

**FRIENDSHIP IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
AND
ITS CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES**

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ABSTRACT

FRIENDSHIP IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND ITS CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

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This thesis analyzes the concept of Friendship in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* with its main aspects. Book VIII and Book IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are devoted specifically to the concept of Friendship to explore the moral and political aspects of it. Friendship has been one of the prominent topics for moral philosophers and hence contemporary discussions lead the Nicomachean account of friendship come to the fore. Thus, the main features of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as contemporary perspectives and discussions on that topic will be analyzed and explored in depth.

Keywords: Friendship, Self-Sufficient, Political Animal, Goodwill, Justice

ÖZ

NİKOMAKHOS'A ETİK'TE DOSTLUK VE GÜNÜMÜZDE BUNA İLİŞKİN TARTIŞMALAR

Subaşı, Necati

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu tezde, Aristoteles'in Nikomakhos'a Etik kitabında yer alan dostluk kavramı temel özellikleri ile beraber incelenmektedir. Nikomakhos'a Etik'te 8. ve 9. Bölümler dostluk kavramı için ayrılmış olup bu kitapta sözkonusu kavramın ahlaki ve politik yanları araştırılmaktadır. Dostluk kavramı etik çalışan felsefecilerin de başat konularından birisi olagelmıştır ve günümüzdeki tartışmalar Nikomakhos'a Etik'te yer alan dostluk kavramını öne çıkarmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tezde dostluğun ana unsurları ile beraber günümüzdeki yansımaları ve dostluk kavramına ilişkin tartışmalar incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dostluk, Kendi Kendine Yeterli, Politik Hayvan, İyi Niyet, Adalet

Didem Madak'a

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 <i>Philia</i> in Heroic society	2
1.2 Legacy of the Lysis in the Nicomachean Ethics.....	8
2. ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF FRIENDSHIP	12
2.1 Account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics	12
2.2 Varieties of Friendship	14
2.3 Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency.....	23
2.4 Other-Self as a Mirror and Self-Knowledge.....	33
3. MAIN ASPECTS OF CIVIC FRIENDSHIP	38
3.1 Two Pillars of Friendship: Justice and Equality	39
3.2 Two Features of Civic Friendship: Goodwill and Concord	41
3.3 Friendship as a Political Bond	44
4. A LIVING SPACE FOR FRIENDSHIP TODAY	47
4.1 Political Arguments over Friendship.....	47
4.2. How to Welcome Friendship Today?	54
4.3 Public Sphere is a Living Space?	59
5. CONCLUSION	68
REFERENCES.....	73

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine Aristotle's understanding of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by analyzing its features and its implications on relations of individuals within society as well as its reflections as a bond in today's world. Moreover, understanding of friendship (*philia*) mainly in Ancient Greek with how it was inherited from Homeros period will be reviewed. Thoughts of Socrates and Plato (in the *Lysis*) on friendship will be compared with that of Aristotle very briefly. Further elaboration will be on the notion of civic friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and debates among various scholars who have diverse arguments regarding Aristotle's introduction of civic friendship as an aspect of political community. Aristotle's concept of friendship with respect to its contemporary perspectives and debates over possibility of a place for friendship in the public sphere will form the final part.

According to Aristotle, friendship is a bond not only among the factions of the society but also among the individuals – the citizens of polis. This bond is also the main constituent of relations between states which is further explained by such terms as Concord and Goodwill. Equality and Justice are also among main pillars which make friendship as a binding element in forms of constitution. I will search the effects of these intertwined concepts of friendship to the political communities in which many differences among the factions have caused discord and struggle.

As a main theme, I will discuss the constituents of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and its claimed implications on political community argued by contemporary scholars by shedding light on true friendship and its derivatives.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* will be the basic reference of the study. Also secondary literatures will be used as supplementary sources in order to mention and compare approaches and comments by various scholars.

The concept of friendship constitutes one of the main topics in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. In fact, the *Nicomachean Ethics* draws not only a very comprehensive but also a holistic picture which necessitates studying the issues of ethics by grasping the constituent concepts without excluding the one from the other. This is also the case for the concept of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The right perspective would be considering the interrelations between the various concepts from happiness to friendship, justice and equality, self-sufficiency and happiness, self-knowledge and other-self and their complementary aspects with each other and others. As the concept of friendship is not an independent one; Aristotle explains in his book, this intertwined relationship between friendship and other concepts, mainly by concentrating on its implications on family, in the police and the state.

1.1 *Philia* in Heroic society

Friendship, in Ancient Greek was called as "*philia*" having a quite different meaning than it has today. As Aristotle states in *the Nicomachean Ethics*, *philia* is bond between animates and it is something noble and good. In general, we can say that it is the binding tie among the sections of community or society. This bond between citizens of polis, among states and family as well as all members of these establishments underlines the importance of the understanding of it in Ancient Greek. Actually, it goes back to the times of Homer's protagonists where it has been closely connected with virtue.

The most proper way seems to make a reference to the poems of Homer for understanding how "*philia*" had been perceived in the heroic society. The relationship between Achilles and Patroclus in the Iliad is often attributed as one of

the few legendary friendships. David Konstan, in his book *Friendship in Classical World* defines that relation by quoting William Anderson (“Barbarian Play: Plautus’ Roman Comedy”, 1993: 35) as saying “The tie between these two men shows the way for later Greek tragedy to explore the pathos of self-sacrifice and the guilt in allowing another to take on one’s own fatal danger.”¹ The term *philia* in epic diction has a different meaning from modern terminology and also for later classical world. For David Konstan, in epic diction the word *philos* is used mainly as an adjective and it can be used also for a part of body.² It does not directly refer to anything active or passive senses in the relation, instead it refers to both senses of friend. For bodily parts, it also means “dear” or “my lovely” for which some scholars have attributed the meaning of possession and it sometimes refers to the people of one’s own community.³ For Konstan, *philos* in archaic epic involves a positive affect and resembles the intensity of feeling for home and loved ones that is ascribed to the heroes. Nevertheless, for him, it does not have a specific reference to friends in Homeric Greek. Konstan cites that the *philos* has the direct meaning of friends after Homeric society. Another term used for friends is *hetairoi*. It refers to the groups or the followers around a leader, groups of leaders from independent social entities.⁴ Another reference *philos* makes is related to strangers. *Xenoi*, translated as guest-friendship, refers to the relation or tie between strangers as a custom of offering hospitality and protection to travellers. However *Xenoi* can also become *philois* after a period of time.

When Suzanne Stern-Gillet defines the word *philia* for Greeks, she cites its semantic evolution by the time Aristotle’s introduction of the concept into philosophical theatre. Stern-Gillet says “The rich and unclear semantic history of *φιλία* weighed heavily on Aristotle as he attempted both to describe its nature and to systematize the

¹ David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p.24

² Ibid., p.28

³ Ibid., p.30

⁴ Ibid., p.31

moral norms it entails”⁵ Like Konstan, Stern-Gillet also accepts its various meaning in Homeric society, citing that “It functions as a possessive reflexive (e.g., in *phila gounata*, one’s knees) and as an adjective which can designate either the members of one’s household, or those one ‘loves’ (as used, e.g., by Achilles and Patroclus to refer to each other), or, lastly, those individuals who are linked by the bond of guest-friendship (as alluded to, e.g., in the famous fight between Diomedes and Glaucus the Lycian).⁶

She asserts further that friendship in pre-classical period is a social institution and not left to the walls of household. Indeed, “Homeric characters are born into particular networks of friendship.”⁷ Stern-Gillet claims that friendship concepts of Herodotus and Xenophon are very useful means to prove the evolution of the concept from the Homeric time to classical period. The concept of friendship in Ancient Greek has a wide and diverse usage in personal and social relationships. Stern-Gillet invokes their conceptions of friendship to support her premise that the friendship as a bond or tie is more than an intimacy between individuals or something irrelevant to the lives of individuals. On the contrary, it is a kind of network into which people are born or an institution with its well-established customs.

According to her, Herodotus’s concept of friendship with its political and social aspects has affected Aristotle’s one as well.

Herodotus, for instance, continues to use *philia* to refer to guest-friendship as well as to private mutual affection. Most frequently, though, in his usage, it serves to designate the mutual bond existing between allies, political or diplomatic, and between companions in arms, as well as between those who have concluded reciprocal arrangements to help, or refrain from harming, one another. Herodotus’ use of *philia* and its cognates contributes to accounting for Aristotle’s preoccupation with the

⁵ Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship*, p.5

⁶ Ibid., p.6

⁷ Ibid., p.6

nature and casuistry of utility friendship and for the contrast he draws between it and what he calls virtue or primary friendship.⁸

Stern-Gillet thus reaches the conclusion that in the Ancient Greek the usage of *philia* includes personal and also social relationships. *Philia* has a wide and diverse usage however the modern concept of friendship has a restricted extension. Stern-Gillet's stress on the differences between ancient friendship and modern friendship is notable. She highlights the rationality of the concept of friendship in Aristotle's corpus. In modern friendship individuals have the elective affinities according to Stern-Gillet, in which parties love each other for their uniqueness. It is not bound to external circumstances thus individuals have their choices. Being capricious in origin and spontaneous in their development, in Stern-Gillet's words, modern friendships are not rational unlike Aristotle's description of friendship which offers an analysis of it in depth. Stern-Gillet claims that Aristotle's definition of virtue or primary friendship as the purest form of the concept differs from its modern meaning. She argues that it is a rational association in the sense that it comprehends the essential selves of the friends. For her, that quality of friendship in Aristotle bars the contingency and capriciousness.

Apart from studying friendship as a concept with its linguistic roots, it will be also pioneering to mention the interconnection between friendship and other virtues in Heroic societies where friendship has substantial social aspects as an association, not something peculiar to individual intimacy or the one experienced solely in the private life of individuals. Alasdair MacIntyre who analyzes the virtues in the Heroic societies, argues that in the Homeric world every man has a duty and role in a well-defined system. For heroic society, key structures are kinship and household. In this determinate system, a man knows who he is because he has a given role and status in the society. Thus he also knows well what he owes and what is owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status.⁹ For every role and status in the heroic society there are actions to be performed accordingly. For that reason a man is what

⁸ Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*, p.7

⁹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.122

he does in such a societal structure. Actions are important. They are not more than what they do, say or suffer. Thus for friendship we can assume some actions by way of inference. Alistair MacIntyre, asserting the interconnectivity of concepts in this society, says:

The word *aretê*, which later comes to be translated as ‘virtue’, is in the Homeric poems used for excellence of any kind; a fast runner, displays the *aretê* of feet (Iliad 20.411) and a son excels his father in every kind of *aretê* - as athlete, as soldier and in mind (Iliad 15.642). This concept of virtue or excellence is more alien to us than we are apt at first to recognize. It is not difficult for us to recognize the central place that strength will have in such a conception of human excellence or the way in which courage will be one of the central virtues, perhaps the central virtue. What is alien to our conception of virtue is the intimate connection in heroic society between the concept of courage and its allied virtues on the one hand and the concepts of friendship, fate and death on the other.¹⁰

Thus we cannot think of friendship without courage as we cannot think it without any action. Alisdair MacIntyre elaborates the ingredients of friendship further, saying:

To be courageous is to be someone on whom reliance can be placed. Hence courage is an important ingredient in friendship. The bonds of friendship in heroic societies are modeled on those kinship. Sometimes friendship is formally vowed, so that by the vow the duties of brothers are mutually incurred. Who my friends are and who my enemies, is clearly defined as who my kinsmen are. The other ingredient of friendship is fidelity. My friend’s courage assures me of his power to aid me and my household; my friend’s fidelity assures me of his will. My household’s fidelity is the basic guarantee of its unity. So in women, who constitute the crucial relationships within the household, fidelity is the key virtue. Andromache and Hector, Penelope and Odysseus are friends (*philos*) as much as are Achilles and Patroclus.¹¹

¹⁰Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.122

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.123

MacIntyre's comment on interrelatedness of virtues strengthens the argument that the concept of friendship has existed as an association and preserved within the social structure.

What I hope this account makes clear already is the way in which any adequate account of the virtues in heroic society would be impossible which divorced them from their context in the social structure, just as no adequate account of the social structure of heroic society would be possible which did not include an account of the heroic virtues. But to put it in this way is to understate the crucial point: morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society.¹²

Guest-friendship or *Xenoi* has come to the fore in heroic society as well. For Sandra Lynch, guest-friendship was an important element especially for warrior-chieftain. According to Lynch, in the Homeric epics, combative relations had an important role and despite strength of virtues in chieftain, it was not enough for survival.¹³ Chieftains need not only the support from family and servants but also need the support of others. Lynch argues that reliance on family, servants and possessions were not sufficient for security and well-being and for that reason there was also the need of an institutional framework to co-operate.¹⁴ It has its own rules and obligations applied accordingly.

