

CHINESE NATION-BUILDING AND SUN YAT-SEN
A Study on 1911 Revolution in China

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ABSTRACT

CHINESE NATION-BUILDING AND SUN YAT-SEN

A Study on 1911 Revolution in China

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The intellectual and political roots of present-day China lie in the late imperial era and the transition to modern statehood. As the last chain of the thousands years of dynastic rule in China, the Qing Dynasty ended in 1911 with a revolution. Even though the Republican regime was immediately established after their revolution, it took three decades until the new government (People's Republic of China) achieved full sovereignty on the territory.

The thesis argues that the 1911 Revolution is a major turning point in Chinese transformation not only because of the regime change but also the ideological shift towards modern statehood. In this study, first, the social forces and actors on the eve of the Revolution are analyzed. The gentry-domination of society and the power relations within the forces involved in the Revolution – especially the intellectuals and the military – appear to be the two major reasons why the transition was not completed with the Revolution. The second focus of the study: the process of breaking with the past. In other words, how was the shift in people's mind achieved? In China, this turning point did not coincide with the 1911 Revolution and/or regime change. It came later in 1910s, reaching its peak in 1919, with the New Culture

Movement of the May Fourth intellectuals. There had been some influential intellectuals building a nationalist discourse even before the May Fourth Movement (e.g. Liang Qichao, reformist and ideologue in late Qing dynasty) but the radical and outspoken tone of the New Culture Movement achieved the grounds for a shift in minds. I will briefly analyze the intellectual work of the period and its politicization. A special emphasis is given on Sun Yat-sen's political and intellectual contribution to the transition since he was not only a major political activist but also a theoretician whose works (Three Principles of People) have been influential on China's nation-building process.

Keywords: China, Sun Yat-sen, the May Fourth Movement, the 1911 Revolution, nation-building, modernization, revolution, nationalism

ÖZ

ÇİN'DE ULUS İNŞASI VE SUN YAT-SEN 1911 Çin Devrimi Üzerine Bir Çalışma

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Günümüz Çin'inin siyasi ve düşünsel temelleri imparatorluğun son yıllarında ve çağdaş devlet olma yolundaki dönüşüm sürecinde yatar. Çin'de binyıllardır süregüden imparatorlukların sonuncusu olan Qing Hanedanlığı 1911'de bir devrim sonucu yıkılmıştır. Devrimin hemen ardından cumhuriyet rejimi ilan edilmiş olmasına rağmen, Çin toprakları üzerinde tam egemen bir devletin kurulabilmesi 30 yılı bulmuştur.

Bu tezde savunulan görüşe göre 1911 Devrimi'nin Çin'in dönüşümü için önemli bir dönüm noktası olmasının nedeni yalnızca rejim değişikliği değil, aynı zamanda çağdaşlaşma yolunda gerçekleşen zihniyet dönüşümünü de temsil etmesidir. Bu çalışmada, ilk önce devrim öncesindeki sosyal güçler ve aktörler incelenmiştir. Toplumun soylu sınıfının kontrolünde olması ve devrime müdahil olan gruplar arasındaki güç mücadeleleri (özellikle aydınlar ve ordu) dönüşümün neden devrimle birlikte sonuçlanmadığının iki temel nedeni olarak gösterilebilir. Çalışmanın ikinci odak noktası geçmişten kopuş sürecidir. Burada amaç, zihniyet dönüşümünün nasıl

gerçekleştirdiğini sorgulamaktır. Çin'de bu dönüm noktası 1911 Devrimi ve/ya rejim değişikliğine denk düşmemektedir. Dönüm noktası 1919 Yeni Kültür Hareketi'dir (4 Mayıs Hareketi). 4 Mayıs aydınlarından önce de ulusalcı söylem geliştiren düşünürlerolmasına rağmen zihniyet dönüşümünü sağlayan Yeni Kültür Hareketi'nin radikal tavrı olmuştur. Bu çalışmanın son bölümünde Sun Yat-sen'in ve 4 Mayıs aydınlarının Çin'in çağdaşlaşmasına siyasi ve düşünsel katkıları incelenmiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Çin, Sun Yat-sen, 4 Mayıs Hareketi, 1911 Devrimi, ulus inşası, çağdaşlaşma, devrim, milliyetçilik

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1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 20th century, we see the organization of the international system into two tracks. In the first track were a group of societies with more or less same locus, i.e. Europe, that had experienced a simultaneous transformation with capitalism. In the second track, were the societies of the rest of the world and/or self-sustained networks that had to reorganize themselves in accordance with the needs of the day. Some of the countries in the latter category experienced the breaking point of their transitions at the turning of 20th century and took their places as an actor in the international politics by early 20th century. The cases of this period, such as Russian, Japanese, Turkish, Mexican, and Chinese experiences, with their categorical similarities and peculiarities, draw an interesting picture of the era. The case to be held in this study will be the Chinese one, regarding its essential role in the East Asian regional system. When we recall the tribute system that had regulated all kinds of foreign relations of the regional countries in the broadest sense under the hegemonic rule of China, it is inevitable to second the importance of the Chinese transformation for the regional and eventually international dynamics.

The intellectual and political roots of present-day China lie in the late imperial era and the transition to modern statehood. As the last chain of the thousands years of dynastic rule in China, the Qing Dynasty ended in 1911 with a revolution. Even though the Republican regime was immediately established after their revolution, it took three decades until a government (People's Republic of China) achieved full sovereignty on the territory.

The 1911 Revolution is a major turning point in Chinese transformation not only because of the regime change but also the ideological shift towards modern statehood. In this study, I will first analyze the social forces and actors on the eve of the Revolution. The gentry-domination of society and the power relations within the forces involved in the Revolution – especially the intellectuals and the military – appear to be the two major reasons why the transition was not completed with the Revolution. Therefore, I reach to the second focus of the

study: the process of breaking with the past. In other words, how was the shift in people's minds achieved? I claim that, in China, this turning point did not coincide with the 1911 Revolution/regime change. It came later in 1910s, reaching the peak in 1919, with the New Culture Movement of the May Fourth intellectuals. There had been influential intellectuals building a nationalist discourse even before the May Fourth Movement (e.g. Liang Qichao, reformist and ideologue in late Qing dynasty) but the radical and outspoken tone of the New Culture Movement achieved the grounds for a shift in minds. I will briefly analyze the intellectual work of the period and its politicization. I especially focus on Sun Yat-sen's political and intellectual contribution to the transition since he was a major political activist but also a theoretician whose works (*Three Principles of People*) have been influential on China's nation-building.

It is useful to briefly analyze the well-known theories of nationalism in order to be able to place our case in a comparable position. In general, theories of nationalism derive their data from European experiences. Therefore, explanations mainly based on the transition from traditional agrarian society to modern statehood. For example, Giddens's nation-formation theory employs the traditional-modern distinction in terms of state formations. He visualizes a scale ranging from the traditional state on the one extreme which doesn't have the administrative power for this containment to the modern state on the other extreme which can supervise evenly through a rationalized network of agencies; and in the middle is place the absolutist state.

Another European-centered explanation is Gellner's: According to Gellner, nationalism is nothing more than a necessity and thoroughly functional response to the Great Transformation from static agrarian society to the world of industry and mechanical communication (Gellner, 1983). Such a functionalist view fails to answer questions like how nationalism occurred in late agrarian society; or why some communities developed nationalism and some others not (Breuilly, 1996:147).

Finally, the three political characteristics, defined by Giddens, for the transition to modern statehood, i.e. centralization and extension of administrative power; development of more abstract practices and codes of law –statutes began

to be drawn between private property and the public domain; legal sanctions of state agencies began to replace customary sanctions; and the changes to the forms of managing money such as large-scale tax systems fail to explain the non-Western paths of development, especially in the cases of long lived empires like in China or Turkey.

This statement brings us to Hrosch who claims that nations are real anthropological formations; and the connections between the rise of nationalism and modern industrial society have been weak and uncertain. According to him, there are three processes to be singled out in a transition: (1) a social/political crisis of the old order and, simultaneously, introduction of new horizons; (2) discontent among significant elements of the population; (3) loss of faith to the traditional moral systems, a decline in legitimacy. This is more helpful to explain the transition in China.

Here to note Chattarjee to understand the necessity for a different approach. She argues that nationalism was, outside Europe, a “derivative discourse” blocking the way of authentic self-generated autonomous development among communities which remained dominated by self-seeking, ultimately collaborationist and “nationalist” politicians, intellectuals, bureaucrats and capitalists. However, she also argues that, in the process of nation-formation in non-Western countries, a duality exists. That is, during the creation of public domain (modern political, economic- administrative institutions) even the Western-educated intellectuals tend to create a cultural identity totally based on traditional sources of the country (Chatterjee,1996:218-222). Her postcolonial approach is often referred in explaining the literary/intellectual movements in non-Western world, such as May Fourth movement in China.

Here, it is timely mention another discussion. Breuilly asks the question whether the transformations take place in elite circles or in nature of the power or at societal level? He gives Benedict Anderson’s *‘Imagined Communities’* as an example of explaining nationalism as transformation among elites. According to Anderson as a result of transformation of consciousness, such an imagining (nationalist ideas) come about. What cause this transformation are the experiences of cultural and political elites in particular under the impact of capitalism; and the

development of 'print culture'. It assumes a close link between groups which develop cultural conceptions of nationality and the groups which are of the centre of nationalist politics. That is the elaboration of ideas helps construction of political movements which eventuates in the accepted sentiments of a whole society (Anderson, 1983). As for nationalism as transition in nature of power Breuilly says that ideas become important when they become a part of a political movement which must negotiate with governments and build support within society (Breuilly,1996: 159-170). For societal transformation Skocpol should be mentioned for her emphasis on class conflicts (Skocpol,1989).

As outlined above in order to analyze non-Western nationalist formations, certain models and theories can be applied. In this study, Selcuk Esenbel's model will be employed. Esenbel is a Turkish historian specialized on comparative histories of Japan and Ottoman Empire. She, in *Modernization and National Identity in Japan* (1991), draws a frame composed of three models of Asian transformation:

1. reaction to West /refusal of West
2. quite the contrary, westernization as modernization
3. the synthesis of East and West

The transformation of China happens through a shift from Refusal model to Westernization model. This shift is symbolized by 1911 Revolution. This paper advocates that even though the transition process was not completed with the establishment of the Republic due to the internal dynamics of the time, 1911 Revolution is a major turning point in Chinese transformation not only because of the regime change but also the ideological shift towards modern statehood. The gentry-domination in the society and the power relations within the forces involved in the revolution, specifically between the intellectuals and the military, were two major reasons for the transition to continue even after the revolution. Still, the revolution had symbolic importance to further the eventual transition.

Here, it is timely to clarify what we mean with the terms of revolution, transition, change and continuity. The dictionary definition of a revolution is: "A complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it; a forcible substitution of a new ruler or

form of government.” (Oxford English Dictionary). This definition has two assumptions: (1) revolutions take place at political level; (2) they must be complete and successful. There are objections to both of these objections. First, do the revolutions take place only at political level? Baecheler’s¹ and Neuman’s² definitions second the revolutionary process including the government and rulers. However Skocpol argues that the most important change takes place in social structure: “Social Revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structure; they are accompanied and in part carried through by class based revolts from below”(Skocpol,1979:4). However she excludes any other possible ways of revolution: “Social revolution change both social and political structures; and occur through intense sociopolitical conflicts in which class struggles play a key role. Establishment of a new regime by other means is not a revolution.” (Skocpol,1979:5). This definition brings us to the problem of types of revolution. Katz classifies revolutions as rural and urban revolutions, coup d’etats, revolutions ‘from above’, revolutions ‘from without’ and osmosis. Rural revolutions mean taking power with guerilla tactics in rural in where the government control is weak, then reaching to the capital after status quo is defeated, withdrawn or demoralized. In urban revolutions revolutionaries don’t have the ability to build up a powerful guerilla arm but can subverse government’s armed forces through general strikes, campaigns etc. They generally involve little/no fighting. Rural revolutions can take years, urban revolution can take weeks. The government initiates revolutions ‘from above’ either to accelerate the change with ambitious projects (Great Leap Forward) or to preempt (introducing seriat if there is a n Islamic threat). Revolutions ‘from without’ –occurs when one country invades another (like in the relation between Soviet Union and East camp; and the US with the West camp). Osmosis is the name for Islamic neo-fundamentalists slowly taking control of the institutions of both society and government via the Islamization of individuals (Katz,1997: 4-9).

¹ “A revolution is a protest movement that manages to seize the power.” (Baecheler,1975:91)

² “A revolution is a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of social order indicating a major break in the continuity of development “(Neumann,1949:333)

Under the light of these descriptions, Chinese revolution can be defined as a political revolution (without any major change in the social system and class structure). It can also be classified as an urban revolution initiated by urban intellectuals and lower level bureaucrats, and supported by strikes and campaigns in the cities.

As for the second assumption, the question later asked is whether success is necessary to name a revolution. Trimberger³ and Calvert⁴ emphasize success. Brinton highlights speed⁵. However, as Tilly puts, one must take in to account the “presence of the counter-revolutionary forces in the midst of society” (Tilly,1964:30) . At this point Kimmel offers a distinction between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes (Kimmel,1990:6). As it is the case in China, a revolution might take place but the outcome might not be the one the revolutionaries envisaged due to several factors such as the contemporary international situation. Here, he suggests adding the word “attempt” to the definition of the revolution in order to clarify the confusion between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes: “Revolutions are *attempts* by subordinate groups to transform the social foundations of political power” (Kimmel,1990:6).

Under the light of this clarification, this study takes a line close to Rhoads:

[1911 Revolution] encompassed two kinds of revolution: the narrow, political revolution of 1911-12 that overthrew the system of monarchical rule, and the broader cultural revolution of 1895-1913 that destroyed the Confucian value-system. Pointing out that it was more successful at destruction than at reconstruction, and that it paved the way for the creative achievements of the May Fourth Movement and beyond, ... the revolution should be located in the broader perspective of the long history of China. (Rhoads,1975 in Kubota,1994)

³ “A Revolution is an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime” (Trimberger,1978:12)

⁴ “Revolution refers to the events in which physical force (or the convincing threat of it) has actually been used successfully to overthrow a government or regime” (Calvert,1970:15)

⁵ “Drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto running that government “(Brinton,1965)

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study does not cover new and/or first-hand documents on the subject. It explores the development of the first nation state in a way as described by Skocpol: “Some books present fresh evidence; others make arguments that urge the reader to see old problems in a new light” (Skocpol, 1979:xi). The latter method has become a path to be followed by several scholars like Skocpol, Hevia, and Keyder. In the course of time, such an attitude has turned out to be an approach rather than individual methods. *Historiographies*, different stories of the same history which are told according to the theories the writer feels attached, has replaced the old style *History*, the sound analysis of the facts.¹

Revisiting the previously held cases in the history makes sense so long as the main question of the History has been placing the collected and verified data into a framework which would give meaning to the given collection of knowledge in the context of the period and the historian’s time. The reference point, against which the analyzed case gains clarification, “by the way of contrast” (Huang, 1998:189), can be either another region/experience at the given period of time which shows comparable patterns or an ideology /theory, which claims to explain the case with time- and space-free principles. In this line, this study, armed with a detailed consumption of the prominent works of the field at a range, aims at (re)evaluation of the facts and the interpretations in the field.

The discussions on history-writing on China have always been heated for two reasons. First of all, the discussions on the emphasis and the look of the analysis *among* historians working on China are inevitable because the material is replete with ambiguities. Beside these intra-field debates, Chinese history is subject to Social Science-wide concerns. That is, since the China history is precisely relevant to metadiscussions like Western-centricism (Eurocentricism), Modernization Orientalism, Postcolonialism, Globalism, it has taken the attention of the scholars’

¹The traditional meaning of Historiography is History-writing but Dirlik gives the above mentioned meaning in *Postmodernity's Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project* (2000)

reasoning on these theoretical questions. To be specific, there are a number of scholars, who are not Sinologists, who utilize Chinese history in their general theories². Such an environment in China studies is conducive to paradigm wars³.

Dirlik's puts it as "[p]aradigms are not just innocuous models of explanation that guide intellectual work. Paradigms are also expressions of social ideologies, narrowly within professions but also, because professions may hardly be isolated from their broader context of social relations. The supremacy of one paradigm over others does not rest merely on a superior ability to explain available "facts"; it is also an ideological supremacy that expresses power relations within a context of social relations and ideologies. Paradigms do not just guide inquiry; they also control it, excluding alternative explanations and, therefore, those who favor or promote alternative explanations (Dirlik,1996:244)".

Citing Dirlik at length allows us to point out two notions that we should take into account in analyzing the schools in China historiography. The first is "the historical conditions of the historical work itself" (Cohen,1996:247). That is, the intellectual background of the field as well as the historian, the academic and political environment is relevant to how the scholar pursued the facts. It is nearly impossible to talk about an Academy evolving into a new phase of inquiry for the sake of Academy itself, free of the political concerns of the day. Even the paradigms to be outlined below cannot be thought without reference to the discussions on the writing of 'human history' which is again bound to the day's political predicament. The precision will be maintained then when the paradigms in Chinese historiography are thrashed out in concord with the paradigms in 'human history' clarified by

² Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (1979) Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Lord and Peasant in the Making of The Modern World*, (1967), Tilly's *The Vendee* is an example of that kind of scholarly work.

³ Paradigm is a concept formulated by Kuhn. He envisioned, as early as 1962, a science as having, at any one time, a world view, or 'paradigm', of its environment. This scientific paradigm describes everything which the science holds, all of its laws, beliefs, procedures, methods, everything upon which it bases its life. The most scientists participate in the common framework of 'normal science' which is any activity consistent with the existing paradigm. Eventually, anomalies arise which the paradigm cannot resolve. Then some individual(s) may step out of the paradigm, and propose some new principle or law. If the scientific community accepts the proposed change, the science experiences a 'paradigm shift', and the new science proceeds with a new paradigm.

Prazniak: the History of Western Civilization of the immediate postwar years, World History comes along with Modernization theories, and finally, the Global History of today's difference politics(Prazniak,2000).

The second is Historicity; that is the relationship of a field to its past, the question whether the historian sees the previous paradigms as obsolete to be developed upon (Dirlik,1996:248). Wolf finds such an understanding of progressive history problematic since,

[i]f history is but a tale of unfolding moral purpose, then each link in the genealogy, each runner in the race, is only a precursor of the final apotheosis and not a manifold of social and cultural processes at work in their own time and place (Wolf,1982:5)

Moving on from such concerns, the debates in historiography on China can be classified in two different ways. These two, as will be held separately below, are, first, theoretical/ideological customs⁴ and then, literary customs.

As for theoretical/ideological classification, we can follow the outline drawn by Cohen in *Discovering History in China, American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (1984). As admitted before, History is not a mere collection of simple facts. The historian, unavoidably and perhaps naturally approaches the subject area with cultural, even ideological preoccupations and the questions (s)he asked are inevitably biased. However, if there are assumptions hidden behind the lines of his/her question, the work becomes problematic. According to Cohen, there is an

⁴ Before going in detail to the classification on theoretical/ideological basis, I would like to explain the reasoning behind the usage of theory and ideology together. To say it, Theory prevents the China historiography from being a mere collection of all kinds of data. However, the ways the theories keep some information in and some out and the manners they interpret the ones stayed in do exclude some other possibilities of reading the facts. Theory is a choice. Thus, theory is political. As Huang derived from his own experiences:

....[I]deological implications are an unavoidable accompaniment of theory use. Theory can lead us to bigger and more fundamental questions. In so doing, however, it also brings us unavoidably into the realm of ideological issues. We cannot avoid criticisms from those thus provoked. That is just part and parcel of the costs of theory use (Huang,1998:188)

Agreeing that theory is political, Esherick seconds it:

[A]ll good scholarship has political implications (Esherick,1998,153)

“intellectual imperialism of American historians” which has been, in turn, influential on Chinese historians’ conceptualization of their own history. Hence, he identifies three paradigms in American historiography on China: the *impact-response*, *tradition-modernity* and *imperialism*. These three schools of thought are deeply scrutinized in the first three chapters through literature survey.

