THE RIGHT WING CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS IN TURKEY:
IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL IMAGINATIONS


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# ABSTRACT

## THE RIGHT WING CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS IN TURKEY: IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL IMAGINATIONS

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This thesis aims to describe and analyze the politicians who belong the right-wing political conservative traditions in Turkey by the mediation of their understanding and mentality. In this framework, the study primarily intends to investigate and analyze their perceptions of political and ideological imaginations. Turkish right seems to have a quite heterogeneous structure. While the recognition of the heterogeneity embodied around the political-institutional structuring is crucial to understand the Turkish right-conservatism, focusing merely on the heterogeneity and differences is inadequate to understand the right-conservative tradition. This study aims to analyze the aforesaid diversity and heterogeneity in the axes of politics and ideology. In spite of its heterogeneous qualifications, there are some attributions which made the Turkish right-wing conservative tradition homogeneous on certain economic, social and cultural issues. In this context, the study aims to analyze and understand the differentiations and affinities among the politicians who belong to the mainstream right-wing conservative political parties by focusing on the politicians discourses.

Keywords: Turkish Right, Turkish Conservatism, Right Wing Politicians, Conservative Ideology, Conservative Discourse

# ÖZ

## TÜRKİYE'DE SAĞ-MUHAFAZAKÂR SİYASETÇİLER: İDEOLOJİK VE POLİTİK TASAVVURLAR

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Bu çalışma Türkiye'deki sağ-muhafazakâr siyasete mensup siyasetçilerin siyasal ve ideolojik tasavvur, algı ve anlayışlarını kendi söylem ve anlatıları üzerinden değerlendirmeyi ve çözümlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türk sağ siyaset geleneği gerek siyasal örgütlenme çeşitliliği gerekse de özgül ideolojik-politik eğilimleri bakımından oldukça heterojen bir görünüm arz etmektedir. Bu heterojenliği göz önünde bulundurmak Türk sağını anlamaya yönelen her girişim için oldukça önem taşımaktadır. Fakat bu heterojenliğe karşılık, söz konusu siyaset geleneğini siyasal, ideolojik, toplumsal ve kültürel konularda çoğu zaman homojen kılan nitelikler de söz konusudur. Bu bağlamda çalışma Türk sağını onun herhangi özgül bir eğilimine indirgeyerek ele almak yerine, ideolojik ve politik ayrışma ve eklemlenme alanlarını eşzamanlı olarak değerlendirmeyi ve bunun dinamiklerini belirleyebilmeye çalışmaktadır. Bunu da sağ siyasetçilerin söylemleri üzerinden analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Sağı, Türk Muhafazakârlığı, Sağ Siyasetçiler, Muhafazakâr İdeoloji, Muhafazakâr Söylem

*For My Family*

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# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Research Problem

This thesis aims to describe and analyze the politicians who belong the right-wing political conservative traditions in Turkey by the mediation of their understanding and mentality. In this framework, the study primarily intends to investigate and analyze their perceptions of Turkey, the society in which they live in, the self-images, the social and political segments that differ from them, the motives that constitute their understanding and mental world, the formations of social, political and cultural values, the aspects that the social and cultural traditions are based on and legitimized through.

One of the significant issues this study aims to understand and analyze is the ideological-political *similarities* and *differences* within the tradition of right-conservative politics. Right-conservative political tradition in Turkey constitutes a highly heterogeneous structure embodying different political parties, organizations, institutions, ideologies, discourses and traditions. This heterogeneous structure may be introduced in three main groups which are represented within the scale of the party and the institution. Without prioritizing any group, the first group forms the ***center-right*** tradition (AP, DP, ANAP, DYP). The second group is composed of ***Milli Görüş (National Vision)*** Parties, which emphasize the Islamic religious patterns and religious ideology in the core of their political discourse. MHP and BBP, representing the ***nationalist*** ideology on party basis, form the third group within the right tradition.

It is regardless to stress that each of these institutionalized political groups-axes has its own ideological and political positions. There are some formations such as institutions, movements of thought, intellectuals, magazines, communities and so on, which are not always identical but complying with the institutional structures that are formed and comprised on these three groups. In this respect, Turkish right seems to have a quite heterogeneous structure. While the recognition of the heterogeneity embodied around the political-institutional structuring is crucial to understand the Turkish right-conservatism, focusing merely on the heterogeneity and differences is inadequate to understand the right-conservative tradition. As a matter of fact, despite its heterogeneous structure, the right-conservative politics is subject to be called homogenous related with a number of social, cultural and political factors.

Almost all the elements that make this homogeneity possible reflect a structure with the following emphasis: nationalist, anti-communist, developmentalist, open to religious discourse and sensibilities, though hesitant but not in a radical opposition and struggle with the official ideology, compatible with the government and authority, supporting and internalizing modernization values. One of the primary purposes of this study, by considering but not attributing an absolute meaning on its homogeneity, is to examine this structure through the interviews with the right-conservative politicians. Why is it crucial to notice this homogeneity? This is crucial in two ways that are related with each other; first politically and second sociologically. First of all, it may be said that there are significant political correspondings of the existing homogeneity to comprehend the political hegemony characteristic of the right-conservative political block in Turkish politics. In my opinion, this becomes incomprehensible because it has a particular emphasis on a single aspect of the Turkish right-conservatism.

It is necessary to mention that the analysis and assessments focused solely on an independent or autonomous aspect of the Turkish right are subject to result in volantarist readings and interpretations in both theoretical and methodological way; such as over-emphasizing social-political change-transformation process by placing

Islamism and its various appearances in the center[1]. For instance, along a line extending from the National Vision tradition to AKP, it is an undeniable fact that Islamism with different versions is one of the major components of the Turkish right-conservatism. However; to what extent this fact allows to assess a political-social process by focusing on pure Islamism and its versions, and to what extent it considers the historical context? At this point, without reducing to any of its components or specific aspects, the Turkish right-conservatism must be evaluated in a form available to articulate in a combination of characteristics such as Islamist, nationalist, liberal and so on (Bora, 1999 and Açıkel, 1996). This statement is, not the only but one of the significant reasons to use the combination of "right-conservative" concept in the study.

If the right-conservative politics is defined as a block, it is not easy to ignore the impact of this homogeneity when it is considered that the political alliances, which are against its opponents on Turkey's political struggles and which are established against the other right-conservative politics and structures (such as National Front or

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[1] Such kinds of readings or analysis have generally focused on a specific dimension or a tendency of the right-conservative politics in Turkey like Islamism. These also have some weakness on some other elements like structural-historical context and the other political power focals, subjects and issues which have affected the politics beyond and the limitations of the right wing politics. For this kind of a reading and an analysis please see. Jenny B. White, *Türkiye'de İslamcı Kitle Seferberliği Yerli Siyaset Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, Oğlak Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007. According to Emrah Göker (2010), who made a similar assessment on the matter cited, take attention to the methodological vulnerability of these kinds of studies. In this context for Göker, it can be said that analysts and their studies like Nilüfer Göle *Modern Mahrem*, Metis, 1991and Elizabeth Özdalga *Modern Türkiye'de Örtünme Sorunu*, Sarmal, 1998 have put forwarded qualitative/ethnographic methods but these have suffered a kind of populism on "everyday life". These studies could not achieve an epistemological distance between the stories of their participants and their practices of objectification. And for Göker, it can be said that the studies especially in the political science discipline fallowing "objective" positivist protocols have interested in political society in its limited parts so they have confined. And these have also confined when they have evaluated the AKP's policies, for example, in the context of "democracy" or "democratic consolidation" (doing indefinite the subjects and structures). In this context Göker cites some of them; William Hale ve Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP*, Routledge, 2010; M. Hakan Yavuz, *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, University of Utah Press, 2006; Turkish version of this study is *Modernleşen Müslümanlar*, Kitap Yayınevi, 2008; İhsan Dağı *Turkey Between Democracy and Militarism: Post-Kemalist Perspectives*, Orion, 2008; Ali Çarkoğlu ve Ersin Kalaycıoğlu *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

the other coalition formations), are relatively easily or smoothly constituted. Evaluation of these concrete alliances limited to an absolute coalition-front and similar political formations would also be an inadequate approach. Both sociological and mental dimensions enabling these political alliances or partnerships should also be considered. Above mentioned condition that assigns sociological significance to the political dimension seems to emerge at this point. Considering the case within a framework of alliances or associations embodied in political behavior or attitudes of masses with the right-conservative forms, might provide more meaningful socio-political conclusions.

Although heterogeneous, the power and hegemony of different right-conservative parties emerging from similar political attitudes and supports of conservative masses might be explained through a homogeneity formed at the base. Here, different political institutional actors hegemonizing the political sphere and the social mediocre enabling hegemonic structure, is subject to form a complex relationality by simultaneously generating and reproducing each other. The fact enabling right-conservative hegemony is not the will or strategic skill of political institutions and actors, but it is the presence of strong sociological equivalent allowing or the possibility to allow its hegemonic structure in all circumstances. However, this study does not intend to analyse the sociological structure of the mentioned masses. The study focuses on analysing the patterns of mentality of the right-conservative politicians representing right-conservative masses, and aims to understand the sociology of the mentioned masses. The decisions expressed here may be challenged on two points, which will probably establish the relation with each other. First challenge is doing sociological reductionism by assuming that the Turkish dominant-ceteris paribus sociological structure (right-conservative) is steady and a political dominant-ceteris paribus structure is legitimized related to this.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that I do not consider the sociological structure and the society as a steady whole. I seize a socio-political approach that is open to be established by different articulated elements, presenting partial and temporary

holism, and an area of practices that cannot be fixed. The 'sociological' understanding that I consider in this study and its corresponding political visions are not coherent. In this respect, the discursive basis in the study is mainly established within the framework of Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe. According to Laclau, the ambition of all holistic discourses is to find out the meaning of any component or social process within a relational system with the other components that it is located, rather than within itself. Structural unity defined and described itself as an object indicating positivity. Thus, unity, undertook a principle underlying the recognition of the social order. Unity was an essence beyond the empirical variations recognized on the surface of social life, and it was the essence of social order. In fact, the social is always surrounded by more than a meaning that the social itself cannot control. And finally, the "social" itself; as an object unique, known, grounding its own partial processes, is impossible (Laclau, 1985). As Laclau and Mouffe states: "We must, therefore, consider the openness of the social as the constitutive ground or 'negative essence' of the existing, and the diverse 'social orders' as precarious and ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences. Accordingly, the multiformity of the social cannot be apprehended through a system of mediations, nor the 'social order' understood as an underlying principle. There is no sutured space peculiar to 'society', since the Social itself has no essence" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 95-96). Because the social itself has no essence, there is no fixed or closed sphere of the "society". Every social practice is an articulated practice for fixing and closing the discourse. According to Laclau and Mouffe every social practice is an articulative practice and every articulation practice is a discursive practice. Therefore, society is composed of a set of discursive practices: "Society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal points is constituted within an intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity" (1985: 113). According to Laclau and Mouffe the structure refers to a closed and complete "fixatition", which is based on law and has essence. The "discourse" they prefer instead, is an infinitude

field, where elements and free floating indicators take place, allowing existentialist and partial articulations. However, according to them, the discourse is not simply an object of text, language, or ideology, it is a wholeness where the social production of meaning takes place (1985: 32-33): "the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition (…) we will affirm the material character of every discursive structure" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). Epistemological limits, weaknesses and contradictions of the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe about the "social" constitute another matter of debate. The point that I accept in their work in general is the emphasis on the openness of the "social" and the epistemological challenge against the essentialist social constructions. Necmi Erdoğan's cautions and assessment is important for the legitimization of the mentioned approach: "articulative discursive principles that are established in "general discursive sphere" should not disregard the materiality of the field and the establishment of their historical-social structure that is "overdetermined". Otherwise, rather than the representation of the closed, structured essences of the social where the history, class, economy, etc. constitutes the ultimate rank; all encompassing discursive of the social on openness, partiality and indeterminacy axis and hegemonic essentialism will take place" (Erdoğan, 1994: 49).

Related and consistent with above theoretical evaluations, I consider the politics and the political structure as the hegemonic struggle sphere and process holding the same complexity and contradictions (or antagonisms). I mean Gramscian perspective of hegemony as the basis of hegemonic politics. Gramsci, unlike the traditional or Orthodox Marxism analysis of power, instead of highlighting the coercive power of the capitalist state, draws attention to the forms of power, which are hard to see and unnecessary. This type of a power is possible through ideology and is defined by the concept of *hegemony*. Instead of the definitions of the center that are external, coercive and derived from the institutional features of the state, Gramsci's hegemony analysis emphasizes the qualities created in the minds, based on *consent* throughout the ideological processes (Üşür, 1997: 28). As Mahutga and Norris put it Gramsci

argued that perceptions and other mediations come between material forces and the meanings connected to them. The realm of ideas, or what Marx called the ''superstructure'' (religion, legal structures, the family, etc.), is affected by the interests of the ruling class such that they incorporate those interests without the appearance of doing so. Gramsci distinguished between different levels of the superstructure. "Civil society" represents all that is considered private, and "political societ" refers to the state. In civil society, the dominant group exercises hegemony, whereas it utilizes the state for direct domination. According to Gramsci, ideological hegemony is a project that the ruling class must accomplish. Therefore, the level of ideological hegemony varies between societies. Where it is strong, capitalists need not rule mainly by physical coercion, but instead rely on popular consensus. Here, power relations are mystified. Where it is weak, that is, where traditional social and authority relations have been undermined, where bourgeois culture and lifestyles have lost their appeal, physical coercion becomes more necessary (Mahutga and Norris, 2007: 2227-28). For Laclau and Mouffe, considering their own discursive perspective of hegemony, which is coherent with Gramsci's general approach of hegemony, mentioned above, the construction of a hegemonic discourse is the result of the articulation. The articulation of discursive elements into contingent moments within a hegemonic discourse takes place in a conflictual element of force and repression. In this context hegemony can be defined as the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces (Torfing, 1999: 101).

My intention is neither claims an unchangeable sociological and political structure of conservatism nor legitimises this structure. In contrast, my purpose is to understand the confirmed nature of the sociological structure through the thoughts and discourses of right conservative politicians. The examination of this structure might be seen at least as an attempt to understand the 'political' and 'social' concepts in Turkey. To mention again, the right-conservative political block comfortably leans on a "*sociology*" that it can mobilize easily or performs hegemony through this; this

is pioneered sometimes by center-right ideology, nationalism or Islamism. From this perspective, hegemony has historical and conjunctural character[2].

In recent years, a considerable number of significant social scientific studies on the sociology of right-conservative social groups are performed to discuss this issue in terms of different aspects. However; within the framework of this study, the focus will mainly be on the identification and evaluation of the ideological and mental manifestations of these sociological dynamics, in general on the basis of the discourses of politicians belonging to the right-conservative political tradition. At this point conservatism arises as the most important social-cultural and ideological-political element; as it is subject to pass through the mentioned political tradition line. Therefore, the determination of various appearances-properties (social-cultural and political) is critical to understand the right politics.

Considering the hegemonical potential in Turkish political life, an analysis of mental and meaning world of the right-wing politics and its politicians, who are the producers and carriers, is expected to make significant contributions to understand the Turkish political structure and its political culture as a whole. The right-wing political tradition in Turkey seems to be quite diverse at least in terms of political organisation. This study aims to analyze the aforesaid diversity and heterogeneity in the axes of politics and ideology. In spite of its heterogeneous qualifications, there are some attributions which made the Turkish right-wing conservative tradition homogeneous on certain economic, social and cultural issues. In this context, the study aims to analyze and understand the differentiations and affinities among the politicians who belong to the mainstream right-wing conservative political parties by focusing on the politicians.

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[2] For example, Cihan Tuğal's (2009) study, analyzing the transformation process within Islamist political context and considering it by "passive revolution" conceptualization, although indicating volantarist emphasis on its reading of Islamist politics, reveals the historical and conjunctural aspect of hegemony accurately. This study introduces the articulation of Islamist politics and discourse with neoliberalism on AKP basis; also analyzes the hesitant and unsteady relationship between the nationalist ideology and Islamist politics.

Since the establishment of the Republic in Turkey, there were considerable reactions in the right-wing political tradition against Kemalism as a founding ideology, Kemalist modernization project and its implementations. However, it should be emphasized that the right-wing political tradition in Turkey has basically modernist or modernizing character from its most radical form to the most modest. This determination is also valid for Islamism, which has a history going back to the establishment of the republic, and which often had a problematic relationship with the principles and practices of modernism, modernization process and Kemalism.

The ideological and political arguments that were put forth from the right-wing conservative politics in Turkey are not homogeneous. The tradition has defended different political-ideological discourses; such as liberal or democratic and developmentalist discourses on the one side and authoritarian, racist and fascist nationalisms and radical Islamism on the other. While aforesaid tendencies can be considered as independent and acquire different characters in terms of their emphasis on political and ideological elements, they generally might have a collective discourse and fellowship of a collective attitude as "state", "authority", "religion", "tradition", "moral-ethical values", "family" etc., which are mainly the issues related with cultural realm. However, there are a number of challenges to determine the differences and similarities precisely where they begin and end, the ideological-discursive transivities and intransivities, the mediations through which the similarities and differences could be established or not. In this regard, the right-conservative political tradition in Turkey is quite heterogeneous, complex, and can be considered as offering an eclectic aspect. Therefore, it does not seem possible to evaluate the right wing-conservatism in Turkey as a single political party, movement or thought tradition.

It might be expressed that there is a rich and extensive literature to understand and explain the right-wing conservatism in Turkey in academic, political and even in popular motivations related with the matter derived and discussed with various aspects. However, despite the presence of important studies and assessments on the

subject, these have remained limited by virtue of their conceptual features; especially in the academic sense there is deficiency on quantitative and qualitative social scientific field studies based on concrete data. When we put aside the limitations of the field studies, the existing studies on the right wing conservatism are mainly produced on the basis of theoretical considerations. Theoretical studies offer a significant contribution to the literature of the field in question. Theoretical evaluations and studies are not sufficient solely. They should be supported by the field studies. This would not only enrich the theoretical and conceptual works, but also would contribute to prove the existing studies. One of the main academic motivations of this thesis is to take such a concern into consideration.

In this study, the indicators establishing the conservative politicians' mentalities will be determined through the political belongings, socializations and formations of political backrounds, the perceptions of politics and political imaginations. In this context, it will be investigated how do right politicians approach politics and define the concept or phenomenon? What are their political and ideological horizon and representation? When regarded right politics in Turkey, the concept of conservatism is of a great importance so that it will be investigated the concept and the fact of conservatism. How do they describe conservatism and what kind of meanings do they assign to it? In this respect, how do they evaluate the correlation between the right-wing politics and conservatism? When considering the importance for the right politics in Turkey, another issue to be addressed is the relationship and interaction between the Islamist and nationalist ideology and discourse? And finally it will be handeled the perceptions of the state and society; how do they consider the state and state-society relations?

When the Turkish right-wing politics is considered, the concept of *conservatism* is one of the main indicators that cut across the mentioned political tradition as a whole. Therefore, perception and understanding forms of the concept are very important to comprehend the differences and similarities in that tradition. An assessment and analysis based on the discourses of the politician who are on the right-wing politics

would obtain in-depth knowledge in general about the right-wing politics and right-wing conservatism in Turkey.

When the existing literature about conservatism is examined, it will be seen that there is no clear consensus on what the concept is or how it will be discussed. It is a crucial topic on which quite different theoretical, political and ideological debates are maintained. The approaches about the subject or concept vary according to the explicit or implicit and direct or indirect political attitudes of the sides that discuss the matter. It might be stated that there are mainly two approaches about conservatism. According to the first one, it is an ideology derived from the intellectual roots of Enlightenment Philosophy and emerged after the French Revolution. It is also an ideology that was brought by the basic direction of the new regime and it is generally called as "modernity", which is perceived as an opposition to sovereign and corporate value. In this approach, conservatism is defined as a reactionary and rigid ideology opposed to individualism, which defend the old regime, kingdom, church and aristocracy that are identified with the old regime. It is also described as questioning the power of the abstract mind against some aspects of the industrial society. According to the second approach, conservatism is a tendency that protects the existing network of institutions and relationships, and it's a form defining the world as a behavior and perception. In this context it is an ideology with a solid doctrinal content. Conservatism corresponds to the general trans-historical tendencies and personality traits which can be found in every human being. Conservatism is inspired by the idea that the human being cannot be perfect and it questions the idea that the world can be dominated through reason. The ideal society imagination of conservatism refers to a hierarchical society where everybody is aware of their place. Change is accepted when it is inevitable. It is accepted as a lesser evil condition when the things will get worse if there is no change. (Özipek: 2004 and Dahl, 1999:1-13).

Mollaer (2009: 30) proposes to be suspicious about those definition attempts, which almost constitute a "normative framework" while defining conservatism. According

to him: "It is clear that conservatism is opposed to the Enlightment and Revolution, which are considered as the basis of modernity and it is true that this starting point inevitably invited conservatism to the world of history and ideologies". However, for Mollaer, this statement is not enough to mark conservatism as a categorical and harsh ideology against modernity. On the other hand, another definition of conservatism that refers to universal human attitudes cannot be considered totally wrong. However, this approach does not assume that the attitudes would be shaped historically. In addition, this approach can also be used to resist analyzing the conservatism historically and make conservatism an authentic reference source against all ideologies (Mollaer, 2009: 30).

It does not seem to be possible to say that there is an agreement on how and in which form the ideology and concept of conservatism will be defined. Nisbet claims that due to the defining characteristics of the concept of ideology, conservatism can be defined as an ideology in general (Nisbet, 1986: vii). For him, ideology corresponds to coherent whole ideas which include moral, economic, social and cultural aspects (1986: vii). Ideology is associated with the politicians and political parties, as well as the publications, articles and so on. When conservatism is associated with these aspects, it can be defined as an ideology (1986: viii). When O'Sullivan (1989) defines conservatism as "a limited political style" and a "philosophy of imperfection"; Scruton (1996) describes the concept as an "inarticulate".

According to Suvanto (1997: 2) the conservatism is a vision on life, it does not need a theory because it does not have a radical intention to change the society. On the other hand, conservatism is treated as an ideology often associated with the tradition. However, according to Mannheim, traditionalism and conservatism are not similar phenomena; traditionalism tries to repeat the past in the present life and it is an approach which intends to reclaim the old attitudes and institutions now. However, conservatism is a political and social movement that has the ability to adapt itself into the new forms of solutions (cited by Suvanto, 1997: 3). When the impact of conservatism on political thought is considered, it is necessary to address it as a point

of view more than an ideology. According to Kolat, conservatism can be handled as an effective ideology mobilizing the masses in terms of political participation when compared to communism and liberalism (Kolat, 2002: 7). For Quinton, conservatism can be understood through three principles which are traditionalism, organism and political skepticism: While traditionalism corresponds to a sincere commitment to the institutions, it indicates a hostility towards revolutionarism or change. Organism is a principle which gives the identity to its members and refers to a natural and holistic conception of society. Political skepticism is a principle, which emphasizes the historical and cumulative experience. According to the last principle, the political virtue is immanent in the community's experiences that were accumulated historically; it does not exist in the speculative theories. This virtue derives from the traditions, customs and institutions (cited by Kolat, 2002: 11). Although conservatism is a movement emerged against the modernization and change, it should be emphasized that it is a "modern" way of thinking. As a modern phenomenon, conservatism has to adjust itself parallel with the modernization process (Özipek, 2004: 2). Whereas conservatism is often treated as an opposition to the change, it is not right to assess it just as a guardian of the status quo. Because conservatism is not opposed to change in an absolute manner; conservatism will be affirmed when the change is perceived as a "reform". In this context, descriptive character of the conservatism can be considered as an opposition to the revolutionary and radical transformation.

The conservative ideology cannot be defined as a categorical opposition to the change, but it does not sublimate it as an ideal either. The change that is accepted tacitly and gradually almost always seems to be related with the capacity to adapt the concrete social and political conditions. I this respect, it can be argued that conservatism is an ideology which is politically flexible and pragmatic that is sensitive to the conditions required by the conjuncture. Indeed, as stated by Heywood: "although conservatism is intellectually the modest ideology among the political ideologies, and perhaps because of that, it has a remarkably flexible and quickly self-resilient capability". Because conservatism is not in favor of a

commitment to any fixed idea system, it is in a continuous improvement (Heywood, 2007: 87). According to Güler (2007: 119), who has a similar evaluation: "The conservative movement or politics has always been related with the specific concrete conditions. It does not reveal certain patterns of attitudes. Conservative politics vary from period to period. It is practical and utilitarian depending on the conditions of the period. Conservatism indicates an ideology of power in which political realism means that the stronger is right and the result justifies the route taken. The importance given to the social order and stability by conservatism might be considered as another distinguishing feature of it. According to the conservative logic, authority is necessary and useful in terms of guidance, support and security feeling which is required by the need to know where everyone stands. It means that the main feature of conservative understanding of authority is beyond the political authority and provides the individual (in his behaviour) the framework of moral codes to be obeyed through religious or non-religious superior power of command. Another feature of conservatism is based on the acceptance of the idea of equality before the law. Despite its receptiveness, it is opposed to the idea of socio-economic equality and believes in the idea that no one is born/created equally (Güler, 2007: 102).

It was mentioned before that conservatism in Turkey is mainly modern. As emphasized by Öğün, first Westernism then modernist Islamism or Turkism which have local associations, have advocated positivist ethos of modernization as a project of modernization with various degrees (Öğün, 2003: 545). In this sense, conservatism is simply not a concept or fact that can be addressed by reducing reactionarism. In fact, the thought or political movements which put forward the administration demands of monarchy or sultanate or voicing of those advocacy and recreation significantly remain weak in Turkey (Taşkın, 2003 and Bora, 1999: 125).

For Turkish conservatism it may be mentioned that it has a consistent opposition to the ideals and practices of modernization of the (Turkish) Republic at least in cultural ideals context. In this sense, it can be argued that 'universal' codes of conservatism

are also valid for the Turkish conservatism. In order to evaluate this 'opposition', 'the imaginations' of the republican modernism and practices of modernization related to the social and cultural life should be considered. Besides the characteristic feature of conservatism that is the insistent emphasis on religion and tradition, its skeptical distance from politics should also be mentioned. For instance, according to Keyder (1990: 97), there were two pillars of opposition platform during the republic period. One of them was advocating the economic freedom against the state intervention in the market and the other was the religious freedom which defended the local traditions against the political pressure and ideological invasion of the center.

It can be said that the most distinctive characteristics of Turkish conservatism were discontent of state intervention to the religious field and deep skepticism about the politics. Öğün's (2003: 556) pointed out that "the reflex to stand against the political life of Turkish conservatives, especially on the writer and thinker level, is compatible with the cultural codes of conservatism in general". For example; Nurettin Topçu, who is considered as one of the important figures in Turkish conservatism, has deep suspicion and disbelief on democracy, politics and its institutions:

> "It is the ideal, which turns a man into a spook against the others, against the spirit of safety and humanity, and which almost left nothing behind, is the terrible ideal of politics. I said that the politics is the production of our weakness. Children of this century, who did not have the spiritual forces and whose sources of power disappeared, deal with the politics unavoidably. Politics is being used in school, family, profession, temple and state; it is being used even for the success of the nationality case" (Topçu, 1998: 40).

In Turkey, some discussion topics in the history of modernization, which include culture, identity, modernization, westernization, nationalism and so on, have been performed through several decomposition axes that can be called as ancient. Perhaps the most important one of these 'ancient' axes is the "culture and civilization" duality. In this sense, it should not be a coincidence that Ziya Gökalp and Sait Halim Pasha or Mehmet Akif and Ziya Gökalp meet at the same point despite all the differences on ideological-intellectual level. As Tanel Demirel pointed out: "the

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institutions, practices and traditions which will be given up for the sake of modernization, and the things about the West that will be received and rejected, are the major discussion points that differentiate Kemalism from the center-right line" (Demirel, 2004: 160).

The issues that conservative sensitivity strongly emphasize are not directly about the ontology of the modernization, but perhaps paradoxically they are about the "corrosions" on 'religion', 'culture', 'tradition', 'institutions' and so on. As Bora (1999: 82) also stated that: "... policy of secularism was the major "exorbitance" of the Turkish revolution and modernization. Conservatism, which can be summarized as the desire to purify the "extremisms" from modernization and reconcile it with the Tradition, adapted itself the 'sedition' of this extremism (Bora, 1999: 82). In fact, the emphasis on the Tradition should not be evaluated outside the modernization context: " … the traditional conservatism is a "therapy" initiative for the Turkish modernization. It is shaped as a different "modernization" thesis. For this thesis, the preliminary acceptance is that the radical-modernist political and intellectual approach is "problematic", which is valid today since the beginning of the Republican Turkey. It has an intention to reduce the damages caused by/continue to cause by this practice (Atay, 2003: 166). We see that a strong defense of the tradition for the sake of the elimination of aforementioned "damages" and the philosophical-intellectual basis are emerged in the early period of the Republic.

It should be noted that there was an intellectual endeavor trying to resist the radical modernism's 'destructions' according to Bergsonian irrational philosophy of life. In this intellectual initiative there was a group of intellectuals such as Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Peyami Safa and İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (İrem, 1997, 2003). For example, Nurettin Topçu criticizes the republic's idea of modernism and modernization in many respects. The main theme of his criticisms can be defined as the 'revolution movement' that is unable to take its share from necessary spiritual 'ethos'. The 'revolution' saved the "Turks" from captivity and slavery was being

appreciated in this sense. But then, the course of 'the revolution' attacked on the nation's moral and spiritual world, was criticized because of its 'attack'. These criticisms might include typical conservative rhetoric; but Topçu often repeats "another revolution" as a manifest manner that was necessary. "Copycat Westernism" is the central theme of his critique. The Westernists [Garpçılar] represent the most devastating dangerous group starting from the Tanzimat, continues with the followers of Servet-i Fünun and ends with Kemalists. According to Topçu, these are "modern Crusaders". The Westernists live an "unconscious" modernization fantasy and they lead Anatolia to reach communism step-by-step (quoted by Öğün, 1992: 162). He is strongly opposed to the 'revolution' in putting pressure on the nation and its mandatory-authoritarian language:

> "... 'Then only obey!' Here is the expression of the actual case that wants to guard our souls with bayonet… Is there love that was accepted by force and oppression, or is there an idea in the world that was loved by force and punch? Aren't you the one who swept the love away from the heart and put grudge there? Aren't you the most evil who harmed the revolution?  If there is a conspicuous backwardness in this country's devoted people, whose soul and body were neglected so far, you are the ones who follow the revolution and the ones who want to burn or crucify them because of their share in this weakness and misery" (Topçu, 1998: 193-197).

The criticisms in this quotation towards the 'revolution' and the republic can be found in several works of Topçu (Öğün, 1992: 162). Similar, but more moderate and even-tempered criticism can be found in Peyami Safa's (1997) novels and intellectual works and in the works of many other conservative thinkers. It can easily be argued that the Turkish conservatism have a wide range of 'vocabulary' about specific themes to criticize the modernist imagination of the republic. Turkish conservatism did not realize an epistemological or ontological rupture from the imagination that was criticized and it cannot reveal from alternative and holistic vision of a society. It criticized modernism only about its cultural aspects. However; on the other hand, it had to articulate the modernist discourse and project as a whole and even Kemalism, with their own rhetoric and ideology.

It can be said that Turkish conservatism has greatly intensified its critiques on cultural-spiritual dimension and practices of the republican project or imagination rather than its technical modernizing aspects. From my perspective, this indicates one of the fundamental paradoxes of the Turkish conservatism. This paradox, so to speak, provides a 'schizophrenic' identity. It should be told that we are facing a political culture which oscillated between different contradictory positions like being dissent against the Republican modernist imagination or not; accepting and articulating modernist discourse or resisting and rejecting it.

The Turkish conservative politics and thought tradition, using a populist rhetoric, can take over the representative of 'libertarian', 'developmentalist', and sometimes 'egalitarian' and 'oppressed' demands. On the other hand, it may represent authoritarian, corporatist and organist social and political discourses as well. This often leads to the formations of contradictory and inconsistent political synthesis. It is quite remarkable that these synthesis forms can easily articulate with the official ideology. Articulations among the basic ideologies within the conservative body often occur in an eclectic manner. It should be said that determining the articulations among the ideologies indicate difficulties. For example, where the Islamism meets the nationalism, where the nationalism meets liberalism, shortly where they meet and diverge is so problematic (Bora, 1999). However, although it is not the sole reason, this eclecticism finds a very strong social and political response and cohesion in the society. It is a clear historical/factual reality that the establishment of the hegemony of the Turkish right-conservatism in political, cultural and social realms is being facilitated through this characteristic.

Within the framework of the aforementioned literature and assessments, this study aims to contribute the accumulation of the relevant academic field by analyzing the structure of the mentality of the politicians who are the subjects of the conservative political discourse and ideology. In addition, the study aims to make new and original contributions to the political science and sociology literature, which were not handled empirically, by placing concrete subjects on its center.

## 1.2 The Research Methodology

The basic data and knowledge about the sociological features and characteristics (of the conservative-right oriented politicians) that are analyzed in this work, has been given as a detailed report to the TUBITAK in January 2010 called "*The Conservative Politician Profile in Turkey*"[3]. The questions in the socio-demographic section that were asked in the questionnaires to the people were also asked to the politicians. Although it is not proper methodologically to compare this quantitative data, knowledge and concept with the ones in "*The Conservative Politician Profile in Turkey*" research, the quantitative data from depth interviews with 126 politicians and from the research match up with each other[4]. This result is not surprising because the depth interviews are planned as a complementary and qualitative component of the research. Nevertheless, the fundamental resource of this thesis is the data from the in-depth interviews. On the other hand, the process and the interpretation of the data require different methodological and epistemological pre-acceptances.

The field work of this thesis made between January 10-May 12, 2009 in approximately five months. The work has been completed in 13 different cities of Turkey; with 126 politicians belong to 6 right-oriented, conservative parties with the semi-structured questionnaires and face-to-face interviews. The 95 interviews were made in the party centers of the cities or districts; 23 interviews were made in the working places; 4 interviews in clubs (lokal), organizations (dernek), cafes and similar places; 2 of them in teacher's lodges and 2 of them at the hotel lobbies. The total period of the interviews are 210 hours and the average duration of the interviews per person is 1,6 hours. All of the interviews were made by digital sound records and after they were decoded into word programme documents. The duration of decoding and writing period was approximately 4 months. The total page of the

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[3] This research project was carried out by Assoc. Prof.Dr Mustafa Şen. The writer of this thesis study was a scholarship during the project.
[4] Main socio-demographic and socio-economic findings and characteristics of the politicians interviewed please see. Appendix F

word documents (with 12 font size, Times New Roman font and single-line spacing format) is 1288 pages.

During the interviews all of which were made by me, the questions in the semi-structured questionnaire[5] were asked to each politician separately. In relation to the nature of the depth interview method, sometimes different objects were being talked outside the main object. The interviewees were not interfered except keeping the interview in the main line so that the interviews maintain in a healthy, sincere and productive atmosphere.

The qualitative researches do not take the value and justification of the "representation" notion as the only criteria because of epistemological and methodological acceptances of the positivist methodology. The theoretical and the methodological frame do not require to take the "representation" notion as the only criteria while defining "sample". This does not mean that I made totally a "randomized" selection. In the field work which is the source of this thesis, politicians from 6 political parties have been interviewed. Although the representation percentage in the parliament is an important criterion for the sample selection, the big difference in the tradition of the right-conservative politics made difficult to take only this criteria as basis. Although politicians from AKP and MHP were taken bigger parts in the general sample, the politicians from the parties such as Saadet Party and Demokrat Party that are not represented in the parliament but important for the right-conservative politics tradition because of their importance, significance and organizational network, have been interviewed considering the representation criteria in the parliament is important for sampling. The politicians from Demokrat Party and Anavatan Party coded as "central right" but not represented in the parliament are also interviewed. During the field work period, the debates over the reunion of DP and ANAP were near to end. During these debates, in many places these organizations were already united. Although their organization

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[5] See Appendix D and Appendix E

was nearly disappeared, some politicians who define themselves in and as ANAP, were also interviewed. I also added a few politicians of Büyük Birlik Party from right-conservative tradition to the sample.

In this study, an epistemological and methodological approach which belongs to the hermeneutical social science tradition[6], was adapted. Every scientific study requires to have a particular paradigm. "A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. Paradigms tell what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. In research, a paradigm has come to mean a set of overarching and interconnected assumptions about the nature of reality" (Shakedi, 2005: 1). Positivism[7] and hermeneutical view (particularly constructivism) are the two overarching perspectives that shape our understanding of research. In general, qualitative research is based on a constructivist and naturalistic position, while quantitative research is based on a positivist position (Shakedi, 2005: 3).

The constructivist-qualitative approach, which gives the direction to our study, is distinctive in addressing any phenomenon with a holistic emphasis (Shakedi, 2005: 3). The researchers, who using the qualitative-constructivist methods, try to understand the phenomena and cases within their wholeness (Shakedi, 2005: 3). According to Shakedi who summarizes this approach: the constructivist-qualitative *ontology* emphasizes the holistic understanding of the phenomena and importance of context in their interpretation. The constructivist-qualitative *epistemology* asserts that the knower and the known are co-existent and that people construct their knowledge through their experience in the world. Phenomena can only be understood from an insider's point of view, and the values of the participants are crucial for our interpretations. Accordingly, the meaning of the phenomenon is subjective, relative to the perspective in which it constructed. In the constructivist-qualitative

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[6] See. Doğan Özlem, *Kültür Bilimleri ve Kültür Felsefesi*, İnkılap Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000 and John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1987.

[7] See, Jonathan H. Turner, "The Origins of Positivism: The Contributions of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer" and Peter Halfpenny, "Positivism in the Twentieth Century" in *Handbook of Social Theory* edited by George Ritzer and Barry Smart, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2001.

***methodology*** the researchers are the primary research instrument and there is no attempt to manipulate or control finding using statistical instruments. The data is collected by the field work in the natural setting. The categories of analysis emerge from the open-ended process of data collection without imposing preexisting understandings on them. The constructivist-qualitative approach holds that human beings organize and manage their perception of the world through the stories they construct and tell. These human narratives give a structured quality to experience and are the way people make sense of the world around them. By telling a story about their life, people do not merely describe their lives but also change them. The constructivist-qualitative researcher invites the informants to tell their stories and focuses his research work on these authentic narratives (Shakedi, 2005: 13).

In this study, which is based on the above summarized approach, the data were collected and analyzed through in depth-interviews. Prior to the analysis, the data compilation process was realized primarily. First, the narratives of politicians were classified according to the parties they belong. Each topic was re-classified based on the politicians' narratives, who are from the same political party, by considering in the context of *affinity* and then in *differentiation* context. Thus, the tendencies within the same party gained clarity. This process was applied to each politician of the same party, then it was applied to the other party members according to the subject discussed. Through this process, the aim was to determine how the parties differentiate and resemble depending on the issues examined. In other words, the general distinctive tendencies were tried to be highlighted, first through the similarities and differences among the same party politicians and then among different parties. Through this matrix, the purpose was to determine the general and specific trends. The basis of the analysis is formed on the data gathered from the similarities and differences.

Throughout the study, distinctive interviews were frequently emphasized which were illustrating the aforementioned tendencies. Because this qualitative study is based on the data from in-depth interviews, this inevitably led to certain problems about the

volume of the study. Although I tried to overcome this problem, it was a difficult issue as this is the nature of the qualitative studies. This situation causes difficulty in two ways. First, it was difficult to follow the main theme and made it its readability relatively hard. Second, in relation with the first, there was a possibility to damage the analytical structure. Despite these difficulties, referring to the interviews frequently was extremely important to grasp the respondents' mind structure in depth. This offers a rich material to the researchers and readers on the phenomenology of the population covered.

It seems necessary to explain a few points for the formal structure of the text that was favored. In the text, the information indicating the personal data of the interviewee (age, gender, city, business and professional information, etc.) is deliberately omitted. A significant number of the politicians I interviewed were already on duty in a specific status in their parties. They asked not to declare their names or personal information in the study due to the possibility that their explanations and assessments might cause "some inconveniences". When the subject is the "politics", which can be considered a relatively sensitive issue in Turkey or elsewhere, to convince the politicians for an interview who are active in politics, was itself a problem. Many of the interviews were achieved by promising not to share interviewees' personal information. After a while, this became a condition to realize an interview efficiently. Meanwhile, a small number of politicians had no objection in sharing their personal data. However, I did not consider appropriate to declare their personal data by considering the general trend among the politicians throughout the whole study. Considering all these, I did share any personal information of the respondents in accordance with a basic research ethics. Instead of the personal data or information, I used an anonymizing coding system in the text that included the first letter of the politicians' party and the number of the interview order as A1 (AKP), S23 (SP), and M16 (MHP). Some date ranges, city and personal names stated by the respondents during the interviews were coded and anonymized as x, xx, xx-xx etc. due to the possibility of damaging the privacy of the respondents. When there was no inconveniency to reveal or state the identity of the interviewee, I had no drawback in

announcing the names, places and dates. In total, 126 interviews were realized with the politicians, but it was not possible to include all of the narratives in the study. There are mainly a number of reasons for this. First, it was not possible to write each interview in the study because of the volume and quantity, which required an extraordinary force when considered the practical necessities and limitations of the study. Second, some interviews were either very short or inefficient depending on the interviewed person's knowledge, intention, perception and accumulation. The vast majority of politicians who are particularly active in politics in the big cities or party centers had answers by taking a "politically correct" attitude or made some assessments which were in delaying or evasive manner. For these reasons, I have preferred not to place these politicians' interviews. In some cases, it was not possible to finalize the interviews (because of being annoyed by the questions, some other responsibilities, lack of time, and so on). However, the interviews with direct, simple, comprehensive information and assessments were placed in the study as much as possible. In contrast with the comprehensive interviews with the general trends, some interviews which had significantly unique character were also mentioned. The unique cases could reflect the tensions and breaks in the general trends and in some cases they could include a very rich assessment and information so that I was not abstained to place them.

The overwhelming majority of the interviewed politicians were men; this was not enabling to emphasize the specificities and differences that were based on gender. Despite my persistence of the matter, this is fundamentally related with the women politicians who did not problematize the status of women or women awareness and because they refrained from a specific emphasis on the case. The aforementioned reasons are not sufficient, but the lack of a gender-based analysis should be regarded as a major inadequacy[8]. This made unnecessary to use the 'she' determiner in the English text. This is unfortunately only a practical reason rather than the gender discrimination and insensitivity.

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[8] The status of women in the right wing-conservative politics seems to be very important issue as a social scientific problematic that needs to be addressed some aspects.

In this study, I often applied to the "narrative" term. Although the term is generally used in literary criticism and analysis is also quite common[9] in the practice of social science. However, in the main text, the term of "narrative" could easily be replaced with the term "interview".

Finally, I want to highlight the issue related to the field experiences and observations. To be experienced by every researcher in different ways, I also obtained a number of positive and negative situations during the field study which were not impossible to experience by working on a table. Unfortunately I did not include them in the analysis and while writing the text. The main reason is related to the normative framework that underpins my work. Not using the techniques that are often applied by the anthropological and ethnographic studies based on participant observation or the techniques examining the field or the subjects intensively, prevented me to transfer the events experienced in the field. I think that not sharing the experiences gained from the field did not cause mainly a deficiency in the study. It led to a weakness when the subjectivities of the respondents and the interviewer (sensitivities, interaction processes, angers, joys, silences, confusion and strains, facial expressions, gestures, etc) are excluded.

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[9] See, Asher Shkedi, *Multiple Case Narrative A Qualitative Approach To Studying Multiple Populations*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2005.

**CHAPTER 2**

**POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF RIGHT-WING CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS, THEIR POLITICAL BELONGING AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND**

**2.1 Introduction**

The understanding of the processes which shape the political belonging and political socialization of the right wing conservative politicians in Turkey is crucial for clarifying right wing political tradition and the series of factors influencing political views of the politicians who belonged to this specific tradition. Figuring out these factors would at least make it possible to explain and evaluate the political culture in Turkey by focusing on a single dimension constituted by the politicians who fabricate and transmit that very culture per se. What are the dynamics of being part of right-wing conservative political tradition? Which social, political, ideological, cultural and institutional aspects do prevail while one affiliates himself in to this tradition? How do these factors influence and guide while one forms his/ her political thought, political mindset and belonging?

I will try to identify and assess the determinants of political socialization process within which policy makers of right wing conservative tradition experience in this section. I asked series of questions pertaining to their political past, where and how they started to involve in politics, which factors were effective for their entry into political realm, and if applicable, with which political movements and traditions they were affiliated in their past or youth to the politicians whom I interviewed. But I want to strongly emphasize that, under this title; I will not take the issue a comprehensive framework or context. This stems from the reason that the issue is not a central problematic of the study and has no specific importance and priority. The

main purpose is to determine the major elements in the formation of political belonging and identity, which may effective for the right wing conservative politicians and also to determine the differences and similarities among the politicians in the political socialization process. This will help us to understand the dynamics of difference and similarity points in the right politics through its concrete subjects or perpetrators.

Prior to present my research findings and data about the political socialization process of right-wing conservative politicians in Turkey, it is rather necessary to provide a theoretical and methodological note about this subject. The conspicuous lack of comprehensive and scientific studies and research directly problematizing political socialization process and social class antecedents of politicians in Turkey, or the relative limitations and disparity of the research problematic of the existing studies in a way deprive me of the possibility of drawing a comparison for, or testing my current research findings and data. Though my research problematic and design do not necessarily focus ***directly*** on political socialization, my concern about explaining intellectual, ideological and political discourse(s) of the politicians who belonged to the right wing conservative political tradition makes it essential to inquire about their political socialization process. One exception that can be said to overlap with my research concerns at most is Ayşen Uysal and Oğuz Toprak's joint study.[10] Since this study's problematic directly address politicians, it becomes more in line with my research object. Despite its extremely valuable data and interesting findings, it does not concentrate straightly on the political socialization process of politicians thanks to its dissimilar problematical framework. On the other hand, İsmail Safi's[11] work is a good example for a PhD. study which treats conservatism with respect to political thought and ideologies. Since Safi's study solely deals with AKP politicians, it is not qualified to draw comparisons with politicians belonged to

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[10] Ayşen Uysal and Oğuz Toprak, *Particiler, Türkiye'de Partiler ve Sosyal Ağların İnşası*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010.
[11] Author's dissertation titled *Türkiye'de Muhafazakârlığın Düşünsel-Siyasal Temelleri ve Muhafazakâr Demokrat Kimlik Arayışı* which was submitted to Ankara University, Faculty of Social Sciences in 2005 published as a book with the title *Türkiye'de Muhafazakâr Siyaset ve Yeni Arayışlar*, Ankara, Lotus, 2007.

other conservative parties. Predominantly a study on the institutionalization of AKP, Safi's work also has the dimension examining quantitative information and findings about AKP politicians. I still find the aforesaid work worth-mentioning for its subject matter and focus on the political sphere while disagreeing with its approach and appraisals about conservative politics and ideologies in Turkey.

There is a very comprehensive field study devised by TUBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) and entitled as *The Profile of Conservative Politicians in Turkey* main report of which completed in 2010. This far-reaching study is based on interviews with 3000 politicians who are affiliated with mainstream right wing conservative parties such as AKP, MHP, SP and DP in Turkey in a way incorporating those politicians' *habitus* directly to its scope. This field study is also a pioneering one with regard to its scope and content, and carried out under the leadership of Associate Professor Mustafa Şen. It should be noted that the aforesaid study is worth mentioning considering its critical quantitative and qualitative contributions to the field. Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to evaluate the findings of this study for the time being since they require an independent and comprehensive analysis. My dissertation project, however, is primarily based on the qualitative data obtained by the aforesaid field work. What I basically try to do in my study is to focus on comprehending and analyzing political and ideological envisagement of right wing conservative politicians by employing certain themes and using qualitative data. Accordingly, I handle the political socialization process of right wing conservative politicians in the context of the formation of their *political belonging* on a *very limited scale*.

Once again, among the studies which primarily deal with political socialization, studies directly take politicians into its center or objectify them are conspicuously absent[12]. Generally speaking, the object populations for this type of studies are either

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[12] Existing political socialization studies, however, adopted certain scientific paradigms that include theoretical and methodological approaches from which I refrain to utilize. Studies as such are predominantly the product of behavioral schools that were shaped by the American political science

children or the youth.[13] Such kind of approaches usually takes politics as a process. For instance, with respect to the concept of system introduced by David Easton, the subject of political science is not the psychological individual or sociological group, but rather a political system that is part of a social system in a broad sense and handled empirically[14]. There are also various analytical studies which follow the aforesaid approaches in Turkey. Such studies mostly bring out political participation and political behavior, dynamics of political participation, electoral behaviors and factors impinging on political tendencies[15].

Generally speaking, I tackle with the issue of political socialization quite similar to the framework delineated by Owen. According to Owen (2008), political socialization is a messy, in some ways elusive process. Broadly construed, political socialization is the transmission of political culture to new generations of citizens in a given society. As mentioned by Owen, it is the product of interlocking sets of macro and micro level phenomena. At the macro or political system level, political socialization is the means by which polities and other political societies inculcate

traditions, and these generally focus on the individuals' political actions and tendencies within a structural-functionalist framework.

[13] For a study in this respect, see "İlkokul Çocuklarının Parti Tutmasını Belirleyen Etmenler", Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, in *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme*, ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Alfa Aktüel Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007.

[14] Systems theory, which aims to formulate political phenomena as predictable categories, developed for variety of respects with regard to the utilization of statistical methods. While their origins and theoretical development had a different path, there has been a growing tendency to address interest groups, the elite and political parties within the framework of systems approach. Researches on public opinion and electoral behavior have also taken place in this context.[14] The claims to form an objective political science free from value judgments have faced increasing criticism from social scientists that have rejected positive scienticism beginning from the 1960s onwards. These critics who discard the subduing of spontaneity and human values by determinism have pondered on the idea that positivist and empirical political science does not necessarily require rational and predictable relational and complex social structures (Köker, 2008).

[15] For studies in this respect, see Deniz Baykal, *Siyasal Katılma: Bir Davranış İncelemesi*, Ankara, AÜ SBF Yayınları, 1970; Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976; İlter Turan, *Siyasal Sistem ve Siyasal Davranış*, İstanbul, Der Yayınları, 1976; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Karşılaştırmalı Siyasal Katılma: Siyasal Eylemin Kökenleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, İstanbul, İÜ SBF Yayınları, 1984; Türker Alkan, *Siyasal Toplumsallaşma*, Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1979. More recent studies on the subject are the following Şaban Sitembölükbaşı, *Parti Seçmenlerinin Siyasal Yönelimlerine Etki Eden Sosyoekonomik Faktörler*, Ankara, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2001; Birol Akgün, *Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı, Partiler Sistemi ve Siyasal Güven*, Ankara, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2007; Osman Özsoy, *Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı ve Etkin Propaganda*, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2002.

appropriate norms and practices in citizens, residents, and members. Polities convey established patterns of thought and action, laws and norms, and traditions and folkways through agencies, such as the family, educational system, peer groups, mass media, political institutions, community organizations, religious organizations, and the military. Political socialization constitutes "the patterns and processes by which individuals engage in political development and learning, constructing their particular relationships to the political contexts in which they live" (Sapiro, 2004: 3, cited by Owen, 2008: 5-6). As a result of political socialization, individuals acquire knowledge about the political system and how it works. They internalize the society's political value system and ideology, and come to understand its symbols and rituals. They become informed about the role of active and passive members of the polity, and may participate in political and civic life.

## 2.2 Family: Indispensable Institution of Formation of Political Belonging

One of the main conclusions I reached through interviews is that "family" has a central role in the formation of political identity, political belonging and affiliation with politics in the right wing conservative political tradition. However, it should also be mentioned that family's decisive role in political socialization is not peculiar to any specific political group or tendency. As the research carried out by Uysal and Toprak has shown (2010: 59-67 and 97-112), variety of factors are operative over political socialization, yet family still occupies a special position among these. With respect to the aforementioned study's findings, majority of the political party leaders are affiliated with either the same or similar political traditions with their families. Accordingly, while the party leaders in the right wing of the political spectrum are generally the descendants of families supporting right wing political thought, leftist political party leaders are the children of families supporting political parties in the left-side of the political spectrum (Uysal and Toprak, 2010: 60). The qualitative data of my own research also supports this claim; for the majority of right wing conservative politicians, *family* is the basic unit in which political socialization takes place.

For Bourdieu, family is a collective principle in the constitution of collective reality as a *motto, category* and a construct (Bourdieu, 1994: 135). It is a *nomos* that exists in everybody's mind. Family is also a constitutive element for our habitus; since it is indoctrinated to all socialized minds in one way or another; it is a collective and individual mental construct at once. Family is an implicit law at the foundation of common belief (Bourdieu, 1994: 136). For the majority of politicians affiliated with the political parties that are included in the scope of my study, family as a sphere and as an institution holds such a function by which political convictions, thoughts and traditions are transmitted. Actually, as emphasized by Bourdieu once again, family is one of the basic preconditions for economic, cultural, symbolic privileges and transference. According to Bourdieu, family has a decisive role not only for biological reproduction, but also for *social reproduction*.[16] Family is a perfect sphere for various forms of capital accumulation and capital relocation among generations: *[family] secures its unity for and by means of transmission. Reproduction is the main subject of its strategies*. (1994: 139). According to Althusser who considers family as one of the ideological (repressive) apparatuses of state (Althusser, 1991: 33) family institution not only performs such a function, but it also contributes to the reproduction of the labor force. It is possible to claim that Bourdieu and Althusser's aforecited conceptions about family and family institution are in line with the

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[16] I would like to underline Ahmet Murat Aytaç's critical study in which he observed and warned us about the limitations of notions such as 'social reproduction' and 'socialization' in the approaches regarding family. According to Aytaç, in order to fully comprehend the relationship between family and politics, the way 'political mind' perceives family is required to be criticized. The idea about family that it keeps state and society alive is one of the main bases for conceptualizing family politically. For Aytaç, this viewpoint by which family is argued out as an ideological reproduction unit or an institution for socialization, remains partial in explaining the political characteristics of family. This partiality is caused by the fact that family performs its reproductive function only if the society is *static* and *in balance*. It is *transformation* rather than reproduction in long-term historical processes within which everything changed. According to Aytaç, the relationship between reproduction and transformation does not necessarily need to be mutually exclusive; it is even proper to suggest that the relationship between these two concepts is mostly dialectical (Aytaç, 2007:196). While guarding state, the criticism for modernization project and their contingent nature as much as representing political mind, this approach highlights the difficulties about dealing with family as an absolute 'entity' skillfully. My study's empirical limits and problematic do not favor evaluating family with its aforesaid features. In this regard, while utilizing notions of 'reproduction' and 'socialization' for this study I take Aytaç's theoretical assessments and cautions into account together with acknowledging probable sociological tendencies of reductionism. For a detailed analysis and commentary, see Ahmet Murat Aytaç, *Ailenin Serencamı Türkiye'de Modern Aile Fikrinin Oluşması*, Dipnot Yayınları, Ankara, 2007.

narrative accounts which are gathered for my study to a large extent. Majority of the interviewed politicians[17] have been adopting their familial inheritance regarding [political values] while socializing politically and developing their cultural consciousness, and then transmitting it to the next generation. It seems that family, where political identity and political belonging primarily commences, is an extremely functional institution for *reproduction* and *transmission* of those aspects to future generations.

It is quite often the case for the majority of the studies dealing with conservatism to claim that family is one of the key institutions to which conservatism attributes a special significance. In other words, family is the backbone of conservatism understands of society. As the smallest unit of civil society, family is the outcome of unselected commitment. The legitimacy and exercise of power begins in the family at first (Akkaş, 2004: 131). As Bottomore and Nisbet elucidated with reference to the conservative thinker Bonald, the molecule [nucleolus] of society is not the individual, but family (Bottomore and Nisbet, 1990: 110). Family is the oldest and most triumphant educational institution for [public] education. Bonald imagined family as a monarchy; he deemed father in the position of king and children as the king's subjects. Family in the Bonald's conception is a miniature society itself; it is an essential institution for the development and assurance of the material and spiritual needs of individuals. According to Scruton, social cohesion is possible only with [assistance of] family (Scruton, 1981: 31-33). Since individuals attain their personality in family and it inspires future [generations] for longevity, it has to be sustained under any circumstance. The stability of family institution is interpreted as the guarantee for societal stability in view of the fact that individuals attain their faith in authority within the family (Akkaş, 2004: 131). Also noted by Özipek, for conservatism not only the norms determined by politics and laws, but other norms generated by institutions such as religion, traditions and customs are valid and binding, too (Özipek, 2004: 80). For Özipek, family is the most important institution

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[17] The number of politicians who referred family's such an influence in their narrative recounts with respect to political party affiliation is as follows: 32 out of 40 for AKP, 20 out of 25 in MHP, 18 out of 23 for SP, 19 out of 27 in DP, 4 out of 6 in MP, and 4 out of 5 for BBP.

after and among which other dignified institutions follow. "It would not be an overstatement to claim that family is the smallest ontological entity from which conservatism as an ideology is started to be constructed" (Özipek, 2004: 82). The properties and gravity attributed to the family institution by conservatism in a way explains the major decisive role [that family plays] in the political socialization of right wing conservative politicians. However, as mentioned above, it is not accurate to claim that the decisive role family plays in political socialization is solely reserved to right wing political conservative politicians, or make a generalization from this conclusion. Since the key part family plays for political socialization process is probably applicable for right wing politicians, one needs to be cautious to draw generalizations about this issue. But considering the significance of this aspect in theory of conservatism, it can be claimed that the influence of family is relatively more for the right wing conservative politicians as compared to others. Yet, the need for studies examining the role of family in political socialization of left wing politicians is obvious; such studies would make it possible to have comprehensive and comparative analysis. The crucial role that family plays in determining political identity and political belonging is a chief factor applicable for all politicians affiliated with the right wing conservative parties in the scope of my study.

In the following, the narrative accounts of some of politicians about the major role and distinctive influence assumed by family in the formation of their political identity, political belonging together with their involvement and interest in politics would be examined. As claimed by a AKP politician, 'family is the most important factor that influences politic'. The politician under question thinks that family is the major foundation for the atmosphere in which upbringing takes place and the 'discipline, mores and customs' internalized since the period of childhood. Accordingly, this politician also claimed his parents as pious, and argued that he [fully adopted] the customs and observances of them'. [The process of] adopting his parents' traditions was as follows:

> "(…) I especially would like to mention that it was not a coercive process in view of the fact
> that I also have studied abroad. Upon my return from abroad, I had the chance to attend an

Italian or an Australian high school, but I did not want to use this opportunity, rather I chose to attend the [vocational] school for religious functionaries. I think that this was the result of my father's inculcations that penetrated into my subconscious. As my father presented two of the options for me to choose [and] to [see] for which one I would make my preference. Then I chose the school for religious functionaries, and I was shaped accordingly." (A9)

According to another AKP politician who believes that an individual definitely subject to influences from others while adopting certain values **(A1),** 'the personal peculiarities ingrained in one' are transmitted mainly from family and parents. While underlining 'family's absolute influence', this politician also claims that 'his family has a major role for his innate right-wing political affiliation.' Another politician from MHP reported that 'his elder brothers' influenced him 'politically' by their conduct, positions, discipline and manners, but it was still his family to provide the main decisive impact. He continues to argue as follows:

"(…) we have such a tradition in our family. One of our relatives who affiliated with right wing politics used to be a deputy from Erzurum during the (XX) government. [Therefore] there is such a family tradition [in this respect]. In addition to this, as I already mentioned, the exemplary behaviors of elder brothers who performed administrative tasks at Hearths of Ideal in that period also had influenced me. Although I was younger, I was responsive about national issues. I had thoughts that Turkey was not properly governed. And these [thoughts] caused me to be interested in politics, but as I previously mentioned, the influence of [my] family was a primary one." (M4)

As an exemplary for the transmission of political thought, political heritage and tradition by the medium of family, the narrative account of a SP politician is strikingly illustrative:

"Ever since I can remember, I have been part of politics. I cannot suggest a specific date for my entry into politics. It is [rather] my father's heritage. Beginning from his childhood, my father also had been active in various positions in political parties in line with National Vision [Milli Görüş] tradition. During Welfare Party [Refah Partisi] rule and between (xx-xx), he functioned as the head of the party's district centre corps. We were always part of this environment enduringly, [I mean] political environment in (X). Starting from (xx), I participated to the establishment of FP [Saadet Partisi]. Apart from this, I had been partaking

in the activities in FP's youth branch during my university years. I officially became affiliated with FP beginning from (xx). My political background is as such (…) as I mentioned earlier, the primary influence for politics was from my acquaintances and family. I praise the fact that I grew up with the accuracy and truth, that's what I think. My family was the main factor that shaped me. After growing older, attending university and becoming a learned [person], and given the fact that you are perceptive about issues regarding Turkey and the world, you become cognizant of certain things. Thus, my observations and [the roots of political tendency] stem from my family." (S4)

The account of another SP politician is suggestive in terms of underlining reproduction and transmission of political belonging and heritage by means of a father figure:

"Actually, my father (XY) is the founding and first president of the provincial branch of National Order Party [Milli Nizam Partisi] in (X). In other words, he was the founding presidents of the provincial branches of National Order Party, National Salvation Party [Milli Selamet Partisi], Welfare Party [Refah Partisi], and founder and inspector for the Felicity Party, which are all started under the guidance of Erbakan Hoca's independent action. I took over the mission from my father at Welfare Party. Our stand in Welfare Party or embrace of National Vision has a very long history, Erbakan Hoca was a person that we used to host when he visited (X). Therefore, our stand in National Opinion started at my home when I was a kid and we still keep being part of it. Prior to the closing down of Welfare Party in the previous era, I served as the member for Welfare Party in the provincial council. I also worked in provincial branches of Welfare, Virtue [Fazilet] and Felicity Parties, and functioned as vice provincial chair but it is perhaps the heritage left my father that I am part of this particular community." (S24)

For a DP politician who embarked on his political carrier while he was upon his father's heels when he was a party member, the influence of family is as follows:

"(…) it is a similar case like dynastic [succession that a position] passes from father to son. The main reason for this was that my father's political views influenced me. I started to visit the premises of True Path Party [Doğru Yol Partisi] along my father in that period; although a civil servant, my father was very active within the party organization. " (D2)

For another politician from DP who claimed to spend nearly all his life in politics, politics is also 'a tradition that is prolonged within the family'. According to him:

> "(…) it is a sort of tradition that continues among us, for example it started with my grandfather, and continued with my father, and me, and it will also be carried on by my children, we are a family of politicians. In my childhood and early adolescence period, people were a bit distanced from the media. I mean I was shaped politically thanks to my father's sole conveyance about what was happening. Needless to say, I was acquainted with events in our country either by newspapers or what my father reported about what was going on." (D6)

A DP politician, who reported to be the 'member of an old family that had Democratic Part vision' and 'shaped' his political thoughts and political belonging within such a family, argues as follows:

> "(…) my own [paternal] uncle was a Democratic Party (X) deputy during (xx-xx) period. While a senior member in the judiciary, he was invited into politics by Menderes himself. My uncle was among the fifteen condemned to death, he was [indeed] among the three ones condemned to death and other twelve condemned to life imprisonment after 1960 coup d'état. So I am from such a family." (D7)

A narrative account of a BBP [Grand Unity Party] politician on political identity and political belonging does not provide an exception in this respect. While emphasizing family's significance in this context, he touches upon other elements, too:

> "(…) the first influence certainly comes from the family, then the neighborhood, now the so-called [ concept] of neighborhood pressure may arise (…) The fact that neighbors, friends and acquaintances, all of them were involving in politics in the same venue definitely had an impact on me, too. But the main reason was the striking overlap in between some of my thoughts with those of theirs. Erzurum is a city that rooms both people nourished from conservatism and rightist or leftist extremist people. Nevertheless, the principal factor is the family and the city's cultural atmosphere. These are most important things that caused me to be in politics. " (B1)

**2.3 Beyond the Family**

Despite an insignificant trend, it should be indicated that there are politicians who do not believe family has a decisive function in this respect. Those politicians who disagree about family's decisive function for political socialization and political belonging argue that their education, various trainings that they received and their intellectual orientation and knowledge affected the formation of their political socialization and political belonging. It is known that a considerable amount of people from conservative communities who organize their lives around traditional social codes and cultural practices support CHP and parties derived from it instead of right wing conservative parties for various motives. [Among these motives, one can count] respect for Atatürk and İnönü, the reminiscences of Independence War, traditions inherited from the 'ancestors or grandfathers' and *pacta sunt servenda* [ahde vefa]. The recounts of politicians from the families whose profile described above are crucial in terms of envisioning their political socialization process. The accounts of politicians having such a profile but have changed their political line provide interesting sociological references both for their approach to 'the left' that they describe, and the fluctuation in their political biographies. The narratives provided here in this section are noteworthy for positing family as an indecisive rather than absolute element, and the interplay of other aspects for the political socialization.

The recount of a AKP politician, who referred to his family's political tradition as supportive toward CHP and 'leftists', is striking also for revealing the typical features of the community described above :

> "I used to be a leftist person considering my childhood, youth and university life. But it was not the left as we know. I was a leftist who performed daily prayers. This is something that I inherited from our ancestors, it is a tradition, there were many [like me] in the past. My late grandfather used to support RPP, and my father, too, and then I also did the same thing. We were RPP followers performing prayers. There is an expression like tremble, and then behave yourself! and after graduating from the university, I made a sort of self-criticism, [I told

myself] 'you perform prayers and feel close to the left [at once]' Huh! I had never voted [until then], and this is yet another issue. Then I tackled all political parties one by one, I considered Motherland Party, I thought about National Movement Party, then Welfare Party and True Path Party. As a result, I decided upon the Welfare Party. (…) My family had no political influence over me. See, I was the first conservative one in my family. I mean politically conservative. As I told, my family was all for the left, I was the only one different among them. But they are in line with me now. I guess these will change in time. People change their preferences with regard to the position of the [party] leaders." (A31)

An account of a politician from Saadet Party is worth to note [here] in terms of reflecting a similar tendency:

"My father was somewhat supportive of CHP. However, my elder brothers and so on were people all adopted the National Opinion. The circle I belonged was moderate in terms of religious observances, in other words my family was trying to practice their religion. My father was a follower of RPP, but in those days, when they uttered İsmet Pasha, they naturally talked about him. They used to talk about İsmet Pasha as such and such, yet, I and my dad rather differed in opinion." (S20)

A AKP politician who claimed that his family did not imprint anything on his political thought and political belonging argues as follows:

"(…) Family aspect in politics is very interesting; my family [members] has never even expressed their opinion to me about whether to be involved or not in politics. Actually it is not an attitude solely applicable for politics. They have never been officious for my life, i.e., while choosing my occupation, my spousal preference, for the rest of my life, or for the life I live, and they leave the decisions to me. Therefore I cannot say that my family was surely decisive. " (A29)

Though not directly highlighting the influence of family, both of the recounts below provide remarkable clues about decisiveness of family culture in an indirect way. The family of a 'rural-based' and 'recently right-wing' politician from MHP is 'conservative', that is, they follow Justice Party and they were pro-Demirel'. The basic motivation for him to be a right-wing, the left-wing, even for his 'nippy revolutionary stance' and 'idealism' was to stand with 'the oppressed':

"I started to get involved with politics in the boarding school. Prior to 1980, boarding schools were the focal point for politics and [various] ideologies. In other words, every time the government changed, this brought in change in the cadres of boarding schools. Each new cadre used to appeal to the students in a way serving their own ideology as far as possible. When I started the university, National Front [MC] government was in power. The faculty I was attending was in control of right-wing [groups]. And I am a village-based person and yes with respect to my origin I am right-wing affiliated today. You know, my family was conservative, following Justice Party and pro-Demirel. But I used to be pro-left at the beginning, once I should say this. While studying at the university, due to the cruelties that the leftist friends bore with, the improper treatment and encroachments inflicted on them, I became a leftist since my nature required that, and I stood with the oppressed. In other words, I became a nippy revolutionary in those days. Then the government changed. When Ecevit government was in power, I saw that the idealists, the right wing started to be oppressed. Then I changed sides, went into the other rank. See, since that time I have been a person who is known as a nationalist and idealist. Then, let me ask, what is the normal? The normal is to affiliate with the one in power, i.e., the ones controlling the school, it is normal for people like me to commit with that [currently dominant] ideology. But I actually did the opposite, I made a reverse thing, I have a *manufacturing defect*. The school passed into idealists' control, then I became a leftist, it passed into leftists' hands, I became an idealist. I am such an eccentric." (…) "As I claimed at the beginning, I cannot say that it was the family, if my family had an influence, I would not affiliate with the left. (…) So, yes, I do have indeed a political view, but this does not limit me. I do not act out with regard to my fanatical beliefs, I can easily relate to anybody, I attend all kinds of meetings, and I read and write. I grew up reading the works of Yaşar Kemal and Kemal Tahir. I did read. I read all kinds of works, either from the left or the right." (M17)

The narrative account of a Saadet Party politician, whose family is rather distant from politics but can be deemed 'right-wing affiliated in general' and also 'ready to vote for somebody from the left if a relishing candidate appears', is also notable for exemplifying the recalibration of one's political road map from the family:

"Well both my family and the social milieu that I belonged at those times were not indeed convenient at all for my affiliation with a party in the National Vision line. The social setting I came from was far from such a state of mind, but I decided that the most suitable path to be taken was the National Vision as a result of my interest in social issues and my consequent probing toward all of the political mentalities, and I came to accept National Vision line. It

was not like, such as, you know, it is very common in our organizations, a person's father had been part of these corps since the times that he acquired a head for politics, then that father's son grew up in there, hovering around , etc., so, for him to be part of any other line would be a surprise. My experience was not like this. I mean there has been nobody in my family affiliated with the corps. Generally speaking, [my family] is distant to politics. It is a right-wing affiliated party, but [my family members] are like being able to vote for a leftist candidate if him relishing enough for them, but let me tell that they have no interest in politics. If we broaden the margins of family circle and include my kin group, [one sees that] there are all kinds of individuals from variety of [political beliefs] from social democrat to nationalist. There aren't many supporting National Opinion at the time, then I myself added that line [into my kin group]. " (S16)

A MHP politician claimed to be from 'a social democratic home', and to grow up with love for Atatürk, country, nation and flag in a familial setting where 'the elderly used to scold him if he was lying down while the call for prayer was given', argues that he has 'concerns' about the political tradition that his family belongs. His suspicions about his family's political tradition are centered on 'unitary structure of the country and the country's integrity, its unity and peaceful existence, and he therefore believes MHP is the most convenient party for his precision about the aforesaid issues:

"(…) as I said, I was brought up in a home that follows social democratic [political thought] I grew up with the love for Atatürk, I was raised with love for country, nation [and] flag. Our elderly used to scold us if we stretch our legs while call for prayer was given. I reached my current position by experiencing all of these, but after these certain suspicions occurred about what I did live. If there is a requirement to defend the unitary constitution of this country, its integrity, unity and peaceful existence, I believe it must be done unconditionally at once. What is all about this unconditional [situation]? My conduct in this respect is like razor's edge. This sense, I believe Nationalist Movement Party is the most convenient party to me..." (M9)

Despite the fact that he attributes primacy to "his personal opinions and tendencies" for determining his political behavior instead of his family's, the DP politician's family is a 'conservative' one in *the end,* and 'he was grew up in a democratic

family'. For the politician whose narrative recount revealed below, family factor also has some weight but he does not prefer to highlight this [influence]:

> "Instead of factors like family, my own political opinion and tendencies were more decisive for politics. One needs to deal with this issue from the vantage point of heredity. It is related to your perspective about life, there is surely an influence from the family, I grew up in a conservative family, and I brought up in a democrat family. When my freedom was restricted, I rebelled. It was all like this. That's what I saw in my childhood. I mean I always wanted people to have freedom, and live as they wish, practice their religion the way they wanted, so everything was shaped accordingly. This is what can be called as the influence of my family. Otherwise, no other factors influenced me. I was contemplating to involve in politics for serving my country and my people. [To realize this], there was Democratic Party, [I mean] the True Path Party [as the offshoot of Democratic Party] at the time, I entered into politics this way. There was no other factor." (D4)

With regard to these narratives, it is obviously evident that family institution is decisive and influential for the political socialization of right-wing conservative politicians. Yet, this does not certainly derive from the fact that family is an absolute and sole entity. The influence concerned here seems to be depending on the capacity by which the family transmits social, cultural and political values and traditions that it inherited from the past to the individuals by means of reproducing them.

## 2.4 The Crucial Role of DP in the Political Belonging

Another finding of my research is the significance of the [historic[18]] Democratic Party for the transmission of political tradition and belonging. Together with the beginning of multi-party regime, Democratic Party's dramatic role that it assumed in politics for variety of respects stands out to be a very crucial one especially for the political socialization of right-wing conservative politicians. Irrespective of the political party affiliation, the appreciable amount of the politicians that I interviewed referred to the Democratic Party in one way or another, either with regard to their

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[18] I felt the necessity to use this prefix to prevent confusion with the Democratic Party included in the scope of my research.

family or their own experiences while narrating the formation of their political belonging. As one would expect, while these reference(s) are directly uttered by politicians from the right-wing conservative line, politicians from other parties make these references by taking different contexts in to account. In other words, it is revealed that [historic] Democratic Party has been a very prominent political institution for the formation of political identity and political belonging of politicians from AKP, MHP, SP and BBP.[19] Although the impact of historic Democratic Party is related to what it represented in political sphere, it also contains dimensions that can be described as symbolic and emotional. This symbolism was particularly embodied in the personalities of Adnan Menderes and his colleagues, and the accompanying sentimentality is meaningful for revealing how significant the influence that historical memory posits for the formation political identity. The political belonging and political position shaped on the basis of opposition to Republican Peoples Party, its (Kemalist-modernist) ideology as represented at various levels and different implications of it gains embodiment by means of Democratic Party in the narrative accounts of right-wing conservative politicians. It seems viable to argue that Democratic Party, which represents one of the sociological implications of political polarization in Turkey in the medium of a [political] party by the coming of multi-party era, also delineates the connotation in the collective memory of right wing conservatism as a strong political symbolism. I believe that the interviews conducted for this study are critical in terms of demonstrating the significant impact that the collective memory and collective knowledge posits for the construction of political identity and political belonging. However, this ascertainment does not necessarily require to disregard structural and historical elements as well as relations such as

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[19] Conjectural and historical dimension of Democratic Party's such influence within right-wing conservative tradition should not be disregarded. I believe that the even possibility of especially AKP's attitude and discourse embracing Democratic Party tradition might have found requital among 'broad-silent conservative' sections of society must be taken into consideration. Despite the absence of data and studies supporting this claim, whether nationalist and Islamist circles in right-wing tradition of pre-1980 historical-social milieu embrace Democratic Party the way it is embraced today or the need to build a state of belonging exist are the points that must be discussed in my opinion. See Poyraz Kolluoğlu, "AKP'nin Demokrat Parti 'Fantezisi'", *BirGün Gazetesi*, 24 Temmuz 2011 which is an article that primarily assesses AKP's relationship with (historic) Democratic Party, at http://www.birgun.net/politics_index.php?news_code=1311505953&year=2011&month=07&day=24

relations and mode of production, class, gender, etc... Since my research does not comprise a data set that would examine and analyze such aspects, I have to content with solely making reference to them. Keeping the limitations of my research in mind, I would like to emphasize the fact that the historicity that is either 'buried' or 'carved' into the depths of cultural and social memory as part of political belonging and identity building process must not be overlooked.

A respectable number of the politicians I consulted referred to Democratic Party and/or Justice Party tradition(s) for variety of ways while talking about the origins of their political opinions and identities. Here, one discovers that relationality is formed frequently by means of family tradition. The quotes below can be comprehended as representative texts for revealing the position and significance of Democratic Party in the collective memory of right-wing conservative tradition. For instance, the narrative account of one of the politicians from MHP also involves observations about the aspects of class and religion that AP and CHP voters were based:

> "(…) All along the period in which my intellect transformed into wisdom and I became able to analyze my relation with human beings and objects, politics is something which was e widely discussed in every house and every sphere of life in Erzurum. As the elderly called it in those times, the *ajans* [news] had to be listened. While listening to the news, making comments or engaging in disputes in a civilized manner were things that our elderly did quite often before us. Although I had a very poor family, daily newspapers were certainly bought. We used to read daily paper. Perhaps the absence of internet and television brought about a primarily conversation- based atmosphere for us to grow up. Despite his poverty, my father was a good reader. He used to call himself as Democrat ["Demir Kırat"]. The ones other than Demir Kırat were generally usurpers. I mean the city's rich. These people were the landlords of both Pasin and Daphan Plains. They were generally fedora wearing- Peoples Party supporters. For whatever the reason, they all grew Hitler's moustache. In our subconscious, People's Party was equaled to squirearchy, wealth, pride: being oppressed, living on one's own labor was equaled to be like a democrat [Demir Kırat]. By the way, what was the role of religion at this point? These bunches of squirearchs were seen as 'dinigollik', which is an expression belongs to Erzurum. (…) Though not spoken, it was felt that the said Demir Kırat tradition was a bit more libertarian in terms of religious freedom. You see, I was a poor Demir Kırat family's child. (…) I used to be kid sympathized with the Democrat or Demir

Kırat tradition. (…) consequential traumas that I experienced drifted me against the political movement which led a coup against Menderes." (M3)

The testimony of a AKP politician about Democratic Party and the "right-wing mentality' put in association with Democratic Party is also remarkable for how he took up the influence of his father, the issues discussed within the family and daily papers read altogether :

"Let me say that it was a custom at my home to converse about affairs regarding Turkey and the world together with politics. Although politics was my father's special interest and the news were always listened, there was no body politically active in my family active in politics. For example there was only one type of newspaper brought into the village. In those days, only the newspaper called Tercüman used to get there, I realized why it was so later, but I remember that Tercüman was the only newspaper [available in the village]. I was always present while my father was chatting with his friends. Thus, I got the initial influences for my subconscious quite probably from the frequent conversations about right-wing thought and Democratic Party. There was yet another influence, though it was not completely conscious. Namely, I used to eavesdrop some doubts regarding Islam and Islamic observances in the time of Atatürk. Namely, a sort of standoff [I felt about] how Islam is practiced in Turkey, how to make up for the some deficiencies about these. I was brought up in such a familial environment. That is to say I grew up in a family setting where people were responsive both for religious and national values and talking about politics, which was a home that Ottoman times were yearned for. Subconsciously, my perception was like this, that's to say." (A14)

It is possible to argue and analyze the importance that Democratic Party generally indicates for right-wing political tradition in variety of dimensions, however, only the Democratic Party's historical function for the formation of political belonging and identity will be deliberated here in this section. If one looks at the narrative accounts of politicians from various parties, it becomes obvious that the functionality that DP performed for the formation of political belonging and identity is emphasized in empirical terms sufficiently. The social and historical foundations of the formation of political belonging found its political correspondence in institutional terms in the Democratic Party. The center right political sphere which was developed parallel to

the introduction of multi-party regime, and the conservative thought that found the opportunity to progress and rendition in that sphere actually determined the ground where right-wing politics conducted in Turkey. It is the common conclusion of many studies conducted about DP that Democratic Party movement was an umbrella political organization made up of a broad social coalition and the alliance among variety of oppositions against CHP's single party rule and policies (Mert, 2003: 315).

With regard to Nuray Mert's analysis, the transition from half-theocratic constitutional monarchy to secular republic with the proclamation of Republic in 1923 was fundamental enough and modernist-westernization oriented cultural revolution parallel to this transition was also a change that would create distress in any given society (2001: 45-46). The development that marked the political life in Turkey commencing from the transition to multi-party life was the emergence of an opportunity for the various responses that were formed against the enormous change suddenly took place since 1920s. As a matter of fact, Democratic Party, which was established in 1946 and laid the foundations not only for the center-right but whole of the right wing tradition, built up its politics on the mobilization of these very reactions. Democratic Party became the junction point for all reactions against radical policies of republic that put at work in social and cultural levels. The opposition to the social elitism of single party rule and western-oriented cultural policies worked as factor that unites people from various segments of society under the same roof. Under such circumstances, the majority of the ones, who fell outside the narrow and elite circle of westernized and city-based bureaucrats of single-party era, were either landlords or peasants, rural artisans or [petty] merchants that could partake in the same side. The center right was represented by parties voted intensely and for a long time by lower-order economic strata beginning from 1950s onwards (Mert, 2001: 48). Yet, it should be noted that it is not quite fair to attribute over-decisiveness to the impact of Democratic Party on right-wing political tradition and right wing politicians. As Nuray Mert claims in another study, *the mental background* and *emotional map* of center right, the outward challenge as a reaction to single party era were all, indeed, determined from a remote [position] to Republican

revolution. Thus, within the sphere where one stood aloof from secular national identity created by the republic, developed [new] vessels, [namely] the right wing nationalism that complements national identity with religious and historical motifs and religious conservatism that highlights religious identity. Beginning from the 1960s, these vessels expanded outside the center right and the process, in which these vessels transformed into political parties such as NWP-NMP and NOP-NSP, became the case. It is useful to remember that these vessels have always coexisted with the liberal line under the roof of right-wing politics. In fact, this coexistence within the National Front governments of 1970s also manifested as coalitions among the [political] parties (Mert, 2007: 25). However, it is not proper to call the relationships among right-wing tradition, Islamist and nationalist-conservative blocks as free of tensions, as a linear and continuous consensus. There has always been a conflicting and fluctuating relationship among these separate structures and ideologies. As Taşkın argues (2007: 84), "while Islamism or nationalist conservatism represented two most powerful and essentialist currents that claimed for most authentic representation for Turkish right, center right tradition vindicated the standing for these two currents in the axis of the myth of "national will itself". In addition to prioritizing the elimination of Islamists and nationalist wings to succeed in getting independent and autonomous representation mechanism for themselves seriously since the Democratic Party's establishment, the center right leadership also heeded for articulating such sensibilities [as Islam and nationalism]. As a response [to DP's stance], Islamist and nationalist conservative currents also embarked to impose their doctrines on the center right."

It seems possible to claim that Democratic Party, and Justice Party in part symbolically provided a foundation for political belonging and sociological-historical root-reference for politicians from various right-wing conservative parties with respect to the aforecited narrative accounts and theoretical evaluations. The aforesaid position to be a reference also affects the interrelationships among different right-wing parties and politicians at various levels. These levels appear to facilitate at large ideological and discursive commonality among right-wing conservative parties

and mutual transivity. It also gives the impression that the same sort of relation explains the intensity of mobilization and transivities at institutional and organizational levels among parties. In this regard, the ideological phenomena which enable common cognitive ground among right-wing conservative parties materialized predominantly on the dimension of religion and nationalism. A more generalized evaluation would be the fact that the differences that occur in right-wing conservative political tradition are the results of specific emphasis exercised on these two ideologies. However, this does not necessarily mean that right wing conservative political parties do not have substantive discourses and ideologies of their own.

