

INFLUENCE OF ORIENTALISM ON  
EUROPEAN UNION-TURKEY RELATIONS

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE INFLUENCE OF ORIENTALISM ON EUROPEAN UNION-TURKEY RELATIONS**

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This thesis analyzes the influence of Orientalism on Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) since Turkey's application for full membership. EU-Turkey relations are elaborated in the context of how Europe constitutes its relations with Turkey as an oriental 'other'. Thus arguments on the role of the other in identification process, self/other conceptualization and Orientalism as an othering mechanism of the west are presented to provide a theoretical framework. The question of how Turkish-European affairs have developed since the eighteenth century is answered in order to constitute a historical background of EU-Turkey relations, adopt theories of othering and observe construction of Orientalism. Lastly the traces of Orientalism since Turkey's application for membership in 1987 are searched in the official documents of the EU and statements of European statesmen. Religion, culture and civilization are analyzed as differentiating factors in the hegemonic relationship between the west and the Orient, between the EU and Turkey. It will be concluded that Orientalism continues to be an influential factor in EU's enlargement process, specifically in Turkey's accession.

Keywords: Orientalism, Turkish-European Relations

## ÖZ

### AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNDE ORYANTALİZMİN ETKİSİ

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Bu tez, Türkiye'nin tam üyelik başvurusundan bu yana Avrupa Birliği (AB) ile ilişkilerinde Oryantalizmin etkisini analiz etmektedir. AB- Türkiye ilişkileri, Avrupa'nın Türkiye ile ilişkilerini nasıl doğulu bir 'öteki' üzerinden kurduğu bağlamında incelenmiştir. Bu nedenle, teorik bir çerçeve oluşturmak amacıyla kimliğin oluşumunda 'öteki'nin rolü, kendi/öteki kavramsallaştırması ve bir ötekileştirme mekanizması olarak Oryantalizm üzerine tartışmalar sunulmuştur. Tarihsel bir arka plan oluşturmak, ötekileştirme teorilerini uygulamak ve oryantalizmin inşasını gözlemlemek amacıyla on sekizinci yüzyıldan bu yana Türk- Avrupalı ilişkilerinin nasıl geliştiği sorusuna yanıt aranmıştır. Son olarak Türkiye'nin 1987'deki üyelik başvurusundan bu yana Oryantalizmin izleri, AB'nin resmi dokümanlarında ve Avrupalı devlet adamlarının söylemlerinde Oryantalizmin izleri aranmıştır. Din, kültür ve medeniyet batı ve doğu, AB ve Türkiye arasında bir hegemonya ilişkisi kuran farklılaştırıcı faktörler olarak incelenmiştir. Oryantalizmin AB'nin genişleme sürecinde, özellikle Türkiye'nin katılımında etkili olmaya devam ettiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Oryantalizm, Türk-Avrupa İlişkileri

To My Grandfather Saip Türkili

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Compared to other candidate countries' application and negotiation periods, one can observe that Turkey's progress towards membership is much slower. Turkey's journey to membership has started over four decades ago with Ankara Agreement and this journey has been characterized by ambiguities, tensions, and uncertainties throughout these years. Question marks about EU's objectivity in evaluating applicant countries have surfaced many times, especially during the last enlargement waves. There are various reasons why Turkey is treated in a different way than the other applicant countries. There are economic reasons like Turkey's sufficiency/insufficiency in coping with competitive pressures of the common market; political issues like rule of law, human rights and minorities, and issues about the adoption of the *acquis* – which make up the Copenhagen criteria. Other reasons can be listed as geographical, cultural, historical, religious ones. Geographically speaking Turkey is a country which has only a small land in Europe, which has a very distinct culture from Europe, which historically used to be the most important enemy of European states during the Ottoman Empire, and Islam which is the principle other of Christianity is the religion of the great majority of its citizens. These factors in total may seem sufficient to make Turkey a different case than all other applicant countries, and indeed they cannot be neglected. However, this thesis is going to argue that Orientalism lies at the core of the debates of Turkey's eligibility and appropriateness for the EU. Centuries of othering of Orient by the West and West defining itself as more developed and civilized is reflected on the EU-Turkey relations as Turkey is still perceived as part of the Orient.

Romano Prodi, as the President of the European Commission in one of his speeches in 2002 explained the aim of European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP) as "to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union." In 2004 he stated "The desire to foster these values in the wider world is the major impetus behind the neighbourhood policy we are developing for eastern Europe and the Mediterranean." And in 2003 he put forward this aim as "We Europeans earnestly hope that these universal values can be shared by all our neighbours and partners, however diverse their cultures and traditions." In Prodi's expressions the ENP rhetoric reveals consistent tension between the one-sided ambition of the Union "(...) to project its values internationally" and a simultaneous emphasis on mutual 'partnership' with its neighbours.<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that ten of the sixteen participants of the ENP are Muslim countries; namely Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Even though Turkey is not part of ENP, this policy illustrates well European Union's attitude towards non-EU countries, especially with the Eastern, Mediterranean, Islamic ones. According to these statements, Europe not only accepts its values as universally valid but also assigns itself the mission to effuse and even teach them to its 'other's.

This Eurocentric attitude is very much related to the formation of European identity, othering of the East by the West and Orientalism. Turks have been one of the most important others of Europe in the course of history and they also have been perceived within the framework of Orientalist dogmas. In this dichotomy it is also necessary to discuss what Europe is in terms of geography, civilization religion, and culture. J. G. A. Pocock suggests that "the continent of Europe" is a term which is a result of a Mediterranean need to describe the lands west of the Bosphorus, adding that it is also a product of a world-dominating outlook developed by the civilization of those lands. Even though the notion of continent was formed in that civilization, Europe

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<sup>1</sup> Ifversen J., and Kølvråa, C., "European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity Politics", Paper presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007, pp. 22-23

does not fit its self-description as a continent. In the sixteenth century many copies of a map and image of Europe in the form of a crowned woman was circulating. Her head was the Iberian Peninsula, heart was Prague, left arm was the peninsula of Denmark, right arm was Italy. The skirts of her floated over indeterminate regions between the Black sea and the Baltic. Europe was more like an extension of Asia rather than being linked to it. Scandinavia came to be regarded as European only as a result of a historical process. A continent, the first continent with indeterminate physical or cultural eastern frontiers was also considered as a civilization. The European civilization was created in last group of Roman provinces after the disintegration of Roman Empire. The conquest of Islamic Turks from central Asia of Arab Asia and Egypt and of Byzantine Asia and Europe maintained the indeterminacy of Europe's eastern borders which also gained a cultural significance.<sup>2</sup> Michael Wintle while rejecting the term 'civilization, 'acknowledges some experiences that Europeans share. These key influences and experiences are the Roman Empire, Christianity, the Enlightenment and industrialization, which are felt "in varying ways and degrees by those whose home is Europe".<sup>3</sup> This argument which is also shared by many contemporary European statesmen seems to suggest that these historical movements have not influenced the people whose home is not Europe. Civilization, religion and culture are the three main factors that are widely mentioned to stress the differences between Europe and the Turks.

Until the mid nineteenth century the main component of Turkish identity was Islam and until the mid seventeenth century the main component of European identity was Christianity. Even though with the Enlightenment there was a transition to post-Christian European society, Christianity continued to be an important part of European identity throughout the

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<sup>2</sup> Pocock, J. G. A., "Some Europeans in their History" in Pagden A. (ed) *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.56-60

<sup>3</sup> Wintle, M., "Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience" in Wintle, M. (ed), *Culture and Identity in Europe*, Aldershot, 1996, p. 13

following centuries as well.<sup>4</sup> Religion is one of the reasons why Europeans otherized Turks for centuries. Firstly Islam is monotheist like Christianity and claim to be universal and this led to drastic conflicts and rivalry. Furthermore Islam had always expanded against Christianity and thus it was perceived as a threat. Although this threat started to lose its power since the eighteenth century, this perception continues to exist. Islam is perceived as a factor hindering the process of “progress-modernization-civilization”.<sup>5</sup> Meyda Yeğenoğlu elaborates further on the issue by referring to Bernard Lewis who “repeated the archetypical Orientalist understanding of Islam whose effectivity cannot be confined to mere faith, belief or a worship system. Unlike Christianity, Islam is pervasive in all aspects of the life of Muslims.” Meaning that in an Orientalist understanding, unlike Christianity, religion becomes identical to culture. Therefore in this case the issue becomes Europe versus Islam, one referring to a continent, the other to a religion.<sup>6</sup>

Civilizational differences between Europe and Turkey have been emphasized in many occasions by the EU officials and member state governments. In order to define this distinction the classification suggested by Gerard Delanty may be helpful. He proposes that in European history there have been three civilizational constellations that have been constitutive of modernity in Europe. These are: (1) the Occidental Christian constellation; (2) the Byzantine-Slavic Eurasian constellation; and (3) the Ottoman, Islamic constellation.<sup>7</sup> European Union’s last enlargement have shown that civilizational differences with Central and East European countries that came from the Byzantine-

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<sup>4</sup> Yurdusev, N. “18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Avrupa’da Türk Kimliği”, in Bilgin, N. (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* (Istanbul: Baglam Yayıncılık, 1997), p.104.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> Yeğenoğlu, M. “The Return of the Religious: Revisiting Europe and Its Islamic Others”, *Culture and Religion*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 251-252

<sup>7</sup> Delanty, G., “The Making of Post-Western Europe: A Civilizational Analysis”, *Thesis Eleven*, No. 72, February 2003, p. 16

Slavic Eurasian constellation were not regarded as handicap. On the contrary their accession was welcomed with the motto "Back to Europe". However Ottoman Islamic civilization is not as easily accepted as this constellation by the EU; it is rather a civilization that is to be feared and controlled by Europe.

In the same way differences in Turkish and European cultures are seen from an Orientalist perspective. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec's study on French and German views on Turkey's EU accession clearly demonstrates how the differences in political cultures are put forward. She presents Heinrich August Winkler's arguments. Winkler argues that

*All those countries which used to have Communist regimes and which joined the EU in 2004 belong to the historical West. By this, we mean that part of Europe where spiritual and worldly powers became distinct and separate from one another, a long process which started in the Middle Ages; it is that part of Europe which was influenced by Roman Law and which was shaped since the Reformation by the opposition between Catholics and Protestants and which, because of this, produced the notions of tolerance, pluralism, as well as human and citizens' rights.*

He adds that, on the contrary Turkey did not belong to that process; it belongs to the Islamic world; a world which ignores secularism and "critical interpretation of scriptures and traditions, both of which were critical in shaping modern European identity (/ies)."<sup>8</sup>

In the light of these debates this thesis asks whether Orientalism is still influential in EU-Turkey relations. In the first chapter of the study, the role of the *other* in identity formation is elaborated. Then the main features, dogmas, prejudices and origins of Orientalism will be provided and the main points of Edward Said's arguments against Orientalism will be explained. A summary of the way in which Orientalism became a systematic discipline capable of exercising authority over the Orient will be given. It is going to be argued that the formation of European identity, othering of the Orient and Orientalism are very much

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<sup>8</sup> Le Gloannec, A., "Is Turkey Euro-Compatible? French and German Debates About the 'Non-Criteria'", *Constellations*, Vol. 13, No.2, p. 265

interconnected. The second chapter is going to present a historical overview of Turkish-European relations for the last three centuries. Declining military threat of the Ottoman Empire, deepening European sense of identity and superiority and transformation of Turkish identity through internalization of Western values are the crucial developments in this period that happened simultaneously, determined Turco-European relations and established a solid ground for Orientalism. Finally the last chapter will seek Orientalist influences in EU-Turkey relations in the official documents of the EU, statements of the European statesmen and EU officials. As a conclusion, it is aimed to answer the question whether contemporary relations with Europe is still influenced by the image of 'the Turk' that has been formed centuries ago with fear and desire to control and whether this image is still 'the other' of Europe.

## CHAPTER II

### OTHERING AND ORIENTALISM

#### 2.2 Role of the Other in Identity Formation

The role of the 'other' and 'othering' is essential to understand the binary oppositions, the hierarchy and core-periphery relationship between the West and Orient. Yurdusev argues that the need for the other is essential for any unit of identity and identification process. Jacques Derrida as well argued that every identity exists together with its difference; there can be no collective social identification without its own 'difference' or 'other'.<sup>9</sup> To identify something means to differentiate it and to identify yourself with one group necessitates distancing yourself from another. Nuri Yurdusev illustrates that someone who is Turk is also the one who is not English or French or Greek. If there were no other nations, then there would be no need for one to identify himself with the Turkish nation. The Turk exists because the English exists. Logically all difference involves identity and any distinction necessitates some identification. No distinction can be achieved unless there is identification.<sup>10</sup>

Yurdusev suggests that the existence of the other/difference in the collective identity formation is not only a logical but also a historical fact. Historically identities of all societies have been defined through their difference from other societies. In the identification process commonly shared characteristics are not as defining as differences from others.

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<sup>9</sup> Yurdusev, N. "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman) – European Relations", Ismail, T and Aydın, M. (eds), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Changing Role in the World Politics*, New York, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 82

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

Yurdusev refers to Thucydides who tells that Hellenes identified themselves through their difference from Persians and before the Trojan War there was no identification of being 'Hellenes' or 'Hellenes' in Greece. Similarly, the French and English were influential in determining each other's identities. There is a generally held view that the Hundred Years War was very influential factor in the formation of French and English national identities.<sup>11</sup>

The names of identity units also reveal the role of the other in identity formation. The units of identity are usually named by the others or as a result of an encounter with the other. For instance the word English is not English but Latin, Romans named them as English. The root word of the word Turk is not Turkish but comes from Chinese. Swedish named the Finns and Turks named the Kurds. These examples show that through the existence of external groups, a group is differentiated and identified and when these external groups are perceived as a threat, the distinction tends to increase and the group identification is developed.<sup>12</sup>

Another important argument about naming the other is that it encodes an 'epistemic and ontological violence'<sup>13</sup> in the encounter of the white colonizers with the colonized. The category Indian for instance, not only represents a historical misrecognition of geography by European explorers<sup>14</sup> but also is a violence that attacked the right of Native Americans' naming themselves. It neglected the differences between them; it dehumanized them by homogenizing them.<sup>15</sup> The name Orient is another example of this epistemic and ontological violence as it is a

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 83

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Spivak, G. quoted in Thobani, S., *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 2007, p. 50

<sup>14</sup> Wright quoted in Thobani, S., *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 2007, p. 50

<sup>15</sup> Thobani, S., *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 2007, p. 51



tool for the West to construct a hegemony over the east since this naming as well erased the differences between nations; regarded them as a homogenous entity, which will be discussed in the next section.

How the other is perceived is an important factor in identity formation. The other may be seen merely as a difference, unit of identity or collectivity in question 'familiar'. When the other is seen as a stranger, a threat, this makes some elements of the identity unit valuable, right and good. Moreover, attributing negative terms to the other and negating them, one makes one's identity affirmative and positive without needing to describe oneself. In other words, self definition may not necessitate the negation of others. It may be done through differentiation or distinction; identification involves both inclusion and exclusion and identity is defined in both negative and positive terms. <sup>16</sup>

Hegel relates the question of identity formation to the self/other conceptualization. He refines the idea that by knowing the other, the self has the power to withhold recognition. 'Self and other recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.'<sup>17</sup> Karl Marx incorporated this idea in his formulation of dialectical identity formation that became dominant in the twentieth-century social theory.

Iver Neumann identifies four paths of theorizing the other: the ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental path and the 'Eastern Excursion'. The first three paths are more institutionalized forms of production but the fourth part has developed on the margins of academia. The ethnographic path has been chosen by international relations scholars who have worked on nationalism. The basic literature of this path goes back to Emile Durkheim's theory of social division of labor which argued that the lineation of an 'in-group' must entail its

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Hegel, quoted in Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.3

demarcation from 'out-groups' and that demarcation is an active and ongoing part of identity formation. Social anthropologist Barth contributed to this path by demonstrating that ethnic groups were reproduced by maintaining their boundaries that separate them from other groups, who were seen to be constituted as other by their lack of some traits. In other words he proposed studying self/other nexus in terms of the boundary markers of identity, which he calls 'diacritica'. At the national level, language is a crucial marker of identity. Certain diacritica will be highly culture specific, and other diacritica may be made crucial by interpretations and may be highly esoteric. Language is a crucial marker of national identity. Nevertheless, a language's distance to other languages is not what makes it an important component of national identity. Even states that profess to having the same state language will make linguistic differences a matter of political identity. One lexical example is from Austria and Germany. Austria's protocol of accession to the EU included twenty-three objects for which one word (for example *Kartoffel*) is used in Germany and another (for example *Erdapfel*) is used in Austria. The protocol states that when potatoes are referred in an EU document, both words must be given in the German text. This means that German language being connected to two different political identities is confirmed. The dividing line between self and other (Germany and Austria) will be maintained.<sup>18</sup>

The second path is the psychological path. Neumann states that the working of the boundary between 'us' and 'them' is the essential of social psychology which has attacked 'ethnocentrism' and related phenomena throughout the twentieth century. Social identification approach sees self-categorization as an explanation of how individuals are turned into groups. Neumann, by referring to Hogg and Abrams, explains that we make a differentiation between ourselves and everybody else. There is peace, order, law, and government among the insiders of the we-group. Relations with the outsiders are characterized

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-7

as war and plunder except it is modified by agreements. We categorize ourselves just like we tend to categorize objects, experiences and other people. As a result of this self-categorization, the similarities between self and other in-group members and differences between self and out-groupers are emphasized; there happens a stereotyping.<sup>19</sup> The foreign policy analysis, literatures on perception, belief systems, enemy images, etc. have failed because it did not directly focus on this self/other nexus. Another point is made by Anne Norton. She wrote that the categories of self and other emerge with clarity only where they are empirically dubious. Meaning that "individual and collective identities are created not simply in the difference between self and other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to oneself and in the recognition of the other as like"<sup>20</sup>

The Continental philosophical path is paved with Marxian dialectics and different philosophers have elaborated on self and other being a raw material for a possible dialectical elevation in the name of reason.

