

AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC THEORY IN ITS RELATION TO  
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC THEORY IN ITS RELATION TO THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

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The main concern of the dissertation is to investigate Kant's aesthetic theory and its problematic relation to theory of knowledge in his transcendental philosophy. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant constructs his aesthetic theory by arguing that the aesthetic experience is based on a certain type of feeling, namely, the feeling of pleasure, rather than a concept. He grounds such a feeling on the aesthetic judgment of reflection. In spite of its non-conceptual and subjective characteristic, an aesthetic reflective judgment still has a claim to be universally valid. Here, the feeling of pleasure in beautiful is produced by the free harmonious relation between the imagination and the understanding. Judgment, in its reflective employment, does not determine its object, but determines the feeling of pleasure in the judging subject. On the other hand, the categories, as pure concepts of the understanding, carry nearly all the weight in his theory of knowledge presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The imagination, in this case, is strictly bounded up with the rules which are imposed by the concepts of the understanding. By this way, judgment, as a cognitive faculty, determines its object and gains its objective validity. In this context, the dissertation

aims to discuss the nature of Kant's aesthetic theory and the components which constitute a pure aesthetic judgment of reflection and to clarify its proper place in critical philosophy regarding his theory of knowledge.

Keywords: Reflective judgment, free harmony, imagination, understanding, reason.

## ÖZ

# KANT'IN ELEŞTİREL FELSEFESİNDE BİLGİ TEORİSİ İLE İLİŞKİSİ İÇİNDE ESTETİK TEORİNİN DOĞASI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME

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Bu çalışmanın temel ilgisi Kant'ın estetik teorisini ve onun aşkinsal felsefede bilgi teorisi ile olan sorunlu ilişkisini araştırmaktır. *Yargıcının Eleştirisi*'nde, Kant estetik deneyimin belli türden bir duyguya, yani haz duygusuna dayandığını tartışarak estetik teorisini kurar. Bu türden bir duyguyu estetik düşünüm yargısı üzerine dayandırır. Kavramsal olmamasına ve öznel bir karakter taşımamasına rağmen, estetik düşünüm yargısı hala tümel geçerlilik iddiası taşır. Burada, güzel olanda duyulan haz duygusu, imgelem ve anlama yetisi arasındaki özgür bir uyum ilişkisi yoluyla üretilir. Yargıcı, düşünümsel kullanımında, nesnesini değil, ama yargıda bulunan öznenin haz duygusunu belirler. Diğer taraftan, *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nde sunulan bilgi teorisinde, anlama yetisinin saf kavramları olarak kategoriler neredeyse bütün ağırlığı taşır. Bu durumda, imgelem tümüyle anlama yetisinin kavramları tarafından yüklenen kurallara bağlıdır. Böylelikle, bir bilgi yetisi olarak yargıcı nesnesini belirler ve nesnel geçerlilik kazanır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez Kant'ın estetik teorisinin doğasını, estetik düşünüm yargısını kuran öğeleri tartışmayı ve bilgi teorisi

göz önüne alınarak estetik teorinin eleştirel felsefedeki uygun konumunu açıklığa kavuşturmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Düşünümsel yargı, özgür uyum, imgelem, anlama yetisi, akıl

To the memory of my father, Metin Özboyran

“Every man’s death begins with the death of his father”

Orhan Pamuk

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# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

Kant introduces his aesthetic theory in the *Critique of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*) published in 1790. In the critical philosophy, there are two main domains corresponding to the theoretical and the practical philosophy. In the theoretical realm, the faculty of the understanding has its own legislative power through its *a priori* laws and principles, while in the practical realm, reason legislates *a priori* by means of its own laws and principles. Yet, they exercise in merely one territory, that is, in the experience. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), it is concerned with the nature, as regards its universal *a priori* laws, in which everything happens in accordance with the concept of necessity. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*), on the other hand, morality is in the scope and the unconditional practical laws necessitate the concept of freedom. In the third *Critique*, the faculty of judgment is presented as a special and an independent faculty which has its own *a priori* principles. Indeed, the faculty of judgment *must* have such a principle; otherwise there would be no need of a transcendental critique to it. It is crucial to emphasize the fact that even though the power of judgment operates with its *a priori* principles, it does not have its own domain. One of the main motives behind the presentation of the faculty of judgment as such in the third *Critique* is simply that the judgment serves as a bridge between the theoretical and the practical domains. In other words, Kant attempts to complete his critical philosophy as a system by combining these two distinct fields through the faculty of judgment. At this juncture, by referring to Kant's arguments about the "schematism" it can be said that the judgment may be considered as a "schema" in the respect that it is homogenous with both understanding and reason, or strictly speaking, with both domains in which the understanding and the reason furnish their own distinct *a priori* laws.

The faculty of judgment, in the third *Critique*, is ascribed to a new kind of employment, reflective judgment, in addition to its determinative function. What is significant here is that aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment are considered as the subclasses of this type of employment. In its reflective form, judgment searches for a concept or universal for a given particular. This central theme will construct the main frame of Kant's aesthetic theory. According to that, aesthetic judgment of reflection is characterized as non-conceptual. Here, we, as the judging subjects, confront with a new side of nature. In the theoretical cognition, we treat the nature as our object of experience to determine and cognize it. On the other hand, when we appreciate the beauty in nature, we do not cognize it. Otherwise stated, we experience another aspect of nature in its fertility and productivity which, let us say, resists to be cognized or conceptualized. In this manner, we live in nature, where we cognize it on the one hand, and we just "feel" it on the other. Considering from this perspective, it can be stated that in the first *Critique* Kant explains our knowing, and therefore, conceptualizing process by explicating the conditions under which the nature or the unity of experience is constructed, while in the third *Critique*, specifically in his aesthetic theory, he expounds our "aesthetic appreciating" process by introducing the condition under which the nature is not constructed by the universal laws or the principles of the understanding but is solely felt. Our feeling of pleasure in the experience of beautiful can be regarded as a sign which expresses that when nature conforms to the structure of our *a priori* conceptual apparatus, there remains something as undetermined by the understanding. However, this does not come to mean that in the aesthetic experience, we use different tools, rather than this conceptual apparatus. Kant argues his aesthetic theory by directly putting the notion "free harmony of the cognitive faculties", in which the imagination and the understanding animate each other in a free way without being determined by the concepts of the understanding, at the center. Therefore, Kant employs the same apparatus both to his theory of knowledge and aesthetic theory but in a completely different way. In other words, theory of knowledge and aesthetic theory in Kant's critical philosophy are fed from the same source, and hence, relied entirely on the same ground. Understood this way, it should be emphasized that such a structure, indeed, allows Kant to integrate his aesthetic theory legitimately into his critical

philosophy. Otherwise, the aesthetic experience would be based on empirical-psychological components, and in such a case, the critique of beautiful would be futile. At this point, the critique of judgment and that of aesthetic judgment intersect. Aesthetic judgment of reflection is grounded also on reflective judgment's *a priori* principles, i.e. the subjective formal purposiveness, as a variety of the principle of purposiveness. The judging subject reflects on the purposive form of the object judged through which our cognitive powers harmonize with each other free from any conceptual determination and by this way the feeling of pleasure is produced.

In addition to the aesthetic experience, reflective judgment's principle of purposiveness, along with the principle of systematicity and of specification, functions in our scientific investigation of nature. Accordingly, in order to classify nature or nature's products, e.g. living organisms in biology, in a systematic way, these principles regulate or guide reflective judgment in the scientific discovery of nature in its diversity of particular empirical rules or laws. Under this guidance, we are able to generate an adequate concept for a given particular case discovered in nature. Here, an empirical concept implies the particular empirical rules or laws for such organisms. In this context, to find a concept for a particular means to subsume it under a genus or species, that is, to classify it. According to Kant, the universal laws or principles of the understanding are too abstract and general for fulfilling such a task. This is the main rationale behind why he assigns reflective judgment and its principle to this task. To exemplify, the universal, and formal, law of causality is unable to inform us about the particular empirical character of nature's specific products. We are in need of special particular causal laws to explain these phenomena. In doing this, we approach to nature in its productivity from teleological perspective by attributing purposes to the nature's products. The principle of purposiveness, in this sense, expresses nature's arrangement and appropriateness to our cognitive faculties.

*Critique of Judgment* is divided into two parts as "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" and as "Critique of Teleological Judgment" in accordance with these two main themes. In the first part, Kant constructs his aesthetic theory by annotating the determinants that function as indispensable components in forming an aesthetic

judgment of reflection. Some of them are described through “the moments” of the aesthetic judgment, i.e., of the judgment of taste, systematically by Kant. Some of them, on the other hand, appear in analyzing his aesthetic theory in a detailed way. If need be mentioning briefly, non-conceptual, disinterested, contemplative, subjective universal, and exemplary necessary characters of aesthetic experience, together with the free harmony and subjective formal purposiveness, internally and mutually necessitate each other. In lacking one of them, the entire system unavoidably collapses. All of them are dependent on each other. In this context, the inner dynamics of aesthetic theory reflect a complete and magnificent system. Each part stands necessarily for the whole. By borrowing Kant’s own language in his second *Critique*, I would like to formulate this system as follows: Each component is *ratio essendi* for the others; and the other is *ratio cognoscendi* for each component and *vice versa*.

Kant’s aesthetic theory entirely excludes the empirical determination of the feeling of pleasure in beautiful, and hence, of the aesthetic judgment of reflection. The aesthetic appreciation cannot be based on any external causal relation between the object judged and the judging subject. In other words, it is not possible to describe an aesthetic experience as that the feeling of pleasure, or, liking, is the product of the existence of the object. On Kant’s account, we take pleasure not in the existence of the object, but in judging itself. As a necessary result of this, any personal interest towards the aesthetic object is inevitably eliminated. If an aesthetic judgment includes such an interest, it refers to what Kant calls “aesthetic judgment of sense” based not on the pleasure in beautiful which is contemplative, but on the pleasure in agreeable. Aesthetic judgment of sense, thus, finds its own roots on the “sensation proper”, namely, on the color, or tone, or flavor, not merely on the form of the object which is purposive. And in this case, it also loses its claim to be universally valid for all judging subjects. This “formal” characteristic of Kant’s aesthetic theory is the main reason for being considered as a “radical version” of “aesthetic formalism”. Moreover, Kant treats the aesthetic judgment of reflection as a “very special” kind of judgment. For, even though it is a “singular”, “subjective” judgment, namely, that it depends on a single empirical experience, and rather, even though it does not involve

a concept, it still has a claim to be universally valid. This subjective and special type of universality takes its legitimacy from mainly three conditions: Disinterestedness/Contemplation, Subjective Formal Purposiveness and Harmony of the Cognitive Powers.

On the other hand, as we will see, Kantian aesthetic theory also includes some serious problems, “impasses”. Some of them stem from the structure of the third *Critique* and from the obscurity of Kant’s own arguments. Some of them are the necessary result of the notion “free harmony”. Comparing it with the first two *Critiques*, it should be noted that Kant’s expositions in the third *Critique* reflect extremely unsystematic structure. Besides, some crucial issues are just left as unexplained without giving any further analysis. These factors can be regarded as responsible basically for commentators’ complaints and conflicts.

The main objective of the dissertation is to examine Kant’s aesthetic theory in its relation to his theory of knowledge. In order to fulfill this aim, firstly, I will elaborate on reflective judgment, its principles and the nature where reflective judgment performs. Secondly, I will attempt to expose the elements of the aesthetic judgment of reflection. In doing this, I will also try to expound the inner dynamics of Kant’s aesthetic theory. And thirdly, I will concentrate specifically on the relation between aesthetic theory and theory of knowledge. In this light, I classify this relation into three groups corresponding to three titles of the first *Critique*: 1) “Transcendental Aesthetics”, regarding the formalist character of Kant’s aesthetic theory 2) “Transcendental Analytic” considering the notion “free harmony of cognitive faculties” 3) “Transcendental Dialectic” and “the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” referring to the arguments of the theory of reflective judgment and its principles. Relevantly, I structure the chapters of the dissertation by projecting this relation. According to this, I entitle the fourth chapter as “Re-examination” and “Stage I” in the respect that I will attempt to re-examine Kant’s arguments about the free harmony with his exposition of “Transcendental Analytic” in which the functions and the positions of the imagination and those of the understanding are discussed. Besides, I entitle the fifth chapter as “Re-examination” and “Stage II” to the extent that I will try to re-examine Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, the

principles and the nature with his expositions of “Transcendental Dialectic” and “the Appendix” in which reason, its concepts and principles along with the transcendent and the empirical employment of them are explained.

Consequently, in the second chapter, I will deal mainly with, first of all, the general theory of reflective judgment and argue Kant’s distinction between determinative and reflective judgments Secondly, I will attempt to investigate the arguments about the principle of purposiveness, the principle of systematicity and the nature presented as a ground for reflective judgment and these principles. While doing so, I will also have presented the reasons why Kant inserts reflective judgment and its principle into his system. Thirdly, the supplementary notions, such as technic of nature, the law of specification of nature, analogy and symbol will be discussed. Immediately afterwards, I will argue Kant’s problematic transition from these arguments to the aesthetic judgment of reflection. In doing this, we will also come to discern the integration problem of aesthetic theory into his general theory of reflective judgment. Lastly, I will attempt to investigate commentators’ arguments about the present issue. By this way, we will have a proper ground to track the arguments and the debates which will be investigated in the following chapters.

In the third chapter, the aesthetic judgment of reflection and its components will be in our scope. I will first expound the general characteristic of such a judgment. Then, I will investigate the notion “disinterestedness” in distinguishing it from the pleasure in agreeable and the pleasure in good. Thirdly, I will argue the universality of the aesthetic judgment. The notion “subjective universality” carries us necessarily to what Kant calls “the Key to the Critique of Taste”. We will see that Kant’s arguments presented in this section results unavoidably in a great rupture among the commentators. In this context, I will attempt to clarify the commentators’ positions by attempting to illuminate their solutions to the present issue. Fourthly, I will discuss the notion “subjective formal purposiveness” through which we will elaborate also on the problematic relation between the judging subject and the aesthetic object to be judged as beautiful. In the second part of this section, I will expound the doctrine of “Transcendental Aesthetics” in the first *Critique*. By this way, Kant’s aesthetic formalism will be clarified. Afterwards, the subjective

necessity of aesthetic judgment and the concept of *sensus communis* will be presented. Finally, the notion “free harmony of the cognitive powers” will be argued. Although this notion carries nearly all weight of his aesthetic theory, Kant does not discuss it under a special or specific title. For this reason, I will first attempt to systematize his arguments about the issue, and then I will expose two commentators’ exemplary approaches to the present theme without elaborating technical details.

In the first part of the fourth chapter, Kant’s explication of the relation between the imagination and the understanding presented in the first *Critique* will be our main concern. Firstly, I will attempt to present the position of the imagination in the A Edition of “Transcendental Deduction” in which the threefold synthesis, i.e. the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction and finally the synthesis of recognition, is discussed. Then, I try to explicate Kant’s complex arguments in the B Edition of the “Deduction”. Here, Kant’s attempt to attach the imagination and its function to the spontaneity of the understanding and the relation between the figurative synthesis by the imagination and the intellectual synthesis by the understanding will be investigated. Afterwards, I will deal with the section “schematism” in which the specific application of the synthesis of the imagination is illuminated. Under the lights of these, in the second part, I will re-examine the free harmony by discussing the commentators’ solutions to the problem of free harmonious relation in a detailed way.

In the first part of the fifth chapter, I will concentrate on the arguments about reason, its relation to the understanding, transcendental ideas as regards to their relation to the concepts of the understanding, the legitimate and illegitimate employment of them, and the tension between “Transcendental Analytic” and “Transcendental Dialectic” introduced in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the first *Critique*. After this, I will argue the cosmological idea of reason, i.e., the world as a whole, which serve as a basis for the regulative and empirical employment of reason in co-operation with the understanding. Under the light of these, in the second part, I will re-examine Kant’s arguments about the function of the reflective judgment, the principle of systematicity and of specification.



## CHAPTER 2

### KANT'S THEORY OF REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

#### 2. 1. General Description of Reflective Judgment

Kant defines “judgment” in general, in the first and the third *Critiques*, as “the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal”.<sup>1</sup> In order to clarify the different functions of the faculty of judgment and to make a room for introducing a new task and a principle (*Grundsatz*), i.e. the principle of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) upon which both the aesthetic judgment of reflection and teleological judgment are based, he inserts a new distinction into his system: Determinative (*Bestimmend*) and Reflective (*Reflectierend*) judgment. It should be noted that such a distinction and these notions are introduced for the first time in the third *Critique*. Determinative judgment, considering its function, was, indeed, one of the main themes in *Critique of Pure Reason*, but Kant called it “objective judgment” or “cognitive judgment”, and did not mention it as “determinative judgment” until the third *Critique*. Another difficulty immediately appears when we systematically elaborate on the *Critique of Judgment* in the respect that Kant deals conspicuously with these notions in both two introductions, not during the whole *Critique*. In the (published) Second Introduction, specifically in section IV, Kant just briefly mentions the natures of determinative and reflective judgment without giving any further explanation about the distinction, while in the First Introduction he deals with the issue in more detail in section V, titled “On Reflective Judgment”.

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<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Werner S. Pluhar, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) (Hereafter *CJ*), 179., and in the First Introduction (Hereafter *FI*) 202., also in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman K. Smith, trans. (Boston: Macmillan, 1965) (Hereafter *CPR*), A 132 B 171.

Determinative judgment is one that “if the universal is given, then the judgment subsumes the particular under it” (*CJ*, 179). In its determinative employment, judgment exercises under the governance of the concepts of understanding (*CPR*, A 131-136 B 170-175). In fact, the task of determinative judgment indicates the routine or the regular function in constructing the objects of the possible experience where the understanding (*Verstand*) has its own legislative (*gesetzgebend*) role. Determinative judgment, which operates “under the universal transcendental laws given by the understanding, is only subsumptive” (*CJ*, 179). In such an employment, judgment relates the particular (*besonder*) to the universal (*allgemein*) by means of which cognition arises. Therefore, the term “determinative” implies explicitly the condition under which it gives attributes to its object through the concepts (i.e. determinative concepts) of the understanding. Yet, this determinative function has a price, and it compensates for its constitutive role as bounded to the functions of the understanding. It is limited by the strict procedures of the process of the cognition (*Erkenntnis*). In this manner, in its determinative form, judgment does not have its own principles or rules; it is guided entirely by the rules or the principles imposed by the understanding.

On the other hand, in the third *Critique*, Kant defines a new path through which judgment can exercise its own “separated” and “special” role. According to that, “if only the particular (*Besonder*) is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, this power is merely reflective, even though this universal will be still always empirical” (*CJ*, FI, 203), that is, an appropriate universal corresponding to this particular. The task of reflective judgment is, hence, defined as finding a proper universal or rule/law in order to determine the particular. At this juncture, it should be noted that reflection still “has a *cognitive aim*: to find a concept for a particular”<sup>2</sup>. And again, reflective employment of judgment also compensates for this privileged role as non-determinative (even if its aim is still cognitive). In its new form, it is not a figure in constructing the experience in a determinative or constitutive way.

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph Cannon, “The Intentionality of Judgments of Taste in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 66:1 (2008), p.54.

Judgment can be regarded either as merely an ability to *reflect*, in terms of a certain principle, on a given presentation (*Vorstellung*) so as to [make] a concept (*Begriff*) possible, or as an ability to *determine* an underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation. In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determinative, power of judgment* (*Urteilskraft*). (CJ, FI, 210)

Hereby, Kant introduces a new type of judgment which has its own principle and function but without having its own legislative role and realm apart from theoretical and practical realms. Reflective judgment does not give attributes to the objects, which means, it does not constitute objects through the concepts of the understanding. Reflective judgment begins with a particular and seeks the universal for it. Thus, on Kant's account, "determinative judgment proceeds only schematically under the laws of the understanding, whereas reflective judgment "technically according to the law of its own" (CJ, FI, 248). That is to say, as we will see later, in the former case, we judge nature through formal laws or principles of the understanding; whereas in the latter case, we treat nature as the dynamical and productive whole without abstracting its heterogeneous empirical laws and its diversity in our scientific investigation (*Forschung*).

At first glance, it can be said that Kant, in the third *Critique*, opposes "determinative judgment" to "reflective judgment". In other words, determinative and reflective judgments are presented as mutually exclusive forms of judgment. Guyer reformulates this contrast drawn by Kant himself between determinative and reflective judgments as following: "In any single case of the subsumption of a particular under a universal either the particular or universal must be given, but not both, and thus that either determinant or reflective judgment must be employed to connect the universal and particular, but not both"<sup>3</sup>. However, this contrast is disputable. Commentators argue that determinative and reflective judgments do not stand in an oppositional relation. Kant himself, in the First Introduction, also states that without schematism, no empirical judgment in which both reflection and determination occur would be

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<sup>3</sup> Paul Guyer, "Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity", *Nous*, 14:1 (1990), p. 18.

possible (*CJ*, FI, 212). Moreover, Kant gives a remarkable definition for the act of reflection.

To *reflect* is to hold given presentations up to, and compare them with, either other presentations or one's cognitive power, in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible. The reflective faculty of judgment [*Urteilskraft*] is the one we also call the power of judging [*Beurteilung*]. (*CJ*, FI, 211)

In this cited passage, the act of reflection indicates the act of comparison on the one hand; reflection and hence comparison involve two processes, on the other. In the first case, a given particular is compared with other particulars in order to find common characteristics, that is, to generate a proper concept and, in the latter case, it is not compared with other presentations but merely with our cognitive faculties. Therefore, regarding the cognitive aim of reflective judgment, i.e. to find or to form an appropriate concept for a given empirical particular case, it can be stated that the determinative judgment necessarily requires reflective judgment, or strictly speaking, determinative employment of judgment intersects, in some ratio, with reflective use of judgment. For, the condition which renders determinative judgment, where we already have a universal or empirical concept, possible, is provided by reflective judgment which supplies these concepts. In other words, the assertion that the employment of determinative judgment must intersect with the employment of the act of reflection relies on the idea that since the determinative judgment works with concepts to determine the particular by subsuming it under that concept, the formation of these determinate concepts inevitably compels the act of reflection. Now, we can elaborate on this problematic relation.

## 2.2. The Problematic Relation between Reflective and Determinative Judgments

As we have seen in the previous section, although Kant situates reflective judgment as opposed to determinative judgment, they mirror, indeed, the complementary aspects of the judgment. Then, what is the proper relation between them? When we investigate the first *Critique* on the basis of our main issue here, that is, of the

notions “reflection” and “comparison”, we realize that it is possible to find some clues in the section “Appendix”, titled “the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection”.

Kant, in fact, puts this “Appendix” just at the end of his analysis of “Transcendental Analytic” (*transzendentale analytic*) labeled as “the land of truth” and just before the second division of the first *Critique* titled “Transcendental Dialectic” (*transzendentale dialektik*) called “the land of illusion” (*CPR*, B 295). The reason for such a placing is to connote the idea that if we do not properly posit the relation between receptive capacity of sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and discursive (*diskursiv*) (*CPR*, A 68 B 93) or spontaneous capacity of our cognitive faculty, i.e. the understanding, we fall inevitably into the dogmatic metaphysics’ traps. Accordingly, he indicates the importance of the functions, the positions and the relations of the different faculties with each other (Kant calls this type of “location” of the concepts “transcendental location” (*CPR*, A 269 B 325)). The subtitle of this appendix also gives us a clue about the discussion; we deal with a problem “arising from the confusion of the empirical with the transcendental employment of understanding”. There is no doubt that amphiboly refers to the confusion of the empirical employment of concepts of the understanding with transcendental use of them. In the former case, the understanding employs its concepts to what is given by sensibility, whereas in the second, the understanding does not relate to the sensibility, and as a result, it implies misemployment of the pure concepts.<sup>4</sup> (At this point, I should note that even though Kant himself, in his first *Critique*, warns us that the terms “transcendental” (*transzental*) and “transcendent” (*transzendent*) cannot be used as interchangeable (*CPR*, A 296 B 352), he often uses them as synonymous. To exemplify, in separating “empirical employment of concepts” from “transcendental employment of them”, he seems confused to use “transcendental” instead of “transcendent”. In the same way, according to Kemp Smith, in the term “transcendental dialectic”, transcendental is used as the synonym of “transcendent”.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, transcendental employment of categories should not have to be necessarily illegitimate. Kant, in the section “the Ground of the Distinction of All

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<sup>4</sup> Norman K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: Macmillan, 2003), p.76.

Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena” argues that despite the fact that transcendental employment of the categories, in which they are applied not to the sensibility, does not have any objective validity, such an employment can still be possible (*CPR*, A 239 B 299)). The central question here is formulated by Kant as following: “In which our cognitive faculties are our representations (*Vorstellung*)<sup>5</sup> connected together? Is it the understanding, or is it the senses, by which they are combined or compared?” (*CPR*, A 260 B 316) Kant defines, first of all, “reflection” as an act of comparison in a consciousness referring not to the object itself but to the state of mind (*Gemüt*). For Kant, “all judgments” and “all comparison” “require reflection” (*CPR*, B 317). That is to say, by this kind of “act”, Kant means, “the comparison with the cognitive faculty which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other” (*CPR*, B 317). In this case, we compare the representations not with others but with pure understanding or sensibility in order to decide if it is sensible or intellectual, and Kant calls this comparison “Transcendental Reflection” to separate it from “Logical Reflection” through which we compare representations with each other in order to generate empirical concepts (*CPR*, B 319/B 367). In this relationship between “transcendental reflection” and “logical reflection”, the former provides the basis which renders possible the act of the latter. Hence, transcendental Reflection provides us with the condition under which we can examine whether we employ illegitimately concepts to noumena in which case “dialectical illusion” arises or legitimately to appearances (*Erscheinung*) by means of which knowledge arises. Kant illustrates this misemployment with reference to Leibniz’s amphiboly of intellectualizing appearances (*CPR*, A 272 B 327). In addition, Kant explains, we have some concepts of reflection *prior to judgment itself*,<sup>6</sup> these are “identity-difference”, agreement-

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<sup>5</sup> “Vorstellung” is traditionally translated as “representation”, Norman .K. Smith also translates it as “representation” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. On the other hand, Werner S. Pluhar, in the third *Critique*, prefers “presentation” in order to distinguish it from “darstellung” referring to “presentation” or “exhibition”.

<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, J. Michael Young, trans. and edit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 579.

opposition”, “inner-outer”, and finally “matter-form”. Among these concepts, Kant attributes more importance to the last one, i.e. “matter-form”. According to him, “these two concepts underlie all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with all employment of the understanding” (*CPR*, A 266 B 323). As we will see, by “matter”, he simply means the content of a concept and by “form” he connotes the universality of a concept.<sup>7</sup> To sum up, in terms of the concept “reflection”, in “the Amphiboly”, Kant attempts to prevent misrelating of the faculties, that is, to distinguish the cognitive faculties from each other in a proper way by indicating the condition under which the concepts reflect merely upon appearances, and only by this way they provide the unity whereby which the knowledge of objects of experience is possible, in so far as they are applied to what is given by the sensibility. As an example, pure concepts or intuitions of mathematics which belong not to sensibility but to pure understanding cannot be treated as a sensible intuition. After presenting “Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant explicates, in “the Discipline of Pure Reason”, reason (*Vernunft*) in its dogmatic employment on the basis of “non-empirical intuitions or concepts” of mathematics (*CPR*, A 713 B 741). According to that, when we attempt to employ the concepts of pure mathematics to the sensible intuition in order to determine an object, we inevitably fall into dialectical illusion. The claim that the objects, extended in space and time, are infinitely divisible is the remarkable result of this kind of illusion, which will be the main theme in the “Second Antinomy of Pure Reason” (*CPR*, A 434 B 462). On the other hand, Kant does not give an explanation about the logical reflection in a more detailed way. It is the *Jäsche Logic* in section §6 where Kant develops his view on logical reflection by asserting that reflection is one of the three acts in the process of originating empirical concepts. By virtue of the logical act of understanding, Kant holds, three components, that is, comparison, reflection and abstraction, pave the way for the formation of the concepts.

The logical *actus* of the understanding, through which concepts are generated as to their form, are:

1. *comparison* of representations among one another in relation to the unity of

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 598.

- consciousness;
2. *reflection* as to how various representations can be conceived in one consciousness;
- and finally
3. *abstraction* of everything else in which the given representations differ.

According to him, through reflection, we can compare different representations, then we abstract the form of them from the content, and by this way, we can arrive at the empirical concepts. In addition to that, in the supplementary note to this cited passage, he makes this case clear by giving an example:

To make concepts out of presentations one must thus be able *to compare, to reflect, and to abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g. a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I *reflect* (my emphasis) on what they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.<sup>8</sup>

Now, as we can realize immediately, the process of the formation of an empirical concept is described as, first, comparing particulars and then reflecting on the common characteristic they share and finally abstracting these features from these particulars (the first two acts are labeled as “positive”, whereas the last one – abstracting - as “negative” by Kant)<sup>9</sup>. This reflective act of comparison, which we compare different particulars with each other, rather than comparing them with our cognitive powers, contains also the act of the formation of an empirical concept in a scientific inquiry into nature’s products. Considering the first quotation from the third *Critique* in which Kant defines the act of reflection (*CJ*, FI, 212), i.e. “to reflect”, by referring to two processes, Longuenesse<sup>10</sup> and Allison<sup>11</sup> remarkably

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 592, note 1.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., P. 596.

<sup>10</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Charles T. Wolfe, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 130.

<sup>11</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 23.

argue that the logical reflection signifies the first process where the particular is compared with other given particular cases in order to form an empirical concept, while transcendental reflection presented in the “Amphiboly” implies the similar case with the second process through which particular is compared not with the others but with our cognitive faculties. This is because in the former case the task of the systematicity of nature necessitates the condition under which logical reflection is based on the principle belonging to the reflective judgment<sup>12</sup>, whereas in the latter case transcendental reflection is not guided by such a principle. Expressed otherwise, the act of reflection in general draws a parallel between “logical reflection” which is responsible for the generation of empirical concepts, and “transcendental reflection” which refers to the act of comparison of a presentation with our cognitive faculties, both presented in the “Amphiboly”. In its logical form, as I have attempted to show, reflection involves the act of comparison of different particulars to abstract what is common they share. The crucial point here appears to be the fact that when we correlate this division with the distinction between teleological judgment of reflection and aesthetic judgment of reflection to the extent that while teleological judgment as a cognitive one is strictly related to both processes, aesthetic judgment as a non-cognitive one is related merely to latter process, i.e. the comparison of the given particular with our cognitive faculties. That is to say, since teleological judgment is a cognitive judgment and serves the basis for reflective judgment’s cognitive aim, it is inevitable to connect this type of judgment with the process of the formation of concept, on the one hand, and also with the latter process as regards to the case in which teleological judgment relates the certain kind of particular, i.e. living organisms, to the idea of reason, i.e. the systematicity of nature, on the other hand. However, in the aesthetic judgment, we encounter, in Allison’s language, with “an anomaly”.<sup>13</sup> Aesthetic judgment, unlike teleological one, is a non-cognitive judgment. That means, by employing aesthetic judgment, we do not arrive at a concept, but at a feeling (*Gefühl*), i.e., the feeling of pleasure (*Lust*). And this feeling arises when a given particular is compared with our cognitive faculties, strictly

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<sup>12</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 132.

<sup>13</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 46.

speaking, with the imagination and the understanding in their free harmony (*Harmonie*) with each other by means of which the feeling of pleasure is produced. For these reasons, Longuenesse also separates the “*aesthetic comparison*” from the logical comparison of reflection by claiming that in the former case “the effort of the activity of judgment to form concepts *fails*”.<sup>14</sup>

At this juncture, as regards to these three acts of the formation of a concept, i.e., comparison, reflection and abstraction, introduced in his *Logic*, it should also be held that they are not, indeed, three separate acts of reflection, on the contrary, they are three complementary aspects of the same act. As Longuenesse holds it, “the chronology” of this three-fold act is problematic. “The comparison... is not temporally prior to reflection and abstraction... Reflection and abstraction are not operations that follow comparison and are dependent on it, rather, each depends on the others and all proceed simultaneously”.<sup>15</sup> It is possible to think this case with direct reference to the three-fold synthesis explicated in A Edition of the “Transcendental Deduction” (*transzendentale deduktion*) in the first *Critique*. Just as, there, synthesis of apprehension, synthesis of reproduction and that of recognition cannot be comprehended as three distinct acts of syntheses, so , here, these three aspects cannot be grasped as temporally successive actions.

Finally, in order both to conceive the inner structure of logical reflection and to underline the difference between empirical and pure concepts, we should return to the distinction emphasized just above in referring to the passage in the *Jäsche Logic*. Accordingly, Kant makes a distinction between “the matter of concept” and “the form of concept”<sup>16</sup> by explaining that the matter of concepts refers to “the object”, while the form of concept to “universality”. That means, “a pure concept is one that is not abstract from experience but arises rather from the understanding, even as to content”.<sup>17</sup> An empirical concept, on the other hand, Kant continues, “arises from the senses through comparison of objects of experience and attains through the

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<sup>14</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 164-165.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 589-592.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 590.

understanding merely the form of universality”<sup>18</sup>, that is, through the comparison of what are given by pure forms of intuition. In such a case, while the matter of concept provides the content, the form of concept paves the way for raising its “universality”. Considering this distinction, Allison notes that the origin of concepts to be empirical or to be pure depends on the origin of its matter, i.e. the content. Otherwise stated, the concepts differ with reference to the matter (i.e. content) in such a way that if content is directly acquired from the experience, it is empirical, whereas if the content is postulated as *a priori*, it is pure concept of the understanding. Nevertheless, in both cases, all concepts (pure or empirical) “share the same *form*, universality”.<sup>19</sup> To sum up, it is due to the very nature of determinative judgment, namely, to determine the particular by subsuming it under the concept, then the paths followed by both determinative judgment and reflective judgment in which we are directed to find or to form an empirical concept are crossed. For this reason, in both Longuenesse’s and Allison’s accounts, reflective judgment is related necessarily to the logical reflection.

On the other hand, Longuenesse does not stop at this level. According to her, the difference between the formation of a concept and the application of it is narrower than traditional interpretations hold. In her account, “the application of the categories is inseparable from a thought process that has a reflective aspect”.<sup>20</sup> Longuenesse, under the title in her book “The Unity of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*”, declares that until the third *Critique*, it is commonly thought that Kant focuses merely on determinative form of judgment in his first *Critique*, and it is just by third *Critique* that Kant elaborates on the reflective form of judgment. For her, from this misguided point of view, some commentators conclude wrongly that these two *Critiques* as regards to different forms of judgment are opposed to each other. Yet, she argues that, Kant has already dealt with the notion “reflection” with reference to the act of the constitution of determinative judgment in the first *Critique*. Reflection plays its own role in determinative judgment as a necessary

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., P. 589.

<sup>19</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 18.

<sup>20</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 164.

component in the formation of concepts whereby determinative judgment operates. She radically states that not only empirical concepts in determinative judgments but also categories as pure concepts are not “innate”, but the products of a certain type of reflective activity. Hence, her distinct argument underlies the problem of the formation or the origin of concepts and categories. Accordingly, the pure concepts of the understanding exercise at two stages: First, it operates “pre-reflectively”, “as the logical functions of judgment guiding the sensible syntheses of the imagination”, which refers to “figurative synthesis” (*CPR*, B 151), at this level, they are being undetermined by concepts yet, that is, “the categories are not reflected as concepts and second, “post-reflectively” as concepts under which objects are subsumed in objectively valid judgments of experience”<sup>21</sup>. For Longuenesse, until categories “are applied as *schemata*, as rules of sensible synthesis”<sup>22</sup>, they are not actually “full-fledged concepts” or “clear concepts”.<sup>23</sup> This is why Longuenesse claims that “the application of the categories is inseparable from a thought process that has a reflective aspect”. She explains that “every judgment on empirical objects is reflective” before being determinative, as “empirical judgments are first formed not by application of the categories”, “but by reflection of empirical given”.

### 2.2.1. Further Remarks on the Issue

In spite of Longuenesse’s and Allison’s theses that we should regard reflective judgment as related strictly to the logical reflection, some other commentators approach to the issue from a different perspective. Accordingly, the relation between reflective judgment and the logical reflection is not constructed in such a strict way. Gibbons expresses that no determinative judgments are possible “without reflective judgment supplying empirical concepts”.<sup>24</sup> Besides, in the reflective judgment, the

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<sup>21</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 244.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>24</sup> Sarah Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgment and Experience*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 82.

act of reflecting, in exactly the same way with logical reflection, “on particulars in searching for a universal involves comparing them in order to find features they possess in common”. However, for her, this type of reflection is not equated with the logical reflection, since the logical reflection “is insufficient itself to guarantee that anything in nature will conform to our reflection, so it does not ensure that we can in fact apply our concepts to the world”.<sup>25</sup> For this reason, Kant makes a “further assumption” “about the suitability of nature to our cognitive faculties in order to guide judgment”. In these explanations, we can notice that reflective judgment and its principle serves as a basis for the formation of the concepts in the logical reflection.

This is one side of the composition. There exists another side, though. Reflective judgment approaches nature from a special perspective to the extent that nature is, in this perspective, dealt with its diversity and multiplicity (*Vielheit*) of its products and of the particular empirical laws in the specific scientific investigations. In fact, this is why Kant ascribes judgment to this task instead of the understanding. In such a structure, as Nuzzo puts it, “judgment’s peculiar type of relation to law” is treated as “searching for laws”, and hence what we are looking for is, indeed, for this empirical rule or law of nature. That is to say, an empirical concept for which we are searching implies the rule or the law required by “*specific given case*”.<sup>26</sup> By the same token, Guyer underlines this fact by explaining that in the case of nature as “a systematically organized or interconnected body of empirical laws or concepts”, the systematicity of empirical laws and that of empirical concepts “share the same logical form”.<sup>27</sup> In other words, in “the classificatory systematicity of nature”, empirical concepts are treated as rules or laws.<sup>28</sup> As we will see, by systematicity, Kant means the logical system under which genera and species stand in the special type of mutual relations.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>26</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2005), p. 167.

<sup>27</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 38.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

Furthermore, Makkreel explicitly rejects Longuenesse's thesis that even in the case of the application of the categories, we need first the reflective judgments. On Makkreel's account, in such an assertion, Longuenesse confuses the general notion "reflection" with the reflective judgment.<sup>29</sup> Kant does not regard reflection as "the condition for the application of the categories". Since categories are a priori and formal, there is no need for "special reflective or technical skill" in order to apply them to the experience.<sup>30</sup> In a similar way, even though Allison follows Longuenesse in the context of the empirical concepts, he thinks that by connecting the origin of the categories to the reflection, she loses her legitimacy and takes a radical position.<sup>31</sup> In addition to that, Allison and Longuenesse conflict with each other in some other details. First of all, Longuenesse, in her article "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgment of Taste: On Henry Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*"<sup>32</sup> attempts to reply Allison's arguments. She, in her book, in order to separate aesthetic reflective judgment from other types of the act of reflection, emphasized "the merely reflective" character of aesthetic judgment by expressing that in merely reflective judgments "the effort of the activity of judgment to form concepts *fails*. And it fails because it *cannot succeed*".<sup>33</sup> And Allison criticized this view: "I am here only in partial agreement with Longuenesse. I agree with her basic thesis that aesthetic judgments are merely reflective and that 'merely reflective' means non-determinative...I also think it somewhat misleading to characterize, as she does, aesthetic reflective judgments as instances of 'reflection failing to reach

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<sup>29</sup> Rudolf Makkreel, "Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and Aesthetic Exemplarity", *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Rebecca Kukla, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 224.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>31</sup> Henry E. Allison, "Where Have All Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction", *Nous* 43:1 (2000), p. 73. See also for discussions, Beatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's Categories and the Capacity to Judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick", *Nous* 43:1 (2000), pp. 91-110, and Sally Sedgwick, "Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge", *Nous* 43:1 (2000), pp. 81-90.

<sup>32</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgment of Taste: On Henry Allison's Kant's Theory of Taste", *Nous* 46:2 (2003), pp. 143-163.

<sup>33</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 165.

determination under a concept'. The suggestion of a failure is out of place here, since the free play of the faculties in such reflection does not aim at such determination, and where there is no aim there can be no failure".<sup>34</sup> Allison in his analysis and his objection seems reasonable. Kant, in determining the specific frame of the aesthetic judgment, explicitly declares that "but when we 'merely reflect' on a perception, we are not dealing with a determinate concept, but are dealing only with the general rule for reflecting on a perception for the sake of understanding, as a power of concepts" (*CJ*, FI, 221). On the other hand, when we think the fact that aesthetic judgment of reflection is the certain type of variant of the general theory of reflective judgment which's aim to arrive at an empirical concept, the more correct word to indicate "merely reflective" character of aesthetic judgment might be "short" instead of "to fail": "cognitive process stops *short*", which is preferred by Hughes<sup>35</sup> and Nuzzo<sup>36</sup>.

However, Longuenesse keeps defending her own position by affirming that "all reflection is geared toward concept formation", this is "whole effort of reflection is about". According to her, when this goal of the judgment fails, this causes "something very important about judging itself: its goal is self-set, heautonomous, and when it fails there may remain... the sheer pleasure of judging itself: the pleasure of bringing imagination and understanding into a common fruitful play. The failure is thus a welcome failure." Finally, she stresses the relation between the principle of purposiveness and aesthetic judgment to the extent that aesthetic judgment rests also on the principle of purposiveness which has already an aim in investigating nature to create a proper concept for a given instance.<sup>37</sup> As a reply to her arguments, Allison publishes an article, where he reconsiders Longuenesse's revised statement "aesthetic judgment starts where the search for concepts collapses". Allison states his worry about the ambiguity of this statement. According

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<sup>34</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, pp. 353-354, note 2.

<sup>35</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 154.

<sup>36</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, p. 187.

<sup>37</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgment of Taste: On Henry Allison's Kant's Theory of Taste", *Nous* 46:2 (2003), p. 147.

to that, it must be first cleared that by stating this whether she means that the cognition referring to “the subsumption of an object under concepts” fails “to yield an appreciation of that object’s aesthetic value” or that “aesthetic reflection can begin only after a failed attempt at cognition.” On Allison’s account, while the first alternative is “obviously” true, the second one which, indeed, indicates Longuenesse’s view, for him, is very problematic.<sup>38</sup> In the next step, Allison approaches the issue from an unusual point of view. Accordingly, in aesthetic reflection, the search for a concept does not have to collapse. “I can perfectly well subsume an aesthetic object under a variety of concepts, e.g. as a painting in the Baroque style, as a portrait of a Hapsburg monarch etc. The point is only that no such subsumption is sufficient to appreciate its aesthetic qualities”.<sup>39</sup> Further, he also does not accept Longuenesse’s thesis expressing that the main motivation behind the act of reflection even in the aesthetic experience is to pursue a cognitive aim. For, when Kant characterizes aesthetic attitude as disinterested and when he takes the free play harmony of the cognitive faculties as a starting point for aesthetic judgment, he, at the beginning, takes his own position against any attempt which renders aesthetic reflection cognitive. Besides, Allison does not want to stop without answering her argument about the relation between aesthetic appreciation and the principle purposiveness. His answer is the simplest one: There is no such a strict relation between them in order to ascribe any cognitive aim to aesthetic judgment of reflection.

### **2.3. The Structure of Kant’s Exposition of the Introductions**

Kant wrote two introductions to *Critique of Judgment*, since he thought that the First Introduction was “disproportionately long for the text”. On the other hand, he also considered that it contains “a number of things that serve to render one’s insight into

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<sup>38</sup> Henry E. Allison, “Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg”, *Nous* 46:2 (2003), p. 182.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

the concept of a purposiveness in nature more complete".<sup>40</sup> The First Introduction was not published until the *Akademie* edition in 1902. For this reason, in the relevant literature, the Second Introduction is also called "the Published Introduction". Furthermore, these Introductions are unique, namely that, they have their own peculiarities, in the sense that they do not function as introductions. They, indeed, look like the independent chapters of the *Critique*. Or, as Nuzzo puts it, they seem conclusion rather than introductions.<sup>41</sup> However, these structures of the Introductions give rise to the confusion and make much more difficult to systematize Kant's arguments in a proper way. I suppose, we can classify the sources of this type of confusion as follows: On the one hand, Kant presents and discusses some subjects or themes in both Introductions without giving further explanations in the main body of the *Critique*. He, to exemplify, deals with the theory of reflective judgment, its relation to the determinative judgment and the principles merely in these Introductions. Most importantly, as we will see, he also serves different and sometimes incompatible strategies about the same issues in the Introductions. On the other hand, he presents and annotates some subjects in solely one of the Introductions. For example, the theme "the transition from the principle of reflective judgment to the aesthetic judgment of reflection" is discussed under the specific title, where he serves a very problematic explanation in the Second Introduction but not in the First Introduction. Conversely, he handles his theory of reflective judgment under the specific title only in the First Introduction. To sum up, the obscurity of the arguments and the unorganized structures of both Introductions are responsible for the confusions. In some cases, which are not less than in some helpful cases, they stand in front of the reader not as explanatory or introductory components but as obstacles to be challenged.

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<sup>40</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, Arnulf Zweig, trans. and ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 446.

<sup>41</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, p. 88.

## **2.4. The Principle of Purposiveness, the Principle of Systematicity and Nature: The Need for Reflective Judgment**

In the previous section, I have attempted to present Kant's distinction between two different types of judgment introduced in the third *Critique* for the first time. As we have seen, in our systematic investigation of nature, or strictly speaking, in our scientific inquiry into nature's particular empirical laws, what is required is a different kind of employment of the faculty of judgment, i.e. reflective judgment, rather than determinative use of judgment. In employing reflective judgment, we have merely a particular in this scientific discovery, and we are searching for a concept that contains the particular empirical law or rule for this particular case in the systematicity of nature. By this way, the particular is classified in its connection or relation with other particular empirical concepts or laws. Moreover, regarding the aim of arriving at a proper concept, that is, the cognitive aim, reflective judgment relates inevitably to the logical reflection through which empirical concepts are generated. Thus, by means of these concepts under which the particulars are subsumed, determinative judgment operates. In this manner, reflective judgment leads to determinative judgment.

The reason why we need such a new type of judgment, Kant explains, is the idea that since there is a large diversity of forms of nature -nature is so "infinitely diverse" that it is "beyond our ability to grasp it" (*CJ*, 185)-, the universal laws or principles imposed by the understanding a priori cannot encompass these particular forms of nature, that is, the empirical variety belonging to nature. In such a manner, we are in need of different kind of employment of judgment, rather than determinative and also need of judgment's own principle to be guided in order to provide "the unity of what is diverse (the unity of all empirical principles), even though we do not know or cognize this principle (*CJ*, 180). Under these conditions, there indispensably appears a distinction between what Kant calls "the formal laws" referring to the universal laws of nature legislated by the understanding and "the particular empirical laws" which are "boundlessly diverse". Here, in his complex notifications, Kant underlines two cases: The first one is that the understanding through its universal laws is not able to grasp the particularity of special empirical laws. For this reason, according to

the second one, the understanding cannot conceive these contingent particular laws of nature as a systematic unity. In order to achieve its own aim to systematize nature, the understanding should be directed by the idea of systematicity.

In order to illustrate what Kant means by this explanation, we could elaborate on the process of employment of the universal law of causality (In the Second Introduction, Kant also mentions the law of causality as an example *CJ*, 183). To put it briefly, in his first *Critique*, under the section “Second Analogy”, Kant deals with the principle of causality as the transcendental principle of the understanding (*CPR*, A 148). By “analogy of experience”, he simply means the condition under which the presentation of a necessary connection of intuitions renders experience as a unity possible (*CPR*, B 218). In such a case, what is determined is the temporal succession of presentations. That means that this analogy provides us with the rule for the synthesis of manifold in time given by the receptive capacity, i.e. the sensibility. According to this transcendental principle, whenever we perceive that two events occur successively in experience, we cognize and judge that there is a causal relation between them by applying our concept of causality to these presentations (we judge determinatively in such a way for all conditions, as before our act of judging, we already have a universal concept of causality for any particular presentations). Hence, the understanding determines nature by employing its schematized concepts, i.e. concepts as the predicates of determinative judgments (the employment of concepts is equal to judge in its determinative form (*CPR*, B 93). By this way, the understanding imposes its universal laws to nature in order to constitute it and becomes the lawgiver of nature (*CPR*, A 127). The universal laws of understanding turn out to be the laws, i.e. formal laws, of nature. Nature, in such a case, is presented merely as “a concept” or “an object of possible experience”, namely that, it is reduced solely to the object of our theoretical cognition. In this cognitive process, it is clear that the understanding applies its formal principles and laws by generalizing them, that is, by abstracting particular cases. It determines nature or objects “mechanically” and treats all appearances as homogeneous manifolds. In other words, the law of causality imposed by understanding to the nature is the “formal law”, it expresses the general condition that “every event has a cause”. Yet, this

formal law is not enough to grasp the particular causalities in nature in their heterogeneities (*CJ*, 186). In arguing “objective purposiveness of teleological judgment”, Kant calls the universal law of causality “blind mechanism” (*CJ*, 361). For him, in nature there is “an infinite diversity of additional ways” through which natural products organize themselves (*CJ*, 184). For this reason, the universal law of causality is not able to grasp the particular empirical causal laws and, as a result, the understanding in its employment of these transcendental laws remains the particular cases as undetermined. Kant, in the first *Critique*, in B edition of “Transcendental Deduction”, mentions, indeed, this distinction between the universal formal laws of the understanding and “special laws”, i.e. empirical laws, although these empirical laws are subject to the categories, they “cannot in their specific character be derived from the categories” (*CPR*, B 165). Now, Kant seems to assign reflective judgment to achieve this special task which is required in “the discovery (*Entdeckung*) or establishment of systematic order among the concepts and laws which constitute our empirical knowledge of nature”.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, Kant also emphasizes the fact that this task is still related to the need of the understanding (*CJ*, 184). In these lights, all these arguments indicate the fact that while Kant’s “Copernican turn”, by means of which the understanding becomes the lawgiver to nature, leads him to construct experience through *a priori* laws of the understanding, it is incapable of fully determining nature’s particular cases. These laws are too abstract to provide us with the full explanation of natural particular phenomena.

Therefore, according to this composition, we are introduced with a new side of nature in its own fertility and heterogeneity<sup>43</sup>, which was unexamined till the third *Critique*. And in “nature” as such, reflective judgment must be employed to obtain the unity without abstracting variety of particular forms and hence without missing

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<sup>42</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p.36.

<sup>43</sup> Here, I would like to note that Kant seems to give different attributes to these notions, i.e. heterogeneity and homogeneity, in his first and third *Critiques*. In *Critique of Pure Reason*, by “heterogeneity”, he means that the things are different in kind (for instance, the law of causality is different from freedom as a causality of reason “in kind”, whereas in third *Critique*, considering his arguments, in nature “heterogeneity” refers to “differing in degree”, not “in kind”).

the diversity of the particular empirical laws which are left as undetermined by the understanding, since the universal formal laws, without which nature in general cannot be thought or cognized, are not able to cover all the manifolds, i.e. heterogeneity of nature. It should be noted that in the system constructed in the first *Critique*, it is dealt with “nature in general” and with the particular type of “cognition”, i.e. theoretical cognition, in the third *Critique* the focus is directed to “specific empirical cognition” and to the particular cases of nature. The notion “nature in general” signifies “the concept of nature” through which it is not possible to systematize the particular empirical laws of nature. On the other hand, reflective judgment operates to capture the particularity of nature, which means, it performs in such a nature that every distinct empirical case can be considered as belonging to “the one system” (CJ, FI, 217). “Nature in general” or “experience in its formal conditions” pictured in the first *Critique* is able to be legislated by the universal laws of understanding, whereas nature in its productivity presented in the third *Critique* “is free from all restrictions (imposed) by our legislative cognitive power” (CJ, FI, 211). Allison significantly mentions that while in the first *Critique* Kant assigns the understanding to provide the unity of experience in its transcendental laws without which “transcendental chaos” appears, in the third *Critique* he assigns judgment to obtain both the way and basis for the unity of nature in its empirical laws without which “empirical chaos” arises.<sup>44</sup>

In fact, all these arguments emphasize the need for the systematic unity of nature with its particular special laws which might be regarded as “contingent” from the perspective of the universal laws of the understanding. Nevertheless, in this contingency, we still perceive some regularities, that is, an order, which render the systematic classification (*Klassifikation*) of nature possible. Otherwise expressed, the particular empirical laws still contain “a law-governed unity” (CJ, 183). Without the concept of systematicity, that is, the systematic unity of all empirical laws or rules in nature as a dynamical (*dynamisch*) whole, we do not have “any hope of finding our way in the labyrinth resulting from the diversity of possible particular laws” (CJ, FI, 214). Hence, reflective judgment in its employment to fulfill its aim to provide the

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<sup>44</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 38.

ground for the unity of these particular laws by classifying them under genera and species in investigating nature must have and be guided by its own principle(s) merely for its own use, namely, “for the sake of unifying empirical laws, so that it can always ascend from what is empirical and particular to what is more general”, (that is, universal) “even if also empirical” (*CJ*, FI, 211).

Consequently, Kant affirms that the function of reflective judgment to arrive at an empirical concept, that is, at an empirical rule or law, for a given particular necessitates the principle, which cannot be derived from experience (*CJ*, FI, 203). That means, the concept which is the product of the act of reflection is empirical, whereas the principle(s) guiding reflective judgment and this comparative act of reflection is not empirical. The central question is formulated by Kant as following: “How could we hope that comparing perceptions would allow us to arrive at empirical concepts of what different natural forms have in common, if nature, because of the great variety in its empirical laws, had made these forms exceedingly heterogeneous, so heterogeneous that comparing them would be futile?” (*CJ*, FI, 213). The answer is the presupposition “the principle of purposiveness of nature” and/or the principle of systematicity in our observing and investigating nature. We presuppose them in the sense that nature is so arranged that it must conform to our power of reflective judgment. In other words, we presume that *as if* nature was purposive for our cognitive powers. As Zuckert points out, we can conceive properly this assumption by analogy with Kant’s reconciliation freedom as a causality of reason with the universal laws of the understanding. Accordingly, when we search for the systematicity in nature, we regard nature *as if* it is purposive; just as we should regard ourselves in nature *as if* we are free.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, we should bear in mind the fact that even though, in the latter case, reason has its own legislative role on the basis of the determination of the free will in the practical realm, in the former case judgment does not have any legislative function in both theoretical and practical realm. To sum up, the principle of purposiveness of nature finds its own roots merely in reflective judgment. Kant calls this principle “formal

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<sup>45</sup> Rachel Zuckert, “The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant’s Aesthetic Formalism”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 44:4 (2006), p. 606.

purposiveness” (*CJ*, 182) (In the “First Introduction”, he calls this principle also “logical purposiveness” *CJ*, FI, 217).

Judgment’s principle concerning the form that things of nature have in terms of empirical laws in general is the *purposeness of nature* in its diversity. In other words, through this concept we present nature as if an understanding contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws. Hence the purposiveness of nature is a special *a priori* concept that has its origin solely in reflective judgment.

These arguments expressing the diversity of nature and the systematicity, i.e. the systematic unity of empirical particular laws, are the first justification articulated in both introductions in order to make a room for the principle of reflective judgment. The second justification for judgment to have a principle is presented only in the “First Introduction”, in Section II: Just as the understanding and reason as higher cognitive faculties have their own *a priori* principles to fulfill their own tasks, so it is logically expected that judgment as a higher and “very special” (*CJ*, FI, 202) cognitive faculty should have its own *a priori* principle. (It is also remarkable that in comparing cognitive faculties with each other, in the Preface, Kant describes judgment and reason as the competitors of the understanding *CJ*, 168) However, differently from these competitor faculties, reflective judgment has its own transcendental principle to give a law *not* to nature but to *itself*, this type of self-legislation is called “Heautonomy” (*Heautonomie*) in order to separate it from “Autonomy” (*Autonomie*) (*CJ*, 180, 186) which refers to “the objective validity” of a legislation. He enunciates that reflective judgment which is subjectively valid “legislates neither to nature nor to freedom, but merely to itself” (*CJ*, FI, 225, 234). Therefore, despite having its own principle, the faculty of judgment is not a lawgiver to the nature. It is clear that this is because, firstly, it does not have a determinative function anything in nature. Most importantly, its determinative function is merely operational on “the feeling of pleasure” in judging subjects regarding aesthetic judgment of reflection<sup>46</sup> (*CJ*, 197, FI, 223), in this case, it is treated as “constitutive principle” instead of solely “regulative” by Kant (*CJ*, 195). Secondly, in relation to the first; it does not have its own “domain” (*CJ*, 174), apart from nature in which

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<sup>46</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 550.

solely the understanding has its own constitutive legislation. According to Hughes, because of the heautonomous structure of the principle of purposiveness, it is a relational principle in the sense that it refers both to the relation of the objects with each other and to “our reflective capacity to the world within which we find ourselves.<sup>47</sup> In this manner, we, as judging subjects, have a new way of relating to nature in which our understanding do not impose a priori laws to nature in order to construct the knowledge of it, but in aesthetic experience we realize the purposiveness of nature’s products through the free harmony of our cognitive faculties. Further, as Allison rightly puts it, judgment’s heautonomous character signifies “purely reflexive” and “self-referential nature of this principle” which means that it is “both *source* and *referent* of its own normativity”.<sup>48</sup> These conditions, as a result, are responsible for the necessary conclusion that a priori principles of reflective judgments differ entirely from a priori principles of the understanding to the extent that the understanding prescribes its own laws directly to the nature and determines it. Yet, as we will see, though this difference between the principles of judgment and those of the understanding, in other words, although a priori principles of judgment legislate merely judgment itself, rather than the nature, aesthetic judgment of reflection still has a special type of validity; subjective validity in virtue of the determination of our feeling of pleasure.

Considering these arguments, it can be also noted that Kant seems to put the notion “unity” into a hierarchical relation: while theoretical objective judgment determinates its objects in accordance with the universal laws of nature supplied by the understanding in order to give “formal” unity to experience, reason, in cooperation with the understanding, attempts to provide a “higher” unity through reflective judgment’s capability of grasping the diversity of all the particular empirical laws in accordance with its own principle. Because of this capacity of reflective judgment to yield a higher unity, judgment, unlike the understanding, has a special ability to render possible the condition for connecting or relating particular empirical laws with

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<sup>47</sup> Fiona Hughes, “On Aesthetic Judgment and our Relation to Nature: Kant’s Concept of Purposiveness”, *Nous*, 49:6 (2006), p. 548.

<sup>48</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 41.

each other in a systematic way through its own principle which is merely a presumption. The system constructed in the first *Critique* accomplished its own task by providing this formal systematic unity of experience. Now, through the third *Critique*, transcendental philosophy has a new task to complete the system as a whole. In order to achieve this task, i.e. to grasp nature as one system and in order to provide “the coherent experience” (*CJ*, 196), according to Kant, reflective judgment must be guided by its principles, as transcendental presupposition, in order to “subordinate empirical principles to one another in a systematic way” (*CJ*, FI, 204). Without such principles, it might not be possible to provide the systematicity of nature in its heterogeneity.

In this way, judgment gains its own status as a separated and “very special cognitive faculty” through its unique principle and this principle’s unique task, i.e. the unity of empirical laws or the coherent experience. Under the light of these explanations, when we look at the general structure of Kant’s arguments, it can be noticed that, in introducing this new principle, Kant opposes transcendental laws of nature in general to the diversity of empirical laws of nature, just as he replaces reflective judgment as opposed to determinative judgment which operates under the legislation of the understanding *mechanically*. Here, the problem seems to be presented as the tension between these two different types of laws, i.e. the universal transcendental laws and particular empirical laws, by him. This tension also implies the stress between cognitive unity of nature in general and the cognitive, but non-determinative, namely, solely assumptive unity of nature in its heterogeneity. The latter tension implied by the former carries us necessarily to the tension between what Kant calls “the aggregate” (*Aggregat*) (*CJ*, 209) and “the system” (*die systeme*) (*CJ*, FI, 207) in experience. It is also conspicuous that Kant, in both introductions, that is, in the “First Introduction” and the “Second Introduction”, insistently emphasizes the “generality” of mechanical laws of nature, while he describes empirical laws of nature as “particulars”. Thus, another tension appears between “the general” which is determined and cognized by the understanding and “the particular” traced by the power of judgment.

To sum up, regarding the arguments about the distinction between reflective-determinative judgments, we should notice that in our systematic investigation of nature, we reflect upon a given empirical particular, and this act signifies also the process of comparison of an individual's form or concept with other forms or concepts of particulars in order to reach a more general concept of it, i.e. in order to systematize these particular empirical cases by classifying, and hence, by subsuming the former under the latter. In order for doing this, we, first, are guided by the principle of purposiveness of nature. At this juncture, we come to the problematic margin between aesthetical and teleological judgments of reflection. At this point, we must refer again to the quotation I have already served in the previous section:

In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determinative*, power of judgment. To *reflect* (or consider) is to hold given presentations up to, and compare them with, either other presentations or one's cognitive faculty, in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible. The reflective faculty of judgment [*Urteilskraft*] is the one we also call the power of judging. (*CJ*, FI, 212)

The importance of this passage lies on its complex and intensive content. Unfortunately, after introducing these two distinct acts of comparison, Kant will not give any further analysis about it during the third *Critique*. As I have mentioned the previous section, in the former case, through the comparison of a given particular with others, the empirical concept is formed for that particular. In guiding of this employment of comparison, teleological judgment of reflection functions its own regulative role. In our investigation of nature, when we discover a new kind of natural form, in our reflective judging, first, we compare this particular form with other empirical forms in order to acquire an appropriate empirical concept under which the particular will be subsumed and be classified. Here, what is the case is “the discovery” of possible empirical laws, i.e. possible empirical concepts (*CJ*, 184). Kant mentions the name of Linnaeus in order to exemplify this case (*CJ*, FI, 427). Linnaeus, Swedish botanist (1707-1778), who explored nature for furnishing the systematic classification in botanic and biology, classified and served a systematic

taxonomy by comparing forms of herbs and plants. Linnaeus, in his *Systema Naturea* (1753), attempts to classify the variety of plants by comparing their morphologies and inner structures. He gives binomial (nomenclature) names to every species to classify them under the genus (*Gattung*).<sup>49</sup> Kant, in his *Anthropology*, labels Linnaeus' studies as “the classification of a system”.<sup>50</sup> The notion “the system”, here, can be read also as “the logical system of nature” as regards the classification of nature under genera and species. By this way, he achieved to order them from the species to the genus. The concept of natural purpose, in such a case, “provides the guide for investigations of living organism rather than being derived from those investigations”.<sup>51</sup> As Kant himself puts it, the observation (*Beobachtung*) can confirm the principle, rather than teaching us the principle itself (CJ, 186). On his account, Linnaeus could not classify nature in such a systematic way without the appropriateness, or the suitability, i.e. purposiveness, of nature to our power of judgment. What guides us in ordering nature's products systematically is the transcendental but indeterminate concept of purposiveness and the idea of systematicity. Steigerwald rightly holds that in the case of natural products' purposes, we notice the objective purposiveness of nature only through reflective judgment, as “it moves between an encounter with these unique natural products and their possible conceptualization”<sup>52</sup>. Therefore, it can be stated that this principle of purposiveness of nature precedes our judging in terms of comparison and hence, cognition (CJ, FI, 213).

The logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given universal concept (here the concept of nature as such); we make this division by thinking, in terms of a certain principle, the particular (here the empirical) in its diversity

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<sup>49</sup> Jean Marc Doruin, “From Linnaeus to Darwin: Naturalists and Travellers”, *A History of Scientific Thought, Elements of a History of Science*, M. Serres, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 401-409.

<sup>50</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Victor L. Dowdell trans., Hans H Rudrick ed. (Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), p. 75.

