

LINKING ONTOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGY VIA THE EXPOSAL OF EVIL
IN HUMAN FREEDOM IN F.W.J. SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman (METU, PHIL)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan (METU, PHIL)

Assist. Prof Dr. Emrah Günok (YYU, PHIL)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Ekrem Övünç Özbey

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Özbey, Ekrem Övünç

M.A., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan

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In this thesis, I have attended to the notion of evil in Schelling's philosophy. To substantiate the view that the notion of evil should be comprehended on a different scale from the comprehensions of the notions of truth and goodness, I have investigated the epistemological structure in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. I have, thus, given an account of German Transcendental Philosophy as a whole and, then, proceeded to elaborate on Schelling's indulgence in Neoplatonic and Spinozistic accounts of ontology. Thereupon, I have encountered a synthesis through an aesthetic unity between critical philosophy and traditional ontology in Schelling's philosophy. I made use of Schelling's investigations into human freedom, through which I emphasized that Schelling's philosophy turns itself into a herald of existentialism by distancing itself from the sheer domination of idealism. In regard, my thesis has been a research on the possibility of such a method by way of interconnecting Schelling's studies with the relevant attempts.

Keywords: Absolute, evil, freedom, transcendental, aesthetic intuition.

ÖZ

İNSAN ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜNDEKİ KÖTÜLÜĞÜN SCHELLING FELSEFESİ'NDE İFŞASI İLE VARLIKBİLİM'İ BİLGİKURAM'A BAĞLAMAK

Özbey, Ekrem Övünç

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Bu tezde, Schelling'in felsefesinde 'kötülük' kavramı üzerinde çalıştım. 'Kötülük' kavramının, 'doğruluk' ve 'iyilik' kavramlarından farklı olarak, kendi başına ele alınmasının gerekliliğine yaptığım vurgunun başarısı için, Immanuel Kant'ın, Johann Gottlieb Fichte'nin ve Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling'in felsefelerindeki bilgikuramsal yapıları inceledim. Böylece Alman Aşkınısal Felsefesi'nin bütünlüklü bir incelemesini yapmış olarak, Schelling'in varlıkbilimsel çalışmalarındaki Spinozacı ve Neo-Platoncu eğilimlerine geçmiş buldum. Bu yaklaşım sayesinde, Schelling felsefesinin, estetik bir birlik önerisi ile, eleştirel felsefe ve geleneksel varlıkbilim kuramları arasında bir senteze ulaştığını görmüş oldum. Burada, Schelling'in insan özgürlüğü üzerine çalışmalarından da faydalanarak, Schelling'in felsefesinin genel olarak katı bir idealizme düşmekten kaçınarak, varoluşçu felsefenin habercisi olacak bir seyirde izlediğini çıkarabildim. Bu hususta, bu çalışma, Schelling'in felsefesi ile alakalandırılabilir diğer teşebbüsler arasında bağlantılar kurarak, bahsedilen türden bir yöntemin imkânını araştırmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mutlak, kötülük, özgürlük, aşkınsal, estetik sezgi.

To Lost Friendships

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is meant to elaborate that which is the insight to, the consequence of and the meaning of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's understanding of evil, whereby it has to be considered with regard not only to the particular philosopher's complete philosophical approach, but also to the philosophical stances and studies of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who were undeniably altogether reciprocally influential on each other.

It would be of a much larger spectrum to analyze all the works of all four philosophers, unlike this study's spectrum as it shall be. However, to the extent that there is a variety of approaches among these German transcendental philosophers, it would aid to heed the original texts of all four. Nevertheless, the dominant focus of the study shall be on Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. In addition to declaring his allegiance to Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, Schelling's studies cover a wide of range of thinkers in the history of speculative thought encircling the philosophies of Plato, Plotinus and Spinoza from where the studies reach out to Hegel and Žižek. The significance of this range is that it covers the metaphysical approaches to overcome *the one and the many* problem systematically.

While some scholars blame Fichte, Schelling and Hegel for not understanding Kant's critical philosophy properly, others consider Schelling a failed counterpart of German Idealism. Andrew Bowie, in the "Introduction" to his *Schelling and*

Modern European Philosophy criticizes this convention in 1952, nearly at the midst of 20th century: “For too long the importance of Schelling’s later work in particular was obscured by the demise of German Idealism which led to him being seen as merely a precursor of Hegel”¹.

Yet others, even though small in number, consider Schelling to be a genuine thinker. It was Martin Heidegger, who had earlier focused on the *Philosophical Investigations into Essence of Human Freedom* and even published his lectures on this topic *Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* in 1936². More recently, Slavoj Žižek has worked on Schelling’s philosophy, focusing on the same text and on the *Ages of the World (Die Weltalter)* although he also tends to subjugate Schelling’s philosophy to a Hegelian context, somehow in the habitual manner, in the texts *The Indivisible Remainder* (1996) and *The Abyss of Freedom* (1997). However, Žižek also goes further, and through a unification of the oppositions he finds in Hegel and Schelling’s philosophies, he finds connections to Marxist dialectic and psychoanalysis³.

What still seems to be missing is a reading of Schelling for his own sake, with a view to examining the development of his own thought through non-biased readings of the texts themselves. In particular, interpreters of Schelling so far have ignored the importance of his philosophy of art and his later works.

I shall give an account of Schelling’s earlier works, which have generally been evaluated as a Fichtean understanding of transcendental philosophy that led the way to Hegel’s philosophy by means of Schelling’s “interlocation” –as his philosophical position is usually described. But it would be a huge omission to ignore Schelling’s works on the philosophy of nature, to which he is indebted for

¹ Bowie, 1952, p.1.

² Heidegger, 1985.

³ Žižek, 2007.

the authenticity of his whole philosophical stance. D. E. Snow, in particular, states that he “wish[es] to restrict [his] inquiry to consideration of the impact that Schelling’s philosophy of nature has had on his idealism” by considering Schelling’s “scientific interests [as] a clear signal of his growing distance from Fichte, for to take nature seriously is to acknowledge that the natural world is [...] a ladder upon which the spirit ascends to itself”⁴.

Still, for a long period of time, this particular ground on philosophy of nature had been an excuse to consider Schelling’s philosophy to be a pantheistic idealism in a misdirected Kantian manner. Because Schelling “distances himself from Fichte and moves closer to Spinoza, who was especially influential on his concept of the absolute,”⁵ he has been held to sever himself from Kantian criticism. But in fact, Schelling does not exclude the critical approach, but he nevertheless criticizes the Kantian and Fichtean approaches against dogmatism as insufficient negative refutations⁶. His elementary claim is that philosophy cannot proceed from the infinite to the finite or vice versa.

Many of those who accused Schelling of such misunderstandings also could not have given account of his philosophy as a whole, but rather slandered him suggesting that he was an ambivalent thinker. Schelling’s philosophy has been and might ever be criticized for not being consistent. His early study on the philosophy of nature is somewhat a reminder of pre-critical metaphysics. His middle stage works are completely idealistic and romantic. Then, his later period philosophy dissolves any idealistic approach to philosophy and it heralds existentialism, positivism and psychoanalysis with various concerns and investigations.

⁴ Snow, 1996, p.68.

⁵ Ibid, p.69.

⁶ Schelling, 1994, p.95.

In fact, the shifting focuses on the subjects of Schelling's philosophical studies (his shift from the philosophy of nature to transcendental idealism and from there to philosophy of art and from there to philosophy of divinity and freedom) are evidences of the "self-critical actuality" that was to characterize his understanding of philosophical endeavor. What is inestimable in these terms concerning the shifts in his philosophy is that his every subsequent approach follows both the success and the failure of the previous endeavor. Meaning that, out of the classical context of conducting science, he excludes the success of the previous approach and includes the failure, which is quite contrary to what sciences practiced while confirming their core theories.

At this point it would be useful to give a chronological sequence of Schelling's works to evoke a rough idea on the course of his philosophical focuses. The works listed here do not correspond to the sum of his works, but rather to the major works in which Schelling differs from his contemporaries. In his early works from 1794 till 1800 (such as *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* and *System of Transcendental Idealism*), Schelling takes issue with the idealism and realism duality, identifying it as a problem that transcendental philosophy needs to overcome. Starting with *Bruno* (which was published in 1802), in works such as *Philosophy and Religion* and *The Philosophy of Art*, he tries to develop an account of the unity of idealism and realism. I believe that *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* written around this time (in 1809) is the key text in that it constitutes the link between Schelling's early idealism and his later work. In the end, I will focus on Schelling's *Bruno* and the *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* since my thesis is aimed at the concept of evil⁷.

It is an existential duty to comprehend what evil is. But how is this relevant to German idealism or even ontology in general? Is not a study of evil supposed to

⁷ Schelling, 2006.

be ethical or at least be concerning practical philosophy? Well, on the very contrary, the main purpose of Schelling's demonstration of his metaphysical consideration of evil is to point out that it is not and cannot be reduced to be solely ethical, whereas it is primordially belonging to the ontological status of beings.

In this case, although my study operates on the notion of evil as Schelling discusses it, it is crucial to remind the reader of Heraclitus' *logos*, of Plato's theory of Forms, of Aristotle's *actuality/potentiality*, of Plotinus' *emanation*, of Hegel's method for dialectics in *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and of Spinoza's metaphysics at large, that *evil* operates in relation with all the dynamics and the metaphysical elements mentioned above.

It is the duty of a student of the history of philosophy to find the right correlation between major intellectual works and major scientific deeds in their causal relationship. Because one has to understand the dynamic transformation of thought into action, and vice versa, to be able to philosophize about it through the means of reflection. And, at this point, it would be a crucial mistake to exclude the major partakers with relevant ideas, even though these partakers' roles in the evaluated subject are indirectly relevant.

To show how such an understanding can be developed, Schelling himself had to reach out to his predecessors in the history of philosophy for giving out a scheme of metaphysics. His main reconstruction of the whole of being is Neoplatonic and Spinozistic, which can be broken down and analyzed by looking at his works *Natürphilosophie* and *Bruno*. But having the relief of being a fellow revolutionary Kantian thinker, Schelling, had been able to exceed his predecessors' deterministic patterns in their schematization of metaphysics. This breakthrough was only possible in regard to his contemporaries' advance in theology, poetry and philosophy. Especially, the liberation of philosophy and art by efforts of

Goethe and Schiller, and by those two's followers, who are also Schelling's close friends in their early years: Schlegel, Hölderlin and Hegel.

This thesis consists of two main parts. As Schelling belongs to the German tradition of transcendental idealism, the next chapter (Chapter II) begins with a brief excursion into the main figures of that tradition, beginning with Kant, in relation to whose works Schelling was developing his own ideas. After a summary of Kant's presentation of the critical method; the main criticisms raised against him by his successors, namely Fichte and Schelling himself, are evaluated. Here, a case is also made for Schelling's search for a ground of metaphysics despite Kant's admonitions. Schelling's own system is revealed to emerge out of this search for a ground and a reevaluation of Fichte's subjective idealism and Spinoza's substance ontology. Schelling presents his own system as one that does not fall into the extremes of either side, but finds an original ground that is positioned at an equal distance from both. The chapter concludes with a detailed epistemological analysis of Schelling's understanding of intuition with a view to making sense of both how the Absolute is alleged to be apprehended through intellectual intuition and why Schelling claims that philosophy finds its true organon in aesthetic intuition, which is the counterpart of intellectual intuition.

In Chapter III, I focus on the concept of evil in Schelling's philosophy as it occupies a crucial place in his ontology and has implications for the final verdict we can give concerning the place Schelling himself occupies in the German idealist tradition and its repercussions on philosophy that has developed to this day.

CHAPTER II

INVESTIGATING THE ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

2.1 Heralds of Schelling's Philosophy

The following break in our focus is on the idealist approach, whereof the aim is to fulfill Kant's transcendental project of metaphysics, while remaining faithful to the requirements of the critical approach. Along with Fichte's and Hegel's systems of idealist transcendental philosophy, Schelling's account is reduced by commentators to be a similar attempt. I argue that though the three philosophers' works differ in various ways, Schelling's account exceeds all the others by its divergence in proposing that aesthetics governs all categorical activity of reason.

This chapter intends to lay bare how Schelling's considerations of Kant's philosophy and its critics opened the way for his Identity Philosophy. With a view to this goal, it begins with a summary of Kant's transcendental project, with a focus on Kant's criticism of dogmatism. I then briefly survey the main criticisms directed to Kant himself, which mainly amount to stating that Kant's philosophy did not give us the ground of the conditions of experience. As Distaso explains in *The Paradox of Existence*, "the two philosophical approaches of Schelling's age was that the principle of philosophy (the very possibility of its beginning), the unconditional could be placed in the I or in the not-I."⁸ Schelling saw an application of either approach in the systems of Fichte and Spinoza,

⁸ Distaso, 2004, p.61.

respectively, and he evaluated and adopted certain aspects from both. Therefore, in the following sections, Schelling's relation to Fichte and Spinoza are discussed.

In the second half of this chapter, Schelling's own transcendental account is presented, starting from its roots in the unity of thought and being found in Descartes' *cogito* and proceeding through an analysis of Kant's transcendental subject. These investigations reveal how Schelling's notion of the Absolute can be understood as the Identity of Subject and Object. The section concludes with Schelling's emphasis on art and aesthetics as his preferred "method" for intuiting the Absolute.

This marvelous discovery is the link that Kant hopes to find between theory and practice in his 3rd critical study, which is on teleology and aesthetics, but where he cannot succeed to do so.⁹ While, Fichte and Hegel seem to have overlooked the fact that the "genius" is the subject of a key investigation in Kant's attempt at the interconnection between the faculties of Reason, Schelling dedicates an analysis to this concept. This insight also survives in his later works as he continues to emphasize the importance of "aesthetic intuition" as an important philosophical tool/method.

2.1.1. Kant's Heritage

It is widely argued that the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is the inspirational cause of German Idealism (in the case that Kant is considered as an exclusive predecessor), but it is also considered to be a failed attempt by Kant to interconnect the theoretical and the practical reason.¹⁰

⁹ See, for instance Terry Pinkard's discussion of the autonomy of art in Kant and Schelling in *German Philosophy: The Legacy of Idealism*, p.191.

¹⁰ Kant, 2002.

Kant made a sharp distinction between two types of philosophic method: dogmatism and criticism¹¹. Dogmatism can arguably be defined as trying to construct an account of metaphysics on a priori principles without asking how such a priori principles are possible¹². Kant's critical method, on the other hand, begins by asking how a priori judgments (*the synthetic a priori* in particular) are possible, and grounds their possibility on the basis of a transcendental subject. He thus limits objective knowledge to knowledge of phenomena in accordance with universal a priori categories and forms of intuition.

Then, the challenge that faces Kant is to explain "the relationship between our a priori knowledge of objects in general and objects of the external senses."¹³ Admittedly, Kant cannot fully meet this challenge. He tells us that we can only know objects as they appear to us (phenomena), but not as they are in themselves (noumena). The concept of objectivity will by no means be regarded on any alignment with subjectivity here, but it can also be never freed from the subject's limits. Kant needs to hold on to the notion of things-in-themselves, because there must be a cause for the phenomena we experience. It is the noumena that give us the sensible element (intuitions) in our experience, without which our concepts would be empty.

There is another (more "sneaky") reason why Kant needs to retain the noumena in his system. Kant distinguishes two different activities of consciousness: understanding (theoretical reason) and reason (practical reason). One "gives shape to experience with concepts;" the latter "legislates laws of freedom, to ourselves, as agents"¹⁴. Consequently, there are two selves: "the transcendental knowing self and the noumenal acting self"¹⁵.

¹¹ Lovejoy, 1906, pp.191-214.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Gare, 2011, p. 31.

It is the noumena that make it possible for him to presuppose the existence of freedom in his practical philosophy (Critique of Practical Reason) or to make it possible to have an idea of God (Critique of Judgment).

In the first introduction to the *Critique of Power of Judgment*, Kant reminds us of the broken link between nature and human cognition. Nature can be conceived as a system, which is constituted by objects of experience. However, it is only in accordance with transcendental laws that this system can be conceived as a totality. Kant warns that “it does not follow from this that nature, even in accordance with empirical laws, is a system that can be grasped by the human faculty of cognition”¹⁶. In other words, even though in one sense we can know nature as a totality (in accordance with transcendental laws), in another sense we can't. This clarification brought by Kant shows why those systems, which try to grasp nature as a whole are addressed as dogmatist approaches. Kant believes that such dogmatism results from a weakness of human nature. We witness through the works of classical metaphysicians that there is a yearning for giving the account of the whole of nature in a single complete system. Kant's critical approach proved that it is impossible to account for a complete conception of nature through the causal relations among objects of experience. This scientific methodology of giving an account of causal relations cannot give us the conditions of experience, which is what the transcendental method aims to do.

Thus, Kant's critique illustrates a difference between causal explanations of nature given by empirical laws and the cause of these laws understood as their condition, as what grounds them. In other words, there emerges a need for an “unconditioned condition” of human cognition or of a totality of system of nature.

¹⁴ Solomon, 1983, p.74.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.92.

¹⁶ Kant, 2002, p.13.

Schelling seems to be engaged in the type of dogmatic search that Kant criticizes as he asserts in the very beginning of his *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799) that philosophy is in search of the *unconditioned*¹⁷. He insists that there must be a point of reality on which our knowledge depends¹⁸. In *Of the I* also, he says there must be “something in which and through which everything that is reaches existence.” He calls this ‘something’, “the original ground.” (*Urgrund*)¹⁹

However, this does not mean that Schelling is unaware of Kant’s admonition. He notes, in *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, that in contradistinction to dogmatism, critical philosophy starts from this question: “*How did we ever come to judge synthetically?*”²⁰ However, he also observes that, despite this distinction between them, criticism and dogmatism have something in common as they both proceed from the same insight: that there is a unity manifest in a synthesis²¹. In other words, both criticism and dogmatism address the problem of the many and the one in philosophy, though in different ways. Schelling also observes that the activity of synthesis implies the presence of a manifold. Also, by definition, it aims at a unity. Kant’s critical philosophy explains this unity by the cognitive faculty of the subject. Schelling underlines that this is the main difference between dogmatism and criticism: while both agree that there is a unity of the manifold, they address differently the question of where to locate the principle of this unity²².

¹⁷ Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, p.13.

¹⁸ Schelling, 2001, p.15.

¹⁹ Schelling, 1980, “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy, or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, p.71.

²⁰ Schelling, 1980, “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism”, p.164.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp.164-165.

²² *Ibid*, p.164.

