

**AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH MODERNITY THROUGH DISCOURSES OF
MASCULINITIES**

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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH MODERNITY THROUGH DISCOURSES OF MASCULINITIES

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This dissertation intends to undertake an analysis of one of the most deeply-rooted dichotomies in Turkey's political and cultural history, -the Islamist-Kemalist divide- through a cultural, interdisciplinary and gender-conscious approach. Both the Kemalist and the Islamist identities situate themselves vis-à-vis the Other, as if they were mutually exclusive entities. However, when and if these formulations are approached as culturally shaped discursive practices, it is also revealed that they operate with and within similarities, continuities and hybridities. Intellectuals on both sides derive their metaphors from a common cultural and rhetorical pool. The cultural analysis of seemingly opposite ideological positions in Turkish political transformation through the gender lens in general and masculinities in particular identifies the various sites of social power that exist in Turkish society today. The study pays particular attention to conceptualizations of masculinity and femininity accompanying Turkey's modernization.

The relative newness of the subject matter, the interdisciplinary approach it necessitates, and the recentness of the theoretical literature and methodological applications, as well as the paucity of empirical work in the context of Turkey employing these parameters necessarily draws the limits of this work as well as showing for the multidisciplinary, “unorthodox” character of the approach. The study contends that such a cultural analysis of Turkish political transformation through the lens of gender in general and masculinities in particular might create a new epistemological terrain, one that goes beyond the current epistemologies mired in ontological dualities.

Keywords: Masculinity, Modernization, Hegemonic Masculinity

ÖZ

TÜRK MODERLEŞMESİ VE ERKEKLİK SÖYLEMLERİ

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Doktora, Siyaset Bilmi ve Kamu Yonetimi Bolumu

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Bu çalışma, Türk modernleşmesine eşlik eden erkeklik söylemlerini ve rollerini, İslamcı-Kemalist ikilemine eleştirel yaklaşarak incelemiştir. Tez farklı ideolojik kesimler arasındaki geçişlilikleri ve ortaklıkları tartışmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türk kültürel ve siyasi tarihi boyunca beliren süreklilikleri takip etmiş, cinsiyet rolleri ve erkeklik kalıplarının modernite projesine ve hegemonik erkeklığe nasıl eklemelendiğini irdelemeye çalışmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Erkeklik, modernleşme, hegemonik erkeklik.

To My Voyages

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the question “how compatible is Islam with the norms of the Secular World?” has become ever more imperative on the agendas of both international and national politics. While the need to overcome polarized generalizations is a pressing one, there is, paradoxically, a growing tendency to polarize the world even further. What has been interpreted as the “retreat to safe spaces of the like-minded” (Sennett, 1992) is gaining pace with far-reaching consequences for all sides involved. Today, the imminent danger that awaits us is an escalating tendency to see the Muslim world in general, and the Middle East in particular, as a monolithic whole, a *terra extraneus*, which is, in turn, assumed to be *sui generis* to the extent of posing a structural incompatibility with the fundamental norms, values and ways of the Western World. Significantly, this generalized ahistorical opposition converges too often with yet another “Other”ization, which is one that is continually procreated by a range of anti-Western discourses both within and outside the Middle East. Interestingly, in this reciprocal expulsion, the urge for what Merleau-Ponty names “ontological security” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973), as well as the reliance on cultural definitions of “rationality”¹ play a crucial role. According to each exclusivist side of the West-Middle East duality, there is something dreadfully “deviant” about the Other, an aberration that is caused, among other things, by either a lack or excess of rationality.

1 The literature on rationalism threads its way into contemporary analyses of the phenomenon of “Islamic revivalism”. For more on this see Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

A closer analysis of this trafficking of generalizations reveals that the banishment of the Middle East outside the realm of rational democratic order is nothing new² and has had several historical turning points³(Arkoun,1994). After all, historically, “the task of Orientalism was to reduce the endless complexity of the East into a definite order of types, characters and constitutions.”(Turner, 1994: 21) Likewise, in plenty of films, novels, cartoons, and illustrations circulating in daily life (Said, 1997), the Middle East is portrayed as a land where rational thought⁴ comes to an abrupt end, only to be substituted instead by a distinct set of religious values and ideas as the main cultural signifier in social and individual life⁵. Nonetheless, stamping Muslim-hood with the seal of “irrationality” had never been as politically pervasive as it has now become⁶. Thus, in the traffic of cultural stereotypes catapulted from all sides, today more than ever, the distinction drawn between “rationality” and “irrationality” has been thoroughly politicized and the definition of “religiosity” territorialized.

2 For a comprehensive study in this regard see Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East : The History and Politics of Orientalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

3 Several important historical events have been turning points in this trajectory, including the Algerian War of Independence, Third World at the Bandung Conference of 1955, Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War..., further augmenting the intensesness of the “Muslimness” versus “Western world” debate. The point has been evaluated by M. Arkoun in his *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers*, Westview Press, 1994.

4 In Ernest Gellner’s triple classification of fundamentalism, relativism and rationalism as three distinct attitudes toward truth, the last two were respectively associated with post-modernism and modernism, whereas the first path, that of fundamentalism, was connected with mainstream religious orthodoxy in general but Islam in particular. The main distinction between rationality and fundamentalism in this framework was that the former solved its problems through criticism and change whereas the latter, rejecting any sort of critical thought, inevitably resorted to violence. Although fundamentalism was acknowledged to lie at the core of all three monotheist religions, it was Islam rather than the other two that emerged as more extensively and systematically incorporated into it. For further on this classification, see Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, London: Routledge, 1992.

5 The gap among zones of religions and forms of civilizations was deemed to be so cavernous that these loomed as the main actors of irreconcilable conflict in Samuel Huntington’s geopolitical scenery. See S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Simon & Schuster, 1998.

6 The fact that many behind the 9/11 attacks were educated men who could have lead a normal life should they have chosen to do so, or that many suicide bombers in Israel were young Muslims who could have preferred to work for a promising future had they chosen to live rather than to kill, have been seen as further signs of the bond between “Islamism and irrationality” in both daily parlance and the media. For an assessment that insinuates the poignant puzzles caused by this popular quandary, see Newsweek, “Suicide Bomber”, April 7, 2002.

Given this troublesome context, it has become vitally important to craft more nuanced approaches to the investigation of problems not only about but also within Islam. This, in turn, is predicated upon the employment of recent methodological and epistemological insights offered by interdisciplinary studies. No matter how urgent the themes of present-day international affairs might turn out to be, the dynamics operative in the Middle East cannot be grasped without deeper insight into areas such as cultural history, religious philosophy, literary criticism and gender studies (Keddie, 1978; R. Lewis, 1995; Badran, 1995). Increased attention to these studies also needs to be accompanied by the fine-drawn recognition that neither does Islam possess a solid, static, essential essence, nor does the Middle East constitute a homogeneous topography.

While the distancing of the Middle East continues in different contexts to varying degrees, located at the other end of the pole is the modernist, reformist, secularist structure that has been the ultimate political product of Western European Enlightenment. In this regard, Turkey was thought to be *unique*⁷ as the only Muslim country in the Middle East with a thoroughly secular structure and political culture. In a similar vein, some scholars have interpreted the Turkish case as a notable political achievement and deviation from a regional pattern in a part of the world where democracy has been the exception rather than the rule (Sayarı, 2002: 183).

A common thread that runs through these analyses is a systematic emphasis placed more on the structural and institutional than the cultural. It is mostly in terms of the presence or absence of certain political institutions and processes, for instance, that a certain country is declared to be democratic or not. Yet the analysis of culture and the ways in which culture interacts with these institutions and processes is vital in order to fathom how a certain system reproduces itself. Recent developments in the social sciences in terms of interdisciplinarity and the subsequent emergence of cultural studies as an academic terrain make such analyses of cultural meaning systems viable. Even

⁷ The uniqueness of the Turkish experience has been accentuated by Ernest Gellner as he maintained that Islam was unique among world religions but the case of Turkey was doubly unique in this framework, being the exception of an exception. See E. Gellner, "The Turkish Option in a Comparative Perspective" in S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

though such a culturally-driven approach has been applied to better understand particular aspects and instances of Turkish society, there have not yet been many systematic analyses of Turkish political development through this approach in general, and through a particular emphasis on gender in particular. Yet, culture and gender relations have been very significant elements of the Turkish Republican project of modernity.

Dissertation Scope: In this dissertation, I propose to undertake an analysis of Turkish political transformation through a cultural approach in general and through an emphasis on gender relations in particular. I pay special attention to conceptualizations of masculinity in the Turkish political transformation, for the cultural study of Turkish men and their masculinities in the context of the history of Turkish society is much less developed than the study of women and their femininities. Yet one cannot undertake an analysis of men and their masculinities to the exclusion of women and their femininities because the social construction of gender emerges from the combination of the two sexes; in addition, the more developed literature in the Turkish context on women in general and gender in relation to women in particular has to be drawn upon and read to gain insights into Turkish men and their masculinities. I contend that such a cultural analysis of Turkish political transformation through the lens of gender in general and masculinities in particular might create a new epistemological terrain, one that goes beyond the current epistemologies mired in ontological dualities. Such a terrain would enable scholars to approach societies and the perceived dualities within from the standpoint of culture and shared cultural pools, wherein seemingly conflicting groups appear conjoined in novel patterns, patterns that go beyond the established dualities.

Time Period: I employed this approach first and foremost to comprehend the continuities, repetitive patterns and hybridities in Turkish culture with respect to gender roles and patterns. I wanted to approach the recent emergence of the Islamist movement in contemporary Turkey, a political development that is currently of concern to numerous scholars, with this concern in mind. Yet my analysis into the cultural dynamics of the Islamist movement revealed its interconnection with the Kemalist movement that had dominated Turkish political life since the inception of the Republic

in 1923. Hence there developed the need to include the Kemalist period of the Republic in the cultural analysis as well. Nonetheless, when one approaches Turkish Republican history from the standpoint of cultural formation rather than political system, one has to go back further than the 1923 establishment of the Turkish Republic to the beginning of the interaction of Ottoman society with modernity in the late Ottoman period. For it was back in the late Ottoman period that elements of modernity started to impact the empire especially through a series of military reforms that also expended into education and state administration as well as through increased interaction with Western ideas and institutions that started to reverberate new cultural meanings and repertoires in society.

In today's political climate both Kemalist and Islamist identities situate themselves vis-à-vis the Other, therefore presenting a polarization as if they were mutually exclusive entities. However, when and if these formulations are approached from the cultural perspective as discursive practices, it is revealed that they draw on and benefit from the same political culture. Both the Islamist and the Kemalist male intellectual derive their metaphors from a common cultural and rhetorical pool. I contend that the cultural analysis of the late Ottoman, Kemalist, and Islamist formulations in Turkish political transformation through the gender lens in general and masculinities in particular fully identifies the various sites of social power that exist in Turkish society today, sources that cannot be viewed in their fullest when Kemalism and Islamism are regarded as oppositional narratives against each other. I further investigate the position of *tasavvuf* (Islamic mysticism) as a legacy appropriated by people on both sides, as a cultural site with a potential to blur the boundaries in the Kemalist-Islamist paradigm. Being widely rekindled in present day society and culture *tasavvuf* should therefore be integrated into the analysis with a particular attention to the understanding of masculinities it embodies. Ultimately, such a framework might provide significant insights into analyzing non-Western societies in a manner that epistemologically privileges not the Western-centric theoretical framework but rather the cultural interpretations of the local sites of meaning, which in turn would better capture the dynamics of political transformation diffused throughout social structures.

Questioning the epistemological foundations of the social sciences has been a paramount concern for feminist scholarly work. Thus, not only the themes dealt with but also *how* these themes were dealt with by mainstream academia has been questioned and challenged in the field.⁸ Unfortunately, recent developments in gender and women studies, gay and lesbian studies, or micro histories have been visibly slow and late in penetrating the scholarship of Islamic studies or the Middle East (Zilfi, 2000). Likewise, despite the valuable contributions of a number of scholars (Acar, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1991, 1998; Göçek, 1994; Z. Arat, 1998; Y. Arat, 2000; Durakbaşa, 1998; A. Bora, 2001), the question as to how varied and fragmented Turkey's gender identities and sexualities are still remains a relatively "isolated" topic of research. Given these shortcomings, research needs to proceed at the more basic level of exploring the relationship between self and society, man and woman, as well as among distinct masculinities.

This dissertation proposes to investigate the triple bond between "modernity, hegemony, and masculinity" in Turkey, a country that presents in itself a prolific context wherein a plethora of local, regional, national and global dynamics can be opened to discussion (Lewis, 1993). It needs to be underlined that my research draws its intellectual framework from a variety of disciplines, most notably cultural studies, women's studies, queer studies, hermeneutics, religious philosophy, feminist literary criticism and contemporary political thought. In pursuing this interdisciplinary fusion, the research employs the concept of "masculinity" as a socio-political construct rather than a biologically determined set of behaviors (Evans, 1997; Ackerly, 2000).

Dissertation Outline: The dissertation is divided into four main parts. Chapter One maps out the theoretical terrain and the fundamental conceptual and methodological tools employed throughout the study. To this end, since I approach the analysis of Turkish political transformation through the conceptual lens of gender, I start off with a

⁸ See for instance M. Belenky, B. Clinchy, N. Goldberger and J. Tarule, *Women's ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Method*, Basic Books, New York, 1986; and Shulamit Reinharz, "Feminist Distrust: Problems of Context and Content in Sociological work" in D. Berg and K. Smith (eds) *The Self in Social Inquiry: Researching Methods*, Sage, CA, 1988; and Dale Spender, *For the Record: The Making and Meaning of Feminist Knowledge*, The Women's Press, London, 1985.

literature review on the debate of “nature versus nurture” which is essential for any study on gender issues; after broadly summarizing this debate, I investigate the shifting paradigms in Queer Studies, Masculinity Studies, and gender in the Middle East. All throughout this study, I employ the concepts of masculinity and femininity as culturally constructed categories that are also relational (Butler, 1990: 6), which means that they shall be analyzed as categories that are “neither separable nor fixed” (Weedon, 1987: 73). Hence, I shall employ both in relation with each other.

I next introduce the main components of the cultural approach that I employ in this dissertation, namely the methodological tools of discourse analysis (Reinharz, 1992; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002) and “deconstruction” (Derrida, 1997; Johnson, 1980) which are employed to articulate cultural processes in a society that generate identity politics or gender discrimination (Hirschmann, 1996); these tools enable the scholar to destabilized “normalized” hierarchies by turning them upside down to reveal power imbalances. The relative newness of the subject matter, the interdisciplinary approach it necessitates, and the recentness of the theoretical literature and methodological applications, as well as the paucity of empirical work in the context of Turkey employing these parameters necessarily draws the limits of this work as well as showing for the multidisciplinary, “unorthodox” character of the approach. I shall first identify the meaning clusters that emerge as culturally significant in Turkish society at a particular juncture in time, and then subject these to an interdisciplinary, critical, and deconstructionist reading to develop additional insights into the cultural dynamics of Turkish political transformation. I conclude this part by offering an overview of the literature on gender and the Middle East, as well as the shifting paradigms in the field (Kandiyoti, 1996) to decipher the theoretical terrain from which my analysis will ensue.

Chapter Two commences with an initial focus into the history of modernization in Turkey; it concentrates on the dynamics of Westernization *alla turca*, the nature of modernization as a driving force (Moghadam, 1993:80), and the transformations in the

pace of time (Mardin, 1990) and the recharting of space (Marcus, 1992) that the late Ottoman male cultural elite undertake. I pay particular attention to the distinction between the public and private spaces, the material and the spiritual (Chatterjee, 1993) in order to decipher respectively, “The Material, the Mundane, the Masculine” and “The Spiritual, the Sacred, the Feminine” that emerge in the context of Turkish modernity. Starting with Simmel’s query into the masculinity of modernization, this chapter explores what I term the “de-masculinization of culture” triggered by a number of societal factors, including the impact of a lengthy period of warfare and strife on male gender roles (Ouditt:1994; Bourke:2000; Goldman:1982; Grayzel:1999), a vibrant women’s movement (Zihnioglu, 1993), and the eventual *loss* or *dethronement* of the Father’s dominion in both the symbolic and political order (Parla, 1998; Sirman, 2000).

I shall also focus on how the overall transformation ignited vast anxiety among the Ottoman male elite that became reflected in their writings on “the family” as a microcosm (Duben and Behar, 1991: 199), and resonated with the argument that when the male order is shattered, a flight from femininity ensues (Fedwa Multi-Douglas, 1991). I will argue that the unique cultural figure that the tensions of this period produce is “the dandy”, the effeminate over-Westernized Ottoman young male (Brummett, 1998: 83), who represented a threat in the eyes of the Ottoman male elite with parental authority (Parla, 1998), and came to symbolize the de-masculinization of Turkish men during the process of Westernization (Moran, 1977). I then focus on the cultural sites of meaning created by Ottoman literature to analyze how the human body and sexuality was perceived (Belge, 1998) within and above the fictive worlds constructed by the novelists in relation to their sons/readers (Parla, 1998; Yaraman, 2001). I end with a discussion of the impact of the dethronement of the father (Sirman, 2000), which figuratively and literally delegates the task of the guarantor of cultural stability and continuity to mothers⁹. The main cultural site of meaning I employ in tracing the nature of this gendered transformation are the novels, novellas, newspaper articles that both fabricated and ossified the texts and contexts of masculinity and femininity in a society

9 For a theoretical background in this regard see also Carol Pateman, “Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Citizenship” in *Beyond Equality and Difference*, G. Bock and S. James(eds), London: Routledge, 1992.

on the brink of dissolution into a new regime. These stereotypes, in turn, played a salient role in legitimizing the newly imagined nation-state (Anderson, 1991) and in fabricating the political aesthetic of ‘nationness’ (Bhabha, 1990). It will also be noted that this period of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire also saw the emergence of a highly vigorous and significantly, multifarious, multicultural, multiethnic women’s movement (Karakışla, 2001) with a considerable range of publications (Çakır, 1991; Demirdirek, 1993; Durakbaşa 2000; Zihnioğlu, 2003) cultural/political/economic targets to fight against and an independent agenda to set. It is this legacy that the Kemalist male elite would eventually succeed, to not only expand and extend, but also to confine and centralize (Yavuz, 2000). As the Turkish nation-state was forged (Zurcher 1998) and the process of modernization accelerated, prototypes of gender and ethnicity served as the cement holding the patriarchal structures together with the nationalist ideologies (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Jayawerdana, 1986).

Chapter Three studies the emergent Turkish nation-state through an analysis of the discursive practices of the Republican elite with a particular attention to the texts and contexts of masculinity brought along. The rise of nationalism, the articulation of the Republican projects of modernity and secularism pinpointed women as the touchstone of the new nation whereby a shift occurs from the late Ottoman cultural metaphor of “fathers and sons” to the Republican one of “fathers and daughters.” As a part of its reforms to achieve complete modernity, the new Republican regime launched an attack against the age-old segregation of sexes achieving the complete secularization of family law (Zürcher, 2001:181). The reforms of Kemalism penetrated into the private sphere that had up until then been tentatively distanced, if not carefully kept away, from the tides of modernity and Westernization. It is no accident that women’s emancipation and inclusion in the public sphere, a social issue hitherto most resistant to westernization and transformation, was interpreted by the Kemalist elite as *the* symbol of Turkey’s level of secularism and modernity (Acar, 1991: 282), and therefore radically dismantled and refabricated.

The Kemalists contended that women's inclusion in the public sphere, as well as the unavoidable encounters between the two sexes that would result from such an inclusion, would steadily and inexorably bring about a greater transformation in the society and culture at large. It is precisely upon this background that the ideal of a "new woman" was drawn as the devout patriot, self-sacrificing citizen while women's bodies had to be disciplined and "connected to the image of the male body" (Durakbasa, 1998: 147). As several scholars have pointed out (Kadioglu, 1998) being a citizen is not one and the same thing as being an individual and the difference was all the more visible for women who attained their citizenship long before the latter. The ideal woman of Kemalism was an asexual sister-in-arms whose emancipation came at the expense of the individual and sexual identities of women (Göle, 1999: 78). From the very start, culture had been the playground for the Kemalist male elite upon which to build the nation's macro projects (Bora, 1996). As such, there was a pattern of continuity between the late Ottoman and Kemalist male elite, yet the latter was able to forge, through the structure of the nation-state, a centralized cultural machinery with its own system of hierarchy and exclusion so as to be able to designate which cultural forms in Turkey were "valuable" and which were not (Erdoğan, 2003). As the Kemalist elite manipulated cultural capital whenever it could and severely constricted the role and space allocated to social actors outside of the state elite, the ensuing public sphere of the Turkish Republic remained feeble and state-dependent. As noted by Schöpflin (1995: 61), the feebleness of the public sphere facilitates the employment of reference to nationhood as a strategy to delegitimize opponents as "traitors to the nation," rather than the utilization of the same reference to treat political opponents as fellow citizens who share the same political culture.

The wide-range of reforms initiated and executed by the Turkish state elite, together with the concomitant support and guidance of their fathers, made it possible for a large number of upper and middle class urban Turkish women to enter into the professions that had been hitherto closed to them (Toska, 1998; Öncü, 1993; Acar, 1991) thereby rendering women publicly visible. Yet, this visibility seemed to occur at the cost of their femininity; hence "emancipation" came at the expense of Turkish women's

individual and sexual identities. (Göle, 1999: 78) The new cultural emphasis was not on the dainty beauty of women, but rather their young, healthy, fit condition, thereby forging a Republican conception of female beauty (Durakbaşa, 1998:144). Once the image of this new woman was employed as a keystone in the cultural creation of the nation-state (Acar and Ayata, 2000:338), the de-feminization of the women (Tekeli, 1989) active within the spheres of public domain would become a permanent feature of Turkish political life. Hence, paradoxically, as the Kemalist elite brought forward the emancipation of Turkish women the reforms came at the cost of de-feminizing them in the public sphere. The chapter analyzes this trajectory and deciphers cultural fragments of masculinities through the numerous social practices of everyday life, such as singing national anthems, wearing uniforms.

Chapter Four focuses on the Islamist discursive practices that move to the forefront of the public sphere after the 1980's and its symbols of masculinity. Since secularism was a very significant component of the Kemalist project of modernity, the Republican state had effectively shifted the practice of Islam into the private sphere and contained all structures and institutions in the public sphere that related to Islam under the control of the state. Hence, with the advent of the Kemalist reforms, religion, once public in its open display of ritual, hierarchy and authority, was relegated to the private sphere. I thus propose to approach the contemporary "Islamist" cultural rhetoric in Turkey as part and parcel of Turkish modernization. I further claim that as the contemporary Islamist movement in Turkey culturally shifted and moved from the periphery to the center of the Republic, the movement itself also changed profoundly, transformed, and came closer to what Bhabha named "forged at the borders" (Bhabha, 1994).

The chapter continues with a broad overview of the 'Islamism' debate (Mango, 1994; Toprak, 1995; S. Ayata, 1996; Özdalga, 1998; Sayarı, 1994; Turan, 1991; Gülalp, 1999) in an attempt to first determine and problematize the parameters of the Islamist movement in Turkey, and then explore and locate within it the discursive field of the new male Islamist elite (Meeker, 1994). I argue that Alain Touraine's premise that social

movements capable of articulating new definitions of a cultural model have a wider impact on the core values of society as they transform the historicity of that society (Touraine, 1978) applies to the Islamist movement in Turkey. I culturally interpret the new Islamist identity in Turkey as a process that not only transforms conservative groups or identities, but also challenges and thrives upon the established norms, cultural models, and modern perceptions of Turkish society at large (Göle, 2003).

The new Turkish Islamist male intellectual (Toprak, 1981; Meeker, 1994) has emerged against this background and played a crucial role in this “cultural translation” as he engaged in the contemporary discourse of modernity and constantly ferried the idioms of “counter-modernity” and “modernity” into one another. I explore the main cultural themes the Islamist movement focuses on, the cultural rhetoric and metaphors they employ in doing so to investigate the “authenticity” of this voice in the Turkish context. By doing so, I maintain that the heavily rhetorical language of the new Islamist male elite is structurally hybrid and un-authentic. I focus on *tasavvuf*, Islamic mysticism, to demonstrate how the Islamist male elite rekindle *tasavvuf* in an attempt to coopt its language as the language of the select, of the spiritual elite that they aspire to become (Mardin, 1989: 221). I will argue that “hybridity” and “in betweenness” are important conceptual tools in analyzing the position of new male Islamist intelligentsia. This cultural engagement of the Turkish Islamist intellectual in the discourse on modernity demonstrates, I argue, that the Islamist/conservative and Kemalist discursive practices originate from, and in return contribute to the same political culture; as they do so, they derive their metaphors, if not their codes and values, from a common cultural pool. While both sides of the Kemalist-Islamist divide rely heavily on binary oppositions starting with the basic distinction of “us” versus “them”, it is interesting to note that they do so in actual fact by employing words from the same pool of settled, agreed-upon and therefore shared what Habermas named linguistic and ethical convictions (Habermas, 1996:24) only to use them in different, differing contexts. “The veil” is a highly politicized and ideologically loaded issue in present day Turkey and thereby when it comes to issues like the veil the contestation between the two sides reaches dramatic levels. However when it comes to the more subtle question of “how to approach male

gender roles and sexuality?” their differences might shrink as Z. Arat has pointed out by noting that ideologically different positions do not necessarily mean different positions with respect to sexuality and gender formations(Z. Arat, 1997). Therefore, this analysis will primarily concentrate on continuities more than discontinuities, and on hybridities more than exclusivities.

One of the continuities in time and commonalities between ideological parties is what I will define as the “denigration of femininity”. As will be respectively elaborated in chapters three and four, both the Kemalist and the Islamist discursive formations share a paternalistic voice and both make a latent distinction between “womanhood” and “femininity”. The former is matched with patriotism, grand ideals, motherhood and so on while the latter is widely, subtly devalued. Following the denigration of what is culturally deemed to be “effeminate” as an undercurrent, in this vein, I propose that the practices of sexism and homophobia function within a cultural constellation: first the effeminacy in man comes to be detested, as a consequence both femininity and homosexuality are thrown outside the cultural conception of “manhood”, ending up in the privileging of one sex over a disparaged other (cf. Butler, 1990; Grosz, 1994). I return to contemporary Turkish society and culturally analyze the possible connections between the “effeminacy” attributed to gay men and the conceptualizations of femininity since the Republican period. I argue that feminist scholars working on women’s issues in Turkey need to further accentuate the bond between misogyny and homophobia, and this has been one of the deficiencies of feminist scholarship so far.

Finally, I also discuss how this bond unfolds along the national-global axes (Benhabib, 1994) since those masculinities produced in Turkey are connected with the globally produced ones (Freeman, 2001) and since within the global postmodern cultural productions, hegemonic masculinities are "constructed through, not outside, difference" for without the Other, there would be no Same (Hall, 1996: 4). Citizens in different locations of the ideological spectrum are increasingly becoming aware of these “wider regional and global networks”. This is not a smooth running process in a country like Turkey where the state elite has been “for the people despite the people” (Y. Arat, 2000)

and individuality has not fully flourished given that people have become citizens before becoming individuals (Kadioğlu, 1996).

All throughout this study, I detect three M processes that accompany one another throughout the history of the Republican era. These I name: monologization¹⁰ - following Bakhtin's work on monologia (Bakhtin, 1981) as will be explained - modernization and masculinization. I discuss these concepts interrelated and trace their continuity in time. I also add the impact of militaristic culture and symbols as an accompanying M element on the side. Over the last hundred years, there have been significant shifts in the patriarchal precedents operating in Turkey. The Kemalist regime has been profoundly effectual in launching a momentous transformation that penetrated into multiple layers of the society, and in so doing, has coalesced with the cultural matrix of "fathers and sons" with that of "fathers and daughters". Still, there were significant continuities in Turkey's social and cultural history that too often went unnoticed because of the focus on change and ruptures. Overall this dissertation contends that tracing the repetitive patterns behind the competing and coexisting masculinities in Turkey can be profoundly enlightening to transcend the rigidified Islamist-Kemalist paradigm. This, in turn, will be productive in developing more comprehensive ways to fathom the power, longevity and legitimacy of patriarchal precedents in Turkey –precedents shared by male elite along a wide gamut of ideological spectrum and time span.

¹⁰ I derive the term from Bakhtin's framework about "monologic language" which is used to refer to a centripetal language in the sense that all the possible discrepancy and diversity among the languages and the idioms, subcultures' jargons and rhetorics has been centralized and homogenized. I will argue that the control of the culture from above, the elimination of Ottoman words, the elimination of Sufi concepts and the language reform intensified the process of the monologization of Turkish language, especially in written culture. I will therefore further contend that throughout the trajectory of modernization and secularization from above, the written language was pushed towards a monologic structure and away from what Bakhtin named as *heteroglossia* (Bakhtin, 1981).

CHAPTER TWO

MAPPING THE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL TERRAIN

This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the approach I employ in studying masculinities in Turkey. I want to start the chapter by noting that the study of masculinities has been a significant area of analysis in Western social sciences during the last decades, especially in terms of further illuminating how sites of political and social power are distributed throughout society, including into the sexual and the private, and how such distribution pinpoints hitherto missed mechanisms through which political and social power structures reproduce themselves with and within gender patterns.

The significant insight this analysis has revealed has instigated my interest in probing the same subject within the context of Turkey. Even though such an endeavor might reveal significant novel insights into the power dynamics that operate in Turkish society and is therefore fruitful, there are two major problems that need to be overcome. The first problem is that these formulations, generated in and for Western contexts, may inherently naturalize certain elements and dynamics of Western societies which may not be similarly applicable to Turkish society. I think that the theoretical framework of discourse analysis I employ is particularly adept at engaging in developing critical interpretations of accrued meanings. I also undertake a thorough literature review of the subject in order to articulate the possible sites of bias and therefore hopefully avert naturalizing them in my discourse. I still maintain that the subject and the theoretical framework will illuminate more in the Turkish context in relation to power dynamics than they obfuscate and hope to demonstrate that throughout the dissertation.

The second problem emerges from the recentness of the subject. Because most of the scholarly literature on the topic has emerged in the last decade in the West, I have to engage in two endeavors rather than the one endeavor of analyzing the political dynamics of Turkey within an already established theoretical framework: My first endeavor is to discuss the theoretical literature that has emerged in the West around discourse analysis and masculinities. This literature and the methodology it employs contain within it significant epistemological departures from earlier social science approaches, however. The subject of analysis, the meaning structures in society that coalesce around masculinities, are not randomly selected by the researcher but emerge through the discourse members of society engage in themselves. This discourse is often fragmented, and appears haphazard to the trained eye of the social scientist; yet it does have an internal consistency in that it highlights the fragments of meanings members of society agree upon, contest or silence. Hence, the approach attempts to capture the spectrum of meanings in a way that the conventional theoretical frameworks and their systematic random selections often tend to miss.

Once such fragments of meanings identified by the researcher, their methodological analysis takes place in a rather multi-layered frame. The researcher will then need to analyze not only the text *per se*, but also critically analyze the context of the text, as well as what has been silenced by the text and what has been marginalized by it. When applied to the subject of masculinities, this approach implies that the researcher has to study not only what is said about masculinity, but also what is left unsaid and marginalized, namely alternate masculinities. In analyzing the context of the text, one needs to bring in femininities, and problematize gender patterns and connections as well.

Only after reviewing the Western literature in relation to the theoretical terrain and its methodological implications can I afford to move into the second endeavor, namely the analysis of masculinities in Turkey. Since there is yet very little research done on this significant topic in the context of Turkey, I once again have to first commence by relating the theoretical terrain and its methodological implications to

Turkey. To do so necessitates to analytically discuss the Western/non-Western paradigm, impact of Orientalism, the location of gender in the Middle East and Turkey's location therein. Once these analytical parameters are critically set, I approach the various cultural junctures in Turkey's articulation of its masculinities. I then focus on what emerged as cultural fragments that society highlighted; these sometimes coincided with the priorities set by the state and at other times went against it. In approaching these junctures, I am especially alert to deviations, marginalizations, and silences because it is through an analysis of these -which often display in everyday life discourse analysis argues, rather than institutional settings and structures- that the power dynamics in society become fully articulated. These analytical parameters have helped me delineate the narrative of masculinities in Turkey into the ensuing chapters.

Let me now outline the structure of this chapter. The chapter, which maps out the theoretical terrain and methodological approach of my research, consists of four sections. Section One undertakes the most significant theoretical discussion underlying masculinities, namely the "nature versus nurture" debate in the construction of gender as an analytical category. I discuss how in Western literature the conceptions of difference, gender duality led to the analysis of gender performance, interpellations, and eventually the analysis of gender in the margins through Queer studies. In so doing, the duality of femininity vis-a-vis masculinity that forms the major analytical impediment was critically problematized; gender was rather seen as a process, a critical reading against the grain within this duality. Section Two then moves into masculinity studies and reviews it in Western literature to reveal how masculinity and femininity came to be interpreted as relational constructs, variation among men was taken into account, manhood was conceptualized and the categories of man and masculinity differentiated. I also comment on the Western/non-Western divide and its significance in this context.

Once I describe the articulation of my conceptual categories in Sections One and Two, Section Three moves into delineating the basic theoretical and methodological premises of my analysis. I therefore discuss discourse analysis and the processes through which it can deconstruct hegemonic dualities such as the one existing between

masculinity and femininity. In addition to dualities, I also introduce the problematic category of undecidables and fluidity in meanings that necessitates the methodological exercise of undertaking a critical reading of the text, for what it says, does not say, marginalizes and what are revealed when it is contextualized. Next, I try to relate this theoretical and methodological premises to Turkey in particular; but since Turkey needs to be first situated as a subject of study, and since the most significant divide I need to take into account in situating Turkey is the epistemological bias that might emerge from naturalizing the Western-centric parameters inherent in my theoretical and methodological premises, my last section, Section Four situates Turkey in relation to the shifting paradigms on gender, Orientalism and the Middle East. It is through the analysis of these paradigms that I am alerted to the inherent biases and am therefore able to problematize certain dimensions of my analysis. The literature alerts me to the multiple determinants of power in Middle Eastern societies often located in contradictory locations, especially in relation to gender. Establishing the heterogeneity of meanings in society and doing so through engaging in rereadings of literary texts emerge as significant research techniques. I am able to articulate how I conceptualize sexuality and masculinity in contradistinction with what exists in the field: it is often conveyed in a one-sided manner as confining, if not oppressive and violent¹, oftentimes totally downplaying the liberating affirmative dimensions that research elsewhere alerts us should also be there. I take account of all these analytical paradigm shifts to further articulate and fine-tune my theoretical and methodological approach to the analysis of masculinities in Turkey.

¹ There are numerous significant examples focusing on the problematic aspects of the practice and understanding of sexuality in Muslim countries, including Goodwin, J., *Price of Honour: Muslim Women, Lift the Veil of Silence on the Islamic World*, Warner Books, 1995; and Al-Khayyat, S., *Honour and Shame: Women in Modern Iraq*, London: Saqi Books, 1993; Brooks, G. (1995): *Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women* London: Penguin. While each one of these studies illuminates important aspects, it is noteworthy that there is relatively less research on the “positive” dimensions of love, desire and sexuality in Muslim countries -dimensions otherwise accentuated in Queer Studies.

2.1. Gender Studies and the ‘Nature versus Nurture’ Debate

Any analysis that pays a special attention to gender has to reflect on the “nature versus nurture” debate, which has been one of the central, if not perpetual, quandaries in multiple disciplines, including psychoanalysis, psychology and sociology. The dispute has been crucial for the advocates of the early wave of feminism, especially for Simone de Beauvoir, and then similarly, for the feminists to come². In *The Second Sex*, de Beauvoir critically handled the deeply-rooted binary of “Self/Subject” and ‘Other’, which had been so crucial for existentialist philosophy. In doing so, she contended that this philosophical, sociological and psychological “Other” was in fact both female and feminized whereby a constant, systematic and multifarious voicelessness, as well as subordination and passivity, allocated to this “female Other” a secondary place in subjective consciousness. Accordingly, Beauvoir held that women lacked existential subjectivity. She further bolstered this last point with the celebrated argument that “one is not born, but becomes a woman. It is civilization as a whole that produces this creature, intermediate between, male and eunuch, which is described as feminine.”³

2.1.1. Separation of Sex and Gender: Simone de Beauvoir has been widely criticized on a variety of issues, including the reification of the Cartesian mind-body duality, and her employment of the male as the center, or put differently, as the determining norm/Subject of her analysis. Nonetheless, her separation of “sex” from “gender” proves to be a useful theoretical tool to this day. Despite the flaws in her theory, for my purposes in this dissertation, one fundamental conceptual implement de Beauvoir offers for the chapters to follow is the distinction between “woman” as a biological entity and “femininity” as a social, cultural construction. De Beauvoir claims that woman is not determined by her body or her hormones but rather with and within the social, psychological, and economic context in which that body is situated, perceived

² For a thorough discussion of de Beauvoir’s work in the light of feminist theory, see Margaret A. Simons, ed. *Feminist Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir*. University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1995. See also Debra Bergoffen, *The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities*. New York: SUNY Press, 1997.

³ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, New York: Bantham, 1952, p. 249.

and produced. Accordingly, it is essential to underline that although gender is indeed derived from sex, it is still distinct from it. “‘Sex’ refers to physiology and ‘gender’ to the socio-cultural elaborations upon physiology.”(Mackie, 1987: 3) Similarly, there is no such fixed thing as “femininity”. Rather, what we deem to be *naturally* “feminine” or “masculine” in a certain socio-cultural context is shaped by that very same context.

In due time, the questions raised by de Beauvoir have been further explored by scholars in numerous disciplines. Significantly, over the last few decades, mostly due to the tides of deconstructionism, post-colonialism, feminism, and post-structuralism, not to mention sexuality studies, a fresh interest has been rekindled in the familiar “nature versus nurture” debate⁴. Despite their profuse differences, in order to fight back biological determinism, each of the aforementioned approaches has unanimously put the accent on the “nurture” side of the duality. As such, they all share a common portrayal of ‘gender identity’ wherein identity formation looms as both a social and cultural “construct”, and thus becomes constitutive of gender norms and patterns itself.

2.1.2. Naturalization of the Gender Difference: Though the alliance was fraught with difficulties, the term “difference”⁵ has gradually been acknowledged as a conceptual niche. Postmodernism, postcolonialism and poststructuralism have especially been paying exceptional attention to the differentiated, “Other”-nized and marginalized identities. Central to these arguments was the attempt to underline the dualistic structure of Western philosophy⁶. This structure is crucial for the fabrication of “femininity’-in

⁴ For an innovative discussion that explores a wide range of themes and metaphors operative in the construction of gender patterns and distances by addressing present debates see for instance Donna Haraway. *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, New York: 1991, pp.127-48.

⁵ The concept of “difference” has been crucial in Derrida’s works, including *Writing and Difference*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. According to the Derridean framework, Western metaphysics suppresses the voice of “difference” through the dominant philosophical vocabulary that favors a certain notion of subjectivity over others. “Difference”, with an “a” refers to that which cannot be spoken, to the inaudible. See David Wood & Robert Bernasconi(eds), *Derrida and Difference*, Warwick: Parousia Press, 1985. For a thorough discussion on how “difference” became a pivotal theme and constant concern across a wide range of institutional disciplines see Chris Weedon, *Feminism, Theory and The Politics of Difference*, Blackwell, 1999.

⁶ Questioning Cartesian duality has been a central pattern of reasoning in postmodernist literature. See Foster, Hal. (ed) *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*. Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1982. The endeavor has also been crucial for feminists engaged in postcolonial and

the way de Beauvoir put the term - since gender is to a large extent informed by binary thinking patterns which position male and female as complete opposites, and then render this imaginary opposition “natural” by strengthening it with further dualities, such as: mind versus body, intellect versus corpus; reason versus irrationality, east versus west, place versus time, and so forth. Still understandably, biological theories are essential not only for the construction of gender ideology but also for the maintenance of those discursive practices revolving around the axes of race, class, religion and nationality.

Questioning how “natural” the given roles of manhood are goes hand in hand with the perception of gender as “an effect of relations of knowledge and power which permeate all areas of life (Weedon, 1999: 5).” This emphasis is tantamount to asserting that gender is not an asymmetrical configuration stemming from biological necessities, but is rather deeply embedded in power relations and dominant forms of knowledge. Though this last point does not reveal much about the criteria by which to evaluate the differences among women as a group⁷, it has nevertheless been the common foundation stone of a variety of feminisms operating under the rubric “second wave of feminism”. More recently, however, the theoretical trajectory seems to be taking another wind mostly and initially due to the intervention of postmodernist criticism⁸ and then of LGBT Studies, and Queer Theory, which have been conceptualizing “difference” not in terms of X vis-a-vis un-X (e.g. man vis-à-vis woman), but as the rudimentary fabric underlying a whole variety of discursive practices.

interdisciplinary studies. See for instance Harding, Sandra and Uma Narayan, (eds). *Border Crossings: Multicultural and Postcolonial Feminist Challenges to Philosophy I*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998. For a critical and illuminating assessment on borderlands, boundaries and geopolitical narratives of identity formation see also Susan Stanford Friedman, *Mappings: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

⁷ Monique Wittig was one of the leading scholars who examined this issue most carefully and critically. Employing a Marxist vocabulary, Wittig has criticized the employment of the term “woman” in feminist writing and argued for a more political understanding of “women”. She claimed that “woman” is an imaginary formation, a myth whereas “women” is the product of a social relationship and thereby a political and economic category. To use the word “woman” meant to reproduce the myth and to deny the differences among “women”. See Monique, Wittig. "One Is Not Born a Woman" in *The Straight Mind and Other Essays*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

⁸ For a discussion on the ways in which postmodernist literature has carved out zones of its own within traditions of social sciences see Pauline Marie Rosenau. *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. See also Seidman,

Accordingly, in this dissertation too, masculinity will be analyzed with and within the underlying fabric of the cultural, social and ideological composition of Turkey. Rejecting the search for “fixed identities” to fight back fixed dominions, Queer theory focuses on “the arbitrariness and unnaturalness of traditional signifiers of gender difference.”(Weedon, 1987: 73) This is precisely why, right from the beginning, transgression and destabilization have been two crucial concepts for Queer Theory whose advocates do not want to tailor a centralized Cartesian identity for queered personas⁹. They do not want to substitute one monolithic subject with another one. Rather, they pine for a fundamental transformation in the basic credentials of contemporary thought on sexuality, normality and identity, and endorse instead a fragmented, nomadic, transcending self¹⁰.

While feminists and Queer theorists have taken the side of “nurture” at the same time the conservatives -or sometimes biologists- piled to the side of “nature”, my contention is that the need to see gender as a social construct should on no account be denied, for the duality itself has proven to be a repetitive loop after a certain extent and should be transcended rather than regularly rekindled. Yet transcending the loop does not mean denying it; it is very difficult to discuss either the masculine or the feminine without taking the other into account for they exist in contradistinction from one another. What is significant is to do so critically so as not to naturalize the attempts of either side to hegemonize the other.

2.1.3. Gender as *Process* versus Gender Divide: One notable thinker who has been highly influential in moving beyond the “nature versus nurture” duality is Rosi

Steven. (ed.) *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁹ For scrupulous analyses on the notion of “Self” and the Queer persona, see Pat Califia. *Sex Changes: The Politics of Transgenderism*. San Francisco: Cleis Press, 1997; Riki Anne Wilchins. *Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender*. Ithaca, NY: Firebrand, 1997; and D. Fuss(ed.). *Inside/out*. NY: Routledge, 1991, pp. 1-10.

¹⁰ See for instance Judith Halberstam, *Female Masculinity*. Durham: Duke UP, 1998.

Braidotti.¹¹ Bluntly stating, Braidotti focuses on biotechnology in order to engineer a feminist politics of body and embodiment, as well as one of difference and sexual difference. While she is profoundly skeptical of the emphasis on nature at the expense of nurture, she draws a scientific realm which she insists can at the same time be surrounded by the *cultural imaginary*. The body, Braidotti contends, is not the antithesis of mind, not a pole in a theoretical dichotomy, but first and foremost *a bridge*. Rather than being a symbol of one side of the duality, the body is the very moderator between nature and nurture or between what is deemed to be organic and technological. Briefly put, Braidotti maintains that the “nature versus nurture” dilemma is artificial since there is no clear distinction between the natural and the cultural, in other words, between the body and technology¹². Where does one start and where does the other end? It is the body that mediates technology. These two are interconnected so much so that the nature versus nurture dilemma has to be left behind.

Braidotti’s principal project is to craft first a conceptualization and then a practice of female subjectivity as an open-ended **process** rather than as a pre-given “thing”. What she is after is a movement of constant fluctuation, irresolution and alteration¹³. If this is applied to gender difference, one can argue that the divide between the masculine and the feminine is also artificial and the two should be analyzed together rather than against one another. In addition, some of Braidotti’s arguments on the changeability of identity largely resonate with a call voiced in Queer theory to question

¹¹ See Rosi Braidotti, "Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in contemporary Feminist Theory," in *Feminist Literary Theory. A reader*. Mary Eagleton. (ed), Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 411-20.

¹² It should be noted that in the history of Western philosophy it was no other than Martin Heidegger who had most critically approached the division between “technology” and “culture”. By underlining that in ancient Greece the arts were referred to as *techne* (the root of “technology”) and pointing out that this word encompassed all forms of art, he has presented technology as one type of “art”. See Martin Heidegger. “The Question Concerning Technology” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*. David Krell (ed). New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

¹³ For further assessment on the emphasis given to alteration see Rosi Braidotti and Nina Lykke(eds), *Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs. Feminist Confrontations With Science, Medicine and Cyberspace*. London: Zed Books, 1996. See also Towards a New Nomadism: Feminist Deleuzian Tracks; or, Metaphysics and Metabolism,” in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*. C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski (eds), New York/London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 159-186.

the distinction between the “normal” and the “abnormal”¹⁴, as well as the “gay” as deviant.¹⁵ By refusing to take the distinction for granted and by emphasizing gender and sex as “constructs”, many among the “cultural constructivists” or post-structuralist-inspired cultural theorists have paved the way for alternative accounts of what is and what is not “queer”.

2.1.4. Gender as Performance: Within this framework, what needs to be further emphasized more than the term “gender” is the term “role”. Gender is always perceived and reflected, as well as internalized and imposed through expressions, acts and behaviors. These, in turn, are assigned by the society to the individual in accordance with what is deemed to be “natural” for each sex. The *performative* dimension of gender has been articulated by Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble*¹⁶. First, she interrogates the conventional definition of sex and gender to claim that “if gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders.”(Butler, 1990: 6) Next Butler accentuates the performative aspect of gender. Gender is, in other words, what you *do* at a specific place and specific time, rather than a universal conception of who you are. Butler spells out that “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; ... identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”(Butler, 1990: 25)

¹⁴ Among the leading scholars who have most attentively questioned these premises are Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. With visible differences among them, each has questioned the efficacy of traditional categories of sexual identification. Alternatively, they have chosen to focus on a more fluid constituency of identities with regard to sexuality. One significant concomitant of this approach has been an enlargement of the theoretical vision so as to avoid projecting the deeply-embedded paradigm of hetero-homosexual to all cultures and historical eras regardless of their differences. An identity that might be regarded as queer at this point in time might not have been so in a different culture and/or at a different time. In short, marginality cannot be seen as operating in a historical vacuum.

¹⁵ Numerous scholars have challenged this distinction, including Jeffrey Weeks, *Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. See also David Halperin, *Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

¹⁶ See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge: London, 1990.

Gender, according to Butler, is both intentional and performative, thereby urging her readers to rethink gender and sexuality in anti-essentialist terms. Blending analyses on cultural fragments such as cross-dressing, lesbian imagery, masculine representations and so on, with feminist and psychoanalytic theory she claims that gender is a performance that created the illusion of possessing a core, pure and virtually polarized femininity or masculinity underneath. Denoting the “performative aspect” of gender requires taking into account the basic premises of role theory. Briefly stating, “role theory ... is based upon a theatrical metaphor in which all social behavior is viewed as a kind of performance.”(Edley, 1997: 100) It should be stated that “role” does not mean “fake” or “phony”. Rather, most often, roles are so much internalized by the individuals they are attributed to that they are not “acted” any more. As one scholar notes “one of the characteristics of subordination is that it makes people internalize their own submission.” (Phillips, 2002: 87)

2.1.5. Gender through Interpellation: It is equally substantial to realize that “roles and stereotypes” are not directly and not necessarily visibly imposed upon individuals in a society¹⁷. They are constantly and extensively promulgated and circulated by the Ideological State Apparatuses (hereafter ISAs), in the sense Althusser¹⁸ employs the term, starting with the family, the legal system, the school and the media. As will be further evaluated in the chapters to follow, when sex roles and gender patterns are concerned, it is the ISAs rather than the Repressive State Apparatuses (hereafter RSAs) such as the police force that play a decisive role. Ideology, according to Althusser, constitutes concrete individuals as subjects through the process of interpellation¹⁹.

¹⁷ For a multi-layered assessment in this regard see Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek. *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*. Verso. Phronesis: London & New York, 2000

¹⁸ See Slavoj Žižek(ed), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, 1994. In addition to a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which ideology resolves itself in culture and society, the book does also include a chapter on Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.

¹⁹ Althusser, Louis. *Ideological State Apparatuses*. in *Lenin and philosophy, and other essays*, 1971, London: New Left Books, pp. 123-17.

Deriving from the same root as the term ‘appellation’ which denotes a name or naming, interpellation crafts some sort of a hailing, addressing the individual “personally”. As soon as we are born, we step into this enclosing system of subjecthood, and we are named personally. Being given a name is an intrinsic part of turning into subjects, and from then on we will be acquiring our position as subjects in ideology. (Elliott, 1994) Nourished by a myriad of ISAs that runs from absolute manipulation to partial pliability with each enjoying a certain degree of autonomy, gender roles comprise a tapestry of teachings. It is this complexity and plurality of sources that makes it harder to dissolve the patterns interpellated. Equally crucial is the need to ascertain that not only women but men too are continually subject to these teachings and are thereby required **to perform** as deemed²⁰. In this sense, “masculinity represents just a set of lines and stage direction which males have to learn to perform.”(Edley, 1997: 100) Yet none of this adds up to denying that patriarchal ideology assumes a one-to-one correspondence between a person’s gender role and gender identity. In other words, if one is born a woman, it is considered “normal and natural” that one should perform a *womanly* gender role²¹.

2.1.6. Gender and Its Margins: While these and the like compose questions endemic to Queer Studies, interrogating the performative aspect of gender is a relatively recent and circumscribed phenomenon. For quite a long time these issues were belittled by mainstream academia belittled, if at all considered. Today, however, there is a newly emerging vocabulary with a whole set of new conceptual tools that have hitherto been ignored by the canon. An overview of “Sexuality Studies” needs to pay special attention to both the changing and unchanging connotations of the word “queer”. Just like feminists, the protagonists of Queer studies are also concerned with the mapping of gender zones and contending with the stereotypes stemming from these. Some scholars

²⁰ For a study that demonstrates the tensions men experience in performing manhood see Boyd K. Knowing your place: the tensions of manliness in boy's story papers, 1918-39, M Roper & J Tosh (eds) *Manfulful assertions: masculinities in Britain since 1800* London: Routledge, 1991, pp.145-167

²¹ The scheme’s confines become all the more visible in the case of gender benders, e.g. “transsexuals”, in whose case gender identity as perceived by them corresponds neither with their biological sex, and nor with the gender role society expects them to perform.

operating in this field have adopted a retrospective approach in the sense that they move backwards in history to present an alternative reading of it by concentrating on known and unknown Queer figures in history that have been systematically excluded from the canon or by pursuing the reinforcement of restrictions and prejudgments with respect to such figures²². Some other scholars have dwelled upon neglected themes, rather than disadvantaged groups or figures, thus working on the representations of body and sexuality, and “geographies of sexualities”²³. Since the 1990s, Queer Studies set out to both answer and complicate questions like these. Tracking the most puissant and dynamic fields in literary, women’s and cultural studies, Queer studies has queried and challenged the way we think about marginality, sexuality, and identity²⁴.

One fecund offshoot derived from Queer studies is Queer Theory, which, broadly stated, has thrived upon the deconstructionist²⁵ approach interrogating the given subject-object interchange. Although there are varying interpretations of deconstruction, it is widely considered to be the philosophical pillar of postmodernism.²⁶ As Barbara Johnson points out, rather than being a method of destruction, “deconstruction” is adjacent to the original meaning of the word ‘analysis’ which implies “to undo”²⁷. Put differently, what deconstruction aspires to invalidate is not the text itself, but the discriminatory power relations sculpting it. The dominant and domineering signifying

²² For an analysis on the roots of this historical trajectory, see for instance Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th - 18th Centuries*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

²³ The term is borrowed from D. Bell as a reference to varying constructs across Europe, America, Africa, as well as the imaginary. See D. Bell and G. Valentine, *Mapping desire: Geographies of Sexualities*. New York: Routledge, 1995.

²⁴ For a critical overview of this process see Rosi Braidotti and Judith Butler (co-authored), "Feminism by any other name", in *differences. More Gender Trouble: Feminism meets Queer Theory*, Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 27-61

²⁵ Prominent examples in this regard include Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. See also Young, Robert (ed.), *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. For the role of deconstruction in feminist theory see Penelope Deutscher, *Yielding Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction and the History of Philosophy*. Routledge, 1997.

²⁶ Writers such as Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Paul de Man or Barbara Johnson have all used the term “deconstruction” and yet at the same time resisted to any tendency to fixate or even accurately clarify the meaning and implications of the term.

system thrives upon a privileged logocentrism, which oftentimes goes hand in hand with an equally privileged phallogentrism. It is precisely this notorious duo that deconstruction intends to unscramble and disentangle. In doing so, deconstruction comes up with an alternative, namely difference, in order to accentuate complexity and heterogeneity rather than overarching principles of commonality, uniformity and “normality”.

2.1.7. Deconstruction beyond Gender Duality: The study and deconstruction of the margins of gender is especially significant in the case of Turkey because there have been very few analyses of gender that go beyond locating women in society; even if one were to extend these analyses to men, the underlying power relations in society would still reproduce themselves and obfuscate the analysis. By studying the margins of gender in Turkey, however, one would be able to uncover such deep running power relations that play a role in the construction of both femininity and masculinity and thereby reach a level of analytical rigor that goes beyond the binary gender categories. One pivotal theme widely discussed in recent decades is the ways in which dualities play a decisive role in constituting and consolidating gender identities. As one scholar notes, “identity is a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself.”(Hall, 1991: 21) Deconstruction is particularly interested in detecting and demonstrating the power frame residing in every duality. This relational, hierarchic construction is thought to exist at the core of even the most seemingly “innocent” or “simple” dualities circulated in daily life. Thus, as Johnson notes, "the differences between entities (prose and poetry, man and woman, literature and theory, guilt and innocence) are shown to be based on a repression of differences within entities, ways by which an entity differs from itself"(Johnson, 1980: x-xi). Put differently, while the logocentric tradition is after “purity”, as rightly Derrida noted, aiming at avoiding complexity, deconstruction seeks doing just the exact opposite and is more at home with “ambivalence” than the tradition it opposes.

²⁷ Barbara Johnson, *The Critical Difference*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

2.1.8. Gender and Desire: One further aspect Queer Studies has doggedly maintained is a new and a more positive conceptualization of “desire”²⁸. Since this point has almost no resonance in the studies on Middle Eastern Sexualities, it needs further evaluation for my purposes in this dissertation. The Cartesian subject promoted by Enlightenment philosophy and modernist paradigm relies upon the rational, thinking, knowing individual capable of shaping his future actions and decisions. In this scheme desire is something to be tamed and controlled; desire is inscribed on the body and, as such, it is territorialized. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) Inspired by postmodernist scholars, Queer Studies scholars like David Halperin²⁹, have supported the idea of a decentered subject and defended the redefinition of desire in which it is seen rather than a conservative, problematic, incarcerating force, a positive, joyful, playful, prolific force (Dews, 1988: 135-6). Accordingly, desire “can be conceived as a forward movement, a flight towards an object which always eludes our grasp, the attempt, never successful but never frustrating, to reach the unattainable by exploring the paths of the possible.”(Lecerle, 1985: 196)

Since I shall return to this point in the following chapters, suffice it to note here that when it comes to studying sexualities in the Middle East the re-definition of desire almost utterly disappears from the scene. When sexuality and Islam are brought side by side in academic lexicon, it is almost always the problematized aspect of sexuality that comes to the fore and never its dynamic, creative, delectable aspects. Sexuality in the Muslim context is not necessarily all about oppressions, controlling and disciplining; it is not solely on honor killings, virginity tests or gay bashing. There is also an impregnable tradition of eroticism and pleasure³⁰, delight and love³¹. I contend that the

²⁸ It needs to be recalled that desire has been problematized more often than not when related with the epidemic AIDS. In this regard see Watney, S. *Policing Desire: Media, Pornography and AIDS*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987; Patton, Cindy. *Inventing AIDS*. New York: Routledge, 1990; and Patton, Cindy. *Fatal Mistakes*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

²⁹ See particularly David Halperin, *Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

³⁰ *The Book of Pleasure*, Bah Nameh has many times been translated from the Turkish into Arabic, and it was widely read in the Ottoman Empire. For an extensive account on the Bah Nameh, see Murat Bardakçı, *Osmanlı'da Seks*, Istanbul: Gur, 1999.

“affirmative aspect of sexuality” needs to be better attained when studying masculinities in the Middle Eastern context, and the conceptual tools developed by critical studies in the West should be more flexibly applied to these cases in order to do so³².

In summary, the “nature versus nurture” debate and its academic offshoots in multiple disciplines is a starting point for this dissertation though ultimately it purports to move beyond the quandary. Likewise, deconstruction has a special significance for my purposes in this study because any strand that favors the disfavored and turns the “normalized” hierarchies upside down to compensate for the power imbalance is essential for masculinity studies, as well as for any analysis that pays specific attention to gender. Given the fact that masculinities cannot be read without deciphering and deconstructing gender dualities (Plummer, 1999), this dissertation will be based on the theoretical terrain carved out by the strands and approaches hitherto analyzed³³. Within this framework and upon this theoretical terrain, it is now necessary to take a closer look at how Masculinity Studies has thrived upon these debates and expanded, carrying along its theoretical achievements as well as structural flaws. Hence in the following part, I will take a closer and critical look at the trajectory of Masculinity Studies.

³¹ The tales in *The Thousand and One Nights* reflect the affirmative aspects of sexuality in Muslim cultures. Herein not only heterosexual love but also “deviant” themes, such as sex change (as in the tale of the Sea Rose –vol IV, p.405) are narrated. See *The Arabian Nights: Tales from a Thousand and One Nights*, trans. Richard Burton, Modern Library Classics, 2001. For further works in which the affirmative “delight” aspect of sexuality can be encountered see *The Perfumed Garden*, trans. Richard Francis Burton, Inner Traditions International, 1992. See also *The Perfumed Garden of the Cheikh Nefzaoui: A Manual of Arabian Erotology* by Umar Ibn Muhammad Nafzawi, Shik Netzawi, Mary S. Lovell, Richard Francis Burton, Signet Classics, 1999.

³² There are various studies that draw on Foucauldian concepts and framework and critically apply these to non-Western contexts. For an illuminating work in this regard see Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

³³ For more information on the bond between feminism and the quest for alternative approaches to render the invisible visible, as well as to discuss how and where race and gender and power operate in objectivity, rationality, and knowledge see Alessandra Tanesini, *An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies*. Malden: Blackwell, 1999.

2.2 The Analytical Trajectory of Masculinity Studies

The rise of men's studies as an independent area of research goes back to late 1960s and 1970s. The area has developed both as a response to and in conjunction with the second wave of feminism in general, and American feminism in particular. One further factor that contributed to the said development was the widespread clashes and challenges triggered by the Vietnam War and the ensuing discontent³⁴. As will be mentioned in the chapters to follow with regard to the waves of the First World War, here too, a war ended up mutilating heroic masculinities, fragmenting wholesale narratives of truth, and creating vacuums of doubts through which gender teachings and traditional male roles could be plausibly questioned. During mid-1970s, in most US liberal institutions, there appeared a whole set of courses focusing solely or mainly on men and/or masculinities. As such, arguing that gender is not "all about women"³⁵, Masculinity Studies rose in 1980s to become more and more visible especially in realms such as psychology, sociology and then cultural studies (R. W. Connell 1987; D. Morgan 1992; L. Segal 1990; V. J. Seidler 1989, 1997) to develop a new theory of masculinity politics³⁶. Additionally, a research network operating under the name of The International Association for Studies on Men was established. During this time, studying male roles and the predicaments of manhood became a means to not only better and further investigate patriarchy, but to also question heterosocial norms³⁷ (Hostetler and

³⁴ For a critical overview of the trajectory of masculinity theory and its critical turning points, see Lemon, J. "Masculinity in Crisis?" *Agenda*, volume 25, 1995, pp. 61-71.

³⁵ The recognition that gender is not only about women and women's issues has been a prominent step in this literature. For further examples in this regard see Cleaver, Frances, (ed), *Masculinities Matter!: Men, Gender and Development*. London: Zed Books, 2003. In order to read more about both the progressive and the conservative perspectives on men and masculinity, as well as encounter a comparative approach to varying standpoints on gender, see also Clatterbaugh, Kenneth. *Contemporary Perspectives on Masculinity*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

³⁶ R.W. Connell is one of the most prolific and political thinkers in the field. In his *Masculinities*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1995, Connell integrates social science with feminist theory, gay theory, and psychoanalysis. The author challenges not only heteronormativity but also the conservative factions in the field.

³⁷ I use heterosocial norms to refer to heteronormativity as hegemonic, normativizing, social, political and cultural patterns. This point will be further explored in the following chapters. It should be recalled here that heterosocial norms are not necessarily linked to heterosexuality as such but should be taken outside the individuals' sexual preferences and within a broader, ideological structure.

Cohler, 1997) and confront male domination³⁸ as part of a quest for a fluid, open-ended sexual and political identity politics(de Lauretis, 1991; Warner, 1993). In other words, these were the years when the question of praxis, and the coordination of theory and practice were still of central concern for academics in both Women's and Male Studies.

In the fullness of time, the two concomitant developments proceeded hand in hand. On the one hand, the gap between theory and practice widened, gradually and steadily confining male studies within academic circles. On the other hand, the field became more diversified and aware of the need to consider gender and sexuality with a whole range of other factors, starting with class, race and ethnicity. Overall, it can be plausibly maintained that as research progressed, the study of men and masculinities became less concerned with dismantling the patriarchal metanarrative, and more concerned in linking previously separated fields, approaches and subnarratives. Accordingly, it has been more and more extensively acknowledged that social sciences have hitherto been male dominated spheres of activity. However, even though science has been done by and about and oftentimes for men, this does not necessarily imply that it has been privileging individual men. That the overall system is male dominated does not mean that it does not curb and restrict *man's* individuality (Buchbinder, 1998). The need to investigate not solely at the macro level but also in multiple micro contexts how and where power operates renders it all the more vital to see how categories of womanhood and manhood were mutually dependent, relational and deeply embedded in discriminatory practices which not always operated through men vis-à-vis women but too often in more multifaceted ways³⁹. The courses developed during this time would soon trigger scholarly interest causing the number of books, articles and publications to increase visibly, including college textbooks (Doyle, 1983; Franklin, 1984). The works of J. Pleck, *The Myth of Masculinity*(1981) and Komorovsky's *Dilemmas of*

³⁸ On how masculinity studies is invested in fighting male domination and is thereby a natural ally to feminist theory, see Judith Kegan, Gardiner (ed) *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory: New Directions*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Masculinity(1976) would later be followed by path-breaking works of numerous others⁴⁰. In the following era, one further factor that contributed to the ongoing debates was the emergence of new social movements⁴¹ and the acknowledgment of the significance of these by various scholars, including Mouffe and Laclau⁴². The proliferation of multiple discursive practices operating within civil society went hand in hand with the proliferation of discourses recognizing sexual heterogeneity.

2.2.1. Masculinity and Femininity as Relational Constructs: Masculinity Studies thrives on the basic premise that masculinity and femininity are relational constructs⁴³. As such, the characterization and validity of either one strongly depends on the very existence of the other. No matter how “biological” or “universal” or “natural” the categories of woman and man may seem to be, it is not possible to understand either one without an overt or subtle reference to the other. To put it more bluntly, mainstream academia has not only been blind to women’s concerns while history has ignored *her* stories, but has also neglected, if not systematically marginalized, critical analyses of masculinities. Taken as a whole, Men's Studies views masculinity as its pivotal quandary—a quandary that inaugurates a whole gamut of vigorous areas for study in the social

³⁹ For a study that blends macro gender analysis with micro contexts and personal narratives of manhood and boyhood from different cultural contexts, see Abbott, Franklin, (ed) *Boyhood, Growing up Male: A Multicultural Anthology*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.

⁴⁰ See for instance Tania Modleski, *Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a 'Postfeminist' Age*, London: Routledge, 1991; and Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. *Epistemology of the Closet*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

⁴¹ For an extensive analysis on new social movements and the prospects for developing a “woman-friendly global polity” see Catherine Eschle, *Global Democracy, Social Movements and Feminism*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.

⁴² Laclau and Mouffe see society as a complex, if not convoluted, field replete with antagonistic struggles. See Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards A Radical Democratic Politics*. New York: Verso, 1985.

⁴³ At first, the central opposition to men’s studies was crystallized around the chary question “why the need?” Since men had always been the normative gender and the society had up till now remained patriarchal, numerous scholars and activists jointly claimed that there was no *need* to pay an additional attention to the “privileged”. As a response, protagonists of Male Studies have asserted that, it is one thing to study a male dominated understanding of history or, for instance, a particular male ruler in history, and quite another to study how masculinities were constructed, internalized and legitimized within that specific location and specific epoch.

sciences. Thereby, right from the outset, Men's Studies retained an interdisciplinary fabric, drawing on research from both social and behavioral sciences⁴⁴.

In the case of Turkey, it is especially the case that one needs to draw upon gender in general and women in particular in order to study the location of men. This emerges as a necessity out of two concerns, one theoretical and the other epistemological. The theoretical concern is that the two sexes, male and female, make up the category of gender together, hence it would be impossible to understand the societal processes that shape one without studying the other. The epistemological concern is based on the amount of knowledge available on men and women in the context of Turkey. The academic study of gender in Turkey is a relatively recent phenomenon and as such, has focused almost exclusively on women. There is, therefore, little analysis on the location of men in Turkish society. One need to differentiate the amount of information that is available on men from the existing analysis; while there is a large degree of the former, paucity still marks the other. Hence the analytical categories that need to be employed for the analysis have to, out of necessity, draw upon analyses based on Turkish women.

2.2.2. Variation among Men: In Men's Studies, the 1990s have somewhat been the golden age as the field continued to expand and branch off. A number of academic journals came out, specifically dedicated to the study of men, such as the *Journal of Men's Studies* (1992) and *Men and Masculinities* (1998). But more significant was the fact that men's studies started to focus on an assortment of men rather than solely or primarily on middle-class, white, urban, heterosexual, Western men. Race and ethnicity, religion and sexual orientations were integrated into the bulk of academic tools with which to tackle the issue of manhood at the individual, patriarchy at the societal level. Behind this important modification the dynamic that played a crucial role was the urge to bring the subjects hitherto pushed to the margins to the center of attention. To put it more bluntly, the wave that emerged during the 1990s was manifestly

⁴⁴ One particular example where "engendered methods of analysis" are discussed, developed and applied to man's studies is Boone and Cadden's collective work. See Joseph Boone and Michael Cadden (eds). *Engendering Men: The Question of Male Feminist Criticism*, London: Routledge, 1990.

incorporated by deconstruction/post-structuralism, gay studies and post-colonialist literature.

2.2.3. Conceptualization of Manhood: Upon this background the fundamental question today is how to define and problematize manhood⁴⁵, and concomitantly, where to seek the prospects for change. What exactly are the cultural definitions, social expectations and individual frustrations revolving around “being a man”. Is “manhood” a socio-economic construct like womanhood and if so, should the two be regarded in similar terms? If not, should these two be elaborated separately? Are men the constructing subjects of manhood, both theirs and those of others, or rather the object, if not the victim, of masculinities? These and similar questions still need to be discussed in the light of facts derived from multiple cultural contexts⁴⁶.

2.2.4. West/Non-West Divide: One other factor that further complicates the field is the constant, albeit often subtle gap between the analysis of masculinities in the Western world and those in the non-Western world. If Men’s Studies is still a marginalized field, research on male and masculinities in the non-Western World within that framework remains even more marginal. Furthermore, when and if non-Western masculinities are concerned, they are almost always connected with nationalism, sexism and patriarchy, but rarely with any positive, -that is, not in the sense of “affirmative” but in the sense of “creative” or “constructive”, forces. The analysis of Western World masculinity displays a broader, richer context, one that takes into account myriad factors when compared to the analysis of masculinity in the non-Western world. A shift in

⁴⁵ On the problems of defining what “masculinity” is, and deciphering its conceptual confines, see John MacInnes who claims that there is no such thing. John MacInnes, *The End of Masculinity: The Confusion of Sexual Genesis and Sexual Differences in Modern Society*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1998.