For Homer's protagonists reciprocal action and co-operation were crucial to the relationship between guest-friends. When an individual travelled away from his household, the only rights of which he was assured were those guaranteed by a well-disposed member of community he had entered. The traveller was a 'comer' or 'suppliant' and had to rely upon being accepted by a sufficiently powerful member of community in order to enjoy food, shelter and protection. He was not, however, regarded as a guest-friend unless he enjoyed a status equal to that of his benefactor, so that he was in a position to return the favours bestowed upon him, at some future date.¹⁵

¹² Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.123

¹³ Sandra Lynch, *Philosophy and Friendship*, p.8

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.8

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.8-9

What Lynch acknowledges is that the Homeric individual defines himself within the society by bringing his achievements and relations. She also confirms Gillet's argument that pre-classical Greek friendship is a social institution and is not so much related with individual's inner life. However, Lynch goes further and claims that there is a more intimate notion of friendship in the Homeric age as well. She cites that "There are in both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* indications of the existence of a more intimate notion of friendship. It is one that spills over the rigid contours of the code of friendship and heroic duty and becomes something closer to the modern expectations of friendship."¹⁶ She argues that among Greek *hetairoi* made up of a group of men of similar status, relations had more intimacy comparing to that in guest-friendship. According to her, "These groups must have made some contribution to the limited reliability of Homeric life and politics."¹⁷

1.2 Legacy of the *Lysis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

It is a fact, with no doubt, that Aristotle's treatment of friendship has indebted to Plato's *Lysis*. It can be said that Aristotle constructed his theory of *philia* mostly as a response to the questions and deliberations on *philia* in the *Lysis*. The main question in the *Lysis* is not what friendship is but why a man likes someone or something.¹⁸ The question of the relation between friendship and human neediness forms the basis of dialogues, or *aporia*, in the *Lysis*. By ignoring scientific speculations with respect to finding a common motive for loving somebody or something, Aristotle pursues answers corresponding to the enquiries in the *Lysis*, mainly exploring whether or not the needs or requirements of man lead to a desire to have friends.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle starts his discussion of *philia* by ignoring scientific speculations due to irrelevancy of the inquiry. What is important for him is

¹⁶ Sandra Lynch, *Philosophy and Friendship*, p.11

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.12

¹⁸ David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*, p.74

the human aspect of the matter or man's character and emotions. Thus, he reiterates the questions asked or the queries dealt with before him: whether all men are capable of friendship or bad men cannot be friends, or whether similar or dissimilar people become friends. Aristotle, in order to ground his responses on a sound base invokes different types of liking, i.e. motives that lead us to love something. Not everything seems to be loved but only what is lovable, then it is good, useful or pleasant. Thus, by distinguishing varieties of friendship he tries to solve the paradoxes mentioned in the *Lysis* and also tries to explain how different kinds of friendship may be compared in degree.¹⁹ Jennifer Whiting argues that such puzzles as "like is friend to like" or "dissimilar people become friends" are dismissed in the related books of *Nicomachean Ethics* even it is admitted that there are human variants in the sense of character and emotions and there are queries on whether good people can be friends or any sort of person can be friends with any sort.²⁰ These puzzles belong to the *Lysis* where Socrates says that a good man will not need anything and thus does not love somebody or something so long as the good person is self-sufficient. For Whiting, the concept of true friend as "another-self" is a response to this question. It can be said that one of the most important notions introduced by Aristotle seems to be the "other-self" as a mirror (Good man has a relation with his friend as he has with himself because his friend is another self or second self). Annas also agrees that the phrase 'another self' (*allos autos*) has an enormous link in the argument. It is no doubt that that notion contributes to Aristotle's formulation in resolving the problems raised by the *Lysis*, finding a ground or a motive for self-sufficient man to seek others' companionship. For Annas, Plato does not have a view of self-sufficiency as "requiring nothing at all from anybody"; instead his argument is that "the basis of friendship is the attraction of good to good qua good."²¹ A good man is self-sufficient with regard to virtues, so a good man has nothing to receive from his friend. He is already virtuous and in that sense no external contribution will naturally be useful for him. Aristotle, for Annas, overcomes that paradox by distinguishing

¹⁹ Michael Pakaluk, "Friendship", *A Companion to Aristotle*, p.471-472

²⁰ Jennifer Whiting, "The Nicomachean Account of Philia", *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 279

²¹ Julia Annas, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", *Oxford Journals*, p. 545

varieties of friendship. There exists various types of friendship and all of them, whether based on good, pleasure or advantage, are really friendships. Annas comments that these distinctions made by Aristotle show us that self-sufficiency of the good man does not mean that he does not need any friends. Annas argues that friendship based on goodness is the central case that also involves characteristics of other sorts of friendship. The inferior kinds are also friendship because they possess attributes of the central case. Why does the good man have pleasure of his friend's virtue? Does he find them useful and pleasant? For Annas, Aristotle's definition of pleasure as "functioning properly in optimal conditions" helps us to find an answer to these questions. "So pleasure will ensue when conditions are optimal for the good man, for he is functioning as a man ought."²² Happiness is also an important element for resolving the problem. Annas reminds Aristotle's view on happiness by saying:

Happiness, the fulfillment of the good life, lies in activity, and we are by nature such as to find pleasure in contemplating activities, our own and those of others. But we can contemplate others and their actions better than we can our own; so that if the good man lacked good friends whose activities he could gain pleasure from contemplating, his life would be to the extent lacking in something worthwhile.²³

Another issue is related with the problem of reciprocity or mutuality which Aristotle highlights several times in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in a response to the *Lysis*. When Socrates asks the two young men, Lysis and his friend Menexinus: "So tell me: when someone loves someone else, which of the two becomes the friend of the other, the one who loves or the one who is loved? Or is there no difference?"²⁴ Later in the dialogue Socrates asks another related question: "then which is the friend of other? Is the lover the friend of the loved, whether he is loved in return or not, or is even hated? Or is the loved the friend of the lover? Or in a case like this, when two both do not love each other, is neither the friend of the other?"²⁵ Aristotle, naturally not

²² Julia Annas, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism", *Oxford Journals*, p. 548

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 550

²⁴ Plato, "The Lysis", *Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship*, p. 212a10-b1

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.212c6-10

too young boys, answers it: “Reciprocity”. Thus, Aristotle reacts by stressing the notion of reciprocity. He asserts that friendship is only applicable to animates because the main aspect of friendship means mutual affection which should be known by both sides. Thus, for Aristotle, it will be ridiculous if one wishes well to a bottle of wine.

When Socrates addresses his questions to the two young boys, he exploits the various uses of the word “*philia*” in ordinary Greek. *Philia* have senses of mutual liking, passive sense (who is loved) and also active sense (who loves). Annas argues that Plato rejects the mutual sense unlike Aristotle who insists that the non-mutual senses should be secondary.²⁶ Annas also points to Aristotle’s claim that friendship cannot be used for lifeless objects because it is not a mutual love, even there is no a wishing well to the other. Annas remarks that “He learns enough from Plato’s paradoxes to reverse his linguistic emphasis: the ‘mutual’ use is made firmly central in the usage of *philos*”.²⁷

On the other hand, Pangle underlines that the core of the dialogue in the *Lysis* is based on the claim that love begins and ends and is wholly driven by needs.²⁸

The *Lysis* explores the possibility that the most important needs that cause us to love are not needs for the pleasures and activities of friendship as such, but are directed to other things that act as remedies for our defects in the way that medicine does for the defects of the body, to which the human beings we call our friends are merely the means.²⁹

Aristotle opposes this argument by suggesting that we love our friends not only for the benefits but also we love them for themselves.

²⁶ Julia Annas, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism”, *Oxford Journals*, p. 533-534

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.534

²⁸ Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, p.20

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.20

CHAPTER 2

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF FRIENDSHIP

2.1 Account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle thinks that “friendship is an outcome of goodness of character and in fact in his well-known words “human being by nature are social animals (*zoon politikon*)”.³⁰ (Hannah Arendt claims that translation of “politikon” as “social” leads misperception and says that “social” is Roman in origin. Arendt, when studying the Public and the Private Realm, insists on the fact that there is no equivalent of the term “social” in Greek language or thought. According to her, substitution of “social” for “politics” reveals the fact that origin of Greek understanding of politics had been lost. Private Realm-Public Realm dilemma will be discussed in detail in Chapter-4 “A Living Space for Friendship Today”).³¹ This perception is the main motive behind the concept of friendship which shapes fabrics of polis and types of regime as well.³² Michael Pakaluk cites that “it is his account of friendship that Aristotle gives us his fullest explanation of distinctively human sociability”.³³ The notion of *Zoon Politikon* also defines the self-sufficiency of man in a way. The discussion results from the question of whether self-sufficient man needs or does not need a friend. Aristotle answers:

³⁰ Michael Pakaluk, “Friendship”, *A Companion to Aristotle*, p.471

³¹ Hannah Arendt, “The Human Condition”, p.23

³² In her essay, Arendt defends the idea that only foundation of the city-state allowed men to spend their whole lives in political realm, in action and speech (praxis and lexis). This conviction was a common belief in Greek Polis... For Arendt, household is different than public realm in that the master of household has its own rules while public realm is based on its own. There is a division between sphere of household and public realm in the sense that household is place of maintenance of life, on the other hand public realms deals with common world, i.e. politics.

³³ Michael Pakaluk, “Friendship”, *A Companion to Aristotle*, p.471

Also perhaps it would be strange to represent supremely happy man as a recluse. Nobody would choose to have all possible good things on the condition that he must enjoy them alone; for man is a social being, and designed by nature to live with others; accordingly the happy man must have society, for he has everything that is naturally good. And it is obviously preferable to associate with friends and with good man than with strangers and chance companions. Therefore the happy man requires friends.³⁴

In Book VIII, Aristotle starts defining the concept of friendship by having in mind the above mentioned notion. He cites that friendship is one of the basic requirements of life. It is something possible only among animates. Then what he counts for friendship covers the meaning of the term for different ages and individuals in different social roles. Friendship is an action and necessitates active participation of one party into other party's social life. Thus, it is not applicable for inanimate objects due to impossibility of any returned affection. Even there seems an interaction between animate and inanimate; it does not mean that there is a friendship in such affairs. Aristotle cites:

The term Friendship is not applied to love for inanimate objects, since here there is no return of affection, and also no wish for the good of the object- for instance it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle of wine: at the most one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it oneself: whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake. But persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed friendship.³⁵

Thus we can conclude that the friendship is based on the principle of reciprocity as regards affections and it comprises mutual understanding between interacting parties. Aristotle says:

To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each

³⁴ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1169b.3-4.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1156a3-4

other's goodwill and (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above.³⁶

By lovable qualities, Aristotle means each person loves what is good for himself, i.e., good, useful or pleasant. This is Aristotle's point of departure for classifying friendship in line with the said qualities.

Aristotle also cites that the feeling of goodwill must be known by the other part in concern. If someone has some feeling towards other persons but those do not have the knowledge of that feeling than it would be not friendship but just one-sided feeling. Even both sides may feel the same thing without being aware of each other's regard and in that case we cannot talk about a friendship. Thus, what is required for a friendship is to have a mutual recognition by both parties on their reciprocal feelings.

He dismisses the "scientific speculations" on the ground that they are not relevant to the inquiry at hand. What he concerns is nothing but "the human aspect of the matter".³⁷

2.2 Varieties of Friendship

Aristotle's attempt to distinguish three kinds of friendship comes from the existing difficulties in question: do similar people become friends and what is measure for the degree of friendship in three types?³⁸ He cites that:

Perhaps the answer to these questions will appear if we ascertain what sort of things arouse liking or love. It seems that not everything is loved but only what is lovable, and that this is either what is good, or pleasant, or useful.³⁹

³⁶ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1156a1-5

³⁷ Ibid., 1155b.10

³⁸ Michael Pakaluk, "Friendship", *A Companion to Aristotle*, p.472

³⁹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1155b18-21

It is a true approach to understand and analyze seemingly complicated aspects of friendship by making a classification on a rational base.

Pakaluk claims that Aristotle takes a different approach by trying to clarify the relationship between friendship and theories of natural sciences as well as logical characteristics of schemes of his classification. For Pakaluk, “His approach to friendship is, one might say, “metaphysical” rather than psychological or ethical”.⁴⁰ Aristotle stands on the idea that there are three kinds of friendship corresponding in number to the three kind of lovable qualities.⁴¹ These qualities lay ground for friendship between men. Aristotle identifies that as the friendship based on utility, pleasure and good. Friendship of good is sometimes referred to as primary friendship. For Aristotle, in the friendship based on utility or pleasure, one loves his friends not for being what he is but for his pleasure or benefits. He argues that:

Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some benefit accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they are in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And there fore these friendships are based on an accident, since the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be. Consequently friendships of this kind are easily broken off, in the event of the parties themselves changing, for if no longer pleasant or useful to each other, they cease to love each other. And utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times. Hence when the motive of the friendship has passed away, the friendship itself is dissolved, having existed merely as a means to that end.⁴²

For friendship of utility, Aristotle argues that it occurs between the old due to gain or profit the old men offers solely. Moreover, it is also between young people who

⁴⁰ Michael Pakaluk, “Friendship”, *A Companion to Aristotle*, p. 472-473

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.457

⁴² Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1156a10-25

are in the prime of life because their basic aspiration for life is gain. Friendship based on pleasure can be observed mostly among young people. As they experience a period of emotion, stability in their life is less frequent thus they change and drop their friendship very quickly as they engage into it in a day.

Aristotle cites that the perfect form of friendship is the one among the good and virtuous men where each party wishes the good of his friend for his friend's sake. They love each other for themselves. It is not something that happened accidentally but is the result of virtue which brings them together. It is their point of departure. Due to virtue and goodness for which they share and come together, it is also stable and enduring. Virtue is a permanent quality unlike the pleasure and usefulness, the friendship based on virtue is also the most permanent one. At that point, we can see how Aristotle uses his logical reasoning in grounding his argument. What should be mentioned here is that Aristotle's arguments and approach are based on logical analogy with foresighted attitude.

Friendship based on virtue includes other qualities as well. What is good contains also useful and pleasant for such friends. However, such men are not abundant. That is why we can see such friendship rarely. In perfect friendship, as Aristotle says, parties seek and work for the benefits of each other. Moreover, this interaction between them requires practice. Without sharing and knowing each other it is not possible to be friends. Someone there should prove his companionship as trustworthy and won the other's confidence for being admitted as a friend. There should be togetherness and being involved in other's society.

Perfect friendship is based on virtue and goodness and is tested in time. Such kind of friendship is possible only among good men. It is the truest friendship and what is good and pleasant is also lovable and desirable strictly. However, all these are valid for good men who work for each other's own good. From that perspective, there is no purpose based action, on the contrary; it is a reciprocal activity and the affairs are based on seeking the other party's goodness.

The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue. For these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally. Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and virtue is a permanent quality. And each is good relatively to his friend as well as absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely and profitable to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways also, since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for everyone is pleased by his own actions, and therefore by actions that resemble his own, and the actions of all good men are the same or similar. —Such friendship is naturally permanent, since it combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess.⁴³

Seeking other's good is in fact a reflection of man's self-love. However this is not a mere egoism but can be counted as the basic ground to love others. There is an interaction and interdependence between self-love and loving others. Thus, Aristotle argues that man who likes himself and has enjoyable memories of the past can love others. In that sense, person in friendly relationship is in awareness of himself. He knows that he likes himself; he is aware of his pleasures and sorrows. Besides, the partner in friendship has also possessed the same virtues and this reciprocity reflects a mirror of self. Then, friendship can be interpreted as the mirror of the other-self. As inferiors do not have such lovable qualities they do not possess such feelings and affection for themselves.⁴⁴ Aristotle also mentions someone's being friend with himself. To try to be virtuous while staying away from wickedness is the best way for somebody to be friend with himself as well as with others.

