THE LGBT AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ELÇİN KURBANOĞLU

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Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Feride Acar  
Supervisor

Examinaing Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Feride Acar (METU, ADM) ______________________
Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata (METU, ADM) ______________________
Assist. Prof. Sheila M. Pelizzon (METU, ECON) ______________________
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Elçin, Kurbanoğlu

Signature :
ABSTRACT

THE LGBTT AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Kurbanoğlu, Elçin

M.S., Department of Political Science and Business Administration
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Feride Acar

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This thesis investigates two social movements in Turkey, the women’s and LGBTT movements comparatively and in the light of available NSM theories. While brief histories of both movements are presented and all active LGBTT associations and groups in Turkey are introduced in the thesis, the main focus of the study is the LGBTT movement. Based on in depth interviews with 17 LGBTT activists, the evolution of this movement is traced and its current profile as well as its relationship to different branches of the women’s movement are analysed in detail. The activities of the two movements during the legislative reforms in the 2000s are also examined. While findings of the thesis point to differences between the LGBTT and women’s movements in Turkey, the interface of both movements with the state constitute a critical explanatory factor of their trajectories. The thesis also argues that the extent to which NSM theories can be used to explain these movements in the Turkish context is limited.

Key Words: LGBTT movement in Turkey, women’s movement in Turkey, interrelations between the LGBTT and women’s movements in Turkey, legislative reforms in the 2000s, New Social Movement theories
ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ LGBTT VE KADIN HAREKETLERİ:
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR İNCEMELE

Kurbanoğlu, Elçin
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye LGBTT hareketi, Türkiye kadın hareketi, Türkiye LGBTT ve kadın hareketleri arasındaki karşılıklı ilişki, 2000’li yıllardaki yasal reform süreçleri, Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler teorileri
To my mother...
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Social scientists have long been studying the so-called “new social movements” of the post-70s era and their differences from the social movements of the previous period, which is commonly referred to as the industrial period. While the emphasis on class-struggle was prominent in explaining the social movements prior to the 1970s, the “new” social movements of post 70s; i.e. “peace movements, student movements, the anti-nuclear energy protests, minority nationalisms, gay rights, women’s rights, animal rights, alternative medicine, fundamentalist religious movements, and New Age and ecology movements” could not be explained by using the existing theories of class struggle (Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994: 3). Thus, New Social Movement (NSM) theories were developed.

This thesis investigates two of these new social movements, namely the women’s movement and the LGBTT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual) movement in Turkey in relation to each other, and takes a critical look at NSM theories. More specifically, the thesis examines the LGBTT movement in Turkey in the light of available NSM theories¹, and seeks the features of the LGBTT movement in Turkey that can or cannot be explained by NSM theories.

The basic argument in this study is that although the LGBTT movement in Turkey provides some support to NSM theorists’ analyses of the organisational structure and certain other features of NSMs as different from the working class movements, two important elements of the LGBTT movement in Turkey cannot be explained in the light of available NSM theories. Firstly, NSM theories cannot

¹ The women’s movement will not be examined in the light of available NSM theories due to its umbrella structure. For instance the dominant branch of the women’s movement, i.e. the Kemalist women’s movement, has a century long history in Turkey and cannot be defined as a “new” social movement. However, it has gone through significant changes due to the emergence of the rest of the branches of the women’s movement, which will be introduced in Chapter 3. Only a more detailed analysis of each branch of the women’s movement might lead us to a conclusion about the strengths and weaknesses of NSM theories taking into account various women’s movements in Turkey. Yet it would extend the scope of this thesis to make such a conclusion.
explain the attitude and strategies of the LGBTT movement vis-à-vis the state. The popular argument in NSM theories that NSM activists do not struggle for social, economic and political rights is not supported by the case in Turkey. Secondly, the participants of the LGBTT movement in Turkey do not fully support NSM theorists’ arguments about NSM participants.

In order to seek the strengths and weaknesses of available NSM theories in explaining the LGBTT movement in Turkey, the movement will be elaborated in detail. However, the LGBTT movement in Turkey is very closely related to the women’s movement. The two movements not only have major theoretical intersections, but also actively work together in many fields. In fact it was the women’s movement in Turkey that encouraged the LGBTT movement to participate in the legislative reforms in the 2000s and this participation is the main feature of the LGBTT movement that cannot be explained by available NSM theories. Hence, before investigating the LGBTT movement in Turkey in the light of NSM theories, the women’s and the LGBTT movements will be examined in relation to each other on the basis of three main dimensions.

First of all, brief histories of the two movements will be presented. In this exposé the LGBTT movement will be reviewed in more detail since in Turkey the written history of the women’s movement is much more easily accessible while that of the LGBTT movement is seldom reachable.

Secondly, I will elaborate on the relationship between these two movements and its evolution over time. I will argue that although there are ongoing debates and controversies between the activists of the two movements, the women’s and LGBTT movements in Turkey are getting closer. I will also focus on the relationship between the feminist and the LGBTT movements in more detail in this section, since the LGBTT movement is closest to the feminist branch of the women’s movement.

Lastly, in my analysis I will focus on the activities of both movements in regard to the legislative reforms in the 2000s; i.e. the reform of the Penal Code, the Constitution, the Civil Code and the Labour Code. Focusing on the activities of the two movements during these reforms is important for two arguments made in this thesis. First of all, I will argue that joint activities during these reform processes were what brought the two movements considerably closer. Secondly, it is the
participation in legislative reform processes, one among many strategies that the
women’s and LGBTT movements in Turkey have adopted vis-à-vis the state,
which available NSM theories cannot explain.

Just as LGBTTs are marginalised in Turkish society, LGBTT studies have
been marginalised in Turkish academia. Although the women’s movement in
Turkey has been written about in detail by many authors, it is very difficult to find
written sources about the LGBTT movement in academic institutions or
universities, libraries etc. Thus, the main aim of this study is to prepare a written
history of the movement based on the available written sources and interviews
conducted for this purpose. I hope that this history of the LGBTT movement in
Turkey will provide an exploratory initial insight into the area for further analyses.

Women and LGBTTs are both subjected to violence by private actors and
the state. Yet very few people in Turkey are aware of the violence against LGBTTs
and society at large remains passive when it comes to even very basic issues as the
LGBTTs’ right to life. It is hoped that studies like this can make such violence
more visible and help raise consciousness and social protest, at least in the
academic world.

Also, although the women’s movement in Turkey is very well documented,
its relationship with the LGBTT movement has seldom been examined. However,
the LGBTT movement has significantly contributed to the women’s movement in
Turkey in the last decade. Yet despite these developments, the actual
marginalisation of the LGBTT movement is also reflected in the studies on the
women’s movement. For a more accurate analysis of the women’s movement in
Turkey, it is important to study its relationship with the LGBTT movement as well.

The present study is made up of seven chapters. After the Introduction in
which I will explain why this issue is worth examining and briefly introduce what
each chapter will consist of, in Chapter 2, available literature on NSMs and the
global economic, political, social and ideological context in which NSM theories
were produced will be presented. The criticisms directed towards available NSM

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2 For instance when I first began my research, I looked for master’s and doctoral theses written in
Middle East Technical University on the subject. The only thesis that I could find was that of Özlem
Hoşcan on the portrayal of homosexuality in the Turkish press (Hoşcan, 2006). Similarly, I could
not find any academic sources on the history of the LGBTT movement in Turkey except for that of
Deniz Yıldız (Yıldız, 2007) published by Kaos GL, and summarised information at the websites of
some major LGBTT organisations.
theories will also briefly be introduced in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I will also shortly elaborate on feminist and LGBT(Q) (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer) theories.

In Chapter 3 I will briefly describe the “History of the Women’s Movement in Turkey” starting from the late Ottoman period and in Chapter 4, the “History of the LGBTT Movement in Turkey” will be presented based on an examination of written sources and oral interviews. In this chapter, I will also present and introduce a discussion of the active LGBTT organisations in Turkey.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss the current relationship of these two movements and how it evolved over time. Both in this chapter and throughout the rest of the thesis, I will present the feminist movement as a sub-category of the women’s movement since it is different from other branches of the women’s movement in significant ways despite the fact that in Turkish context, feminists have worked with other branches of women’s movement in many activities.

In Chapter 6, I will make a comparative analysis of the strategies, activities, demands and accomplishments of the women’s and the LGBTT movements during the legislative reform processes in the 2000s as a specific “case” illustrating the relationship between the two movements. In this context, the Constitutional amendments, reforms of the Penal, Civil and Labour Codes will be analysed.

In the Conclusion I will examine the LGBTT movement in Turkey in light of available NSM literature and argue that although NSM theories may partially be applied to the Turkish case, the most important aspect of the LGBTT movement in Turkey that cannot be explained through NSM theories is their position vis-à-vis the state; i.e. their participation in legislative reform processes. The participants of the LGBTT movement in Turkey do not fully support NSM theorists’ arguments either. Hence, in this chapter, I will try to seek the strengths and weaknesses of NSM theories taking into account the LGBTT movement in Turkey. In the Conclusion, I will also present my final remarks on the current position of the women’s and LGBTT movements and attempt some speculations about their future.

A significant portion of this thesis is based on the information gained in interviews made with the 17 LGBTT activists. Most of these interviewees have had
experiences within the women’s movement in Turkey too. The interviews were conducted between July-October 2009 in Ankara, İstanbul and Eskişehir. Each interview took between one and two and a half hours. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and their transcriptions have been translated by myself.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS

As explained in the Introduction, this thesis examines the LGBTT movement in Turkey to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of available NSM theories. The popular argument in NSM theories is that NSM activists do not struggle for social, economic and political rights. This is not supported by the case of Turkey. Another debate in current NSM literature is about the participants of NSMs. NSM theorists usually make either class based generalisations about NSM participants, or argue that common ideological concerns bring people together in NSMs. The empirical evidence on the participants of the LGBTT movement in Turkey does not fully support such arguments either. However, NSM theories’ analyses of the organisational structure and certain other features of NSMs as different from working class movements apply to the Turkish case.

In order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of current NSM theories to apply universally, we have to take a close look into NSM literature. So I will try to explain NSM theories in this section. Then I will briefly discuss feminist and LGBTQ theories to have an idea about the theoretical foundations of the feminist and LGBTT movements. I specifically introduce feminist theories, rather than women’s studies in general, because most of the academic studies on LGBTT issues reflect a feminist stand, both in Turkey and all around the world. In addition, the branch of the women’s movement that is closest to the LGBTT movement in Turkey is the feminist movement.

However, before presenting available literature on both feminist and LGBTQ theories, and on NSM theories in general, it is important to note that most of this literature is of Anglo-Saxon origin. There are many points in this literature, which will be presented in the following sections that might also be applied to the Turkish case. Since some of the woman and LGBTT activists, were either educated abroad or lived abroad for a while, they were well-acquainted with NSMs.

3 Feminist studies in Turkey are more common than LGBTT studies. Yet they are still marginalised.
NSM theories) so that many commonalities between their experiences, their awareness on such experiences, and their self-perception were indeed influenced by the NSMs of Western origin. However, there were also issues and points in the theoretical discussion of NSMs in the West that could not be applied to Turkey. For instance NSMs were started in Turkey in the late 1980s whereas they had already begun to be formed in the West in the late 1960s. While some NSM theorists claim that one of the factors underlying the formation of NSMs was that the welfare state had satisfied basic human needs in the 1950s and 1960s in the core (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 446), this has never been the case in the periphery. Thus, in order to avoid a Eurocentric view that would not reflect of the Turkish reality, it is necessary to keep in mind the Anglo-Saxon nature of the discussions to be summarised below. It is hoped that field studies like this one will help to provide a non-Western theory that will better analyse and explain the social movements in this area of the world.

There are a few studies made in Turkey on LGBTTs. These are usually undergraduate, MS and doctoral theses or expert theses prepared in institutions such as the Forensic Medicine Institution. These studies are often not related with issues of NSM literature but try to address to psychological or cultural matters concerning LGBTTs. These are Özlem Hoşcan’s (Hoşcan, 2006) Sinem Yıldız’s (Yıldız, 2003) and Nurşen Turan Müsellim’s (Müsellim, 2003) theses. Özlem Hoşcan investigated the portrayal of homosexuality in the Turkish press between the years 1998 and 2006. Sinem Yıldız analysed the relationship between depression levels and childhood negligence in heterosexual and gay men, and Nurşen Turan Müsellim researched trauma and violence due to individuals’ sexual orientation. Unlike these studies, this thesis elaborates on the LGBTT movement in the light of NSM theories.

There are two studies that deal directly with the LGBTT movement in Turkey. One of them, “New Social Movements and the Homosexual Movement in Turkey”, was written by a Kaos GL activist, Ali Erol in 1996. Ali Erol says:

While 19th century social movements revolved around the conflict between labour and capital, new social movements put emphasis on those contradictions that do not directly arise from that of labour and capital, those contradictions that traditional social movements disregard (Erol, 1996: 9).
According to Erol, NSMs were started in the West as an opposition to and to fill the vacuum of social democrats, in the East Communists, and in the Third World national liberation movements (Erol, 1996: 9). He has argued that these movements began in Turkey after the coup in 1980 and the first major gay group of Turkey, Kaos GL got together in the beginning of the 1990s.

The second study, “Homosexuality in Turkey and the Group, Kaos GL” is written by Tuğba Özkan in 2004. It focuses on Kaos GL, but also elaborates on some other LGBTTT groups in Turkey. Details from these two studies will be referred to in the following sections.

2.1. New Social Movements: Context and Theories

2.1.1. Late 1960s and the 1970s: When NSMs Arose

Before introducing NSM theories, it could be useful to describe the economic, political, social and ideological environment in which NSMs were started in the late 1960s and 1970s. The context in which NSMs arose could give an insight into both the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical suggestions presented below, and into understanding NSMs in general.

The Post World War II international economic order was characterised by the Bretton Woods system of trade and monetary regimes (Gilpin, 2001: 86), which required that the hegemon, i.e. United States would be the source of global liquidity through balance of payments deficits (Cohen, 1995: 222, 227) and promote cooperation between the allies; i.e. Western Europe, Canada and Japan, who all shared with US the idea that a liberal economy would both meet their economic interests and consolidate their alliance against “the other world”; i.e. the Soviet bloc (Gilpin, 2001: 86).

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4 Although NSMs are still alive, it would extend the limits of this thesis to discuss the social, economic, political and ideological context from the 1960s to today. Thus, I will only present shortly the context in which NSMs initially arose.

5 Cohen argues that the four basic points central to the Bretton Woods system was the adoption of pegged exchange rates; IMF acting as the pool of national currencies and gold; prevention of economic warfare; i.e. control of currencies or exchange rates; and IMF acting as an international forum of cooperation regarding monetary matters (Cohen, 1995: 219-220).
This political economic order began to come to an end in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Panitch and Gindin argue that the Bretton Woods system was doomed to fail due to structural problems. They explain that:

The fixed exchange rates established by [the Bretton Woods] agreement depended on the capital controls that most countries other than the US maintained after the war. Yet the very internationalisation of trade and foreign direct investment [promoted by the Bretton Woods system]... contributed to the restoration of a global financial market, the corresponding erosion of capital controls, and the vulnerability of fixed exchange rates (Panitch and Gindin, 2004: 18).

In any case, by the mid 1960s, it was obvious that the Bretton Woods system was beginning to crack. Especially after the 1965 Vietnam War, the US began to have balance of payment surpluses⁶ and export inflation (Cohen, 1995: 224, 227). By 1968, which was the year of America’s defeat at Tét (Oran, 2001: 658) it was clear that the dollar could no longer support the pegged-rate regime. Western European countries that had been accumulating dollars, primarily France, contributed to the dollar glut. So in 1971, dollar was devalued (Oran, 2001: 658) and US economic and political decline began to accelerate.

Surely, the affect of Vietnam was not only economic. The US sending of troops to Vietnam despite the objections of its Western allies and NATO would lead the US to be politically isolated (Armaoğlu: 584). Additionally, the war was heavily protested both in US and all over the world (Oran, 2001: 658). Young people refusing to go to Vietnam burnt their draft cards on the streets (Oran, 2001: 659). French students were shouting the anarchist slogan “Forbidden to forbid!” and hippies had already initiated the “sexual revolution” (Oran, 2001: 659-660). The world was, so to say, “boiling”.

One of the most important developments characterising the 1970s was detente. According to Fahir Armaoğlu, among the most important reasons of the detente between the Western and the Eastern blocs were the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, rising Asian, African, Latin American unities, Third World and Non-Alignment movements and improving US-Communist China relations (Armaoğlu: 623). First of all, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed both blocs that if the two super powers would choose to pursue fierce policies towards each other, the world might

⁶ In fact the situation began to reverse in 1958, but 1965 was a turning point with regard to US’s position as the global liquidity supplier. For further detail, see Cohen, 1995.
easily face a nuclear war since both US and USSR had been investing in nuclear weapons for decades (Armaoğlu: 554, 602). In addition, through its emphasis on disarmament and by trying to refrain from picking one of the two blocs (Armaoğlu: 634), the Non-Aligned Movement (or Asian-African Bloc) brought into the international political environment an unprecedented arena of democracy and equality (Oran, 2001: 659)\textsuperscript{7}. The improvement of the US-Communist China relations and the deterioration of the USSR-Communist China relations significantly decreased USSR’s power within the Eastern bloc\textsuperscript{8} (Armaoğlu: 553-554). Last but not least, Baskın Oran explains that individual countries within each bloc, primarily in the Eastern bloc, found the chance to pursue independence policies thanks to the struggle between the leaders of the two blocs (Oran, 2001: 657). Starting with the 1970s, all of these factors came together to trigger detente.

The political and economic crises of the 1970s somehow had to be overcome. Yet large deficit countries like Great Britain were interested in the preservation of the role of the sterling (Gilpin, 2001: 97). Meanwhile, the US began to pursue protectionist policies against the new exporters of manufactured goods—i.e., primarily Japan, the new industrial power. The organ promoted for adjustment was again the IMF (Ruggie, 1982: 408). “The burden of domestic adjustment measures, therefore, fell disproportionately on the developing countries” like Turkey (Ruggie, 1982: 408). Similarly the burden of the oil shocks of the 1970s fell disproportionately on developing countries although the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had intended to use rising oil prices as a political weapon against the West (Armaoğlu, 728).

As Northern states increasingly began to pursue protectionist policies, governments of the South begun (and was forced by the IMF and the WB) to give up import substituting industrialisation programs. Especially Latin American states that had been pursuing import substituting industrialisation policies for decades were being “convinced” to switch to export orientation starting with the 1960s,

\textsuperscript{7} It is important to note that though the Non-Alignment movement tried to refrain from picking a side, most of the members of the movement embraced models of socialism, combining anti-Western elements with nationalist goals of complete independence (Armaoğlu: 630-631).

\textsuperscript{8} In fact, the disagreements between Communist China and USSR had begun in the late 1950s. For a more detailed elaboration of the USSR-US-China relations, see Armaoğlu.
usually through military coups, some of which were promoted by the US. On the other hand the Middle East was being destroyed by interstate and civil wars.\footnote{For a detailed analysis of the wars in the Middle East, see Armaoğlu, 693-783.}

In addition to the above mentioned protests and movements, peasant and working class struggles both in the core and the periphery were at the peak. All of these protests and movements “were bound to have an impact on capital’s profits and on the institutions of the post-war institutional order (Panitch and Gindin, 2004: 18).” Perhaps it was the combination of all of the aforementioned three elements; i.e. structural failures, conjuncture changes and strong protest, that caused the post war international order to come to an end.

Finally in 1979, USSR invaded Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, causing the US to lose two strategic countries (Oran, 2001: 659). In the same year, US began a self-imposed neo-liberal program and basically from the 1980s onwards, neo-liberal policies gradually came to prevail all over the world. Panitch and Gindin argue that neo-liberalism may have economic mechanisms, but it is in fact a political response to the democratic rights gained by subordinate masses, “which had become, in a new context and from capital’s perspective, barriers to accumulation. Neo-liberalism involved not just reversing those gains, but weakening their institutional foundations (Panitch and Gindin, 2004: 21)” and while doing so, it aggrieved millions of people all over the world.

### 2.1.2. NSM Theories

It was in such context that NSMs emerged. For decades, scholars have been trying to develop NSM theories due to the inadequacy of Marxist theories in explaining the social movements of the post-70s era. The class and economic reductionism of previous Marxist explanations of collective action privileged proletarian revolution that is rooted in the sphere of production and marginalised all other social identities (Buechler, 1995: 442). Buechler suggests that while old social movement theories defined class as the basis of collective action, new social movement theories pointed out:

Other logics of action based in politics, ideology, and culture as the root of much collective action, and they have looked to other sources of identity
such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality as the definers of collective identity (Buechler, 1995: 442).

Thus “new” social movements have “presumably displaced the old social movement of proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism (Buechler, 1995: 442).”

The debates about the NSM paradigm revolve around certain questions: what are the reasons underlying the emergence of new social movements; are these movements really “new”, i.e. fundamentally different from the social movements of the pre-70s period or is there continuity between the allegedly “old” and “new” social movements; if new social movements are essentially “new”, what are the main characteristics of NSMs that make them different from the social movements of the previous era; who are the participants of NSMs and why do these people participate in NSMs…

The basic argument of those, who think that NSMs are essentially different from old social movements, revolves around the transformation that Western societies went through after the World War II. It is claimed that by means of the economic expansion of the 1950s and 1960s, and the distribution policies of the welfare state, basic human needs were satisfied:

...The morass of bureaucracies and formal organizations designed to implement the welfare state and maintain economic growth began to expropriate the capacities of societal actors to organize their own spheres of social production autonomously. In other words, in contrast to the industrial phase of capitalism, state control in postindustrial society reaches beyond the productive sphere and into areas of consumption, services, and social relations. Hence the participants in these new movements seek to regain control over their personal and collective sense of identity (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 446).

In this view, western societies have entered into a postindustrial era; hence the social movements in this new era differ from those in the industrial period. In the era of postindustrialism, “movements revolve less around matters of class, and more around politics and culture such as racial equality, feminism, peace, the environment, and local issues (Williams, 2008: 341)”.

Chantal Mouffe has an additional point about the rise of the NSMs. According to Mouffe, the transformations that the took place in Western societies after World War II led to new forms of subordination and inequality, which in turn
produced the NSMs (Mouffe, 2000: 301). As summarised by Slater, these new forms of subordination that led to the rise of the NSMs according to Mouffe is as follows:

(i) the commodification of social life, whereby the expansion and penetration of capitalist relations of production into an ever-widening sphere of social life has created a situation in which culture, leisure, death and sexuality have all become a field of profit for capital; (ii) the increasing bureaucratization of society, or a further penetration of civil society by the state; and (iii) a marked tendency towards a more standardized, homogenous way of life, or a so-called “massification” of social life, resulting from the growing power of mass media (Slater, 1991: 34-35).

According to Mouffe, a subject might identify him/herself in a variety of positions since:

Within every society, each social agent is inscribed in a multiplicity of social relations – not only social relations of production but also the social relations, among others, of sex, race, nationality, and vicinity. All these social relations determine… subject positions… (Mouffe, 2000: 296).

In each individual, Mouffe explains, there are “multiple subject positions corresponding both to the different social relations in which the individual is inserted and to the discourses that constitute these relations (Mouffe, 2000: 296)”.

Mouffe implies that NSM activists were constructed as subjects in a democratic tradition brought about by the working class struggle. “Democratic discourse questions all forms of inequality and subordination (Mouffe, 2000: 303)”. Thus, Mouffe states that since NSMs, or as she calls “new democratic struggles” are resistances to the new forms of subordination brought about by the post war transformation, and since these resistances were carried on by subjects of multiple positions, NSMs revolve around identities other than class. Yet it is the availability of democratic discourses that revolve around class that opened a gate for subjects of “other” positions to pursue these “new democratic struggles”.

In his article “New Social Movements: A Critical Review”, Nelson A. Pichardo summarises the basic claims of those who argue that the social movements of the post-70s period are “new” in the sense that they are essentially different from the working class struggle of the industrial era, and direct certain criticisms against them. As implied above, it is claimed that “rather than focusing on economic redistribution (as do working-class movements), NSMs emphasize quality of life and life-style concerns (Pichardo, 1997: 414)”.

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Economic growth and the material rewards that it provides are no longer endorsed if they entail the destruction of the natural environment and the control of collective and personal identities. Instead, the new social movements seek the achievement of “postmaterial” values, the preservation of social bonds, collective goods and the quality of production and consumption (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 447).

However, as cited by Pichardo, Calhoun points that social movements of the nineteenth century like the suffrage movement were not motivated by economistic motivations neither (Pichardo, 1997: 418).

In addition, it is stated that rather than trying to grasp political power as in the case of the working-class struggles of the industrial era, NSMs try to create a field of autonomy (Slater, 1991: 39) whereby the state’s intervention in everyday life is replaced with individuals’ domination of their own lives10 (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 446). In this regard, Offe argues that NSMs try to change the relationship between the state and the civil society. Contrary to old social movements, NSMs try to “reconstitute a civil society that is no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control and intervention” (Offe, 1999: 338). This aspect is interlinked with the fact that contrary to the “old” social movements, NSMs reject the distinction between the public and the private spheres (Slater, 1991: 38). Offe claims that by acting at an intermediate sphere between “private” concerns and “institutional, state-sanctioned mode of politics”, the civil society tries to emancipate itself from the state and all of its institutions such as family, rationality, progress, production, relations with nature etc. (Offe, 1999: 338).

As Taylor and Whittier express, central to the discussion on the NSMs and why people participate in NSMs is the concept of collective identity. “Collective identity is the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and solidarity (Taylor & Whittier, 1999: 170)”. It is argued that one of the differences between the class based movements prior to the 70s and NSMs is that collective identity is a major point around which NSMs politically organise (Taylor & Whittier, 1999: 170). However, one might ask whether organising around collective identity is really a distinctive feature between the

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10 However, D’Anieri, Ernst and Kier indicate that this is not peculiar to the social movements of the post-70s period. They suggest that nineteenth century Oneida Community and Chartist movements also tried to escape from state intervention (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 450).
“old” and the “new” social movements in the sense that working classes of the pre-70s era also gathered together as a political group due to shared interests and experiences. Likewise Taylor and Whittier argue that collective identity is a central point in all forms of collective action (Taylor & Whittier, 1999: 170). Thus it is neither accurate to claim that “new” social movements present a total break from the past, nor is it correct to overrate the continuity between the two movements.

Despite the controversial arguments about whether the NSMs are indeed “new”, there are certain aspects of the NSMs that distinguish them from the social movements of the pre-70s era. One of the main characteristics of NSMs that make them different from the pre-70’s social movements is that they advocate direct democracy, self-help groups and consciousness raising groups, open, non-hierarchical, segmented and decentralised organisational structures, cooperative styles of social organisation, an anti-bureaucratic posture, nonviolence and civil disobedience (Pichardo, 1997: 414-416; Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994: 8). The commitment to autonomy, solidarity and the struggle against hierarchy and alienation are all basic elements of NSMs (Slater, 1991: 39). Yet this is not always the case for some groups that might be labelled among the NSMs. Whether voluntary or involuntary, there is a visible hierarchy based on merit, education and expertise in some NSMs (Rose, 1997: 465). In addition, D’Anieri, Ernst and Kier argue that the Oneida Community of the 19th century too had a decentralized and participatory form of organisation (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 451). Though it is possible to trace such forms of organisations in singular struggles throughout history, what is arguably different in NSMs is that this form of organisation is somewhat institutionalised.

In addition to the above mentioned characteristics, NSMs differ from previous social movements since they “involve the emergence of new or formerly weak dimensions of identity (Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994: 7). This was strengthened by the fact that most NSMs, particularly the women’s movement, the LGBTTT movement, or alternative medicine movements question personal and intimate aspects of human life such as sexuality, love etc. (Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994: 8). Thus, activists of the pre-70s period, who felt that they could not exist in class-based social movements with their own identities found a place in NSMs and became critical of some features of the pre-70s’ social movements.
Another distinctive aspect of the NSMs is its self-reflexive character; i.e. “participants are constantly questioning the meaning of what is being done” (Pichardo, 1997: 415). Melucci tries to explain this feature of the NSMs by defining them as part of the “information society”. He explains that an information society is one in which “most of the trivial activities of everyday life are marked by and depend on the impacts of the transformations in the sphere of information” and in which “the circulation of information ties the world system together and raises new transnational problems over the control, circulation, and exchange of information” (Melucci, 1994: 110). Since information is a symbolic and reflexive resource, in such a society, individuals recognise themselves as producers of meanings, hence able to change meanings, Melucci says. Hence strong emphasis is put on symbols and signs; there is a huge concern with information and knowledge, an effort to seek alternative readings of official discourses (Slater, 1991: 37) and a constant trial to establish alternative sources of information and knowledge.

Some other features of NSMs that make them different from the social movements of the previous era are that while the pre-70s’ social movements primarily defined their struggle as a step towards the revolution; collective action and collective identity are “ends in themselves” in the NSMs (Slater, 1991, 38). By relating to everyday life and individual identity “contemporary movements detach themselves from the traditional model of political organisation, and they increasingly distance themselves from political systems (Melucci, 1994: 103)” In addition, their tactics and strategies are different from “old” social movements; i.e. they frequently use unconventional tactics like mass rallies, site occupations and sit-ins etc. (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 447).

Many authors classify NSM theories into two with regard to the emphases that different theorists put on different aspects of the NSMs. For instance Pichardo argues that there are basically two views about the participants of the NSMs. One is that if we neglect certain differences, the main participants of these movements are members of the new middle class, “persons who may come from the public service, educational, and artistic sectors of the economy” (Williams, 2008: 341 and Pichardo, 1997: 416-417). These activist professionals are highly educated and are not dependent on corporate profit making ideology. The second view is that the main participants of the NSMs are not necessarily members of a specific social
class but individuals with common social concerns. “It is an ideological rather than ethnic, religious, or class-based community” (Pichardo, 1997: 417). Buechler names the former NSM theories political theories and the latter ones cultural theories (Buechler, 1995: 457) and makes further elaborations regarding these two types of theories 11.

The basic argument regarding the middle class involvement in NSMs is presented by the New Class Theory. Jenkins and Wallace explain that New Class Theory suggests that the conditions of the post-industrial era, namely the basis of social stratification shifting from property to expertise and “the growth of the public sector as a force in shaping the content of and discourse about civil society” made the new class a potential source of political protest (Jenkins and Wallace, 1996: 186). Although there are different perceptions of who belongs to this “new class”, the principle idea is that the new class consists of the professional-managerial class that has higher education and work autonomy compared to the working classes of the pre-70s era (Jenkins and Wallace, 1996: 186). Fred Rose explains that according to the New Class Theory, the reason why the new middle class participate in NSMs is that these movements pursue strictly middle class interest, i.e., material interests deriving from the organisation of middle class work (Rose, 1997: 464). However, this theory neglects the role of individual beliefs in motivating people to participate in social movements, which also explains why not all middle class members participate in these oppositional movements.

In his article “Towards a Class-Cultural Theory of Social Movements: Reinterpreting New Social Movements” Rose also examines two other theories that try to explain the relationship between the new middle class and the NSMs: the New Social Movement Theory and the Cultural Shift Theory (Rose, 1997: 465, 488). Rose explains that the New Social Movement Theory sees NSMs as a response to the subordination of the cultural sphere to economics and that the middle class is the primary group that has the ability and skills to react against this subordination. Yet this theory neglects the role of class interests in participating NSMs. The Cultural Shift Theory reverses this logic and suggests that these movements are outcomes of the growing wealth of the society and that since the middle class is the basic class that benefits from this affluence, it is the main

11 For more details on Buechler’s classification, see Buechler, 1995: 457-459.
participant of these movements but the Cultural Shift Theory fails to recognise that these movements are oppositions to state dominance and the status-quo\textsuperscript{12}.

Combining certain elements of these theories, Rose develops a new explanation, class-culture, to explain the middle class affiliation to NSMs. In this framework, Rose argues that class cultures combine both conformity and resistance to the structural demands of the class which are shaped both by work and by the institutions in which people socialise (Rose, 1997: 473). “Middle-class work entails some degree of judgement, applying knowledge to unique situations” (Rose, 1997: 476). In order to achieve some degree of expertise, [starting from an early age], the middle class must spend considerable amount of energy on “self-development”. This brings the internalisation of certain personal ideas and values (Rose, 1997: 477, 478). Thus, “change is pursued through raising consciousness and affecting lifestyles because the middle class defines its own activities by its ideas and beliefs” (Rose, 1997: 488). Besides, the middle class has a great chance to access state institutions and feels that it has the chance, to a certain degree, to affect the decision making process since members of these institutions too are usually members of the same class (Rose, 1997: 481) Thus, Rose argues that both class interests and cultural values push middle class individuals to participate in social movements: the middle class has an interest in maintaining a society with certain rules and order, which will provide them with the success that comes with self-development; the middle class has “an interest in advancing their own ideas, skills, and beliefs as an affirmation of personal identity and self-worth” in accordance with the cultural environment that they are born into (Rose, 1997: 480-481). Rose also suggests that NSMs emerge from middle class culture:

Middle-class movements must be flexible and egalitarian to accommodate many individuals searching for their own identities and seeking a sense of purpose tied to their knowledge and actions. The emphasis on equality is an acknowledgment of the value placed on the individual quest to define one’s own direction. Since most people join these organizations as volunteers based on internalized purposes, these organizations rely on individual initiative to succeed. This also leads organizations to emphasize egalitarian roles with few means to compel members to participate. Rather, these movement organizations provide avenues for individuals to act based on their own sense of purpose (Rose, 1997: 483-484).

\textsuperscript{12} For a more detailed elaboration of these three theories and Rose’s critique of them, see Rose, 1997: 464-472.
Those who argue that the participants of NSMs are not necessarily members of a certain social class state that what brings NSM activists together is common concerns over social issues (Pichardo, 1997: 417). Rather than arguing that class positions form the basis of NSM participation, these theorists are “more likely to identify the social base of new social movements in non-class terms, by referring either to other statuses and identities or to values and ideologies that define movement constituencies (Buechler, 458-459)”.

Offe, on the other hand, argues that the actors of NSMs are neither dependent upon ideological codes that are found on the level of their self-identification, nor do they belong to particular coded socioeconomic groups like the middle class (Offe, 1999: 345). Yet, he says, this does not indicate that the social base of these movements is amorphous and heterogeneous in terms of class and ideology (Offe, 1999 345). He identifies the three segments of NSM participants as:

(1) the new middle class, especially those elements of which work in the human service professions and/or the public sector, (2) elements of the old middle class, and (3) a category of the population consisting of people outside the labour market or in a peripheral position to it (such as unemployed workers, students, housewives, retired persons) (Offe, 1999: 345).

Though the reasons of the participation of the first group are debated by many authors that were mentioned above, Offe tries to elaborate on the reasons of the participation of the last two groups. He says that the life conditions of these people are shaped by highly authoritative and restrictive mechanisms (Offe, 1999: 347). In this sense they are “trapped”, which brings about revolt against bureaucratic and patriarchal institutions (Offe, 1999: 347). In addition, the so-called peripheral group; i.e. students, housewives etc., according to Offe can afford to spend time on political activities. Offe also says that the interests of the old middle class; i.e. farmers, shop owners and artisan-producers coincide with the protests of the NSMs (Offe, 1999: 347). Thus, Offe argues that these people participate in NSMs.

It is important to note that none of the above mentioned theories are fully supported by empirical evidence (Pichardo, 1997; D’Anieri, Ernst and Kier, 1990; Taylor and Whittier, 1999; Rose, 1997). This is partially due to the effort to
establish a holistic theory on the NSMs regardless of localities. One of the basic criticisms that can be directed towards various NSM theories is that while trying to generalise the structural, ideological and cultural factors underlying NSMs, theorists neglect the impacts of the social, cultural, economic, political, ideological etc. factors peculiar to the geography where a particular NSM rises. While elaborating on the women’s and LGBTT movements in Turkey in the light of existing NSM theories, it is thus significant to keep in mind the factors peculiar to Turkey, and the region that the aforementioned movement developed.

2.2. Feminist and LGBT(Q) Theories

I have previously noted that the women’s and the LGBTT movements in Turkey have a close relationship, both theoretically, and in practice. However, the branch of the women’s movement that is closest to the LGBTT movement in Turkey is the feminist movement. In fact most of the academic studies on LGBTT issues reflect a feminist stand, both in Turkey and all around the world. Hence it might be useful to briefly introduce feminist theories, before taking a closer look at LGBT(Q) theories.

2.2.1. Feminist Theories

Although the women’s movement is listed among NSMs of the post-70s era, feminist theory has a much longer history. From its emergence in the late 18th century till today, it has never been possible to speak about a single feminist theory. Both feminist theory and feminist practice have many branches, the most important of which are liberal, Marxist, radical, socialist and poststructuralist/postmodernist feminisms. In this section, the basic premises of

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13 Arguably, the association of the women’s movement with NSMs is due to the fact that the second wave of the women’s movement that started in the 1960s, when NSMs also emerged, shared basic premises of NSMs, such as the questioning of all forms of hierarchy, the emphasis out on consciousness raising, autonomy etc. However, first wave feminists’ struggle, particularly their struggle for suffrage and equal rights and the Marxist feminist struggle in Soviet countries are worth noting.

14 In addition to these branches of feminism, Josephine Donovan takes into account cultural feminism, Freudian feminism and essentialist feminism. For a more detailed elaboration, see Donovan, 2006.
each of these feminist theories, their suggestions about women’s liberation and some major criticisms directed towards them will be summarised. I will also briefly touch upon lesbian feminism and ecofeminism in this section. Most of the feminist theories that will be explained below are also of Western origin. Hence, they may not exactly address to the subordination and exploitation of women of the non-Western world. In order to avoid a Eurocentric view, it might be important to keep this fact in mind.

Liberal feminism emerged towards the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} and the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries in the West. Mary Wollstonecraft’s famous \textit{A Vindication of the Rights of Woman} (1792) is usually accepted as the initial product of both liberal feminism, and feminism in general (Donovan, 2006: 17). This earlier form of liberal feminism began to be modified starting with the 1960s. The new form(s) of liberal feminism, still alive today, can be referred to as contemporary liberal feminism.

Early liberal feminists, i.e. liberal feminists of the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century, were affected by the Enlightenment idea that “men” had “natural” rights that no government can intrude upon (Donovan, 2006: 17). Most Enlightenment thinkers argued that women were excluded from such rights since they were different from men. As cited in Clinton, one of the most important Enlightenment thinkers, Diderot argued that “men were usually motivated by reason and women by instinct” (Clinton, 1976: 287). This “natural” difference between men and women was reflected in social life as the exclusion of women from the “rational” public sphere; i.e. law, education, employment etc. and imprisonment to the “emotional” private sphere; i.e. the house as housewives (Tong, 1989: 13). Liberal feminists like Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill, Sarah Grimke, E. C. Stanton etc. insisted that women, as well as men, have the capacity of rationality; they maintained that men and women are alike, so that they should have the same rights and opportunities (Donovan, 2006: 33).

The equal rights argument began to lose its strength after the suffrage movement of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries (Bryson, 1992: 159). As Betty Friedan explained in her famous work, \textit{The Feminine Mystique} (1963), after World War II, women began to be envisaged as solely housewives and were imprisoned within their homes. In \textit{The Feminine Mystique} (1963), Friedan suggested that
women should participate in the labour force and spare as little time to housework as possible (Bryson, 1992: 160-161). However, two decades later Friedan recognised that this suggestion was causing “the double day” and began to speak about a Feminist Mystique, in which “Superwoman” was this time trapped within the career-marriage combination (Tong, 1989: 24-25). This recognition; i.e. the recognition that equal rights are not enough to emancipate women led to what I called contemporary liberal feminism. In contrast to early liberal feminists, who believed that there was nothing that we can do to “emancipate” women other than struggling for equal rights and for the abolition of discriminatory practices, contemporary, so-called “welfare”, liberal feminists argue that it necessary to eliminate socio-economic, as well as legal, impediments to women’s progress today, via policies like preferential hiring or reverse discrimination (Tong, 1989: 29).

From its earlier days, liberal feminists were criticised by Marxists feminists for not struggling for the transformation of capitalism but rather for what Clara Zetkin called “the ladies” rights15 (Akal, 2003: 51”). Early Marxist feminists, Alexandra Kollontai, Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg followed Engels’ arguments presented in the Origin of the Family (1884) (Donovan, 2006: 89) that taming of cattle brought by men’s acquisition of surplus value, which in turn led to the introduction of the father right in order to leave heritage the private property that men now acquired, resulting in the transition to monogamy (Engels, 1972: 220-221). This asymmetric material relation between the husband and the wife also holds in modern industrial family, since it is the man, who brings food to the family by working outside the house, and the woman, who engages in non-productive household management, which loses its public character and becomes a private act in modern industrial society (Donovan, 2006: 88). Hence Engels and early Marxists feminists claimed that women would be emancipated under socialism by entering into the public sphere and through the socialisation of housework and childrearing (Tong, 1989: 49).

Like liberal feminism, Marxist feminism also began to change in the 1960s, when Marxists feminists began to reconsider Engels’ thesis. One of those Marxists

15 Zetkin used this term to refer to the struggle for suffrage, which was the main motive of the feminists supported by social democrat leaders in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. For a more detailed discussion, see Akal, 2003.
feminists was Margaret Benston, who defined women as a class of people producing simple use-values, and she was the first among many Marxists to realise that even when women entered into the labour force, they had to struggle with the “double day”\(^\text{16}\). Hence Benston argued that the socialisation of housework and childrearing is the single factor that will end women’s oppression as a group (Tong, 1989: 53-54).

Benston was followed by Mariarosa Bella Costa and Selma James, who realised that domestic work, contrary to Engels’ thesis and Benston’s argument, is productive; i.e. housework produces surplus value. Thus, they started a campaign to wage housework rather than promoting women’s entrance to the labour force in order to be emancipated (Tong, 1989: 54).

One of the most important factors that made both liberal and Marxist feminists to reconsider their premises was the emergence of radical feminism in the 1960s. Radical feminism emerged in the West in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a “reaction against the theories, organisational structures, and personal life styles of the male ‘New Left’ (Donovan, 2006: 155)”. Unlike liberal feminists, radical feminists argued that men and women are essentially different. Unlike Marxist feminists, radical feminists claimed that it was patriarchy, or male-domination that cause women’s oppression, not capitalism (Donovan, 2006: 156).

One of the most well-known radical feminists, Shulamith Firestone argued that patriarchy is the systemic subordination of women, the origins of which are based on biology, not economics as Marxist feminists claimed (Tong, 1989: 72-73). Firestone benefited from Marx and Engels’ work and redefined the economic notion of class as “sex class” as a biological concept; i.e. men and women were two opposite sex classes (Eisenstein, 1990: 126). Firestone argued that just as the proletariat would be liberated once they seized the means of production, women’s emancipation would be possible via artificial reproduction technologies since women would regain control over the means of reproduction\(^\text{17}\) (Tong, 1989: 74).

\(^{16}\) “Double-day” is the term used to indicate that women working outside the house have to deal with the double burden of both housework and their work outside the house.

\(^{17}\) Firestone praised artificial reproduction technologies since she saw biological motherhood as “the root of all evils, especially the vice of possessiveness that generates feelings of hostility and jealousy among human beings” (Tong, 1989: 76). This approach was also embraced by Marge Piercy.
Other radical feminists like Mary O’Brien, Adrienne Rich, Andrea Dworkin, Margaret Atwood, Gena Corea, Robyn Rowland etc. have criticised Firestone’s approach, claiming that giving up biological motherhood would not liberate women (Tong, 1989: 77-81). Such radical feminists embraced women’s reproductive powers and emphasised that women’s power to create life makes men so jealous that they try to control reproductive technologies. Rather than using male-dominated technologies, according to these radical feminists, women would have to embrace their reproductive powers, realising that “the source of [their] oppression is also the source of [their] liberation” (Tong, 1989: 78).

Last but not least, one of the greatest accomplishments of radical feminists was the invention of the motto “the personal is political”. In her famous work, *Sexual Politics* (1969), Kate Millet explained that the relationship between the sexes is political18 (Millet, 2000: 23). Millet argued that patriarchy is “a political institution built on status, temperament, and role [i.e. gender], a socially conditioned belief system presenting itself as nature or necessity” (Millet, 2000: xi). According to Millet, such an institution could be eliminated by eliminating status, temperament and role; i.e. gender as constructed under patriarchy (Tong, 1989: 96). Radical feminists like Millet and Marilyn French suggested that androgyny is a solution against patriarchy while other radical feminists like Mary Daly saw the solution in embracing genuine feminine values, and not the ones that are constructed under male domination (Tong, 1989: 98, 105).

The main criticism directed towards radical feminism was its biological reductionism; some radical feminists have failed to analyse that while sex is a biological concept, gender is socially constructed (Hartmann, 1996: 174). In addition, radical feminists have been criticised for not taking into account the fact that technology too is a socially constructed phenomenon, and technology per se cannot be the source of women’s emancipation. However, the emergence of radical feminism was one of the factors that made women’s subordination envisaged by larger masses.

Taking into account Marxist and radical feminist theories, a new branch of feminism, socialist feminism emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In fact

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18 Millet states that “the term “politics” shall refer to power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another” (Millet, 1970: 23).
some authors like Josephine Donovan (2006) lists socialist feminists among Marxist feminists since the two schools of thoughts have much in common. According to Tong, the basic difference between Marxist feminism and socialist feminism is that while the former accounts class as the basis of women’s oppression, the latter argues that gender and class have equal roles in explaining women’s oppression (Tong, 1989: 39).

Socialist feminists primarily aim to explain the role that capitalism and patriarchy play in women’s oppression. Although there are dozens of socialist feminists with peculiar contributions to the literature, since introducing all would go beyond the scope of this section, I will only present the works of Juliet Mitchell, Heidi Hartmann and Zillah Eisenstein.

According to J. Mitchell, production, reproduction, sexuality and the socialisation of children are four structures that determine women’s condition in capitalist society (Morgen, 1990: 278). Mitchell also defines three aspects in women’s lives: economic, biosocial and ideological. She argues that although the economic aspects of women’s oppression might be overcome by a change in the mode of production; i.e. by overthrowing capitalism, the biosocial and ideological aspects, which constitute the nonmaterial means of patriarchy, will remain even in a non-capitalist society. Hence Mitchell says that women’s liberation involves not only overthrowing capitalism, but also pursuing a nonmaterial struggle against the ideology that envisages women as exchange objects (Donovan, 2006: 122).

Hartmann, on the other hand, have materialist explanations for both capitalism and patriarchy. Hartmann defined patriarchy as “a set of social relations between men which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women” (Hartmann, 1996: 178). This material base rests in men’s control over women’s labour power and sexuality, as well as the restriction of women’s access to important economic resources (Hartmann, 1996: 178).

Hartmann explains that men’s control over women’s labour power is assured through the practice of the family wage. Since women are paid less for equal work and since housework and childrearing are assumed to be the woman’s duty, the family is seen as the income-pooling unit supported via the family wage, which according to Hartmann assures men’s control over women’s labour power
Hartmann also points out how capital benefits from women’s subordination similar to Zillah Eisenstein, which will be explained later.

Hartmann, like all Marxist and socialist feminists, see women’s emancipation in socialism. However, she states that women have to continue their struggle once socialism is established since men might be reluctant towards leaving their privileges. Hartmann summarises this in her famous words: “Men have more to lose than their chains (Hartmann, 1996: 189-190).

Another socialist feminist, Zillah Eisenstein chooses the term “capitalist patriarchy” to indicate that the two systems are mutually dependent (Eisenstein, 1990: 114). Eisenstein adds that hierarchical sexual division of labour is the structural and ideological base for both capitalism and patriarchy (Eisenstein, 1990: 134). Eisenstein explains how both capital and men benefit from women’s work. Capital benefits from women’s domestic work since women reproduce both current and future workers; i.e. they take care of men and children. When they enter the labour force, they work for lower wages and they stabilise the economy through their role as consumers (Eisenstein, 1990: 136). But men also benefit from women’s work:

The bourgeoisie profits from the basic arrangement of women’s work, as do all individual men who benefit from labour done for them in the home. All men, regardless of class, benefit, although differentially, from the system of privileges they acquire within patriarchal society (Eisenstein, 1990: 137).

Eisenstein suggests that women shall develop political consciousness out of their everyday lives, and current sexual division of labour, which lies in the basis of both capitalism and patriarchy, should be challenged for women’s emancipation (Eisenstein, 1990: 137, 140).

While socialist feminists criticised Marxist feminists for not taking into account women’s oppression by men (Tong, 1989: 63), socialist feminists themselves have been criticised for uncritically applying Marx and Engels’ categories to all areas of human life at all historical periods (Flax, 1990: 46). Despite such criticisms, socialist feminists took traditional Marxist feminist arguments a step further and acknowledged that it was men, as well as capital, that benefited from women’s subordination and made important contributions to feminist literature.
All of the above mentioned feminisms have been criticised, particularly by black and Third World feminists, for not addressing the issues of race and ethnicity. To them, feminist theories seemed to address only to the problems of white, middle class, First World women:

Third World feminists and feminists of colour began to talk about race, class and gender as intrinsic to each other, as social constructions, realities, identities emerging in particular social moments and local places, but shaped by processes such as colonialist capital expansion, nation building, and war (Acker, 1999: 51).

Postmodernist/poststructuralist feminism, which rose in the 1980s, also partly managed to address to questions of difference, which were mostly unanswered in previous feminist theories.

In order to understand poststructuralist/postmodernist feminists (and also for the sake of the sections to come), we have to touch upon the basic premises of poststructuralism/postmodernism. Postmodernism challenges the metanarratives of Western civilisation, particularly the Enlightenment idea of the presence of a historically progressive science (Donovan, 2006: 213). Hence postmodernists “make us sceptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the self, and language that are often taken for granted within and serve as legitimation for contemporary Western culture (Flax, 1990: 41)”. Postmodernists like Foucault also reject the grand institutions of Western civilisation, which reify dominative practices (Donovan, 2006: 213).

The most important criticisms that postmodernist/poststructuralist feminists direct towards previous feminist theories are the conceptualisations, “woman” and “patriarchy” (Walby, 1992: 33). Postmodernist feminists argue that such concepts are essentialist, and are unable to deal with questions of difference:

…Not only is there no unity to the category of “woman”, but an analyses based on a dichotomy between “women” and “men” necessarily suffer from the flaw of essentialism. Instead, there are considered to be a number of overlapping, cross-cutting discourses of femininities and masculinities which are historically and culturally variable (Walby, 1992: 34).

Postmodernist feminists also argue that the concept “patriarchy” is unable to deal with the differences between women, such as differences based on class, race and ethnicity (Walby, 1992: 33).
In *Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory*, Jane Flax defines “gender relations” as a category meant to capture a complex set of social processes that are constituted by and through interrelated parts (Flax, 1990: 44):

Through gender relations two types of persons are created: man and women… Nevertheless, gender relations so far as we have been able to understand them have been (more or less) relations of domination. That is, gender relations have been (more) defined and (imperfectly) controlled by one of their interrelated aspects - the man (Flax, 1990: 45).

Flax adds that “to the extent that feminist discourse defines its problematic as “woman”, it also ironically privileges the man as unproblematic or exempted from determination by gender relations (Flax, 1990: 45)” when in fact men too are prisoners of gender, “although in highly differentiated but interrelated ways” (Flax, 1990: 45).

At this stage, one cannot refrain from asking what the political implication of this analysis is. That is the basic criticism directed towards postmodernist/poststructuralist feminists. Donovan (2006) claims that postmodernism blocks the possibility of generic political identity and political action (Donovan, 2006: 214). Walby argues that postmodernist feminists not only neglect the social context of power relations, but also that “woman” and “man” as signifiers still have sufficient cross-cultural continuity (Walby, 1992: 36).

Another branch of feminism that emerged in the 1990s is ecofeminism. Although feminists of various branches have also struggled for animal rights, it was not until the rise of ecofeminism that ecological issues began to be an integral part of feminist theory and practice:

One of the main theoretical projects of ecofeminism is to construct new ways of thinking about the relationship between human and nature, including animal, replacing the dualistic, objectifying mode characteristic of Western science (Donovan, 2006: 219).

Many ecofeminists establish a positive identification between women and nature (Donovan, 2006: 217). Ecofeminists argue that “the domination of women and the domination of nature are integral. (Donovan, 2006: 218)”.

It is almost not possible to notice that although questions of difference have begun to be discussed in feminist literature, sexual orientation is still missing in most feminist studies despite the criticisms of lesbian feminists. Starting from the 1970s, lesbian feminists began to criticise other feminist branches for being
homophobic and heteronormative. For instance Charlotte Bunch criticised the socialist feminist concept, family-wage, for not taking into account lesbian workers (Donovan, 2006: 177).

In 1971, a group of lesbian feminists called Radicalesbians set the grounds of lesbian feminist theory. “Trying to get away from the concept of lesbianism as a strictly sexual identity, the Radicalesbians argue[d] that the lesbian [was] really a natural, ‘unconscious’ feminist, a woman who devote[d] her energies to other women, who refuse[d] to be identified in terms of a man (Donovan, 2006: 174)”.

They refused “male-identified” categories and argued that “only women [could] give to each other a new sense of self”, calling for “woman identified” women (Donovan, 2006: 175).

Among the most important contributions of lesbian feminists to feminist literature was the attempt to define heterosexuality. For instance Adrianne Rich saw compulsory heterosexuality as a political institution that was a beachhead of male dominance (Rich, 1980: 633, 637). According to Rich, this institution curtails woman-identification, which is a potential springhead of female power (Rich, 1980: 657).

Lesbian feminists’ suggestion for women’s emancipation was lesbian separatism; i.e. nonparticipation in the institution of heterosexuality (Tong, 1989: 125). Lesbian feminists like Martha Shelley and Elsa Gidlow saw the lesbian as a model for an independent strong woman (Donovan, 2006: 176) and others like Sydney Abbott and Barbara Love argued that lesbianism was a model for egalitarian bonds (Donovan, 2006: 177).

In short, there are several feminist theories, each evolving through time and affecting each other. Despite the criticisms directed against them, feminist theories constitute a challenge towards mainstream/malestream knowledge and institutions and a potential for women’s liberation.
2.2.2. LGBT(Q) Theories

In this sub section I will refer to LGBT studies and Queer (Q) Theory, the differences between them and the criticisms directed towards them. As mentioned before, LGBTT studies have been marginalised in Turkish academia. Although the situation is better in the West, possibly due to the fact that the LGBT movement has a longer history and is stronger there, Michael Warner expresses how LGBT and Queer issues have been marginalised in Western academia too, even in writings on NSMs despite the fact that the LGBT movement is an important component of NSMs (Warner, 2004: ix). In fact both LGBT and Queer theories have decades’ long histories. Similar to NSM theories in general, both theories emerged as a reaction to organisational left wing politics in the 1960s (Kirsch, 2000: 32). Although LGBT-oriented studies have existed for a century outside the academia, it was only the 1960s that LGBT studies have increased in Western academia, together with the movement rising in Western society (Blasius, 2001: 4) Queer Theory too brought into blossom approximately at the same time in the West, but it began to gain acceptance in the 1990s (Kirsch, 2000: 2). Arguably, this was due to the fact that Queer Theory aimed to fill the missing points in traditional LGBT studies.

Much of the LGBT studies are based on Foucault’s analysis on sexuality. In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 Foucault explains that “homosexual” as a category (not as someone engaging in sexual activity with the same sex since that always existed) rose as a result of the proliferation of discourses on sexuality in Victorian society, particularly in the field of exercise of power itself (Namaste, 1994: 222; Foucault, 1978: 18). According to Foucault, in the West, homosexuals began to be classified as a “perversity” in judiciary and psychiatry in the 19th century. Yet it was again this discourse that made it possible for homosexuals to form a reverse discourse and demand legitimacy using the same categories (Foucault, 1978: 101).

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19 Although the LGBTT movement defines itself as such in Turkey, in the West, the term “transgender” is used commonly for Ts and Ts. Besides, much of the Western literature on LGBT issues is based on Queer Theory, which is not so common in Turkey. Hence, I will use the term LGBT instead of LGBTT, and I will also refer to Queer (Q) Theory only in his sub section.

20 Blasius states that the political identity of “gay” was invented as an opposition to the medical identity “homosexual” (Blasius, 1994: 36).
Following Foucault’s analysis, LGBT theorist Mark Blasius claims that today, being gay or lesbian is by definition political. In fact Blasius claims that someone engaging in sexual activity with the same sex but not defining himself/herself as gay or lesbian; i.e. someone in the closet is “in the prepolitical condition of domination within a society that privileges heterosexuality” (Blasius, 1994: 2). In Blasius’ analysis politics is created:

(1) through a relation to oneself as having a lesbian or gay “sexual identity”, thus making possible a lesbian and gay movement; (2) through recognition with others that sexual practices, norms, and institutions are supported by a wider structure of power relations in society and are consequently subject to change by using the movement as a resource for doing so; and (3) through discourse about how what sexuality is conceived to be, its values, and the use of sexuality in living one’s life (Blasius, 1994: 16).

Central to Blasius’ analysis and in LGBT studies in general, is the emphasis put on coming out by LGs21 as a political act. Blasius explains that unlike other forms of oppression, what is specific to LGs is that they are socially invisible, thus socially tolerated unless they come out; hence heterosexist domination suppresses the creation of selfhood in homosexuals (Blasius, 1994: 37-38). That’s why, Blasius says, coming out is a process of recognising one’s own sexual identity, a life-long process of becoming (Blasius, 2001: 155). Blasius argues that coming out is the essential political act by which LGs reject their subjection as the product of historical process of domination by heterosexism (Blasius, 2001: 155). Coming out not only creates selfhood; i.e. recognising oneself, but also signifies being recognised by other LGs; i.e. become a community. Coming out is also the essential step in transforming oppressive institutions (Blasius, 1994: 39). LGs should struggle as a movement; i.e. “publically introduce a change in the order of compulsory heterosexuality” (Blasius, 2001: 1609), to change a set of asymmetrical power relations in society by changing another set of power relations.

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21 Notice how Blasius, like many others, refer only to lesbians and gays in his 1994 dated work. Perhaps thanks to the Queer Theory’s criticisms towards traditional LGBT studies, which will be explained later, Blasius’ 2001 dated study broadens the issue so as to include BTQ and 2Ss (Blasius, 2001). 2S stands for two spirit, a gender and sexual identity transcending the male/female, heterosexual/homosexual dichotomies. 2S is present in indigenous and non-Western cultures (Blasius, 2001: 4). Yet even at this stage Blasius neglects to take into account intersex identities. In a very narrow sense, intersexuality occurs when it is impossible to distinguish medically the “sex” of a person; i.e. female or maleness is medically ambiguous. For more detailed information on intersexuality, see Preves, 2005.
For instance “to change power relations between blacks and whites in the workplace, it has been necessary to change power relations in the educational system so that blacks can possess the expertise formerly monopolised by whites (Blasius, 1994: 24).” Following a similar logic, one could argue that to change power relations between heterosexuals and LGBTs in the education system, it is necessary to struggle against heteronormative laws so that LGBTs can feel the courage to open up throughout their education thanks to the rights they earned in the legislative system.

Queer Theory directed some criticisms against traditional LGBT studies and made further interpretations. As Warner explains, one of the basic controversies between LGBT theories and Queer Theory is about labelling. Terminologies like “nation” and “community” largely used in LGBT studies and among activists are problematic according to Queer Theory for two of reasons. First of all, lesbian and gay experience in history usually had to do with non-community rather than community. Besides, “dispersal rather than localisation continues to be definitive of queer self-understanding”. Hence the slogan, “We are everywhere (Warner, 2004: xxv).” In addition, whereas the term community suggests that its demands be treated as demands of a political minority that should be tolerated and represented in liberal democracies, queers “reject a minoritising logic of toleration or simple interest-representation in favour of a more thorough resistance to the regimes of the normal (Warner, 2004: xxvi)”.

In fact this rejection has created a dichotomy, according to Paisley Currah, between mainstream US LGBT activists and queers.

While mainstream gay rights activists seek to improve the legal and social status of gays and lesbians by demanding that equal rights be extended to (partially) disenfranchised gay and lesbian (and sometimes bisexual) people, queer theorists reject such devotion to the regulatory mechanisms of the liberal state, including its production of citizens, individuals, and, in the discourse of today’s regime of official multiculturalism, the corollary identity group categories of “gay”, “lesbian”, “homosexual”, “straight” (Currah, 2001: 178).

The rejection of such categories and the danger of coming out are the basic differences of Queer Theory from traditional LGBT theories. Rather than accepting such categories, Queer theorists question how such categories emerge (Namaste, 1994: 224). Rather than accepting coming out as the basic political act by LGBT
individuals, Queer Theory states that coming out strengthens heterosexuality since labelling oneself as L, G, B or T acquires its meaning in relation to heterosexism.

In order to elaborate on these differences, we have to figure out where Queer Theory comes from. Just like feminist theory, Queer Theory too is largely affected by postmodernism and poststructuralism, particularly from the works of Michel Foucault, as mentioned above, and Jacques Derrida. What makes Queer Theory different from these two schools of thought is that it places sexuality in the centre of the analysis and sees it as the key concept through which other social phenomenon can be understood (Kirsch, 2000: 33).

In addition to Foucault’s analysis, Queer theorists also take into account Derrida’s analysis of supplementarity (Derrida, 1976: 244) in theorising homosexuality and heterosexuality as both mutually dependent and antagonistic (Namaste, 1994: 224). Based on Derrida’s work, Namaste claims that “meanings are organised through difference… Heterosexuality needs homosexuality for its own definition: a macho homophobic male can define himself as “straight” only in opposition to that which he is not- an effeminate gay man (Namaste, 1994: 222)”.

Diane Fuss, as cited by Ki Namaste, comments on Foucault’s analysis rather differently from Mark Blasius, the LGBT studies scholar. Fuss argues that:

The production of homosexuality in legal and medical discourse engendered a paradox: although the adoption of homosexual identity allowed for the guarantee of civil rights, it brought with it the notion of the closet… In other words, the emergence of homosexuality was accompanied by its disappearance (Namaste, 1994: 224).

Based on again Derrida’s analysis, Namaste concludes that from the initial production of “homosexual” as a category, anyone trying to identify his/her sexual identity outside the norm had to use the definition of sexuality as present in the dominant discourse. Hence we can neither locate ourselves completely outside heterosexuality, nor completely inside it since terms achieve their meanings in relation to each other, just as homosexuality and heterosexuality does. Thus Namaste claims that coming out only verifies the centrality of heterosexuality and the presence of homosexual people, who are in the closet. That’s why Queer Theory puts an emphasis on the production of homosexuality and heterosexuality in relation to each other (Namaste, 1994: 224) rather than, as common in LGBT studies, focusing on the centrality of homosexuality and coming out. That’s why
Queer Theory argues that coming out carries the risk that the forces that oppress gays and lesbians would perhaps oppress them slyly once they are out (Butler, 1991: 15). This is the primary difference between LGBT studies and Queer Theory.

Instead of focusing on homosexuality as a category and focusing on homosexual identity, Queer Theory suggests that it is necessary to investigate the production and reproduction of heterosexuality and how it affects all subjects, i.e. heterosexuals, homosexuals, transgender etc., and basically sexuality itself (Namaste, 1994: 228). Instead of maintaining singular identities, Queer Theory suggests that we shall focus on a multiplicity of identities, from heterosexuals to fetishists, embracing differences (Namaste, 1994: 230).

The question that occurs at this point then is what defines Queer. Max Kirsch makes a differentiation between Queer activists and Queer theorists at this point. The activist definition of Queer includes a promise “to transcend mainstream politics and include all who are against any conceptions of gender, sexuality and power” whereas the academic definition of Queer includes “the rejection of all categorisations as limiting and labelled by dominant power structures” (Kirsch, 2000: 33).

As mainstream LGBT studies are criticised by Queer Theory, Queer Theory too has been criticised, particularly for its political inaction. Lesbian activist and author Paisley Currah criticises Queer theorists for not recognising the importance of the struggle for civil rights and state intervention (Currah, 2001: 178). She states that an alliance between traditional LGBT studies and Queer Theory might help overcome the shortages of both theories. Another critique of the theory, Annamarie Jagose explains that Queer Theory’s strategically open-ended relational character is interpreted by many authors as a possibility to overcome its shortcomings (Jagose, 2009: 159).

In short discussions on theorising LGBTQI2S matters revolve around traditional LGBT studies and Queer Theory in the West. While the latter has its strengths against the former, it has been criticised due to causing a political inaction situation. Yet it is important to note that LGBT and Queer studies are still at the stage of development and field studies might lead to a more accurate theorising on LGBTQI2S matters. It is also important that especially Queer theory is still very new to the Turkish LGBTT movement.
CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

In this section a brief history of the women’s movement in Turkey will be presented starting with the late Ottoman period. Following the contemporary literature on the issue, I will periodise the women’s movement in Turkey from the late Ottoman period, the Early Republican era, the post 1950s, the 1970s and the post 1980s.

The women’s movement in Turkey can be traced back to the late Ottoman period. Nicole A.N.M. Van Os argues that the first feminist movement in the Empire began in the late 19th century (Van Os, 2002: 336). Influenced by the Enlightenment ideas imported into the Empire during the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman intelligentsia –mostly men- began to debate about women’s status in the society. In the second half of the 19th century, women’s newspapers and magazines, in which issues like equal rights, women’s education, polygamy etc. were debated, began to be published (Van Os, 2002: 337-338). These ideas were also reflected in the popular novels of the time. However these debates were held among and reached only the upper class urban elites of the time.

This process gained speed after the establishment of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. Women and men activists that belonged to the Westernised bureaucratic urban classes, and who had been educated in the upper class schools, which had been opened during the Tanzimat period, began to establish various organisations. These organisations were either charity organisations, organisations that aimed to increase women’s consciousness and provide them cultural and educational activities, or political organisations that tried to support the army during World War I (Çakır, 1993: 988-989). Although the activities of these organisations reached only a small proportion of society, the

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22 For a more detailed elaboration on whether the Enlightenment ideas really inflicted gender equality or reinforced gendering, see Kurbanoğlu & Pelizzon, 2008.
women’s activists of the time made important demands for the right to divorce, the prohibition of polygamous and arranged marriages, and educational and occupational rights (İlkıkaracan, 1997: 4). However, Serpil Çakır argues that the only feminist organisation among the above mentioned ones was Osmanlı Müdafaası-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti (Ottoman Association for the Defence of Women’s Rights) with its publication Kadınlar Dünyaşı (Women’s World) (Çakır, 1991: 146). These women clearly stated that men were not welcome to publish in the journal unless the women’s struggle was recognised and women and men made were equal in all areas. The journal gave way to debates on issues like domestic violence, marriage by proxy, children’s education, women’s participation in the public sphere etc. (Çakır, 1999: 37).

Although there is continuity between the women’s movement in the late Ottoman period and that in the Early Republican era, arguably, the women’s movement began to change its form and its relation to the state after the establishment of the Republic. The “woman question” was an integral aspect of Kemalist Turkish nationalism, the nation-state building process, and the modernisation/Westernisation project. This project required that Turkish women would carry the role of being “enlightened” mothers of the nation and indirect facilitators of the modernisation project (Arat, 1994: 61). In this framework, major legislations were made. The Swiss Civil Code, which abolished polygamy and recognised women’s right to divorce, was adopted in Turkey in 1926; the right to vote was granted to women in 1931; suffrage was granted in 1934; and veil and Islamic dress for women was banned in 1935 (Esim and Cındoğlu, 199: 183; Arat, 1995: 67). As well as this new legal framework, both Mustafa Kemal’s and the Kemalist elites’ discourses in this era indicate that enforcing an alleged gender equality would be a state policy that would have “a strategic role both against the political and ideological basis of the Ottoman state and in terms of establishing proofs of ‘democratisation’ vis-à-vis the West (Kandiyoti, 1987: 321)” in a time when fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini were on the rise. However, Zehra Arat rightfully claims that:

...Kemalism was limited in its intentions in regard to the change in women’s social role and gender relations and sought progress only to the

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24 For a brief analysis of Mustafa Kemal’s gender discourses, see Arat, 1994.
level that had prevailed in the West where the female was still the “second sex”. Thus, Kemalism intended to equip the Turkish women with education and finer skills only to improve their contribution to the Republican patriarchy as better wives and mothers (Arat, 1994: 57).

The relationship between the women’s organisations of the time and the state supports Arat’s argument. Probably the only women’s movement that aimed to go beyond the legislative reforms of the Kemalist elites in the time was Kadınlar Halk Fırkası (The Women’s People Party). However, since the government did not allow these women to organise under a party, the group organised under the name Türk Kadınlar Birliği (Turkish Women’s Federation) in 1924. The leader of the group, Nezihe Muhiddin argued that the government did not let them establish a party since some of the articles in the charter of the party like the one that demands that women should do military service was found “excessive” by the government (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 148). In addition, Zafer Toprak claims that the Ankara government did not accept these women’s demands since the establishment of a women’s party at the time would not only be ‘divisive’ (Toprak, 1988: 31) but also would undermine the activities of Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Republican People’s Party) (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 148).

In 1927, the federation organised a congress, in which they demanded the government to let the federation participate in the national elections. This was not accepted by the government so Nezihe Muhiddin and some of her friends withdrew from the federation (Esin, 2000: 39). In 1935, the government forced the federation was to abolish itself after the 1935 International Women’s Unity Congress, in which peace was the most important point of the agenda (Toprak, 1986: 28). There are various arguments about the reasons why the government, which proclaimed that establishing gender equality, would allegedly be their mission and a state policy, would ban the most important channel of the women’s movement. As Toprak explains, the state’s unity during the single party period required an organic relationship between organisations and the Party (Toprak, 1986: 29). Toprak claims that Kadınlar Birliği had such an organic bond with the party but adds that this came under threat due to the fact that since peace was in the agenda of the federation at a time when European countries were coming to arms was in conflict with the People’s Party’s policies (Toprak, 1986: 29). On the other hand, Yapırcak Zihnioğlu claims that the Kemalist elites tried to keep the women’s movement
under control in order to take credit in the eyes of the West for all the rights that these women struggled for and achieved (Zihnioğlu, 2003: 262). In addition, Zafer Toprak explains that Kadınlar Birliği was not the only group that the government abolished. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the government also abolished many workers’ organisations, cultural organisations etc. and established Halk Evleri (People’s Houses) instead (Toprak, 1986: 29). This might be related to the fact that the Islamist opposition began to raise its voice substantially in the 1930s so Mustafa Kemal’s government banned all political activity in this period. Whichever the case, the government’s attitude towards the civil women’s movement indicates that Kemalist gender reforms did not challenge patriarchy but only tried to change its form.

In any case, the state’s gender policy in the Early Republican era not only significantly affected the women’s movement of the time, but also left a legacy for the women’s movement of the entire history of the Republic. First of all, as cited by Esin, Şirin Tekeli expresses “the transformation in the women’s status realised by the state reforms from above in the spheres of the family, education, clothing and political rights represented a ‘state feminism’. This, she claims, had an inhibiting effect on the development of an autonomous women’s movement (Esin, 2000: 38)”. Secondly, the Kemalist reforms directly benefited women of the urban bourgeoisie (Kandiyoti, 1987: 322). Thanks to the Kemalist policies on women’s education, many upper and middle class women had a chance to be recruited into prestigious and highly remunerated professions (Kanditoyi, 1987: 323) and some of these women struggled to extend their alleged emancipation to women of lower classes in Turkey.

Some of the above mentioned middle and upper class women, who identified themselves with the Kemalist ideology, formed various associations in the 1940s and 1950s after the ban on autonomous women’s organisation was withdrawn in the second half of the 1940s. The basic goal of these organisations, some of which were The Turkish Women’s Federation that was reopened in 1949, Soroptimist Kulüpleri Birliği (The Federation of Soroptimist Clubs), Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği (Turkish University Women’s Association), Kadının Sosyal Hayatını Tetkik Kurumu Derneği (The Association of the Research Institution on the Social Life of Women) and Türk Anneler Derneği (Turkish
Mother’s Association), was to defend the rights ascribed to them by Mustafa Kemal, defend secularism against the Islamist oppositions and “emancipate” women of the lower classes as Kemalist policies had “emancipated” themselves (Esin, 2000: 41-42). In fact there is still such a majority of Kemalist women’s rights defenders that feel organically connected to the ideology of the Early Republican era.

Despite the huge political and economic changes in the country starting with the 1950s and in spite of the fact that these changes made considerable deteriorations in women’s lives, the women’s movement did not accelerate in this period. Tekeli argues that this was due to the inhibiting affects of the Kemalist reforms and ideology. However, the democratic right and freedoms granted by the 1961 constitution gave a place for various women’s groups to demand further and wider rights (Esin, 2000: 42). In this period too, the above mentioned Kemalist approach was maintained by many women’s organisations like İleri Kadınlar Derneği (The Association of Progressive Women) and the women’s branches of the Republican People’s Party (Esin, 2000: 42-43). In addition to the women’s branches of the Republican People’s Party, there were women’s branches of Demokrat Parti (The Democrat Party) and Adalet Partisi (The Justice Party). In this period, the first revolutionary women’s organisation was also established. Devrimci Kadınlar Derneği (Revolutionary Women’s Association) brought women together in an anti-imperialist, national democratic revolution and a struggle for peace (Esin, 2000: 43).

This new leftist approach in the women’s movement accelerated in the 1970s due to the social, political, economic and ideological developments of the time. Beginning with one coup and ending with another, the 1970s would be characterised by three major characteristics in Turkey: increased political instability and frequent government changes, an economic breakdown that could be postponed to the second half of the decade and increasing working class and student militancy and left-right struggles. In this environment, many leftist women’s organisations were established: İlери Kadınlar Derneği (The Progressive Women’s Association), Ankaralı Kadınlar Derneği (The Association of

25 For a summary of how these changes affected the lives of men and women, see Tekeli, 1986: (185-190).
Women of Ankara), Demokratik Kadınlar Birliği (The Federation of Democratic Women) and Emekçi Kadınlar Birliği (The Federation of Women Workers). These organisations were decommissioned towards the coup under martial law. However, they made huge contributions to the women’s movement in Turkey in their lifetimes.

The primary targets of the women belonging to these organisations were fascists and fascism partly due to the civil war between the fascists and socialists towards the second half of the decade and partly due to the influence of the socialist parties that they were in relation with (Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Labour Party), Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Turkish Communist Party), Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (Turkish Popular-Liberation Party Front), Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path) etc.). These organisations believed that the women’s struggle should be in accordance with and in the light of the working class’ struggle (Akal, 2003: 121; Şahin, 1994: 139). This women’s struggle would include all women except “a handful of bourgeois women” (Akal, 2003: 122). Despite the dominance of the Marxist ideology among these women, The Progressive Women’s Association especially made many campaigns including the extension of maternity leaves, the acknowledgement of child bearing as social work, turning the antenatal and postnatal leaves into paid leaves, equal rights for peasant women, equal pay for equal work, setting up nursing rooms at workplaces as required by the law, change of the curriculums of girls’ vocational high schools by removing lectures like fashion and flowers, informing women on women related issues like pregnancy, abortion, the change of life etc.

The legacy that these women left contributed to the activities of the women’s movement in the post 1980 period. Based on their experiences within the socialist parties, after the 1980s, these women became critical of patriarchal and hierarchical party structures and turned towards more horizontal organisation structures, began to identify themselves as feminists and presented feminism as not divisive of the class struggle, translated the Second Wave feminist literature of the West into Turkish, and became important actors of the post 80 women’s movement in Turkey. Arguably, without their huge contributions, the contemporary feminist movement in Turkey would not have made so many important accomplishments if
it was not for the efforts of these women, most of whom did not leave the streets despite feeling the fist of the army on September 12, 1980.

In addition to the leftist women’s organisations, there were many other women’s organisations from different ideological backgrounds in the 1970s. These were occupational women’s organisations like Kadın Ressamlar Derneği (The Association of Women Artists), nationalist organisations like Türk Kadınları Kültür Derneği (The Cultural Association of Turkish Women), the continuation of the above mentioned Kemalist organisations etc. Last but not least, women activists of the 1970s established Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar Partisi (The Turkish National Women’s Party) “with the aim of providing conditions of equal participation for women in the political decision-making process, in addition to the acceptance of women as human beings and citizens (Esin, 2000: 45)”. However, the party could not participate in the national elections of 1972 and 1977 since they did not fulfil certain legal requirements.

Just as Turkey was experiencing the most active political environment of its history came the coup of September 12 1980. This vicious day put an end to the political life in Turkey. All political parties, radical leftist parties, and groups and trade unions were shut down. Thousands of leftist people were murdered, imprisoned, and tortured by the military regime; indeed almost two decades later, victims of September 12 are still suffering physically and emotionally. Many never got the chance to win their lives back. Ironically, the women’s movement had the chance to get strength and raise its voice under such an anti-democratic socio-political environment.

The women’s movement began to come out of its shell in the first half of the 1980s. Şirin Tekeli, one of the most important representatives of the women’s movement in Turkey explains that the first consciousness raising groups began to be formed informally in 1981 and 1982 (Tekeli, 1989: 36). Again in the first half of the 1980s Yazarlar ve Çevirmenler Yayın Üretim Kooperatifi (The Authors’ and Translators’ Union) began to ask questions on the issues of womanhood and sexuality and became an important channel of making feminist politics at the time (Tekeli, 1989: 37). Towards the end of 1983, many women were gathered under the company, Kadın Çevresi (Women’s Circle), to evaluate women’s work inside and outside the home, to make feminist publications, to make campaigns on the
battering of women etc. (Arat, 1991: 10; Sirman, 1989: 17). In 1985, when Turkey would finally approve the *United Nations Decade for Women*, the women’s movement in Turkey began to make demonstrations and collect signatures for the implementation of the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) (Arat, 1991: 10). However, the government only partially ratified CEDAW since some of its articles were in contradiction with the then existing Turkish Civil Code\(^{26}\) (Esin, 2000:53).

The women’s movement accelerated its activities in the second half of the 1980s. “A group of women from [the Women’s Circle] began to publish the journal *Feminist* in 1987 (Esin, 2000: 52)”. Again in May 1987, a campaign against violence against women was started, triggered by an incident in Çorum, where a judge did not grant divorce to a pregnant woman. 3000 women participated to the demonstrations in İstanbul (Tekeli, 1989: 39). “The campaign continued until the women’s shelter for battered women had been established and new regulations against domestic violence had been formulated (Esin, 2000: 55)”. Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Derneği (The Women’s Association against Discrimination against Women) was also founded in the same year (Arat, 1991: 10-11). “The association provided a common ground for women coming from various leftist and feminist groups (Esin, 2000:55)”. In 1989, Kadın Dayanışma Derneği (Women’s Solidarity Association) was established in Ankara. Furthermore a bunch of women from various social statuses under the name Perşembe Grubu (Thursday Group) were forming consciousness groups again in Ankara (Arat, 1991: 11; Timisi and Gevrek, 2007: 26). The group came together every Thursday to make discussions about women’s problems in Turkey, the types of feminist policies to be pursued; established a journal called *Yeter* (*Enough*) etc. (Timisi and Gevrek, 2007: 26).

Feminists of various groups in İzmir, İstanbul, Ankara and Adana, and many individual feminists got together also in 1989 and published the *Women’s Liberation Manifesto* (Tekeli, 1989: 39). These women discussed the means to form a non-hierarchical network between the women’s organisations all over the country without damaging the autonomy of the women’s organisations from different ideological backgrounds (Tekeli, 1989: 39). These women pushed some

\(^{26}\) For a more detailed elaboration, see Esin, 2000: 53.
municipalities to open women’s shelters and opened the Mor Çatı kadın Sığınakı Vakfı (Purple Roof Women Shelter Foundation) themselves in 1990.

Some women activists of the 1980s embraced leftist ideologies. For instance in 1988, the socialist feminist journal Kaktüs (Cactus) began to be published. Among the feminist groups of the time, the women of Cactus were the ones that highlighted their left wing ideological position the most (Arat, 1991: 11). Another leftist group that got together in the same year was Demokrasi Mücadelesinde Kadın Derneği (The Association of Women in the Struggle for Democracy) (Esin, 2000: 62). Founded by working class women, this association argued that there was no need for an autonomous women’s movement following the same approach that the women’s movement in the 1970s had. “...The point of distinction between feminist women who believed in the necessity of autonomous politics for the liberation of women, and socialist women who believed that women would only be liberated through class struggle (Esin, 2000: 60)” began to crystallise during the first Women’s Assembly, established in May 1989 in Istanbul.

In addition to these leftist and/or feminist women’s organisations, other mainstream women’s organisations were established throughout the 1980s. Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s wife, Semra Özal, established Türk Kadını Güçlendirme ve Tanıtma Vakfı (The Foundation for the Elevation of Turkish Woman) in 1986. The position of the foundation was parallel to the Kemalist women’s organisations mentioned above in the sense that it acted as an “emancipator” foundation for lower class women. It made campaigns for women, who had been married unofficially through religious ceremony, to get married officially; for introducing birth control to rural women etc. (Sirman, 1989: 23). In addition, there were Islamic women’s organisations like Hanımlar Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı (The Foundation for Women’s Education and Culture), Kemalist women’s organisations like Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı (The Association for the Support of Modern Life) etc. (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 183).

It is important to note again that although people of Turkey were highly politicised in the 1970s, a woman’s movement independent of socialist parties was

27 “It is important to note that these institutions are totally civil initiatives and they don’t receive any financial support from the state (Kerestecioglu, 2004: 76).”
lacking at the time. It was not until the 1980s that a feminist woman’s movement found a space to evolve in Turkey. In order to understand the history of civil society and women’s movement in Turkey, it is significant to ask why this was the case.

First of all, as Yeşim Arat explains, it was not until the 1960s that the feminist movement began to raise its voice in the West (Arat, 1991: 12). As I have mentioned elsewhere, when the impacts of the women’s movement in the West had not yet reached Turkey and under the civil war environment Turkey, it is possible to understand why women activists of the pre 1980 era had different priorities and why an autonomous women’s movement did not emerge. Yet two factors of its history had impacts on the emergence of a feminist movement in Turkey. As explained above, one of them was the legacy of the Kemalist policies for women’s education. This statist tradition would ensure a safe place for women’s existence in professions and higher education. Though the Kemalist approach towards women is not necessarily “emancipatory” for all women in Turkey, it gave a chance for the existence of a group of educated and powerful women, who would have a critical point of view both regarding the Kemalist policies themselves and regarding the institutions that reinforce gendering in Turkey and around the world although some members of this class preferred to sustain the Kemalist tradition of the Early Republican era. Another one is the legacy of the 1970s. Although men were dominant in the socialist movement of the 1970s, although the movement was arguably patriarchal and though women did not find a place to develop an autonomous women’s movement in the time, the 1970s politicised many women from different social backgrounds, from villages to towns, from the squatter houses to fancy apartments. In addition, since the primary target of September 12 was left wing groups, parties and organisations, there was a place for an autonomous feminist movement to emerge in Turkey after 1980 (Arat, 1991: 13). All of these are possible explanations for why the feminist movement in Turkey did not gain strength until 1980.

Women activists of the 1980s did not only raise questions on issues that had seldom been questioned in Turkey like sexuality, violence, patriarchy, sexual harassment etc., but also they contributed to the return to civil government after the coup. They increased the strength of the civil society and contributed to the
formation of democratic organisational structures in Turkey. As Tekeli explains, this was partly due to the fact that the double day prevents women from both being full-time activists and from forming hierarchical organisations with increased division of labour (Tekeli, 1989: 40). They tend to form non-hierarchical organisations based on rotations and less specialisation. Furthermore, as argued above, the socialist women that became critical of the patriarchal, hierarchical organisations of the 1970s preferred a more democratic form of organisation in the 1980s. In short, women activists of the 1980s embraced the motto “the personal is political” for the first time in Turkey.

It is widely accepted the feminist women’s movement of the 1980s was institutionalised in the 1990s (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 75). In the 1990s, the feminist women’s movement began to be more visible in the media, state institutions and daily discourses. The most obvious development of the late 1990s and the early 2000s is that the feminist civil society began to be more influential in state policies (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 76). International organisations like the United Nations and the European Union were also very influential in urging the Turkish state to change its legal framework and pursue gender mainstreaming policies (Eray, 2008: 5, 6). In addition to according legitimacy to non-governmental women’s organisations, international institutions and their sub branches like United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) also provide financial support to the civil women’s organisations in Turkey (Esin, 2000: 65). In addition, one of the common characteristics of the women’s movement in Turkey is that most of the woman activists are well-educated, urban, middle or upper middle class women, who channel their energies towards women of the lower strata.

As Esim and Cindoğlu argue, women’s organisations in Turkey are influenced by the power struggles among political and social groups (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 180). Taking into account this argument Çiğdem Esin analyses the women’s organisations in Turkey under four major categories: Kemalist women’s organisations, Islamist women’s organisations, feminist women’s organisations and Kurdish feminist women’s organisations. Again Esim and Cindoğlu claim that “In the case of Kemalist and Islamic women's groups, the project of modernity is

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28 For more detailed information, see Eray, 2008: 59-70.
heavily dependent on the symbolic role and image of women for social change…
[whereas] feminist women’s organisations…target change for women for themselves rather than as symbols of wider political projects (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 186, 187).

As indicated above, the Kemalist women’s movement has inherited many aspects of the Early Republican era Kemalist gender policies. In this view, Kemalist women’s organisations struggle for women’s participation in the public sphere while maintaining their traditional roles in the family (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 187). In addition to Çağdaş Yaşam Destekleme Derneği (Association for the support of Contemporary Life), which was established in the late 1980s, the Kemalist women’s organisations established in the 1990s are Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği (Association of Women for the Republic) (1997) and Çağdaş Kadın ve Gençlik Vakfı (Contemporary Women and Youth Foundation) (1994) (Esin, 2000: 69-70). “Their activities include seminars on women's legal rights, skills training courses for income-generating activities. They perceive women as citizens and productive members of society with the belief that by illuminating [lower class] women with Kemalist ideals, the secular nature of the state will be secured (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 183).” In addition, these organisations hold a strong campaign against the headscarf issue in Turkey.

Starting with the 1980s, gaining speed in the 1990s and reaching its peak in the 2000s, the Islamist movement in Turkey gained power and moderate Islamic policies began to be implemented. Under this political environment, certain Islamist women’s organisations were established and increased their activities. Some Islamist women that had the chance to benefit from the secular educational institutions began to be critical towards the status of women in Turkey and the Kemalist state policies towards women (Esin, 2000: 71)\(^\text{29}\). The primary demand of these women’s organisations was the freedom to wear headscarves in the public sphere. Besides, these women have been critical toward “both traditional Islamic ideologies that identify women with the private sphere and toward the secular homogenous public sphere constituted by the Kemalist state elite” (Esin, 2000: 70-

\(^\text{29}\) Arguably, just like the adoption of secularist, modernist policies created a group of Kemalist elite women, who then gathered under various organisations, the adoption of Islamic neoliberal policies created a group of Islamist elite women, who then gathered under various organisations of their own.
Though these organisations are in conflict with Kemalist women’s organisations, they are in debate with feminist women’s organisations (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 94).

These Islamist women began to publish some journals like Kadın ve Aile (Woman and Family), Mektup (Letter), Bizim Aile (Our Family) in the late 1980s (Acar, 1991: 283) and Sena (Sky) and Kadın Kimliği (Woman’s Identity) in the 1990s (Esin, 2000: 71). In these journals, women activists questioned the attitude of mainstream Islam towards women and claimed that originally, women and men are equals in Islamic thought. Yeşim Arat claims that these ideas encourage women “to take part in a more active social as well as political life, and they are introduced to the concept of individual rights” leading “in the long run [to] help women question the confines of the Islamic ideology they presently uphold” (Arat, 1995: 77).

“Currently, there are over 300 Islamist women’s associations, foundations and groups (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 93)”. Some of these are the Gökkuşağı Kadın Platformu (The Rainbow Women’s Platform), Çınar Kadın Platformu (The Plane Tree Women’s Platform) (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 93). The main activities of these platforms are providing food and clothing for lower class families, organising seminars and panels to educate women, particularly mothers, teaching women on income generating activities like sewing, attending international conferences etc. (Esin, 2000: 73). Başkent Kadın Platformu (The Capital City Women’s Platform) and AK-DER (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği) (Women’s Rights Association against Discrimination), on the other hand have a more radical stand. They make press releases, struggle during legislative reform processes, make debates and discussions, focus on the discrimination against women wearing headscarves etc.

Dozens of feminist women’s organisations, foundations and associations have been established all over Turkey in the last two decades. Almost every city in Turkey has a feminist women’s association of its own. Many of these feminist women’s organisations gather under the most well-known feminist network in Turkey, Uçan Süpürge (The Flying Broom). Established in 1996, Uçan Süpürge organises workshops regarding women’s social status and problems, provides support to other women’s organisations in Turkey, engages in national and
international lobbying activities etc. (Kardam and Ecevit, 2007: 94). Via their bulletin, The Flying News, their radio stations and web site, regular film festivals etc. the network tries to create public awareness on feminist issues and provide an alternative to existing misogynistic main stream media and improves communication between women (Kardam and Ecevit, 2007: 97). Uçan Süpürge is a non-profit organisation, legally listed as a company (Kardam and Ecevit, 2007: 93). Thus, while most of the feminist groups face the problem of state control since they organise under foundations and associations, Uçan Süpürge is able to be immune from the type of control that is might be exerted on associations.

Another one of the most important contemporary feminist journals in Turkey is Amargi. In this journal, feminist women make theoretical discussions; give recent news about the feminist movement and women’s problems in Turkey etc. Another important feminist group in Ankara is Feministbizi. While previously the group was named Ankaralı Feministler (Feminists of Ankara), Feministbizi organises workshops, discussions etc., makes street demonstrations etc. Apart from Uçan Süpürge, another network that gathers together many feminist organisations is Kadın için Destek Oluşturma Grubu (NGO Advocacy Network for Women) (KİDOG). Although not all of the organisations under the roof of KİDOG can be labelled as feminist, the NGO is able to undertake effective feminist projects (Esin, 2000: 97).

The feminist groups in Turkey struggle to transform the gender and gender-related hierarchies in Turkey (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 184). They criticise patriarchal institutions like the state, the family etc. while trying to address everyday problems of women. With this aim, they provide shelter and counselling to victimised women, develop training programs on women’s legal rights, carry out training programs of income generating activities for women etc. In addition, they follow women’s agenda and make petition campaigns and street demonstrations whenever necessary.

Many Kurdish feminist women’s organisations also began to be established in the 1990s. The major criticism that Kurdish feminist organisations make against the other feminist organisations is that the Turkish feminist movement disregards the differences between the oppression of Turkish and Kurdish women and does not recognise the state violence against Kurdish women (Esin, 2000: 77). However,
they have many social criticisms in common with the Turkish feminist movement like domestic violence, unequal rights, and discrimination against women in the workplace, at schools etc. With the aim of holding the struggle with gender and ethnic identities, Kurdish feminist activists began to establish the journals *Ji Bo Rizgariya Jinan* in 1993, *Roza* in 1996, *Jujin* in 1997 and *Jin u Jiyan* in 1999, in which they made discussions about the Kurdish women’s movement, criticised the official discourse etc. ³⁰ (Esin, 2000: 78). They also founded *Kürt Kadınlarıyla Dayanışma Vakfı* (*The Foundation for Kurdish Women’s Solidarity*) in 1996, *Jiyan Kadın Kültürevi* (*Jiyan Woman’s Culture House*) in 1999 and *Kırk Örük* in 2005 (Esin, 2000: 78).

Although Esim and Cindoğlu do not include socialist feminism in their classification, nevertheless it is an important branch of the women’s movement in Turkey. Socialist feminists see capitalism and patriarchy as two intertwining systems and unlike their pioneers in the 1970s; they do not believe that women will be emancipated through class struggle. They are in favour of an autonomous women’s movement that shall be anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist in its structure. The most recent socialist feminist group that began to get together in 2007 is the *Sosyalist Feminist Kollektif* (*Socialist Feminist Collective*). This collective began to publish the journal *Feminist Politika* (*Feminist Politics*) in 2009, in which they make discussions about patriarchy, women’s labour, homophobia, neoliberal policies and women etc. The *Socialist Feminist Collective* also supports the struggle of women labourers in Turkey by making street demonstrations all over Turkey.

Before passing on to the activities, demands and accomplishments of the women’s organisations in Turkey in the last two decades, there is another important point that shall be noted. Although Sancar Üşür claims that increasingly, the feminist movement in Turkey has embraced the approach of being of equal distance to all ideologies (Üşür, 2008: 249); many feminist demonstrations made in Turkey carry a leftist tone. Almost all groups that attend the March 8 demonstrations march with anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist slogans. This is also evident in the recent support that feminist women have given to the workers of

³⁰ For a brief information regarding the meanings of these phrases, see Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 95.
Novamed and Desa. However, this does not undermine the power of Kemalist and Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey.

Regardless of the differences between them, many feminist groups have worked together and held various activities to struggle against patriarchy. First of all, “the process of integration of gender equality in the state policies began with the Advisory Council for Women’s Policies set up in the State Planning Organisation (SPO) in 1987 (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 83)” . The council was to ensure that special measures would be taken for women in the five-year plans of the SPO. However, it appears that the council was established only with the urge of international organisations and did not have a connection with the women’s movements of the time. “This ... shows how international obligations lead to developments especially on the official level but remain abortive unless linked with internal social forces (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 83)”.

In 1990, the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (KSSGM) was established. The discussions on the establishment of KSSGM point out to the divisions between the women’s movement. Although conventional women’s organisations and most women activists from academia supported the establishment of the directorate, feminist women’s organisations argue that the state is the institution that pursues the most sexist policies, thus they are against the KSSGM (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 84). In addition, almost all women’s organisations were against the phrases “supervision”, “monitoring” and “protection” used in the drafts prepared by the KSSGM. İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu explains that these women’s scepticism towards the state is partly due to the Early Republican Kemalist experiences (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 84).

Furthermore, feminist activists have struggled for both the extension of the legal rights on violence against women and held various campaigns with the aim of raising awareness on the issue among women. The feminist movement struggled hard to change the available legal framework on the violence against women in favour of women victims of violence. Among these efforts was the change in the Law on the Protection of the Family. However flawed the name of the law sounds from a radical feminist perspective, the change was that the complaint about violence did not necessarily have to come from the victimised woman. With regard to the struggle held against violence outside the efforts to change the legal
framework “one of the most notable developments in the institutionalisation of the fight against violence is the Women’s Shelters Assembly regularly held since 1998 (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 77)”. Furthermore, the foundations Altındağ Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı (Altındağ Foundation for Women’s Solidarity) (1990) and Mor Çatı Kadın Şişınağı Vakfı (The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation) (1990) held campaigns against domestic violence, provided shelter and counselling services etc. in the struggle against domestic violence (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 185). It is impossible to list all the campaigns and projects made to struggle against domestic violence but although domestic violence is still one of the greatest problems of women of all classes, ages, ethnicities etc. all over Turkey, the feminist movement was obviously successful in altering the perspective of the state in regard to its relationship with the private domain (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 80).

One of the most important demands of the women’s movement in Turkey is to increase women’s political participation. The most important effort made for this aim is the establishment of KA-DER (The Association for Supporting and Training Woman Candidates) 1997. Established by a group middle class women of professions, KA-DER aims to reach equality between men and women in politics and increase women’s representation (Bora, 2007: 115).

Another important development of the 1990s was the opening of women’s studies departments in many universities and the efforts to document women’s history. Both women academicians, who fought for the opening of these departments, and women’s studies students, are very influential in shaping the women’s movement, various disciplines in Turkey and documenting women’s history. With the aim of documenting women’s history, many feminists got together to establish Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı (The Foundation of Women’s Library and Information Centre) in 1990 and Kadının İnsan Hakları Bilgi Belge Merkezi (Women’s Human Rights Information and Documentation Centre) in 1999 (Esin, 2000: 94).

By preparing drafts about their demands and sharing them with the government and the media, through lobbying in the national assembly and with the help of international organisations, the women’s movement was able to contribute to many legislative reforms in favour of women between the years 1998 and 2005 (Eray, 2008: 71-77). These were the changes made in the Turkish Constitution, the
Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Labour and Job Security Laws and the Law on the Protection of the Family\textsuperscript{31}.

In short, the history of the women’s movement in Turkey can be traced back to the late Ottoman period. The women’s movement of the Early Republican era and Kemalist gender reforms have made such a strong impact in Turkey that in the 2000s, a branch of the women’s movement in Turkey is still connected to the Kemalist ideology. Although the women’s movement in Turkey was rather silent until the 1970s and was under the dominance of left wing political agenda in the 1970s, women’s movement autonomous both from the state and the radical Turkish left began to evolve after 1980 and institutionalised in the 1990s. This institutionalisation is not only reflected in increased appearance in the media, street demonstrations and various feminist campaigns but also in the legislative reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The most important lesson that the women’s movement has shown to the civil society in Turkey is the ability to work in cooperation regardless of ideological differences. For sure, there are certain women’s groups, like the Kemalist and Islamist groups, that have huge contradictions between each other and are less prone to cooperation; nevertheless, feminist of Turkey have shown that it is possible to walk hand in hand in spite of differences.

\textsuperscript{31}These changes will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 4

HISTORY OF THE LGBTT MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

The LGBTT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvestite and Transsexual) movement in Turkey has a relatively short history. Although there were individual attempts by some LGBTTs to get together in the 1970s, they could not find any support for forming an organisation in the political environment of the 1970s. As this period was dominated by an intense left wing-right wing conflict sphere that discouraged all other types of social and political movements, it was not until the late 1980s that LGBTTs began to gather together to share their experiences and problems. The debates on the public agenda about “sexual orientation” and “sexual identity” however, only started in the 1990s. While LGBTT activists were accelerating their organising activities in the 1990s, the movement had to struggle against the obstacles posed by various state institutions, as well as discouragement due to conflicts among LGBTT groups themselves. Although the movement could still be described as “illegitimate” in the eyes of the vast majority in Turkey, it did gain some visibility and recognition in the 2000s, and was empowered enough for the defence of the rights of LGBTTs, to form associations.

4.1. 1970s

In the 1970s, it was not possible to talk about an LGBTT movement in Turkey. There were, however, some minor attempts by well-educated and economically independent LGBTTs to gather together and discuss the politics of having LGBTT identity. In addition, Ibrahim Eren from Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Labour Party) (TİP), who would later in the 1980s himself form a party,

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32 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
33 Most of the disagreements between LGBTT groups have been resolved throughout the years. However, some conflicts remain. The disagreements and controversies within the movement will be discussed later in this Chapter.
started the İzmir Çevre Sağlığı Derneğī (İzmir Environmental Health Organisation) in İzmir and established support groups for GLs in İzmir.\textsuperscript{34}

There are several reasons why LGBTTs did not get together to share their problems until the late 1980s and could only begin to discuss about organising in the 1990s. First of all, LGBTT activists explained that LGBTTs in Turkey have had a tendency to live “in the closet”\textsuperscript{35} and have chosen not to come out until recently (Erol, 2008: 164). Furthermore, as I have also suggested in regard to the women’s movement, the state policy of the post 1980s towards dissolving the left and right wing political groups opened a space for other political struggles to surface in their own right and develop autonomously from both the state and the left and right wing political groups in Turkey.

The general idea among the leftist movement of the 1970s was that issues such as gender, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, sexual identity etc. would be a threat to “class solidarity”; i.e. dividing the working class (Tekeli, 1986: 195) and would be detrimental for “the cause”. It was assumed that once a socialist revolution liberated the working classes, all such inequalities would come to an end as well.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, in the late 1980s once the working class movement was dissolved by the state via the coup, the so-called “marginal” groups that could not find a place to struggle in their own right under the left wing political organisations of the 1970s managed to get together to discuss their own problems (Tekeli, 1986: 195).\textsuperscript{37} This was the case for the feminist, environmentalist and LGBTT struggles all.

Ali Erol however, also argues that one of the reasons why the LGBTT movement could not develop until the late 80s was the coup itself. He claims that September 12 not only created an apolitical atmosphere, where various groups hesitated to organise for a long time, but also a prohibitive social atmosphere, where individuals with the same concerns could not get together and articulate their demands in accordance with their own experiences and problems (Erol, 2008: 164).

In addition, the few years after the coup were years in which the state used extreme

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{34} “The 1980 military coup shut this organization down, together with all other non-governmental organizations, and Eren left the country to escape government harassment.” “Turkey’s LGBT History – 1970s”. Retrieved from site http://news.kaosgl.com/item/2006/9/11/turkey-s-lgbt-history-1970s, December 5, 2009.
\item\textsuperscript{35} “Being in the closet” is an expression used for LGBTTs, who hide their sexual orientation or sexual identity; i.e. who have not yet “come out” as an LGBTT.
\item\textsuperscript{36} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\item\textsuperscript{37} From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
violence towards LGBTTs (Yıldız, January-February 2007: 48). This might explain why, contrary to the women’s movement, LGBTTs could not organise themselves immediately after the coup. So arguably, while on the one hand the coup indirectly opened the gate for the establishment of political organisations autonomous from the left and the right wing, the anti-democratic and oppressive social environment of especially the early 1980s had an inhibiting affect on the LGBTTT movement and postponed its formation until the second half of the decade.

Similar to the women’s movement, one of the stimulating factors for the LGBTTT movement was the support of international organisations; primarily the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). However, Kaos GL activists claim that associating the rise of the LGBTTT movement in Turkey to the European Union accession process undermines the strength of the movement itself. They remind that their LGBTTT counterparts in Europe have earned their rights and freedoms through their own struggle (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47). In this context, association to or affiliation with both international organisations like the EU and the UN, and with various state institutions, including foreign states, remains a controversial issue in LGBTTT circles in Turkey. Some LGBTTT activists believe that some anti-statist and anti EU and UN groups that could be potential allies of the LGBTTT movement in Turkey develop a negative attitude towards LGBTTT groups when the latter’s names appear with such international organisations or state institutions. Similarly, there is a strong anti-imperialist tendency among some LGBTTT groups in Turkey.

Kürşad Kahramanoğlu suggests that a factor that might have affected the rise of the LGBTTT movement in Turkey was the change of tone in the LGBTTT movement all around the world in the mid 80s. Kahramanoğlu states that in the mid 1980s, the LGBTTT movement in the world started to lose its radical tone; i.e. its aim to change the society was less pronounced and the movement began increasingly to be identified with HIV/AIDS. At the time, HIV/AIDS had begun to be used to discriminate against infected individuals and as the LGBTTT movement began to struggle against the discrimination against infected individuals, public

38 From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
39 From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
discussions on the issue increased. This situation might have had an indirect impact on the rise of the LGBTTT movement in Turkey. However, it is important to note that contrary to most LGBTTT groups in the West, the LGBTTT movement in Turkey continues to have revolutionary aims to induce a systemic change in social, economic and political institutions.

Last but not least, the development of the feminist movement in Turkey had significant impact on the LGBTTT movement. As stated before, the feminist movement set an example of a non-hierarchical civil society with democratic forms of organisation. The LGBTTT movement shares this feature of the feminist movement. Yet, LGBTTT activists also claim that one of the basic criticisms launched by the LGBTTT movement, back in the late 1980s, was directed against the feminist movement for being critical of patriarchy but not one of its most important institutions, heterosexuality. The LGBTTT movement aimed to fill this gap (Erol, 2008: 167). However, the impact of the feminist movement on the LGBTTT movement cannot be reduced to this criticism. Yasemin Öz states that feminism indirectly affected the rise of the LGBTTT movement since it constituted the possibility of organising for the sake of the undiscovered areas of social struggle in Turkey. Thus, arguably the feminist movement encouraged other NSMs in Turkey to take initiative.

However the LGBTTT movement in Turkey did not stem from the women’s movement in Turkey. LGBTTT activists explain that the LGBTTTs that got together for the first time in the late 1980s and early 1990s were almost all men. In fact, women had to struggle against the patriarchal nature of the LGBTTT movement, to exist with their own identities as women within LGBTTT groups, associations, and organisations etc. The same applies to TTs as well. In fact the position of TTs is even more problematic within the movement since TTs are not only marginalised through patriarchal relations but also through transphobia within the movement. Thus, while women are almost equally present with men in the LGBTTT movement

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40 From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
41 From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
42 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
43 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
44 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
45 Transphobia is the ideology involving the prejudice and discrimination against, and fear of TTs.
at the moment, TTs are still few in number except for a few organisations and they are currently debating about organising on their own.\footnote{From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.}

4.2. 1980s

The first half the 1980s was characterised by increased state violence towards LGBTTs, particularly towards TTs. Belgin Çelik argues that although TT sex workers had been facing some problems before the coup, working conditions were better for sex workers during the 1970s. She states that there were closed, hence relatively secure places, where sex workers used to work.\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} Belgin Çelik adds that the state used to pay full attention to the health conditions of sex workers during the 1970s.\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} However, things became very difficult for TT sex workers during the military regime that followed the 1980 coup since they were forced out off their sheltered working places and had to start working on the streets, Çelik claims.\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} Police violence towards TTs increased noticeably, and health services provided by the state decreased.\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} It is argued that LGBTT people, primarily those in Istanbul, were forced by the police to get onto trains, leave their homes, raped, beaten, tortured, kidnapped by the police and their houses were set on fire (Yıldız, January-February 2007, 48-50).

Although most of the LGBTTs that were forced to leave İstanbul jumped off the trains and returned to the city, the horrifying experience is still on their minds. One of those who were on the trains, Belgin Çelik says “I remembered a movie about the World War II, where people were forced to get on trains and were being sent to gas chambers. I thought we were being sent to gas chambers too.”\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} Another claim is that there were regional marks used on gay people in those years. Once someone was marked on their body with the mark of a particular region, he was not allowed back to that region for five years.\footnote{From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.} While it is difficult to establish the exact authenticity of these claims in detail, newspaper accounts and interviews
with the victims of the time published in newspapers years later document a systematic effort on the part of public authorities to rid İstanbul of the “undesirable elements”, including LGBTTs.

In the 1980s LGBTT celebrities were banned from Turkey. In June 1981, TTs and cross-dressers were banned from getting on the stage as artists (Yıldız, January-February 2007, 48). The Minister of Internal Affairs of the period, Yıldırım Akbulut, made a speech in the Parliament in 1985 stating that it was their policy to get rid of these “perverts” at least in the metropolitan areas of Turkey (Yıldız, January-February 2007, 48-50). As the early 1980s was a period of harsh and brutal police practices so far as all those who were detained or interrogated went, LGBTTs suffered significantly. Interviewees narrated “horror” stories of particular police practices they or their friends had endured in this period, often constituting downright torture. Obviously, it was this state violence and society’s acceptance of this violence that inhibited the movement in the beginning. However arguably it was the same oppression that also triggered the LGBTTT resistance in the late 1980s.

An important factor which encouraged the LGBTTT movement in Turkey was Turkey’s application to full European Union membership in 1986, and the international UN conventions that Turkey had started to sign in the 1980s. It is clear from the interviews that from the late 1980s onwards, the EU and UN have been helpful to the LGBTTT movement in Turkey. Firstly, the EU, and more importantly the UN have provided significant financial support to LGBTTT organisations via joint projects. Secondly, in accordance with their human rights

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54 For instance Head Officer Doğan Karakaplan was famous for his torture methods disguised under the name of religion. It was claimed that he would burn women’s hands, saying that they wouldn’t be able to handle the fire in hell if they could not handle that much fire now.*
* From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, İstanbul.
55 As mentioned several times, the affiliation with the EU, the UN and various state institutions has been problematic for the LGBTTT movement in Turkey. Some of the projects funded by the EU, the UN and certain state institutions are as follows: The Sex Workers HIV/AIDS Research and HIV Testing Project prepared by Pembe Hayat and Hacettepe University AIDS Centre in 2009, funded by the UN. The Law and Discrimination Report prepared by Kaos GL in 2008, funded by the EU. The “No to Homophobia and Transphobia in the Media” booklet prepared by Kaos GL, funded by the Netherlands Foreign Affairs Ministry. The LGB Unions Report prepared by Kaos GL in 2009, funded by the German Embassy.
requirements, EU and UN conventions played an indirect role in helping resolve certain conflicts between the Turkish state and LGBTT organisations by urging the state to give up its efforts to ban LGBTT associations. Thirdly, the emphasis that the EU and the UN put on human rights and fundamental freedoms helped create a certain degree of legitimacy to LGBTT’s struggle, at least in the eyes of parts of the society.56

In addition, the social liberalisation policies of the Özal government had an impact on the establishment of LGBTT groups and on the rise of the NSMs in Turkey in general. Although state and government policies towards LGBTTs have always been oppressive in Turkey, social liberalisation policies arguably gave the courage to LGBTTs to get together towards the end of the 1980s. The most obvious example of such policies was the government’s 1988 dated decision to lift the ban on Bülent Ersoy, a famous transsexual artist, who was taken into custody during the military regime and was formerly not allowed in Turkey due to her sexual identity.

When all of the above mentioned factors came together in the late 1980s, LGBTT activists began to get together in small numbers, hold discussions in cafes and evaluate their issues and possible causes of action. Individuals such as İbrahim Eren, Demet Demir and Ali Kemal Yılmaz were instrumental in initiating these activities.57 Activists of the time began to make weekly meetings every Wednesday in 1985 and 1986. LGBTTs around İbrahim Eren began a project called Radikal Demokratik Yeşil Parti (Radical Democratic Green Party) and called for all marginal groups to gather together under this party and its publication, Yeşil Barış (Green Peace) (Özkan, 2004: 92). Some feminists, anti-militarists, atheists, LGBTTs and environmentalists gathered together in this party.58 Though short lived, the party held street demonstrations in İstanbul and was at least able to raise public discussion and public awareness on violence towards LGBTTs for the first time. In the second half of the 1980s, LGBTT activists continued their struggle.

The “No to Homophobia in the Media” report prepared by Kaos GL in 2008, funded by the Netherlands Foreign Affairs Ministry.
56 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
57 From the interviews made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul; Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
getting together in parks, homes, sharing experiences and seeking answers (Erol, 2008: 169; Yıldız, January-February 2007: 51).

The biggest street demonstration of the time took place in 1987. “Thirty-seven gay men and transgender people started a hunger strike to protest harassment and sought help from the new Radical Democratic Green Party. This was the first public action taken by the Turkish LGBT community”. ⁵⁹ In 1988 transgender people gained legal status. This was the most important development of the decade on the LGBTT front in Turkey⁶⁰.

4.3. 1990s

In the 1990s, despite the fact that there were many discussions on establishing associations and intentions to increase their activities, there were also many barriers in front of LGBTT activists and various disagreements among themselves regarding how and under what conditions to organise. For instance while some LGBTT activists were not in favour of organising under the name “gay organisations” since they thought they would face severe state pressure and since they were against coming out, others argued otherwise (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 46).

State institutions, on the other hand, continuously resisted many activities that LGBTT people tried to organise. For instance in 1993, the Gay Pride⁶¹ activities were stopped by the police and many foreign guests were deported⁶². The same thing happened in 1995. In 1993, the Istanbul Governorate rejected LGBTT activists’ demand to organise an international film festival on the grounds that this was against public morality and traditions (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47). Let

⁶¹ What is usually referred to as the “Gay Parade” in the West is called “Pride” in Turkey. Activists of the time tried to organise this initial pride under the name “Gay Pride”, disregarding LBTTs in the activity’s name. This might be an example of the patriarchal and transphobic nature of the LGBTT movement in Turkey in its initial steps. At the moment, the march and other activities held in the corresponding week are called the “Pride Week”, without any reference any sexual orientation or sexual identity in particular. However, the Anti-Homophobia Days organised by Kaos GL still tends to disregard TTs. Hence it isn’t possible to claim that misogyny, biphobia and especially transphobia have completely been erased from the movement.
⁶² From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
alone establishing an association, LGBTTT activists did not even have the chance to display their art under their own identities in legally approved contexts. Hence LGBTTT activists had to gather together unofficially, in small numbers, in their homes trying to figure out what they could do.

Probably the most important evidence of state violence towards LGBTTTs, and the most popular accusation against the police throughout the 1990s (continuing into the 2000s) was the employment of Süleyman Aksoy, aka Hortum (Hose) Süleyman, who served as the Beyoğlu Police Chief between 1992 and 1994 (Yıldız, January-February 2007), and then again from 1996 to 2004. For a decade, Süleyman Aksoy would torture TTs living and working in Beyoğlu so systematically and brutally that the LGBTTT movement would demand his acts to be defined as “genocide” during the Penal Code reform in 2004. LGBTTT activist and one of the actual victims of Ulusoy’s tortures, Demet Demir, argues that Ulusoy forced the shopkeepers working in the region not to sell goods and services to TTs, sent police officers to attack TTs’ houses, swore at TTs and provoked the public to attack TTs etc. As reported by the famous Hürriyet newspaper in 2000, Demet Demir also said that Ulusoy had not only targeted TTs but also Romans, Kurds and street children of the area. Another LGBTTT activist, Belgin Çelik, states that Ulusoy would throw his ablution water on sex workers and TTs’. She adds that he had hoses of different colours and made people choose the colour of the hose that he or she will be beaten by. His actions have also been reported by many newspapers several times. In an interview published in one of the most commonly read newspapers in Turkey, Ulusoy himself admitted that “They might have beaten a couple of them [meaning TTs and homosexuals] from time to time”, that “He might have forgotten his police baton that day, so he might have had to

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use hoses [to beat TTs]” and openly used hate discourses such as “People have to mobilise against homosexuality”, “I am disgusted by transvestites” etc. The court case against Ulusoy demanding twenty-seven years imprisonment was opened in 2003 at the Beyoğlu Sixth Penal Court of General Jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the case was dragged on for five years, unless the criminal act was repeated. To add injury to insult, Süleyman Ulusoy is today walking freely on the streets, retired from the police department, despite the fact that almost 200 complaints have been filed against him, despite the fact that his torture method has been published in many newspapers.

Despite all these difficulties and attacks, the beginning of the 1990s was still an important turning point for the LGBTT movement in Turkey. The best-known and largest LGBTT groups in Turkey, Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul were formed in the beginning of the decade. Neither of these groups were direct extensions of İbrahim Eren’s or Ali Kemal Yılmaz’s earlier groups from the 1980s. It was claimed that the latter only had an indirect affect on the formation of these two groups.

Lambdaistanbul was established in 1993 during the efforts to organise an international conference, which was not allowed by the Istanbul Governorate. LGBTT activists gathered together to hold discussions and develop a common language and strategy in a club in Istanbul for three months but they had to abandon the place due to police busts. One year later in 1994, members of Kaos GL got together to discuss their problems with the idea that it was time for LGBTTs to fight for their rights and be visible in the society. They began to publish their journal, Kaos GL, the first gay and lesbian journal of Turkey, in

70 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
71 The Greek letter lambda is an international symbol of the homosexual movement.
September 1994 as a source of alternative media as they claimed mainstream media insulted homosexuality, triggered the prejudices against LGBTTs and portrayed and ridiculed homosexuality. The journal had a self-declared anti-capitalist, anti-sexist and anti-homophobic attitude and has been published since then. Its self-declared aim is to promote LGBTT policies taking into account these considerations.

Although the two groups, the former in İstanbul and the latter in Ankara, were formed simultaneously, they did so without knowing about each other. This was partly due to the fact that the two groups were not as visible then as they are now, and partly due to the fact that communication technologies like internet had not yet developed then. However, two years after the publication of the first issue of Kaos GL, in 1996, Lambdaistanbul began to publish the journal 100 de 100 Gey (A Hundred Percent Gay) and distribute it in the copies of Kaos GL informally. This was one of the initial contacts between the two groups. Still, activists explain that the relationship between the two groups began to strengthen only towards the end of the decade.

Women and TT activists within the LGBTT movement began to form autonomous groups in the 1990s. For instance in 1995, a group of women, who left Lambdaistanbul formed the first lesbian group in Turkey, Venüs Kızkardeşleri (Venus Sisters) with the aim to develop an autonomous lesbian movement but they decided to join Kaos GL a few years later (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47, 48). In 1998, a group of lesbian feminists formed the group Sappho’nun Kızları (Sappho’s Girls) to question patriarchy and heterosexuality (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47). Öteki Ben (The Other Me) lesbian feminist group was also formed in 1998 and published a journal with the same name for a short period of time. In 1997, a group of TT sex workers organised under the name Gaci (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47).

75 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
77 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
78 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
80 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
81 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
The Bear Movement in Turkey (Ayılar) also began to arise in the 1990s. Actually, the Bear Movement is an international gay movement. İstanbul Bearclub activist Ahmet Kaya argues that gay men, who reject the conventional perception of being a gay man, i.e. being feminine, dressing tight and colourful, waxing etc. and who embrace natural masculinity define themselves as Bears\(^{82}\); i.e. they are masculine in appearance, but they refuse the male gender roles that are oppressive and they love men\(^{83}\). This movement began in Turkey in the mid 90s. Currently, there are two Bear groups in Turkey: Türkiye Ayıları and İstanbul Bearclub\(^{84}\).

Interviewees, who have tried to document the history of LGBTTs in Turkey, claim that LGBTT groups also began to get together in universities. In 1995, a gay group called Bilinçli Eşcinseller Topluluğu (The Conscious Gays’ Group) was founded in Anadolu University (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 47). Again in the same years, some students of Middle East Technical University, Hacettepe University, and Boğaziçi University etc. began to get together to form unregistered LGBT student groups in their universities named Legato\(^{85}\). They organised discussions, shared their experiences, and showed movies in their universities; the ones in Ankara participated to the activities of Kaos GL and volunteered for Kaos GL. Afterwards, many LGBT student groups from various universities all over Turkey got together and named themselves Legato without knowing about each other\(^{86}\). In time, Legato groups kept on opening and closing as students concerned with LGBTT policies entered, and graduated from, universities\(^{87}\).

Among the most important developments in the LGBTT movement in Turkey was the establishment of Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (Freedom and Solidarity Party), being the first political party in Turkey to address LGBTT issues\(^{88}\). This development was followed by the establishment of the Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission under the Ankara Branch of the Human Rights Association in 1994 (Erol, 1996: 59). One year later in 1996, the first gay and

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\(^{82}\) Ayılar have been criticised by many feminist and LGBTT groups for reproducing the traditional masculine gender roles. However, after lots of discussions, now the relationship is better*.

\(^{83}\) From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^{84}\) From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^{85}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^{86}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^{87}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.

* From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.

lesbian radio program began in a radio station called *Açık Radyo (Open Radio)*[^89]. In 1998, many of the aforementioned groups came together to hold the first gay meeting in Turkey. These meetings continued to be held annually in Istanbul and Ankara until 2004[^90].

However, 1996 was an unfortunate year for LGBTTs for two reasons. First of all, in 1996 the Turkish High Court of Appeals decided that a lesbian mother could not have her child’s custody after divorce since she “had a sexual habit in the degree of sickness”[^91]. In 1996, police attacks on transsexuals and transvestites also increased. As explained above, Suleyman Ulusoy came to duty for the second time. The police broke into the homes of transsexual and transvestite people and in many cases the local residents supported the police (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 48). Following Demet Demir’s initiatives, activists of *Lambdaistanbul* responded to this violence by holding street demonstrations to support the victims of the attacks. They continued their struggle also by establishing a gay internet cafe in 1998 and a helpline for LGBTTs in 1999[^92] (Yıldız, March-April 2007: 48).

There were also a few positive developments that included the state’s recognition of LGBTT groups in the 1990s. Probably the most obvious one was the government’s invitation to *Lambdaistanbul* to participate to the National Congress on AIDS in 1997[^93]. Another crucial development was that in 1999 LGBTT activist Demet Demir ran as a candidate in Beyoğlu City Council elections as a member of ÖDP. This was the first time that a transgender individual attended local elections as a candidate[^94].

As already noted, *Kaos GL* and *Lambdaistanbul* began to develop a relationship towards the ends of the decade. In 1998, the meeting *Güzistanbul* was held for the first time in İstanbul. Activists of *Kaos GL* attended the conference from Ankara. Then in the spring of 1999, another conference *BaharAnkara* was

held in Ankara with the participation of Lambdaistanbul activists. These two meetings continued to be held annually until the mid 2000s and this did not only get the two groups closer\textsuperscript{95}, but was also an important step in the institutionalisation of the LGBTT movement in Turkey.

4.4. 2000s

The legacy of the 1990s helped accelerate the activities of the movement in the 2000s. LGBTT activists explain that the 2000s have been the peak of the LGBTT movement. While previously they used to come together, discuss their problems and prepare an infrastructure, in the 2000s the LGBTT movement began to be more visible in the public sphere and in the media.\textsuperscript{96}

First of all, the 2000s started with economic crises in Turkey. Deniz Yıldız claims that like all marginal groups, these also negatively affected LGBTTs. Many open bars and cafes were shut down during the crises, and it is claimed that this hurt LGBTTs socialisation and coming out processes\textsuperscript{97}.

In spite of bureaucratic obstacles, Kaos GL managed to open its cultural centre and library in Ankara in 2000. People get together to watch movies, hold discussions, do research, share experiences etc. at the centre\textsuperscript{98}. Three years later, Lambdaistanbul began to form a library at its cultural centre, where one could find various pieces of gay literature, human rights reports and studies on gay policies\textsuperscript{99}. Like in the 1990s, in the 2000s various LGBTT groups established help lines for LGBTTs to share their problems and get consultancy services.

The most important factor leading to the visibility of the LGBTT movement in Turkey in the 2000s was Kaos GL’s appearance in May 1 demonstrations in Ankara in 2001. Although Kaos GL had appeared in public demonstrations before on March 8, 1997 and in 1999 at an anti-globalisation demonstration\textsuperscript{100}, activists in

\textsuperscript{95} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{96} From the interviews made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara; Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{97} From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{100} From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
İstanbul explain how the appearance in May 1, 2001 increased their enthusiasm, thus leading to Lambdaistanbul’s appearance in May 1 demonstrations in 2002 in İstanbul. Again in 2002, many NGOs and almost all LGBTT groups attended the demonstrations against the US invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, LGBTT organisations have made dozens of street demonstrations against the killings of LGBTTs in the 2000s, although these hardly changed the state and civil violence against LGBTTs.

After Güzistanbul and BaharAnkara came to an end, Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul began to organise even larger annual activities, thanks to the increased visibility of the LGBTT movement. In 2005, the first Pride Week was organised by Lambdaistanbul in İstanbul. The following year in May 17, 2006, the First International Anti-Homophobia Meeting was held by Kaos GL and it has been continuing annually since then. In addition to these annual meetings, many LGBTT groups and organisations have started to organise various meetings, seminars, conferences, symposiums, panels and discussions all over Turkey with the aim to seek solutions for the problems of LGBTTs, help facilitate their socialisation, come up with policies and actions to fight against homophobia and transphobia etc. Some of these were the symposiums called Lezbiyen ve Geylerin Sorunları ve Toplumsal Barış için Çözüm Önerileri (Problems of Lesbian and Gay People and Suggestions Towards Social Peace) (2003), Eşcinsel Aktivist ve Akademisyenler Buluşuyor (Homosexual Activists and Academicians Are Meeting) (2003) (Yıldız, 2007: 25); the seminars called Gey-Lezbiyen İnsan Hakları (Gay-Lesbian Human Rights) (2004) (Yıldız, 2007: 29), Queer Kimlik ve Türkiye (Queer Identity and Turkey) (2004) (Yıldız, 2007: 30), the meeting, Gey ve Lezbiyen İşçiler Buluşması (Gay and Lesbian Workers’ Meeting) (2004) (Yıldız, 2007: 37), 1. Bursa Türkiye Eşcinsel Buluşması (The 1st Bursa Turkey Gay Meeting) (2006) (Yıldız, 2007: 41) etc. Although some of these meetings like the

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101 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
103 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
104 May 17 is the International Anti-Homophobia Day declared when the World Health Organisation proclaimed that homosexuality is not a disease (Erol, 2009: 7).
105 This meeting had record breaking participation and the discussions to establish the association, Kaos GL, accelerated after seeing this participation. *From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
one in Bursa were sabotaged by the police (Yıldız, 2007: 42), LGBTT activists managed to make their voices heard, at least by some sections of society.

The first registered LGBTT student group was also established in Bilgi University in the 2000s. One of the activists in Bilgi University, İzlem Aybastı, explains that their primary aim was to socialise and discuss their problems. At the same time, they deliberately pursued a policy of being more visible both within the school and in the media. According to Aybastı, this concerned parents significantly. Thus, although the university administration and lots of academicians from the university originally supported the group, allowed them to hang banners, and distribute bulletins, they changed their attitude due to the pressure coming from the parents. They then asked the group to be less visible, especially in the media. After the activist students graduated, the group was dissolved.

However, this incident raised debate among the media. After Bilgi LGBTT’s establishment, reporters began to direct questions to various universities chancellors as to whether or not, they would allow the establishment of a registered LGBTT group in their own university. Except for a supportive comment coming from Sabancı University, many chancellors gave negative responses, perhaps refraining from the pressure that would come from the parents. At the moment, the most organised registered student group working on the issues of gender and LGBTT policies is the Cins Klüp in Sabancı University.

The TT movement too began to mature in the 2000s. Although it is an LGBTT organisation, Pembe Hayat (Pink Life) was established in 2006 in Ankara to deal primarily with the problems of TTs. It was established as a reaction to the Eryaman incidents in Ankara. In the spring of 2006, violence towards TTs significantly increased in Eryaman, a district of Ankara. Recently, two new TT groups have also been founded in Istanbul. The first one, Voltrans, is a group of transsexual men, who get together to discuss their problems and possible solutions. The second one is İstanbul LGBTT Sivil Toplum Girişimi (İstanbul LGBTT Civil Society Initiative), a group of mainly TTs, who came together in 2007. Some of the members of İstanbul LGBTT are TTs that have left Lambdaistanbul to organise

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106 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
107 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
108 Both the police and some residents of Eryaman, who wanted TTs to leave the district showed severe violence towards TTs living in the area and forced them to migrate.
autonomously. İstanbuL LGBTT publishes the fanzine, Gaci Laço, which was previously called Gacı İstanbul109.

4.5. Disagreements and Controversies / Agreements and Collaborations within the Movement

Since the early days of the LGBTT movement in Turkey, there have been some disagreements between LGBTT groups and organisations. The debates on coming out or not and the demands of some lesbian groups to form their own associations and organisations had begun earlier in the 1990s. In the beginning of the 2000s during the meetings of Güzistanbul and BaharAnkara one controversy was whether these meetings were Lambdaistanbul’s activities or the activities of all LGBTTs (Yıldız, May-June 2007: 43). This disagreement seems to have been resolved. While the Pride Week activities had been organised by Lambdaistanbul itself alone, in 2009, it was organised by the LGBTT Human Rights Platform with the contribution of many national and international LGBTT groups that are not components of the Platform110.

Due to the fact that all non-heterosexual individuals do not suffer from the same forms and institutions of oppression, exploitation, and violence, and do not have singular identities, disagreements among LGBTT groups have continued to be deep-rooted. For instance while feminist lesbians are in favour of struggling against the institution of marriage, some homosexuals are for struggling for the right to get married (Düzkan, March-April 2007: 21). Such matters as figuring out the differences and commonalities between how a Kurdish homosexual and HIV positive transsexual build their identities in Turkey came to occupy the agenda of LGBTT activists (Erol, 2008: 4). Transphobia within LGBTT groups also remains an important disagreement between various LGBTT groups. The disagreements, especially the one about the discrimination against TTs within LGBTT groups and associations, remain unresolved.

Another disagreement between LGBTT activists, especially in the beginning, was about the media. While some LGBTT activists agreed that the

110 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
struggle cannot be successful without a media presence, others opposed this argument on the grounds that “the country is not yet ready for that” (Yıldız, May-June 2007: 44). This disagreement seems to have been resolved since all components of the LGBTT Human Rights Platform are currently visible in the media.

The most obvious disagreement between LGBTT groups was the one with Bursa Gökkuşağı (Bursa Rainbow LGBTT Solidarity and Cultural Association). This group is currently inactive and some of its members have lately been sentenced to imprisonment for prostitution and encouraging prostitution. All members of the LGBTT Platform had already decided not to work with this association due to the accusations of violence and exploitation by members of this group. Yet in 2006, when the members of the association were faced with violence during the demonstrations they held against the state’s efforts to close down their association, the Platform gave its support to the members of Bursa Gökkuşağı, and some members joined them in the street demonstrations in Bursa.

Despite such disagreements, LGBTT groups and organisations have engaged in many collaborations in the past. LGBTT activists emphasise that the LGBTT movement is probably the only movement in Turkey that has managed not to be divided into numerous fractions with different ideological and political stands and was able to hold the struggle on common ground. For instance in 2006, various LGBTT groups came together to form an LGBTT network in Turkey with the initiation of Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi (Centre for the Development of Civil Society) (STGM) and Kaos GL in order to review the problems of LGBTT organisations in Turkey and discuss about possible solutions (Yıldız, 2007: 44). For two years, six LGBTT groups and associations, Kaos GL, Lambdaistanbul, Pembe Hayat, Siyah Pembe Üçgen (Black Pink Triangle), Hevjin (Living Together; Partner) Diyarbakır and MorEl Eskişehir, have been working together under this platform, the LGBTT Human Rights Platform, sometimes referred to as the LGBTT Platform, and have been continuing their activities all over Turkey. Basic activities of the Platform are to sustain the coordination between the groups and to

111 LGBTT Platform is also against working with İnsanca Yaşam Derneği (Humane Life Association), which is led by a transsexual woman, due to its militarist discourses and claims that homosexuality can be overcome via religion.

112 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
report the human rights violations of LGBTTs all over Turkey. The Platform also held campaigns to struggle for LGBTTs’ democratic rights during the reform of the Penal Code and the Constitutional reform. The existence of the Platform has been encouraging for some LGBTTs to get together and form organisations like MorEl\textsuperscript{113}.

4.6. Accomplishments and Obstacles

Although most of the demands of LGBTT activists have not yet been fulfilled, the movement has made some important gains throughout the 2000s. Probably the most important accomplishment of LGBTT groups was gaining the right to form associations. As mentioned above, the LGBTT movement was unofficial until the 2000s since the law does not recognise the rights of LGBTTs. However, from 2005 onwards, LGBTT groups began to establish associations thanks to the struggle of LGBTT activists and the pressure exerted by international human rights conventions that Turkey signed. At the moment, there are four LGBTT associations and various LGBTT groups all around Turkey. The associations formed after 2005 are Kaos GL, Pembe Hayat, Lambdaistanbul and Siyah Pembe Üçgen. In addition, there are various LGBTT groups in Antalya, Adana, Samsun, Denizli, Van and Antep etc. There was also a group called Kaosist Eşcinsel Sivil Toplum Girişimi (Kaosist Gay Civil Society Initiative) that got together in İstanbul in 2007 but is currently rather inactive\textsuperscript{114}. After the establishment of the abovementioned four associations, people in cities other than İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir began to find the courage to get together, socialise and organise, partly due to increased visibility in the media and the facilities provided by the advancement of communication technologies. In addition, LGBTT activists explain that their relations with national and international non-governmental organisations have significantly improved after gaining legal personality by establishing associations.

\textsuperscript{113} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

\textsuperscript{114} Though Kaosist shares its name and bylaw with Kaos GL and all of its members are also members of Kaos GL, in practice, it was an independent group\textsuperscript{*}.

\textsuperscript{*} From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
Furthermore, although mainstream media is still very homo/bi/transphobic, activists note that compared to the 1990s, there is an observable improvement. Another important accomplishment for the LGBTTT movement was that a transvestite became a candidate for being the mukhtar of the Katip Mustafa Çelebi district in İstanbul in the local elections in 2009. Though Ms. Çelik lost the elections by only a few votes, the whole process had a historical value for the movement in Turkey.

One of the most important accomplishments of the LGBTTT movement was the change within political parties. The recently banned Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) (DTP), the members of which now organise under Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) (Peace and Democracy Party), has been in communication with LGBTTT activists since the early days of the movement. Since the beginning of the 1990s, when BDP was called Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People’s Party) (DEHAP), one of the principles of the party in its election campaigns has been to struggle against anti-homosexual discrimination.115 BDP’s current party program includes a struggle against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

At the moment, a socialist party, Emekçi Hareket Partisi (Labourer Movement Party) (EHP) has an LGBTTT branch, which fights against discrimination against homosexuals. EHP’s party program also includes a struggle against the discrimination against lesbians and gays. MorEl activist Pelin Kalkan argues that the changes in EHP accelerated when the part got into contact with MorEl.116

Besides, LGBTTT groups have close relations with Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party (DSİP), Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi (Socialist Democracy Party) (SDP), Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Platformu (Socialist Platform of the Oppressed) (ESP) and Özgürlik ve Dayanışma Partisi (Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP)117 and Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi (Equality and Democracy Party) (EDP). In 1994, ÖDP banned discrimination based on sexual orientation and sexual identity within the party and was the first

115 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
116 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
117 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
party to do so. Many members of these political parties attend to the activities and join the street demonstrations held by LGBTT associations.

Considering the social environment of the 1970s and socialist parties’ policies towards all other identities as secondary to that of the working class, this change within socialist parties is an important accomplishment of the LGBTT movement. Activists explain that the changes in political parties are have usually come about as a result of individual efforts. For instance the relationship with BDP would not have been at this level if it was not for Sebahat Tuncel, a well-known activist coming from the Kurdish women’s movement. Sebahat Tuncel was the first deputy to submit a parliamentary question to the Grand National Assembly about the discrimination against LGBTTs.

After BDP and some socialist parties, some deputies from CHP and Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) began to focus on LGBTT policies. For instance Mehmet Sevigen from CHP submitted a parliamentary question to the Assembly regarding the firing of a gay football referee in 2009. Again for the first time an AKP deputy, Zafer Üskül, the head of the Human Rights Committee, came to the 2009 Anti-Homophobia Meeting. It was the first time that a deputy attended a conference on the rights of and discrimination against LGBTT people (Erol, 2009: 18). In addition, a right wing party, Demokrat Party (Democrat Party) (DP) recently added the struggle against discrimination based on sexual orientation in its party program. Yet it is worth underlining that this cannot be considered a change in the general mentality of the abovementioned parties, but rather indicate individual efforts on the part of mostly women and LGBT activists.

In a way similar to political parties like EHP that began to be more sensitive towards LGBTT policies after getting in touch with LGBTT groups and associations, many NGOs began to question their homo/bi/transphobia as well after

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119 From the interview made with Pelin Dutlu on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

120 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.

121 This referee, Halil İbrahim Dincdağ, went to court to get his job back. At about the same time, two male police officers were fired since their sexual intercourse videos came out. All of these incidents increased public discussions on the discrimination against homosexuals.

122 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
getting to know LGBTT groups. LGBTT activists explain that they observed a significant change in Amargi and Ankaralı Feministler after these groups started working in collaboration with Lambdaistanbul and Kaos GL. It is now easier for LGBTTs in the two former women’s organisations, and others that pursue the same approach, to come out and underline their identities.

Another important accomplishment of the LGBTT movement in the 2000s was increased legitimacy both among the public and in the eyes of the state. Öner Ceylan points out that while in 2002, only 15 people were walking behind the LGBTT flag on May 1, in 2009 there were thousands of people walking in İstiklal Street during the Pride demonstration. He adds that whereas in the 1990s the İstanbul Governorate did not allow LGBTT groups to hold any activities, today Lambdaistanbul and the Governorate are discussing a joint project for the employment of TTs. Even though LGBTTs are still subjected to discrimination and violence by state institutions and private actors, it is possible to trace positive developments.

The establishment of a Commission for Equality and Struggle against Discrimination is currently on the agenda as part of the “democratic opening” process that AKP government has initiated. One of the provisions of the commission is to ban and penalise all sorts of discrimination, including discrimination based on “sex identity”.

Whether this term is used to imply sexual orientation and/or sexual identity isn’t clear. Besides, newspapers report that the commission will be made up of 15 members, 12 of which will be selected by the Cabinet, the National Assembly and by the President while only 3 will be chosen among NGOs working against discrimination.

Yet the organisation of the commission seems to be problematic, and more NGO representatives should be members of the commission if the “democracy”

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123 From the interviews made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara; İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
124 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
125 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
discourses of the government are sincere. Besides, the government should refrain from ambiguous terms like “sex identity” and benefit from LGBTT associations’ expertise. Yet at this stage, it is too soon to elaborate on this development since the Draft Law has just been prepared in March 2010.

Last but not least, the TT movement in Turkey is rapidly accelerating its activities, especially after the establishment of *Pembe Hayat*\(^\text{128}\). It has already been noted elsewhere that TTs are marginalised even within the movement itself. Although this situation had been slowly getting better, recently in 2010 the disagreements between LGBs and TTs increased. TT groups have been talking about organising on their own without discriminating against LGBs. Yet it is still a significant development that the TT movement itself has increased its strength rapidly. While previously, most TTs had hesitated to go to court in the case of a violation, now, there is even a recent court decision that convicted the murderer of a transsexual by life imprisonment\(^\text{129}\). Also, TTs are in the process of forming an initiative called *Kırmızı Şemsiye (The Red Umbrella)* to struggle for the social security rights of sex workers\(^\text{130}\).

Despite these developments, LGBTT activists claim that the movement is still facing lots of obstacles. LGBTTs are frequently subjected to hate crimes with homo/bi/transphobic elements. A homosexual, Ahmet Yıldız, was murdered in an honour killing in 2008 due to his sexual orientation. Five TTs were murdered in the first two months in 2010.\(^\text{131}\) In April 2010, two homosexual university students were attacked by their counterparts in Bilkent University due to their sexual orientation\(^\text{132}\).

Homo/bi/transphobic attitudes on the part of state institutions are still major obstacles confronting the LGBTT movement. For instance in 2006, the pornography issue of *Kaos GL* was collected by the police on the grounds that it was against “general morality” when in fact it contained discussions on

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\(^\text{128}\) From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.

\(^\text{129}\) From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^\text{130}\) From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.


pornography. A criminal court case has been filed towards a Kaos GL activist, Umut Güner on these grounds.\textsuperscript{133}

One of the most obvious obstacles against the LGBTTT movement has been the Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu (Police Duty and Authority Law) that was modified several times: in 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009. The Law amended by CHP and AKP together, increased the police’s authority. The police have been apprehending and/or giving tickets to TTs for walking in the streets on many grounds such as “blocking the traffic”, “behaving against ‘general morality’”, allegedly “flashing” etc.\textsuperscript{134}

In addition the state has filed law suits against all active LGBTTT associations in Turkey on the grounds that their establishments were against “general morality” and detrimental to the Turkish family order. Although none of the attempts to close the LGBTTT associations were successful, the case against Lambdaistanbul was carried to the High Court of Appeals. In 2010, the Court decided that the association shall not be closed unless it “spreads” homosexuality.\textsuperscript{135} However, this approach is yet another homophobic attitude on the part of the state since it rules out the fact that it is not possible to “spread” homosexuality since it is an innate identity.

Besides, some members of the AKP government have openly made homo/bi/transphobic statements. In 2008, Burhan Kuzu used the words “Homosexuals have a strong demand for equality and the right to get married. Will we give them the right just because they want it?” even though the LGBTTT movement does not have any such demand yet. In March 2010, the State Minister for Women and Family, Selma Aliye Kavaf stated that she believed homosexuality was a disease that it should be cured.\textsuperscript{137} Kavaf’s statement raised considerable public outrage and some protests. Many NGOs have urged Kavaf to resign, while deputies from various political parties—e.g., Mehmet Sevigen of CHP, Sebahat Tuncel of BDP have raised parliamentary questions about the measures taken for

\textsuperscript{133} From the interview made with Barış Sülu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{134} From the interview made with Belgin Çelik on September 4, 2009, Istanbul.
\textsuperscript{135} From the interview made with Izlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
the discrimination against LGBTTs after Kavaf’s statement and signatures have been collected to protest her etc. This can be read as an indication of the LGBTT movement’s increased strength and legitimacy in the eyes of, at least, some sections of the society within a few decades.

LGBTT activists underline militarism, conservatism and the conception of “general morality” as major obstacles to the movement. What they claim to be the “militarist” nature of the state concerns them. Besides, they perceive rising conservatism as a threat to the movement. In addition, some activists express that the current cultural and legal understanding of “morality” stands in their way. Despite all difficulties, LGBTT activists recognise the positive developments and feel that their struggle is going to change minds eventually.

4.7. Active LGBTT Organisations in Turkey

Before elaborating on individual LGBTT organisations, their similarities and differences in detail, it might be useful to investigate the identities of the members of LGBTT organisations. It is important to note that being a member of an LGBTT group, organisation, association etc. is rather problematic for LGBTTs since being legally registered to an association, visibility in the media etc. induce the fears about coming out. Thus, most active members of LGBTT groups have already come out at least to a certain extent: some have not come out to their families but have come out everywhere else; some have come out to their families too but are following a “do not ask do not tell” policy.

Although the situation has significantly changed in the recent past, the majority of the members and followers of the LGBTT organisations in Turkey are still men, except for Pembe Hayat and MorEl, in which women are greater in number. A significant proportion of the women members of LGBTT organisations are heterosexual feminist women. This is partly due to feminist support towards the LGBTT movement.

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138 From the interview made with an LGBTT activist on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
139 From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
140 I have to note that this generalisation is about the active members of LGBTT groups. Hundreds of LGBTTs, who have not come out, visit LGBTT organisations or are in contact with them over the phone or via e-mail. The member profile that I have drawn here with respect to being out of the closet does not refer to such followers, but only to active participants.
LGBTTT organisations do not all have the same focus. Except for *Pembe Hayat* and *İstanbul LGBTTT*, which focus primarily on the problems of TTs, TTs are a minority in the LGBTTT movement. This is due to the difficulty of organising TTs and due to the transphobia that is also present in LGBTTT organisations.

We can see a generalised profile of those in the LGBTTT movement. Most groups consist of a young population. *Kaos GL* activists say that people, who visit the association, are generally between the ages 20 and 40. In *MorEl*’s case, the age average decreases even further since it is formed by university students. *Lambdaistanbul* activist Öner Ceylan states that most of the activists of the movement are middle class. These organisations have no membership requirements except those stated by the law. However, due to the political principles of the movement, these organisations prefer to close their doors to individuals that use violence towards other people.

*İstanbul Bearclub* is the most different LGBTTT group. First of all, due to the definition of being a Bear, the group consists only of men. They do not allow women and TTs in the group. Besides, *İstanbul Bearclub* is a more mixed group in terms of its class structure. *İstanbul Bearclub* has many lower class members, while this is not usually the case for other organisations.

Before elaborating on individual associations in detail, it should be noted that since socialisation opportunities are more abundant in large cities, the most active LGBTTT groups are found in Ankara and İstanbul. However, based on their observations during the last anti-homophobia activities that were held in six cities, activists explain that the participation in the activities in smaller cities were much more intense that they expected. They claim that this might either be due to the lack of such activities there, or due to the fact that a sense of belonging might

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141 Most TT activists are sex workers. TTs in Turkey, and all around the world, are subjected to severe discrimination in all aspects of work life, starting from hiring. Hence the majority of TTs, who have come out, are compulsory sex workers. Since sex workers’ working hours are very different from the “regular” working hours; i.e. since they work at night, it is very difficult for sex workers to actively participate in day time activities. Hence, it is more difficult for TTs to organise.

142 From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.

143 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

144 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.

145 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.

146 From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.

147 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
have been more developed in smaller crowds\textsuperscript{148}. Besides, participation also depends on the type of the activity. When it is a street demonstration or press conference that is open to the media, people are more reluctant to join but when it is a social activity like a picnic, it is easier for people to show up\textsuperscript{149}.

We may now examine individual groups.

4.7.1. Ayılar

As already explained, the Bear Movement is an international gay movement. İstanbul Bearclub activist Ahmet Kaya argues that gay men, who reject the conventional perception of being a gay man, i.e. being feminine, dressing in tight and colourful clothing, waxing etc. and who embrace a natural masculinity define themselves as Ayılar\textsuperscript{150}; i.e. they are masculine in appearance, but they refuse the male gender roles that are oppressive and they love men\textsuperscript{151}.

The first Bear group that came together in Turkey in the 1990s was called Türkiye Ayıları (Bears of Turkey). The group became an extension of the world’s Bear Movement (Özkan, 2004: 99). However, towards the end of the 1990s, Türkiye Ayıları began to separate into two groups due to some political and even personal problems: Türkiye Ayıları and Anadolu Ayıları (Anatolian Bears)\textsuperscript{152}.

In 2000, 15 people separated from Türkiye Ayıları and formed Anadolu Ayıları with the aim of becoming more politicised. The group then took the name İstanbul Bearclub. At first, there was rivalry between the two groups. However, in time, they resolved their problems and today, the two groups share the same bar in İstanbul, and join Bear activities together. İstanbul Bearclub members write for Türkiye Ayıları’s journal, etc.\textsuperscript{155}

There are three types of membership in İstanbul Bearclub. 10 people, who are not in the closet, are executive members. Executive members are selected among people with special talents like graphic design, organisation skills etc. that

\textsuperscript{148} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{149} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{150} Ayılar have been criticised by many feminist and LGBTTT groups for reproducing the traditional masculine gender roles. However, after lots of discussions, now the relationship is better\textsuperscript{151}.
\textsuperscript{151} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{152} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{153} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
can help organise the activities of the group. Supporter members are those who lack those skills but would like to contribute to the organisation in other ways. Any Bear, who would like to join the group, can become a general member.\textsuperscript{154}

Like all other active LGBTTT groups, there are no hierarchies between members of \textit{İstanbul Bearclub}. The group mainly organises parties, art shows, boat trips etc. Ahmet Kaya explains that participation in Bear parties is unusually high. He states that this might be due to the fact that the group is less radical than the rest of the LGBTTT organisations in Turkey, thus apolitical people can more easily fit in.\textsuperscript{155}

\textbf{4.7.2. Kaos GL}

\textit{Kaos GL} is a local association in Ankara. However, through the magazine, \textit{Kaos GL}, which is distributed to 16 cities in Turkey, including Edirne, Antalya, Izmir, Afyon, Çanakkale, Istanbul, Eskisehir, Diyarbakir, Van, Adana, Trabzon, and Samsun etc., the association can reach to a wider geography. The association has almost 50 registered members and it is the most organised association among the LGBTTT groups in Turkey.

In the beginning of the 1990s, members of \textit{Kaos GL} got together to discuss their problems with the idea that it was time for LGBTTTs to fight for their rights and be visible in society.\textsuperscript{156} They began to publish their journal, \textit{Kaos GL}, in September 1994 as a source of alternative media since mainstream media insulted homosexuality, triggered prejudices against LGBTTTs, and portrayed homosexuality as an object of ridicule.\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Kaos GL} has been published since then.

As implied before, during the 1990s, there were very few women and TTs in \textit{Kaos GL}. Women and TTs struggled throughout these years simply to exist in the movement with their own identities. Today, it is easier for women to find a place in \textit{Kaos GL}. \textit{Kaos GL} even has a sub-group called \textit{Kaos Kadın (Kaos Woman)}, underlying gender specific problems, women’s experiences and solidarity etc. However, women members are still less in number in the association. The

\textsuperscript{154} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{155} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{157} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
situation is even worse for TTs, who are still very few in number in Kaos GL\textsuperscript{158}. In fact TT groups have serious complaints about the transphobia within the association.

*Kaos GL*’s initial manifesto indicated that the group would be an anti-capitalist, feminist LGBT group that would struggle against heterosexist patriarchy, and members of the group claimed that they would try to construct their identities in their own right, rejecting the identities that were dictated to them by heterosexist patriarchy\textsuperscript{159}.

Although at the moment the association is well accepted by its neighbours, this was not always the case. In 2004, *Kaos GL*’s cultural centre was attacked by some homophobic individuals (Yıldız, 2007: 34). Despite these social obstacles and state attempts to close down the association, *Kaos GL Kültürsel Araştırmalar ve Dayanışma Derneği (Kaos GL Cultural Studies and Solidarity Association)*\textsuperscript{160} managed to become the first gay and lesbian association in 2005\textsuperscript{161}.

Although *Kaos GL*\textsuperscript{162} became an association in 2005, they had been discussing LGBT policies since the *Lezbiyen ve Gejlerin Sorunları ve Toplumsal Barış için Çözüm Önerileri* conference held in 2003; because the record breaking participation in the conference had encouraged them\textsuperscript{163}. After the conference, the group defined its working areas as the family, education, psychology-psychiatry, law, human rights, sexual health, refugees, social services, military service, media etc. and began to seek possible solutions to the problems in these areas\textsuperscript{164}. Until 2005, the group had specific commissions to work on each field\textsuperscript{165} However, as the members of the group increased in number, the burden on individual activists began to be too heavy\textsuperscript{166}. The reasons for establishing an association were both to decrease this burden by institutionalisation and to test whether the Turkish state would approve the establishment of an LGBT association. Yasemin Öz explains that by establishing an association, the group would gain a legal status in Turkey.

\textsuperscript{158} From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.


\textsuperscript{160} From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.


\textsuperscript{162} *Kaos GL* is the only LGBT association that is stated as a GL association in its charter.

\textsuperscript{163} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.


\textsuperscript{165} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.

\textsuperscript{166} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
Although homosexuality is not recognised by Turkish Law, they would be more visible both to homosexuals and to the society in general\textsuperscript{167}. “It was a strategic, political and legal struggle”, Öz states\textsuperscript{168}. She adds that the technical reason underlying the attempt was that the Code of Associations became much more flexible and the supervision of associations significantly decreased in 2004. She explains that after a bunch of discussions on the dangers of becoming an association since coming out is problematic for homosexuals, the group finally decided in favour\textsuperscript{169}.

After Kaos GL’s application to the Office of Associations, the Ankara Governorate appealed to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office for the closure of the association on the ground that its establishment was against “general morality” and detrimental to the Turkish family order. However, the Office gave a verdict of non-prosecution\textsuperscript{170}. Thus, Kaos GL sustained its legal personality as an association. Activists explain that although this was not a turning point in Kaos GL’s history and political stand, becoming an association had its advantages and disadvantages. First of all, having a legal personality facilitated getting in touch with state institutions\textsuperscript{171}. Additionally, Kaos GL’s establishment encouraged other LGBTT groups to establish their own associations as well. Ali Erol says “This was important both for the institutionalisation of the LGBTT movement in Turkey and for the establishment of the freedom of organisation”\textsuperscript{172}. In addition, Umut Güner states that becoming an association led to professionalisation, which made it possible for the association to work on the issues that they could not previously focus on, such as refugees, human rights reports, media monitoring reports etc.\textsuperscript{173} He adds that becoming an association also made it easier to build regular relationships with volunteer lawyers, volunteer psychologists etc.\textsuperscript{174} However, many LGBTT activists in Turkey make a self-criticism. They think that focusing

\textsuperscript{167} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{168} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 29, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{169} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 29, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{170} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 29, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{171} From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{172} From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{173} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{174} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
on office work and professionalising both reduces volunteerism in the original spirit of the movement, and damages the radical political stand of the group¹⁷⁵.

Barış Süloğlu mentions that the difference between Kaos GL and other LGBTTT associations is the emphasis on creating alternative media. He explains that with this aim, not only do they continue to publish the journal, Kaos GL, despite all financial difficulties but also try to update the website on a daily basis to include recent developments on LGBTTT policies¹⁷⁶. In addition to publishing the journal, Kaos GL organises street demonstrations, seminars, conferences etc. in collaboration with various LGBTTT organisations and feminist organisations. One of the most important activities of Kaos GL is to organise the May 17 Anti-Homophobia Meeting every year since 2006. Besides, a group of LGBTTT and anti-homophobic heterosexual members of Kaos GL organise under the name Kaos GL Gey-Lezbiyen İşçi Ağı (Kaos GL Gay-Lesbian Workers’ Network). The group aims to deal with the problems of worker and civil servant LGBTTTs; i.e. the problems of LGBTTTs who lack the ownership of the means of production and who are discriminated against due to their sexual orientation; to increase unionising among homosexuals; to increase awareness on the discrimination against homosexual workers etc.¹⁷⁷ The association also has a group called Kaos Genç (Kaos Youth) to focus on the problems and experiences of the LGBTTT youth¹⁷⁸.

4.7.3. Pembe Hayat

Pembe Hayat (Pink Life) was established in 2006. Most of the members of the association are TTs and the association focuses more on the problems of TTs. Buse Kılıçkaya states that although many of the members of Pembe Hayat had been activists in organisations like Kaos GL, Lambdaistanbul, Af Örgütü (Amnesty Organisation), İnsanca Yaşam Platformu (Humane Life Platform) prior to the

¹⁷⁶ From the interview made with Barış Süloğlu on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
establishment of *Pembe Hayat*, they felt it was necessary to establish an association specifically to struggle against violence towards, and discrimination against, TTs.

As previously explained, TT activists established *Pembe Hayat LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği (Pink Life LGBTT Solidarity Association)* as a reaction to the Eryaman incidents in Ankara. However, there was another reason for establishing the association. Kılıçkaya explains that before *Pembe Hayat, İnsanca Yaşam Platformu* allegedly struggled for the rights of TTs. However, she argues that this Platform did not respond to the needs of TTs and kept on delaying the formation of an autonomous TT organisation on the grounds that they did not have enough funds. Therefore Kılıçkaya states that they wanted to prove that they could establish their *own* association despite financial difficulties.

After their application to the Office of Associations, the Ankara Governorate appealed to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office for the closure of the association arguing that it is against “general morality” but the Office gave a verdict of non-prosecution. Thus, *Pembe Hayat* too (as well as *Kaos GL*) established its position as an association. However, members of *Pembe Hayat* faced other difficulties during this process. For instance Kılıçkaya says “No one wanted to rent their property to transvestites. They either said this directly or offered extremely high prices”. Thus, in addition to legal problems, activists of *Pembe Hayat* also faced lots of social and financial problems while establishing the association.

*Pembe Hayat* has 49 registered members but activists explain that it is very difficult for TTs to organise mainly due to their working hours. Besides, due to their fear of the police and their position against the state, TTs are reluctant to organise but this situation is gradually changing. Buse Kılıçkaya expresses that almost all TTs in Ankara are either members of the association or has at least once stopped by.

As stated in the charter of the association, the main target of *Pembe Hayat* is to support LGBTTTs and contribute to the formation of a peaceful and affluent

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179 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
180 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
181 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
182 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
society, where LGBTTs can freely exist in their own identities. The main principles of the association are peace, justice and freedom for LGBTTs and all members of the society regardless of their language, race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, sexual identity, philosophical view, religion, denomination and location.

*Pembe Hayat* too is a non-hierarchical association. Titles like “president”, “vice president” etc. exist only since they are requirements set by the state, but practically, they are not in use. Kılıçkaya states that *Pembe Hayat* welcomes LGBTTs of all political stands. She explains that once LGBTTs are liberated, the political differentiations between them might be more important and relevant but it is too soon for that kind of a differentiation. However, similar to *Kaos GL*, *Pembe Hayat* has an anti-capitalist tone. Indeed many members of *Pembe Hayat* (and *Kaos GL*) attended the March 8 demonstrations in 2009 under the name *Anti-Capitalist*. Again Kılıçkaya explains that although struggling for the rights of LGBTTs is a priority for *Pembe Hayat*, the association is not tolerant of other forms of discrimination, and economic, political and social inequalities. In fact one of the main working areas of the association is hate killings, not only towards TTs but all victims of hate crimes.

The association organises cultural, educational, artistic, sports etc. activities that might help struggle against the discrimination against and violence towards LGBTTs. Members of *Pembe Hayat* organise street demonstrations after each TT killing. They try to struggle against the homo/bi/transphobia in various institutions like education, law, psychology and psychiatry, the state, media, academia, health, work life etc. The main activities of the association are making publications; appearing in the media to raise awareness on LGBTTs’ problems;

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185 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
186 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
187 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
188 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
organising seminars, workshops, discussions, panels, plays etc. However, their top priority issues are sex workers, HIV/AIDS and the TTs in prisons. In fact, *Pembe Hayat* was the first organisation that began to make street demonstrations on Sex Workers’ Day. The first of these demonstrations led to the discussions of establishing a civil society initiative for sex workers. Some other LGBTT, feminist and human rights groups also attended the discussions. As a result, the * Kırmızı Şemsiye Seks İşçileri İnisiyatifi* (Red Umbrella Sex Workers Initiative) was established in 2008. The initiative aims to turn into a union for sex worker. *Pembe Hayat* also publishes a journal called *Lubunya*, which includes discussions on LGBTTs problems, attestations from LGBTTs subjected to violence and discrimination, summarise LGBTTs’ human rights etc. Above all, *Pembe Hayat* has created a solid network among TTs all around Turkey, so in case of a violation, they can give legal support to the victim.

### 4.7.4. Lambdaistanbul

*Lambdaistanbul Solidarity Association between LGBTT (Women and Men)* is an LGBTT association established in İstanbul. *Lambdaistanbul* provides social and legal support to LGBTTs. Although members of the associations had been carrying on its activities since 1993s, the association was legally established in May 2006.

Similar to *Kaos GL*, when the group first came together in the beginning of the 1990s, there were almost no women within the group. Thus, women struggled to exist in *Lambdaistanbul*. TTs too were, and are still few in number in the association and the criticisms directed to *Kaos GL* by TTs also apply to...
Lambdaistanbul. Lambdaistanbul activist Öner Ceylan in a self-criticism says that the association should focus more on women’s and TTs’ policies and issues\textsuperscript{197}.

Lambdaistanbul activists state that establishing an association had always been discussed among the group\textsuperscript{198}. Like all LGBTT groups, Lambdaistanbul too hesitated to form an association due to the fear that institutionalising and getting in touch with the state would damage the group’s autonomy. Being an association also brings financial liabilities like paying withholding tax\textsuperscript{199}. Although the group hesitated at first, Öner Ceylan states that “Once you demand to become an association, the state cannot stay indifferent to your presence and can no longer pursue a ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy”\textsuperscript{200}. Thus, the effort to establish an association was a strategic move as well as a struggle to confront the law\textsuperscript{201}. In addition, activists explain that having a legal personality is also beneficial for the visibility of the movement\textsuperscript{202}.

Lambdaistanbul faced many difficulties during the process of establishing an association. Again as in previously mentioned groups, the state tried to close the association on the grounds that it was against “general morality” and was detrimental to the Turkish family structure. However, the case against Lambdaistanbul was somehow more controversial than the cases against Kaos GL and Pembe Hayat. At one point during the lawsuit, the court chose to disregard the expert report although the expert was assigned by the court itself\textsuperscript{203}. Secondly, unlike the cases in Ankara, the Aggravated Felony Court in İstanbul opened a lawsuit against Lambdaistanbul although the charters of Pembe Hayat and Lambdaistanbul are exactly the same\textsuperscript{204}. Since national law must apply equally all over the country, activists believe that all of these show how the legal loopholes regarding LGBTTs are used against them\textsuperscript{205}. Although, in the end, Lambdaistanbul was not closed thanks to the resistance of various LGBTT groups, international agreements, and human rights conventions and with the support of the European

\textsuperscript{197} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{198} From the interviews made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul; Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{199} From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{200} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{201} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{202} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{203} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{204} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{205} From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
Union, the lawsuit process, which lasted for three years, was carried to the High Court of Appeals. The High Court of Appeals decided that closing the association was unlawful, as it was against the freedom of organisation. However, the grounds of the Court’s decision stated that the association could remain open unless it “spreads” homosexuality. *Lambdaistanbul* has objected to the grounds of the decision, fearing that in the future, this phrase may be used to close the association in any activity that the state would not approve but the Court decided not to change the grounds of its decision.

The lawsuit process brought many advantages and disadvantages to *Lambdaistanbul*. For example, international lobbying accelerated during this process. *Lambdaistanbul* got into contact and improved its relationship with many NGOs. Furthermore, the signature campaign and other demonstrations against the lawsuit increased the visibility of the association. On the other hand, the process was painful for many LGBTTs and *Lambdaistanbul* activists. Many activists signed off from membership when the news that *Lambdaistanbul* had been closed appeared in the media, fearing that their identities would be revealed or the police would come to the association. Also, *Lambdaistanbul* activists explain that they even received phone calls from LGBTTs, crying and asking why the association was being closed.

*Lambdaistanbul* currently has about 150-200 registered members, 30 of whom are actively working volunteers. *Lambdaistanbul* has two mail groups: *Lambda Teknik* (*Lambda Technical Group*) and *Lambda Dostlar* (*Lambda Friends*). Actively working volunteers are members of the former group whereas anyone that wants to get information about *Lambdaistanbul* and LGBTT issues are enrolled to the latter.

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206 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
207 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
208 From the interviews made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009; Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul. For a more detailed explanation of the lawsuit process, see [http://www.lambdainstanbul.org/](http://www.lambdainstanbul.org/).
209 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
210 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
211 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
212 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
213 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
214 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
215 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
Similar to Kaos GL and Pembe Hayat, Lambdaistanbul is an association that is against all forms of hierarchy, thus titles and the Board of Directors, which exist as requirements of the Code of Associations are of no practical value to the members and volunteers of the association\(^{216}\). The association is composed of various commissions, each focusing on different issues such as media, international relations, helpline, law, social activities etc.\(^{217}\)

Although Lambdaistanbul is a local association in İstanbul, it gives support to the activities in other cities whenever necessary\(^{218}\). The basic activities of the association are preparing questionnaires regarding the problems of LGBTTs\(^{219}\), organising workshops, seminars, discussions etc. on issues like homosexuality, transsexuality, sexuality, gender, HIV/AIDS, patriarchy, legal rights, the relationship between feminism and LGBTT movement etc.\(^{220}\) Similar to all LGBTT groups, Lambdaistanbul also organises parties, brunches, picnics etc. both to generate income and to socialise. The association also organises family meetings, where LGBTTs’ parents get together to share their experiences on their adaptation process to their child’s coming out.

Since their participation in the Penal Code reform, Lambdaistanbul has been concentrating on its energies on fighting for legal reforms\(^{221}\). Kaos GL, Lambdaistanbul and COC (Centre for Culture and Leisure) are carrying out a joint project financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As part of the project, Kaos GL monitors the homo/bi/transphobia in the media and focuses on LGBTTs’ health problems while Lambdaistanbul reports LGBTTs’ human rights violations\(^{222}\).

\(^{216}\) From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^{217}\) From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^{218}\) From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^{219}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^{221}\) From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^{222}\) From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
4.7.5. MorEl Eskişehir

*MorEl (Purple Hand)* is an LGBTT group that came together in Eskişehir in 2006 but published its manifesto in March 2007. Although it is a local group, it supports LGBTT activities in other cities when necessary. Similar to *Lambdaistanbul* MorEl consists of two groups, *MorEl Teknik (MorEl Technical Group)* and *MorEl Dostlar (MorEl Friends)*. In *MorEl Teknik*, there are 12 volunteers actively working for the group whereas 500 people, who are followers of *MorEl*’s activities are members of *MorEl Dostlar*. *MorEl* has different work groups, each with a particular responsibility: the budget, communication, updating the website etc.

Members of *MorEl* state their principles as follows: *MorEl* struggles against heterosexism, sexism, homophobia and transphobia; with the emphasis on sexual orientation and sexual identity, it is against patriarchy and all forms of discrimination; it is an anti-militarist, egalitarian association that relies upon solidarity rather than hierarchy. Accordingly, decisions are taken on a consensual basis.

The group publishes a journal called *MorEl Fanzin (MorEl Fanzine)*, which includes latest news and theoretical discussions regarding the LGBTT struggle and LGBTTs. Like all other LGBTT groups, *MorEl* organises discussions, conferences, panels; makes and supports field studies, and academic research, shows LGBTT movies, and runs a helpline for LGBTTs to share their experiences and problems. *MorEl* regularly attends street demonstrations on Human Rights Day, March 8, November 25, Anti-Homophobia Day, and HIV/AIDS Day etc.

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223 In the 1970s, a group of office workers in San Francisco painted their hands in purple and marked all over their work place in order to protest their homophobic boss. Since then, some LGBTT activists have been using purple hand as a symbol of the LGBTT struggle.

224 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

225 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

226 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

227 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.


229 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.


231 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
Although the group got together very recently, it is rapidly increasing its activities both in Eskişehir and in other parts of Turkey.

4.7.6. **Siyah Pembe Üçgen İzmir**

*Siyah Pembe Üçgen (Black Pink Triangle) İzmir LGBTT Association* was established in 2009. However, the group first came together in 2002 under the name * İzmir Eşcinsel Kültür Grubu (İzmir Homosexual Culture Group)*, then changed its name to *Pembeüçgen*. Holding regular meetings for two years, the group discussed issues such as coming out, sexual health, militarism etc. The group dissolved after two years but got together, this time with the contributions of previous LGBTT groups in İzmir, to form *Kaos GL İzmir* in 2006. It got its current name and became an association in 2009.

Like the other LGBTT groups and associations, *Siyah Pembe Üçgen* is against all forms of hierarchy between its participants. Similar to *Kaos GL*, *Pembe Hayat* and *Lambdaistanbul*, the state filed a lawsuit to close *Siyah Pembe Üçgen* on the grounds that its establishment was against “general morality” and detrimental for the Turkish family structure. However, as in all previous cases against LGBTT associations, the court decided not to close *Siyah Pembe Üçgen*.

4.7.7. **Hevjin (Living Together; Partner) Diyarbakır**

*Hevjin LGBTT Diyarbakır Group* was established under the name *Piramit LGBTT Diyarbakır Group* in 2008 and got its current name in 2010. It is a local group, mainly active in Diyarbakır. Contrary to other LGBTT groups, most of the members of *Hevjin* are Kurdish and accordingly, the group underlines Kurdish identity, discrimination against and violence towards Kurdish individuals as well as LGBTT issues.

Like all other LGBTT groups and associations, *Hevjin LGBTT Diyarbakır Group* organises seminars, panels, conferences to discuss LGBTT policies. Since

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2009, the group has also been organising the Newroz Holiday in Diyarbakır with the participation of the members of the *LGBTT Human Rights Platform*. At the moment, the group is getting prepared to publish a journal. The journal will be the first LGBTT journal in Turkey that will be published both in Kurdish and in Turkish.

In addition to the LGBTT associations and organisations mentioned above, there are many LGBTT groups all over Turkey. Among these, the recently initiated *Altırenk EBTT İniyatifi* (Six Colours Gay Bisexual Transvestite and Transsexuals’ Initiative) differentiates itself from many LGBTT organisations with its socialist tone. The Initiative claims that it is possible to pursue neither the women’s nor the LGBTT struggle autonomously from class struggle and adds that both women’s and LGBTTs’ liberation are possible under socialism.234 *İstanbul LGBTT Sivil Toplum Girişi* is another LGBTT group mainly composed of TTs that defines its mission as “defending the rights of LGBTTs, struggling for positive discrimination, speaking out about the rights to life and work wherever [they] can, ..., struggling against homophobia, biphobia and transphobia, securing LGBTTs’ rights in the Constitution and reducing social pressure.”235 There are also some activists that are trying to come together in Antalya, Adana, Samsun, Denizli, Van, and Antep etc. Furthermore, various LGBTT activists come together to carry out projects like the *Gökkuşağı Projesi* (The Rainbow Project). *Gökkuşağı Projesi* aims to raise consciousness on sexual health and HIV/AIDS among gay men, to increase the sexual health services provided to gay men, to produce health policies that fulfil the needs of gay men etc. 236

Similar to the women’s associations discussed in the previous chapter, the LGBTT associations in Turkey do not get financial aid from the Turkish state. Unfortunately, member contributions are not sufficient to continue their activities, except for *Pembe Hayat*, whose main sources of income are member contributions.237 For *Kaos GL*, projects are the most important sources of income (projects funded by the Ministry of Health, Heinrich Böll Foundation, EU, UN and

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237 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
World Bank). Income generated from projects is of secondary importance both to Pembe Hayat (projects funded by UN\textsuperscript{238}, EU, Global Dialogue, Mamacash) and to Lambdaistanbul (projects funded by Mamacash, Global Dialogue, Arsea, British Embassy, EU)\textsuperscript{239}. With the income generated from these projects, the associations cover their primary expenses such as employment, rent and bills, prepare reports on LGBTTs’ human rights violations, monitor the media, prepare booklets for consciousness raising, organise panels and conferences etc.\textsuperscript{240} For smaller organisations like MorEl, the main sources of income are member contributions and activities made with Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul\textsuperscript{241}. An additional source of income for all LGBTT groups and associations is the revenue generated from activities like parties, brunches, picnics etc. For İstanbul Bearclub, it is the primary source of income\textsuperscript{242}.

4.7.8. Similarities and Differences between Active LGBTT Organisations

There are basic similarities between all LGBTT groups. First of all, all LGBTT groups are organised in different places in Turkey. In addition to the emphasis on locality, LGBTT groups underline the importance of forming autonomous organisations for different identities. Following this principle, transsexual men have recently formed an autonomous organisation called Voltrans in İstanbul. Similar efforts are shown by the transsexual men in Pembe Hayat. In addition, common membership is very frequent among LGBTT organisations, both for the currently active ones and for the ones that are inactive.

All LGBTT groups are against hierarchy. Hierarchical titles like “president”, “vice president” etc. do not apply practically, and just exist since they are required by law. However, activists admit that sometimes invisible hierarchies are built due to experience. They underline that they are trying to minimise this

\textsuperscript{238} The revenue generated from the UN Project was sent to the TTs in prisons’.
\textsuperscript{*} From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{239} From the interviews made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara; Yasemin Öz on July 29, 2009, İstanbul; Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara; Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{240} However, all of these organisations were once reluctant to being involved in projects funded by the above mentioned institutions, fearing to lose their independence. In fact a Lambdaistanbul activist claimed that they have decided not to carry out large scale projects any more.\textsuperscript{240}
\textsuperscript{241} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{242} From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
type of hierarchy as well. Rather than organising hierarchically, almost all LGBTT associations organise in a participatory manner.

Almost all LGBTT groups in Turkey also share some common ideological positions. All are anti-militarist, against war, feminist (pro-feminist in men’s case), and try to build a close relationship with the working class and Kurdish movements. This is partly due to the ideological position of the first LGBTT association, Kaos GL. As explained before, Kaos GL first appeared in March 8, then anti-globalisation, then May 1 demonstrations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although this was debated by other groups in those years, all LGBTT groups attend such demonstrations at the moment. A common political and ideological standing is possible for the LGBTT movement partly since it is still very young. The differences between them usually arise due to localities.

However, each organisation has important emphases of its own. Probably the most different LGBTT group in Turkey is İstanbul Bearclub. İstanbul Bearclub is a more apolitical group, the primary aim of which is to socialise. Although they sometimes join protests with other groups, İstanbul Bearclub functions more like a social club rather than a political organisation. This is partly due to the fact that İstanbul Bearclub is a more cosmopolitan group. As LGBTT organisations that have not yet gained legal status, MorEl and İstanbul Bearclub are against an institutional structure recognised by the state since it means “adapting to the legal procedures, which do not even recognise gay people.”

Another importance between LGBTT groups is that some are closer to left wing movements. For instance, the founders of Kaos GL are of working class or anarchist origins. Unlike, for instance Lambdaistanbul, Kaos GL and Pembe Hayat underline anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. Similar to Pembe Hayat, MorEl has many members coming from the socialist movement. These emphasise that their idea of freedom is “revolutionary”, that earning rights is not enough. Besides, although all LGBTT groups are in close relations with the women’s movement,

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243 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
244 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
245 From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
246 From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
247 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
*MorEl* is inseparable from the women’s movement in Eskişehir. In fact *MorEl* is the only LGBTTT organisation, where women outnumber men.

However, most LGBTTT activists emphasise that being an LGBTTT individual is an identity, which cuts across the spectrum of all political stands. Thus, they welcome and try to help LGBTTTs regardless of their political views. With the same logic, *Siyah Pembe Üçgen* underlines that this is not an anarchist association although the name suggests so. Some LGBTTT groups put further emphasis on certain concerns due to their location and the identities of their members. For instance while *Pembe Hayat* focuses more on the problems of TTs *Hevjin* sees peace as the priority.

### 4.8. Issues of Ideology and Legitimacy: Enemies and Allies

Given the anti-systemic tone of the LGBTTT movement, carrying out projects funded by the EU, UN, various ministries and embassies etc. is sometimes problematic for LGBTTT groups and raise discussions within and between groups. However, the disagreements seem to have been resolved since LGBTTT activists underline how difficult it is for small organisations to generate income and since funds coming from institutions like the EU are partly allocated to LGBTTT organisations thanks to the struggles of their European counterparts. Umut Güner says “With the revenues generated from projects, we get the chance to go to the Eastern cities of Turkey. How else can we find money for that?” Buse Kılıçkaya underlines a very important point. “With that money, we can save our transsexual friends from the streets. Even if we can save one person, who does not want to work as a sex worker, from working as a sex worker, it seems okay to make projects with the UN.” Since *Lambdaistanbul* does not define its political stand as anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist, being funded by the EU or the UN are not controversial within the organisation. However, some left wing members of the *Lambdaistanbul* have objected to getting funds from *Open Society Institute* and

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248 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
249 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
250 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
251 From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
252 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
253 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
Soros Foundations Network, arguing that this group is associated with the arms trade, so the association decided not to work with that particular organisation again.

LGBTT associations in Turkey have close relations with the women’s movement. Since the women’s movement is an umbrella movement, activists make differentiations between women’s groups and state that they are closest to the feminist branch of the women’s movement, including Kurdish and Islamist women’s groups with feminist concerns. Yet it is important to note that lately, the relationship between the LGBTT movement and the Islamist women’s movement is deteriorating due to the refusal of some Islamist groups to be joint signatories with Kaos GL, in 2010, in a signature campaign on the issue of discrimination against women with headscarves. Individual efforts of a few Islamist feminists like Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal were not enough to reverse the situation.

LGBTT activists also say that the movement is legitimate in the eyes of, and has a better relationship with oppositional groups, like the Kurdish movement, the socialist movement etc. However, LGBTT activists emphasise that such relations have been built by individual efforts of certain Kurdish, socialist and LGBTT activists and cannot account for the entire Kurdish or socialist movements. Besides, LGBTT organisations have close relations with human rights organisations. This has been an important development, since in the beginning of the movement, they were either invisible to or had problems with certain human rights organisations in Turkey as already explained above.

Among labour unions, LGBTT organisations are in close relationship with KESK and DİSK. This, activists explain, is a conscious decision since these labour unions are left wing. As stated above, the LGBTT movement is legitimate in the eyes of some socialist groups and parties in Turkey. However, many socialist parties in Turkey still maintain the 1970s’ approach towards social movements other than that of the working classes; i.e. they strongly believe that “other” social movements are dividing the class struggle. Yet this situation is rapidly changing.

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254 This issue will be elaborated further in the following section.
256 It is worth noting that some socialist groups still maintain a rather fascist attitude towards LGBTTs. There has recently been major debates and even separations between various mixed
The movement has also commonalities with the anti-militarist movement. Though the anarchist and environmentalist movements are also potential allies and recognise the LGBTTT movement, Öner Ceylan states that they have not built a strong relationship with these movements, partially due to the fact that the LGBTTT, anarchist and environmentalist movements are all very new in Turkey. However, recent street demonstrations about conscientious objection and arrests during these demonstrations have brought some anarchist and LGBTTT groups closer. In addition, İzlem Aybastı explains that they have some disagreements on policy making with anarchist groups that show violence in street demonstrations.

However, as already explained, some of the founders of Kaos GL back in the 1990s were anarchists. Arguably, Kaos GL is sustaining this anarchist tone to a certain extent.

LGBTTT organisations have common members with the following parties and organisations: Af Örgütü, HIV/AIDS Platform, labour unions (Eğitim Sen, DİSK and KESK primarily), women’s organisations, feminist groups, certain socialist parties like DSİP, ÖDP, EHP, SDP,ESP, some anarchist groups, students’ groups, human rights organisations, anti-militarist groups, Greenpeace, Yeşiller. However, LGBTTT activists have a common criticism for most these organisations. They argue that some of these organisations recognise the LGBTTT movement because they “have to” and not because they are actually questioning the homo/bi/transphobia within their organisations.

In addition, LGBTTT organisations are in contact with some organisations abroad. For instance Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul are members of ILGA. Besides, LGBTTT groups engage in joint activities with COC Netherlands, Switzerland RFSL, Mamacash, ARSEA and Human Rights Coalition.

In conclusion, although the LGBTTT movement is still very young in Turkey, the struggle gains strength every day. The number of LGBTTT organisations has increased significantly over the last ten years. While in the groups and initiatives due to the socialist journal, Yürüyüş’s (The March) declaration of LGBTTs are “perverts”.

It is worth noting the environmentalist movement has recently begun to raise its voice through street demonstrations against building dams and nuclear power stations. Some anarchist groups also attend such demonstrations.

From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, Istanbul.

From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.

From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
beginnings of the 1980s, it was not even possible to discuss adding the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to the Turkish constitution, today LGBTTs are at least able to raise this questions in the parliament. However, it is an undeniable fact that despite the huge efforts of LGBTT activists, LGBTTs are widely discriminated against, subjected to violence and forced to hide their identities in many areas of social life in Turkey. Still, all of the above mentioned groups, associations and individuals struggle hard enough to address to the problems of LGBTTs with the hope that one day, their voices will be heard at least by the heterosexual society if not the state.
CHAPTER 5

WOMEN’S AND LGBTT MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: THEIR RELATIONSHIP

As indicated in the previous chapters, the LGBTT and women’s movement in Turkey have a close and improving relationship. In order to shed more light into both movements, in this section I will examine the relationship between the two movements. The main topics that will be covered in this section are the relationship between the women’s and the LGBTT movements in general, the relationship between the LGBTT movement and different branches of the women’s movement and the differences between the women’s and the LGBTT movement. I will try to explain the reasons that got the two movements together, common memberships, common causes and activities that LGBTT and women’s activists pursue.

First of all, it is important to note that there are certain key differences between the women’s movement and the feminist movement in Turkey. Throughout this thesis, I have tried to keep in mind these differences. It is a clear fact that the LGBTT movement is closer to the feminist branch of the women’s movement rather than the women’s movement as an umbrella movement. For the sake of simplicity, I will nonetheless refer to the women’s movement, and only distinguish the feminist movement whenever relevant in this section.

Most of the written sources on the relationship between the women’s movement and the LGBTT movement reflect a feminist stand. In fact, not only in Turkey but worldwide, most of the academic work on the issue focuses on the relationship between the feminist the LGBTT movements. In Turkey, so far as the other components of the women’s movement go, the relationship with the LGBTT movement varies in character. Each specific branch of the women’s movement

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261 As indicated in Chapter III, the mainstream women’s movement in Turkey; i.e. the Kemalist women’s movement and the feminist movement are rather different. While the basic aims of mainstream women’s groups are “liberating” lower class women and defending secular rights, feminists struggle to transform patriarchal institutions.
displays a different nature when it comes to its relationship with the LGBTT movement. In this section, I will frequently refer to different branches of the women’s movement specifically for the sake of more elaborate discussion.

5.1. The Relationship between the Women’s and the LGBTT Movements

The basic relationship between the women’s movement and the LGBTT movements in Turkey is built through common membership and/or communication with each other. With respect to the former, (i.e. common membership with the women’s movement), forming associations wasn’t a turning point for the LGBTT movement. LGBTT groups like *Kaos GL, Pembe Hayat* and *Lambdaistanbul* had common members and relations with *Amargi* and *Gökkuşağı* and those in Ankara were components of *Ankara Kadın Platformu* prior to setting associations. Similarly, *MorEl Eskişehir*, though not an association, is an important component of *Eskişehir Demokratik Kadın Platformu* and has common members with *Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı*, some women’s branches of political parties like *SDP, EHP, EMEP, BDP* etc. However, as noted in the previous chapter, establishing formal associations had an impact on the relations that LGBTT groups built with women’s organisations. They began to institutionalise the relationship rather than carrying it on at a personal level. For instance at the moment *Kaos GL* has common members with *Amargi, Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı, Feministbiz*; is a component of *Ankara Kadın Platformu, TCK Kadın Platformu, Kadın Koalisyonu* and has relations with *Başkent Kadın Platformu*; *Lambdaistanbul* has many common members with *Amargi* and *Mor Çatı*; *Pembe Hayat* has common members with *Amargi* and *Feministbiz* and is a component of *Ankara Kadın Platformu*.

Clearly, common membership increased after establishing formal associations and LGBTT and women’s groups have been getting closer each day. The relationship between the two movements significantly improved in the 2000s. One of the most important factors that brought the two movements closer was

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262 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
263 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
264 From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
265 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
266 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
common members and volunteers; i.e. L and B members of women’s organisations and heterosexual women members of LGBTTT organisations. These women facilitated the relationship between the two movements; their physical existences in one another’s organisations taught them how to communicate; sharing experiences and getting into contact got easier. Joint platforms also carried the two movements closer to each other. LGBTTT groups and women’s groups began to work increasingly in collaboration during the TCK and Constitution reforms, and the TT murders. In addition, the struggle that women members of LGBTTT organisations gave within their own organisations had an indirect impact on the relationship between the two movements. Women’s increased visibility within the LGBTTT movement made it easier for women’s organisations to get closer to the LGBTTT movement. Perhaps other factors that brought the two movements together can be summarised as consciousness raising, sharing experiences etc.

This way, the prejudices that each group used to have against each other have gradually been breaking down and women activists begun to get information about the marginalisation of LGBTTT people that they have previously not focused on due to lack of information. Another important reason is that the visibility of especially the LGBTTT movement significantly increased in the 2000s. Seeing LGBTTT groups in street demonstrations and getting to know the ideological position of the movement changed the perspective towards the movement, not only for the women’s movements but for many areas of social opposition since these movements began to see the LGBTTT movement as a political struggle while previously, it was seen as an exaggerated emphasis on sexuality.

LGBTTT groups make joint activities with some women’s organisations. For instance Kaos GL works with Barış için Kadın Platformu, which later turned into Ankara Kadın Platformu, Feministbüz, Amargi, KADER, KAMER, Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği, Kırk Örük Kadın Kooperatifi, Emekçi Kadınlar 267 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
270 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
271 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
272 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
273 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
274 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
275 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
Derneği, Mor Çatı, Van Kadın Derneği and Başkent Kadın Platformu\textsuperscript{276}; MorEl works mostly with Eskişehir Demokratik Kadın Platformu\textsuperscript{277}; Lambdaistanbul works with Amargi, Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler, Sosyalist Feminist Kollektif and Feminist Kadın Çevrest\textsuperscript{278}.

At the moment, there are no funded projects that are made by women’s organisations and LGBTT organisations together. Among the activities that they make together are street demonstrations and press releases, attending the court cases against TTs\textsuperscript{279}, organising seminars, panels, discussions etc.\textsuperscript{280} and providing support to each other whenever possible\textsuperscript{281}, sharing knowledge and experience whenever necessary etc.

The basic issues that women’s organisations and LGBTT groups are equally concerned with are patriarchy\textsuperscript{282}, gender, violence, human rights\textsuperscript{283}, rape and harassment\textsuperscript{284}, honour killings, discrimination of all kinds\textsuperscript{285} and street demonstrations on special days like March 8, November 25 etc.\textsuperscript{286}.

\textit{Kaos GL, Lambdaistanbul, Pembe Hayat, Hevjin Diyarbakır, MorEl and Siyah Pembe Üçgen} are components of the major women’s platforms in the city that they organise in. While \textit{Kaos GL} and \textit{Pembe Hayat} are components of Ankara Kadın Platformu, MorEl is a component of Eskişehir Demokratik Kadın Platformu. All of these associations engage in joint activities with the platform that they are components of\textsuperscript{287}. In addition, LGBTT and women’s organisations got together under platforms like the Penal Code (TCK) Women’s Platform during the Penal Code reform between 2002 and 2004. In fact, it was women’s organisations like Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği that encouraged Lambdaistanbul to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{276} From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\item \textsuperscript{277} From the interview made with Pelin Dutlu on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\item \textsuperscript{278} From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
\item \textsuperscript{279} From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\item \textsuperscript{280} From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, Istanbul.
\item \textsuperscript{281} For instance during the \textit{Anti-Homophobia Meeting} in 2009, Van Kadın Derneği provided logistic support to the LGBTT Platform\textsuperscript{281}. Likewise, Amargi provides logistic support to Voltrans\textsuperscript{*}.
\item \textsuperscript{*} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
\item \textsuperscript{282} From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, Istanbul.
\item \textsuperscript{283} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\item \textsuperscript{284} From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
\item \textsuperscript{285} From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
\item \textsuperscript{286} From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\item \textsuperscript{287} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir; Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\end{itemize}
join the legislative reform processes\(^{288}\). In fact penalising discrimination based on sexual orientation was already present among the demands of \textit{Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği} and \textit{KADER} during the Penal Code reform. Both during the legislative reforms in the 2000s and while writing the CEDAW report, women’s organisations helped LGBTT organisations, mostly in lobbying activities and shared their experiences in the field of law\(^{289}\).

\textbf{5.2. The Relationship between the LGBTT Movement and Different Branches of the Women’s Movement as Seen through the Eyes of LGBTT Activists}

As noted before, the women’s movement is an umbrella movement that has many branches, sometimes with conflicting demands. Thus, it is more accurate to examine the relationship of the LGBTT movement with various branches of the women’s movement. LGBTT activists indicate that regardless of their ideological positions, many women’s organisations have difficulties overcoming their homo/bi/transphobia. \textit{Kaos GL} activist Ali Erol states that there are some women’s organisations from each ideological position that LGBTT organisations have built a solid dialogue with\(^{290}\). However, there are certainly some differences with regard to the approach of women’s organisations of different ideological and political backgrounds towards LGBTT issues.

\textbf{5.2.1. Kemalist Women’s Movement and the LGBTT Movement}

LGBTT activists rightly perceive that the mainstream women’s movement in Turkey is under the impact of Kemalism. With most Kemalist women’s organisations, LGBTT organisations have many opposite views. Although Kemalist women’s organisations and LGBTT organisations gather together under certain platforms mentioned above and are all signatories of certain reports like the CEDAW report, LGBTT activists state that when it comes to issues like nationalism, militarism, the Kurdish question, the head scarf question, Alevism

\(^{288}\) From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
\(^{289}\) From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, Istanbul.
\(^{290}\) From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
etc., they have opposite views with most of the Kemalist women’s organisations.\textsuperscript{291} For instance a MorEl activist, Pelin Kalkan tells her memories from the 2003 CEDAW report meeting. She states that both LGBTI and Kurdish women activists were uncomfortable when the meeting opened with a stand in silence and the National Anthem, which are nationalistic symbols that LGBTI activists argue, should not be present in a civil society gathering.\textsuperscript{292}

5.2.2. Kurdish Women’s Movement and the LGBTI Movement

As already mentioned, the LGBTI movement in Turkey has relations with the Kurdish movement in Turkey. BDP, the political party established for the rights of the Kurdish society, has been in contact with LGBTI groups since the early 1990s. Similar to the Kurdish movement in general, LGBTI organisations have a potential to built closer relations with Kurdish women’s organisations. Both Kurdish women’s organisations and LGBTI organisations focus on each other’s topics of debate. For instance Kurdish identity is a commonly emphasised concept in the publications of all of the LGBTI organisations in question. Hevjin Diyarbakar has a Kurdish name and underlines Kurdish identity as well as LGBTI identity with the motto “There are Kurdish homosexuals”. On the other hand, I personally was at a seminar that Kirk Örük organised, in which the concept of gender was debated such as to include LGBTI individuals’ identities.\textsuperscript{293}

5.2.3. Islamist Women’s Movement and the LGBTI Movement

Another branch of the women’s movement in Turkey is the Islamist women’s movement. LGBTI activists state that they are in contact with some Islamist women’s organisations like Başkent Kadın Platformu and AK-DER. A Kaos GL activist, Burcu Ersoy implies that although these groups and LGBTI organisations try to understand the experiences of each other, and although these

\textsuperscript{291} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{292} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{293} Kirk Örük Kadın Kooperatifi is probably the main Kurdish women’s organisation that LGBTI groups have built a close relationship with.
\textsuperscript{294} From the interview made with Yâsmin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
organisations state that they are against discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and sexual identity, they think they might face problems trying to explain this stand to their bases\textsuperscript{295}. However, LGBTT activists express that especially \textit{Başkent Kadın Platformu} has a positive attitude towards their organisations but suspect that this might be due to individual characteristics of some members of the Platform, primarily Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, rather than the attitude of Islamist women’s organisations in general\textsuperscript{296}.

As mentioned before, it is important to note that the relationship between the LGBTT movement and the Islamist women’s movement has recently begun to deteriorate since some Islamist groups refused to be joint signatories with \textit{Kaos GL} for a signature campaign held in 2010 against discrimination against women with head scarves. Individual efforts of a few women like Tuksal were not enough to reverse the situation\textsuperscript{297}.

5.2.4. Socialist Women’s Movement and the LGBTT Movement

It is worth noting that neither socialist women’s organisations nor socialist groups in Turkey in general have a common approach when it comes to LGBTT policies. For instance, while \textit{EHP} has an LGBTT branch, the group around the journal, \textit{Yürüyüş}, is openly homo/bi/transphobic although both groups are socialist groups. Since women’s branches of socialist political parties and socialist groups are ideologically attached to their organisations, the same applies to the socialist women’s movement. Hence it is important to keep in mind the differences among socialist women’s organisations while elaborating their relationship with the LGBTT movement, and to refrain from making generalisations.

LGBTT groups have many common members and engage in joint activities with some socialist women’s organisations and with women’s branches of some socialist parties that were already mentioned in the previous section. For instance \textit{Pembe Hayat} has very close relations with women from \textit{DSİP} and with \textit{DSİP} members in general. However, as \textit{Kaos GL} activists Seçin Varol explains, LGBTT

\textsuperscript{295} From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{296} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
groups and women’s branches of political parties have some differences of opinion concerning issues like militarism, hierarchical organisation or the classic March 8 demonstration debate, namely whether male counterparts will attend the demonstrations or not. Thus, Varol states that rather than the women’s branches of socialist or radical left wing groups, it is easier for LGBTT groups, at least for *Kaos GL*, to come together with autonomous women’s organisations. However, Şeçin Varol also adds that this situation is gradually improving. For instance while a couple of years ago *Halkevleri* almost withdrew from the joint March 8 demonstrations due to a debate on whether to add the phrase “transvestite” to one of the texts, at the moment such issues are resolved\(^{298}\). In any case, LGBTT organisations have built a relationship with socialist women’s groups like *Emekçi Kadınlar Derneği* and *Sosyalist Feminist Kollektif*.

5.2.5. Feminist Movement and the LGBTT Movement

Though the women’s movement and the LGBTT movements began to get closer in the 2000s, the relationship between feminist organisations has a longer history. In the 1990s, there were some efforts by some feminist groups to include LGBTT issues to their agenda. For instance the journals *Feminist* and *Pazartesi*\(^{299}\) gave place to LGBTT policies from time to time\(^{300}\). However, Ali Erol explains that until the late 1990s and early 2000s, neither did feminists truly question heterosexism and discrimination based on sexual orientation and sexual identity, nor had the LGBTT movement gotten rid of their feminist phobia\(^{301}\). The efforts to get together and work together were insufficient until the 2000s, when the struggle of the LGBTT movement began to yield results and LGBTT discourses began to change feminist organisations’ attitude towards LGBTT groups\(^{302}\). LGBTT activists express that it is quiet expectable that women’s groups with a feminist perspective are easier to communicate and work together with due to the theoretical intersections between the concerns of feminism and LGBTT movement. Not only

\(^{298}\) From the interview made with Şeçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.

\(^{299}\) However, *Ankaralı Feministler* activist Gamze Göker states that there were no open LGBTT individuals in *Pazartesi* (Göker, March-April 2007: 33).

\(^{300}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.

\(^{301}\) From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.

\(^{302}\) From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
are concepts like patriarchy and heterosexism are intertwined, but also there are other fields that the LGBTT movement and feminist groups have a common political stand such as anti-militarism and non-hierarchical structures of organisation. For instance Amargi activists state that Mehmet Tarhan’s struggle for conscientious objection is a common area of political struggle (Amargi Kadın Dayanışma Kooperatifi, March-April 2007: 32). Burcu Ersoy states: “We may work together with women’s organisations that pursue equal rights policies, but we can produce policies together with feminist organisations.”

As in the case of the women’s movement in general, feminist and LGBTT groups have common concerns, some of which are gender, violence, discrimination etc. However, LGBTT activists say that the LGBTT movement and the feminist movement have a broader range of common concerns, including issues such as heterosexism, heteronormativity, sexism, anti-hierarchical organisation structures, anti-militarism, homophobia, the institutions of marriage and family, LBT women, masculinity, power, sexuality, body etc.

At the moment, feminist groups like Amargi, Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümle Kooperatifi and Mor Çatı show an incredible effort to get closer to LGBTT organisations, especially Lambdaistanbul. Lambdaistanbul activists underline that these groups are sincerely questioning the homo/bi/transphobia within their organisations. Lambdaistanbul activists suggest that one of the reasons why Lambdaistanbul has closer relations with particularly these feminist organisations might be due to the fact that they are neighbours with Lambdaistanbul. Activists also add that not all feminist organisations have similar sincere concerns. In addition, LGBTT activists in Ankara stress that feminist groups are greater in number in Istanbul when compared to Ankara. Thus, the relationship in Istanbul might be stronger.

An Amargi and Kaos GL activist, Yasemin Öz, mentions that Ankaralı Feministler, Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı, Kirk Örük Kadın Kooperatifi and KA-DER Ankara Şubesi underline the importance of struggling against the discrimination.

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303 From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
304 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
305 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
306 From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
307 From the interview made with İzlem Aybast on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
308 From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
against and violence towards LGBT individuals (Öz, March-April 2007: 24). Öz explains that heterosexual women activists of these organisations both attend the demonstrations made by LGBT individuals and organisations, and cheer for the movement during other street demonstrations, like May 1 demonstrations (Öz, March-April 2007: 24). Like Ali Erol, she explains that the relationship between the two movements, at least that in Ankara, began to get stronger in the 2000s. She argues that the lack of cooperation between the two movements was due to two reasons: firstly, that LGBT individuals had hidden and/or had been forced to hide their identities; and that feminists and LGBT individuals gathered under different organisations (Öz, March-April 2007: 24-25). She stresses that as lesbian feminists began to join various feminist organisations like Ankaralı Feministler, the relationship began to get strength. Ayça Kurtoğlu, another Ankaralı Feministler activist supports Öz’s argument. She stresses that the lesbian feminists that joined Ankaralı Feministler were very influential in both helping feminist activists to conceptualise gender and sexuality and in consolidating the relationship between the two groups (Kurtoğlu, March-April 2007: 28). However, again Öz claims that not all women’s organisations or not all women activists are anti-homophobic. She explains that the relationship is improving better as the two movements increasingly begin to get in touch with each other (Öz, March-April 2007: 25). The arguments of Ülkü Özakın, a member of both Amargi and Lambdaistanbul, also support Öz’s argument. Özakın suggests that the situation was similar in Istanbul too. She implies that lesbian feminists’ participation in feminist organisations and their coming out in these organisations facilitated the relationship between the two movements (Özakın, March-April 2007: 27).

It is important to note that one of the basic issues that come up during the discussions made between feminists and LGBTTs is regarding the relationship between the institutions of patriarchy and heterosexuality. For instance Ayşe Düzkan, a feminist activist explains that patriarchy benefits from the institution of heterosexism (and heteronormativity) since they reproduce male/female roles and the hierarchy between them. Thus the author states that homosexual people too will be emancipated when patriarchy is abolished and suggests that there is a close connection between the two movements (Düzkan, March-April 2007: 21). However, she explains that just as women and LGBT individuals have different
life experiences, channels of oppression etc., the two movements may have different strategies and sometimes conflicting demands. For instance while coming out is an important strategy for LGBTTs since their existence is denied, for women, as their existence is legitimate, face to face confrontation with misogynistic people and institutions may be a better strategy (Düzkan, March-April 2007: 21).

Burcu Baba claims that despite the differences between them, women and LGBTTT individuals have a potential to develop a common discourse. She explains that the dominant discourse validates the lives of male, heterosexual, middle class, white, educated etc. people and marginalises all social groups that are different. Thus she adds that the discourse to be developed by feminists and LGBTTT activists should be one that celebrates differences and helps understand, rather than standardise, each other (Baba, March-April 2007: 23). LGBTTT activist Kürşad Kahramanoğlu also stresses the importance of producing an alternative language. He adds that it was feminists that taught the LGBTTT movement about the importance of discourse analysis and language and now, this is a major intersection point between the two movements 309.

Lambdaistanbul activist Yeşim Başaran proposes that one of the basic issues that the feminist movement and the LGBTTT movement can produce common policies on is sexuality (Başaran, March-April 2007: 26). Başaran has a valid finding since both LGBTTs’ and women’s sexualities are oppressed, and as LGBTTT’s sexualities are defined by the norms of the heterosexual society, women’s sexualities are defined by men. Kaos GL activist Yasemin Öz adds that the feminist movement in Turkey has made an important contribution to the LGBTTT movement in Turkey through its discussions on sexuality. Öz states that this contribution made it easier for the LGBTTT movement in Turkey to underline sexuality as an area of political struggle 310.

5.3. Differences between the Women’s/Feminist and the LGBTTT Movements

Despite the fact that the women’s/feminist and the LGBTTT movements are getting closer each day, there are some differences between these movements and

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309 From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
310 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
they have some criticisms about each other. The most obvious difference between the women’s movement and the LGBTT movement is the numerical superiority of the women’s movement. Compared to women’s organisations, LGBTT organisations are both fewer in number and have very few members. Thus, sometimes it is more difficult for LGBTT groups to get in touch with other political groups. Also, in common platforms like the Ankara Kadın Platformu, this numerical superiority sometimes causes problems since in cases of joint decisions, women’s groups, especially those that are largest in number have a stronger say. In addition, the women’s movement has a century long history in Turkey whereas the LGBTT movement only has a few decades’. On the other hand, the women’s movement has much more experience than the LGBTT movement. LGBTT activists state that due to this history, some women activists, who are also older chronologically, sometimes try to dominate younger LGBTT activists. However, they also claim that this does not constitute a major obstacle to working together and discussions on the issue continue. Last but not least, visibility is not a concern for women’s groups. They are visible in Turkish society. It is, however, a major area of political struggle and, simultaneously, a social constraint for LGBTT groups.

A Lambdaistanbul activist, Yeşim Başaran suggests that although the activists of the women’s movement and the LGBTT movement see each other as potential allies, the extent to which they form collaborations with social opposition in general is far from being mature (Başaran, March-April 2007: 26). For the LGBTT movement, she argues that this is due to the fact that the movement is still very young and raising its own voice is still a priority (Başaran, March-April 2007: 26). Secondly, she states that ironically, sometimes LGBTT activists undermine their own agenda when they get in touch with other organisations (Başaran, March-April 2007: 26). In addition, Başaran also makes a self criticism by arguing that one of the basic reasons of the failure to collaborate with various groups of social opposition is owing to the fact that LGBTT and women activists keep the relationship on a personal level (Başaran, March-April 2007: 26). Arguably,
although institutionalisation is problematic for many LGBTT activists as explained before, it might help overcome this problem. In fact I have noted elsewhere that to the extent that LGBTT groups gain legal entities, it has become easier for them to institutionalise their relationship with other NGOs.

The LGBTT movement faces some specific obstacles when it comes to women’s movement activists’ perception of TT individuals. They argue that this is partly due to the transphobia among the women’s organisations. Yet it is also important to remember that TT activists make the same criticism towards some LGBTT groups as well. TTs are so marginalised in society that even activists, who maintain an egalitarian view, fail to overcome their transphobia. Secondly, women’s organisations accuse transsexual women, who dress and make up flamboyantly, for reproducing the traditional gender roles. On the other hand, TT activists say that this is only the expression of a learnt womanhood, which has been forced to be hidden for years. Although these are major points of debate, LGBTT activists indicate that the situation is gradually improving as they discuss the issue and explain to each other their point of view. For instance some organisations like Amargi seriously question the transphobia within themselves and TT individuals recently began to come out within this organisation.

A similar problem is that women activists sometimes have harsh criticisms against gay and TT men and neglect the differences between gay and TT men’s masculinity and the conventional sense of masculinity. This, Umut Güner argues, is due to the lack of a sophisticated approach towards the concept of gender. LGBTT activists imply that some women’s groups may have a hostile attitude towards men, regardless of the differences between them. However, they feel this situation too is gradually getting better. Göker states that most feminists used to think that gay men, like men in general, were partly responsible for the marginalisation of women, thus refrained from forming collaborations with them (Göker, March-April 2007: 33). However, she says, as feminist studies improve,

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315 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
316 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
317 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
318 From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
319 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
320 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
321 From the interview made with Yeşim Bağışaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
feminists gradually begin to envisage that men, who do not fulfil the traditional male roles are also oppressed in a patriarchal system (Göker, March-April 2007: 33). Yet it is not to say that gay men – as men- do not participate in the general advantaging of men.

Probably the most important debate between the feminist and the LGBTT movements in Turkey is regarding sexual labour. While feminists argue that using the term “sex worker” with regard to “prostitutes” legitimises the act of prostitution since the Marxist concept of worker and the rights demanded from the state with reference to this conceptualisation is a legitimate act. Rather than using the term “sexual labour”, some feminists, especially those from a socialist tradition\textsuperscript{322}, suggest that the term “prostitution” shall be used and the analysis shall be based on the exploitation of women’s bodies instead. On the other hand, LGBTT, especially TT activists, the majority of which work as sex workers to earn their living, stress that using the phrases “sexual labour” or “sex workers” is only the acceptance of an existing service sector and an existing fact. This, they argue, does not legitimise the act itself. According to LGBTT activists, it is accurate to demand social security rights from the state on this base\textsuperscript{323}. However, there are some LGBTT activists, who express that the debate is overrated and in fact both parties have similar approaches when it comes to prostitution\textsuperscript{324}. In this thesis, I preferred to use the terms “sexual labour” or “sex workers” since I agree with LGBTT activists underlining that the subject of an act shall be the one to determine the name to be given to her/him\textsuperscript{325}.

Lastly, one of the most important differences between the women’s and the LGBTT movements is the legitimacy of these two movements in the eyes of both the state, and different sections of society. The women’s movement is more legitimate in the eyes of both the state and society in Turkey. The media is one of the best indicators of this fact according to Yeşim Başaran. LGBTT activists claim that this is due to the fact that the LGBTT movement is solely seen as an exaggeration of sexuality in the eyes of many people in Turkey while women’s

\textsuperscript{322} From the interview made with Seçin Varol on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{323} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{324} From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{325} From the interview made with Pelin Dutlu on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
demands are more easily considered as human rights demands\textsuperscript{326}. Besides, since homosexuality is a sin according to Islam, it is very difficult for the LGBTT movement in Turkey to be legitimate in the eyes of masses\textsuperscript{327}. Thus, an İstanbul Bearclub activist, Ahmet Kaya suggests that the cultural factors standing as barriers against the LGBTT movement are stronger in Turkey than they are against the women’s movement\textsuperscript{328}. As noted before, one of the factors leading to the legitimacy of the women’s movement in Turkey is its numeric superiority and a century long history\textsuperscript{329}. In addition, it is easier for women to organise in Turkey while LGBTT individuals may refrain or may be forced to refrain from activism since they are fined by the police, confined in mental institutions by their families, face severe violence and social obstacles when they come out\textsuperscript{330}. When all of these factors combine, LGBTT activists think that it is quiet expectable that the women’s movement in Turkey is more legitimate than the LGBTT movement, especially in the eyes of the state. However, LGBTT activists state that the accomplishments of the women’s movement are social accomplishments that have the potential to transform at least a portion of the society such that the LGBTT movement becomes more legitimate too\textsuperscript{331}. In addition, the women’s movement direct emphasis on sexual orientation and sexual identity especially during the Penal Code reform did not only increase the accomplishments of the LGBTT movement, but also increased the legitimacy of the demands of the LGBTT movement in the eyes of the state\textsuperscript{332}.

In Turkey, LGBTT activists also distinguish the feminist movement from the women’s movement when it comes to the issue of legitimacy. For instance a Kaos GL activist, Ali Erol states that the feminist movement is marginalised within the women’s movement. “The feminist movement becomes legitimate in the eyes of the society only when it positions itself within the mainstream women’s movement”, Ali Erol says. Like the LGBTT movement, Ali Erol adds, the feminist

\begin{itemize}
  \item[326] From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
  \item[327] From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
  \item[328] From the interview made with Ahmet Kaya on October 14, 2009, İstanbul. Ahmet Kaya also adds that the feminist movement is a potential ally for the Bear Movement in Turkey since they are both against traditional male gender roles.
  \item[329] From the interview made with Deniz Yıldız on July 30, 2009, İstanbul.
  \item[330] From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
  \item[331] From the interview made with Burcu Ersoy on August 15, 2009, Ankara.
  \item[332] From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\end{itemize}
movement too is less legitimate in the eyes of both the state and the society and both feminists and LGBTTT individuals face similar types of linguistic violence and discrimination.333

In conclusion, the relationship between the women’s movement and the LGBTTT movement in Turkey began to get stronger in the 2000s. Although LGBTTT activists state that there are women’s groups from various ideological positions that are sincerely questioning LGBTTT issues, the LGBTTT movement in Turkey is closer to feminist and Kurdish women’s groups rather than Kemalist or Islamist women’s organisations. The movement also has close relations with some socialist women’s organisations. Despite the differences between them and criticisms towards each other, LGBTTT and women’s organisations from various ideological positions work on common topics and engage in joint activities; and the relationship is improving each day. Still, Cansu Cancan from KADAV and Nilgün Yıldırım from KAMER imply that the relationship between the two movements has not yet matured (Cancan, March- April 2007: 34; Yıldırım, March-April 2007: 34).

CHAPTER 6

WOMEN’S AND LGBTT MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: LEGISLATIVE REFORMS DURING THE 2000s

In this chapter, I will discuss and compare the demands, activities, strategies and accomplishments of the women’s and LGBTT movements in Turkey during the legislative reforms in the 2000s, which included the Penal Code, the Constitution, the Civil Code, and the Labour Code reforms. In addition to being the most important factor that brought the two movements together, participation in legislative reforms also points out one of the major weaknesses of NSM theories in explaining the Turkish case.

As a specific case illustrating the relationship between the two movements, LGBTT organisations were encouraged to participate in this process, mainly in the Penal Code reform, by women’s organisations. While the two movements had many common demands and engaged in similar activities during the process, some critical differences between them were also clear. In this chapter I will also try to elaborate on these differences. The chapter also refers to current activities and other demands of the LGBTT movement that are still on the agenda either because they were not met in the reform process or have since come to the forefront. Since the activities of the women’s movement during the legislative reform process are well documented (WWHR-New Ways, 2003; Arat, 2004; Kerestecioğlu, 2004; WWHR-New Ways, 2005; Eray, 2008) the main focus of this chapter will be the activities of the LGBTT movement.

It is also important to note that despite the women’s movement’s active participation in legislative reforms, a significant proportion of the women’s movement in Turkey has been sceptical of state institutions and concerned about being co-opted by the state (Arat, 2004: 17). I have noted several times throughout the study that this applies to the LGBTT movement as well. Although many activists also question the extent to which legal reforms immediately affect
women’s and LGBTTs’ everyday lives they nonetheless pursue the struggle to change the legislation, at least for the sake of the long run.

Before elaborating on the legislative reforms in detail, it might be useful to explain how the legislative reform process was conducted. Prior to specific lobbying activities of the stakeholders and formal discussions in the Parliament, the groups that wanted a change in specific legislation engaged in activities such as holding campaigns to collect signatures, holding press conferences, carrying their demands to the media, raising public awareness on the issue, getting in touch with other groups that wanted similar changes, preparing written drafts, organising street demonstrations, engaging the support of international organisations etc. Subsequently, when the time for Parliamentary discussion came, groups of activists went and engaged in active lobbying in the relevant sub-commissions and commissions at the Grand National Assembly.

6.1. The Penal Code and the Constitution


The LGBTT associations that had been legally established at the time of these reforms, the LGBTT organisations and individual LGBTT activists that pursued the legal struggle were in collaboration with the women’s platforms. They, however, also pursued somewhat different policies from the women’s movement under another platform named the LGBTT Human Rights Platform. Except for the two Bear groups, all of the active LGBTT groups and organisations that are listed in Chapter 4 of this thesis were components of the LGBTT Human Rights Platform.

6.1.1. The Penal Code

Before 2004, nearly half of the Turkish Penal Code was dated from the 1920s (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 10). The Parliament had taken the reform of the
Penal Code on its agenda in the 1990s, but it was only in 2000 that a Draft Law was prepared (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 10). After a lengthy period of on and off discussions and sustained pressure by various groups, professional NGOs and women’s NGOs, the draft was modified and brought to the Parliamentary floor in 2004 (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 13).

Mainly owing to the clear demand of the EU accession process as specifically required by the EU Progress Reports, the Turkish state had been urged to accord the Turkish Penal Code with the acquis communautaire, especially concerning “honour killings” and women’s abductions (Avrupa Toplulukları Komisyonu, 2001: 28, 67, 80; Avrupa Toplulukları Komisyonu, 2002: 31, 83). Under the impact of the pressures of the EU and international agreements, and thanks to the efforts of the women’s movement, the new Turkish Penal Code came into effect in 2005 when this draft was finally adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly after some modifications. In the following sub-sections, the activities and demands of the women’s and the LGBTT movements in response to the Draft Law and during its discussions in the Parliament in 2004 are summarised.

6.1.1.1. The Women’s Movement

As already mentioned, the Penal Code reform process was a turning point for the relationship between the two movements. Activists I have interviewed have all stated that the experience drew the two movements closer than ever before. This was because some groups among the women’s movement used this opportunity to share their experiences in the field, and the common demands of the two movements provided the necessary incentive.

Both the women’s movement and the LGBTT movements voiced quite detailed demands in the Penal Code reform process. However, in the end of the process while many demands of the women's movement were met, none of the demands of the LGBTT movement was even taken seriously into account by the

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legislature\textsuperscript{335}. The demands of the \textit{Penal Code Women’s Platform} as summarised from various publications of WWHR-New Ways’ (WWHR-New Ways, 2003; Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003) are presented below. These demands are prepared in response to the specific formulation of the Draft Law that formed the basis of the Parliamentary debates in 2004. These demands were as follows:

- The Draft Law introduced a new definition: “Woman: This term also includes girls.” The Platform demanded that this definition in Article 4, Clause (3) of the Draft Law be omitted since it both discriminated against non-virgin women and women in general since the term “man” as “including boys” was not among the definitions in the Draft Law (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 9);
- Clause (2) of Article 325 of the Draft Law, which regulated the abduction or detention of persons, increased the penalty of the perpetrator if the abducted or detained person was married. The Platform demanded that this Clause be omitted since it discriminated against non-married people (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 44);
- Article 326 (Active Penitence and Mitigating Circumstances) and Article 327 (Active Penitence Necessitating the Suspension of Criminal Proceedings or the Sentence) of the Draft Law reduced or postponed the sentence of rapists and/or abductors if the perpetrator would marry the victim. The Platform demanded that these Articles be omitted from the Draft Law since they did not only legitimise rape and/or abduction but also encouraged forced marriages (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 45-46);
- Article 139 of the Draft Law reduced the sentence of murdering a new born child born out of wedlock by the unmarried mother. Assuming that children born out of wedlock violated the family’s honour, the family or the environment in general would pressure the unmarried mother to kill the child. The Platform demanded the omission of this Article since it would legitimise the killing of new born children born out of wedlock by the unmarried mother. Women activists stated that this was both a violation of children’s rights and was in contradiction with the Civil Code since the distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children was abolished from the Civil Code in 2001 (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 11);
- Article 318 (Assault on Chastity with the Consent of the Child) and Article 316 (Seizing of Chastity with the Consent of the Child) implied that children under the age 15 had the faculty of consent in sexual abuse (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 11). Women demanded the omission of these Articles from the Draft Law, arguing that a child under 15 had not yet completed his/her psychological, sexual and intellectual development to give consent to sexual relationships (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 11);
- “Article 320 of the Draft Law (Indecent Behaviours) state[d] that any

\textsuperscript{335} Parliamentary Constitution Commission Chair Burhan Kuzu’s statement in 2008 illustrates how the legislature disregarded the demands of the LGBT movement at the time: “Homosexuals have a strong demand for equality... Will we give them this right just because they want it?” Retrieved from site, \url{http://www.kaosgl.org/content/"istiyorlar-diye-verecek-miyiz"}, January 21, 2010.
person who acts indecently or ‘severs others’ feelings of chastity’ in public will be sentenced to six to twelve months of prison (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 12)”. The Article included ambiguous terms like “chastity” and “decency”. The Platform demanded that the Article be removed from the draft law since “chastity” and “decency” are subjective concepts, the social interpretations of which constantly change; thus they are not matters that can be regulated by law (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 12). The Article is usually used to violate transgendered people’s human rights and restrict women’s sexual and bodily rights (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 12);

Article 31 of the Draft Law regulated unjust provocation. In order to ensure that perpetrators of honour killings would no longer benefit from unjust provocation, women activists demanded to add the sentence “The actors of honour killings cannot benefit from unjust provocation due to the commitment Turkey made in the CEDAW, Peking + 5 UN Special Session Declaration and due to the 30.04.2002 dated advisory jurisdictions of the EC.” to Article 31 of the Draft Law (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 16). The Platform also demanded to define honour killings as aggravated homicide in Article 136 of the Draft Law as a deterrent legal measure against honour killings (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 7);

- The Platform demanded to add the phrase “sexual orientation” to Article 170 of the Draft Law, which penalised discrimination with six months to one year in prison (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 24);

- Sexual crimes were listed under “Crimes against the Society” in the Draft Law. The Platform argued that this was a violation of women’s sexual and bodily rights, since such a classification would imply that women’s bodies and sexuality did not belong to themselves but to the society (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 6). Hence the Platform demanded to list sexual crimes under “Crimes against Persons” rather than “Crimes against the Society”. Women activists also demanded to rename the sub-section “Crimes Against Sexual Integrity and Traditions of Morality”, which included the articles pertaining to sexual offenses (Articles 315-329), as “Crimes Against Sexual Integrity". The emphasis put on traditions and morality indicated once again that women’s bodies and sexuality were perceived as commodities controlled and suppressed by the society, family or men. To correct this mistake and recognise women’s sexual and bodily rights as individual rights, women demanded to name the sub-section as “Crimes Against Sexual Integrity” (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 6);

- Articles 315 and 317 of the Draft Law were respectively named as “Forced Seizing of Chastity” and “Forced Assault on Chastity”. The Platform argued that defining sexual offenses using terms like “chastity” or “honour” "reiterates the perspective that primary target of sexual assault is the person’s honour as foreseen by the society, rather than the person’s sexual and bodily integrity” (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 8). Women activists also explained that using the term “forced” implies the possibility of the existence of consent in sexual assault. Thus they demanded to rename Article 315 and 317 of the Draft Law respectively as “Rape” and “Sexual Assault” rather than “Forced Seizing of Chastity” and “Forced Assault on Chastity” (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 8) and to redefine rape such as to include the specific modes through which rape can take place; i.e. oral and
anal penetration as well as vaginal penetration, and through the forced insertion of an object into the anus. Women demanded to include psychological as well as physical coercion in such cases in the Draft Law (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 8). The Platform also demanded to arrange the Article such that the patriarchal attitude towards women and children are no longer sustained and rape victims are no longer further victimised due to misinterpretations (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 29);

- Article 319 of the Draft Law regulated aggravating circumstances in acts of rape or attempt to rape. Sub-clause (3) of the Article in the Draft Law stated that the perpetrator would be penalised more heavily if the victim caught an illness or if there was another important defect in the victim’s health due to the rape or attempt to rape. The women’s movement demanded to change the phrase “another important defect in the victim’s health” with the phrase “the physical or psychological health of the victim” in Sub-clause (3), arguing that while physical or psychological health are scientific matters observable by experts, the term “important defect” was subjective and open to interpretations. Sub-clause (2) of the same Article listed family members, health institution staff, penal institution and detention house staff etc. as persons, who would be penalised more heavily if they would rape or attempt to rape an individual. The movement demanded also to add “security forces” to this Sub-clause in order to account for rape as torture as an aggravating circumstance in rape or rape attempt cases (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 37). The women’s movement also demanded to omit the sentence “It is stated in the ground of Article 315 that rape between spouses does not constitute a crime” from the ground of Article 319 since it legitimised rape between spouses and male dominance over women’s bodies (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 39). Furthermore, the Platform demanded to remove the sentence “Deflowering constitutes blameworthiness” from the ground of the same Article since it discriminated against non-virgin women and assumed that the rape of a non-virgin is a more serious offense (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 39);

- The Platform demanded to rename Article 321 of the Draft Law as “Sexual Harassment” rather than “Stalking, Indecent Assault and Sexual Harassment” since it assumed that acts like stalking or indecent assault were not forms of sexual harassment when in fact the term “sexual harassment” includes them all (Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler, 2003: 40). Although Article 321 of the Draft Law penalised sexual harassment, it did not refer to sexual harassment at workplace separately. Women activists demanded that sexual harassment at workplace be recognised as an aggravating circumstance in penalising sexual harassment since it does not only violate women’s sexual and bodily rights but also their right to work. Women also demanded that “the prosecution of the offense not be subject to complaint as the aggrieved party may be dependent on the perpetrator or may have to jeopardize her position or job by filing a complaint” (WWHR-New Ways, 2003: 12).

The women’s movement tried to raise public awareness and stimulate discussions on the reform of the Penal Code by organising conferences, panels,
discussions, and press conferences in both Ankara and İstanbul during the reform process (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 87). The Penal Code Women’s Platform prepared a very detailed draft, as presented above, requesting amendments to the draft prepared by the AKP government. What is more, owing to their experience, activist women were quite successful in lobbying the law makers and opinion leaders in the society. In interviews with LGBTT activists, this fact was mentioned too.\(^{336}\)

As a consequence of the efforts of the women’s movement as well as the demands and standards of international conventions and the EU accession process major changes were made in the Turkish Penal Code.

The Penal Code that was passed by the Parliament in 2004 contained a lot of the provisions demanded by women’s groups and international standards. Among these, first and foremost, the misogynistic conception of “woman” as a non-virgin female was removed from the Penal Code.

Secondly, parallel to the demands of the women’s movement, the category “Crimes against Sexual Integrity and Traditions of Morality” was renamed as “Crimes against Sexual Integrity” and was listed under “Crimes against Persons” rather than under “Crimes against the Society” (Eray, 2008: 43). Besides, the term “forced seizing of chastity” contained in the old Penal Code was replaced with “rape” in the new Penal Code. Ambiguous terms like “chastity” were no longer included in the articles of the new Penal Code.

As demanded by the women’s movement, Article 139, which in effect provided immunity to mothers who killed their out of wedlock newborns (as the law had assumed that women committed such a crime under family and community pressure) was removed from the legislation altogether.

Similarly, the provision of the old Penal Code that allowed a rapist to escape his jail sentence if he was to marry his victim and stay married for five years was abolished (Eray, 2008: 47). In addition, Article 321 of the law recognised and defined sexual harassment and the sentence of the perpetrator was increased if the victim would be subjected to sexual harassment in the work place.\(^{337}\)

At the end of the Penal Code reform process, while some demands of the

\(^{336}\) From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.

women’s movement were met, others, on the other hand, were only partially met. For instance, the movement had demanded that “honour killings” be listed among aggravated homicide and that the perpetrators of these crimes be unable to benefit from reduction of sentences due to “unjust provocation”. The Parliament could not agree to adopt the term “honour killings” in the language of the law and instead chose to refer to this crime as “custom killings”. It, however, regulated that those committing this kind of crime are to receive a life sentence under Article 82 of the new Penal Code, which listed custom killings as aggravated homicide\textsuperscript{338}. The fact that a clear statement indicating that the perpetrators of “honour (custom) killings” cannot benefit from the “unjust provocation” clause for reduction of sentences was not added to the relevant article has caused significant disappointment and anger among women activists and remains as a continuing source of disappointment, particularly since inconsistent judgements, some paying heed to “unjust provocation”, others rejecting it in “honour killing” cases, have been passed, over the years, by different courts.

A ground-breaking step was taken in the new Penal Code when the definition of rape was extended to include marital rape (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 88). This being a totally revolutionary concept in criminal law – not only in Turkey but worldwide is seen as a very progressive approach. Other demands of the women's movement to define rape in a more detailed and comprehensive manner so as to include both oral and anal penetration were, however, not accepted (Eray, 2008: 46).

### 6.1.1.2. The LGBTT Movement

The Penal Code reform process was the first legislative reform process that LGBTT associations and groups also participated in. According to the text provided by Lambdaistanbul\textsuperscript{339} translated by the author, the LGBTT Human Rights Platform also had some specific demands they brought to the agenda during the Penal Code reform process in 2004. As explained above, these demands were


\textsuperscript{339} TCK Tasarısına ilişkin Önerilerimiz. Text provided to the author by Lambdaistanbul in October, 2010. (1-6)
prepared in response to the Draft Law that formed the basis of Parliamentary debates in 2004. These consisted of the demands below:

- Article 3 of the Draft Law regulated justice and equality before the law in the implementation of the Turkish Penal Code. It stated that while implementing the Penal Code, everyone shall be treated equally regardless of race, language, religion, sect, nationality, colour, sex, political view or other views, philosophical belief, national or social roots, birth, economic or other social positions. The LGBTTT movement demanded to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to the Article to ensure that LGBTTTs would be treated equally before the law in the implementation of the Turkish Penal Code;

- LGBTTT activists demanded to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Article 124 of the Draft Law, which penalised discrimination. The Clauses of the Article listed discriminative practices that would constitute a crime. Activists demanded to add the phrase “firing from work, preventing promotion, exiling, directly or indirectly forcing to quit” as discriminative practices that constitute a crime to Clause (a) of Article 124 of the Draft Law;

- Article 85 of the Draft Law listed the aggravating circumstances in intentional homicides. As LGBTTTs are often killed intentionally due to their sexual orientation and sexual identities, the LGBTTT movement demanded to add sexual orientation and sexual identity to Article 85 of the Draft Law to make sure that the penalties to the perpetrators of LGBTTT killings are increased rather than reduced by discretion of judges;

- Article 79 of the Draft Law defined and penalised “genocide” and the Sub-clauses of Clause (1) of Article 79 of the Draft Law listed the practices that constituted “genocide”. Seriously harming the physical and psychological integrity of individuals and forcing the group to live under conditions that would completely or partially destroy the group were respectively listed as acts of genocide in Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Clause (1). The LGBTTT movement demanded to add the phrase “a group defined by sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Sub-clause (1) of the Article, arguing that TT individuals, as a group, were subjected to the practices listed in Sub-Clauses (b) and (c) by a police chief, Süleyman Ulusoy, in Istanbul between 1996 and 2004 and that he tried to promote TT murder campaigns by encouraging the public to “exterminate” TTs. The acts of Süleyman Ulusoy

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340 It is important to note that the Penal Code Draft Law was modified a few times during the debates between 2002 and 2004. Hence the numbers of the articles, clauses and sub-clauses in the Draft Law are not fixed. For instance, while the Article penalising discrimination was numbered 170 when the Penal Code Women’s Platform carried their demand to amend it to the Parliament, it was numbered 124 when the LGBTTT Human Rights Platform carried their demand to amend it to the Parliament. In order to avoid confusions, I have specifically explained the content of each Article in all demands throughout this chapter.


343 TCK Tasarrısu ilişkin Önerilerimiz. Text provided to the author by Lambdaistanbul in October, 2010, page 2.
is explained in detail in Chapter 4:  

- Article 18 of the Draft Law regulated the deportation of foreign individuals, who committed a crime or were sentenced to imprisonment. LGBT activists demanded to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Clause (3) of the Article in order to make sure that a foreign LGBT committing a crime in Turkey would not be sent to his/her country if there was a risk of maltreatment or torture in his/her country due to sexual orientation and sexual identity:  

- Article 80 (Other Crimes against Persons) of the Draft Law penalised certain crimes such as torture, subjecting persons to inhumane treatments or involuntary biological experiments etc. The LGBT movement demanded to amend Article 80 to prevent torture methods like electroshock, medicines exterminating sexual desire or therapies forcing to like the opposite sex etc. that are used against LGBTs in health and social services institutions:  

- Article 137 of the Draft Law penalised recording and acquiring personal information and data unlawfully. Clause (2) of the Article stated that the perpetrators of this crime would be sentenced to one year to two years in prison if they had recorded information regarding the individual’s race, ethnicity, political or philosophical view, sexual life etc. LGBT activists demanded to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to the Article, in order to make sure that personal data concerning LGBTs would not be unlawfully recorded:  

- The movement demanded to rephrase Article 29 of the Draft Law, which regulated unjust provocation, so that it could not be used by the perpetrators of LGBT murders to claim a reduction in sentences on the grounds that the victim had harassed, solicited for sexual intercourse or tried to rape the perpetrator. The movement also demanded to add “honour killings” to the same Article in order to make sure that the penalties of the perpetrators of honour killings would not be reduced:  

- LGBT groups demanded to rephrase the ambiguous term “general morality” in laws so as to prevent victimising LGBTs:  

- Article 228 (Obscenity) of the Draft Law penalised “obscenity” in various occasions like children’s exposition to “obscenity” and “obscenity” in media. The LGBT movement demanded to replace the ambiguous phrase “obscenity” from all clauses of Article 228 of the Draft Law with the phrase “causing sexual exploitation” since the definition of “obscenity” was ambiguous and since it was often used to violate LGBTs’, especially TTs’ rights. In addition, Clause (4) of the Article in the Draft Law penalised the

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345 TCK Tasarısına ilişkin Önerilerimiz. Text provided to the author by Lambdaistanbul in October, 2010, page 5.
production, distribution, sales etc. of products involving “unnatural sexual activities”. The movement demanded to remove the phrase “unnatural” from the Clause since the phrase is used to indicate that homosexuality is “unnatural” sexuality.

- LGBTT groups demanded to omit the phrase “exhibitionism” from Article 227 of the Draft Law, which penalised indecent activities. The Article of the Draft Law stated that individuals engaging in sexual intercourse in public or individuals exposing themselves in public would be penalised to six months to one year in prison. LGBTT activists demanded to omit the Article since it was used to imprison TTs.

- The movement demanded to omit Article 107 of the Draft Law, which regulated sexual intercourse with children above age 15. The argument was that children over 15 were capable of making the decision to have sexual intercourse and if the Article had been arranged to protect children’s sexual and bodily rights, Article 106 of the Draft Law was already protecting this right. LGBTT activists also demanded to omit Article 218 of the Draft Law, which regulated grudge and hostility. They claimed that Article 218 of the Draft Law was very similar to Article 362 of the Penal Code that was in effect at the time. Activists argued that Article 362 of the Penal Code that was in effect at the time was used against the freedom of speech and expression. Hence they demanded to omit Article 218 from the Draft Law.

As it can be seen from the nature of these demands, the LGBTT movement is mainly concerned on legalising the notion of “sexual orientation and sexual identity” as a basis of equality and non-discrimination in human rights and basic freedoms. They, however, also had certain other demands from the law that they believed were leading to unjust treatment of LGBTTs either intentionally or unintentionally both in state institutions and in society in general.

Among the above mentioned demands of the LGBTT movement, adding the phrase “sexual orientation” to Article 124 of the Penal Code, which regulates non-discrimination; rearranging the laws on obscenity and exhibitionism; assuring that the perpetrators of “honour killings” would not benefit from unjust provocation; and rephrasing the ambiguous term “general morality” were also shared by the Penal Code Women’s Platform. The rest of the demands were peculiar to the LGBTT movement.

353 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
However, to what extent the two movements shared the LGBTT demands is a controversial subject. For instance, Kaos GL activist Ali Erol explains that some demands made by the LGBTT movement alone did not mean that the women’s movement failed to support these issues. Rather, he argues, the demands peculiar to the LGBTT movement simply point to the fact that they were not the result of a collaborative activity of the two movements. Yet Umut Güner has a more negative view about the extent of agreement between the two movements. He underlines that some women’s organisations in the Penal Code Women’s Platform even wanted to overlook the basic demand to add the phrase “sexual orientation” to Article 124. Buse Kılıçkaya also underlines that while adding of the phrase “sexual orientation” to the Penal Code was among the demands of the women’s movement, the phrase “sexual identity” was never even mentioned, which she viewed as yet another example of the greater discrimination against TTs.

The basic activity of the LGBTT movement in the struggle for their demands was lobbying. Throughout the Penal Code reform process, LGBTT groups and individual activists tried to participate in EU conferences and meetings attended by parliamentarians, the Prime Minister and the President as much as they could for lobbying purposes. They tried to explain their demands and the reasons underlying the demands to decision makers. In order to discuss their demands, LGBTT groups requested appointments from all members of the Parliamentary Sub-Commission on Justice. They were only able to set an appointment with Orhan Erarslan, an opposition (CHP) member. This was despite the fact that the EU, at the time had strongly urged the government to take into account NGOs’ opinions in the draft of the new Penal Code. LGBTT activists were also able to lobby three other parliamentarians (Ufuk Uras [then an independent deputy, now of BDP], Akın Birdal of BDP and Zeynep Dağlı of AKP) on the Penal Code reform, together with women’s organisations. This situation is gradually changing. The women’s movement is now less reluctant to include the term “sexual identity” in their demands from the Parliament. The developments since 2004 will be discussed later in the chapter.

\[354\] From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\[355\] From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\[356\] From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
\[357\] From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\[358\] From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\[359\] From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
held joint press conferences with women’s organisations to raise public awareness on the reform process.  

None of the demands brought to the Parliament specifically by the LGBTT movement was accepted. However, as explained before, the demand to list “honour killings” among aggravated homicide to make sure that the perpetrators of these crimes be unable to benefit from reduction of sentences due to “unjust provocation” was a common demand of both the women’s and the LGBT movements. The Parliament could not agree to adopt the term “honour killings” in the language of the law and instead chose to refer to this crime as “custom killings”. It, however, regulated that perpetrators of custom killings shall receive a life sentence under Article 82 of the new Penal Code, defining custom killings as aggravated homicide. This is the only demand of the LGBT movement, also the only common demand of the women’s and the LGBT movements that was only partially met in the end of the Penal Code reform.

Although none of the demands of the LGBT movement was accepted during the Penal Code reform process, there was an interesting development. With individual efforts of Prof. Adem Sözüer, member of the Parliamentary Sub-Commission on Justice, the term “sexual orientation” was added to Article 124, which regulated non-discrimination in the initial draft of the law. This was the first time the phrase “sexual orientation” entered in a draft legal text in Turkey. However, the term was later dropped from the Article during the deliberations of the Parliamentary Commission on Justice, on the grounds that the phrase, “language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations” in Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution shall be preserved in Article 124 of the Penal Code and that adding the term “sexual orientation” to the Penal Code would be superfluous. In fact according to the Minister of Justice of the time, Cemil Çiçek, the term “sex” already indirectly

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360 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, Istanbul.
363 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, Istanbul.
implied “sexual orientation”. LGBTT activists however claimed that the term “sex” does not imply “sexual orientation” in either theory or practice. LGBTT activist and lawyer Senem Doğanoğlu argued that this attitude, on the part of the legislator, was by no means an unconscious act. She claimed legal loopholes such as this one, are usually deliberate.

6.1.2. The Constitution

The Turkish Constitution went through reforms in 2001 and 2004. However, preparing a new Constitution was also on the Parliament’s agenda in 2007 and 2008. Under the initiative of the AKP government, a Science Board consisting of lawyers and academicians was formed to prepare a “civilian” Constitutional draft in 2007. Yet the “civilian” Constitution debates came to an end in 2008, primarily due to the disagreements on the head scarf question.

While the women’s movement participated in the Constitution reforms in 2001 and 2004 and the debates in 2007 and 2008, the LGBTT movement participated only in the reform debates in 2007 and 2008. Unlike the Penal Code, the women's movement had fewer demands both when the Constitution went through a reform process in 2001 and 2004 and when the “civilian” Constitution debates began to rise in 2007 and 2008. Similarly, the LGBTT movement had fewer demands during the “civilian” Constitution debates in 2007 and 2008 compared to the demands they had during the Penal Code reform. However, there too, similar to the Penal Code, none of the demands of the LGBTT movement was met while some of those of the women's movement were.

6.1.2.1. The Women’s Movement

Thanks to international agreements such as UN conventions and the pressure of the EU accession process etc., an important amendment was made in the Turkish Constitution in 2001 in accordance with the demands of the women’s

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364 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
365 From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
366 The term “civilian” here refers implicitly to the fact that the current Turkish Constitution was prepared by the military government in 1982, after the 1980 coup.
movement. This was the amendment made to Article 41 of the Constitution, which regulates the protection of the family. Parallel to the demands of the women’s movement, the phrase "and based on the equality between the spouses" was added to Article 41 in 2001 (Eray, 2008: 34). Thus the Article now reads "The family is the foundation of the Turkish society and based on the equality between the spouses".\(^{367}\)

In 2004, Article 10 of the Constitution, which regulates equality before the law, was amended as "Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice. No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class".\(^{368}\) While this new form of Article 10 has created a lot of discussion in the women’s movement as to whether or not it can form the legal basis of “special temporary measures” such as quotas etc., it has not been tested to that effect since.

What is more, in 2007, when there was an attempt to draft a new Constitution from scratch by a group of Constitutional Law experts, informally mandated by AKP leadership, in the draft, the sentences “Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice.” was altogether dropped. Instead the proposed new Article in the draft categorised women, children and the elderly as groups of people with special needs, a position that was clearly unacceptable to the women’s movement (Anayasa Kadin Platformu, 2007). Instead, the women’s movement through its voice as the Women’s Constitution Platform demanded that the Article on equality before the law read as follows:

All individuals, irrespective of language, race, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, political view, philosophical belief, religion, sect, marital status, or any such consideration are equal without any discrimination before the law.
Direct and indirect forms of discrimination against women are unlawful.
Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice. Until equality of opportunity and equality in results have been attained between sexes, the State shall take all legal and institutional temporary special measures, including the


implementation of quotas. Such measures shall not be considered discrimination (as translated by the author from Anayasa Kadın Platformu Basın Bülteni, 2007).

As the initiative to draft a new Constitution was aborted in 2007, Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution has to this day remained, in the form it was amended in 2004. Although the women’s movement did not accomplish to make any further changes, especially with regard to special temporary measures, the ground traversed in 2004 was sustained.

Currently, there is a new ongoing attempt to amend the Constitution. The Parliament is preparing for some major changes in the Turkish Constitution and they have shared the draft with the public in March 2010. One of the proposed changes is to add the sentence “Such measures shall not be considered against the principle of equality.” after Clause (2) of Article 10, and to add the Clause “The precautions that will be taken to protect groups with special needs like children, elderly and disabled shall not be considered against the principle of equality.” to the Article so that the Article proposed reads as follows:

All individuals are equal without any discrimination before law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.

Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice. Such measures shall not be considered against the principle of equality.

The precautions that will be taken to protect groups with special needs like children, elderly and disabled shall not be considered against the principle of equality.

No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class.

State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings.

Accordingly, the Women’s Constitution Platform has listed their demands and shared them with the public in March 2010. All LGBTT associations and groups that are members of the LGBT Human Rights Platform are also members of the current Women’s Constitution Platform. As reported by Bianet, an independent communication network, some of the demands of the Platform were to:

- Remove all anti-democratic constitutional and legal obstacles against the
freedom of speech and organisation;
- Remove the election threshold by making the necessary changes in the
 Constitution and the Elections Laws;
- Rescind compulsory religion courses and to omit the “religion” section
 from national identity cards.
- Add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Article 10 of
 the Constitution, which regulates equality before the law, and to add the issues
 of marital status, age and disability to the same Article;
- Establish independent, autonomous and civil institutions such as Public
 Inspection Office for the Equality between Men and Women, Gender
 Equality Institution, Equality Institution, Institution to Struggle against
 Discrimination, National Human Rights Institution, National Institution to
 Prevent Torture, Arm Force Complaint Institution etc. with the
 collaboration of NGOs;
- Reformulate the phrase “the protection of children from sexuality by the
 State” with the sentence “The State shall take the necessary measures to
 protect children from abuse and violence” in all regulations on the
 protection of family and children’s rights; rescind all reservations on the
 Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- Ensure that political parties benefit from the Treasury’ funds in an
 egalitarian manner and that some percentage of the funds is allocated to the
 women’s branches, women candidates and women’s activities.
- Limit the election budgets and expenses of political parties and individual
 candidates; establish an independent institution to monitor the transparency
 of income and expenses of political parties and take effective measures
 against any violation regarding these matters;
- Make the necessary changes in the Constitution and the Political Parties
 Laws to remove the anti-democratic barriers in front of the basic principles,
 activities and organisations of political parties;
- Ensure that banning of a political party is defined as an exceptional case
 within the framework presented by ECHR precedents;
- Limit parliamentary immunity with chair immunity. To make a Turkish
 Grand National Assembly Political Ethics Law;
- Rearrange the regulations on the Supreme Board of Judges and Public
 Prosecutors so that the authorities of the Minister of Justice are not
 increased and the principles of the separation of powers and judicial
 independence are not violated (as translated by the author from “Anayasa
 Kadın Platformu Taleplerini Açıkladı” 371).

These new demands of the Women’s Constitution Platform reflect a change
of tone. Rather than generally focusing on demands specific to women and
children’s rights as in previous reforms, the women’s movement seems to be
planning to go to the Parliament with an approach embracing democracy in

370 There is a 10% election threshold in Turkey.
371 “Anayasa Kadın Platformu Taleplerini Açıkladı”. Retrieved from site,
http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/120920-anayasa-kadin-platformu-taleplerini-acikladi, March 31,
2010.
general. This might be related to the fact that the women’s movement has had, as explained above, some achievements with respect to women’s and children’s rights since the late 1990s. The new approach might be an indicator of the fact that the movement is now strong enough to make further demands about anti-democratic legislation in general. Besides, this new approach might be a reaction against some of the proposals of the government, especially the ones that are limiting the judiciary’s authority in favour of the Minister of Justice.

It is also important to note that adding the phrase “sexual identity” to Article 10 of the Constitution is a new demand of the women’s movement. As explained above, the women’s movement was reluctant to add the phrase “sexual identity” to Article 124 of the Penal Code Draft, which penalised discrimination, although to add the phrase “sexual orientation” to the same Article was among its demands. The women’s movement had been criticised for this reluctance, particularly by TT activists, groups and associations. It seems that these criticisms were taken into account by the women’s movement. This latest development might also be read as an indicator that the TT movement in Turkey is gradually becoming more and more visible and influential, at least on NGOs’ policies if not on government policies in general.

6.1.2.2. The LGBTT Movement

LGBTT organisations, on the other hand changed their strategies in the reform of the Constitution in 2007 after their experiences in the Penal Code reform process in 2004. First of all, while they had demanded twelve amendments in the Penal Code, they demanded only one when the Constitution was debated in 2007. They chose to do so, according to Lambdaistanbul activist Öner Ceylan, since it doesn’t bring any results to have very detailed demands for such a young and unknown movement. Also, Öner Ceylan adds that the demand to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Article 79 (Genocide) of the Penal Code, despite its legitimate reasons, was indeed a quiet radical demand in that it was impossible for the members of the relevant Parliamentary Commissions to really

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372 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
373 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, Istanbul.
understand the reasons and nature of the demand.374

Thus, during the Constitution reform process, the *LGBT Human Rights Platform* chose to struggle for one single demand. This was to add the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution, which regulates equality before the law.375 In this demand, they were joined by the *Women’s Constitution Platform*, which also demanded that the term “sexual orientation” be added to Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution in 2007 (Anayasa Kadın Platformu, 2007). As already noted, to add the phrase “sexual identity” was not among the women’s movement’s demands back then. *Pembe Hayat* activist Buse Kılıçkaya’s view that this as yet another example of the greater discrimination against TTs will be discussed in the following sub-sections. Yet it is important to underline once again that this situation has changed. As mentioned above, adding the phrase sexual orientation and sexual identity to Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution was among the *Women’s Constitution Platform’s* demands in 2010.376 This hopeful development can be seen as a further improvement in the relationship between the two movements and the accomplishment of the TT movement.

In 2008, the *LGBT Human Rights Platform* engaged in many activities to struggle for this amendment. The major campaign held by the Platform included sending postcards to members of the Parliament, demanding that the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” be added to Article 10. Hundreds of LGBTT people and their supports sent rainbow coloured postcards to various LGBTT organisations. The organisations gathered the postcards and sent them to the Turkish Grand National Assembly after simultaneous press conferences made in front of the Galatasaray Post Office in Istanbul and Kızılay Post Office in Ankara in 2008.377 In the same year, LGBTT activists and supporters marched to the Grand National Assembly.378 Furthermore, LGBTT activists tried to lobby political decision makers to persuade them for their cause. However, their request to see

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374 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
375 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
377 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
378 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
Burhan Kuzu, the Chair of the Parliamentary Constitution Commission Head and AKP parliamentarian, was denied. LGBTT groups also organised various street demonstrations, press conferences, signature collection campaigns etc. and tried to raise their voice in the media.

However, despite the support they received from the women’s organisations and some unions in this process, LGBTT activists’ demands were neither taken very seriously by law-makers nor were they fulfilled in the end. However, activists point out that this campaign at least drew some attention to their cause among some politicians although not always in intended manner. For instance, in 2008, Burhan Kuzu, made an inaccurate statement: “Homosexuals have a strong demand for equality and the right to get married. Will we give them the right just because they want?” LGBTT activists had not at any point in the process asked for the right to get married and such an inflammatory statement by an important legislator could lead to the misinterpretation of the LGBTT movement’s goals. As such it was disturbing to the LGBTT activists, who were quite careful not to create a negative reaction towards their cause in the public opinion. As Burhan Kuzu also referred to LGBTT rights issues as “the problems of the 22nd century” attempting to move the topic from the current political agenda in Turkey, such events and incidents also indicated that national politics can no longer be silent towards the demands of the LGBTT movement in Turkey.


6.2.1. The Civil Code

In general, LGBTT organisations did not join the Civil Code and Labour Code reforms, which were respectively carried out in 2002 and 2003. The only exception was that in 2006, Kaos GL was a signatory to the signature campaign carried out by women’s organisations for further reforms in the Labour Code in

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379 From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
380 From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
382 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
383 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
order to eliminate gender based discrimination in work life\textsuperscript{384}. Thus, in this section, only the changes made in the Civil and Labour Codes vis-à-vis the participation of the women’s movement will be discussed.

Since the late 1980s, the women’s movement in Turkey had been struggling to make major changes in the Civil Code, embracing the CEDAW to pressure the state to make the necessary changes in the Civil Code (Arat, 2004: 17, 19). Starting with the incorporation of the protection of women and children into the Law on the Protection of Family (Arat, 2004: 19), the Parliament accelerated its activities to make the necessary legal changes to struggle against gender based discrimination, thanks to the efforts of the women’s movement and international conventions that Turkey signed (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 3). Enacted in 1998:

the Law [on the Protection of Family] listed the forms of violence and unacceptable behaviour (Article 1), defined the obligations of the state and the procedures to be followed, and set the penalty for the violators of the ‘protection decision’ by the court with imprisonment ranging from three to six months (Article 2) (Arat, 2004: 17).

On the other hand, the new Civil Code was approved by the Parliament in 2001 and came into effect in 2002 (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 3-4). The changes made in the Civil Code in 2002 are as follows:

- The terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ were changed to ‘spouses’ (Arat, 2004: 19).
- The husband is no longer defined as the head of the family and spouses are defined as equal partners in the institution of marriage (Eray, 2008: 37).
- According to Article 188, the representative power of the marital union is distributed equally among spouses rather than being assigned to the husband alone as before (Eray, 2008: 37).
- The term “illegitimate children” was removed from the Civil Code (WWHR-New Ways, 2005: 9), thereby also providing equal right to inheritance of all offspring.
- Separation of property ceased to be the legal conjugal property regime. Instead, the joint property regime was adopted (Arat, 2004: 20). This means that the property obtained during marriage is shared equally between spouses, and that all property acquired during marriage is subject to equal division after divorce.
- Article 186 of the new Civil Code states that spouses together choose their domicile\textsuperscript{385}, manage the union, and contribute, according to their ability, to the family expenses with their labour and wealth (Arat, 2004: 20).
- Article 193 was amended so that the wife does not need the approval of the

\textsuperscript{384} “İş Yaşamında Cinsiyet Ayrımcılığına Karşı İmza Kampanyası”. Retrieved from site http://sites.google.com/site/kadinmuhendisler/imzametni, April 21, 2010.

\textsuperscript{385} In the previous code, the wife’s residence was identified as her husband’s residence (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 81).
husband during transactions with third parties any more. Spouses have equal rights in making legal contracts, transactions with each other and third parties (Eray, 2008: 38).

- Prior to 1990, women were obliged to ask their husbands’ permission in order to work outside the home. This law was abandoned by the Constitutional Court in 1990 (Eray, 2008: 39). However, it was not until 2002 that an explicit sentence was added to the Civil Code regarding the employment and work of spouses. Article 192, which reads “Neither of the spouses would need the permission of the other in choosing an occupation or work. However, the peace and interest of the union of marriage is considered in occupation and work choices and their performance” was thus added to the Civil Code in 2002 (Arat, 2004: 20).

- The minimum marriage age, which used to be different for men and women in the previous law, was set as equal for both parties (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 82). While the minimum marriage age was lower for women in the previous Civil Code, in the new Code, it was set to 17 for both sexes; i.e. men and women need to have passed the age 18 in order to get married. In exceptional cases, men and women can get married at the age of 14 (they need to have passed the age 15) with the consent of their parents.

The women’s movement had been struggling for these changes since the beginning of the 1990s. Several drafts had been prepared and proposals had been submitted to the Parliament. Petition campaigns, where more than 100,000 signatures were collected, were organised. Demonstrating in streets, conducting several media-fax campaigns and carrying out person to person lobbying with legislators etc. were some of the activities held by the women’s movement during their struggle for legislation changes (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 80-81). It was all of these efforts and international conventions signed by Turkey that finally exerted enough pressure on the government to change the long-outdated Civil Code. While women were not entirely satisfied with the new law and wanted to continue the struggle for further amendments, the new legal framework has changed the lives of many women in Turkey.

6.2.2. The Labour Code

In 2003, the new Labour Code came into effect (Eray, 2008: 54). In this case, clearly the women’s movement itself was not a major initiator of the reform. Rather, the direct impact, in fact the demand of the EU accession process as well as the related framework of the labour and employers’ unions to align Turkish labour legislation with EU standards played a major role. In effect, it was these unions that
placed gender issues on the legislator’s agenda and that raised voices for the rights of working women (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 92). However, the influence of the women’s movement on the Labour Code reform shall not be undermined. Not only has the women’s movement in Turkey been raising its voice for working women’s rights, but also women’s branches of unions have been actively urging their unions to go the Parliament with gender specific Labour Code demands since the early days of the movement.

Working women ended up gaining important rights in the end of the reform of the Labour Code. One of the most important gains that women had in the new Labour Code reform was that maternal leave before and after pregnancy was increased to 8 weeks each, totalling 16 weeks (Arat, 2004: 21). This period was extended to 18 weeks in multiple-birth cases (Arat, 2004: 21). The new Law also prohibited the removal from office on ground of pregnancy (Eray, 2008: 55).

Another important accomplishment for women was the prohibition of gender-based discrimination in the workplace. The new Law did not only prohibit gender-based discrimination, but also made the employer liable to prove that the annulment was based on a valid reason in cases of gender-based discrimination (Kerestecioğlu, 2004: 92).

The new Labour Code also recognised sexual harassment in the workplace (Eray, 2008: 55). Taking this development one step further, sexual harassment in the workplace was also recognised and penalised by the new Penal Code that came into effect in 2005, as explained earlier.

The activities of independent women’s organisations for further changes in the Labour Code gained speed afterwards. In 2006, 36 women’s organisations and Kaos GL got together and listed their demands for the rights of working women386. As listed by Uçan Süpürge, these demands were as follows:

- Women’s groups asked both from the state and from private enterprises to create new employment fields in general and employment fields for women in particular. They encouraged the state and relevant institutions to formulate a comprehensive program, for which a proportion of the national budget shall be allocated.
- Women demanded the establishment of a Commission for Gender Equality in the Parliament and suggested that this commission shall revise all laws,

including the Labour Code, with a gender perspective.

- Women’s organisations demanded parenting leaves equally for both men and women in order to create an egalitarian division of labour when it comes to child rearing. Only workplaces with more than 150 employees are required to open nurseries and breast-feeding rooms according to the current Labour Code. Women’s groups demanded that since most of the workplaces in Turkey are small enterprises, both employers and local administrations shall take the necessary measures to open nurseries and breast-feeding rooms in small enterprises. Besides, opening nurseries and breast-feeding rooms shall be compulsory in industrial zones regardless of the people employed.

- Temporary women workers and per diem women employees, who often work as maids, shall be recognised in the Labour Law.

- A Labour Law specific to the agriculture sector shall be prepared since women intensely work in the field of agriculture.

- The article regulating the prevention of gender-based discrimination in the Labour Code shall be extended such as to include the hiring process in order to prevent discrimination against women while hiring. In addition, this article shall also ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion etc.

- Positive discrimination shall be implemented until gender equality is sustained in working life. The state shall encourage the implementation of positive discrimination.

- An objective work classification system shall be developed in order to stop the wage differential. Equal pay for equal work principle should be adopted.

- 30% women’s quota shall be imposed in political parties and while hiring and promoting employees, both in the public and private sectors.

In fact most of the demands presented above were not new. Following the Labour Code reform, in June 2003, KA- DER had organised the Congress on the Solutions for Women’s Problems in İstanbul. There, woman activists listed their demands from the Parliament, some of which were demands for further amendments in the Labour Code. The call for equal pay for equal work, the demand to prepare a Labour Law specific to the agriculture sector, where women are intensely employed, the demand to the recognise temporary women workers in the Labour Code etc. (KA-DER, 2003: 8-10) were already among women’s further demands from the Parliament.

The Labour Code has not been amended regarding this matter since women’s groups have formulated the above mentioned demands. Whether such a reform process is going to happen in the close future is uncertain. However, with
the experiences they got from the Penal Code and Constitution reforms, women’s and LGBTT groups might work together under a platform in the future to amend the Labour Code with a gender, sexual orientation and sexual identity based perspective.

6.3. The LGBTT Movement after the Reforms

LGBTT activists have drawn some lessons from the legislative reforms in the 2000s. Today, they express their view that they might follow alternative strategies thanks to these experiences. For instance Kaos GL activist Umut Güner states that now they are following the changes in the law more closely in order to be more prepared in future reform activities\textsuperscript{388}. MorEl activist Pelin Kalkan explains that they have realised that the LGBTT movement should focus on lobbying more intensely. She underlines that the support of well-known public figures directly contribute to oppositional movements’ visibility and power, improves their chances of having a say in political issues as well as the effectiveness of consciousness raising efforts and ultimately, in fulfilling their demands. Kalkan states that they will work harder for the support of important public figures from now on\textsuperscript{389}. Also, Kürşad Kahramanoğlu states that another important strategy in affecting law making might be building stronger relations with local administrations\textsuperscript{390}. He argues that in countries like United Kingdom, working with and getting the support of local administrations turned out to be a more effective strategy than going directly to the Parliament with certain demands. Finally, Öner Ceylan suggests that it is important to use terminologies that decision makers are familiar with. Ceylan states that he has observed that Parliamentary Commission members are more familiar with the concept, “human rights”, than they are with “discrimination”. Thus, he suggests, the movement shall be underlining LGBTT rights as human rights more in the future\textsuperscript{391}.

Taking into account these experiences, LGBTT organisations are preparing

\textsuperscript{388} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.  
\textsuperscript{389} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.  
\textsuperscript{390} From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.  
\textsuperscript{391} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
to attend future legislative reform processes with further demands. LGBTT groups are getting prepared to raise public awareness on the problems with the Penal Institution and Detention Centres Regulations, which are used to segregate LGBTT prisoners. Senem Doğanoğlu argues that due to current regulations, open homosexuals or transgendered people are subjected to solitary confinement in prison under the guise of “special measures”\(^\text{392}\). *Pembe Hayat* is struggling for the abolition of such practices. Members of the association are preparing reports on hate crimes, which will be presented to municipalities\(^\text{395}\). In addition, *Lambdaistanbul, the Greens* and *Bilgi University Amnesty Group* are currently working on the issue\(^\text{394}\).

The movement in general will also focus on honour killings and honour killings of LGBTTs in particular. Some LGBTT groups are planning to demand from the Parliament the recognition of hate crimes as specific crimes in the Penal Code and their punishment accordingly\(^\text{395}\). They are preparing a campaign to raise public awareness on honour killings of LGBTTs\(^\text{396}\). This issue became particularly important for the LGBTT community after Ahmet Yıldız was murdered by his father in the street in 2008 because he was gay.

LGBTT groups also express an intention to join the Labour Code reform process in the future. Here too, the primary demand of the *LGBTT Platform* will be to add the phrases “sexual orientation and sexual identity” to Article 5 of the Labour Code, which prohibits discrimination in employment relations. Umut Güner reminds that the government made a commitment to the EU concerning this matter and that they will follow up on it\(^\text{397}\).

Another issue that the LGBTT movement is directly concerned with pertains to the rights of sex workers. They expect to formulate specific demands to ensure human rights of sex workers, including their right to life. Social security rights for sex workers and the prevention of ill treatment towards sex workers appears to rank high on the priority demands of LGBTTs, mainly of TT groups.

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\(^\text{392}\) From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
\(^\text{393}\) From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
\(^\text{394}\) From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\(^\text{395}\) From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
\(^\text{396}\) From the interview made with Yeşim Başaran on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\(^\text{397}\) From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\(^\text{398}\) From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
Furthermore, LGBTT groups in Turkey are also working on certain amendments to be made in the Misdemeanour Law, as this law, in its current form, is used by the police to particularly victimise TTs\textsuperscript{399}. In this regard they also demand to amend the Police Duty and Authority Law in order to stop police violence towards TTs. A specific demand of LGBTTs in their regard is that the police abandon “the point system”, in which the police office is apprehending sex workers or TTs for soliciting a crime under Turkish law and are rewarded with bonus points\textsuperscript{400}.

Although none of the demands of the LGBTT movement was accepted during the legislative reforms in the 2000s, LGBTT activists stress that they are hopeful for certain developments. Öner Ceylan states that they had, in fact, already predicted that none of their demands would be fulfilled at this juncture. However, the campaigns made during legislative reform processes did not only help raise public awareness on the issue\textsuperscript{401}, but also raised the self-esteem of LGBTTs, including those in the closet, more of whom now might understand that they too can struggle for their rights\textsuperscript{402}. Ceylan adds that law suits that are won are also very effective in actual practice regardless of a change in the law. He underlines that the increase in law suits filed against the perpetrators of violence towards TTs and the objections to the tickets given by the police within the last few years have been influential. For instance, in November 2009, the murderer of a transsexual was sentenced to life imprisonment. It was a first ever judgement. Activists explain that the usual scenario in such a case have been serious reductions due to “provocation”. This single case, Ceylan stresses, might set a precedent in the implementation of the law even if the law itself does not change\textsuperscript{403}. LGBTT activists agree on the fact that a change in the implementation of the law and the rationale behind the law is sometimes even more important than a change in the law itself as the latter, without the former, often does not lead to concrete changes in practice. For instance, they explain that although the Code of Associations has been amended to be more flexible, between 2006 and 2008, *Lambdaistanbul*

\textsuperscript{399} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{400} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{401} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{402} From the interview made with İzlem Aybastı on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{403} From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
struggled with threats of and attempts to closure by the authorities.

In addition, as mentioned before, a very recent legal development for LGBTI is that the establishment of a Commission for Equality and Struggle against Discrimination is currently on the Parliament’s agenda. The commission is said to be planning to ban and penalise all sorts of discrimination, including discrimination based on “sex identity”. Newspapers report that the commission will be made up of 15 members, 12 of which will be selected by the cabinet, the National Assembly and the President while only 3 will be chosen among NGOs working against discrimination. The organisation of the commission seems to be problematic, and more NGO representatives should be members of the commission for the sake of democracy. Besides, government should refrain from ambiguous terms like “sex identity” and take into account LGBTI associations’ demands of using the phrase “sexual orientation and sexual identity” in order to refrain from misinterpretations. However, it is too soon to elaborate on this development since the Draft Law has just been announced in March 2010.

6.4. The Two Movements in Comparison

It is clear that compared to the LGBTI movement, the women’s movement had major accomplishments during the legislative reforms in the 2000s. LGBTI activists point out three factors that might have led to this situation: experience, legitimacy of the cause, and support from other power groups. LGBTI activists state that this is primarily due to the fact that the women’s movement in Turkey has a longer history, more human resources, and has a legitimate basis both in the eyes of the state and the society. Umut Güner adds that the women’s movement is a more visible movement compared to the LGBTI movement and this advantage results in their accomplishments. In addition, he suggested that particularly the Kemalist majority among the women’s organisations is both very experienced in

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406 From the interview made with Yasemin Özd on July 20, 2009, Istanbul.

407 From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
lobbying, and has legitimacy in the eyes of the Parliament with regard to law making, thus it is easier for the struggle of the women’s movement to have results.\textsuperscript{408} Lawyer Senem Doğanoğlu underlines trade unions and left wing organisations as another power group that the Parliament takes into account during legislative reforms. Their support is also seen as having significantly contributed to the success of the women’s movement in gaining rights.\textsuperscript{409} In this perspective, the fact that there are only a few Kemalist women’s groups, trade unions and left wing organisations that would carry LGBTT’s demands to the Parliament is a factor to be regretted. Ali Erol states that this applies to all NGOs failing to support the LGBTT movement in general.\textsuperscript{410} Also Küçüka Kahramanoğlu underlines that nowhere around the world has LGBTT’s, a nearly 10% minority, have gained their rights without the support of heterosexuals.\textsuperscript{411}

In addition to these internal dynamics, there are external factors that have contributed largely to the accomplishments of the women’s movement. LGBTT activists underline the importance of the EU, ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), EC (European Commission), UN (and international agreements in general) in forcing the government to take into account women’s demands. Although adjusting the legislation so as to include LGBTT’s rights are also among Turkey’s commitments to the EU, LGBTT activists underline that rising conservatism and the cultural and legal perception of “morality” stand as stronger barriers in front of the LGBTT movement when compared to the women’s movement.\textsuperscript{412}

LGBTT activists underline that the accomplishments of the women’s movement in the legislative reforms will only partially benefit LGBTT’s. Umut Güner states that the accomplishments of the women’s movement are generally for the benefit of married, heterosexual women. Thus, they would not directly relate to the lives of LGBTT’s.\textsuperscript{413} However, the achievements of the women’s movement, LGBTT activist Buse Kılıçkaya argues, might indirectly create an advantage for

\textsuperscript{408} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{409} From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{410} From the interview made with Ali Erol on August 20, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{411} From the interview made with Küçüka Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, Istanbul.
\textsuperscript{412} It is also important to note that almost all of the LGBTT activists that I have interviewed think that regardless of the political stand of the government; i.e. whether more conservative or more republican, the result would not have changed when it comes to LGBTT’s rights. Yet Umut Güner suggests that it might be more difficult for AKP to legitimise LGBTT rights to its social base.
\textsuperscript{*} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{413} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
the LGBTT movement since it will be easier for the LGBTT movement to express their demands freely.\textsuperscript{414} Another activist, Izlem Aybasti states that now that the women’s movement has begun to change both the law and the rationale of the society, at least partially, it will be easier for both the state and the society to accept the demands of the LGBTT movement.\textsuperscript{415} In addition, the rights earned by activists of the women’s movement in such fields as working life would also work to the benefit of lesbians and bisexual women\textsuperscript{416}.

It is not a coincidence that while the women’s movement puts a strong emphasis on the Civil Code, the LGBTT movement is more concerned about the Penal Code. These codes respectively reflect the most immediate interests and needs of the groups in question. It is possible to argue that since the Civil Code regulates issues like marriage and divorce, it is binding for the majority of women all over the country. Hence the women’s movement struggles harder during Civil Code reforms. On the other hand, the Penal Code is very problematic for LGBTTs since especially TTs are frequently fined and sentenced, and LGBTTs are common victims of hate crimes.

The main difference between the two movements with regard to the legislative reforms is that although the women’s movement participated in all of the four legislative reforms, the LGBTT movement only participated in the Constitution reform debated and the Penal Code reform (with the exception of Kaos GL, who was also a signatory in women’s organisations’ demands from the Labour Code). Kaos GL activists Umut Güner explains that this was partly due to the fact that they were not informed about the Civil Code and Labour Code changes\textsuperscript{417}.

Contrary to the women’s movement, LGBTT activists state that the Civil Code is a secondary issue for the LGBTT movement for three reasons. Firstly, they have not yet earned any rights\textsuperscript{418} and their primary struggle is for the right to life\textsuperscript{419}. Secondly, some LGBTT activists are questioning the institution of marriage, which is regulated by the Civil Code, and perceive marriage as a heterosexist and

\textsuperscript{414} From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{415} From the interview made with Izlem Aybasti on October 13, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{416} From the interview made with Pelin Kalkan on July 24, 2009, Eskişehir.
\textsuperscript{417} From the interview made with Umut Güner on August 21, 2009, Ankara.
\textsuperscript{418} From the interview made with Kürşad Kahramanoğlu on October 14, 2009, İstanbul.
\textsuperscript{419} From the interview made with Buse Kılıçkaya on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
oppressive institution. However, activists note that once they achieve their primary targets, they would struggle for marital rights and/or social rights that married spouses have. Thirdly, Kaos GL activist and lawyer Yasemin Öz explains that before struggling for amending individual Civil Code laws, the LGBTTT movement needs to struggle for recognition in the laws regulating equality so that every right that heterosexual individuals have would be accorded to LGBTTTs.

This difference also indicates a strategic difference between the two movements. While the women’s movement, which has been working on legislative reforms since the 1980s preferred to build their demands on the amendment of individual laws in the beginning, and then developed a demand to amend the Constitution in 2001, the LGBTTT movement primarily targeted a Constitutional change before any other legislative changes. The LGBTTT movement has made this strategic choice since LGBTTTs are not recognised by Turkish law. Thus, activists explain that if they manage to change the Constitution in favour of LGBTTTs, further demands in individual laws will be easier to accomplish.

Another important difference between the two movements is about demands for the rights of sex workers. Senem Doğanoğlu states that if the debates between feminists and LGBTTT activists regarding the issue are not resolved, the women’s movement might not support certain demands that LGBTTT groups are preparing about sexual labour. Doğanoğlu thinks that while the women’s movement might share the future demands on the right to life to sex workers and the prevention of ill treatment towards them, they might not support the LGBTTT movements’ future demands for social security rights for sex workers due to the controversy noted in previous chapters that women’s groups are against defining “prostitutes” as “sex workers”. However, these are only some LGBTTT activists’ arguments and it might be inaccurate to make any further speculations about future demands when a complete set of demands has not even been officially prepared yet.

To conclude, both the women’s movement and the LGBTTT movement have struggled for their rights in the 2000s, women’s organisations by participating in all of the above mentioned four legislative reforms and LGBTTT organisations by

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420 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on May 28, 2009, Ankara.
421 From the interview made with Yasemin Öz on July 20, 2009, İstanbul.
422 From the interview made with Öner Ceylan on October 16, 2009, İstanbul.
423 From the interview made with Senem Doğanoğlu on August, 17, 2009, Ankara.
almost exclusively participating in the Penal Code reform and the Constitution reform debates. Though women’s organisations have made important achievements, none of the demands of the LGBTT movement were fulfilled. Although LGBTT activists are hopeful that at least the court cases won will constitute examples for future judgements, the militarist structure of the state, the cultural and legal perception of “morality” and rising conservatism in Turkish society are seen as obstacles to further positive developments in the LGBTT struggle.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this study, I tried to analyse two specific movements, the women’s and the LGBT movements in Turkey in relation to each other. These are categorised as NSMs worldwide. The study began with an introduction of some NSM, feminist and LGBT(Q) theories, and the criticisms directed against each of these theories. The theoretical discussions were followed by brief summaries of the histories of the women’s and the LGBT movements in Turkey. Before taking a closer look into the relationship between these two movements and explaining how it evolved over time, I tried to make a short analysis of the active LGBT groups and associations in Turkey. Finally, I elaborated the activities of the women’s and LGBTT movements in terms of four legislative reforms in Turkey; i.e. the reform of the Penal Code, the Constitution, the Civil Code and the Labour Code as a case illustrating their relationship and comparative attitude vis-à-vis change.

I have analysed the women’s movement in Turkey in five periods, the late Ottoman period, the Early Republican era, the post 1950s, the 1970s and the post 1980s, and in five branches, Kemalist, Islamist, Kurdish, feminist and socialist women’s movements. As the names of these branches suggest, women’s groups in Turkey have always been under the impact of different ideologies, the most obvious being Kemalism. It was only in the 1980s that a feminist movement autonomous from other ideologies arose in Turkey.

I have also explained that the history of the LGBT movement is much shorter in Turkey, and although there were earlier individual attempts to get LGBTTs together, it wasn’t until the late 1980s and early 1990s that LGBTT

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424 One might question whether any movement is immune to other ideologies in the society. What is intended to be implied here is that before the 1980s, it was impossible to talk about women organising in their own right to take political action on gender related issues, irrespective of their political views in general in Turkey. It was only with the introduction of feminism in Turkey that a women’s movement, at least relatively autonomous, began to develop.
groups began to get organised. The only periodisation that we can make about the LGBTT movement in Turkey is that while the initial decades were years of getting together, sharing experiences etc., the 2000s have been years of increased visibility and political action. There were both internal and external factors leading to the increased visibility of the LGBTT movement in the 2000s. First of all, the movement has gained strength and become legitimate in the eyes of, at least, some sections of the society since it was first formed in the late 1980s. Secondly, in the 2000s, the Turkish government started to feel more pressure exerted by the EU, the UN and international human rights conventions, concerning the recognition of LGBTTs’ human rights.

It is important to conclude at this point that, as previously explained, state institutions have always tried to put obstacles in front of LGBTT groups and organisations and ban their activities since the early days of the movement. When such attitude and state violence towards LGBTTs, especially TTs, are taken into account, we have to understand that although the LGBTT movement in Turkey seems to be highly critical of the state as an oppressive institution, they have also marked state institutions as the primary targets they intend to transform for the sake of the well-being of LGBTTs all over the country.

After summarising the histories of these two movements in Turkey, I argued that the women’s movement is the social movement that the LGBTT movement is closest to in Turkey. Although the LGBTT movement is in touch with all branches of the women’s movement, they engage in joint activities and pursue common policies mostly with women’s groups with a feminist tone, as opposed to other branches of the women’s movement. It is also important to note that in addition to the women’s movement in general, and the feminist movement in particular, the LGBTT movement in Turkey is in contact with oppositional groups like the Kurdish movement, socialist groups and political parties, anti-militarist and some anarchist groups etc.

Based on the comments of the interviewees, I have suggested that although the women’s and the LGBTT movements had been in contact before the 2000s, it was the legislative reforms that brought the two movements closer than ever. Both through common membership in platforms like the Women’s Constitution Platform and Penal Code Women’s Platform, and thanks to women activists sharing the
experiences they gained during the previous reforms, the two movements carried their relationship from a personal to an institutional level in the 2000s.

While the women’s movement participated in all four legislative reforms mentioned in this thesis; i.e. the reforms of the Penal Code, the Constitution, the Civil Code and the Labour Code, the LGBTT movement was active only in the Penal Code reform between 2002 and 2005, and in the Constitution reform debates in 2007-2008. In addition, whereas the women’s movement in Turkey has been very influential on legislative reforms from the late 1990s onwards, none of the legal demands of the LGBTT movement have yet been fulfilled.

In addition to being a major factor in the improvement of the relationship between the women’s and the LGBTT movements in Turkey, legislative reforms are also relevant to this thesis to take a closer look at available NSM theories taking into account the Turkish case.

In this Conclusion, I will argue that considering the LGBTT movement in Turkey, NSM theories cannot explain the attitude and groups’ strategies vis-à-vis the state. The popular argument in NSM theories that NSM activists do not struggle for social, economic and political rights is not supported by the case in Turkey. Another issue is with respect to NSM theories’ analyses of the participants of NSMs. NSM theorists usually make either class based generalisations about NSM participants, or argue that common ideological concerns bring people together in NSMs. The participants of the LGBTT movement in Turkey do not fully support such arguments either. However, investigating the LGBTT movement in Turkey also provides support for NSM theories’ analyses of the organisational structure and certain other features of NSMs as different from working class movements.

It might be useful to start to elaborate on the power of available NSM theories by taking a look at the participants of LGBTT associations, organisations and groups in Turkey and by trying to understand what brought these people together.

The reason why I did not take into account the women’s movement in general in this analysis is its umbrella structure. For instance the dominant branch of the women’s movement, i.e. the Kemalist women’s movement, has a century long history in Turkey. Yet it has gone through significant changes due to the emergence of the rest of the branches. In addition, as previously noted, the women’s movement in Turkey went through a major transformation after the 1980s, with the introduction of the feminist movement relatively autonomous from other ideologies. Hence only a more detailed analysis of each branch of the women’s movement might lead us to a conclusion about the strengths and weaknesses of NSM theories taking into account various women’s movements in Turkey. Yet it would extend the scope of this thesis to make such a conclusion.
together under a social movement. I have explained in the Theoretical Discussions that there are basically two lines of thought about the participants of NSMs: the first one explains NSM affiliation with common social and ideological concerns; the second one explains NSM affiliation with class.

Buechler explains that NSM theories point out collective identity and logic of action based on politics and ideology (rather than class as in the case of the old social movements) brought together NSM activists (Buechler, 1995: 442). Neglecting the class positions of LGBTT activists in Turkey for a moment, we might argue that the factor that brought LGBTTs together under associations and organisations is, collective identity based on sexual orientation and sexual identity. Besides, as mentioned by some LGBTT activists, a considerable proportion of the members and supporters of LGBTT associations and organisations are heterosexual feminist women. These may be all be interpreted as pointing out the logic of action based on politics and ideology (rather than class) as the source of affiliation with LGBTT groups and associations.

However, this observation brings us to a further debate in NSM theories: the class positions of NSM activists. As mentioned in previous chapters, activists from *Kaos GL, Lambdaistanbul* and *MorEl* have stated that a significant proportion of their members are either middle class individuals or university students. This seems to support the argument that the participants of NSMs are either members of the new middle class, the old middle class, or people outside the labour market—namely, unemployed workers, students, housewives, retired persons (Offe, 1999: 345). Yet almost all TT activists are sex workers and not middle class. Besides *İstanbul Bearclub* member Ahmet Kaya emphasised in contrast to most LGBTT associations and groups, many of their members are migrant/lower class individuals residing in the environs of cities. Thus, as LGBTT activists noted several times during the interviews, it is not very simple to make class based generalisations about the participants of the LGBTT movement in Turkey, partly due to the fact that LGBTT identity cuts across all classes and ideologies.

The Turkish case thus exemplifies that neither line of NSM theories, i.e. neither the ones like Offe’s that explain NSM affiliation by class (the new middle class) nor the ones that explain NSM affiliation with common social and ideological concerns as suggested by Buechler, really explain the Turkish case.
Although there are indicators that both lines of theories, to a certain extent, might apply to empirical data, whether it is social concerns/ideology or class that made LGBTT activists participate in their groups is rather ambiguous.

It is obvious that in order to provide a comprehensive explanation about the participants of the LGBTT movement and NSMs in Turkey, and about activists’ motives of participation, one needs to conduct comprehensive studies on socio-economic background characteristics such as income levels, sex, age etc., of participants as well as to examine thoroughly their personal histories. Such studies might also be a more accurate way to comment on the explanatory power of available NSM theories in explaining NSM participants.

Secondly, as already mentioned in the Theoretical Discussions, Mouffe implies that activists of the NSMs were constructed as subjects in a democratic tradition brought about by the working class struggle. Available democratic discourses, according to Mouffe, were among the factors that brought NSM activists together. This is also valid for the Turkish case, especially in the earlier days of the movement. I have explained elsewhere that most of the initiators of the LGBTT movement in Turkey back in the 1970 were members of one-or-another left wing political party. Those that came together in the late 1980s and early 1990s were of trade union and working class origins.426 Yet, Mouffe’s analysis does not recognise that in addition to the existence of democratic discourses centring around the rights of working classes as opening a gate for further democratic struggles, it was also the dominance of these democratic discourses over “other” identities that brought together NSM activists as a part reaction against this dominance. Arguably, the availability of democratic discourses had a double impact on the formation of the LGBTT movement in Turkey: the existence of democratic discourses promoting the rights of working classes encouraged other groups to get organised, and the assimilative attitude of those discourses towards “other” identities triggered both the women’s and the LGBTT movements to organise in their own right in Turkey.

It might also be worthwhile to take a look at the debate about whether NSMs present a break from the “old” working class movements or whether there is

426 In fact, this partially applies to the feminist movement as well. We know that many feminists and LGBTTs, who began to organise in their own right in late 1980s were coming from the socialist tradition of the 1970s’ Turkey.
in fact continuity between the “old” and the “new” social movements. One of the basic premises of the theorists who argue that NSMs are “new” is that “whereas prior social movements fought to secure political and economic rights from the state and other institutional actors, new social movements target their activities away from the state (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 460)””. This, I argue, is a premise that holds very little validity for the LGBTT movement in Turkey. Just like the working class movement, the LGBTT movement too has demands for their political and economic rights from the state, some of which are recognition by law, elimination of discriminatory practices in all areas of life including work life, social rights of sex workers, and employment opportunities for TTs etc. Contrary to some arguments, these are not emphases put on simply quality of life and life-style concerns (Pichardo, 1997: 414), but democratic demands from the state just like previous and current working class movements.

The basic reason why NSM theorists could not recognise this fact may be their observation that NSMs try to “reconstitute a civil society that is no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control and intervention (Offe, 1999: 338)””. Yet a movement, like the LGBTT movement in Turkey, might simultaneously demand less and less state intervention in everyday life and struggle to gain equal democratic rights with the rest of the society, i.e. the heterosexual society, as a political strategy. Another reason why early NSM theorists might have made this suggestion might be related to the fact that initial NSMs like the peace movement in the West in the 1960s did not have demands for democratic rights from the state. Yet many NSMs all around the world evolved over time necessitating an update of the initial observations and early attempts of this theoretical framework.

The basic feature of NSMs that can be explained by available NSM theories is their organisational structure. I have explained that the common point between almost all LGBTT groups in Turkey is their promotion of participation and rejection of all sorts of hierarchy. This is in fact what makes NSMs quite different from “old” social movements. Some common elements of NSMs as listed by various authors, i.e. advocating direct democracy, self-help groups and consciousness raising groups, open, non- hierarchical, segmented and decentralised organisational structures, cooperative styles of social organisation, an anti-bureaucratic posture, nonviolence and civil disobedience (Pichardo, 1997: 414-416;
Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994: 8) are all important elements of the LGBTT associations and organisations in Turkey. While working class organisations like trade unions, political parties etc. have strict hierarchical organisations and adopt representative democracy in their internal decision making processes, LGBTT groups as well as feminist groups in Turkey prefer a de-centralised mode of organisation in which decisions are taken through debates, and titles like “president”, “vice president” etc. only exist in order to abide by the regulations of the state. In practice, decisions are taken by activists together and everyone engages in the task that he/she can. Like feminist groups, LGBTT groups in Turkey too form self-help groups and consciousness raising groups. In fact the initial activities of LGBTT activists, like feminist activists, were to get together in cafes or houses to discuss their problems and share their experiences. LGBTT help lines, Lambdaistanbul’s family group (which is about to function all over Turkey), panels and discussions made by LGBTT associations all point out to this characteristic of the movement.

NSM theorists also point out the aims, tactics and strategies of NSMs as distinctive and different from the “old” social movements (D’Anieri, Ernst & Kier, 1990: 447), which is also verified by the Turkish case. Although the LGBTT movement in Turkey uses conventional methods like lobbying, marches, signature campaigns etc. while struggling for their democratic rights, unconventional methods like using flamboyant costumes, decorations, and accessories during street demonstrations and press conferences are equally common. In fact this applies to the feminist movement in Turkey too. The demonstration against Pippa Bacca’s murder is a good example of the unconventional methods used by the NSMs in Turkey.

Another observation of NSM theorists was the strong emphasis NSMs put on knowledge, information and questioning the meaning of what is being done (Pichardo, 1997: 415). As explained in the Theoretical Discussions, both traditional

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427 Italian artist known as Pippa Bacca had left Europe with a friend to protest war. Wearing wedding dresses, they would hitchhike to arrive in Tel Aviv. Italian artist Pippa Bacca was raped and murdered around Gebze, Turkey.

428 In 2009, some feminists and Kaos GL activists gathered in the centre of Ankara, dressed in white, their faces painted white, and started hitchhiking to protest Pippa Bacca’s rape and murder.
LGBT theories and Queer Theory, which are highly affected by postmodernism, put a strong emphasis on symbols, signs, information and knowledge. This feature of the LGBTT movement in Turkey is highly evident. First of all, LGBTT activists themselves have underlined the emphasis they put on knowledge and information etc. Besides, as I have explained before, the most well-known LGBTT association in Turkey, *Kaos GL*, began to publish its same named journal with the aim of constituting alternative media. It has been published for more than a decade with this aim. Barış Sulu told me that the most important priority for *Kaos GL* was to continue publishing the journal as a source of alternative media in Turkey. In addition, LGBTT groups and associations also try to enter into mainstream media whenever they can and change the dominant discourse used about LGBTTxs; i.e. the discourse that either fans the flames of hatred towards LGBTTxs or shows them as objects of ridicule.

In short, in this study I have tried to focus on the LGBTT movement in Turkey both to shed more light in this seldom examined area in academia, and to seek the strengths and weaknesses of NSM theories in the light of an NSM in Turkey. I have argued that certain features of NSMs, such having decentralised organisational structures, using unconventional tactics and strategies, the constant questioning of knowledge etc., that theorists point out as distinct features that make NSMs different from the working class movement are shared by the LGBTT movement in Turkey. However, I have argued that the LGBTT movement in Turkey does not support NSM theorists’ claims about why participants affiliate with NSMs. Last but not least, I pointed out that the LGBTT movement’s struggle for democratic rights vis-à-vis the state, which indicates continuity between the allegedly “old” working class movements and NSMs is the basic feature that cannot be explained by available NSM theories.

One might at this point ask whether the Turkish case may only be a “deviation”. I have to underline that although it extends the scope of this thesis, it is a fact that many LGBTT groups *all around the world* struggle for democratic rights. The traditions they inherited, as in the case of Turkey, from the working class movements and their attitude about social, economic and political rights are considerably closer to those of earlier social movements.

429 From the interview made with Barış Sulu on July 21, 2009, Ankara.
Most NSM theorists’ reference to the working class movement as an “old” social movement also needs to be re-examined. The working class movement has by no means come to an end with what is called “the post-industrial era”. Although the left in the world has gone through a transformation after the collapse of the USSR, neoliberal policies all around the world are raising huge oppositions from working classes, students, peasants, indigenous groups, environmentalists and others. Oppositional groups, like many women’s and LGBTT groups in Turkey, have not yet lost their anti-capitalist tones. In fact the social movements of the pre-1970s era are now only stronger from in some aspects, thanks to NSMs’ emphasis on the previously ignored sorts of exploitation, oppression and violence.

It would only be appropriate to end this thesis with the hope that the women’s and the LGBTT movements, together with all forms of social opposition in this country and all around the world will get even stronger in the years to come. As neoliberal policies continue to impoverish all disadvantaged groups like working classes, lower classes, rural people, women, children, the coloured, LGBTTs, ethnic minorities, the elderly, the handicapped, and perhaps above all, as they continue to destroy nature, the belief, often emphasised by my interviewees, that “another world is possible” remains also as my final statement.
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