## 2.5 Ideological and Political Transitivites in the Formation of Political Belonging

There are distinctive characteristics both at institutional-organizational and ideological-political levels that unsurprisingly distinguish each of the right wing political parties included in the scope of my research. It should be, however, emphasized that despite their entire differences, a sociological common ground that enable mobilization and transivity among different parties in the right-wing conservative tradition is the case. In here, such a sociological outcome or [common] ground will be analyzed as part of political socialization. In other words, the politicians affiliated with various parties within the right-wing conservative tradition can adopt very flexible attitudes both for institutional-organizational and ideological-political ways. To put it more concretely, while it is possible for a politician who used to be affiliated with nationalism [idealism] to engage in politics within SP or DP currently, another politician that used to be within SP for politics can deal with politics today in nationalist movement or in a center-right party. This, in my opinion, underlines a crucial condition which is indispensable to comprehend the specific trait of right wing conservative political tradition in Turkey. As Tanıl Bora unerringly emphasized, "We are accustomed to the conceptualization of nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as three distinct and ideological positions. With the overlaps, common denominators and collection-extraction [processes], this trio can be regarded as the terms for a zero-sum game of the right-wing politics and

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ideology" (Bora, 1999: 7). Accordingly, Bora also assumes that there is interpenetration among this trio and they are like harmonious organs of the right-side of the body. While he suggests tackling nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as "states [of being]" instead of positions, he interprets nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as forms of occurrences of the Turkish right wing that can transform into each other (Bora, 1999: 8). Thus, the accounts of the interviewed politicians seem to support Bora's interpretations at various levels. The narrative account of a AKP politician who claimed to be close to the right wing thought in general and spend his childhood in Hearths of Ideal is worth-to cite in this respect:

> "Generally speaking, I feel closer to right-wing thought, and I enrolled into AKP since I believed that it had adopted that thought." (…) "My grandfather was a strong supporter of CHP, my father was as an ardent follower of DP, and I am an enthusiastic supporter of AK Party [JDP] in the family. I spent my childhood in the Hearths of Ideal [Ülkü Ocakları] but this was neither official nor active. I just kept going there while I was kid." (A5)

Another AKP politician reported to grow up in a family that was "predisposed to the right-wing" emphasized that despite he finds incorporation of religion into politics wrong, it was a primary aspect for his engagement in politics:

> "Since I grew up in a family that was predisposed to the right-wing, perception regarding religion is decisive for me. I oriented towards the party which was religious, namely, towards the Welfare Party, unavoidably. The first and primary decisive aspect was the religion, which was what oriented me to the politics. But now I believe that perception was not right. I mean I do not believe that religion is an aspect that should be embraced in a political party. Religion is something else. " (A24)

When examining another AKP politician's 'political road map'[20], it is seen that one can come side by side with nationalists as 'an action' in a 'conservative-sectarian' line vis-à-vis 'leftist or communist' circles:

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[20] The concept of 'political road map' is utilized for bearing the same meaning in Uysal and Toprak's study. With respect to this, political road map corresponds to the political socialization process and tendencies of subjects who are within politics. For details, see Ayşen Uysal and Oğuz Toprak, *Particiler Türkiye'de Partiler ve Sosyal Ağların İnşası*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010.

"In my school days, there was a circle called leftist or communist with respect to the popular statement of the time. We used to be a small nationalist-sectarian group. That leftist circle tended to be battering, oppressing, and coming over us. Though not necessarily a nationalist at the time, I had to take the nationalists' side against the leftist. Besides, we had a feature to take a stand for the oppressed as a nation. For example, due to the reasons I talked about, I always have had an instinct to feel a sympathy or take side with the nationalists. Since they were a small, oppressed group, I was side by side with the nationalist by not on the basis of opinion but basis of action. And it used to be so until the time of AK Party." (A27)

A politician of SP, whose family supports MHP, emphasizes practices such as performing daily ritual prayers, participating into the activities of various associations and attending Koran schools as peculiar to the city he lives as follows:

"My family used to support Nationalist Movement Party. But since the secondary school I have performed daily prayers, participated into summer courses in various associations and foundations and attended Koran schools in (X) as a custom peculiar to (X). Besides the influence of many individuals, my circle was decisive for me in terms of politics." (S7)

Another SP politician mentioned that he started to involve in politics in the 'community of idealists' automatically as an exigency caused by his 'opposition to the youth group who aspired to introduce communism into Turkey', the way he was brought up and his family environment as follows:

"I started to involve in active politics for the first time in the period of (XX-XX) when I graduated from the [Vocational] High School for Religious Functionaries. Namely, there were two student movements with regard to the circumstances of the time, one of them aspired to preserve the system, and the other desired to introduce communism into Turkey as far as I know. And certainly I automatically took part within the group which was positioned against the leftist youth as my family circle and my bringing up necessitated. In other words, I started to involve in politics in the community of idealist as it was called at the time: I took part in idealist community. You know, we founded hearths, conversed in those hearths. Then the period of rest started for me in the aftermath of the case of September 12 as many others. Within that period of rest, my inquiries led me to think that doing politics in another atmosphere would be more viable, and I got the idea that National Opinion which was the line of Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan was more appropriate for me." (S23)

A narrative account of a DP politician, who highlighted the political environment prior to 12 September 1980, exemplifies the fluctuations in political attitude over time. Though he espoused center right political thought, he argues that political conjuncture at issue 'inescapably' led him to be closer to the idealist movement:

"(…) When I went to study at the university in Ankara, I realized that there was no youth base for the center right and center left parties active in Turkish politics. Neither Republican People's Party nor Justice Party had such a base. I experienced a political climate where leftist youth sympathized with the more radical left, and rightist youth felt attracted to more radical right. Therefore, under the influence of such a political climate I too became a sympathizer for MHP unavoidably. During my university years, I kept closer to MHP line, to idealist movement despite the fact that I was an ardent supporter of Justice Party when I entered the university. The institutions I studied such as Hacettepe University or METU were universities where leftists were the majority and a great pressure exercised on us. That leftist pressure really bothered me [us]. The demonstration-oriented pressure exercised by leftist groups on us [me] inescapably led me to be under the umbrella of radical left. Many of my friends who felt like me manifestly drifted into the youth organization of Nationalist Movement Party that can be counted as a radical one in the right lane of politics. I lived in a climate where idealists commanded for some part of my studentship at the university, not applicable for whole of it, only couple of years, however, but when the quarrels and fights reached the point of killings, I realized that this would not make any good to Turkey and left the idealist movement while I was still a student.." (D15)

The recount of another DP politician is also striking for illustrating the political fluctuation within the right-wing conservative tradition. This politician was introduced into National Turkish Student Union[21], Necip Fazıl Kısakürek[22] who was

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[21] For a detailed and pioneering study on NTSU see M. Çağatay Okutan's study entitled *Bozkurt'tan Turan'a Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) 1916-1980*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004 and also look at Doğan Duman and Serkan Yorgancılar's joint work titled *Türkçülükten İslamcılığa Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, Vadi Yayınları, Ankara, 2008.

[22] Having been a prominent literary, intellectual and political figure for nearly all circles within right-wing conservative tradition, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek is commemorated as 'the master' by people from this people. There is a very substantial literature on him thanks to his literary, intellectual and political personality. Though it is not possible to cite all of these works here, one should see Orhan Okay, *Necip Fazıl Kısakürek*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1987 which is a work primarily deals with Kısakürek's state of art and works; Mehmet Nuri Şahin and Mehmet Çetin, *Doğumunun 100. Yılında Necip Fazıl Kısakürek*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 2004 for a collection of essays that recounts for different aspects about Kısakürek, and Elizabeth Özdalga's

a very important figure for right-wing conservative politics and ideological tradition as well as Kısakürek's own 'systematization', the notion of Great East[23]. He basically became aware of the relationships between Turkishness and Muslimhood and debates about 'synthesis-oriented' approach together with the 'attractiveness' of the idea of Great East:

"I became acquainted with National Turkish Student Association when I was a second grader at high school prior to the university years, I attended seminars there, then there was an institution called Youth Organization here in (X), this was related to Nur Community but it worked quite similar to the Justice Party's youth branches at those times. Since I was the child of a family rather supportive of Justice Party and Democratic Party tradition, I also attended seminars in Justice Party so and so forth. Later, at the university, I became part of National Turkish Student Union between (XX-XX). Then I discovered Necip Fazıl Kısakürek in that period. He had a book titled Great East that you perhaps read. That book was rather charming for me. Within that book, Turkishness leads, Islam accompanies it, Turkishness and Islam go hand in hand, and it is a such an interesting synthesis. This is actually an issue for a long chat. We used to be called as *Great Easternists* within the National Turkish Student Association's branch there. After a while, as *Great Easternist* we were started to be excluded since the student union turned out to be the performing base for National Salvation Party. To tell you the truth, I did not find the exclusive stress on Islam proper. Religion was religion, but integrating it to the center of politics did not appeal to me at all. On that occasion I started to detach myself gradually. Somewhat we looked like, I mean, disclosed ourselves there, and we were not many. No matter we tried to struggle, the former atmosphere started to

article titled "Tasavvuf Bahçelerinde Dolaşan Bir Milli Kahraman: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek" in *Toplum ve Bilim,* 1997, no.74.

[23] Great East [Büyük Doğu] is the title of a journal published by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. As published under the leadership of Necip Fazıl, this journal created reactions from the government for its strong opposition both during single party rule and Democratic Party period. If half of the lawsuits filed against him in 1950s ended up with convictions, Necip Fazıl would have been imprisoned for more than 300 years. In the period between 1940 and 1980, his work and political activity stood out as an Islamic school of thought, and he therefore influenced many thinkers, politicians and intellectuals of the time who were close to Islamism. The journal is commemorated as follows; "Great East Journal, which was published by Necip Fazıl the great thinker while he was struggling against the great blasphemy, has been a milestone for the education of nationalist Muslim youth". See Hüdavendigar Onur, *Türk Sağı Sözlüğü*, Biyografi.net Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004. Great East is also the name for the thought system applied for Great East Movement which was established by Necip Fazıl. As he explained in his work titled *İdeolocya Örgüsü* [Path for Ideology], with this system of thought he manifests a unique examination of history, understanding of state, aesthetic point of view, and intellectual stance. For a skillful assessment of the journal and his ideas, see Cemil Koçak, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinin İslam'la Buluşması Büyük Doğu", in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, *Milliyetçilik*, Vol. 4, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, pp. 601-613.

disappear. There was an acute political polarization in that period; those were the times that political crimes turned into petty offences (…) I had lots of idealist [ülkücü] friends. By the way, I have an element in my character; I have never been a fanatic. I sit down, discuss, or deliberate; the main issue is the opinion. You may have very remarkable things to say as I may have, and finally, all these issues we defend related to the piece of land we inhabit, they are affairs regarding to the interest of land we call fatherland. " (D16)

Similar kind of a political road map is also evident in the case of another DP politician who partook in idealist movement during university years:

"I was born in (XX), and now (xx) years old. During my university years in Ankara I was among the idealist [ülkücü] youth. After I graduated and started to work in a state institution, I was again among the rightist people. As much as the conditions of working as a state employee allows, I partook within the conservative segment of society once more. I carried this on for a while without changing my direction until the year (xx). In (xx), I joined True Path Party" (D12)

Though it is not surprising for a BBP politician who grew up in a family supporting Democratic Party, then Justice Party to attend MHP and hearths of ideal as a 'child', his account is still prominent in terms of its factual entity:

"My family is from the ones supporting the tradition and mentality of Justice Party and Democratic Party. My grandfather and father dealt with politics with the mentality of Justice Party and Democratic Party as well as supporting them, and I am the member of such a party finally. My secondary and high school years coincided with the years between (xx-xx). The incontestable condition of Turkey in those (xx-xx) years caused the children of people who had the mentality of Democratic Party tended to be in line with NMP and take part or become a member in Hearths of the Ideal, thanks to the overlap of opinions. Let's call it a necessity arose from the family structure of those times. I just found myself in the Hearths of Ideal. Those days were in (xx-xx). My university years were spent in working within the Hearths of Ideals likewise. In the aftermath, I partly dealt with commerce, and then my officialdom started. After I retired in (xx), I started to involve in politics officially. I became the (X) head of Grand Unit Party (BBP) (X) years ago formally, and I carry on this way. My political past consists of these, in sum." (B1)

When the above narratives analyzed altogether, it can be suggested that nationalism, religion and attitude towards the left functioned as a common ground for the formation of political belonging and identity for the politicians in right-wing conservative political tradition. Despite the substantive character and boundaries that political ideologies impose in the formation of political belonging, they do not prevent transitions and volatility with respect to the conditions and conjuncture. If historical and current directions of Turkish political life are put under scrutiny, one needs to evaluate the occasional ability to build trouble-free cooperation and alliances among right-wing conservative political parties in this context. For example, evaluating alliances such as Nationalist Front[24] or cyclical unifications at merely at institutional and organizational levels would be rather imperfect. Probably more crucial than this is the ideological and discursive articulations, parallels or commonalities among right-wing conservative parties.[25]

## 2.6 Youth Organizations

Other finding arose from my research is the dynamic function of the youth organizations or institutional structures directly or indirectly related to the parties with which politicians were affiliated during the process of political socialization. As well as perpetuating the formation of political identity and political belonging, youth organizations also influence political awareness and political training to a large extent. It can be said that the political commitments and discursive performances of politicians who joined up into youth organizations are relatively higher as compared to the others. If one makes a comparison among different parties on this respect, it

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[24] For Nationalist Front and attempts for alliances in this respect, see Feroz Ahmad's works titled *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* Westview Press, London, 1977 and *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980*, Hil Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984. Also see Erik Jan Zürcher's work titled *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000 and M. Ali Ağaoğulları, "Aşırı Milliyetçi Sağ" in Irvin Cemil Schick-Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998 for this respect.
[25] Putting its hegemonic characteristic and ideological-political content aside, even the attempt of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" is an important undertaking in terms of the articulation ability of different components of rightist tradition. For this dimension of the "synthesis" see Fethi Açıkel, "Kutsal Mazlumluğun Psikopatolojisi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, No: 70, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996.

can be seen that the internal political consistency of politicians affiliated with MHP, SP and BBP is higher. It is also possible to claim that the eloquence manifested in the narratives and discourses of the very same politicians is also instrumental in this. It is revealed that the political and ideological commitment of right-wing conservative politicians, who acquainted with politics by getting organized during their childhood and period of youth, is higher. It is also detected that the ruptures in the political road map of politicians in this category are rather rare. It can also be suggested that except BBP, the other two party, namely MHP and SP, have well-recorded political histories and they built their ideology, discourse and political traditions more impressively. One needs to underline the critical contribution of organizations under MHP and SP such as Hearths of Ideal [Ülkü OCakları][26] and National Youth Foundation [Milli Gençlik Vakfı][27] that functioned almost like schools for the political socialization of their members. It is also essential to highlight MHP as an institution that provided a school function especially for the center-right, other right-conservative traditions and parties.[28] In addition to discursive and ideological consistency, the considerable consistency level in terms of organizational and institutional intransience that politicians from MHP and SP maintained in comparison to AKP and DP is another feature to be emphasized.

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[26] For Hearths of Ideal, Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet Ocak Dergâh 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004 and *Devlet ve Kuzgun 1990'lardan 2000'lere MHP*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004 should be mentioned. The official website of Hearths of Ideal provides information on both institutional and ideological character of this organization, therefore this web site is worth-consulting, see http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/

[27] National Youth Foundation was established on 29 May 1975. Despite it had no legal or official tie with the parties of National Opinion, it was an institutional structure that organized its youth base along the purpose and ideology of National Opinion tradition. In the process of February 28, a lawsuit for its closure was brought in, and the foundation was closed down in 2004, and continued its activity under the roof of Anatolian Youth Association. For information on Anatolian Youth Association, check their web site which is www.agd.org.tr.

[28] For this feature of Hearths of Ideal and NMP's relationships with the center-right in general see Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet Ocak Dergâh 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004. Especially pages 191-280. Though it does not provide an analysis on institutional level, for an adept study evaluating center-right tradition's uneasy relationships with nationalist conservative circles and ideology, see Yüksel Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, especially pages between 70-90.

Nearly all of the MHP politicians whom I interviewed had connections with Hearths of the Ideal or former entities in their childhood or youth. A narrative account of one among them can be cited here for its emblematic features:

> "(…) Young Idealists Organization[29] was established in our neighborhood in Erzurum that summer. People such as devout readers, and in addition to them, people who took others' problems into their hearts such as people in the neighborhoods who shoveled the chimney of a widow or fetched water for the unable for free since nobody had taps at home… In other words, these were people who had higher civic responsibility as we call it nowadays, and to some extent, I used to be one among those striplings. We started to frequent that Young Idealists Organization. At the time, communist movement was gaining such an impetus in Turkey. There was this Hearths of Idealist or Young Idealists Movement as if a reflex to [communism], like a national reflex. I took part in this movement unconsciously and the tradition of Hearths of Idealist became a realm that my political behaviors were determined and shaped up until the insurgence. I was a teacher when the September 12 insurgence took place, and I was arrested once or twice. I reached these times [while concerning about] banging out or coming out. Politically, I still feel myself a nationalist and person within the idealist tradition. I have never perceived politics for becoming someone, I have never said "I put such an effort, then I should go into elections to become a neighborhood executive", I have never thought such things, and I will not think in the rest of my life either, but I was a little piece in Erzurum part that [contributed] for such a process in Turkey, namely. " (M3)

A MHP politician **(M4)** who acquainted with MHP and idealist movement in high school years claims that despite he directly affiliated with the party after university, his political opinion and political identity was shaped essentially in the hearts of ideal. He also denoted that he functioned as 'faculty chief' [fakülte reisi] and 'hearth representative' [ocak temsilcisi] during university, and through the process that NWP transformed into MHP, he has worked as a director for Cultural and Educational

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[29]About this institution, following information is presented at http://ulkuotagi.com/forum/index.php?topic=8170.0;wap2; "Young Idealists Organization was established in 1968 with its headquarters in Ankara by students for bringing up the youth with idealist and nationalist spirit and struggling with all kinds of separatist and harmful activities. The organization had branches in 35 provinces and districts, and leading branches were established in Adana, Samsun, Kars, Gaziantep, Mersin, Elazığ, Sakarya, Erzurum, and Bursa. This association is one of the most active ones that it operates under the directives it receives from Nationalist Movement Party".

Foundation for Hearths of Idealist[30] and a journal titled Our Hearth [Bizim Ocak][31] in the city where he lived prior to present day.

Similar to the functionality provided by hearths of ideal, National Youth Foundation and Anatolian Youth Association [Anadolu Gençlik Derneği] that sprung up from the former performed for the political socialization of SP politicians. It can be suggested that the function of these organizations assumed by an entity called Raiders [Akıncılar][32] prior to 1980; as a matter of fact I managed to interview with politicians from FP who were old enough and denoted to have been enrolled into Raiders. It is also found out that the majority of the university-graduate SP politicians were active in NYF before they joined up the party. However, SP politicians who do not have a university degree indicated that they rather served in the youth branches of the party. For instance, the narrative account of a SP politician presented below entails an illustrative content:

> "Now, I am (xx) years old. Since the age of 14 or 15, I have been part of National Opinion Organizations. National Opinion certainly has not been an idea exclusive reserved for Felicity Party. It is an alternative thought that emerged with its whole institutional and organizational structure in Turkey in 1969. Thus, I have served in National Youth Foundation at various levels since I was 15. During my university education, I have served again in its university organizations. Well, I tried to serve the organization in youth branches and National Youth Organization in (xx-xx), or in the party that was called Welfare Party in those years during elections as polls overseer and commission chairman in both (X) centre and towns. (…) In addition to these, let me say that reading was also decisive, I tried to improve

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[30] A foundation set up by Hearths of Ideal. For a detailed account, see http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/

[31] Following the closure of NMP and Hearths of Ideal in September 12, majority of the executive and administrative staff in these organizations were imprisoned. A decision was made to publish a journal in the quest for a new entity for the re-organization of idealists remained outside. The journal titled Our Hearth functioned as the address for the idealist movement and the youth to get organized from 1983 until the year 1988 that Youth Hearths for Youth Culture and Arts. Initially served to draw together especially idealist youth from universities under the same roof, Our Hearth turned into an organization setting up branches across Turkey in time. For the details, see entry for 'Bizim Ocak' in *Türk Sağı Sözlüğü*, Hüdavendigar Onur, Biyografi.net Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004.

[32] An entity representing Islamist circles' action-oriented organization during political conflict prior to1980. The legal name and framework for this entity was indeed Raiders Association [Akıncılar Derneği]. The name 'Raiders' has never been the name for any institutional-organizational entity directly. For a detailed information, see entry title 'Akıncılar Derneği' in *Türk Sağı Sözlüğü*, Hüdavendigar Onur, Biyografi.net Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004.

my knowledge and educate myself seriously by keeping abreast of newly published books, following which author said what in which respect in National Youth Foundation, or other groups with which I was affiliated. National Youth Foundation changed its name into Anatolian Youth Association in 2004. I used to be one of the provincial chair of Anatolian Youth Association in (X). In the year 2004, I was asked to run as a candidate from (X) center. Then I got the post of provincial chairmanship, and I have been serving as a provincial chairman for (X) for (x) years. Meanwhile, in (xx) I ran as a candidate for parliamentary elections from (X) at the (x) row. Though my family was not supportive for National Opinion from the cradle, after I became affiliated with National Opinion, they naturally became supporters. Then I carried on. Now I am still active in politics." (S7)

Another SP politician who appeared to start involving in politics at an early age utters the following:

"(…) I have been in affiliated with national opinion since the time of Welfare Party anyway. I also started in activities in the political parties in my childhood, at the age of 14. Let me put it this way, my very first activity was to hang [party] flags for (xx) elections, preparing flags, participating into the neighborhood meetings, I started by such things. Then, I actively participated into the administration of Anatolian Youth Association, or National Youth Foundation since it was called accordingly in those times, during my undergraduate years. After my activities there and graduation, I returned to my hometown." (S9)

Quite in line with politicians of MHP, it is possible to claim that the political biographies of the majority of SP politicians also have an evident consistent trajectory. The recount of a SP politician is illuminating in this respect:

"I came to be introduced into politics by means of National Youth Foundation in the National Opinion movement. Beginning from the year (xx), namely since first grade at secondary school, I have managed to be affiliated with National Youth Foundation. Afterwards, I assumed positions in Youth Branches of Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and then I started to serve in Felicity Party's provincial administration. For nearly two years, I have been the provincial chairman of Felicity Party. I have never been part of any other political organization or party except these." (S5)

A politician from BBP, however, claimed to be trained "naturally" within the idealist movement of the time and hearths prior to the establishment of the party he is

affiliated. Though it is arguable whether they have indeed accomplished a political tradition, it is a fact that BBP also "has its own hearths of ideals", Hearths of Alperen, which were set up to assume a similar function to that of Hearths of Ideal:

> "(…) but the youth of those times were like that, I also have been one of them. We had been told "you have Muscovites in front of you, shoot them", and the ones on the other side were told "these are fascist servants of Americans, shoot them". Prior to 1980, we experienced a period of fraternal killing in Turkey. Majority of us were wasted, most of us were crippled, and most of us were [imprisoned]. By the way, our cause still exists, we did not sacrifice it. I have been brought up in Hearths of Ideal, I put effort to be brought up there, the opinion we inherited has never blemished. I did not begin with Nationalist Movement Party, but by Nationalist Labor [and] Peasant Party[33], which used to be [NMP's] previous name. A party was established, but they did not accept the affiliates of hearths to that party. We [I] kept supported the hearths as we [I] do today. We *also* have our Hearths of Ideal now.[34] " (B3)

It can be said that since AKP is a relatively new political party and its social base is eclectically configured, it becomes more difficult to track the roots and traces of political socialization processes of the politicians that are affiliated with this party. It should be mentioned that such a statement is rather applicable for the party's younger affiliates. However, it seems harder to suggest the accuracy of this claim for AKP politicians who previously engaged with the National Vision tradition. The narratives about political socialization process provided by AKP politicians who claimed to be part of National Vision tradition are exactly corresponding to those of SP politicians. Uysal and Toprak's study also supports this observation, though partly (2010: 67-70). There is no possibility to examine the political socialization process of AKP's 'new generation' politicians who do not have any ties with National Vision [tradition] by means of an explicit institutional structure for now, but it should be noted that AKP's youth branches present a very active and disciplined vision. Only historical process can confirm what sort of a functionality that the Youth Branches of

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[33] Though the politician I interviewed pronounced the name of the party as Nationalist Labor and Peasant Party, the party's real name is 'Republican Peasant Nation Party'. For detailed information on this party which is generally accepted as the antecedent of NMP, see Mete Kaan Kaynar (ed), *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Siyasi Partileri*, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2007.

[34] It is the expression for the youth branches of Great Unity Party. For a detailed information, visit http://www.alperenocaklari.org.tr/.

AKP[35] in their present form would assume for the party's next generation of politicians. It can also be suggested that the aforesaid observation about AKP politicians is also applicable for politicians from DP. Accordingly, a narrative account of a DP politician in the following seems to support this claim:

"(…) For instance, NMP has a school, they are brought from that school, and the other side also has a school and they [kids] are brought up from that school. Some of them came from the school for religious functionaries, the others from the hearths of ideals. Well, from where ours come from? Ours are trained in the school of life, namely. The main difference is this one, one of them is hearths of ideals and they trained them as nationalist, they teach them how they have to react from childhood onwards. In the other side, they instruct kids about moral and spiritual values, then those kids grow up by learning these values, and these kids do politics accordingly when they involve in politics. For example, what do they have different than us? As the name of the school implies, it trains imams and preachers. All of them are good preachers, they learn the art of rhetoric, they are taught about the style of elocution. If the kids are trained accordingly at an early age, and start in life or grow older, they also bring up their own children accordingly. The currents that we call as Islamist currents work this way. Nationalist currents also functions similarly. A man does not achieve these [traits] later, he is brought up this way and they guide people around themselves in groups very artfully. They are told to influence people around them. How would you influence people? With your knowledge, how would you influence, by your conduct; plus helping each other, supporting each other. In other words, they are told to not ignore any aggrieved coreligionist in any way, and they are told to look after their coreligionists anyhow, and thereby those impoverished people in slums drifted into their laps. " (D18)

## 2.7 Conclusion

It is possible to mention the impact of political thoughts and traditions that one's family members had acquired or embraced as a factor which primarily impinges on the political socialization of right wing conservative politicians. Family is the basic unit where political socialization of right-wing conservative politicians takes place. Major figure who stand out with decisive influence is predominantly the father. In

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[35] For the organizational structure and activities of AKP's youth branches, please visit: *www.akgenclik.org.tr.*

addition to family, institutions such as religion, traditions, customs and mores are also attributed a crucial significance for political socialization. Respect for the elderly, commitment to traditions, daily social and moral rituals are also frequently referred. Though it does not suggest a prominent and strong tendency, there are also politicians who mentioned the influence of factors other than their families for their political socialization process.

(Historic) Democratic Party functions at two levels; first it functions as an institutional framework for the collective memory of the right-wing conservative political tradition and politicians, and the formation of political identity and belonging. Secondly, it performs as a 'symbolically' by keeping the aforecited collective memory alive so that the 'opposition' and 'resistance' potential of right-wing political conservatism vis-à-vis Kemalism, Kemalist modernization and the left can be inherited via various discourses to present day.

Another influential factor is the friends and friendship circle. In addition to these, one can also talk about idealized individuals such as relatives, certain inspiring and portentous political figures, teachers, "elder brothers" and "elderly" as generating significant impact on political identity and belonging despite their constitutive contribution and weight differ. It should also be noted that social and cultural milieu also plays a significant part in the formation of political identity and political belonging. The society one belongs and cultural climate within an individual lives is also decisive in this context. For example traditions, customs as well as religious conduct and culture, the geographical locality or the unit within which people live such as village, town, or neighborhood, some institutions and organizations, schools and reading habits also shape one's political identity and political belonging. Although not being able to treat this data within the margins of my study, it should be noted that subjective elements of psychology or various kinds of subjectivities as supervising aspects for the politician's personality and character have to be taken into account.

Interest in and participation into politics starts at a very early age. Education has the most prominent influence over politicization. It is seen that especially higher education is a significant factor for political consciousness building and political belonging. However, main political institutions within which early interest in politics finds return are predominantly Hearths of Ideal for NMP, and National Youth Foundation and Anatolian Youth Association for FP. It is observed that politicians affiliated with other political parties also participated into these institutions from time to time. Some of the politicians in right-wing conservative tradition were active in organizations or entities such as National Turkish Student Union and Raiders with regard to their age, experience and the political affiliation, and they participated into various activities such as conference, seminar, and poetry reading meetings that were organized by the abovementioned organizations. Although it is not a striking tendency, predominant intellectual figures, their works and certain currents of thought within the right-wing conservative tradition such as Necip Fazıl, Eşref Edip, Osman Serdengeçti and Great East were influential for the politicization process.

Besides the factors already emphasized, it is inevitable to add the background which rooms for structural and historical dynamics as a determinant for political socialization. In fact, some narrative accounts of politicians whom I interviewed include striking factual information and references for those elements and dynamics that pertain to the structural and historical background. Though their constitutive impact and significance is still crucial, it is obvious that political identities and belongings are far from being analyzed solely with structural elements or merely reduced to the structural background. There are references to class and cultural background of politicians themselves and their families in the narratives of the politicians that were interviewed: 'I am a peasant', 'I'm poor', 'we are poor', 'my family is a peasant one' or 'village-based', 'my father was a civil servant',' to be from a home where daily ritual prayers were performed', 'we used to attend Koran schools in summer', 'having a middling sort of family circle that tries to practice piety', 'the posture of standing for the aggrieved/ oppressed and standing against the oppressive', 'segment of craftsman', 'non-fedora wearing ones', 'ones with the cap',

'shoemaker', 'tailoring', 'drapers' or 'grain merchants' are among these references. While such expressions and adjectives about occupational groups provide clues about class and cultural background, they also highlight politicians own perception about themselves.

To determine the factors that play a role in the process of formation of political belonging and identity allows us to comprehend some distinctive attributes of ideologies and political thoughts. Thinking about issues and topics that will be discussed later in the study is important for this reason to consider that kind of background and information.

# CHAPTER 3

# POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING, PERCEPTION AND IMAGINATIONS OF CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS

One of the main subjects the study aims to examine is the perspectives of right-conservative politicians about **politics**. What do the politicians from right-conservative political tradition understand when they were asked about 'politics'? What are the meanings they attribute to the concept of politics? What type of terms and expressions do they understand when politics is the subject? What are the factors and references they attribute to the concept of politics? What type of a society do they imagine via politics and making politics? If there is any, what are those imaginations and the political-social vision that those imaginations point out?

The answers of the mentioned questions are considerable in terms of their meaning, value or importance. First of all, the answers of the right-conservative politicians, which are the objects of the research, will provide an opportunity to understand and conceptualize their perception, mentality and rhetoric about the politics. In this way, it will be possible to comprehend the political imaginations to a certain extent with respect to the aforementioned politicians and also the right-conservative tradition in general through their imaginations. Again in terms of the problematization here, this part of the study might provide another significant issue for social science practices to understand the political structure and culture in Turkey. It is assumed that this part might also bring at least an empirical reference framework for the social science practitioners, who study and think about both the Turkish politics and the tradition of right-conservative politics and thought.

In this subtitle, the type of the answers through the expressions of the politicians interviewed will be evaluated and analyzed. In the light of the expressions, the

determinations and assessments of the tendencies, which can be generalized, and also their content will be submitted. When the interviews are evaluated as a whole, it can be said that *four main* tendencies or approaches rise in politicians' expressions about the concept of **politics.** The tendencies, as they appear in the expressions, will be classified in a hierarchy from the strongest to the weakest. Now, before submitting the details of those approaches and tendencies, a brief description of the tendencies will be provided. *The first tendency*, which is the strongest and most prominent one, is the imagination of politics through the "service" phenomenon. I call this tendency as *the politics as a service discourse.* The kind of imagination, which is formed by this statement, shortly describes the politics as serving/providing service. This imagination reduces politics into a *technical* and *administrative* basis. The political imagination of this tendency puts politics into a limited field, and perceives it as a practical, pragmatist and instrumental activity. *The second tendency,* which is significant and emphasized in the interviews, is the approach considering the politics with respect to the liberal values and principles. In this approach, it can be mentioned that there is an integration of conservatism with the general values and principles (liberty, free economy, competition, entrepreneurship, civil society, etc.) referred and affirmed by political liberalism. As appears in the expressions, in the politics a line is represented, which is derived from the classical liberalism as a tendency towards the new-right neoliberal politics. In the study this political imagination is described as *the liberal-conservative imagination*. A general critical, skeptical, unpleasant and distant tendency towards the politics and politicians can be underlined as the *third* tendency. The tendencies, which consider the politics through a decline described by some negative names, adjectives and expressions, and imagined the politics through those terms, are called *the politics with a negative discourse*. In this tendency, not the ontology of the politics, but the current politics and the daily life practices occuring while making politics, is being criticized. Within the expressions of this tendency, it is possible to see not only the critique of the politics and the negative attitude attributed to it, but also the critique of "a degenerated politician". The last tendency about the comprehension of the politics examines it on *a utopian-radical* line. In terms of the radical negation of the politics and the proposals of "new politics

and sociality" or "civilization" that it provides, this tendency might be considered as closer to an authoritarian political "horizon".

It should be stressed that in the study there is no assessment of the political concepts corresponding to this classification in terms of an autonomous and separate ontological political imagination. This is expressed both by the theory and also by the data provided from the study. In general, when the aspects of the conservative political understanding is evaluated through the related discourse, the statements of conservatism about the politics are roughly as follows; 1. It tends to reduce it into an administrative technics, 2. It is far from *telos* or it has deep suspicions about it; in this respect the politics is perceived as a limited and instrumental activity. This understanding is remote from the structuring rationality and its attribution of the Politics with a capital letter P. It is also remote from any type of utopic imagery. And the final point is, 3. Whereas the politics is not totally rejected ontologically in relation with the mentioned two points, the real or practical politics is both adopted and assigned as the subject of the criticism.

The above classifications and the corresponding descriptions reflect the general tendencies in the expressions. It does not seem to be possible to talk about a complete autonomous, pure or generic tendency for each single political understanding and perception of these classifications and descriptions. These tendencies often appear as discursive oscillation, instability, transition and inconsistency by interwining and partly comprising each other within the same expression; however, they can also appear through cancelling each other. In other words, each tendency might comprise or exclude each other with different degrees. For instance, while "politics as a service discourse" is the significant tendency in an expression, it is replaced by "liberal-conservative" or "radical-utopian politics" tendency-discourse within the same expression.

## 3.1 Technical and Instrumental Politics

The variety of the debates and proposals problematize to discuss the subject on how the politics will be defined or conceptualized. The diversity of attributions for the usage and description of politics within philosophic, academic and everyday life politics, makes it difficult to position the term to a certain degree. Although it is difficult to mention a definitive common understanding on the concept of politics and an imagination with a clearly defined framework, the difficulty of conceptualization is inevitable. In fact, even if only the research results are considered, the above mentioned classifications and the variety of 'political' perceptions and descriptions will imply this difficulty.

It is remarkable within the expressions that first the "service notion" and then the other descriptions of politics is attempted to be practiced on a formal line. When the formality of the description of politics is examined in details, it was observed that there is a repetition of expressions of 'literal' descriptions and contents which correspond to the 'standard' political science literature. For instance, according to Heywood, who provides a good summary of political concept or term of the 'standard political science' literature (2005: 52-54):

> "Politics has been portrayed as the exercise of power or authority, as a process of collective decision-making, as the allocation of scarce resources, as an arena of deception or manipulation and so forth. A number of characteristic themes nevertheless crop up in most, if not all, these definitions. In the first place, politics is an activity. Although politics is also an academic subject, sometimes indicated by the use of 'Politics' with a capital letter P, it is clearly the study of the activity of 'politics'. Second, politics is a social activity; it arises out of interaction between or among people. Third, politics develops out of diversity, the existence of a range of opinions, wants, needs or interests. Fourth, this diversity is closely linked to the existence of conflict: politics involves the expression of differing opinions, competition between rival goals or a clash of irreconcilable interests. Where spontaneous agreement or natural harmony occurs, politics cannot be found. Finally, politics is about decisions, collective decisions which are in some way regarded as binding upon a group of people".

For Scruton (2007: 535), who presents a similar point of view, definitions on politics are many and varied, ranging from the conciliatory ('the art of the possible',

Bismarck), through the cynical ('the art of governing mankind through deceiving them', Isaac D'Israeli), to the wilfully assertive ('the art of carrying out the life struggle of a nation for its earthly existence', Hitler). As now used 'politics' denotes a kind of activity associated with government. A term that is used in at least two important ways; first in the distinction between the political and the social, in which 'political' means, roughly, pertaining to the state and its institutions; secondly in the distinction between political and other models of government, for which see politics (Scruton, 2007: 530). According to Heywood (2005: 53):

> "three clearly distinct conceptions of politics can be identified. In the first place, politics has long been associated with the formal institutions of government and the activities which take place there in. Second, politics is commonly linked to public life and public activities, in contrast to what is thought of as private or personal. Third, politics has been related to the distribution of power, wealth and resources, something that takes place within all institutions and at every level of social existence."

Heywood states that the politics is defined as 'the art of governing', with respect to his above classification and proposal and with an attribution to Bismarck. According to this, politics is collective decision-making and structuring the control over the society by the application of these decisions. Heywood states that this definition probably because it is the classical description of politics derived from its original meaning in Ancient Greek. The word 'Politics' comes from the word 'polis' and it means city-state. Politics can be understood by a reference to the affairs of polis, that is 'about the polis'. The modern version of this word means 'belonging to the state'. This political vision is more clearly evident in everyday life usage: the people, who work in public administration, "are in politics" or "are participated in politics". This is a definition which the academic political science contributes as well.

It is the traditional view of the political science discipline that the politics means "being about the state". The idea is realized in the academic work by focusing on the personnel and mechanism of state instrument. The analysis of the politics means to analyse the state to a degree and the use of authority in a wide term. This point of view was provided by Easton, who describes the politics as "values distributed by the

authority". "Values distrubuted through the authority" are the values accepted by the society in common and considered as compulsory by the citizens. In this approach, the politics is associated with the "policy", which refers to the decisions that are official or based on authority for the activity plan of the society (Heywood, 2007: 4). As Heywood emphasizes, it provides very limited political view-perception. Policy as a term is related to the Greek word 'politea', that is government. It refers to the general principles which guide to make the laws, administration, and executive acts of government in domestic and international affairs. Policy has to be distinguished from doctrine –the system of beliefs and values which generate policy, and purport to describe the ends where policy is the means– and from philosophy, the underlying justification given for doctrine and policy together. Political visions differ radically when the question is whether the policy is or should be a reflection of some underlying philosophical position, but most agree that policy should be consistent, reasonable and acceptable to those with power to oppose it. Some argue that it cannot have those qualities unless it also has the support of a (perhaps unexpressed) doctrine, which identifies, even if it does not justify, the ends that are pursued (Scruton, 2007: 529). As long as these definition and perception methods identify the politics with the administration and its formal processes, it provides a very limited imagination.

According to the meaning and description pointed out by this approach, politics the realized on social organization system (polity) on the basis of the state. Consequently, politics means the activities that take place at the council of ministers, legislative assembly, governmental bodies and the related places in this respect. It is realized by a limited group of people, especially who are the politicians and public officials. It is because many of the people, institutions and social activities are "excluded" from politics. Business circles, schools, communities, families and other aspects are "not political", because they are not a part of the "state governance" (Heywood, 2007: 4-5).

Here, a distinction can be emphasized, which is referred by different political science disciplines, including mainly the American political science discipline. The distinction is made on *policy*, *politics* and *polity* concepts. If those kinds of literal usage are attributed legitimacy for a moment, in general, **policy** refers to the political content analyses. **Politics** refers to the political process and **polity** means the institutional and legal framework of the politics. The term is attributed a simple, but equally an ambiguous meaning and distinction by the disciplinary approaches. However, here the problem is not about a terminological distinction or ambiguity. The significant point is that both the political science discipline in power and the politics is pressed within limited, instrumental and literal descriptions. The problem is about the philosophical and ideological imaginations, which cause limited, ambigious and literal perception of politics. It can also be said that an understanding or imagination of politics that is described and perceived on the basis of "service", points out a limited "political" imagination. This approach also considers the politics as a kind of "technical" issue. As it will be seen in below expressions, the current political perceptions of the right-conservative politician's emprically confirm the situation. However, this case is not only terminological and literal, but it is directly related with the meaning that the (right-) conservatism attributes to the politics. This understanding, which has a correspondance in modern political conceptualization as well, represents a hegemonic position on a line that evolves from Machiavelli to Hayek, from Hayek to today's neoliberal new right or a new type of conservatism.

Considering the politics and political processes on an instrumental basis is another important subject in the political theory to be discussed. It can be mentioned that the politics is considered within an instrumental framework in a historical continuum from Machiavelli, who is the founding father of the modern politics, to today's neoliberal political understanding. It can be said that the instrumentalisation of politics phenomenon in modern times and its identification with the ruling power is theorized by Machiavelli. According to Machiavelli the condition of existence is based on inequality and the permanent reality is based on a dualist structure of the society through a distinction of the ruler and the ruled. The main purpose of the

politics should not be the removal or solution of the duality between the ruler and the ruled, but to "manage" the social division and conflict caused by this duality (Machiavelli, 2004). In this respect, the politics is *a new form of art, the art of ruling people*. Consequently, the politics is not an excessive practice or a practice dependent on values. Being the ruling power and keeping its continuity is a matter of a *strategy and technical skill* (Ağaoğulları ve Köker, 2001: 206). This type of political perception legitimizes the current unequal structure on the one hand and on the other hand, it means the identification of politics with power.

The ruling power is made an inevitable reality instrument in modern politics and it is also neutralized. This 'reality' of the modern times provides the identification of the knowledge with the (ruling) power (Foucault, 1984: 239-256). In a political sphere where the unequal structures are dominant and legitimized (bourgeoisie), the relations between the ruling and the ruled are not questioned and neutralized in time. In such unequal patterns the ruling people; the ones who are capable of everything, compose the minority or the elites who force their decisions on the ruled people without their consent. Meanwhile, the ruled people are dependant on the elites and they compose the 'silent masses'. Power mechanisms are pressure instruments of the ruling people or of the elites.

The political models of Machiavelli and Hobbes symbolize the political rationality of the modern age. In the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the instrumental politics is interwined with capitalism and realism; then with the support of the positivist philosophy, the instrumental approach developed and settled on a continuous capitalism-realism axis (Sunar, 1986 and Köker, 2008). Also today, the description of the 'politics' which is internalized all around the world, reflects the thoughts of the mentioned philosophers. The definition of politics according to the social scientists; such as, Weber (1993), Schumpeter (1947), Easton (1953), Lasswell (1958), Hayek (1960) and Dahl (1976) and their approaches about the democracy, indicate an instrumental aspect being correspondent with the thesis of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

According to Max Weber (1993) the politics "tries to share the power among the states or among the groups within a state, or tries to influence the power distribution". Whereas the state is "a group of people who has the monopoly to use legitimate physical violence in a certain territory (Weber, 1993: 80). Weber has a realistic approach to the politics and the politics is identical with seizing the power. According to Weber, each individual tries to maximize his/her own interest, and the power is the means for that. Competition composes the main characteristics of the system because of the approval of the conflict of interests principle. In accordance with the definition of instrumental politics, Weber identifies the public sphere as a field that can be directed with the individual or group interests. In this respect, the 'vocation' of the politics is natural for him. When the subject is politics, he neglects the society and considers the politics as 'a personal activity' and even the 'vocation of the politician' (Weber, 1993: 86).

Easton (1953), who is one of the prominent representatives of the system approach, defines the politics as the "authorative allocation of social values". Lasswell (1958) also considers the politics in a similar way. According to him, the politics is "concerned with when, how and to whom the sources and valued things in the society are distributed". With this respect the politics is considered as a derivative or second phase of the economics. Economics deals with the production of the sources, whereas politics is related with the distribution. In the studies of Dahl (1976), a confusion might be found obviously between the two fields and the definition of politics as a derivative of economics. Dahl admits that the economics is about the production of materials and services with limited sources. He defines the politics in a Weberian framework that is "a type of human relation based on power, influence or authority" (Dahl, 1976: 3-4); however, he finds it difficult to separate two fields from each other.

Hayek and Schumpeter also address the politics in a limited framework. Schumpeter (1947) has a tendency to define the democracy merely as "a political method":

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"Democracy is a simple institutional regulation to reach the political decisions and is not a purpose". According to Schumpeter, people do not rule; in fact, they cannot rule in democracy. The public is emotional, irrational and primitive, and motivated by their dark instincts. For that reason the people don't rule, but they are ruled. The ones who are the rulers are the politicians. The politicians raise the problems of the people and also decide on them. According to Schumpeter, democracy is a *political method* to select the politicians, who struggle competitively to get vote (1947: 247). Hayek (1960) does not consider democracy as an instrument on its own. For Hayek, democracy is "a method to realize certain purposes" (1960: 106). Although Hayek mentiones about the rule of law, for him the most indispensable unit is the free market.

There are also some tendencies which are the opposite of above mentioned political imaginations. For instance; with a general statement, Marx aimed to analyse the relations between the economic and social structure, and also the politics and philosophy. Although the production relations or economics is central in his analysis, Marx aimed to focus on the possibility of structuring a political and social life where the people are free of economic struggles. In Marx's analysis, the political and logical horizon is a society without class relations. According to Marx (2000 and 1991), a classless society is not an end, but is the moment that the real history will be written by the human being. In Marx's approach the politics can never end. In contrast, when the humanity will be free of relations based on dominancy, the politics will be free from being the means of dominancy. In this case, the politics will refer to different terms and relations, then it will be socialized (Marx, 1977).

Instrumentalization of the politics and its association with the ruling mechanism also results in some criticisms. For instance; Arendt (1994) states that the association of politics with the ruling power and the division of the society as the ruler-ruled, ends with dramatic results especially for the existance of political activity. She comments that the emphasis of administration in politics with priority means turning away from

the politics. Instead of restricting the ruling power, Arendt highlights its equal sharing. She proposes the common good and happiness of the human beings because of being the members of the same species. Sharing the public sphere with others is itself a reason for enthusiasm and thus the thought of individual happiness is replaced by the public happiness. Arendt defended that if the human beings can reach the opportunities to practice solidarity and colloboration, both the political freedom and the public happiness will enlarge its sphere of influence (Özkazanç, 1994).

According to Habermas (1992), the public sphere, which is owned by the citizens and which functions mainly politically, is collapsed as a result of the separation of the society as the decision-makers and the ruled, and also because of the division of the ruling power. For Habermas, because of the transfer of the ruling power to the decision-makers, the public sphere only serves for legitimizing the ruling ones. However, according to Habermas, "to select and support the administratives or the ones who have the ability to administrate, as a rule, indicates plebiscite actions" (1992: 80). In this way, democracy and elections becomes a matter of the approval of the public rather than being a discussion. Elections are used to define who will be assigned to which positions; but the guiding rules for future decisions are not determined during the elections. For that reason Habermas propounds that the elections provided by the representative democracy functions to legitimize the decision-makers themselves in the public rather than their decisions. Non-socialized elitist nature of the modern politics makes controversial that 'who' or 'what' is the 'subject' of the politics. In other words, instrumentalized political understanding also brings the instrumentalized citizenship. Instrumentalized citizenship phenomenon points out one of its aspects that the citizens are far from being active, they don't have right of decision to direct the politics and consequently they are not the subject of the politics. This definition of citizenship has a fictional, abstract, latent function without a real action (Barber, 1995: 273-274).

According to Chantal Mouffe, who is the base of conceptualization of the politics in this study, the possibility to envision the problems politically is disappering in a world where the collective identities are weakened. Theories and practices, which consider the resolution of collective identities as an opportunity for dialogue, consensus and compromise, are far from democratization of democracy with the "post-political" vision they proposed. The limited point of view of such theories and practices about the political dynamics constitutes the source of democracy problems. Mouffe criticizes the approaches blessing and reconciling democracy as they commit the globalization to provide a cosmopolitan future with peace, prosperity and human rights. The source of this criticism is the claim of the social and political theories with the will of creating a world beyond the "right and left", "hegemony", "sovereignity" and "antagonism". Those theories reject the antagonism as the founding element of the policy and their claim that is the idea of democracy without politics.

In Mouffe's conceptualization 'politics' refers to an ontic level and it's about some activities of traditional politics, whereas the 'political' is about the ontological, it's about the establishment of the society. Mouffe mentions the uncertainty on what constitutes the political one, she mentions what she meant as follows:

> "by 'the political' I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by 'politics' I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political" (Mouffe, 2005: 9)

Understanding the political through the ontological one might help the contemporary societies of their inadequacy in thinking their problems politically. According to Mouffe, the existing liberalism, which has a rationalist and individualist attitude, refuses to recognize the nature of collective identities. In this respect, liberalism is lack of the ability to comprehend the pluralistic nature of the social world and the conflicts that pluralism contains that will never result in a rational solution. Although liberalism supposes plurality, it is based on the belief that when the plurality of perspectives and values gather, they might build a non-conflictual and harmonious

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union. It is precisely for this reason that liberalism cannot grasp the political with its antagonistic dimension. However, according to Mouffe:

> "(…) instead of trying to design the institutions which, through supposedly 'impartial' procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant 'agonistic' public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted" (2005: 3).

Then Mouffe asks this question:

> "there is much talk today of 'dialogue' and 'deliberation' but what is the meaning of such words in the political field, if no real choice is at hand and if the participants in the discussion are not able to decide between clearly differentiated alternatives?" (2005: 3-4)

According to Mouffe, being persistent on the projects based on dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation, where a real possibility and freedom of choice takes place; the only point that will lead us is the relinquisment from the politics and democracy.

When the political understanding and imaginations of the right-conservative politicians interviewed are examined, it is seen that they consider the politics not on an 'ontic' plane, but they mainly interpret and conceptualize it as a practical activity. Through the interviews, the expression forms of this concept and its discursive framework will be considered in more details below.

## 3.2 Politics as a Service Discourse

There is a remarkable consensus among the right-conservative politicians in considering the politics on "service" axis. A significant number of politicians consider or perceive the politics on *service-based* manner. According to this tendency, the politics is defined as "serving", "serving the citizen", "providing useful services for the homeland, nation and country", "being an occasion of service", "serving for the peace, prosperity and happiness of the country" or "serving for the benefit of the public and community" and so on. This perception of politics is often

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accompanied by a technicist language and discourse. The approaches, grasping the politics in such a technical language and terms, are expressed in a rhetorical style most of the time. In this language and discourse the politics is "the art of governing", it is "governing", "a way of governing", "meeting the unlimited demands with scarce resources", "the name of the art deciding how, where and with whom who will get what",  "being represented or chosen in the parliament", "a social phenomenon" and "a social science". In this sense, there is no considerable differentiation among the right-conservative politicians in this perception of politics.

The imagination of "the politics as a service discourse" appears when the AKP politicians' expressions are examined. For them the politics is a means to provide service to "the public, citizens, homeland, nation, country" and even to the "humanity". Although AKP politicians mention different reasons for providing service, the prominent aspect in their perception of politics is the notion of "service". This aspect is obvious in politicians' statements below, where some parts of their expressions are submitted.

> "(…) [politics] is what we can do for our future, it is an effort to see how can we serve; this is what politics means to me"(…) "if we will make politics, if we have a point of view about the politics, it doesn't matter being a conservative democrat, central right, social democrat or liberal; however, poeple "should make politics by feeling and living within it. I believe it should be related with serving the society and the humanity." (A1)

> "(…) Service. To me, politics only means serving the citizens, listening their problems and providing solutions. It means to be able to serve the people. " (A2)

> "(…) My purpose is to support or serve the people who will serve this country, homeland and nation properly. This is my only purpose." (A4)

> "I describe the politics as a phenomenon related with the human and service." (A6)

The long expression below is significant as it defines the politics on the basis of service in details. The mentioned expression is interesting as it examplifies both the perception of "the politics as a service discourse" and also the *technicist language* and *literal politics* perception. According to the AKP politician, who owns this expression, the politics means:

"(…) It was established to serve the people. The meaning of the word politics is related with the word seyis [groom]. It means to administrate and serve people, it is a way of administrating the people (...) the politics is a system that is interwined with the people, survives with the people and disappears without them. This should be transferred into service and the best way to do this is [politics]. This is my point of view." (…) "How do we perceive service? If we perceive service as a material issue, this refers to a limited perception. If we evaluate the term, service is a situation where the living aspects and the people feel themselves alive, where the people feel themselves as an individual within the society. In political jargon, there is an expression as "everything is for service", but we added something more on that. We announced that "let the people live so that the state can live". This is related with our tradition, which is directed to our conservatism." (…) "Politics is the methodology, it's a method to meet the infinite demands with scarce resources. People have unlimited demands and expectations, but the resources are limited. These are both material and moral demands. What is politics? It's a bridge. It's a means to provide the optimum values between the two sides and to structure the possible techniques, ways and methods. This is what politics means to me." (A7)

There are definitions of the politics within his following expressions, which are similar to the previous expression **(A7)**. They perceive the politics with some literal descriptions; such as "to govern the country" and "the art of governing". They also highlight the service notion as a main aspect within the expressions:

"What does politics mean to me? The politics is to govern the country. There is politics in every sphere of life. Politics is the decision of contribution to govern our country and also to reach a better governing with our opinions. Politics means service in all points of this country. It means equal share of the opportunities, legal system, economy by each individual of 72,5 millions of people. It means justice to me. In this respect, I love making politics." (A17)

"We can shortly describe politics as the art of governing people around and where we live. Of course, people have many social, economic and cultural requirements. Politics is understanding those points as much as possible and telling them to the people, to the masses and governing them in the light of our knowlede." (A20)

As it was significant in the expressions of the AKP politicians, the politics is defined through the service context accompanied by a *technical* and *literal* political imagination. The political perception that occurs in here is not firstly or primarily described by ideological-political aspects, patterns and ideals. In other words, not indicating such statements **at first**, implies the meaning and value attributed to the politics; but it might also limit the politics within a restricted, superficial and pragmatic framework.

The perception of "the politics as a service discourse" is also a dominant tendency in MHP politicians' expressions. In this respect, it should be mentioned that there is a mental and perceptional similarity between the MHP and AKP politicians. One of the MHP politicians defines politics as an occupation; for this politician the politics is:

> "is a matter, an occupation of serving people. The occupation of serving people is politics. Today or in the past there is or there was no regular politics which served the poeple. This is what distinguishes us from the others." (M2)

For another MHP politician, who considers the politics as "a way of serving the people", states that:

> "in the light of the experience I had for years, the politics is a way chosen for serving the human and society. It is difficult to serve the human without politics, I mean politics is the most effective way to do that. A person can serve individually, but people can lead and be effective in great services through politics. Then the others remain small in terms of serving the people. If you be a part of the politics, as a result of this, you have to be a member of the parliament. When you be a member of the parliament, you can submit a proposal for a new law and lead the society, humanity or nation and citizen for beneficial purposes. I believe politics is necessary. For that reason, I consider serving people as crucial" (M12)

The technicist language accompanied the service discourse in the AKP politicians' expressions, also occurs in MHP politicians' expressions. The expressions of the following two MHP politicians clearly examplify the *technicist* and *literal* understanding of politics. The former politician (**M1**) describes the politics through an association of a political scientist [Lasswell]. In this respect the politics is: " 'it is

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the name of the art which considers how and where, who will get what with whom'
(…) We thought of politics as a means to *serve* the country and the nation".

It is possible to state that the observations and evaluations about the AKP politicians, who defined politics on the basis of service and reduced the meaning into this framework, is also valid for the MHP politicians. It is not possible to talk about any deep-rooted ideological-political or discoursive aspects for a distinction among those two party politicians, who perceive politics in terms of service axis. As so the AKP and MHP politicians, SP politicians have an approach and perception where the discourse of service is prominent. The discoursive similarity of the other two parties, is also valid for the SP politicians. For a SP politician, who confirms this evaluation and mentions the continuity of service notion within the party tradition, politics is: "We consider politics as a way of serving from National Vision point of view or from Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party] or from the Refah Partisi [Welfare Party], Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party]. Our primary aim is to serve the country somehow." **(S5)**. For another SP politician, who considers the politics as "a social phenomenon":

> "the main aspect of the social phenomena is the human being. When a human being is the subject, it means his/her smile and happiness. If you can make a person happy and make his/her face smile, if he/she says 'May Allah bless you' for your help, this is the purpose/this is what politics is. I mean the main material in politics is serving the human being. This differs according to our positions and occasions. You can do that sometimes by making a law or through municipality service and sometimes with an organization that you'll arrange on your street. However, the main purpose is to serve the human being and it should be that way." (S23)

Also the SP politicians' expressions have a technicist language associated or described with the service discourse. When the expressions stated so far of the politicians from three different parties are evaluated, it might be said that there is no significant difference among them in terms of their perception of politics and the value they attribute to it. All the politicians from the three parties highlight service

notion primarily when they comment about the politics. Service is devoted mainly to the "homeland, nation, society, country, humanity" and such aspects.

Again the service discourse is the prominent tendency during the interviews of the DP politicians. For instance, according to a DP politician:

> "Politics provide many things, which are service to the nation and people. Besides this, it [politics] is where a person can share his/her decision and it is the means to value this decision. If I share my decision as (X), or as a lawyer (X), maybe nobody will care about me. However, if I announce my decision as the president (X) of Democrat Party, everybody will pay attention, *because I have a title.*" (D4)

A common emphasis is remarkable in DP politicians' expressions. They state that they work for the public through politics. The politicians emphasize practical, instrumental and pragmatic aspect of politics in order to provide service to the people in a country where the supply and distribution of public services is inadequate. Although this emphasis and motivation seems to be prominent in DP politicians' expressions, it is shared by the other right-conservative politicians as well. In this respect, it is important to explain and functionalize the politics.

In BBP politicians' expressions, politics is perceived through service discourse and indicates a technical definition partially. According to a BBP politician, who describes his purpose to be in politics as "we consider politics as a means of service":

> "We are in [politics] to serve the homeland and country, because it is a means of providing service to the people. I'm in politics in order to reflect the people the opportunities of politics; because it's a means for me to realize this (…) It was not correct for me to ignore the situation in the country. I've always decided to serve, to be in charge, to take risk and take responsibility." (B5)

**3.2.1 An Evaluation of Service as a Politics**

It is remarkable that almost all interviewed right-conservative politicians from different parties describe politics as an activity based on service notion. In this respect, the "service notion" that is used by all right-conservative politicians while describing the politics, constitute a common ground for those politicians. This discourse makes it difficult for the politicians to announce the ideological-political differences among them. Because the general service emphasis on politics almost 'disappears/extinguishes' the differences among the politicians, they implicitly or explicitly emphasize the ways that "service" is provided. They legitimize this emphasis as a *distinction* of their party. This might present a specific aspect of the Turkish right-conservative politics.

In order to establish a specific perspective or qualification about the Turkish right-conservatism, it should be mentioned that some detailed and extensive studies on "the discourse of service", which is found in this study, are necessary to structure the theoretical basis of the discourse. The present study provides limited empirical data about such a mentality. The relation between the general principles that conservatism attributes to politics and the notion of service, seems to be related with the distance of politics from theoretical and abstract political projections. It won't be wrong to consider the political imagination of the right-conservatives in Turkey that is based on service notion through its old practical, pragmatic and popular discourse.

The studies on the Turkish right-conservative political tradition on the basis of populism and pragmatism axis emphasize that the populist characteristics of the right-conservatism occurs clearly and mainly with an opposition to the Kemalist or bureaucratic elitism. For instance; according to Sunar (1983: 2086) populism and patronage system in a multi-party democratic regime, became the fundamental elements not only of the Democratic Party, but also of all the parties after the Democratic Party. After 1961, while applying successful policies against the bureaucratic elites the Justice Party continued the populism of patronage system.

After 1965, in order to get the support of masses just like the Justice Party, the Republican People's Party had to apply a populist ideological and social mobilization. Tanel Demirel (2004: 132) states that the main purpose of the power oriented Justice Party-AP was being the ruling power. In order to protect the rights of the masses, who were excluded from decision-making mechanisms, and provide them concrete services the AP applied politics for the purpose of being the ruling power. Focusing on power is one of the significant marks of the AP's understanding of politics. Süleyman Demirel indicates that AP is not an ideology and doctrine party. He considers practice of politics within "pragmatism" framework. Within the the political realm, pragmatism is used as referring to a common sense, practicality, negotiating, opposition to thinking within strict patterns. Obtaining the desired result is essential for a pragmatist. Süleyman Demirel mentioned that the AP "is a pragmatic party in terms of providing solutions to the problems of the country which are appropriate to the realities of the country" (Demirel, 2004: 136). With a reference to the public's common sense, Süleyman Demirel legitimized his conservative-modernist approach on social and political level and his liberal-conservative approach, which is related with his commitment to corporatism, on economic level (Bora ve Erdoğan, 2003: 644). In this respect, Özal was not expectional either. According to Bora and Erdoğan, Özal was a typical representative of the New Right which articulates nationalist-conservatism with neoliberalism. The new perspective of his authoritarian populism structured a 'selective' modernization, especially an image of qualified Muslim-Turkish society, which is protecting the customs and traditions that are "compatible with the era" (Bora ve Erdoğan, 2003: 644).

It should also be mentioned that the AKP is not exceptional either in implementation of the populist and pragmatic strategy, which has a serious correpondance in real politics in terms of strengthening the political power. Though there are significant differences on the neoliberal new right line from ANAP till AKP, there is no major fraction on the basis. AKP is a party which explicitly announces and defends the service discourse at least in terms of reflecting the exact correspondance within the expressions. A series of points construct the milestones of the neoliberal populist

political line, such as the social aid and solidarity that neoliberal 'social policy' points out and its organization through the public, policies for education (free textbooks) and health care services (green card, ease of access to private hospitals), housing policies of TOKİ, 'double highway' statement, etc so on. display a series of can be said that neo-liberal populist political line (Buğra, 2008; Bakırezer and Demirer, 2009; Köse and Bahçe, 2009).

While this thesis was being prepared, a general election was held in June, 12, 2011 and the AKP was selected for the third time as the ruling party with a remarkable success. After the elections, several assessments and anlyses were conducted and announced that the success of the party stems from the *services* they applied. The party administers and party leaders had similar explanations as well. The success of the AKP in elections proved once again that the service discourse is a quite effective political-social strategy in strengthening the political power. The political discourse seems to be a technical, limited, neutral and rational political imagination at first, but it does not mean that it has no ideological character. Of course, in organizing the large segments of the society, the service discourse cannot be evaluated only as 'an empty indicative'. Besides the ideological function of the service discourse, it has sociological and social provisions in practical logic of the masses.

As appears in the interviews, "the discourse of service" causes all politically controversial issues to be repressed against their practical benefits, it causes the ignorance of ideological-political aspects of the ruling power and becomes an unquestionable case in time. While eliminating an antagonistic politics, this case also encodes the politics as a social or non-class activity. The mentioned discourse or literal [lafız] authoritarian and imposed practices are legitimized through the "service discourse". The attitude of the state/government against the sections of the society, who oppose the HES applications and nuclear power plants, might be considered as one of the concerete indicators of this statement.

The state is perceived as a technical tool or lever in "service discourse". The state is considered as the dominant 'instrument' to access the 'services'. The practice of politics has been an important moment of absorbing the state and the ruling power, and providing "service" by positioning on state instrument. Such a 'political imagination' problematize the ideological-political aspects of state and ruling power, and even obscures its visibility. Especially within the right-conservative tradition, in this type of imagination the main purpose of the politics might be considered as "an activity to seize the ruling power of the state" (Taşkın, 2007).

The politics as a "service discourse" compress the politics in an instrumental and technical sphere and reduces it into an alturistic activity. In this respect, the practiced politics is positioned as a kind of 'customer-client' relation (Bora, 2005). It allows the construction of "clientalist networks" (Komsuoğlu, 2009) and provides the necessary conditions for the reproduction and legitimization of clientalist[36] politics. According to Bora (2005: 557) clientalism is: "the profession of politics, which considers the political representation as the customer or client's representation and which allocates power and opportunity for its customers/clients". Bora evaluates the discourse of Süleyman Demirel, who is of one the most important figures in the center-right politics, and states that besides the representation of specific groups, classes and interest relations Demirel contributed a lot to the institutionalization of clientalism. In fact, for Bora the clientalist relation is not only material-economic but rather an ideological relation. In this respect the customer/client relation is not unidirectional. For Bora: "Demirel established a bidirectional 'grand clientalism' manner between the state, and the society and politics. This manner is based on a

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[36] For a number of studies of politics on the mentioned frameworks and concepts please see Sabri Sayarı, "Political Patronage in Turkey", *Patron's and Clients in Mediteranen Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, London: Duckworth, 1977; Ergun Özbudun, "Politics of Political Clientalism: Turkey", *Political Clientalism, Patronage and Development*, ed. Shumel N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, London: Sage, 1981; Coşkun Can Aktan, *Politik Yozlaşma ve Kleptokrasi: 1980-1990 Türkiye Deneyimi*, Afa Yayınları, İstanbul, 1992; Türker Alkan, *Siyasal Ahlak ve Siyasal Ahlaksızlık*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1993; Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientalism in Turkey", in *Democracy, Clientalism and Civil Society*, ed. L. Roniger and A. Güneş Ayata, UK, Lynne Rienner, 1994; Ayşe Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995.

reciprocal representation and 'governance', and also legitimization aspect. His main political pragma principle –and also the basis of existance- is to broaden and reproduce the political sphere on this clientalist basis" (Bora, 2005: 557). Clientalism is particularly important to understand the political structure and culture of Turkey as a form of political practice and social relationship. Against all its negating sides it embodies and suggests, clientalism is directly or indirectly essential to provide 'social cohesion' or 'political participation' within the current conditions in Turkey. As Komsuoğlu also states: "the individuals try to overcome the limited political participation through clientalist mechanisms and they become a part of the one that is political. The most important motivation is the reality of announcing the demands, which provides the feeling of sharing the personal decisions" (Komsuoğlu, 2009: 23).

If a positive meaning is attributed to the clientalist practice of politics, reaching the "services" by the society and individuals might be the most important aspect. However, on the other hand, it might also preserve the "services" by preventing the access of some parts of the society and individuals, which might even result in keeping those people away from the "services" and 'punish' them. According to Komsuoğlu: "the clientalist networks are expected to be uniting; however, it is obvious that just like the other cases in Turkey, which unite and separate at the same time -like nationalism-, it serves for society's unity for the ones who get less from the political participation and value distribution, they increase those people's chance in this system. Patronage mechanisms contribute to the socialization of those people, who are in an insecure environment with different forms of poverty, not only by providing the material interests but also by providing moral support for the ones who are excluded from cultural and economic opportunities. However, because many of the patronage relationships are structured on ethnical and religious divisions and as they use the local emphasis for this structure, it might be considered that the structuring of clientalism betrays the understanding of sociality of the modern nation state" (Komsuoğlu, 2009: 23). When the above mentioned statements are evaluated the dominated emphasis of the politicians, that is the "service" discourse, is more

understandable. The mission of making politics for the politicians that they mentioned within their expressions might also help us to comprehend the "customer/client" logic of clientalist relationship.

Although not mentioned within the expressions explicitly and clearly, there are some 'spritual' or religious factors that realize and legitimize referencing the "service" discourse by the right-conservative politics and politicians. For various religious groups or communities, "service"[37] is a concept which indicates some religious-spiritual references as well. At this point, the remarkable fact is that the "service" discourse is not reducible to mere religious-spiritual meanings; but the discourse permits a dual use including those meanings as well. In other words, the term "service" refers to religious-spiritual meanings besides its everyday meaning; the popular motto of right-conservative politics that is [halka hizmet hakka hizmet] "serving people serving God" is a good example for this dual meaning usage. As Şen puts it:

> "it seems that *hizmet* is generally used in Turkish culture to denote disinterested social, economic and political actions that are beneficial for the public interest and the common good adhering to humanist ideals based on love and devotion. In this sense, the term *hizmet* might be seen as an effective frame that limits selfish and hedonistic behaviour and actions. Yet, at the same time, it is widely used as self-justification and as a defence and/or response to strong accusations against illegitimate and non-accountable political and economic actions. It is also likely to suggest that the concept of *hizmet* operates as a directive that interpellates persons to a sense of self-devotion and self-sacrifice for religious and secular beliefs (…) in the Turkish culture both types of beliefs provide a wide and secure ground for the functioning of *hizmet* that is imbued with devotion and sacrifice for consecrated causes. Put differently, it is around the concept of *hizmet* that religious and secular beliefs can be articulated and even fused. This is in fact what makes *hizmet* an invaluable root-metaphor at the disposal of the community that strives for the regulation of daily life according to religious [sacred] principles" (Şen, 2001: 28-30).

It is not possible to ignore the ground that enables the "service" term or "service discourse" the way Şen puts and emphasizes. Although there is no exact

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[37] For a study which is focused on the usage and analysis of the "service" concept from different perspectives (cultural, religious, political) of please see Mustafa Şen, *Turkish Entrepreneurs Central Asia: The Case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan*, Non-published Doctoral Thesis, METU, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Ankara, 2001.

correspondance or reference in the interviews, the "service" refers to[38] a crucial socilogical phenomenon in right-conservative politics tradition and in Turkey's social and religious culture in general, which should be handled and analyzed.

Another significant situation that constitutes a ground for "service discourse" is the new-right ideology and practices after the September 12 coup. The new economy and sociality understanding of September 12 regime aimed to keep the masses away from the politics as much as possible, and tended to destroy the meaning and scope of politics. The most obvious result is the depolitization of politics. For Özkazanç (2007) the new-right governing mentality aims to make two types of transformations about the society in Turkey. The first one is to develop capitalism through neoliberal politics by providing the structural adjustment and speed up the pace of modernization. The second one is to structure a conflict-free society in accordance with this model that is hardworking, successful, depoliticized, loyal to the religion and traditions. Özkazanç states that the interventions of the new-right to accomplish this dual transformation 'crashes' the society (Özkazanç, 2007: 98). There were some dramatic results of this 'crashing' intervention: The depolitization of the public sphere destroyed the social citizenship understanding.

The reduction of society into the market created the 'entrepreneur-citizen' model and revealed the 'religious-national citizen' model in cultural context. Two aspects are highlighted in new sociality: the economic individual of the market society and cultural individual of society of the community/society composed of communities. This society, composed of the entrepreneur individuals and individuals of communities, is not a political society that is bound to each other with equal rights and freedoms. This new view of sociality is far from improving the 'civil society' and it refers to the dissolution of 'sociality' in its broadest sense. In an environment where the collectivity and publicity is destroyed, it was not possible to hold the

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[38]For instance, for a study which analyses specific and associated meanings of "service" notion and phenomenon for Fethullah Gülen community please see Yavuz Çobanoğlu, *"Altın Nesil"in Peşinde Fethullah Gülen'de Toplum, Devlet, Ahlak, Otorite*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012.

society together only through formal rules of liberal type and then the process of social disintegration speeded up finally (Özkazanç, 2007: 100-109). Compatible with the ideology/background that Özkazanç stated, the understanding of 'politics' that "the service discourse" presents, removes the politics/'political one' from its context and makes it a part of an anti-political policy.

Many of the critics state in various contexts and perspectives that the politics and citizenship phenomena, which are reduced to instrumental and technical level, are associated with the transformations of modern (bourgeois) liberal democratic values and principles (parliamentarism, representation, etc.) (Schmitt, 2006; Mouffe, 2000, 2005, 2010; Hirschmann, 1994; Dubiel, 1998). It should not be surprising that the meaning of **P**olitics and 'political one' leads to a restricted perception in a new social and political conjuncture where the evaluations and calls are concentrated on the emergence of a ***post-political*** era. If it is considered that the neo-liberal ideology and practices on a global scale create a new social-political matrix (Munck, 2008: 106), then the political horizon and the hegemony of this new matrix can be comprehended easily. As stated by Munck, the most devastating effect of neoliberal hegemony within the last quarter of the century, is the "trivialization" of democracy (2008: 106). A new sociality design is envisaged where the market and its rationale is exalted, then all kinds of criticisms and oppositions are marked as archaism and both ideological as well as forcible oppositions were repressed. In an environment where the market rationale is dominant, the connection between economics and politics is broken; the market society is 'naturalized' and it established its own rationale or hegemony. Neoliberalism remodelled the traditional relationship between the public and private spheres with all aspects of the society; in doing so it "eliminated the political aspect" of politics. "Political" citizenship notion became ordinary, then turned into a nominal process about voting boxes in practice. Many citizens lost their interest in politics within this period; they alienated from the political process entirely and they had a general disbelief as well (Munck, 2008: 113-116). The detachment of politics from the 'political one' compresses it within "service" oriented discourses.

The politicians interviewed are not individuals who are isolated from the society. They are not oppposed to the neoliberal politics and in fact, they have direct or indirect part in legitimization of such politics. In this respect, it is not surprising that they have 'political' envisages appropriate to the current 'political' mentality. Without making any distinction on political party basis, many of the right-conservative politicians interviewed treat politics on a service based framework. This might be a remarkable finding which represents a common tendency of imaginations of the Turkish right-conservatism. This case should also be highlighted in terms of a universal similarity between the right-conservatism and the general political imagination. This case is also significant by confirming the spread of the new-right neoliberal global hegemony over the local-national scale.

It does not seem to be possible to consider "service politics" apart from "liberal-conservative political imagination". As long as the liberal-conservative political imagination reduces politics into a technical and administrative instrument, it seems to be difficult to evaluate the service notion free of this perception. It is not possible to examine the service notion without referring to the neo-liberal/new-right discourse and its populism either. Below, the claim that the "service" oriented political imagination coincide with the new-right/neoliberal political mentality will be discussed at the "liberal-conservative" political imagination part of the study.

## 3.3 Liberal-Conservative Politics

The second prominent political imagination in the research is "liberal-conservatism". Right out of the narrative, which corresponds to the definition naming and discursive elements and indicators. As appears in the expressions of the politicians, there are various discoursive factors and indicators that correspond to this description and classification. If the findings and determinations inferred from the expressions are classified: liberal-conservative political imaginations are described with this phrase as a definition of political discourse or identity. In other words, this imagination is

not described as an ideology with a direct correpondance and a certain name within the expressions. In this respect, the imagination is the abstraction or categorization through the content of existing expressions.

The liberal-conservative discourse within the expressions are concentrated on certain liberal political categorizes such as; supplying the freedom demands and extending the sphere of freedom, assigning importance and priority to the civil society, referring to some aspects and concepts such as, dialogue, consensus, negotiation, acceptance and tolerance of differences, limitations on state authority and criticism of all types of attempts of 'social engineering'. The discoursive aspects above interwine the liberal-conservative imagination with the below mentioned aspects and articulates it with the neo-liberal new-right discourse. Those discoursive aspects are globalization, market, change, privatization, small but a powerful state, which is responsible from providing the justice and security and which has a regulative role, and empahsis on entrepreneurship, competition, innovation, productivity, branding and individualism.

As mentioned above, "service discourse" and "liberal-conservative" political imagination are related with each other both on practical and also theoretical level. I believe those two imaginations should be evaluated as the imaginations that can articulate with each other. This engagement is a type of economic-political engagement and it refers to a neo-liberal new-right political understanding. This type of political imagination is clear mainly in the expressions of the AKP politicians and partially in the expressions of the DP politicians. However, it should also be highlighted that the MHP, SP and BBP politicians represent a political line except the "liberal-conservative" line.

Before making a description and evaluation in the light of the expressions, a theoretical evaluation of conservative and liberal political understanding will be realized. Then the similarities and differences between those two notions will be submitted. Such an assessment would allow to understand the logic of articulation of

those two ideologies. Then again, the theoretical relations of liberal-conservative ideology with neoliberalism or new-right discourse will be focused on. And finally, the overlap between the discussions on theoretical level and the expressions will be evaluated.

## 3.3.1 Controversial Articulations: Conservatism and (Neo) Liberalism

Parallelism, familarity and differentiation between conservatism and liberalism can be evaluated on various levels[39]. There are both conflicts and compatibilities among the themes of those two ideologies. Liberalism affirms the radical changes with capitalist market overview which is provoked by the economic rationality. However, conservatism hesitates from radical changes. Conservatism is remote and in fact alienated from liberal principles such as 'social agreement' and 'negative individual rights'. According to conservatism the society is a concrete organism and it cannot be claimed that it is based on an agreement. Conservatives assign a partnership among the society and the ones who lived, who are living and who will live. In this respect, Robinson Crouse style individual design is a fantasy of liberal fiction. According to the conservatives, because of mental defects the individual can only survive through the collectivities over the individual (Mollaer, 2008: 49-51). In this manner, conservatism does not have an "individualist" understanding but a

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[39] For instance, empricism is a distinctive aspect between conservatism and liberalism when the issue is discussed epistemologically. Rationalist epistemology defines a political design where the facts perceived by mind are applied to the social life; it relies on the principles of the mind rather than experience. In fact, the empricist epistomology is mainly based on 'cautiousness'. In empricism experience is the main principle to reach the reality. Here, the mind is not the founder but it is the regulator, the reality is reached during the experience process and wisdom has a subsidiary function. Although Burke, who defends tradition and gradual change, attributes importance to empirical knowledge, he also thinks that rationalism and utopianism are naive and dangerous (Özipek, 2004: 41-58). In contrast with the rationalist aspect of French Enlightment, in Scottish Enlightment the relationship among liberalism, conservatism and empricism is quite obvious and clear. It is possible to see the main themes of Scottish Enlightment which constitutes the basis of many thoughts in classical liberalism: such as, the idea of evolution which is developed against sudden and voluntary social changes, the divinity of private property, virtues of civil society driven within the capitalist market, importance of self social development and economy (Robertson, 1994: 414-416).

"communal" one. Conservatives reject the 'methodological individualism' principle of liberalism. According to them family and society are much more important than the individual. In this respect conservatism is also described as 'communitarian individualism' (Dunn and Woodard, 1991: 44).

Although liberalism is sympathetic about the radical changes, it does not support an excessive transformation. Liberalism proposes the limitation on state control to free the market conditions, but the state is an essential organization for liberalism to maintain the existing structures. The change should not be radical to destroy the establishment conditions of the state. Social change should be based on self functioning mechanisms. Conservatism defends the idea that a consistent society is not possible without a central power and authority. Loyalty to the state and the laws is the prominent aspect of conservatism. In this respect, conservatism is described by Barry (l989) as "mysticism of obeying the state and its laws". Liberalism is different than conservatism on this manner. (Classical) liberalism defends that a powerful state is a serious threat against freedom and it supports the limitation of state's duties and functions as much as possible.

Another relationship that conservatism and (classical) libearlism intersects is about the administration of the change. Both ideologies are skeptical about the idea that social change is based on conscious human will. In contrast, the ideologies differ in their approaches about their opposition to the rational planning. For instance, even though they agreed in the final analysis about their critiques of the welfare state, liberals and conservatives have different sensitivities; such as, liberals protect the individual initiative whereas the conservatives protect intermediary establishments. The former criticizes the Welfare State in terms of eliminating private entrepreneurship; where the latter criticizes it by making the intermediary establishments functionless (Barry, 2004: 283-299). For instance, even though liberals and conservatives agreed on their critiques of the welfare state at the final analysis, they have different sensitivities; such as, liberals protect the individual

initiative whereas the conservatives protect intermediary establishments. The former criticizes the Welfare State in terms of its elimination of private entrpreneurship, wheres the latter criticizes it as it makes the intermediate institutions dysfunctional (Barry, 2004: 283-299).

To mention again, the similarities and differences between liberalism and conservatism is a wide discussion sphere in many respects (epistemological, political, economic, etc.) in political philosophy and theory. However, it is not possible to examine them within the scope and limits of this study. A similar discussion and diversity is valid in the literature about conceptualization of the new-right, new-conservatism and neoliberalism. When the mentioned descriptions or terms are used with reference to a general accepted terminology and when their similarities, differences and articulations with (classical) liberalism and (classical) conservatism are also considered, the case becomes more complicated.

### 3.3.2   New-Right and Neoliberalism

The relation between the new-right ideology and conservatism has a complex essence. Liberal conservatism, paradoxically, could be considered as one of the strands of the New Right. Its immediate origins lie first in the persistence and durability of the liberal conservative tradition; second, in the anti-totalitarian critiques of the 1950's, specifically in writers such as Leo Strauss, Friedrich Hayek and Michael Oakeshott, who engaged in a running controversy with all forms of socialism and radicalism (Vincent, 2010: 66-67). New-Right is usually seen as an amalgam of traditional liberal conservatism, Austrian liberal economic theory (Ludwig von Mises and Hayek), extreme libertarianism (anarcho-capitalism) and crude populism. It is worth also underlining here one of the central components of the New Right, namely neo-liberalism, that is the attempt to recover a pure form of classical liberalism. This is quite a precise example of the way ideologies will often overlap in very significant respects and indeed share core beliefs and arguments. Further, the prima facie ideological coherence of the New Right stands some chance

if it is limited to the neo-liberal element. The neo-liberal policy emphasis was enthusiastically orientated to the free market. State intervention was perceived to have failed totally. The consensual post-war politics of planning, state welfare, high taxation, public spending, bureaucratic growth, wages unrelated to productivity, and corporatism were seen to be redundant (Vincent, 2010: 67).

The policy objectives of the New Right were the emancipation of the individual from state regulation, cuts in taxation, reduction of state welfare, controlling budgetary deficits and the money supply, and privatizing state monopolies. The difference from the older liberal conservative tradition was that there was an even greater reliance, in the neo-liberal new right, on market criteria. Neoliberalism adopts classical liberalism's equation of free markets an individual freedom, and its distrust of state intervention in the economy. However, neoliberalism goes beyond classical liberalism by embracing market fundamentalism. Neoliberalism also shares with classical liberalism an emphasis on the role of the entrepreneur. (Prechel and Harms, 2007: 4-7).

The crisis of the welfare state introduced a new hegemonic project on the agenda, where capitalism is restructured in neo-liberal direction within a new phase of globalization; where the social system has more authoritative aspect to cope with contradictions caused by the detoriated balances of social system for the good of capital and where authoritarian-populist styles gained importance for the organization of social consent. The two main elements of the new project were *free market* and *small but powerful state*. Socialist discourses are replaced by individualist, competitive, non-egalitarian discourses, and cultural identity-based communitarian discourses (Özkazanç, 2007: 41). Essential transformations in cultural sphere accompanied economic and political developments. In the early 1980s, with electoral victories of Thatcher and Reagan the new right policies were placed on the agenda and marked the period as a kind of synthesis of liberalism-conservatism. This synthesis which articulates neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, solved the democracy-liberalism articulation perceptible as social democracy in

welfare state and moved the democratic qualifications backward. The New-Right discourse articulates an original complex quality, which is composed of restricted state, market economy, economic productivity, individual freedom aspects of neo-liberals and also neo-conservatives' search of law and order based on authority and traditions (Özkazanç, 2007: 42). This new type of ruling power criticizes the political structures which are identical with the welfare state. The main criticism on this subject is the ambiguity of distinction between the economy and state. As Friedman, Hayek and Public Choice School emphasize, 'the markets are good, but the governments are bad' motto has a strategical place in New-Right's political discourse. According to Özkazanç this criticism is not limited only with the economic intervention of the state; it also includes the questioning of democracy principle through 'politization' criticism: The primary criticism against the modern democracies is the ambiguity of distinction between the society and politics. On the one hand, there is the criticism of bureaucracy in terms of state's penetration of society; on the other hand, there is a democracy criticism where the society penetrates the state (Özkazanç, 2007: 44). These criticisms, which aim to restrict the politics, in fact indicate the will to exalt the economy. The New-Right politics projects economy-centered understanding of politics, but in this understanding economy penetrates the political field by excluding all other criteria. Economics in the New-Right thought is not something that will organize social benefit for the public, but it is the basic principle that constitutes the essence of the society. Rather than an economic term, the market refers to a political term which is interwoven with some themes; such as, freedom and progress (Özkazanç, 2007: 45).