About the fourth path 'Eastern Excursion' Neumann tells that it is a more or less isolated and marginal path. He mentions four scholars from this path. Firstly he mentions Georg Simmel who discussed the importance of marginal, the 'stranger' in collective self. Strangers, the socially marginal ones play an important role in collective identity formation as their presence creates the question of who is self and who is the other. The ambiguity of strangers may serve to highlight the possible ambiguity between these two categories. The second scholar of this path is Carl Schmitt, who argues that the state defines itself by distinguishing public enemies from friends. If a given state fails to fulfill this duty, its authority will be challenged by some other unit. This public enemy does

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<sup>19</sup> Hogg and Abrams. quoted in Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.7

<sup>20</sup> Norton quoted in Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 8

not necessarily have to be evil, ugly, appear as an economic competitor and it can even be to the advantage of the economy. "He is nevertheless the Other"<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche's contribution to this path was his emphasis on activity of knowing. According to Nietzsche the world does not simply present itself to human beings, rather the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world. So the self knows the other only as a series of changing perspectives and it is the knowing that makes the self, not the other way around. Mikhail Bakhtin attempted to show that what he called 'epistemological consciousness' or even 'epistemologism' dominated philosophy in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 'Epistemologism' refers to reification of a knowing and sovereign self, cut off from the consciousness of the other. In other words it means the absence of other and "without the other the subject cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse, where consciousnesses meet."<sup>22</sup>

Another important author to mention is Emmanuel Lévinas. He takes a transcendental approach to the self. Accordingly the self possesses a sacred story and social history which derives from appearance of the other, mediated in language. Appearance of the other makes the self come into existence. He says "To be sure, the other (l'Autre) that is announced does not possess this existing as the subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious... we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a mystery. The other's entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or rather its alterity."<sup>23</sup> The other is an alter ego and also other is what I myself self is not and this leads to a tension. Lévinas highlights the possible asymmetry of power here, where the I may be rich and powerful whereas the other may be poor and weak. At the

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<sup>21</sup> Schmitt, quoted in Neumann *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 12

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 13

<sup>23</sup> Lévinas, quoted in Neumann, I. *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 16

collective identity level, the other upsets order by simply being what it is. When there are many others, each of them external, problems arise. Legal justice and state is needed to identify who is closest and who is the other.<sup>24</sup> Sara Ahmed criticizes Lévinas on the ground that by describing the other as having the character of otherness, he simply implied the other is other because he is another being. She argues that in Lévinasian ethics “the other is radically other than me but as his being is characterized by such otherness; he is like me, a being”. She finds this problematic because it means recognizing the other in a certain way and abstracting the other from particular others. Through that abstraction the other becomes a fetish which contains its otherness within its entire being. Therefore the other is cut off from modes of encounter. “The question of ethics, then cannot be asked given the prior act of separation of the other as alien being from the particular and worldly encounters in which beings are constituted in and through their relationship to the other.”<sup>25</sup>

To discuss international relations as self/other relations, Neumann firstly refers to Todorov and his work on the conquest of America. Todorov suggests that the problems of alterity can be located along at least three axes. Firstly, there is a value judgment in which the other is good or bad. Secondly, there is the action of rapprochement of distancing in relation to other: I embrace the other’s values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; and thirdly there is neutrality or indifference.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Lévinas, quoted in Neumann, I. *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.17

<sup>25</sup> Ahmed, S., *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*, Routledge, 2000, p. 143

<sup>26</sup> Todorov, quoted in Neumann, I. *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, in p. 21

When the self/other problematic reached the discipline of international relations, there happened a shift away from dialectical to dialogical reading which had also taken place in social theory twenty years earlier.

Formation of the self is highly related to the formation of its others and failure to regard the others in their own right has effect on formation of the self. Neumann presents some insights which can be used as analytical tools. Anthropological insight is that delineation of a self from an other is an active and ongoing part of identity formation. The creation of social boundaries is a necessary component of integration, not its consequence. The focus for studies of identity should therefore focus on how these boundaries are formed and maintained. A focus on social boundaries is complementary to physical and economic borders. In addition to this, when studying the self/other nexus of two states, one must pay attention to the fact that those states at the same time maintain their collective identities vis-à-vis other human collectives such as societies or organizations. These two collective identities are not only mutually constitutive entities but also they are unbounded. When they encounter they merge into one another. There was a shift in the understanding of this merging from dialectical understanding in which self and other were seen to merge into a new entity as part of the progressive flow of reason, to a dialogical understanding in which no such goal or development is presumed for the exchanges between self and other. Lastly Neumann suggests that integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, so the focus should be on how the exclusion takes place. If active othering is proposed as the price of achieving integration, there is a high price to be paid. Analyses of collective identity formation should contribute to our living in difference,<sup>27</sup> not perpetuate and reproduce otherness.

Hitherto several arguments on how the other is central for identity and identification process; discussions on self/other conceptualization and its

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<sup>27</sup> Neumann, I. *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, pp.36-37

role in integration and exclusion process of collective identity formation are presented. Before elaborating on how the Orient is constructed by the west as its other in the next section, it is important to note that the mechanism of othering was the main factor in formation of western identity. How the west encountered, perceived, described, recognized, characterized and categorized the east is highly related to how the west draws its borders, defines and affirms its values and civilization, legitimizes its authority and power relations. It can be suggested that Orientalism is not only consequence of these processes but also a mechanism that reproduces and perpetuates them.

## **2.2. Orientalism and Othering of the Orient**

Among other conceptualizations, Orientalism may be defined as othering of certain parts of the world by the West. This othering process creates a classification, rather than a differentiation, between the Orient and Occident in which the Occident have a higher status. Edward Said is one of the most well-known and successful anti-Orientalist scholars and thus it is helpful to summarize his arguments in order to have a theoretical framework.

In his review article 'Arabs, Islam and the Dogmas of the West' Said states the essentials of his thesis against Orientalism, a thesis later elaborated in his *Orientalism*.<sup>28</sup> He states that Orientalism is the learned study of the great Asiatic mystery, which included Arab, Indian, Chinese and Japanese civilizations. The roots of modern Orientalism are dated back to the eighteenth century. Said lists four dogmas of Orientalism that today exist in Western studies of Arabs and Islam. It is important to highlight these dogmas because Said argues that popular stereotypes about the Orient and Oriental mentality have derived them. One dogma is that there is a systematic difference between West and Orient. The

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<sup>28</sup> Said, E. "Arabs, Islam and the Dogmas of the West", *New York Times Book Review*, 31 October 1976, quoted in Macfie, A. L., *Orientalism: A Reader*, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p. 84

first is rational, developed, humane, and superior whereas the latter is aberrant, underdeveloped and inferior. The second dogma is that abstractions about the Orient based on texts representing a classical Oriental civilization are preferable to direct evidence. A third dogma is that Orient is eternal, uniform, incapable of defining itself and for this reason a highly generalized vocabulary for describing the Orient from a western standpoint is inevitable and objective. A fourth dogma is that Orient is something to be feared or controlled.

Historically, Islam and Arabs have always been problems about the Orient. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Islam and/or Arabs dominated the Mediterranean and later on Ottoman Empire emerged as part of the so-called Eastern question. Moreover Western Christianity has never been able to accommodate or subdue Islam since it is yet really part of Judeo-Christian tradition. When Koran was translated into Latin in 1143, Western society became familiar with Islam. However its distorted version has penetrated into Western mind. In this version Islam was a preparation for the final appearance of the Antichrist and Mohammad was seen as a parody of Christ. This way offensive attitude of the West against Islam in Middle Ages was justified.<sup>29</sup> There is a tradition in European thought of hostility and even hatred toward Islam as an outlandish competitor. During the early nineteenth century Islam and Arabs became members of the Semitic branch of Orientalism and Said believes that Western anti-Semitism has included both Jews and Muslims.

About the contemporary Orientalists, Said states that Middle East and Islamic specialists in England and the US had never ideologically revised themselves, neither have they been re-educated. For them there is still an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche. They still use texts like Koran to analyze contemporary Egypt or Algeria. It is assumed that Islam –or its seventh century ideal- eludes even recent and crucial

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<sup>29</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1995, p.87



influences of colonialism, imperialism and ordinary politics. Muslim stays as a 'native informant' for the Orientalist.

Said presented an extended version of his thesis in his book *Orientalism*. First published in 1978, *Orientalism* introduced a global perspective on political and economic realities to which literary studies had remained closed until that day. Said brought politics into literary studies by arguing that scholarly Orientalism needs to be seen in the context of Western perceptions of the Orient since classical times. He stated that these perceptions are related to Western domination of the Orient through colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism.<sup>30</sup>

*Orientalism* consists of introduction and three chapters: The Scope of Orientalism, Orientalist structures and Restructures, and Orientalism Now. He states his main arguments in the Introduction where his starting point is that "The Orient is not an inert fact of nature but it is man-made."<sup>31</sup> This statement opens up questions about construction of the Orient and of Oriental people by western scholars, travelers and imperialists. It also raises issues connected with the relation between representation, knowledge and power. These questions lead to insights about the relationship between West and Orient.

The first chapter provides an overview of the field. Said, by discussing Orientalist discourse in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, argues that this discourse is based on the dichotomy between the West and the Orient. West is seen as "rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, and without natural suspicion" and Orient as "none of these things"<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Kennedy, V., *Edward Said : a critical introduction*, Cambridge, UK : Polity Press ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 14

<sup>31</sup> Said, E. *Orientalism*, Vintage, New York, 1978, pp. 4-5

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p.49

In the second part of the first chapter Said continues by stating that "Orientalism is a field of learned study". "In the Christian West, Orientalism is considered to come into existence with the decision of Church Council of Vienna in 1312 establishing a series of chairs; Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon and Salamanca. Yet any account of Orientalism would have to consider professional Orientalist and his work and a field of study based on geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic unit called Orient. These fields are made and acquire coherence and integrity in time as scholars devote themselves to a commonly agreed-upon subject matter."<sup>33</sup> To speak of Orientalism as a geographical field is fairly revealing since there is no symmetrical field called Occidentalism. Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition. When we consider Orientalists, one should accept enormous, indiscriminate size and an almost infinite capacity for subdivision. These describe Orientalism as an academic discipline and the "ism" serves to insist on its distinctiveness from every other kind. The rule in its historical development as an academic discipline has been its increasing scope, not selectiveness.<sup>34</sup>

The chapter introduces the term 'imaginative geography'. He explains that there is a universal practice of determining in ones mind a familiar space which he calls 'our' and unfamiliar space beyond 'ours' which is 'theirs'. This way of making geographical distinctions can be entirely arbitrary. He uses the word arbitrary because imaginative geography does not require 'them' to know the distinction. Imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.<sup>35</sup> Not to ignore positive history, after having a look at western representations of the Orient, Islam, Muslims, and Arabs before the eighteenth century and suggesting how the tradition, discourses and

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p.50

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p.50

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. pp. 54-55

institutions of Orientalism came into being, it opens the analysis of some aspects of the relation between the West and the East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By taking Napoleon's invasion of Egypt along with 'Description de l'Egypte' published between 1809 and 1828 and the building of Suez Canal, Said suggests that the development of Orientalism embodies a 'textual attitude'.<sup>36</sup> He implies that Orientalist discourse relies on images of the East and its inhabitants and these images are derived from books rather than empirical evidence. He refers to Michel Foucault's definition of discourse that texts could create not only knowledge but also the reality they appear to describe. "In time this knowledge and reality produce a tradition or a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it".<sup>37</sup> Said continues by arguing that this view of the Orient both predates and survives the imperialist expansion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The number of Orientalists increased considerably during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to several reasons. Firstly "by then the reaches of imaginative and actual geography had shrunk", secondly, "unstoppable European expansion in search of markets, resources and colonies determined western relations with Orient" and lastly Orientalism accomplished its transition "from a scholarly discourse to an imperial institution."<sup>38</sup> In the same centuries West started to establish its intellectual mastery and economic control over the East which was defined with Western terms and East was forced to internalize the mirror that was presented to it by the West. In other words, the Eastern identity was imposed on the Orient by the colonial powers in order to conquer and exploit it.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p.92.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 94

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p.95

<sup>39</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1995, p. 86

It was a moment of crisis for the field of Orientalism when the formerly colonized countries had gained their independence in the middle of the twentieth century. Said stated that the Orient has now become the Third World, "challenging and politically armed" to confront the West. However Orientalists have failed to take this challenge which is a sign of the bankruptcy of the field in its contemporary form.<sup>40</sup> Said argues that the career of H. A. R. Gibb illustrates approaches which Orientalism has responded to modern Orient. In his lecture called 'Modern Trend in Islam' in 1945, he argued that the Arab mind does not have a sense of individuality of concrete events and therefore a sense of law; it rejects rationalism and utilitarian ethic. Orientalist opposes any Islamic reform attempts due to Islam's permanent disabilities and this was Gibb's main argument. 18 years later Gibb as the head of Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, suggested collaboration of traditional Orientalist and a good social scientist because applying "the psychology and mechanics of western political institutions to Asian or Arab situations is pure Walt Disney.....History, politics and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is Orient and all ideas about left wing and revolutions should be changed back to Disneyland"<sup>41</sup>

In addition to this, contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood to economy and consumption. Edward Said states that although western consumer is a numerical minority, he believes that he is entitled to own majority of world resources, "because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. Anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism presents a white middle-class westerner not only managing but also owning the rest of the world just because by definition "it" is not as quite human as 'we' are."<sup>42</sup> Orientalism takes one step further and views the Orient as something whose existence has remained fixed in time and place for the west. "Orient's cultural, political, and social history are considered mere

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<sup>40</sup> Said, E., *Orientalism*, Vintage, New York, 1978, p.104

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 107

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 108

responses to the West. The West is the actor; the Orient is a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury of Oriental behavior".<sup>43</sup>

A chronological perspective is mainly adopted in second and third chapters. In the second chapter Said discusses the period between last third of the eighteenth century to 1870, which he defines as 'modern Orientalism'. He sees it as part of the legacy of the Enlightenment.<sup>44</sup> It is important to note that by the beginning of the nineteenth century three major interrelated trends stood out: a sense of Western superiority that constitutes pragmatism, imperialism and contempt for other civilizations; a romantic exoticism about the East whose poverty made it more charming; and scholarship on the great ages of the past.<sup>45</sup> In this chapter Said also provides description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists and scholars. He focuses on works of Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan. He argues that Sacy is the originator, whose work represents Orientalism's emergence and status in the nineteenth century and Renan's work solidifies official discourse of Orientalism, systemizes its insights and establishes its intellectual and worldly institutions.<sup>46</sup>

In his description of this discourse and its institutions, Said focuses on the emergence of binary oppositions and comparisons whereby Europe emerges as superior to the Orient and he concludes that scholarly Orientalism developed as an institution at the same time as colonialist and imperialist structures were established.<sup>47</sup> Even though Edward Said does not define imperialism, he means the domination of a distant

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 109

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 118

<sup>45</sup> Rodison, M., *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 52

<sup>46</sup> Said, E. *Orientalism*, p.130

<sup>47</sup> Kennedy, V., *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000, p.18

territory by a western center. Varying degrees of economic, political and military control and cultural dominance constitute this western domination. Cultural dominance is embodied in various domains such as trade, travel and exploration, science, and humanitarian and missionary activities. Colonialism on the other hand is as the establishment of settlements in a distant territory, usually as a result of imperialist expansion and as a process whereby settlers from the imperial power come to play a dominant and privileged role in the economic life of the territory. The use of imperialist rhetoric implying the superiority of the west and barbarity of other cultures had existed from the fifteenth century onwards. The idea of the barbarous Muslim world inhabited by evil tribes was a popular theme in medieval literature. The notion of Oriental despotism was the invention of Renaissance. The Orient was presented as not only despotic and evil, but also cruel. This is evident in the Machiavelli's work that contrasted the despotism of the Orient to the free spirit of the West.<sup>48</sup> The activities of traders, missionaries, travelers and explorers led to a transition from colonialism to imperialism. Said provides examples of the interrelations of imperialism, colonialism and associated discourses.<sup>49</sup>

Delanty, by referring to Rodison, Djait and Hourani, claims that Christian Europe did not have a single image of Orient. The Islamic world had several images such as a hostile politico-ideological structure, a different civilization and an alien economic region and when Orient was no longer a major threat, despotic and cruel image of the Orient was replaced with a romantic other. The contrast between Christianity and Islam left its place to more secular civilization and barbarism distinction.<sup>50</sup> During the Enlightenment, Orient was an important object of curiosity. While

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<sup>48</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1995, p. 87

<sup>49</sup> Said, E. *Orientalism*, Vintage: New York, 1978, p.18

<sup>50</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1995, p.89

European ideas were established as universally valid norms 'humanizing' the non-western world was the main commitment. In this period Orient was perceived to have an innocent nature. While Europe was progress and civilization, Orient represented the sentimentality and innocence of mankind, incapable of progress.<sup>51</sup> Enlightenment also changed Western perceptions of Islam. Islam was now considered sympathetically by pointing out the merit and sincerity of Muslim beliefs against medieval intolerance. The eighteenth century saw the Muslim East in a fraternal and understanding way. The idea that all men are born equal led to a requisitioning of the earlier charges leveled against the Muslim world.<sup>52</sup>

Said argues that institutionalized Orientalism is the legacy of the nineteenth century. In the third chapter 'Orientalism Now', he examines the period after 1870. He restates dogmas of Orientalism and makes a distinction between latent and manifest Orientalism.