<sup>51</sup> Joan Steigerwald, “Natural Purposes and the Reflecting Power of Judgment: The Problem of the Organism in Kant's Critical Philosophy”, *European Romantic Review*, 21:3 (2010), p. 293.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 294.

as contained under the universal. In order to do this we must, if we proceed empirically and ascend from the particular to universal, *classify* the diverse; i.e., compare several classes, each falling under a definite concept; and when these classes are completely enumerated in terms of their common characteristic, we must subsume them under higher classes (*genera*), until we reach the concept containing the principle of the entire classification (and constituting the highest genus). (*CJ*, F1, 215)

However, the case turns out to be more complicated with respect to aesthetic judgment of reflection. This kind comparison of forms of the objects with each other, according to Kant, leads also to the harmony of cognitive powers, i.e., of the imagination and the understanding in an objective way, through which cognition arises in terms of the schematism of determinative judgment. Yet, it is quite clear that this act of comparison in reflective judgment is only operative in order for systematizing or ordering natural products as nature's purposes, not for aesthetic experience. In aesthetic reflective judgment, the harmony is free, namely, free from any determination of the laws or principles of the understanding. In this manner, such a free harmony is merely subjective and reflective, rather than determinative as regards its object. For this reason, Kant treats this type of free harmony as subjective condition for "cognition in general" (*Erkenntnis überhaupt*). As a result, empirical presentation is compared not with other presentations but with our cognitive faculties (*CJ*, 219), which refers to the latter act of the comparison in the quoted passage. This is mainly because, in its aesthetic employment, reflective judgment never arrives at an empirical concept or orders these concepts. Kant repeatedly underlines this "special" or "different" case of judgment of taste. "What is strange and different about a judgment of taste is this: that what is to be connected with the presentation of the object is not an empirical concept but a feeling of pleasure" (*CJ*, 191). In such a case, the principle connotes the "subjective" principle of aesthetic judgment, whereas in its teleological employment, it is called "objective" or "real" purposiveness (*CJ*, 193). The frame will be, indeed, crystallized in focusing on another crucial difference between these two different types of reflective judgment: An aesthetic judgment relates solely to the empirical intuitions of the object, whereas a teleological judgment necessitates a concept, but an indeterminate one, of the object as the cause

or purpose of this object and also a concept of the understanding. Under the light of these explanations, it can be noted that the functions of the principle of purposiveness differ in accordance with these varied functions of reflective judgment. Most importantly, the main division of the third *Critique* is based on these distinct types of reflective judgment and their principles.

Unfortunately, the picture drawn by Kant himself is not as clear as it appears at first sight. We encounter necessarily with some difficulties. First of all, although Kant himself asserts that “the principle of purposiveness of *nature* is the principle of *judgment*” (my emphasis), he does not explicate how the relation between the principle of purposiveness of *nature* and the principle of purposiveness of *judgment* itself can be constructed in a proper way. He just affirms that nature itself represents the systematicity in its empirical laws, hence, in order to grasp this unity, or to form coherent experience, nature should have such a principle according to which it conforms to our power of judgment (*CJ*, 202). Hughes plausibly argues that this relation can comprehensibly be established whereby the claim that these two phrases refer, in fact, to the one and the same idea: “a formal purposiveness of nature *for judgment*”.<sup>53</sup> In the “First Introduction”, Kant expresses that “these principles” (that is, objective purposiveness of teleological judgment and subjective purposiveness of aesthetic judgment) contain the concept of formal purposiveness of nature *for judgment*” (my emphasis) (*CJ*, FI, 232). At this point, it is possible to make an analogy between this case and Kant’s equation of the universal laws of *nature* with those of *the understanding* formulated in his first *Critique*. Accordingly, just as nature can be knowable insofar as it conforms to the structure of the understanding as regards the doctrine of “Transcendental Analytic”, so, here, nature with respect not to its universal, or formal, laws, but to its particular laws conforms to our judgment. We can also read Kant’s treatment of “purposiveness of nature” as “appropriateness of nature” to our judgment from this perspective in that appropriateness implies the conformity of nature to our cognitive faculties. We will return to this topic when we discuss “subjective formal purposiveness” of the aesthetic object in the next chapter.

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<sup>53</sup> Fiona Hughes, “On Aesthetic Judgment and our Relation to Nature: Kant’s Concept of Purposiveness”, p. 551.

However, the crucial difference in this parallelism should not be overlooked in the respect that while the understanding constitutes nature by imposing its own principles and laws (and in this way, the universal laws of nature becomes the universal laws of the understanding), judgment's principles solely have presumptive status, that is to say, they are regulative principles, not constitutive.

Secondly, (as I have attempted to insinuate during this section), as Kant interchangeably uses the notions “the principle of purposiveness” and “the principle of systematicity”, the reader also becomes confused about the relation between them. Kant, indeed, employs the notions “empirical laws”, “empirical rules” or “empirical concepts” interchangeably as well. The main rationale behind such a usage, in this case, relies on the fact that empirical concepts refer to genus and species as classes and they stand in a certain type of relation with each other in virtue of their particular laws in our systematic classification of nature which is the hierarchical organisation. On the other hand, in the former case, the relation is remained as unexplained by Kant. As we have seen, reflective judgment proceeds in accordance with two presumptions in our investigation of nature: The first one is that nature is systematic itself, and the second one is that nature is purposive. For Guyer, the reflective judgment's presupposition of the systematicity of nature “does nothing but transforms our own need for the systematicity into a self-serving delusion that nature is systematic”.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, it can also be said that Kant has already been aware of such a threat and in order to avoid it he reverses the process by articulating the fact that we do not derive the idea of the systematicity of nature from our observation of nature (this is why it is a “presumption” which guides us in our scientific inquiry into nature); on the contrary, we confirm this principle in our observation of nature (this is why this idea is not a mere delusion). At this point, we can refer again to Linnaeus' study of classification. In his achievements of this classification, he confirms the idea of the systematicity of nature. Additionally, we can notice the relation between the principle of purposiveness of *nature* and that of purposiveness of *judgment* in terms of the heautonomous character of the judgment in a quite clear way. According to that, since judgment legislates merely to itself, and since the principle of

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<sup>54</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 42.

purposiveness of nature should be treated merely as a presumption, the connection can be realized in these achievements of the scientific classification. After all, the following question must be asked: How can the relation between the principle of purposiveness and the principle of systematicity be defined? Allison intends to identify the principle of purposiveness in which subjective purposiveness of aesthetic judgment and objective purposiveness of teleological judgment are subclasses with the principle of the systematicity in order to overcome the issue.<sup>55</sup> In fact, he seems right in his equation considering Kant's own arguments in that both principles share the same idea of "lawfulness" (*Gesetzlichkeit*). In his "Comment" on "teleological judgment of reflection" taken place in section § 76, Kant defines "purposeness" as "the lawfulness of the contingent" of the particular laws in nature (CJ, 217). By the same token, the systematicity of nature signifies nothing but "the lawfulness of nature" on the ground that the complete unity of nature as a presumption guides us in our investigation for the systematicity of particular empirical laws of nature in its heterogeneous multiplicity. On the other hand, Zammito plausibly argues that we should hesitate to fully equate the principle of purposiveness with the principle of the systematicity, as in such a fully equation we can lose the ground for fulfilling the task of the faculty of judgment to establish the link between the understanding and reason.<sup>56</sup> Thus, it can be stated that we should regard these two principles as connected stringently with each other, that is, as intertwined, without fully equating. Further, reading Guyer's and Zurckert's explanations together can direct us to the proper solution with respect to the relation between systematicity and purposiveness. Guyer simply states that "systematicity is a logical system which functions to classify natural products by subsuming species under genera"<sup>57</sup> and Zuckert plausibly formulate the relation to the extent that "in forming empirical concepts", we also employ the form of systematicity, as in our investigation of nature, we

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<sup>55</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 58.

<sup>56</sup> John Zammito, "Kant's Notion of Intrinsic Purposiveness in the *Critique of Judgment*", *Kant Yearbook*, Vol. 1 (2009), p. 231.

<sup>57</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 38.

subsume species under appropriate genera.<sup>58</sup> In this regard, the principle of systematicity and the principle of purposiveness must be treated as complementary components on the basis of the aim of arriving at an empirical concept and hence at the systematic classification of nature.

Finally, it could be noted that the relation between the first *Critique* and the third *Critique* can also be traced through the first justification for introducing such a principle. Accordingly, in constituting theory of knowledge, Kant famously declares his “Copernican Revolution” upon which the claim that nature must conform to the structure of our understanding is based. However, through the third *Critique*, we can realize that in such conformity, “something”, that is, empirical particular laws, is excluded. In this manner, Kant assigns the faculty of judgment as a special cognitive power and its principle in order to make possible to integrate these laws into the system. Kant explains that “not only does nature in its transcendental laws harmonizes necessarily with our *understanding*: in addition, nature in its empirical laws harmonize necessarily with *judgment*” (*CJ*, FI, 233). In fact, here, we can approach the issue from this perspective: Just as, in the first *Critique*, in his attempt to re-construct metaphysics as a science regarding Hume’s significant attacks, he takes the mechanical science’s achievements for granted at the beginning, so, his in third *Critique*, in constructing nature in its heterogeneous diversity, he takes the achievements of biological science for granted at the beginning as well. That means, in Kant’s account, it is admittedly true that in biology scientists progress systematically, and the question is “how it is possible”, “how such a systematic progress is possible”. This possibility will be shown through reflective judgment and its principle. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant constitutes the connection or the relation between appearances by means of mechanical law of causality which proceeds by abstracting empirical particular contents (*CJ*, FI, 210), whereas, in *Critique of Judgment*, he attempts to connect them by means of the principles of reflective judgment as regards “technic of nature” in addition to these formal or

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<sup>58</sup> Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 45.

mechanical laws. The fifth chapter of the dissertation will also serve us some clues about these issues.

## **2. 5. The Supplementary Notions: Technic of Nature, The Specification of Nature, Analogy and Symbol**

In addition to the principle of purposiveness and that of systematicity, Kant also inserts some other supplementary but crucial notions into his system. One of them is “technic of nature” (*Technik der Natur*). The term has its origin in the Greek *tekhnē*, i.e. “art” including the craft. Here, the emphasis is on nature’s productivity. Later, in section § 72, Kant defines “technic of nature” as “nature’s power to produce things in terms of purposes” (*CJ*, 391). Hence, by analogy (*Analogie*), it can be stated that just as a craftsman produces his objects in accordance with certain types of purposes, so nature produces its objects in accordance with purposes. Nevertheless, such a principle or concept of technic of nature functions also merely in regulative way, not constitutively, to order or to arrange nature’s products.

Kant introduces the notion “technic” (“as in the case of organized bodies in nature” *CJ*, 193) not only to imply a new kind of organization of nature (it has been already demonstrated by announcing the principle of purposiveness of nature), but also to indicate a procedure to be followed by reflective judgment to grasp this type of organization. (these two terms, i.e. “purposiveness” and “technic”, are used as synonyms in some cases, though.) In this sense, “a *technical rule*” is for judging. Guyer defines it as a method “for judging natural objects as products” which are purposive.<sup>59</sup> It differs from theoretical knowledge of nature, rather, it signifies the new path in which it is possible to judge about the objects of nature *as if* “they were made through art including the craft” (*CJ*, FI, 200), i.e. as a way of nature’s construction of itself in its diversity of products, so that the structure of our power of judgment harmonizes with the structure of nature as such. Hence, technic of nature turns out to be technic of judgment, too. What judgment reflects following this

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<sup>59</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 53.

condition is just “nature itself, though merely by analogy with an art” without determining it or an object as a product of nature. By this way, the purposiveness of nature gains its new form as “the appropriateness of nature” to our power of judgment (*CJ*, FI, 204). According to Hughes, one of the main motives behind introducing such a notion is the fact that since judgment in its reflective employment, as a special cognitive faculty, is not directed by the determinative rules or principles of the understanding, “technic of nature” alongside with the principle of purposiveness guides reflective judgment in its operation to achieve its own task.<sup>60</sup>

Then, we can discern the idea that Kant defines the term “technic” by distinguishing it from what he calls “mechanic” referring to the way of cognizing nature as an object of experience through the universal laws of the understanding. Since nature as a dynamical and productive field can be harmonized with our cognitive powers, we must be able to present nature without abstracting its heterogeneity of particular cases. In nature’s mechanical form, we present nature merely as constructed by the formal laws of understanding. In other words, by means of its universal principles and laws, the understanding reduces everything in nature to mechanical explanation. In putting this distinction, Kant directly opposes “mechanic of nature” to “technic of nature”, but it does not follow that they exclude one another. On the contrary, Kant’s claim serves the necessity of the condition under which both of them can stand without a conflict. They are two different and complementary sides of the same nature. “There is no inconsistency whatever between a *mechanical explanation* of an appearance... and a *technical rule* for *judging* that same object in terms of subjective principles of reflection on such an object”. (*CJ*, FI, 218)

Therefore, the difference between them signifies the difference between the procedures of how they approach towards nature as well: The mechanical of nature judged in determinative way in its strict relation to the understanding is cognized “schematically”, whereas in reflective judgment, nature is approached “technically”. In the latter case, reflective judgment is guided by this procedure of technic of nature. It is not a determinate concept of the understanding. For this reason, Kant

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<sup>60</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 260.

separates technic of nature from the *nomothetic* of nature, that is, from normativity through which transcendental laws of the understanding are imposed to nature (CJ, FI, 216). (Mere experience on which reflective judgment normatively operates via its principle will be aesthetic experience regarding our feeling of pleasure.) Technic of nature, hence, functions when we attempt to systematize nature in its multiplicity of particular products. In this regard, it is clear that technic of nature cannot be reduced to the mechanical causality, the latter is in the range of nature which is merely cognized through the formal and universal laws of the understanding. Because of these characteristics of technic of nature, Kant maintains, it “does not enrich our knowledge of nature” in theoretical sense (CJ, FI, 205). Determinative judgment is not able to underline this distinction, as it can give merely mechanical explanations about nature. Judgment in its determinative form, as we have seen, does not have its own principle. By treating nature merely as an aggregate of its products, it proceeds merely in a mechanical way. On the other hand, considering it as a system and the classes of its products as particular systems, nature organizes itself technically, i.e. in its productivity. And, for Kant, such a distinction is possible by virtue of reflective judgment. At this juncture, we can also notice the relational status of reflective judgment and its principle in the sense that nature is treated as “one” system composed of the particular systems. In such a case, what renders possible for us to subordinate or to classify nature’s products as genus which is also species itself regarding the more general classes and as species which is also subspecies of the more general classes is the principle of systematicity. We systematize or arrange the classes of a particular system, and we also systematize this particular system itself by subsuming it under more general classes. By this way, nature can be represented as “one” system. Thus, the question why we need reflective judgment and its “technic” is this relational idea, which cannot be constituted in a mechanical way, that nature organizes or construct itself as “one” whole system, i.e. the unity as a whole.

Insofar as nature’s products are aggregates, nature proceeds *mechanically, as mere nature*; but insofar as its products are systems –e.g., crystal formations, various shapes of flowers, or the inner structure of plants and animals- nature proceeds *technically*, i.e., it proceeds also as art. The distinction between these

two ways of judging natural beings is made merely by *reflective judgment*. Making this distinction is something that *determinative* judgment did not under principles of reason allow it to do. (*CJ*, FI, 217)

After these, I would like to present some primary divisions and distinctions drawn by Kant himself. All these divisions, indeed, are not systematically and subsequently displayed in both introductions and in the third *Critique* in general. On the other hand, as we will see, the subsequent divisions are strictly and internally related to each other and systematic presentations of them will help us to conceive how the main division of the *Critique*, i.e. the aesthetic judgment of reflection and teleological judgment of reflection, is structured. Firstly, and the most importantly, although Kant, at first, treats “technic of nature” as nature’s causality “regarding the form that its products have as purposes” (*CJ*, FI, 219), that is to say, he characterizes it with reference to the notion “purpose” which is attributed to the teleological judgment of reflection alone, he also mentions it by dividing *formal* which refers to the subjective principle of aesthetic reflective judgment and *real* technic of nature belonging to the objective or real purposiveness in teleological judgment (*CJ*, FI, 221). What he means by this division becomes clear in his argumentation presented in the “First Introduction”. According to that, not the concept but the shape or the figure, that is, aesthetic form of the object which is responsible for harmonizing of imagination with understanding, is served and gains its meaning with respect to the “formal technic of nature”, while “the real technic of nature” contains “the concept of things as natural purposes” (*CJ*, FI, 232). In the “Second Introduction”, Kant explicitly classifies them: Formal subjective purposiveness implies aesthetic, whereas the real or objective purposiveness belongs to teleological by referring to this main division of technic of nature (*CJ*, 193). The former is called “formal”, as it provides “the harmony of the form of the object”, resting on the feeling of pleasure in the apprehension (*Auffassung*) of that object “prior to the concept”. The latter, however, implies the concept of object as the nature’s product with its purpose (*CJ*, 192). Here, we can conceive the main division between aesthetic judgment of reflection and teleological judgment of reflection to the extent that in the former case we are not in need of having a concept of object to reflect purposiveness; what we

reflect on is the effect of the form of the object in us as judging subjects. On the other hand, in teleological judgment, we need the concept of an object which itself manifests the principle of purposiveness, i.e. “the object is perceived as purposive” (*CJ*, FI, 222), and in this case, the concept is regarded as “the thing’s *purpose*” which serves the ground on which “the object’s actuality” relies (*CJ*, 181). (In such a structure, while aesthetic judgment is regarded as subjective and as non-cognitive, teleological judgment as cognitive and its principle as objective purposiveness; but both of them are characterized as non-determinative –even though it contains the concept of the object, teleological judgment still does not have an ability to determine that object. For such a concept is an indeterminate one-. This is why Kant argues that teleological judgment of reflection belongs also to the theoretical part.) (*CJ*, 194). In his complex and unclear argumentations, Kant calls this purposiveness of forms of the objects, served in the formal technic of nature, “figurative purposiveness”, and by referring to “figurative purposiveness”, he re-names nature’s formal technic as “*technical speciosa*” (*CJ*, FI, 234). By this way, he re-emphasizes the importance of “the figure” or “the shape” of the object as regards to aesthetic judgment of reflection. In this respect, the notion “technic” in its formal case signifies merely “the shape”, not a concept of object. It is “figurative purposiveness”, because nature should be captured not merely as aggregate of its products, but also as dynamical and productive with its products.

Furthermore, in order to consolidate the distinction between teleological and aesthetic reflective judgments, Kant offers also two distinct types of “basis” through which the judging subject presents purposiveness by reference to technic of nature: “Subjective basis” referring to “the harmony of the form of the object (the form that is manifested in the *apprehension* of the object prior to a concept) with cognitive powers, that comes to mean the condition under which a given presentation is compared with our cognitive powers and “Objective basis” which implies “the harmony of the form of the object with possibility of the thing itself according to a priori concept of the thing that contains the basis of that form” (*CJ*, 192). While the former refers to the aesthetic experience, the latter denotes teleological objective judgment of reflection. On Kant’s account, regarding beauty as a variety of

purposiveness, either natural or in art, the task of the judgment is to exhibit the concept of formal (subjective) purposiveness through reflection on the form of the object, whereas in the case of natural purpose, its function is to provide the exhibition of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness in the products of nature, i.e. what Kant calls “technic of nature” in general (*CJ*, 193).

After all, we should take another division presented by Kant into consideration in order to make the transition from these issues to the notions “analogy” and “symbol” in a proper way. Accordingly, Kant also draws a distinction between different types of “technic” in the general sense explicated just above: an intentional technic (*technica intentionalis*) and an unintentional technic (*technical naturalis*). By this distinction, he simply underlies the difference between “final cause” (*Endursache*), contrary to “efficient (mechanical) cause”, and an analogous identity between them (*CJ*, 390). It is quite obvious that the category of natural causality as a mechanical law which is employed under the legislation of the understanding differs entirely from “final cause”, but still they are not in a contradictory relation with each other. Rather, we need this mechanical law of causality as an “intermediate cause” in order to *subjectively* conceive the final cause of natural products. According to Kant, we can conceive the final cause, i.e. intentionality of nature’s products (this “intentionality” is, in fact, nothing but “the purposes” of these products), merely by analogy with the mechanical law of causality of the understanding. We can *subjectively* infer the former from the latter. In other words, the notion “analogy” renders possible, not to cognize in the theoretical sense, i.e. theoretical cognition, but to presuppose the subjective principle of reflective judgment (*CJ*, 398). From this explanation, it can be concluded that Kant attempts to make a connection between the understanding and reason, and also between the concepts of the understanding and those of reason by means of the notion “analogy”. As we will see later, the first *Critique* explicates that the schema of reason which provides us with transcendental ideas, i.e. pure concepts of reason, is the analogon of the schema of sensibility (*CPR*, A 673 B 701). Stated otherwise, we can infer “something” which is not given by the sensibility from “something” which is given in space and time as pure forms of intuitions. To exemplify, the idea of systematicity is not given by the experience, on

the contrary, it is the idea of reason corresponding to nothing in experience. Indeed, these both “analogous” and at the same time “opposed” relations between final causes of natural products and mechanical laws will give rise to the antinomy of teleological judgment (*CJ*, 387). What is crucial here is the idea that “analogy” is presented by Kant as a form of cognition differently from theoretical one: “cognition by analogy” (*CJ*, 353). He defines “analogy” as “the identity of the relation between bases and consequences (cause and effects) insofar as it is present despite what difference in kind there is between the thing themselves (i.e. considered apart from that relation), or between those properties themselves that contain the basis of similar consequences” (*CJ*, 464). Thus, it can be said that the notion “analogy” implies the relation between two heterogeneous (differing in kind) things by inferring one from another. According to that, we can cognize both subjective (purposiveness of the forms of the nature’s products) and objective principles (final causes of nature’s products) of reflective judgment merely by analogy in such a way that we can think of nature as purposive, to which no corresponding intuition is given, by analogy, in “the relation of some other object”, an object, which is sensibly given in experience. Thereby, it provides a certain type of relation between the ideas of reason and the sensible object. In this way, we can cognize or “conceive” (*CJ*, 463) nature “by analogy” with subjective basis (*CJ*, 360). In such an analogous cognition, Kant argues, “empirical use of reason” is in the case (*CJ*, 398), that is to say, reason employs its ideas not constitutively which leads to what Kant calls “dialectical illusion”, but in a regulative way which is mere legitimate use of ideas of reason. In this latter case, reason does not extend its concepts beyond the limits of experience which are drawn by the doctrine of “Transcendental Analytic”, on the contrary, it just regulates or orders the concepts of the understanding (*CPR*, A 643 B 671) in order to reach the higher unity of knowledge and nature rather than the unity provided by the universal laws and principles of the understanding. This is the reason behind why I explained that Kant seems to put the notion “unity” in a hierarchical order in the previous section. In this regard, we can say, considering arguments of the first *Critique*, both empirical and hypothetical employment of reason are intersected in the same operation. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he argues, by guiding the

empirical employment of reason, “the possible systematic unity” can be provided (*CPR*, A 670 B 698).

Furthermore, this analogous type of relational cognition appears as a symbol of that supersensible as the idea of reason. In such a manner, analogy is regarded as opposed to the “schematized” theoretical cognition. This paves a way for Kant to make a distinction between “symbolic” and “schematic” by reference to the cognition by analogy (*CJ*, 353).<sup>61</sup> The direct relation between “symbol” and “analogy” is given through the definition of “symbol”. Accordingly, Kant defines the symbol of an idea, that is, “a rational concept” of reason, is a presentation of the object by analogy. Hence, it is clear that a symbol must be, by definition, a symbol of something which is not given in possible experience. Under this type of relation, while a schema indicates the “direct exhibition of the concept”, symbol signifies indirect exhibition through the former. In this kind of relational and indirect cognition “schematic exhibition”, thus, demonstrative, symbolic one exhibits merely by means of analogy (*CJ*, 352). In *Religion within The Bounds of Bare Reason*, Kant consistently differs “schematism of object-determination” from what he calls “schematism of analogy” by arguing that if we transform the former into the latter rather than establishing an analogous relation between them, then we illegitimately expand the former to the sensible experience.<sup>62</sup> That is to say, through analogy, judgment cannot determine the object of the experience by subsuming it under a concept. It is only function for reflective judgment and its principle. To sum up, Kant reduces all types of “hypotyposis” (i.e. exhibition) into two kinds: schematic (it is clear, here, by schematic, he means “a schema of sensibility”) or symbolic (*CJ*, 351).

In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis

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<sup>61</sup> Also, Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pp. 189-192. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Lewis W. Beck, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 69-71. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, Werner S. Pluhar, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), pp. 64-66.

<sup>62</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, p. 65.

there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematizing. (CJ, 351)

In this passage, Kant takes forward his argument by asserting that cognition by analogy is not only possible but also necessary for “reason” as a cognitive faculty “to think”. Just as reason, in its both regulative legitimate use and constitutive illegitimate employment regarding theoretical cognition, works with the concepts of understanding. This is because, concepts are forms of thought which are necessary for any type of cognition. Kant also gives an explanation about the function of judgment in this process. Accordingly, in the symbolic exhibition (*Exhibitio*), judgment contains “a double function”; in the first, it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition”, and in the second, judgment “applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol” (CJ, 352).

In the *Logic*, Kant mentions the notion “analogy” by directly reference to the notion “inference”. As I have explained above, inference and analogy are mutually operated terms. It is possible to infer something which has merely subjective validity analogously from something intuitively given in the pure forms of space and time. Yet, we employ these tools in our observing nature to unify it. Kant explains the mechanic of these tools as following:

I infer according to analogy thus: when two or more things from a genus agree with one another in as many marks as we have been able to discover, I infer that they will also agree with one another in the remaining marks that I have not been able to discover. When things agree no on many points, then I say that they will also agree in the remaining marks... I infer, then, from some marks to all the other ones, that they will also agree in these. E.g., the moon has mountains and valleys, day and night, our earth has day and night/ and so forth; since the moon has much similarity with our earth, I will attribute to it many of the properties of the earth. We must proceed empirically in accordance with analogy.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 408-409.

Therefore, according to Kant, “induction and analogy are inseparable from our cognition, and yet errors for the most part arise from them”<sup>64</sup>, just as judgment itself is the indispensable component of our cognition, but it is considered also as the source of the dialectical inference in the first *Critique* (*CPR*, A 406). As indicated in the cited passage above, in both inference and analogy, our process is directed from the observed thing to the “unobserved”. In this regard, as Allison rightly puts it, Kant draws two paths from “the inference of reflective judgment”: Induction which proceeds from the individual to universal via “principle of universalization”, and “analogy” “from similarity between two things to a total similarity”, through the principle of specification.<sup>65</sup> Here, analogy appears as the form of inference of reflective judgment with reference to the principle of specification.

In this way, we come to another significant notion Kant serves in arguing reflective judgment and its principle: “The specification of nature”. In his argumentation, he correlates it with the principle of reflective judgment but entirely in a converse way. Namely, as we have seen, in observing nature, we proceed from particular (empirical) to the universal (empirical as well) through the guidance of the principle of reflective judgment. In doing this, we attempt to unify nature in its diversity “as contained under the universal” by classifying particulars in terms of which we are able to subsume them under the more general concept. In this process, we compare different particulars and classes, as Linnaeus did, through their common properties. On the other hand, it is also possible to proceed from the universal concept to the particulars or groups by specifying of the diverse under a universal concept. By this way, according to Kant, “we make the universal concept specific by indicating the diverse that fall under it”. In such a case, what makes nature specific is, in fact, “nature itself” for Kant. That is, nature organizes itself. In its own dynamic and productive structure, that is, “technic of nature” or “organic of nature”, as opposed to the mechanic, nature as a self-organizer forms itself from the universal concept, i.e.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 411.

<sup>65</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 37.

highest genus to the particulars, i.e. subclasses of species. For this reason, Kant notices that judging subjects regard nature as *techne* (*CJ*, FI, 215). “Thus, judgment, by means of its principle, thinks of nature as purposive, in the way nature makes its forms specific through empirical laws” for the aim of the power of judgment (*CJ*, FI, 216). Under the light of these explanations, in the case of the principle of specification we can see that nature organizes itself in a converse way of how we judge it in terms of transcendental principle. Yet, what is crucial here is that the universal concept according to which nature organizes itself also refers to the universal concept of nature which “makes also possible a concept of experience at all” for our understanding (*CJ*, FI, 212). Therefore, when we move from the particular to the universal, the path we follow is already constructed by the nature itself, nature’s conformity to our power of judgment is taken for granted at first by Kant. The formal laws which are imposed by the understanding pave the way for the particular empirical laws through which nature conform to our power of judgment. By this way, in nature as “one” system, the relation between individual particular systems or laws and the more general systems or laws is constructed. Now, we have a new formulation of the judgment’s own principle through which the concept of purposiveness of nature, belonging neither to understanding nor to reason, but to reflective judgment because it is posited merely in the subject’s power to reflect through our power of judgment: “Nature, for the sake of the power of judgment, makes its universal laws specific and into empirical ones, according to the form of a logical system.” (*CJ*, FI, 216)

Most importantly, as Allison convincingly puts it, regarding our problem of relation between the systematicity, purposiveness of nature and that of judgment, the inference and analogy of reflective judgment serve us a clue. Accordingly, from our investigation of nature’s regularity and systematic unity through “observed uniformities and similarities”, we can also analogically conclude unobserved uniformities of nature, that is, its purposiveness for our judgment. In other words, observed outer structures of nature’s product might be based on unobserved “inner

and intrinsic” structures of them.<sup>66</sup> Understood this way, it is possible to furnish a proper relation between purposiveness of nature and purposiveness of judgment.

After all, at first glance, it could be claimed that “the unity of nature” in its full diversity of particular laws which cannot be grasped by understanding as a cognitive power, and “the unity of the experience” constructed by understanding in the first *Critique* are two distinct territories. However, there is no such a dualistic view about the nature. In other words, we do not have “the concepts of nature”, we only have “a concept of nature”. Kant warns us that

*unity of nature in time and space*, and unity of the experience possible for us, are one and the same, since nature is a sum total of mere appearances can have its objective reality solely in experience; [hence] if we think of nature as a system (as indeed we must), then experience (too) must be possible [for us] as a system even in terms of empirical laws. Therefore it is subjectively necessary [for us to make the] transcendental *presupposition* that nature [as experience possible for us] does not have this disturbing “boundless” heterogeneity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms, but that, rather through the affinity of its particular laws under more general ones it takes on the quality of experience as an empirical system. (*CJ*, *FI*, 209-210)

In fact, we have further textual evidence about Kant’s claim of the “oneness” of the nature. As we will see in the fifth chapter of this thesis in more detail, after he established the universality of the laws of the understanding in “Transcendental Analytic”, in the second division and Chapter III of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant attempts to make way for the heterogeneity of nature which is neglected entirely by the arguments constructed in the “Analytic”. The highest systematic unity of nature is presented as “the ideal of reason”. Kant has already mentioned most of these terms in explaining regulative role of reason along with the understanding’s legislation. According to that, he preserves the notions *homogeneity*, *specification* and *continuity* as the principles to provide systematicity of nature from the strict formal laws of the understanding (*CPR*, A 658 B 686). In his theory of knowledge, the notion

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

“dynamical” refers to the “heterogeneity”, while “mathematical” to homogeneity. Even Kant himself solves third antinomy in terms of this distinction in order to make a room for freedom as causality of reason along with mechanic causality of the understanding. In this manner, it can be noticed that the notion “nature” in its diverse heterogeneity indicates “dynamical nature”, in the case of its mechanism, nature refers to “the mathematical sum total of all appereances” as “the aggregation in space and time”, what Kant also calls “world” (*CPR*, A 418 B 446). And just as in its dynamical case, freedom can be possible as a different kind of causality from mechanic causality imposed by understanding without contradiction, so there can be no inconsistency, at least in this very short analysis, between technic of nature in its dynamical sense and mechanic of nature in its mathematical sense. Through the third *Critique*, the regulative employment of reason plays legitimately its own role in nature as such.

Finally, it should also be noted that like the notion “analogy”, Kant regards “technic of nature” due to its special character as opposed to schematism. That means, just as “analogy” as a type of cognition is contrary to schematism, so technic of nature, as the way we present the nature in its purposiveness, excludes the process of schematism in observing and investigating nature in its diversity. Reflective judgment in proceeding its own task approaches natural things *technically*, “rather than *schematically*”. “In other words, it does not deal with them mechanically, as it were, like an instrument, guided by the understanding and the senses; it deals with them *artistically*, in terms of a principle that is universal but also indeterminate” (*CJ*, FI, 214) (Here, by “artistically” Kant means the idea that “we judge nature itself through merely by analogy with an art including craft” *CJ*, FI, 200)

To sum up, judgment presupposes a system of nature, i.e. an order of nature, in terms of its principle through which we can grasp that order or system. And such a systematic unity of nature is also presupposed by system constituted in the first *Critique*. Kant affirms that on the one hand, nature as such which constrains particular empirical laws is the object of possible experience which contains merely formal laws constructed by the understanding through which transcendental laws have their constitutive roles (*CJ*, 193), the same nature implies the experience itself

as a system, not as a mere aggregate, on the other hand (*CJ*, FI, 209). Under the light of these explanations, it can be said that “technic of nature” is also a significant component for Kant to provide him with a legitimate opportunity to make a room for introducing the notion “purposiveness” without any contradiction with the mechanism of nature. And the possibility for that kind of transition is provided by the mutual relation of “technic of nature” and “analogy”. We can cognize “formal” technic of nature “by analogy” with the mechanic of nature, as there is no inconsistency between them.

## **2.6. Kant’s Problematic Transition from the Principle of Purposiveness and the Principle of Systematicity to the Aesthetic Theory**

Until now, I have tried to explicate the arguments about the reflective judgment, the principle of purposiveness and that of systematicity of nature and also about their relations to each other. Now, our main issue will be the relation of the principle of purposiveness and systematicity with the aesthetic judgment of reflection. In other words, the problem here with which we are concerned is how Kant attempts to integrate his aesthetic theory into his theory of reflective judgment and the principles.

In the Second Introduction, in section VI, titled “On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature” (in the First Introduction, he does not argue this issue under a specific title), Kant undertakes to pave a way for the transition from the principle of purposiveness to aesthetic judgment, thus, for connecting them in a proper way after his arguments about nature, reflective judgment and the principles. As we have seen, reflective judgment is divided into two groups as aesthetic judgment of reflection and teleological judgment of reflection. Further, the principle of purposiveness provides the basis for these two types of reflective judgments; as “subjective formal purposiveness” and as “objective” or “real purposiveness”. Therefore, in such a composition, aesthetic and teleological judgments are subclasses of both reflective judgment and its principle. In order to show the relation between the principles of purposiveness and systematicity with aesthetic judgment of reflection, Kant seems to make a distinction between the

sources of the feeling of pleasure. Indeed, I suppose, we can classify his complex and unclear approach into two arguments. On the one hand, Kant holds the harmonious relation between nature and cognitive faculties in the scientific inquiry as the juncture; on the other hand, he regards the relation between nature's products and the harmony between our cognitive powers as the intermediary. In the former case, nature's harmony with our cognitive powers will be held for the connection; in the latter case, the condition under which the forms of nature's products animate (*beleben*) the free harmony of imagination with the understanding can be regarded as the ground upon which the principle of purposiveness (and hence, systematicity) and aesthetic judgment of reflection coincidences. We have to find a keystone to link these two cases or to render them compatible, yet Kant does not serve such a strict stone during his arguments. In the mentioned section VI, Kant's main arguments is simply that "the attainment of an aim (*Absicht*) is always connected with the feeling of pleasure", and he keeps stating that "it is a fact that when we discover that two or more heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can be unified under the one principle that comprises them both, the discovery does give rise to a quite noticeable pleasure" (CJ, 187). Undoubtedly, the phrase "the attainment of an aim" is the systematization of nature under species and genera, which is the need and aim of the understanding (CJ, 186). On Kant's account, our need for systematizing nature which is possible firstly through the idea of purposiveness and systematicity should be in connection with the feeling of pleasure in such a way that when this need for reaching the unity of empirical laws by subsuming particulars under the more general concepts through reflective judgment is satisfied by the harmony of nature with our cognitive powers, the feeling of pleasure arises. Otherwise, without the principle of systematicity and the principle of purposiveness, nature was presented as so much heterogeneous that we could not find any higher unity, and in such a case, we would feel displeasure. It is clear that in the case of transcendental laws of the understanding, such a pleasure cannot occur. Because, as Kant holds that, in such a case, we already have a concept for a given representation. There is no need for any discovery there. Yet, as we have seen, in the case of reflective judgment, we do not have such a concept; on the contrary, we have to find a concept for a particular case. And, according to Kant, when we find this systematic or hierarchical unity through which species are

subsumed under genera, we feel pleasure. Here, Kant's explanation refers explicitly to our first case. This is one side of the composition. Now, in order to comprehend why this argument and such a connection is highly problematic, we have to look at our second case, i.e. at the other side of the composition (although this "side" will be our main concern in the next chapter, I will attempt to present the issue very briefly in order to understand why such a connection gives rise to a crucial problem): The free harmony of cognitive faculties.

First of all, according to the other side, the feeling of pleasure is also the product of the harmonious relation between the imagination and the understanding. When we apprehend the form of the object which is given by the sensibility, this apprehension may give rise to the free harmony of our cognitive faculties. If it does, we call this object "beautiful" (*Neigung*). Otherwise expressed, we judge an object to be beautiful provided that the form of the object judged enlivens the harmony or the free play between the imagination and the understanding. For Kant, subjective characteristic of a presentation of an object which cannot be cognized is "the *pleasure or displeasure* connected with that presentation" (*CJ*, 189).

Now if in this comparison a given presentation unintentionally brings imagination (power of a priori intuitions) into harmony with the understanding (the power of concepts), and this harmony arouses a feeling of pleasure, then the object must thereupon be regarded as purposive for the reflective power of judgment. A judgment of this sort is an aesthetic judgment about the object's purposiveness; it is not based on any concept we have of the object, nor does it provide such a concept. (*CJ*, 190)

As we can easily notice, in the case of aesthetic judgment of reflection which is non-cognitive, contra "teleological one which is cognitive" (*CJ*, FI, 221), there is no concept of object, and, besides, we do not arrive at any concept. The mentioned "comparison" in this cited passage, hence, refers to the comparison of a given presentation not with others but with merely our cognitive faculties, i.e. imagination and understanding. In an exactly similar way, in the First Introduction, Kant explicitly states that "in judging natural forms aesthetically", we do not presuppose a

concept of object, “no concept of object was needed, nor was one produced” (*CJ*, *FI*, 233). In aesthetic experience, we reflect merely on the form of the object, not on the concept of that object. Furthermore, there is also a necessary condition in order for this harmony to be arisen. Pleasure in beautiful should be disinterested pleasure, that is to say, it should be merely contemplative. In this sense, to reflect on a form of the object judged implies to contemplate on that form. As a necessary result of this, the very peculiar characteristic of aesthetic judgment is its being “a singular (*einzeln*) judgment” on “a singular empirical intuition”. In aesthetic judgment, we are never concerned about “the natural forms” in their relation or connection with each other. It signifies solely a single case at which we look. Therefore, only through reflecting on the subjective purposive form of the object without any mediating factor, such as an aim, an achievement or a concept, the free harmony of cognitive faculties is animated by means of which the feeling of pleasure appears. In this regards, it is very obvious that “any attainment”, “any achievement” of an aim, or strictly speaking, even any aim or purpose itself, cannot be responsible for arising such a contemplative pleasure. In other words, “the attainment of an aim” of our understanding for the fulfillment of the need to systematize the nature in a higher level cannot be connected with the feeling of pleasure. Indeed, Kant points explicitly out that the feeling of pleasure cannot be found in any type of causal relation including teleological judgment as well (*CJ*, *FI*, 228). That is to say, Kant also rejects the direct relation between the feeling of pleasure and objective purposiveness by stating that “since the presentation of the second kind of purposiveness (i.e., objective purposiveness, my note) does not refer to the object’s form, in its apprehension, to the subject’s cognitive powers, but instead to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept, the presentation of this purposiveness has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure.” (*CJ*, 193). This rupture affirmed by Kant himself between aesthetic and teleological judgments and its principles is, in fact, far from facilitating Kant’s work. We can rightly turn to the notion “technic of nature” in order to find a direct relation between aesthetic and teleological judgment in the sense that the distinction between “formal technic of nature” and “real technic of nature” may lead us to re-connect aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment. However, we cannot do this, as Kant himself cuts the direct relation off. May Kant think to underline the

special case of aesthetic judgment by this cutting, but when we elaborate on the whole structure of the third *Critique* in much more detail, we will realize the crisis that aesthetic judgment of reflection is not properly integrated into this structure or the system.

Under the light of these explanations, it should be noted that the structure of the third *Critique* can be seen responsible for the present issue. For, as I have mentioned before, there is a gap between the Introductions and the main text of the *Critique*. After explaining this problematic transition in the Second Introduction, Kant does not return to the present issue in the main chapters of the *Critique*. Further, and most importantly, this problematic transition will eventually turn out to be the problem of the relation between theory of reflective judgment and aesthetic judgment of reflection. As we may realize, here, the problem is the inconsistency between “the attainment of an aim” and the peculiar characteristic of aesthetic judgment, i.e. of the feeling of pleasure. In the case of “the attainment of an aim”, it is expected that pleasure should arise through the achievement of the connection between the natural products. However, as we have seen, the feeling of pleasure can merely appear by reflecting on a single empirical intuition without regarding its relation with other natural products. To put it differently, the problem is basically the relation between the systematicity of nature and aesthetic judgment of reflection. In the next section, I will attempt to argue commentators’ notifications on these issues.

## **2.7. The Arguments on the Problematic Relation Between Theory of Reflective Judgment and Aesthetic Judgment of Reflection**

In the previous section, as I have attempted to show, the problematic transition from the principle of purposiveness and that of systematicity to aesthetic judgment, articulated in section VI of the Second Introduction by Kant, turns necessarily into the problematic relation between the general theory of reflective judgment and the specific (and also special or peculiar) case of aesthetic judgment of reflection. Kant, as we have seen, distinguishes reflective judgment from determinative one by affirming that in the former case judgment does not have a concept for a given

particular, and the aim of the reflective judgment is to search for or arrive at a proper concept. Determinative judgment necessitates, by its very nature, the application of a concept, while reflective judgment implies the acquisition of such a concept. And this claim explicitly indicates the cognitive characteristic of the aim of reflective judgment. Thus, in this manner, the concepts of purposiveness and systematicity (alongside with the law of specification) are easily integrated into the theory, and hence, teleological judgment of reflection too. On the other hand, aesthetic judgment of reflection is not a cognitive judgment, that is to say, such a cognitive aim seems entirely to be irrelevant regarding this type of judgment. In our aesthetic experience, unlike scientific inquiry, we neither have a concept of object nor do we supply a concept. Aesthetic pleasure arises merely through reflecting, i.e. contemplating, on a single form of the object in which our cognitive faculties becomes freely harmonious with each other. For these reasons, Kant's claim that achieving any aim results always in arising the feeling of pleasure is not compatible with his aesthetic theory. Commentators agree with the idea that Kant suffers seriously from this kind of problematic relation. Dieter Heinrich, to exemplify, rightly complains that we encounter inevitably an impasse by "the overall design of the *Critique of Judgment*". Rather, the impasse results from "the notion of reflective judgment that underlies the aesthetic as well as the teleological part of the third *Critique*". Heinrich calls this case "an impasse", because in the employment of reflective judgment, "which searches for and develops" the proper general concept, "it is intended to apply first to the search for properties shared in common by classes of objects in nature and thus to the attempt to arrive at a classification of and a generalization over natural phenomena and the laws of nature. This concern is obviously quite remote from the situation in which esthetic judgments are entertained and asserted. The classification of nature is a goal-directed, deliberated activity, whereas aesthetic judgment can develop and be entertained spontaneously and independently of any deliberation and investigation."<sup>67</sup>. Besides, according to him, even if we hold the idea that "reflective judgment's search for concepts in the aesthetic situation" can be the search not for

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<sup>67</sup> Dieter Henrich, *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 42-43.

complex and special scientific empirical concepts in our systematic investigation of nature, but for “ordinary general concepts”, such an impasse does not disappear. In a similar way, Guyer finds Kant’s arguments about theory reflective judgment obscure and artificial on the basis of the aesthetic judgment of reflection. In other words, the general theory of reflective judgment does not fully fit to the aesthetic judgment of reflection.<sup>68</sup> He thinks that the general theory of reflective judgment “masks the real character” of Kant’s aesthetic theory.<sup>69</sup> Especially, due to the unorganized structures of both introductions, the significant question how and where exactly aesthetic theory emerges from theory of reflective judgment remains blur. According to Guyer, the arguments of both introductions, in fact, “distort” Kant’s approach to theory of taste. He argues that, Kant serves merely a weak connection by affirming that pleasure can include its own a priori principle by means of the faculty of judgment.<sup>70</sup> In this case, insofar as we hold the idea that the faculty of judgment functions as the source of the certain types of principles, aesthetic judgment and theory of reflective judgment can be connected. In other words, the indeterminacy of aesthetic judgment comes directly from two sources: one of them is the indeterminacy of the principle of purposiveness and systematicity; another is the indeterminacy of the reflective judgment. This means that, Kant’s derivation of aesthetic judgment from his general theory of reflective judgment and from its principle results in the idea that aesthetic judgment necessarily shares some characteristics with them. However, such a connection is not so strong as Kant suggests. For these reasons, the principle of systematicity seems to be “actually irrelevant to” the aesthetic theory.<sup>71</sup> Another important point which Guyer emphasizes is, when we accept the idea that reflective judgment, unlike determinative, does not hold a concept, we also have to accept that there is a gap between the faculty of sensibility and that of concepts which Kant himself already

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<sup>68</sup> Paul Guyer, *Knowledge, Reason and Taste*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 210.

<sup>69</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 29, and also p. 73.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

connected by his theory of schematism in first *Critique*. This new gap is also another problem for Kant's theory of aesthetic.<sup>72</sup>

Before analyzing Guyer's arguments in more detail, firstly, we can look at his classification of different forms of reflective judgment in his other essay "Kant's Principles of Reflecting Judgment". According to this classification, reflective judgment is divided into "at least" five types:<sup>73</sup>

1. "The use of reflecting judgment to search for a *system* of scientific concepts and laws".
2. Aesthetic Judgment of Reflection is classified into two groups:
  - a. Judgment of beauty
  - b. Judgment of Sublime
3. Teleological Judgment of Reflection also divided into two forms:
  - a. "Judgment on the purposive rather than only mechanical organization of *particular organisms* in nature"
  - b. "Judgment that nature as a whole constitutes a single system with a determinate end".

In this classification, it can be seen that the necessary relation or transition between the first and third cases is accomplished by Kant. This is because, through them, we subsume something, i.e. "the individual organisms, under the concept of a system, that is, the systematic unity of nature as a whole. The main problem here, however, according to Guyer, is that Kant does not properly confirm the necessary relation between the first-and-third case and the second one, namely, aesthetic judgment of reflection. He also expresses this connection problem as the gap between "judgments on purposiveness in the division and specification of nature", that is, the systematicity of nature" and judgments on "the purposiveness of individual forms in nature", that is, aesthetic judgments.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., P. 37.

<sup>73</sup> Paul Guyer, "Kant's Principles fo Reflective Judgment", *Kant's Critique of Power of Judgment*, Paul Guyer, ed. (New York: Lowman&Littlefield, 2003), pp. 2-3.

<sup>74</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 54.

Yet, on Guyer's account, the situation is not so hopeless. As we will see in the next chapter, Guyer basically claims that in aesthetic judgment of reflection, we have to assume, not one, but two acts of reflection, or, "double process of reflection" (Indeed, Guyer structures the whole book, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, in accordance with his theory of "double process of reflection). According to this theory, we, first, reflect on the form of the object which is called "simple reflection" or "aesthetic response", and this leads to the harmony of the cognitive faculties and by this way the feeling of pleasure arises. However, the process does not stop at this level. Secondly, we reflect on this feeling of pleasure to define it as contemplative and by this way the judgment of taste appears when we judge an object to be beautiful. Now, such a theory allows Guyer to claim that "the attainment of an aim" can lead to arising the feeling of pleasure without contradiction with Kant's general theory of taste (*Geschmack*). For him, the first act of reflection, that is, aesthetic response can be intentionally and causally related to any cognitive aim. "Success in reflective judgment's objective of systematizing the understanding's knowledge of nature produces a feeling of pleasure".<sup>75</sup> (However, Kant explicitly separates the cognitive and intentional judgment from aesthetic judgment of reflection and characterizes the feeling of pleasure as "unintentional"). In such a case, it seems that the feeling of pleasure produced by the attainment of an aim is a different kind of pleasure produced in the judgment of taste. However, we face still with a serious problem in this kind of explanation. For, Guyer later states that in aesthetic judgment of reflection there are two acts of reflection, but there is merely one kind of pleasure.<sup>76</sup>

On the other hand, according to Allison, Guyer's reading of aesthetic judgment of reflection cannot be a legitimate one, because such a claim obviously contradicts with the general framework of Kant's own aesthetic theory (Allison entirely rejects Guyer's theory of double process of reflection). Nevertheless, Allison shares Guyer's complaints about the proper relation between theory of reflective judgment (and the principles of purposiveness and systematicity) and aesthetic judgment of reflection.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

Before passing to Allison's arguments, it might be helpful to serve his analysis of Kant's reasoning about the reflective judgment, its principle and aesthetic judgment in both Introductions. Allison systematizes it as a five-fold process<sup>77</sup>:

1. The inclusion of judgment in the “system” of higher cognitive faculties requires that it have its own *a priori* or transcendental principle.
2. The formal or logical purposiveness of nature is such a principle
3. But judgment of taste, as merely reflective judgment, makes a claim for universality and necessity.
4. If this claim is legitimate, it must rest on an *a priori* principle, and since the judgment is merely reflective (do not involve determination), it must be a principle that pertains to judgment in its reflective capacity.
5. Since the purposiveness of nature has already been shown to be such a principle, judgment of taste must be based on it (or at least they must be if their claims are to be warranted).

In such a reasoning, Allison thinks that Kant explicitly “equates the principle underlying aesthetic judgment with the principle of formal purposiveness” which is necessarily related to the principle of systematicity without giving any further justification for it. In this regard, for Allison, such an equation and hence, relation, is not demonstrated by Kant in an appropriate way. He rightly indicates the trouble as following: The principle of purposiveness and that of systematicity stand in a strict relation with the logical reflection through which we generate empirical concepts, whereas aesthetic judgment of reflection is deprived of such a relation. From this fact, it is necessarily followed that the principles of purposiveness and systematicity are “concerned only with the relation between diverse forms” of natural products, whereas aesthetic judgment of reflection is concerned with individual or particular forms with regard to their singularities. Therefore, these principles govern “a completely different form of reflection that is operative in judgment of taste”.<sup>78</sup> Rather, all these result from the fact that although aesthetic judgment contains a

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<sup>77</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 61.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

disinterested and contemplative pleasure, the main characteristic of the principle of systematicity and the general theory of reflective judgment has apparently a cognitive aim which is not appropriate for such a pleasure. For these reasons, according to Allison, the pleasure arising from the attainment of an aim should be different from the disinterested pleasure. Then, how should we read the claim of Section VI? Allison affirms that the mentioned section

is to be taken as a transitional section, intended as a bridge between the initial discussion of logical or formal purposiveness by means of which Kant first connects judgment with an a priori principle of its own and the central concern with judgments of taste, which lay claim to a certain normativity (and therefore some kind of a priori grounding) in spite of their aesthetic nature. To this end, then, Kant attempts to show in Section VI how the representation of one kind of purposiveness, namely that which is manifested in certain successful cognitive projects, is connected with a feeling of pleasure, in order to prepare the ground for an account of how the representation of a very different kind of purposiveness (or at least a very different representation of purposiveness) is likewise connected with such a feeling.<sup>79</sup>

Here, Allison offers a way of reading the arguments in presented section VI, according to which that section should be regarded as a transitional part to prepare the basis for integrating aesthetic judgment of reflection into the system. Yet, due to the reasons we have just seen above, such a basis is not as firm as Kant himself suggests. Moreover, Allison, like nearly all commentators, also complains about the obscurity and disorganization of arguments in both Introductions. At this point, he makes a remarkable interpretation about the origin of the problem. According to him, the problem arises out of the fact that Kant serves two conflict deductions of the principle of purposiveness in both Introductions. Accordingly, in the First Introduction Kant tries to prove the idea that the principle of reflective judgment is, indeed, transcendental, rather than merely logical. However, since the principle is also related to the formation of empirical concept, it seems that the principle is solely logical in the sense that in generating such concepts, it is used in guiding the understanding in its logical reflection. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, Kant

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

directs his strategy towards the argument that the principle is also transcendental, as it is the necessary condition of “applying logic to nature”.<sup>80</sup> Here, “logic” refers to the subordination of species under the genera, i.e. the classification of nature.<sup>81</sup> (At this point, we can remember the fact that the systematicity implies the logical system of nature). On the other hand, in the Second Introduction, Kant changes his strategy in a crucial way. He gives up the claim of the necessary condition, and turns to the idea of normative condition by affirming that the principle is also transcendental, since the principle “makes a normative claim about how we *ought to judge*, rather than simply describe how we do judge”.<sup>82</sup> This characteristic of the principle of reflective judgment also show us why the faculty of judgment needs its own principle apart from transcendental principles of the understanding in the sense that these principles of the understanding merely provides us with the criterion “how we do judge”. Thence, changing the strategy renders Kant’s arguments about the relation between the principles and aesthetic judgment incomprehensible. I think, Allison’s reading can lead us to comprehend the structure and argument of both Introductions. When we read Allison’s arguments together with Guyer’s classification and explanations, it can be said that the understanding’s aim of the unification of particular laws is guided by reason’s ideas of systematicity and specification in order to provide higher systematic unity and to reach the complete unity of nature by reducing all principles into “one” principle. While doing so, judgment and its principle of purposiveness have their own roles in the respect that the principle directs or guides the faculty of judgment in its reflective employment to compare a given particular case, such as an empirical law or a concept with reason’s idea of systematicity in order to reach higher empirical systematic unity through generating an empirical concept. Therefore, it is the faculty of judgment in its reflective employment to attribute the principle of purposiveness to nature.

Apart from introductions, Kant rarely mentions the issue of the connection. One of them can be surprisingly found in § 23 where Kant focuses on another transition

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

between judgment of taste and judgment of sublime. There, Kant expresses that “natural beauty reveals to us a technic of nature that allows us to present nature as a system in terms of laws whose principle we do not find anywhere in our understanding: the principle of purposiveness directed to our use of judgment as regards appearances” (*CJ*, 246).

Now, in this quoted passage, according to both Allison<sup>83</sup> and Hughes<sup>84</sup>, Kant serves us a hint about our present issue. Accordingly, Kant again refers to “technic of nature” in explaining natural beauty as a way of presenting nature in a system. Then, “the discovery of natural beauty” can be regarded “as a kind of stimulus to scientific inquiry”. In addition, Steigerwald also considers “technic of nature” as the connector between the purposiveness of nature and the aesthetic theory by referring to Allison’s arguments. According to that, both of them functions as a mirror for each other.<sup>85</sup> As we can notice, even in the case of “technic of nature”, to which Kant himself refers, the connection is far from being necessary or logical, but is merely weak and interpretive. On the other hand, Cannon argues that both Guyer’s and Allison’s starting points in their criticism of the incompatibility of the theory of reflective judgment and aesthetic judgment are problematic. According to Cannon, “their accounts are guided by” the following reasoning: “In the third *Critique* Kant claims that 1. All reflective judgments have the cognitive aim of seeking a universal for a particular, 2. Judgments of taste are reflective, and 3. Judgment of taste must not be governed by (determinate) concepts. Both Guyer and Allison attempt to harmonize these three seemingly incompatible claims.” However, Cannon holds, in these claims, they miss “the reflective *seeking* character of judgments of taste in process”.<sup>86</sup> Here, the emphasis on “in process” carries the all weight of Cannon’s argument. According to Cannon’s view, as in the process of the act of reflection in aesthetic judgment, our cognitive faculties seek still for the appropriate concept. But, at the end of the process, that is, at the end of the cognitive process, when a concept

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>84</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 260.

<sup>85</sup> Joan Steigerwald, “Natural Purposes and the Reflecting Power of Judgment”, p. 302.

<sup>86</sup> Joseph Cannon, “The Intentionality of Judgments of Taste”, p. 55.

cannot be found, or when cognition does not arise, the aesthetic judgment appears. Yet, as we have seen in arguing Longuenesse's and Allison's debate, it is very dubious that in aesthetic judgment of reflection, an empirical concept is sought. This was why Allison rejected Longuenesse's interpretation expressing that in the case of aesthetic experience, judgment "fails" to find a concept.

Fiona Hughes is concerned with the problem as well. In a similar way to Steirgerwald's "mirror" metaphor, Hughes affirms that the aesthetic judgment is in fact the condition of being aware of the logical purposiveness, that is, of the systematicity of nature, and the presumption that nature conforms to our cognitive faculties is the condition of the basis upon which aesthetic judgment of reflection relies, that basis is called "exemplary exhibition" by Hughes.<sup>87</sup> Firstly, she connects the notion "purposiveness" with "the power of judgment". According to that, she re-defines "purposiveness" as a certain type of relation "in which empirical nature stands to our faculties".<sup>88</sup> That is to say, in this definition, the purposiveness is identified with the "appropriateness" of nature to our cognitive faculties, as Kant himself indicates. Secondly, judgment, not only in its reflective form, but also in the determinative employment, is the faculty "that facilitates a relation between mind and nature". In this manner, she regards both judgment and purposiveness as a certain type of "relation" between the judging subject and nature. From this synchronization between purposiveness and judgment, for Hughes, we can conclude the idea that both of them function as a mediator between mind and nature. This can be seen as the first step of her complex arguments.

In the second one, she basically argues that, in order for aesthetic judgment to be compatible with the theory of reflective judgment, we should distinguish "two levels of purposiveness of nature". This classification, for Hughes, provides us with the proper basis for connecting aesthetic judgment with purposiveness and systematicity. Accordingly, it is possible to separate the purposiveness as "the fit in general between mind and nature" called "the general purposiveness" from the purposiveness

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<sup>87</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 267.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 257.

as “the more particular systematicity of empirical nature” called formal or logical purposiveness.<sup>89</sup>. And only “the more general level of purposiveness” can serve the basis upon which the exhibition of subjective purposiveness in aesthetic judgment is relied.<sup>90</sup> This subjective exhibition, that is, “beauty”, is a result of a special kind of synthesis in the process of producing judgment of taste (by “special synthesis”, Hughes points at “schematism without a concept”, we will elaborate on later in the free harmony of imagination in its synthesis of apprehension with the understanding). And in this act “an implicit awareness of our ability for synthesis” appears. In this way, the aesthetic judgment plays its own “exemplary” role through this “implicit awareness”. In this synthesis judging subject implicitly awares also that his aesthetic response to a particular presentation can be an example of the harmony of the empirical laws, that is, systematic unity, in nature.<sup>91</sup> And by means of this type of “exemplary” function, “the more particular systematicity of empirical nature” can be investigated. In this way, according to Hughes, we also solve the puzzle about producing pleasure in “the attainment of an aim”. At this point, it should be explained that in this composition, what Hughes emphasizes is simply the relation between the free harmony of cognitive faculties which is subjective in the aesthetic reflective judgment and the objective harmony of the imagination and understanding in an determinative judgment in which the imagination synthesizes not freely but under the determination of the rules imposed by the concepts of the understanding through which cognition appears. This is also why in the first step she underlies the case “not only reflective judgment but also determinative judgment”. The entire affirmation here is that subjective-free harmony is the exemplary for the objective and the rule-governed harmony, that is to say, the former implies the possibility of the latter.

In this explanation, we can see that the formal or logical purposiveness does not serve the ground for aesthetic judgment. On the contrary, in its relation to “the more general level of purposiveness”, the aesthetic experience is “a particular exhibition of

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<sup>89</sup> Fiona Hughes, “On Aesthetic Judgment and our Relation to Nature”, pp. 557-560.

<sup>90</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 262.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 265.

the possibility” of the formal or logical purposiveness. On the other hand, Allison rejects this division between the more general level of purposiveness and logical purposiveness. On Allison’s account, such a classification is not able to answer the question “how even a general principle of purposiveness could serve to license particular claims of taste”.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, he seems plausible in his objection. For, as we have seen in the first step, the relation is still between the subject and the nature, not between the nature’s products in which case systematicity operates.

Hannah Ginsborg also attempts to solve the problem of relation. Although Ginsborg’s arguments, like Hughes’ ones, may necessitate to be presented after dealing with the deep and complex nature of aesthetic judgment of reflection, her arguments, even at this level, not only will help us about how the proper relation can be established, but also will give a clue about the general structure of Kant’s aesthetic theory. We begin with her analysis by reference to Kant’s statement that “the feeling of pleasure in a judgment of taste is one and the same with the presentation of subjective purposiveness”. According to her, the reason behind this equation is the idea that “the judgment of taste bears an essential reference to the purposiveness of its object, Kant apparently concludes, that we can connect it with the principle of nature’s purposiveness for our cognitive faculties, and hence, with the faculty of reflective judgment, which has to rely on this principle as a condition of its exercise.”<sup>93</sup> However, this interpretation of Kant is open to critics. She reasonably argues that the purposiveness in the case of aesthetic judgment and the feeling of pleasure which is disinterested and unintentional is structurally different from the purposiveness which guides subjectively in the scientific inquiry. This is not only because that the former requires the condition of being disinterested and non-cognitive, whereas the second is entirely interested, intentional and requires apparently an empirical concept, but also because the subjective purposiveness engages merely in the forms of particular cases, whereas logical purposiveness or systematicity relates to the these forms’ relations with each other to generate

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<sup>92</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 63.

<sup>93</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition*, (New York and London: Garland Publishing Company Press, 1990), p. 178.

corresponding empirical concept.<sup>94</sup> In this sense, Kant's argument about the feeling of pleasure produced in "the attainment of an aim" is obviously contradictory.<sup>95</sup> In order to reach her own solution, Ginsborg, firstly, develops her arguments through the notion "systematicity". Accordingly, as I have mentioned before, in order for making empirical cognition about nature infinitely heterogeneous to be possible, we have to presuppose the principle of systematicity. In other words, the answer of the question "how is it that we as human beings are capable of perceiving regularities in nature and thus bringing it under empirical concepts" should be answered as that "the very activity of bringing objects under empirical concepts is intelligible only given the presupposition that nature is in fact organized in a systematic way which conforms to our capacity for empirical cognition. Thus while we cannot know that nature is systematically organized in the appropriate way, we have to assume it in so far as we are to make empirical judgments".<sup>96</sup> At this juncture, we can realize Ginsborg's tendency in that she orients Kant's emphasis on the position of nature in its empirical cognition towards the position of the judging subject. For her, the crucial question is not about the structure of nature; instead, it is about the capacity of human beings which allows us to produce empirical judgment and to form empirical concept under which a given particular is subsumed. Indeed, what she tries to make is to replace the phrase "for judgment" in Kant's statement "the principle of purposiveness for judgment" with "for our capacities to judge". She goes on arguing, Kant implicitly imposes the idea that in order to solve the problem of how nature can be grasped in its diversity not only by affirming the systematicity of nature as a presumption but also by supposing that "we ourselves possess cognitive capacities with respect to which nature can be systematically organized".<sup>97</sup> For, without presuming the latter, the presumption that "nature conforms to" the former makes no sense. By this way, Ginsborg underlies another requirement for grasping nature's purposiveness; our cognitive capacities to judge reflectively. As a next step, she

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>95</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 72 (1991), p. 294.

<sup>96</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, *The Role of Taste in Kant's Theory of Cognition*, p. 192.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p. 194.

attempts to show the claim that these cognitive capacities might be valid also without referring to any concept. With this move, she attempts to pass from the systematicity to the aesthetic judgment of reflection.

Consequently, if we are to presuppose that we have a capacity for empirical cognition in a way which is to make sense of the further presupposition that nature conforms to this capacity, we must be able to describe the capacity without making reference to the discovery or use of empirical concepts, and which is independent of the question of whether nature does or does not exhibit genuine regularities and resemblance.<sup>98</sup>

In such a manner, we might suggest that Ginsborg's argument carries us to the unique and radical case in which whereas nature cannot be purposive independently of our cognitive faculties, our capacities to judge can be valid independently of empirical concepts derived directly from nature. She fulfills this task by reference first to the notion "universal communicability" and second, to Kant's initial distinction between the acts of comparison in reflection.

