

LOCAL REACTIONS TO A NATIONAL ROAD PROJECT:  
THE CASE OF BLACK SEA COASTAL ROAD PROJECT, TURKEY

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **LOCAL REACTIONS TO A NATIONAL ROAD PROJECT: THE CASE OF BLACK SEA COASTAL ROAD PROJECT, TURKEY**

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The main purpose of this study is to understand the mobilization dynamics and impacts of the environmental opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project in Turkey. The study is original in the sense that for the first time an opposition movement against a national road project was realized in Turkey. The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is one of the main infrastructure investments in Turkey. It covers a large geographical area, Eastern Black Sea Region, and some districts/provinces in the region formed an opposition movement against the project which objected to sea-filling method and destruction of coasts.

The fieldwork of the study was conducted in seven districts/provinces of Eastern Black Sea Region. They were investigated in terms of their mobilization dynamics, tactics and the outcomes of the opposition movement. The main analysis is based on an evaluative approach and qualitative research. The fieldwork of the study was conducted in the periods of March 16, 2002 to March 24, 2002 and April 13, 2006 to April 20, 2006. In-depth-interviews and focus groups with local activists are used as data collection



techniques. The seven cases-regions displayed some differences in their opposition movement in terms of the mobilization, tactics and the outcome. In the districts, most crucial for mobilization were the political party affiliation and the economic opportunity structures. The project being a part of governmental policy and the perception by the public, living in the region that the road is needed strongly affected dynamics, tactics and outcomes of the movement.

Keywords: Black Sea Coastal Road Project, environmental movements, road protests, activists, Turkey

## ÖZ

### ULUSAL BİR YOL PROJESİNE YEREL TEPKİLER: KARADENİZ SAHİL YOLU PROJESİ ÖRNEĞİ, TÜRKİYE

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Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, Türkiye’de Karadeniz Sahil Yolu Projesine karşı geliştirilen çevre hareketinin, hareketlilik dinamiklerini ve etkilerini anlamaktır. Çalışma, Türkiye’de ilk kez ulusal bir yol projesine karşı oluşan bir muhalif hareketi araştırdığı için orijinaldir. Karadeniz Sahil Yolu Projesi Türkiye’deki başlıca altyapı yatırımlarından biridir. Bütün Doğu Karadeniz bölgesini içeren geniş bir coğrafi alanı kapsamaktadır ve bölgedeki bazı il ve ilçeler projeye karşı deniz dolgusu metoduna ve sahillerin yok edilmesine itiraz eden bir muhalif hareket oluşturmuşlardır. Çalışmanın saha çalışması Doğu Karadeniz bölgesindeki yedi il ve ilçede gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu il ve ilçeler oluşturdukları muhalif hareketin, hareketlilik dinamikleri, taktikleri ve sonuçları açısından incelemiştir. Asıl analiz, değerlendirme yaklaşımı ve niteliksel araştırmaya dayalıdır. Saha çalışması 16–24 Mart 2002 ve 13–20 Nisan 2006 tarihlerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Derinlemesine görüşmeler ve odak grup toplantısı veri toplama teknikleri olarak kullanılmıştır. Çalışma yapılan yedi olay-bölge muhalif

hareketlerinin hareketlilik dinamikleri, taktik ve sonuçları açısından farklılık göstermişlerdir. İlçelerde en önemli hareketlilik faktörü politik parti bağları ve ekonomik fırsat olanaklarıdır. Projenin hükümet politikasının bir parçası olması ve bölgede yaşayan halk tarafından yolun çok önemli bir ihtiyaç olarak algılanması muhalif hareketin dinamiklerini, taktiklerini ve sonuçlarını etkilemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karadeniz Sahil Yolu Projesi, çevre hareketleri, yol protestoları, aktivistler, Türkiye

To my father

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A SEED</b>	Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment, Development
<b>ACPP</b>	Arhavi Coast Protection Platform
<b>AKP</b>	Justice and Development Party
<b>ANAP</b>	Motherland Party
<b>BSCR</b>	Black Sea Coastal Road Project
<b>CHP</b>	People Republicans Party
<b>DOKÇEP</b>	Eastern Black Sea Environment Platform
<b>DSI</b>	General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works
<b>DSP</b>	Democratic Left Party
<b>DYP</b>	True Path Party
<b>EIA</b>	Environmental Impact Assessment
<b>EMO</b>	Environmental Movement Organization
<b>ENGO</b>	Environmental Non-governmental Organization
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GDH</b>	General Directorate of Highways
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>HEP</b>	Hydraulic power plant
<b>MHP</b>	Nationalist Party
<b>NIMBY</b>	Not in my backyard
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>NPP</b>	Nuclear power plant
<b>NSMs</b>	New Social Movements
<b>ORT</b>	Ordu Radio Television
<b>TEMA</b>	The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats
<b>TENs</b>	Trans-European Transport Networks
<b>TENGO</b>	Trans-European networks and NGOs
<b>TPP</b>	Thermal power plant
<b>TÜRÇEK</b>	Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society
<b>SP</b>	Felicity Party

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, nations included massive infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, nuclear power plants into their national programs. These investments are required as the main pillars of economic development. Therefore, massive infrastructure projects have been carried out by states often without seriously taking into consideration their negative effects on the natural and social environment.

Mega projects of governments and international development agencies like the World Bank, which funded highway systems, hydroelectric projects and dams, came under attack by coalition of first world environmentalists and the communities that would be displaced and destroyed by such projects<sup>1</sup>.

At the same time period, Turkey has also applied the similar development programs. However, in countries like Turkey, the resolution of environmental problems has been especially difficult. Nevertheless, this has begun to be overcome by various environmental movements since the 1980s. Community protests have checked many state-backed construction projects such as thermal and nuclear power plants.<sup>2</sup>

In this study, the environmental opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be analyzed. The project was started to be planned in the 1985; however, its application has started in 1994. It is planned to be completed by 2007.

The originality of this study is based on the fact that for the first time in Turkey an environmental opposition movement has been formed against a road project. The anti-road protest became a major agenda of environmental movements in Europe especially in the beginnings of 1990s. However, this case is new for environmental

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<sup>1</sup> As examples can be listed: India's Chipko movement, Chico Mendes's movements in Brazil

<sup>2</sup> As examples can be listed: Aliağa-thermal plant, Yatağan-thermal plant, Akkuyu Nuclear plant

movements in Turkey. In Turkey, environmental movements formed against thermal, nuclear and lastly hydroelectric power plants. In addition, the most popular movement, *Bergama* movement, was constituted against a multinational gold mining cooperation that used cyanide. It firstly emerged as a grassroots movement limited to local protests, but in time it gained national support. It actually has turned into a nationwide protest and can be considered as a strong and sustainable environmental opposition movement, reaching a wide media attention and public support. In this thesis however, it will be dealt with the oppositional movement in form of a road protest in the Black Sea region of Turkey.

For the purpose of the study, I describe the major theoretical approaches in the field of social movements in the first chapter. In the second chapter, I describe some environmental movements and major anti-road protests in Europe. In addition, I summarize the environmental movements in Turkey on the basis of general dynamics. In the third chapter, I analyze the environmental opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project. This analysis is based on the data collected from qualitative research. In this chapter, the mobilization dynamics, tactics and outcomes of the movement are analyzed. Finally, a general evaluation of the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project is realized.

### **1.1. Research Question**

In this thesis, my aim is to describe and evaluate the mobilization dynamics and impacts of the environmental opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project in order to understand the factors underlying their formation.

By approaching from the conflict perspective, I studied the conflict between state authorities and the local public, the dominant and the subordinated groups which have clashing interests. As Buechler (2000) stated, “the regional level of sociohistorical structure is comprised of various structures of power that involve relations of exploitation, oppression, or domination among specific collectivities of people” (p.106). A dominant group, a subordinate group, and the ongoing, institutionalized relationships between them constitute the structures of power. As

Buechler (2000) clarifies, these groups have “conflicting long-term interests concerning the maintenance or the dissolution of these structures that yield privileges or deprivations, respectively” (p.106). As a conflict theorist, Dahrendorf (1959) states: “group conflicts are not the product of structurally fortuitous relations of power but come forth wherever authority is exercised” (p.166).

In the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project, the governments used their authority to implement the project without seriously consulting and trying to integrate the people who live along the route of the planned road into the decision as well as implementation processes. The local people reacted since they have been in fear of losing their natural environment. This again has been experienced as a danger for their social identity. The conflict that emerged between the national authorities and the local people led to the formation of an opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project (BSCRCP).

The BSCRCP is one of the main infrastructure investments in Turkey. It was initiated in 1994, with an original budget of about 1.5 billion USD. In spite of the objections of many local government officials, local people and non-governmental organizations, the construction of the road is still continuing. The construction works are done by private companies under the supervision of the General Directorate of Highways. It has a length of 522 km and is planned as double lane road. It is covering the whole Eastern Black Sea coast, from *Samsun* to *Sarp*.

Transport policies of Turkey are mainly based on highway transportation of which 95 per cent of the total transportation is provided. This proportion is relatively high comparing to other countries in Europe. The prevailing of highway transportation policies is a result of the process that was initiated in 1950 by Marshall Aid and its significance has continuously increased. The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is one of the powerful indicators of these policies.

Environmental movements emerged in Europe in the 1960s simultaneously with other movements such as peace movements, student movements, minority movements, women’s right movements and so on. These movements are called as

new social movements in the literature. In this study, I will be focusing on environmental movements. However, my thesis is based on a single-case study of a road protest. Therefore, I am not going to summarize all types of environmental movements but I will specifically focus on anti-road protests.

Although it is claimed that environmental movements are getting weaker due to institutionalization processes, there are lots of cases that prove that it is wrong. For example, mobilizations against new infrastructure developments such as roads, airports, high speed railways and waste treatment facilities have been effective. They even lead to the re-evaluation of policies. Especially, Britain has in recent years witnessed the surge of an environmental activism associated with the anti-roads movement. The massive road project of Tory Government in the 1990s led to emergence of road protests<sup>3</sup>, which were mainly associated with direct action tactics, on national level. Consequently, the government made reduction in its road program. At the same time period, the largest infrastructure program of the European Union, called as TENs (Trans-European Transport Networks), was started to be implied. The opposition movements against the road schemes were not delayed. The citizens of those countries, which the project covered, protested the project at the local or national level. At the international level, the protestors constituted movement networks. They continue to challenge the transport policies of EU.

Environmental movements have a recent formation in Turkey. The beginning of the environmental movements could be dated to the beginnings of 1980s. This period also signifies the modernization project of Turkey. At that time, the *Özal* governments invested high amount for the construction of new highways and communication technology. In Turkey, environmental movements realized against thermal power plants such as *Gökova*, *Aliğa*, and *Yatağan*<sup>4</sup>; anti-nuclear campaigns were organized against the *Akkuyu* nuclear power<sup>5</sup> plant; a strong movement was realized in *Bergama*<sup>6</sup> against multinational gold mining cooperation, and also an opposition movement was formed against the construction of hydroelectric power

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<sup>3</sup> See Kingsnorth, P., 2003, 2004a

<sup>4</sup> Adem, Ç., 2002

<sup>5</sup> Künar, A., 1999

<sup>6</sup> Çoban, A. 2004; Ignatow, G. 2005

plant in *Firtına* Valley. The opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project is unique in the sense that in Turkey there has never been an environmental opposition movement against a road investment. The originality of my study is based on this fact.

I am mainly interested in the dynamics and different shareholders in the oppositional movement, the tactics they used and the impact of these on the movement outcomes. Therefore, I am interested in how the local authorities, local politicians, NGOs, national authorities, media and of course the public or grass roots engaged into this oppositional movement? What role did they play? What kind of support did they receive? What role did activists play? What are the differences or similarities of the opposition movements in the seven districts/provinces of Black Sea region that were studied in terms of the dynamics, tactics and outcome of the movement? These are some of the leading questions to be answered with the help of a detailed analysis of the opposition movement in the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project.

## **1.2. Methodology**

The subject of this study is the analysis of opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project. The project covers a large area that includes 6 provinces and 63 districts of the Black Sea region. It covers an area in which 8 million people live. However, not all these provinces and districts have shown opposition against the coastal road project. The opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project emerged in different districts/provinces in different time periods. The opposition movements followed the East-West coastline and the construction order of the sections of the coastal road.

Black Sea region is a mountainous region and the mountains run parallel to the sea. The cities of the region are located on the coastline one after the other. Due to the rows of mountains, the cities of the region are placed very close to the coastline and are mainly covering the East-West coastline corridor.

The opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project has a long history. The first opposition against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project had emerged in the province *Ordu* in 1994. After that, provinces of *Giresun* and *Trabzon* followed. These provinces had started their struggle in 1997 and 1998, and followed by the districts of the province of *Rize*. In 1998, the district of *Fındıklı*, in 2002 district of *Pazar* and in 2004 district of *Ardeşen* had joined the opposition movement. At the end, in 2004 *Arhavi*, district of the province of *Artvin* located on the border of the province of *Rize*, has started to be involved in the opposition movement.

It should be noted that the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project had remained local in nature. The districts/provinces that showed resistance to the project carried out their struggle by forming their own organizations and there were not any mutual support and cooperation at all. The opposition movement was started to be transformed into a regional movement in the very last phase. Especially, the districts of *Arhavi*, *Fındıklı*, *Ardeşen* and *Pazar* began to support their movements by exchanging information, participating press releases and panels, and also by supporting their legal case. However, this tendency to become a regional movement occurred in the last instance of the opposition movement as the construction of the coastal road had been already completed.

The general objection of the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project is the construction of coastal road by sea filling technique. According to the project, the construction of road is mainly required to extract the rocks from mountains and to fill the coast and sea by them. This means the destruction of coasts and dividing the cities from the sea. The reaction of the opposition groups was against the way of construction and not the construction of a road. During their opposition movement, activists all emphasized that Black Sea region needs a road.

The focus on a case study has obvious advantages and disadvantages. An innate problem is questions of representativity and generalization. However, a case study provides also the basis for a detailed analysis of a specific case, which without doubt has to be considered as an important contribution to the general understanding. The fact that these kind of oppositional movements only recently emerged in Turkey

makes it difficult to base the analysis in wider historical frame, and there also exist no documents or data collected on a nationwide, regional or local basis which would be necessary to elaborate a sophisticated and representative sample. This case study however, constitutes the basis for an intensive analysis which might be helpful for future work in this field.

The study of the opposition movement in the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project has been carried out in two stages. The first stage is comprised of the period 1998 to 2002. The second stage had been conducted in 2006 and covers the period from 2002 to the present.

In the analysis of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project protest movement different research methods were combined. Firstly, a literature review of the existing official materials, publications of non-governmental organizations and academic literature on and related to the subject were made. In addition, local and national newspapers were checked for the period 1996 to 2006 to get an idea about the written media presentation of the project and its opposition movement.

The main analysis, however, is based on an evaluative and qualitative approach, in which it was aimed at learning about the oppositional movement through participant observation and in-depth interviews. In addition, interviews and focus groups were conducted. The interviews were basically unstructured, however, following a general question guideline. Firstly, questions were asked, like age, sex, education, profession and affiliation to the protest platform this was followed by a set of open-ended questions.

The justification for such an approach can be seen in the fact that I attempted at “making the agents” speak about their motivations, experiences, perceptions and expectations. To understand an opposition in form of a protest movement, it seems to be of great importance not only to look at macro or structural factors but also to focus on the medium and micro levels. That means, looking at so called non-governmental organizations and individual activists. Such an insider perspective can be considered as an important contribution to the understanding of Turkey-specific civic activism.



The field work of this study has been done in two periods. The initial period of fieldwork lasted from March 16, 2002 to March 24, 2002. The second period lasted from April 13, 2006 to April 20, 2006. The field works were conducted in stay in the region.

The first fieldwork was conducted in a nine day stay in the region. Preliminary interviews and e-mail contacts combined with a check of websites and printed materials pointed at two main centers of the protest platform, one located in *Giresun* the other one in *Trabzon*. Thus, it was decided to conduct a focus group (on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March 2002) in *Giresun* in which the representatives of the major non-governmental organizations participated. The participants have been all actively engaged in the Coast Protection Platform and can be listed as follows: Voluntary Representatives of *Giresun* TEMA Foundation, the Sea-Mountaineering Sport Club, the Saturday Mountaineers, the *Giresun* Architecture Chamber, the *Giresun* Rotary Club, and also the director of the local TV channel, Tempo TV participated in the focus group.

The focus group lasted for three hours; it was recorded and then later transcribed. In addition an in-depth interview was conducted with a representative of the Tourism and Advertisement Association. I also attended the meeting of the Coast Protection Platform on March 18<sup>th</sup> 2002 in *Giresun* to gain a further insight into the functioning and organization of the local protest activities.

In *Trabzon*, no focus group was conducted but a series of in-depth interviews were realized. Organizational problems, like arranging and agreeing upon a date during the field work stay also unwillingness of representatives to meet due to conflict among them, made it impossible to conduct a focus group. Therefore, known and important activists and representatives of NGOs who actively participated in the opposition movement were interviewed in detail. Among those interviewed were the director of the Black Sea Environmentalists Association, three members of the Environment and Culture Entrepreneurs Association, the director of the *Trabzon* Architecture Chamber, a member of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary

Work Group, a member of the Executive Committee of the Environment Council, the first General Secretary of the Environment Council, a member of the Construction-Road Union, and the director of the *Trabzon* TEMA Voluntary Representatives. Thus, in total ten in-depth interviews were conducted. The length of the interviews lasted from one to two and a half hours. Again, the interviews were recorded and transcribed.

The second fieldwork was realized in a seven day stay in the region. Preliminary interviews and e-mail contacts combined with a check of websites and printed materials pointed at four main centers of the protest platform including *Arhavi*, *Fındıklı*, *Pazar* and *Ardeşen*. In addition, two former centers of the protest platform, *Trabzon* and *Giresun* were revisited in the fieldwork.

Before the second fieldwork, on 1st April 2006 an interview was conducted with *Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç*, the spokesperson of *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform, in *Ankara*. By this way, some basic information about the protest movement in *Arhavi* was gained.

On 12<sup>th</sup> April 2006, I went to *Arhavi*, a district of *Artvin*. On 13<sup>th</sup> April 2006, an in-depth interview was conducted with *Musa Ulutaş*, the mayor of *Arhavi*. He is also a member of *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform. After that, I conducted a focus group in *Arhavi*. It included the members of the platform and some citizens that support them. The participants of the focus group can be listed as follows: *Arhavi* Foundation, *Arhavi* Trucking Cooperative, *Arhavi* Marksman and Sparrow Hawk Association and The True Path Party. In addition, a series of interviews were conducted with the chairmen of political parties' district organizations in *Arhavi*. The political parties that are part of the *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform are as follows: The Republican's People Party (*CHP*), The True Path Party (*DYP*), The Democratic Left Party (*DSP*) and Felicity Party (*SP*). The focus group lasted for three hours; it was recorded and then later transcribed.

On 14<sup>th</sup> April 2006, some interviews were conducted with the *Musa K. Özçiçek*, leader of opposition movement in *Fındıklı*, district of *Rize* and two of his supporters.

At the same day, an interview was conducted with *Ferhat Artan*, member of the opposition movement in *Ardeşen*, town of *Rize*. Being a lawyer predetermined him as the legal consultant of the movement.

In *Trabzon*, interviews were realized with known and important activist and representatives of NGOs who actively participated in the opposition movement were interviewed in detail. Among those interviewed were the director of the Black Sea Nature Federation, four members of the Environment and Culture Entrepreneurs Association, the ex-director of the *Trabzon* Architecture Chamber, two members of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, and the director of the *Trabzon* TEMA Voluntary Representatives. Thus, in total nine in-depth interviews were conducted. The length of the interviews lasted from one to two and a half hours. Again, the interviews were recorded and transcribed.

In *Giresun*, the previous coast protection platform broke up. Interviews were conducted with the representatives of some NGOs that struggle to reduce the negative impacts of the coastal road. Thus, interviews were made with the presidents of TÜRÇEK<sup>7</sup> *Giresun* division and *Giresun* Tourism and Advertisement Association.

After the fieldwork, a series of interviews were conducted with the activists who live in *Ankara*. For the district of *Pazar*: the presidents of *Hamidiye* Tourism and Development Association and *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association were interviewed. For the district of *Ardeşen*, the ex-president and general secretary of *Ardeşen* Culture Association were interviewed. The spokesperson of the *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform, *Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç*, provided the connection with those activists who live in *Ankara*.

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<sup>7</sup> Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the study will be clarified. This study is based on the empirical analysis of the environmental opposition movement in the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project. Therefore, the case will be analyzed in terms of the theoretical and research perspectives of the social movements.

Although the social movements have a long history, its formation as an academic field in the social sciences is relatively new. However, social movements are phenomena which penetrate the fabric of the political and social life. As Snow and his colleagues argue, “Social movements and the activities with which they are associated has become an increasingly conscious feature of the social landscape” (Snow et al., 2004: 3-4). Similarly, Diani and Della Porta state that “from the 1960s onwards, social movements, protest actions and, more generally, political organizations unaligned with major political parties or trade unions have become a permanent component of western democracies” (1999: 1). Furthermore, other scholars such as Meyer and Tarrow suggest that we live in a “movement society” and in perhaps even in a movement world (cited in Snow et al., 2004: 4).

In this chapter, first of all, the concept of social movement will be defined. Social movements are an extensive field and there are many definitions of the concept “social movement”. However, the studies have been done to constitute a common definition on which different theoretical perspectives agree. After discussing the main conceptualizations of the term, an explicit definition of ‘social movements’ will be made for the purpose of this study. Secondly, three current perspectives that dominate the analysis of social movements- resource mobilization, political process and new social movements will be examined respectively. Lastly, a general

evaluation of these perspectives and a theoretical connection with the opposition movement in the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be provided.

## **2.2. The Concept of Social Movements**

There are varieties of definitions of the concept “social movement” in the literature. However, an accurate definition had not being offered for a long time. The definitions offered were too broad or too narrow in such a manner that they either included phenomena which could not be called as social movements or excluded certain movements and the range of their forms and activities (Crossley, 2002: 2). A systematic effort to merge these distinct definitions and form an implicit and comprehensive one was carried out by Mario Diani in his study called “The Concept of Social Movement”. In his study, Diani points out to the lack of an implicit, ‘empirical’ agreement about the use of the term and adds that “social and political phenomena such as revolutions, religious sects, political organizations, single-issue campaigns are all, on occasion, defined as social movements” (1992: 2). In his endeavor to highlight the linkage between diverse intellectual traditions and to identify the common elements, Diani (1992) identified four aspects of the social movement dynamics that all these theoretical schools share a concern. These included: a) networks of informal interaction; b) shared beliefs and solidarity; c) collective action on conflictual issues; d) action which displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life.

These were the initial steps in the formulation of the definition of social movements. The final definition that I will use in this study was formulated by Diani and Della Porta (1999). According to them, four characteristic aspects of social movements constitute its definition. First of all, movements may be conceived of as informal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations. Second, to be considered a social movement, an interacting collectivity requires a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging. Third, social movement actors are engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change at either the systematic or non-systematic level. Fourth, use of public protest is a fundamental distinction of social movements (Diani and Della Porta, 1999: 14-15). Thus, Diani and Della Porta (1999: 16) consider social movements “as informal networks based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual

issues through the frequent use of various forms of protest”. As they state, “these elements enable to distinguish social movements from various forms of collective action which are more structured and which take on the form parties, interest groups or religious sects, as well as single protest events or ad hoc political coalitions”.

### **2.3. Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements**

The first systematic study of social movements dates back to the period of 1960s. As Diani states (1999: 2), the movements of 1968, the most-widespread mass mobilizations since the 1930s, raised questions on the evaluation of these movements and responses to them. The existing theoretical models of social conflict were inadequate to explain the social movements of that period. Marxist and structural-functionalist models were responded by some newly emerged theories of collective action. In America, the theories of resource mobilization and political process became dominant in explaining the social movements. In Europe, on the other hand, new social movements became the dominant paradigm. Thus a duality of traditions emerged within the field of social movements. American tradition was based on the critique of structural-functionalist theory whereas European tradition was a result of the dissatisfaction with Marxism. As Diani clarifies (1999: 2-3), these theories explored “the mechanisms which translate various types of structural tension into collective action” from different starting points. Resource mobilization approach stressed the importance of the rational and strategic components of collective behaviors. Political process approach has focused on social movements as new protagonists in the aggregation and representation of different interests. New social movements approach explored the importance of the transformations which have occurred in industrial society and their implications.