2.1.2. Criticism of Kant

In *Of The I As Principle of Philosophy*, Schelling argues that there must be a “basis of every synthesis if there is to be synthesis at all”²³. In this respect, he finds a serious shortcoming in Kant’s philosophy. Synthesis by means of the categories in Kant’s system is a “subordinate” kind of synthesis, which must be derived from “an original form and an original content.”²⁴ However, Kant does not supply this. “The categories are set up according to the table of functions of judgment, but the latter are not set up according to any principle.”²⁵

Further, Schelling also complains that even if there was a unity in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, there still remains a huge gap between his theoretical philosophy and his practical philosophy, and thus the whole system is not unified²⁶. (This is not to say that there is a unity in his theoretical philosophy. As many critics of Kant have pointed out, there is a dualism in Kant’s theoretical philosophy as well between the categories and sensible experience²⁷). Kant remains stuck at the oppositions/dualisms (between noumena and phenomena, etc.) and cannot produce metaphysics.

Lastly, Schelling, like Fichte before him and Hegel after him, sees the residue of the thing-in-itself as revealing the fact that Kant could not come up with a unified system. Further, any suggestion that the thing-in-itself is the ground or condition of the phenomena we experience or of the transcendental I is deeply unpalatable

²³ Schelling, 1980, “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, p.65.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, p.66.

²⁷ Gare, 2011, p.32, fn 10.

to Schelling (or Fichte). If we set the thing-in-itself as antecedent to the I, then the I must be conditioned and this would make its freedom questionable.²⁸

In *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, Hegel has famously written that “the Kantian philosophy needed to have its spirit distinguished from its letter”²⁹, thereby summing up the misgivings that all three philosophers (Fichte, Schelling and Hegel) had with respect to Kant’s philosophy. What he meant by this was basically that the “spirit” of Kant’s philosophy, its motivation, was an investigation into metaphysics, but ironically, Kant ended up denying the possibility of doing metaphysics. While transcendental philosophy intended to question the conditions of experience, Kant stopped short at the categories without being able to find their condition or ground.

The positioning of the transcendental subject by Fichte, and Hegel’s account of it as fulfilling the Absolute are scientifically prolific attempts to overtake Kant’s philosophy.

2.1.3. Fichte

Fichte took upon himself the immodest task of completing Kant’s system by overcoming the dualities inherent in it. By focusing more critically on the immediate certainty of the self, found in Descartes, he posited the “I” (or the Ego) as the first premise from which all further principles could be deduced³⁰. While Descartes conceived of the self as “a thinking *thing*”, Fichte saw it as an activity. He then established the distinction between the world and our cognition of it from

²⁸ Schelling, 1980, “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, p.79.

²⁹ Hegel, 1977, p.80.

³⁰ Fichte, 1982, p.99.

within the self: as a distinction that the “I” posits between itself and the “Not-I”³¹. In this sense, Fichte sees the I as the unconditioned ground that idealists after Kant were looking for.

The way to seeing the “I” as an activity was already cleared by Kant’s understanding of consciousness as actively applying its concepts to intuitions. But Fichte focuses more on the practical aspect of the self (the moral self), to the extent that his system amounts, in Solomon’s view, to “a reduction of nature to a postulate of practical reason.”³² Fichte’s philosophy seems to treat theoretical knowledge as derivative.

There was another move already made by Kant that made it easy for Fichte to develop the view that he did: the fact that Kant saw the transcendental ego, not as an individual ego, but as “consciousness in general”³³. Thus, all that was left for Fichte to do to arrive at a unified comprehensive system was to discard the thing-in-itself³⁴.

Early on in *Wissenschaftslehre*, Fichte emphasizes the importance of starting from an act and not from a fact³⁵. Although Fichte’s analysis of this self in activity as consciousness starts from the notions of object and perception, he argues that the perception of the object is a *feeling* (rather than a *sensation* as Kant perceived it), because he wants to draw attention to the self as firstly an activity³⁶. The object is perceived as a limitation on the I’s freedom, and for this he prefers the word

³¹ Pinkard, 2002, p.174-175.

³² Solomon, 1983, p.90.

³³ Ibid, p.91.

³⁴ Ibid, p.83.

³⁵ Fichte, 1982, p.42.

³⁶ Ibid, p.61.

‘feeling’ because ‘sensation’ implies passivity on the part of the self while ‘feeling’ implies activity.

In his *Vocation of Man* (in the section entitled “Knowledge”) he arrives at the point that consciousness, which knows itself is a kind of self-consciousness that posits itself through what it is not in order to become aware of itself. So it requires of itself to know what it is not, but it also requires to know itself precisely because it cannot know what the object is in-itself. At the same time, he concludes that this not-I is not nothing and is open to the I because they designate each other. This shows that the unknowable aspect of the object cannot be reduced to a notion like the thing-in-itself, because it is at least open to the I in its grasping of it³⁷.

Fichte rejects the thing-in-itself by arguing that it is something that arises in our thought, because of the categories of thought³⁸. As mentioned above, Kant asserts that there must be a thing-in-itself because there must be a cause for our sensations of objects. But Fichte argues that if the thing-in-itself is called for by the laws of thought and our experience of objects, then it doesn’t make sense to say that it is the ground of our experience or to attribute to it a predicate of real efficacy³⁹.

Schelling partially agrees with Kant and Fichte, but at the same time he disagrees with both of them. He considers Kant’s postulation of the thing-in-itself revolutionary in the sense that the notion and its conception unburdened philosophy from the dogmatism ordinary consciousness could and did lead to. In his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling stresses the point that the thing-in-itself provides philosophy with a critical approach to the ground of objects, and Fichte’s rejection of a thing-in-itself which is grounded outside the I is a hasty and

³⁷ Fichte, 1956, pp.35-82.

³⁸ Fichte, 1982, p.55.

³⁹ Ibid.

failed attempt. This ground is clearly apparent in consciousness but it cannot also lie in consciousness because objects (or objectivity), according to Schelling, appear as a limitation of consciousness⁴⁰. Fichte wants to say that the I posits this limitation, but Schelling rightly points out to the difference between how the self feels limited in its present activity and how it is already empirically limited. He gives the example of how the existence of a cube in a portion of space means that my intuition in this part of space can be active “only in the form of a cube”⁴¹. In other words, according to Schelling, Fichte completely reduced the objective to the subjective, which was a mistake.

In short, he agrees that the phenomenal objects fall into the jurisdiction of the transcendental I but he disagrees that their reality should either be “in” (as in Fichte) or “out” (as in Kant) of the reach of the same I. Schelling’s critical elaboration proceeds by suggesting that “this ground of explanation lying beyond consciousness is in the end no more than our own ideal activity”.⁴² Here, I suppose that Schelling considers this ideal activity as a unity of these aspects of ‘in’ and ‘out’ wherefore we can expect the postulation of a concept to this unity for further elaboration which we will dig in the section “The Absolute.”

On a more subtle point, however, Schelling agreed with Fichte’s criticism of the Kantian thing-in-itself. Even if things-in-themselves could be the cause of phenomena, the-thing-in-itself in Kant serves as a ground in a broader and more ambiguous sense, and it is this more broad sense in which Schelling does not believe the ground should be located in the thing-in-itself⁴³. While Kant does not openly posit the thing-in-itself as a ground, both in his theoretical and in his practical philosophy, the thing-in-itself serves as a substitute (a negative

⁴⁰ Schelling, 2001, pp.57-58.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.58.

⁴² Ibid, p.99.

⁴³ Pinkard, 2002, p.174.

surrogate) for the unconditioned. Thus, Schelling understood from Fichte's criticism that one should distinguish between two senses in which noumena could be the "ground" of phenomena. They could be the ground in the sense that they cause sensations, or they could be the ground in the sense that they supply practical reason with norms⁴⁴. Schelling thought the thing-in-itself could not be the ground in the latter sense.

In short, Schelling saw that transcendental philosophy could not produce what it set out to investigate—i.e. metaphysics— and its setting up of the transcendental subject led philosophy to a subjectivist idealism. Meanwhile, the duality created through Kant's critical manner and his resulting transcendental idealism left the noumenal realm in Kant and the non-ego in Fichte as a residue.

Schelling believes that there should be no duality in transcendental philosophy. In other words, the residual realm of noumena (or non-Ego in Fichte) needs to be accounted for and unified with the subject.

2.1.4. The Search for the Possibility of a Non-Dogmatic Metaphysics in Spinozism

While Fichte sought for the unconditional in the "I", Schelling also evaluated the other approach he found in Spinoza who placed the unconditional in the self-caused Substance (*causa sui*). After this evaluation, Schelling reached the conclusion that Spinoza's system will lead to dogmatism as Kant criticizes, but his criticism of the dogmatic tendency in Spinoza differed from Kant's in some respects.

The reason why Schelling sees a dogmatic tendency in Spinoza is not because Spinoza looks for an unconditioned cause (or reason/ground) for the conditioned,

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.174.

but because he conceives of this ground as substance⁴⁵. He agreed with Kant on the following point: Kant argues against dogmatism by accusing it of conducting philosophy or science without making the distinction between being and being-known, and Spinoza's substance does not make this distinction. For Spinoza the substance, which is the ground of all things is simply conceived as *being* itself. Schelling, on the other hand, takes Kant's distinction seriously. In his *System of Transcendental Idealism* he explicates that his quest for the ground begins, in accordance with the transcendental method, with an investigation into the highest principle of knowledge, which is sought not in being but in being-known⁴⁶. Dogmatism, on the contrary, seeks the ground in being.

Can we consider the totality of objects of experience as being and search for the unconditional there? According to Schelling, we can't, for several reasons. First, to find the unconditional among the totality of objects, we must have resorted to that totality's *being-known* as a whole, which means it is a subjective totality. That is why Schelling considers the objective knowing of being as still subjective in the end.

Secondly, if we treat the totality of objects of experience as being, then this will mean that being is bound by empirical laws. But empirical laws basically express causal relations among the conditioned objects of experience. There is no way to break out of this chain of causal explanations to reach an unconditional ground, because in the empirical sciences, cause is understood in a very limited, mechanical sense. When we consider the totality of objects of experience as a whole, the cause (or condition) of every effect (or conditioned object) will be

⁴⁵ Schelling, 1980, "Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge", p.78.

⁴⁶ Schelling, 2001, pp.15-18.

another conditioned object (or the effect of another cause). This means that the search for an ultimate ground in nature will merely lead to an infinite regress⁴⁷.

Schelling puts the same point in another way in *Of the I As Principle of Philosophy*. He says that to locate the unconditioned in nature would make the unconditioned into an object. But the notion of an unconditioned object is self-contradictory. This becomes apparent if we consider this expression in German. An object is a thing—that is *ein Ding*. *Bedingen* is to condition, so an unconditioned thing is *ein unbedingtes Ding*—i.e., a contradiction in terms⁴⁸. (From this it also follows that the unconditioned is free; since it is, by definition, not determined as *anything*.)

The despair of the endless strife in an infinite regress can only be cancelled by discovering or postulating an unconditional which is at once the cause and effect of this chain of causality. Yet Schelling clarifies that such speculation will end up pertaining merely to the science of nature⁴⁹.

Spinoza's *causa sui* is an elegant example to the postulation of such an unconditional. In his system, Spinoza placed the unconditional in the self-caused substance. In this system, we are presented with an axiomatic method of thinking which is modeled on Euclidean geometry. Spinoza's system starts with a definition of self-caused substance and proceeds by deriving further propositions from it. These definitions elaborate *causa sui*'s ontogenetic development. Thus, through this positing of the *causa sui* as the unconditional ground, his system claims to present a lawfulness without an infinite regress. But at the same time, this lawfulness could be considered to be an overlapping (or perhaps even

⁴⁷ Schelling, 2001, p.17.

⁴⁸ Schelling, 1980, "Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge", p.77.

⁴⁹ Schelling, 2001, p.17.

conflation) of conceptual derivation with causality⁵⁰. Further, it is not clear whether Spinoza's axiomatic methodology is derived from empirical causality or not. In other words, it is not clear whether it is a method of discovery or merely a method of presentation⁵¹.

While, to many Spinoza readers, this ambiguity may seem to be a problem, Schelling sees in this seeming ambiguity a fresh way of looking at the problem of causation. Schelling intends to explore the causal relation among finite things as well, but he wants to refrain from falling into infinite regress. So he decides to start from the idea of Absolute, which he discovered in his Fichtean studies. We observe his transition to Spinozism at this point, because Schelling considers Spinoza's conception of a self-caused cause as a successful way of formulating the relation between infinity and finitude. Spinoza's axiomatic and definition-based geometric progress to relate *causa sui* to things dissolves the risk of falling into infinite regress. Through definitions Spinoza derives things of finitude within the infinite concept of the substance. Thus the *causa sui* substance is at once the finite and the infinite itself. *Causa-sui* is taken as a first principle through which finite things and their causal relations are perceived. The abstinence from infinite regress by discovering finitude unfolding from a first principle reveals finitude and infinity to be in a primordial unity. Schelling is fascinated by the idea that there is a primordial unity in the *causa sui* as the first principle since this primordial unity evokes the subject-object relation in his own investigations.

Schelling takes Spinoza's *causa sui* as a model for his Absolute due to the fact that *causa sui* allows a deductive approach for grounding finite things. Thus the conditioned object would be accounted for while it is contained in the unconditioned. However, as mentioned above, Spinoza made a mistake, according to Schelling, by conceiving this unconditioned ground as substance. While the

⁵⁰ Melamed, 2013, p.53.

⁵¹ Mark, 1972.

primordial unity evoked the possibility of a subject-object unity for Schelling, when Spinoza conceived the unconditioned as substance, then he neglected to emphasize the subject. In his *Freedom* essay, Schelling points out that Spinoza's substance is an inanimate abstraction, still resembling a conditioned object⁵².

For that reason, Schelling observes a kind of fatalism (and even dogmatism) in Spinoza's systemization. The lack of subjective activity in the unconditioned prevents us from apprehending the possibility of dialectics in the unity— i.e., the dialectics of subject-object. If *causa sui* could have been formulated with a subjective side as well, then it could have the standards for the Absolute identity's dynamic activity as well as being more in alignment with transcendental philosophy's critical method. But it is not the case in Spinoza's philosophy, and for that reason, Schelling condemns that it cannot account for freedom.

2.2 Schelling's Transcendental Account

The discussions in the two sections on Fichte and Spinoza above were engaged in to expose the two key ideas that Schelling found and combined when developing his own view. From Spinoza he got the idea that the unconditioned ground could express a primordial unity between the finite and the infinite. His critical evaluation of Fichte, on the other hand, revealed the fallibility of conceiving this ground as located on the subject's side while hastily cancelling the notion of a thing-in-itself in a way that leads to a potentially dogmatic idealism. In his *German Philosophy*, Terry Pinkard also observes that Schelling's discovery was to see how the Spinozistic approach could be brought in as a counterbalance to the Fichtean approach⁵³. Schelling adopts the Kantian critical method only to free Spinoza's system from the same dogmatism the Kantian method itself could also lead to in the hands of idealist system-thinkers such as Fichte.

⁵² Schelling, 2006, p.20.

⁵³ Pinkard, 2002, p.174.

As we saw, Fichte had closed the gap between the objective and the subjective by re-casting the subject-object duality as a distinction made within and by the subject. Yet in the case of Schelling, this particular distinction is not reduced to either side of the duality. His ambition to keep both the realist and the idealist aspects of philosophy prevalent and coactive leads him to seek for a possibility of unity between the two sides in a way that addresses their respective concerns and motivations.

We observe throughout his studies that Schelling adopts this bilateral approach until he reaches a certain point where he feels confident enough to find the unity. Schelling conceives the notion of an Absolute as the principle of this unity. His Fichtean period enables him to see and resolve the hazards involved in his attempt to begin a transcendental account. This resolution conduces the mentioned bilateral approach, leading Schelling to tend to *Naturphilosophie* and transcendental idealism at the same time. While *Naturphilosophie* accounts for the causal relations among objects with a speculative methodology, his works on transcendental idealism constitute a subjective inquiry, which reaches through and beyond the subject into a reason-giving ground for both the subject and object. These works cross-reference each other at crucial points and he does not treat either work as final. Thus we can observe the development of a certain type of dialectical relation between these works. So Schelling's metaphysical canon (the unconditional Absolute) shall rest on whatever kind of unity this bilateral approach's dialectics would conclude.

This, at the end of the day, is similar to what Hegel preaches in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* in general. Plainly, it is the essence of what all the three of the "Idealists" had derived from Kant's transcendental philosophy. The problem of determinism caused by the mechanic concept of causation could only be abolished by means of reaching beyond its limits. Thus, the movement is no doubt dialectical. And it is exactly the case of Schelling. Dialectics is not only in

his system of philosophy, but it also is in his scientific attitude through out his life.

2.2.1. Towards the Unity of Being and Thought

It has been suggested that Schelling's handling of the question "how do objects conform to our concepts?" is the first substantial critique of the correspondence theory of truth – a radical reevaluation and subsequent abandonment of it.

In the "Introduction" to the *System of Transcendental Philosophy*, he points out that since 'truth' is generally taken to be the "coincidence of presentations with their objects" the basic epistemological challenge is to give an account of "the coincidence of the objective with the subjective."⁵⁴

Schelling begins his account by methodological considerations on the problem of the proper starting point of the subject-object relation. He points out that there *prima facie* appear to be two candidates: Either one starts out from the object or from the subject. If one begins from the object, then the question arises as to how cognition of the object becomes annexed to it, or, in Schelling's words: "how does nature come to be presented?"⁵⁵ Transcendental philosophy starts from the other direction; it makes the subject primary, and then the question is: How does nature conform to our subjective principle?

Considering either methodology (whether one starts out from the subject or from the object) Schelling observes a tendency in each methodology to be driven towards the opposite pole from which one started simultaneously with a desire to keep the opposite pole out.

⁵⁴ Schelling, 2001, p.5.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

When one takes the objective as primary, one wishes to keep the subjective principle out or to reduce everything subjective to the objective so that the only question that remains for it is to explain how the subjective arises from the objective. This is the problem of nature philosophy (or today we might call it physicalism). However the opposite happens as the natural sciences proceed by introducing lawfulness into phenomena because lawfulness implies the projection of our own categories of thought onto nature so that the positive element in nature (“the husk” in Schelling’s terms) gets subdued to the point of disappearance⁵⁶. Schelling gives examples like the phenomena of optics, magnetism or gravitation which, when explained by the natural sciences, become translated into the logic of geometry⁵⁷. Hence, he concludes that if the natural sciences could give a complete account of nature, than all of nature would have been translated into laws of thought⁵⁸.

He then looks at what happens when one starts from the subjective as primary. Taking the subjective side as the starting point naturally brings along with it a skepticism with respect to the existence of the objective side⁵⁹.

While Schelling will ultimately argue for a subject-object identity, which does not prioritize either side, his reasoning takes the path of transcendental philosophy. It can arguably be claimed that transcendental philosophy begins with Descartes, in whose *immediate certainty* of the “I think” all transcendental idealists saw the germ of a very promising thought, which Descartes later lost track of.