By leading "universally communicating one's presentations", that is, "universal intersubjective validity" in cognition to the present issue at this stage, she attempts to show the possibility of the employment of reflective judgment not only in forming empirical concept by comparing empirical presentations with each other in empirical cognition, but also in reflecting solely on a given particular without an empirical concept. In both cases, reflection has universal validity (*Allgemeingültigkeit*).<sup>99</sup> In the first case, it is objectively valid in employing concepts, in the latter case, it is subjectively but still universally valid without employing any determinate concept. Thus, operating with empirical concepts is not a mere condition to be universally valid. Secondly, in order to make a room for her argument about the reflective comparison of one's presentation with our cognitive faculties, Ginsborg invokes Kant's own explanation of different functions of reflective judgment. According to this, the act of finding a universal for a particular also means the act of "thinking particular under the universal", and this alludes "equally well to think my state of

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

mind as universally valid".<sup>100</sup> She, by this way, arrives at the conclusion that in Kant's suggestion that to reflect comes to mean also the comparison of a given particular case with one's cognitive faculties, "to compare a given presentation with one's own cognitive faculties is to compare it with one's capacity of universally communicating presentations, which in turn is simply to take it to be universally valid".<sup>101</sup> Ginsborg equates cognitive faculties, which are universally valid, with "universal intersubjective communication" which is also universally but subjectively valid. This form of reflective judgment, that is, aesthetic judgment of reflection, according to her, serves us "formal requirement for empirical conceptualization." In other words, it is the "form" through which we also employ reflective judgment in its variation of the comparison of a given particular with others. This type of reflective activity drops the necessity of using empirical concept. It supplies us a way,

in which my claim to the universal validity of my state of mind in a beautiful object satisfies the general condition of my being able to apply a concept to the object in question, yet without my actually applying any concept of it. Correspondingly, in making such a claim, I perceive the object as potentially conceptualizable without falling under any particular concept. In other words, as Kant puts it, the object is 'perceived as purposive', not for the understanding, but 'for judgment'.<sup>102</sup>

Now, Ginsborg first passes from the systematicity and purposiveness to the aesthetic judgment, and by means of her last move, she attempt to reduce the possibility of them, and hence the general theory of reflective judgment alongside with teleological one to the condition provided by aesthetic judgment of reflection. In both radical theses of Hughes and Ginsborg, we can realize the common idea: Both of them approach to the issue from the epistemological point of view. In their radical attempt, they enforce the limits of Kant's theory of knowledge. For, they seem to render the condition of the empirical cognition dependent entirely on the condition of aesthetic judgment. I think, both theses are based on the assumption that the free harmony of

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

cognitive faculties in aesthetic reflective judgment implies also the condition for “cognition in general”. In Ginsborg’s cited passage just above, the phrase “the general condition of my being able to apply a concept”, I suppose, signifies exactly the same condition with Hughes’ phrase “the general condition of judgment”<sup>103</sup>. As we will see in the fourth chapter in arguing the possibility of free harmony on the basis of Kant’s theory of knowledge, Ginsborg, like Hughes, will argue the issue by the notion “exemplary”. In fact, the problem in Ginsborg’s argument is the unexplained transition from being “exemplary” to being “necessary”. She will do it by directly referring to aesthetic judgment’s “exemplary necessity”. To sum up, both Hughes and Ginsborg direct the readers to the epistemic relation between “subjective” in aesthetic judgment of reflection and objective in determinative judgment. In these passages, Hughes focuses on the subjective-objective harmony, while Ginsborg subjective-objective universality. Nevertheless, Allison’s objections are still valid. The relation between theory of reflective judgment, purposiveness, systematicity, teleological judgment as a group and aesthetic judgment cannot be established “directly”. The notion “exemplary” can provide us merely with an “indirect” relation. In fact, Hughes herself in her article admits the validity of Allison’s objections by stating that the relation between them is not a necessary, but merely a “symbolic” one.<sup>104</sup> After these, we have a proper ground to pursue the arguments which will be discussed in the following chapters of the dissertation.

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<sup>103</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 240.

<sup>104</sup> Fiona Hughes, “On Aesthetic Judgment and our Relation to Nature”, p. 554.

## CHAPTER 3

### KANT'S THEORY OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT OF REFLECTION

#### 3.1. General Description of Aesthetic Judgment of Reflection

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Kant, in his aesthetic theory, introduces a new form of judgment, i.e. reflective judgment to which aesthetic judgment belong, as opposed to determinative judgment; the opposition with regard to their operational ways in fulfilling the separated tasks. However, as I have attempted to show, they are not entirely exclusive forms of judgment as they appear in the third *Critique* at first glance. Afterwards, we have seen that the main motive behind Kant's introducing the new theory of reflective judgment is his conception of nature in its particular empirical forms and laws which is left as undetermined by the understanding. Since reflective judgment proceeds from the particular to the general for finding an empirical concept without being governed by the strict rules or principles of the understanding, it is capable of surveying nature in its diversity of its particular forms; and aesthetic experience arises by means of apprehending of those forms. In this manner, Kant thinks that aesthetic judgment is a subclass of reflective judgment to the extent that in judging an object to be beautiful, our judgment does not operate in accordance with a determinant concept, on the contrary, it necessitates, by its very nature, to contemplate or reflect on merely the form of the object judged aesthetically. Moreover, in order to achieve its special task, reflective judgment should have its own unique principle. For, in its operation, it cannot be directed by the principles of the understanding; otherwise it would be a determinant component in cognition. Yet, the principle of purposiveness, which guides both teleological and aesthetic judgments, is not a constitutive, but a regulative principle. Kant divides this principle into two types: subjective formal purposiveness referring to aesthetic judgment and objective purposiveness denoting teleological judgment. In order to

complete his theory, Kant also presents some supplementary notions, such as “technic of nature”, “specification”, “analogy” and “symbol”; those also help us in our investigation of nature and classifying it in a systematic way. By our analysis of the origin and functions of the ideas of reason in its coordination with the understanding, we will also investigate whether Kant, in his first *Critique*, leaves the door open for legitimately integrating his new theory of reflective judgment and nature as such to his transcendental system. On the other hand, the theory of reflective judgment is also regarded as being responsible for the problematic position of aesthetic theory by nearly all scholars. This is because, first, Kant's own obscure classification of “reflection”; namely that, he classifies the act of reflection both as the comparison of a particular with others, and as the comparison a particular with cognitive faculties, without giving any further analysis. And secondly, he defines reflective judgment by referring to the search for and arriving at a concept. However, we know that in aesthetic experience, there is no place for such a concept, nor does it function to arrive at a concept. Now, in this chapter, through our deeper inquiry into the nature of his aesthetic theory, we will see the unique or special characteristic of aesthetic judgment, that unique characteristic is entirely dependent on the inner dynamics which constitutes the condition of aesthetic judgment of reflection, and by re-systematizing his aesthetic theory with reference to his theory of knowledge, we will investigate what Kant has in his mind by presenting aesthetic experience in the theory of reflective judgment and its principle.

“Judgment of taste is aesthetic”. We should read this monumental sentence as that “merely’ judgment of taste is aesthetic”. Kant defines “taste” as “our ability to judge by the feeling of pleasure” the beautiful (*CJ*, 190, 203). (This is the first definition of “taste”, or strictly speaking, the simplest definition of it; during the Book I, “Analytic of the Beautiful”, the definition will be developed and modified) and in order to notice why judgment of taste is “aesthetic”, we, first, should look at the general mechanism of the judgment of taste. In our aesthetic experience, when we judge an object to be “beautiful”, we relate the apprehension of the form of the object to ourselves, i.e., to our feeling of pleasure, not to the concept of the object so as regards to the determinative judgment. In other words, the form of the object is

apprehended by the imagination, but it is not related to a determinate concept of the understanding to be cognized. Therefore, the predicate in a judgment of taste is not such a determinate concept but the feeling of pleasure (*CJ*, 289). As a necessary result of this, our judgment reflects not on the object or the concept of it, but on the apprehended and purposive form of that object. At this point, we should be careful to avoid misinterpreting this case. Here, what Kant attempts to illustrate is that in judgment of taste we are concerned never with “the existence of the object” to which an interest can belong, but with the feeling of pleasure which arises directly out of the form of that object without any interest. This is also why an aesthetic judgment of reflection denotes nothing in the object but in the mere subject judging that object. Put it differently, beauty is not an objective property of the object. In such a case, we have a certain type of relation with the object. In § 30, Kant explicitly states that “subjective formal purposiveness” in aesthetic judgment “does have its basis in the object and its shape”, “even though it does not indicate that we are referring the object to other objects according to concepts” (*CJ*, 279). Hence, Kant just underlies the fact that in judging aesthetically, we are not interested in what the object is, or what its function is. For this reason, in his aesthetic theory the emphasis slides from the object, or the concept of an object, to the form of that object, and so to the judgment about that object. After these explanations, we can notice the main idea that this initial shift from the object or the concept of the object to the subject’s feeling indicates the fact that aesthetic judgment is merely about “how judging subject is affected by the presentation of the object”, not about the object itself or its objective properties. In *Logic*, he explains that “in the description of beautiful objects, one describes only how one is affected by them”.<sup>105</sup> “Aesthetic”, here, implies the condition “how the objects appear to us” without considering any concept.

Hence a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment whose determining basis *cannot be other than subjective*. But any reference of presentations, even of sensations, can be objective (in which case it

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<sup>105</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 443.

signifies what is real [rather than formal] in an empirical presentation); excepted is a reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure- this reference designates nothing whatsoever in the object, but here the subject feels himself, (namely) how he is affected by the presentation.” (CJ, 204)

In this context, since the judgment of taste is a non-cognitive one, it is not in connection with the concept of the object which informs us about the objective properties of the object at which we look or even the existence of the object, but with the judging subject’s own source which reserves the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Under any circumstances, aesthetic judgment signifies nothing in the object, and the feeling of pleasure “does not contribute anything to cognition”, but denotes the judging subjects’ state of mind as a feeling which is the certain type of affection of the form of the object judged. In this regard, this kind of judgment is always about the feeling of the subject without prescribing any attribute to the object. Hence, the criterion for a judgment to be aesthetic is this subjective character. Adorno also stresses the significant role of this subjective character in Kant’s aesthetic theory. For him, what makes Kant’s aesthetic theory “revolutionary” is “that without leaving the circle of the older effect-aesthetics Kant at the same time restricted it through immanent criticism; this is in keeping with the whole of his subjectivism”.<sup>106</sup> This means that, according to Adorno, Kant brings the endless circle that turns around the question whether beauty is in the object or in the subject to an end: “In the subject”.

On the other hand, as we shall see, this kind of subjectivity does not come to mean that it is arbitrary or relative. Otherwise expressed, to affirm that judgment of taste is subjective cannot necessarily carry us to the conclusion that the feeling of the pleasure in aesthetic judgment is personal. In fact, what Kant calls “taste of sense”, which is related to the material or the concept of the object, is personal. If a judgment of taste was treated as such, there would be no need to a transcendental critique for it. Hence, even though it is subjective, it should have still a claim to be universally

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<sup>106</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 10-11.

valid; a subjective universality (*Allgemeinheit*). To sum up, “beautiful” is based on the experience in which a presentation of the form of the object produces the feeling of pleasure by means of enlivening our cognitive faculties in a free harmonious relation with each other, that is, free from being determined by any concept. The judgment of taste is entirely subjective, as it depends on the feeling of pleasure in the judging subject. And the feeling of pleasure is produced by the free harmony without being under the government of any rule imposed by the concepts of the understanding. Thus, free harmony is also not objective, but merely subjective.

### **3.2. Disinterested Nature of Aesthetic Judgment of Reflection**

As we have seen, aesthetic judgment’s determining basis is the feeling of pleasure, i.e. pleasure as the liking in beautiful. Thus, the characteristics of pleasure or the liking also forms the characteristics of judgment of taste. The judgment of taste can, indeed, be defined as the manifestation of the liking for beautiful. On the other hand, the feeling of pleasure or the liking in beautiful is not only one, there are different types of pleasure upon which aesthetic judgment of reflection cannot be grounded. From now on, we specify the liking in judgment of taste in order to differentiate it from other types. Kant’s one of the main assumptions about aesthetical judgment is that the liking which “determines a judgment of taste is devoid of all interest”, that is to say, such a judgment should be disinterested.

He defines “interest” as “the liking we connect with the presentation of an object’s existence.” This type of liking, which necessarily requires the existence of the object, refers to the power of desire “either as the basis that determines it, or.. as necessarily connected with that determining basis”. Kant’s strict rejection of “interestedness” in the aesthetic field and his acceptance of “disinterestedness” results in the claim that the power of desire, that is the capacity to satisfy an inclination, cannot be a determinant component for defining beauty. By this way, Kant puts a deep distance between his aesthetic theory and the power of desire by opposing “contemplation” (*Beschauung*) to “inclination” (*Neigung*). The criterion for a judgment to be aesthetic

is that it cannot involve any personal interest towards the object judged. He gives an example to make the argument expressing that interest is related necessarily to the existence of the object clear. According to this example, when we see the palace and find it “beautiful”, it does not matter for us, as judging subjects, whether to live in it or not. In a similar way, we do not have to see it again whenever we judge it to be beautiful and someone asks us whether we like it or not, we do not need the existence of the palace to answer it (*CJ*, 205). We judge, therefore, the palace in a contemplative way in which we have no personal intention towards it. To find something beautiful should not be dependent on its existence. In this regard, “the pure disinterest liking” in judging about taste is opposed completely to the interested pleasure. It is very clear that the reason why Kant claims that the existence of the object is indifferent in the aesthetic field is to secure the disinterested character of judgment of taste. Kant, in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, also differs interested pleasure from disinterested (contemplative) one and defines “practical pleasure” as “material end” which is “relative” and relates only “particular desire”:

The pleasure which is necessarily connected with desire (for an object whose representation affects feeling in this way) can be called practical pleasure, whether it is the cause or the effect of the desire. On the other hand, the pleasure which is not necessarily connected with a desire for an object and which, therefore, is really not a pleasure taken in the existence of the object of the presentation, can be called mere contemplative pleasure, or passive liking. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure is called taste.<sup>107</sup>

In the First Introduction, we can find Kant’s division of pleasure which refers to the division cited just above. According to that, pleasure as a certain kind of state of mind serves the ground either for preserving only its own state by means of which a presentation harmonizes with our cognitive powers, or “producing the object of this presentation”. The former case refers to the aesthetic judgment of reflection, i.e. to the disinterested pleasure, whereas the latter to what Kant calls “a pathological aesthetic judgment” or “a practical aesthetic judgment” in which pleasure includes an

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<sup>107</sup> Kant, Immanuel, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor, trans. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 27.

interest, and hence, the existence of the object (*CJ*, FI, 231). In a similar way, in his second *Critique*, Kant regards “the feeling of pleasure” based on the satisfaction of an inclination, i.e. an interest, as a kind of “affection by the existence of the object” which is grounded on “senses”, i.e. “sensation proper”.<sup>108</sup> In this composition, we can realize Kant’s aim in introducing “disinterested” character of judgment of taste. In the existence of the object, pleasure necessarily compels the concept of that object, that is, to what kind of object it is. On the other hand, as we have seen, the presentation of the object, without caring about what the object is, should be apprehended by imagination without subsuming it under a determinant concept of the understanding. Indeed, the pleasure involving an interest is called “aesthetic judgment of sense” by Kant as opposed to “aesthetic judgment of reflection”.

By regarding these differences, Kant holds three kinds of liking: agreeable, good and beautiful. Firstly, in the case of “agreeableness”, he separates judgment agreeable or the liking in agreeable from judgment of taste. What is crucial here is that judgment agreeable refers to personal liking and requires “the presentation of object’s existence” (*CJ*, 204). For this reason, according to Kant, this type of judgment necessitates “interestedness”. He defines “the agreeableness” as “what the senses like in sensation (*Empfindung*)” (*CJ*, 206). Namely, to be pleased in sensation agreeable determines or produces an inclination or a desire (*CJ*, 207). In such a case, it is clear that the liking depends on the power of desire and the existence of the object. Most importantly, Kant warns us that all liking, in fact, consists in the sensation of a pleasure (*CJ*, 206). We should be aware the fact that Kant uses the notion of “sensation” by referring both to “sense impression” and to “feeling”. In the former case, the subject judges about the objects solely with reference to the matter of sensation and in such a case pleasure arises in the sensation proper, after this we judge that the object is pleasurable; while in the latter, the judging subject is in relation to his own state of mind, as feeling, and pleasure arises in judgment itself, not before that judgment. Pleasure in agreeable, hence, is merely private (it is “graceful, lovely, delightful, gladdening, etc”), whereas pleasure in beautiful is

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<sup>108</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 19.

subjectively universal. In other words, pleasure in sensation constitutes merely a claim that the object judged is agreeable in sensation, whereas pleasure in beautiful has a claim to be universally valid for everyone. As we will see, in aesthetic judgment of reflection, pleasure cannot precede the judgment itself. Therefore, the liking in judgment of taste should occur in a pure contemplative way, not in the agreement on a sensation.

Secondly, regarding goodness, the subject is determined again by the existence of the object as useful object. Kant says that “in order to consider something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is to be, .i.e., I must have a (determinate) concept of it.”

A judgment of taste is merely *contemplative*, i.e. it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object: it considers the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Nor this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them as *purposes*. (CJ, 209)

To sum up, the agreeable and the good “are always connected with an interest in their objects. The liking for beautiful, contra the liking for agreeableness and for goodness, does not demand the existence of the object. In this sense, disinterestedness is the main characteristic of aesthetic judgment of reflection. When we find something beautiful neither we are in need of the existence or the concept of that object to judge it as beautiful, nor are we directed by any kind of inclination or desire. In such a case, we are not determined by a concept (of understanding as a cognitive faculty or of reason as a moral aspect) or a purpose. We are entirely free from all determinants in judging that it is beautiful. It is crucial to comprehend the fact that the liking or pleasure in beautiful is the only one which serves a suitable criterion for a judgment to be disinterested. For that reason it is distinguished from both agreeableness and goodness. “We call *agreeable* what gratifies us, *beautiful* what we just please, *good* what we esteem or endorse.” (CJ, 210).

After all, Kant re-defines “taste” as “the ability to judge an object...by means of a liking or disliking” which excludes all interest. And “the object of such a liking is called *beautiful*” (CJ, 211).

### **3.3. Subjective Universality: The Universal Voice**

In the previous section, we have dealt with the disinterested character of aesthetic judgment. We have seen that all liking relates to “a sensation of pleasure” which is divided into three groups by Kant: Liking for agreeable, for good and for beautiful. Since liking inevitably requires an interest towards the object in the first two groups, they cannot be counted as pleasure taken in the aesthetic experience. Merely “liking in beautiful” rests on subject’s own feeling without any reference to an inclination and to the existence of the object, i.e. the concept of an object. In this case, judgment is self-referential, and liking occurs immediately and directly in reflecting on the presentation of the purposive form of the object, which will, in fact, be equal to the subject’s feeling. According to Kant, this type of pleasure in its “disinterestedness” should have its own special kind of universality; otherwise it would be personal or private, that is, be agreeable on sensation.

Universality is the one of the most important components of the judgments of taste (another one will be “purposiveness”). For, those judgments cannot be a part of transcendental philosophy without the claim to have the universal validity, and in the case of lack of such a claim, the empirical or psychological investigation which is undoubtedly not the task of transcendental philosophy would be enough. Yet, as we will see, the notion “universality” in aesthetic judgment of reflection is different entirely from the objective universal validity of cognitive judgment, in which the act of subsumption operates under the rules and principles of the understanding through its concepts, as merely subjective. Here, again, we inevitably find ourselves in the major promise for aesthetic judgment that Kant puts it at the very beginning of his introducing aesthetic judgment of reflection: This kind of judgment is produced not by means of the co-operation of the understanding with the imagination relating to the determinant concepts, but by means of the co-operation of the imagination with

the understanding relating to the subject's feeling. Rather, the condition upon which such a unique subjective universality is based inevitably confronts us with the problem of priority, strictly speaking, with the problematic relationship of judgment to the feeling of pleasure in aesthetic experience and also with its problematic solution which Kant calls "the key to the critique of taste" discussed in § 9 where we are introduced the well-known assumption "free harmony of the cognitive faculties" for the first time. This is because Kant's reasoning in constituting non-conceptual subjective universality proceeds as following: by judging that this object is beautiful, the judging subject also demands for other's assent about his own taste, in this way it turns out to be intersubjective universal validity or universal communicability, and what serves the ground for such a demand will be nothing but the idea of all subjects' sharing the same cognitive powers. In other words, due to its non-conceptual nature, subjective universality can be provided merely by reference to the mechanism of cognitive faculties which are common in all people. Besides, Kant, in "the Deduction of Judgment of Taste", presents two types of "peculiarity" belonging to judgment of taste, denotes, in turn, the same tension between subjectivity and objectivity. The problem of these peculiarities (*Eigentümlichkeiten*), fortunately, will be solved in using the same tool, namely, "the harmony of cognitive powers" by Kant. (Another repetition will occur in "the Dialectic of Pure Aesthetic Judgment", there, again, we will encounter with these peculiarities). For these reasons, after discussing "the key to the critique of taste", I will, first, introduce these peculiarities, and then I will present the notion "free harmonious play". But before passing to these arguments, we will elaborate on the general framework of subjective universality drawn by Kant.

Before investigating the universality of judgment of beauty, Kant serves another version of the definition of beautiful on the basis of the notion "universality", in addition to the one formulated in terms of disinterestedness: Beautiful is "what is presented without concepts as the objects of *Universal* liking" (CJ, 211). The emphasis here is that the object can be judged as beautiful only provided that it pleases the judging subjects universally without requiring any concept, that is to say, in judging about taste, the universality of that judgment cannot be based on a concept. Then, the central question unavoidably arises: How is it possible to provide

a universal basis for such a type of judgment without a concept? It is “unavoidably” asked, because “universality”, in the first *Critique*, is rigidly bounded up with the employment of a concept of the understanding. On the other hand, according to Kant, when the subject finds something beautiful, he implicitly demands that everyone should find it beautiful as well, even though beauty does not belong to the object itself, but to the judgment in which the subject’s feeling is pleased. In other words, he “judges not just for himself but for every one, and speaks of beauty as if it were property of things” (*CJ*, 212). This feature of aesthetic pleasure to be judged for everyone is called “Universal Voice” (*allgemeine Stimme*) (*CJ*, 216). Therefore, in the aesthetic realm, the subject’s judgment contains the idea that every other subject ought to share the validity of this judgment, even if we lack of any objective basis for providing the universality. It is already contained in judgment itself (*CJ*, 213). A judgment of taste, hence, must be valid for all subjects. At the beginning, before mentioning “intersubjectivity” argument, Kant claims that we can also conclude the universality of aesthetic contemplation from the idea of the disinterestedness. This inference is based on a simple reasoning: if someone is aware of the fact that his liking in beautiful is released entirely from his private interest, that is, avoided any personal concern, then it necessarily follows that it can be shared by all other people.

if someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain basis for being liked for everyone. He must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any private conditions, on which only he might be dependent, so that he must regard it as based on what he can presuppose in everyone else as well. (*CJ*, 212)

However, this derivation is regarded as “invalid” by Guyer.<sup>109</sup> According to him, the condition of the lack of interest is not self-sufficient to derive the subjective universality, because it is also possible that anyone, who is directed by other private condition rather than interest, can be pleased in judging. For him, what is the case about the intersubjective universality is not disinterestedness but “reflection upon

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<sup>109</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 116.

aesthetic or pleasurable responses".<sup>110</sup> By the same token, Longuenesse also finds this derivation "unsuccessful" but by adding that such a deduction is not the only argument to demonstrate the validity of aesthetic judgment's claim to universality.<sup>111</sup> As a reply, Allison points out that, unlike Guyer's account, Kant's main concern is not to derive universality directly and only from the notion "disinterestedness". Kant does not hold the claim that such a derivation is self-sufficient to prove the universality of judgment of taste. He just attempts to demonstrate the relation between disinterestedness and universality; the relation is "natural" but this is not the "only" condition for establishing the universal validity of aesthetic judgment.<sup>112</sup> In his analysis, Allison seems quite plausible. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Kant's remarkable derivation universality from disinterestedness allows us to notice the intertwined relation between them.

Now returning again to Kant's central thought which is labeled as "psychological argument" by Zammito<sup>113</sup>, we should notice that the universal demand for the subjects' assent is already included in the judgment of taste itself. Here we can easily notice the fact that what Kant explicates is that the justification of the universality of aesthetic judgment requires the subjects' demands and consensus about beautiful. In order to underlie this idea, Kant also uses the expression "*general validity*" identical with the notion "universal validity" of aesthetic judgment. He called "general", because of its "public", "common" or intersubjective character (*CJ*, 215). "A judgment of taste must involve a claim to *subjective universality*." (*CJ*, 212). The judgment of taste, therefore, should rest on the ground that a subject's judgment in the aesthetic field is able to be considered as valid for other judging subjects. Such a common ground cannot be found in private taste of sense. It must be stressed that since liking in agreeable, i.e. aesthetic judgment of sense, is solely personal, it cannot

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>111</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's leading threat in the Analytic of the Beautiful", *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Rebecca Kukla, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 202-203.

<sup>112</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, pp. 99-100.

<sup>113</sup> John H. Zammito, *Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 106.

provide this condition for such subjective universality. That is to say, “universal voice” cannot be included in or derived from the agreeable, as it by definition expresses “agreeable *to me*”. The principle of the agreeable can be formulated as following: “Everyone has their own taste” (*CJ*, 212). We can also convert it into another formulation: “Everyone has his own personal voice about taste of sense”. Under the light of these explanations, the distinction between subjective and objective universality I have mentioned just above can be seen in a clearer way: In *Critique of Pure Reason*, the universality is provided by pure concepts, i.e. categories, of the understanding, i.e. *quid facti*, and it is justified by showing without the application of pure concepts, the experience would not be possible, i.e. *quid juris*, whereas in his third *Critique*, considering the judgment of taste, universality cannot be derived from such a concept due to the non-conceptual nature of aesthetic reflective judgment. In other words, although Kant, in *Prolegomena*, equates the universality with objectivity<sup>114</sup>, in the case of pure aesthetic judgment of reflection, universality is based solely on the subject, and hence, the subjectivity. There are no objective *rules* or *laws* to be applied in the judgment of taste. Pleasure in liking for beautiful never occur in terms of the act of subsuming the presentation of an object under the concept (universal), that is, by mediating of a concept (*CJ*, 286). Kant expounds the difference between logical judgment and judgment of taste by giving an example: “I may look at a rose and make a judgment of taste declaring it to be beautiful. But if I compare many singular roses and so arrive at the judgment, “Roses in general are beautiful”, then my judgment is no longer merely aesthetic, but is a logical judgment based on an aesthetic one” (*CJ*, 215). Here, the act of comparison of the singular case with others necessitates having the concept of this particular. This example stresses also the singularity of aesthetic judgment (*CJ*, 191).

If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, then we lose all presentation of beauty. This is why there can be no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful. No one can use reasons or principles to talk us into a judgment on whether some garment, house, or flower

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<sup>114</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 47.

is beautiful. We want to submit the object to our own eyes, just if our liking of it depended on that sensation. And yet, if we then call the object beautiful, we believe we have a universal voice, and lay claim to the agreement of everyone, whereas a private sensation would decide solely for the observer himself and his liking. (*CJ*, 216)

In this significant quoted passage, Kant explicates, indeed, also a crucial idea in the phrase “no one can use reasons or principles” in judging about taste. At this juncture, again, it is underlined the singularity and non-conceptual characteristic of a judgment of taste in a considerable way that we do not need a concept or a rule or a principle, as we do not say that “this object is beautiful, because it is a rose” in an aesthetic experience. It is entirely irrelevant to judge by reference to the concept of the object. Furthermore, in “Deduction”, Kant mentions, the universality of judgment of taste is “the universality of a singular judgment” (*CJ*, 281). It belongs to the single empirical presentation. It, indeed, must be the case; otherwise we cannot talk about the free play of cognitive faculties in judgment of taste. It is a singular feeling of a single judging subject referring to a singular experience. Yet, the claim of this singular judgment is shared by all subjects. This is the peculiarity of aesthetic judgment (*CJ*, 285). Kant, in the “Analytic”, emphasizes this “feature” which will be called “peculiarity” of aesthetic judgment in the “Deduction” by pointing out “why the aesthetic universality we attribute to a judgment must be of a special kind, for although it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the *object*, considered in its entirely logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over entire sphere *of judging persons*” (*CJ*, 215). In this light, it is possible to affirm that the feeling of pleasure as a predicate in a judgment contributes nothing to the cognition of the object, but still adds a claim to be universally valid to the judgment. In this manner, aesthetic reflective judgment is solely “my subjective response to the presentation of the object”, but “the product”, i.e., the feeling of pleasure, of this *subjective* experience still has the universal validity.<sup>115</sup> Rather, again in the “Deduction”, Kant also mentions why “universal assent” to judgment of taste is

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<sup>115</sup> Sydney Axinn, “And yet: A Kantian Analysis of Aesthetic Interest”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 25:1, (1964), p. 113.

subjective: It refers to the subjective condition of cognition (that is, cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding) which is shared by all people (*CJ*, 290).

Finally, it must be also noted that Kant emphasizes the hierarchical relation between subjective aesthetic judgment and objective judgment produced by cognitive faculties by expressing that “a judgment that is *universally valid objectively* is always subjectively too” (*CJ*, 215). That is to say, when a judgment is grounded on the objective conditions of cognitive faculties, it is necessarily valid for everyone and everything, but not *vice versa*. Judgment of taste has only subjective validity from which we cannot derive the cognitive or objective universal validity. After all, we have seen that the subjective universality of aesthetic judgment is “partially” established without any need for applying the concept of an object by the idea of intersubjective validity for everyone. Now, we will investigate the justification for the ground of this kind of universality.

### **3.3.1. “The Key to the Critique of Taste”: The First Rupture**

In arguing “subjective universality”, we have used some statements, such as “pleasure is involved in judgment itself”, and during our investigation we relate aesthetic judgment to the feeling of pleasure to the extent that the attributes of the feeling of pleasure turns out to be those of judgment of taste. But, until now, Kant has not offered a definite relation between them yet. As we will see, in defining this relation, what Kant himself calls “the key” provides us with a facility to answer to the question “why judgment of taste is incorporated with transcendental philosophy, i.e. under the scope of the critique,” and paves the way for linking subjective validity and harmony of cognitive faculties. By this way, we will have a legitimate link to pass from subjective universality to subjective formal purposiveness. That is to say, the solution gives us a justification of the universality of aesthetic judgment, the present problem here is nothing but re-formulating the problem of the determining ground for the aesthetic judgment of reflection by following another path. For these reasons, Kant treats the solution as “the key to the critique of taste”. However, I

should note that the solution to the problem also results in arising some other crucial problems in that scholars are divided into separated camps in accordance with their attitudes in their attempts to solve the problems brought with Kant's own solution.

He elaborates on these issues in § 9. The title of the section tells us what we will examine: "Investigation of the Question Whether in a Judgment of Taste the Feeling of Pleasure Precedes the Judging of the Object or the Judging Precedes the Pleasure". (Even in the title, the problem welcomes us. Kant does not ask whether the judgment of taste precedes the feeling of pleasure, he asks whether "in the judgment of taste" (*Geschmacksurteil*) "the judging of the object" (*Beurteilung des Gegenstandes*) precedes or not. (Kant will not explain it during the text, but, to be sure, we will search for the answer.) The proper answer and solution will define their relation: Which one of them serves the ground for another and so determinates it? Kant, at the very beginning, exactly in the first sentence, remarks that "the solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste and hence deserves full attention". In fact, he already warned us in § 8 about the essentiality of the problem by saying that "this special characteristic of an esthetic judgment of reflection, the universality to be found in judgment of taste, is a remarkable feature, not for the logician, but certainly for the transcendental philosophers" (CJ, 214). Then, we should pay full attention to this problem and its solution. Here, it is clear that the issue is about "priority", but it is not clear yet whether this "priority" is temporal or it is logical one. Put it simply, Kant's answer is: The judging of the object precedes the feeling of pleasure. Before analyzing Kant's answer, I would like to cite this crucial passage:

If the pleasure in the given object came first, and our judgment of taste were to attribute only the pleasure's universal communicability to the presentation of the object, then this procedure would be self-contradictory. For that kind of pleasure would be none other than mere agreeableness in the sensation, so that by its very nature it could have only private validity, because it would depend directly on the presentation by which the object *is given*". (CJ, 217)

Here, as we can notice, the readers, or "transcendental philosophers", confront with several difficulties. First of all, before the solution, even the answer itself seems to be

problematic, as Kant has already positioned pleasure itself as a determining basis of the judgment of taste. This is because, as we know, judgment of taste is not determined by a concept but by the feeling itself. In the First Introduction, Kant clearly affirms that aesthetic judgment's determining basis is sensation (Kant calls also “so-called sensation” to separate it from other kinds of sensation which relies on “matter” of the object”) (*CJ*, 224), that cannot be an element of the cognition, as it excludes the need for a concept of the object judged. Rather, in the first moment, Kant described pleasure as liking in beautiful which determines judgment of taste; to be sure, he does it until the section 9. And, as we have already seen, this kind of sensation refers to the feeling of pleasure in beautiful. Otherwise, the whole structure of critique of pure aesthetic judgment would collapse. It should be kept in mind that judgment of taste is merely reflective, but at the same time, it is the special one. For, in such a judgment, the predicate is not a concept of the object judged, but the feeling of pleasure. For this reason, this kind of judgment expresses nothing about the object itself. It expresses only the feeling of, or, about the judging subjects. As Kant puts it, judgment of taste refers not to object, but to the pleasure in which the judging subject “feels himself”, “how he is affected by the presentation” (*Cj*, 204). That is to say, judgment of taste is entirely based on this pleasure. In such a structure, to assert that aesthetic judgment determines the feeling of pleasure which is served as the ground of that judgment is paradoxical. We can think this issue from another perspective. Accordingly, in a judgment cognitive or determinative, whose predicate is a determinate concept, judgment itself does not determinate the concept, indeed, a concept as a predicate determinates the given object as a subject of the judgment. Rather, even though judgment of taste does not contain a concept, it has still a claim to universal validity. Because, it expresses the feeling, which is disinterested (that is, it is not relied on any personal or private interest), thus, expresses not a personal feeling but a universal one. Its validity is not for the object, but for the judging subjects. In other words, even if such judgments declare nothing about the objective property of the object, it universally voices about the feeling of all judging subjects. Kant, now, offers that the pleasure itself is “universally communicable”. This is why, in judgment of taste, a judging subject demands also other subjects' agreements.

Secondly, in this passage, we should realize the fact that Kant passes from the universality of judgment of taste, or from “universal voice” “about a liking unmediated by concepts” in judgment itself, to “the pleasure’s universal communicability”. This passing is oddly remained as unexplained by Kant. Thirdly, we also face with another “unexplained passing” problem regarding Kant’s phrase “the pleasure ‘in the given object’”. Here, Kant again passes from the feeling of pleasure in the judgment to “pleasure in the given object”. Now, we can avoid confusion about this phrase as follows: It should be read as “pleasure taken in the form of the object”. Furthermore, we can see that Kant’s justification for judging’s priority is based on the idea that if the reverse was, it would be self-contradictory. The rationale behind this reasoning appears in the second sentence: it would be self-contradictory, because, in the case of pleasure in agreeable which depends not on the judgment itself but on the sensation proper, the feeling precedes judging. Therefore, we can re-formulate the issue as following: If the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object upon which the universal communicability of that pleasure is strictly based, then it loses its own claim to be universally communicable. For, it is logically impossible for something to be prior to something else which serves the basis for the former. Or, put it in a different way, if pleasure taken in the presentation of the object came first, then judgment necessarily had to relate the universal communicability of this kind of pleasure to sensation, and in such a case this pleasure would be merely agreeable, which is called “taste of sense”, rather than “taste of reflection” (CJ, 214). In fact, it is possible to reduce all these arguments into one: what Kant attempts to prevent is the misrelating of pleasure to aesthetic judgment in that the relation between them cannot be taken as “causal relation”. That means, if pleasure is externally caused by the sensation of the object, then it necessarily follows that judgment about taste is based on this empirical-external causal relation which qualifies such a judgment merely as an aesthetic judgment of sense. In such a case, there is no need for a transcendental critique of taste. At this point, we can notice, again, how moments, or properties of aesthetic judgment are internally and necessarily required or dependent on each other. In the next paragraph Kant attempts to give explanations for making clear his answer:

“Hence, it must be the universal communicability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence.”

On Allison’s account, this second paragraph of the section 9 contains “the most puzzling statements” in the third *Critique*.<sup>116</sup> Here, the referent is completely lost; if we take “the universal communicability of the mental state” as “the feeling of pleasure” in accordance with the first paragraph’s phrase “pleasure’s universal communicability”, then we faces inevitably with “absurdity” as Guyer calls it, or with “hopeless circularity” as Allison calls it. For, it is very clear that in such case the pleasure serves both the condition to the judgment and the ground for the pleasure, i.e., for itself. Nuzzo suggests an alternative reading: “the universal communicability of the mental state produced by the representation of the object that must precede and ground the judgment of taste as its subjective condition so that a feeling of pleasure in the object must follow”.<sup>117</sup> As we will see, in order to overcome these difficulties, interpreters will follow different paths by either opposing themselves to Kant’s position or defending him.

Before introducing debates, we have to look at the following passage in the second paragraph, where Kant begins to specify the condition under which the universal communicability is possible.

Nothing, however, can be communicated universally except cognition, as well as presentation insofar as it pertains to cognition; for presentation is objective only insofar as it pertains to cognition, and only through this does it have a universal reference point with which everyone’s presentational power is compelled to harmonize. If, then, we are to think that the judgment about this universal communicability of the presentation has a merely subjective determining basis, i.e., one that does not involve a concept of the object, then this basis can be nothing other than the mental state that we find in relation between the representational powers (imagination and understanding) insofar as they refer a given representation to *cognition in general*. (CJ, 217)

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<sup>116</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 111.

<sup>117</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, p. 275.

In this way, Kant puts the harmony of cognitive powers in his argument by pointing out the view that it has been already held that in cognition the co-operation of cognitive powers is objective basis for judging through concepts, yet even in the case of lack of those concepts, the harmony of the cognitive powers serves still the subjective basis for judging about beautiful. And this provides a possibility for a presentation to be universally communicated. In this passage, in the phrase “the universal communicability of mental state” apparently refers to the free play relation of imagination and understanding. And as we will see, the debate between interpreters mostly depends on Kant’s language: He treats both the harmony of cognitive powers and the feeling of pleasure as “mental state”. At the end of the story, Kant derives the universal communicability from this harmony and takes this harmonic relation as the ground for both judgment of taste and pleasure. In Deduction, he states that “the subjective condition of all judgments is our very ability to judge” (CJ, 287). After all, in order to solve the puzzle presented in Kant’s solution, commentators follows two different paths: they either attempt to distinguish “pleasure in the object” from “pleasure in the judgment” or attempt to distinguish “the judgment of taste” from “the judging of the object”.

### **3.3.1.1. The Two-Acts view or the Double Process of Reflection**

In order to overcome the issue arisen out of Kant’s solution in § 9, some commentators appeal to take the judging of the object and the judgment of taste as two distinct reflective acts. By this way, they attempt to show that the judging of the object precedes the feeling of pleasure, and the same pleasure can be basis of the judgment of taste. This view is called “the Two-Acts View” or “Double Process of Reflection” in the relevant literature. In order to illustrate how this theory is operational, I will argue, first, Crawford’s and then Guyer’s arguments, as two main representative figures for the mentioned theory.

First of all, I would like to give some remarks on the structure of Crawford’s *Kant’s Theory Aesthetic Theory*. In doing so, we will also realize that his attitude to the

solution of “the key to the critique of taste” is also a responsible for composing the structure of his book. Crawford regards Kant’s own arrangement of third *Critique* as “inaccurate” and “misleading”. This structure, according to him, masks “the actual development and the logically distinct stages of Kant’s argument, and obscures the unity of his aesthetic theory”.<sup>118</sup> In order to serve a systematic analysis of Kant’s aesthetic theory, he undertakes the issue of re-arrangement of the third *Critique*. Accordingly, he distinguishes the first moment “disinterestedness” from others, and deals with it under the title of “empirical deduction”.<sup>119</sup> Further, he also treats “disinterestedness” as only element of “the analysis of the judgment of taste”.<sup>120</sup> Crawford’s reason for this division is quite persuasive: In the first moment, as we have seen, Kant’s main aim is to show the condition under which pleasure in beautiful is disinterested pleasure. In doing this, he simply opposes “judgment of taste”, or “aesthetic judgment of reflection” which depends on disinterested pleasure to what he calls “aesthetic judgment of sense”. That is, he investigates empirical conditions by analyzing “judgment of taste”. Kant’s analysis of disinterestedness “leads to the deduction of judgments of taste”.<sup>121</sup> Other items, such as “the key to the critique of taste”, “universality”, “harmony of cognitive powers” and “subjective purposiveness”, are attached to the “transcendental deduction”. In such a structure, it can be realized that “the key to the critique of taste” has its own distinct place as a part of Transcendental Deduction. After these remarks, now we can pass to our main issue.

According to Crawford, in order to comprehend Kant’s solution which states that “the pleasure in the object is a consequent of the judging of the object”, it is necessary, first, to find out whether Kant makes a distinction between the judgment of taste and the judging of the object or not. The view of taking the judging of the object as identical with the judgment of taste brings unavoidably about the paradox.

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<sup>118</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, (Madison: University of Winconsin Press, 1974), p. 66.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

For, “it contradicts Kant’s analysis that the judgment of taste is aesthetic, since an aesthetic judgment by definition is one based on a feeling of pleasure”.<sup>122</sup> At this juncture, Crawford appeals Walter Cerf’s argument. According to that, we should distinguish “two senses of judgment of taste”, namely, a “tasting” and a “verdict”. By this way, in the judgment of taste, aesthetic “verdict” precedes “tasting” as “appreciation” in which pleasure occurs. In Edward Bullough’s language, it comes to mean that “we *judge* a flower to be beautiful and *therefore* like it”.<sup>123</sup> Hence, in order to avoid the paradox mentioned above, we have to distinguish two “senses” from each other in a single judgment of taste. The first sense, “verdict”, determines the pleasure in the object, and then the second sense, “tasting”, grounded on and determined by this pleasure, is employed, by means of which we declare our liking of the presentation of the object. In this case, pleasure becomes both the determining basis and the consequent of judgment of taste.

On the other hand, Crawford is still dubious about that division of the sense included in the same judgment. Because, on the basis of this division, the formulation of the statement in the section 9 must be formed as follows: “the pleasure is a consequent of the judgment of taste, and the judgment of taste is thought of as a verdict that the object in question is beautiful”. This formulation is also obscure. In Crawford’s account, Kant never explicitly mentions “*how*” such a distinct verdictive judgment of taste is responsible for producing pleasure. Conversely, when Kant explains that aesthetic judgment relates the presentation of the object to the feeling of pleasure, he simply means pleasure is “a precondition for making” even “the verdictive judgment of taste”.<sup>124</sup> In other words, disinterested pleasure as a special kind of liking *determines* the characteristic of a judgment to decide whether it is a judgment of taste or not, and “not *vice versa*”. The case in which we attribute two senses to the same kind of the judgment of taste is not enough to save Kant’s argument in section 9 as non-paradoxical. Therefore, according to Crawford, the view suggesting two senses in judgment of taste is insufficient in order to solve the puzzle properly. Although it

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 71

emphasizes two different senses in the judgment of taste, it still holds that the judging of the object which precedes the pleasure is identical with the judgment of taste. He divides the paragraphs and composes sentences in order to illustrate the paradox more apparently. According to that, “the subjective ground of the judgment of taste must be the possibility of the universal communication of ‘the mental state in the given presentation’. Crawford affirms that if we regard “the judging of the object”, to which pleasure is the consequent, as the same act with “the judgment of taste”, it is impossible to arrive coherently at Kant’s conclusion that “the mental state in this presentation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the powers of presentation in a given presentation with reference to a cognition in general”. The point here is also to what “the mental state” is referring? For Crawford, “the mental state” refers to the harmony of the cognitive faculties, or to put it in Crawford’s language, to “the feeling (a consciousness or awareness) of the harmony of the cognitive faculties”. Indeed, Crawford does not mention that it “refers to” harmonious play, he emphasizes that it “must” refer to. In this composition, it is obvious that pleasure as the basis of the judgment of taste is also the consequence of that judgment. In order to avoid this paradox, we should differ “the judging of the object” itself from the judgment of taste itself, not from the senses they involve.

Afterwards, he begins to analysis the first paragraph of the section 9 in an illustrative way. Namely, considering the first assumption “the pleasure in the given object precedes the judging of the object”, Kant’s reasoning proceeds as following: then the feeling of pleasure is connected necessarily with the sensation of the object. And in such a case, the universal communicability of “this” pleasure would be depended upon the sensation. From this, it should be concluded that this pleasure became “the mere pleasantness in sensation”. Hence, such a pleasure could have a claim solely to be private validity, rather than universal validity. As a result of this, the pleasure in beautiful “cannot precede the judging of the object but must be the consequent of” it.<sup>125</sup> Most importantly, from this reasoning, Crawford deduces, but without giving any further explanation for this concluding, that “the judgment of taste is to make a legitimate claim to universal validity, the pleasure in the beautiful object must be

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

consequent of some *as-yet-undetermined activity* called “*the judging of the object*” (my emphasis).<sup>126</sup> Otherwise, the pleasure in beautiful becomes “the pleasure in mere sensation”. Here, he clearly defines the act of the judging of the object as “yet-undetermined activity” in order to separate it from the act of aesthetic judgment. It is “yet-undetermined activity”, because its reflection and contemplation, contemplative regarding disinterestedness, on the form of the object results in the harmony and in this way it produces pleasure but does not define or *determine* it as the pleasure in beautiful. And then through the consciousness or awareness of the harmony of cognitive powers which is subjective but universal condition for a pleasure to be communicable, we realize that this feeling is the pleasure in beautiful and, thus, the pleasure gains its status of being universally communicable. This second reflection on the pleasure itself produced by the free play of cognitive powers is the act of the judgment of taste which is verdictive and includes awareness. Consequently, according to Crawford, “the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is a consequent to the activity of judging the object; it is the product of this activity”. And at the same time, the pleasure serves the ground for the judgment of taste by means of which this pleasure is defined as the pleasure taken in the beautiful object.

Firstly, underlying the transcendental deduction of judgments of taste, there is implied the major assumption that in order for a judgment to have universal validity there must be something at the basis of the judgment which is universally communicable or capable of being shared. Without this basis, judgment of taste could not be distinguished logically from the merely privately valid judgments of sensuous taste. Secondly, the “mental state is the given presentation” is Kant’s way of referring to the state of mind, as yet undetermined, that gives rise to the pleasure at the basis of the judgment of taste. This mental state is the harmony of the cognitive faculties resulting from the reflection and contemplation of the formal purposiveness of the object.<sup>127</sup>

Before passing to Guyer’s arguments, I would like to underline three points. Initially, we can find, in fact, some hints for Crawford’s concluding in the “Deduction”.

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

Especially in § 37 and §38, Kant argues, first, “it is not pleasure, but *the universal validity of this pleasure*, perceived as connected in the mind with our mere judging of an object, that we present a priori as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for everyone” and secondly, in judgment of taste “our liking for the object is connected with our mere judging of the form of the object” (*CJ*, 290). According to that, Kant seems to implicitly separate “pleasure” and “the universal validity of this pleasure”. And he relates the latter with “the judging of the object”. Then, it can be interpreted in a way that he also seems to regard two different acts of reflection in the aesthetic experience. On the other hand, the direct, not interpretive, textual evidences for evaluating this theory’s compatibility with the whole structure of Kant’s aesthetic theory is disputable.

Secondly, although Crawford’s thesis provides Guyer with a basis to establish his own arguments, the relation of the judging of the object with the judgment of taste in Crawford’s thesis is, it can be stated, differently re-constructed than Guyer’s argument. Crawford defines the activity of the judging of the object elsewhere in a clearer way. According to that, the judging of the object “which leads to the judgment of taste” contains some mental activities with respect to “the manifold of intuitions” through which the reflection and contemplation of the form of the object is possible.<sup>128</sup> In Guyer’s account, the first reflective act does not lead to the judgment of taste itself, it leads to the harmony of cognitive powers through the contemplative reflection on the form of the object. They are not temporally successive acts in such a way that the judging of the object necessarily causes the judgment of taste. “While making a judgment about a pleasure certainly presupposes the occurrence of that pleasure”, for this reason, “the latter does not entail the former”.<sup>129</sup> In fact, it is not the judging of the object, but the latter one “leads to an actual judgment of taste”.

Thirdly and finally, even though Crawford himself develops and supports the two-acts view in order to solve some puzzles with which we confront in analyzing Kant’s

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 27, and also p. 96.

<sup>129</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 97.

aesthetic theory, he, both at the end of his book<sup>130</sup> and later in his article<sup>131</sup>, annotates his hesitation about the complete validity of this theory regarding Kant's own arguments.

Taking from the historical perspective, it seems that both Crawford and Guyer<sup>132</sup> owe this paradox to Edward Bullough. Crawford upgrades Bullough's argument in a more complex and a detailed way. The paradox and its solution have deep affects on the structure of Crawford's book. On the other hand, these affects can be felt even in every single page in Guyer's *Kant and The Claims of Taste*. Guyer seems to take the developed version of this paradox from Crawford and carries it to the most complicated stage. And also he seems to be much more confident about the compatibility of his thesis with Kant's aesthetic theory than Crawford. (Although, as a result of some "anomalies", Guyer himself will have to confess that his classification of the third *Critique* is not completely coherent with Kant's own theory.<sup>133</sup> Guyer structures his entire book directly with reference to the theory of double process of reflection. He divides Kant's aesthetic theory into two theories: Theory of Aesthetic Response referring to "the judging of the object" (he translates the German term "Beurteilung" into English as "estimation", hence he calls it "the estimation of the object" during the text), and Theory of Aesthetic Judgment. According to him, while theory of aesthetic response gives us "the explanation of our pleasure in beauty" which is "justificatory criteria", theory of aesthetic judgment provides "analysis of the claims of a judgment of taste"<sup>134</sup> which serves as a "defining criteria for the evaluation" of the former<sup>135</sup>. For this reason, he attaches the theory of aesthetic response to the first and third moments, and theory of aesthetic judgment to the second and fourth moments.<sup>136</sup> At this point, it should be noticed that

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<sup>130</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 117.

<sup>131</sup> Donald W. Crawford, "Comparative Aesthetic Judgments and Kant's Aesthetic Theory", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 38:3 (1980), p. 292.

<sup>132</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 390, n. 125.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p. xviii

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p. xvii.

these two distinct acts of reflection belong to the same faculty of reflective judgment. He calls the judging of the object “aesthetic response”, because it is simply a reflective and contemplative response to the object, or strictly speaking, to the subjective purposive form of the object. In this regard, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, we can find also the genuine transitional link between Kant’s theory of reflective judgment considering the principle of purposiveness and his aesthetic theory. In giving explanation of his “brave” re-interpretive constitution of Kant’s aesthetic theory, Guyer emphasizes how he uses and interprets some details in the third *Critique* in his own right.

Because of the complexity of Kant’s actual use of the concept of reflective judgment and the difficulty of interpreting the case of pure aesthetic judgment in terms of this concept, my strategy in the present book was (“was”, because this is the Foreword to the Second Edition of his book) basically to interpret aesthetic judgment on the basis of other characterizations that Kant offers, relying more on an ordinary conception of reflection and some of its varieties than on Kant’s obviously important but minimally elaborated technical notion of reflective judgment for some of my own crucial distinction.<sup>137</sup>

Now, after giving general remarks, we can elaborate on Guyer’s own arguments about our present issue. He, both in his book and in the article “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste”, regards the judgment of taste as “the outcome of a double process of reflection” both producing pleasure<sup>138</sup> by means of “a direct reflection on or estimation of an object”<sup>139</sup> and “evaluating it”<sup>140</sup> through “a further act of reflection on one’s experience of the object, which issues in the actual judgment of taste”<sup>141</sup>. However, here, the position of the reflective act of the aesthetic judgment is not clear. For, Guyer presents “a further act” as a reflection on

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. xvi.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>139</sup> Paul Guyer, “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s theory of Taste”, *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*, Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), p. 22.

<sup>140</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 133

<sup>141</sup> Paul Guyer, “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s theory of Taste”, p. 21.

“the feeling of pleasure itself” in his book<sup>142</sup>, whereas in his article he asserts that such a reflection is on one’s experience of the object without giving any explanation (most probably, he should have equated the feeling of pleasure with “one’s experience of the object). Furthermore, Guyer specifies these components, namely that the first act of reflection, “the estimation of the object”, is “unintentional” that produces the harmony of cognitive faculties which “causes” the feeling of pleasure.<sup>143</sup> This “simple reflection” on the form of the object, therefore, precedes the feeling of pleasure. The second act is intentional and “determines that the feeling of pleasure *is* such a pleasure”.<sup>144</sup> In other words, this intentional reflection on pleasure itself defines that pleasure and so, determines pleasure’s status and, in this way, “licenses a judgment of taste to its intersubjective validity”.<sup>145</sup> By this second reflective act, we judge an object to be beautiful. Consequently, the feeling of pleasure becomes the basis of the judgment of taste. Indeed, according to Guyer, while affirming that the judging of the object precedes the feeling of pleasure, Kant does not refer to this second intentional act of reflection, but to the first reflective activity. Rather, Kant also does not mention that the feeling of pleasure is the basis of “all reflection”. Unintentional simple reflection produces, therefore, precedes the feeling of pleasure, then intentional reflection is based on this pleasure. What Kant indicates in the first paragraph of the section 9 is that subjective universality of the judgment of taste which will be, in turn, the universal communicability of the pleasure cannot be, “rationally”, attached to “a pleasure whose origination precedes all reflection or estimation, and is instead due entirely to sensation”<sup>146</sup> which has merely a claim to private validity. In order to save the universal communicability of the pleasure, this pleasure should be preceded by an act of reflective judgment whose origin is based upon a priori function of cognitive faculties. However, there appears a problem in this composition presented by Guyer. Namely that although he asserts that the second act of reflection is intentional (it should be, by definition, intentional,

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<sup>142</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. xviii.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 135.

because it reflects on the pleasure in order to determines its status, merely by this way we are able to be aware our free play harmony of cognitive powers), Kant explicitly informs that reflection in aesthetic judgments occurs “unintentionally” as deprived of any purpose (*CJ*, 190). Guyer’s answers to this problem is actually coherent with his general theory of Kant’s aesthetic. According to that, as we have seen, Kant in the section VII of the second introduction has already claimed that “attainment of any aim” gives rise to the feeling of pleasure. Here, in the second reflection, he intentionality refers to the attainment of an aim: cognition in general. As a result, according to Guyer, without regarding this two-acts view, the arguments of section 9 will be “absurd”<sup>147</sup> and “contradictory”<sup>148</sup>. In this regard, he thinks that “the key to the critique of taste” “confirms” his interpretation.<sup>149</sup>

Guyer indicates several passages of Kant as textual evidences. In one of them, Kant expresses that “when the form of an object, in simple reflection on it, without the intention of deriving any concept from it, is estimated (*beurteilt*) as the ground of a pleasure in the presentation of such an object, then this pleasure is judged to be necessarily connected with such a presentation, that is, as so connected not merely for the subject which apprehends this form, but for every judging subject in general. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and thus with universal validity) is called taste”.

Unfortunately, the picture drawn by Guyer is not as accurate as it appears. Guyer himself admits that his distinction between aesthetic response and aesthetic judgment is not entirely compatible with the argument of the section 9. For, Kant’s argument declares also that “aesthetic judgment is the condition of aesthetic response, rather than *vice versa*.<sup>150</sup> In order to grasp the difficulty, we should look again at the relevant passage in the second paragraph of section 9:

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 109.

“Hence, it must be the universal communicability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence”. (*CJ*, 217)

Before presenting Guyer’s analysis, it is worth to note that in his explanation of two kinds of reflective judgment and of the key to the critique of taste, he, first, cites Kant’s relevant passages but by omitting this quoted sentence just above in order to demonstrate his own strategy and to demonstrate the need of his two-acts view in explaining properly Kant’s aesthetic theory. After showing his rightness, then he elaborates on this “problematic” sentence. Now, according to Guyer, the first assumption of this sentence which asserts that the universal communicability of the mental state is the subjective condition for the judgment of taste itself is “unexceptionable”. However, the second assumption included in this passage is “incoherent”. For, in the first paragraph Kant has already equated pleasure with “the mental state in a given presentation”, but here it seems to be asserted that “the universal communicability of a mental state of pleasure” leads to that pleasure, that is, the condition of the universality of the pleasure is “the cause” of the same pleasure. This is also “absurd” for Guyer.<sup>151</sup> In other words, here, on Guyer’s account, Kant seems to confuse the explanation of pleasure in aesthetic response which is responsible for the production of the pleasure with the analysis of aesthetic judgment which assigns the universal communicability to the pleasure. Rather, although Crawford and Guyer defend the same arguments, the reason why Crawford does not take this incoherency into consideration, Guyer explains, is because of his misinterpretation of this sentence.<sup>152</sup>

However, in order to explain this anomaly, Guyer prefers not revising his own interpretation, but preserving his position by affirming that this is actually Kant’s own fault. He presents two reasons for the anomaly. According to the first one, this problem arises due to Kant’s own unclear terminological distinction. Kant never explicitly explains the relation between simple reflection and the estimation of the

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p. 389, n. 117.

object (the judging of the object) and the judgment of taste. “Kant does not use these distinctions consistently.” Guyer thinks that the confusion in section 9 is “due to Kant’s failure to clearly differentiate between reflection as leading to pleasure, to which the fact of communicability is irrelevant, and reflection on pleasure as leading to the judgment of taste, to which the communicability of the first form of reflection is relevant indeed”.<sup>153</sup> Secondly, as a necessary consequence of the first one, when Kant constitutes his own arguments in § 9, he confuses “the origin of aesthetic response with the condition of aesthetic judgment”.<sup>154</sup> On the other hand, I should note that Guyer also states in his book and article that the inconsistency may be unsolved, as Kant’s aesthetic theory is ultimately complex<sup>155</sup> and his description of this complicated structure “is far from obvious”<sup>156</sup>, that is to say, it may not be Kant’s fault but Guyer’s own deficiency to reflect such a complex system appropriately. Finally, it should also be noted that the problem of this theory is not merely incapable of explaining Kant’s aesthetic theory in a compatible way, but also, it can be affirmed, the theory itself involves contradictory arguments. Considering our present issue, Guyer has attempted to solve the puzzle by explaining that the second act of reflection determines the status of pleasure. However, according to Kant’s general theory of aesthetic, pleasure should serve a determining basis for aesthetic judgment. In such a case, Guyer’s theory of double process of reflection fails to explain the problem consistently. For, his theory still explains this second act of reflection as a determinant for the status of pleasure not *vice versa*.

### **3.3.1.2. The Counter-Arguments to the Two-Acts View and Alternative Explanations**

Hannah Ginsborg, in her *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition* and in her article “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste”, deals with the problems rooted in “the key to the critique of taste”. She explicitly takes her position as opposed to

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>155</sup> Paul Guyer, “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s theory of Taste”, p. 38.

<sup>156</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 9.

Crawford's and Guyer's two-acts view and formulates her own solution. First of all, Ginsborg mentions that Guyer's defense expressing his thesis' incoherency due to Kant's own fault is not persuasive. For, it is far from being rational to think that on the one hand Kant himself attributes crucial importance to what he calls "the Key to the Critique of Taste" by emphasizing that "the solution of this problem deserves full attention", on the other hand he confuses his own terms and arguments in arguing "the key"<sup>157</sup>. That is to say, Guyer is fully unfair in his invoicing the failure of his view to Kant's own account. Nevertheless, Ginsborg also indicates that the starting point of the two-acts view results rightly from Kant's own obscure arguments presented in section 9. In this sense, Guyer is right to introduce his explanatory theory of two distinct acts of reflective judgment. In order for someone to comprehend coherently Kant's aesthetic theory, it seems "inevitable" to appeal some versions of the two-acts view. For, Kant himself

makes clear, both that the feeling of pleasure in a judgment of taste is based on an act of reflective judgment, and that the judgment of taste itself involves an act of judging that one's feeling of pleasure is universally valid. Thus, whether he recognizes it or not, he would seem to be inescapably committed to two separate acts of judgment; one which gives rise to the feeling of pleasure, and one which subsequently claims that the feeling of pleasure is universally valid.<sup>158</sup>

Nevertheless, despite this fact, Ginsborg insists on rejecting that the judgment of taste does not consist in a double process of reflection but in merely one reflective act. Therefore, in such a case, what she has to prove is that judgment of taste is able to both produce pleasure and renders it universally valid by means of one act of reflection. That means, she needs to demonstrate the condition under which both that the feeling of pleasure is the product of the judgment of taste, and that the universal communicability of that feeling which is provided by the awareness of the harmony of cognitive faculties is also gained by the same reflective activity of the judgment of

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<sup>157</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste", p. 299.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 297.

taste are possible. In order to achieve this challenging task, firstly, she turns to the arguments of the section 9, and states that the status of “the mental state in the given presentation” expressed in the problematic sentence of the second paragraph is obscure, but through the last sentence of that paragraph Kant describes and defines it as “the feeling of the free play of cognitive powers” (Besides, Ginsborg, quite rightly, criticizes Guyer’s equation of “harmony of the cognitive powers” with “the free play”. For, cognition involves “the harmony of the cognitive faculties”. What differs aesthetic judgment from cognition one is “the free harmonious play of cognitive powers”<sup>159</sup>) At this point, she agrees with both Crawford and Guyer. But she thinks that in order to solve the puzzle, we do not have to impose two acts into the system, it is also possible, in fact necessary to be coherent with Kant’s own aesthetic theory, to dissolve the problem by assigning the function of the free play of faculties, i.e. universal communicability, to the reflection of the judgment of taste itself. By this way, the requirement of the section 9 will be carried out and the judging of the object, “on which the pleasure is consequent”, becomes again the judgment of taste itself, which precedes that pleasure, without contradiction.<sup>160</sup> At this juncture, she presents her argument called “the self-referential act of judgment”. Guyer’s problem, she claims, relies on, as we have seen above, his treating the relation between “the universal communicability of the mental state of the pleasure” and the feeling of pleasure in the object, which is the consequence of the former, as a “causal relation”. However, according to Ginsborg, it implies, indeed, an “intentional” relation: “the pleasure constitutes awareness of its own universal communicability”. In this manner, the judgment of taste itself involves “a self-referential claim to its own universal communicability” instead of having a claim to universality with reference to “the universal communicability of a prior feeling of pleasure”.<sup>161</sup> We can re-formulate Ginsborg’s argument as following: In order to overcome the difficulties arisen from Kant’s two assertions, (one expresses that the feeling of pleasure is the consequence of the universally communicability of the

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 312, n. 7.

<sup>160</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition*, p. 20.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

pleasure itself, which that consequent relation as taken as “causal” one by Guyer, and the other states that the act of the judging of the object which precedes the feeling of the pleasure is the same act as aesthetic judgment by means of which the pleasure “is judged to be universally valid”) we have to regard the judgment of taste as having its own self-referential universality by referring not to the pleasure’s universal communicability but to the object itself.