In order to realize these objectives, the New Right finds the necessary ideological force in revitalizing the conservative values. The New Right's strategy to control both the present and future is the revival of conservative historical consciousness by emphasizing historical cultural values and traditions (Keane, 1994: 31). In a sense, this strategy is rewriting the history appropriate to the conservative values. Besides this, there is a remarkable characteristic of New Right's understanding of politics and its administration rationality that has an emphasis on protection and improvement of

social units such as, nation and family, which are considered as the carrier of social integrity and support them with religious values, with communal support structures and institutions. In developed countries the market mechanisms narrow the public mechanisms in its favor. They applied the same process to the entire world by spreading the **globalization** period. The market mechanisms, which cannot overcome the crisis in its own sphere caused by the decrease in profitability, try to manage the crisis by finding new and profitable investment areas. The privatization policies were formulated and implemented within the new right ideology in developed countries and then those policies were imposed to the whole world through the same ideology and strategies to expand the market space (Özgüder, 2007: 37).

After 1980, the neo-liberal governance mentality was common in Turkey, but unlike the West, this type of governance had an authoritarian character (Özkazanç, 2007: 92). In Turkey after 1980, sovereignty and discipline techniques specific to the authoritarian-statism stands out distinctly. According Özkazanç, political rationality of the new-right consists of a synthesis of neo-liberal and nationalist-conservative elements (Özkazanç, 2007: 92). The principal role of the authoritarian governance in the formation of the new market society is the establishment of a sociality, which is pulled away from its political essence with the destruction of public sphere and directed towards the private sphere. Nationalism within the new-right is also articulated with the religious conservatism on two points. First, as Islam is considered the essence of national identity, being national and muslim refers to a unity. Second, spreading Islamic religious culture is essential for national unity and solidarity. Islam is interpreted in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in a quite statist manner, in a national security doctrine context. On the other hand, through the articulation of the nationalist-conservatism with neo-liberalism, the nation and national identity is defined by market values and also the market is considered in a religious/national meaning (Özkazanç, 2007: 93-94). All similar aspects of Western neo-liberal administration techniques (market, privatization, entrepreneurship culture, individual as a consumer and customer, emphasis on small moral

community, etc.) of neo-liberalism in Turkey, much more clearly integrate with domination techniques (Özkazanç, 2007: 94).

January 24 decisions in Turkey represent the first step of new right transformation which is the transition into neo-liberal policies. The implementation of neo-liberal policies would only be possible in an oppressive and intense depolitization environment of the military coup of September 12. The formation of the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" is started with the establishment of Intellectuals Club [Aydınlar Ocağı] in 1962. The purpose of the Club was uniting Turkishness and Islamism to create a right-wing intellectual movement against the left (Güvenç and others, 1991: 188). According to Mert, Intellectuals Club and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed by them provided "a theoretical framework of conservatism in Turkey" (Mert, 2001: 68). The aim of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which was to establish an unchanging social structure and an authoritarian political regime, creates conservative axis of new-right transformation. This axis served for the legitimacy of a free market-oriented new state structure that was added to the agenda with January 24 decisions (Sakallıoğlu, 1995: 73). The Intellectuals Club played an important role in determining the conservative cultural axis of the new-right in Turkey, it also played an active role in the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies of which the new-right transformation required (Timuroğlu, 1991: 65-67, cited in Özgüder, 2007). One of the indicators that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is a Turkish-Islamic-Market Synthesis legitimizing the interests of capital-market, apeears to be obvious in the intend of eliminating the trade union struggle, which is the main instrument for the working class interests and oppositions (Özgüder, 2007: 227-232). Realization the target of creating an apolitical community in favor of capital, by eliminating trade union struggles and oppositions, is legitimized through Islamic references. According to the synthesis supporters, trade unionism should be settled in a specific order where the growth of Turkish economy would not be damaged. Trade unionism should not be a means of fight and conflict, but it should be a mechanism "for a peaceful spiritual consensus". The basis of wage bargain between workers and employers, must remain within the haram [illicit] and halal [licit] dimensions. Neither the

workers get haram by asking more than they deserve, nor the employers should add haram to their capital by giving less than what the workers deserve (Güvenç and others, 1991: 286). Free from differences, which ignores class and ethnicity based diversities, not a social-political citizenship but an organic community-society imagination can be defined as an aspect of the new-right governance rationality. In Turkey, an organic community imagination is envisioned through Turkishness and Islam, and a new nation is predicted which is formed only from these factors. It was assumed that the public sphere will be depoliticized through religion and nationalist axes with statist interpretation and therefore the political stability will be achieved (Özkazanç, 2007: 96-97). The modern legitimacy discourse of the new-right tries to deepen the modernization theme by establishing an original synthesis throgh the tradition and modernity, Islam and free market economy, liberalism and conservatism (Özkazanç, 2007: 97). However, despite everything the new-right could not be successful in its hegemonic planning and the heritage it passed to the 2000s provided a new political-social matrix that conservatism had coherence in all respects. Today''s current political-social matrix should be evaluated with the heritage of new-right politics within a historical continuum. Indeed, the organic crisis in the early 2000s was resulted in a political-social correspondance with the AKP's ruling power. The new political and social matrix embodied in the AKP government can be interpreted as an expression of an uncontrolled articulation of the global neo-liberal policies at all levels. Nearly 10 years of AKP power during the thesis was being written, revealed numerous examples of direct implementation of neoliberal policies (Uzgel and Duru, 2009; Şen, 2010; Tuğal, 2009).

The mentioned theoretical aspects so far had different style and context of corresopondance in the expressions of the politicians, particularly from the AKP, the DP and partially the SP. As mentioned above, the descriptive elements of "liberal-conservative" political imagination in the interviews reflected through referencing some factors and concepts; such as, meeting the demands of freedom and expanding the spheres of freedom, valuing and placing importance to the civil society, dialogue, compromise, negotiation, acceptance and tolerance of differences, limiting the

authority of the state and criticizing all kinds of 'social engineering' attempts. It is remarkable that those factors overlap with the themes of post-political vision advocates. The articulation of the mentioned elements with globalization, market, change, privatization, small but powerful and regulatory state that is obliged to provide justice and security, entrepreneurship, competitiveness, innovation, productivity, branding, and individualism, reveals the (neo) liberal-conservative political perception directly. If those evaluations are examined in the light of the expressions:

For instance, a AKP politician shares his liberal political notion, which demands the recognition of differences and call the differences to be respectful to each other:

> "(…) we have a particular life style. We make politics in order to live our life style without any restrictions. I want everyone to live with respect to the others' lives. I couldn't have a life style with the standards I wanted to (…) I will live as a person who is respectful to the Turkish Republic, then somebody else can live however he/she likes. Somebody else might want to live with religious values, then he/she can; one other might want to live a social and modern life, then he/she can as well. If there are non-muslim minorities and citizens, they can also live as they want to. The laws should be applied equal and even for everyone. However, I experienced some periods in our country when this situation was not valid. Because I thought I was under pressure, I rejected the contunuity of such a structure. Nobody should apply force to somebody else; I'll respect you and you respect me. I'll live on my own, you'll live on your own; then when we meet outside, we'll respect each other. We should support consensus instead of struggle. We should be in agreement instead of argument. I want this type of the understanding to be spreaded in all levels of the society. Those are my principles about politics." (A15)

A AKP politician, who states that he is a "democrat" and "liberal", highlights a liberal political ideal in his will that is "the spread of freedom as much as possible:

> "My political belief matches up first of all with my political identity. This is my life style. I'm a democrat and liberal in general. Honesty is the primary issue for me both in politics and in normal life. Secondly, I have decisions about the improvement of freedom as much as possible, and improvement of democracy; those are the points such as justice, freedom, and such... Politics is being the right person, to practice right attitudes on duty, to be in justice

against the citizens, to contribute for a wide sphere of freedom both for me and for the others. I mean it is easy to give promises and it is easy to fight. In fact, politics is the agreement, reciprocal dialogue and effort to keep the continuity of differences at the same time. This is my understanding of politics." (A30)

The common aspects of above AKP politicians (**A15 and A30**) are non-conflictual politics, being open to negotiation, dialogue, being tolerant against the differences and liberality. The emphasis on these elements makes the political imagination identical with the liberal principles; whereas the political imagination of the second politician **(A30)** emerges associated with neoliberal principles with an emphasis on globalization, market, competition, a regulatory but powerful state. To mention again the emphasis on these aspects is identical with the vision of post-political discourse. The highlight that is "it is easy to give promises, it is easy to fight" of the same politician **(A30)** reflects a situation related both with liberalism and restricted and practical political understanding of conservatism.

One of the AKP politicians, who have a service oriented political perception describes the liberal imagination through a critique of the centralized-bureaucratic state which is considered as an obstacle during the "service" process:

"(...) we don't have any intention like making social engineering. The society already has a dynamic structure. (…) The common idea so far was 'the people knows nothing, they are ignorant". No, we have highly conscious people. We shouldn't target the things in a way being despite the people. For that reason instead of social engineering, we should rule the country according to the needs of the society and our people. Nobody should recognize Turkey that they can easily shape and lead. Our people is not that much unconscious. Today the media, TV can reach everywhere. Our people are aware of everything. The civil society is quite effective that has never been so far. You can call these values as liberal or libertarian or conservative or democratic. The people take initiatives for their destiny and future." (A2)

In a similar manner, another AKP politician states that politics is not enacting in the center, in Ankara, but it should be an understanding focusing on local and human relations. For this politician politics is "like a non-governmental organization". The

politician, who defines the liberal political imagination in a quite representative way, is similar to the above politician **(A2)** through the 'social engineering' criticism and 'civil society' defence. The politician, who advocates the expression of social demands through politics, states that the political balance among different elements will be structured "spontaneously". In this way the politician describes the classical liberal imagination directly.

Ascribing a regulatory role to the state but also emphasizing the continuity of its power, is associated with the function of the state assigned by the neoliberal discourse:

> "Now politics is an inevitable subject in Turkey and in the world. When you make right politics, it shouldn't mean to shape and lead the society. I don't consider the social engineering of a certain time as politics; I totally reject the social engineering. Human beings should be able to live as he/she was raised. I don't agree with such an expression 'I will dominate your decisions, I will rule you in that way and you will live accordingly'."(…) Politics should be an understanding where our citizens, our people intervene the others only on decision basis in a free environment, where they fight with the decisions, where all organizations, establishments and institutions fight on decision basis and politics should provide the necessary basis. This might be through laws, or state administration, non-governmental organizations, administrative procedure, administrative security policies. Politics does not mean shaping the society, it is the decision to realize the shaped demands of the society(…) What I mean is the state should only be a regulatory establishment; it should not intervene everything. I don't mean that the state should be removed, but it should stay by keeping its power. It should free a space for the civil society and individuals." (A17)

Sometimes it is not possible to examine the liberal-conservative imagination and its indicators through describing the politics directly. The mentioned imagination is more obvious and direct within the evaluations of globalization, change and economics. The below evaluation of a AKP politician about these topics defines neoliberal discourse in terms of both language-manner and context:

> "I believe we have to manage first class productivity and innovation. It's because we have competitors in the world. For instance, CHA Company of Boydak Holding in Kayseri is not selling its products in Turkey. They export all their products to Germany and Europe. We

have several companies, which are highly competitive and innovator. They have specific markets in the world. They can keep these markets because they can innovate; otherwise, if they export the same product for 7 years, this is not productive. As they can manage, they get feedback. This should be a regular practice of all companies. They talk about branding, they say let's be a brand. How can you be a brand? Why shall the people assign you as a brand? In order to be assigned as a brand, you should be in the forefront in that sector and create certain values there. Don't you think you innovate by this way? To create a brand requires to specify the standard. In order to create the standard, you apply new standards and this is done by innovation. Of course we ask the other countries to sell in our country. However, I'm sad that we lost our productivity about the agriculture. We should support the people who deals with agriculture with incentives. The farmers gain a lot in Europe and the USA. Why is that? It's because they were productive. Productivity is their principle; there is innovation in agriculture as well. This is what I mean when I talk about incentive in agriculture. We see that the people who are farmers in Europe are very rich. Here the people who say that they are farmers are poor. It's so weard. They should be supported with incentives by reaching the buyer directly and get what they deserve. You have low prfofit because you have low productivity." (A14)

According to a politician, who emphasizes that AKP settled an understanding of governance that is based on global economic dynamics and free market economy:

"We realized with the AKP that a ruling power emerged where the private sector was in forefront and which is based on free market economy. With AK Party, the following understandig became prominent in time 'If my citizens are rich, then I'm rich.' In this respect, there were no limits for Turkish people. Turkish companies and Turkish entrepreneurs invest in all Europen countries, Islamic countries, Turkic Republics and neighbouring countries. Yes, we are a country where the foreign investors are highly interested in. There is no other leader than our Prime Minister who travels around the world. He tries to develop connections for the private sector whereever he goes. He specially values private sector entrepreneurs. Consequently, we had a large trade potential with neighbouring countries, with Islamic countries, with European countries, with the USA. During this period a differentiation is emerged. As you know, we used to close all the doors for Iran and Syria. However, we have big investments in Syria and Iran. We used to forget about the Turkic Republics, but now there are big investments. In fact, the Prime Minister has such a saying: "formerly, the politics used to lead economy, but now the economy leads politics". The performance and neww approach provided us to be a respected country in the world. Then provided us a respected international politics." (A25)

The announcement of "not the politics, but the economy leads the politics" by referencing the Prime Minister (Tayyip Erdoğan), clearly express the politician's market mentality and related political imagination. It deserves to be emphasized that the language, discourse and mentality provides a confident and proud international political vision.

The expression of another AKP politician, who tells a kind of "success story" over his own life experience, indicates a strong content about the neoliberal individual, society and political imagination in many ways. According to this politician, who is the mayor of a local municipality:

"Poverty and wealth is a result caused by the human being himself. I'm not a rich man. While I was attending the university my father was not rich and in fact he was very poor. During my university educaton I worked even as a porter and a herdsman. I used to give money to my father. At least I had no need to anyone. This is about the human nature. For instance, unemployment; according to the statistical data the unemployment rate is about eight or nine percent in Turkey. I am one of the people who believes in there is no unemployment issue in Turkey. A big business center will be opened here. People are calling me since the morning to be employed there. A lady called me and told me that she doesn't want to work for the specific job that was offered because she doesn't like the job. There is an employment opportunity and she doesn't want to work; can you imagine? This is irresponsibility. A man or a woman in such a case deserves starving. Private sector is dynamic, they create employment opportunities, but the people don't like the jobs. The people do not think about the additional costs such as insurance, transporation, meals and they consider the rates of wages are low. This is called laziness. The basis of this mentality is the statist mentality which was common so far. The state imposed this mentality that is laziness to our people, they can't easily give it up! (…) Now we as (X) Municipality provide various services through intermediary institutions; somebody criticize us for using "subcontractors"[taşeron]. The revenue of the municipality is obvious; shall I pay the wages of the cadre or shall I serve the people? I call the subcontractors and announce a tender. I tell about "the duty"; for instance, I ask 'the cost for garbage collection for two years' and get the offer. Then I pay them and tell them to realize their duties. I only control them. I don't have to deal with the cadre, insurance, trade union and such. Both sides are happy. The reason I share those details is because the state should also do the same. Before providing any kind of service to the citizens, the state should act that way. The state should be the controller for education, health

and public works. It should not deal with any area other than justice and security. It will both save the resources and perform more productively. As the governing power, we actualize this but there is a long way to go." (A31)

In fact, this expression and looks like this, can be considered as a clear text because of the direct description it indicates: the ignorance of structural elements that cause poverty and wealth and the evaluation that only the individual is responsible from all struggles and challenges means the affirmation of individualist understanding of neo-liberal discourse. This politician states that there is no unemployment in the country and the "irresponsible" and "lazy" people who don't like certain jobs deserves starving. This statement refers to a clear understanding of individual and social imagination. The social welfare state might be the target when the politician criticizes the "statist mentality". In this respect, it is the repetition of new-right neoliberal welfare state critique. The legitimation of municipal services through "subcontracting" mechanisms, defencing the validity of the same mentality for the state and providing productivity through this way reveals clearly an almost perfect neoliberal logic. The state imagination especially limited with justice and security overlaps exactly with neoliberal theorists' thesis. In this manner, the expression as a whole seems to repeat the libertarian[40] comment of liberalism.

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[40] Libertarians are in a search for minimizing the public authority, while maximizing the sphere of individual freedom. Typically the state is the main threat against the individual freedom (Heywood, 2008: 111). The essential question of libertarianism is clarified during the efforts of answering what the function of government is. According to the **minarchist** [libertarians are differed from the anarchists because they accept the need of the state on minimal level or even as a night-watchman, and they call themselves as minarchist] line of the libertarians which is differed from anarchists, the functions that government should maintain are police protection, ensuring the contracts and defencing the nation. Libertarians have strong beliefs about individual rights and property. Individual rights and contract freedom perceptions exclude welfare rights. Libertarians believe that a free *laissez-faire* is the most desirable social system of capitalism (Gordon, 1995: 62-63). Libertarianism differs from liberalism by rejecting the adjustment of unequal conditions principle and they represent a different position in this respect. Libertarian approach rejects'unflinchingly' the social security and support attempts of welfare state and relates poverty with individual inability and laziness (Kymlicka, 2006: 223-229). The two prominent figures of this school are Freidrich von Hayek and Robert Nozick. For Hayek please see: *Kanun, Yasama Faaliyeti ve Özgürlük, Cilt 1: Kurallar ve Düzen*, İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994 and *Kanun, Yasama Faaliyeti ve Özgürlük, Cilt 2: Sosyal Adalet Serabı*, İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995. For Nozick please see *Anarşi, Devlet ve Ütopya*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006.

As mentioned before, liberal-conservative political imagination is found not only in the expressions of AKP politicians, but also the DP and SP politicians. However, when the AKP politicians are considered this imagination does not seem to be a generalized tendency. In DP politicians, just as the AKP politicians, this imagination becomes clear when the emphasis on some aspects; such as, market defense, the critique of 'big state' and bureaucracy, affirmation of civil society and globalization period. For a DP politician, who states that he has liberal understanding in terms of 'politics' and 'economy', describes his political imagination as:

"I don't think that politics and economy are different issues. They are sticked to each other. In fact, what I mean is if you support a decision about economy, you should also have a correspondent political vision. I have a liberal vision in terms of both economy and politics. However, I'm a liberal who advocates social justice; economy has priority for me, but it is not possible to have good economy where there is lack of justice and freedom. I defend privatization, globalization; however, we should also think about the protective mechanisms about their possible harmful sides. We live in a globalizing world today. Economy, culture and also politics should go with that. Can you be oppressive in terms of politics in our country where the internet is almost in every household? As you know Kobiler [Small and Medium Sized Companies] realize their export facilities on their own, this is a typical example of globalization. Then the politics is shaped accordingly. There are more democratic structures today; for instance, civil organizations are prominent. The people in Bergama made their voice heard by the whole country, isn't it so? They made protests in front of to the parliament. As far as I know there is no political party supporting those people (…) I think the state should not be an economic entrepreneur, it should not invest anymore. In today's world, the state does not have to carry the load of economy. I defense that state should bring the necessary initiative in all areas to provide privatization. But, as I mentioned it should not ignore the justice and law. This is not underestimating the state." (D15)

This expression of the DP politician repeats the factors affirmed by the liberal-conservative imagination; such as, defencing the free market, privatization and globalization, valuing the civil society and reduction of state from economic sphere. The difference of this politician's statement is clarified in the emphasis of social

justice and law. When this expression is compared with the expression of AKP politician **(A31)**, this emphasis might refer to the social liberalism of Rawls[41].

For SP politicians, liberal imagination is mainly expressed as pluralism, freedom and defence of values and virtues of the civil society. The attitudes of SP politicians when they evaluate economy politics and globalization process differentiates them from the AKP ve DP politicians. There is an overlap and interwining case in the expressions of the AKP and DP politicians, whereas this is not valid for the SP politicians. In other words, other than the AKP and DP politicians, the SP politicians rigidly criticize (neo) liberal economy policies and globalization, which might almost lead to their opposition against them. In this respect, the liberal political vision of SP politicians is much more clear in their emphasize on *political principles.* For instance; a SP politician states that they don't aim to direct the society via politics as a continuum of "social engineering", they reject such type of approaches and will continue to do so. This politician advocates a society where every fraction of the society can express itself freely and can get organised. The politician states he has "a special sensitivity on religious freedom" and continues:

> "The fundamental political understanding of Saadet Party is to structure an environment where all human beings can express their decisions and realize their religious practices freely. When this envronment is being structured it should not be only for specific fractions. We mean an environment that will include all the people from the left to the right, all types of religious sects and all kinds of religion that can live freely together. This is a kind of 'Jerusalem Criteria'; anyone can practice the religion freely. (…) We don't think that there would be any problem if these are systematized by the state. The state is responsible to prepare a democratic basis to bring the possible struggles among the diversities into a negotiation ground. We never followed the confrontatial politics; dialogue and tolerance is the correct in politics. Our religion mainly orders this." (S5)

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[41] John Rawls who is an American political philosopher, developed a kind of social contract theory to associate liberal individualism with redistribution and social justice principles. He defends considering social and ecomomic inequality with regard to the least advantaged people in the society. In spite of this, his justice theory is based on selfishness and selfish interest claims and reflects a liberal perspective in the end (Heywood, 2007: 76). Some writers consider that libertarian Nozick wrote the book *Anarchy, State and Utopia* as an attempt to response Rawls' approach (Kymlicka, 2006).

The political imagination of this SP politician is remarkable with the emphasis on precessors of post-political discourse in terms of 'negotiation', 'tolerance', 'dialogue' and rejection of confrontational sense of political approach.

### 3.3.3 An Evaluation of Liberal-Conservative Politics

As emphasized in the expressions oftenly, the politicians insist on their calls for 'dialogue', 'consensus' and 'negotiation' or point out a (liberal) political pespective that is built with these concepts. In fact, according to Mouffe, insisting on projects structured with the will of dialogue, consensus and negotiation, which are meaningful when there is a real selection possibility and freedom, can only lead us to a point where we give up politics and democracy. Insisting dialogue, consensus, negotiation, reconciliation and avoidance of struggle (or antagonism) 'political' calls of politicians, who express liberal-conservative imagination, might be evaluated in this respect. The vague democracy, pluralism and liberalism discourse of liberal-conservatism defenced oftenly with *politically right* motives, seems to be far from convincing. The mentioned calls implicitly and explicitly point out an imagination that tends to see the society as a homogeneous unity. In fact, the essential aspect enabling the modern society is not homogeneouity, but in contrast, an inevitable struggling 'unity' comprising/accepting pluralism and diversities as *a priori.* 'Each imagination, which ignores this aspect where the 'political one' and politics gains its real meaning, despite of its calls such as negotiation, consensus, etc., it is lack of referencing a democratic politics and its constitutional qualifications. In fact, the politicians who have 'political visions' limited with neoliberal and/or conservative world envisions, it is questionable that what is going to be negotiated and on which issue there will be a consensus.

Another subject that is emphasized very often within the expressions is the critique of "social engineering" concept/phenomenon. Right-conservative politicians' "social engineering" critique might be based on two reasons: the first one is because of discontents about political-cultural interventions of Kemalism; the other one is

implicit and explicit defence of (neo)-liberal economic rationality. As the first reason on political-cultural basis will be examined under the topic of "state-society", it will not be evaluated here. It is meaningful to discuss social engineering" critique as a manifestation of (neo)-liberal rationality here under the mentioned topic.

According to Karl Popper (1994), who raised "utopian social engineering" concept and criticized Marxism through this concept, "utopian social engineering" targets a rational action plan through a certain program. Social engineering attempts aim to restructure the society. In this way, it believes in realizing each step one by one in order to reach the target. To realize the ideal society in the minds and to change the whole society the collective engineering intends to transform it. Popper attributes the "utopian social engineering" to Marx. However, paradoxically, he is aware of Marx's statement that "the society should be developed with the laws of history not with our rational plans". He criticizes Marx as being "historicist", and consequently having a "fundamentalist" position which Popper describes as 'unscientific' (1994: 137-138). Popper advocates "piecemeal social engineering" against "utopian social engineering". In piecemeal social engineering, scientific administration/governing means having a critical approach when social policies are applied and accepting that there would be no perfect and right practice of politics. By finding the mistakes of trial applications, by eliminating the mistakes, more appropriate policies for the society can be adopted. Popper grounds his thoughts on the basis of the idea that anything might happen in human life. The role of possibilities in human and society life leads Popper to decide that the construction of the future cannot be interferred from today. However, the policies applied because of social engineering might cause opposite results rather than expected; it might even cause unexpected negative results (1994: 122-123). Popper's such kind of judgements which are associated with the political principles of liberalism, leads him to social liberalism. He advocates a welfare state where the state has limited interference on economic and political sphere. On the one hand, the state will guarantee the basis of capitalism that is the free entrepreneurship; on the other hand, in case of requirement the state will interfere for necessary precautions for more fair income distribution in the society,

and also it will be responsible to perform all necessary actions to improve the society in terms of services; such as, education and health (1994: 122-123). The criticism of "social engineering", which is defined and theoretical legitimization is questioned by Popper, ends with an advocacy of liberalism. The mentioned criticism might refer to such type of an advocacy of liberalism with various versions (social, libertarian, etc.) that are stated in the expressions.

Altough there is no direct attribution within the expressions, another important case that should be emphasized is the possibility that the ones who criticize "social engineering" might be prone to a *reverse* type of "social engineering" in terms of political, economic and social-cultural projections. Political economy rejects the state wisdom and political logic, which indicates the idea that the state would know everything about the society and direct them. It advocated that the society and economy can only produce wealth and order when they are free within their natural laws (Rose, 1996: 43 cited in Özkazanç, 2007: 67). As Özkazanç (2007: 67) stated, liberalism emerged as a rationality mainly for restricting political administration, that is a rationality for what the government should not do in order to be effective. According to the liberal government, the entire instruments and objectives of the government should be planned according to the autonomous laws of the economy and civil society. Thus, the discipline and bio-politics as a management technology comes to the history stage. All discipline techniques from school to the prison create the necessary subjectivities for the governance of free citizens. The purpose of those techniques is to create 'free individuals' who govern, take care and lead themselves. In liberalism the subject of governance is the 'society' (Özkazanç, 2007: 67). As Özkazanç (2007: 88-89) mentioned with an attribution to Foucault, neoliberalism has a distinctive aspect different than the classical liberalism. Neoliberalism advocates that the market order cannot improve itself, so there should be more political interventions over the market. According to the neoliberal administration rationale, market functioning is not a phenemenon alone itself, but it's an artificial case that is related with legal, institutional and cultural conditions. In neoliberal administration rationality, instead of a society, which acts as a collective subject against the

misfortunes that each individual faces, the decision of state takes place. The state tries to spread the competitive world market discipline by diffusing all patterns of the social structure. It appears to be a mediator during the social relations where each individual attempts to raise the value of his/her life to reduce his/her cost for the society. Thus, a new kind of social interventionism emerges, which is not legator [vesayetçi] (Özkazanç, 2007: 89-90). When the new-right neoliberal political ruling power practices since 1980s are considered, it might be stated[42] that the right-conservative politics and its political, social and cultural envisions as a whole, does not seem to be far from "social engineering" mentality that they have been criticizing.

## 3.4  Politics and Politician as a Negative Imagination

I call the third perception, which is a significant tendency in politicians' expressions, the 'politics as a negative imagination'. This approach describes and perceives politics through a set of negative qualities, definitions and classifications. Even an evaluation merely within the framework of those qualities and classifications might show that it indicates a perception which trivializes and disregards the existance of politics as a social activity, discredits and opposes it within time. However, when the expressions are examined in details, it is not easy and possible to turn this evaluation into a statement.

In theoretical works on conservatism, as a descriptive aspect the skeptical and remote approach of conservatism against the politics written with capital letter is emphasized very often. The content and information provided through the data set of the study seem to verify this aspect that is attributed to conservatism within the theory. In theoretical studies there seems to be a prima facie reciprocity between the skeptical

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[42] AKP's reform attempt known as 4+4+4 and the law enacted after this, the demand of banning abortion and the will of creating a religious generation might be evaluated as the attempts of "social engineering" that are open to be discussed. For a political-social analysis of "social engineering" on AKP conservatism line please see Fethi Açıkel "Muhafazakâr Sosyal Mühendisliğin Yükselişi: 'Yeni Türkiye'nin Eski Siyaseti' " in *Birikim* No: 276, 2012.

and remote position of conservatism about politics and the ampirical content of field research. In spite of this, the mentioned reciprocity does not allow to qualify the Turkish right-conservatism, in fact the right-conservative politicians, as opposed to the politics and as depoliticized. However, on the other hand, it is not also possible to say that the mentioned politics and politicians claim the politics. In other words, there is a vague position neither opposed to the politics nor advocated politics entirely.

Unlike the ideologies that are direct products of the Enlightenment, conservative political understanding structures politics on an entirely different perception of wisdom (Özipek, 2004: 118). In this understanding, the imperfect nature of human being and its limited capacity is emphasized. The limitation attributed to the wisdom obliges/imprisons rational(ist) projections, ideological envisions and utopian imaginations in politics and also reducuces *a priori* politics into a restricted activity. According to the conservative philisopher Kristol, the radical-utopian way of thinking in the Enlightment period emerged modern conservatism: "scientific rationalism does not mean the legitimization of existing establishments through traditions, customs or something else, but it means the legitimization only through wisdom (Kristol, 1999: 191 cited by Özipek, 2004: 122). As Vincent (2010: 70) also emphasizes the inception of conservatism was linked with the refutation of ultrarationalist arguments from the French Revolution, there has always been an impression of an anti-rationalist element in conservative ideology. The conservative view is skeptical concerning the relevance of rationalism to politics; in the words of a conservative thinker Russell Kirk: "any informed conservative is reluctant to condense profound and intricate intellectual systems to a few pretentious phrases; he prefers to leave that technique to the enthusiasm of the radicals" (Kirk, 1967: 6, cited by Vincent, 2010: 70). The dislike of systematic political philosophy, the belief in a more pragmatic, skeptical and expedient approach to politics, has led conservatives from Burke to Oakeshott to repudiate the exclusive role of reason in politics.

The suspicion and distance of conservatism about politics is not merely related with a rationalist wisdom, but it is also related with its understanding of the society and human as well. Political wisdom for the conservative is embodied, first of all, in the inherited fabric of established laws and institutions. This is seen as the deposit of a great historical accumulation of small adjustments to the political order, made by experienced political practitioners, acting under the pressure of a clearly recognized need and in a cautious, prudent way. It follows that the management of public affairs is best remitted to those with extensive direct political experience and not to theorists with their privately fabricated abstract systems. What is needed for successful political practice is *skill* or *know-how*. Even less welcome to conservatives than *abstract principles*, such as doctrines of universally applicable natural or human rights, are utopias, systematic proposals for comprehensive social transformation. Political skepticism in its turn rests on the third central doctrine of conservatism, the conception of human beings and society as being organically or internally related. Individual human beings are not fully formed, except in their basic biological aspect, independently of the social institutions and practices within which they grow up. There is, therefore, no universal human nature.

When considering the Turkish conservatism and right, it should be mentioned that there are few attempts to evaluate the skepticalness and insecurity of the Turkish right-conservative thinking tradition about politics on philosophical-ontological basis. Besides being a separate discussion and research topic per se, though not a high tendency in Turkish right-conservative thinking and political tradition the opposition against politics written with lowercase letter might also be possible for reactionary (recovering-restoring) right-conservatism. Although the mentioned tendency does not refer to a complete and consistent thought and political tradition, it indicates an opposition against the cultural practices and symbolic aspects of republic. This tendency was even sometimes reflected as concrete aggressive attitudes just as in the example of Ticani's (Taşkın, 2003: 192-193). In this tendency, which gained strength relatively after 1950s, Turkishness and Islamism were interwoven with an anti-communist rhetoric (Taşkın, 2003: 202-203). With

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strengthening Islamism after the mids of 1980s, there was a great break in Turkist-Islamist articulation and Islamism followed another direction then. However, this break does not allow to consider Islamism as completely reactionary-recovering. One of the main streams of the mentioned Islamism is resembled by a fascist approach which was affected [malul] by the cold war era reactionarism. This stream reflects eclectical interwining of new problems because of globalization and it might be driven by the violence as well. The second stream appears to be "liberalism", which is between an understanding of liberalism on political level and neo-liberal understanding that is more pragmatic in economic level. It is the line where "Islamist" expression is reduced to one of the other adjectives and which is represented by the AKP (Taşkın, 2003: 211-212).

The opposition against politics in modern terms since the mid of 1980s, the principles[43] of modernity by uniting with post-modernity especially within the Islamist movement, had radical criticisms and gained philosophical-ideological legitimization bases. This new occasion provided important position and 'opportunuties' for Islamism in rejection of the daily-current politics and also started the structuring of a new hegemonic politics just as the AKP reference.

I believe both "service discourse" and "liberal-conservative" political imagination could be examined through "negative politics" perception. General principles of conservatism imposed to politics and its relationality with the service discourse and liberal-conservative political perceptions seems to be related with the distance of politics to more theoretical and abstract patterns of politics. Conservatism that is not in a theoretical search of a specific and concrete *telos* or that does (can) not put forth a general *telos,* makes its politics limited, practical and even pragmatic most of the time. As Özipek (2004: 153-154) emphasize *telos* is: "cannot be known by a limited

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[43]İsmet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Mehmet Metiner, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Mustafa Armağan, Mustafa Özel are some popular names among 'organic intellectuals' who make strong theoretical-political advocacy of anti-modernist discourse based on Islamism. For a critical evaluation of such kind of approaches and names please see Haldun Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003.

creature or by a humanbeing that is not perfect; even if it's known it can only be the subject of politics in limited level. In other words, politics cannot be made an instrument to realize telos." In fact, the 'concrete', practical comprehension of Turkish right-conservative political thought within service, ruling, governing etc. discourses, should not be considered out of this framework. Politics gains an instrumental and technical meaning when there is no *telos,* 'Politics' with capital letter and political imagination. In this respect, the criticized and claimed politics becomes daily-current politics.

The negative perception which is valid for all the politicians of all parties within the scope of the study, reflects a common attitude. For instance, there is a common disappointment of the politicians because of the comprehension on the 'political journey' to reach the targets and aims that rather than "serving", "being beneficial for the society", "sacrificing" etc., some other aspects are effective. Below table, which is composed of the expressions without considering any difference on political party basis, indicates a set of names, characters and associations about institution of politics and politicians.

**Table 1. Nouns, Adjectives and Phrases on Politics and Politicians**

| 1. | 2. | 3. |
|---|---|---|
| Defraudation | Lies | Clientelism |
| Theft | Occupation of telling lies | Prosperity |
| Forgery | Dirtiness | Blessingness |
| Dishonourableness | Getting dirty | |
| Unearned Income | Hypocrisy | |
| Tenderer-Tender Follow-up | Ploy, manoeuvre | |
| Utilitarianism | Trickery | |
| Taking advantage | Two facedness | |
| Bribery | Bad Representation | |
| Trick | Camouflage | |
| Degenerated | Not Nice | |
| Corruption-Degeneracy | Indifference | |
| Exploitation-Exploitor | Someone that should be remained distant | |
| Immorality | | |

In this table, whatever the nouns, adjectives and qualifications about politics and politicians are directed to, it might be said that it perceives them in an apocalyptic mentality. A detailed evaluation only on the qualifications within the table and the following expressions shows to a certain extent that the subject can directly be related with clientalism that we mentioned before and its various negative aspects. The above table indicates clear and completely negative references about the definition method of practical and everyday politics. It is obvious that it is not possible to see politics or political action as affirmative practices through this table. But of course, only through these qualifications an analysis will not be enough at this point, so it will be more meaningful to refer the expressions.

For instance, the expression of a AKP politician, who states that he took place in politics for "serving", resembles a meaningful example with the emphasis that he experienced a great disappointment after participating in politics:

> "Before taking a place in politics I used to think that politics really meant serving the people and I admired the idea. I considered all parliamentarians and mayors as the hands raised for the nation, service, justice and people who are injured. Politics meant power to me. It was the power which supplied the needs of the poor or helped the ones who were subject to injustice; it was the power providing justice for the right people. I thought that the ones who were on duty for these purposes were the ones who had great sacrifices. It's because everybody had an occupation and maybe they used to work for the livelihood of their households before taking place in politics; they used to work in a certain field. I used to think that those people gave up such things in order to make politics and I thought that was sacrifice. I wouldn't feel that there was a mass of unearned income, you should be there to understand this. That was the perspective from outside, I mean my perspective before I participated in politics. I should say that I was shocked when I was a part of the politics. " (A10)

Another AKP politician can be emphasized in terms of having a similar disappointment and reflecting a generalized tendency:

> "The word service is used as a camouflage by many of the people. It is a camouflage word that is used for a while to deceive naive people and get their support. They change when they are in politics. Of course, this is not [valid] for everyone, but it is true for many of them.

When they participate in politics, there is service. What kind of service is this? They serve for the pocket, for the wallet, for sons, daugthers and relatives. We couldn't perceive any service for the society so far." (A12)

To mention again, it is stunning that all the politicians insist on relating making politics with "serving". The persistent emphasis on "service" is important in terms of highlighting the importance of the subject. The present expressions point out *a priori* negative acceptances of daily-current politics before participating in it. The purpose of 'participating in politics' indicates a pre-acceptance of negatively coded/perceived 'politics' and indicates a desire to direct it in a positive way. "Dirty", "corrupted" politics is somehow pre-accepted, but at the same time there is a will to oppose this occasion. Some superior incentives such as "serving", "sacrificing", "helping the injured people" consititute the reasons to participate in politics. However, after 'participating in politics', if it's the right expression, with the perception that the efforts are futile, the disappointments about politics are reflected. Instead of an opposition to serving, altruism, dedication of oneself, etc., "unearned income", "exploitation" and "politics for benefits" prevail them. However, the mentioned negative perception of politics does not provide a rooted and structured critique of the existing political style. The critique of current occasion is replaced by a substituting moral rhetoric instead of the expression of the search of an alternative politics.

In opposition to the "dirty" politics "clean" politics was pointed out, but the way to realize this is undefined. It is vague in the same way whether or not the politics, which should not be made for "unearned income", protect the 'common benefit'. Acting "for one's own benefit" is criticized; however, it is controversial if there is a political pattern that will emphasize the collective interests. "Honesty" instead of "deceitfulness" is provided; but there is no imagination beyond a mere moral desire to actualize this. Rather than an instrument "to camouflage" the real intentions, the desire for transparency is expressed. However, its realization is not expressed in an alternative political pattern. Consequently, as an expression of 'the type of' politics

that is predicted as a common search of the 'good' for the society is not determined as a totalitarian pattern besides moral wills and desires.

Despite being critical about the current political understanding and style, the reason why those politicians 'still' make politics should be asked. In this respect, the answers to those questions is a kind of manifestation of persistence that politics is "still" an important activity. As a finding of this research, which was emphasized at the beginning of this part, the evaluation that conservatism denies the existance of politics, discredits and opposes it within time, cannot be easily turned into a judgement. However, the politics that is insisted to be made is restricted-limited-practical political imagination, which is mentioned at the beginning of this part. The politics that is criticized and owned is the one existed-perceived in this respect, it is the practical politics in its narrow meaning. When this case about politics is ignored, it would be difficult to explain the existance of the politicians, who shared the mentioned expressions, within the institution of politics. In fact, when the rest of the expressions of those three politicians are evaluated, it is possible to see the aspects that support this statement. The moral emphasis of three politicians is remarkable. If the expressions are examined respectively, the first AKP politician **(A10)** states that "there should be some basic moral values that shape each humanbeing's world view" and emphasize that the major values of life for him are *honesty* and *righteousness*. Leaving those values means "betraying" to him and mentiones that he promised to act appropriate to those principles and he/she is determined to continue in politics:

> "(…) they used to criticize me many times from outside by saying 'this is not making politics'. But when I consider the ones who said 'this is not making politics' and when I saw the things in politics, I realized that what I did was really exactly the opposite of their attitudes. I mean it was an opposition just like the negative and positive sides. It's because everything for their benefit is permissible for them. However, for me, I can only get what I deserve. Trade life is an example… There were people who gained positive changes in their trade life after they participated in politics; I personally perceived all those things. This showed me the power of politics which is open to degeneration. If you succeeded on something in trade that you couldn't manage before participating in politics; it is not a result

of your power or talent. It shows the power of politics and you used something in politics. Because I'm completely against such things I insist on making politics (…)" (A10)

Another AKP politician, who has an expression above, emphasizes "responsibility" feeling and states as follows:

> "(…) I've been active in politics since (xx) Especially after February 28, when I realized that my ideal [mefkûre] and politics do not match. Then I thought that people who think properly just like us, who always complain, should take on responsibility, so that the country can be saved. This country should really be served, not in terms of camouflage, but in its real meaning. This service should reach every section of the society at the same time and in the same manner, equally. Both urban and village people should be perceived equally. People of İzmir and Van should be behaved the same. When we think of all the people, our people of Turkey, we don't consider them in terms of ethnicity or behavior pattern. It's because according to my ideal we should serve all the people equally. This is the way I think and I continue to be in politics (…)" (A12)

It should especially be mentioned that three of the above expressions belong to the AKP politicians and they have been the ruling power almost for 10 years when the research was realized; so it has a different meaning in this respect. These expressions are remarkable in terms of showing the corruption in politics within a historical-structural continuum that prioritize AKP and also providing the current situation through the politicians who are the ruling power. However, to what extent this attitude can be generalized for the other AKP politicians and whether or not it corresponds to a self-critical sensitivity is questionable.

It should be emphasized that there is a continuity of the negative perception as a major tendency within MHP politicians' expressions about the politics and politicians. MHP politicians also evaluate politics and the way politics is applied so far and that is still valid today through a critical and distant point of view. They describe an ideal politics and politician imagination by a politician type that they assigned negative and pejorative aspects. A MHP politician, who evaluates the

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current understanding of making politics and politician mentality in a dramatic way, states that:

> "(…) Principle, ideal, programme, ideology… We believe that all those notions are just like a tale, I don't believe in them. The issue is like having the following decision "If we chose someone as a mayor for 5 years, then we can solve our problems about getting a permission to open a buffet or getting the development right for 10 acre field; so that after getting the planning permission we can earn 5-6 times more. Or if there is a green land that [someone] is planned to be turned into a trade land and owned inappropriately. On the basis of this issue, there is interest factor. However, while this subject is being submitted to the public it is related with religion or a similar thing. Of course, this is the way of legitimizing the issue, misleading the people. They will say it will serve religion, country and nation; but there is nothing like that... In fact, the people who vote for this are aware of the case. In politics, everybody cheats himself/herself first, and then cheats someone else." (M1)

The approach that the above expression presents is the politics that value 'principle, ideal, programme, ideology' and such aspects; it is the politics that is shaped around these aspects and an activity that should be actualized in this direction. It is emphasized that those aspects function as a mask in practices of current politics and the main "factor" is interest. In order to legitimize this main factor there is an attribution to religion, country-nation and such notions, and at the end politics is defined as corrupted. Below expressions are important in terms of describing such a perception:

> "In Turkey when you say siyaset [politics] and politics [politika], those are different notions. However, both of them trembles people. When people see a person who is dealing with politics, they perceive and look at him/her differently. They perceive politics as a field that someone is in if he/she has any interest or benefit. I don't know about the other parties, but the political activities in my party is different. It's like a national service, like sacrificing and this is why we try to service at the MHP. As we try to fight for the existance, peace and unity of this country, we work and make politcs in here." (M9)

> "People consider politics in two terms. First, it is a reality in our country: to get use of unearned income of the politics. The other is to correct the things if you see something wrong. In Turkey, in a democratic and secular republic, the only institution is politics." (M6)

"Politics means being multi faced, isn't it so? Being multi faced; now we have shameless [yüzsüzlük]. This is what I understand from politics. The politician should be able to talk both with the people and the ones who are at the upper level. Being multi faced does not mean shameless. They tell lies here and there, they say something to the people and something else to the upper level people. I don't accept such type of a politcs, I reject it in fact." (M20)

There is a common point of both MHP politicians and other conservative politicians. According to this *other* politicians who are 'corrupted' or 'lack of morality' search for "interest" by making politics. However, this is not valid for them. This statement might serve to legitimize their positions-situations or for their 'exoneration' strategies through the criticism of "corrupted" politicians. It might be said here that there is an operational 'exoneration' process by a general moral judgement that nobody can oppose. This process allows the politicians to exonerate themselves through "service discourse" by emphasizing moral records.

The mentioned negative perception of politics is reflected by describing it an activity perceived as "creeping" and "different", and the notions "interest-benefit" and "shameless" attributed to it. Can the clear pessimism within the expressions be evaluated as a deep lack of confidence, suspect and an approach that rejects it within time? In spite of the bad mood within the expressions, I believe those expressions does not allow to make such a judgement about politics. Politics is still perceived as an activity field through some references; such as, "like a national service, sacrifice" or "fight for the existance, peace, unity of the country" or "correct the mistakes".

This approach of MHP politicians which 'owns' politics, appears in a form by referencing nationalist ideology elements and by 'owning' symbolically high values of country, nation, land, flag, etc. However, just like the AKP politicians, MHP politicians did (could) not make a structural examination and analysis on their 'heavy' and pessimist picture about politics and politicians that might be brought to agenda by correlating the mentioned situation with the historical resources.

The mentioned pessimist picture is considered through subjective reasons such as personal incompetence or ambition of politicians or through some cases such as "injustice", "victimization" or "wrongness". The critique of the current understanding of politics envisions an alternative politics; but it is far from developing a rooted and rational critique which considers historical and structural aspects. The horizon that the possible alternative envision points out the replacement of the facts that are reasons of the current situation by positive moral facts. For instance, a moral mentality supposes the emergence of an 'alternative' politician or politics by replacing "dirty", "degenerated", "selfish", "beneficiary" politicians with "clean", "honest", "honorable" and "moral" politicians.

To mention again, it is obvious that an understanding that centralizes moral, virtuous, qualified and accumulated personalities and relates some of their positive aspects with performing various missions and consequently envisioned the realization of ideals about politics and society; do (can) not read the current situation in politics within its historical and structural reasoning. This evaluation might be valid for almost all right-conservative politicians without considering any difference among the political parties. The expression of a SP politician is meaningful which confirms this statement:

> "Unfortunately, especially for the last twenty years, there is a situation caused by the defraudations of people in politics. The society perceive the institution of politics like an instrument to hit the goldmine, an instrument of defraudation. Because some honest people are kept remote from politics and according to me this is a project applied consciously. By stating the idea that 'honest people cannot take place in politics', people who will realize it with competence or honesty are kept distant from politics. For that reason the field is filled by some malevolent people. We, as Saadet Party, see this case during all election preparations. People are really distant from the institution of politics. They say 'you meet us in each election, otherwise you wouldn't visit us'. I believe an honest person should participate in politics. If an honest person is in politics he/she would not steal or let anyone steal, would not consume and let anyone consume. Crucial institutional sources are unfortunately wasted by the dishonest governors. Consequently, we all suffer from it (…) An honest politician leads the society. He/She suggests it to the ones he/she order. I always say

that we should always position good people to certain places, such as a good district governor, a good governor, a good manager, and a good chief. Otherwise, both the politicians and politics will remind bad things to the people."(S5)

This expression **(S5)** points out that the society could never manage to improve as long as there are no politicians or people who had no impropriety, who are "honest and moral", who do not "steal" and "let others steal", who do not "consume" and "let others consume", the people "equipped with goodness" without considering their titles and occupations. It was assumed that the problems could be solved by providing an approach that is reduced to some ambigious moral principles and values such as "being good", "goodness" and "honesty". Through a limited morality logic that is the replacement of bad, liar, virtueless people by good, honest, virtuous people, this statement provides a shallow evaluation similar to the approaches mentioned in the other expressions. One of the DP politicians who states that type of an understanding in his expression by reducing or equating politics to personal qualifications of a politician:

> "(…) When politics is the subject, I would like to hear, see and live something that I missed, something that I really would like to experience is morality. However, unfortunately now the only things that politics reminds are immorality, trickery and deceitfulness. Then it is an environment where all types of lies, hypocrisy, bibery and dishonor take place. For that reason all those notions should be *replaced*. I believe the concepts that were degenerated in humans' minds should be valued as they deserve. Meanwhile, when I tell all those things I don't claim that I'm the most honorable, the great and magnificent person in the world." (D11)

Another evaluation derived from the expressions is that the corruption and deterioration is not only limited to politics and politicians. Although the politicians do not state explicitly, they emphasize a general corruption. There are expressions indicating that the corruption is also spread over the society and of course over the individuals, just as the politics and politicians. The expression of a DP politician, which affirms the above expressions with several respects, is interesting in terms of understanding the meaning of current politics in Turkey. It is also interesting because

of the perception attributed to the politics and politician, the claim that this understanding and perception is passed onto politics and politician:

> "In Turkey the main reason that politics and politician is weak, because the state is too powerful. The second reason is that the politician is weakened too much. I don't mean that the politician is not wrong. The state serves the public in two ways. The first one refers to the routine services which the state is obliged to do; such as, road construction, bridge construction, supplying the needs of the people, supplying the domestic water. However, the state also provides some opportunities to the people. Those opportunities are provided through the ruling power. This is something besides the routine services. If you support a political ruling power, then the ruling power pays you back. What do they do? They pay its cost; they get credit from the bank, hire you the bays or try to *provide some advantages at the tenders*; this is what the state provides. Is this something normal? It's not a normal issue in democratic countries. However, Marx and Weber has a saying to describe the politicians, which is a kind of our understanding, that is politics is the art of the possible. Mr. Demirel translated this expression into Turkish or applied it into politics as politics is an examination. The main purpose of the politicians in Turkey is to share the state sources among the people, among the ones who are around them, which gets too much attention of the citizens. In fact, the citizens who are opposed to this case are not disturbed in terms of moral principles and this is not an objection caused by a moral principle. Their objection is because they cannot also get some shares from those sources. If this is the style of the society, then the politician is shaped accordingly. In Turkey, you expect *honesty* from the politician, of which is an aspect that you yourself don't own. We expect morality from the politician that we don't own personally." (D3)

This expression and the similar ones might be interpreted as an indirect statement of clientalism in Turkish politics. Besides the argument about the degree that clientalism will be transformed to center-right, the mentality here is very important for political system and legitimacy discussions in terms of its central role in past and current politics. This approach and the similar ones, which describe 'the main purpose' of politics and politician as 'sharing state resources' without any legitimizing factor, might be considered as supporting and reproducing the current negative perception about politics. Another stunning point is the claim or acceptance that the issue is adopted by the 'public' as well. The public, which is *assumed* as not opposing the situtation in terms of "morality principle" "as long as they get a share"

from the sources, becomes a constituent of the system. Then 'the public', which has been the constituent of the current political system, should not require honesty and morality from the politicians. Although it is not possible to announce this evaluation as completely meanginless and invalid, this argument is manipulative and meaningless as long as the center-right politics disregards its own role or responsibility in making politics insignificant. It should be mentioned that this evaluation **(D3)** and similar evaluations are important in reflecting 'sincere' and 'inner' information of pragmatist political imagination of center-right politics especially until today. Although the evaluation of this politician and the similar ones seem to separate the state and government, they perceive them as identical and interwoven by describing the routine operational mechanism of the state/government indirectly. According to this the state/government is an instrument that provides "routine services" and this is not an extra ordinary situation. In state/ruling power engagement the ruling power is *suddenly* separated from the state and transformed into an intermediary instrument which provides "opportunities" and supplies "a set of opportunities". Those opportunities or the compensation of "paid cost" for political support is paid in return as "credit supply", the opportunity to "rent" the institutions or places with public identity or as providing "advantages in tenders".

## 3.5 Utopian-Radical Politics

Whereas the political understanding of conservatism is suspicious about and remote from the Politics written with capital letter, it does not mean that the conservatives do not have a better world ideal (Özipek, 2004: 125). In contrast, as much as the optimist ideologies about human nature such as Marxism, which believes in human perfection by changing the "subjective" conditions surrounding the humanbeing, conservatism also values the attempts for such a world. In this respect the differences of conservatism are (1) the content (purpose) of such a world and the way (method) to lead it is not possible through an absolute style and (2) there are accepted principles that politics cannot be a subject to be used ideologically. In contrast, the

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rationalist politics, which the conservatives are opposed to, assigns a definitive role to the human wisdom about the mentioned two points. In this approach wisdom refers both to the nature of the ideal world and the final authority how the political periods should be organized to reach the ideal world. Conservatism, which does not accept such an authority and which distinguishes "modern utopianism" from utopic imagery, notices the ideal world, but rejects the social engineering that is supposed to carry it to the ideal world (Özipek, 2004: 125). In this sense, the final political imagination of conservatism indicates a restricted political ideal with its emiptemological and historical (pre) acceptances and with a utopic imagery that is compatible with it. As mentioned within the parts of the study where service discourse, liberal-conservative and negative political imaginations are considered, the political imagination of conservatism in general could be evaluated separately rather than its perspective over human nature, society, change and permanent social institutions.

Burke, the founding father of conservatism, and other conservatives do not believe that humans are naturally good, noble, and perfectible, but rather, from a Judeo-Christian perspective, see people as fallen, sinful, selfish, and rebellious. So to become as good as possible, economically and morally, people must be shaped and disciplined by the best of the past (education, art, family, patriotism, law, religion, property). This requires authority in the family, the church, the school, and government. So, conservatives want to "conserve" those aspects of society and culture that civilize and improve human beings. Like Aristotle and Christ, they assert that only through virtue can man be happy. From this conservative attitude, Burke criticized liberal and radical social movements, beginning with the French Revolution of 1789. These "Progressive" social movements are in error in two ways: (1) They assume that humans are good by nature and only made bad by their environment, so (2) the way to improve humanity is to change society radically, throwing out the past and creating an entirely new social order (Sheldon, 2001: 71).

For conservatives, radical dream of creating a perfect society (through democracy, equality, communism, feminism, etc.) will end in nightmare and disaster. The arrogance of any group or generation to think it knows more than the wisdom of the past ages will doom it to destruction and misery. So, all utopian schemes or idealistic reforms, for conservatives, will lead to chaos and unhappiness. They are, therefore, to be resisted as a cruel and deceptive trick. Any reform group that promises to solve all human problems is suspect, for conservatives. It is much better to preserve the best of the past, to be patient with the world's wrongs, and to change or improve social conditions slowly. Stability, order, dignity, respect, authority, religion, property, classical education, traditional family, and patriotism are the conservative values. Burkean conservatives hate innovation, disrespect, and change for the sake of change. They even identify a restless desire for radical change with mental illness. Most of all, they fear the seductive quality of radical reformers' promises of liberty and prosperity for all because they deceive the ignorant and destroy the good. The American Revolution of 1776 Burke saw as acceptable because it preserved traditional British values of mixed government, property rights, and law. Like the British Revolution of 1688, the U.S. Constitution preserved the past rather than discarding it. For conservatives, civilized society (art, industry, education, order, stable family, religious traditions) is a fragile structure that takes generations to build up but that is easily and quickly ruined by radical reform. This backward-looking stance of conservatives gives them a reputation for being reactionary, dull, and against progress. Burke felt that given human limitations, progress and improvement can occur only very slowly and gradually; any sudden change for good is an illusion (Sheldon, 2001: 72; Duman, 2010: 381-382). Quinton (2007: 285-286) defines this disposition:

> "traditionalism which supports continuity in politics, the maintenance of existing institutions and practices, and is skeptical of change, particularly of large and sudden change, and above all of violent and systematic revolutionary change. At its most rudimentary this is simply a widespread human disposition, present to some extent in everyone, though by no means universally predominant, to love the familiar and to fear the unknown. Suspicion of change is not the same thing as rigid opposition to it. But, for the conservative, if there is to be change it should be gradual, with each step carefully considered, as though one were venturing on to ice."

Conservatives have long said they are distinguished by being against theorizing about society, and of course putting theory into practice. They say theory is one of a bundle of things they eschew, and a failing of their opponents. It is something, they say, that is incapable of dealing with the complexity of society. It is not clear what they take theory to be, or that they take it to be a single thing. To pass from theory to ideology, whatever it is and however it is related to theory, few things have been taken to be more pernicious by conservatives. They have traditionally said they eschew it. If conservatives say they have nothing to do with theory, ideology and abstractions, they also take themselves to be distinguished by resistance to traditions and habits of thought that issue in these things. The traditions and habits include what are called rationalism, reliance on intellect or reason, and utopianism (Honderich, 2005: 32-34). The conservative philosopher Oakeshott is one of the leading people who formulized efficiently the rational intelligence, political abstraction and opposition against the discourse. He portrayed rational knowledge acquired through books as remote from 'the genuine, concrete knowledge of the permanent interests and direction of movement of a society'. In a famous analogy, he observed of the rationalists:

> "like jumped-up kitchen porters deputizing for an absent cook, their knowledge does not extend beyond the written word which they read mechanically-it generates ideas in their heads but no tastes in their mouths" (Oakeshott, 1967: 22; cited by Freeden, 2006: 320).

Freeden states that some fundamental inferences might be found about the precessors of conservatism through the cook methaphor of Oakeshott, which are:

> "First, that conservatism is about doing, and about understanding what one is doing, not about thinking in the sense of planning what to do. Second, that conservatism is unreflective to the extent that it does not deal with packages of coherent ideas about human beings and their societies, but is a method of recognizing reality through experiencing it, intellectually unintelligible for non-participants. Third, and consequently, that it is non-transmittable, unless this be done by direct instruction in its practices. Fourth, that it is futile to conceptualize about human conduct, political or otherwise, in manners typical of Western Political thought. Philosophy is simply 'experience without reservation or presupposition'. The world of the conservative-the world of practice-is unsystematic and contingent, though there is within experience an inner, self-contained, coherent world" (Freeden, 2006: 321).

According to Özipek, the line starting from classical conservatives until today, despite its diversity, conservative thinkers and statesmen perceived politics as a limited action field rather than an independent field of social act. Conservatives are opposed to the excessive forms of knowledge and analysis epistemologically. They do not accept adaptation of a way of thinking to the society and politics, which is characterized by being extremely abstract, rationalistic and away from experience. On the basis of the reason why conservatives are skeptical about the comprehension of the reality by the political theory entirely and why they hesitate about the limits of political action, is because the complexity of life and diversity of the society leads the invalidity of a rational design (Özipek, 2004: 129-133; Kekes, 2001). The uneasiness against the possible unintended consequences of political action limit the perception of politics for conservatives. Finally, conservatism is opposed to the totalitarian state, collectivism, radical utopianism, structive constituent rationalism and all other aspects that are attributed to socialism and fascism (Özipek, 2004: 156).

When the status of conservatism within the theory against the radical and utopic imagery is considered, it is obvious that a relation between conservatism and radical-utopian politics cannot easily be established. However, the data gathered from the study do not allow describing the mentioned tendency as a simple form; such as reactionary conservatism (McClelland, 1989), revolutionary conservatism (Woods, 1989) and radical right-wing or extreme right-wing (Billig, 1989). There might be some discursive aspects that match and do not match with the qualifications within the attempts of classification here. For instance, we emphasized the weakness of the reactionary tradition within the negative political imaginations part. A type of reactionarism might be mentioned when the revival of the Ottomans is anticipated. However, it is not possible to define it as a powerful and significant tradition. Moreover, the Turkish-right conservatism having the typical conspirator and anti-semitic rhetoric (Bora, 1999; Taşkın, 2007) does not provide the opportunity to consider it under entirely radical or racist right topic. In this respect, instead of evaluating the Turkish right in general within the ideological-political integrity with unique characters, as Bora suggests (1999), it seems to be more reasonable to

evaluate the ideological-discoursive aspects (nationalism, conservatism and Islamism) within the dynamics of articulation and disintegration. If conservatism is excluded because of the mentioned reasons, it might be meaningful to consider the radical-utopian political tendency with a similar approach.

The "utopian-radical political imagination", which represents the weakest tendency within the data and limits of the study, is an imagination that should be considered as different from the above main three tendencies in terms of its relation with conservatism. This tendency is obvious especially in the narrations of the politicians from MHP, SP and BBP. It should be stated that the reason the tendency is more obvious in the mentioned party members, is because of the historical-ideological roots of especially MHP and BBP parties. If the hesitations and objections of the mentioned parties about conservatism as a descriptive ideology or identity are considered, the reason that is why this tendency is prominent within those parties and among their politicians can be understood. However, it should also be emphasized that the utopian-radical imagination relatively and partly overlaps with the negative political discourse as a critique of present (daily) politics. It might be stressed that this tendency seems to be more close to fascist and authoritarian political "horizon" in terms of the radical negation of politics, the "new politics and society understanding" and "civilization" that it refers to.

The radical-utopian tendency might be considered as the imagination of which the establishment of a relation with conservatism is most difficult and sometimes it is impossible. Radical-utopian political imagination resembles a position which is oscillatory between the practical and radical politics. While emphasizing the indispensability of practical politics, it highlights a utopian imagination as well. The practical politics connects it to the real world. Meanwhile, the radical-utopian imagery seems to 'bear' (Açıkel, 1996) the practical political activity and provides the reasons to sustain the political standing-loyalty and to attribute a meaning to the political existence. It might be significant to apply Mannheim's analogy between the "ideology" and "utopia". According to Mannheim (1972) the ideas gain "ideology"

status as much as they get closer to their actualization potential and claim; whereas they stand as "utopia" according to their distance from the reality and practicality. In relation with the subject, this is not considered as an *analytical category*, but considered as useful in terms of analogy. We describe the limited and concrete political representation as "ideology" with respect to Mannheim's definition. Using the meaning of "utopia" as Mannheim uses, really seems to be possible. As it will be perceived within the narrations in details, it is possible to observe indirect utopian tendencies particularly within the narrations of some MHP and SP politicians. For instance, utopia corresponds in "Panturkism", "The Ideal of Turan" or in some other imperialist discourses for MHP politicians. Meanwhile, the meaning of utopia is formed for SP politicians in "providing a new civilization and justice to the world" with the leadership of Islam.

### 3.5.1 Radicalism and Conservatism In the Presence of the Utopian Imagery

The radical-utopian imagination and the political content it implies, which is clear in the narrations of some MHP, SP and BBP politicians, seems to be necessary to be evaluated through a detailed analysis on the basis of unique studies. In this respect, we would like to emphasize that this study provides a significantly limited analysis and evaluation. In general, it might be mentioned that the utopian thought is valuable as long as it is the source for the critique of the present thought and for the alternative social imaginations and politics. Within the framework of the study, utopian imagination is valuable and meaningful because it provides those aspects. However; it is not necessary that each radical-utopian thought will have such aspects as a priori. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to consider the nationalist-Islamist utopian imaginations within the study having such an essence. However, this is not an obstacle for us to see a utopian-radical character within the mentioned imaginations.

Utopia is an ideal society that does not currently exist. Literary depictions of utopia include Plato's Republic, Sir Thomas More's Utopia (1516), and Edward Bellamy's

novel Looking Backward (1888). Utopian literature serves the purpose of criticizing contemporary political injustice and formulating a system of greater justice. This critical and constructive effect of utopian writing has led to many practical social reforms and more humane policies. Plato's Republic formulates the perfect state governed by wise Philosopher-Kings; Francis Bacon's New Atlantis presents an ideal government of scientists and engineers; Charles Fourier offers a socialist utopian society. The utopian urge flows from a dissatisfaction with existing society and the belief that humanity can create perfect social and political systems. Conservative thinkers (St. Augustine, Edmund Burke), who see evil as inevitable in human nature and unalterable by social change, are less likely to formulate ideal utopias (Scruton, 2007: 716-717). Despite the decline in utopian writing during the mid-20th century, idealism arose again in the 1960s New Leftist movements, and communal utopias again flourished. Traditional Marxism denounced such socialist utopias as idealistic and contrary to the objective laws of history (Sheldon, 2001: 300).

According to Açıkel (1996: 180), without considering the religious or secular feature, the utopias  a) can be structured by filtering through the social/historical subject's subjective conditions that define it; b) despite all its relations with the reality and history, the utopic one –negative or positive- carry a sublimation element even on imagery level; c) collective subjects form their new world imagination and hopes by getting rid of their disappointments and suffers; they are reverse negations. Against all its radicalism, utopias articulate with the social and political reality and "intolerable oppressiveness of the ascribed". None of the utopias is formed on a world representation based on suffer. Utopias are the places where catharsis and as well as the pleasure is built on. They are reciprocal, because the dominant moral feature is the belief that the problems will end one day. This tendency should not be considered as a "self-deception" or as not perceiving the reality precisely; instead, it should be treated as a feature that the political-social struggle, which motivates the masses and makes them bound the life.

If the assessments mentioned so far are evaluated through the narrations, for instance, one of the MHP politicians state that:

> "The classical answer about Politics is saying that I'm interested in politics to serve the people. Of course the aim is serving, but there is something that is serving will be in accordance with your decisions. In fact, when you make politics you try to realize the things you think and desire about your country. Of course serving is included in this action. Why do you imagine such a life? It's because you want the people to live a better life. Of course there is service in it, but if I say we only serve, the meaning will be too narrow. People want to be in politics in order to experience their own thoughts and desires, and to structure such a world. This is what I think. I believe this thought will ease and make people's lives better. Then, I have to realize this system. You deal with the politics and make politics to do it. There is the purpose of service at the end. The primary thing is not serving, but realizing the decision on your mind. What is it? It is to reach the point in the world that the great Turkish nation deserves. To be a leader nation. First of all, it is to have a country where the Turkish customs and morality is completely dominant. As long as we comprehend our real potential, I believe there is no obstacle for us to seal the century with Turkishness. This is not a dream. Aren't we the nation who had a world emperor in the past? Didn't we rule the world for 600 years?" (M8)

Above narration deserves to be emphasized because of two reasons. As mentioned at the beginning of this part, the political imaginations of the politicians do not appear as pure and generic tendencies within the narrations. This narration stands as a good example for that. Within the narration, he positions the politics as a "service discourse" on the one hand, and emphasizes a utopian imagination on the other. However, he states that considering politics in terms of service will be inadequate and highlights his desire to adapt the ideology into the real life to make the people and country to live 'in good conditions' and 'a new world'. There is an oscillation when the service discourse is transformed into a utopian discourse. It is possible through the expressions of some desires; such as "being where the great Turkish nation deserves, being a leader nation, a country where the Turkish custom is completely dominant" and "to seal the century with Turkishness".

According to another MHP politician who exemplifies the oscillation between the practical politics and utopic politics:

> "(…) there can be nothing without politics. The key part is politics in everything. This is why I'm in politics. If you want something to be improved, to be improved in a good way, to improve the land, country and people, and all the things remained us, to carry them into a better and good position, you definitely have to be in politics. (...) Of course we have great ideals where the Turks and Turkishness is dominant. Of course, we have an ideal that the Turkishness will lead the world. Otherwise, the normal politics is a plain, but a necessary thing at the same time. Politics without great ideals is a torture most of the time. I hope that I could explain what I mean. You stuck between them generally. However, I make politics because I mainly believe that Turkishness notion will dominate the world. It is not important if I can experience it or not. (…)" (M6)

Concrete-practical politics is seen as an activity "to be within definitely" in order to reach "a better and good position" and have "something to be improved in a good way". Utopian imagination is described through having "great ideals". Utopian theme, as it was for the MHP politician **(M8)** that we quoted, is reflected as the ideal "where Turkishness is dominant". As the politician **(M6)** states, the practical politics without the utopian "great ideals" is "plain politics" and it is a "torture".

According to another politician where the utopian imagination is described 'sharply':

> "I have no expectation from the politics. In fact, I don't like it very much, but I have some expectations from the politics as an institution in the name of the country. These expectations are not only limited with the idealists [ülkücüler], but with the general Turkish society. I believe that the Turkish society is living a life which they do not deserve. Not the politics itself as an institution, but the politicians are not aware of the potentials of Turkey or I believe they are aware of the potentials, but they cannot evaluate them. In fact, I lose my belief that the politics as an institution with the current situation can produce solutions for the country. the problems of the country. However, I don't consider the idealists or Turkish nationalists as a section within Turkish politics. I mean, even if there is no Nationalist Movement Party idealists would work for various institutions or organizations in order to realize their missions. In fact, I also have a similar approach. Turanism is one of the significant factors that describes my political identity. This is forgotten among us as well. I am a citizen of the Turkish state, but I can also call myself as a Turk from East Turkistan. I

mean having a Turkish passport does not restrain me to feel myself a citizen from East Turkistan or Azerbaijan. The first aspect for me is Turan. The second one is the homeland, I always say that idealism [ülkücülük] is a matter of love of homeland. I feel myself as a person who is bothered with each problem of the Turkish nation. I also would like to perceive the idealists within the same respect. The third aspect is that I perceive the Turkish nation and nationality as a global phenomenon. If you check the world map you will see that the Turks are spread over each and critical region in the world. This is an opportunity provided by the globalization. I see that those opportunities will lead the Turkish nation or the nation within the Turan region, with the right strategies and make them a leader nation within the following fifty years. This motivates me a lot. Is there any attempt on this way? No, there is not; but I have enthusiasm which motivates me. Even though there is no attempt now, the things in the world change so rapidly. The maps are cleared and the new ones are being prepared." (M19)

This narration should be emphasized in terms of some different respects. It is significant features in terms of disregarding the personal expectations within politics, putting a distance to the practical-daily politics and putting the ideological imagination limits he attributed to the politics within a wide framework. The political expectations described through a nationalist ideological imagination is not limited only with "ülkücüler", but also with "the general Turkish society". Within the following parts of the narration, it is seen that there is an imagination above those 'limits'. The political identity and ideology described on the axes of "Turan", "Homeland" and "Turkish nationality" also forms the limits of utopia. The politician, who defines nationalist ideology through corporatist content, and does not perceive the "Turkish nationalists" as "a fraction of the politics". According to him: "If there is no Nationalist Movement Party, the idealists [ülkücüler] would work for various institutions or organizations in order to realize their missions. The politician perceive the Turkish nationalism as a "global phenomenon" in a conjuncture where "the maps are cleared and the new ones are being prepared" and claims that "the opportunities provided by the globalization" "will make the Turkish **nation a leader** with the right strategies". Besides the ideological-political content of this claim and evaluation, I believe the important point is the 'depth' and 'commitment' case which is referred by the ideological weight, color and imagination capacity of this 'vision' within its inner

logic. Whether there is a utopian tendency or not, this case might be considered as a generalized tendency for the MHP politicians. The most remarkable tendency among the MHP politicians' narrations within their utopian imaginations about the politics is the defence of a world, society and human understanding compliant with the nationalist ideology. The narrations of the MHP politicians might be considered as the expression of their ideological-political line in accordance with the political tradition of the party. In other words, Turkishness or Panturkism forms the ideological-political discourse, which is the core of his narration. Although Panturkism or any other ideal does not take place within the formal discourse or program of the MHP, it is quite functional in providing political commitment and mobilization. That is to say, when the MHP and similar parties are the subject, the ideological features with high symbolic values, such as Turkishness or Panturkism, have a significant effect both on MHP base and the parts which are conservative, open to nationalism and some are even 'neo-nationalist'. Those features effect the social categories through individual, political and daily life practices. In this respect, the statement that "utopian thought should be considered as a factor motivating the political-social masses and bounding the life" (Açıkel, 1996: 180) emphasize the importance of utopian imagination.

The radical-utopian political imagination is also perceived within the narrations of the BBP politicians. Although the BBP politicians take a small part quantitatively within the sample of the study, a singular example will be sufficient for this purpose. According to a BBP politician, who provides some clues about this imagination:

> "(…) I participated in politics because I believed that we had to integrate with our national and moral values. With our glorious history of 6000 years where the Turkish language was spoken in a geographical region from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, I thought that a blessed passion of Islam can only be possible through democracy arena. I participated in politics because I believed in my party administration that they will lead the country beyond the centuries." (B4)

Utopian politics is obvious in some of the SP politicians' narratives as well. The expression of the utopian imagination through the language, style and rhetoric of the SP politicians' narrations is not quite distinctive from the MHP politicians. As it will be assumed, the difference emerges within the discoursive performance that is attributed to the ideological-political references:

"(…) Politics is a means of service for us. In one of the catechism [ilmihal] books that is commonly read in our tradition, the politics is defined as: 'It is the way which leads people to happiness in the world and afterlife [ahiret]'. Consequently, we comprehend the politics as happiness both in this world and afterlife, and participate in this movement in order to realize the requirements. However, no social order is fair and mature enough to make all the humanity happy. It is not possible for a humanbeing to structure a mature order through a social organization. Happiness can only be possible through a system focused on Quran and sunnah. So, when we examine Quran and sunnah we see a struggle. As Karl Marx stated the manhood and history of manhood is not composed of a struggle for a living. The history of manhood refers to the struggle of wisdom. It is a struggle between the right and wrong; good and bad; fair and cruel. In this respect, for instance, prophet İbrahim [Aleyhisselam] had a fight with the Mount Ararat through logic. Prophet Musa [Aleyhisselam] had a fight with the Mount Ararat on cognitive level. The last prophet, our prophet, Hz. Muhammed, as stated in the Quran had a fight in political, administrative and eternal field. Consequently, according to our perception in Islam we have to *stand within the fight*. The surface and climate in Turkey is available for a political attempt. For that reason, our competitors and enemies are not the political parties in Turkey, but our enemies are the global powers. We call it the dark room regime. The religion advises us to fight with the global powers within the political arena, which was judged by the prophets as well. Then politics means perception at the same time. Politics is not only a means of service, but also *an imagination*. Because we consider politics not as a purpose but as a means, we think that the politics is a *bridge* that will carry us to structure the civilization that can be lived in. Politics is not only a type of service, but also the way that will lead to the *civilization project*. In this respect, politics is inevitable. However, if you ask if our movement is only a political movement or nor; my answer is no, it is not. First of all, our movement is scientific. It focuses on moral subjects. It is the movement of giving and jihad. Finally, it is a political movement. The only target and aim is to constitute a new civilization, where the east and west, the north and south live in peace, compromise and welfare. This is the main target of our movement." (S8)

At least for some of the people from SP tradition this narration might be a complete example, which emphasizes the meaning of politics and the (ideal) world and society foreseen through this politics. This approach, which refers to Islamic references and aspects for the ideological source, describes the politics as a worldly activity and also as a desire/hope of happiness related with "afterlife". Although the politics is attributed value, because it was assumed to be the opportunity to reach the happiness in life and afterlife; any type of social that is political order is not sufficient to reach the happiness. However, the inadequacy attributed to the partiality[44] of the social does not lead the political struggle or conflict into a meaningless level. According to the narration, with reference to Marx, the history of manhood is not constituted on the struggle of "living" [labour], but it is the struggle of "wisdom". The sides in this struggle are the "cruels" and the "suffering ones". The ones who represent the cruel are the "global powers". In this narration, another important subject is the description of the hierarchy while describing the political nature of the movement. The SP (and of course including the prior traditions as well) is not ***primarily*** described as a political movement, but described as a "***first and foremost*** movement of science", "a movement which emphasizes moral issues", "movement of giving", "movement of jihad" and "**finally** a political movement". It is understood by the emphasis of the narrator that the order of the mentioned subject is not a coincidence. However, this order of emphasis has a kind of dimension that draws the practical politics back. The ***priority*** in politics is not mentioned directly by ideological-political aspects, but by "scientific, moral issues" and "jihad". The political ideology is given a meaning through a reflection based on *science*, *morality* and *jihad* discourse. In this hierarchical order 'practical-concrete politics' does not lose its importance, but it is referred as an instrumental function.

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[44] It should be mentioned that the emphasis that the humanbeing is imperfect, is not coincidental in terms of exemplifying the proposal attributed to the conservative theory. For an evaluation about this part of conservatism please see Virginia L. Muller, *The Idea of Perfectibility*, University of America, Lanham and London, 1985.

Another narration of a SP politician **(S1),** which has a similar discoursive content of the above politician **(S8)**, is meaningful in terms of signifying the consistency and position among the SP politicians:

> "In fact, the politician is within the society; but he has ideals, mental and emotional comfort. As you know Platon mentions about the idea. A politician is the one who has an ideal. He is the one who can lead the society, who can call and get the people into his ideal. The society I desire in Turkey: more moral, respectful against others' rights. Why? It is because my belief orders to me a developed, a rich country. Why? For instance, there are verses about charity [zekât] in Quran. They translate them into Turkish in two ways. It is not quite related with our subject, but I tell it to clarify some points. Within the first translation the expression is translated as 'give charity' [zekât veriniz], another version of translation states that gain the income to giving charity [zekât vermek]. Consequently, I don't know if it is a service or not, but more than a service, the important point is constituting an ideal society to enrich, and eliminate all hungry and homeless people. Constituting a country where the people with headscarf are comfortable as much as the ones without headscarf. In our belief, your neighbours lead upto the 40th house around you. We have a belief system where the neighbors can be inheritor/beneficiary of each other. Consequently, we desire a social structure who are highly respectful to each other. We say 'never disrespect your non-muslim neighbor'. We desire such a welfare state and a society that will be a reference to the world. Then I think of the Ottomans, who were not stucked in its borders, who reached the right, left, south, north, east and west, who run everywhere…(…) A new language, a new order that will constitute a peaceful order to constitute an order where the law is dominant, not the overpower. This should be one of the primary purposes of a politician. We aim to transform the society in this way. This is my personal target. (S1)

Again, a political imagination is legalized by referencing a religious source. Charity institution [zekât kurumu], which is referred as a principle of Islamic solidarity, is the core of the discourse. The service notion is not ignored, but in order to constitute "an ideal society", the functionality of an Islamic principle, that is zekât, is emphasized. In the imagined society through the principle of zekât, the individuals are responsible and related to each other. This responsibility and relation is assumed to constitute a "society" that is missed/desired "with welfare, peace and reference to the world". This logical sequence does not limit the target of the utopia only in "here" and this society, the desire seems to become concrete that is spread everywhere and all

places. This unlimited utopia ideal promises us "a new language, new order that will constitute a peaceful order for the humanity". Then the society is aimed to be transformed through this promise. At this point, another SP politician's narration seems to conclude the above narration:

"Of course it is the main philosophy of the politics, the main point to survive the society from some wrong, inappropriate situations. Tranforming the society is quite assertive/challenging; but we can call it submitting an alternative through your statements that you consider as right. I mean we should say those are the issues that we consider as right. We would like to transfer those right issues to the people. Of course, at this point I consider politics as informing people within this framework, as an action in order to submit that alternative. Politics is a field of action. Consequently, it might be considered as an ideal. Of course it is an ideal; politics is a meaningless struggle if there is no ideal. Our ideal is to provide an order of justice both in our society and in the world. Our ancestors managed this through the Ottomans. They constituted the justice and great order throughout six hundred years. This is not a dream. We can do it if we properly examine our ancestors and history" (S10)

The narration of this SP politician is remarkable in indicating the emphasis on the imperialist past and of the Ottoman 'Vision', which is expressed almost by the same sentences within above narrations of the MHP politicians (**M6 and M8**). The correspondence on the perception of Ottomans is significant for those policies that show cognitive and emotional association of the Turkish right-conservatism, but which might be considered as opposite in terms of ideology and politics.

The narrations of SP politicians that are mentioned so far might be sufficient to understand the type of ideological-political discourse system that their political utopian imaginations refer. While the utopia legalizes its discoursive source through Islamic principles, the place is not limited with a country or society. The desire is to spread the utopia all over the world and among the other societies as well. This extended place of utopia's 'vision' is meaningful as it is parallel to some MHP politicians' ideal of 'Turan' and 'Panturkism'. It should be emphasized that when the SP politicians share their utopia ideals, the ideological value indicates a considerable

rich content, style and rhetoric. In this respect, the similarity of SP and MHP politicians deserves to be emphasized.

In order to understand the radical-utopian political imagination I believe that Fethi Açıkel's theoretical perspective is explanatory. In his article "Psychopathology of 'Holy Persecutedness" [Kutsal Mazlumluk] Açıkel (1996), he evaluates the Turkish right, -without any distinction as racist nationalist, statist-corporatist, liberal, conservative- through a conceptualization of an ideological support [payanda] called *Holy Persecutedness*. According to Açıkel "Holy Persecutedness" is:

> "it is the transformation momentum of the masses into a suppressive-neurotic political ideology that represents their *power* requirement, who suffered from social, cultural and imaginary deterritorialization and who lost the financial infrastructure rapidly by losing the properties against the strength of the late capitalization and fast modernization. Holy suppressedness "is the most significant ideological common ground that the Turkish right developed which indicates various discoursive aspects such as the patterns from the Turkish nationalism and the Islamic ones, from the sublimation of pre-capitalism values to the semi-communitarian understanding of the society, from anti-cosmopolitan approaches to the idealized nostalgic understanding of history, from a sceptical world phantasy to the individualistic perspective" (1996: 155).

According to Açıkel Holy Persecutedness to comprehend the imperialist vision of the past and history, will contribute a lot to reveal its future projection as well. It will help us to understand its transition from "the historical persecutedness ideology" to its "manifestation of justice" and "desire of power. From this perspective, the subject, imperialist dream and suppressedness ideology of the Synthesis is *historical* (1996: 165). For Açıkel, the utopia of the suppressed subject of the Turkic-Islamic Synthesis is produced from its disappointment caused by capitalism. This does not appear as a unique liberation utopia, but as a struggle of correction and recovery of its reputation. Its utopic fantasy is limited with the actual configuration of capitalism. The desire of justice is not universal even on discoursive level. In contrast, it prefers the patronizing of others to overcome its suppressedness. Its utopia is patronizing and custodian, rather than being egalitarian and liberal. It indicates the leadership of the Arab countries against the West, being the image of power that is rising against

Europe and after the fall of Soviet Union being the symbolic center within a geographical region of two continents starting from the Adriatic Sea over China Sea. The suppressed subject of the Synthesis desires the justice not to end the oppression, but to realize the historical ego-ideal with the leadership of rising classes and through the opportunities of the new world order. From this point of view, the political difference between the radical justice and freedom desire of the absolute suppressed people and the power desire of the Holy synthesis subjects becomes more clear (Açıkel, 1996: 180-181).

Following Açıkel's statement, it is not possible to evaluate the utopian imaginations within the study as "liberal" or as "the desire of justice and freedom of the absolute suppressed". However, the current utopian imaginations are not problematic only because of this aspect, but also for those imaginations' demand to invalidate the meaning attributed to the politics within this study. This demand invalidates politics with the desire of "a country completely dominant with Turkish customs and morals" **(M8)**, with "the ideal that Turks and Turkishness will lead the world" and the belief that "the Turkishness aspect will spread all over and lead the world" **(M6)**, with a solidarist-corporatist holistic invitation that "a new civilization that aims the people from the east and west, north and south live in peace and welfare" **(M8)**. "Protective and custodian utopia" (Açıkel, 1996: 180) dreams the leadership of the Arab countries against the West with the image that challenges the Europe, and being the symbolic center by covering the two continents from the Adriatic to the China Sea after the collapse of Russia. The "suppressed" subject of the Holy Synthesis desires to realize its historical ego-ideal within the new world order. This ideal corresponds in "the Turkish nationalism is a global phenomenon" expression. "By following the right strategies within the next fifty years, the opportunities of globalization will make the Turkish nation or the nation within Turan region a leader" **(M19)**. There is the belief that "a glorious history of 6000 years, where the Turkish language was spoken in a geographical region from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, a blessed passion of Islam will lead the country beyond the centuries" **(B4)**. The custodian utopia "perceives no obstacle for the Turkishness to seal the century that

we live in" "as long as we are aware of our potential". They say "this is not a dream" and asks "aren't we the nation that established a world emperor? Aren't we the ones who led the world for 600 years?" **(M8)**. "Our ideal is to provide an order of justice both in our society and to the world. Our ancestors realized this ideal through the Ottomans in the past; they constituted the justice and great order throughout 600 years. This is not a dream. We can do it if we properly examine our ancestors and history" **(S10)**.