The impact-response framework rested on the assumption that ‘for much of the nineteenth century, the confrontation with the West was the most significant influence on the events of China’. (Cohen, 1984:9). Moreover, later generalized for all non-Western societies and labeled as *Orientalism* by Edward Said, regards China as stagnant, passive and reactive whereas West is the active one in the making of the history. Cohen finds the impact-response approached ill-mannered since it regards both West and China as coherent and unchanging units. It also assumes the transaction is in one direction. However, West was also influenced and even changed by China. Another critic of the author is that Western historians assume the final impact in line with the intention – whereas in fact it was seriously distorted on the way of transmitting through intermediaries like the Chinese language. To sum up, Cohen asserts that Western role in Chinese history is deliberately overemphasized. This ends with the downgrading of economic and political modes of explanation with respect to cultural ones.

The tradition-modernity dichotomy finds its conceptualization in the Modernization theory formulated in response to Marxist Dependency Theory on Third World. Being the most parochial among all, this dichotomy claims that the development from Traditional to Modern, following the Western path is a desirable thing for China, if not an absolute *sine qua non*. Needless to say, there is an *ipso facto* positive connotation on the concept of development. Being, at the same time, the most ideological of all three, Cohen sees Modernization theory as a justification tool of American interventionism utilizing the notion of “revolution from without”. However, Cohen warns that one should be aware of the consequences of pairing: Such a rigid bipolar view of reality cannot escape from being reductionist while trying to identify ‘vitaly important areas of human experience’ (Cohen, 1984:92)

under the name of either Modern or Traditional. In addition to that, such a dichotomy necessarily implies a zero-sum game.

The *Imperialism paradigm* blames Modernization scholars for reproducing state policies. They have a ‘rhetoric of apology’ of Imperialism theorists witnessing the Vietnam War. Moreover, Imperialism paradigm also employs moral-psychological mode of explanations. This approach deserves special attention in the sense that, according to Cohen, despite severely criticizing the former two for their approaches to China, it cannot avoid to fall into the same trap. However, they echo the formers in regarding China as unchanging and incapable of introducing fundamental change on its own without Western initiative. Even the “Traditional Society” school, attempting to adopt Wallerstein’s World System perspective to East Asian history, which eventually prioritizes economical patterns, tends to see East Asia or non-Western in general a single unit against West. The same is adapted to the term of ‘imperialism’ by Cohen: The classical definition of the term (one society establishes full colonial control over another) is not covering the whole situation in the case of China: There are multiple colonialisms as well as semicolonialism. Moreover, American scholars generally neglect the fact that the Manchu rule over China was also nothing but colonialism. Last but not least, even if one accepts the American attitude of prioritizing culture over politics as given, the Chinese culture rejects the other assumption that development is something good: What Chinese understand of the change is the one back to more traditional. Therefore, Cohen sees imperialism (in the form of American terminology) nothing but a *myth*.

Finally, Cohen, as clearly put towards the final chapter of *Toward a China-centered History of China*, advocates analyzing ‘Chinese problems set in a Chinese context’. (Cohen,1984:154). That is, a China-centered history of China begins Chinese history in China rather than West with internal (Chinese) criteria for determining what is historically significant in Chinese past. This approach maintains a stimuli for regional/local and ‘lower-level’ history through disaggregation both horizontally and vertically, i.e. rejection of the orthodox tendency to see China as a single unit. Moreover, it welcomes interdisciplinary study for a better understanding,

(Cohen,1984:186-7). Regardless of how successfully Cohen clarifies previous theoretical/ideological approaches and their shortcomings, the model he proposes itself lacks clarity. I find it difficult to differentiate between the China-centered narratives and the traditional Sinocentric Sinology that is described by Huang as devoted to Chinese values more than their own origin and consequently culturally biased from the opposite direction. Dirlik claims that there are “internal inconsistencies” of Cohen’s model. That is, Cohen recognizes the differentiation of China only on geographic basis as long as other possible differentiations (based on class, gender, ethnicity,..) are Western conceptualizations. However, by offering interdisciplinary study, he allows “intrusion” of foreign concepts of Western Social Science (Dirlik,1996:265-6). In his major discussion of China studies, Huang comments on the question of ‘concepts’ from a different background. He suggests introducing new concepts for the China-specific cases (Huang,1998:202). Moreover, Cohen reproduces what he most criticizes in the previous approaches, namely the ‘inside/outside’ distinction by employing the China-centricism which excludes the historian to the point at which “‘an insider’s’ history is impossible after all because all historians are ‘outsiders’ to the past [recalling the wonderful title of a 1985 book by David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*]” (Dirlik,1996:265). Finally, according to Dirlik:

Cohen insists on separating *the text* (of Chinese history) from its *context* (in global history), even though he recognizes that the latter shapes and redirects the trajectory of the former (emphasis added) (Dirlik,1996:264)

Although categorizing differently, when we look at the main tenets of Huang’s analysis of the history of historiography on China, we see similar groupings as Cohen. That is to say, he identifies the uncritical Sinologists as *Impact-Responders*; and the ideologically-led theorists as *Modernists* and *Apologists*. Still, his classifications crosscut since each paradigm can be subject to criticism about different issues. For instance, the first-generation Sinologists who were “committed to their subject both emotionally and intellectually (Huang,1998:192)” are under attack not only for their uncritical use of the facts but also for their culturalism, in

favor of China. The same is valid for the Modernists who were ideologically-oriented: they, according to Huang, have fallen into the trap of Western culturalism. His article, which is written a decade later than Cohen's work, is of significance for it covers the New Cultural History / Postcolonialism⁵. He accuses the scholars engaged in Cultural Studies, which he sees as under the influence of deconstruction, for empowering the conservatism of Sinologists and distracted Culturalism/ethnocentricism for the sake of cultural and conceptual relativity (Huang,1998:194-9).

Dirlik applauds his point of criticism in a number of senses: According to Dirlik, the Postcolonial studies "presentifies the past" (Dirlik,2000: 272) by eliminating the colonialism and the related terminology not only from the contemporary studies but also from the History. This attitude ends in failure to understand that the roots of today rest in the past (Dirlik,1996:273). Moreover, the so-called politics of location and politics of identity "opt for an extreme historicism against structural analysis" (Dirlik,1996:273-4) which, at the end of the day, equalizes the differences (a contrary result for their own claims) by isolating them from each other.

Under the light of above discussion, I will introduce the main sources utilized in this study. Spence's *The Gate of Heavenly Peace* (1981), the book investigates on the Chinese and their revolution/s (first the national then the communist one) holding the issue from the late Qing days (1895) to Deng's period (1980s). What makes this book significant and different from common history books (on China) is that the author sets the plot not through the official documents, political events and famous people of the day but instead, through 'common people', i.e. students, ordinary journalists, teachers, housewives and so forth, and ordinary events which individually had no effect on the revolution like a housewife's unbinding of her feet. Such an attitude makes the reader realize the nature of the transformation, the

⁵ Postcolonialism is the face of postmodernism in History and Political Science as soon as it rejects the Foundationalism and Essentialism of Modernity project. The stress of this approach, rather, is on the local dynamics of identity-formations, individualism and situationism. Postcolonial scholars prioritize the culture over politics and economy in order to understand the History as well as today.

events and ideas influential on the course of events, the hidden reasons and motives. The author gives special importance to the parallelisms in world history which helps to contextualize the Chinese case in a broader environment.

Schwarcz's *The Chinese Enlightenment, Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* is also a work of intellectual history that is utilized in this study. Moving on the statement that there would be no revolution without intellectual emancipation, she draws the profile of a generation of intellectuals who witnessed the Republican Revolution in China. She also questions if the modernization in China meant Westernization.

Hobsbawm, in the *Age of Empire*, argues that end of 19th C had witnessed the fact that ordinary people are also included in the histories. That development made the politics involve not only political elite but also common people. Spence's book seems to second this statement. The environment that China had transformed from dynastical establishment to nation-statehood is told through personal experiences of a number of individuals like Kang Youwei, but there is nearly no reference to Sun Yat-sen who is the main focus of other books.

Schiffrin's *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (1970) and [Bergère's](#) *Sun Yat-sen* are examples of intellectual history which is highly relevant to this study. These works' range include Sun Yat-sen's childhood as well as his private life. Even though profiles of some personalities are included given to their closeness to Sun Yat-sen (for example, Song Qingling –his wife; Song Jiaoren –assassinated GMD leader); others are excluded (for example: the May Fourth Movement, and the profile of warlords).

Prasanjit Duara in *Rescuing History from the Nation, Questioning Narratives of Modern China* mainly argues that national histories are multifaceted but multiple alternative versions of the histories are deliberately eliminated by official versions in order to create a legitimate history of the given nation-state. Given this argument, he highlights the parts of Chinese modern history which, he thinks, are undermined in the literature. The issues held in this work are the religion, the role of secret societies

in late Qing- early Republican era, the construction of nationalist discourse in modern China and their comparisons with Indian history.

In *Reform and Revolution in China, The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei* (1976), Esherick advocates that the main focus of the historiography on 1911 Revolution, i.e. Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries could orient the revolution but not cause it since “[t]he causes of any revolution must be sought within the country in question” (Esherick,1976:2). Rather, his emphasis is on the issues such as institutionalization, the shift from anti-foreignism to anti-imperialism, the transformation from conservatism to pragmatic revolutionism, the relation between the reforms and the revolution. His argument, as a result of a detailed examination of the class relations in Hunan and Hubei, is that “1911 was a most unrevolutionary revolution” for its politically progressive but socially regressive aspects, it strengthen the traditional elite’s position in the end (Esherick,1976:8). Yet, even though he does not locate Sun and the revolutionaries at the primary focus, there is a part about social forces. Urban-rural relations as well as gentry-lumpenproleteriariat relations are at the core.

In the same manner, Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions A Comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China* and Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Lord and Peasant in the Making of The Modern World* are two well-known examples of the previously mentioned analysis on social revolutions and are utilized in this work as well.

Fairbank and Goldman’s *China A New History* (1992) and Spence’s *The Search for Modern China* (1990) are exceptions. The beginning of 20th century was an important period of Chinese history, according to the writers of both books, in terms of nation- and state-building attempts. This was mostly due to the foreign impact. However, writers subtly differ on the level and the nature of this foreign impact: According to Fairbank & Goldman, the first impetus for institutionalization in Chinese society came from the gentry elite whereas the treaty ports acted as nothing but catalyzers (Fairbank & Goldman,1992:257). On the other side, Spence relates the internal developments to international predicaments as well as

technological improvements which had world-wide effects (Spence,1990:275). He draws a typical picture of a looming empire keeping the reservation that this fall happened during the times history had been already internationalized.

The importance of urban intellectuals in the lack of organized/concerned masses (either industrial or agricultural labor) was observable in China in a similar way to other countries that experienced a transition around the same time. Even in the formation of CCP, The intellectuals, instead of military men, were the pioneers (Fairbank & Goldman,1992:275)

While reading Spence, a repeated statement that attracts attention is that in (Chinese) history nothing was newly emerged but a repetition in one way or another of a previous occasion. Examples are: Parallelism between Meiji Restoration and Sun Yat-sen reforms (Spence,1990:248); similarity between Revolutionary alliance and Lin Qing rebellion of a century before (Spence,1990:262)

A book on world history, again, finds a place in this literature review which is mainly of Chinese history: Hobsbawm's *Age of Empire 1875-1914* (1989). In the fourth book of a serial narrating the modern history after 1500, Hobsbawm first summarizes the previous developments, i.e. the capitalist transformation and colonialism. In the following parts the rise of the labor class as well as the nationalistic sentiments will be examined. The book is relevant to Chinese history when was capitalism leading revolutions in the Third World. Equally concentrating on both domestic and international dynamics, the work is far from being Orientalist in its dealings with Third World history.

Literature in English's representation of Chinese history has been discussed briefly. In the following part, the works and approaches of Chinese and Japanese are presented in order to indicate the recent literature on Sun Yat-sen.

The differences between the scholars revolve around the characteristics of the revolution. Generally speaking, Japanese scholars tend to regard it as a revolution towards modernization or a military revolution; mainland Chinese scholars as a bourgeoisie revolution; Taiwanese scholars as a nationalist revolution; Western scholars as a social revolution or a gentry-led reform.

In mainland China (PRC), research on 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen passed through several phases: After the period of 1949 to 1966, there was a decade long pause during the Cultural Revolution. The second phase of the research activities started after 1976 and lasted till 1984. The change in the midst of 1980s is because of the interaction with international research community after the Reform and Opening. The third phase of 1985-1990 then gave place to the contemporary era. (Wang,1999)

The characteristics of these periods are as follows: The focus of the first period was the consolidation of the revolution. Therefore the studies on 1911 Revolution were also on the role of 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen's contribution to the 1949 Revolution. There were two debates at that time: (1) whether Sun Yat-sen proposed a real bourgeois revolution heading to a capitalist state or he saw it as a preliminary phase to socialism; (2) whether the construction of the revolutionary ideology was before or after the establishment of Revolutionary Alliance. Besides, the "New" Three Principles of People (the Three Great Policies), Pan-Asianism in Sun Yat-sen thought, universalism and materialism vs. spiritualism were frequently debated. The characteristics of this period are: Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, determinism, research for practical use.

In the second period, there was a shift from political emphasis (anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, anti-terrorism) to the economic development policy of Sun Yat-sen (using foreign investment to protect sovereignty –Zhu Bokan). Moreover, the Three Principles begun to be interpreted as "a bridge" between revolutionary and democratic regimes. The characteristic of this period is the broadening the scope of research and specialization. A new generation of historians began to work on detailed subjects, such as the pre-1911 Revolution uprisings, Yuan Shikai era, the 2nd Revolution of 1913, United Front.

The years between 1985-1990 witnessed the highest amount of research varying from Sun Yat-sen's personal life, background, position and influence to the Three Great Policies, Principle of Livelihood/Socialism, Beiyang Army, Sun Yat-sen's standpoints towards Asia and international predicament, his attitude towards

Confucianism, towards foreign aid and investment. The reason for that was, after the Reform and Opening, mainland historians concentrated on this long-neglected period of history and a series of international conferences were held and a collection of Sun's works was published. The characteristics of this period were as follows: the renewal of methods (from systematic to comparative approach); the broadening of the research realm; the quantitative increase in the research; the raising of debating views.

The characteristics of the fourth period (1991-1999) are wider research areas including Sun Yat-sen's psychology; the researchers looked on controversial topics. However, Wang complains, the majority of the specialists belong to older generations and with the exception of modernization issue, the same old topics have already been discussed. Finally, he highlights two important points that works on 1911 Revolution should be evaluated within the broader context of Chinese history and contemporary predicament; and Sun Yat-sen studies should not be limited to his life since he (or the myth that surrounds him) is highly influential on the following phases of Chinese history.

In Japan, the studies on 1911 Revolution and Sun Yat-sen started in postwar era, took a turn in 1960s coincided with celebrations of hundredth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth and finally entered into a totally new phase in 1980s with increasing opportunities to exchange sources and views in international arena following the PRC's opening. (Fujii,1990)

Yokoyoma Suguru was one of the first to work on 1911 Revolution. He claims that it was "an absolutist change" to transform China into "a semi-feudal, semicolonial society". Ichiko Chuzo influenced the later generation of Western scholars with his gentry-led revolution thesis. Yumoto Kunio is an Asian scholar in line with comparative historians in West. He compares 1911 Revolution with the military revolutions in Third World. Suzuie Genichi's work, "Biography of Sun Yat-sen" follows the Mainland's bourgeoisie revolution thesis.

Taiwanese historian Zhang Yufa theoreticizes the Taiwanese orthodoxy of nationalist revolution thesis by denying the class concerns (Zhang,1983).

Among the historians mentioned above, Bergere and Esherick second Chuzo's gentry-centered interpretation. Schiffrin employs nationalist revolution explanations. Skocpol and Moore are, like Kuno, in to comparative approach.

Before this generation of scholars, Mary Backus Rankin, in her book named "Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chgekiang,1902-1911" (1971) and Edward Rhoads in "China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung,1895-1913" (1975) advocated that 1911 was an unfinished revolution and a part of a larger process. This view gained popularity later.

3. CHINA'S WAY FROM DYNASTY TO NATION-STATE (1890-1930)

3.1. THE LAST YEARS OF HEAVENLY RULE

The economy was mainly based on agriculture and therefore Chinese society was a land-bound peasant society. There was scarcity of fertile or irrigated land but plenty of labor. This eventually caused the concentration of land in the hands of land-owning gentry. This aristocracy was connected to imperial bureaucracy, i.e. the scholars' class through family and/or clan ties. Leaving the larger part of the masses as tenants to the agricultural production and limiting social mobility through the famous examination system, the gentry, composed of scholars and land-owning upper class, dominated the Chinese empire. (Moore,1967,213) The composition of gentry and its dominance alienated not only the peasant masses but also non-aristocratic educated young generation. So, it can be regarded as the primary cause of massive upheavals and the non-aristocratic nature of the revolution.

In such a system, among the non-gentry classes, Chinese bourgeoisie was not a significant part of social structure. In China, "[The landlords, state officials and scholars] managed to keep the merchant class small and weak by restricting and pre-empting its development, devaluing it in social and cultural terms, and co-opting it into the structure of gentry power.....The nexus of gentry power was so prepossessing that businessmen who could afford to do so often bought land themselves and tried to join the economically more idle gentry (Blecher,1997:12)" The upper class consisted of scholars who did not get involved in trade. The Bourgeoisie's access to trade and manufacturing was limited until the 18th century, when the military aggression and economic involvement of the West gave economic significance and political power to Compradors in the port cities. This newly-strengthening bourgeoisie class created an environment conducive to change.

We can summarize the essence of Chinese state system that caused the

weakening in three points: The network of relations among gentry, i.e. the landlords, state officials and scholars; consequently the weak bourgeoisie, and inability of utilizing technology (Blecher,1997:11-13). These were the internal dynamics that led China on its particular course. However, it was not the necessity for domestic reform but foreign imperialism that became influential on China and its path to modernization especially after Opium War of 1839-42 between China and Britain¹. This first defeat by the West is important because it surpassed domestic factors, such as rising population pressure, the localization of power, peasant-based revolutions, and became the major factor in weakening the state. The impact of the West, together with all the internal factors, changed the nature of social forces, i.e. the peasants, bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals. I will first focus on peasants and then on the bourgeoisie.