⁴⁶ In order to see how masculinity operates as a constitutive element in the theory and practice of international relations see, Charlotte Hooper, *Manly States*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Hooper’s work is also significant in that it claims that the international order refrains from coming up with a single masculinity but instead fabricates multiple masculinities and benefits from the conflicts between them. As such Hooper draws attention to the power interplay between a “hegemonic” masculinity and “other” masculinities, which are feminized and subordinated. This argument is of particular concern for this dissertation as I intend to look at patriarchy *not* as something done by men to women but as a structure in which women too take part and which confines and suppresses masculinities too.

intellectual paradigms of thinking rendered the growth and consolidation of Men's Studies possible and concomitantly, the very presence of the latter further paved the way for a chain transformation in both the academia⁴⁷ and the society at large⁴⁸.

2.2.5. Man versus Masculinity: Before going any further, it remains to be recognized that “masculinity” and “man” are not one and the same thing. The role performed by the social agent is not the same as the actor himself. The recognition of this difference makes it possible to underline that not only men as a group exert power over women as a group, but masculinity as a construct confines men as well and exerts power on them. In its lingering vestiges, masculinity is repeatedly associated with authority, power and mastery. Its space is thought to be that of rationality and logics. Femininity, in turn, is associated with submissiveness, subordination and delicateness. Its space is thought to be that of emotionality and impulsiveness. The sex-role paradigm presents a mapping of mutually exclusive roles and existences⁴⁹. Contrary to this paradigm, acknowledging not only how relational but also how “re-doable” and “de-constructable” these construct are opens up new-fangled areas for theoretical discussion and empirical research.

This said, a clearer sense of how we might fathom this phenomenon can be obtained from acknowledging that although masculinity and femininity are fundamentally changeable constructs, they are equally reactive to any such change. Above all, definitions of masculinity will resist any changes in definitions of femininity. When women's roles in family circle change, for instance, in tandem with their

⁴⁷ Interestingly, the overall shift in the field has left a profound impact on the ways in which Gender and Women's Studies have been carried out. Many departments and women's studies programs changed their name or built LGBT Studies or Queer Studies. Particularly in the last two decades the interdisciplinary perspective at the core of men's studies echoes the interdisciplinary perspective cultivated by and within women's studies.

⁴⁸ Yet, still to this day the deep-seated question of ‘praxis’ and how to fuse academic work with activism still remains a vital issue for scholars operating in this new field -a question that has become all the more urgent with regard to recent development, starting with the issue of gay marriages in the USA and elsewhere. The failure in praxis leads to more and more criticism being raised against the “depoliticized” aspect of masculinity studies.

becoming more visible and active in the public realm, this transformation has met and still meets serious reaction from men. What makes the overall picture even more complicated is the very fact that the said reaction stems not solely from men, but from many women as well. In other words, though constructs of femininity and masculinity are alterable, they are also hallmarked with an enduring, ingrained and systematic resistance to any pivotal change in their basic credentials. Significantly, the said reaction does not merely operate at the individual level or amidst daily parlance, but just as visible at the institutional level.

Male roles might display distinct attitudes toward women and yet at the same time, the normative aspect of masculinity hangs on to a perceived differentiation from femininity. An individual man can choose to maintain any attitude toward individual woman in his life, yet his masculinity still hinges on a palpable difference, if not distance, between him and her⁵⁰. Furthermore, masculinity does not solely need to differentiate itself from femininity, but correspondingly, heterosexual manhood is in need of distancing itself as much and as clear as possible from homosexual manhood. The distancing and “Other-ization” is coupled with the power frame operative in the society⁵¹. It is this union that often instigates both micro and macro backlashes against any momentous modification in patterns of gender and sexuality.

Particularly in societies like Turkey where men have traditionally benefited from the gender/power frame in institutions, they would be unwilling to give up this privilege. This is tantamount to saying that the sex-role paradigm confines *both* men and women to

⁴⁹ For an analysis as to how this dualistic context is framed in the pedigree of Western philosophy, see Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1993.

⁵⁰ The role of the individual subject in the operation of the system in which s/he is situated has also been a central debate in Marxist literature and structuralism. The issue has also been central in the theoretical debate between Milliband and Poulantzas. For an inclusive analysis of this see Frances F. Piven, “Reflections on Ralph Milliband” in *New Left Review*, vol: a, issue 206, 1994. See also Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

⁵¹ The point that the hierarchical distancing of the two sexes and the features attributed to each is neither accidental nor sporadic but deeply embedded in the principles of Western thought has been explored by numerous scholars, including Beverley Clack (ed). *Misogyny in the Western Philosophical Tradition: A Reader*. London: Routledge, 1998.

certain roles and spaces of existence⁵². In a similar vein, R. W. Connell (1995), one of the leading scholars in the area, has refrained from essentialist interpretations by making connections between domestic politics and the international order. Connell claims that a post-colonial and neo-liberalist world order has moved along a transformation in the gender order and today's 'transnational business-oriented masculinity' differs significantly albeit often subtly from a traditional masculine order promoted by the bourgeoisie of the earlier era. The subsequent order relies heavily on technical-functional rationality, consumption-oriented women, as well as a libertine sexuality. He further contends that, within this framework, the male body is commodified and used as a marketing tool⁵³. R. W. Connell's framework is prominent in many respects as it deliberately shuns both biological and socio-cultural determinism which hovers all over gender studies. The shifting ground in his analysis gives room to observe the changing paradigms. One theoretical question around which a whole set of debates evolves has been "is there a certain type, if not purer, of masculinity that has been deformed, controlled and confined by patriarchy?" Interestingly just like feminist studies have evolved towards diversity, so has Masculinity Studies diversified by paying extra attention to the differences among men as reflected within manifold texts and contexts.

Before concluding this part, one needs to recall that despite their contributions, Queer Studies and Masculinity Studies have paradoxically had their own biases and blindness, which numerous scholars –both inside and outside the area- have identified as problems with regards to political stance(Seidman, 1993), rhetorics and parody(Grosz, 1994), or failure to relate to more familial problems of social sciences, as well as the evacuation of the political and economical in the name of the cultural(Patton, 1993) and the idealization of the "marginal" or the "sexual outlaw"(Halperin, 1995). Furthermore, while the terrain has so far offered little explanation with regards to non-Western

⁵² S. Johnson and U. Meinhof have pointed out in *Language and Masculinity* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 1997) that presumably two axiomatic tendencies operate. First and foremost, boys and men cannot express or expose their emotions due to the pressure put on them by the society and the system in which they are forced to function. It is this system that all the time obliges them to "look" rational and unemotional all the time. Secondly, the authors emphasize the ways in which men perceive their masculine identity threatened in childhood.

cultural and social contexts and has thereby had its own Eurocentricism, its ignorance of political economy has constituted a further flaw. Executing the Lyotardian shift from a "conceptual economy model" to a "libidinal economy model" of culture⁵⁴, queer theory has failed to recognize the effects of capitalist commodification on sexuality and sexual politics⁵⁵. Queer Theory's cultural bias and absolute preferentiality of desire-theory over need-theory⁵⁶ draws its confines and makes it necessary to warily employ its instrumental tools and theoretical reasoning. This is why throughout this dissertation the terrain opened up by Queer Theory in particular, masculinity studies in general will be bolstered by other theories, and the works of scholars outside this area. The application of all these conceptualizations to the case of Turkey is thus both exciting and extremely challenging; it is exciting because it is a totally new terrain, it is also challenging because it has not been previously undertaken and therefore a lot of ground needs to be covered in articulating the conceptualizations before applying them to Turkey.

2.3. Delineating the Basic Theoretical and Methodological Premises

2.3.1. Discourse Analysis: Discourse analysis⁵⁷ is a methodological path extensively resorted to by those in the field of feminist studies and cultural studies. Although the method has been assessed by many a new academic movements, as a matter of fact, its roots go back to the 19th century and as such, is not completely a

⁵³ See R. W. Connell, *The Men and the Boys*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000. For an analysis on the commodification of the male body, see also Kaja Silverman, *Male Subjectivity at the Margins*, New York: Routledge, 1992.

⁵⁴ See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993

⁵⁵ Donald Morton, has been one of the most critical opponents of the "material blindness of queer theory". As both a scholar and the co-editor of *Transformation: Marxist Boundary Work in Theory, Economics, Politics and Culture*, Morton fervently criticized Queer Theory for privileging the question of "desire" and dismissing the question of "need" (and labor, class, surplus value and praxis). See Donald Morton, *The Material Queer: A LesBiGay Cultural Studies Reader*, Westview Press, 1996.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 203.

⁵⁷ It is difficult to give a single definition of Discourse Analysis as a research method since it can be carried out in different ways and is neither a qualitative nor a quantitative research method, but rather a particular manner of questioning the basic assumptions embodied in these research methods. Discourse Analysis attempts to reveal the hidden within a text and argues that every text is shaped within a discourse and discursive practice. As such it is nurtured by a deconstructive reading.

novelty of the post-industrial age.⁵⁸ The value of studying “things” or “cultural products” has over the last decades been gradually but inexorably recognized⁵⁹ by academics in various disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, literary studies, and history. As Reinharz claims in her extensive work on feminist methodology, “contemporary feminist scholars of cultural texts are likely to see meaning as mediated, and therefore to examine both the text and the processes of its production. They are also likely to examine the processes that prevent texts from being produced”(Reinharz, 1992: 145). Discourse analysis⁶⁰ re-reads “texts” and a “text” can comprise a highly heterogeneous multitude of things⁶¹. Newspaper rhetoric, billboards, fashion, children’s books, fairy tales, women’s journals’ articles⁶², recipes, cookbooks, to mention just a few, can be read through critical lenses and studied as “texts”⁶³. All in all, echoing Reinharz, it might be stated that “these products stem from every aspect of human life including relatively private worlds, ‘high’ culture, popular culture and organizational life. The only limit to what can be considered a cultural artifact is the researcher’s imagination.”(Reinharz, 1992: 146) Hence every meaning producing ‘thing’ in society is potentially an object of analysis; the scholar chooses her subject of analysis among these not through random selection, but in accordance with what the society selects and highlights as important in generating meaning. Hence, although these choices may not

⁵⁸ In 1838, for instance, Harriett Martineau was stressing the importance of collecting nonreactive data. Harriett Martineau, *How to Observe Morals and Manners*, 1838, M. R. Hill (ed), (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988)

⁵⁹ For a full elaboration of research methods not based on empirical data see Eugene Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, *Unobstrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in Social Sciences*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966

⁶⁰ For an argument on the possibility and desirability of combining different discourse analytical and non-discourse analytical approaches in empirical study, see Marianne W Jørgensen and Louise J Phillips *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, Sage publications, 2002. The authors do also contend the “objectivity” of positivist science by maintaining that critique must be an inherent and central part in any research in the social sciences.

⁶¹ To give a few examples on the numerous "types" or theories of Discourse Analysis, Jacques Derrida's "Deconstruction", Michel Foucault's *Genealogy*, Julia Kristeva's 'non-feminist' feminist interpretation and Fredric Jameson's Marxist analysis of Postmodernism could be named.

⁶² Following this methodological path, sociologists Franscesca Cancian and Steven Gordon, for instance have employed content analysis to study U.S. Women’s Magazines. See their “Changing Emotion Norms in Marriage: Love and Anger in U.S. Women’s magazines since 1900” in *Gender & Society*, 1988

appear 'systematic' in the sense of traditional social science methodology, their systematic nature is actually located in the choices that individuals comprising society make by selecting certain ones over others.

2.3.2. Textuality: Additionally, the concepts of "*text*" and "*textuality*" are also of central importance. Deconstructionists have challenged the assumption that each text has an underlying "truth" which corresponds to what the author *intended* to reveal all throughout writing it. Accordingly, they believe that the author too partakes in the "condition of textuality" in which s/he operates. They further contend that neither the language nor the written materials possess a fixed or stable meaning. Needless to add, one pivotal concept that needs clarification in this context is "*discourse*", as ways of constituting knowledge, as defined by Michel Foucault⁶⁴. Within this framework, discourse embodies not only words and speeches but also a wide range of social practices, forms of subjectivity. As Weedon notes, "discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern." (Weedon, 1987: 108).

Hence the meanings of 'things' that are deemed significant by a society, which have been socially constructed in the first place, are constantly in a state of change as well. The task of the scholar is to locate this spectrum of meanings by locating them in time and space. It is in this context that historicity becomes very significant. Hence in my analysis, I locate the repertoire of meanings around the concept of masculinity in space by relating the meanings to those of femininity, and also in time by analyzing the concept through Turkish history among different social groups. Of central importance for the lexicon employed in this dissertation is the notion of "*discourse*" and its

⁶³ The motley items subject to content analysis has been grouped in four categories by Reinharz as follows: written records(e.g. diaries), narratives and visual texts (e.g. TV shows or advertisements), material culture(e.g.technology) and finally behavioral residues(patterns of wear).(Reinharz, 1992 : 147)

⁶⁴ For further analyses on the constitution of knowledge and the fabrication of rational, disciplined individual, see Foucault's *Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity*, by John Ransom, Duke UP

constitutive role in building identities. “Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies.” (Hall, 1996: 4) This usage of the term was given particular prominence by Michel Foucault whose work has left a complex and challenging impact on numerous disciplines and scholars (Sedgwick, 1990; Butler, 1990, 1993; Halperin, 1995). Especially notable was his elaboration of even the most deeply-embedded and “natural” sexual categories as first and foremost social constructs operating in discursive practices⁶⁵. Deciphering the “social” within the “natural”, and the “constructed” within all that had been hitherto “taken for granted” has been path-breaking and made it possible to turn visible the invisible (Weeks, 1981, 1985). Foucault intended to give a reason for the ways in which individuals have become either the subjects or the objects of political, economic, legal and social discourses. In order to probe the dynamics operating behind subjectivity, Foucault approaches subjectivity as both the outcome and the very source of knowledge and power⁶⁶.

2.3.3. Text and Power: Following a similar train of thought, and arguing that “a book is itself a little machine” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari⁶⁷ have underlined that all textual contexts imply cultural “machines”⁶⁸, in the sense that they are engines of discursive intention and desire. This literary machine is connected to other machines operating within the same society. Narratives produce power, and power

1997). See also *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject*, by Alec McHoul with Wendy Grace (New York UP, 1997).

⁶⁵ Foucault laid out the framework for his approach on this issue in his *Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1-2*, New York: Pantheon, 1977.

⁶⁶ Another conceptual tool this dissertation borrows from Foucault is '*discursive field*', which he employed to fathom the rapport among social institutions, subjectivity, knowledge, power and language. Law, for instance, is one notable discursive field, the family is yet another one. Foucault reported them as zones of various, some contradictory, discourses with varying degrees of power and influence. As such, “truth” becomes a discourse. Instead of pursuing the “truth”, Foucault thus proposes to see it as a domineering discourse constitutive of a particular truth, a hegemonic truth.

⁶⁷ Gilles, Deleuze, and Felix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1987. See also Kaufman & Heller(eds), *Deleuze & Guattari: New Mappings in Philosophy, Politics and Culture*, Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1998.

⁶⁸ For further analysis on this point see *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, eds. C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski, Routledge, New York, 1994.

writes its own narrativities. Deleuze and Guattari have supported the idea of a “*minor literature*” which works against centralized, domineering meta-narratives and is basically centrifugal in that it works toward de-territorialization. Deleuze is thus very significant for those scholars engaged in gender analysis⁶⁹. This argument is very similar to the deconstruction of margins argument that the Queer Studies scholars have been proposing to generate (Altman, 1982; Weeks, 1981; Herdt, 1994; Halperin, 1990; Sedgwick, 1990; Patton, 1993; Berlant and Freeman, 1993).

2.3.4. Text and Silences: It should also be noted that discourse analysis is interested in not only “what the text says” but also “what the text silences”. As such, the analysis of silences is an important methodological tool for scholars studying culture in its complexity, as well as those focusing on gender and power relations.⁷⁰ In Reinhartz’s words, “By discovering patterns between existing and missing documents, and with power/gender relations in the society of the time, and by bringing this material to the attention of people today, new ties are made that help explain the current relation between gender and power...”(Reinhartz, 1992: 163). It is these missing elements and suppressed identities that content analysis has been pursuing just as much as words and meanings. Hampsten, for instance, studies the literature of lower class women which she claims is “... the literature of a class of women who have been silent, and it bears few resemblances to public literature of the period or to the private writing of men or of upper class women. To reach it, one must read letters and diaries, for the thoughts of working women are recorded nowhere else.”(Hampsten, 1982: vii) After all, as Collingwood maintains, “the past simply as past is wholly unknowable; it is the past as residually preserved in the present that is alone knowable.”⁷¹ The analysis of “timeless”

⁶⁹ One of the most prominent works in terms of developing a gendered analysis inspired by the Deleuzian framework has been generated by Elizabeth Grosz. See her “A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics,” *Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Sept., 1993, 167-179.

⁷⁰ For an assessment on the bond between cultural studies and critical discourse analysis, see Chris Barker and Dariusz Galasinski, *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis*, Sage, 2001. The authors claim that studying culture by employing the methodology of critical discourse analysis does and will enrich our understanding of culture, gender and ethnicity.

⁷¹ Collingwood R. G., *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1956

cultural products⁷² constitutes one of the many threads interwoven into discourse analysis⁷³. In the context of Turkish literature, not only is it important, then, to analyze what groups have recorded their meanings at the expense of what other groups, but one must also pay attention to among those that are recorded as to what meanings have been left out of the text. Hence the researcher has to constantly read the text by critically locating it in the larger societal and temporal context; and also constantly read into the text by critically looking for structures of meaning that exist in society at large but are left out of the text.

All throughout this study, discourse analysis will be my main methodological tool. Additionally, where and when I introduce additional cultural artifacts from the past or present Turkish cultural life, I will also undertake qualitative or interpretive content analysis⁷⁴ that is based on critical interpretation. I will primarily focus on cultural artifacts⁷⁵ that are generated by Turkish society throughout their recent history. In so doing, I shall employ these artifacts not as isolated phenomena but in relation to the totality of the social institutions and social relations within which they operate, thereby following the example of Paul Stirling⁷⁶ who studied the effects of modernization in Anatolian villages. As I noted previously, studying cultural life requires reading both the existing facts as well as the absences. Keat and Urry have pointed out in their extensive

⁷² It is not solely feminist scholars who have articulated the significance of studying cultural products as “texts” to open to discussion both the existing and the missing dimensions of ideological, cultural and political frames, as well as individual and social psyche. In his enlightening work, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, David Lowenthal explores a myriad of cultural artifacts and relics starting from the premise that “the past is not dead, as J. H. Plumb would have it, it is not even sleeping. A mass of memories and records, of relics and replicas, of monuments and memorabilia, lives at the core of our being. And as we remake it, the past remakes us.” (Lowenthal, 1990: xxv)

⁷³ A noteworthy example that crystallizes this approach is Bonnie J. Fox, “Selling the Mechanized Household: 70 Years of Ads in Ladies Home Journal” in *Gender & Society*, 1990, 4(1): p. 25-40.

⁷⁴ For an enriching study carried out by using this method see Frank Stricker, “Cookbooks and Lawbooks: The Hidden History of Career Women in Twentieth Century America” in N. Cott and E. Pleck(eds) *A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History of American Women*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979

⁷⁵ For an extensive and innovative study on the cultural artifacts generated in Turkey’s cultural history, see Kudret Emiroğlu, *Gündelik Hayatımızın Tarihi*, Ankara: Dost yayınları, 2002.

⁷⁶ Stirling had deciphered not only the changing dynamics along the process of modernization but also those areas most resistant to any structural change, such as marriage, child rearing and religion. See

work on *Social Theory As Science* that it is crucial to develop “the interpretive understanding of belief; an account of the structural features of particular social formations in which these beliefs are generated and disseminated; and an examination of the ways in which people perceive and act in, the situations located within these structures” (Keat and Urry, 1975: 229). Hence the meanings that I study would only be rigorously analyzed when they are properly contextualized within society at large.

2.3.5. Deconstruction of the Hegemonic Dualities It should also be noted that there is a close interconnection between the methodologies scholars employ and their theoretical frameworks. Hence, for instance, anthropologist Gayle Rubin or Sylvia Walby link feminist research to Marxist theory⁷⁷, Zillah Eisenstein’s work draws on contemporary political philosophy, or Kristeva’s work emerges through her discourse with psychoanalysis and linguistics⁷⁸. The methodology I employ is also closely connected to the theoretical framework within which I conduct my analysis; the choice of my theoretical framework, in turn, derives from the nature of my subject matter. A complicated subject as masculinity that is both interdisciplinary in nature and also rather deeply embedded in society cannot be studied through conventional social science methodology and needs to rely on new theoretical insights such as discourse analysis and the deconstructive methods it entails.

Paul Stirling, “Cause, Knowledge and Change: Turkish Village Revisited” in J. Davies (ed) *Choice and Change*, London: Athlone, 1974.

⁷⁷ I base my claims herein upon the following selected studies: Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women” in A. Jaggar and P. Struhl(eds) *Feminist Frameworks*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978; and Sylvia Walby, *Patriarchy at work*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986. For further analysis in this regard see also, Angela V. John, *By the Sweat of Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal Mines*, Croom Helm, London, 1980

⁷⁸ In the Kristevan framework linguistics and psychoanalysis are fused to demonstrate the ways in which language enables the subject to differentiate and distance itself from the “Other”. This, Kristeva claims is rendered possible by repressing archaic maternal authority. See Julia Kristeva, *The Kristeva Reader*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Feminist scholarship has oftentimes designated its main goal as critique, deconstruction and contestation. For a discussion on how feminist political theorists have benefited from these, see Christine Di Stefano and Nancy J. Hirschmann(eds), *Revisioning the Political: Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

I also draw upon the history of political thought, cultural studies and LGBT (Lesbian Gay Bi-sexual Transgender Studies). For my purposes in this dissertation, one aspect of deconstructionist rereading is particularly noteworthy as it serves as a conceptual tool throughout: the persistent endeavor to display the ways in which what appears to be a putatively amalgamated whole is in fact made up of distinct clusters of meanings. It is these clusters of meanings that I try to capture in Turkish society. For the hegemonic masculinity in Turkey can only be fully analyzed through separating it to its constituent parts, once those constituent parts that are formed in different ways at different junctures of Turkish history are understood, only then can we understand the hegemonic Turkish masculinity and in so doing, start to take it apart.⁷⁹

2.3.6. Problem of ‘Undecidables’ and Fluidity: Up until this point, I have briefly elaborated upon the deliberate endeavor of deconstruction to disfavor the favored, the hegemonic. Nevertheless, not everything falls neatly into the mold of dualities. Some things are, though not utterly detached from dualistic frames, still uninstructed by these. It is these that Derrida names “*undecidables*”. As he notes:

...[I]t has been necessary to analyze, to set to work, *within* the text of the history of philosophy, as well as *within* the so-called literary text,..., certain marks, shall we say,... that by analogy I have called undecidables, that is, unities of simulacrum, "false" verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, *without ever* constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics. (Derrida, 1981: 42-43)

As will be elaborated in the chapters to follow, not only were dualities the basis of Western philosophy, but they were of many modernist movements in the non-Western

⁷⁹ The notion of “hegemonic masculinity” has been repeatedly, if not widely, used by a number of scholars, including Connell, 1987, 1990, 1995; Cloud, 1997; Condit, 1997. It is won not only through externally imposed teachings but also through internalization, not only via coercion but also through consent, even though there might never be an absolute consensus. For the latter, the emphasis is on masculine subject-positions (places) as an effect of discursive formations and how these positions are taken up or inhabited (practices of everyday life). That is why it is especially important to look at everyday life reflections of masculinity.

world as well. Indeed modernity emerged in opposition to tradition, science challenged religion; this was built upon a rationalized world that neatly analyzed and categorized everything and in so doing reified existing dualities such as the one between masculinity and femininity. This was all the more visible in the case of Turkish experience of building a modern, secular nation-state where the present and the past were distanced as far as was possible from each other, and the legitimacy of the former was built upon the negation of the latter. Yet, just as much as it is necessary to probe and problematize dichotomous cultural constructions in order to decipher masculinities in Turkey, it will also be very significant to note the “undecidables” in order to decipher the processes within which these operate.

Central in the consolidation of subjectivity is the social context in which certain practices or identities emerge as desirable, venerable or unchangeable. That, in turn, rests upon what Foucault names “*the dividing practices*” which, for instance in the case of psychiatry, purport to divide the insane from the sane or practices that divide normality from abnormality. Foucault also pays special attention to the continuities and discontinuities between ‘*epistemes*’.⁸⁰ He argues that in the history of Western societies, there has occurred a shift from ‘sovereign power’ to ‘disciplinary power’. The latter is based on a much more diffuse power and insidious social surveillance⁸¹, each serving to ‘normalize’ its subjects and define its Other⁸².

⁸⁰ On Foucault’s methods and “different faces”, as well as numerous epistemological connections with the pioneers of political philosophy see Mark Olssen, Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education, Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1999.

⁸¹ For Foucault this surveillance was encapsulated by Bentham’s Panopticon, developed in 19th century as part of the prison system to watch the prison cells from a watchtower. Never sure when they would be watched, over the time the prisoners would start to police their own behavior, internalize the Gaze of the Panopticon.

⁸² One additional consequential conceptual tool this dissertation employs is that of the “*Other*”, which emerges as an individual or collective identity always treated as an object vis-a-vis the gaze of the subject. Within the master signifier, a plethora of identities have loomed as the Other in different historical eras and different geographical places, including slaves, foreigners, women or homosexuals. All throughout this study, the question as to “who is the Other of Turkish modernization”, and has the definition of this category changed in time, and if so how, will be of central importance.

In a similar vein, one further conceptual distinction that might be helpful in our analysis here has been highlighted by Elsbeth Probyn who focuses on the “outside” rather than the interior/exterior or center/marginal model and proposes to slide from “identity” to “belonging”. She notes in particular that “Here I slide from “identity” to “belonging”, in part because I think that the latter term captures more accurately the desire for some sort of attachment, be it to other people, places or modes of being, and the ways in which individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, wanting to become, a process fueled by yearning rather than the positing of identity as a stable state.” (Probyn, 1996: 19) In drawing this distinction Probyn is inspired by Walter Benjamin’s phrase, “perplexity of living”. Probyn states in particular that “Benjamin’s phrase inspires me to study the inbetweenness of belonging, of belonging not in some deep authentic way but belonging in constant movement, modes of belonging as surface shifts.” (Probyn, 1996: 19) Deciphering the power relations and encoding sexist presumptions operating within the texts and contexts of manhood and womanhood has also been a central concern of feminist literary theory. Especially significant in this context is the link between “gender” and “genre”. In so doing, they have demonstrated how and wherein women are placed in the position of “subject” vis-à-vis the Law-of-the-Father. Reinterpreting Lacan, Irigaray has come with a project of the inscription of femininity in culture⁸³. Starting from the mother-daughter relationship, she, among others⁸⁴, has argued that women can create forms of female-to-female inter-subjective communication. Irigaray interprets this feminine language as the very expression of female desire which she defines as essentially fluid⁸⁵. Similarly, Kristeva too deciphers

⁸³ The ways in which the “feminine” is defined and fixed has been a central concern for French feminist scholars in general, Irigaray in particular. For a comprehensive assessment of this see Margaret Whitford, *Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine*, London: Routledge, 1991. See also Irigaray's Notion of Sexual Morphology," *Reimagining Women: Representations of Women in Culture*, eds. S. Neuman and G. Stephenson, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1993, 82-95.

⁸⁴ Despite the differences among them, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous all persuade and promote a feminine language which is thought to have the potential to destabilize the norms of the masculine symbolic. Beyond this agreement there are significant differences of opinion. See Mary Jacobus, *Reading Woman: Essays in Feminist Criticism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986

⁸⁵ Likewise, Cixous’s writing is replete with maternal metaphors. See Susan Stanford Friedman. "Creativity and the Childbirth Metaphor: Gender and Difference in Literary Discourse." *Feminist Studies*, Spring 1987, 13(1). See also Diane Griffin Crowder. "Amazons and Mothers? Monique Wittig, Hélène Cixous and Theories of Women's Writing." *Contemporary Literature* Summer 1983, 24(2), pp. 117-144.

motherhood⁸⁶ as a battleground and emphasizes its significance in the formation of subjectivity, as well as in the access to language and then to culture and society.⁸⁷ For my purposes in this dissertation, Irigaray is important especially with respect to the emphasis she places on the notion of “femininity” and in her acknowledgement that one cannot describe “the feminine” outside of the current definitions (Irigaray, 1985).

“Feminine” is not the same thing as “woman”. Employing the term “femininity” is crucial for a study that concentrates on masculinities as it enables us to focus on sexual taxonomies⁸⁸(Herdt, 1994), cultural biases and expectations rather than on biological women and men. A new definition for womanhood –and thereby manhood– that is based on the formation of their subjectivities will develop out of a mimetic engagement with the old definitions, and not completely outside these. What makes this especially significant in the Turkish context is that if the researcher brings in the *process* of the formation of the subjectivities that lead to the definition of manhood or womanhood, she is less prone to naturalize and adopt West-centric assumptions and premises in doing so.

Such are the basic conceptual tools and methodological paths to be followed throughout this dissertation. Needless to add, some of these concepts have been generated in and for a Western context and as such might not have much explanatory power in a non-Western context. They therefore would need to be reworked and readjusted with particular meanings from Turkish cultural and political history. Still,

⁸⁶ For further analysis on this point of emphasis see Kate Fullbrook, Review of Janet Todd's *Feminist Literary History* and Susan Sellers, ed., *Writing Differences: Readings from the Seminar of Hélène Cixous*, *Feminist Review*, Summer, 1989. Cixous claims that writing is like childbirth and compares ink to milk. Although she also maintains that not everything written by women falls into this camp, writing is an influential weapon to re-appropriate what has been appropriated from women.

⁸⁷ Although Kristeva does not refer to her own writing as feminist, many feminists turn to her work in order to expand and develop various discussions and debates in feminist theory and criticism. Especially important has been her focus on the maternal in the constitution of subjectivity and her notion of abjection as an explanation for oppression and discrimination. It should also be noted that Kristeva suggests that the maternal function cannot be reduced to mother, feminine, or woman. See Julia Kristeva, *Crisis of the European subject*, New York: Other Press, 2000. See also Julia Kristeva and C. Clément and al, *The Feminine and the Sacred, European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

⁸⁸ I use the word “sexual taxonomy” to pursue how gender patterns and distinctions are being perceived and socially, culturally and ideologically categorized. I borrow the term from Herdt. For further

however, I would argue that they provide a fertile epistemological field upon which a researcher can proceed when studying an interdisciplinary subject matter such as masculinity. The main theoretical premise underlying all these theoretical formulations and their methodological applications is that masculinity is a discursive construct deeply embedded in the power relations and structure of society. As such, the field concurs that masculinity is more than a particular biological behavior originating from a person's genitalia. Masculinity is about power. It is about the otherizing, distancing, disciplining individuals that occurs, and then the molding of them into subjects. The dissertation focuses specifically on this hegemonic aspect of masculinity and the conceptual tools developed to disentangle it. I therefore do not focus on individual men *per se*, but on patterns of masculinity, and also on patterns of womanhood insofar as they are relational, mutually constructed⁸⁹ and crucial to understand and deconstruct hegemonic gender ideology.

2.4 Shifting Paradigms on Gender, Orientalism and the Middle East

The previous section has mapped out the theoretical field, questioning the meta-narratives and sweeping generalizations that are in existence in relation to gender. Indeed, the last two decades have been especially successful in demonstrating and therefore eliminating the connection between knowledge and power. It is interesting to note that even though such connections have been successfully removed elsewhere, the category of women in the Middle East has proved to be most resilient in resisting removal. Gender in the Middle East is still one of the most popular topics in both the academia and everyday parlance⁹⁰. Ironically, there is still a lot of ground to be covered

in this regard see Andrew J. Hostetler and Gilbert Herdt, "Culture, Sexual Lifeways, and Developmental Subjectivities: Rethinking Sexual Taxonomies", *Social Research*, Summer 1998.

⁸⁹ The need to study masculinities not as isolated phenomena but with a study of womanhood has been pointed out by numerous scholars. See especially Michael Kaufman, *Men, Feminism and Men's Contradictory Experiences of Power*. In Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman(eds), *Theorizing Masculinities*. London: Sage, 1994; and Seidman, Steven(ed.) *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. For a historical work with the same perspective, see John, Angela V. and Eustance, Claire (eds). *The Men's Share?: Masculinities, Male Support and Women's Suffrage in Britain, 1890-1920*. London: Routledge, 1997

⁹⁰ For a critical assessment see Boaz Shoshan(ed), *Discourse on Gender/Gendered Discourse in the Middle East*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000

and it is very difficult to prevent the conclusions drawn in this field from converging with Orientalist assumptions⁹¹. As one scholar notes, “Orientalism is a discourse which represents the exotic, erotic, strange Orient as a comprehensible, intelligible phenomenon within a network of categories, tables and concepts by which the Orient is simultaneously defined and controlled. To know is to subordinate.”(Turner, 1994: 21)

At this juncture, I should note the relevance of this discussion of women in the Middle East and Orientalism to the topic of masculinity in Turkey. Within history, the Ottoman Empire upon which the Turkish Republic was established and the Islamic religion to which most of the then subjects of the empire and now citizens of the Republic profess within the boundaries defined by state secularism have been the primary targets of Orientalism according to Edward Said. Hence, even though the Turkish Republic is oriented toward the West, it has been historically perceived as located in the East, as the ‘other,’ at best viewed as negotiating a location between the East and the West. It is because of this location that the Orientalism discussion and the theoretical critique it provides is a necessary tool for the analysis of masculinity in Turkey. Likewise, gender relations in Turkey have been mostly analyzed within the context of the relationship between women and Islam because it was specifically this relationship that modernity problematized. Women’s location in Middle Eastern society has always been taken as a measure of modernization and therefore the analysis of women in the Middle East contains important insights into the nature of gender dynamics and therefore into the possible location of men and masculinity in the same society. Since Turkey has been considered a part of the Middle East, it is significant to review this literature, albeit critically to make sure that it does not contain elements which do not apply to the particularities of the Turkish context, in order to benefit from the theoretical insights they too provide. It is in this spirit that I undertake the following review.

⁹¹ For illuminating reflections on the ramifications of Western ethnocentrism, power in the post-colonial world, including Edward Said’s essay on “Orientalism and Beyond” see *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. Bart J. Moore-Gilbert, New York: Verso, 1997.

Women in the Middle East as a category contains a bulky generalization and like all bulky generalizations it can be more than misleading. One should ask, which women? As Gottlieb contends, “the challenge is to recognize the tension between truth-seeking and social reform, the place for polemic and commitment, the danger of over-empathy... the fact that women are not homogeneous, and that much work needs to be done to develop viable, empirically tested theories.”(Gottlieb, 1987: 62) Likewise one should ask, which class, which status group, which age group, where and when? Similarly one should ask, which Middle East? Which country, the urban or the countryside, which historical period, which geographical place and for whom? In whose eyes?

These questions do not imply that there is no reality, no possibility for structural analysis. Rather, they point to the fact that reality is multifaceted and subject to interpretation and change. The more we specify, the better we realize the complexity of the framework and thereby the limitedness of our own answers. Unfortunately, Western feminists know very little about the East, especially the Middle East, and their approaches are replete with biases as well⁹². Many a time, there are myriad stereotypes and a continuous ignorance⁹³. Few people are genuinely interested in the complexities of the Middle East and fewer have genuine knowledge, especially the language skills, to capture the spectrum of meanings that exist in these societies; ignorance buttresses stereotypes and stereotypes engender ignorance. In short, there is often a vicious circle and all too often a double standard⁹⁴.

⁹² For a more detailed coverage of the biased gaze of Western feminism, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses”, *Boundary 2*, 1984/1985, 13(1), p. 333-358.

⁹³ Feminism’s basic premises do either overtly or covertly overlap with the greater social frameworks in which they take shape and thus do converge with modernist discursive practices. See Aihwa Ong, “Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Representations of Women in Non-Western Societies” in *Inscriptions: Special Issue: Feminism and the Critique of Colonial Discourse*, 1988, 3/4, p. 78-93.

⁹⁴ The point is generated by Margrit Eichler in her *The Double Standard: A Feminist Critique of Feminist Social Science*, London, Croom Helm, 1980.

2.4.1. Problematizing the Location of Power: In dealing with the problems of methodology generated by studying women in the Middle East, Göçek and Balaghi ask how constructive it is for feminists to assign primacy to gender identity when studying the Middle East. They state that, “many scholars concur that such boundaries are disadvantageous to the feminist cause in the long run. If one exclusively focuses on gender identity, one would stifle gender rather than liberate it.” (Göçek-Balaghi, 1994: 7) Therefore, neither identity nor the alternative term “belonging” should be problematized solely on the basis of gender experience, they argue. Power can be located in many spheres, and one may overlook the totality of these spheres if one focuses on gender identity alone. In deciphering the complexity of the operation of patriarchal precedents, it is crucial to remember the Foucauldian scheme and recall the existence of various forms of power throughout society.

As Milani maintains, “power and control have not been solely the prerogatives of Iranian men. It is true that women had long been systematically barred from the arena of formal political and economic power. But there are other forms of power, and women have exercised them.”(Milani, 1991: 3) For instance, associations and kinship is a source of power too. As Nicki Keddie claims, “female associations, powerful in cultures where social institutions and values inhibit most efforts by women to establish solidarity in one another, can challenge male domination.”(Keddie-Beck, 1982: 19) Thus, the overall picture at hand is not a men vis-à-vis women type of struggle where the former are the oppressors and the latter simply the oppressed. Sometimes, often times, women too take part, an active part, in the reproduction of patriarchal values and power relations and, in so doing, they too oppress their own “other”.

2.4.2. Determinants of Power It is crucial to recall that apart from gender, one needs to take into account the following determinants. **Age**, for instance, is a massive determinant of power in the Middle East. Aged women have definitely more power and most of the time they do not hesitate in using this power against younger women in the family, especially and paradoxically, the daughter-in-law in a pretty much same way it was done to them when they themselves were young brides. **Class** is

another determinant. Depending on the economic position of a woman, her experience of patriarchy might significantly vary. The distinction between **urban** and **rural** is important to understand variations of life in Middle Eastern societies where the power of women usually increases with the movement toward the urban areas. Likewise, **ethnicity** and religious and social differences need to be taken into account and included in any and every analysis on the region. Feminist scholarship or scholars in LGBT Studies thus need to take into consideration, along with gender and sexuality, a myriad of cultural, political and economic, as well as racial and religious factors especially in studying women in the Middle East⁹⁵. Scholars such as Suad Joseph have indicated that “the patriarchal impetus to gendered and aged domination, found in the domestic sphere, is also found in governmental and nongovernmental spheres.” (Joseph, 2000: 27) Additionally, the existing and potential links between the domestic sphere and the rationale of the state apparatus need to be further articulated. After all, as Joseph asserts, “these continuities between governmental, nongovernmental, and domestic structures, modes of operation, and idioms, which have been constitutive of patriarchy have been central to the culturally specific gendering of citizenship in Middle Eastern states.”(Joseph, 2000: 28)

Last but not least, **sexuality** is one complex dimension that feminist scholarship needs to pay more attention. Not too many scholars are fully aware of the position of sexual minorities in the Middle East. When homosexuals are silenced and suppressed, they are not only suppressed by men but also by women. Many women actively take part in ridiculing, suppressing, silencing homosexuality. As Keddie and Beck note, “differences in class, place, and time meant that there was never one set of Muslim women operating under one set of rules.” (Keddie-Beck, 1982: 6) Thus the existing discursive field is not fixed once and for all. Instead, it is open to negotiation and resistance.

⁹⁵ See bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*, Boston, South End Press, 1984. See also Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” in C. Moraga and G. Andalzua (eds) *This Bridge Called My Back*, Persephone, MA, 1981.

Sexuality in the Middle Eastern context is too often problematized, if not traumatized. When women and sexuality in the Middle East is brought under consideration, the theme is almost always reminisced and probed with and through a setback composed of various problem areas, including honor killings, virginity tests, and the veil. Concomitantly, there is relatively little research on sexualities in the Islamic topography⁹⁶; those that exist most often concentrate basically -- if not exclusively -- on the disciplining, punishing, delimiting aspect of sexuality, and do so in an ethnocentric manner⁹⁷. While one cannot deny the importance of studying this subject, it should also be noted that this is not and should not be the only framework with which sexuality should, ought to, and does operate for Middle Eastern men and women, be they homosexuals or heterosexuals.

2.4.3. A New Approach to Sexuality and Masculinity: Sexuality in the Middle East is also about liberating, enriching, emancipating practices -- a dimension that goes almost totally neglected. If and when the liberating dimension is considered, it is usually done so in reference to either poetry or history, both as reflections of the non-existent. Yet one needs to constantly remind others and elaborate on how within actual social practice, sexuality is reflected in many different ways, some of which provide unshackling to the otherwise disciplined. In the Middle Eastern context, in addition to its pain and punishment inflicting practices and perceptions, feminist studies has to pay more attention to the pleasure driven aspect of sexuality.⁹⁸ It was this concern, this missing research that alerted me to the significance of the study of sexuality in general and masculinity in particular in the context of Turkish society. Drawing upon the

⁹⁶ There are prominent examples that should not go unnoticed nonetheless which include Evelyne Accad, "Sexuality and Sexual Politics: Conflicts and Contradictions for Contemporary Women in the Middle East," in Chandra T. Mohanty, Ann Russo, Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). Also Basim Musallam, *Sex and Society in Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and also Fatma A. Sabbah, *Woman in the Muslim Unconscious* (New York: Pergammon Press, 1984).

⁹⁷ For a critical assesment with respect to this point see Rema Hammami and Martina Rieker, "Feminist Orientalism and Orientalist Marxism," *New Left Review* 170 (July/August 1988), pp. 93-106.

theoretical and empirical research done on this topic elsewhere in the world, I conjectured that I could at least partially help overcome in the case of Turkey the biased narrative that existed in the context of the Middle East, a bias that drew upon the historical portrayal of women in the Middle East as oppressed, sexuality as repressed and violent.

Another crucial feature feminist studies on the Middle East have by and large failed to articulate is the study of men and masculinities. If, following Queer theory, we are to interpret identities as relations rather than as things, then a kind of identity mapping is necessary to understand how and where these are located. Mappings of identity, in turn, are based upon exclusions rather than inclusions. Every map projects a terrain isolated from the outer world. Put in more rigorous terms, the definition of femininity and masculinity in relation to one another also necessitates the simultaneous exclusion of some particular typologies of femininity and masculinity. In this respect, numerous researchers have brought forward highly illuminating analyses on Islamic societies by emphasizing gender and gender patterns in novel ways⁹⁹. Nevertheless, as Nancy Lindisfarne claims, when it comes to doing comparative ethnographies with these questions in mind, despite the myriad important examples in this regard¹⁰⁰, the overall number is still limited (Lindisfarne, 1994).

2.4.4. Contradictory Gender Locations: Indeed, the literature produced within the Middle East has been predominantly a domain of male activity. Women writers or critics have been absent. A few exceptions aside, we have rarely seen women as producers of the literary tradition. Most of the time, the pattern has rather been one of “male writers, female subjects”. Nonetheless, three points are noteworthy at this juncture. First of all, scholars need to pay further attention to the “visibility” women gain in a system that erases their presence. Women have been socially, politically,

⁹⁸ There are several studies that focus on this aspect of sexuality which include J. W. Wright and Everett K. Rowson, eds., *Homoeroticism in Classical Arabic Literature*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

⁹⁹ See for instance Abu Lughod 1986; Ahmed 1992; Yamani 1996 and others.

¹⁰⁰ Tapper 1991; Delaney 1991; Kandiyoti 1994; White 1996; Hofstede 1998.

economically marginalized and yet in the symbolic order, they are located at the center. In the written culture, women symbolically become center. They are invisible in the public arena, but conversely, “visible” in the symbolic order. Women are the center of attention in almost all literary genres. Nevertheless, it remains to be asked how “real” this “imagined” woman of male poets, writers and artists actually is. One also has to further analyze these contradictory locations of real and/or imagined women throughout society. Farzaneh Milani, for instance, gives an interesting example in explaining the invisibility of women in the cultural history of Iran, while studying fables, pictorial or otherwise¹⁰¹. She states that “among the many figures in Persepolis, women are completely absent. The hidden force in history is particularly hidden in this first Iranian Empire. Even the animals carried as gifts for the king by various delegations are, with one exception, male. And the presence of the only female creature, a lioness, ... can easily be explained by the age of the two cubs she accompanies: they still need suckling.” (Milani, 1991: 1) Secondly, it needs to be recalled that it is not only the male subject that produces these codes and codifications, but the female subject does as well. Therefore, by focusing on the masculinist aspect of dominant culture, feminist literary criticism has to recognize that neither logocentrism nor phallogentrism is pertinent solely to male writers¹⁰² but women’s position in society also need to be questioned to solve this puzzle. Thirdly, it is of crucial importance to highlight how and where the dominant and domineering discursive field silences or marginalizes those male identities that do not fit into its patterns. This is tantamount to saying more attention needs to be paid to the position of gay men in the Middle East. I will, however, suggest that homosexual masculinity cannot be analyzed as isolated phenomenon, but should rather be studied in relation with competing masculinities¹⁰³ and the established patterns of “effeminacy”

¹⁰¹ Not only reading new, unexplored texts but also uncovering the “known” is a central task for feminist scholarship. When looking at folk tales and popular narratives one study that might be inspiring is Propp’s analysis of Russian fairytales wherein he took as his corpus the study of these narrations and probed their components. He analyzed how the hero was portrayed as male in each case and how the prize was explicitly female.

¹⁰² For an analysis on male writers and their gender confines within the context of Western literature see Laura Claridge and Elizabeth Langland (eds) *Out of Bounds: Male Writers and Gender*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990.

¹⁰³ For a critical evaluation on the tension between “effeminacy” and expected forms of manhood see especially Mike Brake, ‘I May Be Queer, But At Least I Am a Man’: Male Hegemony and Ascribed

often times attributed to gay men (Edelman, 1994; Bergling, 2001). This is the path that I will follow in this study.

The critical reading above highlights the main elements that will guide my reading of Turkish cultural sources as well. In addition to critically analyzing those works and relations in society that the members of society defined as meaningful at that particular juncture, I shall read into the text with an attempt to locate not only the subjectivities of those in the text, but those left out of the text and those marginalized by it as well. Only when the spectrum of these locations and the meanings they generate are fully analyzed can we arrive at a rigorous analysis of masculinity in the context of Turkey. Such an analysis includes, by necessity of the theoretical and methodological perspectives employed, queries into not only men, but also women and gays at the margin, and queries not only into the text, but into the various aspects of the societal context that further illuminates the text.

2.4.5. Introducing Heterogeneity Gender studies in the Middle East are beset with the rudimentary problems looming in Western academia at large. As Turner elaborates, “Western sociology characteristically argued that Islamic society lacked those autonomous institutions of bourgeois civil society which ultimately broke the tenacious hold of feudalism over the Occident. According to this view, Muslim society lacked independent cities, an autonomous bourgeois class, rational bureaucracy, legal reliability, personal property and that cluster of rights, which embody bourgeois legal culture. Without these traditional and cultural elements, there was nothing in Islamic civilization to challenge the dead hand of pre-capitalist tradition.” (Turner, 1994: 22-23) Broadly stated, this has led feminist scholars in the area to face fundamental dilemmas. As Kandiyoti maintains, “the strong identification of cultural authenticity with Islam has meant that feminist discourse could only legitimately proceed in two directions: either denying that Islamic practices are necessarily oppressive or asserting that oppressive practices are not necessarily Islamic.” (Kandiyoti, 1996: 9)

Versus Achieved Gender. In Barker, Diana L. and Allen, Sheila. (eds). *Sexual Divisions and Society: Process and Change*. London: Tavistock, 1976.

One other important move in the literature is to bring the heterogeneity in women's lives to the fore to refrain from a monolithic gender role. Fernea and Bezirgan's *Middle Eastern Women Speak*(1977) has been influential in this regard. What the editors did was to present autobiographical and biographical statements both by and about Middle Eastern women from varying walks of life. As described by one scholar "the attempts to incorporate the voices of Middle Eastern women in academic milieu have led to an interest in the genre of autobiography." (Göçek, 1994: 10) In the past, among all academic disciplines, it was perhaps anthropology that most wholeheartedly integrated the multiple experiences of women both individually and collectively.¹⁰⁴ In the last decade, however, feminist literary criticism and analyses concentrating on the writing of women writers have also been particularly productive.

2.4.6. Engaging in Rereadings of Texts Over the course of the last two decades feminist scholars have launched radical rereadings of existing traditions and texts. As Mernissi notes, "if women's rights are a problem for some modern Muslim men, it is neither because of the Quran nor the prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the interests of the male elite. The elite faction is trying to convince us that their egoistic, highly subjective and mediocre views of culture and society have a sacred basis."(Mernissi, 1991: IX) The key difficulty is that even when critical, multicultural interpretations are generated, cultural biases that beset the academic agenda still persist. This is precisely why in her influential work "*Can the Subaltern Speak?*", Gayatri Spivak answered the question negatively¹⁰⁵. The moment the subaltern¹⁰⁶ speaks, Spivak argued, she has to resort to the "language" of dominant

¹⁰⁴ One pivotal work in this regard is Lila Abu-Lughod's research of the Bedouin society and women of Awlad Ali. *Veiled Sentiments, Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*, University of California Press, 1990

¹⁰⁵ For a far-reaching study in this vein see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, New York: Routledge, 1993. For an assessment on the subaltern and the limits of academic knowledge see also John Beverley, *Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Using the Gramscian category of "subaltern" as a starting point, Subaltern Studies emerged mostly as a critical response to the ways in which traditional historiography silenced or erased

discursive practices and once she does so, she is no longer speaking in the name of the subaltern. Still however, as Spivak notes, we can all do better than what we have done so far in terms of developing multicultural, critical, interdisciplinary works that crosscut the boundaries between the putatively isolated worlds of East and West, modernity and traditions, Islam and democracy...and so forth. Thus any analysis that purports to deal with the “subaltern” should at the same time recognize its epistemological limits and role in the machine of intellectual production. And it does so through critical engagement in the text.

2.4.7. Paradigm Shifts in Analysis Nevertheless paradigms are shifting. To this day generations of feminist scholars have been working on engendering the Middle East (Fernea 1977; Tekeli 1981; Hatem 1986; Joseph 1991; Kandiyoti 1991; Göçek 1994; Badran 1995; Najmabadi 1998). This spectrum contains paradigmatic adjustments and shifts. The position of women in Muslim countries is no doubt a theme that incites much discussion and generalizations. The theme is continuously construed by a wide range of sources, extending from popular media to daily parlance. As Kandiyoti describes, “the treatment of women and Islam has for a long time been dominated by ahistorical accounts of the main tenets of Muslim religion and their implications for women.”(Kandiyoti, 1991:1) As a matter of fact, today, just like yesterday “the vision found in popular works must have been, as is always the case, more influential in fashioning the image of Muslims for posterity than that found in more reliable scholarly works.”(Rodinson, 1991:11)

Kandiyoti proposes a periodization of the main currents of feminist thought and scholarship in the Middle East. According to this scheme, The First Wave was stamped by the Feminism and Nationalism. In Kandiyoti’s words, “the first wave of feminist writing in the Middle East is associated with movements for social reform and modernization during the era of post-colonial state formation spanning the periods between the 19th and early decades of 20th centuries.” She claims that this specific period

subordinated groups in South Asian cultures. Gradually, however, it started to cover a broader scope and was consulted by numerous scholars in an interdisciplinary framework.

exhibits striking discursive parallels among Turkey, Egypt and Iran.(Kandiyoti, 1996:8). In analyzing this period, the effects of which are still very much present, Kandiyoti draws attention to how deeply nationalist narratives are embedded in women's movement and in turn, the multifaceted roles women play in and for the former. She further notes that "women's stake in nationalism has been both complex and contradictory. On the one hand, nationalist movements invite women to participate more fully in collective life by interpellating them as 'national' actors: mothers, educators, workers and even fighters. On the other hand, they reaffirm the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct and exert pressure on women to articulate their gender interests within the terms set by nationalist discourse. In that sense, feminisms are never autonomous but bound to the signifying networks of the contexts which produce them" (Kandiyoti, 1996: 9)

The second wave emerged during 1950s and 1960s, a period during which new theoretical frameworks, particularly modernization theory and Marxism were incorporated into debates on women and family in the Middle East. Then the Third Wave arrived, characterized by dialogues within feminism. The literature was further enhanced the writings of a variety of scholars both in the area and abroad. Liberal feminists, socialist feminists, and radical feminists, psychoanalysts voiced their ideas, although the last two had interestingly relatively less impact on mainstream studies. Despite the variation there remained a consensus that women were subject to a common oppression. During late 1980s came the Fourth Wave, which, according to Kandiyoti, was marked by the breakdown of this consensus and an internal crisis about 'difference'. This corresponded with a time in which "the policies of multiculturalism and identity politics in the West ... exerted a significant influence on feminist theorizing."(Kandiyoti, 1996: 15) Kandiyoti's analyses are also noteworthy to accentuate that studies on gender in Turkey (Acar, 1994; Y. Arat, 1989; Abadan-Unat, 1982; Sirman, 1989) should not be isolated from the shifting paradigms of gender in the Middle East literature but instead analyzed and critically contextualized in relation to it. It is only through the establishment of such dialogues that gender research could fully

attain its purpose of analyzing and eliminating gender hegemony to replace it with gender equality.

The discussions held so far presented the theoretical terrain and the methodology of this dissertation. It should be once again emphasized that although the terrain offers profoundly useful theoretical insights and a fertile ground, the framework drawn so far is Western-oriented, oftentimes apolitical (Patton, 1993) and should be warily, critically employed when studying Turkish masculinities. The relative “newness” of the subject-matter of masculinities in general and dealt with in the context of Turkey in particular, as well as the employment of the methodology of discourse analysis make it necessary to focus research on fragments of culture that society flags as significant and to read these fragments critically and against the grain, both as a text and within its context, both for what it says as well as for what it silences. Hence, it is upon this theoretical and methodological framework that I now proceed to analyze the continuities and discontinuities in the constructed, imagined, created masculinities –and, by default, femininities- in Turkey.

CHAPTER THREE

MODERNITY 'ALLA TURCA' and THE RISE OF THE DANDY

The theoretical terrain and methodology of the dissertation that was articulated in the previous chapter provides the conceptual framework through which I proceed to analyze hegemony, modernity and masculinities in Turkey. Within this framework, I start this chapter by temporally defining the period within which I intend to study modernity 'alla turca'. Temporally, I begin my analysis of Turkish modernity not with the foundation of the Turkish Republic but with the late Ottoman period for two reasons. First and foremost, although the Kemalist project of the Republic claimed to constitute a profound, if not ultimate break from the Ottoman past, there were significant continuities and *surviving traditions*¹ in Turkish political and cultural history across the empire-republic divide that need to be recognized; dimensions of modernity started to penetrate into Ottoman society from the late eighteenth century to start to influence its cultural production by the late nineteenth century. If one were to select the establishment of the Turkish Republic as the starting point, one would totally miss this previous Ottoman stage. After establishing such a starting point, I shall pay special attention to those studies that attempt a cultural analysis of modernity that does not do 'history from above' by studying the Ottoman imperial life to the exclusion of society, but rather the strategy of 'history from below'. In particular, I shall concentrate on information that could be derived from these studies concerning ordinary people leading ordinary lives. I thus identify and utilize analyses in Turkey's cultural and social history which resonate with this approach and focus on this dimension of Ottoman social life.

¹ For an enriching discussion on surviving traditions and their role in the main elements of modernity see David Gross, *The Past in Ruins: Tradition and the Critique of Modernity*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992.

The second reason, interrelated to the first, for choosing the late Ottoman period as the starting point of my analysis is that many of the modernizing elements in relation to gender that became visible during the Republican period were already under way in the late Ottoman period; in this sense, it is vital to see the continuities, similarities and overlaps between the Republican and Ottoman gender relations in general, and the Republican male elite and the late Ottoman male elite in particular. The gender-conscious critical perspective on knowledge that I employ here needs to take into consideration such continuities to reveal how and wherein patriarchal precedents persist. And therefore, in what follows, I first concentrate on the late Ottoman period to decipher its male elite and masculinities, and then proceed into the Republican period where I scrutinize the masculinities scattered along the Islamist-Kemalist paradigm and beyond.

3.1. Multiple Modernities and the Case of Turkish Modernity

Throughout the twentieth century, the concept of “modernity” has by and large been employed as a fundamental and universal stage, which all societies would have to undergo at one time or another in their history. Formulated as such, modernity has been regarded as a universally applicable formula operating via and above parochial dynamics². More recently, however, this domineering understanding has been replaced by a much more flexible and multifarious approach that acknowledges the existence of varieties, as well as cracks and crevices in the frame of modernity, rendering it possible to talk about *multiple modernities*³ rather than modernity as one single formula⁴. According to this latter view, even though modernity is still perceived as a universal phenomenon transcending all cultures while transforming them as well, an additional argument is made by stating that not all societies would and could proceed to modernity

² For a discussion on oppressive globalization and universal homogenizing, as well as alternative strategies to contend it, see John Wiseman, “Alternatives to Oppressive Globalization” in *Globalization and Its Discontents*. Stephen McBride, (ed) Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

³ The notion of multiple paths to modernity has been essential particularly in certain area studies, including the region of the Balkans. See Gerasimos Augustinos(ed), *Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe: Essays in National Development*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991

⁴ Charles Taylor draws a distinction between what he names as “cultural modernity” and “acultural modernity” claiming that the latter removes culture from history. See Taylor, Charles. “Two Theories of Modernity”, *Public Culture* 11, 1999, pp. 153-174.

along the same route. In more rigorous terms, there is no all-encompassing process of modernization that has been equally suitable and applicable to all places and cultures throughout the world. Modernity is a tapestry of details, varieties and clashes; this, in turn, constitutes part and parcel of its longevity and endurance, as well as a source for the competing identities it forges⁵.

3.1.1.Masculine Categories of Modernity: One particular study that has left a profound impact on the existing literature has been Marshall Berman's *All That is Solid Melts into Air*⁶. Berman first points out how modernity cuts across all boundaries of geography, ethnicity, class and nationality to thereby "unite" humankind⁷; yet, at the same time, he concentrates on those distinct paths of modernization different societies employ by drawing comparisons between France and Russia and by decoding modernization's basic credentials through poems, novels and novellas. In so doing, Berman brings forward an enriching account of modernity; his analyses concentrate on certain key symbols and figures of the modern in the nineteenth century. Significant among these are the pivotal categories where the modernist ideology crystallizes in the public sphere; these categories are "the man in the crowd", "the reorganization of the public sphere", "the cosmopolitan city", "the flaneur" and "the stranger." My own analysis of modernity in late Ottoman and early Republican period will draw upon some elements in this categorization as well.

Even though feminist scholars as well as scholars of post-colonial or subaltern studies scholars who study the tracks of Western modernity have benefited enormously from Berman's work, they have at the same time adopted a critical stance toward it as

⁵ Identities have been more and more forged or "bought" as consumables along the consumption patterns of modern life. This point has been generated by Scott Lash, among others. See in this regard S. Lash and J. Friedman, *Modernity and Identity*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1992. This particular collection is important for my purposes in this dissertation as it discusses a wide range of topics including various ethnographies, modernism in non-Western contexts and how the lack of fixed identity urges people toward religion, nationalism or ethics.

⁶ Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, Verso, London, 1982.

⁷ For a thorough discussion on this aspect of Berman's work and wherein revolutionary forces are to be situated within it, see Perry Anderson, *A Zone of Engagement*, London: Verso, 1992.

well⁸. In so doing, they have particularly emphasized that even though the symbols, metaphors and figures Berman favorably employed in his book were highly significant, they were also explicitly gendered. Felski, for instance,⁹ notes that there could be no female equivalent of *the flaneur*, given that any woman who loitered on the streets of a nineteenth century city would immediately taken in for a prostitute, though no such sanction existed for a man.(Felski, 1995: 145) In addition, the reconstruction of city life under the influence of modernity went hand in hand with the reorganization of the public, leading primarily and mainly to the creation of “the public man”. This is precisely why the public figures Berman cherished as symbols of modernity -- Marx, Baudelaire, and Faust -- were bound to be men. He failed to pay attention and further problematize the intricate relationship between modernity and masculinity.

In comparison to Marshall Berman, the pivotal concern for feminist scholars in relation to modernity has been located in its overpowering masculine aspect¹⁰. After all, “if gender politics played a central role in shaping processes of modernization, these same processes in turn helped to initiate an ongoing reconstruction and re-imagining gender.” (Felski, 1994: 154) To most contemporary ears and advocates of modernization theories¹¹, even though the concept of “being modern” almost automatically calls for an association with the advocacy and achievement of gender equality in each and every sphere, the historical trajectory modernization has taken demonstrates that this anticipation is far from reality. One insufficiently analyzed aspect of modernization is

⁸ For a critical account of Berman’s work see Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner, “Not all that is Solid Melts into Air: modernity and contingency” in *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World*, Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (eds), New Delhi, Sage, 1999.

⁹ Rita Felski has extensively dealt with an engendered reading of modernity in her studies. See especially her *The Gender of Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P. 1995.

¹⁰ There are numerous examples in this regard which include Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, eds. *The Female Imagination and the Modernist Aesthetic*. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1986.

¹¹ During the 1950s modernization theories were prominent on the academic agenda and modernization theorists optimistically and confidently wrote about the future of democracy in “belated modernities”. The overall expectation was that the process of economic development and the pace of modernization would ultimately create and consolidate democratic regimes. This, however, was not the case as many new democracies have had long spells of authoritarian rule, dubbed a bureaucratic authoritarianism. For a thorough discussion on this point see Zehra Arat, *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991.

how it infuses a masculinist centrality to culture which, in turn, leads to the reconstruction of the space attributed to women, as well as a redefinition of what is “feminine”.

Highly relevant in this context is the work of Georg Simmel¹² who wrote extensively on women and the scope of existence allocated to the in nineteenth century European society. Simmel’s approach provides an illuminating rendering of the gendered subtext underlying much sociological thought.(Felski, 1994: 145) Stated briefly, for Simmel, modernity was a product of male activity; man came to the fore as “a transgressor of limits, exemplifying becoming rather than being, objectifying himself through a constant dialectic of creativity and production.”(Felski, 1994: 146) Within this context, Simmel took an unusual step and contemplated the possible channels one could employ to generate what he termed “the feminization of culture”. In order to actualize this, Simmel thought, one had to question, if not to deconstruct entirely, the basic credentials of the cultural psyche and mentality. Simmel therefore seems to have concluded that “a feminization of culture would inevitably require a process of de-modernization.”(Felski, 1994: 146)

Feminist scholars have combined Berman’s lucid approach with Simmel’s framework in the context of a question neither one dwelled upon, namely that of “the masculinity of modernity” and the evolution of the contemporaneous “idea of manliness”¹³. Through such juxtaposition, these feminist scholars were able to discuss the gender codes of modernity through the pioneering texts of literary history of the time such as Emile Zola’s novels or Guy de Maupassant’s stories. And these discussions led Felski to point out, for instance, that many of the early novelists of the modernist psyche starting with Zola deeply linked the idea of the feminization of culture with a pessimistic

¹² For further evaluation on Simmel’s work and legacy see David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (eds), *Simmel on Culture*, London, 1997. See also K. Wolf (ed) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Free Press, New York, 1964.

¹³ One notable scholar who has extensively dealt with this theme has been George Mosse whose work demonstrates the importance of continuities for the fabrication of masculinity. Mosse mixes elements from the past and present, aristocracy and modern imagery. For an historical account of the masculine stereotype see George Mosse. *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*. London: Oxford University Press, 1998.

vision of degeneration and social decline. Western feminists were thus able to first problematize Western modernity in relation to gender relations and then approach the literary texts that generated the meanings around which modernity came to be defined with questions that revealed the nature of the relationship between gender and modernity. In analyzing modernity within the context of its historical introduction to Turkey, I intend to follow a similar interrogative and analytical framework.

Yet I need to underline here the fact that Turkish modernization has relatively not yet been approached with such incisive queries. In fact, the acrimonious debates and seminal developments throughout the departments of Western academia over modernity have been relatively late in arriving to affect the analyses Turkish modernity. Likewise, similar queries about how the forefathers of Turkish modernity, -- the first generation intellectuals and novelists for instance -- would have taken a stand in relation to the possible feminization of Turkish culture or would have interpreted the gender dimension of modernity still constitute important areas of research that have hitherto been unexplored. Despite path-breaking works by a number of prominent scholars both in Turkey and abroad¹⁴, the relationship between Turkish modernity and masculinity is still a ‘marginal’ issue in the existing literature. Actually, this is a part of a larger trend whereby it is not solely Turkish Studies in particular, but Middle Eastern Studies in general that is slow, if not reluctant, to broaden and restructure its scope by bringing to the center the issues and subjects held hitherto at the margins.

The effect of the epistemological developments in Women’s Studies and Queer studies on research regarding Islam or the Middle East was late to arrive. As Madeline Zilfi notes, this gap becomes all the more evident and striking in the literature on

¹⁴ There are numerous prominent works in this area. To name just a few, Yesim Arat, “From Emancipation to Liberation: The Changing Role of Women in Turkey’s Public Realm”, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54, 2000; Ayse Durakbasa and Aynur Ilyasoglu , “Formation of Gender Identities in republican Turkey and Women’s Narratives as Transmitters of ‘Herstory’ of Modernization’, in *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 35, 2001; Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation,” in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, A Reader*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 376-391

Ottoman studies¹⁵. After all, Zilfi states, given the predominant position of the Ottoman Empire within Middle East, as well as the multiplicity of the documents originating there, gender and women studies in the context of Ottoman studies ought to be leading the whole area at large. Following Madeline Zilfi's footsteps, one might argue that Middle Eastern Studies in general and Turkish mainstream historiography and modernization theory (Kasaba, 1997:23) in particular have not only been reluctant to study gender and sexuality despite the works of numerous scholars who have been swimming against the tide, but also rather indifferent to the "ordinary human being" as well as distanced from the approach "history from below"¹⁶. Studies on Turkey that resonate with this approach will be given a special attention throughout this dissertation.

The last decades of the twentieth century have been prolific in terms of the production of studies conducted at micro level analysis. Within this ever-growing literature, themes and subjects and questions that had been hitherto either deliberately ignored and pushed to the margins or deemed trivial and thus omitted were reevaluated, revalued and brought to the center¹⁷. While areas of study such as the history of everyday life, the sociology of everyday life, oral history, gender studies, cultural studies, and the like flourished to produce plenty of offshoots and sub-areas of specialization, interdisciplinary approaches continued to become more important and respected than ever¹⁸. Within this realm, ordinary individuals were moved to the focus of analysis¹⁹ at times, and narratives were centered in particular locations²⁰ at other times.

¹⁵ See Madeline Zilfi(ed), *Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era*, Leiden: Brill, 1997.

¹⁶ The problem of positivism and the neglect of "micro" issues in the study of culture in mainstream Turkish Studies is one of the framing questions in Yael Navaro-Yashin's prominent book in which she intends to problematize secularism. See Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

¹⁷ For a study that proposes to re-read the transition from Ottoman identity to Turkish identity by looking at its literature in general, novels in particular, see Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Türk Romanında Tarih, Toplum ve Kimlik*, Ankara: Imge, 2002.

¹⁸ For a rich discussion on this theme, see Rita Felski, "The Invention of Everyday Life," *New Formations*, 39, 1999/2000, pp. 15-31. See also by the same author "Why Those Who Dismiss Cultural Studies don't Know what They're Talking About," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 23, 1999.

¹⁹ Prominent examples include Michel Foucault's analysis on a 19th century murderer, and Carlo Ginzburg's study on a 16th century miller. See Michel Foucault, *I, Pierre Riviere, Having Slaughtered My*

Yet, more commonly, specific themes were probed and pursued, such as Philippe Aries's *Centuries of Childhood*, Foucault's revering works on the *History of Sexuality*, *Madness and Civilization*). Micro level studies were recalcitrant in especially two respects: First of all, their different subjects of analysis and their particular utilization of knowledge enabled them to generate an epistemological transformation. Secondly, their innovative approach to the historical data located in everyday life enabled the textual" aspect to introduce a methodological difference.²¹

3.1.2. Analyses of Turkish Modernity: In the context of Turkey, analyses of Turkish modernity have been carried out from a variety of epistemological vantage points. Some have concentrated on the effects of modernity on state traditions, (e.g. Metin Heper, Ahmet İnel)²² whereas others upon the transformations it generated in religious structures (e.g. Binnaz Toprak, Bahattin Akşit, Sabri Sayarı)²³, or rapid urban transformation (e.g. Ruşen Keleş)²⁴ overall shifts in traditions and mentalities (e.g. Şerif Mardin, J. Parla)²⁵, or on the propensities of change and maintenance in the socio-

Mother, My Sister, and My Brother ...: A Case of Parricide in the Nineteenth Century, Univ of Nebraska Press, 1982; See also Carlo Ginzburg, *Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1992.

²⁰ For an intense and innovative study in this regard, see for instance Emmanuel le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*, New York: Random House Inc, 1979.

²¹ For a different standpoint which maintains that microhistories and the new kinds of history (ranging from women's history to black history) have further complicated our understanding of the past and further fragmented "postmodern histories", see Arif Dirlik, "Whither history? Encounters with historicism, postmodernism, postcolonialism", *Futures*, vol.34, 2002.

²² See especially the following selected studies: Metin Heper, *Strong State & Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience* Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 1991; Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Huntingdon, United Kingdom: Eothen Press, 1985; also by Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54, 2000. Ahmet İnel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, İstanbul: Birikim, 1990

²³ I particularly refer to the following studies by these authors: Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, Leiden: Brill, 1981. Bahattin, Akşit. "Islamic Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the Republic." in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics, and Literature in a Secular State*. Richard Tapper, ed. London: Tauris, 1991, pp. 145-70. Sabri Sayarı, "Politization of Islamic Retraditionalism: Some Preliminary Notes", in Metin Heper & R. Israeli (eds.), *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 25.

²⁴ Ruşen Keleş and Michael N. Danielson, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985

²⁵ Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar, Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1998.

political framework(e.g. Ergun Özbudun, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu)²⁶. A number of scholars have also developed profoundly enlightening gender-conscious studies (e.g. Y. Arat, Ayşe Kadioğlu)²⁷ While all these studies provide salient insights into the effects of modernity on the macro structure, in mapping out the large-scale changes, only recently has the scale of analysis shifted from macro to micro-analysis through the works on “micro realities” by a number of scholars in recent years.²⁸

When one locates these studies of Turkish modernity within the context of modernity studies at large, it becomes evident that Turkish modernity, with all its flaws and successes, constitutes an interesting case-study in and of itself. Turkish modernity has been regarded as a remarkable exception²⁹ within the context of the Middle East and Islam, and has been repeatedly employed in a comparative framework with other Muslim countries³⁰. As one scholar notes, “Turkey has been repeatedly used by conservative Western scholars as a means of highlighting the European historical distinction, and of stigmatizing those apparently unable to keep up. The path to modernity was, in this view, unitary, inexorable and inevitable for those that simply had the historical will to break with the past.”(Stokes, 2002: 322) Since not many countries had as much historical will to break with the past to achieve Western modernity as

²⁶ See especially the following: Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1976. E. Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, Leiden: Brill, 1995.

²⁷ Yeşim Arat. *The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey*. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989. Ayşe Kadioğlu. "Women's Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?" *Middle East Journal*, 48, No. 4, 1994, 645-60

²⁸ Thus, for instance, Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber have worked on the fragments of cultural life and integrated the daily, ‘the small’, ‘the ordinary’ into academic analyses. See Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, eds. *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002. Another noteworthy study in this regard is Yael Navaro-Yashin’s analysis on the ways in which a state-revering political tradition is reverberated in daily life practices in contemporary Turkey. See Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

²⁹ Bernard Lewis for instance has seen the Turkish case as an unusual and remarkable pattern in the geography of the Muslim Middle East. See Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy?”, *The Middle East Quarterly* 1:1, March 1994

³⁰ See for instance Javaid Saeed’s comparative study wherein the author pays a special case to Turkey not only because of its secular structure but also as the “Muslim country with the longest history of independence”. Javaid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994

Turkey did, Turkey would also be an interesting outlier against which all other aspiring countries would be measured.

Even though the existing studies on Turkish modernity do indeed highlight its significant macro-structural dimensions, very few focus on the micro-processes that would permeate and transform everyday life. Yet it would be exactly in the context of these micro-processes that gender relations as they pertain to modernity would be negotiated and sustained. I therefore intend to develop a novel epistemological take on Turkish modernity by focusing on cultural fragments and micro-level processes in order to elaborate the crossroads where gender ideologies penetrate into the ideological structures and discourses of Turkish modernity. Since the dominant ideology of the time was nationalism, I also shall be paying additional attention to the emergence and reproduction of the Turkish nationalist ideology which went hand in hand with the development of Turkish modernity. Not only is the nation, as Benedict Anderson pointed out, a constructed, imagined community³¹, but in addition, as this dissertation will also underline, along with Nira Yuval-Davis and others, that within the production and the reproduction of the nation as an imagined community, the roles and stereotypes attributed to gender play a pivotal role³². Once these gender stereotypes are investigated in the context of Turkish modernity, it will then be epistemologically and methodologically possible to trace the crossroads where gender, nationalist and racist ideologies converge³³.

In undertaking this analysis, I have benefited enormously from the works of those scholars in Turkish Studies who have specifically focused on highlighting gender

³¹ The term is borrowed from Benedict Anderson. See his *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London and New York: Verso, 1991.

³² Nira Yuval-Davis maintains that for nations to be constructed and for these constructs to be consolidated a certain ‘manhood’ and a certain ‘womanhood’ are essential. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, London: Sage, 1997. See also Floya Anthias, and Nira Yuval-Davis. *Women Nation State*. London: MacMillan, 1989.

³³ Sander L. Gilman’s works on the stereotypes of the ‘Other’ constitute an important source in this regard. See Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

issues or the politics of everyday life.³⁴ For it is through these studies that I can comprehend how Turkish society perceived, understood, interpreted and applied particular cultural codes of modernity in everyday life; such social practices of modernity in everyday life reveal, in turn, the clusters of meaning that make up distinctions such as traditional and modern and concepts such as patriarchy and honor.”(Bowen and Early, 1993:2) I thus employ this focus on contemporary everyday life³⁵ within a historical framework and pursues the continuities, as well as shifts along this historical trajectory of Turkish modernity. In so doing, I also employ a multifaceted, interdisciplinary approach that connects the recent literature on gender issues in Turkish Studies with the current literature in Cultural Studies, Queer Studies and Critical Theory.

In this section, I have thus reviewed the literature on Western modernity, criticized it in relation to its inherent gender bias, then started to analyze Turkish modernity in relation to the research that has been conducted so far. I have emphasized that even though this research has revealed the nature of macro-structural transformations due to modernity, the analysis of the relationship between gender and modernity necessitates an examination of micro-level processes which not only reveal the cultural codes of modernity but also the new clusters of meanings behind concepts such as patriarchy and honor. The next section will now focus specifically on elaborating on those clusters of meanings that articulated gender relations and conceptions of masculinity and femininity in Turkish society.

³⁴ Everyday life studies of Islam, for instance, concentrates on less the “textual” aspect of Islam than the reflections of religion, tradition and modernity in both private and public life. For a study that discusses this method see Anthony Olcott and Sergei P. Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia*. NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. The book concentrates on “gender”, “traditions and intelligentsia”, “child rearing”, “children’s books”, the space attributed to religion in the public domain, and so on. These will also be among the prominent themes to be analyzed in this dissertation. See also D. L. Bowen and E. A. Early(eds), *Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

³⁵ A prominent example in this regard is Kasaba and Bozdoğan’s approach, which criticizes modernization theorists for failing to grasp the messiness and complexity and ambivalences of Turkey’s modernization process. For an evaluation of Turkish experiment with modernity and its critics from an interdisciplinary perspective see Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, University of Washington Press, 1997.

3.2. Continuities, Hybridities and Turkish Modernity

The clusters of meaning around which the cultural dimension of Turkish modernity unfolds relate to religion and gender. Religion, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, predominantly Islam had always provided a system of meanings, a cognitive map for the believers; with the eventual advent of modernity, however, science and rationalization of knowledge started to challenge this system of belief and society started to be increasingly secularized. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the political elites quickly transformed Turkey into a secular state, the only one of its kind in the world. This process of secularization which accompanied modernity introduced many new cultural meanings into society to replace the ones lost with the removal of religion into the private sphere; yet the tension between religion and secularism as alternate sources of authority over the cultural structures of meaning continue to this day.

3.2.1. Turkish Modernity, Religion, Secularism Just like the situation in Turkey, the tension between secularism and fundamentalism in the context of modernity has been very much on the agenda throughout the world in the past two decades. Within the literature on the relationship between political Islam and democracy, Turkey undoubtedly occupies a prominent place as the only secular state with a 99% Muslim population that is also a democracy. It is also the uniqueness of this secular dimension that has been analyzed through many perspectives; for our purposes here, what interests us is the distinct ways in which secularism and the idea of Turkishness have been interwoven in Turkey (cf. Mardin 1988; Ahmad 1994; Zurcher 1998). Still, even though the subject of religion and secularity in the context of modernity has been discussed at length from various angles as it pertains to Turkey, the same literature has also somewhat overlooked certain other themes and questions.

Upon close inspection, it becomes evident that the theme of Turkish secularism has been more often than not analyzed once again in terms of macrostructures rather than micro-histories and processes. Yet, this happens to be less the case with studies on Islamist formations in Turkey, which have often been approached ethnographically or anthropologically to be realized both at the micro level³⁶ and from a historical perspective³⁷. It is important to note for my purposes here that the simple yet challenging question of “how did ordinary individuals, men and women alike, culturally experience, perceive, and interpret the transformation of modernity and secularization taking place in Turkish society at large?” has been less elaborated upon. Yet it is exactly the response to such a question that would have highlighted the spectrum of cultural meanings modernity assumed in Turkey and that would have also delineated how this spectrum would vary across gender categories in general, femininity and masculinity in particular.

3.2.2. Turkish Modernity and Gender Depictions. Since the cultural negotiations of engendered modernity are a relatively recent topic under way in Turkish Studies, what we have to turn to instead is a survey of existing gender depictions to see if these, upon being read against the grain, would reveal new insights into the formulations and reformulations in gender categories in Turkey vis-à-vis modernity. Such an alternative rereading of history with this question in mind may help us map out, in the transformation from late Ottoman to Turkish Republican life, continuities in clusters of meanings rather than a Jacobin rupture³⁸. Even though the process of modernization in Turkey may indeed constitute a radical break with the past in terms of the changes the political, economic and educational institutions underwent, if one focuses instead on the cultural repertoires that informed women’s representations in

³⁶ For an example in this regards see for instance Sencer Ayata, "Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery: Kadiri and Naksibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon", in R. Tapper (ed.), *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, London: I.B. Touris & Co Ltd, 1991.

³⁷ Examples include Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Oxford University Press, 2002; Şerif Mardin. *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. Irvin Cemil Schick and Ahmet Ertuğrul Tonak, eds. *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

³⁸ One particular scholar who has extensively focused on the continuities in political traditions has been Niyazi Berkes. See Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Hurst & Company, London, 1998.

society, the transformation seems to have been much less radical. One has to make clear a theoretical distinction here: women's legal, political and social position certainly improves in the Turkish Republic especially in the public sphere and the major urban areas; what is of concern for our purposes, however, are not these structural parameters of gender location, but rather cultural parameters that cover not only the public sphere but also to the private, the rural area as well as the urban center. When such cultural parameters are considered, than the transformation in cultural codes of meaning extending from the Empire to the Republic seem less radical.

Actually, not only does this continuity in the Turkish cultural codes through which gender is represented pervade from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, it also travels up to the present to cover the current oppositional cultural paradigm of modernity presented by the Islamists. Hence there are noteworthy similarities not only between the Ottoman male elites and their Republican counterparts, but also between the latter and their contemporary political/ideological opponents, the Islamist intellectuals³⁹. For instance, as one scholar notes, “the Ottoman cartoon images of women⁴⁰ where women are depicted as either physically or spiritually weak and thus in need of protection or in need of restraining -- could very well have been produced by the Kemalist governments or by their (recent) Islamist opponents.” (Z. Arat, 1998: 23)

Indeed, when Turkish modernity is approached from the point of the cultural representation of women, the very frontier line drawn between the modern and the traditional begins to blur. After all, as Zehra Arat argues, “improving women's lot was treated as the focal point of community interests by all competing ideological groups,” from the advocates of Western modernization to the defenders of Islam, from the supporters of cosmopolitanism to the protagonists of hard-core nationalism. Despite the basic differences in their theoretical positions, “they all manipulated the same images and metaphors in the presentation of their own ideology.”(Z. Arat, 1998: 23) In order to

³⁹ Zehra Arat has been one of the scholars who has most meticulously studied these continuities and similarities. See Zehra Arat, *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Woman*, Macmillan, 1998.

⁴⁰ For a study and collection of late Ottoman cartoons see Fatma Muge Gocek, *Political Cartoons in the Middle East: Cultural Representations in the Middle East*, Markus Wiener Pub, 1998.

be able to do so, they all had to be able to draw on a cultural repertoire that was readily available for them. Where was such a cultural repertoire of meanings pertaining to gender deposited in Turkish society during this time of transformation under the impact of modernity? It is in this context that literature assumes significance in the Turkish context as the cultural depository of meanings pertaining to gender.

3.2.3. Turkish Modernity and the Significance of Literature: The advent and development of a national literature in Turkey played an enormous role in generating a cultural repertoire of meanings that could be drawn upon in negotiating gender categories. I therefore focus on Turkish literature to delineate how this cultural repertoire of meanings were generated in three sites, in the fabrication of a homogeneous Turkish identity, in the definition and consolidation of drawing boundaries between “us” and “them/others”, and also in the generation of the basic blueprints of femininity and masculinity. In this respect, I shall approach these three site of cultural construction of meanings through three dimensions of literature, namely in terms of its:

- (i) *form and medium* (where language as a cultural signifier becomes significant in the novels and novellas),
- (ii) *content* (where the plots and characters reveal a culturally constructed narrative in these novels and novellas),
- (iii) *authors* (where they culturally position themselves in relation to the existing status quo).

Novels, novellas, newspaper articles were repositories where the texts and contexts of masculinity and femininity were generated and ossified in this society that was on the brink of transforming into a new regime. As Palmira Brummett’s extensive study points out, there was a highly dynamic printing press by the end of the late Ottoman era⁴¹ which generated intellectual activity around repertoires of contested cultural meanings. Indeed, according to Bernard Lewis, “in the late nineteenth and early

⁴¹ Palmira Brummett, *Image & Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000.

twentieth century, there was a very rapid and extensive development of the press –daily, weekly, and monthly -- ... the effect of the growth of the press was enormous.” (Lewis, 1995: 12) The stories and stereotypes in this written culture, in turn, directly shaped *modernization alla turca* which then legitimized and reproduced the basic credentials of the Turkish nation-state. As the Turkish nation-state came into being and the process of modernization accelerated, the cultural prototypes of gender and ethnicity embedded in the print media in general and novels and novellas in particular served as the cement holding gender structures together with nationalist ideologies. This juxtaposition of patriarchal categories alongside national ones in the same literature led to the formulation of rather interesting syntheses, for instance, as ethically immoral characters were oftentimes portrayed as sexually deviant as well.

The transition through modernity from cosmopolitanism as the supra-identity and cohesive ideology of the Ottoman Empire to the construction and consolidation of the Turkish nation-state⁴² has to be analyzed through the interplay between the nationalist and gender ideologies. In this study, I argue that it is upon this foundation of the cultural mappings of gender and nationalism in literature that the gender role-models for the next generations are produced and reproduced. I further argue that not only do gender roles provide the cultural cement for the Turkish nation-state in its formative years, but a subtle yet steady process of “masculinization of culture” also occurs alongside this trajectory of Turkish modernization.

3.2.4. Additional Elements of Turkish Modernity Before I undertake an analysis of Turkish modernity within the framework I have delineated above, I need to discuss additional elements of Turkish modernity that affect the particular shape and rhythm this trajectory takes. These elements are, in addition to the categories of religion, secularism and gender that I have discussed above, Westernization, and political change introduced from above by elites. A number of eminent thinkers in Critical Theory,

⁴² Ernest Gellner has maintained that nationalism has in these cases worked as a functional adaptation to modernization, and thereby employed by the nation-state to provide the bonds necessary for collective belonging that would substitute local and regional and ethnic and tribal bonds. See Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*. London: Penguin, 1994.

including Adorno and Horkheimer⁴³, as well as Benjamin⁴⁴, were wary of the “pace of modernization” and critical toward the repercussions of the underlying rhythm of modernity. Despite the critical stance of these thinkers, there is a general conviction that modernization entails a steady unilinear consistent progress. Modernity, as such, was identified with the emergence of civil society, the emancipation of the individual from the shackles of a traditional order, and the progressive differentiation of society to include political equality, innovation and change⁴⁵, and sometimes democracy⁴⁶.

In the Turkish case, however, the pace and rhythm of modernization were affected by the additional elements I mentioned above. Firstly, Turkish modernity comprised Westernization. Every endeavor to modernize society in a non-Western context entails a process of Westernization and the adoption or negotiation of Western ways and values, and patterns of thought⁴⁷. As mentioned previously, in Turkey the wave of modernization at one point converged with the tide of secularism and the

⁴³ Critical Theorists have extensively written on how the potential in modern society and individual is being suppressed as rationality turns into positivistic rationality which forges domination, alienation and eventually barbarism. See Horkheimer and Adornor, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Continuum International Publishing Group, 1976. See also M. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, Seabury, New York, 1972. According to Herbert Marcuse the modern society is at its core irrational.. That it is able to absorb its inherent contardictions makes Marcuse more pessimistic about its “inescapeability”. See Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Beacon, 1992.

⁴⁴ Benjamin critically elaborated how technology and the reproduction of the works of art changed the understanding and progressive potential of art. See Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*”, in *Illuminations*, London: Fontana, 1992, pp. 211-244.

⁴⁵ Gabriel Almond’s work has been most influential in developing the methodology to discuss the cultural elements of modern democracies. In order to decipher the basic institutions and processes of social change Almond developed an analytical framework for political systems and argued that all political systems embodied specific structures from which they derived specific functions. See Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds, 1960).

⁴⁶ Lipset and Lakin have argued that the process of modernization was not an automatic provider of a democratic order. While they maintained that a country’s wealth made a huge difference in this regard and the richer a country the more its chances of sustaining a democratic order, they also drew the conclusion that in addition to the political order the fabric of culture in a particular country played a determining role. See Martin Lipset and Jason Lakin. *The Democratic Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004

⁴⁷ For a study that concentrates on different cultural and socio-political examples, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Greenfeld takes nationalism as an integral part of modernity and then scrutinizes the development of nationalism in England, France, Russia, Germany and the United States. The book is noteworthy as it makes it possible to develop a comparative perspective, East and West.

establishment of a modern secular Republican regime. In addition, modernization in the Turkish case was characterized as a process that was executed from above by the state through its political elites. Hence in contradistinction from its Western counterpart where modernization was forged by the forces of production and the corresponding historical forces of industrialization, urbanization and class conflict, modernization in Turkey was a state project that was implemented the efforts of the reformist political elite. It therefore depended on the command this elite had on society, culture and the periphery at large. Consequently, modernization, unlike the West, did not originate as a consequence of historical forces and internal dynamics within civil society, but was rather forged by the state. For modernization to succeed under these conditions, the modernist elite had to undertake additional tasks: they had to alter the understanding of “time” and embrace a linear, progressive, ever-moving, non-stop accumulating notion of time congruent with the pace of modernity⁴⁸ and hastened modernization⁴⁹. All these parameters also affected the cultural categories of meanings that were created to negotiate modernity in Turkish society.

The leading role of the reformist elite already formed them into a social group and differentiated them from the rest of society. The cultural construction of Turkish society occurred within these parameters of two groups, the modernizers and the modernized. Scholars starting with Michel Foucault⁵⁰ and Edward Said⁵¹ have underlined how the distinction between “us” and “them” is crucial in defining a cultural

⁴⁸ A comparison between “alaturka” and “alafanga” notion of time has been made in a striking essay by Ahmet Haşim. *Cogito: Zaman*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997

⁴⁹ Notorious in this sense is a question raised by the Ottoman intellectual Abdullah Cevdet. In discussing the question of the rhythm and pace of modernization, Cevdet asked: “How long did it take the Western World to modernize? 400 years? 500 years? Can we afford to wait that long?” Turkish modernization needed to speed up the flow of time. For more on Abdullah Cevdet and his times see Şükrü Hanioglu’s meticulous study. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1995, pp. 200-212

⁵⁰ The question as to how the knowledge of the “outside” is being internalized and turned into the subject of knowledge has been probed by Michel Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London, 2000. See also *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. G. Gutting, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

⁵¹ The depiction of the Other has been a central theme in Said’s works starting with *Orientalism* (Random House, 1979). The theme was carried further in his later studies to decipher the ways in which the news media operates in constructing stereotypes. See Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, Vintage, 1997.

identity and how the definition of the Other is a constitutive element in the construction of the Self. Interestingly, in the Turkish case, because the two groups had formed around the social issue of modernization in general and its pace in particular, the element of time became a crucial factor in differentiating the two groups. The pattern of 'us' and 'them' was applied to the country's present and past in a frenzy of 'voluntary amnesia'⁵². The more the present, and thereby the future, was distanced from the past, the reformist elites conjectured, the more solidified and unified was the new nation-state to become.⁵³

As Homi Bhabha points out "the borderline work of culture" does in fact "demand an encounter with 'newness' that is not part of the continuum of past and present." (Bhabha, 1994:7) This is precisely what Bhabha defines as "a sense of the new as an insurgent act of cultural translation"⁵⁴ For "novelties" to be translated into the cultural fabric and the culture to be transformable, this *threshold in time* is essential. It is therein that antagonisms can be worked upon. The nation, as Bhabha maintains, is fundamentally an arena of conflicts and contestations and, as such, its cultural fabric is characterized by hybridities and liminalities. Hence how the Turkish reformists and their other locate themselves in the thresholds in time to acquire legitimation or contest the legitimation of the others becomes a very significant component of cultural production. This approach opposes the Euro-centric historicism that continues to dominate Western thinking to reproduce a linear understanding of time and a homogenous notion of modernization.

⁵² The term is used by Ayşe Kadioglu in her analysis on the early Republican efforts to "elevate people to the level of contemporary civilization". See Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, no. 2, April 1996.

⁵³ See Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Avrupa: Türk Modernleşmesinin Xanadu'su: Türk Modernleşmesinin Kurucu İradesine Yeni Bir Bakış Denemesi" in Fuat Keyman (ed), *Liberalizm, Devlet ve Hegemonya*, Everest, İstanbul, 2002.

⁵⁴ Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.

This dissertation argues that in the case of Turkish modernization, the in-betweenness in the Bhabhian framework was fully reverberated⁵⁵ and reached its height at several historical junctures; the first of these was the late Ottoman period era when modernization efforts were triggered to lead to a shift in the hegemony of power, as demonstrated by the 1908 revolution. At this juncture, late Ottoman modernization structurally needed and embodied the hybridity and the in-betweenness that Homi Bhabha's "interstitial perspective" outlines. This dissertation further argues that this hybridity and liminality also went hand in hand with a less rigidly gendered culture, as the former could not match up to the ossified gender segregation. As Turkish society made its way into the Republican period, however, this hybridity was suppressed in the name of creating a monolithic nation-state. In the case of liminality, it could not be totally contained, and became subsumed in society until it carved out a new social and political space of existence for itself in the post-1980 environment. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that during the process of modernity, Turkish society was not only de-hybridized but also de-feminized at the beginning of the Republican period and this pattern more or less survived until the 1980s; after the 1980s, hybridity, liminality and de-masculinization re-emerged in the urban space.

The very first thing the new Turkish Republican regime set out to do was to differentiate and distance itself from the immediate past. In order to make the distance clear, dualities were highlighted. The shift from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic was interpreted and announced as a drastic change of dualities: from traditional to modern/ from an Eastern society to a Western one/ from religiosity to secularism/ from static to dynamic/ from a multiethnic empire to a homogeneous, uniform nation-state. The shift was also interpreted as a move from a patriarchal society based on gender segregation into one where women were emancipated or at least, provided with

⁵⁵ Rather than analyzing the trajectory of a nation-state in terms of binary oppositions of colonizer and colonized, as well as of men and women, bhabha proposes to concentrate on the margins and the borders, or better put, thresholds. It is upon these thresholds that he claims identities are performed, consolidated and contested. See also Bart Moore-Gilbert, "Homi Bhabha: The Babelian performance" in Bart J. Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*, New York: Verso, 1997

the legal, economic and social structures that would make such emancipation possible⁵⁶. In short, because the secular Turkish republic was portrayed as such an irreconcilably different entity from the multiethnic empire it succeeded, it was naturally assumed that there was a huge historical rupture between Turkey's past and present. It is crucial to note that not only did such dualities underline the core of Enlightenment thinking, but were also of crucial importance in cementing the process of nation-birthing in the non-Western world. Still, only in very few countries has the role dichotomies played in shaping the cultural identity been as fundamental and long-lived as in Turkey.

At first glance, the late Ottoman period was exceptionally prolific in terms of its spectrum of intellectual pursuits and ideological debates⁵⁷. There was an enormous variety of ideological stands, ranging from hardcore advocates of Westernization to moderate Islamists, from the supporters of cosmopolitanism to the protagonists of nationalism. Despite the basic differences in their theoretical positions, however, when it came to discussions on gender, Zehra Arat capitulates that "they all manipulated the same images and metaphors. Fundamentally different ideological positions might not necessarily mean fundamentally different attitudes towards gender relations. Accordingly, when approaching Turkish modernization from the point of the representation of women, the very frontier line we tend to draw between modern and traditional, backward and progressive, before and after might start to blur."

Because viewing the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation-state reveals such a blurring of boundaries in terms of change and suggest the existence of such strong continuities in cultural categories, we need to come up with a convenient medium through which to study these continuities. I argue in this dissertation that literature may provide just such a medium to capture the cultural

⁵⁶ For further information on this process and its possible interpretations see Nermin Abadan-Unat, "Türk Toplumunda Kadın," Kadın Araştırmaları Serisi, Ankara, 1979.

⁵⁷ In this regard see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

continuities in meaning across structural divides. As Mardin has argued, evaluating the venture of Turkish modernization by concentrating on its novels and novellas can provide us with a deeper insight as to the issues and subjects up till now excluded from the mainstream academic work.⁵⁸ In the following sections, I focus on the writings of the *hommes de lettres*, particularly with respect to their woman characters and their understanding of sexuality, gender, self and society in an attempt to undertake such a reading of cultural meanings of Turkish modernity through literature. The following section analyzes the relationship between Turkish male writers and their female subjects will then be followed by analyses of similar repertoires of cultural meanings in literature by focusing on the gendered categories of ‘the material, mundane and the masculine,’ and ‘the spiritual, sacred and the feminine’ that emerge as a reflection of the dualities and divides the dynamics and elements of modernity introduce to Turkish society. The chapter concludes with a discussion, again in literature, of ‘fathers, sons and the dandy’ as the particular cultural site of meaning that symbolizes the late Ottoman period.

3.3. Turkish Literature through its Male Writers, Female Subjects

Broadly speaking, all around the world, among all forms of art, in projects of nation-building, literature has retained a privileged position through its capacity to promote the collective internalization of norms, conventions, and symbols. As a matter of fact, literature was the first art to evolve into an autonomous institution bearing both symbolic and economic value. Nevertheless, the significance of literature’s constitutive role becomes all the more visible in those cases of belated modernity -- countries that have been “late” in building a modern nation-state, countries where the major driving force of modernization is not the society but instead the state. In that sense Greece, Bulgaria, many of the Balkan countries, countries in various parts of the Middle East and Turkey were all cases of belated modernity with their own particularities. In these contexts, not only has literature been one of the many constitutive forces of modernity and the nation-building process, but rather *the* constitutive force. I argue that this holds

⁵⁸ See Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991. The author uses novels to analyze the features and dynamics of Turkish modernization. See also Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*, Syracuse Univ. Press, 2004.

true for the Turkish case as well; literature in the Turkish case has constituted the main site of contestation for the clash of competing masculinities ever since the advent of modernity, and especially until the 1980's, it comprised one of the few zones where 'fictive hybridity' could continue to exist in spite of the cultural hegemony imposed onto the Turkish society by the nation-state. Jusdanis⁵⁹ indicates that the construction of a modernist/nationalist literature played a pivotal role in the formation of modernist/nationalist identities in countries such as Greece and Turkey. The literary intellectuals in these countries of belated modernities assumed a far more commanding social role in society than Zola or Guy de Maupassant ever did in the French context. And among all the literary genres, it was the novel⁶⁰ that best and most reflected and influenced the social and cultural dynamics of Westernization⁶¹.

When we study the intellectuals of the late Ottoman period, we realize that they were at the same time also the first generation of novelists and journalists. The first Turkish novels were pedagogically driven; they were written to give a message to the society, to teach right from wrong, to construct a microcosm (the family for instance) upon which the macrocosm (the Ottoman Empire) could be presented for debate. According to Tanpınar, the women in these novels were so unreal that one could easily conclude from their portrayal that these male writers did not really know anything about the wives, mothers, and daughters they had in real life⁶². These early Turkish novelists were almost all male, from wealthy or influential families, and often either educated in the West or with Western teachers, and also affiliated with Western culture. These characteristics,

⁵⁹ The concept of belatedness is essential in Jusdanis' work which discusses in depth both how nationalism reproduces itself and the role/autonomy of culture within this framework. See Gregory Jusdanis, *The Necessary Nation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

⁶⁰ For a study that reveals the role of the advent of the novel in shaping and being shaped by the political, cultural and ideological life, see William, Greenslade. *Degeneration, Culture and the Novel, 1880-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.

⁶¹ Interestingly a similar pattern took place in the cultural history of India and its encounter with modernization. For a study on the role of the novel as a genre in Indian cultural structure, see Glyne A. Griffith, *Deconstruction, Imperialism and the West Indian Novel*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1996.

⁶² Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Edebiyat Üzerine Yazılar*, İstanbul: Dergah. Tanpınar gives Namık Kemal as an example in this regard and maintains that Kemal's female figures were so exaggeratedly symbols of vice or conversely virtue that they remained as symbols. Having failed to see woman led him to fail to see man too. (Tanpınar, *ibid.*, p. 62)

however, did not preclude them from articulating and retaining, even accentuating their cultural differences with the West. They also had very strong connections to the state: almost all were employed by a branch of the state apparatus⁶³. They were, in other words, state employees. And that should give us an idea about their limits⁶⁴.

They were men whose primary objective was to empower the state and perhaps to renew the political system and its ideological apparatuses, but never to alter its fundamental principles. Hence they were deeply connected to the state ideology in different ways. More significantly perhaps, these early Turkish novelists wrote fiction with a mission in mind: a task to guide their readers in an era of great upheavals, as can be clearly seen in the Preface written by Ahmet Mithat to *Nedamet mi? Heyhat!*⁶⁵. They had a pedagogic mission to educate the masses from above, and show them how to tell right from wrong – a mission that also gave shape to their female characters, leading them to be caricaturized into extreme categories such as either idealizing them as perfect mothers, future wives or suppressed concubines,⁶⁶ or maligning them for lacking the virtues of the former⁶⁷.

It might be plausibly argued that the Turkish elite in particular and perhaps the elite of the Middle East in general are famous for its distrust of the masses. And the late Ottoman writers were no exception: they had little trust in the masses. As one scholar

⁶³ For further on this point and the backgrounds of Ottoman state officials see Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

⁶⁴ The “limits” of a subject vis-à-vis the state apparatus had also been an important theme of discussion in the famous Poulantzas-Miliband debate. See Bob Jessop, *The Capitalist State*. New York: New York University Press, 1982.

⁶⁵ “Roman yalnız bir vaka-i latifenin hikayesinden ibaret degildir. O vaka elbette funundan... birisine, sanayiden birkacina, hikmetin ... bazi kavaidine, cografiyanin bir faslini teskil eden bir memlekete, tarihin bir firkasina taalluk eder ki... onlara dair verilen izahat erbab-i mutalaanin malumat ve vukufu dairesini tevsi eder”. Cited in B. Moran, *Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, ibid, p. 17.

⁶⁶ Melin Has Er, *Tanzimat Devri Türk Romanında Kadın Kahramanlar*, İstanbul: AKM, 2002.

⁶⁷ Murat Belge claims that the late Ottoman male writer in need of female characters to be able to create a plot had had to resort to the figure of the concubine since sexuality and carnality could only be envisioned with these women and not with “decent” women. Likewise the male writer was also in need of Western female prototypes in order to be able to develop both his plot and his mission of educating the reader. See Murat Belge, *Edebiyat Üstüne Yazılar*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1998.

maintains, “first, they had to situate themselves as persons who communicated with an abstract public.”(Mardin, 1994: 211) That is why their fiction addressed an audience and was always shaped by the necessities of the age as they saw it⁶⁸. Never did they put a character in a novel haphazardly or because the story so demanded. Instead, every single character in these novels was deliberately, calculatingly located there so as to represent something bigger. Thus the characters they created, the stories they conveyed and the language they used were all deliberately chosen as parts of the broader project of modernization. In formulating the plots, the themes and the characters, they basically reflected the concerns of their own circle of life, their own class concerns. As Finn maintains, “they seldom stray beyond the confines of the metropolis and even within the urban complex confine themselves mainly to the lives of the upper classes.”(Finn, 1984: 163) And for the political/cultural elite, the question of “women’s emancipation from the traditional Islamic way of life” proved to be a pressing matter, especially in relation to the modernization process. The privileged few on all sides of the ideological spectrum altogether composed the members of the newly emerging intelligentsia trained in both government service and Western culture(Evin, 1983:10) and as they kept writing, they frequently dipped their ladles into this “woman & Westernization” brew. They sincerely believed that emancipating women would pave the way to the modernization of society at large. All in all, it can be maintained that the Ottoman modernist elite did by and large welcome Westernization. The question was not ‘shall we Westernize or not?’ but rather ‘where shall we draw the boundary of Westernization, where shall we generate the *boundaries?*’

3.3.1. Turkish Literature through the Material and the Mundane

One conceptual tool that elucidates the boundaries of the *hommes de lettres* of 19th century Ottoman intelligentsia (Mardin, 2000) is the distinction between the

⁶⁸ It should also be noted that art for art’s sake versus art for society’s sake was also an ongoing debate in Europe at the time.

spiritual and the material domain; this distinction, according to Partha Chatterjee⁶⁹, lies at the core of almost all anti-colonial discourse. Chatterjee notes that anti-colonial nationalism created its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society and this, in turn, required the division of the world of social institutions and practices into two distinct spheres. “The material is the domain of the ‘outside’, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology -- a domain where the West has proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, was an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity. The greater one’s success in imitating Western skills in the material domain therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture”(Chatterjee, 2000: 941). Non-Western nationalism declared the domain of the spiritual its sovereign territory and thereby vehemently refused to allow Western influence to intervene or penetrate in that specific sphere. Although Turkey had not been colonized, right from the beginning, this particular feature of anti-colonial nationalism was also implicit in the process of Turkish modernization. As a matter of fact, the dividing line between the realm of the spiritual and the realm of the material was the fundamental concern of all late Ottoman intellectuals.

Here it should be noted that despite the ideological differences among them, the late Ottoman male intellectuals did by and large welcome Westernization and modernization. Val Moghadam states that “a desire for modernization and democratic institutions” constituted one of the two⁷⁰ major (internal) driving forces in the context of the Middle East (Moghadam, 1993:80). In this sense, there was no absolute rejection in the Ottoman context on the part of the *hommes de lettres*. Once the necessity, if not the inevitability of Westernization was acknowledged by the Ottomans from the early eighteenth century onward, the question was rather until what point the tides of

⁶⁹ P. Chatterjee, *Nationalist thought and the Colonial World*, Zed Publications, London, 1986. See also by the same author *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1993.

⁷⁰ The other major driving force in the internal domain was growing feeling of nationalism among the non-Turkish groups. See Valentine M. Moghadam, *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 80.

Westernization should be allowed to penetrate. In other words, as I try to elaborate in the following pages, the basic point that preoccupied the Ottoman elite was the question of where and how to draw the boundaries of Westernization/modernization.

At this point, it might be useful to recall the rules and credentials of gender segregation. As Marcus has indicated, “feminist questions concerning the status of Muslim women often revolve around the use of space and thus the ways in which spatial restrictions constitute or reproduce systems of domination.”(Marcus, 1992: 93) Space has always been a much more abstract topic and a deeper void that mainstream approaches in social sciences could not uncover. As the same scholar notes, “a distribution of space according to gender, restricting women to particular areas, is well documented within both the scholarly and popular descriptions of Turkish life. This sexual division of space, together with the limits placed upon women’s mobility, lies at the heart of the moral critique of Islam and occupies a central position in western views of the virtues and vices of Christianity when compared to Islam.”(Marcus, 1992: 91) Accordingly, not only was the notion of time redefined to be “hastened”, but space too was re-organized in accordance with the necessities of modernization. In this vein, Gilson underlines that space is not a given form but a set of relations and structures that are constantly acquired in everyday life. He notes that “space is crucial in thinking about culture and ideology because it is where ideology and culture take on physical existence and representations. These material forms embody, reinforce, and order universes of power and belief. People learn them, absorb them as part of the ‘as it is’, everyday nature of things.”(Gilson, 1992: 187)

According to the mappings of gender segregation, the private sphere was associated with women and femininity, whereas the public domain was identified with men and masculinities. This said, once the public was reorganized in accordance with the lines and requirements of Westernization, not only the operation of gender segregation but the constituent elements of femininity and masculinity as well were deeply influenced. It was precisely this influence that increased the anxiety of the

Ottoman male elite at a time when a bifurcated Ottoman bourgeoisie was emerging⁷¹. Very rapidly, the private sphere and thereby the family turned into a “castle of chastity”, the last castle to be protected against the waves of Westernization and particularly over-Westernization. It was supposed that only the nation had the right to intervene in this semi-sacred area. As such, “it was undoubtedly a new type of patriarchy which was brought into existence, different from the ‘traditional’ order, but one which was also explicitly claimed to be different from the ‘Western’ family. The ‘new woman’ was to be modern, but she would also have to display the signs of national tradition and therefore had to be essentially different from the ‘Western’ woman”(Chatterjee, 2000: 941). The urge to protect the “virginity” of the private sphere increased the ambivalence in the position of women vis-a-vis modernization/Westernization. As a matter of fact, various scholars have pointed out⁷² that women have always occupied a complicated and rather ambivalent position with respect to the development and consolidation of nationalist ideologies. On the one hand, they enjoyed a symbolic importance, but on the other hand, they were continuously subordinated. “In that respect they are simultaneously ‘at both the center and at the margins of the national imagined community’; venerated as icons, yet disempowered in the public realm”(Wilford, 1998: 12). To reiterate what has been said in more rigorous terms, the Turkish modernist male elite declared the spiritual domain their sovereign territory and thereby bitterly refused to allow Westernization to intervene in that specific sphere. But that specific sphere so resolutely kept away from the influence of Westernization was at the very same time the domain of women. It was the sphere of mothers, wives and daughters.

So the dividing line between the spiritual and the material, public and private was at the same time the frontier encircling woman’s area of maneuver. That indeed was the underlying concern in the writings of the early Ottoman novelists. It is interesting to note that almost all of them accepted the necessity, if not the inevitability of

⁷¹ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996

⁷² The literature on gender and nation is replete with prominent studies in this regard. See for instance Nira Yuval-Davis, *Women Nation State*. London: MacMillan, 1989.

Westernization; their question was where to draw the line of Western influence, and it now became clear that the yardstick used in answering this question was “women”. In this context, how women should be dressed became a battleground where the entire project of modernity was put up for discussion. Hence in the case of Turkey, women’s bodies dramatically determined the limits of Westernization.

Recalling the distinction made by Partha Chatterjee, the more the Ottoman public sphere was reorganized in accordance with the requirements of Westernization, the deeper was the need to preserve the private sphere intact. It was supposed that only and only the nation had the right to intervene in that semi-sacred area. This comprised the main concern of the Ottoman male elite. It was this anxiety that was to become all the more evident in the writings, both fiction and non-fiction, produced in this era. In summary, the activities of the Ottoman male elite during this period of modernity focused on the material and the mundane located in the public sphere, their conception of the masculine surfaced in the context modernity only to delimit the parameters of the feminine.

3.3.2. Turkish Literature through the Spiritual, the Sacred, and the Feminine

Significantly, in their discussions on women, some male intellectuals during the late Ottoman period questioned the teachings of Islam. One of the most radical slogans was voiced by Abdullah Cevdet who stated: “Open the Qur’an, open the women”⁷³. Radical Ottoman Westernists, such as Salahaddin Asım, accused Islam for being responsible for the oppression of women while the Islamist Westernists remained on the defensive and looked for a possible synthesis⁷⁴ between the two worlds. One of the most interesting trends of the late Ottoman period comprise the attempts of Ottoman

⁷³ Abdullah Cevdet had maintained that if he were a woman he could be an atheist given the restrictions religion brought for women. For more information see his letters in Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Donemi*, Ucdal Nesriyat, Istanbul, 1981.

⁷⁴ For an endeavour towards attaining a synthesis see Selahaddin Asım, *Osmanlı’da Kadınlığın Durumu*, Istanbul: Arba, 1989.

intellectuals to compare and contrast Islam and Christianity in relation to gender issues⁷⁵. The late Ottoman period was replete with writings and discussions about the social implications of either monotheistic religion on the lives of women. By and large, however, it was acknowledged that Muslim/Turks were culturally distinct in the way they had organized their private life. This, in turn, requires us to take a closer look on how the boundaries of the public and the private were drawn in Ottoman society.

One central concept that characterized Ottoman social and cultural life was that of boundary (*hudut/had*). The overall structure of society was designed to clearly and neatly draw the boundaries that were supposed to separate and isolate distinct identities from one another. These boundaries were drawn between sexes, ethnicities, individuals, groups or communities. It should be noted here that the boundaries were not absolute; rather, they were continuously being redrawn and renegotiated and their presence was persistently recalled. It can be asserted that the pernicious reconstruction of existing boundaries was a *sine qua non* of Ottoman everyday life⁷⁶. This being said, several examples may be helpful to elucidate this assertion.

In his brilliant work published in 1870, Edmondo de Amicis gives a rich account of everyday life in Ottoman Istanbul⁷⁷. In one of the most flamboyant passages of the book, he describes the clothes and shoes of the people passing by. He states how ‘Jews for instance, could be easily recognized due to their yellow shoes. Armenians, Greeks, Muslims... each had a distinctly colored shoe. As such, the eye of the authority could easily perceive who belonged to where.’ The Ottoman *millet* system was in fact a meticulous cognitive mapping of boundaries. As long as the existing boundaries were respected, the system was able to reproduce and legitimize itself. Boundaries played a

⁷⁵ Ahmed Midhat, for instance, asserts that many children are born out of wedlock in the Western world most of which are abandoned and left on their own. He also adds that in Turkish society the only place where a similar thing happens is Beyoğlu. See Ahmed Midhat, *Paris’te Bir Türk*, İstanbul; Kırk Ambar, 1293, p. 160. Cited in Alev Çınar, *Hikaye ve Romanımızda Çocuk*, İstanbul: Alfa, 1997, p. 84.

⁷⁶ See Murat Belge, “Türkiye’de Günlük Hayat” in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol 3, İletişim, İstanbul, pp. 836-875, 1983. See also Lewis, Raphaela. *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey*. New York: Putnam, 1971.

⁷⁷ Edmondo de Amicis, *İstanbul 1874*, İstanbul: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1994.

central role in defining the social rooms within which each sex could easily and freely move. Gender segregation required the maintenance of pre-drawn boundaries and vice versa. This said, one interesting situation concerned that of the hermaphrodite⁷⁸ because this category challenges the neat gender segregation in Islam and in so doing reveals the reasoning behind the segregation. These people with ambiguous genitalia were a continuous source of anxiety, a deep source of confusion in Islam because they did not easily fit into the existing boundaries. For the Ottoman religious man, the fundamental question concerning hermaphrodites was a question of mapping. This indeed was one crucial difference between Christian and Muslim religious authorities of the medieval ages. While Christian religious authorities of these periods were concerned with the body and sexuality of the hermaphrodite, Muslim religious authorities were preoccupied with their place and boundaries in the social context. Where exactly was the hermaphrodite supposed to stay while praying in the mosque? Should s/he stay with women at the back or men in front? Or should s/he stay somewhere in between, in an intermediate area carved especially for him/her in the middle of the mosque?

3.3.3. Ottoman Male Elite and Frontiers: The above mentioned examples can be multiplied. Yet, they all decipher a social construct that to a large extent relies upon the existence and maintenance of boundaries. Within this intellectual and cultural framework, it is not surprising to find out that once modernization and Westernization hastened, the fundamental problem that preoccupied Ottoman male elite was where and how to draw the frontier zone⁷⁹. There was no real disagreement about the necessity of Westernization and in their private lives, in their own ways they had come up with hybrid formulations⁸⁰. It was generally acknowledged that Westernization was necessary, if not inevitable. Thinkers from different ideological perspectives disputed

⁷⁸ For an interesting work upon which the above arguments are based see Paula Saunders, "Gendering the Ungendered," in *Women in Middle Eastern History*, Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron (eds.) Yale U Press, 1991, pp 74-95.

⁷⁹ For an in-depth account of the Ottoman elite's attitude towards Westernization see Şükrü Hanioglu's *Bir Siyasal düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, ibid.

⁸⁰ Sermet Muhtar Alus gives us clues about the private lives of the Ottoman pashas in his "Eski Paşaların Bazı Merakları, Garip Tabiatları ve Hususiyetleri", in *Masal Olanlar, İletişim*, İstanbul, 1997.

not the need for Westernization, but rather the coordinates of its boundaries. Different ideological positions meant different mapping systems. Significantly, it was women and women's issues that demarcated the frontier line for Westernization (Göle, 1997; Yaraman, 2001). Women constituted and represented the boundaries of Westernization in the eyes of the male elite. Hence family life became a source of primary concern for the Ottoman/Turkish male elite. As Duben and Behar have elaborated in detail, "family life was a major point of attention of late Ottoman intellectuals and writers"⁸¹. Despite the ideological differences between them, the major thinkers and writers of the period were convinced that Ottoman family life was undergoing a deep crisis. The family was used by these intellectuals as the very mirror that reflected the problems and flaws in the cultural and social life of the empire in general. The Ottoman family was seen as the microcosm of the society at large. Especially in the Hamidian years (1876-1908), during which severe censorship operated throughout the society, all criticisms that could not be directed to society or the state were focused upon the family as its basic institution. The overall transformation in turn⁸² was encapsulated in the demise of *konak* life: the typical Ottoman house with sons and daughters grandchildren all living together.⁸³

Duben and Behar have maintained that this anxiety over women's position was reflected in the early Ottoman novels where "there is a growing and increasingly unnerving sense that women are getting out of hand." (Duben and Behar, 1991: 199) And once the honor and dignity of women were concerned, novelists felt it necessary to take a closer look at the structure and composition of the Ottoman "home"⁸⁴. This was,

⁸¹ Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households : Marriage, Family, and Fertility, 1880-1940*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

⁸² Şerif Mardin, *Tanzimat'tan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma*, in *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme*, ed. E. Kalaycıoğlu and A. Y. Sarıbay, Alfa, 1999. See also Şerif Mardin, 'European Culture and the Development of Modern Turkey', Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community* (Leske, Budrich: Opladen, 1990), pp.13-23

⁸³ See P. Dumont, "Said Bey: The Everyday Life of an İstanbul Townsman at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", in A. Hourani, P. Khoury and M. C. Wilson (eds) *The Modern Middle East*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993.

⁸⁴ For an enriching discussion on the significance of "home" and its appeal as a concept and desire, as well as on the necessity of studying the social space attributed to it for feminist and leftist scholarship see Bidy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do

indeed, a time of deconstruction and a time of reconstruction for Ottoman family. The overall transformation in turn, encapsulated the demise of *konak* life. Behar and Duben have demonstrated that the disappearance of *konak* life was accompanied by profound cultural crises in perceptions and values. They maintained that “more than almost anything else, the position of women touched the jugular vein of Ottoman society, where their modesty was one of the most cherished and deeply rooted social institutions.”(Duben & Behar, 1991: 200)

But why were the male cultural elite of the Ottoman Empire so anxious about the fate of the family and *konak* life? Part of the answer, I would conjecture, is a fear of loss of the father⁸⁵. In both the symbolic realm and at the social and political level, that was the most imminent danger for the late Ottomans. Fedwa Malti_Douglas has pointed out, in her pioneering work on gender and disclosure in Arabo-Islamic writing⁸⁶, that when the harmony of a male-centered universe is shattered, there follows a flight from the female body and fear of sexuality. And this is precisely what we see in the Ottoman novels of the era. Each novelist plays the imagined father vis-a-vis his readers(Parla, 1990). In a society undergoing tremendous change, a society where the father’s order is shattered, the male novelists created their own micro-societies in these novels. Novelists became or purported to become the fathers of their readers. The main concern of the early novelists in this context was the fate of the son, the youngster. What would happen to Turkish youth without the guidance of the father? The novelists were worried that lust would replace spiritual love, and youngsters would eventually be seduced by the “wrong” women, who were either Western women or over-Westernized Turkish women. One thing that could help to break the pattern of committing the inevitable mistake was love since love also meant transcendence.

with It?“, in Teresa de Lauretis (ed.), *Feminist Studies/Critical Studies* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986), 191-212.

⁸⁵ Fatherhood was a crucial theme for the late Ottoman male novelist/writer. For an analysis on Ahmed Mithad’s *Peder Olmak Sanatı*, see Alev Çınar, *Hikaye ve Romanımızda Çocuk*, *ibid.*

⁸⁶ See Fedwa Multi-Douglas *Woman's body, woman's word: gender and discourse in Arabo-Islamic writing*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. The same point is reiterated in different words by Jale Parla in her *Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1998.

In early Turkish novels, love is more often than not seen as an illness, a malady. What mattered most was the material and spiritual distinction as applied to love. Murat Belge points out that in early novels women are classified⁸⁷ according to this criteria and claims that good women's asexuality or inaccessibility distinguishes them from the negative prototypes(Belge, 1998: 346). It is herein that the Ottoman love neurosis lies: the ideal woman also happens to be the most distanced from womanhood; sex is regarded as something despicable. By uglifying⁸⁸ woman, the appeal of sex is redressed.(Belge, 1998: 346) Belge also adds that these characters have not been shaped by pure imagination and they do reflect the characters, concerns and dynamics of the society in which they were written.(Belge, 1998: 353) He also underlines that as women were depicted in such unreal, exaggerated and awry ways so were the male characters in these books bound to remain "bizarre". Femininity penetrates into their masculinity in different ways; they are oversensitive, ready to cry even at the sight of a beautiful landscape. (Belge, 1998 : 352)

Since sex is despicable, it can only be excused in the name of a higher cause. Thus, for instance, Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar⁸⁹ advised his readers that the real merit was not to give birth to children, but to raise them for the good of all⁹⁰. It is particularly noteworthy that in the writings of the Ottoman male cultural elite, fiction and non-fiction

⁸⁷ Thus, for instance, Şehriyar in Cezmi and Mahpeyker in İntibah are explicitly impure women characters, lost in material greed. At the other end of the pole are Dilaşub in İntibah or Perihan in Cezmi. For more details see, Mehmet Kaplan, Namık Kemal: Hayatı ve Eserleri, İstanbul, 1948. See also Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's, Namık Kemal: Şahsı, Eseri, Tesiri, Ankara, 1940.

⁸⁸ "Örneğin kadın alabildiğine nazenin, çelimsiz olmalıdır. .. ilkin zenginliğin simgesi olarak kadın çalışma ediminden uzaklaştırılır". (Belge, 1998: 352) Belge sees this aspect as a common feature in aristocratic structures. The female character in Eylül, Suad, for instance, presents a case in point. She is so fragile and feeble that she constantly gives the impression of being on the verge of fainting. "Onun durumunda bir kadın için en güzel eylem inci yaşlar dökmektir. Güçsüz, iki ayağı üzerinde duramayan bir kişi olarak..." (Belge, 1998: 353)

⁸⁹ H. R. Gurpınar's work and life should be paid special attention to both because in his writing he oftentimes explicitly questioned patriarchal precedents as he saw it and also in his personal life he paid a price for failing to conform to the "hegemonic heteronormative masculinity" of the era. When as a young man Gurpınar took his first novel Sik to Babiali, for instance, the novel was so profoundly liked that he was accused of having someone else write it. Upon hearing this accusation Gurpınar started to weep, shocking the Babiali father-novelists with his "emotionality". There are some scholars who have named Gurpınar as the "feminist novelist" of late Ottoman era. See for instance Taner Timur, *ibid*, p. 36.

⁹⁰ H. R. Gürpınar, Kadın Erkekleşince, piyes, İstanbul: marifet matbaası, 1933, p. 105.

alike, the Western World was always symbolized by a woman⁹¹. According to Sinasi, for instance, the process named Westernization resembled a marriage between East and West. Just like in all conjugal relations, here, too, it was important to constantly keep in mind *who* was the man and therefore the head of the family (Yaraman, 2001:83).

The Ottoman male elite wanted to keep its “sacred” space intact. There were palpable differences of opinion among the various intellectuals. However, the basic debate was a debate of remapping. Different intellectuals wanted to draw the frontiers at different locations, but the question of the compatibility of Islam with Western cultural codes and gender patterns was a question none could ignore⁹². Some were more tolerant towards the changes in family life than others⁹³. Yet, all believed in the necessity of drawing the frontier somewhere. At more implicit examples, the sacred space of the mother was continuously venerated and protected. One particular writer that I would like to inspect closely is Ömer Seyfettin, who has played a pivotal role in the establishment of Turkish national literature⁹⁴. Seyfettin is also a writer of transitions; he was especially influential in mapping out the transition from cosmopolitanism to the homogeneous notion of nation-state. Historically and philosophically, he serves as a literary bridge between the late Ottoman and Turkish national literatures.

In Ömer Seyfettin’s stories, the distinction between “us” and “them” is a crucial one. The cement that holds together the constitutive elements of “us” in turn is to

⁹¹ The theme is evaluated by Jale Parla in her *Babalar ve Ogullar*, *ibid*.

⁹² Nilufer Gole has written extensively on the ways in which the Ottoman elite opted for balancing Western ways and Eastern codes. See Nilufer Gole, *Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortunme*, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1991, pp. 11-47.

⁹³ Abdullah Cevdet, for instance, has developed a more outspoken and outright rejection of traditional settings whereas writers like Selahaddin Asim pined for a synthesis that would both correct the flaws in the traditional system but also remain “Eastern” in essence. For more information on the differences among late Ottoman male writers see Selim Deringil, “From Ottoman to Turk: Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey” in *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*. Dru C. Gladney(ed) Stanford: Stanford University, 1998 . See also Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen(eds), *Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

⁹⁴ Necati Mert, *Ömer Seyfettin : İslamcı Milliyetçi ve Modernist Bir Yazar*, Istanbul: Kaknus, 2004. Mert argues that Seyfettin’s understanding of national language was quite different than the one to be developed throughout the Kemalist regime. He therefore puts forth two different types of nationalist approach to language.

be derived from that sacred space, that is to say, from the domain of the mother/wife. In addition to stories and novellas, Seyfettin wrote non-fiction as well, extensively on what he deemed to be the most urgent issue of his day: nationalism⁹⁵. The purification of the Turkish language and the fabrication of a Turkish national identity being his primary goals, it was he, more than any previous writer, who wrote extensively on the issue of minorities as well. According to Seyfettin, the issue of nationalities is first and foremost a matter of flocks. Birds of a feather should stay together. If you attempt to fly with birds of a different kind, you diverge from the right path. More than any Turkish other writer he dealt with the theme of intercultural marriage. One common feature of corrupt, effeminate male characters, for instance, is that they are married to the wrong women, to women who are not Turks. Defining nationalities in terms of birds of a feather, Seyfettin sees marriages that crosscut nationalities and religions as a massive threat.

In one particular story⁹⁶ there is a Turkish man, very well-educated but too much Westernized who detests everything that is Turkish and adores everything that is Greek. Calling himself neo-Byzantine, he lives in a house where all the servants are Greek. Likewise, in one other story a Turkish man married to a German woman is so much assimilated that he is called Fon Sadristayn⁹⁷: "... the whole idea of Germanness, the prosperity of Germany, and the might of the German army are all the creation of German women. Before marrying a German woman, I used to weigh only 30 kilos. Today I weigh 95 kilos. The German woman who managed to triple German population has also managed to triple my weight."

In *Pamuk Ipliği*⁹⁸, Madmazel Surpik Bagdeseryan, a young Armenian woman compares the essential characteristics of Turkish family life with those of Armenian family life, drawing the conclusion that the former are much better. The story is

⁹⁵ The ramifications of this historical process have been discussed in W. Haddad, and W. Ochsenwald (ed.), *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, Columbus, Ohio University Press, 1977.

⁹⁶ Ömer Seyfettin, *Boykotaj Düşmanı*, İstanbul: Bilgi

⁹⁷ Ömer Seyfettin, in *Tüm Eserleri*, İstanbul: Bilgi

⁹⁸ Ömer Seyfettin, *Pamuk Ipliği*, in *Tüm Eserleri*, İstanbul: Bilgi

especially noteworthy because it extensively discusses the possibility of an Armenian woman getting married to a Muslim Turk who is in love with her. This marriage is a microcosm in which Seyfettin actually discusses the possibility of Turks and Armenians living together. It is noteworthy that each time he writes on an intercultural marriage it is always the male that represents the Turk and the female that represents the other nationality. In this particular story too Surpik flirts with the young Turk, but in the end decides to marry an Armenian. In the persona of Surpik, we encounter the venture of a whole population. Just like Surpik, Armenians too, Seyfettin contends, “pretended” they could live with the Turks and were not lured by nationalism. But the illusion of pretension was short-lived.

As a Turkish nationalist, Seyfettin’s depiction of Armenian women is crystallized in what was perhaps one of his most revealing novellas titled “The Diary of a Young Armenian”⁹⁹. The Armenian in question is named Hayikyan. At the beginning of the plot, he is young and naive enough to sincerely believe that the 1908 Young Turk revolution would bring forward a profound improvement and the idea of Ottomanism will unite the Turks and the Armenians around a common cause, under a supranational identity. As we keep reading his diary –and the format is noteworthy because when you read someone’s diary, you read his innermost thoughts -- Seyfettin reveals the innermost thoughts of the Armenians as he sees them. Thus not only the content but the form of the story is revealing. We learn that this young Armenian deeply fears that Turks might one day become aware of their national identity which would be totally at odds with the interests of the Armenian population. Hayikyan sees Ottomanism as the only possible barrier to prevent this awakening. With this purpose in mind, Hayikyan joins a club established to propagate Ottomanism, a motley group composed of men from various professions and various nationalities coming from all kinds of backgrounds representing every minority or interest group in the empire. In order to understand the gravity of the mistake, Hayikyan needs the guidance of a woman of his own flock: Hayganosh. It is none other than Hayganosh who makes him realize that as an Armenian he has to

⁹⁹ For Ömer Seyfettin the character of a woman is reflective of the character of the nation she belongs to. That is why he attributes chastity in utmost levels to Turkish woman who are not over-Westernized. For a striking example see *Beyaz Lale*, Istanbul: Bilgi, 1998.

support Armenian nationalism and stop wasting time working for Ottomanism. He states: “Every time we met this beautiful Armenian girl repeated the same plea: Mr Hayikyan love your nation...! As she kept telling me to love my nation, I started doing so. In point of fact what difference can there be between loving a woman and loving a nation?”¹⁰⁰

The novella is particularly interesting because all throughout the story Hayganosh is extensively praised, and her nationalistic ambitions are venerated. But the plot contains a mirror effect. What is on the right in this mirror is placed on the left. Praising the nationalist fervor of Hayganosh aims to hand over a similar fervor to the Turkish readers. In the persona of Hayganosh, Seyfettin tells his readers why Turks and Armenians cannot live together. However, I also think that there is a hidden envy in between the lines in that if Armenian women are so supreme, Armenian nation will be supreme as well. Ideal women make ideal men; ideal women can also make a nation strong and prosperous. Thus what the Turkish men, and the Turkish nation need if they are to survive in the bitter competition of nationalities and nationalisms, is more and more women like Hayganosh.

At the end of the novella, Hayganosh discovers Hayikyan’s diary. Her reaction is incredibly harsh. She looks at her husband with tears in her eyes. “Why are you writing in Turkish? Why don’t you write in Armenian? Do you think Armenian is not good enough? Is it uncouth, is it vulgar?” Hayikyan, in turn, is deeply astonished. He has not even realized he had been writing in Turkish all this time. He looks at her in wonder, and then in profound respect. He notes:

“Oh what a noble woman she is! This great woman who loves the language of her mother. She is jealous of the Turkish language. I understand that if it weren’t for women, if it weren’t for love, there would be no family, no happiness, just like there would be no nationalities and we the men of this world would be doomed to live without

¹⁰⁰ The idea of woman teaching man how to be a good nationalist is interesting a recurrent theme all around the world as the literature on “gender and nation” has proven.

any dignity, we would be forced to live a sluggish, miserable life just like plants. Women teach us family values, they teach us nationalist values as they teach us how to love.”

It should be noted that here it is Hayganosh -- and not Hayikyan -- who is the embodiment of Armenian cultural and national distinctiveness. Consequently, the vital question for Turkish men, as well as for Armenian men is to be in right company, that is to say, with the right women. Exemplary male are the creation of exemplary women, either their mothers or their wives. In either case it is women who create men and not the other way round. It is also interesting to note that Seyfettin’s fiction encapsulates the debate between cosmopolitanism and flight from heterogeneity in urban space –a duality Richard Sennett evaluated in depth in *The Fall of Public Man* and in *The Civitas of Seeing*¹⁰¹. In the latter, Sennett defined the city as “a place that implicates how one derives one’s ethics, how one develops a sense of justice, how one learns to talk with and learn from people who are unlike oneself, which is how a human being becomes human.”

3.3.4. Nationalism and Flight from heterogeneity: For Seyfettin and Turkish nationalists of the future generations the aim was conversely flight from heterogeneity and from the cosmopolitan space. Accordingly, several districts in Istanbul were also deemed to be the “last castles of spirituality”. This is precisely why a popular book written by Peyami Safa was called *Fatih-Harbiye*¹⁰². There, *Fatih*, just like a *konak*, was used by the author as the locus of spirituality. It was in *Fatih* that traditions lived and persisted. This novel requires a particular attention as it will be highly helpful in decoding the basic credentials of Turkish modernization’s masculinity. All throughout the novel a dualistic construction is reproduced. On the one hand, the reader observes

¹⁰¹ See Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1992. Richard, Sennett. *The Civitas of Seeing*, in *Places*, vol. 5, no 4, 1989. See also Richard Sennett, *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1992. As a fervent urbanist Sennett has been one of the most vociferous proponents of cosmopolitanism against scholars like the liberal pluralist Isaiah Berlin who claim that people need “kinship”. For a more detailed discussion on this question, see Joan Cocks, *Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

¹⁰² Peyami Safa, *Fatih-Harbiye*, Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat.

life in Fatih, the spiritual domain of the mother, where everyone is alike and there is a homogeneous culture. On the other hand, there is Harbiye; the locus of a cosmopolitan life, where various different cultures intermingle, -the world of the strange or put differently, a strange world. Harbiye is the realm of the *flaneur*. It is the playground of modernization where the language is purely material. As Turkish girls travel from Fatih to Harbiye, they lose their virginity, chastity and dignity.

According to Seyfettin, the issue of nationalities is first and foremost a matter of flocks. Birds of a feather should stay together. If you attempt to fly with birds of a different kind, you diverge from the right path. When Turkish women are derailed they plunge into the mirth of materialistic greed. In one particular story, one such woman, Belkis, is constantly frustrated and gets ill¹⁰³. The doctor who comes to examine her, Seyfettin tells us, is a specialist in woman's illnesses. He cannot detect any physical problem and concludes that Belkis suffers from hysteria, an illness typical of women of her kind. Correspondingly, the doctor prescribes her to do some more shopping because that is the only thing that will do good to her. It should be noted that the fate of over-Westernized women like Belkis, is revealed in another story titled *On The Edge*¹⁰⁴. The narrator this time is a fallen Turkish woman and the story revolves around a letter she writes to another young Turkish woman on the edge of falling into corruption and debauchery. The former warns the latter that too much consumption of Western goods and envy of a Westernized style of life at the expense of Turkish/Muslim values only brings catastrophe.

Apart from literature, one source wherein this pattern was visible was the cartoons. Ottoman cartoonists relied heavily on stereotypes of women. Among these what Serif Mardin names "super-westernized woman" is a constant figure. As Brummett maintains, "she is Europeanized, a figure alternately sinister, alluring or ridiculous. She represents Ottoman womanhood sacrificed on the altar of European culture, or engaged

¹⁰³ For a thorough albeit biased discussion on Seyfettin's fiction, language, female prototypes, as well as his private life and marriage see Tahir Alangu, *Ömer Seyfettin: Bir Ülkücünün Romanı*, 1968.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

as a willing partner in corrupting Ottoman society from within and sapping its strength and virility. “(Brummett, 1998: 80) Brummett argues that on the other end of the spectrum was the sister-citizen who was first and foremost a patriot. Hence, goods and clothes were the telling signs. In both written and visual culture of the age, the price Muslim women would have to pay in return for over-Westernization was their chastity and virginity.

3.3.5. The Epitome of Turkish Literature in the Late Ottoman Period: Fathers, Sons and the Dandy

The more the modernization/Westernization process gained pace in the Ottoman Empire, the more visible and threatening the gap between the over-Westernized and the rest appeared to become. In the literature on late Ottoman writing, the symbol of the Over-Westernized man is oftentimes a character such as that in Rezaizade Ekrem’s *Araba Sevdasi*, namely Bihruz.¹⁰⁵ If it is the loss of chastity, dignity and virginity that awaits over-Westernized Turkish women, what happens to Muslim/Turkish men that go off the path of Westernization?¹⁰⁶

3.3.6. Unlikely Flaneurs In the preceding pages, several times reference has been made to the role of the *flaneur* whose restless movements are part and parcel of modernist masculinity. A *flaneur* is, before all else, someone who is alone and ready to meet new people, to get in touch with the unknown. Even though the term was originally coined by Charles Baudelaire to apply to the modern urban man, to a city dweller roaming the streets of Paris, there has also been a somewhat different understanding of *flaneur*¹⁰⁷. Strikingly, the Ottoman male elite feared the *flaneur* as an urban figure. After

¹⁰⁵ Rezaizade Mahmut Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası*, İstanbul, İnkilap. See Şerif Mardin’s *Tanzimattan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma* in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *der, Türkiye’de Siyaset: Süreklilik ve Değişim*, İstanbul.

¹⁰⁶ Herkül Milas presents an analysis of more than 450 novels in his *Türk Romanı ve Öteki: Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan İmajı*, İstanbul: Sabancı, 2000. The book does also include a shorter section on the image of the Turk in Greek discursive practice.

¹⁰⁷ For more on the role and conceptualization of the flaneur see Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002.

all he was the symbol of ambivalence, a walking threat, ready to get lost, to penetrate into the unknown districts of the city¹⁰⁸.

3.3.7. The wastrel: The pivotal figure of Ottoman modernity too was a male, but a different one: *mirasyedi*,¹⁰⁹ a wastrel. The wealth of the father is a recurrent theme¹¹⁰. This young, fatherless Ottoman male was far from being a *flaneur*. While the latter is always ready to penetrate the unknown districts of the city in order to find himself, the former loses himself if he does not come back to his home district, to his mother's womb. This lost of identity, in turn, is tantamount to "overwesternization" and constitutes a recurrent theme in early Turkish novels¹¹¹. Men who are over-Westernized develop "un-manly" habits as they become obsessively interested in their body image. There is a subtle albeit constant bond between over-Westernization and effeminacy.¹¹²

In her pathbreaking work *Babalar ve Oğullar*¹¹³, Jale Parla has investigated the ways in which distinct members of the Ottoman male elite¹¹⁴, starting with Ahmed

¹⁰⁸ See Selahattin Özpabıyıklar, *Türk Edebiyatında Beyoğlu*,

¹⁰⁹ *Mirasyedi*, the fatherless son heir to family wealth was one of the most recurrent themes in early Ottoman novels. Most often he went off the rails, deviated from the correct way, got attracted to lust and greed and over-Westernization and squandered his "father's money".

¹¹⁰ Ahmed Mithat's portrait of the dandy (namely Felatun Bey) is one prominent example of *mirasyedi* who squanders all his money gambling and with women. Another similar example is Rezaizade Ekrem's dandy, (namely Bihruz Bey) who also squanders all his money. For a more detailed analysis on *Araba Sevdası*, see Berna Moran, *Alafranga Züppeden Alafranga Haine*, Birikim, May, 1977.

¹¹¹ For further information on the trajectory of the novel in Turkey, see Berna Moran, *Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, vol I and II, İstanbul, 1990. See also Agah Sırrı Levend, *Edebiyat tarihi Dersleri: Tanzimat Edebiyatı*, İstanbul, 1934; Mustafa Nihan Özön, *Türkçe'de Roman*, İstanbul, 1985; and Fethi Naci, *60 Türk Romanı*, İstanbul, Oğlak, 1998.

¹¹² Studies done in different cultural contexts have found similar patterns. In Arab cultural history, for instance, effeminate men, especially those who publicly behaved as women (*mukhannaths*) were regarded as outsiders to the male order. They would have no respectability as men but would have to be treated in a separate category as entertainers -poets, musicians, dancers. For an interesting study on this theme see Everett K. Rowson, "The Categorization of Gender and Sexual Irregularity in Medieval Arabic Vice Lists," in Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub, eds., *Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Ambiguity* New York and London: Routledge, 1991, p. 66-67.

¹¹³ Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar: Tanzimat Romanının Epistemolojik Temelleri*, İstanbul, İletişim, 1998.

¹¹⁴ Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's study, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, is still one of the best works in this area. (A. H. Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1967)

Midhat¹¹⁵, regarded themselves first and foremost as fathers responsible towards their readers who, in turn, were perceived as sons deeply in need of guidance and knowledge at a time of turbulent transformation. One notable author who did not easily conform to this model of “son” was, according to Parla, Beşir Fuat¹¹⁶ whose nonconformist views and suicide was going to create angst and confusion among the older elite¹¹⁷. Beşir Fuat’s suicide was not only shocking, a crack in the father-son metaphor, but also a deviance in roles and codes of male gender. Suicide went hand in hand with emotionality. The fact that a cerebral, positivist person such as Beşir Fuat depicted so much emotionality marred the categorical expectations toward “*aydın adam*”¹¹⁸, the enlightened man, inscribed in hegemonic masculinity. The new male intellectual (Mardin, 2000) was supposed to benefit from the traditional Islamic ethos but remain firmly anchored in a rationalist, secular, modernizing, Enlightenment path¹¹⁹.

To take another example, Ahmet Rasim, in his *Fuhs-i Atik*¹²⁰, presents us a vivid mapping system where some districts in Istanbul are dangerous, and some others are pure¹²¹. In his autobiographical book, he mentions how a young Ottoman male is confronted with the danger of getting lost amidst cosmopolitan streets; -streets

¹¹⁵ For an enriching analysis on the novelist, see Orhan Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi*, Ankara, 1975.

¹¹⁶ See Orhan Okay, *Beşir Fuat: İlk Türk Pozitivist ve Natüralisti*, İstanbul, 1969.

¹¹⁷ The theme has been extensively elaborated by Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, *ibid.* For a closer look at Beşir Fuat’s writing and worldview see Beşir Fuat, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, İstanbul: YKY, 1999.

¹¹⁸ Intellectual is a word that does not fully correspond to the term “*münevver*” in the Ottoman context. In daily Turkish language the term “*aydın adam*” also reflects the gender dimension of the notion and the idea inscribed in the subconscious that the leading brains of the society are male.

¹¹⁹ Mardin's analysis discusses the rise of a new prototype of intellectuals called 'munevver', meaning 'those who have been enlightened'. The term is an appellation with reference to the intellectual tutelage of the Enlightenment. This new class of male elite were to embrace an Islamic ethos but also propagate the modernizing values and dynamics. In Mardin’s work this hybridity appears as one of the most crucial points of confrontation between Islamic traditions and Western modernity. The political ideas of the Young Ottomans were based on two sources according to Mardin. Firstly, the political views of the Muslim theologians, and secondly, the political theory of the Western philosophers. Thus stated the hybrid munevver differed from the prototype of traditional *alim* and the jurists (*fuqaha*). For a meticulous analysis on this see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Syracuse University Press, 2000

¹²⁰ Ahmet Rasim, *Fuhs-i Atik (Eski Fuhuş Hayati) / Hamamcı Ülfet*, İstanbul: Iskit, 1958.

¹²¹ For a more sanguine account of the old city see Balikhane Naziri Ali Rıza Bey’s notes. Ali Rıza Bey, *Eski Zamanlarda İstanbul Hayati*, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2001.

associated with the prostitution, the body, sexuality and either Western or over-Westernized women. At the end of the book, the young male turns back to his neighborhood, where he encounters innocence, religiosity and the protection of his mother. Rasim's urge to "protect" Ottoman youth is shared by M. Akif Ersoy who in his *Safahat* attacks the over-Westernization of young women and men, as well as their having European education (*Avrupa tahsili*). *Safahat* is noteworthy in its authoritarian, paternal voice¹²² replete with metaphors and messages of "chastity" and spirituality deemed of a man¹²³.

Since the West was seen as a woman, over-Westernization meant "feminization". Subject to the detrimental effects of over-Westernization Turkish men and women radically changed in the narratives of the era. If a Turkish woman was over-Westernized she would lose her chastity and virginity. As Finn maintains, "the women of nineteenth century Turkish novels are motivated by a combination of economic and emotional needs. We see mothers struggling to maintain control over their sons, wives fighting against mistresses and woman of the demi-monde attempting to become respectable matrons"(Finn, 2001: 547). A well-known example in this vein is *Ask-i Memnu* (Illicit Love) by Halit Ziya Usakligil. Robert Finn indicates that when women fight to preserve their chastity and honor against this detrimental tide the only viable option for them appears to be suicide. "Death by suicide is repeated in the early novels of Ottoman period, as the limited choices given women confronted with the unacceptable leave characters with few other alternatives"(Finn, 2001: 547).

¹²² "Sade bir fuhşumuz eksikti, evet Ruslardan...

Onu ikmal ediverdik mi, bizimdir meydan!

Kızımın iffeti batmakta rezilin gözüne

Acırım tükürge billahi, tükürsem yüzüne"

For the rest of the poem see M. A. Ersoy, *Safahat*, Ankara: Edisyon Kritik, 1987, p. 142.

¹²³ Interestingly, Necib Asım would publish a list of "ideal" Turkish names to name children in his "İkdam." He would remark that the Turks used their pre-Islamic names long after they embraced Islam. Many among the names chosen for publication were associated with masculinist norms of power, bravery and chivalry. For more on this see David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908*. Frank Cass, London 1977, pp. 81-89.

Two illustrious examples of this particular pattern are Samipaşazade's *Sergüzeşt* (Adventure)¹²⁴ and Namik Kemal's *İntibah*(Vigilance)¹²⁵. Thus both male and female versions of “these Westernized Ottomans were accused of slavish imitation, foolishness, conspicuous consumption, and endangering the sovereignty and cultural integrity of the empire.”(Brummett, 1998: 81) If a Turkish man, however, became over-Westernized he would most probably lose his “manly honor” and more often than not, his masculinity, but rarely his life, unlike his female counterpart. It is especially noteworthy that the first Other of Turkish literature is the dandy, the over-Westernized and thereby effeminate Turkish male character.

In journals such as *Kalem*, numerous poems were published to satirize the modern young Ottoman. As Brummett notes, “Kalem ran another poem entitled Decadent in French, which satirized the paradox of the Occidentalized Ottoman who loved European theatre, styles, and food, but still drew the lines when it came to the cultural borders separating ottoman and European. Such ‘alla franca’ dandies were the butts of many jokes.”(Brummett, 1998: 83) All in all, the dandy is portrayed as the victim of the materialist culture in the cosmopolitan quarter of Istanbul. The representation and vilification of the dandy rests to a large extent on symbols, some of which might plausibly point in different directions¹²⁶. The white trimmed handkerchief is one such symbol, the ornamented cane another. Thus the dandy's effeminacy is most often hinted at rather than bluntly exposed¹²⁷. Yet, the reader knows it, so does the writer. The medium transmits the message without openly stating it. Humor has always been a powerful means to buttress heteronormativity and stamp all those identities that

¹²⁴ *Sergüzeşt* is an interesting book for those interested in how the Ottoman male writer depicted the life of the double Other –a woman and a slave. In the persona of the concubine Dilber the author discusses macro issue including slavery, patriarchy and traditions. See Sami Paşazade Sezai, *Sergüzeşt*, İstanbul: Beyaz Balina, 2001.

¹²⁵ *İntibah* is a typical example of the highly didactic Tazimat writing aimed at educating the readers via the “good” and particularly “fallen” characters created. The character Ali Bey is also a prototype of an over-Westernized fatherless son who squanders the family wealth in his greed and insatiability, and falls in love with the “wrong” woman. Namik Kemal, *İntibah*, İstanbul: Şule, 2002.

¹²⁶ For instance, the dandy is both effeminate and yet one who tries, unsuccessfully, to be a womanizer. Either he fails in his love attempts or he is mistaken right from the start. The woman he falls in love with and idealized happen to be prostitutes or fallen woman.

¹²⁷ The handkerchieves, accessories used by the dandy are oftentimes subtle symbols and in their depiction lies the effeminacy of the character.

do not fit into its boundaries. Just like the mask of femininity,¹²⁸ the dandy puts on a mask and keeps switching roles between femininity and masculinity, to increase ambiguity and thereby destabilize existing hegemonies.

3.3.8. Hommes de Lettres and de-feminization It is thus during this stage that one of the continuities of Turkish cultural history was introduced: de-feminization. In the fictive worlds constructed by *hommes de lettres* “femininity” was constantly problematized. I will argue that this will be a continuous pattern in Turkey’s cultural history that crosscuts ideological divisions. I will also argue that “femininity” as a theme is related to the construction of both female and male gender roles and therefore is part and parcel of the definition of “ideal” masculinity. In Namik Kemal’s *Vatan Yahut Silistre*(1878), for instance, Zekiye is an idealist woman who dresses up as a man to get involved in the patriotic struggle in a way highly reminiscent of the fiction written by the Kemalist *hommes de lettres* in the Republican Era (Yaraman, 2001:58). Zekiye’s patriotism and chastity goes hand in hand with her defeminization. Likewise in *Mai ve Siyah*(1897), *Nemide* (1886) and *Kirik Hayatlar* (1901), Halit Ziya Usakligil’s “negative” woman characters are mostly overtly or over-“feminine” woman. Interestingly, in Semseddin Sami’s *Taassuk’i Talat ve Fitnat*(1872), the male author gives voice to woman characters to complain about the male-dominated order which regards women as first and foremost sexualized, feminized beings to please their husbands. The “over-feminization” of woman was named as “karılařmak”¹²⁹ ‘turning into a woman’ by Salahaddin Asım, who defined it as “having no social role, no social concern” and being reduced to body, beauty and sexuality, as well as re-production. This last point is emphasized by Celal Nuri who explicitly states that women should not be reduced to machines for giving birth to children¹³⁰.

¹²⁸ Joan Riviere was one of the earliest scholars to explore what she termed as “the mask of femininity”. She argued that women performed certain codes and behaviors that were deemed to be “naturally womanly” by oftentimes consciously switching roles. See Joan, Riviere. "Womanliness as a Masquerade." *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 10 (1929), pp.303-313

¹²⁹ Salahattin Asım, *Türk Kadınlığının Tereddidi Yahut Karılařmak*, 1910. Cited in Ayşegül Yaraman, *Resmi Tarihten Kadın Tarihine*, ibid, p. 74-75.

¹³⁰ In original: “Kadın yalnız bir zürriyet makinesi, bir kuluçka fırını değildir.” Celal Nuri, *Kadınlarımız*, İstanbul: İctihad, 1331. Cited in Ayşegül Yaraman, ibid, p. 77-79.

Interestingly, the early novels should also be read from the perspective of the male protagonist's paradoxes and "confines", starting with his failure to reach the "beloved" women. The male hero is oftentimes stretched between the conflicting axes of his "mother" and "beloved"¹³¹, Westernization and traditions¹³², as well as between his responsibilities for his state/nation and for his love/family¹³³. Many novellas and novels are replete with the problems arising from a gender segregated society, the leading male character's agony for love, as well as his responsibilities towards his mother and society. Ahmet Cemil in *Mai ve Siyah*(1897) secretly falls in love with the sister of his friend, only to discover long later that she was married to someone else. The male hero's inability to take a step or to affect his fate in reaching out to his beloved is openly exposed in the novel. Ahmet Cemil also symbolizes a man of letters¹³⁴ and as his love deepens so does his writing. Love and women are the Muses of the male writer, which will be a theme pursued in the chapters to come. At the end, Ahmet Cemil will abandon the city, resent the process of creative writing and leave taking his mother with him. Mothers will always be there to balance their sons' ups-and-downs. Accordingly, detachment from the mother will lead the male character into Over-Westernized, immoral life. Such is the case of Ali Bey in Namik Kemal's *İntibah* or of İslam Bey in *Vatan Yahut Silistre*. In these and similar cases, ideal masculinity is combined with patriotism, altruism, and respect for the mother as the beholder of a culture's distinctiveness at a time of accelerated Westernization and in the face of a feminized

¹³¹ See for instance the conflict between the woman Ali Bey falls in love with (Mehpeyker) and his mother. While the former represents unethical, carnal desire the mother stand as the epitome of morality and chastity. The male hero fluctuates between the two. Namik Kemal, *İntibah*, İstanbul, 1973.

¹³² See for instance the position of Celal in *Sergüzeşt* by Sami Paşazade Sezai. Celal a well-educated Westernized young man is powerless when it comes to confronting the tradition of slavery and the institution of concubines. For more on this see Cevdet Kudret, *ibid*, p. 107.

¹³³ See for instance Mansur in *Turfanda mı, Yoksa Turfa Mı?* by Mizancı Murad Bey. Mansur will at the end of the novel be sent into exile and die there away from his wife and son. The male hero's tension is explicit in his statement: "Ben vücudumu aileye vakf edemem. Çünkü vücudum devlet hizmetine vakf olunmuştur." (Cited in Robert Finn, *ibid*, p. 72)

¹³⁴ It is interesting to note how often both the late Ottoman and the Republican male authors openly associated themselves directly with the main male hero in the novels they created. See for instance Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar and his male hero Fahim Bey in his *Fahim Bey ve Biz*; Peyami Safa's Sami in *Yalnızız*. Oftentimes the male writer so much intervened in the text that he would address the male hero as his son or as a boy faced with dangers: "Ah zavallı çocuk!"(Namik Kemal addressed Ali Bey in *İntibah*, *ibid*, p. 47.)

threat modernization. Both the male author and his male hero speak from an uncomfortable position of “belatedness”(Gürbilek, 2002:82).

Finally it should briefly be noted that de-feminization of women and the denigration of effeminacy was not genuine to male writers only. The question as to what were women writers doing in this atmosphere of constant social change as the tide of modernization accelerated, and fathers and sons became the dominant metaphor of the age and the dandy emerged as the satirized Other, has been investigated by a number of feminist scholars in recent years (Çakır, 1991; Demirdirek, 1993; Durakbaşa 2000). In a meticulous research on Nezihe Muhiddin’s life and the fate of *Kadınlar Birliği*, Yaprak Zihnioğlu (2003) maintains that the development of women’s writing at this early stage took place upon two alcoves. First came the move by women writers to penetrate into this male-dominated cultural scenery. Secondly, there appeared a number of women’s journals targeting an increasingly expanding audience of women (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 45-46). In many respects, there were overlapping statements and concerns between the male elite and women writers of the era. The feminists of this Early Stage were profoundly concerned with verifying the supremacy of the Ottoman Empire, and Muslim culture vis-a-vis Western World¹³⁵(Zihnioğlu, 2003: 47). In this regard, they were supported by the members of the male elite¹³⁶ who shared their propensity towards “Eastern ways” while acknowledging the need to Westernize. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that in many other respects the woman writers¹³⁷ managed to come forward with specific

¹³⁵ Fatma Aliye wrote extensively in this vein to compare Western women with Ottoman women. The term “İslam Kadını” belongs to her and testifies her attempts to reform gender patterns in the Ottoman Empire without losing what she saw as its cultural essence. She was critical of Orientalist approaches as much as she was critical of gender discrimination in Muslim countries. Her attempts to synthesize two cultures are noteworthy and perhaps constitute a continuity with some Islamist women intellectuals’ contemporary attempts (which will be discussed in the chapters to follow)

For more information on Fatma Aliye’s views and the ensuing movement see Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadınsız İnkılap*, Metis yayınları, İstanbul, 2003 and Aynur Demirdirek, *Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayat Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi*, Ankara, İmge, 1993.

¹³⁶ Two sources that might be useful in probing the male elite’s attitude towards women’s demand for equality and emancipation are Salahaddin Asım, *Hukuk-i Nisvan*, 1909, and later, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Kadınlık ve Kadınlarımız*, İstanbul, Orhaniye Matbaası, 1923.

□ Some prominent names include, Fatma Aliye, Emine Semiye, Nezihe Muhiddin. See for instance Nezihe Muhittin, *Türk Kadını*, Numune Matbaası, İstanbul, 1931.

agendas of their own and a critical lexicon that intended to challenge patriarchal precedents in not only culture at large but also among the elite and elitist circles.

In this chapter I have examined the main dynamics and patterns characterizing the late Ottoman male writer's fictive and social world. I have explored the writings of the *hommes de lettres* regarding gender patterns, sexuality, modernity, self and society. It is from their writings and roles that the hegemonic masculinity of the cultural elite can be deduced. Four points of emphasis are noteworthy. Firstly, the hybridity of the late Ottoman male elite's standpoint (Mardin, 2000) and secondly, their paternalistic, authoritarian male voice over their readers and society (Parla, 1992). Thirdly, it has also been argued that "femininity" had started to be increasingly regarded as a precarious feature which rendered Turkish men effeminate and was personified in the character of the dandy, and made Turkish women over-Westernized, if not "karılařmıř"(Yaraman citing Asım, 2001). The era was characterized by a hybrid fabric weaved of attempts to reconcile Islam with Westernization, traditions with the pace of modernism and women's emancipation with the existing gender requirements. This was a fatherless society in which writers assumed the role of fathers vis-à-vis their readers only to write with a mission to guide them. The lack of centralized hegemonic power and the pace of the transition and transformation, as well as the existence of sincere attempts to modernize made it difficult to sustain the male-dominated order as it is. Thus, fourthly, this was also an age of de-masculinization. At a time when the Ottoman Empire was dissolving there had emerged a highly vigorous and multifarious, multicultural, multiethnic¹³⁸ women's movement with a considerable range of publications and a readership of its own, cultural/political/economic targets to fight against and an independent agenda to set. It is this multifaceted legacy that the Kemalist male elite would eventually succeed to, only to expand and extend but also to confine and centralize it.

¹³⁸ For more information on this aspect of late Ottoman women's movement see Yavuz Selim Karakıřla's "Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti", *Toplumsal Tarih* 88, p. 39-43, 2001 and also by the same author "Kürt Kadınları Teali Cemiyeti" (*Toplumsal Tarih* 111, 2001, p. 14-24)

CHAPTER FOUR:

KEMALIST DISCOURSE AND ITS SYMBOLS OF MASCULINITY & HEGEMONY

The previous chapter revealed that the late Ottoman period witnessed the “loss of the father”¹ both symbolically² as well as politically with the terminal deposition of the Ottoman dynasty. Literature of the cultural elite of this period in turn mirrored a severe anxiety triggered by this perception of “loss”. A similar apprehension and anxiety loomed in the fiction of numerous male novelists, leading them to write didactically, pedagogically as substitute ‘micro’ fathers within and above the fictive worlds they constructed. This chapter continues the analysis of the cultural dimensions of the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic by highlighting another development in addition to the cultural theme of the symbolic loss of the father/severe anxiety/emergence of the fatherly figures of writers: this development was a gradual de-masculinization of the culture which would only come to an end after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with the consolidation of the Kemalist regime. The most significant factor in this demasculinization was the long decade of wars fought between 1912-1922 first in the Balkans, then during the First World War, and finally in the War of Independence. Since this is a novel cultural theme that has not yet been adequately articulated in the Turkish context, I first undertake a review of the theoretical and empirical literature

¹ I borrow the idea of the “loss of the Father” or the “dethronement of the Father” from the works of several scholars including Jale Parla and Nükhet Sirman both of whom employ their respective terms in both symbolic and political terms. See respectively, Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, *ibid*; and Nükhet Sirman, “Gender Construction and Nationalist Discourse: Dethroning the Father in the Early Turkish Novel” in *Gender and identity construction: women of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey*, Feride Acar & Ayşe Güneş-Ayata(eds), Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 162-177.

² “Loss” in the symbolic is not tantamount to absolute disappearance from the text. For a study on the semiotics and the dialectics of absence, and an assessment as to how absence “speaks” in

on the relationship between war and masculinity, and then critically apply the analytical insights to the Turkish case.

4.1. Effects of War on Masculinity:

The most significant historical research on the analysis between war and masculinity has been undertaken by British historians in the context of the First World War with respect to its impact on individual men engaged in warfare³. Central to their work was the question of “how the perception of the male body and male gender roles transformed during the time of war and its aftermath”(Ouditt:1994; Bourke:2000; Goldman:1982; Grayzel:1999). Joanne Bourke, for instance, explored how British men regarded themselves profoundly transmogrified by their encounter with warfare. Bourke claimed this transmogrification to occur gradually in several stages⁴. At the outset, the war first molded the bodies of men into soldiers, sailors and airmen, and both before and at the advent of war the male body was glorified, lionized and garlanded with heroic narrations.⁵ This initial phase also marked the state unequivocally and unilaterally claiming ownership over men’s bodies. Yet, as the First World War went on and on, lasting much longer than the initial expectation of a couple of months to almost four years, those once-glorified bodies eventually transformed into wounded, distorted, and destroyed debris.

The whole process, Bourke contended, brought along the “disfigurement of the male body”.⁶ Yet I would add that such a gradual but inexorable “disfigurement”

speech, see Patrick Fuery, *The Theory of Absence: Subjectivity Signification and Desire*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995.

³ Prominent examples on this topic include Margaret Higonnet et al., (eds). *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*. New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1987. The book is particularly revealing in the ways in which the mutilation of the male hero and the return of the soldier is being analyzed, and in the underlying argument that men focus more heavily on the action of war whereas women focus on the long-term consequences of the war.

⁴ Joanna, Bourke. *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War*, Reaktion Books, 1995. Bourke, Joanna. *Fragmentation, Fetishization and Men's Bodies in Britain, 1890-1939*. *Women: A Cultural Review*, 7(3), Winter. 1996.

⁵ For a study that focuses on the “narrativities” of the World War I, this time by examining the fiction and autobiographies produced in the era, see Sharon Ouditt, *Fighting Forces, Writing Women: Identity and Ideology in the First World War*. London & New York: Routledge, 1994.

⁶ For further analysis on this point see also Panchasi Roxanne, *Reconstructions: Prosthetics and the Rehabilitation of the Male Body in World War I France*. *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 1995, 7(3).

needs to be contextualized in relation to its cultural impact both within society at large and in relation to the state. As Foucault has noted⁷, state's subjection of the individual citizen first occurs within people's bodies; it is there that discipline first materializes to then penetrate outwards. The disciplining and normalizing of subject citizens hence operates at 'the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.'" (Foucault, coll.1980:39) The cultural representation of the body is thus innately political, as is its deformation. One can thus trace the location and dislocation of state power through its impact on the body.

Given the public visibility of this shift from the cultural image of the heroic-male to the mutilated-male, from the brave-soldier to the "unknown-soldier", the perception of the male body became the exact opposite of the patriotic imagery initially held in the popular/dominant societal discourse. In other words, even though the Great War initially glorified masculinity, it ultimately ended up shattering it to pieces. This occurred in the Turkish case as well; the decade of war which started with glorification gradually led to despair. The fragmentation of their self-images created significant changes in individual men's lives, leading them to feel despair about their individual conditions, and escalating anxiety about the survival of the families they had left behind; many were therefore led to make a choice between "death and desertion"(Zurcher, 1998). They thus underwent a period of cultural transformation where retaining the heroic masculinity entrenched in the existing cultural codes and roles of masculinity became increasingly difficult to sustain.

Another significant conclusion British scholars⁸ researching the effects of the First World War reached was that wartime experiences created an immense yearning

⁷ In tandem with Gramsci and Frankfurt School thinkers long before him, Foucault maintained that individuals were shaped and conditioned by diverse dynamics of power that thrived upon consent more than coercion. For an analysis of the Foucauldian subjectivity and its reflection in politics, norms and contemporary political thought, see John S. Ransom, *Foucault's Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

⁸ For a study on the role of women through the First World War, see Deborah Thom, *Nice Girls and Rude Girls: Women Workers in World War I*, Palgrave: Macmillan, 1999. Thom's book is also interesting as it debunks the argument that women owe their entry into the public space to war circumstances. Rather, Thom claims that there already was a significant move in this direction in the industrial society long before the war.

for domesticity among the male soldiers, a cultural trait that did not at all adhere with the masculine cultural ideology of the military. It was probably the subconscious fear raised by the possibility of facing one's death that led especially the young recruits to yearn for femininity. Hence paradoxically, the war increased and intensified the longing especially for maternal protection and compassion. It is no accident that wartime literature reflected a veneration of nurses; the cultural portrayal of the nurse became omnipresent in popular narratives, propaganda material, and public drawings. One could further argue that the cultural portrayal of the female nurse as the selfless provider of boundless commiseration was both a necessary functional outcome of the damage inflicted on the male body by warfare as well as the increased yearning in the male body for what it desperately lacked, namely femininity. In the end, the male soldiers of the First World War seemed to have symbolically reached the end of the war not only with a sense of transmogrified masculinity and a yearning for domesticity, but they also witnessed themselves survive while all their peers perished in vast numbers only to be buried collectively, with no identification, no individuality. The tomb of the unknown soldier⁹ was the creation of the process of modernity; the First World War was the first instance when the tools of modernity had started to be applied to warfare – it was especially the use for the first time of machine guns and tanks that led soldiers to die in very large numbers. The First World War also became the first instance of a war where civilian deaths were almost as high as deaths on the battlefield; hence the boundaries between war and society became much more tenuous and as a consequence wars started to impact societies and their everyday lives much more than they had previously done.

What might seem at first glance to be the most obvious truism for any analysis on warfare has not been adequately studied in the Turkish case even though all the aforementioned features are almost equally valid in this context as well¹⁰. Just

⁹ For a scrupulous discussion on how men confronted or failed to confront the First World War, and a highly noteworthy analysis on the cult of the fallen soldier and its political implications, see George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

¹⁰ For a prominent example to the contrary, see Erik Jan Zürcher, "Little Mehmet in the Desert. The Ottoman Soldier's Experience." in: Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (ed.), *Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced*, London, 1996, p. 230-241. For a broader discussion of conscription see also Jan Lucassen and Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Conscription and Resistance: The Historical Context", *International Review of Social History* 43 (3) (1998), pp. 405-419.

like in the British context, in the Turkish one too, one might wonder if years and years of uninterrupted warfare (1912-1922) generated transformations in the codes and codifications of masculinity and in the manifestation of the male body. One can make the argument, for instance, that the essentially ambiguous yet solid cultural image of the “unknown soldier” appeared as a perpetually procreated symbol of the Turkish Republican Regime, this time named and idolized as *Mehmetçik*, the unknown Turkish soldier. This Turkish soldier, just like his British counterpart, possessed no identity, no past, no family name, no family, and not even a face. His indistinguishability made him idiosyncratic; his ambiguous identity enabled him to culturally represent every Turkish man¹¹. As he was Noone, he could just as well be Anyone. Conversely, because he could be Anyone, he had no subjectivity. (Bourke, 2000)

4.1.1. War and the Transformation into the Turkish Republic: One could claim that unlike the British case, the Turkish soldier did not only fight one war that lasted four years, but rather three wars right after one another for a whole decade. The cultural impact of these wars on the transmogrification of the male masculinity was therefore bound to be much more dramatic. One could contend that even after the Republic was established, the first decade of its life was marred by a long series of uprisings throughout Anatolia that sustained the warlike frame of mind for yet another decade¹². During this long period of continuous warfare and confrontation, the male soldier knew he was constantly at the service of the state while his body was in a constant state of symbolic dismemberment. I argue here that the cultural symptoms of this “perpetual warfare” were crucial in disrupting the former expectations and expressions of masculinity in late Ottoman/early Republican history¹³. Unfortunately, the full picture of what such a state of unremitting warfare

¹¹ One promising study concluded in this direction is Erol Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı 1914 - 1918: Propagandadan Milli Kimlik İnşasına*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004. Köroğlu’s, interdisciplinary work draws on multiple sources to focus on the power (as well as the limits) of propaganda, literature and nation-state formation in Turkey.

¹² For an analysis on the consolidation process of the Kemalist regime, see Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001, pp. 91-115.

¹³ For a congruent study on the “other” side of the same history, see David Buchbinder. *Mateship, Gallipoli and the Eternal Masculine*. In Patrick Fuery,(ed.). *Representation, Discourse & Desire: Contemporary Australian Culture and Critical Theory*. Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 1994.

has produced on the psyches of not only the soldiers but also the ordinary men and women of Turkey has yet to be explored (Zurcher, 1996, 1998).¹⁴

Just as the First World War broke out at a time when European societies had started to transform under the impact of modernity, especially in relation to the nature of the relationship between men and women as well the meanings of masculinity and femininity (Cocks, 1989:212), Turkish society had started to undergo dramatic transformations during the same time period as well. The political democratization process which commenced with the constitutional revolution of 1908 escalated to the period of wars, leading finally to the establishment and consolidation of the Republican Regime in Turkey. During this time too, just as in Europe, the texts and contexts of masculinity and femininity were being thoroughly altered, widely contested and systematically re-fabricated. It was not only the nation, but also an accompanying hegemonic masculinity that was in the process of being imagined¹⁵.

The ongoing warfare created an enormous drain of manpower from the civilian economy which in turn created dramatic changes in the workplace. What is so unique to the Turkish experience is that this great shift coincided with a greater wave of “accelerated modernization” as a relatively heterogeneous, vigorous feminist movement flourished and fervent discussions took place on gender equality, accompanied by frequent meetings organized and journals printed by and for women. Hence the nascent Turkish society had to contend with a multiplicity of social, cultural and political forces: first the symbolic loss of the father in the displacement of the person of the Ottoman sultan, the inexorable dissolution of the empire and, along with it, loss of a cultural sense of continuity, confidence and security. In the meanwhile, visible acceleration of Westernization despite fears about its excesses and yet unknown repercussions, all of which were further polarized by the detrimental psychic weariness brought upon the people by war after war. And finally

¹⁴ A useful source in this regard is Mürşit Balabanlılar (ed), *Türk Romanında Kurtuluş Savaşı*, İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2003. The editor has collected a wide range of excerpts from selected examples in Turkish literature that deal with the War of Independence.

¹⁵ The term is borrowed from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, 1993. On how this conceptual tool can be applied to the fabrication of masculinity see Dawson, Graham. *Soldier*

the ensuing fragmentation of masculinity accompanied by women's/feminist movement and women's attempts to become visible and heard in the public realm¹⁶.

What the aforementioned portrayal reveals is *total* transformation of the system in its entirety, extending from its core to its smallest pores, from its body of knowledge to its cultural symbols, meanings systems and emotional resources. It was as if the whole system had been destabilized; Cocks (1989: 107) captures the cultural drama embedded in this transformation when he notes that "... when a system of power rests at its deepest base on an interpretive order, the routing out and dismantling of its few central ideas and its near infinity of little ones becomes the most shattering practical feat." This dissolution goes hand in hand with the contingent process that ensues "when the force of every entrenched idea has been dissolved, when the dissolution takes place not just in thought that is thought, but in thought that is felt and not just in a few isolated corners of a culture, but over its entire breadth..."

Hence the erosion of the sense of masculinity through the embattlement of manhood¹⁷ due to continuous warfare at the end of the Ottoman period produced similar dramatic results, dissolving not only conceptually *thought that is thought* but also emotionally *thought that is felt and experienced*. I would take this argument a step further and contend that this complex process spurred the de-masculinization not only of the male soldiers in the war front, but of the entire Turkish culture in rather contradictory ways. On the one hand, this de-masculinization generated a new social and cultural for the burgeoning of new gender patterns in the public sphere as well as the flourishing of a certain degree of feminist consciousness in the urban areas. As the phallogocentric order embodied in the imperial structure lost its grip on Turkish society and as the social transformation triggered by Westernization accelerated, the subsequent cultural ambiguities created new symbolic spaces where the voices those

Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities. London & New York: Routledge, 1994.

¹⁶ For a more comprehensive coverage of the public/private duality's reflection on gender patterns see Jean Betlike Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: women in Social and Political Thought*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1981.

¹⁷ Compare with Alistair Thompson, *Embattled Manhood: Gender, memory, and the Anzac Legend*. In *Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994.

subjects like ethnic, religious groups and their social themes that had hitherto been silenced were heard. On the other hand, however, the very same de-masculinization process also generated the opposite impact of closing spaces down, confining individuals and voices, as the already experienced anxiety heightened and led the male cultural/political elite to stomp down to take measures to redress the experienced loss with a vengeance.

With the demise of the Ottoman Empire neither the first nor the second proclivity disappeared instantly or entirely, but rather kept threading their way through the ensuing political upheaval and social transformation as well as its aftermath¹⁸. As the previous social order withered away, it left as a legacy to the burgeoning Turkish society both the fluidity of potential for radical liberating change in gender roles, as well as the authoritarian and controlling urge of the male state elite to encapsulate and manipulate that fluidity. One should note, however, that the major anxiety over the loss of a father was eventually replaced to the satisfaction of both groups:¹⁹ after many years of struggle, Turkish society found another father in the very persona of Atatürk²⁰, literally *the father of the Turks*.

4.1.2. Parameters of the Kemalist Transformation: This innate tension between the liberating drive in gender roles and the containing instinct of the male elite is best witnessed in Turkish Republican history in the social, economic and political reforms that were undertaken. These reforms were termed ‘Kemalist’ as they were instigated under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and leader of the Turkish Republic, and these reforms did indeed initiate a deep-seated

¹⁸ The strengths and weaknesses of this transition have been elaborated by a large number of scholars and journalists including N. Pope and H. Pope. See their *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey*, Woodstock, Ovedlook Press, New York, 1997.

¹⁹ The Name-of-the-Father is a foundation, if not a treasure to be discovered, but its legacy is an obstacle to be transcended in the Lacanian scheme. The main question for the individual at the symbolic level is one of transcendence. Just like the two sides of the Moebius strip are continuous, so is structure incessantly flowing in the sense that the two sides are solely differentiated by the time it takes to traverse the whole strip. The scheme makes it possible to see the thin line between binary oppositions, including inside/outside, love/hate and signifier/signified. Accordingly, concepts deemed to be radically apart are regarded as continuous with each other. See, Jacques Lacan, *Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Jacques-Alain Miller(ed), New York: Norton, 1978.

²⁰ For an approach that explores Turkey’s endeavor for a “change in civilization” upon a leader-centered basis see David Fromkin, “Atatürk’s Creation”, *New Criterion*, Vol. 18, April 2000

and far-reaching transformation in Turkish state and society²¹. Especially with respect to women's position in society and family, substantial changes, if not ruptures, were experienced in the fundamental categories of gender ideology. As Göle notes (1999: 73), "Kemalism is perhaps the first movement in the world that set the alteration of the existing civilization as its primary objective. It conveyed daily practices rather than political ones, collective identity and the definition of the relationship between the sexes into the sphere of the Western cultural model." What is once again significant here is the scope, the breadth of the reforms that almost single-handedly attempted to transform the entire cultural repertoire, the complete meaning system of Turkish society in an attempt to fully Westernize them.

At first glance, the transformation was so tremendous that in the eyes of both Turks and Westerners, it seemed as if the entire country was undergoing a wholesale abandonment of one way of life for another²². Hence in 1925, Arnold Toynbee likened the emergence of the Turkish nation to a 'spiritual conversion;' he further maintained that "even while they were fighting the Western powers tooth-and-nail for their political and economic independence, Turks were reconstructing their national institutions from top to bottom on Western lines"²³. The belief that 1923 marked the beginning of an utterly distinct era was at the core of the official discourse of the new Republic, and was further strengthened by an array of material changes. One by one Ottoman institutions were wiped out, the Caliphate abolished, education made a monopoly of the state, and the religious education and religious courts abolished. A new alphabet was adopted as Arabic letters were abandoned. A new dress code was introduced while the traditional forms of dressing were obliterated. Polygamy was outlawed, marriage partners were given equal rights to

²¹ See Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, İletişim, İstanbul, 1990.

²² For an example in this direction see Henry Alisha Allen's assessments arguing that the Turkish Revolution was one of the most, if not the most, far-reaching revolutions ever accomplished as it had broken through the grips of tradition and Islam. See Henry E. Alisha, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935.

²³ See Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, New York: Scribners, 1927, p. 288. Toynbee had come to Anatolia as a reporter for the *Manchester Guardian* and therein observed and wrote accounts of Greek-Turkish confrontation in Southwestern Anatolia. He wrote and published extensively on Turkey. See also Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations" New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922.

divorce and child custody²⁴. The Turkish Civil Code was pioneered against this formative background – interestingly, it was almost identical to the Swiss Civil Code, since it was literally translated. The official discourse of this new Turkish Republic was nationalism; indeed, nationalism was the very soil upon which numerous reforms could burgeon and traditions could be forged²⁵. This is precisely what Kecmanovic (1996: 9) names the “bastion mentality”²⁶, as a polity built among and above the dynamics of ethnic solidarity. In Keyder’s words, “now that a state had been established, the population living in it had to be forged to a nation.”(Keyder, 1987: 89) This was no easy task, and yet the process had already started during the late Ottoman period.

In his groundbreaking study, Benedict Anderson has pointed out to the role of print capitalism in the consolidation of nationalism (1993), especially in terms of mass producing and distributing images of stereotypes, not only of those ‘ideal’ men and women who represented the nation, but also those ethnic, religious and gender stereotypes that were left outside the representation. Unlike Ernest Gellner (1983), who focused primarily on the historical move from an agrarian to an industrial society as the necessary background for the burgeoning of the anonymity and exchangeability of nationalism, Anderson concentrated on the symbolic, emotional power of nationalism²⁷ at both the collective and individual levels. While Anderson’s conceptualization of the nation as an imagined community has been path-breaking, he has been criticized for failing to pose the question of whose community²⁸ was being imagined at the expense of whom, and for failing to take into account the

²⁴ For a comparative work on reformist transformation resonating at the collective and individual level in different non-Western/Muslim countries including *Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan* see Ruth Frances Woodsmall, *Women and the New East*, Washington: Middle East Institute, 1960. See especially pp. 3- 43.

²⁵ Compare with Eric Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

²⁶ For further on this see Kecmanovic, Dusan, *The Mass Psychology of Ethnonationalism*. New York: Plenum Press, 1996.

²⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1993.

²⁸ Partha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community," in *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 3-13.

gendering of the nation²⁹. Anderson's work has been discussed extensively³⁰, and the gendered dimension of nationalism and nationhood has been evaluated by numerous scholars (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, Yuval-Davis 1997, Mosse 1985, Parker et al. 1992, Archetti 1999) to reveal how different cultural and social contexts convey striking similarities³¹.

Another significant element of Turkish modernization was secularization³². As Keyder states, "what the successive waves of secularization achieved was to reconstitute the Ottoman/Turkish state along European precepts. Nineteenth century reformers, Young Turks, and Republicans clearly saw that a state which would claim its place in the concert of nations could not be based on religious rules and legitimation." (Keyder, 1987: 88) In a large number of studies, as well as in daily parlance, secularism has been interpreted as signifying the decisiveness contained in the break with the past. Broadly speaking, while the Ottoman imperial structure privileged sunni Islam and structured the social system around it, the Turkish Republic negated this legacy and removed religion from the public sphere to the private.

Some of the most path-breaking steps the Republic took to establish Turkish secularism were the abolition of the caliphate, the closing down of the religious

²⁹ Chatterjee's question as to whose imagined nation has also been asked by numerous feminist scholars. See by Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcón, and Minoo Moallem(eds), *Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State*, Durham: Duke University Press, London, 1999.

³⁰ The role of the modern centralized nation-state and its bureaucratic machinery in fabricating nationalist discourse has been accentuated by numerous scholars, including Eric Hobsbawm *The Invention of Tradition*(1983), Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*(1993), and the role of economic dynamics stressed by Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975). For gender-conscious re-reading of the role of the state in building nationalist discourse see Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, Marion Kaplan, eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (1984). For a different view, one that criticizes the state-centred model for failing to attach any weight to the properties of territory and the role of ancestral homelands, see A. Smith. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, *Nationalism* (1995)

³¹ For an early multicultural study on various nationalisms including the Turkish one, see *A History of Nationalism in the East*. Hans Kohn, London: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1929.

³² The Turkish Constitutional Court subsequently defined secularism as follows: "Secularism is a civilized form of life which provides the basis for an understanding of freedom and democracy, independence and national sovereignty, and constitutes the humanistic ideal which has developed with the defeat of medieval dogmatism in favor of the primacy of reason and an enlightened mentality." (cited in Oehring 2002:5)

orders, the replacement of the Hijri Muslim calendar with the Gregorian one, the declaration of Sunday rather than Friday as the weekly day of rest; the issuing of the Muslim call for prayer in Turkish rather than Arabic, the replacement of the Arabic script alphabet with the Latin script, the purge of words of Arabic and Persian origins from the Turkish language, and the closing down of religious schools (*madrakas*). Köker maintains that, right from the start, Kemalist secularism had been less of an attempt to differentiate state and religion than an attempt to make the state become the overseer of religion³³.

Accentuating the imaginary line between past and present remained essential in this scheme. Recalling that “substantive truth, with respect to the entities into which the world is divided and their defining qualities and relations, is always...an internal function of representation” (Cocks, 1989: 53) it can be argued that, interestingly in Turkish history, the “us” and “them” duality was applied to the country’s past and present, thereby turning the Ottoman past into the Other of the new regime³⁴. Just like in *Orientalizing the Orient*, or *Otherizing the Other*, representation played a pivotal role in distancing the Ottoman past as well³⁵. And it should be noted that “this representational power in the imaginative field was connected to, but not at all a mere function of economic and political power in the practical field.” (Cocks, 1989: 54) As Zürcher notes, “with complete domination of the political scene assured, Mustafa Kemal and his government embarked on an extensive programme of reforms which performed a double service. They did launch a wholesale transformation at social and individual level, thereby creating further openings. Yet they also confined, manipulated, and domineered the paths that held the possibility of generating an alternate political order. The whole complex of Kemalist reforms should thus be regarded dialectically, as a system that opens up new cultural spaces while simultaneously controlling these from above³⁶.”

³³ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, İletişim, İstanbul, 1987, p. 87.*

³⁴ Hobsbawm, *Invention of Tradition*, *ibid.*

³⁵ For an interesting article on how cultural memory creates or erases identity, see Agnes Heller, *A tentative answer to the question: has civil society cultural memory?*, *Social Research*, Winter, 2001. For further research see also Nora, Pierre. *Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

³⁶ For a detailed and critical account on this trajectory see Nükhet Sirman, “Feminism in Turkey: A Short History”, *New Perspectives in Turkey*, 3:1, Fall 1989, pp.1-34.

4.2 Cultural Theme of the Early Republic: Kemalist Fathers/Ideal Daughters

Once again, it is through Turkish literature that we surmise how this dramatic transformation was culturally interpreted and given meaning by society. The eminent Turkish novelist Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar(1901-1962) maintained that as “we (Turks) moved towards West with a will reinforced by the requirements of the history. Yet at the same time, we owned such a past that it was impossible to close their ears once it starts to talk to us with all its fine quality”(Göle, 1999:57) Therein lied, he claimed, “the tragedy of current Turkish spirit”³⁷ which immediately got reflected in the position of the writer confronted with one of two positions: either some sort of a “ridiculous parochialism” or else, “flawed Westernization”(Gurbilek, 2001: 60). But if there was such a covert and yet conspicuous tragedy, what effects did it culturally produce on Turkish men and women?

The Kemalist project deeply touched and aimed at transforming all aspects of social and individual life, men and women alike³⁸. Yet, in terms of their relationship to the public sphere, the ongoing transformation encompassed far more drastic effects for women than men. Women were granted the vote at local elections in 1930 and then at the national level in 1934; veiling was not legally banned but utterly discouraged. Supported by the male elite, Turkish women even worked their way through numerous professions to hold jobs. The scope of the transformation was most visible when analyzed throughout society in a Foucauldian manner: all the pores of society, from the most complex to the mundane, were infused with change brought about by modernity. As Belge notes (1983: 838), it was the ‘small’, ‘casual’ and ‘intangible’ elements of *everyday life*³⁹ that would undergo the most dramatic

³⁷ For further on Tanpınar’s perspective see “Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar ile Bir Konuşma” in *Yaşadığım Gibi*, Istanbul: Dergah, 1996.

³⁸ It should be underlined that this profound transformation was wholeheartedly supported by countless women of this generation. It is particularly these women who have been named as, both by themselves and others, as the “daughters of Atatürk”. For one prominent example see Tezer Taşkıran, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Kadın Hakları*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1973.

³⁹ The study of everyday life has been a paramount concern for de Certeau whose works have concentrated upon both the everyday and the “common man” amidst politics, culture, commerce and

transformation⁴⁰ in Turkey. More studies are needed in the historical transformation of this social and cultural space.⁴¹ The most dramatic dimension of this transformation was the emergence of a new social actor in the public sphere; Turkish women started to participate in society not only as daughters, wives and mothers, but as professionals in the workplace, as proud citizens of the new republic.

Kemalism remained unique among the various reformist political movements in the Muslim world for being the only one that interfered with family law in this extent. As Zürcher highlights, “the major new step of the Kemalists was the complete secularization of family law, something which, through the abolition of religious marriages and polygamy touched the daily life of the population.”(Zürcher, 2001:181) In so doing, Kemalism injected its ideals into the private sphere which had up to this time been tentatively distanced, if not carefully kept away from the tide of Westernization and modernization. Under Kemalism, the sphere hitherto most resistant to westernization and transformation would thus be radically dismantled and refabricated. As the man behind this reconstruction, Mustafa Kemal aimed at the total secularization of every sphere of social and cultural life⁴².

A conceptual tool that might be helpful in analyzing this process is a distinction drawn between “citizen” and “individual”. Kadıoğlu argues that Turkish women became citizens before they had become individuals⁴³ and this, in turn, let them to construct their social identity and social position not from elements that came from within themselves as individuals, from their own experiences, but instead from the greater ideological project they were engaged in, in this case Kemalism.

language. See Michel de Certeau. *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984

⁴⁰ Murat Belge claims that it was in the reflections of daily life that perhaps the most significant affects of modernization as a change in civilization were felt and experienced. See Murat Belge, "Türkiye'de Günlük Hayat." in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983, p. 836-860.

⁴¹ There are significant examples to the contrary nonetheless. See for instance Ekrem Işın, “19. Yüzyılda Modernleşme ve Gündelik Hayat” in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, İstanbul: İletişim, 1995.

⁴² For further evaluation on this process see Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey", in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, v. 2, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996, pp. 21-26.

⁴³ Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Cumhuriyet Kadını: Vatandaş mı Birey mi?”, *Varlık* 1069, October 1996, pp 12-15.

Kadıoğlu demonstrates how this was not only a cultural characteristic of Turkish women in the context of Kemalism, but also explained the way they later related themselves to Islam as a political movement. Also, this was not a cultural characteristic of Turkish women in particular, women who were given political freedom from above rather than fighting to attain it themselves, as in the case of socialism, for instance, also followed a similar pattern⁴⁴. It should be noted here, however, that there was an additional, larger transformation in identity that was also taking place, from subjecthood in the Ottoman Empire to citizenship in the Turkish Republic. In this context, men also had to define their identities through the Republic and thus develop their new social and cultural roles as citizens through the Republic as well.

The dominant model of citizenship in Turkey is one that does not allude much space to individuality; the “common good”, defined in relation to the project of Westernization, took precedence over what was good for the individual⁴⁵. As Kadıoğlu states, “consequently, the citizen becomes both the subject and the carrier of the Kemalism’s modernization project. He will be expected to not only internalize this project, but also to reproduce the dominant supremacy of the state.”(Kadıoğlu, 2002: 272) While the Kemalist project does need to be critically evaluated for its role in buttressing this tendency⁴⁶, the Turkish model of citizenship cannot be solely explained through the Kemalist legacy. For what Kemalism’s modernization project entailed, how Westernization was defined and interpreted in the context of Turkish society brought in many cultural elements that were predicated on existing social relations.

Hence my study here attempts to go beyond the structural elements that often define modernization and Westernization in terms of visible institutions to reveal the cultural parameters these processes were embedded in, and the cultural elements

⁴⁴ Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Alaturkçuluk ile İffetsizlik Arasında Birey Olarak Kadın” in *Görüş*, May 9th, 1993, pp 58-62.

⁴⁵ On the contents and confines of Kemalist paradigmatic shift see Fuat Keyman, “Kemalizm, Modernite, Gelenek”, in *Toplum ve Bilim*, Spring 1997, no: 72, p. 84-99.

⁴⁶ The social project envisioned by the Kemalist elite has been critically elaborated by numerous scholars, including Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “Kemalist Cumhuriyet, Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi İlişkisi” in *Varlık*, 1069, October 1996, p. 2-8.

within which they became imbued with meaning. I would argue that this aspect of the political modernization of Turkey has to be studied more systematically than it has been so far.

4.2.1 Cultural Repertoire of Women's Images: Cultural iconography plays a crucial role in the adoption and expansion of new republican values, as well as the promotion of ideal citizenship. As I have discussed previously, societal position of women and modernity are interrelated because modernity provides the societal conditions through which women, as the other half of the human race, achieve the envisioned equality through modernity. And modernity is also related to the new political process of nation-building, a new conception of the individual as a citizen, often under the rubric of a nation-state, with particular rights and responsibilities. In tracing back the gendered pillars of the nation-birthing process (Jayawardena, 1986; Davis-Anthias, 1989), Enloe demonstrates how men “see women as the community’s or the nation’s most valuable possessions; the principal vehicles for transmitting the whole nation’s values from one generation to the next; bearers of the community future generations –crudely, nationalist wombs; the members of the community vulnerable to defilement and exploitation by oppressive alien rulers; and most susceptible to assimilation” (Enloe, 1989: 54) In a similar vein, Elshtain notes that most modern nation-states are construed in feminine terms. “The sovereign may bear a masculinized face, but the nation itself is feminized, a mother, a sweetheart, a lover.” (Elshtain, p. 169) Yet, not all women are included in the system in the same way. As the concerns of modernity and the nation coincided in the Turkish context, there was the need to come up with a cultural image for the new Republican woman.

What was the cultural repertoire of women’s images available at the time? The urban women of the empire that were active in the public sphere were predominantly located in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, since the War of Independence was fought in Anatolia, eventually against the Ottoman state centered there, these urban women could not become the symbol of the empire. Of course, there were exceptional urban women like Halide Edip who escaped to Anatolia to join the War of Independence and others who accompanied their husbands to Ankara when the latter moved to join forces with Mustafa Kemal. Yet

this segmented nature of urban women across the two capitals, one past and one present, as well as the presence of large number of minority and foreign urban women in especially Istanbul made it virtually impossible to build the cultural image of the new Republican women around these urban women.

The other group of women who were influential in determining the course of the War of Independence was the peasant women of Anatolia who helped the Turkish army as nurses, food providers, porters and every other imaginable capacity. Indeed, one cultural representation that would long survive in the Turkish collective psyche was the image of Anatolian peasant woman carrying armaments in her farm cart to the soldiers in the front. What corresponds to the definition of Anatolian woman in the collective lexicon is first and foremost “compromise”. In the eyes of both the reformist elite and herself⁴⁷, she is altruistic, utterly selfless, always devoted to causes larger than herself, family, household and homeland. The endeavor to elucidate the “real Turkish” woman is evident in the speeches Atatürk gave at various places all over Anatolia. Published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* in 1923, Mustafa Kemal indicated that the role model for contemporary Turkish woman should indeed be the Anatolian woman carrying armory to the front during the War of Independence. In a public speech he gave in Konya on March 1923⁴⁸, he first announced the concubine as a model of the past and utterly antagonistic to what was to become the real Turkish woman; he also rejected the image presented by the urban women of Istanbul. Atatürk stated that just by looking at the outward appearance of Istanbulite women, foreigners got the wrong impression about Turkish woman in general who was in the meantime located in Anatolia, working hard for her family and nation.(Toska, 1998: 78)

The autobiographical writings of Irfan Orga and Selma Ekrem display the same point. In order to distinguish the new Republican woman, Orga presents examples from his mother’s daily life, describing her as a woman primarily

⁴⁷ For a highly revealing example in this regard see Afet İnan, *Atatürk ve Türk Kadının Haklarının Kazanılması, Tarih Boyunca Türk Kadınının Hak ve Görevleri*. Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Ankara, 1968.

⁴⁸ See the following sources: Mehmet Önder, *Atatürk Konya’da*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989; Emel Doğramacı, *Atatürk’ten Günümüze Sosyal Değişimde Türk Kadını*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1993.

“...content to be solely an ornament in her husband’s home.” (Frey, 1965: 148) So aloof was this model of womanhood from the public sphere that Orga could not hide his bewilderment when he once heard his mother “interfere” in *manly* conversation on politics. Halide Edip who fought alongside the Anatolian woman believed that it was her and other urban women’s responsibility to protect the rights of Anatolian woman.(Toska, 1998: 81) Likewise, a closer inspection of the personal narrative of Mualla Eyüboğlu reveals that she takes the Anatolian woman as the role-model for the new Republican woman⁴⁹. Like in all historical processes of nation-building, in the Turkish context as well, the fact that all Anatolian women were – inescapably -- fully immersed in the war, and worked hard in supporting the ideals of the nationalist project larger than themselves made them potential ideal targets for serving as the cultural face of the new republic.

Yet the War of Independence was led by a cadre of urban elites who then spatially centered the nation-building process mostly in urban centers rather than the countryside. As such, peasant women in the countryside did not fully benefit from the reforms (Abadan-Unat, 1978: 135) and they also could not be incorporated into the national imagery unless they migrated to the urban centers which not many of them chose to do. Indeed, even though some of these courageous women were made deputies in the Turkish assembly, they rarely made a difference in the eventual course of the nation and often felt out of place at the urban center.

4.2.2. The New Turkish Woman: Underlying the social transformation forged by the Kemalist elite was a significant historical continuity with the past, between the “new Turks”⁵⁰ and their late Ottoman male elite predecessors in that they defined the elements of modernity and the civilization and the culture it entailed in urban terms. And the most significant visible difference the Republic culturally brought to the urban space was the public presence of women. “The Kemalist elite emphasized women’s emancipation as a sign of the country’s level of secularism and

⁴⁹ Aynur İlyasoğlu. "Cumhuriyet'le Yaşıt Kadınların Yaşam Tarihi Anlatılarında Kadınlık Durumları, Deneyimler, Öznellik", 75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler, "Bilanço 98" Kitap dizisi, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998.

⁵⁰ I have borrowed the term from Eleanor Bisbee who used it at a relatively early period to address the reformist rupture in Turkey’s history. See Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of The Republic, 1920-1950*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951.

modernity, and equated the two latter concepts with social justice and individual happiness.”(Acar, 1991: 282) In its consequences no less than its underpinnings, the new regime launched an attack against the ages-old segregation of sexes. Not only modernization would correlate with secularization,⁵¹ they argued, but women’s public visibility as well as the encounters between the two sexes would bring about the conversion of civilization (*tebdil-i medeniyet*)⁵². It is precisely upon this background that the ideal of a new woman was drawn.

This ideal woman could not be the peasant woman because even though she fully participated in the War of Independence, she was spatially located outside the urban spaces where the cultural image of the Republican woman was to be created. The ideal woman could not be the urban woman because of even though she was at the urban center and often outwardly modern, she had not fully and wholeheartedly sacrificed herself to the ideals of nation-building the way the peasant woman had. What options were left at the urban centers to locate a new generation of women who would give a cultural face to the new Republic? This would be young urban women, often daughters and female relatives of the urban Kemalist male elite, who would be educated in Republican ideals and taught to fully commit themselves to the service of the nation before all else. The many girls Mustafa Kemal himself adopted as well as the daughters of his comrades were all raised with these expectations. What was expected of the new woman? What were the parameters of her identity?

Good health to be active in society seems to be the first requirement, followed by the necessity to be educated. One of the most obtrusive definitions of the “new woman” was presented by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu in the 1930s when he stated that “the new woman is not a housewife. First and foremost she is educated. She is not a fragile, ailing beauty. The new woman is healthy, hale, agile, successful

⁵¹ By the secularization thesis I particularly refer to the view that associates modernization with secularization and rationalization. For a thorough discussion on this thesis see Nikki R. Keddie, *Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global Comparison*, *New Left Review*. Volume: a. Issue: 226, 1997.

⁵² Changing civilization was a goal shared by numerous leading intellectuals of the era. Yusuf Akçura, for instance, stated as early as 1926 that this constituted the most important issue. “Asri bir devlet tesisi gayesiyle halline çalıştığımız en mühim mesele tebdil-i medeniyet meselesidir.” For a more detailed statement on this point see Yusuf Akçura, “Asri Türk Devleti ve Münevverlere Düşen Birinci Vazife” in *Atatürk Devri Fikir hayatı*, vol 1, (ed) M. Kaplan, *Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları*, 1981.

and active.”⁵³ Yakup Kadri, too, argued that the new woman should not use her freedom to polish her nails, to be a baby doll... but to serve the state and society⁵⁴. After health and education came the requirement of service and dedication to the nation. Hence the veneration of the new woman went hand in hand with an emphasis on a woman’s role as “good citizen and patriot”. I would also add the inherent fourth requirement, that the new woman be urban, for even if she did have rural origins, the best and the brightest were profiled when they were at the center, at the new capital of Ankara. It is true that once this ideal woman was created, she was imbued with the national mission to go to the rural countryside to educate others, but ultimately and symbolically she was located at the urban center with the reforming male elites of the republic.

The ensuing Turkish “state feminism” (Tekeli, 1993: 30; Berktaç, 1996:760) was therefore deeply entrenched into the fabrication and consolidation of the nation-state, and its accompanying nationalist narrative⁵⁵. This in turn strongly reverberated in the literary canon. Eren claims that in no other field had the contrast between the imperial Ottoman tradition and the Republican canon been as extreme as in literature⁵⁶. Once again Yakup Kadri’s writing constitutes a prominent example. In his prominent novel *Ankara*⁵⁷, the Istanbulite female protagonist of the book, Selma, moves from the cosmopolitan/old/imperial İstanbul to its modern/republican alternative: Ankara. The move is part and parcel of her consciousness-raising. The more she turns towards the “plain, friendly and sincere Anatolian atmosphere” the more she will come to know her nation as well as herself as an individual and a woman. In this mission-journey Selma is portrayed as an ideal woman, spiritually, intellectually and physically. She does not have the curved, “feminine” body

⁵³ For autobiographical information on I. H. Baltacıođlu, see I. H. Baltacıođlu, *Hayatım*, İstanbul: Dünya Aktüel. For a study that brings together various conservative thinkers see the collection *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete İslam Düşüncesinde Arayışlar*, İstanbul: Rağbet, 1999.

⁵⁴ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanođlu, *Ankara*, İstanbul, İletişim, 1936, p. 129.

⁵⁵ For a theoretical framework that critically delineates the terrain of state feminism, see Kathleen Staudt, *Policy, Politics & Gender: Women Gaining Ground*, West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998. See also Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Exporting Feminism*, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 48, 1995.

⁵⁶ The change in the script, the form and the spirit differed enormously, claims Eren and underlines that Ottoman literature was only for the privileged and confined to a few. Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization*. New York: Praeger, 1963. p. 211.

⁵⁷ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanođlu, *ibid.*

features, -- thought to be so typical of Eastern/Ottoman women -- but a slim figure and almost unnoticeable female features. She looks like a boy, spends most of her time with boys, and is devoid of the problems of the female world.

Memoirs of women from this period also convey how the new Kemalist women of the republic experienced and interpreted this new cultural identity. Among them, Süreyya Ağaoğlu presents an important example as a pioneer female lawyer who was also highly active in political organizations. Just like many other women in her position, she too regarded the position 'given' to her as part of a broader project⁵⁸, and thereby acted with a mission. As wives, mothers and professionals, Turkish women would followed in the footsteps Atatürk mapped out for them in terms of serving the nation; the life of Firdevs Menteşe is another good example to the shape the life story of the early generation of Kemalist women took⁵⁹. The sense of mission was so overwhelming that, for Melahat Ruacan, for instance, since women, rather than men, were the ones who benefited most from the Kemalist reforms, it had been incumbent upon them to protect their legacy. (Toska, 1998: 82-3)

It is also interesting to note that spatially Istanbul and Ankara were juxtaposed as two opposing centers of identity; this juxtaposition went hand in hand with other dualities, between cosmopolitanism and nationalism⁶⁰, as well as between femininity and masculinity, with the latter categories associated with Ankara and the former with Istanbul as the locus of a multiethnic-Eastern heritage⁶¹. The supposedly monolithic structure on which the nation-state rested⁶² (Greenfield, 1993) was not

⁵⁸ This pattern is not germane to Turkey solely. Rather it occurred in various other non-Western cultural contexts. See for instance Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, London: Zed Books, 1988.

⁵⁹ For further information on individually and collectively early Kemalist women see Bernard Caporal, "Kemalizm ve Kemalizm Sonrasında Türk Kadını," *Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları*, Ankara, 1982

⁶⁰ Enloe recalls that nationalism thrives upon "masculinized memory". For more on this see her *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, London, 1989.

⁶¹ Ankara's symbolizing modernity and geometric designs, de-feminization is profoundly elaborated by Sibel Bozdoğan in her *Modernizm ve Ulusun İnşası, Erken Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Mimari Kültür*, Metis, İstanbul, 2002.

⁶² Greenfield maintained that the pivotal attractiveness of nationalism resided in its homogeneous structure. It was this structure which allowed it to impose a unity of purpose over other

Istanbul with its decadent past and ambiguous present but rather the newly-expanding capital of Ankara.

I should also note that it was not only the young women but also the young men of the Republic who were conscious of their social, political and cultural mission as the launchers of the national, modern transformation. This mission is overtly visible in the memoirs of Ahmed Emin Yalman⁶³ which documents the transition from late Ottoman period to the Republican one. The overlap between the national mission and gender roles becomes all the more visible in the case of those Turkish students sent abroad to be educated to then come back with newly acquired skills to further Westernize the society. A. E. Yalman conveys how he and his friends worked “twice as hard and shunned American girls” even though the new environment was very alluring, given especially the presence and accessibility of these girls in the public sphere – a state of affairs they were aspiring to create in Republican Turkey. Being used to seeing veiled women, young Turkish male university students were now feeling almost thrown into this utterly different world where women were neither covered nor reserved⁶⁴. (Yalman, 1997: 148)

The notion of being first and foremost “representatives of the Turkish nation” vis-à-vis the Americans led A.E. Yalman and his friends to take utmost care to do nothing wrong, to not violate any norms that would give the modern Turks a bad name. (Yalman, 1997: 146) Interestingly, in their encounters with the opposite sex, these young Turkish men were just as idealistic, if not more, as they were in other spheres in demonstrating their new modernity. In order not to give the wrong idea about Turkishness and Turkish men, A. E. Yalman refrained from bodily contact with American girls, for instance. Within the idealized nationalist scheme, he believed, a young Turkish man should marry a young Turkish woman and since

forms of societal structure, including class and status. See Greenfeld, Liah, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

⁶³ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, vol 1-2, Pera, İstanbul, 1997.

⁶⁴ “Memlekette yaşmaklı, çarşafı kadın görmeye alışmış iken, her adımda çıplak boyun ve kollu çok güzel kızlarla karşılaşmanın heyecanı içinde idik. Bize öyle geliyordu ki her şeyi garip ve başka olan Amerika, kadın meselesini halletmenin, gençleri üzüntü ve heyecandan kurtarmanın kendine mahsus yollarını mutlaka keşfetmiştir.” (Yalman, 1997: 148) A. E. Yalman was among the first group of Turkish students sent to the USA, to Columbia University.

sexuality outside marriage was not an option, he abstained from any sexual or romantic contact with America, or with non-Turkish women located there⁶⁵. This cultural frame of mind of course structured the knowledge he acquired from America. A.E. Yalman's autobiographical account is also rich and revealing for any scholar interested in how young idealist Turkish men perceived not only female sexuality and carnality, but also their own sexuality. Nudity, whether female or male, was, for instance, a taboo and a source of shame⁶⁶ which revealed the differing norms of cultural modesty (Yalman 1997: 146).

4.2.3. Fathers and their Daughters: When one culturally contextualizes this young Republican woman within Turkish society at large, it becomes evident that it is the point in her life-course as a daughter that she is identified and idealized as the Republican woman. For this is the stage of her life course when she is old enough to learn and act upon what she has learned, and yet young enough to be actually provided with the national mission which she could then spend the rest of her life achieving. Indeed, women's oral history studies⁶⁷ on this early generation of Kemalist women indicate how important the father-daughter relationship was in each individual case. These women were brought up in the image of their fathers' idealization of the 'modern woman' of Turkey and enjoyed the public sphere newly made available to them in order to perform their new roles and actualize the intended national goals as professionals. This new public sphere and women's roles in it were set mostly through the social rituals in Ankara under the guidance of the nation state. "The rituals of the Republican period, such as Republican Balls, tea parties and

⁶⁵ "Diğer taraftan mesuliyet altına girmemeyi, memleketecenebi bir eş getirmemeyi, eşimi mesleğime başladıktan sonra memlekette seçmeyi aklıma koymuştum. Bu kararıma sonuna kadar bağlı kaldım." (Yalman, 1997: 150)

⁶⁶ When called by the director of the gymnasium questioning why A.E. Yalman and the other Turkish boys always covered their bodies with shorts and never walked around naked in the showers, A. E. Yalman answers saying that in Turkey, according to the Turkish culture it is a source of embarrassment to show genital organs to other people, even to people from the same sex, and that seeing American boys walking around nude ashamed them profoundly. "Küçükken beri aldığımız terbiye ile biz onların hesabına utanmış, yerlere geçtik." (ibid, p. 146) For a critical account on the evolution of notions of nudity and shame, see Hans Peter Duerr, *Çıplaklık ve Utanç: Uygarlaşma Sürecinin Miti*, Ankara: Dost, 1988

⁶⁷ For a prominent study in this direction see Ayşe Durakbaşı and Aynur İlyasoğlu, *Formation Of Gender Identities In Republican Turkey And Women's Narratives As Transmitters Of 'Herstory' Of Modernization*, *Journal of Social History*, Fall 2001. Women's Oral History Pilot Project (1994-1995) was carried out by the Women's Library and Information Center Foundation, as a joint

fashion shows at schools, social activities at people's houses, recreational activities, including card playing and other saloon games, at clubs attached to the military or at other high society clubs, disseminated the ideas and practices of social mixing between men and women.”⁶⁸

When one compares this urban imagery with the initial veneration of the peasantry (Rogers, 1978; Delaney, 1991) in the official iconography and propaganda of the Republic, it becomes once again evident that since the leading male actors of the Kemalist reforms and the women who most benefited from these were the upper or middle classes, peasants who contributed the most in human power to make the Republic a reality did not fit the “symbol” the new regime wanted to attain in its quest for a change in civilization.⁶⁹ Class is thus a decisive factor in analyzing which segments of society benefited the most from the reforms, so is education. The urban-rural distinction⁷⁰ is significant as well. Early studies on the attitudes of Turkish peasantry revealed that peasants were less supportive of the ideals of a nation-state than urban Turks. (Frey, 1965) This is probably due to the highly urban nature of modernity itself as well as that of the ideology of nationalism.

Given this societal context within which the daughters emerged to become the new ideal Republican women, how was the public sphere to which they entered for the first time in large numbers as professionals? The personal stories and backgrounds of the first female deputies of the new republic, who were obliged to operate in a highly male-dominated world, are very telling in this regard. In an extensive analysis carried out in 1960s, Frey maintained that the social backgrounds

project by M. Kıray (project advisor), A. Mardin, Ş. Tekeli, A. Gürsoy S. Paker, A. Öztürkmen, F. Ertuğ, N. Sirman, Z. Toska, N. Erdilek, F. Kerestecioğlu, E. Güreli, A. İlyasoğlu, A. Durakbaşa.

⁶⁸ Ibid. The interviews conducted also clearly indicate how women’s bodies and “dressing” had deep ideological/political and cultural implications.

⁶⁹ It should be noticed that the Kemalist iconography on Turkish peasantry bore interesting similarities with the Soviet iconography at the time.

⁷⁰ For a study on rural women in Turkey see Günseli Berik, Understanding the Gender System in Rural Turkey: Fieldwork Dilemmas of Conformity and Intervention, in *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*. Diane Wolf L(ed), Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, pp 56-70. See also Ferhunde, Özbay, "Türkiye'de Kırsal/Kentsel Kesimde Eğitimin Kadınlar Üzerine Etkisi," in Nermin Abadan-Unat (ed), *Türk Toplumunda Kadın*, Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dizisi, İstanbul: Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 1982, 171-197.

of these deputies played a determining role in their readiness to serve the state which functioned as the highest modernizing agency. He stated:

“Their official background enabled their leaders many times to call upon the magnificent Turkish traditions of sober-minded devotion to duty and sacrifice of self for supra-personal ends. Their shared backlog of experiences helped to produce a homogeneity of values and an ease of communication without which their great achievements in chaotic and critical times might well have been impossible.” (Frey, 1965: 158)

It was this structural resemblance, their shared socialization through belonging to the same class, receiving the same education and being imbued with the same cultural values that enabled the deputies, both male and female, to act in unison without much strife, especially after the political opposition in the first parliament was eliminated through elections. It was in their service to the nation that the males and female deputies united, and the female deputies put their gender issues to the backburner. Frey notes that “finally, the fact that the modernizing cadre was so strategically placed in the existing power and communications structures of Turkish society, and did not have to fight its way to the center of power from a peripheral position, greatly speeded the march toward modernity.”(Frey, 1965: 158) This statement clearly displays that at the beginning of the Republican era there seems to be unison in values among those that could make their way through the cadres of the state/cultural elite, and being male or female made little change in this regard. Just like male deputies, female deputies too were strongly attached to the values the new regime cherished. Their approach to and treatment by the system was “equal”. And yet it was precisely in this apparent equality in status that there resided a more abstruse, essentially structural inequality. As Z. Arat maintains, “the Republican regime wanted to mobilize women, but only under state leadership and only to the point that was permissible by men. Women were called to national duty and action and allowed to enter the public domain, but without the autonomy and power enjoyed by men.”(Z.Arat, 1998: 23.) Hence women did indeed enter the public

sphere as professionals, but they did so in terms determined and dictated by their male counterparts.

Another way to discern the dynamic of this transformative process is to bear in mind the social actors who served as the locomotive behind. The necessary support for the transformation of women came from middle/upper class urban men, chiefly their fathers. Hence it was under the symbolic patronage of these fathers that the daughters were liberated⁷¹ and in so doing, they would also alter the system in which they operated in accordance with the rules that were already set for them. It was thus the “‘Kemalist fathers’ and their ‘ideal daughters’” who thus interpreted and culturally defined “the idea of Turkish equality between the sexes and the public visibility of women in the Turkish social imagination.”(Göle, 1999: 78) It is for this reason that the cultural formation of the first generation of professional Kemalist women and the early women’s movement in Republican history⁷² cannot be understood without paying attention to this “father / daughter” pattern.

Another dimension that was a very significant precondition in the manner of entry of these daughters into the public sphere concerned their sexuality. These young women were, in terms of their own life cycles, transitioning from being girls to becoming young adults; hence they were also acquiring, becoming aware of their sexualities at this particular point of entry as well. Hence the cultural parameters of femininity and masculinity which had not provided for this public presence of women had to be redefined as well, not only in terms of how Republican women would convey their sexuality and reveal their femininity in the public sphere, but also how Republican men would also treat this new presence in terms of their own sexualities and conceptions of masculinity. I shall first discuss the reshaping of the male sexuality in the public sphere through new norms of masculinity because this was a much more publicly manifest process where the male state elites directly engaged in the transformation. I then move onto the more indirect and complex process through which the new Turkish woman’s body, entering into the public sphere at a stage in her life cycle when her sexuality was at its peak, was disciplined

⁷¹ Afet İnan is an important example in this regard. See A. İnan, *ibid.*

⁷² See Zafer Toprak, “Kadınlar Halk Fırkası,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 51, March 1988.

and desexualized to create a new desexualized female Republican comrade-in-arms in the public sphere.

4.2.4. Dimensions of the New Turkish Masculinity: Deciphering the changing roles and codes of sexuality, masculinity and femininity under the Republican regime and unraveling how this change became a constitutive element in imagining the “new woman” have been rather ignored even in the feminist literature. Feminist scholarship has to a large extent concentrated upon the structural and “visible” changes the Turkish women underwent and studied this progression from invisibility to visibility. Yet, I would contend that in so doing, they somewhat neglected to weld this significant transformation to the factor that both accompanied and shaped it, namely a transformation in masculinity. I would further argue that this transformation primarily and overwhelmingly crystallized at three sites: first, in the changing roles of fatherhood, then second, to a lesser extent, in a change in the role of the husband, and third, to a far less extent, in the transformation of the roles played by other male figures around Turkish women. I shall now analyze in more depth this missing cultural dimension of the Turkish transformation.

The role of fatherhood had to be redefined because the Republican men had to first and foremost personally educate their daughters for an entirely new public role. The education of the daughters had been traditionally left to the mothers and the nature of the relationship between fathers and daughters had been very limited in the public sphere. Yet this was about to change. What knowledge the fathers could draw upon was very much structured by their own location in Turkish society: most of these fathers were bureaucrats in an era when service to the state machine⁷³ was the most highly regarded profession. As such, they were very highly regarded in society because the concomitant wars and the transformation from empire to nation-state had rather efficiently destabilized, if not totally eliminated all other professional social groups. As Keyder states “what this drastic development indicates is that during the war years Turkey lost most of its commercial class, such that when the republic was formed, the bureaucracy found itself challenged.”(Keyder, 1987: 79) Likewise, in analyzing the political elite and traditional occupations of Turkish

society, Fredrick Frey prioritizes the following institutions in their order of importance as follows: government, the military, religion and agriculture along with trade⁷⁴. Hence the Republican project attributed a special role to the state, the state apparatuses and the state elite who were from now on expected to take an active role in a wide array of issues directly influencing the daily lives of the citizens.

The French thinker Pierre Bourdieu maintains that social hierarchization and symbolic capital adopt different forms in modern societies, and that symbolic capital can take the form of political capital, educational capital or economic capital.⁷⁵ According to Bourdieu, “the system of symbolic goods production and the system producing the producers fulfill in addition, i.e. by the very logic of their normal functioning, ideological functions, by virtue of the fact that the mechanisms through which they contribute to the reproduction of the established order and to the perpetuation of domination remain hidden”(Bourdieu, 1999:188). Within this context, what is most crucial in modern societies, what determines one's status the most is how much "symbolic capital" one possesses. Of especial significance to the analysis I undertake in relation to the Turkish Republican transformation is the power cultural capital, namely education or skills (Bourdieu 1993), and symbolic capital(Bourdieu, 1991: 170) assume in this transformation as well as the role intellectuals play as the leading force as modernizers. Given that the Turkish Republic was founded on a social structure where the state bureaucracy was the dominant group that had to operate on very limited economic resources (in the absence of a national bourgeoisie) and had to undertake an immense civilizing process for the nation, it is no accident that the leading capital of this project was not economic but rather cultural, and that it was acquired through the public education the nation-state provided. Once the symbolic system of the Turkish Republic was set as such, it was easy to sustain the system through the perpetuation of symbolic domination.

⁷³ For a meticulous assessment on the role of the state in terms of controlling women's lives and spheres, see Ann Sassoon (ed), *Woman and the State*, London: Hutchinson, 1987.

⁷⁴ F. Frey, *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Cultural capital is a term coined by Pierre Bourdieu in order to explore and explain the differences of culture that serve to reproduce the division of social class, and to underline the multiple forms of capital. To this end Bourdieu has elaborated how different forms of capital can be re-shaped, exchanged and transformed into other forms of capital.

Now in this “flow of fatherly-filial cultural capital” in the early Turkish nation-state with the mission to build a nation, daughters rather than sons⁷⁶ became the symbolic agents of modernity and the new face of the nation. The social contextualization of fathers in society which I undertook revealed them to be prominent bureaucrats of the nation-state in the public sphere. Yet the Turkish nation-state and the reforms it initiated were very far-reaching, extending into the private sphere of the citizens of the republic as well. Hence this necessitates the contextualization of the fathers in the private sphere as well; I therefore next undertake an analysis of the family. Hence, one can determine the full parameters of the new definition of fatherhood by analyzing their role as “fathers” in the private sphere as well as their role as “servants of the state apparatus” in the public sphere.

The total Turkish transformation through modernity and nationalism envisioned change at the social level had to go hand in hand with the changes introduced both within and through the institution of family. The members of the state elite adamantly attempted, though not always succeeded, to integrate the state’s principles into their family lives as well. Central to this endeavor has been reshaping the “appearance” of family members in general, of wives and daughters in particular. Just like the modernization wave of the Ottoman period, the reformist tides of the Republican regime too placed a central emphasis on the need to change the “symbolic” and the “representational” by changing the items, clothes and signs of everyday life, by altering how they lived their lives in the privacy of their homes as well. As a whole, practice rather than theory, has been the distinguishing character in Turkish cultural and social history, -reflection rather than thoughts, attitudes rather than principles. Pivotal in this process was the focus on process rather than content: *how* one thought, felt and expressed these was more significant than *what* one thought

⁷⁶ In 1932 Feliha Sedat, a philosophy teacher at Erenköy Kız Lisesi published a widely read book titled *Genç Kızlara Muşeret Usulleri Kitabı* in which she described why the new regime had to be defended and developed by girls more than boys, as well as why girls had to learn manners in order to do so. “Bu büyük ve mesut inkilabı bilhassa genç kızlar kadar kuvvetle kim hissetmiştir!” The advice given to young women all throughout the book comprises a striking combination of being Westernized, civilized and modest at the same time. Chastity and modernity are to go hand in hand. Only those girls who can successfully combine the two can be the true daughters of the regime. (See Kudret Emiroğlu, *Gündelik Hayatımızın Tarihi*, Ankara, 2001, p. 88)

and felt. This obsession with appearance rather than essence has indeed been one of the most interesting characteristics of Turkish republican history.

The new fatherhood thrived on the integral elements of nationalist discourse in the sense that the latter enabled the cultural/political elite to come up with alternative cement to the Islamic one which they associated – and therefore rejected - - with patriarchy, traditionalism and backwardness. Though the break with Islam was never openly announced and Islam was never directly challenged, nationalism clearly advocated the principle of secularism and through secularism replaced religion as the cardinal cement of Turkish society. Thus, nationalism became intertwined with modernity/secularism/Westernization⁷⁷. Islam had determined women to be the main educators of children until puberty after which time the boys would be educated by their fathers, or by those their fathers selected, for entry to the public sphere; girls' education still stayed in the realm of the mothers until their marriage. Yet the republican fathers overtook the girls' education thereby setting a fundamental symbolic shift in the Turkish family dynamics. It has to be pointed out that this of course happened only at urban centers, more specifically at the capital of Ankara and to a certain degree in Istanbul and Izmir where the cultural vision of the Turkish nation state was articulated probably among a select group of Republican families, but it nevertheless established the cultural model for the Republic and therefore had a symbolic impact on the rest of society that went beyond the quantity of families initially engaged in the project. Another consequence was that the influence of Islam over the private sphere, in structuring the lives of the families started to wane as well as mothers lost their authority as the sole educators of their daughters, as the children were educated in secularized schools, and as civil problems families had were settled in secular state courts.

4.2.5. Reforming the Body As everyday life underwent such rapid and radical transformation, the swift pragmatic measure of the success of the transformation became visible indicators such as appearance and attire. As more and

⁷⁷ For further works to trace this process until 1980s see C. H. Dodd: *Politics and Government in Turkey*, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1969; *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, Walkington: Eothen Press, 1979); and *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, Walkington: Eothen Press, 1983).

more women became more and more visible in the public realm, their attire became an important medium. Dressing became the threshold that determined in one glance the “degree and dosage” of one’s attachment to the mission of the Republican nation-state, revealing how pro-Western, pro-modern, pro-reform one was or not. As Meriç maintains, “clothes do at the same time carry and convey a set of cultural, philosophical debates over the chart of meanings and mentalities in that society.” (translation mine) (Meriç, 2000: 51)

Perhaps the most traumatic change for men was the introduction of the hat. Atatürk not only openly stated what the new male dress would be, but by wearing the hat everywhere in Anatolia he symbolized and personified this modification. Kinzer states how Atatürk noted in relation to the hat that “a civilized, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our nation, and we will wear it. Boots or shoes on our feet, trousers on our legs, shirt and tie, jacket and waistcoat –and of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on our heads. I want to make this clear. This head-covering is called ‘hat’.”(Kinzer, 2001:44) By wearing the hat and donning on Western clothes, Atatürk was presenting not only the codes of western style of life, but also a new model of masculinity as well as a new model of fatherhood in his persona as the father of the nation.⁷⁸ On the one hand, the introduction of the hat was a radical move. On the other hand, it was yet another link in a long historical chain of heavily loaded garments and accessories, all momentarily symbolic, similarly imposed from above⁷⁹. In this regard, “that the sartorial aspects of the reforms (for example the hat reform) played such an important role (under the supporters of reform as well as under enemies) fits into a tradition which went back to the new western-style uniforms, the fezzes and the stamboulines of Mahmut II’s servants.” (Zürcher, 2001:181)

⁷⁸ İlkay Sunar names this process *nation-building from above*. See Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power, Vojtech I. Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds), Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p. 141.

⁷⁹ The execution of the “hat reform” symbolizes both increasing state control and micro-power structures in the Foucauldian scheme.

The new dress code brought along a “fashion” of its own though the development was rarely expressed by using this term. According to Simmel⁸⁰, two separate, seemingly opposite, social tendencies are essential to the formation and expansion of fashion: the need of union and the need of isolation. Fashion simultaneously aims at propagating uniformity and ‘distinctiveness’. Being unlike others is part of its rhetoric, yet mass adoption works against this distinctiveness. The transformation in dress codes at the beginning of the era embodied both connotations of the term with a remarkable twist. The need for uniformity required the expansion of the new dress code to the largest number of buyers possible. While Simmel concludes that this peculiar interchange stamped fashion with the novelty of evanescence, with that which is bound to die as soon as it is born, in the Turkish case, the need for uniformity and the need for isolation became interwoven for a fleeting period in the country’s history. The new dress code was supposed to prove that the nation had undergone the civilizational shift. Indeed, the significance attached to the material worn by citizens indicated how much significance the political elite attributed to physical appearance as a sign of ideological transformation (Seni, 1984; Graham-Brown, 1988; Belge, 1983; Hirsch, 1991). Fashion’s ephemeral distinctiveness had in this specific case served to tear a breach in time. The new outfit culturally testified to a rupture in the sense of historical continuity, a symbolic break with the past. The effects of the new dressing codes went far beyond since these did at the very same time closely shape people’s gestures, postures and body language. As Simmel acknowledged, clothing had an impact on the way people walked, even their gestures⁸¹, as well as in the ways in which they carried their bodies in the city⁸². People dressed in similar ways develop similar gestures and postures. Through open public statements which instructed individuals how to dress, through subtle observations individuals made of each

⁸⁰ See Rudolph H. Weingartner, *Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1962.

⁸¹ Simmel regarded the everyday tempo of urban life as affecting, if not shaping, the social psychology of its citizens. See Georg Simmel, *The Conflict in Modern Culture, and Other Essays*. Teachers College Pr, 1968. See also David Frisbs, *Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer, and Benjamin*, Boston: The MIT Press, 1988.

⁸² For a comprehensive study that explores this theme upon a broader context, see David A. Karp, Gregory P. Stone, William C. Yoels, *Being Urban: A Sociology of City Life*. Praeger: New York, 1991

others' attire, through what was said and left unsaid, the Turkish "citizens' bodies" were trained, reshaped and disciplined into the body of a nation.

4.3. New Women as Desexualized Comrades-in-arms

The most dramatic in this transformation through modernity and nationalism was the disciplining of the female body. As I noted earlier, the daughter was educated by the father for entry to the public sphere, but her sexuality had to be somehow contained in this process. It should be noted that historically the molding of the female body had started much earlier in the Turkish history of modernity and the corset had been the first threshold. With the acceptance of the corset, "the soft, fattish and loose body contours of Eastern women, fancied by Orientalist excursionists and artists... were all replaced by an upright posture, upright silhouette of women." (Şeni, 1984: 57) Perhaps more remarkable was the way corset harbored on the boundary between the public and the private, subtly mixing them, for whenever it was worn, it was worn for the outside world, for the public realm. And yet it was inside, utterly invisible. It was an exposure of *privacy* without violating the codes of *privacy*⁸³. These codes connected the public to the private, the state to the individual.⁸⁴

What happened in the early Republican era, however, was quite distinct. From now on, there was no longer an 'inside;' the female body directly became a text, a surface in the public sphere. This point needs further elaboration. Right from the beginning, the movement of Westernization had accorded a special role to women's questions which moved to the center of all social projects, economic, political and cultural (Kadioğlu 1998:89) as all groups expected her to symbolize in her very being a greater social and cultural project. Nonetheless, the "emancipation"

⁸³ Using the Lacanian framework as a starting point, Renata Salecl argues that "privacy" and the discourse on the right to privacy does not, unlike what it is thought to be, aim to protect personal identity. On the contrary, it helps the subject cover up for the lack of an identity. According to Anna Wessely, respect for another person's privacy is, in this interpretation, actually prompted by the anxiety the subject experiences in regard to this lack in the Other and this lack is an untouchable secret of the subject that must be protected from public exposure. See Anna Wessely, *Privacy and Shame: A response to Renata Salecl, Public/Private: the distinction*, Social Research, Spring, 2002.

⁸⁴ I have borrowed the notion from Catherine Alexander. See her *Personal States: Making Connections Between People and Bureaucracy in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

of women went hand in hand with other currents, some of them highly subtle, more visible. In everyday parlance, “fragile femininity” became belittled and discouraged more and more. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic and with its projects of modernity to move Turkey toward the ranks of civilized countries, and of nationalism to build a Turkish nation through disciplining women’s bodies, the Kemalist model of womanhood was posed from the start in terms of a duality: on the one side was the ‘new modern woman’ professional of the public sphere, and opposed to her were two models of women, the religious (veiled) woman who did not enter the public sphere because of what was regarded as her attachment to religion over the nation who I would symbolically term ‘the concubine’, and the feminine woman who did not become prevalent in the public sphere because she did not choose to become a professional woman, who I would term ‘the lady’. Even though neither of the ‘other’ women of the Kemalists entirely disappeared from the cultural stage, they had to still wait until after the 1980s to become visible in the public sphere which was until then controlled by the Kemalist woman; the former entered through the movement of Islamic revival and the latter through the escalating communication channels of the popular culture that escaped the nation-state control of the media. As the modernizing reforms introduced by the state elite, together with the support and guidance of the fathers who were also a part of that elite, enable numerous upper and middle class urban women to enter the public sphere as professionals, it was interesting to note that they could only do so by making their femininity less visible. Thus the very first condition of “women’s emancipation”, then, turned to be a contingent reduction of the greater possibility of self-expression. By the same token, “... the socialization path followed by women, permitted by the will, approval, support, and regulation of men, was determined at the expense of the individual and sexual identities of women.”(Göle, 1999: 78)

Pictures taken during this time period are very revealing in terms of exposing the de-feminized female body. As Bozdoğan maintains, the most canonical photographs of the Kemalist regime were those depicting unveiled women in multiple educational and professional situations, where they participated in the public

sphere as lawyers, doctors or even pilots⁸⁵ (Bozdoğan, 2002: 98) In the iconography of the new regime, women and young girls were portrayed partaking in a myriad of activities in the public sphere⁸⁶, including participation in parades on nationally celebrated holidays. Though the girls in the photographs -- which were widely circulated in society through the state-sponsored press -- would be wearing shorts or short skirts to demonstrate the degree of their modernity, I would argue that conversely, their bodies were less exposed than hidden.

Actually, girls and boys would be wearing almost exactly the same clothes, a 'national' uniform which diminished gender differences rather than emphasizing them. What the national press would draw attention to instead was the ideal of the young, healthy, fit body of the new Turkish national youth⁸⁷. As Durakbaşa states, "a new understanding of female beauty linked with health was an underlined scheme, especially for the upbringing of the new generations. Young women and young men dressed in sportswear participated in parades organized for the celebration of the national holidays and displayed the robustness of the nation." (Durakbaşa, 1998:144) Likewise, in the depiction of women the main point about their appearance that was stressed, presented as significant was that they were first and foremost healthy, virtuous and plain, active, agile and "natural", that is to say they did not wear any make-up or ornamentation.

At one level, what went on in Turkey was highly reminiscent of the nationalist emphasis on fit bodies observed elsewhere, including Germany and the Soviet Union. But the fetishization and politicization of the healthy body had actually started earlier at the turn of the nineteenth century, when women were introduced to the idealized world of gymnastics, and along with it the picturesque, strikingly sculpted body it produced. Gymnastics contained within it a wide range of activities

⁸⁵ As the first female pilot in Turkey Sabiha Gökçen's pictures were widely circulated on the most popular journals and thus quickly became one of the paramount symbols of "Kemalist women and progress".

⁸⁶ For a thorough analysis on the triple bond between women, the public sphere and modernity see Barbara L. Marshall, *Engendering Modernity: Feminism, Social Theory and Social Change*, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1994.

⁸⁷ Ayse, Durakbasa. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Modern Kadın Ve Erkek Kimliklerinin Olusumu: Kemalist Kadın Kimliği Ve 'Münevver Erkekler'." In *Bilanço'98: 75 Yılda Kadınlar Ve*

ranging from swimming, dancing, fencing to skating, from horseback riding to running marathons. The underlying idea, which would also be widely and systematically echoed by the Kemalist elite, was that a fit body was simultaneously the symbol of one's character's eminency. Interestingly, the world of sports in Turkey during this early period⁸⁸ was open to both men and women, boys and girls, and yet, in terms of aesthetics and propaganda it was associated with noble, supreme and *masculine* virtues.

I argue here that the transformation in the female body during the early phases of the Republican regime mirrors what Rose Braidotti names "organs without bodies, wombs without women."⁸⁹ Traditionally, women were perceived primarily, if not merely, as bodies in many social contexts before the Republican era. Now with the advent of the new reformist system, women started to become both 'external' to and surrounded by their bodies. This point is tantamount to making the argument that the female body steadily but surely became a symbol, or else, a space to re-organize. Once the re-organization of this space was concluded, once the inner layer wherein once the corset had previously been worn was brought inside out so that the whole body would turn into a corset, there would no longer remain an "interior". Before the introduction of the Republican reforms, women had been primarily regarded in terms of their capacities as wombs; after the reformist intervention, however, the womb remained while the woman disappeared. And it was the images of the new women and instructions regarding her behavior that circulated in everyday life through the press or other communication media that this powerful shift sustained itself; as such, the republican male elites were careful to instigate the changes indirectly. As the

Erkekler, edited by Ayse Berktaç Hacimirzaoglu. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yay, 1998

⁸⁸ The experience of the bond between nationalism and gender in the Turkish context has been quite different than the one analyzed by Yuval-Davis with regard to Hitler youth, for instance. The Hitler Youth Movement had two different mottos, one designed for girls and the other for boys. The motto of the girls was: "Be faithful, be pure, be German". As for the boys it was: "Live faithfully, fight bravely, die laughing" (Yuval-Davis 1997: 45). Sons/brothers/future husbands were expected to be agile and active, whereas daughters/sisters/future wives were expected to be docile and submissive. The division of labor had brought a long the reorganization of space accordingly. Boys were encouraged to become active in the public sphere whereas girls in the domestic sphere. The Turkish case, however, diverged radically from this framework.

⁸⁹ Rose Braidotti, "Organs Without Bodies", *Differences*, 1: 1, 1989.

regime consolidated itself⁹⁰, the production and reproduction of these hegemonic images accelerated. This path of development had serious implications in the way woman experienced selfhood since, as Braidotti informs us, “women's bodily over-representation without embodiment results in a physical reduction to pure surface, exteriority without depth, a moveable theatre of the self.” (Braidotti, 1994:51)

This “pure surfaceness of female body” is crystallized in the Republican photographs in circulation at the time. Many of these pictures were published in newspapers to demonstrate the new face of Turkey, and to thus expose the modern gender performance of the nation to the largest audience possible. In the snapshots of the era, female professionals emerge as disciplined bodies, wearing almost no make up, with reserved two-piece suits and very modest haircuts pinned at the back without any styling. Perhaps of more interest is their body language, the way they carry, or refuse to carry, their bodies. There is nothing “feminine” in their posture as they stand upright like soldiers with hands on their sides; likewise, there is nothing *mahrem* in their appearance. Be they the pictures of middle-aged female lawyers in their two-piece suits or young nurses or even younger girls in their shorts and mini-skirts, the medium of the ‘spectacle’ has now been entirely altered. In the photos taken and drawings made in late Ottoman era, it was the gaze of the viewer that penetrated into the private, the *mahrem* zone, of the woman only to catch a glimpse of what was in there, only to spot ‘life in the inside of a culture’ for a fleeting moment⁹¹. Nevertheless in the pictures of the early republican era, there is no such “inside” left anymore to penetrate. Yet it appears that the gaze of the subject-viewer is blocked more than ever before because now it is the gaze of the object in the picture in congruence with the “gazing from the inside out” that stops the gaze of the subject-viewer right out, controls it and retaliates back. That fleeting moment no longer exists because the feminine body is no longer there. Now the photograph looks from the inside out. Hence in the photographs of the early Republican period,

⁹⁰ For a systematic analysis of this momentous historical process see E. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, London, 1993. See also Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Routledge, London, 1993.

⁹¹ It should be recalled that although these pictures were deemed to “display” Muslim women they were taken in closed spaces, studios, by dressing (and Orientalizing) non-Muslim women as Muslim women.

the pictures penetrate into real life through the gaze of the objects rather than pictures that penetrate into real life.

I would argue that the female body has at this point been fully transformed and relocated from the private sphere to a public sign, a political statement in the public sphere: Kemalist woman has been molded into a comrade. The only occasion when the female beauty could be praised in this context is when “the corporeal” would be gallantly put into the service of the “sacred”, i.e., to the service of the state and nation. Thus presented, physical beauty transcends *the disreputable zone of carnality*. It is upon this terrain that popular beauty contests became another major novelty of the early Republican period⁹². In the 1930s Turkey participated in international beauty competitions for the first time and won; the outcome became a source of national victory and pride, further buttressing the ‘mission’ of a beauty queen standing for her nation.

The image of the virile women (*femina virilis*) also emerged within the matrices of this gender transformation. As Young notes, “sex changes most often reflect culturally perceived notions of prestige associated with gender. In general, when women change into or disguise themselves as men, they become heroic, but when men reverse their gender, it often leads to powerlessness and humiliation.”(Young, 1993: XXV) The strategy the Republican male elite employed thus entailed the denial of femininity and the molding of women into virile comrades in the public sphere. This imagery went hand in hand with women’s traditional roles of motherhood, without necessarily challenging the latter⁹³. What had radically transformed in Turkey throughout the modernization/Westernization process was not the direct intervention in motherhood roles, but indirect changes in the structure of the family from an extended family to a nuclear one. Yet, as Behar and Duben argue, this change had not been initiated by the Kemalists, but preceded them, even though

⁹² For further analysis on this issue see Duman, Doğan , and Pınar Duman. "Kültürel Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Güzellik Yarışmaları." *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 42 (1997).

⁹³ Being a good wife and a good mother constituted a constant theme that crosscut ideological positions. In his memoirs Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu tells, praisingly, how his wife would take utmost care so that their newborn baby would not disturb him as he worked and studied at home. “Bir yıl sonra doğan oğlumuzun yaygarası beni ders çalışmaktan alkoymasın diye Saimem onu alır, iki odalı evimizin öteki odasına geçirir, bir ananın bebeğine yapabileceği her türlü özeni gösterirdi.” (Hıfzı Veldet velidedeoğlu, *Anıların İzinde*, Remzi, İstanbul, 1977, vol: 1, p. 166)

the Kemalists wanted to get full credit for it since the presence of the nuclear family was a sign of modernity⁹⁴. With the advent of the Kemalist reforms, as Bozdoğan argue, the nuclear family constituted by a working father, an educated mother, and healthy kids was culturally made the national ideal; the more this ideal was actualized, the more the physical structure of the household changed accordingly. (Bozdoğan, 2002: 214)

The Republican need to transform women into “wombs without women” also stemmed from the tension between two ideologies, the dominant secularist/reformist ideology and the opposing traditional/conservative one. Another significant cause was the ever-constant cultural requirement of deeply-rooted codes of chastity. In Durakbaşa’s words, “... the Kemalist women who became active in the public domain, which typically meant to work within a predominantly male bureaucratic structure, had to present a ‘suitable’ body image, a new femininity that was somehow connected to the image of a *male* body.”(Durakbasa, 1998: 147) Zehra Arat further points out to the *enclosing* affect of opening women’s paths in public sphere when she states that “... with Kemalism and modernization, the preoccupation with *namus*⁹⁵, which had been prevalent in Mediterranean culture and was reinforced by the Islamic notion of *fitne*⁹⁶, must have increased as a result of the desegregation of the sexes and women’s participation in public life.”(Z. Arat, 1998:26) The combination of traditional notions of *namus* and the modern motto of ideal citizenship is visible both at the ideological level and in the lives of individual Kemalist women, such as Sabiha Gökçen⁹⁷.

⁹⁴ See Cem Behar and Alain Duben, *İstanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

⁹⁵ On the Muslim perceptions of modesty/privacy see Mohsen Kadivar, *An Introduction to the Public Private Debate in Islam*, Social Research, Fall 2003. See also Talal Asad’s short piece, *Talal Asad, Boundaries and Rights in Islamic Law*, Social Research, 22, Fall 2003.

⁹⁶ The notion of *fitne* and how it is perceived by different understandings in Islam has been extensively, critically studied by Fetna Ayt Sabbah in her *F. A. Sabbah, İslam’ın Bilişçaltında Kadın*, İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 1997.

⁹⁷ Gökçen’s life is replete with elements of de-feminized “emancipated” ideal comrade-womanhood. Of particular interest is the dialogue that took place between her and Atatürk right before her being sent to suppress the Dersim Rebellion. In this conversation Sabiha Gokcen is portrayed both as a genderless citizen-soldier and yet at the same time a “Kemalist daughter”(Türk Kızı, Gök Kızı, Atatürk Kızı was the original definition used) responsible for protecting her chastity if she fell captive to the hands of the rebels. This part of her life Gökçen has been titled as “Dersim Harekatı ve Namusumu Koruyacak Silah!” in her autobiography. Cited in and analyzed extensively by Ayşegül

For the new expectations of womanhood to thrive in the new public sphere in particular and the imagined community of the nation in general, the distinction between “the oppressed women of the past” and “the liberated women of the present” had to be drawn by the male Republican elite as rigidly and impermeably as possible. Along these lines surfaced a familiar dilemma that would have far-reaching repercussions in the collective subconscious of the following generations, albeit under different disguises: Kemalist-comrade-woman versus the Ottoman-concubine-lady. In order to clarify its message, the new Turkish Republican regime thus Orientalized its own past, portraying Ottoman women through harem-like images and then juxtaposing these imagined constructs with modern snapshots taken at the present. The list of such comparisons drawn between the two different types of woman was very long and prolific⁹⁸.

According to Durakbaşa, “Kemalist women of the period were expected to have ‘masculine’ character traits, unlike the Ottoman ladies who regulated and organized activities in the private domain among women.”(Durakbasa, 1998:143) Interestingly, the trend of Orientalizing the Ottoman era did not disappear after the 1930s, but became all the more visible and popular. As Ruth Lumbroso elaborated, the 1950s⁹⁹ witnessed the Turkish societal renewal of interest in Ottoman history in general and an expanding discourse on Ottoman women in particular where the issue of deepest interest was the “harem”. In popular historical journals, pictures and stories of harem appeared one after another as the women of the Ottoman dynasty were represented as part of the Ottoman history, and too often, as part, if not the cause, of its eventual corruption. Sultan’s women and mothers were depicted as having powerful, ambitious personalities and employing their sexualities as a weapon to further their ambitions. Lumbroso underlines that this emphasis among Turkish

Altınay, “Ordu-Millet Kadınlar: Dünyanın İlk Kadın Savaş Pilotu Sabiha Gökçen” in *Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2000, p. 254.

⁹⁸ Nevertheless it should also be recognized that there were quite a number of exceptions, examples that did not fit into this pattern. Therefore, all these categories should be seen as a “typology” and not as a sweeping generalization.

⁹⁹ Lumbroso maintains that the essays on Ottoman women published during the 1950s should be examined within the setting of the post-Kemalist search for a Turkish national identity. See Ruth Lumbroso, “Turkish Men - Ottoman Women: Turkish Historians in the 1950s on Ottoman Women”, in *Discourse on Gender/Gendered Discourse in the Middle East*, Boaz Shoshan (ed), Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000

male historians was part of a masculine agenda of modernization. As she notes, “transformations, modifications and shifts either must refer back to some specifiable and relatively fixed system of social power as a whole, into which they are to be counted as inroads (its total collapse being the end of them), or they must signify pure flux, the endless play of power without any substantively limited shape and point to it.”(Cocks, 1989: 49) Yet what occurred in the Turkish context was not pure flux; there was an anchor giving direction to the changes that took place at various levels. I would contend that this was a necessary stage in the re-masculinization of Turkish society when the Republic had to feminize its imagination of the Ottoman past in order to distance itself as much as possible from the system it had replaced.

4.3.1 Reflections on the Early Republican Turkish Literature: It is interesting to note that the new model of womanhood Republican male writers thus generated in an attempt to feminize the Ottoman past to further distance themselves from it was not produced by and for men and then imposed upon women. To the contrary, women were willing participants in this process. Writing with a mission was also crucial for the woman novelist¹⁰⁰ who also fully partook in the nation-building process through her pen, always favoring and privileging the nation over her gender. Halide Edip Adivar, both as a leading Turkish female writer and a social and political activist, is an outstanding example in this regard. It is in Adivar’s persona that we find a flawless combination of the venerated mothers and the emancipated daughters of the Turkish Republic. As years passed by, an aged Adivar inclined more heavily toward the former, but her claim in both was an ever-present underlying current in her writings.

In Adivar’s writings¹⁰¹ there looms a certain pattern when women characters are concerned. Her protagonists, the female heroines, are systematically de-

¹⁰⁰ The first woman novelist is thought to be Zafer Hanım and the first novel penned by a woman is her *Aşk-ı Vatan*, published in 1877. In the preface of the novel Zafer Hanım stated that she had written this novel because as a woman she could not combat on the battlefield. (Ne yazık ki ben silah tutmak şerefinden yoksun bir kadın olarak yaratılmışım). The money earned from the book, she said, would be spent for and by the wounded soldiers. Interestingly, the main characters in the novel are Western –Spanish mainly- and the whole plot is a love story between Marya and Roberto. For a more detailed account see Zehra Toska’s analysis “Zehra Hanım ve Aşk-ı Vatan”, Zafer Hanım, *Aşk-ı Vatan*, İstanbul, Oğlak yayınları, 1994.

¹⁰¹ For a more detailed account on Halide Edip Adivar’s life and work see Ayşe Durakbaşa’s *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm, İletişim, İstanbul, 2000.*

feminized. She praises them by noting that “there is nothing feminine about them” or “their face could be either male or female” or “they had no interest whatsoever in women’s world”¹⁰². At the other end of the spectrum in Adivar’s writing lies the concubine. What the ideal woman possesses, the concubine lacks miserably: character. “They spoke in Circassian accents, a curious Turkish which sounded like the warbling of birds. They flashed a strange radiance about them, and were very much alike in their blonde beauty. They were indeed older or younger versions of one another. Costly and precious dolls, created in series by the same artist.” Adivar’s male characters are also significant for they reflect the cultural mind frames of the Republican male elite. One male character among these is especially noteworthy for he neither falls into the camp of idealized man (patriots, elderly wise men, elderly dervishes) nor that of traitors. Briefly stated, *The Clown and his Daughter*¹⁰³ is particularly revealing in that it directly reflects the dualistic patterns thought of that shaped the minds of the Republican modernist elites. Roughly stated, the novel revolves around the marriage of Rabia and Peregrini, symbolically the marriage of the East and the West. Rabia represents the East, the spiritual, faith, traditions and home. This time however, home is a small district in Istanbul, a district untouched by the waves of Westernization. Peregrini¹⁰⁴ on the other hand is associated with the West, the mundane, the material, cosmopolitanism. The novel ends as Peregrini changes his name to Osman, gets included in the *mahalle* and thereby becomes one of “us”¹⁰⁵. It is significant that Adivar, just like the male elite of the previous era, left Rabia and the spiritual home intact. While Westernization might have been a strong tide sweeping over the society, its influence was only permitted to be felt somewhere else, somewhere aloof, somewhere as far removed from Ottoman family life as possible. The disruptive influence of Westernization was allowed to be felt in the

¹⁰² On woman writers and gendered language Helene Cixous has written extensively. Though she is one of the proponents of *écriture féminine* she has also maintained that the sheer fact that one is a woman does not render her writing “feminine”. See *Coming to Writing and Other Essays*. Deborah Jensen(ed). Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991.

¹⁰³ *Halide Edib Adivar, Romanlar 4: Sinekli Bakkal*, Istanbul: Özgür Yayınları, 1999.

¹⁰⁴ The novel is also interesting as it portrays an intercultural marriage –a theme which was the worst nightmare of late Ottoman nationalist writers. Adivar eventually solves the problem by converting Peregrini into Islam. Yet, the novel is unusual in the sense that it is the man, not the woman who converts eventually.

¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that the fear of “losing women to outsiders, foreign seducers” is a core issue in nationalist ideology and can be observed in many cultural contexts.

public sphere, but every now and then, and in varying degrees, it seeped into the private sphere as well.

Of central importance in this novel is a male character that does not neatly fit into Adivar's typical categories: Kız Tevfik ("Sissy" Tevfik). As the caring father of Rabia, Tevfik is obviously a positive figure. And yet the reader can never utterly embrace him since there is something "weird" about him. Tevfik likes to act, enjoys wearing women's clothes, putting on make-up and entertaining people. He likes not to be a man. All throughout the novel, Tevfik suffers torments. It is his naivete that leads him to make mistakes, and it is that naivete which draws a thin, gauzy layer of "pardonability" upon his otherwise bizarre, if not erroneous, existence.

Once again Turkish literature operated as the "imaginary zone" in society where writers could take up and discuss numerous issues they could not freely in the nationally-driven public sphere; they could also make the social identities more flexible than they were permitted to appear publicly and by doing so reflect the range of real identities in society as opposed to the imagined rigid national identity that hegemonized the public sphere. Certain themes, such as the modest woman versus the seductive one proved to be repetitive especially among the male writers. The fear on the part of the male writer and the need to caution the (male) readership against falling into the trap of wayward women did not cease. Just like in the previous late Ottoman period, in this period too the seductive woman was associated with materialism, the loss of spirituality and cultural distinctiveness.

The Over-Westernized woman character of the Ottoman male writer was still alive albeit in a new disguise. In Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's "Bir Kadın Meselesi", the lethal danger that a woman can present for a young man is told in the form of a conversation, one that takes place among the men of the local gentry¹⁰⁶. As the local men talk about their affairs with indecent women where each love episode ended in a bloody drama, the writer took the position of a passive transmitter, listening to their words and transmitting these to the reader. In the seemingly neutral transmission of Karaosmanoglu's framework lies the power of the story. When the

local man utters that “this type of women will cause all sorts of trouble and deserve to be killed”, the writer merely conveys these words thereby making the fictive real, transcending class boundaries, and contesting the patriarchal order through the affirmative character of culture.¹⁰⁷ And he does all this without assuming responsibility for what is conveyed.

4.3.2. Impact of the Language Reform on Turkish Culture: This determining of the boundaries of behavior available to women in the public sphere and the concomitant defeminization that characterized the works of early Republican writers¹⁰⁸ like Halide Edip also occurred at a more abstract level to produce an even deeper impact on the Turkish national psyche. Turkish literature and the range of cultural meanings it could capture and interpret in its texts were deeply influenced by one particular Republican reform that was carried out on language. During a speech Mustafa Kemal gave in Central Anatolia in 1933, he announced that there seemed to be some resistance against the initiated reforms, especially against Turkification of the Islamic call to prayer. He noted that the question was not one of religion but basically a matter of language. The foundation of the Turkish nation was going to be its national language which in itself was constitutive of the national self.¹⁰⁹ For the purposes of purifying the language along the nationalist parameters Mustafa Kemal articulated, the Society for the Study of the Turkish language (Türk Dil Tetkik Cemiyeti) was founded. “Its member enthusiastically started to collect words from dialects, ancient literary sources and even Turkic languages from central Asia to replace Ottoman vocabulary. The movement soon ran into difficulties. Only some of the new words were adopted by the population and they often existed side by side with the word they were intended to replace, acquiring a different meaning.” (Zürcher, 2001: 198)

¹⁰⁶ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, “Bir Kadın Meselesi” in *Bir Serencam, İletişim*, İstanbul, 1990, p. 180-189.

¹⁰⁷ I borrow the term from Marcuse herein. One of Marcuse’s most influential essays challenged ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’ (1937) by which he meant that tendency to see culture as ‘a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself ‘from within’, without any transformation of the state of fact.’ I argue that the affirmative character of culture in Turkey’s case too beholds the said potential.

¹⁰⁸ Other novels by women writers include Emine Seniye Hanım’s *Sefalet* and Suat Derviş’s *Buhran Gecesi*.

In this respect, there were striking similarities between the Turkish reformers and the French Jacobins (Kadıoğlu, 1996). For the Jacobins, the revolution had encompassed all aspect of individual and social life in France and history began in 1792, the year they came to power. In the French revolution, as is well known, languages other than French were disenfranchised, and subsequently treated as counterrevolutionary activities. Ferdinand Brunot¹¹⁰ has claimed the basic accomplishment of the French revolution in terms of culture was the *establishment* of the Monarchic language policy¹¹¹. Everything else associated with monarchy was eliminated, but the language policy was retained. And this policy was first and foremost introduced from above, in a centralized manner, aimed at controlling everything. Likewise for the Kemalists, history began in 1923. They imitated the French model in linguistic matters as they treated ethnic languages with suspicion and pushed them aside. But this centralization was not solely in the context of Turkish in relation Kurdish or Armenian or Persian... it was also in the context of old Turkish in relation to new, novel, genuine, 'pure' Turkish.

4.3.3. Monologization of Culture: At this specific stage, one needs to introduce the work of the Russian linguist Bakhtin¹¹² in order to understand the impact of language on society and its cultural meanings systems. Briefly stated, in Bakhtin, just like in Althusser, language itself was first and foremost ideological. Against Saussure and the structuralist view on language that concentrated on shape (or structure), Bakhtin would contend that one needed to probe not the structures of language, but the ways in which people employed it. In other words, he drew attention to how language was constituted by the subjects. This emphasis on language as the meaning-producing tool of people made culture a crucial subject of

¹⁰⁹ For further information see Mustafa Keskin, *Atatürk'ün Millet ve Milliyetçilik Anlayışı*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999.

¹¹⁰ Passionate about language Ferdinand Brunot pined for "making human speech eternal" as a linguist. He thus created the "Archives de la Parole" ("archives of speech") in his laboratory of the Sorbonne University.

¹¹¹ For further analysis on this transformation see Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution*, University of California Press, 1986.

¹¹² *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* by M. M. Bakhtin, M. Holquist and V. Liapunov(eds), University of Texas Press, 1982. For a revealing work highly inspired by Bakhtinian framework see M. Keith Booker, *Techniques of Subversion in Modern Literature: Transgression, Abjection, and the Carnavalesque*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991

investigation for Bakhtin, as it was for Gramsci¹¹³. Bakhtin argued that there were two fundamental forces operating within the usage of language, a centripetal force and a centrifugal one¹¹⁴. The centripetal force tended to ram all elements toward a central point whereas centrifugal force tended to shove them away from that central point in all possible directions. What Bakhtin named “monologic language” was centripetal in the sense that each and every one of its numerous rhetorics (namely, the academic, the fictive, the journalistic, the religious, the political, the economic) functioned on the speaker’s trying to push all the rudiments of language into one single form. Put differently, the centripetal force of monologia constantly tried to eradicate all the possible discrepancy and diversity among the languages and the idioms. Thus homogenized, this standard language would next be put into effect and enforced on society, by what Althusser termed the Ideological State Apparatuses¹¹⁵. At the other end of the frame was heteroglossia, a multiplicity of vernacular, an assortment of all the forms of speech in effect in everyday life within a certain culture. Heteroglossia maneuvered language toward multiplicity and diversity through amalgamating a gamut of sundry subcultures, rhetorics and vocabularies.

Returning to the Turkish case, I will argue that right from the outset of its modernization venture, especially as it blended with nationalism¹¹⁶, the Turkish language gradually, systematically, inexorably moved away from heteroglossia towards a monologic structure.¹¹⁷ It was the pace of hastened modernization and the desire to purify the language to fabricate a national language that corroded the

¹¹³ For a more detailed account of the overlapping between the two thinkers, see C. Brandist, “The Official and the popular in Gramsci and Bakhtin” in *Theory, Culture and Society* 13, no 22, pp 59-74, 1996.

¹¹⁴ See *The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev and Voloshinov*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹¹⁵ L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses " in *'Lenin and Philosophy' and Other Essays*, London, New Left Books, 1977.

¹¹⁶ Kymlicka claims that this was one of the biggest two mistakes done by modernization theorists. Theorists argued that just as the modernization process had led to the depoliticization of religious identities, so a similar process would ultimately lead to the depoliticization of ethnocultural identities. See Will Kymlicka, *Modernity and National Identity in Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation-State*, Yoav Peled(ed), Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

¹¹⁷ There is one important point where the case of Turkish language deviates from the Bakhtinian framework. According to Bakhtin poetic language has historically been centripetal, and novelistic language as centrifugal. Novelistic language is dialogic and heteroglossic. In the Turkish case, I will contend it was just the opposite. In Turkey, poetry has been heteroglossic and the novel as a genre mostly monologic.

heteroglossia in Turkish literature and language¹¹⁸; this happened more in written language than the oral spoken one which was more difficult for the Republican state to control from above. The language and culture reforms reinforced this transformation in the superstructure (Belge, 1983: 1300).

Another equally important factor that contributed to the monologization and masculinization of the Turkish language was the abrupt elimination of the Sufi discursive practices from daily life. Since I analyze the location of Sufism in Turkish society in a later chapter, I will not go into the details of this topic here. At this stage, suffice it to recapitulate that with its rich and lyric and multi-layered language, Sufism created pockets of expression for subjects, especially for women or the lower classes who otherwise had very little chance to express themselves in the public sphere. Islamic heterodoxy and mysticism had for centuries created and served as a channel for women through which they could express themselves and become publicly visible.

Finally, one other factor that contributed to the monologization of high-brow written culture was the “moral cleansing” of the language in terms of eliminating the inherent sexually suggestive meanings and metaphors from it. According to Türkes¹¹⁹, all sorts of sexual stories, expressions other than the one deemed to be in the service of the greater cause (such as the state and the nation) and thereby considered “legitimate” by the state elite were pushed to the margins of the written culture. Indeed, this moralizing drive is a significant dimension of all nationalist movements that emerge with the aim to make a new start from imagined mythically pure origins, and that often delegitimize what existed before them in terms of their decadence and impurity. It is also their claim to possess this moral purity themselves that gives the nationalist leaders the political power to define, sanction and discipline those they see as deviating from these standards.

¹¹⁸ The perpetrators of this monologic language were not only the male writers but woman writers, journalists and teachers as well. As Helene Cixous repeatedly underlined, great care must be taken in working on feminine writing not to get trapped by names. To be signed by a woman’s name doesn’t necessarily make a piece of writing feminine and conversely, the fact that a piece of writing is signed by a man’s name does not in itself exclude femininity. Thus, once again in Adıvar’s writing, just like her female characters to a large extent echo the ideals of the era, so too her style and writing are essentially monologic.

¹¹⁹ Ömer Türkes, *Türk Edebiyatında Eşcinsellik*. The article was originally published in *Milliyet Sanat* then circulated among Turkey’s gay net community including http://www.gaygaye.com/edebiyat_konu01.htm

Culturally, the Turkish Republican male elite faced a difficult task when they set out to create a Turkish nation. On the one hand, they had to prove how different the Republic and its leaders were from those in the past; they had to demonstrate the dramatic rupture between the Ottoman times and the present day. On the other hand, they had to find a sense of historical continuity and historical reference upon which they could base their claims and thus legitimate their actions and existence¹²⁰. They had to turn onto the period previous to the Ottoman Empire to be rid of the Ottoman legacy, and to the period before the Islamic era to be rid of the Islamic one: this led them to define the pre-Islamic period of the Turks as the cultural foundation stone of their Republic. During the 1930s, along with the development of *Türk Tarih Tezi* (Turkish Historical Thesis), writings on the alternative life style of Turks before they converted to Islam became a prominent and contentious theme in Turkish society.

The purification of the Turkish language thus went hand in hand, at least for some time, with a particular rereading of Turkish history. *Güneş-Dil Teorisi* (The Sun-Language Theory) was launched against this background for the Republican elites to maintain the argument that all languages of the world and all contemporary civilizations stemmed from one primeval language spoken in Central Asia. The argument fit into a broader context of the Turkish Historical Thesis which went as follows: The Turks had originally been living in Central Asia, but then hunger and drought brought about by changing climactic conditions forced them to leave their land and migrate to other lands, which included not only the Near East but also Europe and China. Within this specific discourse, the references to Central Asia were especially remarkable. As Zürcher states, “Atilla and Cengiz Khan were described as executing civilizing missions. The theory aimed to give Turks a sense of pride in their past and in their national identity, separate from the immediate past, that is to say the Ottoman era.” (Zürcher, 2001: 199) Needless to say, the doctrine was exceedingly functional in the sense that it helped the Republican regime to detach itself both from Middle Eastern cultures and Islamic civilization, as well as the

¹²⁰ Finding continuities also resonates with Anthony Smith’s emphasis. “My suggestion is that, to answer these questions, we should look not only at the specific economic and political circumstances in which given nationalisms emerge, but also at the ‘deep’ ethno-symbolic resources that they command. In particular the durability and character of a given nationalism can be in large part explained by analysing the ethno-historical, religious and territorial heritages that its proponents

immediate Ottoman past. And it then enabled them to create a nation on an entirely imagined past, one that could be imagined in any manner they wanted.

Any social and cultural elements the Turkish Republican elite wanted to promote could then be introduced through this imagined past. According to Ziya Gökalp who was very influential in drawing the cultural parameters of the Turkish Republic, for instance, originally the Turkish family had been far from patriarchal. On the contrary, Gökalp believed that Turks were feminists and democrats, both features having been deeply embedded in ancient Turkish culture¹²¹. Not that he was against the idea of Westernization, he noted, but he strictly wanted to retain the gist of the Turkish culture intact. “Turkish family will certainly modernize by adopting new ways from Western civilization. Nevertheless, Turkish family will not be identical to a French or British or German family.”(Gökalp, 1977: 620-625) Durakbaşa further elaborates that “the Kemalist Republican ideology incorporated in its modernist reforms a project of ‘degendering’ and ‘regendering’. New forms of masculinity and femininity were brought about by Kemalists, who condemned some of the traditional gender notions as backward and praised others in a new context.”(Durakbasa, 1998, p141)

4.3.4 Masculinization of the Turkish Women: What is more significant for my purposes here is the way in which the “life in Central Asia” was portrayed. The iconography revived in the collective imagination was one of ‘pure’ courage, heroism, and combat – a picture nourished by a series of vivid stories, *Dede Korkut Masalları*¹²². Accordingly, the symbols chosen to narrate the much glorified genesis of the nation were also masculinized. The women who were now in the public sphere did not escape this wave of masculinization either; therein in that ancient imagined past, women rode horses just as well as men, fought alongside the men, hunted and used weapons. The atmosphere stenciled by these stories left lucid traces in the

can draw upon” says Smith in *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 276.

¹²¹ Turkish Nationalism and Western civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp, trans. Niyazi Berkes, Greenwood Press Publishers, Connecticut, 1959.

¹²² For an interesting, unusual study that focuses on the narrativities of the pre-Islamic Turks see M. Bilgin Saydam, *Deli Dumrul’un Bilinci*, İstanbul: Metis, 1997.

collective Turkish psyche and created a shared cultural image where women and men were not only deemed to be equal but were equalized in *masculinity*.

I should note, however, that this cultural “masculinization” also created a considerable reaction, if not backlash, among several members of the society, especially those located among the conservative segments. Thus, for instance, in an article on the “ideal Turkish girl”, Peyami Safa criticized “masculinized” Turkish girls not only in terms of their public appearance, but also in relation to their manner of thinking and especially in terms of their negligent attitude toward keeping their homes in spic span shape. In placing these girls in the public sphere rather than the private one, and in thus causing them to neglect their duties as wives and mothers, the Republican advocates of this transformation were harming both Turkish womanhood and nationhood¹²³, he argued. In short, the cultural image of the idealized Republican woman was as a “comrade”¹²⁴, and the much-needed cultural reference and imagery for this prototype derived from a “collectively imagined” pre-Islamic past in which women and men were depicted as having total equality. Put as such, every novelty that the Republican regime introduced in gender patterns could be traced back and legitimated in terms of its imagined “roots”. The Republican elite thus justified their actions by claiming that all they did was to rediscover and re-appropriating a noble legacy that had already been in existence in the “original” Turkish culture. Yet between the “today” (or the future) and the “genesis” lay the shadow of the past, the Ottoman legacy, which the same cultural/political elite attempted to delegitimize by associating it with fundamentalist terms such as Islam and tradition and the East.

The other end of the spectrum where the Turkish Republican emphasis on the “genesis + future” at the expense of the past was located, was expected to provide the cultural magic and spark to turn a sluggish society into a dynamic one and concubines into comrade women. During this process, women were especially required to carry the “burden of representation” as Yuval-Davis points out. Both

¹²³ See Peyami Safa, “Modern Türk Kızı IV”, *Modern Türkiye Mecmuası* 1, no: 6, (1938): 9 in Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernizm ve Ulusun İnşası*, p. 217.

¹²⁴ See Ayşe, Kadioğlu. “Cumhuriyet Kadını: Vatandaş mı Birey mi?” In *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*. Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1998.

collectively and personally, women turned out to be the symbolic bearers of the identity of the collectivity in which they lived. “Women usually have an ambivalent position within the collectivity. On the one hand... they often symbolize the collectivity unity, honor and the *raison d’être* of specific national and ethnic projects,... On the other hand, however, they are often excluded from the collective “we” of the body politic...” (Yuval-Davis, 2001:127-128)

It should be noted that no matter what the Kemalist cadres proposed and promulgated, Kemalism’s attitudes and ideas toward sexuality and gender at that time came from a number of diverse sources not all of which were necessarily consistent with the reformist agenda. Praxis varied, as it always does, from theory. The leaders inherited a regime and built their system upon that base. It is this continuity, as well as discontinuity in Turkish culture that needs to be recognized and interpreted into the current discourse. Although dichotomies, such as the modern/traditional, progressive/ regressive, West/East, men/women, reason/faith..., and the like, played a pivotal role in this framework, Kemalism in practice did not exactly reflect what it meant and imagined itself to be in theory. Sometimes the attitudes of the Kemalist elite echoed those of late Ottoman thinkers, thus providing continuity in time¹²⁵, or echoed the views of more traditional politicians, thus providing overlaps across space¹²⁶ When gender and sexuality is considered, what emerges becomes far more complicated, if not convoluted, than a simplistic Kemalist/Islamist duality.

According to Gayle Rubin, the construction and performance of sexuality relied upon the operation of binary oppositions, where one side of the pair has the positive, the moral, and the right and the other side the negative, the immoral and the wrong. In other words, once you set up a category as “normal”, you set a measure

¹²⁵ Selim Deringil, for instance maintains that in some ways both Mustafa Kemal and Namık Kemal were the “product” of the same synthesis and they both ultimately sought 'to be useful to the state.' See Selim Deringil, *The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal*, *European History Quarterly*, 1993, pp 165-191

¹²⁶ Compare it with de Lauretis who accentuates these bonds as he maintains that social class, sex-gender, ethnic, and national relations, among others, interact and intersect in such a way as to produce a multiplicity of positions, overlapping categories and fluctuating boundaries, and an "intricate experiential nexus of (often contradictory) heterogeneous differences" (de Lauretis 1988, 161).

that automatically establishes its variants from the normal into a category labeled “deviant”. It is the opening up of a cultural and social space for competing and conflicting masculinities, including that of “the gay” masculinity, that I want to focus and study in this dissertation as well. Yet what I have attempted to establish until this point in the dissertation is to trace the Turkish transformation through modernity and nationalism and to elucidate the cultural dimensions of this transformation through studying its changing spectrum of meanings that is captured various cultural sites such as through its literature, gender relations, attire and the like.

I have tried to demonstrate that despite the Republican period’s vociferous attempts to separate itself once and for all from the Ottoman one, the modernist discourses of the early Republican period and the late Ottoman one were profoundly shaped by similar binary oppositions many of which were also reflected in literature¹²⁷. As Arat maintains, “nevertheless, neither the totalizing logic of Kemalist reforms that fused secularization and Westernization with modernity, nor the modernization theorists’ dichotomization of culture as ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ can explain the emergence and nature of religious movements in ‘modern’ societies. They both fail to see that what is branded as ‘traditional’ can be relevant to ‘modern’ problems and embraced by people both in a reactionary mode and also in an attempt to harness or create an alternative modernity. Ironically, this strategy, of reviving the old to adopt or cope with the new, was also once followed by Kemalists, who, vacillating between modernization/ Westernization and the articulation of a distinct ‘Turkish nation’, resorted to an imagined ‘secular tradition’ described and authenticized by Ziya Gökalp.” (Z. Arat, 1998:26-27)

In bringing more and more women into the professional workforce, one could hypothesize that the Kemalist male elites did so because they noted how underutilized women’s labor force had been in the past. This unacknowledged

¹²⁷ It should be pointed out that unlike many other writers in the history of Turkish literature, A. H. Tanpınar had been deeply interested in the Ottoman/Islamic heritage but also located in the Western literary tradition, especially that of the Western novel. Tanpınar’s writing, both fiction and non-fiction is replete with quests for the possibility of “both...and...” rather than “either...or...” For a clear example see *Huzur* in which the rupture between the past and the present is critically, forlornly explored. One other name that should be mentioned in this regard is Yahya Kemal. *Kökü Mazide Olan Atı-A Future Rooted in the Past* was the motto of a range of intellectuals starting with Yahya Kemal

potential of women did also mean that they could make a significant contribution to the economy. Nonetheless, Z. Arat denotes that the very role of the economy in women's presence in the public sphere did not make significant changes in the way this sphere was defined and perceived. She states that "...this effort does not change the overall gendered and dualistic approach prevalent in both discourses. The public domain continues to be seen as man's domain and it is defined in masculine terms." (Z. Arat, 1998:26)

Correspondingly, Kemalism was unique in the overall transformation that it achieved; the magnitude of this achievement can be better understood not in the short run, not in the years when the Kemalists were unquestionably in control of hegemonic power, but in the long run, as the national system they produced was contested by different groups and dynamics and yet continued to be the underlying current in Turkish society. In other words, it is with and through its seeming "opponents" that the legacy of the Kemalist system can be better grasped. After all, as Gramsci has underscored, cultural life is always collective and always an arena of power conflicts¹²⁸. No cultural transformation, especially no one that takes place at such a major scale, can be probed by attributing it to the conscious efforts of a cadre in the state elite, no matter how much power these seem to have had and no matter how much "from above" Turkish modernization/secularization might have operated throughout its history.

The system the Kemalist elite introduced was certainly an opening for innumerable women. However, and paradoxically, the accompanying current did also trigger a lengthy, subtle period of re-masculinization of society. In this endeavor women, strikingly played a salient role. And so did Turkish literature and Turkish novelists. The notion of "writing with a mission" which was prevalent in the late Ottoman era as elaborated in the preceding chapters, was further extended and

and A. H. Tanpınar. The original verse is as follows: Ne harabi, ne harabatıyım/ Kökü Mazide Olan Atiyim.

¹²⁸ This point in Gramscian framework has been elaborated by numerous scholars. See John Hoffman. *The Gramscian challenge: coercion and consent in Marxist political theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. See also Anne Showstack Sassoon. *Gramsci's politics*. London : Croom Helm, 1980

redefined in the Republican era¹²⁹. Consequently as Göle states, “the cost of women’s liberation may be witnessed in the repression of her ‘femininity’, which is perceived as a threat to the existing social order, and even of her ‘individuality’, in both urban and public realms(education, labor, politics).”(Göle, 1999: 79) The constant continuous denigration of femininity and the militarization of the language in recent decades further intensified this process. As the Turkish language became more and more politicized its aesthetics was more and more corroded. Written culture, which was more closely regulated by monologia, became more and more phallogocentric and along with it increasingly homophobic and less creative.

As Şerif Mardin claims¹³⁰ the most interesting, if not controversial, part of this process, however, was that modernity diminished rather than increased the opportunities for creative “gaming” of this type. This is at odds with the general presumption that modernity entails an opening and provides progress at every single level of social and individual life. This critical assessment of the end-result of Turkish modernity in terms of its cultural production, its production of a spectrum of meanings for citizens to live their lives by, is theoretically more along the lines of the critical approach developed by the Frankfurt School in general, and Adorno and Horkheimer in particular¹³¹. Mardin further contends that in modern Turkey the state’s policy of “purification” of the Turkish language still exhibits two dimensions of central importance. First, the impoverishment of the language of the intellectuals who when in need often had to switch to another Western European language, preferably English. Second, the residue of an earlier pursuit for the recovery of an imagined ‘pure’ Turkish culture in a mythic past that became more and more elusive over time.

¹²⁹ This theme is most clearly seen in the concept of “İnkilap Edebiyatı”, which was proposed by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. “İnkilap edebiyatı yeni bir humanisma, yeni bir insan ve ruh telâkkisi demek oluyor.” A similar understanding of “art for society” and “writing with a mission” is also visible in Burhan Asaf Belge’s writings. For both see Ahmet Oktay, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Edebiyatı, 1923-1950*, Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları, 1993, Ankara, p. 72.

¹³⁰ See Şerif Mardin, "Cultural Change and the Intellectual: a Study of the Effects of Secularization in Modern Turkey," in Şerif Mardin ed. *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*. Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1994. pp. 189-213.

¹³¹ Horkheimer, *ibid.*

In short, Turkish language and culture underwent '3 M' processes, that had separate dynamics but were also interrelated, namely: Modernization, Masculinization, and lastly and essentially, a Monologization of written language and high-brow culture. The Turkish transformation thus culturally shaped its men and women in terms of their identities, expectations, and mentalities through the interaction of these dynamics.

4.4 Anthems, tuxedos, uniforms, oaths: everyday faces of state masculinities

The state, as extensively elaborated by Althusser, is not a homogeneous institutional power but a totality of numerous apparatuses some of which function in an ideological capacity while others do so at a repressive level. Central to this conceptualization of the state is "process" which entails the transformation of a determinate raw material into a determinate product¹³². As stated by Geras, "... politics, ideology and science, as well as economic production in the narrow sense, can all be regarded as forms of practice to the extent that they all entail a transformation of a given raw material or object into a specific product by means of a labour process..." (Geras, 1977: 237); once the nation is narrated and imagined its symbols, that imagery then has to be propagated¹³³. Culture provides the symbols for mobilizing individuals within a unified community (Deutsch, 1969:15) and as such, is employed for the ritualization and structurization of the past (Gellner, 1986). This function of culture becomes more visible especially during and after times of grand transformation (Connor, 1994: 11).

The role of the elite in the construction and consolidation of Turkish nation state has been accentuated in the previous parts. It has also been stated that nationalism has been intertwined into this constructive process and elitist project right from the start. As Gellner states, "the basic deception and self-deception practiced by nationalism is this: nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the

¹³² Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, NLB, London, 1977

¹³³ Benedict Anderson. "Census, Map, Museum" *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised Edition. London: Verso, 1991. 163-185

majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population.”¹³⁴ Though early on the Kemalist state elite were decisive in producing certain patterns of cultural existence and taking pains to replace existing ones with these, it was only through the employment of metaphors¹³⁵, forces and symbols of everyday life that these teachings spread out and took root in the society. Yet, where ever these teachings went, they also became transformed in the process. The nation spoke a gendered language. As Pettman claims, "the state is often gendered male, and the nation female -- the mother country" (Pettman, 1996: 49). The country itself was a motherland¹³⁶, oftentimes a mother's lap (ana kucağı)¹³⁷, and what held citizens together was the mother tongue, and yet the identity of Turkishness was masculinized. When faced with this constructed identity, the Other had to remain feminized¹³⁸. Sex, therefore, entered into the discourse of the nation-as-woman through stories and metaphors of rape, reproduction and conquest some of which were directly inherited (Zurcher, 2000) from the late Ottoman codes.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 57

¹³⁵ For an illuminating study on this issue see Erich Zurcher, *The core terminology of Kemalism: Mefkûre, millî, muasır, medenî*, Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, <http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research/terms.htm>

¹³⁶ Compare with Morris Suziki's emphasis. In *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation*, Morris-Suziki maintains that states are part of the public realm which is traditionally the domain of the male political actor. Nations, however, tend to be envisaged as nurturing bodies vulnerable to outside aggression: They are envisioned in the feminine form, in Britannia, La France, Mother Russia. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) Following the same line of thought Julia Kristeva further argues that "women . . . are particularly vulnerable to a possible support of *Volksggeist* [national or ethnic spirit]. The biological fate that causes us to be the *site* of the species chains us to *space*, home, native soil, motherland [*matrîe*]" Kristeva 1993, 33-34.

¹³⁷ This understanding is reflected in numerous anthems and poems. See for instance the anthem of Izmir Amerikan Kız Lisesi. "Bu vatan bize ana kucağı/Başka yerde yok onun sığağı/Koruyacağız biz bu ocağı/Biz Türk kızımız, yiğit kızımız/İstikbal için ümit kızımız..."

¹³⁸ The feminization of motherland is an issue observed elsewhere and it also occupies a central place in the literature on gender and nation. For a theoretical outline in this regard see Yuval-Davis and Anthias(eds), *Women-Nation-State*, London, 1989. See also Kumari Jayawerdana, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, London, 1986.

¹³⁹ The patriarchal thread woven into Turkish nationalism was already visible by the late Ottoman era. Süleyman Nazif maintained "önce Müslüman, sonra Osmanlı en sonra Türk'üm. Kız kardeşimi Müslüman olmayan Türke vermem de, Türk olmayan Müslümana veririm." Süleyman Nazif, *İçtihat*, in Bozkurt Güvenç, "Cumhuriyet ve Kimlik: Konu, Sorun, kapsam ve Bağlam", 75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul, 1998, p. 118

In investigating the connection between nationalism and sexism, George Mosse's works loom justifiably influential¹⁴⁰. Mosse had convincingly described modern masculinity as a centrepiece of nationalist movements. When studying the rise of aggressive nationalism in Germany during the 1930s, he maintained that there were significant connections between the domestic arena and what was going on in the public sphere. The husband/father roles performed in the house bolstered the spectrum of roles of masculinity that materialized in the public sphere where the state was depicted as the "father"¹⁴¹. In this respect, Artun Ünsal claims that the rhetoric of the Turkish "Paternal State" is an extension of the patriarchal family structure prevalent in Turkey¹⁴². Individuals accustomed to taking orders from the father in the private sphere¹⁴³ turn into accordingly obedient citizens vis-a-vis the authority of the paternal state. The patriarchal structure of the private sphere influenced the fabric of political-public zone and vice versa. Significantly and concomitantly, the roles of housewife/wife/mother in the domestic arena (Dubisch, 1986) also served to buttress both the male roles in public arena and the masculinization of the culture. It is crucial to recognize that both gender identity and national identity have existential dimensions that a person the bearer of ideologies, in the sense of Poulantzas¹⁴⁴ who thus advances the anti-humanist interpretation in Althusser's works a step further¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁰ George Mosse has also written extensively on the power of political symbolism in promoting nationalism. See George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*, Howard Fertig, 2001.

¹⁴¹ Seeing the state as a father is not a bygone thing but yet another continuity in Turkey's political history. For an implicit reference in this regard among contemporary nationalist movement see Ahmet Şafak, *Yükselen Milliyetçilik ve Liberal İhanet*, İstanbul: Kamer, 1994. (Original quotation is as follows: Devlet: dinin, diyanetin, milletin hamisi ve hadimidir. Onsuz il ve kağan olmaz. Kağanın olmadığı yerde bereket yoktur. Devlet bereketi arttırıcı, dil paylaşımı sağlayıcıdır. Devlet kısaca "Baba" dır." (ibid, p. 13)

¹⁴² Artun Ünsal, "Yurttaş Olmak Zor Zanaat" in *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul, 1998.

¹⁴³ A study carried out by Emre Kongar and Taner Berksoy proved this was still the case by late 1990s and money in the family was held by the father and distributed by him as he saw it appropriate. See E. Kongar and T. Berksoy, "İstanbul Halkının Günlük Yaşam Biçimi ve Tüketim Davranışları Araştırması", İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 1990, p. 12-13,

¹⁴⁴ Poulantzas, ibid.

¹⁴⁵ The critique of humanism has been an integral part of Althusser's work. Balibar has dwelled upon this theme and maintained that "individuals are merely the effects' of the different practices, and that each relatively autonomous practice engenders forms of historical individuality which are peculiar to it." (in Norman Geras, *Althusser's Marxism: An Assessment*, p. 258, NLB, edited by New Left review, London, 1977) See also Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, NLB, London, 1970.

In other words, although it is commonly assumed that gender identity is private and personal, whereas national identity is collective and social, these two in practice converge and nurture one another.

In pursuing this two-way road, the cultural signs and symbols of everyday life constitute an imperative yet complex and amorphous niche. Berman warned his readers about how “Reading Capital won’t help us if we don’t also know how to read the signs in the street.”(Stokes, 2002:335) Crucial as that might be, reading everyday life is not an easy task since there are many ‘everyday’s depending on the place, time and subject under consideration. As Stokes states, “if we are to conclude that there are many everydays, and many possibilities for grasping them critically, then Berman’s concerns about the fragmented nature of modern experience are real and palpable. Are we left with nothing but fragments?” (Stokes, 2002:334) Especially in recent years, Turkish modernization has been read through its everyday life fragments, as well as through the interaction between the daily and the institutional¹⁴⁶ in the works of numerous scholars, including D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber among others¹⁴⁷. The significance of the task becomes all the more fundamental when one considers the fact that Turkish modernization by and large measured its impact through its ability to transform everyday life and its concomitant signs. It should also be noted, however, that this process was pertinent to the dynamics and requirements of secularism¹⁴⁸. Secular states often create a civic religion¹⁴⁹. One significant

¹⁴⁶ Jenny White’s 2002 book is one prominent study that combines the daily and the institutional in her second analysis of Umraniye where she concentrated on not only political activism but also civic activism. See Jenny B. White. *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*. Studies in Modernity and National Identity Series. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2002

¹⁴⁷ In exploring "the mutual 'culturisation' of politics and 'politicisation' of culture Deniz Kandiyoti maintains that this bond can only be interpreted through a serious engagement with subcultural expression and cultural production" (2002: 5). Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, eds. *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002

¹⁴⁸ It should be noted that there is no one single definition of secularism. In the previous section it has been maintained that there were various modernizations. In a similar way modernity does not necessarily result in one type of secularism. One study that is in congruence with my arguments here is Jose, Casanova. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. University of Chicago, 1994, wherein he questions the standard theory of secularization which assumes that modernization leads to a diminishing of the role and impact of religion. Casanova’s work is concentrated upon five case studies (Spain, Poland, Brazil, Evangelical Protestantism in the USA, and Catholicism in the USA).

¹⁴⁹ It was Ernest Renan who combined theories of nationalism with those on religion, in the civic form. Renan’s approach would also resonate in Deutsch (1962) and Gellner (1974, 1983). Renan, Ernest (1994) “What is a Nation?” in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.) op.cit.

reflection of this has been the emphasis on “*adab-ı muşeret*” (learning manners). In an extensive study on the rules and codes of manners, Kudret Emiroğlu maintains that learning manners became a recurrent theme during the Republican era, given the attitude of the regime with regards to changing attire and the role of women in the society. (Emiroğlu, 2001: 87)

The new regime consolidated its power by penetrating into the everyday life of its citizens and becoming first and foremost “visible” in that hazy zone. Essential in this project was the endeavor to make Atatürk “present” everywhere. Hence his posters, statues, busts, photographs spread out extensively, making his face¹⁵⁰ a constant element of everyday life for each and every Turk, no matter where he or she lived, in whichever city or a town in Anatolia. According to Kinzer, “the hero-worship that raised Atatürk to secular sainthood began during his own lifetime and with his blessing. During his early years in power, he approved the erection of monuments to independence that were actually monuments to him.”(Kinzer, 2001: 49) At this stage it should also be noted that the whole “statue culture” has been based on the depiction and glorification of masculinity. If and when women were depicted, represented in statues, they were again done so in a de-feminized form. Other statuesque depictions of femininity met resistance from society.¹⁵¹

4.4.1. Atatürk and the Paternal Gaze: I want to draw special attention to the paramount importance of “the face”¹⁵² of Atatürk in Turkey’s cultural and social

¹⁵⁰ Reading the Kemalist regimes’s emphasis on Atatürk’s face with Hamid Dabashi’s analysis on the absence of face in islam provides an interesting insight. Thus at the very commencement of the Faith we move from the absence of the Sign of the Face unto the presence of the Name of the Unseen. The very act of seeing is suspect because every time we see a face we are reminded of the Face that cannot be seen. To forget that the Unseen, the promissory Citation of the Re-Citation, cannot be seen, we are not to be reminded of seeing. See Hamid Dabashi, *In the Absence of the Face*, Social Research, Spring 2000.

¹⁵¹ On the 50th anniversary of the Republic a number of statues named “Beautiful Istanbul” (Güzel İstanbul) had been made to be placed at different parts of the city. Some among these had been inspired by Marianne, the symbol of French Revolution. Once the statues were done, however, their erection at different points in İstanbul caused problems. The Minister of Interior Affairs has explained this reaction by stating that “Turkish mothers could not be exposed in an improper way”(“Türk anası hayasızca teşhir edilemez!”) For more information on this incident see Kudret Emiroğlu, *Gündelik hayatımızın Tarihi*, 2001, Ankara: Dost p. 493.

¹⁵² Compare with Levinas’ work. Suggesting that the face was an agent of pure alteration, Levinas claimed that therein lies “the being”. It is the face that carries the body and not the other way round. Thus, access to the face was straightforward ethical and one always turned toward the

history. If one follows Deleuze and Guattari's scheme¹⁵³, one should interestingly note that the whole Turkish nation turns toward *the paternal gaze and the paternal face* of Atatürk at multiple instances in their everyday life. Children would grow and become educated with the face of Atatürk watching over them in the classrooms, women would see his posters in shopping bazaars and stores, and men would sit around in coffeehouses facing Atatürk's busts, not to mention the fact that everyone would constantly encounter the multiple faces of Atatürk printed on the currency every time they spent money. For Deleuze and Guattari, as they expressed in a *Thousand Plateaus*, the face represents a system. They claim that this system functions like a machine, a facial machine which continuously makes and re-makes the subject it represents. The face territorializes a whole gamut of potential becomings and the body is overcoded and annihilated within and through the facial system. In a similar way, a Turkish student needs only see the face or eyes of Atatürk to imagine his whole body, to feel his whole presence next to him. Although Kemalism managed to create its own iconography and iconology¹⁵⁴, it was habitually in Atatürk's paternal face, and more precisely in his "ever-watching" gaze¹⁵⁵, where his presence and the presence of the nation-state he created, was personified.

In this chapter, I have benefited from the views of Anthony Smith and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that the interchangeable sphere of culture played a pivotal role in construction the masculinities of the Turkish nation-state. This theoretical orientation I adopted considers social and cultural matters as equally important as the fulfillment of the nationalist and irredentist rhetoric (Smith 1987: 149).¹⁵⁶ I argue that culture was indeed the constitutive sphere in the identity formation of the Turkish citizen. It

face.(Levinas, 1985: 85) It was particularly there that, claimed Levinas, "You are you". As such he regarded the face as the principal site of pure ethics.

¹⁵³ Although they shared Levinas' concern for the facial, Deleuze and Guattari would regard the face as representative of the inhuman machine of genuine signification, rather than of God. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)

¹⁵⁴ It needs to be underlined there is a difference between iconography and icology. Unlike iconography which studies symbols, icology primarily focuses on the meanings in symbols and the subtexts of every text. I borrow the distinction from Mitchell, W.J.T. *Iconology: Image, Texts, Ideology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986.

¹⁵⁵ The notion of being watched by Atatürk is an unbroken theme in Kemalist discourse. See for instance a recent book by the Kemalist artist Bedri Baykam in which the reader is given the message that Atatürk watches every step s/he takes. See Bedri Baykam, *Gözleri Hep Üzerimizde*, Istanbul: Ümit, 1997.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, Anthony D. (1987) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

was a process that, following Hegelian lines, was built upon the mutual recognition of the importance that the 'self' and the 'other' play in creating conflict, leading in turn to a redefinition of the culture of conflict (Kellner 1992: 141). This is how the individual 'self' became reflexive of the state's official identity. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 7-8) point out:

Class, religion, ethnicity, race, or nation do not happen spontaneously as reflections of objective conditions in the psyches of individuals. Collective identity, group solidarity, and political commitment are continually transformed-shaped, destroyed, and moulded anew- as a result of conflicts in the course of which political parties, schools, unions, churches, newspapers, armies, and corporations strive to impose a particular form of organisation upon the life of society.

This is precisely why studies that focus solely on the type of masculinity represented by Ataturk to draw conclusions on how that led to changing gender roles in Turkey remain rather limited in scope. Even though he was regarded as the father of Turks¹⁵⁷, Ataturk did not represent any particular type of manhood in the eye of the Turkish society because his image was beyond that of a mere human. Rather than a body, he was and still is a face that has assumed mythical qualities. In a society coming from an Islamic tradition wherein the portrayal of individuals is forbidden, this new, systematic and extensive highlighting of the face had far-reaching effects¹⁵⁸.

One can explore and compare the images of manhood represented by the Republican elite, İsmet İnönü, army officials, right-wing politicians, or Islamist leaders. But when it comes to exploring the type of manhood represented by Ataturk in the collective eye of the generations to follow, I would argue that what needs to be

¹⁵⁷ 'I am now a father. Both of you are my sons. As far as I am concerned there is no difference between the two of you. What I want from you in the Grand National Assembly is an open debate upon national issues.' Ataturk said to two leading politicians. Cited in Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, Walkington, UK: The Eothen Press, 1985, p.52.

¹⁵⁸ It should be simultaneously underlined that this practice was not strictly applied in the Ottoman Era as there was also a strongly embedded tradition of miniatures. Nonetheless, miniature is not one and the same thing as portrait. In the former it is the one dimensional portrayal of the human body that comes to the fore whereas the latter concentrates more heavily on individual differences and facial traits.

emphasized are the ramifications of a “genderless but paternal face” rather than the ramifications of a “gendered, male body”. The omnipresent facial machine went hand in hand with his shielding gaze. From every bust, poster and picture it was Atatürk’s gaze viewing the society, watching over millions of Turkish citizens. Unlike the face, the gaze was gendered, however. It was a paternal gaze, insinuating authority and control. The gaze was old and mature, whereas the society was young, if not infantile. The gaze was authoritarian and domineering, whereas the society was ready to go astray. The gaze was paternal and thereby male, whereas the society was turned into younger female and male, not feminized but daughter-ized.

The whole scheme fit into the deeply-embedded centralized Turkish political structure which would have long-term consequences in Turkish politics, and has been interpreted as the “strong state tradition” by some scholars¹⁵⁹. It also resonated with a teaching that urged for the need to protect the motherland and the reforms against internal and external enemies. This kind of imagery¹⁶⁰ became all the more evident in nationalist songs and anthems¹⁶¹. As students sing these anthems under the posters where Atatürk’s face is portrayed, the facial machine of the body politic is internalized. The use of gender metaphors is further fused with nationalistic poetry, short stories and fiction in general. As it occurred elsewhere in India, Pakistan, Balkan countries, the Middle East, and the like,¹⁶² it is crucial to make the active/passive distinction here. *Vatan* is a woman, meek and docile; the imagery of the nation-as-mother or sometimes the nation-as-virgin to be saved from harm incites

¹⁵⁹ See Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, *ibid.* For a contemporary debate on the same aspect see also M. Heper (ed), *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991.

¹⁶⁰ E. g. *Ey vatan gözyaşlarını sil yetistik çünkü biz*’. (Oh motherland cry no more, for we have run to your rescue.” While the nation here is noticeably feminized, the hero is masculinized, and the we-body is male be it composed of boys or girls or both.

¹⁶¹ About the rise of anthems, K. R. Minogue claims that national anthems must be taken with great care since they may often embody irrelevant themes or emotions (the Marseillaise for instance invites the children of France to water the furrows of the country with the blood of the enemy). K. R. Minogue further claims that such anthems recall times of enthusiasm which are saved from absurdity only by their place in a heroic past. See K. R. Minogue, *Nationalism*, New York: Basic Books, 1967, p. 114.

¹⁶² For a congruent study on a different cultural context see for instance Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001

massive passion and emotional investment¹⁶³. The feminization of the homeland therefore facilitated what Smith calls a “mobilization of sentiment.”(Smith, 1987:3)

4.4.2. Heroic masculine imagery: It is noteworthy that in Turkish culture, long before the advent of the Kemalist era, there already existed a culture of *şehidlik* (martyrdom) stemming from Islamic narrations. The idea of sacrificing oneself for causes larger than one’s self was not an alien thought in Turkish society; Kemalism merely took, transformed and utilized the same metaphor, making it its own¹⁶⁴. By means of such anthems and mantras, secularism too was able to create its own chivalrous, heroic, masculine imagery¹⁶⁵ shared by men and women alike. In this respect, as studies by a number of eminent scholars demonstrate, the Turkish experience mirrored other cases of birthing the nation. Though the literature on nationalism stubbornly remained gender blind for quite some time, some feminist studies stress the importance of men and masculinity in the formation of nations and nationalist politics by arguing that state institutions, political power, militarism and the army that forge and uphold the nation are above all masculine institutions (Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2000; Nagel 1998; Hagemann 1997; Mosse 1997).

4.4.3. Turkish Military as a Site of Masculinization: The most crystallized form of the masculinization of culture operating at the level of the Repressive State Apparatuses, to follow the Althusserian terminology, emerges in the institution of the army. As Enloe notes, “masculinity has been intimately tied to militarism, yet the two sets of ideas are not inseparable. Masculinity and militarism might be pictured as two knitting needles; wielded together, they can knit a sturdy institutional sock. But even such a sturdy sock –the military- is not immune to

¹⁶³ This desire to attain authority to the speaker by denigrating the other in the symbolic structure is not unique to Turkish nationalism, it is in fact in the very essence of all sorts of nationalisms. As Fatma Müge Göçek pointed out "all these Middle Eastern nationalisms took contained many similarities in structure, meaning, and organization. The epistemological shadow of the nation-state on historical scholarship has obfuscated this commonality in form and has instead treated each and every nationalism as sui generic, thereby highlighting difference at the expense of similarity." (Göçek, 2002, p.56) Where nationalisms diverged, oftentimes patriarchies overlapped.

¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, the lines of an anthem voiced aloud collectively every morning of the school year by children ran as follows: “varlığım varlığına armagan olsun” (May my being be bequest thine.)

¹⁶⁵ This heroic masculinity is still very much alive at all levels. As Beyza Sümer points out in her unpublished MSc thesis, Ertuğrul Özkök’s essays provide significant clues in this direction. Özkök claims that there lies an İttihatçı Enver deep inside every Turkish man. “Ben kendi payıma çok kızsam da o içimdeki ittihatçı ruh zaman zaman fırlar. Özellikle de Kafkaslarda ve Balkanlarda dolaşırken...” Hürriyet, 21 June 1998.

holes.”(Enloe, 2000:235) Enloe continues this argument by pointing out that “for this maneuver to succeed, for the military to obtain and keep the number and kind of men in the ranks that officials think they need, military policy makers have to control not only men but women. If very particular concepts of motherhood and femininity –and at times, the concept of liberated woman- are not sustained, the sock may unravel.” (Enloe, 2000:235)

The most perpetual and the least challenged source of masculinization in Turkish society is the army and its concomitant set of images, metaphors and symbols which provide a sense of security as “one peculiar response to double challenge of opportunity and insecurity, of loneliness and power” (Deutsch 1979: 25). Despite all the twists and turns of Turkish history, the belief that the army is above and beyond everyday politics, and is also untouchable has remained firm. The army is a determining force in the eyes of both the army officials and a large number of civilians. To this day, the polls held in Turkey still clearly indicate that for the average Turkish citizen the army is the most trustworthy institution. Citizens from all walks of life regard the army as the main signifier, be they supportive or critical of its policies. Sayari claims that “from time to time civilian politicians are ‘reminded’ of these boundaries, sometimes implicitly, and sometimes, rather explicitly. Yet one should note that the said boundaries are broadly defined and do not usually limit the actions of civilian leaders unless these are conceived as a threat to secularism and/or national integrity –two highly sensitive issues for the military.” (Sayarı, 2002: 5)

Culture production has, from the very start, been the playground upon which the Kemalist male elite built its large projects. There has been a pattern of continuity in this sense between the production of the culture-modernity-hegemony of the late Ottoman male elite and then the Kemalist male elite. The latter, however, have further used this cultural capital with and within the centralized administrative machinery of the nation-state, thereby managing to diffuse cultural power from above. In manipulating cultural capital whenever it could, and giving a limited role and a confined space to the actors outside the state elite, the Kemalist legacy manufactured a feeble civic sphere. As Schöpflin (1995: 61) states, the feebleness of the civic sphere means that references to nationhood can be employed to delegitimize

opponents as “traitors to the nation,” rather than welcome them as political opponents sharing the same political culture.

4.4.4. Surnames as a Site for Masculinization: Another noteworthy cultural site that reflects changing cultural parameters is the array of surnames Turks chose for themselves after the Surname Law was initiated during the early Republican era. Among the surnames chosen, the ones ending with *-oglu*, designating patrilinearity from father, grandfather or *atalar* (ancestors) outnumbered others significantly. Kinzer notes that, “some thought of their fathers, so today there are names like Berberoğlu (barber’s son), Karamehmetoğlu (Black Mehmet’s son), and even Yarımbıyıkoglu (son of the man with the half-mustache). Others took martial names like Erarslan (brave lion) or Demirel (iron hand).”(Kinzer, 2001: 47) Both the surnames ending with *-oglu* and the ones implying heroism, gallantry or warfare clearly revealed the masculinist values cherished by and large¹⁶⁶.

4.4.5. Legacy of the Past: Kemalist legacy has proved to be well-embedded and far-fetched in time. The previous section had brought the relation between the Kemalist state elite and what I have termed *the de-feminization of Turkish culture* to the fore. Secularization from above also entailed the de-feminization, centralization, and monologization of Turkish culture from above. “The élite are the carriers of civilization and the people the holders of culture,” asserted Ziya Gökalp. “Therefore, the élite's approach to the people should only have the following two purposes: to receive training in culture from the people and to carry civilization to them. Yes, it is only with these two purposes that the élite should go to the people.”¹⁶⁷ In this chapter, I elaborated on the implications of this contention as I studied how the Turkish Republican elite produced certain cultural codes and gender patterns to the

¹⁶⁶ The nationalist narrative with respect to “life in Central Asia” clearly indicates this point. Likewise in Nihal Atsız’s writing both men and women are “equaled” in masculinity. (Güz gelmişti. Türk ellerinin yaman güzü Çin beği Şen-king’i bayağı sayrı etmişti. Bu Türk ülkesini hem beğeniyor hem de yadırgıyordu. Burada açık ve temiz bir hava, insanı sağlamaştırın kırmızı ve gürbüz, sağlam kızlar olduğu için Türk ellerini seviyordu. Fakat güneşinin keskin, soğunun sert, kişilerinin cetin ve kızlarının sarp olmasını hiç beğenmiyordu.) For a comprehensive analysis in which this is discussed see Cenk Saraçoğlu, Nihal Atsız’s World-View and Its Influences on the Shared Symbols, Rituals, Myths and Practices of the *Ülkücü* Movement, Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, May 2004, <http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/tcimo/tulp/Research>.

¹⁶⁷ Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, (trans.: Niyazi Berkes) New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 259.

exclusion of others. I have argued that certain gendered metaphors¹⁶⁸ and cherished values¹⁶⁹ have proven to be long-termed and repetitive. It should, however, be reemphasized that while the official national discourse of the Turkish Republic and its written culture mirrored a relatively more homogeneous, centralized set of values and teachings, oral culture, popular culture and the world of fiction remained far more decentralized, open to possibilities, varieties and diversities. It is upon these hybrid possibilities or catachrestic moments¹⁷⁰ that the new emergent political actors in contemporary Turkish history have built their stance and voice. I now proceed to analyze those forces that withdrew into the private sphere to operate in the “periphery” of the nation-state project and its social actors, to then penetrate into the “center” and, in so doing, bring along their own attitudes and ideas on masculinity and hegemony. Scholars who approach this scenery from different disciplines have underlined that all along this transformation, culture -and thereby the cultural elite- have played a decisive role. As Yael Navaro-Yashin, for instance, indicates, if we were to write the history of the concept of culture in Turkey we would need to point out the stages in which culture became a zone of public contestation, and was experienced as something to fight for, and fight upon rather than something to experience of its own accord¹⁷¹. Upon this framework I will now concentrate upon the Islamist discourse and the new male Islamist intellectual.

¹⁶⁸ An example to the point is the writings of Atilla İlhan. See Atilla İlhan, “Anadolu Kadınları, Müdafaa-i Vatan Cemiyeti”, Cumhuriyet, 02.25.2004. The article is particularly interesting as it is replete with images of de-feminized heroism and patriotism. See the following: “Siz 'vatan ve namus' uğruna, düşmanın türlü işkenceden sonra, fırında yaktığı, Nazife Kadın'ı; Kocayayla mıntıkasında, elde mavzer savaşıırken, alnından vurularak şehit edilen Gördesli Makbule Hanım'ı, 'Asker' namıyla maruf Sâime Hanım'ı bilir misiniz? Ya da diğerlerini?... O kadınlar, bizim kadınlarımız!” These fundamental metaphors prove to be recurrent in the Kemalist discourse.

¹⁶⁹ As indicated before one of the cherished metaphors of Kemalist lexicon has been the veneration of young, fit body and mind. This too has proven to be continuous in time. See the following by Yekta Güngör Özden: “Gerçek Atatürkçü, gençlik taşlamaz. Yaşı ne olursa olsun gençtir. Atatürkçü olmak bir onur işidir. Bu onuru her baş, her omuz, her yürek taşıyamaz.”, Yekta Güngör Özden, İleri Dergisi, May-August, no: 16, 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Compare with Homi Bhabha who argues that the resistance of the “repressed”/colonized subject flourishes at the margin of the fixed identity attributed to it and it is these catachrestic moments that embody far more hybridity than that represented in any binary structuring of social antagonism. For an elaboration of this point see, John Beverley, *Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, p. 85.

¹⁷¹ Yael Navaro-Yashin, “Kültür Kehanetleri: Yerelliğin Toplumsal İnşası” in İstanbul: Küresel ile Yerel Arasında, (ed) Çağlar Keyder, 2000, Metis, İstanbul.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE 'ISLAMIST' DISCURSIVE FIELD AND ITS MASCULINITIES

The long-term success and command of the Turkish Republican reforms, the persistence in the public sphere of the idea of development as concomitant to secularization¹, and the continued reliance on Kemalism's enlightening² role until the 1980's in spite of political tension, rendered it difficult, if not puzzling, for scholars both in Turkey and abroad to fathom the rise of an Islamist movement³ in Turkey thereafter, especially during 1990s⁴. It thus became a central question for scholars in several disciplines (Narlı, 1999; S. Ayata, 1996; Çakır, 1994; Yavuz, 1997) to find the appropriate conceptual tools and analytical framework within which to investigate what was at the time described as "the convulsions of a resurgent and militant Islam"(Alkan, 1984). Some of the major significant themes that scholars problematized in analyzing

¹ Gabriel Almond was one of the earliest scholars to conscientiously map out a developmental approach that regards role differentiation and subsystem autonomy as criteria of development. Almond had considered secularization as a criterion of development. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: a Developmental Approach*. Boston: Little Brown, 1966, p. 299.

² For a critical debate on this point see Taha Parla, "Kemalizm Türk Aydınlanması mı?" *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce- Kemalizm*, vol:2, Istanbul: İletisim, 2001.

³ March 1994 has been a decisive moment as the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (WP) won the municipal elections in large cities. Next, Welfare Party emerged from the national elections of December 1995 as the largest party in the parliament. It came to power in June 1996 with Ciller's True Path Party (TPP) -with Erbakan as prime minister. In the phase following the army's *indirect* intervention in February 28th, the *indirect* offshoot of Welfare Party, AKP, came to power.

⁴ The transformation marking this period has been extensively studied by numerous scholars. See in this context Cigdem Balım & Ersin Kalaycıoğlu & Cevat Karataş & Gareth Winrow & Feroz Yasamee (eds.), *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. Within this collection see especially Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and the Secular State in Turkey" for an account on the trajectory of secularist ideology vis-à-vis Islam.

this movement were the veil⁵, the rekindling of traditionalism(Sayari, 1984), and international political and financial ties, especially the flow of Saudi Arabian capital (Yeşilada, 1993; S. Ayata, 1991), backing local Islamist groups. It should also be noted that this societal development attracted the attention of not only Turkish scholars, but also Western scholars⁶ and Muslim thinkers from all around the world. Even though there is a growing literature on this topic, rather than the majority of the scholarly interpretations that focuses on the political dimensions of this development, what is of interest to this dissertation are those few that concentrate instead on the cultural dimensions and implications of it. Among these, Muhammad Arkoun, for instance, argued that “the example of Turkey, profoundly marked by the work of Atatürk, is particularly fertile ground to study the degradation of symbols into signals, and the effort to bring signals back toward symbols in an ideological and cultural context that provokes reflection, as well, on the irreversibility of the history of societies... All Muslims who care about enriching contemporary Islamic thought must spend time examining the Turkish example” (Arkoun, 1994:26).

Today, in the vast academic literature on the nature of the relationship between “political Islam and democracy”⁷, where some analyses emphasize deeply-rooted myths that consider political Islam to be naturally incompatible democracy⁸, while others give precedence to the axes of modernity and traditions⁹ to find the two compatible, the case of Turkey occupies a prominent place as one of the few countries with a predominantly Muslim population that has established a sustainable democracy. Turkey likewise

⁵ The veil has been the niche of the myriad debates along the Islamist-secularist paradigm and as such, the subject of extensive discussion. For an analysis on the debate in Turkey see Elisabeth Özdalga, *The veiling issue, official secularism and popular Islam in modern Turkey*, Richmond: Curzon, 1998.

⁶ See for instance, Andrew Mango, who maintains that unlike the overwhelming majority of Turkey’s population, most non-Turkish Muslims and a fundamentalist minority believe that secularism and the collective governance required by Islam are incompatible. Andrew Mango, (foreword by Heath W. Lowry), *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role*, Westport: Praeger, 1994, p. 76.

⁷ A prominent and comprehensive example in this regard is Ghassan, Salame (ed.) *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1994.

⁸ For a highly critical assessment of this deeply-rooted premise and its ramifications, see Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation*, London: IB Tauris, 1995, pp. 107-132.

⁹ Voicing this view, Juan Cole argues that radical Islamism is a bifocal response both to what its adherents see as the "incomplete" project of Islamization and to the inroads of liberal modernity. See Juan Cole, *The Taliban, women, and the Hegelian private sphere - Part III: individual, family, community, and state*, *Social Research*, Fall 2003.

occupies a prominent place in the existing literature on nation-state formation because of the emphasis it has placed on Kemalist secularism as the guiding principle of the Turkish nation-state, a political move that was again a first among countries with predominantly Muslim populations. The manner in which Turkish secularism and the cultural construction of a Turkish identity have been interwoven has always been the focal point of a group of studies (Mardin 1988; Ahmad 1994; Zürcher 1998; Çınar: 2002).

When an Islamist formation in Turkey that had, as I argue here, always been present in one form but as an ‘other’ removed into the private sphere by the Republican project of modernity and secularization, now came to occupy a significant place in Turkish political life and the public sphere, there was a tendency to interpret this as the failure of the Kemalist Republican project¹⁰. Berkes (1964), for instance, had early on interpreted the presence of politicized Islamism as proof that the Republican regime had ultimately failed. Sayarı elaborated on this interpretation when he noted that “support for radical or extreme parties is often associated with anti-system sentiments. It is hypothesized that membership in a group that is economically and socially underprivileged, excluded, or discriminated against greatly enhances the probability of voting for extreme parties or candidates.... Exclusion from the benefits of the system, provided that the situation is also perceived as such, distances the voter from the center.” (Sayarı, 2002:4) Hence the Islamist movement was viewed as the return of those excluded from the public sphere through the Republican state measures of secularism.

Indeed, the most prominent interpretation of the contemporary *Islamist*¹¹ movement in Turkey has been phrased as “the arrival of the periphery into the center” or

¹⁰ For further on this point see for instance Haldun Gülalp, “The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall, 1999, pp. 35-59.

¹¹ A conceptual distinction needs to be made between “Islamists” and “neo-fundamentalists”. Exploring the sociology of political Islam, Roy argues that unlike the Islamists, (many of whom tried to adapt to aspects of modernity), the neo-fundamentalists are basically focused on channeling the discontents of urban youth into political opposition. See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. In this chapter and elsewhere it is the Islamist male elite that I explore and not the neo-fundamentalists as differentiated in Roy’s scheme.

more bluntly, as “the return of the repressed”¹², implying that the secular Turkish Republican state had excluded these groups which then gradually, inexorably and successfully mobilized against it¹³. Some other scholars, however, have comparatively situated the Turkish case within a broader socio-geographical context to argue instead that Turkey was one among many societies that, “confronted with the challenge of Western ideas and technology,” were “responding with a fervent Muslim fundamentalism; this “revival” must be seen not so much as a religious renaissance as a restatement of values and concepts that have always existed” (Curtis, 1981: iii). In all, the new Islamism in Turkey fervently rekindled old debates on modernity, democracy and gender equality (Toprak, 1981), as well as an intense anxiety on the part of the Republican state elite.¹⁴

It is interesting to note, however, that the trajectory of the Islamist movement in Turkey has not only been elaborated as a new episode or a pristine crisis, but also as yet another symptom of an almost perpetual structural flaw in the way the Turkish Republic was founded in the first place, especially in the way it disregarded the cultural underpinning of society in establishing the dominant national structure. The interpretation of Yavuz¹⁵ is especially noteworthy in this context as he likens modern Turkey to a transgendered body with the soul of one gender in the body of another and attributes the ongoing tension to this dual structure between the state elite and the Turkish body politic.

¹² A term originally developed by Freud, “the return of the repressed” has been a pivotal expression in various disciplines or interdisciplinary zones, including Cultural Studies, Postcolonial Studies and Critical Theory. On how the term is applied to an analysis of societies and contemporary times, see S. Hall, *The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': The Return of the 'Repressed' in Media Studies*, Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran & Woollacott, 1982

¹³ For a study in this direction see Robin, K. And Aksoy, A., “Istanbul Rising: returning the Repressed to Urban Culture” in *European and Regional Studies* 2, no: 3, pp. 223/235, 1995.

¹⁴ The Turkish elite’s anxiety triggered by the rise of the Islamist movement is critically explored by Yael Navaro-Yashin. See Yael Navaro-Yashin, “The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities”, in *Fragments of Culture, The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber (eds), London: IB Tauris, 2002.

¹⁵ Hakan Yavuz explores why and how religious attachments managed to remain and not wither away in Turkey despite the expectations of the secularist political elite. See Hakan Yavuz, *Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere*, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54, 2000.

Concomitantly, while the debate still vehemently continues on different levels and between distinct segments of Turkish society, thereby rapidly creating advocates termed ‘the Kemalists’ and ‘the Islamists’, I argue here that it may perhaps be a useful step to problematize and move beyond the paradigm in which the Islamist-secularist duality is embedded. I think that one can do so by undertaking a cultural reading of the debate, one that ultimately highlights the shared clusters of meanings between the two sides more than the unshared. By so doing, one can highlight the cultural similarities between the two rather than focus exclusively on the differences; such an approach may ultimately open the political path for a synthesis or at least peaceful coexistence between the two.

The culturalist approach I propose is based on two assumptions. First, I assume that both the Islamist/conservative and Kemalist discursive practices originate from and, in return, contribute to the same political culture, thereby deriving many of their metaphors, if not codes and values, from a common cultural pool¹⁶. Second, I assume that there are significant overlapping cultural traits between these alleged “opposites” when one focuses on social issues that have not been fully elaborated upon: most significant among these is the depiction of gender roles, especially in terms of male gender roles. Yet the commonality in concern that the two discursive practices share lessens significantly when one moves a step further to consider “the role of women in society” and the concomitant issue of “the veil.” Still interestingly enough, however, the cultural consensus of the two discursive practices increase visibly when it comes to their understanding of “masculinities”. I once again want to emphasize the significance of the culturalist approach to the study of Turkish political structure throughout history: such an approach contains the analytical tools that enable the scholar to go beyond the confining dualities that only polarize the existing social fissures. It is in addition the emphasis on gender relations within the culturalist approach that enables us to reveal the commonalities of the two discursive practices. Another significant aspect of the culturalist approach is its emphasis on locating loci of social and political power

¹⁶ To give a prominent example in this direction, a survey in 1999 has pointed out that even the most religiously conservative segments of Turkish society are in favor of the separation of the state and Islam. For more information see Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu. "Türkiye'de Siyasi İslam" (Political Islam in Turkey) Istanbul: TESEV, May 1999.

throughout society, extending from the political to the private sphere, from the urban to the rural, and from the center to the margins. This, too, highlights discursive formations in Turkey that go beyond the present framework of political duality, enabling the scholar, in this case, to search for new syntheses that transcend the epistemologically confining Islamist/Kemalist duality.

5.1 The Return of Those Who Had Not Departed

That the post-1980s have triggered a turning point in contemporary Turkish history has been repeatedly stated by numerous scholars.¹⁷ While there is unity of opinion with respect to this historical shift, there is respectively profound disagreement with respect to its dynamics. The rise and visibility of Islamist discourse became the niche of contemporary paradigmatic shift given that religion has been the Achilles' heel of the Republican Kemalist secularist elite¹⁸, who have pined to erase religion from the public sphere and yet failed to develop an alternative autonomous space in its place.¹⁹ Mostly because “Islam” and “modernity” are regarded as mutually exclusive²⁰, Islamist discourse has been labeled as the most fervent opponents of the democratic regime who are an ‘outside’ force, outside in the sense of being external to the modernist, Westernist, secularist mode of living and thinking in Turkey. When portrayed in this manner, Islamist identities in Turkey metaphorically turn into an outside force that rams through the gates of modernity to forcefully interject their own anti-modernist project. Such convictions, singly and altogether, consciously or subconsciously, shape the structure of

¹⁷ Post-1980s marked a crucial transformation in Turkish history in terms of altering economy, societal structure, political culture, as well as external relations. It was also during this time that new definitions were attributed to the old, familiar concepts of “modernity”, “traditions”, “backwardness versus progressiveness”, etc. See Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yeşilada (eds), *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

¹⁸ For a useful source in this regard see Necdet Subaşı, *Türk Aydınımın Din Anlayışı*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996.

¹⁹ I borrow this argument from Şerif Mardin's works (Mardin, 1991, 1994). The role of the intellectual and his incapacity to develop autonomous zones has also been explored by Sabri Ülgener at a relatively early period. See Sabri Ülgener, *Zihniyet, Aydınlar ve İzm'ler*, Ankara: Mayas, 1983.

²⁰ Bassam Tibi is one of those scholars who interconnect Islam and modernity, East and West by envisioning a secular framework with a religious identity and maintaining that Islam can just as well be Western in general, European in particular. See Bassam Tibi. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002.

analyses in Turkey and create structures of thought in such a manner that they leave barely any opportunity to dispute not only the creation of an Other – regardless of which side of the ideological spectrum one situates oneself -- but also the very paradigm based on Other-ization as well.

Therefore, such a construction of the Islamist movement in Turkey eliminates all possibilities of discourse between the two formulations from the upstart, and makes a peaceful resolution impossible. Pursuing a similar line of thought, Stokes argues: “the dominant alternatives for understanding contemporary Turkey are limited and increasingly unproductive... Modernization theory’s inability to account for a ‘resurgent’ Islam, embracing rather than rejecting modernity, is just one of many failings. (Stokes, 2002:322) Underlining that postcolonial theories do not provide an alternative either, Stokes further maintains: “the institutional problem is that this view has simply become a kind of cultural orthodoxy that plays comfortably into the hands of commercial and state interests.” (Stokes, 2002:323) Hence, as long as this construction lingers as the dominant paradigm, the only consequence is that it enhances and reproduces the status quo and thus prevents integration and transformation.

I will further contend that studies that analyze the trajectory of Turkish secularization/Islamization have generally and primarily been concerned with the role of the “social actors” in this process, namely the Kemalists versus the Islamists²¹. Yet, I propose to modify this construction by arguing that we need to take into account the political and cultural spaces they occupied as well: hence, it was not solely the social actors themselves who changed, but the political and cultural space each had initially and customarily occupied transformed as well. When the construction is expanded in this manner to include space, it becomes evident that the Islamist and Kemalist discursive practices in Turkey show remarkable continuity with each other as well as their predecessors, thereby establishing a cultural lineage that potentially extends back to the late Ottoman period. What altered more profoundly than the social actors and their

²¹ For a study that applies this scheme unto a wider comparative framework by comparing the case of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan see Mahmood Monshipouri, *Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. The author maintains that the interplay between secular and Islamic pressures will have an effect on the future of reforms and human rights in these countries.

respective discourses were the parameters of the public sphere, as well as the cultural zones in which these operated.

As Cocks warns us, “to think seriously and systematically is to refuse to think seriously and systematically in almost every vein, but one – to block out therefore, whole lines of inquiry...” (Cocks, 1989: 111) The cultural issue of gender and sexuality is one social topic which reveals the inconsistencies in this opposition in that while Kemalists and Islamists do allocate disparate locations to women in the public sphere, they might portray significant similarities in their attitudes toward gender and sexuality in general, and also toward masculinities in particular. This is precisely why scholarship on this cultural issue needs to move beyond this fundamentally dualistic analytical framework based on actors by being more space-conscious²² (cf. Habermas: 1991, Mouffe: 2000, Arendt: 1958) and less actor-oriented and not necessarily as the absolute antithesis of “the private”²³. Yet the chasm between Kemalists and Islamists and the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy have been so naturalized in existing studies that an approach emphasizing similarities rather than difference has almost become epistemologically impossible. Yet, I argue here that not only will such an approach offer insight into the inner dynamics of each group, but it will also highlight the persistent features of political culture and hegemony in Turkey.

5.1.1. Parameters of Islam in Turkey Before delving into an elaboration of the similarities in concern, however, one has to further analyze the context of Islam in

²² Compare with Seyla Benhabib who connects the approach to the public space to a broader ideological frame. She argues that in Western political philosophy there are three main currents with regards to conceptions of “public space”. The first one is common to the ‘republican virtue’ or civic virtue’ tradition, and crystallized in the work of Hannah Arendt. The second conception is named the legalistic model and belongs to the liberal tradition -beginning with Kant- that renders a ‘just and stable public order’ the centre of their political thinking. The third current is associated with Jürgen Habermas’s ‘discursive public space’ and it envisages a democratic-socialist restructuring of late-capitalist societies. For more on this categorization and the ramifications of each path see Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas” in *Feminism, the Public and the Private*, Joan B. Landes(ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 65.

²³ I borrow the idea from the vast literature on public sphere, particularly from Bruce Robbins(1993). For a more “relaxed”, decentralized and less actor-oriented rereading of the public space, see his(ed) ‘Introduction: The Public as Phantom’, in *The Phantom Public Sphere*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, pp. vii-xxvi.

Republican Turkey and then the emergence of the Islamist movement from this context. İlder Turan (Turan, 1991) identifies three functions of religion in Turkey. First, religion provides a framework within which political power may be exercised; as such, it poses a constraint on what governments can do and still maintain their legitimacy.”(Turan, 1991:42) Second, religion is an element of social control as it contains values such as the show of respect to government authority and its public servants, and compliance with the government’s commands; as such, religion is one of the several ways through which obedience to political authority is secured.”(Turan, 1991:42) Finally, Turan also underlines that “religion in Turkey appears to be an underlying dimension of membership in the political community; through its moderate role in the achievement of political legitimacy, it is one of the bases of political ideology in that it has a source of values which affect political goal-setting and behavior in society.”(Turan, 1991:52) This last emphasis resonates with the Durkheimian view of the role of religion and religiosity in modern societies²⁴. Likewise, Sami Zubaida emphasizes the instrumentality and solidarity embedded in religion by pointing out that “religion in another perspective is the sphere of social solidarities based on common belonging, with specific institutions and rituals of worship which identifies the believers and separates them from practitioners of other faiths.”(Zubaida, 1993: 107) Hence religion in general and Islamic religion in Turkey in particular have always been a source of identity and solidarity communities have drawn upon in determining and solidifying their positions in society. It was only with the advent of nationalism, however, that the imagined community of the nation and the community of believers had their boundaries uncomfortably overlap.

Indeed, the exercise of power, legitimacy and control are also universally persistent in both a nation-state as well as in a religious community. The Enlightenment legacy regarding the relationship between these communities has been to recommend the separation of the two; how that separation was operationalized has varied from society to society however. In the case of Turkey, the nation state²⁵ has been prioritized over

²⁴ Emile, Durkheim. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976.

²⁵ The role of religion as part and parcel of cement behind nation-state formation is an important point that needs to be taken into account in analyses on Turkey. For further emphasis in this regard, see

religion *per se*(Göle: 1996), and this is precisely why Mardin(1985) states that even though state and religion might have been *tev'em* (twins) in Ottoman history, one of the twins had always been more favored than the other. Though the Republican regime radically altered the state structure in Turkey, the primacy of the needs of the state (Heper: 1991, İnsel: 1996, Türköne: 1994) over those of religion remained firm and solid. As a consequence, Turan notes, "... the Turkish state, while not viewing religion as giving direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which may be mobilized for 'purposes of state' whenever it is found useful or necessary."(Turan, 1991:42) Hence, what was politically achieved in Turkey with the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic was less the separation of state and religion than the cooptation of religion by the state.²⁶ Accordingly, any analysis on the Islamist movement in Turkey has to take into consideration the role of the state, the state elites and patronage(S. Ayata, 1996). As Bryant contends "society is the prime mover of the civil religion; the state the prime mover of political religion... the collective representations of a political religion are superimposed on society by those who control the state. The one is historically rooted; the other is politically contrived."²⁷

The significance of this new comprehensive approach enables one to consider the whole context scheme in more fluid terms rather than being constricted to the Kemalist-Islamist partition. Hence neither Islam nor Islamist groups in Turkey can be understood separately from the state, in a vacuum of their own. As Turan also notes "social systems are not closed systems. Religion in any society, including Turkey, influences politics, including political culture."(Turan, 1991:51) Once such a comprehensive approach is institutionalized, interesting, largely unpredicted junctions between the Islamist and Kemalist discursive practices emerge, pointing to convergences, if not synchronizations, that pave the way to multifarious discourses and lead the average Turkish citizen to

David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, p. 59.

²⁶ This point has been accentuated by scholars from different ideological standpoints. Two examples include Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1990; and from a conservative standpoint Beşir Ayvazoğlu, *Geleneğin Direnişi*, İstanbul, Ötügen, 1996.

²⁷ Christopher G. A. Bryant's distinction between civil religion and political religion is fruitful in designating the role of the state and deciphering movements from below as opposed to movements from above. Christopher G. A. Bryant, "Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion", in John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparisons*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 150.

proclaim, as revealed in Tapper and Tapper's analysis of Egridir (1987), *thank God we are secular*. Such a comprehensive approach also creates new analytical venues in the context of gender as well. As Özman and Bulut have maintained, re-reading Turkish history from the point of women does first and foremost make it necessary to question the "women" imagery in the official Kemalist discourse (Özman and Bulut, 2003: 184). Following the same line of reasoning, I argue that re-reading what is perceived to be "outside" the Kemalist reveal hybridities²⁸ that prolematize the boundaries that define the "outside"; this is especially the case when the cultural constructions of categories are taken into account. I claim that just like it was with the Kemalists, for the Islamists too, culture is *the* crucial cement employed to sustain and alter, fasten and differentiate their identities. Indeed, this is also supported by scholars who study contemporary Islamic revivalism such as Bassam Tibi who maintains that such revivalism needs to be regarded as a *cultural system* (Tibi, 1990:119). In this chapter, I investigate how this *cultural system* is composed by its architects, the male Islamist cultural elite, with particular attention to the dynamics of gender that infiltrates it. Retrospectively, in the Kemalist cultural imaginary, women had to be ideal citizens, good patriots and hard workers in addition to being ideal wives (Tekeli, 1991:100); they also had to carry the burden of representation (Yuval-Davis, 1989) -- as such, women had to be far more capable than men. Interestingly, as shall be demonstrated below, so too in the Islamist discourse women are bestowed with macro expectations beyond those attributed to men. It is this commonality, I contend, that makes it essential to distinguish "womanhood" and "femininity" --a trait vital for not only the Kemalist but also the Islamist discourse, as I aim to demonstrate.

I maintain that rather than viewed as a backlash against the dominant ideology defined as "modernist, secularist, and rationalist system" (Heper, 1984:50), the contemporary Islamist movement in Turkey should be situated and analyzed as an organic part of the same system. After all, contemporary Islamist discursive formation is both a manifestation and a participant of the post-1980 social and cultural transformation

²⁸ For a notable study that explores the ways in which conservative discursive practices have been transformed in Turkey to the extent that they came to thrive upon hybrid formations embodying secularism and Islamism at the same time, see Nilufer Göle, *Melez Desenler*, Istanbul: Metis, 2000.

and this transformation cannot be divorced from the historically intrinsic features and flaws of the Kemalist project, one designed and implemented as a limited and limiting modernization project (Çınar, 2004:166). This comprehensive approach is not only *diachronic* in the sense Jusdanis suggests (Jusdanis, 2001:13) but accordingly it situates both the Kemalist and Islamist male elite in Turkish history revealing that they have acted in the past and still do take action within a shared Platonean frame where they regard themselves as “public-spirited man acting in the name of the common good”²⁹. Furthermore, as they both insist upon ‘saving’ society and seizing the Turkish state structure from one another, they attribute a collectivistic, altruistic, almost heroic role to themselves in their attempt to build what Calhoun names “a single authoritative public discourse” (Calhoun, 1997:81), and a *manly state*³⁰. This epistemological resemblance constitutes one of the many features where the two sides unite in the shared politics of sectoral interests.

Still, the “traditional versus modern” duality and “Islamists versus Kemalists” antagonism are too powerful and too imposing as conceptual tools to be fully and entirely abandoned. After all as Özyeğin maintains, “exploring the specifics of tradition and modernity –how they are deployed pragmatically and as ideological values- allows us to understand how the negotiated response generated by this encounter deliberately offers visions, experiences and social practices that are neither modern nor traditional, leaving the significance of this distinction undisturbed. The significance of this dualism in people’s understanding poses a serious challenge to theoretical attempts to abandon the opposition.” (Özyeğin, 2002: 65) And yet, remaining solidly within the boundaries of this dualistic formulation³¹ is inhibiting, if not misleading, since the explanatory frameworks that reside on dualities such as traditional/modern, Islam/Western

²⁹ The argument was central for Plato’s ideal system. See Plato, *The Republic*, New York: Basic Books, 1968. For a thorough discussion following upon this see Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

³⁰ I borrow the term from Charlotte Hooper who develops a critical analysis on the axes of domestic and international power relations. See her *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

³¹ For a revealing assessment that challenges this deeply-rooted binary paradigm see Nabi Avcı, “Sağ-Sol Kutuplaşması Türk Düşünce Tarihi Bakımından Ne Anlama Gelebilir”, *Türkiye Günü*, no:15, Ankara, 1991.

rationalism, reactionary/progressive and rational/irrational³² fall behind a multifaceted analysis which recognizes the *hybridities* (Göle, 2000), the *in-betweennesses* (Bhabha, 1999), the actual and potential overlapping between the categories, as well as what I term as “threshold identities”.

5.1.2. Islamist Gender Practices

Though the theme of “Islam and woman” has been the locus of extensive attention and fervent discussions both in academic debates and daily parlance, this has occurred invariably subject to repetitive generalizations that defy divergences in time, place or culture. As Marcus states “... despite the ways in which other religions have enjoyed some very unpleasant practices upon women, Islam is consistently represented as one of the religions most oppressive to women.” (Marcus, 1992: 55) Discussions in this area have thus more often than not been immersed in international politics and ideological antagonisms, always remaining a short step away from highlighting the cultural distinctiveness of the region (e.g. the Middle East) to viewing it as incompatible with the Western world (Halliday, 1995). When the issue is “Islam and man”, however, startlingly, a deep undisturbed silence canopies the existing academic literature; the only existing knowledge is the highly populist one that radicalizes the relationship into that of the Muslim terrorist whose characterization defies all reason and morality. There is relatively less research carried out on the subject of “men in Muslim countries” or “Islamic masculinities”, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere.³³ This gender imbalance in the literature is one of the major issues this dissertation takes upon itself to analyze in depth. More troubling for a myriad of scholars is the fact that in spite of all the existing negative portrayals to the contrary, the teachings of Islam reveal a relatively positive

³² For a critical evaluation of this dualistic frame see Menderes Çınar, “Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık”, *Birikim*, no:156, April 2002.

³³ There are prominent examples though, which include Fatima Mernissi’s pathbreaking study, *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam*. MA: Perseus, 1991. Other studies include L. Archer, *Race, Masculinity and Schooling: Muslim Boys and Education*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003; and L. Ouzgane, *Islamic Masculinities*, London: Palgrave, 2004; and S. Murray and W. Roscoe, *Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History and Literature*, New York: New York University Press, 1997.

approach toward sexuality³⁴. What complicates the picture even further is the question of how such affirmative principles translate into the almost opposite practices in most contemporary Islamic societies. Hence, the existence of multiple often contradictory discourses on the subject matter has to be acknowledged from the start. As Fernea noted sometime ago, “the Koran’s acceptance of human sexuality as a good to be enjoyed by both men and women, on earth and in paradise, is opposed by a male view that female sexual drives are dangerous and in need of curbing.”(Fernea, 1977: XIX)

One needs to start the analysis of the relationship between women and Islam by first noting that there is no such thing as a monolithic set of rules stamped as “Islam”. Instead, one has to take into account a whole set of teachings and practices which vary across time, region, and society. In addition, although the Qur’an is the very base of all Islamic teachings, the same book was and is still read and interpreted differently by different groups. I pursue this theme further later; at this stage, suffice it to note that the implementation of religious laws can be fully understood by studying those laws as well as their practices across time, space and society. As Bowen notes, “Islam considers women to be believers with full religious duties, including pilgrimage to Mecca. While Islamic laws prescribe gender-specific rights in areas such as divorce and inheritance, ultimately women’s status varies from locale to locale –depending on the implementation of Islamic law and on local traditions and social customs, which are often more powerful forces than the letter of the religious law.” (Bowen, 1993:77) In relation to women’s sexuality, mainstream Islamic readings have often viewed women as the seducer and located her close to irrationality, emotionality, nature and thereby, untamed desire (Berktay: 1996, Sabbah: 1992, Neumann: 1975, Mernissi: 1991). Upon this framework now it is time to focus on the contemporary Islamist male intellectuals in Turkey.

³⁴ A more comprehensive study on the “positive” attitude of Islam towards human sexuality has been carried out by Abdelwahab Bouhhiba in his *Sexuality in Islam*, Routledge, London, 1985.

5.2. Contemporary Islamist Male Intellectuals

First, one needs to socially locate the emergence of these Islamist intellectuals in Turkey within the broader framework of their rise in the context of the Middle East. Exploring this common pattern, Roy maintains that “whereas Western societies were able to integrate the new lower middle classes graduating from the mass educational system with a differentiated ‘trade’ or ‘professional’ status, the newly ‘educated’ of the Muslim world find no social ratification, either real or symbolic, for what they perceive as their new status. (Roy, 1994:93) Hence such a social group emerged throughout the Middle East but could not establish a space for themselves in their societies. Likewise, the new male Islamist intellectuals in Turkey do not possess a pre-given position within the social hierarchy either. Most of them publish essays in newspapers and then publish these essays in books; even though they might thus have a wide readership, such a position can still not generate enough wealth to create a privileged position for them in society. Their class position (Meeker, 1991) and jobs in either the state apparatus or state/private universities³⁵ place these new Islamist male intellectuals in a nebulous position: they cannot step outside the system they so desperately try to distance themselves from in their writings. In order to achieve intellectual empowerment, contemporary Islamist male intellectuals need to procure what Michael Walzer characterizes as “critical distance” from a number of alcoves simultaneously: from the dominant gender-hegemonic Muslim ‘*ulama*’³⁶ who support and uphold a variety of traditional interpretations of religious texts and play a central role in determining social norms (Walzer, 1987: 38), from the Kemalist elite, and finally, from the capitalist ethics within which they operate. Their success and failure in each and every one of these

³⁵ They mostly come from middle classes and/or retain ties with public institutions. To cite a few examples, Ismet Ozel has graduated from Hacettepe University French Language and Literature. He has taught at different public and private universities including, Devlet Konservatuvarı and Bilgi University Comparative Literature Program. Ali Bulaç has had a background in sociology at Istanbul University. He writes columns in Zaman newspaper. Rasim Özdenören has graduated from Istanbul University faculty of Law. The problem of making a living by solely writing is also pertinent to the new male Islamist intellectuals.

³⁶ For an assessment on the differences between classical ulama and contemporary Islamist intellectuals see, Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*, MA: Perseus Books, 1992.

attempts at achieving a critical distance instead ends up rendering their position more ambivalent and essentially eclectic.

Michael Meeker analyses the new Islamist intellectuals in Turkey by emphasizing that “the Muslim intellectual is a critic of republican political and cultural institutions who calls for re-Islamization of the way of life of believers in Turkey. While he is more or less indebted to a century of Islamist criticism of Westernizations, the new Muslim intellectual is very much the product of the post-1950 secular Turkish Republic. This background differentiates him from earlier Islamist thinkers in Turkey.”(Meeker, 1991:189) He then continues to elaborate that “The kind of language (the Islamist intellectual) uses, the literary works he cites or analyses, the stance he takes toward Westernism and secularism, together with less tangible features of his discourse, are unprecedented, even though much of his thinking falls more or less squarely within what might be called a tradition of Islamist resistance and opposition.” (Meeker, 1991:189-190) Meeker then concludes by drawing the following social portrait of the Muslim intellectual: “He is somewhere between thirty and fifty years old and lives in Istanbul or Ankara. He was born to a family of provincial townsmen or officials and attended provincial primary and middle schools... He knows one or more European or Middle Eastern languages other than Turkish, has had a serious longstanding interest in Western literature, philosophy, or social history, and there are more references in his work to Western writers and Western scholarship than to Islamic authorities or sources, ... One suspects that this portrait also applies to the reading audience of the Muslim intellectual, save that the ages of the readers extend downwards beyond thirty years, and their residences are not restricted to the metropolitan centres of Turkey.” (Meeker, 1991:190-191) It is evident from this portrayal that the Islamist intellectual and his audience are very much products of the Republican state they attempt to distance themselves from; what gives the Islamist intellectual his critical edge is the employment of religion as a critical tool to problematize various aspects of Turkish modernity.

The new Muslim intellectuals in Turkey also represent a “new” form of masculinity, one that combines both established gender patterns and modern styles. The combination is particularly visible in their clothes and, though more subtly, still detectable in their speeches. As Roy points out, “the new intellectual identifies himself

by his dress (the Islamic ‘look’ combines an often anachronistic return to traditionalism with marks of modernity, like pens and parkas), by his language (use of a language and not a dialect, with an abundance of neologisms and borrowed terms), as well as, and particularly, through political contestation or, as a last resort, withdrawal to a sect.” (Roy, 1994:94) As for the moustache and the beard, though there are remarkable differences³⁷ among them with respect to these personal signs, the eclecticism in speech and clothes is similarly present here as well.

Language is one area where the new Islamist intellectual male elite in Turkey does contend to be different and reactionary. The new Islamist intellectual’s employment of language, -language in the sense of a social practice (Rorty, 1989; 1997)- is especially noteworthy. It should be recalled that “the secret of language does not lie in some objective truth external to it which it identifies for thought and speech. That secret lies rather first in reality’s being an open field for interpretation. ... Thought then has a double relation to language, being indebted to and constrained by it.” (Cocks, 1989: 29) The new intellectuals take great care to adorn their speeches and frequently use words and concepts banished from Turkish through Kemalist language reform. Interestingly, though their speech and writing is replete with Ottoman words and Islamist notions, as well as with what Mardin calls *games of adaptation* (Mardin, 2002) and hegemonic posturing³⁸, they also have a detectable wish to be “seen” and “heard” by the conventional cultural elite, which implies the secularist intelligentsia. More often than not, the new Islamist intellectual addresses his speech less to an Islamist audience than to the leftist intelligentsia. As this endeavor has been reciprocated, there have been significant attempts to build dialogue and rhetoric³⁹ between the intellectuals of both

³⁷ A number of Islamist writers do grow moustache (e.g. İsmet Özel, A. Alkan, Ali Bulaç), some a goatee (A. Dilipak), while some none (e.g. Hilmi Yavuz, Sadık Yalsızuçanlar). The theme has been discussed on Islamist media. See for instance Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Sakala ve Bıyığa Dair”, Aksiyon, no:280.

³⁸ Şerif Mardin maintains that this hegemonic posture can be traced back in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Linguistic games constitute yet another continuity in Turkish history. See Şerif Mardin, “Playing Games With Names” in *Fragments of Culture*, ibid, 2002, p, 124.

³⁹ *Medine Vesikası* was a central part of this rhetoric. On how it came to be related to post-1980s debates see Ali Bulaç, *Medine Vesikası ve Yeni Bir Toplum Projesi, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol 6, İslamcılık, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004, pp. 503-511.

sides, especially in an attempt to expand the boundaries of the public sphere in Turkey.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the collaboration of intellectuals from both sides has to a large extent been limited to a man-to-man dialogue. It is as if each side needed to convince and co-operate with the “men” of the other side in order to inaugurate the greater social project. In this commonly drawn agenda, “gender issues” which could have been a point of conflict were not pronounced. The *communicative action* (Habermas, 1984) between the leftist and Islamist intellectuals not only failed to “feminize practical discourse”⁴¹ but also excluded women⁴² and women’s questions, among a whole set of other related issues such as sexuality, patriarchy or homophobia.

5.2.1. Question of Authenticity The language of the new male Islamist intellectual elite embodies an eclectic fabric where miscellaneous subjectivities are interwoven. The same hybridity is also at play in the ideological stance as their need to claim the Ottoman past⁴³ goes hand in hand with their need to fulfill the needs and roles of modernity. In various instances, they take hybridity to a new level as they blend the Quran’s teachings with the requirements of the Republican regime and democracy⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ The movement to expand and buttress civil society in Turkey has been quite influential in the post-1980 environment perhaps more so in the ways in which it managed to gather intellectuals from different ideological positions that the ends it achieved. The leftist journal *Birikim* has been one of the leading platforms where the correspondence and communication was materialized.

⁴¹ The failure to feminize practical discourse has been a widespread flaw in the theory and practice of many civil society movements. Habermas has been extensively criticized by feminist scholars on the universality and inclusiveness of his prospects for a democratic public sphere. One of his most optimistic feminist critics is Seyla Benhabib who believes that “once practical discourse is ‘feminized’, the emancipatory aspirations of new social movements such as women’s movement can be best served by the radical proceduralism of the discourse model.” (Landes, 1995, p. 109) For an extensive discussion on this issue see Joan B. Landes, “The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Consideration” in *Feminists Read Habermas*, London: Routledge, 1995.

⁴² Interestingly, there was going to be a twist in the Welfare Party with regards to the “masculine” image of the party after 1990s. Ruşen Çakır has argued that until this turning point Welfare Party was a “man’s party” and yet after 1990s it was the women who came to the fore turning the party into a “women’s party”. For more on this see Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak, İstanbul, Metis, 1994. See also Mehmet Metiner, “RP’nin Yeni Söylemi üzerine,” *Yeni Zemin* sayı 11, Kasım 1994.

⁴³ Making a claim to own Ottoman cultural legacy has been an integral part of the new male Islamist intellectual’s lexicon. For a revealing example in this regard see Hilmi Yavuz, *Osmanlılık, Kültür, Kimlik*, İstanbul: Boyut, 1996.

⁴⁴ For further analyses in this direction see Esra Özcan, “Yaşar Nuri Öztürk” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce- İslamcılık*, vol:6, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004, pp.376-387. One of the many noteworthy amalgams Yaşar Nuri Öztürk develops is his writings on the motto of the Republican regime,

One such case in point is the work of Yasar Nuri Öztürk who has become highly popular among Kemalist circles⁴⁵. With no moustache or a beard, no distinctively religious accessories, yet with a keen eye for modern Western man's fashion, in his project to read the "social/political" from a Quranic perspective, Öztürk is an amalgam of Islamist ethics and Kemalist aesthetics (Özcan, 2004: 377). His discourse is replete with moralistic, religious teachings coated with a didactic, pundit-like style which is also reminiscent of Kemalist pedagogy. Öztürk thus portrays the "modern Turkish man", and his wife also complements this portrayal positively: that she is educated and unveiled makes him "supportable" in the eyes of the Kemalist elite. As such, Öztürk's role has a double function. He is part of the expansion of the Islamist discourse and the expansion of the public space, but he is also seen as a bulwark to spatially confine Islamism by drawing its limits within the precedent of the Republican regime. His being liked and disliked by both Islamist and leftist intellectuals is a reflection of this double-role.

In designating the differences between the modern Islamist intellectual and the old, Fatima Mernissi maintains that the ideal *imam* is someone who is not only instructive but also attentive to the needs of the community in which he lives. Interestingly, another difference is that an ideal *imam* is also "vulnerable" and "challengeable". Mernissi claims that this feature no longer holds true since that vulnerability has disappeared through the combined effect of two factors, the separation of Muslim memory from the rationalist tradition of Islam, and the modern media. These two phenomena have given birth to a monstrosity: the all-powerful, unchallenged, unchallengeable media *imam*. (Mernissi: 2002: 22) Interestingly, Yasar Nuri Öztürk has in his persona elements of this new imam prototype, especially in his prolific use of new media techniques. In style, he employs the same paternal, authoritative voice, yet ironically and paradoxically the Kemalist elite tolerate him because he is pro-Republican regime.

"sovereignty belongs to the people" (hakimiyet kayıtsız şartsız milletindir) as analyzed by Esra Özcan. As against the fundamentalist slogan "sovereignty belongs to God", Öztürk has echoed the Kemalist motto and interestingly based his view on the Holy Qur'an. (Özcan, 2004, p. 379)

⁴⁵ Öztürk has repeatedly been presented in popular media channels as the voice of "moderate Islam" (ılımlı İslam). See for instance "Beyaz İslam'ın Süper Star Hocası", Aktüel, 01. 21. 1998.

The synthesis symbolized in Öztürk's persona is a further indication that "the moderate return to Islam in Turkey is not a resurgence, but an attempt to redress an imbalance that was an integral part of the Kemalist system. It presents a desire of the Turkish people to create available synthesis of values and identities in which Islam is allowed to play a part without excluding other elements of national culture"(cf.Taylor, 1988: 91). The new Islamist discourse in Turkey is neither new nor has it been capable of developing an "untainted" conservative discourse of its own⁴⁶ Likewise, in the categories of appearance, language and ideology, the new male Islamist intellectual in Turkey is also confronted with the question of authenticity⁴⁷. Lee states that "The search for an "authentic" way of acting in the Islamic world means that other paths, such as just being a Muslim or embracing Western values, are deficient or insufficient." (Lee, 1997:175) The new Islamist male intellectual, just like the leftist male intellectual, is first and foremost a public persona and an urban figure. "In this respect, the Muslim intellectuals are not unwilling urban residents yearning to return to the security of the rural town or village where there was no need to think through who one was and what one was to do. They are very much creatures of the contemporary Turkish city, like their secular counterparts." (Meeker, 1991: 217) Thus, both are urban creatures, or put differently, products of the Kemalist urban culture.

One other feature shared by both Islamist and leftist intellectuals in Turkey is, interestingly, their relation to Islam: both treat it as if it were only one single monolithic whole⁴⁸. When the Islamist intellectual defends his position, he talks as if there is only one reading of Islam. When the leftist or Kemalist intellectual defends his own position, he too talks as if there were only one reading of Islam. This discursive agreement of

⁴⁶ A highly useful critical assessment of the trajectory of Islamist lexicon in Turkey resonating with this point of emphasis has also been made by Ahmet Turan Alkan in his "Türkiye'de Sağ'ınTarihine Buruk bir Derkenar", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no:16, Ankara, 1991.

⁴⁷ The question of authenticity has deep implications in developing countries and development theories. The turning point in this sense has been the Iranian Revolution, contending the plausibility of development theory. Robert Lee argues that therein the demand for development lost ground to the cry for authenticity. See Robert D. Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 1.

⁴⁸ According to both Orientalist and Islamic fundamentalist view there is an "essence of Islam" that defies any change in time or place. For a critical assessment of this premise see Bassam Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 122.

opposites in exclusion continuously conceals, distorts or simply ignores the very fact that “the part played by specifically Islamic forms and institutions is always interrelated with other forms and always in a particular context.”(Gilsenan, 1992:189) In an endeavor to emphasize distinctions, cracks and crevices, Gilsenan points out that even the two mosques in the same village can “speak a different language” and “... can have very contrary ideological and social significance.”(Gilsenan, 1992:189) It is to these differences that I shall return when I later locate Islam outside the secularist-Islamist continuum.

In summary, not only has the public sphere, more than the social actors in the Islamist-secularist continuum paradigm, changed radically, but the re-organization of the public sphere has structurally changed the actors operating in it⁴⁹. According to Göle as Islam makes a move into public spheres, two things happen simultaneously: the consensual principles, as well as the monolithic fabric of the national public sphere are disturbed, but so are those of the Islamic movement.⁵⁰ The Islamist movement has therefore undergone a significant transformation and the elements of this process are highly visible in the writings of the male elite.

5.2.2. Portraits of Islamist⁵¹ Intellectuals: Abdurrahman Dilipak I shall begin this analysis with Abdurrahman Dilipak mostly because of his public visibility, outspokenness and also his repeated engagement in political-cultural dialogues with

⁴⁹ That the Islamists have been changing as they moved from the so-called periphery to the center is an important point to consider for my purposes in this dissertation. For an analysis that deals with the changing Islamist culture with respect to capitalist market see Umit Kivanc, “İslamcılar ve Para Pul: Bir Dönüşüm Hikayesi”, *Birikim*, no:99, 1997.

⁵⁰ In this article Göle claims that this is a second phase in the history of Islamic movement –a time in which the revolutionary fervor declines and the ideological chorus gives way to a multiplicity of voices. This is the process Göle names as “Muslim identity is in the process of "normalization." She further maintains that we observe a transformation of these movements from a radical political stance to a more social and cultural orientation, accompanied by a loss of mass mobilization capacity. Nilufer Göle, *Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries*, Volume 14, Number 1 (Winter 2002).

⁵¹ Meeker states that the term Islamist intellectual (İslamcı aydın) is preferred by observers while Muslim intellectual (Müslüman aydın) is preferred by these writers themselves. Meeker prefers Muslim intellectual in line with an anthropologist’s preference for self-reference. I, however, will employ the term Islamist intellectual since the term “Muslim intellectual” implies that other intellectuals along the ideological spectrum are not Muslims, and thereby confuses the whole picture. Michael Meeker, in his “The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A New Configuration of Writer and reader Among Believers in the Republic of Turkey” in Şerif Mardin, 1994, *Cultural transitions in the Middle East*, *ibid*.

leftist intellectuals. As one of the leading figures of the new Islamist male intellectuals, Dilipak conveys in his essays a mixture of modernist debates with traditional conventions; he clearly states, for instance, that although women and men are equal, they are different and this difference should be acknowledged. Like many Islamists, he ardently believes that Islam favors women and protects them. It is worth noting that in accordance with the classical Islamist discourse, here too, the emphasis is on the concept of “justice” as Dilipak notes that “justice comes before equality”. (Dilipak-Yurdatapan, 2003: 123) In other words, it is useless for the Islamist male intellectual to speak of gender equality since what really matters is not equality but the fair and just treatment of the sexes. According to Dilipak “it is important to resist patriarchal or feminist approaches. Perhaps every human being is deficient and finds his or her true character and purpose within the family.” (Dilipak-Yurdatapan, 2003: 122)

In Dilipak’s formulation both feminism and patriarchy are equally “external” to an Islamic way of life. The association of materialism, hedonism and anti-spirituality with Westernism constitutes yet another continuity that resonates with the writings of the conservative cultural elite. Dilipak notes “So the West is a civilization that has risen from the blood of the Native Americans, the tears of the black-skinned, and the stolen sweat of the yellow race... The flipside of all this wealth is colonialism and exploitation.” (Dilipak-Yurdatapan, 2003:137) As revealed in the Dilipak-Yurdatapan dialogue, there is a whole gamut of issues, starting with anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and a direct contestation of Western hegemony, that constitute an overlapping area between Islamist and leftist intellectuals. While some of these are relatively new products of the post-1980 environment, some are much older. Just like the Turkish nationalists of the previous era, the new Islamists male intellectuals too do not relish cosmopolitanism. As stated in Anthony Cohen’s *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (1985), it is this very distance that enables citizens, both women and men, to arrive at the conceptual boundaries of their interpretive communities and identities: “...people become aware of their culture when they stand at its boundaries: when they encounter other cultures, or when they become aware of other ways of doing things, or merely of the contradictions to their own culture.” (Cohen, 1985:69) All in all, the new Islamist intellectuals, like their numerous antecedents throughout the history of Islam,

are past-oriented and long for the Golden Age of the prophet⁵². As such “...when they speak of Islam, they do not have in mind the traditional beliefs and practices of the Turkish Gemeinschaft; rather, they envision an Islam that was never perfectly realized in Turkey, one that is based on divine revelation and orthodoxy practices not on past customary practices in the Ottoman or any other Islamic Empire.” (Meeker, 1991: 216-217)

Although the new Islamist intellectuals in Turkey have been vociferous on a wide range of issues, there are many others on which they have remained stubbornly silent. One among these “unspeakable subjects” is homosexuality. The unspeakability, unchartability of certain subjects goes hand in hand with the constancy in the definition of certain words. The concept of *nefs* analyzed before is one of these; another is *namus* which merits deeper attention. The term indicates the guarding of one’s honor, chastity and is thus personal. Yet at the same time, it can easily have nationalist connotations⁵³, whereby the sexual is switched to the national, thereby to the social and the political. The flag looms as a source of *namus*, as does the Qur’an. The new Islamist intellectual wholeheartedly embraces the social importance alluded to in *namus*. Perhaps the only novelty he adds is its application to both women and men, rather than to women alone. In other words, men too are encouraged to shun from pre-marital sexual conduct, men too are expected to remain faithful and monogamous. Once again, the Western world is identified with the exact opposite – with promiscuity and debauchery. According to Dilipak, “today in the West, the family sustains serious wounds in the name of sexual freedom, and psychological and genetic problems are on the increase as a consequence of incestuous relations” (Dilipak-Yurdatapan, 2003:141) This posturing against the West is a recurrent theme; as Meeker also notes, “for the Muslim intellectuals, Islam is a social discourse which represents an alternative to the Western and secular Gesellschaft

⁵² The reference to the Golden Age runs deeper as it can be re-used again and again when attacking a wide range of issues including women’s rights. Acar notes that “..., the banner of women’s ‘rights’ and ‘emancipation’ is now raised by Islamic groups to attack secularism and modernity, which are perceived as reasons for women’s ‘exploitation’ and ‘degradation’ in a manner reminiscent of the position of original Islam vis-à-vis the Jahiliye system.”(Acar, 1991:282)

⁵³ When nationalist connotations are concerned, on the overlapping between Islamists and nationalists in Turkey see Birol Akgün, Twins or Enemies: Comparing Nationalist and Islamist Traditions in Turkish Politics, MERIA Journal, V6, N1, March, 2002

in contemporary Turkey, one which would be free of the emptiness and injustice that they attribute to modern society.” (Meeker, 1991:196)

Roy claims that for the Western-style intellectual, the text loses its sacredness in the sense that “the intellectual assumes the desacralization of the corpus and of the world. Thus historicization brings up the matter of politics which no doubt most clearly separates clerics and intellectuals today.” (Roy, 1994:91) In the eyes of the cleric, however, the sacred text is a closed corpus. There are no gates open to further individual interpretation and thereby no chances of amalgamating the old and the new, the modern and the traditional, “the gone” and “the imminent”, whereas the new Islamist /conservative male intellectual directly works upon this fusion.⁵⁴ That, however, is not the case with the new Islamist male intellectual whose writing and identity thrives upon hybridity (Göle, 2002a). Hence one can argue that what the Islamist male intellectual undertakes in Turkey may be considered blasphemous in some Muslim understandings where such individual interpretation cannot be taken up by anyone except trained clerics.

The new male Islamist intellectual fetishizes knowledge⁵⁵ and to what Foucault sees as the power it begets to the one in its subject position (Foucault, 1998). As for the sources of his power, he benefits from a whole gamut of sources, artistically, rhetorically blending the East and the West, the traditional and the modern. As a result, he carries out new explorations into what various scholars have named “critical Islam” or “Islamic hermeneutics”, -which will be elaborated in what follows- by concocting a reassessment and re-interpretation of traditional textual sources with contemporary questions of international/national/regional and local politics. Significantly, making a reference to the past does not necessarily mean making the past *the* reference point. The new Islamist

⁵⁴ A good example in this vein is Iskender Pala who places a great emphasis on language and culture, and writes extensively on Divan poetry, the etymology of Ottoman words and expressions, as well as those anchored in daily popular language. Pala is a good example of the new male Islamist intellectual’s aim to ferry Ottoman cultural heritage into present day culture.

⁵⁵ See the writings and public appearance of Hüseyin Hatemi for a good example. His books include *İslam Hukukunda Devlet Yapısı, Çağdaşlaşma Sorunu ve Toplum*, and *Batılılaşma*. For a criticism of “cehalet” see also Yasin Aktay, “Kültürel sahilik Söylemleri ve Modernlik”, *Tezkire*, 14-15, 1998. See also by the same author *Political and Intellectual Disputes on the Academisation of Religious Knowledge*, MSc Thesis, METU, February, 1993.

intellectual's continual reference to traditions, hadiths and Quranic verses is not necessarily a "fundamentalist" move. Rather, it is a deliberate, though perhaps not as much a systematic attempt to interject these into contemporary contexts on the basis of "adoptability" and without resorting to the mediation of dogmatic theology.

The emergence of a 'new' Muslim public sphere has also been tantamount to a significant change of the cadres or elites who would now be in charge of this critical renewal of Islam. As Mandaville maintains "debates over the political imperatives of trans-local Islam serve to create new Muslim public spheres in which formerly disenfranchised voices (e.g. 'deviants', 'moderates', and women) are empowered to articulate alternative interpretations of Islamic authenticity" (Mandaville 2001: 4) Further research⁵⁶ is needed to analyze the increasing growth of this emerging "critical Islam" as the voice of the border⁵⁷ and its relationship to puritanical varieties of Islam. As John Esposito suggests, the most important question about Islam in the coming decades is, "Whose Islam?" – that is, which Islam will win the debates on modern realities? (Esposito, 2002). This is by no means a trivial question for individual Muslim women, as well as men, who have much at stake in the outcome of interpretive disputations. Mandaville once again states that "the new Islam hence exists in spaces which institutionalized forms of politics cannot reach.... The new Islamist intellectual thus represents an interstellar political identity, one which inhabits the gaps between institutional forms." (Mandaville 2001: 177) Abdurrahman Dilipak thus emerges as one such interstellar political identity, as much a product of Kemalist Turkey as his own

⁵⁶ There have been further prominent works discussing the "return of the repressed" in Turkish politics/ See Haldun Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, Istanbul: Metis, 2002. See also by the same author "A Postmodern Reaction to Dependent Modernization: The Social and Historical Roots of Islamic Radicalism", *New Perspectives on Turkey*. Fall 8, 1992, pp. 15-26. See also N.Göle (1996) 'Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey', in A.R.Burton (ed.) *Civil Society in the Middle East*, pp. 17-44. New York: E.J. Brill.

⁵⁷ Some scholars for instance have analyzed various shows and identities in Islamist media as the voice of the periphery or the coming into representation of the border. Ibrahim Sadri's shows on TGRT during 1997 for instance have been interpreted as such by P. Çelikcan, *Border Crossings in Multi-Channel; TV Environment, The Discourse of the Islamic Other in Turkey*, in *Iletisim*, Ankara: Gazi University, N:5, 2000, pp. 71-92.

readings of Islam. Another such Islamist intellectual I now turn to comes from a rather different context.

5.2.3. Portraits of Islamist Intellectuals: İsmet Özel As an Islamist intellectual coming from a Marxist background, İsmet Özel's⁵⁸ life and poetry reverberate a myriad of contradictory dynamics operating in modern Turkish society. As Meeker contends, "Özel's personal transformation from secular, leftist poet to Muslim advocate and analyst puts him in a good position to comment on the relationship of Islam to the Republic of Turkey." (Meeker, 1993:163) In addressing his audience Özel combines elements from the local, traditional and Islamic with highbrow art, modernist aesthetics and Western culture. Waging a discursive war against the Kemalist elite, using an ideologically loaded language like many other Islamist thinkers elsewhere⁵⁹, Özel situates himself in an imagined outside⁶⁰, and yet at the same time, is an insider to the Republican society. Although the Qur'an and the *hadith* represent the ultimate sources of Islam to be written on, it is the contemporary society's issues, sources and jargon that his work and writing thrive upon. The same goes for his audience since, as Meeker states, "Özel's readers may be Islamists in their orientation, but they are also themselves marginal members of the Turkish elite whose basic instincts they sometimes share." (Meeker, 1993: 180)

Significantly, Özel has cautioned against "appropriating the state machine", claiming that "the modernization of Turkey was dished up by educated elite as a result of collaboration between state officials and intellectuals."⁶¹ In this sense, Özel follows a

⁵⁸ See his autobiographical essay, Waldo Sen Neden Burda Değilsin (1988). For his poetry see Celladıma Gülümserken (1984), Cinayetler Kitabı (1975). For his newspaper columns see Üç Mesele: Teknik, medeniyet, yabancılaşma (1978), Zor Zamanda Konuşmak (1984), İrtica Elden Gidiyor! (1986), Surat Asmak Hakkımız (1987) and Tehdit Değil Teklif (1987).

⁵⁹ An important example in this regard is Ali Shariati. For a useful analysis on his work see Abedi Mehbi. "Ali Shariati: The Architect of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran". Iranian Studies 19 (1986), pp. 229-234. See also Akhavi Shahrough. "Shari'ati's Social Thought". In Religion and Politics in Iran, edited by Nikki R. Keddie. New Haven: Yale, 1983.

⁶⁰ It is not only Turkish Muslim intellectuals that act accordingly. In this sense it is striking to see the similarities between new male Islamist intellectuals in different countries. See A. Laroui. The Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals: Tradition or Historicism (Berkeley: UC Press, 1976)

⁶¹ İsmet Özel, To Speak In Difficult Times, p. 205 (Michael Meeker's translation)

different route not only from the Islamic community as such⁶², but has also diverged from the late Ottoman tradition of the conservative intellectual who worked within the state apparatus. Interestingly enough, Özel's request to overtly differentiate himself from mainstream thinking and to instead emphasize his individuality withers away when it comes to gender issues. He too resorts to established thoughts about femininity and masculinity, and at times even likes to overstate these⁶³. Likewise, Özel's individualism and concern for having independence vis-à-vis the state apparatus comes to an abrupt end when he addresses his audience and pines for a communal bond.

The new Islamist male intellectual likes to situate his own position within a space of resistance and prefers to imagine politics as "coming to him" over what Mann names the "interstices" of networks of power (Mann, 1986), rather than "going outside" into the public arena to do politics. In a similar vein, rather than seeing the "man of letters" get involved in politics, Özel yearns for politicizing culture. As such, he is part of the new wave in Islamist movement in Turkey which differs from the previous one in its concentration and reliance upon culture rather than upon politics (Göle, 2002b) as the leitmotif of the desired social change. I thus touch upon here yet another continuity that spans across the late Ottoman, Kemalist and Islamist formulations, namely the politicization of culture⁶⁴.

Once again, multiple literary and artistic genres, starting with music, poetry and the novel become important projects to appropriate and "redo". Just like the late Ottoman intellectual, the new male Islamist intellectual too produces in a variety of

⁶² Pursuing this line of argument Meeker further contends that at the same time Özel challenges the convictions of many conservative Muslims and cautions them against the project to seize the state and its concomitant quest for power which he ultimately finds fatal to the credentials of true religiosity. Meeker, 1993, p. 164

⁶³ In a series of interviews in *Zaman* and *Milliyet*, Özel used an abrasive language calling women and their womanly ways "cowish". The interviews caused a lot of resentment among the different segments of the society and numerous women writers retaliated in their columns and articles. Interestingly, Özel's views created confusion and reaction not only among women writers outside the Islamist circles but male writers within conservative circles as well. See Hasan Sutay's article "İsmet Özel şaka mı yapıyor?", *Zaman*, 04.09.2004

⁶⁴ By the politicization of culture I mean the usage of culture production as the cement in the social-engineering project of modernization from above. The control of particularly written culture by the political/cultural elite is part of the monologization of the culture discussed throughout this dissertation. See A. Aksoy & Kevin Robins, "Peripheral vision: cultural industries and cultural identities in Turkey", *Environment and Planning*, volume 29, 1997.

literary genres, and attempts to represent the *literati*. In terms of “re-doing” literary genres, the Islamist intellectuals have relied more heavily upon poetry –especially mystical lexicon⁶⁵ which will be explored later- benefiting from the long tradition of poetry already in existence in Turkish cultural history. That they choose to express their stance and aesthetics in one of the most deeply-rooted channels of expression in cultural-literary history, namely poetry, constitutes yet another fusion of Islamist movement. I will contend that poetry, as a genre, has been crucially productive and transformative for the cultural and ideological component of the Islamist movement in Turkey. It can be likened to what Foucault named as a *field of strategic possibilities* (Foucault, 1972:32). Poetry contains within it dense cultural symbols that could be interpreted just like religious texts. Yet, there have also been works of significant fiction, especially novels, as well.

5.2.4. Portraits of Islamist Intellectuals: İsmail Hekimoğlu Though overtly scarce when compared to poetry, there here has also been a significant amount of productivity among Islamist male intellectuals in Turkey in the genre of the novel as well. The most prominent example in this regard has been İsmail Hekimoğlu’s, *Minyeli Abdullah* (1983), deemed to be a true Muslim *Bildungsroman* (Mardin. 1994). As a matter of fact, Mardin notes that “nothing shows better the functions of a narrative pattern in providing a structure for the self than the extraordinary success enjoyed in Turkey since the 1960s by one such printed narrative of life, a novel showing Muslims what an ideal life pattern could be.” (Mardin, 1994: 210) The central arguments in *Minyeli Abdullah* have been analyzed by various scholars (Mardin, 1994, Göle, 2002a) in great depth. What has remained relatively unexplored is, however, the correspondence between the themes in the book and the way it was perceived and presented after its publication. *Minyeli Abdullah* needs to be discussed with and within the Habermasian conviction that the author’s/subject’s knowledge belongs to the subject only insofar as

⁶⁵ Mystical poetry is a deeply-embedded tradition of expression in the history of Muslim countries and the new intellectuals have oftentimes resorted to this tradition. For more on the tradition see Schimmel, Annemarie. *As through a veil: mystical poetry in Islam* / Annemarie Schimmel. -- New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. See also Walter Andrews, *poetry’s Voice, society’s song*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1985.

that subject's/author's relation to a particular community of receivers/readers⁶⁶. This latter question requires investigating the dynamics of what Foucault names a *discursive field* (Foucault, 1991:58) in which the writer, the reader and the culture all operate simultaneously.

Written at a relatively early period of time, the novel widely drew on traditional codes and symbols, as well as the notion of victimization vis-à-vis the Kemalist state elite and state machinery. Herein the Muslim intellectual situates himself as both a warrior against and victim to the power frame. Mardin notes that "His success among young Muslims was due to his ability to set together the three elements that underpinned the Muslim canon: affection, honor/heroic deeds, and repentance and redemption." (Mardin, 1994: 210) This pattern is investigated by Bora and Erdoğan in their study on the dynamics of "conservative populism" in Turkey in which they argue that this discourse of sanctified victimhood thrives upon imagining the society in antagonistic terms. It is only insofar as the discourse manages to distance itself from "the tormenter" that "the tormented" can clarify, legitimize and sanctify his position. With respect to this process, Bora and Erdoğan claim that "conservative populism is first and foremost a discourse of self-sacrifice surrounded with a mystic aura."⁶⁷

When asked as to how he had written the novel, İsmail Hekimoğlu extended the theme of "being the victim of the secular order" unto his own life, thus equating the object of the text with the subject. Slowly and surely, the main character of the novel and the author of the novel exchanged roles. He stated that "I used to go to the garbage depository at Ümraniye, searching papers among litter. Some documents were blank on the one side, so I used those as papers to write on. (So that's how I wrote). I collect papers from garbage. I come home, neither my wife knows about it nor the kids. At night when they go to sleep I start writing. I hide my writing in the toilet, inside the

⁶⁶ I borrow the argument from Braaten's reading of Habermasian framework. See Jane Braaten, "From Communicative Rationality to Communicative Thinking" in *Feminists Read Habermas*, ibid, p. 151. The argument presented here helps me to situate the individual thoughts and words of the Islamist intellectual in a social context without overlooking the writer's individual voice.

⁶⁷ Bora and Erdoğan further maintain that this particular discourse blends elements from Islamic mysticism and the traumatic effects of modernization. See Tanıl Bora-Necmi Erdoğan, "Biz, Anadolu'nun Bağrı Yanık Çocukları- Muhafazakar Populizm" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Muhafazakarlık*, vol 5, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004, p. 633.

refrigerator, unscrewing the screws of the box inside. Or I use the well in the garden. I put my writings inside a bucket and hide them inside the well.” (translation mine)⁶⁸

In forms of conservative storytelling analyzed by Hannah Arendt, “the love and lure of meaning rules over the desire for certainty” (Arendt, 1968:105). In Islamist storytelling, too, the author clearly follows the lure of meaning and message. He identifies himself with the main protagonist of the novel, thereby following the old late Ottoman style of writing in which each character is situated in the novel to lead the reader through “the right and the wrong”. Hekimoglu follows this pattern when he notes that “*Minyeli Abdullah* is a role model for me. I wrote the man I always wanted to be. You can ask this to my friends, they’ll tell you I have rejected everything to write this book. I am not *Minyeli Abdullah*, but nonetheless I lived just like him. I sat and slept on a mat. Rather than becoming a man of feasts, I chose to become a man of a cause. .. I wrote *Minyeli Abdullah* by collecting paper out of garbage.”⁶⁹

As for the period following the publication of the novel, once again the author turns his personal experience into a heroic manifestation when he remarked “I can’t tell you the torment I went through after writing *Minyeli Abdullah*. I was told the police would come and search my house. So I go home, tell my wife: you have three bracelets, go somewhere else, be it your father’s mother’s house or wherever, there should be someone to provide you bread. If I come back I will be back, if I do not come back, you will pray for me. And if you do not wish to do so, you won’t do the praying either.” (translation mine)⁷⁰ These comments by the author and other details of his personal narrative have circulated widely among the Islamist community through both the print media and the internet⁷¹. Especially the latter has enabled individual Islamists outside the cultural elite to express and propagate their ideas. Today significantly, a myriad of

⁶⁸ Aksiyon, June, 2002.

⁶⁹ Aksiyon, June, 2002.

⁷⁰ Aksiyon, June, 2002.

⁷¹ Islamist web-sites provide plentiful information with respect to this issue. One particular website where Islamist youth corresponds frequently is interestingly named *delikan-madblood*. On this website Ismail Hekimoglu’s gallantry is praised and regarded as a role-model. One of the readers writes: “The author of *Minyeli Abdullah*, namely Ismail Hekimoglu, whose father has served Kazim Karabekir Pasa, is a man who has nearly escaped death several times in his life.” Myths of sacrifice and heroism surround the novel. See <http://delikanforum.net/archive/index.php/t-12598.html>

Islamist groups and individuals use the web not only to communicate thoughts that they cannot have published elsewhere, but also to build links of camaraderie as part of an imagined umma⁷². Interestingly, however, in numerous chat-rooms and websites individual conservatives do also criticize, challenge and discuss the writings of their own “cultural icons”.⁷³ In the face of these developments, one might plausibly ask "Now that the sacred texts have been digitized and are easily available on CDs, what does this do to the authority of the traditional *alim* who has excelled at what is no longer efficient--memorizing the texts and orally instructing the faithful?" (Piscatori, 2000: 86) The internet has a double effect in that it both creates the means to spread ideas and propaganda more easily, and also gives an autonomous space where individuality can flourish, where elitist distinctions and hegemonic precedents can be blurred and the gender of the correspondent may lose its significance, thus allowing women coming from conservative backgrounds to voice their views in the public without going into the public.

İsmail Hekimoğlu's case demonstrates that although the Islamist male intellectual crafts his own discourse to target a certain audience, he cannot control and shape how his audience is going to perceive and interpret his message. The increase in new techniques of communication and particularly the widespread usage of internet has widened and multiplied the channels of expression and interpretation⁷⁴ for numerous

⁷² Islamist intellectuals make repeated references to an imagined umma in presenting their work and position. This point has been further evaluated by Olivier Roy in his *Globalised Islam: Fundamentalism, De-Territorialisation and the Search for a New 'Ummah*. London: C. Hurst, 2002.

⁷³ For an analysis on Islamists worldwide on the net see Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*, London: Pluto Press, 2003. See also See Anderson, Jon W. "The Internet and Islam's New Interpreters." *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson(eds), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

⁷⁴ There is an increasing amount of work discussing the possible links between “democratization” and the cyberspace. See for instance Poster, M. 1995. “Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the public sphere”, <http://www.hnet.uci.edu/mposter/writings/democ.html>. See also Ogden, M.R. 1994. “Politics in a parallel universe: Is there a future for cyberdemocracy?”, *Futures*, Vol. 26 (7), 713-729. The thesis has been extensively and critically explored in the context of the media by Douglas Kellner who argues that the new communication and media techniques are transforming every aspect of social life in a process that is creating new forms of society and new public spaces for existence. See D. Kellner, *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern*, Routledge: London, 2001.

identities hitherto disempowered by conventional bureaucracy⁷⁵. The new Islamists are part and parcel of the network society⁷⁶ rooted amidst global socio-economic structures of informational capitalism (Castells, 2000). All of these new media indicate how much the boundaries of the public sphere have indeed expanded.

5.2.5. Portraits of Islamist Intellectuals: Sezai Karakoç, Sadık Yalsızuçanlar, Rasim Özdenören and Mustafa İslamoğlu

Islamist intellectuals have frequently voiced a metaphysical gloom. It has been maintained that İsmail Hekimoğlu's statements thrive upon a discourse of sacrifice, death, martyrdom and heroism, where the male writer is attributed the role of a lonely fighter against the secularist machinery. There is doublespeak in that a private, individual and lonely call evolves into a public, political and collective propaganda. Interestingly, in the world of non-fiction, that is to say in the non-fictional essays penned by numerous new male Islamist intellectuals, it is the antagonistic Jalal dimension that becomes more audible whereas in the world of fiction, more often than not the Jamal dimension outweighs the Jalal.

There is an abundance of metaphors of death and apocalyptic symbols in Sezai Karakoç's poetry⁷⁷. Despite the abundance of metaphors of death and apocalyptic

⁷⁵ For an argument in this direction concentrating on the position of the individual or group on the net vis-à-vis centralized bureaucratic discourse, see Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.

⁷⁶ The effects of the internet on conservative groups has been said to connect the individual not only to Islamist networks but also to other social networks, including access to networks that facilitate marriage. See Janine Clark, *Faith, Networks, and Charity: Islamic Social Welfare Activism and the Middle Class in Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan* (Indiana University Press, 2003);

⁷⁷ See Sezai Karakoç's books. A close inspection of the titles chosen for his books will give a better idea. His poetry books are titled as follows. 1. Hızır'la Kırk Saat II: Taha'nın Kitabı/Gül Muştusu III: Körfez/Şahdamar/SeslerIV: Zamana Adanmış SözlerV: AyinlerVI: Leyla ile MecnunVII: Ateş Dansı VIII: Alın Yazısı Saati. His non-fiction books however are titled with quite a different mood and tone. See the following: Ruhun Dirilisi(The Resurgence of the Soul), Kiyamet Asisi (The Injection of Apocalypse), İnsanlığın Dirilisi (The Resurrection of Humanity), İslamın Dirilisi (The Resurgence of Islam), Dirilis Mustusu/Heralding the Resurrection, Awakening After Death(Olumden Sonra Kalkis), The Manifesto of the Generation of Resurrection, The Call of Our Fate, Forgetting and Remembering.

symbols underneath, the author's voice is life-driven⁷⁸. Nonetheless, this metaphysical gloom in the writings of the new male Islamist intellectuals needs to be studied further. (Özdenören, 1983, 2002; Karakoç: 2000) This gloom is not unmixed⁷⁹ mostly since the blend mentioned before resurfaces both artistically and rhetorically, blending the East and the West, the traditional and the modern.⁸⁰ Sadık Yalsızuçanlar's writing and style is a case in point. While his writing is heavily loaded with Ottoman words and Islamic concepts, Yalsızuçanlar has also been using a variety of Western writers, including Borges and Wittgenstein. Yalsızuçanlar also speaks about the need for avant-garde. In all these works the writer visibly connects his writing style to the fables and tales of the Eastern world. Religious themes from the Qur'an are reiterated. At the same time the expression of One Thousand and One Nights is carried out. Thus, both traditional gender roles are reproduced in the book and yet at the same time a high power attributed to women and femininity. In addition to these, many themes and patterns of Sufi thought are visible in his writing. The Sufi aspiration for transcendence is a constant theme.⁸¹

Karakoç, Yalsızuçanlar and Özdenören all write with a particular receiver audience in mind and situate their act of writing along this mission. The traits visible in their fiction is also echoed in not only the poetry but also the non-fiction of Mustafa

⁷⁸ I borrow "the drive for death" from Zygmunt Bauman who reinterprets the 'modern' and 'postmodern' as 'legislative' and "interpretative". He maintains that in postmodernity this interpretative frame of mind undermines the legislative function. Interestingly, he associates the latter with thanatos while the interpretative reason with libido. Thanatos is the drive for death and as such, Bauman's analysis is also a reference to intrinsic corrosive dynamics of the postmodern era. See Zygmunt Bauman, "Philosophical Affinities of Postmodern Sociology," *Sociological Review* 38, 1990: 411-444.

⁷⁹ For the systematic employment of Ottoman words, mystical concepts and religious metaphors within modern genres see for instance Sadık Yalsızuçanlar's writing, including *Tövbe ve İstiğfar Günlüğü*, İstanbul: Tımas, 2004; Halvet Der Ercümen. For a direct assessment on a *Turkish loaded heavily with Ottoman words*, see also by the same author *Unsuru'l Belagat'a İlişkin Notlar*, İstanbul: Gelenek, 2004.

⁸⁰ For more information on the author's personal views see an interview with him ZAMAN, 09.07.2003.

⁸¹ For a prominent example as to how this jargon is being employed by contemporary intellectual see for instance Sadık Yalsızuçanlar's poetic stories. *Risale-i Nur Öyküleri: Bir Yolcunun halleri*, Gelenek, 2002, İstanbul; *Öyküler Kitabı*, Gelenek, İstanbul, 2003. Also see Gerçeği İnciten papağan and Halvet Der Encümen. The theme of transcendence is a recurrent pattern herein. "Sonra...çiçek satan kız kendini satan kadın oluyorum ellerimdeki çılgın saçlarımla müzik oluyorum..." (Öyküler Kitabı, 2003, p. 236)

Islamoglu who laments that “religious language” has been wiped out in Turkey⁸² and now Islamist intellectuals need to concoct their language. I should note here that the concept of writing for a greater cause⁸³ is yet another cultural pattern throughout Turkish history –a pattern that crosscuts ideological divides and generations. Writing with a mission was a central component in the writings of the late Ottoman male elite and a feature that never ceased to exist from that point on on. Today’s Islamist male intellectual continues that tradition in many ways; he writes not for the nation as the Kemalist does, but instead for Islam. In the style of writing, it is hard to distinguish him from the Kemalist since both write within a paternal relationship with their readers. The need to “educate” the masses has also led the Islamist male intellectual to the genre of theatre plays⁸⁴, which can be performed even in small towns and to large audiences. The new Islamist male intellectual is aware of the need to develop a critical Islamist theory, one that does not echo the more traditional forms of interpretation and interpellation.

Now more than ever, not only the text, but the context has become significant for the Islamist intellectual in Turkey. In more traditional ways of reading and interpreting, almost all the attention is devoted to the text and to its authoritative command where questions such as who is interpreting the text, where would the text be applied are utterly ignored. The sacred text is thought to extend beyond the reach of time and place. The new male Islamist intellectual stretches himself between the text and the context, following Barthes’ notion that the reception of a text is as important as its production (Barthes, 1968), while knowingly or unknowingly searching the terrain of an Islamic

⁸² His essays being loaded with both Quranic verses, Ottoman lexicon, mythical jargon and themes characterizing contemporary political discourse Islamoglu’s non-fictional writing is a hybrid and his emphasis on language is stark as to develop an alternative language is a crucial endeavor for the writer. “Yeni bir din dili elbette gerekli. Mevcut din dili modern insanın anlayamayacağı garip bir 'kuş dili'ne dönüşmüş durumda.” 1.1. 2000. Yeni Safak.

⁸³ For example the Islamist poet Abdurrahim Karakoc says he has made a “promise” and should thereby keep writing to fulfill this responsibility. The act of writing becomes a noble cause, an almost sacrosanct activity for a greater or collective cause rather than an individual choice.

⁸⁴ For a case in point see for instance Rasim Özdenören, *Denize Açılan Kapı*, 1983. For a discussion on Özdenören’s “theatre plays to be read” and “theatre plays to be played” see Ahmet Demirhan’s analysis on Rasim Özdenören, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce- İslamcılık*, ibid, p. 763.

hermeneutics, through the detours and twists of implication (Derrida, 1989) like a range of Islamist thinkers have been doing outside Turkey⁸⁵.

5.2.6. A Continuity in Jargon and Said-i Nursi In their own searches into the past, various new Islamist intellectuals in Turkey have also brought to the forefront the writings and teachings of previous Islamist leaders, who throughout the Republican era, especially during its early decades, had either been marginalized or pushed to the periphery. Among these figures, Said-i Nursi's legacy occupies an exclusive position. Mardin notes that "While Said used components of this discourse (of rhetoric) (the position of an *alim* -a learned cleric- the figure of a Saint, the tradition which opposed pious Muslim to "Pharaoh", the style of the mystics, etc.) he also transformed it." (Mardin, 1989: 163) It might be argued that up to a certain extent this legacy facilitated its being transformed and rekindled in modern times. As Şerif Mardin claims Nursi's language was "...a conceptualization of social relations as personalistic, a folk cosmology with imagistic moorings, and an allusive, obscure, highly metaphorical rhetoric." (Mardin, 1989: 163) In this sense it is interesting to note the continuity between this particular rhetoric and that of Necip Fazıl,⁸⁶ which makes the argument that Necip Fazıl was a "man without theoretical ancestors", the instigator of an utterly new tradition dubious(Özdenören, 2004: 143).

⁸⁵ Outside Turkey, one female intellectual who tries to bridge the text and the context is Amina Wadud. She challenges the basic epistemology and methodology stamped in more traditional Islamist movements asking what distinguishes the modernist-Islamist rereading from more traditional-Islamist rereadings? Strikingly, Wadud notes that "tafsir [historical and contemporary commentary] is (hu)man-made and, therefore, subject to human nuances, peculiarities, and limitations" (Wadud 2000:11). That said, she proceeds further by arguing that the "...divine will is always in the process of becoming, humankind can only hope to gain direction toward that will by likewise being in process, never complete" (Wadud 2000, 11). This opens the doors to "interpretation as an ongoing, open-ended process". It brings us directly to the hermeneutical literature in which a text is open to various interpretations each of which drag along a particular tradition of rereading. See Amina Wadud, *Qur'an and Woman: rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.

⁸⁶ I argue that in addition to palpable ideological affinities there are rhetorical bridges between the new male Islamist intellectuals and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, and then between the latter and Said-i Nursi and it is necessary to pay special attention to aesthetics, rhetorics and to the jargon of Islamic mysticism to decipher these continuities. See in this regard especially Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *O ve Ben, Büyük Doğu yayınları*, İstanbul, 1978. See also, M. Orhan Okay, *Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı*, Ankara, 1987.

Rhetoric has always been important in Islamist discourse and in this sense there is a detectable cultural continuity in time as well. As Lewis notes “Much that in other faiths is expressed through art and music is, in Islam, expressed through the word, giving verbal communication a unique importance” (Lewis, 1988: 10) Nonetheless, at present, words and concepts of both the Islamic lexicon and Western culture are combined by the new Muslim intellectual to attain new productions of meaning and to “write the speech of the supposed imaginary Other”.⁸⁷ Interestingly, in the essays and speeches of the new Islamist intellectuals, Said-i Nursi’s teachings are cited side by side with Franz Fanon, Jean Paul Sartre, or Tolstoy. At the core of this endeavor lies too often the resistance against one particular reform of the Kemalist era: the language reform⁸⁸. As Dilipak states, “what does it mean in a land when thought is an offense, when your words and writings can put you on the witness stand as a defendant, when books are criminalized, when the intelligentsia are all viewed as potential criminals, and when fewer than seven million out of our population of seventy million people read newspapers?” (Dilipak-Yurdatapan, 2003: 133) This is not to say that they possess a language that is rigidly isolated from the language of the rest of the society. On the contrary, through written and visual media, everyday life codes and expressions, all social groups are doled out bits and pieces of the same language. Accordingly, writing needs to be seen as “a form of activity inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers (which is) largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which it is embedded” (Eagleton, 1983: 216) And yet at the same time, this does not defy the fact that there is a certain semiotics that has been burgeoning amidst a variety of Islamist discourses. According to Göle, having this lexicon is so vital that “the Islamic body, which resists secularization... shows its difference with western modernism by using different semantics.” (Göle, 1999: 136) This lexicon does not solely entail words or concepts, expressions or an alternative lexis, it also swathes a whole set of gestures and bodily postures. Göle further states that “the hierarchy of genders and age are marked

⁸⁷ This is the process Kristeva discusses with the concept of “intertextuality”; Bakhtin associates with the notion of “appropriation”; Berlin understands as a “social-epistemic rhetoric”.

⁸⁸ For a critical account of the language reform, Sun-Language theory and the Language Society that had been pivotal themes and actors in early republican history, see Geoffrey M. Lewis, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*, Oxford: Oxford University, 1999.

out clearly, and differences are accentuated, furthermore, fine gestures of the body are subject to discipline and religious knowledge.” (Göle, 1999: 136)

In a similar vein, İter Turan points out how Islamist discourse produces a terminology of its own and in turn, thrives on this by defining religion as a source of symbols and meanings. He notes that “a person who dies in battle for the cause of religion is *sehit* and goes directly to heaven. Now this symbol has been borrowed from religious vocabulary, and is used to describe any public servant who dies in the course of public duty; in this way, government services are elevated to the level of God’s cause. This also is a practice of civic religion, and state co-opting religion. Similarly, Friday sermons are used to invite citizens to engage in acts supportive of government.” (Turan, 1991:42) The convergence of political terms with religious ones was also observed by Arat in her work on various Islamist women’s organizations. Here, too, “because the party was believed to be propagating a religiously sanctified world view, women who obeyed the party hierarchy (which curtailed their power) were serving God.” (Y. Arat, 1999: 61)

Significantly, this particular jargon draws its power from not only begetting its own symbols, but also from attacking the symbols of the “Other”. In this continuous discussion, if not condemnation, “women and sexuality” once again emerge as a burning issue. As Acar maintains, “the Kemalist elite emphasized women’s emancipation as a sign of the country’s level of secularism and modernity, and equated the two latter concepts with social justice and individual happiness. Significantly, a denial of this equation is used in the ideological discourse of Islamic revivalism in Turkey for mobilizing women: secularism and modernity, perceived as the twin evils of contemporary life, are particularly blamed for the misery and unhappiness of womankind.” (Acar, 1991: 282) Concomitantly, certain concepts⁸⁹ are plucked, redefined and then vilified. Likewise, the Ottoman past is constantly re-imagined by the

⁸⁹ “Feminism”, no doubt is one such word. The term is not held dear in Islamist circles. Interestingly numerous women in “Islamist circles” have questioned the ways in which Islamist male intellectuals have approached the legacy of Western feminism. See Yeni Şafak, “Hakkımızı Geri Alacağız”, March 10, 2000.

new male Islamist intellectuals less within a neo-fundamentalist discourse than within a tradition that dates back to at least as far as Yahya Kemal⁹⁰.

Interestingly, some subgroups in the Islamist community also employ humor as a political tool⁹¹. Thanks to the new media techniques Islamist youth is increasingly interjecting parody and laughter into traditional discourse. The language of humor⁹² herein, however, is fed more by the general cultural pool in Turkey than by a secluded subculture's jargon and the necessities of Islamist ethics⁹³. The contemporary Islamist movement in Turkey would like to create, it has been just the opposite from the very start, being characterized largely by interpenetration and dialogical relation (Göle, 2002).

The writings of Özel, Yalsızuçanlar, Karakoç and Özdenören contribute to the assertion that gendered metaphors are also employed in the writings of Turkish male intellectuals regardless of where they are situated along the Islamist-Kemalist continuum. As in the writings of numerous Turkish intellectuals, including Tanpınar, the text and subject are subtly or overtly feminized and so is the Muse inspiring it⁹⁴. Mind

⁹⁰ Yahya Kemal was one of the most vociferous critics of Turkey's detachment from the past in the name of Westernization and modernization. He repeatedly maintained that "a nation with some character" would and could not detach itself from the past, imitate the West and turn a blind eye to its own traditions and cultural distinctiveness. Many of the sayings of Yahya Kemal largely resonate with what the new Islamist male intelligentsia is claiming today.

⁹¹ One prominent example in this vein is the rise of Islamist cartoon books. Interestingly there is new satire targeting the secularist political/cultural elite's fear of the rise of Islam. For more on the latter theme see Yael Navaro-Yashin in İstanbul: Yerellik ile Küresellik Arasında, *ibid*.

⁹² I find the recent interest in "humor" among the Islamist circles interesting both as a "new space to critically voice their concerns" by both duplicating and refraining from the "heroic-Muslim" or "victim-Muslim" discourse. Over the last years the cartoonist Hasan Kaçan has come to the fore as both inside the conventional humor media and not quite a part of it due to his "Islamist" identity and image.

⁹³ The new Islamist intellectuals are discussing the prospects of humor in Islamist circles. For an interesting assessment on this point see Ahmet Turan Alkan's comparison of "conventional/secularist humor" and "periphery/Islamist humor" without using these words but instead using the "us" and "them" pattern. See the following by the same writer: "Gırgırcıların işi kolaydı; çünkü onlar için sıradan ve son derece tabii gibi görünen şeyler bizim için tabu idi; belden aşağı espri ve fıkra kullanamazdık, cinsi hayatla veya kadın bedeni ile ilgili karikatüre yeltenemezdik, argo ağzı ile küfürbazlık edemezdik. Burada çok mat, renksiz ve donuk kalıyorduk. Halbuki bu kabil ucuzluğa tevessül etmeden de mizah yapmanın bir yolu olmalıydı". See Ahmet Turan Alkan, "Mizah Dergimiz Yok Çünkü Gülmek Bizi Bozuyor", *Aksiyon*, no: 505, 09.27.2004.

⁹⁴ Nurdan Gürbilek draws attention to the symbol of Ophelia in Tanpınar's writing and what this docile, pure, untainted feminine figure of inspiration meant in the eyes of the male author. For this

and intellect are deemed to be manly features, whereas woman is associated with emotions, body, carnality and oftentimes nature, thus repeating the central duality of Western thought. It is interesting to note that the mind-body duality of Western thought reverberates in the writings of even the most *anti-Western* conservative Turkish elite⁹⁵. This same combination, though very visible in the writings of the Islamist/conservative intellectuals, is by no means solely confined to them⁹⁶. Turkish male writers at different locations of the ideological spectrum regard writing a male activity⁹⁷ all the way back to the late Ottoman period.

What is particularly interesting for my purposes here is that all too often, gendered metaphors are employed in the name of idealizing, venerating women -- not in the name of discriminating against them, even though the latter is often the end-result. While the subject of writing is deemed to be “male”, for instance, the object of writing is most commonly feminized. Blending the modernist aesthetics with concern for the heritage of the past, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar,⁹⁸ for instance, declared that Istanbul should be seen and loved like a woman. Literary critics have pointed out that “the love for a woman” and ‘the love for the city’ is intertwined in Tanpınar’s writing⁹⁹. Feminizing Istanbul is a constant pattern in Turkish literature and one that forms an undercurrent from Ottoman era to Republican era. The pattern is encountered in the writings of the

interesting analysis see Nurdan Gürbilek, “Kurumuş Pınar, Kör Ayna, Kayıp Şark: Tanpınar”da Ophelia, Su ve Rüyalar”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, ibid, pp. 410-438.

⁹⁵ For a book case in point see Rasim Özdenören, *Ruhun Malzemeleri*, İstanbul: Risale, 1986.

⁹⁶ For instance Nurullah Ataç’s writings are heavily loaded with metaphors some of which are explicitly gendered. In Ataç’s scheme, men are always after cerebral work and intellect, which though sophisticated can be tiresome sometimes. At these times Ataç prefers to be in the company of women, who are “by nature” not as much cerebral and therefore more ‘natural’. “Kadınlar arasında ise boyuna nükteli, cinaslı konuşmak isteyen azdır. Onlar çok şükür zekaya erkek kadar itibar etmezler.” (Nurullah Ataç, *Günlerin Getirdiği: Karalama Defteri*, İstanbul: Varlık, 1967, p. 81)

⁹⁷ Oftentimes it is taken for granted that “author” is “male”. See for instance the Islamist intellectual Nuri Pakdil’s definition of writing: “Niçin yazıyoruz? Nedir amacı kalemi elimize alışımızın? Bir kadın doğum yapar sancının sonu muştudur, yazarın da cümleleri öyle.” Cited in Işık Yanar-Abdullah Topçuoğlu, “Nuri Pakdil”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce, İslamcılık*, ibid. p. 849.

⁹⁸ H. B. Kahraman sees A. H. Tanpınar as a writer who pines for establishing, if not recovering, the aesthetic dimension of conservative modernization in Turkey. See H. B. Kahraman, “Yitirilmemiş Zamanın Ardında: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar ve Muhafazakar Modernliğin Estetik Düzlemi”, *Doğu Batı*, no:11, 2000.

⁹⁹ Fethi Naci, for instance, maintains that the love depicted in *Huzur* is not only the male writer’s love toward a woman but also the love toward a (feminized) Istanbul.(Naci, p. 174)

earlier Turkish male elite, including Cemil Meriç's work¹⁰⁰ for whom the West-East question is not only an ideological issue, but also an ontological one¹⁰¹. Hence there are common concerns that constantly crosscut the ideological boundaries among Turkish male intellectuals¹⁰². An interesting pattern emerges between the late Ottoman and Islamist male elites as well; the familiar mode of thought widely encountered in the writings of the late Ottoman elite –as elaborated in Chapter Two- attributes spirituality to the Eastern world –a pattern visible in the writings of contemporary Islamist thinkers (Özdenören, 1987; Bulaç, 1993; Özel, 1992; Dilipak:1990)., ascribes materialism and insatiability to what it deems “femininity”and ends up feminizing the Western world.¹⁰³

5.2.7. Shared Concepts Hence it is through the cultural analysis of words and the ways in which particular lexicons are generated and then disseminated that gender ideology and its ramifications arer deciphered and interpreted. It is also there that national ideology, gender ideology and religious ideology get entangled. To give a prominent example on how the three interlock, “*bacı*”¹⁰⁴ is a most simple and yet at the

¹⁰⁰ Cemil Meriç's writing is replete with gendered metaphors. Selected examples include the following: “kitaplar kadınlara benzer... Her kitapta kendimizi okuruz. Kendimizle yatarız her kadında. Kitaplar kadınlar şehirler metruk kervansaraylar gibi boş. Onları dolduran senin kafan, senin gönlün”. Needless to say the taken-for-granted active subject here is male. The object is feminized. Cemil Meriç, *Bu Ülke*, Collected works, vol: 2, İletişim, İstanbul, 1992, p. 260. Other examples include: “kaçıyorsun, erkekçe çalışmaktan korkuyorsun” (Meriç, 1992: 46) Or see the following: “yığın kadındır. İrzini teslim edecek bir zorba arar. Çobansız rahat edemeyen kaz sürüsü...” (Meriç, 1992: 287)

¹⁰¹ See Kadir Cangızbay, “Cemil Meriç Üzerine”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Mufazakarlık*, ibid, p. 533. His depiction of the role of the intellectual was “conscious-raising” which he defined as “beyin tokatlamak”. Meriç regarded this intellectual figure with an important social-cultural mission to perform as necessarily male.

¹⁰² For a study that focuses on these overlapping features see Orhan Koçak, “Ataç, Meriç, Caliban, Bandung-Evrensellik ve Kısmilik Üzerine Bir Taslak”, in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*, Sabahattin Sen(ed), İstanbul: Bağlam, 1995.

¹⁰³ The pattern of associating femininity-materialism-mechanistic society-Westernism while identifying respectively defeminization-spirituality-collectivistic society- East as opposed to these proves repetitive in Turkish literature and can be traced back from Şinasi's writings to Ercümen Ekrem Talu's novels. For the former see Jale Parla, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, 1990, p. 15. For the latter see especially his *Asriler* (1922). Other examples include Peyami Safa's novels, particularly *Sözde Kızlar* (1925), and Canan (1925); Samet Ağaoğlu's *Büyük Aile* (1957), and Samet Ağaoğlu's *Strazburg Hatıraları* (1944).

¹⁰⁴ Literally meaning “sister” the implications of “*bacı*” goes far beyond this definition. Interestingly, the same notion has been employed by both rightist/conservative circles and leftist/revolutionary forces in Turkey to designate a woman disconnected from any sexual connotations and detached from femininity.

same time a highly ambiguous term. *Bacı* entails untouchability, chastity and modesty, thus denigrating the kind of a woman that is being addressed¹⁰⁵. At different junctures in Turkey's history, the term has been employed with essentially the same overtone by nationalist, leftist¹⁰⁶ and Islamist groups. The Kemalist comrade-woman (Durakbaşa, 1988) and the Islamist-*bacı* share the same ground: both are de-feminized, de-sexualized and transformed into “wombs without bodies” in the name of serving a greater cause, in one case the nation, in the other Islam.

Interestingly, there are striking similarities between Turkey and the Soviet Union in this respect as well. In the latter too the urge to create a comrade-woman went hand in hand with detachment from the past and the distancing of another, “Other” woman mostly associated with the pre-revolutionary era. The so-much required Other of the comrade-woman was the Baba in Russia¹⁰⁷, the Concubine in Turkey. Baba represented ‘woman serving reproduction’ (Wood, 1997) whereas comrade-women represented de-sexualized women serving the state and nation. The word “*bacı*” fit into the legacy of Kemalist comrade-woman, and into the already existing ‘de-feminization of culture from late Ottoman era onward, in her de-sexualized, venerated, de-feminized narrative. It then penetrated contemporary politics only to be employed by a myriad of actors, including Kemalists, Islamists, and nationalists as a lasting metaphor¹⁰⁸ to differentiate venerated women from womanly woman¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁵ For a different assessment on the importance and transformation of the word see Cihan Aktaş, *Bacıdan Bayana-İslamcı Kadınların Kamusal Alan Tecrübesi*, İstanbul :Pınar, 2001.

¹⁰⁶ The position of women in leftist movements in Turkey has been critically evaluated in the period following 1980. See Fatmagül Berktaş. 1989. "Türkiye Solu'nun Kadına Bakışı: Değişen Bir Şey Var mı?" See also Nükhet Sirman, “Feminism in Turkey: A Short History”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 1989, 3(1), pp. 1-34.

¹⁰⁷ For an interesting study in this regard see Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*, Indiana: Bloomington, 1997.

¹⁰⁸ For instance, when Tansu Çiller became the Prime Minister the term “*bacı*” was frequently used for her, and by her. For a few examples see Hikmet Cetinkaya, “Gerçek”, 22 July 1996, *Cumhuriyet*; Derya Sazak, *Meçhul Çete Anıtı*, 13.04.1997, *Milliyet*.

¹⁰⁹ See for instance Cihan Aktaş's books, including Cihan Aktaş, *Kadının Serüveni, Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, İstanbul: Girişim, 1986. Also by the same author *Bacıdan Bayana*, İstanbul: Pınar, 2001. The latter is especially noteworthy to see how the term “*bacı*” is embraced and venerated in Islamist discourse. The author laments the loss of “*Bacı*” (*Bacı*, Anadolu insanı için sosyal hayatta akraba veya akrabalık dışı kadın ve erkek ilişkilerinin sıcak, masum ve güvenilir yönünü temsil ediyordu. Tesettür kadının kamusal alanda insan kimliğini netleştirmek üzere, cinsel bir nesne olarak algılanmasına izin vermemek şartıyla

Most of the terms of endearment for Islamists derive from family life¹¹⁰; Muslims are brothers, sisters or the venerated elder are *dede, baba*, thus reviving the old *tariqat* idioms. This particular employment of the language, however, is in no sense pertinent to the Islamists and, as a matter of fact, can be detected in almost every segment of the society regardless of their position in the ideological spectrum. Therefore, interestingly, while each side in the Islamist-Kemalist divide purports to hold its position firmly and independently, and even though the Islamist movement tries hard to rekindle an idiom and make it its own as it tries to combine the traditional and the modern, and opposes the Kemalist language reform, one can still argue that the words, concepts, expressions and names¹¹¹ within *language games* (Mardin, 2002) do transcend ideological boundaries, thus making it possible for the society to retain the potential for co-existence even at those moments when it seems to be polarized . I shall now turn to test my claim that Islamists and Kemalists share and draw from the same cultural repertoire in very similar ways by undertaking critical readings of the selected writings of numerous Islamist intellectuals.

Along the Islamist-Kemalist divide in Turkey, if one focuses not on the differences of the social actors themselves but rather on the cultural spaces they occupy, I argue here, that the divide turns into a continuum as similarities between them overpower their differences. This is a consequence not only of the common culture where both reside, and the social context Republican Kemalism created that contained the Islamic element even though Kemalism tried so hard to get rid of it, but also a consequence of the fact that the public sphere in which they operate has also changed tremendously in the last two decades. One notable cluster of actors that became

ilişkilere girebileceğini anlatır.) Compare this with the Kemalist discourse on one of the earliest women pilots of the Republican Era, Bedriye Tahir who was re-named as Gökmen Bacı. She has been extensively praised as a symbol of non-sexual woman serving her nation and state sidebyside with men but without ever becoming sexual. See İffet Halim, “Türk Kızlarında Havacılık Sevgisi ve Başarı Hasleti”, in *Havacılık ve Spor*, 1933.

¹¹⁰ In a highly motivating study Shapiro challenges and questions the neoconservative assumption of a natural flow and bond between the traditional family life and civic life by exploring the ways in which words are employed and the family “space” is perceived. See Michael Shapiro, *For Moral Ambiguity National Culture and the Politics of the Family*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

¹¹¹ The effect of naming and the individual’s emotional attachments to these as factors in the shaping of public opinion has been studied at a relatively early time by Walter Lippmann. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York: Macmillan, 1922.

increasingly visible in this sphere is composed of the so-called “new” Islamist intellectuals, an Islamist elite separate not only from the Kemalists, but also from the contemporary Islamist political elite. One could make the argument that it is among these intellectuals that one can locate a discursive practice that refutes the Islamist-Kemalist continuum I have so far established. Yet, as demonstrated below, I argue that neither the views of these Islamist intellectuals, especially in relation to gender issues, nor their communal role is as “new” as the cultural space they started to fill in the post-1980 environment.

5.2.8. Nostalgia One other feature persistently visible in the writings of the conservative cultural elite is the individual’s position vis-à-vis the legacy of the past. The stages of modernization the society underwent also dragged along a desire to conserve and an endeavor on the part of the cultural elite to search for a *future rooted in the past*¹¹². In the previous chapters the late Ottoman male elite’s frequent employment of the theme of the “family” and *konak* life has been discussed. It is interesting to see the same imagery survive throughout the following generations of the republican era. Thus, for instance, in Samet Ağaoğlu’s *Büyük Aile* (1957) *konak* is the microcosm of the Ottoman order. In Kenan Rifai’s *Yolcu Nereye gidiyorsun* (1944) the dissolution of the family symbolizes the dissolution of the system at large. In Semiha Ayverdi’s *Ibrahim Efendi Konağı* (1964) the trajectory of a family reflects the trajectory of the greater social order. As the members of the family break apart so does the late Ottoman order. Nostalgia¹¹³ is a discourse that crosscuts ideological division or generations, it too often

¹¹² Kökü Mazide Olan Atı-A Future Rooted in the Past was the motto of a wide range of intellectuals starting with Yahya Kemal and A. H. Tanpınar. The original verse is as follows: Ne harabi, ne harabatiyim/ Kökü Mazide Olan Atiyim

¹¹³ An example to the point is Ahmet Turan Alkan’s writing, especially his *Altıncı Şehir* (Kaybettiğimiz bütün insan ilişkileri, bütün eski doku... bu bedeli öderken birileri bizi fena halde aldattı galiba; zaman zaman kendimi eski ama nefis bir saray tombağını, uyduruk, zevksiz ve ucuz bir alüminyum ibrikle değiştirmeye razı olan biri gibi hissediyorum, Alkan, 1992:157). For an enriching study on how nostalgia and conservatism are fused in Turkish history see Tanıl Bora and Burak Onbaran, *Nostalji ve Muhafazakarlık: “Mazi Cenneti” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol:5, *Muhafazakarlık*, ibid, pp. 234-260.

merges with a yearning for the large household based on the father's order. The conservative/Islamist elite oftentimes write with a feeling and resentment of "loss"¹¹⁴.

In the process of monologizing, modernizing and de-feminizing the culture the Kemalist elite of the early Republican era forged an "either... or..." scheme which engendered a sense of loss and an aesthetics of loss (Gürbilek, 2004:431) on the part of numerous elite, one of the most vociferous of whom has been A. H. Tanpınar¹¹⁵. Increasing number of writers from different ideological corners and in separate generations have yearned for being "both traditional and modern" or "both Eastern and Western" rather than following an either... or... scheme¹¹⁶. In pursuing the continuities in Turkish cultural history it is essential to take into account what Ayvazoğlu named as "the resistance of tradition"¹¹⁷ -a drift which had accompanied Turkey's cultural history all along but was most visibly revealed in post-1980s. The revival of traditions, seen as neo-Ottomanism by some (Çetinsaya, 2004: 380), has been a component of Turkey's cultural fabric and increasingly so after Özal.

5.2.9. Common Cultural Pool and Populism While making "writing" an act for a bigger cause is by no means solely germane to the conservative author, populism composes one of the many traits shared by secularist and Islamist elite. I will argue that the most explicit gendered discourse of populist ideology revolves around "peasant woman" or "non-urban ordinary woman". Both the Kemalist and the Islamist discourse have portrayed, if not praised, Anatolian/rural woman as devoid of the feminine,

¹¹⁴ N.F.Kısakürek's accusations against A.E.Yalman provide significant clues with respect to this matter as the former accuses the latter of "selling the soul of the nation via beauty contests". Interestingly Kısakürek phrases the nation as a woman whose modesty and chastity is in danger due to over-Westernization and over-Westernized elite. For more on Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's masculinist nationalist rhetoric see Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Doğru Yolun Sapık Kolları*, İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 2000.

¹¹⁵ Tanpınar's writing, both fiction and non-fiction is replete with quests for the possibility of "both...and..." rather than "either...or..." For a clear example see *Huzur* in which the rupture between the past and the present is critically, forlornly explored.

¹¹⁶ For further examples in this regard see Samet Ağaoğlu, *Strazburg Hatıraları* (1944); Ercumend Ekrem Talu, *Asriler* (1922); Orhan Seyfi Orhon, *Çocuk Adam*(1942); Ziya Osman Saba, *Mesut İnsanlar Fotoğrafhanesi* (1952).

¹¹⁷ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, *Geleneğin Direnişi*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 1996. See also Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, *Türk Politik Kültürü*, İstanbul: Alfa, 2000.

materialist, mundane ways of urban woman. This constitutes yet another continuity in time¹¹⁸, and an overlapping in today's ideological spectrum. As Bora and Erdogan point out conservative populism sees the people as an organic whole and venerates them as the protectors of the tradition (Bora and Erdogan, 2004:632). The authors also lay emphasis on the thin line between Kemalist populism and conservative populism.

That said over the last decades it was the new Islamist male intellectual that played a crucial role in the "translation" between the past and the present, as well as the periphery and the center, constantly ferrying the idioms of contra-modernity and modernity into one another. In tracking down the cultural translation the Islamist male intellectuals engaged in, it is crucial to underline how the focus of the cultural approach on the discursive practices of the Kemalists and Islamists in relation to modernity, gender and especially masculinities has revealed significant similarities between them. First and foremost, Islamist/conservative and Kemalist discursive practices originate from and in return, contribute to the same political culture, thereby deriving their metaphors, if not codes and values, from a common cultural pool¹¹⁹. There are stark differences between the two sides when it comes to "women's issues", such as the veil, but much less difference when it comes to male gender roles and masculinities (Z. Arat, 1997). Therefore, I have stated that significant overlaps between these supposed "opposites" occur especially on less elaborated issues, particularly in relation to the depiction of male gender roles. In engaging in this cultural reading, I contend that these texts need to be read against the boundaries drawn in front of them not only by the Kemalist secularist elite, but also by the more traditional lexicon of Islam. The unrestrained eclecticism of the Islamist male intellectuals do not equally exist in the discursive practices of the Islamist female cultural elite that is simultaneously wedged

¹¹⁸ Examples in this regard are abundant. Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti criticizes the Kemalist elite for failing to appreciate the grandeur of Turkish people. "Biz bir türlü yer, bir türlü içer, bir türlü konuşuyoruz. Tıpkı sabırlı, çilekeş halkımız, tıpkı aziz ve sevgili Anadolumuz gibi. Halbuki siz çeşit çeşit, renk renk, türlü türlü adamlarsınız!" (Serdengeçti, 1992:92)

¹¹⁹ This cultural pool is highly heterosexist in its jargon. The word "sapıklık" is used by both secularist and Islamist male writers to designate homosexuality. That the word is not solely confined to conservative circles is an important point to notice. For an example in this regard see İsmet Zeki Eyuboğlu, *Divan Şiirinde Sapık Sevgi*, İstanbul: Broy, 1992.

between two forms of dominion, the Kemalist secular structures and the conservative Islamists males (Çakır, 2002). The Islamist discursive practice also revealed that distinction between “femininity” and “womanhood” constitutes yet another commonality between the two sides in the Islamist-Kemalist continuum.

I conclude that one needs to theoretically approach these discourses as a Kemalist/Islamist power paradigm, a cultural hegemony that does not yield much public space new cultural practices, especially in the context of gender. This being the case, the next theoretical quandary became the problematic of whether there were any possibilities of trespassing/destabilizing this Kemalist/Islamist hegemony. It is in this context that I introduce Turkish Sufism to demonstrate how its construction and praxis continued elements that had the potential to totally turn existing gender hegemonies ‘upside down.’ Even though the potentially deconstructive elements inherent in Sufism may indeed destabilize the Kemalist/Islamist hegemony, there have not yet been adequate scholarly studies undertaken in this vein to attest its potential in this respect.

5.3. Fragments of Islam outside the Islamist-Secularist frame: Sufism

In the post-1980 context, as a number of Islamist intellectuals became more visible alongside the rising Islamist movement’s articulating its demands, the discursive practice revolving around religion and religiosity has become more fragmented and debated than ever before in Turkish cultural and political history. As Ayata claims, even though there had always been multicultural groups in Turkey, only recently has identity politics come to occupy a central role in the Turkish political system¹²⁰. Gradually but inexorably, questions such as “how compatible is an Islamist party with democracy and secularization?” have dominated the social agenda. Out of a social framework in which the “either...or...” scheme had hitherto been dominant, the last two decades have delivered a plethora of attempts on different parts “to be both...and...”. Could a woman

¹²⁰ In analyzing this process the author draws attention to a number of socioeconomic factors in the post-1980 climate, including the rise of liberal economy and the change in the urban-rural balance rate. See Ayşe Ayata, “Türkiye’de Kimlik Politikalarının Doğuşu” in 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul, 1998, p. 159.

both have a university education and be veiled? Could an Islamist party be both in power and refrain from applying the *shariat*? Could the new formations of Islamist intellectuals or businessmen exist side by side with others, or, put more directly, could these figures be in both Islamists and also within the democratic system? The course of events in Turkish political history has made it necessary, if not compelling, for Islamist intellectuals in Turkey to quickly find of moorings that are flexible enough to tie them to different bays at the same time.

As the talks between Turkey and the European Union entered a new stage, the question as to the compatibility of Islam with the West and Western values acquired an additional dimension. Within this multi-layered environment, the existing paradigmatic frames have been disintegrating. As Meeker notes, “Over the last decades a new kind of believer has emerged in Turkey”(Meeker, 1994:159), and along with it, a new kind of believing audience. More than ever before, this new audience is inclined toward syntheses that culturally always embody the same national education, a highly Western-influenced popular culture, and religiosity. As shown before, this eclectic stance is also visible in the discourse of the new male Islamist *literati*. According to Meeker, “in effect, both writer and reader are ‘Republican Muslims’, believers whose outlook has been decisively shaped by the secularist institutions of the Republic and the Westernizing of Turkish society.”(Meeker, 1994:162)

This relatively new and pliable stance and the contemporary need triggered by both domestic and international developments have made it necessary to reform, reconstruct, rephrase the Islamist discourse and, this in turn, has rekindled an interest in “alternative” interpretations of Islam, starting with *tasavvuf*, namely Islamic mysticism. While Islamic mysticism had always been an integral part of Turkish social and cultural history even after the Kemalist abolition of the *tariqas*, the issue has gained an additional importance today for those who want to challenge radical Islam, change the dominant practices in Muslim societies and want to render the Islamic culture more compatible with democracy, but, in addition, do all this much required transformation from within rather than from above or the outside. All these developments make it

necessary to take a closer look at Islamic mysticism, concentrating upon its philosophy, potential ramifications, and stance vis-a-vis male gender roles, for I will contend that it is within Islamic mysticism that an opportunity to develop a new Islamic course in better tune with modernity lies.

5.3.1. The Sufi Interpretation of Islam The mystical dimension of Islam is too-sweeping a title for such a profoundly meticulous and convoluted theme that has deeply intrigued numerous scholars¹²¹ from all over the world. How, where and with what particular implications did *tasawwuf(ilm-i batın)* become laced together with Ottoman/Turkish cultural history carries significant implications with respect to how religion was located in Turkey at various historical junctures. It is therefore vital to critically reread not only the existing literature, but also the absences or “mnemonic decapitations”¹²² which emerged especially in relation to Kemalist secularism. As Ahmet Yaşar Ocak¹²³ notes, Turkish Sufism today is less the subject of serious academic work than a topic of misinformed daily parlance and popular writings, most of which are far from being nurtured through any profound empirical analytical research. In an

¹²¹ A rich literature exists on the Sufi interpretation of Islam. For some selected works see for instance Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabi*, Princeton, 1969; Julian Baldick: *Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism*, New York University Press, New York, 1989; Annemarie Schimmel, *Deciphering the Signs of God*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1994. William, Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love: the Spiritual Teaching of Rumi*. N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1983. Lewis, Bernard, *Music of a Distant Drum: Classical Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Hebrew Poems*, Princeton Univ Pr, 2002. Lewis Franklin. *Rumi, Past and Present, East and West: the Life, Teachings and Poetry of Jalal al-Din Rumi*. Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications, 2000. Nicholson, R.A. *Tales of Mystic Meaning, Being Selections from the Mathnawi of Jalalud-Din Rumi*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1931. For a comprehensive study on the Bektashis see John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi order of Dervishes*, London, Hartford seminary press, 1937.

¹²² I use “absence” or mnemonic decapitation in the way Zerubavel uses the term to explore how language and rhetorics function to create islands of meaning in the construction of nation and collective memory. Forgetting and remembering are part of the “imagining of the past” and the epistemological tools used to analyze the latter. For more on this see Zerubavel’s works, especially the following Eviatar, Zerubavel, *The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; Eviatar, Zerubavel, “In the Beginning: Notes on the Social Construction of Historical Discontinuity,” *Sociological Inquiry* 63, 1993, pp. 457-59. I contend that seeing not only what a nation remembers but also what a nation forgets is important in analyzing tasavvuf in Turkey’s history to fathom how this legacy has been first dwindled and confined only to emerge in a different discourse and disguise, especially in the post 1980 environment.

¹²³ Ocak’s work has been highly influential and innovative in tracing back the Sufi genealogy, as well as the ways in which it was perceived by the orthodoxy. See especially Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, İstanbul, 1980; and Bektaşî Menakıbnamelerinde İslam Öncesi İnanç Motifleri, İstanbul, Enderun, 1983; and *Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar, İletişim*, İstanbul, 1996.

extensive study on Turkish Sufism, Ocak maintains that one fundamental reason behind this dusky condition lies the nature of historical knowledge production or, in this case, its lack, since professional historians have in the course of the last decades either failed or refused to work on the question of the relationship between “Turks and Islam” because of the symbolically heavy mantle of Turkish secularism; there therefore has not emerged a body of scientific knowledge on this extremely significant social issue that comprises the underbelly of Turkish modernity, and the lack of such knowledge in turn has prevented significant discussion on the subject matter in the public sphere. (Ocak, 1996:13) Ocak further claims that the more this question is approached without proper grounding in empirical research embedded in history, the easier it has become to subvert Islamic mysticism ideological and political purposes.

I shall attempt to summarize the main findings of scholars on the subject in an attempt to reconstruct the main points of Islamic mysticism so that I can the discursively analyze it in the context of the Kemalist-Islamist continuum. Undoubtedly, such a literature review needs to commence with Fuat Köprülü’s pathbreaking work¹²⁴. All throughout his academic trajectory, Köprülü has refrained from using the word “*rafizi*”¹²⁵ in referring to Islamic mystics and has instead employed the term “heterodox” or “*batinlik*” to define Turkish Sufism. His work has been continued by a small number of eminent scholars, starting with Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı¹²⁶ and Irene Melikoff¹²⁷. According to A. Y. Ocak, despite the pathbreaking works of these early scholars and the wider opportunities provided by contemporary academia, however, no similarly critical bulk of work has been produced by recent scholars (Ocak, 1996:27). Ocak claims this lack of contemporary research on the topic has been the Turkish cultural tendency to

¹²⁴ Fuat Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*, Ankara, Diy. İşl. Bşk. Yayınları, 1976, and “Ahmed Yesevi” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. It should also be noted that the latter work has been written after almost fifteen years and it reflects a substantial change in Köprülü’s approach.

¹²⁵ *Rafizi* was a term extensively employed in the Ottoman Empire to define and denigrate unorthodox understandings of Islam.

¹²⁶ Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı’s legacy has left a deep impact in the studies on Sufism. See especially his *Melamilik ve Melamiler*, İstanbul, 1931, and *Mevlana’dan sonra Mevlevilik*, İstanbul: İnkilap, 1983.

¹²⁷ The fact that Irene Melikoff’s studies have not been fully translated into Turkish has unfortunately made it difficult for Turkish readers to benefit from her researches for quite long time. See Irene Melikoff, *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, İstanbul, Cem, 1993.

associate “Islam with the history of Muslims”; he therefore proposes a triple conceptual distinction among Islam and *İslamiyet* (Islamhood) and *Müslümanlık* (Muslimhood). The first concept provides the theoretical and teleological framework of Islam; the second concept analyzes the way in which Muslims put this divine message into practice; and finally the third concept involves the different ways in which this format has been molded by differing practices across time and place. According to Ocak, “it is precisely because of this variation that there is no single Muslimhood, but instead various Muslimhoods.” (Ocak, 1996:15)

Here, following Ocak’s conceptualization, I propose to take into account these differing Muslimhoods in Turkey before I undertake a discursive analysis of the inherent relationship between “Islam and masculinity”. The Sufi Interpretation of Islam, with its utter reliance on inner knowledge and intuitive insight as opposed to outer meanings and rules, and with its emphasis on Jamal more than Jalal, spreads itself out over a terrain too voluminous and multifaceted to be decently explored in its fullness here. I therefore focus on the mystical dimension of Islam for three reasons. First, the Sufi legacy in Islam fully demonstrates that there is no single, monolithic Islam but rather different interpretations of it. This diversity is often ignored when many divergent meanings and practices under placed under the label “Islamist”. Such a multivalent portrayal of Islam is crucial to critically examine and destabilize the validity of the Kemalist-Islamist continuum. Second, in defining masculinity and the roles it assumes in Turkish society, the heterodox interpretation potentially and actually diverts from the orthodox tradition. Third and most significantly, the Sufi narrative has been a central component in the writings of especially the Islamist male elite¹²⁸ and therefore needs to be integrated into a discursive analysis of post-1980 Turkey. It was, after all, during this new phase that Sufism was “re-discovered” and re-kindled¹²⁹ not only by the Islamist intellectuals but

¹²⁸ Mysticism was a central or accompanying component in the writings of numerous male writers, including Nurettin Topçu, Remzi Oğuz Arık, Ziyaeddin Fahri and A. H. Tanpınar. It then penetrated into the poetry, fiction and non-fictional writings of the new Islamist male elite, including those of Sadık Yalsızuçanlar, Sezai Karakoç. It also penetrated into and shaped musical works of Mercan Dede, Ömer Faruk Tekbilek and Süleyman Erguner.

¹²⁹ On how the conservative side in Turkey “discovered” tasavvuf, see Beşir Ayvazoğlu’s column in Aksiyon, no: 214.

also popular icons¹³⁰ and the media¹³¹, as well as the secularist uppercrust¹³². Sufism has also been viewed by many secular intellectuals as a potentially “alternative form of religiosity” to that presented by Islamism, and discussions of Islamic mysticism have thus penetrated into secularist discourse¹³³ in this manner. Also Sufism, particularly Mevlevism which descends directly from Rumi’s thought, is today a foggy zone. I further argue in the following last chapter that the “imagined” Sufi discourse became part and parcel of the changing urban narratives that circulated in the post-1980 era to expand the public sphere.

Sufism is centuries old, and as such it has been an integral part of Islamic history right from the beginning. Though Islam has essentially germinated as a collectivistic religion and has thereby penetrated every aspect of social and individual life to achieve uniformity at these levels, “various other interpretations of the Islamic vision, however, from the start, developed and counterposed their readings to that of orthodoxy, even as it gained firm control and denounced alternative visions as heretical.”(Ahmed, 1992: 95). What needs to be highlighted here is that Sufism is a multifarious entity that branched

¹³⁰ For a striking example concerning how tasavvuf is embraced by “popular culture figures” recall the incidence of Yıldı(Yıldırım Benayyat), a talk show host with “seamy” jokes and language. At the peak of his popularity he came forward declaring that he had changed thanks to tasavvuf and was now more appreciative of love and life, and has stopped bad habits deemed of a bachelor man. See Hakikati Tasavvufta Buldum, Aksiyon, no: 219. For another example from popular culture see Özcan Deniz who too has declared he has discovered tasavvuf and has changed eversince. Özcan Deniz plays the character of a mystic/Sufi man in one of the most popular TV series in Turkey. For information on this see Tasavvuf Akımının Voltu Yükseliyor, Turkuaz, Zaman, 09.26.2004. The article also underlines the list of names in literature, music and arts in both conservative and non-conservative circles whom have been linked to the tradition of *tasavvuf* in different ways.

¹³¹ The number of publications with regards to Sufi understanding increased significantly after 1980s. For a sample of writings published in Islamist media see the following: Güner Tayuk, Hakikatte’ki Mistisizm, Aksiyon, no: 270; Hasan Kamil Yılmaz, “Tasavvufun gönül dünyasında kalbin zümrüt tepeleri”, Aksiyon, no: 364. For an interesting article written as a Sufi response to the secularists’ costume of celebrating Valentine’s Day (“Sevgililer Günü”), see Osman İridağ, “Din Aşkını da Aşık Olanları da Seviyor”, Aksiyon, no: 312.

¹³² There are numerous incidences that reveal how the uppercrust in Turkey is voicing its interest in tasavvuf, as it sees it. A case in point is the designer Zeynep Fadilloğlu who announced her attraction to tasavvuf which she claimed was the inspiration behind her designs. Accordingly she designed the furniture in a highly popular and luxurious restaurant in Istanbul, Ulus 29 as dervish turbans and has been using Mawlawi turbans in internal decoration. While it may be dubious how she and others like her are really involved in Sufi legacy and literature, it is nonetheless implicit that they have a desire to appropriate and rekindle the traits of this tradition, as they see it.

¹³³ To see an example as to how tasavvuf is re-kindled in this regard see an interview with Ahmet İnam, “Aydınlatma Görevi Müslüman Entellektüellere Geçti”, Aksiyon, No:475.

off in dissimilar ways and under diverse names throughout the Muslim lands over the course of history. As such, *tasavvuf* does not compose a detectably homogeneous venue in itself. Since the mystical culture is based on the idea of a “different interpretation”, one can safely assume that one of its epistemological keys is “hermeneutical”. Sufis own no dogmatic system of teachings and no single book of reference shared by all, except the holy Qur’an. The rudimentary postulate behind the Sufi mode of thought, however, is that there are many paths, *tarikât*¹³⁴, along which to seek God, and the number of these paths “are in number as the souls of men”.

Turkish Sufism formulated its own complex path within this general context of Islamic mysticism. The conversion of Turks into Islam around the eleventh century and their distinct interpretation of this religion have been the subject of numerous analyses¹³⁵. This special trajectory is usually traced back to Ahmed-i Yesevi and there is a substantial amount of scholarship on Yesevilik¹³⁶. Yet, what too often goes unnoticed is that, as A. Y. Ocak points out, there are two distinct surviving interpretations of Ahmed-i Yesevi in Turkish history, one owned by the Bektashi thought with its ramifications, and the other claimed by the Nakshibendi thought with its

¹³⁴ It should also be noted that over the course of time there occurred various structural changes in the composition of these paths. As we trace their history back in time, the 12th and 13th centuries, we will encounter a more fluid mapping in which the tariqas were relatively less consolidated, less hierarchical and wherein the boundaries in-between were not as rigidly drawn as was the case in the years to follow. In time they have been more and more yoked to a centralized, hierarchical structure in which “the order’s discipline” ruled more than the “inner journey” ruled. To understand this point better suffice it to recall that the founders of tariqas, like Rumi or Hacı Bektaş, had no intentions of establishing orders and many of the aspects attributed to these eminent individuals were endowed retrospectively over the course of centuries. Broadly speaking, “the tariqas were loosely organized bodies of pirs and murids following well-defined and even hierarchically controlled ‘way’ of mystical discipline, each with its rituals, its chiefs and its endowments.” (Hodgson, 1974:214)

¹³⁵ See for instance Prof. Hakkı Dursun, *İslamiyet ve Türkler*, İ.Ü. Edebiyat Fak., İstanbul, 1976. Also Erdoğan Aydın, *Nasıl Müslüman Olduk? Türklerin Müslümanlaştırılmasının Resmî Olmayan Tarihi*, Başak, Ankara, 1994.

¹³⁶ It should be noted that during the 1990s the state elite in Turkey started to show increasing interest in Yesevilik and its legacy. See especially *Milletlerarası Ahmed Yesevi Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, (September 26th-27th 1991), *Kültür ve Turizm Bk.*, Ankara, 1992. For general information see also *Ahmed-i Yesevi, Divan-ı Hikmet’ten Seçmeler*, Prof. Kemal Erarslan, Ankara, 1983.

ramifications¹³⁷. It is the former and the paths that resonate with it rather than the latter that I concentrate upon herein.

When analyzing Sufi practice and thought, it is essential to bear in mind this complexity. In societies characterized by the careful preservation of boundaries, Sufism essentially goaded one to not acknowledge the confines of the identity one was born into, and to therefore problematize and surpass one's established boundaries. What is striking is this particular aspiration inscribed at the root of Sufi thought: the aspiration to transcend. Not only did Sufis preach this belief, they themselves also blurred religious boundaries themselves by occasionally deriving philosophical elements from other religions and cultures. They also held various positions throughout the class structure in their society, thereby blurring class boundaries as well. The prerequisites and constraints of identities in the outside *zahiri* realm made little sense in the inner *batini* realm; as such, Sufi thought and practice always retained at least the potential to go far beyond ethnic, racial and even religious categories and the divides they imposed on human lives. Within their transcendental framework, all types of religion were equal, if not the same, since all were different paths constructed to reach God. Startlingly, a Sufi could go so far as to claim that "Islam is not better than idolatry. It does not matter what creed a man professes or what rites he performs."(Nicholson, 191, p.83) This was so because the ultimate aim was to reach God, how one got there was very varied therefore not very important. In Sufi thought, another prominent idea was that of changing name, identity, and disguise; such a change was done to uproot the inherent weaknesses of humans to hold on to appearances and worldly rewards. This also matched the tradition of miracle, *keramet*¹³⁸ From every single entity to any other, Turkish Sufism conjectured, there existed a myriad of bridges, and it was through these bridges that one could walk from

¹³⁷ Ocak argues that the two descendants of Ahmet Yesevi in Turkey have followed two different paths all the way along until this day. "Böylece bir yanda Bektaşilik'in yapısına, diğer yanda Nakşibendilik'in karakterine uygun iki Ahmed-i Yesevi ortaya çıktı ve günümüze kadar geldi." (A. Y. Ocak, Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar, 1996, İstanbul, İletişim, p. 43)

¹³⁸ One particular story is telling: One day when spotted by the Kadi of Musul who regarded him as a heretic to be seized and punished, Qadib al-Ban is believed to have taken the form of a Kurd, then an Arab of the desert, then he assumed the guise of a doctor of theology. "O kadi! He exclaimed, "which Qadib al-Ban will you hale before the governor and punish?" It is said that the Kadi repented his hostility and became one of the saint's disciples. (Nicholson, 1914, p. 186)

one state of being to another, from one identity to another¹³⁹. One can easily conjecture how challenging such a conceptualization would be to go any state or community that would attempt to establish and reproduce rigidly defined categories.

In Turkish Sufism, in the eyes of the dervish, it is the transcending-cyclical-everlasting epistemology that renders the passage from one state of Being to another not only desirable but also workable. As such the traditional bans of sin and virtue might just as well, and often did, lose their hold on the mystic. Rather than prioritizing these rigidly drawn categories, the center of esoteric attention in Turkish Sufism was the hidden meanings where knowledge of and about the Divine Essence lied. It is this distinction that urges the esoteric to pay less attention to the ecclesiastical rules and their governing commandments so dominant at the outer realm. Understood as such, the difference between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, or put differently, between the esoteric and the exoteric does not lie in the role they attribute to the Holy Book, but instead in the way they read and interpret the very same text. Admittedly, while the exoteric reading of the Qur'an confines itself to the outer meanings of the words and to the semi-sacred distinction between the do's and the don'ts, the esoteric reading searches for inner

¹³⁹ The notion of God as a Divine Power underlying all life phenomena has important implications in shaping Sufi's connection with other human beings. Every individual, no matter his or her particular identity, can be and is indeed a part of the Divine Cycle. As one moves along this cycle and discovers how every part is interconnected with another as well as with the whole, both transformation and beauty occur in mystical discourse. The Sufi believes that God being the eternal Beauty, it is the quest for beauty that is incumbent upon the human individual in this life. The following summarizes this argument:

"I died as mineral and became a plant,
I died as plant and rose to animal,
I died as animal and I was man.
Why should I fear? When was I less by dying?
Yet once more I shall die as man, to soar
With angels blest; but even from angelhood
I must pass on: all except God doth perish.
When I have sacrificed my angel soul,
I shall become what no mind e'er conceived.
Oh, let me not exist! for Non-existence
Proclaims in organ tones, "To Him we shall return." (Rumi)

meanings that are supposed to be well hidden behind the gauzy layers of the outer form. This, indeed, is the main distinction between *tevil* and *tefsir*. While the former tends to concentrate on the inner meaning, the latter is confined to the outer one. The difference between the two approaches can be so stark and far-reaching that “the tension between the two major aspects of Islam forms a constant theme in Islamic cultural history.” (Schimmel, 1991: XIII/XIV)

One further substantial distinction that helps one understand Sufi thought is epistemological. While *ilm* is the way to attain knowledge, the Sufi is more interested in *irfan*, or *marifet*, mystic knowledge that follows a different path of reasoning and therefore has the potential to deduce more dissimilar conclusions than the former. Similar to the ‘gnosis’ of Hellenistic theosophy, *marifet* is direct knowledge of God which is supposed to be based on either apocalyptic vision or revelation. As such, it is much more oriented to the individual’s being rather than his or her reason alone. Broadly stated, *Ilm* is basically a mental process of rules, regulations and logical, didactic deductions; *Irfan*, however, is far less reason-based – it is rather intuition-based¹⁴⁰.

Symbolism is crucial and a constant in Sufi thought. Though Nicholson claims that the erotic and bacchanalian language of Sufism has been misinterpreted by numerous Western thinkers, I propose an alternative rereading of this discursive tradition by critically questioning not the realness of the employed Sufi metaphors, for instance the metaphor of wine in Sufi poetry, but instead the Sufi “metaphor of reality” as an epistemological category. The employment of a particular metaphor is itself constitutive of reality, so I do not query as to whether the themes mentioned in Sufi poetry are real or symbolic. Instead, I am interested in the ways in which those particular themes are constructed and a particular discursive practice is accordingly constituted.

¹⁴⁰ This epistemological difference can be quite far-reaching in its implications in daily life, as underlined by the prominent scholar Reynold Nicholson in *The Way of the Mystic*. Nicholson argued that one conclusion to be drawn out of this distinction was that there could be a discrepancy, if not contradiction between the scriptural teachings and the inner path of the Gnostic. The former was for the common human individual, for the masses but the Gnostic did not see him as part of this bulk. The questioning of the central teachings of mainstream religion constitutes a niche in Sufi literature. Therefore, it is no surprise that “the same act is good in religion, but evil in gnosis--a truth which is briefly stated thus: "The good deeds of the pious are the ill deeds of the favorites of God." (Nicholson, 1914)

The most significant emotive category in Sufism is love; all Sufi symbolism revolves around the notion of love¹⁴¹. The prominence attributed to love is revealed, for instance, in the writings of Ibn al-‘Arabi who declares that no religion is more sublime than a religion of love. The exaltation of love encourages the Sufi to reread the main Islamic narratives with a different eye and accentuate the love romances. Included among these are the tales of Layla and Mejnun, Salaman and Absal, the Moth and the Candle, the Nightingale and the Rose, and especially Yusuf and Zuleyha, many of which have also been central references in Ibn Arabi’s system of thought¹⁴² whose work is of particular importance for the repercussions of tasavvuf among the Turkish intelligentsia.

The pertinence of this age-old tradition in contemporary Turkey is not only because Sufi symbols continually penetrate contemporary Turkish cultural fabric, but also due to the very fact that Turkish Sufism is continuously being re-appropriated by different segments of Turkish cultural elite. Both the Islamist and the secularist elite constantly refer to Sufi iconography, and so by presenting their own interpretation. In a larger epistemological context where knowledge on Sufism is very limited, it becomes very difficult to critically assess the value of these interpretations. Yet such a critical assessment is crucial to culturally destabilize the Kemalist-Islamist continuum. It is for this reason that I undertake such a critical analysis of pertinent discourse on Sufism in the contemporary Turkish public discourse.

5.3.2. Employment of Sufi Concepts in the Turkish Public Sphere I should first note that in Islamic tradition God has 99 names.¹⁴³ Although there is no doubt that each of these names is used to designate a distinct attribute, the names taken as a whole

¹⁴¹ The emphasis on love is so crucial that Annemarie Schimmel claims the Sufis have thus broadened the scope of the Arabic language and rendered it more devotional, expressive and “literary”. See Annemarie Schimmel, *The Mystical Dimension of Islam*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1975. The argument is important for my purposes in this dissertation as I try to present the loss of tasavvuf terminology as part and parcel of the monologization of Turkish language.

¹⁴² Ibn Arabi, for instance believes that the torment in hell cannot last forever and thereby, there will be pardoning and compassion, eventually for all. See W. Chittick, *Hayal alemleri: İbn Arabi ve Dinlerin Çeşitliliği Meselesi*, Kaknüs, İstanbul, 1999.

¹⁴³ For a meticulous discussion on the 99 names of Allah and a discussion on their feminine and masculine aspects, see S. Murata, *The Tao of Islam*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1992. For the implications of these names for the nomadic Turks as these converted to Islam, see Bilgin Saydam, *Deli Dumrul’un Bilinci*, İstanbul, Metis, 1997, p. 188.

can be plausibly divided into two categories, namely the Jamal names and the Jalal names. The former category embodies names such as “Beautiful”, “Merciful”, “Pardoner”, “Forgiving”, “Compassionate”, “Loving”, “Gentle”, “Enricher”, “Life-giving” or “Bestower”. Common to all these is the overt suggestion of God’s mercy and compassion. The Jalal aspect, however, portrays God in a quite different way since it embodies names such as “Inaccessible”, “Slayer”, “High”, “Wrathful”, “King”, “Avenger”, “Proud”, “Mighty”, “Harmer”... and the like. All the names in this category put the accent on God’s majesty and wrath. The dissimilarity between the Jamal and Jalal aspects of God and the difference between those who prioritize one over the other generate three consequences. The first concerns the perception and definition of the divine being, the second relates to the particular construction of the relationship between the human and divine being, and the third structures the manner in which the human being constructs relationships with everything surrounding him or her. In relation to the first dimension, as Murata points out, “the one God is looked upon from two points of view (Murata, 1992:16) where the first approach stresses God’s incomparability, distance and otherness. The second stresses his similarity, nearness and sameness.” (Murata, 1992:9) The second dimension is predicated on the choice made in the first stance; some Muslimhoods, in Ocak’s terminology, will be more inclined to fear and thereby, comply to the rules out of fear while others will accentuate the notion of love.

In relation to the third dimension, it should be underlined that the existence of a punishing God depicted as a never-closing grim celestial eye requires strict obedience to the pre-given boundaries between *haram* and *helal*. To be compensated in heaven or eternally punished in hell depend on the unconditional acceptance of this duality. The conservation of the eschatological hierarchy also requires the preservation of a mundane hierarchy whereby the maintenance of the distinction between right and wrong necessitates the nomination of a group of people for its sustenance; this in turn legitimizes the need for an “authoritative interpreter” in the persona of the *ulema* or the *Shaykh al-Islam*. The valuation of the Jamal aspect is far removed from this framework since it can only be approached with love, and love is a personal experience, one that recognizes no intermediaries and basically takes place between the individual and God.

It is a personal discovery through which the individual commences alone. As Chittick notes, “inasmuch as God is incomparable with all created things, He can only be understood in terms of the attributes denoting His distance, transcendence and difference.”(Chittick, 1989:23) The distancing mechanism does not solely operate between the creator and the created but also among the created. Put more bluntly, the conceptualization of a distance between the Creator and the created works hand in hand with the conceptualization of a distance between the two sexes and the rigidification of gender hierarchy. Celestial hierarchy is wedded to a mundane hierarchy.¹⁴⁴ Yet the approach predicated on love acknowledges no such distance, neither between oneself and the Creator, nor between one’s self and others; in so doing, it potentially challenges all existing hierarchies, be they political and/or gender-based.

5.3.3. Turkish Sufism and Its Gendered Concepts The veneration of God’s Jamal aspect thus potentially leads to a gender-free social conception, a conception that is already predicated on the nature of God’s attributes that the Jamal aspect emphasizes. Perhaps the connection between “womanhood” and “Jamal” is nowhere more overtly stated than in the employment of God’s attributes of *rahman* and *rahim*. The Arabic word *rahem* for ‘womb’ and the word *rahman* for ‘mercy’ share the same etymological origin. In other words “they come from the root *r-h-m*, which also designates the mother’s womb and thus convey the warm, loving care of the Creator for his creatures” (Schimmel, 1994:223) Such an attitude immediately implies the opening of a cultural space for a radical interpretation in the perception of the body as well as sexuality. Sufis believe that along the cycle of life everything shares a divine essence, though in varying degrees, as well as a divine beauty. The beauty of the divine being is thought to be mirrored in the faces of human beings. Accordingly, an esoteric makes no rigid distinction between the worldly beauty he or she is faced with and that of the divine

¹⁴⁴ Metaphors of love and union are frequently employed in Sufi literature. Being married to God, for instance, is an expression repeatedly employed in the poems of Mawlana. In Islamic mysticism and especially in Mawlawi thought, union with God is depicted as a wedding, and should thereby be celebrated. *Shab-i Arus*, meaning the wedding day, is the name given to the day on which Mawlana died. On this special day one is expected not to lament but to celebrate and rejoice.

being¹⁴⁵. Given the underlying belief that God is neither remote nor unattainable, “A woman with a charming beauty is according to a large number of people who take *ijtihad* as their base, the reflection of Evil in human form while for the Sufis she is the reflection of Allah.” (Sabbah, 1992:145) Hence one can surmise what this difference in the interpretation of women’s beauty implies in terms of what is expected from women: while one group requires them to hide their faces, the other one rejoices in the divine they see in the same faces.

It is no surprise that the Sufi understanding of masculinity deviates as radically from the orthodox understanding as conception of Divine power. If femininity is an asset to be attained, then conversely, according to Turkish Sufism, masculinity is a feature that needs to be rubbed out, if not utterly eradicated. The Sufis regard the female body and femininity as first and foremost creative; they are thus sublime and a key to transcendence. While proceeding through the arc of ascendance to God, not only does the dervish value and adore feminine features, but he at the same time relentlessly attempts to symbolically acquire these features. He does so because otherwise he cannot realize either the consummation of beauty or the transformation of the divine essence from potential to actual. I should once again emphasize that the Sufi mistrusts masculinity and its symbols and instead idealizes femininity¹⁴⁶ which is the opposite of the priority set by the Kemalist-Islamist continuum in contemporary Turkey.

¹⁴⁵ This last point brings me to a different but interrelated theme: the practice of Char darb which requires to shave all the hair in the head and body. The feminine Jamal aspect implies beauty and beauty is thought to be feminine. This is not to say that man cannot inhabit beauty, they sure can but the notion of beauty as an aesthetic force is associated with the feminine dimension of life. As such, beauty is observed in women, or else in de-masculinized man. According to Bakhtiar, “to the Sufis the symbols found in women are Divine realities, for he is the place of a Divine manifestation. The symbolism of woman is most often found in Sufi poetry, where a highly technical language of love was formed.”(Bakhtiar, 1976:68)

¹⁴⁶ Rescue this man from his moustache
Curling so proudly, while inside he
Tears his hair. Married to God,
Married to god, but pretending not
(Jaoudi, 1993, p. 64)

The dominant Islamic construction of sexuality and gender¹⁴⁷ relies overwhelmingly on the idea that femininity and masculinity operate within mutually exclusive terms. I would argue that the gap in between the two categories, or put differently, the unbridgeable distance from one to another end up reifying each category even more. Masculinity and femininity thus become defined through negations in that each is deemed to be what the other is not. This is an absolute “either...or...” scheme in which one’s position is determined at birth, by the sex s/he is born into. In the Sufi thought, however, there are myriad bridges from one side to another, so much so that the dervish pines for and attempts to convert to a more feminine being by denouncing and debunking the Masculine Ego. Lying at the core of heterodox Sufi thought are two journeys, the transcendental one through which an individual as *insan-ı kamil*¹⁴⁸ attempts to unite with God, and the transformative one in which the individual loses his masculinity and gains femininity.

This discussion has raised three interrelated points in relation to the construction of gender relations that radically differentiate Sufism from orthodox sunni Islam. First, in the relation to the construction of femininity “among the Sufis, the Islamic mystic women were more highly esteemed than in orthodox Islam.”(Walthner, 1981:31) Second, not only the theoretical valuing of femininity but also the interrelated mechanisms of love and experience in Sufism further pave the way as basic channels through which women could proceed just as much as men do, as equal human beings (Schimmel 1995, Uludağ 1995). At a social and historical context where the doors of the

¹⁴⁷ It should be recognized that with respect to the approach to gender and sexuality there are important similarities among all monotheistic religions. For a meticulous study in this regard see Fatmagül Berktaş, *Tek Tanrılı Dinler Karşısında Kadın*, İstanbul, Metis, 1996.

¹⁴⁸ Sufism also differs from orthodox Islam in relation to the possibility of the perfection of the human state, *al-insân al-kâmil*; in Sufism, this state implies the perfection of both masculine and feminine qualities together, the prototype of both the male and the female. Since men and women perform exactly the same rites and worship, the perfection of human spirituality is therefore equally accessible to men and women. In Sufi literature Allah as the Beloved, the *ma’shûq*, is always depicted with female iconography; for instance, the *Tarjumân al-ashwâq*, Ibn al-‘Arabî’s collection of love poems composed after meeting the learned and beautiful Persian woman Nizam in Mecca, is filled with images pointing to the Divine Feminine. As Ahmed notes, “the Sufi and Qarmati movements also show that there were ways of reading the Islamic moment and text that differed from those of the dominant culture and that such readings had important implications for the conceptualization of women and the social arrangements concerning her.” (Ahmed, 1992:100)

learned hierarchy or scriptural orthodox Islam were closed to women, the personal idiosyncracies of the dervishes as well as the emphasis on individual experience regardless of sex invited many women to the mystical path. Third, women could also partake in the Sufi institution of *tariqas*; they could either establish their own semiautonomous *tekkes* or directly take part along with men in shaping the praxis of non-orthodox Islam.

Since one notable pillar of patriarchal ideologies was the repression and degradation of femininity, as demonstrated in the analysis of Turkish modernization, this pillar culturally defined a particular category of men, that of the dandy, as a scapegoat and ostracized him. Indeed, the binary classification of the male and the female ontologically implies that the features identified with women automatically become devalued. Unlike the early generation of Kemalist women who became healthy, virile and strong as men to transcend the boundaries imposed by gender roles, in Sufism too a strategy existed to cope with gender roles; this time, however, it is an utterly different one, predicated on the active appropriation of femininity (Saydam, 1997:80) by men. Ironically then, while the gender strategy of Islamist and Kemalist orthodoxy implied a degradation of femininity, the Sufi strategy brought along the veneration of femininity by both men and women.¹⁴⁹

If Sufism were to be assigned a new political and cultural space in contemporary debates on gender religion and modernity, women can further benefit from this tide since, as Annemarie Schimmel claims, women have played a positive role in Sufism. Schimmel states that “indeed it was Sufism which opened more avenues of life to women than ‘orthodox’ Islam. The true seeker transcends the limits of sex.” (Schimmel, 1982:146) It should also be noted that Sufi thought and practice has not only been more welcoming to women, but also more inclined to cross gender boundaries. In analyzing

¹⁴⁹ The positive conceptualization of femininity is overtly present in Rumi’s system of thought. Peygamber dedi ki: Kadın, akıllılara, gönül ehline adam-akıllı üst olur/Bilgisizlerse kadınlara üst olurlar; çünkü onlar sert, pek kaba kişilerdir./İncelik, lütuf, sevgi azdır onlarda; çünkü yaratılışlarında hayvanlık üstündür/Sevgi, acımak insanlık huyludur; öfkeyle istekse hayvanlık huyları./Kadın Tanrı ışığıdır, sevgili değil; kadın, sanki yaratıcıdır, yaratılmış değil. (Mesnevi I:2442-2446)

women's folk narratives in the Middle East, Webber claims that "Sometimes the town did intrude into the secluded world of women in the person of dervishes. Dervishes could cross the male-female boundary. They could move from the street world of men to the center-of-the-houses informal world of women just as little boys and girls could. Be they men or women, dervishes were considered immune from certain social, religious, and even natural laws." (Webber, 1985:312) He points out that 'naïve, asexual, vulnerable, they are protected by God or a *wali* (friend of God). Women often refer to male dervishes as *khal*, the attribution for maternal uncle with whom one usually has a more informal, joking relationship than with a paternal uncle. The few lively, typical, first-hand *hikayah* I heard from women were accounts of their experiences with dervishes."(Webber, 1985:312) In overtly gender segregated societies, dervishes have indeed been traveling to and for between the two worlds of women and men. Today in places where gender segregation is still visible, it is only the dervishes and the insane who still retain this spatial ability to cross boundaries and communicate with both sexes.

5.3.4. Rekindling of Islamic Mysticism in Contemporary Turkish Culture and Politics This academic discussion of Sufism indirectly reveals why the New Islamist elite's cooptation and rekindling of Islamic mysticism is inherently inauthentic and ultimately instrumentalist and politically driven¹⁵⁰. As Mardin notes, "mysticism in one special form, i.e., the arcane knowledge of Islamic theosophy, the interpretation of the metaphorical content of the Qur'an was...the language of the select, of the spiritual elite. This spiritual elite was not necessarily part of the ruling group of officials, but it had a special, preferred status which, through its cognitive selectivity, placed it in a position distinct from that of the mass of believers. Again, this does not mean the spiritual elect had no contact with the masses and did not serve their spiritual needs."(Mardin, 1989: 221) What is significant here is that the Sufis had their own

¹⁵⁰ Tasavvuf penetrates into the rhetorics of male intellectuals located at different points in the ideological spectrum. See for instance Nuri Pakdil's works and life. Pakdil is notorious for his rekindling of tasavvuf-tekke tradition within literature. Pakdil's journal *Edebiyat* is also significant to see the reflections of tasavvuf outside Istanbul and Ankara. See Nuri Pakdil, *Derviş Hüneri*, Ankara: *Edebiyat Dergisi* yayınları, 1980.

political, cultural and social space away from that of those engaged in worldly political matters. Yet the last two chapters have demonstrated how both the Islamist intellectuals and their secularist counterparts attempt to coopt Islamic mysticism into their own segment of the public sphere under their own rules; they are not interested in opening up a separate cultural space to Islamic mysticism as such.

The resourceful threads within Islamic mysticism and the possibility of a holistic interpretation of Quran¹⁵¹ have led many Turkish intellectuals¹⁵² to study Islamic mysticism especially in relation to its potential accommodate Western values alongside the Muslim identity. During the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, Bergsonism became popular as part of this quest¹⁵³. Islamist intellectuals, such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek¹⁵⁴ in the past –or as we’ve seen İsmet Özel at present- have amply insinuated the language of Islamic mysticism into their writing¹⁵⁵. Interestingly the impact was not confined to Islamists, as the veneration of Sufi forefathers was a central part of Mavi Anadolu humanism. In Sabahattin Eyüboğlu’s writings, Yunus Emre was depicted as an amalgam

¹⁵¹ In the last few years, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, as part of a quest for an alternative rereading and reinterpretation of Islam that might better “suit” today’s world, numerous scholars from Muslim background have turned their attention to the time-honored traditions of hermeneutics. Now it is time to take a closer look at these debates. Among the said scholars Fazlur Rahman has played a salient role. While the hermeneutical approach adopted by Rahman has been the subject of various debates in contemporary literature, before proceeding further in this vein, it should be underlined that Qur’anic Hermeneutics is an age-old tradition rather than a new discovery. What is new instead is an endeavor on the part of the intellectuals to rekindle this tradition. This process, in turn, might have profound implications for the ongoing discussions in and on Turkey.

¹⁵² This impact of tasavvuf on Turkish intelligentsia has been named as “entellektüel tasavvufçuluk” by Şerif Mardin, particularly with respect to Kenan Rifai and his disciples.(Mardin, 1983:1940). Şerif Mardin cites the Rifai tariqa as a good example of this pattern. Kenan Rifai and his closest circle of believers, including women members like Semiha Ayverdi, Safiye Erol and Sofi Huri had struggled to rekindle the Sufi tradition with and within an intellectual endeavor. For more on this circle see Semiha Ayverdi, N. Araz, S. Erol and S. Huri, Kenan Rifai ve Yirminci Asrın Işığında Müslümanlık, Ankara: Hulbe, 1951(1983).

¹⁵³ Henri Bergson’s philosophy had left a deep impact among Turkish intelligentsia during the very late Ottoman era and early Republican era. For a more detailed account on this see Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi, Ülken yayınları, İstanbul, 1979.

¹⁵⁴ See Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Çile, Büyük Doğu yayınları, 1983. Also, Babıali, Büyük Doğu yayınları, 1985. Especially in the latter Kısakürek has voiced his questions as to what is life, what is time, and attempted to probe “the reality looming beyond the material world”.

¹⁵⁵ For a comprehensive assessment see Elizabeth Özdalga, “Tasavvuf Bahçelerinde Dolaşan Bir Milli Kahraman: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek”, Toplum ve Bilim, no: 71, İstanbul, 1997.

of many identities at the same time, including an Anatolian peasant, a Turkmen *koca*, a dervish, a poet, and “the spokesperson of all the Hittite, pagan, Christian, and Muslim peoples that have lived in Anatolia over the centuries”(Eyüboğlu, 1973: 55) Şerif Mardin maintains that Turkish intellectuals of an earlier era inherited the atavism of the Sufi disciple and master “without being able to fill it with cultural content... What the Republican political elite proposed was that intellectuals should find their spiritual fulfillment in making the ‘imaginary’ (i.e. the West or the new Turkish identity) real for Turkey. This was an enormous burden which many Turkish intellectuals shouldered by becoming part of the apparatus of the Republic.”(Mardin, 1994: 203) Hence rather than being able to open up a space of their own, Turkish intellectuals have traditionally been coopted into the public space created by the nation state thereby becoming the appendices of the state. Even though Islamist intellectuals rhetorically attempted to resist this cooptation, they too have been revealed to be a part of the same public space.

As that intellectual apparatus is more fragmented than ever today, there could have been the possibility of the creation of a new cultural space along the lines suggested by Islamic mysticism. After all, mystical language has penetrated into and shaped a plethora of social, cultural and literary formations; *tasavvuf* has also undergone serious transformations – it has been distorted, erased and then remembered, reshaped, rekindled in accordance with the necessities of each turning point in Turkish political history, and today that distorted legacy is continually re-constructed by particularly the Islamist elite¹⁵⁶ as part and parcel of the cultural fabric inherited. The new male Islamist intellectual attempts to further legitimate himself by portraying himself as someone who has been raised in a Sufi culture (*tasavvuf terbiyesi almak*)¹⁵⁷, though what this premise

¹⁵⁶ See for instance Nuri Pakdil’s poems and essays, particularly *Derviş Huneri*, Istanbul: Kirkikindi, 1997. See also *Osmanlı Simitçiler Kasidesi*, Istanbul: Kirkikindi, 1999. Nuri Pakdil’s fictive and non-fictive writing is a revealing example of the eclecticism that marks the new Islamist male elite today. In it the veneration of the “author as the creator of the text” is fused with the notion of *kul*; Sufism is blended with modernity; reason integrated into religious jargon.

¹⁵⁷ See for instance Mehmet Bahaeddin Özkişi’s presentation in conservative literary journals. He is presented as someone raised in a house that functioned as a *tekke*, by learning the ways of Sufi culture. (bir *tekke* işlevi de gören evlerinde tasavvuf terbiyesiyle yetiştirilmiş) See *Edebistan*, July 5th, 2004. Özkişi’s novels and short stories include *Köse Kadı* (1974), *Uçtaki Adam* (1975) ve *Sokakta* (1975), *Göç Zamanı* (1975).

entails is barely questioned. The new Islamist cultural elite continues to make extensive use of Sufi metaphors and literature¹⁵⁸, albeit by relying upon only one interpretation of Sufism, one that is closest to the conservative stance.

5.3.5. Whom Does Tasavvuf Belong To: Blurring the Boundaries in the Islamist-Kemalist Paradigm Strikingly all throughout this process, while mysticism is used to “iron out” otherwise sharp quandaries, mysticism too gets ironed out by today’s quandaries. It is no accident that rather than the dominant masculine models crafted by Turkish patriarchy, it is Rumi, Hacı Bektash or Yunus Emre who the Turkish populace culturally regards as the “men of peace, serenity and calm”. The names of mystical forefathers, particularly Rumi, survive among both the intellectuals and the masses, are frequently employed as symbols of tolerance, compassion and adaptability, and are frequently given to newborn children. The mystics of the past are further uttered and venerated to prove that Turkish Islam is unlike any other form of Islam practiced in the Muslim world. Thus, interestingly, the mystical roots of the past are employed today do not only differentiate the “Muslim Turk” from the West but also from other Muslims.

This wide range of practices, extending from the “appropriation” of the Sufi forefathers by the discourse of the Islamist cultural elite¹⁵⁹ to the striking increase in the number of books and publications, points to an interest in Islamic mysticism that has the potential to expand the Turkish public sphere. Indeed, addressing different, if not contradictory needs, with one foot in the private the other in the public spheres, similarly oscillating between the individual and the collective, as well as between Turkish civil society and the state, Sufism in Turkey today constitutes a threshold space of antagonistic forces. *Tasavvuf* and *tasavvuf* imagery continue to be employed as both a “past tradition to be remembered” and a “legacy to be erased’ in a society hopelessly

¹⁵⁸ See for instance an interview with Sadik Yalsizucanlar in which the poet contextualizes “fiction writing” within the Sufi Tradition. The interview is particularly interesting as it draws elements from a wide range of intellectual sources –including Ibn Arabi, Dante, Rumi, Shems-i Tebrizi, Seyh Galip, and heavily relies upon traditions of Islamic mysticism by bringing the latter into modern literature. See Hece, no: 84, December 2003.

¹⁵⁹ It is interesting to note that, for instance, the Bayrami sheyh Hacı Bayram-ı Veli has for the first time been publicly, collectively commemorated in 1990. Since then symposiums and commemorations became regular. Hacı Bayram-ı Veli ve Dönemi Sempozyumu., 1991

divided along the Islamist-Kemalist tension, living as well in a disenchanted universe that renders it difficult for individuals to develop a coherent sense of self and community under conditions of modernity"(Benhabib, 1992: 81). Interestingly, seen mainly as a form of Islam pertinent to Turks and Turkish history¹⁶⁰, Sufi thought and imagery has penetrated into contemporary models of masculinities via two different, if not opposing channels. On the one hand, Sufi imagery and symbolism has been appropriated by the conservative circles, especially the Islamist cultural elite¹⁶¹, and all the other possible or actual interpretations of *tasavvuf* that somehow fail to fit into this pattern have been quietly excluded. On the other hand, Sufism has been interpreted as a more flexible, less dogmatic, and structurally egalitarian understanding of Islam, and has thus been appropriated by some segments among the secularist elite outside a religious framework and as part of the cultural heritage they would like to be associated with¹⁶². All throughout the Republican era, but particularly in the post-1980 period intellectual Sufism (Mardin, 1983) has retained an appeal for the cultural and social elite.

The possible impact of Islamic mysticism on the evolution of gender roles in Turkey should not be romanticized or exaggerated out of proportion. Nonetheless, it is a truism that the mystical mode of thought and practice has been a constitutive element in the formation of both popular and high culture, and has shaped the composition of Muslimhoods in contemporary Turkey. Even though among the existing Sufi orders, the relatively more conservative and pro-state ones managed to survive and eventually penetrate into the state apparatus, first during 1950s and then, more clearly during Özal's regime, the scope and impact of this has not at all been academically studied. Sufism has thus become a powerful coordinate in the Turkish social mapping of belonging. The new re-valuation of Sufism is also highly visible especially among middle class and

¹⁶⁰ On how Ziya Gökalp and Yahya Kemal have much in common in pursuing a Turkish Islam see Tayfun Atay, *Gelenekçilikle Karşı-Gelenekçiliğin gelgitinde Türk "gelenek-çi" Muhafazakarlığı*, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol:5, *Muhafazakarlık*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004, p. 174.

¹⁶¹ Selahattin Sar, *İslam Tasavvufu: Tasavvufun Temel İlkeleri*, İstanbul: Toker, 1991. See also Erol Güngör, *İslam Tasavvufunun Meseleleri*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 1982 and by the same author *Sosyal Meseleler ve Aydınlar*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 1993.

¹⁶² The most blatant example of this is the recent Sufi performances in uppercrust high society parties thrown in İstanbul and elsewhere. *Hürriyet*, 14.07.2004

upper class urban women.¹⁶³ The case in point that illustrates the latter argument is the question of “women *semazens*”. In the course of the last five years, one branch in the Mawlawi order¹⁶⁴ created much confusion and debate by arguing that women and men *semazens* had been whirling together at the time of Rumi and could therefore once again pray and whirl together in the same space. The practice caused some in the order to separate their ways and also generated debates among various groups. Eventually, this particular dervish order rejected gender segregation and recruited women *semazens*. The media enjoyed, venerated and exploited the topic as the pictures of women *semazens* were displayed in popular magazines. The issue reached a climax when the winner of last year’s Eurovision song contest Sertab Erener announced her decision to appear on stage with women *semazens* on the evening of Eurovision Song¹⁶⁵ Contest to be held in Turkey. Her decision caused a reaction on the part of conservative groups and personas, including the director of National Television & Radio (TRT). The tension between the director and the singer ended in favor of the latter and the women *semazens* appeared on stage, turning into cultural icons to represent Turkey vis-a-vis the Western world.

This case also demonstrates that as Islamic mysticism is brought onto the contemporary Turkish public sphere, it shapes and yet is in turn shaped by social, political and cultural forces of modernity, Kemalism and Islamism. For instance, the

¹⁶³ This is an untested claim that I make based on my personal talks with Rifai and Mevlevi women living in Istanbul and the USA, some of whom come from rigidly Kemalist families and have had no previous religious education. These women have expressed there is more gender equality in Sufi circles than in other religious formations. More research needs to be done with respect to these women and gender roles in existing *tarikats* in Turkey and abroad. For a more historical account see Reinhertz, Shakina. *Women Called to the Path of Rumi: The Way of the Whirling Dervish*, Hohm Pr; 2001

¹⁶⁴ The discussion particularly concerns those Sufis at Hasan Dede’s Galata Mevlevihanesi and Numan Dede’s Üsküdar Mevlevihanesi.

¹⁶⁵ Especially in the last two decades, the whirling dervishes have become one of the most “marketable” cultural icons in Turkey as both sides in the Islamist-secularist spectrum claim a right upon and repeatedly integrate them into their fabric. In addition to Sertab Erener’s appearance on stage with whirling dervishes on Eurovision Song Contest, thus integrating them into the “cultural mosaic” presented to the Western World, it should be recalled that the ninth annual industrial trade fair of MÜSIAD, which too had invited a high number of foreign visitors, similarly used whirling dervishes on stage as part of its presentation. This usage of Sufi imagery back and forth between the elite of the two sides is an indication of two points of emphasis: First, it is one of the many metaphorical/aesthetic/cultural commonalities between the Kemalist and Islamists that this dissertation has been underlining. Secondly, it is an indication that the Sufi in contemporary Turkey is a metaphor without a body, an amorphous representation less imagined than forgotten.

Eurovision song contest refers to a sign of modernity Turkey relates to, Sertab Erener culturally represents a secular feminist female singer, and the women semazen are practicing their religion, but in this case in a highly commercialized and also nationally condoned context that could be considered a part of the public sphere that was brought under contestation between the director of a state institution who aimed to control this particular sphere, and the singer who wanted to claim this part of the public sphere free from such claims. Even though this cultural event did indeed, in the end, expand the boundaries of the public sphere, it is very difficult to predict future cultural patterns in terms of the employment of Islamic mysticism and their consequences since this interpretation here is the first of its kind and many such cultural readings need to occur to establish a body of knowledge, a cultural epistemology, that would make such a general critical reading possible.

Still, female semazens themselves reveal the complexity of gender roles along the Islamist-Kemalist paradigm. They represent yet another “periphery icon” fragmenting the hitherto entrenched secular public sphere and cultural iconography, an imagery once altogether “regressive” in the eyes of the political/cultural elite of Republican era and now paradoxically, after almost eighty years of transformation, a symbol of “progressiveness” and compatibility with the Western world. The incidence of female semazens constitutes a highly telling case as it brings together the principal actors and persistent dynamics of Turkish political and cultural life: the media, cultural elite, religiosity and religious groups, alternative interpretations of Islam... all of these vis-a-vis the Western world¹⁶⁶. I would argue that it was their being woman more than their being *dervish* that has rendered them so controversial and eventually so influential, and yet, it is the mystical path and unorthodox rereadings of Islam that has furnished them with an opening to do so. In Turkish contemporary culture Sufi imagery reflects

¹⁶⁶ The depiction of the Western world in conservative/Islamist discourse oftentimes thrives upon distancing and defamation. For an analysis that focuses on this see Tanıl Bora, “Milliyetçi Muhafazakar ve İslamcı Düşünüşte Negatif Batı İmgesi”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Batıcılık*, vol:3, İstanbul: İletisim, 2002.

one of pluralism, tolerance and gender equality.¹⁶⁷ The imagery is buttressed less by academic works than by dynamics of popular culture since Sufi thought does not present gender equality as much as it represents gender complementarity¹⁶⁸. Still, however, in today's contemporary framework, Sufism is a ghost-theme, having more rumor than reality, more shadow than presence and as such, it is nobody's special prerogative. And yet it is precisely this nebulosity that makes it shared by different people on the ideological spectrum. Yunus Emre¹⁶⁹ has been valued and venerated in the writings of Islamist intellectuals, like Sezai Karakoç, and secularist intellectuals, like Sabahattin Eyuboğlu. While the two sides come up with different interpretations it is important to note how *tasavvuf* and its symbols and icons becomes part and parcel of the common cultural pool.

5.3.6. Those in Between¹⁷⁰ So far it has been argued that there might be a thin line between the seemingly irreconcilable opposites of the Kemalist-Islamist paradigm as the elite on both sides share common values and metaphors when it comes to gender

¹⁶⁷ For an innovative and comparative study on the Sufi view on gender/women and that of the orthodox approach, see Fetna Ayn Sabbah, *İslam'ın Biliçaltında Kadın, Ayrıntı, İstanbul, 1992*. For a more conventional interpretation see S. Uludağ, *Sufi Gözüyle Kadın, İnsan, İstanbul, 1995*.

¹⁶⁸ "Complementarity" is a key concept in analyzing the Sufi understanding of gender as the two sexes are seen as fulfilling each other's lacks just like day and night or the two halves of the same circle. See A. Schimmel, *Ruhum Bir Kadın, İstanbul: İz, 1995*. The book is an interesting study in many ways but particularly in its elaboration of the Jungian anima in Islam starting with the premise that *nefs* is a feminine force in Islamic discourse.

¹⁶⁹ The fact that Sufi icons like Yunus Emre have been "appropriated" by intellectuals on different spots of the ideological spectrum has been elaborated by the Islamist media as well. Interestingly, Islamist media has recognized that there is perhaps no "real" Yunus but varying interpretations of the same tradition. See the following by Beşir Ayvazoğlu: "Görülüyor ki, Türk aydınları, dünya görüşlerine göre, Yunus'u ya Müslüman bir mutasavvıf olarak benimsemiş ve insan sevgisini onun tasavvuf anlayışına bağlayarak bize has bir hümanizmanın temsilcisi olarak görmüşlerdir, yahut dinî ve tasavvufî tarafını yok sayarak âdeta laik ve batılı manasında hümanist, hatta zaman zaman materyalist bir şair olarak ele almışlardır. Peki hangisi gerçek Yunus? Hepsi. Onda herkes kendini buluyor; demek ki o kadar derin!" Beşir Ayvazoğlu, "Herkesin Yunus'u Kendine", *Aksiyon*, no:278.

¹⁷⁰ The definition "those in the purgatory"(araftakiler) was employed by the journal *Doğu-Bati* to designate a range of male intellectuals in Turkey's cultural and social history who had had wanted to be both "traditional" and "modern" or who had a stake in both the principles of secularist/modernist/Westernized nation-state and yet at the same time were embedded in the Ottoman/traditional/Islamic precedents. The journal named, among many, A.H. Tanpınar, Cemil Meriç, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Nurettin Topçu, Peyami Safa, Oğuz Atay and Hasan Âli Yücel. These were people who had been inclined to say "both..... and..." rather than "either....or..." when confronted with the East/West or secularism/traditional dualities. For more on this see *Doğu-Bati*, May-June-July 2000.

and sexuality and masculinity. Likewise, the type of masculinity favored and promoted by nationalist discourse has profound implications that reach the seemingly non-nationalist circles. Conservatism, defined as *the fear of the loss of past values* (Nisbet, 1986:3), often goes hand in hand with nationalist masculinist imagery thriving upon male codes of bravery, potency and virility. According to Altınyıldız, though it might seem paradoxical at first, it is during times of great upheaval and transformation that the discourse on conservatism and the urge to keep things unchanged gains pace (Altınyıldız, 2004:179). Conservative nationalist discourse is in need of relying upon an eternal time, an imagined permanence in institutions and symbols, while going through the dual processes of “nation-destroying” as much as “nation-building”.

This chapter has problematized the dominant premise that the new Islamist revivalism in Turkey is an “outside” force that has attacked the modern, rational, secularist political system; I have done so by pointing out that neither the boundaries of modernity¹⁷¹ in Turkey are as easily definable as this interpretation suggests and nor is Islam as monolithic as it is implied. My critical close cultural reading of the discursive practices of the contemporary Islamist movement revealed that not only were they not an outsider to the system, but actually a product of the Kemalist modernity in Turkey. Although Islam had been removed to the private and the periphery by the Kemalist reforms, developments in the 1980’s led to the redefinition of Islam and to its subsequent shift back to the center of the public sphere. I also noted that as the contemporary Islamist movement shifted from the periphery to the center, it was profoundly changed, transformed, and “forged at the borders” (Bhabha, 1994).

¹⁷¹ Compare with Paul Rabinow’s analyses on “middling modernism” and his emphasis on modernity as a “problem” in a broad context, including in the context of Moroccan cities wherein the varying, clashing forces of French influence and Moroccan influence were at work. Rabinow’s concentration upon symbols and his depiction of modernity as a multifaceted process is of interest for me in this dissertation. I have also benefited from his analysis on the descendants of a Moroccan saint and the process of modernization. See especially the following: Paul Rabinow, *Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form and Historical Change in Morocco*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975; Paul Rabinow, *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*, CA: University of California Press, 1977.

CHAPTER SIX:

CONCLUSION

The Kemalist-Islamist dilemma that this dissertation has attempted to tackle should be read against a background of Turkey's political culture, which inhabits what Mardin names as "an intrinsic, fierce enmity towards the concept of opposition"(Mardin, 1991: 180). This enmity went hand in hand with the "monopolization of the public domain by the regime"(Sunar, 1974) in a societal context already shaped by a tradition of "strong state tradition that hindered the making of effective civil society"(Heper, 1992:189). Within this historically molded framework one of the far-reaching functions of the Kemalist reforms has been not only the monopolization of the public sphere but also what I have named as "the monologization of culture" and particularly, of written culture, which is way easier to control and sculpt from above than oral culture. It should be recalled that, as evaluated in chapter three, culture has been a salient ground of emphasis for the Kemalist reformists, functioning as a constitutive force of the new regime, and its epistemological rupture with the Ottoman past (Parla, 1998). As the political sphere and culture have been centralized as such, some scholars have also pointed out that the ensuing structure divided Turkey into zones of prosperity and zones of conflict (Yavuz, 2000). This, in turn, further deepened the antagonistic fabric of the political culture. Despite the antagonism, however, my contention is that, following Rustow's fundamental assumption that democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than by prior unity and consensus (Rustow, 1970), it is also necessary to interpret the Kemalist-Islamist debate as a kernel with a significant potential for the strengthening of civil society and democracy in Turkey, if and when further communication and interchange between the two sides can be developed.

That said, in this conclusion, it should also be underlined that there have been important paradigmatic changes especially after the 1990s. Despite the state tradition, the emergence of multiple new factors in the aftermath of 1980, including the expansion of the public space¹, the increase in the number and variety of the social/political/cultural actors committed to civilian-politics and issue-oriented associational activities² (Toprak, 1996) and the ensuing "networks of civic engagement" (Putnam, 1993), as well as Turkey's long-term aspiration for joining the EU, integration into world economy (Yalman, 2004), and the developments in the global-local axes³ have created a significant shift in Turkey's political and cultural constellation. In the post-1980 period, along with the alteration in electoral behavior⁴ the public-private configuration has been radically shifting, as religion inched its way into the public zone once again and the composition of the political elite changed considerably. Both the negative and the positive ramifications of the post-1980 transformation (Heper and Evin, 1988) carry great weight in analyzing masculinities in Turkey. The anxiety triggered by Islamist revivalism (Laciner, 1989) deepened the already dualistic political discourse, and the "call for the army to intervene" on the part of various segments of the secularist urban population, thereby reinforcing the already existing masculinist threads woven into political culture. Yet, at the same time, the opening up of new public spaces made it possible for new masculinities to find a voice and existence in what Fraser names "counter" public spheres of their own (Fraser, 1992). A no less challenging question is the ways in which men relate to the "feminine" spaces of private life in the urban topography (S. Ayata, 2002), a process further intensified by the increasing move towards the suburbia, a pattern highly visible in large cities.

¹ For an interesting account on this see Alev Erkilet Başer, "Sürgünden Ev'e, Eleştirellikten Uyum'a: Türkiye'li Müslümanların Kamusal Alan Serüveni", *Tezkire*, no:16, Winter, 1999.

² In analyzing the contemporary structural changes Binnaz Toprak emphasizes the increasing significance of non-governmental associations in Turkey. For more on this issue, see Binnaz, Toprak "Civil Society in Turkey." In A. R. Norton(ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East, 1996*, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1996.

³ For a critical account of the global-local axes in the light of the theory and practice of cultural politics upon a broader context, see Seyla Benhabib's works, especially Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002.

Despite the important transformations that took place, the Kemalist-Islamist cleavage still is *the* fundamental paradigm of the political lexicon. For the most part this duality thrives upon two points of emphasis: differences and discontinuities. First, the Islamist-Kemalist framework presupposes that the actors on the two sides of the ideological spectrum are fundamentally, if not entirely, different from one another. Second, it often accentuates the ruptures throughout Turkey's history so that each new phase turns into an enclosed episode, almost disconnected with the ones previous to it. However, as argued previously, a study that concentrates on "gender roles in Turkey" and particularly on the hitherto relatively less analyzed theme of "masculinities in Turkey" might find the Kemalist-Islamist binary opposition analytically ineffectual and unproductive in generating novel insights. Therefore, alternatively, it might be useful to concentrate on, a) continuities and b) commonalities.

It often goes unnoticed that both the Kemalist male elite and the Islamist male elite derive their codes, values and metaphors from a common rhetorical and aesthetic pool, and have many to share, both culturally and politically, as some scholars have hitherto doggedly pointed out (Çınar, 2002; Z. Arat, 1998). This commonality is crystallized when it comes to gender and sexuality issues. Strikingly, both the Kemalist and the Islamist discursive fields operate from above, and both perceive Turkish society as a passive object in need of being shaped, so much so that some scholars have forged a new categorical tool: "Islamist Kemalism" (Çınar, 2002) This dissertation employed a similar orientation to analyze the gender dynamics within Turkey's cultural experience with modernity and demonstrated that both the Kemalist and Islamist elite employ a similarly avuncular, if not paternalistic voice in their writings –a style that goes back to the late Ottoman era⁵ and is embedded deeply in the notion of a patriarch-author writing

⁴ For an analysis that reveals electoral behavior in the 1990s see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s", *Comparative Political Studies*, 1994, 27, pp. 402-424.

⁵ See for instance Mizancı Murad Bey's "Tufanda mi Turfanda mi" which has been regarded as one of the earliest "national novels". As an author Murat Bey employs his main male characters as role-models to educate the masses in a way reminiscent of Russian novelists. In a similar vein, Ahmet Evin compares Murat Bey's paternalistic voice in this particular novel with Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. For

with a mission. Male cultural and political elite in various circles and generations have regarded the masses, and thereby their readers, as “young” and in need of a “male adult’s guidance”.

The Kemalist-Islamist duality impedes the detection not only what Bhabha names the accumulative and repetitious strategies in the process of nation-state construction (cf. Bhabha, 1994), but also of the similarities that crosscut ideological divisions from late Ottoman era throughout the distinct stages of Republican history (Z. Arat, 1998). These, however, are essential to decipher the command of patriarchal precedents in Turkey. Overall this study has attempted to liquefy the rigidity of this well-known duality by displaying the hybridities, coexistences, and perhaps oxymoronic amalgamations⁶, as well as the points where lines are blurred and ambiguities arise. It is these that transcend beyond the Islamist-Kemalist paradigm rather than the much-emphasized differences, antagonisms, exclusivities and what Kasaba names “Kemalist certainties” (Kasaba, 1998). The need to escape dualistic frameworks is important not only to fathom these ambiguities but also to see the ways in which gender ideology operates uncontested. It is upon this pedigree that I have pointed out that the *de-feminization of culture* and the belittlement of femininity has been a deeply-rooted cultural pattern in Turkish history. This pattern has been reinforced by the distinction between “womanhood” and “femininity”. Interestingly, this distinction is an essential part of the discursive field operated by male intellectuals on both sides. Both the Kemalist and the Islamist discourse embodied this distinction and venerated women only in so far as they refrained from what was deemed to be male control of female sexuality and body, and tilted towards an ideal womanhood instead. It should be recalled that “femininity” should not be taken as a concept in isolation but with and within the connotations attached to it in a cultural context. It is in this sense that “femininity” often times implied being concerned with body image, materialist consumption, beauty, and so on. In the case of the late Ottoman era it also embodied far-reaching connotations

more on this comparison see Ahmet Evin, *Origins and Development of the Turkish novel*, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1983, p. 127

about over-Westernization. At the other end of the pole was the “venerated mother” as the guarantor of cultural stability. Both then and later on, “ideal womanhood” was, in turn, associated with grandiose ideals, including that of patriotism, serving the nation, motherhood, moral values and so on. Accordingly, similar cultural codes, shared values and fundamental premises have been ferried along the ideological spectrum.

In Turkey, women’s changing roles and men’s traditional expectations are causing both tensions and openings, but in addition to these axes one needs to discuss changing gender roles in the light of issue that might at first glance seem to have less to do with gender (i.e. Westernization, secularization, religiosity, belonging, cultural orientation...etc) Feminist scholarship has mostly discussed gender in terms of women. However, the literature has to pay more attention both to the masculinity of the system as such, and to the gender roles performed by men. After all, “men’s lives and worlds often contain more duality than women’s, as they move back and forth between the male-dominated work and city life and the more private, domestic and feminine world of home,” (S. Ayata, 2002: 31) Masculinities cannot be discussed exclusively both because gender is a relational concept, and the varying faces and facets of men’s selves are depicted in different social situations (men vis-a-vis other men, men vis-a-vis women (mothers, wives, lovers), men vis-a-vis their children...etc). In between these are conflicts that do not necessarily clash and congruities that lack harmony. Since “femininity” and/or “effeminacy” are heavily loaded and denigrated notions, it is essential to take a closer look at the ways in which homophobia and its most crystallized form, sissyphobia, operate in Turkish society.

The operation of homophobia to a large extent depends on the definition of what is “womanly” and what is not. Whenever homosexuality is concerned and homophobia takes a more overt form, masculinity and femininity are treated as if they were mutually exclusive. For that reason, the integrity of masculine identities is premised upon the rejection of all feminine signifiers so much so that masculinity is defined on the grounds

⁶ More often than not these amalgamations have been deliberately expressed in “oxymoronic” ways, thus creating their own rhetorics. See Ibrahim Ethem Deveci, Ben Dindar Bir Cumhuriyetçiyim,

of what it distances itself from: femininity. As such, homosexuality has conventionally been understood as the 'very negation of masculinity' (Connell, 1992: 736). It should also be recalled that the reflections of homophobia easily fuse with ethnic stereotypes or other prejudices as to the immoral ways of the subject concerned. Homophobia is first and foremost a cultural product (Halperin, 1991; Herdt, 1993). Another tide to consider in connection with homophobia is misogyny, especially in the ways it is reflected in jokes, argot, street lingo and alike. Patriarchal societies are obsessed with controlling acts even thoughts about female sexuality (Accad, 2000; Kayir, 2000; Mernissi, 2000; Narasimhan, 1994; Saigol, 2000). In Turkey masculinity functions as an imperatively constitutive element in the fabrication of identities both at the individual and national level (Kandiyoti, 1997). The practices of sexism and homophobia function according to a constellation in which the feminine and the homosexual are abjected, thereby catapulting femininity and homosexuality outside "manhood". If the alteration within masculinity is fundamentally dependent on the manner in which male identities are constructed (Kandiyoti, 1994), and if gender is a performance, then conscientious analysis of these discursive practices that are constitutive of the subjectification of male individuals might present strategies for the transformation of masculinity, and for the transgression of the frontier wherein male subject position is confined. New practices may procreate new forms of subjectivity in the pursuit of what Foucault regarded as the 'undefined work of freedom' (Foucault, 1984:46). Oftentimes change is abstruse, elusive and multi-vocal rather than total. It should be recalled that patriarchal hegemony is not "a fully determining system but a constraining and enabling one. It exerts its power by giving authoritative consent in language, artifact, and speech to the eroticism of male dominance and female submission."(Cocks, 1989: 140)

The common field upon which both homophobia and misogyny can triumphantly flourish is sexism, which needs to be defined by the extent to which one sex is privileged over a disparaged other (Butler, 1990; Grosz 1994). Exploring this contention, Connell (1995) and Petersen (1998) argue that the social construction of masculinity is characterized by the privileging of a set of behavioral and ontological features, such as

virility, courage, self-mastery and independence, over and against those qualities which are typically, traditionally deemed to be feminine. Concomitantly, gay men are stereotyped with “feminine” features, and are therefore thought to be effeminate, unstable, emotional, weak, passive, in short, “unmanly”⁷. Accordingly, heterosexuality is thought to be uniform, unbending and invariable. It is essential to recognize that homophobia shapes not only the relations between men and women but also those among men. Feminist scholars working on women’s issues in Turkey need to further accentuate the bond between misogyny and homophobia.

The theoretical framework of the research has largely benefited from the bulk of Western feminist literary, political and cultural criticism, and yet at the same time employed this rich literature cautiously and critically given what has been named as the “material blindness of queer theory” (Morton, 1996) and its limits in responding to multiple questions originating from Turkey’s particular context. In other words, the study has attempted to critically amalgamate eclectic readings in feminist criticism, Queer Studies, and Contemporary Political Thought with the material and questions originating from Turkish cultural and political history, thereby comprising its own culturalist multidisciplinary approach. Questioning the basic premises of the Cartesian mind frame and thriving upon an interdisciplinary work critical of Eurocentric presumptions and methodology (Harding and Narayan, 1998), women’s studies, cultural studies, and most recently queer studies have challenged the ways in which subjectivity (Kristeva, 2003), marginality, sexuality, and identity (Braidotti, 1996; Butler, 1990; Haraway, 1991) had hitherto been tackled. This far-reaching literature has had less impact on Middle Eastern Studies in general and Turkish Studies in particular. Therefore, both the tardiness of Turkish Studies literature in recognizing masculinities as a legitimate area of study but at the same time, the Eurocentric nature of Queer Studies or Masculinity Studies in the West has intensified this lack. As a result, today, it is as if

⁷ For an interesting study that probes how “unmanliness” and “effeminacy in man” worked for the construction and consolidation of Zionism, which was hoped to “transform the Jewish man from his state of effeminate degeneracy into the status of proper . . . mock-’Aryan male” see Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

there is a glass frontier drawn between the bulk of literature produced in Western academia and Middle Eastern Studies in general –a frontier which the Foucauldian notion of bio-power cannot trespass.⁸ As Kandiyoti has pointed out, feminist scholarship has up till now paid scarce attention to male gender roles and cultural masculinities (Kandiyoti-Saktanber, 2002), and thus much remains to be done in this regard. Digging this theoretical terrain, this dissertation further claimed that the shifts and continuities in patriarchal domination in Turkey cannot be isolated from the prospects or failures for a change in three fundamental M processes, namely modernization, monologization and masculinization.

In terms of modernization, it has been critically pointed out that although the concept of “modernization” has been generally regarded as unitary, inexorable and inevitable (Stokes, 2002:322), more recently, this rigid approach has been replaced by a much more flexible and multifaceted understanding (Azmeah, 1994; Augustinos, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Wiseman, 2000), thus rendering it possible to talk about multiple modernities rather than one single modernity as a sweeping formula. According to this latter view, even if modernity can be regarded as a worldwide phenomenon, it constitutes neither a uniform tapestry (Berman, 1982), nor a univocal pedigree through which all societies and identities proceeded unvaryingly (Felski, 1994). Additionally, it has also been maintained that no matter how positively loaded might the term “modern” be in the “traditional versus modern” duality, the “pace of modernization” brings forward its own dominion through rationalization and alienation (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1976). Modernity is an amalgam of clashes. Within this convoluted frame, the question of undermining of the “feminization of culture” has played a determining role according to the eminent scholar Simmel, who regarded modernity as a product of male

⁸ According to Foucault in modern society individuals are pervasively controlled through standards of normality disseminated by a wide range of knowledges, extending from diagnostic to normative knowledge such as criminology, medicine and psychiatry. Modern individuals become the agents of their own ‘normalization’. In the literature on the Middle East, however, a more conventional definition of power is being employed, defined as “what agent A does to agent B”. Power in this context is regarded as predominantly repressive whereas power in the Western context is regarded as predominantly “creative” (Foucault 1977: 194). For a further debate on the parameters of the Foucauldian bio-power see Sawicki, J., ‘Feminism and the Power of Discourse’ in J. Arac (ed.) *After Foucault: Humanistic*

activity and believed that a feminization of culture could be triggered, endorsed, and this would inevitably require a process of de-modernization (Felski, 1994: 146). This dissertation has proposed to re-read Turkey's modernization through this lens, as a process of de-feminization of culture.

As for the second pivotal M dynamic investigated, that of monologization, it has been argued that as the country steadily modernized, westernized and secularized along the process of "hastened modernization"(Mardin, 1990), there concomitantly emerged a centralization in culture, especially in written culture. This makes it essential to pay special attention to the writings of the cultural elite –novelists, poets, journalists, and columnists. Centralized modernization has brought forward an opening for an interweaving of voices and yet at the same time manipulated its own parameters over all other possible forms of expression. The long-term success of the language reform, which attempted to weed out old Ottoman words of non-Turkish origin, including Sufi terminology, further intensified the control of the center over written language. In this vein, Turkey's modernization and secularization venture, especially as it blended with nationalism and "national language", systematically pushed the written language towards a monologic structure. It was the pace of modernization from above, and the early Kemalist project to "purify" language by eliminating Ottoman words in order to fabricate a national language that corroded the threads of heteroglossia⁹ in Turkish literature and language. This study has asserted that the centripetal functioning of monologia (Bahktin, 1982) systematically eradicated discrepancy and diversity by standardizing, centralizing and controlling the political and cultural discursive field, with the help of a myriad of Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 1977).

Finally in terms of the third M, that of masculinization, which constitutes the niche of this study, I have inquired into the crossroads where masculinities penetrated into ideological structures, as well as into the discursive practices all along Turkish

Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges, New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 161-178.

modernization. This dissertation has assumed that the path followed from Ottomanism as a supra-identity to address to the various nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, to the very construction and consolidation of the Turkish nation-state needs to be culturally investigated by taking into consideration the interaction of nationalist and gender ideologies. It is upon this base that the role-models for the next generations have been produced and consolidated. I further argued that in early Turkish national literature, ethically wrong characters were often portrayed as sexually pervert characters. The main quandary of the era -between cosmopolitanism and national homogeneity- was also a debate reflective of sexuality and gender. Cosmopolitanism implied an essentially motley and un-masculine culture and as such, it frightened the late Ottoman male intellectual. It is no pure coincidence that the first Other of Turkish novels is “the dandy”, the effeminate over-Westernized Ottoman young male (Brummett, 1998: 83). The dandy represented the biggest threat in the eyes of the Ottoman male elite, symbolizing the de-masculinization of Turkish men during the phase of Westernization. Since the West was conceptualized as a woman (Parla, 1993), and Westernization was deemed to be a marriage between the woman/West and man/East¹⁰ in which only the latter could lay out the rules, over-Westernization was tantamount to effeminacy in man, and over-feminization in woman. In the novels of the age explored, when Turkish men became over-Westernized they lost their true essence and manhood and cultural spirit becoming effeminate. When women became over-Westernized they wallowed in materialist greed (Moran, 1977), and eventually lost their chastity and virginity (Finn, 2001: 547). Sex was regarded as despicable and either making ugly (Belge, 1998: 346) or de-feminizing the female fictive characters was essential to redress its presence. Overall over-Westernization was interpreted as a menace leading to the de-masculinization of the culture and feminization of the Ottoman youngster at a time when the society itself was going through profound transformation. The writings of the cultural elite of this era mirrored the main issues of the time (Timur, 1991) and a severe

⁹ For Bakhtin polyphony or heteroglossia reflected the conflicting multiplicity of languages, including those of jargon, technical, and literary language. For more on this see R. B. Kershner, Joyce, Bakhtin, and Popular Literature: Chronicles of Disorder. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1989

¹⁰ “Asya’nin akl-I piranesi ile Avrupa’nin biki-I fikrini izdivac ettirerek” was the original motto viced by Sinasi. Cited in Parla, *ibid*, p. 15.

anxiety triggered by this notion of loss, turning them into ‘micro’ fathers within and above the fictive worlds they constructed vis-a-vis their readers (Parla, 1993; Yaraman, 2001). Scholars have accordingly concentrated upon “fathers and sons” as a crucial metaphor of the age (S. Çakır, 1991; Durakbaşa 2000). Since the father was dethroned (Sirman, 2000) and “impotent” now in both the symbolic and political realm the task of being the guarantor of cultural stability and continuity fell upon the mothers¹¹. The late Ottoman Era came to an end by venerating the de-sexualized mother as the subsidizer of culture and distancing, if not disparaging, the dandy as the slayer of Turkish culture’s authenticity and masculinity. At a time when the Ottoman Empire was dissolving there had emerged a highly vigorous and significantly, multifarious, multicultural, multiethnic women’s movement (Karakışla, 2001) with a considerable range of publications (S. Çakır, 1991; Demirdirek, 1993; Durakbaşa 2000; Zihnioğlu, 2003) cultural/political/economic targets to fight against and an independent agenda to set. It is this legacy that the Kemalist male elite would eventually succeed to, only to expand and extend but also to confine and centralize it (Yavuz, 2000).

To conclude, over the last hundred years there have been significant openings and shifts in the patriarchal precedents operating in Turkey. Kemalist regime has been profoundly effectual and determined in launching a momentous transformation that would penetrate into multiple layers of the society, and in so doing, has replaced the "fathers & sons" matrix with the “fathers & daughters” matrix. That said, there were also significant continuities in Turkish social and cultural history –continuities that too often went unnoticed under the fog of ideological debates and understanding of history via “ruptures”. The continuities between late Ottoman male elite and early Republican male elite were one of these. The similarities and overlapping between the Islamist male elite and secularist male elite were another.

¹¹ See also Carol Pateman, “Equality, Difference, Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood and Citizenship” in *Beyond Equality and Difference*, G. Bock and S. James(eds), London: Routledge, 1992.

Working on the parameters of normality, masculinity and modernity within and in relation to the Islamist-Secularist paradigm in Turkey can present a promising base for developing critical studies that capture the complexities of distinct identity formation processes, as well as promote an understanding among them, and furnish us with further insight into the ruptures and continuities in the country's past and present, and perhaps in its foreseeable future.

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