A person with goodness can also be pleasant to the other person. However, this is not the likely case for secondary forms of friendship. Since those qualities are accidental they are not likely to come together at the same time. For that reason men do not have friends with each other both for utility and pleasure concurrently. For Aristotle, the friendship based on pleasure has much characteristics of true friendship than that

⁴³ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1156b 10-20

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1166b1-25

of utility. In pleasure friendship, both parties have the same benefit and enjoyment as well as having the same tastes. In sum it can be said that friendship of utility ranks last in the varieties of friendship in Aristotle.

Another type of friendship classified by Aristotle comprises of the superiority of one over the other. Relationship marked by the notion of equality such as the one between father and son, an older person and a younger, husband and wife or ruler and the ruled is as such. Since each of these persons differs in excellence and function, their affection and friendship also have different features. That is related to the inequality they possess which will be discussed in the following chapter.

The main discussion is whether only true friendship, which is rarely found and common, possesses a mutual well-wishing and well-doing for the sake of other and thus two inferior types of friendship have only self-centered motives or there is a common property that pertains to all kinds of friendship.

John M. Cooper, in “Reason and Emotion”, discusses and elaborates the issue in a more comprehensive manner. Criticizing the authors who attribute the concept of *philia* solely to the “mutual attraction”, he suggests that such an approach which marks friendship mainly with eroticism or passion makes *philia* unsuitable for such ties seen among businessmen or citizens. Such an interpretation of *philia* excludes other features and especially the practical and active element that it comprises. Trying to find a common element applicable in all forms of friendship, Cooper attaches importance to the “doing-well” element of *philia*. Attributing to Aristotle’s definition of liking as “wanting for someone what one thinks good for his sake and not for one’s own”, he puts not “wishing well” but “doing-well” for someone not “for one’s sake” but “for his sake”.

This count suggests, in fact, that the central idea contained in *philia* is that of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for *him* (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself). If this is right, then the different forms of *philia* listed above could be viewed just as different contexts and circumstances in which this kind of mutual well-doing can arise; within the family, in the state

at large, and among business partners and political cronies, well-doing out of concern for other persons can arise, where it does so, there exists “friendship”. I suggest that if we want some indication of what is common to all personal relationships which the Greeks counted as *philia*, we cannot do better than follow Aristotle’s lead here.⁴⁵

For Cooper, next question is if Aristotle puts that common aspect of friendship, “well-doing out of concern for the other person’s good” as a condition of friendship for all forms of *philia*. Even common interpretations refer to the notion of “seeking other’s good” only to virtuous friendship; Cooper suggests that attributing “seeking other’s good” only to virtuous friendship leads us to a misunderstanding of Aristotelian friendship. If Aristotle holds both pleasure and utility friendships as wholly self-centered and only primary friendship holds that notion then he will be adopting extremely harsh view of the psychological capabilities of almost everyone. It also means that there are a few paragons that have such capability of unself-interested relations in this world which delineates self-centered associations for most people incapable of anything but only that.⁴⁶ Cooper cites that Aristotle does not insist that friendships of derivative kinds are completely self-centered. He argues that two inferior kinds of friendship are *complex and subtle mixture of self-seeking and unself-interested well-wishing and well-doing*.

According to Cooper, Aristotle defines varieties of friendship in parallel with the causes for which involved parties like each other: *triōn ontōn di’ ha philousin* (1155b27)—*dia* to *chrēsimon*, *dia* to *hēdu* and *di’ aretēn*.⁴⁷ “*Dia*” is important as a preposition. For Cooper, wrong perspective in reading “*dia*” leads to an incoherent interpretation of Aristotle. Such a misinterpretation derives from wrong reading of *dia* as “in order to do something”. However, this leads to the belief that one likes his friend because of pleasant or useful in order to secure his pleasure or advantage. If *dia* is interpreted as expressing solely as a mean of producing or aiming at something

⁴⁵ John M. Cooper, “The Forms of Friendship”, *Reason and Emotion*, p.313-314

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.317

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 317-318

by his friend's wellness or prosperity, then it causes misunderstand Aristotle. Cooper cites another interpretation of *dia* as "for the sake of" which for him has the same meaning for the character or virtue friendship. A person wants his friend to be prospered for the sake of excellence of his character. However, this is not the only way of interpretation. Through reading *dia* as a causal way, one will likely read it as "in recognition of their friend's having a good character," so it expresses a consequence of the friend's being morally good rather than having a purpose by a well-wisher. Cooper argues that if one reads the "because" in a causal way for all varieties of friendship, then it will not be difficult to comprehend Aristotle's attribution of *eunoia* to all types of friends. Cooper asserts that *eunoia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* means not only well-wishing but also wishing well for other person's sake.⁴⁸ Three kinds of friendship according to notion of the ends and the means, i.e., "for the sake of other" are defined. Character friendship is given a priority in unself-interested well-wishing.

So the character-friend wishes his friend well in any way that is not inconsistent with his being the good human being he is assumed to be. He wants and expects both pleasure and advantage from his association with his friend, but aiming at these is not essential condition of the friendship itself. He associates with a good person because of his goodness; pleasure and advantage may follow in due course, but his intention in maintaining the friendship is fixed on the goodness of the other person, not on his pleasantness or profitability. So, although there is unself-interested well-wishing in all three types of friendship, it is both broader and deeper in a character-friendship than in the other two. For it is only in this case that the conception of the other person under which one is his friend and wishes him well for his own sake is a conception that corresponds to what he himself essentially is.⁴⁹

Cooper's conclusion gives an important insight about notion of "well-wishing for other". He suggests that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* denies that *eunoia* precedes a friendship of one of the types⁵⁰ and argues that friends even of the

⁴⁸ John M. Cooper, "The Forms of Friendship", *Reason and Emotion*, p.322

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 328-329

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 330

derivative types pursue one another's good out of non-selfish good will. For Cooper, it is not inconsistent with Aristotle's thought.

Martha C. Nussbaum, grounding her argument on Aristotle's lover of wine, cites two important requirements of *philia*: mutuality and independence. For Nussbaum, it is not a one-way street; *philia* is based on sharing of benefits and affection. Given the relation between the master and the slave, one can understand that slave is the extension of the master and there are no independent entities which have the capacity to love or have affection reciprocally. *Philia* must be a separate entity, not possessed by any of *philos*. The object of *philia* should be seen as a being with a separate good, not simply a possession or extension of *philos* and for that reason, we cannot say that there is a genuine *philia* between master and slave. The slave is something of the master.⁵¹ Through *dia*, Nussbaum explains the forms of friendship. *Dia* does not refer to the goal or final end of the relationship. If two people become friends through or on the basis of something, their final end can be some sort of a mutual benefit. Thus, *dia* is a tool, the basic ground or the cause for them to come together. It does not necessarily mean that they are seeking that ground or that tool. She argues that pleasure and advantage friendships are different from the exploitative relationships, in which the related parties aim each at their own pleasure and not at all at the other's good. She remarks that:

The object of the relation in all cases is the other person; but the person will be conceived of and known in a way bounded by the basis: as someone who is pleasant to be with, as a person well-placed for useful dealings, as a person of good character. Thus two inferior types aim at benefit for the other only under a thin and superficial description of the other.⁵²

In "The Nicomachean Account of *Philia*" Jennifer Whiting also questions the meaning of *dia*. By asking if *dia* is an efficient causal or final causal, she interrogates it and grounds her assumption on three possibilities: *Dia* could refer to the final

⁵¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness*, p.355

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.355

cause or the purpose for the sake of which a relationship exists; or it could refer to an efficient cause, a mean or motive that leads parties to act one way or another. A third possibility includes both of them, a claim also asserted by Irwin.⁵³ Whiting states Cooper's reading is plausible if we take Aristotle's account of *philia* in such a psychological tendency. Accordingly, people tend to fond of others whom they find pleasant or useful. They have a tendency to have well-wishing to others they are fond of and do something good for their sake. It is not absurd to think that Cooper's approach seems to bring a sound explanation in its logic, thus, it is consistent. For Whiting, Irwin's approach asserts both efficient cause and final cause should be taken into account for interpreting the meaning of *dia*. Like Cooper, Whiting underlines Aristotle's argument in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that some friendships for the sake of pleasure later exist in the absence of such pleasure if friends have become fond of one another's characters.⁵⁴

It is important to note Whiting's questions here when she interrogates the intrinsic and accidental features of *philia* described by Aristotle:

But why does Aristotle introduce the technical language he typically uses to characterize the distinction between a thing's essence and its accidents? Why does he not say simply that those who love on account of utility (or pleasure) love only themselves and not the other- full stop?⁵⁵

Her insightful answer actually adds a lot to understand the Aristotle's questioning.

One (I think good) way to explain this is to read him as allowing that those who are friends on account of pleasure or utility really do wish one another well for the other's sake, and so satisfy the most important condition for being friends, with the result that he needs to explain what is special about the sort of wishing-well-for –the-other's-sake we find in character-friendship. So he

⁵³ Jennifer Whiting, "The Nicomachean Account of Philia", *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, p.285

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.286

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.287

appeals to the idea that this wishing is based on something essential to who the other is, and not simply on accidental features of her that might change in time, including the relationships in which she stands to the agent's own contingent tastes/or needs. By focusing on essential features of the object, he minimizes the role played the merely accidental tastes and needs of the agent as things dia which she might come to be fond of the other and so wish him well for his sake. But in cases where accidental features of the parties do result in being fond of the other and wishing the other well for the sake, Aristotle seems to allow that (I) is satisfied, even if only accidentally and only temporarily; that is why these cases do not exhibit all the features (such as durability) that should ideally belongs to friends.⁵⁶

2.3 Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency

One of the most controversial issues with respect to friendship is the problem of happiness regarding self-sufficiency of man. Modern scholars focus on the question, one already asked by Socrates and later interrogated and returned by Aristotle, that whether or not a happy man who is self-sufficient and has all necessary things for his happiness requires friends. If a happy man is self-sufficient then logically he should not need anything because he has all necessary things for his happiness of which no further adding or attachment is required.

Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, analyzes the issue by invoking plain questions about assignment of a friend to a happy man. A happy man is assumed to have all good things of life thus does not need anything. He is complete in himself. Aristotle puts: "Whereas the function of a friend, who is a second-self, is to supply things we cannot procure for ourselves."⁵⁷ He deliberately questions the self-sufficiency of a supremely happy man by pointing the strangeness of the situation in case we assign him a friend. Logically, a man with supreme happiness does not need anything including a friend, which he considers as *the greatest of external goods*. However he

⁵⁶ Jennifer Whiting, "The Nicomachean Account of Philia", *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, p.287

⁵⁷ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1169b5-7

is not satisfied with that and goes further producing a conclusion through a logical reasoning:

Also if it be more the mark of a friend to give than to receive benefits, and if beneficence is a function of a good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will need friends as the objects of his beneficence.⁵⁸

In his second argument, Aristotle suggests that a supremely happy man is not a solitary man. He is a social animal and designed by nature to live with others in the society. Thus nobody can be assumed to live alone even if by possessing all possible good things to enjoy on his own. As a social being, man should have society because he has been provided with everything that is naturally good. As a result of this, a happy man needs friends.

Aristotle's third argument is related to the function of being a friend. He argues that meaning of being a friend is misperceived by the majority of people, that suppose that it is something to be useful for us, a mere instrument designed to meet our requirements. People think that a happy man does not need a friend out of necessity or for pleasure. However, Aristotle denies that interference on the ground that happiness is a sort of activity and not something that we have continuously. He points to a better understanding of other-selves and the hard life of a solitary man. A happy man is assumed to have a pleasant life:

But if happiness consists in life and activity, and the activity of a good man, as was said at the beginning, is good and so pleasant in itself, and if the sense that a thing is our own is also pleasant, yet we are better able to contemplate our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions than our own, and thus good men find pleasure in the actions of other good men who are their friends, since those actions possess both these essentially pleasant qualities, it therefore follows that the supremely happy man will require good friends, insomuch as he desires to contemplate actions that are good and that are his own, and the actions of a good man that is his friend are such. Also men think that the life of the happy man ought to be pleasant. Now a

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.1169b 10-15

solitary man has a hard life, for it is not easy to keep up continues activity by oneself; it is easier to do with the aid and in relation to other people. The good man's activity therefore, which is pleasant in itself, will be more continuous if practiced with friends; and the life of the supremely happy should be continuously pleasant.⁵⁹

Aristotle furthers in his argument by putting two other concepts, specifically, sensation and thought which he thinks are indispensable elements and capacities that define life of a man and also distinguish it from the one belongs to animals. Through sensation and thought good man not only thinks and perceives the activities of his daily life but also grasps and perceives how life is good and pleasant. As such people perceive what is intrinsically good and are pleased with that, existence is good and pleasant for them. "If happy and virtuous person feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self) – then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable."⁶⁰

According to Paul Schollmeier, Aristotle's theory of friendship is interwoven with his political and ethical theories. Furthermore, his theory of friendship also shows us the unique conception of human good, a conception of another self. This proves how Aristotelian friendship is 'more sophisticated and feasible than usually supposed.'⁶¹ He argues that in order to understand the concept of friendship in Aristotle, we need to analyze his conception of happiness. Schollmeier says:

Aristotle argues that the motive for friendship is an object of mental pleasure. We act for the sake of happiness of another person because we find that happiness of another is an object of pleasant apperception. He also argues that the happiness of another in either its primary or secondary sense, is an object of mental pleasure. Thus friendship is also pluralistic.⁶²

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1169b30-35, 1170a1-10

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1170b5-10

⁶¹ Paul Schollmeier, *Other Selves*, p. 2

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 3

In his definition of *Eudaimonia* (Happiness), Aristotle refers to a human good and sets all our actions for an end which is the highest good. Schollmeier argues that for Aristotle this appears to be happiness because it is the most complete good which is an end choiceworthy for the sake of itself and not for the sake of something else.⁶³ Schollmeier argues that Aristotle defines happiness as activity in accordance with virtue. The goodness of something that has a function resides in its function. Schollmeier concludes that human beings have only the function of a life of intellection, thus “we have the function of the principled element of our soul.”⁶⁴ Apart from it, as an organism we do have the functions of intellection, perception and nutrition. Perception and nutrition are common functions we share with animals. For well-fulfilling the function of the intellect, virtue is essential. According to Schollmeier, for Aristotle, human goodness means an activity in accordance with virtue and a good character means a virtuous person. Accordingly, friendship is an activity that includes virtue. Happiness also contributes to define ‘another self’. It shows what moral and intellectual activities constitute good activities. Those activities also show us what moral and intellectual virtues constitute good character. Schollmeier defines these moral and intellectual virtues as the cultural identity of other selves. Thus, happiness can be characterized as the cultivation of human beings.⁶⁵

Anthony Kenny, in his article “The Nicomachean Conception of Happiness” cites that the good, for Aristotle, is something self-sufficient, lacking nothing. Kenny also points out that Aristotle defines three traditional lives — the life of philosophy, the life of pleasure and the life of virtue. Like Schollmeier, he emphasizes the good functioning as a good of man and further explains the issue by defining the statement of Aristotle on happiness in *Nicomachean Ethics* as dominant that excludes other sorts of virtues and specifies only the activity of the highest virtue. For Kenny, the *Eudemian Ethics*, in that perspective, does not offer a single dominant end but an

⁶³ Paul Schollmeier, *Other Selves*, p. 18

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.19

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29

inclusive end in definition of its happiness.⁶⁶ Kenny cites the classification made by W.F.R Hardie on conception of happiness, one being dominant and the other inclusive. He asserts that in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the conception of happiness is dominant unlike the one in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Kenny adopts the approach put forward by Heinemen which suggests that the total life of a human being includes a variety of activities each of which is called a life by Aristotle. Thus when Aristotle means life he does not mean a total life but a certain type of activity. Kenny argues that “When he identifies happiness with the rational life, he is identifying it with intellectual activity, not with a certain kind of total life”⁶⁷ In the last chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is noted that there is more than one virtue. Those are the moral and intellectual virtues and “understanding” is the best and the most complete among them. Kenny, referring to the two passages in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, quotes Aristotle “If this is the case, human good turns out to be the activity of soul which is the exercise of virtue, and if there are several virtues, in the exercise of the best and the perfect one.” For Kenny, the second part of the sentence is controversial. For an inclusive interpretation, although we cannot see any argument confining human good to activities in the exercise of contemplative virtue, we need to interpret the second part of the sentence as “the best and the most complete virtue”. Kenny argues that it must be read as “virtue which is the whole of which the individual virtues are parts.”⁶⁸ There is also a problem related with translation of the Greek word “*teleion*” (perfect). Quoting Heinaman’s explanation of the Aristotelian sense of *teleion*, Kenny cites that Aristotle’s explanation of *teleion* in his function argument should not be read as “complete”. Kenny argues that when using ‘more teleion’ Aristotle means that something which is chosen for its own sake is ‘more teleion’ than the other thing which is chosen for its own sake and for the sake of something else. Thus Kenny claims that when Aristotle gives the example of wealth as an end for the sake of something else and honor as an end taken for the sake of its own, he defines honor more teleion than wealth. Quoting Heinaman

⁶⁶ Anthony Kenny, “The Nicomachean Conception of Happiness”, *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*, p.68

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.70

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.71

Kenny states “But of course honor is not more complete or comprehensive end than wealth.” and suggests that Heinaman interprets the second part of the sentence as ‘perfect happiness’ not ‘just happiness’. Underlining Aristotle’s attempt to distinguish between moral and intellectual virtues as well as his differentiation within intellectual virtues as wisdom and understanding, Kenny argues that “Only in Book 10 are moral virtues, plus the intellectual virtue of wisdom which is interlinked with them eliminated as constituents of the supreme happiness.”⁶⁹ For Kenny, it seems wrong to read “most perfect virtue” as total virtue. It is not also true to read it as intellectual virtue once adopted by Cooper on the ground that it is a most final virtue and it is the virtue of the contemplative intellect.⁷⁰ For Aristotle all virtues are chosen for the sake of happiness except understanding which is chosen for its activity. Kenny says it is contemplation for the intellectualist view.

Kenny’s next interrogation is related to the self-sufficiency of happiness. According to him, for inclusive interpretation, if happiness is self-sufficient it should not be defined only with contemplation. The other good things that would be lacking in a purely contemplative life should be included for happiness to be self-sufficient. Kenny brings up Aristotle’s regard on the issue which suggests that man is not self-sufficient and cannot sustain a solitary life by affirming that man need friends. However, Kenny claims that Aristotle thinks contemplation is adequate for a man to be happy, on the ground that “contemplative approaches self-sufficiency more closely than the pursuer of the active life”⁷¹ and cites:

On the face of it, the concluding section of the NE, instead of offering, like the EE, a single life offering all the values sought by the promoters of the three traditional lives, offers us a first-class, perfect happiness, consisting of the exercise of understanding, and alternative, second-class career consisting in the exercise of wisdom and the moral virtues.⁷²

⁶⁹ Anthony Kenny, “The Nicomachean Conception of Happiness”, *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*, p.72

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.72

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.74

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.75

Kenny also points out the discussions on whether morality makes of the person of contemplative excellence.⁷³ He gives a positive answer to it by saying “The Nicomachean position is surely is that the contemplative will possess the moral virtues, but that they will not constitute part of his happiness. That will be constituted by contemplation alone.”⁷⁴

Why someone should rescue his neighbor from burning instead of contemplating, if we do everything for the sake of contemplation? Kenny offers to take a minimalist interpretation in order to solve this dilemma. He says that contemplative will sometimes do temperate things for the sake of his philosophy (to avoid hangover to which would impede his research, for instance), but he will also do temperate things for their own sake (he doesn't want to let himself get soft, for instance). He adds that we can find the highest pleasure in the fine activities of good man and states:

Among these are the activities of the philosophic life. If καλὸς κἀγαθός is a synthesis of the virtues of the parts of the soul in the way that health is a synthesis of various parts of the body, then it must include the virtues of the intellectual parts of the soul as well as of the passional part. But not only is it part of happiness, it also sets the standard to which the activities of the other virtues must conform if they are to remain within the realm of virtue and happiness.⁷⁵

As a supporter of the inclusive view, Ackrill stands on the opposite side of the Aristotelian view of *Eudaimonia*. Questioning in the first instance the definitions of ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’, he argues that dominant can be monolithic in the sense that it is composed of only one and final end, or it includes that element in an end having more than one good/value and it is that element which has a paramount importance. For inclusive end, he defines two possible interpretations: it is either any end with two or more values or activities or, an end of which different parts have

⁷³ Anthony Kenny, “The Nicomachean Conception of Happiness”, *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*, p.77

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.77

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.79

equal value.⁷⁶ Ackrill states that Kenny and Hardie supports *eudaimonia* in Book 1 in the strongest sense of the dominant view. He says that for them *eudaimonia* includes only one end, and that is *Sophia*. Referring the term ‘for the sake of’ or ‘good’ Ackrill claims that one activity can be subordinated to another activity and can produce an end for the sake of the other activity. However, it does not necessarily mean that the subordinated activity does not have an end for its own. It is a statement which has not given its full weight. An activity which is subordinated by a superior activity may have its own end and also an end for the sake of something else. Ackrill argues that:

Now the idea that some things are done for their own sake and may yet be done for the sake of something else is precisely the idea Aristotle will need and use in talking of good actions and *eudaimonia*.⁷⁷

Akrill concludes that the conception of *Eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* has an inclusive meaning and it comprises many activities or ends. *Eudaimonia* is the final end because it includes all final ends in itself as a result of its inclusive aspect.⁷⁸

Unlike other authors, Nancy Sherman in “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life”, takes a more holistic approach in handling the issue of happiness by considering its relation with happiness of others, thus, notably pointing to the relation between *eudaimonia* and friendship. Sherman’s main argument lies on the idea that good living or happiness of an individual also invokes the happiness of others. It is the “shared life that comprises rational capacity for jointly promoting common ends as well as the capacity to identify with and coordinate separate ends.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*”, *Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics*, p.17

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.19

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.23

⁷⁹ Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, p. 589

Aristotle's notion of a friend as "another self" does not exclude separateness of the individuals; on the contrary, it calls distinctive ways for each individual as a separate entity to realize virtue in a shared life. Underlining the mutually acknowledged and reciprocal relation of goodwill and affection of friendship, Sherman argues that virtue as a good, for Aristotle, is not sufficient for happiness and for that reason there should be external goods. And if happiness is doing well and living well, it requires ethical and intellectual virtues. However, for our virtues to be realized we need actions and for these actions we need proper resources or external goods. Friendship is one of the external goods at hand that we can utilize to perform our virtues. As a result, having intimate friends means being interwoven in one's life and through this way we can express our goodness to each other. What is important is that friendship as a context extends the good life in a way that also covers the happiness of others.

Self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) is another controversial issue in debates with regard to the concept of friendship. Unlike its modern notion which refers to economic sufficiency or adequacy it has a more comprehensive meaning in Ancient Greek. As noted by Stern-Gillet, it has a substantial moral aura. Whether an autarkic man has or needs friends is an old question not only asked by Aristotle but also by Plato and Stoics as well. For Aristotle being self-sufficient requires a full realization of essence the object possesses. Stern-Gillet defines it as the basis of Aristotle's approach to self-sufficiency, "a teleological conception of nature".⁸⁰ Attribution of a positive value to self-sufficiency also contributes to his concept of friendship. Through his taxonomy of friendship, he tries to resolve an *aporia* in the *Lysis*: Why a self-sufficient man needs friends? Aristotle comments that in virtuous friendship, the parties involved regard each other for the other's sake and such friendship requires friends be loved for themselves. Thus, for Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's conception of social human nature supports his claim that self-sufficiency is not undermined in character friendship.

⁸⁰ Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*, p.124

Sherman defines Aristotle's self-sufficiency in the concept of friendship as something relational and connected with the good life. She also affirms that for Aristotle, it is not a state that belongs to a solitary person. It is not solely related with the basic requirements or material conditions of human beings and it means a lot for living well. Thus the notion of self-sufficiency in Aristotle's *philia* is relational and refers to good activity. A solitary man may not need others for his basic requirements but for sharing ends and designing his life, he needs others. "Thus the best sort of friendship provides us with companions with whom we can share goods and interests in a jointly pursued life. This sort of shared happiness constitutes the truly self-sufficient life."⁸¹ In choosing our character friends we are also choosing our other-self. We choose another for being partner in the joint pursuit of being good and pleasant in this life. These choices (*prohairesies*) include concord (*Homonoia*), sameness of mind, or singleness of mind in which an individual has sympathy and empathy towards his friend. According to Sherman, friendship also involves the interweaving of two lives in a quite different way.⁸² We can coordinate our ends not only within lives but also between lives. For example, a choice of one of two friends may impede the other to do something which is very important for him or her. In such a case, consideration of the other party in concern becomes an important factor in deciding which choices prevail. For Sherman, main point here is not related with whose choices to be realized but "what is relevant to the decision goes beyond the *eudaimonia* of a single, isolated individual."⁸³ This is also a way for a person to show his loyalty to his friend. Thus in any case, an individual's happiness includes the happiness of others, resulting in extended self or, in Sherman's words, 'a Self enlarged through attachments'. Sherman claims that it includes a sense of altruism as well. Through shared activities we take into consideration of other's concerns. Thus, attachment becomes leverage for mutual regard and affection.

⁸¹ Nancy Sherman, "Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, p. 596

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.600

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.600

Friendship among virtuous persons is not an impediment for maintaining distinct values embodied in each individual. Self-sufficiency does not mean the diminishing of various values or diversified character into a single entity, or putting them into a melting pot. It is inspiring to mention here the comment made by Martha Nussbaum:

When we consider the full requirements of Aristotelian living-together and the requirements it imposes, the vulnerabilities it creates, we cannot think that Aristotle has courted self-sufficiency the neglect of richness of value. Indeed we are more likely to be awed and alarmed at the risk such a person runs in valuing so difficult and unlikely a goal.⁸⁴

So friendship does not mean to enjoy the cozy status quo created by that bond and self-sufficiency is not something underpinning moral comfort.

As it is mentioned before, Aristotle grounds his notion of self-sufficiency on the argument of the awareness of self through the apprehension of other objects. Only via this cognitive process one can grasp knowledge about his self. That noetic thesis of Aristotle with regard to other-self (*allos autos*) and self-knowledge will be the subject of our next inquiry.

2.4 Other-Self as a Mirror and Self-Knowledge

Other Self (*autos allos*) or Second Self is a notion asserted and later debated, for the first time, by Aristotle. As stated in the previous section, Aristotle says that self-sufficient man requires a friend because friend is another self and through the other self one can perceive and grasp his own self. Thus friendship allows taking the perspective of another on “me-self” as well. It is like a mirror through which we can see ourselves. For Aristotle a good man likes himself, he wishes his own good and pursues it in action. On the other hand, good man who wishes good things for him remains himself. Aristotle’s good men have stable characters, not at variance with themselves. Because of having those good feelings for himself, a good man has the

⁸⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness*, p.369

same feelings towards his friends. For being two selves, initially the notion of me-self should be complete as it is in the good man. Bad men may have friends but do not have friendship with themselves. For Aristotle, they do not, unlike good men, enjoy their own company and continuously look for other's society.

Thus a bad man appears to be devoid of affection for himself, because has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others.⁸⁵

Aristotle raises the question of self-love. It seems contradictory to say that one should seek his own company, thus ought to love himself most, while mentioning a shared life in which one seeks goodness of the other and shares a single soul with his friend. Aristotle resolves it by asserting that one should not love himself in an ordinary way as it is a lover of self derived from ordinary kind of self-love. He argues that it is not related with the amount of share one allocated for himself but with what a man saved for himself. If a person takes a larger amount of money or pleasure for himself then he is called as lover of self. However, if a man is acting temperately and justly, trying to secure moral nobility, then nobody will accuse him of being lover of self. "At all times, he takes for himself things that are noblest and most truly good."⁸⁶ For Aristotle, good men desire life because they have the consciousness of their own existence. A good man desires also his friend's consciousness as well. Self-knowledge cannot be acquired directly and, as Stern-Gillet points out, we need an intermediary for it. It is worth to mention here consciousness of man in perception of himself and others:

If one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their

⁸⁵ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1166b23-30

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1168b 30-35

existence, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist.⁸⁷

It is then that perception through which we perceive and understand what we are doing. As Stern-Gillet emphasizes, self-awareness is indirect and man gains awareness of himself qua perceivers of the external world.⁸⁸ In that sense, primary friendship provides us with a process of mutual self-awareness in which friends become not only the source but also beneficiary of that noetic enrichment.⁸⁹

Thus primary friendship conserves moral virtues of friends through their partnership and also improves their moral outlook. Stern-Gillet concludes:

Humans are so constituted that they require others actually to become what they essentially are, and virtuous agents are those who succeed in actualizing their nature to the fullest extent. In this process of self-actualization primary friendship plays a major role, since it uniquely provides the virtuous with goods, both cognitive (i.e., the awareness of themselves qua fully actualized) and moral (i.e., deepened moral understanding and a regard for others in and for themselves) which would otherwise be unavailable to them.⁹⁰

Defining other self as a second but still separate self, Sherman underlines that due to the similarity of characters and exclusivity of the existing bond, each of the concerned parties in the partnership knows each other well and they are in a best position to help. What Sherman argues is that despite that joint activity individuals possess their separateness. Mirror aspect of friendship is to be mentioned here. Echoing Aristotle's comment that we can understand our neighbors better than ourselves, Sherman claims that we learn about ourselves by having another self with similar actions and traits and this gives us the chance to look at ourselves from a more detached and objective point of view. Sherman insists that it is not because we

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1170a30-1170b1

⁸⁸ Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*, p.51

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.54

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.141-142

are biased by our own eyes but because project of self-knowledge necessitates “external dialogue and audience” and concludes “Without friends we act in blindness about who we really are, and indeed lack true practical reason.”⁹¹

Cooper’s view on the relation between friendship and self-knowledge is in the same line with Sherman’s. Cooper cites the same argument that one can have the knowledge of self through an intermediary, i.e., via other self or friends. On the other hand, he denies the claim that the *Nicomachean Ethics* proposes self-consciousness through joint activities with friends and states that friendship is not a necessary precondition of self-consciousness but for self-knowledge. Cooper’s argument is based on the view that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle does not assume the priority of other-awareness to self-awareness. For Cooper, “Aristotle argues pleasant self-consciousness in the good man to the pleasantness of his consciousness of his friend— this latter consciousness is represented, as it were, as an overflow from the good man’s self-consciousness, not as something needed to create it in the first place.”⁹²

Human flourishing does not only mean to be in conformity with natural conditions but it also means well-living. For that reason, human flourishing necessitates self-knowledge which is pleasant for a good man. Cooper asks: How does man attain self-knowledge? According to him, it is the point where we should take friendship into consideration as it is related to the objectivity problem about one’s own self. At least character friendship provides us with the opportunity to reach the required objectivity. Cooper cites:

In any event, on Aristotle’s theory, the perfect friendship is one where parties are good persons who are alike in character. If one supposes that in this perfect character-friendship, as in other lesser ones, the friends may feel a sense of their own kinship without necessarily knowing antecedently, on both sides, in what their similarity consists, then such a friendship could well

⁹¹ Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, p. 612

⁹² John M. Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle”, *Reason and Emotion*, p.340

serve as the needed bridge by which to convert objectivity about others into objectivity about oneself.⁹³

Accordingly, objectivity about our friends can be obtained more securely than the objectivity about ourselves. The knowledge about others is not something unchecked or unlimited. It is based on a long history of shared activities where parties have developed mutual trust and tested their activities. “They are not ‘mere feelings’ but are developed through long-experience both of the other person and of oneself.”⁹⁴

Agreeing that other-self functions as a mirror for a man, he insists that it should not be perceived as an instrument by which a man tries to develop his self-esteem. On the contrary it is a way for a man to love his own self.

⁹³ John M. Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle”, *Reason and Emotion*, p.342

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.344

CHAPTER 3

MAIN ASPECTS OF CIVIC FRIENDSHIP

In the beginning of “Political Animals and Civic friendship”, Cooper says that one of the most important propositions of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory is his claim that by its nature human being is a *politikon zoon- political animal*.⁹⁵ Men live in polis not only for basic conditions of life but also for living well. In the introduction of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle indicates features of civic friendship when citing that

Moreover, friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, or to promote concord, which seems to akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while faction, which is enmity, is what they are anxious to banish. And if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them; whereas merely to be just is not enough—a feeling of friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest form of justice seems to have an element of friendly feeling in it.⁹⁶

For Aristotle, a good man has a flourishing life not only for himself but also for his family and friends as well as his fellow-citizens in polis. As Cooper indicates, civic friendship is an important argument of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which Aristotle devotes great attention to. Cooper states that the nature of civic friendship and its relation with other forms of friendship is not specified explicitly in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He argues that it is a kind of advantage or useful friendship in which each citizen has an expectation of advantage and profit for himself, in common with the others, as members of the civic associations.

⁹⁵ John M. Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship”, *Aristotle’s Politics, Critical Essays*, p.65

⁹⁶ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1158a23-32

Hence, in line with the statements made by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the main features of civic friendship⁹⁷ and the relevant recent debates will be analyzed in the following sub-chapter and specifically in Chapter 4.

3.1 Two Pillars of Friendship: Justice and Equality

Aristotle defines friendship in line with *equality* and *justice*. These terms ground the basis of civic friendship in his argument. What Aristotle draws about the rank among friendship is also applicable for regimes of states. In order to understand how friendship shapes the state governance and how its rules determine the interaction within the society, we need to search further the essentials of friendship. For Aristotle, there must be a proportional equality. All kinds of friendship are inevitably based on this. When Aristotle speaks about the good man being a friend of a superior, he also puts the necessity for *the superior in rank to be superior in virtue*. This is how “good man as the inferior party makes matters proportionally equal”.⁹⁸ Aristotle also defines familial relations in terms of friendship and draws parallels between political regimes and those. This is his way of reasoning. It is based on deduction and reaches to a point where he constructs the concepts by matching them with their visible ends. For Aristotle, friendship in family is another example for friendship among unequals. Father and son are friends like son and mother. However, father is superior to his son as it is a relationship between an old man and a younger. The affection rendered in these various unequal friendships should also be proportionate. Proportionate to desert is an essential component in which parties get their shares accordingly. This creates the sense of equality which, for Aristotle, is a must element of friendship.⁹⁹ However, it still differs from equality in justice. In friendship, the concept reflects to equal in quantity whereas in justice it reflects to proportionate to desert primarily. In friendship there must be a balance between

⁹⁷ Aristotle does not mention it explicitly as “civic friendship”, rather says “limited friendships”. Cooper has called it as “Civic Friendship”, some names it as “Political Friendship” in their debates over that sort of friendship.

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1158a 35

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.1158b 30-35

friends in quantity. In case of a wide split between two friends in virtue or wealth or any other factor that brings them together, we cannot expect the friendship to continue. In Aristotle's case, it describes why God and men cannot be friends. The remote distance between God and men in physical sense as well as the existing gap in quantities they possess prevent them from having such a friendship. The rightful question rises here in Aristotle's mind is *if we can wish our friends to become gods as we think that the Gods possess the goodness in excellence?* For Aristotle, friendship is something that belongs to our world and it shows the limit of mankind. On the condition that the above statement is true, Aristotle claims that:

A true friend wishes his friend's good for friend's own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being¹⁰⁰

As regards justice, Aristotle argues that there is no such thing in friendship. For him, there is no need for any legally binding element since there will be no unjust attitude or relation among friends. On the other hand, according to Aristotle, justice is constituted differently in line with the level of friendship existing between two persons. As level of friendship increases, demand for justice and claims of justice increases reciprocally. As regards political communities, Aristotle's claim is based on an argument that while justice is a best way to keep society in peace, it is not enough for a peaceful co-existence and further bonds or ties, specifically friendship are needed.

Cooper deliberates justice in conjunction with civic friendship. He cites that it is quite natural to mention friendship in the society rather than justice. Lawgivers are more concerned to improve friendship among citizens than they are to put their relations on the footing of justice.¹⁰¹ We see that justice exists in a society where its citizens do not do anything for others unless its rules are present. Justice is understood, by Cooper, as fairness and legality thus it is not out of the range of

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1159a10-13

¹⁰¹ John M. Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship" *Reason and Emotion*, p.333

unsympathetic and suspicious character. In friendship, friends have a lovely concern for one another's welfare and they already acknowledge reasons not to harm or work to disadvantage. Friendship naturally provides an accord without invoking strict rules of justice.¹⁰²

In conclusion, it can be said that the two concepts are the main measures of value used in the definition of asymmetric relations and associations by Aristotle.

3.2 Two Features of Civic Friendship: Goodwill and Concord

Although the *Goodwill and Concord* are not forms of friendship they are the indispensable basis for friendship. These two basic concepts constitute the core elements of the political friendship or civic friendship. As Pangle states in "*Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*", by explaining friendship as extended self-love, Aristotle turns to the elements of friendship that consist in wishing for the friend's life and well-being and then he goes further and mentions concord as the agreement in practical choices between friends which forms the core of political friendship¹⁰³ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, goodwill is defined as the beginning of friendship. It does not possess a desire; it happens suddenly and only intends friendly feelings without action. In that sense, Aristotle defines goodwill as dormant friendship. If such kind of friendship reaches to the point of intimacy then a true friendship may appear. For Aristotle, goodwill appears in friendship of goodness or virtue because the motive behind a true goodwill is not to benefit from utility or pleasure. As Aristotle points out, goodwill is flourished by some kind of excellence or moral goodness.¹⁰⁴ Pangle argues that "Goodwill is natural and unconfused source of the wish to see virtue rewarded. It wishes this because not virtue needs a reward but because our sympathies are naturally with those we admire."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² John M. Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship" *Reason and Emotion*, p. 333

¹⁰³ Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, p.155

¹⁰⁴ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1167a20

¹⁰⁵ Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, p.156

For concord (*homonoia*- oneness of mind), Aristotle makes the definition of friendly feeling, thus, saying that “it is not just an agreement of opinion or on reasoned judgments about any subject.”¹⁰⁶ By giving the example of astronomy, he tries to show that concord is not a simple agreement on common things in daily life; instead, it is an attitude in general for *common interests, adopting the same policy and carrying the common resolves into execution.*¹⁰⁷ Pangle defines it as an *active agreement of purpose and effort resembling at least full-pledged friendship.*

Since concord is related with the agreement on great matters such as political issues which members of polis or political communities are concerned with, it belongs to political friendship. It should be known mutually among citizens. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says;

Now concord in this sense exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men’s wishes are steadfast and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common.¹⁰⁸

As a result, like goodwill, concord is also part of political friendship and exists in relations between good men. Discord which is defined by Aristotle as the reverse of concord is a situation in which everybody tries to make others do their responsibility but refuses to do it himself. Aristide Tessidore, in his book “Reading Aristotle’s Ethics” also cites concord as the notion to identify political or civic friendship as well as discord. He establishes the link between concord and a particular agreement among citizens on *practical matters of direct civic importance*. Tessidore argues that “concord or that kind of like-mindedness on political matters such as structure of regime or selection of ruler is typically identified with political friendship”.¹⁰⁹ What Tessidore underlines as regards concord is really noteworthy. He argues that

¹⁰⁶ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1167a22-25

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.1167a 25-29

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.1167b5-9

¹⁰⁹ Aristide Tessidore, *Reading Aristotle’s Ethics*, p. 85

Aristotle defines concord in two basic lines. One is derived from polis and the other one from decent man or person. Concord from polis resembles an agreement by citizens on what is advantageous in polis. However, concord from decent persons comprises psychic state and characteristics of those persons which allow them to seek just and advantageous things in common. On the other hand, for Tessidore, discord, in a reverse meaning, represents a mutual suspicion among society which is undermined by the very shortsighted type of self-interest.¹¹⁰ This is the point of discussion where the question about nature of political friendship lies as to whether it is a form of utility based or virtue based practice of decent persons.

Pangle also agrees on the function of concord in a similar manner. She further points out several new themes introduced by Aristotle describing the basis of mutual goodwill and affection of good men. According to her, Aristotle introduces similarity, durability, trust as well as time and familiarity that is needed to build that trust in between friends. Furthermore, Pangle defines concord as a bridge between passive goodwill and active friendship. Hence there are agreed goals on what is good and efforts to attain it.¹¹¹

Richard Kraut takes a skeptical approach towards goodwill and concord. Kraut prefers to use political friendship for defining relationships in different constitutional forms. He cites that Aristotle's political friendship is constructed on two basic grounds: the fact that there is a city or a polis, the other one is *homonoia*, 'like-mindedness'. A city is based on shared activities (*koinōnia*) of its members who have common interests. Kraut calls it a cooperative enterprise that benefits its members.¹¹² Aristotle defines all such association as friendship. Relations among sailors, businessmen and finally cities due to forming an alliance for the sake of its citizens can be counted in as examples of such a bond. Kraut argues that for Aristotle, relations between citizens in cities are the same with the relations between

¹¹⁰ Aristide Tessidore, *Reading Aristotle's Ethics*, p.86

¹¹¹ Lorraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*, p.49

¹¹² Richard Kraut, *Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought*, p. 466

businessmen or sailors. There is an advantage or interest that holds them together. In such togetherness, for Kraut, there occurs normally a tension due to a sense of fairness required for the amount of share in common things. It creates a tension amongst segments of society. Kraut claims that when that is the only kind of political friendship, it also invokes a quarrelsome relation. For that reason, Aristotle stresses the importance of *homonoia* which holds the city together. It is a consensus between citizens of the same city on the terms of the cooperation among themselves. For Kraut, in *homonoia*, the relationship is not poisoned by hostility, suspicion and bitterness. Thus there may be a sense of disagreement but just confined to some details and particulars.¹¹³ Still, Kraut comments that it is a difficult and rarely found way to prevent faction among society. Given the fact that we have poor materials in hand and the widening gap between poor and rich, developing a sense of trust and willingness for cooperation through the positive effects of economic activities seems a very difficult effort. Accordingly Kraut explains:

In ordinary conditions, those who train with Aristotle to lead political life can expect only modest results, and are painfully aware of how far reality departs from the ideal or even the second-best. It is nonetheless valuable for them to know how large this gap is. The best protection against bitter disappointment in politics is to realize from the start how poor are the materials in one's disposal, and how difficult it will be to make something tolerable out of them. Those who know what would be ideal and therefore how defective reality is the ones who are best equipped to make modest improvements in the real life.¹¹⁴

3.3 Friendship as a Political Bond

After defining the main aspects of civic friendship and its pillars, we can take a further step by arguing that all features we discussed have links with the association of the State. What claim Aristotle puts forward is the forms of constitution and

¹¹³ Richard Kraut, *Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought*, p.469

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.469-470

binding aspects of friendship as a bond. In fact his argument is more than a definition of forms of regimes as it is a discussion that helps settling the bonding aspect of friendship among the communities. What defines and determines the lines of regimes are the degree and forms of friendship which exist as ferment in the association of the State. This is the point of discussion where ruling systems and friendship come together and classification of constitutions become possible. According to Aristotle, there are three forms of constitution as well as their corrupted and perverted versions. These forms are kingship, aristocracy and a constitution based on a property classification described as timocracy.¹¹⁵ These regimes can be classified from the best to the worst in line with the degree of distortion of the forms of friendship and their axes have correlations with each other. The perversion of kingship, the best in these constitutions, comes to tyranny even both of them are monarchies. What makes them different in very opposite poles is the established interaction with their subjects. A tyrant seeks only his advantage while a true king acts for the sake of his subjects. So we can say that a bad kingship turns to tyranny, aristocracy passes to oligarchy and timocracy is replaced by democracy. All these perverted forms of systems have the common characteristics: the rulers do not distribute what the State has to offer according to desert.¹¹⁶

This parallelism or likenesses can be found in the household as well. The relationship between father and son, husband and wife as well as that between brothers constitutes various types of regimes. Aristotle finds common aspects between the types of regimes and the relations in the household.

The relation between brothers constitutes a sort of Timocracy; they are equals, save in so far as they differ age; hence if the divergence in age be great, the friendship between them cannot be of the fraternal type. Democracy appears most fully in households without a master, for in them all the members are equal. Under each of these forms of government we find

¹¹⁵ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p.1160a 30-35

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.1160b10-23

friendship existing between rulers and ruled, to the same extent as justice.¹¹⁷

In tyranny, on the other hand, there seems little or no friendship between rulers and ruled and also we see little or no justice in the regime.

That likeness gives the path of political aspects of friendship in Aristotle's book. In fact, what shapes political life of community has a very close relation and similarity with the way we act in our friendship.

¹¹⁷ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 1161a4-12

CHAPTER 4

A LIVING SPACE FOR FRIENDSHIP TODAY

4.1 Political Arguments over Friendship

After analyzing aspects of civic friendship in line with justice, equality, concord and goodwill for which Aristotle makes related references for political regimes, we have to further question on which types of friendship fit well to scheme of politics. Do we really have such an existing ground where any type of friendship takes place in the sphere of politics and plays a considerable role in political concord? In fact this question is also the main point discussed by various modern scholars who argue Aristotle's perception of friendship and its implications on politics. The main argument is widely centralized in the extent and degree of true friendship in our political life. Again, if we assume perfect or virtue friendship as the main constituent of political concord which is a must for a peaceful society, then it shall not be difficult for us to define a best regime. What prevents us from having such an assumption is the existence of unequals adding an asymmetrical feature to friendship. Hence Aristotle has concerns regarding creation of equality and maintaining friendship in the community. Then shall we still say that political friendship is an extended variation of full virtue friendship or is it a mere derivation of utility friendship?

Tessidore, who studied Aristotle's ethics in a context of rhetoric, virtue and political philosophy, adopts a "moderate" approach without excluding the dilemma in friendship of utility of which is its being a constituent of political establishment or not. Tessidore rightfully underlines Aristotle's distinction between legal and ethical forms of utility friendship. However there is no clear distinction one can assume between political friendship and the perfect friendship. Tessidore cites that it is the result of Aristotle's teaching of civic association itself and defines Aristotle's

perception of political partnership as an association for the sake of living well while pointing out his insistence on the belief that living well cannot be reduced solely to mutual security or useful exchange. Tessidore suggests that for Aristotle, political friendship should also include noble actions, thus, it should be perceived as ethical in its primary sense, promoting virtuous action among citizens in polis. ¹¹⁸

Regarding how political community will be shaped within the context of political friendship, John M. Cooper, in his essay “Political Animals and Civic Friendship” stresses communal aspect of the notion. Highlighting Aristotle’s definition of the goodness in pursuit of happiness, Cooper states that being a political animal is natural feature of man. He insists this proposition determines ethical and political theory of Aristotle. For Cooper, human being’s happiness or flourishing necessitates collective actions and communality. If someone seeks happiness, he or she should pursue not only for his self-interest but also goodness of his family, friends and fellow-citizens. That is the point where we should stand and have the context for understanding political friendship. Cooper also calls upon the biological aspect that Aristotle talks about while defining the political nature of human beings. Cooper reminds us the comparison among animals made by Aristotle, citing how he makes that distinction by putting human beings together with bees and ants into the same basket of “political animals”.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, what makes human beings different from bees or ants is the capacity of language that they alone have to communicate the necessary conceptions with each other. All these aspects resemble the political realm of human existence, bringing cooperative actions. In sum, Cooper says:

According to Aristotle, a city is a kind of community that depends upon the friendly interest that the citizens take in one another’s qualities of mind and character, as well, of course, as upon their common economic interests. In such a community the way or ways in which the government seeks to promote the citizens’ good as a common good will depend upon the specific character of friendship that forms the political bond within it,

¹¹⁸ Aristide Tessidore, *Reading Aristotle’s Ethics*, p.88

¹¹⁹ John M. Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship”, *Reason and Emotion*, p.358

and the ways in which “civic friends” have and do things in common.¹²⁰

Cooper accepts that Aristotle defines civic friendship as a form of utility friendship however he points out Aristotle’s comment that it is not solely a place of mutual economic interests. Even it is really a friendship like advantage friendship it has further features. Cooper highlights those in order to strengthen his argument and he argues that for Aristotle civic friendship involves concerns of citizens for each other within the context of mutual goodwill, trust and well-wishing. This means that “in a city animated by civic friendship each citizen has a certain measure of interest in and also concern for well-being of each other citizen”.¹²¹ Thus we can say that Cooper sees possibility of living together for man with communal interest without excluding self-interest. For him, being a political animal shows man’s the possession of capacity to live together in cooperative communities. Due to communicative capacity, they also have the ability to form communities in pursuit of *Common Good*.

As a counterargument, Bernard Yack, in his essay “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy” analyzes political community and conflict from a perspective of liberal political theories, and accepts the importance of friendship in polis as a fellow-feeling bond. Still, he questions the character of that feeling among members of political community. In that sense, he criticizes modern champions of Aristotle for being romantic or idealist due to their ignorance of realities of humanity which, according to him, is based on self-interest of individuals seeking self-sufficiency and meeting their necessities in life. Yack comments on the modern supporters of Aristotle claiming that they do not really see what Aristotle has seen. He states that ethical and legal realms of friendship based on interest cause contradiction and Aristotle suggests this contradiction will have no escape from violent distrust.¹²² Yack criticizes those scholars who advocate virtue friendship or

¹²⁰ John M. Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship”, *Reason and Emotion*, p.370

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 371

¹²² Bernard Yack, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy”, *Action and Contemplation*, p.287

goodwill as the basis of political friendship for misunderstanding Aristotle's philosophy.

Yack says that:

Members of political community are indeed friends of a sort according to Aristotle but political friendship, as he understands it, offers no alternative to distrust and competition within a regime. Political friendship grows out of the particular kind of sharing one finds in a political community.¹²³

Opposing any referral to Aristotelian understanding of friendship for arguments against liberalism, Yack thinks widespread misperception of Aristotle leads to explanation of political community as based on "identity" and "organic growth". For Yack, friendship of interest is the main constituent of political community and considering comradeship or fraternity as the ideal of political friendship leads higher expectations which are at the end tend to disappear. Yack claims that Aristotle also finds it a dangerous and an impractical model which leads to the increase of violence because of failed expectations. He claims that "Aristotle's political friendship is a fact of ordinary political life rather than a moral ideal, a source of conflict as well as means of promoting greater cooperation".¹²⁴

Obviously, Aristotle's insistence on friendship as a bond in political establishments has enormous effects not only on discussions about ethics but also on many scholars' political theories. Considering justice and equality as main constituents of ethical theories, friendship takes interestingly a unique place in formulating an ethical theory for resolving conflicts and discord in communities. In fact what Aristotle tries to bring about seems to draw a picture of communities (polis in Greeks) living in concord. In that sense, role of friendship is crucial due to its contribution for preserving peace in that community. Aristotle does not discuss or question possibility of friendship as a phenomenon; instead, he formulates, or at least tries to define the

¹²³ Bernard Yack, "Community and Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy", *Action and Contemplation*, p. 288

¹²⁴ Bernard Yack, *The Problems of A Political Animal*, p.110

nature of friendship and its importance in political societies. He seeks traces of friendship among individuals in the polis. As it can be seen in his analogies, there is a parallelism between private friendship and civic friendship. In fact, Aristotle tries to show the common characteristic of friendship as the binding agent of communities in general. This binding aspect penetrates into the roots of community and shapes daily activities of individuals or citizens. As a binding agent, it not only shapes individual life or activities of factions in society but also keeps them together. Generalization of friendship underlines Aristotle's effort to settle the issue of discord and conflict of interests in communities. When he classifies types of regimes according to level of friendship which exists in that or such kind of regime, he attempts to formulate an all-embracing theory in order to reveal how and in what ways friendship shapes the nature of our relations. In fact, polis, on Aristotle's view, is a place where people live on a mutually agreed set of virtues and goods. People seek to realize the human good and this concord forms polis in which citizens share something common for themselves: seeking goodness. As MacIntyre mentions in the *After Virtue*, for Aristotle, citizens live for continuity of polis which is concerned with the whole of life.

Aristotle's perception of friendship as a bond in sustaining political society should be handled and discussed further not only within the context of philosophy but also in a political context. In that sense, inclusion of concept of friendship into political life will contribute to understand the merits of a society facing discord, conflict and disintegration. The contribution of philosophy in that context to politics will be its constant questioning on to what extent political friendship will be possible in a society. Before answering this question we have another one to face with: Is man a self-centered, egoistic character or is he an altruistic being? Posing these questions also means questioning the possibility of friendship as a separate entity. Do we have an idealistic concept of friendship which reflects our subjectivity or do we really grasp it as it is? For Aristotle, we need to contemplate on its realms and roles in society, instead of questioning its ontology. Considering the modern world and its society, we are about to stand in plural moralistic approaches, unlike the common project of polis relying on mutual interest of individuals. That cast necessitates

further questions. As MacIntyre cites, the notion of political community is not a familiar concept for modern liberal individualist world.¹²⁵ In modern world, friendship is confined to private life and is forced to leave the public realm. That restriction has resulted in the loss of collective mission of friendship once it had in polis. It lost its sense of political unity and coherence as well. Considering MacIntyre's rightful comment on liberal perception of friendship, it will not be wrong to say that friendship in modern world is boxed in the initiative and personal perception of individuals per se.

The motive behind the goodwill or affection that a man feels or shows to his friend deserves inquiry too. In fact, contemplation on that takes the issue to the aforementioned question again: Is man naturally egoistic or not? Even Aristotle points the importance of self-love as the initial condition to love others; I believe that this should be understood as "A man without good qualifications cannot render something loveable either for himself or someone else for bestowing". If we say friendship is a bond between individuals, between two separate but interrelated entities, we should accept the fact that the feature of that bond should be set by these interacting entities. We cannot isolate that feature from its bonding function and regard it merely as an exposition of human egoism. Thus, self-love as a condition for loving others should be considered as an aspect of communal activity of each of those man or these groups (Two separate things can stand together).

Having those controversial features of friendship in mind, one may ask if we have a living place for friendship today. If friendship had been merely a concept of intimacy or something else based on affections it would have been easier to give an answer, saying "yes". However, it is more than that. For a better understanding of communal aspect of it one should refer to the role of that bond in Ancient Greek and its current meaning in our social life as an isolated activity of an individual. Moreover, it is not defined as something separate and isolated, on the contrary, it is defined as interdependent and interlocked by other concepts, specifically, virtues as Aristotle would say. Unlike the common way of modern perception, in Ancient

¹²⁵ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.156

Greek one cannot even imagine any virtue separated from another. For Aristotle, this is more explicit than it is for other philosophers. He does not separate the character of individual from his intelligence. This is an outmoded or unknown attitude for modernity.

Alastair MacIntyre, in the *After Virtue*, suggests that Aristotle's unitary view on non-separable character of virtues is at odds with the belief dominant in modern world.¹²⁶ What is ironic here is the argument put forward by MacIntyre when making comparison between Kant's perception of good will and the one Aristotle has. For Kant, possession of good will is a must but also sufficient for moral worth whereas it is a gift to know how to apply general rules in particular cases, in case of absence of it, stupidity arises. For Aristotle, if you do not have practical intelligence you will also lack goodness. According to MacIntyre, that connection is a rare issue for many cultures. He claims that modern social practice and theory follows the Kantian approach and suggests that the interrelationship of virtues and its connection with practical intelligence makes Aristotle's view more distinct.

The interrelationship of the virtues explains why they do not provide us with a number of distinct criteria by which to judge the goodness of a particular individual, but rather with one complex measure. Application of that measure in a community whose shared aim is the realization of the human good presupposes of course a wide range of agreement in that community on goods and virtues, and it is this agreement which makes possible the kind of bond between citizens which, on Aristotle's view, constitutes a polis.¹²⁷

Yack's approach is based on a liberal point of view when he argues that civic friendship is basically a kind of utility friendship. He interprets Aristotle restrictively by taking a liberal perspective and ignoring communal attachments of such friendship. Living in a political community includes economic activities but also involves norms and ethical aspirations. Friendship, for Aristotle, is a moral good which is necessary in politics. Friendship incorporates justice in its practices but it

¹²⁶ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.154

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.155

also brings solidarity and goodwill in our political interactions as well as the possibility of concord. In Ancient Greek, polis is not only a place whose members have their economic activities but it serves also a political realm where free people have the chance to exercise their political rights and actions for living well. Members of polis have a common project and it is not merely directed at an economic activity. It is a project for living well, not just “living” as a basic requirement.