[F]rom immediate experiences must all of our knowledge start. This is a truth which has already been proclaimed by many philosophers who have

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.6.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p.7.

fallen short of full truth only for lack of an explanation concerning the nature of that intuition [Anschauung]⁶⁰.

Correspondingly, Schelling's transcendental method, at its beginning, seems to follow in the footsteps of Descartes.

He begins by pointing out that the reality of the objective world is not obvious and it is merely a basic prejudice of ordinary consciousness to treat it as an immediate certainty. He acknowledges that this tendency to be certain of the existence of the external world is almost instinctive and completely understandable because the objective world seems to be so different from us and still imposed on our consciousness, but these reasons don't constitute a sound proof for this basic conviction. Schelling argues that this is the main difference between transcendental cognition and ordinary cognition: Ordinary cognition treats the immediate certainty of the objective world as identical to the immediate certainty of the subjective "I think," while transcendental cognition separates the two, and treats the certainty of the subjective as genuinely certain while the certainty of the objective is merely a prejudice for it⁶¹.

Here, Schelling seems to be reiterating Descartes' claim that we have a compelling urge to believe in the existence of the external world, but when Schelling denies that there are any "reputable proofs" of it⁶², he seems to be parting ways with Descartes who arrived at the existence of the external world with the aid of God. In other words, like the Descartes of the first two *Meditations*, Schelling holds that the only immediate certainty is the certainty of the proposition "I exist", but he withholds from arriving at the existence of the external world in the manner of Descartes.

⁶⁰ Schelling, 1980, "Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism", pp. 180-181.

⁶¹ Schelling, 2001, p.8.

⁶² Ibid.

The appropriate method according to Schelling would be to proceed by directing our attention to the subjective⁶³. He touches on this point also in his *Letters* where he implies that an immediate experience which can ground self-certainty would have to be an experience not contaminated by the conviction that it is causally related to outside objects⁶⁴.

Schelling derives the Absolute as subject-object identity from the immediate certainty of the “I” because the Absolute can be understood on the model of *the identity of being and thought* that is found in the proposition ‘I am’. He states in *Of the I* that the unconditional ground must be such that its being and its being-thought must coincide.

But this is not a logical derivation as we understand it. In *Of the I As Principle of Philosophy*, Schelling writes: “That there is an absolute I can never be proved objectively.⁶⁵” To prove ‘the unconditional’ objectively would mean putting it in the sphere of the conditioned, and this would be a contradiction. To prove that there is an Absolute, one would have to treat the Absolute as an object but the Absolute can never become object. Therefore it lies beyond the reach of all imagining. In fact, if it were not for the immediate certainty of the ‘I’ and the intuition we have of ourselves therein we would have no way of reaching/apprehending the Absolute⁶⁶.

Carrying on, we encounter this resolution further in the same text mentioned above: Schelling arrives at the point that the I, as the absolute (unconditional),

⁶³ Ibid, p.9.

⁶⁴ Schelling, 1980, “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism”, pp.180-181. It can also be further examined in Schelling, 2001, p.31.

⁶⁵ Schelling, 1980, “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, p.75.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.76.

cannot be accounted for with sensuous intuition since we now know that it is not an object. That leaves only one alternative in his account, namely, ‘intellectual intuition’.

Schelling derives his use of the term ‘intellectual intuition’ from Fichte. In *On The History of Modern Philosophy*, he explains that the expression comes from Kant; however, it is Fichte who applied it as a first principle to philosophy^{67 68}. However, for Schelling, unlike Fichte, intellectual intuition of the Absolute is not the same as the self-certainty of the particular subject. Thus, while he uses the expression ‘absolute I’ in *Of the I As Principle of Philosophy*, under the influence of Fichte, in his later works the word ‘I’ drops out of the expression as Schelling more decidedly settles into the conclusion that we arrive at the Absolute when we shed the particularity of the immediately certain “I think”.

From an analytic perspective, we find a mere statement of a proposition when we look into the phrase “I am”. But as discussed in Schelling’s *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Kant’s *Anthropology* discovers something beyond a theoretical concern in that proposition –e.g., when a child states it⁶⁹. Concerning the emergence of self-consciousness, it is important to note that the proposition “I am” cannot be synthetic a posteriori. We do not tend to take the consciousness of a child to be a sort of limited artificial intelligence. The statement is itself the very first act of reflection and the first practical step for constituting self-consciousness.

Schelling strongly argues for this step as a being’s self-assertion into the intellectual world. When a child becomes self-conscious, s/he does not say “it

⁶⁷ “Kant, first considered and then rejected ‘intellectual intuition’ as implying the possibility of knowledge of the noumenon” Gare, 2011.

⁶⁸ Schelling, 1994, p19.

⁶⁹ Schelling, 2001, p.31.

exists”, because self-consciousness is real, but not an object. Therefore it is *Being* itself⁷⁰. Thus, this act of self-assertion provides a link to absolute Being, in relation to which the conditioning of the particular self evolves. Any conditional aspect of that self relies on a yet unfolded unconditional. But through self-consciousness, the conditions of the self gain a new ground, which will be the condition of its freedom, just because the self led itself out of its given ground.

The self introduces itself into the nonobjective realm of thought through a realm which appears to be objective and conditioned. Individuality of the particular self disappears and reappears at once because the activity of stating its own existence reaches out of conditions aimed at the unconditional and falls back in a fashion that differentiates itself from itself. This activity seems to be originary, and on that account Schelling suggests that it is not the individual who contains the activity, but rather it should be the activity as the act of self-consciousness that contains the individual⁷¹.

Thus, unlike Fichte, Schelling does not see the immediate self-certainty of the “I” as the generator of his philosophical system. “[T]he self-conscious I must be seen as a result, rather than as the originating act it is in Fichte”⁷²

Pure self-consciousness is an act lying outside time, and by which all time is first constituted; empirical consciousness is that which arises merely in time and the succession of presentations⁷³.

At this point, it is perhaps needless to emphasize that Schelling’s understanding of the self, intuited in the process of thought, which takes us to the Absolute, is not

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.32.

⁷¹ Ibid, p.31-32.

⁷² Bowie, 2010.

⁷³ Schelling, 2001, pp.31-32.

the empirical self⁷⁴. In the *System*, he explains that empirical consciousness arises as a result of pure consciousness being “determined and delimited in various ways” so that if we “take away the limits of the empirical [we will] have the absolute self [that he is] talking about”⁷⁵.

2.2.2. The Absolute

Thus, the Absolute is neither subject nor object. It is, as alluded to above, “something deeper” (Pinkard) that both the subjective and the objective stem from. In the same text (*of the I*), he states that the original form of this absolute is pure identity⁷⁶. In the self-identity of the Absolute, there is no division, negation or duality. These contrasts only belong to the nature of the finite.

In the *Letters*, Schelling describes how we reach the Absolute through ‘intellectual intuition’ as follows:

This intellectual intuition takes place whenever I cease to be an object for myself, when – withdrawn into itself – the intuiting subject is identical with the intuited. In this moment of intuition, time and duration vanish for us; it is not *we* who are in time, but time is *in us*; in fact it is not time but rather pure absolute eternity that is in ourselves. It is not we who are lost in the intuition of the objective world; it is the world that is lost in our intuition⁷⁷.

Schelling’s proposition that “the Absolute is pure identity,” which can be conceived merely through the intellectual intuition, was vulgarly criticized by Hegel with a thorough Kantian stance. Though it was Hegel who accused

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.32.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Schelling, 1980, “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, p.82.

⁷⁷ Schelling, 1980, “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism”, pp.180-181.

Schelling's understanding of the Absolute as an empty identity, it was much earlier than this criticism took place in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that Schelling, in his work *Bruno*, was already contemplating on this tangled science of the Absolute, which ended up falling into an abstraction of transcendence. "But it is obvious that unity is not unity, and plurality is not plurality, unless unity is posited within plurality, and plurality is assimilated to unity"⁷⁸

Subsequently, Schelling published another work, *Philosophy and Religion*, where he ripened his ideas on the Absolute and its identity with respect to an understanding of what he called "real-idealism". Here the claim is that the distinction between the real and the ideal is made by empirical consciousness. In other words, in the Absolute, there are no distinctions; since it is in unity in its self-identity. The distinction arises with the Absolute's absolute reflection, God, which manifests itself to the consciousness. "[T]he self is just the identity of the ideal and the real, or of the finite and the infinite; this identity, however, is its own proper deed, and its alone. [...] [I]nfinite thought becomes its own object within the finite"⁷⁹.

Transcendental idealism can give the account of the ideal, the Absolute's infinity and freedom, and philosophy of nature can account for the real with the objects. But the "Absolute is the indifference of real and ideal, of the subjective and the objective"⁸⁰ in the sense that it is a unity without distinctions. Since the Absolute needs to exist without opposing itself, it gives itself the "ground" of its existence through "a cosmic fall". And there, Schelling works upon the theory of divine Ideas, taken over from the Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions, to elaborate the duality of the finite and the infinite, for the Absolute is not to be reduced either to the real or to the ideal.

⁷⁸ Schelling, 1984, p.192.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.186.

⁸⁰ Lindsay, 1910, p.263.

2.2.3. The Dialectics of Identity Philosophy

Schelling operates on philosophy's duality of the real and the ideal by inferring *Realidealismus* through *Natürphilosophie* and transcendental idealism which are meant to unite with the notion of intellectual intuition as elaborated in his philosophy of art. Therefore, in this section, I shall explore firstly, Schelling's analysis of the transcendental subject, and secondly, his speculative philosophy of nature. This bilateral analysis will be brought into unity in a discussion of Schelling's notions of aesthetic and intellectual intuition as two directions in which the Absolute can be comprehended.

2.2.3.1. From Transcendental Idealism to *Natürphilosophie*

Schelling's transcendental method turns inwards. It objectifies the subject, which means that, when philosophizing, one is both object and subject. One is engaged in a double movement: on the one hand, one is engaged in a *productive activity* of thinking, as subject; on the other hand, one is reflecting on the activity of production, turning this activity into an object for itself.

Schelling contends that the only organ for conducting philosophy in this mode is *inner sense*. To better explain this inner intuition, he contrasts it with mathematical intuition. The objects of mathematics are also not outside the subject's mind, but in mathematics one is concerned with the constructs of the intellect, and not with *the act of construction* itself. Schelling calls the type of intuition involved in mathematics as "outer intuition". The act of philosophizing that Schelling is trying to turn our attention to, on the other hand, is completely turned inwards⁸¹

⁸¹ Schelling, 2001.

Having derived the idea of a non-individual self from immediate experience, and distinguished between inner and outer intuition, Schelling then discusses how the self's boundaries are to be determined. His purpose seems to be to point out the obscurity and contingency of the ways in which the subject-object distinction gets drawn.

To question how the subject comes to be distinguished from the object, he draws attention to the inconspicuous seepages in Kant's epistemology. He points out that what he calls "outer intuition"—that is, mathematics—is in fact fully operant in empirical consciousness. Here, he is reiterating the Kantian view concerning the projection of schemata, which takes place in empirical consciousness. This projection results not from the receptive but from the a priori and spontaneous aspect of consciousness. However, in empirical consciousness, we are not consciously aware of our own active contribution to our perception of objects. Just as we are not aware of the ground of our own spontaneous activity (i.e., the ground of subjectivity), we are also not aware of the ground of the sensory object (i.e., the ground of objectivity). This ground, for Kant, is the noumenal ground. Schelling implies that this noumenal ground (the-thing-in-itself) is the explanatory ground both of subjectivity and of objectivity⁸².

This discussion points to how tenuous and arbitrary the subject-object distinction in fact is. Because we find that what we think of as "outside" us (the sensory object) is already "inside" us (inside our schemata). In other words, the subject and object are inextricably intermingled.

To reveal the arbitrariness of the distinction, Schelling first adopts the transcendental position to shift the subject-object distinction inwards. From the transcendental point of view, the distinction between the subject and object is simply the distinction between inner and outer intuition. So, if there is a boundary

⁸² Ibid, p.99.

that distinguishes the object from the subject, that boundary has rather intrusively shifted inwards as it has become identified with the limits of outer intuition⁸³.

Then Schelling reveals these boundaries to be constantly shifting due to the activity of the subject. He questions whether and to what extent the object can really limit the self⁸⁴. He contends, *a la* Fichte, that the object does not really limit the active self. But as we will remember from the discussion of the cube in the section on Fichte, the object limits the passive self. But insofar as the self is passive, it belongs to the objective side.

Schelling therefore re-defines the boundary between the subject and object, not as a boundary between inner and outer self, but as a boundary between the conscious self and the unconscious object⁸⁵.

He thus declares the delineation of these boundaries to be changeable and arbitrary. Further, the boundaries of the subject and the object are determined not only contingently, but also in mutual interaction and shall be constantly shifting.

While the objective encroaches on the subjective via the object perceived through outer intuition so that the limit of the subjective is pushed all the way to inner sense; the subjective also encroaches on the objective so that the limit of the objective is pushed to the thing-in-itself.

Having shown the shifting and elusive nature of these boundaries between subject and object, Schelling shifts his attention to their ground. He reminds that the ground of the objective limit is actually the “thing-in-itself”. And the boundary that delineates the thing-in-itself is the spontaneous activity of the subject.

⁸³ Ibid, pp.100-101.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.100.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Though, according to Kant, we cannot reach to the ground behind either the subjective or the objective side, we do not know that they are not the same ground. But Schelling implies that it is the same ground by questioning how the subject and object can coincide in truthful propositions⁸⁶.

Further, if we consider this ground as “thing-in-itself”, then to the extent that the subject is unaware of the ground of what distinguishes it from the object (including its passive self), we can say that this ground underlying both the subject and the object is unconscious. Given the contingency of the boundary (owing to the activity of the self), we can further say that the ground of the delineation between the subject and object is the unconscious.

We reach several conclusions: the ground of the coincidence of subject and object is also the ground of their delineation; this ground is nonconscious and the boundaries are contingent.

Thus the metaphysical unity of Schelling’s philosophy accounts for a departure from Kant’s transcendent noumenal realm back to a Spinozistic version of pantheism –only by avoiding any fatalism with regards to an idealist system. So we can consider these concepts’ boundaries and the concepts themselves with respect to their boundaries as gateways to freedom. We also see that Schelling introduces into this reinterpretation of Kant not only concepts like activity and passivity but that of the *unconscious* – concepts, which he also uses in his *Freedom* essay concerning evil.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 99

2.2.3.2. From *Natürphilosophie* to the Philosophy of Art

For Schelling, the activity of the subject asserted in transcendental philosophy is an expression of the originary activity of the Absolute, which nourishes the inseparable subject-object unity in objective transcendental philosophy. This subject-object unity suggests that nature is also an expressive aspect of *a kind of* lawful reasoning⁸⁷.

Schelling's investigation into the realm of objects is due to his dissatisfaction with the lack of apprehension concerning nature in itself in the works of Kant and Fichte. Schelling finds his precursors' attempts to be constricted. Kant's studies on nature seem to be reduced to a totality of experience, and Fichte's formulation of the not-I is so indistinctive that the I is locked down on its subjective idealist assumptions as ultimate⁸⁸. In *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, Schelling says that nature should not only express but “realize the laws of our mind”⁸⁹, thus criticizing Kant for leaving it to be a mere coincidence that nature *conforms* to the laws of our mind.

Schelling urges upon this problematic in his studies in *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* where he further argues that there is “something analogous to rationality” in nature⁹⁰. He considers that each organism on its own is an articulation of this rationality in a way that echoes the totality of our intuition of the world. The articulation, which is found through the activities of an organism is a certain type of regularity implying a lawfulness of nature. But we should keep in mind that this analogy between the way organisms express a “lawfulness” in nature and our schematization of it is bound to and constituted by

⁸⁷ Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of A System of the Philosophy of Nature*, p.132.

⁸⁸ Dunham, Grant, Watson, 2011, p.132.

⁸⁹ Schelling, 1988, p.42.

⁹⁰ Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, p.131.

its transcendent aspect. We cannot account for an objective systematization of nature, in terms of our own schematization alone. Thus we see that, for Schelling, nature is expressed by our intuition as befitting the limits of our intuition, and it is our intuition's regularity that we find expressed by the organisms in nature ⁹¹.

Now what do these shifts between nature and intuition suggest? And how are they even possible? By the very reason that organisms can imply an unlimited or infinite sort of productivity, we are reminded that nature is still bound to the conception of reasoning. But it would be inconsistent to ascribe the same type of causality to the separate stages of these law-like relations. For example, a shelled animal resembles a certain geometrical figure. A snail's geometric shape as a phenomenon might imply to us a conception of infinity within its finitude because spirals grow into infinity in principle. But another example is that the planetary motions in their regularities are geometrical products of our intuitive apprehensions. So there we discover a two-folded aspect to our understanding of nature which implies that the rationality of an individual should be a limited expression of the Absolute, while the Absolute bids this expression through the rationality-like lawfulness of nature.

In this respect, Schelling is inclined to make a distinction concerning the causal relations in nature as he observes the organic and mechanical aspects of these relations as expressions of the Absolute's *productivity*. For the distinction, Schelling deliberately makes use of geometry as inherent to nature, because he interprets determinant geometric forms in nature (e.g., identically hexagon honeycombs) as the inner production of an organic perfection pertaining to nature. The geometrical forms that we derive from relations in nature (e.g., planetary motion) represent the mechanical aspect of productivity (as outer perfections), where objects are still conditionally related to each other. Organic forms in nature as inner perfections (e.g., shelled animals) imply the inner aspect of productivity

⁹¹ Ibid, p.132.

where objects are somewhat dependent on such causality that necessitates an unconditional that gives rise to that particular form⁹².

Yet, the lawfulness of reason is not eligible enough on its own for giving an account of how an organism is able to take force from an unconditional. Schelling's analyses of productive activities (such as honey production of bees) in nature lead him to consider that there is a blind exigency in those activities. However there are also qualitative deviations, which appear in the transformation of mechanical causality to the organic form of a product, which cannot be reduced into a monotypic activity. Such deviations suggest a (non-temporal) point of lawlessness beyond the lawfulness in nature⁹³.

Schelling suggests that these formulations address "an analogue of freedom."⁹⁴ The fact that nature functions like a perfect geometer could be enclosed to a blind necessity if it were not for these heterogeneous transformations which cannot be accounted by mechanical causality and which imply a split in the nature of productivity. Therefore this dual activity pertaining to productivity aligns with the addressing of transcendental freedom and its subject-object duality.

Schelling discovers 'productive activity' as the key concept that constitutes a common ground for the products of nature and the activity of reason. He is thus able to assert "the identity of the transcendental and the dynamic."⁹⁵ The word 'dynamic' here refers to the activity in nature as well as the activity of reason, both expressing the originary productivity of the Absolute.

⁹² Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, p.134-135.

⁹³ Ibid, p.135.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Dunham et al., 2011. p.133.

