

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LAW OF  
CAUSALITY IN KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY IN KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON***

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The main concern of the thesis is the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality and to investigate how Kant makes a room for freedom. Kant, firstly, in “Analytic”, constitutes the conditions of knowledge upon which the objective validity of the law of causality entirely rests. This process of constitution also determines the limits of experience. On the other hand, Kant, in “Dialectic”, postulates freedom as a noumenal cause together with the law of causality. Transcendental freedom, in this case, is a problematic concept which transcends the limits of experience, as it seems to destruct the unity of experience. However, Kant gives up neither the law of causality nor the idea of freedom, but rather he insists upon the idea that they can exist together without contradiction by asserting the distinction between phenomena and noumena as different grounds on which these

two different types of causalities rest. According to Kant both are indispensable, as the former is necessary for the knowledge and the latter is absolutely needed for morality. In this context this thesis aims to explain the objective validity of natural causality which is proved in Second Analogy and the transcendental ground of the idea of freedom which is established in the solution of Third Antinomy in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. And it is discussed whether Kant's solution of this issue is satisfactory and legitimate or not.

Keywords: Second Analogy, Third Antinomy, Transcendental Freedom, The Law of Causality, Understanding, Reason

## ÖZ

### KANT'IN *SAF AKLIN ELEŞTİRİSİ*'NDE NEDENSELLİK YASASI BAĞLAMINDA ÖZGÜRLÜK SORUNU

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Bu tezin temel ilgisi özgürlük ile doğadaki nedensellik arasındaki bir arada varolabilme problemi ve Kant'ın özgürlüğe nasıl yer açtığını incelemektir. Kant öncelikle “Analitik”te, nedensellik yasasının nesnel geçerliliğini dayandırdığı bilginin koşullarını kurar. Bu kurma süreci aynı zamanda deneyimin sınırları belirler. Ancak diğer yandan Kant “Diyalektik”te doğadaki nedensellik yasası ile beraber, numenal bir neden olarak özgürlüğü de öne sürer. Bu durumda, deneyimin birliğini ortadan kaldırdığı için deneyimin sınırlarını aşan aşkınsal özgürlük problemlili bir kavramdır. Ancak Kant ne doğadaki nedensellik yasasından ne de özgürlük idesinden vazgeçer, bunun yerine bu iki farklı nedenselliğin birbiriyle çatışmadan bir arada varolabileceği konusunda ısrar eder. Bunu yaparken de numen ve fenomen ayrımını öne sürer, böylelikle bu iki nedensellik farklı zeminlere uygulanabilir. Kant'a göre,

bu iki tip nedensellik de vazgeçilmezdir, çünkü nedensellik yasası bilgi için gerekli iken, özgürlük idesi ahlak için zorunludur. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma İkinci Analoji’de kanıtlanan doğadaki nedensellik yasasının nesnel geçerliliğini ve üçüncü antinominin çözümünde kurulan özgürlük idesinin aşkınsal zeminini açılmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada ayrıca bu sorunla ilgili olarak Kant’ın çözümünün başarılı ve meşru olup olmadığı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İkinci Analoji, Üçüncü Antinomi, Aşkınsal Özgürlük, Nedensellik Yasası, Anlama Yetisi, Akıl

To Metin and Gülşen Özdoyran



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“... I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for  
*faith.*” KANT [CPR B xxx]

## **CHAPTER I:**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Kant's main concern, in his great work *Critique of Pure Reason*, is the question "how metaphysics is possible as a science". And this question necessarily carries us to another issue, "what can we know?". There are two main reasons which persuaded Kant to deal with these troublesome issues or, in Kant's own words, though he uses this phrase only to indicate Hume's influence on him, two matters "awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers"; his discovery of antinomies and Hume's criticism about causality.

Kant, in the chapter "Transcendental Analytic", specifically in the section Second Analogy, endeavors to establish causality, which lost its consideration due to Hume's criticism, as a necessary and universal law of nature. As a response to Hume's criticism of causality and as an answer to the question how metaphysics is possible, Kant proposes "synthetic a priori knowledge". According to Kant, the point which Hume failed is also his ignorance of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Only type of knowledge to render the concept of causality possible as a universal law of nature is synthetic a priori knowledge. A priori or pure, in this context, is a crucial term for Kant's system and means containing nothing from experience. For Kant, what is a priori is universal and necessary. Therefore, the criterion for knowledge to

be a priori is universality and necessity.<sup>1</sup> Namely, it is universal and necessary if and only if it is a priori. Therefore, it follows that the solution can only be synthetic a priori judgment. For, it is necessary and universal due to its a priori character, and at the same time it is related to experience and extends our knowledge, as it is synthetic. Kant says that all knowledge begins with experience but it does not follow that, all knowledge arises from experience.<sup>2</sup> The main difference between “Transcendental Analytic” and “Transcendental Dialectic”, that is between understanding and reason, will be that it is legitimate to produce such synthetic a priori judgments for understanding but not for reason in its theoretical sense.

What Kant proves in the Second Analogy is that everything in nature, without exception, is determined by the law of causality. In other words, everything can be conceived only under the relation of cause and effect. However, without a deep analysis, this assumption as a rule makes no sense. In order to explain it we have to explain how the unity of experience is possible. In Kantian sense this question is also equal to how experience is possible. For, according to Kant experience is possible only as a unity. And only the structure of our understanding can provide us with this unity. Therefore, when Kant explains our knowing process, he, at the same time, could show the conditions under which the experience or the unity of experience is possible. This is the case because Kant inverts the relation between object and subject in the sense that objects, in so far as they are objects of possible experience, must conform to our forms of understanding. Kant describes this radical

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<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Kant *Critique Of Pure Reason* 1965, B 4

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* B 1

transformation as Copernican Revolution. By this way, the laws of nature become nothing but the laws of understanding and the limits of understanding imply the limits of experience.

Kant divides *Critique of Pure Reason* into two main parts: “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” and “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”. However, according to the most of interpreters of Kant, two main divisions should be “Transcendental Analytic” and “Transcendental Dialectic” which are subsections of “Doctrine of Elements”. Kant deals with the matter how metaphysics is possible as a science in “Analytic”. Consequently, in doing so he also concerns with how the unity of experience and synthetic a priori judgments are possible in this division.

Thus, Kant deals in “Analytic” with the structure of understanding, in other words the structure of theoretical reason, as a ground of the unity of experience and of synthetic a priori judgments. After postulating space and time as pure forms of intuitions in “Transcendental Aesthetics”, he explains the elements which constitute this structure of understanding. These elements are concepts, judgments, synthesis and also imagination and consciousness. Kant argues that concepts are necessary conditions of experience in the sense that merely by concepts we can think of objects which are given to us by pure forms of intuitions. In this sense, concepts and pure intuitions are strictly related each other. By only intuitions or by only concepts it is not possible to produce knowledge. What gives the content of concepts is the

sensibility. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, understanding has a power to judge. Kant defines understanding as the faculty of making judgment by means of concepts. And also he calls judgment the faculty of unity. To employ concepts is to make judgment. When we perceive, for example, that two events occur successively, then we judge that A causes B, or if A, then B. Therefore, without judgment, it is not possible to provide the unity. Judgment, in this case, is also necessary for experience. But in order to produce unity, that is synthetic unity in knowledge, we have to also make a synthesis produced by imagination. And finally, these operations of understanding necessarily require a consciousness. Namely, in order to produce knowledge, they must occur in a consciousness.

In “Transcendental Deduction”, Kant attempts to show the objectivity in order to employ categories by saying that without concepts experience would be impossible. It is important to realize that the causality as a pure category of understanding is not derived from experience; on the contrary it renders experience possible. And in the case of Analytic, concepts can only be applied to experience, or to what is given in pure intuitions. In other words, categories of understanding permit only empirical employment. By this way, understanding is limited by sensibility not to pass beyond experience.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* A 51



Hence, in Kantian system, in the structure of the understanding every element that constitutes this structure is strictly related to each other, like that the questions “how the unity of experience possible”, “how synthetic a priori judgments are possible” and “how the concept of causality as a universal law of nature is possible” presuppose each other. If one of these elements were omitted, the unity of experience would be vanished. That means experience would be impossible for us. The arguments of Analytic, therefore, plays an important role for two reasons: firstly, as we have seen, the objective validity of the concept of causality as a universal law is established in this division, and secondly in the “Third Antinomy”, while Thesis asserts that to accept the law of causality as the only form of causality is self-contradictory, the main argument of Antithesis is that freedom as a second type of causality is not self-contradictory but damages the unity of experience.

In “Dialectic”, on the other hand, Kant aims to criticize dogmatic metaphysics and attempts to show the points it failed. In doing so, he explains the structure of reason itself and its ideas. It is very nature of reason to employ the categories beyond experience, which is strictly forbidden in Analytic, by means of principles. Since, an idea is a necessary concept of reason in which no corresponding object can be given in experience, to use them in the theoretical ground in order to determine the objects of experience gives rise to what Kant call “Illusion”. Furthermore, as understanding is the faculty of employment of concepts and concepts must be applied to what is given by sensibility, that is concepts must always demand its object in experience, understanding produces only “conditional” knowledge. In other words, the unity of experience is necessarily provided by “this condition”. On the other hand, reason, by its nature, always demands the unconditional by attempting to unify all conditionals

in order to reach “absolute totality”. Reason concerns only with concepts and judgments, not with intuitions, whereas understanding concerns with concepts, judgments and also intuitions in order to produce knowledge. Therefore, it follows that reason does not relate to objects but to understanding alone. In this way, reason always aims to extend itself beyond experience. This demand of reason conflicts very clearly with the unity of experience provided by understanding. While the necessary elements of the unity of experience, such as the concept of causality, are only derived from understanding, the idea of freedom belongs to reason alone. Furthermore, ideas of reason, freedom also, do not have, unlike concepts of understanding, any objective validity.

Kant presents the notion “freedom” for the first time in Thesis of Third Antinomy as an idea of reason in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this Antinomy, Kant regards freedom as a second type of causality together with the law of causality. As a solution of this antinomy, Kant suggests that freedom and the law of causality can be compatible in the sense that while freedom performs in the noumenal world, the law of causality reigns in the phenomenal world. Yet, this assumption involves some troublesome issues. In order to overcome these issues, Kant postulates some terms, such as “true cause”, “sufficient cause”, “infinity”, “completeness”, “first beginning”. These terms, however, turn this issue into a more obscure situation rather than serving a solution. As a result of all these reasons, the chapters in which Third Antinomy and its solution are discussed are the longest parts of *Critique of Pure Reason*. (For the same reason, the second chapter of this thesis is longer than others.) Kant cannot abandon the law of causality, because without it experience is not

possible, but he, at the same time, does not reject the possibility of the idea of freedom (though it contradicts with the unity of experience) because without it morality is not possible. This contradiction between second analogy and the solution of third antinomy, in other words between two reasons which awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, that is the tension between freedom and the law of causality is the main issue of this thesis. It can also be expressed in different ways; it implies also a contradiction between conditional and unconditional or a tension between understanding and reason or a tension between “Analytic” and “Dialectic”. The process of setting the natural causality as a universal law and the process of setting the freedom as an idea of reason are the periods which completely exclude each other. The former is located in “Analytic” which is the land of truth, whereas the latter in Dialectic which is the land of illusion. However, although the process which freedom is established contradicts the unity of experience, still he treats the product of this process, freedom, as necessary, and argues that freedom and natural causality can stand together without contradiction in the solution of the Third Antinomy by ignoring its process. And also the questions which *Critique of Pure Reason* deals with are so interconnected, this makes it difficult to solve these problems. My aim is to investigate these processes and how Kant attempts to reconcile them despite the difficulties. Kant admits, in his *Reflexionen*, that all difficulties of metaphysics result from the reconciliation of empirical principles and ideas.

In this way, in the first chapter of this thesis I will deal with “Analytic” and focus specifically on the faculty of understanding as providing the ground for the concept of causality and “Second Analogy”. While doing so, I will try to explain the elements

of understanding and how the unity of experience is granted with these elements, such as space and time as pure intuitions, categories as the pure concepts of the understanding, judgments as the faculty of unity, imagination and consciousness and how this unity of experience provides the objective validity of the concept of causality as the universal law of nature. Therefore, in *Analytic*, specifically in “*Analytic of Concepts*”, I will deal with what Kant call “*quid facti*” with reference to “*Metaphysical Deduction*”, and then deal with “*quid juris*” with reference to *Transcendental deduction*. After doing that, I will attempt to explain the *Schematism* and *Analytic of Principles* to which *Second Analogy* belong.

In the second chapter I will focus on the “*Dialectic*” and reason as a ground of the idea of freedom and also *Third Antinomy*. In the first section of this chapter the source of the problem is the reason’s demand for the absolute totality and its search for the unconditioned in order to provide this totality. And this demand of reason which cannot be satisfied by the resources of understanding but by its ideas of reason results in an illusion. By this way I will try to specifically investigate the difference between reason and understanding. While doing so I would also have shown the difference between rules of understanding and principles of reason.

In the second section, I will mainly deal with the ideas of reason and attempt to explain the sources of these ideas such as dialectical inferences. In the context of reason’s twofold use; real and logical use, I will introduce the distinction between constitutive use of ideas and regulative use of ideas. And I will also attempt to explain the problematic relation between the ideas of reason and concepts of

understanding. Since our main concerns are freedom and causality, I will only focus on the cosmological ideas. This section and the previous section also will help us to conceive how antinomies appear. The dialectical inferences of the cosmological ideas give rise to antinomies.

And in the third section I will deal with these issues. I will briefly mention the notion “antithetic” in order to explain the position of antinomies. In this section we will see that in the case of antinomies reason demands an absolute totality of series of conditions for any given appearance. Why reason demands such a totality is to provide completeness and to reach unconditioned. And demand for the unconditioned or totality of the series necessarily requires synthesis. But we will see that this type of synthesis is completely different from the synthesis of understanding. This type of synthesis will necessarily carry us to another notion; regression. It will be crucial to comprehend different types of regression; dynamical and mathematical. Its importance lies entirely on the fact that by these different types of regressions it will be possible to assert different solutions for the antinomies. Namely, in the case of first and second antinomies which are mathematical, neither thesis nor antithesis can be true whereas in the case of third and fourth antinomies which are dynamical, both thesis and antithesis can be true. In this context, I will attempt to explain the difference between mathematical and dynamical antinomies. The former are only homogeneous whereas the latter are heterogeneous. This distinction plays a very important role in the solution of the Third Antinomy in the sense that since heterogeneity permits an intelligible element together with empirical, it allows us to postulate freedom as an intelligible cause. In the first subsection I will

mainly focus on the arguments of thesis and antithesis of the Third Antinomy and the relations between the notions “explanatory”, “sufficiency”, “true cause” and “first beginning” will be explained. And in the context of thesis and antithesis I will try to explain how the unconditioned is possible as finite and infinite. And finally in the second subsection I will deeply concentrate on the distinction between phenomena and noumena as the solution of the Third Antinomy. In the beginning of this part, I will attempt to explain Kant’s view which he argues in the chapter “The Ground of The Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena”. This chapter is also important in the sense that it provides a way to pass from Analytic to Dialectic in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here, we will meet the obscurity of these terms and in order to overcome this obscurity I will refer to some interpreters’ comments. The obscurity mainly arises from the fact that it is not possible to decompose Kant’s critical and pre-critical views about this issue in this chapter. In this context, I will mention the distinction between empirical and transcendental employment of concepts and the problem of his use of the term “transcendental object”.

Thirdly, and finally, in the last chapter I will be discussing of the solution of the Third Antinomy and present the discussions on the compatibility of freedom and natural law of causality, and the exposition and the solution of the Third Antinomy. In doing so, I will refer to some important interpreters of Kant, such as Allison, Kemp Smith, Ewing, Wood, Beck, Harris and Perry.

**CHAPTER 2:**  
**HOW KANT PROVIDES THE OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE CONCEPT**  
**OF CAUSALITY AS A UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE ON THE**  
**FOUNDATION OF THE UNITY OF EXPERIENCE**  
**(UNDERSTANDING AS THE GROUND OF CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY)**

**2.1. Transcendental Aesthetics**

To explain how synthetic a priori is possible or how the concept of causality (*kausalitat*) is objectively valid, there is a crucial point to be explained, that is space and time as pure intuitions. These two questions are internally related to each other. Once we explain how synthetic a priori is possible, this also explains how causality is objectively valid. In “Transcendental Aesthetics” section Kant concerns himself with intuitions (*Anschauung*) and he aims to give an answer to the question how pure mathematics is possible, or, how mathematics is possible as both synthetic and a priori. It is crucial to apprehend what pure intuition means in order to understand how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. To say that some intuitions are pure, that is a priori, or there are some pure components in the sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) is to say that some judgments which are derived from experience still assume an a priori component.

Kant also in *Prolegomena* argues that if space and time were not pure forms of sensibility, we could not talk about the precise of them.<sup>4</sup>

First of all, Kant asserts that mind (*Geist*) has two kinds of capacities, that are sensibility and understanding (*Verstand*). “Sensibility” is a ‘receptive’ capacity (*Fähigkeit*) whereas “understanding” is a ‘conceptual’ capacity. Kant says that the object can be only through a certain affection of the mind.<sup>5</sup> Receptivity can be defined as that we are affected by objects or objects are given to us. Hence, sensibility can be also defined as the faculty of receptivity. Therefore, it must be said that intuitions are related to the sensibility. On the contrary, as we shall see, concepts (*Begriff*) are related to understanding. Moreover, all intuitions we think must be given by means of sensibility and sensibility provides us intuitions; and intuitions provide us appearances (*Erscheinung*). Kant says that;

“Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions*; they are *thought* through the understanding, and from the understanding arise *concepts*. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.”<sup>6</sup>

What is more, it can be said that since the mind is not active in the process of sensibility, sensibility is passive capacity of mind due to “receptivity”. Although sensibility relates to experience, Kant claims that there are two types of intuitions:

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<sup>4</sup> Immanuel Kant *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* 1997, p.42

<sup>5</sup> Immanuel Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* 1965, A 19

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* A 19



empirical and pure intuitions. He accepts space and time as pure intuitions or pure form of intuitions. That means, space and time cannot be derived from experience, on the contrary, they are conditions which render experience possible. All experience is possible only through space and time.

Therefore, all objects we perceive must be in space and time. In other words, we can intuit objects only provided that they are in space and time. Space and time are the subjective condition of experience, but it does not mean that space and time do not have objective validity. According to Wilbur and Allen, the 'objective' means "permanent" and the 'subjective' means "impermanent" in Kantian sense, whatever their origins are.<sup>7</sup> On the contrary, space and time have an objective validity, because they are "pure" intuitions. That is, space and time are universal and necessary conditions of experience. Subjective condition means that space and time do not belong to external world. Kant asserts that "space and time as pure intuitions are empirically real and transcendently ideal." That means, we can know an object only in so far as it is in space and time but space and time do not have independent existence apart from subject.

### **2.1.1. Time**

To comprehend Kant's approach to causality, it is crucial to understand time as a pure form of intuition. Namely, the term "temporal order" is a crucial term in case of

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<sup>7</sup> J. B. Wilbur, J. H. Allen *The Worlds Of Hume and Kant* 1967 p.115

explaining the Second Analogy with respect to causality. Temporality is also essential term, first, to comprehend Kant's argument in "Dialectic" on the assumption that reason (*Vernunft*) demands the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance in case of Antinomy and second to understand the principle of reason by asserting that if the whole series of conditioned is given, then the unconditioned is also given.

Moreover, "event" is "temporally" related by such terms "before", "after" (in the Second Analogy), and "at the same time" (in the Third Analogy). In the same way with the proof of how the concept of space is pure intuition, if Kant proves that time is a priori form of intuition and it is necessary condition to experience, then the crucial part of legitimacy of objectivity of causality will be demonstrated.

In the section of "Metaphysical Exposition of The Concept of Time", Kant argues that time is not an empirical concept which is derived from experience, "for neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our perception, if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them *a priori*."<sup>8</sup> It is not possible to derive the concept of time by abstraction of which is given to us through sensibility, on the contrary what renders sensibility possible is the a priori intuition of time. Time is also a necessary component to intuit objects. In addition to that, some principles, such as causality, belong to temporality. For example, in order to judge "every change has a cause (*Ursache*)", according to Kant, we must have the a priori intuition of time.

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<sup>8</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 46

“The concept of alteration, and with it the concept of motion, as alteration of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time; and that if this representation were not an *a priori* (inner) intuition, no concept, no matter what it might be, could render comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, that is, of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for instance, the being and the not being of one and the same thing in one and the same place.”<sup>9</sup>

To make this explanation clear, we must mention some properties of time. Firstly, Kant assumes that time, unlike space, has only one dimension. That is, it moves in one and only one direction. Secondly, Kant continues, different points in time cannot be simultaneous but must follow one after and another. Therefore, according to these principles, it must be said that in the concept of causality (in the Second Analogy), as we shall see, the temporal order between two events must be necessary and objective.

To sum up, time is a necessary condition of perceiving objects for us and it is an *a priori* form of intuition, that is necessary and universal, and time has only one dimension and the objects can only be perceived in time and space. These properties of time and, as we shall see, other functions or rules of the understanding, such as categories, judgments, synthesis, consciousness, will provide us the conclusion that the temporal order of events must be necessary and objective. These principles of time cannot be derived from experience, since experience gives neither universality nor necessity. Kant says; “If, however, the condition be added to the concept, and we

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* B 48

say that all things as appearances, that is, as objects of sensible intuition, are in time, then the proposition has legitimate objective validity and universality *a priori*.”<sup>10</sup>

Although, space is only pure form of all *outer* intuitions, that is, it only gives us a priori condition of outer appearances<sup>11</sup>; another important property of time is that it is pure form of our *inner* sense together with outer sense. Therefore, it cannot be a determination (*Bestimmung*) of appearances. This property of time is important to understand how Kant constitutes the concept of “self-consciousness”.

In addition to that, Kant argues, time is not a discursive, or what is called a general concept. Different times are parts only of one and the same time.<sup>12</sup> Time is not a general concept, because the relation of time is something like the relation which is between whole and parts. Different times cannot be put under the concept of time, since, as Kant said, different times are already parts of the same time. Whereas, in the concepts, when we say that, for example, “there is a cat”; different cats can be put under the general concept of “a cat”. Different cats are not parts of the one and the same cat. In the conceptual relation, the relation is not the relation between whole and parts. Therefore, it must be said, there is only “one” time, although there are different parts of time. Bennett explains;

“When we say that there is only one time, according to Kant, we are not saying of general concepts of time that it has only one instance. We are not

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* B 52

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* A 34

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* B 47

dealing with general concepts at all, because time is not descriptive expression but proper name. 'There is only one time' does not have the logical form of 'there is only one great German philosopher'; it is logically nearer to 'there is only one Immanuel Kant'. Similarly with 'there is only one time'.<sup>13</sup>

It is crucial to say there is only one time, because when Kant explains causality in the chapter *Analogies of Experience*, he will say that there are three modes of time: permanence, succession and coexistence. And, we have to know that these modes belong to only one and the same time. Deleuze argues that time is no longer defined by succession because succession concerns only things and movements which are in time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in another time, and must go to infinity.<sup>14</sup>

### **2.1.2. Space**

In the section "Metaphysical Exposition of The Concept of Space", Kant also asserts that space is not an empirical concept deduced from experience.<sup>15</sup> Space is not an empirical concept which we gain as a result of experience; rather without it no experience is possible. For space, like time, is a necessary condition of experience. Kant distinguishes space from time in respect of some principles. That is, space has

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<sup>13</sup> Jonathan Bennett *Kant's Analytic* 1966, p.63

<sup>14</sup> Gilles Deleuze *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of Faculties* 1995, p.26

<sup>15</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 38

tree dimensions and in space different points can be simultaneous whereas for time different points cannot be simultaneous but successive in time.<sup>16</sup>

In this way, he asserts that the possibility and unity (*Einheit*) of experience and the “exactness of objects”, as appearances but not as things in themselves is only possible by accepting the assumption that space and time are not derived from experience but they are the necessary conditions of our experience, that is, they are found in the subject as an a priori form.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, although some judgments relate to sensibility, they can still be pure, that is, universal and necessary. This will be main foundation of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. In this way, universal validity of the law of causality is partially granted.

To sum up, we will be able to talk about the certainty and objectivity of the content of external experience by means of pure intuitions –time and space- and other rules and the faculties of understanding. However, still to render the content of experience objectively valid and to provide the unity of experience, we have to see how pure physics is possible in “Transcendental Analytic”. Therefore, Kant says, if one does not agree this type of epistemology, then he cannot accept that there are some judgments *synthetic a priori*.

“Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things *a priori*, but by which we can know objects only as they *appear* to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves; and this assumption is

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* B 41

<sup>17</sup> Kant op. cit. 2002, pp.37-38

absolutely necessary if synthetic propositions *a priori* be granted as possible or if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand.”<sup>18</sup>

## 2.2. Transcendental Analytic

To begin with, in the chapter “Transcendental Aesthetics”, we said that there are pure intuitions and the objects we intuit must be in space and time. However, space and time are not sufficient conditions to obtain knowledge or the unity of experience. As we said, the mind has two capacities; receptive capacity, and thinking capacity. First, we intuit objects by means of sensibility (receptivity), and then we think of objects by means of concepts (spontaneity). Kant explains that in the *Transcendental Logic*,

“Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for representations), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is *given* to us, through the second the object is *thought* in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge.”<sup>19</sup>

Kant divides “Transcendental Analytic” into two books: “Analytic of Concepts” and “Analytic of Principles”. In the former he deals mainly with two issues; “quid facti” (question of fact) and “quid juris” (question of right). By quid facti he means deriving

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p.30

<sup>19</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 50 B 74

concepts of understanding from the forms of judgments and our employment of these concepts.

Intuitions and concepts have their source in different faculties of mind. The source of intuitions is in the faculty of sensibility while the source of concepts is in the spontaneity of understanding. According to Kant, every intuition must be based on “affection”, as we are affected by objects, whereas concepts of understanding are based on “functions” which mean “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation”. That means, for example, when we perceive a chair what our sensibility gives us is only a manifold of representations of this chair and by means of empirical concept of chair we can bring these different representations into a unity. Therefore, since sensibility is a passive capacity it provides us only with the manifold of representations, while since understanding is an active capacity it provides the unity of them. Hence, neither intuitions nor concepts are sufficient to produce knowledge and to provide the unity of experience by themselves. Knowledge is based upon the relation between intuition and concepts. The manifold of representations which is provided by sensibility is material for the concept of understanding. If these materials cannot be given, then the concepts would have no content. Concepts, therefore, provide “form” whereas intuitions give “content” or “matter” for these concepts.<sup>20</sup> Here, it would be helpful to point out the similarity between the function of understanding and of reason, in the sense that the former by means of its concepts reduces the large number of representations into one, the latter by means of its ideas reduces, as we will see in the

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* A 86



third chapter, the large number of concepts of understanding into the smallest number.

Furthermore, like intuitions, concepts can be both pure and empirical. Kant defines categories as pure concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to what is given by intuition. In the light of these explanations, for Kant, categories can only be applied to what is given by pure intuitions. That means, categories must relate to the objects of the phenomenal world. Therefore, since things-in-themselves are not in space and time, categories cannot be applied to them. What gives the content of these concepts is intuition.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, as we will see in the third chapter, while understanding works with concepts which must be related to their objects in experience, reason works with ideas (*Idee*) to which no corresponding objects can be given in experience. That means ideas are concepts without objects. Kant says that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”<sup>22</sup> What we gain externally about objects by means of pure intuitions must employ the categories. Pure concepts, such as causality, cannot be given through experience, because they are presupposed in experience. Therefore, it can be said that sensibility must conform to the concepts to produce knowledge and to provide the unity of experience. Kant assumes; “All experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a *concept* of an object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing.”<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* A 77

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* A 51 B 75

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* B 126

The function upon which categories rest, that is the function of unifying the manifold of representations, necessarily requires a synthesis which is provided by imagination. The manifold of representations are, as Hume mentioned, unconnected by themselves. Therefore, to bring representations into a unity is an act of the understanding, a synthesis. It is possible to say that categories can be seen as rules for thinking which we can apply to what is given by sensibility.

“But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*. By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical, but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time.”<sup>24</sup>

That is, spontaneity is the active power of the understanding, and this is the difference between sensibility and understanding. Sensibility adds nothing to experience but only takes the representations of objects in space and time. On the contrary, understanding has a capacity to give meaning to these representations and carry them up to the level of knowledge. For, understanding is spontaneous and capable of unifying the representations by applying its own concepts to them.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, understanding provides a unity by making a synthesis of representations of sensibility and this synthesis increases the content of judgments. As a result of this

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* A 77 B 103

<sup>25</sup> Susan Neiman *The Unity of Reason* 1993, p.64

process of synthesis, it is possible to have the knowledge of an object given through sensibility. In the “Dialectic”, Kant will assert that although pure concepts of understanding are concerned with this synthetic unity of representations, pure concepts of reason, that is ideas, are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general.

That the act of synthesis arises from the imagination does not mean understanding uses an associative way in synthesizing. That is, synthesis provided by imagination is neither non-systematic nor accidental. However, he emphasizes that the imagination is not sufficient to produce the synthesis by itself. The understanding also adds contribution in order to produce synthesis, that is, to obtain knowledge of an object.<sup>26</sup> Namely, to relate the synthesis to concepts is the function of understanding. According to Kant, that different representations are brought under one concept is a task of what Kant calls General Logic. On the other hand, that how to bring this pure synthesis of representations, not only representations themselves, under concepts is a task of “Transcendental Logic”. And, the second is the synthesis of the manifold which arises from the faculty of imagination.

Hence when Kant uses the word “imagination” he does not mean “association of ideas” as in Humean sense. For Hume, there are some universal principles in the process of imagination, which he calls “the principle of association of ideas”, and the idea of causality results from this principle of association.<sup>27</sup> In this sense, Kant also

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<sup>26</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 79

<sup>27</sup> David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* 1978, p.11

emphasizes that the Humean association cannot be source of the unity and he sees that association cannot provide objective validity.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, this synthesis provides us with the concepts of understanding and by this pure synthesis Kant understands that “which rests upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity”.

In the light of these explanations, it must be said that, when we receive that two events occur successively, what makes this sensibility meaningful is our pure concept of causality. At this point, in a sense Kant agrees with Hume’s view that causality cannot be derived from experience, even if we repeatedly perceive two events occur successively. However, according to Kant, what the crucial point here is that, when we perceive two successive events, the concept of causality is a priori added by understanding. Therefore, causality is not the association or habit of our mind as Hume asserted, rather it is a pure concept that is imposed by understanding a priori and it is a necessary element which provide the unity of experience. According to Kant, the concept of causality is not an accidental notion which we derive from experience; rather it is the necessary condition of experience. Without the concept of causality it is not possible to comprehend two events which occur successively are connected to each other under the law of causality, otherwise we could only comprehend temporal succession. As Hume also showed, causality cannot be comprehended by what is given by sensibility; on the contrary, we can comprehend what is given empirically as causally connected only by means of causality as a pure concept of the understanding.

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<sup>28</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 127

If there were no pure concepts, we would have only sense representations which are given by the sensibility, and it would be impossible to state their objectivity. Therefore, the concept of causality renders causal relation objectively valid. Just as space and time are necessary conditions which render experience possible, so pure concepts are necessary conditions to provide the unity of experience. This necessity of categories also implies objectivity; because for Kant objectivity is strictly related to necessity.

Furthermore, Kant defines the understanding as the faculty of making judgments by means of concepts.<sup>29</sup> For, the understanding is also the capacity to employ concepts, and to use concepts, according to Kant, is to make a judgment by means of concepts. Therefore, it can be said that using concepts and judging has the same meaning.<sup>30</sup> “The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a *judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an *intuition*; and this unity, we entitle the pure concepts of the understanding.”<sup>31</sup>

Thus, the main function of the judgments is to provide the unity. In other words, judgment is the faculty of unity. Although concepts do not have immediate relation to (the representation of) an object, they have a relation with some other representations of it. Judgment, in this case, is “the mediate knowledge of an object,

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* B 94

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* B 93

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* B 105

that is, representation of a representation of it”<sup>32</sup>. Every judgment has a concept and that concept includes various representations in it. Concepts, therefore, are the predicates of possible judgments. Moreover, judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations (*Vorstellung*) in a consciousness (*Bewusstsein*), are rules. These rules so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules *a priori*. At this point, Deleuze defines judgment as “a complex operation which consists in subsuming the particular under the general.”<sup>33</sup> However, Deleuze also argues whether the judgment is a faculty (*Vermögen*) or not. According to him, the judgment never consists in one faculty alone, but it consists in the harmony of different faculties. Judgment always implies several faculties and expresses the accord between them. For the understanding cannot judge by itself, the understanding can only use its concepts for judging. But this using implies an original act of the imagination and also an original act of reason. For Deleuze, why Kant speaks of judgment as if it were a faculty is to emphasize the originality of its act, the specificity of its product.<sup>34</sup>

Judgment is an essential point for Kant. In the beginning of chapter “Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant assumes that truth or illusion (*schein*) cannot be arisen from the faculty of sensibility, that means it cannot be found in the object, but from the judgment about object. And this point will be dealt with in the third chapter.

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* A 69

<sup>33</sup> Deleuze op. cit. p.100

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p.103

Sensibility, unlike judgments, cannot produce unity. What sensibility or pure intuitions give is only the manifold (*Mannigfaltige*) of representations. In the “Transcendental Aesthetics”, Kant says that space and time can only obtain a manifold of representations. Since sensibility is passive capacity of mind, it cannot unify the manifold of representations. Therefore, what unify them can only be judgments.

Briefly, without judgments, we have only representations. Judgments unify the representations of an object and by this way it becomes possible to regard them as an “object”. Kant defines object as a unification of the manifold representations in a concept, and this unification is provided by judgments. Thus, the notion of “judgment” and “object” are correlative. Judgment always has its object. In this way, we can say that, Kant establishes the connection between judgments and objects. Hume’s failure to understand the possibility of a priori concepts having objective validity is connected with the fact that in a real sense Hume recognizes no problem in how judgment relates to its object. For Hume, concepts are only “faint images of what is given in sensibility”.<sup>35</sup>

In the table of judgments, under the title of “relation”, Hypothetical refers to the causal judgments. A hypothetical judgment is a judgment of the form “if *p*, then *q*”. In addition to that, in the table of categories, under the same topic, we can see the category of causality. Kant gives us four main titles of categories: quality, quantity, relation and modality.

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<sup>35</sup> Arthur Melnick *Kant's Analogies Of Experience* 1973, p.47

### **2.2.1. Justification of The Use of Concepts**

#### **(Transcendental Deduction)**

According to Hume, as asserted in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, sensibility is of two kinds, which are representations and ideas. The difference between them consists in the degrees of force and liveliness. Furthermore, according to Hume, all reasoning and thinking are related to representations, that is, sense perception. For Hume, therefore, if there is a causal relation or necessary connection between two objects, it must be derived from sensibility or their representations.<sup>36</sup>

In this way, in Humean empiricism, the understanding does not have any power to produce knowledge except from sense representations. What Kant tries to show is that the understanding, in addition to the sensibility, has the power of some faculties. Some of them, as we saw in the “Transcendental Analytic”, are the faculty of judging, the faculty of unity and the faculty of concept, that is the capacity of possessing what is given by sensibility. And as we see now, the understanding is the faculty of producing synthesis. In order to overcome Humean skeptic view about causality, Kant has to make the importance of these faculties of understanding evident. Otherwise, he will not be able to prove the objective validity of causality. Namely, if he shows that the categories and the act of synthesis are necessary conditions of experience, then the objectivity of the concept of causality will have been provided. For, necessity is the criteria of being objectively valid. Kant, in *Prolegomena*, says that the objective validity and necessary universality are

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<sup>36</sup> Hume op. cit. p.155



equivalent terms.<sup>37</sup> Hume could not find this necessity, for this necessity cannot be derived from experience. However Kant will find it in the conditions of constructing object of the experience.

Until now, what Kant has explained is only the structure of categories and the employment of them. Hence, he has not proven the validity of using categories yet. In this chapter, Kant explains how the use of categories is legitimate, that means how it is a necessary condition of knowledge and of the unity of experience. In other words he tries to give the justification of the application of concepts. In this sense, what Kant has dealt with in “Metaphysical Deduction” (in “The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”) is “quid facti”. And now by transcendental deduction he deals with “quid juris”. For Kant, if he proves the fact that categories are the necessary conditions of experience, then he will have already proven the fact that using categories is legitimate. Since, categories are defined as pure concepts of understanding, that is, they do not borrow anything from experience, categories are subjective conditions of understanding. And although categories are not derived from experience, they must be applied to objects of experience. Kant formulates this issue as follows; “how *subjective conditions of thought* can have *objective validity*, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects.”<sup>38</sup> According to Kant, synthetic representations, that is, synthesis of representations in an intuition by means of a concept, and their objects can be connected each other; in other words can be in a necessary relation with each

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<sup>37</sup> Kant op. cit. 2002, p.49

<sup>38</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 90

other, in two ways: either the representation must be provided possible by the object, or the object must be rendered possible by the representation.<sup>39</sup> Namely, whether the object must conform to the forms of understanding or vice versa. The former results only in the empirical relation and in this case representation can never be pure, whereas the latter gives rise to the possibility for the way that the representation determines its objects *a priori*. In this way, if appearances conform to this condition of sensibility and understanding then representations can be conceived as an object and objects can be intuited and they can be thought by concepts. Therefore, they can be objects of experience in so far as they conform to such concepts. As Kant says, if only by concepts it is possible to think objects of experience, it follows that they refer by necessity and a priori to all objects of experience;<sup>40</sup> that is the objective validity of concepts rests on the fact that by them alone experience is possible. The categories must have their objective validity, for Kant, in the sense that the categories are the necessary elements in order to provide the unity of experience. Therefore, in order to point out the objective validity of the concept of causality, we have to show what conditions provide this objectivity to concepts. In other words, we have to show the *a priori* conditions or grounds which render experience possible. In the section *Transcendental Deduction*,

“Pure *a priori* concepts, if such exist, cannot indeed contain anything empirical; yet, nonetheless, they can serve solely as *a priori* conditions of a possible experience. Upon this ground alone can their objective reality rest. If, therefore, we seek to discover how pure concepts of understanding are

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* B 125

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* B 126

possible, we must enquire what are the *a priori* conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests.”<sup>41</sup>

Before explaining these *a priori* conditions, I would like to introduce Arthur Melnick’s view about this relation between the validity of concepts and their essential characteristics which render experience possible. According to Melnick,<sup>42</sup> the reason why the categories are the conditions of experience or “the condition of judgment about what is given by experience” is that only in this way categories have objective validity and only in this way can be justified. In this sense, Melnick formulates the relation between having objective validity and being condition of experience in an opposite way. While Kant derives the objective validity of categories from being the necessary condition of experience, Melnick attempts to derive the necessary conditions of experience from the objective validity of concepts.

Now, if we turn back to *a priori* conditions which make experience possible, we must again say that if every representation cannot be connected by synthesis of manifold, then the knowledge of an object would be impossible. In other words, it is clear that, knowledge is only possible provided that there are both receptivity and spontaneity. Receptivity cannot produce knowledge and the unity of experience by itself; rather it should be combined with spontaneity. For Kant, spontaneity is very crucial, in the sense that, it is a ground of threefold synthesis which must necessarily take place in every kind of knowledge; the first is synthesis of apprehension in

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* A 96

<sup>42</sup> Melnick *op. cit.* p.38

intuition, the second is the synthesis of reproduction in imagination and the third is the synthesis of recognition in concept.<sup>43</sup>

Firstly, in the section of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, all representations must conform to time, as it is necessary, a priori condition of all intuition. In addition to that, every representation contains in itself a manifold and the reason why we sense what is given to us as a manifold is that while the mind perceives the objects in time, in relation with time it distinguishes the representations of the one and the same object. And to turn this manifold into a unity of intuition, synthesis of apprehension in intuition is a necessary first step. Kant calls this act the synthesis of apprehension.<sup>44</sup> Such an apprehension is possible, if the different sense representations are combined or held together. If the manifold of the sense representations were not unified, the knowledge of an object would be impossible. Apprehension of manifold of representations is always successive. This point will be crucial to understand what Second Analogy tries to prove.

In the second case, the function of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination is that the imagination reproduces earlier sense representation, which has vanished. Therefore the synthesis of apprehension cannot be separated from the synthesis of reproduction.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 97

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* A 99

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* A 102

Thirdly and finally, in the section of the synthesis of recognition in concepts, Kant explains that in order to render experience possible, in addition to the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction, we must also need the synthesis of recognition, in the sense that these sense representations must also be capable of being recognized in a consciousness. For, Kant asserts “If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless.”<sup>46</sup> Therefore, consciousness is necessary to render synthesis possible. In this way, we come to the section of self-consciousness.

What we said so far about the judgments and the act of synthesis necessarily requires the notion of consciousness. For, only union of representations in “one” consciousness renders judgment possible. When we judge something, there is always a consciousness accompanies this judgment. And to be conscious of something means to unify the manifold of representations in a consciousness. To be conscious of an object is also to be conscious of “I”. Therefore, the object and the subject are strictly interrelated in case of consciousness. Thus, the unity of consciousness is necessary condition of experience and necessary to construct the object. And this also provides the objective validity and the unity of experience.

These threefold synthesis cannot be comprehended as different processes. They are, actually, different aspects of the same process. And without one of them, the unity of experience cannot be possible, the understanding cannot construct an object we

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* A 103

perceive or intuit. The notion of “object” reflects the unity of consciousness. Kant emphasizes;

“There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible.”<sup>47</sup>

This condition of unity of consciousness Kant calls the “Transcendental Apperception”. According to Kant, every thought or representation belongs to a subject, that is, no thoughts or representations can be by itself, but the representation “I think” must accompany every person’s thought. This representation is an act of spontaneity and it is the ground of all forms of judgment. This “I” is not an empirical consciousness, but it is the transcendental “I”, or what Kant calls “transcendental” or “pure” apperception. Hence, it can be said that transcendental apperception is also a necessary condition of experience. Deleuze emphasizes;

“My representations are mine in so far as they are linked in the unity of a consciousness, in such a way that the “I think” accompanies them...The object in general is the correlate of the “I think” or of the unity of consciousness; it is the expression of the “cogito”, its formal objectivation. Therefore the real (synthetic) formula of the cogito is; I think myself and in thinking myself, I think the object in general to which I relate a represented diversity.”<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* A 107

<sup>48</sup> Deleuze op. cit. p.54

This apperception also plays an important role in solution of Third Antinomy, in the sense that, in order to render freedom possible Kant, as we will see in the third chapter, makes a distinction between sensible and intelligible world and man (self) is able to belong to both intelligible and sensible worlds due to its character of pure apperception.

Another important point is that, in order to construct self-consciousness we need the object, since it is only possible through consciousness of other-than-self (That does not belong to self-consciousness.). Therefore, the object and consciousness are internally related. In this point, Melnick emphasizes that the categories are necessary for a structure of consciousness in which “the subject can distinguish himself from what he is conscious of”.<sup>49</sup>

Briefly, for Kant the synthesis of manifold necessarily presupposes transcendental apperception and to judge by means of concepts must be in a consciousness. Therefore in order to provide the unity of experience or to construct the object of experience is only possible by these *a priori* conditions. “The *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of object of experience...They are fundamental concepts by which we think objects...and have therefore *a priori* objective validity.”<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Melnick op. cit. p.44

<sup>50</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 111

What all we have explained until now in “Analytic of Concepts” can be brought into two titles: *quid facti* and *quid juris*. And now, in “Analytic of Principles” Kant explains the principles of understanding which give rules for the application of categories to what is given in sensibility. In this context, mathematical categories refer to “Axiom of Intuition” and “Anticipations of Perception”, whereas dynamical categories refer to “Analogies of Experience” and “The Postulates of Empirical Thought”. Kant firstly emphasized that understanding and judgment have their “canon of objectively valid and correct employment”, that is, their empirical employment. On the other hand, reason, as extends knowledge beyond the limit of experience, has transcendental employment which has no objective validity. The Analytic of Principles guide the judgment to apply the concepts of understanding, that includes the condition of *a priori* rules, to appearances, thus these principles will be a canon for only judgment.<sup>51</sup> That means, as Beck mentions, the principles of understanding supply synthetic *a priori* judgments. We will see that in the Second Analogy, through these principles, the concept of causality supply the principle “every event has a cause”. Kant expresses “the highest principle of all synthetic judgment” as follows: “Every object stands under necessary condition of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.”<sup>52</sup>

In the section “Analytic of Principles”, under the title “Of The Schematism of The Pure Concepts of The Understanding”, Kant tries to solve the problem of the application of categories. That means, “We must be able to show how pure concepts

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* A 132 B 171

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* A 158



can be applicable to appearances”. In the case of empirical concepts, there is no gap between a concept and an appearance to which the concepts categories applied. Since, concepts are homogeneous with their objects, that is, they are same kind; both of them are empirical. In the case of pure concepts, however, there is a gap between them, since categories are not homogeneous but heterogeneous with their objects. Namely, in this case a pure concept and an appearance are not of the same kind. Categories are pure whereas appearances are empirical. Therefore, for Kant, there must be a third element in order to remove this gap. This third element must be homogeneous with both the category and the appearance. And thus, “it makes the application of the former to latter possible”. This mediating element, regarding categories, must be pure and at the same time, regarding appearance must be sensible. Kant calls such an element *Transcendental Schema*.<sup>53</sup> And this transcendental schema must be time. Since time is the condition of the connection of representations it is homogeneous with the category. And at the same time, time is also homogeneous with appearance as it is condition to intuit appearance. “Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.”<sup>54</sup> Therefore, as freedom is noumenal causality, that is, it is not subject to the condition of time, the transcendental schema cannot be applied to it. In the case of the concept of causality, the transcendental schema is the succession of the manifold. That

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* A 138 B 177

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* B 178 A 139

means, the connecting of perceptions which follows one another according to a rule of time determination.<sup>55</sup>

When two events successively occur, this happens in accordance with the schema of the category of causality, that means determined according to a rule. For Kant, a “rule” means the representation of a general condition according to which something manifold can be arranged. The schema of the category of causality is expressed by the temporal succession, that means, the rule is about “the order of time” in this category. And the temporal succession is given by sensibility. In addition to that, according to Deleuze, the main function of imagination is to schematize by synthesis. Namely, the schema is temporally in order, to apply the categories to what is given by sensibility. It is crucial, therefore, not to confuse synthesis and schema in the imagination. Schema presupposes synthesis. On the other hand, “schema is a spatio-temporal determination which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and all times”.<sup>56</sup>

Finally, I would like to explain that the notions heterogeneity and homogeneity in “Analytic” are a little different from the same notions in *Dialectic*, specifically in Third Antinomy. Namely, in the case of schematism their meanings imply a difference between a concept and appearances, whereas in the case of Third Antinomy, as we will see in third chapter, imply different kinds of elements of the same causal chain.

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* A 145

<sup>56</sup> Deleuze op. cit. p.56

### 2.2.2. Second Analogy as the Proof of the Concept of Causality

In the chapter “The System of All Principles of Pure Understanding”, Kant emphasizes that the principles of pure understanding are judgments that are synthetic and a priori.<sup>57</sup> And like forms of judgments and schematism, the quantity, quality, relation and modality are four principles. Axioms of intuition relate to quantity; Anticipations of perception relates to quality, Postulates of empirical thought relates to modality; and finally Analogies of experience relates to relation. While first two principles are called mathematical principles by Kant, last two principles are dynamical principles. And this distinction also plays an important role in the solution of Third Antinomy. Since Kant treats the concept of causality in the analogies of experience, we shall chiefly investigate this chapter, specifically the Second Analogy. In the chapter “Analogies of Experience”, there are three analogies. And the principle of the analogies is that experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.<sup>58</sup> That is, the analogies are principles for the synthesis of the manifold with respect to time; they constitute the conditions of experience.

First of all, Kant says that there are three modes of time; *permanence* (in the First Analogy), *succession* (in the Second Analogy) and *coexistence* (in the Third Analogy). In this way, there must be three rules of all relations of phenomena in time, and these rules render experience possible. And the general principle of the

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<sup>57</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 148

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* B 218

three analogies depends on the necessary unity of apperception with reference to every possible empirical consciousness at every time.<sup>59</sup> These three modes of time cannot be derived from experience. On the contrary, to obtain them we have to employ synthesis of pure understanding. In this way, this synthesis of pure understanding is necessary condition for experience. Kant explains; “By these principles, then, we are justified in combining appearances only according to what is no more than an analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts.”<sup>60</sup>

In the Second Analogy, Kant tries to prove the principle of causality. What has to be proved he formulates as follows: “Everything that happens (begins to be), presupposes something on which it follows according to a rule.” In the B edition, this principle is that “all changes take place according to the law of the connection of cause and effect (*Wirkung*).” Namely, Kant has to prove the temporal order, or the objective sequence of objects in time. In order to be conscious of this objective sequence, according to Kant, we must have the concept of causality. In this sense, this notion of succession will be crucial component in the constitution of the principle of causality. Because, to be able to say that there is a causal relation between two events, there must be a necessary succession between them.

Beginning this chapter, we have to say that all possible perceptions depend on the synthesis of apprehension, and the apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* B 220

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* B 224

always successive. That is, the representations of the parts follow one upon another.<sup>61</sup> For, to render causal relation possible, the cause A, for example, must be antecedent the effect B. Namely, the imagination provides us with the connection of successive two events only in so far as one of them is antecedent to the other in time, because time itself cannot be derived from an object of experience. In this sense, we cannot know causal relation in empirical way, in other words we cannot derive the causality from the experience or from the objects themselves. On the contrary, the principle of causality renders experience possible.<sup>62</sup>

“Understanding is required for all experience and for its possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in making the representation of objects distinct, but in making the representation of an object possible at all.”<sup>63</sup>

In the beginning of the proof, for Kant, in order to regard something as phenomena, it must be “the object of consciousness”, and must be synthesized by imagination. Therefore mind produces the manifold of phenomena successively. In other words, Kant says that we call phenomenon objects in the sense that the phenomenon refers to an object. In addition, what we deal with is what is given by the sensibility, not the object itself. For, we are not able to know the thing-in-itself but we can only know the representations of objects. He does not deal with the nature of objects; he deals with our knowing process. He says that we always have to deal with our

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* B 234 and also B 243 A 198

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* A 201

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* A 199

representations only.<sup>64</sup> If we regard the things themselves as the phenomena, the unity of experience, and the principle of causality cannot be provided.<sup>65</sup>

In this sense, “transcendental” refers to the way that we know objects as a priori but not to what the object is. Hence, as we said often, this way that we know objects a priori includes some faculties; sensibility, category, judgment, synthesis, consciousness. Kant defines categories as *law*, since law means that the manifold *must* be arranged. But these laws (*Gesetz*) cannot be derived from nature; on the contrary nature must conform to these laws. In this sense, the universal laws of the understanding are also universal laws of the nature.<sup>66</sup>

Experience or knowledge of objects is possible only in this way. Therefore, it is simple that, only what conforms to these laws and appears in time, which is pure intuition, can be known. And provided that phenomena are in time and imagination synthesizes the manifold of representations which is successively given by sensibility, then our representations must be successive. In the chapter “General Nature of The Deduction” Kant says; “Things by themselves would necessarily possess their conformity to the law, independent also of any understanding by which they are known. But phenomena are only representations of things, unknown as to what they may be themselves.”

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* B 235 A 190

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* A 201

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* B 198 A 159

Therefore, phenomena are not things by themselves. And the solution of the compatibility of freedom and the natural law of causality lies entirely on this assumption and for this reason the distinction between phenomenon and the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*) will be mentioned deeply in the third chapter.

Furthermore, Kant distinguishes the apprehension of an object from the apprehension of an event. He emphasizes that every apprehension of an event is a perception which follows upon another.<sup>67</sup> The reason why Kant distinguishes them is to show that the subjective temporal succession is not identical with the objective temporal succession. In order to explain his point clearly, Kant gives the examples of “house” and “ship”. In the example of “house” the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house is successive. In this sense, in the example of a house, my perception can follow the sequence which is from the roof to the basement or from the basement to the roof. There is no necessity for its successive order in accordance with a rule, but rather order of representations are determined arbitrarily, that is, the sequence of apprehension of the manifold does not necessarily depend on the object but on the subject. In other words, it can be said that the order is determined subjectively but not objectively. Therefore, there is no necessity, that is objectivity, in this order or sequence.

“In the previous example of a house my perceptions could begin with the apprehension of the roof and end with the basement, or could begin from below and end above; and I could similarly apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition either from right to left or from left to right. In the series

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<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* A 192

of these perceptions there was thus no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin in order to connect the manifold empirically. But in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another a *necessary* order.”<sup>68</sup>

Kant gives the example of “ship” in order to explain the objective temporal order. In this example, when I look at a ship moving along a river, firstly I perceive the ship at point A and then at point B. That I receive the representations in a certain order does not depend on me, unlike as I can determine the order of the representations of the house. The sequence A-B in the case of the house is subjective and arbitrary, but in the case of the ship, it is objective and necessary in the sense that there is no possibility for perceiving the representations at the point B, before perceiving the representations at the point A.<sup>69</sup>

Therefore, the temporal order between A and B is objective, that is necessary. The main difference between these examples is that the house is not an event, but an object; on the other hand the moving ship is an event. Namely, it happens in accordance with a rule. This rule, according to Kant, makes the order of the successive perceptions necessary.<sup>70</sup> Without the rule, every event has its cause, we cannot distinguish not an event from an event.<sup>71</sup> Further, this rule is a necessary condition to distinguish a subjective sequence from an objective sequence.

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<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* A 192 B 238 A 193

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* A 198

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* B 238 A 193

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* A 196 B 242 A 197



Another important point is that, when something happens we always presuppose that there is an antecedent event which has caused it to happen. Accordingly, the following must necessarily come immediately after the preceding according to a rule. That means, when we see an event we can *a priori* know that there is a cause. Therefore, subject has the causality as a pure concept in the mind. We construct the causal relation through experience, however this does not mean that causality is derived from experience. In this case, Kant means that though it is not possible to produce the principle of causality from experience, only experience can give what the cause is. If the causality was not known *a priori*, and it was derived from experience, then there would be no necessity and also the objectivity of causality. Therefore, the concept of causality is necessary for the unity of experience.

By means of understanding it becomes possible to put the events into temporal order in phenomenal world, and for this reason understanding is a necessary condition of all experience;

“...the appearances must determine for one another their position in time, and make their time-order a necessary order. In other words, that which follows or happens must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the preceding state. A series of appearances thus arises which, with the aid of the understanding, produces and makes necessary the same order and continuous connection in the series of possible perceptions as is met with *a priori* in time...”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* A 200

The “necessity” of the relation of cause and effect in the case of temporal order is nothing but the necessary synthesis of the understanding. Kant’s main claim here is that finding a connection between cause and effect is not arbitrary, but this relation is provided by a universal rule which arises from the understanding itself. Moreover, for Kant, the synthesis of manifold by imagination is always successive.<sup>73</sup>

“Thus the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) according to which the subsequent event, that which happens, is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something preceding in conformity with a rule -in other words, the relation of cause to effect- is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments, in respect of the series of perceptions, and so of their empirical truth; that is to say, it is the condition of experience.”<sup>74</sup>

In this sense, Kant assumes that either the principle of causality is objectively valid because it is a necessary condition of our experience, or the objective validity of our empirical judgments can be provided through this principle of causality. That is, objective temporal sequence indicates the principle of causality and the causality indicates the objective temporal sequence of the objects. Because a temporal sequence is objective when it is determined by a rule or law that is the principle of causality. Therefore, it can be deduced that the objective sequence is identical with the principle of causality.

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<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* A 201

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* A 202

Finally, as we said, all laws of nature, without exceptions, must conform to the laws of understanding, they are the universal laws of the understanding. Only through the rules and laws, which are a priori in the understanding, the laws of nature can be grasped as the laws of nature. “Thus, the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature.”<sup>75</sup> What Kant calls dogmatic metaphysics failed in the sense that causality is not a category that belongs to the subject or the understanding as a priori. The causality, in the dogmatic metaphysics, belongs to the objects themselves, not belongs to the subject. Hence, Kant attempts to prove “the principle of causality”, not “empirical causal law”. However, in the Third Antinomy, we will see that Kant seems to conflict with himself by asserting that the natural law of causality which is proved in the Second Analogy is not the only the form of causality. There can be freedom as another type of causality which has the power of beginning a new state spontaneously. And freedom as the second type of causality can be seen as an illusionary element which damages the unity of experience, because freedom is the idea of reason or necessary concept of reason, which do not correspond to any possible object in experience.

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<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* A 127

**CHAPTER 3:**  
**HOW KANT DERIVES FREEDOM AS AN IDEA OF REASON AND**  
**ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE FREEDOM WITH THE LAW OF**  
**CAUSALITY**

**3.1. Transcendental Dialectic**

**(Reason as a Source of Transcendental Illusion)**

In the second chapter I have tried to show how Kant provides the objective validity of the concept of causality as a universal law of nature on the foundation of the unity of experience. In doing so, I have already explained the structure of understanding as the ground of the concept of causality. Therefore, all what we have explained until now takes place in “the territory of pure understanding”. And Kant defines “the territory of pure understanding”, in which we can find the crucial components which constitute the structure of pure understanding, as “the land of truth”.<sup>76</sup> Through dialectic, we will pass into the illusionary field of reason from the land of truth. At first sight, it seems that freedom, as an idea of reason is located in this illusionary field. This is because, as Kemp Smith emphasized in his *Commentary*, Kant treats reason as completely negative in Dialectic. In this sense, transcendental employment of the concepts, as opposed to empirical employment, is treated as not belonging to

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* B 295

the *logic of truth* that is to the “Analytic”, but to the *Dialectic* by Kant.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, in the solution of Third Antinomy he tries to show that freedom is not only possible in a positive sense without contradiction with the law of causality but it is also necessary.

First of all, Kant defines dialectic as *logic of illusion*<sup>78</sup>, and he tries to find the source of this illusion. This source cannot be appearance, as the sensibility is the only passive capacity of mind and so sensibility also cannot be the ground of transcendental illusion, but it can only be the ground of gaining knowledge. On the other hand, in the B edition he later adds a footnote which asserts, “The same sensibility, in so far as it influences the operation of understanding, and determines it to make judgment, is the ground of error.”<sup>79</sup> As a result of these, Kant says, “Illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought.”<sup>80</sup> As we have said, judgment is the faculty of unity and it must always demand its object in the field of appearance. For this reason, it must be said that, since illusion can only be found in the judgment, error that is caused by illusion can only be found in the relation between object and the understanding that is the object and judgment about it. Kant claims, “Neither the understanding itself, nor the senses by themselves would fall into error.”<sup>81</sup> Empirical employment of categories, as we have said in second chapter, is not only legitimate, but also a necessary component in

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* B 170

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* B 350

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.* B 351

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* B 350

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.* A 294

gaining knowledge for Kant. On the other hand, transcendent employment of the categories is strictly forbidden by him. Transcendent (*transzendent*) does not mean “transcendental misemployment or employment of categories of understanding”<sup>82</sup>. It implies, in fact, a principle which carries us beyond the limits of possible experience. (The distinction between empirical and transcendent employment of categories will be dealt with in more detailed later.) Thus, this illusion gives rise to employing the categories of understanding beyond experience and by this way transcendent use of categories can appear. Just as understanding subjectively determines appearance by means of concepts, so reason seeks a way in order to objectively determine thing in itself through transcendent principles. And this results in transcendental illusion for Kant.

The crucial point Kant emphasizes is that transcendental illusion, unlike logical illusion, does not disappear when it is realized and explained by transcendental criticism. Since the ground of this illusion is the very nature of reason. That means there is no way to escape from this illusion or dialectic, it is a natural and an unavoidable part of reason.<sup>83</sup>

Now, in relation to transcendental illusion, I will investigate the distinction between reason as a source of this illusion and understanding as a ground of concept of causality. And after doing this, I will focus on the structure of reason itself.

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.* A 269

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.* A 297 B 354 / A 298 B 355

The main distinction between the reason and understanding is that while understanding must relate to objects through its judgments and concepts, reason does not relate to objects or to intuitions but to judgments and concepts of understanding, that is, to understanding alone. All the other distinctions between the reason and the understanding, I will mention, depends mainly on this distinction.

First of all, Kant defines our knowing process as following: “all our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason.”<sup>84</sup> He treats reason as the highest faculty we have, since it brings the intuitions under the highest unity of thought that understanding never reaches (since understanding is limited by intuition, that means it provides only conditional unity). On the other hand, reason contains some difficulties in itself. Like understanding, reason has twofold employment: one of them is the logical and another is a real employment. By the former, reason abstracts all content of knowledge. In the case of the latter, it contains nothing from sensibility or understanding.<sup>85</sup> In this sense through its real use reason can produce synthetic a priori propositions, that is it works only in practical sense and through its logical use it is only able to infer operations from a rule. And in *Critique of Pure Reason* we deal only with this type of use of reason. In A 800 B 828 Kant calls logical use “regulative use” and real use “constitutive use”. In the case of practical sense reason works with its ideas in its constitutive use, whereas in the case of theoretical sense reason works with its ideas merely in its regulative use. In this case by constitutive use reason generates or creates concepts and if reason orients

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<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* A 299

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* A 299 B 356

itself towards this type of use in theoretical ground it is completely illegitimate for Kant. And by regulative use, reason does not create but only regulates or orders the concepts. That means, in this case reason does not formulate any laws for objects of experience.

In the context of the main distinction between understanding and reason, which I emphasized above, there is another difference between them; Kant thinks that just as understanding can be defined as the faculty of rules, so reason can be defined as the faculty of principles.<sup>86</sup> In relation to that, according to Kant, there is also a strict difference between knowledge derived from principles and knowledge obtained by means of understanding.<sup>87</sup>

Accordingly, understanding is the faculty which “secures the unity of appearances by means of rules”, while reason is the faculty which “secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.”<sup>88</sup> Namely, understanding unifies the manifold of what is given by sensibility, that is, of conditions, by means of rules, whereas reason unifies multiplicity of rules in order to reach unconditioned or to bring the conditioned knowledge of understanding into the complete system by means of principles. By this way, therefore, the unity of reason, which is completely different from the unity of understanding, can be established.

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* B 356

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* A 302

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* B 359



“Multiplicity of rules and the unity of principles is a demand of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into thoroughgoing accord with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thereby connects the manifold.”<sup>89</sup>

Furthermore, principle of reason has no direct relation with objects of experience but it has an indirect relation with them by applying itself to concepts of and judgments of understanding.<sup>90</sup> Hence, reason does not have any faculty which brings intuitions under rules. It can be possible only by categories which belong to understanding. It is not possible to say that reason can provide the unity of experience or that it is a faculty which renders experience possible.

Moreover, rules, in so far as to unify the manifold of appearances, describe laws for objects of experience, such as the law of causality, and determine the objects in this way, whereas principle of reason does not have such a power to describe the laws for objects and to determine them. This principle “is merely a subjective law” in order to put the operations of understanding in an order, and by this way reason is able to reduce the concepts of understanding as much as it can, and reaches to the “smallest possible number”. This process of reason implies the extension of understanding. However, it does not mean that, it is legitimate and signifies any principle which has objective validity.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* A 306

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* A 307

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* A 306 B 363

Consequently, according to Kant, the principle of causality is not a principle which is produced by reason. In other words, “the principle of causality borrows nothing from reason.”<sup>92</sup> For, while the principle of causality, which has a strict relation with sensibility, renders experience possible, and provides the unity of experience, reason cannot be regarded as a part of this process of unification of possible experience.

The principle of causality, “everything which happens has a cause”, is a judgment that is synthetic a priori. As I mentioned before, in the faculty of understanding judgment always has its objects in experience. By this way, the principle of causality which is affirmed in the Second Analogy must relate to its objects in experience and must be detected by experience. On the other hand, in the case of reason, the principle is not able to be in relation with objects. For example, the principle of reason, “if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions is also given”<sup>93</sup> neither provides the unity of experience nor makes experience possible. This principle, for Kant, is *transcendent* when experience is considered. It can never be applied to or detected by experience. There is no objective empirical application of this principle. Because, as we have seen, in *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant has showed that objectivity and validity must take place in the condition which makes experience possible.

Therefore, unlike understanding, reason by its nature always demands the unconditioned through principles in order to provide a complete system. Kant says,

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<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* B 364

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* A 308

“Reason makes this demand (for unconditioned) in accordance with the principle that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions and consequently the unconditioned is also given.”<sup>94</sup>

Since understanding does not have a demand for unconditioned, it cannot itself be the cause of this illusion, but reason, by its concepts, aims to employ understanding in accordance with principles in order to reach totality of experience, or unconditional knowledge.<sup>95</sup> As a result of this, it causes this illusion by extending its concepts beyond experience.

### **3.2. The Ideas of Pure Reason**

Kant calls concepts of understanding “categories”, while he calls concepts of reason “transcendental ideas”.<sup>96</sup> Just as understanding works with categories, so reason works with ideas. According to Kant, concepts of pure reason, unlike concepts of understanding, are not gained by reflection but only by inference (*Schluss*).<sup>97</sup> I will deal with the notion “inference” as a way of gaining concepts of pure reason later. When we come to the notion “reflection” Kant means that concepts of understanding reflects upon appearances, that means, it gives the unity which provides the possibility of the knowledge of objects of experience, in so far as they are subject to

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* B 436

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* B 378

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.* B 368

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* B 367

pure forms of intuition.<sup>98</sup> In this way, their objective validity can be provided by the fact that they are necessary for experience.

Kant defines transcendental idea as “a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience (*in den Sinnen*).”<sup>99</sup> The categories of the understanding relate to objects of the possible experience, whereas the ideas of reason refer to the “absolute totality of all possible experience” which cannot be found in experience. For this reason, concept of reason implies the fact that it contains nothing from experience and it is not possible to apply it directly to experience.

Moreover, concepts of understanding is meaningful only in so far as it is related to experience and since experience can give us only conditioned knowledge, the concept of understanding refers to conditioned. On the other hand, for Kant, concepts of reason equals to the concept of totality of conditions for any given conditioned.<sup>100</sup> That means, concepts of reason refer to unconditioned as concept of totality of conditions presupposes the unconditioned. In this context, if totality and unconditioned are regarded as equivalent terms, then they “become synonymous with the absolute”<sup>101</sup>. Kant says, “a pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ground of the synthesis

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* B 367

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* B 384

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* B 379

<sup>101</sup> Norman Kemp Smith *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* 2003, p.451

of the conditioned”.<sup>102</sup> In addition to that, transcendental ideas regard the conditioned or knowledge obtained in experience as a part of absolute totality of conditions. Transcendental ideas, in this sense, “view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions”<sup>103</sup>. Reason deals with the absolute totality of conditions and this absolute totality cannot be found within experience and the concept of absolute totality cannot be applied to experience. For, as Kant says, “no experience is unconditioned”<sup>104</sup>. Hence, the objective employment of absolute totality is transcendent. Because concepts of reason do not have objective validity but they have “an illusory appearance of being inferences”, Kant calls them *conceptus ratiocinantes* (pseudo-rational [*vernünftelnde*] concepts)<sup>105</sup>.

