living creature with the material environment. The relationship of a living creature with the nature and other creatures is embodied in his/her own material environment. For Santayana, this position of human being, which refers to the dynamism in the nature, provides enough material to philosophize. Accordingly, he states

that his system relies on "the common and notorious state of mankind." His concept of common sense refers to such a reality. He clearly expresses that he wishes to deepen the concept of common sense, thus writes the following: "...in fact it was not common *opinion* that I respected or wished to follow...It was rather the common *intellect* that I wished to adopt and to fortify in myself..." The purpose of Santayana is to add a philosophical dimension to the concept of common sense by putting his philosophy of animal faith to the center. Therefore, according to him, his system does not imply a system of the universe, but "a revision of the categories of common sense." 184

First of all, animal faith has an important role in establishing the connections between belief in existence and essence embodied in matter. If these connections were not established by it, it would be impossible to mention common sense. Living creatures intensify their attentions to their environments with instinctive reactions. By this way, they establish a direct connection with their environments. Instinctive reactions, which confirm also intelligent acts, are the origin of habits enabling living creatures to act similarly. Therefore, common sense characterized by these instinctive reactions is one of the most important concepts which motives Santayana's philosophy. This concept indicates the mechanism at the background of knowledge acquisition of the external world. Santayana argues that this mechanism leads to "a form of faith" within the material body, which proves the reality that objects are recognized as belonging to external reality by living creatures. Therefore, he thinks that common sense legitimates his epistemological realism. That is to say, it shows that living creatures do not

¹⁸² RS, p., 273.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p., 278.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 272.

act on the basis of doubt while they give references to the facts in the material world. In this perspective, it consistently confirms the validity of "the social and laborious character of human life." However, Santayana asserts that a sceptic finds this validated reality based on our daily experiences hard to accept. According to him, sceptic only focuses on the possible sense-data whereby we are directly aware of mental images, but is blind to the reality that they refer to the ever-changing world. Therefore, although sceptic accepts the possible data, he thinks that they are neither the source of our knowledge, nor the condition of our experiences. At this point, Santayana confirms scepticism. However, according to him, there is a fact the sceptic cannot see: the beliefs of common sense about the material existence in ever-changing world are at work before the immediate awareness of the possible sense-data emerge. He claims that common sense is a real manifestation of the reality that living creatures do not accept the material existence on the basis of the possible sense-data or the mental images, but they accept them on the basis of the material existence. In this point, Santayana draws such a conclusion: Perception gives us direct awareness of mental images or essences, which are not real and do not exist. Accordingly, events in the material existence are certain, but the possible data or the mental images are not certain because they lack existence. Santayana puts it as follows:

Indeed, existence or fact, in the sense which I give these words, cannot be a datum at all, because existence involves external relations and actual (not merely specious) flux: whereas, however complex a datum may be, with no matter what perspectives opening within it, it must be embraced in a single stroke apperception, and nothing outside it can belong to it all. The datum is a pure image; it is essentially illusory and unsubstantial, however

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¹⁸⁵ SAF, p., 17.

thunderous its sound and keen its edge, or however normal and significant its presence may be. ¹⁸⁶

Then, what is the nature of the possible datum if it lacks existence? For Santayana, it is the obvious as the apparent, but it has not a believable and knowable character in nature: "The datum is apparent in the sense of being self-evident and luminous; and it is apparent also in the sense of merely appearing and being unsubstantial." Therefore, it is the non-existent, a theme of attention and a term in passing thought. According to Santayana, there is only this non-existent quality and this quality is nothing but an essence. Since essence lacks existence, it does not independently establish external relations with the immediate flux. Therefore, Santayana does not discuss essence on its own. It is just an object of the immediate intuition and it can only go beyond the realm of intuition by means of the force, which is external to it. This effect will add the existence within ever-changing world to it. According to Santayana, essences are not open to existence because being open to existence is a function of the animal faculty within the material body or the sentient being, which carries the material impulses of the nature. Therefore, he writes: "there is a snare...in the very essence of knowledge in that it has to be a form of faith, and faith is something psychic rather than spiritual: an expectation and hope addressed to things not seen, because they would match potentialities in the soul." ¹⁸⁸ Animal faith is the first and most important reality, which refers to the sense of openness to existence. Santayana distinguishes between essence and intuition through animal faith. Intuition is posited by animal faith because intuition is the fact

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 34.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 43.

¹⁸⁸ RS, p., 172.

which occurs. According to Santayana, we cannot know anything about the certainty of intuition except its being posited by animal faith.

The fact that intuition is posited by animal faith brings it into the forefront as a key concept for both discourse and experience. Santayana writes: "...what exists - that is, what is carried on through the flux and has changing and external relations – is a life, discourse itself, the voluminous adventures of the mind in its wholeness." Then, refusing the relationship between animal faith and intuition means that the material existence, the material conditions of experience and the continuity of discourse are refused. Here, nothing that does not exist is added to intuition within discourse, thus Santayana's philosophy cannot be interpreted as an essentialist philosophy. Living creatures are aware of essences by means of the act of intuition and these essences give them freedom. Thus, they both become aware of the opportunities presented by life and find an opportunity to realize those opportunities in their own lives. Santayana states: "Living beings dwell in their expectations rather than in their senses. If they are ever to see what they see, they must first in a manner stop living." For him, as perception does not mean perception in itself, but what is not given in intuition, essences are not essences in themselves, but symbols of the not given. Accordingly, he asserts that intelligence is a combination of what is given and what is not given:

If there is to be intelligence at all, the immediate must be vehicular...What is given becomes in this manner a sign for what is sought, and conventional description of it; and the object originally posited by faith and intent in the act of living may be ultimately more and more accurately revealed to belief and to thought...If thought arises at all, it must think something after some fashion; and the essences it evokes in intuition enable it to imagine, to

¹⁸⁹ SAF, p., 56 – 57.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 68.

assert, and perhaps truly to know something about what is not itself nor its own condition: some existing thing or removed event which would otherwise run on blindly in its own medium, at best overtaking the animal unawares, or confronting him to no purpose...intuition of essences first enables the mind to say something about anything, to think of what is not given, and to be a mind at all. ¹⁹¹

Santayana does not relate essence itself to the existence of physical objects, which is not given to the mind directly. Essence has a function as symbol of the material existence to the animal mind. This function of essence arises from the interaction of living creatures with the physical objects. The intention of a physical object created by this interaction or the animal faith changes essence given in intuition into symbols of the not given. Since object is non-existent, essence supports subject in acquiring the knowledge of object. Santayana puts in the following: "A great use of discovery of essence, then, is to justify the notions of intelligence and knowledge, otherwise self-contradictory, and to show how such transcendence of the actual is possible for the animal mind."192 Essences are involved in Santayana's system as the symbols of the object in itself. They do not have a metaphysical content like providing service for any purpose. That is to say, his system cannot be treated them as ends in themselves. He puts: "Each essence that appears appears just as it is, because its appearance defines it, and determines the whole being that it is or has." 193 Essences do not exist, so they are not any part of objects. Therefore, they are not abstracted from things, but universals. 194 This means that they are objects of thought or

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¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 81 – 82.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p., 82.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p., 92.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 93.

forms of being, so have intrinsically repeatable characters, which do not reside in the material conditions, but in their own realm.

As we discussed above, although Santayana thinks that intuition and essences are separated from each other, he accepts that they are intertwined with each other. That is to say, as discussed above, intuition is a view of essence, attention fixed upon it, and not that essence itself. This means that Santayana presupposes that animal faith works in the background and enables intuition to conduct animal attention. This is because an intuition works by referring to another intuition. This mechanism of intuition, which is connected with the animal faith, is the main support of the Santayana's naturalism. For this reason, he argues that intuition is an "actualization", which is different from the essence itself and which refers to the awareness of essence. He states: "Intuition is an emanation of life, an intellectual response of the animal to his vicissitudes; it is an actualization or hypothesis of formal facts in nature, and not added existence on the same plane as its organ." Beliefs in animal faith and psyche that fits into her environment at the center of these beliefs are the substantial sources of the mechanism of intuition. In this connection, Santayana claims that "the organ of intuition is animal psyche, governed by the laws of material life, in other words, but habit; so that it is normal for intuitions to be recurrent, in so far as circumstances allow." ¹⁹⁶ Therefore, Santayana explains how the relationship between intent, intuition and essence is established within a judgment by referring to these substantial resources: "In judgment...there is more than intuition; there is assumed discourse, involving time, transcendent reference, and various adventitious surveys of identical objects. Thus if I wish to believe that any demonstration whatsoever is significant or correct, I must

¹⁹⁵ Santayana, George, *Obiter Scripta*, p., 208-209.

¹⁹⁶ RE, p. 37.

assume (what I can never demonstrate) that there is an active intelligence at work, capable of reverting an old idea...." Santayana's system gives priority to essences within the material existence, but this priority puts the determinative characteristic of the matter, which refers to certain recurring habits that make animal attention possible, into the forefront. That is to say, the essences are involved in the system depending upon the conditions of the material existence in which they remain in the background.

Santayana asserts that challenging the instinctive faith in the ability to pick up old meanings, to think consecutively, to correct ourselves without changing our subject-matter, to discourse and to live rationally is to collapse into the illusion in a blank and timeless aesthetic trance. ¹⁹⁸ Therefore, in the previous chapter, we assert that Santayana deals with psyche in the center of the animal life as the potentiality of mind. In his system, mind is a function of animal life; accordingly, ideal object or the act of intuition is a product of "belief in the material existence" in the animal life of psyche. According to Santayana, in discourse, we adopt the existence on the grounds of the distinction of intuition from the essence intuited. Here, there is no change in the essence before us and the intuition is the term of a motion. Therefore, Santayana asserts that our discourse makes progress in surveying the essence. He continues:

I have found that even when no change is perceived in the image before me, my discourse changes its phases and makes progress in surveying it; so that in discourse I may now assert, when I perceive a motion, that this intuition of change is *true*; that is, that it has actually followed upon the intuition of a static first term, from which my attention has passed to this intuition of change; and this I may now assert without confusing the essences given successively,

¹⁹⁷ SAF, p., 119.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 121.

or trying, like animal perception, to knead one concrete thing out of their incompatible natures. ¹⁹⁹

According to Santayana, essence without intuition, which is existent, would not be the object of contemplation. In this point, appearances, which are accident to essences, are provided by intuition. Intuition is the principle of appearances, which is a contribution from the animal mind, so supplies descriptions of physical things after their existence is posited by animal faith in action and expectation. Therefore, Santayana writes: "This intuition will be vital in the highest degree. It will be absorbed in its object."²⁰⁰ Essences will appear to the life of psyche, which rise to this intuition. Accordingly, Santayana asserts that the spirit or the consciousness is a part of animal life: "The spirit that actually breathes in man is an animal spirit, transitive like the material endeavours which it expresses; it has a material station and accidental point of view, and a fevered presence for one alternative issue over another." The nature of the spirit, which is different from the essence, can primarily perceive essences in relation to the animal life on which it depends. That is to say, animal attention to some external fact occurs when any given essence appears, so animal attention is different from essence in itself, but pertinent to discourse, which is a function of animal life, not a part of essences. If spirit exists in animal life, it is in tendency to get in touch with essences regarding to its environment in which it grows and develops. Therefore, Santayana writes: "irrelevance, incongruity, and contradiction are accordingly possible in discourse only because discourse is not a play of essences but a play of attention upon

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 124.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 130.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p., 125.

them; which attention is no impartial exercise of spirit but a manifestation of interest, intent, preference, and preoccupation. A hidden life is at work."²⁰²

4.1.2. The Emergence of Spirit

For Santayana, this hidden life is the life of psyche. In his system, discourse is a function of her automatic habits, so always works under her direction or instinct. Under the control of the psyche and her environment, discourse becomes experience. Psyche, which provides the continuity of discourse in the nature, motives desires and needs. Within the discourse, she finds the opportunities to develop experiences, which will keep her surrounding world, which is involved in her feelings and passions, under control. The thing that enables her to find itself in the continuity of discourse is the mechanism in immediate flux. As we discussed before, the concept of shock, which means interruption in discourse in Santayana's system, refers to experience, which makes it possible for us to believe in both our own existence and the external reality. According to Santayana, shocks are brute experiences, and discourse becomes particularly evident in these experiences. Therefore, he asserts "shock contradicts nothing, but uproots the whole experience." 203 Shocks or brute experiences interrupt the continuity of discourse, but recording these interruptions within the discourse also enables memory to take part in the life of psyche. That is to say, because any shock experienced before is directly a part of the relationship between the external world and the material organism, its effect continues in intuition. Santayana puts:

...my intuition covers synthetically the coming, the nature, and the subsidence of that shock; so that I am aware how startled I was, without being startled afresh now. A wonderful and ambiguous

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p., 137

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p., 139.

presence of the absent and persistence of the receding, which is called memory. My objects have receded, yet I continue to consider them. 204

According to Santayana, the object of this consideration is not an essence, but faith in something absent, which is concerned with particular matters of fact. In this perspective, experience of shock establishes not only the validity of memory and of transitive knowledge, but also realism. Experience of shock in independent existence is centrally located in both belief in experience or belief in nature and the specification of an essence. Santayana puts this as follows:

All essences are grist for the mill of intuition, and any order or disorder, any quality of noise or violence, is equally appropriate in an experience which, for all I know or as yet believe, is absolute and groundless. And I call it experience, not because it discloses anything about the environment which produced it, but because it is composed of a series of shocks, which I survey and remember.²⁰⁵

As discussed before, in the experience of shock, the first object, which we posit, is a self, so Santayana says "in one sense, the existence of intuition is tantamount to that of a self..." By this way, self finds an opportunity both to gain the knowledge of physical objects and to experience the material world in a way, which is peculiar to itself, through essences, which it encounters during shock experiences. Santayana asserts that this self exists in the center of active and passionate nature of psyche. In this perspective,

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 141.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 146.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 147.

shock experiences only structure the conditions, which enable intuition to repeat, in the life of psyche or self. Thus, Santayana writes:

If I exist, I am a living creature to whom ideas are incidents like aeroplanes in the sky; they pass over, more or less followed by the eye, more or less listened to, recognised, or remembered; but the self slumbers and breathes below, a mysterious natural organism, full of dark yet definite potentialities; so that different events will awake it to quite disproportionate activities. The self is a fountain of joy, folly, and sorrow, a waxing and waning, stupid and dreaming creature, in the midst of a vast natural world, of which it catches but a few transient and odd perspectives.²⁰⁷

According to Santayana, the repetition of intuition does not occur in the context of the previous intuition. Since intuition makes a reference to an essence, it is a different intuition even when it repeats the previous intuition. Therefore, Santayana asserts, "there must be belief in its previous occurrence, with some indication of its original locus." Intuition without memory does not express an event and thus intuition cannot establish a connection without remote existence provided by the memory. Santayana accepts the belief in memory by asserting that "the psyche, in the case of memory, contains all the seeds, all the involutions and latent habits, which the past left there in passing." In his thought, the mechanism, which control the past experiences, is the habits that the animal psyche spontaneously develops in her relationship with the material environment. That psyche controls her habits by reorganizing herself enables her to carry her knowledge of the past experiences into the place, which he is present. For this reason, in Santayana's system, memory is a typical or good

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 149.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 150.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 156.

example of knowledge. He puts: "In remembering I believe that I am taking cognisance not of a given essence but of a remote existence, so that, being myself here and now, I can consider and describe something going on at another place and time." Accordingly, he claims that this leap renders knowledge essentially faith.