Radical-utopian political imaginations are obvious within MHP, BBP and SP politicians' and these imaginations are not perceived within AKP and DP politicians' expressions. Does it mean that the AKP and DP politicians are away from such imaginations and they have more rational attitude in this respect? It will not be sufficient to evaluate the "silence" of the mentioned politicians about the imaginations only via the lack of data within the limits of the study. It can be stated that, even though not always radically coded, both parties and their political traditions have at least discoursive aspects about the utopian imaginations or intentions. The central right tradition announced its utopian political discourse, if it's possible to call it so, by providing some ideals such as "a millionaire in each street", "the Great Turkey" or by its strong emphasis on industrialist-developmentalist ideology with some popular-pragmatic discoursive aspects. To mention again, this case can be evaluated not as a representative of a total "utopian-radical" imagination of central right tradition as mentioned above, but as being prone to such an imagination. The answer of Süleyman Demirel for the question that is 'what type of Turkey do we want?', can be determined as relating the popular-pragmatic discourse with a *relative* utopian imagination:

> "We want **Turkey to be prosperous.** We want Turkey to be a place where the people can find jobs, where they can feed themselves and their families without a need from others; where they can manage to be away from poverty, unemployment, desperation and be away from the fear of today, tomorrow and future, and consequently where the people are away from all types of fears. We want a place where people can gain their political, economic and social personality; where all the families live in a house that they deserve by gaining all the opportunities that the people have in developed countries, without a need from others. We want a place

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where the patients can find doctors and medicine, where the impaired, elders, widows, orphans and unemployed people are not homeless. We want Turkey to succeed in social security and solidarity. We want **Turkey to be developed**. We want a country where all the regions can be reached and everything can be found; each village and city can be stayed, where all the mountains, fields, mines, forests and shores can provide job, life and happiness for the people. We want a country with the roads all over, with the crowded cities, towns and villages, with the rich fields; without any difference among the cities and without poor and homeless people. We want **Turkey to be prosperous** … We want all the villages and cities to be clean, where they are established according to modern standards; we want Turkey that is built enviably just like a city". (Süleyman Demirel, cited by Tanel Demirel, 2004: 273-274).

The saying-rhetoric that is "from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" used also by Süleyman Demirel and it refers to the "opportunities and potentials" provided to Turkey by the new conjuncture that is formed after the collapse of Soviet Union. This wording is stunning in terms of being reflected/owned by the other parts of the right-conservative tradition as well. However, the mentioned rhetoric and the imagination it refers to, were mainly discussed during the presidency period of Turgut Özal. The notions of 'new imperialist vision' and 'Neo-Ottomanism' were spread at that time and they were highlighted and discussed as an aspect of (foreign) political vision. Özal mentioned the new vision of Turkey within the new conjuncture:

"If Turkey plays its role properly within the following years, the Caucasia, Balkans and also the Asia Minor including the Black Sea and East Mediterranean can solve their problems **around us and with our contributions** with optimal solutions, and they can integrate the **new world** with peace and silence." (Turgut Özal, cited by Taşkın, 2007: 369).

The approach that was supported by the periodical called *Türkiye Günlüğü*[45], which was effective during the leadership of Özal, and by some *liberal* writers in this periodical as well (Taşkın, 2007: 367-379; Sönmez, 2010: 368-384), described

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[45] For the periodical and two studies about the intelligentsia around the periodical, please see Yüksel Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2007, pp. 347-379 and İsmet Akça, "Türkiye Günlüğü: Yeni Sağın Organik Aydınları", in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Volume 5: Muhafazakârlık*, ed: Ahmet Çiğdem, 2003, p. 460-464.

through the current foreign policy criticism most of the time. According to one of those writers, Nur Vergin:

> "'Neo-Ottomanism' movement defines the fear of Turkey since 1940s, its introversion, accepting being the province of the world, and then the movement tells it is time to change. The spirit of 'Neo-Ottomanism' announces that Turkey is the candidate to be a country that is powerful, talking and wondered by the other countries about its announcements… 'Neo-Ottomanism' is the name that was given to multi-dimensional national direction by the people who said 'enough!' to the decision of modest Turkey […] I think Turkey will identify itself through this description and desire to be called so. I can see no obstacle about that because this new politics that is appropriate to the Turkish people's nature and cultural structure is also appropriate for the world within the new world order. On the balance point of the world, which moves towards the Pacific, there is a need of people talking Turkish as a kind of welfare belt" (Vergin, 1992: 43).

After the death of Özal 'Neo-Ottomanism' notion was out of the agenda; however, following the AKP governance, it was used as a 'vision' that was frequently addressed. Especially during its third period of the AKP, when its foreign policy discourse, vision and action is considered, it is possible to find the path of the utopian imaginations. As Uzgel mentions 'Neo-Ottomanism' was directly used neither in the past nor today by the government or by the other authorized people (Uzgel, 2009: 358). The approach is called as "soft power" and "democratization" of foreign policy within the academic literature. One of the leading people of the AKP's foreign policy strategy and discourse that is Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is the Foreign Affairs Minister currently, in his book "Strategic Depth", he prefers to use some notions such as "central country", "strategic depth", "multi-dimensional-multi lane politics" (Davutoğlu, 2009: 358). It deserves[46] to be highlighted that the names of the people and community who support the mentioned approach and vision are from the similar 'liberal' communities and same people as it was during Özal period. As mentioned above, the ones who claim that Turkey has turned into a "soft power", use their proposals through the criticism of the current foreign politics. According to this, the traditional Turkish foreign policy was based on Kemalist principles and they lost their validity within the globalizing world and reshaping international geopolitical

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[46] Just as during the Özal period, some people such as Cengiz Çandar, Şahin Alpay and Taha Akyol, continue to support the mentioned foreign political vision within the AKP political period as well.

atmosphere. For instance, Kemalist foreign policy understanding put Turkey away from the Middle East, and almost collapsed the Kurdish problem. By perceiving the neighbors of Turkey as enemy and through a threat prism they couldn't use the historical inheritance. Moreover, the traditional foreign policy had a kind of tentative, minimalist and status quoist aspect instead of a political expansion and initiative, and acted through defensive reflexes (2009: 359). According to Davutoğlu, the reason of the major contradiction in Turkey is the incompatibility between the historical and cultural accumulation that was the core of a civilization and the political system that was structured by the Kemalist elites (Davutoğlu, 2009: 83). According to this evaluation, the Kemalist elites drew Turkey away from the Ottoman-Islam civilization, which is their historical inheritance, and tried to articulate them to the Western civilization. Turkey stood idle for years to the civilization it belonged to, alienated to the cultural structure of its region, and consequently turned into an inactive, weak and ordinary country within the international sphere (2009: 73). According to Davutoğlu, the conjuncture after the Cold War, provided a spectacle opportunity for the Turkish foreign policy to structure a new framework. If the opportunities are not evaluated precisely, the new conditions, just like the ones submitted by the Sevres Treaty, are inevitable (2009: 61). According to the strategy inspired by those assumptions and evaluations, Turkey should be reactive within the geographical area that was ruled by the Ottoman Emperor. In this respect, there are three major regions that should be operated. The first one is composed of the close land basin that is the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia. The second one indicates another close land basin that is composed of the Black-Sea-Adriatics, East Mediterranean-Read Sea-Gulf and Caspian Sea. The third one is composed of the Europe, North Africa, and South, Middle and East Asia. According to Davutoğlu, the mentioned political basins establish the geopolitical base for a foreign policy that will be extended gradually (2009: 118). For Uzgel (2009: 362), the suggested approach provides the reproduction of a policy based on Realism that focuses on strategic importance of Turkey. The 'fantastic' ideas such as, being a central country, structuring an impact area for the close regions, producing security and stability within the region and even transforming to a world power from

a central country with the political expansions, are in fact the repetition of the ordinary and familiar remarks. It might even be possible to consider Davutoğlu's approach as a kind of foreign policy 'realism'. According to Uzgel, the distinctive feature of Davutoğlu's unoriginal, ordinary Realism approach is his attempt to add Ottomanism elements, historical and religious/cultural aspects in it and his search for a type of "Islamic Realism" (2009: 362).

Here, rather than the consistency or its "real political" content, the stunning and interesting point is the political imagination of which the approach refers to. The adjective version of the suggested approach, which is a kind of "Realism", does not change the utopian content of the referred political imagination. It is obvious that the emphasis on imperialist Ottoman history and the unexceptional 'courtesy' [teveccüh] of the 'vision' this history points out by the Turkish right-conservative political tradition should be evaluated particularly. It might be stated for the Turkish right-conservatism that it indicates a utopian-radical political imagination with different emphasis and contexts, which are parallel to the diversity that it reserves. When *the foreign policy* is especially the subject, this courtesy reflects the desire of "being the regional power based on the arguments of the superiority and improvement of the imperialist history" (Taşkın, 2007: 370). However, as Taşkın states, this desire continues: "to 're-orientalize' a well-known tradition that is 'its own East'. Based on the Ottoman Imperialist past, it is not a new tendency within the imperialist imagination tradition to position Turkey as the new emancipatory country of region. It is not a rare phenomenon within the world history to see the imperialist visions, which highlight their civilization aspect. This tendency is nothing but a reflection of the ones who claim superiority in order to internalize their methods and mentality. The people would like to follow the route and its tracks which are structured by the ones who claim superiority; however, the only condition is to call the conductor as 'us'. This approach is not only ethically problematic, but also indicates the risk of legitimization of the capitalist means and mentality with the claim of locality" (2007: 370).

# CHAPTER 4

# FORMS OF CONSERVATISM

In this chapter, conservatism concept or fact will be discussed. It is possible to classify the concept under *two main topics* in accordance with the perception and description of conservatism of the politicians interviewed. The *first* is description of conservatism related with the social-cultural values, and the *other* is description of conservatism related with the loyalty to the politics, political principles and values. Descriptions related with the social-cultural values can be gathered under two groups: the first one is the conservatism defined according to the religious, traditional and ethical values, and the other is described around the axes of daily practices or habitus[47]. This type of conservatism is called as 'ordinary conservatism'[48] within the study.

When the information received from the politicians are examined as a whole, in comparison with the descriptions of conservatism based on a political axis, the descriptions and perceptions of conservatism described through social-cultural framework is much more inclusive and explanatory, and the meaning of the concept-phenomenon is filled easily. In this respect, it is possible to get more explicit and

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[47] I use the concept of *habitus* following Bourdieu (1977, 2003). Bourdieu defines habitus as the way in which actors calculate and determine future actions based on existing norms, rules, and values representing existing conditions. Bourdieu argues that existing norms, rules, and values have been mentally and cognitively integrated into the actor's frame of reference, and that they represent general social standards as well as specific situational and personal experiences.

[48] 'Ordinary' does not refer to a pejorative adjective, but refers to a social scientific conceptualization. Ordinary conservatism can be defined as a way of life, habitus that finds corresponding forms in practical field. This type of conservatism might also points out a personality typology. Although I will try to describe the personality of this typology within the study, I will not focus on the analysis of this typology. However, this typology might be an interesting pattern for the studies that will analyse conservatism in terms of social anthropology or ethnomethodology. It seems to be an important area where the social and psychological (perhaps psychoanalytical) manifestations and symbolism of a conservative within everyday life practices can be studied.

indirect information about conservatism. As it will be evaluated in the related topics, it is difficult to make the same assessment for the conservatism based on a political axis. However, this conclusion does not lead to a series of interpretations; such as, social-cultural conservatism prevails the one based on politics. Meanwhile, it can be said that the *emphasis* on social-cultural based conservatism is more common and obvious. Without considering that there are different parties, all politicians with the perception of social-cultural based conservatism have more or less similar opinions and approaches. Again, as the details and reasons will be evaluated on the related topics, it is not possible to reach the same conclusion for the conservatism based on politics.

Almost all studies conducted on conservatism underline the loyalty to and emphasize on religion, tradition, morality, history and continuity of history. When this aspect and the significance attributed to conservatism in the discipline is considered, it does not seem to be possible to speak about its specific differences as it appeared and perceived in Turkey. Bottomore and Nisbet (1990: 109), emphasize the constitutive importance of religion and the church in conservatism. Religion is not only a form of belief, but also a form of society and community. According to Nisbet (2007: 131), for Burke Coleridge, Southey, Disraeli, Bonald, de Maistre and Chateaubriand, who are the prominent philosophers of conservatism, religion: "is an outstanding public and institutional pole, which is valuable both for the state and society". As it appears in the West, religion is important to strengthen the stability of the government rather than a prominent value highlighted as a belief or theological principle. As a matter of fact, according to Nisbet (2007: 135): "Overwhelming support of conservatives to religion stems from the belief that their release from the main orthodoxy will most probably result in certain unbalances". In this respect, religious structures should be supported to preserve the stability and balance. As Akkaş (2004: 131-132) emphasizes: "consequently, hierarchy, obedience and authority might be legitimized in the society (...) acceptance of authority is realised through religious values. Recognition of natural inequality and hierarchy is possible if God given norms should be fed by religious and traditional values."

One of the other significant aspects of conservatism is the emphasis on "tradition". In respect to this aspect mentioned in expressions frequently, it is obvious that Turkish conservatives or conservatism is not exceptional. According to Scruton, one of the preeminent conservative philosophers, tradition allows the transmission of customs, habits and attitudes through generations. According to Scruton, traditions are not produced, but derived from the historical heritage. History and society are vital as long as they survive. When a person is related with a history beyond himself, then comes the power of tradition (Scruton, 1991: 40-43).

As mentioned in the "Political Imaginations" part, the emphasis on tradition by conservatives is quite closely related with their epistemological approach. Conservatives worry about practicing life and acting through reasoning, because they think that human rationale is inadequate and should utilise accumulations of nations and ages. Consequently, the emphasis of conservative notion on tradition should also be evaluated in this respect. It might be valuable briefly mentioning about a conservative philosopher Oakeshott's point of view, which is epistemological exemplification of the correlation between the knowledge and tradition in terms of conservatism. There are two types of knowledge according to Oakeshott, which are necessary for a real action. He describes the first one as the "technical knowledge". Technical knowledge can be explained as the rules that can be learned at certain conditions, recalled and practiced (Oakeshott, 1987: 19). For Oakeshott this type of knowledge can be found in driving techniques at highways and highway laws in England. Another example is that cooking techniques can be found in a cookbook (Oakeshott, 1987: 19). The second type that is "practical knowledge" is only valid when experienced; it cannot be explained through a set of rules (Oakeshott, 1987: 19). Technical knowledge can be gained from a book or written format. In opposition to practical knowledge; technical knowledge can be learned and taught shortly. Practical knowledge can only be experienced. According to Oakeshott, it is embedded in practice and it is realized through apprenticeship (Oakeshott, 1987: 20). These two types of knowledge can be differentiated but cannot be separated. According to him, major misinterpretation of the rationalists is that the technical

knowledge is absolute (Oakeshott, 1987: 21). In contrast to the technical knowledge, the gain of practical knowledge through practice instead of guidelines highlights the essence of tradition that the conservative philosophers strongly emphasize.

It is useful to emphasize the essence of tradition in conservative theory. For instance, Beneton (1991: 114) states that conservatives are traditional; however, not every "traditional" is conservative. Mannheim also underlines the difference between the conservatism and traditionalism. According to him, there is a notion of conservatism with somehow universal aspect and another one derived from historical social conditions. Mannheim calls the former as "natural conservatism" and the latter as "modern conservatism". For him, it is more appropriate to describe "natural conservatism" via "traditionalism" and traditionalism is a tendency to survive; which is universal and embedded in every sphere of life. This instinctive traditionalism is opposed to planned changes. (Mannheim, 1966: 94-95). In this respect traditionalism is a psychological approach, whereas conservatism is a conscious thought with its own particular aspect (Mannheim, 1966: 99). Considering Mannheim's distinction, at least with reference to the Turkish politicians' statements, it is not possible to evaluate Turkish conservatism as a rough "traditionalism" and "a tendency for a steady way of life"[49]. For instance; this case can be understood if a further evaluation is realized on the openness of Turkish modernization to the technical modernization and its tendency[50] to improve. The interaction of religion and tradition with modern values, which is structured or not, also clarifies the conservative attitude through certain perspectives (social, cultural or ideological). If a general determination, which is the motto of conservative literature, is followed, the enabling factor of conservatism is exactly the Enlightment idea and the modernity inspired by it (Burke, 1955; Scruton, 1980; Kirk, 1978, Quinton, 1993; Özipek, 2004).

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[49] For a study which analyzes the unsteady and hesitant form of Turkish conservatism within tradition and modernity discourses, see Tayfun Atay, "Gelenekçilikle Karşı-Gelenekçiliğin Gelgitinde Türk "Gelenek-çi" Muhafazakârlığı" in *Muhafazakârlık*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003.

[50] For the detailed studies about these aspects of Turkish conservatism, see Öğün, 2003: 543-548; Öğün, 2000: 377-385; Taşkın, 2007: 275-346.

When the politicians' evaluations on conservatism are evaluated, it was seen that they obviously avoid reducing the concept/phenomenon to religion or tradition, and try to describe the phenomenon as clearly or indirectly cohesive with modernity. In this respect, Turkish conservatism is not eccentric when compared with universal aspects of conservatism. However, the interesting point is more than the same determination of the literature about Turkish conservatism, the vitality and actuality of the discussion in politicians' perceptions and statements. This debate points out a tendency and even a tension, which exists since the 19th century, on religion-progress, modernism-fundamentalism axis or a synthesis of them. The last century of the Ottoman Emperor characterizes the emergence of ideologies inspired by the question that is "how will the state be survived. According to a general and common classification certain periods are identified by certain ideologies; such as Tanzimat (Reform) Era by Ottomanism, Abdülhamid Period by Islamism or Pan-Islamism, İttihad Terakki [Commitee of Union and Progress] Period by Turkishness and Pan-Turkism (Mardin, 2000; Ahmad, 1999). Although those ideologies mainly concentrate on the strategies for the survival of the government, there are specific ideologic attempts beyond that concern. For instance, Islamism aims to free Islam from degenerations and formalist puritan movements and dominate the social life again with its real essence. It also aims to combine the Islamic world, recover it from the effect of the West and backwardness and to provide ijtihad [effort]. The notion of Islamism was used with certain terms in different contexts, such as "Ittihad-i Islam", "tecdid" [innovation], "ıslah" [reform], "ihya" [recovering], "Islamic reformation" and "Islamic modernism". Islamism, developed in the 19th century, searched mainly the reasons of derogation of Islamic world when compared the West and searched for the ways to improve it. Islamists, while offending the survival of moral and cultural values of Islam, generally supported Westernization in scientific and technological fields. Islamists tried to answer the questions raised by the Western researchers about Islam such as; "Is Islam an obstacle against the development; is there a conflict between Islam and science and intelligence; how will the religion-state relations be structured; does Islam agree with the values forming the basis of Western development, e.g. free thinking, equality, women rights; what should be adopted

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from the West; what are the fixed properties of Islam that should be protected. In 1860s, Westernized attitudes of Tanzimat followers were criticized and a search for a new development approach based on Islam was emerged. According to II. Abdülhamit, İttihad-ı İslam was a principle that will unite his citizens in Ottoman State and a way to resist the West for the Muslims who are not living in the state (Tunaya, 2007). The core of the discussions was about the Western civilization and its scientific technical superiority and the situation of the East meanwhile. At that time, the common idea was that the West does not only refer to technics/science, so Ottomans should adopt their modernity in terms of law/legal order, politics and culture. The rise of this idea caused in the rise of moral values of the "East" and reactions against the West. One of the representers of this idea, Sait Halim Paşa (1998), states that the main component of contemporary civilisation on the basis of national selfishness is the destruction of underdeveloped countries in terms of science and industry. Western instutions are the product of wars based on revenge and hate, and they are in a continuous change. Sait Halim Paşa criticizes the disparagement of Islam's perfection and steadiness against the instability and change of the West. Paşa mentions that the idea of Westernisation causes a deep undermining and altruism, and as a solution he suggests Islam, which embodies tolerance, justice and equality in it (Sait Halim Paşa, 1998: 229-289). The reaction against the Westernisation as a whole, resulted in distinction of materialist and moral culture or culture and civilisation. Many of the reformists acted in a radical Islamist manner  and searched a synthesis of Islamic elements on cultural level. 19th century witnessed to Islam becoming beyond a tiny aspect of cultural tradition on local community scale in daily life and to the emergence of Islamism as an ideology (Türköne, 1991 and Mardin, 1991a: 93-96). Within this synthesis exploration, rather than a compulsory cultural aspect, the West was considered as a pattern that can be filled with various forms.

Turkists mentioned that they will remember that the Ottoman State is Eastern, but they should benefit from the West as well. At this point, Ziya Gökalp is distinguished with his search for a Turkish-Islam-West synthesis through his distinction on

civilisation and culture. In this respect, he structured a link between the empire and republic (Kaygı, 1992: 168-170). Just like the other reformists his aim was to awaken and strengten the national conscience. According to Gökalp, this was possible through Turkism. For him, Turkism is to inspire technical and scientific Western civilization to the culture. The distinction between the culture and civilization is the difference between the feeling, sensation, inspiration and the intelligence, method, knowledge and will. Knowledge can be transformed from one nation to the other, whereas religious and moral feelings are inimitable (Turan, 1990: 17). Another perception of Gökalp is his distinction of culture from high culture, by describing culture through antropological elements such as tradition, custom, convention, ritual, religion, morality and music (Parla, 1989).

Both the empirical content and the foregoing theoretical observations point out the old discussion in terms of the relation or interaction between religion, tradition and modernity. The salient side of this foregoing discussion is that it is old, but up-to-date at the same time. Moreover, political and social resolutions and differences are the determinants of the same discussion. Continuity of the political and social differences through cultural (and religious) mediations is important to understand some of the pecularities of both Turkish right-conservatism and Turkish modernization.

Religion and religious culture has core emphasis in social-cultural based conservatism. Nevertheless, there are objections against the approaches that reduce conservatism only to religion and religious values. Besides the religion; traditions, morals, conventions, customs and rituals, emphasis on historical heritage, love-respect, settled daily rituals are emphasized and possessed as the definitive aspects of conservatism. In this respect, there are objections to the perceptions of conservatism as "fundamentalism", "bigotry", "resistance to change" and such. The reduction of conservatism into the mentioned expressions are rejected; in contrast, conservatism is explained as an attitude open to development, also open to contemporaneity and modernity through preserving certain values. This reflects a case coherent with the

universal codes of conservatism and general codes of Turkish conservatism. Again, in this respect, regardless of party differences, it is not possible to emphasize about significant differences among the politicians.

Social and cultural based conservatism is predominantly explained by religion, custom, moral principles and norms. In this respect, it can be said that it reflects a number of relatively abstract imaginations. In fact, beyond the partial and abstract imaginations, it is subject to a series of concrete, practical reflections in the daily life. As mentioned above, this type of conservatism is called as "ordinary conservatism" in the study. Even though it is hard to make a categorical distinction between ordinary conservatism and social and cultural based conservatism, as the former is one of the components of conservatism, this type of conservatism would be evaluated partially different than the abstract conservatism imaginations. Some frustrations are subject to occur between "two types of conservatism", which are imagined conservatism and concrete-practical conservatism. One of the core aspects that should be mentioned about the explanation and perception of 'ordinary' conservatism is that it is a kind of conservatism reflecting what the conservative politicians practice and describe within the daily life, rather than directly reflecting their considerations. In other words, in this sense "ordinary conservatism" might be described as an expression of politicians' daily-social practices attributed to people's conservatism practices or an expression established through these attributions.

## 4.1 Social and Cultural Conservatisms

In order to provide a well-coordinated and practical point of view, the names, adjectives, phrases and descriptions mentioned during the interviews by the politicians to describe social and cultural based conservatism, are shown as a list on the table below.

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**Table 2. Names, Adjectives, Phrases and Descriptions of Conservatism Based on Social and Cultural Values**

| I. | II. |
|---|---|
| Honest | Not excessive |
| Sincere | Aimed at gradual progress |
| Indulgent | Loyal to traditions |
| Easy going | Deferential to the state |
| Open to development | Loyal to religious values and living a life accordingly |
| Fair | Loyal to national and moral values |
| His Expressions and Actions are Coherent | Loyal to people's values and respect them |
| Dignified | Loyal to the history and past |
| Not conservative | Faithful |
| Principled, fidget | Loyal to the family and its values |
| Respectful to the laws | Life style or culture |
| Negotiable | Loyal and respectful to the traditions, customs, conventions and rituals |
| Merciful | |
| Prudent | |
| Helpful | |
| Honorable | |
| Trustable | |
| Loving and compassionate | |
| Mature | |
| Fighting against cruelty | |
| Beneficial to the society and people | |
| Protecting the poor | |
| Serving the society and the people | |
| Protecting the rights of the weak | |
| Valuing his own culture and art | |
| Modest | |
| Clean | |
| Protecting the self | |
| Advocating the welfare, peace and well-being of the country and the society | |

## 4.1.1 Conservatism Based on Religion, Tradition and Ethics

A wide variety and rich repertoire of names, adjectives, phrases and descriptions attributed to conservatism is noticed when above table is examined. All the components on the table are gathered by the politicians and members of each single party; however, after realizing a clear-cut separation among them I divided the table

into two groups. I think the table is important as it reflects the common perception of the politicians and party members. Before evaluating the case on the table according to the parties and party members, it is necessary to make a formal evaluation. The first salient feature is the degree each of the descriptions on the I. column solely represents conservatism. For instance, almost everyone, who does not name himself as conservative in terms of political or social-cultural point of view, might defend or legitimize the values on the I. column. Consequently, it should be mentioned that each specific feature cannot be described as identical and perceptible with conservatism. *Even* some of the items on the II. column are discussable in this respect. A formal evaluation also shows that conservatism is not a core, but a contextual or conditional category. This determination seems to verify the evaluations and interpretations of the discourse, which is conservatism is 'conditional' (Onur-İnce, 2010). Indeed, contextual and a descriptive analysis of this table allows a meaningful assessment and achievement of results when the mentioned items are associated with the ideological-political context. Pure descriptions of conservatism without relational context will be a meaningless effort. As İrem rightly mentions: "some studies try to understand conservatism basicly within the framework of certain core values such as religion, tradition, value attributed to the family, respect to the authority. However, those core values are shared by different ideologies and fractions as well. Consequently, it is not possible to make common generalizations on a certain period/group through making similarities among some core values." (İrem, 2004: 10). Another point that should be mentioned about the table is the correlation of conservatism attributed to such varied and almost completely positive values. On the one hand, this case allows conservatism to be a quite indefinite concept-phenomenon, on the other hand makes it an unquestionable strategy or tendency as a political and cultural phenomenon.

It will be useful to support the observations and statements so far with the information gathered from the politicians. A general tendency to describe conservatism based on social and cultural values, which are named mainly as

morality, tradition and religious values, was mentioned in this study before. Below, conservatism will be explained via the expressions of politicians from different political parties.

For instance, according to one of the AKP politicians (**A1**) a conservative is the one "who has 'honour and dignity' while leaving home in the evening and having the same values when arrived home". For this politician "if you can *serve* your country, if you can *serve* someone else, if you don't think about *property, decency*, nobody can be a better conservative than you." Another AKP politician **(A6)** states that conservative is the one who gives confidence, this is crucial. A conservative is the one who gives confidence by the way he/she sits, talks, listens, serves, walks, works in private and public sector, with all respect he/she acts." According to this politician: "Conservatism is a pattern combined by moral and cultural values." For politicians that highlight some items such as "honour", "dignity", "decency" and "trustfulness", conservatism or being conservative is related with these items, which can be implied as moral.

According to a politician from the MHP Party (National Movement Party) **(M12)** "Being the right person, honest; respectful to elders and youngers, to the person dealing with science and the scholar; combine our characteristics. For the politician conservatism is to "preserve these values". "The resource that forms our cultural values stems from our characteristics as a nation and also from our beliefs." Definition of conservatism, which is "the person and personality peaceful with himself first then with everyone including the neighbors, neighborhood, city, country, motherland and nation", described by another MHP politician **(M13)** in the presence of Anatolian people as: Anatolian conservatism might be defined as a structure devoted to the *traditions,* which forms *a bridge between the past and the future*, and preserves its continuity. We can summarize it as a structure that preserves *social values*, including *religion* and *beliefs*; supports the development, but resists to change". Another MHP politician shares the following remarks while representing

the MHP politicians in terms of their perception of conservatism such as traditions, customs, rituals, cultures and ways of life:

> "(…) Conservatism is the loyalty to traditions and preserving the history. There are traditions and customs during the constitution of this society. There are certain rules that we call as Turkish customs; such as respect of a younger to an elder, attitudes of a younger among the elders, attitude of a wife to her husband, attitude of a sibling to a father. There are certain common values in the society such as the attitude of a worker to an employer, attitude of an apprentice to a master. Those are our traditions, customs. The way that we have to act during the religious feasts, in good and bad days, the things we have to do during a wedding party, help the groom and the bride, respect to a dead and the things we have to do during a funeral; such things constitute our nation's integrity, traditions, customs and attitudes, which form our moral values. Religion constitutes the other component. Of course, we are muslim. Those are the traditions and values that we practice as Turks after accepting Islam as a religion. Of course there are notions of helal [permissible] and haram [forbidden]. While interpreting the halal and haram notions, there is an integration of the traditions and customs that I've just mentioned. (…) We added our own interpretations. The purpose is to depend on these traditions and try to survive them. Of course, we have our cultural values, these are our cultural heritage, which we carried while emigrating from the Central Asia. We have historical, artistic and literal values. We have buildings, architectural monuments that we have to survive as well. It's our duty to protect them and survive for the next generations." (M8)

According to a DP politician **(D11)**, **"**conservatism means the values that make you yourself, the values that are combined with you." Another DP politician **(D14)** defines conservatism as "It's a line where the Turkish society's traditional structure and mainly the religious life are combined through today's conditions". Another DP politician **(D9)** states that conservatism is "an understanding of tradition". It is "the art of finding yourself" within this tradition. According to this politician, "a conservative is the one who can live in his self, be and save there, without any distinction on moral and value judgments". Conservatism is holding one's moral values with modesty, compassion and love, keeping his moral value judgments on a certain degree; it is the art of finding one's self within them. This is what conservatism means to me. (…) Conservatism is respectability in one's essence,

one's tradition, the value that he/she adds to the society; this is what I know about conservatism". For a BBP politician **(B3)** "it is not possible to define conservatism, it can only be understood by practice." According to this politician, conservatives are "good, nice and tolerant people with common sense."

According to a SP politician **(S5)** conservatism is "a nice concept to observe from outside." It is "the person who is loyal to the religion, traditions, social values; who believes in Allah and the holy book; maybe prays each Friday or five times a day, or fasts during Ramadan. Conservative means someone who practices these criteria." Another SP politician defines conservatism as follows:

> "According to us conservatism means certain rules and principles that we call as customs, traditions that were gathered in our society within time; and among these rules and principles the core is composed of the Islamic ones. It is what Islam taught us or we can call it as the Islamic doctrine. Of course, most of the people in Turkey are directly interested in and related with the Islamic traditions, rules and principles. Some of the concepts that we call as tradition and custom determines the line of conservatism. Some of the cases that were mentioned might appear as traditional, Islamic way of dressing and appearance. Even the beard and moustache style, the şalvar [pantalet] they wear can also emphasize the structure. You cannot make a distinction among them. Sometimes even a cepken [jupe/jacket] that is worn in a certain region can be a determinant. The person wearing the cepken is called as conservative, but also the one wearing jeans and the one with a certain style of beard. A person with quite modern dressing with long beard might also be called conservative. All have certain marks and signs. In our culture, we generally describe conservatives as the ones practicing both traditional and religious rules and principles as a whole." (S10)

A MHP politician **(M20)** defining conservatism identical with 'religion' and practice of religious rules and conditions; the politician mentions that in this respect he/she can also "be called conservative". This politician states that he cannot practice his religious practices completely, but according to him continuity of certain traditions both in terms of **religion** and **tradition** is quite beneficial. His understanding of conservatism: "is definitely not the one that is being practiced by certain groups today through the mentality of Arab illiteracy [cahiliye] period, through the transformation of Arabic customs and traditions as if they refer to Islam. This type of

religion has "no relation" with his understanding of conservatism. According to him religion is the "morality" with certain "limits". He mentions that he would support such type of conservatism anytime and anywhere.

According to an AKP politician **(A9)** "in his tradition, there are human rights, democracy, consultation, good relations with people and sharing the happiness of other people"; which form the basis on *religion.* This politician states that "when we help a person we don't 'recall religion'; we make it for charity. For instance, this is a *tradition*, but a tradition that complies with the religion. This is the way I perceive conservatism."

It can be said that the strength and significance of social, cultural, moral and religious values are emphasized sufficiently within the descriptions of conservatism in above expressions. However, when the social and cultural elements are set apart, strong objections should also be mentioned especially about the definition of conservatism through *religious values* and ways of life the religion imposes and its reduction or religion-based perception. When these objections are evaluated conservatism should not be considered as an absolute "religiosity", or "fundamentalism", "bigotry", "resistance to change" or "insistence". One of the AKP politicians **(A28)** opposing such perceptions adds that if conservatism is defined as "being extremely religious", he "completely rejects this". For this politician: "conservatism is to defence welfare, peace and happiness of the country in any circumstances".

According to another AKP politician **(A23)**, conservatism is "a thought and principle", "open to any kind of development" while "attributing importance to the religious values". For the politician: "conservatism means a human being adopting himself to the contemporary age, being open to any kind of development; but respectful to the religious values". Another AKP politician **(A8)** states that conservatism should adopt itself to "a changing and developing world in an age of electronics and space, it should find the new and keep up with the contemporary

age". The politician states "all old traditions should be abandoned if they do not belong to the contemporary age; in fact traditions should be enriched with the requirements of the age." As this politician expresses "our religion is not an obstacle for this, instead orders to be open to such innovations".

For a MHP politician **(M11)** conservatism is not *fundamentalism* in 'his literature', it is: "the continuity of the good and beneficial traditions" and he is 'conservative' in this respect. He states that: "I don't agree with the evaluation of conservatism in terms of fundamentalism and continuity of unchanged things. What is conservatism? In classical terms, it is bigotry and puritan movements in religion. In our point of view, conservatism comprises all national and moral values. We are inspired by the good and right perspective; we value the positive and modern sides. We reject the type of conservatism, which is regressive and reluctant to change. For that reason being religious does not mean being a conservative". For a MHP politician **(M9)** conservatism is not "fundamentalism", but "religiosity". It is natural to perceive "certain diversities" in terms of religiosity in Turkish society, of which 98% is religious. According to this politician the sign of Turkish people's virtue is their tolerance to different ways of religious practices", and conservatism is "the love of Allah in human being".

According to a MHP politician, who doesn't use the 'term' *conservatism* very often and who doesn't like the usage of this term in its "brief meaning". The politician states that he is not status-quoist, because his belief supports the perception of "even if in China, find and adopt the science". To him, "Turkish nation and their ancestors, found the fundamentals of the algebra, modern technics and physics" and "donated to the world".

> "I realise that İbn-i Sina structured the basis of modern medicine and Farabi found the basis of philosophy. Is it possible for his siblings to be conservative in terms of science; is it possible? We have to improve regularly. (…) We face the current situations, because we could not use our energy appropriately. Conservatism cannot take place in science, science has no nationality. Wherever I find science, I have to adopt it to my country. If I find the

opportunity to adopt and if I do not realise this, Allah will judge me after I pass away. We, as Turkish nationalists, can adopt anything except the extremes. Because there is no limit in science". (M2)

According to a SP politician **(S12),** who doesn't consider conservatism as a thought that is reduced merely to religion and religious values; "from the sociological perspective" conservatism is "a notion which emphasizes religious arguments." He disagrees with this "sociological" description and states that a person "can be both leftist and conservative at the same time" and for this, "it is not compulsory to believe in a religion or be religious". Another SP politician **(S17)** "definitely rejects" the common decision of the society that is the conservatism is "bigotry" and describes conservatism as: "it is something social and humane", it is "preserving of our own essences". Conservatism cannot mean something further than "conserving our essential values". Religion is the "core basis coloring our essential values" and "these essential values" are firstly, "traditions" and then our "customs, rituals and conventions".

A DP politician **(D1)** rejects the relation of conservatism with the religious norms or life style. For him this "concept" means, "drawing certain limits in each family and living accordingly". However, the politician states that when conservatism is being discussed today there is "recall of religiosity", of which he/she "strongly rejects". He identifies himself as "a person living in Turkey, proud of being a Turk" and continues: "I am nationalist, conservative, Kemalist, liberal and religious *as well*. Without one of these descriptions, I will be lost."

For a DP politician **(D4)**, describing their party's understanding of conservatism as "freedom of belief", people should practice their "religious believes fully". The politician rejects to call advocacy of freedom of belief as "religiosity" and rejects the definition of the statement as conservatism "in this respect". He says it is not possible to name someone as "religious or fundamentalist" who stands against the headscarf. However, "if somebody still considers this stand as conservatism and

fundamentalism, he will not avoid defensing it". Meanwhile, according to his common-sense, conservatism is 'mainly' tied to more societal, cultural values, which is not reduced to religion.

According to another DP politician: "the meaning of conservatism cannot be minimized merely to religion; a person who is social democrat, can also be nationalist, patriot, honest and principled. For me that kind of person is also conservative. This is the way it should be. It is not possible for me to define honest people, who are not members of my party, through certain statements, such as saying "you are this type" **(D12)**.

A BBP politician describes conservatism as "preserving the past" in his sense of 'meaning. However, this devotion "should not limit improvement of societies"; "people and societies should not bound the past and ignore the future." To him it is wrong "to persist and reject everything in the name of religion and be a straight conservative". For this politician, people can be conservative without resisting the technology and science:

> "In my opinion, a CHP supporter, a social democrat can also be conservative. (…) As I've just mentioned, a straight rejection and also full acceptance of something is wrong. Societies have primary traditions. Such traditions form their visions. It is a narrow framework to reduce them merely to religious values, beliefs. Then the confrontations occur. A person should be sincere. Practicing conservatism and also other things in life should be without a combination of politics." (B5)

According to the above-mentioned expressions of the politicians, it is possible to state that conservatism is mainly perceived on social and cultural basis. When the main elements composing this perception are evaluated, conservatism is described as living a life appropriate to the religious values, traditions, customs and rituals, some moral principles, attitudes and behaviors. Conservatism, expressed as the loyalty and collaboration to the mentioned principles and values, also underlines the need and collaboration to the change. In other words, conservatism is a concept or

phenomenon neither related merely to religious nor anti-religious elements. Religion (or religious culture) is accepted as one of the significant components of conservatism; however, not as the only aspect enabling it.

**4.1.2 Politicians' Perspective of People's „Ordinary Conservatism'**

Conservatism is described or perceived through social and cultural values. It is also possible to mention about the notion of conservatism that is not separated in this study, but described and classified as one of the components of conservatism. This type of conservatism is clarified within the daily life practices and is formed in 'real life'. This type of conservatism, which exists in social life, is named as "ordinary conservatism".

By signifying a set of items, which are aestheticized by referencing abstract and moral principles and values, the conditions of these forms in the discourse and the reflections in mind, might be explained as "imagined form of conservatism". It is possible to announce a tense, unsteady and tidal relationship between imagined form of conservatism and common conservatism. Reciprocity of this tension that is occurred between conservatism in imagined form and the concrete practice of life might be considered as a research area on a phenomenological framework in order to clarify the coordinates of the conservative mentality. 'Ordinary conservatism', which is described as a "form" or forms within the study, might also refer to a social type or personality. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, this type of conservatism that is reflected only as a pattern will be described here, but its materialized typology will not be analyzed on the scope of this study. It is because analyzing such a personality and type is beyond the question of this study and because various factors (religious culture, religious commitment, practices other than religion, psychology, interpretation forms and processes of modern life, etc.) and contexts should also be considered for an adequate study. This type or personality, including the phenomenology, might be a rich research area for the possible future studies on

conservatism. In this respect, limited descriptive analysis in this study is only a small attempt for pointing out the Turkish "conservative habitus".

Religion and religious culture as a value, which is defined related with the ordinary conservatism, holds the central importance as it is described-perceived in imagined form of conservatism. Whereas religion, religious values and obligations are important, other forms beyond these perceptions and practices identifying common conservatism should also be highlighted. In the light of the interviews, the conservative type which might occur as a superficial observation and reductionism, can shortly be described as: *a person or personality loyal to the national and spiritual values, traditions, state, family, neighbors, neighborhood, city and country, generally nice against the authority that is mainly the government, moral, honest, hardworking, righteous, and puritan as much as possible...* However, there is also another form or personality not completely different but accompanying the mentioned description. Besides this puritan form and personality, *there is* at the same time *another personality that holds every aspect of real life by internalizing the modernity values and living with the struggles and contradictions caused by these values.* With reference to the attributions of the 'ordinary conservative' within the expressions, a concrete description about this personality is: *being concerned with daily life issues to gain a livelihood, valuing "money", being a member of low or middle class, which consistently supports*[51] *right-conservative parties.*

It is necessary to mention why this type or personality is important or why it is emphasized. It might be stressed that to understand this type or personality is important to invalidate some 'cognitive comfort' or 'cliché' approaches existing both in the practice of social sciences and also in certain segments of the society. Accepting conservatism as an archaic notion, attitude or manner, will cause difficulty

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[51] For a study on 'ordinary conservative', which mainly emphasize its political tendencies please see Erol Göka, F. Sevinç Göral, Çetin Güney, "Bir Hayat İnsanı Olarak Türk Muhafazakârı ve Kaygan Siyasal Tercihi", in *Muhafazakârlık*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003. This personality type can also be considered with respect to "Selim Türkhan" character of Ateş İlyas Başsoy. For a detailed analysis of "Selim Türkhan" character, please see Ateş İlyas Başsoy, *AKP Neden Kazanır? CHP Neden Kaybeder?*, Pegasus Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011.

in perceiving its nature and peculiarities both analytically and practically. As it is discussed both in the conservatism literature and in the findings of the study, the notion of modern conservatism is beyond prevailing perception and comprehension; so it cannot simply be reduced to archaism or reactionarism (Çiğdem, 2001: 50-54; Taşkın, 2003; Atay, 2003). In fact, the existence of romantic-reactionist tendency (McClelland, 1989; Vincent, 2010; O'Sullivan, 1993; Heywood, 2007) within conservative tradition cannot be ignored; however, it is not in the core of modern world conditions. In "Political Imaginations" part, the weak tendency of reactionist-recovering tradition within the conditions of Turkey was mentioned. It is necessary to underline the weak recovering-reactionist tendency of the Turkish right-conservative thought and politics tradition as much as it supports the authorized tendencies (Taşkın, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2009; Bora, 1999, 2009).

It was mentioned before that the realization of conservatism as an ideology is possible through its opposition with its attitudes and reactions to modernity and modernity processes. Consequently, conservatism has a modern characteristic with respect to ideology, discourse, style or attitude. Having a modern characteristic does not mean being rid of criticisms; meanwhile, the criticism should not result in a wrong way either. Through criticizing and affirming culturalist readings, some approaches insist on explaining conservatism as a kind of archaism or reactionism by making reductionist analysis and evaluations[52]. As Mollaer highlights, although conservatism is discussed in various historical contexts and discussed on different theoretical bases, its opponents and supporters describe it in a similar way: "Without further discussions conservatism is accepted as a culturalist "way of thinking". Conservatism is a cultural reactionist movement in terms of its negative meaning. In terms of its positive meaning, it is a way of thinking valuing the cultural continuity (Mollaer, 2009: 221). Culturalist approaches are functional to understand conservatism; however, without limiting it in culturalist framework, conservatism

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[52] For two studies exemplifying this type of approaches see Sina Akşin, *Bugünkü Türkiye*, Volume V, Cem Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997 ve Baran Dural, *Başkaldırı ve Uyum, Türk Muhafazakârlığı ve Nurettin Topçu*, Birharf Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005. For a criticism on the approaches that reduces conservatism to the cultural level, see Fırat Mollaer, *Muhafazakârlığın İki Yüzü*, Dergâh Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009.

should be noticed within structural and historical context. According to Çiğdem (2001: 35), comprehension of conservatism is possible through the reduction of the ambiguity within its essence. Any kind of attempt to understand and make a sense of the concept requires an evaluation that is explicit to ideological and practical articulation of different factors.

In order to understand the intense relation or interaction between "ordinary conservatism" and "imagined conservatism", it is crucial to notice the accompanying modernity or modern life practices. In other words, it is not possible to understand the mentioned types of conservatism without a sociological background that is accompanied by modernity. Below mentioned interviews, indicate the expressions of politicians on "ordinary conservatism" patterns. A crucial point here is that the expressions describing conservatism by the conservative politicians indicate an extrinsic perspective or perception about the groups the politicians represent. The interesting point is the *distance* in politicians' perspectives and perceptions about the conservative segment that they represent. By noticing the subtle distinction within the study, there is a distance and difference in perception of conservative politicians about conservatism and their descriptions about conservative mass. This statement might include dual meanings: the first is the 'extrinsic' language and perception of the politicians about the people they represent, which reflects an orientalist attitude. The language and perception is not only limited to certain descriptions and expressions, such as "what" the conservatives think or "how" they act, but also "how and in which way" they should think or act. Related with this, with respect to the people's decisions mentioned in the expressions, the politicians seem to claim an authority status or implicit-indirect 'real' representation for themselves. The distance between the politicians and conservative groups, which generates orientalism, is interesting with its claim of authority and representation.

According to an AKP politician as a reflection of conservatism "religious appearance" is an important factor and there is a major difference between "being

religious" and "appearing religious". He mentions that this "difference" is used by the politicians. For him, in order to "get the attention of the society" this kind of "men" practice their daily prayers visible to other people, be "immediately" present at the first row at the funerals or make speeches at wedding ceremonies by using religious patterns. Those are named as the "typical examples" of exploitation of conservatism. For this politician, through these practices, an "image" of closeness to the people is created and the people practicing "their own cultural codes "are being used intensely" by this type of politicians. He states, "Our poor conservative people also act wrong in this issue", and adds that "everybody" including "himself" is "responsible and guilty". The politician, who is a mayor of a municipality, states that "because of his position" he cannot resist such cases and continues: "(...) If you join a community having a sünnet party, normally you have to visit such communities all summer long. Nobody would enjoy this; however, we practice it." The same politician says:

> "(…) There is conservatism within the society. The society considers certain values as sacred or profane. Protecting them is like protecting their family, children, neighborhood and wealth. If you destroy these values, you will destroy his world; which means there will be nothing to hold for him then. The correspondence of this conservatism is the protection of the current situation. (…) In fact, conservatism can gain a meaning in the world of *poors and losers*; but I think the politicians and high-income groups exploit this notion. The main issue for a human being is how to survive and find something to eat. Politics is not the fundamental issue that they will think about. If I don't misunderstand your question, my answer is that the people are interested in politics, but it is not primary for them. But, they generally vote to conservative or right-wing parties" (A24)

Further than being important in exemplifying sociology of conservative and ordinary conservatism, this expression indicates "realistic" findings. Conservatism for some people is represented as they have nothing but "their created sacred values". Otherwise, the world will be destroyed. For them conservatism is presented as a grip "to hold". "Perhaps" this kind of conservatism has a meaning in the world of poors. Besides its reference to the roots of ordinary conservatism, above expression is

interesting as it signifies the profile of the politicians, who can reach and lead the mentioned conservatives through politics.

For a MHP politician **(M19)** five percent of the right-wing voters are "strict conservatives" in Turkey. The rest, which is the "majority of the conservatives", practice certain things in daily life. For instance, men and women dance together, practice folk dances such as "halay"; young ladies wear their "most low-cut dresses". "He is not sure" whether this complies with conservatism or not. For him, such social activities do not constitute a *deep* dimension both in "Nationalist (Ülkücü) Movement" and conservatism of 'right politics' in Turkey. There are two interesting points in this politician's expression: first, he makes a distinction of "strict conservatives" within "right-wing voters"; however, he doesn't describe the "strict conservatives" in his expressions.

Another interesting point is the emphasis on the inconsistency between the ordinary conservatism of the 'right-wing voter', which is derived from their everyday practices and the imagined (ideal) conservatism. Politician's expression about the lack of "deep dimension" in conservatism might refer to dissatisfaction about the "ordinary conservatism". Actually, according to this politician, a person "who is at the right-wing and conservative, should have mutual thoughts and attitudes", especially "the nationalists should be more sensitive about that". In fact, according to this politician "the difference between the ideal and the realities in life" should also be perceived. This politician, who has a hesitant conscious manner while describing conservatism, also has a statement about the religion and nationalism. According to this politician, it is 'wrong' to compare the "depth and symbolism of our religion" and "nationalism". 'Raison d'etre' and 'meaning' of religion and nationalism are entirely different. The politician "mentions" that his party, which is the MHP, could not be as successful as the AKP in terms of using religion and conservatism within politics. When the social and political reflections of the relationship between the Turkish nationalism and religion is considered, the statement that politician points out also implies an important discussion. This statement will be highlighted again in

the chapter where the relationship between religion and nationalism is evaluated. However, the following expression of this politician worths to be mentioned in terms of foregoing discussion and carrying important findings about 'ordinary conservatism'. According to this politician one of the reasons that MHP is politically behind the AKP because there is a lack of necessary emphasis on religion and religious discourse. He says that:

> "(…) One of the major reasons that our party got too few votes when compared to the Justice and Development Party is because we overemphasized the Islamic patterns or conservative nationalist patterns during the last 15 years. I mean, if we think of a rational political behaviour, to get high number of votes, Nationalist Action Party, which represents the Turkish nationalism, should establish a context with regard to Islamic patterns. We should have this in our discourse. Our leader defines it as "exploitation of religion"; but I think we should use this. (…) I was a very *conservative person* ten years ago. My wife, to wear headscarf and my children to learn Kur'an was crucial to me; but it is not important anymore. I don't know whether the society or I was changed. However, most of the wives of nationalits don't wear headscarf. I don't consider that conservatism is distinguishing in our discourse and in our life styles. However, there are strict conservatives, mild conservatives and non-conservatives in our party. I mean, we have such a distinction as it is in the right ideology. (…) However, I don't think that Turkish society is very conservative. Turkish society has never had a close relationship with religion. You are a sociologist, I don't want to exceed the limits, but I examined the Yörük(s). They practice religion, religion is the starting and reference point for them; but it is not a rigid form governed by norms as it is in Western Christianity. We are a Muslim nation, but not religious. We talk about religion, but we don't pray during the working hours. We didn't care about this before. These are transferred to us as flying values; but how? I think Orthodox understanding of Islam was imposed to us. Those are import values. Those are the signs of alienation of Turkish society from the traditional Islamic understanding. I think that way and for that reason, I don't consider Turkish society as a highly conservative society. With the impact of such imported values, people have different decisions lately." (M19)

It worth to emphasize one of the AKP politicians expression, who almost varifies the meaning of religion for the Turkish people as described by the MHP politician **(M19)**. According to this politician, 'some segments' in the society consider "sheria", which describes conservatism as an Islamic regime and its defender sheria

type of life, as the same notions. However, according to this politician it is a "meaningless and idle approach". He says:

"(…) nobody can apply sheria in this country. They can't, why? As I mentioned, the religious practices are different in Kayseri. The people will reject sheria; because this society is used to live in democracy and its blessings; nobody would like to be governed by sheria rules. Because of my profession I can evaluate that (…) For instance; when a rich man, who always helps people, organizes a wedding party for his son or daughter. They serve alcohol at the ceremony and the groom and bride dance together. For instance, if you are a hodja and if you share your decision by saying that you don't approve such things, then the rich man will warn you not to comment on that subject and will end the discussion. This is something always practiced in Kayseri. Very few people, which is five percent of the city, live according to the rules of sheria there. " **(A12)**

According to a SP politician if conservatism is considered in terms of "social and cultural approach" with respect to the traditions, customs and rituals, 'nationalism' is significant. If it is considered on "religious basis" then a structure and group, which is more "Islamic", is perceived. For this politician these aspects should be "considered" together and also separately. According to this politician if those two aspects are considered together, crucial "transitions" are recognized among the groups exercising both nationalist and Islamic tendencies. He says:

"(…) When we evaluate the past in Islam, we see that Tarikat(s) [Communities] wearing çarşaf [burqa] gave up wearing it. Then they started to wear coats instead and later on they started to wear jackets instead of coats. Now it is time for the türban [headscarf]; maybe it will not be used within the next years. There is a transition and change. If you ask me which one is right, maybe transition was right; black çarşaf [burqa] is not necessary anymore. There is a rising value when this is considered in terms of nationalism and conserving of customs, tradition, rituals. In our country when separatist movements start, then nationalist values start to rise. Certain values emerge at that time. Although it is not directly related, it sometimes emerges at the football games. For instance, when Galatasaray team wins a game over a European team, some people calls the name of Allah while drinking beer. It is not possible to understand this. Drinking alcohol and talking about Allah. I don't know if it's something social, but not coherent." (S24)

This expression might be important by noticing the articulation of conservatism both with nationalist and religious factors, and also by introducing the 'change and transition' of conservatives within the unsteady conditions in daily life.

According to another AKP politician **(A16)**, conservatism is "embodiment of the tradition" rather than nationalism. It covers a range from dressing to folklore, from feasts to ceremonies and symbols. For this politician conservatism is not only being devoted to religious symbols and values, but "recognition of living on this land for centuries, recognition of the values carried out from the times of Alparslan until now; even the values of the societies before that time". In order to clarify his statements this politician preferred to make specific evaluations about Kayseri, which is the city he lives in. He shared distinguishing observations about ordinary conservatism.

It is not easy to understand what the people think in Kayseri "at first glance". It is not easy to have a general impression about a person by looking at the dressing and attitudes, or by talking this person. For that reason, the structure in Kayseri is "quite interesting". The people are "nationalist-conservative, but also consider the valuable things in terms of economy, that is **money**. For this politician, an average person from Kayseri thinks as following: He says "yes I follow this action, I advocate certain values, I believe in this", but continues to think "what am I going to have at the end". At this point, the evaluation of another MHP politician **(M13)** is necessary. According to this politician: "Kayseri is not a puritan city as it is assumed"; of course there are marginal groups in the city but this exists everywhere. For this politician "Kayseri is not puritan and fundamentalist city, rather it has a structure where Muslims practice the requirements of the Islam". A AKP politician having similar observations on Kayseri case mentions the following:

> "(…) Let's try to describe a person called as a conservative in Kayseri. For him education for his children is crucial. There was an old belief in Kayseri such as "if a person is not dealing with trade, he/she will be educated". Now the young people in Kayseri, support their children to be educated in Europe and the USA. The parents rent a house in those countries for their children. We directly classify those ones as conservatives. Those people have a business life,

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which is another life that they have to protect and live. They think, "it is not possible to live only with politics". In order to keep the pace, they adopt any aspect of the modernity. They are the modern conservatives, who are few nowadays that is 10-15 percent of the general mass. For instance, the same people exist within the party. They join cocktail parties in a quite modern manner. Everybody is quite kind and greet in a modern way; they use the words such as "hello" and "good evening" while some others use the exaggerated greeting word 'selamunaleykum'. In Kayseri there are few people who use the religion and who are respected because of using religion." (A14)

The purpose is not make an analysis on Kayseri, but the about this city, which is equipped with the conservative aspects, might also be valid for small and big cities, especially for the county[53] in Turkey. Following expressions are remarkable in terms of describing ordinary conservatism and conservatives. The first expression belongs to a SP politician:

"(…) First of all, conservatives think that the state and the authority should exist to arrange and order the Islam, the religious sensitivities and religious life; so that they can practice the requirements of the religion easily. They would like to get religious services without any charge; which means they will pay taxes, then the state will build the mosques and hire the imams for them. If we notice the major criticism of the conservatives that is also reflected to the speeches of the muftis and preachers, we hear them saying "we would like to get the donations after the Cuma prayer, as the state has no support to build the mosques, we need your donations". What does it mean? It means a kind of conservatism in the manner that 'the state hires the imams and provides their salary; it will be the best if the state also builds the mosques without charging the people'. In fact, this is something quite related with life/ worldly issues. It's good that the state builds the mosques, but it will better if they give a chance to go to the heaven by devoting a sheik. The concerns of an average conservative are as follows: "Why does the state do not support them on certain points, why are the people not free to visit their sheiks easily, why does the state chase their sheiks; why does the state intervene?" Those are the concerns of an average conservative, which are the points I criticize. When we consider those people in terms of some applications in daily life, such as using the bank interest or calculations on deposits, I'm sure they are beyond us in their applications of such things! Then they call these applications as "haram"! Among those people, I'm sure there are also precious people living according to their beliefs, but what I

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[53] For a study including different perspectives of 'countryside' in Turkey see T. Bora (ed). *Taşraya Bakmak,* İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005.

would like to say is that it is not easy to understand whether a person is conservative or religious. Most of the conservative people are not distinctive within the society (…)" (S21)

The second expression is important both in terms of providing a perspective about an average conservative and also describing attitudes of this average conservative about the state and authority. According to the same DP politician:

"Conservatives are the ones that we call as pious people, who follow Islam by practicing its religious requirements. They pray five times a day. Even if they cannot pray precisely at the time of prayer, they go home and practice it later on. They try to practice the religious requirements and duties precisely and raise their own children accordingly. What do they do accordingly? They try to raise children with the belief of Allah, the holy book and let them practice the religious requirements as much as possible. They teach their children what is right and wrong, how the relationship should be constituted with their neighbors including helping and having good relations with them, they teach them to help the people in poor conditions, to respect the elders and love the youngsters. They themselves also try to practice all these conditions. I'm trying to describe a real conservative person. There are people who appear to be so, but not act that way. Our society is aware of the fact. Our real vote depote is composed of such people, the ones who vote for us are real conservatives. I mean, our voters read Kor'an, try to exercise religious requirements (…) Conservatives or right-wing people are quite respectful and devoted to the state. They are also respectful to the state leaders and the statesmen. They apply the state when they are in trouble. The conservative group perceives the state as a father. The right-wing voters have faith. They are content with the amount of support that the state provides. They are not opponents, they don't ask many things. They know what they will ask for. When they don't get what they want, they oppose it, but don't rebel." (D18)

The following expression is astonishing in terms of defining how conservative patterns and codes in daily-practiced politics are "functionalized" by the politicians:

"A conservative or right-wing person has different discourses and attitudes. This case should be considered separately. However, if you ask about the discourses, the first one is internalizing the spirit of 46 as a tradition of Democrat Party. The second discourse is the religion, which is a sensitive subject for each human being. This person should talk about religion that is the Islam, which is a sensitive subject. I think religion should never be used, but unfortunately, it is being used. The third one is to act according to the traditions and

customs. Sitting on the ground when you visit certain homes and talking and laughing less might be some examples for that. Conservatives should highlight these values. For instance, while visiting a village if the people eat the food with their hands, the person visiting them would be able to eat with his hands as well. Although the case is quite difficult, the person should practice it. Another example is that when you visit a place that you are not comfortable in terms of the hygiene, when you were asked what to drink, you should be able to ask for a tea or a coffee served in a cup. You should not ask to drink something in a bottle. Those are crucial and also interesting points in politics. If you are in an environment with high religious values, you should be able to say, "Let's go to the mosque". You should go and pray at the mosque precisely. I wish all these things should have been done by heart, but these are real, which were practiced before. Those are shallow acts, but unfortunately it is the real case in life." (D16)

How shall we examine the observations and evaluations in the expressions? As mentioned above, conservatism is described through several academic, philosophical, ideological values and principles. Conservatism has many aspects within the daily life *as well*. In this respect, I mean a structure of 'ordinary conservatism' that is quiet earthly, articulated with the modern life, trying to be compatible with the modernity values and existing with 'pleasures' or contradictions of life. Why is it important to see or know the existing forms of conservatism in this 'ordinary' and 'real life'? First, it is important in terms of providing the information that conservatism cannot be identified through a single dimension. Second, it is important as it allows understanding and comprehending the social, cultural and political structure of Turkey and diversified sights of conservatism in details and through various perspectives. From the political point of view, in terms of political attachment for instance, it is also important to understand the political attitudes, behaviour patterns and motivations of conservatives as a nature and personality in the form they exist or they are presented.

## 4.2 Political Conservatism(s)

Above, the social and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon of conservatism were discussed through the conservative politicians' opinions and understandings. But

conservatism is not a phenomenon that can be understood only by looking at the social and cultural characteristics. Conservatism is also used as a political ideology and envisioned a concept and a strong element of political identity. Almost all located in the tradition of the right political party in Turkey have often referred to this concept an explicit or implicit way. As considering to this how the concept discussed by politicians involved in this tradition is of great importance. Today AKP, the most powerful representative of the right-conservative political tradition and the process of writing this thesis this party in power for nearly ten years, defines its political ideology and identity as a main component with this concept. Because of this reason alone deserves to stand on the subject. But beyond the current situation, any attempt to figure out the right politics in Turkey the phenomenon of conservatism, just as its other aspects, must be taken into consideration, also be politically.

In this section it will be focused on the implications of the phenomenon of political conservatism. Politically, what is understood when it is said of conservatism and political conservatism, is it possible, how the established nexus between politics and conservatism? In this context, the meaning and the implications of political conservatism is in line with the answers to these questions being studied to be understood and the difference and the affinity points between the politicians will be discussed.

As stated above, AKP defines its own political identity and ideology as a conservative democrat. The power and importance of the political sphere are regarded and clearly identified its political ideology as conservatism that is also the main component of its political ideology is taken into account, AKP politicians' views and evaluations on this topic will be discussed first. It will be focused on how AKP politicians perceive and describe conservatism as a political fact and as well as the conservative democracy. Then, the other right-conservative politicians' perception and evaluations on the political conservatism will be discussed.

**4.2.1 Political Conservatism of AKP or ‚Conservative Democracy**

AKP defines its ideology as conservative democracy and defines its identity as conservative democrat. In the booklet (Akdoğan, 2004: 15-17) where the aspects of this ideology and identity are defined, parameters of ***conservative democrat*** political identity are described as follows:

"In contrast with the notion of revolutionary change, conservative democracy depends on the understanding of a natural progressive and gradual change. Social transformation is the fundamental and permanent type of change. Change refers to the realization of a progressive period and provision of a natural development. Interruption of socio-economic, cultural and political life is negative in terms of disappearance of the current accumulation and waste of historical development. This interruption loses its impact, which aims to impose a total understanding to the society by sudden and enforcing methods. In this respect, the potential of conservatism is important to protect the conventional conservative structure against the totalitarian revolutionist interventions and to transfer historical acquisitions to the future. Changes that are not depending on progressive process are not subject to be permanent.

According to the conservative democracy, political arena relies on consensus culture. The reflection of social differences in political realm is only possible if the political realm is based on consensus. Social and cultural diversity should take part in politics as richness based on tolerance and indulgence produced by democratic pluralism. Participatory democracy will also develop itself by providing the representation and participation of these differences in political process.

"Conservative democracy supports a limited and defined political power. It rejects authorized and totalitarian approaches. Totalitarian and authoritarian understanding, which cannot be limited and which is providing arbitrariness and lawlessness, ignoring participation and representation, disregarding individual and collective rights and freedoms, is the core enemy of the civil and democratic politics."

"Democratic political basis is where all the problems are transferred, social demands are reflected, right and wrong is reorganized through testing themselves. The differences and diversities in Turkish society are the elements that will enrich pluralist democracy. The aspect that makes democracy acceptable is to participate the social and cultural differences and demands to the politics, and to protect the current order against compulsory intentions."

"Conservatism rejects radicalism and social engineering. Instead of divergence and polarization, politics should be based on consensus, integration, and tolerance. The total rejection of the current structure and constitution of a brand new system by

radicalism is not accepted as an appropriate approach today. Change, through conserving some traditional values and acquisitions, is crucial."

"There should be a balance between idealism and realism. Some people might have certain utopias, it is natural; however, it is not appropriate to absolutize certain (enforcing) methods and impose their own decisions to others."

According to the AKP's leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "a considerable part of the society"[54] wants modernity which is not excluding the tradition, universalism that is not excluding the locality, rationalism that is not rejecting the meaning and a change which is not fundamental". Erdoğan continues in a similar manner by adding more to the above-mentioned issues:

"AK Party presents the New Conservative Democrat line in accordance with the roots of conservatism and its historical codes, while depending on social and cultural customs of the territory where they make policy. Through its own political tradition AK Party aims to reproduce the local and fundamental value system with the universal standards of conservative political line. AK Party is not opposed to the change, but to the derogation and devolution. We offence the change in the sense of development and progress. Instead of conservatism of the past, which is based on status quo, AK Party emphasizes a modern Conservatism open to innovation. AK Party advocates the change based on evolutionary or progressive natural social transformation. AK Party perceives conservatism as preserving certain values and acquisitions, not as preserving the current institutions and relationships. Preserving does not mean being closed to change and progress, but it means the adaptation of development without losing the essence. According to the Conservative Democracy, "politics" is a sphere of consensus; and social and cultural diversity should take part in politics as richness based on tolerance and indulgence produced by democratic pluralism. AK Party, which values the civil politics and the effect of civil society, emphasizes the importance of non-governmental organizations in a democrat society as median protection mechanisms. AK Party states that radical statements and manners have no use for the Turkish politics. According to them Turkish politics should be based on integration, consensus and tolerance instead of divergence and polarization. In terms of Conservative Democracy, totalitarian and authoritarian approaches cannot be limited. Those approaches cause arbitrariness and lawlessness; they reject personal and collective rights and freedoms. They are the core enemies of civic and democratic politics. AK Party supports a state adapting constitutional state norms, a state that is small, but dynamic and effective. National will is the basic stand of political power and its legitimacy comes from the general acceptance of the society. We perceive legal and political legitimacy as the "essence" of each political party. Any kind of approach, which is imposing and supporting the prototypes, which is prescriptive and is based on social engineering, is an obstacle for a democratic system. Nobody should attempt to lead and form the societies from a distance. Our conservative democrat identity makes us oppose all kinds of social and political engineering. Democracy is a regime of dialogue, tolerance and consensus. Covert societies, where dialogue is not progressed, cannot produce a democratic

culture. Instead of a unique democracy, Turkey should constitute a democracy based on diversity, multiple representation and tolerance. The ideal democracy is not a mechanic one reduced to elections and certain institutions; but the organic one, which is diffused on all administrative, social and political spheres. We call it "deep democracy". Democratic political basis should be a sphere where all the problems are discussed; social demands are reflected and where right and wrong can reorganize itself through a self-test. "Freedom" is not only a value that is realizing democracy, but also a value and principle that is providing the functioning of social order and responsibilities in a moral and legal framework. Each human being should have the basic rights and freedoms just because of being a "human". In order to constitute the individual freedom precisely, the individual should not be left alone against the state, but should be supported through certain civil and social formations. "Human rights", which are gained through birth, should be valid for everyone and should be accepted legally, without making any discrimination in respect to religion, race, gender, language, politics or class differences. AK Party believes in being sensitive about the applications that will harm the "family" and supports the protection of human rights and freedoms under the right of individual choices and preferences. For AK Party the people who make distinction between *"us and the others"*, who accept a single sect, ethnic or religious element in politics, who confront the other discourses and organizational formations, are the ones who indicate exclusionary and discriminative characteristics. These are the red lines of our party" (Erdoğan, 2004).

As it is mentioned in AKP's 'official' texts, one of the main elements that might refer to conservatism is the progressive development against the change. According to this decision: "social transformation is the fundamental and permanent type of change. Change refers to the realization of a progressive period and provision of natural development […]. In this respect, the potential of conservatism is important to protect the conventional conservative structure against the totalitarian revolutionist interventions. It is also important to transfer the historical acquisitions to the future. Changes not depending on progressive process are not subject to be permanent" (Erdoğan, 2004). Radicalism and social engineering are rejected as change and transition should develop in its own nature. The change should be realized by 'preserving some values and acquisitions of traditional structure'. In this respect: "the total rejection of existing structure and attempt to establish a new order by radicalism is not considered as a correct method today. It is essential to realize change by preserving certain values and gains of traditional structure" (Erdoğan, 2004).

Another factor that is announced compatible with universal codes of conservatism is the rejection of "a perspective resisting to decline and fundamentalism" instead of change. In this respect, "AK Party highlights a **modern conservatism** open to improvement instead of former conservatism based on status quo […]. According to AK Party, conservatism is not the protection of current establishments and relations, but conserving certain values and gains. Protection is not being close to change and improvement, but it is adopting the development by preserving the essence" (Erdoğan, 2004). As Erdoğan mentioned 'a considerable part of the society' "wants **modernity**, which is not excluding the **tradition**", **universalism** that is not excluding the **locality**, **rationalism** that is not rejecting the **meaning** and "a **change**[55], which is **not fundamental**" (Erdoğan, 2004). With reference to conservatism, two factors arise within the axis of aforementioned 'official statements'. One of them is the emphasis that freedom is not only a value enabling democracy, 'but a value and principle providing process of **social order** and **responsibilities** within *moral* and legal framework'. The other factor highlights the idea that 'being sensitive about the practices that will weaken "**family**" institution is necessary because personal preferences and acceptances should be protected'.

*Acceptance of gradual change, rejection of radical and revolutionary radicalism, emphasis on the limits of conscious in terms of 'rejecting the meaning', search for an order and emphasis on family institution* are defining features of conservatism that are considered as universal. In this respect, as provided in party documents, conservative democrat ideology and identity has no distinctive or new features in terms of its correspondence with the universal codes of conservatism.

When the factors other than the mentioned features of conservatism are examined, a political understanding is perceived that is based on 'consensus culture'. There is an advocacy of a pluralist understanding of democracy where the cultural differences state their demands. While restricted power is announced, 'authoritarian and

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[55] The emphasis belongs to me.

totalitarian approaches that are enforcing and oppressive' are rejected. "Democracy worths through participation of social and cultural differences and demands to the politics and through protection of the existing order from **enforcing exaggerations**" (Erdoğan, 2004). Moreover, the state is criticized because of "prisoning itself in a dogmatic sphere via an ideological preference". The state is described as "structured with its main functions; the one that is small, but dynamic and effective". According to this, the state "should not describe, shape and impose certain preferences to its citizens; but it should serve as described, controlled and shaped by its citizens".

When we consider the democracy/being democrat part of the definition of conservative democracy/democrat, it was explained through the emphasis on pluralist approach, sublime of democracy discourse, expression of social differences and openness to their demands, criticism of authoritarian state and its governance, emphasis on superiority of law. However, the degree of emphasis of such forms in literature overlapping with the described notion and content of "conservative democracy" is controversial. The first is the literal and undetermined advocacy of democracy referring to "political correctness", if it is correct to mention, a 'great signifier' that is used almost in every political tendency. As perceived in AKP politicians' an expression there is a tendency of difficulty or complexity of a distinctive 'great signifier'. It results in a problematic/controversial content for its introduction in terms of a coherent political identity. Moreover, also in expressions of politicians other than the AKP, there is an emphasis on and reference to some principles and values; such as democracy, being democrat, pluralism, acceptance of social diversity, validity of diversity demands.

With reference to AKP's formal documents, this summary is composed of two main components by referencing the common lines of AKP ideology, which is defined as democracy-democrat conservatism. The first component highlights the universal conservatism values while attempting to identify the ideology, whereas the other component advocates a pluralist understanding of democracy through focusing on liberal-democratic values. With this respect, it might be noticed that there is an

ideological design with an obvious eclectical property. According to Çiğdem (2009: 129): "This concept [conservative democracy] assigned by AKP to describe itself, is functional rather than being ideological. For that reason, it is meaningful to make an eclectic statement whether conservatism or democracy will be emphasized more". According to Yılmaz, various criticisms about AKP's ambiguity of political identity signify its hegemony on public and on academic level: "The major reason of this hegemony is not what AKP realizes, but it is the articulation of various ambigious and eclectic statements in itself" (Yılmaz, 2003: 614).

How do AKP politicians and other right-conservative party members define and perceive aforesaid ideological-political statement? The answers to this question are important for some reasons. First, to understand conservative democracy as structured by AKP governor elite as an identity and ideology, the way their politicians describe, perceive and state if there is any diversity. In other words, if there is any correspondence between the 'official framework' and the statements of the politicians who represent the party; in what terms the foresaid ideology is internalized or if there is any correspondence or not on politicians of the content and meaning attributed to this ideology. Moreover, the correspondence of "conservative democracy" on other right-conservative politicians is essential in two terms. First, to understand how they perceive the AKP in terms of ideology or political identity, then to define conservatism and the meaning they attribute to it according to their point of view. It should be stated that, within the framework of the study, the members of right-conservative parties other than the AKP share a strong displeasure against the AKP. In addition, based on an opposition they are reluctant in claiming conservatism as an ideology and identity. From this point, the right-conservative politicians other than the AKP were quite hesitant about highlighting conservatism as a political feature. This hesitancy might correspond to a remarkable manner, attitude or resolution for right political tradition. In other words, almost all political parties within the right political tradition directly or indirectly imply a certain accepted feature, which is that conservatism as a political identity is considered correspondent with the AKP. Consolidation of conservatism by AKP or its perception as an

ideological component-element attributed to this party might obstruct the manifestation of other party members' independent or specific conservatism. In this respect, descriptions of conservatism of other politicians are explained majorly through the AKP and through the criticism of AKP's conservatism. In this part, the meaning of conservatism, its importance and significance as a political-ideological element will be discussed first with AKP politicians then with other party members and the results will be evaluated.

Although there is mainly an emphasis on AKP criticism, in order to trace different (political) notions of conservatism, this part of the study will state how the right-conservative politicians other than AKP perceive and see AKP, and provide even a partial understanding of those politicians' own definitions (political) of conservatism, so that we can talk about two different essential perspectives or contributions. It should be mentioned that the number of AKP politicians interviewed, identifying themselves through conservative democracy/democrat, are quantitatively few. There is only one politician **(A25)** who can define "conservative democracy" precisely correspondent with the official text and statement. Although AKP politicians apply to this concept (conservative-democrat) as an ideological or identity component, it is unlikely to define the content and to make extensive descriptions as a consistent statement. Excluding the politician who made descriptions correspondent or parallel with the content and framework of party statement, **conservative-democracy/democrat** is mainly defined through social-cultural factors. When a political meaning is attributed to conservative-democracy, a set of attributions defined, described and perceived with content different than the party statement. Although most of the AKP politicians claim conservative-democracy/democrat concept verbally, they discuss or perceive the content of concept-ideology different from the party statement. In this respect, the descriptions of some AKP politicians indicate nationalist and religious (Islamic) ideological discourse. In fact, among AKP

politicians, some define themselves merely as "nationalist conservative", "muslim democrat" or "nationalist" without any attribution to conservative-democracy[56].

If aforementioned observations and findings are considered with respect to the AKP politicians' statements, the expressions of the AKP politician (the only one) **(A25)** indicate importance by strong internalization and expression of relatively consistent understanding of "conservative democrat" notion, which is valid in the party discourse.

> "I really can describe myself as a conservative democrat (…) For instance, our perception of conservative-democracy is not a notion that is directly status quoist, reluctant to change and transition. We mean the change, without disconnecting from certain values, with a gradual, level-by-level progress and development. It means providing both the change and also the transition (…) First of all; we reject a sudden change, which is a revolutionary change, that happens all of a sudden (...) We should provide a change without excluding our unique values. Our notion of conservatism is definitely different. Having no arrogant view against the society is the main difference. Then we accept the common good that is implied by the society. We don't want to specify a value and make the society obey. This is our point of view (…) Our principle is to approach and accompany the society via tolerance, love and sympathy. However, the same case is not valid within the other parties; they are oppressive and they would like to lead the society by force and arrogant approach (...) AK Party is against regional, racist and ethnic nationalism. There are clear statements about that. We call ourselves as the central party, composed of various people from each fraction (…) I am a conservative in terms of my own perception; each fraction assigns a different mission or context to this concept. I am different than what others perceive. To me being conservative is not necessarily essential to be a nationalist. I think a disorder is created through these concepts, which is not a proper attitude. We are Muslim Turks and we are proud of that; however, we don't have a right to insult other nations through this statement. In fact, I am a Turk that I am proud of and I am a Muslim of which I am proud of as well. However, I don't use this against other nations; using it for this purpose is insulting. " (A25)

There is a strong emphasis on this expression, as mentioned; it is because this politician describes the party ideology relatively clear and obvious. In this respect,

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[56] For a study on similar identity definitions about AKP politicians see İsmail Safi, *Türkiye'de Muhafazakâr Siyaset ve Yeni Arayışlar*, Ankara, Lotus Yayıncılık, 2007, pp. 327-334.

there is a complementary point of view when compared with the other politicians. It is stunning that there is only one politician among AKP politicians having strongly internalized consistency while expressing the party politics. However, even rhetorically, the emphasis of this politician on "Muslim Turk" notion might be discussed in terms of its correspondence with the party ideology. Although this single statement reflects the party ideology significantly, it is open to discussion because of aforementioned emphasis.

AKP politicians describe "political" conservatism by mentioning social-cultural values; in these descriptions, cultural or religious tradition emphasis is highlighted. When a specific question that is the definition of "conservative-democracy and democrat" is directed to the AKP politicians, many times the answer is a general concept/phenomenon of "conservatism" with emphasis on its social-cultural aspects instead of a political notion. In an attempt to describe conservatism as a political ideology, the tendency to define it through cultural aspects or means, is valid not only for the AKP politicians but also for other politicians. The evaluations of the AKP politician exemplifying the last finding can be shared here. It is necessary to stress that the following expressions belongs to a AKP politician **(A26)** who is a social scientist with a Ph. D. degree and was an academician previously. In terms of aforesaid aspect, the content and level of the speech of this politician can be considered as eccentric and distinguished to a certain extent from the other AKP politicians. For that reason, the representation of other AKP politicians by this politician of is questionable. Despite its aspect being the only one representing such tendencies among AKP politicians, it might be a remarkable example. The expression of this politician and his emphasis seems to be significant in terms of its emphasis on tradition and on various descriptions of different identities and ideologies within the party. The politician says that the discourse of AKP "overlaps with the people's decisions on certain issues, such as tradition, religion and morality" and continues saying that "the people don't have many problems with liberalism in economic terms". In this respect, this politician states that the AKP "represents the average people" in Turkey, but he has a different idea. For him: "AK Party should

emphasize social political approaches" and in fact "should represent a social democrat line". The politician states that many of his friends in the party share the same decision and continues:

> "I think Ak Party is a conservative party because of the conditions in Turkey. If the members of Ak Party were in Europe, they would be a members or leaders of a social democrat party. I don't know whether or not they have necessary intellectual or class based background, but I think they are close to the understanding of social democracy in their point of view. The right parties in Turkey have a basis and this is bourgeoisie; petit bourgeois in fact. As they depend on this basis they are conservative in this respect." **(A26)**

According to this politician it is neither correct nor possible to transmit the society through politics. This politician states that change "inherents" in social dynamics and the change reflects on the power, politics and regime. This politician does not ***define*** himself as a "conservative-democrat", and states that a "complete reciprocal relationship" between the decisions of AKP executives and the base has not constituted *yet*. For that reason, the transformation of AKP base through internalizing the party discourse is necessary both for the party and for the country. He adds: "of course we will see whether or not this will be realized within time" His "total experience, idea, decision and formation" made him "suspicious" about "reserving something" and continues:

> "I am not an obedient person. I question the traditions; in this respect, I'm not a typical member of Ak Party. In our community they know me as an over questioning person. I believe we should understand the religion, Kur'an, practices of the prophet, and also question them. In fact, I think we should question our political heritage and the recent history as well. However, I can also call myself a kind of conservative. I disagree with the total rejection of the tradition, I agree with the reevaluation. For instance, I read a lot and tried to write something about Ottoman social structure. I think this structure should be recognized and reevaluated. I believe in the statement of Yahya Kemal: "we are the future with roots in the past". This is what I understand from modernity and the new. The new is meaningless in a society where the old not being preserved. This causes the loss of identity; identity erosion and the result is not the new; it's something else and it's not accepted either. It might be accepted in a long time, but generally this is not the case." (A26)

Despite the criticism of the politician against the ***tradition***, his evaluation seems to be correspondent with the conservative democracy/democrat or with conservatism in general. According to Ahmet Çiğdem (2001), Turkish conservatism is represented by Yahya Kemal and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. He points out an intellectual presence of "tranquility style". Çiğdem states that this intellectual stand indicates hesitancy in politics, persistency on Westernization idealism and advocacy of positive traditionalism (Çiğdem, 2001: 60-62). In terms of the emphasis on historical continuum and positive traditionalism, as of consistent with aforesaid "tranquility style" with an attribution to Yahya Kemal as well, this politician devotes to the ***tradition*** and underlines the necessity of its reevaluation. The politician, in his statement where this tranquility style does not reflect a 'political hesitancy', makes an interesting evaluation about the ideological-political stand of his party:

> "There is an opposition against the republic in conservatism, the base is composed of an opposition in fact. Maybe some right-wing parties, which were ruling the country before, tolerated this situation. However, since my childhood, Nurcus for instance were arrested in this country because they read books about their decisions. I was also arrested for the same reason. We were under the pressure of the state and we couldn't turned ourselves into a more revolutionist style; but we had to establish good relations with the state because of its pressure and fear. Everybody practiced a different way. As a result, a structure that is not revolutionist, but more conservative is established in Turkey. Today, this tendency resulted in the establishment of the legal-legitimate political parties. Today we face a structure that is more liberal and close to the social democracy. This is how I perceive Ak Party. There is almost no relation with the MSP (Nationalist Salvation Party) of 1970s. Moreover, there is no more correspondence with the Refah Party (Welfare Party) and its discourses, which were radical discourses. Ak Party gave up its claim about the transition of the society. Refah Party claimed to change the society appropriate to its own ideology. I think Ak Party evolves into liberalism. Rather than conservatism liberalism is dominant now." (A26)

According to another AKP politician describing conservative-democracy as a synthesis of two concepts:

> "Before conservative-democracy concept, we have to describe both conservatism and democracy. For instance, does conservatism refer to fundamentalism? To me, it does not definitely. In today's understanding, there are various types of conservatism (…) In our

social understanding; conservatism is preserving the traditions, religious and historical values. This is a life style and is essential for us. Before Ak Party entered into the political arena, conservatism was related with right decision, which was my decision as well. I still see myself at the right wing, but it is not the case now. Conservatism is not merely the tradition or religion. This is where democracy emerges; in terms of connecting conservatism and democracy. Today democracy is an essential principle that each type of political approach should indicate. This is what we succeeded in as Ak Party. You will conserve both your tradition and culture; including the religion. For instance, this is our distinctive aspect when compared with social democrats. If you ask them they will not agree, but unfortunately social democrats are not as sensitive as *us* in terms of certain subjects such as religion, tradition and culture. (…) As far as I understand, democracy describes a political approach that is respectful to the world and the universal values. According to this description, it defines a political understanding that is most appropriate to our conservative-democrat life style and decision. Conservative democracy is an intertwined structure of those concepts. Instead of dealing with conservatism and democracy separately, I consider to integrate them, to mention with an old expression, it is a quite meaningful "terkip" [combination]. " (A15)

Central topic of the politicians making aforementioned statements is clarified through the emphasis of tradition and the related values. Without ignoring the differences among them, the sensitivity of two politicians and the consideration of conservatism emphasizing tradition, might be considered as corresponding with each other.

However; the suggestion of the first politician **(A26)** about the party politics that is to approach the "social democracy" principles; and also, although not mentioning the details, the other politician **(A15)** "still positioning himself at the right", is stunning in terms of expressing their distance to the party ideology. The existence of aforesaid distance and difference in other politicians' statements does not suggest those two politicians as unique examples. According to another AKP politician exemplifying this approach, the essential point is "the expression of democrat" in conservative democrat identity. For this politician **(A14)**: "conservative is the one who preserves himself and his own **culture**". For him religion is something "imposed", but "it doesn't mean that it is unimportant". Conservative democracy is where those aspects

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"exist together in balance and correspondence". According to this politician, a society preserving its own culture and its habits is "a conservative democratic society".