The decades following Nanjing treaty witnessed a number of rebellions similar to eighteenth century rebellions, like the White Lotus rebellion of Buddhists between 1795 and 1804 and the revolt of Miao minority in again 1790s. The most important rebellion in nineteenth century was Taiping rebellion which lasted for fifteen years between 1850 and 1864. The significance of this rebellion was that they achieved to establish a state or at least an entity free from Qing control in Northern China for almost fifteen years. This ‘state’ claimed to be an alternative to Qing in terms of redistribution of land and anti-Confucianism. Traditionally, the imperial state had an indirect rule over the masses through “cultural nexus of power”, utilizing Duara’s phraseology (Duara,1988), by means of popular culture and by using the actors of popular culture. However, from the massive peasant rebellions on, the central authority had to rely on the local elite and eventually lost its superiority over the local powers.

Concerning these rebellions Moore notes that “[keeping the peace] was one of not squeezing the peasants so hard that they would run off and become bandits or feed an insurrection led by dissatisfied elements in the upper class (Moore,170) However, the rebellions mentioned above can also be read as signs of a new era

¹ Nanjing Treaty signed in 1842. This treaty provided not only Britain but to all Western powers MFN –Most Favored Nation status in Chinese economy, let treaty ports in Southern coast were opened and assured extraterritoriality and equality in diplomacy.

with different concerns. The Taiping Rebellion, for example, was different from previous peasant uprisings which rebelled against suppression and economic deterioration. It proposed a governing system and included a number of Christian elements. It can be read as the transitory effect of the new social forces.

However, the change can be better observed among upper classes. This is also important since the revolution in China, like other non-Western countries, happened under the leadership of intellectuals, as top-to-down movement.

In 1860s, (1861-1872) the hesitant attempts at restoration could be observed in order to cope with the corruption, stagnancy and localization in domestic arena. These traditionalist efforts were called 'Self-strengthening Movement'. It was a state initiative to modernize the army with Western technology and Western loans (which in return increased the dependency to West, adds Blecher,). The 100 Days Reform is an example of "Refusal to West" model of Esenbel since "[t]he distinguished officials who led the movement met the problems of internal rebellion and foreign aggression with a resolute backward-looking policy (Moore,1967,193).

1890s witnessed a second blow to the reform projects. But, this time, the conditions were totally different: The overseas Chinese who were concerned about the mainland and the Western-educated students and intellectuals who brought new ideas as well as motivation to alter the ailing system brought dynamism to the society. This was a short period of a synthesis model but did not last long because they did not propose a program like Westernists which is strong enough to stand against the Refusal clique. The insistence of the Chinese provincial governors on change and of the Manchu government not to change created a duality between the dynasty and the masses. It is interesting that Chinese reformists influenced Japan at that time with their attitudes towards West but they failed in their home country.

There were two camps among the intellectuals of the time. The monarchists, like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, advocated the preservation of the dynasty but elimination of the existing rulers, i.e. Empress Cixi. They were also Western-educated and were well aware of the developments in the Western world. Kang's aim was promulgating the constitution and making China a constitutional

monarchy with Emperor Guangxu at the top. He also advocated Confucian values.

On the other side, there were the anti-Traditionalists. They were pioneered by Sun Yat-sen. Sun was a physician who grew up and was educated out of mainland China. Having a vast network of personal relations and organizational skills, and despite his non-military background and lack of military support he became the leader of the anti-Qing, anti-imperialist struggle of China. He did not only gather the financial aid crucial to armed struggle and international political support but also developed ideas about how the new regime should work, and its ideology. They were against Neo-Confucianism, the moralistic ideology of the state, which was the ultimate source of legitimacy of the central and local elites (Shambough,2000:5).Those foreign-educated young students believed that neo-Confucianism was responsible for the backwardness of the country. They were impressed by the success of Meiji Restoration. The Revolutionary Alliance, organized by Sun and mainly composed of Chinese students in Japan, attempted a number of unsuccessful coups to alter the regime. Even though they took a definite program, they acted within the Westernization model.

The situation began to change with Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. The victor Japan, backed by Western powers, demanded an indemnity which worsened the Chinese economic predicament. The Most Favored Nation clause for Japan was extended to thirteen Western powers. Besides, the defeat against an ex-tributary and extensive foreign presence demoralized the society and lessened the national cohesion. “The problem if keeping the peace was in China mainly a domestic one before the Western intrusion, which began in earnest during the middle of the nineteenth century when internal decay had already made one of its periodic reappearances (Moore,1967,171)”.

The worsened situation heightened the tension and Boxer Uprising broke out in 1898 and lasted for three years. It was a violent anti-foreigner action and destroyed Western zones in Beijing. The Western powers reacted soon and suppressed the uprising. The result was nothing but tightening of foreign ties of China. The Boxer Uprising can be seen as an outbreak of the tension between the Refusal and Westernization cliques.

Blecher notes that “While scholars of imperialism in other parts of the world –

especially Africa and Latin America- have often tended to emphasize economic exploitation and social dislocation, in China the major damage done by imperialism was to the state” (Blecher,1997:13). It created challenges like political and economic reform that worsened the already existing political and social contradictions. These reforms created new social forces like bourgeoisie and mobilized others like peasants. That is, keeping the reservation that there were domestic concerns, foreign impact played a catalyzing role. The unequal treaties, which gave preferential treatment to the Western powers, triggered the anti-foreign sentiments in China which eventually transformed into nationalism. The modernization process gained more nationalistic, anti-imperialistic tones with the presence of foreign troops and merchants. Moreover, the flow of information and interaction popularized Western ideas.

3.2. REVOLUTION

“Groping for stones to cross the river”²

Among all these social forces, “.... [a] substantial amalgamation gradually took place between sections of the gentry (and later their successors turned landlords pure and simple) and urban leaders in trade, finance, and industry (Moore,1967,178). These new forces were united and organized under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Alliance. There were several uprisings and plots to overthrow the dynasty were attempted. The most famous ones among them were the Canton Plot and Waichang Uprising. In such a predicament, the 1911 coup of the Revolutionary Alliance was successful and in 1912 the Republic was established. Sun became the first president. However, he could not find the political power to impose his ideological thoughts at that time.

Since Sun was an intellectual and was lacking strong military power base a few months later he had to relinquish the presidency in favor of Yuan Shikai, a

² "Mozhe shitou guohe" - a Chinese idiom that became famous when Deng Xiaoping used to describe the economic liberalization after 1980s.

Qing general. Yuan tried to achieve some military and educational reforms, but his intention was towards declaring himself emperor. In order to consolidate his power, he delegated power to local rulers who had previously supported him. Thus, his overall impact on the history was the sharpening of localism which paved way to warlordism after his death. (Myers,2000) After his death in 1915, the country fell into the chaos of warlordism which ended with the establishment of People's Republic in 1949.

Meanwhile, the involvement of gentry elements in the revolutionary movement brings a new question: for whose interest did regime change and the creation of new institutions work? Esherick argues that the political-institutional change not accompanied with a radical economic project only reinforced and consolidated gentry domination in the society (Esherick,1975). Bergere seconds this argument on the basis that:

[U]nder the cloak of progressivists and Westernist discourse, was essentially the work of conservative social forces: the gentry and the local elites, merchants, officers, and the officials (Bergere,1994:200)

Thus, both agreed that 1911 might be a revolution but evidently was far from being a transformation. However, it was the first step.

It was this circle that constituted the first membership of Revive China Society (Qing Chung Hui). The society established by Sun Yat-sen, was composed of members from the gentry, bureaucracy, and universities and its membership was around twenty. The discussions on the doubtful amalgamation of visions for society were reflected in the content of the oath. Specifically, although the society did not explicitly advocate a regime change, the oath, originated from Hawaii under American influence, implied republicanism.

The ultimate solution proposed by Sun Yat-sen was fueling a vague sense of patriotism instead of defining specific policies because, above all, the question was mobilizing the well-seated, problem-free and eventually apolitical overseas Chinese towards a political direction (Schiffirin,1970:44-5).

Guangzhou (Canton) has been not only the capital of Guangdong province of China but also the center of the foreign interaction, the flow of goods and ideas, and political movements. It was the center of the revolutionary activity of Sun

Yat-sen and his fellow conspirators given to their familiarity to the dynamics of the region, and to its language. Besides, the near history of the region that had been welcoming the secret societies (Triads) made it more attractive for the Revolutionary Alliance (Schiffrin,1970:56). Last but not the least, the predicament in Guangzhou in the aftermath of the Treaty of Shimoneseki (1895) was conducive to such a gathering³.

“Anticipating an anti-dynastic chain reaction, [the plotters] showed little concern for planning beyond [the] initial stage” (Schiffrin,1970:61). The first steps of the plan to seize Guangzhou showed that rather than being an organized and disciplined action, the coup occurred spontaneously.

For proposing a chain reaction, the leaders of the Alliance depended on the a structure that tended to create secret societies . It was soon obvious that this presumption was deemed to fail. However, the Canton Plot is not to be remembered for its military and/or strategic success at the end of the day, but rather for its impact on the progress of revolutionary movement.

As for the consequences, the Revolutionaries saw the limits of their organizational skills –at least for the time being, faced with the societal relations and tested the degree to which they could infiltrate into those structures; and were challenged by internal incoherence.

Understanding the role of the foreign support here is crucial because it appears to be of explanatory significance for the class profile of the organization and relatedly, the proposed movement. Since the general profile of the members of the organization/movement was lower class whose power base was at stake for being both non-military and non-literati; the organization/movement was dependent on the foreign material and moral support despite the anti-imperialist stance.

The Revolutionary Alliance activists were no doubt the most pro-Western among all, i.e. the reformers/monarchists, status quoists, and the non-intellectual

³ The Treaty brought the problem of the dismissal of the Chinese troops. Besides, the economic insecurity of the nomenclature, unrest due to the corruption of the public institutions and the rumors of invasion added cold water to the boiling pan (Schiffrin,1970:56-60) “These were the major features of the political situation in Kwantung which encouraged the launching of the Hsing Chung Hui plot: a growing mood of patriotism expressed in resentment toward the government,...; discount among the gentry ...and the spread of lawlessness; and the increasing turbulence among the lower strata of society.. (Schiffrin,1970:60)

reactionaries like Boxers. However, the Western governments and the intellectual circles had always declined to appreciate this tendency and they avoided their full support compared to the support they gave to Kang Youwei and Yuan Shikai.

In the reforming project of the Revolutionary Alliance, a considerable level of discrepancy can be observed. The inconsistency was between reform/Monarchy and revolution/Republic and stemmed from its pragmatic policies⁴ as well as the intra-cadre balance of power among the leaders of different backgrounds.

Though it failed, the Canton plot had a reverse effect on Guangzhou authorities and turned them against the modernization attempts. The reason lying beneath was the fear of any revitalization of Taiping thought. Since Sun Yat-sen, as the de facto leader of the movement was Christian, the authorities believed the whole movement as a Christian uprising. However, it was not Western religion but mainly Western political influences which motivated the Hsing Chung Hui leaders; their Christianity was merely the religious aspect of their generally Western orientation” (Shriffin, 1970:89)

The Double Ten is the name of the 10th day of the 10th month (October) in 1911. In truth, it is hard to talk about a one, single and organized event on October, 10th, 1911. It was rather spontaneous flow of individual and perhaps accidental events that gave massive inspiration for change. They were mostly work of local revolutionaries in collaboration with the secret societies and urban elites and partly led by revolutionary elites like Huang Xing, and Song Jiaoren. Therefore, the Hubei Government which was formed as a result of these massive spontaneous movements was far from being coherent and was controlled by a specific group of leadership.

The power base of the anti-dynastical campaign of Sun Yat-sen was the financial support of overseas Chinese and the intellectual support of especially foreign-educated students but definitely not a social group which could donate military equipment or military organization skills.

The organization of the Revolutionary Alliance also reflects this nature of

⁴ “...Given the elasticity which characterized Hsing Chung Hui policies, *a multilateral approach to the powers* could very well have been contemplated (emphasis added)” (Schiffin,1970:79)

Sun's movement: being personal rather than institutional (Bergere,1994:203), the Revolutionary Alliance was a clear manifestation of class structure and interclass relations of 19th century Chinese society.

“In October 1911, when the insurrection took both militant republicans and imperial officials by surprise, the provincial deputies, strong in the knowledge of their institutional legitimacy and with a definite sense of their position as social representatives, were, in contrast, quite ready to seize the initiative” (Bergere,1994:205). The nature of the military government in Hubei also proves the above mentioned personal network: the Revolutionary Alliance obtained the support of Hubei provincial assembly but it was still the local gentry who had the upper hand at that time:

3.3. REPUBLICAN YEARS

Armed with a serious revolts and coups, the last coup in October 1911 successfully overthrew Qing Dynasty. In early 1912 Republic of China was established. Sun Yat-sen, who was not in China at that time (he was in Europe on tour for financial and diplomatic support for the coming revolution), was elected as the first (provisional) president of the new republic. He immediately came back to the country and opened the parliament (Legislative Assembly).

Sun Yat-sen's time in office, however, did not last long. In 3 months time, he relinquished the presidency to General Yuan Shikai. There are several explanations in the literature about the reasons. The general explanation is that he voluntarily gave up his position when he realized that he did not have the power to protect/provide the unification of the state and again he recommended Yuan Shikai who had considerable military network in the North to replace him—where the Revolution was achieved at the first place. Thinking of Sun Yat-sen's political ambitions and self-fulfillment about his leadership, let alone his conspiracies against Yuan government in the following years, it is hard to accept that he agreed

to a rather passive position (head of Railway Construction Bureau). As put before, Sun Yat-sen was an intellectual who was good at contact-building but he neither had military background nor power base that he could depend on. In contrast, Yuan Shikai was a reformist Qing general who had a military power base. He was capable of purging Sun Yat-sen from the presidency. This event is related to the two power struggles during the revolutionary years: one between the intellectuals and military; and the second is the one between the Southerners and Northerners. In both, the changing hands of power shows the latter's supremacy over the former. It was definitely a turning point in Sun Yat-sen's political career, but it is also important for the future of the new Republic since it symbolized the shift of power from modernization-oriented intellectuals to more the coalition of more traditional military and local elites.

The struggle between these two camps did not end with Yuan Shikai's presidency but continued with a series of coup attempts. Besides the concerns about his adherence to democratic ideals, there were some other anxieties as well. One of them was the discontinuity of the anti-imperialist stance of the Revolutionaries in during Yuan's office. Since his government was strengthened with the foreign loans and aids, Yuan was reluctant to take a negative attitude towards Westerners. Quite the contrary, in return of the loans his government received, he was willing to give more concessions to foreign banks and companies. Esherick argues that foreign powers, especially England and Russia used these concessions to increase their domination over the regions like Tibet and Mongolia in which a process that might have led to the eventual partition of China started (Esherick,1975: 252). Another issue was that of the peasants' conditions. It was apparent that the establishment of the new state was not bringing the emancipation of the masses. The prices kept rising and the burden of taxes got even worse; as for the sovereignty of the people, the nomenclature preserved its position in ruling circles and the masses seemingly gained nothing from the revolution. (Esherick,1975:252). The fact that the masses were not really involved played a role in the following developments.

Among the series of coup attempts against the Yuan government, the most organized one was in 1913. This coup, known as Second Revolution, turned out to

be unsuccessful when its leader, prominent revolutionary Song Jiaoren (who was organizing a Nationalist Party against Yuan regime) was assassinated by the forces loyal to Yuan Shikai. The Revolutionary Alliance was strong and better organized in the South, in Nanjing and Guangdong in particular. They persuaded the regional military leaders to support their conspiracy against Yuan government. However, they were dependent on the central regions, such as Hunan and Hubei, for success. At the very last moment, the regional governors rejected to support. This, combined with the moral backlash of Song Jiaoren's assassination, led to failure of the Second Revolution.

In other words, it was Yuan Shikai's Second Revolution because he decided to consolidate his power and crushed GMD, eliminated opponent provincial leaders and established the Beiyang (Northern) regime (Myers,2000:46-7). In both versions, Esherick calls it "the end of revolutionary era". It is also marked as the point that the local landlords got the upper hand in the governance.

Having Yuan Shikai as a member shows the heterogeneous nature of the revolutionary course. Yuan Shikai belonged to the reformist military elite of Qing but he was in no way a tradition-breaker and he did not second the plea for modern nation-state. In accordance with his pre-Revolutionary period line, what he tried to do during his office was creating a centralized unitary state in line with the Qing administrative system. He was an absolute follower of Confucian values. For example, it was one of the biggest disappointment of Revolutionary Alliance members and disillusionment of New Culture intellectuals about the new Republic that he reintroduced Confucianism as the state religion in 1916. In fact, this act was in line with his attitude in governing: "dictatorial, Confucian, and conservative" (Myers,2000:49). He wanted to achieve centralization of the state through local leaders directly loyal to him and created a network of personal ties. "[He] appointed scholar-officials (jinshi), high-ranking military officers, and leaders of local secret societies, many of whom he knew and trusted, thereby gaining power in the provinces" (Myers,2000,47).

Yuan believed that China could only resist foreign powers if it became a strictly centralized, united state. He also believed that a centralized state could be

achieved only under a strong leadership, not with tools of democracy such as division of powers. So, as early as 1913, he suspended the National Council, declared himself Supreme President with extraordinary powers (a collection of law-making, constitutional revision, cabinet appointment, and policy-making)

In fact, Yuan himself was also aware of the shortcomings of the system he established. Some of the reforms he introduced aimed at breaking the power of the local elite in the distant regions (e.g. establishment of police force, high level of bureaucratization). However, this bureaucratization attempt was done with rather personal connections and patron-client relations. The result was twofold: First, the government was personified in Yuan himself, and second, the country was divided into military-regional sections competing for full control of the country(Myers,2000:53).

In addition to these reforms, he also systematized the tax calculation and calculation methods which was growing into a major source of discontent among masses for being totally in the hands of local gentry since the Revolution. The other reforms are the separation of judiciary from politics; administration of salt production and trade, systematization of rank classifications and procedures for promotions in order to perfect the bureaucratic system (even though, his introduction of “open civil service education” was severely criticized for being back to Imperial Examination System).

Despite the unwanted results of all these reforms, it is interesting to see that it prolonged Yuan regime’s life because it attracted foreign financial and military aid. “Those aids and loans helped the government extend the bureaucratic organization and even upgrade the economy” (Myers,2000:50).

Meanwhile, in the international arena, it was the eve of the World War I and the Chinese governing elite often discussed whether or not China should enter this European war. The groups (one advocating entry in the side of Allied powers and the other advocating neutrality) were parallel to the groups polarized between central and local power concentrations. The debate over the international predicament weakened the Yuan administration.

Yuan’s system worked for a while (to let him realize some of institutionalized reforms) but eventually led to the shift of power from the central

government to local authorities. With Yuan's early death, the country found itself in a civil war among local warlords.

According to Myers, Yuan's rule "became unstable because of its insipid militarism." (Myers,2000,47). Because "[his] personalized state-building efforts never legitimated the Beiyang state but instead militarized China, giving every provincial and regional strongman strong incentives to expand his army" (Myers,2000:53).

The unexpected death of Yuan Shikai ended the Republican era until it was reestablished after 1949.

4. SUN YAT-SEN'S ROLE IN THE CHINESE TRANSFORMATION

4.1. EARLY YEARS (1865-1895)

Heidegger, in the 1940s, once stated that Aristotle had “he was born, he thought and he died”. However, unlike the men of letters whose life can (or should) be overshadowed by their works and by what their works tell to the recipient, the men of action stand on the stage of the History with their life stories which were capable of explaining what they intended and achieved. Thus, the men of action are bound to their individual history as well as the collective history of their time which was, in fact, shaped by the former.

People, events, processes, dynamics and (shifting) structures are especially important for a leader like Sun Yat-sen who was “a great improviser”, as Schiffrin repeatedly stated in his biographical work¹. Because, these factors explain the human and sociological patterns of Sun’s political behavior. Therefore, this part of the chapter is concerned with the personal background of Sun Yat-sen, which had decisive impact on his political and intellectual career.

He was born in Qihang which was a tiny village of around a hundred engaged in agriculture and fishing. However, the geographic location of the village gave it more importance than it would have had with its internal dynamics: the village was in Guangdong, one of the Southern provinces approximate to Hong Kong and Macao. Such geographical situation freed Sun’s village together with similar others from isolation and made them open to frequent external contact. These contacts were not only with the foreign merchants but also the emigrants for Southeast Asia. Brought up in such a lively environment and shaken by new ideas, and new ways of living that were introduced by foreigners and outsiders, Sun Yat-sen (or Sun Wen, his given name) was eager to broaden his world view. He soon satisfied his expectations when he was sent to live with his elder brother, Sun Mei in Macao. Sun Mei was a rich merchant and a member of gentry who

¹ Schiffrin, 1970

(which?), according to Esherick, would become the ultimate winner of the 1911 Revolution². Either because he was a mere conservative or his idea of restoration or recovery was not in line with Sun Yat-sen's³, he was oppressive of Sun's new intellectual (and reflectively, religious) orientation.

In his village in Guangdong, Sun had received a traditional education based on Confucian learning, like the Five Classics. However, he received schooling in Hawaii. His systematic education was held in foreign and/or foreign-originated schools. The beginning was in Iolani School which was the center of anti-Americanism and anti-annexationism in spite of the pro-American attitude in Hawaii then as a reaction to Japanese aggression (Schiffrin,1970:12-13). The years he spent in this school give us some of the clues of Sun Yat-sen's formation that later on gave way to what happened. To name it, Sun was raised in Anglo-Saxon tradition which was, then, reflected in his formulations of constitutional government. Moreover, he first gained the anti-Western feelings in this school. However, this sentiment should not be misinterpreted as a rejection of the Western values. Quite the contrary, the Western learning provided by the school and Sun's acceptance of Christianity soon after he begun to attend the school caused internalization of Western values.

Following the Ioani School, Sun Yat-sen transferred to a number of schools. He first attended Oahu College where he moved a step forward to gain a profession, even though he was still indecisive about government and medicine. He attended The Diocesan Home, in which he was still under British influence and in 1884; he began to study in Government Central School. This was a prestigious secondary school composed of children of the middle class (of different nationalities). This school constituted a turning point in Sun Yat-sen's life because, here, in 1884, he was baptized⁴.

² The main argument of Esherick's *Reform and Revolution* is that neither intellectuals and students nor the peasants but the gentry was the class that strengthens its position as a consequence of 1911 revolution (Esherick,1976)

³ Wells argues that he was a conservative whereas Schiffrin explains at length that he had a good deal of revolutionary ideas but the brothers differed on the source of legitimation of the change.

⁴ Yat-sen was indeed his baptized name (Schiffrin,1970:16).

Being a Christian was a challenge to Sun's family. However, his following act, in a sense, counterbalanced the extremity of the first: He got married to a bride chosen by his family. What is worth-noting here for Sun's further positioning towards classes in Chinese society is that his spouse was the daughter of a merchant.

The years he spent in the Central School witnessed Sun Yat-sen's career prospects. Influenced by Sino-French War of 1883-5, he proposed a military career but his societal background would not have been promising in this way. Another possible profession had been law, if conditions in China for law education had been more suitable. The remaining alternative was medicine and Sun opted for this. Taking into account that he was influenced by the French War and he was getting more and more involved in Chinese politics, it is expected that his intention was "to use the school as a place for propaganda and to exploit the medical profession in order to reach people" (Sun,19254:80 in Schiffrin,1970:19). Schiffrin explains this double intention as follows:

...Sun's family background limited his range of influence, and the prestige of modern professional status might presumably enhance his authority among elite (Schiffrin,1970:19)

The dilemmas in Sun's social status brought him advantages as well as obstacles. Those were also the years that Sun developed anti-dynastic feelings. However, these feelings were not yet accompanied with anti-imperialism but, considering his extremely reactive actions back his village, his sentiments had anti-traditional tones.

In order to understand the background of Sun Yat-sen's political and intellectual stance, his education years have forming importance. According to Schiffrin, "[a]s a source of intellectual stimuli and personal contacts, the five years spent in Hong Kong, 1887-1892, were among the most fruitful in Sun's life" (Schiffrin,1970:20). He moves from this statement that Sun Yat-sen's major power base was his personal contacts that he stayed in touch with for a lifetime and the formation he achieved during the early years. Therefore, it is meaningful to have a brief look on his friends and teachers who not only influenced him but also supported him till the end:

His classmate in the medical school, Cheng Shih-liang, accompanied him during his way leading to 1911 Revolution. He was important for another aspect: He developed Sun's interest in local banditry and his ties with secret societies.

Dr. Ho Kai, a Western –educated Chinese, was Sun's teacher. He not only influenced Sun intellectually but also he de facto became the ideologue of the Chinese League (Revive China Society).

Dr. James Cantlie was the second dean of the Medical School. He encouraged Sun Yat-sen to further his medical career and as for political ambitions, not only rhetorically but also practically supported him, for example when Sun Yatsen was kidnapped in London.

Aware of the obstacles arose from family and/or educational background, Sun followed a dual strategy. While he was developing anti-dynastic thoughts to be formulated as revolutionism at the end; simultaneously he exhausted the moderate way by questing for gentry and elite support⁵. The clear manifestation of the second method was his petition to the governor of Chihli.

As manifested in his petition to the governor of Chili, Sun Yat-sen was bred by various sources throughout his medical education. His areas of interest were not limited to fields related to medicine but rather, he was deriving knowledge to be systematized in his modernization project developed in his last years. Thus, he studied Darwinism (a common interest among his contemporary intellectuals), the French Revolution, Chinese geography, scientific agriculture (Schiffrin, 1970:29).

How well mastered Sun Yat-sen on medicine was not the sole determinant of his career prospects. Being a (Chinese) doctor receiving Western education in China came to mean exclusion from both traditional and non-traditional circles. To be specific, the diploma that Sun and his classmates had received was not equivalent of Western medicine schools provided at that time. So, he was not allowed to perform his doctorate in Western-administrated zones like Hong Kong.

⁵ By stating that “[t]hough privately nurturing anti-Manchu sentiments, [Sun Yat-sen] gazed longingly in the direction of moderate, gentry-sponsored reform which bore the stamp of prestige and legitimacy” (Schiffrin,1970:27), Schiffrin comes close to Esherick's argument that 1911 was a revolution that worked only for enhancement of gentry interests (Esherick,1984).

On the other hand, the masses at that time still preferred traditional herbalism and a purely Western doctor was not welcomed. So, Sun Yat-sen went midway and opened an apothecary in which he both sold Western medicine and applied Western methods and practiced Chinese medicine. Still, he could not avoid being banned by the Portuguese authorities in Macao.

However, being prevented from performing his profession did not come as a disaster since he already set up good relations with local Portuguese gentry to be utilized in the following actively political years and the political and intellectual environment of Macao was so lively to involve in. The contribution of the Macao years to Sun's formation was twofold: He found lively and challenging international environment that he could further and diffuse his anti-Manchu thoughts. Besides, he found the opportunity to compensate the limitation imposed on him due to his class background by increasing personal contacts within this circle.

When the Canton Plot was failed, Sun Yat-sen first fled to Japan. There, he cut his Qing queue and adopted Western clothing. This change was mainly to disguise himself as a caution against Chinese spies but it also had symbolic importance because at this time he clarified his attitude in favor of a revolutionary mood aiming for a republican regime with Western values. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly than the previous periods, the Japan stay provided Sun personal contacts and decisive followers that he could find the support he looked for in the rest of his active political life.

After a stopover in Hawaii for family reasons, he decided to go to West in where, he thought, he could pursue fund-raising activities. Since his intention to go to the States failed, on an invitation by his old friend, Dr. Cantlie, he went to the UK. The two years spent in London was markedly fruitful in terms of reputation of his political career, legitimating his fellows and his political ambitions, personal contacts and intellectual development. He became famous when he was rescued from the Chinese Embassy by his influential contacts in London, his story found place in newspapers. Being treated as a heroic figure, he found the opportunity to tell Chinese predicament and to propagate for his revolutionary ambitions about the country's near future. He tried and partly

achieved to turn the public sympathy to his personality into a political support to his campaign. Such identification was also crucial for the leadership role attached to him. His adventurous days not less than the days full of hard-working hours at the British Museum and the Parliament helped him meet with some influential people from intellectual and political circles, like Henry George; Timothy Richard, Rowland Mulkern, Michael Davitt,^b and Felix Volkhovsky. His extensive readings on theoretical and administrative issues constituted the foundation for his ideas on economic development and institutional reform. He indeed wrote several articles in this period, which will be examined in the part of the chapter concerning Sun Yat-sen's intellectual life.

He furthered his efforts towards developing a circle of conspirators and sympathizers among “reformist literati, secret society elders, old-fashioned gentry, Filipino independence fighters, imperialist agents, anti-imperialist firebrands” (Schiffrin,1970:140). The Japanese, who were, utilizing Schiffrin's phraseology, ‘romantic adventurers’ constituted a major proportion of this huge crowd of revolutionaries. Though Sun was often criticized by fellow GMD leaders in the coming years for falling into contradiction of relying on Japanese financial and strategic support who were indeed imperialists acting aggressively towards China in a similar way to the British, one must admit that the support of Japanese, like Miyazaki, was invaluable not only for fund- and support-generation, implementation of plans but also especially for the very first stage of formulating plans (Schiffrin,1970:140). Besides, with these Japanese, who were ideologically pan-Asians indeed, Sun had a special relationship (of “natural allies”, if we again borrow Schiffrin's phraseology) for sharing the same cultural heritage, compared to the British to whose values Sun had an intellectual devotion (Schiffrin,1970:146).

In Japan, Sun Yat-sen not only strove to developing foreign contacts but tried transform Mainland politics. As a worth-mentioning aspect of these efforts, the three years past in Japan witnessed Sun's hard and enthusiastic work to close the ideological, personal and eventually strategic gap between the fellow revolutionaries and the ones who used to envisage the national survival in reformism. The ideological differences can and should not be treated separate

from the personal and class differences. The reformers who were associated with Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao belong to upper class literati and/or gentry families and therefore, they had easier and more prestigious access to official decision-making. Closeness to ruling elite and their very classical education led them to take an attitude that favoured the status quo. It was the very same education which was no doubt superior to Sun's and the other overseas students' in traditional terms that made the reformers personally look down on the revolutionaries despite the fact that "by the end of the century, not only peasant boys like Sun, but also products of the gentry tradition were beginning to show a preference for foreign learning (Schiffrin,1970:172). On the contrary, the revolutionaries, especially Sun Yat-sen decisively sought for rapprochement with Kang Youwei and the reformers (monarchists) in order to give his movement a more national character (Schiffrin,1970:174). It is worth-noting that Sun kept on trying to establish collaboration with reformists even [t]here was a real danger that Sun would be pushed out of the picture while the scholar reformers became activists (Schiffrin,1970:188). He managed to work with Liang Qichao time to time, but Qing scholar Kang Youwei agreed to collaborate with overseas educated Sun Yat-sen. .

We previously mentioned the relevance of Filipino liberation movement. The connection between the Philippines and Chinese revolutionaries was set through the Japanese conspirators who supported both movements. Besides, it is timely to mention his collaboration with the secret societies such as Qing Han Hui (Revive Han Organization) which overtly had racist affiliation. According to Schiffrin, [t]he purpose of the agreement was to provide Sun with three geographic foci for an anti-dynastic uprising: Guandong-Guanxi (Kwangtung-Kwangsi), Fujian-Chejiang (Fukien-Cheikang), and the Yangtze Valley" (Schffrin,1970:177).

Since the political importance of the Waichang Uprising will be examined in depth in the following section, suffice it to say that with shifting alliances and the fragile balance of power, it was a manifest of "Sun's capacity for improvisation" and pragmatism.

The early 1900s witnessed the increasing ties between Sun Yat-sen and the intellectuals whereas Sun's chief target had previously been the wealthy fund-raisers. Sun went back to Yokohama, Japan after the Waichang Uprising. There, he found an environment conducive to development of nationalism and socialism among his close contacts, the students and the sons of gentry that were attracted by modern education and nationalism (Schiffirin,1970:308). Those days later constituted the basis for, first, Sun's shift in his personal career from action to a more intellectual and theoretical phase (this shift stems from the British Library days and ends in the formulation of the Three Principles of People)⁶ and consequently in his theoretical and ideological shift to a socialist world view in his last years. Furthermore, "[t]he students' penetration of the Mainland [in the later phases] had created a new base for revolutionary agitation, and their initial failure had left an opening for an older and presumably wiser hand in the art of conspiracy" (Schiffirin,1970:342).

The Chinese transformation from dynastic rule to republicanism developed in parallel with Sun Yat-sen's personal path, and often intersected and became mutually influential. The Chinese transformation evolved from an all-inclusive anti-dynastic plot to ideological differentiation on the state-building question. A number of ideas were also involved in the process, such as (ethnic) nationalism, culturalism, and modernization. Sun Yat-sen, as an activist and thinker, was also involved in all these trends, sometimes in a leading role, sometimes in opposition. His personal choice and decisions also affected the events. That is why it is important to understand his personal development.

Sun Yat-sen first started his career as an anti-Manchu conspirator. Then, during his fund-raising trips to the West, he developed his thoughts about national salvation but meanwhile lost his touch with his people. His post-revolution regional governor years made him closer to the masses. Finally, when he was accepted as the unquestionable leader of the movement he started trying to add an ideological dimension to the movement.

⁶ Schiffirin calls it "his progress toward adjustment toward to the intellectual milieu (Schiffirin,1970:309)

Sun Yat-sen's involvement in Chinese politics, which had been marked with traditional hierarchy of social stratification, was a story of self-achievement. To be more precise one should refer to his family background. That is, unlike Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, Sun did not belong to a socially and politically privileged group and he had to rely on his own qualifications to make himself heard. Bergere points out to a dual process that occurred as soon as Sun made his attitude clear: He was immediately marginalized from the local politics for being an émigré but his leap was echoed in the non-official, "outsider" circles from which he already derived his power: overseas communities, secret societies, Christian converts, and merchants (Bergere,1994:12)

4.1. REVOLUTIONARY YEARS (1895-1911)

As stated in the previous chapter, the profile of Revive China Society (Xing Zhong Hui) included members from the gentry, bureaucracy and universities. Its membership was around twenty. The regulations of the society did not cover more than procedural matters because although had anti-foreign designs, Sun deliberately excluded anti-dynastic intentions in order not to alienate the gentry supporters of the organization (Schiffrin,1970:42). This was because the power base of the movement-to be was the overseas Chinese (hua qiao) in Hawaii. This hesitant attitude was well manifested in the famous Manifesto which took a considerable step forward from literati reformism by marking the ruling class as responsible for the problems in the existing system but failed to address the particular political results of this revolutionary mood (Schiffrin,1970:51-3). The primary concern of the initiators was best explained by Schiffrin:

Friendships and village ties, especially in Hawaii, were apparently a more important factor than ideology in bringing these people together (Schiffrin,1970:54)

Apparently, the anti-Manchu feeling brought people with same kind of sufferings together. Here, Sun Yat-sen's personal charisma, which has been described differently by different authors (the conspirator (Schffrin,1970), the communicator (Bergere,1984), or spokesman (Wells,2001)), played the decisive role. His mobilizing role is worth mentioning since there a number of leaders in the headquarters of the society who were more educated than Sun himself. The (at least, quantitative) dominance of 'traditional low prestige groups', like laborers and merchants, among the society, was resulted in lack of collective capacity to summon the masses through intellectual activities like publishing journals, perhaps with the exception of The Mail.

It is appropriate here to point out here that the vagueness of the messages is neither peculiar to Sun Yat-sen nor does it show the problems in these messages. The nationalist movements on the eve of the 20th century all faced challenges from multiple sources and they were heterogeneous by nature. This fact led their leaders to employ vague patriotic discourse in order to mobilize the masses at first, until consolidation of the power enabled them to initiate more precise political goals.

The Canton Plot was an early product of Sun Yat-sen's charismatic personality as well as his position in accordance with the intellectuals and the local elite. That is, Sun was good at getting along with the bureaucratic and gentry circles but in terms of intellectual leadership, his activist mode took second place to better educated figures like Yang Zhuyun .

To reach a better understanding of the statement above, we shall recall some points: Guangzhou, historically, was open to foreign influence; revolutionaries were mainly from Guangzhou and for being familiar to the region, they were acting confidently; the traditional place that secret societies had in the society made conspiracy organization easier; the atmosphere after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was conducive to a plot.

Sun Yat-sen saw the weak points of his organization, that is the absence of military excellence, loose ties with local people and lack of consensus on the goal and direction of the movement.

However, it is timely to raise the point that, this seemingly contradictory attitude was indeed in line with the values of the leaders. That is to say, those Western educated leaders were “intellectual and spiritual products of Western, Christian tradition” (Schiffrin,1970:78) and as a result of a process that can be named as self-Orientalization; they, in a sense, internalized the ‘response to West’ approach and were idealistic examples of the Modernization as Westernization model of Esenbel. Therefore, being anti-imperialistic never meant to be anti-Western for the Revive China Society conspirators. It should be mentioned here that Sun Yat-sen had never approved or supported the Boxer Uprising.

The Revolutionary Alliance activists were no doubt the most pro-Western among all, i.e. the reformers/monarchists, status quoists, and the non-intellectual reactionaries like Boxers. However, the Western governments and the intellectual circles had always declined to appreciate this tendency and they avoided their full support in compare to the support they gave to Kang Youwei and Yuan Shikai.

In the reform project of the Revolutionary Alliance, a considerable level of discrepancy can be observed. The inconsistency was between reform/Monarchy and revolution/Republic and stemmed from pragmatic policies⁷ as well as the intra-cadre balance of power among the leaders of different backgrounds.

The years between the Canton plot and the Waichang Uprising were years of mayhem for China, but years of organization and institutionalization for the Revolutionary Alliance. The main performer of all these efforts was Sun:

Reformist literati, secret society elders, old-fashioned gentry, Filipino independence fighters, imperialist agents, and ante-imperialist firebrands –all became the objects of Sun’s untiring penchant for negotiating and plotting (Shiffrin,1970:140)

Among them, a number of Japanese played a constructive role in the coming of the revolution. The Japanese sympathizers were mainly composed of ex-Samurai pan-Asians and romantic university students. No doubt the contradiction of the anti-imperialist collaboration with imperialists was present here too. However, Sun’s attitude towards Japanese was different from the one towards the British

⁷ “...Given the elasticity which characterized Hsing Chung Hui policies, *a multilateral approach to the powers* could very well have been contemplated (emphasis added)” (Schiffrin,1970:79)

because he saw the Japanese as ‘natural allies’ though he had a deep intellectual commitment to European thought (Schiffrin,1970:145-147).

Nevertheless, in the Japan years the more he focused on Japanese understanding of federal republicanism, Sun Yat-sen clarified his revolutionary stance.

Yet those were the years that the ideological and even personal confrontation between Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei became apparent. Leaving the details to be discussed in the third part of the chapter, suffice it to say that the Revolutionaries in that period of time spent considerable effort to reconcile with the Reformists. The result was at least the generalization of the Revolutionary of the movement to non-Cantonese areas. This was important because, according to Schiffrin, the incorporation of the Yangzi valley into the movement was crucial to give the movement a national character and consolidation of his leadership (Schiffrin,1970:174).

Since the political importance of the Waichow Uprising will be examined in depth in the following section, I will here solely point out that with shifting alliances and the fragile balance of power, it was one manifestation of “Sun’s capacity for improvisation” and pragmatism.

The early 1900s witnessed the increasing ties between Sun Yat-sen and the intellectuals whereas Sun’s chief target was used to be the wealthy fund-raisers. As mentioned before, Sun went back to Yokohoma in Japan after the Waichow Uprising. There, he found an environment conducive to development of nationalism and socialism among his close contacts, the students and the sons of gentry were attracted by modern education and nationalism (Schiffrin,1970:308). Those days later constituted the basis for, first, Sun’s shift in his personal career from action to a more intellectual and theoretical phase (this shift stems from the British Library days and ends in the formulation of the Three Principles of People)⁸ and consequently to his theoretical and ideological shift to a socialist world view in his last years. Furthermore, “[t]he students’ penetration of mainland [in the later phases] had created a new base for revolutionary agitation, and their

⁸ Schiffrin calls it “his progress toward adjustment toward to the intellectual milieu (Schiffrin,1970:309)

initial failure had left an opening for an older and presumably wiser hand in the art of conspiracy” (Schiffrin,1970:342).

4.2. IDEOLOGY-BUILDING (1911-1919)

To clearly state a fact repeated in this work several times, given the fact that Sun Yat-sen was neither a military nor state official, he was far from the institution- building experience. This can be an explanation for the hard-to-grasp situation that Sun himself did not involve himself in the last plot that led to the 1911 Revolution and he arrived to the country only after he was appointed as the President of the Republic of China.

There are a number of main views on why he abandoned power to Yuan Shikai: Chen Shiling argues that sun gave up his position not as a compromise but for the sake of revolution. He sees sun Yat-sen’s behavior as a traditional Chinese war tactic to step back for the time being in order to reassert more forcefully later. He advocates that Sun Yat-sen did it for the success of the revolution and the peace in the country (Chen,1979). Similarly, Shang Mingxuan advocates that he did not have a personal desire for positions and power (Shang,1981). Jin Chongji says that Sun Yat-sen relinquished due to power politics, there was no other choice but abandoning power to Yuan (Jin,1980). Bao Chengguan sees the abandonment of presidency as a mistake because it prevented the revolution from being completed peacefully (in Wang,1999:). Duan Yunzhang argues that it was a tactical move from Sun Yat-sen’s side to negotiate with Yuan Shikai but it was too late when he understood that Beiyang regime was not helpful for the revolution (Duan,1990).

The most common explanation in Western literature for why he abandoned the power for Yuan Shikai comes as follows: “Sun Yat-sen’s patriotism, his sense of national unity and his fear of foreign intervention led him to sacrifice his personal ambitions and efface himself before Yuan Shikai, whom he judged to be more capable of ensuring the future of the young Republic” (Bergere,1998:199).

Apparently, this rationalization appears to be less strong than the military and political balance of power between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai. It is timely to highlight here that the power base of the anti-dynastical campaign of Sun Yat-sen was the financial support of overseas Chinese and the intellectual support of especially foreign-educated students but definitely not a social group which was donated by military equipment as well as military organization skills.

The organization of the Revolutionary Alliance also reflects this nature of Sun's movement: being personal rather than institutional (Bergere,1998:203).

4.3. TRANSFORMATION OF IDEOLOGY (1919-1925)

The post-revolutionary chaos, which caused Sun to flee China, also changed his political views. His disenchantment was not only with the GMD under Song Jiaoren's de facto leadership⁹ but he also lost his belief in Western political institutions, democracy in particular. Now what was in his mind was reorganizing the revolutionary forces to continue the struggle. In this struggle he now saw democracy as an obstacle to reach the ultimate goal. Previously, when he first announced Three Stages of Revolution in 1905, the short-term military power was envisaged to be followed by the period of provisional constitution which would eventually end up in democratic life. This plan of action was replaced with a less democratic one in 1914 when Sun Yat-sen was busy with organizing the Revolutionary party. In the revised edition, the second period of constitutional rule left its place to party tutelage for an unknown period of time. In this second plan, an elitist concept of citizenship was also introduced: the party members who were registered during the revolutionary period would be the "privileged citizens" whereas the latecomers would suffer a lack of certain citizenship rights such as participation in elections either as candidates or voters.

⁹Song Jiaoren's tactic was to gather as many people as possible to the party in order to unite the country. Since this recruitment was through his personal charisma, the party meetings witness people from all walks of life. However, Sun Yat-sen was worried that this interesting amalgamation was in fact nothing but a disguise of domination of conservative gentry

His non-democratic political development as well as the missed opportunity of utilizing the democratic and anti-imperialistic aura of late 1910s alienated the original revolutionary cadres from Sun. With his return to centralized, disciplined, leader-centered party (Bergere,1994:257), Sun had two choices in front of him: either lean on the traditional sources of political power in China, secret societies, or on Bolsheviks who wanted Sun to reorganize GMD in a Leninist party model. The coming years would witness Sun Yat-sen's shifts from one side to the other.

The post-revolutionary years (1912-1920s) were lively years that shaped the future of the country. There were Yuan Shikai's government in Beijing, Sun Yat-sen's government in Guangdong (Canton), and several warlords establishing state institutions. Meanwhile, different groups such as the students, merchants, workers who stood up with their own demands about the state administration. Adding up to all, the international position of China gradually worsened. The pressure coming from foreign actors caused reaction in the society and nationalism became an important element in domestic politics. Bergere claims that the 21 Demands of Japan united all segments of society (even the revolutionaries) around Yuan with the hope that he could resist and make his government representative of China (Bergere,1994:263). Evidently, when it was revealed that he accepted the demands secretly, this disenchanted politically active groups and led to May Fourth activism.

While these were happening in the country, Sun Yat-sen was busy with reorganizing his party. His authoritarian tendencies disheartened most of his old fellow revolutionaries who had a democratic zeal above all. The new cadre gathered around him was different than the previous ones in nature. They were less intellectual, more action men with almost no ideological aspirations like democracy or modernization. They had close ties with traditional forces like gentry and secret societies (Bergere,1994: 260). With those ties, some of them, like Chen Qimei –later, close associate of Chiang Kai shek-, became prominent leaders of Nationalist government (Seagrave,1985).

For Sun Yat-sen, in his early stage, nationalism was only a means to mobilize masses to anti-Manchu quest. When the Qing dynasty was toppled, he

thought nationalism became irrelevant for the revolution. He even excluded nationalism from the Three Principles of People for a while. Moreover, situated in Japan, he missed the anti-Japan trend in the mainland in 1910s. He was even treated as a betrayer since he insisted on ignoring Japan's aggressive attitude towards China and refused to take a stance against Japan (Bergere,1994:265). His political credibility was shaken during this period and when he was finally back to Mainland, he found himself as one among many warlords, instead of the natural leader of the nation.

He returned to mainland after Yuan Shikai's death in 1916. The power struggle among warlords was heading to top at those times. The split between Northern and Southern leaders were deepening. Sun Yat-sen immediately took his side with the Southerners not only because his power base was there but also he was against policies of the Beiyang Clique from the North. The Beiyang Clique, warlords first loyal to Yuan Shikai and followers of his policies after his death, wanted to end Republican era because they thought a centralized, authoritarian administration would do better. They also strongly advocated China's entry to the World War I with Allied powers (Bergere,1994:270). Sun Yat-sen, on the contrary, did not want to give up his ideal of Republic. As for World War I, he did not advocate neutrality but he was skeptical about collaborating with Allied Powers because, at that time, he was leaning towards German help for his cause. In late 1910s, when the country was divided between the central military government and the local governments , especially in Yunnan and Yangzi, Sun Yat-sen was a warlord among warlords – a warlord without any military base (other than the mercenaries –local bandits, soldiers on leave), “a general without troops”. Indeed, lack of military power base had always been one of the severest problems of Sun Yat-sen's political life. As a step to compensate it finally and to add military nature to his mission, he decided to take the title of Grand Marshall (Bergere,1994:274).

However, the effort to keep up with military leaders prevented him from better grasping another trend. As mentioned before, nationalism was a strong sentiment at that time, and the New Culture intellectuals managed to combine this popular feeling with plea for modernization. One of the most important notions of

this movement was that it popularized the political issues and tried to make revolution a mass movement. Focused on the foreign diplomatic and economic relations and then the warlord politics, Sun Yat-sen missed this opportunity to derive massive support at that time. Another point that led to him being blamed for a lack of democratic was that since he, at that time, was giving priority to military revolution, he rejected New Culture's prioritization of culture and individual liberties (Bergere,1994:277). It would be only after the establishment of Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang) that the liberalization of Sun Yat-sen's thoughts came. Still, despite its open, non-sectarian way, personification of power was a major problem.

After the October Revolution Tsarist Russia's geopolitical interests were taken over by the Soviets. As an addition to this foreign policy, the early Soviet policy was to extend the revolution to Third World countries. As a part of this project, Soviet Russia sent advisors to China. At the beginning they did not side with any of the warlords and sent an advisor to all of them, including Sun Yat-sen. Later, when the politics in China was cleared up and the communist and nationalist sides were emerged as the most powerful camps, Soviet Russia supported the United Front against Western powers.

There are a number of Soviet advisors who came to China and who had influence on Sun Yat-sen. First of them was Adolf Joffe. He came to China when Sun Yat-sen was heading Canton Government but was still highly ineffective. They had long talks in Sun Yat-sen's Shanghai residence and the result came as the 1923 Sun-Joffe Joint Statement. The content was as follows: China would not make any commitment to Communism but would receive Soviet aid; and most important of all, Sun Yat-sen would be recognized as the President of China. In return, Sun gave Outer Mongolia away to Russians, along with the renewal of tsarist privileges.

Even though this agreement is the most popular indication of Sun Yat-sen's leaning towards Soviets, It was another Soviet advisor, Mikhail Borodin, who changed the balance of influence between the Soviets and the British, in favor of the Soviets. Soviets were pushing Sun Yat-sen to change his Principles in

a more socialist way. For British, the merchants of the South (the Prince's Clique) were the principal source of insistence.

The Reorganization Congress, held in 1924, witnessed the first clear signs of the split between the Communists (supported by Borodin) and the Nationalists (supported by overseas Chinese). The overall atmosphere was pro-Russian because the only option available seemed to be collaboration with Russia since there was no help coming from the West against Japanese aggression.

Sun Yat-sen, who was elected as the honorary leader of the congress but was not directly involved, contributed to this pro-Russian tendency by changing his third principle, Principle of People's Livelihood. It used to be an article mainly concerned with economic development. In the latest version, it introduced essences of a socialist economy.

Bergere calls Sun Yat-sen "the soul of GMD" (Bergere,1994:319). The other sources are also supportive of any statement regarding his importance to the GMD in his late period. How did Sun Yat-sen reach a position of sole leader of the party and the government from being a warlord among many? The answer lies in his third period in which he realized the importance of masses for a revolution. Even though he personally remained a person of limited, elitist contacts, as he realized the lack of people's active contribution to the revolution as the most important problem (Bergere,1994:324), he directed his generals and governors to a more contributive manner in administration.

A good example of how Sun Yat-sen appeared to be the national leader is the controversy over (so-called) Three Great Policies. They are: (1) allying with Soviet Russia, (2) allying with Chinese Communists and (3) assisting peasant and workers. According to Soong Qingling, Sun Yat-sen's wife, the main focus of these policies was not rapprochement with Soviets and communists but anti-imperialism (alliance with Communism is within the context of anti-Japan resistance and alliance with Soviets is anti-Western imperialism) and populism, or, in other words, gaining the support of the masses to the revolution (Epstein,1993). However, the generally- accepted interpretation is that the Great Policies are the signs of Sun's lean towards communism. Even the Chinese version of the third policy is either re-explaining the Three principles or

introducing the New Three Principles to the masses (Lu,1984; Wang,1999). In my opinion, even though Sun Yat-sen clearly leaned towards Soviets in his last years, he never totally engaged in communist politics to go so far to change his Three Principles or offering new ones to replace the original ones. Therefore, it is likely that, as Chiang Yung-Qing of Taiwan offered and Chen Xiqi of mainland China seconded (under the light of findings of Lu Zhenxiang [PRC] and Hazama Noiki [Japan]), the policies are thought and / or accepted by Sun Yat-sen (unlike Taiwanese claims that they never existed) but , probably within that short time they were not proposed as an official policy (In PRC, on the other hand, they are regarded as open manifestation of Sun’s socialism). (Chiang,182)

The position of this academic and political debate illustrates the creation of a myth of Sun Yat-sen as “guofu” –father of the nation- right after his death. Sun Yat-sen said to launch the Three Great Policies in the First National Congress of GMD in 1924. After his death, Chen Duxiu used them in Central Committee of CCP in 1926 and they symbolized the split between GMD and CCP. However, interestingly, later on, through pamphlets and general meetings, these sloganized principles became extremely popular among people and GMD cadres that even Chiang Jieshi (Chang Kaishek) accepted them.

This case shows us the importance of Sun Yat-sen for the justification of the revolutionary cause. In spite of his failures and contradictions, Sun Yat-sen persists from the very early stages of transformation as a central figure in the construction of a new China.

5. THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATION-STATE

5.1. SUN YAT-SEN'S THOUGHT

The three principles of the people is, in a narrow sense, the name of theory that Sun Yat-sen made public a short time before his death. In the broader sense, it is the ideological proposition(s) that Sun Yat-sen utilized during all his political life - an intellectual justification of all of his political actions. Therefore, it is not a coherent work developed in a relatively short span of time in order to bring about a systematic theoretical work but rather a work-in-progress developed in long years and changed, redirected and modified according to the day's needs or the changing external conditions. It is necessary to read Sun Yat-sen's works in relation with the domestic and international developments because all the external developments can be traced in his works.

When he began to develop his principles in 1905, the primary task in front of the Revolutionaries was the one of overthrowing Manchu dynasty. The imperialist threat was not yet urgent and plans about the aftermath of revolution were far from clear. Later, with the failure of the Republic, Sun began to think about the state-building which eventually led him to nation-building question¹. He was not directly involved in the 1919 May Fourth Movement and he did not totally agree with the New Culture intellectuals' point of view, but he appreciated the sense of nationalism that mobilized other segments of the society such as the workers and the merchants. This era contributed strongly to the development of his ideas of nation-building. (Bergere, 1994:363).

¹ Sun's early nationalism was directly against Manchu. When Qing dynasty was toppled down, he thought the nationalist principle was accomplished and it was no longer in agenda. So, in 1914, when he established Chinese Revolutionary Party in Japan, there were only 2 principles: democracy and livelihood. However, by early 1920s, nationalism was back in the agenda in the form of Western imperialism. (Bergere, 1994: 360)

When he formally delivered his lectures on the Three Principles of the People in 1922 and 1924, the international developments in the second half of the 1910s and the early 20s already caused another shift in his thinking and made him lean towards socialism.

As for the international collaboration, Sun Yat-sen's criteria towards foreign powers were not their ideologies or intentions for China but their willingness to help his revolutionary quest. Thus, it was first Japan that Sun Yat-sen favored most. At first, he thought Japan could be a model for China for fiery national spirit and modernizations (Wells,2001:63) but then he realized that the nearest country that could threaten China was Japan, which had powerful navy that could easily smash China's national defenses within days of mobilization (Wells,2001:66).

He always had a tendency towards the Western powers, given to his self-taught days in Britain and the help he received from his contacts in West. When the Western imperialism became impossible to ignore and he understood that anti-imperialism was now the major force that would determine the country's evolution (Bergere,1994,363) he once more changed his position and he leaned towards the Soviets to whom he had kept a distant attitude because of Russophobia.

It is important to note again, his leanings never meant a total engagement, he was always "partial and selective" (Bergere,1994:362). Wang Jiu neatly suggests that Sun Yat-sen was idealist in terms of his ideas but opportunist in practical issues (Wang,1999)

Even though Sun Yat-sen's thoughts were not coherent, the general patterns show considerable similarity with that of previous generation of reformists ("doubters" in Schwarz's terms, as mentioned in the previous chapter)². That is, he held the universalist and ethnocentric culturalist idea that China itself is not a country but the expression of a culture, or rather of culture itself

² If we compare his thoughts with the intellectuals of previous generation of transition, we can find them quite similar. The reason for this fact to be often neglected in the literature, Chinese and Taiwanese ones in particular, I believe, are political. It was necessary to preserve a boundary between the reformists and the revolutionaries. It was also necessary to preserve Sun's originality in the eyes of posterity.

(Bergere,1994:369). He often advocated the superiority of Chinese political thought over that of West's and proposed only adoption of Western technology. Even though he severely criticizes Universalist visions of traditional Chinese thought, the core of his thought was achieving a recovery of (Chinese) Universalism.

In learning from the West scientifically China should learn from *Japan's example* and copy *only the most recent* of the West's scientific developments. In this way China would expedite her modernization which, with a revival of her *national spirit* would enable her to be a great world power which could unify the world on the basis of her ancient morality and love of peace (Wells,2001:68).

Indeed, Bergere sees a cycle in Sun Yat-sen's thoughts. Because for him, "nationalism was not a goal in itself, merely a stage" (the end goal was Datong – Great Harmony, a non-aggressive (Chinese) universalism) (Bergere,1994:369).

He starts from Culturalism with an emphasis on the superiority of the Chinese political system. Then he criticizes this culture-centered view for causing the lack of national feeling. In the nationalist period of his circle, he tries to generate consent to the newly established state. However, he sees nationalism not as an end but a means to reach the Universalist phase of Chineseness. Bergere concludes that since Chinese Universalism is based on culturalist -essentialist notions, he completes the circle in the end.

He sought to move beyond the contradictions that the reformists of the past had encountered and the rifts to which the intellectuals of 1919 resigned themselves. It was a matter not of saving the tradition by means of modern nationalism or of installing that nationalism in tradition's place, but rather of constructing a national identity that would make use of the tradition and at the same time transcend it (Bergere,1994:366).

This cyclic view on nationalism places Sun Yat-sen in a position between the reformists of the previous era and the New Culture intellectuals because he believed that "interpenetration of nation and traditional culture could only create national consciousness".

He decided to refer to history and culture in order to create a new national consciousness. Therefore, he urged that the Chinese should recover not only their old morality but also their ancient learning. He also decried the decline of mental

training. Moreover, the Chinese should show more concern with their personal culture in the present as well as revere their national great achievements of the past (Wells,2001:68).

The necessity of creating consent among the people of the new Republic and the urgency of that task led Sun Yat-sen define his nationalism in racial terms. He continuously emphasized the distinctiveness of Han race. To support his plea, he utilized “survival of the fittest” nation of Social Darwinism. According to him, what made China unique is the coincidence of the race and the nation-state: “China has been developing a single state out of a single race” (Bergere, 1994: 358) It was necessary to stress race in a multi-ethnic country with local loyalties. However, the interaction between ethnicity and national identity in his thought was not clear since he included blood, style of life, language, religion, and customs as constituents of (racial) nationalism but not the territorial rooting. From his point of view, territory was irrelevant in defining nationhood because it is a concept related to the borders of a state but not self-identification of a people. Bergere claims that “in this way, simply by virtue of a definition , Sun Yat-sen integrated and reintegrated into the national community the millions of émigrés established overseas” (Bergere, 1994: 357). However, it is important to note that including overseas Chinese into modern Chinese nationalism did not refer to expansionist goals in Sun Yat-sen’s formulation.

Territory issue also covers the problem of situation of non-Han people of China in a state defined with racial terms, such as Uyghur people of Xinjiang, Tibetans and Mongolians. In fact, he saw this problem as early as 1912 when he proclaimed the equality and the self-determination right of Five Races³ under Chinese sovereignty. Still, argues Bergere, he was counting on a process of cultural assimilation” (Bergere,1994:358).

When he went to Japan after he lost the presidency to Yuan Shikai, he worked on the reasons of the failure of the revolution. The conclusion he reached was the lack of public support. According to him, the people of China did not actively support the revolution because they lack the national consciousness to form a state of their own. Their loyalties were primarily to their families and

³ Han, Manchu, Tibet, Uyghur, Mongol

clans. So, he decided to utilize this structure to create loyalty to the state-nation. No matter how good was the ideal of Chinese Universalism⁴, “; it caused the loose structure of the society. Combining with the indirect administrative tradition of the state, the Chinese had “too much liberty” to accumulate loyalty to the state⁵. The way he proposed to generate consent to the state was a bottom to up mobilization.

...and it would be possible for the nation-state to be constructed naturally, working from bottom upward, from the individual citizens up to its central organizations (Bergere,1994:359)

The consent starts from family loyalties and finally takes in the entire country.

Before comparing Sun Yat-sen’s and the New Culture intellectuals’ approach to modernization, the last words about Sun Yat-sen should be on his *goal with nationalism*. Nationalism for Sun Yat-sen was never been a goal in itself but a means to generate consent to legitimize the new state. Accordingly, in compare to fairness and justness that Cultural Universalism can provide, Nationalism as an ideology cannot be the last stage for a society (Chinese society in specific - Sun Yat-sen always developed ideas for China instead of reasoning on universal problems). For him, any ideology is a tool to achieve state-building. That is why, his lectures were not systematic and coherent as it would be expected from an ideologue. He prioritized action over thoughts and used thoughts as justification for his actions. Without paying attention to coherence, he derived his ideas from wherever possible:

For Sun, as for many Chinese gripped in the vise of modernization, including Mao Zedong, foreign borrowings had to serve Chinese objectives and the importation of new methods and new concepts did not necessarily imply adoption of the systems from which they were extracted (Bergere,1994:254).

Therefore, he is often criticized for the lack of elaboration of his works compared with previous generations of reformists and the New Culture intellectuals.

⁴ This term refers to “Tianxiazhuyi” –“All under Heaven” thought of Chinese cosmology.

⁵ “The European tyranny in one way and another pressed directly down upon the shoulders of the common people”. That is why the people fought for their emancipation. In China, the state’s interference in society was always much more limited....So, the problem was not a lack, but an excess of liberty: “We have had too much liberty without any unity and resisting power, because we have become a sheet of loose sand” (Bergere,1994:371).

However, his works should be evaluated in the context of its conditions and its purpose.

Cultural transmissions are a matter of chance, accident, random encounters. They thrive on simplifications, hasty understanding, misreadings, and misunderstandings. For the generous-hearted men who promote them, writing is simply another form of action. Even if Three Principle of People has not won a place in intellectual history, it does represent an essential milestone in the history of such transmissions. And the very defects (oversimplification, repetition, naïve enthusiasm) that depreciate it in the eyes of scholars have ensured its success in China and the Third World. (Bergere,1994:355)

Bergere believed that it remains a fundamental work for it crystallizes the questions, ambitions, and ideas that fueled the debates of the first quarter of this century.(Bergere,1994: 354)

5.2. THE NEW CULTURE MODERNIZATION

The revolution overthrew the dynasty but failed to replace it with a new state. The reasons of this failure vary in the literature. Most commonly we encounter the view that it failed because of the gentry-domination of society and because of the power relations within the forces involved in the revolution, specifically between the intellectuals and the military (Esherick, Moore, Goldman & Fairbank). The Revolution changed the regime, established the Republic, promulgated the Constitution, and introduced the political institutions. Moreover, in the following years of the Republic, the second President Yuan Shikai tried to reform the economic structure. However it is hard to say that these institutions were working viably. Above all, the new Republic did not have the sovereignty and legitimacy necessary for conclusion. There are two reasons for that: First, the absence of a well-formulated, coherent program about the post-revolutionary period. In other words, all those reforms in state institutions lacked a discourse to justify them. The revolutionary discourse was way more decisive about embracing

Western ideas than its predecessors since the restoration attempts of 19th century but still lacking the radical transitory attitude to modern statehood. The second reason is the limited awareness of masses about the revolutionary quest. The active participants of the Revolution were limited and the inactive majority was lacking the reasons and motives to work for completion of the process.

The public support and consent to the making of modern China was generated much later than the revolution itself. To say the final word at the beginning, the New Culture literary movement (1916-1935?)⁶ opened the way to the creation of the conditions for the revolution to succeed. The intellectual transformation which has practical implications on the social and political structure became an inseparable component of a political revolution. “No revolution without intellectual emancipation”(Schwarz,1986:297) because intellectual revolution constitutes the ideological framework that allows the break with the overthrown regime.

The 1911 Republican Revolution challenged, of course, the traditional political system, but it was left to the May 4th movement of 1917 to 1921 to finally and systematically attack the very cultural underpinnings of the old system.(Duara,2007)

In the cases where the political revolution and the ideological transformation overlapped the regime was established more smoothly (e.g. Turkish Revolution of 1923). However, in China, the shift in the minds happened with a decade-long time gap, rather hesitantly and, in my opinion, this is the reason why the transition in China was not completed with the first revolution but would only be completed with a second revolution.

⁶ It is better to clarify the terminology at the beginning. The name “the New Culture Movement” is often used synonymously with the “May Fourth Movement” and means the articulation of “the contempt for traditional Chinese culture felt by many Chinese intellectuals”. Another common belief about the Movement is that it was a total rejection of “old culture” of China with the accusation if the country’s subordinate position in the day’s international predicament. However, as Yü puts “[it] has always mean different things to different people. It is primarily an age of cultural contradictions, and contradiction is by definition multidimensional as well as multidirectional” (Yü,2000:320). In this study that the New Culture Movement is used as an umbrella term to include a wide range of movements and processes which were interrelated and often crosscut. Those varied from the continuation of the previous works of the earlier reform attempts to non-political intellectual critics and discourse of highly politicized actions.

According to Schwarz, the May Fourth was a post-political enlightenment because enlightenment could not be fulfilled by the revolution (Schwarz,1986:297-9).

It was important for two main reasons: Firstly, concerning China's quest for modernization, the Western thought and values were largely introduced and penetrated into the Chinese society during this time. "During the May Fourth era beginning with the literary revolution of 1917, a paradigmatic change took place in the development of radicalism in modern China. From this time on, whether in criticizing the tradition or advocating changes, Chinese intellectuals would almost invariably invoke some Western ideas, values or institutions as ultimate grounds for justification" (Yü,1993:130).

Secondly, concerning the new state's internal legitimacy problem, it popularized the modern ideas. Even though there were social reasons for the Revolution, the revolutionary action was limited to the circle of intelligentsia who aimed at nation-building. It was important to build a (modern) state consciousness among the people in order to maintain the consent.

[O]ne of the most important projects of intellectuals and the state in the new nations of China and India was and is to remake the "people". The pedagogy of the people was undertaken not only by the nation-state through the educational system, but also by intellectuals through the folklore movement, through literature and, most importantly, through the campaigns against religion. The nation emerged in the name of the people, but the people who mandated the nation would have to be remade to serve as their own sovereign. (Duara,1995:32)

Before going deep into the New Culture Movement, it is better to look at the previous conditions that created the conditions for such a development. Because the New Culture generation⁷ is the third of the generations who devoted themselves to modernization after the 1898 and 1911 generations. The previous

⁷ The New Culture Movement was in no sense a coherent plea to change things and, as we will see below, the participants did vary in background and ambitions. Still, it is possible to see them as a generation given to what they achieved in retrospect. However, even when we talk about a New Culture generation, we should see it as a part of a process being continued since 19th century.

generations had created the environment conducive to the development of “the New Culture”.

Li Zehou, explains the transformation during generations by naming three successive generations as “doubters, destroyers and builders” (Li Zehou,1979:470-1, in Schwarz,1986:25-6). He means that the “doubting” generation questioned the unquestionable classical learning which had been the organizing engine of the imperial state. Gradually accumulating the power to challenge it, the “doubters” opened the way to the “destroyers”. This second generation overthrew the Qing Dynasty but could not replace it with a viable modern state. The third generation, “builders”, attempted to complete the state- and nation-building processes.

Since the “builders” are the main topic of this chapter and the “destroyers” were analyzed in depth in the previous chapter, it will suffice to briefly talk about the “doubters”.

The basics of the new interpretation of the culture and scholarly work that the New Culture intellectuals built their quest on were prepared by the 1898 reformists through fight against the examination system and the teaching of classics.

The May Fourth movement of 1919 would have been inconceivable without the emergence of a type of new intellectual in the first decade of the twentieth century. Only thinkers who were more autonomous in their social position and more independent-minded in their social outlook than the scholar-officials who had served the last dynasty could lay the foundations of a genuinely new culture in China (Schwarz,1986:26)

The creation of *that* new autonomous intellectual took three decades. In the decade, the scholars like Kang Youwei⁸ still needed to act within the system, i.e. to be successful in the imperial examination and get promoted to a degree that can provide the person a free hand to promote reforms⁹. In order to show the

⁸ Kang’s aim was promulgating the constitution and making China a constitutional monarchy with Emperor Guangxu at the top. He also advocated Confucian values.

⁹ This generation of reformers was mainly monarchists who advocated the preservation of the dynasty but elimination of the existing rulers. They were also Western-educated and were well aware of the developments in Western world.

continuity from the first decade to the second, shall we follow the same example: Kang Youwei's student Liang Qichao led the way to break the examination system and brought the challenge of Western learning into the heart of the Confucian bureaucracy (Schwarz,1986:27). He was one of the first who introduced Enlightenment thought to China but as being one of the forerunners he was still close to Confucian thought. As for the third decade, the students (like Qian Xuantong), who were about 10 years younger than Liang Qichao and his classmates used to take a less attached attitude towards Confucian classics even though it cost them their family relations. The students of this generation are called the *transitional generation*. Later students of the decade following the transitional generation (Luo Jialun, who was born 20 years after Liang Qichao, is one example) would actually be encouraged by their families to have a Western education instead of reading the Confucian classics.

The overseas Chinese who were concerned about the ambivalence in the Mainland and the overseas-educated students who came back to China also joined these circles. Their impact on the domestic politics was that they brought new ideas as well as motivation to alter the ailing system. They brought dynamism to Chinese society.

This generation is important for the creation of the conditions that made further and more radical social and political action feasible. In other words, the "doubters" shook the moral and ideological foundations of the imperial system.

The series of events that led to the 1911 Revolution and beyond has been shown in the previous chapter but the impact of the overthrow of Qing Dynasty and the failure of 1911 Republic on the intellectuals of 1911 and post-1911 generation is worth-exploring in order to demonstrate the origins of the following phase of moral-ideological transformation in China.

Before the Revolution, the foreign educated young intellectuals who were alienated or isolated from the imperial circles had gradually organized themselves in secret societies and nationwide associations. That development would radicalized the tone of Chinese politics. At the same time, China was faced with the 1895 defeat by Japan. Japan's technical superiority in the war focused

attentions on the Meiji Restoration as a model for enlightenment in China¹⁰. The sense of humiliation that these young intellectuals felt increased political concern and radicalized alternative politics.

The so-called transitional generation who enjoyed the autonomy achieved by Liang Qichao's generation was composed of new intellectuals who were either actually involved in 1911 Revolution or influenced by it. Contrary to Liang Qichao who advocated institutional reform from above, the transitional generation accused this approach as being submissive and proposed tearing down the institutions from below¹¹.

The new intellectuals who did not actively get involved in the Revolution, i.e. did not participate in the “destruction”, became the “builders” together with the generation below. They were the teachers-to-be of the May Fourth students. As expressed in Chen Duxiu’s writings, they were suspicious of patriotic politics because they saw the failure of 1911 (Schwarz,1986:33). According to them 1911 Revolution failed because the political leaders were suspicious against democracy. Regulations like (re)promotion of Confucianism as the organizing engine of the new state led to the recession of the ideal of nation-state (Schwarz,1986:34). That alienated the intellectuals from the institution-building and let them alone in the political-intellectual arena. Despite this political marginalization, Yuan Shikai era marked the shift from anti-Manchu patriotism¹² to democracy for national salvation among intellectuals (Schwarz,1986:37). This was an important step to systematization of the thought behind the regime change. It signified the transition from the “destruction” phase (which was mobilized by simple Otherization of the previous regime/ruling elite) to “building” phase (which was placed under a broader theoretical framework).

¹⁰ Indeed, earlier Chinese reformists influenced Japan at that time with their attitudes towards West but they failed in their home country. Hence, there was a major difference between Japanese and Chinese “enlightenments”: “Chinese intellectuals had to cope repeatedly with the phenomenon of political failure” (Schwarz,1986).

¹¹ Besides the iconoclasm of the transitional generation, Both rediscovered the importance of culture in the aftermath of bungled politics

¹²The anti-Manchu Han patriotism developed around the idea of “guocui” (national essence), Alongside, concepts of ethnicity (minzu) and national learning (guoxue) were also popularly advocated

Disillusioned by the political developments of the last century, the failure of 1911 Revolution in particular, the teachers of academically and politically influential Peking University (Beida)¹³ gathered together around a literary journal named *New Youth*. The prominent members were Cai Yuanpei, Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lu Xun. The roots of the movement can be traced back to early Republican years. The atmosphere in Beida changed significantly in 1912 when Yan Fu became the president. Still, it was after 1916 when Cai Yuanpei took the office of presidency, Beida began to take the role of intellectual center of China¹⁴.

The famous “Beida spirit” (Beida Xuefeng) shifted from classical teaching’s “daring to know” to modern “daring to do”. It did not mean the prioritizing of political action on academy but the active involvement in knowledge creation instead of passive receiving a (semi-)divine source of knowledge. Along this line, they advocated practical education (education for a world view, that is, knowledge for the sake of knowledge) instead of imperial examination. This active involvement brought a vision of purpose to the disillusioned intellectuals of Beida (Schwarz,1986:48).

The Beida teachers aimed at coexistence of national heritage and Western modernization. They had a profound knowledge of Chinese classical learning, and they did not advocate abandonment of it, they themselves referred to it wherever necessary¹⁵. However, they proposed adaptation of the Western thinking not only in educational but also administrative issues in order to achieve modernization in full sense.

¹³ The most prestigious institute in the country, according to Spence (Spence,1986: 156) and thepropaganda center of dynasty since 18th century, according to Schwarz (Schwarz, 1986:90)

¹⁴ Some argues that contrary to the common belief it was Yan Fu, not Cai Yuanpei, who created the environment favorable to *New Youth (Xin Qingnian)* and even *New Tide (Xin Chao)* circles (Schwarz,1986:48), however, it is better to call it first impetus rather than creation in full sense. Yan Fu broke the dominance of classic scholars and introduced the Western education to some extend. The favorite thought of his era was Social Darwinism which was also compatible with the idea of prioritizing of national interest over individual liberty.

¹⁵ Cai Yuanpei’s resignation letter started with a idiom related to an ancient story. (Spence).

They continued translation of major Western literary and philosophical works and introduced Western style literature¹⁶, differing from their predecessors. However, it is important to make it clear that they did not abandon the entire Chinese culture by introducing Western styles; they wanted dismissal of Confucianism only as the organizing engine of the system.

The most important difference of the New Youth circle from the previous examples was that they realized that there is no modernization without the contribution of masses. They had realized that 1911 Revolution failed because of the lack of the consent and support of the people but what they also realized during their studies in New Youth was that if, borrowing Schwarz's phraseology, "there is no revolution without intellectual emancipation", there is no intellectual emancipation if the masses are not emancipated. So, they began to write in popular language (baihua) instead of old scholarly tradition and organized trips to rural parts of China to explain their stand. During these encounters with the people, they realized that they should first transform themselves to be able to transform people. Hence, the most important contribution of New Youth to Chinese intellectual transformation was the cultural awakening which took the form of changing themselves:

The self-transformation of men of letters thus emerged as the goal of the New Culture movement, even before the demonstration of May 4th, 1919..... The new intellectuals thus emerged when, and only when, they could see how they themselves fell short of the message of enlightenment (Schwarz, 1986:56-7)

The main tenet of the intellectuals of this circle was they did not see modernization as a partial project to keep up with the developed countries but a systemic-level problem (radical transvaluation of values).

To sum up, for the transitional generation the gap between old and new scholarly traditions was not so wide; but as a part of their self-transformation they broke up with the past and collaborated with younger generation (New Tide) which was more coherent and had shared purpose. That is, Hu Shi's moderate, intellectual New Youth opened its doors to youth but simultaneously lost blood to

¹⁶ Characters in famous author Lu Xun's novels were taken from daily life and were still able to reflect the broader political issues. Ah Q in "The Story of Ah Q" and the

pro-CCP radicalism (some of the more radical writers reorganized under another magazine named *Weekly Critic*) (Schwarz,1986:64).

There was another literary journal published in Beida in late 1910s. It was called *New Tide* and belonged to students of Beida. It was the second journal published in Beida after *New Youth*. It was published at the same time with (and, in the name of freedom of expression, protected and supported by) teachers' *New Youth*. The forerunners are Yu Pingbo (Qinghua University president-to-be, interpreter of *Dream of Red Chamber*), Gu Jiegang (Chengyu). Even though this new, politically active generation was symbolized with *New Tide* magazine, there were actually three journals which represented different stands: *Guogu* (National Heritage) –culturally conservative; *Guomin* (Citizen) – politically activist; and, *Xinchao* (*New Tide*) -enlightenment-oriented.

Their quest was for a scientific world view and their rebellion was against the familial ethnic of subservience. For their goals they turned to the West and attacked on National Character formulation of conservative reformists.

New Tide circle was more coherent than *New Youth* teachers for whom generation the gap between old and new scholarly traditions were not so wide. *New Youth* was far more radical than *New Youth* in refuting the Confucian legacy and the adoption of Western values and concepts¹⁷. They seconded the *New Youth* quest for modernization of people; however they were more interested in patriotic politics - since those could spare the disillusionment of failure. Moreover, the political environment of the day led them to different, a more politicized way.

Once one generation had become more daring, more independent in the uses of its own language, the next generation was able to carry both the daring and the knowledge onto the streets of Beijing (Schwarz,1986:38).

Schwarz calls the *New Tide* generation “beneficiaries of the tradition” since they knew tradition but were spared from the disillusionment and pressure it had caused. This freedom let them acquire an aesthetic appreciation for it as a cultural

¹⁷ It is important to differentiate between *New Youth* and *New Tide* in terms of their literary plea since the latter is the one sometimes regarded as self-Orientalization or Occidentalism in Western academy (Shih).

inheritance contrary to the teachers' generation: "a bitter familiarity with classical learning as a pedagogical regimen" A metaphor used to compare New Youth and New Tide is that snake for the former since they attack the old tradition; and the owl for the latter since they take the burden of enlightening the masses (Scharz,1986:64).