The good life for each citizen is inextricably linked to the realization of the good life for others. This is not to say that citizens are all the same with respect to usefulness or goodness or that they serve the same function, but rather that they are all part of the same project.¹²⁸

Thus, citizens in a city perform their functions in a shared activity which is differentiated accordingly. Citizens come together to achieve all the goods of life and these goods not only consists material goods but also moral goods.¹²⁹ Common activity of citizens includes flourishing of citizens as both economic agents and human being.

4.2. How to Welcome Friendship Today?

Along with political discussions over the concept of friendship, it is worth mentioning here its fragility and subtle existence in modern times where “empiric and metric systems” prevail.¹³⁰ On the other hand, it will be helpful to make a comparison between the Aristotelian understanding of practical rationality which allows us to make our choices with current dominant scientific reasoning. The tense and antagonistic relation between these two attitudes results in, in Nussbaum’s words, the vulnerability of friendship. She stresses the urgency of study of existing scientific pictures of practical rationality over social life by analyzing Aristotle’s conception.

¹²⁸ Emily C. Nacol, “Friendship’s Contribution to Politics: The Limits of Justice in Aristotle’s Political Thought”, p.23

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.23

¹³⁰ Nussbaum uses these concepts in her article “The Discernment of Perception”

Aristotle's position is subtle and compelling. It seems to me to go further than any other account of practical rationality I know in capturing the sheer complexity and agonizing difficulty of choosing well. But whether we are in the end persuaded by it or not, the need to study it is urgent. Even more in our time than in his, the power of "Scientific" pictures of practical rationality of social sciences and the more science-based parts of ethical theory on the formation of public policy. We should not accept this situation without assessing the merits of such views against those of the most profound alternatives. If we do not finally accept Aristotle's conception, at least we will have found out more about ourselves...¹³¹

Faced with confusion over finding a way for reaching a rational choice, Aristotle insists on plurality and heterogeneity of goods and values. Contrary to modern Utilitarian arguments, Aristotle asserts uniqueness of values and "defending a picture of choice as a quality-based selection among goods that are plural and heterogeneous, each being chosen for its own distinctive value."¹³² In fact, this is an approach contrary to efforts for finding a set of standard of value and maximizing the quantities of that value, thus reaching a rational choice. Instead Aristotle describes our values as plural and incommensurable.

To value each of the separate types of excellent activity as a constituent of the good life is tantamount, in Aristotle's conception, to saying that a life that lacked item would be deficient or seriously incomplete, in a way that could not be atoned for the presence of other items, in however great supply. To value friendship (for example) in this way is to say (as Aristotle explicitly does) that a life that lacked this one item, even though it had as much as you like of every other item, would fall short of full value or goodness in an important way. Friendship does not supply a commodity that we can get elsewhere; it is the very thing, in its own peculiar nature, that is an end, not simply a means to an end: there no trade-offs without loss.¹³³

¹³¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception", *Aristotle's Ethics, Critical Essays*, p.146

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.148

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.151

In Nussbaum's words, Aristotle sees a good life as a composite whole of which parts are irreplaceable. His way of handling the values as plural and heterogeneous makes also the friendship as a distinct value. Some argues that if friendship is a distinct value and requires such a particularity, then there should not be repeatable actions or things within friendship. However, for Nussbaum, features of shared history and of family relationship that are not even in principle repeatable are allowed to bear serious ethical weight.

Here the agent's own singularity (and/or the historical singularity of relationship itself) enter into moral deliberation in a way that could not even in principle give rise to a universal principle, since what is ethically important (among the other things) is to treat the friend as a unique nonreplaceable being, a being not like anyone else in the world.¹³⁴

Nussbaum's explanation referring to Aristotle's practical wisdom concerns with not only universal but also particulars. For being practical, practical wisdom concerns practice and it also needs to concern particulars. This is the feature that gives uniqueness to the friendship experienced. According to Nussbaum, Aristotle's distinction between practical insight and scientific or mathematical understanding should be noticed. Practical perception, which Aristotle calls *nous*, is gained only through a long process of living and choosing that develops the agent's resourcefulness and responsiveness.¹³⁵

Another feature assert by Nussbaum is related to Aristotelian thought of emotions. For Nussbaum, emotions take a central place in his conception of morality. Not only actions but also feelings appropriate emotions about our choices make us truly good persons. Nussbaum's stress on Aristotelian attitude toward emotions with no doubt brings about considerable features on friendship as well.

If I do the just thing from the wrong motives or desires (not for own its sake but, say, for the sake of gain), that will not count as

¹³⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception", *Aristotle's Ethics, Critical Essays*, p.163

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.165

virtuous actions. This much even Kant could grant. More striking, I must do the just thing without reluctance or inner emotional tension. If my right choices always require struggle, if I must all the time be overcoming powerful feelings that go against virtue, then I am less virtuous than the person whose emotions are in harmony with her actions. I am assessable for my passions as well as for my calculations; all are parts of practical rationality.¹³⁶

This is applicable for friendship. If one gives a hand to his friend with a true feeling and sympathy, he will be deemed as a virtuous person. For Nussbaum, the feelings are constituent parts of friendship. Intellect will call feelings to get advices about the new situation, without them, intellect's approach to a new situation will be blind and obtuse.¹³⁷ For Aristotle, choices made with the guidance of feelings and emotions are more virtuous than the choices without love and sympathy.

As a result, it can be said that friendship, for Aristotle, is not merely a rational choice based on purposeful actions but it is rather a concept that requires true feelings and emotions for a true intimacy between members of society.

Along with noncommensurability and diversity of values, imagination and emotion, as features of perception and practical knowing have enormous effect on friendship. First of all, Aristotle's insistence on noncommensurability supports the priority he gives to particulars. Noncommensurability together with emotions and imagination lead us to understand that there are diverse values in the world where we live together. They help us to grasp these values. By distinct features of the said values, we perceive and appreciate them for their own sake, in other words, we love them as they are. What Nussbaum argues here gives essential features of friendship as a whole.

For his noncommensurability says, Look and see how rich and diverse the ultimate values in the world are. Do not fail to

¹³⁶ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception", *Aristotle's Ethics, Critical Essays*, p.169

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.170

investigate each valuable item, cherishing it for its own specific nature and not reducing it to something else.¹³⁸

And she concludes,

In the context of friendship and love, these injunctions are virtually certain to guarantee that list of ultimate values will include some nonrepeatable particular items: for each friend is to be cherished for his or her own sake, not simply as an instantiation of the universal value, friendship. And it appears that this will include not only character but also shared history of mutuality.¹³⁹

It is important to mention Nussbaum's definition of the Aristotelian agent in order to have a better understanding of the features of friendship in search of possibility of a living space today. Noncommensurability and diversity of things along with guidance of emotions and imagination make the Aristotelian agent to love and care for something. "So our most intense feelings of love and fear and grief are likely to be directed at objects and persons who are seen as irreducibly particular in their nature and in their relationship to us."¹⁴⁰ Emotions and imagination are important parts of the Aristotelian agent's practical knowing. For Nussbaum, noncommensurability opens a space for them to operate, gives a way for perception of specialness. She argues that Aristotelian position accepts emotional attachments as an intrinsically valuable source of richness and goodness in human life. For her, Aristotelian agent is, quoting Henry James's, "finely aware and richly responsible" and "of being a person on whom nothing is lost". Nussbaum's inclusive approach brings about enormous traces for the features of friendship as well. A friend, as a human being and person acting responsible and finely aware of his or her existence as a political animal, takes actions accordingly in his or her friendly and intimate relations. He or she does not seek a purpose or use the existing intimacy as a means of something; instead, they are here or there not because for something but for their own sake. An Aristotelian agent knows his responsibility as a friend because he

¹³⁸ Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Discernment of Perception", *Aristotle's Ethics, Critical Essays*, p.175

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.175

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.175

grasps the existing intimacy not only with his reason and through metrical means but also invokes his emotions and even imagination. The bond or tie standing there is not something numerical or proper for statistical conclusions. He grasps all features of the situation by knowing and thus bearing the responsibility of his existence. This can be traced, as Nussbaum cites, through non-scientific perception, in other words, a practical knowing by accepting noncommensurable and nonrepeatable features of things and values, thus, welcoming also emotions and imagination.

Being responsibly committed to the world of value before her, the perceiving agent can be counted on to investigate and scrutinize the nature of each item and situation, to respond to what is there before her with full sensitivity and imaginative vigor, not to fall short of what is there to be seen and felt because of evasiveness, scientific abstractness, or a love of simplification. The Aristotelian agent is a person whom we could trust to describe a complex situation with full concreteness of detail and emotional shading, missing nothing of practical relevance.¹⁴¹

What an Aristotelian friend does in practice? Without any concern or expectation of reciprocity he needs to love his friend. He knows that his friend is unique to himself and cannot be comparable with someone else. They experience together such a distinct intimacy which has no substitute or alternative. Every friendship has its own roots, experiences and a common future. We can find that uniqueness in his answer when Montaigne replies if one asks him why he is friend with La Boétie: “Because it was he, because it was I.”

4.3 Public Sphere is a Living Space?

Where can we welcome friendship? Structurally, can we find a place on earth for it to live? If we accept the friendship with its own merits and as the way of living, Do we or are we going to give a place for it? Or shall we see it as an authentic concept that should stay in its own archaic place? If we are to open a space for it not only as a

¹⁴¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception”, *Aristotle’s Ethics, Critical Essays*, p.177

kind of private intimacy, but also as a political phenomenon, we are required to look at the existing social and political structure.

In search of a living space for such an experience and actualization, Hannah Arendt's analysis on public and private realm has some hints.

In the *Human Condition*, Arendt explains the term *Vita Activa* through a historical perspective, tracing its original meaning and stressing its changing meaning throughout time and later, underlining its deviation from its original meaning. What is *Vita Activa*? Arendt cites its original meaning as a life committed to political and public affairs.

The term *vita activa* is loaded and overloaded with tradition. It is as old as (but not older than) our tradition of political thought. And this tradition, far from comprehending and conceptualizing all the political experiences of Western mankind, grew out of a specific constellation: the trial of Socrates and the conflict between the philosophers and the *polis*. It eliminated many experiences of an earlier past that were irrelevant to its immediate political purposes and proceeded until its end, in the work of Karl Marx, in a highly selective manner. The term itself, in medieval philosophy the standard translation of the Aristotelian *bios politikos*, already occurs in Augustine, where, as *vita negotiosa or actuosa*, it still reflects its original meaning: a life devoted to public-political matters.¹⁴²

For Arendt, action is “the only activity that goes on directly between man without the intermediary of things or matter corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”¹⁴³ For Arendt, a shift in the meaning of *vita activa* from political to actively engaging in the things of the world, marks also action to be reckoned now among the necessities of earthly life, unlike the one during times of ancient city-state. What is related with *Vita Activa* is the fact that men live together and it is the only action that cannot even be

¹⁴² Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 12

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.7

imagined outside the society of men.¹⁴⁴ Thus she establishes the link between action and living together with which we can find the necessary ground to justify the *Zoon Politikon* as a Political Animal. If it is translated and interpreted as social, there is no equivalent of such a word in Greek thought and it hinders to apprehend the Greek understanding of politics within its true context. For Arendt, Aristotelian term includes only the realm of human affairs and the action, does not refer to labor or work which are seen as serving for what is necessary and useful. The thought of *Zoon Politikon* set up the very formation of city-states or polis.

Neither labor nor work was considered to possess sufficient dignity to constitute a *bios* at all, an autonomous and authentically human way of life; since they served and produced what was necessary and useful, they could not be free, independent of human needs and wants. That the political way of life escaped this verdict is due to the Greek understanding of polis life, which to them denoted a very special and freely chosen form of political organization and by no means just any form of action necessary to keep men together in an orderly fashion.¹⁴⁵

Living together as political animals by nature brings a second sphere apart from the private space for man. In this new sphere man take actions as a necessity of his political nature and forgets his personal ties. Arendt defines it as public or political realm where man actualizes his political activities as a citizen of polis.

According to Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is not only different from but stands in direct opposition to that natural association whose center is the home (*oikia*) and the family. The rise of city-state meant that man received “besides his private life a sort of second life, his *bios politikos*. Now every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinction in his life between what is his own (*idion*) and what is communal (*koinon*). It was not just an opinion or theory of Aristotle but a simple historical fact that the foundation of the polis was preceded by the destruction of all organized units resting on kinship, such as *phratria* and *phyle*. Of all the activities necessary and present in human

¹⁴⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p.22

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13

communities, only two were deemed to be political and to constitute what Aristotle called the *bios politikos*, namely action (praxis) and speech (lexis), out of which rises the realm of human affairs (ta ton anthropon pragmata, as Plato used to call it) from which everything merely necessary or useful is strictly excluded.¹⁴⁶

The separation of political realm from the household where man meets his needs and requirements out of the public sphere was the result of a political understanding that citizens of polis had experienced. Two constituents of *bios politikos*, as Arendt cites, praxis and lexis, existed in the lives of citizens of polis. No one could think of any of those as a separate entity from each other. There was togetherness of two human capacities on an equal rank. Arendt points the rise of decay through separation of the couple.

In the experience of the *polis*, which not without justification has been called the most talkative of all bodies politics, and even more in the political philosophy which sprang from it, speech and action separated and became more and more independent activities. The emphasis shifted from action to speech, and to speech as a means of persuasion rather than the specifically human way of answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or was done.¹⁴⁷

For Greek self-understanding, force or violence are pre-political ways to deal with the issues and to be political means deciding through words and persuasion. For ruling over the members of household, violence and force can be taken into account. However, the power of head of household was not as much strong as a king or tyrant, for Arendt, it was due to mutual exclusivity of absolute, uncontested rule and a political realm.¹⁴⁸

Arendt notes that the rise of “Social” comes with the emergence of the modern age and it gains its political form in the nation-state. Social has neither a public character nor a private one. It has become a political form in which all activities have been

¹⁴⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 24-25

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.28

counted in terms of economy. Activities of the household members of which meet their needs or maintain their survival as species have become national economy or social economy. Following the emergence of the modern age, the boundary between private and public realms became indistinct and social realm as a super human-family has prevailed. Arendt points that polis respected the private lives of its citizens not on a belief that the private property was something that should be respected, on the contrary, it was for the sake of political affairs which could have a place only and only under a free polis. Thus, it was the household where man was in struggle to meet the necessities for survival but it was also a condition for the freedom of the polis. In the political realm, unlike in the household, only the equals have a voice with the capacity to participate in the political activities. In the household, no one could have assumed a freedom or equality similar to the one in the political realm. Freedoms meant “not to be ruled and also not to rule”. For Arendt, the structure that divided both realms with a clear-cut opposition ended following the modern age.

In the modern world, the social and the political realms are much less distinct. That politics is nothing but a function of society, that action, speech and thought are primarily superstructures upon social interest, is not a discovery of Karl Marx but on the contrary is among the axiomatic assumptions Marx accepted uncritically from the political economists of the modern age. This functionalization makes it impossible to perceive any serious gulf between the two realms; and this is not a matter of theory or an ideology, since with the rise of society, that is, the rise of household (oikia) or of economic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a “collective” concern. In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself.¹⁴⁹

Arendt suggests that in Ancient Greek, mastering necessities of life in the household was a prerequisite for life and also for “good life”. On the other hand, the political activities in ancient time were not for survival but household life was for the sake of “good life” in the polis.

¹⁴⁹ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 33

The rise of the social has drastically changed the perception of action. Action which was excluded from the household in ancient times is now excluded also from the social realm. What social realm expects from its members, specifically, from its individuals is nothing but a certain kind of behavior which does not allow them to experience and actualize their differences; in other words, leaving no place for them to live their individuality with their distinct features and characters. Individual participation in the social realm should follow some set of unified rules of the social in order to be normalized. For Arendt, what comes after social realm is emergence of the mass society which absorbs various social groups as what family units had suffered earlier. It is the society that dissolved the public realm and individuals are used to experiencing their differences as their private matters. It can be summarized as the rise of behavior and decline of action. At the same time it is the rise of social realm at the expense of political or public realm which, for Arendt, was reserved for individuality in the past.

It is the same conformism, the assumption that men behave and do not act with respect to each other, that lies at the roof of the modern science of economics, whose birth coincided with the rise of society and which, together with its chief technical tool, statistics, became the social science par excellence. Economics- until the modern age a not too important part of ethics and politics and based on the assumption that men act with respect to their economic activities as they act in every other respect- could achieve a scientific character only when men had become social beings and unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior, so that those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be asocial or abnormal.¹⁵⁰

Economization of all activities in the community through statistical data inevitably leads to defining those activities in terms of laboring which is merely seen as an activity to sustain a life. It is a kind of transformation from modern communities into a society of laborers and jobholders.

Arendt's analysis regarding replacement of public realm with social one signifies also parallel changes in daily life of individuals. In a world where all kinds of

¹⁵⁰ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 41-42

activities are defined in terms of economic variables, individuals would also, with no doubt, act or behave accordingly. Social realm covering all activities of its members and leaving them to live their differences, together with their actions and speech as Arendt cites, only in their private places, will defy any intimacy in its realm. Here, once more we can note Nussbaum's thesis regarding failure of scientific approach to comprehend all dimensions of human being when trying to make a choice. As Nussbaum cites, current scientific reasoning limits practical rationality within its own technical terms. Man makes his or her choices not taking into account of emotions or even desires but solely through empiric and "scientific" ways. Plural and incommensurable values are reduced to one value: maximization of economic activities. On the other hand, within the context of Arendt's discourse, we lost our capacity for action and even speech in the public, "social" with its recent name. Nussbaum's stress on noncommensurability and pluralism coincide with Arendt's argument on the decline of public realm pushing all the political aspirations for revealing itself and the distinct characters of individuality, once predominant in lives of citizens in ancient times, into the realm of private and intimate. The following quotation from Arendt explains much vigorously the situation in which how individuals are to react:

If the sameness of the object can no longer be discerned, no common nature of men, least of all the unnatural conformism of a mass society, can prevent the destruction of the common world, which is usually receded by the destruction of the many aspects in which it presents to human plurality. This can be happen under conditions of radical isolation, where nobody can any longer agree with anybody else, as is usually the case in tyrannies. But it may also happen under conditions of mass society or mass hysteria, where we see all people suddenly behave as though they were members of one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of his neighbor. In both instances, men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come

when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective.¹⁵¹

Regarding the place and value of civic friendship in society, Aristotle and Arendt confronts in some respects. Aristotle, while mentioning the binding aspect of friendship in polis, set the conditions in advance. The private and the public realms, even the permeability between the two domains were limited to the extent one freed from the necessities of life. He who can leave the household participates in the political affairs or the activities of the public realm. Further, Aristotle did not need to question presence of an appropriate place for friendship. He had the polis in which political realm had its own space for friendship. Aristotelian friendship already occupies a place in the political realm. However, this cannot be applied to Arendt's case. Martha E. Stortz, in "Geographies of Friendship: Arendt and Aristotle", claims that Arendt seeks creation of a public realm; actually it is a new sphere created by the men of action and speech. She defines it as Arendt's attempt to re-create public space and says "She cannot assume it; the world must be created in the frank exchange of words."¹⁵² Actually, Arendt owes something to Ancient Greek understanding. It can be said that she brings Aristotle's assuming world to the fore with action and speech, thus takes over the responsibility of citizens in polis for today's action and speech. Stortz stresses in her article Arendt's struggle for achieving that, citing "For Arendt the burden of civic friendship was commitment to uneasy exchange, where one had to stand by action with revelatory speech."

For Stortz, Arendt's attitude toward civic friendship is nothing but practices. Arendt does not define friendship in terms of "context-dependent characteristics".¹⁵³

Rather she defines civic friendship in terms of practices. These practices safeguard the public space the friendship creates. More importantly these practices were mobile. They moved around, as

¹⁵¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 58

¹⁵² Martha E. Stortz, "Geographies of Friendship: Arendt and Aristotle", *Dialog: A Journal of Theology*, 228

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.229

the public space speech and action created shifted, vanished, reconstellated.¹⁵⁴

Arendt's words and arguments seem more promising. For her, friendship can be a starting point. Such a process will not be directed from top to bottom but it will be in parallel. Rather than generalizations, particulars and distinct experiences contribute to the universal aspect of being human. Establishment of intimacy between individuals, retaining speech and action among civic friends enable a more cogent ground for the re-creation of a public space for individuals who have been denied that.

At that point, forgiveness and promise making together with fortitude that Arendt mentions as an authentic attitude safeguard the public space created by friendship. Stotz defines Arendt's challenge as:

Arendt recognized the struggle to be human as changing creatures in a changing world. We swim against the unpredictability of our characters and the irreversibility of our actions, which may have consequences we would never have foreseen. The practice of promise-making protects the public space against unpredictability. Promises ensure that one will be the same today as yesterday. The practice of forgiveness safeguards public space against irreversibility. Love inspires forgiveness in private relationships but in the civic, respect motivates forgiveness. At this point, Arendt recalls Aristotle and his discussion of this key characteristic of civic friendship, but importantly she enacts that characteristic in concrete practices of promise-making and forgiveness.¹⁵⁵

Friendship as an authentic way of living can be a political tool for resistance and struggle against oblivion of the fact that once man had the right to be individual in the public sphere with all his potentiality. Friendship can be leverage as a strategy of resistance for people who denied public space and visibility, as Stotz describes Arendt's stand accordingly.

¹⁵⁴ Martha E. Stotz, "Geographies of Friendship: Arendt and Aristotle", *Dialog: A Journal of Theology*, p. 229

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.229

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We have hitherto analyzed the evolution of the meaning of *philia* in the Ancient Greek and later explained and discussed its features in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. We have seen that *philia* has a more general meaning for Ancient Greek, penetrating into the all segments of society as a binding tie which for modern perspective is something difficult to apprehend. It means more than a private intimacy, not only functioning as guidance for private relations of polis members but also embodying a political structure rules and norms of which conduct daily activities. It is clear that Aristotelian friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* pursues a political life that members of the body come together for a common good and act wisely. The *Nicomachean Ethics* neither asserts a theoretical perspective which results in creation of a utopic world nor explores the subject solely in a practical point of view relying on personal experiences. It is not a projection deriving from untested propositions. It is neither based on generalization nor private experiences of individuals. Furthermore, Aristotelian friendship advocates praxis. *Philia* is not something you can win or obtain by chance but you should make effort and need time to become a friend. It is not a high value in a bell jar but something real that is possible in a life whose subjects are required to come together and share their happiness, sorrows and caring for each other. All they have got is their lives. Their awareness of the existing equality in their relationship makes it a more valuable experience for them.

Aristotelian friendship does not pursue an egoistic attitude which is based on self-love of the ordinary kind. When Aristotle says one should love himself first, he claims seeking the noble in himself. Aristotelian friends are pursuer of what is good. There is a good and a bad form of self-love. So, it requires a proper view of self-love. For sharing activities there is a need of at least two individuals who are self-sufficient in themselves and have the capacity to be good men. It is not totally an

altruistic self which denies itself and bestows for other self endlessly. Rather, it is the state where self and other-self come together and share experiences. Friendship can be seen as a meeting point. They do not need justice because there is no need for justice if there is friendship. It has its own mechanism and mutually agreed norms that regulate the existing relationship.

On the other hand, the nature of political friendship is one of the most controversial issues among modern commentators. Some scholars deny its possibility while others question if it is having similar features like those of virtue or pleasure friendship. It is clear that civic friendship has utilitarian motives. However Aristotle further adds that such friendship can be improved to the extent that it involves virtue and some sort of norms, resulting in a common understanding, so it can be an enduring one. Partners in utility affairs can continue to be friends if they have the same character and virtues. Consequently, political or civic friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is assumed to have the binding role that holds individuals together in the society. It represents an important dimension of citizenship as well. It is holding society as a whole, mitigating the threat of *stasis*. “Political friendship involves the practice of virtues that engender mutual respect and recognition, and aims at consensual agreement or concord between rulers and the ruled about the fundamental terms of their cooperation.”¹⁵⁶ It is something different than the politicized alliance that is based on *pleonexia*. Political friendship, in that sense, is a partnership in virtue characterized by mutually recognized and reciprocated goodwill.¹⁵⁷ It is a system of relations in which virtues along with justice and equality prevail.

Aristotelian friendship also supports diversity and particularity. It does not pursue homogeneity in identity, interest, status or worldviews. It presupposes pluralism.¹⁵⁸ It is based on mutual recognition and also self-respect, not seeking domination and denying exploitation of vulnerabilities of others.

¹⁵⁶ Catherine Lu, “Political Friendship Among Peoples”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, p. 41

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.46

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.47

Today's liberal individual is surrounded with and defined by the instruments of economy and friendship is denied access to public realm. (Modern individuals are living nowhere, defined as only consumers and this is something not perceptible or understandable for members of polis.) Friendship of virtue or goodness has been restricted to the private life of the individual. In that sense, in MacIntyre's saying, social aspect of friendship has lost its ancient forms.¹⁵⁹

It can be argued that neither Aristotle's attempt to remove conflict in his homogenous polis, nor the moral pluralism of the modern world, as defined by MacIntyre, can alone be adequate to understand formation of friendship either as a private relationship or as a communal action in modern political society. It requires further contemplation due to very subtle nature of the subject. However, it is clear that Aristotle's discussion of friendship and his rendering of it for politics, have a certain degree of importance as regards its disclosure and its penetration into the society. Aristotle's suggestion about the binding role of friendship with its features of mutual goodwill and concord as well as "intrinsic" characteristics of justice and equality may bring an insight to think about the possible contributions of friendship to our personal and political relations. If one is still to question friendship as a binding agent in the public sphere then he has to take the arduous task of questioning the *Zoon Politikon* as well.

Thinking on the possibility of friendship once experienced in polis will continue to be one of the prevailing philosophical issues. Do we have the capability of endurance to live together despite potential conflicts among friends in modern world? If my friend is the other-self and mirror of me then how will I look at the reflection from the mirror? Encountering with the other-self, in fact, embraces praxis and it leads us to deliberate on our actions in the private and political realms. By reminding the fact stressed by Arendt, "men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world", this issue will, with no doubt, continue to be a question in man's mind for his living sphere.

¹⁵⁹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p.156

It is clear that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* seems to lead more questions than giving answers. Due to nature of the Books, the subject matter is treated in a rather subtle manner. However, even with its subtle nature it has potentials to prompt exploring the features of and motives for *philia*. Notably these questions will promote further in-depth insight into the issue rather than making it more complicated.

Aristotelian friendship can broaden the modern individual's horizon to alleviate the impasse he faces with in his personal and political actions. Arendt's stance on the role of friendship in the public sphere and the role of *political animal* along with Nussbaum's approach based on particularity and noncommensurability can be regarded as substantial tools in creating a living space for Aristotelian friendship in modern world.

Last but not least, Aristotle's friendship reflects also its own particularity. He was not a citizen of polis. Nevertheless he was a friend of Macedon and after moving to Assos where he met Hermeias— the local ruler known with his Macedonian sympathy— he stayed there for three years. The bond between Aristotle and Hermeias developed there. Aristotle was invited later to be tutor of the young Alexander, son of King Philip, one year before Hermeias was captured and tortured to death by the Persians.¹⁶⁰ Affected by that tragic end, Aristotle had a monument erected for him at Delphi and also composed a poem. The hymn which resembles a friendship written by Aristotle in honor of Hermeias may help us in our worldly exercise of understanding "*philia*" as the greatest of external goods:

*O Virtue, won by earnest strife,
And holding out the noblest prize
That ever gilded earthly life,
Or drew it on to seek the skies;
For thee what son of Greece would not
Deem it an enviable lot,
To live the life, to die the death
That fears no weary hour, shrinks from no fiery breath?*

¹⁶⁰ W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle*, p.124

*Such fruit hast thou of heavenly bloom,
A lure more rich than golden heap,
More tempting than the joys of home,
More bland than spell of soft-eyed sleep.
For thee Alcides, son of Jove,
And the twin boys of Leda strove,
With patient toil and sinewy might,
Thy glorious prize to grasp, to reach thy lofty height.*

*Achilles, Ajax, for thy love
Descended to the realms of night;
Atarneus' King thy vision drove,
To quit for aye the glad sun-light,
Therefore, to memory's daughters dear,
His deathless name, his pure career,
Live shrined in song, and link'd with awe,
The awe of Xenian Jove, and faithful friendship's law.
161*

¹⁶¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermias_of_Atarneus , 22.10.2011

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