Another AKP politician who was asked to describe conservative democracy was reluctant to make any description. The politician mentioned that "the best way" is to apply the "documents, regulations and guidelines" prepared by the party, as "he avoids being misunderstood". However, he stated "I would like to say something":

> "(…) The documents prepared for conservatism and democracy are obvious. Moreover, each individual has his own opinions, feelings and belief. There is an acceptance of belief from one point that is religion; on the other hand, there is to choose a path, a political path, through an inspiration of Islam. When we consider Ak Party in terms of conservative democracy, each person with different perspective has the right to prepare his programme to shape the his country and own future; also to serve the political field accordingly. Experiencing through moral aspects and traditions, serving the country, nation and people is the matter. I think of existing with these ideas and survived so far (...) Ak Party is open to everyone as long as the idea is to serve the country and nation, to expose the notion of being democrat. Not only by saying I am leftist or I am rightist." (A22)

Another AKP politician **(A27)** 'especially' would like to mention that he is a "conservative democrat" and mentions that "conservatism does not refer to fundamentalism". For this politician, in a "climate" where democratic values are "quite prominent" both in the world and in Turkey, it is not possible to defend a classic understanding of conservatism; so that they prefer call themselves as "conservative democrats". Another AKP politician **(A18)** describing conservative-democracy as "a sea, even an ocean" "with arms wide open, a world comprising everybody that we cannot imagine deeply". In this respect, this notion is not a single sided 'phenomenon' "that can be placed whenever and wherever you want".

According to the expressions of the AKP politicians, they consider the "conservative democracy"/"conservative democrat" as a combination/articulation or synthesis of

tradition-culture and "democracy". This determination seems to correspond with two findings of the study. First, as it was a prominent tendency in social-cultural conservatism part, it is possible to state that there is a repetition of articulation of the tradition and/or culture with modernity. According to this, conservatism should not be perceived as stubborn and insisting defender of religion-tradition and culture; but as adopting progressively parallel to the required changes of the age (modernity). As mentioned before, this understanding of conservatism is in correspondence with the AKP's notion of conservatism. It is stunning that politicians define democracy or democrat equal to or identical with modernity.

Another compatible point with our study found in aforementioned determination, is about the interpretation of politics. The tendencies in "Political Imaginations" part, described politics within the framework "service", "consensus", "harmony", "dialogue" and such. The statements of the politicians that are mentioned in the study, also repeat these imaginations in the perception of "conservative democracy". For instance, according to one of these politicians "conservative democracy" is the composition of those elements in "balance and harmony" **(A14)**. For another AKP politician, his party is open to everyone and **without any discrimination of the right and left**, it is "being together to **serve** the country and nation" **(A22)**. Another AKP politician renders the concept of conservative democracy as an "empty signifier" and makes the notion as almost impossible to be defined or defined, as it is desired. In this respect, he signifies an imagination of politics free of antagonism. For this politician it is "a world with arms wide open, **a world comprising everyone** that we cannot imagine enough" **(A18)**.

Despite the specific content of the question that is to describe "conservative democrat" identity/ideology, some of the AKP politicians did not describe their political identity based on this notion; they described themselves through other identities and even rejected the notion. AKP politicians within this category, defined their political identities generally as national, conservative, nationalist-conservative or right-oriented. For instance, according to a AKP politician, who finds the

conservative values at the "right", describes himself as a "right-oriented conservative person":

> "I am a good conservative. I am a good conservative person loving the country and religion; but not a person who is radical, Islamist, fundamentalist or such. I describe a conservative as the one who is loyal to the religion and who loves the religion, the state, the country and the nation." **(A31)**

Following expression of a AKP politician is interesting as defining conservatism in a wide framework both in terms the **religion** and **nationalist** framework:

> "(…) We consider conservatism as being respectful to the moral values, preserving or trying to preserve the traditions and customs, and loyal to the religion. I will call the religion as Islam because Islam and Christianity are different. As we evaluate Turkey, conservative is the one who is respectful to the religion, considering the religion and life at the same time. (…) When the discourses and determinations change, conservative people might have over nationalist expressions. For instance, Mr. Erdoğan's opposition in Davos is a nationalist discourse. Yes, this is a nationalist speech and we like it; the people of the country need such a discourse so that he approaches them." (A18)

AKP politicians, expressing and evaluating conservatism in conservative nationalist understanding, should also be mentioned. According to one of these politicians:

> "I call myself as a person with a prominent nationalist conservative identity. In terms of economics, I value free market economy and a social economy in a limited environment. (…) My major decision is nationalist conservative centered. It is not ümmetçilik. I am loyal to my religion and the laws. I love my country and the flag. I realize my duties in terms of conservatism. I am proud of being a Turk and feeling like a Turk." (A16)

In this respect, another politician states that:

> "I call everyone a conservative person in Turkish nation who says "Happy is the one who says I am a Turk". The ones who betrayed the country are excluded from conservatism. A person should internalize his own country, nation; it doesn't matter from which religion or religious order. Conservatism is not a notion of Islam only. In this respect, I have a more nationalist point of view and I am against the idea of Westernization. " (A4)

Below expression is interesting by showing that the nationalist conservative tendency at the AKP is not an exception and by blaming the left through a typical right-nationalist speech:

> "(…) If someone attempts to wave another flag in Turkey instead of the existing Turkish flag, is it possible to consider it in terms of a political party? We all know that the socialist party leaders in our country hesitate to use any nationalist and conservative statements. Now, these are contradictory for the society; they notice them. For me as well (…) Are the leftists the same in Europe? Are the social democrats the same in Europe? No. If I were in Greece, I wouldn't vote a party other than the socialist party. There is the Panhelenist Socialist Party. There is the notion of Panhelenism, which is Nationalism. It is both socialist and nationalist. Have you ever heard any nationalist expression within the names of one of the socialist parties in Turkey?  They don't even speak about nationalism." (A8)

Some of AKP politicians' intensive emphasis on nationalism as a political identity is remarkable. This is important in terms of signifying the difference between the party ideology and the distance/diversity of some AKP politicians. It is also stunning as it shows a retraction to 'traditional' right-nationalist discourse and rhetoric or as it shows that, some AKP politicians have a strong tendency of right-nationalist discourse.

It was previously mentioned, some of the AKP politicians reject or do not adopt "conservative-democrat" notion. One of them, who "categorically rejects the notion", describes himself as:

> "About my political identity I can use the cliche that I am a muslim democrat; not a conservative muslim, but a muslim democrat. (…) I am different now; I cannot call myself as Islamist as I did in the past. I can call myself as democrat. The notion of liberalism is something that I value more than being a democrat. " (A24)

For a AKP politician **(A19)**, the question that is "What do you think of conservative-democracy?" is a wrong question. The right format of the question is "How can we *go beyond* conservatism?" This is possible through the "world vision", "knowledge" and "courage". The politician states that: "In underdeveloped countries as there is no

established institution or nobody to actualize this, the people raised by the current values will survive only by preserving those values; they preserve whatever they know". "Human nature is available for knowledge accumulation until a certain age; in the rest of life the accumulated knowledge is used." For this politician "the unique characteristic of illiterate people is the stubbornness and they insist to survive with this. Conservatism is a kind of stubbornness and is something that illiterate people deal with". As the politician states, in order to legitimize their *stubbornness* and "glamorize" them they "hold" on "values and such things". From this "point of view", "conservatism" is not something good; if every developing thing changes, there is no conservatism in fact. The logic and argument of this politician continues as:

> (…) "Politics should be based on a philosophy, theory; but do we have that? No, we don't. Then you should lean on the philosophies based on feelings; what can you lean on? You can lean on nationalism and religion; because the pre-conditions already exist. They take a great place in human conscience. This is a comfortable choice in terms of politics; if you use this, you will reach your target by completing 99 point 9 per cent of the case. They can structure everything on that such as the question of existence or questions about meaning. Since 600s', an Islamist philosophy has already been structured for 1400 years. Thousands of scholars tried to answer the questions by organizing, explaining, experiencing and testing. This system is being experienced for 1400 years; the gaps were always filled by someone. Moreover, when the religious philosophies face a trouble, there are some ways to escape. What are they? These are the divine solutions. What are these divine solutions? For instance, if you discuss with someone about corruption of socialism or something else, you can find a gap to be discussed about the philosophy of this subject. This is lack in religious philosophies; why? It's because they have an advantage to propose the things that they cannot give in real life, that is they propose to give them after death "(…) "I'm not a person practicing the religion; however, I think that believing in Allah adds people a lot. I don't compare it with something else. I always think that religion is a relation between the individual and Allah. For that reason people might think that I don't even have such a belief. If you meet some people and if you start by saying "we came here by Allah's will", that means you start a specific way of communication with the people. It means you use something. You give a message ... make use of this philosophy". (...) "Of course, it's quite easy to relate the things with religion or nationalism. You add the things on something that was already prepared. For that reason, underdeveloped societies do not depend on a philosophy or theory. If you consider it in terms of a political party, there should be a program to follow (…)

(…) While preparing such a program, there is no point of view, no knowledge accumulation, no thought, no discussion, no interpretation, no testing that are reflected to the program. This is something that people can easily adopt. It is also appropriate to the spirits of the people. For that reason conservatism always works in Turkey. What happens lately? All the parties depend on conservatism; why? It is because if you follow the right procedures it will take a long time. As conservatism is a short way to reach the targets, they prefer that. So, conservatism is something that is permanent in Turkey. As long as the conditions during the War of Independence and the 'hard conditions' that Atatürk faced at that time do not appear, there is no permanent solution for Turkey, but conservatism." (…) "Sometimes someone starts something, then someone else develops something better than this. There should be a gradual development. When conservatives are allowed to apply something, it's not easy to stop them. When it turns to be a competition, then comes the sharia. 'You will increase the level of competition, then the discussions about being better than the other will start"... This is something like a price competition, where the prices go down. It is the same for politics, this competition will end in hitting the ground. At the beginning people reject such things, but they adopt in time. You can see that if you examine the society. If you watch TV, there are so weird discussions such as the question 'how can a person pray on the Moon'. They think about the things that will never happen in real life. Conservatism is like a competition now, which will cause a lot of problems. Now, black çarşaf, learning Kur'an and such are a subject of competition. At the beginning we waived many things. The starting point was to understand, to learn the religion that is the Islam. The aim was to love and respect the non-muslims in Turkey as well. But now the situation is horrible. Of course this will be reflected to the life styles as well. (…) What I mean is conservatism is not unification. I can tell you this by an example. If there is a mistake on a painting, to paint it completely black is their solution, instead of a retouch. This is what they do. " (A19)

The evaluations of the politician, who is a member of a political party describing one of its political identities as *conservative*, are quite stunning and remarkable as they imply a "rejection" of conservatism. In fact, during the interview this case was stated to the politician. Then he was asked why he is in a party defining at least one of its components as conservatism and how the party members react against his opinions:

"My dear friend (from METU); most probably you are a leftist and I respect that. Please do not misunderstand! As you are making a study, it means that you are interested in politics. You mentioned that you are a sociologist. However, I think you cannot see how the left in Turkey is naive. Left-oriented scientists cannot understand the dynamics of the country.

Leftists assume that they will understand the society through proper discourses and scientific analyses and they will change it accordingly. (…) However, whether you agree or not, this country is being ruled by the conservatives' votes. Finally, politics is a matter of power. Conservatism, conservative-democracy, being socialist, and other things do not matter. You have to find where the power is and then you [must] penetrate it. If you want to change something you need that power. (…) Everybody in my party knows about my decisions very well; I don't hide them, I won't hide them from you either. They are aware of the power that I have. Please don't push me to tell more..." (A19)

Besides the 'assumptions and visions' of me, this expression indirectly reflects almost the typical pragmatic-machavellist imagination concept of right-oriented politics. Here, a more remarkable point is the "criticizing" mode against conservatism. The expressions of the last two AKP politicians and the expressions of the other politicians, although with different reasons, having dramatically diversified identities and evaluations; they signify that their relation with the party is through other elements rather than the party ideology.

In the light of the AKP politicians' statements so far, it might be stressed that the necessary cohesiveness or reciprocity between the political identity of the party and ideology, and the definition of conservative democracy/democrat, could not be realized enough. Different perceptions of political identity existing among AKP politicians might result in a political analysis of the party. This might be interesting in conforming that it is not *a priori* for a political party, to have a consistent discourse for obtaining a place, consolidating its power and establishing its own cadre, and even having an organic ideology. In fact, the current political success of the AKP shows that this case does not cause a political weakness. In opposition to this, the political success of the AKP might be fed by this eclecticism. However, ideological identity and discourse created by the AKP elite, not resulting in coherence among AKP members, although discussable, might cause a weakness for the party and ideological disappointment within the party. Conjectural political fluctuations might propel AKP to nationalist and with a weak possibility, to Islamic political preferences or speeches. AKP approves this with some of its pragmatist

attitudes during a period that it was in power. This might be seen more obvious if its indecisive standing, especially against the Kurdish Problem, is evaluated. With respect to Kurdish problem, Çiğdem underlines a similar possibility that AKP always keeps its conservative statist politics and military perspective in its agenda to solve the problem (Çiğdem, 2009: 150). The tendency of Islamism or Islamic politics is a relatively weak and problematic presumption[57]. As Yılmaz states, according to AKP Islamism signify a "provincial" identity and in this respect the presence of Islamism is "undeveloped", "old", imaginary" and a "childhood disease" that they should overcome. The reckoning between the AKP and Islamism does not seem to end easily, as Islamism is both the source that the party is fed and the stream that carried many of the AKP cadre to the party politics. Islamism stands in the roots of the AKP ideological structure as a suppressed other. Although this case is apt to a potential "back of suppressed", this possibility itself will be the main concern for AKP (Yılmaz, 2003: 616). In this respect, the party ideology and its conservative democracy/democrat identity might be described as fragile ideology against the conjectural political developments and fluctuations. The reflections of such developments and fluctuations on sociological-political base of AKP, should be considered through some other studies. However, lack of internalization of significant and coherent political ideology and identity even by the party politicians, might be a clue about the party attitude. It should be underlined that these statements are based on assumptions. Below mentioned expression of a AKP politician is interesting as how the identity and ideology perception is fragile in terms of political coherence and devotion:

> "I'm devoted to AK Party with my heart. This is very important and what is the source of it? I vote a party that I consider the right one according to the developing circumstances; the party that I like its leader and its administrative committee. Today, I believe AK Party is the one having these standards, so I work for them. In case this administrative committee is displaced in the future and if I don't believe in the new committee that they are good for the

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[57] It is stunning that Yalçın Akdoğan, who is known as the 'ideologist' of the AKP and who is selected as a congressman in 2011 elections, emphasizes the distance of his party and Islamism. For such evaluations see "Muhafazakâr-Demokrat Siyasal Kimliğin Önemi ve Siyasal İslamcılıktan Farkı" in *AK Parti Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri*, ed. Hakan Yavuz, İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2010; and *AK Parti ve Muhafazakâr Demokrasi*, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2004, pp. 91-151.

country, I would be proud to work with another qualified party. This would not affect me politically. I mean, I don't have a restriction about the party, whether it's a right-wing or conservative party or party of a certain fraction. We would like the country to be ruled by wise and right people. It's not important whether the ruling people are leftist, rightist, Alevi or Sunni. The people with good values, who have ruling capacity to mediate the society, should lead them as well." (A18)

Consideration of this expression as a kind of pragmatism would not be adequate. It is interesting as it shows that the political identity with eclectical component, which is both powerful and fragile; and points out ideological and political 'opportunities' and limits for AKP.

## 4.3 The Ways of Defining Political Conservatism Through Criticisms on AKP

In this part of the study, perception and descriptions of conservatism of the parties other than AKP, will be evaluated. It is essential to highlight that it is one of the findings of the study that conservatism cannot be evaluated by attributing to a single party. For instance, a description of conservatism indicating nationalist notion does not only refer to MHP politicians' descriptions, but also to AKP, DP and SP politicians' descriptions. The same case is valid for the description of conservatism with different variations as well.

As mentioned before, right-wing conservative party members other than AKP, on the basis of a deep dissatisfaction and opposition against AKP, were reluctant to accept conservatism as a pure categorical identity and ideology. In this respect, the politicians were *generally* hesitant to define conservatism or use this notion as a part component of their political identity. It can be said that the politicians other than AKP had difficulty in announcing their or their parties' specific definition of conservatism. In fact, conservative-democrat notion is also difficult and problematic for the AKP politicians, at least in terms of creating its meaning. With respect to this, it is difficult to define conservatism in terms of politics most of the time. Despite the

situation, the politicians' approaches other than AKP might be mentioned about (political) conservatism as much as they are represented.

Political conservatism notions of MHP, SP and DP politicians are significant in two lines. The first is defined or described through AKP criticism in general. Through AKP criticism, this line signifies the perception or attribution framework, including the political, indicating what should conservatism be or should not be. The second line, without the AKP "variable", describes (political) conservatism as it appears in the discourse. However, it should be stressed that these lines interwine most of the time. Without attributing any categorical disintegration and absolutism, if we mention the general findings of the study on the basis of MHP, SP and DP politicians' interviews. For the politicians of MHP, SP and DP, AKP uses conservatism "to look nice" to the right-wing, religious and conservative masses. It is a party politically converting this to vote and power, by using conservatism as a "front", "mask", "guise" etc.; they use religion and religiosity as a tool for politics. In this respect, they are far from being "sincere". AKP could not describe "conservative-democracy" or conservatism as a political identity. They could explain this case to neither themselves nor somebody else. For AKP, conservatism is not ideological but is "de facto". In this respect, it is not an original but is an "artificial" ideology. Because AKP acts according to the conditions specified by the USA, EU and Zionism; and as it is a party legitimizing this case, it is not possible to name them as conservative. Especially MHP and DP politicians state that AKP ignores nationalism, so that this party cannot represent "real conservatism".

For MHP, the meaning of conservatism cannot be reduced to religion merely or to religiosity; however, it is an important component of the notion. As long as conservatism is not articulated with nationalism, it cannot get its 'real' meaning. According to some of MHP politicians, conservatism is the result of the *old* [*kâdim*] "modernity" and "traditionalism" discussion in Turkey. In this respect, it signifies a historical and cultural disintegration.

Mainly for SP politicians then for most of the MHP and DP politicians, conservatism is categorically rejected in terms of its identification with AKP. Especially for SP politicians, a positive meaning is rarely attributed to conservatism; instead, they underline the expression of "morality". For SP politicians' conservatism is an "imported and artificial concept". When morality is compared with conservatism, morality is more meaningful, inclusive and appropriate to "us". Morality comprises religion, tradition and cultural elements; and it is a *political* notion at the same time. The prominent discourse of DP politicians about conservatism is the description through a sharp nationalist feature. Predominantly DP politicians state that nationalism is the essential condition for conservatism; if an individual is not nationalist then is not a conservative either. In this respect, the most important indicator of conservatism for DP politicians can be identified as nationalism. When conservatism is described with a social-cultural content, the predominant emphasis is on nationalism again. In fact, many of the DP politicians describe their political identity as "nationalist-conservative". For DP politicians religious values are important in conservatism, but cannot be named as "religiosity". They strongly reject the notion of conservatism identified with "religiosity", and they tend to stress their loyalty to Kemalism or to the official ideology. For DP politicians AKP "can never be" a center-right party. Center-right is a "way of life". In order to be a center-right party or to represent it, deep rooted history, tradition and culture is required. As AKP never had these aspects, they are neither a center-right nor a conservative party. Besides this, as AKP is a "religious" party with "Milli Görüş" (Nationalist Vision) tradition, and is "against Atatürk and Kemalism"; it is not possible for AKP to be a center-right party.

In terms of criticisms against AKP; MHP, SP and DP politicians' statements are highly similar to each other. Members of these parties do not call AKP as conservative. They are suspicious about AKP's notion of conservatism. These politicians describe AKP as the 'vendor' of "global powers", so to say, perceives AKP as a political "daemon". The indicator of this perception is considered as nationalism. This common political and ideological perception can be considered as

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an essential disintegration in the right-conservative politics. One of the poles of this disintegration is totally represented (via a hegemonic type) by AKP; then the other is represented by the right-conservative ideologies, without ignoring the ideological-political diversity among them. Through a general consideration of the findings, according to the evaluations including AKP criticism and the other statements, *conservatism* should not be evaluated merely as religion or religiosity; it is something functional in terms of politics and ideology. In this respect, conservatism is sensitive about religion and religious values; however, not as an artificial ideology but as a sincere *life style and worldview*. By excluding many of the SP politicians' statements, conservatism cannot be considered without nationalism; if so, a "real" conservatism is not a subject anymore. Above mentioned findings and determinations will be evaluated in terms of MHP, SP and DP politicians' statements respectively.

## 4.3.1 MHP Politicians and Conservatism

According to one of the MHP politicians, "the easiest way to address the religious masses is using conservatism". To this politician, AKP having conservatism 'politically' is another way to say "we are a religious political spectrum" and AKP "uses this very well". The politician states that AKP's notion of conservatism is "superficial", excluding "nationalism" and "not combining" nationalism with conservatism. Conservatism can only gain its meaning through a "dynamic nationalism" and it should be "combined" with it:

> "(…) If you say that I am a conservative person politically, who is loyal to the traditions; then if you say that you won't change, this is not possible politically. You will definitely change, develop and gain different ideas. This is what I said while I was saying that Turkish nationalism describes us. The Turkish nationalist should do whatever is required for the good of the Turkish nation. Consequently, nobody can criticize us for having a different approach today. We are conservatives, we reserve our traditions. A perception such as we never move, is false. This results in lack of serving the people and gaining the knowledge" (M8)

According to another MHP politician, the "problems" occur when "politics is practiced through values". For this politician, MHP never had an approach "in its tradition and style, by practicing politics through Atatürk, religion, and such common values of Turkish people". However, this case has been the dilemma of the MHP, which still continues. For this politician:

> "Yes, it true that we have a wide basis in the society. We have the same basis with AKP, but as an argument, we don't have a tradition like using the religion, of which AKP turned into an opportunity. Those people cannot rule the government. They won't be able to improve the country. The societies are not advanced by the people similar to the society itself, but by the ones who lead them. There is no dilemma between being a leader and being an alien in the society. There are people who are leaders within the society, but raised with the values of the society. This is what I understand from conservatism. In every dimension, both aesthetic and intellectual accumulation, interpretation of the events, knowledge of world conjuncture, and knowledge of history does not mean alienation from the society. You can realize this by standing next to the society as well. " (M18)

This expression seems to be interesting not merely in terms of the emphasis on the 'dilemma' of MHP in its attitude against religion, which is one of "the common values of Turkish nation". The following expression "The societies are not advanced by the people similar to the society itself, but by the ones who lead them. There is no dilemma between being a leader and being an alien in the society. There are people who are leaders within the society, but were raised with the values of the society." is interesting in describing AKP and AKP supporters as 'alienated' from the values of the society. Although the emphasis on 'alienation' is not clearly based on certain reasons within the expression, with the risk of speculation, it is obvious that AKP and AKP supporters, that are identical with the religious thought or sensitivities, are not sufficient "to advance the society".

If this speculation is valid and has a meaning, it worth to emphasize one of the MHP politicians statement that AKP is 'alienated' in terms of its relation with religious ideology and forms. The criticism of 'alienation to the society' in Turkey with respect to the social-cultural values, is a popular discourse that right-conservatives

generally use while emphasizing 'locality' and criticizing the left (Çınar, 2006; Bora, 2003: 445-459; Çiğdem, 2001: 7-9; Taşkın, 2007; Mert, 2007: 171-189). The claim of Turkish right-conservatives to be close to the social values and the emphasis of being identical with these values, is considered as one of its habits. Meanwhile the left is criticized to be 'alienated from the society' and being far from its values (Alkan, 1991; Ayvazoğlu, 1991; Türköne, 1991; Bilgin, 1991). However, it is stunning that a member of a right-conservative party (MHP), which is internalized *locality, validity* and *authenticity* notions, directing the alienation criticism towards another right-conservative party (AKP), which would also internalize those values without any doubt. This expression is interesting in terms of how conservatism is explained or comprehended by some of the MHP politicians. Both "aesthetic" and "intellectual accumulation", "following the developments in the world" and "interpret" them should not end with alienation. It is possible to be raised by "values of the society" and also "to lead the society"; this is what conservatism is. It is hard to say that there is a distinction between the notion of conservatism according to AKP and the description of conservatism in terms of the emphasis on social 'values' and its prominence, which is quite consistent with the universal codes of conservatism. Despite of the overlap on the notion, the case is interesting in showing the difference/separation on explanation of conservatism by different party members.

According to another MHP politician, "there is nothing called as conservatism" in Turkey. The politician states that there are "essential differences" between "sincere-religiosity with faith" and "insincere religiosity" and makes a kind of criticism on conservatism:

> "(...) May Allah forgive, I will tell what I experienced so far. Going to a mosque, growing beard, making pilgrimage, going to a mosque half an hour before the pray and gossiping is identified with Islam and conservatism. We see people who pray in a mosque and use the money with bank interest. Half of the mosques communities are composed of those people. I don't call this conservatism, but I call it 'to have money in the pocket, to get business from communities (tarikat), to make more money'. It's quite shameful to talk about these, but we are very sad that the society is fooled that way; and they call it conservatism. Today, if a

Muslim does not love his country, neighbour, nation; I doubt about his Islamism, conservatism and nationalism." (M22)

The assumption of conservatism in this expression is represented through the reversal of the elements subject to criticism. According to this politician, being muslim (or conservative) is something realized through sincerely practicing religion, without reducing to any kind of style (growing beard, making pilgrimage, etc.), appropriate to and consistent with (without usury) the faith and belief. For this politician being muslim, conservative and nationalist is suspicious if the person *does not love* his country, nation and neighbour. This statement, which can be considered a standard criticism of 'ordinary conservatism', is important as it signifies religious sensitivity related with the notion. The note "May Allah forgive, I will tell what I experienced so far" indicates a religious-moral avoidance. The manifestation of religious morality underlines the essence of religious discourse, its principles and elements for the MHP politicians in considering conservatism. In fact, as it will be evaluated in 'nationalism-islamism' part, at least according to a remarkable number of MHP politicians, religious discourse and principles are determinant in their perception of conservatism. However, hesitative and prudent standing in using religion and religious discourse for *politics* might be considered as a handicap for MHP politicians. This case is important in signifying a reasonable continuity in terms of the tense relation between religion and politics mentioned in "social-cultural conservatism" part of the study.

The relationality of religion with nationalism as a modern ideology is a case often mentioned and examined in nationalism and conservatism literature (Anderson, 1993; Eatwell and O'Sullivan, 1989; Heywood, 2007; Bora, 1999). However, reserving or being close to the religious ideologies by nationalism cannot be considered as a norm. The relationship between nationalist imaginations and religion constituted by the MHP has always been problematic historically (Bora and Can, 1991; Bora, 1999; Öğün; 1995; Arıkan, 2008; Yaşlı, 2009). This problematic or tense relation seems to affect MHP to be hesitant in articulation of other elements in its

discourse other than nationalism and narrows its political maneuver field. This confirms a repeating pattern among MHP politicians against AKP, which uses conservative elements effectively in politics, and assumes the MHP being static or weak politically.

There are many MHP politicians representing a remarkable number of MHP members announcing both its sharp opposition to the AKP and also its nationalist-conservative ideology within a strong context. According to those politicians AKP "is a party which obeys the American imperialism and IMF" **(M1, M3, M12, M18)**. Through privatization, they "put all national assets for sale" **(M1, M2, M6, M11, M16, M17)**. "AKP, which is the enemy" of Turkishness and Turkish nationality, is supported by "global powers, countries, states and establishments that are the enemies and are not related with the nation's national and moral standing and principles; such as the Kurds, Gypsies, Rums, Greeks and Israelis" **(M17, M8, M3, M4, M9)**. Ordinary "mosque community" [cami cemaati] of which national reflexes are "paralyzed", "clean muslims", "liberal" and some "left" intellectuals unconsciously joined them. AKP "as if having national and moral values" **(M1)** is "neither conservative nor religious or nationalist"; it is a benefit organization of insincere people with the mask of "conservatism and religiosity" **(M1, M2, M16, M11, M12)**.

In the light of the summary of some of MHP politicians' expressions, although a radical differentiation seems to be hard, there are some MHP politicians approaching to AKP and its conservatism with a relatively moderate language and mode. According to a MHP politician, considering conservatism within the historical-sociological framework, politics has always been classified through *kadimcilik* and *ceditçilik* in Turkey. For this politician *kadimcilik* "is a perspective on the axis of religious enthusiasm" and *ceditçilik* "is the qibla pointing out the West" and this distinction roots back prior to the declaration of republic. After the passage of multi-party period, this distinction, as the politician states "is emerged in the form of manipulated rightism, conservatism and modernism". This politician considers the

political disintegration in Turkey "mainly in terms of cultural meaning". For him "the rational and sociological aspects are vague in Turkey when compared with the history of the West". For that reason according to this politician: "At this point, with a mind in peace we can neither talk about *a conservative political movement* nor a left movement":

> "In early times of the republic, Celal Bayar was leading the country. If he is the leader what kind of conservatism can we talk about? Later on, remember our President Süleyman Demirel in 28 February period. I think there was concert of Presidential Symphony Orchestra, he said "this is the contemporary Turkey". He accompanied them while they were singing the 10. Yıl Marşı [10th Year March]. People who organized morning prays to get votes from mosques for Adalet Partisi [Justice Party], who wrote prefaces for encyclopedias with very negative anecdotes about Atatürk, are now republicans, Kemalists and even supporters of February 28. Remember Mr. Mesut Yılmaz, if you ask him, he will describe himself as a conservative and right-oriented leader. (…) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) announces itself as the founder of the republic. Almost all of the people, who left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi to establish kadimci politics in Turkey, are more West oriented than CHP leaders. For instance Celal Bayar; he wore sombrero, Adnan Menderes wore bow-tie; in fact Celal Bayar is an İttihatçı. The one who insulted the peasants in Turkey, was the leader of people with beard and takke, and was the leader without a moustache wearing bow-tie and fedora hat. Şemsettin Günaltay for instance, from the opposite wing, was quite religious. The distinction between Democrat-Demir Kırat- and Halk Partisi in Turkey is inducted from a center, which are not spontaneous but artificial movements without articulation. (…)" (M3)

Another MHP politician, with a similar approach to the above politician **(M3)**, who makes a historical evaluation; states that "conservativism-progressivism" and "modernity-tradition" arguments started in the times of Jön Türkler [Young Turks] and İttihat ve Terakki. In this respect, current discussions "are not original". According to this politician when Adnan Menderes established Demokrat Party, he mentioned that he is a modernist compared to İnönü; also Ecevit emerged as a modernist compared to İnönü; then AKP [Erdoğan] announced itself as a 'modernist' compared to Erbakan. The politician states that the degree of the meaning attributed

to AKP by "somebody" as modern or modernist, should be considered in terms of the above historical perspective. For this politician AKP is "something" like modernist.

In this respect "conservative democracy notion" is something that "even they cannot express what they understand" and "it is an artificial concept that they developed to legitimize themselves against the society":

> "What is the meaning of conserving and protection for God's sake? As AKP is a movement composed of the people who were otherized. How can they be named in Western literature? They can be named as conservatives. People immigrated from rural to suburbs and the people in ghettos preserved themselves within their presence. They didn't integrate the outside. This is provided by AKP. AKP transferred capital for some of them, modernized their dressing style, organized the people through their life styles. Some people who had never joined the meetings of the party so far, who had never joined any kind of social activities, were provided with certain opportunities and they were selected as the party president of a province or county. Then a new and rich community emerges; a rich class emerges. Once Menderes said 'I will make a millioner in each town and in each district'. Now they created Muslim businessmen, who are members of MÜSİAD, who are called as Kalvenist Muslim as stated in the press. They call the interest in bank as haram, but in case of emergency, they allow themselves to use it. They preserve something as if by changing the dressing, the cover. To sum up; the conservative of today, whether or not he/she prays, fasts and wears headscarf, is the one who wants to continue and preserve the common values. Conserving is the continuity of the culture, resources, and human values on this land, on this geographical sphere, on this nation and under this flag, with the same language and with this parliamentary system. According to me there is no political conservatism." (M7)

The argument and analysis of this politician is interesting as it is directed from AKP criticism towards a statement being lack of a unique conservative politics in Turkey. In fact, the cycle of the analysis is interesting. Despite of the suggestion to evaluate conservatism within a social-cultural framework without transforming any political notion; in fact, conservatism is stated through the description of the discourse (geography, nation, flag, language union, etc.) with a political content or reference.

MHP politicians define conservatism through its hesitant relation with religion and religious values. They also emphasize a similar hesitation and tension about conservatism in its relation with the capital, globalization process, and also the 'change-transformation' phases in the world and in Turkey in general. Although the capital, its characteristic, globalization and the topics about changes in the world and Turkey do not seem to be directly (political) related with conservatism, it is crucial to understand the political conservatism envisions of the MHP politicians. Moreover, the evaluations on these topics are not only crucial for conservatism, but also for right-oriented politics and the recognition of the differences and similarities within the tradition. For that reason below mentioned expressions of the politicians allow understanding the criticisms of MHP against AKP not only about conservatism, but also about right-oriented politics and MHP's position within this politics through a limited political analysis. One of the MHP politicians, who is a businessman at the same time, states how MHP politicians see and perceive the AKP. According to them, AKP "structured its own investors" *now*. They transformed their "management experiences" and "gains" they had through municipality services into an opportunity and "gained remarkable power" and *now* they structured their "elite and intellectual basis".

One of the politicians considers that "conservative-democracy" is politically successful, but it is an "artificial ideology". For this politician it is artificial, but "functional" at the same time:

> "(…) Capital groups that we call Islamic capital have their own banks, holding companies, huge construction companies, energy and agriculture companies. They are at the top ratings among the companies in Turkey and now they own fifty percent of the media sector. Consequently, you can call it Islamic capital or green capital or whatever you like. The fraction with the headscarf established its own bourgeoisie, its own capital, by using its political movements, Islamic understanding and by agitating the headscarf issue. MHP could not manage to do this. Let me explain this issue first. AKP adopted this to the society as 'conservative-democracy'; they succeeded in that way; however, AKP has an artificial ideology, of which I've been talking about for years. We, as nationalists, neither have a bank nor a media company; nor have a businessman like Sabancı or someone like Ahmet Çalık

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who was created by the Ak Party. We are a nationalist and ülkücü movement, which is trying to survive within a limited sphere of life and trying to make evaluations on its own. This is a system both creates its own dynamism in itself and destroys it by itself. Consequently, this is process against the Turkish nationalists, ülkücü's and MHP. " (M5)

The continuation problem of MHP against AKP is caused firstly by the contradictory and hesitant relation it is structured/is not structured with religious values and principles, and secondly by the relation it is structured/is not structured with the capital. In fact, in terms of highlighting the 'problematic' aspect about the capital, one of the MHP politicians, who is also a businessman and highly acquaint to the subject matter, might be consulted:

"We couldn't structure our own bourgeoisie. We are in dispute with the TÜSİAD, but we did not maintain a structure against it. This is not because of the ideology; it's because of wrong readings of world politics and politics in Turkey. We as ülkücüler realized that we are making wrong readings and mistakes about the strategy. Before 1980s we, as ülkücüler, realized the communist threat, and fought against it in the streets. However, just in 2000s we realized the globalization period started after 1980s. Consequently, we couldn't properly analyze the period after 1980s, where the international capital takes place in the world politics. I don't think that Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) analyzed it either. They don't have a certain political way; they adopt the politics that was already prepared by the USA. They follow an economic program and international political strategy that was prepared by the USA. AKP adopts this strategy; there is nothing unique in this respect. But they realised something before we did, they organized MÜSİAD etc. However, there is nobody that can manage such an organization and strategy in their party. For instance, Ali Babacan was the minister of economy and Mehmet Şimşek is the minister of economy now; those people cannot even be an office boy in our party. They don't have a capacity to specify such a strategy. They are in such a formation that they had a close and early relationship with capitalism and green capital. Early relations with the capital resulted in the formation of such alternatives. However, we realized too late that the capital was such an important phenomenon within our fight. We have a natural fight with TÜSİAD; but we don't have an alternative against it. I doubt in their national aspect; for instance, Ali Koç says: "We can leave Cyprus". National capital in Turkey is failed or was destroyed. The businessmen do not think national enough, but this is not a new problem. Turkey is trying to establish a national industrialist class since the I. Meşrutiyet, but couldn't manage it. TÜSİAD is composed of mostly by 'White Turks'. This is why I and other ülkücüler are

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disturbed, and why we are in dispute with TÜSİAD. Some of the ülkücüler do not describe it that way. Although we couldn't establish a national bourgeoisie, we need a businessman identity, who maintains the cooperation of the nation with the business world. I imagine a business life where everybody practices necessary sacrifices. TÜSİAD is so far from doing this, they are too far; this is why we are in dispute. We couldn't establish a media organization such as Zaman Newspaper, which has hundred thousands of circulation. This is again because of wrong readings after 1980s, wrong analyses of the developments." (M19)

Expressions of two MHP politicians **(M5 ve M19)** are open to debate as they provide principles that are questionable in terms of validity of current or 'real politics'. Here, another debate subject might be, whether or not the content and generalizations in those expressions will be internalized or adopted by the MHP politicians. However, if the issue is discussed through an attribution to legitimization of 'current-real politics' analysis, the mentioned political philosophy might cause a series of dilemmas for MHP to be solved. The first dilemma, with respect to 'real politics', is the degree of accessibility to the global dynamics and the tension that will result because of the compatibility of the possible accessibility and nationalist ideology of MHP. It is also arguable that if the nation-state form, which is open to destruction and threat by the 'global dynamics' and the ideology of nationalism that gains a meaning (modern) within this form, can survive as a consistent and coherent ideology. Another questionable point is that whether or not the MHP and MHP politicians will integrate the current globalization period, as they are critical and suspicious about it.

Another MHP politician's expression, who criticizes economy and globalization, might point out this difficulty:

"Economy policy of the nationalist discourse is a little conservative; it requires equal share of the national income with justice; this is what the social order is. National assets should be controlled by national companies and should be shared equally by the society. We think that the sale of many national establishments to international bodies is not related with economy, but is related with politics; that is what we are opposed to. Some strategic sectors such as Telekom, defence industry, transportation, energy, should be controlled by a national hand

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completely, this might be the state or a company; but it should be controlled, produced by a national hand (…) The current capital in Turkey is not national capital, but is local capital. This capital is the agency, distributor of Western companies, in fact, of the global capital. There is no pure national capital. Capital should be nationalized as much as possible and the national assets should be controlled by national values, national companies (…) What we say is everything should be national. Please don't consider it in terms of race; it is about culture. Unless everything is for Turks, shaped for Turks, we can be nothing but a toy for the global actors." (M1)

To mention briefly, there are many similar statements within this expression when it is considered in terms of the aforementioned expressions. There is a point, although being open to the global dynamics, which is hard to be reduced on national ideological imaginations. Whether or not this case will be transformed into a political and ideological strategy, and whether or not it will cause an obstacle and separation within the party, can only be examined within the historical period. Another common point in two expressions is the meaning attributed to 'development of self-capital project', which is considered as the 'success' sign of the AKP.

The analysis, 'acknowledging' that the political and ideological success is possible through developing the self-capital, seems to affect the MHP politicians to a great extent. The two politicians, having businessman identity might be a reason for such an 'analysis'. In terms of their real politics philosophy, being successful in politics requires the repetition of an existing experience by creating another 'success story'. However, for MHP, this case might refer to a 'tragedy' and being late. Moreover, it is also stunning that those politicians structure the political identity through associating it with the material component (capital) and process (globalization).

### 4.3.2 SP Politicians and Conservatism

When SP politicians' descriptions about conservatism are examined, their definitions and evaluations imply to two major points. First, instead of conservatism, they

highlight the notion of **morality** [**maneviyat**] as one of the crucial components of National Vision ideology. Although sometimes the term or concept of conservatism is preferred and used by them, the main concept as an identity and ideology is "morality". As stated in the party program morality is:

> "Moral [ahlak] and morality are our leading flags (...) Moral development is crucial for our party. Morality is our unique difference among other thoughts. As a requirement of our morality, the discipline of soul is essential; other ideas without morality are slaves of their souls. Welfare can only be gained when material integrates with morality. Moral and Morality are fundamental for everything such as inner peace, serenity, freedom, justice, economic development, respect and the issues in a wide range; including defensing the country and minimizing the pressure on justice organizations" [Saadet Partisi Parti Programı][58]

The other major point is the criticism of conservatism as an 'imported notion'. There are two reasons in criticizing conservatism as an 'imported' phenomenon. *The first reason of* criticism is, because the notion of conservatism is alien to "this land", "our history" and "our culture", it does not imply something about "us". *Another reason*, which is mostly related with the above reason, is that the notion is generally identical with AKP and they would like to put themselves away from this position.

In this respect, just like the MHP politicians, they criticize conservatism on the basis of a sharp opposition to AKP. The desire to put a distance between the AKP and themselves sometimes results in a total rejection of conservatism of SP politicians. The strong content and the level of discourse of SP politicians sometimes reach to racism and even the hostility of foreigners on the basis of traditional Zionist opposition of National Vision discourse. This discourse accompanied by locality-authenticity notion and the hostility of foreigners, also includes the opposition to the USA and the West with a criticism of imperialism in a conspiracy manner.

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[58] "Morals and Morality" subject takes place in the second item of Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party] Regulations: "The party tries to realize the criteria mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights, major qualifications stated in the second item of the Constitution, by precisely practicing the individual rights and freedoms appropriate to the universal principles; and the material and moral development of the country on the basis of **"First through Morals and Morality"** notion." [Saadet Partisi Regulations]. see also Saadet Partisi "22 July 2007 Election Manifesto" p.25.

Respectively, *as an understanding of morality, as an imported notion and as a criticism of AKP's notion of conservatism*, the comprehension and perception of conservatism will be described in interwoven and comprised forms many times. One of the SP politicians states that he "doesn't like" the notion of conservatism and prefers to use "morality" instead; he values the notion and tries to live it as "a philosophy of life", "a way of belief" that he tries to tell about to the society. For this politician; SP, with National Vision tradition and similar parties are *in fact* the "parties" based on "morality". The politician mentions that one of the main differences between the parties from National Vision discourse and the other parties, is the meaning they attribute to morality. For this politician, a person might not differentiate them at once, but according to him conservatism and morality should be separated. Conservatism, in 'terms' of the AKP, is "an imported notion". For this politician conservatism is: "In fact, in Turkey, it is the politics that is *using religion*, while communicating the mosque community with their jargon, but also using other jargons whenever required, using other names and other people as well". Morality, on the other hand, is an understanding of politics exercised in the society and individuals' lives without using the religion; by "attributing its real meaning and value". According to the politician, "who describes the notion, without any hesitation, as an understanding of *religious politics*":

> "(…) in fact religious understanding of politics will add a lot to Turkey, it can keep the individuals and the society to be a subject on third page news. This is what I call as morality; what the moral development is. (…) If a person sees a rock on the road, its his duty according to Islam to take it and clean the road. This is what the faith is; one does this with the faith. This is morality and moral development. One realizes this because he/she is responsible to Allah. Fourty or fifty years ago the population of (X) was 60 thousand. In those days, when a merchant used to go home in the afternoon for a nap, he only left a chair at the entrance of the shop without locking the door, then came back after an hour and took the chair from there. Nobody used to enter the shop within an hour; now it is impossible to do that. Maybe this is a typical example, but moral development is something that each individual having the idea that he/she is not only responsible from himself but also from the other people in the society as well. Each person should respect others' rights. How can we manage this? We can manage this through our religion and religious training, this is the reality". (S1)

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In this politician's expression, morality is described as conservatism with socio-cultural content. There is also a criticism of "imported" ideology-notion of conservatism and the criticism of the AKP. According to this politician, we took the notion of "conservatism" and also the concepts of "right" and "left" from the West. For that reason, there are no correspondent meanings for them in our society. The same politician states that the "foreign powers" would like to constitute a dual party assembly in Turkey just like in the USA and England; the republicans on the one side and the democrats on the other. The identity assigned to the AKP is the "conservative-democrat and liberal" one and the CHP is assigned with the identity of "status quoist and having the essential values of the system". The politician says that "this is the whole story"; AKP "never objects" the role assigned to them and "plays an counterfeit game of conservatism". In this respect, as of MHP politicians he thinks that AKP politicians' understanding of conservatism is "far from sincerity". Within the following expression, he gives the clues of his understanding of conservatism:

> "(…) In this respect I don't think that AKP's notion of conservatism indicates preserving social traditions, beliefs and main values. This is an artificial concept that they used to specify their political spectrum or place; it is ambiguous. They have a book named conservative democracy; I haven't read it yet; but they have no serious studies to support it. They practiced the things that even Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People's Party] would not realize. The adultery is not an offense anymore; selling pork is an obligation in butcher shops; Ziraat Bankası lends credit for wine production. If you ask me if those situations correspond with conservatism or not; my answer is no, they don't. Consequently, those concepts are political jargons that can be used in daily life. I think we should examine the degree of a party on loyalty to its traditions, values, the values they have to preserve; then we can consider if it's a moral party or not " (S1).

While the central criticism is on the AKP, the expression repeats a typical notion of conservatism by highlighting the demand for preserving 'main' values based on tradition and faith. Some of the practices of the AKP that even CHP *cannot realize* do not correspond with conservatism. In this respect conservatism described with a social-cultural content and reactions, is the center object of criticism because no political action is developed appropriate to and consistent with the content.

Conservatism of AKP is questioned within this context. According to this politician the AKP, which is "Western and liberal", "cannot advocate conservatism" and their notion of conservatism "is not ideological, but is de facto". For him, in this respect AKP will "never" be a party of a certain ideology. For this politician only the National Vision parties and MHP have the conservative ideology party identity in Turkey. The statement of the politician is not a single example, as many of the SP politicians have similar statements.

According to another SP politician, all ideologies, except the National Vision; their descriptions and concepts, including conservatism, are "imported and foreign concepts that do not correspond to us". For this politician conservatism "is nothing but the religious values and their protection. To this politician, who does not "consider" himself or his party as conservative, if an identity "in any case" is necessary, for him the most appropriate one is "Muslim".

> "(…) the people in this geography have a conscious of ummah [ümmet] inherited from the Ottomans. Those artificial things were passed to this nation from the West to destroy the Ottoman society. I don't accept racism or such identifications and categorizations. " (S3)

The SP politician continues his expression with the AKP; for him AKP "neither could identify nor could reflect through its applications" that what conservatism is; rather they tried to prove what is not conservatism:

> "(…) He announced that he took the shirt off, but tried to prove himself to the dominant powers through certain activities that we've just mentioned about. Then he could keep none of his promises. However, if we use this expression, yes Turkey is conservative; at least 70% of the people are conservative and 30% is left-oriented. Meanwhile, when you observe the left-oriented people, you see them going to the mosque for Friday pray on Fridays with the ones called conservative; and you see their wives wearing headscarf. In fact, they have more appropriate trade relations than the conservatives and they are loyal to the religious values more than the conservatives are. My personal decision is that left-orientation, conservatism, liberalism are all imported concepts. In fact, it dates back to Tanzimat period. Because we were constituting political parties with the partisanship, the process should have been named

somehow, just like the concepts of conservatism, right or left. The confusion about the concepts still goes on." (S3)

It should be stressed that the main component of the SP identity is 'morality'. They sometimes use the concept of conservatism as well; however, it refers to 'morality', as a description form or substitution of the National Vision ideology. For a SP politician exemplifying the case:

> "I can describe my political identity through the National Vision and conservative line. Consequently, the main ideas of our party compose our political views as well. Especially someone like me, who worked at the party for years, wouldn't evaluate the case in a different way. I believe, what we mean by the National Vision matches with the decisions, imaginations of the majority of the people in Turkey, such as the right-oriented people. I think the National Vision and conservatism is a common ground where large masses in Anatolia meet on." (S10)

Another SP politician **(S4)** states that he doesn't understand what the AKP means about conservatism. He adds that the AKP neither understands nor tells properly to the people what conservatism is. For him SP is: "conservative in terms of preserving people's values, culture, past and belief." The politician highlights that they are not conservative in terms of the protection of the system and the state; they are "conservative on the basis of the nation and society; not the state". Most of the SP politicians, in their attempts to describe conservatism through social-cultural or ideological notions, use AKP criticism consistently. This is also valid for other politicians; however, it is a high tendency among SP politicians. For instance, for one of those politicians **(S5),** the main reason of using the notion of conservatism is "to confuse the voters in Turkey who have a tendency over the Nationalist Vision with an Islamic point of view". In this respect, the AKP, who is the "carrier of mild Islam project submitted by the USA", used the "conservative-democrat" notion in order to "achieve" the project.

For another SP politician, all parties that are considered as right-oriented and liberal in Turkey, protected conservatism as a value. In this respect, it is impossible to

considere AKP as "an original party"; it is "obviously a right-oriented party". For this politician *now* "conservative-democracy" is "the name of a structure that supports European Union, America and aims at sustaining the relations with Israel". This politician considers that the right and liberal ideologies in Turkey are similar to each other in terms of offending the same politics and protecting conservatism as a value; to him there are no major differences among them:

> "(…) In Turkey, all political structures with a conservative notion have the same mentality. All previous right-oriented governments, which were considered as conservative, are all the same. They had almost the same practices in national and international politics. The only difference is the names of the parties. If we call AKP with the name ANAP instead, there would be no difference; we can also call it Doğru Yol (Right Path Party) or Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party) They are all the same; that is they are partly liberal, they are the supporter of America and European Union in terms of international politics, they are the supporter of assembly industry in terms of industrialization, they defend importing foreign industry to the country, and such." (S22)

Another SP politician **(S8)** who also repeats that there are no major differences among the right parties and sometimes left parties in Turkey in terms of preserving and offending conservative notion. He adds that there is "a serious confusion of the concept". For him the parties from both wings "neither have an intellectual infrastructure nor philosophy to fill the meaning of the concept". According to this politician the idea and philosophy that will fill in the concept can only be found in the National Vision; and Saadet Party [Felicity Party] is the party that can *significantly manage* it. If conservatism means preserving the tradition, the only thought and political movement, who succeeded in *real essence* intellectually and practically, "is the National Vision that "roots back to our ancestors":

> "(…) when we check the history of our ancestors, the Ottomans; we see that the Sultan never allowed people to kiss his hand, even the German or Belgian governors. When the governors visit the Sultans, they used to kiss their hands. Once Sultan Abdülhamit replies to one of the governors as follows: "Who do you think you are to kiss my hand with alcohol in your blood? As long as I performed my ablution and you had alcohol I don't let you to take my hand." We are the grandchildren of Sultan Abdülhamit; who internalized conservatism. Now,

how can we think of being a member of European Union? Before, we used to make them kiss our stirrups; now we kiss theirs. How can you say that you preserve the Ottoman's values? You are paradoxical with your actions and attitudes. They used to stand against the West, but now you ingratiate yourself with them. Whereas Sultan Abdülhamit never sold a part of the land, "because the land, which is watered with blood can only be relinquished by blood". If you are a conservative, you have to preserve the tradition. In order to rule the country in justice, you have to stand against Israel, America, global imperialism and global Zionism. However, how can you manage this if your name is conservative and your surname is collaborator? Now we sometimes ask if those gentlemen, our 'brothers' perceive conservatism in terms of collaboration, as a substitute?" (S8)

This statement, imposing contradiction and incompatibility between conservatism and trying to be a member of European Union, should be highlighted by an accompany of the eliminative and arrogant 'proud notion'. Some statements in the above expression, such as 'before, we did not condescend them to kiss our hands by the West who had alcohol', today 'to kiss the stirrups' of 'the ones that we made to kiss our stirrups' and to ingratiate ourselves with the West that we used to stand against, are described as a contradictory and paradoxical situation of conservative standing with its attitude.

Holy Persecutedness or Synthesis [Kutsal Mazlumluk], the subject of Turkish right's ideological system, defined by Açıkel (1996:155): "in the history, there is the perception of tragic destruction and decline of its imperialist wills one by one. Starting with imperialist powers, minorities, non-Muslim trade bourgeoisie, intellectuals who are cosmopolitan and imitating Europe, Armenians, Ethnic Greeks, Jewish, adopted non-Muslims and masons are all responsible for the decline with different reasons" (Bora, 1995: 38-44, cited by Açıkel, 1996: 165).

According to Açıkel, understanding the perspective of Holy Synthesis through the imperialist past and history, will also contribute us to understand its future projection. It will also be beneficial to comprise the transition from the "historically wronged ideology" to the "manifestation of justice ideology" and the "will of

power". From this perspective, the subject of the Synthesis, its imperialist dreams and its persecutedness ideology are all *historical* (Açıkel, 1996: 165). SP politician's above expression almost equally comprises an empirical content of evaluations and comments within the framework of Açıkel's approach. The correspondence of the content of above statement and Açıkel's conceptualization is really stunning and meaningful; however, this statement, representing the SP ideology and discourse, also undoubtly reveals the disintegration-differentiation between the AKP and the SP. In this respect, the expression confirms that the SP and the AKP are the political parties, which represent notably different political and ideological discourses. The following expression of a SP politician might be considered as another basis for this evaluation:

"We describe the difference between the Justice and Development Party and us in three groups. First, we have no commitment to the USA; but during the separation period, the founders of the AKP had the following announcement: "The world is now led by one pole; so the world is under the hegemony of the USA. If we would like to serve Turkey, we have to cooperate with the USA". The current authorities of the AKP mentioned that they support being a member of the European Union; but we shared our complete rejection to the European Union by stating the incompatibility between us. Then, we approved this by establishing the D-8s in 1996-1997. We gathered 8 Islamic countries with a population nearly 100 million and established economic and political cooperations. We aimed at developing the establishment up to the D-60 level; in fact, if we could have done this if we were the selected party in the elections. The next target was D-160s, which are the oppressed countries, referring to approximately 5 billion of people in the world. Who are the oppressors? They are G-8s. There are people oppressing, exploiting the world via debt; who are 1 billion of people. Consequently, we are opposed to the global hegemonies, such as the European Union. In the name of the real politics, the AKP authorities cooperated with the USA, Israel and the European Union; by stating that it is the current world politics. Finally, we are opposed to the IMF. All the governments after 80s signed agreements that are the stand by agreements with the IMF. Only when we were the party governing the country, although the IMF authorities visited the country, the government didn't sign an agreement. In fact, our Hodja had the following expression related to this case: "We served them tea and sent them back away". A budget system, pool system was established without a connection to the IMF. The capital given to the fund holder and the debt was turned to the people. Consequently, it is against the IMF, because the world is exploited by the G-8s and especially controlled by the Zionism. There is a system in the world intervening the production by grasping the states and their

economies, preventing real economy, limiting the consumption, meanwhile a system that aims to guarantee the debt of the money with the surplus debt. We are against the IMF. The AKP authorities told that they will also cooperate with the IMF if necessary; of course, they didn't announce this to the people, they discussed it within the party. Now, they will cooperate with the IMF again. All the parties so far, except the National Vision parties, accept the American hegemony; they all support the European Union and the IMF. Consequently, if we evaluate the right, conservative or nationalist groups in Turkey, there is only one party thinking the purpose of the National Vision system, which is the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party). " (S7)

If the assumption that is the *disintegration* of two parties, is valid what does it refer to? With respect to its importance in Turkish politics, the National Vision tradition might be called as 'procreative', which forms the basis for the new political and ideological formations. Because of this aspect that is the 'procreativeness' of the tradition, it might generate a political roof. During the period that the study was conducted, another separation (HAS Party[59]-People's Voice Party) within the Tradition (the National Vision) occurred. However, it is not possible to predict whether it is a renewal or a separation within the Tradition.

Until the establishment of the AKP, the National Vision tradition –except the *breakdown* periods such as the junta and party closures- represented a political tradition through its unique ideological-political discourse and through a consistent, coherent and homogeneous organizational structure. With the establishment of the AKP, although the content and the roots of the mentioned separation was discussed before and is still being discussed, it should be emphasized once again that there is a separation-fracture between the National Vision and the AKP in all respects. The emphasis on separation-fracture does not mean the ignorance of the fact that the AKP takes its roots from the National Vision tradition. However, this case also allows the

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[59] People's Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi), abbreviated to Has Party, was constituted in November, 01, 2010 in Ankara. The founder is the President Prof. Dr. Numan Kurtulmuş. After nearly two years, HAS Party held an extraordinary congress on September 19, 2012, 'due to the termination of integration' was closed by the decision. HAS Party after termination, Numan Kurtulmuş, with many party members at a ceremony, held on September 22, 2012 joined the AKP. These developments seem to be verified to the above detections while this thesis was concluding.

determination of the two lines representing a separate ideological-political movement.

While trying to understand the separation and fracture, if we compose an analogy by naming the **remaining** unit (the National Vision) as the *whole* and the **separated** unit as the *part* (the AKP), then it is possible to state that the remaining insists on preserving the whole and stabilizing itself in all respects. The **T**radition (the National Vision) seems to maintain its stabilized condition in its ideological-political discourse. The Tradition having the 'procreative roof function', also points out the 'opportunities' and limitations in terms of social and political legitimization of the Islamic-Islamist politics in Turkey. The current social and political legitimization scales flex and embrittle the ideological, political and organizational structure of the Islamic-Islamist politics in Turkey. This flexing and embrittlement might allow the new political movements and it might diversify the political arena, but I would like to stress that this statement does not refer to a pluralist liberal optimism. The diversification in Islamist-Islamic tradition, with various perspectives, is a resource for the re-production of various types of conservatism. This type of diversity and movement might neutralize the democratic arena and the politics instead of enriching it. For the future of the **T**radition the following assumptions might be submitted; a) as much as it stabilizes itself it might continue its political existence within certain limits, b) it might continue to be a resource for new conservative movements and c) it might inactivate and disappear in time.

### 4.3.3 DP Politicians and Conservatism

When conservative perception of DP politicians is evaluated, aforementioned concept is defined through appealing a discursive content and notion with a strong nationalist emphasis. In this type of conservatism, which is described and perceived through a right-populist discourse with an obvious nationalist content, not only the loyalty to the national and moral values with "respect" to the religion and the

religious values, but also the loyalty especially to secularism and to "the principles and reforms of Atatürk", is emphasized. In this type of conservatism descriptions, political conservatism and conservatism with the social-cultural content are considered as interlinked most of the time. This is stunning as it highlights a problematic case appeared at the beginning of the study, which is the validity of the tendency to express the political conservatism not by a direct "political" content or concept, but by a social-cultural way for the DP politicians as well. In this respect, it significantly collaborates the right-conservative politicians.

Just like the MHP and the SP politicians, DP politicians define conservatism on the basis of an opposition to the AKP and through the AKP criticism. This is a way for the DP politicians to define their understanding of conservatism. Moreover, it also allows to understand their evaluations and approaches both about the AKP and about the center-right. With this perspective, they might be considered as making a kind of center-right analysis through both the AKP criticism and the center-right politicians' political evaluations about their own politics. That kind of an analysis does not always refer to a self-criticism, but it is important in terms of observing the self-evaluations of the center-right. Consequently, this part of the study is functional not only to understand the DP politicians' (political) conservatism, but also to understand the diversification within the right politics.

To a DP politician **(D1),** describing himself as a nationalist, nationalism is: "not to give in even a small part of the land to another country, to go back the old good days, to defend a life without any concern of hunger or future". Anyone, who agrees on these ideas and who is proud of saying "I am a Turk", is a "Turkish nationalist". This politician, who defines his political identity as being nationalist-conservative, "accepts globalization" "by defending a non-foreign liberal economy". For him conservatism is a "perception of life" and "a philosophy of life of large masses" in Turkey. This politician would especially like to emphasize, "Conservatism is not a notion which intervenes the people's lives"; and adds, "Nationalist conservatism never intervenes people's lives, but protects them against such attempts". In this

respect, if the center right parties and their nationalist-conservative understanding is evaluated; except "some unique cases", no extraordinary situation occurred so far. However, a part of the public "perceived" nationalist-conservative right parties "away from Atatürk nationalism or far from the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and his decisions". According to this politician: "except some practices of central parties, this is completely wrong. This case is not occurred. If there was such a case, this party could not have marked the last 25 years of the country and couldn't get the votes of the majority. This is our view of conservatism."

For another DP politician **(D12)**, who also describes himself as a nationalist-conservative, this notion refers to "a thought comprising the principle of nationalism and honesty, love of nation and flag". For this politician the DP is "a nationalist-conservative party", which reflects and defends these principles through its discourse and actions. For him it is impossible to support the parties who don't defend those principles and criteria, but who call themselves as conservative. The politician continues that parties, especially "the religious ones", do not defend *nationalism;* and according to him "people who are not nationalist, are not conservative either".

According to another DP politician **(D2),** conservatism is "living with our own folk song, melody and note" and it is "a life concept". According to this concept, "living all values of the country and nation, and loyalty to those values, is the summary of nationalist conservatism". Another DP politician, defining himself and his political identity as a nationalist-conservative, has the following expression, which can be considered as a high nationalist popular rhetoric:

> "(…) As I always said; the sound of adhan will always be in the sky and the flag will always wave on the pole in this country. We will always hear the sound of adhan and the flag will never descend from the pole. The reason to emphasize this is because Turkish Republican State *is a Muslim state*, practicing Islam; but we have to preserve our unity, indivisibility under this flag. The flag is the sole factor that gathers us; religion might also be considered in this respect as well. We all have to gather under this flag. We all have to be a Turkish

nationalist. Therefore, we are a political movement defending the mentioned points. In fact, the people on the party grassroots are also the ones who defend those ideas. " (D18)

It should be mentioned that the majority of the DP politicians have highly nationalist expressions similar to aforementioned statements. Although it is possible to say that the emphasis within the expressions is mostly on a nationalist expressionist rhetoric; however, it is not right to reduce it only to the rhetoric. It is not surprising that the center right ideology has a nationalist component (Demirel, 2004: 196-217), and also the members of this party have strong nationalist references. For instance, in terms of Kurdish problem, if the political practices of the DYP with the leadership of Tansu Çiller are considered, the nationalism of this tradition should not be realized as a breakdown tendency. Nevertheless, the strong and consistent emphasis on nationalism with high density, is stunning.

When the DP politicians correlate conservatism with the nationalist notion, there is a kind of 'Kemalist' notion of which they don't neglect to mention, and in fact they need to stress this notion with a certain caution. It is because, they would like to emphasize that the center-right does not lean to the Kemalist elite's attribution to secularism, which aims to remove religious/traditional values from the individuals by providing them a world free of religious norms (Demirel, 2004: 182). Religion constitutes a central place within the social order realization of the right. This tradition criticizes the superstitious beliefs, and does not prefer the religious norms to order all spheres of life. However, the central right considers that the religious values give a meaning to the individual's life and play a significant role to supply social control mechanisms to structure the order. (Demirel, 2004: 183). The central right approach believes that the practices in the name of secularism applied in the past, caused the violation of religion and freedom of conscience. One of the major missions that the AP assigned to itself is defending religion and freedom of conscience of religious people against such type of a secularism (Demirel, 2004: 184). The 'moderate', but not fundamentalist, objection of the official secularism of the central right compose one of its main characteristics. Nevertheless, the objection

of the central right to the official secularism and its radical culturalism in general, should not be determined as a fundamental opposition against Kemalism. In fact, the central right might be considered functionalizing this objection in two terms. First, by establishing a relationship with the 'silent conservative mass' and by joining them to the system. Then, maybe more significant than the former, by creating a balance between "Kemalism and the 'tradition' or among the things claimed in the name of the 'tradition' (Taşkın, 2007: 97)." According to Taşkın, the central right found the solution in "submitting the masses the fruits of the progress and in avoiding possible tensions caused by secularism or religious matters" (Taşkın, 2007: 97). Taşkın states that there was "the masses which were representing the threat of revenge of the 'tradition' against the republic, had no serious threat against the founding principles of the regime and the modernization project that is based on those principles." In contrast, "the success of the central right should not be underestimated in its support of written and didactic modernism attempt of Kemalism, which turned into more obvious targets and accepted by the masses (Taşkın, 2007: 96). As Taşkın mentions, the retrospective comments are not convincing in emphasizing the political polarization between the DP and the CHP as being developed on the axis of Kemalism/anti-Kemalism. In fact, the emphasis of the DP politicians on 'Kemalism' and secularism, which significantly differentiate from the other right-conservative politicians, might be evaluated in this respect. Moreover, while evaluating the National Vision and the AKP, the similarity of the language and style ('religious', 'fundamentalist', etc.) of the DP politicians with Kemalist discourse is spectacular. The statements of Hüsamettin Cindoruk in an interview, who is one of the leading figures of the central right, are crucial in terms of confirming aforementioned evaluations. According to Cindoruk, who describes the AKP as "a religious party", "their skeleton–backbone-bone is the continuity of the religious political idea" and "they transformed the community relations into political relations in Turkey"; "except some tiny oppositions Turkish society accepted all the reforms they performed" (Kurt, 2009: 33-34-39).

In his interview, in the part where he was examining the relationship of the AKP with the communities, he was reminded that the AP also had such relations in the past. His expressions about this point are interesting by providing information about the relational or functional structure of the center-right and Kemalism. He confirms that the AP had relations with the communities; however, they "balanced the relations" and "never surrendered an organization to the communities". Cindoruk legitimizes this relationship in political pragmatism and defines such structures as "romantic". As a liberal democrat he thinks that the communities should be "respected"; but they should "be kept within certain limits" "by the state authority" (Kurt, 2009: 40-41).

As mentioned above, the way the DP politicians define conservatism, just like the MHP and the SP politicians, is through the criticism of the AKP. Criticisms against the AKP, are attempts of self-thinking of the central-right. Even if there is a weak tendency, it sometimes comprises self-criticism as well. Consequently, here it is possible to get detailed and simultaneous information about the DP politicians' understanding of conservatism through their statements that are through the way the central-right evaluates itself and the way they perceive the AKP. Almost all the DP politicians agree that the AKP is not a center-right party. This agreement provides some clues both about the AKP and about what should be understood from the center-right politics. According to the majority of the DP politicians, it is not possible to consider the AKP a center-right party, as it derived from the National Vision tradition. Related with this, having an Islamist-Islamic or "religious" ideology is the proof that the AKP is not a center-right party and will not be either. In fact, for these politicians center-right is a political notion/tradition, which accepts *secularism* and the "principles and reforms of Atatürk" and which adopts the *regime and the system* without having any trouble with them. It is not possible for the AKP to represent the center-right, because they are assumed to have problems with those principles and values. Another point that questions and even invalidates the AKP's center-right notion, is considering them as a party being lack of a rooted tradition, culture and history. In this respect, it is not possible to allocate in the center-right in a short time

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without having roots. When the evaluations of the related statements are examined, for instance, according to one of the DP politicians **(D10)**, the AKP and their way of conservative-democracy is a "cover" to reach the voters of the center-right. Moreover, conservatism is inherited from the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) and Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), and is nothing but a means of "using religion". For another DP politician conservatism in Turkey is considered as "merely loyalty to the religious values", which is the same for the AKP. In this respect, the AKP is an "exploitative and exclusionary party". In fact: "according to our point of view conservatism is where the nationalists, religious people, democrats and even social democrats of the country meet and live in harmony. This is why we say that the Democrat Party means Turkey."

For a DP politician **(D13)** it is impossible for the AKP to be a center-right party; because it's a party that couldn't find its pathway yet. For that reason, the claim that they are a center-right party sounds "funny". For this politician the AKP owns "the National Vision view, but they try to camouflage this aspect". According to another politician **(D14)**, the AKP cannot manage to be a center-right party through establishing a link between the National Vision line and the AKP; it is "a political organization, which is the modernized version of the National Vision".

Another DP politician **(D1)** mentions that the AKP as a political movement, emerged with the support of the international conjuncture and in fact, with the support of "over ocean powers" and "incomprehensible coincidences". In this respect, "its national aspect is doubtful". Also, it is a "seasonal" party that cannot be a "deep-rooted center right party". For another DP politician **(D11),** who "never and ever believes in" that the AKP is a center-right party, the AKP is: "a party of the new world order, getting the support of the big powers. They are the representative of "the benefit groups, not the center-right masses". According to this politician: "It is a screen party of the fundamentalists and the radicals with a mildness mask. Somehow 'the big brother' specified a route and I consider that the AKP is playing its role on this route". Another DP politician **(D2)** the central right "has its real historical basis"

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and "is a huge political cultural tradition" penetrated to the society. According to this politician, although the AKP "quantitatively" pull the votes from the right, it can "never" be a center right party. Even this discussion is "nonsense" for this politician; because the center right is "a culture of life" [yaşam kültürü].

Below mentioned expression, with regard to the statements of the DP politicians so far, seems to be more 'sociological' and 'balanced' approach in terms of its style in evaluating the AKP and also in terms of its point of view about the center right and its consideration and analysis style of the conservatism:

> "Today the founders of the Ak Party are the ones wearing the old national Vision shirt. They are the conservative people who were raised at an extremely right political line by an extreme nationalist and conservative discourse. They obviously do not like the democratic secular order. The ones that I mention are the founders, leaders of the party. However, they did not come into power in Turkey with their past experiences and decisions. The society didn't prefer them because of their current decisions. They didn't say that 'we will enhance the conservative structure in Turkey and we will put the national Vision shirt on Turkey'; in contrast, they said 'we are taking the national shirt off and putting on the central right shirt'. The voters proportion of the central right decision in Turkey is between 60% and 70%. Such a huge mass is composed of the people in the center of the politics or people on the right of the center. What is the profile of the people in the center and on the right of the center; you should examine this profile as a sociologist. As a sociologist you might know that Küçükömer[60] defined these as periphery or [kıyı]. He says periphery, but I think he meant the majority of the people composing the center (...) What are the common points of the people on the central right, the ones who think like me. For instance, they want the modernization of Turkey. The people on the central right desire that Turkey to compete with the modern world and live with it. However, they also want to preserve the conservative values, family values, traditional values, religious values and its structure in Turkey; because the religion is an important phenomenon of the central right. It is also important for the fundamentalists.

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[60] "Center-periphery" and similar analysis frameworks, which were ascribed by the right-conservatives in their search for a political and ideological legitimacy, have a 'theoretical' function. The same function was also assigned to the political-ideological strategies. I think this case is interesting as it is transformed into a sociological paradigm. Similar to this politician, a remarkable number of politicians from the right-conservative sphere also referred to the same theoretical approach of this paradigm. I don't consider the case as an incidental condition. There is a brief emphasis on the subject here, as I will highlight the details in the "state-society" chapter of this study.

Religion gathers people, holds them in peace; it is an essential argument of central right people for the maintenance of life. Those people have moral values, but also the desire and aspiration of the development, modernization and a modern Turkey. They don't have a conflict with the democratic and secular regime. Now, as the Ak Party knows that, the people who desire a political regime other than a democratic regime will never be able to get the majority of the votes in Turkey, as the Ak Party knew that they won't be able to come into power with the votes of the majority, they had to change their discourse. They gathered with the people with liberal discourse, mentioned that they will make politics with an emphasis on center right, and asked the votes of the society. Unfortunately on these days, as you know, there was a gap, the center of politics was affected by the February 28 period, then by the economic crises. That was a complete counterbalance. Within this gap the citizens will vote a party somehow. At this point, I would like to stress that as the center right, we are sinful. Anyway, I don't think that the majority of the society voted for the Ak Party with excitement and ambition. Suppose that we sink in the middle of the sea, there is no boat, we hold on a stick; what else could we do? There was an election; the parties on the left wing were collapsed, the center right politics was also collapsed with defraudation, there was an economic crises, etc. They couldn't announce new issues to the society, they couldn't create new hopes. Then because the other parties were under the vote threshold, this party came into power. When this party came into power, they didn't take radical steps, such as changing the regime. We should talk about the reality. There might have been some desires in their subconscious, some wishes and some decisions that the majority of our society will not accept; however, they practiced no action which will constitute force and threats against the regime." (D15)

This statement should be evaluated for various reasons: although this expression is similar to other DP politicians' statements by the emphasis on the AKP and its authority's relation with the national Vision tradition; with respect to the results, the expression comparatively differs from the others. In contrast to the DP politicians, the AKP 'analysis-evaluation' of this politician is not in an alarmist manner. Whereas his evaluation indicates a shallow and popular criticism of the AKP, even though unwillingly, he/she confesses the preference and 'favour' of the center right mass by referencing some coherent reasons. Although 'restrained' statements of the politician points out a suspicion about the AKP's 'intentions', for this politician AKP's current approach "indicates no action forcing or threatening the regime". Another interesting point in the expression is, even though with a slight emphasis

and without mentioning the details, the responsibility ('we are sinful', 'defraudation', 'economic crisis', 'not be able to announce new issues to the society', etc.) of the center-right politics, which is misused, is somehow undertaken. As highlighted in the "Political Imaginations" part, the (self-) evaluation capacity of the central-right about itself is quite limited. While the erosion of the 'central politics' and the existing gap was emphasized, within this period as a political tradition, no direct or indirect critical evaluation about the responsibility was realised; or it was realised in a shallow form, in a way by attributing the responsibility to the external reasons.

When the expressions exemplifying the current limitations of 'criticism' are examined; for instance, for one of the DP politicians **(D5),** who states that the reason of power loss of the central right is the partial existence of this tradition. As long as the political factors do not gather, retrieval of its "previous power" and "its recovery is impossible". According to this understanding, which allocates the MHP as a part of the central right, **Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)** is the emerging point of ANAP, DYP, and DP, and there are no "significant differences" among them. However, their leaders' "passionate ambitions" "torn" the central right "up". 'Passionate ambitions' of the leaders highlighted the personal interests instead of the country, which resulted in heavy economic crises. For another DP politician the reason of "the crisis and the weakness" of the central right is "the low level of education and culture of the society", then the "large conservative masses, which were sentenced to poverty" *compulsorily* directed to the AKP. Those groups:

> "(…) always take place next to the powerful and the power, because they have a low level income. Voters, who are intellectuals, with good economic conditions always stand next to the leaders that they assume working for Turkey. Who are those people? Majority of them are from the left. Then, who resembles the other side? Its the right. Check the structure of the people from the right, check the sociological structure. This is exactly about your profession. You will realize more than the things I told you. Lately, no clear-cut ideology is being represented, such as the right and left. The people think that if they change the ruling power without a reason, if they vote for another party, they will lose the green card, financial support for heating, food, education, and the support from certain sources (fakir fukara fonu). They get financial support for agricultural investment and then use the support for other

purposes. Although the case is obvious, the government grants an amnesty and those people get all the money. Meanwhile if there is God given disaster, such as flood, hail bounce, etc., then they don't have to pay the support back to the government. Who are capable of doing this? Of course, they are the ones who are the ruling power. If there was no economic crisis in the year 2001, AKP couldn't have been in power now. Of course there are external reasons related with the US and European Union as well. (…) The problem of the center parties is that when we are in power everybody joins us. When we lose power, everybody leaves. However, the case is different in Saadet Partisi; it is home, a school. There is an understanding, a notion that the party serves like a school and has appropriate supporters. Our voters are different. They chose the ones whom they consider as rightful, who provide stability. That is to say, our voters are selective. They definitely punish us when we make mistakes, as a matter of fact, they did so. However, the voters of Saadet Partisi, the stabilized voters of the AKP and the CHP voters don't apply such a punishment." (D10)

This statement calls attention to its description of the center right mass and evaluations of the mass. The mass, which is lack of education and culture, is also "sentenced to" *poverty*. 'Sociological' aspects of the right-conservative mass are interesting in picturing the political choice of this mass next to 'the powerful one'. As described, this mass does not have implicit rational political choices. It has a political standing based on gaining benefits. In an environment where no ideologies with 'sharp lines' exist, the mentioned mass supports the ones who are capable of keeping their benefits. Finally, according to this statement, this voter group, constituting the main base of the center-right, "definitely punishes" the central right if they "harm the stability" and "make mistakes"; and consequently "they did so". It is intriguing in its rational by introducing an explanation about the power loss of the central right and also about the background information how the AKP emerged.

When the evaluations of the MHP, SP and DP politicians are examined, even when conservatism is centeralized; a political diversity, perhaps a split in Turkish right-conservative is possible to be discussed. To stress once again, one of the poles of this diversity or split is represented by the AKP and the other is represented by the other ideologies. It should be mentioned that the pole, other than the AKP, does not represent a complete structure. It is clear that all units of this pole face some political

and ideological problems, especially the survivability and legitimization problem over against the AKP in terms of politics. In this respect, the AKP might be considered as the hegemonic center of the right-conservative politics. If there is any validity of these arguments, deciding on possible political implications and its results requires other studies and comments.

# CHAPTER 5

## DISCUSSION ON NATIONALISM-ISLAMISM AMONG THE POLITICIANS

It is not adequate to evaluate the diversities and similarities of the right-conservative parties and politicians merely on the axis of conservatism. As mentioned above, conservatism axis or the meaning attributed to conservatism, though introducing essential disintegration and correspondence points, other ideological and discursive aspects diversify and correspond the right-conservative tradition. Similarities or differences are not based on a pure, absolute or generic conservatism ideology. In other words, the differences and similarities among the right ideologies and politicians are determined through a particular articulation type of conservatism with nationalism, religious ideology (Islamism) or 'liberalism' etc. This case 'instabilizes' the current form of conservatism; however, enables it to articulate with other ideologies as well. Of course, this statement does not require the ignorance of the specific distinctive features of Islamism or nationalism as an ideology. However, one point that was remarked since the introduction of the study should be highlighted here. Against all its specific forms, it is not possible to discuss or understand the Turkish right free of an articulation of these forms with each other. For instance; according to Aktay, who evaluates the relation between conservatism and Islamism: "Rightist, nationalist and conservative balances within the political discourse of Islamism could never have been adjusted and those balances conjecturally enabled these ideologies meet Islamism quite easily" (Aktay, 2003: 346). For Aktay, who describes conservatism as the "possible and legitimate language of Islamism": "For Islamism, of which the legal basis was completely repealed in the Republican period, conservatism was the most valid and legitimate way to introduce itself" (Aktay, 2003: 349). Whereas this is comprehensible in terms of a legality or legitimacy search, as Aktay mentions it is not adequate to describe an "easy meeting" of

Islamism with rightism, nationalism and conservatism. The point enabling the right-conservative block as a whole and assigning it as "powerful", might be the balances "that couldn't be adjusted" by the aspects of this block or the relation itself[61]. In this context, when conservatism is considered as an ideology open to be articulated, the relations structured or couldn't have been structured between the phenomena of nationalism and Muslimness (Turkishness-Muslimness or Turkishness-Islamism) or the importance or priority attributed to those phenomena must necessarily be questioned.

If the relation between nationalism and Muslimness or the essence and priority attributed to those notions are assigned as the only criteria to describe conservatism, it might cause ambiguities or difficulties to determine the ideological and political differences. Actually, this might be perceived in DP politicians' 'sharp' nationalist statements for conservatism. For instance; DP politicians' definition of conservatism highlighting nationalism as the dominant ideology or MHP politicians' sensitivities about the religion or religious culture, might exemplify the aforementioned articulation. In order to determine the diversities within the right-conservative tradition, also to understand and see the articulation types between the two ideologies, the politicians were asked some questions. They were asked to define their perceptions and understanding of the relation between nationalism and Muslimness, how they evaluate the ideology/phenomenon and if any hierarchy among them could be structured. When the answers are evaluated irrespective of political parties, two situations could be extracted that is common among the politicians.

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[61] This determination requires the discussion of "maturity" issue of Islamism as a specific ideology. The evaluation that Islam dissociates from nationalism, rightism and conservatism, is debatable. It remains unclear to what extent the general attitudes of the Islamic society or their evaluations about some incidents such as the Bloody Sunday [Kanlı Pazar] and Sivas Massacre [Sivas Katliamı], differs from the rightists and nationalists. To illustrate this uncertainty, although a caricatured representation, the news and comments on some newspapers such as Vakit, Akit, etc., are noteworthy. For an essay which evaluates the news and comments of the mentioned newspaper please see Menderes Çınar, "Akit Gazetesi: Şer Güçlere Karşı Ateş Hattında" in *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık*, Dipnot Yayınları, Ankara, 2005.

The first associated situation is a) *the rejection of nationalism, which is described with racist-nationalist (ethnic) content (nationalism-Turkishness or Turkism) with reference to the religion of Islam*, then the other is b) *the rejection of the hierarchy between those two phenomena (religion and nationalism or Islam and Turkishness)*[62]. If the value, importance and priority attributed to those two notions are considered, the significant differences among the politicians and the ideologies will be perceived. Associated with this, the political and ideological differences about the main subject get relatively more obvious. The value, privilege, essence and priority assigned to those factors present and highlight the content and differences of the ideology and discourse. The same attributions assign the name, adjective and description criteria of the political and social identity. Ideological and discursive differences enable to comprehend the social and political identity definitions (nationalist, muslim, conservative-nationalist, rightist, religious, liberal, central-right, etc.), and also how party members/parties see, perceive and describe each other. Although not a common state-manner among the politicians, a separate and obvious state should also be mentioned.

This state is a criticism of both *nationalism* and *Islamism* as an ideological position to the extent of possessing an absolute character of the membership of a party. In other words, the politicians representing this position participates the discussion of nationalism- Muslimness neither by considering the racist-ethnicist [kavmiyetçi] content of nationalism nor by regarding the establishment of the possible hierarchy between those notions. Without considering or emphasizing these discussions, they directly criticize nationalism or Muslimness, in fact, criticize the politics that centralize Islamism or religion as an ideological-political position. This topic will not be evaluated here as it will be emphasized during the discussions of right-conservative politicians' perspectives and perceptions about each other.

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[62] Both of the situations correspond an old and important historical debate between Islam and nationalism. For a study analyzing the current and historical perspectives of the 'eternal and forever' debate between Islam and nationalism please see Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik", in *İslamcılık*, Vol VI, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, ed. Yasin Aktay, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004.

Before mentioning the details of these discussions, some observations and evaluations will be submitted about the reflections and approaches of the politicians against the question on nationalism and Muslimness. Some of the politicians did not answer the questions about these notions "intentionally", because they consider the questions as "intentional", "diversive", "malevolent", "meaningless" and "unnecessary" or some of them answered the questions reluctant and unwillingly. Though such reactions against the questions perceived mainly among the central-right politicians, there were some AKP politicians and few other party politicians as well.

Politicians with the center right conservative identity (from DP and ANAP), with a common tendency, stated that "they don't have adequate information about these issues" and rejected to answer the questions because "there is no use or there will be no use in talking these issues for the society", and because the questions are "ideological", "meaningless" and "unnecessary". Although the possible reasons for asking the questions were submitted, sufficient data and information related to this subject couldn't have been collected from the center-right politicians. Whereas this aspect is assumed to be a partial weakness for the study, it is possible to understand the central-right politicians' approach to some extent. Nationalism- Muslimness discussion for the center-right, as mentioned by some of the DP politicians, is actually an "ideological" issue. As long as the central-right ideology does not assign the nationalism- Muslimness discussion as a *central* subject, it will remain as a ***subsidiary*** issue.