This notion of “the dynamic” is vital for our course, because Schelling does not only discover it among the causal relations of nature, but also in the metaphysical aspect of the practical philosophy.

In the *System* also, Schelling compares the organic activities in nature with the activities of human beings. He points out that the will, which is the subject of practical philosophy, is consciously active, and he underlines that this is clearly a kind of productive activity⁹⁶. There is also, if we accept Kant’s arguments, productive activity in our perception of the world of objects, but this is unconscious. Schelling thus divides the activity of the human mind into two kinds. As moral agents, human beings are consciously and freely active, as they try to create an ideal world, but they are also unconsciously active as they perceive the world⁹⁷.

Schelling then invites us to consider that regardless of whether it is conscious or unconscious, it is the same productive force that lies at the root of our activity and that manifests itself in the products of the world⁹⁸. He therefore concludes that there is an original productivity that is “at once *conscious and non-conscious*.”⁹⁹ According to the movements in Nature, Schelling defines the *unconscious* as the *real* activity and the *conscious* as the *ideal* activity. He reminds that in the transcendental account these activities are identical¹⁰⁰.

Schelling’s investigations into a speculative philosophy of Nature is, indeed, quite important for systematizing his later period historical-critical approach to positive philosophy and philosophy of mythology which, in the end, signal the union of all

⁹⁶ Schelling, 2001, p.12.

⁹⁷ Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*. p.193.

⁹⁸ Schelling, 2001, p.12.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Schelling, 2004, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, p.193.

forms of philosophy as he suggests in his early years. Yet, here, we are merely concerned with why it is important to relate transcendental philosophy to freedom, and consequentially to evil, in Schelling's dialectic approach. Thus, to proceed onto practical philosophy from the *Natürphilosophie* part of the transcendental system, the final theoretical investigation is into human freedom. On that account, we will be able to comprehend that this identity philosophy succeeds in both directions as it claims.

2.2.3.3. Aesthetic Intuition and Intellectual Intuition

From here on, we procure the chance to analyze how Schelling argues for the unity of the unconditioned. As we have seen that the idealist and realist approaches reach out for each other, we must now heed to their connection. If the principle of the unconditioned is conceivable through both approaches, then we must apprehend its unique condition within a unified activity of idealizing and realizing.

Schelling conceives the unconditioned as 'productivity' and the object (the conditioned) as 'product'. He believes that it is possible for us to reflect on this productivity only in two types of activity: philosophy and art. This is because there are only two ways in which original productivity can be "held up" for reflection. The Absolute becomes an object of reflection in inner intuition in philosophy and in aesthetic intuition in art.

In inner intuition, the philosopher is simultaneously engaged in a double activity. On the one hand, his/her mind is spontaneously active (in the Kantian sense) as long as s/he is conscious and since this spontaneous activity is grounded on the Absolute, according to Schelling, s/he is partaking of the original productivity of the Absolute. On the other hand s/he is reflecting on his/her own consciousness

and its productive activity. In other words, s/he is “at the same time both the intuited (the producer) and the intuitant.”¹⁰¹

The Absolute also becomes an object of reflection in aesthetic intuition. While inner intuition of the Absolute is completely abstract and non-objective, Schelling’s conception of aesthetic intuition allows for an objective passage to the Absolute. Thus, we can say that aesthetic intuition is the objective counterpart of intellectual intuition.

In this regard, a real-ideal confrontation concerning the subject and object is to be sought in aesthetics; because we have the reconstruction of the empirical world on the one hand and the infinite self-reflection on the other. Both of these activities are infinitely productive through their finitude. Yet if we want to attend to the product itself and its coming into appearance per se, we need an immediate function beyond conception that for Schelling is to be found in aesthetics.

According to Schelling, the only difference between philosophy and art is the direction the productive force takes in them. As Stott explains in his editor’s footnote to this section of Schelling’s *The Philosophy of Art*, “[a]rt portrays objectively what philosophy portrays subjectively.”¹⁰²

Schelling therefore contends that it is the aesthetic sense that enables us to comprehend what philosophy does at this level (in inner intuition) and thus places philosophy of art on a pedestal, calling it “the true organon of philosophy.”¹⁰³ Undeniably, all types of work (and not only works of art) can produce objects that one can then reflect on. But as Schelling points out in the *Philosophy of Art*, the artist produces, not in accordance with common norms or requirements, “but

¹⁰¹ Schelling, 2001, p.13.

¹⁰² Stott, 1989, p.290.

¹⁰³ Schelling, 2001, p.14.

freely, and according to the archetype of his own intuition.”¹⁰⁴ Here, we encounter Schelling’s conviction that the artist’s activity is, at least partially, non-conscious. Since what is reflected on in aesthetic intuition is pre-categorical and non-conscious¹⁰⁵, it expresses the original productivity of the Absolute, which was explained above to be also both conscious and nonconscious. Like the activity of the organisms discussed in *Naturphilosophie*, the artist’s activity immediately realizes or *shows*, rather than representing, the Absolute’s productivity¹⁰⁶.

Unfortunately, Schelling does not give many concrete or empirical examples to explain aesthetic intuition. He does discuss many empirical examples of art works in *The Philosophy of Art*, but as Ayon Maharaj explains in *The Dialectics of Aesthetic Agency*, in those discussions, he rarely uses, let alone explicating, the concept of aesthetic intuition¹⁰⁷.

2.3. Conclusion

Schelling finds Kant’s critical approach to the science of knowledge to be unique and revolutionary. He elaborates that it is the sole method to function in any system of knowledge and philosophy. But, his ultimate judgment on (especially considering *Critique of Pure Reason* as referring to the total of) the critical approach is that it is not exclusively a system itself.

He says that it would be failing to grasp the spirit of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to consider it a system, whereas it is, in fact, a “canon for all” systems¹⁰⁸; in other

¹⁰⁴ Schelling, 1989, p.132.

¹⁰⁵ Schelling, 2001, p.13.

¹⁰⁶ Das, “Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854)” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

¹⁰⁷ Maharaj, 2013, p.90.

¹⁰⁸ Schelling, 1980, “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism”, p.168.

words, it provides a methodology for all systems. Therefore, though this is the worst thing that can happen to Kant's canon, unfortunately it is also "destined" to produce systems: it will either produce "a system of criticism (conceived as complete)" which will be tantamount to idealism; or, in opposition to it, a system of realism, which will be a dogmatism. Conceived as a method, Schelling believes the *Critique of Reason* to be "unsubvertible", whereas whatever system that develops from it will be contested by its opposite¹⁰⁹.

Schelling also argues that if the *Critique* is to be a method for all systems, then one must be able to deduce practical postulates from it. As we have seen, Schelling understands Kant's analysis of the faculties of reason to show that the essence of reason is spontaneous activity¹¹⁰. One of the most important conclusions Schelling derives from this understanding of the *Critique* is that, if a system is to be developed out of the *Critique*, this system should be a system not only of knowledge, but also of *activity*:

either a *system* of knowledge is an artifice, a mental play [...], or the system must obtain reality, not by a theoretical but by a practical faculty; not by a cognitive faculty, but by *productive* realization; not by *knowledge* [Wissen] but by *action* [Handeln].¹¹¹

However, Schelling is disturbed by the idea that genuine philosophy as the science of knowledge should be conditioned by morality. This, he believes, happens in Kant's philosophy because of the way he establishes the idea of a God. As Schelling observes, Kant does not believe it to be within the power of theoretical reason to comprehend God¹¹². On the other hand, he retains and secretly relies on the notion of God because his practical philosophy requires it.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.168.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.171.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid, p.158.

Because the idea of God is required to save his moral philosophy, Kant's God is a moral God¹¹³. Schelling's arguments show that the occupation of the noumenal realm by a moral God reverts any apprehension of freedom back into the ways of dogmatism whereas in Schelling's alternative account, the forlornness of the thing-in-itself opens up to idealism where freedom becomes the main principle of genuine philosophy.

It is actually the aesthetic sense that sustains freedom and makes ethics possible. For that reason, the idea of a *moral* God offends Schelling's principle of aesthetics.

For the thought of taking a stand against the world loses all greatness the moment I put a higher being between the world and myself, the moment a guardian is necessary to keep the world within bounds.¹¹⁴

The intuition of the Absolute, whether it be through the aesthetic sense or inner sense, signifies the dissolution of boundaries between subject and object, and Schelling finds the possibility of freedom in this simultaneous and dialectic confrontation and convergence of the subject and object. When it is assumed that this open-ended realm is guarded by a moral principle, we fall far from the unconditional ground and the possibility of freedom it upholds.

This does not mean that Schelling discards the practical activity's necessity in fulfilling the achievement of knowledge. But when one tries to create a universally valid theory for practical reason, and does so within a complete system, the consequences of this approach are "detrimental to philosophy."¹¹⁵ In this approach, the principle of freedom is compromised.

¹¹³ Ibid, p.158.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p.157.

Here I might direct Schelling's criticism to the kind of philosophy, e.g., Fichte conducts. Fichte's failure to account for the *feeling* he discovered is responsibly related to his obstinacy concerning the maximal perfection of the subject. We know that the theoretical aspect of philosophy is confined to the practical in his case. His idealist approach claims to be all knowing, therefore we replace a moral transcendental subject with the notion of God; and dogmatism persists. Schelling's criticism might be further speculated to confront Hegel. Exactly because Hegel edicts dialectical movement of reason to a necessary form of Absolute through the categorical logic he adopted from Kant, he happens to be confining the free movement of reason to the phenomenal aspects of its categorical structure. Schelling's claim on true philosophy intends to liberate the thingness of the phenomena, therefore we cannot advocate the objectivity of theoretical reason unless it is purified from the conservation of regularities; and to rely solely on theoretical and practical aspects of reason fails us to consider genuine freedom as the original and active unity that underlies the both aspects.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.172.

CHAPTER III

THE NOTION OF EVIL: A GATEWAY FOR FREEING EXISTENCE FROM THEORY BY METAPHYSICAL AESTHETICS

In his major systematical work *The System of Transcendental Idealism* Schelling had found philosophy's only option in philosophy of art, which alone can give the account of the duality between the ideal and the real. We have seen that this duality persists in post-Kantian philosophy because of the inability to explicate a comprehensible ground from which one can derive principles for both theoretical and practical reason. While adhering to Kant's critical method, Schelling was able to reach an Absolute via a close examination of the notion of freedom he found in the activity of the subject. We concluded our investigations into his onto-epistemology by observing that Schelling does not want our understanding of this primordial realm to be pre-determined by the idea of a moral God.

Based on my understanding of Schelling, I would also add that he does not want our understanding of this primordial realm to be limited to that of an "ontology" in the post-Kantian sense of the term. In this respect, I would argue that what Schelling does, especially in his later writings, is metaphysics rather than ontology. The concern of conducting metaphysics is, at the same, the emergence of the obligation to conduct it. This concern is evident in Schelling as he criticizes the limits of Kantian philosophy for not allowing a unification of theoretical and practical reason. The conducting of ontology in the post-Kantian manner still does not allow for this unification. The question "why is there something, rather than nothing?" implies the question "why do I ask this question, rather than not ask it?" Ontology does not ask this question; it is a metaphysical question. But questioning

the conditions of knowledge and the conditions of existence stem from the same concern; the aim is not to systematize but to expose existential questions--that is the questioning of 'how', which is hid beneath the mask of 'why'.

Schelling's focus on evil as a metaphysical concept sheds light on the real/practical aspects of this concern. By tracing the origins of the manifestation of evil to the *Urgrund* of the cosmic fall, Schelling shows that the traditional gap and misdirected ways of bridging this gap serve to consolidate evil in our social, historical and theoretical existence. Thus, in contradistinction to other German idealists, he refuses to conceptualize or in any other way stabilize the chaotic and abysmal nature of the original ground (that created the subject-object split or the fall of the finite from the infinite). Instead, he focuses on aesthetic intuition and art as the fundamental ways of elevating ourselves above evil. As Schelling later expressed this insight in *Bruno*, "The nature of [the] idea's identity is that of truth itself, and beauty. For the beautiful is what absolutely identifies the universal and the particular"¹¹⁶.

3.1. The Cosmic Fall

The explorations of the either directions transcendental philosophy could be developed in bring Schelling to the inevitable study concerning the divinity of the Absolute's unity and its original split where we find the possibility to apprehend it in these two directions. I refer to this unity here as 'divinity', because Schelling's dialectic approach, throughout his philosophical ventures, teaches us that we are entangled with the phenomenal as well as the theoretical aspects of whatever topic we are in pursuit of. And, in the case of the Absolute's unity, we are entangled with the concept of God as the phenomenal aspect of the Absolute – only in the sense that it is the referent of a divine notion in its historical culmination. So,

¹¹⁶ Schelling, 1984, p.143.

along with Schelling, our task is that of speculating the concept of God, yet by soberly recoiling from any form of theological or dogmatist approach.

Schelling also warns against attempting an empirically causal conception of the account of the cosmic fall. Trying to understand the Absolute by reasoning or through causal categories can only give us “a conditional knowledge of it”, but there can be no such thing as the conditional knowledge of the unconditional. “[T]he description is merely negative and never puts the *Absolute itself* before the soul.”¹¹⁷ Thus, in Schelling’s account of the cosmic fall, we find an illustration of his aesthetic metaphysics as distinct from an ontological account.

Nevertheless and in defiance of Schelling’s warning, we shall, for those who insist on an argument, present a brief philosophical account of the cosmic fall before delving into the speculative picture he paints. In the previous chapter, we had mentioned that the Absolute is “pure identity”; therefore there are no distinctions in the Absolute itself. The Absolute is self-consciousness. Even though the Absolute is self-consciousness, it is not self-conscious. It is, rather, unconscious. This prevents its dissolution to finitude. If it were self-conscious, it would have to oppose itself by subjugating itself as an object to itself.

On the other hand, for this self-consciousness to become absolute identity, which it is, it would need an outer reflection. But it cannot have outer reflection because it is complete fullness and it has no outside. Therefore, Schelling argues that the absolute gives birth to itself –that is, the manifestation of the Absolute, which we refer to as ‘God’.

¹¹⁷ Schelling, 2010, p.11.

3.1.1. God and its Ground of Existence

This “account of the coming to life of God”¹¹⁸ is at the same time the account of the cosmic fall (in traditional wording, *creation*). Distinctions between the finite and the infinite, the existent and existence, etc. arise with the cosmic fall/Absolute’s Absolute reflection: God. One of the most fundamental distinctions yielded by the cosmic fall is between God’s *existence* and its *Ground*.

The investigation, from here on, seeks its precision in the analysis of the crucial concepts of ‘ground’ and ‘existence’, which are emphasized in the target text (*Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*), so long as God’s freedom can only be manifested in God’s existence.

God’s ‘*existence*’ refers to “the Absolute insofar as it fully exists”¹¹⁹. The Ground, on the other hand, is the possibility of God’s existence as its potentiality for all actuality; it is the potential for the possibilities of God to objectify itself. The ground is, in a sense, a nonexistent realm. While it resembles the Absolute itself, unlike Kant’s noumenal realm, the ground does not exist in-itself. Prior to God’s existence, the potency to exist is *in* God as God’s ground, from which God gives birth to itself.

Although the split is non-temporal, God still seems to be prior to the Ground. That is the case because God is *actual* and ground is *potential*, in the sense that, for the activity of the Absolute to achieve its return to itself, the actual aspect of it should shed light upon its potential aspect, wherein the finite activity would emerge to complete itself in the Absolute, guided by its ideal horizon.

¹¹⁸ Freydberg, 2008, p.45.

¹¹⁹ Žižek. 2004, pp.5-6.

Ground, then, is the urge itself for God to exist. As soon as a non-temporal split in the Absolute takes action as a fall in God, the ground emerges as the possibility of all finite relations; that is why it must be comprehended as a dark otherness to God. God's '*ground*' is conceived as referring to "the Absolute qua obscure longing that strives for something outside itself" (which implies that "there is something in God that isn't God.")¹²⁰

If we desire a consistency that allows us to pursue the transitions in Schelling's philosophy, we can consider this *ground* as what takes the place of *nature* from the previous stage in his earlier philosophy. Yet one shift is crucial at this point. It is that while nature can be considered as the aspect of lawfulness considered as the Absolute's aesthetic representation, the ground is the potentiality of this representation. Lawfulness derives itself from the ground insofar as the ground is the non-Absolute, which still is an implication of the Absolute itself.

3.1.2. Order and Disorder

We cannot address the lawfulness of nature to the positive aspect of the Absolute, because the Absolute is unity and identity. Thus, there is no need for an element or a system to organize it unless and until there is the split. The split causes the Absolute to attain an alien nature of finitude, of which the Absolute does not originally consist. But division and finitude necessarily belong to a distortion of it, in the Ground, which is a chaotic sum of the finite aspect of the Absolute. Hence the emergence of reason, nature and human freedom follow.

That is how order follows disorder. It's a necessary but undefined emergence due to the abysmal nature of the Ground, which is not a substance, though it is

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.5-6.

substantial¹²¹ and which can thus both yield disorder and admit the emergence of order¹²².

The distinction between God's existence and its Ground wedges a split from which an equilibrium of order and disorder emerges. However, this equilibrium is non-absolute and necessitates both sides to achieve a unity. Therefore evil inescapably pertains to the forming of the real, because no finitude could attribute infinity to itself at once. All yearnings to infinity must take forms to reconstruct themselves again and again until they unify at the Absolute.

Here we see that these articulations depend on Schelling's impulsive attempt at accounting for freedom alongside the regularity and the lawfulness of nature. And this enables us to consider, that the reality of things is grounded in a God-like realm, which conclusively yields an indivisible remainder (*der nie aufgehende Rest*) in the clash between the finite and the infinite.

In *The Abyss of Freedom*, Žižek interprets the importance of this "ground" put forth by Schelling as the main aspect of Schelling's ontology that distinguishes him from other idealists and post-idealists: Heeding to Žižek's consideration we find that Schelling's evaluation of the split pursues an existential tension in the gap between God's existence and its Ground. Unlike the rest of the post-Kantian philosophies' attempts to fill this gap, Schelling intends to keep this duality between "the rational, articulated universe of the divine Word (logos)" and "that which in God himself is not God"¹²³ He thus retains the gap, but rather than overlooking it or attempting to build an artificial bridge over it, he attributes full metaphysical significance to it. Yet, this elaboration should still be considered

¹²¹ McGrath, 2012, p.4.

¹²² Žižek, 2007, p.76.

¹²³ Žižek, 2004, p.4.

according to the fact that it is an aesthetic insight of the particular philosopher into his speculative account.

3.1.3. Will of Love and Will to Ground

The split results in two distinct forms of will: The Light of Reason's revelatory will pertaining to the Absolute's self-identity, God's Love, *will of love*; and the obscure, dark, chaotic *will to ground*.

