

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN TURKISH AND HUNGARIAN NATIONALISM:
OTTOMAN PAN-TURKISM AND HUNGARIAN TURANISM (1890-1918)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis dealt with the issues of the emergence of Pan-Turkism in Ottoman Empire and of Pan-Turanism in Hungary between the years 1890 and 1920. The theoretical discussion and literature review related to the subject exhibited that these two nationalisms were possible only when a state bureaucrats and intellectuals try to save the state from collapse and make discussions on the national issues, or when a state elites and noble classes aim to use national ideology for protecting the state from external threats and providing benefits on behalf of national interest. While former suits to Ottoman Pan-Turkism, latter describes Hungarian Pan-Turanism.

The thesis consisted of three main and related parts. The first part focused on the historical and theoretical development of nationalism and pan movements, and condition of pan movement in the context of theories of nationalism. In the second

part, the emergence of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism was analysed in the historical context. The third part dwelt upon the genesis of Pan-Turanism in Hungary, and its relations with Ottoman Pan-Turkism until the end of the First World War. For that reason, firstly, historical roots of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism were sought so that it is able to see how the attempts to modernization in the Ottoman state provided a ground for the spreading of Western political concepts and ideas and the emergence of a secular nationalist intelligentsia. Also the role of Turcology and the influence of Russian Turks on the development and politicization of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism could be assessed. Secondly, the political condition of Hungary in the nineteenth century was exposed in order to explain the emergence and development of Pan-Turanism. Then, the focus was made on the linguistic debates of Hungarian academic circles on the origin of Hungarians. Exposing the political and cultural conditions could facilitate to project the partnership between Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism.

Throughout the thesis, it was tried to be demonstrated that Ottoman Empire and Hungarian state had different political conditions and necessities. While Ottoman state bureaucrats and intellectuals aimed to save the state; Hungarian elites and intellectuals urged on the Hungarian national interests. Although some strong relations and partnerships were manifest in political and cultural areas, Hungarian Pan-Turanists and Ottoman Pan-Turkists belonged to different state traditions. Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism had an aim to save the state and create a new national identity. Nevertheless, Hungarian nationalism and Pan-Turanism tended towards the national interests of Hungarians through expansionist policy. That was

the reason why the relations between Pan-Turkists and Pan-Turanists remained temporary.

Keywords: Nationalism, Pan Movements, Pan-Turanism, Pan-Turkism.

ÖZ

TÜRK VE MACAR MILLİYETÇİLİĞİ ARASINDAKİ ETKİLESİM:
OSMANLI PAN-TÜRKÇÜLÜĞÜ VE MACAR PAN-TURANCILIGI (1890-1918)

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Bu tezde Osmanli Pan-Türkçülüğü ile Macar Pan-Turanciliginin ortaya çıkması ve gelişmesi 1890 ve 1920 yılları arasındaki dönem dikkate alınarak ele alınmıştır. Konu üzerindeki teorik okumalar ve literatur çalışması gösterdi ki, bu iki tür milliyetçilik, devlet bürokratlarının ve entelektüellerin devleti çöküsten kurtarma çabaları ve ulusal kimlik üzerine tartışma başlatmaları, ya da devlet elitleri ve soylu sınıfların devleti dış tehditlere karşı korumayı hedeflemesi ve ulusal çıkarları sağlamanın yollarını aramaları durumlarında mümkün olmaktadır. İlk durum Osmanli Pan-Türkçülerine uyarken, ikinci durum Macar Pan-Turancılarını tanımlamaktadır.

Tez, birbirleriyle ilintili üç temel bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm ulusçulugun tarihsel ve teorik gelişmesi ve pan hareketlerin ulusçuluk teorileri içerisindeki konumuna odaklanmaktadır. İkinci bölümde Türk milliyetçiliginin ve Pan-Türkçülüğün ortaya çıkışı tarihsel bağlamda analiz edilmiştir. Üçüncü bölüm Macaristan'da Pan-Turanciligin ortaya çıkması ve bu akimin I. Dünya savaşının sonuna kadarki süreçte Osmanlı Pan-Türkçüleriyle olan ilişkisi üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu nedenden dolayı, ilk olarak Türk ulusçulugunun ve Pan-Türkçülüğün tarihsel kökenleri araştırıldı. Böylece Osmanlı modernleşmesi, batılı siyasal kavram ve düşüncelerin yayılması ve ulusalcı ve seküler bir aydın kesiminin oluşmasına ne şekilde etkiye bulunduğu ortaya çıkmış oldu. Aynı zamanda, Türk ulusçulugunun ve Pan-Türkçülüğün siyasallaşmasında Türkolojinin ve Rusya Türklerinin de rolü ve etkisi de yorumlanabilmiş oldu. İkinci olarak, Pan-Turanciligin ortaya çıkması ve gelişmesini açıklayabilmek için Macaristan'ın 19. Yüzyıldaki siyasal durumu ortaya kondu. Sonrasında Macar bilim akademilerindeki Macarlar'ın kökeni ile ilgili dilsel tartışmalara odaklanıldı. İki ülkenin de siyasal ve kültürel durumlarını belirlemek, Osmanlı ve Macar milliyetçileri arasındaki ilişkiyi aydınlatmak açısından zorunlu bir konuma sahiptir.

Tez boyunca, Osmanlı Devleti'nin ve Macaristan'ın farklı siyasal koşullar ve zorunluluklara sahip oldukları vurgusu yapıldı. Osmanlı devlet bürokratları ve aydınları devleti kurtarma amacını tasarlarken, Macar elitleri ve aydınları Macar ulusal çıkarlarına odaklanmışlardır. Kültürel ve siyasal alanlarda bazı güçlü ilişkiler ve ortaklıklar olsa da, Macar Pan-Turancıları ile Osmanlı Pan-Türkçüleri farklı devlet geleneklerine sahiptirler. Türk ulusçulugu ve Pan-Türkçülük devleti kurtarmayı ve yeni bir ulusal kimlik yaratmayı hedeflemiştir. Bununla birlikte,

Macar ulusçulugu ve Pan-Turancilik, yayilmaci bir politika güderek Macarlar'ın çıkarlarına yönelmiştir. Hedef ve pratikteki farklılık, bu iki hareket arasındaki ilişkinin neden geçici bir konumda kaldığını açıklamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusçuluk, Pan Hareketler, Pan-Türkçülük, Pan-Turancilik.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are some major theoretical approaches on the emergence of nationalism, which can generally be divided into two parts. One sees, such as Ernest Gellner, its emergence according to socio-political changes, that is modernism, peculiar especially to Western Europe. Other approach explains it from a different point of view. In this approach, the sentiment of nationhood is not a novel feeling. On the contrary, it has been held since the ancient times. Anthony Smith is the most popular author in this looking. Whether a novel feeling or not, national sentiment has its effects since its inception that was pervasive throughout the nineteenth century up to now. It is this effect that constructs one of the conventional debates in the modern era. In this respect, the construction of nation-states creates discussions not only in Western Europe but in Eastern Europe, Middle East and Russia, too.

The division between Western Europe and Eastern Europe including the Ottoman Empire, regarding the conception of nationalism, has an important point that determined the directions of their political development in the new era. The West particularly saw the conversion from feudal type of society to the capitalist nation-state. Nationalism found its direction in this reality. However, in the East, the intellectuals developed and applied the nationalistic ideology for the formation of nation-states. Briefly, the West experienced the socio-political process towards a nation-formation from below. However, the East, on the other, tried to follow the

Western pattern of nation-state formation by developing the ideology of nationalism prior to the establishment of modern states.

No matter which kind of nationalism, nationalism as an ideology has three objectives:

- 1) Creation of a national economy
- 2) Construction of new and modern political organizations and the integration of all political movements into these organizations
- 3) Creation of a common culture and the development of a national identity.

These are the general characteristics of any kind of nationalism in which national identities and national movements developed. However, the emergence of nationalism in each case had different social and political phases. The nation in the Western conceptualization of nationalism is understood in connection to the state, because the first examples of modern national forms were formed in the cocoon of state, such as in France and England. A nation was described as the people who have the same rights before the law formulated by the state.¹ Therefore, it must be named as state-nation, rather than nation-state. Nevertheless, there is the concept of *new nationalism* that is articulated mostly by Louis Snyder.² *New nationalism* is the ideology that emerged in the historically non-progressed societies. Some Pan-movements can be included in this definition. Pan movements have an ideal to unify the societies having some common ethnic and cultural ties, rather than to create the society that is determined by the values of civil culture. According to the approach of

¹ Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism*, (Baltimore: Maryland, 1974), p. 34.

² Louis L. Snyder, *The New Nationalism*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968)

new nationalism, a nation cannot be reduced to political organization. On the contrary, political organization must be organized in accordance with the nation. The borders of the homeland are determined with this reality. From now on, the nation cannot be restricted by the state organization. Rather, the borders of state should be determined appropriate to the national elements. In the *new nationalism*, the state is not the matter of existing political reality, but of transcendental ideal. For understanding the different emphasis on the nation-state, new nationalism has to be defined as the nationalism of nation-state, not of state-nation.

In this point of view, pan movements locate themselves correctly on the approach of *new nationalism*. For this reason, this thesis aims to articulate that both Hungarian Turanism and Ottoman Pan-Turkism emerged in the context of romantic and East European kind of nationalism, which could also be named as *new nationalism*. In particular, this thesis will also explore the interplay between these two nationalisms in Budapest and Istanbul, not only with respect to the similarities, but also with respect to differences in form and content between 1890 and 1920.

The main motive behind this thesis is hidden in the specific conditions of the nineteenth century, in which ideological debates were performed for the salvation of both Ottomans and Hungarians. The Ottoman Empire found its direction in modernization and westernization policy through renovating the old and clumsy institutions. The proclamation of *Tanzimat* was the clear expression of the state's renovation policy. However, all these policies could not develop enough to impede the recession of the state. Together with the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman intellectuals started to articulate alternative discourses to save the state from

decreasing further. Turkish nationalism, in this respect, was evaluated as a savior ideology towards the twentieth century when the Ottoman intellectuals started to discuss it with respect to cultural dimensions since a new European map had been created in accordance with national identities which became widespread after the French Revolution. Due to the multi-ethnic structure of the empire, the Ottoman intellectuals and state bureaucrats were not indifferent to the developments that reshaped the borders of European countries.

Similarly, the Hungarians were also involved in ideological discussions for solving their ethnic problems that they met especially with regards to their Slavic minorities in which the Pan-Slavist policy of Russia had great impact on them. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungary lost most of its lands to its neighbors, and this took place with the approval of the Western states. Additionally, there were the ascending developments of Pan-Germenism and Pan-Slavism. These all had negative implications for the Hungarians with respect to the political situation in the European arena. The first ideological reaction of Hungarians was that they started to search their origins in order to constitute an alternative policy in accordance with one consistent ideology, which is Turanism. This was because of the vexation of Hungarians of the European powers which gave rise to their search for alternative allies in Asia. The Hungarians thought of Asia as where they originated from and scientific studies were the main sources of their efforts to form a nationalist ideology on this line. Vambery, a well-known Turcologist, established the first Turcology department in 1870 in Hungary. The Turan Association started to act in 1910 and Pal Teleki, one of the most active politicians among the Turanists, began to publish the *Journal Turan* in 1913.

1890 was the year after which Hungarian Pan-Turanists gained a strong political hand in the Hungarian intellectual arena and started to establish Turanist associations and periodicals. Also in 1890, strong political and cultural relations started between the Hungarians and Ottomans, stronger than the one between the Ottomans and Russians since the Crimean War (1854-1856), which occurred between the Ottomans and Russians. Up to 1890, there was also a mutual sympathy between the Hungarians and Turks. The Hungarian rebels who fought for an independent Hungary and took refuge to Istanbul in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were welcomed by the Istanbul Government. Also, the year 1918 was the indication of political bankruptcy of Pan-Turanism.

Due to the endeavors of Hungarian Turanists toward the big Turan ideal and the historical brotherhood between Turks and Hungarians, they were applauded by the politicians of the reign of Abdulhamid II, as the Turkish republican elites did in return for their support for the Turkish Independence War. Theoretically, the efforts of Hungarian Turanists can be explained in accordance with East European romantic nationalism as discussed above. I will use this model in order to explain how Hungarian Turanists articulated their arguments, their zeal toward the creation of a big Turan state. Their ideals reflect, just as the *new nationalism* asserts, the idealistic thought of the unification of the societies sharing the same ethnics, culture, language and so on. Their mutual interplay with the Turkish nationalist elites from the end of the nineteenth century to the first two decades of the twentieth century will constitute the time interval of this thesis, because 1890 was the year of political organization of Hungarian Turanists. Up to the end of the World War I, the exhaustive relations

between Hungarians and Ottomans have been focused. The key concepts in this thesis are nationalism, state-formation, Pan Movements, nation-state, state-nation, Pan-Turkism, which will be discussed and analyzed throughout the study.

In the studies on Turkish nationalism, especially on Pan-Turkism, there are many studies that emphasize the certain influences on Turkish nationalism without taking into account other factors, or with just citing these superficially. Generally, Russian Turks has been considered as the most important group in the studies on Turkish nationalism, but there are considerable differences between the Ottoman and Russian Turks. While Russian Turks revolted against their state, Ottoman intelligentsia always struggled to save the state. While Turkish nationalism had an aim to modernize the existing state (Ottoman Empire); in Russia, Turkish nationalism was the name of the political reaction against the expansionist policy of Russian Empire and Pan-Slavism.³ Ottoman intellectuals had the sentiment of nationality in the name of saving the state, so did Hungarians in some respect. Their assertion of unifying the entire Turkic world does not conform to the Western type of nationalism. Therefore, it can be evaluated and analyzed in terms of what Hans Kohn puts forth as the *Eastern type of nationalism* or what Louis Snyder brings forward as *new nationalism*. In addition, in order to explain it in the turmoil of national movements, this Pan-Turkist movement can only be understood correctly when conceived as a form of Pan-Movement.

Theoretically, if we consider nationalism in France and England, the bourgeoisie first gained economic domination and then political hegemony. In this way, they

³ Mehmet Karakas, *Türk Ulusçulugunun Insasi*, (The Formation of Turkish Natonalism), (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 2000), p. 152.

(Frenchmen and Englishmen) saw this change as a revolution or evolution from below. However, the breaking point varies. Benedict Anderson emphasizes the unifying effect of print capitalism.⁴ Some, such as Gellner, focuses on the ideology that provides the cultural homogeneity needed by industrial society.⁵ Yet others try to analyze the emergence of nationalism with pervasiveness of mass communication.⁶ As obviously seen, these are all approaches that fit into West European type of nationalism. On these grounds I aim to develop the approach that is appropriate for analyzing Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism, as distinct from its western counterpart.

For Turkish nationalism in general, there are many scholars who deal with this issue through different theoretical perspectives. For example David Kushner⁷, Francois Georleon⁸, Uriel Heyd⁹, Ali Engin Oba¹⁰, and Suavi Aydin¹¹ are some of the main writers projecting the issue. Jacop Landau is the best-known author who covered especially Pan-Turkism. He analyzes the logic of Pan or irredentist movements with respect to other types of nationalism and ~~specified~~ locates Pan-Turkist movement both before and after the emergence of the Turkish republic.¹² Tarik Demirkan also

⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York and London: Verso, 1991)

⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism* (Basil: Blackwell, 1983)

⁶ Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966)

⁷ David Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977)

⁸ Francois Georleon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, (The Roots of Turkish Nationalism: Yusuf Akçura 1876-1935), (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1986)

⁹ Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp*. (London: Luzac, 1950)

¹⁰ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Dogusu*, (The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism), (Istanbul: Imge yay. 1994)

¹¹ Suavi Aydin, *Modernlesme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), (Ankara: Gündogan Yay., 1993)

provides usable facts. His evaluations are on the political and social situation of Hungarian Turanists and Ottoman Pan-Turkists both before and after the collapse of the Ottoman state.

Secondary sources on nationalism, Turkism and Turanism were used in this thesis. Regarding the journals and articles written in Ottoman language, the *Association of Turkish History* (Türk Tarih Kurumu), *State Library of Beyazit* (Beyazit Devlet Kütüphanesi), and *Ottoman Library of Premiership* (Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi) were the main institutions that were used. Whether new or old, all sources were evaluated in terms of analytical and comparative methods. The discussions of Ottoman Pan-Turkists and Hungarian Pan-Turanists about the national issues were analyzed in accordance with the theories of nationalism analyzed in this thesis.

There are two important aspects of my study. One is its emphasis on the Pan feature of Turkish nationalism as different from the cultural and land centered discussions of Turkish nationalism that developed during the early republican period. The other is its effort to reveal the liaison between Turkish and Hungarian Turanists since this is important for understanding the original characteristics of them and since the constructed networks and relations could exhibit the real objectives and necessities of any ideological movement. In chapter two, first of all, I will begin with the discussions on theories of nationalism. How it emerged and why in Western Europe first? What are the main debates on the impetus of nationalism? These are the main questions that will be discussed in this chapter. In addition, the general characteristics of pan movements will be covered in the context of nationalism.

¹² Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (London: Hurst & Company, 1981)

Ottomans Pan-Turkism and Hungarian Turanism will be located in the context of pan movements. In chapter three, political condition of the Ottoman Empire will be discussed, and the emergence of Turkish nationalism will be explained with respect to the intellectual activities of Ottoman and Russian Turks. Then, the development of Turkish nationalism between the proclamation of the Second Constitution and the end of the World War I will be evaluated comprehensively. In the fourth chapter, the condition of Hungarian state and the genesis of Pan-Turanism in the second half of the nineteenth century will be investigated. After the intellectual sources of Pan-Turanism will be explained, the main discussions of Hungarian Turanists and their interests on and relations with the Ottoman Turks between 1910 and 1918 will be assessed. In the final analysis, the main arguments and the findings of the thesis will be summarized and further research questions will be analyzed.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Approaches on the Emergence of Nationalism

The content of nationalism still sustains its significance as forming the sources of current modern states. The reason for this is not coincidental. The appearance of nationalism was first witnessed in Western Europe in the 18th century. After the French Revolution, the sense of nationality, especially due to Napoleonic wars, started to spread throughout Europe. Why French revolution was so important to affect the political system of Europe was its causing a new political order, due to the rise of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism. The ascending bourgeoisie and capitalism also forced the change from below and strengthen the border of existing state.¹³ That is new legitimacy of the administration of the states. The negative effect of the French Revolution was that every nation must be able to form their own state, if they take the initiative against the existing state formation.¹⁴

Historically, the sentiment of nationality was related to the centralization of the state contrary to the decentralized structure of feudalism where feudal lords could act independently. In the modern sense, the nation was witnessed first in Western Europe in England. There were social and political reasons for this change. The collapse of the feudal order took place parallel with the increase of trade between

¹³ Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism* (Basil: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.

¹⁴ Elie Kedourie, *Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik*, (Nationalism in Europe), (M. H. Timurtas, Trans.). (Ankara: MEB Yayinlari, 1971), p. 4.

cities and this gave way to the development of certain, defined territories, that is, the city formations became more important than the feudal formations and the church.

The connection among cities initiated the formation of national boundaries because of the necessity of safe international trade relationship. First, it appeared as absolute monarchies in England, France and Spain. Actually, there occurred a literary nationalism at the time of Renaissance, but the civil wars of Europe constituted a political cause to form a strong obligatory to establish a central state. This process was against the noble and warrior classes. Naturally, the people from lower classes stayed outside the reach of nationalism. The necessity of bringing the civil wars to an end brought the royal power to reign which also led to the modern nation.

The critical time was the seventeenth century due to the civil war in France and the first great wave of nationalism. Nationality means the novel and moral contiguity among a nation. Thus, religion started to lose its traditional legal legitimacy in the administrative fields. Instead, individualism gained popularity against absolute authoritarianism.¹⁵ The ascending of central power resulted in exterminating of universalistic idea of Christianity. While medieval universalistic belief had faded away, etatism came out in scattered princedoms or kingdoms. This time interval embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the state bureaucracy started to take the rationalized way of policy in administration. After that time, nationalism, in the nineteenth century, started to replace what religion fulfilled in society and politics. This replacement also brought the novel legitimacy to the

¹⁵ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), pp. 124-125.

content of states, which, as Kohn said, started to reside “in the hearts of will of its citizens.”¹⁶ Kohn furtherly stated that:

It is this will we call nationalism, a state of mind inspiring the large majority of a people and claiming to inspire all its members. It asserts that the nation state is the ideal and the only legitimate form of political organization and that the nationality is the source of all cultural creative energy and of economic well being.¹⁷

Loyalty to the new state found approval among the people because the newly risen states could be able to end the civil wars. Also, the people now could participate in state affairs with respect to their interests. This central and nationalistic process brought the West European societies in line with secular or non-religious political developments. As Kohn argues, this situation means that the emphasis on the sinful nature of man ceased to exist; and man’s good nature would come to the core. This also would lead towards the good functioning order over them.¹⁸

The period of the absolutist state was different both from the period before absolutism and from the period of early capitalism. The period between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries could not be assessed without considering the absolutist state. This time interval is named as a transitory period. Therefore, the absolutist state provided equilibrium between the rising bourgeoisie and the noble classes.¹⁹ During the transition period from feudal order to capitalism in western Europe, although the state still had many of the characteristics of the state of the feudal type, it already also presents characteristics which permit us to perceive it

¹⁶ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 188.

¹⁷ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, (Canada: Van Nostrand Company, 1955), p. 10.

¹⁸ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 189-91.

¹⁹ Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, (London: NLB, 1974), pp. 15-16.

from the typological point of view as belonging to the capitalist type of state. Therefore, the transition from feudalism to capitalism seems to be characterized particularly by a non-correspondence between the political superstructure and the economic instance. In the transition from feudalism to capitalism, this non-correspondence describes manufacture, which is the particular form of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The typical feature of manufacture is definitely that its mode of property is already the capitalist form of property. This relation of property constitutes that the worker is formally subsumed under capital, and it is stated in the capitalist form of organization of labour within the very process of manufacture.²⁰

In Western Europe, the emergence of absolutist state, as Anderson argues, is positioned during the major crisis age of feudalism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This crisis is characterized by the large-scale collapse of feudal agriculture, by the emergence of manufacturing enterprises and by the development of international commerce. The absolutist state gained strength during the new expansion period, from the middle of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, which constitutes a crisis in the feudal relations of production and denotes the beginning of the capitalist era. The absolutist state is described by the fact that the holder of state power concentrates in his hands a power which is not restrictable by the other institutions and natural or divine law. It is in this way that the notion of state sovereignty gradually takes shape, and this sovereignty is also demonstrated in foreign relations with other nations. Therefore, the absolutist state presents autonomy to the economic relations. The central power of the absolute state is freed from from any political, religious and moral limitations, and is exercised in

²⁰ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, (London: NLB, 1968), pp. 157-58.

an absolute design on popular mass. Accordingly, the interferences to the central power which were constituted by the medieval state collapse. It is seen that the formation of the concepts of people and nation as constitutive elements of a state. As Poulantzas argues:

The sovereignty of the state...appears to be linked to the problem of unity of 'strictly political' power: a power which is seen as representing the unity of the subjects of the state in the public sphere. The state is held to embody the general public interest – a new theme on the agenda: this is the essential principle of the concept of *reasons of state*. This concept covers precisely the independence of a state power, unconstrained by any extra-political limit, *inasmuch as* it is the power which represents the general interest...²¹

Nevertheless, there is a difference between the transitory developments in England and France. As Mardin puts it, in France, before the bourgeoisie gained political power, intellectuals and politicians performed many intellectual and philosophical activities. Due to this fact and different from how England reached this point, the bourgeoisie revolution in France did not occur as mild as or as soft as it did in England, but with many political turmoils. Occurrence of the French Revolution and controversies about it proved the difficulties of the transition from absolutist state to modern nation-state. England, on the other, reached this political stand without revolts or clashes. These were the specific routes that France and England followed for the same end. Consequently, it can be said that although these countries had reached at a constitutional system, the ways leading them to this end were different; and this difference denoted the variant structure among the West European countries.²²

²¹ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, (London: NLB, 1968), pp. 161-63.

²² Serif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3: 197-211, 1971, p. 197.

The emergent bourgeoisie struggled against the absolute monarchs in order to gain free access to all markets throughout the cities. The role of the state is rightly related to this necessity. As Anderson argues, "...these functions of state (expropriating small landowners, financing, supplying funds for starting industrialization, attacking seigneurial power, breaking down commercial barriers within the national boundaries, etc.) *can be performed only by a state with a capitalist character, by a centralized public power of a strictly political character...*"²³ Anderson followingly emphasizes that the institutions of the state are national and popular, which allow them to function in opposition to the interests of the noble classes, when the absolutist state can not obviously rely on the bourgeoisie class. The role of the state in favour of the bourgeoisie and initiators can only be assessed as the intervention of the absolutist transition state.²⁴ This situation denotes that bourgeoisie firstly needed to be in safe situation. When they, bourgeoisie, felt themselves uneasy, the demands of freedom appeared. Because of this, during and after the French revolution, the bourgeoisie class made the word *freedom* their slogan. The final and inevitable destination of these efforts was to arrive at a nation-state. This would lead them to create a national economy, politics, and culture.

An alliance appeared between the bourgeoisie and the secular intelligentsia against the tyrannical regime just before the French Revolution. The Church, at that time, was the source of legitimation of the regime. Nevertheless, because of the alliance between the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, the authority of the Church became

²³ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, (London: NLB, 1968), p. 166.

²⁴ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, (London: NLB, 1968), p. 166.

disputable especially through the strengthening of Protestantism and through the efforts of the thinkers of the Enlightenment. Protestantism was actually the branch of Christianity same as Catholicism. However, it, Protestantism, shook the religious universalism of the Christian Middle Ages. Its emphasis to the individual wills facilitated the increase of beliefs and sects in number.²⁵

The other reason that weakened the power of the Church was the population movement from rural to urban areas. This situation eventually destroyed the old traditional beliefs and customs, because religion by itself did not have the power to provide social order at the time. This also explains why the first sociologists dealt with the issue of social order. For example, August Comte and Saint-Simon tried to constitute a new set of spiritual rules, such as ‘Religion of Humanity’ and ‘New Christianity’ respectively.²⁶ As Kohn rightly put it:

From the beginning of the Roman Empire to the end of the Middle Ages men had commonly stressed the general and the universal and seen imperial unity as the desirable goal. Against the universalism of the past the new nationalism glorified the peculiar and the parochial, national differences and national individualities. These tendencies have become more pronounced as nationalism has developed in the later nineteenth and in the twentieth century.²⁷

All that has been said is related to France and England. However, the implication of nationality has a different meaning in Germany. France and England attributed more significance to the political aspect of the term. On the other hand, Germany took the

²⁵ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 14.

²⁶ Hans Freyer, *İçtimai Nazariyeler Tarihi*, (History of Sociological Theories), Ankara : AÜDTCF Yayinlari, 1968, pp. 46-52.

²⁷ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 15.

term as meaning ‘culture’ and the ‘spirit of folk’.²⁸ The German approach to the meaning of a nation is important since it is more culture-oriented and in this respect similar to Eastern type of nationalism. Like Eastern countries, Germany formed her national unity later than other West European countries and the weakness of the bourgeoisie made the intellectuals key actors. In this respect, the German revolution is conceptualized as a revolution from above.

Theoretically, Herder, a German philosopher, was one of the well known founders of the idea of cultural nationalism. According to Herder, every nation has its own *volkgeist* (spirit of folk) that is given by God. Because of the assignment of this spirit by God, it is considered natural. In accordance with this natural content, every nation must construct their own national state without being mingled with other ethnic groups. The world order would be best, if all nations could form their own nation-state.²⁹

German type of nationalism had similar consequences with respect to what West European intelligentsia and bourgeoisie attempted to achieve. In Germany, intellectuals who tried to form a nation did not ally with the old/traditional noble and religious classes. Their aim was to unite the Germans around a nationalistic feeling and around a national state. Mainly Kant and Herder constructed the theoretical base of nationalism. While Kant asserts political nationalism, Herder focuses on organic

²⁸ C. J. H. Hayes, “Nationalism”. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, V. 11-12: 231-49, 1968, p. 231.

²⁹ Kedourie, *Avrupa’da Milliyetçilik, (Nationalism in Europe)*, pp. 51-52.

solidarity that is culture.³⁰ When opposing the old regime, culture and politics became significant elements that played a critical role in favour of German intellectuals.

With regards to the cultural content of German nationalism, primary emphasis should be given on language, because every nation can be differentiated with respect to language. Why German intellectuals made such an emphasis on the unification role of language must be analyzed in terms of the special conditions of Germany at that time. Germany was not able to construct a national-constitutional formation via political process. The obstacles were the existence of strong landowners and princedoms. There were no rising bourgeoisie to replace the landowners and princedoms as in the case of France and England. As Kohn stressed, there was strong relation between nationalism and tradition in Germany. This relation was found its strong sound in Romanticism. German Romanticism was an interpretation of history, society and all of the human life, in which the past had been mystified against the ideas of French Revolution. Romanticism had definite influences on the emerging German nationalism, as cited above, with respect to content of it, such as *volkgeist* and language.³¹

In addition, the appearance of national process in Germany had a different path in comparison with its West European counterparts. The development of the bourgeoisie was the missing part in this process. Moreover, the intelligentsia that had always conflicted with the existing state fulfilled the role of developing a national

³⁰ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (M. H. Timurtas, Trans.) (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), pp. 32-50.

³¹ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 34-35.

movement. Intellectuals wished to accord the existing political boundaries in the ethnic/linguistic one.³² As for non-Western forms of nationalism, in spite of their ideological opposition against the West, their model is the Western world. Hans Kohn summarises the general characteristics of non-Western type of nationalism through the keywords such as justification, differentiation, looking back to the past, and heritage. In general, the ideas of nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe grew out of historical myths about the past and from their dreams about the future. The significant themes are as follows; an ideal fatherland that is closely linked with their past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present. The national sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe were not rooted in political and social reality; rather they overemphasized and attributed much confidence on their own nationalism, which are soul of nation (volkgeist) and the mission of the nation.³³

Generally, two types of nationalism can be distinguished in terms of their origins and principal characteristics. In the Western Europe, nationalism was the result of the existing political and social factors. Construction of the national state was the preceding process of it. Nevertheless, in Eastern and Central Europe, nationalism remained back in time, and developed in relatively non-progressed societies and politics. For they were mostly in struggle with the existing states, these kind of nationalisms preferred to emphasize the cultural characteristics of a nation in order to find bases to their arguments. West European nationalisms were affected by the Enlightenment ideas. Therefore, individual liberty and rationalism occupied great spaces. In addition, nationalism was the discourse of the rising bourgeoisie. For this

³² Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 329.

³³ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 331.

reason, nationalism could find the repercussion in the social and political arenas.³⁴ However, in the Eastern Europe, Enlightenment project was not accepted taken for granted. Consideration was put on state and religion. Nationalism signs the national unity and power. If the nation was living under foreign domination, nationalism means to fight against that domination for liberty. If the nation was independent, then, nationalism means the expansion beyond existing borders. This kind of nationalism reflected the demands of traditional noble classes and the intellectuals. Because the nationalism does not depend on the social and political reality, their emphasis was mostly on the ideals and expectations of the nation.³⁵

If the origin of the concept of nation is analyzed, it can be seen that the concept of nation had already existed before the development of national movements in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the situation is not the same for the concept of “nationalism.” For instance, Gale stokes argues that the term nationalism was first used in 1844 in England.³⁶ According to this, it can be said that the word nationalism first appeared in Western Europe in the nineteenth century. However, there is no agreement about how to define the main motive behind nationalism. For example, Ernest Gellner asserted a culture-based explanation. Since traditional/feudal societies were divided between the upper and lower classes, there was cultural separation between them. In traditional societies, power was definitely independent from culture, because the ruling elites, consisting of warriors, priests, clerics, administrators and burghers, use

³⁴ Louis L. Snyder. *The New Nationalism*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 55.

³⁵ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 42.

³⁶ Gale Stokes, “How is Nationalism Related to Capitalism”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1986, 28/3: 591-98.

culture to differentiate itself from the large majority of agricultural producers who are confined to small local communities where culture is almost invisible.³⁷

On the other hand, Gellner articulates that there was different interplay between power and culture when industrial societies emerged. The division between ruling elites and people started to become vague, because the industrial type of society forced the people to contact one another. From the time on, high culture penetrates the whole of society. This time necessitates the emergence of a high and active culture that was common to all levels of society. The key actor of this process was the state that was expected to educate the whole society through unification of education and to create a common culture that would bind all segments of the society.³⁸

There are also ethnic based explanations that do not consider modern political changes. For example, Walker Connor does not deal with such explanations as cited above. On the contrary, he emphasizes the ethnic tie of one certain group. According to him, a nation should be taken into consideration with respect to the term 'descent'. This specific group is an ancestrally related group, which has a common mythical past.³⁹ Seton-Watson also defines the nation in a similar way. He gives much significance on the term 'common'. It is important, because common ethnic ties, beliefs, and place define a nation.⁴⁰ These explanations are, as have been seen, all

³⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1983), pp. 9-12.

³⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1983), p. 18.

³⁹ Walker Connor, "The Nation and its Myth," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 33 (1992), p. 48.

partially valid definitions because, each definition describes only one dimension of history and reality in terms of providing a definition of nationalism on which all can agree. While it is connected with industrial developments, it neglects cultural changes caused by industrialization. If cultural explanation is supposed to be valid, then ethnic common sense remains unexplained. Therefore, it is seen that it is hard to reach a comprehensive definition of nationalism.

As cited above, it is possible to divide the debates on the nature and definition of nationalism into two parts. One puts forward the primordialist approach arguing that ethnic ties are not temporary, but permanent identities, which hold the people together with familial ties. According to the primordialists, nations in the modern sense are not novel formations, but perennial, one that hold its members together throughout history. The natural ties among the people stem from place of birth, religion, language, and customs. These divisions always determine the ethnic ties of the people not only in modern times, but also throughout history.⁴¹ According to Edward Shills, the dependence of one's feeling for relatives is not originated from the interaction, but from the tie of blood.⁴² Likewise, Clifford Geertz articulates the people's attachment that stems from culture which is involved in contiguity and kin connection. The givennes of culture are considered inexplicable and coercive.⁴³

⁴⁰ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 1.

⁴¹ Paul Brass, "Elite Competition and Nation-Formation" Anthony Smith & J. Hutchinson (eds.), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 83; Anthony Smith, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 31-33.

⁴² Edward Shills, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties", *British Journal of Sociology*, 8 (2), 1957, p. 142.

⁴³ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 259.

Clifford Geertz, Anthony Smith, Walker Connor, Edward Shills, and P. L. Von der Berghe are the most important representatives of the primordialist approach.

Another approach to nationalism is a modernist one that was asserted by Karl Deutsch. Deutsch gives much importance to the social integrity, which was carried out by connecting the roads. This integrity would untie the old class centred or kinship based relations and to the development of the idea of 'the people'. This means that all the people shared from now on a common cultural and behavioral attitude. All these improvements could facilitate to the formation of a national state.⁴⁴

According to Hobsbawm who developed a modernist approach to nationalism, there was no space for nations and nationalisms in the pre-modern ages. He argues that "nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around".⁴⁵ Modernist approach, in general, asserts that nationalism is a novel process, and therefore the emergence of the nations must be new and modern phenomenon. This phenomenon must be taken into consideration in terms of the modern nation-state. In this sense, nation-states are assessed as accompanying industrial improvements, capitalism, secularism, and bureaucracy that are all modern developments. All the necessities of modernism such as capitalism, liberalism, nationalism and so on should be fulfilled, and in this respect, the nation-states were the ideal form of polity in the modern world. Accordingly, all arguments asserted by primordialists are refused by the modernists. Ethnicity is conceptualized only as the

⁴⁴ Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communications: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966), p. 101.

⁴⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 10.

former form of a nation and had no historical tie to the modern nations.⁴⁶ Hobsbawm argues that the base of the ethnicity must be searched in cultural fields, not biological. In spite of the fact that he sees ethnicity as an ancient form of nation, he definitely differs it from the nation.⁴⁷

In the final analysis, the theories on nationalism should not be supposed definite explanations. Modernist and primordialist point of departure are the approaches in which a study of nationalism determines itself. Because there was no empirical absoluteness in these theories, these theories are not excluded each other. Associating the different datas in history and current society, they could be valid or invalid in terms of the study performed.

2.2 Pan Movements and Pan-Turanism

The word 'pan' means "the whole of something" in ancient Greece, which aims to unite all the people who share the same geography, language, race, or religion.⁴⁸ No matter which kind of element it depends on, a pan movement is a wide type of an existing nationalism⁴⁹. These wide sizes nationalisms are well accorded to the division that Hans Kohn makes between eastern type and western types of nationalisms. Pan nationalisms, since they are romantic and culture-oriented, can be

⁴⁶ Anthony Smith, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, pp. 29-35.

⁴⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 63.

⁴⁸ Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Pan Movements", ed.: David L. Shills, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* Volume: II, p. 365.

⁴⁹ Louis Snyder, "Macro-Nationalisms", *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, ed. Louis Snyder, (New York: Paragon House, 1990), p. 200.

conceptualized in accordance with eastern type of nationalism as Kohn formulates⁵⁰. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Americanism, and Pan-Islamism are all different examples of pan nationalisms.

Pan-Slavism was the oldest movement, which asserted itself with romantic pan-nationalistic ideals. It was first experienced in Europe after 1870s. By this word, it was intended to point to the unity of all Slavic people under the auspices of Russia. While Pan-Germanism and Pan-Turkism became outmoded after the Second World War, Pan-Slavism contained its political validity and significance during the same period.⁵¹ Pan-Slavism promoted the cultural renaissance among the Slavic people, and led many common thoughts and discussions, as well as meetings of writers and artists, in a wide culture area. The political consequences of Pan-Slavism started to appear after the Crimean War in 1860s onward among the Russian public opinion and Slavic minorities in Eastern Europe. Defeat in war led the Russian politicians to endure the idea of Pan-Slavism for the saviour of both the Russian Empire and the Slavic people. After the Crimean war, relations between Russia and West European countries became tenser. Especially the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire struggled with the Russian Empire in order to become the hegemonic power in the Balkans and in East Europe. However, for strengthening the Slavic identity, Russian politicians and intellectuals believed that they would seize all the lands on which the Slavs live, including the Aegean Sea and Istanbul.⁵²

⁵⁰ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 331.

⁵¹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, "Panslavizm", *AÜDTCF Dergisi*, volume 10-11, number 1-4, 1952-53, p. 241.

⁵² Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology*, (Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1953), p. 160.

Most of Pan-Slavs shared the Slavophil belief of Russian messianism, according to which the Russian people were chosen by God to pioneer human being to salvation.

As Kohn argues:

The Russians were proclaimed to be the truly Christian people, guardians of Orthodoxy (the true faith), devoted to peace and social justice, and called to spread this gospel to all the nations...The Russian communists, who in November, 1917, under the leadership of Lenin, ...overthrew the short-lived democratic regime which the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, had established revived Russian nationalist messianism...In 1945 they realized the most daring dreams of nineteenth century Russian Pan-Slavs, uniting all the Slavs under Russian leadership and extending their borders to the Oder River and the Adriatic Sea. They defeated the Pan-Germanism of Adolf Hitler.⁵³

Meanwhile, it should be noted that Pan-Slavism influenced Pan-Turkism in terms of its tactics and terms. Thus, it is highly understandable why initiators and propogators of Pan-Turkism were the Russian Turks, which had been lived many years under Russian rule. Moreover, Russian Turks were subjected to the heavy pressure of the Russification and Christianization policy of Russia. This experience helped them to formulate Pan-Turkism in accordance with Pan-Slavism.⁵⁴

Pan-Germanist thought proliferated in the German territories just in the same years when the Pan-Slavist ideology began to develop in Eastern Europe. The significant term characterizing German nationalism was the term *volk* (people). A well-known philosopher, Fichte, politicized the German nationalism. As discussed in the theoretical chapter of this study, the term *volk* was much more significant in German nationalism than any other type of nationalism or pan movement. In addition, Herder

⁵³ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 72.

⁵⁴ Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, p. 8.

and some other German romantic intellectuals and philosophers used the word *volkgeist* (spirit of people), which represented the right of national autonomy of every nation. According to the German philosophers, every nation is the parts of divided human species and each is dependent on the God. Every people (*volk*) should protect the characteristics of their own nation. Since this is a divine necessity, one nation should not mix with another nation. When each nation establishes its own state, this situation would be the ideal divine order. Accordingly, if there are so many nations under the roof of one state, this will not be in accordance with the divine order. All these arguments formed the basis of the idea of uniting all the German federal states in one state, which would lead to absolute order.⁵⁵

Pan-Germanism had the aim to unite all the Germanic states scattered throughout in Europe. This ideology did not consider these states as separate and independent from one another. On the contrary, their objective was to remove these small states and to establish the ideal German unity. For this reason, the idea of Pan-Germanism displayed revolutionary characteristics; and this is why the liberal actors gave support to this movement.⁵⁶ Kedourie emphasizes the restlessness of young generations of Germany in the existent situation. This uneasiness was the result of French Revolution. German Youngs experienced the breakdown on the religion and politics. The resistance of Youngs to the traditional order of Germany may also be the explanation of the offensive characteristic of many nationalist movements in Eastern Europe. Struggle with old generations would also mean to struggle with

⁵⁵ Elie Kedourie, *Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik*, çev. M. H. Timurtas, (Ankara: MEB Yayinlari, 1971), p. 21.

⁵⁶ Hans Kohn, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, Vol. 2, (New York: Paragon House, 1948), p. 547.

foreign powers. This scene became the inspiration for Young Turks, Young Egypt, and Young Italy.⁵⁷

During the same period, that is the period after the 1870s, it can be seen that both among the Hungarians and Russian Turks there emerged nationalist movements. In Hungary, throughout the nineteenth century there was pervasive nationalist sentiment among the Hungarian intellectuals towards the Vienna government. At the second half of the century, Hungarian nationalism was converted to Pan-Turanism through the efforts of the Turcologists, such as Arminius Vambery, a well-known Turcologist.⁵⁸ It targeted to provide the unity for all the Ural Altaic elements throughout Asia and Europe. Pan-Turkism had, on the other hand, a different implication. It emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century among the Russian Turks. It had the reflective motive towards the aggressive politics of Russian government. Intellectuals such as Ismail Gaspirali and Yusuf Akçura struggled to constitute cultural and political unity among the broader Turkish speaking world. This was called Pan-Turkism as different from Pan-Turanism, which can be considered as more utopic. Since the region had strong traditional ties, Pan-Turkism also included Islamic elements.⁵⁹

Pan-Turanism was the name of a political movement having the objective to unite all Turanic races under the same flag and state. As cited in Firdevsi's *Shahname*, the

⁵⁷ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 94-96.

⁵⁸ Great Britain Foreign Office, *The Rise of the Turks-The Pan-Turanian Movement*, (The British Foreign Office, 1919), p. 14.

⁵⁹ Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Pan Movements", *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume: II, 1968, ed.: David L. Shills, p. 369.

word Turan was the name given to northeast Iran. It can also be found in the Avestan Testament such that the Avestan Testament had three sons who divided the world among themselves. The son Tura took the eastern part of the world. After many years, hostilities emerged between the Iranians and the predatory nomad Turanians. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the word Turanian came into use as a loose designation of all languages of Asiatic origin that are neither Aryan nor Semitic. Up to that time, the word Turan had been used to refer to a primary linguistic family of the eastern hemisphere, which is more usually called the Altaic or the Ural Altaic. This new attitude was developed by the raising linguists. For instance Richardson, in his "Persian Dictionary" (1771), treats the term Turanians as synonymous with the Tatars. Hulme (1861) defines the Turan area as Mongolia and Manchuria. Max Muller, in his "Science of Language" (1861), took the name Turan in opposition to Aryan races and considered it as the nomadic Asian element as opposed to the agricultural communities. On the other hand, Sir James Frazer, in "Golden Boguh" (1913), uses the word Turan as equal to Ural-Altaic world. Last of all, the close affinities among the Turanian peoples were first denoted by the Finnish ethnologist and philologist Castren in his "Ethnologische Vorlesungen Über die a Haischen Völker."⁶⁰

Genereally speaking, the emergence of Pan-Turanism is interpreted differently by various researchers who work on the same field. For instance, while Blanca Villalta sees this movement as a political response to the expansion of Western powers, some others interpreted it as a reaction to Pan-Slavism which was fostered especially in Eastern Europe by the efforts of the Russian Empire. Laszlo Rasonyi explained this

⁶⁰ H. M. Government, *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, Naval Staff Intelligence Department, (Oxford, November 1918), pp. 12-14.

through the efforts of Russian Turks who held the Pan-Turkist ideal and acted in alliance with the Ottoman intellectuals in order to strengthen the Pan-Turkist ideal.⁶¹

Up to the Turan ideal there had never existed any Turkish state which had such an ideal throughout history. Since the Turks had chosen Islam as their religion and devoted themselves for the glorification of it, a race-based state policy never developed in especially Ottoman Empire. While at the beginning of the Empire, there were some central Asiatic ties, such as translation of Turkic epics in the period of Murad II., such traditional Turkic mores and traditions remained weak following the period of the rule of Mehmet the Conqueror, since this time connotes the complement of Ottoman Empire's establishment in opposing to European Christian powers. The contrast with Christian Europe forced Ottoman state to form itself in accordance with the Islamic policy. Also the Ottoman military system was based on the *Devsirme* system (known as the *Janissaries*). Naturally in such a state apparatus, the consciousness of Turkism could not arise. Also, after Sultan Yavuz Selim took on the institution of the Caliphate from the Mamluks, the Ottoman sultans started to use the name "emir-ul mu'minin" (the leader of Muslims). Consequently, they ignored the priority of the Turks with respect to other Muslim communities within the Empire. Therefore, the word "Turk" lost the probability to be in positive usage. On the contrary, this term was used for defining the coarse and uneducated people of Anatolia in the nineteenth century.⁶²

⁶¹ I. Parmaksizoglu, "Turancilik", (Turanism), *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, (Encyclopedia of Turk), Vol. 32, 1977, p. 2.

⁶² George Arnakis, "Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism", *Balkan Studies*, Volume I, 1960, p. 25.

Together with the Tanzimat (regulation) period, the Ottoman elites tried to unify all the communities of the empire under the ideology of Ottomanism. However, the waves of nationalism throughout Europe easily reached to the territories of the Ottoman Empire and shook the congruence of these communities which had lived together for many centuries. Under this situation, the Ottoman elites used the card of Pan-Islamism to provide the ground for the Muslim elements to grow. Moreover, they had the intention to agitate the Muslims who had lived under the colonization of England, France and Russia. Among the upheavals of such ideologies, the Ottoman intellectuals developed the consciousness of Turkism in the second half of the nineteenth century in order to save the state. The first step was a cultural one, which contained linguistic efforts to purify the Turkish language from Arabic and Persian words. Therefore, the movement of language purification started, not only in Istanbul, but also among the Russian Turks. These cultural efforts will be discussed in the chapter 3.

With the increasing development of national consciousness in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Turkish identity was started to be discussed in the Ottoman public opinion. As George Arnakis states:

The war against Russia in the eastern provinces, the alliance with the Germans, Magyars and Bulgarians, disillusionment with both Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, the crisis of the Tanzimat, (*Reformation*), and, last but not least, the loss of the European provinces during the Balkan wars- all these actualities created the psychological *milieu* of Turanism. In the face of adversity, Turanism assumed a narrow, chauvinistic form. To most of its advocates the Turanic ideal aimed at establishing Turkish hegemony over the peoples of Central Asia, or organizing a Turkish-controlled 'Middle Asia', analogous to the German-controlled *Mittel-Europa*. The basis and rationale of the new structure continued to be the same Turkic ethnicism.⁶³

⁶³ George Arnakis, "Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism", p. 25.

I now discuss the development of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman society.

CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH NATIONALISM
IN OTTOMAN SOCIETY

3.1 Political Background

After the French revolution, generally, two kinds of political organizations appeared in Europe: the first one was the nation-state formation based on citizenship and the discourse of the Enlightenment project; while the second was the pan movements with an expansionist policy. The prominent examples of Pan Movements were Pan-Germanism and Panslavism, which the Ottoman Pan-Turkists followed. Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were all a continuation of the pan movements experienced in Europe, both in form and content. Since the Ottoman state had strong state structure and also had different ethnic subjects, the ideology the state followed first was not the Pan-Turkism, but Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism. On the other hand, Ottoman ethnic structure depended on the millet system to which any kind of interference would create the disruption.⁶⁴ In this regard, Abdulhamid II chose the Islamism card in order to keep the Islamic-colonial world under his influence. At the time, advocating any kind of nationalist ideology had been evaluated as an effective damage to the existing social order; also such attempts had always been met with state censorship and pressure. This is the reason why

⁶⁴ Kemal Karpat, "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern, Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk", *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, edited by Kemal Karpat, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 17-18.

Turkish nationalism developed first in the cultural area in the second half of nineteenth century.⁶⁵

Politically, the Ottoman-Russian wars in 1877-1878, the close political relations of Germany and some Balkan nations such as Hungarians and Bulgarians with the Ottoman Turks, and the disappointments stemming from Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism and lastly, the activities of Ottoman intellectuals against the Tanzimat bureaucrats and reforms were all the causes of the emergence of Turkish nationalism as an alternative to Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism. All these developments prepared the situation for Turkish nationalism. Firstly, Turkism or broadly, Turkish nationalism was born under the impact of several inciting factors. While European forces were increasing their political and economic domination, Ottoman Turks and other Muslim countries stayed in a backward position. Educated Turks, therefore, realized the necessity for a new ideology. According to Hostler, "...This ideology was supplied by the impact of Western ideas and by European Turkologists, who showed the Turks that they belonged to a great and ancient nation. The work of Western Turkologists was later followed by that of Turkish scientists..."⁶⁶ Hostler also added the impact of Pan-Islamic ideology and its teachers such as Cemaleddin Afghani who fought for proving the validity of Islam in modern institutions.⁶⁷ Last but not least, the impact of Russian Turks particularly in the nineteenth and in the first quarter of twentieth century gave the ideology of Turkism a political basis and

⁶⁵ Kemal Karpat, "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern, Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk", p. 22.

⁶⁶ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1957), p. 106.

⁶⁷ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, p. 106.

made it a political alternative to Ottomanism where Yusuf Akchura's activities should especially be mentioned.

First of all, the political condition of the late Ottoman Empire will be covered before discussing the emergence of Turkism. Saving the state was the main objective of the Ottoman state bureaucracy and intelligentsia by the eighteenth century.⁶⁸ From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century Ottoman authorities put many modern reforms into practice to stop the decline of the State. Initially Mahmut II initiated the radical and rooted innovations which would change the old institutions. The Sultan firstly wanted to make all the local powers and the opponents of the reforms ineffective. This period could be named as the era of military reforms. Main objective was to renew the old Janissary military order with a modern and an obedient military establishment in 1826. This change would provide the control of both the military and the opponent powers.⁶⁹

The reforms of Mahmut II could be evaluated such that the Ottoman state tried to strengthen the central power in protection against the forces that would oppose the reforms. The central power was to felt itself in spite of other local authorities. The first step taken in this direction was to abolish the Timar system throughout Anatolia and Rumelia in 1831. This change aimed to defuse the rich land owners from the political arena. The Land Code of 1858 was another consolidating act that pointed

⁶⁸ Tarik Zafer Tunaya, "Batililasmada Temel Arastirmalar ve Yaklasimlar", (Basic Researches and Approaches on Westernization), *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (Encyclopedia of Turkey in the Period of Republic), Vol. 1, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1983), p. 238.

⁶⁹ Kemal Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire", *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, ed. W. Polk & R. L. Chambers, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 79.

out the sole authority of the state on land. However, this later caused special form of land ownership among Ottoman people, while the state's intention was to control the land owners. Throughout the Balkans and Anatolia, the landowners and *agas* (local chief) had become the local and influential actors in consequence of these reforms.⁷⁰

The *ulema* (religious clergy) was not excluded from these reforms. This class also objected to the economic restrictions brought about through the centralization of *Evkaf* (charity organizations). From the time on, all *Vakf* orders would be operated from the center. Also the abolition of the Janissaries had ended the traditional alliance between the *Ulema* class and the military power. Janissaries and the *Ulema* class were the major opponents of the reform movements carried out by the state. Up to the time, the *Ulema* had held the services of education and justice. By the establishment of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice, the power of the *Ulema* came to an end. These reforms neutralized the impact of the *Ulema* in the political and social areas.⁷¹ Another important result of this transformation was the inclusion of the intellectuals into the political domain.

In intellectual arena, to study the political and economic structures of the West, the Ottoman government began to send ambassadors to the European capitals at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The first embassy was established in Paris in 1720 and Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi became the first ambassador in Paris. Many other embassies were successively opened in European capitals. All embassies played an active role in transferring all the information about Western intellectual

⁷⁰ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 450.

⁷¹ Ceylan Tokluoglu, "The Formation of Turkish Nation-State and Resistance", Ph. D. Thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Carleton, 1995, p. 112.

and ideological trends and politics. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman government appointed some Turkish students abroad to study at advanced Western schools and institutions and to transfer this information to their country. The Ottoman government made its first intellectual connection with European developments by the assignment of the Turkish literates to the Translation Office in 1821. Before this time, Translation Office was operated by the Greek Ottomans. The significance of the Translation Office was such that many Ottoman sadrazams such as Mustafa Resid Pasa, Ali and Fuad Pasas, Vefik Pasa and so on, performed important services in these institutions. Also some well-known Turkish intellectuals, such as Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasa, emerged as the leading figures in this institution especially in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁷²

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced some political problems. At the time, nationalistic movements throughout Europe affected the minorities of the Empire, which caused inner unrest, and also caused some land lose in the Balkan area. Additionally, the local tribes and land owners refused to pay their taxes and this led to further centralization in the government. The recession of the Empire in every field orientated the Ottoman intellectuals to explore the causes of this recession and the measures to prevent it. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was no distinction between the state bureaucracy and the intellectuals. Their attitude toward modern reforms did not stem from their admiration of the western world, but of the necessity of saving the state⁷³.

⁷² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 82-86.

⁷³ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyil*, (The Longest Century of the Empire), (Istanbul: İletisim Yayinlari, 2000), p. 20.

The nineteenth century confirmed the fact that the political and economic domination of west European countries were accepted by the rest of the world. Colonialist policy and nationalistic expansionism were the two current threats against the existence of the Ottoman Empire. These new developments in Europe forced the Ottoman Empire to adopt a new role in the political arena of Europe. This was named as modernization, which the Ottoman bureaucrats accepted as a measure against the weakening of Ottoman dominance.

Tanzimat period was introduced in the political agenda of the Ottoman society after the time of Mahmud II. The strengthening of the empire was consolidated by the reform process of the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). The announcement of the Tanzimat was made after the Ottoman army was defeated to the forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt and this showed that the reforms applied up till then were not efficient to sustain the empire alive. The Tanzimat announcement was prepared by the grand vizier Mustafa Resid Pasha and later improved by the following viziers, Ali and Fuat Pasas in the period of Abdulmecid and Abdulaziz. The decisive objective of the Tanzimat reforms was to create the Ottoman nation without taking into consideration the ethnic or religious origins of the people. The main objective was to create citizenship the new tie between the individual and the state. Also territory became the new foundation of the state. The Ottoman state bureaucrats were targeting to develop to common civil rights in which all the Ottoman subjects could be gathered around. These rights were not involved with religious loyalties or any other special interests. According to the Tanzimat rescript, the former system of law would be replaced by a new, modern one; and these new

articles of law would be in accordance with the religion based Ottoman law system. Moreover, the rescript positioned all the subjects of the Empire equal before the law; and made it compulsory for the subjects to conform to the arrangements performed by the Tanzimat bureaucrats. Equality before the law was new and in a sense, a radical arrangement which would force the mind of the bureaucrats and intellectuals to adapt to this new condition, because this meant that Ottoman Muslims, from now on, were not considered as different from any other Ottoman minorities⁷⁴.

In classical Ottoman social organisation, the division of subjects was depended on their religious affiliation that was named as the millet system. Each millet was represented by their own religious leaders. They organized their own education, trials, marriage and other private orders. The Tanzimat rescripts brought all private constitutions under the same, equal and autonomous new order of law. These arrangements indicated the new legal process that would be in effect in the Ottoman society from then on. This recent development was novel, since it was the first time in Ottoman history that a legal system outside *Sharia* laws (religion-based laws) was put in practice for shaping the Ottoman social life.⁷⁵

However, the Tanzimat reforms were not effective enough to create a full-fledged Ottoman nation. The only important consequence of these reforms was the centralization of the state. Abolition of the Janissaries, the new Timar law, reducing the power of the *Ulema* and last of all the Tanzimat reforms all contributed to the centralization of the state. The key constraint during the Tanzimat period was the

⁷⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 107.

⁷⁵ Eric J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, (Leiden: Brill, 1984), p. 3.

development of nationalist movements throughout Europe, and also in some regions of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, all the suggestions and expectations of the state bureaucrats turned out to be ineffective. Although the state bureaucrats did not accomplish what they had aimed, their actions had some unintended consequences. For example, some western-originated ideas and concepts such as nationalism, liberalism and idea of fatherland entered into the discussions among the state bureaucrats and intellectuals.⁷⁶

These new thoughts were mostly brought forward by the newly-emerged intelligentsia who were for the most part the sons of the state bureaucrats who carried out western reforms in the first half of the nineteenth century. As already pointed out, these reforms shaped the state's centralization policy. Restricting the central role of the *Ulema* in the political and educational arena, this new intelligentsia, also as a result of being educated in modern schools, became the key actors in the state's future. The schools they had graduated from were the conveyor of the modern western ideas, such as progress, constitutionalism, liberalism and nationalism. Although they were the sons of the Tanzimat reformers, the intelligentsia avoided taking part in the state apparatuses. However, their existence was strongly dependent on the continuation of the state, because, as cited before, both for the bureaucrats and intellectuals, the fundamental objective was to save the state.⁷⁷

The modern institutions formed in the light of the reform movements had created a new generation who believed that their identity was strongly depended on Turkish

⁷⁶ Eric J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, p. 5.

⁷⁷ Feroz Ahmad, "The State and Intervention in Turkey", *Turcica*, Vol. 16, 1984, p. 51.

history and literature. Although the ideology of Ottomanism was deep rooted among the bureaucrats and intellectuals, some officials, such as Ali Pasa, had given significant emphasis on the political capacity of the Turks.⁷⁸ This second generation of intellectuals was named as the *New Ottomans*. Ziya Pasa, Ali Suavi, Namik Kemal and Sinasi were all from this generation with a middle class origin. Their services were limited to the areas of culture and education. They were the sons of high bureaucrats and had an objective to bring state order under a more liberal and constitutional situation. The impact of Western thoughts and institutions not only had changed the physical appearance of the state institutions, but it also had a considerable influence on the intellectual life of the Ottoman society. Although nationalism lately entered in the Ottoman Empire, the effects of it at the cultural field were witnessed only in the second half of the nineteenth century. Purification of Turkish language was the central concern for the Ottoman intellectuals who tried to regain their former self-confidence in the cultural space.⁷⁹

During the Abdulhamit II period, the establishment of modern western schools continued. Throughout the empire, established schools educated the pupils with rural area origin. Most of the opponents of Abdulhamit II were the graduates of these new schools and this situation gave wider acceptance to the ideas of the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottomans, as cited above, were the defenders of a more liberal and constitutionalist state order. Their legitimation of these western ideas was mostly

⁷⁸ Fatma Müge Göçek, “Osmanlı Devletinde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu”, (The Formation of Turkish Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Nationalism), Defne Orhun, trans., (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 70.

⁷⁹ Lewis V. Thomas, “Nationalism in Turkey”, in Sidney Sherwood (Pres.), *Nationalism in the Middle East*, (Sixth Annual Conference on Middle East), (March – 21-22, Washington D. C., 1952)

based on Islamic reformism, which took shape in the Islamic world throughout the nineteenth century. Muhammed Abduh, Cemaleddin Afgani and Abdurrahman Kevakibi were such Muslim *Ulemas* who tried to transfer all the Western institutions into the Ottoman state machinery by filtering them through the Islamic *ictihad* (interpretation), which was the Islamic interpretation of the current problems. Such members of the *Ulema* defended the consitutionalist order, because the Islamic *meshveret* (consultation) was the counterpart of the western democracy. Moreover, poligamy had to be prohibited due to the incongruity of it to the spirit of Islam⁸⁰.

Together with the effects of the French Revolution and other European ideas such as nationalism, Young Ottomans movement defended the ideology of Ottomanism containing its patriotic content to a large extent. There was yet no political agenda in order to create a modern Turkish nation-state since there was already a strong central state, and the Young Ottomans had devoted themselves to it. The main objective of the Young Ottomans was to re-strengthen the dependence of all subjects to the empire. Ottomanism was used to create a common Ottoman citizenship in this regard. For this reason, up to the Balkan wars (1912-13) there was no full-fledged and savoir Turkist ideology as a political alternative to Ottomanism.⁸¹

Politically the Young Ottomans' contrast with the state bureaucracy stemmed from the authoritarian character of the Tanzimat reforms which had resulted in the disorder of the traditional Ottoman institutions, especially in the educational

⁸⁰ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyili*, (The Longest Century of the Empire), (Istanbul: İletisim Yayinlari, 2000), p. 20.

⁸¹ Nergis Canefe, "Turkish nationalism and ethno-symbolic analysis: the rules of exception", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8, Part 2, April 2002, p. 143.

organizations. In this respect, Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi were two main figures who developed the concept of *vatan* (homeland) and a policy for a national economy. They were also the defenders of Turkist ideas which were seen revolutionary at the time. Namik Kemal was one of the leading figures who introduced the Western term *vatan* (patrie) to the Ottoman public opinion and emphasized the importance of the *millet* (nation) living on the same land. Because of the complicated and shifty situation of the Empire, he mostly used the words *vatan*, *millet* and *ummet* (Muslim religious community) in the same meaning.⁸² Due to the ambiguity in his emphasis on the concept of national, he can be considered as a defender of Ottomanism rather than of Turkism.

Ali Suavi, on the other hand, was another important and also creative intellectual who gave great emphasis to the word “Turk”. He considered the Turks superior than the central Asian Turkic races and also the most fertile race of Islamic civilization. Also, according to him, Turkish language was the world’s most rich and excellent language among other world languages. Ali Suavi also used the Islamic literature in order to form a basis for western reforms as all the Young Ottomans did.⁸³ His contribution to to this movement was his strong emphasis on Turkish nation and language, although his ideas did not develop into a systematic nationalist ideology. Rather, his arguments formed only a small part of future Turkish nationalism. Actually at the time of Young Ottomans, the term *Türk* started to lose its former

⁸² Serif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlılar ve Siyasi Fikirleri” (Political Thoughts of New Ottomans), *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to Republic), Vol. 6, 1985, p. 1701.

⁸³ Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 372.

negative meaning. The term *Turk* did not have a positive meaning until the 19th century as mentioned previously.⁸⁴ As George Arnakis put it:

The old practice of associating the name “Turk” with the uncultured and uncouth peasant or nomad of the plains still persisted in the 1880s and a sharp distinction was drawn between the city Turk, who called himself an Osmanli, and the man from the countryside.... When Hermann (Arminius) Vambéry (1832-1913), the great Hungarian Turkologist and Turanist, visited Istanbul in the early 1880’s, he was distressed to see how educated Ottoman Turks refused to have anything to do with the central Asian “nomads”. Vambéry explains the desire of the Osmanli’s to renounce their ethnic origins in the light of the influence of Islam. He remarks that the tendency of denationalization (*Entnationalisierung*), so characteristic of Islam, was now carried so far as in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁵

Though the Turks would be the founders of a state in the near future, the implications of the word *Turk* was still heavily determined by the European writers had used the word ‘Turk’ to define only the Ottoman Turks as one of the several other communities of the empire. However, the Ottoman elites used the term *Ottoman* in place of *Turk* to define not only the Ottoman dynasty but also all the Muslim elements of the Ottoman society. Thus the meaning of the term *nation* in Europe in the 19th century was different from the meaning of the term *Ottoman*. Some definitions around the term Ottoman, such as the Ottoman nation or the Ottoman fatherland, were novel inventions that developed under European influence.⁸⁶ Many Western thoughts, especially patriotism, were also adopted by the Ottoman intellectuals as a result of the modernization efforts of the Ottoman statesmen. Pan-Ottomanism was the main ideology for the state bureaucrats and also for Young

⁸⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University, 1968), p. 333.

⁸⁵ George G. Arnakis, “Turanism, An aspect of Turkish Nationalism”, *Balkan Studies*, Volume I, 1960, p. 25.

⁸⁶ Ercüment Kuran, “The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century”, *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, (Ed. by William R. Polk&Richard L. Chambers), (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1991), pp. 110-11.

Ottomans, because, as cited above, the central concern of the Ottomans was to save the state.

Ottomanism had the aim to unite the all elements of the empire regardless of their ethnic and religious origin. As seen at this point, this was the strategical or political departure towards the non- Muslim population, due to the fact that the Ottoman state needed to acquire the strong devotion its population for the contiunation of the state. For this reason, Turkism developed in the second half of the nineteenth century purely in the cultural field the existing social order restricted such ideological attempts, and Abdulhamid II applied strict censorship towards any kind of opponent political movement. Cultural activities which were the stimulus and scientific base of Turkism were surely not the only sources of this movement. It was the Turcology studies in European centers which were one of the most effective sources in the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁸⁷

The evaluation of the Young Turk movement is critical for a discussion of the development of Turkism in the second half of nineteenth century. As cited above, the Young Ottomans were the first opponent intellectual group who defended liberal policies against the Ottoman state bureaucrats. The Young Ottoman movement was constitutionalist and Midhat Pasha was the most influential member of the movement who actively participated to dethrone of sultan Abdulaziz. After sultan Abdulhamid appointed him as the grand vizier, Midhat Pasa announced the constitution in 1876, which limited the power of the Ottoman sultans. Furthermore, according to the

⁸⁷ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), *Türk Yili*, (Turkish Year), (Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928), pp. 304-309.

constitution, the Ottoman government was now responsible solely to the parliament. The constitutional period did not last long and Abdulhamid disbanded the parliament in 1876 and sent the most influential Young Ottomans to exile.⁸⁸ In 1891, the Committee of Union and Progress, as a successor of the Young Ottoman movement, was established in Geneva. Paris played the temporary main office up to 1906 in which the headquarters would be in Salonica. They executed their policy under strong secrecy, imitating the Italian secret opponent movements as their counterpart. Effective pressure to the Ottoman sultan and the government caused the 1908 Revolution, which led to abolishing censorship, and the restoration of the parliament.⁸⁹ The revolution was a great chance for the Young Turks to put their ideals into action, but however, the situation also brought about a change in Ottoman national combination, for the Committee members were the fiery defenders of Turkism, and this national sensation was growing further. To explore the effect of this change, some steps taken in the cultural field under the influence of orientalist studies must be discussed.

3.2 Turcology Studies and Cultural Development of Turkism

Turkish national discourse did not gain full-fledged political content and aim until the declaration of the Second Constitution in 1908. This relative delay of political controversy on Turkish nationalism was not due to the ignorance of the bureaucrats and intellectuals towards the problem of saving of the state. On the contrary, they

⁸⁸ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, p. 96.

⁸⁹ For a detailed chronology and discussion, see M. Sükrü Hanioglu, "Genesis of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908", *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 277-300.

tried all possible alternative policies, such as Ottomanism, Islamism or, in general, Westernism. At the beginning Turkism did not have pure national content, for Ottomanism and Islamism were still shaping the existing acts of manner. There were persuasive reasons for this outlook. First of all, the Ottoman state was a multi-national empire and this inevitably led to construct the ‘millet’ system. Bringing forward the Turkish national discourse would shake this established and deep-rooted order. Secondly, the term ‘Turk’ did not have the positive meaning until the nineteenth century.⁹⁰

Turcology studies⁹¹ which had started in the second half of the nineteenth century were one of the most effective sources not only in the emergence of Turkish nationalism but also in the emergence of Pan-Turanism.⁹² These studies were mostly directed by some centers in Europe. In order to reveal why these centers undertook such a mission, the specific developments in Europe in the nineteenth century has to be analyzed. One of the important determinants was the superiority of European powers towards the rest of the world, which was also accepted by the Ottoman Empire that could be traced in the institutional reforms that was carried out mostly during the nineteenth century. Other important element which determined the position of Europe was the French Revolution and the new political order brought by it. This new order shook the sovereignty of the old empires, and lead to the ascending nation-states. Western powers, when controlling the rest of the world,

⁹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University, 1968), p. 333.

⁹¹ For a detailed chronology and information on Turcology, see “Türkoloji Çalışmalarına Toplu Bir Bakış ve Ödevlerimiz” (A Holistic View to the Turcology Studies and Our Duties), *Belleten*, reprint of 1960, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1960)

⁹² Yasir Suleiman, *The Arabic Language and National Identity*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p. 72.

naturally tried to collect scientific and sometimes manipulated information. All these studies were based on the logic of the Enlightenment that tried to construct a fact based history. In this regard, the Egypt expedition of Napoleon was critical, because Napoleon took some scientists to Egypt with him. The research carried out by these scientists led to the emergence of a modern orientalist literature.⁹³ This expedition and its results made Paris the center of orientalist studies throughout the nineteenth century.⁹⁴ With these studies, eastern nations could now find support for their nationalistic claims, for these studies had the objective to reveal the relevance of races by investigating their languages and histories. All these studies were carried out by orientalist scholars.

In the nineteenth century, orientalist studies spread especially in oriental philology, and these developments went through text translations which would shed light to languages, ancient social structures and the literature of related cultures. Afterwards, these findings would form the ideological base of future sociological and anthropological traditions about the Middle East. This means that such studies were not just scientific studies but rather studies about the judging and defining of the eastern world.⁹⁵ In doing so, some European centers were charged to collect and publish the related ethnological and anthropological studies. These studies had a considerable impact on the construction of Turkism in Turkey and among the Russian Turks as well as on the construction of Turanism in Hungary. Although

⁹³ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1993), p. 83.

⁹⁴ Edward Said, *Oryantalizm: Sömürgecilğin Kesif Kolu*, (Orientalism), (Istanbul: Pinar Yayınları, 1991), pp. 148-49.

⁹⁵ Edward Said, *Oryantalizm: Sömürgecilğin Kesif Kolu*, (Orientalism), p. 181.

France and England were the two great central powers in shaping the relations with the Orient through these orientalist studies, Turcology studies emerged first at the center of Austro-Hungarian Empire, because eastern Europe was strategically close to the Asiatic world.⁹⁶ Arminius Vambery, Hammer, and Paul Wittek were the greatest figures, who not only studied on Turcology but also related these works to the political and social situation of the Ottoman Empire. Due to the linguistic kinship with Turkish language and therefore with the ancient Hun Empire; the Hungarians, when scrutinizing their ethnics, culture and language, gave great attention to Turcology studies. Turcology was the only national science in Hungary. Therefore, these studies are very rich in content and have a strong tradition.⁹⁷ This situation can be interpreted such that Western powers developed new relations with Asiatic cultures via east European scientific centers.

However, these studies on the Turks were not the novel ones; but some examples about orientalist studies. Joseph Guignes, the French Orientalist, was one of the most important figures who wrote the *Histoire generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols* (1785). This work made a significant contribution to the institutionalization of Turcology. France was the pioneering country among those involved in Turcology studies and established the first Turcology chair in Paris in 1795.⁹⁸ In addition, except for the studies carried out by French orientalists, most of the other studies were also written in French at the time. For example Julius Klaproth, despite his

⁹⁶ Mehmet Karakas, *Türk Ulusçulugunun Insasi* (Construction of Turkish Nationalism), (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 2000), p. 94.

⁹⁷ Gyula Nemeth, *Attila ve Hunlar*, (Serif Bastav, Trans.), (Ankara: A.Ü.D.T.C.F Yayinlari, 1982), p. 8.

⁹⁸ Mehmet Karakas, *Türk Ulusçulugunun Insasi*, p. 93.

German origin, settled in France and wrote his works in French. Up to the twentieth century, French and English orientalists had been competing among themselves to dominate the field of orientalist studies, after which American scientists took the lead. Also the Germans, Scandinavians, Russians and Hungarians, due to their powerful situation in world affairs and in history were always ahead in the area of Turcology and Central Asia.⁹⁹

The studies in the area of Turcology had a significant effect among the Ottoman intellectuals. The writings on Turkish history and language found direct reflection among the Ottoman intelligentsia. Naturally, there was not only one-sided attitude towards the Turks. Some works had negative connotations, while others were positive. For that reason, the Ottoman intellectuals selectively positioned themselves towards these studies, thus they put forward the studies which had a positive attitude towards the Turks. Ziya Gökalp listed the Turcology studies which had a positive effect on the emergence of Turkish nationalism: Joseph de Guignes' *Histoire generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongoles, et autres Tartares occidentaux* (Paris, 1756-1781), Arthur Lumley Davids' *A Grammar of the Turkish Language* (London, 1832), and Leon Cahun's *Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie* (Paris, 1896) are among the most important works.¹⁰⁰ In addition to these works, Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha's *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (Istanbul, 1869) must also be cited.¹⁰¹ Moreover, Hungarian Turkologists, especially Vambery, from the Turan Society of Budapest,

⁹⁹ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, p. 82.

¹⁰⁰ Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, (Londra: Luzac, 1950), p. 105.

¹⁰¹ Ercümen Kuran, "The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century", William R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers (ed.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 113-15.

and Radloff, the Russian Turkologist should absolutely be taken into account. Among these cited works, the work of Leon Cahun (Paris, 1896) had gained unusual impression on the popularization and politicization of Turkism.¹⁰²

While England did not give specific emphasis on the Turcology studies but rather dealt with the eastern world as a whole; Germany considered Turcology studies as important, and and became the varicosis of Turcology studies. Thus, despite its delayed participation in this area of study, Germany took the dominant position in the Turcology studies and became one of the most effective scientific centers of Europe. Julius Klaproth was the founder of Turcology in Germany who studied on various Asiatic languages. After Klaproth, Germans made expeditions on the area of Uygur Turks (Turfan Environs) and found many materials especially hand-written manuscripts between 1902 and 1914. All manuscripts were translated and published by the German scientists.¹⁰³

On the other hand, Russian Turcologists contributed to the area up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century as an extension to France's contribution, the pioneering country of Turcology studies. When Germany entered the area, Russian origin researchers formed direct contact with German scientific centers. In accordance with the geographical situation of Russia, Russian studies had special advantages in collecting the materials about the Turkic tribes. Consequently, so many dictionaries, grammars, and precious books were exposed. The most recognized Russian Turkologist, Vilhelm Radloff wrote many books on the civilizations and language of

¹⁰² Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Dogusu*, (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1995), pp. 123-24.

¹⁰³ Hüseyin Namik Orkun, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, (Ankara: Kömen Yayinlari, 1977), p. 35.

the Turks, and prepared a Russian-German-Turkish dictionary, which was a very considerable study at the time.¹⁰⁴ He wrote all his works in Russian and German languages. As for the studies of Russian Turkologists, the considerable thing was that the Russian Turkologists wrote their works mostly in French up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, when the German orientalist took became dominant in oriental studies, Russian Turkologists started to write mostly in German and Russian languages. This situation obviously makes clear that Turcology studies cannot be thought without taking political contentions into consideration.

The activity of the Hungarians on Turcology and on Turanism, especially that of Vambery's (1831-1913), was another important development that affected the emergence of Turkish nationalist ideology. Vambery, a considerable Hungarian Turkologist, who had written in *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Definition of Thoughts), set the contact with the Young Turks in Paris, and sent articles to the journals published by the Young Turks, such as *Hurriyet* (Liberty) (London) and *Mesveret* (Consultation) (Paris). The Turcology studies emerged in Hungary first with the efforts of Vambery in 1864. Afterwards, Hungarian Turcology was developed further by the studies of Jozsef Thury (1861-1941) and Gyula Nemeth (1890-1977) who made considerable studies on the Hungarian culture and Turkic languages.¹⁰⁵ Hungary had also particular significance for laying the scientific foundation of Panturanism.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, (London: Frank Cass Company, 1977), p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Nicholas Poppe, *Introduction to Altaic Linguistics*, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965), p. 123.

¹⁰⁶ This factor will be detailed in the next chapter.

The repercussions of all these scientific efforts in the Ottoman public opinion can be traced by the use of the concepts of *vatan* and people by the Ottoman intellectuals. In the Tanzimat period, the Turks who went to Europe to study obtained the chance to be informed about what the European public opinion and scientists had in their agenda. They saw the prejudices about the Turks in the public opinion and also saw the lively studies about the Turks. As a result, when some of them returned to Istanbul they were considered as the Turks with a consciousness of their ethnic origin. With these advances, the term *Turk* gained a positive sense which led to the urge of Turkification of language.¹⁰⁷

The Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats had investigated the studies of European Orientalists and Turcologists throughout the nineteenth century and then published new studies in French and Turkish inspired from those former orientalist studies. As is the case in nearly all nationalist endeavours, Turkish nationalism first aimed to create a language to achieve cultural unity. Turkish nationalism also naturally followed the same way as other forms of nationalist movements did in trying to purify the Turkish language by eliminating Arabic or Persian origin words. While Ali Suavi was one of the first defenders of the idea of purifying Turkish language, Semseddin Sami was another important figure working on the same line. The awakening of idea of language purification was further strengthened by the intellectuals, such as Ahmed Vefik Pasa and Mustafa Celaleddin Pasa. These developments became the first signs of the ideology of Turanism. When Ahmed Vefik Pasa used the word *Turk*, he did not mean the Western or Ottoman Turks but all the Turkic origin people living in Anatolia, Asia and Eastern Europe. On the other

¹⁰⁷ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğusu*, p. 125.

hand, Celaleddin Pasa, in his book *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (1869), cited for the first time the philology, ethnology and history of all Turks. At the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Semseddin Sami, Veled Çelebi, Bursali M. Tahir, Raif Pasazade, M. Fuad, Ahmed Hikmet, Mehmed Emin, Tunali Hilmi, Ahmed Cevdet, Emrullah Efendi and Necib Asim were the intellectuals who operated the idea of nationalism in the sphere of Turkish language. However, this current trend of purification of Turkish language was not welcomed by the Ottoman palace. To write in pure Turkish and to convey debates on the issues of language in newspapers and journals were strictly prohibited by the Abdulhamid government. The publication of *Ikdam* (Endeavour) issued by Ahmed Cevdet Bey was censured. Some books, such as *Kamus-i Turki* (Turkish Dictionary), *Seyahatname* (Travel Book) and *Türk Tarihi* (Turkish History) were also prohibited. Despite this restriction, Turkish intellectuals aimed not only to use Turkish language for awakening the conscious of Turkism among the Russian and Iranian Turks, but also used it as a means to save the state. One of them was Yusuf Akçura who published the article, *Üç Tarz-i Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy) (1904) in the journal *Türk* in Egypt. With this article, the ideal of Turan turned into a political movement. Opposing to Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, Akçura articulated Pan-Turkism as a savoir ideology of the Turkish state.¹⁰⁸

Among the Young Ottoman intellectuals, Ali Suavi was the most excited one who emphasized the significance of the Turks as the founders of the empire and the ones who preserved central Asiatic races. He published the journal *Ulum* (Sciences) in Paris (1871) and wrote some articles about the contributions of the Turks to the world civilization. His interest in Turcology developed after his acquaintance with the

¹⁰⁸ I. Parmaksizoglu, "Turancilik" (Turanism), *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara, 1977), Vol. 32, p. 3.

works published by the Orientalists. His articles in *Ulum* (Sciences), for the most part, followed the ideas of the English orientalist Arthur Lumley Davids and his well-known book *A Grammar of the Turkish Language* (1832). Ali Suavi based his linguistic arguments on the arguments in this book. Furthermore, as he discussed, he was especially influenced by the French orientalist Gobineau and his work “Inegalite des races”. Ali Suavi not only defended Turkish language as a perfect language among other world languages, but he also did argue that the Turks were the most effective nation who created and improved Islamic civilization.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, although he was interested in other Central Asian Turkic peoples, he politically did not favour the nationalist ideology, that is Turkism, but Ottomanism.¹¹⁰

The Ottoman intelligentsia, while aware of the widespread use of Turkish language in Asia, naturally gave emphasis on the linguistic discussions. First of all, they focused on the issue of purification of language and then tried to construct a Turkish national identity on the basis of language. This interest on the language actually was the result of the works of some orientalists who previously dealt with Turkic languages. The contributions of Radloff and Thomsen through the deciphering the Orhun monuments in 1893 had an importance such that these monuments are the first known records describing the Turkic states and tribes. So, the term *Türk* was now loaded with a new and a positive meaning. On the other hand, some other studies need to be added to this list, such as those of the French orientalist Joseph de Guignes’ *Histoire generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols et autres Tartares*

¹⁰⁹ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdas Düşünce Tarihi*, (Istanbul: Ülken Yayinlari, 1996), pp. 110-12.

¹¹⁰ Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 222.

Occidentaux (1758). Guignes, in this book, gave the Turks the leading role among other Turkic tribes in Asia and Eastern Europe. Also he pointed out to the Turks as an outstanding example of military success and bravery throughout history. The echo of this book was reflected a century later in the study of Suleyman Pasa. Suleyman Pasa, as a teacher in the Military School, wrote *Tarih-i Alem* (World History) in 1876, and explained the reasons for the military success of the pre-Islamic Turks and also mentioned Oguz Han as a Turkish commander. The sources of these explanations were mostly Guignes' book.¹¹¹ As for politics, Suleyman Pasa strictly refused Ottomanism and obviously relied on the validity of Turkism.¹¹²

Another important study, which had a considerable effect on Turkism was *Les Turcs anciens and modernes* (Istanbul, 1869), written by Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, a Polish exile and a revolutionist. His original name was Konstantin Borzecki. When he was 22 years old, he participated to the 1848 Revolution, and after the failure of the Revolution, he refuged to Istanbul.¹¹³ The Ottoman government, taking into account of his knowledge about the military and maps, recruited him to the Ottoman military organization. He also converted to Islam. In his book referred to above, Celaleddin Pasha wrote about the current problems of the Ottoman Empire, and gave advices to Sultan Abdulaziz about propable solutions. In his book, after commenting on the role of the Turks in contributing to the development of world civilization throughout history, he argued that the Turkish and European nations were based on

¹¹¹ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, (London: Frank Cass Company, 1977), p. 13.

¹¹² Nejat Kaymaz, "Türkçü Tarih Görüsü" (Turkist View of History), *Felsefe Kurumu Seminerleri*, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1977), p. 438.

¹¹³ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), *Türk Yili*, (Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928), p. 307.

the same ethnic origin. This argument was related to the Touro-Aryanism thesis, which had been mostly discussed in the areas of ethnology and linguistics. According to Akchura, there could be two objectives in articulating such an idea: the first was to inculcate the self-confidence of the Ottoman Turks, and to recollect them the strength of being a Turk. Also, stressing the association between the Turks and the Europeans would prevent the Balkan nations to attack the Ottoman State. The second, articulating Touro-Aryanism could surpass the prejudice of European powers against the Turks. Although Celaledin Pasha articulated his evidence in *Les Turcs anciens and modernes* in a very superficial way, the originality of his work was due to his use of European methods and sources for the first time in proving the significance of the Turks and their language throughout history.¹¹⁴

Another important orientalist figure was Leon Cahun who wrote the famous book, *Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des Origines a 1405* (1896), which made Turkism popular and brought it into the political arena in the Ottoman Empire. According to Toynbee, this book made way for the Pan-Turkist movement, which initially imitated Pan-Slavism. A consul in Salonica gave this book to a member of the Young Turk community who became the first chain in spreading its popularity. Cahun, in this book, commented on the nomadic way of life and nomadic people and tried to denote how sedentary societies and Islamic institutions demolished that nomadic culture. Young Turks inferred from this book the idea that if they turned their face to the pre-Islamic Turkish life, then the future unity with other Turkic speaking peoples would be possible.¹¹⁵ For instance, Ziya Gokalp wrote

¹¹⁴ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük", (Turkism), pp. 304-306.

¹¹⁵ Arnold Toynbee, *Türkiye* (Turkey), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1971), p. 77.

that when he came to Istanbul in 1896 he first read Cahun's book and evaluated it as the forerunner of Pan-Turkism. Hostler also wrote that the deep interest of the Young Turks in Cahun's book would later assist to the emergence of the Pan-Turanist idea.¹¹⁶ Cahun's book was later translated to Turkish by Necib Asim in 1896 which was read by a considerable number of people Istanbul. Necib Asim was a Turkologist and also an instructor at the Dar-ul Funun (Istanbul University) who also carried out many linguistic researches. Mostly affected by the French and Hungarian Turkologists, Necip Asim adapted the title of Cahun's book as *Türk Tarihi* meaning *Turkish History* in Turkish (1891). He claimed the superiority of Turkish over Persian language and such efforts also contributed to the awakening of Turkism among intellectuals.¹¹⁷

Hungarian Arminius Vambery (1831-1913) can be regarded as the most influential orientalist in the Ottoman public opinion who kept contact with the Ottoman intellectuals and Abdulhamid II when he was in Istanbul. Based on the works of Hungarian orientalists, he argued that the Turks, Chinese and north eastern European nations all had the same ethnic origin.¹¹⁸ His main impact on Turcology studies appeared after his becoming the head of the Turcology department in Budapest University in 1870. The word *Turan* had first started to be used in this center as a general name for the linguistic families of Fin, Turkish, Hungarian and Mongol. His

¹¹⁶ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1957), p. 141.

¹¹⁷ Ercümen Kuran, "The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century", William R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers (ed.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 114.

¹¹⁸ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, (London: Frank Cass Company, 1977), p. 14.

fame was spread after he had traveled throughout central Asia for three years. After his travel, he wrote *Bir Sahte Dervisin Asya-i Vustada Seyahati* (A Travel of a Pseudo Dervish in the Central Asia) (1879), which was first presented to the English orientalist centers. From then on, he was labeled as an agent of the British government. With this book, the word *Turan* and the ideal of *Turan* became popular among the Ottoman intellectuals. Vambery made compliments about ancient Turks and criticized the Ottoman dynasty for its ignorance of Turkism.¹¹⁹ This was considerably important since for the first time the Ottoman dynasty was accused of ignoring the originality of the idea of *Turkishness* or the importance of being a Turk. These themes were now expressed in the Ottoman intellectual circles and a new kind of ideology received the Ottoman intellectuals' attention. They thought that the state could be saved through the ideology of Pan-Turkism.

At this time, linguistic and historical studies were at the peak, especially towards the end of the nineteenth century. Semseddin Sami prepared an Ottoman Turkish dictionary (1899) and wrote many articles on the eastern Turks. Veled Çelebi pursued the same line of thought with Semseddin Sami and prepared and defended the purification of Turkish language. He edited the poems of Sultan Veled in 1897 and wrote articles in the *Ikdam* and *Tercuman-i Hakikat*. The study of Necip Asim's *Türk Tarihi* (1899), which was mostly affected by Leon Cahun, was also included in these studies. Although this process came to an end with the censoring of

¹¹⁹ Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism*, (Connecticut: Archon Book, 1981), p. 2.

Abdulhamit, the linguistic studies carried out by Mehmed Necip and Hüseyin Kazim continued to be effective in the provincial areas of the Empire.¹²⁰

All these studies contributed to the development of a new kind of mentality in Ottoman public opinion. The Turkish students abroad during the Tanzimat period were also learning the current ideas and thoughts in European centers. With the development of Orientalistic studies, the Ottoman intellectuals understood that their identity was strongly based on Turkish identity; and that they had a glorious history and civilization before they converted to Islam. They evaluated the Ottoman history only as a short period of great Turkish history. Being a Turk became much more important than being a Muslim. It meant that the mentality of Turkish historiography was converted now to a secular point of view. The Ottoman intellectuals discovered their ethnic identity and this discovery, at first sight, was based on the works of orientalist-turkologist scholars where the durability of their scientific arguments was highly debatable. Kushner has analyzed this situation with the following words:

The scholarly works of orientalists acquainted Ottoman Turks with their language and ancient history, and with the contemporary Turkic-speaking peoples living outside the boundaries of the Empire in Central Asia, the Volga Region, the Caucasus and Iran...¹²¹

However, these all prepared the primary material and also the scientific base of political Pan-Turkism, which later became the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress when they became the rules of the Empire after 1908.

¹²⁰ Ercüment Kuran, "The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century", William R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers (ed.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 113-15.

¹²¹ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, (London: Frank Cass Company, 1977), p. 10.

3.3 Influence of Russian Turks on Turkish Nationalism

In addition to the refugees that fled away from the Austrian and Russian states after the failure of the 1848 Revolution, there were others who escaped from Central Asia on account of Russian pressure. This development was also another important dimension of Turkish nationalism, in which the common enemy again was Panslavism. Together with the studies and political efforts of Hungarian intellectuals, the influence of Russian Turks created a fertile domain for controversial debates among the Ottoman intellectuals. As a result of being exposed to Panslavist pressure, they became the strong defenders of Panturanism. Some significant figures in this group were Ismail Gaspirali, Yusuf Akchura, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey and Ahmet Agaoglu who were educated in the Russian and European schools and were closely studying Turcology studies.¹²²

Nationalism among the Russian Turks became an effective weapon against the Russians as a result of Islamic reformism and the development of a bourgeois class of Russian Turks during the late nineteenth century. Turkism emerged among the Russian Turks consciously as a reaction to Panslavism, which was regarded as Russification and Christianization. This expansionist and chauvinistic policy of Russia incited the tradesmen, clergy and of course the Russian Turks to protect their own identity against Russification. Influenced by the Russian populist and revolutionary ideas, the Russian Turks had an aim to create a new society on the

¹²² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University, 1968), 348.

basis of a sense of nationalism. Because of their religious distinction, the Russian Turks tended to be organized around Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Pan-Islamism naturally found a powerful base for its propaganda as a result of preceding Islamic reformism and the pan-Islamist policy of Abdulhamid II. On the other hand, the Pan-Turkist movement was mostly affected by other east European pan-movements, especially by Pan-Slavism. As obviously seen, pan-Turkism's key terms and arguments were similar to pan-Slavism.¹²³ As a result of being familiar with Russian and European ideas as well as with orientalist studies in general, and with the influence of the ascending bourgeois class, a new group of intellectuals emerged among the Russian Turks who played an important role in the political and social arena of the region.¹²⁴

Azerbaijan, Crimea, and Kazan were the main centers where the pan-Turanist movement flourished. The main impact on the improvement of a sense of nationalism among the Russian Turks can be listed as follows: Russian populism and revolutionism, Western liberalism, Tanzimat ideas and the Islamic modernism of Cemaleddin Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Abdurrahman Kevakibi.

Azerbaijan, as a center of silk industry and oil sources, could easily create a bourgeois class and a vivid progress in higher education. On account of this richness, Baku, in a very short period, became a multi-national industrial city towards the end

¹²³ Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism*, (Connecticut: Archon Book, 1981), p. 8.

¹²⁴ Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimlige Rus Azerbaycani 1905-1920* (From Islamic Community to National Identity: Russian Azerbaijan), (Nuray Mert, Trans.), (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1988), p. 160.

of the nineteenth century. After the construction of the Baku-Batum railway, the influence of Iran in the region weakened, and a deeper contact with Istanbul and with other Muslim people in Central Asia was established.¹²⁵ In the second half of the nineteenth century, with the effect of Islamic modernism and western ideas, Mirza Feth Ali Ahundzade (1812-1878) started to lecture in Western language, and used Western methods of science, and also wrote the first modern theatrical text. He also attempted to create a common alphabet which would unite all the Turkic peoples.¹²⁶ Then he went to Istanbul in 1863 and presented his project about the Islamic alphabet to the grand vizier Keçecizade Fuad Pasa, and also discussed his ideas with the Ottoman intellectuals.¹²⁷

During the mid-nineteenth century, in addition to Ahundzade, there were some other intellectuals such as Hasan Zerdabi (1837-1907), Hüseyinzade Ali Bey (1864-1942), and Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), who also aimed to educate the people through Western methods. Undoubtedly, Ahmed Agaoglu was the most famous and influential intellectual among others; and he was also the first intellectual in Azerbaijan who studied in Paris, where he became acquainted with some Young Turk leaders. After the proclamation of the Second Constitution, he settled in Istanbul and contributed to the journal *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) focusing particularly on the problem of civilization with other nationalist intellectuals.¹²⁸ In 1918, he was exiled to Malta. After his return to Turkey, he continued to be engaged

¹²⁵ Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 82.

¹²⁶ Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimlige Rus Azerbaycani 1905-1920*, (From Islamic Community to National Identity: Russian Azerbaijan), p. 46

¹²⁷ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), p. 315.

¹²⁸ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Dogusu* (The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism), p. 161.

in nationalistic activities. Moreover, Ahmed Agaoglu insisted that, lack of national conscious and national unity would inescapably cause divergences and conflicts in society. Religious and political partiality would be the most important consequences of this situation. During his education in Paris, he developed the idea that, in order to save the Turkish culture, Western civilization should be directly adopted, through developing the idea of Turkish nationalism accordingly.¹²⁹

Another important Pan-Turkist figure in Azerbaijan was Huseyinzade Ali Bey (1864-1941) who also contributed to the development of Turkish national consciousness among the Ottoman Turks especially through influencing Ziya Gokalp who developed Huseyinzade Ali Bey's ideas further. After Huseyinzade Ali Bey completed his higher education in Petersburg, he came to Istanbul in 1889 and enrolled to the Military School. He was the first defender of pan-Turanism in Azerbaijan and in the Turkic world and by his writings he paved the way for the development of political Turkism. Influenced from Vambery, he argued for the necessity of pan-Turanism as exemplified in his famous poem:

Sizlersiniz ey kavm-i Macar bizlere ihvan

Ecdadimizin müstereken mensei Turan

Bir dindeyiz hepimiz, hakperestan

Mümkün mü ayirsin bizi Incil ile Kuran¹³⁰

(O, Hungarian nation, you are the brothers of us

¹²⁹ Mehmet Karakas, *Türk Ulusçulugunun Insasi* (The Formation of Turkish Nationalism), pp. 145-46.

¹³⁰ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), p. 413.

The common origin of our ancestry is Turan
We believe in the same religion, truth-worship
Is it possible that Bible and Koran can divide us?)

Hüzeyinzade developed the idea that Turkish language should be the literary language of all Turks and he himself always wrote in Turkish. Among the articles of Huseyinzade Ali Bey which influenced Ziya Gokalp most was his well-known article “*Bize Hangi İlimler Lazimdir*” (Which Sciences Do We Need) published in the journal “*Hayat*” (1905) in Azerbaijan. According to Ali Bey, the most urgent issue for the Turks was the adoption of modern-European sciences. As Huseyinzade Ali Bey formulated, the only way to fulfill this was through Turkification, Islamization and Europeanization. This triologicistic program later became the slogan of Ziya Gokalp as well.¹³¹

Another important region where Pan-Turkism flourished was the Kazan region of Tataristan. The region was a center of trade and industrialization which gave rise to an affluent bourgeoisie. This also contributed to the development of consciousness of Turkism. Also the number of intellectuals who graduated from Russian schools was considerable in the region. The pressure of Russification and Christianization policy of Russian government and the relatively developed and educated profile of Kazan Tatars were the main incentives for the development of national consciousness among these people. The menace of Pan-Slavism especially incited the Tatars to take

¹³¹ Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 149.

precautions against it and to save their culture. In doing so, they, for the most part, focused on linguistic activities.¹³²

In summary, the factors mentioned above facilitated the emergence of a reformist and modernist group of intellectuals in Kazan.¹³³ The provision of unity among intellectuals through a common national consciousness had been for the most part realized in the Muslim congresses held in Russia which was organized by affluent Kazan Turks.¹³⁴ Ismail Gaspirali (1854-1914), Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), and Sadri Maksudi Arsal (1880-1957) were the most distinguished modernists and also Pan-Turkists who participated to this conference.

One of the most influential nationalist leaders in Crimea was Ismail Gaspirali (1851-1914) who wrote outstanding essays in literature and education. The significance of his essays was about his emphasis on the cultural dimension of modernization and nationalization and the systematic relationship between the two.¹³⁵ Gaspirali was educated in Russian high schools and in the Russian Military School. During his education, he became familiar with Pan-Slavizm in general and with its politics and arguments in particular. For his further education he was in Paris between 1872 and 1874.¹³⁶ In 1874, now able to speak French, he came to Istanbul and established personal relations with some of the Young Ottomans, such as Namik Kemal, Sinasi

¹³² Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (C. Hurst & Co. London, North America: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 8.

¹³³ Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Pan Movements", p. 369.

¹³⁴ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Dogusu*, (The Emergent of Turkish Nationalism), p. 147.

¹³⁵ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), p. 158.

¹³⁶ Cafer Seydahmet Kırımlı, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey*, (Istanbul, 1934), pp. 18-19.

and Ziya Pasa. During his Istanbul years, he was also influenced by the reformist thoughts of Cemaleddin Afghani.¹³⁷

After his return to Crimea, he wrote a letter titled, *Rusya Müslümanlari* (Russian Muslims). In this letter, he negated the civilization and Russification policy of the Russian government and also criticized the Muslims and Turks who were living under the sovereignty of Russia for their backward position in education and ignorance of European sciences. For that reason, he argued that all Crimean Tatars should create their own literature, and teach European sciences in their own language.¹³⁸ In realizing this objective, he first started to publish the newspaper *Tercüman* (Interpreter) in Russian and Turkish languages in 1883. This newspaper played an extraordinary role that no newspaper could play in the awakening of Russian Turks. The main objective of Gaspirali was to apply the “usul-i cedit” (new method), which meant to educate the Turks in accordance with European sciences. He defended this policy in *Tercüman* with the slogan “dilde, fikirde, isde birlik” (unity in language, thought and action). With the slogan of unity in language, he aimed to denote the unity of all Turks regardless of their geographical location. With this he meant a common identity for all Turks which would emerge after the unity in language is provided. Last of all, he expected a unity in action from the subsequent generation who would be raised according to these principles. This implied the liberation of Turks from foreign domination.¹³⁹ In short, the activities of Gaspirali

¹³⁷ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), p. 231.

¹³⁸ Yusuf Akçura, “Türkçülük”, (Turkism) pp. 341-42.

¹³⁹ Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism*, p. 10.; Yusuf Akçura, “Türkçülük” (Turkism), p. 345.

had a significant contribution to the national awakening among the Tatar bourgeoisie and intellectuals.

Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933) was another Crimean Tatar who was the most effective Pan-Turkist intellectual and who was mostly active in Istanbul. Therefore he was known as the “symbol of the unity of Eastern and Western Turks”.¹⁴⁰ Born in Volga, Yusuf Akçura completed his first education in Istanbul. Then he entered the Ottoman Military School and in holidays he often went to Kazan to meet and talk with Ismail Gaspıralı. In Istanbul, Akçura, as different from the Jon Turks, was not concerned with the current borders of the Empire because he believed that the separation of non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman society was inevitable in the near future. Therefore, influenced from the German-romantic theories of nationalism, he mostly studied about Turkic elements throughout Europe and Asia.¹⁴¹

Akçura, since he participated in the activities of the Jon Turks, was exiled to Trablsugarp, but later he escaped to Paris to complete his education. His life in Paris evolved around two activities. The first, he was in continuous contact with his fellow exiled friends from the Ottoman Empire and he also participated in the various activities of the Young Turk groups that were still active in the French capital. The second, he attended to the L'Ecole libre des sciences politiques”.¹⁴² He went to Sorbonne and followed the lectures of Durkheim and Tarde. When he completed his

¹⁴⁰ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, p. 143.

¹⁴¹ David Thomas, “Yusuf Akçura and Intellectual Origins of Üç Tarz-i Siyaset”, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2: 1978, p. 132.

¹⁴² David Thomas, “Yusuf Akçura and Intellectual Origins of Üç Tarz-i Siyaset”, p. 131.

education, he temporarily settled in Russia and wrote his most famous article *Üç Tarz-i Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy) (1904) which was then published in the journal *Türk* in Egypt. This article was as important as for pan-Turkists as the Communist Manifesto was for the Marxists.¹⁴³

In this article, Akçura pragmatically discussed the validity of Islamism, Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism under the current political and social situation. According to him, Ottomanism was only a fantasy, because the Ottoman society was not like the United States, and to pursue this policy would degrade the position of Turks in the society who were the ones controlling the Empire. Pan-Islamism was also an invalid policy since the ascending national movements and feelings were against the existing religious feelings.¹⁴⁴ Thus, it would not be a powerful force for awakening the Turks against foreign invasions. Last of all, there only remained Pan-Turkism which would save the state because “the only supporters of the state are Turks...Pan-Turanism is chiefly an enemy of Russia. Russia although a great power, is not invincible. The European powers that are in conflict with Russia will support the pan-Turanian plans of Turkey”.¹⁴⁵

After the proclamation of the Second Constitution, Akçura came to Istanbul and established the journal *Türk Yurdu* in 1908. Especially during the first year of the

¹⁴³ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, p. 145.

¹⁴⁴ Akçura was strongly against the Arabic and Persian cultures and in general against the Islamic tradition. He evaluated Islamism as a conspiracy of Western powers for dividing the Turkish people. He distinguished the civilization of Turks from Persian and Arabic ones and grounded the dominance of the Turks on the Ural-Altaic origin. See, Lothrop T. Stoddart, “Pan-Turanism”, *American Political Science Review*, February 1917, p. 22.

¹⁴⁵ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, p. 96.

journal, he discussed the principal problems of pan-Turkism, the strength of nationalism in the human history, and the political future of Turkish nationalism. It is clear that the thoughts of Akçura on Turkism were considerably different from the Ottoman Turkists. Akçura's Turkism strongly depended on secularism rather than the traditional Islamic heritage.¹⁴⁶ Influenced by Albert Sorel (1842-1906), the chair of diplomatic history at *L'Ecole libre des sciences politiques*, he argued that nationalism was the most influential power throughout history in determining the future of nations. Akchura was, in many ways, acquainted with the scientific developments among the European intellectual community. In addition to his Islamic heritage, he was also related with what the European thinkers wrote. Although the French scientific community had an important effect on him, he also benefited from the studies of Russian Turkologists, and, as quoted above, adopted German theorists of nationalism.¹⁴⁷

The intellectuals of Russian Turks were for the most part educated in Russian and European schools and developed their arguments in accordance with Western orientalisks. The main motive activating them was principally the menace of Pan-Slavism and the negative effects of the Russification policy of Russia. They generally evaluated the Islamic way of life through a reformist perspective and self-criticized their backwardness with regard to their ignorance of European sciences and improvements. Therefore, they thought it was necessary to create a national consciousness and unity among the Turks in accordance with the theories of

¹⁴⁶ Francois Georgeon, "Yusuf Akçura", Çev. Alev Er, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik* (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Nationalism), Cilt 4, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 510.

¹⁴⁷ David Thomas, "Yusuf Akçura and Intellectual Origins of Üç Tarz-i Siyaset", pp. 131-32.

nationalism in Europe. Pan-Slavism was the most familiar and concrete example for them. Generally, pan movements or romantic theories of nationalism were the best examples to adapt to their own conditions. Russian Turks clung on a nationalist ideology to rescue themselves from the oppression of the Russians.¹⁴⁸ Deprived from their own independent state, Russian Turks assessed the situation not from the perspective of a state as the Ottoman intellectuals did, but from the perspective of a nation, namely the Turkish nation. This national unity could be obtained by the creation of a common language as formulated by romantic German nationalism where political independence was seen as highly depended on linguistic independence.¹⁴⁹ For that reason, romantic or pan nationalism would be the best ideology in guiding their uncertain future. Akçura's defense of Pan-Turkism in *Üç Tarz-i Siyaset* was the well-developed formulation of his ideas about. Therefore, Akçura's ideas were first met with suspicion since the Ottoman Turks traditionally had rooted their arguments in the state. Therefore, the project of nationalism in Ottoman Empire can be evaluated as one of steps in the process of modernization carried out by state bureaucrats and intellectuals. However, on the other hand, the political alternative suggested by Russian Turk led to the hot debates about Turkish nationalism including political Turkism. They put Turkish nationalism into the Ottoman political agenda by proposing it as the only political resolution for saving the state.

¹⁴⁸ Masami Arai, "The Genç Kalemler and the Young Turks: A Study in Nationalism", *METU Studies in Development*, 12, (3-4), (Ankara, 1985), p. 198.

¹⁴⁹ Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 115.

3.4 Political Development of Turkish Nationalism: Young Turks and Pan-Turkism

Political Turkism developed in the Ottoman Empire after the Russian Turks had influenced the Ottoman public opinion with their Turkist and reformist thoughts. This was highly related to the activities of Young Turks. Pan-Turkism was the reaction to the futility of Ottomanism and took its form from Pan-Slavism, which was a kind of east European nationalism or the same as German Romantic type of nationalism. This means that Russian Turks also transferred east European type of nationalism into the Ottoman Empire. Certainly, the atmosphere of the Empire facilitated this influence to play a strong role among the Ottoman intellectuals. In addition to the literary studies throughout the nineteenth century, the Turco-Greek War (1897) was another important factor that contributed to the development of an atmosphere in favour of political Turkism.¹⁵⁰ After this war, to raise the national emotions in the Ottoman Empire, ardent nationalist poems were written by Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944). Moreover, English orientalist Edward W. Gibb cited the poem of Mehmet Emin in his book *A History of the Ottoman Poetry* and later sent a Turkish-written letter to him where he said, "...The Turkish nation finally have found their voice in your ability. You came and expressed the feelings of your citizens in their language without looking at the west or the east. (...) In my opinion, Turkish poetry found its correct form with your efforts. We had been waiting for you for six centuries, sir"¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Ercüment Kuran, "The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 115-16

¹⁵¹ Yusuf Akçura, "Türkçülük" (Turkism), p. 383.

The Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats were obviously concerned about the future of the Empire. They were also imbued with patriotic feelings because of the latest conflictive political developments. In the opposition wing, the Young Turks had strongly devoted themselves to Pan-Turkism. They thought that domestic and modern changes could only be achieved through radical structural changes, not through imitation of western institutions.¹⁵² Evaluating the general process of political opposition in the nineteenth century Ottoman society, the Young Ottomans were the first group to be pointed out. As already discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Young Ottomans were the political opponents who fought against the Tanzimat bureaucrats, particularly Ali and Fuat Pasas. They were also the second generation state bureaucrats who objected the despotic policies of the Tanzimat administrators.¹⁵³ During the Tanzimat period, various institutions of education were founded which provided a chance for education for the lower classes. The nucleus figures of the Young Turk movement were mostly the graduates of these newly established schools. Their opposition was focused especially on the despotic regime of Abdulhamid II. This group was named as *Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti* (Society of Ottoman Union) (1889), founded by four medical students and in five years time it was re-named as *Ittihad Terakki* (Union and Progress). They demanded a parliamentary constitutional regime. Due to censorship and pressure of the government, they were forced to live in various European countries.

¹⁵² Seçil Deren, "From Pan-Islamism to Turkish Nationalism: Modernisation and German Influence in the late Ottoman Period", Marco Dogo & Guido Franzinetti (eds.), *Disrupting and Reshaping: Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2002), p. 135.

¹⁵³ Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, p. 108.

Political Turkism was the final ideological recourse of the Young Turks. They defended the ideology of Ottomanism in place of political Turkism even after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 since Ottomanism was more promising in keeping the unity of the Empire. This political attitude sustained up to the Balkan wars (1912-1913). Although the Young Turks looked after the Turkish elements of the Empire and declared Turkish language as the official language (1909), they never supported political Turkism as a solution to the problems of the Empire. For them, the most considerable objective was to keep the unity of all ethnic elements under the patronage of the Ottoman Empire, which Ottomanism was the best ideological tool for this end.¹⁵⁴ At the beginning of the Young Turk government, the Young Turks did not consider Pan-Islamism as a viable ideology in opposing to Abdulhamid II. Partially for this reason, they maintained their Ottomanist policy and also remained sceptical towards the ideology of Pan-Turkism.

However, according to Hostler, non-Turkish sources did not accept the argument that the Young Turks did not follow a Pan-Turkist policy up to the Balkan Wars. For these non-Turkish sources, the Young Turk administration started to apply the policy of Turkification and the extermination of minorities just after the 1908 Revolution. They resorted to the most chauvenistic way to eradicate any non-Turkish movements. Ottomanism was only servicable to the Turkish nation, and was only the guise of their real ideology, that is Turkism.¹⁵⁵ In reality, there was certainly the nationalistic tendency among the Young Turk leaders, because some developments created the atmosphere for it. For example, "...after the 1908 Revolution, Bulgaria

¹⁵⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 349.

¹⁵⁵ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, pp. 98-99.

declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia Herzegovina. At home, the Turks were shocked with non-Turkish deputies' demands from the Empire. All these circumstances made positivist Ittihadists nationalists".¹⁵⁶ This political preference led Ittihadists to be accused as chauvinistic by the non-Turkish sources.

The Union and Progress (Ittihad Terakki) government's most important step towards a nationalist policy was the acceptance of Turkish language as the official language of the Ottoman society (1909) which eventually would be taught to all Ottoman citizens. These applications were carried out not in the name of Turkism, but of secularism and Westernism. Application of a nationalist policy on a secular line was natural in the Ottoman Empire since the emergence of the Pan-Turkist ideas, too, were rooted in the secularization process of the state. Discovering the deeply rooted traditions of the Turks, writers, poets, and historians slowly detached themselves from the classical Islamic way of thinking throughout the nineteenth century. These developments can be seen as forming the basis of the next period of Pan-Turkist policies just before the Balkan Wars broke out. After Ottomanist policies doomed to fail, the Ottoman intellectuals turned their faces towards Pan-Turkism, which, without taking the lost territories into consideration, was promising in terms of new ideas and ideals. After the Balkan Wars started, the Young Turk members more explicitly became inclined towards Pan-Turkism, which now was the most widespread political ideology among the state bureaucrats and intellectuals. The

¹⁵⁶ Vedat Gürbüz, "Genesis of Turkish Nationalism", *Belleten*, Volume: LXVII, No. 248, April 2003, p. 517.

Balkan Wars also led to the precipitation of Pan-Turanist sentiments among Bulgarians.¹⁵⁷

In the time between 1908 and 1913, the expected political transformation from Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism was observed among the Union and Progress (Ittihad-Terakki) leaders. Shortly before that time, both Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp had started their Pan-Turkist activities and publications. Although Yusuf Akçura's *Three Ways of Policy* was met with indifference or suspicion in 1904, it, from that time on, received attention due to the above mentioned political developments. In 1908, taken the lead by Yusuf Akçura, Veled Çelebi and Necib Asim, *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association) was established. While the Unionist leaders tried to be involved in it, Akçura, for preserving the Association's Pan-Turkist ideal did not permit them to interfere.¹⁵⁸ The aim of this association was to promote the Turkish literature and race by way of enhancing the level of national education, economy and scientific studies. They did not limit themselves with the problems of Ottoman Turks, but also paid attention to the current situation in the broader Turkish world.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, together with the atmosphere of relative freedom in the society that came about with the 1908 Revolution, some publications and activities emerged. Defending the further development of Turkish literature and the ideology of Ottoman Turkism, the

¹⁵⁷ Lothrop T. Stoddart, "Pan-Turanism", *American Political Science Review*, February 1917, p. 19.

¹⁵⁸ Sükrü Hanioglu, "Türkçülük", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ("Turkism", *Encyclopedia of Turkey From Tanzimat to Republic*), cilt V, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1985), p. 1397.

¹⁵⁹ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)* (From Turan to Grey Wolf: Turkism in the Single Party Period), (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), p. 78.

journal *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) started to be published with the efforts of Ziya Gökalp, Ali Canip and Ömer Seyfeddin in Salonica in 1911.¹⁶⁰

In 1912 the *Türk Dernegi* (Turkish Society) broke up and the association the *Türk Ocagi* (Turkish Heart) was founded with the contribution of the former members of the *Türk Dernegi* and some medical students. The journal *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) became the publication organ of the *Turkish Heart*. After the Balkan Wars started, the personnel of *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) joined the association of the *Turkish Heart* and began to write in the journal *Türk Yurdu*. Also Enver and Talat Pashas gave support to the *Turkish Heart* and the association eventually became connected to the *Ittihad Terakki* (Union and Progress) government. The articles in the journal *Türk Yurdu* were the ideological sources for the Turkist policies of the *Ittihad Terakki* leaders after the Balkan Wars.¹⁶¹ In examining the journal *Türk Yurdu*, the first theme that one comes across with is national identity, not Islam. For this reason, the journal articles mostly examined the states, cultures and traditions of the Turks in the pre-Islamic times. These were also strongly connected to and dealt with orientalist studies and, if necessary, published some of these studies where Leon Cahun was the most considered one.¹⁶²

In addition to the *Türk Yurdu*, which was published for shedding light to the sensitive issues in the Ottoman public opinion, the *Türk Ocagi* published the journal *Halka Dogru* (Towards People) (1913) in order to reach the Ottoman people of lower

¹⁶⁰ For a comprehensive study, see Masami Arai, "The Genç Kalemler and the Young Turks: A Study in Nationalism", *METU Studies in Development*, 12, (3-4), (Ankara, 1985), pp. 197-244.

¹⁶¹ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), p. 171.

¹⁶² Sükrü Hanioglu, "Türkçülük", (Turkism), p. 1397.

classes. This attitude was the result of the populist ideology, which was widespread among the intellectuals of Russian Turks and Rumelian Turks. This ideology was based on the peasantist-populist nationalism movements of Eastern Europe and Russian Narodnizm. Therefore, the Russian Turks and the Ittihad Terakki leaders from the Balkan Peninsula were highly affected by these kinds of nationalistic sentiments. In this journal, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp took the leading position and tried to specify the principal aims of the populist program. Akçura, referring to the examples of east European nationalistic movements and to the outcomes of these, wrote a series of articles to signify the way the Turkish youth ought to follow.¹⁶³ This can be regarded as an example of social engineering of the people via leading them into the path which the intellectuals consider as worthy.

Politically, in the journal *Türk Yurdu*, neither Yusuf Akçura nor Ahmet Agaoglu and Ziya Gökalp were keen on propagating for the formation of the imagined Turan state. For the realization of this ideal, Munis Tekinalp (1883-1961) (Moiz Kohen), the Jewish-origin Ottoman intellectual, prepared the political ground for the Ittihad-Terakki government which once considered the Turan ideal. He believed that after the Balkan Wars come to an end, Turkish irredentism would be the only political alternative in order to realize the unity of all the Turkic communities throughout the world; otherwise the Empire would be broken into its pieces by foreign powers.¹⁶⁴ Tekinalp argued that the validity of Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism came to an end, because it was obviously witnessed that the rebellions of the Albanians in the Balkans and the Arabs in Yemen showed the end of Pan-Islamism and

¹⁶³ Suavi Aydın, *Modernleşme ve Milliyetçilik*, (Modernization and Nationalism), p. 174.