In this respect, to reach and use/functionalize (with an emphasis sometimes on nationalism or on Islam) the 'feelings' of the conservative masses within the daily-popular imagination of the center-right politics, might be a means but not with an 'ideological' purpose. Moreover, service based-instrumentalist political imagination of the central-right is also effective in this. Otherwise, the statement indicating that the subject matter is "meaningless, unnecessary and not useful for the society-nation", cannot be explained within the study. Some of the AKP politicians hesitated

to answer the question by stating similar reasons of the DP politicians. Some of the AKP politicians with the similar attitude mentioned that I was asking "ideological questions" and they are not sure whether those questions "will be beneficial for the society-nation". However, I think the distinction between the AKP and DP politicians' attitudes might be a defensive reflection. The AKP politicians, hesitating to reduce conservatism merely to nationalism or religion, might be in a defensive reaction of 'conservative-democrat' identity-ideology against those aspects. Aforementioned reaction seems to refer that AKP's current ideological identity does not correlate with the two notions within the question. It might also mean that those notions are not an ideological definition or distinction criterion for their party *anymore*. Those reactions might be a result of the discussions against the AKP, such as rooting back the National Vision tradition, validity of its identity and 'real purposes' of the party. Thus, one of these politicians replied the question as follows **(A7)**: "'conservative-democrat' notion cannot be understood via a reference only to nationalism or religion. The distance of the notion to nationalism and religion is equal to each other. Nationalism, Muslimness, conservatism of our party are all new and distinctive constitutions, and neither of them could be understood by defining a sole meaning to them. Consequently; sorry, but I think such discussions are unnecessary and meaningless. Those topics are not in our agenda." Despite of this case, except the DP politicians, the number of the politicians who answered the question without any reaction is higher than the others. This might be considered as an indication that the questions are 'legitimate' for the politicians. When the answers and evaluations are examined, it might also refer to the importance or 'vitality' of the discussion. As mentioned above, irrespective of political parties, there are two points associating the politicians in the questions about the relationship between nationalism and Muslimness. The first is the rejection of nationalism based on race and ethnicity, with reference to the Islamic doctrine.

Whereas this position unites the politicians, it does not constitute an obstacle against the expression of different reasons or attitudes. For the AKP politicians, nationalism is described-arranged on the basis of race, but rejected in terms of Islamism. Besides

a definition based on race-ethnicity, it might lead the rejection of other types of nationalism, such as "cultural nationalism", which is defended mostly by the MHP politicians. Though it is not named through "cultural nationalism" or a similar expression, most of the time different nationalism types of which the descriptive names or determinants are ambiguous, are rejected or their legitimacy is questioned majorly by the AKP and SP politicians. Such nationalism descriptions, which are mostly attributed to the MHP and their understanding of nationalism with various views and aspects ("racism", "ethnocentrism", "authoritarian", "fascist", etc.), are heavily criticized. However, AKP and SP politicians' critical approaches do not refer to a total rejection or critical standing against nationalism or nationalist ideology(ies). The criticism of nationalism as attributed or perceived, does not prevent the (re) production of different nationalism types. In fact, both AKP and SP politicians' notion of nationalism is mentioned on above descriptions. Moreover, the MHP politicians strongly oppose the determination of nationalism on race-ethnicity basis and they structure their opposition by referring the Islamic doctrine and its source [Quran]. In this respect, at first sight, there is no significant difference between the MHP politicians and the other politicians.

Even though the relation or discussion[63] that should be established between the religion and nationalism seems to be relatively resolved in party ideology within the

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[63] Until the midst of 1960s, as the precessor of the MHP, Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (CMKP) (Republican Peasant's Nation Party) defensed secularism, then this manner started to change in time. Alparslan Türkeş and CMKP spokesmen assigned Islamism "as an inherent aspect of Turkish history". In 1969, Türkeş announced his formulation that "Tanrı Dağı kadar Türk Hira Dağı kadar Müslümanız" [We are Turks just like the Mountain Tanrı and muslims just like Hira Mountain]. According to Can and Bora, the "change" in the CMKP is caused by the conjonctural inspiration of the Muslim masses gathered with anti-communist provocations and slogans, and by the consideration of the popularization possibility of this potential within the long term development. According to the writers, the emphasis on Islam was instrumental both with its political incentives and ideological content: Islam was considered as enhancing Turkishness and consolidating factor of national identity. Meanwhile, this emphasis was assigned as secondary implicitly – "the main" issue was again Turkishness. Adana Congress, constituted in 1969, marked a turning point. The name of the party was changed from CMKP to Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). After this congress, the ones out of the moderate line represented by Türkeş, were either eliminated or marginalized. Nihat Atsız and his followers, that are soy Turkists, opposed to "ümmetçilik even though it is instrumentalist and "associated with Turkishness". This group was eliminated from the party until the midst of 1970s (Bora ve Can, 1991: 54-55). The position of Islam or the discussions and emphasis on the differentiation of its functionality after the September 12 coup, though was not the only reason, caused

historical context, MHP politicians' ideology still reserves race-ethnicity emphasis in various types. However, the way of emphasis might stand ambiguous. MHP politicians "strongly reject" the "ascriptions" of nationalism attributed to themselves based on race-ethnicity. They always try to 'correct' and 'refute' the "ascriptions", "innuendos" and sometimes the 'accusations' attributed to themselves. While answering the "accusations", MHP politicians blame AKP and SP politicians being far from "Turkishness" and "nationalism". They also blame them by "to do ummah" (ümmetçilik yapmak), and even being an enemy to Turkishness and Turkish nationalism.

Another factor associating conservative politicians is the reaction against the hierarchy establishment between nationalism and Muslimness. It was mentioned that any kind of hierarchy (priority-recency, essential-more essential, etc.) between those two phenomena would invalidate the meanings of these notions, as they are not available for a hierarchy and comparison. Although these attitudes unite on literal and abstraction level, some differences might be found if the subject is evaluated in details.

According to the politics and ideology of the politicians, these differences are especially visible in their descriptions of political-social identities. However, it would be noteworthy to mention that the issue is interesting. Whereas the establishment of hierarchy between nationalism and Islamism in literal and abstraction level is often rejected, de facto hierarchies are structured as a manifestation form of the political identity. Irrespective of political parties any politician might define himself with a combination of the following terms; "Muslim and Turk", "Turk and Muslim", only "Muslim", only "Turk", only "Turkish Nationalist", only "Nationalist", etc. Of course, those varied identity definitions do not depend on an observation to be generalized to all politicians. Uncontroversial

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a split within the party and then the Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party - BBP) emerged. For the discussions on the position of religion and religion-nationalism and ideology within the MHP and Ülkücü Movement after the Coup, please see Tanıl Bora ve Kemal Can, *Devlet ve Kuzgun 1990'lardan 2000'lere MHP*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004. pp. 41-66 ve 159-196.

identity declarations are often perceived when a politician expresses his loyalty and consistency to his ideological framework. However, despite of the rejection of a hierarchy within the discourse, some type of hierarchies can be constructed on certain levels in terms of the emphasis and classification.

The way the notions of nationalism and Islamism are approached and evaluated enables to see the differences and similarities of the political ideologies and identities depending on parties. It also provides information about the politicians' point of view, form of evaluation, their labeling, descriptive names and adjectives that they use to describe the other parties. Related with the party that the politicians belong to, they call the other parties and politicians by certain names and expressions such as "pious", "şeriatçı (follower of sharia)", "nationalist", "nationalist-conservative", "racist-ethnocentric", "liberal", "rightist", "Turkist", "ümmetçi", etc. This subject is briefly pointed out here, as it will be highlighted in the section where the politicians evaluate the differences of the right tradition. It will be more appropriate if aforementioned situations are evaluated within the framework of the expressions respectively. To start with the first statement:

## 5.1 Rejection of Definition of Nationalism within Race-Ethnicity Context through Islamic Doctrine

One of the AKP politicians **(A30)**, states that it is wrong to evaluate the human beings only through their colors, languages and religions; their life styles, living styles and preferences do not matter, people should be valued as a human being first. With an attribution to the Prophet Mohammed's last speech: "any kind of racism is under my feet" expression, he states that his sense of nationalism is far from the notion of "racist nationalism". He mentions that he can "never" correlate nationalism and Islamism and states that racism is being masked through some formulas such as by a synthesis of those notions. For him: "(...) how will you stop racism by a synthesis of the notions, by imposing nationalism to the religion with external

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interferences? I am not concerned with such syntheses. I have no idea about a synthesis or something similar to this".

According to another AKP politician, Turkish nationalism "should not be based on ethnic origin. The one, who feels himself as a Turkish citizen, feels commitment to Turkey and says I am from Turkey, is a nationalist. This is my notion of nationalism. Allah created no superior race while creating the human beings. This is my point of view." **(A29)** Another AKP politician stressing that anyone who reads the Holy Quran will easily perceive that Islamism and nationalism can never associate with each other. For him the nationalists in Turkey also think so. He states that he trusts their sincerity because they believe in Quran and adds:

> "In this respect, I don't consider that the nationalists in Turkey as fascists. Maybe there are some fascist components partially. I mean the notion of fascism existing in Europe. I don't consider the nationalists in this country as racists and it's because of religion. It's because Islam rejects the separation of people on the basis of race. First of all, Islam does not assign any superiority on the basis of race. For instance, there is a conservative majority within the MHP. Islam does not and cannot accept nationalism based on ethnicity." (A26)

According to a MHP politician, rejecting nationalism based on race: "In A'raf Surah, Alak Surah, Fatır Surah[64] of the Holy Quran those issues are clearly described. The human being is created variously, equipped with certain rights". For this politician: "people have the right to live with their diversities, to improve and defence themselves, which are legitimate. Those things cannot be prevented. Defencing the diversity might be on individual and also societal level. Its expression in terms of society is nationalism". In this respect nationalism is "the existence of a society and continuation of its existence by improving itself". For the politician, expressing his notion of nationalism as above, the existence and survival of a society is possible through *cultural consciousness*. Nationalism is: "Spreading this consciousness to the masses; the decision to sustain it". For him:

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[64] There is no direct or indirect relation between the subject and the surahs and verses that the politician emphasized. For the details of the mentioned surahs, please see *Kurân-ı Kerim ve Açıklamalı Meâli*, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2002, Ankara.

"Turkishness and Islamism are not opposite concepts; Islam is a religion, Turkishness refers to a nation. I don't mean the race, Turkishness has never been the name of a race. Rather than a race, ethnic origin, Turkishness is a cultural identity. The best expression belongs to Atatürk: "Happy is the one who belongs to here". The reason he said "Happy is the one who says I'm a Turk" is because it is the one who says "I also belong to this group". This is a cultural origin for Atatürk as well". **(M1)**

A MHP politician **(M2)** describes nationalism as "loving the nation and calling the ones with this decision as nationalist". The politician adds: "Allah created various types of human beings. There is a verse, Allah says: "I created you clan by clan, tribe by tribe to meet you with each other. When we structure nationalism on this it is possible to reveal something real. There is no sharia, no fundamentalism, no racism in this. **According to our belief racism is definitely forbidden**". This politician states that it is not possible for him to defend any notion that is forbidden by the belief. For him the nationalism notion of MHP is "cultural nationalism". This politician never accepts a notion of nationalism related with blood, which depends on race: "Yes, I'm a Turk, thanks to Allah. I thank Allah because of creating me as a Turk. His notion of Turkishness is not an idea superior over another **nation** or another **race.** Because the issue is not clearly defined some problems occur in Turkey nowadays. " **(M2)**

A MHP politician, stressing his "proud" of being a Muslim as a Turkish nationalist and a Turk, is opposed to the deviation of those two 'notions' to the extremes:

"(...) We evaluate Turkishness and Islam without deviating them to the extremes. When we say Turk, we don't check the blood or the skull. We've been living in the same geographic region for years. We dance at the same wedding party, we listen the same mevlid, we perform the same semah. We established our culture together; whoever constitutes this culture refers to us. That is to say, there are people who live in the borders of our country, but migrated from other countries. There are also religious minorities, but we call all those people as Turk. We are Turks first. We are in a nationalist and conservative structure, where Muslim religion takes place within the tradition. Our religion condemns the considerations based on blood and race. This is why we don't value such things". (M6)

A SP politician, stating that human being cannot choose their ethnical origin and race, only Allah can decide this; but human beings may choose their religion. Allah would have created him as an Arab, a Gypsy or Kurd, but created him as a Turk. He is proud of the "appearance" of Allah's appreciation, the services of his ancestors provided so far and assigning him as a member of his society. He stresses that it doesn't mean "being arrogant" or being superior over the other societies. According to this politician:

> "It is not possible for me to choose my race. If I was a German, should I be a Nazi? Of course, our prophet has a saying about that: 'There is no superiority of Arab over non-Arab or Persian; superior is in takva (devotion). If we explain what takva is in details, it is the one who afraid of Allah most, but is a good person at the same time. Superiority is being a good person. Otherwise, if a person is a Turk and cheats on people, there is no use, no value in this. I visited Çanakkale; thousands of people, even from Afghanistan, came and fought in the war. They came here for a common emotion, not for a fight against the Turks. The collapse of the Ottomans and emergence of the nation states is the result of those nationalist, racist movements. Of course, we are opposed to nationalism with an attribution to racism." (S4)

Another SP politician *definitely* opposes to the description of nationalism in terms of keeping distance with the people in the world and in the country. He is also against a definition based on superiority over someone or "considering" superiority of a particular race. He states that "all human beings are servants in the presence of Allah; nobody is superior over the other, or nobody is below or above the other. If that was true, Arabs would be more superior than the others as they have kinship ties with the prophet; however, Islam "strictly rejects" this. For this politician, if there is something "perhaps" rendering Turks superior, that is "the preservation of common values and the virtue of solidarity". For him:

> "Living on the same land, helping each other when we are hurt, that is what makes people attach to each other. Consequently, if we consider in this respect, it is something necessary to improve the welfare of the people. It is not opposed to the religion, even supported by the religion through certain arguments; such as if one dies while defending the country the case is called as martyr. However, if we evaluate the meaning of nationalism through some superiority, then the decision does not comply with the religion." **(S24)**

The following expression is distinctive in terms of presenting Islamic-Islamist ideology of a SP politician about ethnicity-nation and religion relationship:

"There is a strong and important verse in the Quran saying that: "We did not leave anything out of Quran". Therefore, we search the answers of our questions first within the Quran. If I answer the questions through my rational gift, then 70 millions of different type of Islamic notions emerges in Turkey. You will state your decision, Mr. Muhammed will share his decision through the expression 'according to me', then Osman, Ali and Mehmet will state their own decisions as well. There should not be an answer indicating, "according to me"; what should be then? There is Quran and Sunnah to apply that is our tradition. It is a spiritual order and norm. We search the answer within this. Allah says in the Holy Quran that: "I made you into tribes so that you may meet each other. The most honorable of you to Allah is the one who has Taqwa [piety]." What is taqwa? It is the degree of the fear from Allah. That is why we were created as Kurds, Turks, Circassians, Laz and Arabs. As you'll appreciate none of us sent a letter of request to Allah saying that "Dear Allah, please create me as a member of an Alewi - socialist family in Sivas as a Turk". Allah created us with his own will and desire as a Turk, Kurd, Arab, Circassian. Thus, there is no meaningful explanation of assigning superiority over something, which is out of our control. It's not on your own control. 'Someone who is saying I'm a nationalist and I'm a Turkist', has not created himself as a Turk. So, it's not possible for me to attribute any superiority where Allah appreciates the case. (…) The concept of Turkism is emerged with Tekinalp in Turkey. I can tell the infrastructure in details, but I will not go into this. His name is Moiz Kohen in fact and he is a Jewish. How a disease like racism was diffused in Turkey? How would deep powers separate Turkey or geography of Ottomans composed of seventy-two and half nations? They could have separated them only through emerging racist diseases, racist maladies or problems, or they could form the infrastructure through creating such decisions. They said: "Turkishness resembles the humanity, Allah awarded Turks with glory and honor, then Turks survived the Ottomans for 600 years. The Ottomans ruled the world. Thus, Turkishness or being Turk means being superior". Following this, the ones who established the Turkish Republic said: "Turk! Be proud, work and trust", "A Turk equals to the world", "I'm a Turk, I'm right, I'm hardworking". The statements starting through such expressions implicitly lighted nationalism and racism. Our honorable Erbakan Hodja criticizes this in his speech in Bingöl: "If you say, I'm Turk, I'm right, I'm hardworking; then the Kurd will also say, I'm Kurd, I'm right, I'm hardworking. If you say happy is the one who says I'm Turk, then he/she says happy is the one who says I'm a Kurd". We have a common ground, we are ummah, ummah of Islam; our ground is the emergence of the belief that "faithful muslims are brothers". There is no difference among us; you are a Turk, me as well. You might have been a Kurd or

Gypsy; however, if we share the same ideals and are fed from the same book and sunnah, it means there is no difference between us. ” (S8)

This expression is meaningful and spectacular both by its indirect reflection of the Islamic perspective about the nation, nationalism and Islamism concepts and the relationship among them, and also by its reflection of the subject in a well-coordinated manner. This expression is distinctive by not only its rejection of Islamic nationalism on race-ethnicity axis, but also its rejection of nationalism as a whole by emphasizing “ummah” phenomenon. Whereas in other expressions nationalism is excluded on race-ethnicity axis with reference to Islam, they somehow accepted it as a commitment to the cultural and social values or as an inevitability of *a priori* allegiance. However, in this expression while the commitment to **ummah** and **Sunnah** is strongly emphasized, any kind of attribution to allegiance is whether excluded or no value is attributed to it. In the light of the above points, the expression suggests a sharp criticism of nationalism from an Islamist point of view, and perhaps suggests its rejection.

If the notion of nationalism according to the AKP, MHP and SP politicians is emphasized again, it is a phenomenon accepting nationalism on race and ethnicity basis, but rejecting its reference to Islam. However, it is not exclusionary and is not assigning any superiority; it is considered as normal with a relatively equitable imagination. Meanwhile, the last expression **(S8)** indicates a case completely rejecting the nationalism based on a commitment to **ummah** and **Sunnah** principles. Of course, such determinations are limited and valid only for the statements mentioned here. Other cases about the subject also require different evaluations. Approaches considering the relation between nationalism and Islamism as the rejection of possible hierarchy establishment will enable to evaluate different perspectives.

**5.2 The Rejection of Hierarchy Establishment between Nationalism and Islamism**

The politicians might be considered in two different situations according to their replies to the questions whether a hierarchy between nationalism and Islamism can be established or not, or which aspect is more important than the other. The politicians either rejected the establishment of such a relationship between two concepts or emphasized the difficulty of a comparison. However, in either case they somehow did not avoid making various assessments. As mentioned above, for the politicians representing both of the situations, although a rejection of hierarchy is required literally and it is difficult to give importance-priority to one of those phenomena, it seems possible to say that some type of hierarchies between the two notions are actually established.

AKP politicians seem to be in three different positions in this respect, which can be classified as:

- Either rejecting the hierarchy between Islamism and Nationalism or considering them as equal,
- Emphasizing Turkishness,
- Positions emphasizing Islamism.

For instance, for an AKP politician **(A29)** it is not right to make a distinction between Islamism and Turkishness. According to the politician as long as no type of nationalism is formed on ethnic origin, whoever feels himself a Turkish citizen, who is deeply committed to, whoever says I am *from Turkey*, is a Turk and nationalist. "He doesn't *also* want to say Turkishness is superior" and he adds, "No race is created as superior by Allah".

An AKP politician, who is close to *Turkishness* among Nationalism and Islamism states the followings:

> "If I use the resources of the Turkish Republic, if it provides me everything I have now and provides me to live on its land; this is what makes me proud of being a Turk. Then comes the Islamism. This is my opinion. I'm a Turk, but I might have been a Christian, but I chose Muslimism, I am Muslim. It is wrong that people think of Islamism before being a Turk. I am a Turk then a muslim." (A28)

According to a AKP politician, mentioning that he/she can explain the relation between nationalism and Islamism through his observations of his party members, "AK Party has a heterogeneous structure". There are both "more nationalist and more Islamic people" within this structure. However, against this heterogeneity, the essential point for everyone is "sensitivity about Islam, religion and religious values":

> "(...) I believe religion is a crucial factor. It will be paradoxical, but the people in Turkey are not religious. They are not religious, but ask the respect against religion. That is to say, even the person is not religious; he/she doesn't want any criticism against the religion. The first factor is religion. Many of the surveys in Turkey indicate that people first call themselves as Muslim or Muslim Turk. Even the ones, who describe themselves as Turk, say that they are Turkish Muslim or Muslim Turk." (A26)

If the statements of three AKP politicians are evaluated respectively, the first statement **(A29)** relatively reflects a balanced case between two phenomena; while rejecting nationalism with ethnic origin, accepting the notion of nationalism based on allegiance of Turkishness and *being from Turkey*. The second statement **(A28)** presents another position being open to Turkishness. The last statement **(A26)** while not indicating a strong emphasis, points out a position more apt to Islamism.

When MHP politicians' statements are evaluated, just like in the case of the AKP politicians, there are three positions to be mentioned. According to the first tendency, instead of a hierarchical sequencing indicating priority-recency between nationalism and muslimism, there is a position accepting the two notions as **equivalent** to each other. MHP politicians in this position often stress the metaphors such as "body-soul", "finger-nail" and the motto of the MHP, which is "we are Turks just like the

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Mountain Tanrı and muslims just like Hira Mountain". Whereas an *equivalent* relationship between nationalism and Muslimness is provided, there is another position mentioning that *the main aspect providing a meaning to Turkishness is Islamism, indicating historical-empirical "witnesses" to prove that it could not be possible for a "Turk" to preserve its existence without Islam*. Although it is rare, through an attribution to equivalency, if it is right to say, another position is the one 'pointing' more 'on' *Turkishness* or *nationalism*. It should be mentioned that those positions indicate subtle differentiations and most of the time they reflect interwoven tendencies, and no absoluteness might be assigned to them.

Among the MHP politicians, within all positions, there is always a criticism on different types Islamism, which are named as "wrong" or "false" and even "enemy". There is also a criticism of the identification of nationalist thought described with racism. If the statement of a MHP politician, who is considered to identify an equivalent position, is evaluated in details:

> "About this subject I would say that Turkishness is our body and Islamism is our soul. We have a decision that a body without a soul is dead. Islam and Turkishness fused to each other. After being honored by Islam, we followed the ideal that we call Nizam-ı Âlem (World Order), which is the ideal of world domination by the Turks. When you check the history of the Ottoman Emperor, they say that their claim is not only being the leader of the world or Turkishness. As I mentioned, after being honored with Islam the Turkish nation established powerful states and affected the world history in terms of providing justice and order to the state. According to me Islam and Turkishness would never be differentiated. In fact, the Turkish nation is passionate about their beliefs. I don't accept Turkishness without Islam. I don't accept such type of a notion, otherwise it is empty. As I've just mentioned Islam is our claim and it adds a soul in it, if you take the soul out then it becomes a dead body, which is useless. What we believe in is the Turkish-Islam ideal. " (M4)

A MHP politician evaluates the equivalent position about Nationalism-Islamism through the symbol figures in this argument that are **Nihal Atsız** and **Necip Fazıl Kısakürek**:

"We love and respect [Nihal] Atsız Hodja within our organisation that is the Nationalist Movement Party. However, there are also people within the constitution feeling the same for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. Nihal Atsız is known as being completely Turkist, not related with religion, mostly known with his Shamanist approach. On the other hand, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek is known with completely his religious aspect without any concessions on Turkishness. As you will recall he created a synthesis called Turkish-Islam synthesis. I don't consider it a synthesis, why? There is a national identity that a person gains by birth, a shape that is God given. Then there is a means of religion we chose later on. I don't think that your identity and religion can be put on each other. When something is evaluated, there should be some criteria; that is to say religion should be a world view, and race is something you were born in. For that reason, it should be realized that the two notions are different and should be evaluated accordingly. I was born as a Turk, who is Muslim and I am a Turk whose religion is Islam. This is how I perceive the case. The ones who determine the case from nationalist point of view, from religious point of view and who attribute superior or inferior values to the case, would like to carry Turkish and Muslim people to another point and would like to separate them. Consequently, I think it is wrong to start such a discussion on this issue."
(M14)

MHP politician **(M22),** representing the position which emphasizes, "The main meaning attributed to Turkishness is Islam", thinks that the relation between Islam and Turkishness is inevitable just like **the finger and nail.** This politician states that some 'Turks' such as Hungarians, Gagauzlar and Yakutlar lost their Turkish identity within time and insists on highlighting that Turkishness is not racism.

According to a MHP politician who states that Turkish nation reserved its national personality better after choosing the religion of Islam, Islam is "a divine religion, but a culture at the same time". With an interesting description *Islam that is considered as a culture at the same time,* seems to be an important aspect of the Turkish culture as well. According to this politician:

"(…) Islam is a culture, an important aspect of the Turkish culture. It is an essential aspect structuring our nation that is our identity. It is because I think the Turkish nation [after], choosing Islam, experienced a better period when preserving its national self. However, nowadays this identity is being affected by a wrong understanding of Islam. It's because the

Islamic doctrine of Vahabi, Mevdudi and Seyyid Kutub are false schools of Islam. They harm our national identity and also our religious integrity; they obviously harm them." (M1)

According to a MHP politician, Nationalism-Islamism discussion might carry different point of views within the party, however, for him the essential "notion" is *Turkishness*:

"(…) The Turks chose Islam; of course Islam is our soul, that is to say there would be nothing without a soul. If the Turks had chosen Christianity, then Christianity would be our soul; or if it was Judaism, then our soul would be Judaism. Turkish nation is a very special nation; it's a nation with unique aspects. The Turks had chosen the last book of Allah and preserved it. Islam is quiet important, however, our Turkish identity is essential for us." (M8)

A MHP politician, describing nationalism as "a nationalist standing" and the basis of the *standing* is "to love the land, country and nation", criticizes the bad sayings of various fractions and environments about nationalism. For this politician nationalism is:

"(...) Masons, fascits, imperialists, global organizations slander nationalism. However, a Muslim being opposed to nationalism is something unbelievable. They used to ask us that: "Are you a Turk or a Muslim?" As if it is not possible to be a Turk when you are a Muslim, or it is not possible to be a Muslim when you are a Turk. I support the saying that "We are Turks just like the Mountain Tanrı and muslims just like the Hira Mountain". Then I think that Islamic movements caused to be an enemy of the nation, enemy of Turks because they were supporting to be an enemy as much as the masons, communists or fascits; that is why the movements were under their control and leadership. This is how it sounds to me. I'm sure of it now. Consequently, nationalism in France is something accepted, there is no discrimination. I don't think that there is a country in Europe where people are separated as nationalists and non-nationalists. This only happens in Turkey. In fact, this is something that might occur in multinational states. The Turkish Republic is not a multinational state, in fact we are a nation state. What you do is by creating enemies against each other that is by emphasizing being Alewi, Sunnah and the ethnical roots, such as Çerkezlik, Abazalık, Lazlık, Kürtlük and by making them to fight each other, by harming the country; you try to capture the country. Therefore, I think that nationalism is the sine qua non for a country and a society. This is not nationalism based on ethnocentrism or biology. We all own this country, we are all in the same ship. For the good of the ship, to sail on it, to protect it, we are all

sailors there. This is my notion of nationalism, and nationalist (ülkücü) movement, Nationalist Movement Party also shares the same approach." (M17)

For the SP politicians the emphasis on Islamism and Muslim identity is clearly observed in this discussion. By positive attributions to the associative aspect of Islam, to solve especially the Kurdish problem and other identity problems, religion of Islam and Islamism becomes prominent. In this respect, it is emphasized that it is wrong to highlight Turkishness or any other ethnic belonging.

According to one of those politicians, stating that it is not possible to constitute a relationship between Turkishness and Islamism by assigning different categories to them:

> "If you ask me how I describe myself; I call myself a Muslim first. However, Allah says in the verse that 'I made you into different tribes so that you may meet each other'. That is to say, it is impossible for me to have a different point of view because of people's ethnical origins, whichever nation they belong to. It is not possible for me to have a different point of view because of their religion. I call myself a Muslim. I don't think of structuring a relationship between Islamism and Turkishness; because they are totally different categories. If you ask me the contribution of Turkishness to Islamism, I can only say that it is the nation served Islam the best. In fact, religion really acts like cement. Some of the writers say that, especially in our southeast politics, 'everything is okay, but why you cannot find a solution to the Kurdish problem in terms of religion'. However, when the history is evaluated, if the people from four different religions used to live in peace in Jerusalem for centuries without any problem; the lab, the center of solution is here." (S5)

A SP politician saying that Islam and Islamism is prior and has priority in his party and they don't ignore Turkishness as a "fact"; however, it should not be "prioritized". For him:

> "(...) If the Ottomans had prioritized Turkishness, they couldn't have established a worldwide empire. The Ottomans were powerful because they prioritized Islamic values; this is still what we think. That is to say, if not the Turkishness, but the Islamic aspects and Islamic brotherhood were prioritized, I believe there would have been no problem like the PKK.

Because the Ottomans highlighted Islamic brotherhood they ruled the people successfully for 600 years, such as Turks, Kurds, etc." (S9)

Another SP politician **(S22),** similar to MHP politicians, states that when they give up Islamic style and life, Turkishness also disappears. The politician adds that they internalize Turkishness the way the Ottomans practiced. For this politician: "The Armenians and also Ethnic Greeks, they all felt themselves as an Ottoman. This is what we mean by Turk." According to this politician: "Whatever the origin of a person is, whether an Ethnic Greek or a Circassian, whoever thinks for the good of the country, is a Turk. The one who thinks bad for the country is excluded from Turkishness".

# CHAPTER 6

## STATE-AUTHORITY AND STATE-SOCIETY PERCEPTION OF THE RIGHT-WING POLITICIANS

The state and perception about the state-society relations is the other main topic of the study in order to comprehend the right-wing conservative politics. How the state is described and perceived, and how the people position themselves with respect to the state is crucial to distinguish the political decisions and ideologies. When the importance and value attributed to the state by the right-wing politics and political decision is considered, it is especially important to examine the state imagination of this tradition. At the beginning of my research, it was not my aim to study 'the state' perception as a sole entity. The main purpose is to examine how the state-society relations are perceived within the historical and actual political context and also to examine how this relationship was evaluated by the right-wing politicians within the republic-modernization period. Although that was the main purpose, the answers of the politicians to an introductory question that is 'what do you recall about the state and how do you describe it forced to examine the 'state' and then 'authority' subjects as unique cases. As the details will be seen on the related sub-topic, the answers to the 'introductory question' pointed out the existence of a strong *mythical* discourse and perception about the 'state'. Although it is a known fact that the right tradition has a mythical perception and imagination, at the beginning it was vague for me whether or not this perception is politically and sociologically essential in modern times. However, as the relation and connection of this ambiguity with the modern and actual one clarifies, the new situation constitutes[65] an important sociological

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[65] In fact, beyond the right-conservative politics, it should be stated that it is essential to examine 'the state' perception with respect to the left-leftist people and traditions in terms of the political anthropology as well. The discursive, political and ideological bases of the distance and space of the left-leftist tradition to the 'state' entity might relatively be explained at first sight. However, other than the reasons mentioned here, the left and the subjects within it, their perception of the 'state' as an entity, might be different than the proposed acceptances. When the neo-nationalist, Kemalist and

research field. For that reason, the first topic of this chapter is the "state mythos" and the second sub-topic is composed of the state-society relations, which dates back to the foundation of the republic. The second topic indicates how the state-society relations are examined within the historical continuum from the foundation of republic until today.

In this part, where I examine the reason why I studied this subject, the focus is on how the right-conservative politicians evaluate and make sense of the mentioned period in terms of the state-society relations. This helps to understand the right-conservative tradition's state (and authority) perception in details and extensively. It also supports to comprehend the politicians' point of view about the modernization of Turkey.

In accordance with the above mentioned purpose, the aim was to determine how the state was described, how the mental-cognitive manifestations of the concept/phenomenon were reflected in the discourse (if realized) and which procedures were used to problematize the state. After reaching a general framework of the state, it was tried to be determined how the state-society relations from the establishment of the republic to the present were structured, how it was shaped and how this process was perceived and interpreted with the positive or negative aspects.

The state, as an asset area (entity), is perceived by the vast majority of the right-conservative politicians as an essential and valuable source of power and authority. The state, which represents the legitimate power and authority, is defined and perceived through a wide variety of qualities, names and adjectives. When the state is described the most common adjective-metaphor is the "father" and another common description is "state father". This is the most common paternalist adjective-metaphor that was used almost by the all politicians while promoting or criticizing the state.

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similar fractions of the left are excluded, the statement of the perception of the left about this subject worths to be studied only to falsify the existence of a mythical perception.

"Holy" or "holiness" is another important factor that was used with the other metaphor.

The state is the most legitimate social source of power and authority in the world. Because it is **holy**, its decisions and applications should not be questioned. As the decisions and authority of the father in the household are accepted by *everyone*, the power and authority is resembled by the state, which is associated as the "father" of the country. "Just like a father", it is the source of peace, happiness and trust of the country. Everyone should support the state, which acts equal and fair to everyone. The existence reason of the state is the nation and vice versa. If one of them is absent, the other one cannot exist. The state is the society itself and in fact, it is the "organized form" of the society. If there is no state the Turkish nation neither can live nor survive. The state should be powerful at all times and conditions. The power of the state stems from the "unity and integrity" of the society. As "the struggle among the states is in fact, the struggle among the nations", any rebellion against the state is a "betrayal" against the existence of the nation. The most unique aspect of the Turkish nation is "its ability to establish a state". There are countless examples within "the Turkish history that date back five-six thousand years". This aspect and talent is valued in beyond "repute and bout state" [ebed müddet devlet] expression. *The state which is the existence reason of the nation*, is always beyond the *individuals. When t*e *existence of the state, its unity and survival is the subject, the state* is beyond everything.


These descriptions and perceptions about the state are based on the narrations. The expressions and determinations in this summary reflect the AKP, MHP, DP and BBP politicians' descriptions which are generally common and also the SP politicians' descriptions partially. Although not a strong tendency, the other descriptions and perceptions, which are a sort of opposite to the expressions and determinations within this summary, should also be highlighted. For instance, the existence, power, authority and holiness of the state is accepted without questioning; however, there are times that those qualities are criticized and questioned. There are also narrations

and tendencies indicating that the authority and power of the state should be limited, the state should value justice and equality in its decisions and applications and it is wrong for the state to impose ideologies and volitions. However, to mention again, this is not a strong tendency within the study.

## 6.1 "The Holy State Father" as the Source of Authority and The Power or The Myth of State

As mentioned above, most of the right wing conservative politicians use only "father" or "state father" metaphor while defining the state. According to this metaphor, the power and authority of the "head" of the household i.e. the father, is *absolute* and it is not questionable. The father, who represents the family in the household, is the *natural* "head" and the *unique* representative of it. The divinity of the family reflected in the state and a kind of holiness is attributed to it. For a politician from the AKP **(A18)**: "because of the traditional and historical understanding, people's perception in this country towards the state is very different. Our people perceive the state like a "father"; the state is similar to a father in the household; in other words, the state is the authority. Therefore, disrespect towards the state is not good."

For another politician from the AKP, for whom the state is like a father just like for the society; the power which established Seljuqs, Ottomans and the Republic declare the "state father authority" as:

> "Just like a father who can do and say anything he wants, who can beat if necessary or if he gets angry! Whether we accept it or not this is the common understanding. At this point, my father used to say that: "the state is like fire, if you move away too much you might freeze, if you get too close you might burn." Moreover, the state has specific rules, principles and procedures for improving, the existence. You should not touch, hand them. Why? The individuals are not strong enough against the state. If you struggle individually, your strength cannot afford the power of the state. But in my opinion you should always care the state of the individual." **(A10)**

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For another politician from AKP **(A21)** "the state, as an organization who prohibits as well as gives freedom, is "holy". Due to we are like "family members" live in the state, we should apply whatever the state *orders*, we should obey whatever the state prohibites. Both for the Ottoman and "Turkish custom", *the state is already a sine qua non*. For another politician from AKP **(A22)** who denotes that the state is "sacred", "everybody should be a side of the state". The state which "manipulates, develops and offers service" to the citizens is a "**holy organization** that guarantees the protection and the honor" at the same time. For a politician from MHP who repeats "the state father" emphasis, the state is:

> "… as I said maybe we can shout, we can get angry, but we love our flag and we love our state like a father. That is to say, we love our father despite he beats or lets us hungry or whatever he does. This is the reason that we call it as a father (…) No, for us there is no revolt against the state. As I said, you cannot get angry with your father, although he beats, he is your father (…) This is a matter of belief, belief, belief. That is to say this state is yours, you should tolerate it. You have to respect your ancestor." (M20)

For another politician from MHP who said that Turks are a nation which establishes "the highest state" in the scene of the history:

> "(…) the state is very important for us. In my opinion, the state should be the father. The father should behave the same towards his children. He should not behave some of them as his own child and some others as the stepchild. The state is not a tangible and visible thing. Therefore, the people, who work for the state, will be aware what the state is and as they know it they will do their job without any discrimination among the people. This is what I understand from the state. It gets angry if it's necessary, but it atones at the same time. This is my understanding of the state, I believe that the state is a father." (M12)

For a politician from the SP who argues that "we are a nation having state tradition" and "we are a statist society" for years, and the Turkish nation have these qualities also because of "the Sunni tradition". For him:

> "…In the Sunni tradition, the obedience to the head is necessary, it is an obligation. Therefore, because of our Sunni tradition, we are a statist society. We call the state as father, we want it to behave us with the tenderness of a father. Although the father sometimes pulls

our ears, we accept it as he is the father. The state father understanding becames our tradition. Our nation always thinks that even the worst authority is better than the absence of it. (S7)

The perceptions which define the state over the figure of the father and attribute holiness to it, necessitate the continuation of its "survival" and "power". *The state should exist in all conditions and at all times, so that the nation can maintain its existence*. According to this understanding, the state and nation are a duality or an existence, which forms each other at the same time. The state and nation (or the society) are the entities which *do not exist on their own*. As these entities make each other possible (or reproduce) simultaneously, both of them should be powerful. A politician from the AKP thinks that "we are living in a critical geography. The state and nation should always be powerful in order to provide both the national unity and solidarity". He states that:

> "…As a state, we are living in a region close to the Middle East, Balkans and Russia at the same time. Therefore, our state should be very powerful. Our army should be powerful too. We are a nation which is loyal to the state, proud of its state and which devotes itself in all sorts of manners. We have to realize all the responsibilities if we want to develop as citizens or individuals. What shall we do? We have to pay our taxes and obey the laws. If we obey them, I believe we can feel more powerful. We have responsibilities both as the state and nation, one cannot survive in the absence of the other." (A13)

According to a politician from MHP "the father state" understanding is "permanent" in the nationalists' apprehension of the state. Moreover, there is "a deep emotional loyalty" to the state. In fact, it can be seen as "a platonic love", in spite of the wrong decisions and applications of the state and even it "gives pain" to the nationalists:

> "…For us, despite everything, the state is holy. Well, at the end we see it as a father too. This might seem emotional to you; but our loyalty to the state is like a love. I'll explain it ironically. Our love for the state is a platonic love. The state is like a young girl we love so much, but this young girl never shares the necessary love, she deprives her love. Do you understand what I mean? We write poems, letters to her. The state reads them and smiles… then it doesn't care them. Then, she walks with another man. What kind of a thing is this? You rise against this, you get angry and maybe you curse the case. Then you hear the azan,

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which reminds you the state. You think what would happen to you if there was no state even if you don't like, you criticize, get angry or curse. When you think that you don't have a chance to live outside this country and you will not be happy somewhere else, then you start to love the state *again*. This is very difficult. For a family of an executed nationalist, loving the state is painful, but they still love it. This is the state. They don't argue about it. This emotion can't easily be explained. But we still love [the state]. So we know that the state is important. The state is important for us. For example, during the coalition period, our party leader never smoked while he was with Mr. Bülent. He didn't call him as Mr. Bülent, but called him as Dear Prime Minister. He always respected the prime minister. In fact, those are some clues of our love towards the state. For example, sometimes I really get angry with the Turkish Armed Forces; however, I know that if the Turkish Armed Forces doesn't exist, this country and the state would be in a bad condition and the nation would be worse. In fact, at the moment the most disapproved point in our community is that we criticize the state too much. This really upsets me and our community as well". (M19)

For a MHP politician the state is "the reason of our survival" and "if there is no state it is not possible for the nation to survive":

"(…) the state should be compassionate and merciful to its citizens. We don't want a state who tortures the citizens. If you ask if how a state should be, the state should be an iron fist in a velvet glow. It should be an iron fist against the cruel but it should be lovely and as soft as a velvet glow for the oppressed." (M13)

For another politician from MHP who argues these aspects should always be powerful for the survival of the state and the nation. Every nation and state have "the right to exist" and "defending this issue" is inevitable. According to this politician his political understanding "sloganizes" this as "the eternal state [devlet-i ebed-müddet]":

"…when you are powerful as a nation politically, culturally and economically, then the state will be eternal. But if your economy and language is weak and you can shout out as much as you want just like the Palestinians after you're collapsed. This is what the state means to me." (M17)

For a politician from DP, who believes in the primacy and strength of the state, "the state cannot exist without the nation and a nation cannot exist without the state."

These are complementary and integrative, but the state should always be strong. It should let everyone feel that all the time:

"What you call as the state is an abstract concept. Of course the state is not a separate concept other than the nation. I think the real problem is to separate them. Let the notion of the state alone, we won't allow it to be wasted. I think the depreciation of the state directly ends with the depreciation of the nation (…) You know, the Turks have 5.000 years of history that is 3.000 years of written and 2.000 years of unwritten history. And we have a state tradition for 5.000 years. Therefore, the Turks have an understanding of assuming holiness toward the state which originate from their genes. You don't have the chance to erase this in one day or two days. Moreover, in our society, to question the state is perceived as a shame. In fact, I think the same way (…) There is no point in thinking the state and the nation as separate systems. In fact, one of them is the other's cause of existence and vice versa. Do you have a chance to think the state in a place where the nation doesn't exist?" (D1)

According to a politician from SP (**S13**), to gain these lands on which we are living now, "the nation and the state spend together a great endeavor with its pros and cons." This nation sacrifices its life, and property without questioning for the **survival** of itself and its state. It will continue to do it in the future too."

Although it is frequently emphasized that the state and the nation bring each other into existence, the state gives precedence in relation to *the nation and the individual* when the survival issue comes into question. For a politician from MHP who says that 'the eternal state' is an unchangeable principle **(M8)**, "when you start to question the state, the survival of the state suffers and this should be avoided." A most indirect and open expression of this discourse can be seen in the narration of a politician from BBP:

"For me, first of all my state is important for me. There is a proverb as "let a thousand worlds die, instead of one wise [bir âlim öleceğine bin âlem ölsün]." Actually, the wise means the state. Now, the concept of the state is divine for me. I am talking about 6.000 years of history. The governments, or who rule them is not important. We have a standard lifetime, we come, live and go. My imaginations and passions compose an *eternal* dream. I think the state and the nation should exist until the end of life, as long as the world exists. I agree of being cruel if necessary. Actually, I can burn (X) for the existance of Turkey. As long as the

state, which generates the Republic of Turkey, lives and Turkey survives in the world arena, I might vanish. I don't dignify myself. I see myself only as a servant for this purpose. I want to be a stick of that *blessed passion*. The state is holy, *it is as holy as my religion. Even when I had no religion, I had a state, it is that much holy*. In my understanding of statism, I have no compromise even for my parents. Actually, I can say that my father might die instead of my state and Allah will not judge me for this. Actually, it can be asked how ethical is such a decision. Why? In my religion there is a solution for that. It says that "if your parents attributes you as if you are equal to me, then it is not a sin if you exclude them from your life". This is what my religion and Allah says. This is the religious dimension and I think it is the same for the national dimension. Actually, no power is above my understanding of the state." (B4)

Although it is a weak tendency, there were some politicians who don't accept the holiness of the state and its priority for the individuals. For example, for a politician from MHP **(M11)** the state is responsible to "serve" the people: "the state is for people, there is nothing as **the holy state**. If it doesn't make people happy, if it doesn't direct people somewhere, if it is not useful, there is a defect there." For a politician from AKP **(A6)** "attributing holiness to the state is not possible. The holy things are our religious values. How can a tyrant and cruel state be considered as holy? For another politician from MHP, who accepts the holiness of the state but argues that the state should exist **in the nation**, the state is "a holy and institutional roof". But, this roof should be fair and charitable towards its citizens. It should not privilege anyone including the people and the institutions representing itself. According to a politician from DP **(D2)** "the state is the father", but he states that he does not attribute "holiness" to it and if it "makes a mistake", the authority of the state can be questioned.

### 6.1.1 The Partial Difference in the Tradition: The National Vision and The Concept of the State

It should be noted that the politicians from SP have different opinions and evaluations from other right-wing conservative politicians about the subject of the state. Although the state as an entity protects its importance for the politicians from SP, the source of this importance does not come from actually *a priori* existence or "the ontological status" of the state, but seems to gain its meaning from the "obedience to the authority [ulul Emre itaat]" discourse of Sunni-Muslim theology. The concept whose meaning is to order, stands for obeying the people who has the competence of governing. This concept takes part in the Quran, Surah Nisa, verse 59: "Believers! Obey Allah. Obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you". The concept of "authority" is interpreted differently in Shi'ism and Sunnism which represent different kinds of Islamic political doctrine. While in Sunnism, it is explained as 'Khalif' or 'authorities', in Shi'ism this concept does not mean political authority but refers to 'Imams' (Lewis, 2007; Arkoun, 1999).

For the politicians from SP, the state is legitimate when it represents this principle and it adapts the principle that it provides. According to this principle, "the worst authority is better than no authority." A *riot* and *rebellion* towards the state cannot be a subject as it is believed that it represents "the authority (ulul emir)". In this context, the politicians from SP frequently call attention to the separation between the state and the government. Accordingly, the *government* does not always and at all times represent the state. Therefore, the governments, which are opposed to Quran and sunnah, can be stand against. This is a "legitimate right". Most of the politicians from SP do not attribute holiness to the state. On the contrary, they assume that the *individual* is "holy". Because of the difference in the general attitude of the politicians from SP, it seems necessary to emphasize their point of view towards the state. It can be said that this is important for the National Vision and the eccentricity of its look of the Islamic-Islamist ideology towards the state that it represents.

Most of the politicians from SP have different opinions and evaluations from the other right-wing conservative politicians about the subject of the state, the nation and the relations among them. This might be related with Islamist ideology that is possessed by the National Vision tradition. In this approach, which takes its own source and basic references from the Quran and sunnah, although the state expresses an important institution in accordance with "the authority", at the last instance, the state is not attributed holiness. From this point of view the state which is responsible to serve the ummah and the religious community [cemaat] does not carry any meaning more than "an apparatus". It can be said that, in the National Vision tradition, this understanding concretizes in the explicit expression of "not a guard, but a waiter state". The holy one is not **the state,** but **the individuals** who form the ummah or the religious community. The state is responsible to represent equal service to everyone. Because there might be different factors composing the state, it is unacceptable for the state to impose any belief and ideology to these factors. Theoretically, this approach makes impossible to attribute holiness to the state. When the state approach is described as such, any organic vision, any relation of primacy between **the state** and **the individual** or **the state** and **the nation** cannot be established; the state becomes an organization, which is responsible of its nation. As much as the authority and the legitimacy of the state that is not attributed holiness departed from the Quran and the sunnah, it might be criticized. Even for this kind of a state, riot is "an obligation". But at this point, it is necessary to emphasize the difference related to the quality of the holiness. Not attributing holiness to the state as a bare entity does not mean the state is being exalted. This attitude towards the state can be evaluated as a reflection of "the integrity of the religion and the state [din-ü devlet][66]" concept which is a concept inspired from the Ottomans, rather than a critical distance toward the state. As much as the state and the nation (or the ummah) point at an integrity, an exact overlapping, "the integrity of the religion and the state" can be a doctrinal (Islamic) ideal or principle without attributing holiness to it.

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[66] About the concept see Halil İnalcık, "Şeriat ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet", in İslamiyat, No: I/4 and "Sultanizm Üzerine Yansımalar: Max Weber'in Osmanlı Siyasal Sistemi Tiplemesi", Toplum ve Ekonomi, 1994, No:7.

In a narration which reflects the general approach towards the state of the politicians from SP, a politician from SP mentions the following:

"Now, we must see the difference or the nuance among the state, the government or the regime. The state is our country on a piece of land. There is no state without soil, without the land. The thing called as the state should appear with the land, with a geography. Therefore, the states are permanent, the governments and the regimes can be temporary. The state is permanent, as long as the piece of land stays the state is permanent too. This is sociologically true as well. However, the governments consititute another issue. Some people consider the government and the regime as a state, but we don't accept this. The state is different from the understanding, the fraction, the ideology, the judgement of the regime which carry out the state. Therefore, when we look at the Islamic literature, when we look from Islamic point of view, to obey the authority is an obligation (…) There is a command, in the Quran, the obedience is very important. It's said that "obey Allah. Obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you." Therefore, I am responsible to obey, but to whom? I never obey and never call an understanding with the attribution of the eternal authority which violates my belief; calls my belief as a reaction; doesn't take my sister who wears a head scarf into the universities; describes my sister with sheet as black sheet, as tented dress; says the interest is the reality of the world; gains income to the state by establishing casinos. However, as required by the laws and regulations, in the framework given by the laws, I obey them; I have to obey. In fact, the eternal authority concept is a phenomenon, an understanding related to and involved in the Islamic state, Islamic geography. Therefore, the societies in which there is no Islamic state and Islamic law of is not current, there won't be the concept of the eternal authority or the concept of khalif." (S8)

According to an expression which contains factors that are not mentioned in this narration and also which is far away from any manifest language:

"We ask the question of what is the state? The state is an apparatus. It is not a thing which has to serve the society, it doesn't have a physical existence that is formed by the people, which is defined by the people of which they wrote books about. It is something formed by the people. It is the people itself who govern the state. Who are the people? The people are the individuals who should protect the state's law against the state. Therefore, in this sense, the state is not holy, the state is an apparatus eventually. It should be an apparatus that serves for the prosperity of the people, the beauty, the happiness of the people. In this sense, Master Erbakan is right when saying the simile of the waiter. You go to a restaurant and they try to serve you the best. You have to locate the state as thar way. The state produces a project, a

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human project (…) the state should not be an apparatus which produces an ideology by itself, which produces a commercial activity for itself, which produces a policy of its own, which places the society to the shelves, classes, models, which imposes its own ideas to the society. It should be a servant. It should be a structure, which can explain everything to anyone, can be checked, can be questioned. It should know that the people is created as the most honorable of the beings (eşrefi mahlûkat), in other words, they are the most honorable of the created ones. It should be started from the point what the human, the law and jurisprudence is. I perceive the state that way, as a servant. They call it as a servant. I think, it should be an apparatus which doesn't dominate; which doesn't divide; which doesn't classify according to the race, gender and religion." (S1)

The understanding of this politician from SP is parallel to the liberal state understanding. In this sense, it can be said that there is a tension with the previous politician **(S8)** and this politician. In the below narrations, a tendency which express this discourse can be found. In contrast to the tendency of the right-wing conservative politicians, which gives priority to the state and nation, the politicians from SP emphasize the individuals, the society or the nation. In this relationship:

"The state is for the nation. The state should be in the service of the nation, it should see the demands of the nation and it can move through the direction of its own character. There is no nation for the state, but there is state for the nation. Today, there is a nation in the Iraq, but there is no state. New examples might ocur in time. If there is a state in the nation, that society exists and develops." (S9)

For another politician from SP which describes the state whose "grand" definition is the "roof institution" composed of the people who has the purposeful and the historical unity **(S16)**. In Turkey, the state "is the toy of the bureaucratic elite preceding the nation". In fact, the state should not be an apparatus of any elite community, it should be an organization which serves the nation and stands everybody at an equal distance. Another politician from the SP who criticizes the imposition of the ideological mission for this state and the power of the state against the society:

"We are in trouble unless we don't make a good definition of the state. The event that we call as the state, is eventually an institution but we are the things that compose it. However, the state brought an ideological function as well. It became an institution which transforms the people. As long as this ideological structure exists, the problems continue to rise. Now, they are finding such a solution, the understanding of the cruel state is valid in the West too. They accept this, on the other hand, they try to find ways to protect the people and the society against the state. The state should be together with its people, it should be a system governed by the people. However, when they are not successful, this time they try to connect the civil society. Then the constitutions were used. The constitutions should protect the powerless instead of the state. At the end, the state became an institution of such power which protects itself with the constitution and controls the NGOs. I don't know if there is any NGO or any kind of Press in Turkey. Those two structures should always exist as an opposition. The state exist because the trade unions, the NGOs, the associations and the religious communities do not perform their primary functions. In my point of view, the state understanding is an imagination which is a leader in universal, moral and ethical issues; not an intervening realization." (S19)

## 6.2 The Right Wing Conservatism and On The Origin of the State Myth

While considering the situation that appears through the narrations told so far we should ask the following questions; what is the source of existing mythical perception about the state, what do these perception and imaginations mean and what do they imply? Excluding majority of SP politicians, it can be said that the perception of the state and the authority included in the narrations above derives from a pre-modern understanding of the history. In this understanding and perception of the history, it can be said that a design and a writing of history with a tendency of ideological value have a powerful effect. In the settlement of that perception, the pedagogical vehicles (study books, maps etc.) of the nation formation is very effective and they are transmitted today by internalizing. Such an understanding of the history and the state authority coherent to this is related to the historical thesis of the early Republican area, and especially related to the thesis of the First Turkish Historical Congress (1932) in which the "romantic" historical design is more

apparent. At the First Congress while the idealization of The Turkish History and the ethicist discourse are dominant, in the period from the Second Congress (1937) to the 1950s the Ottoman History that is looped in the First Congress is more included. But, it can still be seen that the myth of the state is strengthened (Bora, 2006: 44-45). The Turkish History thesis generally stands for the argument that the Turkish race has a distinctive and central role in the construction of all civilizations. According to this argument, in the roots of the civilizations constructed at Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, Chinese, Crete, India, Rome, there is the migration of Turks from Middle Asia to the East, West and South. (Copeaux, 1998: 40) Although the thesis has changed in time and revisioned[67], it can be said that it covered its essential ethicist emphasis. Although many factors related to the ('superior') qualities of the Turkishness are emphasized in this thesis, it is understood that the meaning loaded to the state phenomenon has a special importance. According to this, one of the most important features of the Turks is the capacity of 'constituting state'. In the mythology derived about the state: "The Turkish state is a superior entity which is above the objective and narrative values, is powerful enough to legitimize itself; The Turkish state is not any state but it is actually a quality" (Bora, 2006: 63). From one of the writers of this thesis Şemsettin Günaltay's book written for high schools, it is argued that the capacity of constituting state for the Turks is inherent [fıtri]: "…when we see Turks entered into the scene of the history, we see them constituted straight states." (Günaltay, 1939: 29 cited in Behar, 1992: 109). In the period of the revision of the thesis, we see that the number of the states that is constituted by the Turks through the history changes from 12 to 20 (Behar 1992: 109- 110). According to Taşkın (2007: 32) "the sanctification of the state, the universalization of it as the most developed existence of both the rational and the ethical historical journey is one of the most distinguishing qualities of the nationalist- conventionalist understanding in Turkey." Tanıl Bora analyzes the factors of the "Turkish State" mythos in 10 items through his article called "National History and The Mythos of the State". These items are: 1. **Founding states**, 2. **The continuity among Turkish states**, 3. **The**

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[67] For the "modifications" and "the adjustments" in time, the criticisms and the inconsistencies toward the thesis and the detailed analysis of them, please see Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu* (1929- 1937), İstanbul Afa Yayıncılık, 1992.

**holiness of the state**, 4. Carrying the quality of "national state" of the Turkish states from the beginning, 5. **The central/ist and powerful state tradition**, 6. **The army-nation, army-state**, 7. The special place of "the statesman" ("the statesmanship"), 8. The democratic/populistic and "social" state tradition, 9. "The worldwideness" [cihanşümul] of the Turkish state. 10. The "practicality" and the "realism" of the Turkish state (Bora, 2006: 45- 63 and Bora and Can, 2004: 125- 157). The classification that Bora made with the findings of my research (the bold signed ones above) overlapped around five themes. As Bora emphasized, the remarkable point is not the pre-modern quality of this approach or their ahistoricity or contradictions (Bora, 2006: 44). On the contrary, despite these qualities and the right-wing politicians' acceptance in such a degree, the endurance of their actuality and their being internalized with this point is remarkable. Bora interprets this quality of the Mythos as a practice toward the construction of *the actual state* mythos directly: "the basic premises of the Turkish History Thesis protect its validity partially both through "the core state institutions" approved as "the owner" of the state at first in the ideologies of TSK/MGK (Turkish Armed Forces/ National Security Council) and through the primary-secondary education and the popular history understanding. Moreover, the nationalist-conservative and Turkist and Pan-Turkist history ideologies diverted from the official history prevents the same understanding both from thematically and from basic characteristic patterns (Bora, 2006: 44- 45). Yeğen in his warning about the compressing of the Turkish History thesis and its arguments into a limited thematical framework such as racism etc. and the avoiding of the reading of the thesis (Yeğen, 1996: 19- 24 and Yeğen, 1999: 190- 191), emphasizes that the effect of this thesis over the Turkish politics should not be avoided: "to qualify the Turkish History thesis which is an existentialist factor in the imagining of the national identity that is a primary factor in the constitution of the modern, national and central managerial-political entity as an accident in the history of the Turkish politics is impossible" (Yeğen, 1996: 23). If we want to emphasize again, it can be said that the meaning and the importance of the "thesis" questioned above lies in its harmony and relationship with the actuality in the context of the state and authority.

When the perceptions and descriptions that appear in the narrations above are taken as a base, it can be said that the meaning and function assigned to the state, the holiness that attributed to the state, the fantasizing of the organic state-nation and the logic of the relationship between the state and nation reflect authoritarian-fascistic tendencies. According to İnce who emphasizes the relationship between the conservative ideology and the authoritarian concepts (İnce, 2010: 19): "the determination of the behavior and the manners which are realized in an unquestioned loyalty, on the basis of discipline and obedience toward the political authority, affect the consciousness which develops the people's talents for controlling their lives. The leitmotif for this kind of a life understanding necessitates a mystical illustration of being a powerful state in the future, carrying the expectation of being a powerful state and nation or supporting the belief for the authoritarian and total state. "Although it is not possible to discuss the fascism as a homogeneous, consistent and a complete ideology (Breuer, 2010: 7; Heywood, 2008; Eatwell, 1993), it can be said that it has some qualities that makes the state-nation and nation imaginations similar at the minimum level. The importance given to the authority is one of these qualities. The fascists accept the authority as a sign owned by an extraordinarily talented people of the personal leadership and the charisma. Such an authority is absolute and unquestionable or it should be (Heywood, 2007: 271). In the essence of the fascism that appeals to the feelings more than the intelligence; bases on the belief more than the consistency, there is "to believe" and "to obey". It is not important what the believed one is, whether it is right or wrong; the important thing is what the leader or the figure-structure says the right thing (Örs, 2008: 495). As appeared in the narrations, the most important representative figure of the authority is the state. Again as it is appeared in the narrations, the role attributed to the individual against the state, even the role attributed to the nation against the state if the survival of the state in question, is secondary; the existence and the will of the individual is connected to the usages of the state. This situation is compatible with the qualities of the fascist ideology. "There is nothing really private… and there are no limits to state action". According to a fascist theoretician Gentile: "the state comes to birth in the transcendental rhythm of self-consciousness" (Gentile, 1960: 179- 183 cited in

Vincent, 2010: 156). Since the state is the only foundation of the individual's rights and freedoms, it therefore 'limits him and determines his manner of existence' (Gentile, 1928: 301 cited in Vincent, 2010: 157). For Mussolini and Gentile the fascist state is a conscious formation and has a specific will. Therefore it can be defined in a moral context. The existence of the state does not only emphasize the suppression of the individual's rights. It can "even transform the people's physical appearances". It is expressed in a statement which can be taken as Mussolini's motto: "everything is inside the state, there's nothing against the state, nothing is outside of the state" (Mussolini, 1968: 39-40 cited in Sternhell, 1994: 250). It seems impossible to talk about any homogeneity among the imagination of the fascism about the nationalism, nation and the race. As Heywood argued, all kinds of fascism does not contain racism and all the racists are not fascists. For example; the Italian fascism believed the superiority of the state over the individual, but in the Italian fascism, at least in theory, the state does not separate the individual according to his/her country, color or the race. Despite this, the fascism always either derives from racism or comes together with racism. Attributed to Griffin (1993), Heywood says it is debatable that the militant rationalism invites racism in all kinds of fascism or it accepts these kind of doctrines in an open or latent way. However, in any case, race, religion, ethnicity and such axes of fascism sharply and hysterically has an ideological and practical counterpart in Nazism (Heywood: 2007a: 278- 279).

As a historical-empiricist fact-condition, although an inclination of the nationalism that is a component of Turkish right-conservatism toward the race fascist ideological position can be mentioned (Özdoğan, 2001; Önen, 2005; Maksudyan, 2005). It is impossible to assume it as racist-fascist as it is meant here; but, the parallel points are remarkable. As Parla (1989) suggested, it is a proper suggestion to analyze the Turkish right (and some derivations of the left) with its "corporatist-solidarist" qualities as an ideology open to fascism. For example, it is difficult to talk about a radical difference between the corporatism that saw the nation as an organic unity and the society understanding of the fascism. The fascism and its relationship with the Hegel philosophy is emphasized frequently fascism: "conceives of the nation as

an organic unity that subsumes all divisions (classes, individuals, groups) and conflict in society and produces social harmony and peace. The individual and private organizations are to find their fulfillment in this unity of the state" (Sheldon, 2001: 102). 'As a rightist ideology and world view in its definition' the corporatism sees the society as a whole dependent upon each other and harmonized in itself (Parla, 1989: 7 and 54). Moreover, it is not possible to interpret all the Turkish rightist-conservatist politicians and tradition with this quality despite of its fascistic and authoritarian tendencies. Although fascism sanctifies the state and the authority and dignifies them, it is an ideology which can not only be reduced to this quality. What I would like to emphasize is the parallelisms and similarities among them.

As mentioned before, the mythological perception of the authority and its representative state is not only an archaic-historic or a judgemental-accidental narration, but also spreads to *actuality* and this perception again carries a reproduction[68] potential. However, it can be said that the reproduction is not spontaneous but derives from the procedure of the nationalism. In this procedure it is possible through "the national-pedagogical" (Açıkel, 2002) strategies which are applied by the nation-state. According to Açıkel "the nationalism is not only a principal ideological pre-acceptance, which recreates the primary identification and internalization references and shapes the individuals' meaning-world, but it becomes the basic orbit of the political socialization too. The nation-state clinches both the territorial sovereignty and sovereignty over the society through political-bureaucratic means. It shapes the psycho-social infrastructure of the masses to realize the national ideals; it dispatchs and manages all its resources in a new legitimization-identification sphere. This development indicates a new state-axes *socialization* process" (Açıkel, 2002: 118). As Açıkel states in the same reference, the experiences of nationalism that started with ZiyaGökalp in Turkey continues by absoluting with

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[68]For a research analyzing the mentioned reproduction that is not a coincidence and its transfer towards generations over the Turkish- Islamic Synthesis as a continuity in the school books please see Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931- 1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk- İslam Sentezine, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998.

Kemalist revolutions of 1930s, transforming itself by the rightist-populist colours from 1950s and gaining half-official corporatist fascistic colours from 1970s. It indicates the appearances of the new socialization forms in addition to the shape of official state ideology (Açıkel, 2002: 188). Although the origins of the state image is determined by the mythical elements and references: "the success of the nationalism mostly depends on its ensurance of the transition between *pre-modern* and *modern*, between the group psychology and the *mind* and also between the *community* and the society (…) the nation state can exist by creating its own mythology and by making the society dependent upon the bureaucratic reality discourse, by feeding the tendencies of the solidarity and altruism through a nationalist collectivist utopia" (Açıkel, 2002: 121).

As a general tendency, what is the meaning of the history and the state-authority which is presented mythologically as coherent with the state understanding uttered here? Referring to the narrations above, if we look at the important points, it might be mentioned that such a pre-modern or "discovered" understanding of history and the related state-authority vision that has a response in the rightist-conventialist politicians is an important (ideological) obstacle over the debates and solutions about the actual questions (such as the Kurdish question) that modern politicians have to discuss. This should be considered not only for the right-conservative politicians, but also for the attitudes of the masses that support the tradition. "The submission of history into the service of the politics" (Taşkın, 2007: 60- 61 ve 135- 174) with such an ideological load should be taken as a field, which have practical political feedback instead of a simple theoretical illusion or deviation. However, it is not possible to generalize this judgement -for instance- for AKP by extending the party's official-institutional policies. In spite of all possible intrinsic weaknesses and inconsistencies, it should be noted that there is no reciprocity between AKP politicians' discourse that takes place in the research and the 'official' politics and practices of AKP especially about the Kurdish question, minorities etc. A similar reciprocity is mentioned in the part where "the conservative democracy-democrat identity" was discussed. Although no excessive meaning-value attributed to this point, it can be said that this situation is

remarkable in terms of showing another gap between the core administrators/elites of AKP and the AKP politicians mostly settled in the country side.

Within the limits of this research, it seems to be necessary to state the importance of the official history understanding and more than this the Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideology, which is oscillatory-tensioned or articulated with the official history understanding, for the settlement of the mythical history-state-authority understanding that cuts an important line of conservative political tradition (AKP, MHP and DP). Even though it is not possible to talk about the hegemonic feature or the retention of the synthesis as a political plan-project, the ideological-intellectual heritage is passing by the inheritance today by evolving in a specific continuity. Moreover, this heritage seems to spread not only to one point of the line, but to all of them with various degrees and dimensions. It is impossible to unite this Synthesis, which is identified by Copeaux (1998: 307- 308) as "a rightist, conservative and nationalist movement", with a specific political party. However, SP is not located in this line directly at least in the discourse of its politicians, and it does not mean that SP reads the historical-state as modern or rational respect. It is rather related with the holistic and inclusive nature of its Islamist ideology. At the end, it is obvious that Islamic *telos* is not proper to the synthesis discourse of nationalism. On the contrary, it can be said that the National Vision is not far from the mental attitude similar to the line in question while looking at the history-state-authority; the discourse of difference appears in the factors that construct the ideology. In the "Political Imaginations" section and in the "radical-utopian politics" sub-section of this study, there are necessary data about these subjects. For example, the imperialistic projects similar to "The Union of the Islamic States" whose is led by Turkey such as the ones called "A New World", "A New Civilization", "Grand Turkey Again", D-8, D-50, D-100. It is surprising that there is not even a partial reciprocity between the line represented by SP and the discourses of AKP politicians. As I mentioned in "Political Conservatisms" section, this non-reciprocity can be evaluated as a different sign of the break between two parties that I assumed before. The position of SP against AKP seems to be interesting by showing the political boundaries of a general

Islamist discourse. Though not a single aspect (e.g. neoliberal populism), it seems that AKP does not limit itself only within a general Islamist or nationalist discourse in an attack of a massive mobilization and hegemony. To mention again, beside several factors, AKP articulates the nationalist-conservative elements of the Synthesis into its discourse politically within this period. The reason that SP, which maintains a general Islamism persistently, cannot manage its presence against AKP politically might be considered in terms of this factor. In terms of its articulation of nationalist-conservative and liberal discourse, it can be said that AKP assigns a new identity to this Synthesis by differing it from its common form partially by preserving its essence. In this respect, several AKP politicians' emphasis on nationalism or Turkishness should be kept in mind.

It can be said that the perception of the state mentioned above is important because it shows the internalization of the authoritarian-fascistic mentality. As it is emphasized in the political socialization section, the embodiment of the authority figure in the "father" and the loyalty towards it, is an important factor to understand the relationship with the authority both as socially-politically and also as individually. If it is possible to identify it as a symptom, the political-psychoanalytic manifestations of this symptom can be talked about. According to Açıkel (2002: 133-136) who reads these manifestations with the conceptualization of the "national pedagogy": the "national identification" is also constructed as the problem of characterization. The national pedagogy identifies the masses with their state, rituals, histories and leaders similar to the identification of the primitive societies with their totems and the symbols of the tribe. (…) At the point in which the nation appears as a *substitution* of the family, the state becomes a paternal figure who has the privilege of classification and calling of its citizens virtually. (…) The condition for reproducing a mythological heritage today coming from far is the manipulation of the collective memory by the national rituals. (…) To become a nation means getting out of a chaotic individuality against an authoritarian ego ideal through pedagogical-ideological processes under the supervision of bureaucratic apparatus and socializing according to the expectations of nation-state." The harbouring of the pedagogical-

ideological intervention of the bureaucratic-centralized state apparatus through the nationalization process (thesis of history, study books, the production of the mythical symbols and the adoring to them by rituals etc.) should be taken as dependent from the *socialization* process that Açıkel stated. As a matter of fact such kind of tendencies can be seen as political injustices and the attempts of lynches[69] containing the political references and symbols in both political history and everday life. The sublimation of the state and the authority in such a degree points to a political-social and social-scientific[70],[71],[72] problem that should be taken seriously in terms of reproducing and understanding the patriarchy, the discourse of the manhood, militarism and the other mentalities. On the other hand, it will be interesting to examine this not only for right-conservative tradition, but also for the individual-structure and institutions that are considered as leftist.

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[69]For a study about how thelogic and 'practice' of lynch mobilizes the masses over the discourse of "National Reflex" please see Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'nin 'Kriz İdaresi' Yöntemi: Milli Refleks ve Linç Orjisi" in *Birikim Dergisi*, No: 116, 1998 and also Tanıl Bora, *Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi*, İstanbul, Birikim Yayınları, 2008.

[70]It seems necessary to take this not only for deciding the roots of authoratarian-fascistic tendencies or understanding, but also as a manifestation of the structural situation about the political-social culture of Turkey. According to Fethi Açıkel, who points out the emptiness-deficiency in this area: "The neglect of the sophisticated- political socialization Technologies creates an important deficiency which should be removed. These Technologies are concretized under the leadership of nation-state and with the channels it shaped – but they can not be degraded to it as they are too complicated. Both the political-anthropological as well as the political-psychoanalytical approaches do not reach the necessary concentration and deeping over these areas, therefore there's an important emptiness for the social theory and its manifestations in Turkey. Therefore, (...) the national-pedagogical reproduction processes which characterize the Turkish nationalism dominantly, can be understood better by involving in *the bourgeois-bureaucratic habitus, the patrimonial understanding of citizenship, the Technologies for the creation of the collective conscience/unconscious, the channels of the institutionalization of the national symbolic violence* and the didactic-pedantic processes of the modernization comes forward in Turkey in addition to conservative political history analyses. (Açıkel, 2002: 136)

[71]Ahmet Çiğdem who warns about degrading the authoritarianism and the authoritative persistence only to 'the state' and a condition related to it makes a suitable warning: "(...) to concentrate all of the critical energy towards the state creates a mental tendency towards another kind of *étatism* in reverse order. On the other hand, any kind of sign does not have a meaning about the society has an ideal of humanity which makes possible to resist the authority resorts. The studies that analyze the authoritarian themes, which diffuse into all resorts of the social totality, especially into the structures of characters, into family and the cultural values in micro level, (...) will show how the practices of the authority become permanent. By this way, it makes us to understand the persistence of the authority steps up over and together with the spinal of the society. (Çiğdem, 2001: 23).

[72]For a study that analyzes this subject fromTurkish conservative context over the "paternalizm" concept please see Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Türk Muhafazakârlığının Kültürel Politik Kökleri" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Muhafazakârlık*, Volume: 5, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2003.

## 6.3 The Republic, Modernization and The State-Society Relations

As it is discussed above, the state as solely an entity-being and the authority it represents are mostly accepted and sublimated by the rightist-conservative politicians, the state that was made absolute by the constitution of the republic and the authority, value and principles it represent are criticized significantly. According to my opinion, it signifies a remarkable paradox or tension. As it is discussed below in details, the critical gap toward the state does not lean to its ontological-normative existence actually. It is limited with the modernist ideology of the republic and the criticism about its state centrality (culturalist). In this sense, the state as being criticized and opposed, is mentioned or described by some names and adjectives. In the table below, there are names, adjectives and connotations toward the state, republic and regime derived from the interviews.

**TABLE 3. The Names, Adjectives and Connotations Towards the State In the Period of Republic**

| 1. | 2. | 3. |
|---|---|---|
| Fear | Status Quo | Jacobin |
| Taboo | The Independence Courts | Coup d'etat |
| Pressure | Eternal Chief | Committee of union and progress |
| Prohibition | National Chief | The mentality of Jon Turk |
| Despot | Single Party | Sudden and unexpected |
| Cruel | Gendarmerie | Imposing |
| Scorning | Police | Social engineering |
| Fettering | Province Governor | Despite the society |
| Despot | District Governor | The civilian oligarchic system |
| Domination | Mukhtar | Staking |
| Obey | Taxman | Elite |
| Junta | Bureaucracy | Cold |
| Obstructing | | Distant |
| Means of suppression | | Alien |
| Authoritative | | |
| Caution | | |

The gap between the representation of the state-authority in the table and the representation of the state appeared in the previous section is dramatically radical. Even with their basic condition aside from any context the equalities in the table offers a frame of the state that represents the Republic for the rightist-conservative sides. When the process of the Republic and its modernization practices are being talked, "the holiness of the state" is not mentioned, the quality of the "father" is not referred in the criticisms of the state and the "father" is opposed as much as it performs improper attitudes and approaches that are expected from a "genuine father". Moreover, so to say again, the state is criticized to consider conservative masses (or the nation-people-citizen) as "step children"[73]. As it was seen before, while the state is sublimated as an entity or absoluteness, the harsh criticism of the state identified with the Republic should have various causes and reasons. The first indirect reason might be related with the rightist-conservative imagination of the state and the power. It can be said that the difference between the qualified mythical perception of the state and the perception of the state becomes embodied in the new regime is related to the distance toward the power. Otherwise, it is not quite possible to 'bear with' the state that is pointed at the above table.

As much as the right-conservatism approaches the state power and absorbs it, the language of the criticism and the distance toward it smoothes and then it is affirmed gradually. If we take into consideration that the right-conservative tradition can not develop a radical attitude and actuality, this evaluation gains a partial validity. As Taşkın emphasized in the study about the nationalist-conservative intelligentsia, the nationalist-conservatism is located in the state even when it opposed to it. In the main project of "the recovering of the national culture", the nation does not lean on its components, but leans on the state (Taşkın, 2007: 58- 61). The nationalist

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[73]"The step children" is a metaphor I propose. If the right-conservative tradition is being compared with the metaphor or the imagination that it creates, it can be said that my proposition is completely naive. In this context the "Sakarya Türküsü" poem of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek has an exceptional symbolic importance and value. For the phenomenological-psychoanalytic analysis of the imagination expressed in this poem through the "discourse of being oppressed" see Fethi Açıkel, "Kutsal Mazlumluğun Psikopatolojisi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, No: 70, s. 166- 167, İstanbul, Birikim Yayınları, 1996.

conservatism perceives the capture of the state and the politics as a struggle among the elites around the institutions of the state and this option is the reason of this perception (Taşkın, 2007: 61). This condition is compatible with the judgment about the limited perception of the politics that is mentioned in the "the political imagination" section.

In the interviews of the politicians, it can be seen that one of the most emphasized theme is the relationship between the state and the nation (or the society and the citizen) which is "far", "distant" and "disconnected" since the foundation of the Republic. It is expressed that the main reason of the so-called *farness*, *distanceness* and the *disconnectedness* is Republic's "non-consideration of the values of the nation". The causes of this condition is being explained by the radical ideology and applications of the Republic's founder will toward the arrangements of the social and the cultural life. It can be seen that the most heavy critics toward the founder will and the bureaucratic elitist personnel that apply it is *the politics of religion* and the parallel applications. The basic principle and the practice in which this politics appear tangibly, is the politics of "secularism". The practices related with the secularism and the regulations providing the union of the education such as the closure of the tekkes and zawiyas, the prohibition of the religious symbols in the public area, the translation of the azan into Turkish etc. are criticized harshly. Moreover, other reforms and practices such as the language reform, the transition to the Latin alphabet, are also being criticized heavily. According to the most of the rightist-conservative politicians, the modernist ideology of the Republic and its bureaucratic elite executives become alienated toward the society, "toward its moral and cultural values"; it became "alienated", "estranged" and sometimes behave hostilely toward the values of the society in question. Another important factor that is mentioned in the interviews frequently is the concept of "national will" and the emphasis on its "cancellation". According to this, the national will is "invaded" with the illegitimate ways and methods by the transition into the multi-party period. In this way, it is frequently expressed that the practices of "National Chief" caused a deep dissatisfaction and suspicion toward the values of the Republic. While

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evaluating the Republic process, the distinction between pre-National Chief and after-National Chief periods frequently. The experiences through the period between the lifetime of M. Kemal and 1950s usually interpreted as traumatic-incidental and criticized intensely. In this period while M. Kemal is remembered as an affirmative figure, İsmet İnönü and his period is criticized seriously even if this period was short. According to many conservative politicians, the period and practices of National Chief are the "main" reasons of the distance toward the state and caused the Republic being "misevaluated" *generally*. On the other hand, many reforms and practices being criticized are found "partially understandable" with bringing "the extraordinary conditions" of the foundation of the republic and the new state, to the agenda. "Despite everything", it is expressed that the republic and the process of modernization bring many things to the society and it is distanced to the radical criticisms toward the foundation philosophy of the republic. What is striking about this transferred observations and evaluations is that there is no important difference among the politicians interviewed.

The social-cultural policies of Kemalism are seen as radical and they are criticized with its many ways from both rightist and leftist politics. It can be said that these criticisms toward radicalism in question mainly concentrate in culturalist tradition if we consider the content of the interviews. Şerif Mardin evaluates the response toward the radical character of the cultural modernization on the axes of the "center-periphery" conceptualization. According to Mardin, "until recent times, the opposition of the center and the periphery is the most important social disconnection underlying in the Turkish politics and it seems to survive after more than 100 years of modernization" (Mardin, 1995: 37). According to Mardin, the continuity is in the understanding of the center and in the opposition of center-periphery, and the break is to live this relationship on the "nation-state" axis (Keyman, 2001: 21). While the center based administration of the society determines the public benefit and general will in the political area identified with the state, it has the tendency to define the periphery as "the modern nation which will be modernized, rationalized and become contemporaneous" (Keyman, 2001: 21). According to Mardin, this understanding

can only remove the center-periphery harmony with the way of 'ideology' as much as it ignores the ontological existence of the differences. As Mardin stated: "The official attitude of the Republic is to neglect the structure of the Anatolia which resembles to a draughtboard [dama tahtası]. By this way, the generations that are adopted to the Republican ideology, saw and rejected the local, religious and ethnic groups as unnecessary remnants from the dark ages of Turkey. When they encounter, they treated them as if they are remnants. Therefore, the center confronts the periphery again as *the Big Equalizer*, and this displayed the gloomy and strict appearance of the center again. The unsophistication of the Kemalist ideology should be taken in the lights of these realities. Atatürk tried to do the things which he could not manage by political mobilization or serious changes about the social structure by ideology. This was a heavy burden that was transformed to the ideology" (Mardin, 1995: 64).

As the details and reasons will mentioned at the end of this section, considering the general content of the interviews from this context is not enough to understand the approaches and the criticisms about the state-society and the modernization process generally. It is more meaningful to look at the observations and assessments that I mentioned so far through the axis of the narrations of the politicians. A politician from AKP makes an assessment about the "being remoteness" of the state society relations with the foundation of republic:

> "When the Republic is constructed, the opening of the Parliament is made by the hymns, by chanting of the Quran. In those systems with a remaining system from the Ottomans, our beliefs, values are much appreciated. In the period after that, for example abolition of the caliphate, abolition of the sultanate, abolition of the Arabic, transformation to Latin alphabet or clothing reform, hat reform is realized. Most of these actions created boredom over our citizens. The citizens stay distanced from the state, they lost their confidence. Those applications were not accepted by the public commonly. Some people from CHP accepted them. They established a second party, but closed it at that time. Some adopted them and then all the opportunities of the state were devoted to them. For example, in the single-party period of CHP, the governors worked as if they were a provincial head of the party. This kind of a thing is impossible in democracies. They always show this face of the state to the

citizens, they do not reconcile with the citizens (…) In fact, Democrat Party did not bring a big reform or revolution. The translation of the azan into Turkish boomed their potential of votes in Turkey. This means that there was a huge mass who were not pleased from the administration, government and system. They immediately supported the government which answered their minimum demand, they selected them as the ruling power. These factors that I mentioned caused a distance and disaffection between the state and nation." (A20)

According to another politician from AKP, who states that the relations between the state and the society are problematic since the foundation of republic, these problems still exist today:

"You eliminate the holy things for the people instantly, you exterminate the mosque, the Quran training, the azan of the people etc. There's an administration, caliphate style that people subjected to. You withdraw, eliminate the caliphate suddenly. Now can you expect from these people to *be friend* with this state? There is a disconnection and even a total disagreement started from those times; in fact the troubles today date back to those times." (A12)

According to a politician from MHP who expressed that "the values belong to the nation" was not considered in the foundation of Republic process, the disconnection between the state and the society caused by these reasons. According to this politician "the reformist and jacobin spirit of Atatürk prevented him to see the values of the nation at the right time:

"I wish he could have constructed a system which gives more place to the values of the nation before he passed away. In the period after Atatürk, this distance expanded. The jacobins of Republic who settled especially at Ankara Hotel classified this nation as "Hasolar, Hüsolar".[ordinary people] At 1950, when the multi- party regime is started, those Hasolar, Hüsolar came to light these people. They erase them at one whack. With the multi-party regime the values of the nation are more internalized by the state. This is why the people always tended to the rightist governments. They say something like "look, they care about me" etc. (M1)

The narration of a politician from SP is an important example with its content because it makes a kind of historical reading of the modernization of Turkey:

"He says we have two books; one of them is constitution and the other is Quran, and Quran is our constitution. After, in the period of single-party, We throwed the Quran away, we tortured it, there were serious things. How did the Renaissance occur in the West? It started by opposing the mentality which monopolizes the religion, puts people to the heaven, sends them to the hell, deposes the kings. The renaissance, democracy, the development of the human rights, even the development of the culture were started in the West like that. Therefore, the vision of the West about the world, politics and ideological restructuring were developed like that. Our elites, the elites that constituted the Republic grown up with these values of the West, therefore they said that "what should we do to develop our religiosity, religious values, religious feelings? We should oppose it. Because the biggest obstacle of our improvement is the religion. It's book, Quran, this or that, they are moral things. They are factors that cause people's illiteracy." If we start from here, something emerges, which imposes a life philosophy and a development model. In Turkey, an apparatus of the state that insists on a modernization project and an elite community is occurred. On the other hand, the problem of Turkey was not its religiosity, on the contrary, the problem emerged from forgetting about the religion. We are a society which has not been producing since the times of Kanuni. First, we wrote it onto deepnote [haşi], then we tried to improve ourselves with copies, translations, then our culture developed that way. We step out being a society producing its own values. We are like that for three centuries, four centuries. When we cannot see what is and where is our problem, we took the solutions from Europe, took it and imposed here. In fact, this costume did not fit us, it was too narrow. This formula doesn't suit here. $H_2O$ is water here as well, but probably it's not like the $H_2O$ in Europe. Therefore, there are practices of the state starting from here for modernizing the society; shaping the society according to itself, to its own world, to its imaginations of thought, to its life philosophy. In fact, this doesn't start with the republic. So, as Ziya Paşa said, after the revolution of The Union and Progress is a kind of modernization which starts with the Ottomans. So, you can take it until Tanzimat Fermanı, you can take it until there. When the people from the West, who are educated in the West and grown up within the western philosophy come back to work, so you can witness that the state insists on an ideology, an idea, a life philosophy at the time of Ottomans too. Talat Paşa and a district governor called Mustafa Kemal instructs the azan in Turkish. This event was experienced in a county at the Ottoman period. The public revolts again. Talat Paşa takes him, made him owner agent, but acts as if he punished him in front of the people. In fact, he was promoted. The same was experieneced after the foundation of the Republic; even now or in the periods of coup d'etats too. The people who realized the 1980 coup d'etat was also established religious education as an obligation in the constitution. Therefore, the disconnection between the state and society based on a historical surface. It is not true to attribute it to the Republic. There has been a

controversy between the state and public for 200 years; this is not today's story, that's the thing." (S1)

A politician from DP who says that "the elite regime" of the Republic excludes the public, makes the following analysis:

"Atatürk walked hand in hand with the public during the Republic period, but it can not be denied that he was a revolutionist at the same time. It's true that he realized something that were not welcomed by the nation, but he became successful and realized them in the public. Whatever, he made the transition to the Latin alphabet in a corner of the country, he made the hat reform in a conservative place i.e. Kastamonu, so he made this within the public. The period after Atatürk unfortunately became a period of estrangement, although it should have been a period of fusion with the Republic, a period of understanding the virtue and qualities of the Republic. The elite regime that governs the Republic and its bureaucratic crew left out the public, they were disconnected from the public. Therefore, in a period of profiting by the virtues of Republic, in a period of understanding what the Republic adds to their lives, the public kept out, remained distant from the Republic. The DP period after those times unfortunately made this deficiency in such heavy conditions, therefore that period turns into an understanding of revenge." (D1)

A politician from BBP, indicates that the democracy in Turkey does not reside literally with all its institutions and rules, and the reason of this is related to the domination of "the single party period mentality". This politician who argues that the democracy does not settle down with all its institutions and rules defends that not only "the state-nation", but also "the army-nation" should merge with each other:

"… in our country, the institutions of the democracy did not settle down yet. We always oppose to the understanding of the despotic, repressive state. We support the army-nation merge as well as the state-nation merging. This is our principle as Büyük Birlik. In other words, merging with the state, with the nation and the merging of the state with the nation is an indispensable principle. According to our principle, there is no state without nation. We advocate the state that is serving and manservant; not a dominant, repressive, despotic state. The mentality of the Ottoman, our ancestry was the serving, manservant state. We are sharing the same understanding, but unfortunately there has been a repressive state understanding in Turkey. It is an understanding that does not consider the nation. Its dates back the National Chief period at Republic." (B5)

As it is stated above, there is an emphasis on the modernized ideology of the Republic and the bureaucratic elite as its practitioner, were far from the society with their applications against the society, and its moral and cultural values. Another important factor that is frequently mentioned is the "rape and repeal" of the state with unlegitimate ways and methods until transition into the multi-party period. Among the rightist-conservative politicians, there is a remarkable aggreement in the critic of the single-party period mentality. According to a politician from AKP, who makes a description related to the period in question with depicting such a criticism:

> "When we transformed into the multi-party period in 1946, it was the time when Menderes and Celal Bayar spoke to the masses by saying "Enough, nation speaks now!" In other words, it was the time when the academic people, the intellectuals, the university instructors around İsmet Pasha said "Pasha, what are they saying? They are crazy, they will govern Turkey with Hasos, Memos [ordinary people]. This is a contradiction and it's the weakness of leftists in Turkey (…) there is no understanding like the public have the right to talk. There's a culture of imposition, so that the public must do the missions given to them. The dictatorships, the communist regimes also did the same thing. You will say that we will transform into the multi-party life, the democratic system and then you will say the public doesn't know anything etc. In other words, when we say 'Enough, nation speaks now!', when we say 'we want to bring the nation to the power by the democratic ways', the public shifts to these parties. Could I explain what I mean? (…) I would like to state that the aim is totally different here. The aim is biased, the aim behind this is biased. If we talk about the Republic, democracy today, we should think about Atatürk. When you cehcek the memoirs of Atatürk and the Nutuk [allocution] we see that Atatürk struggled for the War of Independence, for democracy, for the republic. With his everlasting energy, he was in the fronts once, then at the Parliament. By nonstop working during the night and day his aim was to prevent Turkey going back to an authoritarian administration. Now, after a long struggle, this time an oligarchic administration comes into question. And it was the National Chief period. The most obvious example was that azan was in Turkish, although it was a case opposite to values of the nation. These practices, which were against the national values and applied disregarding the nation, got reaction." (A8)

A politician from AKP **(A7)** who expresses that "the elitist people" dictates to the public that they are *the real owners of the state* by using "the formative power" of the state and "created their own sultanate" asserts that "the single- party period

mentality" spreads today. According to him: "the institutions such as Halkevleri and Köy Enstitüleri are the authoritative-fascistic structures in which the mentality and ideology of the state are dictated to the public despite the public." This mentality ignored "AşıkVeysel[74], Karacaoğlan and Yunus Emre; prohibited the folk poems and folk songs and then the public were forced to listen Beethoven and Mozart".