I take my mental state in perceiving an object to be universally communicable, where my mental state is nothing other than the mental state of performing that very act of judgment, that is, of taking my mental state in the object to be universally communicable...in performing this act of judgment, I am not explicitly aware of its self-referential structure, but that my act of judgment is instead manifest to consciousness through a certain experience of pleasure. In other words, the act of self-referentially taking my mental state to be universally communicable with respect to a given object consists...in a feeling of pleasure in that object.<sup>162</sup>

Now, as we can suppose, Ginsborg imputes a special and “intentional” feature to the relation between the act of judgment and the object judged. Further, she claims, in our judging we immediately felt the pleasure which also manifests consciousness or awareness. And, as we can “feel” it, she appeals the notion “formal purposiveness” which includes the reference to the “special” characteristic of the presentation of the object. Thus, as a next step, Ginsborg attracts our attention to the Kant’s definition of pleasure. According to that, he defines pleasure, as regards to the formal purposiveness, as “consciousness of the presentation’s causality directed at the subject’s state so as to *keep him in that state*” (*CJ*, 220). Here, it is clear that the pleasure itself already contains “consciousness” which demands the continuity of our mental state. When we consider this with disinterested characteristic of the pleasure, according to her view, it can be seen that the pleasure felt in judging includes both awareness or consciousness itself and inner causality to preserve the subject in his present mental state. And reflective judgment in taste, as we know, refers this presentation not to the concept of the object but to itself. In the First Introduction,

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<sup>162</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste”, p. 299.

Kant states that presentations regarding the feeling of pleasure are referred not to the object but “merely to the subject, in that they serve as their own grounds for maintaining their own existence in the subject” (*CJ*, 206). At this point, it is important to discern the fact that pleasure in the judgment of taste has its own justifying ground in the subject without reference to the any interest or desire. Now, according to Ginsborg, “the self-maintaining character of the pleasure in taste” and “the self-referential act of judgment” together provide a sufficient reason to be universally valid<sup>163</sup>. The “inner causality” which is another problematic notion as we will see in the next section, to keep me in my mental state is directly taken in the purposive form of the object. The pleasure is nothing but the awareness of this continuity through which the subject feels himself. Therefore, on Ginsborg’s account, when I judge an object to be beautiful I have already made a universal claim for other subjects. All judging subjects “ought to share the mental state that corresponds to my act of judging”.<sup>164</sup> By this way, the pleasure involves “the consciousness of its own universal validity”. In such a composition, the judgment of taste precedes the pleasure (as that pleasure arises in judging), and at the same time renders it universally valid (when pleasure arises, it involves its own consciousness of being universally valid for all other subjects). It is clear that in order to arrive at her own conclusion, she equates “the universal communicability” with “universal validity”. But it seems to be legitimate, as Kant himself makes them identical by equating the universal validity of the judgment of taste with the universal communicability of the pleasure in § 9. And the requirement for the condition that all subjects should agree with our mental state is supplied by both the self-maintaining of the pleasure and the self-referentiality of the reflective judgment. In this manner, self-referentiality refers to having its own sources in order both to be determinant and to be determined without any need for further internal or external act. There remains nothing to assert a further act of reflection to assign universal validity to that pleasure.

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p. 301.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 302.

As we have seen, in order to overcome difficulties stemmed from Kant's own arguments, commentators are obliged to constitute their own complex system, as complex as Kant's own system. Yet, there are also some other simple versions of the solution. Lastly, I would like to mention some of them. To begin with, Gibbons supports Ginsborg's view by affirming that the judging of the object is identical with the judgment of taste. In Gibbons' account, the two-acts view is not only unnecessary and but also incoherent with Kant's own aesthetic theory. In order to solve the puzzle, she distinguishes "pleasure *in the object*" from "pleasure" which is felt in recognition of being universally communicable, or as she puts it, from "the pleasurable recognition of a universal communicability of mental state" that precedes the former.<sup>165</sup> In this sense, it can be said that there is no two successive acts of reflection, rather, in the aesthetic experience two modes of pleasure successively occurs. She also warns us about the fact that "pleasure in the object is not a different pleasure from that taken in the universally communicable mental state". Indeed, the former is "the consequent" to the latter. This is because "universally communicable pleasure" leads to "the aesthetic pleasure in the object". Therefore, regarding these arguments it can be said that she reverse the relation or the process in section 9. The judging of the object precedes "pleasure in the object" which refers to what she calls "the aesthetic pleasure in the object", but "universally communicable pleasure" which is the antecedent mode of the aesthetic pleasure" serves the basis for the judgment of taste. Finally her last emphasis about our present issue is rightfully that the pleasure and the act of judging cannot be separated.<sup>166</sup> They are mutually related to each other. In addition to Gibbons' view, Hughes also differentiates between the modes of the feeling of pleasure. But she makes this division explicitly by asserting that all confusions about the argument of the section 9 result from the fact that "Kant does not make sufficiently clear" the distinction between the feeling of pleasure in the object and the pleasure "distinctive of the very act of judging in an aesthetic manner".<sup>167</sup> Hence, while the judging of the object precedes the former pleasure in

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<sup>165</sup> Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, p. 91.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>167</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, (New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 44.

the object, the latter one occurs in judging through determining it. She also emphasizes that these two kinds of pleasure are “intertwined”. In a similar way, Longuenesse also attempts to solve the problem by dividing “pleasure” into two kinds, first, as what she calls “the first order pleasure” taken in the harmony of the cognitive faculties and second as “the second order pleasure” “taken in the universal communicability of the first order pleasure”.<sup>168</sup> Allison, on the other hand, locates his position closer to Ginsborg’s arguments. For him, Guyer’s theory is too much speculative and does not fit to the arguments of Kant’s aesthetic theory.<sup>169</sup> On the other hand, Ginsborg’s arguments represent also another extremity for Allison.<sup>170</sup> (Palmer also finds Ginsborg’s reading of Kant’s theory of taste as “austere”, and out of too much the literal reading of the theory.<sup>171</sup>) According to Allison’s reading, the problem can be easily solved when we regards, first, “the judging of object” as “disinterested act of reflection” and, secondly, “the judgment of taste proper” as the actual judgment or “verdict”. As we can see, Allison argues the issue in a similar language with Crawford. However, his main difference is that these are not two distinct types of reflections. They are, indeed, two different aspects of the one and the same act of reflection in the same judgment (He also admits that such an explanation is not fully compatible with Kant’s arguments)<sup>172</sup>. Furthermore, Burgess also criticizes Guyer’s position by asserting that Guyer misses the difference between the pleasure’s ground which refers to the free play harmonious of cognitive faculties and the pleasure’s source which relates to the recognition of this free play as satisfying cognition in general”.<sup>173</sup> As a result of this failure, Guyer falsely suggests a distinction between “aesthetic response” and “aesthetic judgment”. As we know, the former is explained by the first and third moment, whereas the latter is explained by the second and fourth moments. However, according to Burges, we cannot divide the

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<sup>168</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, “Kant’s Theory of Judgment and Judgment of Taste”, p. 154.

<sup>169</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 113.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>171</sup> Linda Palmer, “A Universality Not Based on Concepts”, p. 34.

<sup>172</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, pp. 111-112.

<sup>173</sup> Craig Burgess, “Kant’s key to the Critique of Taste”, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 39: 157 (1989), p. 492.

moments. The pleasure in the object “results from the simultaneous satisfaction of all four moments”.<sup>174</sup> Finally, Wicks also states his own view about “the key”, like Ginsborg, by referring to purposive form of the object. For him, the claim that the judging of the object is prior to the feeling of pleasure in beautiful should be conceived through the purposive apprehension of the form of the object. According to that in our judging the object to be beautiful, we attempt to judge by apprehending the form of the object disinterestedly. In such an act, our interest is merely determined by the purposive form of the object. And when we successfully apprehend it, “the object’s purposive form will generate a harmony of the cognitive faculties to a degree that radiates a satisfaction associated with cognition in general”<sup>175</sup> More importantly, he keeps explaining, this successfully generated harmony can be regarded itself as “the form of a judgment in general”, i.e. “S is P”. In this sense, the experience of the free play harmonious of cognitive faculties which gives rise to the pleasure is “a mode of judgment”. Thus, the judging of the object referring to this form or mode of judgment can precede the pleasure and the judgment of taste as a specific type of judgment can be based upon that pleasure without any contradiction.<sup>176</sup>

### **3.4. Kant’s Aesthetic Formalism: The Subjective Formal Purposiveness as the Purposiveness without a Purpose**

As I have attempted to demonstrate, contrary to the judgment of cognition which has an objective validity, the judgment of taste’s claim to universal validity has a subjective dimension. Due to the special characteristic of aesthetic judgment of reflection, in such a judgment, the predicate is not a concept of the object, but a feeling of pleasure. And this predicate expresses nothing about the objective property of the object. “Beautiful” as a predicate of the aesthetic judgment expresses the

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 490.

<sup>175</sup> Robert Wicks, *Kant on Judgment*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 43.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., pp. 44-45.

feeling of the judging subject. In other words, in aesthetic judgment, the given presentation is not subsumed under the determinate concept of the understanding. In such a case, the judgment of taste is not directed by the objective rules or principles of the understanding. On the other hand, that judgment should have a claim to be universally valid, otherwise there would be no need to a “critique” of it. Therefore, universal validity of aesthetic judgment indicates “universal voice” through our demands of all judging subjects’ agreement to our judgment or to our feeling. I demand it because my feeling’s voice is universal. By this way, the origin of the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment is rooted merely on the subjective ground. As we have seen in Ginsborg’s arguments, one of the cornerstones of the condition of this kind of subjective validity is the purposive form of the object. There must be something, not in the object itself, but in the form of that object, which provides us with a ground upon which our judgment’s claim to universal validity is based. Under these conditions, the subjective principle of purposiveness supplies the rule, to be sure, an “indeterminate” and “subjective” rule, for our judging about taste. Hence, we will see that whereby the notion “purposiveness without a purpose”, the object aesthetically judged, or strictly speaking, “the apprehended form of the object” finds its own privileged place in Kant’s aesthetic theory. The main motive behind treating Kant’s aesthetic theory as an “aesthetic formalism” relies completely on Kant’s distinction between “formal purposiveness” which qualifies a judgment as a pure judgment of taste equal to aesthetic judgment of *reflection* and “material purposiveness” or “sensation” which refers to “matter”, i.e. content, of the object and determines a judgment merely as an aesthetic judgment of *sense* which gives rise to pleasure in agreeable (*CJ*, FI, 224). The determining basis (*Bestimmungsgrund*) of the aesthetic judgment of reflection can only be “subjective formal purposiveness” apprehended not in the “matter” of the object, but in the mere form of the object. Thus, the determinant for a judgment to be aesthetic judgment of reflection is the subjective formal purposiveness of the object. Kant states that the form of the object manifests purposiveness (*CJ*, FI, 221). As a necessary result of this approach, in Kant’s aesthetic theory, colours, tones or smells of the object will be entirely excluded. Herewith, we come to the purposive form of the aesthetic object: The relation between the judgment of taste and its object.

### **3.4.1. Definitions and the Problem of Causal Relation: The Second Rupture**

Kant re-defines “beauty” as “an object’s form of *purposiveness* insofar as it is perceived in the object *without the presentation of a purpose*” (*CJ*, 236). Hence, in this section, we will investigate what Kant means by this definition. First of all, in § 10, Kant defines the notions “purpose” (*Zweck*) and “purposiveness” (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) as follows: a purpose is “the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause...and the causality that a *concept* has with regard to its *object* is purposiveness” (*CJ*, 220). Before analyzing these definitions, regarding the notion “causality”, we should note that In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant mentions two different kinds of causality which perform in two different realms: causality in nature and causality of freedom. And both of them can be compatible with each other without any contradiction. While causality in nature is a necessary condition for constructing experience as a unity, causality of freedom is necessary for morality. (It is also argued that there is a third type of causality or causal relation in the first *Critique*: the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*) or noumenon as the cause of the object of the possible experience, i.e. phenomenon, (*CPR*, A 537 B 565). In his third *Critique*, we are introduced to another special type of causal relation between the object and its concept and the relation between the relation of purposes, i.e. purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), but in the case of aesthetic judgment of reflection this purposiveness should be without a cause, i.e. a concept, and hence, without a purpose (*Zweck*). In this manner, it is possible, I think, to call it “causality without a cause”. We should be also careful about “the causal relation” as regards “the judgment of taste”. This is because, in the First Introduction, Kant explicitly warns us that pleasure’s basis cannot be found in any causal relation. If it was, then the feeling of pleasure would be also contained in teleological judgment (*CJ*, FI, 228). Nevertheless, “causality” is not void. As we will see, it plays its own role in aesthetic judgment but in a different way.

To return Kant’s complex definitions cited above, it can be said that the object, in this definition, is regarded as the effect of its own concept as a cause. In other words, a purpose is an effect which can be thought merely through a concept, that is, a cause, of that effect. In this manner, the presentation of the effect is “the basis that

determines the effect's cause and precedes it" (*CJ*, 220). In such a case, a purpose is treated as a "final cause" (*CJ*, 378). As Kant puts it, a purpose is "the object's actuality" (*CJ*, 181). From this definition, Teufel concludes that by characterizing an object as "exhibiting purposiveness", Kant ascribes the object to "a certain kind of causal ancestry" and in such a case "the object's concept played a causal role in the object's coming into being, and, hence, in helping to shape and arrange the object as it is before us".<sup>177</sup> (Guyer also calls it "the causal history of the object"<sup>178</sup>) And this "shape" (*Gestalt*), "arrangement" (*Anordnung*) or "form" of the object will have its own inner causality. Furthermore, here, while in the case of a purpose the object is introduced as the presentation of the effect, the notion "purposiveness" refers not to the object itself but to the causal relation between natural products' purposes. On the other hand, and most importantly, "the formal purposiveness", as "purposiveness without a purpose", refers to merely the "form" of the object apprehended in judging the object to be beautiful, not to the concept of the object. (In a footnote, Kant uses the phrase "a purposive form without recognizing a purpose" to make his notion "purposiveness without a purpose" clear. To recognize a purpose requires "a concept", as a cause of the object. *CJ*, 236) In this sense, the apprehended form of the object reflects purposiveness; it is a "purposive form" (*Zweckform*). Hence, purposiveness is felt by the subject in apprehending the form or the shape of the object. The formal purposiveness is not an objective property of the object itself. The form of the object "manifests" purposiveness merely for our cognitive powers (i.e. merely "contemplative", without pursuing any further aim or interest). At this juncture two points should be emphasized; the first one; it is clear that this task of apprehension of the form of the object belongs to the imagination. Therefore, formal purposiveness is felt through the apprehension of the imagination, but it cannot be objective or cognitive determinant which ruled by the understanding in the act of apprehension. Otherwise, imagination would not be free and pleasure could not arise. The purposiveness "precedes the cognition of the object" (*CJ*, 189). And second one,

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<sup>177</sup> Thomas Teufel, "Kant's Non-Teleological Conception of Purposiveness", *Kant-Studien*, 102 (2011), p. 234.

<sup>178</sup> Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 189.

since subjective formal purposiveness is “felt” in the apprehension of the object in connection with the free harmony of cognitive faculties, Kant also takes it as identical with the feeling of pleasure (*CJ*, *Fl*, 228-230/249). Like pleasure, formal purposiveness cannot be an element of the cognition. However, Kant’s equation of the feeling of pleasure with the subjective formal purposiveness seems problematic. For, he also asserts that if the purposiveness does not “precede” the feeling of pleasure, namely, if it is “grounded on” the feeling of pleasure, than that feeling would be agreeable, which happens in the case of “material purposiveness” in the aesthetic judgment of sense (*CJ*, 222). Conversely, the feeling of pleasure should be based on the purposiveness. In the case of the purposive form of the object, pleasure is entirely “contemplative” as excluded any interest towards the object itself. Now, if the purposiveness should “precede” the feeling of pleasure, then it seems that they cannot be identical. On the other hand, due to the inner structure or dynamics of Kant’s aesthetic theory, they will be identical. For, pleasure is defined as “the consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness”, which is equal to say that pleasure is “consciousness of a presentation’s causality”, i.e. subjective formal purposiveness. And without such awareness, there is no “purposiveness”, because, as I have just mentioned above, “purposiveness” is not an objective property of the object itself, it is purposive for our judging.

Under the light of these explanations, we can discern why Kant presents the notion “purposeness without a purpose”. For, a purpose, as a final cause, “pre-determinates” its object. In this regard, a purpose would necessitate a concept of the object for the judgment of taste. Considering Kant’s argument about disinterestedness, it can be also noted that a purpose strictly relates to the existence of the object. Yet, as we know, when we judge an object to be beautiful, we are indifferent to the object. We are not concerned with whatever the object is, or is meant to be. Then, what kind of relation can be constructed between the feeling of pleasure and the object? And in what sense does “causality involved in the presentation of the object” play its own role in this relation? As we saw in arguing “the key to the critique of taste”, Kant defines pleasure and displeasure as following: “Consciousness of a presentation’s causality directed at the subject’s state so as to

*keep him in that state, may here designate generally what we call pleasure; whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the basis that determines [the subject to change] the state [consisting] of [certain] representations into their own opposite (i.e. to keep them away or remove them)" (CJ, 220)*

First of all, we should bear in mind the process which produces the feeling of pleasure in beautiful: In apprehending the purposive form of the object, our cognitive faculties are animated in their free harmonious relation without furthering any other aim which pleases us. Now, according to Kant, by means of the subject's awareness or consciousness of the feeling pleasure or displeasure in the free play of cognitive powers, the causal relation between the pleasure and the object can be constructed. However, what is crucial here is the fact that Kant does not establish that kind of causal relation here by explaining that the presentation of the object itself "causes" the subject's feeling of pleasure. For, Kant explains in § 11, in that case, our judgment of taste was determined by the existence of the object itself which denotes a purpose, or a concept (CJ, 221). Further, he makes a difference between objective and subjective purposes to indicate the condition under which a judgment can be a pure judgment of taste provided that it is based merely on the purposive form of the object. According to these distinctions, a judgment of taste can be determined by neither objective purpose, nor by subjective purpose which contains personal interest. Both of these purposes are necessarily involved in the "objective purposiveness" (CJ, 227). At this juncture, it is important to comprehend Kant's idea that in all cases objective purposiveness consists of the notion "purpose," i.e. a concept. "Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by referring the manifold to a determinate purpose, and hence, through a concept" (CJ, 226). On the other hand, as we know, in order for a judgment to be aesthetic judgment of reflection, it is a necessary condition that the apprehension of the form of the object is not related to a concept or a purpose, but merely to the subject's own feeling. Therefore, the judgment of taste cannot be grounded upon "objective purposiveness" as a determining basis, but should be grounded upon "subjective formal purposiveness", "purposeness without a purpose" which activates our cognitive powers, i.e. free play of understanding and imagination. In this regard, it is not "the existence of the

object itself”, but “the purposive form of the object”, i.e. “the mere purposive form of the object”, determines the judgment of taste.

This is only one side of the story about “causal relation”. According to the other side, even though the presentation of the object itself would not necessitate a purpose or a concept, again it was not possible to explain the relation between the feeling of pleasure and the presentation of the object through causal relation. For, “we cannot possibly tell *a priori* that some presentation or other (sensation or concept) is connected as cause, with the feeling of a pleasure, as its effect” (*CJ*, 222). In other words, in such a case, the causal relation could only be grasped *a posteriori* in experience, and a pure judgment of taste could its claim to rest on a priori bases and hence its claim to universal validity. Under these conditions, the mere alternative, therefore, remains: the judgment of taste through the feeling of pleasure is not only *causally* but also *internally* (in § 37, it is called also *inwardly*) related to the subjective formal purposiveness in the presentation of the object. In § 12, Kant specifies the causality as “inner causality” (“which is purposive”) both of pleasure and of formal purposiveness in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Here, Kant identifies the pleasure with “the very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject’s cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given”.

For, this consciousness in an aesthetic judgment contains a basis for determining the subject’s activity regarding the animating of his cognitive powers and hence an inner causality (*innere Causalität*) (which is purposive) concerning cognition in general...Hence it contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a presentation... Yet it does have a causality in it (*Causalität in sich*), namely, to *keep* (us in) the state of (having) the presentation itself, and (to keep) the cognitive powers engaged (in their occupation) without any further aim. We *linger* in our contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself. (*CJ*, 222)

Now, “causality” with which we are concerned here is not a direct or external causal relation between the object and the feeling of pleasure, it is the relation between the

feeling of pleasure and the purposive form of the object which has inner causality to animate the harmony of our cognitive powers as a mental state that produces pleasure. That means that, “the inner causality of the subjective purposiveness” is two-fold: it leads to producing the free harmony of the cognitive powers and then as an effect of this activity, it, through consciousness of this cause, reproduces itself. Considering the first definition of the pleasure, i.e. “consciousness of a presentation’s causality directed at the subject’s state so as to *keep* him in that state”, we can now discern the idea that the pleasure is regarded as “consciousness” of this causal capacity of the formal purposiveness. We can combine this definition of pleasure, i.e. “consciousness of a presentation’s causality” with the just quoted passage’s definition: pleasure is “consciousness of merely formal purposiveness”. By this way, Kant’s identification of “presentation’s causality” with the subjective formal purposiveness becomes more apparent. Besides, Kant in this passage also mentions pleasure’s causality to keep us in the mental state, i.e. the harmony of cognitive powers which reproduces itself. Here, again, Kant regards identical the feeling of pleasure with the formal purposiveness. Their causality is one and the same. The inner causality itself contained in pleasure is “purposive”. When we think it with another definition of the pleasure, presented in the First Introduction by Kant, which states that “pleasure is a mental state in which a presentation is in harmony with itself and which is the basis...for merely preserving this state itself (for the state in which the mental powers further one another in a presentation preserves itself)” (CJ, 230, 231), we can also conceive the fact that, “inner causality” in the apprehension of the purposive form is also the intentionality of the feeling of pleasure to preserve us in our mental state, that is, in our *awareness* of free play of cognitive powers which produces that pleasure “without any further aim”, i.e. contemplative or disinterested pleasure.

As a result, what Kant attempts to prove with these complicated assertions is same with the arguments we discussed in § 9. Pleasure as a determining basis of aesthetic judgment of reflection cannot be causally related to the sensation of the object. Pleasure cannot precede the judgment of taste. It arises in our judging. In the exactly same way, “subjective formal purposiveness” is purposive merely for our judging.

We become aware of the presentation's causality in our judging. In this sense, contemplative and disinterested pleasure and subjective formal purposiveness are identical. "Our liking for the object is connected with our mere judging of the form of the object, then this liking is nothing but the form's subjective purposiveness for the power of judgment" (*CJ*, 290). All these formulations indicate nothing but the inner dynamics of the structure of aesthetic judgment of reflection. Each component is necessarily and internally related to others. As we have already seen in Ginsborg's argument in the previous section, contemplative pleasure in its inner causality which is itself purposive is "self-maintaining", there is no any further aim except this "self-maintainance", hence, the judgment of taste itself. In this sense, we can also realize Guyer's rightfulness to direct us to "the universal validity of the pleasure" in order to establish the causal relation. According to him, in terms of pleasure's this claim to have universal validity, the causal connection between the feeling of pleasure and the presentation of the object can be constituted.<sup>179</sup> Without contemplative pleasure's self-maintaining character which has its own role in claiming universal validity, it is not possible to legitimately construct the relation between the apprehension of the purposive form of the object and the feeling of pleasure. Allison points out that "by denying any further aim to this pleasurable consciousness of the purposiveness of the mental state of free harmony, Kant is once again underscoring the disinterested nature of the liking for the beautiful".<sup>180</sup> Nuzzo also states that, pleasure is not merely "a consequence that follows the object's presentation as its cause (in which case the relation would only be a posteriori) but is identical with that very moment of consciousness or self-reflection by which the subject relates the object's presentation to the free play of her cognitive faculties".<sup>181</sup>

On the other hand, commentators arrive nearly at the same result from the notion "inner causality" by following different ways. While Ginsborg's emphasis on pleasure's causality is more apparent than the causality of the purposive form of the object, Allison emphasizes the role of pleasure's "causality" slightly without even

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<sup>179</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 95.

<sup>180</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 130.

<sup>181</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, p. 280.

mentioning the name of “inner causality” specifically. By referring to our quoted passage in the section 12, he just underlines that causality regarding the feeling of pleasure in beautiful is not entirely excluded, “pleasure exercises a causality”.<sup>182</sup> On the other hand, Guyer attempts to explicate the arguments in § 12 by means of his theory of double process of reflection. According to that, unlike general tendency, he separates “internal causality” from what he calls “intrinsic causality” in the cited passage (I should note that Guyer translates “innere Causalität” as “internal causality”, it is equal to “inner causality”). Also on Guyer’s account, Kant posits these notions in order to avoid misrelating the feeling of pleasure to its object through “ordinary causal connection”.<sup>183</sup> The intrinsic causality is not, for him, identical with “the presentation’s causality”. The notion “internal causality first mentioned in § 12” is the power of the presentation’s causality (i.e. the purposive form of the object) “to produce a feeling of pleasure by producing the harmony of” the cognitive faculties, whereas the notion “intrinsic causality next mentioned is the efficacy of the feeling of pleasure itself to produce a tendency toward its own continuation”.<sup>184</sup> Zuckert takes the notion “inner causality” as belonging neither to the purposive form of the object nor to the feeling of pleasure, but to the “aesthetic judging” itself.<sup>185</sup>. To sum up, although commentators interprets Kant’s own position differently, they agree with the idea that the feeling of pleasure and the aesthetic object are not externally but internally connected with each other and the judgment of taste has its own a priori ground; its determining basis is “the subjective formal purposiveness”. Crawford perfectly summarizes the whole story:

The experience of the beautiful... is disinterestedly based on the formal subjective purposiveness in the object. (In Kantian terminology, this becomes: the formal subjective purposiveness in the presentation through which an object

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<sup>182</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, 131.

<sup>183</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, pp. 192-193.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>185</sup> Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology*, p. 311.

is given and the contemplation of which our cognitive powers, the imagination and the understanding, are in harmony and free play).<sup>186</sup>

Finally and crucially, under the light of these explanations, it should be noticed that we have a clue to trace the proper relation between the principle of purposiveness and the judgment of taste which I have discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. Accordingly, formal purposiveness of nature or of natural products, (and also technic of nature as the nature's causality) and the judgment of taste are intersected in the purposive form of the object with regard to the harmony of the cognitive powers. It can be stated that nature produces its own products as involving a certain type of causality to suit to our cognitive powers. And through the free harmony of our cognitive powers which produces the feeling of pleasure, we become aware of the presentation's causality for our judging.

### **3.4.2. Transcendental Aesthetic and the Matter of “Aesthetic Form”**

After discussing the relation between the feeling of pleasure and subjective purposiveness, now we can investigate “what the ‘form’ is” in Kant’s aesthetic theory. Basically, by “the form” of the object, Kant means the shape, figure, design or spatio-temporal composition or structure of the parts of the object. In *Opus Postumum*, Kant points out that in the case of nature’s organic products, “every part of the body is there for the sake of the other [reciprocally as end and, at the same time, means]. It is easily seen that this is a mere idea, which is not assured of reality a priori [i.e. that such a thing could exist]”.<sup>187</sup> Yet, as we will see in arguing “objective intrinsic purposiveness”, in a pure judgment of taste, we are solely concerned with “the form” or “the shape” of, for example, a rose, without regarding what it is meant to be, that is, without a purpose or a concept. We will see the fact that “spatio-temporal relations of the parts of the objects” carries nearly all weights in Kant’s

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<sup>186</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>187</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Opus Postumum*, Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen trans., Eckart Förster ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 64-65.

theory of aesthetic form. For this reason, his theory of aesthetic form is also related to his theory of knowledge, or strictly speaking, to the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic (*transzendentale Ästhetik*). Now, we can deal briefly with Kant's arguments about the pure forms of intuition (*Anschauung*), i.e., space and time, given in the first *Critique*.

As we know, in his theory of knowledge, Kant defines two distinct capacities (*Fähigkeit*) or faculties (*Vermögen*): Sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) which is “receptive”, in the sense of “receiving representations” (*CPR*, A 50 B 74). That is to say, capacity through which objects are given to us and as opposed to the former, “conceptual” or “thinking”, active, capacity through which “the object is *thought*” by means of the understanding (*CPR*, A 19), namely, “the determination of the mind”. Most importantly, Kant emphasizes that in sensibility “we are affected by objects”. We can remember, Kant also mentioned that “a judgment of taste is aesthetic”, as it brings the presentation not to the object but to the judging subject himself; that means, in the judgment of taste the reference is directly to “how the judging subject is affected by the presentation” (*CJ*, 204). However, the difference between the “aesthetic” in the judgment of taste and in the cognitive judgment is simply that in the former case, it is the feeling which attributes nothing to the cognition of the object (*CJ*, FI, 222). For this reason, according to Kant, “aesthetic theory” cannot be a science. Now, returning our present issue, it should be underlined that the knowledge must be based on the relation of these two capacities. Unlike conceptual capacity, the sensibility could able to provide us with intuitions which are “immediate representations” (*CPR*, B 41), that is to say, they are not gained through the mediation of a concept of the understanding. Moreover, he calls “empirical intuitions” “sensation” which is equal to “matter” (*CPR*, B 34) or “raw material” (*CPR*, B 2) of the representations. On the other hand, he also asserts that there are “pure intuitions” or “pure forms of sensible intuitions” (he uses interchangeably these phrases): Space and time. This is why he also calls “transcendental” aesthetic. Space and time are pure in the sense that they are not derived from the experience, conversely, they are the conditions through which the experience becomes possible for us. That is to say, space and time are a priori and “subjective” conditions of the possible experience, but they have

“objective” validity; this type objectivity partially plays its role as a determinant component for the judgment of taste to be universally communicable regarding the form of the aesthetic object. In his *Prolegomena*, Kant derives their preciseness from the idea that they are pure forms of sensibility.<sup>188</sup> Hence, the objects can be knowable, namely that, they are the objects of our cognition merely provided that they are given to us through these pure forms of intuitions. On the other hand, space and time does not belong to the experience, but solely to the subject. Space and time as pure intuitions are empirically real and transcendentally ideal (*CPR*, A 28 B 44/ A 36 B 52). According to Kant, permanence, coexistence and succession are three modes of time. If time was not pure form of intuition, we could not apply, for example, the law of causality, as a necessary connection of successive events, to the appearances (*CPR*, A 31 B 46). Temporal order of the events reflects necessity and objectivity. Moreover, time cannot be regarded as a “discursive” or as a “general concept” to the extent that “different times are parts of one and the same time”. Bennett points out that we cannot pick different times under the general concept of time, because these different times are nothing but the parts of the same time.<sup>189</sup> In fact, this is the necessary result of the idea that time has only one dimension, “different times are not simultaneous but successive” (*CPR*, B 47). Therefore, firstly, it proceeds in merely one direction and different instances in time cannot proceed simultaneously, but can be in the necessary order of following one another. On the other hand, space has three dimensions (*CPR*, B 41). Different instances in space can be simultaneous, but cannot be successive. In addition to that, space cannot represent things “in relation to one another”. The category of “relation” is the property of time. At this juncture, it is remarkable, that in his first *Critique*, Kant attaches “time” to the category of “relation” under which he argues the relation of things with each other, whereas in third *Critique* due to the nature of theme of this *Critique*, the category of “relation” implies not the relation of things, as we have seen in the third moment, i.e. in the “subjective formal purposiveness”, but the relation of the object judged and the judging subject. Finally, it should be explained that, while time is described as the

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<sup>188</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. 42.

<sup>189</sup> Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 63.

pure form of inner sense or of intuition (*CPR*, A 33 B 50), space is the pure form of outer intuitions (*CPR*, A 26 B 42). As we will see in the third chapter of the thesis, the act of synthesis is differently applied to an event and to an object in accordance with these properties of the space and time.

Under the light of these explanations, before passing to discuss the issue of “the aesthetic form” in more detail, I would like to pre-emphasize some points: Even though time plays its own role in Kant’s aesthetic theory, in both natural beauty and artistic beauty, the position of space comes into prominence. Temporal relations are effective, for example, in music (as the temporal sequence of melodies), in painting (as we will see, Kant evaluates simple colors as temporal vibrations), in dance or theatre. On the other hand, space is primarily determinant in the case of natural beauties because of the spatial relations of the parts of the objects in their forms or shapes. It is possible to legitimately claim that time’s primacy in Kant’s aesthetic theory is more dominant not in the aesthetic forms of the objects but in the feeling of pleasure as the effect of these forms. Firstly, time as inner sense of the judging subjects is directly related to the feeling of pleasure. Guyer rightfully underlines the role of “time” in aesthetic theory by pointing out the fact that “all manifolds of intuition are temporally successive”. (In his *Anthropology*, § 15, Kant differs “the inner sense” from “the interior sense” (*sensus interior*) which is “susceptible” and he attaches the feeling of pleasure also to the latter one.<sup>190</sup>). Secondly, Zuckert remarkably argues that, pleasure is “future-directed” to maintain the mental state<sup>191</sup>, and, hence, its intentionality is towards the continuation in time<sup>192</sup>. Therefore, pleasure in beautiful reflects a “temporally related” character; it is related both to the present and to the future. On the other hand, the importance of space is more dominant regarding “the shape” or the form of the both natural and artistic beauties. Further, Kant, in arguing empirical reality of space, explains and determines the status of what he calls “mere sensations”, that is, sound, color, taste, heat etc. For

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<sup>190</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 40.

<sup>191</sup> Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology*, p. 231.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p. 235, and also in “A New Look at Kant’s Theory of Pleasure”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 60.3 (2002), p.240.

him, these items do not obtain any knowledge about the object. They belong to “the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility” (*CPR*, A 28 B 44). They are effects “accidentally added by the particular constitution of the sense organs”, hence, they are based entirely on sensation (*CPR*, A 31). (He even confusingly asserts that these materials of sensation are not intuitions by forgetting his own idea that sensation is empirical intuition. *CPR*, B 45.) For these reasons, Kant will assert, in his aesthetic theory, that they are not able to fulfill the necessary condition for being universally communicable, they are involved in aesthetic judgment of sense which is personal. In this regard, the feeling of pleasure grounded on mere sensation can only be “pleasure in agreeable”.

In his third *Critique*, Kant still abides by his theory of knowledge. He, at the very beginning, condemns “raw material” of the objects, which depends on merely sensation, to be “agreeable”, i.e. aesthetic judgment of *sense*. They gratify an inclination and the pleasure, in such a case, loses its status of being merely contemplative. They cannot serve an a priori basis to the pure judgment of taste. “Any taste remains barbaric if this liking requires that *charms* and *emotions* be mingled in.” (*CJ*, 223). In fact, Kant, in the *Anthropology*, points out that “the consciousness” of the emotions also has a power for the judging subject to remain in his emotional feeling which pleases. Yet, in that case, feeling is based on stimuli and directed towards to gratify this stimuli.<sup>193</sup> On the basis of this characteristic of the feeling of pleasure in the case of emotions and charms, it should be noted that in both aesthetic judgment of sense and that of reflection, the feeling of pleasure is intentional to maintain itself, in the latter case, this intentionality is not directed to satisfy any inclination. The crucial point here is that color, sound or smell is not qualified by the pure forms of intuition, i.e. space and time. They are regarded as “sense impressions that determine inclination”. On the other hand, the mere “forms of intuition that we reflect on” can “determine the power of judgment” (*CJ*, 206). Only by this way, the presentation can be universally communicable. At this point, it could be helpful to point out the complex relation between the form and the content in the first *Critique*. Accordingly, Kant ascribes the function to form what is given

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<sup>193</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 159.

through sensibility to the concepts of the understanding. Sensibility or intuition provides these concepts with “matter” or “content”, whereas the concepts give “form” to these materials (*CPR*, A 86). (This function of a concept to form given intuitions can also be seen in the process of generating an empirical concept through logical reflection. Accordingly, in this process, the understanding compares several particulars and reflects what they have common and then unifies or forms these common features in “one” empirical concept.) “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (*CPR*, A 51 B 75). However, we should not be confused with this form-content distinction regarding Kant’s own arguments presented in his aesthetic theory. Undoubtedly, in postulating the contemplative pleasure in beautiful without any concept of the object; he is still consistent with his theory of knowledge. As we have seen, intuition provided by sensibility is also divided into two groups as “the matter of sensation” from which pleasure in agreeable arises and as the *form* of intuition. Sensibility without concepts *also* serves “*the form*” through the formal determination of space and time on which pure judgment of taste and the feeling of pleasure are grounded. In other words, pure sensibility “*forms*” the matter given by sensation. Sensation as matter or raw material is merely accidental. Kant’s own example, in Transcendental Aesthetic explains clearly what he has in mind by rejecting matter of sensation in his aesthetic theory. According to that, the color or the smell of a rose “can appear differently” to every judging subject, these raw materials can only regarded as “changes in the subject, changes which may, indeed, be different for different men” (*CPR*, A 30). By the same token, in § 58, he insistently and explicitly states that “colors have to do merely with the surface”, in this regard, they have “nothing to do with “the figure” (*CJ*, 397). Hence, the universal communicability of the judgment of taste as the subjective universal validity is based partially on the objectivity of the “*form*” of the object in such a way that pure forms of sensibility determines *a priori* the spatial-temporal compositions or relations of the parts of the object. Crawford rightly emphasizes that Kant identifies form with “geometrical figure or mathematical proportion”.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 110.

In this sense, Kant's attitude in aesthetic theory is radically formalist. On the other hand, it is also quite obvious that in a painting or in a rose, to exemplify, a color or the tone of a violin is beautiful in itself, i.e. contemplatively pleasurable. The only way to save these items as the legitimate components of the pure judgment of taste is, therefore, to convert them from being raw material of sense impressions to being forms of intuition. In order to overcome this problem, Kant appeals to an unusual method. He refers to the theory of Leonhard Euler (1707-1783) who was a Swiss mathematician, physicist and physiologist. According to Euler' thesis, the colors "are vibrations (*pulsus*) of the aether in uniform temporal sequence, as, in the case of sound, tones are such vibrations of the air" (CJ, 224). In this regard, since they depend on the vibrations which are, by their nature, formally spatio-temporal, they do not have to belong to the material or matter of the object. From this theory, Kant derives his conclusion that simple colors or tones are not solely sense impressions, that is, not merely the matter of the presentation or of the intuition; they are unified by the pure forms of intuitions. In other words, they are subject to "the formal determination of the manifold" of sensations. Now, Kant calls them "pure" on which we can reflect in our judging. Nevertheless, this is the case only for simple, unmixed colors and tones. Kant explicitly states that all visual arts including painting, sculpture and architecture are initially evaluated through their designs, hence, what we like in them is their forms (CJ, 225). However, this evaluation is not confused with the perfection of their forms. This is simply because the concept of perfection necessitates objective purposiveness, indeed, "objective intrinsic purposiveness" as opposed to the "objective extrinsic purposiveness" referring to the object's utility (CJ, 227). As we have seen, objective purposiveness involves a concept or a purpose. Consequently, the concept of perfection in its relation to the objective purposiveness in an object necessarily "presupposes the concept of the thing, i.e. *what sort of thing it is [meant] to be*". Therefore, it is very clear that the concept of perfection cannot be contained in the judgment of taste. We need the knowledge of the object in the case of objective purposiveness. Stated differently, the knowledge what kind of object at which we look determines our liking. On the other hand, in our contemplative aesthetic appreciation, the object of our liking should be determined merely by the purposive form of the object without regarding what the object is, or,

without pursuing any further aim. As we know, judgment of taste is “aesthetic”, because there is no concept or conceptual determination in it. It is merely perceptual (*CJ*, 228). According to Kant, the main problem in both Baumgarten’s<sup>195</sup> and Meier’s aesthetic theory of perfection is to confuse the faculty of sensibility with the conceptual faculty of the understanding. There can be no “objective rules” for the judgment of beauty. Moreover, Kant also distinguishes the thing’s “qualitative perfection” from its “quantitative perfection”. By the former, he means “the harmony of the thing’s manifold with its concept”, by the latter “the completeness that any thing may have as a thing of its kind” (*CJ*, 227). Both of them cannot include a mere reflection on the form of the object which is freely apprehended by the imagination, on the contrary, they are necessarily required the concept of the object.

What is formal in the presentation of a thing, the harmony of its manifold to form a unity (where it is indeterminate what this unity is meant to be) does not by itself reveal any objective purposiveness whatsoever. For here we abstract from what this unity is *as a purpose* (what the thing is meant to be), so that nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the presentations in the mind of the beholder. Subjective purposiveness is only a certain purposiveness of the subject’s presentational state, and within that state, an appealingness involved in apprehending a given form by the imagination. (*CJ*, 227)

Here, three points should be immediately underlined: Firstly, as I have attempted to explain before that subjective formal purposiveness is not a property of the object

<sup>195</sup> In his *Aeshtetica*, Baumgarten basically argues that sense knowledge, which equals to the meaning of “aesthetic” in “Transcendental Aesthetic”, is a distinct power of mind and has its own objective rules, hence, “aesthetics” is also a distinct “science”, that is, “the science of sense knowledge”. In this way, Bumgarten identifies it with “critique of taste”. In this theory, the concept of perfection is directly relied on the sense perception. And beauty is defined strictly through the concept of perfection. For more detail, Stefanie Buchenau, *The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment: The Art of Invention and the Invention of Art*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 137-152. Kant, indeed, in the footnote in “Transcendental Aesthetic” of his first *Critique*, argues why Baumgarten’s “endeavour” “to bring the critical treatment of the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science” is, at the very beginning, condemned to be failed by pointing out the idea that any attempt to derive objective rules or principles from merely sense perception is “fruitless”. (*CPR*, A 21)

itself but it is in the judging subject's apprehension of the form of the object, and in this quoted passage Kant explicitly makes this point clear by stating both that "the subjective purposiveness of the presentations" is "in the mind of the beholder" and that "subjective purposiveness" is "a certain purposiveness of the subject's presentational state". Secondly, it also renders the rationale behind Kant's distinction between the objective and subjective purposiveness clear. Objective purposiveness consists indispensably in a purpose and a concept of the object. In the case of a purpose, the judgment is determined by that purpose; in the case of the concept of the object, objective rules imposed by the determinate concepts in the legislation of the understanding for the apprehension determines the judgment. However, subjective formal purposiveness refers solely to the free harmony of the imagination and the understanding in which the imagination apprehends the purpositive form of the object without being governed by the understanding's conceptual capacity. In this way, we can reflect merely on the form of the object in our aesthetic contemplation. Thirdly and most importantly, when we regard this cited passage together with another quoted passage from *Opus Postumum* explaining the case of teleological judgment, it should be emphasized that we have to be careful about Kant's terminology in the sense that he argues both teleological judgment and judgment of perfection with the same terms. In both cases, objective material purposiveness, the concept and a purpose are included. Similarly, in both cases, contra aesthetic judgment of reflection, the parts of the natural products, as organisms, stand in a causal relation with each other in accordance with a purpose and a determinate concept. That is to say, they indicate "objective purposiveness with a purpose" and also the determinate concept, whereas aesthetic judgment of reflection refers to subjective formal purposiveness without a purpose and a concept. In the former case, the natural product is judged in accordance with its concept and its purpose in the sense that it is described by means of the determinate concept under which it is subsumed as a certain type of instance of a genus or a species as belonging to the certain kind of objects. In this sense, Kant puts a very close relation between the empirical concept, i.e. what the object is and a purpose, what is meant to be. On the other hand, aesthetic judgment of reflection is released entirely from such a conceptual determination. At this point, in spite of these "radical" differences", we can still draw

a parallel between teleological and aesthetic judgment. As Allison<sup>196</sup> and Zuckert<sup>197</sup> put it, just as the parts are related to each other and unified harmoniously in the whole regarding a natural organism in a teleological judgment, so the spatio-temporal parts are related to each other and unified harmoniously in the aesthetic object. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind the fact that in the former, the parts not only harmoniously but also causally unified.

Furthermore, even though we differentiate the concept of perfection from aesthetic appreciation in such a proper way; through Kant's next move, we will again confront with, as we usually do, another difficulty regarding his distinction between free and adherent or accessory beauties. The concept of perfection will problematically be in the scene again. McCloskey regards this division as "irreducibly architectonic" and for this reason, as the one which is the source of the difficulty to link natural and artifact beauties.<sup>198</sup> First of all, Kant describes "beauty" as "free" (*pulchritudo vaga*) and, hence, "self-subsistent" provided that it does not require "a concept of what the object is meant to be" in judging aesthetically. Conversely, "adherent beauty" (*pulchritudo adhaerens*) is the one which necessitates both a concept of what the object is meant to be and "the object's perfection in terms of that concept", and for him, in this second class, beauty is conditioned (*bedingt*) (CJ, 176). What is crucial here is that by treating such a dependent case still as beauty, and by calling it also "a judgment of taste", Kant seems to soften his notion "aesthetic beauty". He gives some examples for both cases. Accordingly, flowers, birds, such as the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of paradise, the crustaceans (the seashells), are taken as free natural beauties by Kant. (An interesting detail can be mentioned here. Actually, he saw "the sea" merely one time during his all life. It was in a short trip to the Pillau near to Königsberg, and he had seasickness.<sup>199</sup>) Even a botanist, who has already got detail knowledge about a flower, in judging about it to be beautiful, he does not

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<sup>196</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 102.

<sup>197</sup> Zuckert, "The Purposiveness of Form", p. 617.

<sup>198</sup> Mary McCloskey, *Kant's Aesthetic*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 81-82.

<sup>199</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 59.

concern with “what sort of thing this flower is meant to be”, i.e. with the natural purpose of the flower; his mere focus is on the form of the flower. By referring to the quoted passage just above, we can say that he has to “*abstract*” the conceptual determination in judging about taste. Kant, thus, points out that in judging on natural free beauties, “the judgment is based on no perfection of any kind, no intrinsic purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold might refer” (*CJ*, 229). In addition, Kant also mentions fine art by stating that all music without a topic, i.e. words, belong to free artificial beauties. In § 51, in arguing the division of the fine arts, he states that the painting including no certain theme, which he calls “painting in proper”, also belongs to the class of the free beauty (*CJ*, 323). Therefore, our judgment of taste can be pure provided that we contemplate merely on the form or the shape (figure) of the object without being determined by a concept or a purpose, which disposes the contemplative and disinterested characteristic of the feeling of pleasure in beautiful.

On the other hand, when we come to the beauty of a human being, the beauty of a horse or that of a building, Kant’s attitude changes. For, judging about their beauty, in which we take an individual as a member of a certain kind, necessarily requires “the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is meant to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty” (*CJ*, 230). In these cases, we can make a judgment of taste, but it will not be “a pure” judging, the manifold, first, is mediated and so determined by a concept, and after this mediation it is combined with the presentation. In other words, the object judged is subsumed under the determinate concept of the understanding. Petock correctly mentions that Kant seems to make a distinction between the judgments. Namely, the judgment that “this flower (a daisy, to exemplify) is beautiful” is different from the judgment that “this is a beautiful daisy”. In the first case, no objective intrinsic purposiveness, that is, “what the thing is meant to be”, is to be concerned, whereas in the second case, it is held.<sup>200</sup> To sum up, as we have seen, Kant radically opposes the matter or the material to the form or the figure of the object. He argues that sensations, such as

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<sup>200</sup> Stuart Jay Petock, “Kant, Beauty, and the Object of Taste”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32:2 (1973), p. 185.

color, tone, or smell, as mere matter or material are not determined by the pure forms of the intuitions, i.e., space and time. For this reason, they are merely private, and so, they cannot have a claim to be universally communicable. In such a case, aesthetic judgment of reflection can be based neither on these accidental properties, nor on a concept/a purpose of the object. In § 51, Kant calls this difference “essential” by stating that “there is an essential difference between *what we like when we merely judge it*, and what *gratifies* us (i.e., what we like in sensation)” (CJ, 331). Besides, Zuckert’s emphasis that we can connect aesthetic judgment of reflection “at least by analogy” to teleological judgment on the basis of the relation of parts of the object is remarkable.<sup>201</sup>. I think, it can also be noted that the harmonious unity of diversity of the parts of the aesthetic object can be related “at least by analogy” to the harmonious unity of diversity of the particular empirical rules or laws.

### 3.5. Exemplary Necessity and Sensus Communis

After presenting the nature of the relation between the feeling of pleasure and its object, I will attempt to demonstrate that the judgment of taste and pleasure are related *necessarily* to each other. Although the “necessity” is an indispensable criterion for a judgment to be subject to the transcendental critique, as Guyer<sup>202</sup> and Allison<sup>203</sup> state, Kant just repeats his previous arguments and contributes no original ideas in arguing “necessity” and “sensus communis”. Yet, before passing to our discussion of “the harmony of the cognitive faculties”, it will be helpful to mention Kant’s approach (It will also help us in arguing Ginsborg’s approach to the solution of the harmony of cognitive faculties). To begin with, Kant categorizes pleasure and its relation to the judgment with regard to the cognition, agreeable and beautiful. According to that, the judging subject can say that an object, or strictly speaking, a presentation of the object, is related *possibly* to the feeling of pleasure in the case of cognition, or he thinks of the agreeable that it leads *actually* to the feeling of

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<sup>201</sup> Rachel Zuckert, “The Purposiveness of Form”, p. 164.

<sup>202</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 142.

<sup>203</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 79.

pleasure, or finally, he thinks that the beautiful stands in a *necessary* relation with the feeling of pleasure or the liking (*CJ*, 237). This type of “necessity” is special, as the judgment of taste itself is. Kant treats “aesthetic judgment of reflection” as “unique” one (*CJ*, 247). (About the primacy of aesthetic judgment or that of teleological judgment, Kant is obscure. On the one hand, he claims that due to its special character, teleological judgment needs more transcendental critique than aesthetic judgment does (*CJ*, FI, 241), on the other hand, he also asserts that aesthetic judgments is in need of more transcendental critique since even though aesthetic reflective judgment does not contain a concept of an object, it still claims to be necessary and universal (*CJ*, FI, 242)). As we know, because of the peculiar character of an aesthetic judgment (that is, it is not a cognitive or objective judgment), this kind of necessity is not “a theoretical objective necessity”, which leads the subjects to cognize *a priori*. That is to say, the necessity of the objective judgment is derived from “the determinate concept” of the understanding included as a predicate in that judgment. In the case of pure judgment of taste, however, the necessity is not cognized *a priori*, but “is thought” in judging for an object to be beautiful. Kant defines this “special necessity” as “exemplary necessity”. It is “exemplary”, because it is a necessity “of the assent of *everyone* to a judgment that is regard as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state” (*CJ*, 237). Here, in the idea of “exemplary necessity”, we can also see the connection between beauty in nature and beauty in fine art in the sense that Kant regards the products of “genius” in art as a “model” or “exemplary” which serves a standard or rule to other artists for their own productions (*CJ*, 308). Further, the need for “soliciting” all other judging subject’s assent to our judgment renders it “conditional”. As we can notice, Kant directly relates the exemplary necessity of the judgment of taste to the subjective universality of that judgment. Then, the next move of Kant is inevitably to underline “the harmony of the cognitive faculties”, which is common to or shared by all subjects as a reason for demanding every judging subject’s assent. Kant calls it “the subjective necessity of the universal assent” (*CJ*, 238). This type of necessity relies, like universality, also on a subjective basis.

If judgments of taste had (as cognitive judgments do) a determinate objective principle, then anyone making them in accordance with that principle would claim that his judgment is unconditionally necessary. If they had no principle at all, like judgments of mere taste of sense, then the thought that have a necessity would not occur to us at all.

From this argument in the quoted passage, Kant arrives at the conclusion that there must be a subjective principle, universally valid, which is determined merely by the feeling, not by the concepts of the understanding, to express what pleases or displeases. Such a principle is the “idea” of a Common Sense. In judging for beauty, we also demand that all other subjects “ought to” share that judgment, even if this judgment has no objective determinant. It is not based on an objective and determinate concept but merely on the feeling. Rind stresses this distinction by pointing out that in judging cognitively the judging subject necessarily requires all the other subjects “to conceptualize an object in a certain”, that is, an objective, “way”, whereas in judging by taste the subject requires other subjects to share one’s judging an object to be beautiful.<sup>204</sup> Nevertheless, this feeling is “universally communicable”, it is not a private feeling which is the case for the pleasure in agreeable in the aesthetic judgment of sense. The common sense, in such a case, implies the idea that the subject’s feeling pleasure and judgment about beautiful should have “exemplary validity”. Since the necessity in aesthetic experience cannot be objectively grounded, it is “exemplary necessity” which refers to the necessity of all judging subjects’ assent (*CJ*, 240). In addition, there is a remarkable point in § 21 in which Kant presents his argument of “the attunement of the cognitive powers” to bring into a harmonious relation with each other. Here, Kant keeps discussing the present issue through the idea that “cognitions and judgments” all must be universally communicable. His general reasoning as follows: If cognition is to be communicable, then the feeling of pleasure as a mental state which relied entirely on the attunement of the presentational powers, i.e. the imagination and the understanding, must also be communicable. Immediately afterwards he differs the

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<sup>204</sup> Miles Rind, “What is Claimed in a Kantian Judgment of Taste”, *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 38:63 (2000), p. 85.

attunement of the cognitive powers in cognition where the imagination is induced by the given object to “its activity of combining the manifold” of sensibility and by means of this activity of the imagination, the understanding is induced to its own activity “of providing unity for this manifold in concepts” from the attunement of these faculties in aesthetic experience in which the imagination is free from the restrictions of the rules or the principles imposed by the understanding. However, according to Hughes, there is a problem in Kant’s argumentation in the sense that on the one hand, Kant treats the idea of common sense (*Gemeinsinn*) as the necessary and subjective basis for the judgment of taste; on the other hand he offers it for the necessary condition “of any cognition whatsoever”. For Hughes “the lack of distinction between the difference roles played by common sense in cognition and taste” is a problem for Kant’s own argument. Kant’s attribution of common sense merely to the judgment of taste may fail for this reason. In order to specify “common sense” as a universal and subjective basis of the aesthetic judgment of reflection, Hughes suggests, Kant should have underlined the fact that “any cognition whatsoever rests on an attunement of the faculties, but taste rests on a peculiarly harmonious relation between the cognitive powers in cognition”.<sup>205</sup> In addition to that, we should, I think, re-read this argument together with Kant’s another argument presented in arguing subjective universality of aesthetic judgment. Accordingly, just as subjective universality is also involved in the objective universality, so exemplary or subjective necessity is also included in the objective necessity.

After all, we can elaborate on Kant’s notion “sensus communis”. First of all, in order to realize the logical connection between aesthetic judgment of reflection and “sensus communis”, it should be point out that judgment of taste is synthetic, because it goes beyond the intuition of the object which is judged aesthetically and adds the feeling of pleasure as a predicate (beautiful) to this intuition, which is obviously not cognitive. Moreover, according to Kant, since this kind of a judgment demands all subject’s assent, aesthetic judgment must be grounded on a priori basis. As we have seen in the previous section, Kant emphasizes that as the feeling of pleasure is directly related to the presentation of the object, what a priori here is “the

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<sup>205</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, p. 72.

universal validity of this pleasure” (*CJ*, 289). Due to a priori character, as a universal rule, it is valid for all judging subjects. Here, it can be seen the fact that Kant relates a priori character of the judgment of taste also to the notion “common sense”.

If the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgment are accepted, then it must be also accepted the idea that the feeling of pleasure should be “universally communicable” (*CJ*, 293). As we have seen, what Kant attempts to show us until now is that aesthetic judgment is based on the principle of the subjective formal purposiveness and also on the harmony between understanding and imagination. Through these bases, aesthetic judgment must be held as necessary and the subject should demand other subjects’ assent about his judgment of taste. In such a case, as I have just mentioned, the necessity of judgment of taste, unlike cognitive judgment, is “conditioned” by the other judging subject’s assent. And this case of being conditioned necessarily carries us to the notion “sensus communis”. Kant defines “sensus communis” as “the idea of a sense *shared* (by all of us), i.e. a power to judge that in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else’s way of judgment with human reason in general” (*CJ*, 293). He again inevitably refers to the free play of our cognitive faculties in the sense that the free play between them as a priori capacities is the only suitable ground for the demand to share. In this regard, Kant re-defines taste as “our ability to judge a priori the communicability of the feelings that (without mediation by a concept) are connected with a given presentation” (*CJ*, 296). Therefore, it can be said that “sensus communis” is the necessary result of the harmony between these faculties, in other words, the free play is the basis on which the idea of “sensus communis” is relied. Accordingly, aesthetic judgment is based completely on the feeling of pleasure which does not relate to any concept (it is the pleasure of “mere reflection” (*CJ*, 292)). Hence it is subjective, yet in order for this feeling to arise, the a priori capacities of our mind, the understanding and the imagination, must be freely harmonized. In such a case, although judgment of taste is subjective, it still has a universal and necessary character. And if it is universal and necessary then it should be shared by all other subjects in the ground of sensus communis. Here, we also see the role of the difference between “form of the given object” and “the material or the content of that object” as a determinant factor.

In the latter case, the aesthetic judgment of sense or the pleasure in agreeable (on the mere sensation of the object) does not have to require “sensus communis” as its basis, Kant calls this kind of sensation “sensation proper” in order to distinguish it from the feeling of pleasure in beautiful:

Sensation, (construed) as what is real (i.e. material rather than formal) in perception and hence as referred to cognition, is called sensation proper. The only way for it to be conceivable that what is specific in the quality of such a sensation should be universally communicable in a uniform way is on the assumption that everyone’s sense is like our own. This, however, we simply cannot presuppose about such a sensation. Thus to a person who lacks the sense of smell we cannot communicate this kind of sensation; and even if he does not lack the sense, we still cannot be certain whether he is getting the very same sensation from a flower that we are getting. Yet people must be considered even more divergent concerning the *agreeableness* or *disagreeableness* they feel when sensing one and the same object of sense, and we simply cannot demand that everyone acknowledge taking in such objects the pleasure that we take in them. (*CJ*, 291, 292)

Kant also separates “sensus communis” as an idea or a “universal standpoint” (*CJ*, 295) from “common human understanding” in such a way that while the former is based on “the feeling”, the latter refers merely to the understanding. In this case, taste is called “sensus communis aestheticus”, and common understanding is called “sensus communis logicus” (*CJ*, 296). Lastly, I would like to refer to Lyotard’s *Lessons*. There, Lyotard is fruitfully listing step by step Kant’s arguments about the necessary relation between the judgment of taste and sensus communis. According to that, firstly, cognition and judgment must be universally communicable. Otherwise, “there would only be individual opinions, incapable of showing the agreement of these cognitions and judgments with their object”. Secondly, the criterion to be universally communicable is not only for the knowledge but also for the “subjective” feeling of pleasure. To be subjective, here, means to be reflective. In determinative judgment the attunement of the imagination and the understanding is the sufficient reason to have universal communicability. Thirdly, this attunement does not have to be in the guidance of the understanding. It can also occur in different ways. Fourthly,

then, it is also required for the aesthetic judgment of reflection, because it also contains a certain type of attunement between the cognitive faculties. Fifth, the necessary conclusion of this is that aesthetic judgment of reflection must also be universally communicable. Sixth, the feeling's claim to be universally communicable pre-requires the idea of common sense.<sup>206</sup>

### **3.6. The Harmony of the Cognitive Faculties as the Great Narrative without a Narrative: The Third Rupture**

Until now, we have constructed “judgment of taste” step by step in terms of analyzing its components. And as we have seen, each component necessarily carries us to Kant’s “great narrative”, i.e. “the harmony of the cognitive powers”. The feeling of pleasure in beautiful is the product of this harmony. The necessity and universality of the aesthetic judgment of reflection depends entirely on this free harmonious act.

In doing these, I have also attempted to explicate the inner dynamic of these components which leads to the pure judgment of taste. These components are not independently structured; on the contrary, they are connected internally and universally with each other. Firstly, Kant assigns disinterested pleasure to the judgment of taste in order to separate it from pleasure in agreeable and pleasure in good, both of which require the concept of the object, that makes the “mere reflective” character of the judgment of taste impossible. And this feature is consisted inevitably in the idea of contemplative pleasure. Pleasure in beautiful intends no interest towards its object. In judging by taste, we merely reflect on the form of the object which is subjectively purposive. Secondly, judgment of taste must have a claim to be universally valid; otherwise there is no need for transcendental critique of taste. Judgment of taste is universal, but as opposed to the judgment of cognition which includes a determinate concept of the understanding, its universality

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<sup>206</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime*, Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 201-202.

is not objective, but a subjective one. In other words, since pleasure is merely contemplative in judgment of taste, its universality necessarily indicates a subjective character. At this stage, we have also seen that this subjective universality indicates the universal communicability of the pleasure based on the harmony of the cognitive powers which are common to all judging subjects. Thirdly, as mentioned just above, the contemplative character of the pleasure which excludes the concept of the object depends on the purposive form of the object. Here, we have seen that the relation between the feeling of pleasure and the object judged cannot be relied on the external causal chain. Otherwise stated, pleasure is not simply caused by the presentation of the object itself. If it was, then the pleasure would be merely pleasure in agreeable; that is to say, it would be preceded by the presentation of the object, which case, as we have seen in Kant's very complex and obscure arguments in section 9, is rejected explicitly by Kant himself. Therefore, their relation can be only causally but internally constructed. And finally, such a judgment should fulfill the claim to be necessary, simply because it is the legitimate part of the transcendental philosophy. And again, this necessity has a special character, i.e. "exemplary necessity", due to the contemplative feature of the pleasure in beautiful. This kind of necessity is also the "necessary" conclusion of the arguments which declare the priority of the judging by taste to the feeling of pleasure. Therefore, it can be said that, this kind of necessity is the demand of the judging subject to other subjects' assent on his own judgment of taste. And such a necessity or demand cannot be relied on any concept of the object; on the contrary it should depend on the "free" play of the cognitive faculties, in which the apprehension of the form of the object is not directed by the concept of the understanding. Hence, in turn, this case necessitates the priority of the judgment to the pleasure.

### **3.6.1. Deduction and Kant's Expositions**

It is obvious that the free harmony of the cognitive faculties stands at the heart of the Kant's aesthetic theory. However, what is strange in this regard is the fact that Kant does not devote a special section or chapter to this crucial notion. He explains it in

various passages in his third *Critique* in an unsystematic way without giving any detailed argument about it. Nevertheless, we can classify or systematize these passages as follows: Except both Introductions, it is dealt mainly with at the end of the section 9, in “General Comment on the First Division of the Analytic (of Beautiful)” and in the “Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments”. As we might guess, the most apparent passage in which Kant attempts to give an explanation about it takes place in the “Deduction”. Undoubtedly, the reason for this is the idea that the universality and necessity of the judgment of taste rests on this free play of our cognitive faculties which is valid for every judging subjects, that is, they are subjective conditions for the possibility of cognition in general (*CJ*, 293). Kant states that the critique of taste or the judgment of taste is transcendental critique, as it “derives the possibility of such judging from the nature of these powers as cognitive powers as such” (*CJ*, 286). This also explains us “what makes” deduction of the judgment of taste “easy” (*CJ*, 291). There is no objective concept to determine the universality and necessity of such a judgment. It rests merely and entirely on the free harmony of the cognitive faculties, and the function of these cognitive faculties has already been justified in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is very obvious that the possibility of such a judgment of taste and its deduction is based entirely on the arguments in the first *Critique* by Kant. On the other hand, in his Preface to the third *Critique*, Kant accepts and confesses the obscurity of his own arguments gently. “...I hope to be excused if my solution contains a certain amount of obscurity, not altogether avoidable, as long as I have established clearly enough that the principle has been stated correctly” (*CJ*, 170). In this section, I will first discuss Kant’s own arguments presented in the Deduction and then discuss the commentators’ arguments about our present issue. The technical part of the free harmony and its possibility or legitimacy regarding the functions and the relations of the imagination and the understanding will be discussed in more detailed in the fourth chapter of this thesis after investigating the place of the imagination and the understanding and also their relation in Kant’s theory of knowledge in the first *Critique*. We will see that due to the obscurity and the uncleanness of the arguments, some commentators interpret this task as “impossible” or as condemned to be remained unsolved one.