*The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology and so forth which I shall call manifest Orientalism.*<sup>53</sup>

He argues that in each change that occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant.<sup>54</sup> Said also notes the connections between Orientalism and theories of racial inequality and hierarchy. He concludes that the major change in Orientalism after 1870 was one "from and academic to an instrumental attitude".<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 90

<sup>52</sup> Rodison, M., *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, pp. 45-48

<sup>53</sup> Said, E., *Orientalism*, p. 206

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 246

This instrumental attitude was seen differently in British and French Orientalism in the twentieth century. Sir Hamilton Gibb and Luis Massignon respectively, were the representatives especially pre and post War I period. Edward Said highlights 'Islamic Orientalism', which is characterized by "its retrogressive position... its general methodological and ideological backwardness and its comparative insularity".<sup>56</sup> Massignon and Gibb are the last two major representatives of European Orientalism. He states that after them there was broadly speaking, Anglo-American and more narrowly speaking American Social Scientist.<sup>57</sup> He presents contemporary Orientalism in the US by focusing on how Islam and Arabs are presented in American media and America's cultural and political dominance of Arab countries.<sup>58</sup>

To sum up, Said defines Orientalism as the concept of a difference between East and West. The Orient exists in relation to the Occident, as its opposite. He pointed out two major events in Europe that led to emergence of Orientalism: Semitic philology and imperialism. Semitic philologists reduced Orientalism to a science which depended on studying ancient texts, Islamic literary heritage. They interpreted these texts by assuming a world which is exactly the opposite of theirs: unscientific, ahistorical, not respectful of the individual, and so on. These interpretations were a verification and justification of any European norm.<sup>59</sup>

At this point it is necessary to ask whether Oriental exists apart from Orientalism. Grossberg discusses that if the Orient and the Oriental are constructions of colonialism, they cannot exist outside of colonialist discourse. Colonial relations of power have produced Orient as an object

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 261

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 284

<sup>58</sup> Kennedy, V., *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000, p. 20

<sup>59</sup> Gold, A., "Us and Them", *The Nation*, 24 March 1979, pp.309-310



of study. But if this is the case then any knowledge would supposed to be oppressive. He asks "is it not the articulation of knowledge into particular geo-economic and political relations that reconfigures curiosity into power?" He points out three different positions for the answer. The first position sees the Orient as the negativity at the heart of the Occident's self-perception. In other words, if it were not the Orient, West would create something else for such a negation. The second position suggests that both Occident and Orient are necessary to the self-definition of the other. Each defines itself by emphasizing its difference from the other. However there is an uncertainty that each must have its own positivity independent of the relationship. But this positivity is always irrelevant to the constitutive relation itself. The third position which is Edward Said's, suggests that Orientalism involves actual material processes of colonization, travel, exploitation and domination; meaning that people traveled to places that already existed independently of the Orientalist. The act of power comes when negating for instance the positivity of the Arab world to a constitutive other. Difference is articulated to otherness and this way the material site of discursive power is produced.<sup>60</sup> About the first position, the importance of the other in formation of the identity should be underlined. As it is discussed above, identification involves othering and there cannot be an 'other' without identification. Therefore it should be admitted that if it were not the Orient, West would otherize another geography and/or culture to constitute and preserve its own identity. Colonization, travel, exploitation and domination have otherized certain regions of the world and created the Orient through a discursive power.

Keyman, Mutman and Yeğenoğlu open a discussion on Orientalism in their study *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark (Orientalism, Hegemony and Cultural Difference)*. They mark their starting point with the statement that even though India or China are geographically in the

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<sup>60</sup> Grossberg, L., "Identity and Cultural Studies: Is That All There Is?" in Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Sage Publications, London, 1996, pp. 95-96

west of the USA they are accepted as in the east of the world which leads us to the question of where the world is. Even when we think of the expressions such as Middle East or Far East, we can ask "middle of where?" or "far from where?" and sense that some place is taken as center. These perceptions construct the East not simply as another location or culture but as a place that is radically different, less civilized but more mysterious and exotic place than the West. Edward Said's studies show that "East" or places outside Western Europe and North America and the discourse on it are not independent of economic and political power of the West and associated ideological rhetoric, fantasies and myths.<sup>61</sup> The most important function of discourses like Orientalism which make 'others' an object of study and rule is that they establish West and Western subject as a universal norm and center. What makes this cultural, economic and political entity called the West *modern* is this understanding of ruling based on the relationship between knowledge and power.<sup>62</sup>

West places societies and cultures that are different from it in a system of oppositions, in a comparative scale and this system work with the language. One pole of the opposition is marked with a defect or an absence and therefore superiority of the other pole becomes clear. This comparison involves a value judgement in which the prosecutor is the judge as well. Through this oppositional structure, the societies outside the West are 'otherized' and become radically different.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, 'other' societies become identifiable only according to their distance or closeness to the West.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Keyman, Mutman, Yeğenoğlu, *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya, Kültürel Fark (Orientalism, Hegemony and Cultural Difference)*, İletişim, İstanbul, 1999, pp.7-8

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 10

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 11

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 12

Having argued that Orientalist discourse is indeed more related to the West than to the East, they state that Western identity and modernity constitute an essential problem in history writing. This is the linear evolutionary history writing, which is a paradigm that explains history with causality relations and looks at history as realization of a predetermined aim. Orientalism and similar discourses define western identity as modern, civilized and advanced and eastern identity as the opposite or antecedent of these features. However the conception that Western identity, reason, civilization and prosperity are self-styled, has to be questioned. Reason, as it is defined by the West, civilization and prosperity are dependent on the 'periphery', the Third World that is believed to be outside or behind the West. Therefore, when we talk about Orientalism, we are not simply talking about stereotypes or easily correctable wrong ideas, but an ideological process which establish core-periphery, Western-Oriental relations. This problematic about history writing also exist in nationalist discourses of nation states because in the periphery, nationalist discourses are established according to a world history that locates Western civilization to a privileged status.<sup>65</sup>

They also criticize the conception that it is satisfactory to just simply reverse this Orientalist discourse and world fiction as this would lead to a second binary opposition and hierarchal relation. In this criticism they refer to Derrida and his theory of deconstruction. As any binary opposition means a hierarchal relationship, secondary term should be reversed by a process which revalues it; for instance it should be shown that Orient is not like how it is described by Orientalism and the terms used should be re-evaluated. However such a critique would still be insufficient as it would still be within the terms of the system and this would still constitute an essentialism problem. Deconstruction which is a different approach, suggests that while reversing the system, the terms are also displaced. By this way within the metaphysical terms which mark the interval between the two terms and reveal the relation between them, new concepts can emerge which cannot be grasped in

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 14

that system.<sup>66</sup> This approach necessitates an interruptive style and such a style in history writing can be defined as having a problematizing character.<sup>67</sup>

Mutman, in his article "*Oryantalizmin Gölgesi Altında Batı'ya Karşı İslam*" (*West versus Islam In the Shadow of Orientalism*)<sup>68</sup> suggests perceiving Orientalism that Said examined as an essential text which makes the world that we live meaningful. Mutman articulates deconstruction method of Derrida with Foucault's knowledge-power concepts. He mainly argues that centralizing the West with respect to the 'other' is not only validating the west as predominant but establishing the west and the 'other' in a hegemonic relationship. Since it is not only a one way pressure but a hierarchal system, also Oriental subjects are established by Orientalism and they contributed to its establishment. Mutman suggests understanding the last hundred years of Muslim countries within this framework and highlights the fact that during Westernization process a specific Islamic indicator expands to popular and public space by leaving its traditional context. In these countries as official nationalist programs have gone under crisis, gradually an anti-western fundamentalist Islamic political-ideological rhetoric has been developed.

Keyman, in his article "*Farklılığa Direnmek: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Öteki Sorunu*" (*Withstanding Difference: Problematic of Other in Theory of International Relations*) examines the process of establishment of modernities' global cultural hegemony in the context of international relations discipline. According to Keyman, both Realist and Marxist versions of international relations theory reproduce Orientalist discourse. The mechanism that supports this is, giving the modern subject a privileged status by otherizing non-Western cultures with a

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 15, pp. 41-42

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 16

<sup>68</sup> Mutman, M., "*Oryantalizmin Gölgesi Altında Batıya Karşı İslam*" (*West versus Islam In the shadow of Orientalism*) in Mutman, Keyman, Yeğenoğlu (eds), *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya, Kültürel Fark*, pp. 25-69

typological understanding of history and consequently conceptualizing the World history through Western glass. Keyman also suggests that postmodern and feminist critiques should better be taken into account. He argues that these discourses are also insufficient in the analysis of otherness issue that should be elaborated in a global context. To conclude, Keyman emphasizes that post-colonial discourse is very crucial to shatter Eurocentric and patriarchal structure of the theory of international relations.

Delanty contributes to Orientalism, Self, Other argument in his study *Inventing Europe*. He contends that the idea of Europe found its most permanent expression in its encounter with the Orient in the era of imperialism. European identity was shaped with encounters with other civilizations. Self and Other, Europe and Orient were opposite poles in a system of Europe's civilizational values. In the confrontation with the non-European world, the idea of Europe served as a cultural model which constituted the universally valid European notion of civilization, modernity based on a racial myth. One-dimensional vision of the Orient was created to secure this universalizing and unifying world view of Europe. Delanty argues that since no cultural sphere is universalisable, Europe cannot claim validity. The idea of Europe is not a normative model but an invasion of moral space.<sup>69</sup>

Orient was constructed as the despotic and exotic love-object of the West, served to define the West as a civilized conqueror. The Orient existed to be watched, not for the intellect and so it was perceived as static while the West was dynamic and forward-looking. It was a source of fascination and horror; it was beautiful and cruel; it was an object to be possessed and at the same time to be despised; it was the desired other. In the Oriental and Occidental representations the myth of oriental powerlessness was confronted by western mastery and

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<sup>69</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe, Idea, Identity, Reality*, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1995, p. 84-85

rationalism. Europe was progressive and rational, whereas Orient was stagnant, in decay, and irrational. The Orient was invented in these dichotomies and it was a means for the West to found its own identity.

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Helvacioğlu draws attention on the discrepancy between geographical territory and the cultural heritage of Europe and she offers two explanations to the paradoxical constitution of Europe. Firstly historical developments (such as the Reformation and Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the development of class societies, etc.) are a product of cross-fertilization with other cultures. This interpretation applies to the period in the eighteenth century when colonialism has just started and in this context cross-fertilization implies that there are several entry points to the geographical and cultural formation of Europe and European heritage is a product of many non-European influences. The second point is that self identification of Europe has always required another entity, defined as non-European. Scholars critical of the Eurocentricism argue that self-constitution of Europe was made possible with constructing the 'other' which is inferior to Europe. Starting with Said's work on Orientalism the cross-fertilization of Europe has been investigated within the contexts of slavery, colonialism, and encounters with Islam, Arabs and Turks. In each of these encounters the geographical boundaries of Europe shifted in accordance with the boundary drawn to externalize the other. <sup>71</sup>

In each dualistic category that is used to define Europe, there is the primordial act of possessing something positive such as civilization, the aesthetic beauty in Greek form, the law in Roman times, Reason in Enlightenment, civil society, bourgeois culture, individual rights in liberalism, which non-Europe does not have. "Perhaps what explains the

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p., 88-89

<sup>71</sup> Helvacioğlu, B. "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", *European Legacy*, Vol. 4, No.3, 1999, p. 22

long-standing hegemonic power of European cultural values is this hegemonic power of European cultural values is this positive connotation of European heritage which has been inherited by social formations that came in contact first with colonial powers in the eighteenth century, then by European diplomatic, military and industrial cadre in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries"<sup>72</sup>

About the formation of European identity and its relation with the Orient, Helvacioğlu argues that the cultural conduct of Europe first emerged within the Carolingian narrative of poetry which was replaced by the political narrative of Christianity. With the enlightenment there was a return to secular cultural emblem. Nonetheless despite these changes in the self-identification of Europe the internal contradictions of the cultural construct of Christian Europe have survived until today. She adds that the notion of Christian Europe still demarcates a geographical boundary between the Occident and the Orient; Orient referring to non-Christian, non-European territories. <sup>73</sup>

To sum up, since Edward Said's revolutionary work on Orientalism, anti-orientalist discourse has some core arguments. Firstly it is widely accepted in this discourse that Orient and Orientalism are man-made and they are constructed by the west in a hegemonic relationship. This relationship establishes a dichotomy between the west and the Orient in which west is accepted as rational, civilized, progressive and humane, whereas Orient is irrational, despotic, stagnant and inhumane. This dichotomy is not only a result of othering of the non-western world but also a major factor in the formation of western identity. In other words western identity is a consequence of encounter with and othering of the non-western world. Western perception of the Orient and its reflections on core-periphery relations can be observed in Turkish-European relations during eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty first

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 23

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p.20

centuries. The next chapter attempts to highlight orientalist influences in the period between eighteenth and twentieth centuries.



## CHAPTER III

### TURKISH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

From its emergence as a power in the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire expanded at the expense of Europe. Until the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire occupied and controlled up to one third of Europe. Therefore it is no surprise that Turk was perceived as a threat. The Turk was otherized and described in negative terms. The Medieval Crusades had led to an increasing solidarity of Christendom against the 'other' and the Crusade against the other promoted solidarity among the members of Christendom. The Saracen was the first and foremost a religious other and the presence of an other that could be characterized as evil continued to unify and strengthen Christendom in the early fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Following the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and its increasing pressure on Christians the 'Saracen', as the principle other was replaced with the 'Ottoman Turk'.<sup>74</sup> According to Europeans Muslims were not trustable, they were violent and they were closed to new ideas. Turk was described pejoratively. They were the terror of the world, incapable of feeling friendship to a Christian, they were barbarians, worse than savages and were only destructive forces. All these characteristics affirmed the Europeans and their identification.<sup>75</sup>

The relations between Turks and Europeans from the sixteenth century onwards corresponded to a period of European imperialist expansion and a period in which Orientalism was transformed into an imperial

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<sup>74</sup> Neumann, I, *Uses of the Other: The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 43

<sup>75</sup> Yurdusev, Nuri, "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)-European Relations" in Tariq İsmail and Mustafa Aydın (ed.) *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, Ashgate, New York, 2002, pp. 84-85

institution. The decline of Ottoman Empire had begun in the late seventeenth century and the following years the Ottomans had major reform attempts for modernization and Westernization. As the Orientalist attitudes of European states became institutionalized, Ottomans as the major representative of the Orient, the most significant other of Europe was approaching to the West. Approaching to the West meant distancing from the inferior status of being the other and also politically it meant strengthening the empire by following the stronger imperialist states.

From the fifteenth century till the end of the seventeenth century, Ottoman Empire was a significant player in the European balance of power system, played an important role in maintaining the system and in the rise of nation states. Another important role of Ottoman Empire is that it paradoxically reinforced a European sense of unity. The existence of Ottoman Empire was influential in the continuation of medieval universalism.<sup>76</sup> In other words, othering of Turks not only became the motive of uniting for the Europeans but also was influential in formation of nation states under the principle of universalism.

The Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) was a turning point in Turco- European relations as it confirmed Europe's military superiority over the Ottoman Empire and signaled Ottoman retreat from Central Europe. It was also the first instance in which "the Turk" was invited to participate in a European Congress. Moreover the Ottoman Empire acknowledged the formal existence of non-Muslim states for the first time.<sup>77</sup> The treaties with European states before the Treaty of Carlowitz was unilateral, they were mostly in form of conventions, the commitments were one sided. Mutual agreements with Europe began with this treaty; Ottoman state for the first time made an agreement with non-Muslims according to norms of the international law. These norms of international law date

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p. 86

<sup>77</sup> Neumann, I. *ibid.*, p. 51

back to Peace of Westphalia that ended Thirty Years' War in 1648 which was not only a treaty of peace but determination of diplomatic rules. In 1699, Ottoman Empire accepted the essentials of international diplomacy and representation that was determined in Peace of Westphalia. Foreign ambassadors were given diplomatic exemptions, they were also exempted from certain taxes, and the empire had the responsibility to show respect to ambassadors. Diplomatic principles of Westphalia were perpetuated with Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718.<sup>78</sup> As its military force weakened, Ottoman Empire had to approach to European rules of diplomacy, it opened its doors to foreign ambassadors in many respects, and it led its 'other' in. This gave way to the beginnings of closer observation of the Orient by the west.