A politician from MHP who analyzes the Republic period in interesting periodizations through his narration says that:

"(…) Look, we can tell or express the condition of Turkey today as follows. I divide the Republic into three periods. The first one is between 1923-1938; the second one is between 1940-1950, and the third is after 1950. The period between 1923-1938 is just the period of Kuvay-i Milliye spirit, which we mentally feel ourselves close to this side. You know, the period between 1940- 1950 is the recession period of the Republic. The period of Inonu is the period of recession. It's a period of recession in terms of economy, democracy, technics and science. If the spirit between 1923 to 1938 continued until 1950, there would be no trouble today that we are living (…)" (M2)

According to a politician from SP, who makes an evaluation with separating Mustafa Kemal from CHP of the 1928, argues that after death of Mustafa Kemal, "an oppression over the public has been constructed by using his moral authority". According to him:

"I am evaluating the event within the historical process as follows: I think, some operations of Atatürk especially in the Republic period of Turkey was not well understood or it was misunderstood. I think they are used especially by a specific group to construct oppression over certain fractions intentionally. By this understanding, I separated the practices of CHP from the practices of Atatürk. I think that Atatürk was not able to bring his own thoughts, requests into life very much especially after 1928. We saw that after 1928, especially CHP acted outside of the expectation of the society by using the moral authority of Atatürk. We saw that the society was canalized towards a specific ideology, towards a specific direction. We saw an oppression –we don't say an attack- against the core values and belief aspects that

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[74]It should be noted that the politician makes a factual mistake here. Âşık Veysel was always rewarded by the state, even he gave lessons at Köy Enstitüleri [Village Institutes]. Related to this subject please see. Can Dündar, *Köy Enstitüleri*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara, 2011.

you bring from the past. In that period, we saw that the elite section, in today's expression the bourgeois section, was separated totally from the public mass from the Anatolian people. We also see these people do not have an influence in the political mechanism, administrative mechanism. How long does this case continue? An election was made in 1946 in the format of 'hidden vote, open classification.' This does not reflect the real result, but in 1950 the masses of people ended the single-party power while saying that 'from now on, we want to raise our voice'. The people, our people is so interesting that they never accept the oppression against themselves. Our people has an understanding of never accepting the oppression against their own belief, their own values, their culture. They still protect these values." (S12)

A similar perception that is stated above is expressed by a politician from DP as follows:

"(…) Especially starting from the National Chief period, unfortunately the following notions were dominant in Turkey: the state and the nation are separate concepts; the state is a concept having more elite bureaucrats and administrators; the nation were like *their herds*, the nation became the group of people coming together *to be harbored*. Today the reason of the "state-nation hand in hand" concept endures on the National Chief. In fact, I think that the reason of the appearance of concepts such as "Enough, nation speaks now!", "state-nation hand in hand" was the separation of the state and the nation by the National Chief…" (D1)"

Despite these intensive criticisms focused on the single-party period and the National Chief İnönü and even if the table given above reflected dramatic points, it seems difficult to talk about a total political-ontological criticism towards the Republic. The Republic is paid attention as an understanding of political ideal and administration by the politicians, who have the most distant stand against the Republic and the ideology it represents. The criticized points are not the philosophical ideals and the process, but "the elitist mentality", "malicious bureaucrats" and "the shortsighted administrators." The "virtues and acquisitions" of the Republic are emphasized and usually "the wrong-incorrect" discourses and applications of the Republic were ignored by an apological discourse and they were claimed at the last instance. It might be said that this case shows both 'the consolidation' and its boundaries of Kemalism and its modernized ideology.

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According to a politician from AKP, who states that the social change is inevitable, both Turkey and the republic were changed and this is not against the principles of the republic and the public "internalized and penetrated them completely":

> "The change of Turkey is not a change against the basic principles of the republic. The change of Turkey is not something against the acquisitions of the republic. Somebody project these things as a real case, because their sphere gets narrow." (A7)

For another politician from AKP, who finds "the modernization project of the Republic successful in general on *some* ways without doubt", because there are *still* some "troubles that couldn't have been overcome" and these troubles are related to the "non-comprehension of the modernization process by the Muslims completely". According to this politician, Muslims "should develop a more rational understanding of Islam":

> "(…) I think that today's Muslims, the religious people call themselves as Muslims are not the same with the ones in the beginnings of the 1900s. They are more different. They thought themselves as Muslims, but there is a need for settling a more rational understanding of Islam. For me, the republic realized its duty for spanning a more rational Islamic understanding. Now, it's time for Muslims to accomplish this by themselves. I find the process of Republic's modernization successful in general." (A26)

A politician from MHP who does nott find criticizing the process in question "very fair" by considering the past from today. His attitude can be taken as an apologetic attitude with his consideration about the difficulties and "the extraordinary conditions of the constitution of the Republic. According to this politician, who says that "the transition from an undeveloped agriculture society to a democracy cannot be actualized easily as it is assumed", the republic is "an approach of a new attempt and civilization." This politician thinks that this kind of criticism is inevitable after "all the major reforms". Therefore, the reactions during a transformation into a new civilization and mentality should be considered as normal.

> "(…) of course some requests and demands were not fulfilled totally to compose the republic tradition; there were something against the experiences of [the public] until that day and the

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opposite was impossible. These were seen as the insistence and impositions of the state by the society. We perceive this conflict when we read the history. Even the alphabet reform is a very big issue. Telling the people that "we abolish this, you will not read this anymore, but you will read this instead" is not very easy. When all these existed, of course there were conflicts between the state and the society, but I don't criticize this. I consider them as the sine qua non results of a new beginning. There was a new beginning, as a result of this beginning the things occured. Maybe these could be more merciful and more clinching, but we don't know about the shortages those people had in those days (…) This country emerged in the lands of Anatolia by passing through really difficult conditions and by transforming from a world-wide empire. Then it created a sprout, a tree and a green mass. This is an admiring thing, a person who experienced this period can not criticize the republic. However, it doesn't mean that it is free of defects." (M8)

According to a politician from MHP, who says that there was a mutual agreement in the first parliament about the constitution of republic and the basic principles of the state, there was an alliance about establishing an independent country under invasion after a national struggle and "chosing republic as its political regime." After this alliance it is decided that the state should be unitary. This politician defines the character of the regime as the republic and being unitary state as "the philosophy of foundation". He says the state "is founded as once" and follows:

"(…) this basic philosophy never ever changes while the ruling power changes. The nation does not vote any political power which is related with changing these principles of foundation. However, after this state is founded, there was a struggle about holding the power, the power of administration. In this struggle, two different thoughts appeared. One of them is the tradition of the Union and Development Party, and the other is the tradition of The Free Republican Party. Through the principle of secularism and the values of the nation, through realizing the social, cultural and industrial development, the struggles of two thoughts emerged in Turkey. Both of them were developmentalist and progressive. Some differences occurred related with the progress and development of the country in terms of cultural aspect, values of the nation, for the social and cultural transformation. The priorities about these subjects formed the differences. This is the reason of the fight. It's the same fight today." (M18)

I think that the narration of this politician who grounds "today's fight" on the differences about how this social and cultural transformation are being made, is very important so that I will emphasize it widely. This politician assigns his personal life story as the core of his narration in which he evaluates "the acquisitions of the republic." The content and frame of this story might be seen as a very distinctive text in the extent that it allows both a social-cultural and a class-structural reading of the modernization process of Turkey:

"If we come to the acquisitions of the Republic, let me give an example from my life. I was born in a village. I am a person who grew up in a family who sent me to take care of the cows in the morning. I went to a village school, I read Quran because my grandfather was an imam. Our first experience started with migrating from the village to the city. When I came here, I met the city culture. I had a different accent and I was excluded. When I say exclusion, maybe the people did not exclude me intentionally, but I had that feeling. However, in fact, they excluded me. For example, the children sometimes had fun with me by calling me as "peasant". After time passed, I realized that it was impossible for me to adapt the society as long as I remained the same person. Then, you don't do this intentionally, but you got the feeling that you have to transform, you have to change your inner world. Why should you adapt? I swear, if you don't change you cannot have neighbours, you cannot have friends, you will always be *otherized*. This feeling is not very nice. If you don't want to be otherized, you have to change. First, I changed my accent. Through changing my accent, they thought that I am not a different person, they perceived that way. For instance, the style of eating in our house was different, we were eating on the ground table then we started to eat on the table. When we had better economic conditions, we started to eat meat. Let me explain this. We haven't had refrigerator. After a while, when we got better economically, the staff in our home started to change. As we were educated, our social relations started to change. We started to get close to the city more and more. After a while I had friends. Then we started to meet other families, but not everyone. My father has never been 'from here'. After the years of my first youth, I started to have friends from primary school, high school, university and then I slowly started to be 'from here'. But it's related with something else. You gain intellectual accumulation, after a while your aesthetic concerns emerge. You just realize that you have an aesthetic culture from the harmony of the stuff in your house and the coherency of your dress as well. After experiencing these things, I mean according to the content of your experiences, you start to perceive the world differently whether you aim it or not. This is different in Istanbul, in Adapazarı and in Erzurum. Then, I started to be invited to those urban people's communities, weddings. We started to visit each

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other as families, I started to join non-governmental organizations. Rather, somehow I became one of the urban people. There are thousands of examples. I told you about myself, but there are many people in Istanbul who came from a small town, maybe they started the life through experiencing very difficult conditions. There might be a person who achieved to reach important levels, who has intellectual dimensions, and who is immensely cultured, modern, contemporary. However, I have never lost my values. When I go to my town I dance with them (horon). People from my village may come and stay in my house. I have never alienated from my people. I've never forgotten where I came from. I've neither lost my local cultural values nor had a lack in my national values. On the contrary, I added and grounded more emotional things as well. It was so. But after 1970s, because of the high density of the migration from village to city, it was difficult for the people to adapt the city culture. Most of these people didn't change. They resisted to change and resisted to transform. They constituted their own ghettos. They formed their own ghettos all over Turkey; in big cities, in their own slums. The people from Gaziantep, Sivas or other cities, didn't change their accents. They didn't change their eating habits. Even if they developed economically, they didn't change such aspects. They were far from being urban people and the urban people draw themselves back and this culture began to be dominant in the city. In fact, I say that this government (refers to the AKP) is the product of this culture. Could I explain? Because the people, who were resistant to change and development, by not changing themselves and oppressing the city culture… Because there was no change and transition, I think they reflected their choice by voting a ruling power who is one of themselves. Then AKP emerged and they assigned themselves as the ruling power. In any case, the social scientists, the political scientists, just like you are, they will evaluate whether this status is a challenge towards the Republic or not. But I want to keep my optimism from many respects…"

"(…) according to me, the republic accomplished many things. For example, the national education policy. Although there are some deviations from time to time, I don't think that there are many problems about the common values of our whole nation today, irrespective of the political parties." (M18)

"(…) I don't think that the establishment of the state is not a matter of [establishing] a nation. The minorities, such as the Armenians, Rums were immigrated from Turkey. They had to imimigrate or however you call the situation, Turkey belongs to the Turks. Another success of Turkey is having a national policy of economy. It was not a coincidence that the economy congress and national educational council were established before the establishment of the republic. It proves that the people who established the republic highly valued the economy issue. *Levantenler* [Levantine], minorities, non-muslims used to own the economic power. Several attempts were realized in order to structure our national bourgeoisie. For instance,

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there were families who were particularly selected, who are for instance called as Sabetay. Those are the aspects that were releted with the establishment of a national state within *İttihat Terakki* [The Committee of Union and Progress] or during the establishment of a state. Those people used to have significant roles within the national independence movement, which means that they had crucial functions during the establishment of a national state and national bourgeoisie. Because they were educated, they were far beyond the general educational level of the Turkish people of that time. They used to speak foreign languages, they were educated and they were rich. Who could the state post instead of them? I don't underestimate, but could the Villager Mehmet Ağa be posted for such a purpose by the state? The state chose and posted these people at that time. The people were provided an opportunity to structure a national bourgeoisie. That was the source at that time. Who could structure the public economic enterprise in a state which is lack of capital accumulation? Getting foreign credit, constituting the industry and such things wil be realized by the state as a normal citizen cannot manage them. First the public economic enterprises were established, then there was a safe transition to the joint economic system. Now, there is a transition to the liberal economy, which is a transition to the private sector. This period is in a quite successful continuum." (M18)

The first part of this politician's narration explains "today's struggle" through the differences in social and cultural transitions. He develops a structure on his personal history which points out the socio-economic or structural aspects of the modernization. The narration is important as it emphasizes the socio-cultural aspect of the modernization. The narration provides the items for an empirical legitimacy for different attitudes about the modernization in Turkey and it exemplifies that the social reality is a 'structuring period'. It should be stated that it is a valid evaluation tendency among the MHP politicians to state the problems and inadequacies through an *apologetic* discourse during the establishment of the republic and there are several narrations within the study that is similar to the one mentioned above.

According to a AKP politician **(A24),** the republican philosophy occurred during the establishment of the republic is changing and everything, including the perception of the religion, is changing and transforming. When the religion issue is not a problem anymore, we can talk about "real political issues in Turkey". According to this

politican, the Turkish society is "being modernized gradually". For him, modernization is "an inevitable period" and this can be described "perhaps by the next one or two generations". This politician states that the stunning success of the republic is "the infrastructure that allows the transformation of the society" despite all the suffers and struggles. It might be mentioned that the 'consolidation' of the republic can explicitly be determined at least through the narrations of the DP politicians with respect to the central right politics.

According to a DP politician "our people" do not think that the republic "caused any inconvenience or problem" for them. He states that some "leftist and religious parties", which "sometimes" rule the country, or such type of people "exploit unsatisfaction of the people":

> "(…) some people attempt to criticize Atatürk in order to underestimate the republican values. This deceptive and national outlook understanding on the one side, and the old Marxist Leninist cadres of the second republic on the other side, try to impose their understanding to our society. However, I don't consider that is correct in terms of politics. The values and the infrastructure of the republic is obvious. I don't evaluate it through the conservative thought. I'm open to the modernity and my political party as well. We are open to all sorts of modernity. However, I value this as long as it corresponds with the social, cultural, religious and moral values of our people." **(D14)**

A DP politician, who is sensitive about the "establishment philosophy" of the republic, states the following evaluations in an authoritarian language and discourse:

> "The party, which is the ruling political party in Turkey, should respect the establishment ideology of the Turkish Republic. If you discuss about the establishment philosophy, aims and ideals of the republic, then you can face problems. It is because there is a philosophy when the states are established. Every state indicates this aspect. Russia, USA, Germany, they all own this philosophy. The Turkish state has the same. When the Turkish Republic was being established there were sufferings. The people suffered a lot. If you eliminate them, then there is no reason to exist within that state. This state changes its structure, it cannot survive. The political parties do not make politics other than the establishment philosophy of

the state. There might only be some nuances and style differences within that philosophy. Unfortunately, we question those points and I am worried about the discussions." (D15)

It might be stated that the right-conservative politicians mostly agree and constitute a common infrastructure with respect to the different evaluations and critiques when they were asked to evaluate the historical and political period on the axis of the state and society since the establishment of the republic. The primary stunning point in this agreement is the *focus on culture*, which is dominant within the critiques. In this respect, when the general culturalist context and content of the (standard) right-conservative critique about the modernization practices of the Republic period is considered, a type of coherence and continuum can be mentioned. Of course, it seems to be unnecessary to mention that the current culturalist critique is an explicit or implicit political critique as well. The reactions against (Kemalist) culturalist radicalism or the opposition party itself having another type of culturalism is interesting here. As Taşkın (2007: 37 and 381) states that the nationalist-conservatism has taken over the mentioned cultural voluntarism from the Kemalist ideology.

According to Açıkel (2006: 34) the subject is important in terms of political power analysis. He highlights that both the people who support the Kemalist modernization and also the ones who support Islam have a tendency to degrade the Ottoman-Republic history into a narrow point that is a power struggle of secular and religious ideas: "In this respect, there is no major 'value-directional' difference between the nationalist left tradition, which describes the power analysis through the history of the struggle between the groups who belong to the 'revolutionary' and 'counter-revolution' ideologies and the right conservative tradition, which defines the power analysis as the struggle between the 'imitator' and 'authentic' powers. This means that both the ruling power and the opposition party in Turkey share a dualist modern society understanding on the basis of cultural characteristics".

It is possible to announce that each topic (state, disunity among the state-nation-society, religious policies, social-cultural revolutions-reforms etc.) that the critical right-conservative *round* agree on are subject to be discussed solely on their own, which point out a tremendous social-cultural, political and academic accumulation, literature or field. When the critical attempts against the Kemalist modernization period, which indicates the critiques of not only the right-conservative tradition but also the left and liberal tradition, it is not possible to evaluate each matter-object discursively and also practically. Instead of this, I consider meaningful to problematize the culturalist tendency that was provided by the empirical data of the study.

There is an interesting coherence between the discursive order and content of the narrations and the points highlighted by "center-periphery" approach, which is one of the methods[75],[76],[77] of the current discursive reading-analysis about the modernization period of Turkey.

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[75] There are three main 'hypothetic-normative' discourses, which are dominant in the social sciences literature as a reading and analyzing method of the modernization period in Turkey. According to Keyman the first one is the *political modernization*, the second is the *economic modernization* and the third one is the *identity discourse* (Keyman, 2001: 11). For Keyman, those 'hypothetic-normative' discourses, despite the differences among them, should act together within the modernization paradigm (Keyman, 2001: 11). According to the political modernization discourse, the state is the founder, explanatory and determinant actor (or the dominant subject) in explaining the society and social change, in the settlement of the social problems and in the limitations between the political and social. *Economic modernization discourse* describes the modernization period (dependent) as the development of nationalist capitalism. Economy is the determinant factor and transporter subject of the modernization. In this respect, modernization is the application of different development strategies and the establishment of political and ideological institutions appropriate to those strategies. *Identity discourse* functions as the critique of the political modernization discourse and it describes the state-centered modernization as the transformation of a society completely by an authoritative mentality with its own ideology. This discourse supports and enriches the social with respect to the political. According to this discourse, the real modernity can be possible with a civil society which represents a minimal state, free market and liberties (Keyman, 2001: 11-12). Although those discourses indicate certain accurate points, Keyman states that there are also serious problems parallel to his classification. According to this: 1. All those discourses own a certain linear and theological understanding of history. They accept that modernization is a continuous and progressive process that has a starting and ending point. 2. These approaches indicate the functionalist and minimalist aspects of modernization paradigm. Complicated, multi-dimensional and contradictory periods were reduced to a certain basis, which is the state or the economy or the identity. This basis makes of the other relations, describes and structures them. 3. These approaches use the systematic and perpetuity thesis while reading the history. In this respect, modernization is reduced to nation-state history or to progress levels of dependent capitalism or to a continuous authoritarian mentality. 4. All those

The coherence or mutuality between the proposals and determinations of the "center-periphery" approach, which might also be called as "cultural alienation thesis" (Çınar, 2006), and the general content and context of the narrations resemble the reality of the "center-periphery paradigm and also becomes the paradigm which constructs the reality" (Açıkel, 2006: 34). In this respect, the 'paradigm' might be considered as submitting/providing the ideological-political legitimacy framework for the right-conservative politics.

The mentioned 'paradigm', which seems to be one of the main instruments of Turkish politics, its political history and social structure, becomes more than an analytical attribution framework and transforms into a political and hypothetical position, which legitimizes the given socialization, politics and political power in terms of the right politics. As Açıkel states (2009: 169): "the center-periphery paradigm, especially in the hand of conservative academic and political imagination, turns quickly into the "oppressive-oppressed paradigm. These might provide a basis for a mythological suffer and pain discourse along with a narration other than the

approaches indicate the fallacy of reducing the social processes and relations into actors/institutions that are analytically isolated from each other. They ignore the historical, discursive, multi-dimensional and relational structuring (2001: 12). However, when Keyman notices the defects of the discourses, he cannot see the weaknesses of Mardin's center-periphery approach. The assumption that Keyman mentions within the 4th item (the historical, discursive, multi-dimensional and relational structuring of the processes), is itself a meaningful and reasonable; but it can be discussed that the requirements of this proposal is provided completely by Mardin's studies, especially when the "center-periphery" approach is the subject. This statement does not mean disregarding the contributions and importance of Mardin's work, but it should not prevent to see the gap, deficiency or 'silence' within his studies. For an extensive work of Şerif Mardin, including mainly his "center-periphery" approach, the periodical *Toplum ve Bilim, No: 105* (2006) with the title "Which Center, Which Periphery?" is an important source.

[76] For a similar classification and evaluation of Fuat Keyman on Turkish modernization please see Alper Kaliber "Türk Modernleşmesini Sorunsallaştıran Üç Ana Paradigma Üzerine", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, *Volume: 3*, ed. Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002. For a critique on the operation and products of modernization theory both in international and Turkish social science practice please see Aykut Kansu *1908 Devrimi*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp: 8-34

[77] Another dominant reading-analysis of modernization period is being "state centered". For two different studies on state centered approaches, which critically evaluates the analytical and political dimensions, please see Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi" in *Praksis* No: 9, pp: 17-54, 2003; İsmet Akça, *Militarism, Capitalism and the State: Putting the Military in its Place in Turkey*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2006.

history (...) the paradigm is not an analytical instrument anymore and becomes the instrument of the political struggle".

Only a few of the interviewed politicians directly applied the mentioned paradigm, its main concepts and the analytical categories. Their "way of reading-evaluating" the state, politics and society in their narrations and evaluations repeats this framework and approves that through a highly mutual attitude. This situation itself might be considered as a strong indication about the political and ideological functionality of the 'paradigm'. The general discursive and empirical content that the theory provides or the correspondence of its assumptions might result in some political decisions. For instance, according to Açıkel (2006: 34): "…the anomaly, which is caused by the struggle between the center and periphery or modernity and tradition -for almost two hundred years-, is spreading the idea that the periphery/tradition can only be understood when it turns into its old systemic position. In this respect, this type of a millenarist understanding transforms into a revanchist instrument within the center-periphery polarization through the opposed conservative-religious 'environment'".

The society understanding inspired by Edward Shils' assumption (1975) that is "the society has a center" argues that the social unity is structured through a collective consensus on certain central values. According to this understanding the society is in fact a reality based on consensus. As Çınar (2006: 155) emphasizes this functionalist approach: "by prioritizing culture in social unity and by emphasizing that the power is based on consensus, it subordinates the force and struggle dimension of the ruling power phenomenon" and "cannot evaluate it proper enough". The mentioned approach might be considered as pointing out a political-ideological attitude by subordination of the ruling power or politics.

About the defects of the (Kemalist) modernization period, the most common decision was that "the values of the nation" were ignored. This subject is problematic 1. In terms of the social imagination it provides by reducing the "values of the nation" to

religion or tradition as a priori, 2. Politically (problematic) by "ignoring the ruling power dimension" through "the comprehension of cultural consensus" and reducing politics from the consensus and generating a static central understanding" (Çınar, 2006: 159). Another assumption might be that alienation or subordination might be dealt by transforming the 'periphery' values into 'center' (Açıkel, 2006: 59). The problem for social imagination is because it is not possible to evaluate the modern societies homogeneously in terms of culture and values (Çınar, 2006: 158). In fact, center-periphery "alienation" is "multi-dimensional that cannot be perceived only as a type of culturalism; just as the social power and opposition axes are multi-dimensional and multi-level" (Açıkel, 2006: 46).This approach provides the decision that "religion has a positive contribution for the continuum of social solidarity and integrity" and this decision implicitly "relates the order and community with the religion" (Çınar, 2006: 158). This claim and assumption is coherent with the proposal of orientalism[78] and "because it attributes an Islamic essence to the society, it ignores the social political movements that are not because of Islam or not related with Islam" (Çınar, 2006: 163). Another problematic issue politically is "the anomalies of the modernity led by the *utopic privileged people* who were alienated from the core social values can only be changed by a transition back to the *central social values*. It is a covert assumption that the symptoms of the *modernization from up* can be dealt with the modernization coherent with the *central values* of the society from down" (Açıkel, 2006: 59). This assumption is "based on the *democratic reformist periphery* ideal typification against the *bureaucratic-conservative center*" (Açıkel, 2006: 59). This ideal typification attributes periphery "an implicit democratic ethos" (Açıkel, 2006: 60) and perceives it with an understanding out of history and attaches an ontological privilege to it within the political field. This approach considers the disintegration or conflict within the political field based on a distinction between the *bureaucratic conservatism* and *popular democracy* (Açıkel,

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[78] For a study which exemplifies the modernization period of Turkey through orientalist premises please see Hakan Yavuz, *Modernleşen Müslümanlar Nurcular, Nakşîler, Milli Görüş ve Ak Parti*, İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2008. For the critique of this book please see Menderes Çınar, "Modified Orientalism: The Case of Hakan Yavuz's Islamic Political Identity in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No: 30, pp: 155-168.

2006: 59). In this case, the sides and subjects of the political conflict are described or evaluated in an illusive way. This is not only an analytical-academic deviation or defect, but also a case that has ideological-political implications as well.

Illusive or value directed reading-analysis method, especially with the ruling power of AKP, seems to aid the right-conservative wings and liberals (or 'democrats') to gather for a consensus or perhaps, for an "alliance"[79]. According to Açıkel, *the rise of right intelligentsia* is a reason for the rise and spread of paradigm and this paradigm is interesting for the intelligentsia for two reasons: first, as it provides the opportunity for the critiques of modernization strategies and also because it provides the opportunity of constructive aspect which excludes Islamic tradition based on the 'central value system' notion of Shils. Secondly, as an alternative to Marxist infrastructure and superstructure distinction and class struggle, it adopts center-periphery analysis of the right-wing as a socio-cultural struggle analysis instrument (Açıkel, 2006: 34-35). For instance, according to Taşkın, who states that the Islamic tradition that AKP leans on constructed its autonomous economic and cultural organization within the last twenty years. In this respect, AKP had a more dynamic and known organic intelligentsia than the nationalist conservative privileged group : "Organic intellectuals of the AKP seem to be away from their sceptical and hesitant attitude of the central-right against the liberal ideology and the intellectuals who are close to AKP work hard to synthesize liberalism and conservatism" (Taşkın, 2007: 391-392).

The impacts of the results and outcomes of the mentioned 'work' within popular political field and academic field led a hegemonic position. As Sümer (2010: 68) states that liberal-conservative synthesis is not a temporary articulation style that is fed with political concerns among various ideological positions. This synthesis is the

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[79] Although some of the essays might be questioned in terms of the political proposals and implications, for the theoretical-political roots of 'liberal-conservative' alliance the following study might be examined: *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak*, der. Çağdaş Sümer and Fatih Yaşlı, Tan Yayınları, Ankara, 2010. For another study which analyses liberal-conservative alliance please see Mustafa Şen, "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party" in *Turkish Studies*, No: 11, 2010, pp. 59-84.

expression of the perception of a society and history that stems from fifty years of Turkish cultural mindset and from different traditions. In accordance with the society and history perception, when the discourse provided by the current political-ideological alliance of the liberals and conservatives is examined, it was seen that there is a demand of the liberals "for a complete regression of the 'state' in relation to the society and the extension of the field for the civil society (2010: 66-67).

The main concept and demand of the right-conservative discourse might be summarized as: "the transition of the ruling power to the "people" or their representatives with the same values by taking it from the privileged administrator group, who unjustly seize the power for eighty years, who are alien to the values of the people, which is a group of Westernized privileged administer group" (2010: 67). Although ideally and literally there is a demand to open more fields for civil society instead of the state, I think it is a problematic determination and demand as long as it does not question how the society is described. The way the right-conservative tradition imagines the society generally reduces it into stable essences and comprehends it as the same kind. Despite all its ambiguity, "the values of the people-nation" refer to the Turkish, Islamic and Sunni values. It should be mentioned that such an imagination is not distinctive from the society projection of the republican ideology. Consequently, instead of the demand of the right-conservatives (and some liberals) that is extending more space for the society against the state, I consider that we can talk about an imagination to structure an organic-homogenous society by filling the gap between the state and the society.

The right-conservative perception and point of view about the state and society captivated the dominant culturalism within the tradition with a political critique; it might be proposed that they survived and reproduced until today by the productive subjects of that tradition that is by the discourses of the politicians. When both the dominant discourse within the narrations and also the above theoretical evaluations are considered, the *lack of sociological tradition* (Yüksel, 2007) within the right-conservative politics and thought on the basis of their perception about the history,

society and power is quite obvious. The ideologists (and politicians) of the right-wing distinguish the cultural, political and economic fields sharply and attempt to define the culture as the main determiner. Although this is very inadequate Yüksel's determination-argument, which emphasizes the importance of the *ideological function* (2007: 81), is critical for this study. The claims of being the 'authentic representation' of the "nation" and being the unique bearer of its values, seems to hegemonize the conservative culturalism as a political convince project. It is obvious that culture is not the only aspect that realizes the political hegemony. The right-conservatism backs up liberal discourses and seems to reproduce the theoretical basis that will legitimize the ideological-political hegemony through the "center-periphery" and similar approaches.

# CHAPTER 7

**Conclusion**

The main leitmotiv and purpose of this study was to reveal that the right-conservative politics in Turkey has a character that is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous structure. As generating ideas on the right-conservative politics in Turkey, without taking into account the heterogeneity of the existing tradition, it should be emphasized that it is not possible to achieve a valid and meaningful evaluations on one specific component of this tradition such as nationalism, Islamism or conservatism; at least it would remain incomplete and inadequate. This detection does not mean to ignore the weight and the specific value of each of the different components of the tradition that dealt with. On the contrary, such detection suggests able to see its differences and similarities synchronously. Even more than it suggests focusing on the aforementioned political tradition's ideological, political and discursive points of articulation and differentiation.

The present study, using a framework offered by the discipline of sociology, dealt with primarily as a search for the answers to these questions preferred to focus on the analysis of the discourse and mentality of politicians who are the subjects/the producers of the aforementioned politics. On the basis of this general framework, the study **primarily** focused on the process of political socialization of politicians interviewed. **Second**, the concept of politics those politicians basically tried to understand how they perceive and gave meaning. **Third**, 'conservatism' concept/phenomenon just as a general indicator owned by the different politico-ideological components of the right wing politics in Turkey; try to determine what is understood. **Fourth**, it was deliberated on the relationship/the interaction between religion and nationalism as a matter of combining and dissecting in principal the

right wing politics in Turkey. Finally, it is focused on the state, authority, the republic and modernization process.

The main theme of the first part of the study was the political socialization dynamics of the politicians. In this section, it was tried to be understand of what was the - specific- dynamics of the political socialization process that the right-conservative politicians have. It is possible to mention the impact of political thoughts and traditions that one's family members had acquired or embraced as a factor which primarily impinges on the political socialization of right wing conservative politicians. Family is the basic unit where political socialization of right-wing conservative politicians takes place. In addition to family, institutions such as religion, traditions, customs and mores are also attributed a crucial significance for political socialization. Respect for the elderly, commitment to traditions, daily social and moral rituals are also frequently referred. Though it does not suggest a prominent and strong tendency, there are also politicians who mentioned the influence of factors other than their families for their political socialization process.

(Historic) Democratic Party functions at two levels; first it functions as an institutional framework for the collective memory of the right-wing conservative political tradition and politicians, and the formation of political identity and belonging. Secondly, it performs as a 'symbolically' by keeping the aforecited collective memory alive so that the 'opposition' and 'resistance' potential of right-wing political conservatism vis-à-vis Kemalism, Kemalist modernization and the left can be inherited via various discourses to present day.

Another influential factor is the friends and friendship circle. In addition to these, one can also talk about idealized individuals such as relatives, certain inspiring and portentous political figures, teachers, "elder brothers" and "elderly" as generating significant impact on political identity and belonging despite their constitutive contribution and weight differ. It should also be noted that social and cultural milieu also plays a significant part in the formation of political identity and political

belonging. The society one belongs and cultural climate within an individual lives is also decisive in this context. For example traditions, customs as well as religious conduct and culture, the geographical locality or the unit within which people live such as village, town, or neighborhood, some institutions and organizations, schools and reading habits also shape one's political identity and political belonging. Although not being able to treat this data within the margins of my study, it should be noted that subjective elements of psychology or various kinds of subjectivities as supervising aspects for the politician's personality and character have to be taken into account. Interest in and participation into politics starts at a very early age. Education has the most prominent influence over politicization. It is seen that especially higher education is a significant factor for political consciousness building and political belonging. Besides the factors already emphasized, it is inevitable to add the background which rooms for structural and historical dynamics as a determinant for political socialization. In fact, some narrative accounts of politicians whom I interviewed include striking factual information and references for those elements and dynamics that pertain to the structural and historical background. Though their constitutive impact and significance is still crucial, it is obvious that political identities and belongings are far from being analyzed solely with structural elements or merely reduced to the structural background. To determine the factors that play a role in the process of formation of political belonging and identity allows us to comprehend some distinctive attributes of ideologies and political thoughts.

The chapter on the political imagination of the study has demonstrated that political imaginations of the right-conservative politicians can be treated or classified four main axes. Conceptualized largely abstracted from the interview data, it should be noted that any of these political imaginations were the generic notions or one of those have an internal consistency or an inner adhesion. It can be possible to see the traces of each in the same interview at the same time. So I would like to emphasize that it is not possible to attribute absolutism any one of these imaginations. Nonetheless, the imaginations compared to each other, in terms of weight and importance, allows a hierarchical configuration. In this context, carrying the weight

and based on the priority, the politics is primarily a "service oriented" phenomenon or concept. In the study it was conceptualized as "service discourse". The second featured political vision is the "liberal conservatism" through which liberal and conservative political values are intertwined. This political imagination is named the "liberal-conservative politics" in the study. The third one is largely negating the politics that identifies and detects. This approach was discussed under the heading of "the politics as a negative political discourse". There is a political imagination looking at the politics from the radical-utopian perspective which handled the politics as a political and social change process. This trend is discussed under the heading of "radical-utopian politics".

There is a remarkable consensus among the right-conservative politicians in considering the politics on "service" axis. A significant number of politicians consider or perceive the politics on *service-based* manner. In this sense, there is no considerable differentiation among the right-conservative politicians in this perception of politics. It is remarkable that almost all interviewed right-conservative politicians from different parties describe politics as an activity based on service notion. In this respect, the "service notion" that is used by all right-conservative politicians while describing the politics, constitute a common ground for those politicians. This discourse makes it difficult for the politicians to announce the ideological-political differences among them. Because the general service emphasis on politics almost 'disappears/extinguishes' the differences among the politicians, they implicitly or explicitly emphasize the ways that "service" is provided. They legitimize this emphasis as a *distinction* of their party. This might present a specific aspect of the Turkish right-conservative politics. In order to establish a specific perspective or qualification about the Turkish right-conservatism, it should be mentioned that some detailed and extensive studies on "the discourse of service", which is found in this study, are necessary to structure the theoretical basis of the discourse.

The second prominent political imagination in the research was "liberal-conservatism". Right out of the narrative, which corresponds to the definition naming and discursive elements and indicators. As appears in the expressions of the politicians, there are various discursive factors and indicators that correspond to this description and classification. The liberal-conservative discourse within the expressions are concentrated on certain liberal political categorizes such as; supplying the freedom demands and extending the sphere of freedom, assigning importance and priority to the civil society, referring to some aspects and concepts such as, dialogue, consensus, negotiation, acceptance and tolerance of differences, limitations on state authority and criticism of all types of attempts of 'social engineering'. The discursive aspects above interwine the liberal-conservative imagination with the below mentioned aspects and articulates it with the neo-liberal new-right discourse. Those discursive aspects are globalization, market, change, privatization, small but a powerful state, which is responsible from providing the justice and security and which has a regulative role, and emphasis on entrepreneurship, competition, innovation, productivity, branding and individualism. I think that "service discourse" and "liberal-conservative" political imagination are related with each other both on practical and also theoretical level. I believe those two imaginations should be evaluated as the imaginations that can articulate with each other. This engagement is a type of economic-political engagement and it refers to a neo-liberal new-right political understanding. This type of political imagination is clear mainly in the expressions of the AKP politicians and partially in the expressions of the DP politicians. However, it should also be highlighted that the MHP, SP and BBP politicians represent a political line except the "liberal-conservative" line. As emphasized in the expressions often, the politicians insist on their calls for 'dialogue', 'consensus' and 'negotiation' or point out a (liberal) political pespective that is built with these concepts. In fact, insisting on projects structured with the will of dialogue, consensus and negotiation, which are meaningful when there is a real selection possibility and freedom, can only lead us to a point where we give up politics and democracy. Insisting dialogue, consensus, negotiation, reconciliation and avoidance of struggle (or antagonism) 'political' calls

of politicians, who express liberal-conservative imagination, might be evaluated in this respect. The vague democracy, pluralism and liberalism discourse of liberal-conservatism defended often with *politically right* motives, seems to be far from convincing. The mentioned calls implicitly and explicitly point out an imagination that tends to see the society as a homogeneous unity. In fact, the essential aspect enabling the modern society is not homogeneity, but in contrast, an inevitable struggling 'unity' comprising/accepting pluralism and diversities as *a priori.* 'Each imagination, which ignores this aspect where the 'political one' and politics gains its real meaning, despite of its calls such as negotiation, consensus, etc., it is lack of referencing a democratic politics and its constitutional qualifications. In fact, the politicians who have 'political visions' limited with neoliberal and/or conservative world envisions, it is questionable that what is going to be negotiated and on which issue there will be a consensus.

The third perception, which is a significant tendency in politicians' expressions, the 'politics as a negative imagination'. This approach describes and perceives politics through a set of negative qualities, definitions and classifications. Even an evaluation merely within the framework of those qualities and classifications might show that it indicates a perception which trivializes and disregards the existance of politics as a social activity, discredits and opposes it within time. As a finding of this research that conservatism denies the existance of politics, discredits and opposes it within time, cannot be easily turned into a judgment. However, the politics that is insisted to be made is restricted-limited-practical political imagination, which is mentioned at the beginning of this part. The politics that is criticized and owned is the one existed-perceived in this respect, it is the practical politics in its narrow meaning.

The "utopian-radical political imagination", which represents the weakest tendency within the data and limits of the study, is an imagination that should be considered as different from the above main three tendencies in terms of its relation with conservatism. This tendency is obvious especially in the narrations of the politicians from MHP, SP and BBP. It should be stated that the reason the tendency is more

obvious in the mentioned party members, is because of the historical-ideological roots of especially MHP and BBP parties. If the hesitations and objections of the mentioned parties about conservatism as a descriptive ideology or identity are considered, the reason that is why this tendency is prominent within those parties and among their politicians can be understood. However, it should also be emphasized that the utopian-radical imagination relatively and partly overlaps with the negative political discourse as a critique of present (daily) politics. It might be stressed that this tendency seems to be more close to fascist and authoritarian political "horizon" in terms of the radical negation of politics, the "new politics and society understanding" and "civilization" that it refers to. The radical-utopian tendency might be considered as the imagination of which the establishment of a relation with conservatism is most difficult and sometimes it is impossible. Radical-utopian political imagination resembles a position which is oscillatory between the practical and radical politics. While emphasizing the indispensability of practical politics, it highlights a utopian imagination as well. The practical politics connects it to the real world. The radical-utopian imagination and the political content it implies, which is clear in the narrations of some MHP, SP and BBP politicians, seems to be necessary to be evaluated through a detailed analysis on the basis of unique studies. In this respect, I would like to emphasize that this study provides a significantly limited analysis and evaluation. In general, it might be mentioned that the utopian thought is valuable as long as it is the source for the critique of the present thought and for the alternative social imaginations and politics. Within the framework of the study, utopian imagination is valuable and meaningful because it provides those aspects. However; it is not necessary that each radical-utopian thought will have such aspects as a priori. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to consider the nationalist-Islamist utopian imaginations within the study having such an essence. However, this is not an obstacle for us to see a utopian-radical character within the mentioned imaginations.

The conservatism fact and concept was most important issue in this study. When looking the concept or phenomena, it is possible to classify them under *two main*

*topics* in accordance with the perception and description of conservatism of the politicians interviewed. The *first* is a) description of conservatism related with the social-cultural values, and the *other* is b) description of conservatism related with the loyalty to the politics, principles and values. Descriptions related with the social-cultural values gathered under two groups: the first one is the conservatism defined according to the religious, traditional and ethical values, and the other is described around the axes of daily practices or habitus.

When the information received from the politicians are examined as a whole, in comparison with the descriptions of conservatism based on a political axis, the descriptions and perceptions of conservatism described through social-cultural framework is much more inclusive and explanatory, and the meaning of the concept-phenomenon is filled easily. In this respect, it is possible to get more explicit and indirect information about conservatism. Without considering that there are different parties, all politicians with the perception of social-cultural based conservatism have more or less similar opinions and approaches. Religion and religious culture has core emphasis in social-cultural based conservatism. Besides the religion; traditions, morals, conventions, customs and rituals, emphasis on historical heritage, love-respect, settled daily rituals are emphasized and possessed as the definitive aspects of conservatism. The reduction of conservatism into the mentioned expressions are rejected; in contrast, conservatism is explained as an attitude open to development, also open to contemporaneity and modernity through preserving certain values. This reflects a case coherent with the universal codes of conservatism and general codes of Turkish conservatism. Again, in this respect, regardless of party differences, it is not possible to emphasize about significant differences among the politicians. Social and cultural based conservatism is predominantly explained by religion, custom, moral principles and norms. In this respect, it can be said that it reflects a number of relatively abstract imaginations. In fact, beyond the partial and abstract imaginations, it is subject to a series of concrete, practical reflections in the daily life. In order to understand the intense relation or interaction between "ordinary conservatism" and imagined conservatism, it is crucial to notice the accompanying modernity or modern

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life practices. In other words, it is not possible to understand the mentioned types of conservatism without a sociological background that is accompanied by modernity.

Conservatism is not a phenomenon that can be understood only by looking at its social and cultural characteristics. Conservatism is also used as a political ideology and envisioned a concept and a strong element of political identity. Almost all located in the tradition of the right political party in Turkey have often referred to this concept an explicit or implicit way. As considering to this how the concept discussed by politicians involved in this tradition is of great importance.

As it is known that AKP defines its own political identity and ideology as a conservative democrat. The power and importance of the political sphere are regarded and clearly identified its political ideology as conservatism that is also the main component of its political ideology is taken into account, AKP politicians' views and evaluations on this topic so crucial. How do AKP politicians and other right-conservative party members define and perceive aforesaid ideological-political statement? The answers to this question are important for some reasons. First, to understand conservative democracy as structured by AKP governor elite as an identity and ideology, the way their politicians describe, perceive and state if there is any diversity. In other words, if there is any correspondence between the 'official framework' and the statements of the politicians who represent the party; in what terms the foresaid ideology is internalized or if there is any correspondence or not on politicians of the content and meaning attributed to this ideology. Moreover, the correspondence of "conservative democracy" on other right-conservative politicians is essential in two terms. First, to understand how they perceive the AKP in terms of ideology or political identity, then to define conservatism and the meaning they attribute to it according to their point of view. It should be stated that, within the framework of the study, the members of right-conservative parties other than the AKP share a strong displeasure against the AKP. In addition, based on an opposition they are reluctant in claiming conservatism as an ideology and identity. From this point, the right-conservative politicians other than the AKP were quite hesitant about highlighting conservatism as a political feature. This hesitancy might correspond to a

remarkable manner, attitude or resolution for right political tradition. In other words, almost all political parties within the right political tradition directly or indirectly imply a certain accepted feature, which is that conservatism as a political identity is considered correspondent with the AKP. Consolidation of conservatism by AKP or its perception as an ideological component-element attributed to this party might obstruct the manifestation of other party members' independent or specific conservatism. In this respect, descriptions of conservatism of other politicians are explained majorly through the AKP and through the criticism of AKP's conservatism.

Although there is mainly an emphasis on AKP criticism, in order to trace different (political) notions of conservatism, this part of the study will state how the right-conservative politicians other than AKP perceive and see AKP, and provide even a partial understanding of those politicians' own definitions (political) of conservatism, so that it can talk about two different essential perspectives or contributions. It should be mentioned that the number of AKP politicians interviewed, identifying themselves through conservative democracy/democrat, are quantitatively few. Although AKP politicians apply to this concept (conservative-democrat) as an ideological or identity component, it is unlikely to define the content and to make extensive descriptions as a consistent statement. **Conservative-democracy/democrat** is mainly defined through social-cultural factors. When a political meaning is attributed to conservative-democracy, a set of attributions defined, described and perceived with content different than the party statement. Although most of the AKP politicians claim conservative-democracy/democrat concept verbally, they discuss or perceive the content of concept-ideology different from the party statement. In this respect, the descriptions of some AKP politicians indicate nationalist and religious (Islamic) ideological discourse. In fact, among AKP politicians, some define themselves merely as "nationalist conservative", "muslim democrat" or "nationalist" without any attribution to conservative-democracy.

It is essential to highlight that it is one of the findings of the study that conservatism cannot be evaluated by attributing to a single party. For instance, a description of conservatism indicating nationalist notion does not only refer to MHP politicians' descriptions, but also to AKP, DP and SP politicians' descriptions. The same case is valid for the description of conservatism with different variations as well. Right-wing conservative party members other than AKP, on the basis of a deep dissatisfaction and opposition against AKP, were reluctant to accept conservatism as a pure categorical identity and ideology. In this respect, the politicians were *generally* hesitant to define conservatism or use this notion as a part component of their political identity. It can be said that the politicians other than AKP had difficulty in announcing their or their parties' specific definition of conservatism. In fact, conservative-democrat notion is also difficult and problematic for the AKP politicians, at least in terms of creating its meaning. With respect to this, it is difficult to define conservatism in terms of politics most of the time. Despite the situation, the politicians' approaches other than AKP might be mentioned about (political) conservatism as much as they are represented. Political conservatism notions of MHP, SP and DP politicians are significant in two lines. The first is defined or described through AKP criticism in general. Through AKP criticism, this line signifies the perception or attribution framework, including the political, indicating what should conservatism be or should not be. The second line, without the AKP "variable", describes (political) conservatism as it appears in the discourse. However, it should be stressed that these lines interwine most of the time. For the politicians of MHP, SP and DP, AKP uses conservatism "to look nice" to the right-wing, religious and conservative masses. It is a party politically converting this to vote and power, by using conservatism as a "front", "mask", "guise" etc.; they use religion and religiosity as a tool for politics. In this respect, they are far from being "sincere". AKP could not describe "conservative-democracy" or conservatism as a political identity. They could explain this case to neither themselves nor somebody else. For AKP, conservatism is not ideological but is "de facto". In this respect, it is not an original but is an "artificial" ideology. Because AKP acts according to the conditions specified by the USA, EU and Zionism; and as it is a party legitimizing this case, it is

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not possible to name them as conservative. Especially MHP and DP politicians state that AKP ignores nationalism, so that this party cannot represent "real conservatism". For MHP, the meaning of conservatism cannot be reduced to religion merely or to religiosity; however, it is an important component of the notion. As long as conservatism is not articulated with nationalism, it cannot get its 'real' meaning. According to some of MHP politicians, conservatism is the result of the *old* [*kâdim*] "modernity" and "traditionalism" discussion in Turkey. In this respect, it signifies a historical and cultural disintegration. Mainly for SP politicians then for most of the MHP and DP politicians, conservatism is categorically rejected in terms of its identification with AKP. Especially for SP politicians, a positive meaning is rarely attributed to conservatism; instead, they underline the expression of "morality". For SP politicians' conservatism is an "imported and artificial concept". When morality is compared with conservatism, morality is more meaningful, inclusive and appropriate to "us". Morality comprises religion, tradition and cultural elements; and it is a *political* notion at the same time. The prominent discourse of DP politicians about conservatism is the description through a sharp nationalist feature. Predominantly DP politicians state that nationalism is the essential condition for conservatism; if an individual is not nationalist then is not a conservative either. In this respect, the most important indicator of conservatism for DP politicians can be identified as nationalism. When conservatism is described with a social-cultural content, the predominant emphasis is on nationalism again. In fact, many of the DP politicians describe their political identity as "nationalist-conservative". For DP politicians religious values are important in conservatism, but cannot be named as "religiosity". They strongly reject the notion of conservatism identified with "religiosity", and they tend to stress their loyalty to Kemalism or to the official ideology. For DP politicians AKP "can never be" a center-right party. Center-right is a "way of life". In order to be a center-right party or to represent it, deep rooted history, tradition and culture is required. As AKP never had these aspects, they are neither a center-right nor a conservative party. Besides this, as AKP is a "religious" party with "Milli Görüş" (Nationalist Vision) tradition, and is "against Atatürk and Kemalism"; it is not possible for AKP to be a center-right party.

In terms of criticisms against AKP; MHP, SP and DP politicians' statements are highly similar to each other. Members of these parties do not call AKP as conservative. They are suspicious about AKP's notion of conservatism. These politicians describe AKP as the 'vendor' of "global powers", so to say, perceives AKP as a political "daemon". The indicator of this perception is considered as nationalism. This common political and ideological perception can be considered as an essential disintegration in the right-conservative politics. One of the poles of this disintegration is totally represented (via a hegemonic type) by AKP; then the other is represented by the right-conservative ideologies, without ignoring the ideological-political diversity among them. Through a general consideration of the findings, according to the evaluations including AKP criticism and the other statements, *conservatism* should not be evaluated merely as religion or religiosity; it is something functional in terms of politics and ideology. In this respect, conservatism is sensitive about religion and religious values; however, not as an artificial ideology but as a sincere *life style and worldview*. By excluding many of the SP politicians' statements, conservatism cannot be considered without nationalism; if so, a "real" conservatism is not a subject anymore.

It is not adequate to evaluate the diversities and similarities of the right-conservative parties and politicians merely on the axis of conservatism. As mentioned above, conservatism axis or the meaning attributed to conservatism, though introducing essential disintegration and correspondence points, other ideological and discursive aspects diversify and correspond the right-conservative tradition. Similarities or differences are not based on a pure, absolute or generic conservatism ideology. In other words, the differences and similarities among the right ideologies and politicians are determined through a particular articulation type of conservatism with nationalism, religious ideology (Islamism) or 'liberalism' etc. This case 'instabilizes' the current form of conservatism; however, enables it to articulate with other ideologies as well. Of course, this statement does not require the ignorance of the specific distinctive features of Islamism or nationalism as an ideology. However, one point that was remarked since the introduction of the study should be highlighted

here. Against all its specific forms, it is not possible to discuss or understand the Turkish right free of an articulation of these forms with each other. In this context, when conservatism is considered as an ideology open to be articulated, the relations structured or couldn't have been structured between the phenomena of nationalism and Muslimness (Turkishness-Muslimness or Turkishness-Islamism) or the importance or priority attributed to those phenomena must necessarily be questioned.

If the relation between nationalism and Muslimness or the essence and priority attributed to those notions are assigned as the only criteria to describe conservatism, it might cause ambiguities or difficulties to determine the ideological and political differences. Actually, this might be perceived in DP politicians' 'sharp' nationalist statements for conservatism. For instance; DP politicians' definition of conservatism highlighting nationalism as the dominant ideology or MHP politicians' sensitivities about the religion or religious culture, might exemplify the aforementioned articulation. In order to determine the diversities within the right-conservative tradition, also to understand and see the articulation types between the two ideologies, the politicians were asked some questions.

The first associated situation is a) the rejection of nationalism, which is described with racist-nationalist (ethnic) content (nationalism-Turkishness or Turkism) with reference to the religion of Islam, then the other is b) the rejection of the hierarchy between those two phenomena (religion and nationalism or Islam and Turkishness). If the value, importance and priority attributed to those two notions are considered, the significant differences among the politicians and the ideologies will be perceived. Associated with this, the political and ideological differences about the main subject get relatively more obvious. The value, privilege, essence and priority assigned to those factors present and highlight the content and differences of the ideology and discourse. The same attributions assign the name, adjective and description criteria of the political and social identity. Ideological and discursive differences enable to comprehend the social and political identity definitions (nationalist, muslim, conservative-nationalist, rightist, religious, liberal, central-right, etc.), and also how

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party members/parties see, perceive and describe each other. Although not a common state-manner among the politicians, a separate and obvious state should also be mentioned.

This state is a criticism of both *nationalism* and *Islamism* as an ideological position to the extent of possessing an absolute character of the membership of a party. In other words, the politicians representing this position participates the discussion of nationalism-Muslimness neither by considering the racist-ethnicist [kavmiyetçi] content of nationalism nor by regarding the establishment of the possible hierarchy between those notions. Without considering or emphasizing these discussions, they directly criticize nationalism or Muslimness, in fact, criticize the politics that centralize Islamism or religion as an ideological-political position.

For the AKP politicians, nationalism is described-arranged on the basis of race, but rejected in terms of Islamism. Besides a definition based on race-ethnicity, it might lead the rejection of other types of nationalism, such as "cultural nationalism", which is defended mostly by the MHP politicians. Though it is not named through "cultural nationalism" or a similar expression, most of the time different nationalism types of which the descriptive names or determinants are ambiguous, are rejected or their legitimacy is questioned majorly by the AKP and SP politicians. Such nationalism descriptions, which are mostly attributed to the MHP and their understanding of nationalism with various views and aspects ("racism", "ethnocentrism", "authoritarian", "fascist", etc.), are heavily criticized. However, AKP and SP politicians' critical approaches do not refer to a total rejection or critical standing against nationalism or nationalist ideology(ies). The criticism of nationalism as attributed or perceived, does not prevent the (re) production of different nationalism types. In fact, both AKP and SP politicians' notion of nationalism is mentioned on above descriptions. Moreover, the MHP politicians strongly oppose the determination of nationalism on race-ethnicity basis and they structure their opposition by referring the Islamic doctrine and its source [Quran]. In this respect, at first sight, there is no significant difference between the MHP politicians and the

other politicians. Another factor associating conservative politicians is the reaction against the hierarchy establishment between nationalism and Muslimness. It was mentioned that any kind of hierarchy (priority-recency, essential-more essential, etc.) between those two phenomena would invalidate the meanings of these notions, as they are not available for a hierarchy and comparison. The politicians might be considered in two different situations according to their replies to the questions whether a hierarchy between nationalism and Islamism can be established or not, or which aspect is more important than the other. The politicians either rejected the establishment of such a relationship between two concepts or emphasized the difficulty of a comparison. However, in either case they somehow did not avoid making various assessments. As mentioned above, for the politicians representing both of the situations, although a rejection of hierarchy is required literally and it is difficult to give importance-priority to one of those phenomena, it seems possible to say that some type of hierarchies between the two notions are actually established.

The state and perception about the state-society relations was the other main topic of the study in order to comprehend the right-wing conservative politics. How the state is described and perceived, and how the people position themselves with respect to the state is crucial to distinguish the political decisions and ideologies. When the importance and value attributed to the state by the right-wing politics and political decision is considered, it is especially important to examine the state imagination of this tradition. The state, as an asset area (entity), is perceived by the vast majority of the right-conservative politicians as an essential and valuable source of power and authority. The state, which represents the legitimate power and authority, is defined and perceived through a wide variety of qualities, names and adjectives. When the state is described the most common adjective-metaphor is the "father" and another common description is "state father". This is the most common paternalist adjective-metaphor that was used almost by the all politicians while promoting or criticizing the state. "Holy" or "holiness" is another important factor that was used with the other metaphor.

It can be said that the perception of the state and the authority included in the narrations derives from a pre-modern understanding of the history. In this understanding and perception of the history, it can be said that a design and a writing of history with a tendency of ideological value have a powerful effect. In the settlement of that perception, the pedagogical vehicles (study books, maps etc.) of the nation formation is very effective and they are transmitted today by internalizing. Such an understanding of the history and the state authority coherent to this is related to the historical thesis of the early Republican area, and especially related to the thesis of the First Turkish Historical Congress (1932) in which the "romantic" historical design is more apparent. It can be said that the meaning and function assigned to the state, the holiness that attributed to the state, the fantasizing of the organic state-nation and the logic of the relationship between the state and nation reflect authoritarian-fascistic tendencies. The mythological perception of the authority and its representative state is not only an archaic-historic or a judgmental-accidental narration, but also spreads to *actuality* and this perception again carries a reproduction potential.

As a general tendency, what is the meaning of the history and the state-authority which is presented mythologically as coherent with the state understanding uttered here? Referring to the narrations, if we look at the important points, it might be mentioned that such a pre-modern or "discovered" understanding of history and the related state-authority vision that has a response in the rightist politicians is an important (ideological) obstacle over the debates and solutions about the actual questions (such as the Kurdish question) that modern politicians have to discuss. This should be considered not only for the right-conservative politicians, but also for the attitudes of the masses that support the tradition. "The submission of history into the service of the politics" (Taşkın, 2007: 60- 61 ve 135- 174) with such an ideological load should be taken as a field, which have practical political feedback instead of a simple theoretical illusion or deviation.

As discussed in the main text, the state as solely an entity-being and the authority it represents are mostly accepted and sublimated by the rightist-conservative politicians, the state that was made absolute by the constitution of the republic and the authority, value and principles it represent are criticized significantly. According to my opinion, it signifies a remarkable paradox or tension. The critical gap toward the state does not lean to its ontological-normative existence actually. It is limited with the modernist ideology of the republic and the criticism about its state centrality (culturalist). In this sense, the state as being criticized and opposed, is mentioned or described by some names and adjectives.

According to the most of the rightist-conservative politicians, the modernist ideology of the Republic and its bureaucratic elite executives become alienated toward the society, "toward its moral and cultural values"; it became "alienated", "estranged" and sometimes behave hostilely toward the values of the society in question. Another important factor that is mentioned in the interviews frequently is the concept of "national will" and the emphasis on its "cancellation". According to this, the national will is "invaded" with the illegitimate ways and methods by the transition into the multi-party period. In this way, it is frequently expressed that the practices of "National Chief" caused a deep dissatisfaction and suspicion toward the values of the Republic. While evaluating the Republic process, the distinction between pre-National Chief and after-National Chief periods frequently. The experiences through the period between the lifetime of M. Kemal and 1950s usually interpreted as traumatic-incidental and criticized intensely. In this period while M. Kemal is remembered as an affirmative figure, İsmet İnönü and his period is criticized seriously even if this period was short. According to many conservative politicians, the period and practices of National Chief are the "main" reasons of the distance toward the state and caused the Republic being "misevaluated" *generally*. On the other hand, many reforms and practices being criticized are found "partially understandable" with bringing "the extraordinary conditions" of the foundation of the republic and the new state, to the agenda. "Despite everything", it is expressed that the republic and the process of modernization bring many things to the society

and it is distanced to the radical criticisms toward the foundation philosophy of the republic. What is striking about this transferred observations and evaluations is that there is no important difference among the politicians interviewed.

It might be stated that the right-conservative politicians mostly agree and constitute a common infrastructure with respect to the different evaluations and critiques when they were asked to evaluate the historical and political period on the axis of the state and society since the establishment of the republic. The primary stunning point in this agreement is the *focus on culture*, which is dominant within the critiques. In this respect, when the general culturalist context and content of the (standard) right-conservative critique about the modernization practices of the Republic period is considered, a type of coherence and continuum can be mentioned. Of course, it seems to be unnecessary to mention that the current culturalist critique is an explicit or implicit political critique as well. The reactions against (Kemalist) culturalist radicalism or the opposition party itself having another type of culturalism is interesting here. There is an interesting coherence between the discursive order and content of the narrations and the points highlighted by "center-periphery" approach, which is one of the methods, of the current discursive reading-analysis about the modernization period of Turkey. The coherence or mutuality between the proposals and determinations of the "center-periphery" approach, which might also be called as "cultural alienation thesis" (Çınar, 2006), and the general content and context of the narrations resemble the reality of the "center-periphery paradigm and also becomes the paradigm which constructs the reality" (Açıkel, 2006: 34). In this respect, the 'paradigm' might be considered as submitting/providing the ideological-political legitimacy framework for the right-conservative politics.

The mentioned 'paradigm', which seems to be one of the main instruments of Turkish politics, its political history and social structure, becomes more than an analytical attribution framework and transforms into a political and hypothetical position, which legitimizes the given socialization, politics and political power in terms of the right politics. The right-conservative perception and point of view about

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the state and society captivated the dominant culturalism within the tradition with a political critique; it might be proposed that they survived and reproduced until today by the productive subjects of that tradition that is by the discourses of the politicians. When both the dominant discourse within the narrations and also the above theoretical evaluations are considered, the *lack of sociological tradition* (Yüksel, 2007) within the right-conservative politics and thought on the basis of their perception about the history, society and power is quite obvious. The ideologists (and politicians) of the right-wing distinguish the cultural, political and economic fields sharply and attempt to define the culture as the main determiner. Although this is very inadequate Yüksel's determination-argument, which emphasizes the importance of the *ideological function* (2007: 81), is critical for this study. The claims of being the 'authentic representation' of the "nation" and being the unique bearer of its values, seems to hegemonize the conservative culturalism as a political convince project. It is obvious that culture is not the only aspect that realizes the political hegemony. The right-conservatism backs up liberal discourses and seems to reproduce the theoretical basis that will legitimize the ideological-political hegemony through the "center-periphery" and similar approaches.

Needless to emphasize that this study has inevitably a number of objective limitations. Data and findings of this study are limited to only the right wing conservative politicians. This situation necessarily required to exclude the other elements affecting of the right-conservative political tradition (structural factors, historicity, subject, institutions, thought tradition, etc.). However, it should be told that these excluded elements require as the subject of a separate studies that should be examined various aspects. The present study has mainly focused on the politicians', who represent only a small part of the aforementioned tradition, mentality and its discursive analysis. But mental and discursive elements did not emerge in their own right; they are largely determined by material-structural and historical factors. For this reason, our study should be supported meta-theoretical and empirical studies by considering the mentioned factors. Due to *a priori* theoretical and methodological preference motivating to our study which excludes the

aforementioned factors, it is also aware of its own limitations. It is hoped that these limitations be eliminated by some prospective studies on the subject. Possible studies to address the matter in a relational sociological perspective will contribute to overcome the aforementioned limitations.

In this study that on the right wing-conservative politicians and conservatism in general; there are four important topics to be left out. The first one is about the *social and cultural values* how do these are perceived and interpreted and how do the processes of change and transformation of the social and cultural values are evaluated? The second one is about *religion and religious values* and how are examined the relations between *religion-state* and *religion-politics*? The third important issue is the title of *the economy*. And the final subject is on *the foreign policy*. Each of the mentioned issues is very important in terms of understanding the Turkish right politics and the Turkish conservatism. In a study on the field on mentioned matter, not handled by considering these issues and not being associated with each other indicate a significant lack that to be considered. Although all of these issues are empirically investigated throughout the field study, due to the quantitative limits of the thesis, it is not possible to include them in the existing study. The processing of these titles are mentioned, and removal of the existing deficiencies will be tried to resolve through the producing in other kind of complementary academic studies. However, it must be told that these would also be not enough. Different studies on this issue and to be compared with each other is to contribute to the elimination of the deficiencies and shortcomings pointed out. Correspondingly, there is an extensive and detailed field work[80] which demonstrating quantitative and qualitative features of the population that we handled in this study (simultaneously with it) will significantly contribute to eliminate the deficiencies and inadequacies.

Apart from these, our study and thesis dealt with the issue is meaningful on its own, unless the left-socialist politicians examined in a similar context and data and

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[80] See. Mustafa Şen, "*The Conservative Politician Profile in Turkey*" TUBITAK, Ankara, 2010.

findings of those compared with each other, there will be an inadequacy. It is clear that these kinds of studies and comparisons will enable to get extremely important information about Turkey's political and social culture.

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## APPENDIX B

## TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmanın ana izleği ve temel amacı Türkiye'deki sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetin homojen bir yapıdan çok heterojen bir nitelik taşıyor olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Türkiye'deki sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset üzerine düşünce üretirken mevcut heterojenliği dikkate almadan söz konusu geleneği oluşturan farklı bileşenlerin bir unsuruna, örneğin milliyetçilik, İslamcılık veya liberalliğe odaklanmanın geçerli ve anlamlı değerlendirmelere ulaşmayı mümkün kılmayacağı, en azından eksik ve yetersiz kalacağını vurgulamak gerekmektedir. Bu saptama, ele alınan geleneği oluşturan farklı bileşenlerin her birinin özgül değer, ağırlık ve konumlarını göz ardı etmek anlamına gelmemektedir. Tam tersine söz konusu saptama, geleneği mümkün kılan farklılık ve benzerlikleri eşzamanlı olarak görebilmeyi; hatta bundan daha da öte, bu geleneği oluşturan ideolojik, politik ve söylemsel öğelerin birbirleriyle eklemlenme veya ayrışma noktalarına eşzamanlı odaklanabilmeyi önermektedir.

Çok partili yaşama geçişten günümüze değin iktidar alanındaki hegemonik konumu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, söz konusu siyaset geleneğinin anlaşılması ve anlamlandırılması hem akademik bilgi üretimi hem de siyasal alanın yapısı ve siyasal mücadele analizleri bakımından önem taşımaktadır. Söz konusu siyaset ne türden ideolojik, politik, söylemsel ve zihinsel öğelere dayalı olarak veya bunları mobilize ederek hegemonik bir siyaset olagelmektedir? Söz konusu hegemonyanın zemin bulduğu saikler ne türden bir sosyolojiye tekabül etmektedir ve bunların göstergeleri nelerdir? Bu ve benzeri sorulara ilişkin yanıt arayışları elbette sosyal bilimler tedrisi içinde, örneğin siyaset bilimi, ekonomi-politik, siyasal tarih, siyasal antropoloji vb. ve farklı bağlamlarda çalışılabilir. Mevcut çalışma ise bu sorulara yanıt arayışı olarak esasen ele alınan siyasetin üreticisi/öznesi konumundaki siyasetçilerin/faillerin söylem ve zihin yapılarının analizine sosyoloji disiplininin sunduğu bir çerçeveden odaklanmayı tercih etmiştir. Bu genel çerçeve esas alınarak çalışmada *öncelikle*

görüşülen siyasetçilerin siyasal sosyalizasyon süreçleri üzerinde durulmuştur. *İkinci olarak*, söz konusu siyasetçilerin siyaset kavramını temelde nasıl algıladıkları ve anlamlandırdıkları anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. *Üçüncü olarak*, Türkiye'de sağ siyaseti oluşturan farklı politik-ideolojik bileşenlerin hemen hepsince sahiplenilen genel bir gösterge olarak 'muhafazakârlık' kavramından/olgusundan ne anlaşıldığı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. *Dördüncü olarak*, sağ siyaseti temelde ayrıştıran ve fakat aynı zamanda birleştiren bir konu olarak din-milliyetçilik ilişkisi/etkileşimi üzerinde durulmuştur. *Son olarak* devlet, otorite, cumhuriyet süreci ve modernleşmeye bakış üzerinde durulmuştur.

Çalışmanın ilk kısmının merkezi ilgisini oluşturan konu görüşülen siyasetçilerin siyasal toplumsallaşma dinamikleriydi. Bu kısımda, sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin siyasal toplumsallaşma süreçlerinin -özgül- dinamiklerinin neler olduğu; bunların siyasal ve ideolojik kimlik oluşumundaki işlev ve öneminin altı çizilmeye çalışıldı. Bu bağlamda çalışmamızın öne çıkan en temel bulgularından birine göre, sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin temel siyasal toplumsallaşma birimi ailedir. Buna göre *aile siyasal kimliğin edinildiği ve belirlendiği en temel toplumsal kurumdur*. Ailenin siyasal aidiyet ve kimliğin oluşumundaki mevcut etkisi, Türkiye toplumunun siyasal yapı ve kültürünü anlamak bakımından, bizce biri sosyolojik diğeri ise sosyal bilim pratiği bakımından iki önemli durumu gözetmeyi gerektirdiği söylenebilir. Buna göre, 1. Siyasal düşünce ve zihniyetlerin biçimlenmesi onu belirleyen nesnel ve yapısal etmenlerin ötesindeki öznel öğeleri de (kültür, simgeler, etik ilke ve ölçütler vb.) göz önünde bulundurmalıdır. 2. Sosyal bilimsel bir problematik olarak aile, geleneksel siyasal davranış araştırmalarının vaz ettiği sınırlılıkların ötesinde, ele alınmayı bekleyen oldukça önemli bir araştırma alanını işaret etmektedir. Siyasal toplumsallaşma sürecinde, ailenin taşıdığı bu işlev ve önem farklı sağ-muhafazakâr parti ve mensubu siyasetçilere göre anlamlı bir farklılaşmaya işaret etmemektedir. Siyasal ve toplumsal kimliğin yeniden üretiminin başat kurumu olduğu anlaşılan ailenin bu denli öne çıkması üzerinde durulmayı gerektiren bir sosyolojik duruma işaret etmektedir. Muhafazakâr ideolojinin en çok önem verdiği kurumlardan birinin aile olması ile çalışmamızın bu bulgusu arasındaki uyumluluk dikkat çekicidir.

Ancak bu uyumluluğun sadece sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilere teşmil edilip edilemeyeceği ise tartışmaya açık görünmektedir.

Çalışmamızın siyaset tasavvurlarının ele alındığı kısım, sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin siyaset tasavvurlarının dört temel eksende ele alınabileceğini veya sınıflandırılabileceğini göstermiştir. Büyük ölçüde mülakat verilerinden soyutlanarak kavramsallaştırılan bu siyaset tasavvurlarının herhangi birinin iç tutarlılığı veya tutunumu olan, jenerik tasavvurlar olmadığının altı çizilmelidir. Mülakatların kimilerinde her bir tasavvurun izlerini aynı anda görmek mümkün olabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tasavvurlardan herhangi birine bir mutlaklık atfetmenin mümkün olmadığını vurgulamak isterim. Buna karşılık, ortaya konan tasavvurlar birbirleriyle kıyaslandığında, ağırlık ve önem bakımından bir hiyerarşik dizilime imkân tanımaktadır. Bu bağlamda, taşıdığı ağırlık ve önceliğe göre görüşülen siyasetçilerin tasavvurlarında *siyaset*, ilkin "hizmet eksenli" bir olgu veya kavramdır. Bu tasavvur çalışmada "hizmet söylemi" kavramsallaştırması altında ele alındı. İkinci olarak öne çıkan siyaset tasavvuru liberal ve muhafazakâr siyasal değerlerin iç içe geçirilerek savunulduğu "liberal muhafazakar"lıktır. Bu tasavvur "liberal-muhafazakâr siyaset" olarak adlandırılmıştır. Üçüncü eğilim ise siyaseti büyük ölçüde olumsuzlayarak tanımlayan ve öyle algılayan tasavvurdur. Bu yaklaşım çalışmada "negatif bir söylem olarak siyaset" başlığı altında ele alınmıştır. Ve son olarak, siyasete radikal-ütopyan bir siyasal ve toplumsal değişim perspektifinden bakan tasavvur söz konusudur. Bu eğilim ise "radikal-ütopyan siyaset" başlığı altında ele alınmıştır.

"Hizmet söylemi"ni eksen alan yaklaşımda siyaset teknik, pratik ve araçsal bir süreçtir. Bu algılayışta siyaset esasen devlet ve kurumları etrafında icra edilen bir dizi pratiğe tekabül etmektedir. Devlet de "hizmet"lere erişimi sağlamanın başat 'aygıtı' olarak görülmektedir. Siyaset pratiği de devleti ve iktidarı massedebilmenin, devlet aygıtında konumlanarak "hizmet" sunmanın önemli bir uğrağı haline getirilmektedir. Böylesi bir 'siyasal tasavvur' devlet ve iktidarın ideolojik-politik veçhelerini sorunsallaştırmamakta hatta onun bu yönlü görünürlüğünü perdeleyebilmektedir. Bu tür bir tasavvurda siyasetin asli amacının, özellikle sağ-

muhafazakâr gelenekte, "devlet iktidarını ele geçirmeye yönelik bir etkinlik" (Taşkın, 2007) olarak görüldüğü anlaşılmaktadır. "Hizmet söylemi"nin vaz ettiği 'siyaset' anlayışı siyaseti/'siyasal olan'ı bağlamından kopararak, onu anti-politik bir politikanın unsuru haline getirmiştir. Siyasetin 'siyasal olan'dan bağının bu denli koparılması ise onu "hizmet" eksenli dar bir söyleme ve pratiğe hapsetmiştir.

Parti farkı söz konusu olmaksızın, görüşülen sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin büyük çoğunluğunun siyaseti hizmet endeksli bir çerçeveye indirgeyerek ele almaları, Türk sağ-muhafazakârlığının siyaset tasavvurunun genelleştirilebilir bir eğilimini ortaya koyması bakımından çalışmanın önemli bir bulgusu olarak değerlendirilebilir. Teknik, pratik ve araçsal bir süreç olarak hizmet siyaseti ve tasavvuru, devlet iktidarını ve aygıtını elde etmeye yönelik asli bir motivasyonun dışında 'manevi' veya dinsel bir takım saiklerden de güç almakta ve meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Çeşitli dini grup veya cemaatler için "hizmet" dinsel-manevi gönderimleri de olan bir kavramdır. Bu noktada dikkat çekici olan husus, "hizmet"in salt dinsel-manevi anlamlara indirgenemeyen fakat bunları da kapsayan ikili bir kullanıma cevaz veriyor olmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle "hizmet", gündelik-maddi anlamlarının yanı sıra dinsel-manevi bir içerik atfedilerek de kullanılmaktadır; sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset tarafından popülerleştirilen "halka hizmet hakka hizmet" düsturu sözü edilen bu ikili kullanıma iyi bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. "Hizmet söylemi"nin siyaseten her türlü tartışmalı konunun pratik yararlar hilafına bastırılmasına, iktidarın ideolojik-politik veçhelerinin gözden kaçırılmasına ve giderek tartışılamaz kılınmasına vesile olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bunun ise antagonist bir siyaseti iptal ederken öte yandan siyaseti toplum veya sınıf dışı bir etkinlik olarak kodladığı da söylenmelidir. Siyasetin bu yönlü bir kabulünün ise demokratik bir siyasetin *a priori* olabilirlik koşullarını veya ontolojisini zedelediği söylenmelidir.

Türk sağ-muhafazakârlığının özgül bir görünümü ortaya koyduğunu düşündüğümüz "hizmet söylemi"nin kuramsal ölçekte temellendirilmesine yönelik ayrıntılı ve kapsamlı çalışmalara ihtiyaç olduğu söylenmelidir. Mevcut haliyle Türkiye'deki sağ-

muhafazakarlığın hizmet eksenli siyaset tasavvurunu onun kadim pratik, pragmatik ve popüler söylemiyle ilişkili olduğu görülmektedir. Bunun yanısıra, clientalism olgusunun da kısmen açıklayıcı bir çerçeve sunduğu söylenmelidir. Buna karşın, ideolojik işlevinin yanı sıra kitlelerin pratik mantığında da sosyolojik ve siyasal karşılıkları olduğu anlaşılan hizmet söyleminin mevcut yaklaşımların sunduğu kuramsal ve kavramsal araçların ötesinde derinlemesine çalışılmayı gerektirdiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Araştırmada öne çıkan ikinci belirgin siyaset tasavvuru "liberal-muhafazakâr"lıktır. Bu tasavvur;

- Özgürlük taleplerinin karşılanması ve özgürlük alanlarının genişletilmesi,
- Sivil topluma önem ve öncelik verilmesi,
- Diyalog, uzlaşma, müzakere, farklılıkların kabulü ve hoşgörüsü gibi öğe ve kavramlara sıklıkla müracaat edilmesi,
- Devletin otoritesinin sınırlandırılması ve,
- Çeşitli türden 'toplumsal mühendislik' girişimlerinin eleştirisi olarak liberal siyasetin öne çıkardığı söylemsel kategori ve talepler üzerinden belirginlik kazanmaktadır.

Yukarıdaki söylemsel unsurlar liberal-muhafazakâr tasavvuru, aşağıdaki yer verilen diğer unsurlarla iç içe geçirerek onu neo-liberal yeni-sağ söylemle eklemlemektedir. Bu söylemsel unsurlar ise;

- Küreselleşme,
- Piyasa,
- Değişim,
- Özelleştirme,
- Adalet ve güvenliği sağlamakla mükellef, düzenleyici rolü olan küçük fakat güçlü devlet,

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- Girişimcilik, rekabet, innovasyon, verimlilik, markalaşma ve bireycilik vurgusudur.

Görüşülen siyasetçiler anlatılarında sıklıkla 'diyalog', 'mutabakat', 'müzakare' ve 'uzlaşma' çağrıları yapmakta veya bu kavramlarla örülü (liberal) bir siyasal perspektife işaret etmektedirler. Chantall Mouffe'a göre, gerçek bir seçme olanağının ve özgürlüğünün olduğu durumlarda anlamlı olabilecek diyalog, müzakere ve mutabakat arzusu üzerine kurulu projelerde ısrarcı olmanın bizi ulaştırabileceği tek nokta, siyasetten ve demokrasiden vazgeçmek olacaktır. Liberal-muhafazakâr tasavvuru dile getiren siyasetçilerin anlatılarındaki ısrarlı diyalog, müzakere, uzlaşma ve çatışmadan (ya da antagonizmadan) uzak durmayı vazeden 'siyasal' çağırılarının bu bağlamda değerlendirilebileceği söylenmelidir. Liberal-muhafazakârlığın çoğu kez *siyaseten doğrucu* saiklerle savunduğu müphem bir demokrasi, çoğulculuk ve liberalizm söylemi ise ikna edicilikten oldukça uzak görünmektedir. Söz konusu çağırılar açık veya örtük bir biçimde toplumu olabildiğince homojen bir bütünlük olarak görmeyi arzu eden bir tasavvuru işaret etmektedir. Oysa modern toplumu mümkün kılan temel nitelik *homojenlik* değil tersine çoğulluk ve farklılıkları *a priori* içeren/kabul eden ve bu temel niteliğin kaçınılmaz kıldığı çatışmalı bir 'bütünlük'tür. 'Siyasal olan'ın ve siyasetin esas anlam kazandığı bu niteliği göz ardı eden bu tasavvur, mutabakatçı, uzlaşmacı vb. çağrılarına karşın son tahlilde demokratik bir siyaseti işaret etmekten yoksundur. Üstelik söz konusu siyasetçilerin 'siyasal ufukları'nın neoliberal ve/veya muhafazakâr bir dünya tasavvuru ile sınırlıyken neyin müzakere edileceği, ne hakkında mutabık kalınacağı ise başlı başına tartışmalı görünmektedir.