Associated with the May Fourth Movement (told below) which was primarily political, New Tide's quest for modernization was left behind to the secondary position and the members of the circle eventually leaned to (Chinese) Marxist interpretation of Enlightenment. It is more radical, closer to communism and advocated a new, more activist version of Enlightenment.

By *New Tide*, the focus of the May Fourth Enlightenment shifted from culture in general to language change more specifically (Schwarz,1986:75) but still, New Tide joined the 1917 Literary Reform led by their teachers in Beida, namely, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Qian Yuanhang. Their motto was "realism" and "to educate the masses". In line with this thought they organized Commoners' Education Lecture Society. There were two groups collaborating in this society - New Tide (culturally radical) and Citizen (politically active for national salvation).

The May Fourth movement started with an external cause - the announcement of the terms of the Versailles Treaty after WWI. According to the treaty, Germany's territorial rights in China were not returned to the Chinese, as had been expected, but were instead turned over to the Japanese. The outpouring of popular outrage combined with a new nationalism with repeated cries for a "new culture" (advocated by New Youth and New Tide circles) that would restore China's international position.

Since it got started as a reaction to foreign affairs, it is argued (even by the participants, like Hu Shi) that it did not develop in its natural course. However, it was still a significant turning point from mental transformation to social revolution and it possessed the intellectual and organizational capacity to be an "idol-smashing" move (Schwarz,1986:126).

As shown before, the new intellectuals emerged in China out of a complex process of generational collaboration (Schwarz,1986:92). However, the

politicization of the New Culture movement split the Beida intellectuals into two; teachers and students. At the beginning they were acting together against the political violence but this did not last long. Very few of the teachers participated in the political movement whereas all of them stayed in Beijing and kept New Youth running. On the other side, most of the students in one way or another became politicized. The followers of Citizen decided to fight with the communists and most of the New Tide writers decided to move to South to continue their literary work when they were forced to join CCP. There, they developed a solely literary movement which had considerable impact on modern Chinese literature.

The ideological overture to the May Fourth Movement was the Great War in Europe and the outbreak of the October Revolution (He,1991:501). Meanwhile, because of Lenin's call for revolution to other countries in 3rd International (1921) a considerable number of Soviets came to China. Their impact on the Chinese, and especially on Beijingers, was to transform anti-traditionalism into socialism. (Spence,1981)

Before these developments, the New Culture activists tended to prioritize culture over politics (probably due to the disillusionment of failure of political revolution, according to Schwarz,1986:6). There were some who tried to eliminate the contradiction between cultural critics and quest for national salvation (like Zhou Cezong, Schwarz,1986:290-1) but the problem was that the political revolutions tried to politicize them before they reached a common ground intellectually.

The political developments in 1920s were marked with violence. The May Thirtieth Movement in 1925, the demonstration in Shanghai and March Eighteenth Demonstration in 1926 in Beijing and White Terror of 1927 were major and violent events - a great number of students and workers were killed. They were much larger in extent than the earlier May Fourth movement.

Political violence, which peaked with 1926-7 Massacre, posed a challenge to the evolving ideas of the May Fourth "*enlightenment*" because it changed the nature of the movement. In its early years in Beida, it was free of physical influence and brutality (S147). The high number of casualties of the terror and the

ensorship of media and independent intellectual work caused social atomization (Schwarz,1986:151-2)..

Today's Chinese historians (He, Z., Bu,J., Tang,Y., Sun,K.) tend to claim that the May Fourth was a historical continuity of the New Culture. The New Culture Movement developed into the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and from that time on, Chinese history entered into a brand new stage, the stage of a New Democratic Revolution. (He,1991:504) However, "Enlightenment [modernization attempts of the New Culture movement] developed alongside Revolution, never quite synonymous with it"(Yü,2001) because more of the New Tide and New Youth members gravitated toward literary activities than engagement in practical politics even though they did not lose contact with the ones who chose politics (Schwarz,1986:152).

For New Youth Society's split into two between the left wing under Chen's leadership and the liberal wing in Beijing headed by Hu Shi (Yü,2001:309).

The tension between the commitment to criticize the Chinese cultural legacy from within and the determination to save the nation from increasingly bloody assaults from without deepened in the decade after the May Fourth (Schwarz,1986:146).

Both sides had their reasons. Marxists were suspicious of Liberals because they were not anti-imperialist/foreign. For them, anything foreign was related to imperialism. (Schwarz,1986:146) For Liberals, overpoliticization of the literary movement was dangerous because the concern to comply with the party politics would undermine intellectual autonomy before it could be securely established in China. Hu Shi often regretted that the student movement of 1919 was an unwelcome interruption as far as the Chinese Renaissance was concerned.

As a literary movement the New Culture was not explicitly political. On the contrary, the May Fourth was political by nature since it initially developed against the foreign affairs of China. It was enthusiastically welcomed by the Communists since they were advocates of Revolution. Since, as they noted, the Enlightenment movement often preceded political revolution in European countries, they needed an Enlightenment to justify their advocacy of revolution in China (He,1947:97, in Yü,2001:305). "From the political point of view, they

linked both the May Fourth and the New Enlightenment to patriotism.” (Yü,2001:305). Actually it was the Marxist who first interpreted the May Fourth movement in Enlightenment terms because they needed a “New Enlightenment”.

The Enlightenment project designed by Chinese Marxists was ultimately revolution-oriented. It added patriotic feelings to a quest for national salvation through revolution (Yü,2001:308).

The last phase of the May Fourth Movement, the December Ninth Movement of 1935, was in line with populism of the Socialists of the day (who developed the baihua language movement with the motto of “down with intellectual class”). Different from early 30s, the second phase, i.e. New Enlightenment Movement of 37-39 was anti-Japanese and anti-feudal (Schwarz,1986). Schwarz says that it was a direct outgrowth and fulfillment of the aspirations of the original student movement of 1919(Schwarz,1986:218), but it is hard to second this statement. It was all-inclusive because it was highly politicized and Socialism-oriented whereas (as shown above) even during the most-politicized times, the May Fourth generation preserved its academic stance.

After 1911, Confucian Association by Kang Youwei introduced Cosmopolitanism. Western ideas introduced in the period between 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement: Kantian philosophy, anarchism, neo-idealism, pragmatism, individualism, and certain types of utopian socialism. Kantian philosophy, in particular, was promoted by reformists like Yan Fu (in his early period), Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei; and, revolutionaries: Zhang Taiyan, and Cai Yuanpei. Cai Yuanpei also advanced the theory of evolution during the 1898 Reform Movement. Theories of evolution were advocated by reformists before radicals. Whereas the reformists used the theory of evolution to defend gradual change (reform) and oppose revolution (skipping over historical stages) the revolutionary democrats simply and directly took revolution itself to be progress, and raised the slogan: “Revolution is the evolution of the 20th century” (He,1991:490). The conditions for the New Culture Movement were created by Restoration Society under the name of “civic morals”, i.e. “world-wide education”: a philosophical course by adopting the pre-Qin (non-Confucian)

masters, Indian philosophy and European philosophy (and synthesizing them) in order to break the two thousand year habits of Confucianism.

The turning point for the modernization of China was that the revolutionaries and intellectuals who were mainly anti-foreigner and culturalist until 1911 realized the necessity and inevitability of “a radical transvaluation of values” (Schwarcz,1986). There were two main tenets to be changed: - Central Kingdom was the miracle of world civilization and -the conventions governing social hierarchy were ideally suited to the needs of human nature Schwarz). Duara puts it as the organic unity between the cultural and political order in the Chinese imperial system :

In this system, universal kingship integrated the cultural-moral order with the sociopolitical order. The collapse of the legitimating principle of the elite’s cultural-moral order, which subsequently enabled the totalistic attack on the traditional order (Duara,1995:217)

The common debates about the New Culture movement are whether it was the Chinese Renaissance or Enlightenment and whether the conservative or radical forces were dominant in the process. In both topics it is dangerous to make rigid classifications. Because, as it is mentioned before those who are often labeled as “conservative” critics of the May Fourth movement turned out to be no less critical and no less Westernized than their “progressive” rivals (Yü,2001:314). Besides, the May Fourth was a cultural movement but neither Chinese Renaissance nor Chinese Enlightenment for the simple reason that a great variety of Western ideas and values other than those of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment were also introduced in to China during the same period¹⁸. (Yü,2001:311). Spence states that the influence of Bertrand Russel and Tagore who was popular at that time in Europe characterized the Westernization in China. Therefore, three models of development, namely Western, Indian and Chinese were commonly analyzed in Chinese academic circles. These inquiries resulted in questioning Chinese place in Western paradigm.

¹⁸ Anarchism (in French style), feminism, gradualism and Social Darwinism are popular themes in Chinese debate on Traditionalism vs. anti-traditionalism (Spence,1981).

Note that Shih links the embracement of Western thought to the nature of semicolonialism since “semicolonialism chiefly operated through economic and cultural imperialisms and not territorial occupation” (Shih,2001:371). According to her, Westernization came not as a result of direct Western imposition; it was not received with resistance. Quite on the contrary, the modernization-as-Westernization “was more the object of metropolitan cultural imperialism than colonial cultural domination” which means “the wholesale rejection of Chinese tradition by the Occidentalists can also be read as an act of Orientalism: Chinese tradition became modern China’s “Orient” that needed to be denounced in order for modern China to become worthy member in the Occidentalized world”. She gives the language as an example:

The marked difference in the two types of linguistic colonization is that a colonial apparatus instituted English in India, while the Chinese eagerly absorbed English and other powerful foreign languages (French and Japanese especially) due to the influence, prestige, and cultural superiority exerted directly by a faraway metropolitan cultures, not colonial cultures present in China(Shih,2001:375).

However, according to other scholars, all these different schools of thought united in a creative synthesis: the importation of Western thought and systematic reorganization of national heritage (e.g. Schwarz,1986; Yü,2001; Liu,1995). That is to say, in the interest of self-understanding, China’s old tradition must be critically and systematically re-examined in order to reconstruct the Chinese civilization (Yü,2001:313).

Hence, during the May Fourth era beginning with the literary revolution of 1917, a paradigmatic change took place in the development of radicalism in modern China. From this time on, whether in criticizing the tradition or advocating changes, Chinese intellectuals would almost invariably invoke some Western ideas, values or institutions as ultimate grounds for justification. (Yü,2001:312). There were three specific tasks in front of all new intellectuals regardless of their differences: 1- study problems; 2- to support new ideas, new learning, new literature, new faith from the West; 3- apply the critical spirit to the study of the Chinese intellectual tradition (Yü,2001:312-3).

Specifically, what Lydia Liu calls the shift from racial/cultural to literary/cultural consciousness (Liu,1995:241) was achieved during the “Culture Building” debate between two camps: National Essence and National Character. The National Essence group was mainly composed of the first generation of intellectuals. Their thoughts were modeled on the West even though they had developed as a reaction to West. Their advocacy of cultural essentialism was often criticized as conservatism, self-Orientalization. Their idea of combining Western materialism and Eastern spiritualism was accused of mystification. They were Han nationalist –and, by definition, anti-Manchu- but also anti-Confucianist. They proposed national learning as an alternative to imperial learning.

National Character was the name given to radical New Culturalists. They were realists and opposed cultural essentialism and advocated abandonment of the idea of uniqueness. According to Hu Shi, one of the leading intellectuals of the movement, “..this new movement was led by men who knew their cultural heritage and tried to study it with the new methodology of modern historical criticism and research.” (in Yü,2001:300). His understanding of historical continuity meant renovation rather than destruction of the Chinese tradition. His rejection is far from total. Central to the notion of Renaissance was his belief in the possibility of breathing new life into the old civilization of China. This is a far cry from a total break with the Chinese past (Yü,2001:306)

As we stated before, between these two main camps, there are some others too. For example, the New Century group proposed Esperanto as the solution of language problem; or the radicals of Critical Review who proposed return to the ancient Greek and Judaic works in the name of authenticity. They also promoted New Confucianism in a historical analysis.

To conclude, what is the significance of the New Culture movement for China? Opinions vary. Yü claims that Renaissance preceded Enlightenment by two decades but gave way to the later eventually as a manifestation of radicalization of the Chinese mentality (Yü,2001:308). Hu Shi claims that “the May Fourth cleared the old cultural ground through its destructive work and thereby opened up China for the real possibility of cultural reconstruction, but the important thing was to start a true Chinese Renaissance by going beyond the

Enlightenment.” (Yü,2001). Contemporary Chinese thinking agrees that the process was incomplete but in another way: “they indeed liberated the Chinese people ideologically to a great degree.... [it] was a necessary step toward a new stage in Chinese history, but it was far from being sufficient”. For Liu, it was “far from having set China on the irreversible, glorious path of enlightenment, the event of 1919 marked the first of a series of incomplete efforts to uproot feudalism while pursuing the cause of a nationalist revolution” (Liu, 1995:7)

Interestingly, even though all agree that the New Culture was an incomplete process, they disagree on what way it was incomplete. Yü includes every active member of the May Fourth intellectual as a participant of the New Culture movement (Yü,2001:313) but the other way round is not so easy. That is, the very intellectuals who personally involved in the movement (we previously saw that it was not only Hu Shi but most of the New Culture intellectuals preferred to stay out of the new shape it took) thought that the politicization of the movement undermined the transitory power of it by the simplification of its appeals. Especially the so-called New Enlightenment of 1930s which was centered on anti-intellectualism came as a real disappointment for first generation New Culture intellectuals because what they meant with self-transformation to reach the masses was no way a rejection of their plea for Western scientific learning for the sake of modernization and democracy. The New Culture was an intellectual movement by nature; it should not have been transformed into an anti-intellectual movement. However, it is appropriate here to mention that the leaders of the second New Culture movement were also members of the first one and, contrary to their fellow ideologues they interpreted the second movement as it was. During the first movement, they gradually inclined to the Marxist thought and finally saw the original New Culture thinking as elitist and, even though it rejects Confucian teaching, not radical enough to overthrow the traditional concepts and to build a brand new modern nation (and) state.

As mentioned before, the May Fourth movement always meant different things to different people. Such as contradictory nature may be regarded as its weakness but is also let the involving parties be armed with its proposals in their own struggles. In PRC, the New Culture/May Fourth is regarded as the beginning

of the awakening of masses on the way to a truly modern communist state. In Taiwan it is regarded as an early form of today's nationalism.

Interestingly, as far as I read, similar kinds of different interpretations also exist in the scholarship on the movement. Early works see the New Culture movement as a manifest of disillusionment with political revolution whereas the New Enlightenment was a direct outgrowth and fulfillment of the aspirations of the original student movement of 1919 (Schwarz,1986:297-8). The later works tend to emphasize its literary dimension and discredit as a mere continuation of what had started in the second half of 19th century (Liu,1995).

[It] was a continuation and development of the struggle between Western learning and Chinese learning in the 19th century (He,1991:502).

Still, such different interpretations do not downgrade the fact that the May Fourth/New Culture Movement is a major turning point not only in China's intellectual history but also in its political development. The revolution in China was due to social forces and the international predicament but it was the intelligentsia who aimed at nation-building. Whether Marxist or Nationalist, the outcome of the New Culture movement was "making" the people of a modern state.

5.3. COMPARISON OF SUN YAT-SEN THOUGHT AND NEW CULTURE

Both Sun Yat-sen and the New Culture circle aimed at nation-building. Above all their differences, Sun Yat-sen wanted to create the consent among people whereas the New Culture intellectuals saw nationalism only a means on the way to modernization. For them, modernization of new China was a totalistic project that should have been implemented systematically and comprehensively. Nationalism was a means to reach modernization. Sun Yat-sen's thoughts were

mostly modern, too (perhaps, with the exception of emphasis on ancient culture) but the aim was not modernization itself.

Since they put emphasis on different points (Sun Yat-sen: survival of Chinese state; the New Culture circle: modernization), they have different approaches to Chinese culture as well. The New Culture intellectuals acknowledge Chinese traditional teaching but went even to the point of elimination of it in order to achieve full modernization.

“Rather the extinction of our national quintessence than the definitive extinction of our race” (Chen Duxiu, in Bergere,1994:365)

Sun Yat-sen criticized their radicalism for not being constructive. Sun Yat-sen himself was first and foremost concerned with institutionalization of new China. According to him, every critical attempt should serve enhancement of the state good. He thinks that the 1919 intellectuals enthusiasm to see science and democracy as an inseparable pair was wrong because “the temptations of radical westernization, almost invariably followed by a culturalist backlash” (in Bergere,1994:368). According to Wang, Sun Yat-sen’s total absorption of Western ideas during 1911 Revolution were watered down after May Fourth Movement facing the radicalism of the New Culture intellectuals. From then on, he emphasized a “national” culture (Wang,1999).

In return, the New Culture intellectuals criticized him about his tendency to welcome the Confucian legacy. Indeed, as he did to all kinds of ideology and teaching, he saw no harm in borrowing some notions from Confucianism like filial piety and loyalty. The major novelty in his thought was his concept of loyalty was directed to the state, not to the ruler in classical interpretation of Confucianism. Chen Huaxin advocates that even though his emphasis on the traditional Chinese culture, Sun Yat-sen was aimed at total elimination of Confucianism (Chen,1979).

He preferred the 19th century definition of nationalism (based on objective factors like language and religion). Even while doing this, he felt the necessity to prove this definition again and again.(Bergere,1994:355) The reason why he was doing that, unlike the New Culture scholars who even outgrew this definition

academically, was that his target was the masses who were expected to grow a national sensation from this idea.

Yet the Chinese students were always going on about liberty, believing that the present revolution should imitate that of Europeans. But the Chinese people paid no attention to what they said (Sun Yat-sen in Bergere,1994).

It is important to keep in mind that, among all the generations mentioned in the previous chapters, Sun Yat-sen's intellectual premise should be placed between the reformers/doubters and new intellectuals/builders. That is why; he differs from the New Culture circle in his arguments.

To conclude, Sun Yat-sen and the New Culture Movement should be evaluated together since their strong and weak points were different and, in China's nation-building process, they constituted a complementary view. Sun Yat-sen was primarily political action-oriented. He struggled to build a new independent state as well as to develop of national consciousness among people at the same time. Since he worked for two aims at the same time, his ideas sound amalgamated and incoherent in philosophical terms but they had practical value since they could and they were applicable during the state-formation. That is why, he is the one who is identified as the nation-building leader of China.

On the other hand, the New Culture movement was led by intellectuals and was meant to be a philosophical movement to begin with. That is why, it is more coherent and analytical than Sun Yat-sen thought. However, the very same reason of being an intellectual movement prevents the New Culture thought from being applicable. Since the New Culture intellectuals did not have military and political power to apply their program and their program was not detailed to be applied, their direct political impact was way less than that of Sun Yat-sen's.