#### **2.3.1. Resource Mobilization Theory**

The main assumption of the resource mobilization approach is that “collective movements constitute an extension of the conventional forms of political action and the actors engage in this act in a rational way, following their interests”. Action is

founded on mobilization of collective resources and organizations and movement ‘entrepreneurs’ have an essential role in this process (Diani, 1999: 7).

As Eyerman and Jamison (1991) points out,

Resource mobilization theory takes its starting point for analysis in organizations and not in the individual. Thus it does not center on the question of why individuals join social movements, the rationality or irrationality of their intentions or behavior as participants, but rather on the effectiveness with which movements, that is movement organizations, use the resources in attempting to achieve their goals (p. 23).

The scholars argue that this approach does not center on the question of “why individuals join social movements, the rationality or irrationality of their intentions or behaviors as participants, but rather on the effectiveness with which movements, that is movement organizations, use the resources in attempting to achieve their goals” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 24). The prime research question of the resource mobilization theory is not who the actors are or what motivates them, or what wider historical or structural meaning a particular meaning may have, but rather why some movements are more successful than others. Success is defined as a function of how clearly organizational goals are defined and how effectively its available resources –people, material, and ideas- are put to use both in mobilizing support and in seeing to it that the established institutions take seriously the aims expressed by the movement.

According to Edwards and McCarthy (2004: 116), human time and effort along with money are the most widely appreciated kinds of resources that are more or less available to collective actors. However, they state that

The simply availability of resources is not sufficient; coordination and strategic effort is typically required in order to convert available pools of individually held resources into collective resources and to utilize those resources in collective action. When movement activists do attempt to create collective action (fielding protest, creating social movement organizations, and the like) through historical time and across geographical locations their success are consistently related to the greater presence of available resources in their broader environments (p. 116) .

McCarthy and Zald (2002: 533), the foremost theorists of this approach, argue that although resource mobilization theory was initially designed to focus on the “dynamics and trends of social movements in contemporary American society”, the theory can be applicable in social movements of any society especially industrial societies.

### **2.3.2. Political Process Theory**

Political process theory is another explanation of the collective behavior based on the rational view. As Meyer states (2004: 127), over the past three decades, the analysis of the interaction between social movement and its context is covered under the tradition of political process.

According to Meyer (2004), the primary point of the political process approach was that

activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, the political context sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others. Further, the organization of the polity and the positioning of various actors within it make some strategies of influence more attractive, and potentially efficacious, than others. The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices-their *agency*-can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which those choices are made-that is, *structure* (p. 127-128, italics in original).

Meyer (2004) clarifies that the external factors determine the social movements’

prospects for (a) mobilizing, (b) advancing particular claims rather than others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather than others, (d) employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and (e) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy (p. 126).

The factors that emerged from the world outside the social movement facilitate or barricade those dynamics of social movements.



Kitschelt (1986) explains the basic idea of the political process framework stating that “political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment” (cited in Kriesi, 2004: 69).

The key concept of the political process theory is the political opportunity structure. It was first introduced in the study of Eisinger who tried to explain “why some American cities witnessed extensive riots during the late 1960s” (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004: 1459). As Berclaz and Giugni (2005: 16) states, after this study, the concept of “political opportunity structures” was used to analyze “the impact of the political context on social movements and other forms of contentious politics”.

However, it has been interpreted differently and used in a variety of ways which is the major drawback of the political process approach. As Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) put it “the concept of political opportunity is... in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment”.

Some endeavors to specify the definition of ‘political opportunity structures’ were carried out by certain scholars. According to McAdam, the dimensions of political opportunity are as follows: “the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (cited in Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 32). This conceptualization is criticized by Goodwin and Jasper (1999: 32) as they call it the short list of ‘narrowly political factors’.

Further, as Berclaz and Giugni states (2005:17), Kriesi and his colleagues defined the concept of political opportunity structures more specifically in order to make the term more explanatory. In his effort to present a general framework of the political process approach, Kriesi, first of all, makes a differentiation between the “open and closed” structures. As Kriesi clarifies (2004: 69), open structures allow for easy access to the political system, closed structures, on the other hand, makes access more difficult.

According to Kriesi (2004: 70), the formal political institutions constitute the core of the structures. He states that

The degree of openness of the political system is a function of its (territorial) centralization and the degree of its (functional) separation of power. The greater the degree of decentralization, the wider is the formal access and the smaller the capacity of any one part of the system to act.

For him, decentralization brings about “multiplication of state actors, and therefore, of points of access and decision making”. Kriesi (2004: 70) gives examples of the federal states, such as Germany, Switzerland, or the United States, in which there are multiple of points of relevant access on the national, regional, and local level. On the other hand, in centralized states, such as those of France, the Netherlands, or Sweden, there is insignificance of regional and local access points. Kriesi (2004: 70) also adds that

the system’s openness is closely related to (functional) separation of power. The greater the separation of power between the legislature (parliamentary arena), the executive (government and public administration), and the judiciary, as well as within each one of these powers, the greater the degree of formal access and the more limited the capacity of the state to act.

As Berclaz and Giugni (2005: 17) explains, the idea that “political opportunities might be favorable or less favorable according to the issues raised by challenging groups and the issue fields (policy domains) they address” constitute the basis of the framework of Kriesi and his colleagues. According to the authors, political opportunity structures at least in part issue specific in a sense that they are not fixed and constant for all movements, and hence do not influence the whole social movements sector in the same way and to the same extent.

As Berclaz and Giugni states (2005: 17), Kriesi distinguish “between high-profile and low profile policy domains depending on how members of the polity define them on the basis of their conception of the core task and interest of the state”. The author (2004: 77) exemplifies the “high profile” domains “such as national security, energy, or immigration, while cultural policy would be an example of a “low profile” domain”. Berclaz and Giugni (2005: 17), explain that “issues addressing high-profile policy domains are more threatening for the state than issues targeting low-profile domains or issue fields”.

Berclaz and Giugni clarify (2005: 17-18) that Kriesi and his colleagues make a distinction between movements challenging high-profile policy domains and low-profile policy domains. The former pose a greater threat to the state, and hence, face rather closed political opportunity structures, whereas, the latter is less threatening for the members of the polity, and face rather opens political opportunity structures. In a similar way, political authorities display more exclusive strategies toward the former and inclusive toward the latter.

As Berclaz and Giugni (2005: 18) states Kriesi and his colleagues illustrate the antinuclear and ecology movements as examples of high profile and low-profile movements. Since the claims of the environmentalists are less threatening for the state, it covers a more moderate action repertoire than antinuclear opposition, which often challenges the core interests of the state.

Kriesi and his colleagues introduced the notion of “prevailing strategies” in their study of new social movements in Western Europe. These refer to the procedures typically employed by members of the political system when they are dealing with challengers (Kriesi, 2004: 71). They distinguish between the exclusive (repressive, confrontational, and polarizing) and integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative) strategies. According to Kriesi (2004: 71), “these prevailing strategies have a long tradition in a given country and they are related to its institutional structure. Thus, political authorities in consensus democracies are rather more likely to rely on integrative strategies than their colleagues in majoritarian democracies”.

Kriesi (2004: 72) states that the cultural models have a “facilitative or constraining effect on the mobilization of social movements and their possible success”. For him, “the prevailing strategies of how to deal with challengers” produce the first example of these models. According to Kriesi (2004), “a second major category of cultural models concerns the political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate by the audience’”

As Kriesi argues (2004), the concept of “cultural models” that he introduced only refers to “the stable elements of the cultural repertoire in a given political system that influence the elite’s and the public’s reaction to challengers” (p. 72). According to the author (2004: 72), the cultural models can be combined with the political institutional structures, both of which are influenced by the country-specific political cleavage structures and by the country’s international context. For Kriesi, this provides a more complex and more focused opportunity sets. Thus, the specific political cleavage structure of a country is rooted in the social and cultural conflict structure of its society.

Kriesi (2004: 73) states that, “traditional social and cultural cleavages constitute the basis of the political cleavage structure even today”. He argues that for the new types of challenges directed to articulate a new kind of social or cultural conflict, the space for struggle is little in the case that “traditional conflicts are still salient and segment the population into mutually conscious adversarial groups”.

Kriesi (2004: 73) believe that national political context is still the most significant level as far as the political context for the mobilization of social movements is concerned. However, he emphasize that other levels should not be ignored since the fact that nation-states are subdivided in regional and local levels of governance. Kriesi (2004) argues that “the variance of the opportunity structure between regions or member-states is of great importance above all in federal states, but the significance of the variations in local contexts for the mobilization of social movement are highly relevant everywhere” (p. 73).

### **2.3.3. New Social Movements**

In the 1960s, a wide range of movements emerged in both Europe and North America. These new forms of collective action included peace movements, student movements, environmental movements, second-wave feminism, ethnic movements, fundamentalist religious movements, sexual preference movements and so on. The term, ‘new social movements’ (NSMs) refers to these social movements and also a new theoretical perspective arouses to explain them.

Some scholars such as Crossley (2002: 149) argue that although many of these movements called as 'new' have not disappeared altogether, they are in a period of latency, and none are particularly 'new' any. Furthermore, Tarrow (1998) states that other 'even newer' social movements have emerged in more recent years, some of which are quite different in form to the NSMs (cited in Crossley, 2002: 149).

In spite of these arguments, it is widely accepted that the theoretical approach on new social movements put a different perspective on movement analysis in terms of the types of questions it involves. As Crossley (2002: 149) states, the NSMs raises issues not discussed elsewhere in the literature and opens up a further dimension of movement analysis. In addition, Pichardo (1997: 425) clarify that the principal contributions of the NSM perspective are its emphases on identity, culture, and the role of the civic sphere — aspects of social movements that had been largely overlooked.

It is stated that the central question raised in the NSMs debate is whether the social movements herald a new era in movement politics in any substantive sense and, if so, what sense exactly this is. The key figures associated with the notion of NSMs, Alain Touraine, Jurgen Habermas and Alberto Melucci, all argue that the NSMs do represent a new era. (Crossley, 2002: 150)

According to Alberto Melucci (1995), new social movements are not preoccupied with struggles over the production and distribution of material goods unlike their old counterparts. They are, on the other hand, "multi dimensional realities that affect different levels of the social system pursue diverse goals and, belong to different phases of development of a system or even to different historical systems" (Melucci, 1995: 112).

As Pichardo (1997: 411) clarifies, on the macro level, the NSM paradigm concentrates on the relationship between the rise of contemporary social movements and the larger economic structure, and on the role of culture in such movements. On the micro level, the paradigm is concerned with how issues of identity and personal

behavior are bound up in social movements. It presents a distinctive view of social movements and of the larger sociopolitical environment, of how individuals fit into, respond to, and change the system.

The NSM paradigm has different perspectives, however, a set of core concepts and beliefs can be said to comprise the NSM paradigm. Larana and his colleagues (1994) clarify the fundamental characteristics of NSMs as follows: First, new social movements transcend class structure. Second, “the ideological characteristics of NSMs stand in sharp contrast to the working-class movement and to the Marxist conception of ideology as a unifying and totalizing element for collective action” (p. 7). New social movements exhibit a pluralism of ideas and values. “Third, NSMs often involve the emergence of new or formerly weak dimensions of identity. They are associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values, and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated social group; with members’ image of themselves; and with new, socially constructed attributions about the meaning of everyday life” (p. 7). Fourth, “the relation between the individual and the collective is blurred.... many contemporary movements are “acted out” in individual actions rather than through or among mobilized groups” (p. 7). In other words, “in and through movements that have no clear class or structural base, the movement becomes the focus for the individual’s definition of himself or herself, and action within movement is a complex mix of the collective and individual confirmations of identity” (p. 8). “Fifth, NSMs often involve personal and intimate aspects of human life”. Sixth, New Social Movements’ use of radical mobilization tactics of disruption and resistance differs from those practiced by working-class movement. New social movements employ new mobilization patterns characterized by nonviolence and civil disobedience. “Seventh, the organization and proliferation of new social movement groups are related to the credibility crisis of the conventional channels for participation in Western democracies.” (p. 8) “Finally, new social movement organizations tend to be segmented, diffuse, and decentralized”. This has been called the “self-referential element” of the new movements, and it constitutes another sharp distinction with the hierarchical, centralized organization of the working-class movement” (p. 9).

As the authors clarify, “these characteristics of new social movements are not independent of links with the past. Nor is there an absence of continuity with the old, although that varies with each movement” (p. 9). According to them, however, NSMs need a revised framework of understanding since they have a new form of expression and extension (Larana, et al., 1994: 9).

## **2.4. Conclusion**

In this chapter, the main theoretical approaches in the field of social movements were presented. Each approach generally emphasizes a different aspect of the social movement. The resource mobilization approach study the internal characteristics of challenging groups and leaves the role of the challenging group’s main opponents the state, outside its analysis though the state is often involved directly or indirectly as the movement’s main antagonists. New social movements theory is useful in explaining the ideological motivations of the struggle, the role of culture and identities in the formation of these “new” social movements, one of which is environmental movements. However, this approach neglects the structural factors that shape a social movement’s internal dynamics and outcomes.

In this study, the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be analyzed. The main question of the study is to explore the mobilization dynamics and impact of the opposition movement on the project. To this end, I will use the theoretical framework of the political process approach and the toolkit it provides. The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is carried out by General Directorate of Highways, an institution of the Turkish state. For this reason, the analysis of the opposition movement against this project requires the analysis of structural factors that affect the movement’s impact. In this study, the seven case studies will be analyzed in terms of their differences and similarities on the dynamics, tactics and the outcomes of the opposition movement. The political process approach is also useful in explaining the regional or even national differences on the mobilization and impact of the social movements basing on the differences of political opportunity structures which affect those aspects of movements.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

In this chapter, the environmental movements will be analyzed. The case that was analyzed in this study is an environmental opposition movement against a road project. Therefore, first, the concept of environmental movements will be defined and some basic characteristics of them related with the subject of the study will be presented. Second, an analysis of the road protest mainly the ones in England and following in some EU countries will be done. The anti-road movements were at the apex of the agenda of European environmentalism in the 1990s. Although these movements are not as intense as they were in 1990s, anti-road movements still exist in the European countries that were covered in the scope of TENs project of EU. Finally, the environmental movements in Turkey will be presented briefly. This is crucial in order to understand the dynamics and impacts of the environmental movements in the national political context of Turkey.

#### **3.2. Environmental Movements**

As Rootes claims (1999: 1), “of all the new social movements which emerged in the late 1960s, it is environmental movements which have had most enduring influence on politics and which have undergone the most wide ranging institutionalization in terms of both of the professionalisation of their activities and of the regularization of their access to policy-makers”. Castells also argue that “it is entirely possible that when the history of the twentieth century is finally written, the single most important social movement of the period will be judged to environmentalism” (cited in Rootes, 2004: 609). As Byrne (1997: 128) suggests, environmentalism has had the greatest impact on the issues of social, economic and political life on the national and global level. He also emphasizes that environmental movements attracted more attention than other social movements. As Rucht (1999:204) emphasized, the environmental



movements have also shown growth in the number of activists, adherents, and sympathizers. The financial and organizational resources of the environmental movements have also increased. Rootes (2004: 610) also emphasizes the large support of the public that the environmentalist movements receive. According to Rootes, in most of the industrialized countries the public rely more on the statements made by environmental organizations than on the ones provided by the governments or cooperations on issues related to the environment.

In this study, I will use the definition of environmental movements developed by Diani. According to Diani (1995), environmental movements may be defined as a

loose, noninstitutionalized network of informal interactions that may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying degrees of formality, that are engaged in collective action motivated by shared identity or concern about environmental issues (cited in Rootes, 2004: 610).

As Rootes states (2004: 610), “environmental movements is identical neither with environmental movement organizations (nor any one of them) nor with episodes of environmental protests”. He emphasize that although there maybe many formal environmental organization and many environmental protests, it is only when such organizations (and other actors) are networked one with another an engaged in collective action that an environmental movement can sensibly be identified.

Since the 1960s, environmental mobilization has marked changes. As Rootes stated, (2004: 624), today, environmental movements are relatively highly institutionalized in most highly industrialized countries. This can be seen as a sign of success of the environmental movement, however, it is also perceived as the possible source of weakness, and a major source of discontent. Moreover, Rootes (2004: 624) adds that “EMOs’ increasing dependence on funding from charitable foundations led them to diminish their efforts to mobilize their grass-roots constituencies and influenced them away from protest, and from criticisms of cooperations, and towards ‘noncontroversial positions and nonconfrontatual practices”. However, such institutionalization does not appear everywhere to have entailed the deradicalization of the movement or the loss of shared identity.

### **3.2.1. Local, Community Based Environmental Action Groups**

Local, community based environmental action groups proliferated in most countries during the 1980s. Often referred as NIMBY (not in my backyard) groups, they have taken up a wide range of issues, many of them focusing upon the choice of sites for waste dumps, incinerators, and noxious industries. It is, however, only in the US that they have cohered to form a clearly distinct strand to the environmental movement. The Environmental Justice movement, comprised by these local resistance groups, became an effective organization by increasing networking. In other countries, such a network did not develop. This was due to the character of established US EMOs and the US political structure (Rootes, 2004: 629). In a decentralized political system with a bipolar party system in which one party or other is frequently locally entrenched, with many possible point of political access but where local political boundaries frequently isolate communities with environmental grievances, that attractions of translocal networking are obvious. The closest examples from the European context were the development of West Germany of the Citizen's Initiative movement and in Britain the formation of ALARM UK to foster links among local anti-road protest (Rootes, 2004: 630).

### **3.2.2. Political Opportunity Structures and Environmental Movements**

As Van Der Heijden states (1999), the degree of access to the political system is of central importance for the environmental movement in a society where 'old' political conflicts (e.g. conflicts between capital and labor) have been accommodated politically, the political agenda offers more room for 'new' topics (for example, the environment) than in a society where old conflicts are still paramount. Another important distinction is that between the formal institutional structure of a state (open or closed) on the one hand, and the informal strategies of political elites towards challengers (integrative or exclusive) on the other hand. Open states are characterized by a larger degree of vertical decentralization; a reasonable division of state power between legislature, executive and judiciary; an open electoral system (examples: Germany, Switzerland). The result is a larger number of 'points of

accesses for the environmental movement. For closed states, such as France, the opposite applies. The capacity of political systems to actually implement policies (strong states) is determined by a high degree of centralization of the state and of government control over market participants (Van Der Heijden, 1999: 213).

Van Der Heijden (1999: 213) states that with respect to elative strategies, integrative strategies are characterized by assimilation, facilitation and cooptation. In such countries like Netherlands and Switzerland, patterns of interaction between interest groups and the executive branch are highly developed, as are mechanisms that aggregate social demands. Exclusive elite strategies are characterized by repression, polarization and confrontation. He concludes that ecological modernization would not work equally in all political contexts.

One of the outcomes of the political opportunity structures for the environmentalist movements is also the countermovements. They are formed by people and organizations that have very different ideas about economic development than do environmentalists (Garner, 1996: 356). They see economic growth as an unalloyed positive value and they tend to believe that technological problems can have technological solutions. The counter movements have often been launched and funded by an industry that is under attack by an environmental movement. Industry-supported mobilizations create problems for establishing the legitimacy of the counter movement (Garner, 1996: 357).

### **3.3. Anti-Road Movements**

Anti-road movements became one of the core issues for the environmental movements in Europe during the 1990s. Especially, the environmental politics of Britain in the 1990s were marked by the mobilization and the growth of direct action against road construction (Wall, 1999: 81). These anti-road protests emerged in UK gave rise to the formation of other road protest in different countries of Europe.

In 1989, the British government announced that it would spend £23 billion (\$36.34 billion) on the “largest road-building project since the Roman Empire” (East Island

Journal, 1995: 34). The Tory government published a document entitled 'Roads for prosperity', which was to be the foundation of its new transport strategy. In order to meet the projected traffic growth, the government planned to build 2.700 miles of new roads, doubling Britain's trunk-road capacity, many of these new road schemes would involve destroying or damaging historic and protected sites. However, Tory government did not bother these impacts believing that the 'freedom to drive' would over-ride all other considerations (Kingsnorth, 2004a: 33). In its paper 'Roads for prosperity', Tory government supported the politics that this road scheme would give people what they wanted and the economy what it needed: more space for more cars, ad infinitum. In short, its policy based on the principle known as "predict and provide" (Kingsnorth, 2003: 18).

The British government's road-building project would have meant a wholesale reshaping of the country (Economics, 1994: 61). Nevertheless, the government did not expect any responses to them. However, in 1992, the first protest against the road-building program was initiated in the, 'Twyford Down', first site of the new road schemes (Kingsnorth, 2004a: 33). As Paul Kingsnorth, ex activists, stated people asked that why they were prepared to build on the best of their countryside to provide for projected and unnecessary traffic growth, rather than controlling that growth?; why wasn't money instead being spent on public transport and curbing car use?; and wouldn't building more roads just encourage people to drive on them? (Kingsnorth, 2003: 18).

A small but determined group of local campaigners started to protest the road construction; they set up a home on the top of the site. After a while, the new age' travelers joined the locals by setting up a home on the same area. Slowly, their numbers grew and environmentalists across the country began to take notice the protest. People from all over Britain began arriving at Twyford, joining the camp and fight. National environmental groups, which had been keeping their distance from the potentially illegal actions of those protestors, began to express support. The campaign began to snowball (Kingsnorth, 2004: 33).

In 1993, the construction began in the Twyford site. For the next 18 months, thousands sat in front of bulldozers, tied themselves to trees, set up and were thrown out of camps, invaded offices, disabled machines and took to the streets. Students at Winchester College, one of the country's most exclusive private schools, joined hands with travelers living in vans. WWII veterans gave their medals to crusties camped out on the hill, telling them they were the inheritors of their fight to protect the land (Kingsnorth, 2004: 33). Thus, protesting against new roads has become the rarest of British phenomena, a truly populist movement drawing supporters from all walks of life crossing class, political and generational divides (Knight, 1996: 43).

According to Rankin (2005: 19), the environmental movement has made its most powerful cultural impact when it has managed to cross the usual barriers of age, class, background or lifestyle and tap into more profound underlying values. The protests were done by the old, the young, farmers, nannies, bank managers; by everybody from New Age travelers with beaded hair to the Tory ladies of the Home Counties. There has been a tremendous collective effort (East Island Journal, 1995: 34). Hence, the anti-roads protests showed that ecological consciousness exists often instinctively, across the social and political spectrum.

The anti-roads movement was primarily a revolt of middle England. The coalition of new environmentalists, direct action advocates and local residents directly affected by the road schemes, loosely coordinated in some 250 different groups nationwide, emerged and operated independently of both the traditional left and the established political parties. Thus, it does represented evidence of a significant change in British society and politics- an abandonment of traditional channels of middle class pressure in favor of the direct action that has so long been the preserve of the left; a sense of disillusionment with the established political process, a feeling that government only ever listens if you get out onto the streets to make your voices heard (New Statesman and Society, 1995: 5).

In addition, the crucial point was that national environmental groups with no previous track record in transport campaigning such as Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature, as well as the older conservative groups such as the Royal

Society for the Protection of Birds and the Royal Society for Nature Conservation, began to tackle this issue (Rawcliffe, 1995: 32). These national organizations formed anti-road lobby groups such as Transport 2000. This group proposed coherent alternatives such as road-pricing, special lanes for cars with more than one occupant, and encouraging commuters to travel off-peak. Friends of the Earths, one of the national organizations, suggested that investment in rail brings greater economic benefits. In such a way that increased rail travel will free the roads for freight and new rail lines, it claimed, help to regenerate inner-city areas, whereas new roads suck economic activity into the countryside (Economics, 1994: 61).

As Emma Must (1996: 36) stated, ordinary people who defended their landscapes and communities and have succeeded in putting the roads program into reverse, and in November 1994, the British government canceled one-third of its road-construction plans.

The success of road protesters in the UK inspired Europe's environmental movement. As Boyle clarified (1995: 18), although the movement began in the UK, new battles are waiting to be fought in most European countries. Already protesters have been confronting road-builders and police at a range of sites on Europe's brave new motorway system, notably the controversial Scan bridge link between Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, and the Aspe Valley Tunnel through the Pyrenees, which is supposed to be driving the last bears out of France (Boyle, 1995: 18). Goodwin (1996: 14) suggested that anti-road campaigning has become one of the Britain's most successful exports. The similar tactics have been adopted by European counterparts who fear the development of a European Superhighway.

In 1995, road protesters from all over Europe arranged a with a five-day "summit" meeting in Eeklo in Belgium. 40 participants come from 16 countries from Lama to England and Norway to Romania. Their common denominator was that they have come together to build an international movement against massive European infrastructural projects (Doherty, 1995: 29).

In the Eeklo meeting, Dr John Whiteegg, the member of British environmental transport group Transport 2000, made a speech and deflated the myth that building roads nourishes the economy. He claimed that new roads only shuttle jobs around, destroying local markets and communities in their wake. Whiteegg gave the case of the cities of Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester, all of which have high concentrations of poor residents that blessed with new motorways over the past 25 years. According to Whiteegg, building roads creates fewer jobs than other transport investments, including trams, cycle-ways and traffic-calming. He did not deny, however, that the economy improves in selective ways with new roads: greater profits flow to large industry, and are reflected in traditional economic welfare measures such as GNP. However, life gets more polluted and unpleasant, as new roads create new traffic- a fact documented in the UK in a report by the government-appointed Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (Doherty, 1995: 29).

After the formal speeches, the Eeklo group exchanged strategies;

The English activists talked about kryptonite locks, squatted houses and bulldozer blockades; the Swiss discussed a national referendum to protect the Alps, the Czechs reported on mothers blocking traffic with their prams, the Scots on a tree-house built in the path of a new road and the Dutch on locking themselves to the wheels of departing aircraft. The Swedes reported on walking back and forth, across zebra crossing to annoy city drivers (Doherty, 1995: 30).

Eeklo Summit was followed during the climate summit in April with a gathering of 600 young road protestors, some of them from as far as Estonia and Georgia. Among the speakers was Jonathan Bray, the member of Alarm UK, who gave them advice about campaign tactics and direct action. As Boyle (1995: 18), suggested the emerging anti-roads counter culture was not coincidental. It was happening against a background of ambitious motorway plans, where the 11,000 kilometer Trans-European North-South Motorway (TENs) projects have been in gestation for years.

From the conclusion of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty onwards, transport politics have been judged vital for the constitution of one European space in order to enable the free movement of people and goods throughout the union (Heijden, 2006: 24).

In 1994, European Union Council of Ministers adopted that 120 major roads are expected to be finished by 2002 as part of the Trans-European Network in Western Europe (Boyle, 1995: 19). Thus, TENs have stimulated the formation of two different movement networks: the Trans-European networks and NGOs' (TENGO) networks and Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (A SEED) as the coordinating body or network of the anti roads movement at the European level (Heijden, 2006: 29). The key strategy of this group is to build a common cause between activists and the local groups that oppose the road building because it is in their backyards (Boyle: 1995: 20). As Heijden argues (2006: 33), in the challenge against TENs, there different kinds of framing that could be inferred: a local, a structural and a radical way of framing. Local protests are not principally opposed to TENs, but resist against unintended consequences like noise pollution. Structural protests not only oppose the local consequences of individual TENs, but also their wider implications. Radical protests not only challenge the legitimacy of individual TENs, but also wider economic, social and political context in which they are embedded.

However, in spite of the protest against the TENs project, it still stands as the largest infrastructure program in the history of world. As Heijden points out (2006: 28-29), it has a total estimated budget of 400-500 billion euros, and more than 225 projects planned for construction by the year 2010 including 140 motorways or roads near-motorway standard with a total length of 65.000 km, 15.000 km of which will have to be new. At this moment, a substantial part of these projects have been completed or are under construction.

### **3.4. Environmental Movements in Turkey**

The environmental movements in Turkey developed in the 1980s were fragmented, local in nature and based on discourse and protest rather than fulfillment and action (Atauz and Bora, 1993: 282). The environmental initiatives were labeled as imitative endeavors, inspired by the popularity by which green movement gained in Western world. These initiatives produced the specific knowledge, approach and experience only in a limited level in order to be able to erase this impression. They had difficulty



in providing the balance between utopist perspective and criticism and finding concrete alternatives. This weakness of the environmental movements brought about to being constrained to form an independent identity against media and the state that employed the environmentalism, becoming increasingly popular, in a useless and formal way.

According to Atauz and Bora (1993: 282), the environmental movement in Turkey can be divided into two parts: “the conservatives” and “the greenists”. The conservatist approach does not criticize the capitalist industrial society fundamentally and inclined to the mainly technical studies in order to decrease the damages the nature and environment exposed to. Green ideology/movement refuses the capitalist industrial society as a system and philosophy; and approaches the protection of the nature and environment with alienation and capitalist domination. Atauz and Bora (1993: 282), argues that the groups associated with these approaches could be considered as two separate movements rather than two divisions of environmental movements.

In Turkey, the post-1980 period witnessed the environmental organizations to make a remarkable progress. According to Atauz (2000: 203), in that period, the environmental organizations began to be formed in the provinces other than in metropolitan cities. In addition, the formation of the public opinion was given priority and protest and other forms of actions that directed to prevent the nugatory developments became frequent. For Atauz (2000: 203), these organizations in addition with the organizations that were formed in the late 1970s, determined the common characteristics of the environmental movement and basic preferences on the working style. The environmental problems that were becoming urgent to be solved also affected the operation of these organizations.

#### **3.4.1. The Actions against Thermal Power Plants**

In the 1980s, the first environmental conservation movement was being realized against thermal power plant planned to be built in *Gökova*, on the south west coast of Turkey. The *Gökova* site was under conservation in terms of the international

agreements. The possible harmful impacts of the thermal power plant were the destruction of agricultural land, damaging of tourist site and the pollution of flora and fauna. Therefore, the first protest was initiated on local level, and then it spread to regional and national level (Adem, 2002: 73).

The first protests were initiated by local villagers. They blockade the bridge to protest the officials of Turkish Electricity Institution. After that, *Bodrum* Municipality organized a signature campaign and supported the campaign ‘No! to the *Kemerköy* Power Plant” initiated by Chamber of Agriculture and Trade Association of Hunters and Tourism (Adem, 2002: 74). However, in spite of the huge support of the campaign, the construction of power plant was started. Following this, the juridical process was initiated against the construction. The case opened by activists was rebuffed by the court claiming that the preventions were taken to conserve natural and human health. Thus, the power plant was started to operate and continue to function. However, the campaigns against *Gökova* thermal power plant continued in certain time periods.

In 1989, the other TPP was started to be constructed in *Aliğa*. The mobilization against the plant started simultaneously. They went to the law. The juridical process continued for three years. During this period, the actions of the residents and NGOs lasted. They organized campaigns, protests, picnics, concerts festivals as forms of action. In 1992, the court case was finalized and the decision on *Aliğa* TPP to be built was cancelled (Adem, 2002: 79).

*Yatağan* power plant is another case in which the opposition was taken place in 1989. The power plant, 24 kilometers from *Muğla*, started to function in 1982. However, as time passed, locals started to be faced with negative impacts of the power plant and hence strongly resisted against the power plant (Adem, 2002: 80). The municipality and 3000 locals took the case to the court. The negative impact of the power plant such as the high level of radiation was approved by Ministry of Health and Turkish Atomic Energy Institution and functioning of power plant was halted for a period. After that, a huge demonstration with the participation of 5000 people including locals, local administrators, ENGOS and volunteers was organized under the title of

“Respect to people”. In demonstration, organization committee demanded the construction of a desulphurization plant whereas some groups demanded the shut down of the power plant (Adem, 2002: 81). However, the *Yatağan* power plant started to function again and it was attached a desulphurization unit. Although the measures were taken to decrease the negative impacts, the power plant still continues to function with its decreased side effects.

### **3.4.2. Anti-nuclear Campaign on Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant**

In Turkey, the nuclear power plant was introduced into the agenda of energy politics at the beginning of 1970s. The studies in order to determine the location of the NPP that planned to be constructed was initiated in 1968 and finalized in 1978. The town of *Akkuyu*, located in the province of *Mersin* was chosen as the construction site of the NPP. The location license of the NPP was obtained from Turkish Atomic Energy Institution in the same year. An international bidding for the NPP was organized; however, it could not be finalized.

The first reactions against the *Akkuyu* Nuclear power plant were emerged in 1978 under the leadership of *Aslan Eyice*, the chairman of the Village Cooperative. The struggle against the NPP became the agenda of the public opinion thanks to the journalist *Örsan Öymen* and local press. The Turkish Union of Engineers and Architect Chambers and also The Chamber of Electrical Engineers supported the struggle intensely. The informative meetings and panels were organized in the districts of *Mersin* to make the public aware on the issue (Künar: 1999).

In 1983, an international bidding was held again. Nevertheless, an agreement could not be reached by Turkish government and the international companies. Therefore, the studies for the construction of NPP were delayed.

In the 1990s, the construction of the nuclear power plant in *Akkuyu*, *Mersin* was taken on the agenda again. As Künar (1999) stated, the reactions against the NPP revitalized on local and national level and transformed into a nationwide anti-nuclear platform. The anti-nuclear platform was formed with the high participation of NGOs.

The platform collected 170 000 signatures in 1993 against NPP and submitted them to the chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the same year, a signature campaign and anti-nuclear march were organized in *Silifke*. In October 1993, the first anti-nuclear congress met in *Ankara* with the participation of 46 NGOs and an anti-nuclear week was organized (Adem, 2002: 83).

In 1994, an anti-nuclear camp was held in *Ovacık*, near *Akkuyu* with large participation of NGOs, ecologist, socialists and anarchists. In November 1994, Greenpeace organized an anti-nuclear demonstration in front of the Turkish Electricity Institution. The activists were sued according to the law that they held an illegal meeting (Adem, 2002: 84). As Adem states (2002), “it was the first trial of environmental activists in Turkey” (p.85).

In addition, an anti-nuclear festival has been started to be organized in *Akkuyu* since 1993. It has been carried out by the anti-nuclear platform and municipalities of the region on the 5<sup>th</sup> -6<sup>th</sup> of August each year (Künar: 1999).

In 1996, an international bidding was awarded again and the tenders were accepted. In 1999, the government decided to result the bid and made a contract with the company that won the bid. As a result of this, the debates on NPP have emerged again and demonstrations and marches were held in various regions of the country to protest the decision of the construction of the NPP (Adem, 2002: 85).

In 2000, the bid was cancelled due to disagreements on financial issues and the NPP case remained outside the agenda governmental politics. However, in addition to the *Akkuyu* NPP, the construction of the NPP in the province of *Sinop* has entered the agenda in 2006. Anti-nuclear platform and some NGOs have reacted to this decision and the debate is still continuing on the construction of NPPs in *Akkuyu* and *Sinop*.

### **3.4.3. Bergama Movement**

In the 1990s, environmental movements in Turkey are marked by *Bergama* movement. As Çoban (2004: 438) stated, *Bergama* case is the largest scale and

longest running ecological resistance movement modern Turkey has ever seen. It emerged in the early 1990s, has mushroomed since 1997 and continues to be on the national agenda today.

As Taşkın stated, since the 1990s, cyanide-leach gold mine production by multi-national corporations has been encouraged by the Turkish government to boost economic growth (cited in Çoban, 2004: 439). This development is a direct result of export-oriented industrialization and economic liberalization policies that have been adopted since the 1980s by the Turkish government. In fact, since the 1989, the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has issued authorizations to multi-national corporations interested in searching gold for 560 different sites in Turkey. The *Ovacık* gold mine in *Bergama* is the first gold mine using cyanide-leaching method in Turkey. In 1990, a powerful grassroots oppositional environmental struggle began in order to halt this project due to its severe and irreversible environmental and social impacts (Taşkın, in Çoban 2004: 439). Since 1990, Turkey has experienced a profound locally-based grassroots environmental struggle.

The community of *Bergama* initiated a judicial struggle when a group of several hundred *Bergama* villagers brought the case of the Eurogold mine to court. An effort in 1993 by a group of environmental lawyers from *İzmir*, a nearby city, met with little success. However, in 1994, Eurogold felled 2500 trees within the mining site, enraging villagers, who intensified their protests. Demonstrations were held in *İstanbul* and outside the Turkish Parliament in *Ankara*. In *Bergama*, protesters blockaded a highway, occupied the mine, and organized an international youth meeting to further their cause (Ignatow, 2005: 655). In response to a demand by the Eurogold consortium, the Turkish Ministry of the Environment had issued an act decreeing that there were no health or environmental drawbacks to the *Bergama* mine. The *Bergama* villagers petitioned against this act at the *Izmir* Administrative Court, and, at the end of a four-year judicial process, the court's final ruling stated that the ministerial act was indeed in violation of the principles stipulated in Constitution Article 17, which reads 'everyone has the right to life and the right to develop his/her material and spiritual entity', and Article 56, which reads 'everyone

has the right to live in a healthy, decent environment. It is the duty of the state and citizens to improve the natural environment and to prevent environmental pollution' (Çoban, in Ignatow 2005: 656).

Faced with the court's order, the authorities reluctantly sealed the plant, which had been ready to operate since 1997, in early 1999. As a result of Eurogold's threat of international arbitration, in May 2001, in spite of the binding court decision, production at the site started using 657 kilograms of cyanide a day to obtain 10 kilograms of silver and gold. In the face of unprecedented civic activism and the ruling of the nation's highest court, the mine was nonetheless permitted to operate as planned. Following the opening of the mine, the *Bergama* resistance roughly fractured into an antiglobalisation and a more mainstream group. As Ignatow argues (2006: 656), neither group evolved into an environmental NGO engaged in sustained lobbying or public relations campaigns, as has been the case for numerous environmental groups elsewhere. He also concludes that The *Bergama* resistance may yet inspire citizen activism in other parts of Turkey but, due to Turkey's dependence on foreign investment, and the political machinations that attend that dependence, the movement was ultimately neither successful nor long-lived (Ignatow, 2006: 656).

#### **3.4.4. Firtına Valley**

*Firtına* valley is one of the 200 ecological sites in the world protected in terms of the Rio Agreement. It is located in the district of *Çamlıhemşin* of the province of *Rize*, in the Eastern Black Sea Region. It has a unique flora and fauna and the forest of *Firtına* Valley was declared as one of the 100 hot spots of Europe that is under preservation ([www.bianet.org](http://www.bianet.org)).

In 1998, the government of *ANAP* (Motherland Party) prepared a hydroelectric power plant project that would be required to be constructed in *Firtına* Valley. The power plant would be constructed by BM holding. The opposition against the HEP started in its ceremony of laying foundation. The public protested the Prime Minister, *Mesut Yılmaz*, and the authorities. This protest was covered in national press as “the

fellows of *Yılmaz* protested him” the next day. After that, the juridical process was initiated by activists. The four lawsuits were opened by them. *Trabzon* Administration Court ruled that the EIA report made prepared by BM Holding was insufficient and the works done by the firm were in violation of EIA. After that, BM holding and the Ministry of Environment objected specialist report. However, *Trabzon* Nature and Cultural Resources Protection Committee decided to the halting of the works in *Firtına* Valley basing on the fact that the valley was natural site area. BM holding objected to this decision and opened a case in *Trabzon* Administration Court. After that, the juridical process continued for four years with the cases opened mutually. At the end, 6<sup>th</sup> department of the Council of State approved the decision that requires the annulment of EIA report and put an end to the case. The legal struggle of the activists brought about positive outcome ([www.bianet.org](http://www.bianet.org)).

However, in 16 March 2006, the Energy Sector Supervision Committee approved the production license of ARK Company for construction of HEP in *Firtına* Valley. Therefore, the lawyers that opened a case six years ago reopened a case in the name of *Çamlıhemşin* Foundation in the Council of State to make the approval decision invalid. The case continues to be investigated in the Council of State ([www.bianet.org](http://www.bianet.org)).

### **3.5. Conclusion**

The environmental movements, as one of the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s, still predominate the field of social movements. Although its changing forms, environmental movements influence the political decision making and society’s opinions and attitudes about environmental issues. In the 1990s, the most influential environmental movements in Europe were formed against the massive road construction projects. The forms of direct action that road protestors employed in Britain inspired the other anti-road movements in Europe in the scope of the TENs project. In Turkey, the environmental movements begin to be effective in the 1980s. Bergama movement emerged in the beginning of the 1990s marked the history of environmental movements in Turkey exhibiting the most influential and popular forms of actions.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT AGAINST BLACK SEA COASTAL ROAD PROJECT

#### 4.1. The Black Sea Coastal Road Project

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project consists of a long duration. The first construction work of Black Sea Coastal road was initiated in 1985 under the power of *ANAP* (Motherland Party) government. It covered the section for 7 km in the city center of the province of *Trabzon*. After that, the construction was stopped occasionally. In 1993, it was accelerated and a large share of national budget was allocated for construction. In 1997, the section of Eastern Black Sea was awarded during the coalition government of *ANAP-DSP-DYP*. After that, claims of impropriety were suggested. The law-suits against the contractors were opened. *Yaşar Topçu*, the Minister of Public Works and Settlements, was started to be charged in the High Court. During the government of *AKP*, *Mesut Yılmaz*, ex-Prime Minister and the leader of *ANAP* also impelled to High Court. The lawsuits against *Yaşar Topçu* and *Mesut Yılmaz* continue to be investigated in the High Court.

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is being carried out by General Directorate of Highways, the directorate of Ministry of Public Works and Settlements. The project is being carried out in awarding system and comprised of twelve sections. Each section is awarded separately. The total length of the project is 522 km. By the end of 2006, the 95 per cent of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project have been completed. The sections of the project and approximate length of each are as follows<sup>8</sup>:

*Samsun Bypass 12.3 km*

*Samsun-Ünye 78.8 km*

*Ünye-Piraziz 55.4 km*

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed scheme of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project, see appendix D



*Bolaman Perşembe 27.6 km*  
*Piraziz-Giresun 20 km*  
*Giresun- Espiye 25 km*  
*Espiye-Çarşıbaşı 77 km*  
*Çarşıbaşı-Trabzon-Araklı 68km*  
*Trabzon City Crossing 13km*  
*Araklı-İyidere 27 km*  
*İyidere-Çayeli 33 km*  
*Çayeli-Ardeşen-Hopa 77 km*

#### **4.2. The Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project: A General Overview**

The history of the opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project goes back to 1994. Actually, studies for construction of the Black Sea coastal road had been continuing since 1985. In 1993, a significant amount of the national budget was allocated to the project and the section covering the province of *Ordu* city crossing was awarded. In 1994, General Directorate of Highways required the city crossing to pass through the coast. Governor of *Ordu* called the representatives of media to the meeting of GDH. It was organized to introduce the project of *Ordu* city crossing section. After that meeting, some of the representatives of non-governmental organizations decided to form an opposition group to prevent the application of the project. Thus, the first opposition movement against the BSCRCP emerged in the province of *Ordu* in 1994. The opposition was formed by the representatives of environmental NGOs and local media. They organized a campaign called “we don’t let our coast to be destroyed”. The opposition group organized a mass demonstration with five thousand people and blockaded the *Ordu-Trabzon* highway for five hours. After the demonstration, *Ordu* city crossing section of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project was cancelled.

In 1997, to accelerate the BSCRCP the awarding system with the foreign credit was applied and the government decided to construct the coastal road by filling the sea. After that, the first opposition movement against the BSCRCP emerged in the province

of *Giresun* in 1997. The official starting date of the opposition in *Giresun* is 28 April 1997 at which the first meeting of the opposition groups was held. At this meeting, they founded the first coast protection platform which consisted of twenty NGOs. They released and distributed a statement. After that, the platform objected to General Directorate of Highways and asked for project, but it was not send to them. Afterwards, opposition group demanded Turkish Culture and Natural Resources Conservation Foundation to register the coasts of *Giresun* as natural resources immediately. Their aim was to proclaim the coasts of *Giresun* as natural site area to prevent the construction of the road. The opposition platform demanded to evaluate all the choices of transport and to save the small bays. It was offered that the road standard should be decreased on the behalf of saving the nature. The road that would be constructed for the 120 km. speed limit should have been constructed for 90 km. speed limit. In addition to these actions, they also performed concert, signature campaigns, press release, and a panel. They invited *Duygu Asena*, journalist of the Cumhuriyet Newspaper to *Giresun* in order to provide media coverage. In 2001, a committee consisted of representatives of NGOs, governor and mayor went to *Ankara* to meet with Prime Minister, *Bülent Ecevit*.

In 2002, the second phase of the movement started. A new coast protection platform was formed. However, it only lasted five months and broke up after the demonstration they held in May 2002. The movement is in the third phase at the moment. In this phase, mainly the TÜRÇEK association struggle for the necessary designing works on the sea filling areas.

In 1998, the province of *Trabzon* joints the opposition movement. The government's decision to construct the coastal road by filling the sea led to the formation of Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group and this group initiated the opposition movement. Their aim was to warn the community against the negative impacts of the project and to produce alternative projects. They believed that an investment had to be carried out in a way that it must sensitive to the environment and be economical. Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group included five members. These were *Ahmet Şefik Mollamemetoğlu*, journalist and the representative of Cumhuriyet newspaper, Assoc. Prof. Dr. *Fazıl Çelik*, the

director of Transportation section of civil engineering department of Black Sea Technical University, Prof. Dr. *Hızır Önsoy*, academician from civil engineering department of Black Sea Technical University, Prof. Dr. *Ferit Candeğer*, Retired academician from *Sürmene* Marine Sciences Faculty of Black Sea Technical University, and *Sami Koç*, civil engineer from *Trabzon* division of General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (*DSİ*). The work group was constituted by specialists from different fields. They all investigated the project in their own fields and prepared a series of report about the Black Sea coastal road project. After that, they tried to inform people about the coastal road project by using the local media. They organized panels and press releases that were covered in the local TVs and press. In 7 June 1998, Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group attended the Black Sea forum which was held in *Trabzon* and submit their report. The forum was included in Cumhuriyet newspaper and some parts of the final report of the Black Sea forum including the section on coastal road were covered (Cumhuriyet, 8 June 1998). The Black Sea forum was also included in local newspapers.

In 2000, the opposition movement in *Trabzon* took a new shape and *Trabzon* coast protection platform was formed to struggle against the construction of coastal road. The platform consisted of 24 non-governmental organizations. However, Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group remained as the core team that coordinated the whole movement.

In the period of 2002- 2004 the construction process slowed down due to budget cutbacks. In 2004, it was accelerated again and the sections that cover the provinces of *Rize* and *Artvin* were included into the construction process. Thus, at the beginning of the year 2004, opposition movements against the BSCRП emerged in some of the districts of the *Rize* and *Artvin* provinces. These are the districts of *Ardeşen*, *Pazar*, *Fındıklı* and *Arhavi*. In 1998, district of *Fındıklı*, in 2002 district of *Pazar* and in 2004 district of *Ardeşen* joined the opposition movement. At the end, in 2004 *Arhavi*, district of the province of *Artvin* was included in the opposition.

In the district of *Fındıklı*, the struggle against the coastal road was initiated by *Musa Özçiçek* when he was elected as mukhtar of Aksu neighborhood. At that time, Black Sea costal road project was being discussed. It was revealed that the project required a passage from the coast of *Fındıklı*. Not being against the road, *Musa Özçiçek* tried to find an alternative project that will not destroy the nature. In 2001, *Musa Özçiçek* and *Yüksel Çorbacioğlu* (ex-lawyer, present parliament of *CHP*) went to law to make the project that requires the *Fındıklı*-Aksu passage to be constructed by sea filling cancelled. At the same year, *Musa Özçiçek* met with *Cihan Eren*, the lawyer. They decided to struggle against the coastal road together and both of them directed the opposition movement until the death of *Cihan Eren* in 2005. For the time being, *Musa Özçiçek* and his voters are carrying on the opposition movement.

When the construction of Black Sea coastal road was initiated, the *Ardeşen* section of the project, the route of the coastal road in *Arhavi* section was unknown. *İmdat Sütülioğlu*, the mayor of *Ardeşen*, was against the city crossing that would pass through the coast. However, as a result of the order of Prime Minister, a new project was designed in December 2004. A change was made in development plan of the *Ardeşen* requiring the road to pass through the coast. At the beginning of 2005, the board of *Ardeşen* municipality approved the alteration requiring the road to pass through the coast by majority. Officially, after the decision is made, it is remained in suspense for a month. After that, if there is not an objection, the decision is put into practice. However, in *Ardeşen*, the decision was put into practice the next day and the construction started immediately. As the construction of the coastal road was initiated, the opposition movement against the Black Sea coastal road was come into being in *Ardeşen*. To struggle against the road construction, *Ardeşen* coast protection platform was formed. *Ardeşen* coast protection platform was formed by 29 non-governmental organizations. Among them, there were political parties, unions and associations. Except for *AKP*, all the political parties participated in platform. The main goal of the platform was the prevention of the construction of coastal road. In addition to the NGOs in *Ardeşen*, *Ardeşen* Culture association located in *Ankara* joint the movement. This association is one of the six plaintiffs of the lawsuit opened against GDH.

The opposition movement in the district of *Pazar* was initiated in 2002. However, the main objective of the movement was not to prevent the construction of *Pazar* section of the coastal road but to save the *Hamidiye* coast only. *Hamidiye* is a village that has a coast for three kilometers in the borders of the district of *Pazar*. It is located in the middle of the districts of *Pazar* and *Ardeşen*. *Hamidiye* is famous for its natural beauty and special characteristics that other coasts in Black Sea region do not have. The opposition movement to save the *Hamidiye* coast is being mainly held by two associations. One of them is the *Hamidiye* Tourism and Development Association and the other one is *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association, which is located in *Ankara*. These NGOs are keeping the legal struggle.

The district of *Arhavi* was the last district which joined the opposition movement. The construction of *Arhavi* section of Black Sea Coastal Road was first planned as an extension of existing city crossing. This demand of General Directorate of Highways was put into development plan of the city. The construction of coastal road in *Arhavi* was initiated at the beginning of 2004. The construction area was out of development borders of *Arhavi* municipality. At first, the construction process was designed in a way that will enable changes in development plans and sea filling. Therefore, the board of municipality gathered at 20<sup>th</sup> of May 2004 and they made a decision against the sea filling. In spite of this decision, the construction continued rapidly. For this reason, On June 2004, *Arhavi* municipality, non-governmental organizations and some citizens opened a case to get the project cancelled.

In 24 December 2004, *Arhavi* coast protection platform was founded. The foundation goal of the platform was to prevent the destruction of *Arhavi* coasts and to minimize the negative impacts of the coastal road to the environment. *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform was constituted by Municipality of *Arhavi*, *Arhavi* Foundation, *Arhavi* Marksmen and Sprawl Hawks Association, *Arhavi* Water Products Cooperative, *Arhavi* district organizations of *CHP*, *DSP*, *DYP*, *SHP* and *SP*. In the foundation report of the ACPP it was stated that

*Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform was formed under the principle of 56th article of constitution. It declares that to provide the right to citizens to live in a healthy and decent environment, to improve the environment and to prevent

the environmental pollution are obligations of the state and its citizen's. ACPP is a civil initiative that every citizen that has sensitiveness about the responsibility for nature can participate and support. Not only are the people of *Arhavi*, but also the people of other regions welcomed (From the foundation report of Arhavi Coast Protection Platform accessed from Arhavi Foundation).

They stated that their main objective is to perform all kinds of activities to provide the designing of the coastal road so as not to damage the costs in their town and other towns and provinces. These activities are carried out under the “Yes to road-No to sea filling” campaign. In the foundation report of the platform, it was declared that

To accomplish this, we aim to organize signature campaigns, public meetings, and a series of activities to form a public opinion. It is also aimed to develop alternative projects for the coastal road and to become a pressure agent for the public institutions to make them develop alternative projects (From the foundation report of Arhavi Coast Protection Platform accessed from Arhavi Foundation).

*Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform organized all the actions that were carried out during the opposition movement. First of all, they went to the law. Second, they held a few demonstrations on the *Arhavi* coast. In addition, platform organized panels and press releases. The *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform is keeping on its struggle mainly by legal process at the moment.

### **4.3. Mobilization Dynamics of the Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

#### **4.3.1. Introduction**

In this section, the dynamics that shape the mobilization process of the opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be analyzed. In the mobilization process of the movement, there is variety of actors that engaged in the movement such as local authorities, local party representatives, non-governmental organizations, the media, national authorities and the public. To understand the dynamics of the movement that lead to the mobilization process, the way the actors engage in the movement, the role they played in the mobilization process of the movement and their interaction with their movement environment in terms of the

support they received will be analyzed basing on the data collected from in-depth interviews, and also, content analysis of media and electronic sources.

#### **4.3.2. Categories of Actors Relevant to Social Movements**

I presented and elaborated my conceptualization of social movements as networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organization based on shared beliefs and solidarity and also collective action of these social movement actors on conflictual issues to promote or oppose social change at either the systematic or non-systematic level. To analyze the engagement of these actors into social movements, McAdam and Snow (1997) developed a categorization of actors that are relevant to the course of the movement. In this study, I will use their categorization to define the actors of the opposition movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project, the interactions between them and the role they played in the course of movement. According to McAdam and Snow (1997), actors relevant to social movements fall into three clusters of categories: protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders.

##### **4.3.2.1. Protagonists**

The first category of actors in a social movement is protagonist. As McAdam and Snow define it, “the protagonists include all groups and collectivities that are supportive of the movement or whose interests are represented by it” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). A movement’s adherents, constituency, and beneficiaries all constitute this group. However, at the core of the movement’s protagonists are its *adherents*. The adherents as defined by scholars include those individuals “who engage in movement activities that are conducted in pursuit of its objectives; at a minimum, such engagement typically involves participating in one or more movement activities, be it a protest rally, a sit-in, or a more formal organizational meeting”(McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). However, as McAdam and Snow points out these individuals who share certain key values and objectives and identify themselves with the movement are not equally involved in it. Some may devote considerable time and energy to movement activities and campaigns, while others

may do little other than pay dues or attend an occasional meeting or activity (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). Thus, as Turner and Killian (1987) suggests, “it is useful to distinguish activists from the bulk of the adherents by the level of effort and sacrifice they give to the cause” (cited in McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii).

As suggested by McAdam and Snow (1997), the second set of actors that comprise the movement’s protagonist base is *constituency*, from which most movement adherents are drawn. In the field of social movements, the term refers to “the aggregation of individuals the movement organization claims to represent and which typically is a major source of resource and support” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). The authors emphasize that “not all individuals who comprise a movement’s constituency are wildly enthusiastic about it; some may be indifferent, others sympathetic but uninterested in or unable to provide direct support, while still others may constitute the movement’s primary resource base and it is from this latter group of constituents that adherents are likely to be drawn” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii).

The third category of protagonists is the *beneficiaries* of the movement. McAdam and Snow (1997) point out that “although the typical case is that a movement’s constituents are also the direct beneficiaries of the changes it is trying to effect, the relationship between a movement’s constituency and its beneficiaries is not simple” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). The nature of the good or change being pursued determines the relationship between a movement’s constituency and its beneficiaries. If a public good, such as clean air or clean water, is being pursued, then it is not something that can be targeted or preserved for a specific group or aggregation<sup>9</sup>. Instead, the larger public benefits. The authors suggest that “in such cases, most of the beneficiaries can be thought of as *free riders* inasmuch as they have contributed neither sympathetic support nor more tangible resources to the movement. In other cases, when the objective of a movement is to expand the rights and opportunities of particular disadvantaged groups such as the disabled, the women, ethnic minorities, all of the direct beneficiaries may be constituents, but not

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<sup>9</sup> Public goods are goods that are indivisible and nonexcludable. They are shared by all within a community regardless of whether or not everyone contributed to their attainment or production. See McAdam and Snow (1997)



all of the constituents will necessarily be beneficiaries” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii).

#### **4.3.2.2. Antagonists**

The category of antagonists is the set of actors or groups that stand in opposition to a movement’s adherents and constituents. A movement’s antagonists are the *targets* of its actions, such as city, state, or national government, and sometimes a cooperation. According to McAdam and Snow (1997: xxiii), any set of individuals, groups, or institutions can be the target of the change a movement is attempting to effect. They states that “since many individuals and groupings within a movement’s environment of operation may not only be unsympathetic to a movement’s objectives and activities, but may also perceive the movement’s interests as antithetical to their own, it is not uncommon for *countermovements* to emerge” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiii). The objective of these countermovements is either to halt or neutralize the goal attainment activities of the movement in question.

#### **4.3.2.3. Bystanders**

The third category of actors relevant to the operation of a social movement is bystanders, elements of a community which are initially uninterested in the issue at hand. According to McAdam and Snow (1997), bystanders have no perceptible stake in the objectives and outcomes of a movement, and thus remain somewhat aloof and indifferent. However, interest in a movement and its activities can be activated. The authors classify these in three cases. First, in some instances, a change in orientation may result from the disruption of bystanders’ taken-for granted daily routines. When this occurs, bystanders are more likely to call for a cessation of protest activities than to choose a side. Second, bystander interest is piqued by movement activities and appeals, often through the media, and some bystanders groups are transformed into constituents or even adherents. Third, the actions of movement antagonists be they the police or countermovements, may engender opposition to the movement. Just as likely, however, is the possibility that police are perceived as overreacting and unwittingly generate sympathy for the movement (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiv).

In light of these possibilities, it is clear that the relationship between a movement's protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders, including the media, is a dynamic and ongoing process that is central to a movement's career.

#### **4.3.3. Categories of Actors in the Case of Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

In the case of opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project, the protagonists and antagonists both covered the actors such as mayors, that is, local authority, local party representatives, NGOs, local media representatives, and the public. However, it should be recognized that not all these actors constituted the protagonist/antagonist base in the seven cases that were studied. These showed variety in terms of the cases. Bystanders, on the other hand, constituted the largest category in the case of opposition movement against the BSCR. The categories of actors and the role they played will be analyzed below.

The role of the local authorities in the local opposition movements is crucial. Their roles and the effectiveness on the movement depend on the structure of the state organization and the issue that was challenged. The local authority is generally covered in the spectrum of the antagonists that produce the conflicts.

The position of the local authorities in the case of the opposition movement against the BSCR showed great variety. In the case of district of *Arhavi*, the coast protection platform that was formed to struggle against the BSCR was organized under the leadership of mayor of *Arhavi*, *Musa Ulutaş*. He involved in the opposition movement actively and was the initiator for employing the tactics to prevent the application of the project on the district of *Arhavi*. *Musa Ulutaş*, first of all, tried to provide an alternative road project that would pass through the southern part of the city. By this project, he inclined to protect the coastline and develop the economy of the district of *Arhavi*. *Musa Ulutaş* asked Prof. Dr. *İlyas Yılmaz*, an academician from *Van 100<sup>th</sup> Year University*, to design a southern road project. This led to the opening of an investigation against him for illegal usage of the budget of the

municipality. *Ulutaş* put the construction site under seal for six times basing on the rule of the administration court. However, the contractor firm crushed the seal and continued the construction. *Musa Ulutaş* went into demonstration that was organized on the coast of *Arhavi* and also made press releases very often. Meanwhile, he continued to carry out lobby activities to provide the annulment of the *Arhavi* section of the coastal road project.

The opposition movement of the district of *Arhavi* somehow has become more well-known within the region and in the nation in general. The role of the media is crucial at that point. However, reflection of the struggle of the mayor of *Arhavi* in the opposition movement and the assassinate attempt toward him (a bomb was put in his car) in media made the movement more attractive than the other movements in the region.

In some cases, like in *Ardeşen*, the position of the local authorities changed during the opposition movement in terms of the changing status of the local authorities. The ex-mayor of the district of *Ardeşen*, *İmdat Sütüoğlu*, struggled strongly to prevent the construction of coastal road that would pass through the coast. When the construction of Black Sea coastal road was initiated, the *Ardeşen* section of the project, the route of the coastal road in *Arhavi* section was unknown. *İmdat Sütüoğlu* was against the city crossing that would pass through the coast. For this reason, he made an alternative project prepared. The alternative project required the road to pass through the southern part of the district.

In the next election, *İmdat Sütüoğlu's* political party, *AKP*, came into power and he became parliamentarian. He tried to defend his project in the parliament. Before that, a road was being constructed as city crossing in order to prevent the coastal road to pass through the coast. It was also thought as a temporary road that would be used until the construction of the south road. As the half of the road was completed, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*, Prime Minister, visited the province of *Rize*. He saw the road in construction. Then, *Erdoğan* very definitely ordered that the road would be passed through the coast. Although *İmdat Sütüoğlu* tried to defend this road, he could not convince the Prime Minister.

The withdrawal of the support of *İmdat Sütüoğlu* for the opposition against the BSCRП was criticized by *Ardeşen CHP* district organization in its press release addressing to the people of *Ardeşen*. In this release, it was stated that ex-mayor *İmdat Sütüoğlu*, from *AKP*, was against the road to pass through the coast and he struggled for this. But now, though *Sütüoğlu* is a parliamentarian, he and his team do not follow up his claims (www.lazebura.net).

The case of the ex-mayor of *Ardeşen* is very crucial in order to understand the role of configuration of power relations in structuring the opposition movement. The position of *İmdat Sütüoğlu* in the process of opposition movement was strongly criticized by *Ardeşen CHP* district organization. In contrary to them, the activists of *Ardeşen* think that the role of mayors in the opposition movement is determined by their position in the relations of politics. For them, this is a determining factor for the engagement of the mayors into the movement. For example, *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the *Ardeşen* coast protection platform expressed that “The present mayor of *Ardeşen* is from *AKP*, the party in government. He cannot conflict with his party. So I do not blame him. If he was from the party in opposition, the case would be reverse” (From the interview by *Ferhat Artan* dated 14 April 2006).

The perception of the activists of *Ardeşen* that the importance of the party of mayor he/she belongs is very crucial in his/her effectiveness for the career of the opposition movement is supported by most of the activists of other regions. To illustrate, the activist of *Pazar* also stated that though the mayor supported them, he could not become effective since he is from the party in opposition.

In contrary to this, it was seen that the mayors of the districts of *Fındıklı* and *Ardeşen*, both of whom are from the party in government did not or could not be effective in the opposition movement. They were both against the BSCRП at the beginning. However, in the course of time, the mayors changed or were forced to change their decisions. Some of their speeches gave the clues of the effects of party politics and direct commands from high level party authorities in changing their positions in the opposition. To illustrate, the title of *Aksu* region as natural site was

taken back by *Trabzon* Nature Preservation Council due to the demand of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements. This event was included in newspapers under the title of “No obstacle is left for coastal road”. It was stated that *Adnan Özbalaban*, the mayor of *Fındıklı*, who signed the decision said that “Unfortunately, we behaved a little politically. I remained silent due to the command of prime minister for completing the road rapidly. I could not be opponent thinking that our demand for extension of the viaducts in *Çağlayan* Valley could be approved by this way” (Milliyet, 8 September 2005). The mayors of *Fındıklı* and *Ardeşen* also prevented the activists to select and employ some tactics too. The mayor of *Fındıklı* did not give permission for a referendum whereas the mayor of *Ardeşen* disabled the organization of a demonstration.

In the case of *Trabzon*, the municipality supported the BSCR. According to activists, the mayor and the members of the board of municipality had approached the project in terms of the profitability. The fact that the mayor did not support the opposition movement was one of the reasons that led to the movement not to be support by the public.

The case of the province of *Ordu* is different from other cases in that they achieved the annulment of *Ordu* city crossing section as a result of the demonstration with the participation of the mayor, governor, parliamentarians and the large section of the public. The accumulation of these actors in the category of protagonists was interpreted as the main factor behind the success of the opposition movement in the province of *Ordu*. The activists of *Ordu*, on the other hand, states that the mobilization of these actors stemmed from the power of public. According to them, these actors, especially the mayor of *Ordu*, were obliged to support the movement since there were five thousand people and all the NGOs of the city in the demonstration. As *Taner Aksoy*, activist and coordinator of ORT TV, explained

The mayor had no choice other than support and took part in the demonstration. What could he have done? Could he have waved his hand from the window of his office? In this case, we were going to struggle with his way. We were, first of all, providing that all the people in demonstration would wave to him. Secondly, the day following the demonstration, I was going to ask him on my TV channel that ‘where had you been yesterday, did

you have a more important duty? (From the interview by *Taner Aksoy* dated 19 April 2006).

*Aksoy* also added that he was going to ask these kinds of questions to the governor in case that he had not given permission for demonstration and to the parliamentarians in cases that they had not been participate to the demonstration. However, he emphasized that since the public supported him as an activist, his questions became meaningful and effective. Otherwise, it could have been interpreted as the “fabricated” words of a journalist. According to him, though the local authorities were on the side of General Directorate of Highways mentally, they took the side of activists in appearance. The case of the province of *Ordu* signifies that the role of the local and national authorities in the movement can be determined by the position of the public.

The position and the role of the local politicians in the opposition movement against the BSCRП are interesting to be investigated. Their position is especially important in order to explain the effects of political opportunity structures on the communities of small districts.

In the case of the district of *Arhavi*, local politicians significantly supported the opposition movement. Except for the *ANAP* and *AKP* district organization, all the other political party representatives involved in the coast protection platform which was formed to resist the BSCRП. The nonparticipation of these two party representatives indicates the existence of political opportunity structures shaping the course of the movement. It should be noticed that *ANAP* initiated the project and in the period of its government the awarding of the large sections of the project were carried out. In addition, ex-Prime Minister and the leader of *ANAP* and the ex-minister of Public Works and Settlement are being charged in the High Court. In this case, the participation of the *ANAP* district organization to the coast protection platform would mean the disobedience to the party politics. In a similar way, the nonparticipation of the *AKP* party to the platform can be explained by the fact that as the representative of the party in power that put the BSCRП into the high-policy domain of its own; they had no other choice rather than being abstain.

The case of the district of *Arhavi* forms an interesting case in the opposition movement since there is no other case in which almost all the district organizations of political parties were included in the same platform and struggled in solidarity no matter the ideological differences they have. The president of district organization of Felicity party, one of the extreme-right parties, *Necati Bař*, even stated that he asked his party organization and took the approval of them before involving in the platform. However, there is a section, including the members of *AKP* which criticize him for being in opposition against the BSCRП with the leftists (From the interview by *Necati Bař* dated 13 April 2006). The case of *Arhavi* showed that the environmental concerns became the most important issue and united the different ideological groups under a common frame.

*Ardeřen* was another case in which all the district organizations of the political parties, except for *AKP*, were involved in the opposition platform. The district organization of *CHP* also made press releases declaring the reasons of their opposition to the coastal road and the negative impacts of it. The *CHP* district organization called the board of municipality for not to approve the coastal road project.

In the case of the district of *Fındıklı*, *Musa Özçiçek*, the leading activist and the mukhtar of *Aksu* neighborhood, explained that *CHP Fındıklı* district organization supported him though he is in the direction board of a different political party (From the interview by *Musa Özçiçek* dated 14 April 2006). This statement actually reveals that this support was not expected one and the affiliations of political party is an important factor for the social relationships in these small districts. All these cases show us that the representatives of political parties in the districts played a more significant role in the opposition movement against the BSCRП comparing to the ones in the provinces.

In the case of opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project, NGOs, in general, were covered in the opposition platforms. In some cases, they played an active role in the opposition, in other cases they only signed the press releases and were not involved in any other actions.

In order to investigate the role of the NGOs in the opposition movement, the case of *Pazar* is the interesting one to be examined. In this case, one of the activists formed an association only to be able to struggle against the BSCR. In 2003, *Hamidiye* Tourism and Development Association was formed by *Doğan Karadeniz* to save the *Hamidiye* coast. *Doğan Karadeniz* is from *Hamidiye* village and lives in the province of *Ankara*. He is a retired person and to prevent the construction of coastal road on *Hamidiye*, this association made a beach on the coast, rent it for three years and started to operate it. By this way, the beach was operated for a year. However, the filling of sea for the construction of coastal road was initiated at the beginning of 2005 and by now, 60 per cent of the *Hamidiye* coast has been filled.

The range of the NGOs that took part in the opposition movements is relatively large in some cases. In the case of *Trabzon*, the coast protection platform consisted of 24 non-governmental organizations. In numerical terms, unions were in majority within the platform. There were twelve unions, three environmentalist NGOs, three associations, three chambers, *Trabzon* Environment Council and Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group in the platform. Although the platform included a large number of NGOs, the movement was mainly carried out by Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group. It was the core team that coordinated the whole movement. Usually, NGOs that were involved in the platform only supported them by signing the press releases. In the case of *Trabzon*, we see the symbolic participation of NGOs in the opposition platforms. In this respect, it is an interesting case that Although *Trabzon* TEMA Voluntary Representative of the period 1998-2003 did not support the opposition movement; TEMA Foundation was included in the list of platform without consent of the foundation due to the fact that it is an environmental NGO.

In the districts of *Pazar*, *Ardeşen* and *Arhavi*, the NGOs that are located in *Ankara* actively took part in the opposition movement. In the case of *Pazar*, *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association, in the case of *Ardeşen*, *Ardeşen* Culture Association, and in the case of *Arhavi*, *Arhavi* Foundation were actively involved in the struggle against the BSCR. They were among the plaintiffs of the lawsuits opened to annual



the project. In the case of *Arhavi*, the ex-president of *Arhavi* Foundation, *Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç*, is the spokesperson of the coast protection platform and one of the main organizers of the actions of the movement. The president of *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association, *Süleyman Basa*, stated that their association represents the will of the public of *Pazar*. He also emphasize that since all the institutions of state including the decision-making agents of the BSCRIP are in *Ankara*, they carried out the actions as the representative of the public of the district of *Pazar*. The association made lobby activities, met with authorities of GDH, the Minister and the Prime Minister and also, submitted the petitions to him that were collected as the request of the public of *Pazar*. In short, *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association operated as the representative of the public of *Pazar* during the opposition movement.

In some opposition movements, the participation of the NGOs to the opposition platform seems to be quite high. In the second phase of the opposition movement of the province of *Giresun*, the opposition platform consisted of 50 NGOs. Nevertheless, the executive committee that consisted of 10 members coordinated the whole movement. Other NGOs only supported them by signing press releases. The role that the NGOs included in the opposition platform share is not equal. Some of them actively struggled whereas others gave only symbolic support to the opposition. As *Hakan Adanır*, the president of *Giresun* division of TÜRÇEK association stated

The Tourism and Advertisement Association was one of the members of the second opposition platform. However, it did not participate in the struggle very actively at the beginning. They have actively participated in the struggle recently. When you write the names on the paper, everybody becomes the members of the platform (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

It is also argued that an opposition platform with large participation was not beneficial for the opposition movement due to the fact that it had prevented the cooperation of the struggle. According to some activists, the opposition platform should consist of only the ENGOs or the NGOs related with environment in order to gain positive outcomes. To illustrate, *Hakan Adanır*, activist and the president of *Giresun* TÜRÇEK division, stated that

Not to compensate the building of *İş Bank* at the coastal road, they intended to demolish the historical *Taşbaşı Park*. To save the *Taşbaşı Park*, Sea Mountaineering Club, Tourism and Advertisement Association and TÜRÇEK formed a corporation. At the end, we succeeded in our struggle and prevented the demolishing of historical *Taşbaşı Park* (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

He also added that opposition platforms that they formed with NGOs except for the ENGOs could not last long due to the conflicts of the members about the actions that would be taken and ended with dispute. For example, an important conflict was existed when the opposition platform was going to direct action. Some members of the platform had anxieties and they did not want to protest. *Hakan Adanır* interpreted this conflict as such

Demonstration and to go to action are bad words. These are frayed words. Rich people do not like to use old and frayed things. Maybe it was the reason. Since in demonstration there are environmentalist people who have beards, long hair or earring. You are in a position to be together with those people in the demonstration. This is a terrifying and old thing for them (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

In the case of the opposition movement against the BSCR, the NGOs mainly constituted the opposition platforms. The role of the NGOs showed a great variety. In some cases, most of the NGOs supported the movement symbolically and did not struggled actively. In spite of this fact, however, their participation to the movements increased the validity of them. In other cases, some NGOs, especially ENGOs, became the main actor of the opposition movement against the BSCR.

The role of the media in the mobilization process of the opposition movement is highly significant. Media is one of the most important means to take interest of the bystanders and transform them into constituents or adherents. The role of the media in general was not noteworthy in the mobilization process of the movement against the BSCR. The role of the media in the opposition movement against the BSCR showed a great variety between the cases that were studied. In some cases the local media is directly took part in the opposition by being a member of the opposition platforms. We see this especially in the cases of the provinces of *Giresun* and *Ordu*. In the case of *Giresun*, local TV Channel, Tempo TV, took part in the opposition

platform actively and though the platform came to an end, they still continue to support the movement. Similarly, in the case of the province of *Ordu*, some local TV channels and newspapers were the active members of the opposition committee of the movement. The journalist, *Rüştü Baş*, and TV coordinator *Taner Aksoy* were among the foremost activists of the opposition movement. They actively worked in the organization of demonstration and the publicity of the movement.

In the other end of the spectrum lies the case of the districts of *Pazar* and *Ardeşen* in which minimal support of the media is received. In these districts, only the *Çay TV*, the local TV channel of the *Ardeşen* district, supports the opposition movements in these districts by transmitting the developments on the case in their news and programs and covering the activists in the programs about coastal road. Some of the activists complain about the indifference of the media of the province of *Rize*. As *Doğan Karadeniz*, president of *Hamidiye* Tourism and Development Association expressed “*Karadeniz* radio channel did not cover us stating that they took credit. So, they beware of the state” (From the interview by *Doğan Karadeniz* dated 26 April 2006). *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the *Ardeşen* coast protection platform, also stated that at the very beginning of the movement, local media was included in the opposition, but later they withdrawn and did not support the movement. The local media in the provinces *Giresun* and *Trabzon* was actively played in the opposition movement. The most developed local media among these provinces is included in the province of *Trabzon*. The employing of the media was the priory tactics of the activists there. The activists tried to be covered in local media by means of their individual endeavors and they achieved this goal. Thus, they could introduce the opposition platform and their claims. Nevertheless, they exposed to the propaganda of the some of the local media directed by the countermovement constituted mainly by businessman of the province. In the case of *Trabzon*, countermovement effectively used the media to introduce the activists as “the enemy of the country” that prevent the economic development of the region and the country by opposing the BSCR. The activist had to strive heavily to erase this image.

In the case of *Giresun*, the opposition movement has gained the support of local media. The opposition was covered in local press largely. However, the

noneffectiveness of the local media in transforming the bystanders into active participants is based on the fact that the public do not read the local newspapers. As *Hakan Adanır*, president of TÜRÇEK association argued the readers of the local press are limited. He stated that only bureaucrats and rich tradesman of the province read the local press. Ordinary people do not read the local press. They watch the local TV a little but to read local press is an “intellectual” activity. Therefore, in small towns local press is not read so much (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006). In addition to this, *Asaf Zeki Kitapçı*, president of *Giresun* Tourism and Advertisement Association, stated that local press has some problems. As he argued

They do not write things against the municipality and governor. Since, they are not independent due to the ads income and awarding issues. In addition, they are exposed to political pressure. For this reason, they cannot keep the coverage regularly (From the interview by *Asaf Zeki Kitapçı* dated 18 April 2006).

The opposition movement in *Arhavi* is the one that received support from the national media. This is due to the fact that one of the writers of the *Milliyet* newspaper is from *Arhavi*. *Şükran Özçakmak*, the journalist of *Milliyet* newspaper, provided the opposition movement of *Arhavi* to be covered in the newspapers *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet* and the *Radikal*, all of which are the publications of *Doğan* Holding Company. By this way, the opposition movement in *Arhavi* was more publicized.

The district of *Fındıklı* and partially the district of *Ardeşen* were also benefited from the support of journalist, *Şükran Özçakmak*. They could be covered in the newspapers of *Doğan* Holding Company thanks to her endeavors. The activists of the *Arhavi* coast protection platform contributed to the formation of the necessary networks between *Şükran Özçakmak* and the activists of these districts. The opposition movement in the district of *Fındıklı* is also got the interest of the media after the incident of the murder of *Cihan Eren*, the lawyer and the foremost activist of the movement in *Fındıklı*.

Some of the activists of the other provinces complain that *Şükran Özçakmak* began to pay attention to the issue only after the *Arhavi* section of the project was actualized.

They state that before that, she was not interested in the BSCRП and the opposition movements of the other districts/provinces. They criticize the one-sided attitude of her as a journalist based on favoring her region in this case.

In general, all the activist of the opposition movement clarifies the lack of interest of the national media as the structural relations of power. The activists confirmed that the owners of the national media are the owners of powerful holdings and they have economical interests from the BSCRП. According to them, the owners of the national media have connections with the construction firms, and therefore; they did not want to take place on the opposite side of the government.

In the case of the opposition against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project, the national media did not support and cover the movement. The lack of support of the national media caused the case of the Black Sea Coastal Road Project to be unknown and since they did not introduce the opposition movements, the movement did not received support by the public of the nation. This was one of the main reasons for the opposition movement against the BSCRП to remain as a local movement.

What or how the public played in the opposition movement against BSCRП is one of the leading questions that should be answered to understand the dynamics of the opposition movement against the BSCRП. The claims of the opposition groups in all cases that were investigated were required the annulment or the change of the BSCRП in order to protect their coasts and to maintain the identity of their city as shore town. In this movement, the good or change being pursued was a public one, it was not something that can be targeted or preserved for a specific group such as fishermen or the people who has home on the coast. The goals that the opposition groups pursued covered the benefits for the sake of public. However, the public of these districts/provinces remained as free riders during the opposition movement except for the case of *Ordu*. In other cases, the public have contributed neither sympathetic support nor more tangible resources to the movement. Further, the public could not be converted into adherents by the activist of the movement.

Although there are varieties of reasons behind the bystander position of the public, some general conclusions could be drawn. First of all, there was a strong belief on the public that the road was a necessity for the Black Sea region. All the activists, except for a few, also support this statement vigorously. There are several reasons behind this belief. First of all, the existing road was built in the beginning of 1960s. It was an old road. Since then, the works to improve its quality have not been done sufficiently. Secondly, there had been high level of traffic accidents on the previous road. Thirdly, the fact that Black Sea region has high level of migration and the ratio of the migrants that live in other parts of Turkey is very high. Therefore, there is a high level of mobility of people between the Black Sea region and the other regions. However, travel time of these passengers was very high. To give an example, *Ankara-Artvin* route was being traveled in 18 hours. Thus, the people required a road that could shorten the distances and make the accession easy. Fourthly, the low quality of the road was considered/or make considered to be the primary reason for the underdevelopment of economy. It was also set forth as the most important obstacle for the development of trade and tourism sector in the region.

These factors caused the public of Black Sea region to have understanding that a road must be built no matter its construction technique. They did not consider the destructive environmental impacts of the BSCR and the implications for them. Therefore, they did not take care of the filling of sea and destruction of coasts for construction of the road.

Activist all believed that an alternative road projects could be applied for Black Sea region. However, the alternatives for the BSCR were not explained by the activists, or they were insufficient in this matter. On the other side, supporters of the coastal road project convinced the public that the alternative road project could not be applicable due to its high costs. For example, in the case of *Pazar*, the activist stated that the national authorities made an explanation to the public that the alternative road project is not economical. This claim of the national authorities led to the large section of the public to remain as bystanders in the opposition.

The same factor was also effective in the case of *Ardeşen*. *Mehmedali Beşli*, one of the lawyers of the *Ardeşen* Coast Protection platform recognized this fact at the beginning of their opposition movement and stated in a website of the region. *Mehmedali Beşli* emphasized that as a result of the conversations he made, he noticed that people of *Ardeşen* was informed incorrectly. “They think that the road that passes through the inland will cost more”. For this reason, *Beşli* suggested that the facts about the road must be explained to public in order to be supported by them. In addition, he stressed the importance of remaining on the agenda for the struggle to become successful ([www.kuzeydetutun.org](http://www.kuzeydetutun.org) accessed in 16 March 2006).

In the case of the province of *Giresun*, the activist and the members of the second opposition platform, pointed out to the need for communicating with the public and getting information to receive the support of the public. The representatives of the Sea-Mountaineering Sport Club even expressed that they had not known some points such as the construction purpose, location and the construction way of the coastal road when first actions were started to be done for the project. Therefore, they believed that for the time being society was not conscious about these matters and not have enough information about the BSCR (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

Similarly, *Zafer Çakır*, president of DSP district organization of *Arhavi*, criticized their opposition in *Arhavi* stating that they have made mistakes in forming public opinion. *Çakır* clarified that

For example, people could have been clearly warned about this matter by means of local TVs. If our mayor and our friends who have knowledge on that matter had explained to people, and made them more aware of the problem, maybe the reactions could have increased. Also, we could have gone to coffee shops and villages to talk with people by one by, we could have meet at homes with people and discuss the issue. However, at that time, we were very busy (From the interview by *Zafer Çakır* dated 13 April 2006).

Supposing that the public comprehends the destructive impacts of the BSCR due to its construction technique that requires sea filling, there were other barriers behind the immobilization of the public. In the case of the BSCR, the crucial fact is that

BSCRIP is an investment carried out by the state. Activists in general all stated that the public has the belief that you cannot resist against the practices of the state and no matter how hard you resist the state carry out its practices. Furthermore, activists clarify that there is a strong commitment to the state among the people of the region. The people cannot dare to oppose the practices of the state. To propose something that is against the practices of the state is not appropriated by people. In that case, people do not take you seriously. They rely on the applications of the state and they still think that what state realizes is right and the opposition is perceived as “evil thing” since you object to the road that the state construct. These general judgments caused the public to remain as bystanders in the opposition movement against the BSCRIP.

In addition to this, the belief of the public that road is a “public service” prevented them for being opposite to the BSCRIP. In *Giresun*, for example, activists that were trying to explain the negative effects of the project were criticized by the public and warned by them so as not to prevent the construction. *Hakan Adanır*, president of *Giresun* division of TÜRÇEK Association, explained this case by stating that

In Black Sea region, people had not seen bulldozers for years and when they saw the bulldozer and grader they were pleased. This is a very different psychology and hard to explain. That is, the case that people become happy by seeing the bulldozer and grader in their homeland. We all merely disappointed them by our speeches. Nothing else happened. That’s all (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

This factor was also declared four years ago by other activists. The director of the Tempo TV similarly stated that

To possess the road, villagers use political agents, members of the parliament. It is very important. For this reason, road is perceived as a good thing, at least 60 per cent of the people think like that. Only small sections of the people who are sensitive in nature perceive the negative impacts of the road (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

At that time, the activists of *Giresun* also declared that the people of *Giresun* did not have resistance culture since the fact that they had not experienced any kind of economic and environmental problems so far. They have faced with these problems recently. The economy of *Giresun* had been very strong due to hazelnut agriculture



and there was nothing to resist. The activist believed that the next generation will change and they will learn to react (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

The fact that the negative implications of the coastal road for the natural and social environment could not be realized before the appearance of the road in a concrete form was an important factor behind the bystander position of the public. The majority of the public in general could not comprehend the impacts of the coastal road until they saw it in a concrete form. To illustrate, the activists of *Pazar* state that when the people of *Pazar* inclined to walk around the coast, they became upset since the coast was disappeared and there isn't any place to walk and refresh. Therefore, the ratio of the public who are against the coastal road increased. Activist think that it will continue to increase as the construction of road progressing.

The same factor was also emphasized in the case of *Trabzon*. The activist emphasized that when the public saw that the project was taken up a shape and the coasts were started to be filled, people began to aware of the impacts of project. When the road construction was almost finished, they began to be worried. Some activists related this to the characteristics of society. *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu*, spokesperson of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, for example, claimed that

Our society has a very weak imagination. We can not comprehend the facts before we see them in concrete forms. We have problems in comprehension. Therefore, when the project was taken the concrete form, people started to recognize the facts about the project. In some regions, reactions started to increase but it was too late (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 15 April 2006).

In the case of the opposition movement in the districts that were studied, the political opportunity structures affected the mobilization of the public. In the districts of *Arhavi*, *Ardeşen* and *Fındıklı*, the political context is one of the most important factors that led to the public to become bystanders and accept the project without resistance. As activists of the opposition in the district of *Arhavi* stated that party politics separated the public and led to the lack of solidarity between them. As *Ahmet Aydınoğlu*, the president of *DYP* district organization explained

In the period of this project, a few governments were on power. In the first phase of the project, *CHP-DYP* coalition was on power. In the bidding period of the road, *DSP-ANAP* coalition was on power. The *ANAP-DSP-MHP* coalition applied the project. In *Arhavi*, all the districts organizations of these parties are included. Every party organization has at least actual 60 members and totally 200 people belongs to it. Most of the members of the parties are generally comes from the prominent families of the districts. They are influential in the district. There are four or five political party organization that took part in the coastal road project. In that case, who will oppose the project? How will you unite the people? (From the interview by *Ahmet Aydinoglu* dated 13 April 2006).

In addition to these small districts, the political opportunity structures partly influenced the opposition movement in the province of *Giresun*. In the second period of their opposition, *Hakan Adanır* the ex-representative of *Giresun* division of TEMA Foundation expressed that

Only one political party rejected the adjudication of the road claiming that there was an unlawful action. Except for it, all the political parties advocated the road. Environmentalist organizations were seen as the supporter of this political party. The political party that reacted to this adjudication was among the insignificant parties. Then, we were thought as if we are against the majority of people. Political discrimination and partisanship prevented the solidarity (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

The economic opportunity structures affected the mobilization process of the opposition movements in the districts of *Arhavi*, *Fındıklı* and *Ardeşen* as well as the political ones. In the case of *Arhavi*, a large portion of the public has a share in the construction of the coastal road. This is mainly results from the operation of construction system in Turkey in that the construction firms that gains the awarding share out the construction project between different contractors. In the BSCR, the section *Arhavi* was awarded to one of the biggest construction firms of Turkey, the owner of which is from *Arhavi*. The firm awarded the construction of firms to local contractors. By this way, a large quantity of people started to work in the construction of coastal road. The workers and also the owner of the trucks that were used in construction are all local people. As one of the activists stated, “If we look the people except for the members of the platform, 90 per cent of them have trucks and relatives that work in the construction” (From the focus group dated 13 April

2006). As a result of this, the public did not oppose the construction of coastal road. The economic opportunities led to the erosion of support of the public. As the mayor of *Arhavi*, *Musa Ulutaş*, explained

People of *Arhavi* were strongly against this road at the beginning. However, the power of capitalism developed subsequently destroyed it. How? People work in public sector as civil servant or as worker or they work in these construction firms. The economic condition of Turkey is obvious. Shall everybody lose their job? That is, in that case the members of political parties exile them. Citizens cower in that way. Thus, the community was cowered. They withdrew (From the interview by *Musa Ulutaş* dated 13 April 2006).

The cases of the districts of *Ardeşen* and *Fındıklı* have witnessed the influence of the same economical opportunity structures. The sections of coastal road covering these districts were awarded to the construction firms the owner of which is from these regions. Due to the strong networks based on the kinship, a large portion of the public was employed in these firms. In addition to these workers, their family, relatives and friends did not support the opposition movement. The poor economic conditions and especially high levels of unemployment resulted in lack of support of the public to the opposition movement such that they expected coastal road to bring about employment for them. *Ahmet Aydınoğlu*, the president of *Arhavi DYP* district organization, stated that

Our people are a little more powerless in recent years. They are obliged to follow the small interests. Politic actors promise them to employee their children or any other gains. By that way, they take the support of people who are in critical positions and they act together. Also, some were promised big gains. Imaginary plants for recreational facilities were produced on areas formed by sea fillings. The operation of them was promised to some people. They believed this and finally some gossipers who were persuaded by small amounts of money lobbied in weddings, funerals, festivals etc. they degenerated people, emotions, ideas (From the interview by *Ahmet Aydınoğlu* dated 13 April 2006).

In the case of the district of *Ardeşen*, activists also emphasized that economical problems are certainly effective in the immobilization of people. *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the coast protection platform, exemplified the case as

You cannot talk about art with a hungry person; you cannot talk about the beauty of sea. If the main problems are economical and the solution of them

sometimes based on to establish good relations with the government, there is nothing to do (From the interview by *Ferhat Artan* dated 14 April 2006).

The same factor was also valid in the province of *Giresun*. In this province, some group of people living in the city center wanted the road mainly due to economical interests. They indented to have a buffet or football field next to the road. These groups of people tried to surpass the activists claiming that they were late and the opposition was a late action (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

The role the national authorities played in this opposition movement has a tremendous influence on the dynamics and outcomes of the movement. Since the fact that the BSCRП has a history for more than a decade, the national governments showed a great variety during this time span. The project was awarded officially in the period of 55<sup>th</sup> government, that is, under the *ANAP-DSP-DYP* coalition in 1997. At the present, the 59<sup>th</sup> government, *AKP* rules Turkey and between these periods five political parties took part in the government. In 1997, the *ANAP-DSP-DYP* government gave priority to the BSCRП in their national programs and allowed the construction companies to take foreign credit to complete the project. Thus, the companies took credit from foreign financial funds and the construction was accelerated.

The opposition movement against the BSCRП was first initiated in 1997. During the opposition, the activists of the movement had to make their claims against different governments. Generally, the BSCRП has remained in the high- domain policy of the national governments. Nevertheless, in the period 2000-2002, the construction of Black Sea coastal road was slowed down due to the lack of monetary resources. This period could have been considered as an opportunity for the opposition movements to strengthen their progress. After that period, the *AKP* took the government and “urgent action plan” was put into the national program that required the construction of 15 thousand km. double lane road. The government gave high priority to the finalization of the BSCRП and provided all the facilities to achieve it. The order was given to the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements to set the credits free in order to provide the monetary resources.

The Prime Minister, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*, is from the province of *Rize* and it was claimed that he wants to be remembered as the Prime Minister who will complete the coastal road. He responded to the criticism about the BSCRП claiming that their government did not prepare the project and added that “We found this project as ready and there had already been a progress in this matter. The changes in this project bring high costs to my country and nation. We can not endure these costs”(Milliyet, 1st January 2005). *AKP* government was so determined to complete the BSCRП that the Prime Minister, himself, gave a direct command for the finalization of *Ardeşen* section of the coastal road. Some activists stated that the road is being constructed by the command of Prime Minister.

The implementation of the BSCRП is carried out under the authority of General Directorate of Highways. Therefore, the lawsuits opened by activists are directed to this institution. GDH is only responsible for the controlling of the construction and does not design the projects. The projects are designed by construction firms and they are studied by GDH. The controlling of the construction is carried out by the department of construction and the engineers of control perform this duty.

The BSCRП was awarded to certain national construction firms, all of which shared the sections equally. According to the claims of activist, the equal appropriation of these sections led to the construction lobbies not to object to any kind of application of the project and to work in harmony within the scope of the project. The activists also claim that if one of these companies had not been included in the project, they would have supported the opposition movement and in this case the opposition would have been successful.

Except for the cases of the provinces of *Giresun* and *Ordu*, all the other movements went into the law. They sued General Directorate of Highways for violating the coastal law and the related terms of the law. They all won the lawsuits opened in administration courts and the courts made stay of execution decision. In spite of this, companies continued to the construction of the coastal road. As a result of this case, activists opened lawsuits against General Directorate of Highways owing to the fact

that GDH did not put the court rule into practice and permitted the construction to continue. These lawsuits continue to be charged.

The triangle of the national government, General Directorate of Highways and the construction company was the main antagonist in the opposition movement against the BSCR. The activist had to challenge this structure of power relations during their opposition. However, mainly due to the centralist structure of the Turkish state, they could not reach the agent of decision making and there was not any transparency in the process of implication of the BSCR.

#### **4.3.4. The Actors and the Mobilization Process in the Case of Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

In this section, I will use the theoretical conceptualization developed by Oegema and Klandermans (1994) on the mobilization process. They suggest that activating individuals who are already sympathetic to a movement or action mobilization is more difficult than one might imagine. According to them, movement participation evolves in four steps. First, one becomes a sympathizer of the movement; then a target of mobilization attempts; after that, one becomes motivated to participate, and finally one overcomes the barriers to participation (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994: 703).

Oegema and Klandermans state that differences in levels of participation (or between subsets of) the same population originate at each transition point in the four-step model of movement participation, and the relative contribution of each step to the final number of participants points to the strengths and weakness of a mobilization campaign (1994: 703-704).

According to Oegema and Klandermans (1994: 704), there are two different forms in which nonparticipation of the sympathizers can take. First, a campaign can fail to transform sympathizers into active participants, an outcome called as *nonconversion*. Second, people who initially support the movement may change their minds and become unwilling to become active. In this case, the problem isn't that sympathy is

not converted into action, but rather that sympathy disappears- this is called as *erosion*. Nonconversion and erosion of support are two measures of a mobilization campaign's effectiveness or ineffectiveness. From the standpoint of movement organizers, of course, neither is desirable: organizers must convert support into action.

#### **4.3.4.1. Erosion of Support in the Case of Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

Erosion of support is observed in some opposition movements in the case of the BSCR. To illustrate, in the district of *Ardeşen*, the opposition against the coastal road was initiated by establishment of *Ardeşen* coast protection platform. The platform was constituted by 29 NGOs of the district of *Ardeşen*. At the beginning of the struggle, the participation to the meetings of the platform was quite high. However, as time passed, members of the platform did not start to attend the meetings and withdrawn from the opposition movement. As a result, the duration of the platform did not last for a long time. As *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the *Ardeşen* coast protection platform stated

Actually, our movement started strongly. But it slowed down due to some economical anxieties. To mention about these, the roads are constructed by contractors in Turkey. At least two contractor firms are working in *Ardeşen*. The system of contracting brought about inclusion of local people in construction. The owners of trucks that work in construction are from *Ardeşen*. Workers are shopping from the stores of *Ardeşen*. The members of the platform such as tradesman association or cooperatives have contacts with the contractors. I am also acquainted with these contractors. Consequently, these mutual relationships and the negative economical impacts of halting of road construction caused the supporters of movement to give up. Now, the plaintiffs are only three people including me. Others are presidents of Water Products Cooperative and Education Union. Except for them, nobody asks about the development of movement. Unfortunately, this is the painful state of Turkish society (From the interview by *Ferhat Artan* dated 14 April 2006).

The erosion of support was also occurred in the case of the province of *Giresun*. In the second phase of the opposition movement, coast protection platform organized a demonstration on 7 May 2002. However, after the demonstration, the coast protection platform broke up due to the conflicts between its members. The platform

lasted merely five months. *Hakan Adanır*, president of *Giresun* division of TÜRÇEK Association, defined this period as an uneasy process. He stated that

Architecture Chamber and Rotary Club did not want to participate in the demonstration. They stated that we do not have to be together with people. We do not have to make demonstration. We only offered to do it, that's all. I said that it does not matter whether you participate. We will do it. You had not been in the platform so far. You came by your wish. We welcomed you. As we reacted strongly to them, they were afraid of these reactions and they attended the demonstration. But after that, we could not work with them (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

#### **4.3.4.2. Nonconversion in the Case of Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

The opposition movement against BSCRCP is generally was not supported by the public except for the case of *Ordu*. Although there are a considerable proportion of public that are sympathetic to the movement, they remained as bystanders and did not become active participants. Therefore, the factor of nonconversion is should be analyzed in order to understand the immobilization of the sympathizers.

In the case of *Arhavi*, some of the activists made self-criticism that they did not informed the public about the BSCRCP, its negative environmental impacts and the alternative projects that could be applied instead of it. As *Necati Baş*, president of the district organization of Felicity Party (*SP*) declared

The panels must have been organized more often. We must have explained the people that what we will acquire by the southern road and what we will lose by the coastal road. They did not know these. We were very late to explain these facts to the people (From the interview by *Necati Baş* dated 13 April 2006).

*Bülent Özbirinci*, president of *CHP Arhavi* District Organization, points out to a different aspect for the reasons behind the nonconversion of the public. As *Özbirinci* stated

Our people have a reluctance about to be against the state. To be against the state means to be treated like a terrorist. One who is against the state is against the law; however, our opposition is legal. We had difficulties in



explaining this to the people. Think that such an enlightened community like *Arhavi* has these opinions, what about the general condition of our country. We could not explain ourselves to community. At first we have collected 3000 signature. Later when we went into action but we could not find much people. I think this is a genetically characteristic of Turkish people. People abstained from participating social movement when the opposition turned into action. I think that 40 per cent of people of *Arhavi* is against this road. But on the basis of action, we could only find 10 per cent (From the interview by *Bülent Özbirinci* dated 13 April 2006).

The inadequacy in order to form public opinion was stated in the e-mail group of the activists of *Arhavi*. The spokesperson of the *Arhavi* coast protection platform, *Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç*, declared that they could not perform required endeavor to form public opinion due to intense legal struggle. *Özkazanç* suggested that more organized actions including the cooperation with ENGOS of the province of *Trabzon* and other platforms are needed to form public opinion. (*Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç*, from the e-mail dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 2005). Some activists also declared that the opposition platform should not be perceived as independent from political context. *Sanem Öztürk*, the activist, for example, stressed that by participating to the Mediterranean Social Forum, “it could address large masses, get the chance to express the movement, explain their complaint to the environmentalists and activists of world or people who are not indifferent the events surrounding them” (*Sanem Öztürk*, from the e-mail dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 2005). It is evident that the some of the activist appreciated the need to introduce the movement to the people and transform them into active participants during the opposition movement. It seems, however, that the lack of organization based on a regular division of labor enabled the actions to form public opinion.

In the case of *Arhavi*, some of the activists think that a leader of opinion is the crucial actor in a community to include the public into the movement. In the case of *Arhavi*, some of the activists such as *Necati Baş*, president of district organization of Felicity Party (*SP*) accused the mayor of *Arhavi* for behaving ineffectively in the opposition. As he stated

Our mayor is from *CHP*. He was selected by a certain amount of vote. I think that he must have taken this power on his side. He could not do that. If he could, the supporters of other political parties and NGOs would follow him. However, the case was the reverse. A small amount of people supported him and people thought that even members of his party do not support him. This

became very effective. It was thought that the opposition is the private decision of the mayor or the decision of a few people.

He also adds that panels must have been held more often and the struggle must have been initiated earlier. *Baş* argues that activists were late to explain the facts about what *Arhavi* gain by coastal road and by south road (From the interview by *Necati Baş* dated 13 April 2006).

In the case of *Ardeşen*, in order to activate the public, coast protection platform distributed 3000 notifications stating the reasons behind their opposition to the road. First, they mentioned about constitution framework of the platform, and then stated that road will cause coast plundering and destruction of nature. They also added that the coastal road would not be economical and destroy the image of the city. However, these actions did not become effective to provide the support of public of *Ardeşen*. Even, the activist could not transform the sympathizers into active participants. As *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the *Ardeşen* coast protection platform, declared

If you talk with the public individually, you see that they are mostly against the road, but they did not oppose the BSCRPP thinking that nothing can change. If they had been reacted, they would not suffer a pang of consciousness in the future. Nevertheless, the result would be the same” (From the interview by *Ferhat Artan* dated 14 April 2006).

In the case of *Ardeşen*, *Cengiz Tekin*, ex-president of *Ardeşen* Culture Association, accuse intellectuals of *Ardeşen* for being inactive in the process of activating people. He emphasized that

The most important failure of our intellectuals was that they could not convince them of the truth about the coastal road. For example, there are sensitive teachers, who are more aware and cultured people, in *Ardeşen*. They should have undertaken this duty. This is their failure. There is a division of education union in *Ardeşen*. We know that many friends of us, members of the union, are against the coastal road. They should have transmitted the issue to their students and through them their parents. If we could explain the facts by means of panels, demonstrations, and some kinds of activities in *Ardeşen*, I am certain that we could make five thousand people to go into action.

His belief on this matter is also based on his past experiences. As he explained

Every summer, panels are held in *Ardeşen* in every topic such as tourism. I see that people are very sensitive there. In evening hours, they sit and listen to the panelists for hours. They also participate to discussions and conversations. Therefore, our people could have been made sensitive. If only we had opportunity to do this. However, we, as association, were incapable to intervene to struggle in *Ardeşen* from *Ankara*. This is a failure. We had shortcomings to enlighten the people. I think that we must not certainly blame the villagers or people who do not have knowledge about the issue (From the interview by *Cengiz Tekin* dated 10 May 2006).

The individualistic attitudes of the foremost leaders of opinion, especially those of mayors, were also criticized by some of the activists. They think that this led to nonactivation of the public in the opposition. For example, *Cengiz Tekin*, ex-president of *Ardeşen* Culture Association, accuses the ex-mayor of *Ardeşen*, *İmdat Sütüoğlu*, for behaving individually. *Tekin* stated that ex-mayor did not required support of people and NGOs in the opposition. He behaved individually and presented his alternative project occasionally. Thus, his alternative project was not put into practice and a decision about the route of *Ardeşen* city crossing was not made (From the interview by *Cengiz Tekin* dated 10 May 2006).

A distinguishing factor in preventing the endeavors in engagement of people into opposition was emphasized by the activists of the province of *Giresun*. They emphasize the fact that in the previous road many accidents had happened. When activists opposed the coastal road, the people who had lost their child, friend and relatives in the traffic accident reacted against the activists thinking that the road was the responsible for this. This case was the most binding factor in the opposition. Activists cannot venture to stop the building of coastal road, since they could have been assumed as the responsible person for the death of people. As *Hakan Adanır*, president of *Giresun* division of TÜRÇEK association, stated

In that case, nobody cares that you saved the small bay and you cannot explain this to those people. For that reason, we tried to be positive in our opposition. That is, our demands were to save the some small bays, to add alternative solutions, to change the direction of the road, to make it divided road. It was necessary to solve the transportation problem. But coastal road, this construction was not necessary (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

In the case of *Giresun*, the lack of communication and solidarity with the local government in the second phase of the opposition movement was also another factor for the nonconversion. The attitude of the mayor of that period towards the BSCRП was uncertain. The mayor claimed that there was no project of city crossing and asserted that he was against the transit road that told to be constructed. However, *Nevin Kurt*, activist and the president of Architecture Chamber, strongly claimed that a project exists. Therefore, the public confused and the majority believed to the mayor since he was the person who was selected by votes of them.

The attitude of the activists toward the mobilization of public differed considerably between the cases. In some cases, like the case of *Pazar*, activists do not conceptualize the participation of large masses of people into movement as a necessary step for the advance of opposition. For example, the activists of *Pazar* think that the 1000 petition that was collected was the indicator of the willingness of the public to take part in the opposition to the *Hamidiye* section of coastal road project. They do not consider it necessary to activate these people who sign the petitions. According to them, to sign the petition means to activate the people. As *Basa* strongly emphasized they reflect the will of the public of *Pazar* (From the interview by *Süleyman Basa* dated 29 April 2006).

The activists also stated that the road is a highly technical issue to understand. The activists of the province of *Trabzon* clarified that it is required to visualize the road in order to explain it to the people. *Ayla Kurşunoğlu*, activist and also the member of the Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association, stated that the road issue should have been visualized but to prepare photographs by means of computer or to prepare slide shows to be projected in square of the city requires money and time. She stated that they did not have time to do this since they work and also have other responsibilities such as home, family etc (From the interview by *Ayla Kurşunoğlu* dated 20 March 2002). *Ahmet Şefik Mollametmetoğlu*, activist and spokesperson of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, also emphasized that visual events are very important for a struggle. As he stated,

Instead of preparing reports or present written materials to people, platform should have prepared visual expressions like animation that project the coasts, road, and the alternative of railway by means of existing technology. In this case, the opposition could have been more effective in the eyes of the public, decision-makers and the media due to the fact that people support you emotionally but they cannot conceptualize it in a concrete way.

He emphasized the importance of financial resources in protest movements and clarified that they had not enough money and to perform these activities (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollametmetoğlu* dated 22 March 2002).

In the second phase of the opposition movement in the province of *Giresun*, the common view which all the activists strongly emphasized was that the public must be believed on the opposition movement. Activists believed that if they could be successful in arranging demonstrations on the coast with the extensive participation of the public, their protest would result in successfully. They also thought that if they can reach to the people, the politicians could be engaged into the movement. To achieve this goal, the activist employed a wide range of tactics to engage them into opposition.

The ideological image of the activists was also important for them to engage the public into opposition movement. In the case of *Giresun*, the public of *Giresun* thought that people who protest were remains of the “old leftist”. The ideological discrimination prevented the public to support and to be covered in the opposition movement. This case was also important for the opposition movement of *Trabzon*. *Fazıl Çelik*, the member of Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, stated that he was called to account for struggling with the “communists”. *Çelik* stated that “I could not explain that this is the matter of environment” (From the interview by *Fazıl Çelik* dated 17 April 2006).

The image of the environmentalists has also negative connotations for some part of the public of *Trabzon*. Environmentalists were perceived as the group of people who are against “everything”. For that reason, the claims of the activists, especially the members of ENGOS, did not taken into consideration by some groups of people.

In the case of *Giresun*, the opportunity relations that prevail partly led to the nonactivation of the public. The activist and representatives of the Saturday Mountaineers Association, *Mustafa Dağ*, explained that

When I went to the public square, I saw that some of our posters are hanged up everywhere; on the other hand, there is not any poster on some shops. When I asked the reason, they say that some people told us not participate to this event. They do not want to be opposed by some groups. Then, we are called as “buffoon and charlatan” (From the focus group dated 16 March 2006).

The province of *Ordu* had the highest level of mobilization in terms of the number of participants. The activists could activate large number of people into the opposition movement. The demonstration by which activists organized attracted five thousand people to the public square. However, in other cases, such as, in the province of *Trabzon*, the activists did not consider the mobilization of large masses of public as a necessary factor for the positive impact of opposition movement. Therefore, they did not try to include the public into the opposition movement. As *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu*, spokesperson of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group stated, they conceptualize the movement as a technical issue and they did not intend to be a mass movement. However, they tried to receive the support of the section of organized people who are supposed to be more sensitive to the environmental issues but they did not support the movement. Instead of the entire community, the activists of *Trabzon* would expect these sections to go into action. However, they could not be activated. On the other side, *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* makes a self-criticism about their opposition. As *Mollamehmetoğlu* stated

More severe actions could have been done. However, we had no opportunity. We tried to struggle by a small amount of money that was saved from our salaries. I think that we got important distance in spite of these lacks of facilities (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 15 April 2006).

One of the reasons behind the nonconversion process was that the number of activists was too low to be effective in the opposition movement. Activists pointed out that as a result of this, activists could not be persuasive in the eyes of the public. *Coşkun*

*Eruz*, Voluntary Representative of TEMA Foundation, stated that there is a certain section of people in every province that carry out the struggle. He clarifies that

These people are in public like “*Don Quixote*” every time. There is a case of abrasion of faces. I sometimes say that do not call me to the meetings or actions. Since people will say that same people are always in this event. In that case, you are seemed to be unemployed or idler and bound to following these kinds of events. However, if there are other people who deal with these actions, people will see different faces and think that other people are also interested in. They think that these are a handful of people and you become inured to them. They also think that the opposition is our “business” whereas this is our sensitiveness to the environment only (From the interview by *Çoşkun Eruz* dated 16 April 2006).

*Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu*, the spokesperson of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, also emphasized the same factor. For him, there is a handful section of people who are sensitive to the issue. Although there was high participation in some panels they organized, the people who support a matter or a project, that is, project that is being applied became more convincing for the society. *Mollamehmetoğlu* stated that the activists’ warnings are not seem realistic for the public. These warnings do not find a place in their world, and also they cannot conceptualize the issue of the road and its impacts (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 15 April 2006).

Majority of activists explain the state of immobilization of large masses of people as the weakness of civil society in the region and in Turkey both as a relatively independent public sphere and as a setting in which various social movements can emerge. They relate this to the socio-historical factors. According to them, especially the military coup of 12 September, 1980 has great negative effects on the public. The public was cowered and intimidation is prevalent among the community. In addition, the public pay attention to the leader of the movement. Activists emphasize that in the opposition movement against the BSCR, if the leaders of the movement had been from the party in power, they could have been more powerful.

As activists stated, in this political context, the determination of the government to construct the coastal road was the most important factor that influenced the

activation of the public. In the case of *Ardeşen*, this case was so crucial. Since the Prime Minister gave a direct command for completing the *Ardeşen* section of coastal road. As *Ferhat Artan*, ex-spokesperson of the coast protection platform, explained

Prime Minister came here and said that the road would pass through the coast. We oppose the decision of prime minister. In that case, nobody listen to you. Once the government decided to pass the road through the coast, it carries out it. Therefore, many think that our endeavor is of no use. For me, they are not very unjust since they will complete the road. Now, the law-suit continues. But they still construct the road. People see this situation. People believe what they see. In that case, your endeavor will be wasted. Even the most sensitive friends of mine told me that you struggle uselessly; there is nothing to do (From the interview by *Ferhat Artan* dated 14 April 2006).

The activists think that the public will understand the outcomes of their immobilization as time passes. However, the idea that to oppose is not effective to change the result of the application of the project has priority at this moment. The activists emphasize that “If you talk with people individually, you see that they are against the coastal road. But they did not oppose it thinking that nothing could be done to obstruct its construction”. Activists think that that they might have been ineffective to inform the people, but they carry out all the actions they can do. Although, in some cases like in *Ardeşen*, municipality informed people about the direction of coastal road and local press covered it, these actions could not be effective to change the awareness of people.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

In this section, the mobilization dynamics of the opposition movement against the BSCR, the actors that engaged into the movement, the role they played in the movement and their interaction between them were tried to be investigated. The opposition movement against the BSCR is consisted of large variety of actors. The most distinguishing feature of the opposition movement was the immobilization of the public. In the case of opposition movement against the BSCR, the change that the activists pursued was a public good, the protection of coasts and nature of the Black Sea region, and hence to maintain the identity of their cities. However, the public did not conceive this goal as their public good and they did not consider



themselves as the beneficiaries of the opposition movement. Instead, they consider the “coastal road of BSCR” as the public good for themselves due to the fact that a new road was needed to be constructed. Therefore, majority of the public remained in the bystander’s position during the movement.

Whether the majority of public could be transformed into active participants of the movement is a complex question to answer. There were a great number of political, economical and cultural factors that barricaded this transformation. Nevertheless, the role the actors played had also considerable effect. The case of the province of *Ordu* is an example to the interaction effect of the movement actors. The activist and supporters in *Ordu* constituted the largest movement structure and hence, they could get a favorable consequence in the opposition movement. In the other cases of the opposition movement against BSCR, the protagonist and antagonist base of the movement was not as clear as it was in the province of *Ordu*. This made the mobilization dynamics of the movements more complex and hard to analyze. The fact that national authorities, public institutions, that is, General Directorate of Highways, constituted the antagonist base of the movement that was directly challenged is the one of the distinguishing dynamics of the movement. This factor affected the mobilization negatively.

The seven cases investigated showed differences and similarities on the mobilization dynamics. The similar economic and political structure was the main cause behind the resembling mobilization dynamics of the districts studied. In addition, the traditional networks based on kinship and political cleavages were influential factors for these districts. The provinces included in the opposition movement showed differences in terms of the mobilization dynamics. The configuration of power relations of the actors in the movement affected the mobilization process differently in these provinces.

## **4.5. Tactical Repertoires of the Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

### **4.5.1. Introduction**

In this section, the tactics and strategies that were employed in the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be presented. For the purpose of study, the seven district/provinces in Black Sea region were studied. There are some differences and similarities between these regions in terms of their tactical repertoire covered in their opposition against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project. The tactics used in opposition movement against the project will be analyzed basing on the data collected from depth-interviews, and also media and electronic sources. The factors that became effective in the choice of tactics, the facilitating and barricading factors in the selection process of tactic repertoire and the implementation of the tactics used will be analyzed.

### **4.5.2. Forms of Action and Tactics**

Forms of action or tactics are critically important to social movements and those who would seek to direct them. In defining the social movements, Diani (1992) stated that “action which displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life” is one of the fundamental distinctions of social movements. According to Taylor and Vandyke (2004: 263), the protest or the collective use of unconventional methods of political participation to try to persuade or coerce authorities to support a challenging group’s aims distinguishes social movements from routine political actors. The authors point out that protest can include

a wide variety of actions, ranging from conventional strategies of political persuasion such as lobbying, voting, and petitioning; confrontational tactics such as marches, strikes, and demonstrations that disrupt the day-to-day life of a community; violent acts that inflict material and economic damage and loss of life; and cultural forms of political expression such as rituals, spectacles, music, art, poetry, film, literature and cultural practices of everyday life (2004: 263).

McAdam and Snow (1997: 326) state that although there is not information as much as the dynamics of emergence or differential recruitment of social movements; the

studies were developed recently to understand some of the processes that shape the tactical decisions and outcomes of collective action. Especially, as Taylor and Van Dyke states, the study of protest events is defining feature of the resource mobilization and political process traditions (2004: 263).

#### **4.5.3. Repertoires of Contention and Tactical Repertoires**

As Taylor and Van Dyke points out, the numerous examples of tactics used in various social movements lead to the suggestion that the protest possibilities are virtually unlimited. However, as the scholars suggest, tactic of protest is “fairly predictable, limited and bounded by the repertoires that protestors have learned” (2004: 263).

As Taylor and Van Dyke put it, Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998) use the term “repertoires of contention” to describe the distinctive constellations of tactics and strategies developed over time and used by protest groups to act collectively in order to make claims on individuals and groups. Like its theoretical counterpart the term “repertoire” implies that the interactions between a movement and its antagonists can be understood as strategic performances or as Tilly (1995) puts it “established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other’s interests” (cited in Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 265).

As Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) states, social movement scholars use the concept of repertoires of contention to refer to the recurrent, predictable and fairly narrow “toolkit” of specific protest tactics used by a set of collective actors in a particular campaign. As Muller (1997) points out, “the tactics or specific forms of collective claims-making used by social movements are increasingly examined in terms of their place in a larger repertoire of collective action” (cited in Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 266).

In this study, I will use the term “tactical repertoire” that was developed by Taylor and Van Dyke (2004). The authors suggest a more delimited concept of tactical repertoires to describe and understand the features and implications of particular

forms of collective protest. They are interested in *tactical repertoires* as interactive episodes that link social movement actors to each other as well as to opponents and authorities for the intended purpose of challenging or resisting change in groups, organizations, or societies.

According to Taylor and Van Dyke (2004), the term “tactical repertoire” includes three main features: contestation, intentionality, and collective identity: “First, tactical repertoires are sites of *contestation* in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations”(p. 268). The second component of tactical repertoires is the *intentionality*. The authors share the view of resource mobilization and political protest theorists that “strategic decision- making is one of the essential aspects of the social psychology of collective claims-making” (p. 269). Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 270) state that in examining whether any form of collective action serves as part of a tactical repertoire, it should be asked that what are the intentions of actors and whether a particular set of actors are consciously and strategically promoting or resisting change in dominant relations of power. According to Taylor and Van Dyke, to consider collective identity as one of the defining features of a tactical repertoire means recognizing that “a movement’s particular forms of protest are not only directed to *external targets*, but they also have an *internal* movement-building dimension” (p. 270). The conceptualization of tactical repertoires by Taylor and Van Dyke enables the analyzing the common features and process of the strategies used by any types of social movements.

#### **4.5.4. Types of Tactical Repertoires**

Turner and Killian (1987) identify four basic tactics: “*persuasion*, which appeals to the values or self-interest of the target; *facilitation*, which assists the target group in acquiring knowledge or resources to support the movement, for example, through consciousness raising; *bargaining*, such as when a movement exchanges electoral and other kinds of cooperation with the target group for support of the movement; and *coercion*, which punishes the target group for failure to support the movement’s goals” (cited in Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 267). On the other hand, as Taylor and

Van Dyke (2004) suggests, the recent formulations tend to differentiate between two modes of action: “one category subsumes nonconfrontational or *insider tactics*, such as boycotts, dramaturgy, lawsuits, leafleting, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying, petitions, and press conferences. The second includes confrontational or *outsider tactics*, such as sit-ins, demonstrations, vigils, marches, strikes, motorcades, symbolic actions, boycotts of classes, blockades, and other illegal actions such as bombings” (p. 267).

#### **4.5.5. Selection Process of Tactical Repertoire**

There are a number of factors that influence the selection process of the tactics that will be employed in the movement. However, the study of Tarrow (1994) shows that the most important factor for the selection of movement activists is the cultural availability of any given tactic. The fact is, for all the seeming spontaneity and unpredictability of social movements, their selection of tactics tend to be patterned and predictable. At any given historical moment, activists-especially those sharing a general ideological orientation –have available to them a fairly narrow “toolkit” of protest tactics. It is difficult for movements, especially at the outset, to choose forms of action that are unknown or otherwise unavailable to them (cited in McAdam and Snow, 1997: 326).

In the context of environmental movements, as Rootes states (2004: 621), the tactical and strategic choices of protestors much depends on how the issues, about which they mobilize, framed, and the political cultural and institutional contexts in which mobilization occurs. Much also depends on the nature of the immediate political conjuncture as well as the historical dynamics of protest and on the interactions among them.

According to Rootes (2004), the institutional structures of states have clearly influenced the organizational structures, forms of action, and courses of development of environmental movements. Although authoritarian regimes have generally tolerated environmental activists more than human-rights or pro-democracy campaigners it is only where liberal democratic institutions are well established that

fully developed environmental movements have flourished. Even among liberal democracies, different structures of the state have different impacts. However, as Rootes (2004: 622) claims, the structure of political institutions cannot explain the temporal variation in the forms of environmental movements repertoires within states. States are not merely structurally open or closed to but contingently open or closed to particular issues and movements at different times. As Rootes exemplifies, Britain reputedly relatively open to environmentalists before 1980, became closed as government prioritized economic development in general and, in the 1990s, road-building in particular. France, on the other hand, famously closed to antinuclear activists, has latterly been surprisingly open to environmentalists in respect of water policies (2004: 622).

#### **4.5.6. Tactical Repertoires in The Case of Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

The tactical repertoires of the opposition movement against the BSCRCP comprised a wide range of variety from nonconfrontational to confrontational tactics. In general, the tactics that were employed in the case of opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project consisted of the lawsuits, lobbying, petitions, press releases, panels, leafleting, demonstrations, and road blockages.

Among all the cases of Black sea region, the province *Ordu* shows a great variety. It is argued in the literature that the tactics of protest used by social movements are so integral to popular views of social movements that sometimes a movement is remembered more for its tactics than for its goals (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 263). The demonstration held in the province of *Ordu* in 1994 exemplifies this case. In *Ordu*, the main purpose of the opposition movement was the annulment of the *Ordu* section of coastal road project and the inclusion of construction of the bypass road instead. However, the movement in *Ordu* is denounced as the action of road blockage. This action led to the annulment of the construction of city crossing. Nevertheless, the demand of the activists for construction of the bypass road has not fulfilled yet.

Tarrow (1993) argues that similar tactics may be borrowed by different groups of activists pursuing different targets without face-to-face interaction (cited in Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 266). Meyer and Whitter also suggests that (1994), because of linkages between activist networks and movement organizations, the same protest tactics spread from one campaign to another (cited in Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 266). In the case of opposition movement against the BSCR, this was not the case. On the contrary, the tactical repertoire of other oppositional movements in the region influenced the selection of tactics in other movements. To illustrate, the opposition movement in the province of *Giresun* did not go for a law. *Hakan Adanır*, president of *Giresun* Division of TÜRÇEK Association, explained that the activists in the province of *Trabzon* went to the law in 2000. Although the administration court gave stay of execution decision, the contractor firm did not obey the court's rule and construction of road continued. Therefore, they did not go to the law thinking that this would mean only to make people helpless, and to struggle uselessly. They consider it as an unnecessary tactic since in the case of coastal road; lawsuits and law were not taken into consideration. However, *Adanır* confirmed that if the outcome of the legal case in *Trabzon* had been successful, they could have gone to the law (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

In the case of the opposition movement against the BSCR, there were barricading factors that prevented activists not to select a certain tactics in spite of the intentions of movement actors. For example, in the district of *Fındıklı*, activists immediately tried to prevent the filling of sea when the construction was first initiated. They blockade the work machines; however, police force that was sent from the province of *Rize* by the command of governor took them out of work site. Some of the activist stated that "If I had reacted more, police would take me to the jail. I wish they did, but it is useless if there aren't lots of people taken to the jail" (From the interview by *Bahattin Sarı* dated 14 April 2006). After this event, the activists of *Fındıklı* did not attempted to go into action once again. In this way, the demonstration was extracted from the tactical repertoire of the activists due to the use of repression by police force.

In some cases, political opportunity structures became a barrier for the selection of certain tactics. To illustrate, the demand of the activist to hold a referendum to reveal the opinions of public was refused by mayor of *Fındıklı*. One of the activist *Musa Özçiçek*, the mukhtar of the *Aksu* neighborhood, clarify that if they hold a referendum, 80 per cent of people votes as no to sea filling.

In other case, the activist of the opposition in district of *Ardeşen* planned to organize a demonstration in city center. They asked for march permission from local authorities. However, authorities did not give permission for a demonstration that would be organized in city center but allocated them the back streets of city center. Therefore, activist decided not to march since as they call it “they did not want to shout to empty shops” (From the interview by *Cengiz Tekin* dated 10 May 2006). Activist tried to carry out an action plan that would include a panel, a concert and a road blockage in *Ardeşen*. However, the mayor did not give permission for the panel. He only allowed to the organization of the concert. Thus, activists could not carry out their action plan (From the interview by *Cengiz Tekin* dated 10 May 2006). Both of these cases indicate that the political structure opportunities of a movement set the limits of tactical repertoire.

The legal struggle was the main tactical repertoire employed by all the oppositions in the region except for the provinces of *Ordu* and *Giresun*. The activists of *Trabzon*, *Ardeşen*, *Pazar*, *Fındıklı* and *Arhavi* opened cases in the Administration Court to annul the application of the BSCR. The administration court gave stay of execution decision for all the cases; however, the Council of State annulled these decisions. The activists objected to the Council of State and the lawsuits of these districts/provinces are still being charged in the Council of State.

The case of *Ordu* significantly differs from the other cases in its choice of tactical repertoire. The activists covered in the opposition movement in *Ordu* gave priority to hold a demonstration in their tactical repertoire. Among the factors that influence their selection process is the existence of movement and demonstration culture in the province of *Ordu*. In the 1970s, mass demonstrations were hold in the province of



*Ordu*. The political structure of the *Ordu* somehow differs from the other provinces in the Black Sea region in that the leftist tradition prevails.

In 1994, the activists of *Ordu* started to plan a demonstration. For the purpose of publicity, activists used media and distributed posters in the city. With the participation of five thousand people, they blockade the *Ordu-Trabzon* highway for three hours and provided the participation of parliaments, governor and the mayor of *Ordu* into demonstration. During the demonstration, the members of the opposition group did not take part in the front side. They remained in the back part and the demonstration was completed successfully. The cultural availability of the tactic of demonstration in the movement culture of *Ordu* and the convenient political conjuncture enabled the activists to utilize this tactic.

In addition to *Ordu*, the province of *Giresun* and the district of *Arhavi* organized demonstrations. In 2002, the province of *Giresun*, organized a demonstration. The including of demonstration to their tactical repertoire led to the conflict between the activists. As a result of this, the opposition platform split up after the demonstration. The platform held the demonstration in *Giresun* in 7 May 2002. The demonstration had high participation. The project of the coast protection platform was offered and suspended on the boards of *Ata Park*. The project was examined by people of *Giresun* and members of the platform explained it to people. Later, ex-mayor, *Mehmet Işık* came to demonstration area. He was also informed. From the province of *Trabzon*, the Black Sea Environmentalists Association participated the demonstration. From the province of *Samsun*, the Conversation of Nature Association sent its placard. They collected approximately 2500 signature. A few authorities from the General Directorate of Highways also came for demonstration. However, severe debates were hold between them and the opposition platform. The demand of the *Giresun* TEMA representative to plant trees on the filling area was rejected. The news of the demonstration has taken place on the local press only.

The activist in *Giresun* also organized road blockades after the demonstration. They blockaded the road two times within two weeks. Approximately, 60-70 people attended the blockade. The opposition platform did not take permission for

demonstration from legal authorities considering that an illegal road was constructing and they were in a state of holding a legal demonstration. Therefore, the platform refused to take permission. However, as the activist *Hakan Adanır*, president of *Giresun* Division of TÜRÇEK Association, explained

We explained that we would hold an illegal demonstration to everyone. This was a decisive factor for their participation. Therefore, we organized road blockade two times. Actually, the level of participation is not low for the province of *Giresun*. Also, in big cities, participation is not high in many actions (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006).

In the district of *Arhavi*, the opposition against the coastal road is being held by *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform. In the foundation report of the ACPP that was presented to public by a press release it was stated that their main objective is to perform all kinds of activities to provide the designing of the coastal road so as not to damage the costs in their town and other towns and provinces. These activities are carried out under the “Yes to road-No to sea filling” campaign. They declared that

To accomplish this, we aim to organize signature campaigns, public meetings, and a series of activities to form a public opinion. It is also aimed to develop alternative projects for the coastal road and to become a pressure agent for the public institutions to make them develop alternative projects (From the press release of the *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform accessed from Arhavi Foundation) .

Thus, as different from other cases, *Arhavi* Coast Protection Platform designated their tactical repertoire at the beginning of the movement in an official way. The activists held a few demonstrations on the *Fenerburnu* coast to attract attention of the public to the destructive effects of coastal road constructed by sea filling. The demonstration was organized under the leadership of mayor and also famous local singer, *Kazım Koyuncu*, was involved in the demonstration. The demonstration was also covered in national press.

In the case of *Pazar*, however, the activists of the district of *Pazar* did not even consider the demonstration as one of the choices of tactical repertoire of their opposition. Their approach to the tactic of demonstration is somewhat different from

activist of the other opposition movements in the region. As *Süleyman Basa*, the president of *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association clarified

We are not interested in show aspect of this case. We do not do this struggle for show. Shall we burn ourselves in *Hamidiye*? There is nothing to do these kinds of things in Turkey no matter how you are right (From the interview by *Süleyman Basa* dated 29 April 2006)

*Basa* even added that they have nothing to do with ways other than legal ones and they have no information about them. He strictly confirmed that they are carrying out all the necessary legal procedures and the case of the Black Sea coastal road can only be solved by law. *Doğan Karadeniz*, one of the activists of district of *Pazar*, conceptualizes these actions as undemocratic. As he stated “I went to the action in a “democratic” way, I did not organized a demonstration (From the interview by *Doğan Karadeniz* dated 26 April 2006).

Activists of the *Pazar* strictly emphasize that for a demonstration to become effective, the participation level must be very high. *Süleyman Basa* even stated that no matter the number of participants reaches to 5 or 6 thousand, demonstration will not become effective. According to him, all the people who live in *Pazar* must participate the demonstration. *Basa* also added that “the construction of the road continues in such a great speed that there is no use to organize demonstrations with low participation”. He stated that “they struggle in the scope of law, silently but in a suitable way”. As *Basa* explained few demonstrations were made on the coast in a small scale by the organization of some people of *Pazar*. However, he describes these demonstrations as “useless” for the sake of the movement. As *Basa* put it

If we had not opened the lawsuits, and if everybody lives in coast and made demonstration continually, could have the construction be halted for six months. Was it possible, if we could have not gone to law? (From the interview by *Süleyman Basa* dated 29 April 2006).

Some opposition movements had relied more heavily on media in their choice of tactics. They relied on the power of media to introduce themselves to local public and designate the goals of their opposition. The activists in the province of *Trabzon* exposed to the propaganda of countermovement constituted by mainly the

businessman of *Trabzon*. The activist were manifested as ‘the enemies of the country’ opposing the development of the region and the country. For a year, activists tried to remove these claims and tried to explain that they are not against the construction of a road but the Black Sea Coastal Road Project. To support their claims, they proposed alternative transportation systems and explained these. To this end, they used local media and covered in local media. They made press releases, participated to TV programs. In the end, they became successful to remove the claims propagated them by the members of countermovement. *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu*, the spokesman of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, stated that people who watched them said that they were persuaded (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 15 April 2006).

The counter movement directed towards the activist of *Trabzon* was became a preventing factor for them to select a more direct actions. As *Kenan Kuri*, the president of Black Sea Nature Federation declared “We were proclaimed as the enemy of the country though we were struggling by legal process. If we had used radical actions, we could have been proclaimed as “terrorist” (From the interview by *Kenan Kuri* dated 15 April 2006).

In some cases, activists disagreed on the employing of media as an effective tactic. In the case of *Pazar*, for example, *Süleyman Basa*, president of *Pazar* Culture and Development Association, is strictly against the usage of media in their movement. As he clarified,

Occasionally, they demand me to appear on TV or radio. But these are not helpful. On the contrary, they can cause to misunderstandings and harm to our lawsuit. You say something and they interpret this on their benefits. Consequently, it reaches in a different point. If the right way is law, we follow the law (From the interview by *Süleyman Basa* dated 29 April 2006)

*Doğan Karadeniz*, president of *Hamidiye* Tourism and Development Association, is on the other hand; complain about the indifference of the media to the opposition case (From the interview by *Doğan Karadeniz* dated 26 April 2006).

The activists of the district of *Pazar* employed the lobbying as main tactic as well as lawsuits from the beginning of the opposition. To illustrate, before the construction of coastal road in *Hamidiye* section, some activists of the district of *Pazar* came to *Ankara* to meet with *Mesut Yılmaz*, the deputy Prime Minister. *Doğan Karadeniz* stated that he asked *Mesut Yılmaz* not to pass the road through *Hamidiye* coast stating that it would be an important tourism center. After that, *Karadeniz* met with district governor and governor of the district of *Pazar*. However, district governor did not deal with this matter so much. Later on, the governor of *Pazar* advised him to form an association emphasizing that he could not struggle by himself (From the interview by *Doğan Karadeniz* dated 26 April 2006).

As a result of these actions, the *Hamidiye* section of the project was not applied until the beginning of 2005. However, finally, General Directorate of Highways approved the project that require coastal crossing and the construction of *Hamidiye* section was initiated. Meanwhile, the activists tried to form strong relations with the authorities. They went to General Directorate of Highways and Ministry of Public Works and Settlement and told the minister not to construct the road. They met with Prime Minister, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan* in a meeting that all the associations of province of *Rize* attended. As *Süleyman Basa*, president of *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association stated

Prime Minister listened to our problems. We explained this matter. He ordered the parliamentarians to reevaluate this problem. He did as required. However, he is being informed incorrectly. One engineer can inform him incorrectly and he/she is listened to. This case continues in spite of the command of Prime Minister. At this meeting, we also presented him 1000 petition signed by people of *Pazar* (From the interview by *Süleyman Basa* dated 29 April 2006).

The tactic of lobbying was mainly employed by the activists of the province of *Trabzon* and district of *Pazar* in addition to legal process. Activists of the province of *Trabzon* expressed that they even made an interview with *Koray Aydın*, one of the ministers of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements of the former government. They thought that since *Koray Aydın* is from *Trabzon*, he could be interested in their struggle. Activists met with the minister when he came to *Trabzon*. They explained that the project could not meet the needs of transportation sufficiently and the road

could not fulfill the expected goals of the project since it was a defective project. The activist explained the defects of the project. In this conversation activist admitted the fact that the project had been completed partly. However, in spite of this, they offered some changes that could be made. For example, they stated that the road could be passed through the southern parts of the towns stating that in development plans of the towns these kinds of roads are available. After explaining these issues, activists offered a few alternatives to the minister. Having being convinced of these facts, the minister said that he would meet with the authorities to make some changes in the project as soon as he returns to *Ankara*. However, the changes being offered were not carried out by the authorities. (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 15 April 2006).

The tactic of lobbying is the main form of action that the activists perform in the province of *Giresun*. For the time being, the main goal of the opposition movement in *Giresun* is the designing of filling areas. For them, it is an important matter and can not be decided by municipality or NGOs by themselves. Therefore, they want this decision to be made by a contest that all the architecture bureaus specialized in land escape will compete. To do this, they lobby in municipality and discuss the matter on local TV channels.

The popular forms of action to attract the attention of public are planned by the activist of various district/provinces. In the province of *Giresun*, activist arranged a concert with the placards of tradesman and carried out a signature campaign in *Ata* park beach. Although there were 2000 people at the beach, only 300 signatures could be collected. Activist stated that “If there had not been a concert, we could have not draw attention of people” (From the focus group dated 16 March 2002).

The activists of *Giresun* also brought famous pop singer, *Levent Yüksel*, to the province not to have him give a concert but only for press releases. Their slogan was “Do Not Divide the Black Sea”. During this action, activists also performed a placards and poster work to inform the public.

In the district of *Ardeşen*, at the beginning of the movement, activists planned to organize a concert. *Kazım Koyuncu*, famous local singer, was going to participate to the concert. However, he could not come due to his illness. Other singers did not come either. Activists think that if this concert had been given, it could have been effective for the publicity of opposition movement (From the interview by *Cengiz Tekin* dated 10 May 2006).

In the case of *Trabzon*, to make the public informed about the project, the coast protection platform involved panels and press releases in which the studies or reports prepared by work group presented to public. These were reflected in media. The representatives of the General Directorate of Highways were invited to these panels but they did not come. Only one observant came to panel from GDH. The academicians, experts, mayors and representatives of the NGOs took participate in these panels. Since 1998, the coastal road project has been reflected in the activities of ‘World Environment Day’. Moreover, in 1998 and 1999, in the scope of ‘Black Sea Day’, the project was reflected in panels one of which was held in *Ankara*.

Activist of *Trabzon* also arranged a meeting with the mayors and mukhtars of the districts in *Trabzon* in 2003 to inform them. Some of the mayors followed the decisions made in the meeting and a few sections on the route of the coastal road were saved. Coordination was built among the districts. The platform in *Trabzon* promised them to give support in case of the legal process.

In addition to these tactics, some petitions prepared by members of the platform were sent to the authorities. *Sibel Suiçmez*, member of the *Trabzon* Environment Council, sent a petition dated 7.10.1998 to the General Directorate of Highways. She emphasized the need for existing road to be improved. However, she stated that the enlargement of the existing road to the sea will destruct the coast and beaches and rupture the connection between the sea and people. *Sibel Suiçmez* demanded that the route of the road should be changed in the direction of the south and a revised project that protects the environment should be applied (From the petition dated 7.10.1998 accessed from *Sibel Suiçmez*). General Directorate of Highways replied the petition claiming that since the existing road cannot meet the increased traffic volume, to

construct a divided road became a requirement. They stated that the necessary measures were taken to protect the environment and fisherman, to form new coasts and to regulate the traffic.

*Ömer Faruk Altuntaş*, spokesperson of the *Trabzon* Coast Protection Platform, wrote a petition dated 12.03.2001 to the Presidency. He demanded that the works of coastal road project should be inspected and the unlawful procedures and applications should be started to be inspected by State Inspection Committee (From the petition dated 12.03.1998 accessed from *Ömer Faruk Altuntaş*). However, he could not get a response.

Some of the activist of *Trabzon*, such as *Fazıl Çelik*, the member of Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, does not consider the writing of petition addressing to national authorities as a useful tactic. According to him, the authorities do not read the petitions and these are answered by public relations departments (From the interview by *Fazıl Çelik* dated 17 April 2006).

The use of the tactics based technological innovation such as internet, web pages, and e-mail floods could not be used effectively in the opposition movement. This is caused partly due to the current introduction of these kinds of facilities into the usage of the activists. Therefore, during the initial periods of the opposition movements, these kinds of tactics could not be applied. However, some of the activists of *Trabzon* were declared that use of technology was very important for the opposition movement. As *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu*, the spokesman of the Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group, stated

E-mail is a recent occurrence, we are aware of it recently. We could have formed a good communication network nationally. Thus, we could have showed common reaction and spread it to international agenda. We could have communicated with more sensitive and larger masses (From the interview by *Ahmet Şefik Mollamehmetoğlu* dated 22 March 2002).

The opposition movements in other districts that were initiated subsequently were more aware of the tactics based on technology. The opposition movement in the district of *Arhavi* used the internet efficiently and formed an e-mail group. The



communication and exchange of information between the activists were provided by means of this group. It became, especially, effective to provide the communication with the activists and supporters of the movement who live in other provinces.

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

In this section, the tactics that were employed in the opposition movements against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project were tried to be analyzed. The districts/provinces that were included in the opposition movements used a wide range of tactical repertoires. The tactics of repertoire that were employed was covered mainly the confrontational tactics. The nonconfrontational tactics, on the other hand, were included less in the tactical repertoires of the opposition movements. In general, the tactic of lawsuit was selected to be used in the opposition movement. In addition to this, the lobbying, the media, press releases, panel, signature campaign petitions, concerts, demonstration and blockade were employed in the opposition movement.

The selection process of the tactical repertoire of the movements was influenced by some factors. The cultural non-availability of the tactics was the most important factor. Some tactics were not available in the toolkit of the activists and hence they could not be covered in the repertoire. In addition, the political opportunity structures was also became effective in selection certain types of tactics and excluding others.

#### **4.7. Outcomes of the Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

##### **4.7.1. Introduction**

In this section, the outcomes of the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project will be analyzed. There are many different potential consequences of social movements that include legislative, cultural or even personal outcomes. McAdam and Snow (1997: 462) gather the possible outcomes of the social movements under some general categories based on the empirical studies conducted in the field. They state that “while movements are typically associated with fairly specific goals, the impacts they ultimately have may be much broader and quite often

unintended” (p.462). Second, it can lead to the redistribution of political power. Third, social movements result in broad changes in public opinion and behavior in certain time period. Fourth, a movement can have impact on other movements. Finally, the authors conclude that “movements also have powerful biographical consequences for those who commit themselves to the struggle” (p. 462).

#### **4.7.2. General Analysis of the Outcomes of the Opposition Movement against Black Sea Coastal Road Project**

The opposition movement against the BSCRCP was fragmented since the fact that the project covered a huge area for 522 km and the road was everywhere to be reacted. The districts/provinces of Black sea region that formed an opposition movement against the BSCRCP had similar goals though some of them showed dissimilarity during the movement.

The activist indented to halt the implementation of the BSCRCP in their districts/provinces and to carry out alternative projects that would not require the sea filling method instead. For all the seven cases that were studied, only the province of *Ordu* could reach this goal partly. The opposition movement in *Ordu* achieved the prevention of construction of coastal road in their city; however, their demand for bypass road has still been in suspension.

In all the other cases, the construction of coastal road has almost been completed. Their coasts have been destructed and in some districts like *Pazar* and *Fındıklı* retaining walls in the altitude of seven meters were built between the road and the settlement areas. This increased the severity of the negative impacts of the BSCRCP in these districts in which the connection between the sea and the people was interrupted.

These outcomes were not the ones expected by the opposition movements. This mostly stemmed from the fact that except for the provinces of *Giresun* and *Ordu*, all the opposition movements went to the law. They won the lawsuits opened in administration court. The court made the decision of stay of execution. However, the

6<sup>th</sup> department of the Council of State cancelled the decision of the administration court. The activists, first, expected that after they won the lawsuits, the construction would be halted. However, the contractor firm did not obey the rule of the court. Secondly, the annulment decision of the Council of State was not expected by the activists. In short, they all believed that they could reach their goal by legal struggle.

It is suggested by all the activists that after seeing negative effects of the road, the environmental awareness increased among the people of Black Sea Region. However, the effects of the BSCR on the people of Black Sea region need to be investigated in the following years in order to be able to analyze the changes in attitudes and behaviors of the public of Black Sea region.

However, it could be said that the some negative impacts of the coastal road led to some reactions among the public. To illustrate, the insufficient measures to design the traffic order such as lack of overpasses led to the traffic accidents. In the province of *Rize*, which remained as unreactive to the BSCR, the people reacted against the traffic accidents and they blockade the highway. This reaction is an important indicator that some factors could activate the people. It is also argued by the activists that the economic income of the tradesman decreased due to the transit nature of the coastal road. However, the economic effects of the BSCR need to be further investigation.

In the winter of 2006, some of the regions exposed to floods that caused significant damages to the cities. The Minister of Environment and Forestry, *Osman Pepe*, declared that they did the coastal road wrong. As he declared, “We needed duple road but I wish it was not passed from this route, it became a motorway that make people of Black Sea region feel the absence of Black Sea” (Cumhuriyet, 3 July 2006). The negative aspects of the project could lead to the changing in policies as it was the case in Britain in the 1990s.

The culture of movement was introduced to the region. The activists especially learned how to struggle against environmental problems and for the time being they struggle to save the mountain pastures of the Black Sea region. The activist changed

their tactics repertoire. The majority of the activist believed that they could be successful by employing legal process. They did not even consider the other tactics of choice. However, their opinions about the tactical repertoire have been changed. Activists think that other tactics that include confrontational ones should be used to gain an influential outcome.

The movement remained as local movement. It turned to be a regional movement at the last phase of the movement. It was understood that the problem was the common problem of all the districts/provinces of the Black Sea region and a movement that unite the activists of all the oppositions could have been more influential. The opposition movement in BSCRП could not be converted into national movement. For a movement to be a national one, the media have to play a publicize role and the local organizations have to connect with the national NGOs. In the case of BSCRП, neither of them occurred. Some of the activist declared that they did not think to communicate with national NGOs.

The issue of road became one of the specialization issues of the ENGOs of the Black Sea region. The usage of technological innovations was increased among the NGOs. The NGOs gained computer and started to use internet. Even, Black Sea Nature Federation gained a grand from European Union. The member the NGOs of this federation all set computer hardware and all the members of these NGOs took training on how to use computer.

The activists stated that a secretariat is necessary for a coordinated movement. According to them, a center for secretariat that will employ full-time officials is required. The secretariat has to be responsible for the organization of meetings, dissemination the decisions made in the meeting and providing the communications. If there is not such kind of organization in a movement, it is not possible to get effective results in the long term. They stated that this respect is very important and must be taken into consideration for the following struggles.

The lawsuits that were won in administration courts showed the rightful claims of the activists. However, the annual decisions of the Council of State disappointed the

activists and led to the nonconfidence to the law system. Therefore, most of the activists are thinking to apply to European Court of Human Rights.

The committee of administrative lawsuits' departments of the Council of State, stopped the execution decision for the filling zone plan of the *Ardeşen* city crossing. An expert report was required by the Council of State. This recent development has resulted in some hope that other lawsuits might have a chance to be won in future.

The formation of regional environmental organizations, *DOKÇEP* (Eastern Black Sea Environment Platform) and Black Sea Nature Federation, was the most significant outcome of the opposition movement. *DOKÇEP* was formed by some NGOs of the provinces of Eastern Black Sea region in order to solve and fight the environmental problems of the region. To achieve this goal, NGOS decided to work in cooperation as a platform. Furthermore, they also attempt to inform the wider public on critical environmental issues. The importance of this platform is that it was realized that environmental problems have to be perceived not only as local but also as regional problems and to cope with these a joint struggle is needed.

The fact is that many NGOs in Black Sea region were communicated with one other by means of the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project. As *Hakan Adamır*, president of *TÜRÇEK Giresun* division stated

We came together with the people with whom we shared the common problems and views. We prevented the construction of thermal power plant in the districts of *Bulancak* and *Yomra*. Now, there is an organized movement in Black Sea region against the nuclear power plant that is planned to be constructed in *Sinop*. At the moment, everybody is preparing for *Sinop* demonstration.

He also clarify that

Ten years ago, a nuclear power plant was thought to be built in the province of *Sinop*. But the movement that formed in these days was not formed ten years ago. Because, the capacity of NGOs were insufficient. But now, we know each other. We have all the connections. Coastal road has big impacts on this development. Without experiencing the environmental disaster, it is not possible to explain it to the people. Maybe we have to experience this. Coastal road became the reason of this. Since, big investments are not made

in Black Sea region such as factories, burning plants and nuclear power plants etc. We did not suffer from environmental disasters. However, coastal road became the reason to experience the environmental disasters (From the interview by *Hakan Adanır* dated 18 April 2006)

In conclusion, activist thinks that they had gained a big experience. Now, they have enough information about the road case. The activists think that in the case that there will be a problem like this, they will be more prepared and their experience will be helpful somewhere.

#### **4.6.3. Conclusion**

The opposition movement against the BSCRП was formed to prevent the implementation of the project that requires the construction of coastal road by sea-filling method. The movement could not achieve this goal, however, brought about some outcomes.

The formation of organized environmentalist platforms is the most significant outcome of the movement. The Eastern Black Sea region had gained environmentalist activists who had experienced to struggle and organized under the common organizations. The outcome of the opposition movement against the BSCRП on other environmental movements will possibly be measured in the movement against nuclear power plant that is planned to be built in the province of *Sinop* or the movement to save the mountain pastures of the region against the danger of concrete building or another road opposition movements in other parts of Turkey.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

In this thesis, the mobilization dynamics and impacts of the environmental opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project (BSCRCP) were studied. The main research question of the study is which factors affected the mobilization dynamics, tactics and the outcomes of the opposition movement against the BSCRCP. To answer this question, the actors who engaged into the movement as activist, the tactics they used, the forms of protest they held and the outcomes of the opposition movement against the BSCRCP are analyzed. The activists conducted several protests during their struggle, most typically the held demonstrations and in a few cases it turned into road blockage. The originality of this thesis lies in the fact that environmental movements in Turkey did emerge only quite recently and only few got actually public attention. The protest of a state road project can be considered as a new form of environmentalist oppositional action in Turkey. The study of the underlying dynamics and impacts of the oppositional movement were not only the result of an academic interest but also of a personal affiliation and engagement in the ongoing opposition of the road project. A main aim of this study; however, was to investigate the historical emergence of the ongoing environmental opposition; to trace the dynamics and mechanisms of the mobilization processes; to point out local differences in the opposition; and to settle the road protest into a discussion of environmental opposition in Turkey. A specific effort was made in presenting the movement also from an “insider” perspective, i.e. the experiences and opinions of activists constitute the main body of information for this study.

Thus, it can be concluded, that the opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project (BSCRCP) was analyzed based on an evaluative approach and in-depth interviews with activists on the local level, focus groups, newspaper analysis and analysis of internet sources. These materials were further enriched through participant observation. The methods used can be summarized as being primarily qualitative. The fieldworks were conducted in two stages and in total seven

cases (different locales in the region) of the opposition movement were studied. It should be noted that the Black Sea Coastal Road Project covers a large geographical area, in the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey, however, not all the districts or provinces of this region have been involved in the opposition movement. Some of the provinces and districts did not engage in any open reaction to the project.

The opposition movement was first initiated in the province of *Ordu* in 1994. For the time being it seems that the protests nearly are coming to an end since the process of road construction and sea filling has been almost completed (already about 90 per cent) in spite of the protests. The Black Sea coastal road is planned to be opened to traffic in the midst of 2007.

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project is one of the biggest national investment projects of the Turkish Republic in terms of its scope and budget. The project was planned to cost 1.5 billion \$, however, the amount that was spent for the project has exceeded tremendously and has reached 4.5 billion \$.

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project (BSCR) should not be considered only as a project of national interest, it carries also very important international dimensions. The road constitutes an important land trade route connecting the Caucasus and Russia with Turkey. Especially, after the opening of the border of *Sarp* in 1989, it was considered and designed as a trade link to the bordering countries. The project itself was presented as an opportunity to bring economic development to the Black Sea region. A prerequisite of such a development axis was the need to increase the capacity of the existing coastal road to meet the traffic volume, assumably to increase in course with the expected increase in trade in the region.

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project was actually split into different road construction sections, each awarded and finally assigned to different national construction firms. The specificity of the project lies in the fact that the construction and widening processes of the new road resulted in drastic environmental destruction of the natural coast line. The natural landscape has been totally redesigned and many of the coastal villages and towns formerly directly in touch with the sea are now



actually “disconnected” in physical terms. The sea filling processes running parallel to the construction measures, created a highly artificial coast line.

In the frame of major infrastructural projects Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports became actually a legal precondition in Turkey, but interestingly the BSCRП has been exempted from such an obligation. In Turkey, a participatory approach in the sense that the public is included in the decision-making processes of major infrastructural projects (or projects like dams, thermal power plants, nuclear power plants and so on) is not common.

The environmental destruction of the coastal line as part of the BSCRП led to the formation of opposition movements in some districts and provinces of the Eastern Black Sea Region. The opposition movement against the BSCRП has been unique in the sense that environmental protests in Turkey in general and the opposition of a road project in specific is exceptional for Turkey. For the first time in Turkey, an oppositional movement emerged protesting a state planned road project. A distinctive feature of the opposition movement has been the fact that it actually covers a relatively large region. The road itself has a length of 522 km passing through a multitude of different sized settlements.

The basic motivations of the activists engaged into the opposition movements against the BSCRП were to save the coasts and environment. They objected to the coastal road due to its route and sea-filling method. The activists emphasized that the BSCRП would vanish their sea and coasts, and thus also the identity of their cities and the people living their. They suggested alternative road projects and routes that would pass through the southern part of their cities. Some activists proposed the application of other means of transport such as sea and railway to solve the transport problem. However, these suggestions were not taken into consideration by national authorities.

Highway transportation in Turkey is the most prevalent mode of transport. In total, 95 per cent of the transportation is realized through the use of highways. The

alternative southern road projects were not considered on the ground that they were too costly and the national budget not sufficient.

The first principle of the national authorities in an infrastructure investment seems to be economic feasibility whereas the principle of sustainable development requires the balance between economic objectives and the protection of the environment. However, in this project, it seems that in addition to the environmental effects, the impact of the project on the social environment has not been considered either.

The Black Sea Coastal Road Project has been part of politics of several governments over a period of almost ten years. The coastal road project has been a priority policy area of these governments. Especially, the AKP (*Ak Parti*) government declared an “urgent action plan” for the construction of double lane highways and accelerated the BSCR. 25 per cent of the project was completed in the AKP period, from November of 2002 to the present. The fact that the BSCR was a favorite national project supported strongly by the governments constituted a significant barrier for the emergence of an opposition movement.

Another important barrier expressed by the activists was the lack of transparency in the administrative structure of the local and national governments. This prevented the formation of rapid and forceful opposition to emerge. The plans of the coastal road sections were not open to public or they were presented only shortly before the initiation of the construction actually started. Whereas, in the case of the opposition against the BSCR, a speedy and forceful mobilization was required since the fact that the base of the road construction is provided by filling the sea by rocks and stones extracted from the nearby mountain areas. Thus, it is possible that in a relatively short time period the direct coastline as well as the mountainous areas forming the hinterland will be destructed. After this process, there is no possibility to convert the newly emerging coastline into its previous form.

The analysis of the opposition movement against the BSCR was based on the study of seven cases, districts and provinces of Eastern Black Sea region. The first fieldwork was carried out in March 2002, in the provinces of *Giresun* and *Trabzon*.

At that time, the opposition was active in these provinces; therefore, they were included in the study. The second fieldwork was conducted in April 2006, covering the provinces of *Ordu*, *Giresun*, *Trabzon*, and the districts of *Pazar*, *Ardeşen*, *Fındıklı* and *Arhavi*. The opposition movements in these districts have started after my first fieldwork; therefore, I included these cases later to my study. In my first fieldwork, I did not cover the province of *Ordu*, although *Ordu* had already an opposition in 1994. In my second fieldwork, I included the case of *Ordu* to complete a general picture of the oppositional movement along the road project. As aforementioned, the findings and results of the study are based on interviews with activists who spoke of their own experiences.

The seven districts/provinces showed similarities and dissimilarities in terms of the mobilization dynamics, tactics and the outcomes of their movements. In general, the opposition movement against the BSCRП can be characterized as a group of local movements. Every district/province carried out their struggle by forming opposition platforms or organization committees. However, these organizations did not make any cooperation or constitute common protest strategy; this can be also considered as one of the reasons why the opposition did not gain a wider regional and also national support. Some cooperation emerged between the districts of *Arhavi*, *Fındıklı*, *Ardeşen* and *Pazar* in 2004. However, these efforts of joining into a regional opposition came soon to an end, due to the fact that the construction of the road proceeded fastly parallel to the filling of the sea. Thus, the people were confronted with the destruction and remained without hope for a change of return to “the coasts natural form”.

Still it has to be mentioned that in the opposition movement against the BSCRП, a wide range of actors were included. Local authorities, local party representatives, non-governmental organizations, the media, national authorities and the public were engaged into the movement in different ways. The position of the actors and the interaction among them differed in terms of the districts/provinces. The local authorities, for example, supported the movement in some cases whereas in others they were involved in antagonist attempts. In the district of *Arhavi*, the mayor was the leading activist of the movement whereas the mayor in the neighbor district,

*Fındıklı*, displayed some antagonist attempts such as approving some decisions in favor of the BSCR. The most important factor that determines the position of local authorities seems to be the political party affiliation. The statement made by the mayor of *Fındıklı* reveals this fact. *Adnan Özbalaban* stated that although he was against the sea-filling, he did not oppose due to the direction of Prime Minister for completion of the road (Milliyet, 8 September 2005). The activists of *Arhavi* argued that the mayors of *Fındıklı* and *Ardeşen*, both of whom are from *AKP (Ak Parti)* did not support the opposition though they are in favor of it mentally. According to the activists, this prevented the formation of a common opposition against the BSCR.

The same case was also valid for the position of the local politicians in the movement. Especially, the activists of *Arhavi* stated that the members of the board of municipality from *ANAP (Anavatan Partisi)* and *AKP* approved the alterations in decisions and projects in favor of the operation of the BSCR. Some activists also declared that although the members of these parties do not support the BSCR, they are obliged to act in favor of it. They cannot stay out of party politics and act individually.

It should be considered that environmental movements are very recent phenomena in Turkey. In the last fifteen years, more active ENGOs emerged in Turkey which reflects itself also in an increase in numbers. In addition, the institutionalization process of these ENGOs has lead to the specialization in a specific environmental field. This process could be thought as a progressive development for ENGOs, however, it has certain disadvantages for the environmental movements. In the case of the opposition movement against BSCR, there are no ENGOs that are specialized in the fields of coast and marine. Some of the activists also explained that they did not demand support from international ENGOs like Greenpeace, specialized in the fields of energy and nuclear waste, assuming that they would not answer their petitions. However, the ENGOs covered in the opposition movement against BSCR gained a certain experience. Further, the environmental NGOs of the region started to be engaged into new structural organizations and it might be claimed that some kind of a new movement culture has begun to emerge.

In addition to ENGOS, other NGOs and also unions, profession chambers, culture associations etc. took a large share in the opposition movement against BSCR. They took part in the opposition platforms and, supported the movement. Also some townsmen associations located in *Ankara* supported the opposition and in some cases they carried out the legal struggle by themselves. The associations of the districts of *Pazar* and *Ardeşen* like *Pazar* Culture and Solidarity Association, and *Ardeşen* Culture Association are examples for this. However, the lack of organization among the local NGOs and ENGOS of the region and the lack of support of national ENGOS to the opposition movement led the movement to be almost ineffective.

The NGOs in the Black Sea region were unable to form connections with the road protestors in the countries of Western Europe. This was expressed as due to the lack of infrastructure like internet and human resources, i.e. persons with foreign language skills. However, these are not only problems of NGOs in the Black Sea region but also of NGOs in Turkey in general.

The role of the media is crucial for any social movement. The impacts of a movement are partly determined by the role of the media. In the case of opposition movement against BSCR, the media did not engage into the movement effectively. Especially, the national media did not cover the opposition widely and this prevented the movement to transform into a national movement. All the activists in the seven district/provinces emphasized that the relations of economic interest between the owners of national media and contractor firms led to the uncovering of the opposition in the national media. They also stated that the national media do not cover these kinds of events. Some activists stated that the individual endeavors of some journalists were not enough to form an effective impact for the public opinion and the publicity of the movement. Some stated that the national media began to get interested in the case recently; however, it was a late attempt since the coastal road is almost finished.

One of the most important factors in the case of opposition movement against BSCR was the immobilization of the public. They did not support the opposition movement except for the case of *Ordu*. According to the activists of *Ordu*, the

majority of people who live in *Ordu* largely benefit from the recreational facilities on the coasts. Unlike the other provinces in Eastern Black Sea region, *Ordu* has no harbor on the coastline and this area is used mainly for recreational aims. In addition, the availability of the tourism facilities on the coastline of the province could be a reason for the reaction to the BSCR. The province of *Ordu* has a distinct political culture inherited from the past. In the 1970s, mass demonstrations were organizing in *Ordu*. This period is signified by the events of *Fatsa*, a district of the province of *Ordu*. In 1979, the extreme-leftist group “Revolutionist Path” founded a commune and elected their “independent” mayor, *Fikri Sönmez*. He was one of the organizers of mass demonstrations for the resolution of the problems of hazelnut producers (one of the most important fields of agricultural production). This autonomous structure was demolished in 11 July 1980 by a military operation. The activists confirmed that the province of *Ordu* was the center of leftist ideology in the Black Sea region at those times. They still emphasize the existence of an “unconservative” political and cultural structure of the province. Further, some activists consider the inclusion of the conservative leaders of opinion to the movement as a great success of their opposition. These factors distinguish the province of *Ordu* from the other cases.

In some cases like in Arhavi, a great amount of signatures was collected at the beginning of the opposition, but the public who signed petitions did not take part in the demonstrations. *Musa Ulutaş*, the mayor, explained that the public does not want to be included in the demonstration since it was not considered as a democratic action by the representatives of the state like public prosecutor, the police and the politicians. The public does not want to be deciphered by police cameras. There remains some fear and that is a reason why they do easily participate in demonstrations. However, the support of the public is crucial for any movement to be influential and become effective to create a change in policies or unwanted implementations.

In the case of the opposition movement against the BSCR, the public remained largely in bystander position due to the fact that a new road for Black Sea region was perceived by many as actually needed. Factors such as the low quality of the existing old road, the high rate of traffic accidents, the long travel times have been frequently

cited by the people living in the region as serious problems in need to be solved, thus they actually facilitated the acceptance of the project. The destructive effects of the project only gained importance while the project itself was already ongoing. On the other hand, since a road construction is highly technical and not easy to comprehend, the public very late realized the future consequences of the implementation of the project.

Another dimension is the fact that the public was sympathetic to the movement but did not become activist. One of the main reasons for this was are the political and economic opportunity structures. For example, the activists in *Arhavi*, *Ardeşen* and *Fındıklı* emphasized that the contractor firms employed the local public in the construction of the road or they were promised to be employed by the politicians. In addition, the strong social network patterns through existing local forms of political nepotism and patron-client relations gave rise to the lack of support of the public. However, due to the lack of support of the public, the opposition movement remained dormant in general.

The seven districts/provinces that were studied displayed some similarities and dissimilarities in terms of the tactic repertoires they employed. The majority of them used the legal struggle as the main tactic. The violation of the coastal law and the related articles of the constitution led the activists to go to court. The trust in law was the most important factor in the choice of the tactical repertoire. The activists all won the cases opened in administrative courts. However, the slow operation of the legal process in Turkey gave rise to the rapid progress of construction firms and made the court decisions in favor of the opponents ineffective. The court cases took approximately six months to be finalized and the annunciation of the court decision to the contractor firms was also delayed. In this time period, the process of sea filling has been accelerated by contractor firms to render the stay of the execution decision of the court invalid.

Most of the activists who were interviewed pointed out that the public is increasingly realizing the negative effects of the coastal road since the construction or at least the sea filling process of the road have been completed and the new coastal road became

a concrete reality for them. For this reason, an impact assessment study can be carried out in the following years to analyze the attitudes of the public on the project since it is possible that the impacts of the coastal road on natural and social environment would be more obvious in the future.

Although it attracted less attention, the other dimension of the BSCRП was stone quarries. These were opened to provide the necessary materials for road construction. The rocks and stones extracted from these quarries have been used to fill the sea. However, these quarries have destructive effects on the environment. Because, for taking the rocks from the surrounding mountains, dynamite is used to. This again results in minor earthquakes to occur and sliding of soil on the surrounding area. This threatens the settlement areas nearby. The stone quarries have been exempted from Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regarding as the part of the BSCRП. Court cases were opened by the activists of *Arhavi* and NGOs of the district of *Çamlıhemşin* to halt the operation of them and also some small scale protests were held against these quarries in *Güngören-Arhavi* and *Çamlıhemşin*. However, a strong reaction has not been formed against this process. Some of the activists strongly criticized national ENGOS like TEMA<sup>10</sup> foundation for not being in opposition to this operation since the fact that the foundation is mainly interested in the erosion and the protection of soil. It is possible that the obvious effects of the stone quarries on environment could lead to the formation of more severe local reactions in the inner land of the districts in the near future.

To challenge against a practice of the state, a national project was not an easy task for the activists of the opposition movement against the BSCRП. Especially, the insistence of all the governments on the implementation of the project enabled the opposition to progress and succeed. The statement of the public prosecutor to *Musa Ulutaş*, the mayor of *Arhavi*, might best exemplify the attitude of the national authorities on this project: “This is a national project, and therefore, it must not be prevented, it must continue” (From the recording of the panel dated 27 November

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<sup>10</sup> TEMA, The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats, aims to prevent the soil erosion and desertification and to raise public awareness on these issues. The foundation has a large organizational structure based on voluntary representatives on the provinces, districts and villages. For more information, see [www.tema.org.tr](http://www.tema.org.tr)



2004). Although the governments following the initiator of the project consider its negative effects, they all kept the project thinking that it would be extremely costly high to reverse the project.

The oppositional movements in seven district/provinces had similar goals; an alteration in the BSCR in order not to allow the passage of coastal road constructed by sea-filling through their coasts. Basing on the success criteria developed by Broadbent (2003), the opposition movement against the BSCR could be described as partly successful in general. The seven cases of the movement formed protest organization and it survived for a certain period of time. However, they could not attain the major policy goals and have a major impact on the public opinion. The case of opposition movement against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project designates that the issues in high policy domain is hard to challenge; and in this case the impacts of the opposition movements are bounded to political opportunity structures.

Recently, the national authorities have begun to make press releases stating that the BSCR was a wrong application and alternative forms of transport could have been used. It is possible that in future the transport policies in Turkey will be altered in a way that will include sea and railway transport.

The opposition movement against the BSCR created a body of environmentalist activists in Eastern Black Sea region who acquired a culture of resistance. They have gained experience on how an environmental struggle is carried out thanks to the coastal road case. Apart from this case, some environmental problems in Black Sea region have emerged recently. The mountain pastures of the region are in danger to be destructed and the building of a nuclear power plant in the province of *Sinop* is being planned. Thus, it seems possible that an organized and more powerful opposition movement will be formed in the following years in order to cope with these environmental problems in the Black Sea region.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A**

#### **INTERVIEW FORM**

##### **Socio-Demographic Features of the Respondent**

Name, Surname:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth (province, district, village):

Education level:

Occupation:

Job:

The name of the workplace, the position:

##### **The Features of Non-governmental Organization to which the Respondent belongs**

Name:

Date of Foundation:

The Goal of Foundation:

The Charter Members:

The Number of the Members:

Address:

Phone:

E-mail:

Are there full-time staffs in your NGO? If any, how many staffs work in?

Has your NGO got a journal or web site?

When did you join this NGO?

How were you informed about the activities of your NGO?

Do you attend the activities of your NGO? Which activities have you attend?

## **APPENDIX B**

### **THE GUIDELINE FOR THE INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS**

- 1) What is the reason for your opposition to the coastal road constructed by sea-filling?
- 2) Does Black Sea region need a new road?
- 3) What are your alternatives to the Black Sea Coastal Road Project?
- 4) What will the effects of Black Sea Coastal Road for your district/province?
- 5) How was your opposition formed?
- 6) Who engaged into your opposition platform?
- 7) From whom have you received support (local governments, NGOs, media, etc.)?
- 8) Which tactics have you used in your struggle against Black Sea Coastal Road Project?
- 9) Which actions did you carry out in your opposition?
- 10) What have you done to inform the public about the Black Sea Coastal Road Project?
- 11) Does/Did the public support you?
- 12) Do/Did you have any cooperation with the activists/NGOs in other districts/provinces?
- 13) Have you been covered in local and national media?
- 14) Did you get communicate with national and international NGOs?
- 15) What are you planning to carry out for your opposition from now on?
- 16) What are the implications of your opposition for the Black Sea Coastal Road Project?

#### **For the provinces of Giresun and Trabzon (in second stage)**

- 1) How did your opposition progress after March 2002?
- 2) Which activities did you carry out after March 2002?
- 3) Does your opposition platform still exist? If yes, did the member composition change?

- 4) Who struggle against the Black Sea Coastal Road Project now?
- 5) Did you form any connections with the activists in the districts of Ardeşen, Arhavi, Fındıklı and Pazar?
- 6) What are you planning to carry out for your opposition from now on?



## APPENDIX C

### INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP LIST

#### Giresun

##### Focus Group; 16 March 2002

Hakan Adanır	TEMA Giresun Voluntary Representative
İsa Kurt	Giresun Rotary Club
Saffet Sabit Oksal	Sea-Mountaineering Sport Club
Cevdet Süslü	Sea-Mountaineering Sport Club
Hasan Ali Tek	Sea-Mountaineering Sport Club
Nevin Kurt	Giresun Architecture Chamber
Hasan Karaahmet	Tempo TV
Mustafa Dağ	Giresun Saturday Mountaineers Association

#### Interviews

1. Tolunay Kurdoğlu; Tourism Advertisement Association  
— 18 March 2002

#### Trabzon

1. Sami Koç; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
— 20 March 2002
2. Ayla Kurşunoğlu; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
— 20 March 2002
3. Kenan Kuri; Black Sea Environmentalists Association  
— 20 March 2002
4. Ömer Faruk Altunbaş; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
— 21 March 2002
5. Bekir Gerçek; Trabzon Architecture Chamber  
— 21 March 2002
6. Sevim Celep; Construction-Road Union  
— 22 March 2002

7. Ahmet Ş. Mollamehmetoğlu; Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group  
—22 March 2002
8. Osman Çavuşoğlu; Trabzon Environment Council  
— 22 March 2002
9. Güzin Apaydın; Trabzon TEMA Voluntary Representative  
— 22 March 2002
10. Sibel Suiçmez; Trabzon Environment Council  
—23 March 2002

### **Arhavi**

#### **Focus Group; 13 April 2006**

Belgin Lakerta	Arhavi Coast Protection Platform
Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç	Arhavi Foundation- ACPP
Kenan Öztürk	Arhavi Transporters Cooperative- ACPP
Osman Şentürk	DYP Arhavi District Organization - ACPP
Refik Lakerta	Arhavi Marksmen&Sprawl Hawks Association -ACPP
M. Fehmi Uyanık	
Erdem Güven	
M. Kemal Tatar	
Leyla Öncel	

### **Interviews**

1. Hasan Sıtkı Özkazanç; Spokesperson of the Arhavi Coast Protection Platform  
—1st April 2006
2. Musa Ulutaş; Mayor of Arhavi, Arhavi Coast Protection Platform  
—13 April 2006
3. H.Bülent Özbirinci; President of CHP Arhavi District Organization, ACPP  
—13 April 2006
4. Necati Baş; President of SP Arhavi District Organization – ACPP  
—13 April 2006
5. Zafer Çakır; President of DSP Arhavi District Organization - ACPP  
—13 April 2006

6. Ahmet Aydınlioğlu- President of DYP Arhavi District Organization-ACPP  
—13 April 2006

#### **Fındıklı**

1. Musa Kazım Özçiçek; Mukhtar of Aksu Neighborhood, Fındıklı  
—14 April 2006
2. Tacettin Yılmaz  
—14 April 2006
3. Bahattin Sarı  
—14 April 2006

#### **Ardeşen**

1. Ferhat Artan; Ardeşen Atatürk's Society  
—14 April 2006
2. Cengiz Tekin; Ardeşen Culture Association  
—10 May 2006

#### **Pazar**

1. Doğan Karadeniz; President of Hamidiye Tourism and Development Association  
—26 April 2006
2. Dr. Süleyman H. Basa; President of Pazar Culture and Solidarity Association  
—29 April 2006

#### **Trabzon**

1. Ömer F. Altunbaş; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
—15 April 2006
2. Ahmet Ş. Mollamehmetoğlu; Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work Group  
—15 April 2006
3. Kenan Kuri; Black Sea Nature Federation  
—15 April 2006

4. Mustafa Yazıcı; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
—15 April 2006
5. Coşkun Eruz; Trabzon TEMA Voluntary Representative  
—16 April 2006
6. Sami Koç; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
—17 April 2006
7. Ayla Kurşunoğlu; Environment-Culture Entrepreneurs Association  
—17 April 2006
8. Bekir Gerçek; Trabzon Architecture Chambers  
—17 April 2006
9. Fazıl Çelik; Black Sea Transportation and Environment Voluntary Work  
Group  
—17 April 2006

#### **Giresun**

1. Hakan Adanır; President of TÜRÇEK Giresun Division  
—18 April 2006
2. Asaf Zeki Kitapçı; Giresun Tourism and Advertisement Association  
—18 April 2006

#### **Ordu**

1. Taner Aksoy; Ordu Nature Activities Association  
—19 April 2006
2. Hüseyin İlhan- Ordu Nature Activities Association  
—19 April 2006
3. Oruç Rüştü Baş- Ordu Natural Environment Protection Association  
—19 April 2006
4. Nilgün Gözükan- Ordu TEMA Voluntary Representative  
—19 April 2006

## APPENDIX D

### MAPS, PHOTOGRAHS AND MATERIALS



Regions of Turkey



Black Sea Region, Turkey





**Aksu Coast, Fındıklı  
Before the Coastal Road**



**Aksu Coast, Fındıklı  
During the Sea Filling Process**



**During the Construction of the Coastal Road**



**The Retaining Wall of the Coastal Road, after the Construction**





**Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi,  
Before the Construction of the Coastal Road**




**Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
During the Sea Filling Process**



**Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
During the Sea Filling Process**



**Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
During the Sea Filling Process**



**Construction of the Tunnel on the Fenerburnu Coast by Sea-filling**





**The Demonstration against the Coastal Road on Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi**



**The Demonstration against the Coastal Road on Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
The Mayor and the Other Members of the Coast Protection Platform  
25 June 2004**






**The Demonstration against the Coastal Road on Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
Kazım Koyuncu, Famous Local Singer Supporting the Demonstrators  
25 June 2004**



**The Demonstration against the Coastal Road on Fenerburnu Coast, Arhavi  
25 June 2004**



Ardeşen Southern Road Project  
The Alternative Road Project Prepared by Mayor of Ardeşen





**Arhavi Southern Road Project**  
**The Alternative Road Project Prepared by Mayor of Arhavi**





**Press Release of the Activists of Fındıklı  
Mukhtar Musa Özçiçek and Cihan Eren**



**Press Release of the Activists of Fındıklı**





**Black Sea Coastal Road  
Espiye-Çarşıbaşı Section**



**Black Sea Coastal Road  
Çarşıbaşı-Trabzon Section**





**Black Sea Coastal Road  
Çayeli-Ardeşen-Hopa Section**



**Black Sea Coastal Road  
Çayeli-Ardeşen-Hopa Section**



GRAFİK: UĞURCAN ATAÖZLÜ TASARIM: NİLGÜN GÖZÜKANLI

Demonstration in the Province of Ordu