However 'the Turk' as a cultural threat continued to exist even after military defeat. As European expansion took the form of colonialism, expansion into the Ottoman Empire was regarded as continuation of Crusades. It is interesting to note that the terms describing the Turk changed. Religious notions such as 'infidel' or 'non-believer' were replaced with 'barbarian'. This indicated that civilization which was defined as humanity, law and social mores started to gradually replace religion as differentiating factor in Europe. 14 years after the Treaty of Carlowitz, with the Treaties of Utrecht, the term *Respublica Christiana* was no longer used in European diplomatic treaties. The religious other was replaced by the Orient as the other. Now one dogma of Orientalism, west being rational, developed, superior and civilized and Orient being barbaric, was realized. This barbarian other was a very influential factor in justification of European unity. Many scholars of international relations, until the French revolutionary wars, base their arguments on European unity on the idea of a common front against the Ottomans.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Ortaylı, İ., *Avrupa ve Biz (Europe and Us)*, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2007, pp. 39-41

<sup>79</sup> Yurdusev, N., *ibid.* p. 87

Eighteenth century witnessed the deepening of European sense of identity and superiority. In addition to this the eighteenth and nineteenth century publicists subordinated the logic of *raison d'état* to the common ground of culture in describing European components. Neumann refers to Edmund Burke<sup>80</sup> who elaborated on 'Commonwealth of Europe' by marking the similitude throughout Europe: monarchical principle of government, the Christian religion, the Roman law heritage, old Germanic customs and feudal institutions. An important aim of this definition of the Commonwealth of Europe was to distinguish it from the Ottoman Empire.

The fading away of the concept of Christendom in the West was the result of many things: the rise of the sovereign state, the expansion across the oceans, the beginnings of modern natural science, the waning of the Turkish threat, but perhaps above all the reaction of thinking men and women against the devastation caused by religious wars and persecutions. Increasingly, those persons in the international intellectual elite who sought a focus for a loyalty higher than their immediate sovereign, found it in the secular concept of Europe. To some extent not only independent intellectuals but ruling princes accepted the idea too. The civilization of the eighteenth century Europe, as displayed by the courts of European sovereigns and the wider world of professions connected with or dependent on them, revealed a growing uniformity.<sup>81</sup>

Despite the arguments that there was no room for the Turk in Europe, Ottoman Empire continued to be a player in Europe. During the eighteenth century Britain and France maintained diplomats in Constantinople to serve their campaign of military and commercial expansion. Moreover, the defeats in 1768-74 and 1787-92 revealed to the Ottomans that they were no longer able to defend themselves

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<sup>80</sup> Neumann, p. *ibid.* p.53

<sup>81</sup> Seton-Watson, H. "Thoughts on the Concept of West and East in Europe", *Government and Opposition*, Volume 20, Issue 2, p. 160

without European allies.<sup>82</sup> Channels of communication between Europe and Ottomans were opened up during the reign of Ottoman Empire Selim III who acceded to the throne in 1789. Even before his accession, he was interested in the world outside the palace and in Europe. Louis XVI of France was his role model and he had gathered around him a circle of friends and servants who were also interested in European things. When he acceded to the throne, he appointed these people to positions of high influence. After concluding peace with Russia, he launched the programme of reforms which was called *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order), which aimed to give strength to the central state organization. The distinctive characteristic of this reform attempt from traditional attempts since time of Köprülü vezirs on the one hand and the nineteenth century Tanzimat on the other is the extent to which Selim III was ready to accept European practices and advices. The channels of communication with Europe were established in two fields. Selim III created opportunities for the flow of Western ideas into the Empire. The European, mainly French, instructors in army corps was one channel of communication. Their students learned French and started discussions with their foreign instructors on various new ideas. These foreigners had much more freedom than their predecessors. They socialized with leading members of Christian communities and with members of Ottoman ruling class. The second channel of communication was Ottoman embassies in Europe. Selim III for the first time established permanent Ottoman embassies in London (1793), Vienna (1794), Berlin (1795) and Paris (1796) where later reformers had their first experience in Europe.<sup>83</sup> Before, missions were sent abroad for specific purposes and temporarily. The absence of permanent embassies reflected a basic assumption of superiority.<sup>84</sup> Embassies as a channel of communication did not work the other way around. Foreign embassies in Constantinople were fairly useful in introducing Ottoman Empire to

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<sup>82</sup> Neumann, *ibid.* p. 53

<sup>83</sup> Zürcher, E. J. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi (Turkey A Modern History)*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2005, p.21-23

<sup>84</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid*

Europe. One anecdote of Cevdet Pasha upholds this view. In 1866, the Ottoman statesman Cevdet Pasha and the French ambassador Moustier had a long discussion on the nature of the Ottoman Empire during a voyage from France to Constantinople. The ambassador complimented Cevdet Pasha by saying that never in all his years of residence in Constantinople had he ever had access to such thorough information on the empire. Recounting the incident in his memoirs, Cevdet Pasha comments on how limited the foreigner's knowledge of the Ottoman Empire is:

*I told (the ambassador):*

*Your residence in the Ottoman Empire was in the European quarter. There, you could not even learn about the affairs of Constantinople, let alone the nature of the Ottoman lands. The European quarter is an interval between Europe and the Ottoman lands. From there, you see Constantinople through a telescope; but all the telescopes you use are crooked.*

This cynical comment on the European quarter embraces a deep-seated criticism of the level of Western knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. Just as European social theorists based their interpretation of the East on inadequate evidence, even Westerners residing in the empire itself hardly grasped the nature of the Ottoman empire.<sup>85</sup> This verifies another dogma of Orientalism that is abstractions about the Orient are not based on the direct evidence; even if the ambassador had the chance to acquire deeper knowledge about the Ottomans, he did not use it. It can be argued that abstractions about the Orient derived from the texts about classical Oriental civilization were preferable.

Ortaylı underlines another interesting fact about ambassadors in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire opened its lands to foreign diplomats, merchants and missionaries with the Treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz. The diplomats displayed activities not only in the capital but also in other provinces through consulates. One important feature of

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<sup>85</sup> Gocek, F. M. *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire : Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1996, p.20.

these diplomats was their large group of interpreters, who were selected mostly among local Greeks, Armenians or Jews. By favoring these interpreters, they formed a privileged class of people who had tax exemption and other freedoms accorded to diplomats. For a consulate which needed only one interpreter, there were ten to nineteen interpreters under the protection of diplomats.<sup>86</sup> The privileged class actually represented the self and other distinction of diplomats; they were favored because they were not perceived as from the Orient but from the West. Even though by the eighteenth century the religion lost its significance in formation and labeling of the 'other', in this case it was the basis of differentiation since the selected interpreters were all non-Muslims.

The embassies in Ottoman Empire were not solely for diplomatic missions; the colonialist practices of several European states extended the purpose of embassies. Levant Company is a good example in this sense. The Western dominance was felt by the Ottomans not only in the battle field but also in economy as Western traders began to move into the market which they had dominated. Although the British envoy in Istanbul "was accredited by the queen, he was appointed and paid, and the embassy maintained, not by the Crown but by the Levant Company, a joint stock company established in England for the purpose of trading in the Levant." Levant Company wanted an embassy in Istanbul, even though at that period an English monarch would not take the trouble of establishing an embassy. The embassy remained to be the embassy of Levant Company until Napoleonic Wars when the Crown took it over.<sup>87</sup>

Ottoman society's encounter with the West with ambassadors, traders, travelers, missionaries have brought many novelties to Ottoman's daily lives. Westernization was influential in the society to a great extent. In

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<sup>86</sup> Ortaylı, İ. *ibid.*, p. 42

<sup>87</sup> Lewis, B., "The West and the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1997, p. 117

the eighteenth century Western goods started to spread. Firstly, rich Ottoman officials started to use Western furniture such as chests, consoles, lusters, chandeliers and tables. However they had to hide this furniture as the current Ottoman sultan was against Western way of living. As sultan's attitude changed, consumption of Western goods became a significant social issue in the eighteenth century Ottoman society. During the nineteenth century there was an increased flow of western goods into Ottoman Empire due to the advent of steamships. Domestic goods were gradually replaced by Western ones, firstly in port towns. Inland spread of Western goods took one century.<sup>88</sup>

Western manners also started to spread in Ottoman society. It is difficult to elaborate on the net effect of these manners since there is limited historical information. The following account from an Ottoman newspaper in 1869 demonstrates complaints about these manners:

*Most elite families have left the purity, honor, manners, and modesty of Islam. (The women) almost abandoned their dustcoats (ferace) and veils (yaşmak); women's petticoat (fistan) have replaced the loose robe (entari). It has become good breeding for women to peddle refinement with a few French words such as "bonjour, monsieur, merci," and to dance arm in arm with Europeans in (the foreign quarter of) Beyoglu, skimpily dressed. It has become gracious for women to engage in all kinds of such disgraceful behavior. . . . And these "alia franga" manners have infected the entire society, from individuals to their families and household members. (This new state of affairs) has driven many decent and honorable families to disarray<sup>89</sup>*

This kind of reaction shows the internal frictions over Western practices. Western forms emerged in Constantinople and reproduced themselves throughout the capital and provinces. Foreign residents, minorities and Ottoman embassies started to use Western goods, and then sultan and his household started to consume and reproduce them. Western art and

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<sup>88</sup> Göcek, F. *ibid.* p. 40

<sup>89</sup> Sungu quoted in Göcek F., *ibid.* p. 42



architecture were also first adopted in the capital and then spread to provinces.<sup>90</sup>

Through interaction with Western goods and institutions, gradually Western ideas entered into Ottoman society. As Enver Paşa put it in his letter to a lady friend in Europe in 1911:

*C'est un poison votre civilisation, mais c'est un poison qui reveille et on ne veut, on ne peut plus dormir. On sent que si on refermait les yeux, ce serait pour mourir.*<sup>91</sup>

*(Your civilization, it is a poison, but it is a poison that wakes one up and one cannot, one does not want to sleep anymore. One feels that if one were to close one's eyes, it would be in order to die.)*

One crucial concept among Western ideas that spread through newspapers and voluntary associations was "civilization". The concept of civilization resulted in a reassessment of the Ottoman society. As Ottomans compared themselves with the West, distinct visions formed about how Ottoman society ought to be. Moreover an increased number of social groups had the access to material that escaped sultan's control. Even one group of people escaped to Europe to live as political exiles. Cultural capital of some officials and merchant capital of minority merchants created a new social environment. Ottoman intellectuals were born in this environment. They worked for the new journals and newspapers, wrote novels, taught at the Western-style schools. Their knowledge and skills supplied their livelihood to a great extent unlike the previous intellectuals who were entirely dependent on Sultan. Therefore they could envision a society that was not centered on Sultan. The Ottoman civil society which complemented their vision emerged with Western-style schools, new professional and social organizations, secret societies, reading rooms and libraries with Western and Ottoman books and periodicals. New ideas survived and circulated through newly emerging newspapers and voluntary associations.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Göcek, F. *ibid.*, p. 43

<sup>91</sup> Enver quoted in Göcek, F., p 43

<sup>92</sup> Göcek, F. *ibid.*, pp.117-118

Formation of Western ideas about civilization was a very significant development in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century Ottoman society. Even though there was no clear definition of the term civilization, it was very effective on the Ottoman social structure. Diverse and incompatible interpretation of civilization led to higher social expectations. The ultimate meaning of the term 'civilization' (medeniyet) for the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century was stated by an Ottoman palace chronicle as:

*The edifice of (Western) civilization is built on two principles, one material and the other moral. The moral principle is devoutness. . . . The material principle comprises the rescue from idleness of the populace by the farmers, merchants and artisans, and the re-strengthening of the principles that justify the production of wealth and discipline.*<sup>93</sup>

Göcek finds this definition vague saying that it can be used to define civilization, capitalism, and/ or industrialization, all the Western historical processes that came to the Ottoman Empire simultaneously as one undifferentiated whole. She adds that the combination of these processes affected the Ottoman social structure in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To put it differently, "the origins of the twentieth-century social change can be traced to this historical conjunction of capitalism, democracy, and industrialization, which affected all spheres of life, from the personal and communal to the national, from the family and workplace to the public sphere."<sup>94</sup>

In the eighteenth and nineteenth century Ottoman society the spread of western values, ideas and life-style could be observed together with acceptance of the superiority of western civilization. It is the period in which Orientalism was institutionalized in the west and it could sneak into Ottoman society with western goods, habits, ideas and with the notion of 'medeniyet'. The newly westernizing social environment was

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<sup>93</sup> Ahmed Lütfi, quoted in Göcek F., *ibid.* p. 117

<sup>94</sup> Göcek, F. *ibid.*, p. 118

also the signifier of institutionalized Orientalism and the western hegemony that was being established with colonialism.

How Europeans perceived Ottomans during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries vary considerably. One example is the 'Painting of Nations' in the eighteenth century that is currently displayed in Vienna Ethnographic Museum. In the painting there is a Spanish, French, Gallic, German, British, Swedish, Polish, Hungarian, Russian (Moskowich) and lastly a Greek or Turkish peasant. Below the painting there is a table of description of characteristics of these nations. There are several comments worth to underline in order to understand the Turkish image in Europe in the eighteenth century. Firstly, Turks and Greeks are regarded as the same, they are not differentiated. Secondly, when comments about religion are compared, one can see that Islam and Orthodoxy are not differentiated either. Religion of the Turk is an evil and satanic belief and religion of the Russian is also close to that and interestingly this is how Western Church typically describes Orthodoxy. Especially Eastern Europeans, Russians, Turks, Greeks, Orthodox and Muslim communities are left aside, are at the end of the rating in the table and painting. Western Europe excludes these people, even during Philhellenism period of Enlightenment; Europe does not recognize Greeks as an insider. Other characteristics of the Turk or Greek are that he is intelligent, he has a pleasant country, he seems compassionate but he is evil. Unlike the Moskowich, he is not stupid at all; he will die out of fraud. The clothing of the Turk or Greek is described as feminine and weird. In the table it is written that his mood is unstable like an April weather, his science is cheap politics, he is worthless and lazy when it comes to war, he spends his time with illness and he looks like a cat.<sup>95</sup> Turks and Greeks together with Russians appear as the others of Europe, all negative and compared to other nations inferior characteristics are attributed to these people. It is needless to say that the painting is completely Eurocentric and Orientalist; Turkish and Greek

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<sup>95</sup> Ortaylı, İ., *ibid.*, p. 10-15

images carry features of exoticism in Western imagination. Feminine and weird outfit, laziness, and having a pleasant country are all adjectives that complete an Orientalist picture.

The relationship between Turks and Islam was also mentioned in academic circles in Europe in the nineteenth century. It was perceived that despotism was highly related to Islam and Turks as pragmatic Muslims represent the worst features of Oriental societies. It was declared in *National Quarterly Review* in 1876 that in Turks "indolent, self-indulgent and vicious, yet bigoted and cruel (...) we may perceive the legitimate results of the principles and religion of Mohammed."<sup>96</sup> There were also some attempts to differentiate Islam from the faults of its believers. For instance, Bosworth Smith argued that "it was unfair to judge Islam in terms of Turkish despots, maniac dervishes, and Persian libertines, as to judge Christianity in terms of Anabaptists, Pillar Saints, or Shakers."<sup>97</sup> Despite these attempts there was a strong tendency during Victorian period to blame Islam for all so-called deficiencies of Oriental societies such as; moral degradation of women, the physical and mental weaknesses of men, envy, violence and cruelty, misery of private life, continual agitations, disorder and revolutions of public life.<sup>98</sup> Islam is a level of abstraction more general than ethnic/national identities that collects the defects of the eastern others, like Christianity being the common ground of western identity. Geography becomes the highest level of abstraction when Europe is taken as the center. Therefore in every formation of the other there is firstly geographical, secondly religious and thirdly ethnic classification is made. When a European talks about a Turk firstly he thinks that Turk is eastern, Muslim and then Turk, and he firstly thinks about characteristics of the

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<sup>96</sup> Anon., quoted in Almond, P. "Western Images of Islam, 1700-1900", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 49. No. 3, p. 421

<sup>97</sup> Smith, B., quoted in Almond, P. "Western Images of Islam, 1700-1900", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 49. No. 3, p. 415

<sup>98</sup> Almond, P., *ibid.*, p. 421

East, than Islam and then other characteristics unique to Turks. So it is not surprising that sometimes all these characteristics were collected in the same pot.