¹⁶⁴ See, Jacob M. Landau, *Tekinalp, Turkish Patriot, 1883-1961*, (Leiden: Dutch Institute on Near East, 1984)

Ottomanism.¹⁶⁵ The proposals of Tekinalp were seriously considered and put into practice by Enver Pasa with the coalition of Germany against Russia.¹⁶⁶

All these developments indicated that cultural Turkism gradually turned into political Turkism. For the Turkists, the first objective was to unite all the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire around the consciousness of Turkism. The second step was to awaken all the Turks in the world and to provide their unity under the banner of Turkism. This could firstly be achieved with the cultural policy aiming to provide the unity of Turks around the same language that is the Turkish spoken in Istanbul. While the boundaries of Pan-Turkism ideal fatherland and the ethnic elements in the arguments of the Pan-Turkists differed, the principal arguments were more or less the same as put forward by most of the Pan-Turkist intellectuals at the time. While the conditions under which to practice the policy of Pan-Turkism was seen to be very convenient, in reality, the Ittihad Terakki leaders were very hesitant to rely on this policy even during the Balkan Wars. To abandon the former ideology of Ottomanism and even the Pan-Islamist policy were the critical decisions taken by the rulers of the Empire with respect to the existing population composition of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it was after the Russian Turks took the leading position in the cultural arena and the rebellion of Albanians and Arabs that Pan-Turkism emerged as a better political alternative to be followed in solving the problems of the empire. Moreover, the Russian Turks and Ziya Gokalp who were the ideologues of Pan-Turkism were not in favour of political action towards creating a Turan state. They were only

¹⁶⁵ Seçil Deren, "From Pan-Islamism to Turkish Nationalism: Modernisation and German Influence in the late Ottoman Period", p. 134.

¹⁶⁶ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)*, (From Turan to Grey Wolf: Turkism in the Single Party Period), pp. 79-80.

advocating cultural themes around Turkism until the World War I It should be remembered that to save the state was the vital and fundamental issue both for the state bureaucrats and intellectuals. Attempting to achieve such a political ideal would look over the adventurous personality and the dreamer intellectual, that is Enver Pasa and Tekinalp respectively.

CHAPTER 4

HUNGARIAN TURANISM IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS

4.1 Condition of Hungary in the Second half of the Nineteenth Century

In 1890, a group of Hungarian intellectuals emerged favouring a new national ideology. Their assertion took shape as a counter ideology of western-oriented Hungarian historiography. These intellectuals were mostly offended by their alienation from the eastern world and had decided to return to their Asiatic roots. According to them, the experience of Hungarians with the West had been a quite misfortune. This view of the world came out especially from seeing themselves as the third-class nation among the European world, because of the international alliances between the west European countries and the Slavs of Eastern Europe in opposition to Hungarians. Their salvation had to come from the Pan-Turanist movement that would bring them into the new political alternative. The emergence of national self-consciousness and the alliance between all the Turkic peoples of the Turanian world would be based on the Ural- Altaic speech.¹⁶⁷

According to Kessler, the objective of modern Pan-Turanism was to turn the Hungarian people to their sublime past by rising their self-conscious that they belong to the Turanian race. All these efforts were the result of the intensive propaganda of

¹⁶⁷ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, Unpublished PH. D. Thesis, (University of California, Berkeley, University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1967), pp. IX-XIII.

Pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodoxy, which was promoted by Russia throughout the nineteenth century. Therefore, the Hungarian intellectuals choose the way in which all Turanian races would be gathered around it. As discussed in the third chapter, the emergence of Pan-Turkism in Ottoman society coincided with Pan-Turanism in Hungary. Even though Pan-Turkism had not developed exhaustive ethno-linguistic studies, it was absolutely the active counterpart of Pan-Turanism in Hungary. It is obvious that all the intellectuals that defended Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism in Hungary and Turkey respectively were secular academicians and writers. Especially in Hungary, the defenders of Pan-Turanism were usually high-educated and from upper classes origin.¹⁶⁸

Therefore, generally the nationalism movements in Hungary were not populist movements without a class basis stemming from backwardness in opposite to the economic exploitation of any other external power, but elitist ones, which had been looking for a new ideology. As Breuilly powerfully puts it:

One cannot usefully account for the first nationalist movements in terms of economic exploitation or backwardness. For example, the first strong nationalist movement in Habsburg Empire was that of the Magyars. The Magyars, however, were a privileged rather than an exploited or backward group, and the nationalist movement was led by privileged elements within the Magyars. Admittedly Magyar nationalism was a reaction against what was seen as oppressive control from Vienna, but the nature of that control raised issues of political power and its uses of economic exploitation or backwardness. It was then the nationalism of the Magyars which stimulated counter-nationalisms from among the non-Magyar groups which they dominated and exploited (Romanians, Serbians...)¹⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁸ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. XVII-XVIII.

¹⁶⁹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 412-13.

In the Carpathian Basin, great division and enmity began when the Vienne government started to apply cultural and political pressure on the communities in the region, and sent Rumanian and Slovakian immigrants to Budapest in the eighteenth century. The Independence contention of 1848-49 was the Hungarians' most critical political attempt in order to strengthen their position to their own advantage in the region. Nevertheless, with the support of all the ethnic minorities, the Habsburg Empire gained the political advantage and that situation increased the ethnic tensions and antagonisms not only between Vienne and Budapest but in other areas as well. This negative situation of the Hungarians led them more to feel the threat of Pan-Slavism. However, this was only the one side of the coin. Actually, the political intentions of the great powers, such as of Russia and Germany, and their interventions were the primary reason for their endless struggles and dissensions in the Balkans.¹⁷⁰

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the major objective of the Habsburg Empire was to comprehend the ethnicity question. In 1867, the Empire was restructured as a double-monarchy, which was named as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Hungary was put forward as an autonomous government. Most of the Slav minorities lived under the dominance of the Hungarian government and naturally were uneasy about this situation, longing to bring forward a multi-national and multi-lingual state structure.¹⁷¹ From that time on, the Hungarians began to realize that not only Pan-Germanism but also Pan-Slavism of the ethnic minorities constituted a serious threat against their cultural and political existence.

¹⁷⁰ "Origins of the Hungarian Question", in <http://hunmagyar.org>, [16.05.2005]

¹⁷¹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 429.

Obviously, the negative attitude towards the Hungarians was clear and visible and this could be seen through the various objectives of the British, French, Austrian and Russian governments. For instance, in the Paris Peace Conference, a bureaucrat of England stated his and naturally his state's negative attitude towards the Hungarians, and stigmatized them as a 'cruel and rude Turanian tribe'. In his view, same as their ethnic brother, the Turks, the Hungarians had spoiled the traditional and rooted order of Europe.¹⁷² Nevertheless, this did not mean that this attitude became a widespread novel feeling in the nineteenth century serving for the interests of European powers. However, there were also so many negative descriptions about the Hungarian nation in the medieval sources. In these sources, the Hungarians were being described as an Asiatic race, barbarian and rapist. They were seen as an excluded nation from the Indo-European family linguistically, and were also evaluated as an alien group at the heart of Europe.¹⁷³

In relatively near times, since the eighteenth century, the Hungarian image begun to be described in accordance with the quasi-scientific researches of German orientalists. These studies insistently emphasized the Asiatic origins of Hungarians and the related proposals about them naturally ended up with the propaganda of sending the Hungarians back to Asia. This put the image of Hungarians in the inferior of Asiatic race and provided the ethnic minorities of Hungary to carry on a negative propaganda against the Hungarians in order to serve for the national

¹⁷² Simon Borsody, *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), pp. 26-27.

¹⁷³ Denis Sinor, *History of Hungary*, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 21.

interests of European powers and to make their voices heard not only in Europe but especially in Russia.¹⁷⁴

Although the Hungarian government applied an assimilationist policy towards its ethnic minorities, particularly towards the minority elites throughout the nineteenth century, the Hungarians still were not satisfied with this situation since they were also pessimist about their own future. At this time, the Pan-Turanists realized that the assimilationist policies would worsen since the ethnic minorities gained a considerable support from the democratic governments of western countries that is England and France. The main problem was of course the Slav minorities. In this context, Pan-Slavism was seen as a danger since it gave way to a new psychology which received political support among the Slav peoples in Hungary. Additionally, Russia wanted to draw attention of Slav speaking minorities and provoked them for her own political benefits.¹⁷⁵

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia began to speed up its modernization process like the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was in close contact with the Berlin government during this process, so was Hungary. Because of this close relationship with the German government; Hungary was in danger to loose the support of Western powers. On the other hand, France and England saw Hungary as an undemocratic state on account of its assimilation policy towards its minorities. Nevertheless, close relations with Germany did not last long since the alliance between France and Russia on the one hand, and the newly formed alliance between

¹⁷⁴ Simon Borsody, *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), pp. 15-25.

¹⁷⁵ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. XXXVII-XXXXIV.

Germany and Austria put Hungary in a desperate position. Also the Hungarian mistreatment of the German minority in Hungary made Germany feel offended and, in response, Germany began its anti-Hungarian propaganda. Under these conditions, Hungarian neo-nationalists from that time on started to seek political benefits by turning their face towards the east, from Istanbul to Tokyo. What they expected was to draw Germany close to them in response to the rising danger of Pan-Slavism. As a result, the Pan-Turanist sentiment became the strongest tie among the Hungarian neo-nationalists. At that time, cooperation between Hungary and Turkey reached to its peak.¹⁷⁶

The political and economic conditions of Hungary in a way obliged Hungarians to turn towards the East.¹⁷⁷ The political pressure of ethnic minorities demanding a more liberal political atmosphere from the government forced the noble and newly emerging bourgeois classes in Hungary to move not towards liberalism like the bourgeois class in Western Europe but to develop more strict policies since liberalism meant to serve the interests of ethnic minorities. Therefore, the most appropriate ideology was inevitably Turanism, since it not only provided a source for historical self-respect, but also opened a path for a new and a glorious future for the Hungarian people. With the contribution of Turcology studies throughout the nineteenth century, Hungarians began to study their Asiatic origin and other Asiatic

¹⁷⁶ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)*, (From Turan to Grey Wolf: Turkism in the Single Party Period), pp. 63-64.

¹⁷⁷ Dr. Baro Nyary Aibert, "Macaristan'ın Turanilikteki Rolü", (The Role of Hungary in Turanism), (Trans. by Dr. Mesaros Yoli Efendi), *Türk Yurdu*, (Turkish Homeland), Vol. VI, issue 4, April 1914, p. 270.

or Turanian races and these studies were stimulated and developed further by the menace of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.¹⁷⁸

In Hungary, starting in 1870, there appeared mutual concerns between the Hungarians and the Turks and also partisanship towards the Ottoman Turks began to grow. This situation was strengthened further as a result of the Ottoman government's protection of the Hungarian rebels who fought against the Vienne government demanding the independence of Hungary. A Hungarian general was welcomed by some of the students of the Ottoman Military and Medical schools.¹⁷⁹

In Stottard's words:

The evil memories of Ottoman conquest had quite died away, and throughout the nineteenth century Magyar opinion was increasingly Turcophil. After the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 it was to Turkey that Louis Kossuth and the other Hungarian leaders fled, and the warm welcome and resolute protection there accorded them greatly strengthened the ties of sympathy between the two peoples. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 Hungary was violently pro-Turkish, and a magnificent sword of honor then presented by the Magyars to the Sultan aroused comment throughout Europe. The labors of Magyar publicists and statesmen have had a great deal to do with the present Turco-Bulgar intimacy...¹⁸⁰

Without delay, the Ottoman government sent a commission to make a counter visit to Budapest in 1877 during the Ottoman-Russian War. This visit aroused excitement among the Hungarian and Ottoman peoples.¹⁸¹ This close and warm relationship was

¹⁷⁸ Nejat Kaymaz, "Türkçü Tarih Görüsü" (Turkist View of History), p. 439.

¹⁷⁹ David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908*, p. 45.

¹⁸⁰ T Lothrop Stoddard, "Pan-Turanism", p. 21.

¹⁸¹ For the details of this visit, see Cemil Öztürk, "113 Yıl Önceki Bir Türk Heyetinin Macaristan Gezisi" (Travel of a Turkish Committee in Hungary 113 Years Before), *Tarih ve Toplum*, (History and Society), Vol. 14, issue 83, November 1990, Yılmaz Gülen, "Cok Yasa!" (Long Live), *Tarih ve Toplum*, (History and Society), Vol. 36, issue 215, November 2001, pp. 4-7, Ebubekir Sofuoğlu, "Her Bir Macar İçin Elli Bin Osmanlı'yı Feda Ederim: Abdülmecid ve Macar Mültecileri", (I Sacrifice

seemingly the result of having a common enemy, which was the Russian Empire or, ideologically, Pan-Slavism. Throughout the Ottoman-Russian War, the Hungarian government expected that the Ottoman army would defeat the Russian powers, because, otherwise, their future plans concerning the Danubian Basin, including the broader Eastern world would come to an end. Therefore the Hungarians wanted to maintain their relations just as before the Ottoman Russian War (1877-1878).¹⁸²

4.2 Intellectual Sources of Pan-Turanism in Hungary

As discussed above, the protagonists of Turanism in Hungary were both the modernizers and secular-minded intellectuals same as the Ottoman and Russian Turks. The resemblance among all these three groups in the intellectual arena was based on the orientalist studies of European scholars who paved the way for the Turan ideal. Actually, although the Hungarians had always been preoccupied with European social and political relations, they had never ignored their Eastern origin and, as a result of emergent nationalist movements, they had remained dislocated among European powers for long. Accordingly, it was natural that Hungarian scholars were eager to try to explore their linguistic and racial kinship ties through their endeavor in the area of orientalist studies.¹⁸³

Fifty Thousand Ottomans for Every Hungarians: Abdulmecid and Hungarian Refugees), *Tarih ve Toplum*, (History and Society), issue 215, November 2001, pp. 41-46.

¹⁸² Gabor Agoston, "Politics and Historiography: The Development of Turkish and Balkan Studies in Hungary and the Hungarian Research Institute in Istanbul" in Hasan Celal Guzel, C.Cem Oguz, Osman Karatay (eds.), *The Turks* (Türkler Ansiklopedisi), Vol. 4., (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publication, 2002), p. 93.

¹⁸³ T Lothrop Stoddard, "Pan-Turanism", p. 17.

Sharing the same linguistic origin with the Turks, the Hungarians gave special importance to Turcology studies. Until the nineteenth century, on account of religious and political diversities, there had been many encounters between the Turks and Hungarians between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. After the Ottomans defeated the Hungarians in the Mohac War, they lived together together for 156 years. When Hungary was invaded by the Habsburg Empire in 1686, the Hungarians started to rebel against the invaders. In the second half of the seventeenth century, when Hungarian rebels were fighting against the Habsburg Empire for independence, Imre Thököly and his 1400 followers took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Rakoczi Ferenc II, who escaped from such a rebellion in the eighteenth century, fled to the Ottoman Empire. Last of all, after the 1848-49 rebellions, Kossuth Lajos and some other rebels took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, all these examples shed light to the historical sympathy of Hungarians towards the Turks.¹⁸⁴

In Hungary, the revolutionary leaders, before they revolted against the Austrian government, struggled for the acceptance of Hungarian language as the official language in all areas of Hungary. Their argument was based on the idea that the survival of Hungarian national identity had to be grounded on Hungarian language and history. Throughout the nineteenth century, such a cultural attitude towards nationalism can easily be traced throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In order to provide a scientific ground for such culture based arguments *The Magyar Academy*

¹⁸⁴ Fuat Köprülü, "Türk Macar Münasebetlerine Dair" (On the Relations of Turks and Hungarians), Orhan Köprülü (Ed.), *Köprülü'den Seçmeler*, (Selections from Köprülü), (Istanbul, 1972), pp. 16-22, cited by Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Dogusu*, (The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism), p. 130.

of Sciences was founded in 1827 and this institution naturally became the academic centre for Hungarian revival. A distinguished linguist Samuel Gyarmathi (1751-1830) was one of the influential figures who, after his education in Germany, studied about the Finno-Ugrian connection of the Hungarian race. Nevertheless, since the Hungarian public opinion was inclined to believe in the Asiatic origin of the Hungarian nation, such kind of assertions were met with suspicion, because Hungary regarded any European origin stands as unpromising.¹⁸⁵

Moreover, another outstanding scholar Anton Reguly (1819-1858), although he did not assent, felt obliged to incline with these questionable stands as the basis of Hungarian history. The observations of the romantic traveler, Csoma de Körös (1784-1842), were one of such stands, which argued for the Tibetan origin of the Hungarians. As Winternitz put it:

Clearly the Magyar political and cultural revival of the first half of the nineteenth century prepared the ground in Hungary for an all-too-easy acceptance of something like 'Turanian' theory even before it had been 'scientifically' worked out by linguists in Western Europe...although the 'Turanian' classification would be acceptable, the Western European colouring imposed on it, that of relative inferiority, would not. On the contrary, the Ural-Altai heritage placed the Magyars apart, gave them the right of conquest and leadership.¹⁸⁶

Orientalistic studies, in this respect, played a considerable role for the Hungarians, because orientalist studies made way for and formed the basis of Hungarian nationalism as well as Pan-Turanism. For instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Central Asia seemed to be evaluated as the origin of all the civilizations by

¹⁸⁵ Judith Winternitz, "The 'Turanian' Hypothesis and Magyar Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century", *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, ed.: Roland Sussex & J. C. Eade, (Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1985), p. 147.

¹⁸⁶ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 148.

some Hungarian scholars and this was the result of orientalist studies. The article of a recognized Hungarian orientalist, Ferencz Pulszky (1839), articulated Central Asia as a pioneer of Hindu, Chinese, Egyptian and Greek civilizations. In the second half of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the studies of Hungarian academicians had especially followed this line of argument, and tried to prove the claimed connection between the Sumerian and Hungarian languages since the first settlers of Europe were supposed to speak Sumerian language.¹⁸⁷ This argument found a sound in the Hungarian academic circles and was to be considered as the Ural-Altaiism, which will be cleared further below.

To make a clearer expression of the Hungarians' attitude about orientalist studies, it should be known that the tendencies of Hungarians towards the studies on Asiatic origin were divided as the academic and political ones. While the former was related to academic Ural-Altaiism thesis, the latter was concerned with Pan-Turanism as an ideal. Throughout the Asian countries, Ural-Altaiist studies had a considerable effect on the Hungarian Pan-Turanists. First of all, between 1894 and 1899, Danish philologist Thomsen solved the Orkhoun-Yenissei monuments in the Mongol region. These writings were the earliest literary samples of the Ural-Altaiic languages. These discoveries led to a growing interest in the Ural-Altaiic studies on which there had been laxity. Not only west European scholars, but also Finnish and German philologists then began to pay attention to this issue.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Nizam Önen, *Turanî Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, 2003), p. 19.

¹⁸⁸ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. 1-4.

The Ural-Altai linguistic hypothesis first appeared in the works of Max Muller, the German Turcologist, in the middle of the nineteenth century. He articulated the Turanian linguistic family as opposed to the Indo-European linguistic family. Ural-Altai linguistic family was part of the agglutinative Central Asiatic language and survived in accordance with a warlike and nomadic tribal life-style. According to Muller, the Hungarians were the best nation to fit to this linguistic and cultural structure.¹⁸⁹ For the first time in history, the linguistic Turan family was put forward as a linguistic branch different from the Sami and Hindo-Aryan branches. In the second half of the nineteenth century, similar to how the Sami and Aryan ethnicities were defined with respect to their language; the Turanian communities were now also classified on the basis of race and in accordance with the Turanian linguistic family.¹⁹⁰

The Turanian hypothesis became scientifically considerable after the development of linguistic studies and after the emergence of a highly educated group of scholars who took the scene in Hungary from 1850s onwards. From the time on, the Turanian hypothesis started to be discussed with respect to linguistic inquiries. One of the distinguished linguists and politicians was Pal Hunfalvy (1810-1891) who was convinced that the Hungarian language contained both Finno-Ugrian and Ural-Altai elements, thus situated in between these two language families.¹⁹¹ *The Magyar Ethnographic Society* (1889) was founded in Budapest under the direction of him.

¹⁸⁹ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 145.

¹⁹⁰ H. M. Government, *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, Naval Staff Intelligence Department, (Oxford, November 1918), p. 14.

¹⁹¹ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 149.

The main objective of this Society was to side with the Finno-Ugrian school in order to counter the Ural-Altaiist school led mainly by Vambery defending the Turanian hypothesis. The periodical of *The Magyar Ethnographic Society* was *Ethnographia* which had the objective of exploring the ethnic and linguistic origins of Hungarians and other Carpathian ethnic dwellers. However, soon after, the *Ethnographic Society* became the supporter of the Ural-Altaiism school as a result of the activities of the scholars who were in favour of the Turanian thesis.¹⁹²

Therefore, significant resemblances started to be constructed between Eastern Europe and Northern Asia through the works of Western orientalist in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1896, Leon Cahun, the French Turcologist, emphasized the differences between the northern and southern parts of Asia in his recognized work titled, *Introduction to History of Asia*. In this work, the nomadic peoples of Asia were described as a full-fledged society having their own particular history. Up to that time, the history of nomadic peoples of Asia, for the major part, had been evaluated as an inferior position and seen as belonging to 'backward' civilizations. The study of Cahun had increased the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanist sentiments both in Istanbul and Hungary. The emergence of Ural-Altaiism coincided with the emergence of Pan-Turkism in Russia and in the Ottoman Empire. Both forms of nationalism were described as pertaining to ancient history.¹⁹³ The most sources for the development of the Turanist idea was, as stated above, the novel argument of Ural-Altaiism thesis that embraced all Turanian races.

¹⁹² Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁹³ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 340.

Following Muller, some scholars such as Russian V. V. Radlov, and Hungarian Arminius Vambery made significant contributions for the augmentation of the Ural- Altaic studies at the XII Congress of Orientalists in Rome, in 1899. In 1902, at the XIII Congress of Orientalists, the ideas of Vambery and Radlov about the Ural- Altaist studies were welcomed by the participants of the congress. The first Hungarian philologist who particularly studied Turcology was Arminius Vambery. He not only gave special attention to Turks, but also wrote a Turkish Etymological Dictionary.¹⁹⁴ The term Turan was scientifically introduced in the Hungarian academy for the first time with his efforts. Vambery pictured the nomadic life of the central Asiatic peoples in a positive way and constructed his theory so as to explain why Hungarian origin is more close to Turks than it is to Finns on the basis of linguistic and also physiological and anthropological evidence.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, a Japanese orientalist and also an outstanding Pan-Turanist, Kurakichi Shiratori, presented the Orkhoun Yenissei discoveries at the Orientalist congresses in 1892 and 1908. As one of the scholars of Ural- Altaism and Pan-Turanism schools, he also studied both in Hungary and Turkey between the years 1902 and 1903. He also worked as an assistant in the journal *Keleti Szemle* (Eastern Review), which was the most important and well known journal on the Ural- Altaic subjects.¹⁹⁶ All the activities of these Turcologists contributed to the scientific base of Turanian hypothesis.

¹⁹⁴ “Türkoloji Çalışmalarına Toplu Bir Bakış ve Ödevlerimiz”, (A Holistic View to the Turcology Studies and Our Duties), *Belleten*, 1960’dan ayrı basım, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1960), pp. 14-15.