God is presumably the Light of Reason, in the sense that the Absolute is the identity and the unity of all principles and first of all the unity of the basic principles of *positive* and *negative*, and *light* and *dark*, and *existence* and *nothingness*¹²⁴. We must not forget that Light/God and Dark/Ground are not opposing elements; they are the two aspects of existence necessary to fulfill the Absolute's absoluteness. Considering the allegory (which is far from being a metaphor but rather a symbolism of the potential, because these concepts rely on Schelling's philosophy of nature) light –as God- exists so long as it exists with the darkness.

Schelling throughout his studies makes use of the notion of gravity (especially in his *Natürphilosophie* and his middle period ontology). In regard to the forces of existence, he refers to gravity as the *contractive* force in a kind of opposition to light, to which he refers to as the *expansive* force. The antithetical relations between these forces result in the dynamic processes in nature. As to ontological concerns, Schelling considers these forces to be interchangeable because otherwise (if they were absolutely separate) one would dominate the other, in which case the world would result either in a complete monotypic blinding light of reason or in eternal darkness of abyss. Yet the Absolute's two-folded manifestation of God and its ground of existence does not intend a domination of

¹²⁴ McGrath, 2012, p.4.

one or the other. Absolute as self-identity necessitates an interchangeable relation between these two aspects and their forces. This kind of relation results in differences. Accordingly, the contractive force of ground can be considered to be the source of particularity whereas the expansive force of God resembles the unity while it sets itself as a horizon to the freedom of the finite.

In the *Philosophy of Art*, Schelling defines 'light' as "concept, ideal unity"¹²⁵. To understand this "ideal unity", it might be useful to compare it with "real unity" even though the two are not opposed; on the contrary, they are best understood in juxtaposition. But in real unity, the "predominating element" is differentiation. In other words, particularity and distinctions predominate in real unity. In ideal unity, the essence, the universal element predominates. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Schelling identifies 'spirit' as the being, which "unifies the world of darkness with that of the light and subordinates both principles to its realization and personality"¹²⁶.

There is ideal reason in nature's mechanic system. The ideal is the horizon of activity and it is the teleological cause of the activity, but it is not activity itself; nor is the ground. It is the human being who grasps the ideal by the faculty of intellectual intuition they possess, which is delivered to him/her by Light/God's separation from the Absolute as it appears on the Dark/Ground. Thus we find that the human subject is the instrument of freedom, in which way the Absolute fulfills itself as self-identity. In Žižek's words, "the goal of creation is the emergence of man, in whom the finite returns to the infinite"¹²⁷. The finite consciousness can become self-conscious to the extent that it finds the possibility of transcendental unity.

¹²⁵ Schelling, 1989, p.119.

¹²⁶ Schelling, 2006, p.66.

¹²⁷ Žižek, 2007, pp.54-55.

The Ground, on the other hand, resists this unity. It manifests its will towards greater differentiation, multiplicity, and separation of good from evil. Schelling notes that it is necessary for the will of the ground to manifest itself in this way so that the Absolute can realize itself in the finite before the finite returns to the Absolute¹²⁸.

3.1.4. The Existential Plight of the Subject

The account of the cosmic fall thus “discloses the essence of human freedom”¹²⁹ without concealing the inevitable relation that human freedom has to the reality of evil.

The Absolute is comprehended in a division, and that is the very essence of the subject’s existence. Thus departure of finite consciousness is the consciousness of light by means of its darkness, the reality. And even if reason is emanated for the consciousness to be aware of itself, the consciousness –being forlorn with its alienation-- is also aware of its dark ground.

The reason in nature is explicitly open to the empirical consciousness though empirical consciousness hinders the understanding of this divine immediacy among finitude. While self-consciousness is obligated to find its self-identity, this self-identity is contrary to the knowing nature of empirical consciousness. The subject cannot hold on to its essence because of its finitude. If it did, then the ground of existence would not be productive in the subject, but rather it would itself be actuality as if it is the Absolute, which is at the end what *evil* is.

¹²⁸ Schelling, 2006, pp.66-67.

¹²⁹ Freyberg, 2008, p.45.

Thus the finite subject who, results from the fall, which takes place in the Absolute's manifestation of itself in God, finds itself in an existential plight because it does not have a single predominant *telos*.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Schelling addresses the concepts "unconscious", "chaotic", "dark", and "primordial" to describe the antithetical forces that ground nature as it manifests itself to consciousness.

This shows that Schelling conceives this cosmic fall not as a strict separation of the Absolute from itself, but rather as an untraceable real manifestation of the Absolute that the empirical consciousness can give the account of so long as the intellectual intuition is the manifestation of God.

Finite consciousness can discover the possibility of this unity through aesthetic or intellectual intuition in the divine Ground, through the unconscious immanence of the infinite in the work of art. But it is only conceivable in the finitude alienated by the cosmic fall, because even the genuine work of art is finite at its object.

3.2. Freedom and Evil

Although consciousness in its actuality is not self-consciousness as the Absolute itself is, it shares the freedom of God. With respect to Schelling's philosophy, freedom rests in the self-identity of the Absolute, and while it is usually deemed to be contrary to the finitude of the real, according to Schelling, it is manifested in the finite real.

Schelling gives an articulation of freedom concerning the split in the Absolute, in his *Philosophy and Religion*. Therein, Schelling observes Absolute's mediating self-conscious activity for its self-identity. Absolute's exclusive particularity is dependent on its unity. It grants its own essential freedom to its organs for the accomplishment of a complete unity. Otherwise it would be an empty tautological

unity. So the divided actual and potential aspects of the Absolute carry its essential freedom. Although these aspects cannot be the Absolute itself on their own, they are the ideal and real conditions of its identity. Therefore, while freedom is essential to the Absolute, God is the actual emergence of freedom inasmuch as Ground is the potential for this emergence. Thus, the outflowing of freedom in the phenomenal world is co-dependent on the relation between God and ground. This co-dependence necessitates a transition to human freedom which Schelling considers to be the organ of this unification for the fulfillment of essential freedom¹³⁰.

Even though finite consciousness, human, resembles God for it is free, its freedom is in division by means of good and evil. Thus evil is a necessary implication/consequence of “the self-revelation of God in humanity”¹³¹ which results in the finite consciousness’ ability to choose between good and evil.

For Schelling, the evil acts of a free being which is fallen and alienated from God are still in the primordial sense dependent on God. But Schelling insists that this dependence does not cancel that being’s freedom¹³². Further, Schelling argues that in another sense, our evil acts are not dependent on God or even on the Ground. Any emergence conditioned to the ground does not come from God itself though God and ground necessitate each other’s existence. Yet it is not that the emergence of evil is originated in the ground either because the arousal of evil is only possible by human activity, through the will of human freedom¹³³.

As Žižek further explains in *The Indivisible Remainder*, it is not God that is “the positive cause of the finite” but “the broken link between God and His creature -

¹³⁰ Schelling, 2010, pp.27-28.

¹³¹ Freyberg, 2008, p.78.

¹³² Schelling, 2006, p.17.

¹³³ Ibid, p.63.

that is the creature's *fall* from God- which is why finitude as such is evil."¹³⁴. Thus we see that God is not responsible for human activity because the primordial activity of human freedom was its separation from God itself. The responsibility that God bears for the finite can merely be considered to be a mediated, indirect one. God does not lack the responsibility, but it is an ideal responsibility; God is not responsible for the particular activities of the finite. God is only responsible for the finite's God-like infinite freedom, which is necessary for the finite's emergence¹³⁵.

In *Philosophical Investigations* Schelling explains that far from contradicting freedom, immanence in God determines to what extent a human being is free: "what is free is in God to the extent it is free, and what is not free is necessarily outside of God to the extent that it is not free."¹³⁶

Moreover, Schelling adds that God's will is the will of love. Even though God's will is the will of love in its unity, finite consciousness will yearn for the self-identity as if it is infinite but it lacks the unity, so it does oppose the objects among nature, so it turns into desire. But although its will to ground is not identical to its will of love, they are not opposed because will to ground is for the will of love¹³⁷.

In his drafts to his *Ages of the World*, Schelling distinguishes between three potencies.¹³⁸ These potencies give us insight into the relation between the will to ground and the will of love. In his book *The Dark Ground*, McGrath points out that these potencies and their division signify the aspect of freedom and the

¹³⁴ Žižek, 2007, pp.54-55.

¹³⁵ Ibid, pp.54-55.

¹³⁶ Schelling, 2006, pp.18-19.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p.42.

¹³⁸ Schelling, 2004, "Ages of the World".

necessary evil that follows from it¹³⁹. With a closer look, we can observe that the differences of these potencies refer to the voyage of the absolute in its self-recognition —both analogously and with a permanent dissociation at once.

If God's split is dependent on a decision to recognize itself, then it can be considered to be a personalization consisting of opposed desires/drives: A desire to be itself, and a desire not to be itself, because the alienated personalization of God simply is not the Absolute itself.

Thus, the first potency is conceived as one of these opposed desires, which is merely the negative (due to its manner of falling from the existence of God) dark ground.¹⁴⁰ Yet, such an antithetical potency's contractiveness in relation to its opposite urges it to be the will to desire so that it fulfills the productive aspect of God, which itself has no room for it in its fullness; and it produces the reality of the finite insofar as the product is determinant —as in the case of nature. Here we observe that it, unlike the Absolute, is not wholly unconscious; still, it is relatively unconscious, because it is not expansive, yearning to the pure activity of the Absolute. The first potency is indifferent to the other and merely bent on preserving its individuality and finitude.

In opposition, the second potency is the existential aspect of this split. It is expansive and positive, but it lacks the determinacy of the first potency for it was redeemed of it in order for split to emerge in the first place. Thus it is the selfless aspect of the personalization¹⁴¹. But the selflessness of this potency is almost pathological since it is not free but requires linkage to the other for its being. But as Schelling writes in *Philosophical Investigations*:

¹³⁹ McGrath, 2012, p.16.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.14.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, pp.14-15.

For love is neither in indifference nor where opposites are linked which require linkage for {their} Being, but rather [...] this is the secret of love, that it links such things of which each could exist for itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other^{142 143}

There, we have the harmonious identity of the Absolute fallen from itself and suspended in a tension between these two potencies, which bring about the third potency necessarily.

The third potency is the potent aspect of the unifying activity. But through this mediation, we obtain a main difference from the original unity. Rather than the original unity's unconscious aspect, we arrive at a personalized God¹⁴⁴. This opens up to the moral/conscious aspect of freedom.

McGrath analyses the weakness of these potencies altogether, which they possess on their own. He, in his *The Dark Ground of the Spirit* points out that

No beginning would be possible without [a] violent break with eternity, this “fall” from the absolute, for in the eternal tri-potentized divinity no potency is strong enough to hold its ground against the other two¹⁴⁵.

He concludes that the split of the cosmic fall necessitates the possibility of evil in that regard; because, if the personalization of God is essential to absolute freedom, the creation and development of free persons (finite personalities) must,

¹⁴² In his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling examines “other intelligences” and he proposes a beginning for his practical philosophy by relating the interaction with other intelligences to the autonomy of the self.

¹⁴³ Schelling, 2006, pp.69-70.

¹⁴⁴ McGrath, 2012, p.15.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.16.

therefore, be carrying the potencies separately altogether¹⁴⁶. Hence there is the possibility to resist expansion and thus the insistence on determinacy.

Thus, we can conclude that human freedom is bound to the possibility of the arousal of evil unless that particular vessel of freedom (i.e. person or spirit) aspires after the elevation of its conditionality to the point of orienting itself, not to the ground, but to the absolute unity¹⁴⁷.

In his *Schelling's Treatise On The essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger explicates this conditionality of human freedom. He considers evil to be “a decidedness of freedom” where the Ground’s partaking of the Absolute ends up being an idealized imitation of its manifested aspect, God. This deviant transformation is bound to the Ground’s self-like nature, which is the necessary basis for the component of individuality in human freedom. In this regard, although evil resides in the realizing aspects of free activity, it is incapable of change and self-refutation. Thus evil is dependent on the lawfulness of nature, but belonging to the broken link between lawful nature and lawless ground. Heidegger further emphasizes that the realization of evil in this way is still germane to the revelatory aspect of God. The will-to-ground mimics the will of love and channels all activity, which is originary in essential freedom into an inessential and fatalist self-craving¹⁴⁸.

The only pure being is the pure self-identity, the Absolute. Thence, it is impossible for spirit, the organism of freedom, to be pure good which necessarily opposes evil. Rather, the finite’s will to exist which is bound to its finite nature of opposition is inescapably evil, but it is good so long as it can elevate itself to self-consciousness. And that is the act of solely pertaining to the godly creature.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Schelling, 2006, p.54.

¹⁴⁸ Heidegger, 1985, pp.156-157.

In short, as Freydberg summarizes “[e]vil consists in humanity’s elevation of the dark basis of his selfhood to the place where the universal will should be”¹⁴⁹. Human being, the organ of the transcendental I, accounts for the Ideal because it is certain of it by its most profound ability -the intellectual intuition- that the infinite God is. But it is also the empirical consciousness, desire, thereby necessarily opposing itself. Then, although the sequence of evil acts is necessarily ontologically bound to nature, it cannot be, by any means, the will of God.

Through these considerations we find that Nature presents its objects to each other in opposition and Schelling speaks of at least three ways in which consciousness confronts other objects: aesthetic and intellectual intuition, science and desire. Aesthetic intuition is actualized in moments of possibility so long as objects of nature can be considered as works of art. Yet, the rest of the finite objects are either objects of science for consciousness to seek self-consciousness, or the objects of desire for consciousness to sustain its will to desire. (Will to desire, is of course the parallel distortion of the will of love.)

Since the ways in which will to desire can result in evil are more obvious, in the following sections I will make use of Schelling’s analysis to consider the ways in which science, or more generally theory, can lead to evil even when it professes to be doing the exact opposite.

3.3. Evil in the Tradition

Schelling’s focus on the concept of evil has a significance that is not merely moral but metaphysical. Schelling finds, in the concept of evil, something omitted in the history of philosophy from Plato to Kant. As this tradition is developed around The Good (which does have an ontological significance), evil is at most treated as

¹⁴⁹ Freydberg, 2008, p.78.

a practical problem, emerging only as the opposite or lack of good. This traditional idea is primal in Plato's *theory of forms*, according to which form of the good is the purest reality and evil is the lack of it.

It is not difficult to compare, and find similarities between, Plato and Schelling's accounts of the split. The split in Absolute, as the fall of the finite from the infinite, does exactly remind and apparently follow from the Platonic (and even in the Neo-platonic) manner. In *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, Émile Bréhier, who is a scholar of both Plotinus and Schelling, observes this similarity between Schelling and Plotinus and even extends the affinity to include Spinoza in this kindred spirit. All three philosophers indicate a union and identity of the individual soul with an absolute being¹⁵⁰.

What is essential in Plato's philosophy is that true existence belongs in the realm of ideas. This existence is falsely presented in reality by the finitude of earthly presentations of these ideas. One of Plato's key methods concerning the relation of idea and representation is *recollection*, by which the individual grasps the idea as the true notion of existence through finite representations of it. Similarly, as Baum claims, Schelling conceives of an 'idea' that is unreachable unless it is intellectually intuited in its model [*Urbild*]. This shows how much Schelling's epistemological claim to ontology is alike to that of Plato's¹⁵¹.

Plato's metaphysical claim is of course pre-critical in the sense that he conceives the individual as soul, which recollects his/her original place –that is the realm of ideas. It is pre-critical because there is no rational explanation for the voyage of the soul from this realm of ideas to finite reality. There is a certain ontological split between *there* (realm of ideas) and *here* (finite reality), but it is mainly

¹⁵⁰ Bréhier, 1958, p.123.

¹⁵¹ Baum, 2000, p.208.

accounted in accordance with mythological notions. *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy* (1842) shows that Schelling finds Plato's and Neo-Platonist accounts and mythological derivations of God to be unscientific. Yet he finds something positive in these accounts. He claims that they address and investigate a god that *exists*. He contrasts their approach with Aristotle and Kant's notions of God (between whom he deduces a similarity). The notion of a generative God "*as terminus*" in Aristotle and Kant suppressed the positive philosophical approaches in Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Spinozism.

Schelling's account of the cosmic fall from The Absolute is also reminiscent of Plotinus' account of how finite things emanate from The One. As a matter of fact, Schelling's argument that the Absolute cannot be understood by logical reasoning echoes a similar argument found in Plotinus about how we cannot rationally know the One, because to know the One, the knower would have to stand outside the One, and then there would be not One, but Two.

However, there is an important difference between the Platonic and Neo-Platonist accounts and that of Schelling's. Most importantly, Plotinus's idea of emanation fortifies an understanding of evil as merely a lack. For Plotinus, The One is the True, the Good, The Beautiful; and as things fall away from The One, they become less good, less true, less beautiful. In other words, for Plotinus, evil does not have a positive existence.

Schelling, on the other hand, emphasizes that evil is "undeniably real"¹⁵². In *Philosophical Investigations*, he writes:

what needs to be explained is not [...] how evil becomes actual in individuals, but rather its universal activity or how it was able to break out of creation as an unmistakably general principle everywhere locked in

¹⁵² Schelling, 2006, pp.40-41.

struggle with the good. [...] there can indeed be no doubt from the outset that it was necessary for the revelation of God.¹⁵³

If the manner attained towards evil would be as of the classical metaphysics, evil, then, is abstracted from God and God is left to be pure good, but if a pure good God's creature would be capable of such free act that its creator would be bound to be less of a being. However the philosophical accounts of this division that have been given since Plato have all been more or less the same. In other words, as discussed above, evil has always been explained away as the negation of good; it has not been given a positive existence. We have seen this in Plotinus' idea of emanation, and Augustine has made use of this idea to solve the traditional problem of evil. Kant's account on the other hand, is limited by his critical method, where reason cannot account for the real ground of the finite and the maxims of evil acts are analyzed but their origin remains unexplained.

Evil here, along with human freedom, finds its spirit in the nature of oppositions alone because so long as science of knowledge yearns for the good, it works with oppositions. According to Schelling, as mentioned at the end of last chapter, the ground of existence cannot be limited to a moral unity for the sake of the phenomenal realm's universal totality. Evil is not to be reduced to a mere negative aspect of Good. The science of knowledge, after all, is only able to grasp what it intuits. It cannot account for what sort of infinity lies beyond the beginnings or ends of its Absolute.

Consequently, Schelling considers his particular contemporary philosophies as negative in this sense. If God is pure identity in its Absolute reality, and if God is *nous*, the infinite intellect, then it cannot be restricted to its own knowledge. So it manifests itself only for itself. This manifestation is not conceivable by the individual empirical consciousness even if it truly follows the science of

¹⁵³ Ibid, pp.40-41.

knowledge by transcendental idealism. The transcendental I, may only deal with oppositions to deduce the truth from the ideal. Hegel's system of philosophy gives more or less an accurate account of it. Real freedom is an undissolved unity in God, but truth, prisoned to a concept of it, brings forth its opposition, and therefore dissolution.