However, although there is no object corresponding to them, these ideas are not accidental, but they arise from the very nature of reason. Thus, they are necessary component of reason.

“Although a purely transcendental idea is, in accordance with the original laws of reason, its object, it may yet be said, is something of which we have no concept ... although we cannot have any knowledge of the object which corresponds to an idea, we yet have a problematic concept of it.”<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 379

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.* B 384

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.* A 327

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.* B 368

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* B 397

If we are to summarize what we have mentioned until now, it is clear that understanding is concerned only with the conditioned, and concepts of understanding are only applied to what is given by sensibility. On the other hand, ideas of reason cannot be applied to experience; understanding is not able to employ them beyond experience.

In “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant has shown how objective deduction of concepts is possible by the way that without them, experience would be impossible. Nevertheless, in the case of ideas of reason, objective deduction cannot be done. For no experience can provide us with the absolute totality of the conditions.

According to Kant, there can be only subjective deduction from the nature of reason for transcendental ideas<sup>107</sup>. Therefore, in the light of these explanations, it can be said that just as concept of causality is deduced from the spontaneity of understanding, so freedom as a transcendental idea arises from spontaneity of reason.

On the other hand, Kant points out the strict relation between the categories of understanding and the ideas of reason by saying “dynamical concepts of understanding are adequate to ideas of reason.”<sup>108</sup> Namely, reason borrows concepts from understanding and makes them free from the limits of experience. That means, reason extends them beyond the limits of possible experience. By this way, concepts of understanding are transformed into transcendental ideas by reason. Consequently,

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<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* A 336 B 393

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* A 529 B 557

“transcendental ideas are simply categories extended to the unconditioned”.<sup>109</sup> Yet it is crucial to realize that regarding in the case of reason schematized categories is not the case.

However, since ideas of reason reflects an act towards unconditioned from the series of conditions, and since unconditioned cannot be found in experience, these concepts cannot be reconciled with objects. For this reason, to use them is illegitimate for understanding and there is no way to justify their employment.

Now I would like to turn back to the notion “inference” as a way of gaining concepts of reason. First of all, Kant also defines reason as the faculty of inferring.<sup>110</sup> Namely, just as Kant derived the categories of understanding from the forms of judgments, so he derives the ideas of reason from the types of inferences. For Kant, there are mainly three types of inferences: “Categorical”, “Hypothetical” and “Disjunctive”. They are related to the subject through categorical inferences; to objects or the manifold of the object in the field of appearance through hypothetical inferences; and to all things in general through disjunctive inferences. Yet, Kemp Smith finds such a derivation of ideas as “wholly artificial”.<sup>111</sup>

These types are also presented as the dialectical inferences. They require the synthesis of totality of the conditions. By these inferences, reason can reach

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<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.* B 436

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.* B 386

<sup>111</sup> Smith op. cit. p.450

unconditional knowledge. In other words, it can synthesize conditioned in order to provide the absolute totality of conditions. Therefore, concept of reason always seeks for absolute totality through the synthesis of conditions. However, synthesis of conditions for the absolute totality is not empirical. Kant emphasizes that transcendental illusion rests completely on this character of dialectical inferences.<sup>112</sup> And also judgments which cause error result from these dialectical inferences. Kant asserts, “We have therefore to seek for an *unconditioned*, first, of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*; secondly, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a *series*; thirdly, of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*.”<sup>113</sup>

In addition, Kant attempts to bring all transcendental ideas into three classes, corresponding to three kinds of inferences or synthesis:<sup>114</sup>

1. The absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject
2. The absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance
3. The absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general

As a result of this classification, Kant arrives to three types of transcendental ideas. Since “the thinking subject is the object of *psychology*,” Kant calls it “psychological idea”; since “the sum total of all appearances is the object of *cosmology*”, it refers to “cosmological idea” and since “the thing (*das Ding*) which contains the highest

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<sup>112</sup> Kant op.cit. 1965, A 406

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.* A 323

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.* B 391 A 334



condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of *theology*”, it refers to “theological idea”.

“The understanding is not in a position to yield even the mere project of any one of these sciences, not even though it be supported by the highest logical employment of reason, that is by all the conceivable inferences through which we seek to advance from one of its objects (appearance) to all others ... each of these sciences is an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure reason.”<sup>115</sup>

Kant asserts that by means of these transcendental ideas, reason can bring all modes of knowledge under a system.<sup>116</sup> For Kant, these ideas of reason cannot be dialectical themselves. The illusion can arise only in so far as they are misguided.<sup>117</sup> Since freedom is regarded as a cosmological idea by Kant, we deal only with cosmology. And dialectical inference of cosmological ideas results in antinomies of pure reason.

Finally, it must be emphasized that it seems that there is an obscurity about the source of ideas of reason. Accordingly, Kant presents us two different sources for the origin of ideas: cosmological concepts of understanding and dialectical inference. According to Beck<sup>118</sup> and Kemp Smith<sup>119</sup> this is because the former may have been written before “Kant’s formulation of the metaphysical deduction from the three species of dialectical inferences.”

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.* B 392 A 335

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* B 395

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.* A 669 B 697

<sup>118</sup> Lewis White Beck *A Commentary On Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason* 1966, p.183

<sup>119</sup> Smith *op. cit.* p.478

### 3.3. Antinomy of Pure Reason

From the dialectical inference of three kinds of transcendental ideas, which are psychological, cosmological and theological ideas, “paralogism”, “antinomy” and “ideal” of pure reason arise.

Kant asserts that whereas paralogism rests on the *categorical* inference, antinomy results from the *hypothetical* inference.<sup>120</sup> This frame is also similar to the way in “Transcendental Analytic” that concept of causality takes place under the title of hypothetical judgment.<sup>121</sup>

In the case of antinomy, reason deals with “the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance”.<sup>122</sup>

Kant postulates the notion “antithetic” to explain the position of antinomies in his system by saying that “the antithetic does not deal with one-sided assertions”, in it “no one assertion can establish superiority over another”.<sup>123</sup> Namely, in the structure of antinomies, Thesis and Antithesis conflict with each other and owing to the nature of reason, one of them cannot be superior to another. It is not possible to justify or falsify their arguments. For, as we know, we cannot find anything in experience, corresponding to the absolute totality of synthesis of conditions. And it must be said

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<sup>120</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 433

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* A 70 B 95

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* B 398

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.* A 421

that this conflict is not arbitrary, it arises completely from the nature of reason, that is, from the natural and unavoidable illusion of reason.

“If in employing the principles of understanding we do not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of experience, there arise *pseudo-rational* doctrines which can neither hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it. Each of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason.”<sup>124</sup>

Since an idea is a necessary concept of reason in which no corresponding object can be given in experience, pure reason cannot make a connection with the objects. Because of these characteristics of reason, it appears to contain antinomies. Antinomies of pure reason result from cosmological ideas. Namely, when reason tries to determine the thing in itself through its ideas, just as understanding determines the object of possible experience through its concepts, there arises a conflict, that is, reason seems to be in a conflict with itself.

“From the fact that my concept of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory, I conclude that there is really a unity of the opposite kind, although of it also I have no concept. The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the *antinomy* of pure reason.”<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.* B 449

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* B 398

The antinomy of pure reason, Kant emphasizes, is “transcendental principles of a pretended pure rational cosmology”.<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, such a dialectical conflict of reason is not related to the unity of understanding in concepts, but to the unity of reason in only ideas. This unity of reason consists in the absolute totality of synthesis, the unconditioned. The absolute totality of synthesis cannot be given by pure intuition, and it cannot be detected by experience. Although this type of synthesis is not suitable for understanding, it must be subject to understanding. Since, reason is a way of thinking, it still must use the category of understanding. Conversely, the synthesis of understanding is not enough for reason. And from this, the conflict becomes unavoidable for Kant. Therefore, since it is not possible to prove cosmology as a metaphysical discipline to be valid, it remains merely as the conflict of reason.

As we have said, according to Kant, antinomies result from cosmological ideas through dialectical inferences. Kant postulates four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the four titles of the categories which are quality, quantity, relation and modality<sup>127</sup> in the sense that, reason demands an absolute completeness of the conditions which must constitute a series, in the condition that appearance is in accordance with the laws of understanding:

1. Absolute completeness of the *Composition* of the given whole of all appearance.

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.* B 435

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.* A 415 B 443

2. Absolute completeness in the *Division* of a given whole in the [field of] appearance.
3. Absolute completeness in the *Origination* of an appearance.
4. Absolute completeness as regards *Dependence of Existence* of the alterable in the [field of] appearance.

Sequentially, Kant deals with “composition” (*Zusammensetzung*) in the first antinomy, “division” (*Teilung*) in the second antinomy, “origination” in the Third Antinomy, and finally “dependence of existence” is dealt with in the fourth antinomy.

When we are given a conditioned, reason tries to reach the conditions of this conditioned and while doing this it seeks for the completeness of the series of given conditions, that is “the absolute totality of the series”.<sup>128</sup> The synthesis of conditions is completely different from the synthesis of understanding in the sense that, the absolute totality of the series which is produced by synthesis of conditions is only an idea.<sup>129</sup> For, experience is not able to provide the absolute totality of series of conditions. Moreover, completeness is only possible through an “unconditioned condition”.<sup>130</sup> Kant asserts, “Reason finally attains unconditioned necessity only in the totality of the series”<sup>131</sup> and he adds that unconditioned is possible in two ways:

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<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* B 444

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.* B 446

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.* B 581

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* A 415

“This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in which all members without exception are conditioned and only the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This regress is to be entitled *infinite (unendlich)*. Or alternatively, the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series –a part to which the other members are subordinated, and which does not itself stand under any other condition.”<sup>132</sup>

In addition, to provide the unconditioned or the totality of the series is only possible through synthesis of conditions. Synthesis can be either progressive, that is from the antecedent to the consequent (from the conditioned to the future conditions) or regressive, that is from the conditioned to the conditions. Kant stresses that the synthesis of the series of conditions can only be regressive synthesis rather than progressive synthesis.<sup>133</sup> For Kant, in the case of progressive synthesis, the absolute totality of whole series of all *future* conditions will be arbitrary, not a necessary presupposition of reason. Because, Kant says “the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions but not of its consequences (*Folgerung*). Such a concept is not, therefore, one of the transcendental ideas.”<sup>134</sup> Hence, cosmological ideas rest only on the totality of the regressive synthesis “which proceeds from the conditioned to the condition.”<sup>135</sup>

According to Kant, there is a regressive proceeding in time as “the time in itself a series” but in case of space the difference between regress (*Rückgang, Regressus*)

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.* A 418 B 445

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.* B 437

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* A 337

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.* A 411 B 438

and progress (*Fortschritt, Fortgang*) is not the case<sup>136</sup>, as in space everything is co-existence. In other words space is an aggregate, it is not a series.

With regard to time, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of conditions of any given conditioned deals merely with all past time, namely conditions, not with consequents, that is, not with future.

Thus, the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of conditions provides reason with the unconditioned. In order to comprehend the problem and the solution of the Third Antinomy, it is crucial to point out the distinction between mathematical synthesis and dynamical synthesis.

The distinction lies entirely on the difference of the characters of their members. Namely, in mathematical synthesis each and every member of the series are of the same character, that is, homogeneous (*gleichartig*) and they are all empirical. There is no place for an intelligible element as it vanishes this homogeneity. And homogeneity cannot be thought without the concept of *magnitude* (*Grösse*). “If the unity of the combination of the manifold is homogeneous then it can be possible only by the concept of a magnitude. In other words, appearances are all without exception magnitudes, as intuitions in space or time they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby space and time in general are determined.”<sup>137</sup> Each member must

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<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.* A 412 B 439

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.* B 203

be in time, i.e. must be *in concreto* and subject to the conditions of it, and due to this character of it, it can never reach to an end or a first beginning.

“The condition is always a member of a series along with the conditioned, and so is *homogeneous* with it. In such a series the regress was never thought as completed, or if it had to be so thought, a member, in itself conditioned, must have been falsely supposed to be a first member, and therefore to be unconditioned...”<sup>138</sup>

As a result of this characteristic of mathematical synthesis, infinity is the case. In short, mathematical synthesis is possible only in so far as all of its members are appearances and must be themselves “a part of the series”.<sup>139</sup> In this sense, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed for the possibility of experience.<sup>140</sup>

However, in the dynamical synthesis there is no necessity for every element to be of the same character. In opposition to mathematical synthesis, heterogeneity can be allowed in the dynamical synthesis. Heterogeneity, in this sense, implies a possibility for the condition that, while an effect is in the sensible world, the cause of this effect need not to be in the field of appearances, that is it is not subject to the conditions of experience, but can be in the intelligible world. In other words, while the cause itself is unconditioned, the effect of it can be conditioned. Kant asserts, “In the dynamical

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<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.* A 528 B 556

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.* A 531 B 559

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.* A 654 B 682



series of sensible conditions, a heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but *purely intelligible*, and as such outside the series can be allowed”.<sup>141</sup>

Kant summarizes the difference between mathematical and dynamical regress by asserting;

“The dynamical regress is distinguished in an important respect from the mathematical. Since the mathematical regress is concerned only with the combining of parts to form a whole, or the division of a whole into parts, the conditions of this series must always be regarded as parts of the series, and therefore as homogeneous and as appearances. In the dynamical regress, on the other hand, we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole of given parts, or with an unconditioned part for a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent (*zufällig*) existence of substance itself from necessary existence. In this latter regress, it is not, therefore, necessary that the condition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.”<sup>142</sup>

Corresponding to two types of synthesis, Kant divides antinomies into two parts as mathematical and dynamical. First two antinomies which deal with world and substance are regarded as mathematical by Kant, Third and Fourth antinomies which deal with freedom and God are treated as dynamical. In other words, since world and substance can be thought only as magnitude and they correspond to mathematical concepts of understanding as quality and quantity, they are subject to mathematical synthesis of conditions. On the other hand, freedom, as a causality, and God

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.* A 531 B 559

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.* A 560 B 588

correspond to dynamical concepts of understanding as relation and modality. And they work with dynamical synthesis of conditions.

The different structures of the mathematical and dynamical synthesis impose some frames for mathematical and dynamical antinomies, in the sense that, mathematical antinomies presuppose homogeneity in relation to the mathematical synthesis, whereas dynamical antinomies include heterogeneity along with homogeneity with reference to dynamical synthesis. In the context of these main distinctions, mathematical and dynamical antinomies include some other differences in themselves.

First of all, the distinction between the ways the mathematical and the dynamical antinomies regress results in the fact that they conceive the totality (*Allheit*) from different views.

Accordingly, totality in mathematical antinomies is “world” and that means “mathematical sum-total of all appearances and totality of their synthesis”, whereas totality in the dynamical antinomies is “nature”, that is “a sum-total (*Inbegriff*) conceived as a dynamical whole”<sup>143</sup>. Kant defines, in his *Prolegomena*, nature as “the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws.”<sup>144</sup>

And also in *Analytic* Kant explains that the order and regularity in the field of appearances supply us “nature”. Therefore, this nature is the unity of the connection

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<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.* A 419 B 447

<sup>144</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.42

of the appearances. In this case, the connection of appearances requires the concept of relation and this concept is dynamical.

In mathematical antinomies, for only homogeneity is accepted and there is no place for intelligible elements, totality can only be composed of empirical elements. Totality in mathematical antinomies is entitled as world and world is defined as “a complete set of spatiotemporal items”, and “a whole as a magnitude collection”. However, mathematical antinomies are self-contradictory<sup>145</sup> in the sense that while they allow only empirical regress, at the same time they demand the absolute totality of the series through unconditioned. In other words, mathematical antinomies treat the unconditioned as if it was in space and time, as conditioned stands. However, as we know, in space and time everything is conditioned. Thus, totality is not possible only through with empirical elements. As a result of this, since mathematical antinomies are homogeneous as including the same type of Thesis and Antithesis, that are both homogeneous, they are lack of any solution. For this reason, “neither” the Thesis “nor” the Antithesis of the mathematical antinomies can be true.<sup>146</sup>

On the other hand, since dynamical antinomies allow both homogeneity and heterogeneity in the case of regression, there is a place for intelligible elements. In dynamical antinomies, totality is only possible through an intelligible or an unconditioned element, in case of Third Antinomy; this element will be freedom as a first beginning. That is to say, freedom, that is, a power which is not itself in time but

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<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.* p.89 and also Kant op. cit. 1965, A 527 B 555

<sup>146</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.90

its effect can be seen in time as an appearance, is necessary to reach a finite series. Kant emphasizes, “In this case, the condition of that which happens is entitled the cause. Its unconditioned causality in the [field of] appearance is called *freedom*, and its conditioned causality is called *natural* cause in the narrower [adjectival] sense.”<sup>147</sup>

Totality, in dynamical antinomies is equal to “nature”. Namely, dynamical antinomies, unlike mathematical, do not concern with the aggregation or collection in space and time, that is, with magnitude. Instead of this, they deal with “the unity in the existence of appearances”.

“But dynamical concept of reason, ... posses this peculiarity that they are not concerned with an object considered as a magnitude, but only with its existence. Accordingly, we can abstract (*abstrahieren*) from the magnitude of the series of conditions, and considered only the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned.”<sup>148</sup>

Another point is that, totality of nature in the sense of dynamical antinomies is “explanatory”, as it leaves nothing to be explained, and due to this type of “explanation”, in Third Antinomy, there will be a need for “freedom”. This notion of “explanation” is emphasized only in the Thesis arguments.

Finally, dynamical antinomies consist of both homogeneity and heterogeneity, that means, they do not exclude the possibility of heterogeneity, in the sense that, the Antithesis of them only accepts the homogeneity, whereas the Thesis arguments

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<sup>147</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 447

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.* A 536 B 564

accepts both homogeneity and heterogeneity. By this way, the Thesis and the Antithesis of the dynamical antinomies both can be true, that is, it is possible to assert that “either” Thesis “or” Antithesis is true without contradiction.

In conclusion, the distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies paves the way for the possibility for them to postulate different solutions. Therefore, if Kant did not make a distinction between mathematical and dynamical antinomies, that is, if he treated dynamical antinomies as mathematical, then it would be impossible to postulate freedom as an unconditioned cause. And this point will be explained in the next chapter.

### **3.3.1. Third Antinomy**

#### THESIS

Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.<sup>149</sup>

#### ANTITHESIS

There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.* A 444 B 472

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.* A 445 B 473

First of all, the argument of Thesis has an idealist approach, whereas the argument of Antithesis reflects the view of empiricism.<sup>151</sup> In this respect, in Third Antinomy, the Thesis maintains that causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not enough to explain the nature. We must also assume another type of causality, that is “freedom”. According to Kant’s argument in Thesis, if we assume that everything in the nature occurred only in accordance with the first kind of causality that has a rule that every event presupposes a preceding cause, then this cause can only be explained when it is considered to be the effect of a preceding cause, and this preceding cause also must be taken as to be effect of another preceding cause, and so on.

“The causality of cause through which something takes place is itself, therefore, something that has *taken place*, which again presupposes, in accordance with the law of nature (*Gesetz der Natur*), a preceding state and its causality, and this in similar manner a still earlier state, and so on.”<sup>152</sup>

Consequently, according to the principle, Kant says, we can never arrive at a first cause. There cannot be a beginning to the series of causes. This series will always be unfinished and incomplete. Therefore, it cannot constitute a sufficient (*zureichend*) condition for a causal explanation in accordance with the laws of nature. Kant asserts in Thesis argument that “if everything takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature, there will...never a first beginning, and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise the one from the other”.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.* A 466 B 494

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.* A 444 B 472

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.* A 446 B 474

It is crucial to point out that, in postulating freedom as a necessary cause in order to be released from the strict determination of law of natural causality, the notions “explanatory”, “sufficiency”, “true cause” and “first beginning” are of a great importance in the sense that they have strict relation with each other and also with freedom and they bear almost the entire weight of the argument. Namely, in our search for the completeness of the series we ask for an explanatory element, and this brings the demand for sufficiency which presupposes a true cause and true cause necessarily takes us to the notion of first beginning.

To begin with, it is very clear that the concept of “first beginning” is strictly related to the notion “a true cause”. Such a cause involves an absolute (*absolut*) spontaneity, and this spontaneity Kant calls “transcendental freedom”. Kant defines “freedom” as “the power (*Kraft*) of a beginning state spontaneously”.<sup>154</sup> And such spontaneity does not require another preceding cause which is determined in time. Freedom, in this sense, does not contain anything from experience, and it cannot be determined by empirical laws, that is the laws of understanding. In order to make it legitimate to introduce the notion of freedom as a cause which has a power of beginning a new series spontaneously, Kant claims that without such a cause, merely with natural law of causality we cannot arrive at a first cause in causal sequence, and therefore it is not possible to find a complete series of events. For Kant, a cause is “a true cause” or “a real cause” provided that it gives an ultimate explanation. That means that a true cause can only be an absolute spontaneity which is not itself in the field of appearances. Therefore, because of its character of spontaneity, freedom as a first

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<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.* A 533 B 561

cause can give an ultimate explanation of itself. Kant, in Thesis, asserts “the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori. The proposition that no causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory; and this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality.”<sup>155</sup> In other words, Kant seems to have an attitude that principle of causality requires a sufficient cause for each event. And such sufficiency cannot be found in natural causes, since every member of a series is determined by another preceding cause. Therefore, it is derivative or conditioned. That is to say, by mathematical regression it is not possible to provide such sufficiency. Consequently, we can never find a true cause in the series of causes. It is therefore necessary, according to Thesis argument, to assume the existence of a cause that is not itself the effect of a preceding cause. In this sense, Kant says, in his *Prolegomena*, that a true cause must be freedom owing to its capacity of beginning of a new series, namely, to its capacity of determining itself without any other influences. By reference to this explanation, it can be said that its “determinants” can only be itself.<sup>156</sup>

Therefore, since, as we have said, absolute totality of causal sequence cannot be provided by universal law of causality, reason produces the idea of spontaneity having the power of beginning of a new series. According to Kant, if there is such

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.* A 446 B 474

<sup>156</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.93



spontaneity, then there would be no need and no place for an antecedent cause to determine it.<sup>157</sup>

On the other hand, Antithesis maintains that there is no freedom and everything happens in the world in accordance with the laws of nature. According to Antithesis, if we assumed that there is a transcendental freedom which has a power of beginning a new series without itself in the sensible world, then the unity of experience would be impossible. As the concept of freedom implies independency of the laws of nature, freedom contradicts the conditions of it, so freedom is lawless according to Antithesis. Controversially, if freedom occurred in accordance with the laws of nature then freedom would not vanish the unity of experience, but in this case “it would not be freedom; it would simply be nature under another name.”<sup>158</sup> Kant emphasizes, “Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality; and the kind of connection which it assumes as holding between the successive states of the active causes renders all unity of experience impossible.”<sup>159</sup>

The main reason why Antithesis denies the possibility of freedom as a second type of causality is that, Antithesis requires homogeneity in the series of conditions in order to provide the unity of experience, and freedom as a dynamical concept of reason ruins the unity of the causal chain. Indeed, in the case of causal connection,

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<sup>157</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 533 B 561

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.* A 447 B 475

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.* A 447 B 475

homogeneity can be found but it is not necessarily required.<sup>160</sup> However, homogeneity, regarding Antithesis, is presented *as if* it was necessary element, or, as if causality was possible only through mathematical connection together with homogeneity. In other words, it may be asserted that Antithesis allows only empirical regression in order to reach unconditioned. However, as we know, in experience, in the field of appearance it is not possible to find an unconditioned component, in it everything is conditioned. Therefore, Antithesis can be seen as self-contradictory, because, like mathematical antinomies, antithesis allows only empirical regression but at the same time it searches for the unconditioned. In *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant adds a footnote in order to emphasize that dynamical connection, unlike mathematical, can be found in *physical* or *metaphysical* ground.<sup>161</sup>

In short, transcendental freedom contradicts the Second Analogy in which Kant thinks that he has proved that every event is determined by another preceding event in accordance with the universal laws of nature. In this sense, with regard to Antithesis, it can be said that transcendental freedom has no validity. In other words, the argument of the Antithesis has its power solely from the *Transcendental Analytic*, and asserts no other counterarguments for Thesis argument. Under the light of these explanations, it can be said that, while Thesis' argument claims that the principle of natural causality is self-contradictory, the Antithesis' argument says that the assumption of transcendental freedom as a second type of causality contradicts the conditions of possible experience.

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<sup>160</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.90

<sup>161</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 202

Kant regards freedom as a dynamical concept of reason, that means, it does not concern with an object as a magnitude, but with its existence by means of abstraction. This feature of freedom results in the possibility of its existence.<sup>162</sup> For, in this way, we can assert that without any contradiction, it is possible, an effect in the world can arise from nature or from freedom. On the other hand, if Kant claimed that freedom is not a dynamical but mathematical concept, this possibility would be impossible. Because, in this case we cannot talk about the possibility of two different modes of existence, but only talk about an object as a magnitude, and magnitude, in this sense, implies the determination “which can be thought only through a judgment which has quantity”<sup>163</sup> and freedom as an idea cannot be harmonious with the universal laws of nature being in the same character.<sup>164</sup> Kant says, “the concept of magnitude in general can never be explained except by saying that it is that determination of a thing whereby we are enabled to think how many times a unit is posited in it. But this how-many-times is based on successive repetition, and therefore on time and the synthesis of the homogeneous in time”<sup>165</sup>. (Therefore, the concept of magnitude contains the concept of “limitation”.)

With respect to the difference between heterogeneity and homogeneity, Kant makes a distinction between “a beginning in time” and a “beginning in causality” in the Thesis argument<sup>166</sup> and this distinction is only possible through heterogeneity. By

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.* A 536 B 564

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.* A 246

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.* A 462 B 490

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.* A 241

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.* A 450 B 478

this way transcendental freedom as a first beginning can be postulated. If we suppose that there is only one type of beginning, that is beginning in time, we would necessarily reject heterogeneity. Because, a beginning in time can *only* be found in the field of appearances. And this *onlyness* excludes the possibility of consisting of empirical and non-empirical elements together. We can only get rid of this handicap of onlyness by the help of the notion “beginning in causality”. In the case of beginning in causality since things in themselves are not subject to the conditions of time, they can cause a beginning not in time but in causality. In order to make this distinction clear, in “Observation on the Third Antinomy”, “On the Thesis” Kant asserts,

“... first beginning of which we are speaking is not a beginning in time, but in causality. If, for instance, I at this moment arise from my chair, in complete freedom, without being necessarily determined thereto by the influence of natural causes, a new series, with all its natural consequences *in infinitum*, has its absolute beginning in this event, although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of mine do not form part of the succession of purely natural effects, and are not a mere continuation of them. In respect of its happening, natural causes exercise over it no determining influence whatsoever. It does indeed follow upon them, but without arising out of them; and accordingly, in respect of causality though not of time, must be entitled an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.”<sup>167</sup>

This quotation also should be read together with the Kant’s earlier quoted phrase (A 418 B 445) in the sense that, two ways Kant mentioned in first phrase (A 418 B 445) materializes in the example of the second phrase (A 450 B 478). Namely, the

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<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.* A 450 B 478

expression “the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series” implies the undetermined act of Kant in the example. By this way it can be seen that the unconditioned is possible in either two ways. Also the phrase “infinite” in the former quotation is the counterpart of the phrase “infinitum” in the latter quotation. The first way refers to the infinite series of natural causes in which Kant’s act as an example of first beginning takes place only as a part of it. And the second way refers to Kant’s unconditioned act as a first beginning of its own series which is only a part of the whole series. Kant, in *Prolegomena*, sheds light on this matter by saying that “...every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds is always a *first beginning*, though the same action is in the series of appearances only a *subordinate beginning*, which must be preceded by a state of the cause which determines it and is itself determined in the same manner by another immediately (*unmittelbar*) preceding”.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, the first way is infinite while the second finite. In the case of first way, it brings together with the mathematical regression because each and every element in the entire series are conditioned that is they must be subject to the condition of time. On the other hand, in the case of second way, it reflects dynamical regression and it is the case that every element does not have to be conditioned. Under the light of these explanations, with respect to second way, it appears to be a possibility to postulate the claim that there is a first member of the series. And in respect to cause, this first member is the absolute *self-activity* (*Selbsttatigkeit*), that is, freedom for Kant.

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<sup>168</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.94

Since, as we have said, Kant regards Third Antinomy as dynamical, Thesis and Antithesis of Third Antinomy both can be true.<sup>169</sup> As a solution of this antinomy, Kant suggests that if appearance were taken as thing in itself, and space and time were regarded as the conditions of thing in itself, then the antinomy could not be solved.<sup>170</sup> However, if we accept the distinction between appearance and thing in itself, namely between phenomena and noumena, then it is not contradictory to assert that there exist two types of causality. Namely, natural causality can be seen to be applicable to what is given by sensibility, that is to appearance, whereas freedom as a second type of causality works with noumena in the intelligible world.<sup>171</sup> In this context, the solution of the Third Antinomy, in the sense that freedom and natural causality can be compatible without any conflict, lies on the distinction between phenomena and noumena. By this way, the question Kant deals with in this antinomy may be answered:

“That all events in the sensible world stand in thoroughgoing connection in accordance with unchangeable laws of nature is an established principle of the transcendental analytic, and allows of no exception. The question, therefore, can only be whether freedom is completely excluded by this inviolable rule...”<sup>172</sup>

Finally, in the light of these explanations I would like to assert that, denying the possibility of that both Thesis and Antithesis can be true is indeed equal to denial of

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<sup>169</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 532 B 560

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.* A 535 B 563

<sup>171</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.91

<sup>172</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 536 B 564

the Thesis. For, in my opinion, acceptance of the Thesis does not necessitate the denial of the Antithesis, but on the contrary it necessarily requires the acceptance of Antithesis, as denial of the Antithesis is equal to denial of a part of the Thesis. Because, as we know, Thesis does not reject the argument of the Antithesis, that the existence of natural causality, but adds something to it. That means, Antithesis is the part of Thesis. Then it would be self-contradictory to accept Thesis but at the same time to reject Antithesis. Also rejection of homogeneity, as a part of heterogeneity, is equal to the rejection of heterogeneity by the fact that in the case of antinomies homogeneity includes only empirical elements, whereas heterogeneity includes both empirical and intelligible elements. For this reason, Thesis only tries to show that Antithesis is self-contradictory, rather than denying the validity of the Antithesis. However, when we deny heterogeneity, we do not necessarily deny homogeneity. Controversially, the Antithesis denies the possibility of the Thesis, as homogeneity does not contain intelligible element. Thesis, in this sense can be seen as self-contradictory, as it seems to accept an element, which strictly denies Thesis, as a part of it. That is to say, it denies its own possibility by accepting an argument which denies the possibility of it. Suppose there are two arguments, T and A, corresponding to Thesis and Antithesis. A includes only one element, that is B, corresponding to homogeneity. And T consists of two elements, which are C, corresponding to heterogeneity, and B. B, in the case of Third Antinomy, means “not-C”. Hence, T includes C and not-C, that means, it attempts to render C and “not-C” compatible. Thus, it is self-contradictory. Briefly, due to the structure of Thesis, whether it denies or includes the Antithesis, it seems to be self-contradictory.

### **2.3.2. The Distinction Between Phenomena and Noumena as the Solution of Third Antinomy**

Now, in order to comprehend how freedom and natural causality can be consistent without contradiction, we have to realize the distinction between appearance and thing in itself, that is, phenomenon which is sensible and noumenon which is intelligible. This point is crucial, since the solution of the Third Antinomy lies entirely on this distinction. Kant asserts, in his *Prolegomena*,

“If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in themselves and the laws of nature for laws of things in themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the subject of freedom were, like other objects, represented as mere appearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoidable.”<sup>173</sup>

Kant has proved, in “Transcendental Analytic”, that all events, without any exception, in the sensible world, that is in the field of appearances, must conform to the universal laws of nature. On the other hand, if the laws of nature, containing causal determination, refer only to appearances, and freedom refers only to things in themselves; the contradiction, for Kant, will be overcome, as we can assume that it is very possible to introduce two kinds of causality. While one of them works with appearances in conformity with natural law of causality and another belongs to things in themselves in respect to transcendental freedom.

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<sup>173</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.91



In order to provide a place for thing in itself, Kant proposes the assertion that if appearances are not regarded as things in themselves but merely as representations which must conform to the natural laws in time, then “they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances”.<sup>174</sup> Therefore, it can be said that Kant derives the existence of such a thing from the fact that it is not reasonable to say that there can be appearance without having a ground of it, that is, “without anything that appears”.<sup>175</sup> In this sense, Kant says that noumena, or thing in itself, is the ground of appearance.<sup>176</sup> From this, it can be said that noumena is the cause of appearance, or appearance is the effect of noumena.

Harris, in his article “Kant’s Third Antinomy and His Fallacy Regarding The First Cause”, sees a similarity between this Kantian argument and Plato-Aristotelian argument about an ontological proof of the existence of God as a first cause. Just as “dependent being” presupposes “independent being” as its source or ground and the denial of existence of an independent being necessarily requires the denial of the existence of all things that depends on it. Therefore, Harris says, appearance, as representation of an object necessarily requires thing in itself as a ground.<sup>177</sup>

In order to explain the distinction between phenomena and noumena we should look at the relevant chapter “The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena”. According to most of the commentators of Kant, this

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<sup>174</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 537 B 565

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.* B xxvi-xxvii

<sup>176</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.92

<sup>177</sup> W .T Harris “Kant’s Third Antinomy and His Fallacy Regarding the First Cause” 1894, p.6

chapter is one of the obscure parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The obscurity results from that in the second edition Kant omitted some parts which were argued in the first edition.

In the beginning of this chapter Kant summarizes the arguments about the structure of concepts of understanding rather than introducing new arguments. Then, he makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental employment of categories in order to introduce the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.<sup>178</sup> According to Paton, Kant serves the opposition between phenomena and noumena as an equivalent for the opposition between the empirical and transcendental use of concepts.<sup>179</sup>

In its empirical employment, categories are limited to sensibility, that is to sensible intuitions. Namely, apart from sensibility, categories do not have any meaning. Without sensibility, categories are empty. By empirical employment of them, categories are applied only to objects which are in space and time.

On the other hand, in its transcendental employment, we can employ pure categories not to objects given to us by sensible intuitions but to thing in itself. However, in this case, the employment of them does not have any objective validity.<sup>180</sup> But in these passages what Kant attempts to prove is not the objective validity of them but to

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<sup>178</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 298

<sup>179</sup> H. J. Paton *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Volume 2* 2002, p. 439

<sup>180</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 239 B 299 / A 244

prove that this type of employment is not self-contradictory, by asserting that if pure categories are abstracted from all sensibility, there still remains the logical possibility of them.<sup>181</sup> That means, the source of categories is understanding alone, not intuition, so it is possible to use categories without intuition. Another important point Kant emphasizes is that, the object, regarding transcendental employment, is not empirical but transcendental object, as its sensible intuition is not given.<sup>182</sup> As we have mentioned in the second chapter, we can know an object by means of sensible intuitions only as it appears to us but not as it is in itself. In other words, pure concepts of understanding do not derive from experience and do not conform to the objects. On the contrary, objects must conform to our forms of understanding. Experience is only possible in the sense that the objects we perceive are in pure forms of intuition and only possible if it conforms to these forms. Therefore, we can only know the representation of objects; we cannot know what it really is in itself. Then it follows that, Kant calls these representations of objects appearances, and in this case such sensible entities as appearances are phenomena.<sup>183</sup>

In addition to that, Kant never doubts that “there are intelligible entities (*Verstandeswesen*) corresponding to the sensible entities (*Sinnenwesen*)”.<sup>184</sup> These intelligible entities Kant calls *noumena*. Such objects are not objects of sensible intuitions but objects of understanding or of thought. At this point, the concept of noumena is comprehended in two different senses; negative and positive. In its

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<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.* A 245 B 303

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* B 304

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.* A 249 B 306

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.* B 309

negative sense, noumenon “is not an object of our sensible intuition” that means, it is abstracted completely from all our intuitions. And in its positive sense it is an object of a non-sensible intuition<sup>185</sup>, that is, an object of the understanding<sup>186</sup>. In the former, that no intuitions are the case is self-contradictory for Kant. On the other hand, in the latter it signifies another type of intuition rather than sensible, instead of depending on no intuitions. And such intuition Kant calls intellectual intuition. “We cannot assume that such objects can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another kind of intuition than the sensible.”<sup>187</sup>

However, as we have said above, these arguments are not so clear. Namely, it is not very clear what Kant means with the term transcendental object. In B 236 A 191 Kant asserts that a house, for example, is not a thing in itself but only an appearance, that is the transcendental object of which is unknown. In this point, there is a discussion among the commentators of Kant, whether transcendental object refers to thing in itself or to appearance.

The same obscurity rises in the respect that if we accept that transcendental object refers to thing in itself then the question should be asked: whether this object is transcendental or transcendent? And also the same question arises that whether the second type of employment of concepts is transcendental or transcendent. In order to

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<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.* B 307

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.* A 250

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.* A 254

throw light on this matter, we have to deal with the distinction between the meanings of the transcendental and transcendent.

According to Kemp Smith “transcendental” has three different meanings in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Firstly, transcendental indicates a special type of knowledge. Kemp Smith says that transcendental knowledge is not knowledge of objects and he defines it as the knowledge “of the nature and conditions of our *a priori* cognition (*Erkenntnis*) of them.” In this sense, for Kemp Smith, transcendental knowledge and transcendental philosophy are equivalent in meaning. “They signify the signs of the possibility, nature, and limits of *a priori* knowledge.”<sup>188</sup>

In the second case it is not a kind of knowledge but it implies “the *a priori* factors in knowledge”. Accordingly, all our *a priori* representations which are applicable to objects are transcendental. By its first meaning, transcendental is distinguished from the empirical, and by the second from the “transcendent”. Thus, transcendent and transcendental are not synonymous. Transcendent passes beyond experience whereas the transcendental indicates *a priori* elements which are necessary conditions of experience. In this context, transcendent is not knowable for us, while the transcendental renders “all knowledge, whether *a priori* or empirical, possible” as a condition of experience. Nevertheless, according to Smith, Kant makes an “arbitrary” distinction between them. Kemp Smith claims that the transcendental is not indeed distinct from the transcendent by referring to Watson and Stirling’s critical position, that “the transcendental is a species of the transcendent, in that while the latter

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<sup>188</sup> Smith op. cit. p.74

transcends the scope of experience, the former transcends its sense-content.” In this respect, for Kemp Smith, in some cases Kant uses the term transcendental as “exactly equivalent in meaning to transcendent”. For example, in the title “Transcendental Dialectic”, the transcendental is equal to the transcendent.<sup>189</sup> Besides, Kant uses the term “immanent” as opposite of transcendent.<sup>190</sup> Immanent in this case includes both transcendental and empirical.

The term gains its third meaning as a result of “its extension from the *a priori* intuitions and concepts to the processes and faculties to which they are supposed to be due.”<sup>191</sup> This meaning of the term appears in its use as such; transcendental synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.

Under the light of these explanations, according to Paton when Kant expresses “transcendental employment of categories” he means transcendent rather than transcendental. In this context, Paton agrees with Kemp Smith by saying that the criterion for distinguishing the transcendental from the transcendent is obscure. Although Kant asserts that “transcendental” and “transcendent” are not interchangeable terms<sup>192</sup>, Paton and Kemp Smith agree that Kant sometimes uses them as synonymous. Paton argues, for example, it is not very clear that Kant means whether transcendent object or phenomenal object with the term “transcendental

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<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.* p.75

<sup>190</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 296

<sup>191</sup> Smith op. cit. p.76

<sup>192</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 296 B353

object”.<sup>193</sup> Besides, for Paton, Kant seems to use the transcendental in the meaning of extending beyond the limits of experience *accidentally*, while the transcendent means passing beyond the limits of experience *necessarily*.<sup>194</sup> Yet, this distinction is not enough to remove the obscurity about how Kant uses them in different meanings.

In the context of this discussion, Paton asserts that if there is “appearance” there must also be something which appears and that can be taken as transcendental object. It is called transcendental, as it is not given in experience, for otherwise it would not be “something” but it would also be another appearance. “Hence it must be known *a priori* if at all.”<sup>195</sup> In this case it is very clear that it cannot be known at all as we can only know what appears in space and time. Accordingly, if it is *known*, the transcendental object must be identical with phenomenal or empirical object. On the other hand, if it is only *thought*, then the transcendental object must be noumenon and in this case it can be called transcendent object rather than transcendental. By this way, according to Paton “the double meaning of transcendental object is confusing, though we can understand how one meaning grows out of the other”.<sup>196</sup> Paton argues this confusion by asserting,

“Kant never ceases to hold that the phenomenal objects we know are only appearances of unknown things-in-themselves. On his view there are not two objects, but only one considered from different points of view: (1) the thing

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<sup>193</sup> H. J. Paton *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Volume 1* 2002, pp.420-421

<sup>194</sup> Paton op. cit. vol.2, p.430

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.* pp.442-443

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.* p.443

as it is in itself, (2) the same thing as it appears to us. The thing in itself is the object which appears to us, though it never appears to us as it is in itself, but only as transformed by the nature of our understanding and sensibility. The thing as it is in itself is therefore the unknown object of which the objects known to us are the appearances.”<sup>197</sup>

And it must be added that Paton’s phrase “appearance of unknown thing in itself” is clearly appearance, as he asserts that Kant never doubts that appearances are appearances of things in themselves.<sup>198</sup> From this point of view it can be said that Paton treats “appearance of unknown thing in itself” as phenomenal object, whereas Kant treats appearance as transcendental object of thing in itself.

In short, on the one hand, transcendental object, as opposed to empirical or the phenomenal object, may be seen as thing in itself. On the other hand, in the case of the quoted phrase (A 191 B 236) transcendental object is not thing in itself but appearance. In addition, if we take transcendental object in the meaning of immanent (that refers to Kemp Smith’s definition of second meaning) it must be appearance and if it is, since the opposite of the immanent is the transcendent (which is asserted by Kant in A 296) then thing in itself is not transcendental but must be transcendent object.

The difference between the transcendent object and the transcendental object is that, the former is only a thing *which is in itself*, that means has no relation with us and it is completely unknown for us, while the latter implies the *ground of our knowledge*

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<sup>197</sup> Paton op. cit. vol.1, p.442

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.* p.61



of the appearance, that is we do not know the thing in itself but it helps us to conceive how it appears to us. If the thing in itself is regarded as the ground of the appearance, then it is transcendental rather than transcendent. For this ground provides us with the possibility to establish a relation between the thing in itself and appearance. However, for Paton, we can take thing in itself as a “condition” of appearance, rather than as a “ground” of it.<sup>199</sup>

“...appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object -an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object=x.”<sup>200</sup>

In this sense appearance is appearance of the thing in itself, that means appearance has its object as a ground of itself and this ground can only be thing in itself.

Nevertheless, according to Kemp Smith transcendental object in this manner is uncritical.<sup>201</sup> For the doctrine of transcendental object is an earlier argument, that is pre-critical. Thus, Kant does not recognize that the doctrine of transcendental object is not compatible with the critical principles. This doctrine of transcendental object is, for Kemp Smith, a “combination of subjectivism and of dogmatic rationalism” rather than critical.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.* p.62

<sup>200</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 109

<sup>201</sup> Smith op. cit. p.204

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.* p.406

Kemp Smith asserts, “It is true that all our sense-representations are related by the understanding to an object, that is ‘transcendental’”.<sup>203</sup> In this case transcendental object can be grasped, as a ground of appearance and this interpretation of transcendental object is compatible with the critical philosophy for him.

What is more, Kemp Smith continues to argue; by limiting the sensibility, understanding implicitly leaves a place for something that is outside this limit and then it attempts to pass this limit; by this way understanding “proceeds to transform the notion of the transcendental object=x into the concept of a noumenon”.<sup>204</sup> This view of the doctrine of the transcendental object is regarded as un-critical by him.

That means, to say that sensibility is limited by understanding (Kant asserts “... understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves”<sup>205</sup>) implies the fact that same restrictive understanding illegitimately finds the authority in itself to extend beyond this limit. In this way, it carries the transcendental object from the sensible world to the non-sensible, that is from the phenomenal world to intelligible world. In the light of this explanation, sensibility is possible by means of sensible intuitions so the non-sensibility is possible through non-sensible intuitions, that are intellectual intuitions. By this possibility of non-sensible intuition, the notion noumenon, in a positive sense, is prevented from being self-contradictory. Although

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<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.* p.406

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.* p.407

<sup>205</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 256 B 312

the concept of noumena is not self-contradictory, it is yet not legitimate to change the transcendental object = x, which is an empty notion, into a noumenon which is a positive concept. According to Kemp Smith, what Kant calls transcendental illusion in *Dialectic* is this process of transformation of the transcendental object into the noumenon.<sup>206</sup>

“If the objective reality of a concept cannot be in any way known, while yet the concept contains no contradiction and also at the same time is connected with other modes of knowledge that involve given concepts which it serves to limit, I entitle that concept problematic. That concept of a *noumenon* –that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding- is not in any way contradictory. For we cannot assert of sensibility that it is sole possible kind of intuition.”<sup>207</sup>

In its positive sense, Kant asserts that the notion of noumena distinguishes from the notion of objects in general. At this point Kant tries to postulate it not only as legitimate and non-contradictory, but also as necessary.

“The concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge.<sup>208</sup> ... (When understanding limits sensibility by noumena) it at the same time limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the

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<sup>206</sup> Smith op. cit. p.408

<sup>207</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 310

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.* A 255

categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something.”<sup>209</sup>

Then it follows, we can think of “objects in general” without sensibility, that is, in abstraction from sensible intuition. But the notion “objects in general” is empty and it gives rise to illusion. In order to prevent this illusion, Kant postulates noumena. For noumena serves a type of limitation.

Briefly, to gain knowledge of objects of possible experience is not possible without pure forms of intuition, i.e. sensible intuition; but to think of objects *in general* is possible merely through pure categories without sensible intuition.<sup>210</sup> By this way, there occurs a possibility for postulating non-sensible objects, that is noumena. And although we cannot know anything about it, still we can think of it. Therefore, to employ pure categories without intuitions, that is, it may be said, to employ ideas of reason, refers to transcendental employment of the pure categories, while to use pure categories together with intuitions refers to empirical employment of pure categories. In the light of these explanations it is certain that the distinction between phenomena and noumena corresponds to the distinction between the empirical and transcendental employment of concepts.

Now, in order to show how it is possible without contradiction to assert that the possibility of noumena requires the employment of pure categories, we have to emphasize that; since pure categories of understanding is nothing but only the forms

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<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.* A 256 B 312

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.* B 166

of thought<sup>211</sup>, and thing in itself cannot be known but only thought, this thing in itself must be, therefore, located in these pure categories and must be conceived only through them. However, in this process pure categories are only employed transcendently, not empirically. Therefore, although we can have no knowledge of noumena by means of pure categories, Kant leaves a logical possibility for it.

“We cannot think an object save through categories; we cannot *know* an object so thought save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so far as its object is given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. *Consequently there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience.*”<sup>212</sup>

From this quotation, we can conclude that since no *a priori* knowledge is possible except from objects of possible experience, the possibility of thing in itself disappears. In order to prevent this misunderstanding Kant adds a footnote:

“*For thought* the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the *knowledge* of that which we think, the determining of the object, that requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, the thought of the object (transcendental object) may still have its true and useful consequences, as regards subject’s *employment of reason.*”

Finally, it must be emphasized that; the arguments of “Transcendental Aesthetic” give rise to the possibility of asserting that the sensible intuitions are not the only

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<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.* B 288

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.* B 166

form of intuitions and to the possibility of noumenon.<sup>213</sup> Sebastian Gardner asserts that, “Transcendental Aesthetic” affirms the possibility of non-sensible intuitions.<sup>214</sup> Like Gardner, Paton also argues that, “Transcendental Aesthetic” justifies a belief for the possibility of noumena.<sup>215</sup> According to Kant, we can prove neither the only possible kind of intuition is the sensible intuition, nor there is another kind of intuition.<sup>216</sup>

According to Kemp Smith, the argument of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” that, space and time as pure intuitions are subjective forms, that is transcendently ideal, is meaningful only in so far as the possibility of thing in itself is postulated.<sup>217</sup> But this assertion does not prove the objective reality of noumena. Indeed, Kant never attempts to prove the “reality” of noumenon, but only argues whether it is possible.<sup>218</sup>

However, in A 249, which is omitted in B edition, Kant claims that appearance, which is limited by the arguments in “Transcendental Aesthetic”, both provides the objective reality of *noumena* and legitimates not only to divide an object into

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<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.* A 251

<sup>214</sup> Sebastian Gardner *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* 1999, p.200

<sup>215</sup> Paton op. cit. vol.2, p.441

<sup>216</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 252

<sup>217</sup> Smith op. cit. p.406

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.* p.404

*phenomena* and *noumena* but also the separation of the world of senses and the world of understanding.<sup>219</sup>

In addition to that in A 250, which is also omitted in B edition, Kant also asserts that not only empirical employment but also transcendental employment of categories is objectively valid. It is very clear that these two assumptions are far from being compatible with critical doctrine, anyway the reason why A 249 and A 250 is omitted in the B edition lies entirely on the fact that they are pre-critical arguments.

Here, it can be helpful to introduce Wolff's interpretations about the notion thing in itself. According to him this term can be explained in three different meanings, namely, (1) the *independently real* or *a thing in itself*, (2) the *transcendental object* = *x*, and (3) *noumenon*.

In the first case, it implies the independency from the conditions of knowledge, "it is the thing as it is rather than as it appears." However, for Wolff, this independency is not equal to be unconditioned in the strict sense, for it has relation with other independent realities.<sup>220</sup>

In the second case, according to Wolff, at the beginning Kant treats transcendental object as something which is in the field of our knowledge but then he moves to the idea that transcendental object can be seen as equal to thing in itself. Although in this

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<sup>219</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 249

<sup>220</sup> Robert Paul Wolff *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* 1969, p.313

sense this object seems to be a transcendent object rather than transcendental, Kant continues to call it transcendental. At this point, according to Wolff the distinction between the transcendent object and the transcendental object is that, “the former is merely the concept of the thing in itself, but the latter is the concept of the ground of the unity of a manifold of representations in one consciousness.”<sup>221</sup>

In the third case, the distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon is that, for Wolff, the phenomenon is the object of sensibility while the noumenon is the object of intelligence, “for the mind cognizes noumenon by means of the pure concepts of intelligence, uncontaminated by sensibility”. In this sense the source of phenomena is sensible intuition, whereas the source of noumena is the *intellectual intuition*. According to Wolff, Kant “fails to bring them all into accord with one another.”<sup>222</sup>

Despite the obscurity of the chapter “The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena”, Kant, in the relevant paragraphs of the solution of the Third Antinomy, seems to have a clearer attitude about this distinction. In this context, in order to make this distinction between intelligible and sensible character clear, Kant defines “intelligible” as “whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance”.<sup>223</sup> Therefore, from this definition, it can be deduced a conclusion that an object has two different aspects: appearance, in the sense of

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<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.* p.314

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.* p.315

<sup>223</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 538 B 566



sensibility, determined in time, and the thing in itself in respect of its intelligibility, without having any obligation to conform to the conditions of experience. By this way, it seems, for Kant, to have no contradiction to assert that each part may conform to different conditions.

“In its empirical character, therefore, this subject, as appearance, would have to conform to all the laws of causal determination<sup>224</sup> ... In its intelligible character (though we can only have a general concept of that character) this same subject must be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility and from all determination through appearance.<sup>225</sup>”

Firstly, a subject is a part of the sensible world in respect to its empirical character; secondly the same subject should be regarded as a part of intelligible world in respect to its intelligible character. In the case of former, it must be subject to the conditions of experience in time, and due to its intelligible character the same subject can produce a cause which is not itself in the sensible world, but in the intelligible, the effect of this cause can be seen in the sensible world. So this cause itself is not conditioned and does not stand under the conditions of time and space. Thus, sensible character of a subject belongs to the field of appearances, and the intelligible character belongs to the field of things in themselves.<sup>226</sup>

Besides, Kant emphasizes the fact that although the cause, which is produced by the causality of freedom, is not in the field of appearances and not determined by another

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<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.* A 540 B 568

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.* A 541 B 569

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.* A 539 B 567

cause in time, but begins spontaneously, it can produce an effect which can cause another state in the sensible world in accordance with empirical laws.<sup>227</sup> In other words, even though transcendental freedom itself is not in the sensible world, its effect can be seen in the field of appearances and can influence an event in accordance with empirical laws, that is with the conditions of experience. Time, in this sense, is the condition of only appearances, not of thing in itself.<sup>228</sup> The phrases, such as “antecedent cause”, or “preceding event” refers explicitly to the condition of time, namely belong to the world of appearance. The cause, in so far as it is intelligible, therefore, does not have to conform to the conditions of experience, and in case of an event, it does not have to subject to the law of causality, that is, to the causal determination. Consequently, it does not have to be an effect of another preceding event, or antecedent cause. “While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series.”<sup>229</sup>

Therefore, it can begin a new series of events completely of itself. Consequently, the effect can be grasped as free with reference to its intelligible cause, but at the same time it is determined in time because of its character of appearance.

As we have implicitly mentioned, these two different aspects refer to the one and the same subject.<sup>230</sup> Kant maintains that,

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<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.* A 539 B 567 and also Kant op. cit. 1997, p.93

<sup>228</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965 A 540 B 568

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.* A 537 B 565

<sup>230</sup> Kant op. cit. 1997, p.92

“Regarded as the causality of a thing in itself, it is *intelligible* in its *action*; regarded as the causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is *sensible* in its *effects*. We should therefore have to form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of the faculty such a subject, and regard both as referring to one and the same effect.”<sup>231</sup>

By this way, Kant assumes that second form of causality, that is causality of freedom, does not contradict with the universal law of nature, and it does not remove the unity of experience; if, as we have said, we do not regard it as mere representation.

Another important point is that, Kant indicates the difference between “what is” and “ought to be”. While “what is” refers to the law of sensible world, “ought to be” refers to man’s intelligible character. And just as the natural law, such as causality, is regarded as necessity, so “ought” implies a kind of necessity as imperative. “The understanding can know in nature only as ‘what is’.”<sup>232</sup> We cannot say that, however, anything in nature “ought to be” except that what it is actually in time, that is, we cannot derive what the thing “ought to be” from what it is.<sup>233</sup> Therefore, “ought” implies an action which has not occurred but may possibly occur, that is, it is not determined by any antecedent state in time.

Hudson, as Harris claims, asserts that in Kant’s view the intelligible causality, that is transcendental freedom, is equivalent to natural law of causality, as subject partly

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<sup>231</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 538 B 566

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.* A 547 B 575

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.* A 319

belongs to the sensible world. On the other hand, Hudson tells us although the intelligible and natural causality are identical, the intelligible causality differs from natural law of causality, which is affirmed in the Second Analogy, in respect that the causality of reason is always formulated with “ought”, which has no place in natural laws.<sup>234</sup> Rather, Hudson claims that Kant does not impute the notion ‘determination’ to the intelligible causality, but only to natural law of causality. For reason itself does not depend on subjective conditions, in that sense, on the condition of time, that is on the laws of nature. Therefore, “without any contradiction” Kant asserts “on the hand all actions of a man as an appearance must be subject to (or conform to) the causal determination, but on the other hand, the same actions, as actions of thing in itself, in respect of reason, are free. However, as we have said, as the foundation of the cause of appearance, the thing in itself is “unknown for us”. The effect of the causality of reason can be seen in the field of appearances, while the causality of reason itself is not determined in time. The empirical character of a man is itself determined by intelligible character through reason. Its action, therefore, can produce undetermined causes. Reason is not subject to the condition of time. Consequently, Kant assumes that reason acts completely free from the conditions of laws of nature. In the sense of independency of nature, such a freedom is regarded as negative; while in the case of its power of beginning a new series of events; it is in the positive sense.<sup>235</sup>

Therefore, it must be mentioned that, the reason why Kant postulates freedom as a second type of causality is that, freedom, for him, is a necessary condition of

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<sup>234</sup> Hudson “Kant’s Third Antinomy and Anomalous Monism” 2002, p.248

<sup>235</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 554 B 582

morality. If there existed only natural law of causality, then every event would be determined by another preceding event in time in accordance with necessary law which is affirmed in Second Analogy. Even if in case of man's actions, we cannot talk about the responsibility of his acts. For, his actions, as he is a part of phenomenal world, also would be strictly determined by the laws of nature. In order to suppose the existence of practical freedom, therefore, we have to accept that there must be conditions in which something can act of itself independently of these natural causes, that is, without determined by a preceding cause in time. Consequently, "the denial of transcendental freedom must involve the elimination of all practical freedom", that is, of morality.<sup>236</sup> Freedom, in the case of morality, presupposes that "although something has not happened, it ought to have happened".<sup>237</sup> Therefore, in order to preserve freedom from the strict determination of the natural law of causality and to make a room for morality, Kant asserts causality of freedom as a second type of causality together with causality of nature. Perry, in his article "The Abstract Freedom of Kant", mentions that for Kant to find a place for morality is only possible by the notion of freedom. In this case, according to Perry, when we find in the first critique an exposition of freedom as a problematical concept, we must take it as our starting point, not as final point.<sup>238</sup> Freedom, therefore, in the practical sense is the will in so far as it signifies the independency of determinations of sensibility. For, according to Kant, subject has a power of self-determination which provides him to

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<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.* A 534 B 562

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.* A 534 B 562

<sup>238</sup> Ralph Barton Perry "The Abstract Freedom of Kant" 1900, p.630

determine its actions being independently of compulsion of its sensuous desires, so sensibility does not necessarily determine its actions.<sup>239</sup>

Finally, what Kant attempts to show is that, freedom is not compatible with nature if appearance and thing in itself were taken as one and the same thing. In the light of these explanations, Kant assumes that “freedom and nature, in the full sense of these terms, can exist together, without any conflict, in the same actions according as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their sensible cause”.<sup>240</sup> And until now, what Kant attempts to show or to prove is only that “this antinomy (third) rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least *not incompatible with nature*”.<sup>241</sup> What Kant suggests is that; to assert that all appearances without exception must conform to the laws of nature does not necessarily exclude the possibility of intelligible elements as the ground of these appearances, for although freedom is the case, regarding Third Antinomy, we do not necessarily use it to explain the nature. That means, we can explain the nature merely by appearances treating *as if* there was no freedom as a first beginning.<sup>242</sup>

In the next chapter the question whether the natural law of causality and freedom can be compatible, as Kant claimed, will be discussed in the context of the distinction between phenomena and noumena.

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<sup>239</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 534 B 562

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.* A 541 B 569

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* A 558 B 586

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.* A 672 B 699

**CHAPTER 4:**  
**ARGUMENTS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS ON THE SOLUTION OF**  
**THIRD ANTINOMY**  
**(ON COMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM AND THE LAW OF CAUSALITY)**

In previous chapter I have attempted to show the distinction between phenomena and noumena together with the distinction between empirical and intelligible character. And now I will deal with the discussions about the exposition and the solution of Third Antinomy, that is whether freedom is compatible with natural causality or not, and also the problem of compatibility between phenomena and noumena.

First of all, like some other terms Kant's usage of these terms is problematic in the sense that the distinction is obscure and also it is not clear that what is the source of this distinction. This point is crucial because to remove this obscurity will help us in showing how Thesis and Antithesis are compatible. With reference to this problem, I will firstly refer to Allen Wood's interpretations. Wood brings the arguments about the relation of phenomena and noumena in *Critique of Pure Reason* into two main titles. According to Wood, in some paragraphs Kant treats noumena as the cause of phenomena. Therefore, the relation between phenomena and noumena is provided by this causal relation. In the case of this type of relation "appearances are subjective

states in us, that are *caused* by things in themselves outside us”<sup>243</sup>. Rather, instead of the term “cause” Kant more often uses the term “ground”. Wood calls this type of interpretation of relation “the causality interpretation” (and also Allison calls it as such<sup>244</sup>). And he also defines it as “non-identity interpretation”. For, if we are to make a causal connection, there should be two distinct entities, one is the cause and the other is the effect. Wood asserts; “if a given appearance is grounded on or caused by some thing in itself, then at the very least, it cannot be identical with that very thing that ground or causes it; so it has to be a different thing.”<sup>245</sup>

Secondly, in some paragraphs Kant holds that phenomena and noumena signifies one and the same entity. That means, by making a distinction Kant does not point out two distinct entities but rather they are the characteristics of one and the same being as they appear to us and as they are. In this case, “every appearance is *identical* to a thing in itself, and the distinction is not between two different entities but between two ways of thinking about or referring to the same entity.”<sup>246</sup> Wood calls this type of interpretation “the identity interpretation”.

In the light of these explanations, with reference to the distinction of these two types of interpretations, Wood also treats the causality interpretation as the “two worlds interpretation”. For, it is very clear that the causality interpretation implies that appearances and things in themselves establish two different worlds, that is “two

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<sup>243</sup> Allen W. Wood *Kant* 2005, p.64

<sup>244</sup> Henry E. Allison *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* 1983, p.239

<sup>245</sup> Wood op.cit. p.64

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.* p.65



separate realms of distinct entities”<sup>247</sup>. And Wood adds that it is also justifiable to define the identity interpretation as “two worlds interpretation” as much as the causality interpretation. Accordingly, one being belongs to the world of appearances as being the object of sensible intuition and also it belongs to the world of things in themselves as existing independent of our sensible intuition. The important point which must be emphasized according to causality interpretation is that appearance is not identical with the thing in itself.

Therefore, these two types of interpretations results in two different kinds of relations which, according to Wood, make them incompatible. Although it is not possible to prefer one of these interpretations if we refer to Kant’s own texts<sup>248</sup>, according to Wood, we should choose the identity interpretation if we would like to make a reconciliation between phenomena and noumena in the solution of the Third Antinomy<sup>249</sup>. This is because if we strictly separate these two worlds as the causality interpretation does, we completely lose the ground for reconciling these two realms. On the other hand, according to Allison, although these two interpretations seem to have crucial distinctions, in fact they refer to same thing in different expressions.<sup>250</sup>

When we examine Allen Wood’s article “Kant’s Compatibilism”, in relation with these problems, Wood asserts that Kant does not only attempt to reconcile freedom and natural causality but also to show “the compatibility of compatibilism and

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<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.* p.65

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.* p.64

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.* p.71

<sup>250</sup> Allison op.cit. p.242

incompatibilism”<sup>251</sup>. The compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism signifies, in my opinion, the compatibility of the Thesis and Antithesis in Third Antinomy in the sense that while Thesis, as we have seen, is presented as compatibility of determinism and freedom due to heterogeneity, Antithesis strictly rejects this compatibility because of its homogeneous character by asserting that determinism and freedom cannot be compatible. Wood takes Kant’s compatibilism as dependent on “the aggressively metaphysical distinction between phenomena and noumena”<sup>252</sup>. In Wood’s view Kant suggests that freedom and causal determinism can be compatible only through the assertion that they belong to completely to different worlds.<sup>253</sup>

According to Wood, when Kant talks about the distinctions between noumena and phenomena, or between intelligible character and empirical character in general, it is not clear how they can be reconciled or how reconciliation can be consistent<sup>254</sup>, but in the case of human actions it is possible to reconcile them by the fact that “phenomenal causality is grounded in noumenal causality”<sup>255</sup>. That means, in the case of human actions, causality which occurs in empirical world can be seen as an effect of intelligible causality. Accordingly, causes of empirical actions are found in the noumenal world in the sense that they are determined by intelligible causes, and yet they seem to be in the series of the natural events and they seem as if they were

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<sup>251</sup> Allen W. Wood “Kant’s Compatibilism” 1998, p.239

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.* p.240

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.* p.241

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.* p.248

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.* p.250

determined by causality of nature. However, Wood goes on saying that he does not believe that is all for Kant, since human actions are also determined by antecedent events in accordance with the laws of nature and the empirical causality is not only “apparent” in his actions but rather it must be treated, according to Wood, as the “real cause” in so far as they occur in the field of appearances. Yet, they are not complete and sufficient to explain human actions, as human actions are also effected by causality of freedom.<sup>256</sup> In this sense, for Wood, as opposed to Kant’s own views (as Kant does not claim that empirical cause is not sufficient for its effect but rather empirical cause is not sufficient to explain itself without regarding its effect), the real cause does not have to be sufficient to produce its effect or to be complete. Hudson asserts in his article “Kant’s Third Antinomy and Anomalous Monism” that Wood’s interpretation is “stronger” than Kant’s own views in this respect: it renders transcendental freedom necessary in order to produce a new series of events in the sensible world. However, Kant attempts to show only its possibility through showing that it is not incompatible with nature.<sup>257</sup> However, Hudson claims, it is a sacrifice of a necessity (of natural law of causality) for the sake of a possibility (of causality of freedom). Namely, if Wood is right in his claim that empirical cause is not sufficient even to lead its effect, then Kant is not consistent since by accepting this view he would ruin the argument of the Second Analogy which asserts clearly that empirical cause is sufficiently and necessarily determines its effects. Then, Hudson concludes, “either Wood is mistaken in his interpretation or Kant is inconsistent”<sup>258</sup>.

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<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.* p.251

<sup>257</sup> Hudson op. cit. p.236

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.* p.238

For Hudson, Wood, in his article “Kant’s Compatibilism”, seems to have an attitude to accept “two worlds interpretation” which signifies an ontological distinction. Allison agrees with this view that such a distinction necessarily takes us to an ontological distinction.<sup>259</sup> In addition, Kemp Smith thinks independently from this two-world discussion that the distinction of phenomena and noumena is an ontological distinction.<sup>260</sup> On the other hand, Perry supposes that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, in fact, is not an ontological distinction. For noumenon cannot have “possible mode of existence”, apart from the phenomenon. Noumenon, according to Perry, is not an entity, unlike phenomenon, with an independent “substantial” existence, since “substance” is a category of only in the phenomenal order in the sensible world.<sup>261</sup>

Besides, Hudson asserts another hypothesis “two-descriptions” instead of Wood’s “two-worlds” hypothesis. The two-descriptions theory differs mainly from Wood’s argument in respect that there are not two selves which belong to two different worlds, but there is only one world and one self which are described in different way.<sup>262</sup> One of these descriptions implies intelligible character, whereas another concerns with the sensible character. Kant himself also, in his *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals*, emphasizes the fact that “he (a rational being) can consider himself, first so far as he belongs to the sensible world, to be under laws of nature, and secondly so far as he belongs to the intelligible world, to be under laws which

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<sup>259</sup> Allison op. cit. p.239

<sup>260</sup> Smith op. cit p.513

<sup>261</sup> Perry op. cit. p.641

<sup>262</sup> Hudson op. cit. p.239

being independent of nature, are not empirical but have their ground in reason alone”. In this context, according to Hudson, Kant seems to point out that the concept of freedom is acceptable only in respect of a two-descriptions view, not of two-worlds hypothesis. It is, therefore, legitimate to insist on the fact that phenomenon and noumenon refer to the same subject in two different relations.

With reference to this discussion about two-world argument, Beck indicates a dilemma that if the reality of freedom makes a difference to the unity of nature, then it must be seen that there is no unity of nature. On the other hand, if it does not any make a difference then it cannot be possible to talk about the reality of such freedom.<sup>263</sup>

In order to overcome this dilemma, Beck suggests two ways. According to one of them, if we take the world as consisting of two realms as phenomenal and noumenal, then this assumption signifies an ontological distinction. And this is two-world theory. However, for Beck, Kant prefers a “two-aspect” theory (this theory is almost identical with Hudson’s two-description theory or Wood’s identity interpretation) instead of two-world theory. In the case of second way is to regard freedom and causal determination as regulative ideas which are “co-ordinate”, not “one as subordinate to the other in constitutive authority in experience”. In order to provide the conditions for the second way, in Beck’s account, we have only one evidence which is mentioned in *Critique of Judgment*. Namely, according to Beck, we can extend the solution of the relation between the mechanical determination of nature

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<sup>263</sup> Beck op. cit. p.192

and theological causation to the relation between freedom and natural causation and by this way just as mechanical determination of nature is taken as a regulative idea, so we can take natural causation as a regulative idea.<sup>264</sup>

Therefore, Beck thinks that Kant takes the solution of Antinomy of Theological Judgment as a model for the resolution of Third Antinomy. Accordingly, if we take both Thesis and Antithesis of the Third Antinomy as regulative principles in two distinct fields, for Beck, we can have two maxims and by this way freedom and natural causality can be compatible. These maxims are: (1) “Always (in science) search for mechanical causes and allow no non-natural causes to enter into the explanation of natural phenomena.” (2) “Always (in ethics) act as if the maxim of the will were a sufficient determining ground of the conduct to be executed or judged.”<sup>265</sup>

Thus, what Beck asserts simply is that, like Kant<sup>266</sup>, we will not deny the possibility of freedom but we will, in the case of science, act as if there were no freedom as a second type of causality. According to Hudson, this view is also beneficial, because it does not sacrifice Kant’s assertions for the sake of a two-world view by making an ontological claim.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.* p.192

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.* p.193

<sup>266</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 672 B 700

<sup>267</sup> Hudson op. cit. p.243

Perry also considers that in order to solve the problem of reconciliation between causality of freedom and of nature, we have to comprehend what the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon implies. According to him, our interpretation of Kantian freedom depends upon our interpretation of noumenon as an intelligible or transcendental object.<sup>268</sup> In this context, he stresses that the noumenon is an integral part of Kant's system and it is a misunderstanding to see Kant as a subjective idealist due to his exposition of noumenon. For Kant was conscious of the fact that, Perry asserts, "After he had firmly established his conceptual order and natural science, he had nevertheless not discovered the whole reality".<sup>269</sup> In fact, in Perry's account, the noumenon is regarded as a "reminder" of the fact that we can know the sensible world only in so far as it is appearance, but we cannot know what it really is in itself. In this sense, Perry mentions, "the divorce between phenomenon and noumenon is the divorce between the knowable and the real".<sup>270</sup>

Furthermore, Perry claims that this distinction also implies a need for the capacity of human reason to distinguish the 'that' from the 'what' in the subject. In this sense, there are two modes of representation, namely, 'the sensible' and 'the intelligible'. That means, in Perry's view, "we can represent to ourselves 'what' the object is by virtue of the former", that is, how it is related to other objects; and by virtue of the latter "we can represent to ourselves 'that' an object is".<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Perry op. cit. p.636

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.* p.635

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.* p.636

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.* p.644

Harris has an interpretation about this issue. He points out that natural causality, in Kant's account, as we have said, is not enough to explain the phenomena, so we need another type of causality. That is causality of freedom. Every event has a cause and with respect to natural causality this leads us to infinite or "incomplete" series of causes. Any cause in the field of appearance is not purely a cause but an effect at the same time. So it cannot be a true cause, in other words, it cannot give an ultimate explanation. According to Harris, "since no previous event originates anything", it is clear that this cannot be a real causality.<sup>272</sup> When Kant says we cannot find true cause by the causality of nature, he destroys both the validity and the existence of it. However, then he proceeds that there are two kinds of causality, but as he destroys the causality of nature, there remains only one. According to Harris, this is the point where Kant is mistaken. He destroys the existence of natural causality to present the causality of freedom but then again claims that there is a causality of nature as a type of causality. In this respect, Harris says "the series of phenomena in nature would lack causality, if spontaneity or self-activity is denied."<sup>273</sup> In this sense, the reason why Kant introduces the term "true cause" is to render freedom possible. According to Harris, the idea of natural causality belongs to an inconsistent dualism, as provides things to happen and then leaves them to go on of themselves. However, it asserts that, the spontaneous factor of causality is taken to the series of phenomena in nature; in this way created things become real and true causes. And they can originate new distinctions. In this case, "there would be no need for the infinite regress of cause to

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<sup>272</sup> Harris op. cit. p.6

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid* p.7



explain any given event.”<sup>274</sup> According to Harris, the fallacy of Kant’s true cause argument is also can be seen in the Antithesis, as he asserts that natural cause is the absolute cause for every event in the world. But it is not satisfactory because there is a “beginning of action” and so there must be a true cause, namely freedom, and this destroys this causality argument. Therefore, it is “destructive of the unity of experience.”<sup>275</sup>

Now, I will attempt to investigate how the interpreters of Kant evaluate the arguments of Thesis and Antithesis. First of all, Allison asserts that the argument of the Thesis constitutes “the most negative conclusion” that natural causality is not the only kind of causality.

With reference to the Thesis, the most crucial part of the problem is that what the assertion “a cause sufficiently determined a priori” means. According to Allison, it must be seen that the claim is that the cause must be sufficiently “determined” not that it must be “sufficient”.<sup>276</sup> In Allison’s account, these terms do not have the same meaning. For him, however, it is common to understand it as a “sufficient cause” which is able to describe the whole effect. When it is related with the argument of Second Analogy, it can be clearly asserted that every event should have a sufficient cause, and when it is understood in this meaning there is no problem in asserting “the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently

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<sup>274</sup> *Ibid* p.9

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid* p.10

<sup>276</sup> Henry E. Allison *Kant’s Theory of Freedom* 1990, p.32

determined *a priori*.” However, then there would be no contradiction which is required for an antinomy. Besides Kemp Smith takes the phrase “a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*” as sufficient cause.<sup>277</sup> When criticizing the argument of the Thesis, Kemp Smith argues that principle of causality seeks for a sufficient cause for each event, but this sufficiency cannot be met within the series of causal chains, since every empirical cause is itself derivative and conditioned. That means, although principle of causality is conditioned, it still seeks for a sufficient cause and therefore principle of causality contradicts itself. However, according to Kemp Smith Kant’s this argument is not valid. For, Kemp Smith asserts, “each natural cause is sufficient to account for its effect. That is to say, the causation is sufficient *at each stage*.”<sup>278</sup> According to Kemp Smith, the problem is in fact not insufficiency but rather infinity. What Kant has to prove is not self-contradiction of sufficiency but self-contradiction of infinity.

On the other hand, according to Bennett, Kemp Smith is mistaken in his interpretation, since when Kant uses the phrase “a cause sufficiently determined” he underlines the characteristic of the cause itself but not its relation to its effect in the sense of explaining it sufficiently. Kant already accepts in the Second Analogy the fact that every empirical cause must be necessarily sufficient to account for its effect. In this case Bennett holds that “cause should be treated as independent of the effect rather than how it must relate to the effect”<sup>279</sup>. Therefore if a cause, for Bennett, has

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<sup>277</sup> Smith op.cit. p.492

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.* p.493

<sup>279</sup> Jonathan Bennett *Kant's Dialectic* 1990, p.186

the power to explain itself without any need to look for an antecedent state or an effect, then this cause is sufficient.

Ewing agreed with Kemp Smith's interpretation and says: "...there must be something which is its own cause, otherwise causation gives no ultimate explanation or reason at all..." But for Bennett these interpretations are wrong, since "a justification needs a justified basis, but an explanation does not need an explained basis"<sup>280</sup> and yet Bennett agrees with Ewing's interpretation in the sense that if the natural causality is the only type of causality, then "no causal explanation can be 'ultimate' in the sense of leaving nothing to be explained". This damages the Antithesis argument in which natural causality is the only kind, and that every event has an "ultimate" explanation.

Jonathan Bennett agrees with Allison by saying that there is an important distinction between sufficiently determined and sufficient. Also we should beware of the meaning of the term "a priori" here. It is not in the meaning of "independently of all experience" how Kant uses it, but it is used in the meaning "in advance" or "independently" in the usual pre-Kantian sense. "So the thought is that the cause must be sufficiently determined in advance of, or independently of its relation with the effect."<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.* P.185

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.* p.186

For Beck, the Thesis-argument “is a proof of the impossibility of an infinite series of causes and hence of the necessity of a first cause”. But, Beck’s account faces a difficulty in the sense that how this proof is supposed to work as the most important phrase is “a condition that is a priori sufficient”. With this suggestion it turns up to be an infinity problem, however, Bennett says that, it is not a point for Kant, because what matters is not “the magnitude of the series of conditions” but rather “the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned”. That means, for Bennett, Thesis does not concern with an infinity problem but with “the nature of the causal relation”<sup>282</sup>. Bennett says that infinity is in a close relation with totality, and totality is a crucial point of the Thesis argument, it is not the point of the antinomy. Kant says,

“(The Antithesis) would seem to imply the existence of a chain of causes which in the regress to their conditions allows of no *absolute totality*. But that need not trouble us. The point has already been dealt with in the general discussion of the antinomy into which reason falls when in the series of appearances it proceeds to the unconditioned.”<sup>283</sup>

According to Allison, the main idea of the argument of the Thesis is far from being convincing.<sup>284</sup> Likewise, the Thesis, for Bennett, could not be persuading even if it were perfect; “If the concept of freedom solves problems about humans, then why invoke cosmology in its defense? If it cannot satisfactorily solve such problems, how

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<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.* p.187

<sup>283</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 543 B 571

<sup>284</sup> Allison op. cit. 1990, p.16

could cosmology rescue it? There is no philosophical justification for leading into human freedom through the Thesis-argument which Kant has given us.”<sup>285</sup>

When we come to the argument of the Antithesis, firstly, Kemp Smith attracts attention to the strange relation of the proofs of Thesis and Antithesis. Accordingly, for Thesis if freedom is not postulated then the principle of causality would contradict itself and for the Antithesis “freedom is impossible for the same reason”. That means both parts of the Third Antinomy asserts that the other is self-contradictory and they try to prove their validity by this way. The reason why this is strange is that, “a principle cannot be reconciled with itself through the making of an assumption which contradicts it”. According to Kemp Smith, in an antinomy argument of the Thesis and argument of the Antithesis necessarily conflict each other, but their grounds must not contradict, in the sense that they should not depend on different grounds, “which they establish themselves”, otherwise there remains an empty and meaningless discussion. For, “an antinomy is not the simple assertion that both A and not-A are true, but that A and not-A, though contradictory one another, can both be established by arguments in which such contradiction does not occur.”<sup>286</sup>

However, what Kant mistakes in the Third Antinomy is this contradiction between grounds of Thesis and Antithesis, as he uses the meanings of the terms arbitrarily. This becomes clear, for Kemp Smith, in the example of the use term “the principle of natural causality” in the Thesis and the Antithesis. Namely, if Kant asserted, in Thesis, as he did in Antithesis, that the meaning of the term signifies the fact that

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<sup>285</sup> Bennett op. cit. 1990, p.189

<sup>286</sup> Smith op. cit. p.494

“every event has an *antecedent* cause determining it to exist” then there would be no place for postulating freedom, so he uses the term in the sense of “a cause sufficiently determined” to make a room for freedom in Thesis. According to Kemp Smith, the principle of natural causality clearly refers to the former, that is to “antecedent cause” rather than the latter. In this sense, the proof of the Thesis can be seen to be unacceptable for Kemp Smith. The principle of causality is not self-contradictory. The reason why Kant attempts to show that it is self-contradictory is only for the sake of postulating freedom. Kant wants neither to lose the unity of experience nor to give up the idea of freedom. From this point of view Kant seems to be “both running with the hare and hunting with the hounds”.

Strawson also finds the Antithesis as “consistent with the results of Second Analogy” and calls it “simple denial of freedom”.<sup>287</sup> Moreover, according to Allison, like Kemp Smith, the argument of the Antithesis is more consistent than of the Thesis. Unlike Thesis, Antithesis is not self-contradictory, rather if one of the propositions is denied, then the argument would not provide the conditions of possible experience. For Allison “whatever conflicts with conditions of the unity of experience, or more generally whatever is experientially impossible, is also impossible.” And for him, these features of the argument, as Kemp Smith emphasizes as a strange relation, may render both the Thesis and the Antithesis true.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>287</sup> P. F. Strawson *The Bounds of Sense* 1968, p.208

<sup>288</sup> Allison op. cit. 1990, p.20

However there are also counterarguments for the Antithesis. First of all they assert that the argument of the Antithesis is “question begging” or “circular”. They find the argument of the Antithesis the same with Analytic and they do not accept Kant’s application of the results of the Analytic to the argument of the Antithesis. By doing this, Kant commits the results of Analytic for the sake of transcendental idealism. Also, for the argument of the Antithesis to work the freedom must be lawless in opposition to Kant’s freedom. If the freedom is not lawless, then it does not vanish the unity of experience, and that does not contradict with the Antithesis’s argument. Allison’s response to these counterarguments is negative. According to him validity of the causal principle is not “question begging”<sup>289</sup>. Because the premise “every beginning of action presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause” and the validity of the principle is accepted by both the Thesis and the Antithesis. Indeed, the problem here is that whether the freedom is possible when the validity of this principle accepted. And the Antithesis clearly argues that the freedom is not possible. In addition to that, Allison asserts, Antithesis does not presuppose the truth of transcendental idealism as, for Kant, transcendental realism affirms that there is only one type of causality, that is causality of nature, and this is proved in the Second Analogy. What is important here, for Allison, is that the distinction between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism is not in the empirical level but rather beyond the possible experience. Kant says “does distinction of the mode in which we view the reality of these objects of the senses become of importance, as serving to guard us against a deceptive error which is bound to arise if we

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<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.* p.21

misinterpret our empirical concepts”<sup>290</sup>. For Allison, the assertion that the freedom must be lawless for the Antithesis’ argument to work, which is opposed to Kant’s view, is not even a matter. Also the Antithesis has a dogmatic empiricist approach and it assumes freedom as lawless rather than reflecting Kant’s own views. So the concept of freedom is incompatibilist and it conflicts with laws of nature.

By asserting that there is only type of causality, the argument of the Antithesis generalizes the rules and extends the area that the causality rules over. By this way the Antithesis does not make a distinction between the things in themselves and the objects of possible experience. However, there is no such generalization in Analytic, the rules are only accepted for the objects of possible experience. Consequently the Antithesis, unlike Analytic, rejects the existence of freedom not only in the rules of nature but rather completely. So the claim that the arguments of Antithesis depend on the Analytic is not true for Allison.<sup>291</sup>

Finally, the Antithesis, like Thesis, uses the uncertainty of the notion of sufficient reason as an advantage to prove its argument. The basic distinction between the Thesis and the Antithesis is that, what is crucial for the Thesis is completeness whereas what is crucial for the Antithesis is universality. In other words, the Thesis, being in a dogmatic rationalist approach, claims that “reason demands the unconditioned unity that satisfies the conditions of thought” whereas the Antithesis, being in a dogmatic empiricist approach, claims that “understanding demands consistency and connectibility, that satisfies the conditions of experience”.

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<sup>290</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 496-7 B 525

<sup>291</sup> Allison op. cit. 1990, p.22



When we come to Strawson's view about the arguments of Third Antinomy "series of causality", according to him, must exist as a "whole", but in the concept of causality of freedom, we cannot talk about such a "wholeness" or completeness. For, what exist must be caused by an antecedent cause otherwise there would be no existence. "Since the series does not exist as a whole, there is no question of its existing either as an infinite whole or, as is asserted in the Thesis, as a finite whole with a first, uncaused member. Every member of the series which is actually 'met with' in experience, however, may and must, be taken to have an antecedent cause. The Thesis, then, is false, the Antithesis is true."<sup>292</sup> So every object of possible experience as a "member of the series" must have an antecedent cause. However, Allison does not agree with this claim. He responds to this claim by asserting that Strawson treats as if Kant does not claim in the mathematical antinomies neither the Thesis nor the Thesis is true. In addition, "it also fails to distinguish between the regulative demand always to seek further conditions and the Antithesis's dogmatic assertion of the presence of an actual infinity of conditions"<sup>293</sup>. According to Allison "Kant regards the Antithesis as being as dogmatic in its own way as the Thesis" and this is what Strawson does not notice. Kant makes a distinction between two types of antinomies according to how they regress from conditioned to condition, that is, from effect to cause. Namely, in the mathematical antinomies cause and effect are "homogeneous" that is they both occur in the same spatio-temporal series. That means, both the cause and the effect are in the sensible world. As a result of this assumption antinomical conflict requires that these causes and effects form a

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<sup>292</sup> Strawson op. cit. p.209

<sup>293</sup> Allison op. cit. 1990, p.23

completeness or in Strawson's words "wholeness". According to principle of reason "if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned ... is also given". So the set of causes and effects "must be composed of either finite or infinite number of the members". According to Allison, by rejecting this assumption Strawson also denies both the finitistic and the infinitistic alternatives. Here Allison emphasizes two points. First point is that, the dynamical antinomies serve the possibility of both homogeneity and heterogeneity without contradiction, whereas the mathematical antinomies are only homogeneous. The heterogeneous structure of dynamical antinomies, as we have mentioned, renders it possible for the Thesis to assert the causality of freedom as a second type of causality.

As a result of these, it can be said that, the incompatibility of Antithesis and Thesis arises from the Antithesis's denial of possibility of freedom. Both sides may be correct if the Antithesis accepts the possibility of causality of freedom. So, Allison agrees with Kant in the claim that either the Thesis or the Thesis may be true.

Furthermore, Allison points out that the difference between the regressions of the antinomies from the conditioned to condition also implies the difference between the antinomies' conceptions of totality. World, in this sense, is a "complete set or totality of spatio-temporal items", that is a whole as a magnitude collection. However, according to Allison, this concept is self-contradictory as in spite of being composed of finite or infinite number of empirical elements, it requires both a search for further conditions and seeks for completeness and this conflicts with the conditions of

possible experience. On the other hand, nature as an explanatory whole leaves nothing to be explained. That means, “The existence of everything conditioned to be explained.”<sup>294</sup>

Explanatory whole, unlike mathematical whole, is not self-contradictory, as there is no necessity of all items to be spatio-temporal. Heterogeneity makes it possible that condition of a spatio-temporal conditioned can be non-spatiotemporal, that is intelligible. Completeness, which is demanded, can be provided by finding the unconditioned condition of a series. As a result of this, there is nothing left to be explained in the causal chain. However, it conflicts with the condition of possible experience as it includes a condition that is non-sensible, or non-empirical.

For these reasons, according to Allison, Antithesis of the Third Antinomy does not maintain that the notion of an unconditioned cause is self-contradictory. In Third Antinomy, being different from mathematical antinomies, the task is to make seemingly conflicting two notions, which are Thesis and Antithesis, compatible instead of rejecting both of them. Allison asserts, “It is, therefore, systematic difference rather than, as is usually assumed, Kant’s misguided zeal to reconcile science and morality that accounts for the difference in the treatment of the two types of antinomy.”<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.* p.24

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 24-25

Resolution of mathematical antinomies, unlike dynamical antinomies, implies an indirect proof of transcendental idealism. According to Allison, the rejection of the transcendental realism results in (in logical sense) the possibility of the assertion of the transcendental ideality of appearances. For him, the key point in the discourse is that, since the concept of an explanatory whole is not self-contradictory, there is no need to reject it.<sup>296</sup> Allison adds that, Kant cannot argue that it is possible to deduce the concept of transcendental realism from the self-contradictory nature of the world, as a complete collection. Likewise, it is not possible to affirm transcendental idealism with the negation of transcendental realism. As Kant cannot argue these, he serves the transcendental idealism as a solution and he uses it to explain how the apparently incompatible elements of explanatory whole can be compatible. This entails that, in the Third Antinomy freedom as a transcendental idea is logically possible. But for Allison, it is such a view Kant strictly rejects, at least theoretically. “Thus, although transcendental idealism resolves the antinomy by showing that ‘causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature’ (A 558 B 586), this does not suffice to establish the truth of transcendental idealism.”

For Allison, freedom is an incompatibilist conception, and he thinks what Kant should do is not “reconciliation of free agency with causal determinism” but rather “reconciliation of causal determinism with an incompatibilist conception of freedom”<sup>297</sup>. In Wood’s words; “compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism”. Although I have explained Wood’s this view with reference to

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<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.* p.25

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.* p.28

Thesis and Antithesis of Third Antinomy, Allison takes the phrase from a different point of view. For Allison, freedom refers to incompatibilist conception since it seems to conflict with the conclusion of Second Analogy.

Furthermore, according to Bennett, Antithesis has more weight than the Thesis, as it is strongly supported by Analytic whereas the Thesis seems “desultory” and “obscure”.<sup>298</sup> And for Bennett, Kant seems to be lack of confidence about it. Also Hudson asserts that “Kant does not seem to be satisfied” with the presentation and the solution of the Third Antinomy, as his “obsession” made him to write about his solution repeatedly after his *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>299</sup> However, for Bennett, Kant seems to have a sympathy for the Thesis not because of “causal sufficiency” or “completeness of causal chains” but absolutely for “human freedom”.<sup>300</sup>

Bennett, though not referring to Beck, meets with him by asserting that if we take freedom as a regulative idea and natural causality as a constitutive principle, then transcendental freedom does not make a difference. According to Bennett, Kant treats causality of freedom as “the causality of reason”. Because causality of freedom cannot be experienced but it is thought through reason. Bennett holds that “if Kant is right that thinking involves concepts and that these are tools for the orderly management of intuitions, then the theory of noumenal freedom does not even make

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<sup>298</sup> Bennett op. cit. 1990, p.188

<sup>299</sup> Hudson op. cit. p.234

<sup>300</sup> Bennett op. cit. 1990, p.188

a sense.”<sup>301</sup> In this sense, Bennett, like Beck, seems to use the argument of *Critique of Judgment* in order to solve Third Antinomy.

As we have said, Kant has an attempt to bring two causes together. He asserts that in one event both causality of nature and the transcendental freedom are effective. Bennett criticizes this view by summarizing the reconciliation as such: “These two causes cannot conflict, because they cannot even meet. One is in the empirical realm, while the other is in the intelligible realm.”<sup>302</sup> One of the reasons why Bennett criticizes Kant’s reconciliation theory is that even though Kant makes a distinction between empirical and intelligible character in order to postulate transcendental freedom and this intelligible character, for Bennett, “fills an otherwise an empty place in the theory of noumenal causality, but it fills it only with words”<sup>303</sup>. For, we do not have a concept for such a noumenal item.

Another reason is that, in his “Observation” Kant seems to have an attitude as if he is “illustrating the Thesis” in case of acting “in complete freedom”, according to Bennett, which “demands more than the reconciling theory will allow”<sup>304</sup>. Also there is another reason for Bennett’s criticism that, Kant says, freedom involves “independence of empirical conditions”, and this implies that, for Bennett, Kant here

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<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.* p.194

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.* p.193

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.* p.192

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.* p.194

leaves his compatibilism and “implicitly allows that freedom can interfere with –or at least fill a gap by- natural causality”<sup>305</sup>. Kant asserts;

“Sometimes ... we find, or at least believe that we find, that the ideas of reason have in actual fact proved their causality in respect of the actions of men, as appearances; and that these actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.”<sup>306</sup>

In this phrase Bennett points out the expression “not because”. Kant does not say “not only because they were determined”, but “not because”. That implies the fact that according to Kant in some cases intelligible causes rule over in the empirical realm. And also that means, “Kant quietly construing freedom as being in competition with natural causality”<sup>307</sup>. Furthermore, freedom sets its seal on the phenomenal realm implying that the natural causality does not prevail. In this context, Kant “repeatedly” claims both that the freedom influences the realm of appearances and that everything happens in the phenomenal world are in accordance with the laws of nature. From these explanations, for Bennett, it can be said that although Kant’s determinism is damaged yet it is not reconciliation.

Finally, according to Bennett, Kant’s reconciliation theory does not “honor” the Thesis, as it is not related with Kant’s real interests. Kant claims that empirical world is not real world but there is a more real world behind the given, but his claim is, for

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<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.* p.199

<sup>306</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, B 578

<sup>307</sup> Bennett op. cit. 1990, p.200

Bennett, “worse than merely dubious”. Bennett concludes, whatever we say, we cannot deny “his theory has the abstract form of a reconciliation between determinism and something that might be called freedom.” In addition, for Bennett, Kant was not satisfied with “mere absence of self-contradiction” of causality of freedom, but indeed he wants more than this.<sup>308</sup> Accordingly, Kant aims to extend freedom from the noumenal world to which it is condemned, and release it to reign in the phenomenal world.

When we come back to Ewing’s view about Third Antinomy, the distinction between the Thesis and the Antithesis is that, for Ewing, the Thesis deals with the series of conditions from the aspect of totality whereas the Antithesis deals with them only from the aspect of probability of its members. According to Ewing, for Kant, fallacy arises from the use of the term “conditioned”. The principle “if the conditioned is given, then the whole series of all conditions of this conditioned is also given” is correct only as far as the conditions are not in time but things-in-themselves. However, in the phrase “objects of the senses are given to us as conditioned”, the term conditioned is used in an empirical sense of concepts of understanding that it is applied only in the field of appearances.<sup>309</sup> Thus, in the former the term conditioned refers to idea of reason corresponding no object in experience, whereas in the latter it refers to an empirical concept of understanding. In this case, like Ewing, Beck also thinks that here the term conditioned amounts to two different meanings. For, if we

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<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.* p.195

<sup>309</sup> A. C. Ewing *Kant’s Treatment of Causality* 1969, p.187



take the conditioned in the same meaning, then the antinomy cannot be solved.<sup>310</sup> Therefore, according to Beck, the idea of totality of conditions is not a constitutive idea in which we can find an object of experience but a regulative idea or a “rule prescribing a regress in the series of given appearances, and forbidding (reason) to bring the regress to a close by treating anything it may arrive at (in experience) as absolutely unconditioned”<sup>311</sup>. If we take phenomena as thing in itself then this regulative idea must be taken as constitutive idea so neither freedom nor natural causation can be true, for Beck.<sup>312</sup> Kant emphasizes,

“The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition and the whole series of the conditions involved no limitation through time at all and no concept of succession. On the other hand, the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in the phenomenal world is necessarily successive and they are only given as following each other in time, consequently I was not able to presuppose the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series represented...For, (in the transcendental sense of pure category) all members of the series are given in themselves (without the condition of time), in the other they are only possible through the successive regress which is only given in its actual fulfillment.”<sup>313</sup>

Ewing also stresses, as Kemp Smith does, the Thesis of the Third Antinomy is based on the principle of causality that “nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori”. That is, the principle of causality is used in a meaning which is distinct from its meaning in the Second Analogy and Antithesis. According to

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<sup>310</sup> Beck op. cit. p.186

<sup>311</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 509 B 537

<sup>312</sup> Beck op. cit. p.187

<sup>313</sup> Kant op .cit. 1965, B 528

Ewing, this definition reduces the Thesis to the principle of sufficient reason in no relation with time.<sup>314</sup> By this definition Kant asserts that there is no such necessity for a cause of a state to be in an antecedent, rather the cause may be the state itself. For, if every state requires an antecedent state then it carries us to a never-ending series of events in time, and as a result of this we cannot gain a completion of series.

According to Ewing, as it is difficult to regard such an infinity as completed, the Thesis argument seems more plausible.<sup>315</sup> However, this difficulty is not only met with in the case of causality but rather it is a difficulty met in all of the four antinomies. Namely, in the First Antinomy, it is asserted that, we suppose there is no beginning of the series of an event in time, however if we are to require a completion, the series must be finite but not infinite. Then, Ewing suggests that we may regard the cause as the same with “logical ground”. However, he adds, then so causality can be accounted for not merely of a necessary connection but also a principle of explanation. If we take causality in this meaning, then it is clear that there is no help of looking for further conditions which has no explanation of itself. So, there must be at least one condition which explains also itself, that has a logical ground.<sup>316</sup>

In addition, according to Ewing, if the cause is not the ground of the effect, the problem is not only that there would be no explanation of the effect but also we even

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<sup>314</sup> Ewing op .cit. p.188

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.* p.189

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid* p.189

cannot suppose an infinite series of events, as there would be no necessary logical connection between them.<sup>317</sup>

Likewise, Sidgwick asserts that the problem of the First Antinomy is similar to the problem of the Third Antinomy in the sense that while the former deals with a first beginning problem; the latter similarly deals with the problem of an unconditioned cause. According to Sidgwick we should not separate First and Third antinomies in their solutions, otherwise it would not be persuasive.<sup>318</sup> However, Sidgwick asserts that, Kant errs by arguing that there can be an unconditioned cause in the series while he clearly asserts that there is no reason for the world to begin in a definite time instead of another, as there can be no “condition decisive of existence rather than non-existence”. Also Kemp Smith holds that the criticism of the Thesis of First Antinomy may be applied to the Thesis of Third Antinomy.<sup>319</sup>

In short, Ewing asserts, the Thesis aims to show that taking an antecedent event as a cause does not explain phenomena and so does not satisfy the demand of reason to know, because by this way we can never reach the complete series of conditions.<sup>320</sup>

The Antithesis, as we know, assumes that “every event must have an antecedent cause” and it refutes the conclusion of Thesis due to its contradiction with the principle of causality. Antithesis shows the universal validity of the principle of

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<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.* p.190

<sup>318</sup> Henry Sidgwick *Lectures on The Philosophy of Kant* 1968 p.165

<sup>319</sup> Smith op.cit. p.493

<sup>320</sup> Ewing op.cit. p.190

causality as a ground for that and it claims that there would be no unity of experience if there were a second type of causality.

However, according to Ewing, this is not legitimate to insert in an antinomy, as it is a conclusion of Kant's critical philosophy. In the Antithesis, unlike Thesis, the principle of causality is not equal to sufficient ground but that an event is connected with an antecedent by necessary laws of nature, thus "you can 'infer' the one from the other, but not, necessarily, so that you can 'explain' the one from other"<sup>321</sup>.

The argument of the *Analytic*, which supports the argument of the Antithesis, according to Ewing "only proves that every event is necessarily connected with a preceding event if it be already assumed that there is no first event; without that assumption it would have only proved that any sequence that occurs must be necessary"<sup>322</sup>. Accordingly, it can be said that, the principle of causality cannot prove that the world and also the series of conditions has no beginning in time, but only it is valid if we already accept that the world has no beginning. So, Antithesis cannot "disprove the possibility of a first cause in the sense of a noumenal ground of a phenomena"<sup>323</sup>.

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<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.* p.191

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.* p.191

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.* p.191

The most important distinction between Thesis and Antithesis, for Ewing, is that the Antithesis loses “the idea of ground” for the sake of “the idea of cause”, whereas the Thesis loses “the idea of cause” for the sake of “the idea of ground”<sup>324</sup>.

According to Ewing, the principle that “if the conditioned is given, then the whole series of all conditions of this conditioned is also given” is valid if all the causes and the effects were things-in-themselves. However, in sense of phenomena, by means of a certain regress we may reach an existence of a cause, which is not present. But we cannot claim that this event may have an existence independently, therefore it has no existence outside this chain.<sup>325</sup> So we must change the premise into “that a regress to the conditions, i.e., the continuation of an empirical synthesis on this side commanded or set as a task, and that there can never be a lack of the conditions given through this regress”.<sup>326</sup> So, all we have is “a rule, which commands a regress in the series of conditions of given phenomena, which regress we are never allowed to bring to a stop with something absolutely unconditioned (*bei einem Schlechtinunbedingten*)”<sup>327</sup>. Although this premise implies the infinity of the series, it does not contradict with the assumption that there is an unconditioned cause, so the series is finite. For, this premise “does not assert that the series can be given as a whole” and this leaves a possibility for being finite. That means, if the series were given to us as a whole it would be finite. But that we are not given the whole does not mean that there is not such wholeness and that means the series is finite.

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<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.* p.191

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.* p.192

<sup>326</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965, A 500 B 527

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.* A 508 B 536

However, as we are in space and time we can never reach the unconditioned and we do not gain the whole, the series in the phenomena is infinite. So we can neither assert that the series is not infinite nor that the series is not finite. What renders both Thesis and Antithesis of third and fourth antinomies possible is their heterogeneous character. This heterogeneity provides the ground for the connection of phenomena and noumena. Ewing asserts,

“The Antithesis is right in asserting that there is no uncaused first cause and no absolutely necessary being to be found in the phenomenal world. This does not, however, mean that there is an actual infinite series of causes, but that, however far we go back in the series of events, we can never reach an event which does not presuppose a still earlier event or events to cause it.”<sup>328</sup>

In conclusion, I would like to summarize what the interpreters think about the solution of Third Antinomy. According to Harris, the acceptance of the transcendental freedom as a second type of causality results in demolishing the unity of experience.<sup>329</sup> For Bennett, it is clear that Kant has a great trust in the Analytic’s doctrine and according to this doctrine, all probable experiences must conform to the causality of nature. Thus, it seems that in relation to Kantian system Antithesis can be seen more acceptable. Like Harris, Bennett thinks that, *Analytic* supports the validity of Antithesis’ argument. In addition, the Thesis is supported by the reconciling theory, as it gets to the conclusion of “there is a causality of freedom, as well as one of nature”. According to Bennett, although the Thesis-argument is supported by Kant’s doctrine, it is random and uncertain. Also it can be seen that

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<sup>328</sup> Ewing op.cit. p.193

<sup>329</sup> Harris, op. cit. p.13

Kant is “lack of confidence” as he does not imply it once more after once presenting it.<sup>330</sup> In Bennett’s account, the arguments of the *Analytic* already render the Antithesis valid. However, he adds, what is valid for Kant is not the Antithesis but Thesis. One can think that Kant aims to show that the Thesis is right for the sake of “completeness of causal chains”, however, in fact he does this to make the way for “human freedom”. Like Harris, Bennett also thinks that Kant’s effort to show that the Thesis is valid makes no sense, as it has no theoretical grounds. Kant does this in need for morality not to be lawless; otherwise people would have no responsibility for what they do. Perry asserts that since freedom as a “creative spontaneity” damages both the unity of experience and condition of intuition, the position of the Antithesis may be seen as sound and valid.

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<sup>330</sup> Bennett, op. cit. 1990, p.201

## CHAPTER V:

### CONCLUSION

According to Kant, objects become knowable for us only in so far as they carry out two conditions that they conform to the laws of understanding and they are in space and time. Therefore, we can know objects only as they appear to us not as they are in themselves. Whatever Kant prescribes, in Analytic and Deduction, as rules, laws and principles for objects, all of these determinants are effective only for appearances, not for thing in itself. In this sense, when Kant, in Second Analogy, asserts that everything in nature without exception, must be determined by the universal law of causality, he intends appearances. That is to say, in Analytic wherever Kant talks about a rule, for example, for *every cause* or *everything*, he does not mean for both *every appearance* and *every thing in itself*, but only for appearances or phenomena as sensible entities. When we take the issue from this point of view, Antithesis can be seen invalid. Because, it treats everything in nature as they are, not as they appear to us. In this case, Antithesis does not make a distinction between phenomena and noumena. And that shows us the reason why the Antithesis is dogmatic empiricism. In this sense the criticism of the Antithesis can be accepted as valid. If Kant stops at this point, it could be possible to talk about the compatibility between freedom and the law of causality without contradiction. Besides, it is indisputable reality that Kant, from the very beginning, strongly believes in the reality of human freedom.



And while he is trying to preserve freedom from the strict determinism of natural causality, he rightly takes up noumena immediately as the only way out.

However, an important point which corners Kant in his just attitude is that noumena can be thought but cannot be known, and it is not possible to judge about it. Because to judge about it requires constitutive use of reason illegitimately and necessarily carries us beyond the limits of experience which is banned by Kant. Therefore, since Kant knows this ban and freedom as a cause is noumenal, he cannot respond to the arguments of the Antithesis and laws of Analytic with the reality of freedom or with arguing about the character of such a noumenal cause. In this case, Kant tries to respond them with their own weapons. In other words, Kant attempts to repulse the attack of Antithesis and Analytic against freedom by means of their own language. As the limit of knowledge is set by the limit of phenomena in Analytic; if Kant would like to legitimately postulate freedom as compatible with the law of causality, he tries to attack the Antithesis without passing beyond this limit of Analytic. For these reasons, Kant uses the terms “first cause”, “completeness”, “true cause”, “real cause”, “a cause sufficiently determined a priori” in order to present freedom as a second type of causality without any conflict with the law of causality. Kant’s main concerns, in fact, are not “true cause”, or “sufficient cause” but rather he deals “artificially” with these problems in order to render freedom compatible with his theory of knowledge. These terms do not signify the character of noumenal causality, on the contrary they stress the deficiencies of the phenomenal or empirical arguments of causality. When Kant uses these terms against Antithesis, he is still relatively in the limits of Analytic. However, this results in crucial fallacies. Using

the weapons of Analytic against Antithesis, Kant does not only damage the Antithesis but also Analytic. That is to say, it gives rise to vanish the unity of experience. Since the causes in the causal chain in the field of appearances are not sufficient cause or real cause and there is no first beginning in it (as it cannot possible to find unconditional cause in experience), the law of causality falls into the position of self-contradiction. By this way, the validity of the law of causality proved in Second Analogy is also damaged. Hence, there are not two types of causality but only one; causality of freedom. At the beginning, the validity and reality of natural causality is very certain without leaving a place for discussing its reality (since without it experience is not possible), and Kant tries to only make a room for the possibility of freedom together with the law of causality, as a result of these reasons I explained just above the argument transforms into a competition between freedom and natural causality, and finally and surprisingly the causality of freedom seems to be superior to the law of causality and also the law of causality becomes dependent on the causality of freedom.

Moreover, the another difficulty to reconcile freedom and natural causality arises from the fact that Kant, at the beginning of Dialectic, treats reason and its idea as completely negative but then he attempts to show that they not only possible but also necessary even for the unity of experience.<sup>331</sup> This obscurity is also related to time between the period which involves the process of bringing *Critique of Pure Reason* into being and its preceding period, that is between critical and pre-critical periods. That is to say, as we have seen in the third chapter, some terms Kant uses are

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<sup>331</sup> Kant op. cit. 1965 A 651 B 679

ambiguous in the sense that sometimes he uses them in critical sense and sometimes in pre-critical. In this context, it must be emphasized that we know that Kant realized the antinomies before *Critique of Pure Reason* that means antinomies are indeed pre-critical. That antinomies are pre-critical may be seen as a cause of their incompatibility with the arguments of Analytic.

According to Kant, empiricists cannot speak of morality in this case if Kant did not postulate freedom in Third Antinomy and accepted only the results of Second Analogy and also did not postulate Transcendental Idealism as a key for the solution of antinomies (i.e. he did not make a distinction between phenomena and noumena), then Kant either could not speak of morality. All Kant interpreters meet at the same point that the reason why Kant postulates freedom, is in order to make room for morality, at the expense of that it contradicts with the arguments of Analytic. In this case, it can be said that morality transcends the limits of experience. Also Kant himself in B edition's preface says "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*."<sup>332</sup> Accordingly, for Beck, if Kant had to make a choice between law of nature and freedom, then he would clearly prefer freedom. Therefore, the solution of Third Antinomy bears more importance than the others in the sense that it provides the connection between theoretical and practical philosophy. As Perry emphasized, freedom, in this sense, is not a final point but a starting point for the second critique. Now, it is crucial to emphasize the fact that in *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant does not attempt to prove the objective reality of transcendental freedom, instead of this, he only indicates the idea that freedom as a

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<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.* B xxx

noumenal cause and natural law of causality can be compatible, that is, he merely attempt to show that the idea of freedom is possible. The arguments of Analytic and Aesthetic pave the way for the possibility of two notable points. The first is noumenon. We can “think” of noumenon, as whatever we think, it is thought only through categories and categories have their source is understanding alone. They are nothing but the forms of thought. And understanding is the capacity of “thinking”. Therefore, it is possible to think of noumenon, but we cannot know it. For, if the same understanding works with sensibility and with synthesis, that is schematized categories are the case, it becomes the capacity of “knowing”. Secondly, transcendental employment of categories is logically possible, as again the source of categories is not sensibility but understanding alone. By this way, we can use pure concepts of understanding without intuitions. Thus, Kant asserts that noumena and transcendental employment of categories are not self-contradictory, because they are logically possible. Kant, in this sense, seems to have an attitude to make a difference between “to be real or actual” and “to be possible”. In the case of theoretical reason, if something is able to be thought, then it is not self-contradictory, that is, it is logically possible. That means, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, to think renders it possible, whereas in *Critique of Practical Reason* it can make it actual. Therefore, it must be emphasized that regarding theoretical reason, transcendental freedom is possible but only as a problematic concept, that is, as without having any objective validity, whereas in the case of practical reason it will have objective reality. Kant in *Critique of Practical Reason* attempts to constitute the reciprocal thesis. Namely, for Kant, freedom is not only necessary concept, but also it is sufficient condition of morality or moral law. Freedom, in this sense, is the condition of moral law (*Ratio*

*Essendi*), while morality is the condition of being conscious of freedom (*Ratio Cognoscendi*). Therefore, morality and freedom necessarily requires each other. Kant, in *Critique of Practical Reason*, emphasizes that “freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other”. In this case, it must be stressed that in the case of theoretical reason, unconditioned does not have any objective validity, as it is not given by sensibility, on the other hand, in the case of practical reason, unconditioned is not only possible but also necessary for moral law, that means it must be objectively valid. According to Kant, “will” can be free, if it is completely independent of all empirical conditions. Will determined by any empirical condition is not able to act in accordance with pure rational law. Free will must be self-determinants. Thus, will must be unconditional, if it is free. Will, therefore, must have its source merely in pure practical reason and it must be conducted only by pure practical reason. By this way, regarding practical reason, transcendental freedom as an unconditioned cause is not anymore an illusion, but rather it will be necessary condition of moral law under which will acts completely free from bounds of empirical conditions, and it is determined only by pure practical reason through categorical imperative. Thus, although illusion, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, is not disappeared even if it is detected by critical philosophy, in the case of pure practical reason it will be disappeared when it is constituted that pure practical reason is possible. And only pure practical reason can be the source of categorical imperative i.e. moral law. This is also the reason why Kant approves the title of *Critique of Practical Reason* for his second critique, instead of Critique of Pure Practical Reason.

In addition, we have to remember the fact that Kant clearly emphasizes that he deals not with the question whether freedom has a reality, but with “whether freedom is possible at all and if it is possible, whether it can exist along with the universality of natural law of causality”. Likewise, he deals only with the possibility of transcendental employment of concepts but not reality of it. Yet, this possibility is nothing more than “abstract” and it may be seen as resulting from his attempt to provide a place for freedom in his system. For Kant, morality necessarily presupposes the idea of freedom. In his first critique he does not attempt to prove the objective reality of it but shows it in the second critique. Kant, in his *Logic*, emphasizes, “one cannot provide nor prove objective reality for any idea but for the idea of freedom and this is the case because freedom is the condition of moral law, whose reality is an axiom”.

Another important point is that noumena, as we have said in the second chapter, cannot be “known” by us but only we can “think” of it through pure categories. This character of noumena implies the fact that judgment, regarding noumena, is not possible. We cannot judge about it. This point is crucial to conceive how Kant attempts to reconcile the argument of dialectic with that of analytic. In the case of analytic, to use concept and to judge cannot be separated, but in the case of noumena, we can use pure categories without judgments. Thus, we cannot produce “synthetic a priori judgments” through reason alone<sup>333</sup>. As Kant emphasizes in *Prolegomena* synthetic a priori judgments refer to the principle of understanding.

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<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.* A 248

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