Görüşülen siyasetçilerin anlatılarında belirgin bir eğilim olarak öne çıkan üçüncü algı 'negatif bir tasavvur olarak siyaset'tir. Siyaseti bir dizi olumsuz sıfat, niteleme ve adlandırmalar ekseninde tanımlayan ve algılayan bu yaklaşımın salt sıfat ve adlandırmalar çerçevesinde değerlendirildiğinde dahi siyaseti değersizleştiren, onun toplumsal bir etkinlik olarak varlığını yadsıyan, itibarsızlaştıran ve giderek reddeden bir kavrayışı yansıttığı söylenmelidir. Muhafazakârlığı ele alan kuramsal çalışmalar,

muhafazakârlığın tanımlayıcı bir özelliği olarak onun büyük harfle yazılan siyasete yönelik kuşkulu ve mesafeli yaklaşıma sahip olduğunun altını çizer. Araştırmanın veri setinin yansıttığı içerik ve bulgular da kuramda muhafazakârlığa atfedilen bu niteliği doğrular görünmektedir. İlk bakışta, kuramsal çalışmalarda muhafazakarlığın siyasete yönelik kuşkulu ve mesafeli duruşu ile alan çalışmasının ampirik içeriği arasında da böylesine bir mütekabiliyet olmasına karşın, bu mütekabiliyet Türk sağ-muhafazakârlığını veya sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçileri siyaset karşıtı veya apolitik olarak nitelemeyi mümkün kılmamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle ne tümüyle siyaset karşıtı ne de tümüyle siyasete sahip çıkan oldukça muğlak bir pozisyondan söz edilmelidir. Ancak yapılmasında ısrar edilen siyaset, sınırlı-pratik bir siyaset tasavvurudur. Eleştirilen ve sahip çıkılan siyaset de bu anlamda var olan-algılanan, dar anlamıyla 'pratik siyaset'tir. Siyasete yönelik olumsuz tutum mevcut (siyaset ve siyaset yapma) tarzının köklü, derinlikli veya yapısal bir eleştirisine yol açmamaktadır. Eleştirilen cari siyasetin salt ahlaki bir eleştirisinin yapıldığı görülmektedir. Soyut ahlaki ilke ve değerlere vurguyla yetinilen bu siyaset yapma arzusu, siyaseti yine pratik bir etkinliğe indirgediğinden, mustarip olduğu cari siyasetin ötesinde bir tasavvur da geliştirmekten uzak görünmektedir.

Araştırmanın verili sınırları içinde en zayıf eğilimi temsil eden "ütopyan-radikal siyaset tasavvuru"nun, muhafazakârlıkla ilişkiselliği bağlamında, yukarıdaki üç ana eğilimden ayrı tutulması gereken bir tasavvur olduğu söylenebilir. Kimi siyasetçilerin anlatılarında belirginlik kazanan radikal-ütopyan tahayyülü ve ima ettiği siyasetin ideolojik içeriğinin ayrıntılı analizinin müstakil çalışmalar etrafında değerlendirilmesi gerekli görünmektedir. Genel olarak ütopyan düşüncenin, mevcut olanın eleştirisine, alternatif toplumsal tahayyüllere ve siyasetlere kaynaklık etmesiyle değerli olduğu söylenebilir. Fakat her radikal-ütopyan düşünce *a priori* bu vasıfları taşımak zorunda da değildir. Nitekim çalışmada ortaya çıkan milliyetçi-İslamcı ütopyan tahayyüllerin bu yönlü bir niteliğe sahip olduğunu söylemek bizim için mümkün görünmemektedir. Özellikle MHP, BBP ve SP'li siyasetçilerin bazılarının söylemlerinde belirginlik kazanan radikal-ütopyan siyaset tahayyülü AKP ve DP'li siyasetçilerin söylemlerinde görünmemektedir. Ancak bu durum bu partilere

mensup siyasetçilerin böylesi bir tahayyülden uzak durdukları ve genel olarak siyaset tahayyüllerinde daha rasyonel bir tutuma sahip oldukları anlamına gelmemektedir. Söz konusu siyasetçilerin bu tür bir tahayyüle ilişkin, çalışmanın sınırları içindeki mevcut 'suskunluğu'nu sadece araştırma verilerine dayalı bir eksikliğin tezahürü olarak değerlendirilmemelidir. Anılan her iki partinin ve yaslandıkları siyasal geleneklerin, her zaman radikal olarak kodlamaya imkân vermese de en azından ütopyan tahayyüllere veya niyetlere ilişkin söylemsel öğelere sahip olduklarından söz edilmelidir. Merkez sağ gelenek, böyle adlandırmak mümkünse eğer, ütopyan siyasal söylemini "her mahallede bir milyoner", "Büyük Türkiye" vb. idealler vazederek veya sanayileşmeci-kalkınmacı bir ideolojiye yönelik güçlü vurgusuyla popüler-pragmatik bir takım söylemsel unsurlara atıfla dillendirmiştir.

Yukarıda da vurgulandığı üzere Türk sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset geleneği onu oluşturan bileşenlerden tekil birine bakılarak anlaşılamaz. Bu nedenle, söz konusu siyaset geleneğini anlamaya yönelik her girişim onu içinde barındırdığı çeşitlilik ve benzeşlikleri ile aynı anda görmek durumundadır. Bu geleneği bir hat boyunca kat eden, ortaklaştıran ve aynı zamanda farklılaştıran muhafazakârlık olgusunun toplumsal, kültürel ve siyasal görünümlerini-niteliklerini anlamak sağ siyaseti, sağcılığı ve giderek sağ-muhafazakâr bileşimi anlamak için oldukça kritik bir önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda siyasetçilerin muhafazakârlık olgusu hakkında ne düşündükleri ve onu nasıl değerlendirdikleri büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Siyasetçilerin muhafazakârlığı tanımlarken oldukça çeşitli ve zengin bir ad, sıfat ve tamlamalarla ilişkilendirdikleri ve büyük ölçüde olumluluk içeren ifadelerle betimledikleri görülmektedir. Salt ad, sıfat ve tamlamalara bakıldığında muhafazakârlığa atfedilen unsurların her birinin tek başına muhafazakârlığa ne ölçüde atfedilebileceği tartışmalı görünmektedir. Başka bir deyişle muhafazakârlık tek başına, ona atfedilen olumlayıcı veya yadsıyıcı kavramsal nitelik ve nitelemelerle değil ideolojik-politik bağlam dikkate alındığında ayırt edici bir nitelik kazanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bağlamından koparılmış bir bakışla salt kavramlar/terimler/nitelemeler üzerinden yapılacak muhafazakârlık tarifleri bu

yanıyla anlamsız bir çaba olacaktır. Bu durumla ilgili belirtilmesi gereken önemli bir hususa değinmek gerekirse, muhafazakârlığın bu denli çeşitlenmiş ve neredeyse hepsi olumlu değerlere gönderme yapan bir dizi unsura iliştirilmiş olması, bir yandan onu bir kavram-olgu olarak oldukça müphem kılarken, öte yandan onu siyasal ve kültürel bir olgu olarak neredeyse tartışmasız kılan bir stratejiyi veya eğilimi de dışa vurur görünmektedir.

Görüşülen siyasetçilerin muhafazakârlığa ilişkin algı ve tariflerinin *iki ana başlık* etrafında gruplandırılabileceği anlaşılmıştır. Söz konusu algı ve tariflerden **ilkini** *toplumsal-kültürel değerlere bağlı olarak yapılan muhafazakârlık* tanımlamaları oluştururken, **diğerini** ise *siyasal ideoloji, ilke ve değerlere bağlı olarak yapılan tanımlamalar* takip etmektedir. Toplumsal-kültürel değerlere bağlı olarak yapılan tanımlamalar ise iki ana başlıkta toplanabilir: ilki, *din, gelenek ve ahlaki* değerlere göre tanımlanan bir muhafazakârlıkken, ikincisi ise *gündelik yaşamdaki pratikler* veya *habituslar* eksenlerinde tanımlanan bir muhafazakârlık olmaktadır. Bu tür muhafazakârlık çalışmada 'sıradan muhafazakârlık' olarak kavramsallaştırıldı. Toplumsal-kültürel çerçevede tanımlanan muhafazakârlık algı ve tariflerinin, siyasal eksende ortaya konulan muhafazakârlığa kıyasla, daha kapsayıcı ve ayrıntılı bir çerçevede ele alındığı ve kavramın-olgunun içinin daha kolay doldurulabildiği görülmüştür. Buna karşılık, siyasal eksende yapılan muhafazakârlık tarifleri için aynı tespiti yapabilmek ise daha zor görünmektedir. Toplumsal-kültürel temelli muhafazakârlık algısında parti farkı gözetmeksizin neredeyse bütün siyasetçilerin, birbirlerine yakın sayılabilecek görüş ve yaklaşımlara sahip olduğu dikkat çekmektedir. Toplumsal-kültürel temelli muhafazakârlık tariflerinde din ve dinsel kültür merkezi bir öneme sahip görünmektedir. Bunula birlikte siyasetçilerin bir kısmının, muhafazakârlığın salt dine ve dinsel değerlere indirgenmesine itiraz ettikleri görülmektedir. Din başat önemini korumakla birlikte, yanı sıra, gelenek, ahlak, töre, örf ve adetler, tarihi mirasa verilen önem, saygı-sevgi ve yerleşiklik kazanmış gündelik pratiklere verilen önem gibi bir dizi unsur da muhafazakârlığa atfedilen tanımlayıcı nitelikler olarak öne çıkarılmakta ve sahiplenilmektedir. Bu bağlamda muhafazakârlığın "gericilik", "yobazlık", "değişime ayak direme" vs.

biçiminde algılanışına yönelik belirgin itirazların dile getirildiği görülmüştür. Muhafazakârlığın, sayılan bu sıfat ve niteliklere indirgenmesi kabul edilmemekte, tam tersine, muhafazakârlık bir takım değerleri koruyarak, ilerlemeye, çağdaşlaşmaya, modernleşmeye açık bir tutum olarak da tarif edilmektedir. Bu, hem muhafazakârlığın evrensel kodlarıyla hem genel olarak Türk muhafazakârlığının kodlarıyla da uyumlu bir durumu yansıtmaktadır. Yine bu bağlamda, siyasetçileri parti farkı gözetmeksizin birbirlerinden ayırt edici kayda değer farklılıklardan söz etmek mümkün görünmemektedir.

Muhafazakârlığın kitabi, felsefi, ideolojik değer ve ilkeler etrafında tebarüz eden (dışa vuran) yanları olduğu gibi onun gündelik hayat içinde beliren çok yönlü veçheleri *de* söz konusudur. Bu yanıyla 'sıradan muhafazakârlık' son derece dünyevi, modern hayata eklemlenmiş, modernlik değerleriyle uyumlu olmaya gayret eden ve böylesi bir hayatın önüne koyduğu 'haz' veya çelişkilerle de var olan bir yapı söz konusudur. Muhafazakârlığın bu 'sıradan' ve 'gerçek hayat' içindeki var oluş biçimlerini görmek veya bilmek, öncelikle, muhafazakârlığın tek boyutlu bir kavranışının mümkün olamayacağını anlamak bakımından önem taşımaktadır. İkinci olarak, Türkiye'nin toplumsal, kültürel ve siyasal yapısını muhafazakârlığın çeşitlenebilen görünümleriyle daha ayrıntılı ve çok boyutlu olarak anlamamıza ve kavramamıza olanak verdiği ölçüde önem taşımaktadır. Siyasal bir perspektiften bakıldığında ise, örneğin siyasal aidiyet bağlamında, bir yapı ve kişilik olarak muhafazakârların siyasal tutumlarını, davranış kalıplarını ve motivasyonlarını anlayabilmek için onu var olan veya arz edilen halleriyle de anlayabilmek bakımından önem taşıdığı söylenmelidir. Kavramı anlamaya ve anlamlandırmaya yönelik herhangi bir girişim onu hem bir ideoloji hem de bir pratik olarak farklı toplumsal, kültürel ve siyasal öğelerle eklemlenmeye açık halleriyle de ele almayı gerekli kılmaktadır. Gerek "sıradan muhafazakârlık" gerekse de tasavvur olarak muhafazakârlık arasında var olan gerilimli ilişki veya etkileşimi anlayabilmek için ona eşlik eden modernliği ve modern gündelik hayat pratiklerini de dikkate almak gerekmektedir.

Muhafazakârlığın siyasi-ideolojik bir çerçevede nasıl ele alındığı ve anlamlandırıldığı sağ-muhafazâr siyasetteki farklılık ve benzeşmeleri tayin edebilmek bakımından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Siyasal alandaki ağırlık ve önemi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, özellikle de bir ideolojik öğe olarak partisinin asli ideolojik bileşenlerinden birini "muhafazâr" olarak tanımlayan AKP'nin ve ona mensup siyasetçilerin muhafazakârlığa bakışı ayrı bir dikkati gerektirmektedir. Bu nedenle çalışmada, ilkin AKP'li sonra da diğer partilere mensup siyasetçiler için muhafazakârlığın "siyaseten" ne anlama geldiği, taşıdığı önem ve anlam değerlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Çalışmamızın AKP'li siyasetçilere yönelik önemli bir bulgusu, AKP'li siyasetçiler arasında kendisini muhafazâr demokrasi/demokratlık kavramına partinin atfettiği çerçeve ve içeriğe bağlı biçimde siyasal bir ideoloji ve kimlik bağlamında tanımlayanların sayısının niceliksel olarak çok az olduğunu göstermektedir. Buna karşılık muhafazâr-demokrasi/demokratlık, siyasal bir içerimden ziyade büyük ölçüde toplumsal-kültürel unsurlara atıflarla tarif edilmektedir. Muhafazâr-demokrasiye siyasal bir anlam atfedildiği durumlarda ise muhafazakârlık partinin 'resmi' söylem ve metinlerinden farklı içeriklerle tanımlanmakta veya algılanmaktadır. Başka bir ifadeyle, AKP'li siyasetçilerin büyük çoğunluğu lâfzî olarak muhafazâr-demokrasi/demokratlık kavramını sahiplenmekteler fakat kavramın-ideolojinin içeriğini parti söyleminden farklı içerik ve bağlamlarda ele almakta ya da algılamaktadırlar. Bu yönde yapılan tariflerde ise AKP'li siyasetçilerin bir kısmının muhafazakârlığı milliyetçi ve dinsel (İslami) bir ideolojik çerçeve içinde tarif ettikleri görülmektedir; hatta AKP'li siyasetçiler arasında muhafazâr-demokratlığa herhangi bir atıfta bulunmadan kendisini sadece "milliyetçi muhafazâr", "müslüman demokrat" veya "milliyetçi" olarak tarif eden siyasetçiler de bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, AKP'li siyasetçilerin anlatıları ile partinin siyasi kimlik ve ideolojisi olarak sunduğu muhafazâr demokrasi/demokratlık tarifleri arasındaki uyumun veya mütekabiliyetin kurul(a)madığının altını çizmek gerekmektedir. AKP'nin, mensubu siyasetçileri nezdinde dahi belirgin ve tutarlı bir

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siyasal ideoloji ve kimlik algısını yeterince oturtamamış olması hegemonik bir siyaset bağlamında bizce önemli bir siyasal duruma işaret etmektedir: siyasal kimliğin eklektik bir vasfa sahip oluşu, AKP örneğinde görüldüğü üzere, siyasal gücün tahkimi (kadro ve dayanılan taban) bakımından her koşulda bir zaafa tekabül etmeyebilmektedir. Başka bir deyişle hegemonik siyaset girişimleri *a priori* tutarlı bir ideoloji veya söylemi gerektirmeyebilmektedir. Fakat öte yandan hegemonyanın mutlak bir süreç olmadığı da göz önünde bulundurulursa, AKP'nin mevcut eklektik ideolojisinin gerek parti gerek kadro gerekse de gücünü aldığı taban için konjonktürel siyasal gelişme ve dalgalanmalar karşısında kırılganlaştırabilir. AKP'nin hegemonya atağında "muhafazakâr-demokrat" ideoloji onun hem gücünü hem de kırılganlığını işaret etmesi bakımından dikkat çekici bir durumu ortaya koymaktadır.

AKP dışındaki diğer sağ-muhafazakâr partilerin mensuplarının, çoğunlukla AKP'ye yönelik derin bir memnuniyetsizlik ve karşıtlık temelinde, muhafazakârlığı bir kimlik ve ideoloji olarak sahiplenmede oldukça isteksiz bir tutum takındıklarını gözlemlediğimizi belirtmek isteriz. Bu bağlamda AKP dışındaki sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçiler, muhafazakârlığı siyasal bir kimlik ve ideoloji olarak öne çıkarmakta oldukça tereddütlüydüler. Bu tereddütün sağ siyaset geleneği için dikkat çekici bir ayrışmaya tekabül ettiği söylenmelidir. Buna göre, sağ siyaset geleneği içinde yer alan siyasi partilerin hemen hepsi için doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak sahip çıkılan bir özelliği işaret etmesi anlamında muhafazakârlık, büyük ölçüde AKP ile özdeşleştirilen bir siyasal kimlik unsuru olarak görülmektedir. Muhafazakarlığın AKP tarafından konsolide edilen veya bu partiye atfedilen bir ideolojik bileşen-unsur olarak algılanmasının, diğer partilere mensup siyasetçilerin müstakil veya özgül muhafazakârlıklarını ortaya koymalarını oldukça zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, diğer siyasetçilerin muhafazakârlık tasavvurları ağırlıklı bir biçimde AKP ve onun (siyasal) muhafazakârlığının eleştirisi üzerinden tarif edilmiştir.

MHP, SP ve DP'li siyasetçilerin siyasal muhafazakârlık söylemlerinin iki hat üzerinden belirginlik kazandığı görülmüştür. Siyasal muhafazakâr söylemin belirdiği

ilk hat, genel olarak, AKP'nin eleştirisi üzerinden tanımlanmakta ya da tarif edilmektedir. Bu hat, AKP'nin eleştirisi aracılığıyla muhafazakârlığın ne olması veya olmaması gerektiğine ilişkin görüş ve değerlendirmelerden oluşmaktadır. İkinci hat ise AKP "değişkeni" olmaksızın, (siyasal) muhafazakârlığa yönelik tarifler biçiminde ortaya konulmaktadır. Ancak bu iki hattın çoğu zaman iç içe geçtiğini de belirtmek gerekiyor. AKP dışındaki siyasetçilerin değerlendirmelerine göre; AKP muhafazakârlığı, sağ, dindar ve muhafazakâr kitlelere "hoş görünmek" ve bunu siyaseten oy ve güce tahvil etmek için bir "paravan", "maske", "kisve" vs olarak kullanan bir partidir; dini ve dindarlığı siyasete alet etmektedir. Bu yanıyla onun muhafazakârlığı "samimiyetten" uzaktır. AKP, siyasi bir kimlik olarak "muhafazakâr-demokrasi"yi veya muhafazakârlığı tanımlayamamıştır. Bunu, ne kendisine ne de başkalarına anlatabilmiş değildir. AKP'nin muhafazakârlığı ideolojik değil "fiili"dir; bu yanıyla özgün değil "suni" bir ideolojidir. Özellikle MHP ve DP'li siyasetçilere göre AKP, milliyetçiliği göz ardı ettiğinden bu partinin "gerçek muhafazakârlığı" temsil etmesi söz konusu değildir. MHP için muhafazakârlık tek başına din veya dindarlığa indirgenebilecek bir şey olmasa da onun önemli bir bileşenidir. Muhafazakârlık, milliyetçilikle birlikte ele alınmadığı sürece 'gerçek' anlamına kavuşamaz. MHP'li siyasetçilerin bir kısmına göre muhafazakârlık, Türkiye'deki *kadim* "yenilikçilik" ve "gelenekçilik" tartışmasından kaynaklanmaktadır; bu yanıyla tarihsel ve kültürel bir ayrışmaya da işaret etmektedir. Başta SP'li siyasetçiler olmak üzere, MHP ve DP'li siyasetçilerin büyük bir çoğunluğu için muhafazakârlık, AKP ile özdeşleştirildiği ölçüde, kategorik olarak reddedilmesi gereken bir kavram ve ideolojidir. Özellikle SP'li siyasetçiler için, muhafazakârlık nadir olarak olumluluk atfedilen bir öğe olarak kabul edilmekte bunun yerine "maneviyatçılık"a vurgu yapılmaktadır. SP'li siyasetçilere göre muhafazakârlık, "ithal ve suni bir mefhum"dur. Maneviyatçılık, muhafazakârlık ile karşılaştırıldığında, daha anlamlı, kapsayıcı ve "bize" özgüdür. Maneviyatçılık, din, gelenek ve kültürel öğeleri kapsadığı gibi aynı zamanda *siyasal* da bir kavramdır. Muhafazakârlığa ilişkin DP'li siyasetçilerin söylemlerinde öne çıkan en belirgin söylemin, onu MHP'li siyasetçilerden bile daha keskin bir milliyetçilikle özdeşleştirerek ele almaları olduğu söylenebilir. DP'li siyasetçilerin ezici bir kısmına

göre milliyetçilik, muhafazakâr olmanın en önemli koşuludur; milliyetçi olmayan muhafazakâr da olamaz. Bu anlamda DP'li siyasetçilerin siyasal düzlemdeki en önemli muhafazakârlık belirtecinin milliyetçilik olduğu söylenebilir. Muhafazakârlık, toplumsal-kültürel bir içerikle tanımlandığı anlarda da milliyetçilik vurgusunun öne çıktığı söylenmelidir. Nitekim DP'li siyasetçilerin büyük çoğunluğu siyasal kimliklerini "milliyetçi-muhafazakâr" olarak ifade etmektedirler. DP'li siyasetçilere göre muhafazakârlıkta dini değerler önemli olmakla birlikte, o "dincilik" olarak değerlendirilemez. "Dincilik" ile özdeşleştirilen muhafazakârlığa keskin bir karşıtlık söz konusu olurken, DP'lilerin Kemalizme veya resmi ideolojiye bağlılıklarını sıklıkla vurgulamaya özen gösterdikleri görülmektedir.

AKP'ye yöneltilen eleştiriler bağlamında, MHP, SP ve DP'li siyasetçilerin büyük ölçüde birbirlerine yakın görüşlere sahip oldukları görülmektedir. Bu üç partiye mensup siyasetçiler AKP'yi muhafazakâr olarak görmemekte; onun muhafazakârlığına şüpheyle bakmaktadırlar. Bu üç partiye mensup siyasetçiler AKP'yi "küresel güçlerin" bir tür 'taşeronu' olarak görmekte, deyim yerindeyse, onu siyasal bir "daemon" olarak algılamaktadırlar. Bu algının belirleyici ideolojik ölçütünün ise büyük ölçüde milliyetçilik olduğu görülmektedir. Bu ortaklaşan algının siyaseten ve ideolojik olarak, sağ-muhafazakâr siyasette önemli bir ayrışmaya işaret ettiği söylenebilir; ayrışmanın bir kutbunu bütünüyle (ve hegemonik bir tarzda) AKP temsil ederken diğerini, aralarındaki ideolojik-politik farklılıkları ihmal etmemek kaydıyla, diğer sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetler temsil etmektedirler.

Sağ-muhafazakâr partiler ve siyasetçiler arasındaki farklılık ve benzeşmeleri sadece muhafazakârlık ekseni üzerinden değerlendirmek yeterli değildir. Yukarıda da görüldüğü üzere muhafazakârlık ekseni veya muhafazakârlığa yüklenilen anlam, önemli ayrışma ve benzeşme noktalarını ortaya koymakla birlikte sağ-muhafazakâr geleneği birbiriyle benzeştiren ve farklılaştıran başka ideolojik ve söylemsel unsurlar da söz konusudur. Benzerlik veya farklılıklar sadece, saf, mutlak veya jenerik bir muhafazakârlık ideolojisi üzerinden kurulmamaktadır. Muhafazakârlığın yanı sıra, sağ siyaset ve siyasetçiler arasındaki farklılık ve benzeşmeler milliyetçiliğin ve dini

bir ideoloji olarak İslamcılığın muhafazakârlık ile özgül eklemlenme biçimlerine göre de tayin edilmektedir. Bu durum, mevcut olduğu haliyle muhafazakârlığı 'istikrarsızlaştır'makta fakat onu aynı zamanda bu ideolojilere eklemlenmeye açık bir olgu da kılmaktadır. Bu tespit, birer ideoloji olarak İslamcılığın veya milliyetçiliğin ayırt edici özgül niteliklerini göz ardı etmeyi gerektirmemektedir elbette. Fakat çalışmamızın tümünde dikkat çekmek istediğimiz bir hususu tekrar vurgulamak gerekirse, türlü veçheleriyle Türk sağını, bütün özgül formlarına karşın, bu formların birbirleriyle olan eklemlenme ilişkisinden azade olarak ele almak veya anlamak mümkün görünmemektedir. Bu bağlamda, eklemlenmeye açık bir ideoloji olarak muhafazakârlık ele alındığında, milliyetçilik ve müslümanlık (Türklük-Müslümanlık veya Türklük-İslamcılık da denilebilir) olguları arasında kurulan veya kurulamayan ilişkiler ya da bu olgulara atfedilen önem veya önceliğin sorunsallaştırılmasının elzem olduğu söylenmelidir. Bu bağlamda, sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset içindeki farklılıkları ve benzeşmeleri tayin edebilmekte, milliyetçilik ile İslami ideolojilere bakışın kritik bir önemi bulunmaktadır. Siyasetçilerin bu bağlamda ifade ettiklerine bakıldığında, parti farkı gözetmeksizin onları ortaklaştıran iki konumdan söz etmek mümkün görünüyor. Buna göre;

- *Irkçı-kavmiyetçi bir içerikle tanımlandığı ölçüde milliyetçilik, İslam dinine referansla reddedilmektedir ve*
- *Din ve milliyetçilik ya da İslam ve Türklük arasında bir hiyerarşinin kurulması reddedilmektedir.*

AKP'lilerde milliyetçilik ırk esasına göre tanımlandığı-tanzim edildiği ölçüde İslami değerlere göre reddedilirken, bu reddediş aynı zamanda ırkçı-kavmiyetçiliğin dışında da tarif edilebilen, örneğin "kültür milliyetçiliği" gibi daha çok MHP'lilerin savunduğu türden milliyetçiliklerin de reddine varabilmektedir. Bu bağlamda tanımlanan milliyetçilikler ağırlıklı olarak MHP'ye atfedilmekte ve MHP'nin milliyetçiliği çeşitli görünüm ve nitelikleriyle ("ırkçılık", "kafatasçılık", "otoriter", "faşist" vb adlandırmalarla) yoğun bir biçimde eleştiriye tabi tutulmaktadır. Ancak, AKP ve SP'li siyasetçilerin bu eleştirel tutumları onların milliyetçilik veya milliyetçi

ideoloji(ler) karşısında topyekûn reddiyetçi veya eleştirel bir tutum aldıklarını söylemeye imkân vermemektedir. Atfedildiği haliyle tanımlanan veya algılanan milliyetçiliklerin eleştirisi, farklı türden milliyetçiliklerin (yeniden-) üretilmesini engellememektedir. MHP'li siyasetçiler de milliyetçiliğin ırkçı-kavmiyetçi bir esasa dayandırılarak tanımlanmasına şiddetle karşı çıkıyorlar ve bu karşı çıkışlarını yine İslami öğretiye (temel metin Kuran'a) başvuruyla temellendiriyorlar. Bu haliyle MHP'li siyasetçilerin tutumlarını ilk bakışta diğer siyasetçilerden temelde farklı kılan bir durum söz konusu değildir. Ancak, MHP'li siyasetçilerin ırk-kavmiyet vurgusunun çeşitli biçimlerde diriliğini muhafaza ettiği de söylenmelidir. MHP'liler kendilerine atfedilen ırkçı-kavmiyetçi-etnik temelli milliyetçilik "yakıştırmalarını" "şiddetle reddetmekte", bu temelde yöneltilen "yakıştırmaları", "imaları" ve yer yer 'suçlamaları' savunmacı bir tutumla sürekli olarak 'tashih' ve 'tekzip etmeye' çalışmaktadırlar. MHP'li siyasetçiler bir yandan bu türlü "ithamlara" cevaplar türetirlerken diğer yandan da AKP ve SP'lileri gerek "Türklük"ten gerekse de "milliyetçilikten" uzak olmakla, "ümmetçilik yapmakla" hatta Türklüğe ve Türk milliyetçiliğine "düşman" olmakla itham etmektedirler.

Muhafazakâr siyasetçileri ortaklaştıran diğer bir pozisyon ise milliyetçilik-müslümanlık olguları arasında herhangi bir hiyerarşinin tesis edilmesine yönelik duyulan tepkidir. Bu iki olgu arasında kurulacak her türlü hiyerarşinin (öncelik-sonralık, önemli-daha önemli vb.) bu olguların verili anlamlarını geçersizleştireceği, hiyerarşi ve kıyasa açık olgular olmadığı dile getirilmektedir. Lâfzî ve soyutlama düzeyinde bu tutumlar ortaklaşalık gösterse de yakından bakıldığında bu konuda da farklılaşmaların olduğunu söylemek mümkün görünüyor. Mensup olunan siyasete ve ideolojiye bağlı olarak bu farklılıklar, özellikle siyasal-toplumsal kimliklerin ifade edilme biçimlerinde somut olarak görülmektedir. Ancak bu noktada ilgi çekici bir durumla karşı karşıya olunduğunu vurgulamak isteriz. Lâfzî ve söylemsel düzeyde milliyetçilik ve müslümanlık arasında bir hiyerarşi tesis edilmesine sıklıkla itiraz edilse de siyasal kimliğin dışavurum biçimi olarak fiili veya somut hiyerarşilerin kurulabildiği görülmektedir. Parti farkı gözetmeksizin herhangi bir siyasetçi kendisini "Müslüman ve Türk", "Türk ve Müslüman", sadece "Müslüman", sadece

"Türk", sadece "Türk Milliyetçisi", sadece "Milliyetçi" vb. çeşitli kimlik kombinasyonlarıyla ifade edebilmektedirler. Bu çeşitlendirilmiş kimlik ifadeleri elbette siyasetçilerin tümüne genelleştirilebilecek bir gözlemi yansıtmamaktadır.

Parti ve partililerden bağımsız olarak bütün bu konumlanış ve tartışmaların sağ-muhafazakâr gelenek içindeki önemli bir gerilimi dışa vurduğu söylenmelidir. Bu gerilim esasında Türklük ve İslamcılık ideolojileri arasındaki kadim tartışmanın bir tür dışavurumundan ibarettir. Bu gerilimin üstesinden ise kolayca gelinemeyeceği söylenmelidir. Bunu en somut göstergesinin ise mevcut gerilimin güncelliğini koruyor olmaya devam etmesidir. Gerilim, önemli bir yanıyla bu iki ideolojinin ontolojik kabulleriyle ilgiliyken öte yandan her iki ideolojinin karşılık bulduğu toplumsal ve siyasal vasatla da ilgilidir. Bu ideolojilerin siyasal değişim-dönüşüm momentlerinde hangisinin bir diğerine galebe çalacağı ise büyük ölçüde konjonktürel görünmektedir. Türkiye'nin siyasal tarihi ve tecrübesi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda ise, daha olası görünen, iki ideolojiden birinin mutlak bir üstünlüğünden ziyade ara formlardan söz etmek daha olası ve makul görünmektedir. Örneğin, bir dönem devlet tarafından da benimsenen ya da dayatılan "Türk-İslam Sentezi" gibi ideolojik formlar söz konusu olabilir. Bu ve benzeri olası formlara hangi ideolojinin rengini ağırlıklı olarak vereceği ise siyasal konjonktüre bağlı olacak gibi görünmektedir.

Sağ-muhafazakâr siyaseti anlamak bakımından önemli konu başlıklarını teşkil ettiği düşünülen devlet-otorite ve devlet-toplum anlayışı, muhafazakârlık eksenleri dışında, araştırmanın incelemeyi bir diğer konuyu oluşturdu. Devletin nasıl tanımlandığı ve algılandığı, devlet olgusu karşısında nasıl konum alındığı siyasal düşünce ve ideolojilerin ayırt edilmesi bakımından oldukça önem taşımaktadır. Çalışmanın devlet bahsine ilişkin en dikkat çekici bulgusu, siyasetçilerin 'devlet' hakkında güçlü bir *mitolojik* söylem ve algıya sahip olduklarını göstermektedir. Devlet'e ilişkin sağ geleneğin mitik bir algı ve imgeleme sahip olduğu bilinen bir durum olsa da açıkçası bu algının *modern zamanlar*da siyasal ve sosyolojik bakımdan bir önem taşıyıp taşımadığı başlangıçta bizim için görece muğlaklık taşıyan bir konuydu. Fakat bu

muğlaklığın modern ve güncelle olan rabıta ve bağlantısı belirginleştiği ölçüde, ortaya çıkan durumun önemli bir sosyolojik soruşturma alanı teşkil ettiği görülmüştür. Bir varlık alanı (entite) olarak devlet, görüşülen sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin büyük çoğunluğu için oldukça önem ve değer verilen bir güç ve otorite kaynağı olarak görülmektedir. Meşru güç ve otoriteyi temsil eden devlet, çok çeşitli nitelik, ad ve sıfatlar etrafında tanımlanmakta ve algılanmaktadır. Devlet tanımlanırken en sık müracaat edilen sıfat-mecaz onun "baba" oluşudur; yaygın kullanılan tipik ikili "devlet baba"dır. Hemen her siyasetçi tarafından yüceltilirken de yerilirken de kullanılan en yaygın paternalist sıfat-mecaz budur. Bu mecaza eşlik eden ayrılmaz bir başka önemli unsur ise "kutsallık" veya "kutsiyet"tir.

Devlet beşeri dünyada en meşru güç ve otorite kaynağıdır. Varlığı *kutsal* olduğundan kararları ve tasarrufları sorgulanmamalıdır. Evde babanın kararları ve otoritesi nasıl *herkesçe* kabulleniliyorsa, eve benzetilen ülkenin güç ve otoritesini de ülkenin "babası" olan devlet temsil eder. O, "tıpkı bir baba gibi" ülkenin huzur, mutluluk ve güven kaynağıdır. Herkese eşit ve adil davranan devlete herkes *de* destek ve taraftar olmalıdır. Devletin varlık sebebi milletse, milletin varlık sebebi de devlettir; bu ikisinden birinin eksikliği diğerinin varoluşunu olanaksız kılar. Devlet toplumun ta kendisi hatta onun "teşkilatlanmış halidir". Devlet olmazsa Türk milleti ne varlığını ne de yaşamını sürdürebilir. Devlet her zaman ve koşulda güçlü olmalıdır. Devlet gücünü toplumun "birliği ve bütünlüğünden" alır. "Devletler mücadelesi aslında milletler mücadelesi" olduğundan devlete *başkaldırmak* milletin varlığına da "ihanettir". Türk milletinin en karakteristik vasfı, onun "devlet kurma yeteneği"dir. "Türkün beş-altı bin yıllık geçmişi" bu yeteneği cisimleştiren sayısız örnekler içermektedir. Bu vasıf ve yetenek "ebed müddet devlet" deyişinde anlam kazanır. *Milletin varlık sebebi* olarak görülen devlet her zaman *bireylerin* üstündedir. *Devletin varlığı, birliği ve bekası söz konusu olduğunda devlet*, her şeyden önce gelir.

Devlete yönelik bu tarif ve algılar anlatılarda dile getirilen ifadelere dayalıdır. Bu özette yer alan ifade ve yargılar AKP, MHP, DP ve BBP'li siyasetçilerin büyük

ölçüde ortaklaşan tarif ve algılarını ve kısmen de SP'li siyasetçilerinkini yansıtmaktadırlar. Güçlü bir eğilimi temsil ediyor olmasa da, bu özetteki ifade ve görüşlerle kısmen ihtilaflı, ona uymayan tarif ve algılara da değinmek gerekiyor. Örneğin, devletin varlığı, gücü, otoritesi ve kutsallığı her şeye karşın kabul edilmekle birlikte aynı zamanda ona atfedilen bu niteliklerinin eleştirildiği ve sorgulandığını da belirtmek gerekiyor. Devletin, otorite ve gücünün sınırlarının belirlenmesi gerektiğini, karar ve uygulamalarında adaleti ve eşitliği gözetmesini, ideoloji ve irade dayatmasını yanlış bulduğunu belirten anlatı ve eğilimler de söz konusudur. Fakat yinelemek gerekirse bunun güçlü bir eğilim olmadığını belirtmeliyiz.

SP'li siyasetçilerin devlet konusunda diğer sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerden farklı görüş ve değerlendirmelere sahip olduğu belirtilmelidir. Bir entite olarak devlet, SP'li siyasetçiler için önemini korusa da bu önemin kaynağı bizatihi devletin *a priori* yalın varlığı veya 'ontolojik statüsü' değil Sünni-İslami teolojinin "ulul emre itaat" düsturunda anlam kazanıyor görünmektedir. SP'li siyasetçilere göre devlet, bu ilkeyi temsil ettiği ve onun vazettiği ilkeye uyduğu ölçüde meşrudur. Bu ilkeye göre "en kötü otorite otoritesizlikten yeğdir". "Ulul emri" temsil ettiğine inanıldığı ölçüde devlete *isyan* ve *başkaldırı* söz konusu olamaz.

Peki devlete dair mevcut mitik algının kaynağı nedir ve bu algı ve tahayyüller ne anlama gelmekte ve ne anlatmaktadır? SP'li siyasetçilerin önemli bir kısmı dışarıda bırakılarak söylenirse, öncelikle, siyasetçilerin anlatıların ortaya koyduğu devlet ve otorite algısının pre-modern bir tarih kavrayışından türediği söylenebilir. Bu tarih kavrayışı ve algısında ideolojik-değer yönelimli bir tarih tasarımı ve yazımının güçlü bir etkiye sahip oluşundan söz edilebilir. Söz konusu algının yerleşiklik kazanmasında uluslaşma sürecinin pedagojik vasıtalarının (ders kitapları, haritalar vb.) son derece etkili olduğu ve içselleştirilerek günümüze aktarıldığı söylenebilir. Böylesi bir tarih ve bununla uyumlu devlet-otorite kavrayışının erken cumhuriyet döneminde ortaya konulan tarih tezleriyle, özellikle de "romantik" tarih tasarımının çok daha belirgin olduğu I. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nin (1932) tezleriyle (Türk Tarih

Tezi) bağlantılı olduğu görülmektedir. Otoritenin ve onu temsil eden devletin mitolojik alımlanışı, salt arkaik-tarihsel veya kazai-arızi bir anlatı olmakla sınırlı kalmayıp *güncele* de sirayet etmekte ve bu algı yeniden ve yeniden-üretilme potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Ancak bu yeniden-üretimin de kendiliğinden değil uluslaşma sürecinden kaynaklandığı ve bu süreçte ulus-devletin uyguladığı belirli "ulusal-pedagojik" (Açıkel, 2002) stratejiler sonucu mümkün olabildiği söylenmelidir.

Genel bir eğilim olarak tarihin ve burada dile getirilen tarih anlayışıyla uyumlu olarak beliren devletin-otoritenin mitolojik bir biçimde tasavvur edilmesinin ne anlamı bulunmaktadır? Anlatılarda ortaya çıkan pre-modern veya "icad edilen" tarih anlayışının ve bununla ilintili devlet-otorite tasavvurunun sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçiler nezdinde karşılık bulmasının, modern siyasetin siyasetçilerin önüne koyduğu *güncel* meselelerin tartışılması ve çözüm olasılıkları (örneğin, Kürt sorununu) önünde ciddiye alınması gereken (ideolojik) bir engel oluşturduğu söylenmelidir. Bu, salt sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçileri değil aynı zamanda söz konusu geleneğe destek sunan kitlelerin tutumları için de göz önünde bulundurulması gereken bir durum sayılabilir. 'Tarihin siyasetin hizmetine' (Taşkın, 2007: 60-61 ve 135-174) bu denli ideolojik bir yükle koşulması basitçe teorik bir yanılsamanın veya sapmanın ötesinde pratik siyasal karşılıkları olabilen bir alan sayılmalıdır.

Sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset geleneğinin önemli bir hattını (AKP-MHP-DP) kesen bu mitik tarih-devlet-otorite anlayışının yerleşiklik kazanmasında hem resmi tarih anlayışının hem de, belki de ondan daha fazla, resmi tarih anlayışıyla salınımlı-gerilimli veya ona zaman zaman eklemlenebilen Türk-İslam sentezi ideolojisinin payını vurgulamak elzem görünüyor. Sentez'in güncel siyasi bir tasarım-proje olarak hegemonik vasfından veya tutunumundan söz etmek mümkün olmasa da geriye bıraktığı ideolojik-zihinsel mirasın belirli bir süreklilik içinde evrilerek günümüze tevarüs ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. Üstelik bu miras yukarıda anılan hattın bir unsuruna değil tümüne birden çeşitli derece ve boyutlarıyla sirayet etmiş görünmektedir.

Otoriter-faşizan bir zihniyetin içselleştirilebilmesini göstermesi bakımından da yukarıda sözü edilen devlet algısının önem taşıdığı söylenebilir. Siyasal sosyalleşme kısmında da vurgulandığı üzere, "baba"da cisimleşen otorite figürü ve ona olan bağlılık hem toplumsal-siyasal hem de bireysel olarak otoriteyle olan ilişkinin anlaşılması bakımdan önemli bir unsur olarak görünüyor. Ataerkilliğin, erkeklik söyleminin, militarizmin ve sair zihniyetlerin yeniden-üretimi ve anlaşılması bakımından devletin ve otoritenin bu denli yüceltilişinin ciddiye alınması gereken siyasal-toplumsal ve sosyal bilimsel bir soruna işaret ettiği söylenmelidir. Fakat bunu salt sağ-muhafazakâr gelenek değil sol addedilen kişi-yapı ve kurumlar için de soruşturulması da ilgi çekici olacaktır.

Yukarıda da tartışıldığı üzere salt bir entite-varlık alanı olarak devlet ve onun temsil ettiği otorite, sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerce büyük ölçüde olumlanır ve yüceltilirken cumhuriyetin kuruluşu ile somutluk kazanan devlet ve onun temsil ettiği otorite, değer ve ilkeler ise kayda değer ölçüde eleştiriye tabi tutulmaktadır. Bu bize göre dikkat çekici bir paradoks veya gerilime işaret etmektedir. Cumhuriyet ve sonrası için, devlete yönelik eleştirel mesafe bizatihi onun ontolojik-normatif varlığına yönelmekten ziyade cumhuriyetin modernleşmeci ideolojisinin ve onun devlet merkezliliğinin (kültüralist) eleştirisiyle sınırlı kalmaktadır.

Mutlak bir entite olarak devlet-otoriteye yönelen ayrıcalıklı algı ile cumhuriyet döneminde tecessüm eden devlet temsili arasında kayda değer bir farklılık ve gerilim söz konusudur. Cumhuriyet süreci ve onun modernleşme pratikleri söz konusu olduğunda devlete yöneltilen eleştirilerde "devletin kutsiyeti"nden söz edilmemekte, "baba" vasfına göndermede bulunulmamakta veya deyim yerindeyse bir "öz baba"dan beklenmeyecek tavır ve tutumlar takındığı ölçüde "baba"ya karşı çıkılmaktadır. Yine deyim yerindeyse devlet nezdinde muhafazakâr kitlelerin (veya milletin-halkın-vatandaşın) "üvey evlat" konumuna getirilmesinden şikâyet edilmektedir. Daha önce görüldüğü üzere, bir entite veya mutlaklık olarak 'devlet' yüceltilirken cumhuriyetle özdeşleştirilen devletin kıyasıya eleştirilmesinin çeşitli neden ve gerekçeleri olmalıdır. Bunun ilk dolaysız nedeninin, sağ-muhafazakârlığın

devlet ve iktidar tahayyülüyle bağlantılı olduğu söylenmelidir. Devletin mitik nitelikli algılanışı ile yeni rejimde tecessüm eden devlet algısı arasındaki farkın iktidara/güce olan mesafe ile ilişkili olduğu anlaşılıyor. Sağ-muhafazakârlık devlet iktidarına yaklaşabildiği ve onu massedebildiği sürece ona yönelen eleştirinin ve mesafenin dilinin de yumuşamakta ve giderek onu olumladığı görülmektedir. Cumhuriyet boyunca sağ-muhafazakâr geleneğin devlete (iktidara) yakınlaştıkça muhalif tavır ve tutumu gevşemektedir ve son kertede onu sahiplenmektedir. Taşkın'ın milliyetçi-muhafazakâr entelejensiya üzerine olan çalışmasında da vurguladığı üzere milliyetçi-muhafazakârlık, muhalifken bile devlette konumlanmıştır, "milli kültürün yeniden ihyası ana projesinde" millet bileşenlerine değil devlete yaslanma tercihinde bulunmuştur (Taşkın, 2007: 58-61). Bu tercih, milliyetçi-muhafazakârlığın: "devleti ele geçirme ve siyaseti devlet kurumları etrafında cereyan eden bir seçkinler arası mücadele olarak algılamasının da nedenidir" (Taşkın, 2007: 61).

Siyasetçilerle yapılan görüşmelerde, devlet ile millet (ya da toplum veya vatandaş) arasındaki ilişkilerin cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan bu yana "uzak", "mesafeli" ve "kopuk"luğun en sık vurgulanan temalar olduğu görülmüştür. Söz konusu *uzaklık*, *mesafe* ve *kopukluğun* başlıca gerekçesi ise cumhuriyetin "millete ait değerler"i dikkate almaması olarak ifade edilmektedir. Buna neden olarak cumhuriyetin kurucu iradesinin toplumsal ve kültürel hayatı düzenlemeye yönelik radikal ideolojisi ve uygulamaları gündeme getirilmektedir. Kurucu iradenin ve onu uygulayan bürokratik seçkinci kadroların sert biçimde eleştirildiği başlıca konunun ise *din politikası* ve ona koşut uygulamalar olduğu görülmektedir. Bu politikanın somut olarak tezahür ettiği temel ilke ve uygulama ise 'laiklik' politikasıdır. Sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin büyük çoğunluğuna göre cumhuriyetin modernleşmeci ideolojisi ve onun uygulayıcı bürokratik eliti topluma, "milletin manevi ve kültürel değerlerine" "yabancılaşmış", "uzak düşmüş" ve bazen de toplumun söz konusu değerlerine "düşmanca" bir tutum takınmıştır.

Mülakatlarda sıklıkla değinilen önemli bir başka husus ise "milli irade" kavramı ve bunun "ilga edilmesi"ne yapılan güçlü vurgudur. Buna göre 'milli irade' çok partili yaşama geçilene değin meşru olmayan yol ve yöntemlerle "gasp" edilmiştir. Bu minvalde, "Milli Şef" dönemi uygulamalarının "geniş halk kesimleri"nde cumhuriyetin değerlerine yönelik derin bir memnuniyetsizlik ve kuşkuya yol açtığı sıklıkla dile getirilmektedir. Cumhuriyet süreci değerlendirilirken Milli Şef öncesi ve sonrası ayrımı sıklıkla yapılmaktadır. M. Kemal'in yaşadığı dönem ile 1950 arasında yaşananlar genellikle *travmatik-arızi* bir süreç olarak yorumlanmakta ve yoğun bir biçimde eleştiriye tabi tutulmaktadır. Bu süreçte M. Kemal çoğu kez olumluluklar atfedilen bir figür olarak anılırken, daha kısa bir dönem olmasına rağmen, İsmet İnönü ve dönemi ağır bir biçimde eleştirilmektedir. Milli Şef dönemi ve uygulamaları, çoğu muhafazakâr siyasetçiye göre, devlete mesafe alınmasının "asıl" nedeni olmuş ve cumhuriyetin *genellikle* "yanlış değerlendirilmesine" yol açmıştır. Fakat öte yandan cumhuriyetin ve yeni devletin kuruluş sürecinin "olağanüstü şartları" gündeme getirilerek, eleştirilen birçok devrim ve uygulama ise "kısmen" de olsa "anlaşılır" bulunmaktadır. "Her şeye karşın" cumhuriyet ve modernleşme sürecinin bu topluma birçok şeyi kazandırdığı ifade edilmekte ve cumhuriyetin kuruluş felsefesine yönelik köktenci eleştirilere ise mesafeli bakılmaktadır. Dikkat çekici olan ise aktarılan bu gözlem ve değerlendirmeler konusunda görüşülen siyasetçiler arasında kayda değer bir farklılaşmanın olmayışıdır. Her şeye rağmen, Cumhuriyete ve temsil ettiği ideolojiye en mesafeli duruşa sahip görünen siyasetçiler de dâhil olmak üzere bir siyasi ideal ve yönetim anlayışı olarak cumhuriyet önemsenmektedir. Topyekûn cumhuriyetin felsefi ideallerinin veya modernleşme sürecinin doğrudan kendisi değil "elitist zihniyet", "kötü niyetli bürokratlar" ve "basiretsiz yöneticiler" eleştirilmektedir. Cumhuriyetin "erdem ve kazanımları" vurgulanmakla birlikte çoğu kez apolojik bir söyleme müracaatla cumhuriyetin "yanlış-hatalı" ideoloji ve uygulamaları mazur gösterilmekte ve son kertede ona sahip çıkılmaktadır. Bu durum, sağ-muhafazakârlık nezdinde bize göre, Kemalizmin ve onun modernleştirici ideolojisinin-iradesinin hem 'konsolidasyonu'nu hem de bunun sınırlarını göstermektedir.

Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan günümüze dek uzanan tarihsel ve siyasal süreci devlet ve toplum ilişkileri ekseninde değerlendirmeleri istenen sağ-muhafazakâr siyasetçilerin konunun farklılaşan boyutlarına yönelik değerlendirme ve eleştirilerinde büyük ölçüde mutabık kaldıklarını ve ortaklaştığı söylenebilecek bir anlatı inşa ettiklerini söylemek mümkün görünüyor. Bu mutabakatta göze çarpan öncelikli durumun eleştirilere hâkim olan kültür odaklılık olduğu söylenebilir. Bu yanıyla, Cumhuriyet dönemi modernleşme pratiklerine yönelik (standart) sağ-muhafazakâr eleştirinin genel kültüralist bağlam ve içeriği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda şaşırtıcı sayılmaması gereken bir uyumluluk ya da süreklilik söz konusudur. Elbette, mevcut kültüralist eleştirinin açık ya da örtülü bir siyasal eleştiri de olduğunu vurgulamalıyız. Burada ilgi çekici olan (Kemalist) kültürel radikalizme yönelik tepki veya muhalefetin kendisinin de bir başka kültüralizmle malul oluşudur.

Sağ-muhafazakâr eleştirel *kanonun* mutabık kaldığı konuların her birinin (devlet, devlet-millet-toplum kopukluğu, din politikaları, toplumsal-kültürel devrimler-reformlar vs.) kendi içinde ayrı ayrı tartışılmayı gerektiren gerek toplumsal-kültürel gerek politik ve gerekse de akademik olarak devasa bir birikime, literatüre veya alana işaret ettiği rahatlıkla söylenebilir. Kemalist modernleşme sürecine yönelik, salt sağ-muhafazakâr gelenek içinden türetilen eleştirel mesai değil sol ve liberal eleştirel mesai de hesaba katılırsa, tekil bir alan çalışmayla her bir eleştiri konusunu-nesnesini çözümlemeye girişmek hem kuramsal-ampirik hem de pratik olarak mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla, çalışmanın bulgularının ortaya koyduğu genel kültüralist ve siyasal eğilimi sorunsallaştırmak sağ gelenekteki önemli bir ortaklaşalığı anlamak bakımından önem taşımaktadır.

İlgi çekici bir biçimde, anlatıların genel söylemsel düzeni ve sahip olduğu içerik ile Türkiye'nin modernleşme sürecine ilişkin cari kuramsal okuma-analiz yordamlarından biri olan "merkez-çevre" yaklaşımının vazettikleri arasında var olan bir uyumluluk göze çarpmaktadır. "Kültürel yabancılaşma tezi" (Çınar, 2006) olarak da tanımlanabilecek "merkez-çevre" yaklaşımının öneri ve tespitleriyle, anlatıların genel içerik ve bağlamı arasındaki söz konusu uyumluluk veya mütekabiliyet,

"merkez-çevre paradigmasının gerçekliği temsil ettiği kadar, gerçekliği kuran bir paradigma haline geldiğine de işaret etmektedir" (Açıkel, 2006: 34). Bu haliyle 'paradigma'nın sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset için kullanışlı bir ideolojik-politik meşrulaştırım çerçevesi sunduğu/sağladığı söylenebilir. Türkiye'nin siyasetini, siyasal tarihini ve toplumsal yapısını okumanın başat araçlarından biri haline gelmiş gibi görünen söz konusu 'paradigma' analitik bir atıf çerçevesi olmaktan çıkarak verili toplumsallığı, siyaseti ve iktidar konumunu sağ siyaset nezdinde meşrulaştıran bir siyasal ve kuramsal pozisyona dönüşmüş görünmektedir. Görüşülen siyasetçilerin çok azı sözü edilen paradigmaya, onun kullandığı temel kavramlara ve analitik kategorilere doğrudan müracaat etmektedirler. Fakat anlatılarda ve değerlendirmelerinde belirginlik kazanan devleti, siyaseti ve toplumu 'okuma-değerlendirme yordamı' bu çerçeveyi tekrarlamakta ve üstelik büyük ölçüde ortaklaşan bir tutumla teyit de etmektedir. Salt bu halin kendisi, 'paradigma'nın siyasal ve ideolojik işlevselliğine dair kayda değer bir emare olarak değerlendirilmelidir.

Sağ-muhafazakâr geleneğin toplumu tasavvur etme biçimi büyük ölçüde onu, sabit özlere indirgemekte ve türdeş bir biçimde kavramaktadır. "Halkın-milletin değerleri"nden anlaşılanın, bütün muğlaklığına karşın, Türk, Müslüman ve Sünni değerlere tekabül ettiği söylenebilir. Böylesi bir tahayyülün sağ-muhafazakârlığın eleştire geldikleri cumhuriyet ideolojisinin vazettiği toplum tasarımından çok da farklı olmadığını belirtmek gerekiyor. Dolayısıyla sağ-muhafazakârların (ve kimi liberallerin) topluma devlet karşısında daha fazla alan açılması gibi demokratik bir talepten ziyade, tersine, devlet ve toplum arasındaki mesafenin kapatılarak organik-türdeş bir toplum yaratma tahayyülünden söz edilebileceğini düşünüyoruz. Devlet ve topluma yönelik olarak sağ-muhafazakâr algı ve bakış açısı bugüne değin bu geleneğe hâkim olan kültüralizmi siyasal bir eleştiriye meftun kılarak, geleneğin üretici öznelerinden olan siyasetçilerinin söylemleri aracılığıyla günümüze taşıdıkları ve yeniden-ürettikleri görülmüştür. Gerek anlatılara hâkim söylem gerekse de kuramsal değerlendirmeler göz önünde bulundurulursa, sağ-muhafazakâr siyaset ve düşün geleneğinin tarihe, topluma ve iktidara bakarken *sosyolojik gelenekten*

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*yoksunluk* tespiti (Yüksel, 2007) geçerlilik kazanmaktadır. Sağın ideologlarının (ve siyasetçilerinin) kültür, siyaset ve iktisat alanlarını birbirinden net biçimde ayrıştırarak, çoğunlukla kültürü asıl belirleyici haline getirme arayışlarının, son derece yetersiz bir bakış olmakla beraber, *ideolojik işlevinin* önemine değinen (Yüksel, 2007: 81) Yüksel'in tespiti-tezi bu bakımdan çalışmamız için kritik bir önemdedir. "Millet"in 'otantik temsili' ve onun değerlerinin yegâne taşıyıcısı olma iddiaları, muhafazakâr kültüralizmi siyasal bir ikna projesi olarak hegemonik kılmış görünüyor. Siyasal hegemonyayı mümkün kılan tek unsurun kültür olmadığı açık olmakla birlikte, sağ-muhafazakârlık liberal söylemleri de yedeğine alarak ideolojik-politik hegemonyasını meşrulaştıracak kuramsal dayanaklarını da "merkez-çevre" vs. yaklaşımların içinden türetiyor görünmektedir.

# APPENDIX C

## TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

**ENSTİTÜ**

| | |
|---|---|
| Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü | ☐ |
| Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü | X |
| Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü | ☐ |
| Enformatik Enstitüsü | ☐ |
| Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü | ☐ |

**YAZARIN**

Soyadı : Suveren
Adı     : Yaşar
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) :

The Right Wing Conservative Politicians in Turkey: Ideological and Political
Imaginations

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** :   Yüksek Lisans ☐          Doktora   X

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.   X

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir
bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.   X

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.   X

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ**:

# APPENDIX D

## THE QUESTIONAIRE USED IN INTERVIEWING THE POLITICIANS

G. 1.  The province where the interview took place :

G. 2.  The district where the interview took place :

G. 3.  The political party affiliation of the respondent :

G. 4.  Respondent's position  in the party :

G. 5.  (Respondent's) gender :

| Male | 1 |
|------|---|
| Female | 2 |

### Socio-Demographic Characteristics

A. 1.  Year of Birth: .......................

A. 2.  Province of Birth: _____

A. 3.  Residential definition of the birth place :

| Prefecture | 1 | |
|------------|---|---|
| County seat or town centre | 2 | |
| Village | 3 | |
| Overseas | 4 | **Please indicate the name of the country:………….** |

A. 4.  Which of the following best describes your connection to the location where you are currently living?

| I have been a local man/ woman where I live | 1 |
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| I'm the descendant of immigrant parents or grandparents | 2 |
| I immigrated to the place where I'm currently living (by myself or with my spouse) | 3 |
| Work-related appointment, compulsory service, etc. is  the reason for me to move where I currently live | 4 |
| Other (please indicate the reason (s): | 5 |

A. 5.  Education level (Highest diploma or degree obtained)

| Primary School diploma | 1 |
|------------------------|---|
| Secondary School diploma | 2 |
| High School diploma | 3 |
| University graduate degree | 4 |
| Junior Technical College degree | 5 |

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| Graduate degree (M.A., PhD., etc.) | 6 |
|---|---|

**A. 6.** **If you're a high school or university graduate, please indicate the type of high school from which you were graduated :**

| Comprehensive/academic High School | 1 |
|---|---|
| Vocational High School | 2 |
| Vocational High School for Religious Functionaries | 3 |
| Foreign language-focused public High School | 4 |
| High School for Teachers | 5 |
| Science-focused High School | 6 |
| Private High School | 7 |
| Other (Please indicate)............................................................... | 8 |

A. 7.   Which of the following was your major area in university?

|  | **School type** |
|---|---|
| Engineering | 1 |
| Humanities or Social Sciences ( Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, History, etc.,) | 2 |
| Law | 3 |
| Economics or Administrative Sciences | 4 |
| Natural Sciences (Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics) | 5 |
| Academy for Technical Training or Higher Institute for Islamic Studies | 6 |
| Health  Sciences ( Medicine, Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine, Pharmacy) | 7 |
| Education | 8 |
| Foreign Languages | 9 |
| Fine Arts and Conservatory | 11 |
| Agriculture and Forestry | 12 |
| Other (please indicate)................................................................ | 13 |

A. 8.   Do you speak any foreign languages?

| 0 | I do not speak any foreign language | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | **Fluent** | **Intermediate** | **Beginner** |
| 1 | English | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2 | German | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 3 | French | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 4 | Arabic | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 | Russian | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 6 | Other (please indicate): .................. | 1 | 2 | 3 |

A. 9.   What is the educational level of your parents?

| **Education** | **Mother** | **Father** |
|---|---|---|
| Illiterate | 1 | 1 |
| Literate without a primary school diploma | 2 | 2 |
| Primary School graduate | 3 | 3 |
| Middle School graduate | 5 | 5 |
| High School graduate | 7 | 7 |
| University graduate | 8 | 8 |

| Vocational/ Junior Technical College graduate | 9 | 9 |
|---|---|---|
| Graduate School/ PhD. degree | 11 | 11 |

A. 10. Marital Status :

| Single | 1 | **Go to question number …..** |
|---|---|---|
| Engaged/ Betrothed | 2 | **Go to question number …..** |
| Married | 3 | |
| Divorced/Widower | 4 | |

A. 11. What is the most recent diploma that your spouse has?

| Illiterate | 1 |
|---|---|
| Literate without a primary school diploma | 2 |
| Primary school  diploma | 3 |
| Secondary School diploma | 4 |
| High School diploma | 5 |
| University graduate/ diploma | 6 |
| Vocational/ Junior Technical College diploma | 7 |
| Graduate School/ PhD. Diploma | 8 |

A. 12. Do you have any children?  If so, please indicate the number **: _____   (If childless, please mark 0.)**

A. 13. How many people, including yourself, are there in your household currently? Number:.................

**Socio-Economic Characteristics**

E. 1.   What is your occupation?
 .....................................................................................................................................

E. 2.   What is your current job?
.....................................................................................................................................

E. 3.   What is/was your father's job?
.....................................................................................................................................

E. 4.   What is /was your mother's job?
.....................................................................................................................................

E. 5.   **(If  married) What is /was your spouse's job?**
.....................................................................................................................................

E. 6.   Which of the following describes the ownership of your current residence?

| I am the owner | 1 |
|---|---|
| I rent it | 2 |
| It is a company/ state owned dwelling | 3 |
| It  belongs to a family member and rented free | 4 |
| Other: | 5 |

Please indicate the total monthly household income......................................................NT

**APPENDIX E**

GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

1. **Political Background and Position**

   a) Would you please provide some information about your political background? (For example where and how did you start to be politically active? Which political traditions did have an influence on you? In what sorts of political activity were you engaged? Did you assume any formal responsibilities?) In the past, with what kinds of political movements and traditions were you affiliated?

   b) Which factors or individuals have been influential in shaping your political views and preferences?

   c) Have you ever been affiliated with or worked for a political party/parties apart from the one you are serving currently? If yes, would you please specify the in which party name(s), time period of involvement in the party, and the responsibilities and positions that you assumed?

   d) (If applicable) What caused you to break away from the political party or political tradition with which you had identified?

   e) Would you please provide some information about the process that led to your current position in the party?

2. **Perception and Conceptualization of "Politics" and "Political"**

   a) What does the term "**politics**" means to you? What are your expectations from politics and how would you describe them? What comes to your mind, when the term "politics" is mentioned? What is the purpose of your active involvement in politics? What sort of a world and society do you envision and intend to achieve by engaging in politics?

   b) How would you describe your political identity? How did you acquire such a political identity?

   c) How would you define the left-right divide in politics? How would you describe the broad characteristics of these two concepts?

d) What do the terms "right-wing" and "right-wing politics" suggest to you? What are the major and defining features of the right-wing political tradition? In your opinion, what kind of political, cultural, economic and social values would be endorsed and followed by a "right-winger" individual?

e) What does "left-wing politics" or "being a leftist" mean to you? What comes to your mind, when the term left is mentioned?

f) What comes to your mind when the term "conservatism" is mentioned? Whom would you call or consider a "conservative"? What are the things that conservatives would promote? To what would they oppose?

g) Where would you locate conservatism in the political spectrum? Why?

h) Would you describe yourself as "a conservative person"? If yes, why?

i) Is there any connection between being "conservative" and being "right-winger", "nationalist", "Muslim", "religious" or "liberal"?

j) How would you separate the various conservative parties and traditions from each other? How would you describe their similarities and differences? For example, could we talk about some distinct characteristics that would separate the members of your party from the members of other conservative parties in your city/region or locale?

k) How would you define the relationship between "Turkishness" and Muslimhood" (Türklük ve Islam)? Are these concepts mutually exclusive, overlapping or reinforcing each other? Do you think it is possible to assume a hierarchical relationship between them?

l) What comes to your mind, when the word "state" is mentioned? How would you describe the state? How would you characterize the right-wing conservative political tradition's relationship with the "state" in Turkey?

m) How would you portray and explain the formation and development of state-society relations in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic?

n) Considering it a political project, what would you consider as, the achievements and failures of the "Republic" since its establishment to the present? In other words, are there any shortcomings or achievements of the Republic?

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POLITICIANS

**The Distribution of Sample by City**

| City | Number | Percent |
|------|--------|---------|
| Sakarya | 25 | 19,8 |
| Kayseri | 21 | 16,7 |
| Erzurum | 14 | 11,1 |
| Malatya | 13 | 10,3 |
| Aydın | 9 | 7,1 |
| Antalya | 8 | 6,3 |
| Samsun | 7 | 5,6 |
| Trabzon | 6 | 4,8 |
| Balıkesir | 6 | 4,8 |
| Ankara | 5 | 4,0 |
| Gaziantep | 4 | 3,2 |
| Bursa | 4 | 3,2 |
| İstanbul | 4 | 3,2 |
| **Total** | **126** | **100,0** |

**The Distribution of Sample by Party**

|       | Number | Percent |
|-------|--------|---------|
| AKP   | 40     | 31,7    |
| MHP   | 25     | 19,8    |
| SP    | 23     | 18,3    |
| DP    | 27     | 21,4    |
| ANAP  | 6      | 4,8     |
| BBP   | 5      | 4,0     |
| Total | **126** | **100,0** |

**The Distribution of Sample by Position within the Party Administration**

| | Number | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Provincial/District executive board member | 51 | 40,5 |
| Chair of provincial council | 16 | 12,7 |
| Chair of district council | 14 | 11,1 |
| Provincial council member | 14 | 11,1 |
| Vice-chair of district | 8 | 6,3 |
| Party council member | 8 | 6,3 |
| Member of Parliament | 4 | 3,2 |
| Mayor | 3 | 2,4 |
| Member of general congress | 3 | 2,4 |
| Vice-chair of youth affiliate | 2 | 1,6 |
| Deputy mayor | 1 | 0,8 |
| Provincial council member | 1 | 0,8 |
| Vice-Chair of women's affiliate | 1 | 0,8 |
| **Total** | **126** | **100,0** |

**Gender of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

|  |  | Gender | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Men | Women | |
| AKP | Number | 34 | 6 | 40 |
| | Percent | 85,0% | 15,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 24 | 1 | 25 |
| | Percent | 96,0% | 4,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 23 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 27 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 119 | 7 | 126 |
| | Percent | 94,4% | 5,6% | 100,0% |

## Age of Politicians by Party Affiliation

| | | Birth Year and Age Brackets | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1928-1949 (59-80) | 1950-1959 (49-58) | 1960-1969 (39-48) | 1970-1979 (29-38) | 1980-1990 (18-28) | Total |
| AKP | Number | 4 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 3 | 40 |
| | Percent | 10,0% | 22,5% | 30,0% | 30,0% | 7,5% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 8 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 25 |
| | Percent | 32,0% | 32,0% | 24,0% | 12,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 11 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 47,8% | 30,4% | 13,0% | 8,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 4 | 4 | 9 | 10 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 14,8% | 14,8% | 33,3% | 37,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 50,0% | 16,7% | 16,7% | 16,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 100,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 30 | 34 | 31 | 28 | 3 | 126 |
| | Percent | 23,8% | 27,0% | 24,6% | 22,2% | 2,4% | 100,0% |

**Birth Place of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | Place of Birth | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | City | District or Town | Village | |
| AKP | Number | 16 | 13 | 11 | 40 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | 32,5% | 27,5% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 12 | 9 | 4 | 25 |
| | Percent | 48,0% | 36,0% | 16,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 12 | 7 | 4 | 23 |
| | Percent | 52,2% | 30,4% | 17,4% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 10 | 12 | 5 | 27 |
| | Percent | 37,0% | 44,4% | 18,5% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 66,7% | 33,3% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | 20,0% | 40,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 56 | 44 | 26 | 126 |
| | Percent | 44,4% | 34,9% | 20,6% | 100,0% |

**Migration Status of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| PARTY | | Migration Status | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I am native to where I live | My elders (mother, father, grandfather etc.) had migrated to where I live | I migrated to where I live. | I live in this place unofficial duty, or due to appointment, promotion, conscription etc. | |
| AKP | Number | 30 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 40 |
| | Percent | 75,0% | 22,5% | 2,5% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 17 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 25 |
| | Percent | 68,0% | 12,0% | 16,0% | 4,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 17 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 23 |
| | Percent | 73,9% | 21,7% | ,0% | 4,3% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 23 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 85,2% | 14,8% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 83,3% | 16,7% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 60,0% | 40,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 95 | 24 | 5 | 2 | 126 |
| | Percent | 75,4% | 19,0% | 4,0% | 1,6% | 100,0% |

**Household Size of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | Size of Household | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **One person** | **Two person** | **Three person** | **Four person** | **Five person and over** | |
| **AKP** | Number | 7 | 0 | 4 | 13 | 16 | 40 |
| | Percent | 17,5% | ,0% | 10,0% | 32,5% | 40,0% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 12 | 25 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 4,0% | 48,0% | 48,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 1 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 23 |
| | Percent | 4,3% | 17,4% | 26,1% | 21,7% | 30,4% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 13 | 27 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 14,8% | 37,0% | 48,1% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 83,3% | 16,7% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | 80,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 8 | 4 | 15 | 46 | 53 | 126 |
| | Percent | 6,3% | 3,2% | 11,9% | 36,5% | 42,1% | 100,0% |

**Marital Status of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

|  |  | Marital Status | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | **Married** | **Single** |  |
| **AKP** | Number | 33 | 7 | 40 |
|  | Percent | 82,5% | 17,5% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 25 | 0 | 25 |
|  | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 22 | 1 | 23 |
|  | Percent | 95,7% | 4,3% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 27 | 0 | 27 |
|  | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 6 | 0 | 6 |
|  | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 5 | 0 | 5 |
|  | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 118 | 8 | 126 |
|  | Percent | 93,7% | 6,3% | 100,0% |

**The Number of Children owned by Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | Number of Children | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Without children | One children | Two children | Three children | Four children | Five children or more | |
| **AKP** | Number | 0 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 33 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 9,1% | 33,3% | 33,3% | 21,2% | 3,0% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 0 | 1 | 10 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 25 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 4,0% | 40,0% | 44,0% | 8,0% | 4,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 1 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 22 |
| | Percent | 4,5% | 18,2% | 22,7% | 31,8% | 18,2% | 4,5% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 0 | 1 | 7 | 15 | 2 | 2 | 27 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 3,7% | 25,9% | 55,6% | 7,4% | 7,4% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 83,3% | 16,7% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | 80,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 1 | 9 | 39 | 49 | 15 | 5 | 118 |
| | Percent | ,8% | 7,6% | 33,1% | 41,5% | 12,7% | 4,2% | 100,0% |

**The Education Level of Fathers by Party Affiliation**

| | | Education Level | | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Illite rate | Literate but not finished primary school | Prim ary schoo l | Secondary school | High school | Technic al college | Unive rsity | |
| **AKP** | Number | 3 | 2 | 24 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 40 |
| | Percent | 7,5% | 5,0% | 60,0 % | 7,5% | 10,0% | 7,5% | 2,5% | 100,0 % |
| **MHP** | Number | 3 | 1 | 13 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| | Percent | 12,0 % | 4,0% | 52,0 % | 20,0% | 12,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0 % |
| **SP** | Number | 5 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 21,7 % | 13,0% | 39,1 % | 26,1% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0 % |
| **DP** | Number | 3 | 0 | 16 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 11,1 % | ,0% | 59,3 % | 18,5% | 11,1% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0 % |
| **ANAP** | Number | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 16,7 % | ,0% | 50,0 % | 16,7% | 16,7% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0 % |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 80,0 % | 20,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0 % |
| **Total** | Number | 15 | 6 | 69 | 21 | 11 | 3 | 1 | 126 |
| | Percent | 11,9 % | 4,8% | 54,8 % | 16,7% | 8,7% | 2,4% | ,8% | 100,0 % |

**The Politicians According to Parties and the Education Levels of Their Mothers**

| | | The Education Level of Mothers | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Illiterate | Literate but not finished primary school | Primary school | Secondary school | High school | University | |
| **AKP** | Number | 4 | 2 | 24 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 40 |
| | Percent | 10,0% | 5,0% | 60,0% | 12,5% | 10,0% | 2,5% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 3 | 4 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 25 |
| | Percent | 12,0% | 16,0% | 56,0% | 8,0% | 8,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 5 | 3 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 21,7% | 13,0% | 60,9% | 4,3% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 4 | 0 | 20 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 14,8% | ,0% | 74,1% | 7,4% | 3,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 16,7% | 16,7% | 66,7% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 17 | 10 | 81 | 10 | 7 | 1 | 126 |
| | Percent | 13,5% | 7,9% | 64,3% | 7,9% | 5,6% | ,8% | 100,0% |

**The Educational Level of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | Level of Education | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Primary school | High school | University | |
| AKP | Number | 0 | 8 | 32 | 40 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 20,0% | 80,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 0 | 6 | 19 | 25 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 24,0% | 76,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 1 | 2 | 20 | 23 |
| | Percent | 4,3% | 8,7% | 87,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 3 | 3 | 21 | 27 |
| | Percent | 11,1% | 11,1% | 77,8% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 0 | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 16,7% | 83,3% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| | Percent | 20,0% | 20,0% | 60,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 5 | 21 | 100 | 126 |
| | Percent | 4,0% | 16,7% | 79,4% | 100,0% |

### The Age and Education Level of Politicians

| Age Groups | | | Primary | High School | University | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1928-1949 (59-80)** | | Number | 1 | 6 | 23 | 30 |
| | | Percent | 3,3% | 20,0% | 76,7% | 100,0% |
| **1950-1959 (49-58)** | | Number | 3 | 5 | 26 | 34 |
| | | Percent | 8,8% | 14,7% | 76,5% | 100,0% |
| **1960-1969 (39-48)** | | Number | 1 | 6 | 24 | 31 |
| | | Percent | 3,2% | 19,4% | 77,4% | 100,0% |
| **1970-1979 (29-38)** | | Number | 0 | 4 | 24 | 28 |
| | | Percent | ,0% | 14,3% | 85,7% | 100,0% |
| **1980-1990 (18-28)** | | Number | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | | Number | 5 | 21 | 100 | 126 |
| | | Percent | 4,0% | 16,7% | 79,4% | 100,0% |

**The Types of High Schools of Politicians According to Parties**

| | | Type of High School | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Academic High School | Imam Hatip High School | Anadolu High School | Private High School/ College | |
| **AKP** | Number | 28 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 40 |
| | Percent | 70,0% | 25,0% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 21 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| | Percent | 84,0% | 16,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 18 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| | Percent | 81,8% | 18,2% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| | Percent | 75,0% | 25,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| | Percent | 75,0% | 25,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 94 | 25 | 1 | 1 | 121 |
| | Percent | 77,7% | 20,7% | ,8% | ,8% | 100,0% |

**The Major/Field of Study in University by Party Affiliation**

| | | Graduated Areas in University | | | | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Engineering sciences | Humanities and Social Sciences (Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, History etc.) | Law | Economic and administrative sciences | Natural Sciences (Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics etc.) | Theology and/or Higher Institute of Islam | Health sciences (medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmaceutics etc.) | Educational sciences | Fine arts or Conservatory | |
| AKP | Number | 7 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 32 |
| | Percent | 21,9% | 3,1% | 18,8% | 15,6% | 3,1% | 12,5% | 9,4% | 12,5% | 3,1% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 6 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 19 |
| | Percent | 31,6% | ,0% | 15,8% | 15,8% | ,0% | ,0% | 10,5% | 26,3% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 3 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 20 |
| | Percent | 15,0% | 5,0% | 20,0% | 25,0% | ,0% | 5,0% | 5,0% | 20,0% | 5,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 6 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 21 |
| | Percent | 28,6% | ,0% | 28,6% | 33,3% | ,0% | 4,8% | ,0% | 4,8% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 40,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 33,3% | 33,3% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 33,3% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| Toplam | Number | 24 | 2 | 20 | 23 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 15 | 2 | 100 |
| | Percent | 24,0% | 2,0% | 20,0% | 23,0% | 1,0% | 6,0% | 7,0% | 15,0% | 2,0% | 100,0% |

**The Foreign Language Level of the Politicians by party Affiliation**

| | | Foreign Language Known | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No foreign language | One foreign language | Two foreign languages | Three foreign languages | |
| **AKP** | Number | 8 | 29 | 2 | 1 | 40 |
| | Percent | 20,0% | 72,5% | 5,0% | 2,5% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 4 | 19 | 2 | 0 | 25 |
| | Percent | 16,0% | 76,0% | 8,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 4 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 17,4% | 78,3% | 4,3% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 4 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 14,8% | 85,2% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 100,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | 60,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 22 | 98 | 5 | 1 | 126 |
| | Percent | 17,5% | 77,8% | 4,0% | ,8% | 100,0% |

**The English Level of the Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | English | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | He/she Doesn't Know | He/she Knows | |
| **AKP** | Number | 10 | 30 | 40 |
| | Percent | 25,0% | 75,0% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 6 | 19 | 25 |
| | Percent | 24,0% | 76,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 7 | 16 | 23 |
| | Percent | 30,4% | 69,6% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 6 | 21 | 27 |
| | Percent | 22,2% | 77,8% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| | Percent | 16,7% | 83,3% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | 60,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 32 | 94 | 126 |
| | Percent | 25,4% | 74,6% | 100,0% |

# Occupation of the Politicians by Party Affiliation

| | | Artisan | Teachers or Retired Teacher | Attorney | Businessman | Engineer | Worker | Civil Servant | Doctor | Journalist | Retired | Business manager | Manager | Technician | Counselor or accountant | Academics /Instructor | Pharmacist | Others | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AKP** | Number | 1 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 40 |
| | Percent | 2,5% | 15,0% | 15,0% | 25,0% | 15,0% | 5,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 2,5% | 2,5% | ,0% | 5,0% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 0 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 25 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 24,0% | 12,0% | 20,0% | 12,0% | 8,0% | ,0% | 8,0% | ,0% | 4,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 4,0% | 4,0% | 4,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 23 |
| | Percent | 8,7% | 17,4% | 17,4% | 8,7% | 8,7% | 4,3% | 4,3% | ,0% | 4,3% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 26,1% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 27 |
| | Percent | 3,7% | 7,4% | 22,2% | ,0% | 18,5% | 14,8% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 3,7% | 7,4% | ,0% | 7,4% | 3,7% | ,0% | 3,7% | 7,4% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 16,7% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 33,3% | ,0% | ,0% | 16,7% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 16,7% | ,0% | 16,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | 20,0% | ,0% | 40,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 5 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 11 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 11 | 126 |
| | Percent | 4,0% | 14,3% | 15,9% | 14,3% | 14,3% | 8,7% | ,8% | 2,4% | 1,6% | 2,4% | 2,4% | ,8% | 2,4% | 3,2% | 1,6% | 2,4% | 8,7% | 100,0% |

# Work Status of Politicians' Fathers by Party Affiliation

| | | Work Status | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Disabled, not working** | **Nonworking** | **Retired, nonworking** | **Retired, working in another job** | **Working on his own land** | |
| **AKP** | Number | 1 | 3 | 29 | 6 | 1 | 40 |
| | Percent | 2,5% | 7,5% | 72,5% | 15,0% | 2,5% | 100,0% |
| **MHP** | Number | 0 | 3 | 19 | 1 | 2 | 25 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 12,0% | 76,0% | 4,0% | 8,0% | 100,0% |
| **SP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 17 | 4 | 2 | 23 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 73,9% | 17,4% | 8,7% | 100,0% |
| **DP** | Number | 1 | 2 | 17 | 1 | 6 | 27 |
| | Percent | 3,7% | 7,4% | 63,0% | 3,7% | 22,2% | 100,0% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,0% | ,0% | 83,3% | 16,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **BBP** | Number | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | ,0% | 20,0% | 80,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 2 | 9 | 91 | 13 | 11 | 126 |
| | Percent | 1,6% | 7,1% | 72,2% | 10,3% | 8,7% | 100,0% |

**The Work Status of the Politicians' Mothers by Party Affiliation**

| | | Work Status of Mothers | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Housewife | Disabled, not working | Nonworking | Retired | |
| AKP | Number | 29 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 40 |
| | Percent | 72,5% | 2,5% | 5,0% | 20,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 21 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 25 |
| | Percent | 84,0% | ,0% | 12,0% | 4,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 18 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 23 |
| | Percent | 78,3% | 4,3% | 4,3% | 13,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 20 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 27 |
| | Percent | 74,1% | ,0% | 11,1% | 14,8% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | 100,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| | Percent | 40,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | 40,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 96 | 2 | 10 | 18 | 126 |
| | Percent | 76,2% | 1,6% | 7,9% | 14,3% | 100,0% |

**The Work Status of Politicians' Wives by Party Affiliation**

| | | Work Status of Wives | | | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | House wife | Nonworking | Unemployed (nonworking but seeking for job) | Retired, nonworking | Retired working in another job | Salaried/ paid in public sector | Salaried/ paid in private sector | |
| AKP | Number | 24 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 33 |
| | Percent | 72,7% | 3,0% | 3,0% | 6,1% | ,0% | 15,2% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 15 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 25 |
| | Percent | 60,0% | ,0% | 8,0% | ,0% | 8,0% | 12,0% | 12,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 18 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 22 |
| | Percent | 81,8% | ,0% | 9,1% | ,0% | ,0% | 9,1% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 12 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 27 |
| | Percent | 44,4% | 3,7% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 29,6% | 22,2% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| | Percent | 50,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 33,3% | 16,7% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 60,0% | ,0% | 20,0% | 20,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 75 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 20 | 10 | 118 |
| | Percent | 63,6% | 1,7% | 5,1% | 2,5% | 1,7% | 16,9% | 8,5% | 100,0% |

**Average Monthly Household Income of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | 500-1000 NTL | 1001-1500 NTL | 1501-2000 NTL | 2001-2500 NTL | 2501-3000 NTL | 3001-3500 NTL | 3501-4000 NTL | 4001-4500 NTL | 4501-5000 NTL | 5001-5500 NTL | 5501-6000 NTL | 6501-7000 NTL | 7001-7500 NTL | 7501-8000 NTL | 8001-8500 NTL | 8501-9000 NTL | 9001-10000 NTL | 10001+ NTL | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AKP** | Number | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 40 |
| | Percent | 1,6% | 2,4% | 1,6% | ,8% | 2,4% | 2,4% | 2,4% | ,8% | 4,8% | ,0% | 5,6% | ,8% | ,0% | 1,6% | ,0% | 1,6% | ,8% | 2,4% | 31,7% |
| **MHP** | Number | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| | Percent | 1,6% | 3,2% | 2,4% | ,8% | ,0% | ,8% | 1,6% | 1,6% | 1,6% | ,0% | 1,6% | 1,6% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,8% | 2,4% | 19,8% |
| **SP** | Number | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 23 |
| | Percent | 1,6% | ,8% | 2,4% | ,8% | ,8% | ,8% | 2,4% | ,8% | 1,6% | ,8% | ,0% | 1,6% | ,8% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | 2,4% | ,0% | 18,3% |
| **DP** | Number | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 27 |
| | Percent | 2,4% | 2,4% | 3,2% | 1,6% | ,8% | ,8% | ,8% | ,8% | 3,2% | ,8% | 1,6% | 1,6% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | 21,4% |
| **ANAP** | Number | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | Percent | ,8% | ,0% | ,0% | ,8% | ,8% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 4,8% |
| **BBP** | Number | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | Percent | 1,6% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 1,6% | ,0% | ,0% | ,8% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 4,0% |
| **Total** | Number | 12 | 11 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 | 5 | 15 | 3 | 12 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 126 |
| | Percent | 9,5% | 8,7% | 9,5% | 4,8% | 4,8% | 4,8% | 9,5% | 4,0% | 11,9% | 2,4% | 9,5% | 5,6% | ,8% | 2,4% | ,8% | 1,6% | 4,8% | 4,8% | 100,0% |

**Home Ownership of Politicians by Party Affiliation**

| | | Do you own or rent your current residence? | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Own | Rent | |
| AKP | Number | 36 | 4 | 40 |
| | Percent | 90,0% | 10,0% | 100,0% |
| MHP | Number | 19 | 6 | 25 |
| | Percent | 76,0% | 24,0% | 100,0% |
| SP | Number | 20 | 3 | 23 |
| | Percent | 87,0% | 13,0% | 100,0% |
| DP | Number | 20 | 7 | 27 |
| | Percent | 74,1% | 25,9% | 100,0% |
| ANAP | Number | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| | Percent | 83,3% | 16,7% | 100,0% |
| BBP | Number | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| | Percent | 60,0% | 40,0% | 100,0% |
| Total | Number | 103 | 23 | 126 |
| | Percent | 81,7% | 18,3% | 100,0% |