In that respect, while Schelling's dialectic may sound like the Hegelian one, there is in fact an important difference. Hegel tries to explain all contradictions as arising out of the Spirit's alienation of itself from itself, and he sees the Spirit's movement as aimed at overcoming these oppositions, and hence a return to itself. Schelling, on the other hand "[r]ather than striving [...] to overcome the opposition between the I and not-I, [...] embraces the oppositions of human being and nature, subject and object, insisting that reason comes to know itself by preserving, not overcoming its other"¹⁵⁴. In that sense, I can say that Hegel was a rational idealist, where Schelling was an existential one.

In their *Idealism: The History of a Philosophy*, Dunham et al. endorse Schelling's dialectics in comparison with Hegel's. They point out to Schelling's different method in which the identity of the Absolute is realized for self-consciousness foremost via aesthetics. The difference of Schelling from Hegel lies in the fact that Hegel's orientation is more towards an overcoming of otherness, which results in Absolute knowing. Dunham et al. emphasize that while Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* accounts for a self-knowing Spirit, in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* consciousness contains the universal activity of antithesis all along, concerning the interchangeability of/ activity between product and productivity. Thus Schelling's real idealist system, which is a kind of process philosophy, is swapped with an idealist system of progress philosophy in Hegel¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵⁴ Lauer, 2010, p.56.

¹⁵⁵ Dunham et al., 2011, pp.135-136.

Schelling's account shows that remaining in the will of ground can occur in other, more subtle ways than yielding to bodily desires. It also occurs when the finite acts as if has acquired an infallible grasp of the Absolute as this attitude prevents the intuition of the unity in God in the infinite complexity of its abysmal Ground. This happens, for example, in Hegel's system.

This is the Schellingian criticism of Platonic and/or theosophical understanding of good. After the view, which supposes that human freedom and the notion of evil are ontologically relational, is developed, therein emerges the asymmetric gap between good and evil. According to Schelling, evil is what disrupts the return of the finite to the infinite by remaining in will of Ground.

Eventually, the accounts of German philosophers in this context restrict the science of knowledge to reason, in such a way that knowledge of being is treated as a tool of practical concern that ends up as a mere thought of justification. But the critical manner they have attained to ends up trapping them one by one. Fichte's criticism of Kant, positions his philosophy in an endless strife of the transcendental I's negation of itself. Hegel's criticism of Fichte, positions his philosophy in an endless strife of the spirit's negation of desire.

3.4 Schelling's Alternative Account

On the other hand, what Schelling comes up with by the cosmic fall and the evil that operates in the light of God's manifestation, conveys his understanding of philosophy to a positive one because he does not yield to the blind progression of mere idealism. Identity philosophy seems to remain in the horizons of transcendental idealism because of the 'indivisible remainder' of God due to finitude's fall. Thus reality and its oppositions are not reduced to any system of philosophy or science but sought to be united through the liberty in art.

By now, we have learnt that if any kind of higher affiliation with the Absolute is possible, it must be through art. Thus, I find it fruitful to attend to Schelling's deliberations on this unity in *The Philosophy of Art*. What Schelling's aesthetical account of metaphysics at large suggests is that the cognitively limited human psyche is capable of understanding its activity only through means of productive activity –a sort of praxis. This productive activity cannot avoid fatalism if it becomes dependent on any sort of institutional system of morality, which eventually turns out to form an organism of spirit of evil taking possession of the ground's empirical right to act.

In contrast to such a system, the only true progressive productivity lies in ever reflective positive philosophy, which grasps the totality of existence in its fluxing course by means of art. Schelling's philosophy of art showed that the identity of the real and the ideal is vivified in the work of art as the finite manifestation of the infinite Absolute. "[T]he unity of the absolute and the finite (particular) appears in the material of art on the one hand as a product of nature, on the other as a product of freedom."¹⁵⁶ "This world is the content or material of all poesy" and "that material is always and eternally *one*, always and necessarily absolute identity of the universal and the particular."¹⁵⁷

The genius artist thus emerges as the model of a truly free individual. Because a truly free individual who is the Genius unconsciously produces the inevitable/necessary work of art, which is unpredictable, and on that chaotic account, it is the Absolute itself.

However the unconscious and genuine production of the genius is halted if his or her freedom is bound by force. A tyrant figure of contractive force finds its form

¹⁵⁶ Schelling, 1989, p.78.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.78-79.

of an evil spirit with the submission of a homogeneous mass which we may call the Rabble.

Tyrant and the Rabble can be seen as paradigmatic examples of an evil spirit.¹⁵⁸ The Tyrant only preaches what is at-hand the reality of the present by fixing it to its own-satisfaction, which is totally closed to idea's infinity and to reality's finitude; bound to bondage.

Tyrant functions exactly as the opposite of Genius in this case. He presents an idea and forces the public into that idea's abysmal reality, where Genius presents a reality as an idea for the audience. Genius never dictates what his work of art is with an empirical causal explanation. The work of art summons the consciousness to reflection by the aesthetic intuition's destruction of conventional reason it is constituted on. It shifts the paradigm into an obscurity while keeping the empirical reality and its tool revolutionary.

3.5. Some Social and Historical Extrapolations

So far we have discussed the gap created between epistemology and metaphysics by the distinction Kant made between criticism and dogmatism and explained the way Schelling's aesthetic metaphysics addresses this gap. This discussion does not only concern the ways of approaching scientific study, but it also pertains to the repercussions of the paradigmatic faith in scientific practice, ranging from technology and economy to being a social actor amongst those –hermeneutically. Considering ground/darkness as the ulterior force, we might realize that it is not on its own the sole responsible for evil. The finite consciousness that is free, yearns for the absolute. Any social entity (or, in Hegelian terms, a constituted “spirit”), such as a neighborhood, a sports team, work environment, society,

¹⁵⁸ Lord and Bondsman would not be correct, because Lord is dialectically disposable, but a Tyrant can only be empirically negated.

military or state, is a means to channeling this freedom to Absolute's identity. However, once a spirit is constituted it is empirically bound to preserve itself. If the finite, which is bound to empirical causation, does not adapt to change by dialectical elevation, then the freedom is turned into the self-satisfaction of an illusive unity. The spirit that is conservatively preserved for-itself serves as an empirical substitute for the Absolute in the real existence, which is of course never the Absolute itself.

This is what we see as happening in today's scientific paradigm. The brief history of positivist philosophy's triumph would lie in modernity followed by modernism. I generalize, by the permission of Kant's critical philosophy, that classical metaphysics had reference to a transcendent truth, which was more or less the apotheosis of a cultural web of beliefs. The reformist aspect of modern philosophy is that it turned the transcendent figures and symbols of truth (or rather, dogmas) into objects of the understanding. The related philosophical investigations begin with Descartes and I claim that they end with Hume.

Since the abolishment of classical metaphysics by critical philosophy, the modern Scientific endeavor inherited the empirical view of a causal reality as the sole law to function in its logic (and thus ours, too).

However, Kant's critical philosophy had not intended to separate the object from the subject by eliminating the subject –which is the case that what is known as Logical Positivism ended up with. On the contrary, critical philosophy showed that a scientifically pure reason constitutes the truth by synthesis, wherein the *synthetic a priori* is dependent on the transcendental subject. However, until recent developments in Quantum Mechanics, the sciences, which are guided by the *telos* of technological achievements, seemed not to question the subjective element in knowledge. Even quantum physics still doesn't fully give way to the inclusion of any dialectical relation between the object's phenomenal existence and its assertive being-in-itself.

Thus today's empirical idealism in positive sciences is no better than pre-Kantian metaphysics. If you replace the God of theology with the truth of positive sciences, then you have a new god: scientific truth, which can only be provided by the paradigm of the conventional scientific endeavor in which the transcendence problem is, still, sought to be solved causally. But how is it that while empirical consciousness is sense-certain, the scientific endeavor can be considered to be universally objective? Universality does not belong to empirical (or positive) reality; it is arrived at by conceptualization.

Consciousness -in an Aristotelian manner- deals with the particulars and universals, the thisness and thatness of things. (Here, I use 'thisness' to refer to the material of what Schelling calls 'positive philosophy'; the contingent, empirical, and particular. I use 'thatness' to refer to universals arrived at by abstractions of the understanding, which Schelling calls 'negative'.) Understanding leads reason to conceptualize the image of things to universalities (going from 'thisness' to 'thatness') so as to abstract from the positive, empirical content of sensible things to arrive at universals. Then consciousness -in a Fichtean manner- elevates itself to the position of the Absolute.

Given that Hegelian dialectics is an attempt to explain the unity of the universal and the particular, we may allow that the Hegelian labor attempts to bring 'thatness' to 'thisness' again. However, even if the subject's existential process could be explained by Hegelian dialectics, the immediate image of the finite subject's presence is then considered evil/erroneous/an anomaly from the vantage point of the Absolute (or, for our purposes, by the social convention/paradigm.) The 'thisness' of things in Hegel is presented through the mediation of a paradigm or other (in a certain phase of the Hegelian Spirit) and is meant to be

superseded¹⁵⁹. But should multiplicity be discarded this easily for the sake of universals?

Thus, a form of *evil spirit* is traceable in the post-Kantian philosophical studies as well. Žižek's elaboration of Hegelian dialectics from a Schellingian perspective illuminates this claim. Žižek points out that when 'the Essential' and 'the Inessential' oppose each other in the Hegelian dialectics, the subject's negation of *negation* does not do justice to its own existential unity, but it merely sacrifices 'the Inessential'. The subject sublates itself only to bring about its empty form back to itself¹⁶⁰. This transformation is a deviant idealism with respect to Schellingian considerations. Opposition is reduced to the ideal activity of the subject in accordance with the will of the ground. In Žižek's words:

[A]fter sacrificing everything I considered 'inessential', I suddenly realize that the very essential dimension for the sake of which I sacrificed the inessential is already lost. The subject does save his skin, he survives the ordeal, but the price he has to pay is the loss of his very substance, of the most precious kernel of his individuality.¹⁶¹

So long as there is understanding, things are condemned to be phenomena. In this sense, the understanding of a thing leads consciousness to its limits, calling for a dissolution of the bondage that limits consciousness. Consciousness remains a slave to the understanding as long as it does not dialectically liberate itself from this understanding.

Schelling's aesthetic metaphysics, on the other hand, can investigate the *subject* as a unity, which is divided into parts of an inside-outside duality: as a duality of divine/transcendent ideality and otherness/ abyssal alienage. In this view, infinity is the absolute manifestation of Absolute: God. If things of the real account for

¹⁵⁹ Thus a critique of *a priori* on its conventionality as a psychological aspect of the self.

¹⁶⁰ Žižek, 2007, p.126-127.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p.126.

infinity through consciousness, there follows alienation. But aesthetic intuition can immediately grasp the Absolute through the genuine work of art. This immediate reality is ideal (or divine).

Schelling's *Natürphilosophie* takes Nature as its conventional whole unit. It moves from the infinity of this whole to the universals of the finites. The asymmetric forces discovered in this speculation, darkness and light, then take place in his metaphysical studies as God and ground. Neither darkness is outside of light, nor ground is of God. Yet, they are still forces on their own because of the opposition they are capable of producing. The split in God is not temporal, thus, although ground (or darkness) is not substantial, it behaves differently as an aspect of form and change, the two kinds of finitude which Absolute would not confine itself to without the split. Identity of *ideal* and *real* in the work of art as the finite manifestation of the infinite Absolute is dependent on this inner split.

Thus, we can also mention how a speculative science can function exactly as Schellingian aesthetical metaphysics suggests. Scientists should consider that imagination brings forth what the ground has presented to it in terms of phenomena and shouldn't refrain from exploring its connotation in the ideal by grasping nature's unity via aesthetic intuition. Because nature belongs to the self-identity of the Absolute and science as the instrument of the productive activity of human should grasp the true knowledge of it in nature by dissolving its essential empirical knowledge that is provided by the ground.

In *The Rise of Modern Science and the Genesis of Romanticism*, Eichner gives examples of such scientists from the Romantic tradition who were influenced by Schelling's aesthetical metaphysics and made important discoveries in this way. For example, German chemist J. W. Ritter's discovery of ultraviolet light was inspired by Schelling's *Natürphilosophie* in general (and his "law of polarity" in particular). Similarly, Danish physicist and chemist H. C. Oersted persisted in searching for a connection between electric currents and magnetic fields,

ultimately succeeding in showing that electric currents produce magnetic fields. His persistence was motivated by his conviction of Schellingian speculations about the unity of nature¹⁶².

Schelling's aesthetic metaphysics can also be applied to social sciences such as history. Perhaps even a reconstructive look at *mythology* and the works of art therein can enlighten our existence with historicity, so that causally read history cannot become an empirical dogma that conditions our activities, but rather we can reform and reconstruct our essences in agreement with our freedom.

It seems that only the aesthetic production of collective social communities may grasp the reel-ideal notion of existence.

¹⁶² Eichner, 1982, p.23.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The obscure gap between the practice of everyday life and the (so-called) theoretical certainty of scientific endeavor urged me to investigate the relation between ontology and epistemology. In this regard, the romantic philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's speculative account of Aesthetics has been insightful concerning the obscurity of this gap. But it was impossible to attain a complete schematization of his philosophy because his philosophy does not yield to a merely analytical consideration of consistency. As we have seen, his method of conducting philosophy is concerned with the *actu*¹⁶³ aspects of thought, which, at once, ought to be loyal to the attention of speculative and critical approaches. That is exactly why his main assumptions change according to how his previous studies present new oppositions. In that case, I tried to give an account of his transitive, and even maybe poetic, way of conducting philosophy. And, on that account, I also had the obligation to relate his philosophy to his predecessors', to his contemporaries' and even to his successors'.

In Chapter II of this thesis, I have begun my investigation with Immanuel Kant's critical approach, for it is the chief influence on Schelling's philosophy. Studying the transcendental tradition, beginning with Kant and advancing with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, presented the possibility to analyze Schelling's idealism.

¹⁶³ Schelling himself makes us of this notion of '*actu*' in place of a kind of actuality, which is carried out in an ideal manner (e.g. in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom)

I have deduced an agreement between Kant and Schelling concerning their evaluation of pre-critical metaphysics as dogmatism. The contrast between dogmatism and criticism gives way to illustrate the difference between causal explanations of nature and that, which conditions those explanations. We have, then, seen that, although Kant's critical approach addresses the requirement of such an 'unconditioned condition', his assertion concerning the unity of transcendental philosophy had failed to do justice to this requirement. Neither Kant's *noumenal realm*, nor Fichte's formulation of the *I* have been satisfactory with respect to an unconditioned, which ought not to be a reduction to either one of the subjective or objective realms.

We have then reached the point, where we have discovered that Schelling intends to formulate an original unity as the identity of subject and object, of being and thought. His reluctance to discard neither one of the two aspects urges Schelling to seek for a system of philosophy, which would redeem the real in tandem with the ideal.

Schelling's criticisms of Kant and Fichte, and his desire to liberate *phenomena* from the oppression of the unknowable ground in Kant's system (which is unfortunately totally rejected in Fichte's) carries him back to the arms of pre-critical philosophy. Yet, having learnt from Kant's distinction between *being* and *being-known*, Schelling's resort to pre-Kantian philosophy (i.e., Spinozism) is not an example of an obtuse bigotry. On the very contrary, we see that Schelling still intends to fulfill transcendental unity in accordance with Kant's critical methodology. Thus, his shift to Spinozism is not a metaphysical retrogression, but it is rather a methodological utilization, and even, an attempt at a kind of synthesis.

Although Schelling takes refuge in Spinozism, his revaluation of Spinoza's system results in a radical alteration of it. Schelling considers Spinoza's self-

caused substance (*causa sui*) to be an inanimate abstraction, which leads him to find Spinoza to be a necessitarian. Schelling believes that if Spinoza had not conceived of the *causa sui* as a substance, then he could have avoided this fatalism and produced a system grounded on freedom. Thus Schelling's appropriation of Spinoza into his own system combines the insights he has gleaned from Kant's and Fichte's understandings of the subject (–i.e., the non-individual transcendental subject and the notion of the *I* as an activity) with the Spinozistic method of deriving the finite from the infinite *causa sui*. While avoiding falling into dogmatism by heeding to Kant's distinction between *being* and *being-known*, Schelling discovers that the unconditional ground he seeks must be such that its *being* and *being-thought* must coincide. He is, thus, able to derive a notion of the Absolute as subject-object identity through a transcendental analysis of the unity found in individual self-consciousness.

We saw that Schelling proceeds by referring to the Absolute self-consciousness as self-identity or rather *Absolute Identity*. This discovery urges him to account for an Identity Philosophy, which ought not be limited by his Fichtean Transcendental Idealism. However, Schelling's discovery of the Absolute cannot be accounted for unless both aspects of idealization and realization are traced in their systematizations. Hence I have followed the exact rhythm Schelling produced between his so-called early and middle periods of conducting philosophy.

The Spinozistic turn in Schelling's philosophy orients his concerns for the unity of being and thought towards a philosophy of nature. His idealist approach and *Natürphilosophie* belong to the same period among his studies. In the light of this information, we safely proceeded by knowing that Schelling conducted these two approaches for the sake of his identity philosophy. Schelling's tendency to the principle of unity permits a speculative investigation into the philosophy of nature. *Natürphilosophie* deals with objects of reality as well as their relations,

and more importantly, it tries to explain the underlying elements of the objects and their relations in a unity.

If we ever dare to attribute to Schelling an existential attitude, its heralds would be in his *Natürphilosophie*, because his consideration of organisms in relation to the inorganic aspect of nature brings forth an infinite sort of productivity. Schelling's elaborations remind us that nature is, on the hand, bound to the conception of reasoning, and, on the other, open to infinity via productive activity. His speculative insight discovers that the causal relations in nature are the expressions of the Absolute's productivity itself. Schelling's researches and subsequent contemplations concerning some particular examples attest to the lawfulness of nature (e.g., examining gravitational force as an inorganic factor for determining organisms' chemical and physical states, and therefore gaining an insight into object's being-in-itself). However, Schelling realizes that the insight into object's being-in-itself still lies beyond this lawfulness, in a kind of lawless region of reality. This indicates a deviation in the objective world that is unaccounted for in our conception of causality. Hence, along with Schelling's studies we find the inevitable crack between object's subjectivized lawfulness and object's lawless being-in-itself. Schelling must have speculated this crack to have emerged at the point at which the duality of being and thought is also originally formed.

Thereafter, the quest for the 'unconditional' indicates that this deviation or rather this 'meta-causality' between the lawful and lawless aspects of subject-object unity is correlated to the notion of freedom. From there on, Schelling conducts a dialectics that opens up to an immediate grasp of this transcendental freedom. In that respect the interchangeability between elements and notions among Schelling's philosophical schematizations allows us to grasp the transitions between science of nature (i.e., ontology) and science of knowledge (i.e., epistemology) for the possibility of a vivid metaphysics.

At this stage, we find ourselves amidst a transformation of Schelling's early conception of intellectual intuition into an aesthetic faculty. Yet, we are reminded that although Schelling's dialectic allows us this kind of transformation, we do not abandon the former.

Although Schelling himself does not give us the basic formula for his identity philosophy, we have been able to induce that (1) intellectual intuition is the ability to reflect upon the immediacy of the Absolute via self-consciousness; (2) aesthetic intuition is the unconscious ability to grasp all phenomenal reality at once; and therefore (3) empirical consciousness of the ordinary individual is subject to transcendental freedom insofar as s/he mediates himself/herself in the dialectics of this reciprocal *realidealismus*. However, attending to such a moral deduction requires an ontological basis for this metaphysical activity. Thus, I have indulged in Schelling's Neoplatonic instalment for ontology.

Chapter III operated on how Schelling arrives at this kind of ontology. Although we have returned to the Absolute at every step of Schelling's identity philosophy, his speculations concerning the ontology were lacking in his profuse idealism. The assertion of the Absolute as self-identity and as self-consciousness is contemplated in his works *Bruno, Philosophy and Religion* and *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*. But more importantly, we have seen that Schelling's contra Kant quest for the ground as the outset of his philosophical expedition from his early (and doubtfully) Fichtean period aligns with the activity of the Absolute from his identity philosophy. We plunged the object's being-in-itself into the realm of self-consciousness, into the pure activity of the Absolute.

Having derived the Absolute as the non-individual self, which is complete fullness, Schelling finally proceeds into questioning how critical transcendental philosophy can account for a non-dogmatic ontology. Amidst the findings of productivity and activity, he relinquishes the one-sidedness of either subjectivism

or objectivism with his awakening into the dynamic understanding of the world. At that point we analyse how he installs the enterprise of a Neoplatonic ontology into the heart of critical philosophy.

Keeping in mind that Schellingian philosophy foremost guides us towards transcendental freedom, which, in this case, is ultimately concerned with the unity of being and thought as absolute identity, we have proceeded to investigate the origins of the gap thereto. We can, thus, conceive of the reason-like lawfulness of nature and its lawless, broken link to the whole of being as the two outcomes of the crack in reason in-itself. Accrediting the 'reason' of critical philosophy with such vitality allows us to consider it analogous to the Neoplatonic and even the Heraclitian senses of it (i.e., *nous*; *logos*). Accordingly we follow Schelling's *historico-critical mythology* (what later Schelling, himself, would address this method as), through which, basically, what are at hand are the historical culminations of the notions we are entangled with, and the reality of the world in contrast with its ideal aspect.

This Neoplatonic attitude in Schelling's metaphysical explorations brings forth the crucial conceptions of God and of its Ground of existence. Schelling conceives of the crack in the original unity as the becoming of a split, and thereof the beginning of Absolute's voyage to attend its self-consciousness. Self-consciousness requires its bearer to be self-conscious at least in a nominal sense of necessity, but it is not our concern to give such a scholastic account for the Absolute. In regard, we have found Schelling's relevant, and rather speculative, narrative in his text, *Bruno*, which is themed by a very Socratic-like dialogue. Throughout my argumentations, which reckon on the convictions of the mentioned dialogue, we have concluded that truth resides in the unity via aesthetics. We embraced God as the Light of Reason, the *light* itself and the Ground as the chaotic darkness, the abyssal nothingness. I thus arrived at the judgment that pure idealism and pure criticism lead us to either of these ends, ripping all vitality of the unity, which we call *existence*.

So, neither of our traditional Platonic nor revolutionary Kantian approaches managed to come across with the fate of the individual in contradiction with the freedom of the non-individual absolute. Absolute freedom is clearly not granted to the individual, but the individual is still somehow free. S/he yearns for what s/he is not, and even elevates himself/herself (of which we can see an analysis in Hegel's phenomenology). However, there is no absolute ascension into the realm of ideas, because the realm of phenomena is the realm of finitude, in which all types of relations are condemned to be defined by the otherness of the objects. Then, forming a spirit for the individual's ascension in and through the *real-ideal* reason might end up forming merely an imitation of this nature. That is what we have come to know as positive evil in this thesis. The determinacy of institutional behaviour in any form of logic (either theoretical or practical) has the risk of reanimating. We come to find that infinite regress is not only applicable to the peripheries of theoretical reason but also to the habitual routines and to the lawfulness of practical reason as well.

In the long run, our Schellingian journey brought us to the shores of aesthetics and introduced us to a character, who might find in themselves a personalized aspect of God. Human freedom, indeed, needs to liberate itself from the darkness of its ground of existence, while keeping its paradoxical existence at peace with those oppositions and never give up yielding aesthetic representations of this existence.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Turkish Summary

Bu çalışmamda, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling'in felsefesinde "kötülük" anlayışının esasına, dayanaklarına ve sonuçlarına değindim. Filozofun yalnızca kendi başına ürettiklerini değil, aynı zamanda, kendisinin çağdaşları olan Johann Gottlieb Fichte'nin ve Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel'in çalışmalarına değindiğim gibi, bu bahsedilen isimlere öncül olmasından mütevellit, Immanuel Kant'ın felsefesine de içeriklice girmekten çekinmedim.

Bu çalışmanın yelpazesi, bahsettiğim şu dört farklı filozofun tüm eserlerini derinlemesine tahlil etmek için yeterli olmayacaktı. Her ne kadar çalışmanın doğası bu dört filozofun ve daha fazlasının bu konuya değinişini gerektirse dahi, ölçülü kalmayı bilerek, gerektiği müddetçe her birine yer ve vakit ayırdım. Ancak, Alman Aşkınısal Felsefesi'nin temelini oluşturacak bu filozofların kendi metinlerine dönmek gerektiğinde de, gerekli incelemeleri yapmaktan geri kalmadım. Bununla birlikte, araştırmanın odağı baskın olarak Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling'in üzerinde oldu. Immanuel Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesine bağlılığını ilan etmiş olmasına ek olarak, Schelling'in çalışmaları spekülâtif düşüncenin tarihinde, Platon'un, Plotinus'un ve Baruch Spinoza'nın felsefelerini çevreleyebilen ve buradan Hegel'in ve Slavoj Žižek'in felsefelerine kadar ulaşan geniş bir aralığa sahip olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu aralığın ve çerçevenin önemli yönü, birlik ve çokluk problemini aşmaya çalışan metafizik çalışmaları sistematik bir şekilde kapsıyor olmasıdır.

Kimi bilim insanları Fichte, Schelling ve Hegel'in üçünü birden Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesini yanlış anlamış olmakla suçlarken, bazılarıysa Alman İdealizmi'ni oluşturan bu üçlünün içerisinde bile Schelling'i başarısız bir filozof olarak görme eğilimindedir. Andrew Bowie, *Schelling ve Modern Avrupa Felsefesi* isimli

kitabında bu eğilimi eleştirir ve bu vaziyetin sebebi olarak Schelling'i okumayı Hegel'i okumaya indirgemedeki hataya işaret eder.

Ancak bazı bilim insanları da var ki, sayıları az da olsa, Schelling'in kendisine has bir düşünür olduğunu keşfetmiş durumdadır. Örneğin Martin Heidegger, Schelling'in *İnsan Özgürlüğünün Özüne Dair Felsefi Soruşturmalar* metnini önce dersleştirmiş, sonra da, 1936 yılında bu dersleri *Schelling'in İnsan Özgürlüğünün Özü Üzerine Tezi* ismiyle kitaplaştırmıştır.

Daha yakın zamanlarda, çağdaşımız Slavoj Žižek, Schelling'in hem aynı metin üzerinde ve hem de *Evrenin Çağları (Die Weltalter)* metni üzerinde çalışmıştır. İşin tuhaf yanı Žižek de hala Schelling'i Hegel için okumak isteyenlerdendir; fakat alışılmışın aksine, *Bölünemez Kalıntı (The Indivisible Remainder)* ve *Özgürlükteki Boşluk (The Abyss of Freedom)* metinlerinde de gördüğümüz üzere Žižek'in Schelling'den Lacancı okumaları çıkarabiliyor ve başka yerlerde Marksist okumalara bağlayabiliyor oluşu, onu, Schelling'i sadece Hegel'e indirgiyor bulmamıza ve bu vesile ile yadırgamamıza mani oluyor.

Yine de Schelling felsefesini kendi içinde bütünlüklü olarak okuyanların azlığı gün gibi ortadadır. Özellikle metinleri arasındaki ilişkiyi bağlayamamış olan bilim insanları genellikle Schelling'in felsefesini üçe bölmüş, ve kolaylıkla bu üç döneme binaen Schelling'in kendisini ise tutarsız olmakla suçlamıştır. Oysa Kant'ın aşkınsallık fikriyle ve Hegel'in diyalektik mekanizmasıyla tanışık olmak ve bunlarla beraber Schelling'in özdeşlik felsefesi bağlamında sanat felsefesini nasıl ele aldığını incelemek çoğunun dikkatinden kaçmıştır.

Fichtecilik'ten devşirdiği aşkınsal idealizmi diye bilinen Schelling'in erken dönem felsefesinin Hegelcilik'e mal edilişi üzerinde kısaca durmakta fayda gördüm. Ne de olsa felsefi kariyerlerinde beraber yakın bir arkadaşlıkla başlayan Schelling ve Hegel'in felsefelerinde ortaklık bulmak pek doğal olacaktır. Fakat, belki de, düşünülenin ve uygulananın aksine, Hegel'i için Schelling için okumak

ya da, en azından, onları aynı bütünlük içerisinde ayrı ayrı okumak mümkün olabilir. Bu sebeple, Schelling'in doğa felsefesine verdiği önemi bu çalışmada es geçemedim. Spekülatif bir tavırla doğa bilimi çalışmaları yürüten Schelling'in, belirli analogiler eşliğinde, metafizik çalışmalarında doğa bilimi ve idealizm arasında özdeşlik bulacak kadar verimli çalışmalar yapmış olduğunu görebiliriz. Böylelikle, Schelling felsefesi Fichtecilik'ten uzaklaşmış ve Hegelcilik'e sığdırılmayacak bir içeriğe kavuşmuştur. Bütün hareketler yine de mutlak bir kopuş barındırmamakla birlikte, daha ziyade diyalektik hareketle diğer iki filozofun işlerini bağlamında tutmaktadır.

Fakat, yine de, bilim insanları uzun süredir Schelling'in doğa felsefesi çalışmalarından ötürü onu panteist olmakla suçlamış ve Kantçılık'tan uzaklaştığını iddia etmişlerdir. Schelling'in bu minvalde Spinozacılık'a doğru seyrettiği doğrudur. Fakat bunu daha ziyade yöntemsel olarak kabul eder. Schelling Spinozacılık'a bir anlamda sığınsa da, Spinoza'nın sistemini yeniden ele alışı radikal bir yoruma dönüşür. Spinoza'nın felsefesindeki kendinden sebepli töz 'causa sui' Schelling için nihayetinde cansız bir soyutlamadan ibarettir, ki buna göre de, Schelling Spinoza'yı bir belirlenimci olarak görür. Schelling'e göre, Spinoza'nın felsefesindeki tevekkülden kaçınılmalı, bunu da 'causa sui'yi bir töz olarak almayarak sağlamalıdır. 'Causa sui'ye bir tümdengelim ilkesi olarak yaklaşan Schelling, Kant'ın ve Fichte'nin felsefelerinden devşirdiği 'aşkınsal özne'nin yanına bu ilkeyi koyduğunda, felsefeye aradığı koşulsuzluk zeminin bu iki ilkenin kesişiminde bulacağından hemen hemen emin olur. Kant'ın varlık ve bilinen-varlık ayırımına olan sadakati bu hususta onu aydınlatmıştır. Böylece özne-nesne ayırımına değil, özne-nesne özdeşliğine odaklanmayı hedef alan Schelling, bu özdeşliğin kavramını 'Mutlak' olarak bulur¹⁶⁴.

¹⁶⁴ Burada 'Absolute' kavramının çevirisi için genellikle kullanılan 'Saltık' kavramı yerine 'Mutlak' kavramını tercih etmiş olmam, Schelling'in felsefesinde bazı kavramların sağduyusal göndermelerde de işlerliğini korumasından dolayıdır.

Schelling, panteistik bir bütünlükle doğa bilimi yapmaya kalktığında, spekülâtif tavrını ve eleştirel yöntemi asla bir kenara bırakmaz, aksine dogmacı olmamak için tek çare olarak elde tutar. Üzerine üstlük Kant'ın ve Fichte'nin dogmatizm eleştirilerini eksik bulur ve iddia ettikleri devrimsellikte metafizik yapabilmeyen imkânını bu türettiği özdeşlik yönteminde görür. Çünkü temel iddiası felsefenin tek başına sonludan sonsuza giderek sonuç alamayacağı gibi bunun tersini de yalnız başına bir arayış olarak koyutlamaktaki hatadır. Özdeşlik felsefesinin iki yönlülüğü böylece temellendirilebilir.

Schelling felsefesini bu tip yanlış anlamalarla yargılayanlar maalesef yargılarının hakkını verebilecek biçimde Schelling'in felsefesini bütünlüklü olarak ele alamamışlar, onu ancak kararsız ve çelişki olmakla suçlamakla kalmışlardır. Schelling'in felsefesinde gerçekten de klasik mânâda tutarsızlık bulunabilir. Doğa felsefesi çalışmaları eleştirel felsefe öncesi çalışmalara benzer bulunabilir ve orta dönem felsefesi idealizmi ile romantik bir özdeşlik felsefesine dönecektir. Geç dönem felsefesindeyse idealizminin temeli olan Mutlak kavramını terk edişi ve tarihselliğe açtığı kapı ve yaptığı vurgu ön plana çıkar. Her şeye rağmen, gözlerden kaçan, bu dönemler arasındaki diyalektik ilerleyiş ve Schelling'in canlı bir bilimsellik ile çalışmış olduğudur. Varoluşçuluk ve psikanaliz gibi akımlara öncel olduğunu bu sürecinden takip edebiliriz.

Öz-eleştirel aktüelitesiyle Schelling'in felsefi karakterini biraz tanımış oluyoruz. Aşkînsal idealizm, ve doğa felsefesini yürüttüğü ilk yıllarından devralan ilahiyatı ve özdeşlik metafiziği, oradan özgürlük ve kötülük üzerine açılan çalışmaları ile görüyoruz ki Schelling bir önceki soruşturmasında hem başarıya ulaşmış yanları hem de başarısızlıkla soru olarak kalan öğeleri yeni soruşturmasına karşıtlık içerisinde taşıyabiliyor. Bu da, Hegel diyalektiğindeki kopuşlardan (Aufhebung) bir adım ötede, pekinlik korumadan ilerlemek ve hayatın kendiliğindenliğinin hakkını vermek anlamına gelebiliyor. Dahası klasik bilimsel yöntemselliği toptan reddeden ve kendi içerisinde çekirdek teori tutmayan, ve eldeki teorileri 'ad

hoc'larla bezemeyen organik bir akışla bir bilimsel süreci işleyebildiğini görüyoruz.

Bu noktada Schelling'in felsefi dizisine kronolojisine uygun bir biçimde değinmem faydalı olabilir. Bu sayede Schelling'in felsefi rotasını daha net anlayabiliriz. Listelediğimde, işlerinin tamamına bakmış olmayacağız; yine de, çağdaşlarına kıyasla farkını belirlememize yardımca olacak başlıca eserlerini görmüş olacağız. 1794 – 1800 yılları arasında *Aşkınısal İdealizmin Dizgesi*'ne varacak çalışmalarında Schelling, Fichteci idealizmi eleştirdiği gibi över de. Bu esnada doğa bilimi üzerine denemelerine de başlar. *Bir Doğa Felsefesi için Fikirler* ve *Bir Doğa Felsefesi Sistemi'nin İlk Taslağı*'nı bu yıllarda peş peşe yazar. İdealizm-realizm düalizmini ele alan Schelling, bu çalışmalar eşliğinde bu ikiliğin her iki yakasıyla da ilgilenmiş olur. Aşkınısal felsefenin bu ikilikle nasıl ilgileneceğine dair yaptığı sorgulamalarına yanıtı bir özdeşlik felsefesinde arar. Bu bağlamda bir sonraki döneminin çalışmalarını buraya bağlı görmeyi uygun buluyorum. *Bruno* (1802) metniyle başlayan, *Felsefe ve Din* (1804) metniyle devam eden, ve o yıllardaki sanat felsefesi dersleriyle pekişen sürecindeyse, Schelling, bu özdeşlik felsefesinin imkânlarını ve koşullarını arar. Nihayetinde 1809 yılında yayınladığı *İnsan Özgürlüğünün Özüne Dair Felsefi Soruşturmalar* eseriyle bu süreç kabaca tamamlanır. Bu metnin böylesine anahtar bir rol oynadığını düşünme sebebim, Schelling'in erken dönem idealizmini ve doğa felsefesindeki realizmini, sanat felsefesi ve varlıkbilim çalışmaları ışığında bu çalışmada sentezleyebilmiş olmasıdır. Bu sürecin sonunda 'kötülük' kavramının kalıntısı olarak açılışı ise ne idealizm ile, ne geleneksel varlıkbilim ile, ne de salt eleştirel tavırla felsefe üretmeye devam edebileceğimizi ifşa eder. Bu yüzde buraya ayrıca önem vermiş bulunmaktayım. Bütün bilimsel faaliyetlerimizi yeniden kavrayabilmemizin yegâne imkânını burada buldum.

Bu 'kötülük' kavramını anlamak, en başta, varoluşsal bir görevdi. Ama bu nasıl olup da Alman idealizmiyle ya da genel olarak varlıkbilimle alakalandırılabilir? Kötülük üzerine yapılan bir çalışmanın etik ile, ya da, en azından, pratik felsefe ile

ilgili olması gerekmez mi? Aslında aksine, Schelling için ‘kötülük’ kavramının temellerini ve kötülüğün ortaya çıkışını tam da varlıkbilim sorgulamalarımızın kökeninde keşfediyoruz. Böylece, kötülüğün primordiyal (başlangıca dair olan) veçhesine gitmek, varoluşumuzu ve özgürlüğümüzü de daha iyi kavramak demek oluyor.

Dolayısıyla, çalışmam ‘kötülük’ üzerine eğilerek sonuçlanıyor olsa da, bu yolda Heraklitçi ‘logos’un, Platon’un formlar teorisinin, Aristoteles’in ‘aktüelite’ ve ‘potansiyelite’ kavramlarının, Plotinusçu ‘esrime’nin, bütün olarak Spinoza metafiziğinin ve Hegelci diyalektiğin önemini sürekli akılda tutarak ve onlara yeri geldiğinde değinerek ilerlemiştir. Zira, günün sonunda, ‘kötülük’ kavramının kökenini ve işlerliğini bu dinamiklerle beraber anlaşılabilir buldum.

Bir felsefe tarihi öğrencisi olarak kendime şu soruyu akılda tutmayı görev bildim. Başlıca bilimsel başarıların ve başlıca düşünsel çalışmaların arasındaki teori-pratik geçişine dair hayati bağlantıları nedensellik çerçevesinde ve ötesinde nasıl anlayabilirim? Çünkü, düşüncenin eyleme dönüşümüne ve tersi durumda gerçekleşen düşünselliğe sebep olan iki yönlü akışı anlayabilmenin zorluğunu ve hayati önemini, felsefenin en temel derdi olarak ele aldım.

Böyle bir anlayışı gerçekleştirebilmek için Schelling’in kendisinin belirli bir tarihsellik ile bir dizge oluşturmuş olması bu anlayışa önemli bir emsal teşkil etmiştir. Felsefe tarihinden devşirdiği metafizik şablonuyla, Yeni-Platoncu ve Spinozacı bir tavırla varlığın bütünü nasıl yeniden inşa etmiş olduğunu, doğa felsefesi çalışmalarında ve *Bruno* metninde gördük. Aynı zamanda Kant’ın devrimsel eleştirel düşüncesinden nasiplenmiş bir aşkınsal felsefeci olmaktan da istifade eden Schelling, bu şablonu çıkarırken, Platoncu geleneğin ve Spinoza’nın kendisinin aksine, determinist olmaktan kurtulmuştur. Bunu aynı zamanda Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’nin ve Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller’in *Weimar Klasisizm*’ini takip eden romantik çağa borçlu olan Schelling’in, bilimin ve sanatın daha da özgürleşmiş olduğu bir çağda Johann Christian Friedrich

Hölderlin ve Hegel ile genç yaşta bu özgürlükleri paylaşarak arkadaşlık etmiş olması sayesinde bu bilimselliği mümkün kılmış olduğunu görüyoruz.

Schelling'in Alman Aşkınısal İdealizmi'nin bir parçası olmasından mütevellit bu tezin ilk yarısında, bu felsefi duruşa nasıl vardığını ele aldım. Kant'ın, Fichte'nin ve bir geri dönüşle Spinoza'nın felsefelerinden nasıl beslendiğini gösterdim. Eleştirel tutumuyla bilimsel başarıları süzgecinden geçiren Schelling'in, yanlıgıları değil, ama gelişimi yarım kalmış kavramları ve kuramları kendi dizgesine aktardığını görüyoruz. Kant'ın 'kendinde-şey'i kavramsallaştırmasını kaçınılmaz bulan Schelling, bunun Fichte'nin felsefesinde olduğu gibi 'Ben-Olmayan'a indirgenerek, mutlak değillemeye tabi tutulmasına karşı çıkıyor; yine de, Kant'ın felsefesindeki erişilemezliğini de bu bahsedilen dizge içerisindeki metafizik çabanın başarısızlığı olarak görüyor. Hatta Kant felsefesini metafizik yapabilen bir bütün olarak göremeyişinin yegâne sebebinin de bu başarısızlık olduğuna da işaret ediyor. Schelling, Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin, dogmatizm ve eleştirelilik arasında isabetli bir ayırım yapabilen bir sistemden öteye gitmediğini iddia ediyor. Schelling, bu türden bir Kantçılığın faydalarını ise Spinoza'nın tözcü varlıkbilimi ile Fichte'nin öznel idealizmi arasından kurmaya çalıştığı bir *reel-idealizm*¹⁶⁵ alanında arıyor. Schelling, bu arayışa yön veren yegâne kavramı da, bir dolayım üzerinden, yine Kant'tan almış bulunuyor. Fichte'nin Kant'tan devşirerek *Bilgi Bilimi (Wissenschaftslehre)* eserinde geliştirdiği 'entelektüel sezgi' kavramı, özellikle Schelling'in felsefesinde olmak üzere, Alman İdealizmi'nde merkezi bir rol oynamaya başlıyor.

Dolayısıyla 'özne'nin bilgikuramsal analizlerini yaparak varlıkbilimdeki merkeziliyetinin tabiatını anlamak kolaylaşıyor. Entelektüel sezginin 'Mutlak'ı tefekkür yoluyla bulma organı görevi gördüğünü araştırdığım bu bölümde,

¹⁶⁵ Schelling'in bir çok eserinde vurguladığı bu kavram, özdeşlik felsefesine genel olarak verdiği tek isimdir. Schelling, böylece, gerçekçiliği ve idealizmi iki yönlü olarak barındıran özdeşlik felsefesinin bu iki vechesini tek isim altında toplamıştır.

öznenin dışında kalan doğanın yalnızca mekanistik bir yapıyla çalışamayacağını çıkarsayan Schelling, Mutlak'ın kendisinden ne tür bir kuralızsızlıkla böyle bir kurallılık çıkardığını anlamak isteyen soruya varmış oluyor. Bu şekilde idealizmi ve realizmi ayrı ayrı ele almış ve ikisinin ortaklığını sanat felsefesinde, ve entelektüel sezginin sanat felsefesindeki muadili olan 'estetik sezgi'de bulmuş olan Schelling, varlıkbilim çalışmalarına ağırlık vermeye başlıyor. Tezin ikinci yarısında da bu seyre odaklanmış bulundum.

Bu sayede özdeşlik felsefesinin imkanını estetik ve özgürlük arasındaki ne kapsayıcı, ne de dışlayıcı olan ilişkide bulmuş olarak, onun dinamiklerini ve problemlerini anlamaya çalıştım.

Eğer, Schelling felsefesine varoluşçu bir tavır atfedeceksek, bunun kaynağını onun doğa felsefesinde bulabiliriz. Schelling'in, bu çalışmasında, organizmaların doğadaki inorganik ilişkileneimler üzerinden nasıl dönüştüğüne dair gözlemleri ve çıkarımları sonsuz bir üretkenlik fikrine varmasına sebep olmuştur. Takiben, bu bağlamda, Schelling'in spekülatif sorgulamasının vargısı, bu tip bir sonsuz üretkenliğin ancak Mutlak'a dayandırılabilir olduğu olmuştur. Fakat nesnenin 'kendinde-şey'liğinin hesabını bu üretkenliğin doğadaki karşılığı olan yasalılık verebilir olmadığından, doğa ötesinin (yani metafiziğin), gerçekliğin yasadışı bir alanında aranması gerekliliği açık olur. Dolayısıyla bu görüşlerin ışığında, doğanın dinamizminde üretkenliğin hayatiliğini keşfetmiş olup, hem de bu üretkenliğin varoluş nedenlerini böyle bir yasalılıkla aramaktansa, bu üretkenliğin, bu aktivitenin kendisinin Mutlak'ta temel alındığı bir mecradan gelerek doğada belirlenim kazandığını ileri sürebiliriz. Bu da bizim nesnel dünyayı kavramayı çalışmamızla uzanamayacağımızı, ama öznelliğimizin kategorik yapısının ötesinde bir yere açılabilir olduğunu da göstermiş olur.

Bu noktada hatırlamak gerekiyor ki, günlük yaşamın pratiği ile bilimsel çabanın teorik kesinliği arasındaki karanlık yarık bizi bilgikuram ile varlıkbilim arasındaki

ilişkiyi incelemeye çağırıyor. Bu bağlamda, Schelling'i estetik felsefeye yapmış olduğu vurguyla süren takibim, onun bu yarığa 'zemin' arayışına uzanıyor.

Schelling bize bu özdeşlik felsefesinin nasıl işlediğine dair herhangi somut bir tartışma hiç bir zaman sunmuyor. Yine de onun izleğini takip ettiğimizde şu üç adımı görebiliyoruz: (1) Kendi farkındalığına sahip olan öz bilinç, entelektüel sezgi vesile ile varlığın ve varlığın akışının bütünü olan Mutlak'ın dolayimsız farkındalığına ulaşabilir oluyor; (2) estetik sezgi ise görünür alem üzerinden gerçekliği bilindiği olarak veren yeti görevini görüyor; (3) ve her birimizin sıradan bireyler olduğunun göstergesi olan görgül (empirical) bilinç ise aşkınsal özgürlük vesayeti altında kendimizi bu reelidealizm içerisinde nasıl dolayımıldığımızı serimliyor. Fakat bu çıkarımlar en nihayetinde ahlaki olarak yargılanabilir bir bağlama düşüyorlar ve bu etik alana varabilmemiz için Mutlak'ın metafizik aktivitesi içerisinde nasıl bir varlıkbilim kurgulamış olduğumuz hayati bir önem kazanıyor. Böylece, sıra Schelling'in Yeni-Platoncu temdidine geliyor.

Tezin ikinci yarısının ilk kısmı olan üçüncü bölümde de gördüğümüz gibi Schelling bu türden bir ontolojinin imkânlarını soruşturmuştur. Özdeşlik felsefesinin her adımda Mutlak'ın kavramına geri dönmek durumunda kalsak da, Schelling'in idealist dizgesinde varlıkbilime dair bazı söylemlerinin eksik kaldığını gördük. Fakat şunu unutmamalı ki, Schelling, bu alanın kendisinin asla mutlak bir bilimsellikte açıklanamayacağını, insan zihninin böyle bir Mutlak'ı ve onun zeminini kategorik olarak kavrama kabiliyetine sahip olamayacağını ve bunu ancak dolayimsız sezgisellikte yakalayabileceğini bize tekrar tekrar söylemişti –ister entelektüel sezgi olsun, ister estetik sezgi.

Buradan hareketle, Mutlak'ın 'mutlak özdeşlik' ve 'öz bilinçlilik' olarak tanımları Schelling'in özellikle *Bruno ve İnsan Özgürlüğünün Özüne Dair Felsefi Soruşturmalar* metinlerinde ortaya koyulup inceleniyor. Fakat daha önemlisi, Schelling'in Kant karşıtı varlığa zemin arayışları kendi Fichteci idealizminin nihai sınırları olmaya başladığını görüyoruz ve dolayısıyla çalışmasının iç dinamikleri

ile çalışma yöntemi arasında müthiş bir tutarlılık örneği görüyoruz. Bu daha sonraları Hegel'in felsefesinde de ortaya açılacak olan diyalektik hareketin habercisi olacak türden bir yöntemselliğe işaret ediyor. Schelling, böylece nesnenin kendinde-şeyliğini, özbilincin gerçeklik alanına çekerek, Mutlak'ın saf aktivitesinin dinamiklerine dahil etmiş oluyor.

Bu noktada Schelling'in Mutlak'ı 'Bireysel-Olmayan-Kendilik' olarak ortaya koyuşu –ki bu da Schelling'e göre bütünlüklü bir doluluğa işaret eder, dışı yoktur– varlığın ve düşüncenin nihai birliğini mutlak özdeşlik üzerinden anlamaya yardımcı olmaya yönelik hareketlerinden birisidir. Buradan hareketle Schelling, eleştirel aşkınsal felsefenin nasıl olup da dogmatik olmaya bir ontoloji kurabileceğini sorgulamaya geçiyor. Bu sorgulamayla birlikte, doğa felsefesi aracılığıyla keşfetmiş olduğu üretkenlik ve aktivite kavramlarının da varlıkbilimdeki olası tekabülîyetleri üzerinden, öznelîğin ve nesnelîğin tek taraflılıklarının çaresizliğine işaret eden Schelling, evreni iki yönlü bir dinamizm ile anlama gayretine erişiyor. Böylelikle Schelling'in eleştirel felsefenin kalbine Yeni-Platonculuk'u getirişine tanıklık ediyoruz.

Schellingci felsefenin en asli gayesinin aşkınsal özgürlükle ilgilenmek olduğunu ve bu aşkınsal özgürlüğün imkânının varlık ve düşüncenin birliğine dayandığını akılda tutarak, en baştan beri mevzu bahis edilen teori ile pratik ve varlıkbilim ile bilgikuram arasındaki yarıkla ilgilenmeye geçebiliyoruz. Doğanın akıl-benzeri yasalılığı ile varlığın bütünlüğüne olan ilişkisindeki yasadışılığı arasındaki çatlak, aklın kendisinde bir tür iki sonuçluluk olduğunu bize işaret ediyor. Schelling, eleştirel felsefenin 'akıl' kavramına böyle bir canlılık ve hayatîlik kazandırmış olmakla onu Yeni-Platoncu 'nous' ve Heraklitçi 'logos'a analogik olarak yakınsamış oluyor. Bu zaten kendisinin daha sonraları mitoloji felsefesi çalışmalarında açık edeceği bir tarihsellik anlayışını beraberinde getiriyor ki bu tavrın yöntemselleşmesi ile gerçekliğimizin kuruluşunun nasıl da kavramların tarihselliğinde yüklü olduğunu görebiliyoruz.

Schelling'in metafizik keşiflerindeki bu Yeni-Platoncu ve tarihselci tutumlarının ışığında, Tanrı'yı ve Tanrı'nın varoluş Zemin'ini hem kavramsal olarak, hem de yaşantısında ele alma imkânı buluyoruz. Bu bağlamda, Schelling, varlığın ve aklın kökenindeki çatlağı, tekrar, bir yarıma olarak ele almaya başlıyor. Bu da Mutlak'ın özbilinçliliğini sağlayabilmesi için başlamış olduğu serüveninin çıkış noktası olarak beliriyor. Şu noktada hatırlamalıyız ki Mutlak'ın özbilinçlilik olması onun özbilinç olduğu anlamına gelmiyor. Zira, özbilinç olmak için kendilik farkındalığı ve dolayısıyla bir iç-dış ayrımı gerekiyor. Fakat Mutlak ilkece dolu bir bütünlük olduğu için böyle bir ayrım onun mutlaklığı ile çelişkili olacaktır. Tam da buradan hareketle, Schelling, Mutlak'ın kendisindeki yarığın nedeni olarak bu özbilinçliliğin özbilinç üretme ihtiyacını görüyor. Dolayısıyla biz de insan özgürlüğünün belirleyici olarak olmasa da nedensel olarak nasıl ortaya çıktığını kavrama imkânı buluyoruz. Nihayetinde Schelling'in varlıkbilim çalışmalarınca, Mutlak'ın kendi mutlak özgürlüğünü atfettiği biri varoluş aktivitesi (Tanrı) diğeri de varoluş potansiyelitesi (Zemin) olmak üzere ikiye, bir başka anlamda da iç ve dış olarak, ayrıldığını takip etmiş ve incelemiş olduk. Yine de şunu unutmamak gerekir: Tanrı, Mutlak'ın mutlak tezahürü olması bakımından hâlâ bütünlüklü ve dışsızdır, dolayısıyla Tanrı'nın varoluş Zemin'i hala Tanrı'ya ve dolayısıyla Mutlak'a bağlıdır, yalnızca bu bağ nedensel bir bağ değildir –en azından doğa kanunlarınca anladığımız nedenselliğe tabî olacak türden değildir. Sokratik diyalogu kendisine model almış olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz *Bruno* metninde bu sorgulamalar ikna edici bir estetik akışla ele alınmaktadır. Schelling'in felsefesinde 'doğru'nun estetikte yattığını kavramış olmakla birlikte analogileri okumaya devam edebiliriz. Schelling Tanrı'yı 'aklın ışığı', 'ışık'ın ta kendisi olarak ve Zemin'i ise 'kaotik karanlık' ve 'dipsiz boşluk' olarak yeniden kurmaktadır. Bu sayede görmüş oldum ki safi idealizm ve safi eleştirelilik bizi varoluşun birlikli canlılığından uzaklaştırarak bu iki aşırı uçtan birine götürmektedir.

Yani ne Platoncu felsefe geleneği, ne de Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinin devrimciliği kendi başlarına Birey-Olmayan-Kendilik'i ya da onun karşısındaki özgür bireyi

birbirlerine uyumlu olacak biçimde ele alabilmiştir. Mutlak özgürlüğün birey ile paylaşılmadığı aşikâr iken, onun kendi türünden (aşkınsal) özgürlüğünün ise Mutlak'ın özgürlüğünün yegâne imkânı olarak ortaya çıkmış olduğunu görüyoruz. Fakat, özgürlüğün fikri olarak yücelten ve terfi ettiren gücü asla bireyi mutlak olarak ideal dünyaya vardırabilecek bir yapıda değildir. Burada Platonculuk'un hatasına düşmemeliyiz. Çünkü görüngüsel alemin sonluluğuna mahpus olan bireylerin özgürlüğü ancak ve ancak nesnelerce tanımlanabilirlikle ve ötekilikle açıklanabilir. Bu vaziyette, reelideal aklın yoluyla Mutlak'ın fikri alemine terfi etme yönelimlerinde bireyin ya da bireylerin fikri birlikteliklerinden doğmuş olan tinlerin özgürlüklerin dair duydukları pekinlik ancak kötülükle sonuçlanabilir. Bu aklın ve doğanın sentezi sayesinde üretilmiş tinin Mutlak'ın kendisi olma iddiası taşınması ve ona ulaşabilirliğini kaybetmesi demek olacaktır. Dahası, bu bir sabitlik üretmeyeceği gibi bu bireyin ya da tinin kendisini, Zemin'in yasalılığına yenik düşürecek ve dolayısıyla Zemin'in kurallılığın ötesindeki kuralsız dipsiz boşlukta yönsüz bir düşüşe sevk edecektir. Aklın mantıksal yapısından nasiplenmiş herhangi bir kurumsal tutum, belirlenmişliği ile bu tehlikeyi barındırabilir. Dolayısıyla, sonsuz gerilemenin sadece teorik aklın sınırlarında değil, pratik aklın rutinlerinde de barınabildiğini görmüş olduk.

Uzun vadede, Schellingci seyrimiz bizi estetik felsefenin kıyılarına ulaştırmış olmakla beraber, bizi, kendisinde Tanrı'nın şahsileşmiş bir veçhesini taşıyan bir karakterin imkânıyla tanıştırır. Kötülüğün tinselliğine zorunlu olarak imkân sağlayan insan özgürlüğünün Tanrı'nın Işığı'na yükselebilmesi ise, varoluş zemininin karanlık ve dipsiz boşluğunun yasalı temsilinden kendisini azat edebilmesine bağlıdır. Bu özgürlükten nasiplenmiş olan karakterin, karşıtlıklılığının paradoksallığıyla barış içerisinde olma zorunluluğu taşıyan varoluşunu, Mutlak'ın estetik temsillerine emanet etmesi yegâne kurtuluşu olacaktır.

Appendix B: Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ÖZBEY
Adı : EKREM ÖVÜNÇ
Bölümü : FELSEFE

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : LINKING ONTOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGY VIA
THE EXPOSAL OF EVIL IN HUMAN FREEDOM IN
F.W.J. SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: