TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THEIR OTHERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVES ABOUT GREEK CYPRIOTS AND
TURKIYELILER

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' in relation to Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* in the framework of struggling political discourses proposing conflicting identities to the population in the northern part of Cyprus. Purpose of the study is to understand dominant elements in self-representations of 'native' Turkish Cypriots in the context of relatively new reality, namely, the partition of the island and immigration from Turkey. In other words, this study focuses on images of 'Turkish Cypriots' and of their 'Others'- Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler*- in popular discourse.

For the purpose of understanding the self-perception of identity among 'native' Turkish Cypriots, in-depth interviews were conducted in different cities of the northern part of the island. As a result of analyses of these narratives, the relational and precarious nature of identificatory practice is pointed. Moreover, problems relating to dominant perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' marked with hierarchical exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* is stressed. It is concluded that popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' signals the fact that, more than opening space for a transnational attachment, Cyprus-centered identity fosters exclusivist approach towards *Türkiyeli* 'Other'.

Keywords: Identity, Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Türkiyeliler, Exclusion

ÖZ

KIBRISLI TÜRKLER VE ÖTEKİLERİ:
KIBRISLI RUMLAR VE TÜRKİYELİLER HAKKINDAKİ ANLATILARIN
ANALİZİ

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Bu tez Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türkiyelilere ilişkin olarak popüler algıdaki 'Kıbrıslı Türklüğü', Kıbrıs'ın kuzeyindeki nüfusa çatışan kimlikler sunan politik söylemler çerçevesinde inceler. Bu çalışmanın amacı 'yerli' Kıbrıslı Türker'in görece yeni bir gerçeklik- yani adanın bölünmesi ve Türkiye'den göç- bağlamında kendi sunumlarındaki baskın öğelerin anlaşılmasıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, bu çalışma 'Kıbrıslı Türklerin' ve onların 'Ötekilerinin'- Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türkiyelilerin- popüler söylemdeki imajları üzerine odaklanır.

'Yerli' Kıbrıslı Türklerin kendi kimlik algılarını anlamak amacıyla, adanın kuzeyindeki farklı şehirlerde derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Bu anlatıların analizi sonucunda, kimliklenme pratiğinin doğasındaki ilişkisellik ve kararsızlık işaret edilmiştir. Ayrıca, baskın 'Kıbrıslı Türklük' algısının Türkiyelilerin hiyerarşik dışlanmasıyla göze çarpan sorunları vurgulanmıştır. Popüler algıdaki 'Kıbrıslı Türklüğün' Kıbrıs-merkezli kimliğin, ulus üstü bağlılığa yer açmaktan fazla, Türkiyeli 'Ötekiye' karşı dışlayıcı yaklaşımı beslediği gerçeğini işaret ettiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, Kıbrıslı Türk, Kıbrıslı Rum, Türkiyeliler, Dışlama

To My Dear Family…

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This study focuses on recent identification patterns of 'native' Turkish Cypriots in northern part of Cyprus and endeavors to uncover dominant elements in self-representations of the group under focus. To make it clear, this study concentrates on popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' in the face of struggling political discourses proposing conflicting identities to the population in the northern part of Cyprus. With the presumption that identity is a relational concept which inevitably necessitates 'Other(s)' by which the uniqueness of particular collective identity is delineated, the recent narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity is elaborated in relation to its 'Others': Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler*[*]. In other words, this study is also an analysis of the images of Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* in popular perception, both of whom are *sine qua non* for grasping recent self-perception of the group under focus.

Taking historical background of the island marked with the interethnic struggle between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and the recent political mobilization on the grounds of the Annan settlement plan into account, it seems evident that Greek Cypriot community have a particular role in the narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity. However, the main focus of this thesis will be the image of *Türkiyeliler* and the narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler*. That is to say, it will be argued that '*Türkiyeliler*' is the relatively recent 'Other' in the narratives of 'Turkish Cypriots', thus; it is believed that the image of *Türkiyeliler* and depiction of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler* necessitate elaborate discussion. Thence, aforementioned topic is the

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[*] In this study, population immigrated to northern part of Cyprus from Turkey within different periods will be named as Türkiyeliler (people of Turkey) as this banner is commonly used in popular discourse for referring aforementioned group.

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main problem to be investigated in this study. Nevertheless, without an analysis of narratives of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots, it is not possible to fully grasp Turkish Cypriot identity in popular perception, moreover; the contextual changes in representations about this collective identity can not be delineated. Otherwise stated, this study focuses on sense of belongingness of 'ordinary' people in the northern part of the island in the face of relatively new reality which, apart from other things, is marked with the partition of island and the entrance of new 'Other'- *Türkiyeliler*- into the everyday lives of individuals dwelling in northern part of Cyprus. However, without taking social, political and economic conditions of the northern part into account, the study on self-perceptions of 'ordinary' individuals would be inadequate. Thus, the political struggle on identity, migration movements into the island, and the political and economic significance of migrations will briefly be delineated in this study.

The political struggle in the northern part of the island, apart from other things, has been a struggle of different identity projects. Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, which had been the dominant and official ideology until the recent political mobilization and governmental change, has based its discursive struggle on Turkishness of the population now living in the northern part of the island and has perceived the two communities of island as 'Turks of Cyprus' and 'Greeks of Cyprus'. In this perception, the Turks of 'babyland' Cyprus have turn their faces to their protector, 'motherland' Turkey, and there is nothing 'Cypriot' in the island that would be perceived as the common bond between Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. Thence, the project about future is clear: integration of 'babyland' with 'motherland' and the perpetuation of partition in the island. In the face of negation of any attachment to Cyprus and reduction of the population under focus to Turkish national identity, perpetuation of partition in the island, 'baby' status of Turkish Cypriots, and continuously increasing 'new' TRNC citizens migrated from Turkey, the opposition to Turkish nationalist discourse has been crystallized with the emphasis on Cypriotness of the communities of the island. That is to say, the left in northern part of Cyprus has identified itself with the project of 'Cypriotness' that puts attachment to the island of Cyprus to the center. As such, rather than the opposites, Turkish and Greek Cypriots have been perceived as two communities of island sharing common

transnational Cypriot identity, common past and culture. In this vein, rather than super harmony between the members of motherland and baby land, the uniqueness and difference of Turkish Cypriots is emphasized. Thence, rather than integration with Turkey or partition of the island, the target has been the peaceful coexistence of islanders- which was destroyed as a result of Greek and Turkish nationalism- under a federated state. In this alternative proposal of identity that is based on Cypriotness, the border between insiders and outsiders has not been constituted for Greek Cypriots who are depicted as the enemy by nationalist discourse, but for those 'non-Cypriots' that, apart from other things, have been perceived as the symbols of Turkey's intervention and of Turkish nationalist rule in the island. Otherwise stated, it is now *Türkiyeliler* rather than 'Greeks of Cyprus' who have remained outside the border of identity.

In this framework of discursive struggle on definition of the identity of population under focus, immigration from Turkey, and of recent political developments in relation to so called 'Cyprus problem'- political movement on the grounds of Annan Plan, the 'opening of borders' between northern and southern parts of the island and Greek Cypriot 'no' and Turkish Cypriot 'yes' vote in the referendum- it would be significant to focus on the images of Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* in popular representation of Turkish Cypriot identity. By analyzing 'Turkish Cypriotness' in popular perception, it is believed that both the precarious and relational nature of identification and the problems relating to Cyprus-centered identity project would be delineated. In other words, in this study I will try to shed light on unsteadiness at the center of identificatory practice illustrated with Turkish Cypriot identity in popular discourse. Additionally, and more importantly, by focusing on the popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness', the underlying aim of the study at hand is grasping the problems of 'Cypriotness' which is proposed as a transnational identity.

1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature directly concentrating on Turkish Cypriot identity by analyzing the self-perceptions of the members of this collectivity is very limited. In fact, except some

short articles focusing on the issue, there is no theoretical work which directly discusses the construction of Turkish Cypriot identity in popular discourse and the self-images of members of this community. Moreover, the general tendency displays itself with the analysis of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots. In other words, whether critical or defender, in most of the cases, the 'Other' of Turkish Cypriot identity is taken solely as its Greek Cypriot counterpart, and the role of *Türkiyeliler* in the island in the narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity is neglected. However, some of the more contemporary studies mention the role of *Türkiyeliler* in the self-perceptions of 'ingenious' population. At this point, I will make a brief look into the literature on Turkish Cypriot identity.

In his book "Kıbrıslı Türklerin Kimliği", Nesim defines identity as the totality of permanent characteristics of community's "historical, political, societal and cultural elements."[1] As such, he claims that the identity of Turkish Cypriot people could be understood by focusing on their historical and cultural roots, which have been closely linked with the Turkish history and culture. Moreover, he claims that the main elements of Turkish Cypriot identity are "language, religion, societal values and family structure."[2] At this juncture, Nesim comes to the conclusion that the "essential-culture" of Turkish Cypriots- which is depicted as the basis of this particular identity- is the Turkish culture formed in Cyprus. Differently put, it is stated that identity of Turkish Cypriot community is based on its culture which is the "sub-culture of motherland Turkey".[3] Therefore, in Nesim's point of view, the identity of Turkish Cypriots has been predominantly linked with Turkish culture and history, while 'Cypriotness' designates merely a contingent geographical belonging and "street-culture"[4] which is totally complementary and contributing to the improvement of the former. Finally, Nesim depicts Greek Cypriots as the 'Other' of Turkish Cypriot identity with emphasizing that Greek Cypriot identity and culture are completely different and opposite of its Turkish counterpart. Conceptualizing identity as a permanent entity that is rooted in history and culture,

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[1] A. Nesim, *Kıbrıslı Türklerin Kimliği,* (KKTC Milli Eğitim ve Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), 146.

[2] A. Nesim, 1990, 123.

[3] A. Nesim, 1990, 124.

[4] A. Nesim, 1990, 141.

and investigating the aspects of identity through focusing on its primordial characteristics, Nesim's discussion on Turkish Cypriot identity have several problematic points. First of all, as Nesim has an essentialist perception of identity and since he focuses on so called permanent elements in order to grasp the Turkish Cypriot identity, his discussion could not give account on constructed, transforming and contextual character of identity. Moreover, since he *a priori* adopts the premises of long lasting official Turkish nationalist discourse marked with the claim that Turkish Cypriots are the members of great Turkish family and that they are in a complete harmony with the Turkish national group, Nesim could not discuss the discrepancy between aforementioned discourse and the narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity in everyday lives of 'ordinary' people.

In his social-psychological studies, Volkan tries to grasp the main themes to which Turkish Cypriots attach themselves in their identification process. Accordingly, it is claimed that Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people perceived each other as the mirror images of themselves before their physical separation and that this perception persists also after the separation of these communities into different geographical locations. As such, it is claimed that Greek Cypriots have been the 'Other' of Turkish Cypriot identity as they have been signified the 'all-bad' for Turkish Cypriots.[5] In Volkan's words, "Cypriot Turks make Cypriot Greeks the target of their externalization of 'all bad' self- and object representations. Such an externalization permits the Turks to keep for their kind 'all good' constellations in rather cohesive way"[6]. Writing shortly after the intercommunal killings and physical separation of two communities in the island, Volkan adds that the themes of loss, humiliation and enclavement constitute the main points of Turkish Cypriot self perception. Similarly, in his later work in 1998, Volkan states that because loss and humiliation during the period of 1963-1968 has become the part of Turkish Cypriot identity, the community still perceives itself as 'underdog' and the

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[5] V. Volkan, *Cyprus War and Adaptations: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979) , 11.

[6] V. Volkan , 1979, 63.

predominant 'Other' of the identity is still its Greek Cypriot counterpart.[7] Though he does not give any account of them in the later work, in his early work Volkan also mentions *Türkiyeli* immigrants whose settlement was newly started at that time. At this point, he states that with their less Westernized life style these people had different culture, and that some Turkish people talk about their provincial notions and peasant dress among themselves. Nonetheless, he says that "it would be a grave mistake, however, to think of the Cypriot Turks as in any way denying their blood brotherhood with other Turks"[8]. Indeed, Volkan's conceptualization of Turkish identity is not totally unacceptable. That is, for the time being when Turkish Cypriots lived in enclaves and aftermath of intercommunal killings, it is true that Greek Cypriots was the mirror image of Turkish Cypriot identification. What is more, I agree that the themes of loss and humiliation were the main shared experience connecting Turkish Cypriots together and constituting the dominant element of their identity. However, it should be problematized whether these themes are still the main elements that Turkish Cypriots attach themselves. In other words, it should be asked whether Turkish Cypriots today still perceive themselves solely as underdog and victim, or whether they perceive themselves as superior to some other groups, such as to *Türkiyeliler*. In fact, Volkan himself gives a clue about the answer of this question when he defines *Türkiyeli* immigrants as 'less Westerized', nevertheless, he does not conclude his work with conceptualization of *Türkiyeliler* as the second 'Other' of Turkish Cypriot identity.

Through a critical perspective, Kızılyürek and Gauter- Kızılyürek analyze the identity formation of Turkish Cypriot community before 1974, and mention the afterwards process of transformation in the identity perceptions marked with the resistance against the neglect of Cypriotness in official discourse. It is claimed that ruling group in Turkish Cypriot community identified itself with Turkey and have developed policies emphasizing Turkish roots of this community starting with the establishment of Turkish nation-state. Therefore, it is stated that the basis of Turkish Cypriot identity was identification with Turkey until the division of island in 1974.

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[7] V. Volkan, Turks and Greeks of Cyprus: Psychopolitical Considerations. In *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable* edited by Vangelis Calotychos, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 281-283.

[8] V. Volkan, 1979, p.143

Yet, it is stressed that this picture has started to change after the division and Turkish Cypriots began to define Cyprus itself as their homeland. At this point, it is asserted that such factors as economic, political and social problems Turkish Cypriots have been faced with; Turkey's interference in Turkish Cypriot affairs; and threat of becoming minority as a result of population transfer from Turkey all contributed to identification of Turkish Cypriots with Cyprus rather than with Turkey.[9] Despite their illuminating accounts on the nationalist discursive practices aiming at identification with 'motherland' Turkey, and although they point out the resistance against the official discourse that displays itself with identification with Cyprus as the 'motherland', Kızılyürek and Gauter- Kızılyürek do not focus on the manner of differentiation from Turkish identity, and they do not ask whether this resistance itself reproduces nationalist ideology. Since this kind of problem is ignored, they give an inadequate picture of the recent Turkish Cypriot identification patterns.

Focusing on turkishCypriot (Kıbrıslıtürk) subject position, Derya defines 'turkishCypriotness' as a liminal position between the excesses of two prevailing discourses: Greek Cypriot official discourse of 'Cypriotness' that proposes totalized and homogeneous Cypriot identity (with the excess of 'Turkishness'), and Turkish nationalist discourse of 'Turkishness' that premises a monolithic Turkish identity (with the excess of 'Cypriotness'). Hence, it is stressed that 'turkishCypriotness' signifies unrepresentable liminal position between excess of 'Turkishness' that is absent in Cypriot identity and the 'Cypriotness' which is absent in Turkish identity.[10] The reason behind conceptualization of 'turkishCypriotness' as a liminality, rather than identity, is perceived to be the fact that turkishCypriots define what they 'are not' according to *Türkiyeli* and Greek Cypriot 'Others' by using the identity of 'Other'. In other words, the Turkish identity is used for marking the difference from 'Cypriotness' and 'Cypriot' identity is used for the emphasis of difference from *Türkiyeliler*[11]. At this juncture, Derya indicates that this liminal

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[9] N. Kızılyürek and S. Gauter-Kızılyürek, "The Politics of Identity in the Turkish Cypriot Community and The Language Question", *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 108 (2001), 37-8.

[10] D. Derya, "Cinlenmiş Özgürlüğümüz Çatlaktaki Özgünlüğümüz" *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 2 (2006): 41-42.

[11] D. Derya, 2006, 45-46.

position of turkishCypriotness opens a space for politics of difference and equality in the face of homogenizing national identities that neglect cultural differences.[12] While I agree with Derya's assertion that it is mainly through indicating difference from *Türkiyeli* and Greek Cypriot 'Others' that the population under focus represents itself, it should be emphasized that she ignores to focus on how the signifier 'difference' is filled in self-representations and on the way 'Other' is defined and represented in Turkish Cypriot narratives. In this sense, as will be delineated in this study, it is hard to propose that 'turkishCypriotness' can be perceived as a subject position searching for difference and equality, rather, exclusion and inferiorization of *Türkiyeliler* lies at the center of narratives on 'turkishCypriotness' in popular perception. As a matter of fact, it could be argued that *Türkiyeliler* in the island is the excess of 'turkishCypriotness' itself. Hence, in this depiction both the self-perception of 'turkishCypriots' and especially the image of *Türkiyeliler* remain inadequate, and the problematic features in representation of 'turkishCypriotness' persist to be neglected. Finally, it could be asserted that, when popular perception is taken into account, the search for equality with and difference from Greek Cypriots is followed by unequivocal request for difference/distinction from *Türkiyeliler*, rather than any claim for equality with the latter.

In her short article titled "De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus", Navaro-Yashin stresses that political and social conflict in northern Cyprus between native Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey are generally neglected in the literature. Referring to the interviews she conducted in late 1990s in northern Cyprus, Navaro-Yashin asserts that Turkish Cypriots express their distinction from the immigrants from Turkey by using terms that represent difference and social class. That is to say, it is indicated that narratives about *Türkiyeliler* are permeated with symbols of lifestyle, culture and class[13]. At this juncture, Navaro-Yashin emphasizes that Turkish Cypriots' resort of local cultural capital when speaking about *Türkiyeliler* is related to the fact that they could not, at least until the recent shift of governmental power, freely make political remarks about population

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[12] D. Derya,2006, 46.

[13] Y. Navaro-Yashin, "De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus" In *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict ed.* by Yiannis Papadakis (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2006), 91-92.

transfer and assimilation policy of Turkey. That is to say, it is indicated that Turkish Cypriots politicized their everyday lives and they express their resentment about Turkey's policies and about political subordination of Turkish Cypriots through symbolically charged comments about *Türkiyeliler*[14]. Therefore, she claims that Turkish Cypriots' attitude towards *Türkiyeliler* could not be analyzed in vacuum by applying concepts of 'class' and 'migration' and that the particular relationship between the two should not be confused with the one between Germans and Turkish immigrants or the one between rural immigrants and Istanbul's middle classes. Thus, she asserts that "more careful analysis would seek to study relations between Turkish Cypriots and settlers as complicated and situational points of positionality in the context of political space governed and controlled by a repressive administration and military power…Turkey's policies…are represented with the presence of settlers in northern Cyprus."[15] While I agree with Navaro-Yashin's discussion on the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular perception and with her remark that the popular narratives should not be analyzed in vacuum, I have some rejections to her assertions. First of all, as will be mentioned in the following pages, immigrations from Turkey in different periods have particular characteristics and the immigrations starting with 1990s has been marked with the influx of cheap labor into the island. Hence, taking the dominant form of recent immigrations and the image of 'latecomer' *Türkiyeliler* in popular representation into account, it could be claimed that there is a parallelism between such relationships as rural immigrants and Istanbul's middle classes and the one between aforementioned group and Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, though the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* is complicated and connected to the particular political condition of the island, it would be a mistake to claim that the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse is solely connected to repressive Turkish nationalist political rule in the northern part of the island. That is to say, as Navaro-Yashin also indicates, those supporting Turkish nationalist rule and integrationalist regime also generally have similar approach towards *Türkiyeliler* in their narratives, thus; it is hard to claim that the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse is solely connected with the latter's symbolic role in Turkey's intervention. Finally, the hierarchical division of

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[14] Y. Navaro-Yashin, 2006, 92-94.

[15] Y. Navaro-Yashin, 2006, 93.

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Türkiyeliler in popular perception that would be indicated in following pages, makes the analyst to ask whether the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* is related to political condition of the island or there are some other criteria in marking the 'distinction' of Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler*. Therefore, it should be claimed that concepts of 'class' and 'migration' could not be used in a vacuum for the analysis at hand, however; the discussion about self-perceptions of Turkish Cypriots in relation to *Türkiyeliler* and the image of the latter will be inadequate without mentioning the aforementioned concepts.

Finally, in their respective articles Alankuş-Kural, Erhürman and Ramm all touch upon recent Turkish Cypriot identity marked with the emphasis on 'Cypriotness' and differentiation from *Türkiyeliler* in a hierarchical manner. As such, Alankuş-Kural claims that as opposed to official policies strengthening 'Turkishness' of the Turkish Cypriot community, after physical coexistence with *Türkiyeliler* that reminded the ingenious population its 'Cypriotness', Turkish Cypriots have started to perceive *Türkiyeli* immigrants as the 'Other' in their everyday lives. In her words, "Turkish people who were seen as *close relatives in the distance* until that time…has become to be perceived as *distant relatives in the near* or…even as the foreigners."[16] In a similar vein, focusing on Cypriot identity project of the Left Erhürman claims that the Left's internationalist approach towards Greek Cypriots is conjoined with emphasis on outsider position of *Türkiyeliler*. At this juncture, he emphasizes that the Left neglects homogeneous categorization of *Türkiyeliler* as the carriers of inferior or unacceptable characteristics in popular representations of Cypriotness. As such, Erhürman asserts that in its search for Cyprus-centered identity project, Turkish Cypriot Left is faced with the problem of fostering the 'othering' of *Türkiyeliler*.[17] Finally, in his discussion on construction and re-negotiation of identity within the Turkish Cypriot community, Ramm analyzes Cypriotist discourse and popular narratives on identity in this particular collectivity. Accordingly, Ramm stresses that *Türkiyeliler* in the island are perceived to be the 'Other' of Turkish Cypriot identity and that Cypriotist identity discourse reveals an

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[16] S. Alankuş-Kural, "Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Kıbrıslı Türk Kimliği," *Birikim* 77, (1995): 32.

[17] T. Erhürman, "Kıbrıs Türk Solunda Kıbrıs Merkezli Kimlik Arayışları, Ötekiler ve İnsan Hakları", *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 3-4 (2006): 101-103.

exclusionary potential in spite of its transnational orientation[18]. The standpoint of aforementioned scholars significantly resembles to my conceptualization of recent Turkish Cypriot identification patterns and their works would be perceived as starting point in the analysis of current Turkish Cypriot identity formation. Yet, as aforementioned works are not extensive or exhaustive, more detailed discussion and analysis is a requirement. This is what I will endeavor to do in this thesis.

1.3. THE RESEARCH METHOD AND GENERAL INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS

With an objective of understanding the self-perception of identity among Turkish Cypriots living in northern part of the island and uncovering the image of 'Others' in the narratives on this particular identity, this study is based on in-depth interviews as the method of analysis. The interviews were conducted between June 2007 and December 2007 with 33 'native' Turkish Cypriots in different regions of the northern part. That is to say, the group with whom interviews were conducted includes those who are sometimes referred to as the 'original' Turkish Cypriots. In other words, the label 'Turkish Cypriot' is used very restrictively and I made a 'distinction' between 'the original' Turkish Cypriots and '*Türkiyeliler*' (or between the 'residents' and the 'settlers' as conceptualized in the literature) in selection of interviewees. In fact, focusing on such target group itself is very problematic excluding considerable number of people living in Cyprus from the analysis. Additionally, this kind of selection, which is focusing on the origins and selection according to genesis, is itself one of the main criticisms of this study. Nevertheless, in order to display the problem that I want to take attention, I used a method of selection whose very mechanism is the one I want to criticize.

The interviews were made in four cities of the northern part: Famagusta, Nicosia, Kyrenia and Guzelyurt (Morphou). The dispersal of interviews according to regions is this: 11 from Famagusta, 8 from Nicosia, 8 from Kyrenia and 6 from Guzelyurt (Morphou). The interviews were conducted either at interviewee's houses- 23 of

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[18] C. Ramm, "Assessing Transnational Re-negotiation in the Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Community: 'Cyprus Donkeys', 'Black Beards' and the 'EU Carrot'" , Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6 (2006): 534-539.

them- or at their occupational places- 10 of them. The interviews were recorded by a tape recorder with the permission of interview participants and the duration of interviews ranged from 30 to 120 minutes. However, the names used in this study are not the real names of participants since the interviews were conducted with this condition. Moreover, it should be stressed that I reach all of the interviewees with somebody's reference- from my extended family or friend circle. The reason behind this is the fact that all of my random trials for interview have failed. This also clarifies why participants from Famagusta constitutes the majority in comparison to other regions.

One of the criteria in selection of interviewee was age. That is to say, it was planned to make interviews with especially two age groups: one consisting of people having been spending all/most of their lives after the partition of the island, and the other consisting people who had first-hand experience of living in ethnically heterogeneous state and of the ethnic struggle. As such, the ages of interview participants range from 19 to 69 and the average age of the interview participants is 40, 6. The dispersal of participants according to aforementioned age-groups is almost half and half.

Though it was planned to conduct half of the interviews with women, only 12 of the informants are women as considerable number of women I asked for interview rejected me and suggested their husbands or fathers for the interview. The gender dispersal according to cities is this: 3 women and 8 men from Famagusta, 3 women and 5 men from Nicosia, 4 women and 4 men from Kyrenia, 2 women and 4 men from Morphou. Apart from this, it was planned to select interviewees from different socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Although it is still possible to claim that there is some variety in socio-economic and educational backgrounds of participants within each region, this could not exactly be done. To make it clear, in line with the particular condition of the northern part marked with the relatively high number of people having high school or university education and being from the 'middle class', vast majority of the informants are broadly from aforementioned socio-economic strata. However, as the banner 'middle class' itself is a broad term enclosing quite various socioeconomic positionalities and since informants' were

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selected from different occupational and educational backgrounds within each region, it is still possible to claim that there is some variety in participants' socio-economic backgrounds. In different parts of the study, the occupational and educational backgrounds of participants will be mentioned. Moreover, the information about each participant's occupation and education is given in the appendix which would give some clues about informants' socio-economic status.

The sample of interview questions was outlined before the research in order to achieve some coherence between interviews. Most of the questions were mainly related to popularly voiced expressions in the northern part of the island- such as 'we slept when the doors were open in old times' or 'Gavurdan dost domuzdan post olmaz'- or some popularly known mottos like 'we become minority in our own country' or else, some cliché questions that participants thought to be heard before, like 'do Cypriots not love *Türkiyeliler*?', were asked. Otherwise stated, the questions were generally formulated in such a way that participants have had some acquaintance before I asked in the interview.

As a final note on interviews, I should indicate some of my observations. In most of the cases, I realized that I won participants' confidence. The reason behind this is not only the fact that I had a reference, or that I would not release their names, but also because of the fact that my dialect, origin, and outlook are similar to participants', thus; they perceive me as a member of collectivity they attach themselves. I believe that my 'Turkish Cypriotness' has a very crucial role in the results of this research, since it made participants to feel themselves more 'relaxed' in their expressions especially about *Türkiyeliler*. However, it should also be noted that there were exceptions to aforementioned creation of a trustful atmosphere. As an illustration, Cemal who first and foremost defined himself as Turkish and criticized those differentiating *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish Cypriots and stressed the harmonious relationship between the two, surprised me when I was preparing to leave his occupational place. That is to say, one of the *Türkiyeli* customers of Cemal forgot to close the door when s/he left the store, Cemal got angry and shouted "ignorant Turks, you do not have any idea even about air conditioning." As will be indicated in the following chapters, such an image of *Türkiyeliler* is dominant

perception in popular discourse, but until the end of the interview Cemal did not give any clue about such a perception. Finally, it should be emphasized that the sense of belongingness of participants is much more ambivalent than the one that will be depicted in this study. Differently put, though elaborating the dominant elements in self-perceptions of participants and analyzing the manner of differentiation participants made between themselves and the 'Others' , the author of this thesis is aware of the fact that precariousness and inconsistency lie at the center of identification and of narratives on identity. However, it is believed that this could not prevent elaborate discussion on the subject matter.

1.4. THE PLAN OF THE THESIS

This thesis is designed as six chapters. In the second chapter, theoretical and conceptual framework of the study will be outlined. Accordingly, main approaches to nationalism; conceptualization of the term identity in the framework of post-structuralism; and Bourdieu's analysis of taste and lifestyle and the concept 'habitus' in his theory of practice will be outlined in the second chapter.

The third chapter is designed as background information for the analysis of informants' narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity. In this respect, this chapter will summarize identity projects of Turkish nationalist and Cypriotist discourses; give brief information about *Türkiyeli* immigration to the island in different periods; will introduce some of the interviewee and present the data on participants' answers to the question how they define their selves (Turkish, Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot or alternatively). Moreover, a brief evaluation of the results of aforementioned data will be made in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter will concentrate on participants' narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots. As such, this chapter will analyze self-perception of participants and the image of Greek Cypriot 'Other' in popular discourse. At this juncture, memories about the past; comparison between Turkish and Greek Cypriots' cultures and physical outlooks; participants' answers to the questions relating their trust towards Greek Cypriots and preferred relationship

between two communities; the image of Greek Cypriots before and after the allowance of entrance to 'the other side'; and participants' narratives on their own image in the eyes of Greek Cypriots will be the topics of discussion.

The fifth chapter focuses on narration of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler*. In this respect, categories of distinction from *Türkiyeliler* expressed by participants will be analyzed. By this way, both the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular perception and the self-images of participants will be delineated. Accordingly, representations of Turkish Cypriot culture and the image of *Türkiyeliler* in these narratives; the bodily image of *Türkiyeliler* and connotations of difference in relation to outlooks; social segregation; the criminal image of *Türkiyeliler*; the symbolic role of *Türkiyeliler* in political and economic realms; and the negative repercussions of Cypriot centered identity project will be discussed in the fifth chapter.

Finally, the last chapter will summarize the main arguments of this thesis and will make a general evaluation about the study.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

For an analysis of the recent identification patterns and narratives about the sense of belonging of individuals living in an island whose historical background is marked with ethno-nationalist conflict, partition and massive migration within, from, and to the island; it seems necessary to refer some theoretical tools in order to support and explain the relevant parts of the study. Therefore, this chapter elaborates the theoretical and conceptual framework of this study. In this respect, main approaches to nationalism will be summarized in the first section with a specific focus on the modernist approach on which the study at hand draws its theoretical basis. Then, conceptualization of identity in general and ethnic identity in particular would be outlined in line with post-structuralist approach in the second section. Finally, Bourdieu's analysis of taste and lifestyle, and the concept of "habitus" will be summarized in the third section with the purpose of expanding the ground of discussion on 'difference' in the narratives of identity.

2.1. THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

This section touches upon nation, 'nation-ness' and nationalism by giving a brief overview of main theoretical discussions on the subject matter. As such, after mentioning the primordialist approach, main presumptions of ethno-symbolism will be given with reference to Anthony Smith's conceptualization of emergence of nationalism, and finally the premises of some theoreticians of modernist approach will be overviewed.

One of the basic questions in nationalism debates is whether the nations and nationality are eternal, essential and ahistorical phenomena or they are theoretical constructions that are connected to the conditions of particular historical conjuncture- of modernity. Primordialist approach answers this question as such:

nations are 'as old as the history'.[19] Differently put, according to this approach, lying at the root of subsequent processes and developments, nations exist in the first order of time, thus they are 'primordial'.[20] In this sense, different versions of primordialism share the presumption that nation and nationality are essentially ahistorical and eternal phenomena[21].

In contrast to primordialist approach, Smith and other 'ethno-symbolists'- as he terms- perceive nations and nationalism as modern phenomena though having related to pre-modern ties. Accordingly, by focusing on subjective elements of ethnic and national identities, such as shared symbols, memories, myths, values and other popular, moral and emotional dimensions, ethno-symbolist approach emphasizes the link between national identities and prior ethnic ties. As such, it is indicated that the analysis of 'inner worlds' of ethnicity and nationalism reveals the influence of the pre-modern subjective elements in the emergence of nationalism[22]. In other words, according to ethno-symbolist approach the nation-formation process, as a modern phenomenon, should be perceived as reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural motifs and reconstruction of earlier ethnic sentiments, hence; it is indicated that the rise of modern nations should be placed in the context of premodern collective cultural identities[23].

Defining nations as felt lived and named human communities sharing a homeland, having common history and myths, shared public culture, common rights and duties and a single economy, Smith stresses that the distinguishing aspect of nationalist ideology is its emphasis on cultural gestation and representation[24]. While accepting the modernity of nationalism as an ideology and the recent formation of most nations, Smith stresses that premodern collective cultural

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[19] N. Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs,* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 20.

[20] A. D. Smith, Nationalism: *Theory, Ideology, History* (Malden, Mass. : Polity Press, 2001), 51.

[21] H. Yücel, "Milliyetçiliğin (Sınırlı) Dünyasından küreselleşmenin (Sınır-sız) Dünyasına Kimlik Arayışları/Tartışmaları," *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 2, (2006): 3.

[22] A.D. Smith, 2001, 57-59.

[23] A. D. Smith, 2001, 83-85.

[24] A. D. Smith, 2001, 7-13.

communities influenced and sometimes formed the basis for nations and nationalisms[25]. In fact, it is even possible to state "nations are unlikely to emerge except on the basis of prior ethnic ties"[26]. At this point, Smith indicates that the most important type of such communities is 'ethnie' which is defined as "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among elites"[27]. In other words, Smith claims that the rise of modern nations and nationalism is connected with pre-modern collectivities and he delineates a kind of continuity between national attachment and ethnic identities. However, aforementioned continuity neither would be seen as simple linear progression nor implies identicalness between ethnies and nations. Rather, it is stressed that there is a complex relationship between nations and ethnies and that there are discontinuities and ruptures in the historical record.[28]

Similar to that of continuity of certain subjective elements, it is claimed by Smith that 'daily plebiscite' of the members of national communities enables people to speak the same nation in subsequent generations. Hence, it is stressed that there might be limited transformations in certain national identities, but not a complete and radical break in the identities of nationals[29]. At this point, it would be argued that while Smith does not define nations as primordial entities, since he perceives the 'ethnies' as the *sine qua non* of nations and nationalism and as he emphasize the continuity between ethnies and nations, his conceptualization still has essentialist implications.

At this juncture, it would be meaningful to focus on discussions of some of the theoreticians of nationalism who would spuriously be gathered under modernist paradigm. The basic claim of this paradigm is that: nationalism is a product of modernity and, rather than being 'as old as the history', particular collectivity

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[25] A. D. Smith, 2001, 60.

[26] A. D. Smith,2001, 86.

[27] A. D. Smith, 2001, 13.

[28] A. D. Smith,2001, 58.

[29] A. D. Smith,2001, 20.

called as 'nation' has a relatively recent existence. Moreover, nationalism is a phenomenon brought into being as a result of entirely new set of conditions; it is an innovation rather than being a reconstruction of or an updated version of something older. As such, the nation and national attachments are perceived as designating new type of polity and completely new kind of collective identity[30]. Having mentioned the basic presumption of the paradigm, I would like to make a brief overview of the conceptualization of 'nation-ness' and nationalism within the framework of aforementioned indications, which would provide theoretical basis of nationalism presumed in this study.

Analyzing the emergence and particular aspects of nations and nationalism through historical comparison of premodern and industrial social formations, Gellner defines nationalism as "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."[31] As such, as a political principle, nationalism searches for homogeneity between presumed cultural ties and political rule. In other words, it is emphasized that nationalism is closely linked with the state rule proposing to represent the members of particular culture. As he terms, "every girl ought to have a husband, preferably of her own, and every high culture now want a state, preferably its own."[32] At this point, it is important to focus on the conditions paving way for such kind of historically novel political principle and for the emergence of nations. By this way, the peculiarity of this particular collective community would be manifested.

First of all, Gellner reminds that rather than being the awakening of a dormant force, the rise of nationalism is a very consequence of novel conditions linked with new form of social organization based on modern economy. While pre-modern agrarian societies were marked with vertical division within masses and horizontal division between the masses and the rulers, and with the latter's apathy to establish either cultural homogeneity or lateral communication at the social level, industrial

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[30] A. D. Smith, 2001, 46-47.

[31] E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford : Blackwell, 1983): 1.

[32] E. Gellner, 1983, 51.

society brought about new kind of division of labor within society that fostered the growth of nationalism:

> *[I]t has engendered a new kind of division of labor: one requiring the man taking part in it to be ready to move from one occupational position to another, even within a single life-span, and certainly between generations. They need a shared culture, a literate sophisticated high culture at that. It obliges them to be able to communicate contextlessly and with precision with all comers, in face-to-face ephemeral contacts, but also through abstract means of communication. All this- mobility, communication, size due to the refinement of specialization- imposed on the industrial order by its thirst fort he affluence and growth, obliges its social units to be large and yet culturally homogeneous[33].*

Since this complex division of labor necessitated large but culturally homogeneous social units, Gellner claims that in industrial age the presence of the state is inevitable.[34]Moreover, the basic means to achieve required cultural homogeneity is nothing but standardized and universal education under the supervision of the state. In other words, as opposed to the pre-industrial age when diversified and locally-tied cultures were prevalent and solely small number of elite people – clerisy, as he terms- had the means of literacy and 'high culture' (training-sustained culture), in industrial society it becomes a requirement to achieve homogeneity in culture which would be sustained through socialization with a monolithic education that imposes the high culture on the masses. Differently put, Gellner states that generic and standardized education- exo-socialization- have had a significant role in the production and reproduction of society proper to aforementioned relatively new epoch[35]:

> *Exo-socialization, the production and reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit, is now the norm, and must be so. The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of nationalism[36].*

As such, centrally sustained and standardized high cultures that pervade the society as a whole gave way to approximately one kind of social unit with which people willingly identify themselves. Only in this juncture, cultures turned out to be natural

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[33] E. Gellner, 1983, 140-141.

[34] E. Gellner,1983, 2.

[35] E. Gellner, 1983, 37.

[36] E. Gellner, 1983, 38.

reposit of political legitimacy and division between cultural and political units became scandal[37]. Thence, neither nations are naturally given and ahistorical entities nor nationalism would be seen as a self- evident or latent force existing throughout the history. Moreover, the latter begets nations through selective use of some of the pre-existing cultural elements, history and other inheritances of pre-nationalist era[38]. Differently put, though nationalist ideology proposes the reverse, it is not the existence of nations that produces nationalism but it is the crystallization of new units in new social conditions that stimulate the emergence of nationalism, and the latter fosters national attachments by the imposition of homogeneous high-culture sometimes through taking the pre-existing cultures and making them nations, sometimes through inventing them and often through destroying the pre-existent cultures[39].

In brief, putting a demarcating line between agrarian and industrial social formations Gellner claims that the new kind of division of labor engendered by industrialization necessitated large and culturally homogenious social units which paved the way for the prevalence of nationalism. Accordingly, through fitting people to their places within the society, exo-socialization- education proper- make masses to know 'what they are' while obliterating or transforming local attachments with the imposition of homogeneous high culture[40].

Accepting Gellner's definition of nationalism and his stress on modernity and constructed nature of nations, Hobsbawm criticizes him on the grounds that he analyzes nationalism solely from above without making an analysis from below-that is, without taking identifications, hopes, necessities and interests of ordinary people (which would not necessarily be national or nationalist) into account. For this reason, Hobsbawm indicates that while nations are constructed from above, it is impossible to understand this peculiar construction without an analysis from below. As such, he asserts three important points in relation to analysis of nationalism:

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[37] E. Gellner,1983, 55.

[38] E. Gellner, 1983, 48-55.

[39] E. Gellner, 1983, 49.

[40] E. Gellner, 1983, 37.

first, ideologies of states are not guides to how people feel; second, national identification- if exists- do not exclude other identifications in the social being and generally combination of distinct identifications constitute the identity of people, even if the former presumed to have superior status; and third, national identification can change over time, even in short periods. [41] Therefore, Hobsbawm illuminatingly emphasizes the possible discrepancy between the construction from above and its reception from below, and by this way endeavors to escape from mechanistic explanation of nationalism. Then, it would be significant to point out some determinations made by Hobsbawm in relation to the conditions of development of nationalism and its particular aspects.

While stressing that it is impossible to make a definition of 'nation' and delineate its distinguishing elements from other collectivities *a priori*, Hobsbawm perceive the development of nations to be connected with politics, technology and social transformation.[42] Differently put, Hobsawm stresses that 'nation' is not an ancient community whose elements are naturally given and would be defined *a priori*, rather it is a social entity which belongs exclusively to particular stage of technological and economic development and to historically recent period; i.e. it is a product of modernity and capitalist relations of production. Moreover, similar to Gellner, he also points out that "nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way around."[43] As such, rather than being self-evident and essential entities, nations are social artifacts, political constructions and what is peculiarly significant in their development is the social engineering and *invention* on the road to nation's construction and reproduction. That is the case, the nation-state, nationalism, national symbols, histories and all related phenomena are based on deliberate and innovative social engineering[44]. At this point, Hobsbawm states:

> *[M]odern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be opposite of*
> *novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed,*

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[41] E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality* 2.nd ed. Cambridge (England); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 11.

[42] E. J. Hobsbawm, 1992, 8-10.

[43] E. J. Hobsbawm, 1992, 10.

[44] E. J. Hobsbawm "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" in *The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm and Ranger eds,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13.

namely human communities so 'natural' as to require no definition other than self-assertion...And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern 'nation' consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as national history), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the 'invention of tradition'[45].

Hobsbawm defines the "invented tradition" as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition which implies continuity with the past."[46] As such, the invention of traditions is based on a process of ritualization and formalization that is characterized by reference to a historic past, though this reference is mainly fictitious. At this point, Hobsbawm claims that history is used by invented traditions as a cement of group cohesion and as the legitimator of action[47]. Thence, nationalism use, modify and formalize the ancient materials for the construction of past in order to prove historic continuity of the nations:

The standard example of identity culture which anchors itself to the past by means of myths dressed up as history is nationalism...For nations are historically novel entities pretending to have existed for a very long time. Inevitably the nationalist version of history consist of anachronism, omission, decontextualisation and, in extreme cases, lies to a lesser extent this is true of all forms of identity history, old and new[48].

Paying particular attention to language which is presumed to be primordial foundations of nations by nationalist discourse, Hobsbawm stresses that even national languages are practically invented semi-artificial constructions. That is, before printing and mass schooling that brought about formalized and standardized national-languages, "the actual or literal 'mother tongue', i.e. the idiom children learned from illiterate mothers and spoke for everyday use, was not in any sense a 'national language"[49]. As such, elements and symbols of national attachment are nothing but 'invented traditions' and despite their basis of legitimacy are ensured with reference to historic past, even this historical continuity is fictitious and often

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[45] E. J. Hobsbawm , "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", 1992, 14.

[46] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", 1992, 1.

[47] E. J Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", 1992, 2-12.

[48] E. J. Hobsbawm "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", 1992 , 270.

[49] E. J. Hobsbawm, 1992, 53.

has to be invented. Thus, nationalism invents national languages, national culture, national rituals and symbols, and it even invents enemies for the construction and reproduction of the national collectivities.

Apart from Hobsbawm, Anderson also agrees with Gellner that nationalism invents nations and the latter has an artificial nature. Accordingly, he indicates that nationality or 'nation-ness' as well as nationalism are cultural artifacts whose creation was linked with distillation of complex 'crossing' of disjunctional historical forces[50]. Nevertheless, Anderson directs crucial criticism against Gellner that he takes invention as 'fabrication' and 'falsity' rather than creation and imagination, therefore; he implies the possibility of 'true' communities other than nations. Anderson on the other hand, stresses that collectivities should be distinguished not by their genuineness versus falsity but by the manner in which they are imagined[51]. In this sense, Anderson define nation as "imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[52] In this vein; it would be meaningful to touch upon Anderson's expressions on the manner of imagination of this particular community and to point out the conditions paving way to this particular type of imagination.

Nations are imagined, Anderson claims, since even in the smallest national collectivities members know only a very small group within this collectivity and never meet with most of their fellow-members, yet each member has an image of their particular community in their minds. Moreover, the nation is imagined as sovereign and it is imagined within limits because even the largest nations have limited - whether they are elastic or not- borders beyond which situated other nations. As a last point, Anderson emphasizes that irrespective of the actually prevailing inequalities and exploitation, the nation is imagined as a community that presumes deep and horizontal commandership. This conceived brotherhood, he stresses, has to do with deep attachment to the nation which makes people to be

[50] B. Anderson, . *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London : Verso, 1991), 4.

[51] B. Anderson, 1991, 6.

[52] B. Anderson, 1991, 6.

willing to die for the nation.[53] That is to say, Anderson indicates that nationalism is a discourse that imagines the nation as limited, sovereign and horizontally bond cross-class political community. As such, particular conditions behind this novel manner of imagination of a community should be touched upon.

According to Anderson, the emergence of nationalism and creation of nations towards the end of eighteen century should be thought in relation firstly to the two large cultural systems preceding nationalism- religious community and dynastic realm- out of which and also against which nationalism came into being[54]. In this sense, Anderson reminds that "in Western Europe the eighteen century marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism but the dust of religious modes of thought"[55]. That is to say, the prevalence of rational secularist thought of enlightenment weakened religious mode of solution to fatality and its proposal for continuity through salvation. At this juncture; the nation fills the void through transforming fatality to continuity in a secular way. Differently put, as a product of modernity, the idea of nation provides sense of continuity and meaning to the modern life:

> If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical', the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn the chance into destiny[56]

Adding the gradual reduction of sacred languages of religions that imagine distinct communities than the one imagined by nationalism and the decline of dynastic rule, Anderson perceives each of these transformations to have a role in the emergence of nationalism. More importantly, Anderson emphasizes that one basic transformation in the modes of apprehending the world, namely the transformation of medieval 'simultaneity-along-time' with the idea of 'homogeneous and empty time' measured calenderically, made it possible to 'think' the nations[57]:

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[53] B. Anderson, 1991, 6-7.

[54] B. Anderson, 1991, 12.

[55] B. Anderson, 1991, 11.

[56] B. Anderson, 1991, 11-12.

[57] B. Anderson, 1991, 18-24.

> *The idea of sociological organism moving calendericaly through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never meet, or even know more than a handful of his 240,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity[58].*

At this point, Anderson indicates that with their standardized languages and conceptions of homogeneous time, printed documents- such as novel and newspaper- provided means for the re-presentation of the imagined community of nation. Therefore, it is the print-capitalism which provided mass production of these documents that sustained this kind of imagination and made it possible for people to relate themselves to others in significantly new ways[59]. Henceforth, Anderson claims that the intersection between capitalism, print technology and fatality of human linguistic diversity made it possible to imagine particularly a new kind of imagined community, which is the nation[60].

On the whole, what Hobsbawm calls the 'invention' of traditions, Anderson says 'imagined' communities and Gellner mentions the selective use and obliteration of agrarian cultures for the establishment of homogeneous 'high culture' and anonymous society, all designate a cultural and linguistic rupture in the structure of human communities that is linked particularly with modernity. As such, nations could not be seen as natural and ahistorical entities, rather they are political constructions of a specific era, and nationalism could not be perceived as reflecting the always already existing nations. Nations and nationalism designate completely novel type of polity and attachment, though nationalism uses, invents and transforms preexistent cultures and social bonds for the production and reproduction of this particular collectivity. As Jusdanis claims, ethnic, linguistic and racial differences, hitherto politically inconsequential, acquired institutional and ideological wright with nationalism that politicized ethnic divisions. In this sense, it is the political dimension given to ethnicity that constitutes distinguishing aspect of nationalism[61]. As such, nationalism promotes transformation of

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[58] B. Anderson, 1991, 26.

[59] B. Anderson, 1991, 22-36.

[60] B. Anderson, 1991, 46.

[61] G. Jusdanis, *The Necessary Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 19-20.

collectivity's perception of difference from other groups into a political project. "The nation is a modern manifestation of the human propensity to devise shared identities and to divide the outside form the inside. It transforms the human urge to make distinctions into a self-conscious project of outlining culture."[62] Differently put, through the emphasis on shared rituals, symbols, collective experience and 'national' culture, nationalism stresses similarities between co-nationals and differences from those outside the nation, by this way it makes individuals to believe that they are related to each other and promote the sense of fellowship between insiders while distinguishing those who do not belong to this particular collectivity. In line with this, it is also a topographical undertaking of outlining boundaries in the sense that it designates also a project of "mapping a homeland" through assigning names to places and endowing them with meaning[63]. In this sense, nationalism has integrated the emotional and political life of the people; it works through people's hearths, nerves and the gut.[64] Therefore, as Anderson asserts, the nation is 'imagined' and it is an imagined 'community'.

2.2. ON IDENTITY

In the last section, it is mentioned that distinguishing co-nationals from those who are outside the nation is one of the basic characteristics of nationalism. That is to say, it is indicated that establishment of borders between insiders and outsiders is significant in the constitution of national identity. Then, as this study focuses on representations and self-perceptions of participants in relation to their ethnic/national identities, it is a requirement to clarify the concept identity that is presumed in this study. As such, this section summarizes the theoretical framework of the concept 'identity' in general and ethnic/national identities in particular.

In his discussions on identity, Hall indicates that the logic of identity in traditional sense is linked with essentialized conception of selfhood as a self-sustaining and permanent subject, and thus identity is perceived to be a kind of guarantee of

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[62] G. Jusdanis, 2001, 21.

[63] G. Jusdanis, 2001, 39.

[64] G. Jusdanis, 2001, 31-33.

authenticity, of the 'true self'[65]. Against this unitary, integral and essentialist notion of identity that "helps us...to sleep well at night"[66], Hall emphasizes that the concept of identity should not be perceived as the "stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change; the bit of the self which remains always-already 'the same'"[67]. As opposed to this, the constructed nature of all identities is stressed, which implies the performative action and the necessary instability at the center of any identity. In a similar vein, Laclau reminds that the significance of discussion on identity is linked with its constructed nature:

> *If agents were to have an always already defined location in the social structure, the problem of their identity, considered in a radical way, would not arise- or, at most, would be seen as a matter of people discovering or recognizing their own identity, not of constructing it... any social identity would necessarily entail, as one of its dimensions, construction, and not simply recognition*[68] *(emphasis original)*

If any social identity has a constructed character rather than designating the totality of 'natural', primordial, predetermined and stable aspects of the social agents, then the implications of this anti-essentialist conception of identity should be elaborated. At this point, it would be meaningful to mention the Lacanian conception of subject as the 'subject of lack'. Accordingly, there is an originary and unbridgeable lack at the root of any identity and this space of unrepresentability, of undecidability constitutes the locus of the subject[69]. In other words, as there is an inescapable lack at the root of the subject, so called identity is constructed by reference of the subject to something other than itself, which is identification. "One needs to identify with something because there is an originary and insurmountable lack of identity."[70]

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[65] S. Hall, "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader* edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996), 339.

   S. Hall, "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities." In *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity* edited by Anthony D. King (Binghamton, New York: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton,1991), 41-2.

[66] S. Hall, *Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities,* 43.

[67] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*"* In *Questions of Cultural Identity* edited by Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (London ; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1996), 3.

[68] E. Laclau, Introduction." In *The Making of Political Identities edited* by Ernesto Laclau (London; New York: Verso, 1994), 2-3.

[69] E. Laclau and L. Zac, "Minding the Gap." In *The Making of Political Identities edited* by Ernesto Laclau (London ; New York : Verso, 1994), 27.

[70] E. Laclau, 1994, 3.

Nevertheless, since the lack in the subject is insurmountable, contents of the identificatory act are essentially inadequate for the former's fulfillment, so the identification will have always been recreated as it will always be constitutively incomplete- in other words, identification preserves rather than supersedes the constitutive nothingness of the subject[71]. Differently put, "the story of identity is a cover story"[72] and "the unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure"[73] – and which will always be a partial closure. At this juncture, it would be stressed that identification is not a one thing or one moment of stabilization but always in a never-completed process, it is something that happens over time[74]. Thus, the discussion on collective identity is related to strategic and positional identification, to the process of becoming, not of being. In other words, it is connected to 'routes' of identification through using culture, history and language rather than the 'roots' designating 'who we are'[75].

Since the subject necessarily identifies with something other than itself, it is always through relation to what it is external, to what it is not, that the identity is constructed. In other words, it is through marking the difference from the 'Other', namely from the '*constitutive outside*'[76], and through the exclusion of 'Other' that the identity is constructed. In Hall's words, "identity is a game that ought to be played against difference"[77]:

> *[W]hen you know what everybody else, then you are what they are not. Identity is always, in that sense, a structural representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself.[78]*

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[71] E. Laclau and L. Zac, 1994, 16-17.

[72] S. Hall, Ethnicity: "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader,* 344.

[73] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*"* In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 5.

[74] S. Hall, "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader,* 344.

[75] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*"* In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 3-4.

[76] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*"* In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 4.

[77] S. Hall, "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader,* 346.

[78] S. Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity." In *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity* edited by Anthony D. King. Binghamton (New York: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1991): 21.

And there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the Other. The Other is not outside, but also inside the Self, the identity. So, identity is a process, identity is split. Identity is not fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the relationship of the Other to oneself[79].

As such, the splitting between that which one is and the one which is the other lies at the center of identificatory act[80]. In other words, the concept of identity presumed here is neither stable nor a pure and closed totality but it is related to ever continuing process of construction, transformation and necessarily linked with the 'Other'. In this respect, since any identity should be discussed in relation to what it is not, it follows that the process of identification is context depended and precarious. In other words, "though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources to sustain it, identification is the end conditional logged in contingency.[81]" What is more, as the identity is not something natural or 'reality out there', since it is not "something which is formed outside and then we tell stories about it", it is always in part a narrative and constructed within representation.[82] In this respect, identification is also the narrativization of the self, it is the story of the self on which we impose structure for knowing who we are[83]; and since the identity arises from the narrativization which necessarily has a fictional nature, it is always partly constructed in phantasmatic field and grounded in phantasy, idealization and in projection. This, on the other hand, does not undermine the materiality and political significance of the identities[84].

Within this framework, it would be claimed that collective identity is related to the perception and sense of particular human group about itself; it is connected to the

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[79] S. Hall, "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader,* 345.

[80] S. Hall, *Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities,* 47-8.

[81] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*" In Questions of Cultural Identity,* 2.

[82] S. Hall, *Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities,* 49
   S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*" In Questions of Cultural Identity,* 4.

[83] S. Hall, "Ethnicity:Identity and Difference." *In Becoming National: A Reader,* 346.

[84] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?*" In Questions of Cultural Identity,* 3-4.

conception of the latter as having distinctive characteristics and unique being[85]. In other words, additional to perceived commonalities between the 'insiders', it is the marking of difference and stress on uniqueness that constitute the collective identities. As such, and in concordance with aforementioned link between identity and its 'constitutive outside', for the constitution of a 'we' through collective identities, it is necessary that there is/are – or would be 'created' –(an)other collectivity(ies) for comparison and distinction. That is, perceived common characteristics of a particular group is not adequate for the proposal of distinct collective identity, but it is required that there is/are 'Other(s)' from which the difference of the former is stressed[86]. Moreover, the common features themselves are narrated by the very contrast and stress on difference from 'Other(s)', and it does not matter whether there are 'objective' differences such as language and skin or 'subjective' commonalities such as traditions, common myths or common history. Each of them particularly, or both of them together could be the basis of attachment to particular collectivity[87]. To make it clear, as a process operating across difference, identification requires what is left outside, an excess; and it entails discursive work of marking symbolic boundaries for the consolidation of this process. As such, it is within particular modalities of power that so called identities emerge and exclusion- rather than natural unity and sameness- lies at the center of this process[88]. Emerging within the relations of power and constructed through the constitution of symbolic boundaries between 'us' and 'them', identities are linked with the intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions. In other words, process of identification is also the process of subjectification to discursive practices that hail 'us' as the social subjects of particular discourses. As such, identities have contradictory and ambivalent nature as they are constructed through interpellation of different and multiple discourses[89]. This, on the other hand, reveals the fact that any social identity is open to antagonistic struggles and discursive

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[85] N. Bilgin, "Kimlik Sorunu." İstanbul: Ege Yayıncılık, 1994, quoted in A. Bizden, *Kolektif Kimliklerin İnşasında Siyasal Ritüeller ve Medya: Kıbrıs Örneği.* (Ankara: Masters Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1999), 7.

[86] A. Bizden, *Kolektif Kimliklerin İnşasında Siyasal Ritüeller ve Medya: Kıbrıs Örneği* (Ankara: Masters Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1999), 13.

[87] S. Alankuş-Kural, 1995, 31.

[88] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?" In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 3-4.

[89] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?" In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 2-5.

operations that constantly and transiently (re)define the surface of identification. Thus, the identity of social agents has transforming character also because of these identificatory practices which resist, transform, maintain or completely reject the current order[90]. At this point, Laclau and Zac's claim on the link between the conceptualization of subject as 'subject of lack' and political struggle is illuminating:

> [S]ubject of lack is an 'active or productive' impossibility. For while it constantly remarks the moment of impossibility of constituting a full identity...it also triggers action, that is, the act of identification and the struggle to re-suture the political field.[91]

At this juncture, Hall's definition of identity would be significant for emphasizing that identities are constructed within multiple and antagonistic discourses and, that they are not stable, pregiven, completed totalities:

> I use the 'identity' to refer the meeting point, the point of suture, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to 'interpellate', speak us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct subjects which can be 'spoken'. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. They are the result of a successful articulation or 'chaining' of the subject into the flow of the discourse[92].

On the whole, rather than being primordial and essential totality, the concept identity indicates a never-completed process of identification which is linked with the 'Other'. It is not designating either stability or all-sameness but an ambivalent and transforming attachment to subject positions constructed by multiple discourses. Moreover, any identity could not be perceived separate from particular power relations and struggles for the (re)definition of the surface of identification. As a narrative about the self and told in relation to the 'Other', it is structured within representation and is partially constituted in fantasy, idealization and projection.

As a final point, Comarrof's expressions on identity, particularly on ethnic identity are significant for the discussion be made in this study. Indicating that identities are

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[90] E. Laclau and L. Zac, 1994, 34.

[91] E. Laclau and L. Zac, 1994, 34-5.

[92] S. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?" In *Questions of Cultural Identity,* 5-6.

relations rather than things, Comarrof claims that the contents of ethnicity or nationality can not be defined abstractly as the former is wrought in particularities of historical construction[93]. As such, he indicates four points in relation to discussion on ethnic and national identities. Firstly, it is emphasized that the emergence of ethnic identities occurs within material, political and symbolic power relations and struggle. "Ethnogenesis is most likely to occur through social processes in which culturally defined groups – constituted in a dialectic of attribution and self-assertion- are integrated into a hierarchical social division of labor...their construction involves struggle, contestation and sometimes failure"[94]. In addition, Comarrof rightly stresses that the making of any identity is closely linked with everyday practices, "they involve, simultaneously, the mundane production of both objects and subjects, signs and styles. Usually, too, they are gendered- women and their bodies, and their dress often being prime sites for the representation of difference"[95]. What is more, it is indicated that the construction of ethnic identity usually follows with naturalization and essentialization in the experiences and perceptions of its bearers, *as if* designating primordial characteristics. Finally, Comarrof reminds the fact that conditions given rise to a social identity is not necessarily same with the ones that sustain it. It follows that, politics surrounding ethnic struggles may subject to radical transformations because of the changes in historical circumstances. It also means that an ethnic group which was constituted as underclass firstly may alter its composition over time[96].

2.3. TASTE LIFE STYLE AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH 'HABITUS'

In the last section, it was indicated that identification is also the narrative of the self and that identity is constituted through assertion of difference from the 'Other'. At this juncture, before focusing on the analysis of interview participants' self conceptions and the image of 'Other' in their narrations, it would be illuminating to

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[93] J. L. Comarrof, "Politics of Difference In the Age of Revolution." In *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power* edited by Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 165-166.

[94] J. L. Comarrof, 1996, 166.

[95] J. L. Comarrof, 1996, 166.

[96] J. L. Comarrof, 1996, 166.

mention Pierre Bourdieu's assertions about taste and life style and the concept of 'habitus' that he uses as the basis of his sociology of practice. By this way, it would become possible to introduce additional sight to the study of self perceptions of the interviews. That is to say, as indicated in previous sections, national identification is generally combined with other identifications and the marking of any identity is closely linked with everyday practices and mundane production of styles. In this sense, Bourdieu's discussion about taste and life-style would be perceived as expanding the ground of discussion on difference in the narratives of identity. Therefore, this section gives a spurious and eclectic overview of Bourdieu's conceptualizations on aforementioned topics.

Bourdieu elaborates the taste and life-style in relation to social classes and class fractions and he analyses the "economic and social determinants of tastes"[97]. According to him, the struggles about the meaning of the world are nothing but aspects of class struggle. In this sense, he proposes that the representations of agents about the social world, their contribution to the construction of the vision of the social world, that is, their construction of this world through representation which they perpetually perform for imposing their own vision of the world or of their position in this world, should be taken into account. At this point, he stresses that all knowledge about the social world is construction and implementing schemes of thought and expression which are not universal categories but constituted historically and collectively, and acquired in individual life history[98]. These categories of perception of social world is the outcome of the incorporation of social structure, which in turn influence social agents to perceive the social world as taken for granted rather than being opposed to it. For this reason, Bourdieu indicates that agents' sense of their place has the implication of tacit acceptance of one's position, one's limits and also the distances to be respected and maintained[99]. As such, Bourdieu claims:

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[97] P. Bourdieu, *Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.* Translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 101.

[98] P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power.* Edited by John B. Thompson; translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pres 1991), 467.

[99] P. Bourdieu, 1991, 234-235.

> *[R]elations of power are also present in people's minds in the form of the categories of perception of those relations. Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely the categories which make it possible, are stakes par excellence of the political struggle, a struggle which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of the world.[100]*

Apart from this, in relation to the conception of differences in the social world- which also imply the assertion of social identity through difference- Bourdieu stresses that socially recognized differences necessitate a subject being capable of perceiving the differences and recognizing them as significant. In other words, socially known differences exist only for a subject having inclination to establish differences perceived to be significant in the social world. As such, he indicates, the social world itself has the status of symbolic system that is organized according to logic of difference. This social space and differences within it, on the other hand, function symbolically as space of groups having different life-styles[101].

Bourdieu defines the taste as "acquired disposition to 'differentiate' and 'appreciate'...to establish and mark differences by a process of distinction"[102]. According to him, every kind of taste has uniting and separating function, and presumption of natural taste is nothing but ideological strategy of everyday class struggle that naturalizes real differences through turning differences in the mode of acquisition of culture into the differences of nature[103]. Henceforth, it is stressed that taste is the product of conditionings which are connected with particular class of conditions of existence, and it is emphasized that taste unites all those being the product of similar conditions while separating them from the others[104]. In this manner, taste functions as a 'sense of place'; as a sort of guidance of the occupants

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[100] P. Bourdieu, 1991, 236.

[101] P. Bourdieu, 1991, 237.

[102] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 466.

[103] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 68.

[104] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 56.

in the social space, taste orients social agents towards social positions adjusted to their properties and towards goods or practices befitting to their position.[105]

As such, Bourdieu stresses that taste is the practical affirmation of difference; it is materialized class culture that unites all those who are the product of similar conditions. What is more, he claims that the justification of tastes is declared negatively by the refusal of other tastes; disgust and distaste provoked by intolerance of the tastes of others. Thus, he asserts that aversion to different life styles constitutes probably one of the greatest barriers between classes[106]. In this respect, taste is associated with agents' whole social being, with everything that is perceived to define agents' own idea of themselves. As a common classificatory system, it resembles a sort of tacit contract defining 'us' as oppose to 'them', 'other people' and therefore is the basis of exclusions and inclusions.[107]

Bourdieu indicates that, more than declared opinions, it is the adherence to the tastes and distastes, aversions and sympathies, phobias and fantasies that forms the unconscious unity of a class. Hence, if it is possible to interpret life-style of a group from everyday mundane preferences such as of clothing or furnishing, it is not only because they are the objectification of economic and cultural necessity, but they also designate the unconscious objectifications of social relations[108]. In Bourdieu's words:

> *It is found in all the properties- and property- with which individuals and groups surround themselves, houses, furniture, paintings, books, cars, spirits, cigarettes, perfume, clothes…only because it is in the synthetic unity of the habitus, the unifying generative principle of all practices. Taste, the propensity and capacity to appropriate (materially and symbolically) a given class of classified, classifying objects or practices, is the generative formula of life-style, a unitary set of distinctive preferences which express the same expressive intention in the specific logic of each symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, language or body hexis.[109]*

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[105] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 466.

[106] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 56.

[107] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 478.

[108] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 77.

[109] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 173.

At this juncture, it is necessary to focus on the 'habitus' which would be conceived as constituting the basis of social reproduction according to Bourdieu's sociology of practice. Habitus, as Bourdieu asserts, refers to system of dispositions, to permanent ways of acting, thinking, seeing and being; it is a system of long-lasting schemes or structures of perception, conception and action. Habitus somehow resembles to character but has an essential difference in the sense that the former designates set of non-natural, acquired characteristics which are the product of particular social conditions and thus totally or partially common to people who have been the product of similar conditions. Moreover, though dispositions are generally reproducing themselves and tend to perpetuate, they are not perceived as necessarily eternal[110].

Designating the loose systematicity characterized in human behavior, system of dispositions of an individual or group is metaphorically similar with handwriting in the sense that irrespective of the size, material or color of the surface, produced writings present family resemblances. Hence, as classificatory and assessment propensities of those who have been the product of similar conditions, habitus is manifested in 'life styles', in outlooks, manners of walking, eating, talking, gestures and opinions all of which also imply some practical unity[111]. As mentioned before, Bourdieu indicates that taste is a class culture turned into nature. As such, he stresses that the body is the most indisputable manifestation of embodied class taste. That is to say, apparently most natural features of the body such as its dimension or shape and the manner of treating it, feeding it, caring for it and alike reveals the deepest dispositions of habitus. Hence, the 'sign-bearing' and 'sign-wearing' body is also producer of signs and is connected with the dispositions of habitus[112]. Orienting practices practically, the efficacy of the schemes of habitus- the primary forms of classification- derives from their functioning below the level of language

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[110] P. Bourdieu, "Habitus." In *Habitus: A Sense of Place* edited by Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 43-45.

[111] P. Bourdieu, 2005, 44-45.
 P. Bourdieu, 1984, 173.

[112] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 190-192.

and consciousness and beyond the reach of inward scrutiny or control by the will[113]. Therefore, "closer to class unconscious than 'class consciousnesses in Marxist sense"[114], habitus implies particular form of internalized unity of class condition and of conditionings it entails.[115]

> *In fact, through the economic and social conditions which they presuppose, the different ways of relating to realities and fictions, of believing in fictions and the realities they stimulate, with more or less distance and detachment, are very closely linked to the different possible positions in social space and, consequently, bound up with he system of dispositions (habitus) characterizing of the different classes and class fractions[116].*

Generating meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions, habitus enables establishment of an intelligible relation between practices and a situation whose meaning is produced by the habitus with the categories of appreciation and perception which themselves are products of particular social condition[117]. As such, Bourdieu states:

> *The habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgments and the system of classification (principium divisionis) of these practices. It is in the relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the represented social world, i.e. the space of life styles, is constituted.[118]*

In this sense, life styles are defined as the systematic products of habitus and, perceived in their mutual relations to the schemes of the habitus, they become sign systems which are socially qualified such as 'distinguished', 'vulgar' and alike[119]. Accordingly, Bourdieu insists that members of a class or class fraction could not be defined solely with their position in relations of production. The 'objective class' should be constructed as set of agents who are placed in similar conditionings and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions that are capable of generating similar practices, and those who posses set of objectified properties or properties

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[113] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 466.

[114] P. Bourdieu, 1991, 235.

[115] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 101.

[116] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 6.

[117] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 101.

[118] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 170.

[119] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 172.

that are embodied in class habitus, particularly the systems of classificatory schemes. It follows that class or class fraction is defined also by a certain sex-ratio, by a particular distribution in social space which is never socially neutral and by a whole set of supplementary characteristics which may function, in the form of tacit necessities, as real principles of selection or exclusion without being formally stated, as in the case of ethnic origin and sex[120].

On the whole, taking the topics delineated in this chapter as a whole, it would be meaningful to mention the relationship between nationalism, identity, culture and distinction. As Jusdanis indicates, with the emphasis on shared rituals, culture, symbols and alike, nationalism promotes collectivity's perception of difference through transforming the difference from other groups into a political project[121]. In this sense, as in the case of any claim of identity, nationalism marks the border between the insider and the outsider and as such it necessitates 'Other(s)' for reminding the fellowship between co-nationals. Moreover, construction and reproduction of ethnic and national identities are connected with everyday practices and categories of perception of its bearers. As Commarrof puts it, the making of ethnic and national identities also involves production of signs and styles and such categories as women's bodies and dresses would be crucial sites in representation of difference[122]. At this juncture, it is apparent that Bourdeiu's aforementioned discussion on taste and distinction is significant in the sense that differences requires a subject recognizing differences as significant and justification of difference is generally conjoined with marking the distinction between vulgar and distinguished and alike. Thus, as a common classificatory system of those having been the product of similar conditions, taste also differentiate 'us' from 'them' and is the basis of inclusions and exclusions.[123] In this sense, national identification is generally combined with other identifications in the social being. [124]

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[120] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 101-102.

[121] G. Jusdanis, 2001, 21.

[122] J. L. Comarrof, 1996, 166.

[123] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 478.

[124] E. J. Hobsbawm, 1992, 11.

CHAPTER III

STRUGGLING IDENTITY PROJECTS, TURKIYELI IMMIGRATION AND IDENTITY PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMANTS:

Before the elaboration of interview participants' narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity that will be made in the following chapters, it is meaningful to touch upon some topics as background information. By this way, it is believed that the analysis of and arguments about participants' self-perceptions become more intelligible. As such, in this chapter a brief outline of Turkish nationalist and Cypriotist discourses and their identity projects will be given in the first and second sections. By this way, the discursive struggles on the identity of this particular collectivity in political realm become more manifest. Differently put, as it is claimed, the constitution of identity is also related to multiple and struggling discourses that hail particular groups as subjects of particular discourses. Therefore, overview of the identity projects of Turkish nationalist and Cypriotist discourses will give some information about the political background of participants' narratives on their identities.

Additionally, it is necessary to give some information about *Türkiyeli* population in northern part of Cyprus whose immigration began after the partition of the island in 1974 and has been continuing till contemporary days. For this reason, an overview of *Türkiyeli* immigration to the island and of the political discussions on their acquirement of TRNC citizenship will be made in the third section.

Finally, before the elaboration of narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity in popular discourse that will be made in proceeding chapters, data about the participants' answers to the interview question how they define themselves (Turkish, Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot or something other than these) will be given, some of the interviewees will be introduced, and a brief assessment of the results will be made in the fourth section. Therefore, this chapter includes basic

information that is perceived to be necessary to touch upon before focusing on the narratives in popular discourse about Turkish Cypriot identity and it's 'Others'.

3.1. NOTES ON TURKISH NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS

The process of modernization of multiethnic traditional social structure of the island of Cyprus gave way to two distinct and opposite national projects and national consciousnesses rather than having resulted in integration of the two main ethnic communities under the same attachment. On the contrary; development of mutually exclusive and conflicting Greek and Turkish nationalisms constitutes the hallmark of the historical background of the island.[125] Accordingly, union with 'motherland Greece' on the one hand, and with 'motherland Turkey' on the other, became the basic goals of Greek and Turkish nationalisms in the island both of which took Cyprus as a piece of territory gaining its meaning solely from being part of Greek and/or Turkish national 'supra-family'[126].

Regarding to the position of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus that constitutes the focus of this section, it would firstly be pointed out that development of Turkish nationalist consciousness in preference to religious belongingness, that firstly started as an elite position, was based on the reaction against Greek nationalism's search for enosis- union with Greece- which gained power in the beginning of 20th century and became highly popularized in 1930s. That is to say, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus took shape as a counter nationalism to a great extent, and its discourse has been determined with the opposition against Helens and Helens' proposal of enosis[127]. As a very brief and superficial touch on the historical development of the former, it would be stated that the first phase of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was marked with romantic turn and admiration towards modern Turkey, the motherland, for protection in the period when Greek Cypriot national movement for enosis popularly demanded in 1930s. "In this period of deep insecurities, the emergence of modern Turkey and the personal cult of Mustafa

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[125] N. Kızılyürek, "Birinci Cumhuriyet'ten Yeni Kıbrıs'a." In Kıbrıs: Dün ve Bugün edited by Masis Kürkçügil (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2003), 14.

[126] N. Kızılyürek and S. Gauter-Kızılyurek, 2001, 38.

[127] N. Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*, 231.

Kemal Atatürk were the main sources of the ethnic pride for Turkish Cypriots in response to the dialectical other, that is, Greek Cypriots."[128] In other words, it would be claimed that Kemalism and anti-Hellenist, anti-enosis sentiments have constituted the basic elements of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. In 1940s, having finally achieved to take the interest of public opinion and the press in Turkey, Turkish Cypriot nationalism having proposed the union of island with the 'motherland' gained dominance in return for closer relationship with the latter[129]. In the period of 1950s, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism became fully organized ideology with a political program of 'taksim'- the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey and the unification of two communities of the island with their respective motherlands- and became popularized as would be illustrated with the meeting held by 3000 people in 1958 with the slogan 'either taksim or death'[130]. "From now on, Turkish Cypriot nationalism ceased to be merely a romantic attachment to 'mother Turkey' and…gradually became a separatist ideology and cultivated the myth that two communities can not live together."[131] Constitution of Cyprus Republic in 1960 when both nationalisms in Cyprus reached culmination, did not pave the way for reconciliation between two communities but was perceived to be the interim period for the goals of taksim and enosis. As such, in 1963 Turkish Cypriots left the governmental roles in the republic and started to live in ethnically homogeneous enclaves which led to the unquestioned dominance of Turkish nationalism and militarism within aforementioned community. With Turkey's military intervention after Greek coup to Cyprus in 1974, de facto division of the island made Turkish Cypriot nationalism's proposal for partition a practical reality and with the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish nationalism became the official ideology of a state which has been recognized only by the 'motherland' Turkey.

As a brief look on the presumptions of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus relating to the study at hand, it would be meaningful to touch upon identity politics of the former

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[128] N. Kızılyurek and S. Gauter-Kızılyürek, 2001, 41.

[129] B. Evre, *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği: Oluşumu ve Gelişimi* (Lefkoşa- Kıbrıs: Işık Kitabevi, 2004),124.

[130] B. Evre, 2004, 135.

[131] N. Kızılyurek and L. Gauter-Kızılyürek, 2001, 45.

through mentioning the so called motherland-babyland metaphor and the basic elements in the constitution of past apparent in this particular ideology. At this point, it would firstly be stated that identity construction of Turkish nationalist discourse in Cyprus has been marked with a renouncement, that is, with negation of any attachment connected to Cyprus itself and commonly shared by the two communities of the island. As oppose to this, strong emphasis on differences/opposition between 'Turks of Cyprus' and 'Greeks of Cyprus', and the reduction of the former to Turkishness as a result of blood ties lie at the hearth of Turkish nationalist discourse. Differently put, while ignoring its spatio-temporal belongingness, Turkish Cypriot community has been represented with bio-genetically defined national identity[132]. As such, it would be stated that "there is nothing Cypriot by Turkish Cypriots, they are just Turks in Cyprus"[133] has been the main presumption of Turkish nationalist discourse in Cyprus. Thence, the stress on the difference from so called 'Greeks of Cyprus' has been conjoined with the emphasis on commonalities "with the 'great Turkish nation', 'great Turkish ideal', 'great Turkish history' and even, in disintegration period of the Soviets, with the 'great Turkish geography'."[134] In this sense, symbols referring to the island of Cyprus itself have at least been perceived to be meaningless or worse presumed to be threats against Turkishness in the island.

As a matter of fact, 'motherland-baby land' metaphor of Turkish nationalism could be perceived as the keystone of this discourse summarizing its perception about the Turkish Cypriot community in the island and its relationship with the Turkish 'family'. That is to say, constructed as a parent and connected with blood ties, Turkey has been perceived to be the protector of the 'baby' 'Turks of Cyprus' and the Turkish nation has been represented as "an organic whole, a 'suprafamily', to which Turkish Cypriots belong."[135] Hence, the belongingness of the members of Turkish Cypriot community is reduced to blood ties and accordingly, the community gains its meaning as a result of being a "department of the Turkishness

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[132] N. Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*, 293.

[133] N. Kızılyürek and L. Gauter-Kızılyürek, 2001, 48.

[134] A. Bizden, "Reddi Miras: Sırtını Silahtar'a Dönmek." *Birikim* 167 (2003): 45.

[135] **N.** Kızılyurek and S. Gauter-Kızılyurek, 2001, 45.

in Turkey"[136]. Moreover; it is apparent that the former do not have an identical position with the latter as it is perceived to have 'baby', but not 'adult' status[137]. As such, the super harmony between baby land that was 'gained with blood' and motherland, the land of blood brothers, and the 'familial' hierarchy constitutes basis of the meaning world of Turkish nationalist discourse. Henceforth, other than being the common bond between nationals, the blood spilled in the island is constructed as the common essence shared between the land and people, and the island of Cyprus is imagined as "the offspring of the Anatolian mother and the blood shed in the island."[138] What is more, aforementioned metaphor gives clue about the project of future; "this project is the racial, cultural, historical, geographic bonds and the necessity of 'reconnection of bonds' between Turkey and Cyprus."[139]

Motherland-babyland harmony and the stress on difference/opposition between Turks and Greeks of Cyprus – or between those strugglers for emancipation and aggressors as would be mentioned in proceeding paragraphs-has also been reminded with national symbols: the national days of the 'motherland' has been celebrated in 'baby land', national anthem of the 'motherland' has also been the anthem of 'baby land', Greek street names and school names were changed with Turkish ones- generally with the names of martyrs- and the cruelty of Rum has been reflected with martyr weeks, nameless soldier monuments, with the barbarism museum and alike. In addition, the stress on the Turks' of Cyprus connection with their motherland also implies the connection of the 'Other' with its respective motherland, as such, the separatism at the basis of this discourse reflects itself in the question "they have their Greece and we have our Turkey, why should we live under the framework of the same republic?"[140] As a final point, the responsibility of

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[136] T. Bora, "Milli Dava Kıbrıs: Bir Velayet Davası: Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs." *Birikim* 77 (1995): 19.

[137] T. Bora, 1995, 18-19.

[138] R. Bryant, The Purity of Spirit and the Power of Blood: A Comperative Perspective on Nation, Gender and Kinship in Cyprus. Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 8 (2002): 512-517.

[139] A. Bizden, 1999, 84.

[140] Denktaş R.R, "...Onların Yunanistanı'ı bizim de Türkiyemiz varken, neden aynı cumhuriyet çatısı altında yaşayalım?" Ortam Gazetesi,13 kasım 1995, quoted in N. Kzılyurek *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs,* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 294.

'baby' in the 'familial' hierarchy and the spiritual connection between the land and blood is explained by the nationalist leader Denktaş as such:

> *I think Cyprus is what Adana is. Cyprus is the gate of the waters for Turkey. For us, equality is the claim for prevention of Cyprus from being the second Crete, the prevention of becoming minority in the lands created by 70 thousand martyrs. If it is snatched by Rum, by Greek, as a 13th Greek island, Cyprus encloses our southern coast, Turkey loose the status of being open to waters[141].*

Apart from the stress on Turkishness of Turkish Cypriots and their position within Turkish nation that is imagined as a great family, another crucial point in the identity politics of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus is related to the narrativization of past which is marked with the ethnic war and the treachery of the enemy, 'Greeks of Cyprus'. That is, since the *de facto* partition of the island in 1974, purely Turkish - non-Greek- image of past for 'Turks of Cyprus' and the eternal enmity between Turks and Greeks of Cyprus are constituted as the main themes in the narration of past by Turkish nationalist discourse. Accordingly, putting the ethnic clash in the island at the center, the past is represented with the themes of disappearance and struggle for survival in the face of malicious and treacherous Greek Cypriots[142]. As such, while remarking the tolerance of Turks/Ottomans, Greeks and Greek Cypriots are represented as those butchers who stabbed 'us' in the back in the name of megali idea* and the enosis[143]. Differently put, in the narration of ethnic war in the island, Greek Cypriots are constructed as a homogeneous group and the deeds made by the members of this community regarding to the ethnic clash have been attributed to the group as a whole, that is; 'they' represent the 'all-bad' and the 'enemy' in the constitution of past by Turkish nationalist discourse[144]. The position of 'Turks of Cyprus' in this narration, on the other hand is marked with its victim status, painfulness and with its struggle for liberation that is presumed to be achieved with the establishment of Turkish

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[141] R.R., Denktaş, *Yeniden 12'ye 5 Kala* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi: 2005), 163.

[142] A. Bizden, 2003, 45.

* Great Idea: pan-Hellenist goal to encompass all ethnic Greeks under the Great Greek state

[143] Y. Papadakis, "Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythical Realities?" In *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable* edited by Vangelis Calotychos Boulder (CO: Westview Press, 1998) ,70**.**

[144] F. Pinkel, *"Tarih Eğitim ve Tarihte "Öteki" Sorunu."* In Tarihsel Anılar ve ÇokEtnisiteli Bir Bağlamda Tarih Ders Kitapları: Bazı Deneyimler 1998, quoted in, Ali Bizden, *Kolektif Kimliklerin İnşasında Siyasal Ritüeller ve Medya: Kıbrıs Örneği* (Ankara: Masters Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi 1999), 84.

Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. Thence, the painful days of the past also designate the war of emancipation, which transform the sacrifices and pain of the collectivity into pride resulting from the achieved happy end of emancipation[145]. Therefore, the narrative that two communities of Cyprus never had a peaceful coexistence and that there has been eternal enmity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots constitutes the basis of the depiction of past by nationalist discourse and this 'myth-history' is used for the justification of partition and for 'proving' the proposal that two communities of the island can not live together[146].

As a final point about the discussion at hand, it would be meaningful to return Nesim's book on 'Turkish Cypriot Identity' that is published in 1990- in the period when discussions on Cyprus-centered identity project gained prominence in the Left- by TRNC ministry of education press. Depicting differences between Turkish and Greek Cypriots throughout the book, Nesim claims that Turkish Cypriot identity reveals itself in the culture: though having some nuance differences from the culture of motherland as a result of various effects, the culture of Turkish Cypriots is connected with Turkish culture: "...Turkish Cypriot culture is a subculture of motherland Turkish culture, and has a totally different structure from Greek Cypriot culture"[147] As such, it is indicated that 'Cypriotness' is totally geographical attribution and might be termed as a 'street culture' established through economic and geographic relations[148]. In his depiction of differences in outside appearances of the two communities- which would be dealt in the related section of third chapter in relation to participants representations- Nesim indicates the opposition as such:

> *Turks and Rums have never INTEGRATED with each other either in their behaviors or in their appearances. The dressing of Turks have always been clean and with bright colors, Rums on the other hand wear black tones and smell bad owing to their seldom bathe and not cutting the hairs for religious reasons[149].*(emphasis original)

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[145] A. Bizden, "Kıbrıs'ta Güç/İktidar Mücadelesinin Değişen Yüzü: Kıbrıs(lı/Türk) Milliyetçiliği." *Birikim* 97 (1997): 82.

[146] N. Kızılyurek and L. Gauter-Kızılyurek, 2001, 47-48.

[147] A. Nesim, 1990, 124.

[148] A. Nesim, 1990, 141.

[149] A. Nesim, 1990, 33.

On the whole, image of Greek Cypriots and the main themes in the representation of Turkish Cypriot identity by Turkish nationalist discourse were outlined in this section. As such, while Turkish Cypriots are defined as Turks of the 'babyland' and strictly differentiated from Greek Cypriot community in every aspect, the latter is perceived to be 'Greeks of Cyprus' and represented with cruelty and treachery. As Nesim's assertions also illustrate, the 'Other' is defined with complete opposition from the collective self and perceived to have all the 'bad' characteristics in comparison to 'us'. As such, the construction of 'Turks' and 'Greeks' of Cyprus as two mutually exclusive identities, the emphasis on the impossibility of coexistence of the two communities in the island and the super harmony between 'motherland Turks' and 'babyland Turks' would be seen as basic elements of Turkish nationalist discourse in Cyprus.

3.2. REMARKS ON CYPRIOTIST DISCOURSE

As touched upon in the previous section, the official discourse in the northern part of Cyprus signed with the super harmony between 'motherland' and 'babyland' and proposed purely Turkish national identity constructed as the opposite of Greek one. Accordingly, dwelling in Cyprus perceived to be merely a contingent phenomenon which should not have any significance in the identity formation of 'Turks of Cyprus'. According to R.R.Denktaş, "the only true Cypriots are the wild donkeys of the Karpaz peninsula…otherwise; there are only Greeks and Turks living in Cyprus, ethnically and culturally indistinct from the populations of their respective motherlands.[150]" In these conditions, dissident against the reduction of the population under consideration to Turkishness has been claimed through the emphasis on 'Cypriotness' of the communities in Cyprus. Evre indicates that it is possible to discuss 'Cypriotness' in two realms: in the political realm where the usage of the term signifies a transnational supra-identity enclosing both Turkish and Greek identities, and in the sociological realm where the bearers of Cypriotist discourse narrate themselves with particular aspects.[151] Before focusing on 'sociological realm' through the analysis of interviews, it is necessary to mention

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[150] H. Lacher and E. Kaymak, "Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non- Settlement in Cyprus?", Mediterranean Politics 10, no.2 (2005): 9.

[151] B. Evre, "Kıbrıs'ta Milliyetçilik: Versus Kıbrıslılık." *Birikim* 181 (2004): 31.

the 'political realm'. Dealing with the latter, this section touches upon the emergence and basic premises of Cypriotist discourse in northern part of Cyprus.

In the face of division of the island and the dominance of Turkish nationalist ideology which have supported the perpetuation of divided position of Cyprus and gained official status after the conditions of 1974, some Turkish Cypriot groups being critical of their nationalist leadership began to disassociate themselves from the 'motherland' and Turkish nationalist discourse. Starting from 1970s, firstly the intellectual circles and the political left preoccupied with the question of Cypriot identity commonly shared with the two ethnic communities of Cyprus[152]. That is to say, the opposition against nationalist ideology, which has perceived the latter to be one of the main reasons behind the destruction of peaceful coexistence in Cyprus, proposed the notion of common Cypriot identity and emphasized the necessity to develop 'Cypriot consciousness'[153] in the road to reunite Cyprus.

As one of the first sophisticated discussions on Turkish Cypriot identity and the development of Cypriot consciousness, in 1987, a number of intellectuals gathered in London and discussed Turkish Cypriot identity in literature. Here, the 'identity crisis' of the population living in northern part of the island was remarked and a search for an identity signifying the belongingness to Cyprus geography and 'spontaneous' Cypriot culture as opposed to the 'alienating' one proposed by the official discourse was made through discussion of Turkish Cypriot identity in plays, novels and poetry.[154] As one of the intellectuals involved in aforementioned discussion, Mehmet Yaşın, criticized the cultural politics of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus as such:

> *The Turkish Cypriot ideology, just like the cultural values associated with it, is an imported product. It is alien to Cyprus. It alienates the Turkish Cypriots from themselves. It prevents our community from starting from its own cultural origins and establishing a powerful cultural link with both the substructure and the superstructures…We have never been able to adopt Cyprus as our motherland,*

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[152] C. Ramm, 2006, 528.

[153] See, A. An, *Kıbrıslılık Bilincinin Geliştirilmesi.* (Lefkoşa- Kıbrıs: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, 1998).

[154] M. Yaşın, "The Question of Identity and Its Socio-Historical Basis İn Turkish Cypriot Literature." In *Turkish Cypriot Identity in Literature* edited by Aydın Mehmet Ali. (London: Fatal Publications, 1990), 36-37.

instead of having feeling of Cypriotness we feel like a nomad minority dropped somehow on this island[155]

In other words, against the homogenization and 'Turkification' of the population in the north, and against the stressed indistinctiveness of 'Turks of Cyprus' from 'mainlanders' with such claims as "nations have culture, there is no culture for 100-150 thousand people"[156], the common Cypriot identity, the common culture and the common past of the two communities of Cyprus were reminded by the opposition for contesting with Turkish nationalist ideology. At this juncture, in contrast to nationalist discourse that has constructed the history of Cyprus with the beginning of the Ottoman rule in the island; the "rich and original history[157]" of Cypriots that includes earlier civilizations which contribute the cultural formation of the islanders was stressed.

Starting from the late 1980s on, political parties and organizations on the Left have proposed 'Cyprus-centered'[*] approach more elaborately and developed the project of common Cypriot identity as the main element of their political struggle. Having established some contacts with Greek Cypriot left, supporters of this approach has engaged in bi-communal activities and has remarked the cultural heritage that have been shared with the two communities of Cyprus.[158] Targeting the peaceful coexistence of two communities in "common-homeland Cyprus"[159], Cypriot-centered identity project of the Left has been the main element of struggle against Turkish and Greek nationalism that are perceived to be the reasons behind the unresolved 'Cyprus problem'. As such, emphasizing the common culture, folklore and tradition shared by the two communities, Cypriotist discourse struggles for a

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[155] M. Yaşın, 1990, 43-58.

[156] R.R. Denktaş, 2000'e Doğru 21, quoted in A. An, 1998, 116.

[157] M. Yaşın, 1990, 38.

[*] See, N. Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*, 290-299.

[158] C. Ramm, 2006, 529.

[159] M. Yashin, "Three Generations, Three Identities, Three "Patriae" Within Twenty- Century Cypriot Poetry." In *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable* edited by Vangelis Calotychos (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 231.

unified Cypriot citizenship in a bi-communal federation in the island[160]. Differently put, against the secondary position of Cypriotness with regard to Turkishness and Greekness appeared in nationalist discourse, Cypriotist discourse stresses the former through remarking the common culture and history shared by the islanders.

In 1990s, immigration from Turkey to Cyprus[**] reached a new phase as the entrance into the island became possible just with identity cards for Turkish citizens. This time, generally more politicized people (generally supporting Turkish nationalism) than the ones came in 1974 and unemployed masses to be used as cheap labor immigrated to the island, most of whom after a while gained citizenship that gave them the capacity to affect political decisions through their votes.[161] Adding the dependency relationship with Turkey and repressive political rule intolerant to any oppositional voice into the picture, the struggle on the basis of identity have become much more politicized, and 41 opposition organizations established "This Country is Ours"[***] platform claiming the idea that 'Cyprus belong to Cypriots'. Yücel indicates the demands of this platform as such:

> *Turkish Cypriot who is smarted, continuously humiliated and abased; and worse, announced to be "guilty", wants to stand on its own feet (economic demand); to have the right of audience in its own future as free political subjects(political demand) and finally wants to be and live as itself (socio-cultural demand). In general terms, this is a demand for 'identity' and naturally includes elements of 'uniqueness' and 'difference'.[162]*

Therefore, as oppose to the official Turkish nationalist discourse, proponents of aforementioned demand for identity emphasize the cultural, traditional and

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[160] V. Calotychos, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Difference at the Heart of Cypriot Identity and Its Study." In *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable* edited by Vangelis Calotychos (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) 16-17.

[**] Information about the immigrants from Turkey to Cyprus will be given in the following section.

[161] M.T. Özsağlam, "Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta Milliyetçi Akımlar Üzerine Düşünceler." In *Kıbrıs'ın Turuncusu* edited by Mehmet Hasgüler and Ümit İnatçı (İstanbul:Anka Yayınları, 2003), 222.

[***] By the way, ten organizations taking part in 'This Country is Ours Platform' recently (30.01.2008) established additional organization 'Cyprus Peace Platform' with the aim to surpass the former's malfunctions. The basic objective of this recent platform is announced as such: " resumption of political will of Turkish Cypriots that is seized through the transformation of demographic structure; abolition of chauvinism, nationalism and cultural, political and economic assimilation of Turkish Cypriots; resistance against outside interference; constitution of democratic, transparent, civilized administration that is based on Turkish Cypriot's political will; constitution of united federal Cyprus that is based on Turkish Cypriots' and Greek Cypriots' political will without any dwindling" Kıbrıs Gazetesi, 31.01.2008, "Kıbrıs Barış Platformu Oluşturuldu".

[162] H. Yücel, "Tarih, Kimlik ve Siyaset Üçgeninde Kıbrıslı Türkler." *Birikim* 167 (2003):37.

geographical commonalities of the two communities of Cyprus rather than constructing them as the opposites. As such, the religious, linguistic and national differences that are emphasized in the construction of Greek and Turkish nationalist identities are tried to be surpassed through putting Cyprus at the center. What is more, Cypriot identity is not only perceived as a medium of peaceful coexistence in the future federal state, but the left also attempts to construct such an identity for making "Cypriots" to preserve their democratic rights and to have the capacity to determine the political decisions in northern part of Cyprus since the number of 'outsider' citizens had been increasing day by day and those gaining citizenship mainly vote for the regime parties, rather than leftist ones, and as such, contribute to the domination of Turkish nationalism in the northern part of the island.[163] Thus, in this demand for identity, rather than stressing the 'Turkishness' of the people in the island that connotes harmony with the so called 'motherland' Turkey, 'Cypriotness' is perceived to be the basis of attachment. Hence, "when it is stated that 'this country is ours', 'we' constitutes Cypriots, and the others are not Greek Cypriots who are alleged as eternal enemies by the official discourse, but the 'motherland' and those who came from 'motherland' and settled in TRNC."[164] Having mentioned the basic premises of Cypriotist identity project of the left, it also becomes manifest that the immigrants from Turkey are not conceptualized as 'our blood brothers' which is the case in Turkish nationalist discourse. Rather, the 'outsider' position of 'them' are implied or remarked in the construction of Cypriot identity. By this way, a new "other" is accordingly constructed with this alternative proposal of identity.

3.3. TURKIYELI IMMIGRATION TO CYPRUS

The unilateral military intervention of Turkey in response to Greek junta regime's coup to the island in 1974 led to geographical division of Cyprus into two ethnically 'homogeneous' parts and to massive population movements within the island. That is to say, it is estimated that 30 per cent of the island population (142 thousand northern Greek Cypriots immigrated to the South and 45 thousand

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[163] T. Erhürman, 2006, 94.

[164] B. Taşeli-Sakallı, "Kıbrıs'ta 'Barış'ı Yeniden Düşünmek." *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 2 (2006):72.

southern Turkish Cypriots to the North) faced with the enforced migration as a result of the interethnic conflict and the military intervention in 1974[165]. In relation to the northern part, the partition of the island had crucial ramifications: the Turkish Cypriot control over 18% of land in pre-1974 period was increased to 34 per cent; this on the other hand, meant that there was a surplus of land relative to population. More over, since almost all of the Greek Cypriots who constituted the agricultural and qualified labor force of the north emigrated to the southern part of the island, the north was faced with serious labor force shortage[166]. That is to say, southern Turkish Cypriot immigrants were accommodated to the lands left by Greek Cypriots, yet only minor part of the required labor force in agriculture and animal husbandry was countervailed by this population. Concomitantly, serious labor shortage would be perceived as the hallmark of northern part of Cyprus in post–1974 economic and socio-spatial reconstruction period[167]. As such, the immigration movements from Turkey to Cyprus that has been continuing till contemporary days originated from such a historical background. This section gives brief information about *Türkiyeli* immigrants and immigration from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus in different periods.

Following Purkis and Kurtuluş, the immigration movements from Turkey to Cyprus can be divided into three phases. The first phase of these immigrations started with the common decision of Turkish-Turkish Cypriot authorities on population transfer because of aforementioned necessity to 'fill' the lands 'gained' through the intervention. Differently put, the influx of Turkish citizens to the northern part of the island was perceived as legitimizing tool for the post-1974 control over 34 percent of land.[168] What is more, the labor force shortage was tried to be overcome by the immigrants from Turkey. Hatay classifies this group of immigrants (later TRNC citizens) into three groups: those technical staff and skilled labor who came immediately after 1974 in order to reconstruct infrastructure and accepted the

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[165] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis, "Türkiye'den Kuzey Kıbrıs'a Göç Dalgaları: Lefkoşa'nın Dışlanmış Göçmen-Enformel Emekçileri." *Toplum ve Bilim* 112 (2008): 61.

[166] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis, 2008, 62.

[167] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis, 2008, 63.

[168] H. Lacher and E. Kaymak, 2005, 3.

TRNC citizenship offer; 'peace forces' soldiers and their families who accepted TRNC citizenship; and agricultural laborers whose majority came between the years 1974-77 from the regions around Trabzon, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Çarşamba, Samsun, Konya and southeastern Turkey.[169] Relating to the last group, it is indicated that majority of these immigrants were landless villagers most of whom had demanded agricultural land from the state before 1974 and waited for provision of land to them in Amik meadow. Apart from these, some villager families left their villages as a result of political-ethnic pressure or of some hostilities-such as blood feud or enmities resulting from land issues- and immigrated to the island. The first phase of immigrations continued till 1979 when land and house incentives of Turkish Cypriot state were ended, but the migration networks and individual-economic migration channels were constructed in this phase and stimulated immigration in later periods[170].

Additional to these, there have been immigrations from Turkey on individual basis and acquirement of TRNC citizenship accordingly[171]. These immigrations accelerated in 1980s and constituted the second phase of immigrations from Turkey to the island. That is to say, the second phase of immigration movements was not based on migratory agreements between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities but resulted from particular material-professional profit opportunities. This opportunity-led migration wave included mainly three groups of immigrants: professional and semi-professional groups, traders having small-intermediate capital- mainly the shuttle traders- and soldiers. This population wave was mainly stimulated with free circulation of imported goods in the island and continued till 1990s when Turkey liberalized the entrance of imported goods into the country. Nonetheless, as a result of these migration networks, opportunity-led migration to

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[169] M. Hatay, "Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish Settlers in Northern Cyprus." In *PRIO Cyprus Centre Report*. (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2005), 11-12.

[170] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis, 2008, 64-65.

[171] M. Hatay, 2005, 13.

the island has continued in such profit spheres as casino-tourism sector, private universities and off-shore banking[172].

In 1990s the third phase of immigrations having very different characteristics than the former ones started[173]. Before the elaboration of the last phase of migrations, it would be stated that the acquirement of citizenship especially by this last group has constituted the main controversy between Turkish Cypriot right and the opposition against population movements into the northern part of the island. In this respect, it is argued that immigration from Turkey was consciously encouraged "to create loyal clientele that could be relied upon to give their consent to those on whom their property titles and citizenship dependent."[174] At this point, it is meaningful to refer citizenship law of 1992 that allowed acquirement of TRNC citizenship to anyone living legally at least five years, with the exception that this requirement could be relinquished with the decision of council of ministers for those 'of the benefit of state'. Herein, the oppositional parties voiced their rejection and reminded that those who has been regarded as 'of the benefit of state' has risen before the elections and it was argued that the demographic balance have been changed in the island for supporting conservative regime of R.R.Denktaş and his proponents.[175] Adding these the large number of new citizens before the critical 2003 elections whose results were perceived to display citizens' position in so called Annan settlement plan, the assignment of TRNC citizenship to *Türkiyeliler* have been criticized on the grounds that it disenfranchises Turkish Cypriots in their own country.[176] As such, it is stated that population transfer policy has later been used as a mechanism preventing opposition against the existing political rule. In other words, immigration to the island is perceived as a tool for "preserving the status quo" as it was popularly claimed by the opposition to the political rule of

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[172] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis,2008, 66.

[173] H. Kurtuluş and S. Purkis,2008, 66.

[174] H. Lacher and E. Kaymak, 2005, 3.

[175] Kıbrıs Gazetesi 8 October 2003, Kıbrıs Gazetesi 9 October 2003, quoted in Mete Hatay, 2005, 13 and 1.

[176] By the way, TRNC citizenships of 1563 people were annuled on the grounds of illegality in past years. Yenidüzen, 26 February 2004. In this sense, it is apparent that acquirement of TRNC citizenship by Türkiyeliler have instrumental role in Turkish nationalist perception

R.R.Denktaş and to his proponents searching for integration with Turkey. Here the famous comment of R.R.Denktaş about Turkish Cypriot emigrants, "those coming and those leaving are both Turks", is frequently quoted for displaying the population transfer policy apathetic to dissolution of native Turkish Cypriot population and transformation of demographic balance in the island.

On the other hand, elaboration of the third phase of population movements designates another face of these migrations that could be veiled in aforementioned discussions. That is to say, starting from late 1990s, the immigration of unskilled cheap labor to the island has constituted the hallmark of the population movements into the island. Connected with the agricultural policies, unemployment and regional revenue imbalances in Turkey, this phase of immigration highly accelerated in 2000s and the immigrants have provided the demanded cheap labor force especially to the construction sector that has been leading the accumulation of capital in the northern part of the island. To make it clear, farmers who lost their land, unemployed agricultural laborers and indebted farmers who are mainly from eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey has immigrated to the northern part of the island in this third period, and has provided the cheap labor force demanded especially by the construction sector. In this sense, the demand for cheap labor mainly in construction sector constitutes one of the basic grounds of the last immigration wave[177]. Therefore, it would be stressed that apart form the political, historical and strategic relationship between Turkey and Northern part of Cyprus; it is the demand for cheap labor that stimulated the influx of population from Turkey to the island. As such, it would be claimed that the population under consideration constitutes the migrant cheap labor force of the northern part of the island that is facing with similar conditions and have similar characteristics with the migrant cheap labor in the other parts of the world[178].

3.4. TURKISH, CYPRIOT, TURKISH CYPRIOT, TURKISH-SPEAKING CYPRIOT? PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ON IDENTITY PERCEPTIONS OF INTERVIEWEES

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[177] H. Kurtuluş and A. Purkis, 2008, 73-79.

[178] H. Kurtuluş and A. Purkis, 2008, 93.

In interviews, it is asked to participants whether they define themselves as Turkish or Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot or alternatively. Hence, as the final part of this chapter, this section focuses on the data about the answers of aforementioned question. To begin with, it is seen that only small number of participants(5 out of 33) emphasized firstly the Turkish part of their identity while having perceived the Cypriot part as secondary, contingent or as solely geographical issue (in interviews all of these informants mentioned their own experiences during the interethnic struggle in the island). Being mainly in concordance with Turkish nationalist discourse, it would be stated that these interviewees define themselves as 'Turkish cypriot' since the 'Turkish' part of their identity is perceived to be more dominant and, when compared with *Türkiyeliler,* the difference from Greek Cypriots is perceived to be more crucial in the narration of self. Here features relating to 'Cypriotness', such as common cultural practices, past coexistence or shared traditions that are generally emphasized by Cypriotist discourse are perceived as disturbing and degenerating 'Turkishness' or, at least, they are perceived to be contingent and meaningless similarities. As an example to such kind of perception, 60-year-old **Gürsel** says**:**

> *I define myself as Turkish Cypriot, and in general terms, I presume Turkish Cypriot as an extension of Turkish nation. I say 'I am Turkish Cypriot' to specify my geographic location, but I feel myself as an individual of Turkish nation.*

A retired civil servant **Şakir** who repeatedly mentions the sacrifices of Turkish Cypriots during the ethnic struggle, gives his answer with similar perspective:

> *We are people whose culture is affected from British and Greeks, but we are Turkish. That is, our traditions and habits are different, yet we are Turkish...and Turkish Cypriots preserve their Turkishness in here thanks to the motherland...*

As a final example on such descriptions, a housewife who stresses her fear from being re-captured by Greek-Cypriots, **Canan** claims:

> *I describe myself as Turkish Cypriot, there is not one nation in Cyprus; there are two separate languages, two separate religions and two separate nations in here. Our cultures, dishes, life styles and even outside appearances are resembling, yet these do not have any meaning because we are Turkish Cypriots...Apart from this, I describe myself as Turkish Cypriot because of political reasons, to mean that I also have claim in this island, that this island is also a Turkish island. I was not born in Turkey, but my antecessors were from there, thus I am a Turkish Cypriot.*

The rest of the participants on the other hand, emphasize their Cypriot identity with differing tones: some of interviewers define themselves as solely Cypriot (4 out of 33) or as Turkish speaking Cypriots (4out of 33) and attach themselves just to Cyprus land and culture. Here, the differences between the two communities of Cyprus are perceived to be insignificant when compared to the similarities. The differences between 'Turkish' identity or *'Türkiyeliler'* and the 'Cypriotness' on the other hand, are emphasized and perceived to be much more sensible when compared to the differences between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus. To illustrate, emphasizing that he perceives his Turkish Cypriot tongue as a separate language distinct from Turkish one, a Ph.D. student **İrfan** defines his nationality as Cypriot:

> *I define myself solely as Cypriot...I presume that only the language of us is Turkish Cypriot... When you compare with the people in the South, you can not distinguish which one is Turkish and which one is Greek Cypriot...That is the basic point, sometimes language and nationality is not identical.*

Osman who defines himself as leftist and criticizes population pump from Turkey states:

> *I am a person who lives in Cyprus and have Turkish mother tongue. I am primarily Cypriot, this place is my motherland. I do not exactly know where my antecessors came from, perhaps the grandfather of my grandfather came from Turkey...the antecessors of people living in Australia or America were from England, but do they define themselves as English?*

54-year-old **Onur** who is a mechanic, complains about alienation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots and defines his identity as such:

> *I describe myself as Turkish speaking Cypriot; there are Greek speaking Cypriots, maronite Cypriots and Armenian speaking Cypriots, I am the one who speaks Turkish...Turkish speaking Cypriots are those who continue their lifetime in Cyprus since the Ottoman era.*

And **Sevgi,** a high school teacher who expresses her displeasure about decreasing tranquility in the island, also defines herself as Turkish-speaking Cypriot:

> *I am Turkish-speaking Cypriot...Turkish speaking Cypriots are those who were born, grown, live in Cyprus and internalize Cypriotness sense. We call settlers to those who came after 1974...As such; Turkish speaking Cypriots are the people who live in the period before 1974, when the Cyprus was Cyprus, and their offspring.*

Apart from these, it is grasped in interviews that the mostly preferred self-definition of participants (20 out of 33) is- what I will term as- 'turkish Cypriot'. In this

perception, the Cypriot part of the identity is much more dominant and usually more preferable though the 'Turkishness' also have more significance compared with those defining themselves solely as Cypriot or as Turkish speaking Cypriot. In this conception, the main attachment of participants is to the island of Cyprus and to the social-cultural life claimed to be experienced particularly in this social formation. As such, the difference from those who are not Cypriot preserves its importance and dominance when participants narrate their selves. However, having a secondary status, 'Turkish' part of identity that signifies linguistic, national and religious differences from Greek Cypriots is also emphasized by this group. In other words, this group defines itself firstly as Cypriot but also attach themselves to elements that are connected with 'Turkishness'. Thus, the 'Otherness' of both Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* is much more manifest in this conception of the collective identity (though with different degrees and characteristics). Illustrating the dominance of 'Cypriot' part in this perception of collective identity, 30 year-old **Gizem,** says "I prefer to define myself as Turkish Cypriot but if I have to choose one of them, I would say I am Cypriot." Similarly, 29-year-old **Ebru,** who stresses her disappointment because of the 'no' vote of Greek Cypriots in the referendum of Annan plan, states: "sometimes I ask this question to myself, I fluctuate between Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, I am Turkish Cypriot but being Cypriot is more dominant and crucial for me". To give more examples about the answers of aforementioned question 22-year-old **Mert,** an undergraduate student at a university in England who indicates that he has both Greek Cypriot and *Türkiyeli* friends in England but no *Türkiyeli* friends in Cyprus, claims:

> *I describe myself as Turkish Cypriot...Because there are two distinct communities in Cyprus… In fact, people settled here from Turkey in the past and Cypriotness is something acquired afterwards, nevertheless our contemporary life styles are very different from the one in Turkey, so Cypriotness is definitely more primary for me.*

65-year-old **Mehmet** also defines himself as Turkish Cypriot:

> *First of all I am Cypriot...because I was born in here, I took part of my education in here, as Cypriots we were born and live with Greek Cypriots in the same land. Yet, our language and our religion are different, that is there are some distinctions in the features of Turkish and Greek, because of this I define myself as Turkish Cypriot…*

55-year old retired civil servant**, Türkan,** who frequently stresses that when she criticizes *Türkiyeliler* she does not mean those educated and well-

mannered people in Turkey or those who already become similar to Cypriots, states the reason behind her definition of herself as Turkish Cypriot:

> *I am Turkish Cypriot, born and bred Turkish Cypriot. When something is happen, Türkiyeli is the Türkiyeli, I do not deny that I am Turkish but I am Turkish Cypriot; born and bred, genuine Turkish Cypriot.*

Finally, 69-year-old **Murat,** who stresses that Greek Cypriots are nothing but double dealers, answers the question as such:

> *After observing the situation of Türkiyeliler, I detach myself out of necessity. In the past I define as Turkish, but now I describe myself as Turkish Cypriot...*

Apart from above quotations that illustrate participants' answers to the question how they define themselves- as the last two quotations sheds some light on- it should be pointed out that in the continuation of participants' definition of their 'Cypriotness', their differences from so called *Türkiyeliler* has a vital role. Differently put, the narration of the self is made through the definition of contrasting points with the *Türkiyeli* 'Other'.

As an assessment of the data given in this section, it would be argued that in the conditions after 1974- when physical contact with the Greek Cypriot 'other' become impossible- the 'otherness' of Greek Cypriots and the dictated enmity between two communities has become virtual day by day and generation to generation. On the other hand, people immigrated from rural regions of Turkey to northern part of Cyprus with the population transfer policy after the war and those immigrants afterwards have had distinct socio-economic and cultural backgrounds which made them to be conceptualized as the newly faced 'Other' in everyday lives of the 'native' population. Though not constituting a homogeneous group but coming from different regions of Turkey with their distinctive attachments, this immigrant mass first and foremost was gathered under the label of *Türkiyeliler* by the 'native' population. Henceforth, "perceived to be *close relatives in the distance* until that time, when they settled *Türkiyeliler*…have been perceived as *distant relatives in the near* or…even as the foreigners."[179]That is, with their distinctive habits and life styles; and with their imagined or real connection with the social-political-economic problems, *Türkiyeliler* has become the reference point in the

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[179] S. Alankuş-Kural, 1995, 32.

definition of what Turkish Cypriots 'are not'. Concomitantly, it would be argued that in the conditions before 1974, 'Turkishness' was dominant element of self-perception of Turkish Cypriots as they differentiate themselves from Greek Cypriots, while after the physical separation of the two communities and with the population transfer from Turkey, 'Cypriotness' has been emphasized more dominantly since *Türkiyeliler* has become the 'Other' faced physically in everyday life of the 'ingenious' population. Accordingly, the more the emphasis on "Cypriotness" is increased in the self-definition, the more the "otherness" of the relatively new "other", *Türkiyeliler*, is asserted.

Having given some background information in this chapter, the following chapters focus on interviews and deal with narratives of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* and delineate the images of 'Others' in these narratives.

CHAPTER IV

TURKISH CYPRIOT IDENTITY IN RELATION TO GREEK CYPRIOTS

Coexistence of Muslim and Christian subjects, ethnic clash and war between 'Turks' and 'Greeks' of Cyprus, geographical partition of the island between two communities, the lack of communication (in the sense of face to face relations of individuals) and the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the one hand, and the recent political developments such as the Turkish Cypriot mass demand for settlement on the grounds of the Annan plan and the mutual permission of 'Republic of Cyprus' and 'Turkish Republic of Cyprus' to visit the 'other side' on the other; all had ramifications on the role of Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot identity formation. In this sense, before focusing on the self-perceptions of interview participants in relation to the more recent 'Other', *Türkiyeliler*, depiction of Greek Cypriot image and participants' self-perceptions in relation to the latter is a requirement. By this way, both the effects of the project of the left and of the Turkish nationalist discourse, whose main premises were touched upon in the previous chapter, in the popular perception will become more perceivable. That is to say, the self definitions of participants dealt in last section of previous chapter signal that Cypriotist discourse of the left has been gaining prominence in the popular perception as most of the participants emphasize their belongingness firstly to Cypriot, rather than Turkish part of their identity. Then, the image of Greek Cypriots and the role of 'Turkishness' of participants in their self-perceptions in relation to former will be uncovered in this chapter, which will also bring light to particular effects of aforementioned discourses in relation to their struggle on construction of a collective identity.

As such, the first section deals with the construction of past by participants in relation to Greek Cypriots and accordingly it is claimed that the memories about past are generally in concordance with Turkish nationalist narrativization of the past. In the second section, it is mentioned that 'culture' is perceived to be common bond between the two communities and as such, it is claimed that cultural practices

signify 'Cypriot' rather than 'Greek' or 'Turkish' belongingness in the popular discourse. Additionally, it is pointed out that relatively more inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriots reveals itself in the depiction of outside appearances of the two communities by the participants. Third section, on the other hand, elaborates the image of Greek Cypriots through informants' answers relating to reliability of Greek Cypriots and uncovers the instability at the center of representation of Greek Cypriots in popular discourse. The fourth section focuses on the depictions of participants about the transformation of Greek Cypriot image after the opening of borders and the last section deals with informants' answers to the question how Greek Cypriots perceive Turkish Cypriots, and it is claimed that perception of being perceived as the 'Other' by Greek Cypriots has a significant place in the popular discourse.

4.1. NARRATIVIZATION OF THE PAST: CRUELTY OF 'RUM' OR MUTUAL TOLERANCE?

According to Canefe, remembrance should be perceived as a process that is closely related to particular political practices in particular periods, and the subjects of remembrance strategically select some objects while the others are omitted in this process[180]. Henceforth, it could be argued that the remembrance and narration of the past is strongly connected with the struggling political discourses that depict the past with divergent representations. What is more, collective memory of the past has a key role in the construction and the perpetuation of collective identities[181]. In the previous chapter, representations of past by Turkish nationalist discourse and Cypriotist discourse were mentioned. Accordingly, it was indicated that the themes of sacrifice and struggle for emancipation in the face of Greek Cypriot cruelty on the one hand, and the stress on common past and peaceful coexistence of two communities of Cyprus before nationalist conflict on the other, have been main elements of narratives about past in Turkish nationalist and Cypriotist discourses respectively. If that is the case, it is meaningful to focus on the participants

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[180] N. Canefe, *Anavatandan Yavruvatana: Milliyetçilik, Bellek ve Aidiyet* translated by Deniz Boyraz (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 321-322.

[181] N. Canefe, "Communal Memory and Turkish Cypriot National History: Missing Links." In *National Identities and Memories in the Balkans* edited by Todorova, M. (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), 77.

remembrance of past in relation to Greek Cypriots in order to grasp their self-representation and the image of the latter in popular discourse. At this point, it should be noted that the reason behind such a start in the elaboration of Greek Cypriot image in popular discourse is the realization during the interviews that memories about past coexistence and/or interethnic conflict are significant means in the narration of Greek Cypriot 'Other' in many participants' expressions. In other words, irrespective of their attitude, when the topic is about Greek Cypriots, retrospective evaluation and representation of Greek Cypriots accordingly are frequently seen in participants having suitable age to personally experience coexistence and ethnic conflict, and also in the younger ones who mentioned their families' experiences.

To begin with, themes like pain, death, oppression and fright of the collective self because of Greek Cypriot 'Other' are popularly used in interviews for the representation of past in relation to Greek Cypriots. Thence, while Greek Cypriots as a homogeneous group is marked with cruelty, the collective self is defined as victim and the representation of past is marked with the faced sacrifices. Explaining her experiences in the ethnic war elaborately for nearly half of the interview, **Canan** stresses her distrust to Greek Cypriots stemming from the incidents she experienced in the past:

> *I would like to start with the painful days experienced in the past...We were captured in the hands of Rum for 2 months, men of our region were collected and sent to Greek side. There were solely women and children in the city...from our experiences we thought that Rum would kill them, that they would not return...They captured us, as three sisters we were carried to Limassol Turkish hospital's backyard. Their aim was murdering us in there...These kind of experiences are the reasons of those who reject the Annan plan, we have memories from our childhood and we reject this plan because we do not want to experience those days again. They prepared their arms in that backyard, they were on the point to kill us, meanwhile some people came and say them not to kill us because Turkey has more captures...By this way we rescue from death...It is not possible to express my scare...you can not imagine what kind of things has scraped into my brain that I could not forget for years…The memory of our martyrs, even this alone, is adequate reason behind rejection of peace with the Rum..*

Cemal depicts his biography with reference to ethnic conflict in the island and the past is represented with the themes misery, hardship and struggle while the 1974 military intervention of Turkey is perceived to be the happy end after hard days:

My childhood passed with misery, we were faced with several hardships... we even could not sing our anthem in schools...we then started to struggle with the Rum; they established EOKA in 1955 and struggled with us firstly in the period of 1950-60. For preserving ourselves we established TMT, gathered in this organization...I was trained in Ayaş mountain for this reason...We were faced with numerous hardships until 1974, we lived in a neighborhood surrounded by Rum, they did not give any chance to us, we endeavored to defend ourselves with some insignificant weapons. We supposed to get relaxed after the establishment of Cyprus republic in 1960 but Rum attacked to us and we waited till 74 Turkey's arrival...They captured us for three months...We faced with several hardships...They oppressed us, they even did not permit us to go the toilet...They made various tortures, beat most of us...

In the words of **Çiler**, the past is again marked with Greek Cypriots attack and Turkish Cypriots endeavor to survive:

The war continued for years, many people were seized and murdered, they were assassinated. We ourselves experienced these, I was ten years old when these occurrences were happened, thus I do not trust Rum, I do not love them...I was nine or ten years old, we were living in the Sakarya region, Rum surrounded that place and we did not have any arms, we fight with stones and bayonets against Rum, we experienced these....Enmity comes to my mind when I think the Rum, it is impossible to think of any other thing by those who experienced such occurrences.

Türkan, who openly expressed her demand for settlement in the island and states that she vote positively in the referendum of Annan settlement plan, also mentions 'their' aggression in the past in order to remark the potential of 'them' to repeat similar deeds:

We were faced with several cases, 1958s, 1963s, 1974...We supposed in each time that the situation would be recovered, but with some cloak, they attacked to us in each time. Since they perceive us as secondary citizen, perhaps even today they can do similar things if they have the chance. They still call Constantinople to Istanbul even today, and then you guess their position.

Apparently, in the aforementioned narratives of the past that are marked with the interethnic struggle, 'we' are represented to be the underdog while 'they' are perceived to be the persecutors. Additionally, depictions of the past also express these participants' position in the future: as 'they' were the cruels while 'we' were the ones who sacrificed, 'we' do not trust and dislike 'them' today and in the future. At this point, it is manifest that the pains and sacrifices of 'them'; frights and oppression of 'their' captives are omitted in these stories. In other words, "the other side-as if there ever were a singular, unitary 'other side'-becomes demonized, homogenized, and worse, omitted entirely"[182] from the narratives about past. As

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[182] J. Bowman, "*Seeing What's Missing in Memories of Cyprus", Peace Rewiew* 18 (2006): 119.

such, 'our' pains on the one hand, and 'their' treachery and cruelty on the other, result in perception of the 'Other' as unreliable and potential aggressor. **Şakir** stresses his discredit against Greek Cypriots by mentioning his experiences:

> *I had Rum friends till from my childhood, since I was 5-6 years old. There had been earthquake when I was six and British gave us blankets; we cut some of them and wave as flag and Rum woman told us to wait the day when Greece came and show our punishment. Our Rum friends had always called us with some adjectives that insult Turks. Moreover, I will never forget this, I had a Rum violin teacher, and one day I went to his house for the lecture but he was injured; and afterwards we learned that he had been injured when bombing Turks. Other than these, I witnessed the burn of our house by them and I saw their moving Turk corpses from villages to the Pafhos, thus I suspect about them...*

Apart from these remarks on the interethnic conflict which stress the brutality of the 'Other', some participants mention their past experiences for displaying particular eternal attributes of the 'Other'. A retired army officer, **Mustafa**, for example, depicts less problematic picture of the past. Yet, he adds his observations on Greek Cypriots that is marked with 'their' vigilance and skepticism:

> *I went to Bekirpaşa high school with Rum in the same bus in 1972, I was the only boy going to high school from our village Moreover, as there were no Turkish coffeehouses in our village, we went to Greek coffeehouse; until 1974 they did not display any negative behavior towards us; no one in the period of 1963 occurrences was injured from our village…We went on the same bus, my school shirt was white and theirs blue, my necktie was red and theirs blue, but we did not have any problem. Yet, I should emphasize this, they have always been much more sensitive than us to their roots, they have always been vigilant and their deeds have always had particular target...They still do not trust us, they still perceive themselves to be more clever than us…*

Hakan firstly mentions his experiences proving the opportunism of 'them', though he afterwards stresses the commonality of pains in the time of war:

> *Greek Cypriots have always been opportunist, they are still as such. For example, after 1963 occurrences, they did not sell us cement or iron as they believed that we would set up positions. Yet some of them sold us these materials in the black market with enormous prices. They also did not permit us to buy fuel oil…they even measured the amount of oil in our cars...They destroyed our vegetables in order to prevent us to sell them…That is to say, you can not wait any charity from Rum. We want settlement but they do not have any inclination towards agreement…They lament in 20th of July and we celebrate this date, this is our situation…Leftists and those who wish peace in the island are in collaboration. For example those who have missing people in their families were united. In fact our sacrifices are same, I lost my cousins and uncles…There is no 'good' war…*

Additional to aforementioned attribution of particular characteristics to the 'Other', above quotations also give a clue about the instability in the depictions of

participants generally seen in the interviews in relation to Greek Cypriots. That is, both stigmatization and relatively inclusive position towards Greek Cypriots and the tension between the two constitute the main aspect in the popular narrative of the collective self in relation to Greek Cypriots. Moreover, as would be discussed in proceeding pages, it is also blurred in participants' representations whether Greek Cypriots are perceived to be the enemy or it is perceived that Greek Cypriots one-sidedly constitute Turkish Cypriots as their enemy. In other words, it is appeared that there is an ambivalence in participants' narrations between the constitution of Greek Cypriots as the 'Other' and the perception of 'othering' of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots. Therefore, as it would become more apparent in the following pages of this chapter, complicated and contradictive rather than consistent expressions would be the hallmark of the informants' depictions in relation to Greek Cypriots.

As opposed to those participants narrating the past by victimization of the collective self, others (though having smaller number than the former) depict different story that is marked with mutual tolerance and/or commonality of pains in their expressions about Greek Cypriots. In other words, rather than stressing the interethnic struggle and war in the island, the past is represented with the emphasis on harmonious relationship between the two communities of Cyprus. Moreover, the pain owing to the war is represented to be shared by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In other words, relatively more inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriots is also apparent- especially by relatively younger ones- in some of the participants' representations about the past. To illustrate the narrativization of the past by the emphasis on harmonious relationship between the communities, 23-year-old university student **Levent** states, "what we learn from our grandfathers and read is that: one side went to the church on Sundays, the other went to the mosque on Fridays and then, with a mutual tolerance, they went to the coffeehouses and drunk their coffees together", and 19-year-old university student **Pınar** also stresses the close relationship between two communities in the past through giving example from her family, " for example my grandfather was trader and had a very good relationship with Greek Cypriots, he had many Greek Cypriot friends and my father's closest neighbor was Greek Cypriot, I have always heart positive

expressions from my family about their coexistence with Greek Cypriots". 53-year-old **Engin** illustrates the well behavior of Greek Cypriots through his experience in his childhood:

> *As a person who witnessed the past coexistence, I should stress these: Greek Cypriots really had a good attitude towards us. For example, my father was hawker and I helped to him and I remember that they behaved very well to us. Rum tradesmen gave me some money at the weekends; they gave me bags full of banana or apple each and every time…They had such a smart approach that you can not imagine…*

In line with these, rather than the stress on the sacrifices of the Turkish Cypriot collectivity in its endeavor to survive against Greek Cypriot oppression, the ethnic struggle and war in the island is represented with mutual sacrifices of the two communities by few participants whose depiction of the past signifies more inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriot community. **Aslı,** a journalist who defines herself as 'Cypriot', expresses her views in this issue as such:

> *I do not perceive Greek Cypriots with negative aspects because of my family, they had a lot of close friends who were Greek Cypriots, even their closest friends was Greek Cypriot...Thus I never perceive the war with the mentality that 'they killed us', the war affected both sides. Both they and we have martyrs, both they and we have pains...*

Mete, who was chatting with his Greek Cypriot friend when I went to his occupational place for the interview**,** also stresses the commonality of pains as a result of the clash between communities:

> *I am a person who attended the war in 1974...but I do not say that 'Greek Cypriots killed us'...Both I and Luga (his Greek Cypriot friend) now say that they were the thing of past, that we are very close friends. He saddens my grandfather's murder, just like me who feel bad because of the death of his sister's son...There were occurrences in the past, someone made us to do evil things...*

At this point, **Onur** describes another story of the past. In this description, rather than suffering, the very nationalist 'games' played by Turkish Cypriots, and rather than the problems of cohabitance with Greek Cypriots, the problems of the period that Turkish Cypriots had lived homogeneously in ghettos are emphasized:

> *In the period of 1963 I was graduated from primary school…but I remember that the headmaster gave us stones to throw Greek Cypriots in Digomo village-whose name is now 'Dikmen'- so we threw stones at Greek Cypriot buses in that period…In 1967 Turks began to live in enclaves; in that period Turkish Cypriots could go anywhere in the island but Greek Cypriots could not enter into these regions…The enclave period was very hard...in the sense that we lived in a close society. The best profession of each and every person was being soldier; everyone was 'mücahit' in that period. Additionally, as we lived in a*

closed society gambling, cinema and alcohol were the sole elements of our social life.

On the whole, mainly two different narratives of the past draw the attention in the interviews: on the one hand, the past is represented in accordance with the Turkish nationalist discourse which represent Greek Cypriots as the enemy and demonized 'them' all. Here, Greek Cypriot image is constructed through the depiction of the past with the themes of pain and sacrifices of 'us' as oppose to cruelty and oppression of 'them'. On the other hand, despite not being as dominant as the former, it is appeared in the interviews that more inclusive narrative of the past that emphasizes the commonality of pains and focuses on mutual tolerance between two communities before the conditions of the war is also on the scene. Then, it would be argued that, despite having official dominance for a long time, Turkish nationalist discourse and its representation of past with symbols of pain is not directly embraced by all participants and especially by the younger ones. Nevertheless, in relation to Greek Cypriots, the past is still predominantly marked with the interethnic war and Turkish Cypriots' sacrifices in popular perception.

4.2. CULTURAL PRACTICES AND PHYSICAL APPEARENCES: PREVALENCE OF SIMILARITIES

Despite the expressions about peaceful coexistence of two communities and the stress of some participants' on common experiences of pain and sacrifice in the period of ethnic struggle in the island, in the last section it is uncovered that prevailing depiction of the past, especially for relatively elder participants who personally witnessed the war between two communities of Cyprus, is unidimensional emphasis on the sacrifice of Turkish Cypriots in the face of Greek Cypriot oppression. As such, opposite images of the collective self and Greek Cypriot 'Other' is the prevailing conception in the narration of past by the participants. However, when the subject matter is related to culture and physical appearances- which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, is one of the most popular topics in the enumeration of differences of Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler*- similarity rather than opposition, is the dominant perception in participants' comparison of their selves and Greek Cypriots. Therefore, it should be

remarked beforehand that while cultures and outside appearances are perceived as points of separation in relation to *Türkiyeli* 'Other' and as such, significant in the emphasis on the uniqueness of the collective identity with which participants identified their selves; these elements signify the commonality rather than uniqueness when the object of comparison is Greek Cypriots. Differently put, culture and physical appearances constitute the elements that are represented to be shared between two communities of Cyprus, so it could be claimed that they are perceived to be connected to 'Cypriot' part of these particular identities rather than 'Greek' or 'Turkish' parts. This, on the other hand; signals that 'culture' connects precisely the 'Cypriots' while excludes those 'non-Cypriots' in popular discourse.

In the description of cultural similarities between the two communities, eating habits, shared cuisine and life styles - which are also touched upon in the differentiation of *Türkiyeli* and Turkish Cypriot cultures as will be indicated in the following chapter- are popularly given illustrations in the interviews. **Hasan** compares Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in cultural terms and claims:

> *The only cultural difference between us is the fact that they eat pork but we do not. Other than this, everything of us is identical. They love rakı, so we do; they like cooking meat on the brazier rather than in the oven, so we do; they eat şeftali kabap, so we do; they eat pilavuna, so we do; that is, we are not different in cultural terms, we are identical. There are not many things that you can point out as difference, they are just more powerful economically than us, but they are more rigid than us, we are more sensitive.*

Sevgi, who stresses the huge differences between Turkish Cypriot and *Türkiyeli* cultures, believes that other than the religious beliefs and mother tongues, Turkish and Greek speaking Cypriots share common cultural formation:

> *Greek-speaking Cypriots, they are the people with whom we share an identical culture. We have many common points, that is; they feel just the same what I feel in the face of particular happening, so we understand each other in our conversations. When I say 'hellim', they know the taste of it, we eat same meals, our relationship styles are similar; we are identical; we do not have any difference except our languages and the religion which is more dominant in their society.*

According to **Aslı**, though their religion and languages are different, two communities of Cyprus resemble culturally and even genetically:

> *Their language and religion is different... Of course religion has some effects, of course there are certain differences but we lived together until recent past, so in terms of life styles, of meals there are many identical characteristics; our conception of life, our way of life, all are very similar. What is more, there are*

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incredible similarities in scientific, genetic terms, for example, in leukemia cases, donors are mostly supplied from one another.

Pınar, on the other hand, mentions similarities in familial relations, in her words, "... in the topics like family structures, familial relationships, parents' protection of children, I believe that we resemble more to Greek Cypriots". At this point, though it is perceived that "we" have differences from Greek Cypriots- such as 'our' language, 'our' religion', the power of religion in 'our' daily lives, 'our' sensitiveness- the shared elements between us (Cypriots) surpasses the differences and cause 'us' to become closer to each other. Differently put, in relation to culture, rather than 'Turkishness' or 'Greekness' of the two communities, 'Cypriotness' is perceived to be the dominant element of identity. Thence, while national and religious belongingness are detrimental in the expression of differences, socio-cultural values and practices are represented to be the basis of similarities, so while the former signifies conflict, the latter refers to reconciliation relation between the two communities.[183]

In a similar vein, on the question whether it is possible to distinguish Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by looking their outside appearances; almost all of the participants claim that the outside appearances are very similar except some details, so it is perceived to be difficult to distinguish the members of each community through the eye perception. That is, similar to that of cultural characteristics, the physical image of the 'Other' is represented to be similar with the collective self and as such, more inclusive perception towards Greek Cypriots is constructed on the topic where *Türkiyeliler* are perceived as 'different'. That is the case; participants' descriptions of the outside appearances of Greek Cypriots are detrimental in grasping both the image of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in interviewees' perceptions. At this juncture, though it will be dealt in the following chapter, as informants make twofold comparison- with Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler*- in relation to their physical appearances, certain points relating to physical image of *Türkiyeliler* would inevitably be revealed beforehand. For instance**, Türkan** answers the aforementioned question as such:

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[183] H. Yücel, "Geçmişe Dönmek, Bugünde Kalmak, Geleceği Yaşamak." *Birikim* 180 (2004): 4.

You can not distinguish, very similar; even our facades are very similar. We are the people of the same country, two brother communities. Only the languages are different, people resemble to each other, their facade, hair styles, dresses, modernity all are very similar. Perhaps there are some women wearing black dresses in the villages, but also there are those in our elders who still wear their blacks. For example, Türkiyeliler also do not offend the eyes in their regions, they also find strange our dresses, but the issue is that they are not matching to here. When I wear jeans, a shalvared woman looks strangely to me.

Apart from the emphasis on 'modernity' that is shared between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (as opposed to *Türkiyeliler*), what is interesting in this depiction is the fact that even the traditional dressing styles are perceived to be shared between two communities- though in the stated contrast between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish Cypriot outside appearances that will be dealt in the next chapter, the former is the sole one be marked with traditionalism in dressing style. That is, as will become more apparent in the following chapter, "those elders of us who still wear their blacks" are omitted in the representation of outside appearances of *Türkiyeliler* that is made through the emphasis on duality between modernly dressed Turkish Cypriots and traditional *Türkiyeliler.*

To continue with participants' answers to the related question, it is impossible to distinguish Turkish and Greek Cypriots through looking outside appearances according to **Mete,** because "even their body languages are same". **Aslı** similarly states that "everything, dressing styles, entertainment styles, facade, skin tone, hair-cut styles even accents are same tough they have different languages." Thence, just like the depiction of cultural formations of two communities, physical appearances are represented to be identical causing 'Cypriots' to become closer while excluding the 'non-Cypriots'. Apart from these, some of the participants mention the differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots though expressing that they have resembling outside appearances. To illustrate, the answer of **Gizem** to the question is that:

They can not be distinguished at a first glance, yet their women are different, their young women are very pretty. Our women easily slump down but the outlook is much more important for them.

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Similarly, **Emre** states that "they are very well-groomed...to be honest; their women wear higher quality dresses." For **İrfan**, on the other hand, "their physical appearances resemble, but some Greek Cypriots are more relaxed in terms of hair and beard cut and the others are more metrosexual..." **Özge** on the other hand differentiate 'their' elders and young and says that "their elder women wear black dresses and put the cross, younger ones on the other hand looks more European than us, and Turkish Cypriots have an in-between outlook". Interestingly, in these representations, where the details bring to light who Turkish Cypriots and who Greek Cypriots are, there is a hierarchy between outlooks and the 'Other' in this particular topic is perceived to stand on a 'higher' position. The comparison of the physical image of the collective self and the 'Other' delineated in these representations with the one in relation to *Türkiyeliler* would be significant and this will be made in the following chapter.

Finally, for small section of participants, though the appearances are similar, because of the geographic separation that brought about unfamiliarity, it is possible to distinguish Greek Cypriots from Turkish Cypriots. **Şakir**, states that "you can not distinguish through looking their faces...you can understand by their gaze, their gaze like that of the stranger, they look timidly, because they are afraid of Turks, but you can not distinguish as easily as *Türkiyelile*r" and **Onur** states that not because of physical appearance but because of the partition of island it becomes possible to distinguish Greek Cypriots:

> *Before 1974 it was impossible to distinguish...But after 30-35 years of separation, our behaviors like stranger, we are alienated from each other because of separation. Thus it became possible to distinguish each other.*

As outlined in this section, mutually shared cultural elements and similar physical outlooks are the predominant expressions in relation to Greek Cypriots in participants' narratives. Hence, it is apparent that informants perceive their selves to have more affinities with Greek Cypriots- rather than *Türkiyeliler*- in cultural and physical characteristics. However, in the period these interviews were made, aforementioned stress on common culture is followed with separation of individual relations from societal relations, and diversification of politics and culture in some of the participants' expressions. That is to say, despite the emphasis on cultural

harmony between two communities of Cyprus, some of participants contrast politics and culture in order to emphasize the significance of aforementioned similarity in their perception. At this point, it is believed by some participants that because of 'their' political orientation, cultural similarities between two communities do not give way to political reconciliation. To illustrate the latter point of view, after describing the cultural similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, **Hasan** adds: "I trust them in cultural terms but not in societal and political one, because their ideal aim is still transforming Cyprus to a Greek island". With a similar approach, **Mustafa** compares the two communities says:

> *In personal characteristics, there is no difference between us. We rejoice and bother from similar things, we both speak loudly, and our dishes are same... Two grandchildren of the Ottoman, one are Muslim and the other Christian; there is no difference. Thus in terms of personal relationship they resemble to us, yet when the subject matter is state rule, the situation changes; their only goal is to hold the state power in their hands... As a retired soldier, what I observed is that: in terms of individual relationship both of us really have Mediterranean spirit, but their government directs them through using psychological techniques. Many Greek Cypriots do not have any idea that we also have rights in Cyprus Republic...They asked why to share their prosperity with us; and because of this they do not want settlement.*

Canan also enumerates the similarities but then she reminds that these are meaningless in the political realm:

> *Our culture, our folklore, our dishes, our life styles and even our facades resemble; we lived together for a long time so there are many similar aspects. But these are meaningless, we are Turkish Cypriots and we have our own governors and our own state.*

Comparing his personal relationship with Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler*, **Mert** believes that nothing but political matters are the conflicting points between him and his Greek Cypriot friends:

> *I feel more close to and feel relaxed when I am with my Greek Cypriot friends as compared to Türkiyeli ones. But the problem with Greek Cypriots is that, when the topic is related to political issues, we debate even with my best friends. Certainly our demands are conflicting. But when the issue is entertainment or something other than politics I feel myself very happy with them...The difference of Greek Cypriots is that, they are very rigid in political issues and they do not want to share political and economic power with us. Even they do not directly state this; it is manifest that they do not want to share the facilities of Cyprus Republic with us.*

In summary, it is uncovered in the interviews that cultural practices and physical appearances are constituted as elements of inclusion in relation to Greek Cypriots in

the popular discourse. Differently put, it is possible to assert that participants perceive their culture to be connected with the island of Cyprus in contrast to the Turkish nationalist discourse that narrates the identity of the population under focus solely with reference to 'motherland' in particular and Turkishness in general. However, as noted in the quotations above and will be touched upon in proceeding pages, since it is believed that cultural commonalities are related to individual relations, such a stress on similarities between the two communities of Cyprus does not pave the way for a demand for enlargement of societal or political sharing with Greek Cypriots by all of the participants who mention the similarities. Apart from these, it should also be remarked beforehand that aforementioned inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriots where the 'Greekness' and 'Turkishness' of each communities are perceived to be secondary in relation to their 'Cypriotness', excludes those 'non-Cypriots' in the island- particularly *Türkiyeliler* who are not 'natives' of Cyprus. Moreover, it would be speculated that the strict emphasis on sameness between the cultural formations of the two communities would pave the way for problematic relationship with the 'Other' in the conditions of 'realization' of the difference of the latter through closer relationship.

4.3. TRUST TOWARDS THE 'OTHER': COULD 'GAVUR' BE A FRIEND?

The image of Greek Cypriots in popular discourse is not coherent as could be understood by the comparison of depictions in previous sections. On the contrary; contradicting expressions are coexisting in the narratives of participants about different topics in relation to Greek Cypriots. In the last section, it is uncovered that more inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriots is the prevailing position in the discussions of cultural and physical characteristics of the two communities. This section, on the other hand, focuses on participants trust and disposition towards closer relationship(coexistence) with the aforementioned community through given answers to such questions as whether it is impossible to be friends with Greek Cypriots, whether they rely on Greek Cypriots and whether they accept to live in the same district with Greek Cypriots . Despite the emphasis on similarities between the peoples of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in the period these interviews were made (when it is relatively politically stagnant period in terms of negotiations for the

reconciliation of so called Cyprus problem) it is uncovered that the predominant tendency is distrust against Greek Cypriot 'Other' though the former is not strictly represented to be the enemy. Paradoxically, although there are those who give negative or conditional answer to the question, most of the participants indicate that they would like to live together with Greek Cypriots.

Constructing the social through friend-enemy dichotomy and implying the eternal enmity and distrust towards the 'gavur'(infidel) which generally refers to Greek Cypriot 'Other', one of the commonly known preposition in the northern part of the island is "domuzdan post gavurdan dost olmaz". In order to understand the strength of this perception in popular discourse, it is asked in interviews whether participants agree on aforementioned statement. The answers, on the other hand; changes from total rejection to total agreement with the connotations of aforementioned claim. To begin with the opponents who constitute approximately the half of the addressees of this question, demonization of this particular community by making generalizations is criticized. **Pınar** opposes to this claim on the grounds that " it is a racist talk, it is not possible to agree with statements representing all Rums as bad..."; similarly **Nilgün** states that " I do not believe this...I do not discriminate people according to their language, religion and race", **Mert** also disagrees and claims that "this is a nationalist talk, I think we should firstly respect anyone because s/he is a human; being Rum, English, American or Jewish is not important..", **Engin** rejects the constructed connection between nationality and evilness and claims that " evil mind is not related no Greekness", and **Mehmet** remarks that "human is human, religions, languages, races may be different but both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are human". Apart from these, some of the opponents point out that such kind of propositions is consciously constructed by nationalists for encouraging separatist perceptions in society. To illustrate, **Deniz** states:

> *During the so called national struggle period, construction of difference was required...With slogans, they made generalizations about Greek Cypriots as evils...Enemy is required for the existence of nation, so they claimed that Greek Cypriots are the enemy...Still today some people believe in such kind of statements, but we are lucky that we were born after 1974 and perceive those statements as allegements.*

As such, aforementioned claim and stigmatization of Greek Cypriot community as a homogeneous group is rejected on humanist and universalist grounds by these participants. Yet, it would be argued that such a universalist approach become apparent in extreme instances like that of presumption of eternal enmity between the two communities.

Nevertheless, according to the second half of the participants' views, aforementioned statement implying eternal skepticism towards Greek Cypriots is acceptable. In this perception, the reference to the past experiences that is marked with the cruelty of Rum as touched upon in the first section is again on the scene. That is to say, the painful days of the past are perceived as references proving the impossibility of friendship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Interestingly, this time some of the relatively younger participants and also some of those who express their demand for peace in the island share the perception that Greek Cypriots are unreliable and that the past is marked with struggle and oppression of Turkish Cypriots. An as illustration, **Gizem** states:

> It is true. Eating, drinking or chatting with a person is something, being friend with a person is totally another thing. We should not forget that the past is the mirror of the future. I can not forget that we had bad experiences with that society and I have to be careful…Yes it may seems oppressive to say something like that, but we had experiences…You have to keep those experiences in the memory…

33-year old **Melda** who indicates that she voted 'yes' in the referendum of Annan plan claims:

> We did not witness the war, but as a result of our elders' experiences, we understand that it is quite hard to be friend with…It is certainly not necessary to be friends; in fact I do not trust them.

Ahmet foregrounds his Turkish nationalist and religious attachments and says:

> In fact it is a true statement. Elders experienced this, thus they know more. 'There is no friend for Turk other than Turk', in fact this is truer...It may be severe, but it is not possible to be friend with Rum…Yet I think they are not enemy either, but I do not trust them because they do not love a Muslim society, because they are Orthodox…

Cemal, who also states that he vote positively in the referendum, agrees with this preposition since he believes that Greek Cypriots do not want to share equal rights with Turkish Cypriots:

It is right; gavur can not be friend of us. We thought that they transformed themselves to a certain extent, but they did not. What they were 33 years ago and what they are today are just the same. They want us to live under their rule; they do not want to give any right to us. The only solution is division of political rule and continuance of separate existence in the island.

In line with these, some of the participants express their distrust to Greek Cypriot community in their answers to the question whether they trust to Greek Cypriots. At this point, as it is stated before, it should be noted that many participants have contradictory perception about Greek Cypriots, so their answers to different questions sometimes contradict with each other. Moreover, as mentioned before, since personal and political or personal and societal relationships are generally differentiated by the participants, it is blurred whether their distrust is against Greek Cypriots as members of this particular community or against the political practices and discourses perceived to be the dominant in this community. To continue with participants' expressions on their distrust against Greek Cypriots, **Türkan** asserts her opinion as such:

Greek Cypriots are probably not very reliable community, we always have a suspicion and uneasiness in our minds, especially those whose family members were murdered feel hatred...This feeling is confirmed and can never be changed. In any case, whether they are very well mannered or not, there is a hatred and resentment towards them.

Sinan states his distrust to Greek Cypriots with these words:

You can not trust to Rums, it is not obvious what they will do; they could do everything bad for us. If they have the possibility, Greek administration tries to execute the enosis even now. They still keep alive the hatred they had before the 1974.

Gürsel stresses that there is not a personal reliability problem but that of political and societal:

Reliability is something relative, for example ten Rum can not give harm to me where Turkish Cypriots constitute the majority...Yet, when I look in societal terms, I can not say that I trust to them, that is; I do not trust them if it is agreed to return to the past conditions. Thus, rather than personal discredit, I have political and societal suspicions, I believe that their politics would constrain us.

And, **Hasan** mentions lack of confidence between the two communities:

Neither they trust to us nor do we rely on them. We sold their properties and lost their reliance; and we think that they still could kill us and still do not totally trust to them.

In this vein, it is possible to claim that- though not rigidly perceiving Greek Cypriots as their enemies- the reliability of Greek Cypriots in participants' perceptions is not very high and especially the past experiences are perceived to be the reason behind such a lack of reliability. Additionally, as will be pointed out in the next section more elaborately, it could be argued that the referendum results of Annan settlement plan also have affected such kind of perception since considerable number of participants mention their disappointment about the fact that majority of Greek Cypriot citizens vote against the Annan settlement plan.

In order to grasp their preferred relationship with Greek Cypriots, it is asked to participants what kind of socio-political relationship they want to see between the two communities of the island, and for analyzing their trust towards Greek Cypriot people it is asked whether they accept to live in the same district with the members of this community. Here again, despite the limited number of interviews, the responses are multifarious. Moreover, it is understood that the reliability of Greek Cypriots in many participants eyes vary form question to question, that is; the same participant would demand for peace and close relationship between two communities and does not prefer to live in the same district with Greek Cypriots at the same time, or oppositely; same participant might both claim that Greek Cypriots only think the bad for Turkish Cypriots and that Turkish and Greek Cypriots can live in the same district harmoniously. For instance, **Ebru** states her preferred relationship between communities as such:

> *What I want is very close human relationship with them, and politically, it is undeniable fact that these communities had lived together peacefully for ages. I want to live together with Greek Cypriots in the island, with tranquility, peace and equality.*

Yet, for the question whether she accept to live together with Greek Cypriots in the same district, she says:

> *I do not think so now, I do not trust them. I presume that they will make me feel myself as inferior even if we live side by side in the same district. As long as they are not educated, this situation will continue, this problem can not be solved solely by settlement.*

Sinan who states that Greek Cypriots can do whatever bad for Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, claims that he wants to live together with the former:

> *Of course I can live in the same district with them, we have similar culture, and our life styles are similar; because of the shared culture I do not believe that there would be problems in neighborhood relationship. Even I wish closer relationship with them, even familial relationships. Thus I can live with them but they are not ready to this now.*

Hüseyin who states that he realized after the opening the fact that Greek Cypriots can not be friends, believes that cultural similarities enable the coexistence:

> *Turkish Cypriots can live with anybody, also with Greek Cypriot. We can live together with the latter easily because there is a cultural commonality. I say this in terms of individual relationship, in terms of neighborhood relationship: I can live with Greek Cypriots in the same district.*

Similarly, **Nilgün** indicates that she can live together with Greek Cypriot neighbors:

> *I can live with Greek Cypriots; it is not a problem for me. Yet, it perhaps needs time to have close relationship since we need to get to know each other. Having close relationship is related to individual characteristics, if we have similar mind then why not to live in the same district? I think ordinary people can live together, the problem is political...*

Interestingly, comparing her possibility to live side by side with people from Hatay and with Greek Cypriots, **Türkan** prefers the latter though it is not her first choice:

> *I prefer to live in a separate region; I am not sure whether I can live in the same district because I have never lived side by side with them. Thus I am a bit doubtful, but if you ask me to choose between living side by side with Türkiyeliler- but when I say Türkiyeli I refer to those from Hatay and alike- and living with Greek Cypriot then I certainly prefer to live with Greek Cypriot.*

That is to say, as it is perceived that 'culture' is the connecting bond between two communities and since it is believed that Greek Cypriots have 'appropriate' characteristics for personal relationship, living in the same district is accepted by these participants. Here, Türkan's comparison of particular section of *Türkiyeliler* and Greek Cypriots and her preference to live together with the latter despite her suspicions, is significant in the sense that socio-economic and cultural criteria comes prior to the 'national' one in her perception. As a matter of fact, it would be claimed that those participants having positive answer to the aforementioned question perceive cultural commonality to be prior to the conflicting national attachments.

On the other hand, (though having smaller number than those accepting to live together with Greek Cypriots) some of the participants express their reluctance against living in an ethnically heterogeneous state. For the question about preferred relationship with Greek Cypriots, **Melda** states:

> *I think the existing situation is well, we can go there and they can come here; no one harms the other but I do not want to live in a mixed manner. I vote yes to the Annan Plan, but it was a societal reaction, in fact I do not want to live in a mixed state, the past experiences and pains are still there. If Turkish and Greek Cypriots could coexist, they would have made it before and the war would have not occurred...I do not want to live with a Greek Cypriot in the same district, I have child, and I have family. A kind of distance is necessary, many things had happened before...*

Cemal on the other hand, describes his opinion as such:

> *We met after the opening, they have good and bad people, but there is not such a condition making us to live together...We said yes in the referendum, thinking our children not to face with hard days that we experienced; we said yes but the other side do not reply with sincerity. Thus the distance between us has been enlarged...It is impossible to live together. We are determined to live in this side until the end of our lives and they will live in the other side.*

Canan stresses that only political partition would bring security to the society:

> *In fact, we are not narrow-minded, we can be friends, we can entertain together, but everything of us should be separate...That is, when I close my door I do not want to wonder whether Rum come and say me that he will take my husband and child...People unconsciously accept the Annan Plan....Some people say me that I am not peace supporter, is there a war in here? There is peace in the island since 1974...*

Finally, **Şakir** also states that his preference is separate existence of two communities in the island:

> *I prefer to live separately, but I would like to engage in any relationship with them. There will not be any Greek Cypriot it my district; my economy, my civil servant, my police and like this should be separate in order not to suspect whether they make me something bad. Other than this, to governments would have a good and close relationship...The only way to live in the same district would be as such, for instance, there would be one Greek Cypriot and four Turkish Cypriot, but if the ratio is 2 Greek Cypriot and 3 Turkish Cypriot it will not be acceptable for me.*

Eventually, the tension in the representation of Greek Cypriots in many of the participants' expressions and the unsteadiness about the role of the former in the meaning world of the latter become evident when the topic is about the reliability of and disposition to coexist with the 'Other'. Then, though Greek Cypriots are not strictly the 'enemy' of 'us', they are still the 'Other' and unreliable in the end.

Nevertheless, we 'Cypriots' can live side by side as our culture is similar which makes personal relationships be possible. Yet, what kind of relationship is possible with such a notion becomes a question mark that could not be easily answered. As such, it could be claimed that the struggling narratives of Turkish nationalist discourse and Cypriotist discourse pave the way for contradictory image of Greek Cypriots in popular discourse. Other than this, though having smaller number in this limited scoped study, it would be noted that the presumptions of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus still continues its dominance in the perceptions of some participants.

4.4. IMAGE OF GREEK CYPRIOT BEFORE AND AFTER THE 'OPENING OF DOORS'

Although there have been several negotiations between the leaders of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and there have been various settlement propositions, it is the introduction of Annan settlement plan -in the period when Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus acceptance to EU membership was on the scene- into the agendas of each community that paved the way for popularized political struggle in the northern part of the island between those supporters and opponents of aforementioned settlement plan. Apart from other developments during this period, opening of some border points between the communities in 2003 could be perceived as significant since- apart from other things- it enabled the members of each community to visit the 'other side'- or 'that side' as generally used in the popular discourse- which was not possible for almost 30 years. Therefore, the chance to have personal interaction with the people in 'that side'; (especially for younger generation) to see concrete individuals living in the 'other side' and, at least, to have the liberty of tripping in the island as a whole was gained after a long period of time. In this sense, assessments about the 'opening of the doors' as it is put in popular discourse, and the effects of aforementioned development on participants perception of Greek Cypriots are tried to be grasped through the questions how they evaluate the 'opening of doors' after thirty years, and whether/how the Greek Cypriot image is changed after the 'opening'.

To begin with the assessments about so called 'opening of the doors', it is perceived that the opening symbolizes the demonstration of the welfare of Turkish Cypriot society to Greek Cypriots in some participants' representations. In other words, since it is believed that the latter perceives the former as having an inferior status as will be dealt in the next section, the opening of the borders is perceived to enable Turkish Cypriots to show off their equal status and their wellbeing to Greek Cypriots. In this manner, considerable number of participants point out that not the image of Greek Cypriots in their minds, but the image of Turkish Cypriots in the former's mind has drastically changed after the encounter of two communities. As an example, **Cemal** evaluates the opening as such:

> *It was a good development; Rum came here and saw how we live. They supposed that we are living in poverty and we are in a miserable condition. They realize that there is a community existing in equal conditions with them, they understand that we never have lower status than them. Thus, they gave up their hope from this side.*

Şakir also states that the opening makes Greek Cypriots to realize the welfare of Turkish Cypriots:

> *During the period when the doors were closed, Greek Cypriots supposed that we are hungry, that we use donkeys for transportation etc. They realize that we are mature in every aspect. We also go and see, at least we see their perceptions about us, we tried to explain that we are also human and Cypriots.*

Hasan also emphasizes the amazement of Greek Cypriots with the opening of borders:

> *In fact, it is Greek Cypriots, more than us, who changed their mind. In the first days that we went there, they were very surprised...our dresses, our outlook surprised them. Because our dresses, our shoes and alike were even superior. Their perception was very different, but since we start shopping in there they offer very good service to us, this is totally commercial. Yet they are still amazed because of our spending, because of the cars we used etc...*

In a similar vein, **Aslı** mentions the surprise that Greek Cypriots came across with the opening of borders, "they supposed that we live in military camps, but when they see the houses that we live in, they were shocked." Thence, it would be claimed that additional to the ability to see the 'Other', the opening is perceived to enable participants to show their selves and their socioeconomic power to the 'Other'. Differently put, it is perceived that Greek Cypriots underestimate Turkish Cypriot community, so it is necessitated to prove 'them' that the latter have as good status as the former. In other words, it would be claimed that the opening

itself has a role in some participants' being sure of to their selves and to the collectivity they attach themselves.

Apart from demonstrative role of aforementioned development in the island, it would be noted that almost all of the participants (except Özge who claimed that the opening has no benefit for Turkish Cypriots and Gökçen who claimed that the opening brought about more disadvantages than the advantages) expressed their pleasure owing to the ability to cross to the 'other side'. Nevertheless, the stated pleasure from the opening have distinct reasons for different participants, to illustrate some of the stated accounts; for **Onur** the opening displays that "Cyprus problem is not a struggle between people but a political struggle...no serious problem has happened between people since the opening but they show hospitality to each other" , **Mehmet** states that "it is a crucial step in the political agreement between the two communities living in the same piece of land", for **Gürsel** on the other hand; the opening is fine "because young generation supposed that… peace is necessary. Yet…they realized the reality that Greek Cypriots do not behave according to general assumptions, so the sincerity of Greek Cypriots is scrutinized after the opening", in the words of **Melda** the opening is celebrated on the grounds that it enables new shopping alternatives, in her words " opening is fine I think, we can find several products in the other side that we could not reach before, Marks and Spencer and alike, it gives us shopping facilities", **Türkan** states that the opening eliminate her wonder about 'that side', " it was fine, I wondered how is that side, how people live in there; we improve ourselves culturally and economically for years, I wondered their situation" and **Çiler** illustrates another approach about the opening: rather than any other thing- such as communication with Greek Cypriots- the opening signifies just a permission to see the left places and properties one more time.

> *After the opening everyone's wonderment that has continued since 1974 come to an end, people went there and saw their houses and left places...They saw the regions they left, but I think that is all. The curiosity is ended and the trips to the other side become stagnant. In the beginning, there was an enthusiasm, but it is ended because everyone went and saw their houses and places up to now.*

Having touched upon the assessments of participants about the opening, the rest of this section would focus on the effects of this development in the Greek Cypriot

image in participants' perceptions. At this point, there are two prevailing and opposite depictions of transformation in Greek Cypriot image in the interviews: on the one hand some of the participants mentioned transformation of the negative image of Greek Cypriots to the positive, yet on the other; considerable number of interview participants emphasize their disappointment after the opening of borders (and especially after the referendum of Annan Plan). To begin with the expressions of those participants having the first position, **Levent** enumerates the changes in his mind after the opening:

> *We did not see any Rum and they were imaginary beings until the opening of the doors. The image in my mind that referred to the Rum was a kind of creature having axe in his hand, it was something like monster. In that April that the doors were opened, I went to the other side with a great wonder; I wonder how the people in there, what kind of things there are in that side. In add, I heard too much rumors that the other side is highly developed than us, so I supposed that I would go to somewhere like New York. I went and saw that they are just like us humans...they also supposed us as barbarians, we supposed that they are very developed; now each supposition became smoother.*

Ahmet also states that his presumptions about Greek Cypriots have changed after the opening:

> *I realize this: we thought that Greek Cypriots are our enemies, that they are bad people, that we should not communicate with them; after the opening I went and saw that they are not different than us, they just have more facilities, they have better economic situation. Of course they also have fanatics, their state also dictates enmity, but they are not different than us.*

Sevgi mentions the changing and unstable image of Greek Cypriots in her perception in different periods:

> *I was ten years old in the war of 1974, I did not have any acquaintance with Greek Cypriots before because we lived in a region where only Turkish people dwelled. We only went sometimes to their region for shopping or for swimming...the only thing stated to us was not to talk since they would understand that we are Turkish. This was my Greek Cypriot image for a long time, 'not to talk or they would understand that we are Turkish', thus I felt danger from them and had a distance... The process of change in my mind started when I grown up and felt my Cypriotness in danger...I realized that there are other Cypriots in Cyprus, that Greek Cypriots are Cypriots as well. For preserving this essence, my opinions smoothened...With the opening of doors, I saw that they are also human just like us, that their state also pumped enmity just like ours, in the end both of us had made mistakes in the past... I was very hopeful before the opening that we could live together, but I realized the dominance of church; so I am not very hopeful now, they should try hard for peace in the island...Turkish-speaking Cypriots are ready for peace but I do not believe so for Greek Cypriots.*

Gizem explains her observations after the opening as such:

I had believed that they were our enemy. But after the opening I saw smiling, I saw the curiosity similar to mine, I saw that they asked me similar question that I asked to them; many of them said me that they wish politics be not as such, I saw that we are identical.

Finally, **Nilgün** also points out her realization of similarities between two communities, " we have always listened from the elders that there exist two enemy communities in this land...I saw after opening that they are very close to us in every aspect; their outlook, their behaviors are just resemble to ours." Thence, it could be claimed that the image of Greek Cypriots that is in accordance with the long lasting official nationalist discourse, which proposes Greek Cypriots as the opposites of Turkish Cypriots and stresses the impossibility of good relationship between the two communities of island, lost ground to a great extend.

However, in the period these interviews were made, it was observed that Greek Cypriots are perceived to be the responsible of the non-settlement in the island. In this sense, most of the participants indicate their disappointment after the opening as they find Greek Cypriots distant towards Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the numeric majority of the opponents of Annan plan in the southern part of the island are referred in the depiction of disillusionment of the participants about Greek Cypriot community. Thence, for these participants Greek Cypriot image is changed from negatively as it is believed that Greek Cypriot community do not demand peace and sharing with Turkish Cypriots.

To illustrate, **Murat**:

Before the opening I thought that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could live together, but after the opening, when I saw the attitudes of most of them, my opinion has changed. They disdain us … they do not want to live with us.

Hüseyin also claims that his views about Greek Cypriots have transformed:

If the doors had open before, Turkish Cypriots would have also vote 'no' to the Annan plan...My opinion about Greek Cypriots totally changed; before the opening the elders say that it is not possible to be friends with Greek Cypriots but we did not want to believe this…. We realized that… they perceive us as their headache and if they had the chance they are prepared to sacrifice Turkish Cypriots

Deniz indicates his disappointment with these words:

There is a point, when we were endeavoring for peace; we hope Greek Cypriots would have been much more active; perhaps we deify them before the

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opening. But they, especially their youth, are not communicating with us, they keep distance. This is frightening, that is; they are those people who we will live together if the common-state is going to be established in the future. But they look distantly toward us; they do not accept us...

Finally, **Ebru** indicates that 'their' negative vote for the referendum transformed her opinion about Greek Cypriots:

Not after the opening of doors, but after the referendum my mind was changed. As I support the peace … I thought that the evil things of the past do not need to be recurred in the future. I thought that if some recovery will be made, this is us who would do that. After the opening I still thought like that...but having seen that even AKEL supported the 'no', I began to perceive them as selfish and after the referendum they start to loose their sympathy for me, I do not have any inclination to trip to that side now, I am disappointed.

Consequently, taking aforementioned two different types of transformations mentioned by the participants , it would be argued that the opening has dual effect in the sense that it signifies both the diminish in the strength of the presumptions of nationalist discourse that demonize Greek Cypriots and also opens way for nationalist attachment since many participants still perceive themselves as victims, this time not because of Greek Cypriots' oppression but as a result of 'their' distance and 'no' vote in the referendum. At this juncture, it would be claimed that the image of Greek Cypriots before the encounter was constructed on sameness phantasmatically(as also evident in the strong stress on identical cultures between the two communities that is elaborated in the second section) and after the encounter with the concrete members of this particular community, the tension between the phantasmic image of Greek Cypriots and apparent 'reality' resulted in participants perception of the latter as distant and disappointing.

4.5. NARRATION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT IMAGE OF GREEK CYPRIOTS AND IDEALISATION OF 'THAT SIDE'

The last section elaborated the effects of encounter with the members of Greek Cypriot community to the Greek Cypriot image in participants' perception, and it is mentioned that while some participants emphasize the transformation of Greek Cypriot image in a positive manner, others expressed their disappointment after the opening since it is believed that the former inferiorized the latter. In this framework,

this section will touch upon participants' answers on the question how are Turkish Cypriots perceived by Greek Cypriots. By this way, the discrepancy between participants' self-perception and their sense of 'perception from outside' is tried to be uncovered. Additionally, another topic where the image of Greek Cypriot community is marked with superiority (in contrast to Turkish Cypriot one) in participants' narratives will be delineated in this section.

As it is mentioned in preceding sections, although there are predominant perspectives in particular points, conceptions of participants about Greek Cypriot community and their representations in relation to particular topics are not monophthong but multifarious and even unstable. Nevertheless, it is observed that participants share more or less common views about their image in the eyes of Greek Cypriots. That is to say, almost all of the addressees of aforementioned question expressed their discomfort because of Greek Cypriots' perception of Turkish Cypriots as having an inferior status in comparison to the former. Differently put, it is believed that Greek Cypriot community perceives Turkish Cypriots as the 'Other'. Thus, having an inferior position in the eyes of Greek Cypriots is criticized and it is emphasized that, rather than having a hierarchical relationship, people of the two communities have equal/identical status. To illustrate some of the answers given to aforementioned question, **Ebru** states "it is a reality that they perceive us as minority, it is clear that they do not perceive us as their equals. They perceive us as wretched, as second class people", similarly **Hakan** mentions the discrepancy between Turkish Cypriots' demands and Greek Cypriots' perspective " unfortunately they perceive us as minorities and wish to give us minority status, but we do not satisfy with this; we want to share totally same conditions and rights with them". **Mustafa** also have a similar approach: " they do not trust us, they even look down to us, they wish to have a ruling position", and **Özge** says that "they never perceive us as their brothers, they think that we took their belongings…in Greek Cypriots view we are the outsiders, as if we have not been in Cyprus for years". Therefore, demand for political equality is not shared by Greek Cypriots according to participants since it is perceived that the latter perceives itself in a superior position, as **Gürsel** says "...they perceive themselves to be complete in every aspect, to be the superior, to be the real master of this

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country…but we perceive us neither inferior nor superior then them, they just have better living conditions as they have had more possibilities".

In line with these, some of the interviewers link the inferior and enemy image of Turkish Cypriots in Greek Cypriot perception with the nationalist education and misrepresentation. **Gizem** states Greek Cypriots' perspective towards Turkish Cypriots as such:

> *They do not love us because of their education, they really grown up with the conception that we are the enemy...they may love Turkish Cypriots but not Türkiyeliler, in fact they are afraid from the latter, they have learned that Turkish people are barbarians and they are very rigid in this perception...it is a reality that they perceive us as second class people because we are lazy...*

In her comparison of younger generations of two communities, **Melda** also mentions the effects of nationalist education on Greek Cypriot community:

> *They perceive us as occupiers, surely some of them love us but they are not the majority. Our difference from Greek Cypriots is that: we do not grow our children with nationalism but they are educated with nationalism starting from primary school ages; and their younger section hate us, the new generation do not like us but ours are insensible towards nationalism as we do not grow them so.*

Engin also mentions the felt enmity of young Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots in his words, "those who are looking in a hostile manner to us are their youngsters, because their history books represent us as their enemies and claim that Turkish army made such and such things to them". Thence, it is believed by some of the participants that the collective self is represented as the enemy of Greek Cypriots- especially by the younger ones- and the reason behind such an image is perceived to be connected with 'their' nationalist education as oppose to 'our' avoidance from nationalist perception.

Apparently, the basic complaint about Greek Cypriot perception of Turkish Cypriots is related to inferior position of the latter in the eyes of former, as **Hüseyin** also states "...they continuously perceive us as having lower status, as useless...as having a position below them...no one from us who work in there have a supervisor position because they look down to us..." What is more, it is expressed by some

participants that Greek Cypriots exclude Turkish Cypriots from Cypriotness itself, as **Deniz** puts it:

> *...they look distantly to us, they do not accept us, there is a negation...While perceiving him/herself as Cypriot, we are perceived as Turkish...if there would be division it should be made between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots...This is the first problem, they do not count us as Cypriots*

Kürşat has similar approach:

> *What disappointed me is the fact that Greek Cypriots did not realize that this country belongs to both of us...I observed that they do not tolerate sharing...When it is understood who we are- that all of us are Cypriots- by both communities, meaningful steps will be taken...*

Similarly, **Şakir** claims that Greek Cypriots are not aware of the fact that Turkish Cypriots are also Cypriots:

> *The press in there does not reflect the truth, so most of the Greek Cypriots do not know what Turkish Cypriots think about themselves. If such kind of communication become possible, they will realize that Turkish Cypriots are also Cypriots, that Turkish Cypriots also have the right to live in this country; but their assertion is that Turkish community is the latecomer in Cyprus and because of this they want to rule us, to make us their servants...*

In the face of felt exclusion, some of the participants indicate that they need to differentiate/distance themselves from Greek Cypriots and to become closer towards other attachments. At this point, **Deniz** indicates the reason behind his definition of himself as Turkish Cypriot rather than Cypriot:

> *Those with whom we should share Cypriot consciousness never perceive us as insiders...You are constrained to make differentiation...there is continuous negation so you need to differentiate yourself, if they have inclusive approach to you...if it is claimed that we live under the same sky, that we are the people of same country, I will not necessitate to think about such thing..*

In a similar vein, **Murat** expresses his reaction against the felt exclusion with his answer on Greek Cypriots' perception, "they do not want to live together, side by side with Turks, and they degrade us. If they do not want us, I also do not want to be together with them, I need to take a step back and feel more secure..." and **Şakir** indicates the reason behind his attachment firstly to Turkishness:

> *As the other community continuously tries to push you down, you feel more Turkish; if they have a position to accept you as an insider, probably you will not feel such. But for feeling yourself more secure, you put your Turkishness on the foreground.*

As aforementioned quotations indicate, when it is compared with the Greek Cypriot community, 'Cypriotness' gains another meaning in some participants definitions and this time it signifies the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot community. At this point, liminal position of 'Turkish Cypriotness'[184] is illustrated with Hüseyin's words:

> I always define myself as Turkish Cypriot, if I say I am Cypriot I would be seen as Rum, If I say I am Turkish I would be seen as Türkiyeli; then I should leave this country either to Rum or to Türkiyeli, but we do not have any intention to leave this country to anyone, so I define myself as Turkish Cypriot.

As it is manifest, the dominant element of informants' identity in their narration of their own image in Greek Cypriots' perspective is 'Turkishness', thus; representation of the collective self with particular aspects attributed to 'Cypriotness'- such as those stressed in relation to *Türkiyeliler* that will be elaborated in the next section- lost its significance in this depiction. What is more, it is mainly because of their 'Turkishness' that participants have inferior/inferiorized status in these representations. Otherwise stated, it is possible to assert that 'Turkishness' is signifying inferiority in popular perception. Concomitantly, when the object of comparison is Greek Cypriots, perception of being represented as the 'Other' by Greek Cypriots is the hallmark of informants' narratives about collectivity they attach themselves. Hence, in the face of the 'othering' of the collective self by Greek Cypriots, claim for equality is voiced as illustrated by aforementioned expressions. What is more, (and which could be perceived as paradoxical with the self-definitions mentioned in the last chapter) as participants' expressions on their reaction against Greek Cypriot exclusion displays, attachment to 'Turkishness' is perceived to be the securing ground in relation to Greek Cypriots by some participants, making the aforementioned attachment to be the 'buoy' in the face of exclusion. This on the other hand, signals that the dominance of the elements of identity in participants' perception is closely connected to the perception of the 'Other' in particular relation.

Notwithstanding aforementioned criticisms against expressed Greek Cypriot self-perception, it is seen in the interviews that some of the participants themselves also

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[184] D. Derya, 2006, 45.

represent Greek Cypriot community as superior in particular respects. To make it clear, 'that side' also signifies the 'ideal society' in particular respects, it is symbolizing the 'West' and the 'Europe' in fact- the target point that could not ever be 'reached', and it is where the participants compare their situation and perceive the 'other side' as the exemplar of good decisions. For instance, **Levent** compares the two communities and says:

> *On the one hand Greek Cypriots became a member of European Union, on the other hand we still complain about the dissolution of Turkish Cypriotness, this displays that we made many mistakes, this shows that Greek Cypriots play the cards truly but we did not..*

Comparing two communities, **Onur** explains the differences as such:

> *When I go to Greek Cypriot side I realize that our main loss is our far distance from the world culture. In that side, there is accumulation of knowledge enabling communication with the world without compensating from the native culture. The people in that side can renew their selves, but we live in a closed system like that of dairy, and lost our self-reliance.*

Melda defines the distinguishing aspect of Greek Cypriots society as such:

> *What comes to my mind about Greek Cypriots is more developed society than ours, an EU member society where people lives in more humane conditions. I think they are 50 years ahead us...They are much more developed society than us.*

In his criticism against population transport from Turkey, **Murat** depicts Greek Cypriots as the winner of the race:

> *If this is a race between Greek side, Turkey should have sent strong sportsmen to us. Greek Cypriots make exercise; try hard for improving physics and intelligence for the competition. Turkey on the other hand, sent all of the deficient, imbecile sportsmen… Greek Cypriots win all of the races, they become a member of European Union, improve their living standards, live in welfare and we are struggling with various hardships in here…*

Mustafa also compares two communities and indicates:

> *Turkey controls here militarily, politically and economically. Greek Cypriots control their selves economically and the difference is manifest. They become a world state and our situation is here, there are huge gaps between us.*

Hasan believes that the prosperity of the 'other side' is linked with their rightful decisions:

> *They are economically stronger than us, they do not give up the prescriptive system that British established in here, and we on the other hand, abandon it and devastate everything for political rants.*

Eventually, the economic prosperity of 'them' as oppose to 'our' economic powerlessness make them to be 'ahead' from us and more closer to the 'Europe' and to the world. As such, this comparison makes 'us' to feel inferior and also victim, this time, of the bad decisions of 'our' rulers and of the intervention from Turkey.

Taking the topics discussed in this chapter as a whole, it is apparent that the image of Greek Cypriots and self-representation of participants in relation to the former is not very coherent and *the* role of Greek Cypriots in participants' expressions changes according to different topics of discussion. Differently put, Greek Cypriots who constitute one of the reference points in the depiction of difference of Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler* owing to the similarities of 'Cypriots' broadly in cultural terms, are also perceived to be those who 'exclude Turkish Cypriots from Cypriotness', 'cruels', 'unreliables', 'those who rejected the Annan plan' and 'those who perceive Turkish Cypriots as inferior/enemy/second class-'Other'. Yet they are also those 'who lived with us in harmony' , 'with whom we prefer to live side by side', 'those whose outlook resemble to ours', those 'who experienced painful days like us in the past' and also those 'who are more developed and ahead from us'. Thence, universalism and nationalism, humanism and stigmatization, victimization and idealization, demonization and demand for peaceful coexistence are all apparent in the depictions relating to Greek Cypriots. As such, the tension between the image of 'other' and self-image of 'being the other', the unsteadiness between the inclusion and exclusion and the changing dominance of different elements of attachment- Turkishness and Cypriotness, North Cyprus and Cyprus- that result in attribution of contradictory characteristics to Greek Cypriots constitute the distinguishing aspect of the narratives about collective self in relation to Greek Cypriots in the popular discourse.

CHAPTER V

TURKISH CYPRIOT IDENTITY IN RELATION TO TURKIYELILER

In the second chapter, it is mentioned that identity is relational and constituted through marking difference between the insider and the outsider. As such, it has to be conceptualized in relation to 'Other'. Concomitantly, it could be claimed that narrative of the self is contextual in the sense that its nature changes according to the perceived 'Other'. The previous chapter focused on participants' self-perceptions in relation to Greek Cypriots and it is stressed that the image of Greek Cypriots in popular discourse has an ambivalent nature as participants attribute contradictory characteristics to the former in different topics of discussion. Moreover, it was indicated that the tension between inclusion and exclusion, between the image of 'Other' and self-image of 'being the Other' constitutes the hallmark of narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots. At this juncture, it is necessary to elaborate self-perceptions of participants in relation to *Türkiyeliler* who, as mentioned before, constitute the recent 'Other' of the population under consideration. By this way, both the image of *Türkiyeliler* who designate what Turkish Cypriot 'is not' in popular perception and the self-image of participants in different contexts become more detectable. As such, this chapter concentrates on the self-perceptions of interviewees in relation to *Türkiyeliler* through focusing the way they represent the latter and the points of comparison they use for distinguishing each other.

The mostly alleged reason behind the self-description of participants as Turkish Cypriot, and the main reference point of diversification that interviewees made between themselves and *Türkiyeliler* is cultural difference. As such, the first part of this chapter will elaborate the representation of Turkish Cypriot culture; the connotations of stressed cultural difference and the image of *Türkiyeliler* in relation to culture. Secondly, the bodily image of *Türkiyeliler* in participants' narratives and the latter's self image in relation to the former will be outlined. The third section deals with social segregation in the northern part of the island and exemplifies the

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exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in everyday life by delineating participant's answers to the question whether they send their children to a school including considerable number of *Türkiyeli* students. The fourth section discusses the connection between *Türkiyeliler* and crime that is expressed in interviews and asserts that criminal stereotype is constructed by classification of *Türkiyelile*r within themselves. In the fifth section, expressed social-political-economic repercussions of immigration from Turkey will be pointed out and it will be argued that *Türkiyeliler* in this discussion are represented as social, political and economic threats in participants' depictions. The final section of this chapter asks whether it is possible for so called *Türkiyeliler* in Cyprus to become 'Turkish Cypriots' and criticizes the Cypriot-centered identity project on the grounds that rather than construction of a transnational identity, the very Cypriotist discourse itself fosters reproduction of nationalist ideology and social exclusion. In other words, it will be argued that the problematic nature of the self-perception of the participants that will be discussed in proceeding pages of this chapter, also signals the handicaps and negative repercussions of 'Cyprus-centered' or 'Cypriotist' discourse.

In the third chapter, it is pointed out that most of the participants define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' and perceive the 'Cypriot' part of their identity as more dominant. Adding those who define themselves as solely 'Cypriot' or 'Turkish-speaking Cypriot', difference from *Türkiyeliler* is essential in the identifications of considerable number of the participants. What is more, it is perceived in interviews that participants who define themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' and primarily emphasize 'Turkish' part of their identity also express their 'difference' when the subject of discussion is *Türkiyeliler* – analogous to participants who define themselves solely Cypriot or Turkish-speaking Cypriot who also utter their difference from Greek Cypriots when the latter is the subject of discussion. Therefore, as a final note before elaboration of participants' narratives, it should be remarked that I use the word 'Turkish*Cypriot*' as a term referring to dominant self-image in interviews in relation to *Türkiyeliler*. The reason behind such a preference is the conception that the latter is mainly represented as being the inferior in participants' narratives on their collective identity. Hence, aforementioned term will

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be used in following pages and sections as far as *Türkiyeliler* are represented to be the 'Other' and the inferior.

5.1. CULTURE AS THE HALLMARK OF DIVERSITY

In previous chapter, it is indicated that culture is perceived to be common bond between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and asserted that it symbolically unites 'Cypriots' while excludes 'non-Cypriots' in popular discourse. In line with this, it is observed that cultural difference between Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* is the most popularly stated reason behind participants' preference of defining themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' rather than 'Turkish'. It is emphasized that there are distinctive cultural elements and practices that are unique to the 'native' people of Cyprus. Additionally, cultural characteristics of the 'Other' are depicted extensively so as to display the opposition- or incommensurability- between two cultures. In other words, taking interviews into account, it is possible to state that it is basically the 'culture' that is used as the borderline and the basis of difference between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*. Concomitantly, it is necessary to focus on the way this cultural difference is constructed in the narratives of participants and to elaborate the points of discussion that are put under the banner of 'culture'. Differently put, I will investigate how the signifiers 'culture' and 'difference' are filled in the popular discourse in relation to *Türkiyeliler.* At this point, it should be reminded that categories relating to cultural difference that will be elaborated in the following pages are arranged in line with the priorities in interviewees' narratives.

Defining themselves as 'Turkish cypriot' or 'turkishCypriot'- whether they perceive their 'Cypriotness' as secondary or not- participants feel that this 'Cypriotness' makes them different from *Türkiyeliler* and it is generally related to the 'culture'. Culture, in this usage, is signifying habits, life styles or more generally, the 'way of life' of the community under focus. Hence, what participants call 'cultural difference' generally refers to the difference between 'ways of life'. For very small number of informants, this cultural difference resembles to the cultural difference between the regions of Turkey. Such as **Gürsel** says:

> As a result of the interaction in the age of coexistence with the Rum, and because of elements taken or had been injected from the British, we have

cultural differences seen in our life styles. I think the difference from Turkish nation is not very sharp. There are differences between people living in Artvin and Edirne, perhaps ours is a bit deeper...

On the other hand, for most of the participants this difference is much more sharp and crucial for the determination of their own identity. For **Sevgi** there is even a total distinction between Cypriot and *Türkiyeli* ways of life. She says:

> *The degree of difference between Cypriots who have been here since before 1974 and those people from Turkey that have been settling since 1974 is like the difference between a Turkish and an English. We are different to this extend. The only common point is the language but other than this, our approach towards life, our stand in man-woman relations, our attitude towards our children, our traditions, norms, manners...etc all of them are different.*

First of all, it is uncovered in interviews that distinctive origins of Cypriot culture and the cultural heritage of Cypriots are stressed for marking the difference between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*. To make it clear, as mentioned in the third chapter, for stressing the unique culture that is shared between the two communities of the island, Cypriotist discourse opposes to construction of history with the beginning of Ottoman rule in the island and stresses the contributions of earlier civilizations to the culture in the island. In relation to cultural difference, some of the participants narrate the history of the island similarly and link the uniqueness of culture in Cyprus to the residues of previous civilizations. Accordingly, it is pointed out that there had been several rulers of the island and there have been interaction of various cultures in this land, as such, it is reminded that people of Cyprus have their own unique culture which is marked with this resulting cultural mosaic and hybridity. Hence, as opposed to nationalist discourse, it is pointed out that the culture of people living in Cyprus is not limited with the Turkish one. **Osman** claims:

> *For years we have been affected from several cultures, from Venetians, Lusignians, Byzantine, Greeks, Ottomans, we have been affected from all and the resulting point is a mixture. As such, a distinct culture is constructed and this culture is different from the culture in Turkey. Some do not like this reality, for example we are not Turkish enough according to some, such as Turkish commander asked our prime minister to prove his Turkishness. On the other hand, some criticize us for not being Muslim enough, accusing us of not fasting, not performing the prayer...some criticizes our Turkishness, some our Muslimness, yet nobody asks me what I want, who I am, how I feel myself, how I want to see my country, they do not ask these, they just try to dictate us something. When I touch upon these, they accuse me of being utopist or say that they doubt about my blood.*

As illustrated above, some of the participants touch upon historical background of the island and the cultural interaction of different civilizations for defining the origins of the particular culture seen in Cyprus. In this representation, rather than defining culture to have a homogeneous essence unaffected from any outside effect, the uniqueness of culture itself is perceived to be resulted from its amorphous character. As such, the need to emphasize Cypriotness is traced to this historical-cultural background that 'native' people of Cyprus have in contrast to *Türkiyeliler*. At this point, it is interesting that while emphasizing the heterogeneous nature of the culture of Turkish*Cypriots*, members of *Türkiyeliler* are represented as if they share a homogeneous cultural formation. As an example, a lecturer, **Deniz** who stresses that he spent the most critical years of his life in Turkey because of education, says:

> *[W]e have differences from people in Turkey. English, Venetian and others had effects on us. Even in our language, there are Greek and Italian elements. In some villages the mother tongue of old people is Greek even tough they are not Greek…Thus, we have differences in language, in culture, in attitude, and in our lives…Thus, we have to make distinction because our culture is really different.*

In the emphasis on cultural difference of Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler* as a result of the former's coexistence with different civilizations in the past, Cypriot culture is mainly represented as a patchwork of Greek, English and Turkish cultural elements. Accordingly, it is believed that some particular characteristics were gained with this past experience and have been shared by the Cypriots as a whole. As such, as will be discussed extensively in the following pages, especially the past coexistence with Greek Cypriots and the British rule in the island, as far as *Türkiyeliler* are taken into account, are seen as the ground of the specificity of Turkish*Cypriot* identity. **Engin** touches upon the importance of past cohabitation in cultural differentiation:

> *Turkish Cypriots have many differences from Türkiyeliler, firstly our family structure is very different, our raising styles are very different, that is, our culture is very different because we lived with the Rum, we lived with the English and the culture of those came and settled in Cyprus in Ottoman age was very different. We are the people of these three cultures…*

Similarly, a high school teacher **Melda,** who expresses her reluctance to coexist with Greek Cypriots in a same district, says:

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There are many things unique to us, we lived together with English and there are some effects of them; we lived together with Greek Cypriots and we are affected from their culture also, accordingly we construct our own culture. This culture is developed as a result of living together with different cultures for years. In our accent, in our traditions, lifestyle etc. we have our own culture.

Therefore, particular culture of Turkish Cypriots is represented to be the resulting point of the successive civilizations and cultures existed in the past. As such, the common past is reconstructed in the narratives of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler-* in the sense that rather than the themes of sacrifice of Turkish Cypriots and cruelty of Greek Cypriots that were emphasized in the memories of past in relation to Greek Cypriots, the past is constructed by the very emphasis on coexistence of Turkish Cypriots with Greek Cypriots and other communities. Hence, it becomes apparent that the narrative of the past is relational and transforms its nature according to the 'Other'. Apart from this, it is perceived that the past cohabitation of 'imagined community' with different cultures and civilizations had created a hybrid culture that is distinct from the one *Türkiyeliler* have. Paradoxically- as will become more manifest in following paragraphs- the very emphasis on hybridity of this particular culture is used against the threat of *Türkiyeliler* to distort the former with their different culture. Then, since aforementioned hybridity is constructed as an originary substance, hybridity of the culture has its limits. Concomitantly; the culture is perceived to be frozen at particular time rather than a transformable and dynamic phenomenon.[185] Moreover, as the origin of cultural difference is perceived to be the common past of the 'ingenious' population, it becomes impossible for *Türkiyeliler* to be included in this particular identity. What is more, as it is impossible for the former to share such kind of historical-cultural background it also becomes impossible for 'them' to share the positive aspects attributed to Turkish*Cypriot* culture.

Up to this point, it is asserted that participants perceive their culture to be different from *Türkiyeliler* because of the distinct historical background that affected the socialization process and culture in Cyprus. Then, concentration on the elements of this culture, representation of the 'Other' and the connotations of 'difference' in

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[185] D. Schnapper, *Sosyoloji Düşüncesinin Özünde Öteki ile İlişki* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), quoted in T. Erhürman, Kıbrıs Türk Solunda Kıbrıs Merkezli Kimlik Arayışları, Ötekiler ve İnsan Hakları." *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 3-4 (2006): 99.

interviewers' expressions is a necessity. At this juncture, Cyprus cuisine and difference between tastes of Turkish Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* are basic illustrations used by participants for referring the difference between cultures. "When we look at culture, to life style, to eating and drinking things I am Cypriot…" says **Pınar,** and to the question what kind of differences she perceive from the culture of *Türkiyeliler* she says: "The most basic example is this, we offer coffee to the guests but they serve tea." Referring to the effects of British culture, **Levent** says "living in this land is very different, British hegemony is still felt in here, such as we drink tea with milk and we drink tea in a mug not in *ince belli."*

While Cypriot cuisine and taste close Cypriots up to each other, the distinctiveness of the former also constitutes the opposition between 'we' Cypriots and 'they' *Türkiyeliler*. What is more, the food connected with the latter is perceived to be the symbol of assimilation of the former's culture by the latter. Defining the reason behind population transfer from Turkey as elimination of Turkish*Cypriot* culture as quick as possible, **Mete** indicates:

> *In cultural terms, we love green paper but they love red pepper. We are different even in this; we are different even in the peppers we eat. I love köyekmeği, they love something called bazlama, I love zeytinli bidda and I do not want what they call kek...but there is a struggle between zeytinli bidda and simit in my country, I beleive that zeytinli bidda will win...But, neither Luga (his Greek Cypriot friend) nor I love red pepper. Both Luga and I love zeytinli bidda, both of our wives make çakıstes in the same way...*

In a similar vein, **Aslı** asserts:

> *In fact, Cypriotness is what is kept in the other side (Greek Cypriot side), because the other side is not assimilated. I like to learn my own culture from the other side, I could not easily find çakıstes in this side, and I eat it in the other side, they still serve garavulli as a meze in their restaurants, it is in our cuisine...but when you look at Turkish cuisine, as the economic level is low in there, it is a cuisine of the poor...we have bumbar…we have macun…we have gollifa...we have coffee not tea. That is we are totally different… And this is my country, so you should eat bumbar, çakıstes and macun not yeşil zeytin in here.*

Most of the dishes that are enumerated by interviewees are in fact symbolizing cuisine of 'traditional' Cyprus society, then it is questionable whether the reason behind decrease in popularity of above mentioned dishes is increasing number of *Türkiyeliler* or the so called 'modernization' of society with the changing relations of production. Secondly, it is possible to argue that the search for difference from

Türkiyeliler is accompanied with intolerance to the difference of the 'Other' as it is perceived to be a threat against the ingenious culture symbolized with the cuisine in these representations. Additionally, in this depiction, participants' representation of themselves with traditional cuisine is interesting since one of the most popular attributes in the narration of collective culture is its modernity as will be pointed out in the following paragraphs. In other words, this depiction illustrates the articulation of contradicting elements of attachment in the constitution of identity.

The dishes, serving habits or raising styles, when it is related to *Türkiyeliler*, 'difference' is the word to be used to explain the relationship between two ways of life. On the other hand, as will be uncovered in proceeding paragraphs, cultural difference generally is not simply stressed to mean just two different 'life styles', rather the implication- or direct meaning- is that there is a difference between 'proper' and 'not proper' ways of life. In other words, emphasis on difference and uniqueness does not exhaust itself with search for 'respect' to difference or struggle against homogenization of culture, it even does not exhaust itself with constitution and strengthening of borders for insiders and outsiders, rather, representation of difference is made through the assessment of cultural elements and practices of the 'Other' as vulgar, not proper etc. As such, 'we are different' turns out to be 'we are proper' and, as far as 'we' are proper, 'they' are not. **Nilgün,** who works in a private company, indicates the differences as such:

> *Our dressing habits, our nutrition way, even our sitting around table is different. As far as I observe, and I see from some friends in my workplace, they even do not have table culture yet.*

Hakan also illustrates difference between cultures with this 'table culture':

> *Those coming from Turkey could not adapt to our culture. To illustrate, our meal is on the table but theirs on the floor, this is one of the basic differences, and this results in discordance.*

According to **İrfan,** all Cypriots know the 'proper' way to eat meal:

> *You can not differentiate people in here as the worker and something, all of them have common features, such as all of them know the way to eat the meal...even the least cultured and the most ignorant person knows to eat the meal in a modern way...*

Then, Turkish*Cypriots* are represented as monolithic, harmonious group whose members share common essence that is marked with its properness. On the other hand, those who could be differentiated as 'worker or something' is the group mentioned under the banner of *Türkiyeliler,* and those who do not know to eat meal in a proper, modern way is also *Türkiyeliler* or some sections of *Türkiyeliler* (the differentiation between *Türkiyeliler* that is uncovered through the interviews will also be discussed in proceeding paragraphs and sections). Thus, Bourdieu's remark that taste differentiates 'us' and 'them' and that aversion to different life styles is one of the crucial barriers between classes[186] gains meaning in aforementioned depictions. To continue with proper 'us' and non-proper 'them', it would be significant to touch upon some behavioral characteristics of *Türkiyeliler* pointed out in the interviews. Here, since *Türkiyeli* is matched with vulgarity, opportunism and alike, this time Turkish*Cypriot* is the 'not' one, that is; the latter is represented as having the negatives of such features. **Türkan** asks "excuse me, but which Cypriot ever spit on the road or press on shoes?" similarly, **Hakan** claims that Turkish*Cypriots* do not have 'spitting on the road' in their culture:

> *I am sitting at the bazaar, for example, I see a man spitting on the road, I perceive that he is wearing shalvar and I perceive that he is from Turkey, do Cypriots make these? I do not want to see these kinds of things, we do not have such behaviors in our culture, and these are the points of separation. We have such kind of identity, we find these strange.*

Claiming that the cultural difference between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots* is continuing for 30 years, **Osman** illustrates the point as such: "Look at the marina, there are several people eating pumpkin seeds and throwing their hull on to the road, none of them is Cypriot." For **Emre,** behaviors in traffic reveal who is who and he says "*Türkiyeliler* are greedy for opportunities and like this, you can understand it even looking to the traffic, they sound the horn simultaneous with the yellow light, but we are very relax and wait for the green light." **Kürşat** also emphasizes the opposition between two cultures by saying that "there are specific cultural differences, we are not clamorous, and we are not combative". As such, Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler* are both taken as if they constitute two homogeneous groups, and oppositions between the behaviors in their daily lives are enumerated in order to differentiate the properties of 'us' from 'theirs'. So, if 'we'

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[186] P. Bourdieu, 1984, 56.

'are not' clamorous and combative, then 'they' 'are' the ones who are marked with noisiness and belligerence**. Aslı** depicts the opposition between her and 'them' as two way exclusion:

> *All over the world, bad is excluded. It is the reason behind their exclusion. Wearing mini skirt that I do is bad for them, thus they exclude me and I exclude them because he beat his wife, because she give birth to eight children, I exclude them because I see that their kids are in the street at night just one day later of a rape case inside the city wall where they live. Those who manage to 'Cypriotize', those who manage to be adapted the conditions of this island would not be excluded. There are many that managed to Cypriotize, but there are so many people that do not fit to live in this island.*

Mentioning her observations about *Türkiyeli* customers, a shop assistant, **Gökçen** claims that 'their' abnormality gives way to exclusion. In her words: "as our cultures are different, what is seen as normal by them is not perceived as normal by us, it seems strange to us, and we exclude them." So, 'their' difference that is marked with abnormal, amoral, vulgar, bad etc. veils 'our' abnormality, amorality, vulgarity and the bad in 'us'. The elements of 'their' difference also makes 'us' to have the opposites of aforementioned attributes, and stated erroneous behaviors of them give legitimacy to their exclusion. Thus, exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* is the resulting point of the stress on cultural difference. Concomitantly, problems relating to the perception of the "Other"- different community, class, culture etc- in popular discourse become more evident. In other words, negative repercussions of political struggle through the stress on cultural difference also become more perceivable.

Additional to the separation of "proper" and "not proper" ways of life, there is a tendency to make distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture in the narratives of cultural difference. That is to say, 'difference' also signifies the hierarchical relationship between cultures of *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*. At this juncture, mainly connected to the level of education, the culture of the latter is perceived to be 'higher' than the former. As such, just like being proper and not proper, culture is also divided into levels, and the difference in cultures also designates the difference between the 'cultured' and the 'uncultured'; the 'educated' and the 'uneducated'; between the 'qualified' and the 'unqualified'. Expressing his discomfort about the continuing immigrations from Turkey to Cyprus, an employer of a company related to construction sector, **Hüseyin** says:

> *People having some welfare do not immigrate to Cyprus, those coming to our country are ignorant people having low level of culture and are those who do not see anything up to today.*

According to **Mehmet,** difference between the 'cultured' and 'uncultured' results in disconnection:

> *Rather than people of good quality who would contribute to the advancement of society, those who did not gain any success in their country, those who are not culturally and socially powerful have been blindly transferred to here...The number of cultured, educated people is very high in here, similarly in Greek Cypriot side. Alas, the people coming from Turkey do not have such properties, they do not have university or high school education, they even do not have primary school graduation, hence; they do not have any possibility to integrate in this society. Because of this, there is a disconnection between two populations.*

In the words of **Gökçen,** cultural difference is equivalent to difference between 'high' and 'low' culture and the latter is marked with its distance from properties that the former has :

> *Our culture is different. There are many educated people in our society, our culture is higher. Those people coming from Turkey are away from many things, they are away from the civilization; they are poor people with different culture... men labeled as 'maço' are mostly seen in them, man is the head of the family in Turkey...but hear women and men are almost equal... our women can demand their rights...here the level of culture is higher, so women do not accept to be dejected.*

Özge defines *Türkiyeliler* with similar attributes and links particular region with the uncultured status:

> *Those who could not live up in Turkey come to Cyprus, they are poor people coming from the east...all those coming are illiterate and unknowing people...We do not love these eastern uncultured people, not all Turkey...*

For **Aslı,** 'their' level is what makes them to be excluded:

> *The population immigrating to here is not qualified. I do not want to say Turkey is this, I do not want to say that all of Türkiyeliler are like this, but Turkey send people that it want to dispose of, they are ignorant. They are excluded because of this, because it is impossible for them to reach the level in here, and the level in here could not be dropped.*

Almost all of the quotations above more or less state the same thing: *Türkiyeliler* are different than 'us' because they *do not have* the level of culture we *have*; they *do not have* the level of education we *have*; and they *do not have* the level of qualification we *have*. As such, we 'do not love', 'disconnect' from or 'exclude' those who could not adapt to our level of culture. Therefore; the stress on cultural

difference in participants' self-representations is also conjoined with the stress on cultural superiority. Since the culture of Turkish*Cypriots* is high, then those who are coming from Turkey "are not congruous with our culture" as **Nilgün** puts it. Then, as long as they do not get 'Cypriotize' or 'reach the level in here', they deserve to be excluded. In other words, the exclusion of and aversion from *Türkiyeliler* are legitimated through construction of hierarchy between the cultures of 'us' and of the 'Other'. In brief, through the division of cultures into levels, 'we are different' turns out to mean 'we are superior'.

Comparing the past when immigrants from Turkey firstly came and today, some of the interviewers perceive an 'improvement' in the culture of *Türkiyeliler*. *Türkiyeli* subject in this representation refers to some of those people who settled in the island with the first population transfer after 1974 and their children who were born and raised afterwards. Differently put, mentioned improve- and potential to resemble Cypriots- is perceived to be valid for particular section of *Türkiyeliler*. Here the culture of Turkish*Cypriots* is still superior, yet there is a potential that those on the lower level might become closer to the higher culture. **Engin** says:

> *99% of those who had came in the first period was ignorant, uneducated. Here the distinction between the levels of culture is quickly uncovered, because they have dogmatic line of thought. As an illustration, perhaps they do not want to open their faces to be seen by a man, not want to wear skirts which will display their legs, they do not give the chance to their girls to get educated and make their boys to work in the lands…yet bit by bit they are trying to reach us...some of them have began to attend our universities.*

Türkan also perceives improvement in 'their' level and stresses the decreasing distance between two levels of culture in the course of time:

> *We found them [those who settled in the first period] strange at the beginning. We heard many things such as that some of them cut the legs of table and put on the floor before using it. They had such a low level that they did not know what washing machine is...But in the course time they keep up with us, when you look at their behaviors, accent, styles and lives, they have barely adapted to our level of culture*

Though emphasizing the 'eternal gap' between these two cultures, **Mustafa** similarly mentions the 'improvement' in the cultural level of *Türkiyeliler*. He says:

> *People coming from Turkey to Cyprus after the war was generally from low social and economic status, so their culture…Cultural difference between us and those people who have been here for a long time is becoming lesser, though we of course can understand who is who…*

Criticizing the continuing population transfer from Turkey, **Gürsel** also points out a kind of possibility for improvement in the culture of the 'settlers', here Turkish*Cypriot* society is depicted as having an 'enlightening power' because of its superior status. But, unlike the former quotations, he perceives this as a decreasing rather than increasing potential. He says,

> *Especially when they newly came, their behaviors were a bit loutish and vulgar, and as they have low level of culture, they could not commingle with us...they are from lower culture than us. I believe that a society from higher culture could improve the cultural level of those from lower one, yet if the number of these people is high, if their number is more than your population, your potential to affect them will decrease.*

However, since culture is perceived to be divided into levels and since the cultural differences between the collective self and the 'Other' is hierarchically constructed, the stress on the 'improvement' in the level of the culture of the 'Other' paves the way for persistence of the cultural superiority of 'us'. In other words, as the collective self and the 'Other' are not perceived to have identical positions, the result is reassessment and reproduction of cultural superiority of 'us'. Moreover, as will be discussed in proceeding pages, the stress on the progress in the level of culture of particular section of *Türkiyeliler* also legitimizes the double exclusion of remaining sections of the 'Other' who do not have such an inclination.