As noted before, Ottoman Empire's increasing dependence on European powers as a result of its military weakness was a significant factor of European balance of power. Capitulation treaties, in which European powers obtained huge concessions and rights of immunity in change of theirs alliances, were the result of this dependence that brought along economic dependence as well.<sup>99</sup> For two centuries Ottoman's friendly relations with France was the cornerstone of Ottoman foreign policy. Selim III was in touch with the French king; and the relationship with France continued after the French revolution as well until Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt in 1798. Due to colonial and commercial rivalry between France and England, French policy aims were directed to British position in the East by turning Egypt into a French base. Ottomans attempted to ally with Britain and Russia in response to French invasion of Egypt. This alliance did not last long, by 1806 Ottomans were allied to France once more until Napoleon changed side during negotiations with Russia.<sup>100</sup> Its Tri-partite alliance with Britain and Russia against Napoleon's France was the result of Ottoman Empire's increasing reliance on Europe. Military and power political concerns about French hegemonic aims and the need to postpone Ottoman Empire's crumble were behind this alliance. The alliance crumbled when French threat ceased to exist. In the following period diplomatic arrangements shifted between Ottoman Empire and Europe aiming to ensure survival of Empire and preserve the European balance of power. In other words there was a status quo policy and the Turk was no longer perceived as the barbarian other by Europe. He was now the 'odd man out'. In European discourse the name of how to handle

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<sup>99</sup> Neumann, I. *ibid.*, p. 54

<sup>100</sup> Zürcher, E. J., *ibid.* p. 25

relations with this odd man is the 'Eastern Question'.<sup>101</sup> 'Eastern Question' was the major issue of European diplomacy in the nineteenth century. As the European powers put it, Eastern Question meant the destiny of Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, there were four states interested in the destiny of Ottoman Empire; Russia, Austria, Great Britain and France. Even though the issue was not in the agenda of Vienna Congress, Great powers were aware of it because how to share the legacy of the 'sick man of Europe' was a matter of concern.<sup>102</sup>

Within the context of Eastern question the Balkans was a region between Europe and Islamic East, represented principally by the Ottoman Empire. The eastern frontier for Europe has always changed in time and the Balkans always had an ambivalent image for Europe: while geographically they are clearly a part of Europe, politically they were close to Asia Minor. The Balkans were the dividing line of two civilizations, the point of conspiracies between Europe and Asia. In this mountainous land, three religions clashed: Sunni Islam, Roman Christianity and Christian Orthodoxy. The Balkans and the Adriatic Sea constituted Western Europe's last line of defense against the Muslim East when the Black Sea became a Turkish lake in the sixteenth century. Even in Antiquity, the Balkans was a borderland. When the Roman Empire was divided into eastern and western parts in the late fourth century, the new border went through the Balkans, dividing them into two territories. The Balkans subsequently became the dividing line- the Sava and Danube rivers becoming the northern frontiers of the rising Ottoman Empire between the Occident and the Orient. In other words, the Balkans represented the outer limits of Europe, the point that the Latin West confronted the Muslim Orient. The Ottoman advance into Europe and the European counter-offensive created an ethnic fault-line which in subsequent centuries became a frontier of civilizations. The

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<sup>101</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid.* p. 55

<sup>102</sup> Tuncer, H. *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Avrupa İlişkileri (Ottoman-European Relations in the Nineteenth Century)*, Ümit Yayıncılık, 2000, p. 27

Balkans lay at the center of this borderland. They were never fully incorporated into either of the two principal powers, the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which competed for control of the area.<sup>103</sup> Until 1919 the Balkans was a Habsburg-Ottoman frontier society, a zone of transition between two civilizations. In 2007 the dividing line was drawn again with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria and together with Greece these three countries constitute the eastern border of the EU with the Orient, with Turkey.

The nineteenth century was a period which Europe controlled world politics and the area of interest of Europe was as wide as the whole world. Due to its strategic location and closeness to Europe, it was inevitable for the Ottoman Empire to encounter European interference. In addition to this, every great power had vital advantages from Ottoman Empire. Nationalism in Balkans, weakness of Ottomans, Russia and Austria failing to reach compromise, and Britain being determined to support Ottomans were the components of what Europeans called Eastern Question in the nineteenth century. By 1871, Italy and Germany were also among the states that were interested in the destiny of Ottoman Empire. The basic principle of determining the destiny of Ottoman Empire was balance of power. None of the states was going to invade more land than the other or control more regions. Austro-Hungarian Empire supported territorial integrity of Ottoman Empire since they were both threatened by Russia. Especially in 1860s when Pan Slavism movement began, panslavists wanted collapse of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, nation-states to replace them and Russia to have hegemony in east and southeast Europe. During few years before and Crimean war, Britain was the major ally of Ottoman Empire. However after the death of Lord Palmerston, British impact on Ottomans started to decrease. From 1856 to 1871, French influences increased to a great extent. After 1860, French representatives in Constantinople had attempts to strengthen Ottoman Empire and became

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<sup>103</sup> Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), pp.49-50

effective; however the defeat of French by Prussians decreased French interest in Eastern Question. Nationalism movement spread fast to the non-Muslim communities of Ottoman Empire, which gradually lead to the collapse of the empire. For the first time in 1774, Russia was accepted as the protector of orthodox communities in Ottoman Empire with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Later on, French became the protector of Catholics, Britain and United States became the protectors of Protestants and therefore all non-Muslim communities except Jews were under safeguard of Great Powers. Capitulations were the other tools to intervene in domestic issues of Ottoman Empire. Great powers stood for the integrity of Ottoman Empire, nevertheless this integrity had to be safeguarded under their control. Britain, France, Austria and Russia were totally against and independent strong Ottoman Empire in Europe. To sum up, the Great Powers wanted a semi-autonomous Ottoman Empire to survive without harming their advantages and at the same time to prevent their enlargement at the expense of each other.<sup>104</sup>

Since the 'Eastern Question' was formulated, from the eighteenth century onwards, Turks have the fear that Europeans have intentions to destroy the unity and integrity of Turkish state. However, the solution to the problem was seen as to be part of Europe. Even though most of the nineteenth century Europeans did not regard Turks as European, due to the principle of *raison d'état* Turkey was accepted to Concert of Europe. Yurdusev argues that this was due to the policy of managing the other, just as Turkey managed Europe by introducing reforms and thus claiming to be a European state in the face of European threat.<sup>105</sup>

It should be noted that Ottoman Empire's weak position in the European political environment, its economic and military deficiencies were all supportive of orientalist dogmas. Ottoman state was in need of western

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<sup>104</sup> Tuncer, H., *ibid.*, pp.95-96

<sup>105</sup> Yurdusev, N. "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman) – European Relations", Ismail, T and Aydın, M. (eds), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Changing Role in the World Politics*, New York, Ashgate, 2002 p. 89



protection just as an Oriental society was in need of western civilization. It was a justification of European domination, colonialist and invading practices. Political developments in the next decades are based on this understanding to a great extent. Inferiority of the Turk was stated continually.

The famous term that described Ottomans in the nineteenth century emerged during the second Mohammad Ali crisis (1838). Lord Palmerston organized a collective European power to prevent collapse of the Ottoman Empire in order to avoid strengthening Russian power. "In a conversation with the British naval commander Sir Hamilton Seymour in 1853, Tsar Nicholas I could afford to allude to the Sublime Porte as a 'sick man' that Europe had 'on his hands'". The 'of Europe' was added to the term 'sick man' that vaguely offered the Turk a place among the European if only he could heal himself.<sup>106</sup> Yurdusev argues that the term justifies an assertion that "Ottoman Empire may well be considered as being of Europe to a certain extent."<sup>107</sup> However this term did not "crowd out echoes of other representations". One example is Christian legitimist campaign that was suggested by Tsar Alexander I at the Congress of Vienna. He suggested a Christian alliance, a fraternal association based on precepts of Christianity. An altered form of the text was signed by all the parties of the Congress except Great Britain, Vatican and Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, in 1836 Richard Cobden who is a British politician believed that the acceptability of the Turk as a member of European concert was doubtful. Cobden was particularly against inclusion of Turkey and exclusion of the United States in Europe's balance of power.

During the nineteenth century "the idea that international society was world wide and all inclusive lost ground... to the idea that it was a privileged association of Christian, European or civilized states." To

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<sup>106</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid.* p. 56

<sup>107</sup> Yurdusev, N., *ibid.*, p. 88

illustrate, even though Ottoman Empire was officially accepted as a member of European State System, the equality of the Turk was not admitted. International lawyers in that century perpetuated this dualism by asserting that advanced international law did not apply to territories outside Europe. They gradually developed a formal European "standard of civilization" to differentiate members of the civilized international society from the others. The common features of the 'civilized world' became apparent only when juxtaposed with the barbarous and savage worlds. These features included "long-standing European practices such as protection of basic individual rights (life, dignity, and freedom of travel, commerce and religion), an organized and efficient state bureaucracy; a fairly nondiscriminatory domestic system of courts, codes and public laws; adherence to international law and maintenance of avenues for diplomatic interchange; and conformity with accepted norms and practices such as slavery and polygamy". A natural law theorist James Lorimer states that "in case of the Turks, we have had bitter experience of consequences of extending the rights of civilization to barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind." Even the partial acceptance of the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe was early. He believed that the Turk had not yet achieved the "standard of civilization that would allow him to sustain international relations."<sup>108</sup>

The superiority of the Turk had left its place to military and economic defeat and this led to an evolution of Ottoman diplomacy and self-examination of Ottoman leaders and intellectuals. Turkish statesman initiated a policy of modernization and westernization which is still going on. From the nineteenth century onwards they were regarded as European sovereigns, to a certain extent. In this process west or Europe defined modern Turkish identity.<sup>109</sup> Europe assisted reforms in education, technology, communication, transportation, and political and

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<sup>108</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid.*, pp.56-57

<sup>109</sup> Yurdusev, N., *ibid.*, p. 88

judicial institutions. These were attempts to transform Ottomans to a secular European state. It is important to note that it was European powers themselves that demanded a continuous progress in these domestic changes.<sup>110</sup> The period from 1839 to 1876 is known in Turkish historiography as Tanzimat (reforms). On 3 November 1839, an imperial edict written by Reşit paşa who was the leading reformer and foreign minister, but promulgated in the name of the new sultan was read to an assembly of Ottoman dignitaries and foreign diplomats. It promised four basic reforms:

- The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan's subjects;
- An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax farming;
- A system of conscription for the army; and
- Equality before the law, of all subjects, whatever their religion is. (although this was formulated somewhat ambiguously in the document).

Promulgation of the edict served two purposes. Firstly it was a diplomatic move aiming to gain the support of Europe, especially Britain for solving Mehmet Ali crisis in Egypt. Secondly, it reflected concerns of the group of reformers led by Reşit Paşa. "The call for guarantees for the life, honour and property of subjects, apart from echoing classic liberal thought as understood by the Ottoman statesman who had been to Europe and knew European languages, also reflected the Ottoman bureaucrats desire to escape their valuable position as slaves of the sultan". The promise of equal rights to Ottoman Christians was meant to serve relations with Europe. Another purpose of the edict was to prevent the growth of nationalism and separatism among the Christian communities.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid.*, p. 58

<sup>111</sup> Zürcher, E. J., *ibid.*, p. 51

Ottoman reforms were introduced at the height of critical events. The new measures guaranteeing the security of life, and property and a new penal code were introduced in the 1839 Mohammed Ali Crisis over Egypt and Syria. Secondly, reaffirming privileges and immunities of non-muslim population, new principle of religious equality throughout the Empire that were features of 1856 reform edict corresponded to Treaty of Paris.<sup>112</sup> With the Treaty of Paris, Ottoman Empire was formally admitted to the 'Concert of Europe', which was the system of Great Powers of Europe since Napoleon's defeat and the Congress of Vienna. Aydin contends that it was an irony that while Ottoman Empire was more and more alienated from Europe through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was officially re-admitted to the European system at the Paris Congress in 1856.<sup>113</sup> Since Ottomans were weak in finance and military, they became object of the system, not the active participant of it. The new reform decree elaborating promises of 1839 edict was dictated by the French and British ambassadors. It coincided with the peace conference to boost Ottoman prestige. The European powers, in response to the edict stated that it removed any pretext for European intervention in relations between sultan and his subjects. However this promise was not kept.<sup>114</sup> Lastly, during another Balkan crisis that would lead to Ottoman-Russo war, the first Ottoman constitution was promulgated (December 1876). It is necessary to highlight that reform demands of European states served their own economic interests or the interests of non-Muslim communities. The second Hague Conference in 1905 demonstrated that despite these reforms Ottoman Empire was still a second-class state as the capitulations still continued to exist and prohibited Ottomans from nominating a permanent member to the Court of Arbitration. The Turk

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<sup>112</sup> Neumann, I., *ibid.* p. 58

<sup>113</sup> Aydin, M., "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's European Vocation", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.3 No.2, p. 310

<sup>114</sup> Zürcher, E. J. *ibid.* p. 54

was still culturally different, it was still the other.<sup>115</sup> The dichotomy between the world of Orient and Occident was reflected to the social status of women. Modernization efforts in Ottoman Empire had attempted to overcome this, however even in a period of a very intense Westernization, in 1910; Sultan Seniha wrote rebelliously, to one of her French friends how the West described the conditions of Turkish women. She complained that Turkish women were unknown for the West, less known than Chinese or Japanese women even though Istanbul was much closer to Europe. She claimed that in Western imagination, Turkish women were imprisoned, lived in cages, were being watched by savage black slaves, and even sometimes were put in bags and thrown to the sea; every Turkish man had a harem of 8-10 women and all the women lived as rivals to each other.<sup>116</sup>

Despite internal administrative reforms and attempts of Westernization, the empire was regarded neither European nor civilized. Great Powers justified their support for autonomy and later independence of Christian Balkan states on the ground that removing them from Ottoman rule was the best way of civilizing them. Occupation of Ottoman territory by European states had also the same justification. After the Franco-Prussian War the notion of belligerent occupation was devised by international lawyers. It meant 'a state of affairs in which a military occupant interfered as little as was compatible with military necessity in the internal affairs of the occupied country so as not to prejudice the rights of the former ruler of that territory who was regarded as remaining sovereign until a peace settlement might conclude otherwise.' It was a contract between civilized states not to unilaterally challenge each others sovereignty. This was not applicable to Ottoman territories. When the Russians were in Bulgaria in 1877, Egypt was rented to the British 1882, they administered the regions. Ottoman sultan lost his sovereignty in Bulgaria. In 1908 Austrians and in 1914 British declared

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<sup>115</sup> Neumann, I, *ibid.*, p. 59

<sup>116</sup> Göle, N., *Modern Mahrem (Modern Intimate)*, Metis, İstanbul, 2001, p. 43

their sovereignty over the territories they occupied at an end. Ottoman Empire was left outside the circle of civilization, principles of Treaty of Paris. Mazower argues that Islam was definitely an important factor in this. In 1915, in the initial draft of diplomatic protest of France and Russia on the mass murder of Ottoman Armenians, there was the statement as "crimes against Christendom". The wording changed to "crimes against humanity" only when British mentioned that they were worried over the possible impact on Indian Muslim opinion.<sup>117</sup>

The centrality of this other started to diminish as it became the sick man of Europe. Colonialism was one important factor. The Eastern question had suggested that Turkey was the East but it was discovered that there were other Easts.

There was a certain homogenization of the Ottoman Turk, meaning that there was a single image, an ideal type of the Ottoman as the other and this trend became even stranger as the Ottoman Empire gave way to Turkish nation-state<sup>118</sup> because the aims of the new Turkish state were not to create and expand an empire but to found a strong stable nation state within the boundaries of its homeland.<sup>119</sup>

Yurdusev states that with the modernization project which resulted in the Republican reforms, Turkey defined itself as part of the western civilization, which is to a great extent represented by Europe. Imperial past was rejected by Republican elite. Yet refusing to recognize the imperial past did not mean that the Turkish Republic avoided some fundamental Ottoman features. Forging of Ottoman identity with

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<sup>117</sup> Mazower, M., "An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism, and the Crisis of the mid-twentieth century", *International Affairs*, Vol.82, No. 3 p. 556

<sup>118</sup> Neumann, I. *ibid.*, p.59

<sup>119</sup> Aydın, M., "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's European Vocation", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.3 No.2, p. 309

concepts of modernization has created an 'identity problem'.<sup>120</sup> In Turkish intellectual discourse, the concepts modernization, secularization, Westernization and Europeanization shared almost the same meaning in Republican period. Turkey was Western oriented also in foreign policy and this was a natural result of Atatürk's overall embracing of the West and rejection of the East. He, as the leader of Westernization asserted at the end of War of Independence that there were many nations but only one civilization. It was necessary to be a part of that civilization for a nation to advance. He added that all the efforts were "directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore Western, government". It is important to note that he identified modernization with westernization and used them interchangeably.<sup>121</sup> As a result of this ideology, while internal reforms served the purpose of Westernization, in external relations, the Republican policy-makers have been enthusiastic about being a member of international organizations in the West or Europe. Even though imperial past was rejected by the Republican elite, this policy was indeed a continuation of the Ottoman policy towards the West. The pace of Westernization considerably increased as Turkey became member of NATO, OECD, the Council of Europe and OSCE and finally in 1963 signed an Association Agreement with the European Community.<sup>122</sup>

The politics of identity of Europeans did not surface until late 1970s. The principle of *raison d'état* replaced the policy of identity mainly due to the bipolar structure of world system during cold war years. Nevertheless the issue of identity continued to exist. Turkish administrative and intellectual elite regarded this attitude of Europe as a confirmation of Turkey's modern/European identity. For Europeans the issue of identity surfaced in late 1970s and early 1980s when the influence of Cold War began to diminish in international politics. As the borders of Europe and

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p. 309

<sup>121</sup> Aydın, M. ibid.p. 321

<sup>122</sup> Yurdusev, N. ibid., pp.88-89

its relations with the Muslim communities started to be discussed, "the old suspicions between the Europeans and the Turks have re-emerged."<sup>123</sup>

To conclude, Turks' relations with the West from the eighteenth century till 1980s have always been influenced by Orientalism. The eighteenth century was a period when Ottoman Empire started to lose military and economic power while Europe started to develop an Orientalist discourse as a product of Enlightenment. Decline of the empire made modernization and Westernization necessary and these attempts coincided with newly institutionalized Orientalism. In nineteenth and twentieth centuries, reform attempts in Ottoman Empire and Orientalist, imperialist, colonialist tendencies in Europe were highly influential in Orient-Occident relations. Even though Ottomans dominated a large portion of Europe for centuries and had struggled hard to Westernize for three centuries, it was never regarded as European. Thomas Naff calls this dilemma as "being in Europe but not of Europe".<sup>124</sup> He states that "the logical conclusion ought to be that the Ottoman Empire was, empirically, a European state, the paradox is that it was not. Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe, it cannot be said to have been of Europe" Aydın argues that throughout history, the Turks have been connected to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally.<sup>125</sup>

Orientalist influences continued to exist in the relations of Turkish Republic with European states. In the last chapter how the Turk is perceived as an Oriental subject and how Turkey-European Union

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<sup>123</sup> Yurdusev, N., *ibid*, pp. 89-90

<sup>124</sup> Naff, T., 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System' in Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 143

<sup>125</sup> Aydın, M., *ibid*. p. 309



relations conceal Orientalism in the twentieth and twenty first centuries is elaborated through examination of statements of EU statesmen and official EU documents from Turkey's application for full membership in 1987 onwards.