As we know, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, the notion of “deduction” is used as identical with the notion of “justification” by Kant. What is questioned here, i.e. *Quid Juris* (question of right), is the justification of the universality of judgment of taste (*CJ*, 279) and its claim of necessity (*CJ*, 281). That is to say, it is in need of being justified whether such a judgment has any a priori ground to be universal. This is the case because the universality and necessity are two main characteristics for something in order to have a priori basis. Yet, as we have seen in arguing the judgment of taste, these two elements are “special” kinds. The universality and necessity, in this case, are not cognitive. “Since an aesthetic judgment lays claim to universal validity for every subject and hence must be based on some a priori principle or other, it requires a deduction” (*CJ*, 279). Therefore, what Kant here attempts to show is the legitimacy of the pure judgment of taste. How can the subjective reflective judgment have a necessary universal validity?

A judgment of taste differs from a logical in that a logical judgment subsumes a presentation under the concepts of the object, whereas a judgment of taste does not subsume it under any concept at all, since otherwise the necessary universal approval could be (obtained) by compelling. But a judgment of taste does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as it alleges a universality and necessity, though a universality and necessity that is governed by concepts of object and hence is merely subjective. (*CJ*, 286, 287)

In order to explain this issue, Kant, firstly, mentions two “peculiarities” of a judgment of taste which will also be re-articulated in the dialectic of aesthetic judgment of reflection: The first one is that the aesthetic judgment has universal validity, even if its universality is entirely different from cognitive judgment produced by the co-operation between the imagination and the understanding. Second, aesthetic judgment imposes also a necessity, which should be based on a priori ground, though this ground cannot be constructed by concepts (*CJ*, 281).

Kant formulates the first peculiarity as following: “A judgment of taste determines its object in respect of our liking (beauty) [but] makes a claim to *everyone's* assent, as if it were an objective judgment” (*CJ*, 282). We should remember the fact that

when we judge something as beautiful, the beauty does not belong to the object itself. On the contrary, it appears when the subject judges it to be beautiful. The beautiful as a certain kind of liking in the aesthetic judgment functions as a predicate, but it does not determine its object; nevertheless, it determines the judging subject's own feeling. Aesthetic judgment is reflective, namely that, there is no concept of the object which we compare other concepts of the objects. And in the second peculiarity, Kant asserts that “a judgment of taste, just as if it were *subjective*, cannot be determined by bases of proof” (CJ, 284). That is to say, we cannot prove such a judgment’s determining basis, i.e., subjective formal purposiveness, and the feeling of pleasure, as we do in the judgment of cognition in which the determining basis is the concept of the object itself. In fact, it can be noticed that, what Kant does in the “Deduction” is partially repetition of his previous arguments to indicate the “peculiarities” of the pure judgment of taste, and by this way, demonstrating why the deduction of such a judgment is easy: There is no objective proof for the Deduction.

In the both first and second peculiarity, Kant presents some examples in order to explain that, in the case of aesthetic appreciation, it is not possible to justify the universality and necessity of this kind of judgment by reference to the justification of the employment of a determinate concept so as regards to objective judgment. For, as we have seen before, Kant again emphasizes the fact that judgment of taste is singular (CJ, 191), not conceptual. It belongs to the single empirical (CJ, FI, 229). That is to say, the object judged is also “singular”, it is not treated as an instance of a certain kind of objects. Here again, we can see Kant’s emphasis on the “essential distinction” between objective purposiveness and subjective formal purposiveness. However, this does not, surely, mean that every judging subject has its own taste about the beautiful object. Its referring to the particular empirical intuition without a concept means that it reflects merely on the form of the object, that is, on the “purposive form of the object” which enlivens the harmonious free play of our cognitive powers. Since in judging by taste we “feel this contemplative pleasure, or “subjective purposiveness of the presentation for the relation between our cognitive powers, then we must be entitled to require this pleasure from everyone” (CJ, 290). Earlier, as we remember, in explaining the singularity of the aesthetic judgment,

Kant gave an example of a beautiful rose. Here, in the “Deduction”, he attempts to underline it by giving a similar example, a tulip. According to that, the judgment, for instance, that “all tulips are beautiful” is not the aesthetic judgment of reflection but to the cognitive judgment, as in this case the particular object “tulip”, subsumed under a general concept, is compared with other tulips and in this way we form a universal judgment. On the other hand, the judgment “this tulip is beautiful”, a singular judgment about that tulip, must be regarded as a judgment of taste. It has its own basis merely on the subjective feelings.

Only a judgment by which I find a singular given tulip beautiful, i.e. in which I find that my liking for the tulip universally valid, is a judgment of taste. Its peculiarity, however, consists in the fact that, even though it has merely subjective validity, it yet extends its claim to *all* subjects, just as it always could if it were an objective judgment that rested on cognitive bases and that (we) could be compelled (to make) by a proof. (*CJ*, 285)

Kant mentions also the notion of “autonomy” to the extent that despite its aesthetic judgment’s “singular” character, the judging subject must be autonomous in judging the object to be beautiful (*CJ*, 282). That means, since it requires the “immediate” relation between a single subject and a particular presentation of the object, the judging subject must have his own autonomy to find something beautiful. As we can see, this type of “autonomy” in the fine art indicates also the “exemplary” status of the genius’ products (*CJ*, 284). It is also worth noting that in “the Deduction”, Kant refers to the “autonomy” by distinguishing it from “heteronomy”, whereas in the First Introduction, he mentions “autonomy” with reference to “heautonomy” (*CJ*, 225). While the notion “heteronomy” expounds the condition under which the subject needs “to make other people’s judgments the basis determining” his own judgment (*CJ*, 283), autonomy underscores itself as its own determining basis. The subjective universality of the judgment of taste stands in need of the “autonomy” of the judging subject. Therefore, according to Kant, the objective principle of taste by means of which the particular object is subsumed under the concept and concluding that the object is beautiful is impossible. Because, it is clear that, the subject must

feel that pleasure “immediately” in his presentation of the object, and hence, aesthetic judgment must reflect upon the judging subject’s feeling, not upon some other bases in need for proof (*CJ*, 289). In this manner, the contemplative pleasure does not have “any bases of proof” (*CJ*, 286). Then, what is remained here to be done is to explain how to reciprocally perform the cognitive faculties, i.e. the understanding and the imagination, in judging about beauty. For Kant, transcendental critique concerns only with the possibility to derive aesthetic judgment from the nature of these two cognitive powers. It is crucial to comprehend Kant’s claim that the ground of the pure judgment of taste is “the subjective formal condition of a judgment” itself (*CJ*, 287). This phrase “the subjective formal condition” should be, indeed, explained. It is “formal” because in the case of judgment of taste, as we have seen, the “purposiveness” of the “form” of the object, which pleases the subject, is merely for our judgment. Secondly, judgment of taste is “conditioned” by all subjects’ demand of assent. In this light, on Kant’s account, this subjective condition of a judgment is the subject’s ability to judge, that is, the power of judgment. At this juncture, we should appeal again the first quoted passage above where Kant explains not only the difference but also the similarity between the judgment of taste and the cognitive judgment. They are similar, because they share the same “form” of the judgment in general, namely that, they contain a subject, as a given particular, and also the predicate. As we know, in logical form of the judgment of cognition, the particular presentation of the object which is apprehended by the imagination under the guide of the rules or the principles of the understanding is related to the universal or the concept of the understanding. In judging about beautiful, however, the given presentation is referred not to the concept but to the feeling, as a predicate. Yet, even in such a case, it is a necessary condition that the understanding, as a spontaneous discursive capacity, and the imagination, as a capacity for the combination of the manifold, must be harmonized. The crucial difference between cognitive and aesthetic judgment must also be stressed. In the former case, as the process of the synthesis is directed by the rules of understanding, whereas in the latter case, such a subsumption determined by understanding cannot be allowed. Here, the imagination

as the faculty of intuition (as Guyer rightly notices<sup>207</sup>, while in the first critique, the faculty of intuition is ascribed to both the sensibility and the imagination, in his third *Critique*, Kant merely assigns the imagination to the faculty of intuition) is subsumed under the faculty of understanding, provided that imagination in its *freedom* is to be harmonized with the understanding in its *lawfulness* (*CJ*, 291). (In the “General Comment”, it is “the *free lawfulness* of the imagination” (*CJ*, 241)).

Now, since a judgment of taste is not based on a concept of the object, it can consist only in the subsumption of the very imagination under the condition (which must be met) for the understanding to proceed in general from intuition to concepts. In other words, since the imagination’s freedom consists precisely in its schematizing without a concept, a judgment of taste must rest upon mere sensation, namely, our sensation of both the imagination in its *freedom*, and the understanding with its *lawfulness*, as they reciprocally quicken each other; i.e. it must rest on a feeling that allows us to judge the object by the purposiveness that the presentation has insofar as it furthers the cognitive powers in their free play. Hence taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains principle of subsumption; however, this subsumption is not one of intuitions under concepts, but, rather, one of the *power* of intuitions or presentations (the imagination) under the *power* of the concepts (the understanding), insofar as the imagination in its *freedom* harmonizes with the understanding in its *lawfulness*. (*CJ*, 287)

In this long but crucial cited passage, it is clear that the process of the subsumption is still operational even in the judgment of taste. In our present case, on the other hand, the content of the act of subsumption is entirely different from the subsumption in the judgment of cognition. Here, the particular empirical intuition is not subsumed under the determinate concept; on the contrary, the faculty of the imagination as the faculty of intuition itself is subsumed under the faculty of the understanding as the faculty of concept without a mediation of any concept. Kant explicitly mentions the phrase “schematizing without a concept”. We may realize the idea that Kant seems to speak of the general conditions of two cognitive faculties. Allison, in replying to Guyer, attempts to clarify this issue. According to that, it is the power of judgment in general “which serves as the norm governing judgment of taste” in the sense that in the aesthetic judgment of reflection a given presentation of the object is subsumed

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<sup>207</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 75.

under “the conditions required by judgment to move from intuition to concept”.<sup>208</sup> In other words, “schematism without a concept” and the subsumption of the faculty of imagination under the faculty of the understanding indicate the general condition of the power of judgment. Moreover, in the cognitive judgment, to exemplify, a given presentation of “rose” is subsumed under the empirical concept in such a way that the imagination as the power of apprehension synthesizes the given intuition in accordance with the rule which is supplied by the concept of the understanding. In this manner, the apprehension of the imagination and the subsumption of the judgment are directly governed by the understanding. On the other hand, in the aesthetic judgment, there is no such a universal rule to be followed. Imagination is completely free in its act of the apprehension of the form of the object. By the same token, in an aesthetic judgment of sense, the predicate is again not a determinate concept of the object. However, the feeling of pleasure, as a predicate in such a judgment, does not have a claim to be universally valid, as it is based solely on sensation proper, i.e. matter or material. In this light, we can more clearly discern the reason why Kant insistently rejects a determinate concept in the aesthetic appreciation and relevantly the reason why pleasure should be contemplative in beautiful. Besides, as we have seen in the second chapter of this dissertation, in order to form an empirical concept in explaining the problematic relation between the reflective and the determinative judgments, it is a necessary step to compare the given presentation with other particular presentations to abstract what is common to them. Yet, this process is entirely irrelevant to the aesthetic experience due to the lack of the concept of the object. Kant, in the First Introduction, holds three stages or “acts of the spontaneous cognitive power” in employing empirical concepts: The first one is the “apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the manifold of intuition” which is the task of the imagination; the second one is “comprehension (*zusammenfassung*) of this manifold, i.e. “synthetic unity of the consciousness of this manifold in the concept of an object” which refers to the understanding; and finally the third one is the

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<sup>208</sup> Henry E. Allison, “Dialogue: Paul Guyer and Henry Allison on Allison’s *Kant’s Theory of Taste*”, *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, Rebecca Kukla, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 133.

exhibition (*exhibitio*) in intuition “of the object corresponding to” the concept of the object (CJ, 220). This is, indeed, the routine process to be followed in the employment of the cognitive judgment. On the other hand, in the reflective judgment, or strictly speaking, in the “merely” reflective judgment, the first to act should be performed without relating to the concept of the understanding. Kant calls the exhibition of the “indeterminate” concept of the understanding in the aesthetic judgment of reflection (CJ, FI, 221). In emphasizing “an indeterminate concept” under which the particular empirical intuition is subsumed, Kant seems to change his position considering the free harmonious play in the sense that in such a case, what is subsumed is not the imagination itself as the faculty of intuition or not the understanding itself as the faculty of concept, but an indeterminate concept of it under which the particular is subsumed. In addition to that, another difficulty arises in Kant’s division of tasks which are ascribed to the different cognitive faculties. According to this, in the First Introduction, in 221, Kant assigns the judgment to the exhibition in intuition, whereas in 224, he indicates the understanding for this task. As we will see later, commentators define their emplacement in accordance with the owner of this task.

Furthermore, in his *Logic*, he interestingly defines the relation between the imagination and the understanding in the judgment of taste. Accordingly, they are “two friends” “who cannot stand each other and yet cannot part from each other”.<sup>209</sup> They should agree with each other in the free harmonious act, even though they stand in a tensional relationship. Crowther properly describes this relation by pointing out that they represent opposite directions; the understanding intends to the universality, whereas the imagination towards specification through the intuition.<sup>210</sup> (This case is also remarkable; in the fifth chapter of the dissertation, we will see that the direction of the relation between the imagination and the understanding will be reversed in the relation between the understanding and reason). Under the light of all these explanations, it should be noticed that what Kant serves us about such a critical issue

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<sup>209</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 445.

<sup>210</sup> Paul Crowther, “The significance of Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgment”, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 36:2 (1996), p. 117.

is just a general framework without giving any further detailed explanation: In the free play, the imagination and the understanding are in mutual harmony in their freedom. When we elaborate on his arguments given in the first *Critique* about the relation between the imagination and the understanding, we will see that explaining “the free harmony” consistently with his theory of knowledge is an uphill task and we will see why Kant gently apologizes to his readers about the obscurity and uncleanness of his arguments. I choose Dieter Heinrich’s and Guyer’s latest articles for the next section, as their arguments will help us draw an ordered picture about the issue before going into technical details in the following chapter.

### **3.6.2. Exemplary Arguments for the Harmony of the Cognitive Faculties**

After these explanations, I would like to pass to Heinrich’s explanatory analysis of the harmony of the cognitive faculties presented in his article “Kant’s Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment”. First of all, it should be noted that Heinrich also takes the readers’ attention to the close relationship between Kant’s aesthetic theory and his theory of knowledge. According to him, Kant discusses his aesthetic theory directly “by integrating it into” his theory of knowledge.<sup>211</sup> Aesthetic judgment shares or uses the same sources with the cognitive judgments (but the former, unlike the latter, does not “express knowledge”).<sup>212</sup> In this sense, Kant’s “conceptual apparatus” for his aesthetic theory, in fact, is just transferred from his theory of knowledge.<sup>213</sup> For this reason, Kant thought that the claim to have universal validity for aesthetic judgment has already been justified through his epistemological arguments.<sup>214</sup> Further, according to Heinrich, Kant himself also realized that his arguments, especially about the relation between the imagination and the understanding, allow him to give a coherent and persuasive explanation for aesthetic judgment. Hence, “the new

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<sup>211</sup> Dieter Henrich, *Aesthetic Judgment*, p. 29.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

explanation would have the a priori status of a transcendental sight".<sup>215</sup> However, the picture is not so clear-cut regarding Kant's own arguments about the harmony of the imagination and the understanding. Here, the relations and the functions of these distinct cognitive faculties are dramatically changed by Kant. On the other hand, Kant has done it in such an obscure way; it should be re-formulated and clarified. Heinrich begins his analysis by underlining the position and the function the imagination. According to this, the imagination is "the source of all combinations within what is sensibly given to us".<sup>216</sup> In its function, the imagination is directly governed by the understanding. However, on Heinrich's account, in judging an object to be beautiful, the imagination and the understanding "proceed in another way" in which "the operations of the two capacities are coordinated".<sup>217</sup> In forming an aesthetic judgment, the imagination is not just served to the understanding; conversely, it spontaneously and freely supports the understanding. Heinrich also underlines the importance of the singularity of aesthetic judgment. This is because we are concerned solely with an individual presentation in the perceptual level without "having a description of the object". Heinrich's emphasis is remarkable. As we have seen in the previous sections, description necessarily requires the concept of the object, we do not judge by taste in accordance with what kind of object judged is. And as a result of this, the process of perceiving "precedes" the process of concept formation and the application of concept.<sup>218</sup> By this way, the notion "the harmony of the cognitive faculties" is positioned very close to the perceptual process in that no knowledge but merely the feeling of pleasure appears through the "intrinsic" awareness of this mutual accordance of the faculties.

Now, in order to investigate the structure of the free harmonious play of them, he suggests looking at the schematism in Kant's epistemology. He rightly regards the relation between the imagination and the understanding in the schematism as another kind of "harmony". The difference between these two types of harmonic relation, i.e. one of them is epistemic, another is aesthetic, is that schematism signifies a

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., p. 36

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., p. 37

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

determinative relation between them, or put it in a different way, the power of judgment operates in accordance with the laws of the principles of the understanding. For this reason, schematism proceeds from the concepts to the particulars. On the other hand, as we know, reflective judgment “operates in the reverse direction”.<sup>219</sup> This “reverse direction” can guide us in our investigation of the free play harmony. In reflective judgment, as Kant repeatedly emphasizes, there is no concept, conversely, we reflect on the presentation of the object in order to form an empirical concept for that particular. Here, Heinrich distinguishes “the acquisition of a concept” and “the application of it”. In this way, he will search for the imagination’s freedom and the understanding’s lawfulness, that is, for “the schematism without a concept”, in the free play. And again, in reflective judgment, there appears two distinct act of comparison; the comparison the given particular with others, or the comparison it with the cognitive powers. The first option is excluded, because, in the former, first, there is a need for the conceptual awareness, and second, aesthetic judgment is singular. Therefore, aesthetic attitude, as Kant states in the First Introduction, “arises before we attend to a comparison of an object with another”. From these, Heinrich conclude that “the lawfulness” of the understanding cannot include “the constitutive usage of the categories” in the formation of empirical concepts. Then, we should elaborate on another notion “exhibition” (*Darstellung*) which will, in turn, be the key term for the solution.<sup>220</sup> First of all, to apply concepts means to produce “instances of them in intuition” “whose unitary form” is spatio-temporal. And exhibiting a concept, which is the task of the understanding (Heinrich prefers ascribing the understanding for this task), in schematism through the power of judgment is always in intuition apprehended by the imagination. The same is the case in aesthetic experience: the power of judgment “holds up” the imagination as the capacity of apprehension to the understanding as the capacity of exhibition of a concept.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

However, we have a serious difficulty here. The reflective judgment proceeds from the perception and thus from the imagination to the understanding (concepts), whereas the exhibition entails necessarily the employment of a concept. In other words, exhibition is in contrast to the direction in which aesthetic judgment operates. In such a case, “to exhibit” is more appropriate for the determinative judgment: How can we explain “the exhibition as such” as the contribution of the understanding to the aesthetic experience? Immediately afterwards, Heinrich directs us to the solution: In its reflective form, the power of judgment compares “the state of the imagination with the conditions of a possible conceptualization in general. Yet, a symptom of the possession of a concept is always the possibility of its being exhibited in intuition. One cannot even search for concepts unless one conceives them already in light of the way in which they can be exhibited”.<sup>222</sup> Here, the phrase “conceptualization in general” refers explicitly to “the general structure of exhibition”.<sup>223</sup> Now, we can summarize Heinrich’s view, I suppose, as following: In the aesthetic judgment of reflection, in the free harmony, the lawfulness of the understanding and the exhibition of a concept in intuition can take place just as a possibility, as a “general condition” in searching for a concept. And when this search fails, the aesthetic judgment arises. But in the process, it is still the case. The aesthetic experience precedes both the formation of the concept and the employment of it. It is important to notice that Heinrich, at the beginning, does not separate the aesthetic reflective judgment from the search of the reflective judgment in general for a concept. We can interpret Heinrich’s approach as a “lawfulness of the understanding without a law”, like “schematism without a concept” or “purposiveness without a purpose”. The understanding as such “enters the play *prior to* the acquisition of any particular concept”. As Heinrich puts it, the solution, in turn, depends entirely on Kant’s close link of the aesthetic experience with the cognitive process. Imagination in the free harmonious act performs with “the general structure of the exhibition”. Both the imagination and the understanding in its lawfulness meet in the perceptual level.

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

The lawfulness of the understanding is revealed. What remains is the freedom of the imagination in the harmony. Firstly, Heinrich classifies the act of the imagination in the cognition as three groups: 1) The imagination “synthesizes what is given in intuition according to the rules of the understanding (the categories)” 2) “It apprehends particular manifold while respecting the way in which the manifolds are given.” 3) “It provides instances of empirical concepts by designing appropriate images for them by means of which the concepts are exhibited.”<sup>224</sup> As we can see, in three cases, the imagination is in service of the understanding. How does it operate free from the rules of the understanding? According to Heinrich, all these functions of the imagination are equal to “the constitution of particular forms and shapes”. Hence, if the imagination operates freely, it should “produce traces of forms without aiming at particular forms”, that is, without being directed by the understanding in its exhibition of a concept in intuition. At the beginning, the act of the apprehension of the imagination should not be determined. Significantly, Heinrich asserts that even in its determined apprehension in cognition, the act of imagination still proceeds freely until it stops when it forms a required particular shape. And in the aesthetic experience, it exercises without any coercion of the understanding. He describes this free harmony as “a dance of two partners who harmonize in their movements without influencing each other and enjoy their joint performance”.<sup>225</sup> For him, the free act of the imagination itself pleases. In fact, Heinrich’s approach is supported by Kant’s own explanation especially when he states in the Second Introduction that pleasure is related to the imagination and “possibly” to the understanding in general. By the same token, Crowther also uses the metaphor “rhapsody” in order to explain the free play relation.<sup>226</sup> He follows the same path with Heinrich by affirming that the lawfulness of the understanding is nothing but its general condition of the application of a concept. However, Heinrich’s explanation about the free act of the imagination is still obscure. Along with Meerbote<sup>227</sup>, Ginsborg rightly complains that Heinrich’s

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>226</sup> Paul Crowther, “The significance of Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgment”, p. 113.

<sup>227</sup> Ralf Meerbote, “Reflection on Beauty”, *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*, Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), p. 58.

explanation about the position of the imagination in the free play is “no clear than Kant’s own formulations”.<sup>228</sup> Moreover, Guyer regards Heinrich’s arguments as “pre-cognitive interpretation” in the sense that Heinrich’s statement that the ability of the judgment of taste “without having a description of the object” precedes “the process of acquisition and employment of a concept” indicates the pre-cognitive stage in Kant’s theory of knowledge.<sup>229</sup> And, Budd also complains about obscurity of Heinrich’s arguments. For him, Heinrich misses the role of the aesthetic object in explaining the apprehensive function of the imagination in the free play. In fact, Heinrich’s attempt is a very fruitful example in the respect that in the relevant literature, majority of commentators, exactly in the same way as Heinrich, “seemingly” explain the free play of the cognitive faculties without elaborating on these faculties functions in the first *Critique*.

Guyer, in his article “The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited”, focuses on the problem of the harmonious play and the interpretations about it and presents his own arguments. After presenting Kant’s own arguments, he classifies the interpretations in accordance with both how they evaluate Kant’s arguments and how they attempt to solve the problem. And by this way he introduces two classes: “pre-cognitive interpretations” and “multi-cognitive interpretations”.<sup>230</sup> We can re-classify, indeed, Guyer’s classification in such a way that the former refers to the condition under which the entire faculty of imagination itself is subsumed under the faculty of the understanding (“lawfulness without a law”), while the latter indicates the condition under which not the whole faculty, but the particular intuition is subsumed, not under the faculty of the understanding itself, but under the “indeterminate concept” (or, more correctly “indeterminate multitude of concepts”) of the understanding. Guyer himself explains the first group, i.e. precognitive interpretations, through their treating the harmonious play as a mental state “in which the manifold of

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<sup>228</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, “Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and Understanding”, *Philosophical Topics*, 25:1 (1997), p. 45.

<sup>229</sup> Paul Guyer, “The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited”, *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, Rebecca Kukla, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 166.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., pp. 165-166.

presentations furnished by the perception of an object satisfies all of the conditions for normal cognition of an object *except for that of the actual application of a determinate concept to the manifold*.<sup>231</sup> Therefore, the rationale behind why he terms it “pre-cognitive” lies entirely on the idea of Kant’s equation of the cognition with the process of the subsumption of the manifold under the determinate concept of the understanding (Guyer calls this cognition “ordinary cognition”). And, as we have seen in Heinrich’s case, in these interpretations the free act of apprehension of the imagination in relation to the lawfulness of the understanding “precedes” the employment of a determinate concept. On the other hand, the latter class, i.e. “multi-cognitive interpretations”, according to Guyer, affirms that the harmonious play of the cognitive faculties satisfies neither some of the conditions for “ordinary cognition” nor the “one of the normal conditions for cognition” by means of which pre-cognitive approach interprets the free play activity, but rather “it satisfies all of them, although only in an indeterminate way: Instead of suggesting *no* determinate concept for the manifold of intuition that it furnishes, a beautiful object suggests an indeterminate or open-ended *manifold* of concepts for the manifold of intuition”, simply by this way the mind operates “playfully and enjoyably among different ways of conceiving the same object without allowing or requiring it to settle down on one determinate way of conceiving” the object judged.<sup>232</sup> Guyer labels this approach as “multicognitive”, because it reflects the idea of “multiplicity of possible concepts” in the free play. He regards both Heinrich’s, Crawford’s which I will present in the next chapter and Allison’s views as the examples of precognitive approach. Allison, in explicating Kant’s argumentation of the free play, excludes the option of the indeterminate concept by maintaining that in forming an aesthetic judgment, the subsumption is “non-conceptual”.<sup>233</sup> However, Allison also explains “the basic idea” behind “the mechanics of the reciprocal quickening” as follows: “The imagination in its free play stimulates the understanding by occasioning it to entertain fresh conceptual possibilities, while, conversely, the imagination, under the general

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<sup>231</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>233</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 169.

direction of the understanding, strives to conceive new patterns of order".<sup>234</sup> Here, it is obvious that Allison suggests multiple conceptual possibilities and as related to this, new multiple patterns. For this reason, Guyer also takes Allison's interpretation as an example of "multicognitive" interpretation.<sup>235</sup> Moreover, according to Budd's interpretation of the harmony, as we will again see in the next chapter, represents symptoms in advance of the multicognitive approach. Although Guyer does not mention Gibbons's name, her view, which maintains that in producing aesthetic judgment the order of intuition is connected with the order of thought in a multiple ways<sup>236</sup>, should be clearly included in the "multicognitive" interpretations.

After these classifications, Guyer claims that we have, indeed, textual supports for both approaches.<sup>237</sup> To exemplify, Kant's arguments in the First Introduction (223-224) are taken as the evidence for the precognitive interpretation. Accordingly, in that passage Kant ascribes the function of the imagination "merely" to the apprehension of the object and states that the power of judgment "has no concept ready for the given intuition". In giving an explanation about these, Guyer publishes what he exactly means by "precognitive". Kant's these phrases, on Guyer's account, provide us with a motive to suggest that the harmony of the cognitive powers is a mental state "that logically and even temporally precedes ordinary cognition"<sup>238</sup>, because the act of apprehension is the first stage in the process of the three-fold synthesis which is the necessary condition for cognition. From this perspective, Guyer's own argument given in his *Kant and the Claims of Taste*<sup>239</sup>, in fact,

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>235</sup> Paul Guyer, "The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited", p. 169.

<sup>236</sup> Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, p. 113.

<sup>237</sup> Guyer, "The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited", p. 170.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>239</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, pp.79-90. Here, Guyer argues that the free harmony involves just two stages of the synthesis, that is, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination; the third one, i.e. the synthesis of recognition in a concept must be excluded. This view (together with Crawford's approach) will significantly be criticized by both Ginsborg and Makkreel. I will discuss these technical issues in the next chapter.)

represents also another example for the pre-cognitive approach (This side of his arguments is also confidently stated by Guyer's himself<sup>240</sup>, and it seems that this article is the "revised" version of his earlier thoughts introduced in his book). Guyer goes on saying that Kant's statements in the First Introduction (220-221) can be interpreted as the evidence for the multi-cognitive approach as well. In the relevant passage, Kant states that the apprehension of the manifold in the imagination agrees with "the presentation of a concept of the understanding (though which concept is undetermined)". For Guyer, from this passage we may conclude that aesthetically apprehended manifold does not only indicate the condition under which "some precondition for cognition" is satisfied, but, indeed, suggests "some concept for the object it presents without suggesting or generating any particular concept".<sup>241</sup> On the other hand, both interpretations suffer from some philosophical problems. First of all, precognitive interpretation paves the way for the problem of "everything's beautifulness". That is to say, this approach is not able to explain how a particular object can be judged to be beautiful, as, according to this approach, the harmony in aesthetic judgment satisfies "a condition that must be satisfied in every case of cognition".<sup>242</sup> One of the most important objections of Guyer to pre-cognitive approach is the fact that although this approach attempts to separate the application of pure concepts, i.e., categories, from the application of empirical ones in order to show the condition under which in the free play, merely categories operates without employing empirical determinate ones, Guyer rightfully holds that, as regards to Kant's theory of knowledge according to which "the categories are only the forms of empirical determinate concepts and can be applied to intuitions only through determinate concepts", it is impossible to apply the categories without applying any empirical determinate concepts to the aesthetic objects.

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<sup>240</sup> Paul Guyer, "The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited", p. 167.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>242</sup> For discussions on this issue, see Christian Wenzel's fruitful article, "Kant Finds Nothing Ugly?", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 39: 4 (1999), pp. 416-422., Also, Garrett Thomson, "Kant's Problem with Ugliness", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 50:2 (1992), pp. 107-115.

Furthermore, multi-cognitive approach does not have any “further” textual supports. Even in the adherent beauty, Kant suggests merely *one* concept instead of the multiple concepts or conceptual possibilities.<sup>243</sup> Along with all these difficulties, the major philosophical problem for both of them arises when we concern their basic claim that “a state of our cognitive powers”, i.e. the free play, “does not involve any determinate concept” with Kant’s own arguments in his theory of knowledge. In Guyer’s view, such a claim is very “dubious”. For, this claim “is inconsistent both with an ordinary assumption about judgments of taste and with the most fundamental claims of Kant’s theory of knowledge”.<sup>244</sup> The judgment of taste shares the same “form” with ordinary cognitive judgments, that is to say, it is in the form of which “this object is beautiful”, whatever that object is, such as “this sunset, “this painting” etc. In such a case, the objects aesthetically judged “must be identified by means of particular empirical concepts and that we must be cognizant of the application of such concepts to them in order to make such judgments, just as in the case with” the cognitive judgments about the object. He asserts that even Kant himself insists that the judgment of taste is, in a sense, independent from determinate concepts, he, at the same time, always indicates the particularity or singularity of the objects judged. At this point, Guyer attempts to interpret what Kant has in his own mind. According to him, Kant should have thought that such empirical concepts “are just used to tell others to what objects we are responding, to which they should also respond”.<sup>245</sup> That means, here, Guyer offers the idea that we should use a determinate empirical concept of an object in order to indicate its particularity. We do not use that concept for determining its object as being cognitively judged, i.e. for generalizing it. In fact, we use that concept to differ its object from other same kind of objects. By this way, Guyer thinks that he overcomes the difficulty with which both precognitive and multicognitive approaches face in the sense that applying an empirical concept necessarily explains or underlines the position of “recognition” or “self-consciousness” in the judgment of taste.<sup>246</sup> Then, how can we interpret Kant’s own

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<sup>243</sup> Paul Guyer, “The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited”, p. 176.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p. 180.

statements about the fact that in the free play there is no determinate concept? In order to overcome this issue, Guyer seems to distinguish what he calls “ordinary determinate concepts of objects” from “empirical determinates concepts”. The former is necessarily required to determine an object as a cognitive one. It includes “their intended *use* or *end*”, namely that, they have a definite intention or aim to determine its object cognitively. However, the latter is identified by “the absence” of “the determinate intended end or use of the object”.<sup>247</sup> For Guyer, this amounts to the absence of that concept. Therefore, according to him, concepts are also divided in accordance with their “use”. But this perspective also encounters with a difficulty: It depends merely on “lackness” or “absence”, it consists in entirely negative content. At this point, Guyer serves his approach and defines it as “metacognitive”. Metacognitive approach conceives the free harmonious play of the cognitive faculties as a special type of mental state, both, which is cognitive, i.e., it is “cognized”, and also which is “felt”. Accordingly, in the first case, the imagination through which the manifold of intuition is apprehended and the understanding through which that apprehension is recognized agree with each other “to satisfy the rules for the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept on which our recognition or identification of the object of this experience depends”, while in the latter case, the harmony is “felt” that “the understanding’s underlying objective or interest in unity is being satisfied in a way that *goes beyond* anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept”.<sup>248</sup> That is to say, it goes beyond the unity dictated by the concept itself. By means of going beyond the rules, the aesthetic pleasure arises. Therefore, in Guyer’s account, we can say, aesthetic judgment fulfills the conditions for the ordinary cognition, but it does not stop there and “goes beyond” these conditions. In this sense, Guyer’s approach does not regard the process of forming the judgment as “falling short” to fulfill these conditions, it does not “precede” these conditions; on the contrary, it goes beyond them. In other words, it is “additional” to the process of ordinary cognition.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p. 181.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., pp. 182-183.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p. 185.

A beautiful object can always be recognized as an object of some determinate kind, but our experience of it always has even more unity and coherence than is required for it to be a member of that kind, or has a kind of unity and coherence that is not merely a necessary condition of our classification of it.<sup>250</sup>

Guyer persuasively argues that metacognitive approach is also effective regarding the difficulty of “abstracting” or “forgetting” what the object is, i.e., the ordinary cognition of object. The free play of cognitive powers “is not a condition that must precede any ordinary cognition, nor must we forget or abstract away from our ordinary cognition of the object to take pleasure in its beauty.” The criticism of this approach is arisen again by Guyer himself: He confesses that meta-cognitive approach suffers from the fact that it is poorly supported by the text. (Although Guyer himself never mentions it, in section 36, Kant asserts that “judgment of taste is synthetic; for they *go beyond* the concept of the object, and even beyond the intuition of the object, and *add*” the feeling of pleasure as a predicate to the intuition” (my emphasis) (CJ, 289)). Nevertheless, according to him, this approach is the most appropriate one in order to explain Kant’s aesthetic theory coherently with his theory of knowledge.<sup>251</sup> Considering Guyer’s arguments in his book, we can legitimately assert that in his “new” article, it seems that he “revises” his arguments and through strict criticism of them, he modifies his view. Although it seems like Guyer takes some risks in order to explain the free play consistently with Kant’s theory of knowledge at first glance, in the next chapter we will see that other commentators will have to radically enforce the limits drawn by the doctrine of Transcendental Analytic to explain the free harmony in a proper way.

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., p. 186, and p. 193.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **STAGE I: RE-CONSIDERING THE FACULTIES: IMAGINATION (AND UNDERSTANDING)**

#### **4.1. General Descriptions**

In this chapter, I will attempt to present the function of imagination in its relation to the understanding in Kant's theory of knowledge and under the light of these explanations, I will re-argue that Kant's notion of "the free harmony of the cognitive faculties", that is, the possibility of such a free relation between imagination and understanding is problematic. To begin with, in order to comprehend the difficulty in aesthetic judgment of reflection in which no concept is involved, I would like to mention briefly the functions and positions of both the understanding and the judgment to which Kant ascribes in the first *Critique*. Kant defines the understanding as "a faculty of judgment", i.e., as the faculty of producing judgments by means of concepts (*CPR*, A 69 B 94). "We can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments". This is because the understanding is also considered as "the faculty of thought", i.e. discursive capacity, through which we think the object of intuition given by sensibility through concepts. In this composition, Kant also draws a distinction between the grounds of intuitions and of concepts. Intuitions are based on "affection" (*Affektionen*) as we are affected by these intuitions, whereas concepts rest on "function" which means "the unity of act of bringing various representations under one common representation" (*CPR*, B 93). Here, as we can see, Kant implicitly refers to the "logical reflection". In the *Bloomberg Logic*, a concept is also defined as "a general representation or a representation of what is common to several objects, as

representation, hence, so far as it may be contained in different objects".<sup>252</sup> As a result, for Kant, that the understanding employs its concepts amounts to making judgments. In other words, to employ concepts is nothing but to judge. The faculty of judgment, in this sense, is also the faculty of thought (*CPR*, A 81 B 107). Concepts, in this complicated structure, become the "predicates of possible judgments" (*CPR*, A 70). The function of a concept and of a judgment intersects: Both of them supply the unity. As I have presented in the previous chapter, knowledge is grounded upon two sources: Sensibility which obtains intuitions and spontaneity of the understanding which thinks these intuitions by employing its concepts. "The same function which gives unity of the various representations (*Vorstellung*) in a *judgment* also gives unity to mere synthesis of various representations in an *intuition*; and this unity, we entitle the pure concepts of the understanding" (*CPR*, B 105). Furthermore, pure concepts as the forms of thought, corresponding to the logical forms of judgment, do not stand in an immediate relation to the objects, or strictly speaking, to the representations of the objects. In such a case, judgment is "the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of" the object (*CPR*, A 69). At this point, the imagination appears as a mediator between the sensibility and the understanding. Sensibility as a passive capacity provides us with merely manifold of various representations. To synthesize this manifold in accordance with the rules imposed by the concepts is the function of the imagination as "the faculty of sensibility" which is different from the mere "senses".<sup>253</sup> (Here, I have to emphasize an obscurity. Although Kant himself states, in Transcendental Aesthetic, that sensibility is also source of the sensation (*CPR*, B 34), he sometimes regards them as two different sources.) What is unified by judgment is this synthesized unity in intuition as a subject of the judgment and the concept as a predicate of that judgment, namely that, judgment subsumes the former under the latter. This act of subsumption is also governed by the understanding. Judgment, through its copula (*Verhaltniswörtchen*) "is", is an activity, produced by the understanding, in which "given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective

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<sup>252</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 10.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

unity of apperception (*Apperzeption*)” (*CPR*, B 141). In this way, both the former and the latter are “combined in the object” (in B Edition, Kant uses the notions “synthesis” and “combination” interchangeably), the object which is nothing but the unity of the manifold of the given intuition in a concept (*CPR*, B 137).

Kant, in “The Clue to The Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding” (so-called “Metaphysical Deduction”) presents a general description about what he means by “synthesis”. Accordingly, the synthesis is “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping (*begreifen*) what is manifold in them in one knowledge” (*CPR*, B 103).. Further, he states that “synthesis in general is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely, ever conscious.” In this way, Kant ascribes the task of synthesis to the imagination. In this regard, intuition and conception should be combined by means of which the knowledge of the object arises. He goes on saying that “to bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function which belongs to the understanding.” Therefore, alongside with the imagination’s synthesis, the function of the understanding is defined as bringing this synthesis to concepts through its act of making a judgment. However, as we will see, Kant, in the B-Deduction, changes his strategy and attaches the synthesis to the spontaneity (*Spontaneität*) of understanding. He will declare that without the spontaneity in connection with pure apperception, a synthesis would not be possible (*CPR*, B 132).

## 4.2. The Position of Imagination in “A” Deduction

In the “Transcendental Deduction” of the First (A) Edition, Kant argues “threefold synthesis”. We should be careful about the fact that they are not referred to three distinct syntheses; conversely, they are solely different components or aspects of the same synthesis. Kant stresses the fact that the first component of the synthesis, i.e. synthesis of apprehension, is “inseparably bound up with” the second component, synthesis of reproduction (*CPR*, A 102). And both of them would be useless without the third element, the synthesis of recognition (*CPR*, A 103). This point will be

crucial in our discussing of the free harmony. Indeed, there is a deep debate about both “A” Deduction and “B” Deduction on the basis of their arguments, structures and conclusions. Since to explain all these issues in a detailed way exceeds the capacity of this chapter and is not directly relevant to our present aim, I will follow Kant’s own text and I will attempt to briefly expound his complex arguments also by appealing some commentators’ interpretations.<sup>254</sup> First of all, it should be noted that A-Deduction is divided into two parts: Subjective Deduction which includes threefold synthesis and Objective Deduction which explains transcendental apperception as the basis of all synthesis and unities and hence, as the source of the categories. Besides, the first two stages explained without referring to any conceptual capacity are called imaginative synthesis and the third one is conceptual synthesis. Remarkably, in A 94 which is omitted in B Edition, all synthesis is attributed to the imagination and the function of the conceptual synthesis is defined as the unity of the synthesis in a concept.

The first component is called “the synthesis of apprehension in intuition”. Kant remarks that all representations are given in time as a manifold, that is, they are subject to or conform to the condition of time, i.e. to inner sense. Since they are given as a manifold in themselves, they must be “ordered, connected, and brought into relation” (*CPR*, A 98). Therefore, to unify these representations in an intuition requires the act of synthesis.

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another...In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must be first run

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<sup>254</sup> Norman K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: Macmillan, 2003), H. J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience, Volume 1-2*, (London: Routledge, 2002), P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, (London: Methuen, 1968), Robert B. Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), J. Michael Young, “Kant’s View of Imagination”, *Kant-Studien*, 79:2 (1988), Eva Schaper, “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 18:2 (1964), Richard Aquila, “Imagination as a Medium in the *Critique of Pure Reason*”, *Monist*, 72:2 (1989).

through, and held together. This act I name the *synthesis of apprehension*.  
(CPR, A 99)

Then, it is clear that receptivity (*Empfanglichkeit*) as a passive capacity is only able to supply a manifold of different and unconnected impressions, through the synthesis of apprehension this manifold is combined in a single representation. That is to say, the manifold of different representations is apprehended as a manifold of the representation in an intuition. Most importantly, Kant also emphasizes that along with this empirical employment, the synthesis of apprehension must also be operated *a priori*. In explaining its *a priori* character upon which empirical synthesis is based, Kant makes a critical move and declares that space and time as pure intuitions “can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold” (CPR, A 100). In other words, imagination also “orders” space and time in its act of the synthesis of apprehension. In the section “On Imagination” of *Anthropology*, he states that pure intuitions of space and time belong to the productive faculty of imagination.<sup>255</sup> In the “Schematism” section, he also mentions that time itself is generated in the apprehension of the intuition (CPR, A 143). Therefore, the empirical synthesis presupposes pure synthesis of apprehension by imagination, and for this reason it is the transcendental condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the position and the full function of the imagination regarding pure forms of intuition is disputable. Heidegger considers the pure synthesis of apprehension as the process of “time-forming”.<sup>256</sup> Before this pure synthesis, we do not have the representation of time. Pure apprehending synthesis of imagination “does not first take place in the horizon of time”<sup>257</sup>, on the contrary, “transcendental imagination is primordial time”<sup>258</sup>. In a similar way, Longuenesse also points out that the temporality, in the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, “is generated by the very act of apprehending the

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<sup>255</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 56

<sup>256</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, R. Taft, trans. (Blooming: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 184.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., 192.

manifold".<sup>259</sup> Yet, as we will see, in B-Deduction Kant steps back, and asserts that the synthesis of imagination must conform to the pure forms of intuition as well.

The second component is the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. According to that, in this stage, imagination functions to reproduce earlier representations in the successive order of time. In fact, this is the necessary conclusion of the synthesis of apprehension. In order to unify the manifold of impressions, imagination must reproduce the earlier ones. Kant, here, first, mentions that it is the empirical law, when it operates in accordance with the law of association. On the other hand, the empirical synthesis of reproduction can exercise, if pure synthesis of reproduction provides it with "certain rules" to be followed in its empirical activity without which the knowledge of an object would be impossible (*CPR*, A 101). (On the other hand, Kant in both the objective deduction in A Edition (*CPR*, A 118, A 121) and "B" Deduction (*CPR*, B 152) revises his argument by stating that reproductive synthesis of imagination relies entirely on empirical conditions.) In other words, pure synthesis of reproduction is necessarily presupposed for the experience to be possible (*CPR*, A 102). Kant, in the third *Critique*, points out that in the free harmony, the free lawfulness of the imagination necessitates its productive activity, as otherwise the reproductive activity is subject to the law of association (*CJ*, 240). In order to make the difference between the empirical synthesis of reproduction and pure synthesis of it clear, Sallis plausibly reminds us a functional measure: While the former is "derivative", that is to say, it can be derived from the empirical intuition and hence it follows the experience, the latter is not derivative, on the contrary, it conditions experience.<sup>260</sup>

And finally, the third one is the synthesis of recognition in a concept. In addition to the first two elements of the synthesis, according to Kant, there must also be the synthesis of recognition by means of which the manifold of the representation forms the unity in a consciousness as well. This is because, Kant affirms, "if we were not

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<sup>259</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 37.

<sup>260</sup> John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), pp. 148-149.

conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless" (*CPR*, A 103). Furthermore, furnishing this unity is possible merely through a concept in the sense that it supplies the basis for the consciousness of the unity of synthesis. As Wolff emphasizes, at this stage, Kant identifies the concept and the consciousness in the process of synthesis.<sup>261</sup> The concept is able to provide this unity of consciousness, as it "serves as a rule" (*CPR*, A 105). The intuition is constructed in accordance with the concept of the object. That is to say, the synthesis of manifold is guided directly by the rules to which the concept imposes. The concept of body, Kant gives an example, "as the unity of manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances" (*CPR*, A 106). The mechanism of such a rule will be clearer in the section of "schematism". In such a structure, hence, the concept of an object mirrors the unitary consciousness (self-consciousness). Otherwise stated, the concept of the object and the self-consciousness are mutually dependent on each other. According to Melnick, we need the concept of object not only because it reflects the unity of consciousness, but also because it provides the ground for "the consciousness of other-than-self" through which one can "distinguish himself from what he is conscious of".<sup>262</sup> In this sense, to be conscious of a representation or an object means to be conscious of "I" as well. And in the same way as the first two stages, the unity of conceptual consciousness also necessitates "a transcendental ground" for the synthesis of the manifold of all representations, "and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general". Without such a ground, the experience would be impossible.

There can be no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of object alone

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<sup>261</sup> Robert P. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 154.

<sup>262</sup> Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 46.

possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name *transcendental apperception*. (CPR, A 107)

Therefore, when we construct the object or the knowledge of the object, we, at the same time, construct the unity of our consciousness. But in this case, we are necessarily related to the intuitions; hence, this consciousness is “empirical apperception”. What Kant calls “Transcendental Apperception” is, on the other hand, the transcendental ground of all these unities. Transcendental Apperception as an “abiding and unchanging ‘I’ (CPR, A 123) is *a priori* condition of the possible experience. As a result, without exception, each representation or thought must belong to one consciousness, as they cannot be by themselves. Representations belong to one consciousness provided that they are connected on the ground of the unity of a consciousness. Understood this way, it should be noticed that pure apperception necessarily accompanies every representation and every judgment. In the B Edition, Kant will explain very little about the synthesis of apprehension, what he tries to expound is the idea that the unity of apperception and hence categories necessarily precede all synthesis.

#### **4.3. The Position of Imagination in “B” Deduction**

In the previous section, I have attempted to present the structure in which imagination, understanding, its concepts and finally the object stand in a complex relation. Imagination, in the A Edition, has its own role as a mediator between the sensibility and the understanding. There, sensibility and understanding is postulated as “two extremes” on the ground that without imagination they remain as unconnected (CPR, A 124). As we have seen, until the presentation of pure apperception which appears whereby the third stage, it seems that there was no necessary connection between the synthesis of imagination and understanding. Expressed otherwise, the faculty of imagination seems to be positioned independently from the bounds of the understanding and its categories. Aquila interprets it in such a way that the order of his exposition of threefold synthesis is

also responsible for such an evaluation.<sup>263</sup> By the same token, for Pippin, the sequence of the exposition of threefold synthesis signifies merely logical order; it is not temporal successive process which necessitates distinguishing three components from each other.<sup>264</sup> In order to avoid these interpretations and due to the subjective-psychological remarks of the arguments of the “A” Deduction, Kant rewrites transcendental deduction in the B edition. In the “Preface”, he notes that “I must forestall the reader’s criticism by pointing out that the objective deduction with which I am here chiefly concerned retains its full force even if my subjective deduction should fail to produce that complete conviction for which I hope” (*CPR*, A xvii). In this regard, he changes the structure of “B” Deduction in such a way that while in the first edition, deduction proceeds from the below (intuition, or more specifically apprehension of intuition) to the above (conceptual capacity and transcendental apperception), in the second edition it moves from the above to the below. In “B” Deduction, even though the strict relational positions of the faculties will be still saved, and though the imagination still functions as a mediator, it will be rendered dependent on the spontaneity of the understanding in the sense that the act of synthesis will be structured on the unity of pure apperception. As we will see, Kant’s move in B Edition will be important for our discussions about the possibility of “the free play of the cognitive faculties”.

Traditionally, “B” Deduction in its complexity is considered as containing two steps by reference to Heinrich’s arguments in his “The Proof Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”. According to that, in the first step Kant focuses on the argument of the pure apperception, its unity and intellectual synthesis (*synthesis intellectialis*), in the second step he deals with the imagination, its figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*) along with the latter. On the other hand, on Heinrich’s accounts, in “B” Deduction, contra many interpretations, Kant serves just one proof in seemingly two steps.<sup>265</sup> Paton, to exemplify, argues that in the second edition,

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<sup>263</sup> Richard Aquila, “Imagination as a Medium in the *Critique of Pure Reason*”, p. 215.

<sup>264</sup> Robert B. Pippin, “The Schematism and Empirical Concepts”, *Kant-Studien*, 67:2 (1976), p. 158.

<sup>265</sup> Dieter Heinrich, “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 22:4 (1969), pp. 641-643.

Kant's argument proceeds through "two separate parts". In the first part, he deals with the pure categories, and in the second the schematized categories.<sup>266</sup> In fact, Paton's classification coincides with Kant's own structure. When he elaborates on the synthesis of the imagination, he concerns inevitably with the apprehension of empirical intuitions. Yet, Paton goes on arguing that the first path can be called "objective deduction" due to its emphasis on the objective unity of apperception, while the second path can be treated as subjective deduction due to turning back to the synthesis of apprehension.<sup>267</sup> Hence, according to Paton, just as "A" Deduction consisting of both subjective and objective deduction serves two separate proves, so "B" Deduction also reflects two distinct proofs. Regarding the order of deductions, i.e. the sequence from "above" to "below", Heinrich rejects such interpretations by claiming that this sequence of the structure of the "B" Deduction will direct us to construct the condition of transcendental apperception as the basis of all synthesis, and this is the whole story about what this deduction attempts to prove. We should notice that the aim of Kant's arguments is to prove that the source of pure concepts, i.e. categories, which are *a priori* and necessary condition of the possible experience, is nothing but the understanding itself. In other words, they cannot be derived from the experience; on the contrary, they are preconditions for the possibility of the experience. Therefore, the main concern in these deductions is to demonstrate "how *subjective conditions* of thought can have *objective validity*, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects" (*CPR*, A 90).

At the very beginning of the "B" Deduction, Kant declares that the combination (*conjunction*) of the manifold in general, which will, in turn, entail "the intellectual synthesis" in which the categories is related to the object of intuition in general merely through the understanding, (*CPR*, B 150, 151) cannot be given by means of sense and, cannot be contained in the pure forms of intuition. His next move is to attach, contra the arguments of "A" Deduction, the synthesis or the combination not to the imagination, but to the understanding. In § 15, Kant re-describes the understanding as the faculty of representation through which the combination of the

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<sup>266</sup> H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, p. 501.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., p. 507.

manifold is supplied by means of the act of spontaneity (*CPR*, B 129). This spontaneous act of the understanding is called “synthesis” by Kant (*CPR*, B 130). The concept of “combination”, which means the synthesis in general, itself cannot be given through the sensibility. Besides, the concept of combination logically requires the concept of manifold and its synthesis, thus, that of the unity (*CPR*, B 131). For, it is clear that without the concept of manifold, the concept of combination or of synthesis is simply void; there must logically be a manifold in order to combine or to synthesize. More importantly, without the concept of unity, all other concepts would be meaningless. This unity “which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity, for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment” and hence “in these functions combination”. For this reason, the category also presupposes combination. Understood in this way, these concepts, like the concept of combination, cannot be result of the receptive capacity. On the contrary, all of them are prerequisites for the manifold given by the sensibility. For, in order to conceive the case that the sensibility provides us “the manifold” of intuitions, we have to posses the concept of manifold itself before. In this structure, the concept of combination, i.e. the synthesis, is based on solely the spontaneous act of the understanding as a discursive capacity. And hence, all synthesis including the synthesis of the imagination necessarily presupposes and is grounded upon the spontaneity of the understanding. “We cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined”. This spontaneous of act of the understanding is the spontaneous act of the transcendental apperception. As I have just mentioned in the previous section by emphasizing his footnote in “B” Deduction, transcendental apperception as the basis of the synthesis of the recognition in a concept at first, and then was served as the ground for all acts of both the imagination and the understanding, here Kant develops and deepens his argument of transcendental apperception. After all, Kant relates these analyses to the pure apperception. As we have seen, “I think” should accompany all my representations, as there is no representation without “I think” which thinks that representation. The representation “I think” is “the act of spontaneity”, which is called “pure or original apperception” by Kant (*CPR*, B 131, 132). It is very clear that since it is the act of spontaneity, it cannot belong to the sensible capacity. The

concept of combination, that of unity or manifold in general, which renders the manifold given by sensibility and all synthesis possible, is grounded upon this spontaneity of pure apperception. In this manner, Kant establishes a close connection between the concept of unity and the unity of apperception. “All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this manifold is found.” Moreover, Kant emphasizes that this original unity of apperception differs entirely from the act of consciousness, i.e. empirical consciousness. He regards empirical consciousness as accompanying different representations, “it is in itself diverse”. (*CPR*, B 133). We can think this in terms of the synthesis of recognition in a concept. According to that, as we have seen, in order to unify the first two aspects of synthesis, every single sense impressions in succession should be not only cognized and but also be recognized that all of them belongs to the same self-consciousness, in other words, “the thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness”. By this way, we are able to call them “one and all ours”. Empirical consciousness, in this manner, refers to the first case in that it cognizes each representation diversely. But without pure apperception as the basis of all consciousness, empirical intuition and hence empirical consciousness would be useless. Therefore, merely through our capacity to “unite a manifold of given representations in *one consciousness*”, it is possible for us “to represent to ourselves the *identity of the consciousness in (i.e. throughout) these representations*”. Transcendental apperception is “prior to all sensible intuition” (*CPR*, B 154), and thus, it is the necessary condition for the possibility of such an empirical consciousness. This structure also allows Kant to claim that synthetic unity of apperception conditions analytic unity (*CPR*, B 134). Accordingly, the unity of apperception by itself is analytic unity, i.e. self-identical (*CPR*, B 135). And, the condition “the capacity to unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness” indicates the idea that in one consciousness it already involves the unity of manifold, that is, a synthetic unity. In other words, as I have explained above, the unity of apperception is meaningful merely through being conscious of something which is a manifold, i.e. through distinguishing itself from what it is

conscious of. Hence, synthetic unity is the presupposition of the analytic unity of apperception.

*Understanding* is, to use general terms, *the faculty of knowledge*. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an *object* is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is *united*. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding. (CPR, B 137)

As a result, the object as the unity of the manifold and the unity of apperception stand in a necessary relation; they are internally and mutually related to each other. In this complex relational network, categories have their own peculiar roles. The manifold and unity of intuition “always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold for an intuition”. And this manifold for empirical intuition is given necessarily in terms of the category and hence “by means of the understanding” (CPR, B 145). Therefore, since the categories must be employed “in determination of the manifold of a given intuition”, and since we distinguish ourselves merely through the given empirical intuition, it cannot be thought without the application of these categories. Whenever we are affected by the sensibility, categories operate. Appearances in their necessary relation to the understanding must be determined by the categories. From this, it necessarily follows that “the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination”, i.e. the sensibility, necessitates the categories. (In fact, this is why Guyer rejects “pre-cognitive approach’s claim. It seems that it is not possible to separate the application of categories from the application of empirical concepts.) By this way, Kant will pass from the analysis of the pure understanding as the first step of B Deduction, in which the faculty of the understanding is dealt with as abstracted from sensibility, to the synthesis of the imagination. At this juncture, we should keep in mind that the synthesis of the manifold of representations is solely possible through the synthesis of the manifold,

as the concept of the manifold including the concept of combination and that of unity, which is not given by sensibility, but belonging to the understanding itself. Empirical consciousness, in this mechanism, has merely subjective validity, whereas the transcendental unity of apperception is objectively valid, that is, “an objective condition of all knowledge” (*CPR*, B 140). Kant serves two reasons for its objective validity: Firstly, pure apperception cognizes itself merely through the unity of the manifold which is given, “I myself require in knowing an object”, the second, it is the condition “under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me” (*CPR*, B 138). Here, we can again underlie the fact that the whole arguments rely on the “Copernican revolution”, the major argument of the first *Critique*, “objects must conform to our knowledge” (*CPR*, B xvi). Therefore, the unity of apperception and categories gain their objective validity solely by being applied to the sensible intuition. Categories by themselves are “mere forms of thought”, i.e. logical forms of judgments, without having objective reality, namely that, only “sensible and empirical can give to them body and meaning” (*CPR*, B 148). At this point, the synthesis of the imagination performs its function.

#### **4.3.1. Figurative Synthesis and Intellectual Synthesis**

In “the second step” of “B” Deduction Kant presents the imagination and its act of synthesis. In § 24, Kant defines the synthesis of apprehension as “the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition, is possible” (*CPR*, B 160). And he renames it “figurative synthesis” (*synthesis speciosa*) of imagination. Makkreel holds that the name “figurative” suggests “the graphic, more spatial qualities that the imagination contributes to synthesis.<sup>268</sup> Kant’s strategy here is to present “figurative synthesis” of imagination by distinguishing it from “the intellectual synthesis” (*synthesis intellectualis*) of the understanding. (Some commentators, such as Caygill<sup>269</sup>, intend

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<sup>268</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 30.

<sup>269</sup> Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgment*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 87.

to interpret the relation of figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis as that the former refers to the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction in threefold synthesis, and the latter to the synthesis of recognition. However, as we will see, it is difficult to define their relations as such.) According to that, in the apprehension, the notion “the synthesis” indicates the synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition belonging to the figurative synthesis of the imagination, and this type of synthesis or combination differs from the intellectual synthesis “which is thought in mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, which is entitled combination by the understanding” (*CPR*, B 151). In the former case, i.e. in its figurative use, the act of synthesis is applied to the sensible intuition in accordance with the rules supplied by these categories or concepts, in the latter case, i.e. in its intellectual employment, the synthesis is not applied but merely thought in general. From this, it follows that through the figurative synthesis, categories are related to objects of empirical intuition, whereas in the intellectual intuition, “the pure concepts of understanding relate, through the mere understanding, to objects of intuition in general” (*CPR*, B 150). On the other hand, Kant does not simply distinguish them; he also equates the imagination and its act of synthesis with the understanding by affirming that imagination’s synthesis of intuitions, “conforming as it does to the categories”, is “an action of the understanding on sensibility” (*CPR*, B 152) and that transcendental act of imagination, i.e. figurative synthesis, is “synthetic influence of the understanding” (*CPR*, B 154). In this way, he reduces the faculty of imagination to the part of the faculty of understanding. Besides, Kant expresses that the original synthetic unity of apperception which is also the basis of the analytic unity of apperception, “is the highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself” (*CPR*, B 134). That means, without such a unity, understanding as a faculty could not be possible. On the other hand, in Objective Deduction of A Edition, he argued that “*the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding*” (*CPR*, A 119). The reason behind his revision is the same: The position of imagination should not be described as an entirely independent from the understanding and its concepts. At this juncture, it can be said that one of the major

reasons, along with the empirical and subjective, i.e. psychological, character of the subjective deduction, why Kant steps back in “B” Deduction regarding the positions of both imagination and understanding is that if the imagination, as independent faculty from understanding, was the sole authority to relate the object of intuition to the categories, then there would be no difference between understanding and reason. In other words, the line which separates understanding from reason would disappear. As we have partially seen in the second chapter and as we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the ideas of reason, to which no corresponding object is given in experience, are extended forms of the categories, i.e. forms of thought. Hence, understanding and its categories, without relating to the sensible intuitions, would become reason itself and its ideas. The synthesis of intuition, in this sense, should not be independent act from understanding; on the contrary, it should be part of understanding. This case can also be seen in the fact that if the imagination was an entirely independent faculty, then the co-operation of the imagination and reason would produce with the same results as in the case of the understanding.

Furthermore, although figurative synthesis must be bound up with the understanding, intellectual synthesis is able to be “carried out by the understanding alone, without the aid of the imagination”. Thus, we can formulate the issue as follows: There cannot be any act of synthesis without the understanding, its categories and the unity of apperception, whereas without the imagination, it is still possible for a synthesis to be operated. The motive behind this reasoning is, indeed, simple: Intellectual synthesis refers to the concept of combination”, which is not empirical, as we saw above, but a priori, i.e. grounded upon the transcendental unity of apperception. And without such a concept, no synthesis, including the synthesis of imagination, could arise. Through figurative synthesis, this manifold is intuited (*CPR*, B 145). That is to say, the content of the intellectual synthesis is provided by figurative synthesis. Kant holds that the synthesis or combination of manifold in categories as mere forms of thought relates solely to the unity of apperception with no reference to sensible intuition. For this reason, this intellectual synthesis or combination is basis *a priori* for all possible knowledge and hence it is transcendental. In arguing these, Kant also makes another critical move which is highly controversial. According to that, it is the

understanding which determines inner sense, pure forms of sensibility, through its spontaneity (*CPR*, B 150). Bennett interprets this as that understanding determinates also the condition that “the intuitions can be given only in the unity of apperception”.<sup>270</sup> In other words, the given manifold which includes the unity itself by sensibility is possible merely the concept of manifold and its unity in the unity of apperception. In a similar way, Heinrich argues that intuitions “which already contain unity” must depend on the unity of apperception, because “wherever there is unity, there is a relation which can be thought according to categories”.<sup>271</sup> Merely by this way, it is possible to apply categories to the sensible intuitions.<sup>272</sup> Therefore, now, in “B” Deduction, there are no two entirely distinct faculties as sensibility and understanding, i.e. the conceptual capacity, to be mediated by merely imagination. Finally, according to Pippin, the unity of manifold in pure forms of intuition is also determined by the understanding, because Kant, in this deduction, does not only demonstrate that without categories there is no unity in experience, but also that without categories there is no the concept of unity itself at all.<sup>273</sup> In such a case, Kant concerns with “transcendental ideality” of pure forms of intuitions as abstracted from the senses, not with its “empirical reality”.<sup>274</sup> Hence, the understanding’s unity by intellectual synthesis is formal pre-condition for all unity of manifold which is already intuited as manifold. In such a structure, imagination is not a determinant factor which also forms intuitions themselves. In its figurative synthesis, it must conform to the form of intuition, and also to the categories (*CPR*, B 162). This is the one side of the story. There should be another side, as there is a mutual relation between the unity of apperception and the object of intuition. In this side, figurative synthesis of imagination operates in an effective way. Accordingly, through the act of imagination, figurative synthesis, the apperception realizes the inner and outer senses by recognizing inner sense as inner, and by this way it differs itself from what

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<sup>270</sup> Jonathan Bennett, *Kant’s Analytic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 111.

<sup>271</sup> Dieter Heinrich, “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 22:4 (1969), p. 646.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., p. 649.