¹⁹⁵ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 151.

¹⁹⁶ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. 20-22.

However, in 1880, the studies of Jozsef Budenz (1836-1892) who was the assistant of Pal Hunfalvy had seriously challenged the Turanian hypothesis. After investigating Eurasian languages, he argued that Finno-Ugrian connection of the Hungarians was overwhelmingly more persuasive than the Turkic tie. The reply to this claim did not last long. Although Vambery had also confessed the fundamental connection of the Hungarians to the Finno-Ugrian language, he insisted on the relative significance of Turkic elements in the Hungarian language and culture. After the long and fervour debates between the two camps, in 1914 Vambery last of all asserted the novel argument that when Turkic origin Hungarians came to Danubian Basin in the ninth century, there were already small and backward Finno-Ugrian groups in the area. In a short time, the Turkic origin Hungarian groups, for they were more progressed easily assimilated these small tribes. Consequently, he argued that the resemblance between these two language groups rests on that historical connection.¹⁹⁷

The defenders of Finno-Ugrian linguistic school won this linguistic debate. Although the debate would, from time to time, come to the fore, the arguments of the Ural- Altaic linguistic group always remained scientifically weak.¹⁹⁸ However, since the Hungarian Turanists were politically strong and effective, the arguments of Ural- Altaism always held a critical position in the Hungarian academic circles and public opinion. After the death of Pal Hunfalvy and Jozsef Budenz, Vambery took the leading position in the *Ethnographic Society* and elected his pupils, Geza Nagy and

¹⁹⁷ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 152-53.

¹⁹⁸ Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancilari*, (Hungarian Turanists), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2000), p. 11.

Gyula Nemeth, into significant positions in the Society. It can be concluded that, in spite of the scientific defeat of the Ural-Altaism thesis, it was eagerly defended especially in the 1910s and onwards in Hungary. In Winternitz's words:

Why did the 'Turanian' hypothesis persist against the linguists' attack? Firstly, it was hard to pin down, operating as it did on several levels at once, levels about which still no conclusive evidence seemed to have been found as a whole. Secondly, more importantly, the 'Turanian' hypothesis had become indispensable politically from the 1890s onward. Magyar intractability encouraged the deepening of non-Magyar resistance, which in turn created an even more heavy-handed attitude on the Magyar side amounting to a siege mentality. The Magyar state seemed faced with internal and external enemies, surrounded and undermined from within by hostile Germans and Slavs.¹⁹⁹

The response of Turanism to this challenging situation was radical: both to secure the national rights of Hungarians and also to turn their face politically and culturally to the east. This benefits of this choice was threefold; to preserve their own national unity, to liberate themselves from the pressure of the Vienne government, and lastly to take back the historical role of being the representative of the Turanian world in Europe.²⁰⁰

4.3 Hungarian Turanists and their Efforts towards Developing the Turan Ideal

As discussed in the chapter One, German type of nationalism had shaped the pattern of Eastern European nationalism and also of Turkish and Hungarian nationalisms. In such kind of nationalism, nationalist ideologues consider the national borders in accordance with ethnic communities. Moreover, the cultural field is regarded as

¹⁹⁹ Judith Winternitz, *Culture and Nationalism in the Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, p. 154.

²⁰⁰ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. XII-XIII.

containing the descriptive elements of nations. The basic argument of this kind of nationalism touches upon such key elements as justification, differentiation, myth-making of the past and heritage, and dreams of the future (ideal fatherland). As Kohn asserted, the national sentiments of Central and Eastern Europe were not rooted in the political and social reality, rather they overemphasized and attributed much confidence on their own nationalism, soul of nation, and the mission of the nation.²⁰¹

Alexander Dutu explains the nineteenth century political and national manners of Central and East European nationalism as follows:

The main foundation of the modern solidarities and of the legitimacy that people in power had to prove lied less in the will to reform the old mentality and more in a desire of self-assertion. A new identity was produced under the influence of the romantic spirit that prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the stress fell on the fight for independence, the cultural continuity, the ancient roots and the virtues that overcome permanent vicissitudes: emotions often prevailed over ideas. The intellectuals sustained the formation of the national state and forged a continuity that started from the very first settled habitations. The ethnic foundations pushed on a secondary plane the democratic projects and mapped out mental borders that gratified national vanities: the national discourse became aggressive and inconsistent with collective aspirations and international regulations each time it was translated into the language of propaganda....(I)n the case of the ethnic continuity, we meet with the *retrospective utopia*. An utopia that is still active, as we may infer from the many theories that proclaim 'purity' of race, class or nation as a political major topic and from the obsession to "achieve even approximately a coincidence between nation, territory and state."²⁰²

The Hungarian case of the nineteenth century nationalism was not exempted from such identifications. Particularly cultural studies were determinant in supporting the assertions of Hungarian Turanism. In any case, it can openly be perceived that the nineteenth century witnessed the quiet and intensive efforts of the Turcology studies.

²⁰¹ See footnotes 24 and 25.

²⁰² Alexander Dutu, "National and Regional Identity in Southeast Europe", Günay Göksu Özdoğan & Kemali Saybasili (Eds.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1995), pp. 82-83.

Hungarians were also highly keen on studying Turcology and inquiring the language and culture of the relative races in Asia. Also, the thesis on the kinship of Turks and Hungarians was asserted in this time. According to Ortayli, the intensity of Turcology studies was the result of the policy of Austrian government with which it intended to make Budapest as a barrier against the expansionist objectives of Russia with using the Slav minorities living in the Austrian Empire.²⁰³

The thesis argued on the kinship between the Turks and Hungarians and this was particularly executed in the linguistic arena. Politically, as explained in the chapter Four, the sympathy of Hungarian public opinion towards the Turks was manifest. In addition to the sense of brotherhood towards the Turks, the Hungarians were afraid of losing their status following the Russian-Turk War (1877-78). This fear also forced them to be close to the Turks, because the probable victory of Russia would change the situation in the Balkans in favour of Slav minorities who were suppressing the Hungarian government for acquiring their political independence or, at least, autonomy.²⁰⁴

In Hungary, there was rapid urbanization and a developing bourgeois class in the nineteenth century. However, the aristocratic powers did not let the bourgeois class to insert liberal elements in the cultural arena. Therefore, the spokesmen of Hungarian nationalism remained from within the aristocratic classes who wanted to preserve their traditional influence in the political and cultural spheres. As Kessler

²⁰³ *Felsefe Kurumu Seminerleri* (Seminars of Philosophy Institution), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1977), pp. 456-57.

²⁰⁴ Nizam Önen, *Turanî Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 24.

writes, “1890 was the year when a small group of Magyar intellectuals began to propound a new national ideology that was the very antithesis of this traditional, optimistic, and West-oriented Magyar historiography”²⁰⁵ This class projected Hungarian nationalism based on both the mythic past and political independence, and wishing to preserve the political system against the bourgeois-liberal wave. Turanism was the best accorded to these expectations and objectives of the noble classes.

In the 1890s onwards, the Hungarians began to feel the double pressure of both Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. The alienation of the Hungarians from the European world in which they had been living up to the time, orientated them towards the probable future allies in Eastern Europe and Asia. The Ottoman Empire, for its dissension with Russia, was the most considerable ally for the Hungarians. The linguistic studies already prepared the ground for this proximity. In the beginning of the twentieth century, noble elites of the Hungarians strongly emphasized the Asiatic past of the Hungarian nation against the European bourgeois way of thinking.

From the time on, the term Turan was more than a geographical definition of an area. It also came to mean the political ideal for the Turanist elites in Hungary. For this reason, the *Magyar Ethnographic Society* became the center of Hungarian Ural-Altaiist academicians in 1890, although founded by the Finnist academicians. The foundation of the Eastern Commercial School in 1891 became like the branch of the *Ethnographic Society*. In 1891 the journal *Ethnographia* was established in order to be scene for the studies of the Ural-Altaiism hypothesis which was seen as the

²⁰⁵ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, p. X.

national science of the Hungarian nation. A famous Pan-Turanist, Geza Nagy, wrote a series of articles about the political and academic situation of Ural-Altaiism in 1890. Including the Koreans and Japanese, he argued that the Turanian world comprised the ten percent of the world. This claim seemed promising for realizing the Turan ideal. Nagy also warned the Hungarians that the political developments in Europe should make them more critical. Therefore the only way to escape from this uneasy situation was to become united with all the Ural-Altaiic peoples.²⁰⁶

In 1898, a successful progress was made within the Ural-Altaiist academic community. An outstanding Ural-Altaiist, Baron Imre Szalay, became the president of the *Ethnographic Society*. In his direction, Arminius Vambery and Kont Jenő were given considerable responsibilities with regards to Pan-Turanist activities. With the efforts of them, the Ural-Altaiism perspective was intended to be the national science of Hungarians. *The Ethnographic Society* and its academicians put forward earnest activities at the Orientalist Congresses in Rome (1899) and in Hamburg (1902). Together with these endeavours, the Ethnographic Society began to publish its own journal “Keleti Szemle” (Eastern Review) in 1900. Again as Kessler writes, “...The publication was the first international periodical devoted exclusively to Ural-Altaiic studies, and made Budapest a sort of scholarly Mecca for the world’s specialists in this particular field of endeavour.”²⁰⁷

However, soon after, with the pressure of the Finnist-dominated academicians, Keleti Szemle was forced to accept the new scientific support that is the Finnist-

²⁰⁶ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. 68-71.

²⁰⁷ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, pp. 78-80.

dominated *Academy of Science* between the years of 1902 and 1904. The Finnist school, as discussed above, was the main counter linguistic school of Ural-Altaiism. In 1905, this academy founded the *Magyar Philological Society* in Budapest. Since they were dealing with the ethnic origins of the Hungarians, the Finnist scholars tried to reveal the unscientific grounds of the Ural-Altaiist claims.²⁰⁸

In spite of these negative developments, Hungarian Turanists soon recovered themselves because the international and national climate was now highly in favour of the Ural-Altaiists. As a result of the Russo-Japanese war, a group of young Ural-Altaiist came to the scene to bring the Turanist movement into force. This was an unsuccessful attempt. Soon thereafter, a poem book, *Turani Dalok* (Turanian Songs) (1910) was published in Budapest by a poet named Arpad Zemlenyi, who then would become the prophet of Hungarian Turanism. Also his book later became the handbook of Hungarian Turanists. Same as Nagy, Zemlenyi also stated his disappointment towards the European world and marked the East as the real address of brotherhood.²⁰⁹

Under the incitement of this sentimental addressing, the Hungarian orientalist gathered under the *Turani Tarsasag* (Turan Society) in 1910. These academicians were comprised of well-known academicians, politicians and men of letter, such as Kont Pal Teleki, Jholnoky Jenö, Gyula Pekar, Bela Vikar, Aladar Ban, Sandor Marki, and Arpad Zemlenyi among others. Some of them were involved only in academic studies about the Ural-Altaiic people while some focused only on the

²⁰⁸ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, p. 82.

²⁰⁹ Nizam Önen, *Turanci Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), pp. 28-29

political implications of the Turanian world. Although these variant situations denoted that the Turan Society was not a foundation which was based on fixed ideas, it displayed a minimum cooperation between these people all that showed varying degrees of interest in the Turanian world.²¹⁰ The basic purpose of the *Turan Society* was stated in the below expression:

The purpose of the Society is to study, propagate and develop the national cultures and economies of the (Ural-Altaic) peoples of Europe and Asia which are related to the Magyar people. The task is to be pursued in conformity with the Magyar national interest.²¹¹

The first president of the *Turan Society* was Kont Pal Teleki. Pal Teleki later undertook the key role in the political arena of Hungary when he became Hungary's Prime Minister during 1918 and 1919. Arminius Vambery also took part in the *Turan Society* as the honorary president.

The Turan Society was first of all a center for scientific inquiries. Its primary aim was to investigate the culture, literature and history of the relative peoples of Hungary. Hungary was evaluated as the pioneer country among other Turanian peoples. Political, religious, and personal interests were not included among the Society's activities. The only interest of the *Turan Society* was defined as scientific and any kind of commercial interests were avoided.²¹²

²¹⁰ Nizam Önen, *Turan Hareketleri: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 29.

²¹¹ Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, p. 359.

²¹² Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancilari*, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2000), pp. 26-27.

The asserted leading role of the Hungarians among other Turanic races denoted the politicization of the Turanist movement. Although the Turan Society took scientific investigations at first hand, the supposedly savior role of Hungarians particularly revealed the political intentions of them. Although not evident, the future expectations of the Hungarians to change the political balances of Europe and Asia in favour of Turanic peoples and their unity on the basis of such objectives were the open signs of this politicization. The most important reason that brought forward the Hungarian race before other Turanic races was certainly the inescapable result of the nineteenth and twentieth century nationalist movements. As discussed in the prior chapter, centuries-lasting struggles of the Hungarians against the Vienne government naturally had given birth to the Hungarian national aspiration. This was the reason why Hungarian Turanists gave special attention to the advantages of expanding towards the Turanic races and saw themselves as the pioneering country.²¹³

The first serious activities of the *Turan Society* began in 1912. From this time on, many conferences were organized in order to inform the Hungarian people about the existence of other Turanian peoples of Asia. Also many research projects were carried out in Anatolia, the Caspian Sea region, the Caucasuses and in other inner Asian lands to study the economic conditions of these locations. In the first years, the interest of the public opinion towards these activities remained limited. Nevertheless, with the support of official institutions, such activities gained relatively increasing interest in time.²¹⁴ Also in 1912, the *Turan Society* started to contact with Ottoman Pan-Turkists. This relationship will be discussed further in the following pages.

²¹³ Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancilari*, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2000), p. 28.

In 1913 the Turan Society began to publish its journal *Turan* in French, Hungarian, German and Turkish languages. Although the *Turan Society* sometimes had to stop the publication of its journal, it was nevertheless published up to the World War II.²¹⁵ The first editor of the journal *Turan* was Alajos Paikert. This significant Hungarian scientist and also Abdullatif Efendi, who was the head of Budapest Muslim Society, undertook significant roles in the journal *Turan*. The first articles of the *Turan* journal were mostly about the economic, cultural and social structures of the Turan countries of Asia. These articles also covered not only the impressions of the travelers who visited many countries throughout Asia but also linguistic investigations.²¹⁶

Among the stated objectives of the journal *Turan* were to examine the spheres of culture, art, science and the economic and social politics of European and Asian nations. The political, religious and personal problems were kept out of interest. It seems that the primary concern of the first articles published in the journal was the economic structures of Asian countries. Towards the end of World War I., the word Turan was imputed with geographical, linguistic and ethnic implications. Concern about the economic structures of Asian countries received much attention from the time. This implied the expansionist objectives of the Hungarian Turanists during the period before the World War I started.

²¹⁴ Nizam Önen, *Turan Hareketleri: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), pp. 31-32.

²¹⁵ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğusu*, (The Emergent of Turkish Nationalism), (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), p. 130.

²¹⁶ Nizam Önen, *Turan Hareketleri: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), pp. 33-34.

With the inception of the World War I, Hungarian Turanism gained further popularity in the Hungarian public opinion. The war was considered as an advantageous condition for realizing Turanist expansionism and also as a way of escaping from the defensive politics based on the loneliness of Hungary among European countries. Hungarian Turanists expected that at the end of the World War I, Central European allies would win a victory and the Turan ideal would than be realized. As a result, the Hungarians would take the leading position among all Turanian nations and this naturally would end the Pan-Slavist threat. On account of the ideological connections based on brotherhood and kinship, first the Bulgarians and later the Ottoman Turks began to appear among the ranks of the Hungarian Turanist community.²¹⁷

The attitude of Hungarian Turanists denoted a romantic and an expansionist ideological tendency. Joining the camp of Germany, the Turanists expected to win a victory together with Germany which would help them to realize their future ideals. However, this was a highly contradictory policy since Germany also belonged to Arian origin which the Hungarian Turanists were fighting against. This shows us that the ideology of Hungarian Turanism was flexible and that it even contained contradictory elements within it. Moreover, in their view, the expected victory of the German-Austrian alliance would also enhance the economic networks and interests

²¹⁷ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, “Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Turancılık”, (Turanism in the World and in Turkey), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Nationalism), Cilt 4, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 390.

of Hungary in South-East Europe. This was another evidence of the precedence of Hungarian nationality put forward by the Hungarian Turanists.²¹⁸

Nevertheless, the War did not result as Hungarian Turanists expected. 1918 was the year of change for the *Turan Society* as a result of the defeat in the World War I. In 1918, in the first issue of the journal *Turan*, it was argued that the word Turan was neither a linguistic nor a political concept; it was a geographical definition. In other words, prior definitions of the term Turan and any of its former political implications were refused, because the defeat in the War changed strictly the comprehension of the Hungarians on Turan ideal. In this issue, the former president Kont Pal Teleki wrote a detailed article on the correct meaning of the term Turan where he linked it with geography. On this ground, Teleki argued that the existence of the Hungarian nation was formerly imagined in the context of historically linking themselves with the East.²¹⁹ Trying to prove the rightness of this unscientific claim, i. e. the political definition of Turanism, was doomed to fail. He, also, argued that, the criterion that determine the rightfulness of a political movement can never have a scientific basis since it is always determined by the strength of faith in that movement which makes it politically powerful or not.²²⁰

This attitude revealed that the claimed scientific truths were only instruments for covering and polishing the ideology of Turanism. No matter scientifically true or not,

²¹⁸ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, “Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Turancılık”, (Turanism in the World and in Turkey), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Nationalism), Cilt 4, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 390-91.

²¹⁹ Nizam Önen, *Turanlı Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 42.

²²⁰ Pal Teleki, “Turan a földrajzi fogalom”, *Turan*, 1918, issue 1, pp. 44-83, in Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancıları*, (Hungarian Turanists), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), pp. 75-81.

the arguments of Turanists reflected the demand of Hungarian public opinion, which intended to economically benefit through cooperation with the so-called brother nations of Asia. In fact, this intention was apparent in some articles. For instance, in 1912, in relatively early times, Sandor Marki expressed that the Hungarians had economic interests in the East.²²¹ Also, according to Baron Nyary, there were so many untouched fields, forests and mines in the Ottoman Empire that were waiting to be discovered by the Hungarians.²²² For this reason, it can be claimed that the closeness towards the Ottoman Turks was not only legitimized on the basis of (ethnic) kinship ties between these two nations but also on the basis of expected economic benefits in the future.

In this respect, it seems that Hungarian Turanists had put forward Turanism not only as a result of feeling alienated from other European countries and thus turning their face towards the East but also, and for the most part, as a result of seeking economic benefits beyond their borders. No matter how the Turan term was defined, this economical incentive was the case for all Turanists. Turanism in Hungary was conceived as an instrumental ideology by some people who were not convinced about its scientific validity as claimed by the Turanists themselves. Many believed that there was a hidden political agenda of Turanism. For this reason, in spite of the frustration following the World War I, the Turanist ideology, with some changes in emphasis and content continued to appear in Hungarian politics up to the beginning of the World War II.

²²¹ Dr. Iskender Marki, "Asya Tarihinde Turaniler" (The Turanians in Asian History), *Türk Yurdu*, (Turkish Homeland), issue 14, (1327), p. 423.

²²² Nizam Önen, *Turanlı Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 46.

4.4 Relations between Hungarian Turanism and Turkish Nationalism

As mentioned in the chapter 4.1, there appeared close interests and attraction between Hungarians and Ottoman Turks as a result of the Ottoman Empire's protection of Hungarians who rebelled against the Vienne government for the independence of Hungarians. The Turcology studies of Hungarians were another connection enhancing this sympathy. Vambéry, before his visit to Central Asia, came to Istanbul and was warmly received by Sultan Abdulhamit II. In 1876, an Hungarian general and his committee visited Istanbul and presented a precious sword to the Ottoman general Abdülkerim Pasha as a mark of brotherhood between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. In a year time the Ottomans responded to this visit by sending a committee to Hungary. The Ottoman committee was enthusiastically welcomed in every station of Hungarian cities.²²³ This mutual interest and sympathy between the two nations, as denoted before, was the result of a perceived common threat, that is, the threat of increasing Pan-Slavism.

As discussed before, Hungarian Turanism began to grow as a political movement in 1890 which was also the year when Turkish nationalism also began to take shape as a result of cultural and political protest movements. In this national awakening, the efforts of Russian Turks were considerable, particularly in making Turkism as an ideological alternative of Ottomanism. Between the years of 1890 and 1910, Istanbul entertained the great Turcologists and Turanist politicians of Hungary. This

²²³ Cemil Öztürk, "113 Yıl Önceki Bir Türk Heyetinin Macaristan Gezisi", (Travel of a Turkish Committee in Hungary 113 Years Before), *Tarih ve Toplum*, (History and Society), Vol. 14, issue 83, (November 1990), pp. 52-54.

positive attitude towards the Hungarians can be appraised as the result of the Ottoman, German and Austro-Hungarian collaboration in the wake of the World War I.

The political rapprochement of these states was a great chance for Hungarian Turanists to propagate the Ural-Altaiism thesis. With the excitement of this advantageous atmosphere, Hungarian national history started to be reevaluated in favour of Hungarian-Turkish brotherhood and the 150 years long Ottoman domination over Hungarians was considered as a period of reciprocal cultural influence between the Turks and Hungarians. From the time on, the Istanbul archives became the most important source of information to enlighten the historical relations between the Hungarians and the Turks properly.²²⁴

The Russian Turks were the most considerable mediators of this rapprochement. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, many Russian Turks had come to Istanbul to propagate Pan-Turkist sentiments. Imbued with the idea of Turanism stemming from the motive to protect Turkish identity from the aggression of pan-Slavism, Akchura, Huseyinzade Ali and Agaoglu Ahmed Bey contacted the Hungarian Turanists. Yusuf Akchura had personally contacted with Ignacz Kunos, Gabor Balint Gyula Meszaros and other outstanding Turanist figures of Hungary. In addition to this vigour, the president of the *Turan Society* in Budapest, Pal Teleki, habitually visited Istanbul and he was involved in hot debates with the chief members of the Young Turks. The close relations between the *Turan* and *Turk Yurdu* journals in

²²⁴ Jozsef Somogyi, "Magyars and Turks", Istvan Gal (Ed.), *Hungary and East Europe*, (Budapest, 1947), p. 262.

Budapest and Istanbul respectively by itself symbolized the above discussed relations.

As analyzed above, the political atmosphere in Istanbul was definitely in favour of Turanist activities. Ziya Gokalp's poem titled "Turan" was published in 1911 after he set up the *Turkish Hearth* and the *Turkish Society*. Also the journal *Türk Yurdu* started to be published in 1911 under the direction of Yusuf Akchura. In 1914, Akchura requested from the Hungarians to enhance the Turanist activities to a higher level.²²⁵

Other key element in this closeness between the Hungarians and the Ottoman Turks was the Turcology studies. Believing that they belong to the same origin and proving this claim with scientific studies, assisted them to open the new path for forming close relations. While Hungarians were more involved in Turcological studies and followed the Turanist policy enthusiastically, the Ottoman Turks, on the other, formed only some organizations and published journals with the aim to inform the Ottoman public opinion about recent developments. These activities were carried out under the direction of the Turkists, particularly of Yusuf Akchura. In one article published in the journal *Türk Yurdu*, it was stated that the Turks were solely known with their military and conqueror character throughout history but, together with the influence of orientalist studies, the contribution of the Turks in world civilization were brought into light in German, French, Russian and English publications.²²⁶

²²⁵ Yusuf Akchura, "The Role of the Magyars and Turks in Turandom", *A Cel*, (Budapest, 1914), pp. 84-91, in Joseph Kessler, *Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945*, p. 31.