## CHAPTER IV

### ORIENTALISM IN EC/EU-TURKEY RELATIONS

Turkey made its first application for association agreement to EEC on 31 July 1959 and Turkey-EEC relations officially started. After four years of negotiations, on 12 September 1963 Turkey has signed Ankara Agreement. Ankara Agreement was an association agreement with EEC which formed the legal basis of relations with the EC/EU. It was based on the article 238 of Treaty of Rome. Additional Protocol was signed on 23 November 1970 to determine the process, methods, order and transitional period until signing of customs union agreement in 1995. In the first elections after military coup of 1980, Motherland Party and Turgut Özal came into power. Even though Özal was a conservative leader who had been involved in anti-EC activities since 1966, when he became the prime minister he decided to carry Turkey-EC relations to a further step which was the application for full membership on 14 April 1987. The EC was not only a market but also an establishment that put pressure on Turkey for democratization.

#### 4.1 14 April 1987, Application for Membership

Conservative rhetoric of Prime Minister Özal changed considerably with the application for membership to the EC. He related relations with the EC to modernization and principles of Atatürk. "Application for membership is part of Westernization and Turkey is definitely going to accede to the EC"<sup>126</sup> Anatolia being part of Europe, contributions of Europeans to the Turks, Westernization process in Turkey took their places in his arguments which were very much in line with Kemalism. Özal states his arguments about European identity in his petition to the

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<sup>126</sup> *Milliyet*, 12 April 1987

European Community as "Turkey is not an alien to Europe, as is the popular belief but is her alter ego, her complementary identity". He argues that Europe perceiving Turkey as a negative identity has to do with the pathology of those who believe it, it is not reality. He asserts that the problem was that in order to be strong enough self identity of Europe needs to be unique.<sup>127</sup> There were also arguments against Özal that he made the application for membership for only pragmatic reasons.<sup>128</sup>

On the same day of application Özal made a press conference in which he stated that "Turkey feels and is an integral part of Europe".<sup>129</sup> However with Turkey's application issues of Turkish identity and culture was going to be questioned in European press.

*Turkey wants to be accepted to the Community not only as it is but also in the way how it wants to be. Also it is clear that Turkey does not fit to Community standards. First of all Turks are not European. Turks are definitely a unique nation in terms of their thought, religion, culture, tradition and social life.*<sup>130</sup>

The application increased European public interest in internal affairs of Turkey; the EC and the member states were able to assert their claims on Turkish politics. It also gave political and legal-procedural justification for external-European interferences.<sup>131</sup> During 1980s the main issue of interference was human rights and democratization of Turkey; since the military coup in 1980 Turkey's record in these issues was very poor. Turkey increased the level of European pressure by claiming itself as European and by officially claiming for EC membership.

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<sup>127</sup> Robins, K., "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe", in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (eds), Sage Publications, London, 1996, p. 80

<sup>128</sup> Çalış, Ş. *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Turkey-EU Relations)*, Nobel, Ankara, 2006, p. 263

<sup>129</sup> Dağı, İ., "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: the Özal Years 1983-87", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37(1), p. 27 trans. *Başbakan Özal'ın Basın Toplantıları*, 14 April 1987, pp. 3-6

<sup>130</sup> *The Independent*, 15 April 1987

<sup>131</sup> Dağı, İ., *ibid.*, p.27

Turkey was then liable to criticism based on the European standards and with the application Turkey submitted the prospect of its aspirations to the good will of the Europeans. During the proceedings Turkey was in defense, trying to prove its good intentions by taking some steps to convince European Community about Turkey's commitment and determination to develop a Western style of political system.<sup>132</sup> Turkey's application prepared a ground for the Orientalist mechanisms work officially. In other words, Orientalism began to re-emerge in discussions about Turkey's Europeanness in terms of its level of development in politics, economy, fundamental rights and freedoms and its civilization, religion and culture.

Besides the scrutiny of human rights and democracy in Turkey identity politics began to surface in Europe; Turkey's application was also elaborated on these parameters. Edward Mortimer argued in *Financial Times* on 17 July 1987 that these differences that affected the two parties' decisions and futures could not be handled as a simple problem. Peoples of Europe thought about living in a strongly integrated society because they had a strong feeling of sharing the same culture that was rooted in a common history. However, he continued, Turkey was a different issue. Its cultural roots depended on Islamic civilization not Christianity (Roma or Enlightenment). If it was to be an EC member, probably it was going to be one of the largest states in terms of population. In this case a Europe with Turkey was going to be 'a new Europe'. He claims that the question in most of the Europeans' mind was whether this new Europe was going to be able to preserve or develop its unique identity with such a diverse and versatile structure. Some Europeans who shared similar ideas had a strong belief that they would never let Turkey dilute Europeanness of EC.<sup>133</sup>

Arguments on culture, religion and identity about Turkey's application were also voiced in European Institutions. Background Report prepared

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<sup>132</sup> Dağı, İ., *ibid.*, p.33

<sup>133</sup> *Time*, 19 October 1992, in Çalış, Ş. *ibid.* p. 269

by the Commission is a clear evidence of these arguments. In the report, it was stated

*Following World War I and Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk has made revolutionary changes in this country. He removed the political power of Islam and encouraged Western reforms. Pre eminently Turkish elite in the Western part of Turkey perceive themselves as European. However, Turkey that appears as one goes to the East, to Russian, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian borders, is different from Europe for sure. Anatolia used to be entrance gate of the East; Islam is still the popular religion and from Istanbul to Kars mosques exhibit the architecture of the East.*<sup>134</sup>

A supporting view came from a member of European Parliament who wrote "When religious and cultural differences that differentiate Turkey from all member states, come together with problems of application (economic and political problems), it becomes even more difficult to overcome the issue."<sup>135</sup> Oriental image of Turkey continues to exist in both of these statements. There is an emphasis on the East which derives from a Eurocentric attitude, when distancing Turkey from Europe. Mosques, in other words Islam is taken to be reference point as it overweighs the reforms made by Atatürk. Anatolia that neighbors Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria is part of the East and has eternal characteristics that prevent it to regard itself as European despite revolutionary changes. This view written in the Background Report is also supported by some parliamentarians as one of them does not hesitate to mention religion and culture among the issues about Turkey's application.

#### **4.2 18 December 1989, Commission's Opinion**

A working paper was prepared in the Commission before the opinion was given to the press. In the paper there were some notes about why Turkey's membership would not be beneficial for the EC. One of the reasons was Turkey's population and its growth rate. With this large

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<sup>134</sup> European Communities Commission, *Background Report*, ISEC/B9/87, 4 June 1987 in Çalış, Ş., *ibid.*, p. 271

<sup>135</sup> *The Sunday Telegraph*, 1 May 1988, in Çalış, Ş., *ibid.*, p. 272

population Turkey would occupy 20% of the European Parliament and when differences in religion, culture, history and political, cultural and administrative traditions are considered this would block policies of the Community in various fields. They opened to discussion even whether gender equality would be a problem for Turkey.<sup>136</sup> Without giving reference to secularist reforms that were completed in 1920s; religion of Turkey is presented as a determining factor which makes one think that it is a trace of Orientalist thinking. Muslim still continues to be, in Said's terms, "a native informant" of the East. In this case Islam seems to be a sufficient reference to understand Turkey.

Geoffrey Lewis, also states in his study 'Turkey's Historical and Cultural Approach to Europe' that there were people charged in effective positions of the Community who discuss issues of security and national income while at the end stating that Europe is a Christian society and there were no room for a country that is *de jure* secular but have a dominantly Muslim population.<sup>137</sup> Jacques Delors, who was the president of the Commission declared the same ideas a few times in 1989.<sup>138</sup> A former Commissioner Claude Cheysson also stated that there was no answer to the question when Turkey was going to be a member because Turkey is not/will not be ready for this due to its different cultural background.<sup>139</sup> Emphasis on the cultural background seems to stand as a factor of exclusion; a permanent differentiating feature that will always hinder Turkey's membership.

After 1989, Jaques Delors openly declared that Turkey could not join the EU because of its religion, in 1993, European social democrats advised Erdal İnönü, the then Turkish Foreign Minister, to remove the crescent from the Turkish flag, if Turks wanted to become a full member of the

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<sup>136</sup> *Agence Europe*, 2 December 1989, in Çalış, Ş., *ibid*, p. 273

<sup>137</sup> Lewis G., *quoted* in Çalış, Ş. *ibid.*, p. 274

<sup>138</sup> *Milliyet*, 29-30 September 1989

<sup>139</sup> *Hürriyet*, 28 May 1988

union.<sup>140</sup> Apart from despise and arrogance in the suggestion, there is a clear opposition to Islam and its symbols such that Islam stands as the main obstacle for Europeanness.

The Commission declared its Opinion on Turkey's Application for Membership on 20 December 1989. Orientalist tendencies were not reflected to the Opinion overtly; Turkey's progress towards modernization was not neglected and culture and religion were not mentioned. The Opinion was concluded as

*to contribute to the success of Turkey's modernization efforts, the Commission recommends that the Community propose to Turkey a series of substantial measures, which without casting doubt on its **eligibility** for membership of Community would enable both parties to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration, in accordance with the political will shown at the time of the signing of the Ankara Treaty<sup>141</sup>*

It is worth to have a closer look at the term 'eligibility'. John Redmond suggests that usage of this term was the consequence of two factors. The EC was aware of the fact that Turkish diplomacy was focused on being included to/excluded from the West in its rhetoric of Westernization.<sup>142</sup> Whether to include or exclude Turks was an issue also in the establishment of each Western institution. The term was used successfully in balancing these two concerns as it had a positive connotation for the Turkish side while maintaining the negative attitude of the EC. The Opinion created a positive atmosphere in Turkey; Turkish diplomacy and press interpreted as an acknowledgement of Turkey's Europeanness.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Çalış, Ş., Kanlı, Y., *Turkish Daily News*, 12 March 2002, "Who are the Turks for the West"

<sup>141</sup> Accessed on 5 September 2007, Commission of the European Communities, "Opinion of the Commission on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community", [http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/01/001842\\_1.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/01/001842_1.pdf), 20 December 1989

<sup>142</sup> Redmond, J., quoted in Çalış, Ş., *ibid.*, p.280

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, pp 280-282

### 4.3 6 March 1995, Customs Union

As Turkey fulfilled the requirements of the Additional Protocol a Customs Union Agreement was signed on 6 March 1995. Some Turkish intellectuals highly criticized the agreement on the ground that Turkish market became highly dependent on the EC; Turkey became subject to a trade policy that it did not have a say in decision making mechanism; the condition of Customs Union was unequally beneficial for the EC and therefore the CU agreement was a continuation of colonialist practices of the EC; it was an altered form of capitulations.<sup>144</sup> Aral criticizes the agreement pointing out that it was harmful to Turkey's balance of trade. He says "It was after all bound to be the net loser, given that it was mostly Turkey which undertook the additional duties envisaged by the customs union. The statistics have shown that Turkey's trade gap with the EU has plummeted as a result of the customs union."<sup>145</sup>

However in Turkey the agreement was presented to the public as a further step towards EC membership. A positive atmosphere was created that Turkey was soon going to accede to the EC and Turkish economy would benefit from the CU to a large extent.

On the eve of signing the Customs Union agreement, the European Parliament required the Turkish government to carry out some political reforms including constitutional amendments. Customs Union was not solely a trade agreement for EU either, it was going to be used as a tool to interrupt domestic affairs of Turkey by claiming that it is a step that needs to be taken for membership. As a response to this Süleyman Demirel argued that "the conditions required by the European Parliament create an image as if Turkey is not wanted in Europe. If the excuse is because the Turkish people are Muslim, then this does not fit

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<sup>144</sup> See Manisalı, E. *İçyüzü ve Perde Arkasıyla Avrupa Çıkmazı (European Deadlock with Its Inside Story and Backstage)*, Otopsi, 2005

<sup>145</sup> Aral, B., "Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish- European Union Relations", *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, Vol.7 No.1, p. 104.



well with the idea of Europe and with today's understanding of humanity".<sup>146</sup>

Some statements in the press release made by the Commission titled 'Enlargement: Questions and Answers' reveal the EU approach to CU Agreement with Turkey. After stating that Turkey-EU relations operate in the framework of the 1964 Ankara Agreement which established an association between two parties, it is added that the EU had fundamental interest in intensifying relations with Turkey and helping it complete the political and economic modernization process. It is claimed that customs union decision which came into effect on 1 January 1996 gave a major boost to this process.<sup>147</sup> Customs union decision is claimed to be an instrument of political and economic modernization in which the EU has a fundamental interest. Why is customs union, which is mainly about abolishment of trade barriers presented as an instrument that increases the pace of political modernization? And why does EU have fundamental interests in helping Turkey to modernize? And lastly, why does modernization mean to be able to establish intense relations with the EU?

On the day the agreement was signed, in her trip to Brussels Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller said it was the happiest day of her life because Turkey had took its place in Europe after waiting for 30 years. She believed that this agreement meant integration with Europe and it was a symbol of determination in modernization of Atatürk's Turkey.<sup>148</sup> However Çiller's belief in customs union as a step towards membership was shared by no one from the EU. A German member of EP Claudia Roth pointed out this misperception by saying that "Nobody in the EU

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<sup>146</sup> Interview with Süleyman Demirel, Yeni Yüzyıl, 22 May 1995.

<sup>147</sup> Accessed on 10 June 2007, European Union Press Releases, "Enlargement: Questions and Answers", <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/96/78&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, 30 July 1996

<sup>148</sup> Newspot, 10 March 1995 in Çalış, Ş. p.322

have seen Customs Union as a tool; nobody said he perceived CU like this. This is how you perceived it or this is how CU was marketed in Turkish public opinion.”<sup>149</sup> To sum up, for the EU Customs Union was definitely not a cornerstone in Turkey’s road to membership but it was a tool for Turkey’s political and economic modernization. As a matter of fact, a year before this remark, Roth had denounced that majority of the countries who seemed to support CU agreement with Turkey did not support Turkey’s accession to the EU. She stated that the real reason behind this attitude was not human rights violations or anything else but Turkey being an Islamic country. She said that those people regard the EU as a Christian union. One of the people who openly declare that he did not want Turkey’s membership was Helmut Kohl’s representative Mr. Schauble. According to Roth, the dominant view among those people was to give a little bit of Customs Union and then to give no other rights.<sup>150</sup> It is not irrelevant to argue that this approach is no different than colonialism. Customs union agreement led to serious discussions in Turkey that Turkey could not benefit from customs union; on the contrary Turkish economy had to bear a loss each year. Greek veto on the financial aid that was promised in the CU decision made it even more difficult to handle the conditions of the agreement. Customs union with Turkey conceals an asymmetrical power relation between Turkey and EU in the field of economy since Turkey is subject to an agreement in which it has no place in the decision making system and costs and benefits of the agreement are hotly debated on Turkey’s side whereas the agreement hardly bears a cost for the EU.

#### **4.4 12-13 December 1997, Luxembourg Summit**

Two years later, Luxembourg Summit was a cold shower on Turkey’s hopes for candidacy. The signs of the Luxembourg Summit decisions were given eight months before the summit. On March 4, 1997, at a

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<sup>149</sup> *Milyet*, 10 December 1996, *Çalış*, Ş. p. 325

<sup>150</sup> *Milliyet*, 6 December 1995, *Çalış*, Ş. p. 338

meeting of European People's Party, in Brussels, the representatives of Christian Democratic Party from six countries led by Helmut Kohl declared that "the EU is a civilization process and within this civilization process, Turkey has no place". In this statement it seems that the handicap to Turkey's accession to the EU is not the formally cited reasons such as human rights, democracy and economics but the perception of the Turk as an alien. Turkish identity remained to be a crucial element in Turkey's exclusion from the EU. In this meeting it was indeed claimed that there is an uncivilized component in Turkish identity that made it impossible to be an EU member. CDU parliamentary party leader Wolfgang Schauble also announced that "Turkish membership in the EU might be too much for Europe and Turkey's membership could endanger the identity and political workability of the EU."<sup>151</sup> A prominent member Wilfried Martens, was widely quoted as saying, "The European Union is in the process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place".<sup>152</sup> Former Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans who attended the same meeting stated that the attitude of Helmut Kohl was too harsh but the differences in civilization between EU and Turkey were discussed among Christian Democrats and none of them agreed to include Turkey to the list of candidates of EU membership.<sup>153</sup>

Bilgin points out the civilizational geopolitics of European Union in its relations with the Mediterranean, particularly with Turkey. Civilizational geopolitics was identified by John Agnew and it suggests that different parts of the world are categorized in people's minds according to the

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<sup>151</sup> Minutes of European People's Party meeting, Val Duchesse, March 4, 1997 in Müftüler-Bac, M. "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No 1, 2000, p. 30

<sup>152</sup> Accessed on 3 March 2007, The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, "Time to Take Turkey into Europe" <http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/power/1997/pow14-5.html> May 14, 1997

<sup>153</sup> Accessed on 5 July 2007, Milliyet, "AB'den Medeniyet Farkı Gerekçesi" (Civilizational Difference Justification from the EU), <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/03/06/dunya/medeniyet.html>, 6 March 1997

civilization to which people that inhabited that region were perceived to belong. Agnew argues that during the Cold War, world was divided according to ideological geopolitics in which countries were classified according to ideological leanings of their governments. After the Cold War ideological geopolitics was replaced with civilizational discourse.<sup>154</sup> The views of Christian Democrats quoted above support this argument. During the 90s there was a continued emphasis on civilizational differences between Europe and Turkey.

In the Luxembourg Summit, the European Council decided to start accession process with ten Central and East European countries and Cyprus; and by confirming its eligibility for accession 'European Strategy for Turkey' was declared in the conclusions "to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the EU".<sup>155</sup> The decision not to include Turkey among these applicants created question marks about EU's objectivity. Meltem Müftüler-Bac argues that perception of the Turk as culturally different affects how the Commission perceives democracy in Turkey. Turkey was ahead of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in economy, politics and adoption of the *acquis*.<sup>156</sup> The political and economic reasons were put forward for not giving Turkey candidacy. It was not explicitly put forward but the cultural reasons were playing an important role in this decision. The religious reason had been declared by the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo when he delivered a speech to European Parliament on behalf of Dutch Presidency of the EU on 15 January 1997. He said that it was "time to be honest" and admit that the problem about Turkey's membership to the EU was also about

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<sup>154</sup> Bilgin, P., 'A Return to Civilizational Geopolitics in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in Post Cold War Era', *Geopolitics*, Vol.4, No.2, pp. 269-270.

<sup>155</sup> Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, DOC/97/24 Date: 14/12/1997

<sup>156</sup> Müftüler-Bac, M. 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Turkish Studies*, 1:1, Spring 2000, p. 24

admitting a large Muslim country.<sup>157</sup> Remarks of Ambassador Onur Öymen, Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in 1997 explained Turkey's concern about the decision as iron curtain that once divided Europe was being replaced by a cultural/religious iron curtain.<sup>158</sup>

When Turkey suspended all its relations with the EU, the Europeans began to think about how to keep Turkey in the periphery of the Union. In the Helsinki Summit, EU decided offer something concrete to Turkey.

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#### **4.5 12 December 1999, Helsinki Summit**

The importance of the borders of European identity has been underlined by Nicole Fontaine, who was the EP president in 1999, at the Helsinki Summit Council.

*Turkey's accession would of course be to the Union's advantage economically and politically, but it would not be possible to evade the problem of cultural integration. It will arise, and so will the issue of what criteria to adopt to determine the limits of Europe's new borders in the face of new applications from countries to the east or south of the Union which would inevitably be encouraged by Turkey's accession. To tell the truth, Parliament is divided among this burning issue at present.*<sup>160</sup>

The borders determine where the territories of the West end and territories of the Orient begin. That is why Turkey's candidacy was much more debated than accession of other central and eastern European states.

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<sup>157</sup> Neumann, Iver, B., *ibid.*, p.62

<sup>158</sup> Accessed on 20 October 2007, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Current Challenges", <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1117>, 27 February 1997

<sup>159</sup> Genç, E., "The Role of Religious Identity in Turco-European Relations", Thesis submitted to Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, 2004, p. 107

<sup>160</sup> Müftüler-Bac, M., 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Turkish Studies*, 1:1, Spring 2000, p. 25

On 19 February 1999, in Financial Times Greek foreign minister Theodor Pangalos made remarks about Turks being allowed to “drag their bloodstained boots across the carpet in EU capitals” by labeling Turks as “bandits, murderers, rapists”.<sup>161</sup> Turks were again claimed to be barbarian after two centuries when formation of European identity and European integration gained priority, when Turks were again at the European gates.

On the other hand establishing ties with Turkey had fundamental importance and it was also beneficial for the EU as it was stated in 1996. In the Helsinki Summit Conclusions Turkey was given candidacy status with the same conditions as the other candidate countries. İsmail Cem, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, elaborates the conclusions as

*Helsinki Summit has confirmed and declared that Turkey became an EU candidate with equal conditions as other candidates. Turkey’s candidacy is not attached to any precondition or special condition. I’ve been telling from the beginning that in the case of a precondition, a special condition for Turkey, we are not in. We have explained this very well before Helsinki. With our resistance, there was no possibility for deviations. There is no particular point in Helsinki Summit decision of Turkey that is disturbing or creates hesitations.*<sup>162</sup>

From 1997 to 2002, Turkish foreign policy about the EU was based on three main principles. Consistency in policies about Middle East and Europe, explaining the EU that Turkey is European according to the official definition of EU (respect for democracy, pluralism, and human rights), and protection of national interests.<sup>163</sup> This strategy became successful in overcoming the European prejudices, the real barriers to Turkey’s accession to a certain extend.

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<sup>161</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> Cem, İ. *Avrupa’nın Birliği ve Türkiye (Europe’s Unity and Turkey)*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 198-199

<sup>163</sup> *ibid.* p. 71-73

The headline of a news about the Helsinki Summit on 13 December 1999 in Daily Mail, a British newspaper, was stating that if Turkey entered the EU, the next would be Africans. This was the President of the EP Nicole Fontain's worry. She stated that unless the borders of Europe were determined, soon North African countries would be at the door and this would lead to even greater problems. The reporter David Hughes states that Turkey is in the thirteenth place in the line of countries longing for the prosperity of Europe that they cannot even imagine in their countries. The next day the President of European Group of CDP stated that it was no harm to have different views, but a majority of their group had doubts about Turkey's candidacy because Turkey's membership would affect the economic, political and cultural quality of the EU.<sup>164</sup> The president of CDU/CSU Parliament Fraction of Germany stated that the EU had to clear the necessary criteria for preserving the European identity before taking further steps of enlargement. He also said that CDU believed that European identity and EU institutional structures needed to be strengthened and these issues had to be handled before giving hopes to Turkey that cannot be fulfilled, which was only irresponsibility.<sup>165</sup> Leader of CSU in Germany, Michael Glos shared the same concerns claiming that an EU with Turkey as a member would be a union which is completely against the ideals of its founders, that is open to any country who wishes to join.<sup>166</sup> Preservation of European identity and its relation to Turkey's membership was also in the agenda of UDF party in France that demanded a discussion on Turkey's membership in the parliament.<sup>167</sup> All these statements against Turkey's membership reflect a single concern which is defending the boundaries of European identity against the Turks who will lead to

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<sup>164</sup> 14 December 1999, Deutche Welle, in *Dış Basında Helsinki Zirvesi (5-23 Aralık 1999) (Helsinki Summit in Foreign Press, 5-23 December 1999)*, T.C. Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1999, p. 167

<sup>165</sup> 15 December 1999, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* quoted in Çalıř, ř., *ibid.*, pp.176-177

<sup>166</sup> 17 December 1999, *Frankfurter Rundschau* quoted in Çalıř, ř., *ibid.*, p.203)

<sup>167</sup> 17 December 1999, *Badische Zeitung*, quoted in Çalıř, ř., *ibid.*, p. 204

degradation in Europe once they are accepted. Turkey's membership will also mean opening the doors of the EU to the Orient, which is even scarier than accepting 70 million Muslim Turks. The statements like Fontain's, surface in every discussion on Turkey's membership to show its absurdity.

Another interesting statement was from Commissioner for Enlargement in the European Commission, Günter Verheugen in an interview he made with the German newspaper *Die Welt*. "It is not a blessing for Europe to give Turkey candidacy status; on the contrary it is a political strategy to watch our personal interests." While defending how Turkey was a European country and how she deserves to be an EU member once she fulfills the necessary conditions, he does not hesitate to declare that it was only to watch European interests.<sup>168</sup>

After Turkey was given candidacy status, as foreseen in the Helsinki European Council Conclusions, the EU Commission declared an Accession Partnership for Turkey on March 8, 2001. After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the Council, the Turkish Government announced its own National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis on March 19, 2001. Each year the Commission submits Regular Reports to the Council on the progress achieved by each country. Turkey has always been said not to have fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. In short, Turkey's inability in the realization of political and economic criteria is mentioned, without making any reference to *cultural* ones.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> 11 December 1999, *Die Welt* quoted in Çalış, Ş., *ibid.*, p. 204

<sup>169</sup> Genç, E., *ibid.*, p. 107



#### 4.6 Oppositions towards the Opening of Negotiations

Copenhagen summit on 12 December 2002 set a "date for a date" at which a decision on starting negotiations with Turkey would be made.<sup>170</sup> "If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay."<sup>171</sup> The Brussels Summit of the European Council in on 16-17 December 2004, was very important for Turkey as it laid out a timetable for the opening of negotiations with Turkey. The European Council decided depending on the Commission report and recommendation that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations. The negotiations would open on 3 October 2005.<sup>172</sup> Even though Turkey was approaching to the EU membership with these summit conclusions, the founding members of the EU were still skeptic about Turkey's membership mainly due to established orientalist attitudes towards Turkey; skepticism and oppositions were voiced even after opening of negotiations.

France is deeply divided over whether Turkey really belongs in Europe, geographically or culturally, and some MPs asked directly whether a union founded on Judeo-Christian principles could or should accept such a large Muslim nation. As one of the founding EU members, France cares deeply about its future. Already there's unease here that France is losing influence thanks to Europe's enlargement to the east. Many worry that

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<sup>170</sup> Wood, Quaisser, "Turkey's Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, 2005. p. 148

<sup>171</sup> Accessed on 7 December 2007, Council of the European Union, "Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions", [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf), 29 January 2003

<sup>172</sup> Accessed on 7 December 2007, Council of the European Union, "Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions", [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf), 1 February 2005

expanding to include Turkey as well would spell an end to any hope of deepening EU co-operation to make Europe a superpower to rival the United States. Instead, the French fear, it could end up as little more than a free trade area - not the Europe that the French elite had in mind.<sup>173</sup>

Some issues in European agenda have demonstrated how prejudices worked against Turkey's EU membership. The banning of headscarf in French public schools which was supposed to be part of French immigrant policy, not an issue related to EU enlargement was actually relevant to Turkey's accession. In 1988 when Leyla Şahin, who was a student Istanbul University medical school, was barred from attending university because of her headscarf brought the case to European Court of Human Rights. The Court came out in favor of Turkey stating that Turkey treats men and women equally and secularism is mandated in the Turkish constitution. Moreover it stated that notion of secularism in Turkey was consistent with the values of European Convention on Human Rights. On the other hand, majority of French intellectuals, feminists, politicians or simple citizens did not agree with the decision. Offenders of the headscarf in the public schools were also against Turkey's accession to the EU. A strong public opinion was being formed in France which was nationalist, secularist and feminist and in contradistinction to migrants and Turks, the Muslim 'others'.<sup>174</sup>

Referendums of European Constitution were also linked to Turkish accession in European public opinion. Nilüfer Göle summarizes French arguments for the rejection of constitution as fear and resentment against neo-liberal globalization, the enlargement of Europe, the Turkish question and Muslim migrants; they fear that they could no longer control their economic and political future. Dutch society shared the

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<sup>173</sup> Accessed on 17 May 2007, BBC, "Lively Debate on Turkey's EU Entry", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3741282.stm>, 14 October, 2004

<sup>174</sup> Göle, N., "Europe's Encounter with Islam: What Future?", *Constellations*, 13(2), 2006, p. 250.

same fear and three days after French voting they also rejected the constitution. In the Netherlands multicultural immigrant policies have failed to integrate migrant population and prejudices that were perpetuated with the assassination of Van Gogh by a Moroccan immigrant led the public opinion towards commitment to and need to defend national values on the lines of Western culture.

In Germany, some conservative newspapers which were against Turkey's accession campaigned against opening of negotiations, implying that the EU was hiding its real opinion on the issue because of fear of being labeled as exclusive and discriminating. According to a report in these papers:

*The Europeans have trapped themselves in a bizarre "obligation to reward", whereby the rewarded, Turkey, may always determine what its reward should be. Whatever it costs." The Turks should have been warned against the goal of becoming an EU member. That in forty years it was not is an "indescribable shame for the Europeans" who out of cowardice have forbidden themselves to speak. They have failed to mark their economic, political, geographic and cultural borders vis-à-vis other worlds, like the moderate Islamic or central Asian. The Europeans have never found a formula to, in their own interests, exclude others from their circle of members . . . with the induced EU entry of Turkey this powerlessness is unmasked: only those who themselves do not want to enter, will not enter the EU.*<sup>175</sup>

The statements of the report actually presents Orientalism as the ideal way of preserving Europeanness and the criticism is in fact about blurring the Eurocentric, orientalist attitude in the EU enlargement. Turkey's accession is a failure in othering, a weakness, a shame for the EU which failed to exclude its other.

German MP for the opposition CDU party Friedbert Plueger's opinion on religion and European identity and integrity reflects German Christian Democratic conceptions: "Letting Turkey in only makes sense if you are British and want an end to further integration of the European Union. In that case it is a brilliant idea. Then we are further away from a single

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<sup>175</sup> Wood and QuAisser, *ibid.*, p. 165

currency, further away from a state-like character for the union. We don't want to be a Christian club. But we want to have an identity as Europeans and, of course, to take such an enormously big country, with such enormous problems and with basically another religion - that poses problems to the coherence of the EU."<sup>176</sup> The trinity of Islam, immigration and Turkish membership were also at the core of German legislative elections in 2005. Christian Democratic movement captured attention and support with its rejection of Turkish membership in the EU. Angela Merkel's visit to the capital city of Turkey revealed that she had a very scarce knowledge about Turkey; she could not hide her ignorance when she asked where Anatolia was to the representative of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Also she did not know that all Mercedes trucks were produced in Turkey; she was surprised that Turkish workers were that qualified.<sup>177</sup> Still othering of Turkey does not base from concrete facts; prejudices based on Orientalist dogmas are preferred to direct evidence. Othering with Orientalism is so strong that it does not require any further information about the other. For instance the Turk cannot be qualified enough to produce a German industrial product. This assumption is fixed in time, developments and changing conditions in Turkey are ignored because belief in inferiority of the other, superiority of the self and western identity is perpetuated. That is why politicians who oriented their politics on security issues and against Turkish membership became more popular. German Prime Minister Angela Merkel's approach to EU-Turkey relations was summarized in her speech for the Europe Day in 2006. This approach was the most debated topic in diplomatic corps of Berlin. Firstly, CDU preserves its rejection to Turkey's EU membership and wishes a special status to be prepared for Turkey that will satisfy Turkey as well. Secondly, Christian Democrats are going to be against Turkey's accession even if Turkey fulfills all the

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<sup>176</sup> Accessed on 17 May 2007, *BBC*, "Viewpoints: Turkey's EU Hopes", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3703560.stm>, 14 December, 2004

<sup>177</sup> Accessed on 17 May 2007, *Milliyet*, "Cahilliğin Bu Kadarı" (Such and Ignorance), <http://www.milliyet.com/2004/02/19/siyaset/siy03.html>, 19 February 2004

necessary requirements. And lastly, Turkey should be told that this is a strong possibility and that Turkey should prepare herself and give up the expectations of full membership.<sup>178</sup> It was also the case in France, like Nicolas Sarkozy who was interior minister or like Phillipe de Villiers who was the owner of the slogan "*non a la turquie*". Göle argues that this political climate was due to the fact that French universalism was no longer sufficient to face the problems of globalization, immigration and multiculturalism and politics of nationalism was gaining ground in European countries in the face of Islam.<sup>179</sup>

The arguments against Turkey's membership have changed in time. In 1970s violation of human rights, the repression of Kurdish nationalism, the military influence in Turkish politics, Cyprus problem and official denial of Armenian genocide were the hot topics about Turkey. In 1990s the three main issues were disputes with Greece, Cyprus problem and issues of human rights and democracy. However the debates about Turkey did not fade out as Turkey's file became thinner or in other words when Turkey started to do her home works and became eligible for membership. When Turkey started to get closer to European democracy, different offensive arguments against Turkey's membership replaced the previous ones. One argument was about the geographical borders of Europe. Geographically and historically Turkey is accepted as part of Europe; Turkish membership represents an endless enlargement of frontiers, it is as absurd as Morocco or Russia being an EU member. There is also fear that especially after the impoverishing last enlargements Turkey will be economically a great burden for the EU. Politically Turkey will outweigh other EU members in the European Parliament; EU will have to face 70 million Muslims and be neighbors with other risky Muslim countries. When Turkish membership threatened European values, frontiers and future othering mechanism started to