6. CONCLUSION

The Revolution in 1911 overthrew the dynasty but failed to replace it with a new state. The republic established right after the revolution failed to be a sovereign entity on the territory that Qing state used to reign because the new state did not have the full consent and support of its people. That is, what the state lacked was to be backed by the people of its own. There are several reasons for this failure: (1) The groups that supported and were actively involved in the revolutionary process (landlords, monarchists, overseas educated students) were seeking their own agenda. The only common target was overthrowing Manchu rule. When this aim was fulfilled the tie that bounded all of these actors was dissolved. (2) The revolutionaries were not ready for the second step of the revolution, i.e. building of a new state. The revolutionary process developed so spontaneously that the revolutionaries could not construct an ideology for the forthcoming state. In fact, the intellectual nature of the revolution was insufficient to create a convincing discourse either because the revolutionaries lacked the intellectual capacity to reason on further institutionalization, or because they lacked the coherence in their thoughts to bring about a program for the new state. (3) The revolution was not the result of a popular action. It was achieved by the collaboration of gentry, students, overseas Chinese and the foreign financial and diplomatic support generated by Sun Yat-sen.

Under these conditions, the late 1910s witness development of a new initiative: the New Culture Movement. It began as an elitist/intellectual modernization project but in time the scholars realized that their project could succeed only if it was understood and supported by the masses. In order to generate public support, they first transformed themselves and freed themselves from their previous elitist attitude (through May Fourth Movement). When the May Fourth Movement popularized the New Culture movement's quest, the modernization attempt was inevitably mingled with people's patriotic feelings. Eventually, the New

Culture Movement became one of the major sources of Chinese nationalism in state- and nation-building.

The transformation of the modernist New Culture Movement into nationalist May Fourth Movement also coincides with Sun Yat-sen's attempts to develop a national ideology and formal announcement of the three principles of the people.

To conclude, the decade-long timing gap between the political revolution and the ideological transformation is the major reason behind the failure of the 1911 Revolution. Hence, the struggle between the Nationalists of GMD (under the leadership of Jiang Jie Shi/ Chiang Kai Shek) and Communists of CCP (under the leadership of Mao Zedong) was not only about the ideology of the regime of the new state but also about nation-building.

The aim of this study is to examine the conditions that brought about the 1911 Revolution and the ones that shaped the future of transition. In the *first chapter* the actors and relations in late 19th-early20th century China are described. The most powerful class in the society used to be gentry-scholar collaboration because the agricultural administrative system gave enormous power to the middle-level rulers and the imperial examination system restricted the social mobility. Moreover, the reforms in late Qing dynasty changed this traditional structure and created unattached classes like foreign educated students and overseas immigrants. Therefore, the gentry-domination in the society and the power relations within the forces involved in the revolution, specifically between the intellectuals and the military, were two major reasons for the transition to continue even after the revolution. Stating that, the study aims to further ask why 1911 Revolution failed to complete the transition and how the transition continued, with the contribution of which forces and with what ideological motive. The legacy that the Republican government inherited was an economic situation with blurred social class lines among a weak bourgeoisie; a strong gentry involved in commercialization and isolated ruling elite. The economy was in between commercialization and corruption (Miller,2000,33-34). In such a predicament neither the intellectuals and the students nor the peasants but the gentry was the class that strengthens its position as a consequence of 1911 Revolution

(Esherick,1976). The chapter asks for whose interest did the regime change, building of new institutions work. Esherick argues that the political-institutional change not accompanied with a radical economic project only reinforced and consolidated the gentry domination in the society. Bergere seconds this argument on the basis that:

[U]nder the cloak of progressivists and Westernist discourse, was essentially the work of conservative social forces: the gentry and the local elites, merchants, officers, and the officials (Bergere,1994:200)

The *second chapter* aims to explore Sun Yat-sen`s role in the situation depicted in the second chapter. the headings in this chapter show the evolution of Sun Yat-sen`s political and ideological orientation over time. Since it was mainly the developments in the revolutionary course which affected the turning points in his life, this chapter comes after the narration of the events. In the years until 1911, he was dealing with the organization of the plots against Qing rule. His main concern was securing as many people and as much financial and military support as possible for the revolutionary cause. Therefore, the revolutionary program was not openly and clearly put. The revolutionary forces were composed of different groups and individuals with one single common goal: anti-Manchuism. When they achieved overthrowing of the dynasty but failed to build the new state, he began to speculate on the reasons of the failure and eventually worked on the reorganization of the revolutionary organizations. Meanwhile, he was trying to reclaim the power in the Nanjing government. Those were years full of political concerns. The following decade witnessed a focus on the ideology. Affected by the aura created by the May Fourth movement, and the new ideas coming from new Soviet state, he reformulated his ideas about state- and nation-building in China. Even though he did not see the accomplishment of his ideals in his lifetime, his intellectual and political legacy is still being discussed.

Once accepting that his thoughts are influential on nation-building in China, the *third chapter* tries to answer these questions. In late nineteenth-early twentieth century China, one can talk about three important schools of thought: Reformists of

late Qing Dynasty; Revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen; and Modernists of the New Culture Movement. As a matter of timing and scope of action the first one was not influential on post-Revolution politics of China. The latter two, on the contrary, are crucial to understand the transition. Therefore, in the following parts these two streams of thought will be discussed and compared.

Concluding, this study aims to show that 1911 Revolution was not successful because its timing did not coincide with the New Culture Movement. 1911 Revolution (changing the political structure), short-lived Republic (changing economic structure) and the New Culture Movement (changing the mentality) should have gone together in order to achieve an overall transformation.

The biggest problem of the 1911 Revolution was the lack of popular support. Revolution failed providing a coherent program to propagate to the masses. In the absence of a strong, convincing ideal to reach, the peasant majority felt reluctant to support, and in the later stages, to protect “their” revolution and easily engaged in local narrow interests. Lacking the masses behind them, revolutionaries soon found themselves stuck in the regional power politics. Even when the Canton government, which eventually assured a position of “national leader” to Sun Yat-sen, was established, Sun Yat-sen was way behind achieving his ideal of nation-state.

It was years after, when the New Culture intellectuals began to work on “making of people” as well of “remaking of intellectuals” for a modernized China that the Revolutionaries realized that they should explain themselves to the people since a new modern state could not be established without its people. However, by this time, the political situation was not conducive to take action and to finish the revolution. Still, the political and ideological roots of the following events, i.e. the Civil War, the 1949 Revolution, the establishment of People’ Republic of China and Republic of China lie in this period of time.

Therefore, I suggest that 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth Movement should be analyzed together as a transitory process. This transitional period is crucial in understanding not only the Chinese history but also the broader history of the day. The Chinese case especially fits to this frame of explanation because of two reasons.

The first is that the fall of Qing Dynasty, the 1911 Revolution, the establishment of the Republic of China and the entire process of transformation was temporary, like a number of other revolutionary transformations, such as Russian, Turkish, Mexican and Indian. The timing of all these examples, combined with the stages of capitalism as the organizing engine of the modern world, necessitates an analysis at structural level. In order to examine the structural dynamics influential on Chinese transition, one should hold the case in comparison with its contemporaries. In addition to comparison, recalling Wolf's theoretization of relational existence, the relations and interactions of these cases should also come under scrutiny.

The second reason is a peculiarity of Chinese case. Explicitly, the 1911 Revolution appears to be interesting because of the strict connections maintained with abroad maintained by either overseas Chinese or the Chinese students abroad. The Diaspora's influence over the political and social transition at the beginning of twentieth century was as crucial as it is today for the economic transition of PRC. Besides, the intellectual histories shows us that the intellectuals traveling all along Europe, the States and the students conducting their higher education especially in (post-Meiji) Japan at the end of nineteenth century were the revolutionaries-to-be. Moreover, it is worth noting that the secret societies and the revolutionary organizations had their organizational ground abroad, especially in Japan. Therefore, it carries great weight to point out the major events and leading intellectual and social waves that surely had an impact over the ideas shaped in the minds of those people.

To conclude, this thesis is a study mainly on Chinese nationalist revolution but can constitute a starting point for a comparative analysis. Esherick says:

The extensive historiography [on Sun Yat-sen and other intellectuals and conspirators in the revolutionary camp] has provided useful insights into the revolutionary conspiracy of the day. Nonetheless, though exiled revolutionary conspirators may capitalize on revolutionary situations, they do not fundamentally cause revolutions. The causes of any revolution must be sought within the country in question. (Esherick,1976:1)

Following this line, taking the actors and processes involved in the Chinese case as comparison points, a research on the other revolutions within the same context can provide us a better understanding on the individual histories as well as the international history.

This study can also provide a ground for further studies on contemporary politics within the PRC, cross-Strait, and Sino-Western relations. With the PRC's opening up since 1980s, the question of Chinese modernization and nation-statehood have become two highly relevant issues for the Chinese political and academic elites advocating liberalization. The nationalism and economic development theses of the three principles of the people are still and often mentioned.

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APPENDIX A

The Three Principles of the People

The summarized Principles here are the version delivered in 1924 as a series of lectures. There was a previous version completed in the form of written work prior to the Revolution but this copy of the Principles was destroyed during an attack to Sun Yat-sen's Shanghai residence by a local warlord after the Revolution. Therefore, a brief comparison with the 1905 version (based on the drafts and quotations) are attached to the end of each principle.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALISM

Lecture 1

The first lecture started with the definition of an ideology or principle (zhuyi). What Sun Yat-sen meant with a principle was the doctrine of the state in China. Then he described the societal structure of China, i.e. people's loyalty not to the state but to their clans and families. In the first lecture, he talked about Han people as a single pure race. Finally, he pointed Japan as a model for national construction.

Lecture 2

The second lecture started with a reference to social Darwinism and its main concept of natural selection/survival of the fittest. He relates social Darwinism to building of nation-states in early 20th century international settlement. Consequently, he talks about Anti-imperialism (Economic imperialism). He called China as a "hypo-colony". There was a repeated emphasis on Han racial

purity despite Mongol and Manchu rules in the second lecture as well. He praised the overthrow of Manchus.

Lecture 3

In the third lecture, he depicted secret societies as repositories for Chinese nationalism; and talked about the history of secret societies with a special emphasis on Taiping Rebellion. It was the first time that he mentions the `national spirit` (guoci) as the essence of the nation-building. The third chapter witnessed a shift from emphasis on the racial purity to cosmopolitanism as a prerequisite of a multiethnic state.

Lecture 4

The fourth lecture started with anti-imperialism. He mentioned the necessity to fight against imperialism. For that, he offered utilizing Wilson's self-determination principle. There were two warnings in the fourth lecture; one was against Russia's "false cosmopolitanism" which could easily turn out to be expansionism against Chinese territory, and the other one against the New Culture Movement's cosmopolitanism which tended to undermine the national values to build a state.

Lecture 5

In the fifth lecture, Sun Yat-sen changed his positive attitude towards Japan and warned against aggressiveness of Japanese army. Then, he listed the means which China could resist external aggression: (1) to appreciate the dangers; (2) to unite. He also returned to the subject of the state-forming method. According to him, the Chinese could build on their family and clan structures to improve their internal organization. This would eventuate in the forming of the state. The reference to Gandhi's policy of non-cooperation illustrates the pacific leanings of Sun.

Lecture 6

In the sixth lecture, he revisited Confucianism saying that the Chinese should preserve what is good in the past and should throw away what is bad. He once more highlighted the importance of loyalty to nation and enhancement of national spirit.

COMPARISON

1905 version of the Principle of Nationalism included use of violence; in 1924 Sun expressed his admiration for Gandhi's passive resistance.

1905 version was explicitly against Manchus and advocating Han superiority; in 1924 Sun argued that Manchus were absorbed by Han people. He also developed the idea of 'Five Nationalities' (Wuminzu), i.e. equality of ethnic groups in China, in 1924

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY

Lecture 1

Sun Yat-sen started his lectures on the Principle of Democracy with the definition of democracy which was, for him, people's sovereignty. Then he told the history of man and he analyzed theocracies, autocracies and monarchies. He mentioned the French & American Revolutions, Rousseau's 'Social Contract' and democracy in Ancient Greece and Rome, and Confucianism. He claimed that world history was moving towards republicanism.

Lecture 2

He identified the Principle of Democracy as the equivalent to the second idea of French Revolution's slogan: 'equality'. He said that foreigners criticize China for being 'like a sheet of loose sand'. He, quite the contrary, believed that the Chinese had too much liberty. To Sun, liberty is 'to move as one wished with an organized group'. The second lecture of Principle of Democracy also included

a critic of the New Culture movement. He thought that, contrary to what the New Culture Movement argued, China needed democracy rather than liberty (Sun differentiated between these two) because “China now had to unify its people for the struggle for national freedom for which personal liberty had to be sacrificed”. In the second lecture he redefined people’s sovereignty as the political equality of all citizens. Finally, he set the goal as “for the happiness of our four hundred million people”.

Lecture 3

The main theme of the third lecture was equality. According to Sun, equality was not a natural right because there was no equality in Nature. States should avoid ‘false equality’. However, autocracies had also pushed natural inequality to artificial extremes. True equality in human society was equal political rights. In China social inequality was less than Europe because social mobility was possible since there was no hereditary heretical system in China. Since there is no equality, people can be divided into three groups: the discoverers, the promoters and the practical men.

Lecture 4

In the fourth lecture, he dealt with the federalism question. According to him, federalism was not suitable for China because it might cause partitioning of China by local warlords. He thought if federalism was properly applied to the Far East, China could unite with other Far Eastern countries in a federation. He also underlined the importance of universal suffrage, lack of which caused the failure of the French Revolution. He developed the basic framework of the legal system in China. According to that system there were four popular rights that China should borrow from West: suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum. The ideal regime to realize these four rights was the representative government. That was the objective of 1911 Revolution but failed since many of the representatives were financially corrupt.

Lecture 5

The fifth lecture dealt with the problem of democracy. Sun advocated that China must follow the world's tendency to democracy but not the Western pattern. Still, China should learn from Western governments' experiences and Western scholarship. In this lecture Sun made a distinction between sovereignty and ability.

Lecture 6

In the sixth lecture, he described the government as a machine (jikuang). He proposed that a high-powered, strong government, given China's large population and resources could achieve much. He developed the idea of five-power Constitution: executive, legislature, judiciary, censorship and civil service examinations (last two were ancient Chinese institutions).

COMPARISON

There was neither a distinction between sovereignty and ability nor mention of the National Assembly in 1905.

THE PRINCIPLE OF LIVELIHOOD

Lecture 1

The first lecture of the Principle of Livelihood started with a critic of Marx. According to Sun Yat-sen, Marx was wrong because the socialized distribution, heavy taxation of capitalists, increased productive prevented a clash between classes. Sun proposed that the society should progress through a harmonizing rather than a clashing of the workers' and capitalists' interest. Class war is not a cause of social progress.

Lecture 2

Each country has its own method to deal with livelihood problem. In China, the method was equalization of landownership and the regulation of the capital. China was not yet highly industrialized and therefore did not need class struggle unlike West. Sun Yat-sen put the difference between the Principle of Livelihood and Communism as that of method rather than principle. He said that the 'minsheng' principle was Confucius' hope of a 'great commonwealth'.

Lecture 3

The third lecture dealt with the food problem in China. The peasants should be liberated and given their own land to till. He proposed using France's example of intensive agriculture as a solution to China's agriculture problem. He also mentioned China's other problems such as poor-quality clothing, lack of adequate shelter, and transport difficulties.

Lecture 4

The fourth lecture dealt with the problem of clothing and sericulture. Sun proposed that the Chinese should buy native products and boycott foreign cloth and also should secure the control of the Maritime Customs.

Note: Sun Yat-sen died before he completed his lectures on the Principle of Livelihood. Later, Chiang Kai-shek wrote two additional chapters to the Principles but they were not meant to complete the original Principles.

APPENDIX B: PHOTOGRAPHS*

* All Photos are Taken By The Author in Central Governmet Museum (Zong Tong Fu), and Sun-Yat sen's Mausoleum (Zhongshan Ling). Nanjing, China: May 2005



“Tianxia wei gong” (All under heaven belongs to the people) -Sun Yat-sen’s famous words to describe the shift in the source of sovereignty with the 1911 Revolution



1888年，孙中山与好友陆皓东等人捣毁庙中偶像，这是当年的北极殿。
The village of the Beiji Temple at Shiqiang — Dr Sun and his friend Lu Haodong toppled the idols in it

The village temple in which Sun Yat-sen destroyed the deities when he was first converted to Christianity




Sun Yat-sen with his friends from the Medical School. They shared a strong anti-Manchu feeling



One of the revolutionary newspapers published in Guangdong prior to the uprisings



The flag used in Guangzhou Uprising



Dr Cantlie –Sun Yat-sen’s teacher and protégée in London years



Sun Mei - Sun Yat-sen’s elder brother who sponsored his education in Macao




Gate of *Zong Tong Fu* (Provisional Presidential Palace) after 1911 Revolution





Assassination of Song Jiaoren in attempt to the Second Revolution



Sun Yat-sen's declaration to oppose Yuan Shikai



总统府秘书长 胡汉民
(1 8 7 9 - 1 9 3 6)

Hu Hanmin(1879----1936), Secretary-General of President's Office

字展堂，广东番禺人。早年留学日本。同盟会员。追随孙中山策划西南诸次起义，1911年参加广州起义。曾任广东都督。1912年1月任南京临时政府大总统府秘书处秘书长。后任过广州军政府交通部总长、总统府文官长、政治部长、国民党中央执行委员、广东省长、代理大元帅等职。1927年后任南京国民政府常委、中央宣传部长、立法院长。1931年被蒋介石软禁，释放后居住香港。1936年1月在广州病逝。

Courtesy name: Zhan-tang; native of Panyu, Guangdong. Member of China Federal Association. Military Governor of Guangdong. Secretary-General, President's Office, Nanjing Provisional Government in 1912. Minister of Communications; Governor of Guangdong, Guangzhou Military Government. Acting the Generalissimo. Member of Central Executive Committee, KMT. Standing member; President of Legislative Yuan, Nationalist Government. Arrested by Chiang Kai-shek in 1931 and released soon, and left Nanjing to live in Hong Kong. Died of illness in Guangzhou in Jan. 1936.

Hu Hanmin – The closest man to Sun Yat-sen's for long years



教育部总长 蔡元培
(1 8 6 8 - 1 9 4 0)

Cai Yuanpei(1868----1940), Minister of Education


字鹤卿，浙江绍兴人。清朝补翰林院编修。早年提倡新学，宣传革命。任上海爱国女校校长，中国教育会会长等职。组织光复会并加入同盟会。1912年1月任南京临时政府教育部总长。后任国民党中政会常委、大学院院长，以及北京大学、交通大学、中央大学校长、中央研究院院长等职。与宋庆龄等人一道成立了“中国民权保障同盟”，任副主席。1940年3月在香港病逝。

Courtesy name: He-qing; native of Shaoxing, Zhejiang. Junior compiler of Hanlin Academy. Member of China Federal Association. Minister of Education, Nanjing Provisional Government in 1912. Member, Standing Committee, Central Political Council, KMT. President, Beijing, Communications and Central Universities. President, Academia Sinica. Organized China Protection of People's Rights League with Soong Chingling et al. Died of illness in


Cai Yuanpei –President of Peking University during May Fourth Movement



Sun Yat-sen as a military commander during Nanjing Government



A. Joffe –The first Soviet advisor to Sun Yat-sen




Sun Yat-sen with Guomindang members



Sun Yat-sen and his wife, Song Qing-ling




Sun Yat-sen and Song Qing-ling in front of the first China-made plane




1924年11月，扶病北上时的孙中山。
Sun Yat-sen was in illness in Nov. 1924

The last photograph of Sun Yat-sen before his death.



Sun Yat-sen and Song Qing-ling on their way to Beijing to negotiate with Northern warlords (1924)



Funeral of Sun Yat-sen



Mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing



Mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing