# DE-REGULATORY URBAN REDEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN *GECEKONDU* AREAS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF DİKMEN VALLEY

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# ABSTRACT

## DE-REGULATORY URBAN REDEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN *GECEKONDU* AREAS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF DİKMEN VALLEY

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Urban renewal policies in welfare state period are usually associated with the paradigm of social engineering that was dominant between 1940s and 1970s. However, in the wake of the fiscal crisis of the state in 1970s, and the following hegemony of the new right, urban policies including the renewal schemes have been ever-increasingly dominated by the deregulatory market oriented policies and rent seeking concerns.

De-regulatory urban renewal policies focusing mainly in squatter areas have also dominated the urban policies and political discourse in Turkey since the mid-1980s and little attention has been paid to the negative consequences of these policies.

Today, more than ever, residential redevelopment presents cities with a fundamental dilemma. In order to change the social and spatial condition of disstressed areas, alternative policies are implemented through either market or state-led redevelopment schemes. However, very same renewal schemes directly or indirectly leads to displacement of lower-income population, raising concerns over political equity. Likewise, overall success of these schemes often complicated by their impact on the macro-form of the cities.

The main objective of this study is to discuss the impacts of de-regulatory urban renewal policies on the socio-spatial structure of contemporary Turkish cities in which, social

exclusion and spatial segregation are becoming increasingly widespread. The case of Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project provides us with the opportunities to conduct this discussion since it is one of the most significant urban renewal projects in Turkey and it is regarded as a model for the forthcoming *gecekondu* transformation projects. The thesis argues that although the scheme has been led by the local authority, the logic of market which revolves around the rent-seeking activities has dominated the redevelopment process in the area and main losers are the tenants who live in the squatters subjected to redevelopment.

Keywords: Urban Renewal, Urban Regeneration, Displacement, De-regulation

# ÖZ

## TÜRKİYE'DE GECEKONDU ALANLARINDA KURALSIZLAŞTIRICI KENTSEL YENİLEME POLİTİKALARI: DİKMEN VADİSİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Refah devleti dönemindeki kentsel yenileme politikaları genellikle, 1940lar ile 1970ler arasında yaygın olan sosyal mühendislik paradigması ile bağlantılandırılmaktadır. Buna karşın 1970lerde ortaya çıkan devletin mali krizi ve bunun devamında yeni sağın hegemonyası ile birlikte kentsel yenileme faaliyetleri dahil olmak üzere kentleşme politikalarında kuralsızlaştırıcı ve serbest piyasa yönelimli politikalar ve rant kaygısı artan oranda baskın hale gelmeye başlamıştır.

Genel olarak gecekondu alanlarına yoğunlaşan kuralsızlaştırıcı kentsel yenileme politikaları 1980lerin ortalarından bu yana Türkiye'deki kentleşme politikalarında ve politik söyleminde de baskın hale gelmiş, bu politikaların olumsuz sonuçlarının üzerinde çok az durulmuştur.

Bugün konut alanlarının yenilenmesi kentleri daha önce olmadığı kadar temel bir çelişki ile karşı karşıya getirmektedir. Çöküntü alanlarındaki sosyal ve mekansal koşulları değiştirmek için geliştirilen alternatif politikalar piyasa veya devlet mekanizmasınca yürütülen programlarca yürütülmektedir. Ancak aynı kentsel yenileme programları, doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak düşük gelirli nüfusun yerinden edilmesiyle sonuçlanmakta ve politik eşitliğe dair kaygıları artırmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, bu programların başarıları genellikle kentlerin makro formuna olan etkileriyle uyuşmamaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı kuralsızlaştırıcı kentsel yenileme politikalarının sosyal dışlanmanın ve mekansal ayrışmanın giderek yaygınlaştığı günümüz Türkiye kentleri üzerindeki etkilerini tartışmaktır. Dikmen Vadisi Yenileme Projesi örneği bu tartışmayı yürütmemizde bize olanaklar sağlamaktadır, çünkü bu proje Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilen en önemli kentsel yenileme projelerinden biridir ve ileride uygulanacak olan diğer gecekondu alanı dönüşüm projelerine örnek olarak görülmektedir. Bu program yerel yönetimler tarafından uygulanmakla beraber bu tezde, rant-merkezli faaliyetlerce şekillenen serbest piyasa mantığının bu alandaki kentsel yenileme hareketlerinde öne çıktığı ve asıl kaybedenlerin yenilenecek olan gecekondularda yaşayan kiracılar olduğu savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kentsel Yenileme, Kentsel Yeniden-canlandırma, Yerinden Edilme, Kuralsızlaştırma

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The main concern of this thesis has been the de-regulatory urban policies revolving around the rent-seeking urban renewal and redevelopment schemes leading to the transformation of unauthorized settlements in Turkey. The thesis has aimed at achieving two interrelated objectives. On the one hand a critique of mainstream literature has been presented with a particular emphasis on an alternative framework through which a more viable perspective on urban renewal and redevelopment could be obtained. Secondly through a case study it has been shown that renewal policies led by the local authorities serving to the strengthening rent seeking activities in the city at the expense of so-called public interest. The thesis through the field research has found out that there has been little resistance to the renewal policies implemented by the local authority among those who have been the main victims of the process itself.

In the following sections of this chapter, having reviewed some conceptual definitions on urban renewal and redevelopment, existing views on the interpretation of urban policies and the epistemological assumptions that will shape the language of the forthcoming chapters are going to be discussed.

The second chapter consists of the evolution of urban renewal after the World War II in industrialized countries, since the tendencies of adapting similar policy initiatives for the Turkish context necessitates an analysis of the consequences of these practices in these geographies. In the third chapter, urban policy and planning experience of Turkey is going to be discussed with a comparison between these experiences before and after 1980. In this way, it is aimed to explain the conditions that prepared the suitable environment for the emergence of de-regulatory policies and their reflection in urban renewal and regeneration initiatives, which is also going to be discussed in this chapter. The outcomes of the discussions in these chapters are going to be used in the fourth chapter for interpreting the case of Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project in Ankara. In this part, the main purpose is to

picture the current stage of this project and inquire the extent to which, the initial objectives are realized. In the final chapter, firstly, a brief observation is made regarding the reasons that have created a positive conception of urban renewal and regeneration initiatives in Turkey. Some arguments about the influence of this conception on local policy-makers are also going to be discussed. Lastly, some recommendations are going to be made in order to contribute to possible efforts of formulating alternative policy proposals.

It should be pointed out that the debates developed in this study depart from the findings of current empirical studies and the critiques of the contemporary urban policies in different contexts. As discussed in certain parts of the thesis, detection of common tendencies in urban policy-making plays a significant role in interpreting the outcomes of such tendencies in Turkey. Because of the intentions of extracting the most significant aspects of urban renewal and regeneration initiatives in Western countries and employing them in interpreting their reflection in Turkish context, certain specific features of distinct geographies are excluded by the author, unless these specificities transform the whole experience. The reason of this exclusion is not only to realize the aim of focusing extensively on the issue of discussion, but also to benefit from the experiences of Western countries in terms of initiating such policies that are undeniably richer when compared to the urbanization practices in Turkey. This way of conducting the debate will also contribute to the subtle intention of analyzing the contemporary urbanization discourse and discussing the adverse effects of adapting Western literature directly to the third world context without inquiring the analytical validity of the tools that shape the academic language.

### 1.1. Conceptual Definitions

In this study, urban renewal is used as an umbrella concept for inquiring a wide range of policy initiatives and urban transformation processes like ‘urban redevelopment’, ‘rehabilitation’, ‘reconstruction’, and ‘conservation’. As it can be deduced from the everyday meaning of the word, the primary feature of renewal is that it is realized on previously developed areas. In Parfect and Power’s words urban renewal activities are initiated “with specific plans as well as generalized local planning policies, including certain redevelopment/demolition implications” (Parfect and Power, 1997:159). It is of course difficult to define urban renewal precisely, since its meaning changes with respect to the period that it is conducted; the actors who are involved in it; and the objectives, means, and the scope of transformation. In addition, because of the political connotations of urban

renewal, the language of discussion changes according to the consequences of these initiatives on the socio-spatial configuration of the renewed area. In order to specify the issue of discussion, it should be said that urban renewal activities are going to be discussed with a main emphasis on the state's role in these initiatives. Thus, transformations in built environment through the market processes that are indirectly encouraged by the state are excluded from our inquiry.

Another vital concept that is going to be discussed is 'gentrification'. The gentrification process should be conceived of as an extension of urban renewal, though it has become an issue of study in itself as a result of "the geographical intersection of (…) demand-side changes with supply-side forces of urban land markets" (Wyly and Hammel, 2001:213) in this process. It was previously defined as the move of middle-class households into working-class neighborhoods in London (van Weesep, 1994:76). Having been labeled with different terms like 'revitalization' (in U.S.) or *embourgeoisment* (in France), Gale defines gentrification as "the renovation of the older urban neighborhoods primarily by individual market actions -sometimes accompanied by public subsidies and other governmental actions" (Gale, 1985:174). Thus, although gentrification seems to be necessitating the willingness of the private agents to restore the dilapidated buildings, the role of the state in creating and/or encouraging this willingness locates this issue in a pivotal position in this study.

The implications of urban renewal policies are going to be discussed with respect to the transformation of the urban policy-making scheme from 1940s onwards with an extensive emphasis on urban restructuring. Therefore, it should be noted that concomitant to (and emerging from) the changes in the economic base of cities by 1970s, definition of urban renewal have broadened from expressing a "process of essentially physical change" to its contemporary form, that is 'urban regeneration', which is defined as a process "in which the state or local community is seeking to bring back investment, employment and consumption and enhance the quality of life within an urban area" (Couch, 1990:2-3). With its emphasis on the increasing involvement of private actors and the necessity of strategic thinking, urban regeneration is defined by Roberts as "comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social, and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change" (Roberts, 2000:17). In the following parts of the study, the

concepts of urban renewal and regeneration are going to be used interchangeably according to the context that the inquiry is conducted.

During the inquiry, the rich experiences in urban restructuring of advanced countries in terms of urban renewal and regeneration initiatives are going to be discussed briefly, in order to reveal the tendencies of homogenization in the course of urban politics in global world that has gone far beyond simple resemblances and started to expose the slippery nature of capital. However, contextual peculiarities that emanate from the differences in the social, political, and economic processes in distinct geographies should be specified. These contextual specificities in the conduction of these initiatives are going to be discussed during the discussions in the following chapters without loosing the grips of the theoretical framework in order not to reduce the inquiry into a mere comparison. What should be in mind is that the main concern in this study is to detect the socio-spatial consequences of urbanization policies that have increasingly been seeking to create rent in the built environment and setting the convenient conditions for the accumulation of capital.

### 1.2. Approaching the Issue

In order to inquire the implications of urban renewal initiatives after the World War II and in the post-1980 period, the language of discussion about the determinants of these policies and the emerging tendencies in urban policy-making should be discussed. Fainstein defines the attitudes inherent in the analysis of urban restructuring within fundamentally two opposing views: “one is to overly polarize the issue so that only structure or agency, only economics or only politics, only space or only history becomes the determinant of outcomes; the other is to say that everything matters” (Fainstein, 1994:12). Although this main dichotomy should be in mind, urban political theory has been trying to overcome this split and generate all-encompassing interpretations of urban political restructuring, among which, the growth machine thesis, its extended version, that is, regime theory, and the regulationist perspective constitute the language of discussion. What is important in these efforts is that they stand at the conjunction of three approaches: The market theory, the statist-institutionalist view, and the neo-Marxist view. The reason of this tendency of convergence can be observed in the common points of criticism that they share with each other. Market theory and institutionalist approach blame Marxist explanations for being functionalist and determinist, by invoking structure-agency dichotomy, though in different rates and contents. The common critique of institutionalist and neo-Marxist approaches on market theory is the

consideration of market processes as naturally given, without any suspicion. Market theory and neo-Marxist view, on the other hand, repudiate the Weberian emphasis of the institutionalist approach on the autonomy of the state and the power of bureaucracy over economic determinants. In consequence, it is possible to observe the impacts of the current ambiguities in the social theory in theorizing urban phenomena.

In all these theories of urban restructuring, it is possible to observe a fundamental inquiry, that is, the possibility of local politics in the new phase of capitalism. Although the restructured policy-making processes appear to be signaling a new paradigm of proactive governments in sub-national scales, it is still under discussion, whether local policy initiatives are the generators of growth and regeneration, or mere responses to the capital accumulation processes. The ambiguity in theorizing the impact of international capital and local business, the decisiveness of growth coalitions and community-based oppositions, and the role of central and local governments blur the picture and results with the interpretations, which are swaying between local specificities and theoretical abstractions. In consequence, what has been experienced is a still undefined space economy, which could not be interpreted adequately to prepare a proper prescription neither for the defenders, nor for the criticizers of it.

The scope of this study does not provide much space for a theoretical inquiry and the author does by no means claim that he achieved in protecting the forthcoming analysis from all kinds of epistemological pitfalls. However, it should be noted that the fundamental assumptions of the regulation theory constitutes the route that will be followed in following chapters, although certain points of criticism about this approach are admitted by the author. Hirst and Zeitlin, for example, point that regulationist perspective is open to incompatibilities when combining higher and lower levels of analysis and claim that its effort to discover a middle way between general theory and empirical analysis has necessarily run into a 'blind alley' (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991:21-22). Even though Hirst and Zeitlin's cautions about the level of abstraction in regulationist approach provides a convenient reason for suspicion, loosening the ties with a general theory of capital accumulation would eventually lead us to a comparative approach that promise nothing more than 'comparing' for the sake of being 'comparative'. Besides, the forthcoming discussions will display the fact that regulationist perspective's comprehension of empirical studies is more revealing in terms of detecting the roles of the agents of urban regeneration policies, since it provides necessary tools for understanding the relationship between demand-side and

supply-side factors, and thus, for grasping why particular classes are the beneficiaries of the processes without blaming the victim.

### 1.3. Interpreting the Outcomes

Urban renewal has always been an issue that combines economic and political aspects of urbanization. This was the case for the Haussmann's famous plan for Paris in mid-1800s, which was prepared by the order of Napoleon III with the main goal of creating a 'politically functional' Paris. The transformation of Paris was criticized, on the one hand, for displacing many residents and for its brutal attitude towards historical values of the city and, on the other hand, for its gigantic cost. It has been admitted for a long time that space is political and every single intervention in built environment has an ideological connotation. Perhaps that is the reason why Lefebvre criticized the efforts to construct town planning as a science of space, which uses the concepts of other disciplines like demography, political economy, geography and produce its claims in the same manner as an established discipline like economics. According to him, despite there are efforts to formulate one, planning has no epistemology (Lefebvre, 1977: 339-341).

Besides its complex social patterns, built environment's major role in capital accumulation process had fostered the establishment of the branch of urban economics that is constructed upon a strong rationale. The undeniable relationship between urban renewal and urban economics necessitates economic interpretations. The contradictions within the whole process of urbanization are also reflected to urban renewal practices since the social character of space stands as an obstacle for realizing the economic objectives of intervention. In his structural analysis, Harvey points a potential crisis, arising from relations of possession and use (or, as an extension of it, exchange-value and use-value) of the two categories of built environment which are 'fixed capital items' -to be used in production (factories, highways, railroads, etc.)- and 'consumption fund items' -to be used in consumption (houses, roads, parks, etc). In his words, "a 'rational' allocation of land to use can be arrived at through a market process. But because of the pervasive externality effects and the sequential character of both development and occupancy, the price signals suffer from all manner of serious distortions" (Harvey, 1985a:36, 39).

The monopolistic character of land ownership does not, however, excludes the socio-spatial relationships from the crisis-ridden capital accumulation processes. What should secondly be

analyzed is the extent to which, interventions in the built environment influences these relationships. Harvey, for example, interprets processes like "suburbanization, deindustrialization and restructuring, gentrification and urban renewal" as a part "of a general process of continuous reshaping of geographical landscapes to match the quest to accelerate turnover time" (ibid.:28). According to Harvey the struggle against the landlord or against urban renewal is a surface appearance of conflicts around the built environment, which conceals the real essence of class cleavages. At this point a divergence in interpreting how these cleavages should be conducted and what they are all about.

Turning back to Lefebvre, it is possible to observe the initial reaction of the opposing idea. In his words, "[o]ne of the most important points for the power of the left is to support consumer movements that have not yet found their voice (…). One of the political roles for the left, then, is to *use the class struggle in space*" (Lefebvre, 1979:291-292). The struggle for collective consumption goods is successfully described by Castells but with an extensive emphasis on the self-interest of the governing authorities. He relates the urban renewal activities in Paris in 1970s directly with the electoral interests of a particular political party and points that an interpretation of these processes necessitates an inquiry about the internal logic of politics. Emphasizing the conflict between different voting groups, rather than the dominant and working classes, he interprets the restructuring activities in Paris as a project of domination of Paris by a certain group of voters (voters of De Gaulle) aiming to remove the leftist groups (Castells, 1997:136-138).

This kind of a definition of short-term interests of the actors has long been inherent in discussions about urban renewal initiatives. Since these interventions are visible in space and can be realized in a short time span, they were (and still are) used for electoral concerns. However, perceiving urban renewal in this perspective does not only disconnect the relationship between politics and capital accumulation, it also verifies the relevance of community-based oppositions, which too are based on short-term interests, and thus, have little opportunity of success. Parsons, for example, blames Harvey for being 'economistic' and for separating capital and class struggle, at least in conceptual level. Contrary to Harvey, he prefers a more 'political' perspective and praises inner city struggles against urban renewal initiatives in 1960s, which have been conducted primarily by minority workers "both peripheral and unwaged, who had little or no tradition of unionization or, indeed, steady waged work" (Parson, 1982:394-407). Although Parson's arguments display a proper point of departure for the struggle against exploitative policies at first glance, it only stands

as a description of the actual practices, rather than being a prescription for an emancipatory one. Considering the structure of local politics, community resistance can easily deviate the goals of resistances that are conducted under the label of working class movements. Since, as Harvey points, "community-consciousness rather than class-consciousness in the Marxian sense is dominant in the capitalist city" (Harvey, 1985b:122), the resistances that Parson praises take place within the plane and logic of capitalism, especially when considering the current form of these autonomous movements under local democracy discourse, in which alliance with other actors -which is defined by Schönwalder as 'the dilemma of autonomy and co-optation' (Schönwalder, 1997: 755)- or relying on the representative democracy are considered as the only possible strategies to reach the goals of the community.

In this study, it is considered that there is a dialectical relationship between the economic motives and ideological connotations of urban renewal initiatives. The reason of this dialectical relationship is twofold: Firstly, as it is going to be discussed, growth oriented and rent-seeking policies directly or indirectly influence the class structure of areas of regeneration, since the eventual landscape that is sought to be created is shaped by the life-style concerns of a particular class. Secondly, the means of these policies emanate directly from the interests of the dominant class. In other words, not only the end result of urban regeneration, but also the process of transformation is determined by hegemonic relationships. Thus, the historical evolution of urban renewal during the postwar period and its contemporary scheme is going to be inquired through a survey on the surface appearance of urban renewal policies and their underlying content. The main goal is to evaluate the whole process with respect to the interests of dominant and oppressed classes and the conditions that influence their motives.

# CHAPTER II

# URBAN RENEWAL BEFORE AND AFTER DE-REGULATION

## 2.1. The Rise and Fall of the Myth of Technocracy

It is possible to observe that the urban policy initiatives in postwar period up to 1970s had been based upon the conception of the notion of 'urban', which has an external relationship with production and economic development. The insistence in perceiving of the urban problems as mere extensions of the problems of industrial development and refusing the direct relationship between capital accumulation and urbanization had resulted with producing policy formulations that aim to protect the adverse impacts of industrialization by strict zoning, land-use control, and decentralization of economic activities immediately after the World War II. Overlapping with the widespread belief in the virtues of social engineering, urban policy schemes were formulated under a technocratic point of view, unlike the first half of the 20$^{th}$ century in which, market values had dominated the production of space. As it is going to be discussed later, the disinvestment of private sector in cities and the increase in the decline of the central cities had changed this conception and fostered the conditions for the emergence of market logic in state policy-making and transformed the urban scene totally by 1980s.

Although the priorities and motives may vary according to the agenda and the execution may display certain differences according to the social, political, and economic structure, what can easily be pointed as a common feature in the urban renewal initiatives in the postwar period is the extensive role of the state in these processes. The extent of the power of governments in shaping the built environment is determined with the relationship between the central and local governments; the role of the local elites in local policy formation; and the limits of the profitability of investing in urban land -which surely is in relation with the regulations on urban development. The cases that are mentioned below are selected in order to reflect these diversities. According to this while the local elites and capital holders have a more apparent impact on policy-making processes in U.S., the local policies have had

influenced by the conflicting relationship between the central and local governments in Britain. The French case, on the other hand, provides us an example of extensive central government control on urbanization policies. However, like the cases in other advanced countries, urban renewal in the U.S., Britain, and France were criticized for their ineffectiveness in overcoming the social problems and for enhancing them by destructing community life.

### 2.1.1. Regulating the Urban Form through Direct Intervention

The most widespread discussions about urban renewal in 20th century was probably conducted in the U.S. and the strategies for dealing with the problem of ill-conditioned housing in this case stands as an instance for a false prescription caused by a false diagnosis for a pathological situation. Although civil reaction against poor conditions of housing for masses goes back to the beginning of the century, government's precautions to eliminate this problem have firstly appeared by the Great Depression in 1929, within the *New Deal* program, which marks the establishment of the conception of welfare state policies in U.S. Although there were some examples of the building of planned communities, it was not until 1930s that federal action was initiated towards housing problem by the enaction of several laws to improve housing conditions for the urban poor.

Urbanization and, in particular, housing policy in U.S. have always been affected by the regulations and the public opinion that are based on liberal thought. English response to housing problem after the World War I -that is, providing government-subsidized housing-, for instance, has been strictly rejected in American political circles and labeled as a form of 'benevolent paternalism' which endangers moral and economic standards of the country (Abrams, 1967:36). In order to alter public opinion and to justify the basic principles of the application of New Deal policies in the elimination of slum areas, poverty problem was emphasized and England's successful experience with public housing was expressed in political arena and media (Abrams, 1967:39, 40). Earlier legislations of the establishment of Federal Home Loan Act (in 1932), The Home Owners Loan Corporation (in 1933), and Federal Housing Administration (in 1934) were mainly based on supporting lending institutions by providing lower interest rates and longer repayment periods (Bellush and Hausknecht, 1967a:4-6). In practice, the main goal was to stimulate housing sector by giving incentives, since its peculiarity in revitalizing the economy was conceived as a pertinent way of fighting against the diminishing rates of profit and the crisis in capital accumulation. This

preliminary intention became the main attribute of strategies against the housing problem in U.S. and government initiatives in the phenomena of urban renewal in general. The paradox may be stated as to depart from the assumption that the existing economic system fails to address the needs of poor and to consider private sector the remedy for this problem (ibid.:7). Similarly, Grigsby points that market trends should not dictate their demands and deviate the goals of renewal projects, since these interventions, in principle, seek to alter these trends (Grigsby, 1966:626,627).

The Housing Act of 1937 aimed to eliminate slums in 'the European way' of confronting the problem of housing the urban poor, that is, government's participation in low-cost housing by building public housing. According to Greer, "the program might be called, indifferently, public housing or slum clearance", since public housing were built on the site of slums (Greer, 1965:15). The distaste for Negroes, who constituted the greatest proportion of the urban poor, stood as an obstacle in public housing, and resulted with the construction of taller buildings at the center of the Negro districts, away from middle-class communities. These projects, however, gave rise to criticisms about the social costs of public housing and inhumane living conditions in building blocks, and caused an ongoing repugnance for public housing in broad circles, from housing activists to social scientists in U.S. Gans, for example, defined them as "huge nests of crime and delinquency", and strictly refused it as an alternative for housing policy (Gans, 1966:546). The program was also away from realizing its goal, since the number of public housing constructed lagged behind the number of removed slum-dwellers.

The economic boom caused by the World War II has postponed the reformulation of housing policy until the establishment of the reformed housing act under the new concept of 'urban redevelopment' in 1949. The emphasis was again on the role of private sector; the main target was to enable private developers to handle as much of the redevelopment projects as possible. Even though some precautions that avoid the competition between private and public housing were taken -like limitation in rents and determining the criteria of dwellers who can settle in public housing-, 1949 Act could not meet the expectations, because of the housing policy's subtle content of supporting private housing sector by purchasing the most of the land and providing redevelopment projects in which the biggest share in the cost of construction -the cost of the land- was excluded. In that period, previous calls for comprehensive approach to redevelopment have also become apparent and planners stipulated that the 'spot removal' type of housing projects could not be a solution for the

housing problem, since ill-conditioned housing areas were a part of a larger system (Greer, 1965:18).

The third attempt in the period of welfare politics in U.S. was the reform in The Housing Act of 1949, which was ratified in 1954. The new program was embarked upon the label of 'urban renewal', with a new strategy of rehabilitation and conservation rather than clearance. The major difference of this program was the introduction of the Workable Program, which contains regulations for relocating the displaced dwellers, minimum standards for dwellings, and participation of the citizens in the renewal process. The comprehensive approach has become dominant by this new legislation and local public authorities like local political officials and local redevelopers in the private real estate business had a more active position in renewal processes. By the increasing concern of conserving the existing stock of housing, analysis of the blighted areas and categorization of the type of intervention in built environment gave a different outlook to projects, unlike previous clearance programs. The projects initiated under The Housing Act of 1954 were very costly and seemed to be away from realizing its goals for several reasons. The concept of participation necessitated solutions of many conflicting neighborhood interests. Slum dwellers were curious about the promises and property owners were pressing because of the profitability of slum ownership. Another aspect of the new program was the shift from the conception of redevelopment, which predominantly was based on reconstruction of residential areas, to the conception of renewal, which comprises the constructions for functions other than residential use. This feature of urban renewal did not contribute to program's claim of providing housing for dislocated dwellers and ignited new critiques about the negative effects of housing policy in U.S.

The evaluation of housing policy between 1930s and 1960s in U.S., has been initiated within the mainstream discourse of American urban political literature on the welfare politics, since urban renewal has been a significant and the most obvious example of the application of it not only because of the modernist content of it -that is, the architectural determinism embedded in the vision of redevelopment and renewal projects-, but also because of the fragile position of housing -that is being both the most basic good in provision of public services (by itself and by its externalities) and a source of capital accumulation. Because of the lack of interest of critical social scientists in urban politics before 1970s, authors in U.S. made discussions on the subject within the boundaries of the application of projects, without a clear emphasis on the relationship between the broader processes of urbanization and

capital accumulation. Although there were critiques of renewal politics, like the ones of Davis and Whinston, which stresses on the necessity to discern the subject of elimination of slums within the subject of the distribution of income (Davis and Whinston, 1966:60), the main discordance was the inefficient use of public fund. It was understood that renewal practices resulted with the exacerbation of the living conditions of the urban poor, but this was conceived of as the consequence of policy makers' dominant concern on economic interests and the operational failures in renewal projects. The debates on the insufficient comprehension of market dynamics did not go hand in hand with the debates on the insufficient comprehension of the urbanization process in general. Bellush and Hausknecht's critique of earlier practices in 1930s for their not griping the housing problem 'as a distinct issue in its own right' (Bellush and Hauknecht, 1967a:6) can be falsified by the later practices of renewal politics, which handled the issue as a distinct one without considering the further implications of redevelopment and renewal projects on real estate markets, slum dwellers, and the future of urbanization.

Debates about the economic aspect of renewal politics in U.S. were generally based on the decisive goal of these regulations. It is a generally admitted fact that the commencement of slum clearance policies was related with decline of central city and the shift of its economic, social, and cultural functions to suburban communities. The loss of population concomitantly reduced the amount of taxes local governments collected and declining budgets made the problems like physical deterioration and rising crime rates in downtown insurmountable. The problem fed itself; as central city resources decreased, residents who can afford moved out to escape from the rising tax burdens and infrastructure problems (Long, 1966:423). As Maris stated, "the most straightforward aim of urban renewal is the reconstruction of the tax-base" (Maris, 1963:117). This dilemma between means and ends in renewal politics in U.S. transformed the housing problem in central cities to a contagious disease and fastened the deprivation of downtown communities. Interventions for the regeneration of central city merely by giving incentives to real estate enterprises and speculators caused an inevitable rise in rents of renewed neighborhoods, and pushed dislocated populations to other deprived communities, since renewed, rehabilitated, or cleared districts were far beyond the reach of slum dwellers. Besides, some cleared slum areas were reconstructed as luxury housing and distorted the social goals of renewal, which were, in reality, seem to be pretence. The discontent against renewal projects, also, contributed to critiques of social welfare state politics and raised suspicion even for the supporters of state's intervention to housing sector.

Debates on the social and political aspects of the phenomena, on the other hand were generally gathered around the racial aspects of the housing problem and the concomitant lack of public support to renewal programs. The loss of the sense of community and the 'street' as the spaces of socialization was another point of discussion, which was successfully displayed by Jacobs in her famous book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (Jacobs, 1961). Growing resistance of neighborhoods, who constitutes a great proportion of voters, and the disturbance about the inefficient allocation of public funds prepared a double-trap for housing policy. By the addition of the principle of 'participation' in 1954 Act, issues of discussion were broadened to debates on pluralism -which became popular again in 1960s-, and cultural aspects of slum communities were questioned. On the one hand authors, like Wilson, criticized radical civic activities for their lack of concern about the general interest and their frustration for their short-term interests, as opposed to upper and upper-middle class people (Wilson, 1966:413-416). Similarly, Bellush and Hausknecht pointed that 'cohesion' is inevitable for effective participation of citizens, since, according to them, individual's membership of a group or organization is prerequisite for effective political participation in U.S. (Bellush and Hausknecht, 1967b:279). The problem that should be overcome, for these authors, was the lack of culture of participation in the residents in zones of transition (in other words in Negroes and other minority groups). Others, like Gans and Grigsby, on the other hand, pointed that removal of slum-dwellers have accelerated the formation of new slums, since dispossessed tenants were merely relocated to existing unwanted neighborhoods -if not to other slum areas, where overcrowding resulted with blight and deprivation in these areas (Gans, 1966:539; Grigsby, 1966:625). Studies, which displayed that, dislocated dwellers choose to settle in other slum areas, rather than offered communities opened other discussions about the social and cultural aspects of renewal policies. Unsolved problem of racism in American society worsened the conditions of application of housing policy and the integration of colored population into social and economic life, and, resulted with the conflation of the issues of race and class in the analysis of the problem of urbanization.

As Marris successfully stressed, justifications of urban renewal in economic, social, cultural, and political terms may be incompatible with each other (Marris, 1963:118), since discrepancies of interests and inequality in political arena between different groups aggravates the success of any incomprehensive intervention in a complex phenomenon, like urbanization. The economic concerns of regeneration of central city and the enhancement of

tax returns stands as a cogent verification for giving incentives for construction of luxury housing, but contradicts with social goals of renewal programs.

Similar to the case in U.S. the urbanization policy in Britain in postwar period was occupied with fighting with slums and the congestion in metropolitan areas through policies on land-use control and the dispersion of population, though marking an apparent difference from the initiatives in U.S. in the extensiveness of state involvement. It is possible to observe two main themes in British town planning; the ideal of 'balance' and the ideal of 'neighborhood units' (Ryder and Silver, 1970:168). While the former was crystallized in the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act, the latter was tried to be realized through the creation of new towns.

Being the hallmark of rational comprehensive urban planning approach, British urban planning tradition was mostly inspired from Ebenezer Howard's idea of Garden Cities, whose primary examples were established by Howard himself and some other urban planners at the beginning of the 20$^{th}$ century. Their efforts had eventually created Town and Country Planning Association that eventually became the most powerful lobby in urban planning in Britain (Couch, 1990:26). The primary objectives were to increase the state involvement in housing and the idea of public planning and reconstruction in order to recover the war damage in British cities (Barnekov *et al.*, 1989:31). These objectives were tried to be realized under the 1946 New Towns Act through reducing the inner city working class housing densities and shifting the dislocated population to the New Towns, which were going to be constructed out of the urban sprawl. Following this initiative, an opposing view had emerged in a report about utilizing the lands in rural areas, which stood against the spread of built environment to countryside and contributed to the idea of developing high-rise housing renewal policies (Couch, 1990:27).

The postwar economic boom enabled the acceleration of slum clearance activities. Especially after 1954, urban renewal policies in Britain had generally focused on the renewal of residential areas and the transformation of deteriorated private dwellings into public housing (Barnekov *et al.*, 1989:32). Developments in the construction industry and the concomitant emphasis on the modern style had resulted with the domination of high-rise buildings in reconstruction activities, which had become one of the main sources of the urban problems in following periods. The enthusiasm was so intense that while the devastation of the World War II was regarded as an opportunity in Central Europe for

restoration and re-creation of historic city centers, it was used to get rid of the Victorian city totally in Britain (E. Wilson, 1991:107). The belief in the state's leadership in redevelopment and the confidence in the 'technique' of rational planning became so widespread that even the Conservative government of 1950s had ensued these policies despite all efforts in increasing the role of the private sector. The difference that the Conservative government of 1950s made is the installation of Town Development Act of 1952, which transformed the strategy of relieving the congestion and over-population of central metropolitan areas from constructing new towns to encouraging rapid expansion of small towns (Rodwin, 1956:131).

It should be noted that the planning regime in Britain did not totally foster a tendency toward the domination of state initiative in the production of space. "Indeed, the chief beneficiaries" of the redevelopment of the central parts of the cities and other projects on built environment "were often found in the business community" (Barnekov *et al.*, 1989:34). The demands for producing large numbers of dwellings had resulted with the increasing pressure of the large capital holders, since the need for mass production of housing was in line with their advantages in acquiring large quantities of construction materials and applying industrialized construction methods, and by so being, it intensifies their opportunities in competing with smaller firms for local authority housing contracts (Couch, 1990:34).

Similar to the case in U.S., slum clearance policy in Britain had shifted toward improvement activities with the Housing Act of 1964 and 1969 because of the rising costs of the redevelopment activities. In addition, concerns about participation of local residents and the conservation of cultural heritage and the sense of community gained significance as a result of the increasing political oppositions and social problems emerging from the growing problem of poverty and racism. Lastly, and as a result of the afore-mentioned problems, the population decline in central cities had pushed the governments to initiate certain policies for creating wealth in the cities and prepared the conditions for the forthcoming de-regulatory urban policies in British cities.

State's intervention in urban development was also visible in France in the postwar period and similar to the concerns in Britain on uneven development, the main theme was the economic and social costs of the concentration of economic activity in the Paris region (Maclennan *et al.*, 1968:315). Preteceille points that the dominant discourse of the state had focused on housing in 1950s, which had then shifted toward urban planning and provision of services and infrastructure in early 1970s and environment and the quality of life in mid-

1970s (Preteceille, 1990:37). Le Galés points that France was predominantly a rural country before the World War II. when compared to Britain (Le Galés, 1991:205). Paris was already the major city of the country and the first massive urban renewal activity in France in postwar period was initiated in this city between mid-1950s and mid-1960s and these projects were followed by the construction of new towns and suburbs, which were going to be the source of the French urban crisis in following periods.

Within the highly centralized state structure of France there were a wide range of instruments that are directly attached to the national state with powers of withholding construction permits, inducing private enterprises to move to specific locations, designating sites for public investments and freezing the price of land in order to prevent speculation (Savitch, 1990:158). It is possible to say that the state structure and the urbanization patterns were different in France from that of U.S. and Britain, which had resulted with a seemingly different shift in urban restructuring. The population decline in central cities was far below the level in Britain (Le Galés, 1991:208). However, as it is going to be discussed later, the outcome of economic restructuring was experienced in the outskirts of French and fostered mainly similar policy initiatives in especially post-1980 period. Although having never been reached to the levels in the U.S., the dislocation of the working classes and the welfare-dependents from the renewed and gentrified areas of central cities in Europe did not compensated for with the provision of housing accessible for these populations and the classless utopia of modernist architecture that was represented by the high-rise apartment blocks became the lethal heritage of the welfare state policies for the following generations.

### 2.1.2. Grassroots Participation and the Radical Opposition

Urban renewal activities in the postwar period triggered massive oppositions among a variety of social groups ranging from homeless and tenants to landlords and owner-occupiers. Going hand in hand with the rising social movements, reactions of community-based groups marked the politicization of the urbanization process in 1960s and 1970s. Struggle over housing became the main political issue in class cleavages, though the relationship between these oppositions and the struggle in the workplace could not be formed; instead, they were (and still are) regarded as struggles over consumption. While some of these movements were initiated by local elites and non-radical citizens in order to stand against the destructive effects of large scale clearance on the sense of community, in some others, radical groups were involved in the movements and resisted against the class-

based content of urban renewal projects. What makes these oppositions more complex is the dialectical relationship between these movements, which made them to augment each other by exposing the hidden clashes between the interest groups as it was the case in the diverse relationship between the black populations' struggle over housing and the white populations' efforts to conserve their communities in the U.S.

Community-based movements in the U.S. were perhaps the most influential ones, since, as a part of grassroots participation, mobilization of neighborhood organizations for solving urban problems was a part of national policy in 1960s and 1970s. Similar to the community action programs in U.S., British government launched the Community Development Project in 1969 in order to enhance the community participation in the preparation of local planning schemes (Kraushaar, 1984:354). However, these movements did not make any impact on the 'sweeping away' of working classes and other disadvantaged groups since their interests were hardly represented in decision-making bodies and renewal activities were mainly conceived of as positive interventions for their communities by the social groups who participate in these neighborhood organizations. Inquiring extent of participation in the case in the U.S., Castells points that urban renewal activities are supported by middle class groups who take part in these organizations and who are able to remain in the redeveloped areas (Castells, 1977:303).

Radical opposition against evictions and large-scale urban renewal projects is totally a different issue. Firstly, it should be noted that the disinterest and suspicion of class-based movements have isolated neighborhood activism, though these movements had gained a relative significance in 1960s and 1970s with the culmination of class struggle. In addition, since there is a considerable difference between the class-based political opposition in Europe and the community-based civic movements in the U.S., local politics has been a more dynamic issue in the latter. While the struggle in the workplace has been more apparent in Europe, local elites and property developers have been more successful in mobilizing the grassroots participation in the U.S. Although this is the case, there are certain examples of radical community-based movements that should be mentioned.

Race-based protests in the U.S. are obviously one of the most significant movements against urban renewal. As a result of the flaws in the representative system, blacks and other minorities turned to violence in order to change the course of the inner city policies. Riots occurred in the poverty-ridden black ghettos and were regarded as a form of political protest

among many residents of black communities (Rabrenovic, 1996:26). The contradiction between the declared aims and the means of urban renewal practices has deepened the social problems in inner cities and by contributing to the tendency of disinvestments it has transformed the problem of urban decline to an entire urban crisis. The racial confrontation and riots in central cities had fed the deep-rooted racism of the American society and even the academicians, who did not hesitate from blaming the black population for the crisis in the inner cities (Beauregard, 1993:209).

Another form of struggle was observed in squatters' movements in 1960s and 1970s. The vacant buildings -that are left to deterioration by their owners for making speculation or that are publicly owned but could not be utilized- in declining central cities are occupied by variety of groups ranging from artists and counter-cultural groups to homeless and radical organizations in that period. While squatters are generally regarded as groups who suffer from rising levels of homelessness as a result of urban renewal projects and gentrification, there are also radical groups who use squatting as a form of political resistance against housing policy and/or property ownership. There are even some squatters' movements that have gained an official status. In Manhattan a Puerto Rican radical political group organized large-scale occupation of vacant buildings, demanded permanent illegal occupation and acquired legal title for their buildings (Van Kleunen, 1994:288). There are also organized squatters in Britain like the London Squatters Campaign. In the case of Britain, government tried to settle down the rising tension by licensing squatters for temporary occupation and obligating the use of court order for their eviction (Lowe, 1986:141, 143).

The constant threat of eviction also fostered the establishment of political organizations in France like the National Tenants' Association, Anti-Renewal Committee, and The Committee of Badly Housed, who apparently declared their confrontation against the bourgeoisie (Castells, 1977:332-343). In addition to these, a kind of 'housing syndicalism' has emerged by the *Confédération Generale du Logement* (General Housing Confederation) -which was established in 1954. This organization was operated as a pressure group that is in contact with landlords, constructors, banks, and governmental organizations in order to reduce rent levels and construction and maintenance costs (Thorel, 1979:24).

There are lots of more examples of community-based organizations and neighborhood activists who had challenged the other interest groups to a certain extent in urban renewal activities. In this regard, it is possible to say that large-scale clearance and redevelopment

activities in the postwar period were far away from being celebrated by social classes belonging to a wide variety of social strata. In terms of economics, inner city policies were criticized for their inability in gripping the problems that were expressed as the main target of the renewal projects and that were used to legitimize the huge costs of clearance and reconstruction activities. Government officials could never succeed in convincing the criticizers of the initiatives that the choices in location, planning, and the application of the projects were not shaped by the private developers' and constructors' interests. Claims about the political and ideological content of the urban renewal scheme could not also been proved to be wrong because of the continuous enforcement of the working classes, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups to leave their communities to the higher classes who were thought to be more suitable for reviving the urban way of living in the decaying city centers. In short, urban renewal initiatives in this period were regarded as one of the main sources of urban crisis. As it is going to be discussed below, this situation has changed in the forthcoming phase of capitalist urbanization.

### 2.2. Urban Renewal in the Age of De-Regulation

What has changed in the course of urbanization policy can be discussed with respect to the shift in the accumulation regime by the economic restructuring in 1970s. According to this, there is a widespread agreement on a shift in the patterns of production and economic growth by 1970s, which has been redefined in a bunch of literature in varying focal points from economic analysis to social and cultural aspects of this transformation. Most commonly, the transformation in the commodity production, the emerging patterns of international finance, and the new trends in service industry is said to be reshaping the whole globe, which is accompanied by important transformations in social and political spheres. This new form signifies the definition of a post-industrial society in which, the emergence of highly mobile finance capital; the increase in labor productivity; downgrading of blue collar-based manufacturing in developed countries and its export to low-wage economies; and the emergence of a new middle class emanating from the rising significance of service industry are the main themes.

In the economic sphere, the expansion of production overseas has been complemented the expansion of producer services, especially finance (Thrift, 1988:19). Cohen identifies this trend as the 'international spread of corporate-related services', including multinational banks, law firms, accounting firms, advertising firms, and contracting firms (Cohen,

1981:288). According to this, unlike traditional distributive and retailing services that are bounded to their locations, advanced producer services are tend to cluster in large cities and increase the role of major metropolitans as global actors of financial market. The reason of the emerging significance of producer services is not only the preference of other sectors to left behind some of the functions that they previously provided within their own corporate body and acquiring these services by contracting with service sector to diminish their costs, but also the major role of these international firms in the 'system of international financial markets' in which firms are less subject to national-based regulatory mechanisms and be able to distract profit from fluctuating financial markets in a period in which productive activity can be costly. The impact of the growth in producer services is the rapid growth in particular cities, since major metropolitans are the preferred sites for such services (Sassen, 2002:16) and these particular cities are the advantaged ones with their strong economies of agglomeration that is necessary in reducing the transaction costs (Garcia, 2002:61).

The reflection of these shifts in the political sphere was observed in the diminishing significance of the Bretton Woods agreement -that had been valid since 1944- by the end of 1960s, which have created pressures both on the states' financial balance and private sectors' rate of profitability. The inflationary expansion in U.S. forced it to use new capital-export channels, which was becoming available by the internationalization of companies and banks, to finance deficit. The competitive position of American industry was also worsening as a result of the slow down in the rate of productivity, rapid increase in the costs of services bought from the tertiary sector, and the distinctive growth in Japanese industry (Aglietta, 1982:20-22). Surely, what has happened at the end of 1960s cannot only be perceived as the results of the recession in U.S. and its impact to global economy; rather it should be considered as the consequence of several other factors. Capitalist system's constant need of expansion was reaching its limits within its existing organization of production and was entering to a bottle neck as a result of rising labor costs, saturation of domestic markets, and decreasing rates of productivity. Preservation of closed economy was getting more costly and financing state deficit with free-flowing money was becoming an attractive alternative. Oil crisis in 1973 also contributed to the tendency of transition toward de-regulation. Commitment to national Keynesianism has ended in Britain in 1979 by the abolishment of capital controls in 1979, and was copied by Australia and New Zealand in 1984-85. Continental European countries, Scandinavian countries and Japan also progressively joined to financial liberalism - though in varying degrees- throughout 1980s (Helleiner, 1994: 146).

The new alliance between the state and internationalized private sector was followed by a widespread belief in the benefits of public-private partnership for boosting economic growth and handling the rising costs of redistributive activities of the state. The immediate result was the privatization of the public sphere, which means the contracting of certain functions that were previously labeled as 'unproductive' and, therefore, carried out by the state to private sector. The concept of 'governance' gained a prominent position in administration with its emphasis on flexibility, diversification, and informal exchange between state and market, in a period in which "[t]he market has come to be seen as everything Big Government is not (…)" (Pierre and Peters, 2000:18). The former Keynesian state policies were discarded and governments dismissed their function of supporting localities and providing social services, since what has been previously perceived as the reason for the existence of the state has started to be considered as a burden for it. Localities were left alone with their own faith in the competition for attracting free-flowing capital and faced with discrimination of the state between the potential growth poles and the excluded regions with little or no capacity to develop. Overlapping with the movement from government to governance and parallel to the shift toward flexibility in production sphere, public sector has tended to act in private sector logic and restructured the field of public administration by applying the private sector management principles, under the rubric of neo-liberalism. More businesslike approach to the running of public services has been installed and virtues of private management practice are emphasized within the emerging views on 'new public management' (Hambleton, 2002:153). Unlike the hierarchical structure of the conventional conception of bureaucracy, the concern in efficiency has carried project-oriented, flexible administrative structures to the pivotal position in the provision of services.

The liberalization of relatively closed national economies and the penetration of international capital in advanced, post-communist, and less developed countries have opened up debates about the autonomy of nation-states. Although some precautions against speculative capital movements -like James Tobin's proposal for the imposition of a transaction tax on spot foreign exchange transaction, in order to protect the policy autonomy of the states (Helleiner, 1994:126) and to orient foreign capital to productive fields (Tonak, 2004:40)- were offered, demolishment of the barriers of national markets were generally perceived as an inescapable policy initiative. In addition, as a result of the increasing income inequality within advanced countries and between developed and underdeveloped countries, the transfer of the former functions of the state to private sector and the diminishing safety net of the social state fostered debates on legitimization crisis. On the other hand, employing the same approach

with the critiques of state interventionism in Keynesian period, some authors justify neo-liberal policies and de-regulated markets, since state regulation in economic activities were thought to be hindering the efficiency of the market.

All these views of neo-liberal state rely on the belief in the disappearance of the state as an actor and the reign of market logic in local development and social policy in which political and ideological commitments had generally been thought to be primary concerns in the past. However, what has been experienced since mid-1970s can hardly be defined as the total annihilation of state. Rather than that, the domination of business-like approach after political restructuring has transformed the state into a more active agent in local development without bearing certain clashes with the private sector as opposed to the postwar welfare state period. In other words, the function of state in capital accumulation did not disappear but enhanced with the dissolution of the boundaries between the action areas of the public and private sector.

### 2.2.1. Changing Meanings of Urban Renewal under Urban Entrepreneurialism

The endemic flow of capital from core regions and the concentration of management, organization, research and development (R&D), and design functions of capital accumulation processes generated the idea of the revived significance of certain nodes in global economy, which was initially formulated by Friedmann and Wolff in their 'world-city hypotheses' (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982) and then by Sassen in her definition of the 'global city-regions' (Sassen, 1991). This emerging interest in certain nodes of accelerated economic growth, which possess an active position in the world economy, is interpreted by Lash and Urry as 'globalized localization' (Lash and Urry, 1994:17), marking the growing significance of certain innovation and financial centers in flexible accumulation regime. Similarly, Fainstein puts the reasons of the increasing importance of global cities as "the greater size and velocity of world capital flows", "the increased need for centralized command and control posts in a decentralized world economy", and "the extensive technical infrastructure needed by the finance and business service industries" (Fainstein, 1994:27). This new feature of city-regions flourished a belief in the virtues of clustered flexible production networks under the names like 'learning regions' or 'innovative milieu'.

In this context, conception of cities as the spaces where the created prosperity is consumed has shifted towards an understanding that regards built environment as the main source and

generator of this prosperity. By the change in the economic base of cities in the period of urban restructuring, "white-collar workers suddenly replaced blue-collar workers, office towers sprung up where factories once stood, and fancy boutiques took the place of corner taverns" (Savitch, 1990:151). The immediate response of governments for realizing this ideal-typical urban landscape was to attract investments to inner cities, which will both increase the tax-base of localities and attract the better-offs. This objective surely necessitates (directly or indirectly) sweeping away of certain social groups and transforming the property relationships in central cities. It can be said that local policies for dealing with inner-city social problems by renewal and redevelopment activities in welfare state period were transformed into (and, in a sense, supported by) more extensive efforts of revitalization, gentrification, regeneration, and place marketing within neo-liberal discourse under the label of 'urban entrepreneurialism'.

The emerging form of urban governance under political restructuring is an extension of 'competitive state' or 'entrepreneurial state' policy mechanisms, which is defined by Jessop as "being proactive in promoting the competitiveness of their respective economic spaces in the face of intensified international (and also, for regions and cities, inter- and intra-regional) competition" (Jessop, 1997:28). In Healey's (*et al.*) words, in urban entrepreneurialism "efforts have been made to reduce the degree of regulation over, for example, land and property development, and to change the criteria used in such regulation to benefit market processes" (Healey *et al.*, 1992:8). Observing a shift from managerial approach that was dominant in 1960s to entrepreneurial urban governance, Harvey defines three characteristics in contemporary urban politics as follows:

• the primacy of the notion of public-private partnerships;

• the diverse relationship between the partners in that, 'the public sector assumes the risk and the private sector takes the benefits';

• the primacy of the concerns about promoting the regeneration of place through projects that will upgrade the image of cities, rather than focusing on improving living and employment opportunities through investing in housing, education, etc. (Harvey, 2002:457-458).

Thus, the afore-mentioned restructuring of the state is in line with the need for transferring the urban development processes to market forces, which has again taken the prior role in

shaping the built environment. What is peculiar in this new accumulation regime is the vigorous support of the state itself in accelerating these processes by de-regulating the guidelines of urbanization. The existing authorities of state in shaping the urban form have been mobilized to reconfigure the built environment and expanded in scale and scope by other means of de-regulation that constitute the bases of indirect interventions of the state.

#### 2.2.1.1. Urban Entrepreneurialism through Public-Private Partnerships

Forging alliances with the private sector and being more sensitive to the interests of the agents who will function for the flow of capital to declining segments of cities has not been a new policy initiative. The traces of the notion of public-private partnership can be found in the growth machine thesis of Molotch. Talking about the American context, Molotch says that "the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality (…) is growth" (Molotch, 1976:310). Departing from the pluralist conception of society in American sociology he tried to display that in the U.S. land development emerges from the competition between distinct coalitions, which consist of 'otherwise competing land-interest groups', on scarce governmental resources: "Localities thus compete with one another to gain the preconditions of growth" (ibid.:312). Mollenkopf's definition of pro-growth coalitions, on the other hand, centralizes the role of, especially Democratic, political entrepreneurs since the New Deal in the development of American cities. Standing against the classic market approach and classic Marxist conception of politics, Mollenkopf points that pro-growth coalitions -which are formed by political entrepreneurs by bringing together competing and conflicting political actors and interests- are the main actors in urban politics: "[P]rogrammatic initiatives launched by such coalitions have tended to reshape the contours of private sector interests" (Mollenkopf, 1983:4).

The involvement of private sector in contemporary urban development, however, has significant differences from the previous periods. Harvey points that in contemporary public-private partnerships, "the use of local governmental powers to carry and attract external sources of funding, new direct investments, or new employment sources" is integrated to the traditional local boosterism (Harvey, 2002:457). Carter explains the reasons for the necessity of establishing public-private partnerships as follows:

• the funding requirements for addressing policy initiatives for social, economic, and environmental issues;

• the necessity of 'integrated, coordinated, and multifaceted strategies' for dealing with multidimensional and complex nature of urban problems;

• the organizational problems of hierarchical structures in which, power is centralized;

• the demand of individuals for participating in decision-making processes about their own environment (Carter, 2000:44).

While the first and the third reasons are related with the so-called 'fiscal crisis of the state' and the experiences in the cities of the welfare state, the second and the fourth ones are based on the participation discourse and they are the most disputable aspects of the contemporary urban politics. There are mainly two points that should be mentioned: Firstly, by the expansion in the sphere of local political action the role of the private sector has shifted to a somewhat conflicting one. On the one hand, it has become more responsible in the implementation process of the policies. On the other hand, by the increasing emphasis on collaboration, participation and bargaining, partnerships have acquired more powers during the implementation of the projects like making contracts with other parties or demanding the enlargement of the specific project areas by claiming that it is necessary for reaching the pre-established goals.

Secondly, downgrading the direct role of the state from social and economic issues has fostered the questions about the conflict between the state entrepreneurialism and the main reason of existence of the state itself. By 1960s, urban renewal has started to be conceived of as a tool for reducing poverty and providing employment opportunities in central cities. However, by the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism, it is claimed that the ghetto problem can be 'trickled-down' by the spill-over effects of urban regeneration practices in certain parts of the cities. Although representing this idea, Varady and Raffel point that there is little evidence of spill-over benefits from redevelopment projects with all kinds of excuses for the lack of empirical data (Varady and Raffel, 1995:23-34, 156). As it is going to be discussed below, these two voids have created an ambiguity about the legitimacy of partnerships.

#### 2.2.1.2. Urban Regimes for Whom and What Purposes

The new phase of urban politics and the role of public-private partnerships in this new scheme is generally discussed in mainstream literature under urban regime theory, since it gives an opportunity to inquire possible variations in governing coalitions (Logan *et al.*, 1999:75). Being a combination of political economy and pluralist approaches, it surpasses the tension between structural and voluntarist aspects of growth machine analysis (Dowding, 2001:7-8). Its another benefit is to overcome the problem of adapting the growth machine thesis -which, according to Cochrane, reflects the awareness of the problems in interpreting urban politics as a separate sphere and the decisive role of the local politics of business and local elites as opposed to the theories that are based on collective consumption, pluralism, pressure groups, public choice, and more radical thesis on urban social movements and the municipal politics of the left (Cochrane, 1999a:109-111)- to the industrialized countries other than the U.S. It is possible to say that the hybrid formulation of regime theory makes it the culmination of current tendencies of convergence in urban theory, and, in general, social theory, with its inherent structurationist approach. By leaving a more apparent space for anti-growth coalitions and other forms of regimes it comprises both the statist-institutionalist perspective's concerns on the distributional and regulatory functions of the particular scales of the state and Marxist critique's emphasis on the relationship between capital accumulation and local politics. In other words, it is constructed on the paradoxical assumptions that offer the anti-theoretical attitude of comparative approaches and the meta-theoretical stance of political economy approach at the same time.

The operational benefit of the regime theory is that it provides the opportunity to claim that contemporary urban regeneration schemes do not have to be based on the interests of the winning coalitions. There are certain efforts to upgrade the growth machine thesis, which, in fact, uses this opportunity of regime theory. One of them is Cox and Mair's, who introduce the notion of 'local dependency' and claim that land and property owners form a growth coalition only if they are depending on the success of local economy (Cox and Mair, 1988). Another is Molotch's, who defends his thesis upon a comparative approach in an anti-theoretical manner and tries to get rid of deterministic interpretations of growth machines by pointing that there may be alternative interests other than growth-oriented coalitions, since local politics does not emerge from the underlying logic of market, but from 'mundane politics' (Molotch, 1990:176).

However, claims about the possibilities of different regimes can hardly be observed in contemporary urban regeneration schemes. It is difficult to deny the entrepreneurial concerns of the state and partnerships mainly for two reasons: the inevitable relationship between localities and the global capital accumulation regime and the apparent tendency of partnerships to determine the interest of the locality with respect to the concerns about creating rent in built environment. Considering the first reason, although there are certain efforts for extracting the benefits of regime theory and forge them with the broader perspective of the regulationist school for explaining the unevenness in economic restructuring (see Lauria, 1999:129-130; Le Galés, 1998:502), it is criticized for the afore-mentioned paradox in its methodological foundation. Jessop (*et al.*), for example, point that regime theory and growth machine analysis do not locate their empirical findings to wider processes of capital accumulation or state restructuring and limit the scope of their analysis to agents in specific geographies who are assumed to be independent from these processes (Jessop *et al.*, 1999:144).

The rent-seeking approach of local governments and partnerships, on the other hand, stands as an obstacle for realizing the ideals of cooperation and participation. Davies points that partnerships are not necessarily formed upon mutual benefits since "bureaucracy can limit the capacity of partnerships for flexibility and innovation" (Davies, 2001:46). However, if the primacy of the principle of flexibility is verified, it should also be admitted that the very same principle can be mobilized for discarding partners that operate counter to the interest of bureaucracy. Considering the entrepreneurial concerns of the state, it is difficult to claim that bureaucracies may use their discretion over the private actors, although the objective of increasing rents in inner cities is realized by their contribution. Thus, the necessity to cooperate with other governing bodies can easily be neglected in case of an objection of a partner about the adverse effects of rent-seeking policy initiatives. In addition to this, inquiring the openness or accountability of the partnerships, Mayer points that "the participants may form an exclusive group representing only selected interests" (Mayer, 1995:239). Putting it more harshly, Beauregard points that public-private partnerships "isolate development politics from democratic politics" (Beauregard, 1996:222).

Even though there are claims about the possibility of public-private partnerships that does not necessarily function for accelerating accumulation of capital, the priority of rent-creation cannot be denied, since urban renewal has long been defined as a policy initiative that primarily seeks for achieving this goal. It is possible to observe that in the vast literature on

urban regimes there are extensive efforts to redefine a regime and explaining the differences between regimes, which results with discussions between the authors who defend that a regime exists in a particular locality and the ones who do not think so. However, the main objective of urban entrepreneurialism pushes for policy initiatives that bring about the current formation of cities eventually.

#### 2.2.1.3. Boosting Regeneration through Gentrification

In contemporary literature of urbanization it is possible to observe a debate between the ones who represent the outcomes of the new urban politics as a 'cultural revolution' and the ones who interpret it as 'the commodification of space'. The obvious myopia of the defenders of the 'cultural revolution' causes the cognition of inner city policies as the revitalization of cultural richness in declining inner cities, which, in fact, result with the homogenization of urban culture through the domination of inner cities by certain groups and the creation of 'single-classed' islands. One of the most prominent manifestations of this process is the gentrification of deteriorated communities, which has been observed for a long time, though gaining a prior position in urban politics and the interpretation of urbanization. Gentrification process is usually associated by a 'back to the city' trend in young, usually professional middle-class people, and is generally resulting with upward socio-economic transition in inner-city neighborhoods. Thus, the gentrifiers are regarded as the 'new urban heroes' who are rescuing the inner cities from decline and gentrification is becoming a significant policy initiative for regeneration according to many urban policy-makers and town planners (Delanty, 2003:59).

As one of the key aspects of the regeneration of decaying parts of cities, gentrification has been conceptualized within two opposing strands of thought. Because of the obvious participation of the new middle-class in it, some authors viewed gentrification in a behaviorist approach and defined it as a manifestation of the significance of individual preferences in the formation of built environment. According to one of the main defenders of this view, David Ley, gentrification is a reflection of emerging patterns of consumption and it is an evidence for that "the values of consumption rather than production guide central city land use decisions" (Ley, 1978:11; cited in Smith, 1996:52). Elsewhere, Ley broadens his formulation by trying to fuse social, economic, and cultural change. By emphasizing the counter-culture movements of 1960s, he rejects the conceptualization of gentrification as a

mere result of functional convenience (like, rising costs of living in suburbs after 1973 oil shock) and regards it as a part of identity formation for middle class (Ley, 1996:9).

A more structural explanation of gentrification has been offered by Neil Smith, who criticizes both Ley's 'culturalist' explanations, and neoclassic economic definitions of the process, which focuses on the benefits of living in inner cities as opposed to suburbs with their economic costs of commuting. Against these, Smith stresses the significance of built environment for profit making and points that suburbs can both be a vehicle for capital accumulation and a barrier for further accumulation, and added that, as fixed investments with long turn over period of capital, suburbs create a monopoly of the landowner and prevent further extraction of profit (Smith, 1996:59). Departing from that, he locates his theory of 'rent gap' (that he developed in 1979) as the fundamental element of developers' strategies in profit maximization by using depreciated inner-city neighborhoods. According to this, when the gap between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use becomes sufficiently large, "developers can purchase structures cheaply and can pay the builder's costs and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product (…)" (ibid.:68).

Smith's theory of rent gap is criticized by Leitner and Sheppard as being tautological since it marks the main motive of the developer; "otherwise there would be no profit to the entrepreneur (unless the state subsidized the investment)" (Leitner and Sheppard, 1989:70). Their second critique, on the other hand, is the insufficiency of the existence of an adequate rent gap for land use change – a critique, which constitutes the main point of departure for Ley, who points that gentrification does not take place in everywhere; rather, there is a specific geography of gentrification (Ley, 1996:8). Another serious critique is Bourassa's argument on the irrelevance of potential land rent as an analytical tool; according to him "it is only land rent as an opportunity cost that has any clear economic significance" (Bourassa, 1993:1734). Clark rejects this argument, since Bourassa looks for the rent gap "within a narrow scope of time at and just prior to redevelopment", that is "a time when the rent gap either diminished to negligible proportions or has disappeared altogether under the influence of speculation" (Clark, 1995:1495).

Although the theory of rent-gap is still open to discussion and there are certain attempts to reformulate it, the relationship between the gentrification and the conditions enabling it in

current land development patterns cannot be neglected. Badcock points that from the late 1960s onwards, mortgage financing initiated by lending institutions have allocated greater amounts of their resources to redevelopment of established dwellings and, talking about the cases in the U.S. and Australia, the rising production costs in suburban sites and new housing have shifted the attention to undercapitalized housing stock in near-city localities. In her words, "[I]t is no accident that the most feverish activity in the inner city housing market coincided with the general surge of speculative capital into real estate at the beginning of the 1970s" (Badcock, 1984:165). Similarly, Gotham calls into question the priority of consumer desires or individual preferences and points that demand for gentrified spaces is in fact created and marketed and "depends on the alternatives offered by property capitalists" (Gotham, 2001a:438). In addition, Smith points that although realtors, governments, and constructors have a decisive role in this process, "gentrification can be represented as a marvelous testament to the values of conservative do-it-yourself individualism, economic opportunity, and the dignity of work (…)" (Smith, 1991:89).

Besides these debates between voluntarist and structural explanations, the 'definitional' benefits of gentrification could not be supported by empirical findings. Firstly, the claim that gentrification as a 'back-to-the-city movement' has been proved to be wrong. Gale points that the resettlers are mostly first-home buyers, who 'did not' migrate from suburbs (Gale, 1982:317). In addition, the representation of gentrification as a virtue of market liberalism has been denied by Marcuse, since the displacement of outmovers is not only a result of market relations, but also a result of intentional activities of local authorities and landlords who force the inhabitants to leave their residences by cutting off urban services, leaving the buildings to deterioration, and even by actual harassment (Marcuse, 1986:162). Arguments about the improvements in urban culture through gentrification have also been refused. Writing about the U.S., LeGates and Hartman points that there has been no sign of promoting integration in gentrifying neighborhoods; instead, even the new-coming black households are refused by the white in-movers (LeGates and Hartman, 1986:195). In consequence, joyfully welcomed phenomenon of gentrification is nothing, but the dislocation of working classes, minorities, welfare dependents and other disadvantaged groups by the young urban professionals and intellectuals who wish to live in an illusionary heterogeneity in 'cleared' inner cities.

Questioning the 'normal' sequence of events in gentrification (and redevelopment), van Weesep, on the other hand, criticizes ecological explanations of these practices, which

supposes them to follow the complete decay of a neighborhood. By its neoclassical presuppositions, ecological tradition, apparently, leaves out political and social factors determining the applications and mechanisms of gentrification. Van Weesep says that "[g]entrification is not caused by neighborhood dynamics; rather, it emanates from the reciprocal process of economic, demographic and socio-cultural restructuring in society" (van Weesep, 1994:76), and points that apart from the economic and demographic change and the subsequent socio-spatial fragmentation in urban areas, housing policy should also be considered in the analysis of gentrification, since transformation in the economic base of the cities and the quality and supply of housing for the better-off are reciprocal processes (ibid.: 76-77). Thus, gentrification should be analyzed within the general framework of urban restructuring with its economic and political implications -whether the theory of rent gap is analytically valid or not-, rather than voluntarist conception of consumer preferences or neoclassical explanations regarding urban transformation within the narrow conception of natural life cycle of assets.

#### 2.2.1.4. From the Classless Utopia to the City of White Collars

To put it simply, the place marketing rhetoric has been initiated, on the one hand, through extensive investments in upgrading the infrastructure of cities in order to meet the necessary conditions for taking part in the global competition for attracting investments, and on the other hand, through promoting the cultural features of urban way of living, which has became a source of wealth itself. Urry, for example, points that almost everywhere, identity should necessarily be produced by the images constructed for tourists (Urry, 1999:226). Similarly, talking about Britain, Ward points that although large amount of money has been spent for building libraries, concert halls, art galleries, and museums over a century ago, they were more like the demonstrations of the success of industrial civilization, unlike contemporary goal of boosting the economy. In his words, "[c]ulture was the 'icing on the cake'; today it has become part of the 'cake' itself" (Ward, 1998:3).

In this context, there are two main features of urban entrepreneurialism that should be observed. Firstly, contemporary initiation of urban regeneration policies includes the apparent objective of dislocation of particular groups from the inner cities in order to obtain the potential ground rent, since these groups endangers boosting the economic growth in inner cities both by blocking the re-configuration of property relationships and by diminishing the attraction of investments and the better-offs because of their very existence.

As it is going to be discussed later, this underlying content of the new urban regeneration scheme can be observed in the disjunction between the needy fields of investment like housing and education and entrepreneurial state's constant efforts to follow rent-seeking policies that encourage transformation of lower class communities into higher class residential areas and office buildings.

It should secondly be pointed that concomitant to the transformation of the means, and the representation of urban renewal by the emergence of entrepreneurial state, the forms of resistance against large-scale clearance projects and the dislocation of working classes and other disadvantaged groups from the inner cities also changed, at least when talking about oppositions that emanates from the 'urban' itself. As it was discussed before, urban renewal activities had fostered significant oppositions that nurtured the class-based social movements in 1960s. These movements were firstly interpreted within Chicago School's emphasis on the idea of the 'loss of the community'. A second branch of thought had produced more ideological interpretations by mobilizing critical human geography's inquiries about the 'sense of place' and Marxist critique's emphasis on the struggle for collective consumption goods. However, the critical interpretations' more dynamic conceptualization of community had prepared the conditions for de-politicized discourse on urban social movements in the following period. Praising agency over structure, a blend of American anti-functionalist sociology, British cultural studies, and French structuralism -especially Foucault's redefinition of power and resistance (Foucault, 1982)- constituted the language of the new political debates from 1980s onwards and enlarged the notion of 'community power' to the postmodern identity politics, which marks a convergence between the post-Marxist conception of subject -who cannot hereafter be located in a class position- and the neo-liberal conception of subject -who still could not make a choice between its own interest and the interest of its community. The inherent contradiction within neo-liberalism is observed by Giddens as its reliance on the tradition for its legitimacy and its necessary hostility to it at the same time (Giddens, 2002:16). This contradiction is visible in Kantian liberalism of John Rawls and its communitarian critique, which stands against attributing priority to the concept of *right* over the *good* (Sandel, 1992:13). In post-Marxist camp, on the other hand, the end of class politics has been represented by the notion of 'radical democracy', which "conceives of the social agent not as a unitary subject but as the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions" (Mouffe, 1993:71).

The implications of these debates for the current practices of urban restructuring is the clash between the conception of community as a potential of self-expression and democracy and its function for fragmenting the class struggle, and hence, dissolving the resistances in the inner contradictions of the individual. Locating it within the postmodern thinking, which, according to him, replaces ethics with aesthetics and confuses atomization with autonomy, Harvey criticizes cultural interpretations for praising poverty, exclusion, and deprivation by attributing an aesthetic value to them, and therefore, removing the phenomenon of poverty itself from our conception of society (Harvey, 1999:370-371). The anti-theoretical approach of humanistic geography, on the other hand, is criticized by Daniels for it lacks in comprehending the conservative connotations of the notion of community and its reduction of subjectivity to feelings in a 'naive subjectivity' that neglects the work relations and the economic implications of the space. In his words, "to neglect the economic is to neglect a dimension of life that is *experienced* forcefully, especially when money or resources are scarce" (Daniels, 1997:370).

Thus the conflict between exchange value and use value, between business community and residents, or, in Cox's terminology, between 'territorial ideologies' and 'ideologies of local community' (Cox, 1999) has been relatively dissolved by the consensus on the benefits of boosting the local economy through encouraging the investments in tertiary sector jobs, attracting better-offs who will be employed in these jobs, and emphasizing the market value of culture. In addition, it is possible to say that every effort to redefine the field of politics within a critical perspective, with a 'definitionally' non-Marxian ontology and epistemology, unfortunately, has found a legitimate position in neo-liberal discourse. Foucault's *heterotopias* (Foucault, 1997) and Lefebvre's *lived spaces* (Lefebvre, 1991) have been adapted, in a direct manner, to the *street performances* in the name of counter-hegemonic cultural politics -which proposes reacting from within the subject position assigned by the hegemonic power that "*produces and reproduces difference* as a key strategy to create and maintain modes of social and spatial division that are advantageous to its continued empowerment" (Soja and Hooper, 1993: 184, 185)- and thus, became the manifestations of fragmentation of the potential of resistance and the admittance of the identities, which are *constructed* (that is, not only *assigned*) by the existing poles of domination. However, as it can easily be observed in the current urban landscape, urban entrepreneurialism has produced nothing but the necessary conditions for socio-spatial exclusion and it has started to be inquired even by its supporters.

### 2.2.2. Observations on Rent-Seeking Urban Regeneration Initiatives

It is obvious that the ingredients of policy response against urban restructuring are various in different geographies because of the differences in regulations, political and social structure, and the position in global economy. The roles of the agents in urban regeneration change according to the capacity of interest groups and their relationships with the policy-makers. Inquiring the possibilities of interpreting contemporary urban politics in the U.K. with the growth machine thesis, Cochrane argues that the growth machine thesis cannot be applied to this case, since business involvement has not been generated as a result of local pressures from existing business groups; "[i]nstead, national and local states have taken the lead in creating the institutional space for a local politics of business" (Cochrane, 1999a:115). The geography of urban decline is also changing in different contexts. Le Galés, for example points that unlike the case in Britain, there is not a decline in French inner cities. Instead, as a result of the state's extensive focus on industrial decline, small cities and the suburbs of big cities are the places where urban crisis has taken place (Le Galés, 1991:204-205). The strategies of governments for dealing with economic restructuring are another point of divergence in inner city policies. In Switzerland, for example, the degree of social polarization has not reached to the levels in U.S. or Western European countries, although it has been accelerated since 1970s. However, the excessive focus on 'headquarter economy', which suppressed the sub-cultural activities -that, in fact, has a vital role in boosting the urban economy-, has generated counter-cultural opposition and demands for autonomy in everyday life in Zurich (Hitz *et al.*, 1996:111-113).

Although there is a bunch of literature that reveals these differences there are undeniable similarities in urban policy-making in advanced countries, which has also been presented and/or regarded as the 'ideal' inner city policies, without mentioning the inherent causes of urban problems and, even, without inquiring to what extent these problems are 'urban'. The administrative features of these common initiatives can briefly be defined as follows:

• emphasizing decentralization as a mean for diminishing the regulatory function of the state (except particular cases like Britain);

• relaxing planning regulations in order to increase the flexibility of rent-seeking activities in redevelopment areas;

• shifting the extended capacity of local policy-making to public-private partnerships;

• encouraging private sector investments through giving incentives.

In the following sections, these reforms are going to be discussed by focusing on the cases of U.S. and Europe, since the 'ideal' application of neo-liberal policies of urban restructuring is often ascribed to the shift in U.S. policies and there is a tendency in most European countries to adapt these initiatives. Although it may be a hindrance to explain urban restructuring in an ideal-typical model and consider U.S. case as the 'best practice' of this process without mentioning the diversities between distinct localities, it is possible to observe much of the themes in current tendencies in urban politics within this case. The reason of pointing only the most common features of urban restructuring in this study is not only the fear of exceeding the scope of the inquiry, but also the intention to stress the convergence in local politics in certain points. Taking the risk of over-simplifying the issue, contrary to the comparative perspectives that focus on the 'means' of urban restructuring, a more realist perspective that extracts the similarities between the 'ends' of this process is preferred in this study, in order to be able to put forward certain propositions that may increase our capability to interpret the phenomenon and that will lead us towards constructing alternative policy initiatives.

#### 2.2.2.1. Opening the Channels for Rent-Creation: The Case of U.S.

Decentralization has long been a peculiar feature of U.S. politics in which, federal states has extensive powers in governing. Local government authorities also have authorities in wide variety of fields and they always have a closer relationship with local elites and entrepreneurs. The decentralization policy of the U.S. in 1980s, however, can easily be regarded as a turning point for American cities, since rather than increasing the autonomy of localities in political terms, it has been realized through removing the entire function of state as a regulator and supporter of localities. The initial reform for decentralization that is related with inner city policies was the replacement of the urban renewal program in 1974 with the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG), which gave cities more control over the use of federal funds. In this program federal money was being divided into three categories to be used in 'deteriorated areas', 'transitional areas', and 'healthy areas', aiming to increase the efficiency of public intervention, while giving opportunity to local governments in directing their investment to more profitable policies of private development.

A second federal subsidy for private development was the introduction of Housing and Urban Development Act which created Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) requiring applicants to propose and accomplish specific urban projects, which means providing public support for those property developments that would encourage a large amount of private investment compensating for federal grant. These subsidies have contradictory goals of modifying the living conditions of disadvantaged and stimulating private sector investment. UDAGs were mostly used to provide streets, utilities, and other services necessary for various types of private residential, commercial, and industrial projects and "benefited business and affluent suburbanites, rather than needy residents and poor neighborhoods" (Gotham, 2001b:12).

By Reagan administration's domination in 1980s, decentralization policies was conducted by the abolishment of the existing urban program and the strong emphasis on decentralization in this period is defined by Gaffikin and Warf as "a policy ostensibly designed to transfer federal obligations to the states", which, in practice "did not transfer federal programs to the states, it abolished them all" (Gaffikin and Warf, 1993:70). Not only UDAGs, but also Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) were terminated and "federal subsidies to localities for mass transit, education, water treatment, medical care and public housing were sharply reduced" (ibid.:70). Following this, in 1981, The Economic Recovery Tax Act, which "significantly reduced tax rates of real estate investment, dramatically accelerated the rate at which property could be depreciated (increasing tax deductions and reducing the time needed to recover invested capital), and introduced generous tax credits for property rehabilitation" (Leitner and Sheppard, 1989:76) was launched. Concomitant to these reforms, the main actors of the de-regulated urban regeneration in the U.S. were introduced by the establishment of public-private partnerships as the main policy initiatives and the acknowledgement of the privileged role of quasi-governmental development organizations that manage these partnerships. Various types of these organizations named as Downtown Development Authorities (DDAs), Economic Development Corporations (EDCs), and Local Development Companies (LDCs) were established. Having powers of eminent domain and tax abatement, development corporations are criticized for using public funds for subsidizing projects in which, the primary beneficiaries are private developers and implementing their projects without referenda or legislative approval (Feagin and Smith, 1987:20).

The proposal for 'enterprise zones' was the primary manifestation of relaxing the planning regulations in Reagan administration. It was as a reaction towards the flow of population,

jobs, and industry from industrialized northern cities to suburban areas and to the so-called sunbelt. The decline in population and job opportunities in large cities and metropolitan areas, in contrast to smaller towns and suburbs was tried to be tackled by enterprise zone, which would attract new, small, labor-intensive enterprises (Smith, 1988:169). Being "one of the few specifically urban-related proposals made by the Reagan administration", the main goals of the prescriptions of enterprise zones were to "promote a free market environment in designated urban areas by reducing taxes and relaxing or eliminating regulations on business activity" (Barnekov *et al*., 1989:119). In fact, according to Shutt, Republicans would have preferred to support state governments rather than city governments, since tackling the urban problems have not been a necessary strategy to please their electoral base (Shutt, 2003:260). This may explain why Democrats blocked the way to the establishment of enterprise zones by Republican administrations, since they did not want them to take the credit of dealing with urban problems (Smith, 1988:169).

In consequence, under the presidency of Clinton, Democrat administration validated 'empowerment zones' in the first half of 1990s. Although Shutt praise the idea of empowerment zones for it differs from the enterprise zones "in its focus on people rather than the search for inward investment and new business" (Shutt, 2003:262-263), Clarke reminds the lack of incentives to invest in human capital at the local scale, when the federal context and the mobility of human capital is considered (Clarke, 2002:33). In addition, empowerment zones are regarded as the continuation of failed policies over the last thirty years that employ neighborhood revitalization as the only long-term solution for reducing poverty (Varady and Raffel, 1995:29). At this point, a similarity between Democrats' response to enterprise zones in 1980s and their response to urban renewal legislation of 1949 and 1954 can be speculated: They supported urban renewal legislations because of their political interest in black population, since these legislations were mainly aimed at assisting this group. However, the result was the removal of minority communities from CBDs (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986: 248-249). The establishment of empowerment zones can be seen as an evidence for the inexistence of alternative policy-making in U.S. Under these conditions, the wave of privatization and de-regulation initiated competition between cities to attract capital with their own resources and deepened this crisis by encouraging the dislocation of residents in inner cities and pushing them to the areas of disinvestment through aggravating the conditions of redistribution of collective consumption goods and social services.

#### 2.2.2.2. Dismantling the Welfare State: The Case of Europe

Urban restructuring in Europe is a more complicated story because of the still fragmented structure of European Union (E.U.) with its continuous policy of expansion and the political culture in this continent. Until recently, European governments intervene in built environment more extensively and play a more regulatory role in urban development, unlike the case in U.S. In most of the Western European cities, new construction is heavily subsidized in the form of loans below market interest rates or direct capital subsidies (Harshman and Quigley, 1991:26). In addition to the widespread construction of public housing, price regulation and rent control has been valid for a long time in most European cities. Despite these general features, European cities display certain distinctions in their urban policy and planning patterns because of constitutional, legal, and administrative differences. What is significant for the purpose of this study is the common direction in Europe, where this fragmentation has been surpassed in a certain extent as a result of the global economic restructuring, which had influenced the economic and political practices of distinct European countries and the policies of E.U.

The economic decline in 1970s and its continuous impact in 1980s severely damaged European cities, especially in regions that had been the agglomerations of certain sectors that faced with the threat of extensive job losses and that tend to prefer other locations. The reaction of E.U. to decline was to introduce certain initiatives, in order to tackle with the problems, caused by current trends in world economy, and to develop environmental action programs, which possessed a major position in the agenda of urbanization by the impact of the revived concern about the environmental drawbacks of industrial agglomerations, since it stands as an obstacle for the cultivation of a new economy in old industrial cores. The Single European Act was introduced in 1986 for these purposes. Following this, Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established 'cohesion fund' to assist poorer members of the Union (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal). Several other precautions has been taken like structural funds to reduce regional disparities and to meet the social needs of declining localities, and other supportive activities to fight with poverty and to improve the capacity of regions by investing in communication and by increasing the labor power skill by training. The introduction of The Single European Market in 1993, on the other hand, was inevitable and had diverse impacts on regions. The removal of the barriers limited the scope of national action and has exposed regions and localities to direct competition (Bennet, 1993:17). Although single market influenced the flow of capital from previously developed regions in the north of Europe to

southern regions, economic integration has been beneficiary mostly for major cities in the south (Newman and Thornley, 1996:20).

The most radical response was Britain's, which tried to move into free market state much more rapidly than other European countries and faced with disastrous results in terms of output and employment (Harloe and Paris, 1989:224). Although both U.S. and U.K. have been said to be applying welfare state policies in postwar period up to 1970s, U.K. has always been much closer to the definition of 'social state' in varying aspects of social services. Being one of the main components of these services, housing policy of U.K. also presents an apparent inclusiveness when compared to U.S. While public housing policy in U.S. was only available to the poorest residents and generally constructed in low-income areas, the council houses of U.K. were located in every parts of cities with relatively low ethnic and income segregation (Fainstein, 1994:6, 7). Deakin and Edwards point that until 1977, urban deprivation was concerned as a residual problem of welfare state and policies like Urban Programme, the Educational Priority Areas, and the Community Development Projects were used to solve it. At that time, economic infrastructure and the need for economic regeneration were not considered to be the cure for inner cities (Deakin and Edwards, 1993:3, 17). By the shift of emphasis from social to economic problems in the inner cities, the conception of 'social pathology', which was the widely accepted way to conceive of the ghetto riots in U.S. and the growing racial unrest in U.K. in 1960s, was left behind in both countries and substituted by entrepreneurial concerns about inner-city decline. The sharp de-regulatory initiatives have had severe impacts in Britain and resulted with continuous emphasis on the divided nature of British cities (see McDowell *et al.*, 1989; Lee and Murie, 2002).

The so called 'White Paper' of 'Policy for the Inner Cities' in 1977 presented the calls for a new inner urban area act, increases in budget and some other new arrangements. The establishment of inner-city partnerships that functioned for linking central and local governments with private sector followed the initial organizational change, which was occurred by the shift of responsibility of dealing with inner-city problems from the Home Office to The Department of Environment in 1976, after the election of Conservative Party in 1979. Among other strategies like the creation of 'task forces', 'city action teams' and 'enterprise zones'; the establishment of the first two 'urban development corporations' (UDCs) (London Docklands Development Corporation -LDDC- and Merseyside Development Corporation -MDC) in 1981 evidently represents the convergence of British

and American urban politics, since these institutions were modeled from similar American ventures (Fainstein, 1994:8), although they are connected to central government unlike the ones in U.S. (Fainstein, 1995:130). These institutions were equipped by powers over land acquisition, finance, and planning, and are dominated by local business, especially construction interests. Also they have authority to develop plans and projects in their immediate boundaries, if they find it necessary in order to secure regeneration. The shift in housing policy by 1980 Housing Act, which made local authorities obliged to sell council housing (Duncan and Gooodwin, 1982:177), contributed to the transformation of built environment into fields of profit maximization. By providing home ownership, social and financial responsibilities were transferred from the state to the individuals (Forrest and Murie, 1989:235). In addition, the introduction of enterprise zones discarded the formal planning regulations in the areas to which they are applied (Taylor, 1999:137) and constituted the spatial representation of de-regulation. Another tool for relaxing the planning regulations was the Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs), which has not gained significance as a policy initiative, since the ambiguities in where to locate SPZs has generated strong oppositions and the inexistence of a planning regulation has even forced private sector to demand some specifications (Allmendiger, 1998:140-141).

The exception of British case, however, can be observed in the distribution of central and local government authorities. In contrast to other European countries, neo-liberalism has emerged in Britain in a different appearance with the consistent erosion of local government powers and strong tendency toward centralization, which, in fact, roots back to the governmental system of 1930s (Banner, 2002:218). Although 1988 Local Government Act was initiated to foster decentralization, financial and political pressure of the central government remained in a great extent, visible in the disputes between U.K. and European Commission about the way European structural funds are spent (Davies, 1993:85). The UDCs are the foremost best example of government's antipathy to local authorities, "they are designated, empowered, financed by, and directly accountable to central government" (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991:43). The main goal in the establishment of UDCs was to create a single-minded agency with limited objectives and to by-pass the uncertainties and restraints of local democracy (ibid.:44). "Local politicians were invited to be members, but not as official representatives of their cities, and many refused to join" (Parkinson, 1990:107). The concentration of power in central government is also visible in the fiscal initiatives given by Conservative government for urban redevelopment during 1980s. The first initiative was 'urban development grants' -which is based on the American Urban

Development Grant-, giving incentives to local governments to collaborate with private sector for development. This was followed by 'urban regeneration grant', which was established because of the dissatisfaction of Conservative government about Labor-controlled cities. In this initiative, central government took over a more direct role in interaction with private sector. By the introduction of 'city grants', role of local governments were entirely eliminated (Parkinson, 1990: 101). Reductions in the powers of local authorities have continued by strict limitations on their revenues and the privatization or de-regulation of many urban services.

It is widely admitted that, unlike the impacts of pressure groups in fragmented American federal system, political parties dominate policy-making processes in U.K. In this regard, inner-city policy debates in U.K. are generally gathered around ideological controversies between Labour and Conservative parties, which signal the discretionary character of British politics, in which the political preferences are stressed, rather than economic determinants. These controversies were also observable in the field of local politics in 1980s, between neo-liberal practices of urban entrepreneurialism and Labour's response, municipal socialism. However, new oppositions to the local politics in U.K. have emerged aside from these old ones because of the apparent failure of UDCs' activities, especially the activities of LDDC. The critiques of LDDC is various: Firstly, it could not realized the claim that the regeneration activities in Docklands would 'trickle-down' the neighboring deteriorating working class communities because of the extensive concern of LDDC on physical improvement and the lack of well-defined economic and social targets: "New development sits beside old poverty" (Colenutt, 1991:34). In addition there has been limited impact on local unemployment, while the racial tension was exacerbated because of the restrictions in the supply of social housing (Brownill, 1999:57-58). MDC has also faced with oppositions after it has expanded its boundaries and comprised neighboring residential areas (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991:53). These problems have fostered further questions about the legitimacy of UDCs and created ambiguities about their functioning. It is argued that although they were legitimized for functioning for the regeneration of inner cities with lower costs for government, increasing expenses of UDCs and their dependency on local politicians and civil servants increased the distaste against their activities (Imrie and Thomas, 1999:5).

Contrary to the case in Britain, decentralization was one of the key features in post-1980 inner city policies in other European countries and it is extensively encouraged by the E.U.

In France decentralization was initiated by the Planning Act and Decentralization Act of 1982 and a further reform in 1986. At this point, it should be noted that the difference between the French and British cases can be interpreted with respect to political climate and the alternative route that France has followed for regional development. Preteceille points that French left resisted better than in Britain and protected welfare and collective consumption-oriented urban policies in a greater extent in 1980s (Preteceille, 1990:46), for example, by creating a guaranteed minimum income in 1988 (Lipietz, 1998:180). In addition, contrary to the tendencies of amalgamation especially in U.K., Sweden, and Denmark -which roots back to 1960s and 1970s-, in order to increase efficiency of the functioning of local units, France has preferred to foster cooperation between localities rather than merger (Marcou, 1993:53, 54). After 1982 Act, in Fox-Przeworski's words, "[t]he enhanced pluralism has resulted in greater cooperation rather than competition among localities, especially in the area of economic regeneration" (Fox-Przeworski, 1991:121).

Decentralization is a widely accepted policy initiative also for other countries and a spreading ideal as it can be observed in the efforts of transition into federal structure in Spain (since 1982) and Belgium (since 1988) (Bennet, 1993:30), though this may not imply complete affirmation of the policies of E.U. in all circles. German *Lander* -an example of 'truly federal' system-, for example, supported the creation of Committee of Regions by Maastricht Treaty for restructuring the Union as 'Europe of the Regions' (Davies, 1993:85), but resisted against the transfer of further national powers and responsibilities to the E.U. and demanded a more active role in E.U. decision-making (Wollman and Lund, 1997:60-61).

Although there are differences in terms of distribution of authority, the implementation of urban entrepreneurialism has been conducted upon similar principles. In the case of the Netherlands, the renewal program, which was on the agenda in 1970s and early 1980s could not be implemented since the conventional financial strategies of these projects were not suitable within the emerging environment of recession in the period of restructuring. Inner city decline and the problem of unemployment hit hard the older neighborhoods; even Amsterdam with its historical heritage of trade and services could not absorbed employment losses from manufacturing sector and shifted its prior policies on housing shortage in 1970s toward economic activities (De Jong, 1991:220). In order to increase the flexibility of renewal activities, the Urban Renewal Act of 1984 was adapted, which provides the legal basis for improving urban areas without a master plan. According to this, an urban area can be given the status of a Renewal Area by the approval of the Minister with the guarantee of

financing by the national government. “This plan has a status comparable to the master plan, but is more practical in nature. The approval procedure is simplified compared to the master plan, and many decisions can be made at the local level (…)” (van Wissen *et al.*, 1991:140). The renewal of Zeedijk-Amsterdam is one of the application areas of this act with its emphasis on public-private partnership. In this project, a development corporation was established in 1985 and Zeedijk was declared as an official urban renewal area, in which adjacent projects handled by public works department and private sector were combined (De Jong, 1991:224-225).

Two important initiatives in social policy of Netherlands throughout 1990s were Social Renewal -which was applied in the first half of the 1990s- and the Big Cities Policy of 1995. The failure of Social Renewal, which focuses on long term unemployment, dependency on welfare, and the deterioration of certain neighborhoods have resulted with the application of the Big Cities Policy, whose main concern is boosting the urban economy that will lead to revitalization of declining cities. Kloosterman and Broeders define the difference between these policies by pointing that while the former was focusing on people, the latter considers residents much less like actors, but much more like clients (Kloosterman and Broeders, 2002:142). Another feature of this policy is defined by these authors as ‘territorialisation of policy’ (ibid.: 135), which reveals the incomprehensive nature of the Big Cities Policy.

The expansion of renewal program in (West) Germany by 1982 has also been in line with the mainstream economic boosterism. The decline of Ruhr area (the biggest industrial agglomeration in Western Europe) and the flow of high-tech industries to southern Germany has tried to be covered by changing the negative image of the region (‘region of smoke-stack industries’) with a massive renewal initiative in Dortmund (Hennings *et al.*, 1991:142-143). In this project, Dortmund was declared as a Development Area under the support of European Social and Regional Fund and experienced a renewal process with dual goals of securing the local steel basis (since one of the biggest steel enterprise in Germany is located in this region and was almost bankrupt in 1980) and attracting high-tech and service industries. Another project was initiated in Frankfurt, though with a primary goal of constructing a ‘world city’. The project was initiated by the Christian Democrat Party and realized through the creation of a downtown skyline and the acceleration of suburbanization under the control of a semi-public corporation (the Economic Development Corporation), which was established in 1987 (Newman and Thornley, 1996:86). The dislocation of residents from the central area created a substantial housing need -which was followed by

rising homelessness, since demand for social housing have not been met- and resulted with the rising votes for 'green' party during 1980s.

There are other examples of urban regeneration activities, which have been conducted with similar principles, though with additional objectives like conservation of historical buildings in Florance (Nanetti, 1991), rehabilitation of older housing stock -mostly public housing stock- in Sweden (Anas *et al.*, 1991), Austria-Vienna (Aufhauser *et al.*, 1991), and Denmark (Vestergaard, 1998), or special cases like re-organization of Berlin after the demolishment of Berlin Wall and the redevelopment activities in Barcelona for the Olympic games -in which what has been seen as a city marketing strategy has turned out to be a source of problem for the city, since, by the end of the Games, a slump in the property market has occurred as a result of the oversupply of office spaces and the aim of using the Olympic Village to solve the severe housing problem cannot be realized; the houses were sold in the market (Newman and Thornley, 1996:93). All these policy responses share the underlying goal of adaptation to the new space economy and, although carrying certain characteristics of direct state interventionism -especially in Northern European cities-, they have been initiated with similar principles in the reorganization of institutional structures and re-arrangements of legislations, like the establishment of semi-public authorities functioning with private sector logic and the dismantling of the conventional planning regulations in order to increase the flexibility of developmental activities in redevelopment areas.

For some authors, it is still difficult to claim the existence of a 'Europe of the Regions' or 'Europe of the Cities' when considering the variety between different countries in Europe in terms of urban and regional policies (Goldsmith and Klausen, 1997:4), or to talk about the existence of proactive local governments (Newman and Thornley, 1996:73). Hall praises Europe for its non-hierarchical richness based on its long cultural history, which enabled the development of specialized nodes (such as Zurich in banking, Milan in fashion, or Paris in art) (Hall, 2001:64). However, crisis of Fordism hit hard most of the European cities and necessitated restructuring, which may not be initiated in accordance with the policies of the Union. Cities, regions, and countries develop programs for regenerating the economic structure of the declining cities and display the signals of the emergence of a 'new urban hierarchy' through certain policies, which may converge, at least, in principle. In consequence, despite the apparent constitutional, legal, and administrative differences between European countries and the historical inclination of U.S. cities to supply-side policy-making when compared to European cities, affinity between the political responses in

different geographies provide a convenient base to claim the existence of a new 'urban paradigm' in advanced countries.

### 2.3. Socio-Spatial Consequences of the New Configuration

The rhetoric of urban regeneration through physical renewal has usually been opposed by the critiques of the pertaining problem of urban poverty and social exclusion. The new scheme of regeneration has not solved the problem of declining neighborhoods in U.S., and it has introduced previously unknown social problems in the most developed welfare countries of Europe. The working class communities that were built by the state have become the nests of poverty and exclusion for ex-industrial workers, welfare dependents, and minorities. The conjunction between the decrease in employment opportunities, political restructuring, and its spatial representation, that is, rent-seeking urban regeneration has forced authors to formulize synthetic explanations for the poverty in post-industrial societies. Defined by a new notion, 'new urban poverty', the emerging patterns of inequality is observed in the rising levels of homelessness, unemployment and low-paid insecure employment -mostly concentrated in disadvantaged groups-, street crime and violence, and decaying communities (Mingione, 1993:325). The broadened definition of poverty is significant for defining the dislocated groups who are excluded from the future prospects of urban policy-makers.

Causes of the failure in the attempts to reduce poverty have long been interpreted within the discussions about the convenient definition of poverty. In general, three broad concepts of poverty have been defined. First one is the conceptualization of poverty, as 'subsistence' which is concerned with minimum needs to maintain health and working capacity. In this view, poverty is defined in reference to capacity to survive. The second definition is in terms of 'inequality', which is based on a relational perspective and focuses on the relative positions of income groups. The main concern of this approach is the necessity to consider the poor within the social whole. A third definition of poverty is in terms of 'externality', which stresses the social consequences of this phenomenon for the rest of the society. In this approach, poverty is conceptualized as a problem not only for the ones who experience it, but also for the affluent groups of society (Rein, 1970:46). These definitions and prescriptions, however, revealed another issue of discussion about the definition of poverty, conducted on the necessity to broaden the subject from its economic-based boundaries to its implications in political sphere. The mainstream literature on poverty is, in fact, aware of this necessity and admits it in their extolling of the virtues of Weber's emphasis on distribution

and exchange, in contrast to Marxian emphasis on production relations and the definition of class emerging from it. According to Townsend "[t]he concept of class is poorly operationalized" and to grasp the social phenomena institutions other than industry, like education, social services, and fiscal system should be taken into consideration (Townsend, 1970:23). Miller and Roby, on the other hand, considers Weber's contribution not as "to overturn Marx's analysis but to go beyond it, to broaden its perspectives" (Miller and Roby, 1970:125). According to them, Weber's major contribution is his introduction of three components of stratification, which are class, status, and power, which marks a shift of emphasis from conceptualization of poverty in terms of income and provision of social services to opportunities for social mobility and participation in decision-making processes. In Miller and Roby's words, "[t]he limited results of poverty programs based upon subsistence standards are now forcing a realization that not pauperism but inequality is the main issue within high-income industrial societies" (ibid.: 124).

Apart from the inherent problem of ambiguity in measuring poverty, the absence of a spatial perspective in these definitions, that is crucial for comprehending the current form of poverty, necessitated further interpretations and formulations. What is crucial in the debate on new urban poverty is the difficulty in comparing the empirical manifestations of the new poverty, since national variations in norms of poverty and the differences in their way of occurrence stand as obstacles for the abstraction of the research findings. In addition, as Silver points, national political conflicts and sociological traditions influence on the patterns of selectivity and political concerns of the researchers in their observations (Silver, 1993:338). However, there is a tendency toward interpreting the new poverty by appointing imported notions. The most apparent example of this trend is the attempt to form an analogy between the geographical concentration of poverty in certain parts of European metropolitan areas and the unsolved black American ghetto problem. The growing 'European racism' and the reluctance of post-Keynesian states in integrating immigrant populations contribute to this tendency with its claimed affinity with the ethno-racial segregation in American cities and the emerging fears about the 'Americanization' of European poverty (Wacquant, 1993:366).

The problem with this tendency is the epistemological differences between the two traditions of thought. According to this, while the Anglo-Saxon tradition considers poverty "as a socially undesirable consequence of market interaction and hence, on the individual level as a lack of resources", the Continental tradition focuses on the function of welfare state "as an

organizing principle for society and hence on citizenship" (Eva van Kempen, 2002:240). This main difference comes out from that, the continental tradition conceptualizes the society as composed of groups with reciprocal rights and obligations, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon approach, which considers it fragmented and is composed of individuals competing with each other (Cameron and Davoudi, 1998:236). Incorporating the concept of 'social exclusion', the European perspective tries to enable the comprehension of social and cultural dimensions of exclusionary processes and defines the problem of poverty as a dynamic process by using its attention to social change, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon formulation, which defines it as a static phenomenon with its permanent and rigid methodological individualism. Another emphasized advantage of the concept of social exclusion is its applicability to the analysis, which aims to combine endogenous and exogenous social factors (Freitas, 1998:212). In addition, it pays attention to the concept of 'social citizenship', next to labor market position and has a wider conception of social exclusion with its recognition of exclusion as a phenomenon not restricted to low-income groups, but also to other omitted social groups like young people, the elderly, and the singles (Geddes, 1997:208). Departing from this point, it is claimed that empowerment of excluded groups should also comprise improvement in the access to political rights by which, participation of these groups can be enabled.

The ambiguities in the class structure of postindustrial societies triggered the debates about other determinants for the emergence of different and unequal strata in cities. The use of race, gender and other divisions in society -with the further contribution of the development of cultural studies and debates on 'identity politics' in 1980s- gained a pivotal position in the interpretation of urban societies. On the other hand, neo-Marxist debates on the 'production of space', which ignited calls for a new epistemological base for the discipline of geography and a further influence on community studies, resulted with the tendencies of locating spatial opportunities and/or obstacles in social processes in the analysis of poverty and exclusion. All these discussions found their echoes in the explanations and critiques about the consequences of urban renewal, since contemporary rent-seeking urban regeneration policies have victimized larger amounts of people who are difficult to be regarded in the conventional definition of working class.

### 2.3.1. Spatializing the Disadvantaged

Although economic restructuring has had some similar impacts and has generated similar responses in urban-policy-making processes, the explanations on the social consequences of rent-seeking urban regeneration tended to be varying according to the contextual factors. In U.S. the apparent race-based segregation forced American stratification theorists to stress the fact of discrimination by establishing a term that specifies the racial aspect of inner city deprivation, which is 'underclass'. In Britain, on the other hand, the main field of interest has been the new class structure emerging since 1970s, that ignites questions on 'where to locate middle-layers' (Crompton and Jones, 1989:52) and how to interpret the inevitable concentration of urban poor, who suffer from long-term unemployment, in inner city slums. The solution of British scholars is to stress the significance of housing by the concept of 'housing classes'. Both of the concepts have created controversy among scholars and they can hardly be put as chief analytical tools in the interpretation of urban decline in U.S. and Britain, or somewhere else, though having significance in defining the excluded populations.

Although in its first use by Gunnar Myrdal the underclass was described structurally, that is, in terms of economics; it was immediately transferred to another language of discourse, which emphasizes the racial aspect of the group of people who constitutes the underclass - the black population in ghettos (Gans, 1993:327). With the further contribution of Oscar Lewis's writings about the 'culture of poverty', the concept of underclass started to be used in a cultural-behavioral tone in a lay fashion, with an apparent dislike against black population, and regarded as an unscientific concept with no analytical validity by most of the scholars. Wilson, on the other hand, tries to locate it in a structural analysis by combining it with cultural aspect of the interpretation of the ghetto and use it in the interpretation of the inner-city problems of postindustrial city. Although admitting that there is little agreement on the definition of the underclass, he defines it as a group made up of "individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or are not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency" (Wilson, 1987: 8). Observing a sharp difference between the structure of inner-city black populations of previous periods and its structure from 1980s onwards, Wilson points that, as opposed to the expectations from the regulations initiated in 1950s and 1960s against racial separation, the most disadvantaged members of the minority population has

deteriorated rapidly since 1970s. He employs the concept of 'social isolation', which differs from the concept of 'culture of poverty' and implies that the contact between groups from different races and/or classes is inhibited and these constraints enhance, what Wilson calls, the 'concentration effects'. In other words, it focuses on the structure of constraints and opportunities, rather than sub-cultural traits (ibid.: 61).

Elsewhere, Wilson specifies the geography of ghetto poverty and points that these are the industrial regions in the Northeast and the Midwest of the U.S. that suffered from the recession of 1970s (Wilson, 1991:6). As a result of the shift from goods production to service-based activities and the shift of employment opportunities from the central city to suburbs, the least educated blacks -who do not only have geographical constraints to have access to jobs in suburbs, but also face with discrimination- inevitably live in isolation in inner city slum dwellings. Other than the economic side of the weak labor force attachment in the inner-city ghetto, there are also factors that determine the opportunity of the individual in the labor market, which are related with the social milieu. The cultural aspect of Wilson's formulation, at this point, focuses on certain issues like the weak access to job information networks, lack of coherent expectations and goals -as a result of absence of long term employment-, and the absence of cultural resources such as conventional role models for neighborhood children -as a result of the higher income black exodus to suburbs (ibid.: 9, 10).

Wilson's explanations on the creation of underclass are rejected by Massey and Denton, though they admit the existence of an underclass. Massey and Denton's main argument is the neglect of another concept by politicians, government officials, journalists, and civil rights leaders: the concept of 'segregation'. Stressing the residential segregation in urban America, they point that "[s]egregation, not middle class out-migration, is the key factor responsible for the creation and perpetuation of communities characterized by persistent and spatially concentrated poverty" (Massey and Denton, 1993:118). Gans, on the other hand, offers to discard the concept of underclass totally. Beside its racist connotations, Gans points that the underclass label damages the construction of antipoverty policies. According to him, using an ideal-typical definition for analyzing social groups with various characteristics may conceal the reality and may foster comprehensive 'underclass policies' that would violate the civil rights and civil liberties (Gans, 1995:65). Gans also adds that, another danger of this reification is that, its race-based definition hides the very poor whites who, in fact, suffer from many of the same problems. In a similar fashion, Fainstein argues that the concept of

underclass limits the conceptualization of the problem of racism in American society by focusing only on the very poor African Americans without mentioning the isolation of non-poor blacks from white America (Fainstein, 1993:401). Thus, it is possible to say that although the concept of underclass ignites a discussion on the certain characteristics of the 'truly disadvantaged' groups, which potentially stands as the real victims of the de-regulated urban policies, it contains the danger of focusing on dislocation and spatial concentration of poverty partially, without mentioning the underlying motives of rent-seeking urban regeneration and its wider consequences for urban societies.

The concept of underclass has also been discussed in British context, as an inevitable result of the existing interplay between the academic studies in U.S. and Britain. Welfare dependency was a frequently stressed issue to legitimize new right policies implemented from late 1970s onwards. However, the claim about the existence of an underclass in Britain raises an immediate suspicion since inner cities of Britain are by no means predominantly black. The conflicting empirical results contribute to this suspicion and constituted a consensus on the inappropriateness of the use of this concept. In his inquiry on the existence of a British underclass, Morris questions whether there is a segregation of long-term unemployed and pointed the ambiguity in drawing the line between the long-term unemployed, underemployed, and the insecurely employed (Morris, 1993:408). Besides, the validity of talking about sub-cultural traits of a distinctive underclass is questionable since groups who have disadvantaged position in occupational structure are diversified. Thus, in his words, "the notion of the 'underclass' is an oversimplification, contaminated by its use as a tool of political rhetoric, which has been too readily applied to complex social phenomena (…) and would be better replaced with detailed studies of labor market dynamics, recruitment and job search, and the patterning and reproduction of disadvantage" (ibid.: 411). In addition, Pahl points the dangers of the use of the concept to the situation in Europe and stresses the various forms of social polarization, which makes it difficult to be interpreted with a single notion. He, for example, reminds the difference between U.S. and U.K. in the patterns of social polarization in that, while inequality in U.S. results with a shrinking middle-class, it is fattening it in U.K., because of the differences in household structures, labor market dynamics, and systems of welfare (Pahl, 1988:260). Contrary to these objections, which depart from analytical concerns, Hall does not hesitate from using this concept. Making a distinction between the American way of urban policy making -which separate social problems from planning policies- and the solution in Britain -which tackles with these problems in a more comprehensive manner-, Hall praises the housing

policy in Britain in mid-1960s up to 1980s, in which physical renewal had gone hand in hand with the provision of public housing to inner city black immigrants. However, emphasizing the new right policies of Thatcher government, he argues that the urban riots in 1980s in British cities -in which a considerable amount of blacks have involved in- is a consequence of the decline in number of manual jobs and the continuous alienation of black population from the 'mainstream' society (Hall, 1997:395-400).

It is possible to perceive that the concept of underclass reflects the concern of stratification theorists to define features of social classes other than their occupational position and income level. The apparent crystallization of urban poverty in U.S. in inner city deprived communities, which have a relatively homogenous character, and its apparent relationship with race attracts the attention to the notion of underclass, which makes it possible to combine individuals' position in labor market and the cultural impact of being pushed into slums, in which, opportunities for vertical mobilization are diminished for several reasons. Sharing the similar view with U.S. scholars about the difficulties in interpreting the current class structure with relations of production, some British scholars also focus on consumption; though tend to stay away from the notion of underclass. The relatively heterogeneous character of excluded communities -in terms of class, race, and occupational patterns- directs the issue of debate in Britain toward the interpretation of these communities with more diverse analytical tools. The concept of 'housing classes' stands as a possible point of departure for this purpose.

The concept of housing class was firstly used in Rex and Moore's study about the inequalities and conflicts in the distribution of council housing between local residents and immigrants from Pakistan and India in Birmingham, Sparkbrook. Although the study appears to be based on racial discrimination and its spatial reflection -segregation- at first sight, neither the authors, nor the interpreters have emphasized the racial aspect of the study; instead, Rex and Moore's study on Birmingham is labeled as one of the chief inquiries in the Weberian urban sociological perspective, since their survey was mainly based on the competition for the scarce resource of housing, in which class conflicts cross-cut ethnic conflicts, forcing the competing groups to form temporary agreements, and authorities operating in the systems of housing allocation have an active role in this process. Locating the drastic housing shortage in Birmingham, rather than employment -since it was "one of the most affluent and fully employed cities in Britain"- at the center of their survey -since there were comprehensive redevelopment activities in Birmingham at the time their survey

was being initiated-, Rex and Moore observe discriminative and segregationist tendencies "which compelled colored people to live in certain typical conditions, and which of itself exacerbated racial ill-feeling" (Rex and Moore, 1979:20), embedded in the criteria of council housing allocation, in the discretionary elements of allocation system throughout bureaucratic processes, and in the supply of mortgages by building societies. In addition to this 'discrimination without a policy of discrimination', the slum-clearance program creates pressure on owner-occupiers of large houses to transform their houses into multiple-occupation (lodging-houses), which accelerates the deterioration of these buildings. Defining certain 'classes' and sub-classes according to tenure positions, Rex and Moore claims that existing political system in Britain cannot meet the demands of these classes. On the side of Conservatives, while local Conservative organization are anxious about the spread of lodging-houses and thinks that the best way to preserve their area is to keep out colored people and, if possible, Irish families, Conservative Party cannot respond to their demand, since their primary concern is the people in commuter areas -because of their electoral interest- and the shortage of labor in Birmingham force them not to turn their back to immigrants. On the other hand, local Labor Party's pressure on allocation of council housing to working class citizens of Sparkbrook is in conflict with Labor Party's historical commitment to liberal racial policies (ibid.: 194, 195).

Although in their preface to the fourth edition (first published in 1967) Rex and Moore declare that they concern a much wider socio-political context and that "overall pattern of race relations cannot be understood solely as an urban problem" (p: xiv); departing from his argument that "[t]he sociological study of the city (…) becomes a means to the end of a broader understanding of society and not simply an end in itself" (Pahl, 1975:235), Pahl criticizes Rex and Moore for they focus on the city as a sociological entity in itself. Furthermore, criticizing them not to clarify the place of local authority -to whom he gave the chief position in his thesis of 'urban managerialism'-, he points that housing condition is temporary and does not necessarily create 'class' conflict. If a 'category' (not 'class') "is condemned to remain in such a housing condition (…) the conflict will not be directed against those in another housing situation but rather on the means and criteria of access and those who determine and control them" (ibid.: 244-245).

Aside from these critiques from the Weberian camp, in his structurationist perspective Saunders tried to use the housing class model to develop his theory of 'domestic property classes', though he rejected his own formulation later and pointed that what he called as

domestic property classes are in fact political interest groups, and then even extended his conception of domestic property classes to a primary position in consumption sector cleavage (Saunders, 1989). However, his earlier formulation was regarded by Pratt as a relevant one, though she admits that domestic property class analysis may lack in answering the critiques about the neglect of contextual features of tenurial division and its further epistemological flaws within Weberian class analysis. According to Pratt domestic property classes provide a convenient framework in interpreting distributive inequalities in domestic property market and investigating the domestic property market in terms of real income, rather than earned income (Pratt, 1982:497). Saunders, on the other hand aimed to discard home ownership as a determinant of class structuration in his later formulation by claiming that the divisions emerging from ownership of key means of consumption (such as housing) is the major fault-line in British society, which is intensified by the privatization of welfare provision and which have carried sectoral alignments in regard to consumption to a primary position ahead of the class alignments in respect of production (Saunders, 1989:203). Defining a tendency towards diffusion of privatized mode of consumption to working class since 1950s in Britain, Saunders points that exploitation in the process of consumption takes place between the ones who claim access to crucial consumption resources and the ones who are excluded from such resources, rather than between "big capital and everybody else" (ibid.: 214).

### 2.3.2. From Poverty to Social Exclusion

As it was stated above, in European context the concept of social exclusion is more widely used than the conventional notion of poverty. The conceptualization of the segments of population who are most vulnerable to current renewal and regeneration policies is, however, vogue in Europe, when compared to the consensus on the ethno-racial base of social exclusion in American urbanization literature -whether these groups are labeled as underclass or not. Apart from the theoretical debates about the validity of underclass in U.S., European scholars focus on the drawbacks of importing this concept, since racism and xenophobia are newly emerging issues and hardly been conceived of as the reason of the social and spatial segregation of immigrants -an understandable concern when the theoretical distortion in American literature caused by focusing on race and ethnicity as the main division in society is considered. The two classes of non-national residents, defined by Allen, in E.U. countries also contribute to this ambiguity. According to this, the non-national residents coming from other member countries and the ones coming from other countries

have different status, since the Maastricht Treaty does not have any regulation that forces the inclusion of the latter group in political activities. Allen points that current tendencies toward the curtailment of immigration from outside the Union may result with the further marginalization of immigrant inhabitants by forcing them to be severely exploited in casualized labor markets (Allen, 1998:32). Attempts to define excluded groups -who do not only consist of immigrants- incorporate T. H. Marshall's definitions of 'civil citizenship', 'political citizenship', and 'social citizenship' in order to draw the lines that divide European society. Making his own classification of exclusion, Madanipour points that the most acute form of exclusion is the existence of exclusion from economic, political, and cultural arena simultaneously (Madanipour, 1998:78).

Although most of the advanced countries have undergone similar changes in employment and income structures, the variety in the proportion of the application of neo-liberal flexibility in distinct nations determines the differences in levels of exclusion and polarization. For example, Silver, in her comparison between Britain, France and America, points that part-time work is widespread in Britain and U.S., while this is not the case in French, because of the limitations in labor regulations (Silver, 1993:339). The belief in the fragmentation within the working class in post-industrial period, on the other hand, is not a new issue in Britain, since the divide between the council housing tenant union members and the non-union homeowners were already present in mid-1960s (Heath and McDonald, 1989:36). Redistribution and social security systems also have different strengths and weaknesses, with different focal points and social concerns. The processes of urban segregation vary according to the public policies, conditions of housing market, and cultural peculiarities and bias. Preteceille rejects the traditional contrast between European cities with their enhanced land values in inner cities by the presence of the upper classes and the American cities where better off have left the inner city to urban poor and preferred to settle in suburbs by stressing the upper and middle class tendency in Paris and London toward settling in suburban communities (Preteceille, 2000:79). However, French suburbs cannot be seen as the spaces of wealth and order. Rhein, for example points that the left-wing municipalities in Paris are blamed for constructing social housing between 1950s and 1970s -to assure their electoral base-, which are the spatial representation of the urban crisis in Paris suburbs (Rhein, 1996:62). Lipietz, on the other hand, claims that since there is no more room for slum housing in central Paris, the near periphery of the city center is open to decline, unless land agents find it profitable to regenerate the area in a single renovation project (Lipietz, 1998:184).

The socio-economic bases of the division between central city and suburbs have different reasons. In Netherlands, the efforts of authorities in Amsterdam to attract suburban residents to the inner city in 1960s have resulted with the concentration of groups with low socio-economic status (singles, immigrants, etc.) in inner city high-rise apartment blocks, though the Dutch welfare system still does not allow any sharp polarization or spatial concentration of poverty, unemployment, or ethnic minorities (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1996:82, 93-4). Similarly, Ronald van Kempen rejects the existence of a dual/divided character in the Dutch cities, because of its 'famous' high quality social rented housing sector (Ronald van Kempen, 2002:88, 89). However, the contemporary government policy of 'compact city' has been initiated in a more market-oriented character with reduced proportion of social housing (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1996:88, 89) and, after mid-1990s, with the aim of constructing expensive dwellings in low-rent areas (Ronald van Kempen, 2002:104) and this may lead to an increasing concentration of low-income households in other neighborhoods. Similarly Preteceille points that there is not a strong spatial duality or concentration of very poor in Paris, though working class and/or poor does not settle in certain parts of the city (Preteceille, 2000:80). Wacquant generalizes Preteceille's claim and points that as opposed to the race-based exclusion of American Black Belt, spatial exclusion operates on the basis of social classes, which is "partly exacerbated by colonial-immigrant status and partly alleviated by the (central and municipal) state" (Wacquant, 2002:222). In Germany, on the other hand, the state (Land) of Northrine-Westphalia, especially in its heavily industrialized Ruhr area, has faced with a cumulative economic decline, as opposed to the southern regions of Germany, where contemporary forms of secondary and tertiary sectors are nested. According to Friedrichs, although the social polarization has not been accompanied by spatial segregation in Ruhr -because of the tight housing market, which hinders the move of owners or renters-, after the massive population losses, the foreign-born population who had migrated to Germany as 'guest workers' is concentrated in central cities of the Ruhr and suffers from unemployment and welfare-dependency (Friedrichs, 1996:142, 143). In addition, emphasizing the function of work in the integration of the immigrants in this region, Kürpick and Weck warn against the danger of permanent exclusion of non-German population "not only from the formal labor market but also from social and cultural opportunities" (Kürpick and Weck, 1998:191).

These discussions in European context broaden the definition of poverty and reveal the implications of contemporary initiatives for various segments of the societies. Another

significance of this conceptual framework is that, contrary to the previous claims that the prosperity created by upgrading the economic base of certain nodes would solve the problems of the most deprived, necessity of more holistic and coordinated approaches toward social problems came into agenda. Reminding that the interrelationships that shape people's lives are very complex, Cars (*et al.*) point that "many social problems are best solved by very directly targeted actions" (Cars *et al.*, 1998:286). The introduction of City Challenge Program and Single Regeneration Budget by 1990s in Britain can be given as an expression of this new approach. Contrary to the UDCs' activities in 1980s, these programs were constructed for focusing directly on residential areas with more directly addressed policies for deprived communities and for fostering the involvement of local governments and community groups (Cameron and Davoudi, 1998:243; Colenutt, 1999:234). Similarly, in France, *Banlieue 1989* and *Dévelopment Social des Quartiers* programs have been introduced for solving the social and physical decay of certain neighborhoods (Le Galés, 1991:204).

Although these policies can be seen as promising attempts in the field of urban politics, they are only tiny efforts to reconstruct the welfare state, which is one of the responsible parties for the urban crisis. It is obvious that such policy suggestions would not only trigger concomitant problems in administrative level, but also contain pretentious tones implying an *a priori* belief in knowing 'what is the best for them'. In addition, it approves the current policies conducted under the mainstream discourse and is devoid of any comprehensive policy initiative with its piecemeal, short-run action plans. Using the phrase that Cochrane expressed in his critique against UDCs, in these approaches "[t]he 'problem' was defined in terms of areas, rather than people" (Cochrane, 1999b:248).

### 2.4. Conclusion: Dislocation for the Sake of Capital Accumulation

When the arguments for legitimizing contemporary urban regeneration scheme and their social, political, and economical consequences are evaluated, it can easily be concluded from the experiences that only particular groups have benefited from these initiatives; the activities of semi-autonomous partnerships could not create a spill-over effect on deteriorating neighborhoods and, contrary to the principle behind their establishment, they tend to increase the spendings of national and local governments. The excessive construction of office buildings has produced property booms and damaged the real estate economy. In addition, as a result of the de-regulation in home mortgage finance and the globalization of

real estate the interest rates have increased, and hence, pushed up housing prices (Harloe *et al.*, 1992:176). The efforts to relax planning regulations and by-passing the 'burden' of local democracy have resulted with the calls for turning back to socially-concerned policies and forced local authorities and elites to forge alliances with opposing groups in order to diminish the risk of loosing their popular support.

The new urban politics has severe consequences for the large segments of societies. The continuous dislocation of working classes -who face with the threat of unemployment and are working for diminishing incomes-, welfare dependents -who suffer from the narrowing safety net of the welfare services- , minorities -who are excluded from the mainstream society as a result of the increasing social exclusion and, by so, increasing racism-, non-professional young population -who has little opportunity, but to work under insecure employment conditions in short-term jobs- and other disadvantaged groups from their neighborhoods could not be compensated for by supply of affordable housing and employment opportunities and these groups are forced two live in high-density deteriorating neighborhoods. Lipietz claims that formation of ghettos for excluded populations is not a problem in neo-liberal logic; instead it is a solution for overcoming the land question (Lipietz, 1998:185). Similarly, Smith points that disinvestment is an integral dimension of the uneven development of urban space; according to him, aside from the relationship between housing demand and state policy, interests of financial institutions and landlords set the conditions for disinvestment (Smith, 1991:93-94).

The dialectical relationship between the economic and ideological motives of the current phase of urban politics can easily be observed in the rent-seeking urban regeneration initiatives. The demand of capital for high-status places necessarily ignited the calls for policies that will eventually dislocate the members of lower classes, who decrease the credibility of inner cities. However, these policies are never formulated in order to dislocate these segments totally since their concentration in certain parts of cities is necessary for extracting the largest benefit from the reproduced space. As a result, spatial segregation and ghettoization bring about exclusion and marginalization of these groups who are forced to settle in deteriorated parts of their cities until the rent gap in their neighborhood widens enough. When these necessary conditions are set, the diminishing rents in the surroundings of these ghettos and the concentration of criminal behaviors in these parts of cities naturalizes the clearance of these neighborhoods for constructing office buildings and housing for upper classes or removal of the residents through a process of gentrification.

Thus, far from being an invasion-succession process that is defined by the Chicago School, the constant dislocation and concentration of lower classes is the result of policies, which are initiated by the state that concerns about creating rent; implemented by public-private partnerships that are usually far away from securing participation and accountability; and widely supported by middle and upper classes whose distaste against the excluded populations inhibits the possibility of collective opposition. Under these conditions, the excluded populations can hardly forge any alliance for their struggle in the lived space except their neighbors who also lack in reaching the networks that influence the decision-making processes. Inquiring the possibility of connecting their struggle with the one in the workplace seems to have little or no use at this point since the latter's impact has been diminishing in the postindustrial period. One does not have to be a fortune-teller to predict an upcoming urban crisis unless economic policies that seek to increase the employment opportunities of excluded populations and urban policies for diminishing the spatial segregation are launched.

# CHAPTER III

## URBAN RENEWAL IN TURKEY

The interpretation of the urban renewal practices in Turkey necessitates a concomitant in-depth survey of social, economic, and political processes, since the top-to-bottom modernization project in Turkey fostered not only struggles that are peculiar to a class-based society, but also conflicts emerging from the cultural history inherited from the long Ottoman period. Although the periods of Turkish urbanization history can be discussed with respect to the administrative reforms emerging from within the inner developmental dynamics, considering the aim of this study, it is divided into two periods, in which 1980 is the turning point. The reason of this categorization is the significant changes in the urban land development patterns after 1980s, which should be considered as the result of the shift in the mode of accumulation defined in the previous chapters. The end of Keynesian period in advanced countries has also marked the end of import-substitute industrialization (ISI) policies in developing countries -which was designed to be compatible with the accumulation regime in developed countries. What has been observed globally since 1980s, that is the shift of investments from 'primary circuit' to 'secondary circuit of capital' (built environment) as a result of the diminishing returns in the commodity production activities (Harvey, 1985b:6), is also valid for Turkish context. The vital point of this tendency for our inquiry is the increasing interest of the national and international large capital in the urban renewal activities. In fact, it is possible to say that -regarding the meaning of the concept in the urbanization literature- urban renewal has emerged after 1980 in Turkey.

In the following sections, economic and political processes are going to be taken up with a parallel analysis of social change. Apart from the class-based and the cultural struggles mentioned above, the migration movements from rural to urban regions by the end of the 2nd World War -a phenomenon observed almost in every developing country- has generated the most apparent field of conflict in urban scene. In the absence of comprehensive economic

policies and accompanying regulations on urbanization neither better offs nor the urban poor have anything but to use their own resources and/or non-institutionalized relationships in producing housing and urban land. While middle and upper classes' demands were met mostly by small capital holders in construction sector, the solution of the immigrants for the problem of shelter was squatters (*gecekondu*), which have been the reflection of the inadequacies of economic policies, and therefore, the symbol of poverty. Similar to the analytical problems caused by the vague definition of deprived populations in advanced countries, the shaky cultural and occupational structure of *gecekondu* dwellers has brought about the necessity to re-conceptualize these groups. Since renewal activities are mostly conducted on formerly unauthorized settlements in Turkey -unlike the case in advanced countries-, dynamics of *gecekondu* populations gain a pivotal position in the analysis of urban renewal. The other divisions within the Turkish society, which were strengthened by the revival of religious and ethnic conflicts in the post-1980 period, are also going to be mentioned in order to provide a comprehensive outlook of the contemporary Turkish cities.

### 3.1. Economy and Politics of Urbanization in Pre-1980 Period

Turkish modernization project, which involved in the creation of a bourgeois class, was initiated by providing substantial incentives in 1920s and étatist policies with an emphasis on industrialization by direct investments of the state in 1930s because of the lack of indigenous entrepreneurship in Turkish society. A corporatist model that denies the existence of social classes was installed in which, while working classes were being repressed by a labor regulation -based on fascist Italian regulation- that forbids syndicalism and strike activities (1936), monopolization and vertical integration was encouraged by state policy (Keyder, 2003a:49-50). Although étatist policies of 1930s has not been supported by political circles and entrepreneurs in the first years of the republic, the fundamentals of this alliance was constructed in 1923 İzmir Economics Congress in which urban bourgeoisie is defined as the mediator between the state and the labor class (local elites had a similar role between the state and the peasants). In this congress, laborers were represented by the İstanbul Labor Union -which was established by an entrepreneurs' association- and the peasants were represented by Farmers Association -whose main activity is to avoid the distribution of vacant lands to small peasants (Yerasimos, 2003:87-88).

The urban bourgeoisie accumulated capital between 1925-50 period by getting the ownership of resources of the minority groups -who were forced to leave the country- and the extra

profits of the 2nd World War, and found itself powerful enough to stand against the bureaucracy. Keyder interprets this inevitable result as the consequence of the contradiction of the bureaucratic project, which includes in itself the conditions of the annihilation of the coalition between these classes (Keyder, 2003b: 174). The transition into multi-party system by 1950s created a suitable environment for the domination of the political arena by opposing ideologies, mainly gathered around the Democrat Party (DP), and provided an alternative to the calls for economic growth both in rural population and urban bourgeoisie. The double strategy of the DP, that is, defending market economy against state intervention and religious freedom and conservation of local traditions against the pressure of the center, constructed the bases for the populist policies, which will shape the political sphere from thereafter.

The first half of the 1950s has been marked by rapid growth and import liberalization (Celasun, 1994: 454) through which, the most dramatic transformation has been experienced in rural areas as a result of the explosion in the import of agricultural machinery and road construction machines, which will enable the spread of capitalist relations throughout the rural areas and the appearance of non-urban capitalists. This was related with the role that has been assigned to Turkey by the U.S. as the producer of agricultural products in the international division of labor and was beyond a simple suggestion, but a kind of obligation in order to benefit from U.S.'s development program for Europe to which, Turkey was included in 1947. In this respect, DP government's policies in the first half of the 1950s have been marked by an emphasis on rural areas both by direct and indirect consequences of the economic policy.

In the second half of the 1950s, on the other hand, policies that supported agricultural sector started to be replaced by the first efforts of ISI economic policies. As a result of the end of the post-war expansion in the world market the relative stagnation in the economy and the declining demand on exported goods forced limitations in import (Boratav, 2004:107). By 1954 a controlled foreign trade regime was applied and the decrease in the import of consumption goods started to be compensated by industrialization policies. DP government's inflationist policies for delaying the crisis could not resist to pressures and obliged to initiate a stabilization program in 1958, which is defined as the starting point of the so-called planned period. The establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) in 1960 -with significant powers in allocation of credits and foreign currency- is the most apparent institutional reform that shaped this transformation. The two main components of this period

were the allocation of scarce economic resources by administrative mechanisms and the redistribution of income in order to create domestic market (Keyder, 2003b:202). The Turkish Industrial Development Bank (*Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası*), which was established in this period by the support of the World Bank, provided credits and foreign currency for industrial investments and contributed to the shift of emphasis toward industrialization. Starting from this period, the share of industry has inclined, while agricultural sector's position in economic growth has declined gradually.

### 3.1.1. Dynamics of Rapid Urbanization

Unlike the case in industrialized countries in which, technocracy had dominated the course of urbanization in the postwar period, state's interventions in built environment was at the peek between the two wars because of the obvious reason of constructing a nation. The spatial strategy for the organization of Turkish Republic in its early periods are put by Tekeli as the declaration of Ankara as the capital city, transformation of the colonial-type of railway system into web-type system, and -after the big depression in 1929- the establishment of factories in small Anatolian cities on the railway route (Tekeli, 1998:5). There are several aspects of the reasons for shifting the capital city functions from İstanbul to Ankara: While economic interpretations gather around the goal of shifting the newly emerging bourgeois capital from İstanbul to underdeveloped cities, political and ideological interpretations emphasize the transformation of the patterns of unification of the newly-established nation state. According to Keyder, İstanbul was representing a kind of modernization process that was directed and shaped by non-Muslim populations in the Ottoman period, which was not fitting to the modernization project of Turkish Republic (Keyder, 2000a:17). This strategy has worked throughout the early periods of urbanization process and diminished the primacy of İstanbul against Anatolian cities, especially Ankara, until the end of the 2$^{nd}$ World War. While the population growth between 1927 and 1950 was 690.857 to 983.041 in İstanbul and 153.924 to 227.578 in İzmir, the population of Ankara has risen from 74.784 to 288.537 (cited in Şengül, 2001:72). On the other hand, the important characteristics that shapes the urban morphology, especially after the second half of 1960s is twofold according to Tekeli: Firstly, housing cooperatives, mass housing, and organized industrial sites resulted with a shift in urbanization process from oil-spot type to expansion by large land uses which are constructed for single purposes. Secondly, speculative tendencies caused leaping-type of expansion, which became possible by the launching of the production of automobiles in

Turkey by 1970s. The idea of mass housing came into agenda in the 2nd Five-Year Plan (1967), but applied by municipalities and private sector in that period (Tekeli, 1998:16-17).

Although the post-war period in Turkey is generally labeled as the 'planned' period, some authors interpret it as the period of populism and 'non-planned' growth because of the redistribution policies in macro level and/or the speculative land development patterns in metropolitan areas (respectively Boratav, 1983:7, Öncü, 1988:38). The mechanization of agricultural production and the emerging employment opportunities in cities brought about the most decisive dynamic of the urbanization process in Turkey -just as it did in other underdeveloped countries-, that is, huge waves of population movements from rural to urban areas, and their outcomes as the formation of *gecekondu* settlements. Defined by Şengül as the 'urbanization of labor power', a rapid urbanization process marks the period between 1950 and 1980, especially in metropolitan areas. Şengül interprets the reaction of the state -prohibition and demolition- as an effort to protect the principal of private property and the primacy of exchange value over use value in the production of space (Şengül, 2003:160). On the other hand, however, *gecekondu*'s were standing as a cheap solution for the immigrants, and immigrants had a prominent role in the supply of labor force during the period of ISI.

In the period of the second-generation migration wave (1970s), *gecekondu* phenomenon has transformed totally. By the expansion of cities, *gecekondu* settlements, which were once built in outskirts of cities, usually close to industrial sites, became valuable areas with increasing land prices. Huge profits from these areas ignited a shift of emphasis from use-value into exchange-value and transformed *gecekondu*'s into commodities. As Işık defines, although the first generation of *gecekondu*'s were characterized by being constructed outside capitalist market relations with no differentiation between the constructor and the user of the shelter, the second generation *gecekondu*'s were started to be constructed with no concern about having a shelter, but for benefiting from the increasing rents of the land that the shelter is built on. Starting from 1970s and increasing throughout 1980s the number of *gecekondu* tenants and ownership of more than one *gecekondu* have increased sharply (Işık, 1999:283-287). The proportion of squatters in the housing stock has risen from 4% in 1950 to 21% in 1980. The rise in the proportion of squatter population in the same period was 12.8% to 23.4% (cited in Danielson and Keleş, 1985:42). These values are more dramatic in large cities.

Another important aspect of the urbanization processes during the planned period was the gradually diminishing emphasis on the concerns about regional disparities. Although SPO was trying to develop policies for balanced growth, the economic primacy of İstanbul has started to be admitted by 1970s. ISI was becoming inevitably focused on İstanbul, and to a lesser extent Kocaeli and İzmir, because of the dependency of manufacture on imported inputs. Entrepreneurs in Anatolia also tended to move to these regions (Ataay, 2001:61) and contributed to the process of İstanbul-centered economic development. By this period, rural-to-urban migration movements have slowed down, while urban-to-urban population shifts have accelerated.

According to Tekeli the scale of capital accumulation in Turkey was not enough to cope with both rapid urbanization and industrialization at the same time. Industrialization-based economic policy (during 1960-1980 period) has oriented capital toward this sector, and has left the urbanization process at the hands of small capital owners in construction industry (*yapsatçı*), and the landlords (Tekeli, 1991:168). In the absence of state subsidies and large scale development projects, large corporations had left the housing market to these small-scale, frequently one-man firms who benefits from high rates of inflation, acute housing demand, and cheap labor for obtaining high profits in the short run (Öncü, 1988:52). As a result of the void in regulations for housing supply policy, the uncontrolled expansion of *gecekondu* settlements with increasingly commercial concerns, and the individual housing supply patterns dominant in middle-class housing sector created the bases of the dual character of Turkish metropolitan areas, which would going to be apparent by the shift of attention of the large capital from industrial sector to the built environment by 1980s. The enormous boom in the land prices as a result of the increasing demand for urban land -since urban land was one of the few 'inflation-resistant' forms of investment because of the lack of a developed financial system- (ibid.:40-41) also contributed to this gap by diminishing the opportunity of low-income groups' access to home ownership and even their access to tenancy in authorized housing. The provision of subsidized credit for low-income residential construction through the Turkish Real Estate and Credit Bank and the Social Insurance Fund was used for middle-class and luxurious residential construction and provided incentives mostly for housing cooperatives, which require steady employment in the formal sector (Buğra, 1998:308-309).

### 3.1.2. Constructing the Legal Bases of Urbanization and Planning

The first regulations for urbanization in Turkey was applied in Ankara by the establishment of Municipality of Ankara (*Ankara Şehremaneti*), -which was inspired from the *İstanbul Şehremaneti*- in 1924 (Altaban, 1998:43), which was followed by the enaction of the law number 1351 in 1928 that defined Ankara City Public Works Directorate (*Ankara Şehri İmar Müdürlüğü*) as the authority of planning in Ankara. The Law of Municipalities (law number 1580) was enacted in 1930 and other regulations for public health, construction, and expropriation (respectively law number 1593 (in 1930), 2290 (in 1933), and 2722 (in 1933)) were constituted in order to cope with the urban problems in rapid urbanization processes, especially in Ankara. These efforts to regulate urban problems, however, had not been conducted upon a decentralization policy. Planning authority was in The Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement (*İmar İskan Bakanlığı* -established in 1958) and financial and technical support for planning and infrastructure projects has been provided by İller Bank (*İller Bankası* -established in 1945). Municipalities could not have a direct control of urban development until the establishment of Metropolitan Municipalities in 1984. Also citizens could not have acquired the right to elect mayors until 1963.

Although have not been planned comprehensively during the 19$^{th}$ century (Tapan, 1998:75), İstanbul was a relatively more experienced city in terms of planning activities. However the first massive planning movement of the new republic was initiated in the capital city. The construction of the capital, however, did not take place as the renewal of the old city center, but proceeded through the construction of an alternative city center (Yenişehir) and a middle-class housing zone (Çankaya) in the southern part of the city, which have determined the divided character of Ankara ever since. This division has become the dominant characteristic of Anatolian cities in that period. New administrative functions, services, and facilities that was going to shape the urban way of life in the new republic were located outside the traditional city centers and constituted double-centered cities (Osmay, 1998:141). Ankara planning project was achieved by the expropriation of a large amount of land (400 ha.), whose price was determined according to the tax values of the land. This was a significant feature of city planning history in Turkey, since this plan could not be achieved unless the Law of Expropriation in 1925 (law number 583) was enacted, because of the gigantic rent increases in Ankara. This application was in agenda again in 1971 during the discussions about the changes in the constitution, but considered as to be against the primacy

of private property and annulled by the Court of Constitution (Altaban, 1998:44). The famous Jansen Plan was approved in 1932 and was largely applied until 1950. During the same periods İstanbul was experiencing planning activities -though not as comprehensively as Herman Jansen's studies in Ankara- under the studies of another famous planner Henri Prost. Both plans lost their relevance as a consequence of massive migration waves after the 2nd World War.

These initial planning efforts, however, could not cope with the problem of housing. Even in 1950, *gecekondu* problem was apparent in big cities and comprising large proportions of the built environment and it was disrupting the pre-determined schemes on land development. Starting from the second half of 1940s, a series of regulations has been applied, which did not provide solutions for unauthorized urbanization but contributed to the dominance of illegal housing supply methods and land acquisition patterns. The first regulation was the exemption of *gecekondu* settlements in Ankara in 1948 and it was generalized for other cities one year later. Similar to the earlier slum-clearance experiences in U.S. cities, *gecekondu* phenomena was considered as a social problem at first and was tried to be solved by supplying cheap land -by 10 years installment- to families that suits to particular conditions. However, the amount of housing need was far beyond the limits of these efforts. The huge rent pressure in authorized land was also exceeding the financial capacity of the newcomers and orienting these masses to solve their problems by their own. Until the enaction of the *Gecekondu* Law (law number 775) in 1966, a group of regulations -which allow the allotment of municipal land to immigrants, transfer of lands owned by the National Treasury to municipalities, and the supply of infrastructure to *gecekondu* settlements (respectively in 1953, 1959, and 1963)- were enacted without using the term *gecekondu*. All these regulations have contributed to the spread of unauthorized housing; they were degenerated for populist policies and located clientalism at the center of urban policy-making processes in Turkey. What can be seen as a positive step in the law number 775 is that the *gecekondu* problem was firstly expressed officially. In addition, contrary to the previous laws that were mainly made up of statements that were resulted with the exemption of unauthorized housing, the law number 775 expressed the necessity to categorize *gecekondu* settlements and proposed the assignment of these areas to common use -in 'clearance zones'-, upgrading the dwellings -in 'improvement zones'-, or constructing housing for low income groups -in 'prevention zone' (Özkan, 1998:71-72). Although this law can be regarded as a significant policy initiative, the only result of it was to enhance the tension between the state and the neglected masses since it was abused for the benefits of middle and upper classes in practice.

In 1976 law number 1990, which comprises some changes in the previous law, was enacted. By this law, Turkey has entered to 1980s with almost all unauthorized housing settlements as being legalized (Ekinci, 1995:26), although having miserable living conditions, even worse than it was 30 years ago (Işık, 1999:285).

Besides the spread of unauthorized housing, patterns of housing provision and the morphology of central business districts (CBD) in Turkish cities has also experienced decisive transformations. Increasing rent pressure necessitated a new regulation that allows multi-storey use in scarce urban land. Flat ownership system was installed in Ankara in 1950s and the Flat Ownership Law was enacted in 1965. This regulation created cooperation between landowners, contractors, and individual buyers and cancelled the necessity of large-scale investment in housing for some time (Ayata, 2003:39). A report prepared by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement declares that "a sort of urban renewal process" was completed in larger cities in the second half of the 1970s (cited in Danielson and Keleş, 1985:181). Besides, by 1965, small production units started to leave their traditional location in city centers and shifted to small industrial sites constructed in peripheral parts of cities. Large industrial complexes, also, tended to locate in organized industrial sites (Tekeli, 1998:16). These tendencies have reduced the compression in CBDs and increased the attractiveness of central parts of cities for middle-classes for residential uses. On the one hand, provision of housing by small capital holders was meeting the demand of middle-classes. On the other hand, transfer of public lands to housing cooperatives accelerated this kind of housing provision. Keyder points the corporatist relations that limit the groups (among which soldiers, judges, journalists, and doctors are the best known occupational groups) who can have access to these cooperatives (Keyder, 2000b:182). Although laborers have formed cooperatives by using the credit opportunities of Laborer Insurance (*İşçi Sigortası*) by 1970s, these projects were far away from meeting the housing need of these groups (Sey, 1998:289).

Thus, it is possible to observe a disjunction between the efforts of regulating urbanization and the exiting processes that shape the built environment. However, the growing urban problems were by no means emanating from by-passing the notion of planning. Instead, the period between 1960s and 1980 was marked by the emergence of a relative concern about planned urban and regional development. Although SPO's regional plans could not be applied as they were aimed to be as a result of the diminishing concerns about regional disparities, the establishment of Master Plan Bureaus (*Nazım Plan Büroları*) in metropolitan

areas by the second half of 1960s and the organization of planning contests by İller Bank for Anatolian cities had significant influences in urbanization processes in that period. What can be expressed as the reason of failure is the continuous rejection of the dynamics of Turkish society that, in fact, was influenced by the ideological presuppositions of the technocratic project about the organization of everyday life, as it was the case in the urban politics in certain advanced countries like the U.S.

### 3.1.3. Problem of Integration in Turkish Cities

The way of conceptualizing *gecekondu* phenomena before 1980s was generally shaped by the analysis about the discordance between the scale of massive population movements from rural to urban areas and the slow industrialization process with insufficient absorption capacity. Tekeli (1982-orig.1974) and Şenyapılı (1978) informs us about the dualist models of economy, which aim to explain the transition form feudalism to capitalism in developing countries by focusing on the contrast between the inefficient and labor-intensive character of agricultural production and the growing industrial sector in urban areas looking for reserve labor power. According to these models as the capitalistic way of production become dominant in agricultural sector, the excess population will shift to industrial sector and meet the need for labor force. Both authors remind the critiques against the incapacity of these models and point the alternative survival strategies of unemployed rural population in urban environment, that is, shifting to informal sector.

Informal sector is generally defined as being unorganized, individual, inefficient, temporary, and accessible jobs with no vertical hierarchy. The peculiarity of Şenyapılı's analysis is her critique of defining *gecekondu* phenomena as a temporary one, which would disappear in time as it is formulated in dualist models. According to her, *gecekondu* phenomena or marginal sector is not a problem, but a certain kind of process of transition into capitalism (Şenyapılı, 1978:41). Keynesian approach to the problem of employment does not provide solutions for structural and developmental problems. The problem of developing countries is not inadequate demand; therefore, solution is not to increase consumption spendings, but to increase investment spendings. Widely admitted fact that the ISI in Turkey was generally capital-intensive -just as its applications in other developing countries- contributes to the relevance of this analysis. The source of this observation is Kıray's view that exemption of *gecekondu*'s or supply of public housing can never be a solution for problems of urbanization in Turkey. She points that rate of growth in urban population in Turkey is 18%,

while rate of increase in industrial employers is only 8%, and says that industrial growth is the only way to cope with rapid urbanization process (Kıray, 2003-orig. 1970: 26-27). Şenyapılı's addition to Kıray's studies was her conceptualization of informal sector as a buffer that functions to reduce the friction between the bourgeoisie and the 'disintegrated' urban population by bringing the services that the latter group can not reach within existing mechanisms and by providing the ability to survive and accumulate capital until obtaining two basic reliance, which are employment in an organized job and ownership of land in the city.

Karpat's study was another influential one on unauthorized settlements in that period (Karpat, 1976). Similar to Şenyapılı's study, Karpat was proposing a chain of migration-squatterization-urbanization or integration-politicization (ibid.:196) and focuses on the significance of newcomers in the spreading of a new political culture by acting as a pressure group and forming their own civil organizations like Society for Settlement Improvement (*Gecekonduyu Güzelleştirme Derneği*) (ibid.:43). Although he admits the primacy of economic and occupational integration over cultural change, he denies the potential of radicalism in these groups and emphasizes the efforts of squatter population to become full-fledged members of the system (ibid.:44). Elsewhere, he regards politics as a tool for integration: "In the current phase of the migrants' transition from a rural to an urban existence, politics intensifies communication and social mobilization and facilitates the *gecekondu* dwellers' participation in city affairs, and thus speeds up their integration into an urban environment" (Karpat, 1975:92).

Although written in a period, which witnessed radical movements in *gecekondu* settlements, both studies neglect the impacts of these tendencies on political climate in 1970s. While criticizing dualist models, Şenyapılı considers the problem of 'disintegration' as a temporary one and says that connections of immigrants with rural areas are economic until the two basic reliance (organized employment and urban land) was obtained; at the end of this process connection of the newcomer with the homeland transforms into regular routines like visiting the relatives (Şenyapılı, 1978:20-22). Similarly, Karpat perceives informal employment and housing opportunities as supplementary strategies for integration and attribute a positive meaning to clientalist relationships by interpreting the perception of state by *gecekondu* dwellers as a 'father', who will protect them (Karpat, 1975:93-94). Patterns of social stratification in post-1980 period have displayed that this thesis is invalid. Integration

of immigrant populations would not going to be in line with these kinds of modernization-theory-based estimations.

### 3.1.4. New Forms of Political Clashes in 1970s

The fluctuations in the political environment of 1970s should be regarded as the consequences of the policies in previous periods swaying between the efforts of planning the economic development in surface appearance and the loose social policies that rely on the reflexes generated within the own dynamics of the society. The election of social democratic mayors of Republican People's Party (RPP) in metropolitans in 1973 revealed the awry socio-political structure by carrying the conflicts within the society to the political arena. What has been labeled as the 'New Municipal Movement' is the first apparent manifestation of the central-local conflict in Turkish political history. The main principles of the Movement were introduced as the aims of establishing autonomous and democratic municipalities, which undertake the tasks of production, regulation of consumption, creation of resources, and which form unions with each other (Tekeli, 1977:33). The municipal success of the Italian Communist Party (Finkel, 1990:206), the struggles against the housing and tenancy laws in England (Yıldırım, 1979:19), the new left movements in France, and several other examples have generally been regarded as the sources of inspiration for this movement, which considers the local government scale as an important step to realize socialist revolution. The conflict between the rightist central government and leftist municipalities have increased the tendency of revolutionist mayors to use statements implying illegality (that is, disobedience to the central state) (Tekeli, 1983:11) and forced them to refuse paying some obligatory payments to the institutions of the state in order to create resources, which had been shrinking as a result of the discretionary budget policies of the central government (Tekeli, 1991: 177). One of the idols of that period, Vedat Dalokay (the mayor of Ankara between 1973 and 1977) says that the tutelage on municipalities are not only limited with the formal administrative practices, but also in the administrative pressures of the provincial governor and even the hindering activities of the police force without any legal base (Dalokay, 1975:24). The radicalism of the revolutionist mayors also ignited oppositions with the central body of their own political party (RPP) and resulted with their withdrawal from the 1977 local elections. Adding the conflict between mayors and the municipal councils, this picture is compatible with the principle of the Movement, defined by Finkel as the intention of being "part of the institutional foundations of a civil society that

would be more reliant on its own inner fund of rational accountability than on the ideological consensus of a political elite" (Finkel, 1990:191).

The principle of unionization was realized by the establishment of Marmara and Straits Municipal Union in 1975, which was followed by other unions in different regions and the problems emerging from the struggles with the central government were aimed to be solved in co-operation. While implementing their policies, revolutionist mayors have also faced with the oppositions from the local entrepreneurs -the group that was (and still is) heavily represented in municipal councils- because of the 'productive municipality' principle, which marks the necessity of direct intervention of municipalities in the production and the supply of cheap consumption goods (like, bread) in good quality. It was proposed that the municipalities should initiate certain activities that would provide the necessary resources for the production of these goods (Kazancı, 1983:44). The productive activities of municipalities were not limited to these fields, but were extended to the regulation of built environment in order to undermine the speculative forces (Finkel, 1990:208). In doing so, it was aimed that the gain of the socially produced space would not be extracted by the landlord -who had no labor in the production of this value-, but be distributed to the society (Tekeli, 1977:34). One of the most important aspects of this principle was the development of a positive conception of *gecekondu* settlements in which, use value was the main concern. "Housing problem is a part of class struggle!" was a slogan widely used in leftist circles (Arslan, 2004:81). Another important aspect of the Movement was its emphasis on the democratic local government. The establishment of KENT-KOOP in Ankara (1977), which was the largest union of housing cooperatives in Turkey, is one of the examples of this principle. Similar to The community Development Project in England (1969), which was based on the ideal of allowing the participation of community groups, unions, and local governments (Kraushaar, 1984:357-358), KENT-KOOP tried to apply participatory mechanisms. In this project, the low-income housing problem was tried to be solved by using the housing credits obtained from the European Settlement Fund of the Council of Europe and the individual savings of the participants on the urban land donated by the municipality of Ankara (Keleş and Kano, 1987:33-34). Fatsa case was, however, the foremost radical local initiative in Turkish urbanization history. The significance of Fatsa case was the election of an independent candidate (Fikri Sönmez), who was an active member of a revolutionist organization (*Devrimci Yol*). Being applied for less than one year between 1979 and 1980, the participatory mechanisms in Fatsa had been initiated through neighborhood committees. Apart from its radical conception of democracy, what is unique in this case is that, unlike the

view of other revolutionist organizations that regard taking part in elections a useless attempt, *Devrimci Yol* has intended to display that a local movement that is independent from the sovereignty of the central state is possible (Erten, 1999:132).

The interpretations of the movement in 1970s have generally depart from the belief in the lack of the tradition of municipal organization in Turkey -which roots back to the Ottoman period- (Tekeli, 1983:10; Belge, 1979:16) and the potential dangers of locally-organized revolutionary movements like corporatism or the perpetuation of the conservative tendency of Turkish society, which prepares the convenient conditions for a patriarchal model of mayor, who uses the same informal channels and strategies for creating resources (though using it for the interest of the citizens) (Belge, 1979:16, 18). Another important aspect of the Movement was its class-based political discourse, in which, *gecekondu* dwellers' struggle for the right of shelter was regarded as a part of working class movement. Although the success of the left-wing parties in 1973 local elections was related with the increasing votes from the second generation of *gecekondu* population, the identification of *gecekondu* dwellers as poor people -who could take part in revolutionary movements-, was going to be criticized by emphasizing the heterogeneous structure of *gecekondu* population (Erder, 1999:296-297). The positive conception of *gecekondu* in the Movement has also been criticized for exacerbating the illegalization of land development (Ekinci, 1995:13). Similarly, Güneş-Ayata interprets the political initiatives in *gecekondu* settlements within the clientalistic nature of Turkish political life: "[I]n the squatter housing areas old neighborhood leaders were replaced by party officials whose link to the community was ethnic" (Güneş-Ayata, 1994:55).

As it can be deduced from these critiques, the New Municipal Movement had set the conditions for the emergence of the 'negative' conception of *gecekondu* dwellers, which has dominated the interpretations of housing problem in the following period and encouraged the rent-seeking policies with its constant approval of victimizing the neglected segments of immigrant populations. Thus, the once neglected part of urban population has been entirely excluded from the mainstream society. In addition, the Movement's failure in combining its ambitions with the struggle in workplace have left *gecekondu* dwellers alone in the post-1980 period, forced them to strengthen their emerging tendency of forging alliances with other agents of urbanization, and thus, to be the defenders of commodification of space. However, as it is going to be discussed below, only a few proportion of this group has benefited from this process.

### 3.2. Neo-Liberalism and the Emergence of Rent-Seeking Urbanization Policies

The end of Keynesianism in the second half of the 1970s in advanced countries has been experienced in Turkey as the end of the ISI policies, which, in fact, has been faltering since 1968 because of the structural dependency of industrial growth on imported inputs. The dept-crisis in 1978-1980 period has ended with the military-coup and has set the stage for the initiation of market-oriented policies thereafter. The initial conditions of the new era was established by the introduction of the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program (SSAP) in January1980 under IMF-World Bank auspices, which was followed by three-year stand-by agreement with IMF (1980-1983), five successive Structural Adjustment Loans (1980-1984), and three Sectoral Adjustment Loans from the World Bank (Şenses, 1994:54).

It is generally assumed that post-1980 period can be analyzed in two phases, in which the first phase (1980-1988) was characterized by export promotion (involving tax rebates, duty-free import allowances and subsidized credits) and the suppression of wage incomes, which had "the dual effect of both reducing domestic demand in favor of creating an 'exportable' surplus and also cutting labor costs" (Boratav *et al.*, 2001:319). Privatization, and private sector expansion became the main economic policy and this was tried to be achieved by the spread of contract personnel, by which job security and the right for membership to unions are exchanged with higher wages. Nevertheless, according to Waterbury, the weight of the public sector in Turkish economy has not diminished, but rather it has 'regrouped': "In many ways more discretionary power and resources have been concentrated in the state, and, more specifically, in the prime minister's office than is generally recognized." (Waterbury, 1992:50). Waterbury interprets the policies of Motherland Party (MP) government as to be determined by the calculation of the optimum of public spending and investment patterns that will serve the minimal winning coalition (ibid.:66).

By the end of the first phase not only the privatization policy had been standing as a failure, but also the public savings gap was widening. The sharp rises in the cost of imports, industrial prices and interest rates against the steep fall in agricultural prices and urban real wages (Celasun, 1994:461) exposed its consequences in the general elections in 1987 and the municipal elections in 1989. The policy response was the complete de-regulation of financial markets and the opening of the domestic assets markets to global financial competition by the elimination of the controls on foreign capital transactions and the declaration of the

convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989. The 'hot money' inflows "enabled, on the one hand, the financing of rising public sector expenditures, and also provided relief on inflationary pressures by cheapening import costs" (Boratav *et al.*, 2001:323). After 1989, bond financing became "almost the single most important component of financing deficit" (Türel, 2001:185). In this period public investments have shifted away from manufacturing toward transportation, communications and energy and contribute to the marginalization of the industrial labor force. Export incentives became less generous but support for foreign direct investments (FDI) increased. High interest rates (for financing public sector deficits), however, enabled saving surplus in private sector and made it sluggish in investing on industrialization in that unstable macroeconomic environment. While the private investment has leaned to focus on investments with short turn-over time -and opportunities of subsidized credits from special public funds- like housing and tourism, the expected FDI also turned its face to service sector like banking. The ones who benefited from the FDI incentives were mostly the local enterprises, which have established firms in foreign countries and invested in Turkey under the label of FDI (Tonak, 2004:46). Also, foreign enterprises in Turkey had negative effect on the income distribution with their high profit-wage ratio (ibid.:47).

### 3.2.1. Urbanization of Capital

By the transition from ISI into an export-promotion strategy in 1980s, Turkish cities have witnessed vital transformations. Labeled by Şengül as the 'urbanization of capital', post-1980 period marks a significant change in mode of accumulation in Turkey. By the shift of public investments from manufacturing toward infrastructure and the increasing tendency of private sector to invest in built environment, "the large cities became major sites of private and state investments" (Şengül, 2003:163). This increasing attention of large capital to built environment nurtured large-scale mass housing and infrastructure projects and the construction of high-rise office buildings and shopping malls, which has been complemented by the new market policies that has opened the gates to foreign capital and goods. De-regulation has been applied in urban environment by the state through, on the one hand, indirect interventions in economy like liberalization of financial markets, and on the other, direct policies like funding construction activities or relaxing planning regulations that encouraged the (re)developmental activities in a somewhat illegal way.

The increasing significance of built environment for capital accumulation necessitated certain administrative reforms for decentralization, which brought about the enaction of

regulations in the first half of 1980s, which includes the transfer of larger funds and the authority to prepare and approve plans to municipalities. By the dismantling of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement, municipalities restored their position as actors that determine the urbanization process more intensely. The establishment of metropolitan municipalities in 1984 played a decisive role in these new regulations, since by this law, the conflict between district municipalities and the metropolitan municipalities has emerged as another dimension of the existing conflicts between central and local governments. By obtaining the authority to collect real estate taxes -whose revenues were increased by the tax reform in 1982- within their jurisdictions (Yönder, 1998:64), metropolitan municipalities have become important economic and political poles. The process of the urbanization of capital has been complemented by the election of liberal mayors of Motherland Party (MP) in most of the large cities in 1984 local elections, and contributed to what Tekeli defines as the transition from small capital's speculative city to large capital's speculative city (Tekeli, 1991:170).

The implications of new regulations and the tendencies of capital can be discussed in two layers. In national scale, decentralization has had adverse effects in underdeveloped parts of Turkey. In fact developmental approach for reducing regional disparities has never been successfully applied in previous periods. However, the total dismantling of these policies by 1980s has resulted with the flow of even the existing capital in these regions to more attractive geographies. Slower rate of population increase in underdeveloped regions decreased the share of municipalities of small Anatolian cities in the national budget and reduced their ability to cope with urban problems. Apart from the regional disparities, major metropolitan areas have also confronted with many difficulties in terms of urban development that emanate both from the internal dynamics of Turkish society and the dominance of rent-seeking urbanization policies that encourage speculation. The invasion of capital into built environment has not been accompanied by the emergence of a fully developed housing and urban land market has emerged. The big increase in interest rates as a result of the de-regulated banking sector -which was an element of the more flexible interest rate policy of SSAP (Şenses, 1994:55)- has oriented savings to the banks and bankers at the beginning of 1980s and resulted with a sharp fall in housing demand, which has eliminated many small capital constructors and increased the advantageous position of large enterprises, who overcame this crisis by shifting their construction activities to Middle Eastern countries (Türel, 1994:203). The production of housing could only be accelerated by the intervention of state. Under these conditions, while formal sector has been shaping certain parts of cities

by using the benefits of their coalition with international capital, informal relations have started to play an increasing role in the production of space. New policies and regulations did not provide any solution for wage and service distribution; rather they have contributed to the formation of a particular type of capital accumulation in informal sector that benefits from the existing clientalist relationships and enjoys larger profits as a result of their increasing interrelationship with formal sector in urbanization. As a result, Turkish cities have transformed into environments that display fragmented morphologies and that contain disguised confrontations and coalitions, without providing any satisfaction not only for the critical interpreters of capitalist urbanization, but also for the defenders of globalization and 'competitive-city' discourse.

### 3.2.2. Housing Problem and the Legalization of 'Illegalization'

As it was stated above, private sector's interest in built environment could not be mobilized to solve the acute housing problem at the beginning of 1980s. Housing market was (and still is) not diversified to meet the demands of certain groups. The fall in the proportion of married population since 1960s, for example, has generated the necessity of the provision of smaller (Keleş, 1982:18) and rented (Balamir, 1995:77) dwellings for singles, though neither small capital holders, nor large enterprises could be oriented towards constructing dwellings for this group. In addition, newly married couples and groups with no steady income cannot meet the necessary conditions to participate in housing cooperatives (Osmay, 1995:194), which have become the most convenient way for owner occupation. Although the contribution of commercial banks in providing credits to housing sector had increased until 1987, it has fallen since then by the emergence of financial problems in Public Housing Fund (PHF) (Türel, 1994:210). Since long-term housing credits are not profitable for financial markets (Türel, 1996:2) or costly for households (Türel, 1994:212), the provision of authorized housing is not reachable for low-income groups, singles, newly wed couples, and more marginalized groups like widows or single-parented households who have little or no income.

Calls for mass production for social housing in the 3rd and 4th Five-Year development plans have been realized in order to cope with the housing problem in this period by the enaction of The Law of Mass Housing in 1981, -which was rearranged in 1984- and the creation of PHF with extensive resources. Mass Housing Organization (*Toplu Konut İdaresi*) played an active role by planning and constructing housing projects in İstanbul-Halkalı, Ankara-

Eryaman, and subsequent projects. The first regulation (in 1981) was criticized by small constructors -for it was more advantageous for large-scale enterprises-, while large-scale enterprises had also stood against it -because of the priority given to non-profit organizations (Keleş, 1990:153). The second regulation (in 1984) have met the demands of these groups and provided the opportunity to individuals to obtain credit for their second homes, and even for their residence in a resort area (ibid.:155). Keleş's earlier critique on the first regulation, that is, the neglect of local governments from mass housing production process (Keleş, 1982:31), is also valid for the second regulation. In addition, contrary to the restriction in the size of the houses constructed by the fund in the previous law, the new regulation gave the right to construct large dwellings with 3 or 4 bedrooms (Keleş and Kano, 1987:30-31). Adding the priority given to housing cooperatives in receiving the credit, the dwellings built with PHF have exceeded the purchasing ability of low-income groups who have not enough savings necessary to participate in a cooperative and who have no steady income. The project proposals of the private sector, to acquire this fund, has also gradually shifted towards construction of housing for upper income groups and contributed to the process of spatial segregation by constructing housing estates for privileged groups (Sey, 1998:297) in the peripheral lands, "hitherto available to the squatters" (Buğra, 1998:311).

The shortcomings of the regulations on housing and the reluctance of policy-makers to stand against speculation have accelerated unplanned and unauthorized development. In fact, state has played the leading role in the legalization of illegal housing market by enacting the law number 2981 -one month before 1984 local elections-, which introduces the notion of 'improvement plan' (*ıslah imar planı*) and transfers the authority of giving construction license to under oath bureaus. Although the latter regulation was annulled, the former played a vital role in the legalization of illegal urbanization thereafter. After the changes in this law in 1986, even vacant lands could have been defined as potential squatter development areas that should be preserved.

This regulation has opened up the road for encouraging the formation of squatter settlements by announcing improvement plans, even in areas with no potential for unauthorized development. Up to 4 floor permits within these plans resulted with the development of unauthorized settlements directly by the construction of apartments (Ekinci, 1995:32). The approval of metropolitan municipalities was not necessary for the application of improvement plans. By using political channels, new district municipalities have been formed illegally and these municipalities distributed title deeds without any legal basis. Even

manufacturers have started to demand lands from these illegal settlements (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2002:79). Since the improvement plans are not obliged to obey the rules of Development Law (*İmar Kanunu*), squatter settlements flourished in naturally fragile areas, which have important functions for providing fresh water and air to metropolitan areas. These regulations did not only encouraged the spread of speculative movements in squatter development, they were (and still are) also used for permitting the construction of luxury housing in areas closed for development. Even a prime minister and a mayor of İstanbul (who is the prime minister of Turkey today) were blamed to use these legal gaps to authorize their own lands for construction (respectively, Ekinci, 1995:34; Bora, 2000:67).

### 3.2.3. Urban Renewal as a Tool for Reshaping the City

In Turkey neither specific regulations within the administrative system, nor any specific institution for regulating or undertaking urban renewal activities have been established yet. Genç points that renewal activities are regulated by the existing regulations, though there are certain institutional re-arrangements within local governments (Genç, 2003:448). Although Özkan's surveys about the regulations that had been employed for regenerative initiatives in pre-1980 period point that certain laws like the Flat Ownership Law of 1965 or the *Gecekondu* Law of 1966 fostered activities that can be discussed under the label of urban renewal (Özkan, 1998), neither the transformation of CBDs after the Flat Ownership Law, nor the tiny efforts to rehabilitate unauthorized housing areas after the *Gecekondu* Law can be regarded as the otcomes of specific regulations on urban renewal, especially when the definition of the concept in this study is considered. What has changed after 1980 is not, however, a sharp break point in terms of the appearance of urban renewal and regeneration policy initiatives. More pricisely, governmental bodies have gained a more active role in managing these initiatives during the second part of 1980s, besides its indirect interventions that disguised its pioneering position in redevelopmental activities by letting market forces to use the opportunities provided by regulations.

It is possible to say that the initial steps that exposed the processes and the agents of transformation of unauthorized settlement through urban renewal and regeneration initiatives can be detected within the new regulations on *gecekondu* settlements in mid-1980s. Law number 2981 and 3290 has opened the channels of transformation in *gecekondu* settlements by introducing the concept of improvement plan. Although the definition of the law implies that it will be operated in order to provide basic infrastructure facilities and improve the

living conditions in unauthorized settlements without changing the legal status of *gecekondu* houses, it has encouraged the development of high-dense settlements in these unplanned areas by giving the redevelopment rights directly to owner-occupiers (Özdemir, 1998:104-105). Thus, the transformation of urban fabric has been directed mainly by market forces that obtained the opportunity to conduct its own rules under the encouragement of speculative movements by regulations. In this period, state's urbanization policy was mainly a continuation of the previous period's clientalist approach in which, electoral concerns, network relationships, and pressure group politics constitute the main axis. Turkey became a 'heaven for contractors' by 1980s, since the involvement of large construction firms were still limited to the construction of gated communities for higher classes in the outskirts of the major metropolitan areas.

In mid-1980s, the policy prescriptions that emanate from the advanced countries' experiences in the period of urban restructuring have started to dominate the urbanization discourse in Turkey. The immediate impact of competitive city discourse is crystallized in large-scale renewal activities in the central districts of İstanbul. Being praised by Keyder with its goal of creating a 'world city', liberal major Bedrettin Dalan initiated a series of renewal activities in mid-1980s (Keyder, 2000a:26). In these projects some historical neighborhoods have undergone large-scale demolishment, historically embedded small manufacturers have been removed, and touristy features of İstanbul were tried to be emphasized. However, it was still difficult to claim the widespread tendency of conducting similar regenerative initiatives in other cities for two reasons: Firstly, although a sort of decentralization policy was launched by the establishment of metropolitan municipalities, the existing clientalist relationships, the central-local and metropolitan-district municipality conflicts, and the longly-awaited investments in improving unauthorized settlements obstructed the use of this discourse. Secondly, Turkey's potential in tourism sector provided opportunities to abuse the dominant discourse of selling cities in 1980s by enacting special laws that relaxed the planning regulations or dismantled them all in environmentally fragile areas and attracted the attention of constructers to virgin beachsides rather than deteriorated inner city neighborhoods.

By the end of 1980s, the afore-mentioned shift in capital accumulation processes in Turkey has carried the built environment into a more pivotal position in terms of profit making and increased the attention of both public and private sector to this field. On the one hand, the complete de-regulation of financial markets opened the channels for foreign capital inflows

that financed the state's increasing investments in infrastructure; while on the other, increasing interest rates and the diminishing exports incentives pushed the private sector to invest in built environment that started to be more profitable than manufacturing with its short turn-over time. Thus, the conditions for launching rent-seeking urbanization policies have been set in this period both for the state -which demands its share from the profit that is partly produced from its investments in infrastructure- and the private sector -that is ready to turn its face to the second circuit of capital accumulation with its saving surplus.

It can easily be said that the case of Dikmen Valley was one of the most significant examples of urban renewal initiatives in Turkey that can directly be related with the similar practices inquired in this study. As it is going to be discussed in the following chapter, Dikmen Valley Project was launched by a social democratic mayor in 1989 with the main objectives of improving the living conditions of *gecekondu* dwellers and the environmental quality of the entire city of Ankara. Nevertheless, especially after the following local elections, it has become one of the major representations of the new way of urban policy-making with its rent-seeking and unaccountable approach. Being based on the principle of public-private partnership in the first place, the execution of the project went far beyond the concerns about self-financing and participation. Today, Dikmen Valley Project is presented as a best-practice in terms of *gecekondu* settlement renewal project and its model is adapted to similar initiatives like Ankara Northern Entrance Urban Transformation Project.

The widely mentioned necessity of the transformation of unauthorized settlements for the image of the cityscape has finally carried urban renewal into the political agenda and accelerated the efforts to prepare necessary specific regulations. The anxiety of the parliament about enacting certain laws for adapting the existing regulations to the criteria of E.U. has contributed to the enaction of the new Law of Metropolitan Municipalities (law number 5216) and the new Law of Municipalities (law number 5272) in 2004 without leaving much time for public discussion. Although the latter was annulled in 2005, another law was enacted after a couple of months (law number 5393). These two laws (law number 5216 and 5393) give significant powers to metropolitan municipalities in project areas. Talking about the previously annulled law number 5272, Ersoy points that it lacks in comprehensiveness and it is not convenient to put this article into the Law of Municipalities, rather than the Development Law (Ersoy, 2005:153). It is possible to criticize the re-enacted Law of municipality (law number 5393) in a similar fashion. Urban Transformation Law Draft is another significant effort to increase the autonomy of municipalities on lands that are

decided to be 'urban transformation and improvement zone'. According to this draft, municipalities will be capable of making partial clearance, renewal, improvement, and transformation activities in areas where 'social' and 'technical' features 'do not meet the necessities of contemporary conditions and future prospects and requirements'. In addition, within these zones, the lands that are owned by the National Treasury will be transferred to the municipality for free. The law number 5272 was annulled by the court of constitution because of the very same article.

Thus, the emerging interest in urban renewal in Turkey has been developing in line with the rent-seeking urban regeneration initiatives in advanced countries and the newly enacted Law of Metropolitan Municipalities and Law of Municipalities are encouraging these tendencies. Urban Transformation Law Draft, on the other hand, will be the hallmark of the new approach and it has been one of the main issues of discussion since it was announced. Ekinci, for example, claims that this draft will be a new exemption for *gecekondu* settlements and it is a reflection of rent-seeking understanding of urbanization. In addition, the draft eliminates the existing limitations of the developmental activities in natural and historical sites, since there is not a single article indicating that the municipalities cannot announce them to be urban transformation and improvement zones (Ekinci, 2005). Chamber of City Planners also criticized the draft for plenty of reasons. The main points of criticism are the rent-seeking approach embedded in the draft; the potential discordances between Law of Urban Transformation and the existing laws that regulate urbanization and property development; and the incomprehensive approach to urbanization that inhibits the implementation of real solutions (Chamber of City Planners Press Release, June 23rd 2005).

New powers of metropolitan municipalities and the forthcoming Law of Urban Transformation are conceived of as opportunities to draw territories within metropolitan areas around land pieces that are suitable for the implementation of rent-seeking projects. Transformation of *gecekondu* settlements is not regarded as a solution for the problem of housing the urban poor; instead these projects are going to accelerate the transformation of the property relationships. It is not very inconvenient to claim that urban transformation and implementation zones are going to be 'free zones' for municipalities, in which, there is no need to legitimize the decisions and there is no one to bother. It is also possible to say that they are going to play the role of '*gecekondu* prevention zones' that were introduced in

previous regulations and function for encouraging land speculation. A short survey about the socio-spatial configuration of Turkish cities will display the fact that the implications of this new approach may be severe and it has the potential to foster an urban crisis that has never been experienced in Turkey before.

### 3.2.4. Towards a New Stratification

What has been experienced in Turkish cities can be interpreted with respect to the new accumulation regime, which have influenced on the formation of policy and discourse, although having no clear bases of vindication. World-system and dependency school theories have clarified the drawbacks of this new regime of accumulation for both advanced and peripheral countries. Turkey has also been suffering from contemporary mode of social regulation, though not displaying symptoms of full-dependency unlike other more dramatic examples. On the one hand, the supportive policies on agricultural sector, and by so, the income of rural populations has diminished by 1980s (Boratav, 2004:165, 166); while on the other, sharp decreases in the investments in manufacturing have influenced negatively on employment opportunities. Under these conditions, opportunities for formal sector employment has been limited to particular groups in society, while the domain of informal relations has been enlarged and even has influenced formal sector. In addition to this, 1980 military coup severely damaged the conditions of organized labor by imprisoning large numbers of trade union leaders, suspending free collective bargaining and strike activity, and enacting new regulations aiming to diminish the power of trade unions in wage determination (Celasun, 1994:56). Although the right of free collective bargaining has been given back, efforts to repress working class resistance has been concerted since then. The relationship between the immigrant labor force and the organized labor force in urban areas is also playing a crucial role in the course of class conflict. Insufficient absorption capacity of industrial sector has long been a recognized phenomenon, which have resulted with the shift of immigrant populations toward informal sector. This process have fragmented the working class by igniting competition between the immigrant laborers -who could not obtain a permanent position in formal sector- and the organized labor force -who developed class consciousness (İçduygu *et al.*, 1998:211). This fragmentation has been reinforced by the creation of a so-called 'working-class aristocracy' through intensification of the duality in the labor market. The wage-expansion in post-1989 period, for instance, has actually

included organized labor in a great extent (Boratav *et al.*, 2001:331), whose share in the total number of working classes has been steadily decreased throughout 1980s and 1990s.

The development of small and medium enterprises in certain cities like Denizli, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, and Gaziantep (the so-called *Anadolu Kaplanları*-'Anatolian Tigers') has been appreciated for being examples of local initiatives, which have benefited from the opportunities of global capitalism by having been integrated to global markets through the application of post-Fordist flexible production techniques. These examples, however, conceived of as the representations of a new mode of exploitation in which unhealthy working conditions and low wages are the main characteristics. Besides its implications for class conflict, they also lack in promising a continuous growth, since they are mostly family-owned enterprises with tiny levels of professionalization (Şengül, 2000:148). Similarly, Doğan points the negative wage conditions in free zones and organized industrial districts (Doğan, 2001:111). Continuous presence of the primacy of small-scale production units in Turkish manufacturing sector also contributed to the negative income distribution. Boratav (*et al.*) points that 95% of enterprises in manufacturing employ less than 9 workers and "[t]hey employ, on the average, 24% of the formal industrial labor force with an average wage of about one-fourth of the wages paid in 'large' enterprises" (Boratav *et al.*, 2001:330).

The processes that escalated class struggle have been going hand in hand with other sources of tension resulting from the dramatic transformations in the socio-spatial morphology of urban areas. Changing dimensions of migration movements and urban land markets did not only feed the existing urban problems, but also exacerbated them by the emergence of additional unequal relationships. As an important aspect of this shift, 1980 has witnessed a transition from chain migration movements into compulsory-massive migration waves as a result of separatist movements in eastern regions. The difference between these types of migration movements is that, while immigrants in previous periods were members of same social stratum, massive migration waves pushed populations who are members of various layers (Erder, 2000:196). These new groups were coming to cities in a desperate situation, without any support from their homeland. Since they did not have enough resources to built their own shelters, they did not have any choice, but to settle in existing *gecekondu* settlements (Keyder, 2000b:189). These groups are one of the main components of the new type of excluded populations, who have little or no access to upward mobility opportunities through enjoying the benefits of speculative and illegal urbanization processes. A sort of institutionalization of illegality has added new dimensions to inequalities, like

criminalization of land market. According to a study initiated by SPO in 1993, 80% of squatter owners who has settled on the lands owned by the National Treasury in İstanbul have paid money to 'land mafia' (cited in Ekinci, 1995:40).

Such tendencies in urbanization are interpreted, by Erder, as a consequence of the incapability of the state in establishing of necessary institutions, which will organize public life. According to her, neither a liberal state policy that will prepare the necessary conditions for competitive market relationships, nor a welfareist state policy that will constitute necessary institutions to regulate public life was followed; and Turkish cities have entered the contemporary economic and political conjuncture under a fragile state of being (Erder, 1998:108). Though being influential for a long time, the function and content of informal relationships has gone through significant transformations that made them not only one of the main determinant factors in housing problem and redistribution of urban services, but also the an additional source of disparity.

These informal relationships have different aspects with different outcomes. Erder's survey in Ümraniye (a squatter settlement in İstanbul) (Erder, 1996) focuses on relationships between relatives and fellow countrymen (*hemşehri*) living in this area and points that these relationships do not include certain families -families that do not meet particular conditions, like being a fellow countrymen or having male children. Considering the dependency of the squatter dwellers on these informal relationships, the exclusion of certain groups from them necessitates an inquiry on the content of solidarity within these communities. Hierarchical power relations embedded in conventional local relationships do not only stand as a source of inequality by attributing primacy to ethnicity and by being male and adult dominant (Erder, 1998:112), but also reveal the fact that the function of these relationships in previous periods in reducing the problems of the immigrants are changing in a way that they become more exclusionary and rigid.

In her another survey, in Pendik-İstanbul, Erder emphasizes the relationships between local and supra-local institutions, and, departing from a managerialist point of view, she points that supra-local institutions can behave as an interest group (Erder, 2002:56). On the one side, Bosnian immigrants, who were pushed away from their homelands by the war, face with difficulties, although there is an existing Bosnian population in Pendik. It was observed that there is a cultural gap between the existing Bosnian community and the new comers, which brings up difficulties for the functioning of an informal relationship that may

constitute a safety net. The 'state' does not seem to be enthusiastic to intervene to this situation either by some institutional arrangements or by granting settling or working permit, since it is perceived as a temporary problem (ibid.:148). However Erder points that these groups did not face with any official obstructions against their own efforts to survive or benefiting from solidarity relationships. On the other hand, another compulsory-massive immigrant group -Kurdish populations who were pushed away from their homelands as a result of the separatist movements in eastern parts of Turkey- faces with more intense problems. Erder points that supra-local institutions are far away from observing the difference between the migration movements in previous periods and the obligatory-massive migration in post-1980 period, and by so being, no institutional arrangements has been initiated for these groups, who are lacking in surviving by their own resources (individual accumulation or homeland support) and who suffer from cultural-linguistic differences. It was also observed that, unlike Bosnian immigrants, Kurdish immigrants not only face with obstacles in enjoying their cultural life, they even have difficulties in demanding their daily necessities (ibid.:152).

Another aspect of informal relationships is scrutinized by Işık and Pınarcıoğlu in their survey of Sultanbeyli (another squatter settlement in İstanbul). Departing from the post-modern critique of social sciences, they deny static definitions of the informal and they re-conceptualize it as heterogeneous relationships with self-dynamism (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2002:56). They introduce the concept of 'poverty-in turns' (*nöbetleşe yoksulluk*) by emphasizing the unequal power relationships within the urban poor. According to this, by using the illegal land market, some groups accumulate capital over their exploitative relationship with other segments of deprived populations. Once these groups get wealthier, they pass over their turn to following group, who seeks for obtaining the control of another piece of land, where they can accumulate capital by exploiting others. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu explain their goal as to synthesize class analysis -which lacks in grasping *gecekondu* phenomena and urban land rent- with cultural facts -which does not provide in itself a convenient basis for analysis, since it departs from unstable and slippery definitions (ibid.:46, 47). On these bases, they introduce another concept, 'transformative capacity' (*dönüştürme kapasitesi*), referring to the self-dynamism of informality, in which poverty is not a static moment that is determined by wage and consumption levels, but a flowing state of being that comprises in itself the potential for upward mobilization. The significance of the cultural aspect of their analysis is the function of the ties between the relatives and fellow countrymen in these strategies, which are becoming more and more exclusionary.

### 3.3. Conclusion: Cautions against an Urban Crisis

These dimensions of urbanization mark a tendency towards a new spatial and social stratification. While wealthier groups prefer to settle in their 'gated communities' in isolation, deprived communities has started to display fragmented compositions, in which exclusionary relationships have emerged through congregations (*cemaat*). It is becoming more and more difficult to conceive of squatter settlements as communities in conventional sociological terms, since solidarity relationships are not functioning in the way that they were in previous periods. The gradual dissolving of middle class also contributes to this stratification process, since these groups are moving toward one of these opposite ends.

Apparent shift of large capital from manufacturing to built environment and the institutionalization of illegal urbanization processes by 1980s were resulted with the formation of complex coalitions and conflicts between different groups. These tendencies created seemingly opposite impacts, that is, a complete divergence of urbanization patterns that caused spatial stratification, and a reciprocal diffusion between formal and informal relationships that formed a mutual dependency between these sectors, which is difficult to elucidate. It is possible to say that the inner conflicts in the fundamental elements of Turkish modernization project has came to light more briefly by globalization and the diminishing the power of state ideology -that, in fact, could have never been established on clear bases- to repress the pressures from the bottom. The exploitative relationship between working classes and capitalists has resulted with class-based movements in urban areas in 1970s and it was tried to be repressed by the military intervention in 1980. The ethnic conflicts that has been curtained for a long time has came into body by the separatist movements in eastern regions of Turkey in 1980s and did not only blurred the political discourse, but also transformed the culture of urbanization extensively. The rise of fundamentalist tendencies, also, could not be avoided in this period as a result of the inability in the installation of secular ideology in previous periods and the accumulation of capital in the so called 'green capital'. Consequently the conflict between working classes and the capitalists have conflated with other dimensions of cleavages between 'white Turks' and 'black Turks' on the one hand, and between secular (laicist) and religious segments of the society on the other. All these processes are reflected in urban areas in a volatile manner that makes it difficult to grasp the content of the urbanization, and by so being, discourse on urban phenomena has reached an impasse.

On these bases, it is observable that, although departing from different streams of thought and different points of emphasis, authors of urbanization are announcing a potential risk for the future of Turkish cities in terms of economic, political, and cultural tendencies. Representing the Weberian wing, Erder points the necessity of redefining the concept of poverty by using variables other than income, and leans to interpret the *gecekondu* phenomenon within the concept of housing classes. She also emphasizes the necessity to inquire the informal relationships in deprived communities in scrutiny, since solidarity relationships in these settlements do not display a homogenous character. Although, in a pluralist stance, she defends the idea that every class in society have access to resources in a certain degree (Erder, 2002:35), inequalities within urban poor in terms of political, cultural and gender relations result with the exclusion of certain groups.

Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, on the other hand, draw a much more pessimist picture in their analysis of 'poverty-in turn'. Their explanation about the difference between the poor in outskirts (*varoş*) and the inner-city urban poor reminds the conceptual division made by Karpat, between slums and shantytowns: In Karpat's words, "[t]he shantytown may be regarded as the hopeful beginning of the migrant's effort to integrate himself into urban life, whereas the slum may symbolize his failure to achieve it" (Karpat, 1976:25). Similarly, Işık and Pınarcığlu separate *gecekondu* dweller from the so-called inner-city 'underclass' because of the potential of these populations, named as 'transformative capacity'. What is crucial in their analysis is the gradual disappearance of this capacity as a result of the decrease in migration to metropolitan areas and the vacant land that can be occupied illegally (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2002:82). In this respect, poverty-in turn is reaching its culmination and leaving its place to a 'new poverty', which has to survive under little or no regulative rule (formal or informal). What has been reducing the tension in cities since the beginning of 1980s will not going to be functioning in the forthcoming period. Similarly, Şenyapılı emphasizes the problems fostered by the changing conditions of the transformation of the *gecekondu* stock. Defining a younger *gecekondu* population -who differ from *gecekondu* owners and dwellers settling in apartments in *gecekondu* settlements- she points the potential problem of integration for the following generation raised by these young couples since changing processes in *gecekondu* settlements does not provide the convenient environment for the transformation of *gecekondu* settlements into 'proper' neighborhoods, unlike the previous periods (Şenyapılı, 1995:31-32).

The cultural critique's interpretations of the transformation in the culture of urbanization by post-1980 period also display alarming indications for the future. According to this stream of thought, multiplicity in accumulation opportunities did not only blurred the class profiles; they created a genuine metropolitan culture, which cannot be defined by the conventional notions of modernism, like alienation and class opposition. Contemporary discourse, based on concepts like identity and otherness have been mobilized to interpret the unprecedented encounters in everyday life and reveals the fact that this heterogeneity may not be representing a fusion between different segments of society; on the contrary, it may intensify stratification. On the one hand, class culture has been becoming more widely to be expressed through consumption patterns in every segment of society (Kandiyoti, 2003:21). The commodification of lifestyle and identity is becoming apparent in the rigid distinction between the presentation of secular and religious ideologies through symbols (Navaro-Yaşın, 2003:232, 237). Spatial expression of identities is another aspect of this fragmentation, which realizes itself through the construction of suburban communities, away from the 'disturbing' effects of the city, with their own shopping malls and guards. Distaste of upper classes for the life in central city -which, according to these groups, represents corruption- pushes them towards these 'gated communities' (Ayata, 2003:42). All these conflicts have been, inevitably, observed in political arena, through the rise of a religious political party (Welfare Party -WP) in 1994 local elections. Candidates of WP have won the election in big cities like Ankara and İstanbul, and amplified the discussions about the values of the republic by proposing (and realizing) projects, which have symbolic contents. One of the most criticized projects was the proposal for the construction of a mosque and an Islamic cultural center in Taksim Square, which was interpreted as an officially declared ideological opposition, located against the spatial representations of Atatürk revolution (Atatürk Cultural Center –Atatürk Kültür Merkezi), and the cultural character of İstanbul (the orthodox church) (Bartu, 2000:54, 55). Another example of these projects (this project was realized) was the alternation of the emblem of Ankara, which was a symbol of Hittite civilization. What is more interesting in this project was that, the new emblem is an illustration of a landmark in Ankara (Atakule) -which is in fact a shopping mall- with minarets. All these debates have put the conflict between secular and religious segments of society at the forefront. According to Keyder, Islamic wing of the political circles escalated this tension by emphasizing ethical and cultural oppositions, in order to acquire the support of masses for its struggle to take the control of public space. He points that this polarization reduces the possibility for the political representation of groups who are both faithful to secularism and marginalized (Keyder, 2000a: 36, 37).

Differing from these approaches, objections of Marxist critique depart from the dual-source of the risks within the current tendencies in Turkey: On the one side, the new mode of regulation in post-1980 period has been gradually widening the gap between the living conditions of working classes and the dominant classes through unequal wage and redistribution policies. On the other side, mainstream discourse contributes to these tendencies, by shifting the main dimension of opposition in society (class conflict) towards other tensions between state and civil society or secularism and fundamentalism. What has been criticized is the claims on the primacy of locality, in the sense that, local initiatives are appreciated for igniting economic growth by forming connections with global networks without any central guidance and/or for standing as a barrier against the domination of national and global pressures. Though departing from similar ideals on local democracy, participation, and governance, these views are defending opposite ends of the bottom-up process. While authors like Tekeli, and Keyder and Öncü emphasize the potential role of İstanbul in the global economy and defends the necessity of formulating an economic strategy through an İstanbul-centered development (Tekeli, 2001:87-98; Keyder and Öncü, 1993: 33-38); left-wing defenders of locality reminds the *gecekondu* movement and 'the new municipal movement' experienced in Turkey in 1970s and emphasize the potential of local social movements for transformative political initiative (Arslan, 2004).

These approaches are criticized by Marxist authors for several reasons. Ersoy, for example, points that the thesis on post-industrialism departs from an idea of evolutionist perspective, which neglects the drawbacks of policies based on the claims of post-industrialism for less developed countries. He says that, in the long run, the costs of de-industrialization process may exceed the savings obtained by the reduction of public investments in certain sectors that are defined as unprofitable (Ersoy, 2001:34-39, 43). Similarly, Şengül criticize the academic formulations that are based on the consent to the hegemony of the world-system; he reminds that even the global cities, which are introduced as the best practices in the post-Fordist discourse (London, New York) cannot solve their problems of social inequality (Şengül, 2004:142, 144) and he points that the reflection of these approaches in Turkish urbanization literature -that mainly emphasizes İstanbul's potential in global competition- neglects the fact that such approaches proved to be wrong in the past, since İstanbul-centered economic growth could not create a spill over effect for other Turkish cities (Şengül, 2001:158). In addition, he interprets the belief in the identification of decentralization with democratization as spatial determinism, since these approaches attribute *a priori*

characteristics (positive or negative) to space regardless of the scales that are defined by power relations. According to him, the relationship between the localities and the process of democratization should be established through the social relations that constitute the 'local', not from the space itself (Şengül, 2004:150). Departing from this, inequalities in urban areas are conceived of from a different perspective in Marxist approach. Although it is generally admitted that the notion of 'new urban poverty' has different characteristics than the conception of poverty in previous periods, spatial segregation in contemporary cities is a factor that deepens and maintains the continuity of the inequalities, rather than the cause of it (Kaygalak, 2001: 131). In this respect, explanations of urban conflict within the limits of informal networks with little or no reference to class domination are criticized in this stream of thought. The symptoms of an up coming urban crisis are not conveyed with respect to congregational relationships, but through the widening gap between the dominant and oppressed classes in society -that constitutes the real fragmentation in Turkish society-, whose territories are blurred by explanations that are based on the stratification theory.

Reflecting, though modestly, the diversity of approaches in the literature, interpreters of Turkish urbanization express a common belief in that, the conditions of deprived urban communities are becoming worse in post-1980 period and the opportunities to solve this problem are reduced in the contemporary global world. The main point of divergence can be seen in the debates on whether the solution is to accept these conditions and to take part in the global competition between cities, or to stand against the mainstream discourse so as to avoid the drawbacks of integrating with the global economy within the very limits that are defined by the rules of this competition. However, a debate on the theory and practice of urban renewal in Turkey should be more in-depth since the above-mentioned divergence does not shed light to the inner dynamics of urban politics through which, relationships of interest between the actors of urbanization can be grasped.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE CASE OF DİKMEN VALLEY REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

In the previous chapters, a sort of homogenization in the urban political initiatives in advanced countries was mentioned and it was argued that urban boosterism has been presented as the only possible response to the economic restructuring by the mainstream discourse. Even some of the critical views against the neo-liberal policies have developed opinions that correspond to the existing conceptions of society and individual, and by so being, they could not constitute an alternative view of urban society. Nevertheless, these formulations neglect the fact that these policy initiatives are the surface appearance of the rent-seeking urbanization policies that are not only encouraging the invasion of private sector logic into the production of space, but also are applied directly by national and local governments in Turkey. In other words, rather than being regulatory bodies, governments act as agents that are directly involved in capital accumulation through urban land market even by competing with private sector by using their authority over organizing urban space.

In order to conduct a healthy analysis, the characteristics of urbanization in Turkey should be considered. However, this statement does not imply the necessity of a comparative or a merely contextual perspective. Rather than that, an interpretation that oscillates between the external influences on the conceptualization of urban renewal -which include not only the tendency of convergence in the current literature on urbanization, but also the policy prescriptions that have been presented as obligations to Turkish governments by supra-national institutions and power poles- and its contextual components -which have been neglected to some extent not only in the literature on urbanization in Turkish academic circles, but also by the decision-makers and executers of urban renewal practices. In this chapter, before evaluating the results of the field survey in Dikmen Valley, the motives of urban renewal activities in Turkish cities are going to be examined with an emphasis on the conceptual similarities and differences between the existing definitions of urban renewal in advanced countries and in Turkey. It is hoped that the findings of the research will be interpreted by considering these preliminary notes.

## 4.1. Preliminary Notes

### 4.1.1. Contextual Specifications

Locating certain concepts at the center of an inquiry without mentioning the possible deviations resulting from contextual differences and from the very nature of the phenomenon that these concepts are mobilized to explain is not the most convenient way for a healthy interpretation of the issue at hand. As it was stated before, urban renewal is a subject that has long been experienced in advanced countries and there is a tendency of adapting the policy initiatives without questioning the debates and oppositions that take place in the urbanization literature. Since the urban renewal practices in these countries are regarded as models for the implementations in Turkey, these debates should also be inquired in scrutiny. This inquiry will not only contribute to more successful executions and interpretations, but also serve for determining the norms that are necessary for questioning the legitimacy of renewal activities. For this reason, the following questions should be asked:

• Is there an 'inner city crisis' in Turkey?

• Does the concept of 'underclass' have any use in defining the disadvantaged segments of Turkish society?

• To what extent the administrative system and entrepreneurialism comprise the feature that makes it possible to talk about 'growth coalitions' and/or 'regimes' in Turkey?

• To what extent Turkish cities meet the necessary conditions for being administered as competitive cities?

Although it seems like the inner city crisis is the most slippery concept among the others that are mentioned above, there are relatively precise conditions that caused the use of this concept. As it was discussed in detail at the beginning of the study, this concept is generally used to identify the crisis of metropolitan areas as a result of the transformation in the economic functions of the inner cities. Massive migrations to suburban areas and other cities that have adapted successfully to the flexible accumulation regime have left certain segments

of working classes and other disadvantaged groups in the decaying neighborhoods of the cities that were once regarded as the spaces of prosperity. The Turkish case diverges from the case in advanced countries from the very beginning since it is a developing country. It had passed through totally different stages and has had less power over making decisions for itself. Urbanization patterns also does not resemble to the advanced countries, at least when suburbanization is considered as a common feature. In addition, although a similar wave of wealthy out-migration takes place, what would have happen in inner cities cannot easily be defined as a crisis; since metropolitan municipalities in Turkey are mostly relying on the taxes that are collected by the central government, they would not suffer from falling tax bases. In consequence, it may even seem to be an absurd effort to inquire the validity of making this kind of an analogy. However, these differences should always be remembered when analyzing urban politics in Turkey, since what is presented as the only prescription for dealing with the problem of cities in post-Fordist period has been shaped by the inner city crisis in advanced countries.

'Underclass' is another concept that has been widely used, especially in American urbanization literature, though there are some strong arguments against its validity in interpreting European societies. As it was expressed before, the reason of the use of this concept is generally explained by the changing class structure, economic transformation, and the changes in the demographic characteristics. The socio-cultural difference of Turkish society may immediately be employed for supporting the claim that the concept of underclass is not analytically valid in interpreting the problem of poverty. According to this view, the solidarity relationships are stronger in Turkey, which has relatively newly met with the so called 'possessive individualism' that is embedded in capitalist societies and did not experience the widely mentioned transformation of the family structure that was experienced in advanced countries by 1960s. Therefore, it is claimed that the unemployed populations have more opportunity to survive by using their network relationships; the bachelors and newly-wed couples can stay with their family as long as it is necessary; and elderly members of families are supported by their children.

What should be in mind is that although consideration of socio-cultural specificities in interpretation of societies provides certain opportunities for healthier explanations, mystification of informal networks and solidarity relationships in Turkish case can also be obstructive. The main problem in this view is that it contains the danger of neglecting certain deficiencies of public policy and supporting -although unconsciously- the reproduction of

these informal relationships that can easily fall apart after a more destructive transformation in the regime of accumulation. In fact, as it was expressed before, there are some strong evidences that these relationships are becoming more limited as a result of the increasing congregational tendencies. Thus, while interpreting the dislocation of *gecekondu* dwellers through urban renewal projects, family ties and solidarity relationships should not be regarded as given features of the society that can be relied on; assuming the reverse would be to reproduce existing exclusionary views. Constructing walls around settlements will eventually lead to stratification; but demolishing these walls without considering further steps will not result with integration; instead, it is a legitimate way of accelerating stratification.

The third question is significant for inquiring further features of current debates on urban politics, like public-private partnerships, pressure groups, etc. Although this is not the place to conduct a detailed discussion on these broad titles, there are certain points that should be clarified. What should be mentioned initially is the basic difference between the approach to civil society in American literature and the one in Europe in terms of interpreting urban policies. It is possible to speculate that the source of this difference is the underlying assumption in American literature that the logic of entrepreneurialism had diffused in the American society, by which, rent-seeking urbanization patterns are not opposed by a great proportion of society; indeed, according to this view, civil society has developed the necessary tools to benefit from it. In European urbanization literature, on the other hand, social groups are dominantly presented as the criticizer of urban policy-making schemes in the post-Fordist period. This main split can be explained by the difference between the traditional pluralist stance in the mainstream American urbanization literature and the social democratic tradition of the post-war Europe. The significance of this split for the urbanization literature in Turkey is the unconscious tendencies of conflating these two approaches in the analysis of the agents in urban development. These tendencies obstruct the perception of extensive efforts of the governments in European countries to create and/or increase the bottom-up pressure for rent-seeking urbanization policies and the currently unobservable opposition in American society against these initiatives.

The reason of the emphasis on the growth machine thesis and the regime theory is the widespread use of these approaches in analyzing urban regeneration in advanced countries. However, in order to inquire the validity of discussing urbanization in Turkey with an imported language, some explanations about these approaches are necessary. At this point,

Vicari and Molotch's explanation about the necessary conditions for the emergence of growth machines is a convenient starting point. According to this, growth machines are most likely to emerge where local governments have more power over taxation and land use control; local governments are relatively autonomous; party organization is weak; and there is no party that opposes to growth-oriented policies (Vicari and Molotch, 1990; cited in Jessop *et al.*, 1999:145). Elkin, on the other hand, detects three defining features of urban politics that are related with the emergence of urban regimes. These are the coalition between public and private sector, the nature of electoral politics, and the nature of bureaucratic policies (Elkin, 1987; cited in Dowding, 2001:9). When considering these criteria, it is visible that talking about growth machines or regimes in Turkey is not possible for certain reasons. Aside from the financial dependency of local governments on central governments, political character of local governments and the conflict-ridden relationship between mayors and local party organizations hinder the possibility of local governments to follow growth-oriented policies and force them to answer the demands of their voters and political supporters. In addition, it is still difficult to talk about a structured system that enables the emergence of formal procedures in urban renewal, since entrepreneurial activities mediating between land owners and the large capital holders involved in the production of space have not developed yet (Işık, 1994:381), although new regulations that enable the local governments to conduct their rent-seeking urban renewal activities and the newly emerging interest of foreign capital in Turkish cities visible in the establishment of foreign-based real estate firms signals a tendency towards institutionalization of hitherto informally conducted relationships in construction sector. The inaplicability of growth machine and/or regime analysis in Turkish context results with two seemingly paradoxical outcomes: On the one hand, putting precise definitions about the agents and tracking to what extent they influence in urbanization processes becomes more difficult. Under these conditions, analysis of such processes necessitates an emphasis on the contextual specificities in distinct localities. On the other hand, because of the 'silence' of other agents, the role of local governments in urban policy-making processes can be exaggerated in the eye of public. This situation results with the ignorance of the role of capital accumulation processes, fosters analyses that present such initiatives as a part of public policies, and create an obstacle for public inquiry, at least in mainstream society. These differences should always be in mind, since adaptation of certain policy initiatives without constructing necessary mechanisms would eventually create bigger problems than the existing ones. The results of the 'illegalization' of urbanization in Turkey through de-regulatory policies of 1980s can be given as an example for this.

The reason of the necessity to discuss the competitive city discourse for the purpose of this study is the increasing tendency in Turkey to explain urban renewal and regeneration projects by giving reference to the potential benefits of attracting foreign capital. The defining features of world cities and the necessary conditions for being successful in this competition has long been discussed with different points of emphasis and with different presumptions about the 'nature' and/or 'logic' of capital. In Turkish context, it is widely admitted that the unsuccessful experience in terms of privatization in 1980s had disastrous impacts on the working classes and, contrary to the claims, the state did not benefit from this process. The expectations from FDI, on the other hand, have still not been satisfied for variety of reasons, ranging from the attractiveness of worse working conditions in other underdeveloped countries for multinational corporations and the contemporary ambiguities in the field of international politics fostered by the increasing conflict between Christian and Muslim communities in global scale.

When focusing the subject of this study, it can be observed that increasing the status of Turkish cities through conducting comprehensive regeneration projects seems to be difficult without crashing the walls of pressure group politics and igniting collective oppositions because of the embedded clientalism and its outcomes in the formation of urban landscapes in Turkey. In advanced countries, governments have more opportunities since the problem areas that are subject to regenerative projects are not only made up of residential areas, but also industrial buildings owned by the state and have been unused for a long time. Besides, slum areas in advanced countries provide more opportunities to local governments for enjoying the benefits of boosting the rents in these areas by special projects without undertaking higher costs for expropriation. Although there are certain efforts in Turkey in terms of transforming industrial areas that are owned by the state or deteriorated residential areas, the relatively low amount of these kinds of areas that are useful for inner city urban regeneration projects and the inner city urban lands that have similar characteristics with the slums of industrialized cities -that is, providing enough rent gap because of both their close proximity to high-rent areas and being completely decayed-, Turkish local governments are necessarily focusing more extensively on *gecekondu* settlements in central parts of cities. This limitations increase the difficulty of implementing transformation projects because of the high land rents and the electoral concerns of policy-makers.

These specifications does by no means bring about a conclusion that the emerging problems in advanced countries fostered by rent-seeking urban regeneration policies are not an indicator for Turkish context. Indeed, they increase the ambiguities about the legitimacy of urbanization policies in Turkey since the similarities in terms of execution and socio-spatial consequences of such policies are becoming more visible in an environment where certain structured regulations for increasing social welfare has never been developed unlike the case in industrialized countries. In other words, Turkish governments have relatively less obstacles in terms of political oppositions while adapting de-regulatory policies into rent-seeking urban regeneration initiatives when necessary coalitions are formed within the existing clientalist relationships. Under these conditions, employing these specifications while interpreting the outcomes of rent-seeking policies stands as an important task.

### 4.1.2. How to Evaluate Urban Renewal Processes in Turkey

The revival of the particular forms of social cleavages in Turkish society in the period of economic restructuring has had a blurring effect in the conceptualization of the urban conflicts, and therefore, urban renewal activities in Turkish cities. Therefore, comprehension of urban renewal in Turkey necessitates a deeper understanding of these processes, since, as it was stated before, renewal activities are generally conducted in irregularly developed *gecekondu* sites, which can be considered as one of the most apparent spatial representations of these cleavages. One of the significant implications of these conflicts is that, although the new regulations in mid-1980s have encouraged the transformation of *gecekondu* dwellings into apartment blocks (Şengül, 2003:164), as a result of the differences between the unauthorized settlements in pre-1980 period and the ones that have emerged after 1980s - because of the afore-mentioned changes in the conditions of the immigrant populations, the changes in the social relations within *gecekondu* population, and the shift toward exchange-value relations in *gecekondu* formation-, *gecekondu* settlements have lost their flexibility and tended to become slum areas (Keyder, 2000b:189; Işık, 1998:288). These tendencies have fostered suspicious approaches towards modernization-based views that drew a rigid line between the slums of advanced countries and *gecekondu* settlements in Turkey. In addition to this, emerging interest of large capital holders in built environment has ignited the formation of new coalitions, which provided new opportunities of profit extraction through forging alliances with legally and financially empowered local governments. Given the absence of regulations for the renewal of *gecekondu* settlements and the embedded

clientalism in Turkish urban policy, evaluation of these activities necessitates an analysis of the implications of urban development patterns for the *gecekondu* dwellers.

What has to be done, firstly, for a clear comprehension of the dynamics in this segment of the society is that, the negative conception of *gecekondu* dwellers in recent years -which display similarities with the segregationist tones in the debates on underclass and 'culture of poverty' in U.S.- should be superseded. Although this negative conception involves in a distinction between *gecekondu* owners and tenants and a tendency to present the latter as the victims of current urbanization patterns, making a clear-cut distinction between these groups is misleading, since they should be regarded as the two sides of the same coin. Since tenants conceive of acquiring a *gecekondu* as maybe the only upward channel of mobility, a solution without providing other opportunities for this group does not seem to be possible. On the other hand, claiming that renewal activities initiated in *gecekondu* settlements would be beneficial for the owner-occupiers is another example of miscomprehension of the issue. Firstly, giving flats from the apartment blocks in redeveloped areas to right-holders would not be a solution for development of further unauthorized settlements unless opportunities for education and employment for these groups are provided. It would not be too speculative to claim that strengthening the regulations against illegal land acquisition would foster more complex social problems if concomitant socially-concerned policies are not initiated. Secondly, blaming the *gecekondu* owners who acquired flats though prefer to rent their flats and dwell in other *gecekondu* settlements would also be misleading, since it would be to rely on personal choices and cultural traits for solving the problems of urbanization. Their choice can be interpreted mainly in three different perspectives: Firstly, given the difference between the rent they acquire from their flat and the rent they pay for the *gecekondu*, their preference can be regarded as an economically pragmatic one, aiming to benefit further from the gap between the costs of living in the redeveloped settlement -which includes various components like, using institutionalized retail services, necessary payments for the maintenance of the houses, etc.- and living in a *gecekondu* settlement -in which, there are opportunities to accumulate by postponing payments for daily consumption goods, supplying the maintenance of the dwelling individually, etc. Secondly, cultural aspects can be emphasized, by which, their choice can be interpreted as the result of the obstacles in the integration of the rural-rooted populations to urban way of living, if there is a specific definition of it. A safer interpretation can be to synthesize these two approaches and adding to the afore-mentioned reasons the economic costs of integration, like the increasing demands of the children, who want to be like their 'urbanite' friends. Nevertheless, what

should be considered is that neither 'pragmatic', nor 'victim of modernization' can be assigned as an adjective for *gecekondu* owners, since it would be to block the way to locate the issue in a broader picture that includes other interest groups and other victims.

However, this should not be conceived of as a call for lumping together all variables without any conceptual base. Işık, for example, argues that the interest groups involved in urban land market have various expectations and that the heterogeneity in these groups invalidates a class-based analysis in the production of space (Işık, 1994:379). Although his argument on the fragmented structure of these groups cannot be denied easily, his suggestion -that these groups should be analyzed within their field of activities- would be to neglect the fact that all these 'expectations' are shaped and encouraged by the interests and opportunities constituted by the existing urbanization patterns, and hence, relations of production. Denial of this fact can only open up the way for the production of partial proposals, which will be indifferent to the reproduction of similar conflicts in another space and time.

The second group of *gecekondu* dwellers, that is tenants, is apparently the most disadvantaged group in cities. Şenyapılı's observations have shown that this groups does suffer not only from living in smaller and more deteriorated dwellings, but also from the obligation of being spatially mobile, which stands as an obstacle for establishing an orderly life necessary for themselves and for the development of their children, although spatial mobility seems to be an advantage for job recruitment. Şenyapılı also observes that the channels for upward mobility are more limited for the children of tenants when compared to the children of owner-occupiers (Şenyapılı, 1996). In this regard, the removal of this group would not be a solution for the production of unauthorized housing and the deterioration of existing stock, if concomitant policies for provision of housing for low-income groups are not initiated.

In consequence, a purely negative or positive conception of *gecekondu* phenomenon in the interpretation of urban renewal activities would lead to simple pressure group or growth-coalition analysis, which neglect capital accumulation processes in broader scales. On the other hand, an analysis departing from the globalization may hinder a convenient conceptualization of urban renewal in Turkey, since the current assumptions in urban regeneration in discursive level stands as a tool for legitimizing newly emerging rent-seeking urban policy initiatives, rather than being a motive for avoiding the harmful impacts of these processes. Given the flow of international capital into the real estate market and the

opportunities of acquiring funds from supra-national organizations -like E.U. or the World Bank-, it should be surveyed in scrutiny to what extent urban renewal activities are initiated for the public good. In the following section a renewal project conducted in Ankara -Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project- is going to be analyzed under these considerations.

### 4.2. Evolution of Dikmen Valley

Being one of the seven valleys of Ankara, Dikmen Valley can be considered as a cleft that starts from the south of the city and reaches the midst of it. The valley functions for air circulation, which increases its importance for Ankara since the problem of air pollution reached its culmination at the end of 1980s in the city, tried to be reduced by encouraging the consumption of natural gas, and starting to be a major problem again in these years by the spread of unlicensed coal usage. Just as the lands with similar characteristics, the vital role of the valley for the fragile ecology of the city has prepared the conditions for the development of *gecekondu* settlements, which have firstly appeared in the area by 1950s.

Up to 1989, Dikmen Valley was considered as a green corridor. In the 1930 master plan of Jansen and 1957 master plan of Yücel and Uybadin the valley has been decided to be green area with no permission to construction. In the Ankara Master Plan Bureau's 1990 master plan (which was prepared at the beginning of 1970s), and in 2015 Structural Plan (which was prepared in 1985) 'Dikmen Valley Green Area Project' was proposed for the valley in order to create a green corridor. The 'Green Area Project' was approved in 1986, including the allocation of land for the displaced population. However, court decisions vindicated the objections of *gecekondu* population and the project was cancelled (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:160). Thus, as it is pointed in a report, the valley is characterized with 'an intensive confusion' in terms of planning (Metropol İmar Inc. Co., 1993:8).

By the end of 1980s, intervening to the valley became inevitable. Within the valley *gecekondu* populations had been living under unhealthy conditions because of the polluted stream flowing through it and the risks of living in a valley, like flood, and unauthorized construction had been accelerated by mid-1980s because of the speculative pressure. On the other hand, separating the two districts with dense settlements -Çankaya and Dikmen-, it stands as a natural barrier for the transportation circulation. In addition, the surroundings of the valley has been invaded by high housing blocks with hideous retaining walls, which were constructed for benefiting from the gaps in the planning regulation that gives opportunity for

higher gains in lands with changing altitudes in single plots. As a more important motive, the valley was promising gigantic rents with its attractive location for luxury housing and commercial activities. 'The Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project' (hereafter, Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project) has taken into the program of the Metropolitan Municipality under these conditions in 1989 as the most important squatter settlement renewal project in Turkey.

### 4.2.1. Planning the Wind Corridor

The Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project has been conducted under the cooperation between the Chairmanship of the Development Department of the metropolitan municipality and a municipal company -Metropol İmar Inc. Co. Being established in 1986 (with a different name), the pre-defined objectives of the company was ranging from various kinds of construction (housing, roads, commercial centers, etc.) to supporting the cultural life in the city (through conservation of natural and historical sites, arranging cultural and sportive activities, etc.) (Activity Report about the Municipal Companies, 2002:34-35).

The aims of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project are expressed as "to enable the disrupted ecological balance to be set up again", to create "a cultural and recreational corridor to serve the whole city", and to solve "the housing problem of present squatter owner inhabitants of the valley (…) through a participatory rehabilitation model" (Metropol İmar Inc. Co., 1991:1). Aside from the ecological concerns, participation and self-financing has been two other major themes that are expressed during the project. According to the values of the *gecekondu* houses that was going to be determined by a commission, the right holders either acquire their new flats and acquire extra payment -which was going to be compensated by the municipality-, or pay the extra amount of money to acquire one of the new flats. In order to organize the participation of the inhabitants, housing cooperatives were established for every distinct neighborhood that is comprised by the project (Ayrancı, Güzeltepe, İlkadım, İlker, Metin Akkuş) and these cooperatives took part in the Steering Committee. The project is financed by the credits taken from the Japanese market under the guarantee of the Ministry of Treasury, which was obtained after the evaluation of the payment ability of the metropolitan municipality by an international rating organization.

In 1990 the first plan was prepared in two parts. According to this, the first part of the project was made up of 5 phases and the second part was named as the 'Eastern Side' (Yıldız-Oran

Axis). In the plan, the buildings are located at each side of the valley in order not to block the wind circulation. Dikmen Stream is planned to be rehabilitated and taken into control in an artificial stream, which constitutes the main axis of the recreational area of the valley, named as the 'Culture Park'. While at the east side of the valley (Yukarı Ayrancı-Çankaya side) high apartment blocks and terrace houses, which are both designed for high income groups, take place; at the west side of the valley (Dikmen side) housing for the right holders are located. Two sides of the valley are connected by the 'Culture Bridge', which contains cultural facilities -though this is one of the most controversial elements of the project since the bridge blocks the air circulation at the narrowest part of the valley (Malusardi and Occhipinti, 2003). In 1992, 'Dikmen Valley II. Phase Regulation Plan and Yıldız-Oran Axis Revision Regulation Plan' was approved and it was observed that *gecekondu* construction was accelerated immediately after the announcement of the project. In the first part of the project, which covers 148 hectares of area, the number of *gecekondu* houses and the number of inhabitants has increased from approximately 2000 to 2500 and 10350 to 11250 respectively, between 1989 and 1993 (Metropol İmar Inc. Co., 1993:3).

**TABLE 1: NUMBER OF RIGHT HOLDERS AND *GECEKONDU* HOUSES IN THE FIRST PART OF THE PROJECT IN 1993**

| Phase | Number of right holders | Number of *gecekondu* houses | Surface area (ha.) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 333 | 396 | 18.5 |
| 2 | 757 | 901 | 39.3 |
| 3 | 201 | 307 | 21.2 |
| 4 | 109 | 137 | 14.5 |
| 5 | 406 | 791 | 44.6 |

Source: adapted from Metropol İmar Inc. Co., 1993 and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2001

The local elections in 1991 is a turning point for the valley. The new municipality made significant plan revisions, in which, the most criticized one is the increase in density of the area by transforming the municipal service areas into luxury houses. The municipality defended its decision by pointing that the previous plan was victimizing the landowners who did not construct a *gecekondu*, though the demands of this group was rejected in the previous period by pointing that the goal of the project is to solve the problem of the valley, rather than promoting speculation. The decision of the new municipality was criticized and it was blamed for extracting extra profits by the density increase (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:189-192). However, channels for this plan revision had already been open since the purpose of the

project was declared as 'to balance the personal interests emerging from the ownership within the valley and the societal interests' at the beginning.

The residents of the 1st phase have started to settle in the first phase of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project in the second half of the 1990s, though plan revisions have continued until the beginning of the 2000s. The 2nd phase, on the other hand was opened in 2003. By 2001, 4th and 5th phases of the first part of the plan were integrated with the second part (the 'Southern Side') and the surface areas, the number of flats, and the densities in the forthcoming phases, on the other hand, were increased.

**TABLE 2: CHANGES IN THE SURFACE AREA, NUMBER OF FLATS, AND THE DENSITY IN THE FORTHCOMING PHASES**

| Phase | Surface area (ha.) | | Number of flats | | Density (person/ha.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1993 | 2001 | 1993 | 2001 | 1993 | 2001 |
| 3 | 21.2 | 28.6 | 663 | 1039 | 125 | 145 |
| 4, 5, and the Southern Side | 67.7 | 176 | 1503 | 4200 | 89 | 95 |

Source: adapted from Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2001

Some of the *gecekondu* houses in the 3rd phase (which contains a total of 393 squatters) are demolished today and the expropriation process is still going on. The expropriation, demolishment, and construction activities in the 4th phase (in which, the field survey for this study was conducted) have not started and the schedule for future activities has not been prepared yet. The total number of *gecekondu* houses in 4th and 5th phases is 1119 (Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, 2001).

### 4.2.2. Politics of Space in Dikmen Valley

The renewal of Dikmen Valley has objections from the inhabitants in the first half of 1990s. In 1992, some of the right holders established the Dikmen Valley Gecekondu Solidarity Association in order to resist against the local government. However, this neighborhood association could not prolong its opposition because of the pressure of police forces who accused it for illegal activities and closed its office eventually (Özdemir, 1998:234-236). Apart from this opposition, it is possible to say that a collective opposition did not occur against the project; the ordinary views of protests, misery and harassment did not take place in newspapers and televisions. The main clash in the case of Dikmen Valley has been

experienced between the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and the Municipality of Çankaya District. In this manner, Dikmen Valley can be considered as an example that reveals the insights of the problem-ridden relationship between central government, metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities.

Murat Karayalçın, from the RPP, was the mayor of Ankara and the initiator of the project. Being a charismatic leader, Karayalçın has allocated specialists of urbanism to key positions of master planning units of the municipality and in Metropol İmar Inc. Co. The emphasis on the theme of participation and social democratic values can be regarded as factors that diminished the possibility of a massive opposition from the *gecekondu* population, although there were right holders whose objections about the expropriation value were justified by the court. The problems that are frequently experienced in large urban projects did not occur in Karayalçın's period: Being administered by mayors who were both the candidates of the RPP, the metropolitan municipality and the Çankaya Municipality have worked in harmony in the preparation of 5000-scaled master plans and 1000-scaled application plans until the election of WP's candidate, İ. Melih Gökçek in 1992.

The first significant shift in the approach to the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project in Gökçek's period was the transformation of the inner organization of both the municipality and Metropol İmar Inc. Co., which revealed its impact in slight changes in the plans of the first phase and more apparent changes in the plans of the second phase (Dündar, 1997:142-143). RPP was still in power in Çankaya Municipality and started a war against the metropolitan municipality that continuous today. In 1997 Çankaya Municipality brought a lawsuit against the construction permits for municipal service areas and accused the metropolitan municipality of extracting profit by increasing the density, though Türker-Devecigil claims that the hidden problem between the two municipality was the district municipality's unaccepted demand of share from the new residential units in return for the property that the Çankaya Municipality had transferred to the metropolitan municipality (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:192-194). In 2000, metropolitan municipality prepared 1000-scaled application plans, which in fact should be prepared by district municipalities. These plans were cancelled by court decision. In order to solve the problem, the mayors and the technical staff of the two municipalities had a meeting and made an agreement on the transfer of the all planning authorities to metropolitan municipality, but Çankaya Municipality continued its opposition. In 2003 the debate was still going on; Gökçek was accusing Çankaya Municipality for hindering the project by insisting on not to prepare application plans and

announcing that the metropolitan municipality will gain the authority to prepare application plans itself by the forthcoming law of metropolitan municipalities (*Akşam*, October 16th 2003).

Before the local elections in March 2004, Gökçek's new party (Justice and Development Party) -which has been in power since 2003- has based their propaganda on the central-local dichotomy by expressing apparently that they would work in a 'better' harmony with metropolitan municipalities if their own candidates win the elections. The so-called 'Castle of RPP' -Çankaya- has significance in local elections for JDP. Aside from its symbolic meaning, as one of the biggest districts in Ankara, Çankaya has a massive economic potential for growth-oriented private-led urbanization policies. Gökçek himself, in fact, revealed this goal in one of his speeches about his plans for 2005 for the surrounding area of Dikmen Valley. According to this, the new construction permits will not be given and the contractors who 'provoke' the landowners will be excluded from the process. Instead of the current situation, he promises a 'second Dikmen Valley' with doubled-up housing prices (*Ankarahaber.com*, December 13th 2004). Using the frase 'invasion of Çankaya', the deputy of the prime minister, on the other hand, emphasized the existing gap between the central government and Çankaya Municipality and demanded the votes of the inhabitants of Çankaya in return for better services.

Although JDP could not win in Çankaya, the problem in Dikmen Valley was solved by the enaction of the new law of Metropolitan Municipalities (law no. 5216) in 2004 July, by which, metropolitan municipalities have gained the planning authority in all scales. Dikmen Valley was immediately labeled as a 'municipal project area' and the conflicts about the 1000-scaled application plans have ended. Today, there is no single unit in the Çankaya Municipality that take part in the transformation process of the valley and the metropolitan municipality does not seem to be willing to open the channels of participation. On the other hand, there is no pressure from the dwellers of the valley for taking an active role in the planning process. The *gecekondu* population has never displayed any collective opposition after the initial efforts in mid-1990s. In one of the few noticeable protests -which occurred in March 2005-, the protest of the right holders was limited to snitching on Gökçek to the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (*Ankarahaber.com*, March 7th 2005).

### 4.2.3. Disappointment and Forgotten Promises

Although the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project is usually regarded as a success story and represented as an example for further renewal projects by groups who conceive of urban policy-making as a profit-making and rent-creating activity, it is difficult to define it so when considering the consequences of the project for the inhabitants of the valley and the underlying principles of the project, which were the main tools for legitimizing the displacement.

Dündar's study (1997), which has witnessed the consequences of the project in its earlier periods, provides some of the drawbacks of the partial approach to renewal. The most significant result of her observation is the 'dismiss' of a great percentage of the previous inhabitants (Dündar, 1997:169) and Türker-Devecigil's observations show that the process of out-migration has continued. According to this, while 49% of the inhabitants in the first phase were right holder in 1997, this ratio has fallen to 38% in 2002. Although there is no information about the ownership ratio in Dündar's observation, Türker-Devecigil's survey shows that 22% of the right holders have sold their new flats during that period (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:199). When considering the first and the second phases totally, 39% of the inhabitants are ex-squatter house inhabitants, while their ownership ratio is 70%. Türker-Devecigil points that the main reason that forced the right holders to sell their new flats is that most of them were dead and their properties are sold by their children (ibid:201), but she does not support her claim with quantitative data. This study also has no data about the characteristics of the current residences of the right holders who have sold or rented their flats. Dündar's study, on the other hand, includes some data about the ones who rented their house -though it is very limited- and she detects some right holders who preferred to settle in another *gecekondu* settlement (Dündar, 1997:175). Although the existing data in these studies does not provide exact information about the process of out-migration, it is possible to conclude that a significant proportion of the right holders did not prefer to live in the valley and out-migrated either by renting or selling their flats. What is not possible to detect is the number of dislocated tenants, for whom, no policy was designed before and after the initiation of the renewal project except the promises of providing cheap land elsewhere to build their own houses, which was abandoned since 'suitable land for this project could not be found' (Özdemir,1998:231).

Türker-Devecigil's survey, on the other hand, reveals the further concerns of the right holders aside from the complaints about the low construction quality, insufficient surface area of the flats, and the lack of retail services in the valley. Expressing their worries about living with upper income groups, the right holders claim that these groups have privilege in acquiring services and add that they are against of the luxury cafes in the Culture Park. In addition, instead of the luxury houses, which were added to the plan after the agreement, they point that they would prefer playgrounds and sports areas (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:202). These complaints display that the rent-seeking and incomprehensive perspective of the renewal activities in Dikmen Valley are far away from creating a sense of community. Although it is not documented, it would not be too speculative to claim that the new comers are also not satisfied with sharing their neighborhood with low-income groups. Although Türker-Devecigil points that what has been experienced in the valley cannot be defined as gentrification for certain reasons, it can easily be claimed that the previous inhabitants of the valley will eventually prefer to leave, unless Gökçek's promises about the future developments in the valley and its surroundings will not be realized. In fact, Özdemir's observations indicate that the gentrification process has already started immediately after the completion of redevelopment in early phases of the project and seems to accelerate when the opinions of the right holders who suffers from the maintenance costs of their new flats, their dissatisfaction towards the gap between their higher expectations in terms of rents, and the difference between the socio-cultural structure of the tenants in the new flats and the right holders who preferred to stay in the valley (Özdemir, 1998:230-231, 237-241).

The performance of the project in terms of participation and self-financing is also far away from being a success story. Dündar points that no opportunity to participate in the steering committee was given to the district municipality, the inhabitants of the surroundings of the valley, and the Chamber of City Planners (Dündar, 1997:143). All these groups have criticized the project. The Chamber of City Planners was (and is) against of the incomprehensive approach to urban renewal and criticized the metropolitan municipality for excluding the Çankaya Municipality from the planning process. In addition, the surrounding neighborhoods reacted against the high apartment blocks in Ayrancı-Çankaya side, which blocked their views (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:188). The promise of increasing rents did not realized; the prizes have fallen sharply in buildings, which are remained in the shadow of luxury apartments. The claim of self-finance also could not be realized. The credits, which were obtained at the beginning of the project, were not paid in Gökçek's period and the Ministry of Treasury had to pay the debts of the metropolitan municipality, although

Karayalçın later claimed that the project has the potential of self-financing and even making profit (*Milliyet*, July 20th 1997).

In conclusion, the main goals of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project could not have been achieved until today. The project can easily be evaluated as a non-participatory one and it hardly provides a successful example of public-private partnership with its massive cost for the national budget. In addition to this, it has resulted with the removal of some of the previous inhabitants and the current complaints of the remaining right holders reveal that the removal process may continue in the future. In the next section, further evidences of the potential of failure for the up coming phases of the project are going to be displayed.

### 4.3. Field Survey: 4th Phase of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project

In this section of the study, a survey in the southern part of the valley, which constitutes the 4th phase of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project, is going to be evaluated. The data was collected from the questionnaires, to which, 37 households participated. The research site comprises three neighborhoods (Metin Akkuş, Hilal, and Yukarı Dikmen Neighborhoods). Neither the number of right holders nor the number of *gecekondu* houses in the area is known. Considering the increase in the total number of *gecekondu* houses in 4th and 5th phases from 1993 (515) to 2001 (1119), it can be assumed that there are more than 137 *gecekondu* houses in the area. However, it should also be noted that during the survey, no newly constructed *gecekondu* was detected. The reason of this ambiguity is the integration of the 4th phase with the forthcoming phases of the project. As it is going to be discussed below, there are other renewal projects that have more priority than the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project and the metropolitan municipality is reluctant to make any survey in the area.

The aim of the study is to detect the impacts of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project in neighborhoods, which are waiting for demolishment and redevelopment. In order to acquire information about the demands and expectations of the owner-occupiers and tenants before the implementation of the project, 4th implementation zone was chosen for field survey. By this way, the study also aims to realize its additional objective of providing preliminary information for further studies for comparing and contrasting the groups who settle in the valley before and after the renewal. In addition, the dwellers' point of view is also significant for investigating the possible problems that can emerge in these kinds of long term renewal

projects, since their opinions and expectations are also influenced by the experiences of the right holders who acquired their new flats in the previous phases of the project.

In the following part, after a short information about the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the area, negative impacts of the project in these neighborhoods and potential obstacles for the forthcoming implementations are going to be discussed. It should be noted that a conceptual distinction between owner-occupiers and right holders is made, since there is an ambiguity in the current process of the project about the status of the *gecekondu* owners who do not have title deed. In addition, tenants who are living in a relative's *gecekondu* and do not pay rent are also separated from other tenants. Their opinions are interpreted within different groups (tenants or owner occupiers) according to the question at hand and according to their gains and losses from the project.

### 4.3.1. General Information about the Area

#### 4.3.1.1. Demographic Characteristics

• Most of the owner-occupiers (66.7%) are long term inhabitants in the valley, among which, 50% had inherited their houses from their families. In addition, all of the owner-occupiers who inherited their houses from their families have title deed. The most of the owner-occupiers who had not inherited their houses expressed that they constructed their houses themselves (80%) and only 20% have come from outside of the valley. 20% of the owner-occupiers purchased their houses.

**TABLE 3: TYPE OF TENURE**

| Type of tenure | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Owner-occupier (with title deed) | 9 | 24.3 |
| Owner-occupier (with no title deed) | 6 | 16.2 |
| Tenant | 19 | 51,4 |
| Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | 3 | 8,1 |
| Total | 37 | 100,0 |

• The tenants are mostly young married couples who did not change their place of residence too much. Only 15.8% of the tenants have changed their place of residence more than two times. 63.1% of tenants' first place of residence is not in Dikmen Valley and 50% of this group's second place of residence is also not in the valley. Although this observation may

imply that the tenants are mostly newcomers, 36.8% have been living in the valley (in their current residence or in another *gecekondu* in the valley) for more than 10 years and this ratio is 57.9% for the ones who are living in the valley for at least 5 years.

**TABLE 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TENURE AND THE DURATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THE VALLEY**

| Duration of settlement | Type of tenure | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Owner-occupier (with title deed) | Owner-occupier (with no title deed) | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) |
| 1-5 years | 1 | | 10 | |
| 6-10 years | | | 5 | |
| >10 years | 8 | 6 | 4 | 3 |

**TABLE 5: DURATION OF SETTLEMENT IN THE CURRENT RESIDENCE (AMONG TENANTS)**

| Duration of settlement | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| <2 years | 4 | 21.1 |
| 2-5 years | 11 | 57.9 |
| 6-10 years | 3 | 15.8 |
| >10 years | 1 | 5.2 |
| Total | 19 | 100.0 |

• It should be noted that the households who do not pay rent are excluded from the percentages given in the two analyses above in order not to deviate the ratios. The reason of potential deviation in case of inclusion of these households in the analysis is that they are not obliged to be mobile in space, since they settled in their parents' houses after marriage.

• The field displays the characteristics that are common in most of the *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Ankara in terms of migration patterns. The inhabitants of the field are mostly immigrants from Middle Anatolia. While 13.5% of the head of households were born in Ankara, 80% of them are from the provinces of the city. 70.3% of the immigrants expressed that their relationship with their hometowns continue. Although immigrants are dominant, children were mostly born in Ankara (71% of the households with children, the eldest child was born in Ankara and this ratio increases to 78.3% in the second child if there is any).

**TABLE 6: PLACE OF BIRTH FOR THE HEADS OF THE HOUSEHOLD**

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Inner Anatolian Region | 28 | 84.8 |
| Eastern Anatolian Region | 2 | 6.1 |
| Northern Anatolian Region | 3 | 9.1 |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 |

• There are also 3 single parent families (families with mother) and 2 households that are made up of bachelor brothers and sisters. While, all the widow mothers' birth of place is in Inner Anatolian Region; in one of bachelors' house (which is made up of 2 young brothers) the brothers' place of birth is in Inner Anatolian Region, and in the other (which is made up of 4 brothers and a sister) the birth place of all inhabitants is in Eastern Anatolian Region.

• 80% of the head of the households who were born in Ankara is owner-occupier. Nevertheless a direct relationship between the owner-occupation and the place of birth for immigrants cannot be observed. 24.3% of the households are immigrants from a single Middle Anatolian city (Çorum), but concentration of people from a common motherland does not exist. Although the development of the settlement in the valley may followed an ordinary direction that is generally observed in *gecekondu* neighborhoods, the dwellers in this period are not necessairily fellow countrymen. Thus, the motive that has influenced over the current households' choice for the place of residence cannot be found in place of birth for most of the inhabitants. This deduction is also supported by the existence of single-parent families and households that are constituted by brothers and sisters.

• Family sizes among the inhabitants are not large in general. 67.6% of the families are composed of 4 or less persons. 23.5% of families have 3 children and 8.8% of the families have 4 children; there is no household, in which, 5 or more children is living. The reason of this situation can be explained by the concentration of young couples or newly-weds who are still constructing a family, and retirees, whose children are married and living in their own houses.

• There are two households, which are made up of brothers and sisters. During the observation, information about two construction workers (who are living together) is also acquired, though they did not participate in the questionnaire. The existence of these kinds of households in the valley may indicate that the forthcoming project has repelled parented-

households and attracted groups who are looking for temporary residents with little costs. The further implications of this situation are going to be discussed later in this section.

• Level of education is not high among parents. 9.4% of the head of the family have graduated from high school and only 3.1% of this group has higher education. Among the wives, the ratio of high school graduates is 8.8% and there is no person with higher education in this group. The proportion of illiterate female parents is a considerable indicator of the unevenness between the male and female members of the previous generation and should be considered as a problem in terms of child care. The level of education for children varies according to their ages. While the children of the older families had lower levels of education, children of younger families are mostly continuing their education. Thus, an increase in the level of education can be observed for the children of younger parents.

**TABLE 7: LEVEL OF EDUCATION AMONG PARENTS**

| Level of education | Male parents | Female parents |
|---|---|---|
| Illiterate | | 14,7 |
| Renounced primary school | 6,3 | 8,8 |
| Primary school graduate | 53,1 | 64,7 |
| Renounced secondary school | 6,3 | |
| Secondary school graduate | 21,9 | |
| Renounced high school | | 2,9 |
| High school graduate | 9,4 | 8,8 |
| Vocational school graduate | 3,1 | |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

#### 4.3.1.2. Economic and Social Characteristics

• It is not possible to observe the concentration of very poor in this part of the valley, nor is it to point the reverse. The most apparent characteristic of the area in terms of occupational structure is the dominance of salaried employees (33.3%) and the retirees (30.3%). The ratio of independent workers is 21.2%, among which, 71.4% is construction worker. The ratio of unemployed, on the other hand, is 15.2%. Long term unemployment is also observed in this group. According to this, while 20% of this group is unemployed for 6 months, 40% cannot find a job for more that 2 years. It should also be noted that the contribution of children to income is very narrow. Only 14.2% of the families have children who are active in workforce (in 40% of this group the contribution of children is compulsory since the head of the family is either dead or had left the house).

**TABLE 8: OCCUPATION**

| Occupation | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Salaried | 11 | 33,3 |
| Independent worker | 7 | 21,2 |
| Retired | 10 | 30,3 |
| Unemployed | 5 | 15,2 |
| Total | 33 | 100,0 |

• When the relationship between the occupation of the households and the type of tenure is considered, it is observed that there is a dominance of retirees among the owner-occupiers (60%). In addition, most of the salaried employees who are owner-occupier pointed that they inherited their houses from their parents (75%). On the other hand, few of the retirees, had acquired their by this way (22.2%); the rest of this group had either bought their houses or constructed it themselves. These data display that the owner-occupier retirees had acquired their houses either in the early periods -that the valley was becoming a *gecekondu* settlement-, or after long years of working. What can be deduced from this situation is that it is becoming more difficult to own a *gecekondu* even for the ones who have regular jobs. When the employment opportunities and incomes of the tenants are considered, this observation gains a further significance. While salaried employees (37.5%) and independent workers (31.2%) are dominant among tenants, the ratio of unemployed is also considerable (25%) in this group. Although the average age of the heads of the tenant households is lower than the owner-occupiers, diminishing opportunities for regular employment and increasing attention of large capital holders to urban space reduce their opportunity to acquire their own *gecekondu* in the future.

**TABLE 9: TYPE OF WORK**

| Type of work | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Official duty | 4 | 36,4 |
| Unqualified worker | 1 | 9,1 |
| Qualified worker | 4 | 36,4 |
| Other | 2 | 18,2 |
| Total | 11 | 100,0 |

• The income of the independent workers are less than 500 YTL (33.3% of this group says that their income is less than 300 YTL), while %55.5 of the salaried employees earn more than this amount. Although only 5.4% of the inhabitants have pointed that they are satisfied with their income, the ratio of households who have debts is relatively low (27%), among which, the unemployed and independent workers are dominant (80% of the unemployed and

28.5% of the independent workers are indebted). A gap between the incomes of the owner-occupiers and tenants was not observed. The reason of this is the dominance of retirees among the owner-occupiers. The condition of being indebted, however, changes among the two groups. According to this, while 13.3% of the owner-occupiers are indebted, this ratio increases to 36.8% among the tenants.

**TABLE 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND TYPE OF TENURE**

| | | Type of tenure | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Owner-occupier | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | |
| Occupation | Salaried | 4 | 6 | 1 | 11 |
| | Independent worker | 2 | 5 | | 7 |
| | Retired | 9 | 1 | | 10 |
| | Unemployed | | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Total | | 15 | 16 | 2 | 33 |

**TABLE 11: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONTHLY INCOME AND THE TYPE OF TENURE**

| Monthly income (in YTL) | Type of tenure | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Owner-occupier | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | |
| <300 | | 2 | | 2 |
| 300-400 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 8 |
| 400-500 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| 500-600 | 4 | 2 | | 6 |
| 600-800 | | 3 | | 3 |
| 800-1000 | 2 | 1 | | 3 |
| Total | 12 | 14 | 2 | 28 |

• A significant part of the participants who are active in workforce do not have any social security (72.2%), since there is a dominance of salaried employees who are working in private sector (90.9%) and independent workers. While 66.6% of the owner-occupiers have no social security, this ratio increases to 81.8% among the tenants.

• There are few owner-occupiers who have other properties. 1 owner-occupier has land in his hometown and 1 owner-occupier owns a flat in another district of Ankara (Keçiören). A similar situation is also observed among tenants. 2 of the tenants declared that they own flats, though 1 of them is made up of brothers and sisters and it is possible to say that they are living in Dikmen Valley in order to accumulate money, since all the brothers and sisters are

working for relatively higher wages when compared to other employees in the valley. In addition, only two tenants have land in their hometown. Thus, it is difficult to detect any source of additional income for most of the inhabitants of the valley.

• 72.9% of the inhabitants expresses that they would prefer to live in apartment flats if they would have better income, among which, 7.4% added that they feel uncomfortable about the idea of living with upper income groups. While some inhabitants' suspicion about living with upper income groups is based on the idea that these groups would behave pretentious against them, some others express that there would be problems with children; even one of the inhabitants says that he feels himself inferior against upper income groups. Most of the inhabitants who prefer to live in *gecekondu* emphasize spaciousness and sense of neighborhood as the positive features of *gecekondu* settlements. What is noticeable is that the percentage of the owner-occupiers is much higher than the tenants in terms of preferring to live in *gecekondu* (respectively, 33.3% and 10.5%). Better quality in owner-occupiers' houses can be given as an explanation for this difference, since most of the tenants are living in houses, which seem to be constructed at the basement for other members of families though having been rented after these members have left their residence (or constructed for this purpose at the beginning). Since these houses are located in more sloppy parts of the plots without any connection to the road apart from footpaths, as opposed to the upstairs that are occupied by owner-occupiers and have access from the road, it is difficult to reach them especially for elderly and the tenants in these houses suffer more in times of rain and snow.

**TABLE 12: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEAL RESIDENCE AND THE OPINION ABOUT LIVING WITH HIGH-INCOME GROUPS**

| Opinion about living with high-income groups | Ideal type of residence | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Apartment flat | *Gecekondu* | Cottage house | |
| Would feel uncomfortable | 2 | 4 | 1 | 7 |
| Would not feel uncomfortable | 23 | 2 | 2 | 27 |
| No idea | 2 | 1 | | 3 |
| Total | 27 | 7 | 3 | 37 |

**TABLE 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF TENURE AND IDEAL TYPE OF RESIDENCE**

| Type of tenure | Ideal type of residence | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Apartment flat | *Gecekondu* | Cottage house | |
| Owner-occupier | 8 | 5 | 2 | 15 |
| Tenant | 16 | 2 | 1 | 19 |
| Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | 3 | | | 3 |
| Total | 27 | 7 | 3 | 37 |

• It is observed that most of the inhabitants do not participate in the activities that are usually regarded as the components of 'urban' way of living. Their visits to shopping malls are usually limited to strolling, with no intention of shopping. While the shopping malls, which are in short distance to the valley (Atakule) or serving for moderate consumers (Beğendik) are visited more by the inhabitants (respectively, 27% and 13.5%), they regard more luxurious malls as places that are unreachable (for example, only 5.4% of the inhabitants pointed that they have visited Armada). A similar pattern is also observable for the use of commercial centers. According to this, while the ratio of inhabitants who have visited Kızılay and Ulus is higher (respectively, 75.7% and 45.9%), these percentages fall for commercial centers that are preferred by higher income groups (for example, only 2.7% of the inhabitants pointed that they have visited Tunalı). The number of inhabitants who has ever gone to the cinema, theatre or a concert is also very few.

### 4.3.2. Impacts of the Forthcoming Project

A hasty evaluation of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project may easily result with celebrating it as a win-win project, from which, both the right holders and the city of Ankara will benefit. The opinions of the inhabitants about the project also support this kind of a claim. According to this, 56.6% of the inhabitants have positive attitude towards the project and 76.2% among this group explain their opinion by pointing that the city and the neighborhoods in the valley will benefit from the project. What is more encouraging for the ones who appreciate the project is that tenants are more supportive towards the project. However, a more in-depth inquiry indicates that there is not much reason to be optimistic about the future of the inhabitants of the valley and for the future of Ankara in general.

The results of the questionnaire indicate that the project has negative impacts for the neighborhoods that are discussed in this study and it is difficult to say that the current

situation is promising. One explanation about the reason of disturbance among the inhabitants is the delay in the implementation of the further phases of the project. From another point of view, it is possible to interpret this delay as an ordinary situation in these kinds of long-term projects. Nevertheless, it can easily be observed that both the owner-occupiers and the tenants in these neighborhoods are suffering from the lack of service provision and the ambiguity in their near future.

As it is going to be discussed below, the opaque pre-project processes have produced inconsistent rumors about the date of demolishment, ranging from 1 or 2 months to 2 years. The continuing lawsuits about the 3rd implementation zone and the negative opinions of the right holders in previous phases contribute to the worries of the owner-occupiers. In addition, the considerable amount of owner-occupiers who have no title deed (and thus, who are not 'right holder') (40%) may create further problems. More importantly, it is apparent that these ambiguities have more harmful consequences for the tenants. The indifference of the initiators of the project towards this group shows that the project will hardly be anything, but an ordinary displacement. In this section, the impacts of the forthcoming project are going to be inquired through the evaluation of the opinions, worries, and expectations of the inhabitants.

#### 4.3.2.1. Neighborhoods without Service

The initial problem for the daily life of the inhabitants that can be observed in the area is the lack of urban and retail services, which, according to some inhabitants, has been going on for more than a year. Although the forthcoming project can be given as a compensation for the reluctance of local governments to make investments, the ambiguity in the date of renewal invalidates that kind of an excuse.

**TABLE 14: SATISFACTION FROM THE PROVISION OF SERVICES**

| Level of satisfaction | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Satisfied | 10 | 27,0 |
| Unsatisfied | 23 | 62,2 |
| No idea | 4 | 10,8 |
| Total | 37 | 100,0 |

The most declared problems are the lack of provision of infrastructure services, which exacerbates the already existing problems in the valley, like flood and land slide. In addition

to these problems, some inhabitants complain about the increasing number of thefts caused by the unsolved problem of street illumination. Another problem that the inhabitants are suffering from is the lack of transportation service, which has more significance for the inhabitants in the valley since, although these neighborhoods are closed to main transportation axes in Çankaya and Dikmen, the high degree of slope in the two sides of the valley is an obstacle for pedestrians. This situation also gains significance for the acquisition of daily consumption goods since the inhabitants are obliged to use the retail services in Dikmen. Aside from these problems, rumor that the school will not be opened in the next semester is another source of anxiety for the household whose children are continuing their education.

Under these conditions the valley is becoming unattractive for most of the types of household (families with children, retires, etc.); indeed, 61.1% of the tenants have pointed that they have already been planning to leave the valley even if the project would be cancelled. In consequence, the valley is becoming more preferable to the groups who are looking for temporary residents with least cost. The rents are also supporting this claim. According to this, none of the tenants who have settled in the area in the last two years pay more than 135 YTL for monthly rent; among this group the least amount of monthly rent is 75 YTL, while it reaches to 170 YTL for the ones who have been settling in the valley for more than two years. There are also some houses in the area, which are unused -and not rented- by their owners.

**TABLE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY RENTS**

| Amount of monthly rent (YTL) | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| 75 | 1 | 5,3 |
| 100 | 1 | 5,3 |
| 110 | 1 | 5,3 |
| 120 | 3 | 15,8 |
| 130 | 4 | 21,1 |
| 135 | 2 | 10,5 |
| 140 | 1 | 5,3 |
| 150 | 5 | 26,3 |
| 170 | 1 | 5,3 |
| Total | 19 | 100,0 |

The social life in the valley is another indicator of this situation. Although 70.3% of the inhabitants said that solidarity relationships between the dwellers is developed, 29.7% of the heads of the family points that they do not have any friend in their neighborhood, though their wives are more actively communicating with each other. The economic conditions can

be regarded as one of the explanations of the lack of communication. According to this, the ones who are not satisfied with the solidarity relationships explain this situation with economic problems and express that inhabitants can only take care of themselves. However, reluctance to communicate with neighbors can also be considered as a symptom of diminishing solidarity, especially when considering the existence of a major split among the inhabitants, that is, the one between the right holders and the tenants. Whatever the reason, the lack of communication is apparently an obstacle to the possibility of collective action.

**TABLE 16: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HAVING A FRIEND IN THE VALLEY AND THE TYPE OF TENURE**

| Condition of having a friend | Type of tenure | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Owner-occupier | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | |
| Have a friend | 13 | 11 | 2 | 26 |
| Have no friend | 2 | 8 | 1 | 11 |
| Total | 15 | 19 | 3 | 37 |

Currently, the surrounding of the area is deserted. The settlements in the 3rd implementation zone (the north side of the research site) are almost demolished, except few *gecekondu* houses whose future is subject to the ongoing lawsuits. On the other hand, there are few houses in the south of the 4th implementation zone (which, in fact, can be defined as a boundary for the city). However, high apartment blocks can be seen at the east and west side of the valley. Mostly, luxurious automobiles of the dwellers of high-income settlements in the southern part of the city travel along the main roads of the area, apart from few busses, which visit the settlement rarely. Thus, the area gives an impression of a temporary settlement, from which, the inhabitants are going to be displaced soon. It is apparent that the diminishing attractiveness of the area will be an additional motive for the right holders to accept the offers of the local government.

#### 4.3.2.2. Towards Distrust and Indifference

Unlike the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the public do not pay much attention to the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project. After the completion of the first two phases of the project, which is the most visible part, it seems like very few people deal with what is going on in the southern part of the valley. During the research, it is observed that, at least to some extent, this state of being has permeated to the ones who are the main subjects of the project;

there are tendencies of distrust and indifference to the project among a considerable amount of inhabitants. While 10.8% of the inhabitants do not have a positive attitude towards the project, 30.6% pointed that they have no opinion about it.

**TABLE 17: OPINIONS OF THE INHABITANTS ABOUT THE PROJECT**

| Opinion | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Positive | 21 | 56.6 |
| Negative | 4 | 10.8 |
| No idea | 12 | 32,6 |
| Total | 37 | 100,0 |

What can be regarded as an extraordinary result is that the percentage of tenants is higher than the owner-occupiers in terms of having a positive opinion about the project and this is not related with the high percentage of owner-occupiers who have no title deed; indeed, the owner-occupiers who are going the acquire new flats at the end of the project are less satisfied than the ones who are not regarded as right holder in the current scheme of the project, since the latter group have little or no opinion about their gains and/or losses in the project.

**TABLE 18: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF TENURE AND THE OPINION ABOUT THE PROJECT**

| Opinion about the project | Type of tenure | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Owner-occupier | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | |
| Positive | 8 | 11 | 2 | 21 |
| Negative | 3 | 1 | | 4 |
| No idea | 4 | 7 | 1 | 12 |
| Total | 15 | 19 | 3 | 37 |

**TABLE 19: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONDITION OF HAVING TITLE DEED (AMONG OWNER-OCCUPIERS) AND THE OPINION ABOUT THE PROJECT**

| Condition of having title deed (among owner-occupiers) | Opinion about the project | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Positive | Negative | No idea | |
| Have title deed | 55.6% | 22.2% | 22.2% | 9 |
| Do not have title deed | 50% | 16.7% | 33.3% | 6 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 15 |

There are plenty of reasons that explain this situation. Firstly, it is obvious that the owner-occupiers are more impatient than the tenants about the project and they are more anxious

about the current ambiguities. A considerable amount of right holders (66.7%) do not have any expectation aside from its completion. Secondly, as it is going to be discussed below, the proposal of the metropolitan municipality does not satisfy the right holders. Tenants, on the other hand, do not seem to be thinking about the project a lot, contrary to the owner-occupiers. Most of the tenants do not have any opinion about the project. In their perspective, this is an ordinary process; the owner of their house will inform them about the demolishment and they will leave the area. The reason of their attitude can be interpreted as a deep-rooted reflex that forces them to assume that the *gecekondu* dwellers (or, the poor in general) always loose; this kind of an attitude is also visible among the owner-occupiers, though in a different sense. While the ratio of tenants who think that 'the wealthy' will benefit from the project is 26.3%, this ratio increases to 40% among the owner-occupiers, since they have higher expectations. The widespread belief among the ones who defend this idea can be perceived in the expression of one tenant who said that 'the rich people will settle in this area and the old inhabitants will use the redeveloped valley only while strolling around or going to the local market'.

**TABLE 20: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPINION ABOUT THE WINNERS OF THE PROJECT AND THE TYPE OF TENURE**

| Opinion about the winners of the project | Type of tenure | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Owner-occupier | Tenant | Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | |
| The city | 2 | 5 | | 7 |
| Owner-occupiers | | 2 | | 2 |
| The wealthy | 6 | 5 | | 11 |
| Himself/herself | 4 | | 1 | 5 |
| The poor | | | 1 | 1 |
| No idea | 3 | 7 | 1 | 11 |
| Total | 15 | 19 | 3 | 37 |

Although there is a considerable amount of inhabitants who are not satisfied with the project, a visible opposition could not be observed. The results of the questionnaire displayed that the forthcoming project is not an issue of discussion among the inhabitants. While 40% of the right holders said that they are discussing about the project with other dwellers, this ratio is 36.3% for the tenants, and these discussions are limited to daily talks without any organization or order. As it is going to be discussed below, it is hardly possible to blame the inhabitants for this situation.

### 4.3.3. Actual and Potential Problems in the Implementation

What have been discussed above is the social and economic consequences of the forthcoming phase of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project for the inhabitants. In this section, these interpretations are going to be forged with further observations in order to make a double-inquiry of the problems that both the initiators of the project and the ones who are subject to it may face with. It should be noted that a cost-benefit analysis or an evaluation of project-management is not going to take place in this inquiry. Instead, legitimacy of the project will be the main concern. Potential problems for the initiators of the project are significant for this purpose since in case of their appearance, it will be more damaging for the bearers of this particular project and similar ones in the future, either by victimizing the inhabitants in the valley, or by reproducing the housing problem in general, and thus, victimizing the *gecekondu* dwellers in some other settlements.

The main proposition that is going to be discussed in this section is that the underlying approach of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project is not concerned over the problems of the *gecekondu* dwellers in the valley or in Ankara and it is prone to produce problems for itself. The pre-project processes and the dynamics of the location of the site indicate that the objectives of the project are unlikely to be realized. It is far away from being a distinctive project in terms of participation and it is doubtful that it will be completed with minimum economic costs. The latter has significance for the purpose of this study in so far the renewal activities in the valley can be regarded as a project that concerns public good. As long as the metropolitan municipality acts as an actor that aims to maximize its profit through rent-seeking policies, the rising costs of the project would not be an actual problem for it, since these costs are met by the national budget.

#### 4.3.3.1. A Non-Participatory Process

Legitimacy of an urban renewal project can be questioned from certain different aspects, among which, comprehending the urban renewal as a part of the urbanization policy; compensating the losses of the dislocated inhabitants; securing the transparency of the project; and providing the channels of participation, can be given as the most important ones. Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project has not yet provided the necessary conditions to be interpreted as a legitimate one and there is no evidence implying that there are efforts to

change the current situation. In this section, the third aspect is going to be discussed in terms of participation of the inhabitants.

During the questionnaire, it is observed that none of the inhabitants were informed about the current processes of the project. Only some technicians have come to the area for making preliminary technical surveys. In addition, the inhabitants who have ever intended to acquire information pointed that they could not achieve their goals. The level of opacity in the Metropolitan Municipality's and Metropol İmar Inc. Co.'s activities can be perceived in the reproaches of an owner-occupier who complain about the reluctance of the officials in informing the inhabitants. It should be noted that the author of this study also faced with similar problems. The so called public-private partnership achieves to create confusion for simple citizens and treats them as a tennis ball between the municipality and the company - which, in fact, is located in the skirts of the valley.

**TABLE 21: ACHIEVEMENT IN ACQUIRING INFIRMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT**

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Could not acquire information | 15 | 40.5 |
| Is not interested | 22 | 59.5 |
| Total | 37 | 100,0 |

Given the lack of tendency of organized activity within the inhabitants in the valley, channels for declaring the demands are blocked, even for the owner-occupiers who have title deed. As far as they know, there is not any assigned unit in the municipality, from which, they can be informed about the processes of the project and the procedures that they will be subject to. Thus, it is possible to claim that the function of the steering committee is limited to bargains during the expropriation process.

**TABLE 22: DEMANDS OF THE INHABITANTS FROM THE MUNICIPALITY**

| Demand | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Completion of the project as soon as possible | 8 | 21,6 |
| Transparency | 3 | 8.1 |
| A better proposal | 2 | 5,4 |
| Not to victimize people | 1 | 2.7 |
| Cancellation of the demolishment | 2 | 5,4 |
| Better flats for the right holders | 2 | 5,4 |
| Master plan permit | 1 | 2,7 |
| No idea | 18 | 48.7 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 |

According to the current situation, the inhabitants will have to find a new residence in one or two months before the demolishment. Considering the economic characteristics of the inhabitants, they will not have any choice, but to settle in another *gecekondu* settlement. In addition, 69% of the inhabitants declare that their ideal district for settlement is Dikmen; since there will no longer be any *gecekondu* neighborhood in Dikmen Valley, they will necessarily look for residents in another part of the Dikmen district or another part of the city that most of them are unfamiliar to. While the situation may be more promising for the right holders, since they will acquire rent assistance; tenants are the potential victims of the ambiguities about the future of the project. A great amount of the tenants point that there is no one to help them in case of an unexpected evacuation (73.6%), and they have possibly nothing to do but to rely on the mercy of the metropolitan municipality.

#### 4.3.3.2. Increasing Speculative Pressure

Apart from the problems of the inhabitants about the ambiguities in the project and the insensitive attitude of the municipality, the economic obstacles for the forthcoming implementations of the municipality and the company should also be considered. As it was expressed before, Dikmen Valley has always been considered as green area, with no permit for settlement. The renewal project, on the other hand, marks a change in the perception of the valley since the completed part of the valley has attracted the attentions of the speculators. One motive for speculative movement in the valley is its potential rent, which is very high for two reasons: The attractiveness of both Çankaya and Dikmen for high-income residential use and the attractiveness of the valley itself. However, it is difficult to consider this motive as the primary one, since the factors that increases the potential rent in the area are not peculiar to 2000s. What should be pointed as the main reason is the encouragement of speculation, visible in the contemporary language of urban policy making in general and in Ankara.

In case of Dikmen Valley, it was observed that the inhabitants have various opinions and expectations about the gains and losses of the project. Although most of them points that they are only expecting to acquire their flats, they have objections about the size and the construction quality of their new houses. The main objection of the ones who are not satisfied with the project is the 50 $/m² value that is proposed by the municipality. The demand of some of the owner-occupiers reaches up to ten times of this value. Although this

value was determined by a council decision for 3rd and 4th phases of the project, at the end of the bargaining process for the 3rd phase, it has reached to approximately 415 $/m² (540 YTL). Metropolitan municipality also invalidated its own decision about owner-occupiers who have no title deed and paid approximately 240 $/m² (310 YTL) to these inhabitants in this phase.

**TABLE 23: EXPECTATIONS OF THE OWNER-OCCUPIERS FROM THE PROJECT**

| Expectations | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Money | 2 | 13,3 |
| Flat | 11 | 73,3 |
| No idea | 2 | 13,3 |
| Total | 15 | 100,0 |

There are certain interrelated reasons that create this large gap between the proposal of the municipality and the demands of the owner-occupiers. Firstly, it is observed that the owner-occupiers have some information about the experiences of the right holders in the previous phases of the project. During the conversations, some owner-occupiers mentioned the narrowness and the law construction quality of the right holder apartments. One of the right holders says that "I only want my new flat, but I also know that some of my friends have sold their new flats and left the valley". The owner-occupiers are also comparing their situation with the other *gecekondu* owners in the skirts of the valley who had formed cooperatives and constructed apartment blocks for high-income residential use; during the time that this study had been in progress, constructions in the Çankaya side of the valley were going on. In addition, some of the owner-occupiers whose houses are closer to the Dikmen side pointed that a constructor made a more satisfying offer for their land. Since the municipality is going to build apartments on their land, prohibition of construction in the valley does not make much sense for the owner-occupiers; in one of the right holders words, "when I think about the huge difference between the land value 50 meters away from my house and the amount of money that the municipality offers, what I see is nothing but exploitation".

**TABLE 24: DEMANDS OF THE OWNER-OCCUPIERS FROM THE MUNICIPALITY**

| Demand | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Completion of the project as soon as possible | 6 | 40.0 |
| Transparency | 2 | 13.3 |
| A better proposal | 1 | 6.6 |
| Better flats for the right holders | 2 | 13.3 |
| Master plan permit | 1 | 6.6 |
| No idea | 3 | 20.0 |
| Total | 15 | 100.0 |

### 4.3.4. Implications of the Project on the Political Inclinations of the Inhabitants

An inquiry about the political inclinations of the inhabitants can be conceived of as a useless effort in this kind of a study. Given the inherent problems of questionnaires as a research method, the answers of the inhabitants may seem to be far away from providing a healthy indicator especially when politics is the issue. The hesitation of a considerable amount of inhabitants for talking about their choices in the last elections supports this suspicion. However, this inquiry gains significance if the subject of this study is regarded as an integral part of urbanization rather than an isolated phenomenon; since the information about the political inclinations of *gecekondu* dwellers, the issues that they mention when evaluating the political agents, and their opinions about the activities that directly affects their lives provide some clues about their expectations from the current policy-making scheme.

Although it is not possible to inquire the impacts of the project in the political preferences of the inhabitants through a comparison of their voting patterns in other elections, these impacts can be inquired from their opinion about the activities of the metropolitan municipality, at least speculatively. As it was mentioned before, in Turkey the voting patterns in local elections are influenced by the party that leads the parliament. Under these conditions, the widespread support of the current mayor can be explained by the dominance of his party in the parliament. It should also be noted that the current mayor has been successful in local elections for the third time and his previous parties were not dominant in the parliament in previous elections. Thus, the answers of the inhabitants may not directly provide an idea about the relationship between their political inclinations and their opinion about the forthcoming project. During the inquiry, the opinions of the inhabitants about the level of service provision in their neighborhoods are related with their level of satisfaction about the metropolitan municipality's services in the city and their opinion about the Dikmen Valley

Redevelopment Project. The reason of the neglect of the district municipality in terms of service provision is the widely accepted fact among the inhabitants that district municipalities have a limited power especially when they are rivals with the metropolitan municipality. Although some inhabitants' statements about the district municipality imply a positive attitude (since district municipality has slowed down the renewal project by refusing to cooperate with the metropolitan municipality), most of the inhabitants do not have any opinion about the services of the district municipality.

**TABLE 25: DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN GENERAL ELECTION, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY ELECTION, AND DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY ELECTION**

| Supported parties in the general elections | Percentage |
|---|---|
| JDP | 66.7 |
| RPP | 25.9 |
| DPP-SDPP* | 3.7 |
| NAP** | 3.7 |
| Supported parties in the metropolitan municipality election | |
| JDP | 80.8 |
| RPP | 15.4 |
| DPP-SDPP | 3.8 |
| Supported parties in the district municipality election | |
| JDP | 65.4 |
| RPP | 30.8 |
| DPP-SDPP | 3.8 |

* *DEHAP-SHP Koalisyonu*
** *MHP*

It is observed that there is dominance of the supporters of JDP in the last general elections, and more apparently, in local elections, though there is a considerable increase in the number of supporters of RPP in district municipality elections. It is possible to claim that RPP's historical dominance in Çankaya District and its particular role for the developments in the valley could not have overcome the strength of JDP in today's political climate. However, a decrease in the ratio of the supporters of the metropolitan municipality can easily be observed. According to this, 40.5% of the inhabitants are not satisfied with the services of the metropolitan municipality in general, which marks a 21.3% of loss in the percentage of the supporters of the mayor. The most widespread criticism against the metropolitan municipality is the lack of services provided to the area.

**TABLE 26: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF SATISFACTION FROM THE SERVICES OF THE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY IN GENERAL AND THE SERVICES PROVIDED TO THE AREA**

| Satisfaction from the services of the metropolitan municipality in general | Satisfaction from the services provided to the area | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Satisfied | Not satisfied | No idea | |
| Satisfied | 7 | 14 | 1 | 22 |
| Not satisfied | 2 | 8 | 1 | 11 |
| No idea | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Total | 10 | 23 | 4 | 37 |

Inhabitants' level of satisfaction with the services of the metropolitan municipality should also be inquired with respect to their gains and losses from the renewal project in the valley. It is observed that among the owner-occupiers, 75% of the supporters of the mayor are satisfied with the services of the metropolitan municipality and this ratio is very closed to the ratio of supporters of the mayor in the local elections (72.7%). On the other hand, while 85.7% of the tenants are the supporter of JDP in the local elections, this ratio falls to 58.3% in terms of being satisfied with the services of the municipality in general. Nonetheless, it is hardly possible to relate these results directly with the inhabitants' gains and losses from the project, at least when considering their opinions about the project.

**TABLE 27: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN THE LAST LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE LEVEL OF SATISFACTION FROM THE SERVICES OF THE MUNICIPALITY IN GENERAL**

| Type of tenure | Distribution of votes in the last local elections | Satisfaction from the services of the metropolitan municipality in general | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Satisfied | Not satisfied | No idea | |
| Owner-occupier | JDP | 6 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| | RPP | 1 | 2 | | 3 |
| | Total | 7 | 3 | 1 | 11 |
| Tenant | JDP | 7 | 5 | | 12 |
| | RPP | 1 | | | 1 |
| | DPP-SDPP | | 1 | | 1 |
| | Total | 8 | 6 | | 14 |
| Living in a relative's house (does not pay rent) | JDP | 1 | | | 1 |
| | Total | 1 | | | 1 |

The observations displayed that the opinions of the inhabitants about the metropolitan municipality are influenced by factors other than the forthcoming renewal project. While the

projects of the municipality in other parts of Ankara and the one in Dikmen Valley are the most mentioned successes of the municipality (respectively 37.8% and 27%), 21.6% of the inhabitants express that they are happy with the municipality because of the food and coal aid. It is possible to perceive that aids are important aspects of gaining the support of the inhabitants. Among the inhabitants who are not satisfied with the metropolitan municipality, inequality in the distribution of aids is the most declared complaint (72.7%). On the other hand, the ratios of inhabitants who complain from the municipality for the lack of services provided to their neighborhood or to the city in general are relatively low (respectively 13.5% and 8.1%). None of the inhabitants criticize the municipality because of the forthcoming project.

**TABLE 28: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF SATISFACTION FROM THE SERVICES OF MUNICIPALITY IN GENERAL AND THE OPINION ABOUT THE PROJECT**

| Satisfaction from the services of the metropolitan municipality in general | Opinion about the project | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Positive | Negative | No idea | |
| Satisfied | 15 | 2 | 5 | 22 |
| Not satisfied | 5 | 2 | 4 | 11 |
| No idea | 1 | | 3 | 4 |
| Total | 21 | 4 | 12 | 37 |

The results of the questionnaire indicate that the political agents are successful in applying market-led urban renewal without loosing the popular support of the bearers of these projects. The low level of expectations of the *gecekondu* dwellers is compatible with the short-term, rent-seeking approach to urban policy-making. This is visible in the silence of dwellers when their opinions about the activities of the metropolitan municipality. During the questionnaire, some dwellers revealed their anxiety over being defined as a criticizer of the project and acted suspicious about the conductor of this study. Under these conditions, it is difficult to claim that the source of the popular support of the current activities of the metropolitan municipality is the renewal of their neighborhood, especially when considering the proportion of inhabitants who will have no benefit from the project and have nothing to do, but to leave the area and settle in another *gecekondu* settlement and wait for the forthcoming dislocation. A more optimistic future for the tenants in the valley would only bring about the misery of the following disadvantaged groups in other *gecekondu* settlements within the current urban policy-making scheme.

### 4.4. Evaluating the Current Picture

The excitement at the beginning of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project has ended. The social democratic values like participation, right of shelter, and environmentalism have left their places to the rent-seeking policies that have gradually been dislocating the *gecekondu* population. Dikmen Valley takes place in newspapers only when some luxury flats, which are under the ownership of the metropolitan municipality, are put out to tender. The right holders are complaining from the flats, which they think are suitable only for families with no children (Türker-Devecigil, 2003:201-202). The tenants, on the other hand, are neglected entirely from the very beginning of the project. As it is going to be discussed in the last chapter, the approach to urban renewal in this project will be copied in other renewal projects in Ankara, which have been introduced with promises of pumped up prizes. The short-sightedness is visible in mayor's speech in an interview, who proudly says that whenever he talks about a project in any part of Ankara, rents are boosting.

Claims about being able to formulate what is best for any particular social group has long been regarded as an indication of having a deviated comprehension of society. The reason of hesitating over putting forward precise explanations about social phenomena is not the theoretical fluctuations within the social theory, but the past experiences, which themselves are the reason of these fluctuations by displaying the gap between theory and reality. However, one does not have to be pretentious when claiming that the logic behind the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project has no concern over the problems of *gecekondu* dwellers (and the urban poor in general); and thus, has no concern over public good.

The ongoing process in Dikmen Valley is in line with the similar initiatives that were discussed in previous chapters. Being the executive agent of the project, Metropol İmar Inc. Co. is a reflection of Bayırbağ's observations about the changing functions of municipal firms in the post-1980 period, contrary to their use as the instruments of socialist-leftist oriented municipal practices of RPP in the second half of 1970s (Bayırbağ, 1999:82). The reason of preparing a special project and using a public-private partnership model for Dikmen Valley rather than leaving the transformation process to the market forces through an improvement plan, is to "guarantee the gains of the municipality and that of the private firms who would take part in the redevelopment process" (Özdemir, 1998:206). In addition, as opposed to Yenigün's claims about the partnerships in general, Metropol İmar Inc. Co. is not perceived as the sole implementing agency who bears "the brunt of any dissatisfaction"

(Yenigün, 1996:94). Contrary to it and parallel to what Harvey claims (Harvey, 2002:458), the field survey displays that the residents of the valley are completely aware of the fact that the metropolitan municipality is the directive agent of the project with its full authority over preparing plans in all scales and relaxing the planning regulations when it is necessary for it to fulfill the main objectives. At this point, however, the ideological-religious commitment of the residences to the political party in power functions for reducing the possibility of any collective opposition among the dislocated. In conclusion, neither Metropolitan Inc. Co., nor the metropolitan municipality is directly subject to any objection although it is difficult to claim that everybody is happy about what is going on.

The opinions of the inhabitants about the renewal project can easily be defined as a silent distrust. Owner-occupiers who are right holders under current project scheme will acquire their flat, though they have no opportunity to express their opinions about their residences. Their participation cannot be regarded as an unnecessary luxury, since the validity of the laws that enabled the renewal project on their lands has no superiority over the laws that enabled the right holders to acquire their title deeds; denying this fact would be nothing but to confirm the illegitimacy of the project and the regulations that enabled its conduction. The future of owner-occupiers who have no title deed, on the other hand, keeps its ambiguity and the municipality does not seem to prefer to clarify their status. Although metropolitan municipality determined a value for the lands of this group, this value was lower than the one that was determined for the owner-occupiers who have title deed. Considering the high expectations of the owner-occupiers with title deed, metropolitan municipality will be forced to increase either the opposition of the inhabitants, or the cost of the project. Tenants can easily be defined as the real victims of the project in the long run, though they do not express a direct opposition, since what has been going on in the valley is in line with their expectations that are shaped by their past experiences as *gecekondu* dwellers.

In her study, Dündar criticizes the project for hindering the potential for future development in the area and its narrow vision in creating an area that is attractive for the 'global man'. According to her, this project "evaluated the physical potentials of the land but did not consider its local capacities coming from the existing civic identity of the area (…) A renewal project for this area requires first to be an example for the action plans that will be prepared to make Ankara competitive in the global scale, secondly, providing adequate shelter for all the squatters in the area and thirdly, support public participation" (Dündar, 1997:193). It is possible to observe all the deficiencies and contradictions of the authors who

conceive of the market-led urban development policies as ideal initiatives to take part in global competition. It seems like Dündar defends the idea that *gecekondu* inhabitants' need for shelter should be provided but at somewhere away where their 'civic identity' cannot damage the 'local capacity' of the valley and its surroundings. Thus, although she puts the dislocation and out-migration of the existing population as a negative aspect of the project, she, in fact, finds it necessary to increase the competitiveness of Ankara. At this point, mentioning to 'public participation' becomes totally meaningless.

Although it also takes part in Dündar's study, the ideals of sustainability, livability, and equity constitute the focal point of Türker-Devecigil's study on Dikmen Valley (Türker-Devecigil, 2003). Conducting a more theoretical debate, she has a more critical attitude towards the rent-seeking urban policy-making schemes. However, her concern on the environmental values of the valley seems to be exceeding the societal concerns and neglecting the 'humane' side of the notion of 'human interest' that she mentions. The deficiency of her approach can be regarded as an extension of the principles that are defined in Habitat II Conference upon which, she constructed her analysis without questioning. The notion of 'power' takes place in her study for merely criticizing the current understanding of equity and the principle of participation is the only policy initiative that she proposes as an alternative. In other words, while focusing on the tendencies and activities of the actors in her analysis of the existing situation, she neglects the contradictory motives and interests of the actors that would take part in her loose definition of participatory policy-making processes. Although her perspective is comprehensive in terms of conceiving of the ecological balance in a totality, her analysis does not comprise the loosers of the Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project, since the notion of 'human interest' that she locates at the opposite side of the eco-centric approach is based on the interests of the defenders of rent-seeking policies, rather than the dislocated populations and the disadvantaged groups in other parts of the city. Thus, her conceptualization of comprehensiveness is limited to the totality of the ecology and has no social dimension. Her emphasis on environmental degradation is so extensive that housing of the urban poor does not seem to be a problem for her unless these groups solve their problem of shelter on ecologically fragile lands. Approaching to the case of Dikmen Valley from this perspective can only lead to the ignorance of the conditions that push these people to these areas.

Unlike the above-mentioned approaches, renewal of *gecekondu* settlements should be regarded as an integral part of urban policy planning for solving the housing problem of the

urban poor. Urban renewal should neither be an activity to 'clear' *gecekondu* neighborhoods for the inhabitance of classes that will contribute to the 'image' of cities, nor should they be conducted in order to boost the land rent. Under these considerations, Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project is far away from representing a break from profit-seeking, non-participatory approach to urban policy-making scheme. The project is going to dislocate a great proportion of the existing population and the valley is going to be inhabited by middle and upper classes. The expressions of the mayor also support the fact that metropolitan municipality's interest in the Dikmen Valley is directly related with the potential ground rent in the area. Thus, the project is an example that invalidates the claims about the opposition between the local governments' regulatory role in urban development and the speculative activities of private sector on urban lands; indeed, metropolitan municipality is in competition with the private sector in the possession of the potential ground rent. In addition, with its ill-conceived understanding of accountability and public good, the project hardly meets the conditions of the two ideals: the ideal of securing the legitimacy of public policies in the eyes of the citizens and the ideal of democratization. Under these conditions, it acknowledges the necessity to inquire if these ideals are paradoxical or not.

# CHAPTER V

# CONCLUSION

What has been discussed until now can be defined as the application of de-regulatory urban policies in the formation of rent-seeking urban renewal and regeneration activities and the adaptation of similar policy initiative in Turkey in the transformation of unauthorized settlements in Turkey. In this final chapter, firstly, the complementary relationship between the reflection of dominant discourse in urban politics and the public opinion about the *gecekondu* phenomenon is going to be discussed. It is hoped that the observations in this section will reveal the obstacles in the way towards constructing alternative policy propositions since they are displaying not only the limited scope of policy-making in Turkey, but also the widespread consent to these policies even by their victims. Following that, the case of Ankara in terms of the execution of de-regulated urban renewal and regeneration initiative are going to be discussed in order to exemplify the extent to which, the increasing power of local governments has been employed to facilitate the rent-seeking activities by the local authorities themselves. Lastly, certain recommendations that could be useful for putting forward alternative policy proposals are going to be made.

## 5.1. Role of the State

It is clear that direct use of the experience of advance capitalist societies to understand the Turkish case is not a viable strategy. However, an analogy between the socio-spatial consequences of these initiatives in advanced countries and in Turkey could be useful in so far as we are aware of the contextual differences between these two experiences. It is also necessary to emphasis that there are at least two common features of these highly diversified experiences. Firstly, in line with the deregulatory policies framed by neo-liberal urban policies redevelopment schemes in both contexts serve to the rent-seeking interests and secondly, in most of these schemes displacement of the weak is the outcome of the redevelopment. In what follows first I would like to concentrate on the role of the state,

particularly that of the local authorities and then I would like to pay some attention to the reaction of the victims of the redevelopment schemes.

In the political climate dominated by the neo-liberal discourse and policies, public-private partnership is one of the main mottos of urban policies and one of the key areas of such partnership is the redevelopment schemes. In this context, in the case of advance capitalist societies the redevelopment schemes have been developed and applied through the active cooperation of public and private sectors. One of the key roles played by the local authorities in this are is to provide the suitable conditions of entry for the private sector to these areas through legal and planning arrangements.

Although public-private partnership discourse has been widely used in the Turkish context, the way in which such partnership schemes have been applied is highly different in the case of Turkey. Putting it clearly, public sector involvement in redevelopment is much bolder than its western counterparts. Local authorities themselves establish municipal firms to directly engage in the areas subjected to redevelopment. However, such an involvement should not be interpreted as a means of defending the so-called public interests. The current experience has proven that the local authorities themselves act with market logic which priorities the rent-seeking activities rather than public interests. By enjoying the legal and planning powers, local authorities monopolize the rent emerging out of redevelopment schemes. In most cases, targeted areas for the redevelopment have been the strategic enclaves in the city where potential rents which could be derived as a result of redevelopment are high. In most cases, local authorities are not willing to apply the redevelopment schemes in those distressed areas. Dikmen Valley is an example of such an approach. As an enclave between high income neighborhoods Dikmen Valley provides a good opportunity for the local authority to monopolize the emerging land rent out of redevelopment and so far municipality has been highly successful in extracting emerging rent in the area by giving minimum share to the owners of the squatters.

### 5.2. Victims of Redevelopment

One of the interesting questions emerging out of redevelopment processes is the reaction of the victims. As was shown in the thesis, there are losers of this process. To a certain extent, squatter owners are one of these groups. In the case of the Dikmen Valley, main policy applied by the municipality has been to give a flat in the redeveloped area in exchange for

the land possessed by the squatter owners. One would claim that this is a fair share to be given to the squatter owners who originally possessed these areas through land invasion. Nevertheless, it is also true that later on most of the owners obtained title deeds as a result of amnesties. It is a well known situation that if redevelopment in this area would take place through market mechanism the squatter owners could get more flats than the local authority has already offered. It is not my objective to defend the rights of squatter owners here. Rather I would like to make it clear that compared to the market conditions, the local authority-led scheme were not in the benefit of the squatter owners.

However the real losers of this process are the tenants living in the area. In those already redeveloped areas tenants were forced out of the area without any compensatory policy and in the area where I conducted my research the tenants are under treat of displacement. Displacement has been shown one of the negative consequences of the redevelopment process in general and same applies to the Dikmen Valley. Even those who were squatter owners and therefore obtained a flat in the area, as was shown in other studies in the area, could not stay in the Dikmen Valley. For economic and cultural reasons, most flat owners sold their flats and moved to the other parts of the city.

Since the start of the Dikmen Valley Project there has been little resistance to the scheme and if there was it was not effective. Likewise my own findings in the field show that there is little dismay among the tenants who are under threat of displacement. If this is not surprising, nevertheless beg some explanation. I would like to make some point regarding this silence of the victims. In the first place most tenants did not see themselves as right owner in the area as tenants. Redevelopment has been taken as an inevitable process against which they could not resist. In my view, in order to resist such a scheme one requires to see himself as a right owner and this is not the case among the tenants. In my view part of the explanation why they were far away from claiming some right on the area lies in the fact that they are without organization and leadership. Let alone such an organization and leadership, there is little relationship among the tenants who live in the same area. It would be unrealistic to expect them to resist such a scheme under these conditions.

In addition to these factors, the following three interrelated aspects of urbanization (respectively in economic, policy-making, and societal terms) should be considered in order to explain the conditions of approval since they have been functioning for the legalization of

rent-seeking policies in Turkey without confronting with oppositions emanating from administrative bodies, academic circles, and civil society:

• the emphasis on the competitive city discourse and the need for foreign capital inflow;

• the economic and administrative opportunities of urban renewal and regeneration initiatives;

• the conceptualization of poverty as an external factor.

The competitive city discourse and the debates about the necessity of private sector involvement for the transformation of declining parts of cities provide the tools for legitimizing the rent-seeking policy initiatives. Although large capital holders' and international capital's interest in property development has been increasing since 1980s, their involvement as active actors has not reached to the levels as much as it is in advanced countries. Under these conditions, the emergence of the structured tendencies that have been criticized in these countries are tried to be encouraged by central and local states in Turkey. In other words, what can be defined as a bottom-up pressure -that is, the pressure of private sector for the initiation of market-led urbanization policies- does not exist in Turkey; indeed urbanization policies are organized to create an illusionary 'new wave of property development', which blurs the continuing discretionary relationships between the central and local governments and the clientalist relationships between the state and the private sector. Real estate market is de-regulated, but this has been conducted in a way that the direct involvement of certain actors is disguised as the legitimate face of the state.

'Production of urban land' is a widely mentioned problem in urbanization and urban planning literature in Turkey. Urban renewal and regeneration initiatives gain significance at that point since they enable the transfer of profitable urban lands from the *gecekondu* owners to large capital holders. Thus, what has been represented as a prescription for the problem of housing shortage is, in fact, an effort to transform the property relationships. When conceptualized in this way, the encouragement of the exchange-value relationships in previously unauthorized settlements can be considered as the initial step of a long-run plan. Boosting the urban land market through rent-seeking activities and disinvestment are other integral parts of this plan; initiation of policies for housing the urban poor surely is an obstacle in this project. The existing regulations encourage land speculation and the illusion

that has been created though the 'competitive city' discourse hides the fact that the ones who will settle in renewed areas will not going to be the white collar groups who are employed in the 'flourishing' tertiary sector jobs. The promotion of capital accumulation without productive activity will eventually create a vicious circle, which will exclude the groups whose resources are not sufficient to take part in speculative activities.

The conceptualization of poverty is also in line with the ongoing process. The image of the *gecekondu* dwellers as the unrighteous winners of the urban renewal activities hides the fact that the transformation of *gecekondu* settlements is beneficial for a limited segment of this group and giving a flat or paying a certain amount of money to *gecekondu* owners for their land is not sufficient for enabling their integration to the mainstream society. In addition, local governments' authorities provide them the opportunity to expropriate the lands of *gecekondu* dwellers without undertaking higher costs by special renewal and redevelopment projects and the mainstream society support their activities since the fetishized (and, to some extent, aesthetitized) conception of *gecekondu* settlements hides the social dimension of *gecekondu* formation and increases the distaste against the residents of these communities. Public opinion about poverty shows its face when a brutal crime takes place and approaching poverty as an external factor is visible in the language that is used in these debates. In addition, conception of social whole is limited to the solidarity relationships, which have been becoming more exclusionary since 1980s. The results of this situation in twofold: In *gecekondu* dwellers' point of view, the community-based struggle is defined in spatial terms and excludes the struggles in another community since resistance in community level is more extensively discussed within identity politics and what is conceived of as an adverse impact in one community could be beneficial for another. On the other hand, the mainstream society disapproves these community-based struggles since it mentally exclude the *gecekondu* dwellers and regard the *gecekondu* problem as a physical one that obstructs the urban economic development, rather than a reflection of political and economic imbalances in the socio-spatial configuration of built environment. In conclusion, *varoş* and *gecekondu* are the two concepts that are fetishized and used for spatializing the urban poverty and the complementary relationship between the space of the urban poor and the space of the others is neglected.

These conditions have provided a convenient environment for the execution of post-1980 de-regulatory policies by which, similar to the policies in advanced countries, financial responsibilities are transferred from the state to the individuals without fostering any

collective opposition. Given the existing deficiencies in provision of welfare services, it can easily be said that the rent-seeking approach to urbanization will reproduce the dual character of Turkish cities until it turns out to be something worse; after that point relying on the disadvantaged groups' experiences in taking care of themselves (which is regarded as an *a priori* characteristic of Turkish society not only by the society and the decision-makers but also by the interpreters of urban politics in Turkey) will be totally meaningless.

Representation of urban renewal projects as a solution for the problems of urbanization in Turkey is nothing but a strategy for eliminating the regulations about property development and provision of housing. They are celebrated by mayors -since urban renewal activities provide opportunities for representing themselves as heroes who please both *gecekondu* dwellers and the mainstream society-, property developers -who benefit from these projects without risking their capital, since their investment is guaranteed and advertised by the state itself-, and urban planners -since urban renewal projects stand as a short cut for by-passing the burden of regulations and creating an attractive outlook to cities without thinking too much about where the dislocated has gone. Since there is a consensus on the legitimacy of existing de-regulation, governments are going to enjoy the opportunity to enact new laws without suffering from formulizing 'exceptional' cases in law texts.

### 5.3. Reflections in Urban Politics: Future Prospects of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is one of the most active municipalities in term of conducting urban renewal projects. In fact, the primary role of urban renewal and regeneration initiatives in terms of being regarded as a 'successful municipality' can be observed in Ankara case. Along with transportation projects -like the underground railway project that expanded the debts of the municipality and criticized for the influence of electoral concerns on the decisions about its route; and the bridges that are criticized for attracting motor vehicles to the inner city and neglecting the pedestrian circulation-, transformation of unauthorized settlements into luxury residential housing and office areas are extensively employed for presenting the metropolitan municipality as the pioneer of constructing the Ankara of the 21$^{st}$ century. Among these projects, Ankara Northern Entrance Urban Transformation Project is the most promoted one. First implementations of this project have started by May 2005, though being protested by some of the *gecekondu* dwellers who demanded the delay of the demolishment until the completion of their new

flats. What is more striking is that the inhabitants also demanded job from the mayor (*Hürriyet*, July 14th 2005). The most widely mentioned aspect of this project is its significance for the status of Ankara, since it is going to be implemented through the 'protocol road' that connects the city with the airport. Its influence on the first impression of the foreign politicians and tourists about the capital city of Turkey contributes to the importance of the renewal activities in this area. The priority of this project has shadowed other implementations in Ankara. Being one of the most celebrated projects few years ago, Ulus Historical City Center Project has been forgotten for some time and is widely criticized by non-governmental organizations because of the reluctance of the metropolitan municipality to enlighten the ongoing ambiguity (*Hürriyet*, May 17th 2005). Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project is another renewal project that has lost its significance in the program of the metropolitan municipality in these days.

The new laws provided opportunity to Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for solving the problem of planning authority in urban renewal areas. The municipality immediately announced 9 'urban transformation and development areas' in 2004 (Activity Report of the Directorate of Master Planning, 2004) after the new Law of Metropolitan Municipalities and the new Law of Municipalities, and the number of these areas have risen to 15 by 2005 among which, Dikmen Valley 4th and 5th phases and the Eastern Side is one of them. However, it cannot be said that aspirations of the metropolitan municipality indicates how passionately it tries to solve the problems of the capital city. Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has no plan about the future of the 15 urban transformation and improvements zones (or 'municipal project areas'). Dikmen Valley Redevelopment Project is still waiting to be completed and there is no sign that other urban transformation projects (Samsun Road Urban Transformation Project, Konya Road Urban Transformation Project, Şentepe Urban Transformation Project) are in progress. The words of one of the city planners who work in the metropolitan municipality reveals the extent to which, the resources of the municipality are fully employed in the Northern Entrance Project: "We don't know what will be done in other urban transformation and improvement zones. Neither the Dikmen Valley, nor another project area is on the agenda. We are so much busy with the Northern Entrance Project that we don't even talk about other projects unless a land owner wants to get informed".

The highlighted urban transformation projects are providing possibilities to mayors to make their own promotion as it is seen in the Northern Entrance Project, which is presented as the gateway to the Ankara of the E.U. It is possible to foresee that the other urban transformation

and improvements zones will be the stars of the following election campaigns. It seems like these areas were chosen in order to gain the authority to prepare plans without the participation of the citizens and the district municipalities and without risking the involvement of market forces that have been accelerated by the new credit opportunities and started to shape especially the southern and western parts of Ankara in the last years. Considering the process in this perspective, the developmental activities that will be conducted in these areas have nothing to do with the municipality's vision of Ankara, if there is any.

### 5.4. Recommendations for Alternative Policies

In this study, the socio-spatial consequences of the reflections of post-1980 de-regulation in urban renewal and regeneration initiatives are discussed. Therefore, the brief recommendations about overcoming the adverse impacts of these initiatives should be regarded as a part of an alternative comprehensive social policy. Although it exceeds the scope of this study to put forward macro policies in detail, in order to develop an alternative policy proposal, it should firstly be understood that the solutions for the problems of urbanization cannot be produced from the urban scale. Claiming the reverse would limit the solutions to short-run action plans. Space-specific policies cannot diminish the struggle for housing and employment opportunity of the urban poor since the struggle of these populations and the problems in areas where they are concentrated are integral parts of the economic relationships. Without encouraging productive activities, the economic base of the cities cannot be developed and the private actors would be forced to involve in speculative activities, as it is the case today. The problem of housing the urban poor is never the problem of housing itself. Neglecting the primary role of the production relationships and their impacts in the organization of urban space in the post-Fordist period would lead one to develop naïve expectations from 'wishfully' awaited foreign capital investments, E.U. funds or tiny altruistic activities.

As an extension of these macro policies, there are certain insufficiencies of administrative structure that should be improved in order to use urban renewal and regeneration initiatives as an effective tool for tackling the urban problems in contemporary Turkish cities. Here is a list of certain recommendation that can be a convenient starting point:

• Urban renewal and regeneration initiatives should not be regarded as a method for by-passing the 'burden' of comprehensive planning schemes. Comprehensive urban plans must be the guidelines for the decisions about the locations of special project areas.

• In order to force local governments to concern about the disadvantaged participants of urban renewal projects, the policies that support decentralization and expand the authorities of local governments should also include certain regulations that increase their social responsibilities.

• Methods of mobilizing the rents that are created within and adjacent to the redeveloped areas for solving the housing problem of the dislocated inhabitants and transforming the unhealthy segments of cities -in which, rent gap is not widened enough for attracting the attention of private developers and local government- should be developed.

• Although the new regulations that give metropolitan municipalities the authority to establish urban transformation and improvements zones seems to be encouraging partial planning approaches, considering the acceleration of housing construction by the increasing competition between banks to attract home buyers -by offering generous credit opportunities-, this authority can also be regarded as an opportunity to control the production of unplanned environments if it is used with a concomitant effort to employ comprehensive planning approach.

• New authorities of metropolitan municipalities for conducting urban renewal and regeneration initiatives should not be used for excluding district municipalities from the planning process. Although the conflict between metropolitan and district municipalities are regarded as a problem, this conflict is one of the few control mechanisms in contemporary administrative system since the reflections of the debates between these two scales of government in public arena force policy-makers to discuss their policies with citizens, at least to some extent.

• If the role of urban renewal and regeneration projects for improving the economic base of the whole city is admitted, then the channels of participation in the decision-making processes of these initiatives should be opened not only for the ones who take part in the bargains for the conditions of expropriation but also for the rest of the citizens.

• Considering the extensive role of public-private partnerships, these corporations should function for realizing the principles of participation and transparency, rather than being design and sales offices who welcome only the 'clients'.

When focusing on the city of Ankara, the necessity of formulating regulations in line with the recommendations that are listed above can easily be observed. As we mentioned before, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is an active local government in terms of conducting urban renewal projects. However, the highlighted projects (like the Northern Entrance Project) conceal the urgency of dealing with the housing problem of urban poor who are becoming increasingly concentrated in certain segments of the city. In addition, outskirts of the city (especially southern and western parts) are experiencing an accelerated process of demolishment and construction without any comprehensive planning scheme. Aside from the necessary steps to deal with this tendency of unplanned development, metropolitan municipality should immediately focus on the problems emanating from the ambiguities in Dikmen Valley Project. Certain policy initiatives that should be followed in short-run can be listed as follows:

• The initial step that should be taken is to solve the problem of opacity since the inhabitants suffer from the reluctance of both the metropolitan municipality and Metropol İmar Inc. Co. to inform them about the future of the project. Activating the steering committee can be a convenient starting point for increasing the transparency.

• Rent aid should also be provided to the tenants in the valley, at least for a certain period of time, in order to assist this group in undertaking the costs of settling in a new community.

• The right holders should be encouraged to form cooperatives, just as it had been done in the earlier phases of the project. Increasing the consciousness of the inhabitants should be regarded as a positive step since it would accelerate the process by eliminating the potential problems emanating from the lack of information.

• The inhabitants of the valley must be informed about the ecological importance of the area. It was observed that some right holders are confused about the proposal of the municipality because of the more attractive offers of contractors. In order to avoid this confusion they must be assured about the difference between the project in the valley and an ordinary process of transformation that is shaped by market tendencies.

• In order to avoid a process of gentrification that was observed in the previous phases, right holders' demands about their flats and the green areas in the valley should be considered as a part of planning and design process. Making a research about the complaints of the right holders who had left the area can also be helpful.

• Since Dikmen Valley is not going to be used only by the inhabitants of the redeveloped area, the participation of the inhabitants of the surrounding areas should also be secured, unless the aim of the project is to construct a gated community in the middle of a high-density residential area.

• The opportunity to create harmony with the cooperative constructions in the Çankaya side of the valley is missed since they have already been in construction process and, as one construction firm owner says, the municipality is reluctant to inform the cooperatives about the future of the project. In order not to make the same mistake, the municipality should also consider the developments in the surrounding areas and inform the landowners about the forthcoming applications. If increasing the status (and thus, the rent) of the valley is one of the mostly promoted features of the project, the environmental quality of the whole area should be concerned.

Under these considerations, it is apparent that the highlighted urban renewal activities do not provide any solution for urban problems by themselves. Transformation of unhealthy segments of cities without putting forward any comprehensive planning schemes that concern about the housing opportunities of the dislocated inhabitants during the reorganization of space, will eventually create 'poverty pockets' in other parts of cities in which, deterioration is accelerated because of the concentration of urban poor. Discouraging the property ownership and giving priority to use-value are the primary policy alternatives for the existing urbanization policies. These policies should be complemented by providing education and employment opportunities to *gecekondu* populations. Unless the current role of urban space in capital accumulation is transformed, physical transformation of space would not bring about the integration of these groups to mainstream society. The possible outcomes of such a failure can be observed in the suburban riots in France whose echoes are extensive in these days even in the mainstream media. Although French context largely differs with its social and historical specificities, the underlying reason of these movements is the lack of enthusiasm in French policy-makers to diminish the exclusion of a particular

segment of society. Relying on the support of the urban poor for the existing government (but not precisely the government policies) does not provide a safety belt for a potential urban crisis. It should be noted that the author of this text denies any position that stands against community-based movements or social upheavals if collective opposition is the only way for developing the consciousness of policy-makers and the supporters of the existing de-regulatory policies about social phenomena.

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