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<sup>178</sup> Accessed on 17 May 2007, *Milliyet*, "Çok Önemli Bir Gezi Güme Gitti" (A Very Important Visit is Wasted), <http://www.milliyet.com/2006/05/30/yazar/zbirand.html>, 30 May 2006

<sup>179</sup> Göle, N., *ibid.*, p. 251

work again to solidify European identity. Frits Bolkestein, Dutch commissioner for the European Union argued prior to negotiations with Turkey that Turkey entering Europe would mean forgetting 1683 when the siege of Vienna was lifted and the Ottoman army was defeated. In this respect Austria's objection until the last minute to opening negotiations with Turkey is understandable, the memory of the past haunts present day EU-Turkey relations.<sup>180</sup>

Turkish Parliament has adopted many reforms for further alignment to the EU standards and values. The third reform package in August 2002 was important in the sense that it covered many problematic issues such as abolition of death penalty, the allowance of broadcasting in different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens and improved education possibilities for minority languages. The European Commission welcomed the adoption of the reform package by the Turkish Parliament as an important indicator of the determination of the majority of Turkey's political leaders towards further alignment to EU standards and values. The Turkish Parliament adopted these important decisions also in a very short period of time and with an overwhelming majority. These reforms were regarded as significant steps towards better protection of human rights and the rights of minorities in Turkey. Commissioner Günter Verheugen, responsible for EU Enlargement, said:

*I welcome the courageous decision of the Turkish Parliament. This decision would not have been possible without a clear European perspective that the EU has developed for Turkey since the European Council of Helsinki in 1999. The Turkish decision also shows that the EU is right in being firm as regards human rights and the protection of minorities. Our position starts paying off. Not to give in on these issues makes our partners better understand why we so strongly defend our values and that they are precious for us. As regards the abolition of death penalty, no doubt, Turkey is now on our side.*<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 254-255

<sup>181</sup> Accessed on 9 May 2007, European Union Press Releases, "Commission Welcomes Package of Reforms in Turkey", <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1197&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> IP/02/1197, 5 August 2002

Verheugen, is one of the EU representatives that supports Turkey's accession the most. His statements about Turkey's accession mostly support the view that Turkey is evaluated with the same objective criteria that is applied to other accession procedures. Moreover he believes that Turkey's accession will be an achievement both for Turkey and EU and he also believes in multiculturalism to be an asset. However with this statement about the reform package he also falls into the trap of Orientalism. He asserts that the EU knows that 'right' rapprochement in human rights and protection of minorities and when Turkey adopts this rapprochement, EU's position is confessed. In his another statement, he says that the arguments about the borders of Europe must be taken seriously:

*Turkey's candidature for EU membership leaves nobody indifferent. There will and should be a debate in Turkey and in the EU. There are those who are concerned about the capacity of the Union to integrate a country of the size and with the demography of Turkey. Others see the issue in terms of where the borders of the future European Union shall be or the impact of Turkey on the nature of the European integration project. We will have to take these and other concerns seriously and be prepared to discuss them.*<sup>182</sup>

Though officially EU claims no specific religious Orientation, two particular facts signal religion as an important factor to be studied in relation to the EU: firstly, religion played central role in the historical development of a cultural and political entity understood to be 'Europe', and secondly, there were increased efforts after the Maastricht Treaty to create a European identity based on Europe's historical development and cultural, social and ideological affinity between its members.<sup>183</sup> Within

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<sup>182</sup> Accessed on 10 September 2007, European Union Press Releases, "Günter Verheugen Member of the European Commission Responsible for Enlargement Turkey and the EU towards December 2004 Friends of Europe" <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/309&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, SPEECH/04/309, 17 June 2004

<sup>183</sup> Effie Fokas, "Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity", Paper presented in The Kokkalis Program on Southeast Europe, 11 February 2000, p.1., in Genç, E., "The Role of Religious Identity in Turco-European Relations", p.112

this context, on August 11, 2004 the Catholic Church's most senior theologian, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, said that there was no place for Turkey in the European Union, Turkey should not even attempt to join the European Union because it is a majority Muslim country with Muslim roots and Turkey should seek its future in an association of Muslim nations rather than try to join a European community with Christian roots. He added that Turkey could try to set up a cultural continent with neighboring Arab countries and become the leading figure of a culture with its own identity. He adds that in the course of history, Turkey has always represented a different continent, in permanent contrast to Europe. In his view, Europe should continue to debate its Christian heritage and that the EU was wrong to ignore the historical fact that its heritage was Christian.<sup>184</sup>

Another hot topic that reproduces Turkey's image of being barbarian and murderer is so-called 'Armenian genocide'.<sup>185</sup> Official recognition of planned mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in 1915 by many parliaments around the world and Turkey's unsuccessful attempts to clarify the issue with objective scientific research have made the so-called genocide a historical fact that Turkey and some subjective historians denied. A historical occasion gained official ground when on 29 May 1998 French National Assembly recognized the bill on the 1915 Armenian genocide. On 29 November 1998 Ottoman history specialist Gille Veinstein was elected as the Head of College de France Chair of Turkish History. Veinstein is known as his support to Turkish thesis on the issue and French press and many French historians highly reacted to his election.<sup>186</sup> The wave of official recognition started to spread when

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<sup>184</sup> <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ECEE591F-A4ED-46BE-8784-1459F23710E2.htm>, quoted in Genç, E., *ibid.*, p.109

<sup>185</sup> Türkkahraman, M., Şenol Çevik, D. "Normatif ve Fonksiyonel Bütünleşme Bağlamında Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye" (EU and Turkey in Context of Normative and Functional Integration), *Yeni Türkiye*, 2000/36, p. 862

<sup>186</sup> Seki, Y., *Dış Basında Ermeni Meselesi, (Armenian Issue in Foreign Press) (1999-2003)*, Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 2004 p. 27-38



on 6 March 2000 Rome City Council recognized the same bill. In the same month Swedish Parliament recognized a report covering allegations on the so-called genocide. Similar allegations were recognized by Lebanese Parliament, US House of Representatives Committee of International Relations, and Uruguay National Senate. This wave reached Turkey's EU policy when European Parliament acknowledged the proposal concerning Turkey's recognition of the Armenian genocide and included this proposal to the Progress Report. 2 days later Italian Parliament acknowledged a draft bill concerning the recognition of the Armenian genocide. In January 2001 France also accepted the same bill that was voted in November 2000. In addition to these national parliaments of Switzerland and Wales took their place among the other parliaments that recognized the 1915 Armenian genocide.<sup>187</sup> On 12 October 2006 the lower house of the French Parliament has approved a bill making it a crime to deny Armenians suffered genocide. The bill was proposed by the minority Socialists in the French Parliament. There was a presidential election next year and cynics said that the bill was actually about winning the Armenian votes in France. However cynics also say there are others whom those who put forward the want to impress: the majority of the French people who do not want Turkey joining the European Union. Indeed many French politicians agree that a mainly Muslim country has no place in the EU and this may be the motive behind the anti-Turkish bill.<sup>188</sup> Segolene Royal, who was Socialist Party's candidate in presidential elections, said the day before the bill was approved "If Turkey wants to enter EU, she should recognize Armenian Genocide". Nicholas Sarkozy, who won the elections, is known of his oppositions to Turkey's EU membership.<sup>189</sup> The

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 217-220

<sup>188</sup> Accessed on 1 July 2007, BBC, "Analysis: French Focus on Armenian Genocide", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6046352.stm>, 12 October 2006

<sup>189</sup> Accessed on 1 July 2007, BBC Turkish, "Fransa'da Ermeni Yasa Teklifi Onaylandı" (Armenian Bill is Ratified in France), [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/10/061012\\_france\\_voting.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/10/061012_france_voting.shtml), 12 October 2006

series of official recognition of so-called Armenian genocide in European Parliaments raises questions. How a theory which is in the field of historical research entered in the field of politics and gained a legal ground within ten years? Was it an opportunity in Europe to perpetuate Orientalist Turkish image as barbarian and therefore an opportunity to create a solid handicap in Turkey's accession to the EU? It is not yet an official precondition for Turkey's accession; time will show whether it is going to be. Even if Turkey will not be forced to recognize the planned mass-killing of Armenians, it can reproduce Orientalist prejudices about the Turks. Lastly, it is also clear that the genocide practiced by the Nazi Germans did not and cannot dilute Germany's Europeanness. Talal Asad argues that on the contrary, European solidarity is strengthened by internal violence. He adds that 'the myth of Europe' defines the extent of solidarity and this myth not only helps to suppress the collective memories of violence but also resurrection of those memories perpetuates that myth.<sup>190</sup>

Turkish membership triggers an anxiety of loss of European borders and identity. The question of geographical frontiers, civilizational belonging, religious differences and past memories remain as persistent obstacles and set a new agenda besides the official requirements of EU membership because identifying Europe meant and still means othering Turkey. Throughout these debates, Europe is constructed as an identity defined by shared history and common cultural values rather than as a project for the future. Göle argues that Turkish candidacy reveals the difference between Europe as a project and Europe as an identity. For the insiders of the EU there is no difference but continuity between these: the EU is the European. Secondly, encounter of the EU with Islam reveals tensions between universalism and Judeo-Christian legacy of Europe. The sincerity of European claims of universalism is tested again by Turkish membership, after the Muslim migrants. Muslims in Europe

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<sup>190</sup> Asad, T., "Muslims and European Identity" in Pagden, A. (ed), *The Idea Of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 212

imply loosening of boundaries to maintain the European civilization.<sup>191</sup> In addition to this, after the ending of bipolar power structure and communism, Islam reappeared as the other of Europe against which it can construct its identity. It is explained by Delanty that the West, being unable to invoke the threat of communism, has found a new trouble again in Islam. With Islam, as the focus of hostility, the West has simply transferred the image of totalitarianism from the communist bloc to the Muslim East. The East still remains the focus of European hostility, the only difference being that it has been pushed further southwards. One of the images, the leader of the French National Front, Le Pen, creates is a future in which the French will be forced to beg outside a mosque. This xenophobic view is constructed not only with the fear of a Muslim dominated world but an 'Islamisation of Europe', the enemy outside the gates, is capable of appealing to a deep European hostility to the East, a hostility, as it has been explained has a long history. An image of Islam is being shaped which emphasizes its cultural homogeneity and threatening otherness.<sup>192</sup>

Since its application for full membership to the EU in 1987, Turkey has been facing European dilemma about whether to accept an Oriental nation to a western club. Even though the dilemma has almost never officially stated in EU documents, it has been widely discussed by EU statesman and officials, it has been in the domestic politics of member states, it has been in the daily lives of EU citizens on the one hand and on the other hand it has been in the future prospects of Turkish Republic, it has been in the aspirations of being a westerner for the ones who are on the other side of the borders of the Orient. A close examination of EU rhetoric on Turkey's accession reveals that the dilemma is about self identification of Europe and definition of Europeanness in terms of geography, culture, religion, civilization,

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<sup>191</sup> Göle, N., *ibid.* p. 260-261

<sup>192</sup> Delanty, G., *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, MacMillan Press, London, 1995, p.150.

modernity and development all of which serve to reproduce of Orientalism.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

The starting point of this study is the proposition that other is central to identity formation. Since the encounter of Christianity with Islam, Muslims became the principle other of Christians and since the encounter of Europeans with the Turks, Turks became an other for the Europeans. Even though Europeanness and the borders of Europe have changed in time, this perception did not change. Moreover both Islam and Ottoman Empire expanded at the expense of Christianity and Europe and therefore Turks were a source of threat as well. The theoretical analysis of othering in this study attempted to provide a framework that will be a tool to understand European perception of the Turk. It can be suggested that this Eastern other served to form and affirm a Western identity through attributing negative characteristics; the Western identity is defined by encounters with its other who is a source of fear, a mystery, a fully negative version of its identity.

When the balance of power started to change on Europe's side, especially after seventeenth century, the other became the Orient. Orient meant the rest of the world, the world that was outside the borders of Europe. Increasing economic and military power of the west created an altered version of means to deal with its others. Acceptance of Western values as universal; a linear understanding of world history which suggested European to be the most civilized; economic and political control of the Orient, namely colonialism and imperialism; and institutionalization of Orientalism were among the means to strengthen Western superiority. In spite of its modernization and Westernization efforts Ottoman Empire was also subject to political and economic consequences of Western superiority and Orientalism. Establishment of Turkish Republic and its rejection of Ottoman imperial past were hardly sufficient to change European image of the Turk as the Oriental subject.

Europe had to encounter its former other the Turk again when Turkey applied for EU membership. As Yeğenoğlu suggested in her article "The Return of the Religious", Turkey's application and envisioning a Muslim country in the Union have revitalized Orientalist anxieties about Islam especially among liberals and extreme rightists in Europe. Orientalist fears about Islam merged with claiming distinctive characteristics of being European. However European heritage and core values of Europe are not completely free from religious aspects such that they leave question marks about the role of Christianity in recent attempts to form European identity.<sup>193</sup> Especially Christian Democrats and right wing governments increased in the EU and this resulted in backlashes in relations with Turkey. Concerns about religious, cultural and civilizational differences were voiced with the official requirements of the accession process. Assimilation of Turkey in the Union; keeping relations at functional level by giving a privileged partnership; sticking to "unity in diversity" slogan and accept Turkey when it fulfills the necessary official requirements and sending the Islamic world the message that there is no clash of civilizations seem like the options for the EU in this situation. Each option means giving different directions to the concept of Europeanness.

EU-Turkey relations are not merely a result of a simple stereotyping. Rather, they tend to demonstrate an epistemic and ontological violence in Europe's discourse on the East, a discourse that began to emerge with the 18<sup>th</sup> century Orientalism to a great extent. It is a holistic way of thinking that tends to neglect the peculiarities in the East, create a single image for the non-western; it is an idea that would produce knowledge about that image and then use it as an excluding mechanism. Legacy of Orientalism in the twentieth and twenty first centuries appears within this mechanism. Contentions on borders of Europe, Europe as a civilization and Europe as a cultural identity as well

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<sup>193</sup> Yeğenoğlu, M., "The Return of the Religious: Revisiting Europe and Its Islamic Others", *Culture and Religion*, Vol. 7, No. 3, November 2006, p. 247

as EU's emphasis on Turkey's Eastern characteristics can be understood in this context. Contemporary Orientalism in the EU can mostly be found in the emphasis on religious identity of the Turks contrasted with European secularism, which Delanty describes as a secular form of Christianity.<sup>194</sup> The EU redraws the frontiers of Europe in the enlargement process by deciding which of its others to include and which others to exclude; it constructs its identity by claiming a commonness with its acceptable others and by suggesting a sameness among its unacceptable others. Turkey seems to be the unacceptable since it is a Muslim country that has not experienced Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and industrialization, and therefore cannot appreciate European core values like respect for human rights and democracy. It is not only an issue of exclusion but also it is an issue of claiming universality of certain values. Derrida states that "value of universality is always linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the universal in the proper body of a singularity".<sup>195</sup> Europe inscribes an advanced point of exemplarity, the idea of an end, the idea of a completed achievement.<sup>196</sup>

Yeğenoğlu underlines Derrida's warnings that the redefinition of European identity necessitates a responsibility for the other. Such a responsibility entails recognizing the role of the other in constituting European identity.

*For Derrida, a responsible Europe must appeal both to its own heading and to the heading of the other. It is this opening, this non-exclusive move of Europe, this change of the heading, and the possibility of the experience of the other heading, the responsibility to the other which can pave the way for the birth of a different Europe. This new Europe will emerge precisely in not*

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<sup>194</sup> Delanty, G., *ibid.*, p.68

<sup>195</sup> Quoted in Nancy, J., "Introduction: For Example", in Derrida, J., *The Other Heading: Reflections of Today's Europe*, Indiana University Press: Indianapolis, 1992, p.xxvi

<sup>196</sup> Derrida, J., *The Other Heading: Reflections of Today's Europe*, Indiana University Press: Indianapolis, 1992, pp. 24-25

*closing itself off from its own identity but by advancing itself towards what it is not.*<sup>197</sup>

It is also necessary to ask whether it is impossible to think of a Muslim Turkish European. Does this question mean expanding borders of EU endlessly? Have the EU already expanded its borders with its millions of Muslim immigrant population who are EU citizens as well? Calleya draws attention to these questions. He argues that the terror attacks in London in July 2005 and the riots in France in November 2005 should be alarms for European leaders for the integration of ethnic communities to European society and convince Muslim citizens that they can be both European and Muslim. Turkish accession to the EU will support the compatibility of Europe with Islam.<sup>198</sup> It can be argued that Orientalism will no longer serve to establish and strengthen European identity because now the excluded other can turn into terror and lead to domestic and international conflicts.

In conclusion, Orientalism has been an integral part of European identity for several centuries and its dogmas served very well for strengthening Europeanness, and it is for this reason that the EU still clings to it in its relations with Turkey. However whether this philosophy is sufficient to deal with contemporary challenges of international relations such as the notion of cosmopolitan identities, and 'clash of civilizations', is the question to be answered.

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<sup>197</sup> Yeğenoğlu, M., *ibid.* pp. 257-258

<sup>198</sup> Calleya, S., "EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.2, p.45



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