On the other hand, some of the participants define aforementioned section of *Türkiyeliler*- first phase immigrants- with its very conservativeness towards change. That is, rather than an 'improvement' in their culture that decreases differences between two cultures, here *Türkiyeliler* are marked with their resistance to the change. **Ebru**, for example, expresses the cultural differences between native population and *Türkiyeliler* in the island as such:

> *For example our neighbor is Türkiyeli, they came thirty-five years ago to Cyprus; they still wear shalvar, still wear head scarf; the husband still does not talk with us when we wear shorts or alike; and they still have not changed their accent, they still are not adapted ...*

Osman similarly asserts:

> *There is a cultural difference between us and this has been continuing for 30 years. People from rural regions of Turkey have been brought to here, look at Karpaz region it could be seen much more clearly in there, they still live as if they are in their villages in Turkey, they live as if they do not belong to here...*

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Nilgün also has a resembling approach:

> *Even those settled in 1974 have been continuing their habits, perhaps some minor transformation is occurred in their children but they also do not carry the culture of Cyprus, they still have their cultures in the end.*

Perceived to have a stagnant or progressive nature, it is manifest that the culture of *Türkiyeliler* has an inferior status. Those earlier immigrants might have some potential to gain features resembling to 'us' which make them to have a 'better than worse' culture, but it is almost impossible for 'them' to reach the 'level' of 'us' and as such it is impossible for 'them' to have identical position with 'us'. Differently put, it is manifest that either the stress on 'their' apathy to change or the emphasis on 'their' cultural 'improvement' designate not only the cultural difference between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler*, but also the hierarchical relation between 'us' and 'them'.

As indicated in the beginning of this section, the past coexistence of Turkish*Cypriots* with other societies than Turkish one is stressed in the participants' narratives about their identity. In other words, especially past cohabitation with Greek Cypriots and the fact that Cyprus was a colony of the British Empire are pointed out as the reasons behind the unique position of Turkish*Cypriot* culture. The significance of these two societies, as uncovered through the interviews, is the fact that they signify the connection of Turkish*Cypriots* with the "West" and the "European" (the connection of Greek Cypriot side- 'the other side' with the West and Europe in participants' representations was asserted in the previous chapter). Here, the Europe is defined with its hegemonic connotations: 'civilized' 'modern' and 'culturally superior' as opposed to the non-European 'Other' and especially to the less civilized 'Orient'[187]. As such, stated cultural difference is also related to the contrast between the 'West' and the 'East', between 'the European', 'the modern', the 'civilized' and 'the oriental', 'traditional' or 'backwards'. Answering the question who Turkish Cypriots are **Sinan,** who defines himself as immigrant from southern part of the

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[187] Christoph Ramm, "Construction of Identity beyond Recognized Borders: The Turkish Cypriot Community between Cyprus, Turkey and the European Union" *Ruhr University Bochum Germany, Department of History, South East* 2004. http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/ramm.pdf (24 March 2007).

island, has a short and clear answer: "Turkish Cypriots are those who saw (experienced) British and Rum culture." Defining herself firstly as from Turkish genesis, **Canan** also believes that there are some differences stemming from "British convenances":

> *We are affected from the British, we took British convenances, and thus I perceive myself as having differences from Turks of Turkey. In our accent, in our perceptions about life, in our dresses … people in here are much more different…*

It is impossible for *Türkiyeliler* to share such an experience that Cypriots had, thence; it becomes impossible for 'them' to share 'our' properties which were gained through this experience. Then, what the properties that were gained through this historical background is answered by **Nilgün** as such:

> *I think the British culture still exists in here. Because of this, we are more Western, modern and secular than Türkiyeliler, this is the most important difference of us.*

Similarly, according to **Hakan,** difference of Turkish*Cypriot* culture is its 'civilized', 'cultured' and 'proud' nature that is gained through the British effect:

> *Cypriots could not get commingle with Türkiyeliler because they have different traditions and culture... they come from different tradition, our education and culture was affected from British traditions and education, so we are civilized, proud and cultured people.*

Likewise, **Ebru** characterizes the life style of Turkish*Cypriots* with the attributes of 'European', 'not religious' and 'modern'.

> *I suppose this is remaining from British period, our life style is much more European, more Western. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots are Muslims but religion is not experienced similar to Türkiyeliler who are fanatic and conservative. Perhaps it is dating from British era, or related to long coexistence with the Christian Rum. I think our people are much more modern.*

Finally, **Levent** points the contemporary effects of British culture and connects it with the modernity and religious tolerance in the island:

> *British laws are still valid in here and almost everyone has relatives in England, so modernity is felt in here. You can criticize anything of Europe but not its modernity and its respect to human rights...another thing that we take is the secondary position of religion. People used to live with different religions, our grandfathers lived together with Rums, and thus tolerance is developed in this land. Clergyman was killed in Turkey, but our people will not say anything if someone set up a church across the road.*

As above quotations illustrate, emphasis on the tolerance of 'us' in religious matters veils 'our' intolerance that exists against other differences. Apart from this;

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symbolizing the West and the Europe in interviewers' expressions, alleged British culture is represented as the substance of 'modernity', 'secularity', and 'superiority'. Thence, as Turkish*Cypriots* took part in this substance, they become 'more' Western and European than *Türkiyeliler.* Therefore, possession of the properties that are allegedly matched with the Western and the European becomes distinguishing aspects of the former. That is to say, 'we are different' turns out to be 'we are Western, European, modern, civilized, secular…and they are not'. As an example, **Melda** describes *Türkiyeliler*:

> *Cypriots used to live with different societies, we can adapt to different societies. Yet, if those who came to here had been from good section of Turkey, if they had been above of particular level, we could live with them... Yet, those who came in the past were too backwards and too eastern and they gave harm to us.*

According to **Mert**, the ground of difference in two cultures is the opposition between conservatism and Western life style:

> *As far as I understand, they are not in a situation to integrate here, they try to continue their own culture in here…For example, women are more relaxed in here, but such kind of thing do not develop in their minds, they grow up their daughters and sons differently… and the most important difference is the fact that one side lives in a more Western style and is very relaxed while the other side is very traditional and conservative...*

Özge defines *Türkiyeliler* as patriarchal while Turkish*Cypriots* as modern, European and large-mined:

> *There are many cultural differences between us. We are modern, they are patriarchal...They do not have their own opinions, they do not improve themselves, they perceive the words of the elders as orders...We are European, large-minded...We have much the right of audience, we can be friends with our parents but they could not..*

Answering the question about the distinguishing aspects of Turkish*Cypriots*, **Ahmet** enumerates:

> *Our dishes, our accent, being an islander, being warm blooded… Because we have lived with several cultures since the past- and British laws are still valid in here-we are always more near to the Europe than Türkiyeliler, this really differentiate us.*

Therefore, by construction of another opposition with its *Türkiyeli* counterpart, uniqueness of Turkish*Cypriot* culture is delineated, and this time Europeannes, Westernity and properties attributed to them are expressed as the distinguishing aspects of Turkish*Cypriot* identity. To put it differently, aforementioned conception of Turkish*Cypriot* culture that is marked with its modernity and civilization is

linked to the references other than 'Turkishness', mostly to British and Greek Cypriot society. And, as far as those aspects connote superiority, it could be claimed that what is perceived to be superior is connected to the 'Cypriot' rather than 'Turkish' part of this particular identity. At this point, it is significant to remind that in narratives on Turkish Cypriot identity in relation Greek Cypriots, the latter more than the former was marked with its closeness to the 'European' and the 'West'. Yet, as long as the comparison is made with *Türkiyeliler*, Turkish*Cypriots* are the ones defined with 'Westernity' and 'Europeanness'. Henceforth, in relation to *Türkiyeliler,* it would be argued that this historical background of "living with the Rum and the English" is perceived to be the substance of the aforementioned cultural difference, and the substance of Turkish*Cypriot* identity. This in turn, reveals the basis of perceived superiority between the culture of collective self and of the 'Other'. That is, aforementioned past experience is one of the main objective grounds of distinctive status of Turkish*Cypriots*, and as far as the two cultures are defined in a hierarchical manner, this historical background is essential also for the proof of superiority. To make it clear, because of past experience of cohabitation with the British and the Greek Cypriots, Turkish*Cypriot* culture is perceived to have already been connected with the West and the Europe which are seen to have superior qualities such as being civilized, modern and etc. Thence, without any other criteria, being "the original" Turkish*Cypriot* per se is perceived to be adequate to take part in the 'high' 'modern' or 'proper' culture. In other words, "being Cypriot is presented as a merit by itself[188]." Thus, as mentioned before, **İrfan** believes that:

> You can not differentiate people in here as the worker and something, all of them have common features...even the least cultured, and the most ignorant person knows to eat the meal in a modern way...

In concordance with this, when illustrating distinctions of two cultures **Mustafa** a priori connect Turkish Cypriot people with conformism and trust and says*:*

> … For example, when you talk with native people, you feel that s/he is not malevolent, most of those coming from Turkey has suspicious approach…Our people in here is not like this, whether they are poor or rich, whether they are educated or not, they are more tolerant and conformist

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[188] A. Bizden, 1997, 90.

Taking differentiations made by interviewees as a whole, it is apparent that the uniqueness of Turkish*Cypriot* culture is represented with such dichotomies as 'proper' versus 'non-proper', 'cultured' versus 'uncultured', 'educated versus uneducated', 'civilized' versus 'backwards', 'Western' versus 'Eastern', 'European' versus 'non-European', 'secular' versus 'religious', 'modern' versus 'traditional' and 'superior' versus 'inferior'. In other words, Turkish*Cypriots* as a homogeneous body is identified with the positive attributes while *Türkiyeliler* as a monolithic group with their opposites. Nonetheless, it is observed in interviews that *Türkiyeliler* themselves are also divided into 'levels'. Otherwise stated, there is a cultural hierarchy between the subject '*Türkiyeliler*' which is determined according to some criteria like socio-economic background and settlement place. Accordingly, it is believed that those from metropolitan cities of Turkey and those from higher socio-economic background have more in common with Turkish*Cypriot* culture. In this manner, some sections of *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to be exceptions to the image depicted in aforementioned narratives. **Mert** compares the compatibility of people from different regions of Turkey to the life style in Cyprus, he states:

> *[W]e are different especially from those coming from South, economic factors make our life styles too afar from each other, there is a total difference between us and those coming from South-East, especially from those coming from Hatay etc…Yet when we look at the West, to Istanbul, Aegean etc, though they are a bit conservative than us, they are much more relax than the other and we have much more common points…If people from Ankara, Istanbul, people from more middle class had came here in 1974, there might have been more harmony, I think there might have been some oppositions again, but now there are gulfs and there are two isolated societies of Turkish Cypriots and the settlers..*

Türkan states her exceptions:

> *Both of my sisters are living in Turkey and their husbands are Türkiyeli, yet there have not been any problems with them up to today. Because they are conscious, educated and have a particular level. So, I do not want to confuse this kind of people with those who I mention as unqualified and uncultured...*

Defining the workers coming from Turkey with their 'worthlessness'**, İrfan** *says:*

> *There are many people who are from Ankara, Istanbul etc that we communicate as a family, they are presentable people, I do not mean in physical terms. In other words, they are educated, well mannered and clever people. Perhaps you will say that they do not have this chance, but this is not the issue, the cultural level or worthlessness of people coming here as worker is clear, they seem strange in here, they do not adapt to island spirit!*

In a similar vein, as quoted before, **Melda** claims:

If those who came to here had been from good section of Turkey, if they had been above of particular level, we could live with them. There are people in our family or our neighbors that we interact. Yet, those who came in the past were too backwards and too eastern…

What is significant in here is the fact that almost all of the subjects of exception that are enumerated above are not *Türkiyeliler* who are living in Cyprus. Differently put, the very exception to the bad image of the 'Other' is not living in the island. Thence; with the construction of hierarchy between the cultures of *Türkiyeliler* and the stress on those who have superior culture, the exclusion of 'settlers', and especially of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, on the grounds of their inferior culture is legitimated.

On the whole, the narrative about cultural difference of Turkish*Cypriots* in relation to *Türkiyeliler* is marked with the construction of oppositions, culturally superior self-image of the former, classification of 'Other' within itself, and exclusion of *Türkiyeliler*- except those who are more 'Western', educated, presentable and not living in the island, and may also those who are able to 'Cypriotize' themselves.

5.2. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUTLOOKS AND THE BODILY IMAGE OF 'OTHER'

As Comarrof notes, the marking of identity is closely linked with mundane production of signs and styles, and the physical outlook is often one of the prime sites for the representation of difference[189]. It is indicated that physical appearance of Greek Cypriots is represented as similar with Turkish Cypriots and that the physical image of the former is sometimes marked with more 'European' outlook and more 'qualified' dresses as elaborated in the previous chapter. As such, it is asserted that outside appearance is, on the one hand, constituted as one of the points of inclusion between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in popular discourse, yet on the other; some participants perceive the very collective self as having inferior status in comparison to the latter. Concomitantly, elaboration of narratives on physical outlook in relation to *Türkiyeliler* will enlighten participants' self-perceptions in this particular context and reveals the bodily image of the 'Other'.

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[189] J. L. Comarrof, 1996, 166.

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Similar to that of Greek Cypriots, it is asked to participants whether it is possible to distinguish Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler* by looking their outside appearances. This time, however; none of the addresses of this question gave negative answer. Apart from this question, in their depiction of their differences from *Türkiyeliler*, many participants themselves point out that they are different even in their outside appearances. **Aslı,** for example, claims that "though they are alleged as the members of the so called motherland, they are distinguishable; even if there is just one *Türkiyeli* in a group containing a hundred Turkish Cypriots, s/he will shine out". As such, it is uncovered in the interviews that the physical image of *Türkiyeliler* is another point of separation. Alias, dichotomously represented relationship between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots* also displays itself with the outside appearance, with the clothes, beards, hair-cut styles etc. That is to say, similar to the aforementioned discussions on cultural difference, here the outside appearance and dresses divide people as modern, and traditional or backwards and they give clues about the proper and not. Therefore, both the self-perception of the participants and the image of *Türkiyeliler* become more manifest in the expressions of interviewees about their differences in outside appearance. According to **Ebru,** the similarity that exists between Cypriots is not valid for *Türkiyeliler*:

> *It is impossible to distinguish a person whether s/he is Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, but Türkiyeliler are distinguishable simultaneously. Their appearance is different, their posture is different*

Ahmet, a bank employee who repeatedly states that 'the only friend of Turk is Turk' when the topic of discussion is Greek Cypriots, represents *Türkiyeliler* with 'darkish' attributes and traditional dressing style:

> *Their dressing styles are different, Turkish people has black eyes, eyebrows, they are more brunette, they have beards, their dressing style is more traditional…Our hair-cuts are more American, we dress more relaxed like jeans and t-shirt.*

Hasan indicates the contrast between outside appearances:

> *Though our ancestors were from Turkey, our guise resemble with Italians, Greek Cypriots and Greeks. Besides, you can easily understand whether a person in the street is Cypriot or Türkiyeli...Our walking, the style of our hair and beard, our dresses are very different...Cypriots cut their beards freely, but theirs in particular pattern...Cypriots walk freely in the street, but they swagger...Cypriots dress freely, but Türkiyeliler more classic. Leather shoe do not fit with jean according to us, we wear rubbers with jean, but they wear leather shoe...*

As such, it is apparent that the narration of physical attributes is also hierarchical: on the one hand, there are Turkish*Cypriots* who dress, cut their beards and walk freely, on the other hand there are *Türkiyeliler* that are marked with their swagger and 'unfit' dress. It is also interesting that in all of the above quotations, the guise of Turkish*Cypriots* is resembled with the references other than Turkishness. This, in fact, is a clue that the narrative of self is also a phantasm. Apart from these, shalvar and head scarf are two elements that are popularly stressed in representation of outside appearance of *Türkiyeliler.* As **Pınar** states "we Cypriot people do not wear shalvar and alike, almost none of us wear head scarf" **Çiler** contrasts modernly dressed Turkish*Cypriots* with *Türkiyeliler* and says that "they look like villager, our people are much more modernly dressed; I have never seen any Cypriot wearing shalvar". Criticizing their 'disturbing' appearance*,* **Nilgün** defines the dress of *Türkiyeli* women as such:

> *They still wear shalvar, they still continue to dress like in the place where they came-*
> *from Hatay or Adana- wear head scarf, plastic shoes, 2 children stick to skirt, 1*
> *child in the belly...These are the people that offend my eye and disturb me...*

Gökçen mentions the opposition in outside appearances of women:

> *Their women should dress conservatively, yet here everyone is very relaxed, you*
> *can wear whatever you want. As such, women in here are perceived as naked by*
> *them...*

Polarities in culture correspond to polarities in the physical appearances of *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*, that is; the former is marked with its inferiority, traditionalism, conservativeness and as such, 'offend the eyes' of the latter. In this representation, shalvar, scarf and alike are objects of symbolic hate. Additional to these, analogous to the exceptional status of particular sections of *Türkiyeliler* who are seen as sharing common cultural elements with Turkish*Cypriots*, some of the interviews mention the differentiation between the outside appearances of *Türkiyeliler* themselves. As such, particular *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to resemble with the Turkish*Cypriots*. Here again, those who have common physical properties with Turkish*Cypriots* are not those who are living in the island but in specific districts of Turkey. While identifying those 'worker section' *Türkiyeliler* immigrating to the island with shalvar and bad smell, **Türkan** states that she could not differentiate *Türkiyeliler* in Istanbul- Göksu:

It differs from Türkiyeli to Türkiyeli, if you go to Istanbul, for example I went to Göksu, it is impossible to differentiate people in there. Yet that section in here, especially those who emigrate recently, manifest themselves...It is manifest even in their gaze, you understand whether they are Cypriot or not simultaneous with the look on their faces. Their dress, shalvar reveals them, even their smell reveals them. Even in this period when there are several types of shampoos and soaps, their smell distinguishes them

Özge also differentiate *Türkiyeliler* living in Cyprus and those in the 7th street of Ankara:

You can easily differentiate them, for example you can understand from their press on their shoes, or from their walking styles, they walk strangely, it is even distinguishable through their large moustache... They are of course those living in here, there are very well appeared people in Turkey, such as in the 7th street of Ankara you can not differentiate Türkiyeliler from Cypriots.

On the whole, the difference between the physical appearances of Turkish*Cypriots* and the 'Other' is represented with the construction of two poles: modern and properly dressed, not bearded Turkish*Cypriots* "whose smell reveals that they are Cypriots" as **Sevgi** puts it, and 'brunette' *Türkiyeliler* whose dresses are 'conservative', 'traditional', 'villager-like' and who are marked with their 'beards', 'moustache'; wear 'shalvar' and 'scarf'; 'press on their shoes' and 'smell bad'. That is, the superior culture of Turkish*Cypriots* corresponds with their superior physical appearance and the social hierarchy constructed through the emphasis on cultural difference also reflects itself in the narration of outside appearance of the 'Other'. At this point, with their smells *Türkiyeliler* becomes repulsive, and with their dresses they offend the eyes- except those who live in places like Istanbul- Göksu and the Ankara-7th street. Then, the expression 'we are different in our outside appearances' turns out to be 'we have modern, proper and superior appearance". In connection with these, the gaze of the 'other' is stated to be disturbing by some participants. As such, the disgust against the 'Other' manifests itself in the eye contact. According to **Levent** "their glance is different, it is frozen and unsympathetic, but when our people look their eyes shine." Those *Türkiyeliler* whose gaze is disturbing is specified by some participants and- similar to aforementioned division between *Türkiyeliler*- here again the lower classes are the targets of exclusion. **Şakir** expresses his discomfort with those who came from South-eastern region:

Especially those coming from South-east or from villages persist their herd understanding in here, they do not wander singularly. When there is a woman

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passing on the street, even she is with her husband, all of them turn their heads simultaneously and disturb with their gaze

Türkan indicates her abstain from the eye contact with the *Türkiyeli* workers:

I definitely do not want to make discrimination between Cypriots and Türkiyeliler, but I am troubled with some people coming from Turkey, most of them are the workers; I am troubled with their gaze...As my house is near to mosque, they pass in front of my house to go there, I do not show up in the garden when they are passing because their gaze is really disturbing, they look as if they will enter into the house...

Pınar expresses her disgust against the gaze of 'garasakal':

Near the marina in Kyrinia, there are many people eating pumpkin seeds, lot of garasakal, all of them look at you, you can not walk freely, they are annoying, you can not wear mini skirt, even stretch jeans around them, it is disturbing, I disgust from their gaze..

The dualist language of popular discourse in the narration of Turkish*Cypriot* identity through the stress on cultural difference reflects itself to the eyes. Then, physical appearance, smell and gaze of the 'Other' are not only different than 'ours', but they are just the opposite of 'ours' and as such, 'their' bodily existences becomes offending 'our' eyes, sometimes even repel 'us'. Constructed analogous to the contrast between 'white' and 'black' with all its connotations, the cultural, physical and behavioral difference of Turkish*Cypriots* is perceived like a race. As such, this very narrow and essentialist conception of Turkish*Cypriot* identity excludes the *Türkiyeli* 'Other' by its very definition.

The nicknames given to *Türkiyeliler*- which are averted to be used by most of the participants during the interviews, but are voiced when it is 'off the record' and as far as I know, popularly used in the northern part of Cyprus- also illustrates the point. **Pınar** says that "when you say *Türkiyeli* it is more polite, but when you say *gara sakal, gaco, fica* and alike you manifest your position that you are against the population pump from Turkey". **Aslı,** on the other hand, reminds that "the term garasakal symbolizes the bad just contemporarily, in old times it symbolized able-bodied soldier whose beards get long." 'Garasakal'[*], 'gaco'[**] and 'fica'[***] that are

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[*] Black Bearded. It is the oldest nickname given to Türkiyeliler

[**] It is another nickname used to refer the population under focus.

[***] fica is the local name of a kind of moss cast to the coast and it connotes the dirt or waste of sea , the beaches full of fica are not so preferable as they stick to the foods...

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the most popularly voiced nicknames of *Türkiyeliler* manifest the image of 'other': physically the 'Other' is represented with the 'black beards' and it is the waste of sea, the moss that cast to the land of Cyprus.

At this point, Faiz indicates his observation that aforementioned nicknames have specific addressees, accordingly; there is a tendency to call 'garasakal' to those *Türkiyeliler* who have better socio-economic conditions and 'gaco' and 'fica' to the ones from lower socio-economic strata.[190] "This observation confirms the othering 'Türkiyeliler' as a group no matter their distinct socio-economic or educational conditions."[191] What is more, this observation manifests the hierarchical division of the 'Other' within itself. On the top of this hierarchy, there is *Türkiyeliler* living in the particular cities- and even in particular districts- of Turkey, who are educated, from middle/high socio-economic strata and whose cultural formation and physical appearances resemble to Turkish*Cypriots*. They are the 'exceptions' to the bad image linked with the *Türkiyeliler*. Below this, there are *Türkiyeliler* who settled in the island with the population transfer shortly after the 1974 military intervention and have better socio-economic status than those from the lower stage of the hierarchy since at least they were awarded with land and properties when they firstly came. Though having allegedly inferior status when compared with Turkish*Cypriots*, their status is blurring. That is to say, for some they are improving themselves in the never-ending road to reach the level of Turkish*Cypriots*, for the others they still are totally 'different' (with all its connotations) from the former. Nevertheless, 'they' are perceived to be 'better than worse' for most of the interviewers. Finally, there are those at the bottom of this hierarchy, namely the *fica*s, who are socioeconomically most disadvantaged group whose immigration increased after 1990s; constituting the cheap labor of the northern part of the island, they mostly came from southern/southern-east regions of Turkey. As such, the 'Other' is classified within itself and the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in the narratives of Turkish*Cypriot* identity doubles and triples when the other is on the lower stages

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[190] F. Muharrem, Kıbrıslı Türk Çocukların Gündelikçi Kadınlara Yönelik Tutumları, Özdeşleşme ve Kimlik (Halkbilimi 52, 2004) quoted in T. Erhürman, Kıbrıs Türk Solunda Kıbrıs Merkezli Kimlik Arayışları, Ötekiler ve İnsan Hakları." *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 3-4 (2006): 100.

[191] F. Muharrem, Kıbrıslı Türk Çocukların Gündelikçi Kadınlara Yönelik Tutumları, Özdeşleşme ve Kimlik (Halkbilimi 52, 2004) quoted in T. Erhürman, Kıbrıs Türk Solunda Kıbrıs Merkezli Kimlik Arayışları, Ötekiler ve İnsan Hakları." *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 3-4 (2006): 100.

of this hierarchy. This classification between *Türkiyeliler* is also vital in the connection of *Türkiyeliler* with crime in the popular discourse. This will be discussed under the forth section; but before this, a look to the social segregation between 'us' and 'them' is a requirement and this is the subject of the following title.

5.3. EVERYDAY REFLECTIONS: SOCIAL SEGREGATION AND SCHOOL AS THE MATERIALIZATION OF EXCLUSION

The previous sections elaborated the representation of cultural difference and of differences in outlook between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse and it became apparent that participants' categories of 'distinction' are diffused with symbols of life style, taste and class[192]. As such, multifaceted exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in the narratives of participants was remarked. In line with these; this section will briefly outline some reflections of aforementioned exclusion in the narratives about everyday practices. In other words, this section superficially depicts the social segregation between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots* and outlines an instance of the social exclusion of the former that manifest itself with participants' answer to an interview question on their school preference for their children.

In the face of participants' almost totally antagonistic perception of the two cultures, the way of encounter with *Türkiyeliler* in daily lives of participants is tried to be understood in the interviews. Nonetheless, it is realized that quite a considerable number of interviewees even do not have any social relationship with *Türkiyeliler*. Some of them believe that cultural opposition results in non-interaction and some connect social separation to socio-economic distinctions. Here, another popular belief is that *Türkiyeliler* could not or do not want to commingle with the 'native' population. As **Hakan** puts it:

> *Cypriots and Türkiyeliler could not commingle, this is resulting from traditional differences. Besides, they did not want to integrate with us...They did not manage to attune with our culture...So, we could not commingle.*

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[192] P. Bourdieu, 1984.

Şakir gives example about the disconnection between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*:

> There have not been problems with the first comers up to now, yet, for example, they go to separate coffeehouses, they follow their group, they still communicate within themselves. In the first period when they came there was more or less a connection. Because their number increased then, the polarization has been increased. We are not in conflict but also we do not socialize… for example I have never seen a Cypriot in the coffeehouse at the corner. We have never expelled them, but they do not come to the coffeehouse that we go. Our cultures are still different.

Nilgün makes a determination that there are two separate societies in the northern part of the island:

> Perhaps nobody touches upon but they also make discrimination, that is; they also make Cypriot-Türkiyeli distinction; they also interact with the people in their circle. Besides, even friendships are limited…they also do not socialize with us…In fact, there is two separate societies in the north.

As it is apparent, encounter with the 'Other' is very limited in daily social lives of the participants. In other words, aforementioned differences pointed out in the first section are perceived to be 'cultural barrier' between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler.* Here, one-sided transformation in the culture of *Türkiyeliler*- which is also thought as an impossible process- is seen as the key for socialization and as such, bring about abstaining from interaction with the 'Other'. In this sense, as **Nilgün** stresses, there are signs of two separate societies existing in the northern part of Cyprus. Concomitantly, as far as 'difference' signifies hierarchical and exclusionary relationship, the emphasis on cultural difference (re)produces social segregation within the northern part of the island. **Mert,** who indicates that he has *Türkiyeli* friends in studying with him in England but not in Cyprus, illustrates the social separation between two communities with his words:

> It is a reality that there is very minor contact with the settlers. In my environment, there is no settler, I do not have any friend in Cyprus whose parents are *Türkiyeli*…I do not see *Türkiyeliler* at the clubs I go…where these people go, how they enjoy etc. I don't know…I do not know these people, I just know that there is a disconnection…

Osman states the reasons he perceived behind the non-communication**:**

> Neither Cypriots not Türkiyeliler interact with each other, this is a reality. Take my family life as an illustration, do I have any Türkiyeli friends that we frequently communicate and visit each other? No. I look my circle, they also do not have. They interact with each other and we interact with each other, because there is no common point that we could share. Of course there are those who interact with them, but they are certainly in minority and they probably interact because they

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are in their family or something like that. We make shopping from them and they also make shopping from us, yet that is all. This is not that we are conditioned as such, but because of the fact that there is no connecting bond; there is no communication. We are totally different from each other; our life styles are different...

About the question on his relationship with *Türkiyeliler*, **Onur** says:

There is neither any big problem nor any fusion between us. Since there are cultural and economic differences, we have not experienced any fusion...I do not have any dialogue with the new generation, put differently, I do not perceive that such kind of children commingle with our children.

On the whole, perceived differences of the 'Other' results in lack of communication, this in turn strengthens the dualist language of the popular discourse. Hence, the perpetual circle of lack of connection and exclusion is created with the stress on opposition between 'us' and 'them'. As such, exclusion of the 'Other' in the narrative of the collective self gives way to social segregation. What is more, as far as aforementioned lack of connection is taken into account, it becomes possible to argue that representation of *Türkiyeli* subject is often based on imagination additional to perception.

Besides these, it is possible to argue that school preferences of some participants for their children could be perceived as an instance in materialization of the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in everyday practices. Herein, it is asked to interviewers whether the composition of the school is important in their school preferences for their children, i.e., whether they send their children to a school in which considerable number of its students are *Türkiyeliler*. As such, apart from two conditional positive answers, all of the addressees of this question prefer not to send their children to a school including many *Türkiyeliler*. At this point, perception of the 'Other' as inadequate, improper and insecure is on the scene. **Sinan** expresses his avoidance to send his child to a school including considerable number of *Türkiyeli* children as such: "I do not send my child to school with them because I do not want him to learn to talk like them, and our life style is different." **Osman** similarly claims that he sent his son to a private school since the quality of education is better and environment is more secure than those including many *Türkiyeliler:*

As a matter of fact, I do not prefer to send him to the same school with them. We think as such and sent our son to a private primary school. The reason is that, the quality of education and the level of students are much lower in the schools they attend. A ship full of Türkiyeliler arrives here and their children go to same

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school, the classes become too crowded in these schools. A class with 45-50 students and a class with maximum 20 students; which one do you choose? In addition, I hear several times that their children take the snacks of our children with force, that they stole the money of children. Hence, I do not prefer to send my son to a school consisting lots of Türkiyeliler.

As a teacher, **Sevgi** also asserts that Cypriots have a tendency to send their children to private schools as the 'Other' debases the quality of education:

Cypriots mostly send their children to private schools because 80 per cent of students in public schools are those coming from Turkey, they fill the ship and come, then register their children to schools, many even do not know reading, they also have adaptation problems...

Hasan expresses his observation about the issue with similar approach:

My daughter is not in the age to go to the school, but I know from my friend circle that they send their children to the schools where there are least number of Türkiyeli students, if they oblige to, they send their children to private schools. This is just like this; nobody can deny this, but why? Because of cultural difference again, for preventing their children to learn bad things...The more the distance is the better it is, if one wishes to protect his/her children.

On the other hand, **Melda**, classifies *Türkiyeliler* within themselves and accordingly lets her child to study with the ones on 'higher' level in this hierarchy, but not with the 'lower' ones who are living in particular regions:

She can study with Türkiyeliler, but if they are children of such as lecturers from Eastern Mediterranean University, or of my friends, yet I do not send her to a school to study with people living Antalyalılar region and beyond. For example I do not send my daughter to schools in Maraş region.

Finally, **Hüseyin** states that he permits her daughter to study in a school with considerable number of *Türkiyeliler,* in the sense that he allows her "to study in schools like Galatasaray or Robert College because education is crucial for her future". As such, the exclusion in the narrative is materialized in school preferences of some participants for their children and the abstaining to encounter with the 'Other' results in the tendency to segregate the schools of 'our' children from 'theirs'. As **Pınar** reminds "if a child in primary school says that s/he has a friend from Urfa, the mother will say keep her/himself apart from that child, because there are prejudices". Concomitantly, the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse influences preferences and practices, which in turn reproduces distinction from and exclusion of the 'Other' as touched upon in this example. Here, as the last two quotations illustrate, the hierarchical classification of the *Türkiyeliler* in

representation also reflects itself to practices, so *Türkiyeliler* having 'higher' status in this hierarchy become eligible to educate with 'our' children in the same school. Thence, a clue of class discrimination additional to exclusion of the 'Other' that will also be touched upon in following sections reveals itself also in this illustration.

5.4. THOSE GOOD OLD DAYS AND THOSE WHO DESTROY THEM

In previous sections connotations of 'difference' in relation to *Türkiyeliler* in participants' self-perceptions and the image of *Türkiyeli* subject in these narratives were elaborated. In connection with these, this section focuses on the link between crime and image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse. That is to say, this section elaborates another popularly stated narrative about Turkish*Cypriot* collectivity which is signed with its innocence and victimhood in the face of decreasing social tranquility as a result of increase in the population of 'outsiders'. Concomitantly, another element in the narratives of Turkish*Cypriot* identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler* prevalent in popular discourse will be released in this section.

Almost all of the interviewers mention the continuously accelerating criminal incidents as one of the most important social problem in the northern part of Cyprus. "We let the doors open and slept in old times" is significantly popular statement explaining the discomfort against the vanishing property and life security in the northern part of the island. Though the time when these good old days were ended and the instigators are not identical in all representations, most of the interviews believe that increase in crime rates is closely associated with allowance of 'every one' to enter into the island without requesting passport or visa. As an example, **Gökçen** criticizes the border policy which request solely ID cards for Turkish Republic citizens since she connects this with the increase in crime rates. She claims:

> *They are coming with ID cards from Turkey, some committed murder, some burglary and then they are coming to Cyprus. They can come here and turn back to Turkey in one day…We resent because of these, people can come here from outside, but we don't want criminals. There should be investigation, how much they have in their pockets, whether they have some property, estate etc. Why the whole caboodle can come to our country?*

At this juncture, complaint about the increase in criminal incidents is generally linked with the fact that society in northern part of Cyprus has been becoming more crowded and complex as a result of immigrations from Turkey for years. In other words, it is pointed out that the more the "unfamiliar" is coming to Cyprus, the more crime is committed. A house wife, **Çiler,** states:

> [I]n old times we could let the door open and went to the neighbor but we can not do this now…This is stemming from the fact that ambiguous people are coming to here. Those ambiguous people, for example exit from the jail and come here… This makes us troubled, they are coming here and rob and break down the order. In our native people there is no such individual.

Thus, the "unfamiliar" becomes the responsible of the increasing discomfort and insecurity. As such, the nostalgia of past takes the shape of a lost paradise, and immigrants become the murderer of the very paradise itself. Complaints of **Sinan** illustrate the nostalgia of past, he says:

> In Cyprus, people knew each other in past, they did not disturb each other, did not steal others' properties, everyone knew each other. Because entrance and exit is free in our country now, all those condemned, sentenced, convicted people came here, and they are penniless and hungry people. So they incline towards this way.

Deniz also mentions the vanishing familiarity and increasing disruptions in society:

> The society in here was smaller and the criminals were apparent, robber Ali, even his nickname was robber, so you knew who is who, you easily found the responsible of a problem. There were not any heavy juridical faults such as murder. Of course the inadequate controls on the borders have role in this issue. It is in fact natural that immigration from outside causes these kind of problems. There have been similar occasions in England and Germany; this is one of the results of globalism.

Nilgün indicates her distrust towards the 'unfamiliar' *Türkiyeliler:*

> Surely there are also good people between them but we have prejudices, they are people that we do not have any acquaintance. Besides, we do not create such an environment as we do not know them, since we hear negative things and because there is huge behavioral differences...Cyprus is a small place and everyone knew each other, we continue this custom, that is; we do not easily accept the outsiders.

At this point, it is interesting that the image of society represented in the quotations above is quite different than the one that is represented in participants' narratives about their cultural properties. In other words, above quotations emphasize more organic social bonds that are linked with traditional or congregational society, yet the image of society that is expressed in relation to cultural properties of its members was marked with its modernity and transnational bonds. As such,

contradicting elements of attachment are articulated in the construction of collective identity as it is uncovered in participants' perceptions of their selves and their society. In line with these, since the outsider or the unfamiliar is linked with crime, the 'original' Turkish*Cypriots* are represented as if they constitute a homogenous group whose members are guiltless people. Then, in order to open the doors of their houses, the 'doors' of the island should be closed to the 'unfamiliar' immigrants from Turkey. At this point the words of **Levent** are illustrative:

> *If we Cypriots are approximately 120 thousand people in here, I am sure that if just we 120 thousand Cypriot people had lived in the north, we would have continued to sleep when the doors are open…because everyone would have known each other, but the social pressure decreased in recent times as unfamiliarity is increased.*

Then, although the subjects of those who broke down the good old days is not always the same in the interviews- that is, their arrival time, their social class, whether they come from specific regions of Turkey or not, whether they have particular roots - it is certain that they are "unfortunately not the natives but the *Türkiyeliler"* as **Türkan** puts it. Hence, one of the main reasons behind the discontent against *Türkiyeliler* stems from the imagined or real link between 'them' and these criminal incidents. That is to say, according to the data about the composition of the central prison, the number of 'original' Turkish*Cypriot* criminals is considerably lower than *Türkiyeliler* who constitute the main population of the prison[193]. In this sense, the composition of the jail which is marked with *Türkiyeli* criminal majority constitutes the numeric ground of the connection between criminal incidents and *Türkiyeliler*. Concomitantly, 'they' are perceived to be the responsible of social trouble, of life and property insecurity. Put it differently, there is a strong connection between *Türkiyeliler* and the criminal in popular discourse and the numeric majority of *Türkiyeliler* in the jail is the basic reference point of participants. In other words, the reality is 'distorted' through generalization and *Türkiyeliler* are represented as the criminals. **Engin** states:

> *Who causes all the incidents in Cyprus? Look at the jails, 99% of them are those unemployed, penniless section coming from Turkey or those who try to get rich in an easy way, that is, those having Turkish roots. This is our difference.*

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[193] Data is taken from *Yenidüzen* , 22 April 2007. With the title "We Import Criminals", detailled chart about crime sorts and nationality/citizenship of criminals is given. Accordingly it is claimed that only 60 of 413 incumbents are Turkish Cypriots, while 247 are TR citizens, 81 are TR and TRNC citizens, and the rest is foreigners. Interestingly, those ciminals who have both TRNC and TR citizenships are not defined as Turkish Cypriots.

Similarly, **Nilgün** says:

> *In old times, the jail was empty but now convicts are more than the capacity of the jail, how many original Cypriot can you find in there?...When you look, you see that they are Türkiyeliler, perhaps it is wrong to perceive all of them as identical but those coming to Cyprus are as such..*

The reputation of *Türkiyeliler* as criminal is sometimes so high that some of the interviewers directly define 'them' as impostors. To illustrate, **Çiler** replies the question what the word *Türkiyeli* reminds her as such: "To be honest, it reminds firstly liar, impostor people, it does not remind me good things, but thieves, impostors and liars." Likewise, though not defining them simply as criminals, **Mert** claims that he automatically connects theft and *Türkiyeliler:*

> *It is a reality that we have prejudices in our minds; there is a great prejudice against Türkiyeliler. When someone talks about theft, I am sure that everyone-including me-will says that it is certainly 'garasakal'. When it is stated that there was a robbery, the figure in the mind very possibly resembles to the settlers.*

As mentioned before, the preposition "we let the doors open and slept in old times" is very popular discourse and many of the interviewers themselves stated this preposition when complaining about population transfer or about social problems in general. Additionally, in interviews it is asked to participants whether they agree on this complaint. Except two interviewers- Mustafa and Gürsel- who disagree or have amendments, all of the participants agree on this. What is more, all of them also share the conception that those who destroy such quiet life are *Türkiyeliler*. As an example, **Mert** agrees on the preposition through mentioning his grandfather's past experience:

> *I did not experience that period of course, but what we listen from the prior generation is that the crime level was terrifically lower than now. For example my grandfather says that he had never locked the doors of his house or car, he says he had never controlled whether the doors were open before traveling to another city. By the way, our house was robbed in 1999, they broke down the shatter and entered, took one mobile phone and money and the robbers were settlers.*

Ahmet has similar answer:

> *As this is a small place, everyone knew the other and trusted each other, so they were able to leave their home when the doors were open. However, this is not possible now...Many people have been coming to Cyprus in last years, generally from Turkey. This is also the problem of metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, various types of individuals are coming from Turkey and faults like narcotic transportation or burglary have been increased.*

Mehmet, who is a lawyer, also agrees with the statement and the structural change of population with immigrations is expressed as the reason:

> *This complaint is true because the crime rates in Turkish Cypriot society were extremely low before 1974 peace operation. With the population transfer after 1974 peace operation, the rate of criminal incidents reasonably accelerated...Before 1974 such crimes as narcotic or rape were very rare but with the change in population structure such crimes are increased very much*

Sevgi has a similar approach:

> *The responsible of this changing situation is the population being transferred to Cyprus. Robbers, murderers and rapists are coming to our country. Every side of my house is gated because it is robbed five times. Of course we slept when the doors are open in the time when we live with Rum, you knew the people around you in that time.*

By this way, the statement 'we let the doors open and slept in old times' becomes manifestation of discontent against insecurity within society resulting from increasing criminal incidents. Moreover, it becomes the manifestation of disapproval to population transfer and/or border policy which does not require any other thing than ID cards for Turkish citizens. Notwithstanding, the sole reason behind the obligation to close the doors when sleeping, i.e., the sole reason behind increasing social and security problems, is perceived as *Türkiyeliler* without any discussion on the dynamics in the transformation of social tranquility. Thence, *Türkiyeliler* become threats against the life and property security of the native population and as will be elaborated below, criminal stereotype(s) is constituted through classification of *Türkiyeliler* within themselves.

Only two of the interviewers somehow do not accept this preposition and give alternative approaches about the issue. Here, interestingly, both of them need to mention Greek Cypriots as the subjects of insecurity. **Mustafa** says:

> *I am 50 years old and I do not remember such thing, from the start of recalling myself, I grew up with the fear of being killed by Rum. We emigrated in 1963, we were captured in 1967 etc, that is, there was afraid from Rum…Until the day of my graduation from military college, I was afraid of Rum… This preposition 'we let the doors open and slept' might be true for the English period, so do not reflect our era. Perhaps it was true for small settlements, but not for big cities.*

And **Gürsel** rejects the preposition and explains:

> *I perceive this discourse of 'we let the doors open and slept' as an exaggeration. There should have been some real point but the reason behind such a point should also clearly be understood. A society that was living in ghettos, everyone had an arm in their hands and all of us were waiting something from outside. In those circumstances it was very natural that our doors were open and I do not suppose*

that the doors are open in cities. The increase in population, acceleration of economic relations, imbalance in income distribution, all of them brought about some problems. In old times there was no such thing that the poorest of the village could steal from the richest, thus it was natural that the doors were open. Now there are problems resulting from the increase in population, income distribution and from the extreme rate of population transfer from Turkey.

As it is apparent, aforementioned complaints are targeting *Türkiyeliler* in general. That is, as a monolithic group 'they' are represented to be the authors of criminal incidents and social disorder. As such, as far as interviews are taken into account, it is possible to argue that- apart form other things- susceptibility and criminality are two elements attributed to the image of the 'Other' in popular discourse. Yet, there are different explanations about who these so called criminal *Türkiyeliler* are and about the reason behind the fact that mostly not 'the original' Turkish*Cypriots* but 'they' are the criminals. The definitions about the criminal 'Other', on the other hand; disperse from attribution of criminality to *Türkiyeliler* as a whole to class based accusations as would be elaborated in the rest of this section.

Some of the interviewers believe that there is a tendency to commit crime generally in people who are *Türkiyeli*. **Emre** for example, implies that, in contrast to Turkish*Cypriots* as a monolithic group, *Türkiyeliler* as another homogeneous group has an inclination towards crime. He says:

There are such events even in universities not to mention lower strata, for example two Türkiyeli stabbed each other when it was my second year in university. They made this just because of girlfriend issue. Not one Cypriot makes such a thing, they perhaps fight but never stab another person but Türkiyeliler do that.

Apart from misrepresenting the sociological truth, the reason why *Türkiyeliler* stabbed each other is given totologously: that is, because they are *Türkiyeliler*. As such, in this representation, being *Türkiyeli* automatically makes its members to be linked with crime while being Turkish*Cypriot* automatically makes its members to be apart from criminal inclinations. Two of the participants even go further and assert that this is related to the genesis of *Türkiyeliler*, that is, 'they' are perceived as if they have innate capacity to commit crime. As an illustration, on the question whether those who or whose family settled just after 74 could be counted as Cypriot, **Murat** replies:

He might be born in Cyprus, but he is not a Cypriot. People are affected from their genesis. Since their mother and father are Türkiyeli, they bear their features. Look

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at those who commit crime, who rob, look at the jail; at least 95 of a hundred people have Turkish origins.

Sinan, who is a policeman, has a similar idea on the issue:

> *Look at the guy who stabbed the police 2 days ago; his parents came from Turkey but he was born in Cyprus, he went to school in Cyprus, he did his military service in Cyprus, yet he stabbed the police. This is related to their genes. Cypriots may get angry and may beat but certainly never kill someone. They, on the other hand, immediately think of murdering, even in familial issues.*

Outspokenly, without any criterion, having *Türkiyeli* roots as such is enough for some of the interviewees to have the potential to be criminal. Thence, *Türkiyeliler* are represented as 'all bad' and it is grounded to their genesis. That is the case, total exclusion and accusation of a group as criminal is manifest in aforementioned quotations.

Apart from these, some of the interviewers link this alleged tendency to crime to the very culture of the *Türkiyeliler*. In other words, here again the 'cultural difference' dealt in the first section is on the scene which this time refers to the classification of people according to their tendency to commit crime. Here again, the two 'cultures' are displayed as opposites: on the one hand, there are *Türkiyeliler* whose culture is making them 'open-eyed' and 'unreliable' and on the other, there are Turkish*Cypriots* whose members are 'natural' and 'naive' people. To illustrate, in his depiction of cultural differences between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler*, **Levent** states that Cypriot culture refers to "honesty and respectful human relationship", similarly; **Nilgün** defines Turkish*Cypriots* as "sincere, honest and genuine people". Not surprisingly, the opposites of these properties are linked with *Türkiyeliler* as it is also seen in the dichotomy stated by **Mert**: "…our people are very relaxed, *Türkiyeliler* are more open-eyed, our people are more ingenious, hence this is the result." Therefore, the cultural superiority of Turkish*Cypriots* this time is expressed through the ethical propensities of its members and the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* is legitimated on the grounds of the latter's unreliability. **Hasan** indicates:

> *In cultural terms there are differences, our culture bring us totally humanist life style that is based on reliability…But there is no such reliability in Türkiyeliler, you even feel in the workplace that they can double-cross you at any time, this is definitely as such.*

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Mete also mentions the opposition between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler* through illustrating the issue with his professional experiences:

> *I started to the profession of law in 1978; in that year it was terrifically hard to find 5 gr. narcotic cases for narcotic precedent judgment. Now the cases are about 10-15 kg drugs. These kind of things are alien to us, moreover these guys brought some unwritten tribal habits called as töre with them, all of them are too alien to us, we Cypriots act with the framework of law, rules and measures, but those coming here carry none of these three elements.*

Hence, the culture of Turkish*Cypriots* is represented with its distance from illegal, unreliable and criminal behavior; and this is generally linked to the organic social bonds. This in turn, results in essentialist definition of both the collective self and the other: while 'we' Turkish*Cypriots* share a cultural essence whose hallmark is reliability and distance from unethical behavior, 'their' culture is essentially connected with crime, unreliability and dishonesty. As such, the negative examples to this definition are depicted as being the exceptions to the general rule. **Engin** illustrates the issue when he identifies his own group as being honest and says:

> *I do not say it for degradation, but one of our distinctions is the fact that Turkish Cypriots are very honest people, this is really in our fabric and because of this we suppose our addressee as similarly honest, this is a cultural difference…Cyprus is very wrongly defined, it is stated that there are lots of money; you can earn money easily in Cyprus. Hence when they come to Cyprus and see that you should work for earning money, they choose other ways…I perceive it totally cultural thing, being theft is related to their culture, to personality and to family structure, their family structure is corrupt. I do not want to make generalizations, yet most of those coming to Cyprus, even all of them, are mob and you could not expect any other thing from mobs. There is of course some trying to earn with their labor, we should congratulate them…but they are not the majority.*

Similarly, **Mustafa** claims:

> *For example, when you talk with native people, you feel that s/he is not evil-minded, most of those coming from Turkey have suspicious approach…Our people in here is not like this, whether they are poor or rich, whether they are educated or not, they are more tolerant and conformist. Their fabric is different, and we have such kind of fabric.*

In this manner, "we have different culture" turns out to be "we have a reliable, sincere and naive fabric making us distant from guiltiness" but "they have not". Thus, exclusion through the stress on cultural difference displays another face in the complaints about crime that is crystallized with the statement "we let the doors open and slept in old times". Additional to these, some participants refer aforementioned cultural hierarchy between *Türkiyeliler* and link it with the criminal incidents. So, in

relation to those having 'lower' status in the hierarchy, it is indicated that 'their' low level of culture is the reason behind 'their' tendency to crime. As **Gürsel** asserts:

> *As they have low level culture, they are the authors of the most of the incidents. At this point, they occupy courts, other places, such as hospitals. When we look at health problem also, this section has more health problems. In other words, rather than funding on more rentable areas, country's economic resources are wasting to their education, health problems etc.*

Connecting 'high' culture with innocence, **Hakan** says: "we love Turkey, but we love those civilized and cultured people of Turkey, not their robbers!" Analogously, linking the potential to be criminal with the so called level of culture, **Engin** emphasize that even those 'cultured' people of Turkey hesitate from the group under focus:

> *Those having high level of culture, those coming from Istanbul Ankara, from big cities, also do not like them…they also react against them, against their theft and illegalities, they also claim that these people are from particular region, not just we Turkish Cypriots say these…*

Similar to the hierarchical differentiation of *Türkiyeliler* within themselves as pointed out in previous sections, *Türkiyeliler* are classified within themselves and the author of criminal incidents has its specifications. In other words, it is perceived in interviews that while firstly connecting *Türkiyeliler* with the crime, most of the participants afterwards state their exceptions or specify the criminals. In other words, despite the 'Other' as opposed to 'us' is perceived as the responsible of criminal incidents, the 'Other' itself is classified and the criminal stereotype is depicted by these specifications, henceforth; particular sections of *Türkiyeliler* are specifically and directly linked with crime. Otherwise stated, the criminal stereotype is deductively constructed from *Türkiyeliler* to those 'dangerous classes' whose members will be elaborated in proceeding paragraphs.

At this point, those *Türkiyeliler* who settled in the island with the population transfer after the 1974 military intervention have an in-between position. That is, like that of the representation of their cultural formation to be 'better than worse' when compared to the rest of *Türkiyeliler*, their reliability- which is not absolute- is on a higher point of the hierarchy than the latter in most of the participants'

perceptions. That is the case; considerable number of interviewees indicate that not those who settled in the island just after 1974 but those 'latecomers' mostly have connection with criminal incidents. Here, it is additionally emphasized by few participants that those early settlers themselves also complain about the aforementioned group. As such, most of the interviewers tend to discuss the issue with terms that differentiate first comer *Türkiyeliler* and the late comer *Türkiyeliler*. **Hasan** explains the differences between the latecomers and the first comers:

> *At least most of those who settled after 1974 were not robber or murderer, but all of those who came later are robbers, murderers and rapists. Those first comers adapted themselves in some respects and they were propertied and employed. Yet, those who came later with their ID cards are too problematic, they kill somebody in Turkey and come here, they kill someone and turn back to Turkey. In the day when it is proposed to enter Istanbul with visa, it is meaningless to enter into our island just with the ID cards.*

In the depiction of **Levent**, though not as innocent as the 'natives', first comers are differentiated from the rest:

> *Though they did not adapt to us, though there are some fizzling out within them, the rate of criminals within those who came after 1974 was lesser, they at least were settled by the state and awarded with some particular properties, but those who came after the permission of entrance with the ID cards broke down the order in here…*

Therefore, generalization about *Türkiyeliler* as criminals that is outlined in the beginning of this section is specified through stressing the link between increase in criminal incidents and the latecomer *Türkiyeliler* who enter into the island with their ID cards. At this point, it is apparent that aforementioned specification gives way to another generalization: ID cards are represented as crime devices and those *Türkiyeliler* entering into the island with their ID cars are represented as a homogeneous group of criminals. Complaining about the increase in crime levels after the recent immigrations from Turkey, **Mustafa** states**:**

> *[E]specially after the amnesty act that was applied in Turkey, most of the robbers in those jails came to Cyprus. Similar to that of Ankara- Çankaya, these people cause discomfort in Cyprus. Turkey is a big country and people do not know each other, but our island is small, so we are much more disturbed. Thus, at the time when it is discussed to request visa to the entrance in Istanbul, it is so disastrous that the whole caboodle is coming to Cyprus... As far as I see, those who came 30-40 years before are also complaining about this situation.*

Deniz gives example about the discussion and claims**:**

> *Our secretary's parents are Türkiyeli, she was born in here- I do not separate her from us- she also indicates that they are disturbed from the current situation. She*

says that they report the illegal workers coming from Turkey. In other words, she means that being Türkiyeli does not change the fact that these guys are problematic… Many people are entering into the island without any control and this cause security problems, everyone is conscious about this…Same problem is existing in Istanbul and Ankara, I think this is natural, but the main reason behind this is lack of control. If you annul the entrance with passport and apply policy that solely request ID card for the entrance, this is the result...

Therefore, as understood from the interviews, while *Türkiyeliler* are linked with crime in popular discourse, the image of latecomer *Türkiyeliler* are particularly represented with criminality. As such, we took one step further in the hierarchical discrimination against so called *Türkiyeliler.*

Another crucial element in classification of *Türkiyeliler* with respect to crime is related to regional belongingness or origins other than Turkishness that particular sections of *Türkiyeliler* have. To make it clear, according to some interviewees, the criminals are coming from particular regions of Turkey or have particular roots. At this point, especially those coming from Hatay and those having Arabic or Kurdish origins are basic of the reference points of informants. Differently put, *Türkiyeliler* having aforementioned ties are perceived to be positioned at the lower levels of the reliability hierarchy mentioned before, so they are more strongly connected with crime in comparison to the rest of 'them'. **Hakan** says:

And, unfortunately we let the doors open and sleep in old times, nothing was stolen, but today those coming from Antakya region, those who even do not know to speak Turkish properly are coming as if they are tourists or settling down in our country. Hence, when they become moneyless, when they could not find any job, they rob the houses, usurp bags. We see in the news and newspapers that even usury started in here just like the case in Turkey...

Ahmet believes that people coming from Hatay are degrading the image of *Türkiyeliler*, he says:

Because of their role in acceleration of incident rates, people from some regions of Turkey, such as from Hatay, degrade the entire Türkiyeli image, because of them people make generalizations about all Türkiyeliler.

Likewise, **Mert** identifies people from Hatay as 'bad examples':

Turkey is a big country, yet we unfortunately always see the bad examples, those from Hatay etc. In fact, my aunt is from Izmir and she says that we are certainly right on feeling these people as stranger, she says even they do not see such kind of people around them.

Apparently, social exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* on the grounds of their relationship with the increasing criminal incidents has many substratums. Here the region and roots of immigrants from Turkey are other vital criteria for the mentioned specification. As such, coming from Hatay or being Kurt means additional exclusion as, apart from other things, some of the 'native' people perceive 'them' as potential criminals. As an example, identifying the group under discussion with such attributes as 'colored' or 'dark-skinned', **İrfan** says:

> *In old times our grandmothers and grandfathers slept when the doors were open, this is a reality. But, it is impossible now, because you can not know whether a dark-skinned citizen will come 1 hour later and cut your throat, strip your house or not. I do not see these people as the responsible, because they are not native of this place, they are brought to here in some way… Generally, our people do not like colored citizens…that is, those coming from South-East or East, those generally having Arabic or Kurdish origins…*

Interestingly, **Türkan** who mentions that her charlady is from Hatay, states her doubtfulness against those people coming from Hatay:

> *Probably 3 of 4 Türkiyeliler in Nicosia are coming from Hatay, perhaps these people are also good; but looking from outside, they make me feel uncomfortable. I can not take a walk in Arasta* even in the afternoon, but can make this even in the midnight...Arasta resembles a village of Turkey, even a village of Hatay...when you go there you definitely feel restlessness.*

On the question, how then she relies on a person from Hatay in her house, she says:

> *She is working in my house for 14 years; she is like a member of our house. I entrusted my house for years and went to work, even a needle has not been lost up to today. Yet, I did not accept when she asked me whether her husband could deal with garden, I do not want them to work in my house together...Though she is from Hatay, she told me that she is ashamed to say that she is from Hatay...You can not imagine what she says about people coming from Hatay...*

Therefore, *Türkiyeliler* with particular belongingness are represented to be unreliable since they are directly linked with crime. That is, if those latecomer *Türkiyelile*r- who enter into the island with their ID cards and then settle in the northern part of the island- are also from aforementioned group, they are perceived to be more 'dangerous' in the sense that their potential to be criminal is conceived as quite certain. Those some 'familiar' ones, on the other hand; as above quotation clarifies, are seen as exceptions and even there is a remote stance towards them. As

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* Arasta: The old citywall in Nicosia where mainly 'latercomer' Türkiyeliler are dwelling.

such, another step is furthered in the hierarchical exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in interviewers' depictions.

Finally, some of the informants go one step further in the specification of those potential criminals and identify workers coming from Turkey- especially workers in constructions- with the crime. At this point, social class of the immigrants from Turkey is the significant criterion in the assessment of personality and reliability. That is, being unemployed, poor or worker in constructions and coming from Turkey make people to be perceived as unreliable, robber, liar etc. Moreover, aforementioned 'dangerous' belongingness of these people and their social class are generally overlapped. As such, being worker and coming from particular regions of Turkey, such as from Hatay, is very frequently encountered situation- as also mentioned in the second chapter. Nevertheless, having such a position is identical with being the target of society, the murderer of 'good old days' mentioned in the beginning of this section. Herein, the assertion of **Engin** is a meaningful illustration. He says:

> *Do you know the main danger? Workers coming from Hatay. Turkish Cypriots were sleeping when the doors are open before 1974, the cars were open, nobody looked the others property, there might be one murder in 20 years. Now, we see theft, forgery, burglary, murder vs. each and every day in newspapers...*

Gökçen's expression is another example, she states:

> *[W]orkers in constructions etc, these are causing discomfort, they showed us incidents that we not used to see… On the whole, there is a building here and I see many workers working with shalvar, and this makes me irritated. As long as they are working in the building, I do not open my windows and doors because I do not trust them.*

Finally, **Emre** clarifies the hierarchical exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* with his words:

> *Because of some occasions caused by people coming from Turkey- especially by the worker section- the approach of Cypriots towards Türkiyeliler has been transformed, even some Türkiyeliler accept this situation: for example those Türkiyeliler coming from eastern regions, they really come without any money in their pockets and if they could not find a job in here they can do everything to get money. Besides, the majority of criminal incidents are committed by eastern Türkiyeli worker section. I have not heard that any Cypriot commit robbery up to today, I remember that we park the car without locking, even without closing its windows. But now the situation has been changed, as such Cypriots' perceptions about Türkiyeliler naturally changed. That is, even they are from Istanbul or Izmir, when someone says I am Türkiyeli we prefer to step back…*

As such, the final point of hierarchical exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* though the complaint against the decrease in social tranquility is identification of migrant cheap labor defined in the third chapter with the crime. In other words, intermingle of cultural, regional, national and class-based exclusion is voiced through the criticism against increasing crime rates. As such, particular section of the 'Other' is precisely represented as unreliable and dangerous, and with the specification of criminal stereotype, social exclusion is tripled for aforementioned group. Then, the lower classes of latecomer *Türkiyeliler* as a whole that mainly constitute the migrant cheap labor in the northern part of the island, become the targets of society. In this sense, as claimed in the second section, it is apparent that the migrant cheap labor force of the northern part of the island is facing with similar conditions in the other parts of the world. At this point, Wallerstein's note on the image of immigrants is illuminating; perceiving it as the "old story of the modern world"[194] Wallerstein indicates that immigrants are accused of many things like that of their repulsive/ inferior cultural practices and of their role in increase of the crime rates by the 'native' population[195]. Taking aforementioned representations into account, it is apparent that the narratives of participants are in concordance with Wallerstein's assertion.

This part tried to elaborate one of the most popular complaints in the northern part of Cyprus, namely the harsh increase in criminal incidents which is connected with population transfer from Turkey. As such, it is revealed that the 'Other'- additional to being vulgar non-proper, uneducated etc. - is also criminal or at least the one who is insecure. Hence, as far as the 'Other' is linked with the crime and criminal attributes, self-representation of participants is marked with the opposites of aforementioned features. That is, Turkish*Cypriots* are perceived to be a monolithic group whose members share properties that are incommensurable with criminality: such as naiveté, naturalness and reliability. Thence, the stress on the guiltiness of the 'Other' strengthen the innocence of collective self, by this way the superiority

[194] I, Wallerstein, "Göç Tepkiye Tepki mi?" trans. by, Pembe Behçetoğulları and Birikim Ozgür *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 2 (2006):102

[195] I. Wallerstein, Ibid, p.101

of the latter's identity is remarked. So, another face of the image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse is manifested in this section, and also another face of trouble relating to the popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' is uncovered.

5.5. SYMBOLS OF POLITICAL DEPENDENCY AND DISSOLUTION OF SOCIETY: TURKIYELILER

Preceding sections focused on interview results about participants' representation of Turkish*Cypriot* identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler* and on the image of the 'Other' in narratives, everyday experiences and imaginations of the informants. In this section, descriptive analysis of participants' opinions about political and economic ramifications of population transfer/immigration to northern part of island will be made. Differently put, image of *Türkiyeliler* in relation to the political and economic realms will be touched upon. Finally, it will be argued that Turkish*Cypriot* identity is constructed very narrowly in the popular discourse since considerable number of interviewers exclude *Türkiyeliler* from 'ingenious' citizens irrespective of the time period spent in the island. This in turn, shends light on the fact that belongingness to the island of Cyprus is perceived as an essence in popular discourse.

In the third chapter, *Türkiyeli* immigration to the northern part of the island in different periods was summarized. Moreover, it is pointed out that acquirement of TRNC citizenship by *Türkiyeliler* has been criticized on the grounds that it has been used as a mechanism preventing opposition to existing political rule, disenfranchising the native population within its own country and that it has paved the way for transformation of demographic balance in island. Before the elaboration of participants' expressions about immigration and citizenship issues, it should also be reminded that there have been remarkable emigration of 'ingenious' population from the island. That is to say, there have been massive emigrations from Turkish Cypriot society- under whatever state rule- to other countries (especially to Britain, Australia and Turkey) and it is estimated that more than 100,000 people having Turkish Cypriot origins left the island in past decades[196]. As such, it is meaningful

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[196] Ramm, 2006, p.524

to elaborate the narratives of participants about immigrations within this framework.

To begin with, *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to be symbols of Turkey's political intervention, of political rule in the north searching for integration with Turkey and of the dissolution of Turkish Cypriot society by some participants. **Aslı**, for example, states her discomfort against the issue:

> *In Turkey's conception, it is not us which is important in here but the Turkish existence, what is required is manageable Turkish population in the island, so there has been Turkification policy in the North.*

In a similar vein, **Levent** claims:

> *It is alleged that Greek Cypriot government's strategy against Turkish Cypriots is osmosis, but Turkey had already actualized osmosis policy in here...*

Thence; more focus on the interviewers' conception of the population movements in the northern part of the island is a requirement. In interviews, it was touched upon both population transfer policy after 1974 and the current immigration movements. For the first phase of immigrations from Turkey that started immediately after 1974, two approaches are prevalent in participants' evaluations. First of all, some of the addressees of the question on assessment of population transfer from Turkey partly accept the mentality behind population transfer yet have some reservations. **Şakir**, for example, states:

> *There was planned transfer policy in the beginning, we needed work force in here as there were large lands for work, these people came and help the native population...In the period of national struggle we embraced even a crew coming from Turkey, so we embrace these people at first...But then work seeking people or those searching for adventure came here, their families also came afterwards and make us disturbed...*

Though complaining about the limitlessness of the phenomenon, **Gürsel** also emphasizes that transfer of population was a requirement:

> *Like all other citizens, I am also criticizing limitless and uncontrolled population transfer, yet I think it was a requirement. That is, it was explicit that there was a necessity of extra population in the geography surrounding us, but it is apparent that the required degree is exceeded now...*

At this point, *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to be instrumental for reconstruction of life after war and as such, as far as they are perceived to be 'beneficial', their immigration to the island is not criticized. On the other hand, it is believed by some participants that their instrumentality should not conceal the fact that 'they' were awarded more than they deserve. To illustrate, **Mustafa** says:

> *There had been 30-40 thousand Turkish Cypriots emigrating to the North while the number of Greek Cypriots was approximately 300thousand, moreover; Greek Cypriots were 90 percent richer than us. As Cyprus problem could not be solved in a short period of time, from my point of view, population transfer from Turkey, which enabled working with the lands in the North, could be seen as natural. Nevertheless, I think property title distribution to these people and giving right to sell these lands was an unjust policy.*

Cemal touches upon similar point:

> *At that time it was a necessity to fill the lands in here, it was a necessity to bring these people into here, so they brought them. Perhaps the only mistake in here was the policy that gave real estate property as a contribution to them; I think this should not be made. Some field to work might be given to them, but they distributed all the property*

Then, first comer *Türkiyeliler*- apart from other features that were touched upon before- gain an instrumental role in 'filling' the extra land. Yet, the property distribution to 'them', as opposed to Turkish Cypriot migrants from the southern part of the island to whom also assigned real estate and lands -that were originally in Greek Cypriot ownership- in return to their properties they left in the South, are perceived to be problematic. As property issue would be discussed in proceeding paragraphs, it is enough to note for now that first comer *Türkiyeliler* are represented as symbols of unjust property distribution after 1974 military intervention.

Smaller number of the addressees of aforementioned question, on the other hand; criticizes the population transfer policy since it is believed that better solutions would have been proposed. For instance, **Engin** explains the forthcoming effects of the policy and proposes his alternative:

> *They perhaps found our population numerically inadequate and thought that there might be a settlement agreement that distribute the land according to population rates of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but they made a huge mistake. We have still been paying the penalty of that mistake; any person could easily enter into our country... Though we needed occupation groups rather than ordinary man, they even did not make any selection according to this criterion. Houses full of furniture and 100 donums lands to each newcomer were given... Rather than bringing people from Turkey, facilities should have been provided for Turkish Cypriots who had had to escape from their own country in 1960s...*

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Onur also touches upon the population policy and states:

> *Population transfer policy was…very wrongly implemented. In the period of war, more than 40 thousand soldiers had come here for the war and many soldiers died. For the reason that these soldiers shed their blood in this land, right to live in this country would be given only to these soldiers and their family. Yet, rather than this, they tried to fill the villages with unqualified people whose environment had nothing common with the environment in here...and they still have adaptation problems in this country.*

Mehmet touches upon similar point:

> *There are considerable number of Turkish Cypriots in Australia, Britain and other European countries, rather than this political strategy, these Cypriots living outside Cyprus should have been encouraged to return. By this way, the possibility of peaceful coexistence of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in this land could have been achieved.*

As it is outlined before, the immigration process has not been limited with the period after 1974 but has been continuing till contemporary times. Having mentioned participants' standpoint in relation to population transfer policy, enumerated reasons behind criticisms against more recent immigrations and especially against acquirement of citizenship by the 'latecomer' *Türkiyeliler* should be touched upon. By this way, what *Türkiyeliler* symbolize in political and economic realms in popular discourse will be enlightened. As mentioned before, the opponents of aforementioned population movements and of uncontrolled acceptance to TRNC citizenship of immigrants from Turkey to Cyprus focus on the repercussions of this phenomenon on political representation of Turkish Cypriots' will and claim that their political will is concealed by the Turkish-originate TRNC citizens. For expressing the criticism against this situation, mottos like "we become minority in our own country" and "our political will become minority in our own society" are typical statements connected with the discomfort against the citizenship acquirements. Some participants themselves mention this situation and point out that the political will of native population is dependent on the will of those Turkish-originate TRNC citizens whose number is believed to be higher than the former. In line with these, some of the participants complain about the decreasing number/rate of "original" Turkish*Cypriots* as a result of the immigrations. Additional to participants' discussions, in order to understand participants' conceptions about the issue at hand, it is asked whether they agree

with aforementioned statements claiming that native population become minority in northern part of Cyprus. At this point, almost all of the participants assert their agreement with the perception that the 'ingenious' population became minority in its own country. **Osman** enumerates his criticisms against the sociopolitical situation after 1974:

> *Think about a society where the outcomers have capacity to occupy the democratic will. Democracy game is played in here, in this play they display as if we are ruling ourselves with our free will...Rum lay claim to the republic, but we were made minority in our own country....We became minority in this country, 70%-75 % of the voters are not from you, are not part of your society...they brought population from outside and broke down our political structure, they occupied our political will.*

Mustafa also mentions the effects of the immigration movements on political representation:

> *Turkish Cypriots are bothered from the process that transform the structure of population in here, this is a reality. There is no personal discomfort against Ahmet or Mehmet, but people react against the transformation of the structure of population which causes Turkish Cypriots' political will to be neglected...That is, I think the main problem in Cyprus is the lost political will of Turkish Cypriots.*

Kürşat has similar point:

> *They give citizenship to these people, there even some acquiring citizenship in three months because of political rants. This of course affects the political will. There is a Cypriot culture and there are unique problems of this island, but I think outsiders could not understand these in 5 years...that is, the right to vote should be changed.*

Onur emphasizes that decreasing number of native Turkish*Cypriots* brought about hegemony of latecomers:

> *As a result of the decrease in our native population, that is; in Turkish speaking population remained from Ottoman age, and of increase in the number of outsiders, of those people coming from Turkey, it is getting harder and harder to survive Cyprus culture in the island...We are under the hegemony of people coming to our island, especially after the Annan plan, without any control.*

Taking polemical citizenship acquirements[*] into account and the fact that majority of Turkish originate citizens gave their support to parties proposing integrationist agenda with Turkey[197], participants' conceptions on the issue at hand is partly understandable. Nonetheless, there are at least three problematic points that should

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[*] Like that of Sinan Aygün, Semih Tufan Gülaltay etc. whose TRNC citizenships were withdrawed on the grounds of illegality.

[197] Hatay, Beyond Numbers, Appendix V, 2005

be stressed in relation to aforementioned representation of *Türkiyeliler* as political threats against native political will. First of all, until the year 2000 the election results of two main conservative parties (UBP and DP) that are represented to be supported by *Türkiyeliler* was about 65-75 per cent, which clearly means that 'ingenious' TRNC citizens themselves also stood behind the 'status quo' parties.[198] As such, it is hard to argue that the contradictory political will of *Türkiyeliler* was the only reason behind the criticized integrationist regime. Secondly, neither *Türkiyeliler* nor their political behavior is homogeneous; rather the political orientation of the latter is affected from political discourses and the conjuncture.[199] Finally, participants' complaint about concealment of native political will by Turkish-originate population generally does not refer solely to those whose acquirement of citizenship is polemical. On the contrary, those who are perceived to be political threats is a more crowded group, even sometimes includes whole *Türkiyeli* population in the island. Put it differently, irrespective of the time period spent in the island *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to be outsiders by considerable number of participants since their focus point is the very origins of these citizens. As such, 'their' right to vote are perceived to be regrettable or at least, to be barriers against 'ingenious' political will which is represented to be more or less homogeneous. At this point, participants' stress on higher natality rates of *Türkiyeliler* and their focus on the number of 'original' Turkish*Cypriots* in census results illustrate the criteria of 'origin' to be perceived as a member of 'real' Turkish*Cypriot* population. **Engin**, for example, compares natality rates and speculates:

> *Look at people who came from Turkey, each have 8 or 9 children, Cypriots, on the other hand, have 1 or 2 children. As such, if there are almost 120 thousand Cypriots, there are 160 thousand that are coming from Turkey, this is our situation. What will be the situation in ten years? Our prime minister, the chair of the assembly and alike will come from Turkey...now the balance of population is broken down and the picture in front of us is very dangerous: Turkish Cypriot identity is in danger of being lost. I certainly do not mean enmity against Türkiyeliler, but our identity is on the point of being lost.*

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[198] Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, 13

[199] For detailed analysis of political behaivour of so called settler population, see M. Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 2005

Pınar has analogous mentality when she asserts her perception about TRNC citizenship acquirement of 'outsiders':

> *They give citizenship to outsiders, and those citizens became more than our population, so of course they will vote their group in the elections and the political will is going to be in their hands. So we Turkish Cypriots are becoming minority in here, that is a circle, they acquire citizenship, then they reproduce and increase their number in here, then vote, and as their number is higher they have pressure, so their orientation gain political significance...I think, unfortunately, there will not be such a thing as Turkish Cypriot in the near future...brain drain is high in our society, what is more, as Türkiyeliler are increasing in number in here, marriages with them will increase in the future. As such, our society will gradually be evaporated. In the future, unfortunately, we will be dispersed minorities in different parts of the world.*

By mentioning the polemics on the 'real' number of Turkish Cypriot population **Deniz** emphasizes that the population of native people- that is, the 'real' population in his eyes- is not declared by the state. As such, he says:

> *Our state counts us, but we do not know our real number. There are rumors on this, some says in real terms we remain 60 thousand people, some says we are 150 thousand, for some 200 thousand, then the estimation is between 60 thousand and 200 thousand, this is really ironical...If immigrants exceed your population, of course this means you are becoming minority...if your real population is below the population of outsiders or immigrants, of course this effect your society, so it is effecting our society also.*

Henceforth, as long as the point of departure is the origins of 'them', *Türkiyeliler* are perceived to be outsiders and there is no potential for 'them' to become insiders. In other words, Cypriotness is perceived like a nationalist attachment, rather than transnational belongingness. Thence, generalization and genealogical classification of population under consideration preclude the very nationalist acts in the northern part of the island that is which necessitate criticism. Besides this, in concordance with the constitution of *Türkiyeliler* as all the opposite of Turkish*Cypriots*, 'they' are represented to be the opposite also in political behavior. Yet, either Turkish*Cypriots* or *Türkiyeliler* do not have stable and homogeneous political orientation and aforementioned representation blurs also the differences in political orientation within the 'ingenious' population.

On the other hand, few participants assert that they do not agree with the idea promoting total exclusion of population having Turkish origins. Here, some of them make classification between Turkish immigrants and believe that part of them-

though having some problems again- should not be separated from native population; others emphasize their instrumental importance in the society and propose some alternative solutions. **Deniz**, for example, claims:

> *We can not reject those Turkish-originate people who immigrate or made to immigrate after 1974...In the end, they some how be assimilated, I do not separate them, they are TRNC citizens. Yes it is true that they have some problematic aspects, resulting from Turkey, that is, majority of these people accept whatever the word of Turkey is and indirectly take role in Turkey's intervention to the island...We could not exclude them from Turkish Cypriot identity because we are mixed, there have been marriages...*

Similarly, **Gürsel** believes that rather than excluding them from society, some Turkish-originate people should be seen as new Cypriots:

> *It is an apparent reality, there are people that acquired citizenship and have been living in here for 30-40 years; and there are those people have born by the former and there is a generation who feel themselves similar to us. So, with the condition to stop at this point, we should interiorize and accept them as new Cypriots...*

Hakan touches upon similar point when he mentions settlement debates between Turkish and Greek Cypriots:

> *They (Greek Cypriots) are about 800 thousand and we are about 200 with Türkiyeliler. If a settlement would accepted in the future, they say Türkiyeliler will leave the island. That is ok but those who have been living in here for 20-30 years...those who married in here, those who married with native population could they leave? It is not possible.*

Emphasizing the instrumental role of *Türkiyeliler* in economic relations, **Mustafa**, on the other hand, proposes his own solution for immigration and citizenship issues:

> *The population structure in here is in such a condition now that if you go to a market or somewhere like that, you perceive that 80 percent of customers is Türkiyeli. Do you think that owner of that market wants Türkiyeliler to leave the island? So, in this circumstances, we have to live together...In political terms, what should be made is this: they should not have political power, that is they should not acquire citizenship...Every kind of required work force should come here, otherwise we would live like in a village...For example, Famagusta is developing because of university...If these consumer people have not been in here, how would the welfare of people have been increased?...But I find their acquirement of citizenship as problematic. Look at Dubai, there are 2 million people living in there but only 50 thousand of them are citizens, they do not concede from their political will...*

In preceding paragraphs, increase in Turkish-originate population in the island and its stated repercussions on political representation are depicted. As such, it becomes apparent that *Türkiyeliler* -especially those who came to island more recently- are

seen as threats against the representation of native population's political will. In this sense, there is a strong tendency to criticize the acceptance of *Türkiyeliler* to TRNC citizenship. Living for years- about 30 years- with Turkish Cypriots or developing some resembling features with the native population might be some criteria allowing aforementioned group to deserve TRNC citizenship in participants eyes, but having Turkish origins generally means supporting Turkey's political perspective in the island, which is seen as different from the one supported by native population. In other words, in the eyes of many interviewers, Turkish-originate people are, in a sense, everyday symbols of Turkey's political intervention or Turkey-led political rule in the island.

Apart from these, though there was not any question relating to labor prices-unemployment-migration issues in the interviews, some of the participants themselves emphasize economic reasons of Turkish*Cypriot* emigration from the island and connect this with the immigration from Turkey. As stated before *Türkiyeli* immigrants, especially those 'latecomers', constitute the considerable part of cheap labor- especially in construction sector- in the northern part of the island and this is another factor behind the immigration from Turkey. As an employer in a company related to construction sector, **Hüseyin,** asserts the need for cheap labor:

> *About 10-12 thousand of our people work in the Greek side, because we could not afford salaries for comfortable life, because we also could not earn enough money. Our profit margin is very low, so out of necessity we import workers from Turkey...*

The influx of cheap labor from Turkey to the island is connected in popular discourse with emigration of Turkish*Cypriots* resulting from ossified unemployment problem in the northern part of Cyprus. In other words, it is stated that unemployment make native population to leave its country and it is believed that *Türkiyeli* immigrants have a role in the development of unemployment problem in northern part of the island. Differently put, *Türkiyeli* immigrants in this case are represented as the catalyst of Turkish*Cypriot* emigration from the island since the former work with cheaper prices and allegedly occupy the jobs of native people. The words of **Hakan** clarify the discussion:

> *The native population of TRNC decreased from 120 thousand to approximately 74thousand, how did it happen? Denktaş said that both those leaving and coming*

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are Turks, yet native population emigrated. The labor prices in here was higher in comparison to Turkey, but when it is stated that those coming and leaving are both Turks, cheap labor from Turkey stole the job of native people. They stole three fourths of the cake, and a quarter remained to us. In these circumstances, natives were obliged to emigrate...

Likewise, **Onur** who is a mechanic, states his criticism against labor- prices of *Türkiyeliler*:

[T]he price of outsider workforce is dirt-cheap... The minimum wage is around 800-900 Turkish Lira now, but they accept working with 400 Turkish Lira salary...If you ask me why I went out of business and got retired, the basic reason is this, because the only purpose of these people is to fill their stomach and send the remaining money to Turkey... The policy in here is this, TRNC should be continued but there will not be any Cypriots in there...Turkish speaking Cypriots are emigrating and 10 years later there will not be any Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus.

Pınar also connects increase in *Türkiyeli* workers with native emigration:

They came and took Cypriots' place...perhaps they are not in high positions now, they are workers and alike, yet there is a requirement of such workforce in this country and they take the place of natives. Employers also benefit from this situation as they have lower prices, but this means giving our people's job to others...this accelerates Cypriots emigration...

Similarly, **Sinan** claims:

Our population is on the point of evaporation; in 1974 our population was 50 thousand and now 60 thousand. On the other hand, 350 thousand Turkish Cypriots live in other countries, like Britain. The population transfer should be halted and our youngsters should be employed. But just the opposite is done in here; they transfer population and do not give job to Turkish Cypriots

As it is clear, owing to aforementioned emigration of native population that is accompanied with immigration from Turkey, *Türkiyeliler-* here particularly *Türkiyeli* immigrant workers- are again conceptualized by some participants as threats, this time against the continuation of Turkish*Cypriot* existence in the island. At this point, *Türkiyeli* immigrants are also represented as the threats in labor market since they have lower labor prices and as such, it is perceived that they are 'stealing' native population's jobs. Then the circle is constituted: the cheap labor of Turkish immigrants increase unemployment of Turkish*Cypriot* job-seekers, which in turn accelerates native population's emigration to other countries. As such, *Türkiyeliler* under focus, are conceptualized as symbols of Turkish*Cypriot* society's dissolution.

The final topic to be mentioned in this section is related to the property distribution policy after the war –distribution of some land and property, which were originally

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in Greek Cypriot ownership, to both Turkish Cypriot immigrants from the southern part of the island and *Türkiyeliler*. Here, *Türkiyeliler* are generally represented as those who gained property in an unjust way, or those who own lands and real estate in the lads of Turkish*Cypriots*. In other words, in this depiction, participants identify themselves with the recently 'owned' land but hesitate to share it with the 'settlers'. Thence, proceeding paragraphs will touch upon another face in the depiction of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse which is related to 'their' position in property distribution. Here, it should be emphasized that similar to that of 'cheap labor' discussion, property distribution is not directly asked to the participants but many of them mention it. To illustrate, **Onur** points that unjust property distribution is one of the reasons behind discomfort against *Türkiyeliler*:

> *Considerable part of Cypriots immigrating from the South to the North could not own even a house and because of these problems in distribution there has been discomfort between the former and Türkiyeliler; and most of the former migrated to European countries. This situation in fact encouraged people to migrate...*

Gürsel similarly believes that the negative attitude of Turkish*Cypriots* towards *Türkiyeliler* is stemming from property issue:

> *There is a negative approach towards Türkiyeliler in the society, the reason behind this is perceived by our society as such: We possess particular region and we obliged to share it with them, this is our land and I should have possessed more than I have, yet they possess more than us. These kinds of complaints are popularly stated in conversations...*

Deniz complains about the injustices experienced during property distributions:

> *The fist issue is equity; people from Turkey were brought but it was not just the houses given to them, rather many of them possessed lots of property. I do not accuse them all, there are those who owned just a house, there are those stacked in a room...but your encumbrances who immigrated from South do not possess anything. The distribution system was wrong, I do not support it either but it was done and they did not respect for equity...My father says we Cypriots are third class citizen, the first classes are the big shots, the second is Türkiyeliler and the third is us. This is really as such, I am a citizen of this country but you do not treat me as your citizen, you favor the outsider, you give more rights and facilities to them, then of course we voice our disruptions.*

Engin compares properties of immigrants from southern part of Cyprus with those of *Türkiyeli* immigrants and asserts:

> *While those people immigrating from the South could not possess similar properties which they left in the South, people from Turkey settled here and possessed much more properties and land than us. They sell their lands to billion pounds now, then; what is the class of these citizens? With just working, I am a Turkish Cypriot who owns one-two houses in the end. I could have been benefited from those facilities, why they do not give to me?*

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Therefore, in relation to 'booty' distribution after the war of 1974, the banner of *Türkiyeliler* becomes the name of injustices made in distribution. Hence, this time 'they' are the symbols of the corrupt order resulting from injustices made during the 'equivalent property' distribution policy after the war. In other words, like the other cases that were mentioned before, *Türkiyelile*r are generally identified with the problematic aspects/ results of existing conditions in popular discourse and thus become the everyday symbols of perceived unjust treatments and policies.

Additionally, it is realized during interviews that another complaint against *Türkiyeliler* about the property-ownership issue is becoming popular after the Annan plan. To make it clear, since the Annan plan determined the lands that would be under Turkish Cypriot ownership in a putative future bi-communal state, foreign demand on the land that are used by TRNC citizens was increased after the referendum. Hence, the price of the lands and the trade of these lands accelerated concomitantly. Herein, as it is uncovered in interviews, the recent complaint about *Türkiyeliler* is that they sell Turkish*Cypriot* lands to foreigners and leave the country; and this is perceived to be threat against future composition of population in northern part of Cypriot society. **Osman**, for example, stresses his discomfort relating to the issue:

> *Imagine that I go to Australia and they give me 100 donums lands, and then imagine that I sell these lands and gain billion pounds. In what part of the world you can find such an unearned income? This is only possible in so called TRNC, they migrate from mountains and acquired properties, what is more; they now sell these lands to foreigners and gain pounds. But who think my children's future, who cares for the future of Cyprus?*

Mustafa emphasizes that *Türkiyeliler* sell the lands to foreigners as they do not identify Cyprus as their homeland:

> *We protect our lands, but according to last rumors, Türkiyeliler sell their lands and houses and send the money to Turkey, because they perceive Turkey as their homeland...As they are not aware of the value of these lands they sell their lands to British and Jews and return to their countries...As such, the latter naturally will have voice in some affairs of our country...*

In this vein, *Türkiyeli* property owners are identified with dishonesty against and non-identification with the island as long as 'they' sell their property to foreigners. As such, act of selling land and real estate to foreigners which is perceived to be

unethical/false is attached to *Türkiyeliler* which, in turn represents 'ingenious' population with opposite attributes. Concomitantly, *Türkiyeliler* under focus are symbolizing the threat against Turkish*Cypriot* society's integrity.

This section dealt with some topics where people having Turkish origins are perceived as threats, as such; TRNC citizens having Turkish origins in general- and especially more recent citizens- are seen as political threats against native population, in other words they are seen as instruments of conservative parties for hiding the representation of the political will of the ingenious population. Secondly, labor having Turkish origin- here having TRNC citizenship or not does not have a significance- is seen as both economic and social threat in the sense that the cheap price of the former results in unemployment/ decrease in the welfare of native laborers which concomitantly gives way to emigration of native population, that is 'they' become the symbols of the dissolution of Turkish*Cypriot* society. Finally, *Türkiyeliler* who benefitted from property distribution after 1974- that is, those who are seen relatively less troubling in cultural, criminal and even in political realms- are appeared as symbols of injustice made during the period of property distribution and are also seen as threats against Turkish*Cypriot* sovereignty and integrity in the future because of potential increase in foreign owners of contemporary Turkish Cypriot lands. Hence, perceived political and economic reasons behind the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* from Turkish*Cypriot* identity in popular discourse is touched upon in this section, the final section focus on the question whether there is a possibility of inclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in Turkish*Cypriot* identity.

5.6. COULD TURKIYELILER BECOME TURKISH*CYPRIOTS*?

Notwithstanding the limited scope of this study which does not have any claim to reflect the whole society under the focus, commonalities in answers and in narratives of participants that were touched upon in previous sections give clues about the popular perception of Cypriotness in relation to *Türkiyeliler*. As such, the claim for difference firstly displays itself in the description of the culture of the 'Other' and of the collective self in participants' expressions. Herein, as it is elaborated, cultural difference is constituted in a hierarchical and exclusionary

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manner. What is more, the Cypriot culture is defined in such an essentialist way that it becomes impossible for *Türkiyeliler* to 'gain' the features of the former. In other words, the common past is constructed in such a way that- without any additional effort- it is enough for the 'ingenious' individual to be born for having the attributes linked to the culture of the collective self, as opposed to the 'Other' who- even when there is a special effort- could not 'gain' identical features and do not included to the collective identity.[200] That is to say, constituted through oppositions, the search for difference turns out to be the expression of superiority and properness of 'us' against 'them'. Adding these representation of *Türkiyeliler* as the murderer of the lost paradise which is crystallized with the statement "we let the doors open and slept in the past", and symbolic position of 'them' as political and economic threats, it is evident that we are in the waters of nationalist ideology. In other words, it is not the 'nation' that should be focused on in relation to the nationalist ideology but the very mechanism of the latter: rejection of the construction of a collective identity with universal or encompassing features, distancing the self from the known 'Other' and perceiving limited section of 'Other' as having an identical position with 'us' is the outlet and the center of nationalism[201]. Therefore, it is possible to argue that, in relation to *Türkiyeliler*- rather than being transnational attachment or resistance against nationalism- Turkish*Cypriot* identity is reproducing nationalist ideology whose core is this time Cypriotness, rather than Turkishness proposed by Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. In a similar vein, the claim for difference against totalizing discourse of Turkish nationalism transforms into impatience to, even humiliation of, the difference of the 'Other' in popular discourse and as such, is marked with its exclusionary language.

As mentioned in previous sections, the *Türkiyeli* 'Other' is hierarchically classified within itself and as such, particular section of the 'Other'- those latecomer *Türkiyeliler* and especially *Türkiyeli* workers from some regions like Hatay- are perceived to be more inferior and faced with total exclusion. At this point, it is wondered whether those *Türkiyeliler* who spent most/all of their life in Cyprus

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[200] *"Milliyetçilik Sendromu."* Birikim 45-46 (1993): 12

[201] *"Milliyetçilik Sendromu."* Birikim 45-46 (1993): 12

could be included in Turkish*Cypriot* identity in participants eyes. For this reason, it is asked to interviewees whether those people who were born in Cyprus from non-Cypriot parents and those who spent most of their life in Cyprus could be counted as Cypriots. By this way, the scope of exclusion and the potential of inclusion for a limited section of the 'Other' are tried to be understood. The answers, on the other hand; ranges from total exclusion to conditional inclusion. Some answers given to this question would be pointed before the final remarks of this chapter. As illustrations of more inclusionary approach, **Şakir** states:

> *Even if they have some insufficiencies, you can not eject them from Cyprus, they are somehow affected from the culture in here, they can be counted as Cypriots and if they have some deficiencies we should help...*

As mentioned in the previous section, **Deniz** says that "we could not reject those Turkish-originated people who immigrate or made to immigrate after 1974..." and **Gürsel** claims that "…with the condition to stop in this point, we should interiorize and accept them as new Cypriots." As such, few of the participants have more inclusive approach towards the group under the focus since 'they' have or potential to have resembling features with 'us'. Nearly half of the addressees of the question, on the other hand, mention different criteria in order to be counted as 'Cypriots'. **Kürşat**, for instance, allusively asserts that "if you respect everything of Cyprus; to its people, to its land, to its culture and to its tree, then you are Cypriot." At this point, **Melda** enumerates her criteria for non-exclusion in the following way: " some could be counted as Cypriot but his/her position is important; if s/he integrated to society, have a particular level, cultured and have a good record, then why not?" That is, almost all of the opposite aspects attributed to *Türkiyeliler* before, become conditions for inclusion which in the end reproduces the exclusion. In line with this, it is asserted that their 'Cypriotness' is a personal issue, as **Pınar** says:

> *This is totally relating to personal socialization and feeling...one of my friends, for example, was born in Turkey and immigrated to Cyprus in eight years old. But she feels herself totally as Cypriot, in her accent, in her behaviors...etc. She also says that she wish peace in the island, she also pronounces that she wish 'gacolar' leave the island. I can not say that she is Türkiyeli. But her brother, though he was born and has grown in Cyprus, is definitely Türkiyeli, I can not say he is Cypriot...Possibly this is related to friend circle...*

In this depiction, to be perceived as 'Cypriot', *Türkiyeliler* should have resembling attitudes with Cypriots, to such an extent that they should also "wish 'gacolar' leave

the island." Therefore, the inclusion of the 'Other' into 'our' collective identity requires the very exclusion of the 'Other' by the 'Other' itself. Finally, considerable part of the addressees of the question asserts the eternal gap between the Turkish*Cypriot* identity and *Türkiyeliler* with different explanations. For **Murat**, the answer of the question is impossible because "they might be born in Cyprus but...people are affected from their past generation and race"; also for **Sevgi** the answer is negative because "the culture inside the house is very important...you may at most be two-cultured people... It is indisputable…Do you become German when you live in Germany?" Lastly, **Özge** states that "It is related to socialization of that child...but in her/his substance s/he is *Türkiyeli.*"

As it is evident, the narrativization of Turkish*Cypriot* identity and the image of *Türkiyeli*ler in popular discourse are highly problematic and the approach towards the 'Other' includes antipathy, ethnocentrism, nationalism and social exclusion. As it is touched before, identity is constructed within discourse and as far as the left identifies itself with the Cypriotist identity project, it should be reminded that representation of Cypriotness, at least in the everyday perception of so called ordinary people, has remarkably problematic characteristic. Differently put, it is possible to argue that though stress on Cypriotness appeals to the bearers of this identity and cause 'Cypriots' to become closer, it fails to construct a transnational identity. In other words, though it is transnational identity that was envisaged with the project of Cyprus-centered identity, as the tools and mentality of nationalism is at work (like constitution of common history, common origins of culture, common folklore...etc of Cypriots) and as the universalistic language of Cypriotism for Turkish and Greek Cypriots is accompanied with solely particularistic approach stressing the uniqueness of Turkish Cypriots against totalizing Turkish nationalism, *Türkiyeliler* living in the island are, by definition, excluded from this identity. Otherwise stated, the political struggle against Turkish nationalism is dominated by the stress on uniqueness and difference of Turkish*Cypriot* identity without universalistic approach towards *Türkiyeliler* in the island and as such, "while attempting to *resist* the dominant discourse of nationalism the oppositional counter-discourse creates its own nationalistic language...and this discursive contestation

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process leaves the vocabulary of nationalism unchallenged."[202]At this point, Laclau's criticism against solely particularistic political struggle is enlightening; he states that pure particularism proposes an image of society where

> [A]ll groups are different from each other, and in which none of them wanted to be anything other than what they are…It is not for nothing that a pure logic of difference- the notion of separate developments- lays at the root of apartheid[203]

Therefore, despite the undeniable effort of the left in its struggle against Turkish nationalism, the problems resulting from particularistic discourse in relation to *Türkiyeliler* are apparent. Thence, to fulfill the mission of 'peace in the island', peace with so called *Türkiyeliler* is as necessary as peace between the two ethnic communities of the island. Otherwise, as Tulga reminds, "Africa belonged to Africans long before the slogan Cypriot belongs to Cypriots"[204], and as such it becomes impossible to struggle with nationalist ideology and to construct a transnational identity.

Finally, as it is touched upon before, the exclusion of third-phase immigrants is much more severe and they are the most inferiorized section of the 'Other' in the popular discourse. That is, they are directly identified with their inferior culture, with their 'eye offending' physical appearance; with their 'dirt-cheap' labor price that allegedly causes unemployment of the native population; with their Turkey-led political orientation and they are precisely connected with the crime. As such, it is at best paradoxical that the very 'Other' of the identity proposed by left is socioeconomically most disadvantaged groups in the northern part of the island. Then, taking the contemporary narratives of Turkish*Cypriot* identity seen in interviews into account, it would be argued that Cypriotist identity project fosters social hierarchization and exclusion prevalent in popular perception. Concomitantly, it reproduces the prevailing power and domination relations in this particular social formation.

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[202] M Killoran, "Nationalism and Embodied Memory in Northern Cyprus", in Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimagineble Community 1955-1997, 1998,160.

[203] E.Laclau, *Emancipation(s),*(London: Verso,2007), 49.

[204] H. Tulga "Kıbrıs'ta Sağ Durum" *Kıbrıs Yazıları* 5-6 (2007): 132

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This study began with questioning some popular narratives apparent in northern part of Cyprus and with the curiosity to understand the significance of 'Cypriotness' in popular perception. At this juncture, I presumed that an analysis of the identity perceptions of 'ordinary' people in northern part would be a significant illustration of ambiguous nature of identification and would shed light on exclusionary dimension of the narratives about 'Turkish Cypriotness'. Thence, in the framework of political struggles on definition of identity for the population under consideration and of the immigration movements from Turkey to the northern part, in this thesis I have analyzed popular narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity. In this vein, perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness' and the images of 'Others' in popular discourse have been discussed with reference to the interviews conducted in different regions of the northern part of the island.

Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, which had been the dominant ideology until recent political mobilizations and governmental change, has based its discourse on ethnic conflict between 'Turks of Cyprus' and 'Greeks of Cyprus' on the one hand and the harmony between 'babyland' and 'motherland' on the other. Accordingly, it has been emphasized that there is nothing 'Cypriot' in the island and symbols relating to Cyprus has been perceived as threats against 'Turkishness'. In line with this, the past has constructed with the themes of war, sacrifices of 'Turks of Cyprus' and the cruelty of 'Greeks of Cyprus'. This narrative on past has been perceived as legitimizing ground of the partition of the island and as the proof of the impossibility of coexistence with the 'enemy'.

In the face of reduction of the population in northern part of the island to 'Turkishness'; permanence of partitioned status of the island and the continuous influx of *Türkiyeli* population (who have been perceived as voting reservoir of the

conservative regime), the parties and organizations on the left based their political struggle on Cyprus-centered identity project. Henceforth, rather than constructing Greek Cypriots as 'the enemy', common past; culture; folklore and traditions of Cypriots have been emphasized in order to redefine the surface of identification. In other words, in this oppositional discourse of identity, 'Cypriotness' has been perceived as a transnational identity above 'Greekness' and 'Turkishness' of the communities in Cyprus. As opposed to the perception that "those coming and leaving are both Turks", difference and uniqueness of Turkish Cypriots has been emphasized with the slogans like 'this country is ours'. At this juncture, Cypriotist discourse has constructed another border of identity, which this time marks the difference between 'Cypriots' and 'non-Cypriots'.

As a brief touch on those 'non-Cypriots'- namely, *Türkiyeliler*- their immigration started with the migration agreement between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities after the partition of the island. The first phase immigrants were settled in order to compensate lack of labor force and to fill the newly 'gained' lands. Nevertheless, migration from Turkey on an individual basis has continued till contemporary date with different characteristics. What is significant about relatively later migration movements is the fact that the immigrants who acquired TRNC citizenship have been perceived as instruments of Turkey's political intervention, on the other hand; they mainly constitute the cheap labor force demanded especially by the construction sector in the north.

The identity perceptions of interviewees and their narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity, Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* have been analyzed in the framework of aforementioned discourses and migration from Turkey to the island. That is to say, by mentioning the struggling discourses proposing different subject positions to the population under focus, popular perception of Turkish Cypriot(or Turkish*Cypriot*) identity has been analyzed in relation to its Greek Cypriot and *Türkiyeli* 'Others'. Comparison of identity perceptions of participants in relation to Greek Cypriots and to *Türkiyeliler* reveals the contextual and precarious nature of identification in the sense that participants' self-image and narrativization of Turkish Cypriot identity significantly transforms according to the 'Other'. Thence, it is meaningful to return

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the basic points of dominant self-image in interviews in relation to Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* and the images of 'Other' in these representations.

At this point, it would be significant to compare and contrast dominant representations in interviews about past, culture and physical image of the collective self in relation to Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler*. To begin with the narrativization of past, it is remarkable that Greek Cypriots' image in the narratives significantly changes according to the 'Other'. That is to say, when the past is depicted in relation to Greek Cypriots, the dominant image of Turkish Cypriots is marked with victimhood in the face of Greek Cypriot cruelty, and the distrust towards the latter is generally connected to the sacrifices of Turkish Cypriots during the period of interethnic conflict. Hence, it could be stated that 'we' are represented to be the underdog and 'they' are perceived to be persecutors. Differently put, intercommunal killings and the struggle between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have a crucial place in the narratives about past in relation to Greek Cypriots. However, in the depiction of difference from *Türkiyeliler*, it is apparent that rather than the conflict, past coexistence with Greek Cypriots is one of the basic points that informants emphasized in order to delineate their unique identity. What is more, the past coexistence of 'imagined community' with Greek Cypriots is represented as one of the reasons behind cultural superiority of collective self in relation to *Türkiyeliler*. In this sense, the past is (re)constructed according to the 'Other' in popular narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity.

As far as interviews are taken into account, it could be stated that 'culture' has a significant place in the popular discourse on 'Cypriotness'. To make it clear, 'culture' is the basic surface of identification with 'Cypriotness' and the main ground of 'distinction' between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler*. In other words, culture is the main ground of the claim "we are different from *Türkiyeliler*" and of the perception that "we are similar with Greek Cypriots". Here, when the object of comparison is Greek Cypriots, culture refers mainly to cuisine and eating habits, moreover (though not elaborately depicted as in the case of *Türkiyeliler*) it refers to life styles and behaviors. In this manner, the similarity- even identicalness- between the cultures of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in participants' representations designate

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the fact that 'culture' primarily signifies 'Cypriotness' rather than 'Turkishness' or 'Greekness' of the islanders. Differently put, participants perceive their culture to be connected with the island of Cyprus as opposed to the Turkish nationalist discourse that narrates the identity of 'Turks of Cyprus' solely with reference to 'motherland' in particular and Turkishness in general. In this sense, it could be claimed that relatively inclusive approach towards Greek Cypriots constitutes the hallmark of popular narratives on 'Cypriot' culture. On the other hand, it should be stressed that social exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in the island and dominant self-image of superiority also become manifest in the narratives about cultural difference between *Türkiyeliler* and Turkish*Cypriots*. Thence, it would be significant to restate basic points of the narratives about cultural difference between Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeliler*.

To begin with, in relation to *Türkiyeliler*, 'cultural difference' not only refers to differences in eating habits, cuisine and life styles but it designates the difference between 'proper' and 'non-proper'; 'cultured' and 'uncultured'; 'educated and uneducated', 'civilized' and 'backwards', 'Western' and 'Eastern', 'European' and 'non-European', 'secular' and 'religious', 'modern' and 'traditional', and 'superior' versus 'inferior'. In other words, both the culture of collective self and of the 'Other' elaborately defined in a hierarchical manner and Turkish*Cypriots* are represented as a monolithic and harmonious group whose members share common essence that is marked with 'positives' of aforementioned attributes. Then, as Hall puts it, the positive meaning of identity is achieved through construction of opposition between what 'they are' (which also designates what 'we are not') and what 'we are'[205]. In this manner, it could be argued that "we are different from *Türkiyeliler*" in cultural terms also means "we have proper cultural formation", "we have higher level of culture, higher level of education and higher level of qualification", "we are Western, European, modern, civilized and secular" and as far as 'we' are the bearers of such characteristics, 'they' are what 'we are not'. Thence, aforementioned duality between 'us' and 'them' reveals the fact that claim for difference is conjoined with the claim for cultural superiority in relation to

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[205] Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity." In *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, 21

Türkiyeliler. Hence, the narrative about Turkish*Cypriot* culture is marked with inferiorization of *Türkiyeliler* in the island and 'Cypriotness' designate the othering of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse. At this point, it should be reminded that past coexistence with Greek Cypriots and the so called 'British effect' are main reference points in the depictions of Westernity and superiority of Turkish*Cypriot* culture. Thence, when the collective self is narrated in relation to Greek Cypriots, it is Greek Cypriots rather than Turkish Cypriots who are represented with 'Westernity' and 'Europenness'. Therefore, the image of collective self transforms according to the 'Other' and as far as aforementioned characteristics represent superiority, it is possible to state that 'Turkishness' is connected with inferiority in popular perception.

Apart from the 'culture', narratives on physical appearance cause 'Cypriots' to become closer and differentiate the former from *Türkiyeliler*. Differently put, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are represented with similar outlook which makes it difficult to distinguish the members of each community through the eye perception. However, depictions of some of the informants signal the hierarchy between physical appearances where the bodily image of Greek Cypriot 'Other' is marked with 'Westernity', 'modernity' and 'qualified dresses'. On the other hand, when the comparison is made with *Türkiyeliler*, the social hierarchy constructed through the emphasis on cultural difference reflects itself to the eyes and inferior status of the 'Other' reveals itself in the narratives about outside appearance of the *Türkiyeli* 'Other'. That is to say, the difference between the physical appearances of Turkish*Cypriots* and *Türkiyeli* 'Other' is represented with the construction of two poles: modern and properly dressed, not bearded Turkish*Cypriots* "whose smell reveals that they are Cypriots", and 'brunette' *Türkiyeliler* whose dresses are 'conservative', 'traditional', 'villager-like' and who are marked with their 'beards', 'moustache'; wear 'shalvar' and 'scarf'; 'press on their shoes' and 'smell bad'. At this point, with their smells *Türkiyeliler* becomes repulsive, and with their dresses they offend the eyes. Therefore, the body and dresses are one of the prime sites for marking the difference from *Türkiyeliler* and the expression 'we are different in our outside appearances' turns out to mean 'we have modern, proper and superior appearance'. Hence, 'Turkish*Cypriotness*' designates modernity and superiority in

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physical terms in relation to *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse and the self-image of participants is marked with the othering of 'non-Cypriots' on the grounds of their inferior outlook. Interestingly, when it is possible to speak of hierarchical representation in physical appearances in relation to Greek Cypriots, it is 'them' rather than 'us' perceived to be standing on a 'higher' position.

Up to this point, topics that are apparent in the narratives both about *Türkiyeliler* and about Greek Cypriots and the dominant image of collective self and of the images of 'Others' in these narratives on similar topics has been remarked. Thence, before giving some concluding remarks, it is essential to concentrate on images of Greek Cypriots and *Türkiyeliler* respectively. To begin with a brief look on Greek Cypriot image, it should be stressed that the unsteadiness about the role of Greek Cypriots in the meaning world of interviewees could be perceived as the hallmark of the representation of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots. To make it clear, despite the aforementioned stress on similarity between 'Cypriots' in cultural and physical terms, Greek Cypriots are still dominantly represented with cruelty and pragmatism in the narratives about past and, though 'they' are not perceived to be 'the enemy', 'they' are still marked with their unreliability in the end. However, 'that side' also signifies the 'ideal society' in particular respects, it is symbolizing the 'West' and the 'Europe', and it is where the participants compare their situation and perceive the 'other side' as the exemplar of good decisions. Adding these the felt exclusion of the collective self from 'Cypriotness' and perception of being perceived as the 'Other' in Greek Cypriots' eyes, the ambiguousness in participants' self-perceptions becomes evident. At this point, it could be stated that collective self is mainly perceived as 'victim' in the narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to Greek Cypriots. That is to say, the collective self is represented as victim not only because of past Greek Cypriot oppression, but also because of 'their' distance, 'no' vote in the referendum and 'their' inferiorization of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, as far as 'our' situation is compared with the 'other side', 'we' are represented to be victim, this time, of the wrong decisions of 'our' rulers and of the intervention from Turkey. Thence, in the face of felt exclusion and inferiority, the claim for equality with Greek Cypriot 'Other' is voiced, on the other hand; attachment to the 'Turkish' part of identity

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gains prevalence as a result of perceived othering of the collective self. Differently put, attachment to 'Turkishness' is perceived to be the securing ground in relation to Greek Cypriots by some participants, making the aforementioned attachment to be the 'buoy' in the face of exclusion. This on the other hand, signals that the dominance of the elements of identity is closely connected to the image of the 'Other' in particular relation. On the whole, it could be claimed that the role of Greek Cypriots in participants' expressions changes according to different topics of discussion. Differently put, Greek Cypriots who constitute one of the reference points in the depiction of difference of Turkish Cypriots from *Türkiyeliler* owing to the similarities of 'Cypriots' broadly in cultural terms, are also perceived to be those who 'exclude Turkish Cypriots from Cypriotness', 'cruels', 'unreliables', 'those who voted no in the referendum of Annan plan' and 'those who perceive Turkish Cypriots as inferior/enemy/second class-'other'. Yet they are also those 'who lived with us in harmony' , 'with whom we prefer to live side by side', 'those whose outlook resemble to ours', and also those 'who are more developed and ahead from us'. Thence, universalism and nationalism, victimization and idealization, demonization and demand for peaceful coexistence are all apparent in the depictions relating to Greek Cypriots. As such, the tension between the image of 'other' and self-image of 'being the other', the unsteadiness between the inclusion and exclusion and the changing dominance of different elements of attachment-Turkishness and Cypriotness, North Cyprus and Cyprus- that result in attribution of contradictory characteristics to Greek Cypriots constitute the distinguishing aspect of the narratives about collective self in relation to Greek Cypriots in the popular discourse. In this vein, it could be stated that the struggling narratives of Turkish nationalist discourse and Cypriotist discourse pave the way for contradictory image of Greek Cypriots in popular discourse.

It has been indicated in preceding paragraphs that *Türkiyeliler* represent what Turkish*Cypriots* 'are not' in cultural and physical terms and the exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* is legitimated through construction of hierarchy between the cultures and outlooks of 'us' and the 'Other'. At this juncture, remarking other elements of *Türkiyeli* image in popular discourse and mentioning the constructed hierarchy between *Türkiyeliler* themselves is a requirement. Here, popular expressions "we let

the doors open and slept in old times" and "everyone new each other in the past" signify the criminal image of the *Türkiyeli* 'Other'. That is to say, the past is represented as a lost paradise and increasing discomfort and insecurity is connected with the *Türkiyeli* immigration to the island. Otherwise stated, *Türkiyeliler* are marked with criminality and insecurity and 'they' are represented as the destroyers of 'those good old days'. At this point, since 'they' are the ones linked with the crime, 'we', as a homogeneous group, are represented with innocence and naïve fabric. Thence, it is apparent that for opening the doors of 'our' houses, the 'doors' of the island should be closed to *Türkiyeli* immigrants. Significantly, the image of society in these representations radically changed in the sense that rather than modernity and transnational bonds of Turkish*Cypriot* society that were expressed in relation to culture, aforementioned depiction is marked with congregational and traditional societal relations.

Apart from the criminal image of *Türkiyeliler* in popular perception, 'they' are symbolizing the 'threats' against Turkish*Cypriot* collectivity. At this juncture, *Türkiyeliler* who acquired TRNC citizenship are represented as threats against political will of 'ingenious' population and they are the everyday symbols of Turkey's intervention and Turkey-led political rule in popular perception. Moreover, as 'they' are the cheap labor force in the northern part, 'they' are perceived as economic and social threats in the sense that 'they' are represented as the 'occupiers' of the jobs of native people and the 'catalyst' of Turkish Cypriot emigration from the island. Finally, in relation to 'booty' distribution after the war of 1974, *Türkiyeliler* are represented as symbols of injustices made during the period of property distribution. And, as far as 'they' sell their lands and properties to foreigners, 'they' are represented as threats against future Turkish*Cypriot* sovereignty and integrity because of potential increase in foreign owners of contemporary Turkish Cypriot lands. On the whole, it could be claimed that 'they' are the symbols of the unjust policies and social problems in popular perception. Therefore, the banner of *Türkiyeliler* becomes the name of threats against integrity of Turkish*Cypriot* collectivity.

Apparently, the narrative about Turkish*Cypriot* identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler* is based on opposition between 'them' and 'us' both of whom are represented as monolithic groups. Thence, it is possible to assert that the othering of *Türkiyeliler* as a group is the hallmark of 'Turkish*Cypriotness*' in popular discourse. What is more, the narratives of interviewees reveal the fact that *Türkiyeliler* themselves are also divided into levels and social exclusion of particular sections of *Türkiyeliler* doubles and triples through the hierarchical classification of 'Other' within itself. As a brief touch on this classification, *Türkiyeliler* who are not dwelling in the island but live in particular regions of Turkey, who are educated and from middle/high socio-economic strata, stand on the top of this hierarchy and they are the 'exceptions' to the aforementioned *Türkiyeli* images in the narratives. This particular section of *Türkiyeliler* is represented with similar cultural formation and physical appearance with Turkish*Cypriots* and they are marked with their aversion from those on the lower level of hierarchy. Below this, there are those 'garasakal' *Türkiyeliler* who settled in the island with the population transfer shortly after the 1974 military intervention and have better socio-economic status than those from the lower stage of the hierarchy. Though having allegedly inferior status when compared with Turkish*Cypriots*, their status is blurring. That is to say, for some they are improving themselves in the never-ending road to reach the level of Turkish*Cypriots*, for the others they are still totally 'different' from the former. Like that of the representation of their cultural formation to be 'better than worse' when compared to the rest of *Türkiyeliler*, their reliability- which is not absolute- is higher and their crime potential might be lower than those on the lowest stage of the hierarchy. Nonetheless, they are the symbols of unjust property distribution after the war and they are also threats against the political will of Turkish*Cypriots*. Finally, there are those at the bottom of this hierarchy, namely the *fica*s, who are socioeconomically most disadvantaged group and those whose immigration increased after 1990s. Constituting the cheap labor of the northern part of the island, they mostly came from southern/southern-east regions of Turkey. Yet, their regional belongingness (such as being from Hatay), their Kurdish origins and their social class make them to be directly linked with decreasing social tranquility; and 'they' are precisely represented as 'criminals'. Similarly, since 'they' are the most inferior in cultural and physical terms, 'their' practices, gaze and bodily existences repel

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'us'. Finally, 'they' are also social, political and economic threats in the sense that 'they' make 'us' minority in our own country, and with their dirt-cheap labor price, 'they' make Turkish*Cypriots* to leave the island. On the whole, 'they' are nothing but the 'waste of sea', the moss that cast to the land of Cyprus.

As a matter of fact, the summary of the narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity and the images of 'Others' in these narratives also reveals the problematic points of popular perception of 'Turkish Cypriotness'. Though the Greek Cypriot image is not as stable as in the case of *Türkiyeliler*, in relation to Greek Cypriots it could be stated that victimization of collective self paves the way for representation of Greek Cypriots as opposite of 'us'. On the other hand, strict emphasis on cultural sameness results in 'disillusionment' after the encounter with the 'Other'. At this juncture, it could be asserted that the contradictory image of Greek Cypriots and contextual changes in the narrations reflects the discursive struggle on definition of identity to the population under focus.

On the other hand, the image of *Türkiyeliler* in the narratives is quite manifest and coherent, and narration of Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to former is marked with construction of social hierarchies. Put it differently, it is evident that Turkish Cypriot identity in relation to *Türkiyeliler* is perceived as an essence and the marking of 'distinction' from the 'Other' is conjoined with the claim for superiority. Moreover, elaborately defined attributes of the 'Other' delineate the multifaceted exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in popular discourse. Finally, classification of *Türkiyeliler* between themselves and double exclusion of so called *fica*s signal the class dimension of distinction from the 'Other'. In other words, intermingle of cultural, regional, national and class-based exclusion is apparent in the popular narratives about Turkish Cypriot identity, and attitude towards *Türkiyeli* other is marked with antipathy, ethnocentrism, nationalism and social exclusion. At this juncture, in relation to *Türkiyeliler*, it is evident that 'Cypriotness' in popular perception is neither a 'transnational' identity nor could be perceived as a space for politics of difference and equality. Otherwise stated, 'Cypriotness' or 'Turkish*Cypriotness*' appeals the bearers of this identity in their everyday lives, but it fosters exclusivist approach towards *Türkiyeli* 'Other' more than opening space for a transnational

attachment. In this framework, it should be asked whether Cypriot-centered project of the Left is in concordance with the values of the Left itself. That is to say, though Left's identification of itself with the project of Cyprus- centered identity should be evaluated in the framework of the particular condition of the island, intervention of the 'motherland' and dominance of Turkish nationalism in northern part, and despite the instrumental role of 'blood brothers' in Turkish nationalist perception, it is manifest that turning the categories of Turkish nationalist discourse upside down could not be the way of struggling with nationalist ideology. Moreover, as long as *Türkiyeli* immigration to the island is conceptualized as monolithic population pomp from Turkey, neither differing characteristics of migrations in different periods nor the hierarchical classification and exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* would be revealed. That is to say, those on the lowest stage of hierarchy who are the migrant cheap labor force in the northern part of the island and those who are directly identified with their inferior culture, with their 'eye offending' physical appearance and 'disgusting' smell; with their 'dirt-cheap' labor price and precisely connected with the crime became the very 'Other' of 'Cyprus-centered' identity which is proposed by the left. Thence, as far as popular perception is taken into account, in spite of its transnational orientation, it is evident that Cypriot-centered identity project fosters nationalist ideology, ethnocentrism, class-based accusation and social exclusion of *Türkiyeliler* in the island. In this sense, the left should reconsider its relationship with *Türkiyeliler* and should realize that to fulfill the mission of 'peace in the island', peace with the so called *Türkiyeliler* is as necessary as peace between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Table I: Social Demographic Profile of Interviewees

	Names	Location	Sex	Birth	Occupation	Education
1.	Hüseyin	Famagusta	M	1967	Private Company Employer	High Sch.
2.	Ahmet	Famagusta	M	1982	Bank Employee	University
3.	Çiler	Famagusta	F	1949	House Wife	Secondary Sch.
4.	Sinan	Famagusta	M	1972	Police	High Sch.
5.	Melda	Famagusta	F	1975	Teacher	University
6.	Mustafa	Famagusta	M	1957	Retired Army Officer	University
7.	Gürsel	Famagusta	M	1948	Judge	University
8.	İrfan	Famagusta	M	1983	PhD. Student	
9.	Murat	Famagusta	M	1939	Farmer	Primary Sch.
10.	Gökçen	Famagusta	F	1979	Shop Assistant	High Sch.
11.	Hakan	Famagusta	M	1952	Physically Disabled Currently Unemployed	High Sch.
12.	Onur	Nicosia	M	1954	Mechanic	Primary Sch.
13.	Mert	Nicosia	M	1986	MA. Student	
14.	Aslı	Nicosia	F	1971	Journalist	University
15.	Türkan	Nicosia	F	1953	Retired Civil Servant	High Sch.
16.	Deniz	Nicosia	M	1978	Lecturer	PhD. Degree
17.	Hasan	Nicosia	M	1974	Shop Assistant	High Sch.
18.	Pınar	Nicosia	F	1989	Undergraduate Student	
19.	Engin	Nicosia	M	1955	Consultant	University
20.	Osman	Kyrenia	M	1968	Self Employed	University
21.	Canan	Kyrenia	F	1962	House Wife	High Sch.
22.	Emre	Kyrenia	M	1981	Architect	University
23.	Gizem	Kyrenia	F	1978	Secretary	University
24.	Cemal	Kyrenia	M	1940	Self Employed	High Sch.
25.	Levent	Kyrenia	M	1985	Undergraduate Student	
26.	Sevgi	Kyrenia	F	1964	Teacher	University
27.	Nilgün	Kyrenia	F	1963	Private Company Staff	High Sch.
28.	Mete	Morphou	M	1952	Lawyer	High Sch.
29.	Özge	Morphou	F	1968	Shop Assistant	Secondary Sch.
30.	Şakir	Morphou	M	1948	Retired Civil Servant and Currently Self Employed	University
31.	Kürşat	Morphou	M	1981	Typographer	University
32.	Ebru	Morphou	F	1979	Teacher	University
33.	Mehmet	Morphou	M	1943	Lawyer	University