<sup>273</sup> Robert B. Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form*, p. 184.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., p. 185.

he is conscious of. Gibbons points out the fact that figurative synthesis which connects the sensible intuition with the unity of apperception renders possible the case that “the I of ‘I think’ which is empty itself becomes the judging subject.<sup>275</sup> We should keep in mind that the intuition by itself or the category by itself is not enough to provide knowledge. It is by means of the objective judgment in which the apprehended intuition by the imagination and the concept which provides the rule for that apprehension is connected, the objective knowledge arises. All these components, therefore, are the necessary condition of the possible experience. To sum up, in this structure, all types of synthesis, “even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid *a priori* for all objects of experience” (*CPR*, B 161). The act of the imagination is grounded on the synthetic unity of apperception, that is, on the understanding itself. As both Longuenesse<sup>276</sup> and Allison<sup>277</sup> hold it, figurative synthesis of imagination is mere the effect of the function of understanding. Hence, contra the argument of A Edition, the synthesis of imagination is depended entirely on the spontaneity of the understanding. Otherwise stated, it is strictly bounded up with the condition of understanding and its categories. Strawson clearly states that imagination is not an independent faculty but the “lieutenant” of the understanding.<sup>278</sup> Later, Kant also emphasizes that the synthesis of representations by imagination rests on the unity of apperception (*CPR*, B 194). Then, we can realize now how difficult it is to consider imagination and its apprehension free from the understanding, the condition which free harmonious play in aesthetic judgment requires. Further, in these deductions, Kant presents only the general description of imagination and its act of apprehension. In schematism, the specific function of imagination will be clearer.

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<sup>275</sup> Sarah Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, p. 41.

<sup>276</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 202.

<sup>277</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 185.

<sup>278</sup> P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*,

#### 4.4. Schematism and the Implications of the Synthesis of Imagination

Kant explicates the deductions, *quid facti* and *quid juris*, in the first division, titled “Transcendental Analytic”, and specifically in the Book I, “Analytic of Concepts”, of *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the Book II, under the title of “Analytic of Principles”, Kant concentrates on the principles of the understanding which govern the employment of the categories. Here, Kant will expound these principles by means of which the categories are applied to the given representation in sensibility. Therefore, “the Analytic of Principles” provides us with the rules which guide judgment in its act of subsumption. Kant regards the principles as “the canon for judgment” (*CPR*, A 132 B 171). Under the condition of *a priori* rules, synthetic *a priori* judgments arise. According to that, the highest principle of synthetic judgment is that “every object stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience” (*CPR*, A 158 B 197). As I have emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, we think or comprehend the given intuition through employing concepts to this intuition. In such a case, to conceive what is intuited, for Kant, is to subsume it under the concept in judgment. In turn, applying concepts and making a judgment signify the same process. Through “Schematism” chapter, we pass to the application of categories to the appearances. For this reason, Schaper rightly considers this chapter as transitional section from “Analytic of Concepts” to “Analytic of Principles”.<sup>279</sup> Schematism, in this structure, implies the act of judgment, i.e. judgmental act of understanding, through which the object of intuition connects with the categories in accordance with the rule, that is, the principle. In order to attempt to solve the puzzle in aesthetic reflective judgment in which the representation of the object is subsumed under not the concept but the feeling (called “schematism without a concept”), first, we should look at the mechanism of subsumption. Kant formulates the present issue as following: “How is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?” (*CPR*, B 177 A 138). Although Kemp Smith<sup>280</sup> and Wolff<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Eva Schaper, “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered”, 274.

<sup>280</sup> Norman K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 334.

<sup>281</sup> Robert P. Wolff, *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 207.

find it entirely artificial, Kant elaborates the issue in terms of the notions “heterogeneity” and “homogeneity”. Accordingly, the object of intuition must be homogeneous with the concept under which that intuition is subsumed, that is to say, the concept “must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it” (*CPR*, A 137 B 176). To exemplify, the empirical concept of plate stands in a “homogenous” relation with the pure concept of circle. However, pure concepts are heterogeneous with the empirical intuition. Therefore, in order to render the application of the pure concepts to the empirical intuition possible, there must be a mediator component, i.e. “third thing”, which is homogenous both with the pure concepts and also with empirical intuition. Otherwise stated, “this mediating representation” must be pure as regards to categories, and at the same time it must be sensible considering empirical intuition. This mediator is called “transcendental schema” by Kant (*CPR*, B 138). Which representation can have these qualities? According to Kant, “time” fulfills all these conditions. On the one hand, it is homogenous with categories, as it is “pure” form of intuition (it is “transcendentally ideal”). On the other hand, it is also homogenous with the appearance; because it is already contained in every empirical intuition as a pure and formal condition of sensibility (it is “empirically real”). For these reasons, “an application of the category to appearances become possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category” (*CPR*, A 139 B 178).

The pure schema of magnitude (*Grösse*), for example, as a concept of the understanding , is number (*Zahl*), “a representation which comprises the successive addition of homogenous units. Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general” (*CPR*, B 182). Another example can be given from the causality. The schema of cause, “and of the causality of a thing in general, is the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subject to a rule”. (*CPR*, A 144). Kant summarizes the schemata of all categories as follows:

We thus find the schema of each category contains and makes capable of representation only a determination of time. The schema of magnitude is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object. The schema of quality is the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is filling of time. The schema of relation is the connecting of perceptions with one another all times according to a rule of time-determination. (*CPR*, B 185)

In this quoted passage, we should notice the fact that the schema of magnitude as the synthesis of time in the successive apprehension of an object refers directly to the function of time in the aesthetic experience as regards to the apprehension of the aesthetic object judged, not to the feeling of pleasure. Furthermore, the schema is a pure *a priori* product of the figurative synthesis of imagination (*CPR*, A 140 B 179). Yet, Kant warns us that, despite its “figurative” character, a schema is not simply an image (*Bild*). An image, Kant states, is an outcome of the empirical reproductive synthesis of imagination (*CPR*, B 181). A schema, then, is a rule for the synthesis of apprehension regarding time as pure intuition and inner sense and pure figure (*Gestalt*) in space. In other words, the schema provides the rule for producing images, and hence for “the determination of our intuition” (*CPR*, B 180). It is “an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze” (*CPR*, B 181). An image is always *individual*, for this reason, it cannot provide a rule for apprehension, i.e. for the application of a concept.<sup>282</sup> Kant gives a critical example to clarify his point. Accordingly, the concept of a “dog” “signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience or any image” (*CPR*, A 141). Therefore, a schema of a concept is not an individual image but a monogram regarding mere form without any content. Kant calls it “monogram” which is the product of pure *a priori* productive imagination (*CPR*, A 142). By means of a monogram, the images become possible. Although Bennett insists on

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<sup>282</sup> Michael Pendlebury, “Making Sense of Kant’s Schematism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 55:4 (1995), p. 784.

treating figure in monogram as a “private mental image”<sup>283</sup>, Pippin rightfully states that it is a schema which provides the ground for producing any image.<sup>284</sup> In other words, it is not an image itself, but a rule for producing the image. At this point, it is important to underline the difference between the empirical concepts and categories. The difference between a schema and an image also implies the difference between empirical concepts and categories. Regarding empirical concepts, it seems that there is no significant difference between them and schemata. And in this case, the figurative synthesis of imagination which produces monograms, i.e. schemata, is also related to the spatial forms. Later, Kant will define monogram as “an outline” (*CPR*, A 833 B 861). As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the case of aesthetic form of the object, we concern with “figure” (*Gestalt*) or “shape of the object, that is, with the spatial form or relations which is defined as “geometrical” or “mathematical figures” by Crawford.<sup>285</sup> Now, a monogram is defined as a rule “for generating spatial forms”, that is, it is a schema for “mathematical figures”.<sup>286</sup> Wolff significantly explicates the difference between the empirical concept and the category. According to that a concept itself can be considered as a rule for producing an image for a specific object. However, a category does not have such a specific function. A category supplies universal rule for the application of a determinate empirical concept. Wolff classifies them as “first order rule” corresponding to the empirical concept and “second order rule” referring to the category. In this manner, categories “lay down the general conditions to which first-order concepts must conform”.<sup>287</sup> By the same token, Pippin also distinguishes “rules” and “rules for rules”. Categories supplies rules for the empirical concepts which produces rules for generating mental images.<sup>288</sup> The category “substance” or “causality”, for example, does not provide any rule for producing images. But they serve the rules for the empirical concepts which supply the rules for the images. This is why Kant states

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<sup>283</sup> Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>284</sup> Robert B. Pippin, “The Schematism and Empirical Concepts”, p. 168.

<sup>285</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, p. 110.

<sup>286</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 32.

<sup>287</sup> Robert P. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 211-214.

<sup>288</sup> B. Pippin, “The Schematism and Empirical Concepts”, p. 157.

that “the schema of a *pure* concept of understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever. It is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression” (*CPR*, A 142). At this point, we can discern the strict relation between the categories and empirical concepts in their application to what is given in the sensibility. Hence, in the case of pure concepts, a schema as a product is strictly related to the time determination, as inner sense in general, and as successive order of time in mostly dynamical categories and as regards the pure image of all magnitudes, they are also related to space. Guyer holds the idea that both empirical concepts and mathematical categories are *themselves* “schemata”, i.e. “monograms”.<sup>289</sup> That is to say, they both indicate one and the same thing. We can also realize this case in Kant’s own example of the concept of “dog”. Rather, Makkreel, for example, treats “figurative synthesis of the imagination” in producing schemata as explicitly “the apprehension of ‘space’”.<sup>290</sup> Therefore, in the aesthetic apprehension of the form of the object, the primacy of space becomes apparent. For these reasons, Lewis White Beck directly declares that when Kant affirms that there is no determinate concept in “the construction of an aesthetic judgment, he means merely dynamical “categorical concepts”. Mathematical categories and their principles are necessarily involved in the judgment of taste.<sup>291</sup> We will return Beck’s analysis later.

In order to make the synthesis of apprehension clear, its application and its relation to the mathematical-dynamical categories and empirical concepts, I will elaborate on the difference between the apprehension of an object and the apprehension of an event in the next section. But before passing to it, lastly I would like to emphasize the fact that whenever Kant mentions the phrase “the schematized category” or “the schema of a concept”, he always means that it is applied to the empirical intuition in space and time. Categories are “restricted” by sensible intuition through the figurative synthesis of imagination (*CPR*, A 140 B 179). This point helps us to

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<sup>289</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 163.

<sup>290</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 48.

<sup>291</sup> Lewis W. Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 56-59.

comprehend our discussion, in the second chapter of this thesis, about “symbol” or “analogy” as a certain type of “exhibition” which is entirely different from the exhibition of “schematized concepts”. For the former, we need the latter, not *vice versa*.

#### **4.4.1. The Difference between the Apprehension of an Event and the Apprehension of an Object**

As I have mentioned before, categories are logical forms of judgment. In other words, Kant derives them from the logical forms of judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction. According to this derivation, there appear four main heads of the categories corresponding to the forms of judgment (*CPR*, A 80 B 106): Quality, Quantity, Relation and Modality. For example, in the table of judgment, under the title of “relation”, there are three types or forms of judgment (*CPR*, A 70 B 95): Categorical, Hypothetical and Disjunctive. Hypothetical form of judgment (if  $p$ , then  $q$ ) corresponds to the category of causality. Moreover, Kant also divides categories into two groups: Mathematical Categories, as quality and quantity, and Dynamical Categories, as relation and modality (*CPR*, B 110). Importantly, mathematical categories are about the object and determine its condition on the basis of space and time, as we have seen in the previous section. In other words, mathematical categories “have no correlates”, whereas dynamical categories are about the objects as regards to the relation with each other, or, about the object in relation to other objects. Hence, in the case of the schemata of dynamical categories, time as both inner and outer intuition is much more dominant. The function of time as outer sense, in this case, comes into prominence, as it determines the relation of objects with each other. On the other hand, in the case of the mathematical categories, in addition to time determination, space as outer intuition also plays its role. As Allison rightly puts it, since dynamical categories are relational ones, they are more appropriate for the rules of time determinations.<sup>292</sup>. At this point, we should refer back to our arguments in the previous chapter regarding the positions of space and time in aesthetic

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<sup>292</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 222.

experience. As I have attempted to demonstrate, time as inner sense is the factor mostly for pleasure itself and for the given manifold -manifold is always given successively in time- (as we have seen in the cited passage in the previous section), whereas space has a central role considering the aesthetic form of the object. In this sense, space has a direct impact on the aesthetic experience. We can notice this when we look at Kant's own expositions. In the first *Critique*, the category of "relation" which is dynamical implies the relation between objects, and hence we deal with the determination of an object in relation to others. On the other hand, in the third *Critique*, under the category of "relation", Kant exposes not the relation between objects, but the relation between the object and the subject.

Returning our present issue, it should be added that corresponding to the division of categories, principles are also divided into two groups: Mathematical and Dynamical principles (*CPR*, A 162 B 202). At this juncture, mathematical categories and principles refers "axiom of intuition" (Quantity) and "anticipation of perception" (Quality), while dynamical categories and principles to "analogies of experience" (Relation) and "postulates of empirical thought in general" (Modality). Under the light of these explanations, we can reconsider the arguments presented in "Schematism". For example, considering the category "quantity", Kant explains, "the pure image of all magnitudes for outer sense is space"; "that of all objects of the senses in general is time" (*CPR*, B 182). Otherwise stated, magnitude as regards outer intuition is spatial, and takes place in time. Here, time functions in the successive apprehension of an object. On the other hand, regarding the category "causality", it is not a pure image, but the schema of succession of events in time which is subject to a rule (*CPR*, A 144). The successive temporal order of two events which follows one another is apprehended by the imagination and through the category of causality, we define the relation between them as "necessary causal relation". Most importantly, in all cases, i.e. pure concepts, as both mathematical and dynamical, and empirical concepts, schemata serves as rules for the synthesis of apprehension. Further, it is also important to notice the function of space, or spatial form, in both the empirical concepts and mathematical categories/principles. Kant explicates the difference between the apprehension of an object and that of an event

mainly in two different places in the first *Critique*. The first one is in “B” Deduction. Here, the example of a house is in our scope. In this example, we will also see the strict relation between the synthesis of imagination, the understanding and its concepts. According to that,

...by apprehension of the manifold of a house I make the empirical intuition of it into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my apprehension, and I draw as it were the outline of the house in conformity with this synthetic unity of manifold in space. But if I abstract from the form of space, this same synthetic unity has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of homogenous in an intuition in general, that is, the category of quantity. To this category, therefore, the synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must completely conform. (CPR, B 162)

In this passage, two points should be underlined. The first one is that the synthesis apprehension is directly subject to the rules imposed by the category of the understanding, i.e. the category of quantity, as a mathematical concept, which itself imposes the rule also for the empirical concept of a house. The second one is Kant’s emphasis on the notion “homogenous” as regards to the mathematical categories and principles. As we will see in the next chapter in more detail, according to Kant, since mathematical concepts and principles are concerned not with the connections or the relations, their synthesis is homogenous, whereas in the case of dynamical concepts and principles, the synthesis is heterogeneous. This distinction will allow Kant to insert ideas of reason to the system without contradiction.

When we come to the apprehension of an event, the case is different. The emphasis will be entirely on time or time-relation. Kant gives an example of “the freezing of water” in the “B” Deduction. Here, two states, fluidity and solidity, are apprehended as “standing to one another in a relation of time”, that is, in the relation of cause and effect in accordance with the category of causality. And this time sequence is determined as necessarily successive (CPR, B 163).

The second example is given in the “Second Analogy” in which Kant attempts to prove the objective sequence of events or the relation of the objects in time. In A Edition, Kant formulates it as following: “Everything that happens...presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule”. In B Edition: “All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (*CPR*, B 232). In arguing these, Kant compares the apprehension of an object and of an event and distinguishes the former from the latter. In the former case, the succession of apprehension is subjective, whereas in the latter case objective. The apprehended object, here, is again “a house”. In perceiving a house, the apprehension of the manifold is successive. However, the sequence of this successive apprehension is not objective; that is to say, it is not a necessary successive sequence. Perceiving a house can follow the sequence or order from the basement of the house to the roof or conversely can follow the order from the roof of the house to the basement. The succession of the apprehension of the manifold does not proceed in accordance with a rule, or a principle. The sequence of the apprehension in an object is entirely arbitrary. In other words, the synthesis of apprehension of an object is successive, but not objectively determined in accordance with a rule as regards to time determination. It is not time sequence, but spatial form of the apprehended object that is synthesized by imagination in accordance with a rule provided by the empirical concept of “house”. On the other hand, in the apprehension of an event, a ship moving down stream, the order of receiving the representations must follow an objective time sequence. First, the ship is received at a certain point “A”, then at “B”. “A” necessarily precedes “B”, or conversely, B necessarily follows A” (*CPR*, A 192 B 237).

In the previous example of a house my perceptions could begin with the apprehension of the roof and end with the basement, or could begin from below and end above; and I could similarly apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition either from right to left or from left to right. In the series of these perceptions there was thus no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin in order to connect the manifold empirically. But in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another a *necessary* order. (*CPR*, B 238)

After all, it can be seen that in apprehending an object or an event, the synthesis is directed by a rule imposed by the concept of understanding. In the case of apprehension of an object, the concept of the object imposes a rule, a monogram, to the synthesis. To sum up, as we have seen, in his theory of knowledge, Kant holds that the imagination and its function stand in a strict and complex relation with the understanding and its concepts, a relation under which the understanding dominates the acts of imagination. As a conclusion of “B” deduction, it can also be said that imagination is not an independent faculty; it bounds up strictly with the spontaneity of the understanding and its concepts. According to Hughes, in this relation, the imagination is the “handmaiden” of understanding.<sup>293</sup> We can re-formulate the difficulty as following: In Kant’s theory of knowledge, the imagination is completely in the service of the understanding, whereas in his aesthetic theory, the relation is reversed in such a way that the understanding is in the service of the imagination (CJ, 242). How can these two opposite cases be compatible? How does the imagination operate free from the bounds of the understanding? All these can show us why Kant leaves the notion “free play of the cognitive faculties” as unexplained. Now, after these explanations, we have an efficient ground to re-examine the free harmonious of these faculties in more detail.

#### **4.5. Re-Examination of the Free Harmony of the Cognitive Faculties: The Last Attempt**

As we have seen in the previous sections, in Kant’s theory of knowledge, the imagination, the understanding, and its concepts stand in a complex and intertwined relation. The arguments in “A” Deduction can be interpreted as that the synthesis of imagination is free from the bounds of the spontaneity of the understanding and the concepts. However, in order to avoid such an interpretation Kant re-writes Deduction in the Second Edition where the imagination and its functions are rendered to be subject entirely to the conditions of the spontaneity of the understanding. As Hughes

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<sup>293</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 157.

puts it, the conclusion of the arguments of “B” Deduction implies that “all apprehension is determinately unified”, that is to say, “all sensory apprehension is cognitive”.<sup>294</sup> On the other hand, in his aesthetic theory, Kant also offers that in the aesthetic appreciation, the feeling of pleasure is produced by the free harmony of the imagination and the understanding in which the imagination operates freely from the conceptual determination of the understanding. It seems that due to the non-conceptual characteristic of the aesthetic judgment of reflection, the aesthetic experience should occur at the perceptual level. In order to solve the puzzle, commentators attempt to explain the free harmony by reference to the arguments of Kant’s theory of knowledge, and most importantly, by interpreting it in a radical way.

Firstly, I would like to elaborate on Crawford’s arguments which will help us pass to other commentators’ views. Crawford begins his analysis with presenting Kant’s approach towards the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Accordingly, in arguing “subjective universality”, i.e. “universal communicability” of the judgment of taste, Kant shows that such a judgment should be based on the feeling of pleasure which is universally communicable through his arguments in “the key to the critique of taste”. As a next step, he attempts to demonstrate that the universal communicability of the pleasure is possible merely provided that it is based on the mental state which is a subjective condition for the cognition in general for all subjects, i.e. the harmony of the cognitive faculties.<sup>295</sup> Crawford interprets Kant’s exposition in such a way that Kant seems to link aesthetic perception with cognitive perception. And the notion “free harmony” is the necessary result of this linking.<sup>296</sup> However, in the cognitive perception, the imagination and the understanding and its concepts are internally related to each other. In the argument of the harmony, the major difficulty arises out of such an attempt for linking aesthetic perception with cognitive perception. In order to overcome this difficulty, Crawford makes a move which is highly controversial. He tries, first, to define the position of the imagination, i.e. the freedom of

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<sup>294</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology*, pp. 138-139.

<sup>295</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 75.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

imagination, in the harmonious relation with the understanding. The free play of the imagination refers, for him, to the condition under which the imagination orders the spatial and temporal elements of perceptions and relates the parts, i.e. “elements and complexes of elements”, “to each other in a variety of ways to determine whether a relatedness, a purposiveness of form, can be apprehended”.<sup>297</sup> Here, his emphasis on “a variety of ways to determine” is remarkable considering Guyer’s classification of the interpretations about the harmony of the faculties. The phrase “variety of ways to determine” is usually taken as definite factor to attach the interpretation to the multi-cognitive approach, as it defines the ways belonging to the conceptual capacity, i.e. the understanding. Nevertheless, as we can see, here Crawford ascribes it, in an unusual way, not to the understanding, but to the imagination in its act of synthesis. Then, how can such a freedom in the variety of ways be obtained? Crawford’s critical attack comes in replying this question: the only way to provide this condition is to distinguish the first two components of threefold synthesis. In order to explain the harmonious play in aesthetic experience in both a proper and consistent way “with the doctrines of the *Critique of Pure Reason*”, the synthesis of imagination, as both productive (apprehension in an intuition) and reproductive capacity, should be distinguished from the conceptual synthesis of the understanding, i.e. synthesis of recognition in a concept. Now, for saving the imagination’s freedom from the determination of the understanding, or strictly speaking, for saving “the variety of ways” in which imagination choices freely its own apprehension, the determinative rules or empirical concepts must be eliminated. In this way, merely the pre-conceptual synthesis of imagination is added to the process of the harmony by him. In his analysis, Crawford focuses rightly on the conditions under which the aesthetic object is constructed in accordance with the doctrines of the first *Critique*. On the other hand, in order for rendering his explanation of the free harmony to be coherent with these doctrines, he seems to ignore Kant’s own arguments. First, he ignores the fact that threefold synthesis cannot be considered as the combination of three distinct act of synthesis. Rather, Kant himself revises his arguments presented in “A” Deduction, and entirely rewrites it in “B” Edition for showing that the imagination

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

cannot operate independently from the understanding. Second, he also ignores the fact that Kant, both in his third *Critique*, emphasizes that only productive synthesis of imagination can be operational in aesthetic experience. Yet, according to Crawford, Kant “must not completely exclude the reproductive function of the imagination from the experience of the beautiful”.<sup>298</sup> It can also be said that since Kant defines “A” Deduction partially as “subjective deduction”, and defines the harmony of the cognitive faculties as “subjective condition for cognition in general”, Crawford appeals to the “A” Deduction, instead of “B” Deduction. As a result, for him, through the free apprehension of imagination in its act of reordering of the manifold of intuition, the free play and pleasure in taste arise, and this “is as if the manifold has a unity to which a concept ought to apply, even though there is no definite concept applicable”. For this reason, that is, for his accepting merely pre-conceptual level of the synthesis, Guyer attaches Crawford’s approach to the pre-cognitive interpretation.<sup>299</sup> Until now, as we can notice, Crawford, contrary to Heinrich’s position, nearly says nothing about the position of the understanding. Heinrich, in his article, as we have seen, attempted to explain only the role of the understanding in the free harmony in a detailed way, without elaborating on the imagination’s position (He just explained that imagination functions in the same way as it does in the first *Critique*, but this is not a problem, on his account, as, even in the case of the cognition, the imagination is still free). Surprisingly, at the end of his analysis, Crawford briefly mentions the understanding, and this, in fact, changes his position in a radical way (even if it is not clear whether he does it willingly or not). When he summarizes his view, he underlies the contemplative character of pleasure in aesthetic experience by stating that if we already know what kind of object with which we encounter to judge, he affirms, we “abstract from that knowledge” or “disregarding” that knowledge and contemplate merely on the form of the object. We “do not relate” the form of the object to the concept of the object.<sup>300</sup> At this point, Crawford seems to talk not about the first two elements of threefold synthesis, but

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<sup>298</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>299</sup> Paul Guyer, “The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited”, p. 166.

<sup>300</sup> Donald W. Crawford, *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*, p. 91.

about the condition under which all types of synthesis, including conceptual one, operate in the aesthetic appreciation. Further, he seems to separate two cases from each other in the experience of beautiful object. In the first case, we have no knowledge about the object; namely that, we do not know what kind object we experience, it is not familiar to us, and in the second case, we have that knowledge about the object. And the process of aesthetic experience is changeable according to these conditions. However, I think, Crawford's position is not plausible. It seems that in the first part of his argument, Crawford strictly elaborates on the coherent explanation of the free harmony, while in the second part, he just presents his general view about the judgment of taste (Even though these two parts contradict with each other). Finally, I suppose, it is also legitimate to assert that here Crawford stands close to Guyer's "meta-cognitive" approach in the sense that we can interpret "the abstraction" as that in aesthetic experience the conditions for the cognition of an object is fulfilled, and then we abstract from the results of this cognitive process, i.e. the knowledge of the object.<sup>301</sup> In other words, we stop neither at the pre-conceptual level, nor at conceptual level, but "go beyond" that conceptual level in aesthetic experience.

Guyer, in his *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, follows the first part of Crawford's arguments. In a similar way, Guyer also attempts to find a proper way to reconcile Kant's notion "the free harmony" with "the first *Critique*'s theory of knowledge".<sup>302</sup> In fact, he explicitly defines the problem of the free harmony as "the problem of reconciliation".<sup>303</sup> He rightly complaints that, on the one hand, despite Kant's own awareness of the structural difficulties, Kant grounds the free harmony upon his theory of knowledge; on the other hand, he gives no hint for the solution of the problem in third *Critique*.<sup>304</sup> First of all, according to Guyer, when we look at the

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<sup>301</sup> As we can notice here again, Guyer's classification is not fully exhaustive. Like Allison's position which involves both pre-cognitive and multi-cognitive approaches, Crawford's approach should be also regarded as both interpretations. Anyway, still Guyer's attempt is functional, as it draws a general framework to systematize arguments about the harmony

<sup>302</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 80.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

arguments of the first *Critique* in general, we realize the idea that “there can be no synthesis of manifolds without objectively valid judgments”, i.e. the judgment of cognition.<sup>305</sup> Yet, as we know, there must be a synthesis even in the aesthetic judgment of reflection in order to produce pleasure, which means, to produce the free harmony of the cognitive faculties, in which, in turn, the synthesis brings about. Hence, Guyer offers approaching to the issue not from the cognitive perspective but from the psychological point of view in that the act of synthesis of the unification can be regarded as a “mental event”. From this psychological perspective, he claims, it is possible to isolate this mental event from the cognition and in such a case the synthesis itself becomes “the subjective condition of cognition”. Here, we should notice that, unlike Kant’s view, what is taken as “subjective condition of the cognition” is not the free harmony itself, but the act of synthesis, which is one of the definite components of this harmony, by Guyer. As a next step, he puts the harmony in a special case by asserting that in this psychological aspect, the harmony of the cognitive faculties is “a state in which the subjective condition of knowledge exists without the use of concepts”, i.e. without making an objectively valid judgment, in this way, “we can think of this state as one in which a manifold of intuition, presented by the imagination, is unified” also without employing a concept.<sup>306</sup> After explaining this “ideal case” for the free harmony, Guyer looks for a legitimate place in both Kant’s aesthetic theory and theory of knowledge to insert this ideal case. In this first case, he refers to Kant’s arguments that the harmony of the cognitive faculties is “the sensible” and, at the same time, “the subjective” condition of knowledge. Now, Guyer turns back to the first *Critique*, and claims that in the threefold synthesis, the first two process, i.e. the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction performed by the imagination, is, indeed, both “sensible” and a “subjective” condition of the objective cognitive judgment. For him, the third one, i.e. synthesis of recognition, involving “the actual application of concept of the understanding to the manifold of intuitions”, signifies “objective” and “conceptual”

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<sup>305</sup> Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

condition of knowledge.<sup>307</sup> Hence, according to him, in the first two cases, the imagination performs without being bounded up with the fixed rules of the understanding. In the same way with Crawford, Guyer divides threefold synthesis and ascribes just the first two elements to the free harmony. Both Guyer and Crawford appeal to this type of solution by explaining it with the different “names” of the same notion. Crawford carries out it by referring to “the perceptual” status of aesthetic experience, while Guyer does it by referring to “the sensible” status. In this light, Guyer’s own arguments in his book should also be classified as “pre-cognitive interpretation”. However, Guyer does not stop at this level and keeps analyzing to determine the status of the understanding in this free play relation. Guyer attempts to explain this case by stating that the imagination in fulfilling its task without determining by the rule stands in a harmonious relation with “the usual requirements of the understanding”.<sup>308</sup> In other words, when imagination apprehends freely the form of the object, it also satisfies the general conditions of the understanding, which means that, it still accords mutually with the understanding. This also explains why Kant holds that the free harmony of them is requisite for “cognition *in general*” (not for “cognition”). It is “general” or “usual” requirements of the understanding, because there appears no knowledge through the free play process. The “specific” condition of the understanding is to produce “cognition”, i.e. knowledge. Guyer expounds this case in underlining the reflective character of aesthetic judgment. Accordingly, as we know, a reflective judgment typically seeks an appropriate universal for a given particular presentation. In such a case, the aim of the reflective judgment is to find a concept and by this way it leads cognition to arising. Hence, in aesthetic judgment of reflection, even though it does not operate for finding a possible concept, it still fulfills “the general condition for the possibility of the application of concepts without having any concept at all applied”.<sup>309</sup> Here, the concept of the understanding is not employed, but the possibility of such an employment is always the case. Pillow explicates this position of the understanding

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<sup>307</sup> Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

in a way that the understanding does not know what the imagination apprehends, but interprets it in a various ways without applying a definite concept of itself, that is, without determining it.<sup>310</sup> For Guyer, the harmony is not between the freedom of the imagination and the freedom of the understanding; rather, it is between the activity of the imagination and the goal of the understanding.<sup>311</sup>

On the other hand, Guyer insists on his claim that aesthetic judgment must merely involve the synthesis of apprehension and that of reproduction without the conceptual synthesis of recognition. For, only such a case serves us a proper ground to give a reasonable explanation for the free harmony. Nevertheless, he is also aware of the trouble about his assertion and, he looks for a coherent explanation of his position with the doctrine of the first *Critique*. In order to achieve this aim, instead of giving up his claim or revising it, he re-interprets Kant's theory of knowledge. Guyer, as he usually does, divides "Kant's analysis of knowledge" into two elements: Psychological and Epistemological elements. The former refers to "a theory of syntheses as mental processes by which mental states of cognition are produced", whereas the latter signifies "a theory of the categories as rules by which the verification of claims to cognition may proceed".<sup>312</sup> How does this division work? According to him, this division leads to the condition under which the syntheses can occur without being directed by categories or concepts. He admits that categories are necessary conditions for any kind of synthesis. Yet, by means of this division, it can be asserted that they are necessary condition in order for the synthesis to be counted as knowledge, not as just feeling. There is no need to them for "the psychological process of synthesis" in which the application of a concept is absent, but for "the verification of claims to actual knowledge". Guyer calls it "psychological concomitants of knowledge". Thus, the harmony of the cognitive faculties requires "a separation of the psychological and epistemological components

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<sup>310</sup> Kirk Pillow, "Understanding Aestheticized". *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Rebecca Kukla, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 261.

<sup>311</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 82.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

of Kant's theory of synthesis to explain the possibility of that harmony".<sup>313</sup> Although he does not mention it, it seems to be clear that he derives this approach from the various arguments about Kant's own distinction between deductions and his own criticism of transcendental deduction in "A" Edition. Finally, it can also be said that even Guyer himself should have been unsatisfied about his own explanations, as he revises this approach in his latest article. As we have seen, there, Guyer regards the idea of the free harmony in which the involvement of a determinate concept is excluded as very "dubious", instead of accepting and explaining this idea by distinguishing so-called "psychological concomitants" from "epistemological elements". In fact, in his book, Guyer explicitly confesses the difficulty, or we can read this as "impossibility", of the present issue. Since Kant serves no further explanation about the free harmony, and gives no clue about the solution, "the commentator can only speculate on its answer".<sup>314</sup>

After all, it is predictable that Guyer's solution is criticized by many other commentators, such as Makkreel<sup>315</sup> and Ginsborg<sup>316</sup>. In criticizing this approach, Makkreel also constructs his own remarkable solution to the present issue. The significance of his interpretation stems from two reasons: The first one is that the position of the categories he places in explaining the free harmony, and the second is that the function of the imagination to which he ascribes in the free harmony. Makkreel begins with the analysis by stating that even if the imagination is free in its activity in the harmony, it still conforms to the laws of the understanding.<sup>317</sup> He calls it "free conformity" of the aesthetic imagination which means that the imagination "may not violate the categorical framework of the understanding, although it may explicate possibilities left open by that framework". He argues that "the harmonious relation" in the aesthetic experience is commonly held as a kind of synthesis" by

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>315</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 49-50.

<sup>316</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, "Hannah Ginsborg, "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste", p. 293, and also Ginsborg, "Lawfulness without a Law", p. 45.

<sup>317</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 46.

referring to A. Heinrich Trebels' and P. Heintel's arguments. For them, this special kind of synthesis is “open synthesis” or “vague synthesis of the harmony”. The reason why Makkreel rejects the view of taking the harmony as a synthesis relies on a very simple idea; if it was, then there would be no way to save the freedom of the imagination. For him, in the harmony, as a synthesis, it has already been proved that the relation between the imagination and the understanding is merely “one-sided” in favor of the understanding. At this point, Makkreel seems to hold that we cannot solve the present puzzle by deforming Kant's theory of knowledge. He also states that in his third *Critique*, Kant never mentions the concept “synthesis” in explaining the free harmony. In regard to this issue, Makkreel claims that aesthetic judgment is not, indeed, a synthetic judgment. When Kant explains the synthetic character of the aesthetic judgment, he means solely “synthetic in form”<sup>318</sup>, i.e. the form of judgment, not synthetic “in the objective sense applicable to” the objectively valid judgment. Hughes also shares this view by asserting that “aesthetic judgments are not synthetic in the sense as is cognition”.<sup>319</sup> However, from this idea, we should not conclude that we can follow Guyer's path in that the imagination functions as a subjective-psychological synthesis in the free harmony. According to Makkreel, in such a harmony, the imagination still stands in co-operation with the categories of the understanding. “The fact that aesthetic apprehension occurs without concepts does not entail that it stands in no relation to any at all”.<sup>320</sup> He persuasively holds that the synthetic unity of apperception as a condition is valid not only for cognitive judgment but also aesthetic judgment of reflection (This is also a factor for an aesthetic judgment to be synthetic).<sup>321</sup> This means that since it is entirely impossible to construct the synthetic unity of apperception, as we have seen, without categories, these categories play their own roles also in aesthetic experience. By emphasizing the fact that the categories are necessarily involved in the aesthetic experience, I think, Makkreel indicates the very legitimate condition: The unity of apperception. At this juncture, he refers to the Mary Gregor's view which explains that “in reflecting on

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>319</sup> Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*, p. 159.

<sup>320</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 52.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

the form of the object we are relating elements- lines, tones- to each other and ultimately to the unity of the representation ‘this’, which is clearly a product of human consciousness and involves the categories”.<sup>322</sup> Here, like Lewis W. Beck, Gregor also declares that mathematical categories perform in the aesthetic experience. Makkreel admits this view, but he adds that dynamical categories can also be included in this experience. He gives solely one example about the applicability of dynamical categories in the aesthetic appreciation. According to that, the phrase “inner causality”, on Makkreel’s account, can be taken as an example of the category of causality. Nevertheless, it can be affirmed that his claim is “dubious”. Firstly, as we have seen, Kant is very careful about using the notion “causality” in aesthetic experience. He insistently rejects the direct causal relation between the subject and the object. The *application* of the category of causality necessitates the external causal relation between them, which is labeled as unacceptable case, according to Kant, as regards to the aesthetic judgment. In addition, if Makkreel was right, then there would be no way to save “freedom” as “the causality of reason”, which is sharply distinguished from the category of causality of the understanding. And hence, Kant would never construct “morality”. Secondly, “inner causality” also refers to the purposiveness’ causality, which is not the concept of the understanding. In fact, Makkreel himself also mentions that “inner causality” cannot be attached to the object in the sense of the schematized category of causality signifying the relation of objects with each other. Besides, Kant, in the section “The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment” of the first *Critique*, underlines the fact that “the concept of cause” cannot pass the sensible intuition “which exhibits” that concept “*in concreto*” as time-condition (*CPR*, A 722 B 750). In this manner, it seems more appropriate to attach mathematical categories to the aesthetic experience. In order to explain this issue, I would like to appeal again to the Lewis White Beck’s article. There, Beck basically suggests that all judgments, including aesthetic ones, “always make use of categorical concepts” without exception.<sup>323</sup> He explains this thesis by declaring that “a judgment does not have to mention a categorical concept,

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<sup>322</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>323</sup> Lewis W. Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*, p. 50.

but it has to use one".<sup>324</sup> To justify his thesis, he refers to Kant's distinction between "judgment of experience" and "the judgment of perception". In fact, the majority of commentators agree with the idea that the reflective judgment, as a subjective one, shares very similar characteristics with the judgment of perception (It should be noted that although "judgment of perception" is also a subjective one, it is still, unlike the aesthetic judgment, a cognitive judgment). Now, according to Kant's arguments in his *Prolegomena*, judgment of experience is objectively valid, whereas judgment of perception has merely subjective validity. (It should be noted that since judgment of perception is entirely based on subjective conditions, it, for Kant, includes also feeling).<sup>325</sup> Kant's claim is simply that while in the case of judgment of experience, we apply the pure concepts of the understanding to our experience, in the case of judgment of perception we do not. He states that all judgments of experience are empirical judgments, but not all empirical judgments are judgments of experience.<sup>326</sup> The criterion for an empirical judgment to be judgment of experience is to be "objectively valid" and "necessarily universal", in other words, to contain the schematized categories. He serves some examples; "if the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows warm"<sup>327</sup> or "when the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm"<sup>328</sup>. These are judgments of perception which are subjective, namely that, they have no objective validity and universal necessity. These examples are also similar with the example presented in "B" Deduction ("the bodies are heavy" and "if I support a body, I feel an impression of weight" (*CPR*, B 142)). On the other hand, the judgment "the sun is by its lights the cause of heat" is a judgment of experience, as it involves a necessary connection which is valid for everyone. Here, as we can notice, Kant explains the application of the category of causality to the experience as a principle. Later, he also stresses that judgment of perception is always "single" or "singular".<sup>329</sup> Kant explicitly states that what we lack in the judgment of perception

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<sup>324</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>325</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p. 75, n. 9.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., p. 76.

is the determinate rule of “relation”.<sup>330</sup> As a result, he claims that judgment of perception does not include any category of the understanding without mentioning any distinction between mathematical or dynamical. However, Beck plausibly objects to this generalization.<sup>331</sup> According to him, judgment of perception still indicates the application of mathematical categories to the experience, or strictly speaking, to the objects (It can be added that even though it is not “relational” by referring to Allison’s emphasis). It is true that it does not involve any dynamical categories, for example, the category of causality, which functions in the case of the relation between the objects of experience. Considering Kant’s own example “the room is warm”, which is subjective, i.e. judgment of perception, here, there is no relation of an object with other objects; it is between the object and the subject. But, for Beck, the concept of warm, as intensive magnitude, implies the mathematical concept. Likewise, in the judgment “the sun looks bright”, the mathematical concept is applied to the “brightness”. In these regards, according to Beck, aesthetic judgment employs mathematical categories.<sup>332</sup>

Therefore, although Makkreel affirms that all categories are operational in the aesthetic judgment<sup>333</sup>, for Beck, just mathematical concepts are appropriate for the aesthetic judgment. In any cases, Makkreel *partially* defines the position of the understanding in the aesthetic experience. But we look still for the solution to the free harmony relation. Makkreel’s next move is an unusual one. For him, in the free harmony, the relation is not, indeed, between the imagination and the understanding, but between two functions of the imagination, that is, the apprehension and the presentation or exhibition. Makkreel reads Kant’s assertion of “schematism without a concept” as such that the freedom of the imagination in the harmony indicates the fact that the imagination schematizes without an empirical concept. Here, Makkreel

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<sup>330</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>331</sup> Lewis W. Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume*, p. 52.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>333</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation*, p. 53.

treats “a concept” as “an empirical concept”.<sup>334</sup> In this structure, the free harmony cannot possess the empirical concept. He approaches to the schemata of categories only in respect of the time determination. In this way, he saves the claim of “schematism without a concept” to be seen as “self-contradictory” by reducing the notion “a concept” to “an empirical concept”. A schema, as time determination, can be involved in the free harmony. For him, the aesthetic judgment “directly”, i.e. without mediating by any empirical concept or the application of a concept, “compares the apprehended form of an object with *the way* categories *generally* schematized in relation to the form of time and it is this accord that is aesthetically pleasing” (my emphasis).<sup>335</sup> That means, all categories are in case, but their direct application to the objects through empirical concepts are not.

We are now in a position to explicate Kant’s earlier claim by saying that the aesthetic imagination schematizes without using *empirical* concepts. The aesthetic judgment compares the apprehended form of an object with the way categories are generally schematized in relation to the form of time and its accord that is aesthetically pleasing. Although Kant speaks of a harmony of the understanding and the imagination, what is actually compared in the aesthetic experience are two products of the imagination; i.e., a form apprehended by the imagination and schemata as temporal rules of the imagination.<sup>336</sup>

In such an account, the imagination produces “schemata” in accordance with the general rule of time determination imposed by the categories, but it is not used to subsume a given representation under a determinate concept. Schemata, here, are taken as “presentation” or “exhibition” (*darstellung*) of a concept of the understanding “regardless of which concept”, i.e. without applying a determinate concept.<sup>337</sup> Hence, according to Makkreel, the free harmony is not, indeed, between the imagination and the understanding. It is between “two products of the

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<sup>334</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

imagination”: “a form apprehended by the imagination” and “schemata of the imagination”. It seems that he does not divide threefold synthesis, but divides the act of imagination which produces schemata from the application of a specific concept. In such a case, the imagination is free in its apprehension of the form, and it is in accord with the lawfulness of the understanding without a specific rule or law. The rules or the laws of the understanding, on his account, operate not in the act of producing schemata but the application of the categories. In fact, Makkreel is aware of the fact that in order for a category to be schematized, it is necessary to apply it through the empirical concept.<sup>338</sup> Nevertheless, he seems to separate the acquisition of schemata from the schematized categories in order to overcome this difficulty. It should be noted that the reason why he attempts to entirely exclude the application of the schematized categories and empirical concepts is the fact that he tries to explain the free harmony in the “pre-conceptual” level.

By the same token, Gibbons also interprets the free harmony as the harmonious relation between two functions of the imagination. According to her, in the free play relation, the harmony is between the imagination, as the power of apprehending a manifold in intuition, and the imagination, as the power of exhibiting a concept.<sup>339</sup> The free harmony is “a response to a form exhibited in intuition, rather than a conceptual determination of that form”. Here, like Makkreel, she also equates “schema” with “exhibition”. In order to comprehend her thesis, we should investigate how she interprets “schema”. She considers a schema, by adhering Kant’s own arguments, as the product of the imagination which “makes *possible* the application of a pure concept to intuition” (my emphasis).<sup>340</sup> From this, she concludes that it must also be possible to produce a schema without applying a specific concept to the intuition. A schema, in this context, is a form or exhibition “of the reciprocity between conceptual thought and intuition and of the appropriateness, or fittedness, of each to the other”.<sup>341</sup> In other words, a schema expresses the fittedness of the

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>339</sup> Sarah Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, p. 93.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

categories to the intuitions by temporalizing these categories. For this reason, she also treats a schema as a kind of “harmony”<sup>342</sup>; a harmony between two heterogeneous components, i.e. sensible intuition and categories. Yet, we should be careful that the free harmony merely includes the exhibition of concepts *in general*, that is, the schemata, not the application of “temporalized categories to a given sensible manifold of intuition”.<sup>343</sup> Therefore, in the same way with Makkreel, she eliminates the application of the categories from the process, and regards the free harmony as the comparison or the mutual accord of the apprehended form of the object and the exhibitions or the schemata of categories without any specification. By this way, this harmony between two functions of the imagination also indicates the harmony between the imagination and the understanding. That is to say, according to this approach, in the aesthetic experience, the imagination apprehends the form of the object and also produces schema but not a specific one, by this way; it is satisfied that a given particular empirical intuition represents the fittedness or appropriateness to the concepts of the understanding, i.e., to our conceptual capacity, in general without applying a specific concept.

That the harmony of the faculties may be expressed as a harmony between the apprehension and exhibition of intuited forms- a harmony which is compatible with conceptualizing in general- demonstrates the centrality of both this harmony and the imagination to the subjective characterization of schematizing and judgment.<sup>344</sup>

As noted above, like Makkreel, Gibbons also seems to eliminate the stage of the application of the schematized categories or empirical concepts, as she regards the free harmony as a pre-conceptual relation. The conditions of the cognition cannot be fulfilled according to this approach. But, just a general condition, namely, the applicability, or strictly speaking, the *possibility* of the application, of concepts of the understanding, is satisfied. In the light of these explanations, it is possible to classify, I suppose, “the pre-cognitive interpretations” into two groups. In the first group, the

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<sup>342</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction function in the free harmony without mixing with any conceptual capacity. In the second group, the categories are the case without the direct application of these categories through empirical concepts. What is common in their explanatory models is the idea that in both classes the application of the concepts is not allowed, namely that, cognition does not arise. On the other hand, it can be said that dividing a threefold synthesis into two parts includes some trouble, so it is also difficult to separate the schema as the rule of the application of a concept, from this application. Otherwise stated, both Makkreel and Gibbons seem to separate the rule, i.e. time determination, *in general*, from the specific application of that rule in order to overcome the problem of the free harmony. Such a difficulty becomes more apparent in the case of mathematical categories and empirical concepts. For, as we have seen, mathematical categories and empirical concepts and their schemata as rules of apprehension, i.e. rules for generating images, are intertwined.

Ginsborg, in her article “Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and Understanding”, concentrates on the proper solution for our present issue. She criticizes both Crawford’s and Guyer’s positions by directly mentioning their names.<sup>345</sup> On the other hand, as we will see, even though she refers never to their names and their positions, her arguments will also indirectly demonstrate why Makkreel’s and Gibbon’s model of explanations are not able to provide us with a proper solution. And, it can be said that Ginsborg seems to be persuasive in her approach to the issue at that stage. She, first of all, explicates the confusion of Kant’s presentation of the notion “exhibition” in third *Critique*<sup>346</sup>, the notion was the central theme for Makkreel and Gibbons. As we have seen, Kant, in the Second Introduction, attributes the task of exhibiting a concept to the faculty of judgment (*CJ*, 220, 221). But, in the First Introduction, it seems that the task is attached to the understanding (*CJ*, FI, 223). Yet, according to Ginsborg, regarding general arguments in the third *Critique* along side with the doctrine of the first *Critique*, it is reasonable to support that the exhibition of a concept, that is, the formation of an

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<sup>345</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, “Lawfulness without a Law”, pp. 45-47.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

image corresponding to intuition, is the task of the imagination. Now, as a next move, Ginsborg investigates how “the exhibition of a concept ‘in general’” which indicates both the freedom of the imagination and the lawfulness of the understanding without a law, i.e., the condition for the free harmony, is possible. She also admits that “empirical concepts are themselves rules”, i.e. schemata, “for synthesis”<sup>347</sup> by referring to Kant’s own example of the empirical concept of dog given in the “Schematism”. Besides, she keeps arguing, the pure and empirical concepts “go together” in the act of synthesis: “my synthesis can be governed by pure concepts only insofar as it is governed by some empirical concept”. The imagination produces an image “under the guidance of a concept”<sup>348</sup>, and in this guidance, empirical and pure concepts co-operate. According to her, the main rationale behind Kant’s arguments is the idea that empirical concepts provide universality to the image produced by imagination. At this point, we should remember Wolff’s and Pippin’s explanations of “rule of rules” which means that empirical concepts serve first-order rules and pure concepts serve second-order rules. She explains this case by giving an example.

We can perceive or imagine something as a substance only by perceiving of imagining it as, say, a dog, or an armadillo, or some other particular kind of substance. But this implies that, to the extent that I am governed by the concept of substance in my synthesis of the given empirical intuitions, I must at the same time be governed by the concept of dog or of armadillo... I cannot first synthesize my intuitions according to the concept of substance and then, on the basis of that synthesis, perceive the object as a dog.<sup>349</sup>

Until now, she follows the path constructed by the doctrine of the first *Critique* in a proper way. On the other hand, Ginsborg also thinks that the only way to explain the free harmony is to save the free act of the imagination from the rules imposed by the concepts of the understanding, namely, to isolate the free harmony from the

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<sup>347</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

conditions of the cognition. And she significantly grounds her arguments on the idea that even if Kant's theory of knowledge declares the imagination's dependence on the spontaneity of the understanding, the structure described above is also problematic. For, there is a circularity problem between the concepts and the synthesis of imagination. The problem of circularity is simply that the synthesis of imagination is governed by the rule obtained by the empirical concepts, on the other hand, in order to possess such an empirical concept, the imagination should synthesize the manifold of the representations in accordance with such a rule. Indeed, we can comprehend this circularity problem by reference to Kant's arguments about concept formation in his *Logic*. As mentioned before, in order to form the empirical concept of "a tree", it is first compared different types of trees, such as a spruce, a willow, and a linden, and then reflected on what is common they share and finally abstracted these marks. But how is it possible to generate an empirical concept of a tree without a concept of it? She defines this problem as a "tension" between "rules for synthesis" and "concepts". On Ginsborg's account, in solving this circularity problem, her explanatory model also guides us to see how the synthesis of imagination can be free in the harmony of cognitive faculties. She holds that the proper solution should carry out the condition under which "empirical concepts govern the imaginative synthesis of our representation", "while at the same time empirical concepts depend on that synthesis".<sup>350</sup> In this model, the synthesis indicates or produces "*exemplary of rules*". The way she follows to explain that model is by analogy with "speaking a language", English, which is also a "rule-governed activity". According to that, a native English speaker does not consciously follow the rule of the grammar. The process cannot be described as following: She learns, first, the grammar rules of the language and then applies these rules to her speaking activity. On the contrary, she learns language in a natural way by imitating other speakers. In order to "determine the correctness of a given usage" or to "discover the rules govern it", we appeal to "the linguistic behavior of English behavior", that is, "our own and that of other".<sup>351</sup> As we can notice, Ginsborg seems

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<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

to borrow her arguments from Wittgensteinian model of explanation. She applies this model to the mechanism of the activity of the imagination. According to that the synthesis of imagination is not, indeed, guided by the rule. In a similar way with the speaking of English, on the one hand, it is “a natural psychological process” in which it is not necessitated to be guided by “any antecedent grasp of rules or standards”. On the other hand, again like the speaking of a language, the act of imagination is still subject to the rules “which are not imposed externally but rather determined by the very activity they govern”.<sup>352</sup> In other words, the synthesis of the imagination “can be governed by rules without being guided by them”.<sup>353</sup> By this way, for Ginsborg, the general principle of the act of the imagination becomes the “exemplary of rules” in particular case of the synthesis.<sup>354</sup> It is “in this way that I acquire the concept of a tree: a concept which serves as a standard not only for my own subsequent acts of synthesis and for those of others, but for the very act of synthesis through which I come to acquire the concept”.<sup>355</sup> And she calls it “principle” to take our “perceptual synthesis as exemplary of how it ought to be”. As a result, according to this approach, the synthesis of imagination itself reflects universality as an exemplary rule without being determined by any specific concept, which means that, it operates at the pre-conceptual level.

In the act of perceptual synthesis through which I acquire, say, the concept of tree, I take my act of imagination not only to exemplify but also to be governed by the concept “tree”. It is true that I do not grasp this concept *antecedently to* my act of synthesis, since it is precisely this act of synthesis which is required if I am to acquire the concept in the first place. But I come to grasp it *in* the act of synthesis, which means that I take my act of synthesis itself –the very act through which I come to grasp it - to be governed by the concept.<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>354</sup> This main theme is also discussed in her article “Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 14:3 (2006), pp. 359-364.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

In this explanatory model, when she speaks of “exemplary rule” as “ought to be”, she simply means the particular synthesis of imagination “conforms successfully to” the empirical concept. At this point, we can realize the parallel ideas between Makkreel/Gibbon’s and Gingborg’s models. As mentioned above, for Gibbons the act of imagination also indicates a kind of “appropriateness” that is, “conformity” to the conceptual capacity. More importantly, she adds that “the acquisition of a concept cannot take place in isolation from the recognition of its applicability. The act through which I acquire the concept ‘tree’ is at the same time my first act of judging something to be tree”. Consequently, what she has attempted to prove by solving the circularity problem is the possibility of the synthesis of the imagination at the pre-conceptual stage. Indeed, this is the central theme of her book *The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition*, where she attempts to expound that Kant’s theory of knowledge also necessarily requires subjective universality and exemplary necessity. Then, what is the implication of this model to the free harmony? It is clear that she regards the act of imagination at this pre-conceptual level without the application of the determinate concept with reference to her model. According to “the general principle” she have just described above, we do not need to possess the empirical concept of, to exemplify, “tree” as an antecedent rule to be guided, in order to “form the perceptual image” of it. In such a case, imagination draws or, in Kant’s own word, “delineates” (*CPR*, A 141 B 180) the image of a tree in its own freedom without defining or recognizing it as “a tree”. In the case of aesthetic experience, imagination operates in accordance with this “general” principle without determined by the rule of a “specific” concept.<sup>357</sup> We need a determinate specific concept to define the image as the image of “a tree”. Yet, we do not need such a definition regarding aesthetic object. Here, we can consider, indeed, Kant’s own example of “savage” in his *Logic*.

If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

different in the two. With the one it is *mere intuition*, with the other it is *intuition and concept* at the same time.<sup>358</sup>

In this example, a savage who does not know what a house is just intuit the house, whereas another both intuits and conceptualizes, and hence, defines it as “a house”. I think, this example illuminates what Ginsborg has in her mind in introducing her explanatory model. However, the difficulty with which Crawford’s two parts of explanation is encountered is here also valid for Ginsborg’s thesis. In the case that we have already known the aesthetic object, we have to abstract this knowledge from our judging. Further, her distinction between the synthesis of imagination and the empirical concept which functions to define what imagination synthesizes can be also interpreted as the distinction between imaginative synthesis and the conceptual synthesis of the recognition in a concept. In addition to that, it is also possible to state that her emphasis on the notion “psychological process” brings Guyer’s distinction between “psychological” and “epistemological” elements” to our minds (In her another article, she labels Guyer’s view as “empirical psychology” to separate it from her view she calls “transcendental-psychological account”).<sup>359</sup>

Before passing to Malcolm Budd’s arguments, first I would like to mention Longuenesse and Allison’s views. Both of them also elaborate on the circularity problem (Allison calls it “hopeless circularity”<sup>360</sup>). Longuenesse examines the issue through her notion “universal comparison”. According to that, Kant’s conceiving of “logical act of comparison”, for Longuenesse, is indeed the act of “universalizing comparison” in the sense that in its logical employment, reflection compares representations by universalizing their forms “at the same time”.<sup>361</sup> That is to say, logical reflection itself universalizes in its own act of comparison. In such a manner, it can be called simultaneous act of reflection, simultaneous in the sense of comparing and universalizing at the same time. From this point of view, it can be

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<sup>358</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 544-545.

<sup>359</sup> Hannah Ginsborg, “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste”, p. 301, also p. 307.

<sup>360</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 22.

<sup>361</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 116.

said that Longuenesse and Ginsborg both indicate “simultaneity” of the process of universalization. However, on Longuenesse account, what are compared in this process are not representations but the schemata. “Universalizing comparison” refers to the schema, when the schema is regarded as “the rule of apprehension”. “To compare representations in order to form concepts is therefore to compare schemata”.<sup>362</sup> Allison argues that “since what is universal in a rule governing or ordering our apprehension of an object is equivalent to what the *Critique* (he means the first *Critique* here) characterizes as a schema, it follows that the comparison leading to the formation of concepts is a comparison of schemata rather than merely impressions or images”.<sup>363</sup> In other words, considering Kant’s own example of the formation of the concept of a tree, we compare not the particular images of laden, pillow etc., but compare their schemata. The idea that the act of comparison, as the comparison of the schemata gains its universal character seems very plausible at first sight. For, the schemata as “rule-governed” product of the synthesis themselves reflect universal character. Yet, here again we confront with another problem that ‘how is it possible to compare schemata without having concepts in the process of the formation of a concept’? At this stage, both Allison and Longuenesse share the view that we should consider a schema and an empirical concept as two distinct items. In such an approach, a schema is a condition for possessing an empirical concept. Longuenesse states that “to compare schemata, by means of the three joint acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, is first of all to generate these schemata”.<sup>364</sup> For her, not only a concept but also a schema arises from (i.e. product of) the same act of universalizing comparison. In such a case, a schema should be produced prior to the logical reflection. Consequently, according to Longuenesse, “universal comparison” gains its universality not through the discursive capacity, but through the intuitive capacity. That is to say, “pre-reflective” act of synthesis of apprehension has its own universal rule in its intuitive stage. The synthesis of intuition has its own universal rule, or strictly speaking, the apprehension is

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<sup>362</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>363</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 24.

<sup>364</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 118.

“universal in itself”.<sup>365</sup> Indeed, she also accepts that in order to have an empirical schema, the categories as “rules for forming rules” play their own role<sup>366</sup>, but not as “a full-fledged concepts” in the “post-reflective” level, but in the “pre-reflective” stage. However, in this approach, it also seems problematic how it is possible to synthesize in accordance with the categories without empirical schema itself. Allison, in his *Transcendental Idealism*, attempts to show the validity about the distinction between an empirical concept and an empirical schema by affirming that Kant, in his example of “the concept of dog” in the “Schematism” chapter, “misstates his own position, referring to the *concept* of dog, when he clearly means the *schema*”.<sup>367</sup>

Lastly, I would like to argue Malcolm Budd’s views. I think, Budd’s arguments have a special place due to his emphasis on “subjective formal purposiveness” in explaining the free harmony. According to him, in order to make clear Kant’s own arguments about the harmonious play we should take the object judged into consideration. The key for the solution relies on the form of the object. First of all, Budd elaborates on the notion “comparison” in the aesthetic judgment.<sup>368</sup> At the end of the analysis, it is stated that in aesthetic judgment of reflection the comparison of the given presentation with our cognitive powers refers to the harmonious play of them. As we can see, Budd’s emphasis on the object or the form of the object is necessarily related to his emphasis on “reflection” in the judgment of taste. He also indicates the fact that the principle of purposiveness, or more specifically subjective purposiveness comes to mean to be purposive “*for the reflective power of judgment*”.<sup>369</sup> Then, what is the function of this purposiveness in the free play of the cognitive powers? He underlines the operation of the reflective judgment in order for acquiring a concept under which the particular can be subsumed. The second

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>367</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 208.

<sup>368</sup> Malcolm Budd, “The Pure Judgment of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective Judgment”, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 41:3 (2001). P. 249.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., p. 248.

question: What is the nature of this concept? In Budd's view, the freedom of the imagination in the harmonious play is merely possible provided that the empirical determinant concept is excluded. In the pure judgment of taste, we are not dealing with what kind of object is judged, but merely with the form of it<sup>370</sup>, which means that, in the free harmony, i.e. in "implicit comparison", the contemplation or the disinterested pleasure is a necessary condition. Solely through this contemplative pleasure, two cognitive powers "mutually assist" or enliven each other in the reflection on the form. In this manner, the pleasure "is an indication of this harmonious interplay in virtue of the fact that the pleasure just is the feeling of this free play of the cognitive powers".<sup>371</sup> Here, we can notice the strict relation between the pleasure, subjective formal purposiveness and the free play. As I have noticed before, the fact that subjective formal purposiveness implies the idea of purposiveness only for our judging is internally related to the contemplative, i.e. disinterested, pleasure which is nothing but the awareness of the free play. Since Budd accepts the possibility of a concept in the aesthetic judgment, he should explicate the content and the function of that kind of concept. One of Budd's critical moves come after defining the form as the inner or the outer spatial structure of the object. According to that, by referring to Kant's statement in the First Introduction (CJ, 224), Budd examines the claim that the argument Kant offers can be interpreted as following: The harmonious play of the cognitive powers is temporally prior to, i.e. precedes, "the conceptualization of the intuition".<sup>372</sup> Hence, for this interpretation, aesthetic pleasure arises when the cognitive process falls short. This also explains the necessary exclusion of the application or the formation of any empirical concept in the reflective act of the aesthetic judgment. "If I am concerned to determine whether this rose is beautiful I must not conceptualize it as a rose, or a flower, or an instance of any other empirical kind". However, according to Budd, this view is not necessitated by Kant's own arguments. For, "perceiving an object" as an example of a kind does not bring about the idea that the object's form is presented "differently

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid., p. 250.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid., p. 251.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

from how it is presented when it is perceived but not as an instance of that kind". Therefore, it can be said, in Budd's account, Heinrich's interpretation becomes null and void. The only "viable" interpretation, Budd offers, is that in the aesthetic judgment, even though we cognize the object as such, it is still possible "not being allowed" this cognition to function or to be determinant in the process of reflection in which we just contemplate on the form of that object. Budd's another critical move comes through his assertion that the free play in which the imagination schematizes without a concept, i.e. without an empirical determinant concept, indicates the idea that "the imagination's freedom consists in its not being constrained by the requirement of being adequate to some particular empirical concept".<sup>373</sup> That is to say, in the harmonious play, the imagination's freedom can still be saved even if the understanding's conceptual condition in general is satisfied without referring to any empirical concept. In this regard, the conceptual possibility does not have to be preceded by the aesthetic judgment. What is more, he goes on arguing, for the imagination as to be free from the rules imposed by the concepts in apprehending the mere form of the object creates the possibility for the "multiplicity" of the unity of manifold.<sup>374</sup> That means, this multiplicity is harmoniously unified. Which concept can fulfill these requirements for the free play? According to Budd, this concept can only be the concept of subjective formal purposiveness, that is, the indeterminate concept of subjective formal purposiveness.<sup>375</sup> It is not "a particular concept". It is not "a characteristic of the object, determined in it according to concepts" (*CJ*, 229). Here, Budd equates the subjective formal purposiveness with the beauty. Indeed, his claim seems to be coherent with some Kant's own statements. Accordingly, Kant asserted that in the aesthetic judgment, the particular intuition is subsumed under the indeterminate concept. In this sense, when we also think of Kant's own equation of pleasure with the subjective purposiveness, this interpretation still seems to be acceptable. Further, in the "General Comment", Kant also identifies "the free lawfulness of the understanding" in the free harmony with "purposiveness without a

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<sup>373</sup> Ibid., p. 255.

<sup>374</sup> Ibid., p. 256.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., p. 259.

purpose” without giving any further explanation (*CJ*, 241). Hence, on the basis of this equation, it is legitimate to regard “subjective purposiveness” as the predicate under which the particular intuition is subsumed. Budd also rightfully indicates the fact that Kant holds “beauty” as “an object of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose”, to support his approach.<sup>376</sup> When we read this together with the phrases “schematism without a concept” or “the exhibition of an indeterminate concept” as the tasks of the imagination in the free harmony, we can interpret this as that imagination apprehends the form of object and exhibits the purposiveness as an indeterminate concept without a purpose, i.e. concept, of this purposiveness.

#### **4.6. Concluding Remarks**

Just as the central themes or components in Kant’s aesthetic theory are strictly and internally related to each other, so, as I have attempted to present in this chapter, the cognitive faculties and their functions constituting Kant’s theory of knowledge stand in an embedded and complex relation with each other. It seems impossible to separate one of those elements from others without damaging the whole structure in his aesthetic theory, nor can we do this in the case of his theory of knowledge. Such complex structures, I think, pave the way for the deadlock of the problem of the free harmony relation. Heinrich’s interpretation that in working on his third *Critique*, Kant realizes that he is able to explain the aesthetic theory by means of the faculties and the structure constructed in his first *Critique* is quite significant and explanatory. Nevertheless, due to such intertwined structures, it could not be possible to give a full explanation for the free harmony of the cognitive faculties. As we have seen, Kant entirely rewrites transcendental deduction in B Edition to attach the imagination and its function to the conceptual capacity of the understanding. Now, in his third *Critique*, written up just after three years from the second edition of the first *Critique*, he could not separate the imagination from the conceptual capacity of the

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<sup>376</sup> Malcolm Budd, “Delight in the Natural World: Kant on the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature”, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 38:1 (1998), p. 11.

understanding in order to explain the free harmony, as most commentators had attempted. As Guyer rightly puts it, under this circumstance, the commentators can merely speculate. We have already seen that commentators push the lines in order to explain the notion “free harmony” coherently with the doctrine of the first *Critique*. However, again as we have seen, they attempt to achieve this aim by impairing that doctrine. As a result of this, they fail to give a proper solution to the issue. Therefore, the most plausible way to render them compatible in explaining the free harmonious relation is to save these structures as they stand themselves. For this reason, considering all interpretations, I suppose that Guyer’s revised view of the harmony in his article, i.e. what he calls “meta-cognitive approach”, is the most appropriate one. It provides the proper condition under which both, structure of theory of knowledge and that of aesthetic theory, are saved in their unity and uniqueness. Meta-cognitive approach allows us to explain aesthetic experience without damaging Kant’s theory of knowledge. We do not have to interfere in the structure of cognitive process. The conditions of cognition can still be fulfilled. The cognition still operates, because we experience still in the same “nature”. In our experience of the aesthetic object, the cognition may occur, but we do not stop at this level. In cognitive level, aesthetic appreciation does not arise. It appears merely provided that our experience “goes beyond” the cognitive level. Otherwise, we find ourselves in an “absurd” position that we judge an object aesthetically solely on the condition that we do not know that object, that is, what kind of object at which we look, we apprehend (We have to realize such a case in Crawford’s twofold explanation). It is quite plausible to think that Kant, in aesthetic experience, does not mean that, we should not know the object. When he asserts that in aesthetic experience, we do not judge in accordance with a concept, he means that in such a judging, the cognitive side of the story is entirely indeterminate. It cannot be a determinate factor in aesthetic experience. At this level, aesthetic appreciation or the feeling of pleasure or the free harmony cannot occur. At this point, it should also be emphasized that aesthetic judgment is always “singular”; as Kant puts it, because it is a judgment on a “single”, “singular” empirical intuition. That is to say, in aesthetic experience, we do not deal with a certain kind of “objects”, or the relation of objects with each other. Here, we deal solely with the form of the object, i.e. the figure, shape extended in space. For this

reason, “space”, mathematical concepts and monograms come into prominence. Dynamical categories as time-determinations regarding the relation of the objects are not required (In the case of systematicity of nature, and hence, teleological judgment, these categories are much more appropriate). Here, the imagination apprehends merely “the form of the object” in its singularity. However, imagination also apprehends “something” in that form, which cannot be cognized, but merely felt; “subjective purposiveness of the form of the object”. In aesthetic experience, we can say, the form of object involves “something” which is “surplus” for cognition. It cannot be a part of the cognitive process. It is just felt. That means, it cannot be subsumed under a determinate concept of the understanding. The imagination is free in its apprehension. It is not governed by a rule of a concept. Here, it is in the free harmonious relation with the understanding. In this sense, Budd’s interpretation and his emphasis on “purposive form of the object” are also crucial. His interpretation can be regarded as a supplementary component of the “meta-cognitive approach”.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **STAGE II: RE-CONSIDERING THE FACULTIES: REASON (AND UNDERSTANDING)**

#### **5.1. Reason and its Relation to Understanding in the System of Transcendental Dialectic**

As we have seen in the second chapter of the dissertation, in order to make a room for the reflective judgment and its principles, Kant puts the deficiency of the understanding and its universal laws to capture the diversity of nature forward. Moreover, his explanation of the principle of reflective judgments, that is, the principle of purposiveness, the systematicity of nature, and the law of the specification of nature necessitates the employment of reason, explicated in the first *Critique*. On the other hand, as we will see, except its practical use, reason cannot constitutively operate in the experience. It cannot prescribe any law or principle to the objects of the experience. Thus, this prohibition puts the relation of reason with the understanding into a very sensitive balance. Through this chapter, we find an efficient ground to examine the validity and the coherency of Kant's arguments about the reflective judgment and its principles.

In “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant dealt with the cognitive process which produces objectively valid knowledge. Now, in “Transcendental Dialectic”, he will elaborate on reason, its functions and ideas. Put it in a systematic way, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic are subsections or divisions of Transcendental Logic which is itself the second part of Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. First of all, he defines the notion “dialectic” as “*logic of illusion*” (*CPR*, A 293 B 349). As I have mentioned before, “the territory of the understanding” in which the doctrine of

the Transcendental Analytic is constructed is “the land of truth”. This land is described as an “island”, which is “enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits” by Kant (*CPR*, B 294). That is to say, in this safe territory, objectively valid knowledge is produced by the co-operation between the sensibility and the understanding. By this way, knowledge as such is inevitably “conditional”. It is “limited” or restricted by this condition. What the “Analytic” teaches us is the very fact that the pure concepts of the understanding can only be applied to the sensible intuition. In other words, the judgment or knowledge is not about thing in itself or noumenon, it is merely about the appearance, or the phenomenon (after schematized). Indeed, this limitation has entirely a positive sense. By this condition or limit, the unity of experience, and hence, “the truth” is yielded. However, this island is “surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion” (*CPR*, A 236). We can read this metaphor as “surrounded by” the danger of, what Kant calls, “dogmatic metaphysics”. Dogmatic metaphysics necessarily fails, because it does not consider the vital distinction between phenomena and noumena. It speaks as if it employs the concepts to the noumena which are not given by the sensibility, that implies “the transcendent employment of the concepts” as opposed to the empirical use of them. For this reason, it violates the limits or the conditions drawn by the Transcendental Analytic. Thus, in “Transcendental Dialectic” Kant aims to demonstrate how dogmatic metaphysics fails. By this way, we pass to the land of illusion or “the logic of illusion” from the land of truth or “the logic of truth” (*CPR*, B 170). Here, we are encountered with the tension between the conditioned provided by the understanding, and the unconditioned demanded by reason. Reason, by its nature, always attempts to employ the concepts beyond what is given by the sensibility in order to reach the unconditioned. Otherwise stated, through its principles, reason claims the totality (*Allheit*) or the unconditioned, as the condition of all conditions, by trying to provide the unity of the conditioned. According to Kant, these attempts are responsible for the illusion. Kant begins with the attempt to find the source of this error (*Irrtum*) or the illusion which itself leads to the error. He explicitly states that illusion or error cannot result from the object, insofar as it is given by the sensibility or the senses, that is, as appearance, but it can be found in judgment about it (*CPR*, B 350). Indeed, this explanation is very plausible regarding

the system of Transcendental Analytic. As we know, sensibility is not an active capacity, namely that, it does not have spontaneous capacity, it just passively affects us, and hence, it cannot be responsible for the error or the illusion. Kant's emphasis on "judgment" as the source of this error comes to mean that the illusion arises in the relation between the object and the understanding. On the other hand, it is also clear that such an error never appears when judgment expresses the laws of the understanding. Thus "neither the understanding by itself, nor the senses by themselves" can pave the way for the illusion (*Schein*) (*CPR*, A 294). On the other hand, in the *Logic*, Kant declares that error, in a general sense, "proceeds only from understanding or from reason", but never from imagination or from the senses.<sup>377</sup> In a similar way, later in "the Appendix", Kant also explains that all errors are ascribed "to a defect of judgment, never to understanding or reason" (*CPR*, A 643 B 671). This confusions can be explained in such a way that in Kant's introduction to reason in the Transcendental Dialectic, the reader confronts with an entirely negative narrative about it.<sup>378</sup> Later, in the "Appendix" to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant will explain the legitimate side of reason. In addition to that, it should also be noted that the understanding may be considered as the source of the illusion but not of "transcendental illusion". Kant warns us about the fact that empirical (or optical) illusion can also occur in the empirical employment of the rules of the understanding. In this case, the sensibility or the imagination misleads the judgment about the object (*CPR*, B 351). Rather, there is also "logical illusion" which is the illusion of formal fallacies. Kant makes a generalization that "all *illusion* may be said to consist in treating the *subjective* condition of thinking as being knowledge of the *object*" (*CPR*, A 396). Yet, merely the transcendental illusion is in the scope of the Transcendental Dialectic. The empirical or logical illusion can be removed by transcendental criticism, whereas transcendental illusion cannot be disappeared. For, it is not an empirical or artificial but "a *natural*" and "inevitable *illusion*" which is grounded upon the very nature of reason itself (*CPR*, A 298). Since pure reason demands the

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<sup>377</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p.76.

<sup>378</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 423., and also Norman K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 544.

totality of all conditions, that is, the unconditioned, which is never given in experience, by employing or expanding the concepts beyond the appearances, the transcendental illusion inevitably arises. When reason attempts to impose the constitutive laws or principles to the nature, that is to say, when it demands to be lawgiver of nature, as the understanding is (*CPR*, A 127), falls into transcendental dialectic. Therefore, the main difference between the concepts of the understanding and the ideas of reason is that the former necessarily relates to the appearances, whereas the latter corresponds to nothing in the possible experience. This central difference carries us to the another distinction: Kant defines reason as “the faculty of principles” (*CPR*, A 405, A 300) to distinguish it from the understanding as the faculty of rules. Rules, as we know, are constitutive components of the understanding regarding the objects of the experience. And the principles of the understanding can yield the knowledge merely provided that the concepts are applied to what is given by the sensibility. Therefore, the rules prescribe the laws or the principles for the appearances, and hence, they are legitimately determinative components for the experience. On the other hand, the principle in the case of pure reason does not provide us the objectively valid knowledge. The difference between these two types of principle can be formulated as following: The principle of reason borrows nothing from the senses and from the understanding (*CPR*, A 299), that is, from the experience, whereas the principles of the understanding, such as the principle of causality which is the law of the nature as well, make the experience possible and borrows nothing from reason (*CPR*, B 364). For these reasons, according to Kant, the unity of reason which connotes the unconditioned differs entirely from the unity of the understanding which is conditioned and provides the unity of the possible experience. However, pure reason’s principle, i.e. the unconditioned or the absolute totality, which expresses “if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another- a series which is therefore itself unconditioned- is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection” (*CPR*, A 308), must be distinguished from the principle of causality in a radical way. The former refers to nothing in experience, and hence, cannot be the condition of the unity of the experience. Kant formulates the issue as follows: Reason, by its nature, seeks or demands the unconditioned which is “never met with in experience” in accordance

with its principle that “if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, consequently the absolutely unconditioned is also given” (*CPR*, A 409 B 436). Here, the central issue, for him, is not simply the transcendental misemployment of the concepts of the understanding but “transcendent use of the categories” which expands them to beyond the limits or the bounds of the experience in accordance with its principle. To avoid this illegitimate employment of the categories, Kant separates it from what he calls “immanent” use of the concepts. In this manner, “immanent” employment refers to the empirical employment of the understanding within the limits of the experience (*CPR*, B 365). Later, in the “Appendix”, Kant explains that the principles of reason and its transcendental ideas have also a legitimate use, that is, “immanent use”. In this case, reason does not create concepts (of object), on the contrary, merely “orders” the concepts of the understanding in order to reach the higher unity (*CPR*, A 644 B 671). Here, the principles of reason are not transcendent, Kant, now, calls them “transcendental principles of reason” (*CPR*, A 649 B 677). Since the task of reason, through its ideas and principles, is solely to regulate the principles or the rules of the understanding in its legitimate use, it is called “regulative employment of the ideas”. In the third *Critique*, he also mentions “the immanent use and underlines this fact by stating that in the case of “the principle of purposiveness” of reflective judgment, reason exercises in accordance with its “immanent” use, i.e. not constitutive, but merely regulative (*CJ*, FI, 235, 237). Therefore, the principle of reason is not transcendent but transcendental, and we are in need of such a legitimate employment in our scientific enquiry. Furthermore, in order to indicate the distinction between the understanding and reason, Kant introduces another definition of them in relation to those definitions presented just above. According to that, the understanding is defined as “the faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules”, while reason as “the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles” (*CPR*, A 299 B 359). Here, indeed, Kant constitutes a relation between the understanding and reason. As we have seen, the understanding gives a unity to the given manifolds by imposing the rules to them through its concepts. By the same token, reason provides the unity of the manifold of these rules or concepts through its ideas and principles (*CPR*, A 645 B 673). Reason “never applies itself directly to experience or

to any object, but to understanding” (*CPR*, A 302). That is to say, while the understanding relates to the objects of the experience through the sensibility, reason does not have an “immediate relation” to sensible intuition (*CPR*, A 307) but to the understanding and its concepts. At this juncture, two points should be emphasized: the first is that in the “Transcendental Analytic” Kant explained the fact that the concepts of the understanding are not immediately related to the appearances in the experience, but through the mediation of the sensibility. Here, in explaining the positions of reason and its concepts, the relation between the objects of the experience and the concepts of the understanding is described as “immediate”. For, it is clear that the relation of the concepts of reason with the objects of the experience reflect a double mediation. Reason attempts to relate to the objects of the experience through the mediation of the understanding. For this reason, in the “Transcendental Dialectic”, the understanding is treated as a faculty which “directly” relates to the objects. And the second one is that we can notice the similar functions of, both, reason and understanding on the basis of these relations. Reason attempts to reduce the certain number of principles of understanding to the “highest possible unity” via its principle and ideas, while understanding aims to reduce the multiplicity of representations to the unified one via its concepts. At this juncture, considering Kant’s argument about the necessity of reflective judgment and its principles, it can be noted that on the one hand, in addition to the universal, abstract laws of understanding, we need also empirical laws to capture nature in its diversity; on the other hand, this diversity or multiplicity of laws can be grasped in terms of the principles of reason which aims to reduce multiplicity of principles to the smallest one.

As a matter of fact, multiplicity of rules and unity of principles is a demand of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into throughgoing accordance with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby connects the manifold. But such a principle does not prescribe any law for objects, and does not contain any general ground of the possibility of knowing or of determining objects as such; it is merely subjective law for the orderly management of the possessions of our understanding, that by comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest possible number” (*CPR*, A 306 B 362).

In this quoted passage, Kant gives us a clue about the regulative employment of reason by emphasizing its role of ordering the rules or the principles of the understanding. Therefore, if reason in its activity of the unification extends the concepts of the understanding beyond to the limits of possible experience in order to reach the unconditioned, then the transcendent employment appears and inevitably finds itself in dialectical illusion. Nevertheless, if it merely regulates the understanding in its empirical employment, it does not prescribe any laws for the object, and conforms to the condition of transcendental distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. In such a structure, we can say, it is not the lawgiver of the nature, its function is not to impose its own laws to the nature, but its legitimate function is restricted by the legitimate task to regulate the laws of the understanding, which laws are at the same time the laws of nature. In this latter case, reason is treated as the higher faculty to supply “the highest unity of thought” and becomes the indispensable part of the knowledge. “All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought” (*CPR*, A 299). As Allison puts it, this sequence is not, surely, a temporal but a logical one.<sup>379</sup> Throughout this chapter, the relation between reason and understanding becomes more apparent.

## 5.2. Transcendental Ideas as the Pure Concepts of Reason

As we have seen, Kant draws a strict relation between the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason. In a similar way, he asserts that these ideas are derived from the forms of inference or syllogism of judgment, just as the categories of the understanding are acquired by means of logical forms of judgment (*CPR*, 310). His basic example proceeds as following: “All men are mortal” in which two other propositions are already contained “some men are mortal” and “some mortal beings are men”; from this, it follows, “all learned beings are men” and consequently the proposition “all learned beings are mortal” is inferred. Moreover, in every inference,

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<sup>379</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 309.

first we think of “a rule” by means of the understanding, and secondly we subsume “something known” under the rule through judgment, and finally we conclude through reason (*CPR*, A 304 B 361). In this regard, he re-defines reason as the faculty of inferring (*CPR*, A 330). After all, he determines three main kinds of syllogism corresponding to the ideas: Categorical, Hypothetical and Disjunctive (*CPR*, B 361). Hence, as it can be easily noticed, in such a frame, reason, in its act of inferring, has no direct relation to the objects of sensible intuition. Conversely, it relates merely to the understanding and its judgments. Despite this fact, reason still tries to produce objective knowledge about the objects of the experience. Under the light of these explanations, we can conceive the rationale behind why the ideas of reason are defined as “necessary concepts of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense experience” (*CPR*, B 384). The pure concepts of reason, thus, are called “transcendental ideas”. Since reason is the faculty of inferring and ideas are the product of these inferences, then they are not “arbitrarily invented”, on the contrary, these ideas “are imposed by the very nature of reason itself”, that is to say, they are necessary concepts of reason, and “therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding” (*CPR*, B 384). This necessary relation between the ideas of reason and the concepts of understanding is illuminated whereby a fruitful summarizing of the relations of all components of theory of knowledge by Kant himself:

A *perception* which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is *sensation* (*Empfindung*), an objective perception is *knowledge*. This is either *intuition* or *concept*. The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it meditately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure concept*. The pure concept, insofar as it has its origin in the understanding alone is called a *notion* (*Notio*). A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an *idea* or concept of reason. (*CPR*, A 320 B 377).

Here, Kant identifies “notion” with the categories of the understanding, and strictly relates them to the ideas of reason which transcend the limits of the experience. Reason inevitably transcends this limit or the condition, because it is guided by the

principle of “the unconditioned”. For this reason, Kant equates the concept of reason also with the concept of “the totality of conditions for any given conditioned” (*CPR*, B379). Rather, the latter concept can be possible solely through “the unconditioned”, as the totality of conditions itself is the unconditioned which cannot be found in the sense experience. This rupture between the ideas and the objects of experience carries us to the three important conclusions. The first one is that reason necessarily relates to the understanding and its concepts. For “the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned” (*CPR*, B 383). The second, as an inevitable result of the first one, unlike the concepts of the understanding, which stand in a very close relation to the sensible intuition, the objective deduction of these ideas is not possible (*CPR*, B 393 A 336). And according to the third one, the objective employment of these ideas is necessarily transcendent, whereas the objective employment of the concepts of the understanding is not only possible, but also a necessary component for the objective knowledge of the objects of the experience (*CPR*, A 327). To sum up, reason connects with the concepts of the understanding and the principles of the understanding, and it attempts to unify all conditions in order to reach the unconditioned, i.e. the absolute totality, by extending these concepts to the beyond of the experience. In this structure, transcendental ideas are “simply categories extended to the unconditioned” (*CPR*, B 436).

As I have mentioned just above, Kant defines three types of inferences. First of all, Kant reduces all relations in representations into two groups: 1) The relation to the subject, 2) The relation to the objects. From this classification, he derives three main subdivisions: 1) The relation to the subject, referring to Categorical inference 2) The relation to the manifold of the object in the sense experience, referring to Hypothetical inference 3) The relation to all things in general, referring to Disjunctive inference (*CPR*, B 391 A 334). On the other hand, when reason employs these ideas in accordance with its transcendent principle, i.e. the unconditioned, or the absolute totality of all conditions, dialectical inference appears. In such a case, Kant calls inferences “pseudo-rational inferences” (*CPR*, A 406 B 432), and calls the concepts of reason “pseudo-rational concepts” (*CPR*, A 311 B 368). What is crucial

here is the fact that since the unconditioned is the absolute totality of all conditions, to supply the unconditioned necessitates the act of synthesis. The unconditioned, in this sense, is also “the ground of the synthesis of the conditioned”. “We have therefore to seek for an *unconditioned*, first, of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*; secondly, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a *series*; thirdly, of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*” (*CPR*, A 323). By this way, Kant thinks that the unconditioned, or the absolute unity of each of these syntheses or inferences provides us with, first, the absolute, or the unconditioned, unity of the thinking subject; second, the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, and finally, the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. Here, the main motive is the idea that the synthesis of absolute totality of all conditions paves the way for the unconditioned. Most importantly, in accordance with this exposition, Kant formulates mainly three pure concepts of reason: Psychological, Cosmological and Theological ideas.

The thinking subject is the object of *psychology*, the sum total of all appearances (the world) is the object *cosmology*, and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of *theology*. Pure reason thus furnishes the idea for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*), for a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and finally for a transcendental knowledge of God (*theologia transzentalis*). (*CPR*, B 391 A 334)

Consequently, we have three types of dialectical inferences corresponding to these ideas, paralogism, antinomy and ideal of pure reason. Since our main issue here is to examine the nature presented in the third *Critique*, we will deal with the cosmological ideas. In doing this, we will see step by step how reason necessarily falls into dialectical illusion in attempting to produce knowledge about the world or nature. In doing this, we will also notice the mechanism of reason in its process of synthesis divided into mathematical and dynamical one in order to reach the unconditioned. After these, we will have an efficient ground to pass to the legitimate regulative employment of reason, i.e. empirical employment, and its ideas.

### **5.3. Cosmological Ideas and the Synthesis of Conditions**

In the previous section, we have seen that reason employs its own ideas, just as the understanding uses its own concepts. However, there is a crucial difference between the ideas of reason and the concepts of the understanding. Accordingly, while the concepts of the understanding necessarily relate to the appearances through the act of the schema performed by imagination, an idea of reason refers to nothing but the unconditioned provided by the synthesis of the conditioned (*CPR*, B 379) to which no representation corresponds in possible experience (*CPR*, B 384). Kant calls such an idea “a pure concept of reason”. Ideas of reason, hence, are not in relation with the objects of experience, but with the concepts of the understanding through its principle, “the absolute totality of conditions for any given conditioned” (*CPR*, B 367), i.e. the unconditioned. The understanding produces solely the conditional knowledge, whereas reason tries to reach unconditioned by using the conditioned. Yet, Kant argues, “no experience is unconditioned” (*CPR*, A 327). For this reason, they cannot be treated as having objective validity. Reason’s demand for the unconditioned results in “transcendental dialectic”. In this section, I will attempt to argue the cosmological ideas and the notion “the synthesis of conditions” in order to grasp the difference between the illegitimate (constitutive) and legitimate (regulative) employment of the ideas of reason. In this way, we will be able to re-examine the nature and the regulative principle of reflective judgment which exercises in such a nature.

Kant does not deal with the issue of the synthesis of conditions under a proper title in his first *Critique*. Thus, his relevant arguments can be found in different passages during the Transcendental Dialectic. On the other hand, he gives further explanations about it in more detailed and in a systematic way in the section the “Antinomy of Pure Reason”. First of all, reason, as we have seen, attempts to synthesize the conditions provided by understanding in order to arrive at the unconditioned unity of these conditions. Here, the relation between reason and understanding appears more clearly. The unconditioned synthesis is, obviously, not empirical, whereas the

synthesis of the manifold, which is by its very nature empirical, is always conditional. Since reason does not correlate directly with the objects of the experience, it works with understanding's own tools. Therefore, in its dialectical employment, reason takes the empirical or conditional synthesis of the understanding and applies it beyond these conditions. Kant states the fact that in such an employment, the empirical knowledge or the empirical synthesis is “only a part”. For, “no actual experience” is adequate to its ideas or to the unconditioned synthesis (*CPR*, A 311). This unconditioned unity, or the absolute totality, is “merely an idea” (*CPR*, A 328), not the schematized category of the understanding.

If in employing the principles of understanding we do not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of experience, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines which can neither hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it. (*CPR*, B 449)

Another significant emphasis on the notion of the synthesis appears when Kant explains the main difference between paralogism and antinomy. According to that, paralogism is a one-sided illusion, whereas antinomy is a two-sided conflict (*CPR*, A 407 B 434), which he calls this structure of antinomy “antithetic” (*CPR*, A 421). And this difference between two types of dialectical inference relies on the fact that in the case of antinomy reason is “applied to the objective synthesis of appearances”, which is entirely conditional and hence empirical. In order to conceive what Kant means by this, we should elaborate on the antinomies of pure reason. As a matter of fact, antinomies have their central impact on Kant’s theory of knowledge. In his letter to Christian Grave in 1878, Kant writes that the antinomy of pure reason is what arose him from his dogmatic slumbers.<sup>380</sup>

According to Kant, in seeking the unconditioned in the nature or the world as the field of appearances, reason inevitably falls into antinomies. In other words, the unconditioned or the absolute unity in the synthesis of appearances unavoidably results in two contradict positions, as thesis and as antithesis. For, the former, i.e., the absolute totality, is not given in experience, whereas the latter, i.e. the synthesis of

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<sup>380</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, p. 552.

appearances, necessitates the empirical synthesis (*CPR*, A 408). Kant states that “from the fact that my synthetic unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory, I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind, although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the *antinomy* of pure reason.” (*CPR*, A 332 B 398).

### **5.3.1. The distinction between Mathematical Synthesis and Dynamical Synthesis**

We have two factors or manners here as regards the relation of reason with the understanding. The first one is that reason takes empirical synthesis and extends it beyond the limits of experience. The second one is that reason borrows the categories from the understanding and employs them beyond the limitations of possible experience, “and so to endeavor to extent” them “beyond the limits of the empirical, though still, indeed, in terms of their relation to the empirical” (*CPR*, B 436) Then how do these two manners work together? As we know, the antinomy of pure reason lies on the dialectical inference or syllogism: “If the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given; objects of the sense are given as conditioned; therefore, etc.” (*CPR*, A 497 B 525). Now, reason, in its transcendent employment in accordance with its principle, “converts the category of the understanding into a transcendental idea”, to which no corresponding object is given in experience, by carrying empirical synthesis to the unconditioned (*CPR*, A 409 B 436). In fact, what Kant means by all these is simply that just as the understanding constructs the objects of experience, as the phenomena, in a determinative way via its rules and principles imposed by its concepts, so reason attempts to determine these objects as if they were not phenomena but noumena. For these reasons, Kant ascribes the certain types of peculiarities to these cosmological ideas in the sense that “they can presuppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for its concept, as being given” (*CPR*, A 479 B 507). As a necessary result of being free from the limits of the understanding, reason never brings these ideas into “harmony with the universal laws of nature” (*CPR*, A 462 B 490), that is, with the universal laws of the understanding. As we can easily notice here, reason in its constitutive use can never

reconcile with the understanding and its universal laws. Therefore, in order to provide the proper condition, as presented in the third *Critique*, under which reason and the understanding can co-operate without any contradiction, reason and its ideas should be employed in a different way. Moreover, for reflecting this tension between reason and understanding, or, between the conditioned and the conditional, Kant uses the terms “too small” or “too large”. According to that, empirical synthesis and the categories of the understanding is “too small” for reason’s demand of the absolute totality, whereas ideas of reason and the synthesis of totality of all conditions are too large for the understanding and its concepts. (*CPR*, A 422 B 450/ A 487 B 515).

Consequently, just as Kant derives these categories from the logical forms of judgment, so he posits four cosmological ideas “corresponding to four titles of categories”, i.e. quantity, quality, relation and modality (*CPR*, A 415 B 443). As we can see, in this classification, cosmological ideas and the antinomies are divided into two groups in accordance with their characteristics and their syntheses. Accordingly, mathematical antinomies work with mathematical synthesis, whereas dynamical antinomies operate through dynamical synthesis. These divisions, indeed, carry all weight in Kant’s solution to the antinomies. He will impose two different solutions corresponding to these two different types of antinomies and syntheses. Then, what is the difference between mathematical synthesis and dynamical synthesis? As mentioned in the previous chapter, mathematical categories and mathematical principles of the understanding regard the object of the experience as a magnitude, and hence as the homogenous unity. That is to say, in the synthesis or the apprehension of the manifold of the object, this manifold is synthesized as homogenous. In the “Axioms of Intuition”, Kant explains that all combination (*Conjunctio*) is either composition (*Compositio*) or connection (*nexus*). The former contains the synthesis of homogenous manifold; in this case, an object is treated as merely magnitude, i.e. mathematically treated. Here, we deal with the object in its mathematical unity; all of its parts are combined as magnitude and aggregate. (*CPR*, A 162 B 202). On the other hand, in the latter case, i.e. connection, we are concerned with the connection of the objects with one another. Kant calls this second case “dynamical”, and in the dynamical principles, the synthesis or the connection

proceeds heterogeneously. Most importantly, he emphasizes that in this dynamical case, the connection can be also either *psychical* or *metaphysical*. (*CPR*, A 163 B 203). On the other hand, since mathematical categories or principles concern solely with an object and allow merely homogenous synthesis, they lead to only spatiotemporal items. To sum up, the concept of magnitude entails the notion “homogeneity”, and from this argument, it necessarily follows that “magnitude is the determination” in space and time, i.e. the synthesis of the homogenous in space and time (*CPR*, A 245), and hence, it necessarily signifies a certain type of “limitation” (*CPR*, A 241). For these reasons, Kant indicates the fact that mathematical principle and synthesis is constitutive, whereas dynamical principle and synthesis is solely regulative (*CPR*, B 296). Under the light of these explanations, it should be noted that in his explanation of transcendental dialectic and the mechanism of reason, Kant is still committed to the doctrine of Transcendental Analytic.

Now, returning our present issue, these arguments allow Kant to divide antinomies and syntheses into two classes as mathematical and as dynamical. In the case of mathematical antinomies which treat the items as magnitudes, i.e. as spatiotemporal items, the synthesis should be homogenous; therefore, it is allowed to contain merely empirical synthesis. On the other hand, in the case of dynamical antinomies, it is possible to regard the connection of appearances not merely as empirical, because it synthesizes heterogeneously. In these lights, we can investigate the application of these distinctions in the antinomies. As we have seen, in the case of antinomies, reason seeks for the absolute unity or totality of the series of conditions of appearances. Otherwise stated, in virtue of inferring, reason exercises in such a way that if the conditioned is given, reason demands the unconditioned by attempting to synthesize the series of conditions. According to Kant, to provide this absolute totality of the series is possible in terms of two ways: In first case, the totality of the entire series of the conditions itself is the unconditioned, or, the unconditioned itself can be able to begin a new series without being conditioned, and by this way the unconditioned is “only a part of the series” (*CPR*, A 419 B 446). Therefore, the synthesis to reach the absolute totality of the series is not progressive, but regressive (*CPR*, B 437) Reason attempts to reach the unconditioned through the absolute

totality of regressive synthesis of conditions. The totality of the synthesis of conditions upon which pure cosmological concepts of reason are based proceeds regressively “from the conditioned to the condition” (*CPR*, A 411 B 438).

The dynamical regress is distinguished in an important respect from the mathematical. Since the mathematical regress is concerned only with the combining of parts to form a whole, or the division of a whole into parts, the conditions of this series must always be regarded as parts of the series, and therefore as homogenous and as appearances. In the dynamical regress, on the other hand, we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole of given parts, or with an unconditioned part for a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance itself from necessary existence. In this latter regress, it is not, therefore, necessary that the condition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned. (*CPR*, A 560 B 588)

What is crucial in this composition is the fact that in the mathematical antinomies and that of synthesis, all members of the series should be homogenous and empirical, whereas in the case of dynamical, the heterogeneous condition under which an intelligible element in the series as the unconditioned can be allowed (*CPR*, A 532 B 560). Now, in the first two antinomies, which are mathematical ones, Kant explains that neither thesis nor antithesis is true. According to that, in the first antinomy, thesis asserts that the world has a beginning in time and is also limited in space, while antithesis claims that the world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both space and time (*CPR*, A 426 B 454). In the second antinomy, thesis affirms that every composite thing or substance in the world is made up of simple parts, that is, indivisible parts, whereas antithesis holds that no composite thing in the world is made up with of simple parts (*CPR*, A 434 B 462). At this juncture, as it can be noticed, reason conflicts with itself. For, even though it is only allowed in the mathematical antinomies to employ empirical synthesis, it attempts to provide the world as a whole which cannot be given through empirical synthesis. Thus, in both cases, that is, in both thesis and antithesis, it presupposes the mathematical synthesis, and as a result, no one of them can be true. On the other hand, regarding dynamical antinomies, Kant postulates a different type of solution by

declaring that both thesis and antithesis can be true without any conflict. In the third antinomy, thesis claims that causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not only type of causality, there is also freedom as another type of causality, whereas antithesis holds that there is no such freedom as causality (*CPR*, A 444 B 472). In the forth antinomy, thesis states that there is a being which necessarily exists, while antithesis denies that an absolutely necessary being can exist (*CPR*, A 452 B 480). According to that, since these are dynamical ideas and hence they are subject to dynamical synthesis, both thesis and antithesis can be compatible without a conflict (*CPR*, A 532 B 560). Here, we should be careful about the idea that Kant does not demonstrate the objective validity of freedom alongside the universal law of causality. It is just the possibility of such a freedom to be examined.

To sum up, mathematical ideas attempt to conceive the absolute unity through the empirical synthesis, which transcends the limitation drawn by the doctrine of Transcendental Analytic. In other words, mathematical ideas are concerned with the object by determining it as if it was noumenon, not with the connection of the objects with each other, they are self-contradictory (*CPR*, A 526 B 554). Kant explicitly maintains the “importance” of the distinction between dynamical and mathematical synthesis in arguing the solutions to the antinomies. By referring to this essential distinction, he states that since reason in its legitimate use can only operate in a regulative way, not constitutively, dynamical concepts of the understanding, which impose rules or principles merely for regulative employment on the basis of the relation or the connection of the objects with each other, are more “adequate to the idea of reason” (*CPR*, A 530 B 558). Mathematical concepts of the understanding, which treat an object as a magnitude and function in constituting the object of the experience, do not allow reason and its idea to be legitimately employed. From this fact, Kant directs us to the other crucial distinction between regulative principle of reason and constitutive principle. According to that constitutive principle of reason, which seeks for the absolute totality of the series of the conditions, forces us to illegitimately extend our concepts beyond all possible experience. In doing this, it attempts to prescribe a law to the objects and produce knowledge about them. On the other hand, the regulative principle of reason postulates a rule to detect what is given

in space and time. (*CPR*, A 509 B 537). Therefore, dynamical concepts of reason do not concern with an object as a magnitude, but with dynamical relation between the appearances (*CPR*, A 536 B 564).

Furthermore, Kant also draws a distinction between the notions “the world” and “the nature” corresponding to the mathematical and dynamical concepts. Indeed, they are not two distinct notions; namely that, “the world” indicates “mathematical sum total of all appearances and totality of their synthesis”, and the same world regarded as “a dynamical whole” is called “nature” in which “we are not concerned with the aggregation in space and time, with a view to determining it as a magnitude”, but with unity of the connection of appearances (*CPR*, A 419 B 447). At this point, we can easily notice why mathematical antinomies collapse to the extent that even though absolute totality for which mathematical antinomies seek refers to the world as a mathematical whole in which merely spatiotemporal items are given, they attempt to reach the unconditioned through the empirical components. Thus, in nature as a dynamical whole, reason employs its ideas in a regulative way to order the relations of appearances without prescribing any law to determine the appearances. In a similar way, in “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant defines “nature” as where the order or the regularity of the appearances is in the case (*CPR*, A 125). Here, Kant just shows us the possibility of such a nature regarding intelligible elements. In the next section, we will elaborate on the empirical employment of reason and its ideas in a co-operation with the understanding. Yet, in both cases, that is, in the case of freedom as the causality of reason or in the case of the empirical employment of reason, reason has its own peculiar place solely as an “explanatory” or “regulative” component (*CPR*, A 481 B 508) without having objective validity in the scientific inquiry into nature. (The constitutive employment of reason is legitimate not in the theoretical realm, but merely in the practical realm.) As Kant himself puts it, the knowledge derived from the principles of reason should be distinguished from the knowledge supplied by the understanding (*CPR*, A 302).

#### **5.4. Reason as a Higher Faculty: Regulative Employment of the Ideas**

After “Transcendental Dialectic”, through the “Appendix” to the “Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant passes to the legitimate side of reason and its ideas from the land of illusion. As I have emphasized above, the place and the title, i.e. the “Appendix”, of the section is highly problematic, as it creates an impression on the readers that reason functions negatively regarding the system of “Transcendental Analytic”, and its legitimate use is just supplementary. Nevertheless Kant ascribes a crucial function to reason in the process of the unity of knowledge. What Kant attempts to demonstrate in the “Appendix” is the idea that although reason relates only to the understanding, instead of the objects of experience, the legitimate employment of reason and its ideas are still possible, not as being constitutive, but as being regulative through which it does not create concepts of the objects but merely regulates or orders these concepts supplied by the understanding. That is to say, the cosmological idea “the world” or “the nature” as a “totality” still function legitimately in the empirical employment of reason. Then, what does Kant exactly mean by the notions “constitutive” and “regulative” principles? Further, is there any difference between the meanings of them in “Transcendental Analytic” and in “Transcendental Dialectic”?

As we have seen, Kant differentiates the mathematical concepts and the principles of the understanding from dynamical ones by explaining that in the former case principles are constitutive, whereas in the latter they are regulative. In “Analogies of Experience” in which dynamical principles of the understanding are mentioned, he gives further explanation about the issue. According to that, mathematical principles which operate through mathematical synthesis, i.e. magnitude, are applied directly to the appearance to construct it as the object of the experience. On the other hand, dynamical principles and synthesis are attended not to the object itself as magnitude, but to the “existence of the appearances” and to their “*relation*” to “one another” in accordance with time determination (*CPR*, A 178 B 221). In such a case, since these principles do not construct the object as magnitude, but applied to the relations of the appearances, they are, as opposed to the mathematical ones, “regulative” principles. They are not principles “*constitutive* of the objects, that is of the appearances, but only *regulative*” (*CPR*, A 180 B 223). As a result, they provide “rules” for the

relations of the objects through which these relations become “objective” and hence, “law” (*CPR*, A114), e.g. causal relation. Then, is the regulative employment of the ideas of reason considered as exactly the same way with regulative principles of the understanding? In the “Appendix”, Kant necessarily returns this issue;

In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished the *dynamical* principles of the understanding, as merely regulative principles of *intuition*, from the *mathematical*, which as regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dynamical laws are constitutive in respect of *experience*, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible *a priori*. (*CPR*, A 664 B 692)

In this passage, Kant makes it clear that dynamical principles and synthesis are still constitutive on the basis of the unity of experience in the respect that experience as the unity of empirical intuitions depends on the dynamical principles through which the relations of these empirical intuitions are constructed. Under the light of these explanations, it should be noticed that regulative employment of the ideas of reason is also different from the regulative principles of the understanding. They can be thought similar regarding their functions which focus on the relations or the connections of the appearances. However, they are entirely different on the basis of the constitutive power of the former. In its legitimate employment, reason employs its principles or ideas to the understanding itself. In doing this, it directs the understanding “towards a certain goal” (*CPR*, A 646 B 672). This goal is the systematic unity of knowledge, or, strictly speaking, “totality in knowledge”. In order to achieve this task, reason co-operates with the understanding and its concepts, and hence it leads them to grasping the systematicity of nature through the principle of “systematization” or “systematic unity” which is the regulative idea of reason. In such a case, reason still has the idea of “totality”, but, contra its constitutive employment, in this regulative case, it does not stand for an object as noumenon by determining it, on the contrary, it functions to regulate the relations of the concepts of the understanding which stand for the objects as phenomena to determine or to constitute. In other words, the idea of systematic unity is the unity of (the

connections of) the concepts of the understanding. Reason in its empirical employment guides or directs the understanding in producing knowledge. Therefore, as we can realize, what Kant meant by asserting that in its regulative employment, reason does not generate concepts, but just regulates the concepts of the understanding is simply the fact that reason through its idea does not produce any knowledge, it provides the systematic unity of the knowledge supplied by the understanding. “Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding.” (*CPR*, A 664 B 671). Allison points out that transcendental ideas of reason in their regulative use are the forms of the thought of the systematic unity of knowledge, just as the categories of the understanding are “the forms of the thought of its synthetic unity”.<sup>381</sup> This idea of the systematic unity, Kant emphasizes, cannot be derived from the nature itself. On the contrary, we investigate nature in our scientific inquiry in accordance with this idea. At this point, we should refer again to one of the major assertions made in the third *Critique*. According to that, Kant stated that without the principle of systematic unity of nature, the understanding cannot grasp the nature in its diversity and multiplicity of heterogeneity as a systematic unity. This is simple because such a unity as a totality cannot be given through the experience. This idea, indeed, precedes the process of producing knowledge in the investigation of nature. In the scientific inquiry into nature, the understanding is guided by this principle. As a necessary result of this claim, then, this idea “which postulates a complete unity in knowledge obtained by the understanding” precedes this determinate knowledge produced by the concepts of the understanding. In this manner, the complete unity of the knowledge also implicitly connotes the partiality of the knowledge of the understanding. The legitimate task of reason and its ideas is to provide the basis for the proper connection or the relation of the parts of the knowledge. It is clear that these arguments reflect a direct parallelism with Kant’s arguments presented in the third *Critique*. Just as, in introducing the principle of purposiveness and of the systematization, Kant’s main motive is to provide systematic unity of the nature in its

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<sup>381</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 441.

diversity, so in the “Appendix” he justifies the regulative employment of reason through the idea that without such a aid or an assistance of reason, the understanding would not be able to grasp the nature as a complete and “coherent” (*CPR*, A 643 B 671) “system” (*CPR*, A 649 B 677), but would merely produce a “contingent aggregate”. Therefore, the unity of reason implies the unity of diversity or of multiplicity in nature. Although Guyer states his suspicion about the unity of reason as such by claiming that if the idea or the principle of systematicity is necessary for the unity of experience, then it should be followed that either such an employment of reason is also constitutive, or the unity of experience is also regulative, instead of constitutive.<sup>382</sup> On the other hand, as he expounds later, it is not possible to equate the unity of reason with the unity of experience. First of all, Kant explicitly and insistently differentiates the regulative from the constitutive employment of reason by holding that reason can be determinative neither for the construction of the object of the experience, nor for the constitution the relation between the appearances. The unity of experience, on the other hand, necessarily entails both of them. In the case of the regulative employment, reason seeks for “the systematic unity of all empirical concepts” (*CPR*, A 652 B 680). The principles of reason “can never be constitutive in respect of empirical concepts; for since no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can never be given, they can never have an object in concreto” (*CPR*, A 664 B 692). Therefore, in arguing the unity of reason, Kant means the systematic unity of the nature in its diversity, not the unity of experience with regard to the unity of the object. Kant defines an object as a certain type of determination according to laws of “the unity of experience” (*CPR*, A 494 B 522). The unity of reason is “the unity of system; and this systematic unity does not serve objectively as a principles that extends the application of reason to objects.” (*CPR*, A 680 B 708). Further, as we have seen, Kant also distinguished dynamical principles of the understanding from the ideas of reason to the extent that even though dynamical principles of the understanding are regulative, they are still constitutively employed regarding the unity of experience. To put it in a different way, although the functions of the dynamical principles of the understanding and of the principles of reason are similar

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<sup>382</sup> Paul Guyer, “Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity”, p. 19.

on the basis of their concerning with the mere connections or the relations of the objects, they are differentiated from each other in the sense that the former still has a constitutive power to determine objectively these relations. This is also why Kant treats the unity of reason as merely “hypothetical” (*CPR*, A 649 B 677) by distinguishing it from “hypostatical”, i.e. constitutive employment (*CPR*, A 694 B 722). The systematic unity of nature, “as a mere idea”, is “a disguised unity” (*CPR*, A 651 B 679) or “a projected unity” (*CPR*, A 674 B 675), which is entirely different from the unity obtained by the concepts of the understanding. For these reasons, the principle of reason cannot be a constitutive principle “that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct object” (*CPR*, A 681 B 709). Consequently, the function of the regulative principle of reason is just “to assist the understanding by means of ideas, in those cases in which the understanding cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time to give the numerous and diverse rules of the understanding unity of system under a single principle, and thus to secure coherence in every possible way” (*CPR*, A 648 B 676). In these lights, the main difference between the unity of reason and the unity of the understanding is that without the former, the understanding still produces knowledge even if it suffers from the systematic unity. The unity of the understanding, in this sense, is the necessary condition of the experience, whereas the unity of reason cannot be considered as the necessary condition of the experience. Moreover, it should be emphasized that Kant also mentions “the object in the idea” (*CPR*, A 671 B 699) as a concept of reason which is a presupposition. However, we should be careful that such a concept or the object is not an appearance determined and constituted by the mathematical concepts of the understanding. It just guides the understanding in producing the knowledge about the objects. As we know, an empirical concept in nature also contains a rule or a law through which it is subsumed under the genus in the classification of nature. Thus, such an “object in the idea” in its relation to the nature as a totality just serves as a ground for such a systematic classification. Kant calls, for example, “pure water”, “pure earth” or “pure air”, which are not found in the experience (*CPR*, A 646 B 674). Yet, they provide a basis in our investigation in chemistry. They in themselves, however, can offer or say nothing about the object or the constitution of the object of the experience in a determinative way.

In addition to these, Kant explains some forms of the principle of systematisation. These forms are the principle of homogeneity, the principle of specification and that of continuity. They, to be sure, are indispensably required for the mechanism of such a systematic unity. To begin with, the principle of homogeneity explicates the condition under which despite the diversity of nature, the manifolds of empirical laws or principles or concepts should reflect homogeneity, so that the systematic unity can be possible. In other words, if nature as such consisted of entirely heterogeneous varieties or diversity, then it would not be possible to order its laws or concepts through the classification, that is, would not be possible to provide a coherent system. In such a case, there would be no guarantee, in our scientific investigation, that every single empirical law can be connected with another one. At the first sight, this principle seems to stand as opposed to Kant's argument of the heterogeneity of nature in its diversity presented in the third *Critique* as the ground for the reflective judgment and its principle. Yet, it does not. Kant uses the notion "homogeneity" in the "Appendix" in a different way as regards his usage of it in the introductions to the third *Critique* in that in the former it does not come to mean the "homogeneity" of the universal laws of the understanding. As we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis, Kant have postulated the notion "heterogeneity of nature in its boundless diversity" in such a way that since the understanding proceeds by abstracting the specific content of nature through its universal laws, it is not able to grasp nature in its variety of forms. Thus, it proceeds by rendering everything in nature homogenous. For example, the universal law of causality is unable to grasp the special empirical laws of nature regarding biology. When Kant speaks of the principle of homogeneity as the idea of reason, he still reserves the concept of the multiplicity of nature. He just means that this regulative principle of reason is the logical ground for grasping the multiplicity of nature, that is to say, the ground for the use of possible empirical concepts and empirical laws. According to him, through such a ground, i.e., through the assistance of reason, the understanding, in our scientific inquiry, can generate an empirical concept, to exemplify, for a new kind of flower just discovered through connecting it with other similar kind of empirical concepts. This is also the main motive behind why the hypothetical employment of reason is described with reference to the relation between the particular instances and

its universality by Kant. In a very similar way with the process of reflective judgment, at this point Kant also refers to the judgment and the subsumption. Nonetheless, it is crucial that in the hypothetical employment of reason, while the particular instance is certain, such universality is just “problematic”, or “approximative” (*CPR*, A 647 B 675), that is, it is just regulative, not constitutive or determinative. This is why he regards these principles as merely “heuristic” (*CPR*, A 663 B 690) or as “explanatory”, not as “ostensive” (*CPR*, A 512 B 540). This point becomes clear when he introduces the notions “genus” and “species” as the necessary conceptions to the principle of homogeneity. In order to grasp nature as a systematic unity, the idea of nature is presupposed as a coherent logical system. And in this logical system, it should be possible to subsume the species under the genera. The possibility of the systematic classification necessitates the possibility of such a class of higher genera. In such a structure, the principle of homogeneity necessitates the homogeneity of manifolds of species under the genera. As Kemp Smith puts it, “the various species are varieties of a few genera, and these again of still higher genera”.<sup>383</sup> By this way, reason attempts to reduce the multiplicity of the principles of the understanding into a single one and conceive nature as “one” coherent system.

A great advance was made when chemists succeeded in reducing all salts to two main genera, acids and alkalies; and they endeavour to show that even this difference is merely a variety, or diverse manifestation, of one and the same fundamental material. Chemists have sought , step by step, to reduce the different kinds of earths (the material of stones and even of metals) to three, and at last to two. (*CPR*, A 653 B 681)

Moreover, from this, it necessarily follows that “every genus requires diversity of species”, and these species require, in turn, the diversity of subspecies (*CPR*, A 655 B 683). Understood this way, the principle of homogeneity implies also the diversity of the homogenous species under the subspecies. Kant calls this second form of the principle “the law of specification”. What is remarkable here is the idea that while in the former case, i.e. genus, the principle of homogeneity refers to the unity, in the

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<sup>383</sup> Norman K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 650.

latter case, i.e. species and specification, to the differentiation. He explains this issue by emphasizing the fact that the understanding can have knowledge not merely through the intuition but also by means of concepts, and these concepts always stand in a relation of the lower concepts and higher concepts. And hence, in this hierarchical system the lower concepts, i.e. the specification of the concepts, is required for the higher ones (*CPR*, A 656 B 684). Finally, there is also a third form of the principle as the intermediate factor between the principle of homogeneity regarding the unity and the law of specification, i.e. the principle of diversity or of plenitude: the continuity or the affinity of these forms.

Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: (1) through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under higher genera; (2) through a principle of the variety of the homogenous under lower species; and (3) in order to complete the systematic unity, a further law, that of the affinity of all concepts –a law which prescribes that we proceed from each species to every other by gradual increase of the diversity. (*CPR*, A 657 B 685)

Therefore, the systematicity refers directly to this gradual organization of nature in its diversity into genera and species. Kant illustrates all these cases as following:

Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and, as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. This horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which has its own narrower horizon; that is, every species contains subspecies, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclusively of smaller horizons (subspecies), never of points which possess no extent (individuals). But for different horizons, that is, genera, each of which is determined by its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to which, as from a common centre, they can all be surveyed; and from this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness –genera, species and subspecies. (*CPR*, A 659 B 687)

To sum up, in its regulative and empirical employment, the ideas of reason cannot provide the concept of the object with the understanding by determining its object.

They assist the understanding in its empirical employment to order the connection of the concepts of the understanding to arrive at the totality as the complete systematic unity of nature. In fact, all these can be considered as a necessary result of the special character of the relation between reason and the understanding, that is to say, reason's incapability of relating directly to the objects in the unity of experience. The understanding connects the manifold of appearances by means of its concepts and brings them under the empirical laws. And reason attempts to reach the unconditional, namely, the complete systematic unity not by extending these conditions beyond what is given in experience but by guiding the understanding in its empirical activity. It can also be noted that in this relationship, reason approaches towards the universality, whereas the understanding towards the specificity, just as in producing the conditional knowledge, as Wolff indicated it, the imagination towards specificity and the understanding towards the universality. This is because, the object of reason is merely the understanding itself. "The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensibility for the understanding" (*CPR*, A 664 B 692). That means, what serves the function of the sensibility to the understanding is the similar as what serves the function of the understanding to reason. For this reason, Kant uses the notion "analogy" for defining the indirect relation between schema of sensibility and the idea of reason by explaining that a schema of sensibility may be regarded as the analogon for the idea of reason. Allison rightly holds that the systematic unity may function through the inference from something observed to something unobserved.<sup>384</sup> On the other hand, the principles or the ideas of reason can say nothing about the objects of the experience. As Kant himself puts it, what is given to reason "does not consist in objects that have to be brought to the unity of the empirical concept, but in those modes of knowledge supplied by the understanding" for the unity of the connections in conformity with a principle (*CPR*, A 680 B 708). This is why these principles are treated as merely heuristic and why they cannot be counted as the conditions of the unity of experience. In our scientific research, we may just consider the nature *as if* it was a complete systematic unity. Kant, in the *Logic*, emphasizes that the cosmological idea of reason "contains the *archetype* for the use of the

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<sup>384</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 429.

understanding, e.g. the idea of the *world whole*, which idea must necessarily be, *not as constitutive* principle for the empirical use of the understanding, but as *regulative* principle for the sake of the thoroughgoing connection of our empirical use of the understanding".<sup>385</sup>

### **5.5. Re-Examination of the Principles and the Nature as the Ground for the Reflective Judgment**

After these explanations, we have a proper ground to re-examine the nature presented as the basis for the reflective judgment and its principles. Here, again, our main concern will be the arguments presented in both introductions, the First Introduction and the Second Introduction, as Kant himself does not elaborate on these issues in the body of the text in third *Critique*, except these introductions. As we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis, Kant distinguishes formal laws, i.e. the universal laws of the understanding or of nature from the particular empirical laws and ascribes the task of surveying these empirical cases in nature to the reflective judgment and its principles. Basically, when the understanding operates through its formal laws, it abstracts the particular empirical contents and generalizes its universal laws and hence it is unable to grasp the nature in its boundless diversity. In such a case, the reflective employment of judgment and the principle of purposiveness have their own peculiar functions in the investigation of nature through its particular empirical laws for providing the coherent systematic unity. In introducing the function of reflective judgment and its principles, Kant argues the notion "nature" with the same terms as in the first *Critique*. The principle of purposiveness is explicated along with the systematicity, i.e. systematic unity of empirical laws, the coherent experience, the concepts "genus" and "species", and also the law of specification. As we know, in its reflective employment, the particular is given, and judgment has to find the universal for this particular. And, in this case, as opposed to determinative employment, judgment cannot be directed by the principles of the understanding, as the main point here is already to find a concept. Therefore, in our scientific inquiry of nature, such

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<sup>385</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 590.

as chemistry, botanic or biology, when we discover a new particular, we have to find a proper universal under which we subsume this particular. Expressed otherwise, we create an empirical concept, i.e. an empirical rule, for this particular and classify this particular through comparing it other particular cases. According to Kant, in order to make this process possible, we presuppose the idea that nature in its diversity should reflect a certain type of coherent systematic unity, so that to subsume species under higher genera becomes possible.

Hence, reflective judgment, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires a principle, which it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is to be the basis for the unity of all empirical principles under higher though still empirical principles, hence is to be the basis that makes it possible to subordinate empirical principles to one another in a systematic way. (*CJ*, 180)

Here, the principles are again merely regulative, rather than constitutive; in other words, reflective judgment uses the idea of purposiveness of nature as a principle “for reflection, rather than determination”. Thus, judgment does not prescribe any law to the nature, but merely to itself. Kant explicitly declares the fact that the purposiveness of nature is not “a constitutive concept of experience”, i.e. “a category”; it cannot determine an appearance “and so belongs to an empirical concept of the object” (*CJ*, FI, 220). In our reflecting on the objects of nature we must assume the systematic unity of nature as a dynamical whole, i.e. the coherent order of empirical laws or particular rules in nature in its productivity, in order to classify these objects in a systematic way, even though neither judgment itself nor the understanding knows or cognizes this principle (*CJ*, 183). For this reason, and for the same reason with the argument of the “Appendix”, Kant treats these principles also as “heuristic” (*CJ*, FI, 205). In other words, in the exactly similar way with the arguments presented in the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, in our scientific inquiry, we ought to regard nature *as if* it were purposive. In the First Introduction, Kant points out that the central concept which judgment can employ is “the nature’s arrangement”: Nature must be arranged in such a way that it must conform to our power of judgment, that is to say, there must be a harmony between

nature and our power of judgment (*CJ*, 202). Merely by this way, the “appropriateness” (*CJ*, 215) of the arrangement (*Anordnung*) of nature renders possible the condition for power of judgment to subsume the given particular laws “under more universal laws” in its determinative employment.

The main idea here is simply that in such an investigation, the principles should be presupposed at the very beginning, which means that, the principle of purposiveness, the systematicity and the law of specification, or specifically, the idea of “unity”, precedes this investigation, the process of finding empirical concept, and hence the process of cognition. In the employment of reflective judgment “we insist only that, nature may be arranged in terms of its universal laws, any search for its empirical laws” should follow these principles, for merely to the extent that these principles have applications “can we make progress in using our understanding in experience and arrive at cognition” (*CJ*, 187). Then, we should be careful that the uniformity of nature and its products by means of the universal laws of the understanding are still necessary condition for any empirical cognition. Here, Kant concerns with “the specific differences in the empirical laws of nature” which would be so heterogenous and diverse that the understanding without being guided by these principles might not be able to grasp the systematic arrangement of nature. From this, it may follow that these principles are not necessarily required for our ordinary empirical cognition, and ordinary empirical judgment. That is to say, to make any empirical judgment, it is necessary condition that the understanding operates its concepts, and judgment “schematizes” and applies schemata to the empirical synthesis in accordance with the principles presented in the “Transcendental Analytic” in the first *Critique*. Therefore, we do not need the reflective judgment and its principles when we are familiar with empirical laws, that is, when “the comparison with empirical forms for which we already have concepts” (*CJ*, FI, 213). At this point, before elaborating on the details, we have to refer again to Kant’s definition of “reflection”. As we have seen, to reflect means to compare an empirical presentation either with other presentations which is the case for teleological judgment and for the formation of the empirical concept or with our cognitive powers which is the case for both teleological and aesthetic judgments. Hence, in the case of the scientific discovery, the former case is

necessarily operational. Without being directed by these regulative principles, that is, the principles of systematicity, the purposiveness, and the specification, we would get lose our way in investigating nature to classify the given empirical presentation under a species or a genus in a systematic way. This is why these principles precede the act of comparison, the formation of the empirical concept and thus the empirical cognition in such a special investigation of nature. It should also be underlined that Kant, in both First and Second Introductions, uses the notions “empirical concepts” and “empirical laws or rules” interchangeably. Allison rightly points out that, since our main concern here is the specific scientific investigation of nature, an empirical concept is necessarily a member of a set of empirical concepts which is obtained in accordance with a system of empirical laws or rules. “Some degree of coherence is clearly necessary if concepts obtained through comparison are to be connectable with one another”, and “this is what is provided by their systematic ordering in terms of the relation of genera and species”, that is, by “the hierarchical ordering in terms of genera and species”.<sup>386</sup> In this systematic and hierarchical unity, an empirical concept “is itself both a species of the concepts contained in it and a genus for the concepts falling under it”.<sup>387</sup> Indeed, considering Kant’s own language, it can also be said that in this systematic network, an empirical concept is treated as a certain type of “class”. We find or generate an empirical concept for a given empirical case through classifying it. Kant states that in the scientific investigation and discovery, we proceed “from the particular to the universal, *classify* the diverse, i.e. compare several classes, each falling under a definite concept; and when these classes are completely enumerated in terms of their common characteristic, we must subsume them under higher classes (genera)” (*CJ*, FI, 215). By the same token, Makkreel, in his article “Regulative and Reflective uses of Purposiveness in Kant” also indicates the fact that in nature as the systematic unity, Kant’s use of “concept” or “universal” refers to “the rule” which is sought for a given particular in reflective judgment in accordance with the coherence system, and in this process the principle of purposiveness guides our power of judgment for the need of our understanding to

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<sup>386</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 33.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid.

systematize nature.<sup>388</sup> As a result, if we did not presuppose “the principle of purposiveness of nature”, “there could not be systematic unity in the thorough classification of particular forms in terms of empirical laws” (*CJ*, FI, 219). In this manner, two points should be emphasized. The first one is that here we again concern with the nature as a logical system as the relation between species and genera, so as regards to the “Appendix”, and the second one is that since these principles are also regulative, the main concern here is again the connection or the relation of the objects with each other. In other words, nature’s systematic unity is the unity of the connections of natural products, i.e. the systematic coherence of empirical laws. By arguing objective purposiveness in the context of teleological judgments, Kant also mentions “the principle of connection” with respect to the purposes (*CJ*, FI, 244). Accordingly, the relations of empirical concepts of natural products come to mean the relations of the natural purposes of these products.

Additionally, in the Second Introduction, Kant formulates the principle of systematicity in nature as a logical system, i.e. coherent organization, as following: “There is in nature a subordination graspable by us of species and genera; that genera in turn approach one another under some common principle so as to make possible a transition from one another and so to a higher genus”; and further “while initially it seems to our understanding unavoidable to assume as many different kinds of causality as there are specific differences among natural effects, they may nevertheless fall under a small number of principles which it is our task to discover” (*CJ*, 185). Therefore, through this type of a logical organization, we are able to grasp nature as a coherent unity which renders our scientific discovery of particular laws possible. To exemplify, as noted before, this unity as a presumption leads, indeed, Linneaus to classify nature’s products in a systematic way. Besides, Kant argues the principle of specification in the same way with the arguments presented in the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” in the first *Critique*. Accordingly, judgment is guided by the principle of specification not in unifying nature’s particular laws, but “in dividing nature’s universal laws”. Here, then, the emphasis

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<sup>388</sup> Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Regulative and Reflective Uses of Purposiveness in Kant”, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 30 (1992), p. 57.

again is on the differentiation. In its reflective employment judgment “seeks to subordinate” to universal laws “a diversity of particular laws, so that the division will have an order that our understanding can cognize”. The principle expresses the idea that “nature makes its universal laws specific in accordance with the principle of purposiveness” (*CJ*, 189, *FI*, 216) In this case, the movement proceeds from “the highest genus to low genera”, that is, from subgenera to species, and from species to subspecies. From these, Makkreel concludes that the law of specification of nature progresses “from the knowledge that objects of a certain class share a partial set of properties to further claims that they share an increasingly larger set of properties”.<sup>389</sup> Therefore, it is clear that the law of specification, as the subclass and regulative principle of the systematicity<sup>390</sup>, depends entirely on the idea of logical systematicity of nature, i.e. the classification. In other words, it is supplementary law in the systematic arrangement of nature as species and as genera. “*Nature, for the sake of the power of judgment, makes its universal laws specific and into empirical ones, according to the form of a logical system*” (*CJ*, *FI*, 216). And most importantly, by being guided by these regulative principles in our scientific investigation of nature, “in thinking of nature as purposive in this way, what we think of purposive” is not the forms or empirical concepts themselves, “but only their *relation* to one another”.

## 5.6. Concluding Remarks

Under the light of these explanations, it can be stated that Kant, by introducing nature as a dynamical whole in its diversity, seems to be entirely committed to the arguments in the First *Critique*. In *Critique of Pure Reason*, he assigns the understanding as the legislator of the construction of experience and the lawgiver of the nature on the basis of the doctrine of the Transcendental Analytic as “a land of truth”. On the other hand, in the “Transcendental Dialectic” as “a land of illusion”, firstly, he presents reason, its ideas and principles as the threat for the unity of experience legitimately and conditionally constructed by the understanding, its

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<sup>389</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>390</sup> Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology*, p. 44.

concepts and principles. Nevertheless, he does not stop at this “negative” level. In the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, he introduces us the legitimate employment of reason, its ideas and principles in such a way that reason functions as a guide of the understanding in its empirical employment. In pursuing this function, reason again aims to reach the totality or the unconditional unity but not in an illegitimate way, that is, not through employing its principles and ideas beyond the limits of experience. At this stage, it does not create its own concepts to prescribe rules for the objects of the experience; on the contrary it just regulates or orders the concepts of the understanding in order to provide the complete unity of knowledge. Nature, not merely as a mathematical or formal unity, but also as a dynamical whole or unity in its multiplicity of particular empirical laws paves the way for reason’s legitimate employment. This composition imposes the framework to the third *Critique*. The nature as such is presented as a basis of the reflective judgment and its principles. As we have just seen, in the third *Critique*, Kant regards the aim of the systematicity as a regulative principle in the same way with the first *Critique*. As Guyer puts it, the only difference is the degree of the emphasis on this aim.<sup>391</sup> Therefore, it can be noted that regarding the difficulties of the Stage I, it is easier to claim that there is an obvious coherency between the arguments of the first *Critique* and the third *Critique* with respect to the description of nature. The principles, functions and aims follow the same path opened by the arguments of “the Appendix”. These items operate just in a regulative way, instead of constitutively. They function as supplementary components along with the operations of the understanding. They cannot prescribe any constitutive rule or law to the objects of the experience as the understanding legitimately and necessarily does. The main concern here is the connections or relations of the particulars in nature. Thus, there is a consistency and continuity regarding nature as a theme from the first *Critique* to the Third *Critique*. As Guyer significantly puts it, “the systematic unity of the knowledge of the understanding”, unlike the unity of the knowledge of experience established in the Transcendental Analytic, is “the legitimate and necessary aim of the faculty of reason”. This is because Kant asserts that “law of reason which

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<sup>391</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, p. 41.

requires us to seek for...unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason, no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this, no criterion of empirical truth" (*CPR*, A 651 B 769), that is, no systematic coherence of the experience. "Kant seemed to believe that reason's idea of systematicity is the necessary only to motivate the understanding and to assist it in reaching coherent experience".<sup>392</sup> Indeed, this cooperation is also declared in the preface of third *Critique*, Kant explains that;

The critique [discovers this as it] inspects every one of the cognitive powers to decide what each has [in fact] contributed from its own roots to the cognition we actually possess. [as distinguished from] whatever it might pretend to have contributed to it. Nothing, it turns out, (passes this inspection) except what the understanding (through its a priori concepts) prescribes a priori as a law to nature, as the sum total of appearances (whose form is also given a priori). All other pure concepts the critique relegates to the ideas, which are transcendent for our theoretical cognitive power, though that certainly does not make them useless or dispensable, since they serve as regulative principles: they serve, in part, to restrain the understanding's arrogant claims, namely, that (since it can state a priori the conditions for the possibility of all things it can cognize) it has thereby circumscribed the area within which all things in general are possible; in part, they serve to guide the understanding, in its contemplation of nature, by a principle of completeness—though the understanding cannot attain this completeness—and so further the final aim (*Endabsicht*) of all cognition. (*CJ*, 167)

However, this is not the whole story. The problem of the link between reflective judgment and the aesthetic judgment of reflection, which we dealt with in the second chapter of the dissertation, turns out to be a crisis rather than being solved. Considering all these arguments, the position, the function and the place of the aesthetic judgment become more problematic. Since there is a gap between the systematicity of nature in its scientific investigation and the aesthetic judgment, the problematic link between the general theory of reflective judgment and the aesthetic judgment stands in front of us as a "gulf".

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<sup>392</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 37.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

The main assumption of Kant's aesthetic theory is that aesthetic judgment of reflection is non-cognitive, and hence, non-conceptual. The whole structure rises upon this main promise. All keystones which construct this theory are formed or shaped in accordance with this affirmation. This is also responsible for the condition under which each keystone or component stands in a significant relation to others. The feeling of pleasure in beautiful is basically characterized as being disinterested. The judging subjects cannot reflect any interest towards the object to be judged as beautiful. Otherwise, the feeling of pleasure or liking would be dependent on the existence of the object, in which case the concept of the object is necessarily required. Hence, any aesthetic judgment qualified by the concept of the object must be considered as an aesthetic judgment of sense whose determining basis is the pleasure in agreeable, rather than as an aesthetic judgment of reflection. For, it is not judged through the reflection or the contemplation on the form of the object, on the contrary, our judging is directed by emotion or charm satisfying an interest or inclination; or by the utility of the object. One of Kant's move towards the subjective universality of a judgment of taste is to derive it from the disinterested character of the pleasure. In our judging of an object to be beautiful, we also demand all other judging subjects' assents on our judgment of taste, as we are aware the fact that the determining basis of our judging is not our personal or private interest. In this manner, an aesthetic judgment of reflection has a "universal voice". By this way, the subjective validity of a judgment of taste turns into the intersubjective validity. This is, indeed, an unavoidable result of the fact that in the aesthetic appreciation, the judgment cannot be governed by the concept of the understanding which provides objective validity.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the qualifications of the feeling of pleasure in beautiful also define and determine the qualifications of aesthetic judgment of reflection. Merely a contemplative pleasure can provide a ground for judgment of taste. However, in “the Key to the Critique of Taste”, Kant disputably argues that our judging of the aesthetic object must precede the feeling of pleasure. On the one hand, the priority of the judgment is plausibly necessitated on the basis of Kant’s general structure of aesthetic theory. On the other hand, it seems to be very problematic, since Kant insistently indicates the feeling of pleasure as the determining basis of judgment of taste. This dilemma paves the way for a great rupture among the commentators. Following Bullough’s approach, Crawford attempts to solve the puzzle by means of “two-act view”. According to that, the judgment of taste includes two distinct acts of reflection. First, it is reflected on the form of the object which causes the free harmony of the cognitive faculties; second, it is reflected also on the pleasure which is produced by the free play to define it as the disinterested and contemplative pleasure in beautiful. Guyer borrows the theory of double process of reflection and carries it to the most complicated stage so that he structures his entire book in accordance with this theory. What is striking here is that Kant himself never states such a view of double process of reflection in his aesthetic theory. Even this alone is enough for the readers to notice the fact that Kant’s arguments are so obscure and unsolvable that commentators construct some additional theories in order to overcome the problems that his aesthetic theory involves. As Guyer puts it, due to the obscurity of Kant’s notifications, the commentators can be merely speculating about them.

Another crucial component is the subjective formal purposiveness, i.e., the purposiveness without a purpose. The dynamics of aesthetic experience indispensably exclude “a purpose” which compels to put the concept of the object into the composition. The judgment of taste is a “singular” judgment on the singular empirical case. In the aesthetic experience, we reflect merely on the form of the object, which is purposive for our judging, regardless of the concept of that object. This also qualifies the feeling of pleasure as disinterested and contemplative. In this manner, the notion “subjective formal purposiveness” implies the relation between

the judging subject and the object judged. The relation cannot be considered as the external causal relation. In other words, the contemplative pleasure in beautiful cannot be rooted in such a causal chain. Otherwise, the pleasure would precede the judging of the aesthetic object, in which case the aesthetic judgment losses its claim to be universally valid for all judging subjects. Kant defines such a unique relation through the notion “inner causality”. Under these circumstances, solely subjective formal purposiveness without a purpose, that is, without a concept, can lead to the free harmony to which the disinterested pleasure is consequent. As just mentioned above, one of the basis upon which the subjective universality, and hence, the exemplary necessity, of aesthetic judgment of reflection rests is the disinterested character of the pleasure. The second one is the free harmonious relation in which the imagination harmonizes with the understanding without being determined by a concept. By equating the subjective universal validity with the universal communicability of the pleasure, Kant directs us necessarily to the free harmony to the cognitive faculties which are common to all judging subjects. In this picture drawn by Kant, the aesthetic theory reflects a magnificent circularity which itself is pleasurable. Every keystone depends necessarily on another one. However, when we concentrate on the content of the free harmony, the crisis inevitably appears. As I have emphasized before, just as these components or keystones are structured in an intertwined relation to each other in the aesthetic theory, so the faculties, their positions and functions stand in a strict and complex relation in his theory of knowledge. We cannot isolate one of those elements from others without damaging the whole structure in his aesthetic theory, nor can we do this in the case of his theory of knowledge. Such complex structures, I suppose, are responsible for the deadlock of the free harmonious relation. I agree with Heinrich’s view that Kant thought that he is able to explain the aesthetic theory by means of the faculties and the structures constructed in his first *Critique*. Yet, for the same reason, it could not be possible to give a full explanation to the free harmony of the cognitive faculties. In this regard, to convert the condition under which the imagination is in the service of the understanding into the condition under which the understanding is in the service of the imagination is a highly problematic issue. At this juncture, the issue is

primarily the problem of the reconciliation of aesthetic theory with theory of knowledge.

This is the one aspect of the composition. There is also another one. Kant attaches his aesthetic theory to the theory of reflective judgment and its principle, i.e., the principle of purposiveness. Here, we are introduced a new side of nature, a productive, fertile, living side. The nature as such we live in reflects an order or arrangement which fits into our judgment. What is more, nature produces the certain kinds of figures or shapes through its products which please us. By this way, we feel ourselves, which means that we feel life. This is what Kant calls as the feeling of life (*Lebensgefühl*). In this sense, I think, it is possible to conceive Kant's approach to nature "by analogy" with his approach to the subject. In the solution of the third antinomy, in order make a room for freedom as a causality of reason he affirms that the postulation of the concept of freedom can be compatible with the universal law of causality. In grounding his view, he explains that a subject as an appearance must subject to the necessary law of causality in nature, on the other hand, he as a rational being must be free in their actions in the practical realm. In a similar way, just as Kant splits the subject into two parts, so he seems to split the nature. As we have seen, the universal laws of the understanding are incapable of encompassing or grasping the nature in its diversity of particular empirical cases. At this juncture, reflective judgment and its principle play their own roles. Kant attributes a cognitive aim to the reflective judgment in the way that in our scientific investigation, when we discover a new particular case, we search for an appropriate concept to classify it. In such a manner, the understanding is guided by reason and its idea of complete systematic unity of nature, or strictly speaking, the absolute unity of knowledge. In doing so, reason attempts to reduce the multiplicity of the principles of the understanding to a single one, which amounts to comprehend nature as "one" system. In this structure, nature is regarded as a network in which all particular cases connect with each other through their particular rules or laws. When we discover a new particular, and when we subsume it under a concept as a genus or species, i.e. a certain type of class which involves its own particular laws, this particular is connected with other particulars. The principle of purposiveness, that of

systematicity and the law of specification are regulative tools for reflective judgment in our scientific study of classification. It can be said that the regulative character of these principles indicates the certain types of connections, relations and comparisons of the empirical particular rules or laws. Understood this way, teleological judgment of reflection as a cognitive judgment perfectly fits to the theory of reflective judgment. Teleological judgment “compares two concepts of a natural product” to arrive at a determinate concept of it (*CJ*, 240). Through the principles of purposiveness, of systematicity and specification, we make progress in using our understanding and arrive at cognition (*CJ*, 186). As we have seen, the transition from the “Appendix” in the first *Critique* to the general theory of reflective judgment in the third *Critique* reflects a coherent continuity. The nature where reason through its empirical-regulative employment guiding the cognitive aim of the understanding is the field in which reflective judgment and these principles legitimately exercise their own tasks in a regulative way. In this context, the arguments presented in the section “Stage II” of the dissertation in its relation to the “Stage I”, indicates also the tension between the doctrine of the “Transcendental Analytic” and the doctrine of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, or specifically, the tension between the conditional and the unconditional. In this context, the issue turns also into the problem of the compatibility of the nature constructed in the “Analytic” with the nature described in the “Dialectic” and the “Appendix”. When we accept this compatibility, then the epistemological link between the first and the third *Critiques* is seamlessly constructed.

However, the aesthetic theory appears to be an “anomaly” in this structure. It does not fit to the general theory of reflective judgment. The aim of aesthetic judgment of reflection as a non-cognitive and non-conceptual one is not to arrive at a determinate concept or at cognition. The concept of the object, or the knowledge about what kind of object, is entirely irrelevant to the aesthetic theory. We are not dealing with the connection or the relation between the objects; in contrast, what we are concerned is the certain type of relation between the subject and the object. This case, indeed, becomes more in the third moment of the “Analytic of Beautiful”, where under the title or the category of “relation”, we are not concerned with the causal relation

between the natural objects, but the relation between the judging subject and the object aesthetically judged. It could be said that even in the case of teleological judgment, the subjective relation between the natural products and the subject is in the scope. Nevertheless, it is clear that, in such a relation, the subject is concerned with the concept of the object by comparing it both with the idea of systematicity and with other products in order to systematize and classify nature. On the other hand, in the aesthetic experience, the apprehended form of the object is not referred to the concept of the understanding but to the feeling of the subject. Kant primarily held that the principle of purposiveness and the systematicity must precede our investigation of nature, the formation of empirical concept, and hence, cognition, as these principles direct and guide the understanding in its cognitive activity. Yet, such a priority also seems to not necessary for aesthetic experience in which we never arrive at a concept. The scientific, cognitive, causal and relational character of reflective judgment and the systematicity explicitly contrast the non-cognitive, singular and non-conceptual character of the aesthetic judgment of reflection. Here, the issue is the problem of the integration of aesthetic theory into the general theory of reflective judgment and the general structure of the third *Critique*. It seems quite troublesome to establish a necessary relation between aesthetic theory and theory of reflective judgment. Basically, we can talk about two apparent connections. According to that, the first one is the characteristic of free harmony between the imagination and the understanding which is considered as “cognition in general”, i.e., subjective condition of cognition in general. The second one is the appropriateness or the suitability of nature to our judgment in the respect that the general theory of reflective judgment stands in the presumption of the harmony of nature with our cognitive powers. Understood this way, such a relation can be connected merely by analogy, i.e., symbolically. On the other hand, it can be noted that even this symbolic or analogical relation is problematic. For, the subjective formal purposiveness, contra the general principle of purposiveness, is a constitutive principle regarding the feeling of the subject. As we have seen, the regulative employment of the principles, including teleological judgment, necessarily works with the “*as if*” theory in the sense that we judge nature *as if* its products were purposive, or, *as if* the natural products had purposes. In the case of aesthetic appreciation, however, we do not

judge *as if* the natural product were beautiful, we directly and constitutively judge that it is beautiful, even if “beauty” is not an objective property of that object. Here, the transition from the constitutive to the regulative is also disputable. Pippin rightfully points out that in order to be coherent, Kant should have assumed that we attend to nature “as if it were beautiful”.<sup>393</sup> It can be approached to the issue from the point of view that since Kant reduces aesthetic theory to the spatial and mathematical correlation of the parts of the form, or the geometrical figure, of the object in its singularity by cutting off its relation to other objects, this inevitably results in the obscurity of its relation to the regulative employment of reflective judgment. As we have seen, the regulative employment is defined as the regulation or the ordering the appearances in their relation to each other in nature as a dynamical whole. For this reason, dynamical synthesis, principles and concepts have their own peculiar and primary roles in the regulative employment. But, finding such a dynamical relation in the aesthetic theory is nearly impossible. Under the light of these explanations, I think, it can be legitimately asserted that Kant himself is also aware of this integration problem, and in order to avoid it he makes a move by affirming that the attainment of an aim paves the way for the feeling of pleasure in our scientific investigation. However, this move itself is also problematic, obscure and artificial to connect aesthetic theory with the general theory of reflection in a proper way. In this light, we are most probably not wrong if we interpret Kant’s position as that, similar to the case of his theory of knowledge; he could think that he finds an appropriate place to put his aesthetic theory in working on his third *Critique*. But in that case, aesthetic theory is not fully fitted to the general structure of third *Critique* and theory of reflective judgment.

As we know from Herz’s letter to Kant, the scholars complained about the “darkness” and “vagueness” of the arguments in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. As a reply, Kant wrote the *Prolegomena* to clarify his arguments by noting that the study is not for amateurs but for professional and its worth to pay the price for it. However, it could be stated that, the “darkness” or “obscurity” of the arguments in his aesthetic theory does not disappear even after paying the price for it, as the darkness of the

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<sup>393</sup> Robert B. Pippin, “The Significant of Taste: Kant, Aesthetic and Reflective Judgment”, p. 568.

arguments does not stem only from the complexity of the system but also from the “incompleteness” and “incompatibleness” of it. Nevertheless, in my opinion, his aesthetic theory opens a new and priceless path to us. As we have seen during the dissertation, the relation between aesthetic theory and theory of knowledge is not one sided. The commentators and scholars do not only turn back to the first *Critique* to render coherent aesthetic theory with theory of knowledge and not only re-interpret the arguments of aesthetic theory in accordance with the arguments of theory of knowledge. They also attempt to re-interpret these arguments and the system of *Critique of Pure Reason* in a very liberal way in the light of his aesthetic theory. These attempts pave the way for interpretive re-readings of his theory of knowledge. In this regard, both aesthetic theory and theory of knowledge mutually affect each other. These obscurities and troublesome issues could be regarded as new opportunities to re-read, re-examine and re-interpret Kant’s critical system. “That very concept which puts us in a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it” (*CPR*, A 477 B 505).

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## TURKISH SUMMARY

Kant, 1790 yılında yayımlanan *Yargıgücüün Eleştiri* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*) adlı yapıtında estetik teorisini tartışmaya açar. Eleştirel felsefede, temel olarak, teorik ve pratik felsefeye karşılık gelen iki ana alan bulunur. Teorik alanda, anlama yetisi *a priori* yasaları ve ilkeleri vasıtıyla kendi yasa koyucu gücüne sahip iken, pratik alanda akıl, *a priori* olarak kendi yasalarını ve ilkelerini koyar. Bu iki farklı alana rağmen, anlama yetisi ve akıl yalnızca tek bir yerde çalışırlar, yani, deneyim dünyasında. *Saf Akıl Eleştiri*'nde (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), tümel *a priori* yasalar bağlamında, herşeyin zorunluluk kavramına göre cereyan ettiği "doğa" araştırma nesnesidir. Öte yandan, *Pratik Akıl Eleştiri*'nde (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*), ahlak incelenmekte ve burada koşulsuz pratik yasalar özgürlük kavramını gerekli kılmaktadır. Üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de ise, yargıgücü kendi *a priori* ilkelerine sahip, özel ve bağımsız bir yeti olarak tartışılar. Aslında, yargıgücü böyle bir ilkeye sahip olmak *zorundadır*, aksi takdirde bu özel yeti için aşkinsal eleştiriye gerek olmazdı. Ancak şu belirtilmelidir ki, bir bilgi yetisi olarak yargı kendi *a priori* ilkesine sahip olmasına rağmen, anlama yetisi ve akıldan farklı olarak, kendine ait özel bir alanı yoktur. Yargıgücü'nün, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de, bu şekilde ele alınmasının temel sebebi onun teorik alan ve pratik alan arasında bir köprü olarak işlevselleştirilmesi projesidir. Diğer bir deyişle, Kant, yargıgücü yoluyla birbirinden ayrı bu iki alanı birleştirip eleştirel felsefesini tek bir sistem olarak tamamlamayı amaçlar. Bu noktada, "şematizm" ile ilgili Kant'ın kendi argümanlarına atıfta bulunarak denilebilir ki, kendisine atfedilen bu görev düşünüldüğünde, yargıgücü'nün kendisi de böylelikle bir tür "şema" olarak düşünülebilir; o hem anlama yetisi hem akıl ile homojen, yani, türdeştir. Yani, hem anlama yetisinin kendi *a priori* yasalarını uyguladığı teorik alanla hem de akılın kendi *a priori* yasalarını uyguladığı pratik alanla türdeştir. Böylelikle, bu iki alanı birleştirmek için en uygun yetidir.

Yargıgcıne, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de, belirleyici işlevine ek olarak, yeni bir kullanım atfedilir; Düşünümsel yargı. Burada altının çizilmesi gereken husus, estetik yargı ve teleolojik yargının bu türden düşünümsel yargı'nın alt sınıfları olarak tasavvur edildiği gerçeğidir. Bu yeni kullanım biçiminde, yani düşünümsel olanda, yargı verili olan tikel için bir kavram ya da tikel arar. Bu merkezi tema Kant'ın estetik teorisinin genel çerçevesini de oluşturmaktadır. Buna göre, estetik düşünüm yargısi kavramsal olmayan yargı türü olarak nitelendirilir. Burada, yargıda bulunan özneler olarak bizler doğanın yeni bir yönyle karşı karşıya kalırız. Teorik bilgi'de doğa bilinmesi ve belirlenmesi gereken deneyim nesnemizdir. Ancak, doğadaki güzel deneyimimizde, doğayı ya da doğa nesnesini, yani estetik nesneyi, bilişsel olarak belirlemeyiz. Bu türden bir estetik takdir deneyiminde, doğa nesnesi bizim bilgi nesnemiz değildir. Başka bir deyişle, doğayı onun kendi verimliliği ve üretkenliği içinde bilgi nesnesi haline getirmeksızın deneyimleriz. Bu üretken yönyle doğa, diyebiliriz ki, kavramsallaştırılmaya ya da bilgi nesnesine dönüştürülmeye direnir. Doğa bir yönyle bilinebilir bir alan iken, bu yeni yönyle sadece "hissedilebilir". Bu açıdan düşünüldüğünde, denilebilir ki, birinci *Eleştiri*'de Kant, doğayı ya da deneyimin birliğini kurarak bilme ve kavramsallaştırma sürecini açıklarken, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de, özellikle de estetik teorisinde, doğayı anlama yetisinin tümel yasaları ya da ilkeleri ile kurmayı değil, ama onun "estetik takdir" sürecini açıklamaya çalışır. Güzel deneyimimizdeki haz duygusu, bu yönyle, doğanın onu bilmeye yönelen öznedeki *a priori* kavramsal düzeneğine tabi olduğunda, anlama yetisi tarafından belirlenmemiş olarak bırakılan bir yönü olduğunun işaretti olarak da değerlendirilebilir. Ancak böyle bir değerlendirme, estetik deneyimimizin bahsi edilen kavramsal düzenekler dışında farklı araçlarla ortaya çıktıgı anlamına gelmemektedir. Tam tersine, Kant estetik teorisini imgelem ve anlama yetisi arasındaki özgür bir oyun ilişkisi üzerinden tartıĢır. Buradaki özgür uyum, sözü edilen iki bilgi yetisinin anlama yetisinin kavramları tarafından belirlenmeksızın birbirini harekete geçirmesi ile meydana gelir. Görüleceği gibi, Kant hem bilgi teorisinde hem de estetik teoride aynı kavramsal çerçeveyi farklı yollarla kullanır. Başka bir deyişle, Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinde bilgi teorisi ve estetik teori aynı kaynaktan beslenir ve dolayısıyla tümüyle aynı zemine dayanırlar. Bu şekilde anlaşıldığında, böyle bir yapı, Kant'a estetik teorisini eleştirel felsefesine meşru bir

birimde eklemleme fırsatı sunar. Aksi halde, estetik deneyim görgül-psikolojik temellere dayanır ve bu durumda da güzel'in eleştirisi mümkün olmazdı. Bu çerçevede ele alındığında, yargıcının ve estetik yargının eleştirisi kesişmektedir. Estetik düşünüm yargısı düşünümsel yargının *a priori* ilkeleri üzerine, yani öznel biçimsel amaçsallık, üzerine inşa edilir. Yargıda bulunan özne, bilgi yetilerinin kavramsal herhangi bir belirlenimden özgür bir biçimde uyumu yoluyla, yargıda bulunulan nesnenin amaçsal biçimini üzerine düşünüm gerçekleştirir.

Estetik düşünüm yargısına ek olarak, sistematiklik ilkesi ve spesifikasyon ilkesi ile beraber, amaçsallık ilkesi doğadaki bilimsel araştırmalarımızda işlevseldirler. Buna göre, doğayı ya da doğanın ürünlerini, yani canlı organizmaları, sistematik bir biçimde sınıflandırmak için, sözü edilen ilkeler doğanın kendi tikel görgül kuralları ve yasaları bağlamında düşünümsel yargıyı yönlendirirler, veya ona rehberlik ederler. Bu türden bir rehberlik yardımıyla doğada keşfettiğimiz tikel için uygun olan tümeli ya da kavramı oluşturabiliriz. Görgül kavram aynı zamanda bu tür organizma için tikel kural ve yasaları da imler. Bu bağlamda, verili tikel için kavram bulmak demek bu tikeli bir sınıfın ya da altsınıfın altında kapsamak, başka bir ifadeyle, onu sınıflandırmak anlamına gelmektedir. Kant açısından, anlama yetisinin tümel yasaları ya da ilkeleri böyle bir görev için fazla soyut ve geneldir. Örnek vermek gerekirse, anlama yetisinin tümel ve biçimsel bir ilkesi olarak “nedensellik yasası”, doğanın belirli türden ürünlerinin tikel görgül nitelikleri hakkında bize bilgi veremez. Kimyadaki alkin, örneğin, kendi tikel ve görgül yasalarına sahiptir ve bu yasaları belirlemek için “nedenselik yasası” fazla geneldir. Bu sebepten dolayı, doğadaki bu türden görüntüleri açıklayabilmek için özel tikel nedensel yasalara ihtiyaç duyuyoruz. Böylelikle, doğayı kendi özgüllüğünü, canlılığını, üretkenliğini içinde ele almalı, ona ve ürünlerine amaçsallık atfetmeliyiz. Amaçsallık ilkesi, bu anlamda, doğanın düzenliliği ve bizim bilgi yetilerimize uygunluğu ifade eder.

*Yargıcının Eleştirisi*, yukarıda anlatılmaya çalışılan ayrımlar bağlamında, iki ana bölümden oluşur: “Estetik Yargının Eleştirisi” ve “Teleolojik Yargının Eleştirisi”. İlk bölümde, estetik düşünümsel yargıyı oluşturan öğeler ele alınır. Bu öğelerin bazıları, dört temel durak (moment) vasıtasiyla ortaya çıkarken, diğerleri Kant'ın estetik teorisini daha detaylı bir biçimde çözümlediğimizde ortaya çıkar. Kısaca degenecek

olursak, estetik deneyimin “kavramsal olmayan”, “bir ilgiden bağımsız” ya da “çıkarsız”, “salt seyirsel”, “öznel tümellik”, ve “örnekSEL zorunluluk” gibi nitelikleri, “özgür uyum” ve “öznel biçimSEL amaçsallıK” kavramları ile beraber karşılıklı olarak birbirlerini zorunlu kılarlar. Bu yapıtaşları kavamlardan birinin noksanlığı bütün bir sistemin kaçınılmaz olarak çökmesine sebebiyet verir. Aslında, en başından estetik teori kavramsal belirlenimden azade bir biçimde kurgulandığından dolayı, bütün bu öğeler birbirini gerektirir ve her biri “kavramsal belirlenim” olmaksızın teorinin kendi içSEL bütünlüğünü ve dayanağını sağlar. Bu anlamıyla, Kant’ın estetik teorisi kendi içinde tamamlanmış bir sistem olarak ortaya çıkar. Kant’ın kendi ifadesini ödünc alarak ifade edecek olursak, bütün bu öğeler bir diğerinin *Ratio Essendi*’si, bir diğeri, geri kalan bütün öğelerin *Ratio Cognoscendi*’sidir.

Bir diğer önemli nokta, Kant’ın estetik teorisinin görgül belirlenimi dışında bırakmasıdır. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, estetik takdir yargıda bulunan özne ile yargıda bulunulan nesne arasındaki dışsal, görgül bir nedensel ilişki üzerinden tanımlanamaz. Kant açısından, estetik yargıda bulunan özneler, yargıda bulunan nesnenin varlığından değil, bizatihî yargının kendisinden haz alırlar. Bunun zorunlu sonucu olarak, estetik nesneye yönelik her türden kişisel ilgi bu teoride dışında bırakılmıştır. Böyle bir kişisel ilgi barındıran estetik yargılar, Kant tarafından, “estetik düşünüm yargı”ından ayrılarak, “estetik duyu yargısı” olarak adlandırılırlar. Estetik duyu yargıları, estetik düşünüm yargılarından tümüyle farklı olarak, salt seyirsel olan güzeldeki haz duygusuna değil, “uzlaşımsal haz duygusuna” dayanırlar. Burada uzlaşım zorunlu veya tümel değil, aksine kişiseldir. O halde, estetik duyu yargıları kendi köklerini nesnenin amaçsal olan salt biçiminde değil, belirli türden duyumda (renk, koku, ses) bulur. Bu durumda kaçınılmaz olarak, yargıda bulunan bütün özneler için tümel geçerlilik iddiasını kaybeder. Kant’ın estetik teorisinin bu “biçimsel” karakteri sebebiyle, “estetik biçimciliğin” üç örneklerinden biri olarak kabul edilir. Bir diğer önemli nokta, Kant estetik düşünüm yargısını “çok özel” bir tür yargı biçimi olarak ele alır. Bu yargı biçimi “öznel” ve “tekil” karakterine rağmen, bir başka deyişle, tekil öznenin, kendi tekil ve görgül deneyimine dayanmasına rağmen, ve dahası, herhangi bir belirleyici kavram içermemesine rağmen, hala tümel geçerlilik iddiası taşır. Bu türden öznel ve özel bir tümellik,

meşruiyetini üç temel koşuldan alır: Herhangi bir ilgiden bağımsız olması (salt seyirsel olması), Öznel biçimsel amaçlılık ilkesine dayanması ve özgür uyum yoluyla ortaya çıkması.

Düzen yandan, göreceğimiz gibi, Kant'ın estetik teorisi bazı ciddi sorunları, çökmazları da barındırır. Bunlardan bazıları üçüncü *Eleştiri*'nin yapısından ve Kant'ın kendi argümanlarının muğlaklığından kaynaklanmakla birlikte, bazıları da “özgür uyum” tasarıminin zorunlu bir sonunu olarak karşımıza çıkar.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Kant'ın estetik teorisinin doğasını, onun bilgi teorisi ile olan ilişkisi bağlamında incelemektir. Bu amacı gerçekleştirebilmek için, öncelikle “düşünümsel yargı”, ilkeleri ve işlevsel olduğu “doğa” kramını ele alıyorum. İlkinci olarak, estetik düşünüm yargısının sözü edilen öğelerini açımlamaya çalışacağım. Üçüncü olarak, ilk iki aşamada dephinilen bilgi teorisi ile ilgili yönleri daha detaylı olarak ele alıp estetik teorisi ve bilgi teorisi arasındaki sorunlu ilişkiye açık kılmaya çalışacağım. Bu bilgiler ışığında, estetik ile bilgi teorisi arasındaki ilişkiye birinci *Eleştiri*'nin üç ayrı başlığına karşılık gelecek şekilde sınıflandırmak: 1) “Aşkınsal Estetik” (estetik teorinin “biçimsel” yapısı bağlamında) 2) “Aşkınsal Analitik” (“özgür uyum” kramı bağlamında) 3) “Aşkınsal Diyalektik” ve “Aşkınsal Diyalektik’e Ek” (“düşünümsel yargı” teorisi ve ilkeleri bağlamında). Bu sınıflandırmayı yansıtacak bir biçimde tezin ana bölümleri yapılandırılmıştır. Buna göre, dördüncü ana bölümü “Aşama I” ve “Yeniden inceleme” olarak adlandırdım. Bu adlandırmadaki temel amaç, üçüncü bölümde estetik teorisi bağlamında ele aldığım “özgür uyum” kramını, bilgi teorisi ve “Aşkınsal Analitik” bölümünde açımlanan imgelem ve anlama yetisinin işlevleri, konumları ve birbirleri ile olan ilişkileri bağlamında yeniden tartışmaktır. Benzer şekilde, beşinci ana bölümde “Aşama II” ve “Yeniden inceleme” olarak adlandırdım. Buradaki temel vurgu ise, Kant'ın “düşünümsel yargı” teorisi, ilkeleri ve “doğa” kramı tartışmalarını, “Aşkınsal Diyalektik” ve “Ek” bölümündeki argümanlar ışığında yeniden tartışmaktadır. Böylelikle, tezin temel ilgisi olan estetik teorisi ve bilgi teorisi arasındaki ilişki bir bütünlük arz edecek şekilde sınanmaya tabi tutulmuştur.

Bütün bu bilgiler ışığında, ikinci ana bölümde, ilk olarak, Kant'ın “düşünümsel yargı” teorisini ve “düşünümsel yargı” ile “belirleyici yargı” arasındaki sorunlu ilişkiye tartışıyorum. Her ne kadar *Yargıgücünün Eleştiri*'nde “düşünümsel yargı” kavramı merkezi bir rol üstlense de, Kant bu iki yargı biçimini arasındaki ilişkiye detaylandırmaz. Hatta bu iki yargı biçimini ve adlandırılması ilk defa üçüncü *Eleştiri* ile ortaya çıkar. Kant burada “belirleyici yargı” derken, kastettiği birinci *Eleştiri*'de ele aldığı mantıksal ve bilişsel yargı biçimidir. Buna göre, varolan kavramı tikele uygular ve söz konusu tikeli kavramın ya da tümelin altına koyarak onu belirleriz. Düşünümsel yargıda ise, yukarıda değinildiği gibi, tümel ya da kavram hazır değildir, tersine, verili tikel için uygun kavram ya da tümel ararız. Bu bağlamda, düşünümsel yargı biçimini de hala bilişsel bir amaç taşırlı: uygun bir tikel ya da kavram bulmak ya da oluşturmak. Bu iki farklı işlevsellik, iki yargı türünün konumunu da belirler. Belirleyici kullanımında, yargı yetisi deneyimin birliğinin kurulmasında kendi rolünü oynar, ancak kendi ilkesine ve bağımsız konumuna sahip değildir. Anlama yetisinin kavramıyla çalıştığı için, bu kavramlar tarafından empoze edilen ilkeler ve yasalar altında çalışırlar. Diğer yandan, düşünümsel yargı, kavram ile çalışmadığı için, kendi ilkesine ve özerk konumuna sahiptir. Ancak burada da artık bu yargı biçimini deneyimin birliğinin kurulmasında belirleyici bir öğe değildir, bir başka deyişle, nesnesini belirleyemez ya da kuramaz. Kant bu temel ayrimı ifade etmek için belirleyici yargı yetisinin “şematik” olarak, düşünümsel yargı yetisinin ise “teknik” olarak ilerlediğini belirtir.

Kant, “düşünümsel yargıgücü”nü ayrı bir başlık altında ele alıp detaylandırdığı için, bu iki farklı yargı biçiminin ilişkisi de tartışma konusu olmuştur. İlk bakışta, Kant bu iki kullanımı birbirine karşıt gibi konumlama gibi görünse de, bu karşılık tartışmalıdır. Öncelikle, “düşünüm” kavramına baktığımızda, bu kavramın izlerini tekrar *Saf Akıl Eleştiri*'nde bulabiliyoruz. “Aşkınsal Analitik”in “Ek” bölümünde, Kant “aşkınsal düşünüm” kavramını tartışmaya açar. Burada, Kant, bilişsel yetilerin, yani duyusallık ve anlama yetisinin, konumları, işlevleri ve birbirileriyle olan ilişkilerini tartışır. Buna göre, tasarımlarımız üzerine düşünümlerimizde bu tasarımların anlama yetisine mi yoksa duyusallığa mı ait olduğunu belirlememizin önemine vurgu vardır. Salt anlama yetisine ait tasarımları duyusallığın tasarıları

olarak karıştırırsak, Kant'ın deyimi ile “dogmatik metafiziğin” tuzağına düşüyoruz. Burada örnek olarak Leibniz'i görüyoruz. Dolayısıyla, “aşkınsal düşünüm” derken Kant'ın kasti verili olan tasarımin öznedeki bilişsel yetilerle karşılaşılmasıdır. “Düşünüm kavramının izini sürdürümüzde, *Mantık Üzerine Dersler*'de, Kant'ın “mantıksal düşünüm” kavramını ele aldığıన görürüz. Burada kavramın uygulanması daha başkadır. Anlama yetisi mantıksal kullanımında, görgül kavramları oluşturmak için üç aşamalı bir süreç uygular. Düşünüm bu üç aşamadan birine tekabül etmektedir. Burada verili olan tasarımları birbirleri ile karşılaştırır, düşünüm yoluyla ortak özelliklerini bulur ve bunları soyutlayarak görgül kavramlar oluştururuz. Şimdi, tekrar üçüncü *Eleştiri*'ye dönüp Kant'ın “düşünüm” kavramını nasıl tarif ettiğine bakılmalıdır. Buna göre, “düşünüm” iki şekilde ortaya çıkar: Birincisi, verili olan tikeli ya da tasarımlı, diğer tekillerle karşılaşırız, ikincisine göre ise, verili olan tikeli diğer tikellerle değil ama öznedeki bilişsel yetilerle karşılaşırılır. Yorumlara göre, ilk durum “aşkınsal düşünüm”, ikinci durum ise “mantıksal düşünüm”e tekabül etmektedir. Bu görüşün en temel savunucuları olarak Longuenesse ve Allison'ı sayabiliriz. Öte yandan, Gibbons, Makkreel gibi yorumculara göre böyle bir sıkı ilişki kurmak çok mümkün değildir. Buradaki temel itirazlardan biri, görgül kavram oluşturma sürecini imleyen “mantıksal düşünüm”de salt anlama yetisinin, yargı gücünün kendi ilkesi olan “amaçsallık” tarafından yönlendirilmediği itirazıdır. Ancak, yine de, Kant'ın, *Yargıgücüünün Eleştirisi*'nde verdiği “düşünümsel yargı” tanımı referans alınacak olursa, buradaki “bilişsel amaç” ve “görgül kavrama” ulaşma görevi, bu türden bir paralelliğin kurulabileceğini bize göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, şu söylenebilir ki, “belirleyici yargı”nın çalıştığı görgül kavramın oluşturulmasında “düşünümsel yargı”nın işlevi daha görünür hale gelmektedir. Bu durumda da bu iki yargı biçimini birbirine tümüyle karşıt değil, ama bu yönleriyle paraleldir.

Kant'ın neden yeni bir tür yargı biçimini, yani “düşünümsel yargı” teorisini ortaya attığına bakılacak olursa, temel argümanın “doğa”nın kendi canlılığı ve üretkenliği içinde araştırılması, sınıflandırılması ve sistematik hale getirilmesi çabası olduğu görülecektir. Buna göre, bilgi teorisinin nesnesi olan “doğa”, bütün farklılıklarından arındırılmış, türdeş, anlama yetisinin biçimsel, tümel yasalarına tabi bir şekilde ele

alınır. Öte yandan, “doğa” tikel görgül yasaları ve kuralları içinde sonsuz bir çeşitlilik arz eder ve bu çeşitliliği anlama yetisi tümel ve soyut kavramları ile yakalayamaz. Allison, son derece isabetli bir biçimde, ilk *Eleştiri*'de Kant'ın deneyimin birliğini saglama görevine anlama yetisini ve onun tümel yasalarını atadığını söyler. Bu yasalar olmasa iddi doğada “aşkınsal bir karmaşa” olurdu. Diğer taraftan, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de ise Kant'ın doğanın ve onun tikel görgül yasalarının birliğini saglama görevini yargıcuna verdiğini ifade eder. Böylelikle, doğadaki “görgül bir karmaşa”的 önüne geçer. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken husus, düşünümsel yargıcının ve onun amaçsallık ilkesinin, doğayı ve nesnesini kurucu bir biçimde belirleyemez oluşudur. Buradaki meşru sınır, *Saf Akıl Eleştirisi*'nde “Aşkınsal Analitik” ve “Aşkınsal Diyalektik” bölümlerinde kesin olarak çizilmiştir. Kant, burada, amaçsallık ilkesini “heuristic” (yol gösterici) olarak tanımlar. Bir başka deyişle, bu ilkeler, anlama yetisinin ilkelerinden tümyle farklı olarak, yalnızca “düzenleyici” ilkelerdir. Düşünümsel yargıcının ve ilkelerin işlevlerini açıklarken, Kant dikkat çekici bir biçimde İsveçli ünlü botanikçi Linnaeus'un ismini zikreder. Buna göre, Linnaeus'un botanik ve biyolojideki sınıflandırma ve sistematize etme çalışmalarında görülmüştür ki, doğa bu sonsuz çeşitliliği içinde aynı zamanda bir sistematiğin bütünlük olarak karşımıza çıkar. Şimdi, buradaki bütün tartışmalar, Kant tarafından çizilen çerçeveye, aslında, teleolojik düşünüm yargısı için daha uygun görünmektedir. Çünkü, yukarıda işaret edildiği gibi, “düşünümsel yargıcı teorisi”的 temel taşı verili tikel için uygun bir tümel ya da kavram bulup, söz konusu tikel bu kavram altında kapsamak ve sınıflandırmaktır. Öte yandan, estetik düşünümsel yargının bu türden bir tümel bulma ya da oluşturma işlevi yoktur. Bir başka deyişle, genel olarak “düşünümsel yargıcı”ne atfedilen bilişsel amaç, estetik düşünüm yargısı için geçerli görünmemektedir. Estetik yargıda, ne kavram söz konusudur, ne de bir kavrama ulaşmak söz konusudur. Bu haliyle, estetik düşünümsel yargı bir “anomali” olarak kalır.

Üçüncü bölümde, *Yargıcının Eleştirisi*'nin genel projesi ve düşünümsel yargıcı teorisinin genel çerçevesi dışında, özel olarak “estetik düşünüm yargısı”的na odaklanılmaktadır. İlk altının çizilmesi gereken husus, estetik yargının nesnesine yönelik bilgi vermediği vurgusudur. Bir başka deyişle, estetik düşünümsel yargı

bilişsel bir yargı değildir, nesnesini belirleyemez. Bu yönyle güzellik, estetik nesnenin nesnel bir belirlenimi değildir. Tersine, yargıda bulunan öznenin, nesnenin tasarımlı karşısında kendi duyu durumunu belirleyen bir yargıdır. Bu açıdan, estetik düşünümsel yargı tümüyle özneldir. Beğeni yargısı, yargıda bulunan öznenin haz duygusunda temellenir. Kant, üç tip haz duygusu tanımlar: Uzlaşimsal, Güzel ve İyi. Bunlardan ancak “güzel” olan beğeni yargısının dayandığı haz duygusu olabilir. Uzlaşimsal olandaki haz duygusu, nesnenin kavramını, varlığını ön gerektirir. Böylelikle o, kişisel beğeniyi ifade eder ve tümel bir geçerlilik iddiası taşıyamaz. Burada söz konusu olan bir eğilimin, bir ilginin veya nesneye yönelik bir çıkarın tatmini olarak ortaya çıkan haz duygusudur. Saf seyirsəl olmayan, çıkara dayalı ve kişisel ilginin merkezde olduğu bu türden bir haz duygusu saf estetik düşünüm yargısının temeli ya da dayanağı olamaz. Burada ortaya çıkan haz, yargının kendisine değil, bizatihî nesnenin kendisinde ortaya çıkar. Burada görüleceği gibi, nesne ile özne arasında doğrudan dışsal bir nedensel ilişki söz konusudur. Diğer taraftan “iyi”de ortaya çıkan haz duygusunu Kant iki farklı biçimce ele alır. Birincisine göre, nesnenin “faydalı” olup olmadığı belirleyicidir. “Fayda” haz duygusunu ortaya çıkarır. Böylelikle, burada da nesnenin varlığı ve nesneye yönelik kişisel bir ilgi kaçınılmazdır. İkinci olarak “iyi” ahlaki olarak belirleyicidir. Burada ise, yine nesnenin kavramı ve aklın pratik yasaları söz konusudur. Bu analizlerden sonra, Kant açısından, yalnızca “güzel”de görülen haz duygusu saf estetik düşünüm yargısının dayanağı olabilir. Estetik nesne karşısında özne, nesnenin kavramının dolayımına ihtiyaç duymaksızın, nesnenin amaçsal biçimine yönelik salt seyirsəl, çıkarsız, bütün kişisel ilgilerden ve yönelimlerden azade biçimde yargıda bulunur.

Bir diğer önemli nokta, estetik düşünümsel yargının kavramsal olmamasına rağmen, hala öznel bir tümellik ya da evrensellik iddiası taşımasıdır. Kant buna “tümel ya da evrensel ses” demektedir. Dikkatli bakıldığından, ikinci uğraşın bu iddiasının “çıkarsızlık” ile yakından bağı görülebilir. Güzeldeki haz duygusu her türlü kişisel eğilimi ve ilgiyi dışladığı için, yargıda bulunan bir özne, diğer öznelerinde onayını beklemektedir. Estetik düşünümsel yargının tümelliğinin “öznel” olmasının anlamı da buradadır. Bu türden “tümellik” ya da “evrensellik” iddiası nesnenin kavramına dayanmaz. Buradaki güçlük özetle şudur: İlk Eleştiri’de ve *Prolegomena*’da Kant,

“tümellik” ya da “evrensellik” iddiasını sıkı sıkıya “kavram”a bağlamakta, bir başka deyişle, “kavram”dan türemektedir. Bu açıdan, bilişsel ya da mantıksal yargının “nesnel evrensellik” iddiası ile “estetik düşünümsel yargı”nın “öznel evrensellik” iddiası farklı türden iddialardır. Bu noktada, bir diğer önemli vurgu, “nesnel olarak tümel” olanın “öznel olarak da tümel” olduğu vurgusudur. Ancak bu ilişki tek yönlüdür, tersi geçerli değildir. Yani, öznel evrensellik iddiası, nesnel evrensellik iddiasını imlemez. Kant’ın “çıkarsız” olandan “evrensel” olana bu çıkarımı Guyer ve Longuenesse tarafından “yetersiz” bulunmaktadır. Ancak, Allison’ın doğru bir biçimde vurguladığı gibi, Kant’ın bu çıkarımı “nihai” olan değildir. Burada Kant, yalnızca bu iki uğrak arasındaki doğrudan ilişkiyi vurgular. Kant’ın argümanları takip edilecek olursa öznel tümellik iddiasının temel yapı taşlarından biri olarak “özgür uyum” kavramını koyduğu görülür. Özgür uyum’da, bildiğimiz gibi, imgemelem ve anlama yetisi bir kavram tarafından belirlenmeksizin birbirleri ile özgür bir oyun içine girerler. Buradaki temel iddia, özetle, bu iki bilgi yetisinin yargıda bulunan tüm öznelerde ortak olmasıdır. Bu sebeple Kant “özgür oyun” ya da “özgür uyum” kavramını “bilginin genel koşulu” olarak görür. Bir yanıyla “uyum”, şematik, yani, bilişsel yargıda da söz konusudur. Ancak orada, imgemelem’in işlevi tümyle anlama yetisi ve onun kavramları tarafından belirlenir. Estetik yargıdaki “uyum” ise bu türden bir deneyimden azade, özgürdür.

Kant, öznel tümellik iddiasını tartışıırken, “Beğeni Eleştirisine bir Anahtar” başlığı altında son derece kritik bir hamle yapar. Şimdiye kadar, haz duygusu ve beğeni yargısı arasındaki ilişki, ilkinin ikincisini belirlediği yönünde idi. Bir başka ifadeyle, haz duygusu, beğeni yargısına zemin sunuyor, onu belirliyor. Haz duygusunun nitelikleri aynı zamanda saf beğeni yargısının da niteliklerini imliyordu. Ancak bu alt başlıkta, Kant son derece tartışmalı ve muğlâk bir biçimde, estetik nesnenin yargısının haz duygusunu öncelemesi gerektiğini iddia eder. Aksi takdirde, eğer haz duygusu yargıyı önceler ve yargı haz duygusundan sonra ortaya çıkarsa, söz konusu duyu “uzlaşımsal” olacak ve evrensellik iddiasını yitirecektir. Çok açıktr ki burada bir çelişki ile karşılaşılır. Bu durumda, haz duygusu kendisini önceleyen yargının zemini olamaz, onu belirleyemez. Bu güçlüğü aşmak için yorumcular son derece çetrefil açıklamalar getirmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Haz duygusu ve beğeni yargısı

arasındaki “öncelik” ilişkisine karşı alınan tutum ve pozisyonlar, tarafları Kant’ın estetik teorisini ele alma biçimlerini tümüyle etkilemiştir. Öyle ki, örneğin Crawford ve Guyer, bu çelişkiyi aşmak için, “düşünüm” kavramını yeniden yorumlamışlar ve Kant’ın estetik teorisinde, beğeni yargısının iki ayrı “düşünüm” eylemi içerdigini iddia etmişlerdir. Söz konusu yorumcular, kitaplarını bütünüyle bu yeni teorileri üzerinden yapılandırmışlar ve estetik teorisini bu ayrım üzerinden okumuşlardır. Buna göre, yargıda bulunan özne, estetik nesneye karşı öncelikle “estetik tepki”de bulunur, bu, birinci “düşünüm” eylemidir. Bu eylem ya da yargı sonucunda, imgelem ve anlama yetisi özgür bir uyum içine girerler ve haz duygusu ortaya çıkar. Bu birinci aşamadır. İkinci aşama da ise, nesnenin biçimini üzerine değil, ortaya çıkan haz duygusu üzerine “düşünüm” eylemi gerçekleştirilir. Böylelikle, haz duygusunun, “çıkarsız”, salt seyirsel olduğu belirlenir, bir başka deyişle, haz duygusu “güzel” olarak tanımlanır ve gerçek “estetik yargı” ortaya çıkar. Bu açıklama modeliyle, söz konusu çelişki ortadan kaldırılır. Yargı hem haz duygusunu önceler, hem de onu zemini, dayanağı olarak alır. Ancak diğer bazı yorumcular bu türden okumanın meşru olmadığını, Kant’ın kendi estetik teorisinin de bu okumayı desteklemediğini iddia ederler. Aslında, Guyer ve Crawford’un kendileri de bu itirazı kabul ederler. Diğer taraftan, çelişkinin ortadan kaldırılması için bu açıklama modelinin zaruri olduğu iddiasını bırakmazlar. Ginsborg, bir diğer açıklama modeli geliştirir. Bu modele göre, “iki ayrı düşünüm eylemi” ön kabulüne ihtiyacımız yoktur. Güzeldeki haz duygusunun “kendini sürdürme” eğilimi, Kant bunu “haz duygusunun “içsel nedenselliği” olarak adlandırır ve beğeni yargısının “kendi düşünümsel” özelliği söz konusu çelişkiyi aşmamız için yeterlidir. Buna göre, beğeni yargısi biçimlendiğinde haz duygusu ortaya çıkar, ancak yargı orada durmaz kendi üzerine “düşünüm” gerçekleştirmeye devam eder. Aynı şekilde haz duygusu da ortaya çıktığında yargıda bulunan öznenin bu durumda kalmayı, bu duyguyu sürdürmeye ister. Bir başka ifadeyle, “özgür uyum” haz duygusunu yeniden üretir. Böylelikle, beğeni yargısi, haz duygusunu önceler, haz duygusu da yargıyı belirler, ona zemin sunar. Bu açıklama modeline göre, estetik deneyim ya da beğeni yargısi bir tür “performans”tır. Bir başka ifadeyle, beğeni yargısi “anlık” değil, ama bir süreçtir. Bu nedenle de estetik deneyimde iki farklı “düşünüm” eylemine gerek yoktur.

Bir diğer altbaşlık olan “Estetik Biçimcilik” ya da “Öznel Biçimsel Amaçsallık”da, Kant’ın estetik teorisinin temel taşlarından biri olan “amaçsız amaçsallık” kavramı tartışılmaktadır. Kant burada “amaç” ve “amaçsallık” kavramlarını birbirinden ayırmıştır ve estetik düşünüm yargısında yalnızca “amaçsallık” kavramının içerildiğini belirtir. Bu iddia, estetik teorinin genel çerçevesi açısından zorunludur. Çünkü “amaç” tasarımları kaçınılmaz olarak nesnenin “kavram”ını ön gerektirir. Dolayısıyla, “amaç” teleolojik düşünüm yargısının merkezindeyken, estetik düşünüm yargısında “amaçsız amaçsallık” merkezi konumdadır. Kant açısından, doğadaki estetik nesneni biçimini “amaçsallığı” ifşa etmektedir. Bir başka ifadeyle, nesnenin biçiminin kendisi amaçsalıdır. Buradaki “amaçsallık”, nesnenin bir niteliği değildir, nesnenin bilgisine dair hiçbir şey söylemez. Tam tersine, yargıda bulunan öznenin duyu durumunu belirler. Beğeni yargısının ayırt edici niteliğine göre, imgelem tarafından kavranan nesnenin biçimini, anlama yetisinin kavramı altına konmaz. Bu türden bir biçim, imgelem ile anlama yetisini özgür bir oyun durumuna sokar ve böylelikle haz duyusu üretilir. Dolayısıyla, söz konusu olan “amaçsallık”, nesnel bir nitilik, nesneye dair bir belirlenim değildir. “Amaçsallık”, nesnenin biçiminin, bilişsel yetilerimize uygunluğunu imler. Yani, beğeni yargısının kendisinde ortaya çıkar, ondan bağımsız değildir. Bu nedenledir ki, “amaçsallık” ya da “ereksellik” tümüyle öznel ve biçimselidir. Teleolojik düşünüm yargısında ise, nesnenin kavramı, dolayısıyla “amaç” ya da “erek” kendi işlevine sahiptir. Ancak burada dahi, “kavram” ya da “amaç” nesnel ya da belirleyici değil, tümüyle “düzenleyici”dir. Doğadaki tikeller, anlama yetisinin görgül kavramı, akıl’ın “amaç” idesi ile karşılaşır. Bu bağlamda, teleolojik düşünüm yargısi, beğeni yargısından farklı olarak, bilişsel bir yargıdır. Bu tür yargıda, “amaçsallık” nesneldir. O halde, estetik deneyimde, yargıda bulunan özne, nesnenin bu “amaçsal” biçimini üzerine salt seyirsel düşünümde bulunur. “Öznel biçimsel amaçsallık”, bilişsel değildir, bilginin bir ögesi değildir, tam tersine o sadece “hissedilir”. Estetik düşünüm yargısi sonucunda üretilen şey “bilgi” değil, “duyu”dur. Kavranılan amaçsal biçimin kendisinde, herhangi bir kavram dolayımı olmadan, hissedilir. Burada, kişisel eğilim, ya da ilgi bütünüyle dışında bırakılır. Kant’ın bütün bu kompozisyonda vurgulamak istediği noktalardan biri, aslında, estetik nesne ile yargıda bulunan özne arasındaki ilişkinin niteliğidir. Bu ilişki dışsal bir nedensellik bağıntısı üzerinden kurulamaz. Böyle bir

durumda, haz duygusu yargının kendisini önceler, evrensellik ya da tümellik iddiasını kaybeder. Başka bir ifadeyle, haz duygusu kişisel bir ilgi ya da eğilimin doyurulması sonucu ortaya çıkar ve salt seyirsel niteliği ortadan kalkar. Burada dikkat çekici husus, Kant'ın kendi örneğidir. Buna göre, bir botanikçi bile, örneğin, bir gül ile girdiği estetik takdir ilişkisinde, gülün kavramını ya da bilgisini soyutlar. Gülün sadece amaçsal biçimine yönelen salt seyirsel düşünüm yoluyla haz duygusunu hisseder. Kant'ın “biçimsellik” vurgusunun yoğunluğu, aslında, onun ilk *Eleştiri*'ndeki “Aşkinsal Estetik” bölümündeki argümanlarıyla tutarlılık içindedir. Buna göre, zaman ve uzam saf görü formlarıdır, yani duyusallığın saf formlarıdır. Zaman ve uzam deneyimden türettiğimiz formlar değil, bilakis, öznenin deneyime uyguladığı biçimlerdir. Pasif alıcı konumundaki duyusallık, bu türden saf görü biçimlerini deneyim nesnelerine dayatır. Deneyim nesneleri, ya da görünüüler, ancak bu saf görü formlarına tabi oldukları sürece bilgi nesnesi olabilirler. Kant estetik teorisinde de bu türden bir “öznel nesnellik” aramaktadır. Bu sebepledir ki, ses, renk, tat gibi saf görü formlarına dayanmayan nitelikleri estetik teorisinin belirleyici öğeleri olarak görmez. Bu tema, aslında üçüncü *Eleştiri*'de ortaya çıkışmış da değildir. Birinci *Eleştiri*'de “Aşkinsal Estetik” bölümünde zaman ve uzamı tartışıırken bu niteliklerin “olumsal” ya da “rastlantısal” olduğunun altını çizer. O halde, estetik teorinin “biçimsellik” vurgusu, kaynağını büyük oranda bilgi teorisinin temel taşlarından birinde bulur.

Kant'ın estetik teorisinin en sorunlu kısımlarından biri “özgür uyum” kavramıdır. Görüldüğü üzere, bu kavram söz konusu teorinin tam merkezinde olmasına rağmen, Kant *Yargıgücünün Eleştiri*'nde bu kavramı ayrı, özel bir başlık altında detaylı olarak tartışmaz. Bu durum son derece dikkat çekicidir. Çünkü “özgür uyum” ilişkisinin başat aktörleri olan iki temel bilgi yetisinin, yani imgelem ve anlama yetisinin, işlevleri, konumları ve birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri bilgi teorisi bağlamında detaylı olarak anlatılmış ve bu anlatımında imgelem kesin bir biçimde anlama yetisinin kendisine, kavramlarına, yasalarına ve ilkelerine bağlı olarak ele alınmıştır. O halde, estetik teorinin merkezinde olan “özgür uyum” içinde bu iki yeti nasıl çalışmaktadır? Kant, detaylarına girmeden, bu ilişkiyi imgelemenin kavrama işlevi ile sınırlar. Burada anlama yetisinin konumu “belirleyici” değil, serbesttir. Ana metnin kendisini

taradığımızda, Kant'ın bu konudaki argümanlarını iki tema olarak sınıflandırabiliriz. Birinciye göre, estetik deneyimde, imgelem nesnenin biçimini kavrar ve bunu anlama yetisinin belirleyici olmayan kavramı altına koyar. İkinciye göre, bir yeti olarak imgelemenin kendisi, diğer bir yeti olan anlama yetisinin kendisinin altına koyulur. Görüleceği gibi iki açıklama biçimini de açık olmaktan uzak ve son derece muğlaktır. Bu durumda, yorumcular, Guyer'in ifadesiyle, konu hakkında çeşitli spekulasyonlar yapmaktan öteye gidemezler. Bu bölümün sonunda, teknik detaylarına girmeden, konunun ne kadar çetrefil olduğunu göstermek amacıyla iki örnek seçilip tartışılmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, Heinrich'in konu üzerine argümanlarıdır. Heinrich'in bu aşama da seçilmesinin sebebi, hem konu ile ilgili genel çerçeveyi çizmesi hem de diğer çoğu yorumcunun yaptığı gibi, açıklamaya çalışırken aslında en az Kant kadar muğlak olmasıdır. Bu sorun, çoğu tartışmada görülecektir. İkinci örnek, Guyer'in en son makalesidir. Guyer, bu makalede, kitabındaki argümanları revize eder ve dikkat çekici bir sonuca varır. Buna göre, estetik deneyimde, aslında anlama yetisinin kavramları söz konusudur. Nesnenin bilgisi kaçınılmaz olarak ortaya çıkar. Ancak, estetik deneyim ya da estetik takdir bu noktada belirmez, bunun ötesine gider. Bir başka deyişle, "bilgi" için gerekli bütün koşullar meydan gelir, ancak hazır duyusu bu koşulların ötesinde ortaya çıkar. Estetik deneyimde söz konusu olan, beğeni yargısının bilgi koşullarına önsel olması değil, onu aşmasıdır.

Dördüncü bölümde, "özgür uyum" tasarımda rol oynayan iki bilgi yetisinin, imgelem ve anlama yetisinin, *Saf Aklın Eleştiri'si*'nde nasıl konumlandırıldığı, işlevleri ve ilişkileri tartışılmaktadır. Burada, "Aşkınsal Analitik" bölümünün temel doktrini açık hale getirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Buradaki amaç, "özgür uyum" tasarımanın nasıl mümkün olduğunu bütün teknik detaylarıyla tartışmaya açmaktadır. Buna göre, bilgi teorisinin temel araçları, yetileri, kısaca özetenmiş, imgelem, anlama yetisi, şematizm, yargıücü, aşkınsal ben, aşkınsal tam-algı kavramları tartışılmıştır. Bilindiği üzere, Kant ilk *Eleştiri*'nin "A" ve "B" basımlarında iki farklı "Dedüksiyon" kaleme almıştır. Başka bir deyişle, birinci basımdaki "dedüksiyon" bölümünü, ikinci basımda baştan yeniden yazmıştır. Buradaki dikkat çekici nokta, "A" basımdaki "imgelem" ve "anlama yetisi" arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışan üç aşama, "B" basımda büyük bir revizyona uğramıştır. Bunun arkasındaki temel kaygılardan

biri imgelemenin sentez işleminde, anlama yetisi ve onun kategorilerinden bağımsız olarak yorumlanması tehlikesidir. “B” basımında bu süreçten geri adım atılmış ve imgelem sıkı sıkıya anlama yetisine ve onun kavramlarına bağlı hale getirilmiştir. İlginç olan ise, kronolojik olarak bakıldığından bu hamlenin *Yargıtaycının Eleştirisi*’nin basımından sadece üç yıl önce yapılmasıdır. İkinci basımdaki bu değişiklik ile “özgür uyum” teması daha da açıklanamaz hale gelmiştir. Bütün bu teknik detaylar açıklandıktan sonra, çeşitli yorumcuların “özgür uyum” açıklama modelleri tartışılmıştır.

Beşinci bölümde, tezin birinci ana bölümünde tartışılan düşünümsel yargıcılık teorisi, ilkeleri ve doğa kavramının *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*’nin “Aşkinsal Diyalektik” ve “Ek” bölümlerinde izleri sürülmüştür. Dördüncü ana bölümün merkez teması olan “imgelem-anlama yetisi” ilişkisinin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi idi. Burada ise “akıl-anlama yetisi” ilişkisinin bilgi teorisi bağlamında yeniden gözden geçirilmesi ve tartışılması söz konusudur. Düşünümsel yargıcılığın atfedilen görev ve işlevler, amaçsallık ilkesi, sistematiklik ilkesi ve spesifikasyon ilkesi, bu ilkelerin ve düşünümsel yargının işlevsel olduğu doğa tasarıminın kökenleri bilgi teorisinde incelenmiş ve meşruiyeti araştırılmıştır. Buna göre, anlama yetisinden farklı olarak, akıl’ın ya da us’un, “Aşkinsal Analitik”de çizilmiş olan meşru sınırları aşmaya çalışması, bir başka deyişle, koşullu olandan koşulsuz olana ulaşma eğilimi üzerinde durulmuş, anlama yetisinin kavramları ile akılın kavramları, yani ideleri, arasındaki ilişki açık kılınmaya çalışılmıştır. “Aşkinsal Diyalektik”te eleştiriye tabi tutulan akıl, daha sonra “Ek” kısmında meşruiyetini kazanmıştır. Buradaki tartışmada görülmektedir ki, akıl sadece meşru değil, aynı zamanda zorunlu bir bilgi yetisidir. Belirleyici olmayan, düzenleyici rolüyle akıl ve ideleri, anlama yetisi ve kavramlarının ürettiği parçalı bilgiden sistematik bir bütün’e ulaşmak için yol gösterici olarak düzenleyici işlevini icra etmelidir. Dördüncü ana bölümün aksine, buradaki araştırma göstermektedir ki, tezin birinci ana bölümde ele alınan üçüncü *Eleştiri*’nin argümanlarıyla ilk *Eleştiri*’nin ilgili bölümlerde çizilen çerçeve büyük oranda tutarlıdır. Bir başka ifadeyle, ilki, ikincisinin doğal uzantısı ve sonucudur. Ancak bütün bu tartışmalardan sonra, tezin birinci ana bölümünde ortaya konulan estetik düşünüm yargısı ile ilgili “anomali” ortadan kalkmamıştır.

Böylelikle, sonuç bölümünde, ana bölümler arasındaki ilişki bağlamında tartışılan noktalar vurgulanmış ve estetik teori ile bilgi teorisi arasındaki uyum ve uyumsuzluklar ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Beşinci bölümdeki tartışmalar göz önüne alındığında, denilebilir ki, *Yargıgücüünün Eleştiri* ile *Saf Akılın Eleştiri* arasındaki ilişki ve bu ilişkinin meşruluğu, aslında ilk *Eleştiri*'deki “Aşkınsal Analitik” ve “Aşkınsal Diyalektik” ana bölümlerindeki ilişkinin tutarlı olmasıyla doğrudan bağlantılıdır. İkincisindeki tutarlılık, ilkindeki tutarlığı da beraberinde getirmektedir. Ancak buradaki meşruluk ya da berraklık, estetik teorinin hem üçüncü *Eleştiri*'nin genel yapısı ve projesi ile hem de bilgi teorisinin yapısı ile bütünüyle uyumlu görünmemektedir. Kısaca denilebilir ki, Kant estetik teorisi üzerine çalışırken, bilgi teorisinin ana yapı taşlarının bu teori için uygun olduğunu düşünüp, bu temel üzerine inşa etmeye çalışmış, ancak özellikle “özgür uyum” temasında görüldüğü gibi, bu uygunluk aynı zamanda büyük bir çıkmazı da beraberinde getirmiştir. Bilgi teorisinin temel taşıları ve bunlar arasındaki ilişki öyle sağlam bir yapı arz etmektedir ki, burada çerçevesi çizilen yetilerin ve sistemin estetik teoriye uyarlanması, söz konusu yapıya zarar vermeden mümkün görünmemektedir. “Aşkınsal Analitik”te kurulan yapı, estetik teorinin merkezi teması olan “özgür uyum” temasını tutarlı bir biçimde açıklamanın önündeki en büyük engel olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, estetik teori, ya da estetik düşünüm yargısı, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'nin temel yapısı ile uyuşmamaktadır. Düşünümsel yargıcının genel teorisi, ilkeleri ve buradaki “doğa” kavramı “Aşkınsal Diyalektik” ve “Ek” bölümündeki argümanlarla uygunluk içindedir. Ancak burada da sorun, estetik teorinin sözü edilen genel yapı ve projeye tümüyle uyumlu olmama sorunudur.

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