²²⁶ "Pek Eski Türk Edebiyatı", (Old Turkish Literature), *Türk Yurdu*, (Turkish Homeland), issue 3, (1327), p. 63.

The journal *Türk Yurdu* played a key role as a mediator between Turkish nationalists and others who were politically and scientifically involved in the field of Turcology. *Türk Yurdu* sometimes published the significant developments that occurred in Turcology studies. For instance Radlov and Thomsen mostly wrote about their own research in Turcology studies. In another article, the *Türk Yurdu* expressed their gratitude to Radlov and Thomsen for their research and publications about Turkish civilization and Turkish languages.²²⁷

It seems that the Turkish nationalists, at the time, were very eager to closely observe the developments in Turcological studies. The travels of the orientalist to Central Asia and the Turcological studies in well known libraries were introduced to the public particularly during the first year publications of the journal *Türk Yurdu*. The activities of Hungarian Turanists were of great interest for the Ottoman Pan-Turkists. The Turan Society in Hungary was one of the most important foundations which also had close relations with the *Türk Yurdu*.

In 1910, the conference delivered by Sandor Marki in Budapest was translated to Turkish and later published in the journal. In 1914, the *Türk Yurdu* announced the establishment of the Turan Journal in Budapest with the following words:

We had written in the 6th issue of the *Türk Yurdu* that the society named *Turan Society* was founded by Hungarian scientists and notables. One of the objectives of this society is to publish a journal on the present and historical life of Turanians. In these days, we are so happy to see the first issue of the journal *Turan* which was sent to *Türk Yurdu*.

²²⁷ “Türkolog V. Radlov ve Wilhelm Thomsen Hazretlerinin Jübileleri“, (Jubilee of Turcologists V. Radlov and Wilhelm Thomsen), *Türk Yurdu*, (Turkish Homeland), issue 6, (1327), pp. 171-177.

The committee of *Türk Yurdu* congratulates the journal *Turan* for successful publication, and expects from the Society the translation of some Hungarian articles into Turkish in order that other Turanians could benefit more from this useful journal.²²⁸

Furthermore, the *Hungarian-Turkish Friendship Society* was founded in Istanbul with the efforts of Pal Teleki and some other Hungarian Turanists in 1916 when Pal Teleki and a commission came to Istanbul. It was the time when the Ittihad Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) and Hungarian Turanists established official ties with one another. From the time on, Bahaeddin Sakir undertook the responsibility of running these mutual activities. One year later, a similar friendship society was founded in Budapest under the direction of Kont Bela Szechenyi who was also the president of the Turan Society at the time. These times witness the establishment of institutions aiming to carry out scientific studies. For instance, the *Hungarian Science Institute* was established in Istanbul in 1917 where archeological studies occupied a major area of interest.²²⁹

In 1916, together with the contribution of both Hungarian and Ottoman governments, it was decided that some Turkish students be sent to Budapest in order to educate and include them in the Turanian community. From 1916 onwards, the Hungarian government provided financial support to Turanist activities in a systematic way. The expenditures of the students were undertaken by the Hungarian ministries of education and trade. After three months of training in Hungarian language, these students were placed in Hungarian high schools. Despite the discouraging conditions of the World

²²⁸ "Türklük Suunu", (Conscious of Turkishness), *Türk Yurdu*, (Turkish Homeland), Vol. VI., issue 4, (1914), pp. 78-79.

²²⁹ Nizam Önen, *Turanî Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), pp. 51-52.

War I, almost 180 Turkish students managed to complete their studies and graduated from their schools.²³⁰

The Ottoman consuls in Budapest, Ahmed Hikmed Bey and Enis Behiç Bey, established close relations with the *Turan Society* and they were also personally involved with the problems of the Turkish students in Hungary. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Bahaeddin Sakir, was a representative of the Ottoman government in Hungary and he was also involved in selection and sending of Turkish students to Hungary. In 1916 an association named *Tahsil-i Sanayi Cemiyeti* (Society of Industrial Education) was founded by some Turanists in Istanbul which was established for teaching Hungarian language.²³¹

Turkish students in Hungary studied in various departments in Hungarian schools. Industry was the main area of interest for most of them. Other departments were as follows: Economy, agriculture, horticulture, forestry, mining and trading.²³² As obviously seen, technical areas constituted the immediate interest of the Ottoman government. Rather than the social or philosophical sciences, technical departments were of primary concern since these departments were considered as the most related ones for the improvement of the Ottoman economy.

²³⁰ “Turan Cemiyetinin Egitim Faaliyetlerine Dair”, (On the Educational Activities of Turan Society), *Turan*, Vol. 1, (1921), p. 67, in Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancilari*, (Hungarian Turanists), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 2000), pp. 99-102.

²³¹ Nizam Önen, *Turan Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 50.

²³² “Turan Cemiyetinin Egitim Faaliyetlerine Dair”, (On the Educational Activities of Turan Society), *Turan*, Vol. 1, (1921), p. 67, in Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancilari*, (Hungarian Turanists), p. 100.

The students who have graduated from these schools later began to work in Budapest, Istanbul, Ankara and some other Hungarian cities in the fields of agriculture, mechanics, forestry and trading. These Turkish students working in Istanbul were considered as the representatives of the Hungarians in the Ottoman Empire. They also founded a society for solidarity in 1922 for those students who were formerly educated in Budapest. The objectives of this society were to strengthen the ties and relations between the students to guide the students who want to go to Budapest for education, and to improve the relations between Hungarians and Turks.²³³ Until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Turkish students continued to go to Budapest for their education.

On the other hand, the Hungarian Turanists interest in Anatolia in every respect increased in time. In its first years of its establishment, the Turan Society formed several research teams to study Anatolia and they were particularly interested in its geographical characteristics. During the First World War, these studies did not come to an end but, on the contrary, their area of interest expanded, including researching the natural resources of Anatolia. The exploration of the mines in the Karadeniz region was the outcome of such research and it received much attention. Also, a Turkish committee visited Hungary in order to collect information about the structure and functioning of Hungarian institutions such as education, administration etc. All these information were later published in the journal *Turan*. However, as a result of

²³³ “Egitimini Macaristan’da Gören Öğrenciler Cemiyeti”, (The Society of the Students Who Educated in Hungary), *Turan*, (1922), p. 216, in Tarık Demirkan, *Macar Turancıları*, (Hungarian Turanists), p. 104.

the World War I, these reciprocal visits and investigations came to an end since the War did not end as the Turanists expected.²³⁴

After 1918, the ideal of a big Turan unity doomed to fail. As the defeated powers, Hungarians and the Turks were now not only forced to accept the new world order, but they also had to face the threat of Western allies more openly. While the Ottoman lands were now divided between Western powers, Hungary objected to the Trianon Peace Treaty, which resulted with the loss of some of its – lands. Also the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Hungary became a major obstacle for the activities of the Turanists. On the other hand, the preoccupation of Turkish nationalists to save Anatolia from foreign invasion, detached them from Hungarian Turanists, particularly at the level of governmental relations. Finally, the post-war frustration created a chaotic situation not only for Ottoman Pan-Turkists but also for Hungarian Turanists.

²³⁴ Nizam Önen, *Turanî Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910-1944)*, (Turanianist Movements: Hungary and Turkey 1910-1944), p. 53.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Anthony Smith argues that pan nationalism mostly emerged both among the nations who had to live under the yoke of big traditional empires, and had an intention to gain their own independent state; and the nations who had traditional state order and had an aim to spring from existent backward situation.²³⁵ Since the significant point was the unity on the race, religion or geographical likeness; the existent borders were controversial. For this reason, this kind of nationalism had irredentist and expansionist tendencies. Pan nationalisms took their contents and tendencies from the East European type of nationalism which was developed by German romanticists. As distinct from West European type of nationalism, this nationalism defines nationality in accordance with the community coming from the same ethnic origin. German philosopher Johann Herder was considered as the founder of romantic/cultural nationalism in his concept, *volk*. The *volk* is a community having a common language, religion, race, land and culture as different from West European kind of nationalism in which civil and political boundaries were given more attention. In Eastern-romantic type of nationalism, distinguishing factors of a nation are the historical base of nationalism, ethnic heroes, myths and legends. All these shaped the general features and determinants of Eastern type of nationalism. It can be argued that there were two main concepts propping up pan nationalism: history and language.

²³⁵ Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 161.

History provides the common heroic past to a nation living together. Since there was not any strong tradition of civil or bourgeois structure, this kind of nationalism had to emphasize the deep-rooted historical dependencies, rather than focusing on citizenship or unity around the democratic state. Another determinant was language in which a nation can find its common characteristic via using it, because language was the only way to argue for the ethnic sameness of a nation. Since ancestral arguments were so controversial, language became the valid substance to provide the dependency of people with each other. Both the philosophical views of Herder and political-social conditions of Eastern Europe led to the emergence of such kind of nationalism understanding.

Romantic nationalism can easily be transformed into pan nationalism. It was obvious that ethnic (romantic) based nationalisms tended to become united around other people who shared the same ethnic origin. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turanism, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Turkism were all the nineteenth century movements which directed their objectives in irredentist and expansionist policy in order to create ethnic-based state formation. They considered their nation more progressed and civilized than rest of nations. This was the reason for the efforts of extending their borders beyond the existent one. In general, all pan movements tried to find the scientific bases for their arguments, since there appeared so many orientalist studies on the historical origins of the nations throughout the nineteenth century. While West European countries had the terms such as law, citizenship to make ground for their national identity, East European and Asian states` elites and intellectuals focused on the linguistic, philological and ethnic studies of orientalists.

Therefore, pan movements tried to explore their linguistic origins in history. Many findings on the mores, languages, rituals and other cultural elements in history helped for the national articulations of these movements. The emergence of the nation, historical fatherland, historical process of ancestral development, migration from ancient lands, myth of the national liberation, myth of golden age, national recession, and expected resurrection of the nation were the significant historical phases from which a nation could get a lesson and improve its national position. Since the activities of each pan movements could meet one another, the struggles between them were inevitable. Also, the national aspiration of a pan movement could be fed from counter pan movement as seen in the example of Hungarian Turanism. Hungarian Turanism mostly reacted against Pan-Slavist and Pan-German activities. Also, Russian Turks defended Pan-Turkism in order to save themselves from the assimilation policies of the Russian Empire via Pan-Slavism.

Hungarian Turanism and Ottoman Pan-Turkism in this respect were the ideological movements in which there were significant similarities and differences with respect to objectives and activities. On account of having the same enemy, that was Russia, these two movements had similar starting points. While Ottomans felt the expansionist policy of Russia; the Hungarians, on the other, were discontented about the probable independence claims of the Slavic minorities from their sovereignty. However, since the national question was considered as the turning point in these two pan movements, there were various differences both in form and content.

First of all, the Hungarians had a national state, and they were thinking all about their questions with respect to Hungarian point of view. Economical backwardness and relatively weak position with regards to the Austrian and German Empires forced them to onslaught towards beyond the existing borders. For that reason, Hungarians began to search their ethnic origins and argued that they belonged to the Ural-Altaic linguistic branch. Asia was their historical fatherland and with the unity of all Ural-Altaic races, they would be liberated from the pincers of European powers, particularly from the Pan-Slavist threat.

It was obvious that saving their national existence was the main problem of Hungarians. This was also the explanation for their new ideological investigations. Economical backwardness and political loneliness were the main motivators. In Hungary, the defenders and ideologues of Turanism were the state bureaucrats and noble classes. Turanism provided a national honor for Hungarians which had been weak for centuries. In addition, Turanism was a very useful instrument in order to propagate the Hungarian expansionism in Eastern Europe and inner Asia.

Since secular thoughts of Western Europe preoccupied the minds of Hungarian elites in the eighteenth century, this situation prepared the psycho-political ground for the intellectual efforts of the expected future of Hungary. These preoccupations included mostly rationalization, national self-conscious and figuring a way out of the political loneliness of Hungary from Western Europe. Consequently, this psycho-political condition led the Hungarian elites (intellectuals) to articulate history of philosophy, pan ideas, hypothesis of origin, and messianic assertions.

Pan Turanism reflected the self-assertion of the Hungarian noble class. Turanism would bring a national honor for the Hungarians who remained backwards from the Western progressed states. In addition, Pan-Turanist policy would open a new path for the economic benefits in Eastern Europe and inner Asia by using the politicized Ural- Altaic arguments. Ural- Altaic hypothesis appeared among the linguist circles in the eighteenth century. However, the elaboration of it was fulfilled only in the second half of the nineteenth century. With the political activities of Pan-Turanism in 1890, Ural- Altaic hypothesis became the scientific base for Pan-Turanists in Hungary up to 1921. Although there was another linguistic branch, Finno-Ugrian group, articulating the Finnic origin of the Hungarians, the political wave was in favour of the Ural- Altaist defenders of Pan-Turanists at the time, because Ural- Altaism articulated the linguistic sameness between North Asian and East European peoples. This absolutely accorded to the ideal of the Pan-Turanists.

From 1890 to 1910, Pan-Turanists mostly engaged with scientific studies. *Magyar Ethnographic Society* (1890) and the journal *Eastern Review* (1900) were the headquarters of the activities of Ural- Altaic studies. Taking these structures as the scientific bases, *Turan Society* was formed in 1910 under the direction of Kont Pal Teleki. Until the end of the First World War, *Turan Society* played significant role in Hungary, and strong political relations were constructed with Ottoman Turks. Nevertheless, defeat in the War shook the expectations of Turanists in Hungary.

On the other hand, Ottoman Pan-Turkists were mainly the opponent intellectuals who first wanted to awaken the national consciousness among the Ottoman Turks, because the dominant ideology of Ottoman state bureaucrats and intellectuals was still

Ottomanism up to World War I. Since there was strong state tradition in Ottoman society, the primal objective of Pan-Turkists was to convince the Ottoman public opinion that only valid answer of the problems was to be gathered around the national identity. Ottoman Pan-Turkists had an aim to create a unity among Turkic speaking people in inner Asia. Their ideal was only to create the network among Asian Turks and awaken the Ottoman Turks to become conscious on their ethnic origin. As seen, Ottoman Pan-Turkists mostly emerged among the Russian Turks who addressed only to the Turks of central Asia, not Ural-Altaic peoples, contrary to what Hungarian Turanists did.

The Russian Turks came to Istanbul in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yusuf Akchura issued an article, *Uc Tarz-i Siyaset* (1904) (Three Ways of Policy), in which he argued that there was only one ideological option to save the state, which was Pan-Turkism. This time was supposed to the beginning of political Turkism in the Ottoman public opinion. From the 1910s onward, cultural and political activities on Turkish nationalism reached to the peak. Having connection with the Hungarian Turanism, Ottoman Pan-Turkists pursued closely to the political developments, orientalist studies and activities of Hungarian Turanists in Budapest.

At this point, the vital differences between Hungarian Turanism and Ottoman Pan-Turkism became conspicuous. Hungarian Turanists were dreaming the big Turan ideal extending from Budapest to Tokio. They were supposing all the people throughout Asia who belonged to the Ural-Altai linguistic group as the potential sources and brothers to their future golden empire. On the other hand, Ottoman Pan-Turkist firstly had an objective to save the unity of the existing state, since there was not still any

full-fledged conscious of Turkishness in the Ottoman Turkish society. This question was more vital than any other ideals. Their ideal to reach the unity with the Turks living outside Anatolia was the secondary objective. Also the cultural activities of Pan-Turkists were seen as the first phase of the future political unity with the Turks of Central Asia. This ideal would appear itself with the beginning of World War I.

Regardless of the content, language was the main determinant of the arguments of Ottoman Pan-Turkists and Hungarian Turanists. This was the most obvious indicator of romantic nationalism which determined the contents of the Turanist pan movement. Language was the main determinant of the romantic or, particularly, pan nationalisms. However, there was the significant difference between Hungarians and Turks with respect to the extension of the linguistic dimension. While Hungarians argued all Ural-Altai speaking nations as the people who were ought to be united with them; Ottoman Turks, on the other, included only Turkic speaking elements to their future cultural and political order.

The expected future of both Turanist movements would doom to fail at the end of World War I. While Hungarians lost their most of lands and; Ottoman Turks were organized around the new republican state. Although there were close and strong relationship between Hungarian Turanists and Ottoman Pan-Turkists, these relations did not get the continuity because of the different contents of both pan nationalisms.

As cited above, for the Ottomans, no matter Pan-Turkists or Pan-Otomanists, the main objective was to save the state. Ottomans had strong state tradition for the six hundred years. The elements of the Empire were organized around the *millet* system, not ethnic

differences. *Millet* system was created in accordance with religious differences. There were not Turkish or Arab nations in the modern sense, but Muslim *millet*. Turks were the administrator of the Empire. However, this does not mean that any non-Turkish origin could not interfere with the state administration. Being Muslim was the only criterion for inclusion the state affairs. Actually, the Turk means Muslim, since the term Turk had no ethnic meaning. The name Turk was not more than the identification of state. Some definitions, such as *Kurdistan*, or *diyar-i Arab* (Arab region) were only geographical names for the administrative division.

Moreover, Islam had very significant role for the Empire in struggle with the European-Christian powers. Ottoman Empire, while also struggling with Iran, mostly turned its face toward the West. It was situated at the Eastern border of Europe. This situation gave them strong religious stimulus when it made direct wars or any other relations with Christian Europe. Because of this, Islam, for the major part, determined the state ideology in Orthodox-Sunni way. In *Sunni* (Orthodox) interpretation of Islam, there are clear and strict responsibilities that any individuals should carry out. Contrary to Shiite or Alevi interpretation of Islam, there are not any eastern-originated mystic elements. While *Sunni* interpretation determined the ideology of the Empire, the other Islamic interpretations of Islam in Anatolia sustained their existence. Even Turcoman Alevites were settled in Balkan Areas by the State itself. Some strict state interventions towards the Turcomans were not out of the religious enmities, but of the political reasons. For example, in Çaldıran War (1514) against Shah Ismail, Turcomans preferred to fight in the army of Shah Ismail. After the War ended up, Yavuz Selim killed many Turcomans for they took the side of Shah Ismail, but not for they believed in Alevite interpretation.

This view denotes that Ottoman Empire used its religious preference for protecting the fortune of the state. Islam occupied the unshakable ground in the Empire. However, if investigated deeply and closely, Ottoman Empire mostly used Islam as an instrument in order to save the state. In Ottoman state administration, *Kapikulu* (slave of state) system was at the heart of the logic of administration. All the institutions were existent only for the existence of state. Even *Sheyhul-Islam* (Head of Islam) should obey the edict of the Padishah (emperor). If the *fetva* (Islamic edict) of the *Sheyhul-Islam* contradicted to the edict of the Padishah, then *fetva* had to be edited. The *fetva* of “killing the brothers” under the rule of Mehmet II. was the most considerable proof of it. If there appeared the danger on the continuity of the state, then Padishah could kill his brothers no matter how old they were, because the Ottoman Empire was not the state of religion, but state of *örf* (tradition).

Emphasizing the significance of the state signifies the self-confidence of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire, because of this self-confidence, never cared about the ethnic or religious differences inside the Empires, as long as all the elements remained obedient to the rules. This situation sustained itself until the Ottoman Empire started to lose its former power against the Western powers in the eighteenth century. Together with the Tanzimat Edict, Ottoman Empire had to declare the new type of system for saving the obedience of the ethnic and religious elements by bringing the citizenship system for proving the equality of the religious groups as Ottomanis.

This was the end of the Ottoman self-confidence towards the non-Muslim interferences, and also confession of the invalidity of the traditional *millet* system.

From that time on, Muslims, Christians, and Jews were considered equal before the law. Although this reform aimed to strengthen the central administration, this situation was also a confession of the necessity of the new kind of ideology that state should depend, since the new ideas from the Europe came speedly to Istanbul and public opinion particularly after the French Revolution. In the nineteenth century, for the first time in the Ottoman history, there appeared the political opponent movement that was *New Ottomans*. This movement fought against the centralization policy of the state. Later it was named *Young Turks* and *Ittihad Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress), took the government in 1908, and stayed in power until the end of the First World War. Although there were many nationalist activities, which were expressed in the Chapter 3, up to the the First World War, the major ideology always remained Pan-Ottomanism, since Pan-Ottomanism articulated to protecting the existing state borders. If nationalist policy was functioned by the state, it would mean to suicide itself, because there was still many ethnic elements, Arabs, Albanians and Kurds, who were ready to rebel reactively.

It was this reason that saving the state constructed the main objective of all state bureaucrats and intellectuals. Republican elites also looked at the problem from this perspective, and never pursued the Turanist ideals. The declaration of *Misak-i Milli* (national borders) during the Independence War proved it obviously. As cited in the Introduction chapter, Smith distinguishes two routes of the formation of nations, that of bureaucratic incorporation and that of vernacular mobilization. If aristocratic elites from a lateral community created a nation by using the state possibilities, it predictably shows a fervent territorial nationalism, as Hungarians did. On the other hand, if a nation was created by nationalist intelligentsia using cultural resources, such

as history, language and customs, to activate people, it equally tended to construct the idealized nation, and directed outwards against external oppressors and alien powers, as Ottoman Turks did.

Nowadays, Pan-Turanism in Hungary and Pan-Turkism in Turkey are defended by small and marginal groups. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the chance of the Turan ideal appeared, but it did not last long. The constructions of the national states in the former Soviet Union were considered by Turkic states much more significant than to pursue such an ideal. In addition, both Turkey and Hungary turned their direction to another unity that is European Union. This situation proved again that there are no interests of the brothers who share the common ethnic or linguistic origin, but of the national states. If Yusuf Akchura lives today, he will predictably argue that Turkish national state should not ignore the European Union for the fortune of the state.

In this study, it is argued that German-originated romantic nationalism had deep impact on both Hungarians and Ottoman Turks. Romantic nationalism put its articulation mostly with respect to linguistic based explanations. This thesis also put forth that in spite of the similarities in appearance, there were deep-rooted differences between Hungarian Turanism and Ottoman Pan-Turkism. First of all, Hungarians had no identity question. Conscious of being Hungarian was strong. On the other hand, in the Ottoman Empire, there were still strong intellectual controversies on the future ideology of the state. The Turkish identity was also far from the common agreement. While Hungarians put the huge Ural-Altai world into their future golden order, Ottoman Turks approached much more prudent to such idealistic discourses. Also, since the economical expectations occupied the great dimension of the discourse of

the Hungarian Turanists, the expected unity with the Ural-Altai speaking elements seemed to appear as a reflection of the expansionist intention of them. Last of all, the close relations of Hungarian Turanists and Ottoman Pan-Turkism between 1890 and 1918 were on the account of the political loneliness of both Hungarians and Turks. Having the same enemy, that is Russia; put them in the same political ally in the wake of World War I.

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