Psyche lives in her surrounding environment at the exact center of nature. In this sense, knowledge is another name for the material impulses, which the nature exposes her. Although physical objects situate external to her, she acts by believing in the existence of matter, in which all rational processes are expressions of psyche's animal life. Psyche grounded in the existence of matter or the field of action believes that the knowledge of certain things belongs to herself. Within this context, since the shock of the real or a shock within experience is the source of the brute experience, psyche is the brute response of an animal organism to the brute force of nature. Santayana asserts "in themselves all the points of space-time are equally central and palpitating, and every phase of every psyche is a focus for actual readjustments to the whole universe." ²¹¹ Organism only resists to existence when coordinated with it. However, first of all, animal must posit the existence of certain things in order to achieve this. Beliefs in animal faith are the vital reactions of the organism and psyche that tries to survive in the existence unconsciously acquires habits, which will collect these reactions at a point. Her great plasticity in the nature establishes a ground for interests in survival and so the emergence of animal attention. Living creatures cannot acquire an animal attention, which will turn into an awareness regarding essences, without the animal life of psyche. Then, the psyche as a part of the external world, which has an effect upon on the emergence of

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 164.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 165

intuition while she moves toward physical things, has also direct influence on the emergence of the spirit. If there is not any psyche, which shows a tendency to essences, spirit could never find of itself. Because psyche stays between essences and spirit, essences get close to the spirit and they are contemplated by it. Santayana puts as follows:

So all existing things, past, future, or infinitely distant, are equally within the range of knowledge, if only a psyche happens to be directed upon them, and to choose terms, however poor or fantastic, in which to describe them. In choosing these terms the psyche creates spirit, for they are essences given in intuition; and in directing her action or endeavour, backward or forward, upon those remote events, she creates intent in the spirit, so that the given essences become descriptions of the things with which the psyche is then busied.²¹²

At this place, according to Santayana, spirit is a function of psyche's animal life and it emerges through her animal presumptions and expectations. Thanks to the contribution of psyche to the relationship between animal faith and intuition, the realm of essence serves as a tool to research the material world. This point clearly shows that spirit is a part of the relationships of psyche with its own environment. Then, spirit is not inconsistent with the animal life of psyche from the very beginning. The psyche uses the spirit to obtain the knowledge of the material reality. Animal faith establishes a ground for psyche to instinctively react to the substantial reality and act naturally in it. Psyche that motives organism to survive enables animal faith to be considered by living creatures as intent in the spirit. Here, Santayana argues that spirit enters into the animal life with reactions of the psyche to the substantial reality. Therefore, spirit firstly manifests itself in the field of action. Psyche only acts by focusing the

²¹² *Ibid.*, p., 166.

relationship of the material body and the material organism on a certain point in the field of action. She is not aware of existence. Living creatures only becomes aware of the material existence through the spirit. Although the awareness of spirit occurs when actions are motivated by psyche, the spirit posits existence based on the animal faith at the center of the actions. Santayana puts it as follows:

Experience, for animal faith, begins by reporting what is not experience; and the life of the self, if I accept its endeavors as significant, implies an equally substantial, dynamic, ill-reported world around it, in whose movements it is implicated. In conveying this feeling, as in all else, experience *might* be pure illusion; but if I reject this initial and fundamental suasion of my cognitive life, it will be hard to find anything better to put in its place.²¹³

According to Santayana, our relationship with existence occurs through our beliefs since we live in a substantial reality. Spirit is aware of existence, but it never knows existence directly because its awareness occurs through essences. Santayana states "spirit, therefore, has no need to leap in order to know, because in its range as spirit it is omnipresent and omnimodal." The existence of animal watchfulness or vital sensibility stimulated by the substance in the field of action before the emergence of spirit has a vital importance for the spirit. This is also biological proof in Santayana's essay Three Proofs of Realism in *Essays in Critical Realism*. ²¹⁵According to

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p., 187.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 166

²¹⁵ In this essay, Santayana puts it as follows: "Animals...in pursuing, touching, or recoiling from surrounding things, evidently know them. This knowledge is transitive, since the things known exist side by side with the animal they stimulate, and prior to the reaction and perception which they occasion. This knowledge is also relevant, no matter what sensible essence may be called up by it before the mind, since such essences are the apparent qualities of the thing perceived. The senses of all animals supply them with such signs and their thoughts can often rehearse and anticipate the movements of things by reckoning it up in symbolic terms such as words. It is evident that all animals have relevant

Santayana, the direct observation of state of affairs proves that there is not anything permanent in material existence, so we only use direct observation to draw conclusions about physical object by believing its existence. Animal watchfulness in the continuity of object is the very sense of movement, in which substance is a chief element. According to Santayana, "this experience may be repeated on a larger scale. The psyche, being surrounded by substances, is adapted to them, and does not suspend her adjustments or her beliefs whenever her sensations are interrupted."216 In the flux of existence, thanks to the contribution of animal psyche to the continuity of discourse, essences become our objects, which give rise to terms in discourse. By this way, the possibility of the cognitive relationship between the subject and object manifests itself in the immediate flux. The thing that should be remembered here is that neither essence nor substance is effective in the emergence of this cognitive relationship by itself. However, their combination can provide the conditions, which make it possible. Therefore, cognitive process is closely related to what animal faith posit when an animal psyche acts or a living creature pursue any thing, which they really want. Spirit takes part in this process by itself. Its participation in this process refers to a reality, which is different from the mechanism of intuition. Santayana puts: "For by spirit I understand simply the pure light or actuality of thought, common to all intuitions, in which essences are bathed if they are given."²¹⁷

According to Santayana, passive intuition does not contain anything evident except the given essence itself. The active life of psyche enables intuition to

and transitive knowledge of their environment; so that realistic knowledge is but another name for vital sensibility and intelligence." AFSL, p., 179-180.

²¹⁶ SAF, p., 196

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 214.

be active in the continuity of discourse by working together with intent. However, as we discussed before, this situation does not mean that intuition is active. Intuition, which manifests itself as a part of the relationship between animal psyche and nature, is a fact and an event. But, the recognition of an essence as identical with itself refers the distinction between this essence and its intuition and so is more than the activity of a material self of psyche. Santayana states: "for by spirit I understand not only the passive intuition implied in any essences being given, but also the understanding and belief that may greet their presence." Santayana often mentions that he uses the concept of spirit in a similar meaning to the concept of conscious, which has an important place in the history of philosophy. In his system, the primary function of the spirit is to enlighten the essence by separating it from another essence. Santayana continues:

Spirit is a fountain of clearness, decidedly windblown and spasmodic, and possessing at each moment the natural and historical actuality of an event, not the imputed or specious actuality of a datum. Spirit, in a word, is no phenomenon, not sharing the aesthetic sort of reality proper to essences when given, nor that other sort proper to dynamic and material things; its peculiar sort of reality is to be intelligence in act. Spirit, or the intuitions in which it is realised, accordingly forms a new realm of being, silently implicated in the apparition of essences and in the felt pressure of nature, but requiring the existence of nature to create it, and to call up those essences before it. By spirit essences are transposed into appearances and things into objects of belief...²¹⁹

Then, in Santayana's system, the primary function of spirit performs to transmit the essences, which emerge in passive intuition, to objects of intent and appearances. In his system, intuition in which essences are given has

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 272.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 273-274.

two roles with regards to its relationship with psyche and spirit. One of them is its role on its relationship with psyche that we have focused on so far. In this relationship, the active life of psyche also leads intuition to coact with the dynamic world of flux actively. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that Santayana puts ideal objects, which are thought in connection with perception, into the relationship of psyche with intuition and intent. Here, psyche transmits objects of belief to essences, thus intuition works by referring to other intuitions. Nevertheless, intuition is completely passive in its relationship with the spirit. Here, spirit transmits essences to objects of belief on the basis of the underlying animal life or the psyche. Then, the concept, which has the primary role at the background in both cases, is nothing but intent. For this reason, Santayana asserts that spirit is more than passive intuition in the continuity of discourse. This means that animal faith is very effective in the realm of spirit as intent. Accordingly, Santayana asserts that intent is the dominant element, which is liable for conscious awareness.²²⁰

In the system of Santayana, the choice of essence occurs in intuition in the grip of the psyche. Intuition does not separate itself from essence in the life of psyche. By moving toward the conscious awareness, psyche does not only provide the necessary conditions, which intuition emerges, but also makes a connection between intuition and substance. In this sense, psyche forces intuition to intuit essences, which refer to remote existences and remote events, by applying to beliefs in animal faith. Accordingly, spirit becomes aware of the symbols that will provide the knowledge of external world through intuition of essence, which refers to substance, and plays an important role on psyche's combining her experiences with these symbols. Santayana writes:

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 275.

In intent, in belief, in emotion a given essence takes on a value which to pure spirit it could not have. The essence then symbolises an object to which the animal is tentatively addressed, or an event through which he has just labaoured, or which he is preparing to meet. This attitude of the animal may be confined to inner readjustments in the psyche, not open to gross external observation; yet it may all the more directly be raised to consciousness in the form of attention, expectation, deliberation, memory, or desire.²²¹

For psyche's ability to survive, it is compulsory that she must forge her awareness about the material world ahead in the nature. For this reason, her attempts to survive make both the act of intuition and essences possible for her life. She attains the possibility to acquire the knowledge of the external reality with the emergence of the spirit. She, before anything else, is the essence of the material body and the fact that she has a central role in the emergence of the spirit results from her relationship with the material body. The spirit, which organizes the acts of psyche, primarily becomes aware the superiority of the body over itself. Santayana puts it as follows: "Spiritual minds are the first to recognise the empire of the flesh over the spirit in the senses, the passions, and even in a too vivid imagination."²²² Spirit is inevitable fruit of animal life because the psyche moves in the material body by giving form to the material impulses and becomes organized in the realm of substance by changing her actions into habits. Santayana continues: "Synthesis in thought, correlation, scope, or (as the phrase is) taking things in, is laborious piety on the spirit's part in subservience to the flesh. It is the mental fruit of training, of care: an inner possession rewarding an outer fidelity."²²³ Psyche is at the center of internal and external activities, which

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p., 276.

²²² *Ibid.*, p., 279.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p., 281.

establish the connection between spirit and body. Although spirit cannot emerge in the material body without her, Santayana asserts that there is not a causal relationship between psyche and spirit. He writes:

Human energies have polished the earth's surface and pullulate in it: and it is only too easy for random impulses and contagious phrases to carry mankind away, like sheep after a bellwether. But this guiding or organising or explosive force in animal life is not spirit in any spiritual sense. It is an obscure, complex, groping movement of the psyche, or of many psyches in contact: it is a perpetual readjustment of passionate habits in matter.²²⁴

Psyche depends on the physical impulses within the organism and intuition is a part of the life of psyche, which works in accordance with physical events. In the system of Santayana, intuition, which works in keeping with psyche, cannot be considered as an independent source for intelligence. In this sense, Santayana asserts that spirit is born within the conditions determined by psyche, which is a complex structure developed in the relationship of the animal body with the environment. Her complex structure opens the way from substance to essence for living creatures. The plasticity in the psyche refers to this reality. This means that she works in harmony with the mechanism in the nature, and its harmony with nature has the primary importance on providing the appropriate structures, which will enable spirit to emerge.

Santayana asserts that the organs of spirit are structures, which are mechanisms instituted in nature to keep doing certain things, roughly appropriate to the environment, itself roughly constant. "It is to this approximate fixity of function and habit that spirit owes its distinct ideas, the names it gives to things, and its faith in things, which is a true revelation

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²²⁴ RM, p., 164.

of their existence – knowledge of them stored for use."²²⁵ In these relations, there is gratuitous and contingent matter being disposed to be involved in habits and reiterating its progress in the material flux. The material flux is the life of matter, and the nature of matter is motion and change. The matter becomes more and more complex, dynamic and varied by moving into patterns. The life of psyche is not a closed system in the life of matter, but a complex structure driving each organism. She repeats and exemplifies her own specific patterns in the material world. Therefore, she is the material agent in action and the material self in experience. Santayana claims that action in the material existence comes into existence by favour of the governing forces of nature in the underlying substance, which pertain to matters of fact. Animal faith signifies the form of intentional force behind animal or material and adaptive action. Psyche within animal faith in the form of intent is constantly contingent to the material impulse of the environment. In this condition, "some of the impact of the external world rises to consciousness in the form of intuitions."226 Intent or animal faith enables living psyche to take essences presented in her intuition for signs of material agencies. In this position, the object of perception is not an essence given in intuition, but some existing thing. Therefore, Santayana puts in the following: "Perception is a stretching forth of intent beyond intuition; it is an exercise of intelligence. Intelligence, the most ideal function of spirit, is precisely its point of closest intimacy with matter, of most evident subservience to material modes of being."227

In the light of these considerations, materialism and epiphenomenalism of Santayana presupposes that the life energy of universe flows through an

²²⁵ SAF, p., 282.

²²⁶ GS, p., 84.

²²⁷ SAF, p., 282.

irrational and contingent existence. According to this point of view, we cannot explain this existence to the exclusion of the constant flux of energy. Santayana argues that the indefinite potentiality of all things is implicit in the inexplicable power of immediate flux or the realm of matter. This power, which is the source of existence and the creative material action, cannot be denied. In a sense, the reality in which we live is the inevitable fruit of the material process that turns potentialities into constitutive action. Accordingly, spirit is also an inevitable part of this existence in the universe, which we accept without hesitation. Santayana puts it as follows: "In this very irrationality or contingency of existence, which is inevitable in any case, I find a clue to the strange presence of spirit in this world. Spirit, the wakefulness of attention, could not have arisen of its own accord; it contains no bias, no principle of choice, but is an impartial readiness to know."228 Spirit is irrational no matter where it finds the opportunity to emerge since it is a part of an irrational and contingent existence. Its existence in the material world can only be explained through brute chance and the arbitrary choice of essence taking place in the existence. According to Santayana, this arbitrary existing world makes the animal attention or wakefulness "a witness to animal unrest, appetition, alarm, concern, preparation."229

4.2. The Nature of Spirit

4.2.1. The Willful Psyche as Potentiality of Spirit

According to Santayana, psyche inevitably and impulsively lives in a substantial reality in the flux of matter. In his system, the realm of matter is not defined as an epistemological category. What supports the psyche epistemologically is the connection she establishes with the substance in the realm of action. According to Santayana, there are indispensable and

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 284.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 285.

presumable properties of substance. He lists up five indispensable properties of substance:

- 1. Substance is external to the thought which posits it.
- 2. Substance has parts and constitutes a physical space. All the parts of substance are external to one another.
- 3. Substance is in flux and constitutes a physical time.
- 4. Substance is unequally distributed.
- 5. Substance composes a relative cosmos. ²³⁰

Substance is indifferent to the epistemological connection, which we establish with it. Therefore, every animal organism independently establishes a connection with the substance. From this point of view, different organisms have different perspectives, in terms of their relationships with the substance, even if they exist within the same environment. On this basis, there are also presumable properties of substances. Santayana puts it as follows:

- 1. Substance, in diversifying the field of nature, sometimes takes the form of animals in whom there are feelings, images, and thoughts. These mental facts are immaterial.
- 2. The same mental facts are manifestations of substance.
- 3. Beneath the intermittence of phenomena, the phases or modes through which substance flows are continuous.
- 4. As far as action and calculation can extend, the quantity of substance remains equivalent throughout.
- 5. Each phase or mode of substance, although not contained in its antecedents, is predetermined by them in its place and quality, and proportionate to them in extent and intensity.²³¹

²³⁰ RM, p., 10-11.

The indispensable and presumable properties of substance are assumed by all living creatures. The former is assumed by them in the field of action, and the latter enables them to clear up their action. They form the basis of experience. Santayana tries to clarify the realm of matter by referring to the concept of substance. Substance reveals itself as blind potentiality within the immediate flux. We, therefore, not only see appearances, but also substances in the richness of appearances when we turn towards the world. Appearances of the matter enrich substances and substances enrich appearances of the matter. In this sense, everything in the realm of matter is determined by the change. This is why Santayana suggests that it is impossible to understand the reality without referring to the concept of essence. This also means that presumable properties of substance are not only based on the substance itself. They are based on the relationship between the matter and the essence. That is to say, essence is illustrated in the material flux by the realm of matter. The presumable properties of substance are provided by every illustration of essence in the material existence. Within this framework, Santayana's system asserts that awareness of essence is rooted in the awareness of the properties of substance. Substance is inevitably a part of the material actions. It pushes the living creatures towards positing the existence in the realm of action, thus causes them to raise awareness for its properties. This situation makes Santayana's concept of animal faith one of the most central concepts. In this perspective, he writes in the following:

...I have found from the beginning that the impulse to act and the confidence that the opposite partner in action has specific and measurable resources, are the primary expressions of animal faith; also that animal faith is the only principle by which belief in existence of any kind can be justified or suggested to spirit. It follows that the only object posited by animal faith is matter; and

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p., 41 – 42.

that all those images which in human experience may be names or signs for objects of belief are, in their ultimate signification, so many names or signs for matter.²³²

It is impossible to know what kind of content the field of substance has within itself. However, this field is inevitably at the core of the relationship established with the matter by the animal in the realm of action. The changes in the flux of existence become our objects through its properties. Still, these changes are nothing but symbolic representations to us. Such symbolic representations are indispensable for animal life. As our relationship with them takes place through animal faith, they are not considered knowledge. They are the object of intent and they possess an important content that keeps us alive in the nature. In other words, if we did not have our animal faith for existence within the constantly changing world, the approaching danger could not be noticed beforehand and our survival within the existence would become impossible. Therefore, Santayana asserts that this animal faith is "a faith imposed on every living creature by the exigencies of action and justified in the natural interplay of each animal with his environment." He continues: "Such faith accumulates sufficient and trustworthy knowledge of "things-in-themselves," that is, of the substances, powers, or agencies that actually breed and support animal life."233

In Santayana's philosophy, common sense and animal faith hinge upon the postulate of substance, and they prove that the sensitive body is an integral part of the real material world, so of the material psyche. In the sensitive body, psyche is due "to the spontaneous formation, in living nuclei in

²³² *Ibid.*, p., 43.

²³³ PGS, p., 512.

matter, of organs fit for action and observation."234 Because the material existence is replete with pitfalls and obstacles, it is not a peaceful place for psyche. In the material existence, according to Santayana, what is harmful is experienced as pain by her and what is beneficial is experienced as pleasure. Because pleasure and pain are reactions to the sensitive body, he regards them as feelings. The experience of pleasure and pain in the life of psyche results in the impulse to seek survival at all costs. Santayana puts: "For the animal psyche is retentive and wound up to go on; she is full of survivals and preparations. This gathered experience and this potentiality work within her automatically: but sometimes she becomes aware of them in part, in so far as she learns to project given essences and to develop spatial and temporal perspectives within the specious field of the moment."²³⁵ Within this framework, her active and dynamic life stimulates the animal attention, interests and passions, and the vicissitudes of her life force the animal attention to focus on the material existence. In this perspective, sensory feelings become sensory intuition through her effects on the animal attention. Hence, Santayana asserts "intuition is primitive; it is pervasive" 236 in the life of psyche. Living creatures cannot look or think without evoking it. Without it, it is also impossible for us to evaluate material impulses. Animal organism only experiences material impulses that flow from the flux of matter. Depending on the bodily states, psyche may find a given object suitable or unsuitable, liked or disliked and approached or avoided. Accordingly, Santayana claims that "intuition, then, is always with us, but dispersed over occasions that continually confuse and interrupt it."²³⁷ In the

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 545.

²³⁵ RM, p., 63.

²³⁶ RS, p., 93.

²³⁷ *Ibid*.

field of action, intuition is directly associated with substance posited by animal. The relation between living creatures and existing things is established in this way. Accordingly, Santayana asserts "essence is indeed everywhere at hand." That the realm of essence has the pervasive presence in everywhere means that "essence is certainly the deepest, the only inevitable, form of reality." 239

According to Santayana, unless the immediate flux is a flow through essences, which signifies forms of being differing from one another, it could not be a flux perceived by living creatures. Santayana makes clear this position in these utterances: "Essence is just that character which any existence wears in so far as it remains identical with itself and so long as it does so; the very character which it throws overboard by changing, and loses altogether when it becomes something else."²⁴⁰ In Santayana's system, all essences have separately eternal and everlasting characters. Any essence that is merely identical to itself is isolated from the other essences and its difference explains other essences within the context of eternity. They stand behind every form that the matter takes in the course of existence. Notwithstanding, they do not exist on their own. They appear and disappear in the course of existence. That is to say, they are both everywhere and nowhere. However, existing things cannot be everlasting in the contingency of existence. That is to say, "to be able to become something else, to suffer change and yet endure, is the privilege of existence, be it in a substance, an event or an experience; whereas essences can be exchanged, but not changed."²⁴¹ Accordingly, Santayana writes: "everything, then, seems to be

²³⁸ RE, p., 1.

²³⁹*Ibid.*, p., 14.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 23

²⁴¹ *Ibid*.

a mechanism of circumstances, of which the essences realised at distinct moments are, for the naturalist, only idle signs."²⁴²

According to Santayana, essences are never baseless things. They are based on feelings. At the same time, substance is the principle of the material continuity, so the relation between the material body and the substantial reality takes precedence of essences. Psyche as a "habit in matter", "mode of substance" and "system of tropes" has two directions. She acts as a bridge between the material substance and the eternal essence within the sensitive body, so she creates a field for the emergence of intuition. In this way, the reality of the material world starts to be reflected on the mind. This means that "nothing could be further from the fact, or more incongruous with animal life and sensibility. That which appears to sense is determined at each moment by the liveliness and direction of the psyche in her current reactions."243 The ideal objects regarded as the third type objects of cognitive process in the previous chapter primarily refer to the world of substances behind the flux of appearances. These objects start to be intellectualized when the psyche manifests itself in the material existence. Santayana claims that substance cannot exist in material things, but flows through them. He continues: "It bestows on them their hereditary qualities and quantities, and their place in nature. Without substance each phenomenon would be an insulated essence, lacking all force or movement, either internal or transcendent and incapable of existing in itself or of imposing itself at any particular moment on any particular mind."244 For this reason, substance mediates the relationship between the living psyche, which is the source of the act of intuition, and the intuition, which is the

²⁴² RM, p., 97.

²⁴³ RE, p., 35.

²⁴⁴ RM, p., 85.

source of essence. All acts of intuition or intuitions are the intentional acts directed upon the not given and their specific objects are dependent on the living psyche, and the objects of intuition are essences conceived as spatio-temporally particularized or instantiated in Santayana's system.

As the psyche is in the field of substance, ideal objects or all acts of intuition initiate mental processes. At this point, psyche is the most compatible component of the nature and her life has primary impact in ensuring the favourable conditions for the emergence of intuitions. In Santayana's system, intuition and psyche are events in the physical time and place. Physical time and place are integral elements of events in the realm of matter. Accordingly, physical place is relative positions of events to each other, and physical time is the consecution of these events. Santayana claims that "interaction and genesis involve this sort of space and time, or create them." Physical time and space are contingent and explored by action rather than reasoning. They are the integral components of a physical moment in which intuition manifests itself. Santayana puts it as follows:

Intuition, when it arises, arises within a physical moment, and expresses a passing condition of the psyche. Feelings and thoughts are parts of natural events; they belong the self which generates them in one of its physical phases. Intuition creates a synthesis in present sensibility; it is an act of attention occurring here and now. It has not, intrinsically, any miraculous transcendence, as if it spontaneously revealed distant things as they are or were or shall be. Yet in expressing the moment intuition evokes essences; and these essences, coming as they come in the heat of action, and attributed as they are to the objects of physical pursuit or physical attention, may bring tidings of facts at any distance. 246

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 46.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 62-63.

Santayana regards the spatio-temporal world in which we live as the pictorial space and sentimental time, which are symbolic forms of physical time and space. According to him, sentimental time is a genuine version of the march of existence and pictorial space is a genuine version of its distribution. Therefore, they are known by common sense and psyche, which are located in them. They enable the psyche to develop sensitivity to her environment and to be alert what is happening. Santayana believes that they is flooded with natural moments indicating the events. He says that by natural moments, I mean events, which exemplify essences, "facts generated and dated in a general flux that outruns them on every side." A natural moment in itself sets an example of an essence's being picked from the realm of essences by the matter and of the suspension of other essence. In this context, existence is characterized by both the realm of essence and the realm of matter.

Natural moments are both the beginning and the end giving the direction, in which matter may flow through it, a reference. Accordingly, Santayana asserts that "every natural moment is both traditional and propulsive. It has a beginning and an end, a head and a tail – the head turned towards the end, and the tail towards the beginning." He regards the direction in natural moments as a forward tension: "Forward tension, then, will designate fairly enough whatsoever corresponds, within a natural moment, to the external fact that it occurs between two others, one of which an observer would call its antecedent and the other its consequent." This concept is inherent in the changing succession of essences instantiated by matter. Santayana

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p., 64.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 89.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 89.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 91.

characterizes the inner mechanism of the material world by means of this concept. It directs the course of the material events in the flux of matter. Because the field of existence is simply the field of action and the material psyche is an event in the field of action, forward tension also characterizes all her instincts, desires and passions. Santayana puts it as follows:

A man, with the forward tension of all his instincts and passions, notoriously springs from a seed; and he develops from the heart of that seed, internally, as it transforms and organizes the food which comes to it and which selects. Seed and food: these are the conditions *a parte priori* of a man's existence; a seed, to transmit the centre of organisation and impose its specific hereditary from; and food to supply suitable matter to pass through that form and sustain it in existence. So this conventional moment, this individual life, begins and is established...²⁵¹

Psyche within natural moments designated by the forward tension has also her own distinctive trope, in which she exhibits an instinctive readjustment. This means that she governs her actions in her environment according to mechanism, in which she nourishes and reproduces herself. In the mechanical world, as we mentioned before, she is a definite potentiality rooted in a seed. Accordingly, the development of the psyche refers to changes that occur as a psyche grows and develops in direct proportion to being physically healthy, mentally alert, emotionally sound and ready to learn. Santayana continues: "Such an innate but merely potential trope, which an animal strives to realize by growth and action, has the aspect of a will; it may become conscious of its own ultimate form, but rather of incidental contrasts between pleasure and pain, success and failure, involved in the realization of its destiny." At this point, not only the psyche, but

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p., 92-93.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p., 116.

also her animal life is a part of the material existence. Santayana believes that her animal life, which is one of the most significant parts of the natural processes, emphasizes an animal Will. In his opinion, it is steered by the needs of the organism. He uses the word 'needs' in broad terms. As the animal Will is steered by needs, it plays a significant role in enabling the psyche to discover the properties of objects and their relationships with other objects. It is, therefore, in perfect harmony with the psyche.

Santayana asserts that the material force, which organizes matter into specific forms, is the universal Will, "which is the observable endeavor in things of any sort to develop a specific form and to preserve it."253 Accordingly, whenever material impulses, which stem from material force, organize the material body into organic forms, the universal Will is nothing but the material psyche. Santayana writes: "According to this use of terms, the psyche becomes a particular instance of universal Will, found whenever the form to be maintained is organic and preserved by nutrition and reproduction. Then spirit, too, may be called an expression of Will, since it arises at a specifically energetic phase in the life of the psyche, namely, when the range of adjustment and control begins to extend beyond the body."254 While spirit arises in highly organized psyche, it is a conscious instance of the universal Will. Here, the psyche as the most highly organized form of matter directs her needs; she also shapes the material reality. This is why she also sets an example of the universal Will. In this sense, she is an unconscious spirit and an inevitable material reality. Conscious spirit manifests itself in the desire of psyche to know rather than to randomly react to her environment. While psyche can react only impulsively and instinctively to her environment, spirit has the ability to

²⁵³ RS, p., 53.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 54.

describe events in the material environment. Here, the Will is the name for the principle of organization in the realm of matter. Thanks to the animal Will or the psyche, which is a part of the universal Will, an organism obtains the ability to find the suitable form when it becomes unbalanced. Santayana puts: "We may then say that spirit arises whenever Will in one place finds it profitable to mark, trace, and even imitatively to share the movement of Will elsewhere."²⁵⁵

The Will pushes the psyche in order that she takes the suitable forms to ensure the survival of the organism. The will is, therefore, an internal part of her adaptation process. In a healthy Will, Santayana asserts, "adaptation far from being a compromise or a mutilation, may be a happy development, bringing out latent faculties of the psyche, and enriching life with an increased relevance and responsiveness to different orders of things."256 Adaptation process, which is fundamental to the maintenance of psyche's life, is managed by the flux of substance based upon universal Will. For this reason, Santayana thinks that the Will is responsible for the intelligent adaptation of the psyche to her environment. In this perspective, the willful psyche as an organized pattern or trope in the substantial reality is the derivative of the force of universal Will and spirit is a product of this willful psyche. Therefore, spirit, which is a function of the willful psyche, is a manifestation of the Will. According to Santayana, "this spirit is spontaneous, disinterested, intellectual in its essence; but it does not live, as sometimes it imagines, on its own resources or by its own power."257 Its nature and function enlarges the capacity of the psyche to adapt herself to remote things and to change with the material existence. By becoming

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 55.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p., 57 − 58.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.* ,p., 64.

materially sensitive to remote things, psyche creates intent in the spirit and acquires a mental cognizance of the material world. Hence, Santayana puts in the following: "The whole experience of spirit expresses natural predicaments. Spirit suffers hunger and thirst; it hates, it fears, it loves, it inquires, it feels perplexed and forsaken. It is merely the psyche become consciousness."

Santayana thinks conscious spirit is born in the willful psyche which acts in order to find substances that provide the basis for nutrition and reproduction in her material environment filled with unpredictable/chaotic circumstances or dangerous situations. The willful psyche grapples with conflicting forces, which ravage the balance of nature, in order to maintain and develop her own status. She, as a moving equilibrium and a system of tropes, which exhibit a readjustment when distracted, is concentrated against both any distraction, which refers to physical barriers in the material existence, and any disintegration, which will ruin her dynamic and active life in harmony with nature. Her animal attention and her readiness for action to provide the basis for her requirements of nutrition and reproduction will end up with the emergence of spirit. That is to say, Santayana asserts that she distracts the spirit because of her willful efforts to maintain her focus on the material world. He puts: "Even fundamental functions, like nutrition and reproduction, since they engage the same organism, may come into conflict, and each will then be distracting to the spirit in so far as it interferes with the other." Therefore, the discipline of psyche in the bodily faculties and the regulation of external impulses are important for the spirit to improve its ability to maintain its attention. Since spirit does not have an ability to manage the material processes and any equipment to obtain this ability, it

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 65.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 130.

has a tendency to watch the material processes rather than controlling them. Santayana states: "spirit is the witness of the cosmic dance; in respect to that agitation it is transcendental and epiphenomenal; yet it crowns some impulse, raises it to actual unity and totality, and being the fruition of it, could not arise until that organ had matured." In this respect "its essence is to be light, not to be power; and it can never be pure light until it is satisfied with an ideal dominion, not striving to possess or to change world, but identifying itself only with the truth and beauty that rise unbidden from the world into the realm of spirit." Evidently, from his point of view, impotent and passive spirit is earthling and it follows in the footsteps of the willful psyche, in which spirit acquires the ability to penetrate into the realm of essence.

4.2.2. The Immaterial Spirit

Santayana argues that the conception of matter is honest and inevitable for a philosophical investigation. It is dynamic and self-subsisting, and so the principle of existence: "it is all things in their potentiality, and therefore the condition of all their excellence or possible perfection." It has primacy in the immediate flux in which all objects and impulses are given. According to Santayana, it is impossible to say that there could be an existential flux, unless it was a perceptual flux through essences. He puts in the following: "Existence at every step casts off one essence and picks up another: we call it the same existence when we are able to trace its continuity in change, by virtue of its locus and proportions." Essence is not the sense datum, not

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 8.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p., 89.

²⁶² RM, p., v.

²⁶³ RE, p., 23.

the form of things, not abstracted from the material world, not thought, not image and not intrinsic quality of things. Santayana states that "they are what they are; and of all the meanings of the word is-existence, substance, equivalence, definition, etc., the most radical and proper is that in which I may say of anything that it is what it is."

The building blocks of Santayana's philosophy underlie his theory of essence, even if he tends to bring the flux of matter forward within the context of his own materialist concerns. The natural organism taking the data in the immediate flux finds himself in the realm of spirit in company with the discovery of essence. According to Santayana, existing things which is indefinite and only endured depend on external relation in the flux of nature; however, self-identical essences which are definite and thinkable "are given bodily in intuition." This, primarily, means that Santayana attributes his thoughts about the mind and the self to the natural organism within the material body, which produces "the conscious awareness." Idealism in the history of philosophy tended to explain our subjective lives by centralizing our cognitive abilities. Contrary to this thought, Santayana puts the psyche and the self in the same category.²⁶⁶ For him, the source of cognitive abilities is the network of material connexions among psyche, intuition and self. However, even if the material relationships are a fountain for our thoughts, he separates the conscious awareness or spirit from material processes because of the fact that he accepts it as an immaterial entity. He puts as follows:

...the fountain of my thoughts, that is, the self who thinks them, is psyche, and that movements there guide my thoughts and render

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 5.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 39.

²⁶⁶ "...the self posited by the sense of shock is a living psyche." SAF, p., 147.

them, as the case may be, intelligent, confused, rapid, or halting; also supply my language, dictate my feelings, and determine when my thinking shall begin and where it shall end. But the light of thought is wanting there, which is the very thinking; and no fine inspection of behavior nor interweaving of objects will ever transmute behavior into intuition nor objects into the attention which, falling upon them, turns them from substances or essences into objects of actual thought.²⁶⁷

Therefore, when we consider the relationship between psyche and spirit, the idea that the animal organism is evolved from psyche to spirit does not mean that the spirit is reduced to matter. Therefore, psychic processes do not consist of conscious awareness, because "all possible terms in mental discourse are essences existing nowhere; visionary equally, whether the faculty that discovers them be sense or thought or the most fantastic fancy."²⁶⁸ Living creatures in the field of action freely intuit essences. Santayana says "this world of free expression, this drift of sensations, passions, and ideas, perpetually kindled and fading in the light of consciousness, I call the *Realm of Spirit*." The essences randomly picked by the realm of matter do not appear and disappear only in the flux of existence, but they also show similar characteristics within the realm of spirit. Santayana treats matter, essence and spirit ontologically because matter is the principle of the material flux, essence is eternally what it is, and spirit is pure light and perpetual actuality, in which there is nothing persistent or potential. We should understand Santayana's treatment of spirit as a separate realm of being within this scope. He says: "by spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything – the

²⁶⁷ SAF, p., 245.

²⁶⁸ RE, p., viii.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p., x-xi.

ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought."²⁷⁰ Over here, the difference between psyche and spirit can be recognized clearly. Psyche indicates a fully organized material structure within organism and it differentiates from spirit in this respect. At one and the same time, it refers to a dynamic life linking the material body to the immaterial mind. Therefore, for Santayana, an attempt to understand the nature of the light of spirit within its boundaries would be a categorical mistake.

According to Santayana, essences penetrate into the animal life as soon as the realm of matter invites the spirit to the stage by the agency of intuitions. He puts: "...by intuition I mean direct and obvious possession of the apparent, without commitments of any sort about its truth, significance, or material existence. The deliverance of intuition is some pure essence." For this reason, spirit does not ensure the occurrence of essence and in addition to this, it is not the entity that makes the mental activities emerge. Santayana puts in the following:

The passions, in so far as they are impulses to action, entangle us materially in the flux of substance, being intent on seizing, transforming, or destroying something that exists: but at the same time, in so far as they quicken the mind, they are favourable to the discernment of essence; and it is only a passionate soul that can be truly contemplative. ²⁷²

Santayana's materialism presupposes that matter takes an active role in the emergence of spirit. His materialism asserts that spirit completely lacks an internal principle that uses its situation in the material existence to revive itself. That is to say, "...the nature of spirit is not, like that of matter, to be a

²⁷⁰ RM, p., 139.

²⁷¹ RS, p., 92.

²⁷² RE, p., 16.

principle of existence and movement, but on the contrary a principle of enjoyment, contemplation, description, and belief... its primary nature is to be secondary – to be observant and intelligent...it cannot originate the animal powers and passions which it comes to express." Santayana's separation of essence and spirit from the realm of matter in certain points and his attempt to understand the relationship between them without excluding the natural organic body enables him to shape an epiphenomenal characterization of the reality. At this place, like the realm of essence, the realm of spirit is also passive and impotent. For this reason, nature does not support the spirit to acquire a total grasp on the substance life of psyche, existence and the realm of matter as well as not providing a chance to living creatures for an intrinsic evaluation about essences.

According to Santayana, the substance under the moving force of the material world is being continually carried to a certain form in company with a continuous pattern. He regards this pattern as a trope, which "is not a power, only a description; it simply puts all the included facts in the places which they have always taken spontaneously." He asserts that the psyche as a mode of substance exhibits a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, and the acquired habits established in matter. Obscure and complex movement of psyche is the guiding or organizing or explosive force in animal life and a perpetual readjustment of passionate habits in matter. But, "the psyche is not another name for consciousness or mind. Everything truly conscious or mental-feeling, intuition, intent-belongs to the realm of spirit. We may say of spirit, but not of the psyche, that its essence is to think." To try to understand the relationship between psyche and spirit by

²⁷³ RM, p., 163.

²⁷⁴ RS, p., 75.

²⁷⁵ RM, p., 139.

considering Santayana's evaluations in his different works make the analysis of his ideas difficult for us. Although this condition may complicate our understanding of him, his position about the dependency of the realm of spirit on the material existence is a crystal-clear fact. He puts as follows:

"The spirit that actually breathes in man is an animal spirit, transitive like the material endeavors which it expresses." ²⁷⁶

"The office of matter is precisely to breed mind and to feed it." ²⁷⁷

"Matter is the principle of distribution for spirit as for every other feature of the existing world." ²⁷⁸

"As the flesh is the necessary organ of spirit, so the world is its inevitable environment, and its appointed theme when spirit is intelligent." ²⁷⁹

Do these ideas of Santayana show the links between them explicitly? Although it is a controversial issue whether his situation is clear enough or not, well we know that the actual substance of natural world which represents the matter is a dark principle of the material existence, which is defined as "surd" by Santayana. That is to say, even if we presuppose the power of matter as the main source of all processes behind the vitality, there is a permanent dark side of the flux of existence. Maybe we should understand what Santayana writes about the nature of essence and spirit by taking the dark side of the matter into consideration. The spirit emerges from the dark sides of the material existence, which it cannot comprehend

²⁷⁶ SAF, p., 125.

²⁷⁷ Santayana, George, *The Realm of Truth: Book Third of Realms of Being*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938 p., 35.

²⁷⁸ RS, p., 20.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 194.

retrospectively because of the impotency of essences. This is why the roots of spirit in the psyche and the matter make the spirit helpless against the material existence. Santayana states: "The spirit I speak of...dwells, not in setting suns, but in human bodies, bodies breeding a thousand passions and diseases by which the spirit also is tormented, so that it congenitally longs at first for happiness and at last for salvation." Whether the material roots of spirit are sufficient to make the spirit clear or not is a slightly different problem from mind/body problem. In this place, a question manifests itself: How does Santayana, who does not deny that spirit has its own peculiar nature other than material, organic and natural basis, justify his thoughts? According to him, consciousness is the inevitable outpourings proper to an existence which is in flux and gathers itself into living bodies. Santayana continues: "in consciousness the psyche becomes festive, lyrical, rhetorical; she caps her life by considering it, and talking to herself about the absent parts of it. Consciousness is a spiritual synthesis of organic movements." Accordingly, if consciousness did not exist, it would not be possible for psyche to exceed its material limits. Santayana continues:

...in fact, on account of its organic seat and material conditions, consciousness is significant. Its very datum is an index, and may become in its eyes a symbol, for its cause. In other words, consciousness is naturally cognitive. Its spiritual essence renders it an imponderable sublimation of organic life, and invisible there; yet it is attached historically, morally, and indicatively to its source, by being knowledge of it. ²⁸¹

Santayana claims that the reality pointed out by his concept of spirit is closely related to the concept of *pensee* or *cogitatio* in Descartes's or

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p., ix.

²⁸¹ RM, p., 157.

Spinoza's philosophy. 282 However, he clearly expresses that he does not add the meaning, which refers to the power that compels the things to become what they already are, to its nature. For him, it does not have any context out of the material existence and the physical power. He says that "what I call spirit is only that inner light of actuality or attention which floods all life as men actually live it on earth"283, and "...its essence is to think, to love, to be awake, watchful, and transitive." 284 On this basis, he asserts that "in the spirit, by definition, there is nothing persistent or potential. It is pure light and perpetual actuality"²⁸⁵ and "a living light ready to fall upon things, as they are spread out in their weight and motion and variety, ready to be lighted upon."²⁸⁶ Before anything else, spirit sees into essences and arranges them. Its pure light is a witness to their individual natures. As discussed above, essences are not metaphysical powers, mental events or concepts beyond the world of appearances. In addition to this, they are not intrinsically attractive or detestable and it is impossible to be regarded them as superior to existence. "They are identical and individual, universal and non-existent; they are not imaginary, nor abstract, nor, except by chance, the terms of discourse. They alone are luminous in a world where the texture of events is confused and puzzling; but they are not therefore friendly to man, but only innocent of all regard for mortals." Accordingly, self-identical essences are passive and impotent, and therefore it is impossible for them to

²⁸² RS, p., vii.

²⁸³ *Ibid*.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 298 – 299.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 18. Santayana's epiphenomenalism should be understood within this context. According to him, goings-on in the mind do not arise from the realm of spirit, but causal chains in the realm of matter. Therefore, spirit lives in the close interplay between the sensitive individual and the material world.

²⁸⁶ SAF, p., 273.

²⁸⁷ AFSL, p., 309.

actualize themselves without the power of matter. Both the selection of essence in the existence and its occurrence in intuition indicates to the power of matter in every sense. The willful psyche which is, in a sense, a branch of matter in the material body finds its meaning in both the intuition of essences and the emergence of spirit or consciousness.

Santayana says that spirit is a pure light and a perpetual activity, so "will a symptom, not a cause; its roots as well as its consequences are invisible to it, material, and often incongruous and astonishing."288 Since the roots of spirit are within the material reality and spirit is an epiphenomenon the flux of existence, its role in the reality is only the disclosure of the organizing power of the matter or the universal Will. Santayana puts in the following: "Matter in any one of its moments and in any one of its atoms no foothold for consciousness: but let certain tropes and cycles be established in the movement of matter cohere and pulse together in an organism, and behold, consciousness has arisen."289 Therefore, "conscious will" has a secondary influence on the life. That is to say, a material psyche is an instance of the Will as an animal Will and the spirit as a function of a highly organized psyche in the material reality is an expression of the Will. According to this point of view, spirit's relationship with psyche is grounded on the material reality, it is impossible for the psyche to use the spirit as a tool against the dangerous situations that she encounters. Santayana asserts that it suffers from both her bodily faculties and her wrong commitments to the material world. He regards the internal discordance between psyche and spirit in these conditions as the distraction of the spirit. He puts it as follows: "By distraction I understand the alien force that drags the spirit away from the

²⁸⁸ RM, p., 121.

²⁸⁹Santayana, George, *The Realm of Truth*, p., 110-111.

spontaneous exercise of its liberty, and holds it down to the rack of care, doubt, pain, hatred, and vice." ²⁹⁰

According to Santayana, in the realm of spirit, intuition is hindered by distractions of the Flesh, the World and the Devil. The Flesh is continually threatened by ageing, disease and death and helpless in the face of the flux of matter. According to Santayana, because spirit is inescapable dependence on it, spirit is over and done with when the body dies. The world in the flux of matter is a treacherous place to live. Santayana thinks that it is also contradictory and unpredictable: "The world, then, however familiar superficially, is in its blindness and in its treachery utterly contrary to the spirit. The world is not as it looks, it contradicts what it teaches, it leaves memories which it stultifies, and excites hopes which it betrays."²⁹¹ Lastly, Santayana asserts, the Devil is an enemy, which is internal to spirit. This concept refers to a war, in which the spirit contradicts itself. That is to say, Santayana says "...when each passion begins to asserts its primary right to life and to liberty, spirit has come upon an enemy in the spiritual sphere."²⁹² The Devil may drive us insanity and suicide. 293 The spirit suffers these contradictions because it exists and dies in the world, and is a natural being, an emanation of universal Will. In this sense, it is evident that pure intuitions do not occur in animal life. However, Santayana believes, because "spirit is essentially dateless, and its immediate terms are essences in

²⁹⁰ RS, p., 119.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 143.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p., 165.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p., 194-195.

themselves eternal"²⁹⁴ it may find a chance to exceed all these distractions by turning only to eternal essences. He puts it as follows:

What profit has the spirit in existing, and who are its true friends and true enemies? To which I reply: The perfect function of spirit is pure intuition. By the very impulse that generates it, intuition tends to become pure. It is the movement of apprehension by which anything is given to consciousness; and there is a natural joy in it, whenever it can live unimpeded by fatigue or pain, and not harassed by care, fear, doubt, desire or any other obsession about the not-given. Distress at its source and distraction about its objects are the enemies of spirit; and its salvation comes when it is freed from all distress or distraction, and becomes pure intuition, be the theme of that intuition simple or complex, a breath of morning air or the sum total of possible knowledge.

At this point, free spirit simply and purely watches essences that appear and disappear in their own realm: "A perfectly free spirit (if it could exist) would not consider eternal beings in their ideal capacity, because it would no longer refer to the fancies or hopes of some living creature, but would consider in themselves, ranging from one to another quite speculatively..." By doing this, it cannot aim either to reach out into the dark sides of the matter or to acquire a deep understanding of the cosmos. Moreover, since it cannot be able to manifest itself without psyche, it is not possible for it to actualize liberation in the full sense of the word. But, Santayana states: "We should liberate the spirit quite enough from the flesh if we could liberate the flesh from all that, as flesh, distorts, starves, and degrades it." Spirit is not in need of being free, however; if there is a

²⁹⁴Santayana, George, *Winds of Doctrine & Platonism and The Spiritual Life*, Gloucester, Mass. Peter Smith, the United States of America, 1971, p., 275.

²⁹⁵ RS, p., 91-92.

²⁹⁶Santayana, George, Winds of Doctrine & Platonism and The Spiritual Life, p., 285.

²⁹⁷ RS, p., 193.

liberation from the worries of the psyche, and spirit is going to be free at the end of the day, this is only possible through using the power of the Flesh to good account. This does not mean that this liberation is removed from the world for spirit. Quite the contrary, "when the World, the Flesh, and the Devil are understood, when the World and the Flesh are in some measure controlled and directed to serve the health and happiness of the psyche, the spirit is freed to perform its own function."

According to Santayana, if the spirit gets an opportunity to contemplate the essences, it will open the door of the spiritual life slightly. All the same, spirituality is not the denial of the animal psyche in his system. That is to say, according to him, spiritual life does not destroy the positive possessions of the animal psyche to which the spirit is attached. He asserts that "it is merely to disinfect them, to view them as accidents, to enjoy them without claiming them, to transcend without despising them."²⁹⁹ In spiritual life, spirit purely and simply witnesses and observes the integration of psyche with the material existence and "it lives by finding itself in the world, by seeing how the world wags, by tracing with emotion the tragedies of history. The greater the range or deeper the insight of spirit the more inextricably will it live the life of the world, though not as the world lives it "300" Santayana believes that if the relationship between the willful psyche and the material world was grounded on the perfect harmony, then it would not be possible to speak of spirit and spiritual life. Therefore, he states, "spirit is bred in the psyche because the psyche, in living, is obliged to adjust herself to alien things: she does so in her own interest: but in taking cognizance of other things, in moulding a part of her dream to follow their alien fortunes,

²⁹⁸ Arnett, Willard E., Santayana and The Sense of Beauty, p., 147-148.

²⁹⁹ RS, p., 200.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 194.

she becomes intelligent, she creates spirit."³⁰¹ In his system, psyche as a willful agent is a necessarily mythical character for the hereditary system of material preferences and dispositions that underlie the conscious awareness. However, he puts: "...the cosmos – not feeding or breeding – can have no psyche, but only psyches within it; and the spirit is no psyche, but always has some psyche beneath, which sustains it."³⁰²

In Santayana's philosophy, the unconscious psyche and the conscious spirit are based on the same reality; however, they point to two different realms of being. In the material reality, moments of spirit are symptoms of psychic movements in animal life, which refer the maturing instincts of the inner psyche. So, Santayana asserts "at certain junctures animal life, properly a habit in matter, bursts as with a peal of bells into a new realm of being, into the realm of spirit." At this point, the psyche comes to the forefront as a character that both shapes the material body and carries it to spiritual moments. As the willful psyche gets organized in the realm of substance, it starts using the power of the matter or the universal Will more effectively to adapt herself to new circumstances. Santayana puts: "Spirit is therefore a concomitant effect of physical causes and not a separate cause descending from another world." This concomitant effect proper to the willful psyche imagines, perceives, contemplates and evaluates the material reality by using the eternal essences. Therefore, Santayana puts: "Spirit is incarnate by

³⁰¹Santayana, George, Winds of Doctrine & Platonism and The Spiritual Life, p., 284.

³⁰² RM. p., 143.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p., 156.

³⁰⁴ RS, p., 282.

nature, not by accident. Otherwise it would not possess the lyrical, moral, impassioned character that makes it spiritual."³⁰⁵

Spirit is crucial for the living creatures, in terms of enhancing their knowledge on material existence. But, Santayana also addresses spirit as rather moral category, not as an epistemological one. It is a form of life. He expresses its properties as its interest in and curiosity for the material existence. What keeps its interest and curiosity alive is the constantly changing substance. Santayana thinks that nothing comes to intuition in which essences reveal before the sensitive body is stimulated by the change in the environment. Intuition is nothing but an active perception in the life of psyche directed by the source of stimulation. Nevertheless, the spirit always remains identical to itself in the face of change, as its objects are essences. What brings essences to the spirit is the animal interests of the underlying psyche. When we consider that the living psyche in the continuity of discourse eliminates the results that are incompatible with the facts and redefines facts within the dialectic process³⁰⁶, it will be easier for us to grasp Santayana's spirit. Santayana thinks that every new essence contemplated by the spirit indicates that the spirit owes its existence to the animal life of psyche. According to him, if the psyche were not here, then

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 43.

³⁰⁶ In Santayana's thought, the dialectic process is pertinent to the intuition, which is itself incidental to animal life, the essence, which crystallizes in the process of discourse, and the intent, which directed to this essence. He puts it as follows: "Intuition lyrically marks the chief crises in material life, when some organ composes and accelerates its movement, turning it into a musical note. Dialectic is merely a change of scope in this organic synthesis by which a new essence is substituted for the one first given, that is, for the theme and terms of the analysis or deduction; a change by which the original essence, in disappearing, is identified with a part of the new one, or with a whole of which the new one is a part. The transitions is discursive, their necessity is merely psychical; but they lead to intuitions in which essences appear having intrinsically a logical complexity corresponding more or less perfectly to the stages of discourse which preceded.; this correspondence, so far as it goes, makes the validity of dialectic, a validity which cannot be intrinsic to the essence reached in the conclusion, since it is the validity of a process, of a series of substitutions and identifications." (RE, p., 102)

the conscious spirit could not have found a place at all within the material existence and human lifestyle would not have begun. However, it would be wrong to regard the spirit as a compulsory category in Santayana's system. The animal life of psyche renders it inevitable and perpetually renews it. We can understand why Santayana characterizes it as inevitable in this way: In the Paleolithic era, if the man who rubbed stones together could not discover how to control the sparks caused by them, his conscious would not develop. His belief in the external world or "a specific assurance and expectancy turned towards the not-given" supports the cognitive aspect of intuition that leads to the emergence of spirit. The animal faith, which assisted the animal in finding its way in the material world, ensures that the willful psyche is fully organized within the realm of matter and, thus, develops the capacity of spirit to contemplate essences given in intuition. In this case, psyche is the specific seed of material life since she is both the form of the material body and the animal Will in the organizing power of the matter, so efficacious, and spirit is immaterial since it originates in the life of psyche and it has no life of its own, so without efficacy.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In Santayana's philosophy, the ontological character of the realm of matter is related to its being a power that forms the immediate flux by using the realm of essence. On the other hand, the ontological character of the realm of essence is related to its remaining as whatever it is, without changing. The fact that the realm of essence is closed to external relations is vital for the initiation of the cognitive process. Santayana asks the following question: If essences have no external relations, and therefore no implications, what can be the source of dialectic? Every essence is individual in the realm of essence and essences are not engaged in compulsory relationships with each other. Then what makes an essence to be full of the implications of another essence? Santayana says that the very notion of pregnancy gives a clue for the answer. Accordingly, "pregnancy belongs to matter, not to essence." The natural organisation proper to the innate involution of the psyche in living creature opens to his imagination in his own action or explicit discourse. There is the psyche or the existential component that continuously and actively takes place within this process. By this way, dialectic finds a place in the system, as a combination of the essence and the existence. In the system, dialectic is a concept used to

³⁰⁷ RE, p., 94.

clarify the transition from one essence to another. If no external effect intervenes in the realm of essence, it is impossible for the dialectic process to take place. This effect underlies the dialectic.

According to Santayana, it is clear that dialectic evidently requires to transition because it is progressive. However, "...any actual transition transcends the realm of essence (where every term traversed must always retain its intrinsic character) and proves that an existential and moving factor is at work, namely, attention and whatever may be the basis or organ of attention and of its movement." ³⁰⁸ In this case, an existential and moving factor involved in the dialectical process is the material psyche, which herself involves an existing material environment. According to Santayana, because transition contains a sense of direction in control of the material psyche, dialectic contains more than transition. Psyche picks up on the object of a previous intuition and compares it with that of the present one through the agency of intent. Therefore, the guiding element, which refers to the power in thought, is not provided by intuition, but intent based on the postulate of substance. Santayana claims "intent is a sort of projection through faith, positing a relation of which only one term is given, the terminus or point of origin here, together with a gesture, word, or sense of direction indicating what and where the other term ought to be." This proves that the psyche intentionally acts in her environment in the contingent nature under favour of intent. Herein, it would be impossible to talk about dialectic, if the nature did not have any material impulse on the organism. In Santayana's system, dialectic appears as an instrumental concept related to the experiences of the psyche, rather than pure reasoning. That is to say, "the psyche is predetermined at birth to certain generic

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 96.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*.

conceptions and transitions; and these are rendered precise and irrevocable by habits formed under the pressure of circumstances."³¹⁰ This indicates that dialectic is associated with material life, as much as it is with the realm of essence. Essences take place as names that indicate other essences in the life of psyche, within the dialectical process. Therefore, from Santayana's point of view, essences are not abstractions or generic terms designating classes of particulars: "...they are not themselves particulars, because they do not (in their own medium) occupy any part of space or time, or have any physical relations. Each essence has only the essential relations that ally it to other essences. Only the intuition (the fact that the essence appears) is an event and a particular."³¹¹ In dialectical process, intuition is an event and psyche is an intuiting animal. In this sense, there is a unity between them in this process.

The material flux is the character of the material existence. Essences enable existence to change continuously, and enable the mind to note and to describe the change. In the material world characterized by the radical flux, knowledge has a practical importance. According to Santayana, there is no absolute truth, so our life is established on a tragic base. In order to survive, we have to obtain knowledge about the realm of matter. In any case, this knowledge can be obtained only after confronting the facts. Then, the results we attain through our experiences are vital for us. Nothing has a predetermined content in the material world. Living creatures live in a completely contingent world. Santayana asserts that existence itself is not a state of completeness, but it is scattered into moments. He continues that

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 99.

³¹¹Santayana, George. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Six, 1937-1940*. Edited by William G. Holzberger, Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., and Marianne Wokeck. Vol. 5. 20 vols. Santayana Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004, p., 110.

³¹² RE, p. 5.

"the brute fact might be enlarged, but it would necessarily remain insulated and absolute in its contingency. No moment, no event, and no world can insure the existence or the character of anything beyond it."313 However, "everything in the moving equilibrium of nature is necessarily cooperative."314 The nature, therefore, makes a place for the adaptation of living creatures to their environments. As we stated before, this adaptation process takes place within the flux that is shaped through the essences randomly selected by the matter and that ensures the continuation of the existence. According to Santayana, the immediate flux continues by taking new forms within the realm of matter: "...flux has actually gathered and distilled itself many-coloured natural moments..."315 Santayana defines the realm of matter in terms of the flux, and according to him, this realm takes place in existence through essences chosen by it. An essence is given bodily in intuition at the core of the psyche. It manifests itself in intuition as a part of the immaterial flux. Here, it is the object of animal attention. In this sense, animal life becomes intuition in the continuity of discourse. The life of psyche in the continuity of discourse is replete with intuitions of essences.

The intuition of the essence to be thought of next, even in the most obvious inference or deduction, must be generated by movement of living discourse, and by the circumstances of some animal life. Essences are unsubstantial: the psyche, or matter elsewhere, is the substance at work. The essence last thought of was an essence only; it can trail no consequences and involve no sequel. To attribute consequences to essences is superstition. ³¹⁶

³¹³ RM, p. 114.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p., 118.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p., 98.

³¹⁶ RE, p., 79.

According to Santayana, the first thing we will find is essence when we try to comprehend the changing world. Essences are eternal and immutable entities revealed within the intuition. They are the forms of things, which existed within the existence, in our consciousness within a certain period of time. They are present in order to be selected by the matter, and physical existence occurs after the matter selects essences. Psyche coordinates the material existence by means her acquired habits. According to Santayana, belief in material existence constitutes the backbone of the psyche, and the animal attention in the field of action. For this reason, the psyche cannot exist without animal body, and spirit cannot exist without psyche. The spirit here is used as equivalent to the spontaneity within nature in Santayana's system: "Essences must be exemplified, tropes must be adopted, truths must be established; and when the trope is a psyche, spirit too must be evoked, not now by logical necessity but by a free spontaneity in nature..."317 Hence, Santayana claims that spirit is entirely contingent upon matter for its existence and distribution, so it does not have any direct effect to move existence. Moreover, he does not base the emergence of spirit on the presence of essences; but on the contrary, appearance of essences can only be possible by means of spirit. Psyche is continuously subject to impulses from the surrounding nature. These impulses are a bridge for the relationships between intent, intuition, essence and spirit. Intuition means being directly aware of the essence. Intent, on the other hand, is the conversion of intuition into knowledge of the external world. Here, psyche in concordance with intent or animal faith naturally enables the spirit to use essences presented in intuition as signs about material existence. In this perspective, the concept of spirit seems pretty clearly to be used as a substitute for psyche that has gained the ability to see essences. Although spirit is rooted in psyche in the flux of matter, spirit in connection with

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³¹⁷ RS, p., 79.

essences points to a reality, which is different from the material existence. Therefore, it would be a mistake to degrade the spirit to the matter. Psyche gives certain directions to the spirit, and leads spirit to focus on essences, but the role of spirit within the system is much more different than psyche. The purpose of its presence within the material existence is merely to contemplate essences. It is as impotent and passive as essences and any effect to unearth itself is beyond its power. Therefore, for Santayana, its primary nature is to be secondary.

Santayana's epiphenomenalism gives us important clues about the background of his philosophy of mind. Psyche paves the way for the spirit to serve her. Santayana suggests that, psyche's life on earth turns into a moral career with the emergence of spirit. For living creatures, the governing psyche and the impotent spirit do not stand on opposite sides. On the contrary, they exist together inside the life. Santayana's system asserts that spirit emerges by holding on to the passionate and desirous life of psyche. At this point, psyche is not the spirit, but is the source for the emergence of the spirit in the nature. Neither psyche nor spirit exists in the nature itself. Therefore, the nature is not a process flowing towards the spirit. Nevertheless, the nature is the vehicle for the psyche and the spirit. Then we can ask the following question once again: How is the concept of matter characterized in Santayana's philosophy? Within the framework of the present study, we can answer this question as follows: It is not the most general category, because other categories are not tackled by reducing them into matter, as well. If that was the case, Santayana's materialism would be an extension of the traditional materialism which defends that everything derives from matter. However, his materialism claims that the concept of matter is a carrier of the realms of existence.

In Santayana's opinion, matter is not an epistemological category because the most important element of knowledge is not the matter, but the substance. His concept of matter does not refer to any object. The concept only asserts that everything is material. Although this looks like the basic assertion here, what paves the way for Santayana to philosophize is his faith in the realm of essence. If there is the flux of existence and if there is a change, then there is essence. Essence illustrated in existence is chosen by matter, so recurrent events manifest itself in the nature. Santayana claims that they are tropes or habits in matter. Belief in necessity is an indispensable concept to discover recurrent events. According to him, facts necessarily have an existential content or a substance. This condition, which activates the animal faith, enables living creatures to assume facts. As nothing is precisely known through the medium of the animal faith, it is impossible to reach the certain knowledge of the facts in the material world. At this place, Santayana asserts that truth arises by automatically radiation from every region of fact. According to him, truth is a product of interaction between contingent existence and infinite essences. Here, Santayana differentiates between necessity and truth. He uses necessity as a concept for definitions characterized by terms, which become evident to us in the continuity of discourse. Because every particular fact is contingent, arbitrary, and logically unnecessary, the possible terms of thought are infinite in number. According to Santayana, the facts themselves determine the truth because they are combinations of essence and matter. Therefore, the realm of truth is composed of "standard comprehensive description of any fact."318 Because psyche is a natural fact, Santayana writes both "spirit in general is a child of psyche" and "spirit is a child of truth." In this

³¹⁸ Santayana, George, The Realm of Truth, p. vii.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p., 13-14.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p., 110

perspective, spirit is a foster-child of matter, and of secondary importance. So, from Santayana's point of view, "spirit is more often distracted than harmonious; and the attainment of harmony depends on many other causes than those that suffice to evoke spirit." 321

In Santayana's system, whereas spirit is a natural fruition of physical life, which rests on the willful psyche, its perfect function is pure intuition. That is to say, spirit in the material body is enchained by physical life, but it also becomes disinterested by contemplating the realm of essence. The realm of essence constitutes the objects of consciousness, and so an essence has different content than an ideal object. This differentiation originates in two tendencies of the psyche. Psyche is both the inner moving equilibrium, which asserts itself in all living things, and animal Will, which makes the matter speak. The emergence of spirit underlies these two tendencies of psyche. Because she is not only a movement, but also a mode of substance and a trope, the object occupies her animal attention. The environment determines the inherited organisation of psyche and psyche determines the conditions on which the ideal objects or intuitions are based. At the same time, because she has a direction associated with the flux of matter, she as a material agent in the field of action is also the representative of the universal Will. For this reason, she plays an active role in the emergence of the spirit, which projects into any given essence that stands behind the ideal object and is a true sign for the physical object or event. According to Santayana, the material conditions, which encircle the animal life of psyche, trigger the distraction of spirit. In addition to this, the organic energy of the willful psyche, which organizes the matter, has a relative plasticity, which enables the spirit to contemplate infinite essences. As long as spirit is propelled by the organic energy of psyche, it is a witness to all life by turning towards the

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³²¹ RS, p., 268.

realm of essence. In the realm of essence, according to Santayana, its vocation is to light up the truth of the present moment under the form of eternity, and thus to enhance the relationship between the life of psyche and the material existence.

In Santayana's philosophy, if the distinction between the ideal objects and the objects of consciousness is missed it will make seeing the connections made between psyche and spirit difficult. This is the most important argument of the present study. Depending on this distinction, Santayana attains the opportunity to genuinely identify the role of the consciousness within life by means of the concepts of psyche and spirit. In his philosophy, ideal objects are dependent on the occurrence of intuitions in conjunction with the life of psyche. The specific objects of intuitions or the objects of consciousness belong to the realm of essence, and they cannot find opportunity to emerge without the mediation of substance directing animal life of psyche. As animal is directly related to substance within the system, if substance is omitted from the system, this will have the same consequences as omitting animal attention, which discerns characters and distinguishes one character from another. According to Santayana, animal faith is of vital importance for the development of animal attention, thus, for the balance between a living organism or psyche and its environment. Together with substance, essences showing up within the material existence pave the way for psyche to form the material realm by means of intuitions, which are the bridge between psyche and spirit. Here, intuitions or ideal objects have their origin in the activities of the animal psyche and thus in mind. In the meantime, psyche as a willful agent organizing the matter opens up the way for the emergence of the realm of spirit by urging the animal attention to direct towards the essences within intuitions. Here, the willful psyche becomes a spiritual inventor of the infinite essences, so spirit is liberated from the distractions of animal life.

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APPENDICES

A: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: HAMDİOĞLU, Yakup

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 24 June 1978, Ceyhan

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	Cumhuriyet University-Philosophy	2003
BA	Mersin University-Philosophy	2001

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2011-2015	Cumhuriyet University-Department of Philosophy	Research Assistant

2005-2011	METU-Department of Philosophy	Research Assistant
2003-2005	Cumhuriyet University-Department of Philosophy	Research Assistant

B: TURKISH SUMMARY

İspanyol asıllı Amerikalı bir düşünür olan George Santayana (1863 - 1952) Amerika dışında çok az sayıda kişinin dikkatini çekmesine rağmen, oradaki düşünce hayatının gelişmesine şair, edebiyatçı, kültür eleştirmeni ve filozof olarak önemli katkılarda bulunmuştur. O, 1886 yılında kaydolduğu Harvard'da William James ve Josiah Royce gibi Amerikan düşünce tarihinin ve dolayısıyla felsefe tarihinin önemli isimlerinin öğrencisi ve çalışma arkadaşı olmuştur. Orada 1907 yılında felsefe profesörlüğüne yükseltilmiş ve 1912 yılında tüm zamanını felsefi çalışmalarına vakfetmek için akademik görevinden ayrılmıştır. Santayana, felsefi ilgisi oldukça geniş ve çarpıcı şekilde üretken bir filozoftur. Felsefe tarihine dair birçok problem üzerine yorulmaksızın düşünmüş ve bu problemlere eserlerinde bir dünya vatandaşı olarak geniş bir perspektiften nüfuz etmeye çalışmıştır.

Santayana'nın eserleri bize doğalcılık ile birlikte maddeciliği merkeze alan bütünlüklü bir felsefe sunar. Onun ismi felsefe tarihi kitaplarında şüphecilik, gerçekçilik, eleştirel gerçekçilik, epistemolojik düalizm ve epifenomenalizm ile birlikte anılmaktadır. O, geniş düşünce yelpazesi içinde, bize aynı zamanda epistemolojik temellere dayanan doğalcı veya maddeci bir varlık felsefesi sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle, onun doğalcı varlık felsefesi içinde kişi kavramı yerine kullandığı maddi canla; bilinç yerine kullandığı tin arasında kurduğu bağlantıların felsefeye önemli bir katkı olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu iddianın nedenini şöyle açıklayabiliriz: Santayana'nın sistemi, genel bir ifade ile onun felsefe için dürüstçe bir yaklaşım olarak gördüğü eylemi merkeze alan hayvani inanç felsefesine ve öz ve madde kavramlarını merkeze alan varlık alanları teorisine dayanır. Ona göre insanın eylem alanındaki ya da madde alanındaki hikâyesini başlatan onun

bir cana sahip olmasıdır. Hayatımızın ve eylemlerimizin maddi koşulu olan canımız, dünya veya doğanın ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Can doğa ve eylemlerimiz arasındaki bütünlükte öyle aktif bir rol oynar ki onun bu rolü maddi olmayan tinin ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlar. Bu zemin, canın hayvani koşullar içinde yüksek derecede organize olmasıyla mümkün olmaktadır. Santayana'nın burada başvurduğu en önemli kavram hayvani inançtır. Hayvani inancın yönlendirdiği niyetin objeleri ve canın yönlendirdiği özün görüsü tinin ortaya çıkmasında kilit rol oynarlar. Santayana maddeci bir filozof olmasına rağmen burada beliren hayvani hayata dayanarak, tini maddi varoluş içinde madde alanına indirgemeden ele alabilmiştir. Bu bakış açısında tin, canın maddi koşullarına sonuna kadar bağlı kalmasına rağmen Santayana tarafından maddeciliğin sınırları dışına çıkmadan maddi olmayan bir varlık alanı olarak ele alınması dikkat çekicidir. O hâlde bu nasıl mümkün olmaktadır? Bu doğrultuda sunulan çalışmada şu soruya yanıt aranmıştır: Maddi can aracılığıyla maddi olmayan tin maddi varoluş içinde nasıl ortaya çıkmıştır? Böyle bir çaba, onun farklı felsefe problemlerine derin kavrayışlar sağlayan kapsamlı felsefesini geniş bir bakış açısından incelemeyi gerektirmektedir. Bu nedenle Santayana'nın düşüncesinde tinin maddi cana dayanan maddi köklerinin gereğince anlaşılabilmesi için onun doğalcılığının veya maddeciliğinin, hayvani inanç felsefesinin ve bu felsefesine dayanan varlık teorisinin özenli bir biçimde incelenmesi gerekir. Bu inceleme yerine getirilmezse Santayana'nın maddi can ve maddi olmayan tin arasında kurduğu ilişkileri anlamak tamamen zorlaşacaktır. Bu calışmanın nihai amacı, bu inceleme ışığında, Santayana'nın maddeci varlık felsefesinin kabullerinin canın maddi yaşantısından maddi olmayan tinin ortaya çıkışını nasıl gerekçelendirdiğini göstermeye çalışmaktır.

Santayana açıkça burada felsefe yapmak için herhangi bir başlangıç noktasına sahip olmadığımız düşüncesini savunmaktadır. Bu nedenle ona göre felsefe yapmak için bir başlangıç noktası aramaktan çok; karşı karşıya kaldığımız doğanın koşullarına odaklanarak felsefe yapmaya şeylerin ortasından (in medias res) başlamak zorundayız. Bu bağlamda o, başlangıç kaynağını felsefenin maddi bir başlangıç noktasından almasının zorunlu olduğunu düşünür. Öyle ki hayatın maddi kökleri hâlihazırda felsefe yapmak için yeterli kaynaklar sunmaktadır. Onun büyük bir dikkatle bağlandığı bu kaynaklar meslek hayatında önemli bir değişiklik Bununla birlikte Santayana'nın kullandığı terimler göstermemiştir. dizgesinin ilk eseri Güzellik Duyusu (The Sense of Beauty)'ndan son eseri Hâkimiyetler ve Güçler (Dominations and Powers)'e kadar gittikçe derinleşen ve çeşitlenen bir değişime uğradığını söylemek yanlış değildir. Ancak terimler dizgesi içindeki değişimler felsefi yöneliminde bir eksen kaymasına yol açacak kadar köklü görünmemektedir. Bunda Santayana'nın düşünsel hayatı boyunca maddeci felsefenin ön kabullerine bağlı kalarak düşünme eğiliminde bir filozof oluşu çok büyük bir rol oynamıştır. O, tüm felsefi çalışmaları boyunca, varoluşun ilkesi veya her şeyin temeli/kaynağı olarak tek gerçekliğin bizzat maddenin kendisi olduğuna inanmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra madde kavramına bağlı kalarak doğanın hem dürtüsel ve besleyici bir kaynak olduğunu hem de hayat, deneyim, us ve düşünce gibi süreçleri anlamak için anahtar bir kavram olduğunu varsaymıştır. Santayana'nın düşünce evreninde maddecilik ve doğalcılık birbirinden ayrı görülemez; aksine onlar birbiri içine girmiş düşünme biçimleridir. Bu düşünme biçimi, geleneksel Batı felsefesinin ve özellikle tin, zihin, ben veya ruh gibi kavramları üstün bir değer olarak gören idealist düşünme biçiminin bir eleştirisi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Santayana, idealist filozofları hayal ürünü bir kozmolojiye dayalı, olgularla açık yürekli bir şekilde karşılaşmadan felsefe yapma eğilimi içinde olmakla eleştirir. İdealizmle karşılaştırıldığında açıkça maddi varoluşa öncelik vermektedir. Ona göre içinde bulunduğumuz bu varoluş, maddi bir karaktere sahiptir ve bunun dışında varoluşun yalnızca us dışı ve olumsal bir karaktere sahip olduğu söylenebilir.

Santayana her türlü metafiziği reddederken kendi felsefesinin de metafizik bir karaktere sahip olmadığını açıkça belirtir. Onun düşüncesindeki maddeciliğin/doğalcılığın en yüksek amacı açıklanması zor olan maddi gerçekliği felsefi bir dürüstlük içinde ele alabilmektir. Bu nedenle o hem anlaşılması zor ve kapıları sıradan okuyuculara kapalı hem de evren, doğa ve insan hayatı ile ilgili neredeyse tüm sorulara teorik açıklamalar getirme peşinde olan felsefi geleneklerden uzak durmuş; bu gelenekleri içselleştirmeden felsefe problemlerine odaklanmış ve bu problemlere maddi dünyanın varoluşu içinde yer alan gündelik deneyimleri merkeze alarak çözümlemeler getirmeye çalışmıştır. Böylece eylem, gündelik hayat, ortak akıl, görünüşlerin akışı, ihtiyaç, arzu, ilgi ve doyum gibi genellikle filozofların büyük çoğunluğu tarafından geri planda bırakılan kavramlar tasvir ettiği kavramsal çerçeve içinde büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Ona göre eylem ortak akla (common sense) isaret etmektedir ve ortak akıl doğanın koşulu olarak zihni değil, zihnin koşulu olarak doğayı göz önünde tutmaktadır. Bu, deneyimin düşünce içindeki bir yapı olan doğanın bir tözü değil, doğa düzeninin deneyimden önce gelen bir töz olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Burada doğa sahip olduğu koşulların genel bir toplamıdır ve maddi olaylardaki dolaysız akış hem doğa düzeninin gerçeği hem de onun sahip olduğu alt yapıyı açıklayan ve kontrol eden bir işleyiştir. Fiziki veya dış dünyanın içine derin bir biçimde gömülü olan bu gerçeklik, Santayana'ya göre idealist filozoflar tarafından tamamen göz ardı edilmiştir. Buna karşın maddi dünya/doğanın düzeni içinde işlenmemiş deneyim zaten doğa düşüncesinin temelinde yatmaktadır ve onun gerçekliğini açıkça onaylamaktadır.

Santayana'ya göre maddi varolus özünde zeminsizdir veya başka bir ifadeyle anlamsızdır; bu nedenle kendimizi içinde bulduğumuz maddi dünya bizim için us dışıdır. Ancak bu hiçbir zaman onun içinde genel bir zemin kabul etmeksizin yaşadığımız anlamına gelmemektedir. Santayana'nın felsefesinde bu genel zemin, insanoğlunun yolunu bulmak için çaba sarf etmek zorunda olduğu bir eylem sahasına işaret etmektedir. Bu bağlamda insanoğlunun kendini içinde bulduğu maddi çevre, amaçlarına hizmet eden bir eylem sahasıdır. Santayana, tesadüfî olarak maddi dünyaya dâhil olan, daha açık bir tanımla kendini maddi çevresindeki eylem sahasında bulan insanoğlunu bir canlı varlık olarak adlandırır. İnsanoğlu hayatta kalmak için maddi dünyaya, doğaya ve özellikle çevresel koşullarına uyum sağlamak zorunda olan bir canlı varlıktır. İnsanoğlunun standartları ihtiyaçları ve amaçları ile doğrudan çerçevelenmiştir. Bu anlamda Santayana felsefesinde "İnsanoğlunun yeri neresidir?" gibi bir soruya, doğrudan gökyüzünde parlayan yıldızlar, bitkiler ve hayvanlar gibi doğanın bir parçası ve bir ürünü olduğunu yanıtı verilir. Burada, her şeyden önce, insanoğlu maddi bedene sahip bir varlık olarak diğer şeylerin ve canlıların arasında yaşamaktadır. O, maddi bedeniyle birlikte hem doğada hem de evrimde yer alan hayvani bir yapıdır. İnsan bedeninin canlı doğa içinde yaşayan hayvani bir yapı olması, doğanın onun üzerindeki dürtüsel etkilerine işaret etmektedir. Santayana doğanın insan üzerinde uyandırdığı haz ve acı deneyimlerine dayanarak bu etkilerin edilgen değil, onun uygun formları kazanması için harekete geçirici bir içeriğinin olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bu bağlamda doğanın dürtüsel etkilerinin yönlendirdiği ihtiyaç ve arzularının yanı sıra, maddi dünyada yaşayan bir canlı olarak insanoğlunun tercihlerini kontrol etmesini sağlayan herhangi bir evrensel ilkeden bahsetmek mümkün değildir.

İnsanoğlu, doğal çevresinde, hayatta kalma amacına hizmet edecek şeyleri "iyi", ona karşı düşmanca olduğunu düşündüğü şeyleriyse "kötü" olarak değerlendirir. Bu durum insanoğlunun tercihlerinin belirmesinde ve

gelişmesinde hayati bir öneme sahiptir. Uyum sürecinin sonunda o, hayatta kalma amacına hizmet edecek araçları geliştirecek şekilde doğayı kendine ait bir çevreye dönüştürür. Bu anlamda Santayana'nın insanı doğa ile ilişkisi içinde ele aldığına işaret etmek için kullandığı canlı varlık kavramı, insanı tek bir kavrama indirgemeden ele aldığını göstermektedir. Daha da önemlisi, bu kavramla o, her kişinin kendi doğasına odaklanmak ihtiyacında olduğu yeryüzündeki insan hayatının çeşitliğine vurgu yaparak, doğanın maddi itkilerinin yön verdiği hayatın biyolojik, sosyal ve kültürel yönlerini ön plana çıkartmaktadır. Doğanın hareket ettirici işleyişine vurgu yapan maddi itkileri, yaşayan varlıkların maddi bedenleri içinde dürtü, ihtiyaç, ilgi, inanç ve alışkanlık olarak karşılık bulur. Bu durum canlı varlıkların maddi etkileri eyleme dönüştürdükleri anlamını taşır. Santayana'ya göre insanlar da dâhil tüm hayvani yapılar, maddi itkileri eyleme dönüştüren bir yeteneğe sahip olmaksızın hayatta kalamazlar. Bununla birlikte insanoğlu maddi dünya içinde başıboş hareket etmemektedir. İnsanoğlunun kendini maddi akış içinde bulması ve doğanın tehlikelerinden yalıtılmış olmaması, onun eylemlerine amaca yönelik bir içerik kazandırmasına imkân tanımaktadır. Onun doğa içinde var olma savaşı haz ve acı deneyimlerinin işaret ettiği basit sembollere ve böylece de cümleler ve önermeler gibi karmaşık sembollere dair bir farkındalık geliştirmesini sağlar. Santayana'ya göre algı, düşünme, hayal gücü, karşılaştırma ve bilme bu gerçekliğin farklı yönlerine karşılık gelmektedir. Bu bakış açısına göre canlı yapıya sahip insanoğlunun maddi hayatının incelikleri doğa tarafından belirlenmektedir.

Santayana için maddi çevrenin sağladığı doğal itki insanın zihinsel olgunluğa ulaşması için insana bir firsat sunmaktadır. O, doğal itkinin bu işlevini doğanın nedensel süreçleri içindeki bir açmaz olarak kabul eder. Santayana'nın, zihni beden içindeki doğal süreçlerin altını çizerek onların etkisiz bir sonucu olarak kabul etmesi, yorumcularının onu bir epiphenomenalist olarak değerlendirmesine neden olmuştur. Bütün bilinç

olaylarının beden içindeki süreçler aracılığıyla varoluşa geldiği ancak bu olayların hiçbirinin diğer zihinsel olaylar ve fiziksel dünya üzerinde bir etkiye sahip olmadığı düşüncesi epiphenomenalizmin merkezi tezidir. Bu bağlamda Santayana'nın da bir epiphenomenalist olduğunu ve onun zihinbeden problemini epiphenomenalizmin merkezi tezi etrafında düşündüğünü söylemek mümkündür. O, zihin ve beden arasında karşılıklı bir etkileşim olduğuna inanır; başka bir deyişle biri olmadan diğerini düşünmenin mümkün olmadığına inanır. Bu bağlantı içinde zihin, maddi bedenin kesin bir mükemmelliğe ulaştığında onun ilk olgunluk durumudur ve onun temeli bedenin atomlarından çok ilgilerinde yatmaktadır. Santayana'nın amacı zihin ve bedeni birbirine indirgemeden ele alabilmek ve maddi süreçlerin onlar üzerindeki etkilerini ön plana çıkarabilmektir. Zihin bu süreçler içinde etkisiz bir sonuçtur. Bu nedenle onlar zihin için geriye doğru anlaşılabilecek bir içeriğe sahip değildir. Santayana, aynı şekilde, bilinç kavramını da bu süreçler içinde etkisiz bir parça olarak ele alır. Bilinç, ona göre, beden içindeki maddi süreçlerin ikinci olgunluk durumudur. O, eserlerinde açıkça bilinç kavramını tin kavramı ile eş anlamlı olarak kullandığını ifade eder. Burada maddi süreçlere kökten bağlı olduğunu düşünmesine rağmen, tinin kendi alanının maddi olmayan bir içeriğe sahip olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Tin alanı birlikte Santayana, 3 varlık alanını daha birbirinden ayırır: madde, öz, hakikat.

Madde alanı, daha öncede ifade ettiğimiz gibi, fiziksel nesnelerle karşılaştığımız eylem sahasına karşılık gelen varlık alanıdır. O, özleri çekerek varoluşa getiren kaba güce karşılık gelmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu güç zamansal, değişim içinde olan ve kararsız varoluşun kaynağıdır. Zamansız ve kendisiyle özdeş formlara veya karakterlere karşılık gelen öz alanı ise, maddi akışın içindeki değişimi olanaklı hale getiren ve maddi varoluştan bahsedebilmemizi olanaklı kılan alandır. Onlar fiziksel varlığın her aşamasında madde tarafından vücuda getirilirler. Onları, sayısal

hesaplamalardan estetik beğeniye kadar her yerde keşfetmek mümkündür. Hakikat alanı ise özlerin madde tarafından seçilerek, tarih içinde hayata geçirilen kısmına karşılık gelen alandır. Bu anlamda varoluşa getirilmiş veya madde tarafından örneklendirilmiş ne kadar öz varsa hakikat alanının bünyesinde bulunmaktadır. Somutlaşmış özlerin envanter defteri olan hakikat alanı, nesneldir ve bilen öznenin varlığını önceden gerektirmese de doğru fikirlerinin imkânın zorunlu koşuludur. Bu çalışmada öncelikli araştırma nesnemiz tin kavramı, varlık alanları içinde Santayana'nın deyimiyle uykuda olma ve uyanık olma arasındaki içsel farka karsılık gelen bir içeriğe sahiptir. Burada Santayana tarafından tasvir edilen tin alanı, bir dizi bilinç olayları için kullanılmaktadır. Ona göre bilincin dolaysız objeleri özlerdir. Özlerin bilinç tarafından fark edilmesi ise görüler aracılığıyla olur. Varlık alanları içinde madde kavramı bir var olan olarak ele alınır. Öz ise ne maddidir ne de bir var olandır. Hakikat ve tin kavramları maddi olmamalarına rağmen birer var olandırlar. Santayana buradaki kavramsal yapıyı maddi gerçeklik üzerine şekillendirmiştir. Bu kavramların işaret ettiği alanları, süreçler icerisinde bizim deneyimlerimize varlık doğal karışmaktadırlar. Yukarıda da ifade ettiğimiz gibi, bu çalışmanın amacı Santayana'nın maddi gerçeklik içinde maddi olmadığını iddia ettiği tinin ortaya çıkışını nasıl gerekçelendirdiğini gösterebilmektir. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada diğer varlık alanlarını, doğrudan bu amaç doğrultusunda ele aldık. Böylece Santayana'nın sistemindeki varoluş gerçekliğin yapısal öğeleri madde ve öz alanları, insanoğlunun/canlı varlıkların bu gerçeklikle ilişkisinin kavramsal çerçevesini ifade eden hayvani inanç felsefesi ve maddi can kavramı çalışmamızda daha fazla ön plana çıkmıştır.

Bilincin, içinde yaşadığımız fiziksel dünyadan olmayan bir içeriğe sahip olduğu düşüncesi Batı metafizik geleneği tarafından genel kabul görmektedir. Bilince ayrıcalıklı bir konum veren bu bakışın son tahlilde saf bilincin nasıl bir doğaya sahip olduğunu araştırmaya odaklanması, bilinç ve

beden arasındaki mesafenin açılmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu mesafenin açılması, tinin hayatının düşünsel ve rasyonel bir süreç içinde nasıl ilerlediğini ortaya çıkarmaya kendini adayan felsefe teorilerine yol açmıştır. Santayana'nın sisteminde tin maddi hayat üzerinde baskın bir rol oynayacak herhangi bir amaç tarafından yönetilmez. Onun usdışı evren tasarımı, tini maddi gerçekliğe tabi ve maddi varoluş içinde maddenin yan ürünü olan etkisiz ve maddi olmayan bir var olan olarak ele alır. O halde o, buradaki düşüncelerini nasıl temellendirebilmektedir? Bunu anlayabilmek için, öncelikle, Santayana'nın maddi gerçekliği nasıl tasvir ettiğinden hareket etmemiz gerekir. Ona göre, yukarıda da ifade ettiğimiz gibi, zihnimizin dışındaki maddi varoluş, maddenin tamamen tesadüfi olarak özleri seçmesi ile dışa vurulmaktadır. O, burada madde ve varoluş kavramlarını birbirinden ayırarak kullanmaktadır. Akılsal bir içeriğe sahip olmamakla madde, anlaşılması imkânsız bir içeriğe sahip olmasına rağmen varoluşun tek kaynağı veya gücüdür. Varoluşsal akışın madde kavramıyla birlikte en önemli parçası olan özler hem düşünceden hem de varoluştan bağımsız saf imkânlardır. Onlar ne zihinseldir ne de maddidir; buna rağmen hem maddi veya doğal süreçler hem de zihinsel süreçler ancak ve ancak onların kendi öncesiz alanından ödünç alınılması ile mümkün hale gelmektedir. Kendileriyle özdeş ve zamansız özler böyle bir dışa vurma için daima uygundurlar. Onlar epistemolojik veya ontolojik olarak herhangi ayrıcalıklı bir konuma sahip değildirler. Sayıca sınırsızdırlar ve değer bakımından yansızdırlar. Her öz bir diğer özden tamamen farklıdır ve tam olarak özgündür. Santayana öz kavramının nasıl bir karaktere sahip olduğunu açık kılabilmek için onu idea, veri, imge, görünüş ve form gibi farklı kavramlarla birlikte ele alır. Hiç şüphe yok ki onun sisteminde öz kavramı, mental süreçlerle ilgili bütün terimlerle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Önceden belirlenmiş herhangi bir karaktere sahip olmayan ve herhangi bir amaca hizmet etmeyen öz, maddi varoluşun etkisiz bir bileşenidir. O, içkin doğası içinde ne maddeye ne de zihne dayanır, ancak madde tarafından vücut bulur ve zihin tarafından görülenir. O halde, burada temelde 3 farklı özden bahsedebiliriz:

- 1. Objenin özü veya madde içinde cisimleşmiş öz.
- 2. Görünün özü veya görü içinde kendisini gösteren öz.
- 3. Ne madde içinde cisimleşmiş ne de görü içinde kendisini gösteren öz.

Burada şöyle önemli bir soru karşımıza çıkmaktadır: Burada beliren özler hangi kaynaktan gelmektedirler? Santayana açıkça özler için herhangi bir kaynağa gönderme yapmaz. Onun sisteminde öz tüm şeylerin içkin düşünsel mümkünlüğünü karşılayan isimdir. Sistem içinde varoluşsal olanağı karşılayan isim madde olduğu için güçlü bir şekilde vurgulamak gerekir ki madde alanından ayrı bir varlık alanı olarak ele alınsa da özler, maddi süreçler içinde kendilerini gösterirler. Onların hiçbirisi seçilmek için bir diğerinden daha kıymetli değildir ve kesinlikle mükemmel oldukları için varoluş içinde örneklendirilmezler. İşte tamda özleri maddi varoluş içindeki rastlantısallığın ve insanoğlunun seçimlerinin bir parçası yapanda budur. Özlerin keşfi Santayana'nın felsefesinin gelişimi için oldukça büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Onun olgun dönem eserlerinin başlangıcı olarak kabul edilen Şüphecilik ve Hayvani İnanç (Scepticism and Animal Faith) adlı eserinin sloganlarından biri olan "verili hiçbir şey var olamaz" doğrudan öz alanına gönderme yapmaktadır. Bu anlamda, ona göre, şüphenin tamamen ortadan kaldırılması imkânsızdır. Onun bakış açısından esaslı bir şüpheci veya solipsist, herhangi bir kesin kanıt veya şüpheyi ortadan kaldırabilecek herhangi bir ussal iddiayı sonuna kadar reddedeceği için çıkışı olmayan bir yerde ikamet etmektedir. Santayana'nın şüphecilik eleştirisi şüpheci filozofun bulunduğu yeri onaylamaz; süpheyi onun bulunduğu yere kadar götürerek buradan elde edebileceğimiz sonuçları felsefe yapmak için kullanabileceğimizi düşünür. Onun şüpheciliği ne Descartes'in yöntem

süpheciliği gibi bir kesinlik arayısı içindedir ne de süpheyi solipsizme vardıran filozofun yaptığı gibi bir hayat formudur. O, şüpheyi felsefe yapmak için bir alıştırma gibi kullanır. Ona göre şüphe, düşüncenin namusudur ve bizim gündelik tecrübelerimizin bilginin sağlam ve sıradan koşullarıyla ilişkisini gösterebilecek bir değere sahiptir. Şüphecilik, ona felsefi soruşturması için önemli bir zemin sağlamaktadır. Bunu şöyle özetleyebiliriz: Kesin bir kanıt aracılığıyla, Descartes'in yaptığı gibi, dış gerçekliğe içkin değişimin yanıltıcı doğasını çürütebilmemiz olanaklı değildir. Bununla birlikte, süphenin en üst düzeyinde, solipsistin bulunduğu yer, gündelik faaliyetlerimizi yerine getirmemiz olanaksızdır. O halde geriye bir tek seçenek kalmaktadır: burada karşılaştığımız yanılsamayı aldatıcı olmayan bir yanılsama olarak kabul etmek. Onun aldatıcı olmaması, başka türlü olamaması ile ilişkili bir durumdur. Bu bakımdan şüphe elestirisinin sonunda aldatıcı olmayan yanılsamadan geriye kalan tek sey, hiçbir açıklama gerektirmeyen bir hakikatten başka bir şey değildir. Santayana şüphenin en dibe dokunduğunda keşfettiği bu hakikati, soyut olarak daha fazla indirgenemeyecek bir konum içinde bulunan itibarlı bir dayanak olarak düşünür. Burada bulduğu şey, kendini yanıltmadığını düşündüğü ve görünün objesi olarak kabul ettiği özden başka bir şey değildir.

Özün keşfi *Şüphecilik ve Hayvani İnanç*'ın önemli sonuçlarından sadece biridir. Burada onun felsefesine özgün bir içerik kazandıran, en az özün keşfi kadar etkileyici başka sonuçlar daha vardır. Bunların en önde geleni hayvani inançtır. Santayana hayvani inanç kavramını felsefi bir dürüstlüğe işaret eden bir kavram olarak görmektedir. Ona göre, felsefi dürüstlük bilgi için standartlarını varoluşun olduğu yerde onu varsayan (posit) hayvani inançtan edinmek zorundadır. Yaşayan canlıların kendilerine dışsal şeylerin ortasında var olmaları ve yaşamaları, akla dayanmayan ancak eyleme karışan bir inançtır. Hayvani inanç, dürtülerimiz ve tehlikelerden kaçma

eğilimi içinde gelecek için planlar yaparak hayatımızı sürdürdüğümüz maddi çevremiz arasındaki ilişki içinde her zaman iş başındadır. Böyle olduğu için burada madde ve özün birlikte meydana getirdiği tözsel veya maddi gerçekliğin olduğuna inanırız. Ortak akıl bu durumun en önemli göstergelerinden biridir. Ortak akıl, maddi gerçeklik içinde kendilerinden şüphe edilemeyecek, kaydedilmiş olguların var olduğunu önceden varsayarak yaşamaktadır. Gerçekten de Santayana'nın hayvani inanç kavramı ile sunmak istediği gerçeklik bundan daha fazlası değildir. Hayvani inanç temelinde ortak akıl, canlı varlıkların maddi çevrelerinde benzer bir biçimde hareket etmelerinin yolunu açmaktadır. Burada öz kavramının sistemin içindeki yerini düşündüğümüzde, maddi varoluş ortak akıl tarafından doğrudan bilinemeyecek bir yapıdadır. Bir anlamda insan hayatının trajik boyutuna da gönderme yapan bu durum, Santayana'ya göre, bilgi araştırmalarında gerçekçi tavrı kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. Bu tavır tamamen zihnimizin dışında konuşlanan maddenin verili olmadığını bunun karşısında zihin objeleri olan özlerin doğrudan verili olduğunu ve bilginin aracıları veya sembolleri olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Burada ne hayvani inanç ne de öz, bilginin objesidirler. Onların maddi beden içinde bir arada çalışması, bilginin ortaya çıkmasını olanaklı hale getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda Santayana'nın sisteminde, maddi varoluşun bilgisi semboller vasıtasıyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle bilgi, sembollerin aracılık ettiği bir inançtır ve bu nedenle tüm bilgi semboliktir.

Hayvani inanç, dünya ve bizim aramızdaki ilişkinin zemini için önemli ipuçları vermektedir. Canlılığımıza dayanan hayvani eylemlerimizin bir maddi dünyanın varoluşunu ve bizim tek bir eylem sahası içinde hareket ettiğimizi önceden varsaydığı kabul edilmektedir. Dürtülerimizin çevrenin zorlamalarına ön uyumunu ifade eden bu varsayım, Santayana'nın hem doğalcı epistemolojisinin hem de doğalcı ontolojisinin merkezi iddialarındandır. Onun madde kavramı öncelikle ontolojiktir ve ontolojik

madde fikri iki önemli maddi kategoriyi içermektedir. Bunlardan ilki yukarıda üzerinde durduğumuz varoluştur. İkincisi ise tözdür. Santayana'nın sistemi içinde madde kavramı herhangi bir objeye gönderimde bulunmaz. Santayana bu kavramla yalnızca her şeyin maddi olduğunu iddia eder. Eylemlerimizde maddi bir içeriğe sahiptir. Santayana maddenin doğal dünyanın deneyimlerine karışmasını töz kavramı ile içeriklendirmektedir. Bu nedenle dış dünyaya dair bilginin en önemli unsuru madde değil tözdür. Töz kavramı, Santayana'nın zihinsel süreçler de dâhil bütün süreçlerin gerçeklikten bağımsız olmadığı yönündeki inancını getirmektedir. Ona göre maddi gerçeklik içinde hayatta kalmamız için daima bir töz ileri sürmemiz gerekmektedir. Bu bakımdan töz, deneyimi önceleyen bir karaktere sahiptir. Eğer öyle olmasaydı canlı varlıkların dış gerçekliğin tehlikelerini önceden fark edebildikleri hayvani uyanıklığa sahip olmaları olanaklı olmazdı ve varolus içinde çaresiz kalırlardı. Santayana, açıkça, kullandığı töz kavramının metafizik bir içeriğe sahip olmadığını bunun aksine onun fiziksel bir töz olduğunu iddia eder. Burada töz, hayvani inanç tarafından yönlendirilen niyetin objesidir. Canlı varlıkların maddi gerçeklikle doğrudan ilişkilerine işaret eden töze inanç, özlerin görüleri ortaya çıkmadan canlı varlıkların deneyim sahasında yer almaktadır. Canlı varlıklar, eylemlerinde madde alanı içinde kendisini gösteren tözlere gönderme yaparlar. Bu bakış açısı içinde düşünüldüğünde, yukarıda ifade ettiğimiz birinci tür öz ile ikinci tür öz arasında kurulan bağ özlerin kendisine yaslanarak kurulmamaktadır. Bu bağın kurulmasını sağlayan etki niyetin objeleri veya tözleri yönlendiren hayvani inanç vasıtasıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Bu nedenle Santayana'ya göre bilginin kaynağı, özün kendisi veya verili olan ile değil hayvani inancın temsilcisi olan niyet aracılığıyla hayatımıza doğrudan karışan ancak verili olmayan madde ile bağlantılıdır. Bu anlamda görü, verili olmayana yönelen güven ve beklentiyi ifade eden niyetin içinde doğar ve varoluşun etkisiz bir parçasıdır.

Santayana verili olan özün tözün bir sembolü olarak ele alınmasının aracı hayvani inancı veya niyeti etkin bir zihinsel hareket olarak kabul ederken, özlerin içinde ortaya çıktığı görüyü etkisiz bir zihinsel hareket olarak ele almaktadır. O burada çok önemli bir ayrım daha yapar. Buna göre görünün kendisiyle onun içinde verili olan öz birbirlerinden ayrı doğalara sahiptirler. Her şeyden önce özün görüsü, bir var olandır ve madde alanına aittir. Buna karşın görünün özü, bir var olan değildir ve kendi alanı içinde ikamet etmektedir. Burada özün görüsünün madde alanına ait olması ve hayvani inancın onun üzerinde oynadığı rol vasıtasıyla varoluş içinde ortaya çıkması, Santayana'nın maddeciliğinin ve epiphenomenalizmin en önemli iddialarıdır. Niyet görüden önce gelmesine rağmen her ikisi de bilgi sürecinde birbirinden ayrılmaz bir biçimde iç içe geçmişlerdir. Hayvani inancın özün görüsünün ortaya çıkmasında oynadığı rol, maddenin etkisi olmayan herhangi bir seyin görülere karışmasını olanaksız kılmaktadır. Bu nedenle Santayana'nın felsefesi kesinlikle özcü bir felsefe veya idealist bir felsefe olarak kabul edilemez. Görü maddi gerçeklik içinde sadece bir var olan değil, aynı zamanda varoluşun en yoğun formudur. Bu, Santayana'nın zihinsel süreçleri maddi süreçlere indirgemeden ele alma çabasını göstermektedir. O, açıkça, indirgemeci bir tutum içerisine girmeden onları bir arada tutan süreci ön plana çıkarmaya çabalamaktadır. Öyleyse bu nasıl mümkündür? Burada şöyle bir soru onu anlamamızı kolaylaştırmaktadır: Fiziksel duyularımıza verili olmayan bir şeyin maddi olmadığını iddia edebilir miyiz? Santayana, burada böyle bir iddiada bulunmak için herhangi bir gerekçenin var olmadığını düşündüğünü söyleyebiliriz. Madde verili olmamasına rağmen doğal dünyanın eylemsel tözü vasıtasıyla bizim deneyim sahamızın doğrudan bir parçasıdır. Bu nedenle hayvani inancın inançları, bizim için algılanamaz hareketler değildirler ve tözün etkisinin maddi beden içinde taşınmasını sağlayarak görülerin ve onların içindeki özlerin ortaya çıkmasında hayati bir öneme sahiptirler. Tamda bu noktada şöyle bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Niyetin objeleri veya tözler ve görünün objeleri veya özler arasındaki ilişkinin kurulması nasıl sağlanmaktadır? Santayana'nın can kavramı bu ilişkinin kurulmasında çok önemli bir yere sahiptir.

Santayana'nın sisteminde can, maddi bir karaktere sahiptir. Onun tabiriyle can, zemin değildir fakat çekirdektir; yüzey değildir fakat cevherdir veya özdür. Her seyden önce o, madde içinde insan bedenine ve zihnine form veren bir alışkanlıktır. Bu bakış açısından düşünüldüğünde o, madde, maddi beden, hayvani organizma, zihin ve doğa gibi kavramların birbiriyle ilişkilendiren alışkanlıkların maddi ilkesidir. Böylece o, Santayana'nın sisteminde, tinin maddi gerçeklik içinde ve böylece doğa içinde nasıl kendisini gösterdiğini anlamamız için göz önünde bulundurmamız gereken en önemli parçadır. Onun maddi akış içindeki hareketli hayatı, niyet ve görü kavramlarının birbirine bağlanmasında merkezi bir rol oynamaktadır. Burada o kolayca inceleyemeyeceğimiz derecede karmasık bir sistem veya yapı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ancak genel bir bakış açısından o, her seyden önce, maddi beden ve hayvani organizma arasındaki bir yapıdır. Maddi bedenleri vasıtasıyla dışsal varoluşa doğru olan canlı varlıkların hareketliliğini sağlayan şey, maddi çevrelerinin üzerlerinde bıraktığı zorlamalardır. Bu maddi itkiler organizmayı biyolojik olarak beslerler. Onların aynı zamanda bir cana sahip olmaları, doğanın işleyişi içindeki organizmaların kendilerini korumalarına ve çoğalmalarına olanak tanımaktadır. Can burada organizmaları belirli formlara doğru iten güce denk gelmektedir. Santayana'ya birbiriyle göre bağlantılı fakat organizmanın farklı iki yönüne isaret eden iki ayrı can vardır: Bitkisel can ve hayvani can. Doğal olarak, hayat hayvani can ile doğrudan ilişkilidir. O, kaynağını maddeden alan doğanın itici gücü temelinde organizmalara kendi kendilerini veniden üretebilmelerinin ve kendi kendilerine alışkanlıklar kazanabilmelerinin yolunu açar. O, hiçbir anlamda, madde ve tözün kendisi değildir. Ancak o, tözün bir türü, bir trope veya madde alanı içinde alışkanlığın bir formudur. Can, maddenin gücünün maddi beden içinde devam etmesini sağlayan gizemli içsel bir harekettir. Santayana bu hareketi bir trope olarak tanımlamakla onun hayati olaylar içindeki rolüne dikkat çekmektedir. Santayana'nın sisteminde trope kavramı, olayın kendisinden özünü ayırdığımızda ulaştığımız forma veya öze karşılık gelmektedir. Olayın özü tekrar eden bir örüntüdür ve Santayana bu örüntüye trope adını verir. Böyle düşünüldüğünde can, doğumundan ölümüne kadar canlı varlıkların bir hayata sahip olmalarına imkân veren ve onların bir hayata sahip olmalarını açıklayan bir örüntüdür. Canlı bir organizmanın kendini korumasına ve kendini ifade etmesine karşılık gelen doğal bir olgu olan can, içsel taşınan bir denge durumudur ve kalıtımsal alışkanların maddi çevreye yansıtılmasını sağlar. O, beden ve organizma ile taşınarak hem bedenin biyolojik ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasında hem de sürekli değişen doğanın içinde organizmanın çevresel koşullarına uyum sağlamasında merkezi bir rol oynamaktadır.

Santayana cana ve onun tutkularına o kadar merkezi bir önem atfeder ki, onu benlik (self) kavramı ile eş anlamlı olarak kullanır. Yani can, maddi bedenin özü olan benlik kavramına içten bağlıdır. Burada benlik kavramı hem maddi dünyadan farklı hem de onu aşan bir içeriğe sahiptir. Onun aşkınlığı canın içinde yaşadığı maddi bedeni dış dünyadan ayırdığı anlarda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Gündelik hayat ağı içinde can, dış dünya içerisine gömülerek yaşamaktadır. O halde kendimizi maddi şeylerin varoluşundan ayırarak kişisel bir benliğimiz olduğumuzun nasıl farkına varıyoruz? Santayana burada şok kavramının önemine dikkat çeker. Buna göre şok deneyimleri, tamamen kendimizi kaptırarak yaşadığımız dış dünyadan farklı yapıda olduğumuzu kanıtlamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, dış dünyadan ayrılmamıza rağmen onunla devam eden bir fiziksel benliğe sahip olduğumuzu bu deneyimler aracılığıyla kavrarız. Can ve onun tutkuları sadece maddi benlik üzerinde değil benlik bilincinin kazanılmasında da

etkindir. Santayana benlik bilincini, hayatta kalma eğilimini barındıran doğal beden ile hareket halinde olan can arasında bir yerde anlamaktadır. Bu nedenle can maddi gerçeklik içindeki fiziksel hayatın özel bir formu ve canlı varlıkların tercihlerinin maddi ilkesidir.

Santayana'ya göre görünüşler, dolaysız akışa içkin olan tözün hareketlerinin işaretleri olarak işlev gören, onun dışavurumlarından başka bir şey değildirler. Tözün dışavurumlarını objeden süjeye taşıyan veriler veya özler, görü içinde kendilerini gösterirler. Santayana'nın görü ve öz arasında yaptığı ayrımı göz önünde bulundurursak görünün – bu kavram madde alanına ait olduğu için – canın töz ile kurduğu bağlantıların ışığında hareket ettiğini söylemek mümkündür. Eğer öyleyse hayvani inancın objelerinin veya tözlerin etkilerini görüye taşıyan canın, bununla özlerin karakterini belirleyecek bir hareket alanına doğru açıldığını söylemekte yanlış olmayacaktır. Tözün bir türü veya madde içinde bir alışkanlık olan maddi benlik olarak can, hayvani inanç temelinde görüyü özleri olguların yankıları veya maddi ve devimsel dünyanın görünüşleri olarak görülemesi için zorlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda can, canlı varlıklara özler içinde verili olmayan şeyi düşünmelerini sağlayarak onların belleklerini sürdürmelerine imkân tanır. O halde sistem içinde etkisiz bir parça olarak kabul edilen görü, can ile ilişkisi bağlamında etkin bir görüye dönüşmektedir. Burada töze bağlı olan hayvani canın hayatının, onun görü üzerindeki rolü sayesinde zihnin olanağı olarak düşünülmesi de yanlış olmayacaktır. Santayana hiçbir zaman görüyü tek başına ele almaz. Sisteminin içinde görü, niyet ve can ile ilişkisinde anlamını bulmaktadır. Niyetin objeleri hiçbir sekilde görüde ortaya çıkmazlar ancak onlar canın maddi hayatı içinde görü ile birlikte hareket etmektedirler. Bu nedenle can, bilginin kazanımına imkân tanıyan geçişlerin sağlanmasında önemli bir rol üstlenmektedir. Yani bir canlı organizmanın bir öze dair farkındalık kazanmasındaki görünün sıçraması ile fiili olarak duyuda veya düşüncede bulunan sembolden var olan şeylere inanç sıçramasında. O halde canın görü eylemleri üzerindeki etkisi onun zihnin olanağı olarak sistemin içinde yer aldığına dair iddiayı açık kılmaktadır. Burada görü eylemleri, canlı varlıklar tarafından dış dünyanın düşünülmesini sağlayan ideal objeler olarak düşünülebilirler. O halde Santayana'nın sistemi içindeki bilişsel sürecin objelerini şu şekilde sıralayabiliriz:

- 1. Gerçek Obje: Hayvani inanç tarafından varsayılan fiziksel objeler.
- 2. Niyetin Objeleri: Tözler.
- 3. İdeal Objeler: Var olan görünün tüm eylemleri.
- 4. Bilincin Objeleri: Var olmayan özler.

Burada hemen hatırlatmak gerekir ki, Santayana görü kavramını bütünlüklü bir kavram olarak ele alır. Görü hem töz tarafından yönlendirilen hayvani inancın ve buna doğrudan bağlı olarak hareket eden canın maddi hayatının etki alanında ortaya çıkar, hem de madde alanına bağlı olmayan bir içeriğe sahiptir. Burada ortaya çıkan, maddi olmayan ve var olmayan özler doğal süreçler tarafından yönlendirilen görünün içinde doğrudan verilidirler. Santayana'ya göre onları öncelikle duyular aracığıyla kavrarız. Duyular, dışsal gerçeklik içerisine rastlantı sonucu karışan hayvani organizmanın içinde kendisini gösterirler. Burada canın algılara katkısı göz ardı edilemez. Bu demek oluyor ki özün kendisi görüde belirmeden önce can algılara "eşlik eden bir etki" de bulunmaktadır. Bu, algıdaki kavrayışın ortaya çıkmasını sağlamaktadır. Bu nedenle maddi dünyada bir düzeneğe karşılık gelen can ne zihin ne de görüdür, fakat onların altında yatan zemindir. Bu bağlamda bizim bu çalışmada ideal objeler olarak ele aldığımız görü eylemlerinin başlamasında etkin bir rol oynar ve bu bakış açısı içinde zihnin olağanadır. Santayana'ya göre onun hayatının bütünlüğü, madde alanında yüksek derecede organize olduğunu göstermektedir. Can burada hem madde içinde bir alışkanlık, tözün bir türü ve bir tropelar sistemi olarak maddi gerçeklik

içinde yer alan, hem de maddeye form veren ve onu fiziksel varoluş içindeki hayatın içerisine yerleştiren istemli ve yüksek derecede organize olmuş bir etkendir. Böylece canın yukarıda saydığımız bilişsel sürecin üçüncü tür objelerinin ortaya çıkmasının yanında dördüncü tür objelerinin ortaya çıkmasında da kilit bir rolü bulunmaktadır. Santayana dördüncü tür objelerin tinin objeleri olduğunu düşünür. O halde tin canın hayvani hayatına bağlı olarak ortaya çıkıyorsa, canın tinin özlerle ilişkisinde oynadığı rolü açık kıldığımızda yanı onun maddi gerçeklik içinde yüksek derecede organize olmasının işaret ettiği gerçekliği açık kıldığımızda tinin canın hayatında nasıl ortaya çıktığını da göstermiş oluruz.

Santayana'ya göre maddi gerçeklik içinde yaşadığımız için varoluş ile ilişkimiz inançlarımız aracığıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Burada sahasında töz tarafından harekete geçirilen hayvani uyanıklık – hayati önem tasıyan duyarlılık – tinin ortaya çıkması için büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Hayvani uyanıklık objenin devamı içindeki hareketin duyusudur. Varoluşun akısı içinde, canın algılara yaptığı katkı sayesinde özler bizim için söylem içindeki terimleri meydana getiren objeler olurlar. Süje ve obje arasındaki bilişsel ilişkinin imkânı, dolaysız akış içinde böylece kendisini gösterir. Burada önemle vurgulamak gerekir ki ne töz ne de öz tek başına bu imkânı sağlamaktadır. Onların maddi veya doğal süreçlere bağlı hayvani hayat içinde birbirine karışması bilişsel süreci mümkün hale getiren koşulları sağlamaktadır. Santayana'ya göre tin, bu sürecin içine kendiliğinden katılır. Burada tin ne bir nedendir ne de bir sonuçtur. O, tesadüfi olarak ortaya çıkma imkânı bulduğunda sadece canın hayatının bir ürünüdür. Canın karmaşık yapısı canlı varlıklara dolaysız akışı zenginleştiren tözden zihinsel süreçleri başlatan öze giden yolu açmaktadır. Canın doğasındaki esneklik, bu süreçlerin gerçekleşmesinde doğrudan etkili olmaktadır. Bu, öncelikle, onun doğa içindeki işleyişle uyumlu çalıştığı ve tinin ortaya çıkmasına olanak tanıyan uygun yapıların sağlanmasında birincil bir öneme sahip olduğu anlamına gelmektedir.

Görünün tüm eylemleri veya görüler verili olmayan madde tarafından yönlendirilir ve onların özel objeleri canın hayatına dayanmaktadır. Bu, başka bir ifadeyle, madde ve özün sadece maddi varoluş içinde gerçekleşmediği, aynı zamanda maddi beden içinde de gerçekleştiği demektir. Can, doğanın en uyumlu parçasıdır ve görülerin ortaya çıkmasında başat bir etkiye sahiptir. Santayana için görü ve can fiziksel zaman ve mekân içinde birer olaydır. Olayların birbirine göreceli konumuna işaret eden fiziksel mekân ile bu olayların birbirini izlemesine karşılık gelen fiziksel zaman madde alanının ayrılmaz parçasıdırlar. Santayana'ya göre bunlar olumsaldırlar ve uslamlama yoluyla değil, doğrudan eylem tarafından keşfedilirler. Santayana içinde yaşadığımız zamansal ve mekânsal dünyayı ise fiziksel zaman ve mekânın sembolik formları olan resimsel mekân ve duygusal zaman olarak adlandırmıştır. Burada duygusal zaman varoluşun seyrinin özgün türü iken, resimsel mekân onun dağılımının özgün bir versiyonudur. Bunlar, onların içinde yer alan ortak akıl ve can tarafından doğrudan bilinirler. Onlar canın çevresine duyarlılık geliştirmesini ve etrafında olan bitene karşı uyanık olmasını sağlarlar. Onlar olaylara işaret eden doğal anlarla doludurlar. Doğal bir an bir özün madde tarafından seçilmesinin ve diğer özün askıya alınmasının bir örneğini oluşturmaktadır. Doğal anlar hem bir başlangıçtır, hem de maddenin onunla birlikte aktığı bir istikamete gönderme yapan bir sondur. Santayana doğal anlar içindeki istikameti ileriye doğru bir gerilim olarak adlandırır. O, maddi dünyanın iç işleyişini bu kavramla karakterize etmektedir. Kavramın işaret ettiği gerçeklik, maddenin akışı içindeki maddi olayların seyrini yönlendirmektedir. Varoluşsal saha basitçe eylem sahası ve maddi can ise bu sahada bir olay olduğu için, ileriye doğru gerilim canın bütün dürtü, arzu ve tutkularını tanımlamaktadır. İleriye doğru gerilim tarafından tanımlanan

doğal anlar içindeki can, bu anlar içinde içgüdüsel olarak kendini yeni koşullara uyarlayarak hareket eder. O, sahip olduğu ayırt edici trope nedeniyle böyle bir doğaya sahiptir. Canın hayatında büyüme ve eylem aracılığıyla fark etme mücadelesinde gizil bir güce karşılık gelen trope, canın istemenin bir boyutu olmasına olanak tanır.

Sadece can değil, aynı zamanda onun hayvani hayatı da maddi varoluşun bir parçasıdır. Doğal süreçlerin en dikkate değer parçalarından biri olan onun doğal hayatı, bir hayvani istemeyi vurgulamaktadır. Santayana'ya göre hayvani isteme ihtiyaçlar tarafından idare edilmektedir. O, bu noktada ihtiyaçları geniş anlamda kullanır. İhtiyaçlar, organizmanın objelerin özellikleri ve diğer objelerle ilişkilerini keşfetmesinde çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu nedenle hayvani isteme, ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda hareket eden can ile tam uyum içerisindedir. Santayana hayvani istemeyi, maddeyi belirli formların içine verleştiren maddi güce ait evrensel isteme ile ilişkili bir biçimde ele alır. Evrensel isteme, belirli bir form geliştirmesi ve onu sürdürmesi için herhangi bir türe ait seylerin içindeki görünür çabadır. Maddi güçten kaynaklanan maddi itkiler maddi bedeni yapısal formlara doğru her düzenlediğinde, evrensel isteme maddi candan başka bir şey değildir. Terimlerin bu kullanımına göre can, evrensel istemenin istisnai bir örneği olmaktadır. Santayana'ya göre tin, evrensel istemenin özellikle canın doğaya uyum sağlamasında ve gücünü bedenin ötesine doğru uzatmaya başladığında ortaya çıkmaktadır. O halde tin canın hayatı aracılığıyla beliren, istemenin bir dışavurumu olarak adlandırılabilir. Tin yüksek derecede organize olmus can içinde ortaya çıkmakla birlikte, evrensel istemenin bilinçli bir örneğini oluşturmaktadır. Maddenin yüksek derecede organize olan bir formu olarak can, ihtiyaçlarını yönlendirirken aynı zamanda maddi gerçekliğe de biçimlendirmektedir. Bu nedenle o, evrensel istemenin bir örneği olarak gösterilmektedir. Bu bağlamda can, bilinçsiz bir tindir ve kaçınılmaz bir maddi gerçekliktir. Bilinçli tin canın çevresine rasgele tepki vermesinden çok bilme arzusu içerisinde kendini göstermeye başlar. Can, çevresine sadece düşüncesizce ve dürtüsel tepki vermesine rağmen tin maddi çevre içerisindeki olayları tanımlama eğilimindedir. Tin, çevresini tanımasında organizmayı destekledikçe organizma dengesi bozulduğunda uygun formu bulma yeteneğini daha da ileriye taşır. Bu nedenle tinin maddi varoluş içerisinde doğası ve işlevi, canın kendini uzak şeylere uyarlamasının ve maddi varoluş ile birlikte değişiminin boyutunu genişletmektir. Bu bağlamda Santayana'nın felsefesinde tin, bir anlamda, bilinçlenmiş bir candır. Bu nedenle Santayana, bilinçli tinin önceden kestirilemeyen koşullarla dolu olan, maddi çevre içinde beslenme ve üreme için temel oluşturan tözleri bulma amacıyla hareket eden istemli canın hayatında doğduğunu düşünür.

İstemli can, doğa içindeki konumunu sürdürmek için doğanın dengesine zarar veren – açlık, hastalık, ölüm vb. – zorluklarla mücadele içerisindedir. Onun maddi dünya üzerindeki dikkatini sürdürme çabası tini rahatsız eder. İstemli can hayatta kalma amacı doğrultusunda devinirken, hayvani dikkati niyetin objelerinden görünün objelerine taşıyarak tinin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan yolu açar. Tin görülerin içinde var olur. Canın niyetin objelerini işlemesindeki bütünlüğü zihinsel aktivitelere de yansımaktadır. Böylece tin, algılama ve düşünme bağlamında ortaya çıkan ideal objeler içindeki özleri keşfetmeye başlar. Maddi gerçekliğin yasalarına uygun bir biçimde hareket eden can, tinin içerisindeki niyetin oluşmasında da önemli bir role sahiptir. Bu bağlamda can, eylem sahasında hareket ederken tin aracılığıyla da maddeye dair bilgisini de genişletme imkânı bulmaktadır. Hayvani dikkat tözlere bağlı gelişmektedir ve tinin objeleri olan özler organizma içinde üretilmektedir. Santayana'ya göre bütün zihinsel olgular canın eylemlerinin bir yan ürünüdürler ve tin, maddi süreçleri düzenlemekten çok onları izleme eğiliminde bir karaktere sahiptir. Bu nedenle ancak ve ancak istemli canın adımlarını izleyerek özlerin içerisine nüfuz etme yeteneği kazanan tin,

sistemin içinde etkisiz bir unsurdur. Gücü elinde bulundurmadığı için onun özü sadece ve sadece ışık olmaktır. O, bir anlamda, özleri görme yeteneği kazanmış candır. Onun maddi varoluş içindeki varlığının amacı özler üzerine düşünmektir. O, özler gibi etkisizdir ve kendini gün ışığına çıkaran bir güce sahip değildir. Eğer maddi bedenin özü olan istemli can kaçınılmaz bir şekilde varoluş içerisinde yer almasaydı tinin burada ortaya çıkması imkânsız olacaktı. Bu nedenle o, zorunlu bir kategori değildir ancak insani hayat tarzının başlaması için gerekli bir kategoridir.

Dış dünyaya inanç – kendine has bir güven ve verili olmayan maddeye yönelmiş bir beklenti – bilişsel süreçlerin en ilkel halidir. Hayvani inancın içinde şekillenen farklı inançlar – varoluşa inanç, töze inanç, olgulara inanç, belleğe inanç ve diğer zihinlere inanç, vb. – canın araya girmesiyle insanın madde alanında örgütlenmesinin en önemli parçaları olurlar. Hayvani inanç, bir anlamda, istemli canın eylem dünyasından tam organize olmasını garanti altına almaktadır. Canın hayatı araya girmeden madde alanına bağlı görülerin vuku bulması olanaklı değildir. Bütün görü eylemleri canın hayatına bağlantılı olarak ortaya çıkarlar ve onlar burada ideal objelerdir. Eğer bu gözden kaçırılırsa Santayana'nın canın hayatına tutunarak ortaya çıktığını iddia ettiği tini anlamak zorlaşacaktır. Özler görülerin içindedir ve tin onlar aracılığıyla varoluş içinde kendine yer bulur. Ancak bu durum, özler var olduğu için tinin maddi dünyada kendine yer bulduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Santayana'nın sistemi içerisinde canlı varlıklar doğrudan tözlerle ilişkilerinde ele alınırlar. Onlar bu ilişki içerisinde madde içinde bir alışkanlık, bir tropelar seti ve tözün bir türüdür. Cana sahip olmalarıyla gösterdikleri bu özelliklerle birlikte onlar, maddenin dünyasında içsel bir denge durumlarıdırlar. Bu nedenle can, hayvani uyanıklığın gelişmesinde hayati bir role sahiptir. Onun eylem alanında kendi amaçlarının peşinden gitmesi ve bu amaca hizmet edecek koşullar üzerindeki etkili gücü hayvani dikkati bir adım ileri taşır. Böylece tözlerle birlikte varoluş içinde kendini gösteren özler, onun hayatına görüler aracılığıyla girerler ve tinin objeleri olurlar. İdeal objeler veya görüler bütünlüklü bir yapıya sahiptirler. Hareket alanı içerisinde can, niyetin objelerinin veya tözlerin görüyle birlikte kullanılması için gerekli koşulları yapılandırarak algı ve düşünme arasındaki bağları kurar. Burada ortaya çıkan görü eylemleri dış dünyanın düşünülmesi için zihin objesi olarak hizmet ederler. Bununla birlikte evrensel isteme veya maddi güç ile uyumlu çalışan istemli can, tözlere bağlı hayvani inançlara dikkat kesilerek hayvani dikkati dış dünyadan özlere doğru sevk eder ve tinin görüde verilen özleri düzenlenmesinde ihtiyaç duyduğu enerjiyi ona sağlar. Bu nedenle tin hem varoluş içerisinde ortaya çıkmak, hem de sonsuz özler alanını keşfetmek için daima canın hayvani hayatına ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Bütün bu düşünceler ışığında, Santayana'nın can ve tin arasında kurduğu bağların kendi içerisinde yapısal bir bütünlüğe sahip olduğunu iddia edebiliriz. Bu çalışma bu bütünlük içerisindeki can kavramının dış dünyanın düşünülmesinde algı ve düşünme arasında oynadığı role dikkat çekerek, Santayana'nın tini maddi varoluş içerisinde etkisiz bir unsur olarak ele almasının anlaşılması zor bir felsefi çaba olmadığını göstermeye çalışmıştır. Bu çalışmanın sonunda onun can ve tin üzerine iddialarının, onlar arasındaki ilişkinin doğasını anlamak adına felsefi araştırmaya önemli bir katkı sağladığını söyleyebiliriz.

C: TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

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