

“SOFT POWER” CONCEPT IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT:  
A CASE STUDY

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **“SOFT POWER” CONCEPT IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY**

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This thesis examines the applicability of the concept of soft power in the Chinese context. After a brief discussion of the concept of “soft power”, which was coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in 1990, and also similar concepts developed in western academia, the Chinese understanding of soft power is investigated with reference to statements made by Chinese policy-makers and academics, Chinese soft power applications in Africa and the use of the Confucius Institutes as soft power tools. It is argued that although China pursues non-coercive policies to augment its power in the international arena, this power is not solely attained by the methods of soft power as suggested by Nye. Although the concept of “sticky power”, coined by Walter Russell Mead, and/or that of “smart power”, introduced by Nye and Richard Armitage, can be beneficial in understanding the Chinese experience, the Chinese goal-oriented and empiric approach to attaining power differs in essence from the western understanding both in theory and practice.

Keywords : China, Power, Soft Power, Africa, Confucius Institutes

## ÖZ

### ÇİN HALK CUMHURİYETİ (ÇHC) BAĞLAMINDA “YUMUŞAK GÜÇ” KONSEPTİ: BİR VAKA ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışmada, Çin'in güç algılamaları kapsamında yumuşak güç konseptinin uygulanabilirliği araştırılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Batı akademisyenleri tarafından geliştirilen benzer diğer konseptlerle birlikte, Joseph S. Nye Jr. tarafından 1990 yılında isimlendirilen Batı merkezli 'yumuşak güç' kavramının tartışılmasını müteakip, Çin'deki yumuşak güç anlayışı; Çinli siyasilerin ve akademisyenlerin beyanları ile Çin'in Afrika'da yürüttüğü yumuşak güç uygulamaları ve 2004 yılından bu yana Çin kültürünü ve dilini yaymak için kurulan Konfüçyus Enstitüleri referans alınarak incelenmektedir. Çin, uluslararası alanda gücünü artırmak maksadıyla “zor kullanmaya” dayanmayan politikalar uygulamakta olmasına rağmen, Çin'in gücü, sadece Nye'in ileri sürdüğü yumuşak güç yöntemlerine dayanmamaktadır. Çin'in yumuşak güç algılaması; Walter Russel Mead'in 'Yapışkan Güç' ve/veya Nye ile Armitage'in 'akıllı güç' adı altında ileri sürdüğü kavramlardan faydalanılarak açıklanabilir. Ancak Çin'in güce erişmek için uyguladığı, 'hedefe odaklı' ve 'ampirik' yaklaşımları, teori ve uygulama düzeyinde, Çin'i Batı algılamalarından ayırmaktadır.

To the people who dedicated their lives for the Republic of Turkey

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Power has been part of international relations studies since the earliest writings by Thucydides and Machiavelli, and remains perhaps one of the most important and least understood concepts in International Relations.<sup>1</sup> The same reality is valid for the emerging global power, China, too. China's power perception will directly identify the picture of the coming decades in international relations. The long term intention of China and likely methods of becoming a global player are challenging the predictions of scholars for the next century. The factors that shape pursued policies and ultimate goals of China can be counted in the frame of various headlines such as the size of its population, its economy, increasing natural resource demand for its huge industry and its need to market cheap Chinese goods.

The sense of own possessed power and power of the adversaries, in other words power politics, will be deterministic in identifying the strategies to obtain the defined ultimate goals. But power politics is challenged after the World Wars and Cold War due to experienced brutal consequences and unrecoverable costs. Hence more pacifist approaches were developed to realize the interests. The soft power conception is one crucial branch of these approaches. Western soft power conception is designed to meet the demands of western values that are currently dominant in global interactions. In order to understand and even to predict the activities and policies of such an important global actor in international relations, it ought to be clarified what China perceives from the soft power conception. The questions to be answered will be "how China conceives and conceptualizes soft power", as part of a comprehensive conception of power, and "what parameters may be used to evaluate China in the comparisons with the other actors".

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<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, David A., "Power and International Relations" in *Handbook of International Relations*, W. Carlsnaes, B. A. Simmons and T. Risse-Kappen (eds.), London, SAGE Publications, 2005, pp. 177-179.

As a response to the requirements of “glocal” environment, which can be named as eventually shrinking global environment, the scholars of the West questioned the concept of power and introduced various approaches that guided the policy makers, as well as domestic and international public. In this context, congeneric conceptions of soft power came out before Nye claimed his theory though; the conception of “soft power” and its practices in international relations appeared to be popular after 1990s. It can be claimed that soft power applications are cost effective, peaceful, long lasting, and tolerable by the publics. The concept is built upon attraction rather than coercion or inducement. But it is clear that the nature of the concept is controversial. The purpose of the concept may be claimed in two different axis of creating a more liberating and peaceful globe or pursuing a tolerable course to achieve the “realist” interests. This study will also search if Chinese perception of soft power is based on interests or to pursue an idealistic course of wielding power.

China may be claimed of imitating the course of western powers to be a global player. China’s Communist Party Chief Hu Yaobang’s statement in 1985 apparently pinpoints China’s desire to be a medium developed country by 2021 and a superpower in 2049 that is the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Communist rule in China.<sup>2</sup> China’s smart strategy of promoting its status to be a super power seems to be built upon peace, cooperation and integration in international community that reminds the concept of soft power perception to reach the 2049 agenda of China. This course reminds the soft power conception of Nye. In this frame, this study will clarify whether Chinese scholars and policymakers have the same theoretical understanding as western scholars do have or they develop a *sui generis* concept of soft power? If China employs policies in the form of soft power, is it a consciously-built policy or a mere imitation of the West to be a great power? To what extent could China be a “power” by presenting herself a soft power in the global power struggle?

The first chapter will cover the western perception of soft power to create a base line to search China’s motivation of soft power and to facilitate comparisons of western and Chinese soft power perceptions. The initial step will be to briefly focus

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<sup>2</sup> The Sydney Morning Herald, “China: A Superpower by 2049”, August 13, 1985, p.8, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1301&dat=19850813&id=G7IRAAAIBAJ&sjid=gOgDAAAIBAJ&pg=5159,8621071>, accessed on November 15, 2009.

on the concept of power in order to understand soft power concept, but it will not be a detailed examination of 'power' conception since it is a comprehensive field that deserves a separate study, which is outside the limits of this study. Following step will be to examine the origins of the concept of soft power. A leading American scholar, Joseph S. Nye's concept of soft power will be assumed as the basis of western approach. On the other hand similar proposals can be seen in the studies of various scholars under different titles and resemblances. These conceptions and proposals of western scholars will be compared and contrasted in this chapter to obtain the common western perception of soft power. By that way, the theoretical constant to assess Chinese perception will be constructed. Then the method will be to evaluate the unknown dilemma – that is the Chinese soft power perception, by applying the known and common theories of the western academics.

The second chapter will focus on the Chinese context of soft power. The initial step will essentially be to identify the historical background and development of soft power understanding. Then, Chinese practices will be discussed to search the traces of soft power conception. Finally China's capabilities in terms of sources and means of soft power will be assessed. The outcomes of the policies and claimed soft power tools will be examined to identify to what extent Chinese soft power is realistic. Nye's methodology will be used as a reference point to assess the Chinese conception of soft power and as a mean to narrow the debate on this issue. Image building and nation branding efforts of China will be discussed together with soft power. China has concerns over not only its international image but also image with its own society. China's interest seems to have a peaceful environment to sustain the desired growth to strengthen both its international and domestic images. As a result, the efforts of building soft power address both inward and outward societies. Hence China's soft power will not be examined not only in the perception of international public, but also by taking domestic public into consideration. Outward image may be attributed to obtain credibility and reliability in international system. But domestic concerns on the legitimacy of the regime and inner stability are crucial for China's image in the international arena. Chinese leaders usually emphasized peace, harmony and development to present China's path to satisfy both international actors and domestic public. From this perspective, China's

strategies such as peaceful development and harmonious society will be discussed if it suits the soft power perception or not.

In the following two chapters, the Chinese soft power applications will be discussed by focusing on two cases. In the third chapter, China - Africa relations and Chinese African policy will be examined to identify the soft power practices of China. Africa exhibits a convenient ground for China to apply her soft power capacity. Africa has underdeveloped or developing countries with energy resources and raw materials while offering a market for cheap Chinese products. Moreover political support to China can be ensured by the voting power of African countries in international organizations against western accusations to China. In turn, China's veto power in the UN Security Council provides shields for authoritarian African governments. China's unconditional economic and political support presents opportunities to African countries. These dynamics urge China to be active in African arena. China's overall African policy is blended with economic aids, political partnership, cooperation in peace keeping operations and cultural interactions that recall soft power endeavour of China. Consequently, the third chapter will discuss to what extent China's African policy fits soft power application in western style and whether it is an interest-related mutual cooperation that is based on inducements or integrative, long term partnership that involves the voluntary participation of both parties recalling the conception of soft power.

The fourth chapter will cover the Confucius Institutes of China as a soft power mean. If the language teaching and cultural expansion activities of the big powers are taken into consideration, the activities of cultural institutions are crucial to shape a targeted society. It may be a point of discussion if language teaching and cultural diffusion can be utilized to gain the hearts and minds of the masses. It may be disputable if language learning and favouring a foreign actor can be correlated. But the dominance of a foreign culture and expanded use of a foreign language offer opportunities to expand business and trade. Confucius Institutes will be examined to find out to what extent cultural diffusion and language teaching efforts could be benefitted to influence minds and hearts of the masses, and may be benefited in shaping the society. The structure and messages of various Confucius Institutes will be compared whilst identifying if China pursues a coordinated policy and delivering similar messages on the way to promote the Chinese goals. Additionally the

activities of other known cultural organizations of the West will be discussed in order to compare and contrast with the Chinese activities.

### **1.1 The Concept of Soft Power in Western Context:**

Power is an essentially contested concept with different interpretations.<sup>3</sup> Scholars claimed various definitions to clarify the context of power<sup>4</sup> to justify their priorities and theoretical choices. Hence, the perception of power determined preferences of politics and security; methods of governance and practices of actors to survive or dominate in international environment. If some of the scholars' definitions are examined; power is "national interests" for Edward H. Carr<sup>5</sup>; "the interests of the essential actor – that is state" and "the control of man over man" for Morgenthau<sup>6</sup>; "specific assets or material forces of a state" and "the outcomes of the interactions between states" for Mearsheimer<sup>7</sup>; "control and influence" for Dahl<sup>8</sup>; one of the "currencies of politics", "mechanisms of acceleration"<sup>9</sup> and "obedience through habits and threats"<sup>10</sup> for Karl M. Deutsch; "potential for change" for Kenneth Boulding.<sup>11</sup> Nye depicts power in a linear line beginning from command power, made up of coercion and inducement to co-opt power that is based upon agenda setting and attraction.<sup>12</sup> The poles of this linear line are identified as "materially based, measurable and coercive" hard power and "value laden, immeasurable, and intangible" soft power. Berenskoetter underlines the existence of many other

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<sup>3</sup> Berenskoetter, Felix, "Thinking about Power" in *Power in World Politics*, Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (eds.), New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Literally power is defined as "the ability or capacity to produce an effect for the possession of control, authority or influence over others". <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/power>, accessed on September 20, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Burchill, Scott, "Realism and Neorealism" in *Theories of International Relations*, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True (eds.), 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 75.

<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1974, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Mearsheimer, John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, Norton, 2001, p. 57.

<sup>8</sup> Dahl, Robert A., "The Concept of Power", *Behavioural Science*, 2, 1957, pp. 202-203.

<sup>9</sup> Deutsch, Karl W., *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control*, New York, Collier-Macmillan, 1963, p. 124.

<sup>10</sup> Deutsch, Karl W., "On the Concepts of Politics and Power", *Journal of International Affairs*, 21, 1967, p. 232.

<sup>11</sup> Boulding, Kenneth, *Three Faces of Power*, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1989, p. 15-17.

<sup>12</sup> Nye, Jr., Joseph S., *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 8.

“forgotten voices” reminding similar approaches to power as the aforementioned scholars did.<sup>13</sup>

Power has long been considered in the domain of realism, if aforementioned determinations are concerned. Realist way of power perception can be differentiated from the other theoretical currencies by its emphasis to coercion, compulsion and ruthless application of power to realize the interests of the state actor. For instance Weber’s concept of “authority, dominance, rule or governance” inspired leading realist thinkers such as Robert Dahl, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aaron and Michael Mann to locate power application methods in the frame of coercion and [compulsion].<sup>14</sup> Among them, Dahl prioritizes compulsion in his definition of power: “to get what [the state] wants”<sup>15</sup> that “[the other state] would not otherwise have done”.<sup>16</sup> Steans and Pettiford underline a similar perception on the essence of “power” as “the ability to change [the] behaviour [of states] and dominate in international realm, either regional or global”.<sup>17</sup> In the realist approach, then, power is to be able to force the other actors to act in line with own interests.

The question may be how the power may be measured or identified to be perceived as powerful. Common method can be named as benefiting from the measurable, tangible power indicators such as the economic capacity or military strength in numbers.<sup>18</sup> Indexes may be created to determine the parameters and compare these parameters among the power holders. Assessments will be based upon the quantitative figures of parameters to evaluate the possession of power. The use or even the threat to use the power indicators will force the state actors to change the pursued policies and consent with the interests of the power holder.

It may be conceived crucial to identify how the nature of the power will be determined and presented in realist thinking. The capabilities and characteristics of

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<sup>13</sup> Berenssköetter, “Thinking about Power”, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Berenssköetter, “Thinking about Power”, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, p. 226

<sup>16</sup> Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, p. 158.

<sup>17</sup> Steans, Jill and Pettiford, Lloyd, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, Malaysia, Pearson Education, 2001, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> The deductions of Mearsheimer, Morgenthau and Deutsch are in parallel to identify the context of power since all of them focus on material capabilities. See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 57; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 127; Deutsch, *Politics and Government*, p. 85.



targeted state and competing powers may be determinants to some extent in accordance with vulnerability and superiority correlation. In other words, it would be preferred to be superior benefiting from the vulnerable aspect of the counter part. By that way, targeted state will be coerced to act in consent with the desire of the power holder. The vulnerability may be in different forms such as military, economic, administrative. These forms will sophisticate and also shape the nature of power applications. For instance military threats to interests will require the powerholder to build a strong military capability and also capacity to project it to remote regions of the globe if needed. A state actor's vulnerability to economic sanctions will require measures to manipulate the financial markets. Diplomatic capacity will complement the military and economic capabilities to urge the third parties to have the targeted audience to accept the demands. Vulnerabilities of value-system and identity debate in the society present opportunities to bear measures of manipulation to discredit the targeted state. Media's role becomes prominent in articulating prejudices to shape the societies. Instant delivery of messages in media will expand the power's efficiency because globalization process eased the media's penetration to the societies. Consequently power implementation methods have been challenged. Tangible power indicators, such as quantities in military equipment or facts and figures of economy are not the sole sources of power. Hence opinion, unity and perception of the society can be counted as important as actual numerable strength.

Another question is to what extent the superiority of the powerful may be sustained. The weak counterpart or competing powers will balance the power of the dominant state. If the number and efficiency of perceived power indicators diminish, the deterrence and plausibility will perish. Hence the power holder should not only lean on the measurable power indicators, but supplement power by persuasive factors. By that way, the power will be consistent and long lasting. Emotions, mainly affirmative perception of power, of the targeted state ought to be expected significant and considerable, even to realize the interests in realist thinking. Especially the historical developments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such as the Cold War environment, forced the realist scholars to soften the ruthless power generating methods preached by realism and to prefer or take into account more "acceptable" methods to achieve the interests of the state. Wars are expensive and difficult to

justify. The reasoning of hard power application ought to be acceptable by international and domestic public not to lose the credibility.

From this perspective, Weber's definition of power and conception contributes to the debate on the developing concept of power. He defines power as "the opportunity to have one's will within a social relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on" and indicates three forms of power as "power over", "power to" and "power with". "Power over" refers to domination that has coercive nature. "Power to" indicates the definition of power in general. "Power with" refers to a certain form of having things done in collaborative endeavours. Social relationship that requires a shared value system forms a "power with" understanding rather than "power to" or "power over" perception. Distinction of power "with", rather than "to" and "over", can be reasoned by the evolving nature of the international relations. International relations is enriched with newly emerging actors such as civilian society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and opinion groups. These formations can not efficiently be influenced by military strength. Coercive measures can agitate the public opinion and lead to loss of credibility, especially in democratic societies. Hence it is required new dimensions of power exercises other than pure military and economic coercive measures. It is a fact that the environment of the international arena brought challenging power wielding methods, prioritizing peaceful and cooperative courses of power applications.<sup>19</sup>

Today, even realists have to acknowledge the importance of non-coercive methods to attain power for achieving the set of goals in international arena. For instance Mearsheimer, as a realist, confesses the fact that it is becoming more and more difficult to pursue security by relying exclusively on brute force or classic military deterrence.<sup>20</sup> Because military power has increasingly become ineffective and power need not to be conceptualized in terms of zero-sum game. In another words, the loss of any advantage is not always the gain of any other actor. On the contrary, as Hannah Arendt claims, power is creative, productive and emerges from togetherness.<sup>21</sup> Then power might be viewed in "positive terms as the capacity to

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<sup>19</sup> Berenskoetter, "Power in World Politics", p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 29-40.

<sup>21</sup> Arendt Hannah, *On Violence*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970, pp. 51-53.

act collectively to realize a common good” as Stean and Pettifor mentioned.<sup>22</sup> Morgenthau’s “policy of prestige”<sup>23</sup> is significant in challenging the realist thought, even though he is known as a harsh realist and he credits measurable material power. He, however also, attributes prestige to long running policies. Performance and the quality of the total undertakings define to what extent the state is credible. Hans Morgenthau points out that “a subtle diplomacy aiming not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men” is one of the most powerful “instruments for changing the power relation between nations.”<sup>24</sup> Realist thinkers’ focus shifted from coercive nature of power wielding to the sense of collectivity and cooperation of liberal currency that lets power to be collaborative and integrative where trust, cooperation and non-coercive forms of power exist. The reasons might be global challenge in politics, experiences emanating from wars and conflicts, structural developments that pave the way of realizing interests by means of cooperation rather than competition.

The classification power by Kenneth Boulding, who can be counted as an idealist type economist-sociologist due to his proposal of a world government, is commonly accepted to describe a typology of power as “the stick, the carrot, and the hug” that resembles Joseph. S. Nye’s concept of soft power as will be explained in this chapter. The “stick” matches coercive power that is based on superior strength by applying threat or use of the power, which fits the realist thought. The “carrot” is more gentle form of power such as rewards, bribes or exchanges. Finally “hug” is the “integrative” and “collaborative attraction” embraced by liberals. It is the co-optive power that enables to shape peacefully rather than change forcefully. Boulding typifies integrative power by teamwork, loyalty, legitimacy, the will to cooperate and the use of persuasion where “integrative power is both the most difficult to define and yet potentially the most significant form of power”<sup>25</sup>.

The linear divisions of power may be thought lying between positions of destructive and constructive power. Destructive power may be characterized as “unidirectional”, “competitive” and requires a “zero-sum” approach, which can be

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<sup>22</sup> Steans and Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>23</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>24</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 74.

<sup>25</sup> Boulding, Kenneth, *Three Faces of Power*, p. 10.

claimed as the loss of one party is the gain of the other party. The powerful imposes what the weak is required to do. It has the authority and initiative on the weak. On the other hand powerful must check the rivalling powers to challenge the relations of power wielders and its dependents. Apart from destructive power, constructive power is “bi-directional” and “cooperative”. Mutual gains and rewards will encourage the actors to share power and expand each other’s power. It has outcomes for self, other and the environment. This perception suits power “with” and “to” the partners, rather than “against/over” the others. It is flexible and responsive to the demands of the others and to the environment.<sup>26</sup>

Afore mentioned discussions indicate that there is a clear distinction between realist and liberal poles of power perception, especially in terms of the sources and means of power. The realist approach prioritizes interest oriented power figures, which can be presented by significant facts and figures of capabilities. Power is both an aim and mean to dominate the realm and realize the interest. Liberal thought, on the other hand, promotes a cooperative tendency disregarding the strength of the counter part basing the relationship on mutual gains. The liberal perception is built upon a value laden evaluation of power conception. The word “powerful” may be attributed not to the one that holds a stronger army, but the other issues such as agenda setting capability in international arena. Liberal triumph of the post-Cold War era weights heavily the non-coercive means of power other than military, but new soft-threats<sup>27</sup> and interventions are contradictions. The general tendency of power applications ought to be taken into consideration that peace time cooperative activities of the both state and non-state actors shape the political environment in international arena. If both realist and liberal approaches and their derivatives are analyzed, the transition of methods in identifying and applying power is reality, but it is a fact that both destructive and cooperative power, in other words power “to, with, over” classification of the actors ought to be preserved to both “survive” and also expand “mutual gains”. This analysis may lead the debate to post modernist perception.

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<sup>26</sup> Coleman, Peter T., “Positive Power: Mapping the Dimensions of Constructive Power Relations”, *International Centre for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution*, Teachers’ College, Columbia University, pp. 2-11, [http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/document/9109\\_PositivePower.pdf](http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/document/9109_PositivePower.pdf), accessed on January 12, 2009.

<sup>27</sup> I used soft threat for the emerging threats to the welfare and stability of individual and international societies such as unlawful immigration, environmental degradation, organized crime, corruption, terrorism etc.

Peter Digeser compares and contrasts the known power perceptions with the leading scholar of post modernism, Michel Foucault. He presents the power conception of Dahl, which was “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” as the first face of power. But he puts forward the second face of power with the conception of Bachrach and Baratz that “power is not solely a matter of getting B to do something that she does not want to do, but can also be a matter of preventing B from doing what she wants to do”. Finally he presents the perception of Luke as the third face of power as “an agent B may willingly do something that agent A wants B to do” reminding the volunteer participation of actor to the desires of powerful. He introduces Foucault’s power explanation as the fourth face of power.<sup>28</sup>

If the Foucault’s vision of power is examined, flexible judgment of human values, beliefs, actions, cultural meanings and contexts can clearly be observed as the fundamentals. The “multiplicity of force relations” requires being flexible to prevent “misunderstandings” because power has its own sphere and organization. If the nature of power is examined, the imposed knowledge is injected upon people to perceive powerful. Then it is the “power” that produces knowledge that has people to know who the powerful is. In another words, individuals or societies perceives powerful in a way they are directed. Interpretations play a prominent role to define the truth in accordance with dominants’ knowledge. Foucault’s approach takes the “given context” by the power that one cannot escape. Then, when a discussion on the nature of power occurs, the focus ought to be on who has the power and how the power is exercised. Moreover to the debate on the nature of power, the process per se is power for Foucault. Because it is the wide range of complex processes that builds the power perceptions. If any conception of power is taken into consideration, all of the conceptions are reasonable in the frame of post modernist approach since they represent only one approach in power politics, but it can not be claimed that it is the only and absolute gate. Because, there will be no overall pattern or end-point to describe the dynamics of politics. Moreover subjects of the

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<sup>28</sup> Digeser, Peter, “The Fourth Face of Power”, *Journal of Politics*, 54/4, 1992, pp. 977-982.

power are social constructions. These views can be matched with constructivist debate of power as will be discussed below.<sup>29</sup>

Constructivists contribute a further dimension to the perception of power in parallel to the post-modernist view. Post modernists claim that the known is constructed from a particular point of view that is taught. The constructivists go further in the debate and underline that “ideas always matter”<sup>30</sup> in defining the meaning of power. Wendt states that “the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of ideas that make them up”.<sup>31</sup> Then the ‘idea’s make sense to identify how “power” is perceived where culture may be put in the context of “Idea”. Foucault’s power understanding as “process is power by itself” can be contrasted by Wendt’s correlation of power and idea. If idea leads to power and interest, then, idea can be perceived as a process that builds power. Agenda setting may be examined to test this proposal. Agenda setting is a process of injecting and shaping the ideas to obtain desired outcomes by determining in what content to focus on and how it will be debated. The prevailing prejudice of the actors on the topics can be channelled to the desired courses to achieve advantages or limit the opponents’ impartial choices. If the focus is to solve a dispute; ideas such as identifying the nature of the dispute, on what ground the dispute will be discussed, what method will be preferred, what would be the just solution of dispute, causal relations leading to the dispute will be factors shaping the agenda. The actor that clarifies this process will have the credibility or it will be the one that is credible that defines this process. Ultimately the one that is determining the course of the dispute has the power. It is the idea of parties who has agenda setting power. Hence the structure of the current system will be challenged or maintained for the advantage of one side.

In the context of soft power, cultural affairs and public diplomacy may be considered as tools of building “ideas” in accordance with constructivist

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<sup>29</sup> Foucault, Michel, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality 1*, London, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 92-95.

<sup>30</sup> Jackson, Robert, [http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson\\_chap06.pdf](http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf) , accessed on October 07, 2008.

<sup>31</sup> Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 195.

understanding. Soft power contributes producing knowledge and emanating ideas in the minds of individuals and societies. The idea of a commonly dreamed globe, which is non-resistible in the minds, is itself a power, although the context of the dream varies in the minds. Common goods of international society and universal values may be presented as the ultimate, innocent and unquestionable motivation of the international actors. For instance, ideas, such as toleration and welcoming the “different” will not be difficult to reach consensus among the actors of international system, because either of the ideologies, governments or organizations can not claim inequity and injustice. The significant characteristic of this tendency is the cooperative nature of the power relations to attract the public opinion. There will be no coercive power that magnetizes overall public.

As seen from the afore mentioned discussions, there exists a transition from destructive to constructive, from material-based to intangible-oriented value laden and flexible power perception in Western thinking where the concept of soft power finds its place. Peace time methods of power relations may be in the frames of show of military forces, economic and political dominance, but additionally ideational attractiveness to shape prejudice in the minds of adversaries, impartial opponents and domestic public. Realist ultimate goals can be achieved not only in the forms of brutal military mobilizations, but by means of liberal methods such as scientific superiority, educational offers to the other communities, building alike world views among the individuals, cultural politics attracting the masses. Liberal views can not regret from state-centric, realist approaches in a world that is ultimately controlled by the states. Hence realist and liberal views eventually overlap in benefiting tools of generating power to reach the goals, especially in peace time activities. As an example, both paradigm make use of cultural activities. Realist aim would be to realize the interest whilst liberal purpose would be to create an environment of cooperation. The factors like communication and language contributes or degrades attempts of wielding power reminding the constructive and structuralist nature of power politics. Consequently the benefited tools of power appeared to be more peaceful, cost effective and tolerable after the Cold War. The reason may be public opinion and transparency in the current century. But all states do not exhibit the same standards of politics, as can be seen in China case. But ‘soft power’ effectively became a method in international relations disregarding the differences

in ideologies, regimes or theoretical backgrounds. Hence new frontiers are more likely in the coming decades that pave the route of soft power conception.

## 1.2 Nye's Conception of Soft Power:

Joseph S. Nye Jr. alluded the concept of soft power in his book "Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power" in 1990.<sup>32</sup> His description of "co-optive power" as "getting others to want what you want" was different from the "command power" that was framed by "stick and carrot approach".<sup>33</sup> He argued that "as world politics becomes more complex, the power of all major states to achieve their purposes will diminish"<sup>34</sup> because there was a transformation of power that was intertwined with "the complex interdependence"<sup>35</sup>. A decade later, Nye published "The Paradox of American Power" in 2001 whereas he claimed the term "soft power".<sup>36</sup> According to him, "soft power or co-optive power" was as important as hard, command power. The context of power-in general rested on "the mix of soft and hard power"<sup>37</sup> – later he called this "smart power"<sup>38</sup> in his 2004 publication. Nye provided a brief definition of soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies"<sup>39</sup> which indicates "attitude change on voluntary basis" without any coercive pressure.<sup>40</sup> Nye's 'soft power' can be linked to the belief that changing peoples' firmly held beliefs are

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<sup>32</sup> Nye focused on "the decline of the USA" in almost all of his publications. He provides a solution to the US decline by recommending a new type of power to be applied by the American policy makers. This is 'co-optive' power that will make the USA to shape rather than change, but still lead.

<sup>33</sup> Nye, Joseph. S. Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, New York, 1990, p. 31.

<sup>34</sup> Nye, *Bound to Lead*, p. 175.

<sup>35</sup> Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77/5, 1998, pp. 81-94. Nye and Keohane put forward this concept to state that states and their fortunes are intertwined. Their suggestion was based on the increased cooperation of states due to economic and other forms of interconnectedness. But they underline that military and power balancing are still an important aspects of international relations, their significance are decreasing though.

<sup>36</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Super Power Can't Go It Alone*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 8-9.

<sup>37</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 32.

<sup>39</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. X.

<sup>40</sup> Petty, Richard E. and Cacioppo, John T., *Attitudes and Persuasion: Classics and Contemporary Approaches*, Boulder, Brown Company Publishers, 1981, pp. 4-7. <http://www.questia.com/library/book/attitudes-and-persuasion-classic-and-contemporary-approaches-by-john-t-cacioppo-richard-e-petty.jsp>, accessed on July 12, 2008. An attitude is defined as a general and enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue. Persuasion is any instance in which an active attempt is made to change a person's mind.



difficult, but not impossible. When a source is credible and attractive, if a message is repeated with emotional content, whilst a receptive mood of the target exists, attitudinal change is more likely.

Nye termed the concept of soft power though; similar conceptions of various scholars exist along with Nye's publications on soft power. For instance Nye's 'soft power' concept can be resembled to "power with" of Weber, "integrative" power of Boulding and Lukes' "the radical conception of power". Weber's collaborative endeavour in promoting power indicates a similar vision. Boulding underlines that "the increase in the productive and integrative powers of the human race" as much more significant than "the increase in its destructive powers"<sup>41</sup> before Nye's liberal soft power concept that highlights cooperation and interconnectedness. Steven Lukes argues volunteer obedience of an agent B that agent A wants B to do.<sup>42</sup> Then there is a manipulation on desires of B. The motivation of B may be interest or fear, but still B willingly does what A wants.

Apart from these scholars, a new generation scholar, Melissen, confirms the validity of Nye's soft power concept by arguing that soft power is the post modern variant of "power over opinion" in the global information age. He points out that the loss of soft power can be costly for hard power, defining soft power as a complimentary ingredient of hard power. He signifies the efficiency of soft power on the minds, while clearing the concept of soft power from negative impressions of "power over opinion". His contribution to the debate of soft power is that he includes public diplomacy as one asset of soft power to clear the negative image of propaganda and "power over opinion". Public diplomacy, a soft power method, is presented as the cooperative method of stable relations with shared values and common interests while putting the people as the target of soft power.<sup>43</sup>

Soft power conception of Nye does not rely on command power that consists military and economic assets that will "change what others do", but co-optive power that is "the ability to shape what others do"<sup>44</sup> by indicating two separate

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<sup>41</sup> Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, p. 226.

<sup>42</sup> Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View*, Houndmills Macmillan Education, London, 1974, p. 27.

<sup>43</sup> Melissen, Jan, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 7.

courses to achieve goals: “the use of sanctions or the inducements” or “convincing other actors to share preferences” by attraction rather than coercion.<sup>45</sup> Nye approaches sanctions and inducements in the context of hard power along with military and economic power even though the line between inducement and “attractive” power is blurring. Military power itself is hard power, but may be soft power as well. Soft-military-power may be extended to the fields such as military equipment sales, offered doctrinal and training support, cooperation in peace support operations to be named as “partner country” or possessing belief that military superiority is determinant factor in international arena. Besides the states will examine the complex military systems of powerful states with their perfect training system, organizational structures, technological capabilities, doctrines and successfully executed missions such as peace support operations or military campaigns. The success story of military formations will push the other states to emulate the military structure of the powerful state. Military interaction should be expected to take the emulating state into the sphere of power wielder. Apart from military strength, economic strength may attract the other agents to pursue convenient policies for the economic powers to avoid conflicts or to obtain advantages in bilateral relations on their own wills. Domestic concerns such as managing a stable economy, reaching the rich markets, need to access aids may cause the policy makers to be in consent with the economically powerful states, even though they lack adequate level of military capabilities.

Co-optive power introduces volunteer obedience or serving to the goals of soft power with a cost effective method. The methods of “the ability to affect what other countries want” can be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.<sup>46</sup> Agenda setting capability and dominating the international arena to determine the discourse of problematic issues could be co-optive methods to achieve the outcomes in world politics because other states want to follow it. Trust may be one determinant, but also, the belief and perception of the majority of the international society may persuade most of the agents to accept the

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<sup>45</sup> Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*, New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 5.

<sup>46</sup> Nye, “Soft Power”, *Foreign Policy*, 80, 1990, pp. 166-167, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT\\_POWER.PDF](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT_POWER.PDF), accessed on September 11, 2008.

discourses of few agents. In another words, not only the military or economic strength, but also the trust and belief can convince the actors to accept the courses of actions of these players.

Soft power facilitates manipulation of the goals of the targeted audience. Interconnectedness and global liberal trend offer some actors to realize the interests by soft power strength, while locating some actors to the level of being attracted. It may be argued that liberal trend provides just opportunities for some states, but strictly framing the under-developed and developing states open to the influence of soft powers to realize their ultimate goals. This perception may lead to a discussion on the legitimacy and justification of soft power efforts. If soft power is a planned and conscious series of activities, the liberal opportunities to realist intentions would be the fact of the international environment. This fact may be perceived as a critique to Nye's soft power conception.

Soft power offers to realize certain aims. The expected outcomes of the soft power implementation might present a vast spectrum of goals. These goals can be listed as obtaining society's imitation to applicant states' policies, gaining sympathy to the existence of applicant states enterprises, shaping societies and obtaining loyalty, privileges and dominance in trade, benefiting from the natural resources of any country with her own consent, opening new markets, shaping the consuming trend, trading cultural products, obtaining a similar approach to the global political issues. Whatever the aims is, the crucial point is to have the targeted society to accept what is desired on own will.

There are, however, constraints of soft power capabilities.<sup>47</sup> Nye underlines that democracy and transparency in political system may hinder the outcomes of the soft power application. Democracy and transparency may affect the soft power in two ways. The first one is the own public's perception. Not all the actors of domestic public are controlled by states. Public opinion may thwart the efforts to build cooperative relations with certain actors. Voters' intention may stop the policy makers to apply desired policies. Apart from domestic society, democratic political system of targeted society may prevent the policymakers to take decisions in favour of the other states. The decision takers should justify why they are acting in a

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<sup>47</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 16.

manner that another state desires due to the risk of vote erosion. Then the dynamics of internal and international societies will complicate the decision mechanisms where openness will bring the debates before the public, especially under the observance of efficient media. That fact will lead to the lack of control on all soft power means available. Moreover nongovernmental sources of soft power will challenge the concept since it may serve to the interest of itself other than state actor. Consequently authoritative regimes, such as China, seems lucky to coordinate the own soft power strength against non-democratic regimes like some African States such as Sudan or Zimbabwe.

If openness and transparency is taken into account, Nye's contribution to the debate of soft power, which is the relation between information and power, ought to be examined. Nye claims that power is passing from the "capital-rich" to the "information-rich".<sup>48</sup> Even though this claim contradicts with the effects of democracy and transparency on soft power, information is a multiplier of power wielding. The spectrum of information-related soft power activities can widely be identified such as scientific domination, broadcasts of media, information technologies and intelligence. For instance the produced knowledge in social sciences is the essential mean of justification and legitimization. It will directly cause to value exportation to the other societies. The terminology of the produced information can be benefited to build the basis of agreements or disagreements. In other words, information facilitates the norm and culture diffusion with the proper communication means. Apart from producing, also sharing information eases the soft power wielding efforts since "it will contribute to cooperation, common understanding and dealing with common challenges."<sup>49</sup> But Nye points out that the inflation of information offers the state actors chances, but also requires flexibility to respond the fast spinning nature of new information.

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<sup>48</sup> Nye, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT\\_POWER.PDF](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT_POWER.PDF) , accessed on September 11, 2008, p. 164

<sup>49</sup> Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age", p. 94.

### 1.3 The Sources of Soft Power:

According to Nye, while the traditional conceptualization of power as military and economic strength leads to threats and bribes in order to increase the state's influence, soft power instead benefits from the spread of culture, ideas and values. This approach focuses on "the power of seduction" where Nye refers his proposal to E.H. Carr's "power over opinion" concept, which can be summed up as directing the opinion leaders.<sup>50</sup> Nye identifies three sources of soft power that are "attractive cultural capability; political values at home; morally and legitimately justified foreign policy"<sup>51</sup>, although the success or failure of the mentioned sources can hardly be measured since the natures of these sources are value-laden. These three sources of generating soft power are in the focus of Nye's conception. Before clarifying the soft means, these sources ought to be examined. Hence, it will be discussed why Nye preferred these fields as sources of soft power.

The first source of soft power is pointed out as culture by Nye. Taylor defines culture as "a complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom, and any other figures [of a certain society] acquired by men as a member of society."<sup>52</sup> UNESCO points culture as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs"<sup>53</sup> Culture offers vast opportunities to attract the societies by its own characteristics. Therefore Nye attributes great value to culture in his discussion of soft power. He argues that "the cultural customs and ideas, which are dominating global norms will enhance the credibility"<sup>54</sup> and promote the soft power strength. It is not meant only popular culture, but also high culture including values that attracts the others to applaud and adopt in daily life and preferences. In the frame of high cultural motives; fields such as education,

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<sup>50</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 5.

<sup>51</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 11.

<sup>52</sup> Taylor, Edward, B., *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom*, London, Brentano's, 1924, p.1, <http://www.archive.org/stream/primitiveculture01tylouoft#page/n7/mode/2up> , September 10, 2008.

<sup>53</sup> UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, [http://www.unesco.org/education/imld\\_2002/universal\\_decla.shtml](http://www.unesco.org/education/imld_2002/universal_decla.shtml) , accessed on September 29, 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "The Benefits of Soft Power", February 8, 2008, <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>, accessed on September 11, 2008.

academic and scientific cooperation, shared cultural characteristics would attract the other actors to tolerate the leadership of a certain actor. The obtained leadership by means of culture should be expected to spill over to the other areas of international and transnational affairs. Policy makers' decisions may be shaped by the sympathy of society to a certain international actor. The probability of crisis and disputes would be expected to be at the lowest level if cultural interaction is increased.

It could be argued that the current age of information eased the cultural interaction of societies especially after Internet was invented. Not only Internet, but means such as personal contacts, communications via intense flow of immigrants, world wide TV and radio broadcasts, and trade as well carry non-official but effective cultural messages that attract the vast majorities while facilitating them to compare the traditions, political systems and various structures of their own to other societies or states. Especially societies deprived of welfare and political freedom under authoritarian regimes will be more open to cultural attraction of free communities. The comparison will cause a sense of admiration and imitation.

Apart from political outcomes; low or popular cultural interaction like TV programs, movies, singers, sports, computer games and their icons will spread a standard consumption habit and contribute to trade between societies. This property of culture will promote the economic interaction and profit the culturally dominant actor. Soft industries such as language teaching, movie industry, tourism should be expected to profit the culturally dominant society lowering the cost of being a "power". By means of these cultural activities, eventually, societies will begin to judge their own societal values, economic, political and justice systems attributing the dominant culture as a reference. Attractive culture will start to transform the structure of the society and shape the choices in a chain of societal fields as discussed above.

Additional to culture, political values and their practices are efficient sources of expanding soft power for Nye.<sup>55</sup> The power wielder should be trustworthy and believable. The implementation of propounded thesis in domestic sphere will be observed by international public. Media and information technologies made possible to aware even the underdeveloped societies what is occurring in the most

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<sup>55</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 15.

developed states. The pursued domestic policies of soft power wielders appeared to be a point of admiration or criticism. For Nye, “the regime of the state actor and offered freedom to the domestic institutions” may be criteria in the perception of societies, even though authoritarian regimes may deny some portion of the policies.<sup>56</sup> If the implementation of policies is fruitful, developing or underdeveloped societies take it as an example and emulates similar policies in their domestic affairs. On the contrary, double standards and failures breach the image of states. An apparent example may be given in the field of Western values such as democratic government and respect to sovereignty and freedoms. A soft power wielder, such as the USA, may recommend the other states to pursue policies respecting the individual freedoms and liberties. But contrary applications for its people regarding political freedoms will weaken the credibility and reliability of the USA. The same case will be examined in the second chapter for China. Put another way, the soft power wielder should be consistent with what she says and what she does to international public. Consistency of the verbal statements and practices will promote the credibility of the soft power wielder and will be more persuasive in shaping other societies.

Besides the implementation of universal values, domestic public order and welfare are criteria to identify the strength of any society. If any society is depriving of reaching the basic services such as sanitary, clean water, electricity, food, injustice in disputes or lack of job to feed the family, then it will be inevitable for them to dream the order and living standard of the power wielder. Soft power wielder will be able to persuade the societies, which are void of basic needs, to apply her system of development while fixing this society to her sphere of influence. Adhered society will probably cooperate voluntarily with the soft power wielder. On the other hand, it is a fact that the emulation of one society by another society will cause social disasters like immigration flows. Consequently, if common public goods function properly, the other societies will observe the model of development and import it to their countries. Consistent and successful domestic policy of the soft power wielder will charm the other states to pursue similar policies as the soft power wielder. As far as the administrative systems come closer, interaction may increase and a state of dependency may occur.

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<sup>56</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 16.

Unlike Nye, Huntington perceives the imposition of values and institutions of the West to non-Western people as immoral.<sup>57</sup> For him, every society and its political extension have a value system different from the dominant universal and widely accepted value system. Different civilizations may have their own political preferences that require respect by the other civilizations. But Nye's point of view is not the coercive imposition of values to the other societies. It is rather the volunteer acceptance of various societal, political, economic, military, cultural, legal practices by influencing the minds and hearts of different societies. This influence will "promote the image and perceived legitimacy" of the soft power wielder "for the advancement of foreign policy objectives".<sup>58</sup>

Robert Cooper claims that the centrality of the state and its legal and constitutional order as the most developed version of soft power.<sup>59</sup> This approach confirms Nye's emphasis on policies promoting soft power. Coopers' emphasis on the role of the state mechanisms can be assessed essential to maintain order. Public order leads the society to the state of peace and welfare. The dynamics of the society can be harmonized and be directed to the common good whilst ascending the credibility of the state by agenda setting capability in foreign policy.

Besides domestic implementation of consistent policies, Nye counts foreign policy of the state as a source of soft power since the attractiveness of a state depends on the values that are expressed through the substance and style of foreign policy.<sup>60</sup> The starting point of the Nye's debate may be based on liberal approach. From this perspective, the credibility and plausibility of a state can be enhanced in international arena by promoting shared values, which can be exemplified as respect to international law, adherence to universal values, integration to institutions and loyalty to peace. Along with adherence to common values, cooperative tendency with both state and non-state actors will ease the efforts of wielding soft power. Broad and transparent foreign policies will promote respect and trust where consultation is the essential tool in solving disputes. Pursued policies to achieve

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<sup>57</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., "The West Unique, not Universal", *Foreign Affairs*, 75/6, 1996, pp. 28-46, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52621/samuel-p-huntington/the-west-unique-not-universal>, accessed on September 13, 2008.

<sup>58</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 57.

<sup>59</sup> Cooper, Robert, "The Goals of Diplomacy, Hard Power, and Soft Power" in David Held/Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), *American Power in the 21st Century*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 167-180.

<sup>60</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 60.



global public goods will motivate actors to follow the defined course on the way to build a global system that every party will be consistent.

Realist approach in implementing feasible foreign policy may also be accountable in wielding soft power. It will be in the interest of the dominant actor to stick the values of the international realm. Active and acceptable foreign policy that can be tolerated by the members of the international society may persuade these members to pursue consistent policy with dominant actor. It is clear that the dominant actor will be the one who is holding initiative in the international realm by exhibiting norm defining and implementation capability. Then it may be perceived as a “must” to be persuasive, compliant and active in foreign policy. It does not matter liberal or realist, dominant states somehow need to wield soft power, to lead cost effective resolutions in international relations.

Nevertheless “the ability of great powers with impressive traditional power resources to control their environments has been reduced by the changing nature of world politics”.<sup>61</sup> States are obliged to cooperate on transnational issues due to lack of capability that any individual state can not figure out against new type of threats. Moreover, interconnectedness of the international realm will diffuse the consequences of common problems towards the majority of the states notwithstanding their will. The new threats might be ecological changes, health epidemics, illicit trade of drugs, human trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism etc. Such issues are trans-national in nature, although they may have domestic roots. Cooperation of small, weak states that are not fully capable of managing their own domestic problems should be urged and supported to prevent these threats. But the problem lies in how to convince these states to be consistent with the common good of international society since interests and capabilities of states may vary. It is clear that they can not be prevented by coercive measures, but soft power strength in both domestic and international realm would reduce the undesired outcomes of these threats.

If these three sources of soft power are concerned, by what means soft power wielding can be achieved? Hard power assets are easy to be identified by

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<sup>61</sup> Nye, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT\\_POWER.PDF](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFT_POWER.PDF) , pp. 163-164, accessed on September 11, 2008.

quantifying them. Military and economic strength are the tools that can coerce the targeted audience to act in accordance with the interests. Soft power indicates a third type of power that is neither military nor economic in coercive nature. In other words, all non-military power tools appeared to be termed as 'soft'. Methods in which the other party is encouraged to accept something on its own free will may be conceived as a mean of "soft power". The cause may be the fact that new dimensions of the social sphere offers a developing means of power as far as the frontiers of the human kind enhances. The very different soft power means may be identified since the characteristics of the targeted audience varies pending to geography, societal dynamics, and indigenous life styles. Then the means to enhance soft power of any actor can be quantitatively enriched pending to the expectations and capabilities. The most common tools may be education, cultural interaction, language, support in international realm, technical and financial aid, building infrastructure, entertainment, trade and/or ideology. But some of these soft power means may be conceived as inducement. The method and perception how the means are served will be the determinant to label it as soft power.

One of the confusion in the means of soft power is to assess the soft power with the achievements of states or societies in certain aspects of life. For instance Nye lists the potential indicators of soft power as Nobel prices, music sales, book sales, attracting tourists, the number of asylum seekers, life expectancy, GDP, popular sports.<sup>62</sup> The issue should be to what degree these achievements lead to policy changes. If these achievements are observed by the other societies, they will provide basis to determine how charming soft power wielder is. But it is vogue if these facts and figures lead to policy changes. It can be claimed that some of the indicators would, some would not. For instance neither of the policymakers would sacrifice the interests of own country since another state is the best in football. Folk music should not be expected to shape the minds of the policymakers and societies in international affairs. But it is clear that these means will contribute to obtain psychological basis.

There is another conception other than Nye's "soft power" that underlines similar contexts. Walter Russell Mead expands the discussion of public diplomacy and soft

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<sup>62</sup> NYE, *Soft Power*, p. 76.

power proposing the conception of “sticky power”. His claim is that “arguments relating to the limitations of hard power and the advantages that can accrue from the use of attractive power rooted in factors such as culture, ideals, values, which encourages others to want what you want, are basic among advocates of an advanced role of public diplomacy. [But] sticky power is the “power of economic attraction, which once embedded becomes addictive and hard to escape from”.<sup>63</sup> It is clear that ‘sticky power’ challenges ‘soft power’. The source is economic that can be counted as hard power in Nye’s conception. Hence economic attraction makes the weak state to be addictive to the stronger state. As far as the economic power declines, then addiction ends. Because it becomes an obligation for weak state to be in consent with the demands of the strong state. Otherwise weak state will be faced with damaging consequences. Weak state finds a living space for her to benefit from the economic strength. As a result, the necessity of volunteer obedience of the weaker actor, according to ‘soft power’, ought to be ignored in any case the weaker actor should consent to the will of stronger one.

Other than sticky power concept, obviously, Nye was not satisfied with his term of ‘soft power’ and therefore he proposed a new type of power in 2008 with his colleague Richard L. Armitage before the Foreign Relations Committee of US Senate. They pinpoint a new type of power that may be affiliated to soft power: “smart power”.<sup>64</sup> Armitage and Nye suggested that “an integrated grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft attractive power to create smart power of the sort that won the Cold War”. Considering this speech was made in front of the U.S. policy makers, it had mere practical meaning than an academic one. The testament may be perceived as a step back from the liberal point of power perception. The reasons might be the experienced conditions of “global war against terrorism” that can be shortened as Iraq and Afghanistan interventions. If Armitage’s realist<sup>65</sup> and Nye’s liberal backgrounds are combined, it may easy be understood how the smart power suggestion was constructed upon.

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<sup>63</sup> Mead, Walter Russell, “America’s Sticky Power”, *Foreign Policy*, 141, 2004, p. 48.

<sup>64</sup> Armitage, Richard L. and Nye, Joseph S., “Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform”, Statement before the Foreign Relation Committee of US Senate, April 24, 2008, [http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com\\_csis\\_congress&task=view&id=254](http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_congress&task=view&id=254) , accessed on September 11, 2008.

<sup>65</sup> Spartacus School Net, <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKarmitage.htm>, accessed on December 06, 2009. Armitage was foreign policy advisor of Ronald Reagan, deputy Secretary of State in Reagan’s and

Before Armitage and Nye, Gunnar Hökmark, a Swedish politician and Leader of Moderate Party Group in EU Parliament, attracted the attention of his audience in Tel Aviv University to the necessity of combining soft power with military resources even though he did not termed smart power.<sup>66</sup> He pointed out the deficiencies of power by his two proposals: “The first one is that diplomacy and soft power can be quite successful but without the presence of power and military resources these instruments lack credibility. The second is that hard power and military resources can be enough to win a war but are not enough to establish peace”. He presented soft power as a useful method, but lack of adequacy without coercive potential power resources and vice versa.

Combination of soft power and hard power, which is ‘smart power’ in Nye’s term, may bear soft power the function of image building for a ‘hard’ power. Image building may serve to both edges of power. The hard power will be tolerable and perennial by its good looking image, mainly emanating from her soft power. But also, any soft power wielding attempt will be naïve without obtaining a good image in the hearts and minds. Then image building and acquiring soft power can be correlated with each other to strengthen hard power. Jan Melissen mentions the relevant concepts to clarify the soft power’s role in image building. For him, propaganda’s bad reputation makes it repelling in building image building. Hence propaganda replaced its position to public diplomacy to efficiently communicate with the societies. He refers public diplomacy as a “key instrument of soft power”<sup>67</sup> that can be affiliated with “nation branding”.<sup>68</sup> Public diplomacy, an essential element of public relations, is “a governmental process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”.<sup>69</sup> By

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George W. Bush’s presidency term. He was interviewed by the special commissions to identify his role in illegal CIA operations.

<sup>66</sup> Hökmark, Gunnar, Speech in Tel Aviv University, October 31, 2006. [http://www.european-enterprise.org/items/whatwedo/articlelesspeeches/Tel\\_Aviv\\_University\\_Diplomacy\\_and\\_balance\\_rev.pdf](http://www.european-enterprise.org/items/whatwedo/articlelesspeeches/Tel_Aviv_University_Diplomacy_and_balance_rev.pdf), accessed on September 12, 2008.

<sup>67</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p. 4.

<sup>68</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p.10.

<sup>69</sup> Tuch, Hans, *Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas*, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 3.

that way, a reliable image can be exhibited in the eyes of foreign societies while justifying and legitimizing the reasons and consequences of the actions.

According to the Melissen, then, the concepts of propaganda and public diplomacy should be distinguished in wielding soft power. Propaganda is the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandist and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.<sup>70</sup> Hence soft power can not benefit from propaganda if propaganda's negative connotation, the long term non-realistic projection and its temporary nature are considered. Despite, propaganda may breach the soft power's reliability in pursuing long run policies.

In comparison to propaganda, it can be claimed that public diplomacy may expand and serve the soft power of an actor with long term projection. But public diplomacy should also be distinguished from lobbying efforts. Lobbying is directed to obtain specific goals and aims at directly influencing specific policies where the individuals are directly in the loop of the policy process. But public diplomacy aims spanning bridges between different cultures.<sup>71</sup> Lobbying efforts will be directed to realize certain political objectives by focusing on the minds and hearts of specific individuals or groups of people. As far as the objective is achieved, lobbying efforts may be reviewed. But public diplomacy requires a continuous communicative effort to inform and influence the foreign societies. Public diplomacy – and soft power as well, occurs in a sense of two way interaction with modest methods of communication whereas. Finally the aim of propaganda is to persuade its subject or public of one point of view; and to close off other options.<sup>72</sup> Consequently public diplomacy contributes soft power wielding where propaganda and lobbying efforts may breach the soft power in the long run.

Apart from these concepts, nation branding ought to be considered in comparison to public diplomacy. The purpose of nation branding is to challenge “image building” by mobilizing “all of nation's forces that can contribute to the promotion of its

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<sup>70</sup> Welch, David, “Powers of Persuasion”, *History Today*, 49, 1999, p. 24.

<sup>71</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p. 4.

<sup>72</sup> Welch, “Powers of Persuasion”, p. 24.

image abroad”.<sup>73</sup> The reputation of a society is at the centre of efforts. The impressions of foreign societies are aimed to be challenged and changed. A state deprived of good reputation regarding human rights, social injustices, or authoritarian government may endeavour to build a new impression. The focus might be through various methods such as transparent and consistent social, economic, environmental and foreign policies; engaging in tourism, cultural, sporting, academic and political events; commitments to be responsible state; engagement with institutions and organizations. The purpose of nation branding would be to clean the impression that is inherited from previous governments or regimes. Then nation branding may be perceived in parallel to soft power wielding if the state endeavours to build a new image.

#### **1.4 Conclusion:**

The “context of” and “means to realize” the power is a point of discussions in accordance with the streams of eras. The main events of different centuries shaped the perception on the concept of power. After the World Wars and the Cold War, it could be observed a challenge in Western IR discipline to describe what the power is. Power was perceived with measurable material figures such as number of soldiers, population, number of annexed territories, economic parameters. The one who had the capability to coerce the other actors would be conceived as powerful. But the recent discussions about the nature of power shift from material basis of power to its intangible structure such as moral, value-laden, cooperative, ideational and cultural factors.

The question would be to identify preferred courses of the power wielders to obtain desired outcomes. The states would prefer coercive courses or present cooperative behaviours with the other members of the international society. The criteria to decide on the method would be the role of ‘environment’ and ‘perception on the nature of threat’. These two variables challenge the nature of possessed power. The response of the question “to what extent the environment or probable/existing threats affect me” should be expected to shape the power perception. The environment and perceived threat may require a hard or soft nature of power application. The environment and the nature of threat are dynamic. States faced

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<sup>73</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, p. 19.

with new types of threats, which can not be addressed by classical hard power assets. Then it can be assumed that there needs to be developed a flexible approach while describing the context of power regarding the environment and perceived threat in the coming periods. Soft power and its evolving concepts such as “smart power” seem to be a course to respond new types of threats in a dynamic environment.

Despite all these discussions, soft power is not something entirely new; however it has gained a new relative importance in recent years due to changing global environment after Cold War. Similar approaches can be determined in the frame of various concepts, definitions and policy applications that can be resembled to the concept of soft power. Similar proposals can be identified in the perception of various scholars that recalls Nye’s soft power conception, such as power “over, with, to” classification, “carrot, stick and hug” resemblance and “integrative and destructive” behavioural mood. If the aforementioned power perceptions are taken into consideration, soft power may be presented on the “integrative-constructive-power with” aspect of the power conception. But the crucial point is that it is rare to identify and classify power as such titles. “Intention of actor” will define the power’s nature. Any integrative and cooperative attempt would be benefited to realize “realist” interests with a modest *modus operandi*. Soft power may be generated for good or bad purposes.

Although it is clear that there are various scholars who claimed similar concepts to the Nye’s soft power justification, Nye clarified his concept while recommending US government of what policies should be pursued to promote the US interests. This logic makes the Nye’s neoliberal conception closer to the realistic justification since the ultimate goal is to achieve the interests of the U.S. by benefiting liberal ideas. This judgment brings the realist perception of “state’s interests” to the debate because a neoliberal, Nye, also puts forward the interests of the USA to claim a liberal concept: soft power. But Nye’s soft power concept, which is based on culture, internal implementation of political values and foreign policy preferences, presents a good theoretical study that any actor’s integrative or soft power application could be tested to foresee its consequences on global and regional balances. It ought to be discussed if it is a real type of power that could promote the states’ interests.

If the context of western power perception is concerned, it can be reached to a conclusion to comment on the power perceptions of the international actors. But “interconnected” global order offers non-western states and non-state actors to possess opportunity to dominate international realm. China, an emerging international actor, is attempting to remind her existence in remote parts of globe; not militarily, but economically, politically and culturally. It is still open to discussion to what extent China is a “powerful actor” in comparison to western global players like the USA and the EU. If China is a ‘great’ power or an emerging power, a challenge to the existing global order ought to be expected. The concept of soft power is overtly sounded by the Chinese leaders to describe China’s foreign policies. The soft power perception of China is crucial on determining how China would make its decisions, whether China conceives Western type of inducements as soft power or really attracts the state and non-state actors? China’s choice of power application will directly affect the peaceful environment and may bring back the Cold war era. The current policies of China and long term objectives ought to be examined to reach a reliable prediction. Soft power seems to be the current preferred method of power application. But the question is what China conceives from the soft power conception. The answer of this question will be searched in the next chapter.



## CHAPTER 2

### THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER IN CHINESE CONTEXT

How do Chinese scholars and policy makers perceive the concept of soft power? How can Chinese soft-power-thinking be framed in the light of the frontiers of western conceptions? In this chapter, Western context of soft power conception is utilized to understand the Chinese perception of soft power. This will offer guidance to evaluate Chinese conceptions and lead a judgment on a probable comparison of China and the West regarding power-related behavioural tendencies. Although Nye's understanding of soft power, with his detailed analysis, could be the sole framework to clarify the power perception of China, his point of concern was, and still is, the US foreign policy. Therefore, as the aim of this section is to understand China's power parameters in identifying how she perceives the soft power of the West and herself, there is a need for a further analysis of the Chinese understanding of soft power both within and without the Nye's framework. The constraint of the study is that the theoretical sources of Chinese academics are limited in number especially in the languages other than Chinese. So English publication of both Chinese and western scholars are benefited to identify the Chinese context of soft power.

#### 2.1 The Concept of Power in Chinese Context:

The historical flux of China should be examined to understand how Chinese intellectuals and policymakers perceive power and soft power in comparison to western thinking. The term "Quanli"<sup>74</sup> in Chinese language is defined as "legitimate interests and abilities within Confucianism" where it presents capability and power. A small pronunciation difference of "Li" gives the term of 'Quanli' the meaning of "benefit, wealth, and interest". Even though the same term can be used for "rights"; the general perception of using 'quanli' among Chinese people is based on "power, authority, privilege, but most often political power" where it was perceived as

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<sup>74</sup> Cao, Deborah, *The Chinese Law*, Ashgate Publishing, Hants (England), 2004, pp. 72-74.

“people’s power such as right to vote, right of citizenship etc”.<sup>75</sup> Yiwei Wang relates the traditional meaning of “Quanli” to “strategy” and “morality” which are essence of the Chinese power perception.<sup>76</sup>

China, traditionally, practiced strict rules and code of conducts in domestic and outer circles of politics, which were shaped by the Chinese teachings. Chinese history can be described within the context of power politics, through controlling and unifying the country both against domestic warlords<sup>77</sup> and northern nomadic societies. China’s motivation in relations with other states was based on the centrality of China which did not offer equity. China perceived the outer world as inferior that could not deserve equal rights in comparison to superiority of China in bilateral relations until 18<sup>th</sup> century. Besides foreign relations, the domestic stability of China was based on social order and obedience to the authority. From this perspective, Confucianism, the prevalent teaching of Chinese culture, defines the relevance of society and power politics in the compiled classics of Confucius<sup>78</sup>. For Confucius, men play their assigned role in a fixed society of authority, as was summarized in the motto of “let the ruler be a ruler and the subject be a subject; let the father be a father and the son a son”. This statement presents a status-quo approach in the perception of social life and foreign politics, and implies peaceful acceptance of social order. It should be underlined that the Chinese teaching of power politics emphasizes harmony and consent both inside and abroad disregarding military entailment. According to this understanding, China did not apply coercive and offensive courses of actions in domestic and international affairs, but defensive counter-measures prioritizing peace and stability.<sup>79</sup>

Western expansion to the South East Asia and Pacific challenged China’s own power perception; hence China perceived military backwardness as the reason to the defeats in the hands of westerners and unequal concessions granted to them by

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<sup>75</sup> Angle, Stephen C., “Did Someone Say Rights? Liu Shipei’s Concept of Quanli”, *Philosophy East & West*, 48 1998, p. 624.

<sup>76</sup> Yiwei, Wang, “Chinese Tradition of Thinking Power”, 46th Annual ISA Convention, Honolulu, 2005, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> The term “Warlord” refers to an individual who sought to establish independent political and military authority over a designated territory, relying primarily on personal command of a military force.

<sup>78</sup> The classics of Confucius are known as Classic of Songs, Classic of Document, Classic of Changes, The Spring and Autumn Annals, and the Record of Rituals.

<sup>79</sup> Harding, Harry, “China’s Cooperative Behaviour” in Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David, (eds.) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 397-398.

itself. “Self-strengthening” process of 1860, which was to reform the institutions of the state, was a result of the Chinese defeat against Anglo-French coalition in 1858.<sup>80</sup> A “cooperative policy” was used to modernize China by building an office for foreign relations, establishing customs service, and introducing international law to Chinese international relations. Its aim was to “use barbarians to control barbarians” for rejuvenation while gradual modernization was aimed to have a “powerful” China. By that way, China adopted western methods to overcome the western superiority.<sup>81</sup>

The perception of balancing the West led China not only to aspire acquiring the materially based power accumulation, but also to develop a structural approach to survive despite the negative efforts of the West. If the perceptions of Western scholars are contrasted to the ancient Chinese thinking, it can be assumed that power politics of China could be based on a realist perception. The priorities of the Chinese were continuity of the reign of Chinese tyrannies and balance the West for this purpose. On the other hand there was no awareness of western type philosophical debate of diplomacy and politics in 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century. Then it can be claimed that the realist tradition of IR among Chinese society can be labelled as “unconscious” realism.

The events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century further shaped the power perception of China and cemented “unconscious” realism in the frame of these events. For instance the 1911 Revolution toppled the Ch’ing dynasty, but led to turmoil and caused to strengthening of warlordism until the foundation of Republic of China under Chiang Kai-Shek rule. The wars against Russia’s and Japan’s aggression were followed by the struggle between nationalist and communist groups that challenged China’s stance in the international arena. Military superiority of nationalists and ideologically motivated Communists kept China in turmoil until the end of World War II, ended only with the triumph of Mao’s communists was achieved.<sup>82</sup>

During Maoist term, ambiguities of Cold War required an anxious approach to world politics. The Comprehensive National Power (CNP), an index of power

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<sup>80</sup> Fairbank, J. and Reischauer, E., *China: Tradition and Transformation*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989, p. 308.

<sup>81</sup> Fairbank and Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation*, p. 309.

<sup>82</sup> Fairbank and Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation*, pp. 469-473.

parameters, was an important feature of Chinese power conception in this period. The CNP was developed and used to measure the strength of the nation by listing the figures of the perceived power. In fact the CNP is still used in the evaluations of Chinese authorities to measure the Chinese position in power comparisons with the other global players. The main motive behind this effort is presented by Mark Leonard as looking at opponent's weaknesses to understand own strength.<sup>83</sup> But composition of the content of the CNP has been transformed by value-laden features. For instance Kurlantzick identifies the CNP as a combination of international prestige, diplomacy, economic power, cultural influence and, to a lesser extent, military force.<sup>84</sup> The identified index of the CNP stresses political, economic, and military power where cultural attraction is emphasized as the most intangible power type in comparison to aforementioned power types. The CNP presents power in measurable variables that is common in state actors' power strength. But inclusion of culture to the CNP and emphasizing the intangible aspect of power clearly indicates a shift in measuring power after 1990s. China accounts not only the tangible assets of power wielding factors, but intangible brands of power components in the CNP that takes China away from realist evaluations.

As seen from the evolution in the CNP index, it is widely accepted that the Chinese system of international politics cannot be conceived in the context of Western thinking until 1990s due to closed and limited circuit of social science studies of Communist era to protect the values and authority of Mao Thought. Scholars and social science studies were under the strict control of the Communist Party. Hence Chinese leadership, including the current one, played a major role to direct IR debates. Mao, Deng and their successors determined their own principles of politics and international relations serving the Chinese interests. Deng's leadership was a challenge to Chinese IR development since his successors continued to apply the basic pillars of his thought and developed it with a similar mentality, which was reforming the Mao thought. Wang Jisi explains the development of International Relations as in Chinese context and identifies how this development shaped the power perception of Chinese epistemic community. Jisi divides the evolution of

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<sup>83</sup> Leonard, Mark, *What Does China Think?*, London, Fourth Estate, 2008, p. 85.

<sup>84</sup> Kurlantzick, Joshua, "China's Chance", *Prospect Magazine*, 108, 2005, p. 28, <http://www.exacteditions.com/exact/browsePages.do?issue=4&size=3&pageLabel=28> , accessed on August 20, 2009.

International Relations studies into three periods. The first period (1989-1991) was marked by political turbulence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. Chinese perception was that China was to remain the only “great” power that was practicing socialism. Tiananmen incidents increased the fear of western intervention as was done in the collapse of Soviet Union. But the preferred method to prevent western involvement in China was to emphasize a “peaceful evolution” that prioritizes economic policies and integration to international institutions, which sounds neorealist approach of western IR thinking.<sup>85</sup>

The second term (1992-1998) was marked by a fascinating growth of IR scholarship in China. Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform remarks of 1992 encouraged the Chinese policy-makers to take significant decisions. China established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, normalized the relations with USA and Russia; finally started the integration process to international institutions.<sup>86</sup> As Alan Hunter argued, China pursued a strategy of a cautious partnership with the USA and also committed China to improve multi-lateral ties especially in Asia and also in other regions. Deng Xiaoping’s policy would be characterized as sustaining a peaceful international environment, which created an optimistic atmosphere among Chinese scholars. The core of debates in the first and second period was to discover International Relations discipline. In the second period, the concepts such as five principles of peaceful existence, the epoch of peace and development, the new international order, anti-hegemonism, independent foreign policy of peace were discussed intensively.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Jisi, Wang, “International Relations Studies in China Today: Achievements, Trends and Conditions”, Ford Foundation, 2005, pp. 1-8, <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=377>, accessed on December 13, 2008. Wang Jisi is the professor of Institute of American Studies in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He submitted the report “*International Relations Studies in China Today: Achievements, Trends and Conditions*” to Ford Foundation for Future Programs for assisting Chinese scholars in this field. The study is based on ten leading Chinese journals in IR studies between January 1996 and July 2001 regarding the areas of research and the evolution of the proportion. The periods of evolution is examined from the end of Cold War. He identifies six systems in current Chinese IR studies: State Council system, the system of Academies of Social Sciences, National Defence establishments, universities, Communist Party School system, and media. Each of the aforementioned systems has its own approach to domestic and global issues, although Mao Thought was above all the others.

<sup>86</sup> Jisi, Wang, “International Relations Studies in China Today”, p. 5.

<sup>87</sup> Hunter, Alan, “China: Soft Power and Cultural Influence”, *Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies Publication*, Coventry University, 2008, p. 2,

The third period began in 1999 and it can be considered as a period of reassessment and new debates about unfamiliar subjects of IR in the Chinese academia. Chinese experiences in the international arena in this period prompted a series of issues to be discussed such as a “power struggle” between the states, stemming from the need to understand George W. Bush’s hard realism; similarly to understand or perhaps justify the necessity of national defence as a response to Taiwan’s secessionism. These discussions were intensified especially with the incidents which embedded in the Chinese national conscious awakening as fears of national humiliation such as the NATO bombardment of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo intervention, the collision of Chinese and American aircraft in 2001 which turned into a crisis between two states, and American arms sale to Taiwan in the same year. In this era, Chinese scholars were reactive to these incidents, but they also started to assess the political methodologies in the new era of globalization.<sup>88</sup> The reached consensus was to benefit from the unipolar global order under the US leadership, liberal political environment and globalization process. There was no deviation from “peace and development” program of Deng Xiaoping. Power conceptions based on culture and various peaceful, integrative strategies were discussed for bilateral and multilateral relations.

If the course of the overall development of the IR in China is considered, it can be claimed that Maoist era mainly focused on building a new state. The Chinese context of power was blended with ideological motives of Mao Thought within a realist foreign policy. Post Cold War, coincided with Deng’s era, became the appropriate term to have western IR thinking to flourish in Chinese academic and political flora by translated basic IR theoretical publications. Moreover Deng focused on being neutral in foreign policy contrary to Mao. He stressed the importance of not only socialist countries, but also any country that could assist in China’s quest for markets, natural resources, and political support. There was a radical power policy shift when Deng Xiaoping established the principle of sustaining a peaceful international environment for transformation of China into a

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<http://www.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/external/content/1/c4/11/36/v1229079768/user/China%20and%20Soft%20Power.pdf> , accessed on May 12, 2009.

<sup>88</sup> Jisi, Wang, “International Relations Studies in China Today”, p. 7.

modern industrialized power.<sup>89</sup> Deng Xiaoping's phrase of "bide our time and build our capability" converted Chinese IR thinking as "avoid conflicts and concentrate on economic development".<sup>90</sup> The motivation of this shift may be the need to obtain an economic growth to maintain the unity of the society other than ideological concerns. Deng's challenge to Maoist tradition may be the disappointment that emanated from the Soviet experience and its lessons learned.

By the 1990s, the guidelines of Deng shaped the perception of power parameters reminding neorealist approach. *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, claims Deng's recommendations as smart strategy naming it as "twenty-four character principle": "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."<sup>91</sup> If Deng's statement is examined regarding how it can be applied to power politics of Chinese IR theories; first, it can be argued that there exists a challenge to traditional Chinese realist understanding of world politics. Second, there seems no transition or resemblance to any type of western theoretical understanding, but a strategy that has a smiling liberal face of a realist actor until the ultimate goal would be achieved with a hidden agenda. In another behavioural explanation, Deng's strategy sounds like "behave soft, until you are hard enough". But the question is that why China preferred this method of power wielding? The reasons may be domestic or foreign policy oriented as will be explained below.

The main reason would be domestic stability of China that can be described as fragile. National Bureau of Statistics of China demonstrates, according to the 2008 data, that China is intensely populated with 1,3 billion people with 5.7% annual population growth rate. GDP per capita is 2,773 USD as of 2008 in comparison to 43,950 USD for USA.<sup>92</sup> The number of people, their low income and living conditions can easily create resentment and breach the legitimacy of the communist

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<sup>89</sup> Guo, Sujian, *China's Peaceful Rise in 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions*, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate Publishing, 2002, p. 18.

<sup>90</sup> Leonard, *What Does China Think?*, p. 87.

<sup>91</sup> People Daily, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200605/26/eng20060526\\_268890.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200605/26/eng20060526_268890.html), accessed on April 14th, 2009.

<sup>92</sup> National Bureau of Statistics of China, *China Statistical Year Book 2008*, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm>, accessed on December 09, 2009.

regime. Contentment of the society should be maintained especially if the Chinese public's capability of comparing their living conditions with the rest of the world is concerned.<sup>93</sup> If China wants to play in the league of big powers, domestic public's satisfaction of their living conditions must be provided. This obligation has two edges. First, power wielding rests on the domestic strength, and second domestic strength helps image building abroad. But the process of domestic strengthening can not be achieved instantly. It requires structural adjustments and planned development, but ultimately it is a time consuming process that China needs at least decades for development.

If the duration of the internal strengthening process is taken into account, China's foreign policy should be based on external peace and toleration. China should pursue a pacifist policy, because of its domestic problems of the country such as the gap of development between coastal line and inner regions, its very high population and rampant poverty, the lack of a modern military capability, and its middle-sized economic power that can not compete with the USA as well.

Taiwan issue presents a significant example for China's consistent and peaceful foreign policy. China's policy is known as "One China" policy, which indicates the integrity of China including Taiwan. China continuously contended with Taiwan's efforts to be recognized by developing states and therefore offered aid programs and investment with precondition of their abolishing relations with Taiwan, as will be seen in the following chapter. As an example to power perception shift, Taiwan policy is challenged in accordance with Deng's strategy as can be summed up in "budu buwu - no independence, no war" policy.<sup>94</sup> The threats of war in case of Taiwan independency is replaced by the acceptance of status-quo. Moreover China signed historical agreements with Taiwan trying to ease the economic and cultural relations in 2008.<sup>95</sup> The reason would be to avoid probable obstacles not to stop the economic growth while presenting China's consistency with international order. But China's reaction to US arms sales to Taiwan in 2010 is significant to observe

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<sup>93</sup> 'China Today' Magazine, in <http://www.chinatoday.com/data/data.htm> , accessed on December 10, 2009. China has 700 million mobile phone and 338 million Internet users. These numbers eases the interconnectedness of Chinese society with the rest of the world with timely access to information.

<sup>94</sup> Guo, Sujian, *China's Peaceful Rise in 21st Century*, p. 201.

<sup>95</sup> Taipei Liaison Office of South Africa, <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=73262&ctNode=2122&mp=402&nowPage=1&pagesize=50>, accessed on December 10, 2009.



China's stance against the attempts to breach "One China" policy by China's threat to stop military relations with the USA.

Another issue is that economic expansion and military growth were perceived as a threat by western scholars and policy makers after 1990s. The origin of this thought can be found in the academic debates on shifting threat perceptions. For instance, Huntington argues that the source of conflict in international arena will be cultural, mentioning Islam and Confucianism as challenges to Western values and power.<sup>96</sup> For Huntington, only China poses a genuinely serious threat because it differs greatly from the United States in cultural traditions, life-style and value concepts. Bernstein and Munro published a book in 1997 titled as *The Coming Conflict with China* indicating China as the only challenger to the USA with its intangible power sources.<sup>97</sup> Apart from scholarly views, CNN survey on the threat perception of U.S. public confirms this thesis to some extent. The CNN Opinion Research Corporation poll was conducted in November 2009 with 1,014 adult Americans by telephone. The poll indicates that 51 percent of the US public considers China a military threat, while the 47 percent of the sample group were disagreeing. But 71 percent of Americans consider China as an economic threat to the U.S. and 68 percent suggest that China is doing a bad job disrespecting the human rights of its citizens.<sup>98</sup> The polls apparently shows that China is perceived as threat to the USA in the minds of the US public. It is China's economic growth and military build-up that ignites the "China threat" claims.

In response to western suspicious perception of "Chinese Threat", Chinese scholars and policy makers discovered strategies such as "peaceful rise, peaceful development, win-win policy"<sup>99</sup> that designate power perception shifts denouncing any ideological propaganda. These strategies can be fit to western collaborative power perceptions that were mentioned in Chapter 1, but they bear Chinese characteristics. For instance Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok claim that "China achieved equilibrium between a peaceful external environment and sustainable

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<sup>96</sup> Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 1993, pp. 22-49.

<sup>97</sup> Bernstein, Richard and Munro, Ross H., *The Coming Conflict With China*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997, pp. 1-24.

<sup>98</sup> CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/17/obama.china/index.html>, accessed on December 10, 2009.

<sup>99</sup> Guo, Sujian, *China's Peaceful Rise in 21st Century*, p. 1.

domestic development”<sup>100</sup> by claiming these strategies. Hence the discussion in China seems how to maintain continuous growth by having the West, mainly the USA, tolerating the Chinese policies within western IR power perceptions. It can be assumed that China claimed concepts in the form of strategies to inject her own IR thinking to the other international actors. It ought to be noticed that these strategies are not only theoretical visions and emerging values but also empiric implementations that suit Western norms.

The softening in the discourse level of the policies can be observed in the applied strategies of Chinese government. Even naming such strategies, as can be observed in “peaceful rise versus development” debate, became a point of discussion among Chinese elite and policy makers. The concept of peaceful development is derived from the debate about “Peaceful Rise” in Bo’ao Forum of 2003 by Zheng Bijian.<sup>101</sup> He claimed that Asia had a historically unique opportunity to rise peacefully while benefiting from China’s “peaceful rise”.<sup>102</sup> According to this strategy, China would pretend to apply integrative, cooperative power relations. Bijian’s view was, and still is, an acceptance of the regional and international order, an indicator of a status quo policy, and a tendency of not disrupting western policies in Asia. China’s “peaceful rise” was presented as offering opportunities, but never favouring revisionism. Revisionism means threat and challenge to international and regional order that China refrains. It can also be argued that Bijian’s determination offers China to have Asian countries “bandwagoning” to China and promotion to be a sticky power in close neighborhood. Asian states will benefit from China’s expanding growth and trade, but besides they will be economically dependent to China’s economy. They will have to pursue policies consistent with China’s interests not to disrupt her. Because it will be their benefit to be in consent with Chinese interests.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Yongnian, Zheng and Keat, Tok Sow, “China’s Peaceful Rise: Concept and Practice”, China Policy Institute of the University of Nottingham, 2005, p. 3.

<sup>101</sup> Bijian, Zeng, “The New Path of China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia”, Boao Forum for Asia, Nov 2003, p. 5-17. <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf>, accessed on December 11, 2008. Bijian is advisor to Chinese Communist Party leadership and Vice-President of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee.

<sup>102</sup> Bijian, Zeng, *China’s Peaceful Rise*, Washington DC, Brookings Institutions, 2005, pp. 1-15.

<sup>103</sup> Bijian, “The New Path of China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia”, p. 17.

According to Guo Sujian, the term “Peaceful Rise” was not accepted by the Chinese officials without questioning. “Rising” would be meant bloodshed and “rise” was the decline of the others that can justify the western “Chinese threat” theory.<sup>104</sup> “Rise” may be affiliated with the concept of “relative gain” as was put forward in Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism, that can be expressed as one’s gain is the other’s loss.<sup>105</sup> According to Sujian’s point of view, the term “rise” poses a threat to the major powers, and then the term “peaceful rising” had to be replaced by “peaceful development”. The term “development” recalls a peaceful modal that would not irritate the other states. Actually Chinese sensitivity over the words demonstrates the intent of the decision-makers and their employed policy. It is clear that abstaining from the word “rise” is the result of the implementation of the policy of former President Deng Xiaoping, which can be explained as “keep a low profile and never take the lead”.<sup>106</sup> China’s desire seems not to appal the western powers and not to start a competition in global affairs.

According to Ding, China’s power policy can be summarized as “more compliant with the existing international rules and norms; actively participated in various global and regional institutions; and gradually expanded its influence in the existing international economic institutions”<sup>107</sup>, which seems in accordance with Western liberal thinking. China, apparently, consents with established international norms. China’s memberships to international organizations offer a norm building power with extra privileges as one can witness in the United Nations Security Council. Agenda setting is a soft power method and China has this power under the roof of the UN to canalize the discussions related to Chinese interests. The Chinese policy can be described as “play along with, but not against the players; consent with the rules, but not appal the others”.

On the other hand, however, the strategy of “bide time, hide capacity” brings hesitation about the real intention of China if it pursues a western IR thinking or pretend to be a follower of the West whilst pursuing her own power perception to

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<sup>104</sup> Guo, *China’s Peaceful Rise in 21st Century*, p. 2.

<sup>105</sup> Mearsheimer, John J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, Norton, 2001, p. 36.

<sup>106</sup> Guo, *China’s Peaceful Rise in 21st Century*, p. 2.

<sup>107</sup> Ding, Sheng, *The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power*, New York, Lexington Books, p. 10.

be a future hegemon. China's power perceptions can be determined as being evolved from "unconscious" realist thinking in her own standards to a realist conception adopting the western context blended with Chinese characteristics. The question that will be a point of debate is if China is playing with the rules of the western powers to be more powerful or an honest, just and responsible actor in international era. Whatever the discussion on China's real intention is, it is a fact that China overtly pursues policies and employs strategies compliant with the Nye's soft power conception, although Nye's framework of soft power does not solely cover China's soft power perception. The universally respected values such as peace, harmony, mutual gain, tolerance, cooperation and responsible code of conducts in international politics became China's methodologies of IR thinking with its own *sui generis* applications. Then, it ought to be discussed what China perceives from the concept of soft power in comparison to the western scholars' conceptual claims.

## **2.2. China's Soft Power Conception:**

The first western International Relations texts were translated into Chinese in 1981. Eleven years later, the western concept of soft power was imported to the Chinese social sciences via the translation of "Bound to Lead" of Nye by He Xiaodong in 1992. Two years after its release, the idea of soft power versus hard power was presented as "mental" versus "material" power in Chinese academic debate.<sup>108</sup> But the Tiananmen student movement of 1989 and harsh reaction of security forces may be conceived as a flashback in soft power perception of Chinese policy makers, mainly for former President Deng. Liberal values of the West were announced as guilty while blaming the protesters to attempt destroying China's evolution of socialism and "spiritual civilization"<sup>109</sup> of China.

Western perception of soft power concept was put into the agenda of academics and domestic public after the fears of the Tiananmen incidents disappeared in the minds of policy makers at the end of 1990s. It was 2004 when President Hu Jintao and

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<sup>108</sup> Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, p. 26.

<sup>109</sup> Kane, Thomas, "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy", *Department of Politics and Asian Studies of Hull University*, UK, 2001, p. 4. Deng proposed the four basic principles of China in 1979, which is known as "spiritual civilization". These principles can be summoned as "We must keep to the socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold the leadership of the Communist Party, uphold Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought".

Premier Wen Jibao attributed the importance of social sciences as an important component of China's "soft power".<sup>110</sup> The remark of soft power in their speeches was the first emphasis of the concept in Chinese intellectual debates, although it was vogue what they had meant by soft power. The term and context of "soft power" in Chinese academic studies were initially framed by proposals of Nye as Chinese cultural attraction, internal political implementation of socialist practices and reliable foreign policy. As can be seen in the speeches and statements before media, Chinese politicians are aware of the conceptual power shifts after the termination of Cold War, with the reality of declining hard power, but expanding soft power.

China implements a policy prioritizing and claiming to be a soft power where scholars of social sciences in China strictly recommends and favours implementation of soft power policies to be a responsible power. But the question is whether Chinese intellectuals and policymakers perceive soft power as Nye suggested. Nye's framework of soft power concept was initially benefited to justify the Chinese soft power. But further expansion of debate and its practices turned the Chinese perception *sui generis*. Nye had claimed cultural attraction, political values and foreign policy as sources of soft power for the USA. Hence Chinese perception will be searched in the context of these sources, and additionally its own perception of soft power.

### **2.2.1. Cultural Source of Chinese Soft Power:**

Every dominant power wants to expand its culture, as well as its military and economic power, [and China is not an exception for this attempt].<sup>111</sup> Moreover China has extra advantages in comparison to the other power wielders. It has a 5,000 years old tradition and cultural accumulation that influenced a wide geography in South and East Asia. Hence, the role of culture in Chinese soft power may be discerned in historical perceptions of Chinese in comparison to economic and military strength. Historically, "Sino-centrism and assumption of Chinese cultural superiority"<sup>112</sup> are significant characteristics to describe the behavioural tendency of Chinese in relations with the other cultures. Chinese culture possessed

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<sup>110</sup> Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, p. 27.

<sup>111</sup> Wight, Martin, *Power Politics*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 144.

<sup>112</sup> Fairbank, John K., *Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1968, p. 2.

the power of assimilation, in other words “localization”, of foreign societies while converting their traditions and adopting them into Chinese life style. For instance Buddhism, as a religion, is accepted by Chinese people until it had to transform itself to the teachings of Chinese culture.<sup>113</sup> It is a common belief among Chinese that China has the ability to export its cultural values.<sup>114</sup>

Besides it can be argued that historically the attraction of Chinese culture worked outwards and continuously exported values to the neighbouring regions by its own osmosis.<sup>115</sup> In accordance with the Tang Dynasty’s (618-906) centralization of China’s northern and southern parts, Chinese cultural heritage was unified and Chinese literature reached to its peak both inside and outside to neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Korea and Japan. The voyages of Chinese monks, like Jianzhen in 8<sup>th</sup> century, exported the Chinese culture and arts to the neighbouring countries. Fairbank and Reischauer argues that the societies of East Asia came from ancient China and developed within the Chinese culture as can be proved by the Chinese ideographic writing system, the Confucian classical teachings about family and social order, the official examination system, and the imperial Chinese monarchy and bureaucracy. Silk Road that connected the Chinese cities to the Western civilization not only provided the trade of Chinese goods, but also passed the cultural bids as well as innovations like gun powder and compass. Porcelain and silk passed both the basic daily utensils along with cultural symbols on it when Europe had no technology and customs to produce and consume them.<sup>116</sup>

Contrary to the glorious past, the decline of Chinese cultural attractiveness was witnessed due to Western semi colonial attempts in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially in terms of spiritual life. There occurred the loss of self confidence in building spiritual superiority over the outside world and dislodged Chinese intellectuals from Confucian teaching. On the basis of the breach of self confidence in this century, Mao practiced an isolationist policy denouncing the four “old”s – old ideas, old

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<sup>113</sup> Chan, Wing-Tsit, “Transformation of Buddhism in China”, *Philosophy East and West*, University of Hawaii Press, 7/3, 1957, pp. 107-116. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397344?seq=4>, accessed on December 14, 2009. Chan clarifies how Buddhism in Chinese characteristics flourished in various Chinese schools of thought.

<sup>114</sup> Glasser, Bonnie S. and Murphy, Melissa E., “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate” in McGiffert, Carola (ed.) *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States*, CSIS Smart Power Initiative, March 2009, p. 13. [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305\\_mcgiffert\\_chinesesoftpower\\_web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf), accessed on April, 11, 2009.

<sup>115</sup> Ding, *The Dragon’s Hidden Wing*, p. 66.

<sup>116</sup> Fairbank and Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation*, pp. 3-54.

culture, old customs, and old habits, triggering the decline of Chinese culture all around the world. But Deng Xiaoping's reform process and open door policy, again, paved the way for a dynamic rise of China's culture while the destructive effect of Tiananmen incidents in 1989 downgraded this cultural diffusion. Tiananmen incidents urged the Chinese politicians to suffer more in order to build a positive image of China. This desire of building a positive image fastened the efforts of having soft power rather than hard power for China.<sup>117</sup>

This awareness pushed China to combine culture and ideology to have the Chinese system more attractive to both its domestic and international public. In this framework, the concept of "Three Principles", which was announced after the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2000, emphasized culture as the source of Chinese power. The culture was remarked as "Chinese advanced culture" in the statement of Plenary Session which was meant as "a socialist culture with Chinese characteristics". The same statement interpreted the term with the context of developing a national, scientific, and popular culture that is geared to the needs of modernization, the world and the future. The term 'advanced culture' is benefited to prompt "lofty ideals, moral integrity, good education and a strong sense of discipline" to reach socialism with Chinese characteristics.<sup>118</sup> The cultural perception of Communist party seems to be blended with ideology and desired model of citizenship. The motivation of Chinese leaders is not only to introduce the magnificent Chinese culture, but to present Chinese culture blended with Chinese socialist system acceptable by both domestic and international public.

As a result of this perception, many remarks to Chinese 'advanced' culture can be observed in the speeches of Chinese leaders and policies of Chinese government. Chinese emphasis on 'advanced' culture appeared to be termed as "soft power" of China by Chinese leadership after Nye alluded the concept of soft power and found a vast amount of audience to his concept. China's leaders' belief seems that China's rise should be based not only on its economic, political, and military power but also

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<sup>117</sup> Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, p. 67.

<sup>118</sup> The Communist Party of China, official website, <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html>, accessed on December 18, 2009.

on its soft power, which is mainly its ‘advanced’ culture.<sup>119</sup> For instance China’s Premier Wen Jiabao indicated the Chinese culture as a method of mutual interaction with international community in his speech delivered in Harvard University on December 10, 2003. Wen emphasized China’s attraction in terms of Chinese civilization, culture, the spread of eastern learning and China’s dedication to peace while describing China as a developing country and explaining why China needed progress. He underlined the strategy of China as not based on military or coercive methods but on promoting world peace and development, which were essentially inherited in Chinese culture.<sup>120</sup> He indicated the teachings of Confucius, Tao, and even Sun Yat Sen of Taiwan as the pillars of the Chinese culture binding and regulating the family, the country and the society, moreover source of interests for the western scholars. But the significant issue is that he did not mention socialism in Chinese characteristics as part of Chinese ‘advanced’ culture. The motivation behind this ignorance would be not to irritate the international public by propagating the Chinese ideology, but to make the Chinese culture attractive.

The reason of frequent emphasis of Chinese culture in various speeches and documentation may be the efficiency and low cost of culture in promoting power.<sup>121</sup> The possession of leadership in dominating international realm, especially in developing and under-developed countries, requires a prevalent cultural diffusion. The one who wants to be a leading actor of international system ought to have the other actors to accept and tolerate the presence and existence of her culture. Culture makes dominance perennial, but also becomes a point of competition. But the feature of cultural competition is that it is peaceful, integrative and fruitful. In this context, President Hu Jintao evidently called for a mobilization of “Chinese culture as the country's soft power” at the 17th National Congress of Communist Party in 2007, arguing that “culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion, creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition

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<sup>119</sup> Lai, Hongyi, “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power”, *East Asian Institute*, 308, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>120</sup> Jibao, Wen, “Turning Your Eyes to China”, Speech in Harvard University on December 10, 2003, <http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html>, accessed on June 06, 2008.

<sup>121</sup> Majie, Zu, “The Role of Soft Power in International Relations” in Xintian, Yu (ed.) *Cultural Impact on International Relation: Chinese Philosophical Studies*, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington DC, 2002, p. 41.



in overall national strength.”<sup>122</sup> Hu Jintao points soft power serving “to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests”. In this connection, Jintao proposed the development of a socially responsible media; a good internet culture and cyber environment; non-profit cultural programs associated with cultural rights and interests; cultural industries, investments and markets; and a system of honours for cultural workers.<sup>123</sup> His remarks are focused on domestic needs rather than international public. The aim of his speech may be perceived as describing the culture to contribute to the unity and loyalty of the Chinese society by culture's apotheosis. Jintao's focus apparently includes the economic dimension of culture as an industry and benefiting from culture as an icon of trade, which will ease the diffusion of Chinese culture. But his brief premise of “soft power” seems to be challenging the priorities of Chinese politics, especially in terms of image building and nation branding.

In terms of image building, culture is an essential component for wielding soft power. The image of a country may be promoted and presented by its cultural activities such as its ideology, religion, traditions, arts, language, music, science, literature, education and many other practices of social life. China has the chance to address most of these cultural features. Examples can easily be found to confirm this proposal. Chinese Universities host more and more foreign students each year. Although there are critiques about the religious freedom of Chinese public, China tries to benefit from world wide respect to Buddhism and teachings of Confucius, Mencius and Tao. Chinese folk music has its own distinguished characteristic different from popular music and has its own audience. Chinese movie industry reflects the historical richness and cultural characteristics as can be witnessed in movies like *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*.<sup>124</sup>

The efforts of diffusing culture have been eased in comparison to previous decades due to globalization process. Globalization offers China a great opportunity to

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<sup>122</sup> People Daily, <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92187/6283148.html> , accessed on April 01, 2008.

<sup>123</sup> Chinaview, website, “Hu Jintao calls for Enhancing Soft Power of Chinese Culture”, 17th CPC National Congress on Scientific Outlook on Development, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content\\_6883748.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6883748.htm), accessed on April 01, 2008.

<sup>124</sup> Balding, Christopher, “A Dragon Buffet World: The Emergence of Chinese Soft Power”, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, p. 20. [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/9/8/0/8/pages98082/p98082-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/0/8/pages98082/p98082-1.php), accessed on December 15, 2009.

promote the Chinese culture by rising communication, trade, common consumption and free flow of information capabilities.<sup>125</sup> It is much easier to spread culture and attract the sympathy of the global population with low costs, if the diminishing barriers of interaction between states are concerned. Chinese calligraphy, ideology, justification of cultural diversities can be published smoothly to international society. Advertisement of the cultural figures is cheaper and easier. But the danger, especially for China, is the vulnerability of domestic public to the foreign cultures. Cultural tools of westerners such as Internet, movies, music industry and living conditions attract the Chinese people, while downgrading the soft power of China to her own society. If the sensitiveness of the Chinese demographic structure, in terms of ethnicity, is concerned, Chinese culture can be claimed to be open to the danger of corrosion. But the advantage of China is the perception of Han Chinese majority who are traditionally proud of their own history and culture. Additionally, ideological propaganda, education system and control mechanism of foreign media helps to limit the subversive effect of foreign cultures.

The cultural diplomacy can be observed in Chinese foreign diplomacy as ways of wielding soft confidence and attraction. For instance, “panda diplomacy” was aimed to influence international public opinion, lowering Cold War tensions and easing China’s entry into the world stage in the 1980s.<sup>126</sup> Pandas were given as gifts to foreign state leaders, as a gesture of peace and friendship. Actually it was common between the heads of the states and monarchs to exchange gifts such as horses, birds or dogs. But Panda was the ultimate gift in Chinese understanding presenting Chinese goodwill in delivering political messages to foreign societies. In another words, Pandas became cultural icons of Chinese diplomacy.<sup>127</sup> For instance Chinese “Panda” diplomacy towards Taiwan is a significant case. Chinese leadership offered two pandas to Taiwan in 2005, but Taiwanese pro-independence leadership refused them.<sup>128</sup> The reason for this decision was that Pandas were named as ‘Tuan Tuan’ and ‘Yuan Yuan’, that the union of these words ‘Tuan Yuan’

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<sup>125</sup> Zhao, Suisheng, “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s”, *The China Quarterly*, 152, 1997, p. 745.

<sup>126</sup> Chey, Jocelyn, “Gentle Dragon”, <http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/content/view/7442/85/>, accessed on December 19, 2007.

<sup>127</sup> BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4508873.stm>, accessed on August 28, 2009.

<sup>128</sup> China Post, Newspaper, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2008/01/09/138299/Taiwan-rejects.htm>, accessed on December 18, 2009.

means 're-union'. Panda's delivery as a gift from Chinese public was described as a propaganda attempt by the Taiwanese government, even though unofficial polls in Taiwan was indicating the public support to accept Pandas as 50%. But, the new Taiwanese government after 2008 elections was pro-union with China and announced that they accepted the Pandas. When Pandas arrived in Taiwan, "Pandamania" has started according to Taiwan media.<sup>129</sup> Public buses, shops were decorated by the Panda icons. Pandas and China became popular among the Taiwanese people despite Taiwanese opposition accused China delivering a political message. 'Tuan Tuan' and 'Yuan Yuan' interpreted as the icon of union, "which were perfectly matched Beijing's goal of bringing Taiwan into its fold".<sup>130</sup> Actually the names of the Pandas clearly confirm China's intention as Taiwan could not be excluded from the Chinese unity and Panda was the gesture of the common cultural unity. The intense interest of Taiwanese public was a chance for Chinese government to deliver these messages to the minds of Taiwanese that would bring out long term acquisition.

There are also challenges in Chinese thinking for its own society in accordance with President Jintao's perception of cultural aspect of Chinese soft power. One example for this challenge is the regime's policy change towards 'religion' as an element of cultural feature of any society. China's communist structure banned religion and kept the practitioners under strict control for many years. China was continuously criticized due to heavy constraints on religion. But cultural dimension of China's opening policy allowed citizens to practice their beliefs, although there are still control mechanisms on religious affairs. This limited freedom is advertised by Chinese government and used as a source of attraction in image building efforts. Chinese have become active in various international Christian organizations and Chinese Buddhist Associations' Network across Asia after 1980s.<sup>131</sup> As an example for development in religious affairs, World Buddhist Forum was hosted in China on April 12, 2006 whose slogan was the extension of President Hu Jintao's famous

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<sup>129</sup> Sina, Newspaper, <http://english.sina.com/china/p/2008/1223/206907.html>, accessed on December 18, 2009.

<sup>130</sup> BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7796312.stm>, accessed on December 18, 2009.

<sup>131</sup> Hunter, Alan, "China and Soft Power", *Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies*, Coventry University, 2008, UK, pp. 18-19. <http://www.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/external/content/1/c4/11/36/v1229079768/user/China%20and%20Soft%20Power.pdf>, accessed on August 30, 2009.

expression of “Harmonious world”:<sup>132</sup> “Harmonious world begins in the mind”.<sup>133</sup> The political message of the Forum was blended with the spirit of Buddhist belief and China’s sympathy to Buddhism reminding the pioneering role of China.

The reason of presenting a transforming image pending to religious sect might be the Chinese aspirations to present itself as a moderate and tolerating country, reducing the level of prejudice towards the Communist regime. As an example, Buddhism is benefitted to address the neighbour societies of China. Buddhism is widespread mainly in the neighbouring Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Cambodia at the neighbourhood of China that is at the core of China’s sphere of influence. Many schools of Buddhism were spread to these countries by the Chinese figures and perception, which can be named as ‘Sinified Buddhism’.<sup>134</sup> China can be claimed to attempt to gain sympathy of the public in these countries through promoting Buddhism. It is clear that China’s influence on domestic practitioners and Chinese overseas populations will be enhanced by the Chinese toleration to Buddhism. For instance, Chinese ‘cultural diplomacy’ based on Buddhism is the development of relations between China and Sri Lanka. President of the Buddhist Association of China, Shi Yie Chang, paid a visit to Sri Lanka with a 125 member strong Buddhist delegation in 2007 to develop closer interactions and enhance the bilateral Buddhist cultural relations between the two countries. The visit of the delegation was encouraged by the State leaders of both countries. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated the visit and The Beijing Television Network (BTV), the second largest television network in China accompanied them to cover the visit and prepare a series of documentaries on Buddhism, Culture and Tourism.<sup>135</sup> The Buddhist communities of both countries were informed about the common religious background and traditions of practicing the same faith. The meaning of such an attempt may be explained by China’s

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<sup>132</sup> China Daily, [http://english.china.com/zh\\_cn/news/china/11020307/20071015/14392767.html](http://english.china.com/zh_cn/news/china/11020307/20071015/14392767.html), accessed on June 09, 2008. Jintao delivered the expression ‘harmonious world’ in the UN summit on May 16, 2005 and enhanced the deepness of this expression by introducing it as a concept in his report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

<sup>133</sup> Beijing Review, [http://www.bjreview.com.cn/letter/txt/2006-12/16/content\\_51067.htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/letter/txt/2006-12/16/content_51067.htm), accessed on, June 08, 2008 .

<sup>134</sup> Maps of World, website, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-countries-with-largest-buddhist-populations-map.html>, accessed on June 08, 2008.

<sup>135</sup> Buddhist Channel TV, <http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=43,4750,0,0,1,0>, accessed on December 17, 2009.

intention to build influential relations with Sri Lankan decision makers and public. In the case of Sri Lanka, India's enmity to both China and Sri Lanka may be a factor of benefiting Buddhism to promote the mutual cooperation. But it is a fact that culture is used in this relation as a tool of Chinese attraction.

More than religion, culture is intertwined with language. Language is the principle means of culture and when it is used in the context of communication, it is bound up with culture in multiple and complex ways. Language presents a stock of knowledge that consist facts, ideas, events, attitudes, and beliefs. It gives meaning to the understandings of people who speak the language as a 'cultural value'.<sup>136</sup> Chinese language is no exception for these features. Chinese language and its written form present a continuum and unity of Chinese culture. Although dialects dramatically change from one region to another and simplification and standardization efforts of Chinese language during 1950s favoured the Peking Chinese dialect in the frame of nation branding attempts of the Communist Party, written form of Chinese remained almost unchanged and facilitated different parts of the country to communicate with each other without any problem.<sup>137</sup> That fact would be the reason that Chinese language conveyed the cultural components of Chinese society preserving the early common features. Especially the dialect spoken at the south, which is called as "Mandarin – Putonghua" appeared to be the common ground of communicating with all Chinese and neighbouring countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia. Mandarin is on par with English in these countries as a lingua Franca.<sup>138</sup> Chinese economic growth and predictions on China to be a big power in near future made the Chinese language attractive. Hence, the effort of teaching Chinese as a second language is systematically boosted by Chinese government.

In the frame of teaching Chinese as a second language, China's Ministry of Education officially reveals that "the efforts to teach Chinese commenced as early as two years after China's revolution and were directed to the Eastern European

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<sup>136</sup> Kramsch, Claire J., *Language and Culture*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 3.

<sup>137</sup> Norman, Jerry, *Chinese*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 1-3.

<sup>138</sup> Kane, Daniel, *The Chinese Language: Its History and Current Usage*, Singapore, Tuttle Publishing, 2006, pp. 13-19.

countries”.<sup>139</sup> The motivation of spreading Chinese language seems to be ideological concern not against western ‘capitalists’, but rivalling Soviets. Bulgaria was the first country that a group of Chinese linguists had been sent. For this purpose, China established Beijing Language College for teaching Chinese in 1962. Chinese language instructors were sent to Egypt, Mali, Congo, Cambodia and Yemen, and France as well. The Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong was a set back to these efforts until opening up policy of Deng Xiaoping which remarkably improved the language teaching aspirations. Structural adjustments of Deng era made available to teach more than 40,000 students a year in more than 300 Chinese colleges.<sup>140</sup> The Confucius Institutes<sup>141</sup> are designed to spread the teaching of Chinese culture and language in the hosting countries and additionally support Chinese Overseas in terms of tradition and culture. The variety of the activities in these institutes significantly is affiliated with the soft power efforts of China that is well designed in terms of public diplomacy. The structure and activities of these Institutes can be resembled to the similar organizations of the other big powers such as British Council and Goethe Institute. The Confucius Institutes and the comparison with the other cultural organizations will be examined in Chapter 4.

To what extent Chinese is popular as a second language among foreigners and what outcomes can China obtain by language teaching to the other societies? The response to these questions will identify the Mandarin’s contribution to Chinese soft power wielding efforts. Popularity may be measured by the attendees to the Chinese teaching programs. Although Chinese is a difficult language because of the outnumbered symbols, its similarities to the South Asian countries’ languages easily promoted Chinese language to a regional business language. For instance, Chinese language was preferred in American schools at the seventh order with 51.582

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<sup>139</sup> Ministry of Education of PRC, [http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international\\_11.htm](http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international_11.htm), accessed on May 02, 2008. Currently, there are more than 330 colleges offering Chinese programs in China, receiving about 40,000 foreign students to learn Chinese every year. Furthermore there are 36 Chinese language examination sites in China and 35 abroad. More than 142,000 people have participated in the language proficiency tests.

<sup>140</sup> Ministry of Education of PRC, [http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international\\_11.htm](http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international_11.htm), accessed on May 02, 2008.

<sup>141</sup> HANBAN, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/412360.htm>, accessed on May 02, 2008. Its headquarters is in Beijing and is under the Office of Chinese Language Council International or Hanban. Currently, there are 290 institutes all over the world’s respective universities. Mentioned institutes are dealing with not only language, but also cultural activities and Chinese entertainment shows.

students attending Chinese courses in 2006.<sup>142</sup> Now, Chinese replaced French and German in American schools and promoted to the second preferred foreign language after Spanish.<sup>143</sup> There are Chinese programs in more than 550 elementary, junior high and senior high schools, which represent a 100 percent increase in two years. The enrolment in Chinese-language classes has increased 51 percent since 2002.<sup>144</sup>

The figures show that Chinese language became more popular in comparison to 1980s. The reasons may be various. The societies living at China's neighbourhood, speaking different languages are attracted by the business opportunities with Chinese companies. China's economic power is changing attitudes towards Mandarin, especially in Southeast Asia.<sup>145</sup> The one who wants to conduct business ought to learn a bit from the Chinese Mandarin in the region. Another perception may be counted as "prediction and threat" approach. There is an expectation on China's economic and military growth heading to be a big power. China may be perceived as a threat by decision makers. But, in any case, Chinese language learning will be encouraged in order to benefit or to counter the Chinese reality. China may benefit from this dilemma. Because it will be the Chinese government that will direct the language teaching. China will try to diffuse its culture and popularize its image to counter the originators of "threat theory" while exporting Mandarin.

The outcomes to be obtained by language teaching are multi-faceted. The initial outcome can be argued as introducing Chinese culture and having the culture acceptable in frame of image building. Language teaching cannot be differed from culture teaching. Themes of language teaching such as words skills, topic of conversations, background details of materials like selected pictures give messages

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<sup>142</sup> Association of Department of Foreign Languages, "Enrollments in Languages other than English in United States", Institutions of Higher Education, Fall 2006, <http://web2.adfl.org/ADFL/bulletin/v39n2/adfl.039.2.066.pdf>, accessed on June 09, 2008. The number of Chinese learners has increased from 28,456 in 1998 to 34,153 in 2002 by 20%. If the number of learners in 2006, which is 51,582, is compared, the change is 52% for the years 2002-2006.

<sup>143</sup> Rawnsley, D. Garry, "A Survey of China's Public Diplomacy", University of Souther California, 2007. [http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog\\_detail/070502\\_a\\_survey\\_of\\_chinas\\_public\\_diplomacy/](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/070502_a_survey_of_chinas_public_diplomacy/) accessed on May 03, 2008.

<sup>144</sup> USA TODAY, newspaper, [http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-11-19-mandarin-cover\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-11-19-mandarin-cover_N.htm), accessed on June 09, 2008.

<sup>145</sup> Guardian, newspaper, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/sep/23/tefl>, accessed on December 20, 2009.

to the learners. Language increases not only cultural diffusion, but also tourism and trade based on cultural products. As a result, public opinion can be influenced and shaped. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's position is significant in terms of Mandarin teaching and obtained outcomes for China. Rudd learned Chinese language in 1970s in Australian National University.<sup>146</sup> His background eased the efforts of spreading the language teaching of Asian countries, mainly Mandarin, in Australia. Accordingly Australia allocated a budget of 60 millions USD to encourage the education of Asian languages as a second language. Joshua Kurlantzick argues that language teaching activities of China and its image building efforts in Australia paved the way of obtaining an affirmative perception of China. He compares the visits of American President George W. Bush in 2003 and Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2004. The former was met by protests in both Australian Parliament and public. But Jintao was welcomed in a warm manner while being praised by media. China was presented as the developing country that would challenge the USA after the collapse of Soviets.<sup>147</sup>

Consequently China has built a global strategy of public diplomacy based on culture. Culture and diplomacy are well coordinated in China's perspective with the self confidence of possessing a historical heritage of culture. The activities such as religious interaction, language teaching, media's coverage, and many other fields of cultural interaction are well designed to meet the needs of diplomacy. The central control of the regime makes the attempts of image building by means of cultural activities pragmatic and fast going. Chinese overseas and minorities in the neighbourhoods may be claimed as the essential targets of cultural interaction. But current Chinese cultural attempt covers not only these Chinese societies, but also foreign publics. The cultural heritage of Chinese civilization is heavily linked with the Chinese soft power as can be deduced from the statements of Jibao and Jintao. The motivation of benefiting from culture in wielding soft power may be to obtain the acceptability and toleration of foreign communities, to shape the public opinions and convert common opinions to have political gaining. Culture softens the societies and prepares them to the penetration of dominant state. China, with her

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<sup>146</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/sgjs/sghd/t474332.htm>, accessed on August 16, 2009.

<sup>147</sup> Kurtlanzick, Joshua, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, New York, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 3-5.



great history and cultural strength has the opportunity to benefit from her culture in wielding soft power. But it should be underlined that China has started to diffuse its culture after 1990 without ideological motivations and still at the early phases of cultural expansion.

### **2.2.2 Political Source of Chinese Soft Power:**

Nye argues that soft power rests also on political values of a country that are both practiced in domestic and in the international realm.<sup>148</sup> Then Chinese political values ought to be clarified to determine on what basis these values are perceived and how credible they are in the eyes of domestic and international public. Do the political values of China have the capacity to urge societies to conceive China reliable and consistent with universal values? The methodology to answer these questions will be based on the *sui generis* characteristics of China since political values of any country emanates from its own history, traditions, and perception of international values as well. Hence Chinese political values will be discussed, first of all, in the frame of Chinese history and the current Communist regime. Afterwards, Chinese perception of international political values will be investigated. The implementation of the values and the statements of the policymakers will be compared with the political applications of Chinese government to identify to what extent China is consistent. Finally, the correlation between Chinese perception of political values and the outcomes of their implementations in the frame of Chinese soft power will be contrasted to conclude this part of study.

The first issue that shaped the Chinese political values is the teachings of Chinese thinkers such as Confucianism, Moism, and social contract concept of Mencius, Taoism of Chung Tzu, or legalism of Hsün Tzu.<sup>149</sup> If the Chinese political values

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<sup>148</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 11.

<sup>149</sup> Hooker, Richard, "World Civilizations", Washington State University Distant Learning Resources, <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/CHPHIL/CONF.HTM>, accessed on December 21, 2009. Hooker summarizes the Chinese teachings that add value to the Chinese philosophy. He argues that Confucius (551-479 BC) thought can be framed by humaneness, goodness, virtue and benevolence in keeping peace and order. Music and dance is encouraged by Confucius to reflect order and the concept of behavior in social life. Mo Tzu (470-391 B.C.) has the belief that all human beings were fundamentally equal in the eyes of heaven. But this equality is not bounded by the society that is being lived in. He underlines a universal equality of humans that responsibility extends to the people even not known. Hence, a universal love, rather than partial love, should be preferred. The teaching of Mencius (372-289 B.C.) is similar to Confucius regarding peace and goodness, but underlines the social relationship that gives birth to duty in the society. His emphasis is "social contract" of modern times. He argues that revolt is possible if the governor cannot bring order and peace. Taoism of Chuang Tzu (369-286 B.C.) avoids public duty and has no concern on state affairs pushing forward the passivity of the state. The state's existence is accepted, but State would not wage war, would not be complex, would not interfere in people's lives, but ideally, would be inactive, serving mainly as a guide rather than as a governor. Legalism of

are taken into consideration in its historical context, a well designed socio-political order can be observed in the frame of Chinese teachings. Even though a competition was witnessed between the supporters of various teachings, especially those of legalists and Confucianism, Han dynasty succeeded to unify all the rival schools of Chinese thought and philosophy, that was named as “Han Synthesis”. The offered credibility to the teachings by Hans shaped the social, administrative and spiritual life of Chinese society. For instance, the examination system to select the elite to the administrative positions was based on the knowledge on the values imposed by the mix of teachings. Traditional domestic political values contributed to the emerging model of governance not only in China, but also in Korea and Japan until 19<sup>th</sup> century. This governance style can be described as centralized system of governance, uniform legal system, equal allocation system, religious policy that tolerates all faiths, integrated ethnic minorities, standardized school systems and value-derivate policy applications.<sup>150</sup> Hence Chinese political values were prominent in South East Asia.

The introduction of western thinking to the South East Asian countries declined the influence of Chinese teachings lowering the soft power of China in terms of political efficiency; because China was also a receiver of Western teachings until the establishment of Peoples Republic of China in 1949. But Mao Zedong Thought, as an internal political dynamic of China, increased its appeal on many groups of people in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even to some leftists in Western Europe and the United States. In the developing world, political groups and symbol names of revival movements, like Ernesto Che Guevara, equated Maoism with the struggle against Western colonialism and used this ideology mainstream as a tool for winning national independence. In other words, Mao Thought replaced the influential Chinese teachings after 1950s.

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Hsün Tzu (298-238 B.C.) differs from these philosophers believed due to his approach to the human being. Contrary to Confucius and Mencius's teachings, all human beings were born fundamentally depraved, selfish, greedy, and lustful. However, this was not an entirely dark and pessimistic view of humanity because humans could be made good through acculturation and education. If the teachings are compared to each other, it can be argued that the source of the teachings except legalists is based on the superiority of “Middle Kingdom”, in other words China, which is inherited from the nature. The order of the nature requires the social order in the community. The Emperor who holds the title of “Mandate of the Heaven” observes this order. The moral pillars of these teachings are based on spiritual beliefs. But legalists resemble realist school of IR. They recognize the immorality in state affairs and necessity to take harsh measures in case of the survivability.

<sup>150</sup> Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, p. 77.

Despite this popularity of Maoist Thought mainly in non-western world, western scholars denoted the non-western thoughts lack of credibility. For instance, Morgenthau's "national morale approach"<sup>151</sup> criticizes the absence of democratic rule, ethnical or national dissention, and class divisions. If Morgenthau's approach is applied to China, China's national morale may be conceived as 'low' due to existing 'authoritarian regime' and 'the denial of basic civil human rights' in the eyes of western thinking. The discussion about the political structure of China, however, is contradictory. The questions are whether such a huge number of population and wide number of ethnical groupings can be governed by a western type of democratic system and to what extent full participation of public in political decision making process brings stability and welfare. It can be claimed that Morgenthau's approach can hardly be applied to China, if the integrity and unity of China is desired. As an example, Tiananmen incidents indicated that western type political movements will bring instability to China in the eyes of the Communist Party. Hence "democracy with Chinese characteristics" is frequently mentioned by pro-government elites. For instance former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, indicated the necessity of knowing "the basic Chinese values in order to have a good understanding of what has happened and what will happen in China", underlining the socialism with Chinese characteristics as "the absorption and learning process is by no means one of simple imitation and China can not copy the development model of Western capitalist countries, nor can it mechanically follow other countries' models of building socialism".<sup>152</sup>

Chinese Premier Jibao also agrees with Zemin's approach that China should take its own path in enhancing democracy. He describes the Chinese democracy and rule-of-law blended with socialism, which still has a room for improvement, with two pioneering tasks: "to liberate and develop the productive forces to vastly increase the material wealth of the whole society" and "to achieve social fairness and justice, fire the creativity of the whole nation and promote social harmony".<sup>153</sup> Jibao's

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<sup>151</sup> Morgenthau, *The Politics among Nations*, p. 197.

<sup>152</sup> Zemin, Jiang, "President Jiang Spells out Chinese Values", October 22, 1999, <http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/jiangzemin-chinesevalues.htm>, accessed on October 02, 2008.

<sup>153</sup> China Elections, website, <http://www.chinaelections.net/newsinfo.asp?newsid=1221>, accessed on December 24, 2009. The statement of Prime Minister Wen Jibao is released as an article in the official newspaper of Chinese Communist Party, People's Daily in Chinese language.

article entirely underlines reform and innovation in ‘productive socialism’ to lead a prosperous society under the auspices of peaceful development that requires a peaceful international environment, but also an internal harmony and contribution to peace. As an initial analysis, it is clear that Jibao perceives western capitalism as rival and praises the own socialist thinking of democracy and own perception of rule-of-law. His point of view is built upon production and innovation that will bring forward the economic reconstruction of the country to keep China firm and united. Hence Chinese socialist political perception is tied up with competition with capitalism benefiting from the peaceful international and domestic environment while bearing the experiences of Chinese history in mind. Communist Party and socialism is perceived as a “must” over Chinese political values by Jibao.

What events forced Jibao to denote the “democracy with Chinese characteristics”? The response can be searched in the socio-economic and political challenges of 1980s. Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989 and the demise of Soviet Union echoed warnings to the Chinese leadership. A fuse had to be established to take the pressure of society out. Hence a gradual political reform process had been initiated such as inner democracy in the Communist Party’s institutions, village level elections, countering corruption and establishing good governance. But the process should not be perceived as the adoption of western liberal values. Chinese intellectuals and society is well aware of the fact that western type of liberal democracy will not favour the Chinese Communist Party. But they also do not want to apply orthodox Marxism as Soviets did. Hence the elites in the Communist Party put in place the concept of ‘soft authoritarianism’ that indicates the mix of successful political undertakings such as education programs of Communist Party’s cadres on ideology and good governance, freedom of requesting information from the local level offices to provide transparency, increasing role of National People’s Congress on Communist Party, secret vote and open counting system in local elections.<sup>154</sup> It is clear that such attempts of reforming the Communist Party and state affairs are progresses, but still far from the western style of democracy.

Apart from what Chinese leadership strives for, the perception of domestic and international public is crucial to identify the political values of China as soft power

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<sup>154</sup> Bergsten, Fred C., Freeman, Charles, Lardy, Nicholas R. and Derek J., Mitchell, *China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities*, Washington DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008, pp. 57-64.

source. Mark Leonard underlines two new currencies in Chinese politics as “new left or conservatives (to the reforms)” versus “new right or liberals” in the recent years. Both currencies have their own criteria to grade the current political process in domestic arena and different optimistic or pessimistic approaches to the future status of China. New leftists want a market-oriented reform process under the central authority of Communist Party, providing economic welfare to Chinese people – that is so called “neo-authoritarian school”. New rightists or liberals demand for a political reform that will be based on multi-party system and free elections that will transform China to Western type of democratic state.<sup>155</sup> Because, according to new rightists, China’s current serious problems like social injustice and environmental degradation are associated with its outmoded political system. Hence, only a western type democratic regime can solve such that complex problems. This discussion seems to bring a challenge to the political system. It is clear that Communist Party will try to preserve the existing system while making modifications under the control of Party and pursue a status quo policy, but it is not clear to what extent it will be able to stand against the pressures for reform. Deng tried to assemble both of the tendencies to mediate the methodological dispute by tying up economic development with political system. China built ‘free trade areas’ where the spirit of capitalism prevails; despite the inner land of the country practiced Communist rule.<sup>156</sup> Deng’s approach was to create an alternative economic and political model to the current system before reforming the old one. Deng’s approach was named as “one country – two systems” model as far as Hong Kong joined to China’s rule allowing Hong Kong to enjoy capitalist system and way of life.<sup>157</sup>

Despite all of the attempts to reform state system, the perception of domestic Chinese society should be examined if they fond of the offered reforms by the Communist Party leadership. The number of protests in China may be indicators to determine the perception. Mooney highlights “the number of protests was 74,000 by

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<sup>155</sup> Leonard, *What does China Think?*, p. 29.

<sup>156</sup> Leonard, *What does China Think?* pp. 24-25.

<sup>157</sup> Chi, James, “China’s One Country Two Systems Concept: The Hong Kong Experience and Implications for Taiwan”, Paper presented in Annual International Studies of Asia Convention, San Diego, 2006, p. 1. [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/9/8/8/2/pages98822/p98822-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/8/2/pages98822/p98822-1.php), accessed on December 24, 2009.

3.7 million protesters in 2003 while it was 58,000 and more than 10,000 incidents in 1994”.<sup>158</sup> These figures show the level of discontent in society. Moreover Tiananmen and Uyghur incidents, perception of Tibetans should be emphasized apart from these numbers. The motivations of the domestic discontent may be economic concerns, lack of human rights, ethnical concerns or political struggles, but it is clear that Chinese public seems not very happy with the current political system, if the numbers of protests are taken into consideration.

Besides domestic public, the attitude of international public to Chinese political values in developing and under developed countries should be clarified to identify the contribution or degradation of Chinese soft power. Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the concept of “Beijing Consensus” to describe the perception of these countries.<sup>159</sup> China’s political system and economic growth have a huge effect outside of China. China is a model on its own path for other nations who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices. That leads to the thought that Chinese policy of development and its implementations provide model to the states who do not want to imitate the Western World but pursue their own path of transformation, enriched with their own characteristics. Most of the developing countries are sceptical about the western led globe. They do not want to lose the initiative to take the decisions regarding the faith of the population.

China may be a model of economic growth and a model for authoritarian regimes of third world. But China is frequently criticized by western observers due to human rights violations, addressing the problems of minorities, corruption, environmental degradation and social injustice. For instance US Congress built a Special Commission in October 2001 to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress.<sup>160</sup> Commission organizes conferences, forums, meetings to discuss the human rights violations and send e-mail alerts worldwide who subscribe to the

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<sup>158</sup> Mooney Paul, *China Faces Up to Growing Unrest*, Asia Times Online, November 16, 2004, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FK16Ad01.html> , accessed on August 10, 2008.

<sup>159</sup> Ramo, Joshua Cooper, *The Beijing Consensus*, The Foreign Policy Center, UK, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>160</sup> The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, <http://www.cecc.gov/pages/general/overview.php>, accessed on December 23, 2009.

Commission. The annual report of 2009 accuses China of continuing to violate the rights of Chinese citizens, and fall far short of meeting international standards. As a response to these kinds of publications, China issued “Human Rights Action Plan” in 2009 by means of Information Office that conducts public diplomacy although concrete results of the Action Plan could not be observed yet.<sup>161</sup>

Consequently, China inherited a series of teachings that offered China attraction over the neighbouring countries. But it is vogue to what extent these teachings are influential on the political choices of the neighbouring countries. If the political values are linked to the economic growth, Chinese current political system can be named as a model for developing and underdeveloped states. But economic success can not be directly affiliated with political system. It was Deng’s policy that the Mao Thought had to be reformed to achieve the economic leap. Reforms in Chinese political system are carefully designed and employed extending the process to decades because reform processes should be managed gradually and carefully if China’s huge population and geography is concerned. That means there is a hope of political transformation with Chinese characteristics in coming decades. Moreover, despite the number of protests and sense of discontent, there still exists a loyalty to communist regime in one part of Chinese public. This loyalty will preserve the Communist Party’s status in the coming years. But that is for sure an inner reform of the Communist Party will profound the society. On the other hand, the similar proposals will not address the minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs. Regarding the international realm, China is accused of human rights violations and societal-political gaps for good governance in the country, especially by western observers. China addresses these accusations by inviting states to respect the diversities of the regimes. This thought may be attractive to the countries experiencing a similar governance style. Especially economic growth and development model of China will be benefited to justify its political values in the eyes of developing and underdeveloped countries. If the increasing discontent in the Chinese society and new political currencies are taken into account, it can be argued that China’s political soft power is still fragile. It can be a model of political governance for underdeveloped and developing countries under the leadership of authoritarian

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<sup>161</sup> China, Newspaper, [http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2009-04/13/content\\_17595407.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2009-04/13/content_17595407.htm), accessed on December 24, 2009.

regimes, but not for the states successfully practicing western style democracy. Moreover, domestic failure of Chinese governance will lead to global image erosion. The common public goods of China will define if the pursued policy options are legitimate or not. But China does not possess a strong image of good governance and political values, which is based on Communist thought. That is why the Chinese leadership highlights ‘Confucianism’, ‘one state-two system’ or ‘socialism in Chinese characteristics’ rather than Mao Thought in the previous decade.

### **2.2.3. Foreign Policy as a Soft Power Tool of China:**

Final source of soft power in Nye’s thinking is the foreign policy of a country. China’s historical foreign policy climate can be portrayed as isolationist and unilateralist. The reasoning of this portrayal can be linked to economic self-sufficiency, own perception of being cultural centre of universe, and alleged king vassal relationship with the other states due to the belief of political inequality.<sup>162</sup> Naturalism, attributing the political events to nature, was dominant in Chinese political thinking. The emperor was the Son of Heaven and had the mandate of it. The other “inferior” states had to pay tribute to the Emperor to adopt them to the Chinese civilization.<sup>163</sup> China was neither involved in western system of sovereign states nor was aware of it. The West also did not understand the Chinese system shaped by naturalism in Chinese perception. The defeats and descent of China was inevitable as the powerful and dynamic western states settled to the Chinese ports. The control of western powers over the land and tributaries to the western societies led to a “victim mentality” in the minds of the Chinese people. It is believed, afterwards, that this victimization “would not end until its weaknesses had been turned into strength”.<sup>164</sup> Mao’s foreign policy was based on revolution against imperialism, revisionism and anti-revolutionary influences while the Third World was conceived as an opportunity to spread the Mao Zedong Thought. The foreign policy goal of Mao period was “not the expansion of China’s political and military control of foreign [figures] and resources –but rather the spread of their influence to

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<sup>162</sup> Ding, *The Dragon’s Hidden Wings*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>163</sup> Kornberg, Judith F. and Faust, John R., *China in World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 2005, p. 10.

<sup>164</sup> Chen, Jian, *Mao’s China and Cold War*, Chapel Hill (NC), University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p.12. [http://www.ibiblio.org/unccpress/chapters/chen\\_maos.html](http://www.ibiblio.org/unccpress/chapters/chen_maos.html), accessed on August 12, 2008.



other hearts and minds around the world”.<sup>165</sup> The competing ideologies, which were both capitalism and Soviet Marxism, and powerful states, which were the capitalist West and Soviet Union, were frequently accused of thwarting the desired “big leap” of China in international realm. Big leap had two dimensions. The first part was domestic transformation in strengthening the position of Communist Party. But the other was targeting the underdeveloped and developing countries by spreading Maoist ideology as an alternative to bipolar balance of Cold War period. Chinese leaders clearly announced principles and policies to international public to present their otherness. For instance, a new international order was voiced by Chinese former Premier Zhou Enlai in his speech to Indian delegation at the beginning of negotiations which took place in Beijing from December 1953 to April 1954 on Tibet issue. In this context, “Five Principles of Co-existence” in international relations were declared as “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”.<sup>166</sup>

China's foreign policy of Cold War was built upon the balance and alliance with and against rivalling ideologies and states. Mao's first foreign policy act was to sign an alliance with Soviet Union against the USA. But the border dispute of 1969 with Soviets pushed China to seek security in Washington D.C. against Soviets.<sup>167</sup> It was a remarkable challenge for China to build diplomatic relations with the USA and acceptance to the UN Security Council. China avoided from a confrontational policy with the outer world after these events whilst leaving aside the ideological concerns. Veto power offered somehow dependency of “Big Powers” to China in realizing their interests. Deng's leadership resulted with the adoption of four means of national power in foreign policy. The first was the diplomacy that can be defined as negotiating capability and being steersman in international realm. The second is the domestic economy's reflection on foreign policy. Trade and Chinese economic interests required to obtain political outcomes from the foreign policy implementation. The support of foreign policy with cultural attractiveness was the

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<sup>165</sup> Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings*, p. 97.

<sup>166</sup> PRC Houston Consulate, <http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140964.htm>, accessed on October 02, 2008.

<sup>167</sup> Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 560.

third dimension of national power. Cultural contact with the world was not a fear anymore. Foreigners would enjoy interacting with Chinese society. The last source of national power was military, although Chinese military was far behind the contemporary western armies. Hence military relations were commenced with the foreign weapon technology producers, including Israel.<sup>168</sup> After Deng, China was conducting an overall “leap” in foreign relations, but the course of foreign policy was challenged by Tiananmen incidents and collapse of Soviets. Conservatism, rather than reformism, prevailed upon the Chinese foreign policy. The end of 1990s refreshed the modernization process and the will to create a prosperous society. Foreign policy, once again, accorded with the domestic development needs such as economic reconstruction.<sup>169</sup>

Currently China’s modernization process is believed to be a “process of re-emergence” after “one hundred years of humiliation”.<sup>170</sup> Chinese public conceive themselves practicing the holy culture and teachings including the ideological innovations of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Then the goal is to become a respectable super power while achieving the rejuvenation of China. Yan Xuetong points out that China’s rise is “a restoration of fairness rather than gaining advantages over others”.<sup>171</sup> Chey clarifies the objectives of China’s foreign policy as equal priority of domestic and foreign affairs, advocacy of a new security outlook, development of bilateral relations with foreign partners and concerning soft power “playing an active part in international affairs with emphasis on gaining ‘soft strength’ and acting as a responsible big country”.<sup>172</sup> If the views of these scholars are taken into consideration, it can be argued that China wants to pursue an independent foreign policy to reach the desired status of being a super power. The preconditions of being active to shape the international environment and diffusion, as the other super powers achieved, are conceived to be obligation to reach this goal. China’s decision makers and scholars claimed various strategies and slogans, as mentioned below, to

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<sup>168</sup> Robinson and Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, pp. 579-581.

<sup>169</sup> Guo, *China’s Peaceful Rise in 21st Century*, p. 12.

<sup>170</sup> Ding, *The Dragon’s Hidden Wings*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>171</sup> Yan, Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, No. 10, 2001, pp. 33-39. <http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/pdf/yxt2.pdf>, accessed on September 14, 2008.

<sup>172</sup> Chey, Jocelyn, *Gentle Dragon*, [http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=7442&Itemid=85](http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7442&Itemid=85), accessed on December 19, 2007.

present China a responsible power to the globe while bearing the ultimate goal in mind.

President Hu Jintao's speech at the 60<sup>th</sup> UN Summit for Establishment Anniversary significantly coins a new concept: "harmonious world". "Harmonious world", according to him, will be constructed upon the pillars of "balancing national development against international responsibilities, economic benefits against political and security interests, relations with world powers against those with various countries, and reform against the maintenance of world order."<sup>173</sup> Shi Yonghong comments on the strategy of China as "relying primarily on resources of non-military power" which cover foreign trade, economy, diplomacy, culture and esteem from successful national development as well as persuasive power.<sup>174</sup> These pillars and strategies present Chinese foreign policy different from western, mainly Nye's, perception of soft power sources. China's goal oriented policies, prioritizing Chinese interests suit a Chinese *sui generis* approach by underlining tolerable and smart strategy of promoting itself in international realm. China's new global strategy seems presented as not to be based on conflict and coercion, but peaceful ascendancy that is cemented by soft power means. Harmonious world, which Chinese leadership desires, will be built unbiased and impartial. But the reality behind these types of slogans can be evaluated after China could have been reached its ultimate goal.

As a result of this awareness, Chinese leaders are actively seeking input and guidance from experts with extensive training, expertise, and experience in regional and international affairs. Decision making, regarding foreign policy, has become less personalized and more institutionalized, and Chinese diplomats have become more sophisticated in their articulation of the country's goals.<sup>175</sup> China is seeking to become a sustainable major power rather than a fast-rising, then fast-declining one. On the other hand, liberal practices of a communist country may be contradictory. Harmonious world projection, claiming to be responsible power, fits the liberal

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<sup>173</sup> Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/english/international/153463.htm>, accessed on September 25, 2008.

<sup>174</sup> Yonghong, Shi, "China's Peaceful Rise is All about Soft Power", *China Daily*, June 14, 2007. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-06/14/content\\_894052.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-06/14/content_894052.htm), accessed on April 14, 2009.

<sup>175</sup> Medeiros, Evan, and Fravel, M. Taylor, "China's New Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 2003, pp. 22-35. [http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/fravel/fravel\\_medeiros\\_2003\\_FA\\_new\\_diplo.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/fravel/fravel_medeiros_2003_FA_new_diplo.pdf), accessed on September 15, 2008.

currency; the agenda in the minds would be a realist motivated approach though. If the soft power concept of Nye is criticized due to realist motivation rather than liberal make up for the United States, the same critique would be directed to Chinese understanding of soft power.

China does not only rely on the soft power assets, but hard power resources as western countries do. For instance, military expenditure may be an indicator. Military expenditure of China provides clues to determine its long term strategy. China's military is one of the largest armies in the world with a military budget increasing more or less 10 percent every year. China's military budget in 2008 was 63.643 Bn USD that was incomparably higher than 9.498 Bn USD of Taiwan, 24.716 Bn USD of India and 38.238 Bn USD of Russia that can be claimed as regional powers in the neighbourhood of China. Global powers' military budget is in balance but lower than China such as 57.392 Bn USD of UK, 52.565 Bn USD of France and 37.237 Bn USD of Germany. But expenditure of the USA<sup>176</sup> is at the peak among all of the states by 548.531 Bn USD.<sup>177</sup> China spends more than its neighbours, but as much as the strong states. The figures clearly show that China is endeavouring to become a regional hard power, and candidate of being a super power. Economic growth of China compliments the military expenditure with 9.6 percent growth in gross domestic product that is valued as 4.6 trillion USD narrowing the gap between the second largest economy that is Japan, with 4.9 trillion USD.<sup>178</sup> Hence statements and announced strategies of China should be evaluated with its hard power assets to predict future behaviours.

China's foreign policy principals and practices can be examined to identify the soft strength of China in international realm. China frequently vows basic recognized foreign policy values such as equal sovereignty of the states disregarding their poorness, size, weakness while underlining a "new world order".<sup>179</sup> These values are attractive for most of the developing and underdeveloped states. China clearly

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<sup>176</sup> The annual cost of Iraq and Afghanistan interventions should be counted in evaluating the US military expenditures.

<sup>177</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, accessed on December 25, 2009.

<sup>178</sup> Bloomberg News Channel, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aymieb1eL4qg&pos=1>, accessed on December 26, 2009.

<sup>179</sup> Kornberg and Faust, *China in World Politics*, p. 20.

announces that they are not concerned with the political regimes of states whether they are authoritarian, have bad human rights records or in “the axis of evil” of the USA. For China, hence, each and every country has the right to choose independently its own social, political and economic system and course of development. The principal is the ‘win-win’ policy that requires mutual benefits in relations. This strategy is the apparent difference between Chinese and western foreign policies. As a result of such thinking, a new and fair world order should be established to observe the rights of underdeveloped and developing states in Chinese thinking. These principles will apparently contribute to China’s attraction in the eyes of suffering states and societies. This approach will attract the underdeveloped and developing states while offering China the leadership for the oppressed majority of the states. Current foreign policy may promote China to be a soft power possessing the freedom of manoeuvre in international arena, if its membership to international organizations is taken into consideration.

Chinese public diplomacy efforts should also be examined to identify how China advertises its image in its international relations. The reason is that public diplomacy and marketing a good image can increase the attractiveness of China. In the historical context, China’s efforts have varied regarding the leaders’ perceptions of China’s desired image abroad for obtaining political and economic outcomes. Beginning from 1990s, Chinese government prioritized to build positive Chinese image abroad and the main emphasis was about “improving and safeguarding socialist China's international images”.<sup>180</sup> Hence China built institutions to coordinate propaganda and image-building efforts. “Overseas Propaganda Department” under the Communist Party Central Committee in 1990 and “Information Office” under the State Council in 1991 were established to coordinate public diplomacy efforts. In 1998 the Party Propaganda Department changed its English name to “Publicity Department”, even though its Chinese name remained the same.<sup>181</sup> This change may be seen as an imitation of American “Public Diplomacy” structure.

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<sup>180</sup> Deng, Yong and Wang, Fei-ling, *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, Lanham (USA), Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, p. 98.

<sup>181</sup> Wang, Hongying, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy”, *China: An International Journal*, 1/1, 2003, p. 48.

Chinese government published “White Papers” to explain China’s positions on the sensitive questions such as Chinese democratic values, human and minority rights. These publications were tools to provide direct communication and express the “real truth” in Chinese perception to audiences to justify the Chinese policies. In addition to these efforts, the Chinese government has begun to hire international media expertise to polish China's image. For instance, China employed the American firm “Hill and Knowlton” to lobby the US Congress for the unconditional renewal of most-favoured-nation trade status for China in 1991. Chinese government have hired some of the most prominent and well-connected lobbying companies, public relations specialists and law firms in Washington, including Patton Boggs, Hogan & Hartson, and Wexler and Walker Public Policy Associates. In its bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chinese government hired another American firm, “Weber Shanwick Worldwide” to run its public relations campaign. Finally, the Chinese government has sponsored and organized cultural events in other countries to improve the country's image. For instance, in the summer of 2000, China spent millions of dollars and sent famous artists for a series of show in the eight different cities of the United States.<sup>182</sup> The road-show was aimed at enabling the US travel trade and the public to better understand China and its tourism development under the theme of “Discovering China in the New Century”.<sup>183</sup>

Chinese image building efforts focused on two different audiences: domestic and international public. The Peking Review (later renamed as Beijing Review due to pronunciation change in 1979) was prepared for international public and the Government Work Reports was released for domestic public as a communiqué. Both of the documents projected similar images of China as an international actor, such as peace-loving country, victim of foreign aggression, socialist country, bastion of revolution, anti-hegemonic force, developing country, major power in global politics, international co-operator, and autonomous actor. The desired and propagated image of China ought to be expected to shape the policies of the Chinese government. The gradual and planned efforts to construct a positive image always became a prominent motive for the Chinese decision makers. The ultimate

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<sup>182</sup> Wang, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy”, p. 43.

<sup>183</sup> China, Newspaper, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jun/14778.htm>, accessed on January 02, 2009.

goal of image building activities might be acceptability in international realm, tourism, sympathy of global public and increasing trade trend. But societal discontent such as Tiananmen and Uyghur protests, additionally the harsh response of Chinese government should be expected to breach the overall image building efforts of China. The image building efforts and these uprisings put the soft strength of China in discussion to what extent China is in consent with the image it delivers by media.

#### **2.2.4. Soft Power Means of China:**

China has a set of means that may contribute to its soft power in international realm. Some of these means will be examined in this section in order to find out whether China has the capability to be a soft power. The first soft power asset worth to underline is the Chinese originated immigrants that is mostly known as Chinese overseas. The questions affiliated with Chinese overseas would be if the growing amount of Chinese population outside China contributes to the soft power of China and if China could have the hosting countries want what China wants in terms of politics due to the presence of Chinese population in their homeland. The projections on these questions will define the role of Chinese overseas. Hunter argues that in a number of areas, China can benefit from Chinese overseas.<sup>184</sup> The estimated population of Chinese overseas is over 35 million people.<sup>185</sup> They are not solely introducing culture of China, but conducting business and creating employment. For instance the UK, receiving 28 Bn USD of 118 BN USD worth overall foreign direct investment<sup>186</sup> of the Chinese, hosts approximately 250.000<sup>187</sup> Chinese overseas in its country. Another example is that the Chinese have emerged as the fastest-growing ethnic minority in Russia according to the census of 2002. Russia's Chinese population has grown from just over 5,000 in the late 1980s to

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<sup>184</sup> Hunter, Alan, "China: Soft Power and Cultural Influence", <http://www.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/external/content/1/c4/11/36/v1229079768/user/China%20and%20Soft%20Power.pdf>, accessed on May 12, 2009.

<sup>185</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the USA, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/qwqz/t297510.htm>, accessed on August 18, 2009. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) prepared and released 2007 Blue Book on Global Politics and Security with the inclusion of the fact and figures on Chinese overseas. The report presents that the number of overseas Chinese has reached 35 million in 151 countries, making it the largest migrant group in the world.

<sup>186</sup> Burghart, Nora and Rossi, Vanessa, "China's Overseas Direct Investment in the UK", *International Economics*, Chatham House, Program Paper, December 2009, p. 3. [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15511\\_1209pp\\_china\\_odi.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15511_1209pp_china_odi.pdf), accessed on December 30, 2009.

<sup>187</sup> Nation Master Statistics, website, [http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo\\_chi\\_pop-people-chinese-population](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_chi_pop-people-chinese-population), accessed on December 30, 2009.

3.26 million in 2002. This makes the Chinese fourth biggest ethnic group in this country after Russians (104.1 million), Tatars (7.2 million), and Ukrainians (5.1 million)—all indigenous inhabitants of Russia. More than three-fourths of Chinese immigrants have settled down in Siberia and the East regions of Russia in the Chinese neighbourhood.<sup>188</sup> Not only the labour power; but cultural, language, religious interactions with China make the hosting society vulnerable to the domination of Chinese traditions. Consequently, Chinese populations can also challenge the equilibrium of demography in sensitive regions such as South East Asia, and Far East coasts of Russia where border disputes exist. The presence of Chinese population may strengthen the position of Chinese governments against these countries.

As the integration and wealth of Chinese overseas enhance, it is a fact that they will interact with the hosting societies and trigger business, despite a reaction to their existence is possible. According to the International Migration Report of UN in June 2006, a “Diaspora effect” has led to 32-60 percent increases in trade volumes between China and countries where ethnic Chinese account for more than 1 percent of the total population.<sup>189</sup> As the hosting societies get used to the traditions and trade with the migrants, it would be a necessity to build political and cultural contacts with the migrant’s home government to cooperate on the needs of these people because of the necessity for social stability of hosting country. Besides the presence of this people and their involvement in business, a pressure group in these countries can occur as the integration process develops.

Another soft power means can be named as Chinese universities.<sup>190</sup> Foreign students, especially from South East Asia and Africa, filled the Chinese universities much more in number than a decade ago. As an example, figures from China's Ministry of Education show that 3,737 African students came to study in Chinese universities [in 2006], compared with 2,757 in 2005, marking a sharp rise of 40

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<sup>188</sup> Gateway to Russia Project, [http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art\\_144395.php](http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_144395.php), accessed on May 02, 2008.

<sup>189</sup> United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *International Migration Report 2006: A Global Assessment*, p. 22.  
[http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006\\_MigrationRep/report.htm](http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/report.htm), accessed on August 15, 2009.

<sup>190</sup> Zou Hui, Department for Science and Technology, Ministry of Education of P.R. of China, [www.co-reach.org/input/document/documents/636.ppt](http://www.co-reach.org/input/document/documents/636.ppt), accessed on May 01, 2008.



percent.<sup>191</sup> If the first two-year-Mandarin-learning term is concerned, these students will be donated by the Chinese culture. But if the numbers are examined, China is still far from being attractive for students, although Chinese attempts of attracting foreign students should be expected to increase in the coming decades.

Another fact regarding the Chinese education system, however, corrodes the soft power of China. A report of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) highlights that more than 300,000 talented Chinese emigrants are working in high value-added industries in other countries, and this statement brings the discussion about brain draining into agenda. The number of overall students studying abroad was about one million by 2006, where the figure was 580,000 only in 2003.<sup>192</sup> The same report claims that two-thirds of them have chosen to stay overseas after graduation, a ratio higher than for any other country. Even if the Chinese universities attract the youth of developing and under-developed countries, Chinese students permanently leave China to have a better opportunity of education. This fact is contradictory to the claims that China is attractive in terms of education that will have influence on the incoming students.

Media is another prominent asset to shape the environment. The main tools of media are news agencies, Internet reporting, TV and radio channels in various languages, delivery of routine magazines and informative activities like press conferences. China seems to be pressing to hold initiative in informative activities to provide timely news not to have the reports of the Western media exaggerating occurrences in China and to limit the diffusion of them to the Chinese society. Chinese media benefits from visual, audio, written and electronic assets to cover regional and to some extent global news flow about China. Regarding the internet-based news; China is becoming a good news provider on the internet for anyone interested in researching official news and views about China. Chinese News agency Xinhua<sup>193</sup> provides world-wide news in six languages and releases the official propaganda papers such as “Weekly Overview” and “Voice of China”. Television broadcasting to international audience is facilitated by Chinese Central

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<sup>191</sup> Xinhua News Agency, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/17/content\\_7264552.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/17/content_7264552.htm) , accessed on May 02, 2008.

<sup>192</sup> China Daily, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/13/content\\_807798.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/13/content_807798.htm), accessed on August 14, 2009.

<sup>193</sup> Xinhua News Agency, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/> , accessed on June 10, 2008.

Television (CCTV). CCTV is directly linked to the Communist Party Central Propaganda Department and under the control of “the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television” with an access to approximately one billion audiences. The programs are a mixture of documentary, comedy and entertainment.<sup>194</sup> CCTV’s 19 sub channels target different groups in China and outside.<sup>195</sup> CCTV-9 International is compatible with CNN International and broadcasts news 24 hours a day in English, including both Chinese local news and global coverage of China to present China’s view about the current events.<sup>196</sup>

It is clear that current Chinese media lacks of free expression and far from influencing the decisions of the government other than reflecting. The credibility of the TV channels and media coverage is in question due to the strict control of broadcasts and inexperience of the staff regarding free-press. Hence its influence on international public seems inefficient, although, still, CCTV is the asset to reach international public and China’s overseas. CCTV appears to be an ideal tool to shape the opinions of various strands of audiences. If the number of English sources on China is concerned, there exist inadequate sources to search Chinese society and daily life. The media fills this gap in a way that Chinese government desires.

The tools enhancing the interaction between societies as mentioned above such as media, universities, immigrants contribute the development of tourism. Tourism clears off the fears and apprehension that exist as prejudice in the minds of the societies. It can be argued that more tourists frequent a country, more understandable the culture of the hosting society is and more trust occurs. Image building can be directly affiliated and eased by the number of tourists conveying the affirmative opinions. People visit a country if it is safe and has adequate infrastructure. Hence tourism is an indicator of being respected and possessing popularity while valuing the country by spending time and money. It can be claimed that tourism enhances the image of the country and softens the views of

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<sup>194</sup> CCTV website, <http://big5.cctv.com/english/special/help/01/index.shtml>, accessed on August 18, 2009.

<sup>195</sup> The sub channels are CCTV-1 General, CCTV-2 Finance, CCTV-3 Arts and Entertainment, CCTV-4 International (in Chinese for Overseas Chinese), CCTV-5 Sports, CCTV-6 Movie, CCTV-7 Children/Military/Agriculture, CCTV-8 TV series, CCTV-9 International (in English), CCTV-10 Science and Education, CCTV-11 Chinese Opera, CCTV-12 Society and Law, CCTV-News, CCTV-Children, CCTV-Music, CCTV-E International (in Spanish), CCTV-F International (in French), CCTV- ni) lanoitanretnI ىة اءرب Arabic), CCTV-HD – High-definition.

<sup>196</sup> CCTV website, [www.cctv.com/aboutus](http://www.cctv.com/aboutus), accessed on June 09, 2008.

foreigners. If a positive image is projected on them, it shapes the views of the masses gradually and consistently. But political outcomes of tourism are vague. Governments decision making process can not be correlated to the attracted tourist numbers. But tourism promotes business and interaction of societies that can lead to political indulgence. In this context China's tourism should be searched to understand how it is perceived and if it may be benefited to wield soft power.

China hosted more than 54 million foreign tourists in 2007, but it was slightly less in 2008 by 53 million that is a 3.1 percent decrease due to world wide economic crisis and H1N1 Epidemic Disease. World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) data shows that China holds the fourth tourist arrival number after France, Spain and the USA. South Korea, Japan, Russia, the USA and Malaysia are respectively top five tourist providers to China. But Hong Kong and Macao are excluded from China's tourist arrivals. If they are included, China is the first country that has tourist arrivals (more than 81,000,000 after France) in 2008.<sup>197</sup> But it should be noted the figures of Chinese National Bureau of Statistics is different from UNWTO's figures. The Bureau covers the numbers of 2007, indicating the number of foreign tourist arrivals in 2007 was more than 26 millions.<sup>198</sup> This amount is five times lower than arrivals of Chinese nationalities living overseas.<sup>199</sup> The question is whether these visits, demonstrated in the above statistics, contribute to the soft power of China. The numbers clearly shows that China's tourist attraction addresses, first, surrounding neighbour countries. The western countries such as UK, USA, France and Germany are the places where Chinese overseas live, and figures are probably covering this society. Then Chinese-origin-overseas are primary body of tourists with a motivation of business and visiting relatives. If

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<sup>197</sup> World Tourism Organization, [http://unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO\\_Barom09\\_update\\_sept\\_en.pdf](http://unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_update_sept_en.pdf) accessed on October 25, 2009.

<sup>198</sup> National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm>, accessed on December 30, 2009.

<sup>199</sup> The figures of 2007 of National Bureau of Statistics indicate that the number of overall arrivals is 131,833,300 whereas arrivals from Hong Kong and Macao are 101,135,700, from Taiwan 4,677,900. Overnight arrivals are 5,471,980. Majority of the foreign arrivals are from Asian countries by 16,061,200. Republic of Korea, Japan, and Malaysia are the top three countries sending their citizens to China. Europe is the second tourist provider continent by 6,216,800. The majority of the foreign arrivals came from Russia, (3,003,900), UK (605,100) and Germany (566,700). North America is the third continent sending foreign arrivals by 2,561,500. Even though the numbers does not indicate the racial background; most of the arrivals can be assessed as arrivals of Chinese overseas from these regions. Regarding the motivation of the arrivals, 26.3% is affiliated with business, but 50.3% sightseeing and leisure.

Chinese tourism figures are assessed, it can be argued that, China may receive more tourists in future, but the current numbers of tourists are inadequate to obtain a desired impression of China. Chinese tourism can be perceived as an indicator of soft power, but tourism seems limited in wielding soft power for China.

Another soft power tool, sports, represent the strength of countries in terms of infrastructure, capability, training and development. Sports have great impacts on societies. For instance medals in the competitions may be indicators of development level. The more developed the country is, the more medals are won in the international games. Olympic Games are perfect cases to search the correlation of sports and soft power. If the sports history of China is examined, it can be concluded that Chinese do not have a long history of Olympic achievement.<sup>200</sup> China sent its first Olympic team to the 1932 Los Angeles Summer Games. At the 1984 Summer Olympics, again in Los Angeles, China won 15 gold medals, 32 overall, and fourth in the gold medal count, when the Soviet Union boycotted the Olympics. Four years later, in the Seoul Olympics, China's gold medal total dipped to five. China was at the third rank in Barcelona (1992), Atlanta (1996), and Sydney (2000) in the number of medals. In the 2004 Athens Olympics, China was second to the USA in the gold medal count with 32 gold of 63 medals overall in comparison to the USA's 36 gold and 102 medals overall. In Beijing 2008 Olympics, again China followed the USA by 100 medals, while the USA had 110 medals. China, however, won 51 gold medals, despite the USA had only 36.<sup>201</sup> Hence there is a continuous rise of Chinese success in winning medals in Olympic Games. This success story should be expected to influence the generations and leave the message of strength in the minds. The strength is not only infrastructural capacity, but education and governing system.

Movie industry of a country directly influences hearts and minds of both domestic and international public. China was not able to benefit from its film industry as the West, especially the US did. The story of the film industry in China is like a summary of the nation's modern history. The films generally dealt with life style before 1949, the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, the civil war, the

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<sup>200</sup> USA Today, [http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-06-13-china-sports-schools-1a-cover\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-06-13-china-sports-schools-1a-cover_N.htm) , accessed on June 09, 2008.

<sup>201</sup> CNN, <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/olympics/2008/medals/tracker/>, accessed on November 12, 2008.

establishment and frustrating era of the Peoples Republic of China, its economic development and challenges after World Trade Organization entry.<sup>202</sup> In the 1990s, Chinese film industry started to flourish. At the same time the government allowed showing of foreign movies in 1995. But tight control of the state mechanism was of significance. The hindrances to Chinese movie industry were the lack of good screenplays, shortage of fund, unnecessary modifications of films by Chinese Communist Party and high ticket prices for domestic public.<sup>203</sup> If these facts are concerned, Chinese movie industry can not be counted as a soft power asset in comparison to western movie industry, although a progress may be witnessed in coming decades.

China's other soft power assets may be expanded to trade, ideology, aid and investment, although some of these tools may be perceived as benefit oriented inducements that challenge the spirit of soft power. But the outcomes and the perception of the targeted audience ought to be concerned to identify the soft power assets as inducement or co-optive tools. Chinese investment in underdeveloped states makes China credible and respective in the eyes of local decision-makers. Nye may not perceive investment and economic interaction as soft power tool, but inducement. But China has political outcomes from these activities. But Mead's sticky power concept can fit China's position in underdeveloped countries. Chinese influence on these countries can be sustained as soon as China keeps continue to invest and provide aid. Otherwise they will search for new investors or donors and consent with the policies of these states. Hence China's economic interaction with the Third World states can be resembled to sticky power concept, but not the soft power thinking. On the other hand, it is China's perception to conceive trade and investment as soft power tools that differs Chinese soft power aspirations from western conceptions.

China's membership to UN Security Council and its veto power is a significant soft power tool. Especially authoritarian regimes and anti-western leaders should be expected to benefit from China's Security Council membership. China's ignorance of political system in building relations with the other states makes China attractive

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<sup>202</sup> China Daily, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/film/84966.htm>, accessed on August 31, 2009.

<sup>203</sup> China through a Lens, website, "China's Film Industry Faces Four Challenges", <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Aug/71474.htm>, accessed on August 20, 2009.

and alternative political power to the dominating states in UN. China will easily benefit from this asset to have relative advantages in trade and political affairs within the mentality of 'win-win'. For instance Iran's nuclear program and western pressure to stop nuclear program made China, and Russia as well, a gate for Iran. China supported Iran against the harsh resolution proposals of the western powers in the UN Security Council.<sup>204</sup> In turn; China ensured a stable and secure supply of oil and gas. Two countries signed five agreements in 2009 for development of oil fields and partnership in the oil production.<sup>205</sup> China's policy can be summoned as diverging the trade from politics and benefiting from the offered political support in the UN Security Council.

### **2.3. Comparison of Western and Chinese Soft Power Perception:**

If the approaches of western and Chinese soft power conceptions are compared, there could be observed several differences apart from the Nye's framework. The initial difference is that Western context does not cover the own public for soft power applications. But China has concerns on the three different target groups. The first one is the domestic society comprising of Hans and the minorities, the second is the Chinese overseas and finally the last one is international society. The stability in domestic order and success in international realm is heavily interrelated for China. China needs peace and harmony at home and abroad to realize its interests and ultimate goals. Coercive methods of internal practices and a pure realism-oriented approach in foreign affairs will not serve to the Chinese interests. Because China is still a developing country and needs time to finish the process of strengthening. Hence soft power, but in Chinese characteristics, satisfies the Chinese discourse of development. An integrative and cooperative approach will benefit China's urgent economic development and image making efforts.

Another issue is the role of trade and economy as a soft power source. Economic and political inducements are not counted as soft power sources in western conception. But China recognizes these sources as far as the targeted society voluntarily consents with the demands of China. From this perspective, Robert

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<sup>204</sup> Washington Post, "China's Backing on Iran Followed Dire Predictions", <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/25/AR2009112504112.html>, accessed on February 04, 2010.

<sup>205</sup> Alibaba business news website, <http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/energy/100181227-1-timeline-china%2527s-investment-iranian-oil%252Fgas-sectors.html>, accessed on January 17, 2010.

Kaplan argues that the Chinese are becoming “masters of indirect influence” through the establishment of business communities and diplomatic outposts and “by negotiating construction and trade agreements”.<sup>206</sup> Disregarding the internal dynamics and conditions of its partners, China wants to deepen its economic relations with all countries without any discrimination of ideological background. Because China is aware of the fact that the intention of spreading ideology poses threat to developed states and will limit the Chinese capabilities. Then China puts the ideological concerns back and benefit from the peaceful environment of international order. Deng’s “white cat, black cat” theory (No matter if it’s a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can catch mice, it’s a good cat) epitomizes the sort of experimentalism and pragmatism that has gripped post-Mao China.<sup>207</sup>

Another view believes in a *sui generis* Chinese soft power approach in Chinese politics. For instance Pang Zhongying is critical to the western perception of soft power concept. He expands the debate to a field that is full of question marks and exclamations: the blur line of soft and hard power, confusion of comprehensive state capacity that includes vast unexpected aspects of soft power such as pornography, nasty fast food, and commercialized pop culture.<sup>208</sup> Then, if China’s soft power is evaluated in the lenses of American culture, it means that China’s soft power is weak. He indicates China’s soft power a completely new project correlating economic power to soft power.

Ever since the beginning of the 21st century, China started readjusting its national developing strategy ... with a series of propositions and policies – such as “scientific concept of development”, “sustainable development”, “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” – to solve the social problems [like] social inequality while laying stress on its economic development. This is [an] important transformation in terms of China’s idea of development, strategy and policy, which is conducive to the development of China’s soft power.<sup>209</sup>

This opinion recognizes the soft power strength with the economic power of a country. The background of this strategy of development is, again, tied to social problems of China while indicating economic power as a course to solve them.

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<sup>206</sup> Kaplan, Robert, “How We Could Fight China?”, *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2005, 295, p. 54. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200506/kaplan>, accessed on April 12th, 2009.

<sup>207</sup> Hui, Wang, “Depoliticized Politics and the End of the Short Twentieth Century in China”, University of California (UCLA) Asian Studies, <http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/article.asp?parentid=62482>, accessed on February 04, 2010.

<sup>208</sup> Pang, Pang, Zhongying, “On China’s Soft Power”, pp. 2-3, [http://www.siis.org.cn/Sh\\_Yj\\_Cms/Mgz/200601/2008724225610L5PS.PDF](http://www.siis.org.cn/Sh_Yj_Cms/Mgz/200601/2008724225610L5PS.PDF), accessed on September 25, 2008.

<sup>209</sup> Pang, Zhongying, “On China’s Soft Power”, p. 2.



Then it is the economic power that sweeps the domestic inconvenience of Chinese society and enhances the soft power abroad. In this context, soft power is a tool for obtaining economic power and also a consequence of economic power. This approach contradicts with Nye's conception. Nye perceives economic power as a variety of hard power source, rather than soft power.

Contrary to Zhongying, soft power is not always perceived as a method to promote economic power by some other Chinese scholars. For instance Yan Xuetong claims that;

China's material power has increased enormously, but this has not measurably improved its soft power. In principle, if a country is rich economically and powerful militarily, despite it is widely perceived to be an immoral country adverse to world trends, then its international influence remains quite low.<sup>210</sup>

This approach is in accordance with the soft power concept of Nye. Morality in state affairs and consent with the world trends recalls the Nye's second and third pillars of wielding soft power: possessing political values in and out of country that is commonly accepted by international audience and applying a consistent foreign policy in international realm. The economic power is not a sole method to promote China's effective leadership in international realm. This motivation in Chinese diplomacy may be resembled to the former colonial powers' economy and trade oriented foreign policies. Because diplomacy should not only be limited to create a peaceful environment for economic development, but also harvesting an image of responsible power and expanding friendly relationships to urge the other actors on credibility of China.

Chinese soft power perception should also be compared with Nye's sources of soft power. Nye's first soft power source, cultural attraction, can be identified in Chinese perception as a criterion of wielding soft power. If China wants to be a prosperous super power, Chinese culture and language should be generated to outer societies, additional to Chinese overseas societies. From this perspective, Chinese leadership expresses the self reliance on the depth of Chinese culture to address not only the Chinese society but also the other publics. For this purpose, China benefits from various strands of its culture richness. For example, Chinese diplomacy

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<sup>210</sup> Yan Xuetong, "The Path for China to Increase its Soft Power", p. 1., <http://www.ccwe.org.cn/ccweold/en/journal/2/4ThePathforChinatoIncreaseitsSoftPower.pdf>, accessed on September 11, 2008. Yan Xuetong is the Director of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences.



presents Buddhism as a point of interaction with Sri Lankan society, while sending Pandas to Taiwan to denote the cultural unity of both societies. These attempts are complimentary to political motivations of Chinese leadership to realize political goals. This motivation may be assessed similar to western ambitions of benefiting from cultural diplomacy. But the difference is that China blends its culture with its ideology and justifies its regime with the motivation of addressing its own public while denouncing the critiques of the West on its ideology.

Chinese media assets are well developed to present its culture and political messages. Chinese media can be listed as news agencies, TV channels, magazines, and internet websites in different languages. The disadvantage of Chinese media is that they address to Chinese originated people rather than foreigners. Although they broadcast in different languages, Western media is free from intrusions of the state-mechanism, but Chinese media justifies the regimes policies. If Chinese and western capabilities of media are compared, there exist a gap between them. Chinese media lacks the adequate capability and credibility to spread Chinese culture as western media organs can do. The same gap can also be seen in the other fields of cultural diffusion such as education, tourism, and cultural industry is considered.

In terms of political values, China has some problems since China is facing criticisms due to human rights violations, addressing the demands of minorities and investment practices in the developing and under-developed countries due to environmental degradation, social rights of workers. China claims its own political values other than western values, but ignores the fact that western values are universal values and hard to challenge in short term. The treatment of Tiananmen, Uyghur and Tibet demonstrators makes China away from a democratic country in the eyes of not only western, but also other societies. Autocratic leaders and regimes may welcome the Chinese measures to prevent these demonstrations, but societies' perception should be differed from the autocratic leaders, since societies' perception is perennial than the latter. But some can claim that a huge population and geography can only be governed by harsh measures and 'non-democratic' rules of western mind. The crucial thing is how the societies perceive these political values. Hence Chinese political values can be claimed as broken chain of Chinese soft power. Consequently Chinese perception differs from western perception in

terms of political values as a source of soft power. This belief may be the reason of presenting political values with Chinese characteristics by Chinese politicians.

According to Nye, foreign policy is the third source of soft power, and accordingly, China's foreign policy offers opportunities to China in wielding soft power. China's membership to UN Security Council facilitates agenda setting power and makes it a dominant state in international affairs. China should be the one that its consent must be guaranteed before drafting a resolution in UN Security Council. Apart from agenda setting power, China's relations with the developing and under-developed countries within the principals of peaceful co-existence makes China attractive in reaching political support and obtaining an alternative to the aid of the West. West imposes pre-conditions to provide aid, but China plays smart in offers by not caring the internal and regional problems of aid recipient. China may be criticized to help 'rogue' states, but it is China's strength to provide support to these countries while presenting a benign image. Moreover China's economic growth is a model for these countries. China presents a case study for them to realize self recovery without the interventions of the West and western controlled international organizations. The relations with developing and under-developed countries compliment Chinese public relations and image building efforts. China presents the relations with these countries built on "win-win" policy that persuades them to perceive China different from the West. The outcome of this strategy will be political solidarity against the West, trade opportunities and access to raw materials and resources. China's soft power by its foreign policy inspires with hope and currently obtained some of these outcomes as will be seen in African case study in Chapter 3.

If the soft power applications of the USA and China are compared, China is seeking to develop China's benign soft power strength where the other great powers fail in geographies such as Africa, Iran, and Venezuela. It can be assumed that China is not copying or duplicating American mode of soft power, but learns the experience from the failure of America's soft power. China does not claim to be a new empire and cannot follow the American suit in dealing with the international system, instead, should regard the "democratic and effective multilateralism" as a fundamental goal, not challenge "international order", promote the global governance and reconstruct China's new outlook in the current international politics. Soviet experience and triumph of liberalism taught China to be consistent

with the ongoing norms and accept the leadership of the West, at least for a while. Hence soft power sources such as military capability and their costs create risks to achieve the ultimate goal of China: to be a hegemonic power and dominate the international realm.

#### **2.4. Conclusion:**

Chinese power discourse shifted from materially based power context through intangible power perceptions prioritizing its culture and attraction as was witnessed in western IR academia. The Chinese perception that is based on economic growth to be a prosperous country and future super power reveals threat scenarios in western minds. China's current capabilities in terms of its hard power and internal fragile dynamics necessitate strategies that are empiric, goal oriented and tolerable by the other actors of the international realm. These strategies can be described as means of soft power in western terminology, although Chinese context is a bit different from western perceptions. The general characteristic of the Chinese soft power conception can be located to "integrative-constructive-power with" perceptions of western scholars, but blended with Chinese *sui generis* characteristics. Neither of the western theoretical debates relevant to power politics can solely be used to justify Chinese 'soft' power perception. Similarly, Nye's vision of soft power can not be used as a frame to assess the Chinese soft power since China's perception fits its own realities.

In the context of assessing Chinese soft power, the strategies of Chinese leadership, especially 'win-win strategy', contributes to the soft power diffusion of China in developing and under-developed states, although western countries direct criticisms to China for its relations with authoritarian regimes. Its trade oriented perception contradicts Nye's frame that makes Chinese soft power controversial. If Nye's perception is benefitted to evaluate China's soft strength, the first leg of Nye's concept, China presents its culture as 'advanced' by blended it with 'Chinese socialism' to both domestic public and targeted international audience. Soft power assets such as language teaching, education in Chinese universities, tourism, sports suit Chinese soft strength, but to a limited extent in comparison to western cultural activities. China's 'advanced' culture strategy may be assessed as a way of justifying its deficiencies in the frame of western value system.

Another source of soft power, political values and their implementation in China is far from the expectations of domestic and international public. In other words political values are the vulnerable chain that can be broken easily. Hence Chinese politicians claim values with Chinese characteristics, but the context of the values are not comprehensive.

Finally Chinese foreign policy practices offer opportunities to China by its membership to the UN Security Council and *sui generis* perception in relations with other countries disregarding their political regimes. Especially underdeveloped and developed countries can be expected to consent with the Chinese foreign policy goals to benefit from its agenda setting power. Principles of peaceful coexistence ease China's efforts to improve its relations with the states that have bad reputation in the western perception.

Other than these sources, China perceives trade, investment and its model of economic growth as a soft power source. This perception clearly contradicts with the western conception since economic factors are recognized as 'hard' power source. But Mead's perception of sticky power can be contrasted with China's economic activities in underdeveloped and developed states that create addiction rather than attraction due to China's economic activities.

## CHAPTER 3

### CHINA'S "SOFT MOBILIZATION"<sup>211</sup> IN AFRICA

This chapter will focus on the African policy of China to find out the context of China's soft power concept that was examined in the previous chapter. The issues to be discussed will be built upon Chinese activities in Africa to test the concept by several questions. How can the Chinese soft power perception be justified by means of its African policy? Can China use soft power to have Africa want what China wants? The answers to these questions will clarify the success of soft power applications of China.

Regarding the historical context, it can be argued that western expansion to Africa paved the way for the tyrannical exploitation of Africa disregarding the African peoples' needs and universal rights for centuries. Africa and other remote geographies as well, fed the hunger of Western governments who were eager to prove their strength against each other and to their own public. Colonialism was identified with the African policy of the West. 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and subsequent events challenged the colonialism upon Africa, although Africa suffering from poverty. As far as western existence was acquitted itself from the colonial desires on the continent, Simertin and Nkrumah argues, colonialism has changed one dress with another by the occurrence of neo-colonialism in 1960s.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> I used the term 'soft mobilization' to adapt 'mobilization' for the requirements of soft power concept. Mobilization is to dispatch the overall means and capabilities for a specific goal by organizing, assembling or putting into readiness. The capabilities might be military, economic, or human resources. States mobilize their capabilities in case of war or crisis. The term "soft mobilization" is used for instigating bilateral relations by means of culture, education, public diplomacy, tourism, sports, and similar activities other than hard power sources. Investment and aid might be named as part of soft mobilization, if it attracts the sympathy of society by public projects without any expectation or interests. Nye's determination of soft power resources – culture, internal and foreign policies – may be counted as the issues of soft mobilization. This term adapts mobilization to the requirements of soft power concept.

<sup>212</sup> Simertin, Yuri, *Kwame Nkrumah: Positive Action*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, pp. 75-105. [http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=oP7osqefJM4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_v2\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false](http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=oP7osqefJM4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false), accessed on September 12, 2009. The term neo-colonialism was used to describe the dependency of former colonies to imperial powers by Kwame Nkrumah, the former President of Ghana. Nkrumah pointed out the economic enslavement of African countries to the West, although they were independent. He claimed a third force rather than the West and Soviets, which was a united independent Africa.

China, as an emerging and developing power, concurrently denounced the colonial order and claimed to be a member of the South<sup>213</sup> of which African countries are part. China's motive of developing a third pole apart from the West and Moscow might be considered as the existence of Chinese will to be the champion of the Third World against the developed North. Deng's suggestion of building a Third World commodity cartels and South-South Summit in Shanghai (1983) strengthened the commitment of China to South club.<sup>214</sup> But the conditions in international relations and balance of power have been challenged for the last three decades. The "soft"ification of power gentled the power-derivative concepts even though the background motives and ultimate goals have not been challenged in interest-based power politics. If this "soft"ification process is applied to China's desires, the question appears if China pursues a Chinese-style "realism" to build a "soft balance of power" against current dominant powers or commits herself to build a world, free of foreign intrusions in idealistic way. It is hard to guess the real intentions of China, but its African policy gives clues about the power perception and conception of China and to what extent China differs herself from West affiliated with power politics.

China's path in international relations ought to be compared to the other conceptions and applications of power politics to understand if China is benefiting from empirically-proven-successful methods, as western states did to achieve welfare society. Development and continuous growth are essential to keep stability in Chinese society and to prevent social disasters. Hence it is a "must" for China to play in the elite club of international community and to be attractive for her own society. For this purpose, it is vital for China to sustain economic growth and build a brilliant image in the eyes of the other states to satisfy the traditional expectation of domestic and overseas Chinese society. Africa, with 55 independent countries, offers the conditions where China can feed the ideational appetite of Chinese public and prove the greatness of Chinese policies.

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<sup>213</sup> North-South dispute presents the problematic relationships between the advanced industrialized countries (the North) and the third world or developing countries (the South). A large number of states accessed International system after decolonization process in which they found themselves to be at a serious disadvantage, particularly in economic terms against developed-industrialized states. 1970s witnessed a series of South solidarity movement and conferences between developed versus underdeveloped or developing countries. Bandung Conference of 1955 was the initial step to commence the solidarity of the developing states.

<sup>214</sup> Snow, Philip, "China and Africa" in Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 288.

If the resources of African countries and structure of the African market is concerned, China's approach to Africa may be resembled to an "opportunistic neo-mercantilist policy", as was used by Holslag in order to denote Asian blend of mercantilism. This term aims at developing strategies for national prosperity in a context of intensifying trans-national competition and a highly fluid globalized economy with two key features: openness and compliance to international liberalist standards in mooring the accumulated wealth and creating a well-off society through guidance and redistribution.<sup>215</sup> The Chinese perception of Africa is identified as a commodity supplier and a modest consumer market. The priorities of China may be propounded as handling raw materials, extracting and transferring energy sources, marketing low quality and cheap industrial products where most African countries could not manufacture due to the lack of capital. But the crucial point is whether China has a new type of colonial motive in her relations with Africa or she differs from the West by offering incentives to African countries in the frame of 'win-win' policy.

Soft power offers China an influential course to counter the allegations of being a neo-colonial power in the eyes of developing and under developed states. China frequently faces with such accusations of pursuing neo-colonial policies towards under-developed states by local political movements or western diplomats due to China's desire to reach rich natural resources and markets. But China continuously rejects the allegations of being "neo-colonial" power and come up with strategies that contain mutual gains. Africa is a very significant case to identify China's applications of announced strategies that can be commented as soft power tools. Africa is the poorest continent striving for development while having a vast amount of sources that leads a competition between China and western countries. Africa needs to lean on a foreign power to obtain aid and support to get rid of poverty. That makes China an alternative course in comparison to conditional western aids. Hence Africa presents an environment to any actor to pursue a neo-colonial ambition or neo-liberal approach. On the way to be a champion of African world, military solutions are outmoded and risky while inducements and soft power

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<sup>215</sup> Holslag, Jonathan, "Friendly Giant? China's Evolving Africa Policy", *Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS)*, *Asia Paper*, 2/5, August 2007, p. 2, [http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache%3A65mMQy5b6sMJ%3Awww.ucsia.org%2Fdownload.aspx%3Fc%3D\\*USOS%26n%3D42681%26ct%3D43141%26e%3D106252+China%E2%80%99s+New+Mercantilism&hl=tr&gl=tr&pli=1](http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache%3A65mMQy5b6sMJ%3Awww.ucsia.org%2Fdownload.aspx%3Fc%3D*USOS%26n%3D42681%26ct%3D43141%26e%3D106252+China%E2%80%99s+New+Mercantilism&hl=tr&gl=tr&pli=1), accessed on August 20, 2009.

applications are preferred paths for controlling the continent. Even though, inducement and economic power is not counted as soft power in Nye's perception, African case presents that inducement and economic relations, as China generally prefers, work for wielding soft power.

China's pillars of foreign relations with developing and under-developed states can be described as "socialism with Chinese characteristics, five principles of coexistence, challenging current global unfair order and welcoming the various paths of different nations on the road of development including democracy".<sup>216</sup> It should be discussed if these claims are ideational claims inspired by soft power concept or only made up to obtain natural sources, raw materials, market for Chinese manufactures and keep political support against competing powers while generating power by "full-packed" deals that contain various fields of cooperation such as aid, investment, people to people contact, political binding and trade. The reasoning of an overall attempt of cooperation may be to entangle the whole continent to China on Africans' own will. In this context, this chapter will examine the African policy of China by focusing on various aspects in order to understand to what extent China's policy towards Africa fits to soft power concept and similar concepts of western scholars, and to what extent China has her own *sui generis* soft power application.

### **3.1 China's African Policy:**

While the Sino-African relationship has steadily improved in the recent decades, the relations had started beginning from the Ming Dynasty's exploratory voyages to the east of African coasts to exhibit the greatness of Chinese civilization.<sup>217</sup> China's interest to Africa was intense after the World War II with ideological motivations while providing support to revolutions and independence movements against 'imperialism'. Chinese early contacts were focused on the communist parties of South Africa, New Guinea and Cape Verde whereas ideological disputes with Soviet Union and warming relations with the USA challenged the Chinese approach to Africa. China laid down the fundamental principles to sustain its African policy

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<sup>216</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t157833.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>217</sup> Fairbank and Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation*, p. 198.



that are known as ‘Five Stands of China-African Relations’ and ‘Eight Principles for Economic Cooperation’. In this context, China had been involved in economic and aid commitments to African states, which were prone to Chinese system. For instance China offered economic aid amounting to \$2.476 billion to Africa countries, which accounted for 58% of China’s total foreign aid from 1956 to 1977, despite its own great economic plight.<sup>218</sup> As an example of long term contribution to Africa, China built the 1,860 km long Tanzania-Zambia railroad in six years, which constituted great support for southern African countries’ national independence and liberation movements.<sup>219</sup> As the relations of China and two super powers were challenged in 1970s, China preferred to support the Non-Alignment Movement and supported the third pole for a just alternative international order. During the Cold War era, China’s primary strategy in Africa was to increase Third World solidarity by exporting its model of revolution and economic development to African nations.<sup>220</sup> In return, African countries recognized the People’s Republic of China in international realm and supported China as a member of the United Nations (UN) and UN Security Council rather than Taiwan.

China pursues strategies to reach resources in order to maintain its economic growth. For this goal, there should be no obstacle to prevent China accessing resources and convenient markets for Chinese cheap goods. Hence China's diplomacy is transforming from “responsive diplomacy to pro-active diplomacy” in order to hold the initiative in the continent as Wu Jianmin, former Chinese ambassador to France and President of the Chinese Foreign Affairs University, confessed.<sup>221</sup> Africa offers a geography that suits the requirements of a pro-active diplomacy for China. Because resentment against the colonial exercises of the West offers China opportunities to be dominant in the continent by claiming a similar past as Africans have. A common humiliation sense may be reflected by drafting

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<sup>218</sup> Li Anshan, “On the Adjustment and Transformation of China's Africa Policy: When, Why and What”, *West Asia and Africa*, 8, 2006, pp. 1-20.

<sup>219</sup> Jianbo, Luo and Xiaomin, Zhang, “China’s African Policy and its Soft Power”, *AntePodium*, Victoria University of Wellington, 2009, pp. 1-3.

<sup>220</sup> Zhu, Zhiquan, “China’s New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications”, Chicago, 48<sup>th</sup> International Studies Association Annual Conference, 2007, p. 2, [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apr\\_research\\_citation/1/8/0/6/3/pages180639/p180639-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apr_research_citation/1/8/0/6/3/pages180639/p180639-1.php), accessed on February 12, 2008.

<sup>221</sup> Liangxiang, Jin, “Energy First: China and the Middle East”, *Middle East Quarterly*, 12/2, Spring 2005, <http://www.meforum.org/694/energy-first>, accessed on February 27, 2009.

deals with the African states giving no room for the involvement of third party to make any deal. From Chinese perspective, this attempt can be perceived as an indicator of not tolerating any loss on the road of development. Every step to serve the soaring development of China ought to be immune from intervention of any third party. An inadequate presence of the West on the continent offers China to build the system she wants and take pro-active measures on the route to growth. In addition to development concerns of China, Africa presents a precious political support to Chinese national interests in international relations. Africa accounts for almost half of the non-aligned nations and a 53 of 192 United Nations' member countries, all of which have demonstrated themselves opposing to hegemony and power politics of the West.<sup>222</sup>

Why is China interested in Africa? The initial answer to this question might be that China's and western countries demand to energy sources and raw materials from Africa as Africa has become the world's third largest oil-producing region, next only to the Middle East and Latin America. Oil production in Africa is expected to double over the next 20 years while it stays flat or declines in much of the rest of the world.<sup>223</sup> China's booming economy, which has averaged annual 9 percent growth for the last two decades, requires massive levels of energy to sustain its growth. Although China relies on coal to meet most of its energy needs, it is the second-largest consumer of oil in the world behind the United States. The International Energy Agency projects that China's net oil imports will jump to 13.1 million barrels per day by 2030 from 3.5 million barrels per day in 2006. China is expected to maintain a 2.7 percent annual growth rate in energy demand.<sup>224</sup> China currently imports about half of its oil supplies from the Middle East, and the extent of the country's energy demand has also compelled China to push into new markets, particularly Africa.

Africa holds comparatively small fraction of the world's proven oil reserves—9 percent compared to the Middle East's nearly 62 percent—but industry analysts

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<sup>222</sup> United Nations, <http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml> , accessed on February 12, 2009.

<sup>223</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 2.

<sup>224</sup> Energy Information Agency of US, *International Energy Outlook 2008*, June 2008, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/appi.html> , accessed on February 27, 2009.

believe that Africa can have significant undiscovered oil reserves.<sup>225</sup> As a result, China seeks to increase its oil imports from the continent. Key World Energy Statistics of 2009 indicates that China produced only 4.8% of world oil with 190 million ton (mt) in 2008, but was a net importer of oil with 159 mt ranking third after the USA (573 mt) and Japan (276 mt). The same report names Nigeria and Angola as net oil exporters with 112 and 83 mt of oil respectively.<sup>226</sup> China receives about one-third of its oil imports from Africa, 9 percent of the continent's total exports as of 2006. China's biggest suppliers in Africa are Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan. It has also sought supplies from Chad, Nigeria, Algeria, and Gabon. In 2006, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's largest supplier of crude oil. Angola and Sudan are China's biggest African trading partners, selling China 25 percent of its total oil imports. Other huge energy deals have been signed between China and African countries in recent years. Sinopec, China's state oil and gas firm signed a preliminary deal with Liberia to explore oil and gas in this western African state. Ghana's Energy Minister disclosed China-Africa summit November 2006 that his country was close to signing a \$562 million deal with China's Sino Hydro Corporation to build 400 megawatt Dui Hydroelectric Dam in north Ghana while signing a \$3 billion iron ore deal with China. Ghana's debt to construct the dam is financed by the export of cocoa seeds to China. Hence China created employment for Chinese construction firms while importing cheap cocoa beans to process and sell it to world markets that means doubling its gains.<sup>227</sup>

This strategy is named as Angola Mode that is defined as repayment of loans by natural sources.<sup>228</sup> Chinese Eximbank's involvement in investment projects and loans used by means of Chinese companies' undertakings created a circle of win-twice strategy for China.<sup>229</sup> While Chinese companies benefited from the investments, African states are offered to pay back costs by commodities rather than

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<sup>225</sup> Hanson, Stephanie, *China, Africa, and Oil*, June 6, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/>, accessed on February 27, 2009.

<sup>226</sup> International Energy Agency, *Key World Energy Statistics*, 2009, p. 13, [http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key\\_stats\\_2009.pdf](http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf), accessed on September 14, 2009.

<sup>227</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 8.

<sup>228</sup> Donnelly, Roger, "Sub-Saharan Roulette", <http://www.the-diplomat.com/article.aspx?aeid=8722>, accessed on February 13, 2009.

<sup>229</sup> Detailed analysis of trade between China and Africa can be seen in the study of Foster, Vivien; Butterfield, William; Chen, Chuan; Pushak, Nataliya, "China's Emerging Role in Africa", *Gridlines*, 42, 2008, [http://www.ppiaf.org/documents/gridlines/42role\\_china\\_africa.pdf](http://www.ppiaf.org/documents/gridlines/42role_china_africa.pdf), accessed on February 16, 2009.

financial tools. This strategy also facilitated African states to fund the urgent infrastructural needs with suitable payment assets. As a result the pursued strategy of trade benefited not only China but African countries and China together. This strategy let China implement new multidimensional foreign policy objectives in Africa making use of trade deals, making double benefit and wield influence on the capital poor African states within the frame of dependency model.

Evolving foreign policy which is based on trade is carefully expanded to other fields of cooperation. Boosting trade and the establishment of organizations such as Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Africa Development Bank have facilitated intense political interactions. These institutionalized mechanisms facilitated a wide range of tools of cooperation and strengthened the position of China by economic transactions, channels of diplomatic exchanges and cultural interactions in the continent. So far, the FOCAC has been convened three times since 2000. The inaugural meeting was held in Beijing, followed by the 2003 session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the third forum was held in Beijing in November 2006. These meetings provided an opportunity for high-level officials to plan future commitments of both parties. At the 2006 forum, political leaders from 48 of the 53 African countries were in attendance, including 40 heads of state. The forums were ended with various declarations and announcements such as “The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)” and “The Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation” of 2006 Beijing Forum.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000) and Beijing Declaration are significant indicators of China being a centre of attraction in the eyes of African policy-makers and peoples. Hence it is worth to begin to underline China-African relations with this forum and Beijing Declaration. It was China’s success is to gather the high ranking officials of 44 African countries and 17 regional and international organizations. The forum is one of the rare achievements in international arena that have its roots in Non-Alignment Movement and a long term policy to organize a summit between leaders and countries with different or opposing regimes, enmities and agendas.<sup>230</sup> The declaration covers the basic tenets

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<sup>230</sup> Forum on China Africa Cooperation, [http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/05/content\\_5166.htm](http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/05/content_5166.htm), accessed on January 11, 2009.

of a long term partnership that is expected to build a vast spectrum of cooperation fields. The Declaration's emphasis is the gap between northern and southern world while locating China among the rows of African countries as a member and probable leader of the South club. The background may be assumed to be based on injustice and inequality in international order, which hinder 'south' development, pose threat to the stability of the South in an interconnected globe that would have global consequences. Unfair order of globalization is declared as the reason of unjust system whilst attributing the roots of the problem in economic and social factors and newly emerging soft threats such as diseases, poverty, and debt burden of/in Africa.<sup>231</sup> Actually the outlined troubles and complaints seems to be the justification of the desire of building a new, fair political and economical world order that can be perceived as a common discontent of South Club and willingness to ignite a challenge in international system. A sense of "unity of fate" and common discontent about the existing unfair world, emanating from the West, become common topics of the forums and action plans.

The tenets of the action plans are framed by clear principles within the framework of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In this frame, both parties clearly agreed on loyalty to the UN Charter and the Organization of African Unity with an emphasis on non-interference and equality between North and South in the founding document of the Forum. Reformation of the UN is linked with the increased representation of African countries in the UN system. Declaration underlines the efforts of China by her offerings such as debt relief, fight against terrorism and diseases, cooperation on "soft" issues like culture, tourism, education, human resources, science and technology, medical care, and environmental protection. All of the aforementioned fields of cooperation require a wide scale of involvement of the daily political, economic, social and to some extent military presence of China in Africa, but with the voluntary acceptance of African countries. It is obvious that it is China benefiting from interaction with Africa due to her "believed" attraction in the hearts and minds of African public by offering aid and support and additionally political backing.

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<sup>231</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t157833.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

The importance of the Beijing Declaration of 2000 lies in several points. First, China is presented as a hero of downtrodden African countries. They all agree on the tenets of the cooperation on their own willingness which reminds us the Nye's soft power conception. The pledges of China to the African countries may be interpreted as inducement. But the commitments on social, cultural and scientific fields along with military and economic undertakings lead to constructive and integrative power conceptions of western scholars. Hard power issues like cooperation in counter-terrorism may promote soft strength in two different ways, if the Chinese involvement in Africa is concerned. First, it eases the concerns of troubled African leaders about rebels and builds contacts with the rebellions. The Declaration offers China to be an "honest arbiter" in African affairs while locating China's military presence to be peace keeping force. The claims of African countries on which the West refused or ignored to fulfil their "great power responsibility" are underlined frequently in the Declaration, offering China credibility in the hearts and minds of African people and policy makers. Actually this declaration can be recognized as a great success of public diplomacy that facilitates soft power tools for China. It can be assumed that declaration is a good example of image building effort of China in the eyes of African society by preventing a western style colonial dress.

Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development is agreed and signed unanimously after Beijing Forum of 2000 to define the principles of cooperation referring the necessity of cooperation to build a fair world order.<sup>232</sup> The principles are mentioned as equality and mutual benefit, diversity in form and content, emphasis on practical results of cooperation, pursuit of common progress, and amicable settlement of differences. These tenets are based on the idea of a fair partnership based on China's peaceful development and win-win policy. The prominent feature of China-Africa relations are emphasized by equality in relations and China avoids presenting the one profiting more, but a responsible stake holder in Africa.

Program requires contribution of China to Africa by preferential market access, development assistance, promotion of local industries, and employment by means

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<sup>232</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t157833.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

of aid grants and interest free loans. The pledges of China aim at forming an environment to enable trade and investment for boosting the development and integrity of Africa. Another significant issue is to grant Chinese infrastructural investment, again, by the exchange in goods that will be realized by raw materials and energy resources at large in future. This smart strategy offers African countries capital for the least preferred infrastructure investment fields that the West has always showed unwillingness. China's support attempts, such as debt relief, compliment China's "self sacrificing" commitments. Tourism, migration, visa regimes and work permits are Program's essential features that engage Chinese entrepreneurs to African business life more easily. Other than economic and trade activities, the Program covers general principles of cooperation on agriculture, science, culture, exploration, and utilization of natural sources, education and human resources. This part of the program is in accordance with the declaration of Beijing Forum 2000 which can be interpreted as the basis of "complete" soft power package of China. The strategy represents the win-win policy of China in practical terms that denounces the "neo-colonial" China.

Addis Ababa Forum of 2003 was the second Ministerial Conference after Beijing Forum on China – Africa Cooperation and reviewed the post Beijing Forum period. An Action Plan is signed, covering the following-two-years-term to promote the cooperation in accordance with the principles of Beijing Forum at the end of the Forum.<sup>233</sup> Actually the title of the agreement, Action Plan, tells China's tactic to display the implemented methodology: least words, but programmed and achievable goals that will differentiate China from the probable competitors who did not keep promises in the past.<sup>234</sup>

Regarding political affairs; the Action Plan (2003) aims building mechanisms and institutions between African countries and China such as initiating regular high level visits, consultation of various committees on cooperation especially on economy, trade, science and technology. China finds opportunity to legitimize Chinese military presence by means of peace-keeping operations, offering China to

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<sup>233</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t157710.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>234</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/bjzl/t404131.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.



play the mediator role in regional conflicts and non-traditional security issues. Action Plan complains about “unfair and inequitable order” in international realm that favours the West, as was done in Beijing Declaration and demands change in the nature of international order in favour of Africa. China’s promise to support Africa in the international organizations increases the African expectations from China as a hope of development, but also this is expected to promote the soft power strength of China in the eyes of African countries. The probable consequence of such an expectation will increase the voluntary support of African countries to China not to lose a perfect political support. This fact will lead to a welcomed obedience of African countries to China’s desire in international organizations and continuous presence of China in Africa related issues.

Apart from political foresights, subfields of economic cooperation are highlighted in the Action Plan (2003) such as agriculture, trade, investment, tourism, debt relief, development assistance, natural resources and energy development. This plan includes general frameworks and promises of both sides rather than significant undertakings with relevant statistical data. Approximation of regulations is obliged for both parties, especially regarding the essential problems of investment and cooperation; basically agriculture, infrastructure and energy resources. China-Africa Chamber of Industry and Commerce is established as a corner stone for approximation process.<sup>235</sup> Although these improvements can be perceived as a relation of interest of two parties, China gets the initiative in norm building of African trade while prioritizing her interests under the cover of a fair player to assist Africa in terms of trade and investment. Additionally non-conditional assistance programs in terms of politics and trade opportunities are underlined in the Plan, urging “resentful” leaders to click China option as an alternative to the “North”. Especially promised debt relief that leads to 1,6 bn USD contributes to enhance the image of China in comparison to the West, which believed to be “non-merciful” in financial issues.

Socio-cultural interaction becomes a cornerstone of the mutual cooperation in the Action Plan (2003). The significant feature is that the institutionalized exchange addresses various segments of the societies such as elite, students, scholars, and

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<sup>235</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/bjzl/t404131.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.



ordinary people. In this context, human resource activities are facilitated by the establishment of African Human Resources Development Fund to realize training and education programs. Ethiopia was assigned as the coordinator of the Fund among African countries. ‘Talent- training’ and ‘Higher Learning Vocational Education’ were built to improve and expand academic disciplines. Cooperation on medical care and public health was the centimatique of the traditional Chinese assistance of China. Cultural exchange and cooperation efforts were put forward in Action Plan with specific projects. “Meet in Beijing Festival” and “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” festivals augmented the cultural interaction but mainly introduced the “rich” Chinese culture in Africa. “China-Africa Youth Festival” was designed to contribute to the toleration of mutual cultures while boosting China’s vision in Africa.<sup>236</sup> Hence people to people contact is on the forefront of the Action Plan. Other than all of these undertakings, media coverage was pointed out to present the activities to public. Media’s involvement may be assessed as the public diplomacy aspect of the Action Plan to shape the African societies.

China released an “African Policy Paper” in 2006 to announce the basic tenets of bilateral relations with Africa in broad terms.<sup>237</sup> One question could be why China did need a policy paper for Africa to declare the basic principles to Chinese ‘African policy’, but why any other report was not prepared for any other country or region. The most probable reason could be the expectation of Chinese decision makers from this relation. Africa presents great opportunities to China’s aspirations. Hence, a specific frame should be drafted to clarify the ‘rules of the game’. African Policy Paper, therefore, underlines the willingness of a fair partnership to prove honest stance towards Africa by pointing out ‘how to’s of Chinese self control in African relations. This intention can be interpreted as a type of ‘open’ and ‘clear’ diplomacy that makes the Chinese stance a tool of “attraction” in the eyes of African states and publics. By that way, China will gain the confidence of Africans and trust in the light of bad memories of “imperial” West.

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<sup>236</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/bjzl/t404131.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>237</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

African Policy Paper (2006) is attributed to “change” and “globalization” to sustain peace and development in accordance with enhancing cooperation. Actually these themes are the common concerns of the most of the ‘South’ community. It can be argued that China emphasized these themes in the Paper to build a relationship with the developing world on the basis of South-South relations. The paper, in this sense, can be assumed as a tool to impose the targeted audience a sense of sharing common fate and interest denouncing the western type of exploitative relationship. To this end, the paper was constructed on “political equality” and “mutual trust”, complimented by “cultural exchange”, to present a fair relationship which calls Kenneth Boulding’s integrative or Nye’s soft power. Mutual support and close coordination in international organizations, as mentioned in Addis Ababa Action Plan, was expressed as a promise and also expectation to have political support by proposing mutual gain through ‘win-win policy’. Sharing experiences in governance and development make China a model to African countries polished by “make-up” words in policy paper. Moreover the aim of expanding the exchange and cooperation to “education, science, culture and health” made the relation more than a mere political and economic structure. Although China asked no preconditions to develop such relations, the paper required to recognize “one China policy”, indicating Taiwan’s unity with the main land, as a condition to realize pledges of China. Consequently, China’s Taiwan concern presided over the overall bilateral Sino-African relations.<sup>238</sup> China’s commitment of equality and trust were conditioned by China’s foreign policy concern: alienating Taiwan from the continent.

The Policy Paper (2006) covers the mechanisms of cooperation beginning from highest level official visits to “people to people” contacts that lays interactions between Chinese and African publics and policymakers. It is clear that summits of heads of States will provide vulnerable contacts since most of the African governments lack the credibility in the eyes of one part of their societies. But multilevel contacts with legislative bodies, political parties with varying political backgrounds, civil society organizations, trade unions, business chambers, agricultural cooperative societies, tourism and cultural exchanges will offer a long

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<sup>238</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

term, concrete partnership disregarding the probability of political turmoil, government changes and systemic differences. The low level undertakings should be expected to promote the soft strength of China since a dedication to fair treatment of unfair past of African exploitation seems to be promised in the Policy Paper.

The Policy Paper (2006) frames the fundamental principles of trade, investment and financial cooperation that recall the hard power conception of Nye as inducement. The ‘inducements’ of China may be listed, according to Nye’s framework, as the access of African commodities to China, Free Trade Agreements, direct investment of Chinese government and private enterprises, preferential loans, buyer credits and debt relief.<sup>239</sup> But psychological impact on the African people of these privileges promotes the credibility of China. Especially Chinese aid in agriculture and infrastructure are significant issues of Policy Paper strengthening the soft power of China. In this region, African nations feel the deficiency of capital to meet the urgent needs of public, but western countries hesitated to offer such capital. Contrary to the West, China promises to facilitate technology, investment, education, experimental and demonstrative agricultural projects while rehabilitating and improving infrastructure such as transportation, communication, electricity generation and water conservancy. These attempts of assistance will attract the admiration of vast masses since these offers are for the solutions of common problems, suffered by any average individual.

There exist some minor fields of cooperation such as offer to create “Approved Destinations” to Chinese tourists, language teaching by Confucius Institutes, exchange of students, medical aid, science and technology transfer, humanitarian assistance, environmental cooperation, bio-agricultural projects, solar energy utilization, exchange of artists and athletes.<sup>240</sup> All these interactions completely fit Nye’s conception of soft power and present Chinese presence in Africa as a blessing to African people.

Furthermore, exchange and cooperation between media and “balanced media coverage of each other” should be expected to broadcast all of the aforementioned

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<sup>239</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

fields of activities to the houses of millions of Africans. A western style public diplomacy is aimed at having African community to get used to China's presence, which is different from the unwanted western existence that let turbulences all over the continent for centuries. Chinese state controlled media would broadcast the official-rosy image of Chinese style socialism by means of African media as an alternative to American dream. Moreover China can easily propagate socialism with Chinese characteristics by using these assets.

African Policy Paper (2006) underlines military cooperation, too.<sup>241</sup> Even though military cooperation could be perceived as hard power in the eyes of Nye, it can be benefited as a means of fair arbiter and a soft power asset. Military presence by means of conflict settlement and peace keeping operations ought to be expected to offer initiative in regional disputes and shaping the political environment. Then the friendship of China will be immune from the local and regional enmities. Non-traditional threats, such as terrorism or ethnical instability which require foreign military presence, will justify China's military presence. China's active involvement in regional problems by its military forces will promote its global image.

After the release of the aforementioned paper, The Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) were held on 03-05 November 2006, and concluded with another Action Plan for (2007-2009) to define concrete wills and goals referring to previous two summits, declarations and ongoing or achieved projects.<sup>242</sup> Underlined statistical data is presented as a success story to prevent possible disappointment in the eyes of public and policymakers in the underdeveloped and developing countries, if long term wishes and promises are concerned. Because these countries have learnt not to lean on sole words, but actions if lack of trust to foreigners and desperate history of colonialism are recalled from the memories. Thus the content of Action Plan (2007-2009) and achievements of promised commitments are parameters of soft power in Africa. Action Plan covers the forthcoming two years term and complies

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<sup>241</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>242</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

with Addis Ababa Action Plan of 2004-2006 while questioning if it worked out or not.

The Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) requires institutionalization in the relations of China and Africa as the previous commitments did. The Forum's decision of gathering the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in New York in accordance with the UN General Assembly and realization of this decision is a very crucial step to realize the soft power of China in Africa and international society in terms of political incentives.<sup>243</sup> Such meetings mean that African countries and China will consult the probable issue areas and messages that will be delivered in the UN and lead to consent on the basic principles within a 'win-win' mentality. In other words, China would politically gather what she had invested in Africa in the matters like Taiwan and against accusations of violating human rights by benefiting the voting power of African states in the UN General Assembly. As a result of this effort, African countries provided China strong support in foiling anti-China motions, introduced by some Western countries at the UN Human Rights Commission.<sup>244</sup> They helped China to defeat the attempts of Taiwan to participate to the United Nations and to edge into the World Health Organization. Another example is that African countries supported China in its bid to host the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo.<sup>245</sup> The significant thing of such kind of meetings is that African countries are not forced to accept what China wants, but voluntarily stand united along with China. It can be assumed that Nye's conception or similar theoretical studies, as mentioned in Chapter 1, are empirically achieved under the roof of the UN. It is a fact that this reality will prove the soft strength of China to all of the UN members if the support of the African countries to China is concerned.

The Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) foresees the cooperation of China and Africa with third parties.<sup>246</sup> So China would hold initiative to determine the new players in Africa and shape the pursued foreign policies in the continent. This reality reminds the modern variant of competition on Africa between big powers and China. China

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<sup>243</sup> Article 2.2.2, *Ibid*.

<sup>244</sup> Heritage Foundation, "The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Disastrous First Year", June 01, 2007, <http://www.heritage.org/research/worldwidefreedom/bg2038.cfm>, accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>245</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 8.

<sup>246</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009, article 2.2.3.

ought to be expected to interfere the political choices of African states in accordance with Chinese interests, even though non-interference is one of the basic tenets of China-Africa relation.

Apart from contacts of diplomatic, political and legislation bodies, the spirit of Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) is extended to a wide strand of relations pending to non-political fields. For instance, sister-city establishment takes the mutual high and middle level interaction to sublevel, local to local contact.<sup>247</sup> This attempt should be expected to directly shape the perception of African public towards Chinese presence in Africa. Cooperation on consulate and law enforcement agencies would provide additional privilege to the citizens of both parties, but mainly to Chinese. It must be noted that if the same privilege would be offered to western powers, it may be perceived as another colonial victory of the West.

Regarding the efficiency of African Union (AU), China overtly supports the AU or the other regional organizations by incentives specific to these structures such as building a Convention Centre in Addis Ababa for the AU.<sup>248</sup> (Article 2.5.3). China's investment should be assessed along with the AU's importance in African affairs as a platform of discussions addressing all of the African states. In return, the volunteer consensus of African countries regarding China's involvement in peacekeeping operations under the UN or the AU umbrella is supported by African states in the Action Plan. Once again, 'unrequited' investment of China seems rewarded by African countries in the frame of win-win strategy.

Another significant step of The Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) is the cooperation in agriculture.<sup>249</sup> China's political, social and ideological system has been based on traditional agrarian society even though it was challenged by Deng's governance. One of the most important problem is the starving Sub-Saharan African countries that need agricultural production to feed its own people. This field of cooperation directly fits the basic need of the most African public. Agricultural support, such as technology transfer for modern harvest methods or pilot projects of farms to exhibit and teach mass production, will be benefited by the ordinary individuals by making

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<sup>247</sup> Article 2.3.2, *Ibid.*

<sup>248</sup> Article 2.5.3, *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> Article 3.1, *Ibid.*

money or reaching food to feed their families, which naturally will lead to a boost of credibility for China. The Action Plan clearly defines what will be done in this field by naming the projects including time frames. Hence it can be assumed that China is delivering the aid to the correct field and worth admiration of African public in comparison to the unrealized promises of the West.

Investment and business cooperation are also clearly named by significant steps like preventing double taxation, building a joint Chamber of Commerce, supporting small and medium scale industrial enterprises and finally setting up a China-Africa Development Fund by the support of Chinese banks with a budget of \$5 bn even though credits are designed for Chinese investments in Africa. China promised to build economic zones to facilitate trade more efficiently and increased the number of zero-tariff items to 440 from 190 to balance the trade with African countries.<sup>250</sup> It is probable that China took the decision of increasing the number of zero-tariff items to show how altruistic China is. African goods have difficulties to reach the markets of the West but China offers African producers to reach Chinese market. By these incentives, the resentment of public who are widely concerned about the loss of jobs due to cheap Chinese goods will be eased by a self restriction of Chinese government.

The Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) covers a coordinated infrastructure building and investment. The priorities of the investments are emphasized as transportation, telecommunication, water conservancy and power generation. These investments are huge in quantity and clear the barriers of desired development in African economic life. It may be claimed that China is investing in Africa to ease the extraction and transportation of valuable African natural resources. But these investments are the needs of the continent, and actually “must” for survival. China’s promises are furthered by expanding the support to low-cost, sustainable energy resources like solar energy, geological survey of mining, biotechnology in agriculture and development of medicine in accordance with the World Summit of Information Technology that was organized in Tunisia on November 16-18, 2005. Such long term projects should be expected to spill over to the other fields of interaction.

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<sup>250</sup> Article 3.2, *Ibid.*

Other than economic incentives, China underlines the respect for different traditions and social systems in the Action Plan.<sup>251</sup> This proposal seems innocent if the West's double standards are concerned. In the light of five principles of peaceful coexistence, China presents an alternative system and does not want "others" to judge China's system using western criteria. It can be argued that this step may be conceived as denying universal values. But the Action Plan is negotiated and approved by 48 African countries unanimously. This means that they agreed about the respect to social system of not only China's but also theirs. Most of the African countries have problems in governing their people and this thesis appears to be a defence mechanism against the western criticism. Actually this proposal justifies why China wants to reform the UN system in favour of African countries.

The Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)'s crucial part is about attaining specific goals which are supported by concrete facts and figures rather than general pledged political, economic and military commitments.<sup>252</sup> For instance, China promises to train 15.000 professionals in three years additional to previously trained 10.000 professionals under the commitments of African Human Resources Development Fund. Cultural interactions are announced to be organized under the auspices of China-Africa Cultural Visitors Program and performances at the local level relations, additional to student and academic exchange programs and accreditations. From this perspective, Chinese government undertakes to set up 100 schools, deliver 4.000 scholarships, educate school teachers, and establish Confucius Institutes to teach Mandarin. Additional to culture and education, medical support is emphasized by setting up precise targets such as building 30 hospitals, 30 exhibition centres, and funding for medicine. Concerning tourism, China increased the number of Approved Destinations for Chinese citizens. But the number of tourists from China, however, did not reach to the number of western tourists arrived in Africa. Regarding media, the Plan provides China opportunities to host workshops, trips, news coverage, training for radio and TV staff. These activities are perfect tools for image building and influence the African public opinion. Culture, education,

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<sup>251</sup> Article 4.3, *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> Article 5.1, 5.2, *Ibid.*



tourism and media ought to be evaluated all together in a single category since all of them have consequences affecting one another and deepens the overall interaction.

One year after the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), an Implementation Report was prepared to overview the achievements in bilateral relations in accordance with the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) in May 2008.<sup>253</sup> The format of the report is the same as declarations, action plans and programs of previous years to see the improvements in a systemic way. The practical outcomes of the bilateral relations are overviewed. The achievements and kept promises ought to be evaluated along with China's appointment of the envoy to the 10<sup>th</sup> AU summit and the special representative to African affairs in 2007. The report seems to be an evidence of success story after the drafted action plans.

The report mentions high level visits to show the tendency and willingness of Chinese leaders on relations with Africa.<sup>254</sup> In the years 2007 and 2008, top Chinese leaders visited 24 African countries in comparison to total 25 official visits of African countries to China. Additionally Foreign Ministers met in New York before the UN General Assembly as was planned in the Action Plan (2007-2009).<sup>255</sup> China and eight African countries participated to plenary meetings including strategic dialogue for consulting and coordinating the relations with South Africa. Totally 40 delegations of African and 25 groups of Chinese political party representatives paid visits while the number of sister-cities reached to 85.<sup>256</sup> It may be claimed that increasing number of political interactions provided fruitful outcomes for China. As an example to a specific outcome of the political undertakings, the Report underlines, China's success is to prevent Taiwan's attempts to be a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 60<sup>th</sup> and 61<sup>st</sup> sessions of the WHO and join the UN under the name of Taiwan in 62<sup>nd</sup> session.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/wjjh/hywj/t459449.htm>, accessed on February 01, 2009.

<sup>254</sup> Article I/1, *Ibid*.

<sup>255</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2467/t368086.htm>, accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>256</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/xwlb/t367671.htm>, accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>257</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The UN Plenary Session Five", <http://www.iiss.org/publications/conference-proceedings/manama-dialogue-report-2007/plenary-session-5/>, accessed on February 05, 2010.

The report emphasizes China's contribution to the peaceful resolutions of regional conflicts and participation to the AU peacekeeping operations in Sudan and Somali.<sup>258</sup> This statement is supported by the facts about Chinese participation to seven peacekeeping operations with 1,400 soldiers and providing mine clearing assistance program. Apart from military commitments, China's investment in Africa is charming with a \$1 bn direct investment in 2007. More than 500 Chinese and African entrepreneurs gathered in China-Africa Business Forum in Egypt to discuss the opportunities. The promised Africa Development Fund was launched with \$1 bn capital in 2007 and the significant project was the construction of Shenzhen Gas-fired Combined Cycle Power Station in Ghana. The economic and trade cooperation zones were built in Zambia and Mauritius. As a result of similar undertakings in overall Africa, the bilateral trade reached to \$73.31 bn in 2007 with a 32.2 percent increase in comparison to 2006 and seven fold since 2000.<sup>259</sup> As seen from the figures, the goals of Beijing Action Plan are materialized by numbers and events to show the efficiency of cooperation and China's efforts to have Africa rolling forward on the way to development.

Debt cancellation is another issue that should be stressed. Debt relief issue is one of the fields about which the Africans criticized the West due to their unkept promises. China, on the other hand, has provided aid to African countries about the issue as indicated in the report. China signed assistance agreements with 48 African countries and protocols for debt cancellation with 32 of 33 heavily indebted African countries. China's exclusion of 466 items from tariff exemption for 30 of 31 least developed countries and financial partnership of People's Bank of China and West African Development Bank strengthened the Chinese contribution to overall African welfare.<sup>260</sup> Regarding the agricultural assistance, commitments of China were materialized through various ways such as dispatching 100 senior agro-technicians to 35 African countries, formulation of development plans, building exhibition centres of agriculture technology in 14 countries. In terms of human resources, China's opening of 263 training work-shops for 49 African countries and

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<sup>258</sup> Ministry of Foreign Ministry of PRC, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/xwlb/t367671.htm>, article I/5, accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>259</sup> Article II/1, 2, *Ibid*.

<sup>260</sup> Article III/1, *Ibid*.

training 6,432 professionals in various fields provided skilful workforce in various level of bureaucracy while the construction of promised 100 schools present long term investments to human resources. Moreover the granted scholarship reached to 2,683 in 2007 that is 700 more than of 2006.<sup>261</sup>

Regarding the cultural interactions, China renewed the annual plans for implementing cultural agreements with five African countries. Nine Chinese art troupes toured 17 countries and one African art troupe visited China. China extended the number of Approved Destination Status countries to 27. More than 234,400 Chinese citizens visited Africa on their overseas stop in 2007 that is a year on year increase of 36.15 percent. China sent 103 youth volunteers to five African countries to teach Mandarin.<sup>262</sup>

If China's soft ventures are overviewed during the last decades, many attempts of close constructive or integrative fields of cooperation can be observed apart from the information in the Implementation Report of 2008. According to the data provided by Gill and Huang, China has supported nearly 900 projects in economic and social development related fields, offered government scholarship for 50 African countries, and sent more than 1,760 officers and soldiers to carry out the UN peace-keeping tasks in Africa as of 2008.<sup>263</sup> These figures indicate the clear presence of China in Africa. But as a result of intense cooperation, social reflections of bilateral interactions can be observed. For instance the migrant Chinese population in Zambia has risen from 3,000 to 30,000 in the past ten years, while in South Africa the number of Chinese migrants has grown from virtually from none to as many as 300,000 in twenty years. These figures require China to take effective measures in terms of protecting the consular rights and acquire preferential rights.

Kurlantzick argues that the Chinese assistance to the continent has focused on four aspects. First, China offers to fund infrastructure projects, which the World Bank and most bilateral donors stopped funding decades ago. Second, China prefers to build its relationship with regional banks like the African Development Bank since

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<sup>261</sup> Articles III/2, 3, *Ibid.*

<sup>262</sup> Articles III/6, *Ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> Gill, Bates and Huang, Chin-Hao, "China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications", *SIPRI Policy Brief*, p. 2, <http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPB0902.pdf>, accessed on February 2009.

China can play a more substantial role in the regional banks than it could in the World Bank and the larger international financial institutions. Third, Beijing has focused on training African professionals, particularly in economic management. By means of African Human Resources Development Fund, this helps training 3,800 African professionals per year. Finally, Beijing has tried to establish Chinese language schools at African universities, often under the framework of China's Confucius Institute project and established cooperation agreements with 27 African universities.<sup>264</sup>

China regularly conducts cooperation in the field of health to facilitate the regular exchange of medical teams and training for medical professionals. China also provides medicine and medical equipment free of charge to several African countries, and has active programs to jointly prevent and treat infectious diseases including malaria and HIV/AIDS. In 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Health conducted a two-part international training course in techniques for the prevention and treatment of malaria and tropical diseases. China deployed its first medical team in 1964 at the invitation of the Algerian government. Since then, China has cumulatively sent over 15,000 doctors to more than 47 African countries and treated approximately 180 million African patients as of 2006. This long term medical cooperation builds person-to-person relations between Africans and Chinese, and brings benefits to both sides. Like many sports stadiums, highways, and other infrastructure such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, the medical teams are publicized by both Chinese and African leaders as a tangible public good.<sup>265</sup>

### **3.2 Analysis of the Commitments of China:**

China's venture of harvesting sympathy may be claimed as hugely successful in Africa. Beijing offers African nations an alternative market for resources that they have no capability to process, a model of successful development, and trade policies that are more benign than Western initiatives. China exports its own brand of capitalism that can be characterized as a sophisticated development model. Beijing

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<sup>264</sup> Kurlantzick, Joshua, "Beijing's Safari: China's Move into Africa and Its Implications for Aid, Development, and Governance", *Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook*, 29, November 2006, p. 3

<sup>265</sup> Thompson, Drew, "China's Soft Power in Africa: From the 'Beijing Consensus' to Health Diplomacy", *China Brief: A Journal of Analyses and Information*, 5/1, 2005, p. 3.

[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051013\\_china\\_soft\\_pwr.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051013_china_soft_pwr.pdf), accessed on March 12, 2008.

increasingly advertises its state directed model of development, which can prove alluring on a continent where neoliberal economic reforms did not deliver their promised poverty reduction.<sup>266</sup>

While establishing relations with African countries, China has two options: either it would confront with the global powers or avoid frictions with them while dealing with Africa. Considering China's caution even about choosing words of diplomacy and adopting strategies such as win-win policy or five principle of co-existence, China tried to have utmost care not to upset the international society in its dealings. China creates a posture of sharing similar history of exploitation, identical present status in the 'South' club and a dedicated future involvement to build a fair international order. China's claims suit what Africans want to hear in the declarations, announcements or forums. China pushes to specific targets that can be achieved in a certain time-table. This strategy will promote China to a credible and honest actor in the eyes of Africans. China handled cost effective and efficient power tools by adapting the bilateral relations to international norms, benefiting from these norms, bearing the international responsibility, and many legitimate regional institutional commitments while binding African resource-rich countries to China's ultimate goals on their own wills. It can be claimed that China pursues a long term policy with no step on the wrong stones crossing the river as the West did.

If the channels of interactions between China and African countries are considered, there can be identified six key channels of mutual interaction; trade links, investment flows, aid, institutions of global governance, flows of people, environmental cooperation. These fields of interactions may and should be outnumbered with soft power sources and tools as Action plans indicate.<sup>267</sup> For instance China's cultural, political and foreign policy sources of soft power in Africa could be included to channels of interaction that would spill-over the bilateral cooperation to long term partnership. Cultural interaction ought to be expected to spill over trade. Contrary to constructive effect of bilateral relations, these channels of interaction and can have negative aspects. For instance, trade and

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<sup>266</sup> Kurlantzick, "Beijing's Safari", p. 2.

<sup>267</sup> Kaplinsky, R., "What does the Rise of China Do for Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of African Political Economy" *Pambazuka*, 357, 2008, p. 7.

marketing may hamper employment in host countries. Then good excuses and preventive measures should be taken to arrange the relation and create a full scale influence on the hearts and minds. As an example, there are incompatibilities between Chinese and African markets and China's export of plastic and textile to Africa is a particularly acute problem.<sup>268</sup> China's textile and garment exports to South Africa had increased by 80 percent in recent years, reaching \$1.2 billion in 2004, which accounted for 80 percent of China's total exports to South Africa that year. The flood of cheap Chinese merchandise had forced many local textile and garments factories to close down in South Africa, which has led to high unemployment rates. Chinese textile imports had caused more than 80 per cent of Nigeria's textile factories to shut down and an estimated 250,000 Nigerian workers had been laid off as a result.<sup>269</sup> In order to ameliorate this problem, China put in place a self-imposed quota to restrict the total exports of textile and garment products, such as quotas to export textile garments to South Africa.<sup>270, 271</sup> Self control to textile export is not expected to solve the overall trade deficit in garments but at least contributes to image building efforts of China by presenting Chinese goodwill for preventing social and economic consequences of Chinese related trade deficits.

Aid is China's one of the most important soft power tool in her perception, although Nye labels aid and investment as inducement. Chinese aid programs to African countries can be tied to preconditions and preferential fields to shape the policy makers, societies, industrial or infrastructural branches. So far, Chinese aid is primarily tied to China's political and strategic goals on the continent, rather than humanitarian reasons.<sup>272</sup> But unlike the other donors, China prefers to provide loans rather than donations. The motivation of China can be that it can use these loans as leverage over recipient nations. This strategy offers China to relieve the debts of heavily indebted African countries if the recipient country is consistent with

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<sup>268</sup> Wenping, He, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy", *China Security*, 3/3, Summer 2007, p. 26.

<sup>269</sup> Financial Times Special Report, "Africa-China Trade", January 24, 2008, <http://media.ft.com/cms/e13530f4-c9df-11dc-b5dc-000077b07658.pdf>, accessed on March 15, 2009.

<sup>270</sup> Wenping, He, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy", p. 26.

<sup>271</sup> African Growth and Opportunity Act, <http://www.agoa.info/news.php?story=629>, accessed on September 04, 2009.

<sup>272</sup> Kurlantzick, "Beijing's Safari", p. 2

China's policies. In addition, Chinese loans coincide with contracts to Chinese companies especially those interested in natural resource extraction and marketing. For instance Angola became China's largest trade partner with 25.3 billion USD in 2008.<sup>273</sup> But most of the funds were realized by means of Chinese firms through the process of governmental procurement of China by Eximbank loans. On the other hand, China disregards any political, environmental or social conditions, such as making democratic reforms or promoting human rights as the West requires, to its financial aid to Africa other than an affirmation of the "one China policy".<sup>274</sup> African countries that have hope to reach cheap Chinese capital and debt cancellation offer should be expected to back China's political motivations voluntarily that reminds soft power in Chinese perception.

China's presence is greatest in the resource-rich countries like Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, but it is also manifest in less obvious spots. Zhu pointed out that Chinese companies built and renovated hotels and restaurants in Sierra Leone. In Mozambique, Chinese companies invested in soybean processing and prawn production. In Senegal whose economy was long dominated by peanut farming, Chinese construction companies are working on roads, bridges, waterworks and other projects. China is displaying its capabilities with overall development in practice that directly appears in the daily life of Africans.<sup>275</sup>

China's soaring energy demand and hunger to natural resources let China sign big deals of business agreements with African countries. But China's resource suppliers are generally the countries which the West has unwillingness to conduct business due to political reasons. In the late 1990s, for example, when Ethiopia went to war with neighbouring Eritrea, the United States evacuated its Peace Corps volunteers, scaled back military aid and issued a security warning to US citizens and companies. In contrast, China saw the war as an opportunity to expand its influence. It dispatched even more diplomats, engineers, businesspeople and teachers to Ethiopia. Today, China's influence in Ethiopia is overwhelming. Most recently,

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<sup>273</sup> China Daily, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content\\_7407941.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content_7407941.htm), accessed on September 04, 2009.

<sup>274</sup> Campos, Indira and Vines, Alex, "Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation", Working Paper Presented at CSIS Conference of *"Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership"*, December 5, 2007, p. 11 [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080306\\_angolachina.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080306_angolachina.pdf), accessed on September 04, 2009.

<sup>275</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 17.

China has begun exploring for oil and building Ethiopian military installations.<sup>276</sup> One place where such Chinese indifference about political conditions jeopardizes the American efforts to fight against corruption and human rights abuse is Sudan. China's claim was that China strictly believes in non-interference and no attachment of preconditions to the relations with Africa. The Chinese have invested more than \$8 billion in joint exploration contracts in Sudan, including the building of a 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea, deployed thousands of military personnel disguised as oil workers and provided arms to the Sudanese government to support it in the country's 20-year civil war, even though the UN Security Council attempted to put sanctions to Sudan's oil export. But China provided political shield to Sudan against international sanctions. The western companies evacuated Sudan due to human rights concerns, but China provided full coverage of trade, aid, investment, political protection, cultural interaction.<sup>277</sup>

For African countries, China is not just a new source of investment; it is also a useful counterweight to American and European influence in the region. China presents an excellent development model to Africa to find an alternative model of development rather than preconditioned and recidivous colonial powers' implementations. By this determination, Joshua Cooper Ramo, a leading analyst of Kissinger Associates on China, has labelled the "Beijing Consensus", a development approach "driven not by a desire to make bankers happy, but by the more fundamental urge for equitable, high-quality growth".<sup>278</sup> The Beijing Consensus demands that ideas such as privatization and free trade be approached with incredible caution. The ultimate goal could be concluded as growing while holding independence. China has effectively exported its notion of economic development with Chinese characteristics to its African trading partners, encouraging them to develop their economy through trade and investment in infrastructure and social institutions, without dictating terms for political or

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<sup>276</sup> Leggett, Karby, "China Flexes Economic Muscle Throughout Burgeoning Africa", *Wall Street Journal Europe*, March 29, 2005, <http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111205419351091336,00.html>, accessed on January 12, 2009.

<sup>277</sup> Lyman, Princeton N., "China's Rising Role in Africa", Brief to the US-China Commission of US Senate, July 21, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/c>, accessed on February 27, 2009.

<sup>278</sup> Ramo, Joshua Cooper, "China has Discovered Its Own Economic Consensus", The Foreign Policy Centre (EU), *Financial Times*, May 08, 2004, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/240.pdf>, accessed on April 12, 2008. Ramo is a leading correspondent on China and released two books on China titled as "the Beijing Consensus" and "Brand China".



economic reforms. But the crucial aspect of this development is to preserve the own characteristics disregarding forced transformation in accordance with the interests of foreign players. China's ambition is to neglect the regime, political environment or concerns such as human rights records. China's respects for national sovereignty and disinterest to the problematic domestic issues are attractive features not only for Zimbabwe's Mugabe, but also other African nations that are reluctant to implement economic and political reforms considered necessary by Western donor institutions and countries.<sup>279</sup>

China prioritizes the poverty reduction strategies to attract policy makers as well as societies since poverty is disaster in Africans' daily life. Lin Lin, Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia and Representative to the African Union, claimed that "China managed to reduce the number of its citizens living below the poverty line from 100 million to 20 million in 30 years and willing to share its experiences in poverty reduction with Africa".<sup>280</sup> This statement is both hope and expectation for Africans, especially when the common disappointment from the West is concerned. The priority of regular individual is mostly self sufficiency in terms of welfare in daily life. Such statements and specific actions will shape African society's sympathy, and even 'fondness' for China. Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, described China as a key source of support for African nations striving for reducing their poverty: "China provides for Africa a source of successful development experience, technology transfer, trade and investment".<sup>281</sup>

As the largest developing nation and the largest developing continent, respectively China and Africa do not have any historical grievances against each other. Instead, they share a similar history of being colonized and bullied by Western powers.<sup>282</sup> Referring herself as "the largest developing country in the world," China markets itself to the African nations as an alternative, non-Western model of governance and development. It is an attractive idea to preserve the autonomous statue while

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<sup>279</sup> Thompson, Drew, "China's Soft Power in Africa: From the 'Beijing Consensus' to Health Diplomacy", p. 2, [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/051013\\_china\\_soft\\_pwr.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/051013_china_soft_pwr.pdf), accessed on April 13, 2008.

<sup>280</sup> Organization of African Union, <http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Actualites/2006/sept/strategic%20partnerships-%20opening%2012sept06.pdf>, accessed on February 11, 2009.

<sup>281</sup> XINHUA News Agency, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/04/content\\_5289600.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/04/content_5289600.htm), accessed on January 01, 2009.

<sup>282</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 22.

receiving aid and trading for African countries. That is what China offers: growth and independence from former colonial powers.<sup>283</sup>

The action plans and their implementation indicate China's strategy of offering complete package of bilateral relations. Not only political engagements, but a wide range of cooperation fields, including Nye's soft power means, are covered in the documents between parties. If China's soft power perception is resembled and matched by western concept of soft power, an imitation may be observed in issues like cultural dominance, trade preferential rights, and political bindings. Realizing that Chinese media and popular culture have only very limited entry into African markets so far, China has actively promoted cultural exchanges with African nations.<sup>284</sup>

If the cultural interaction of China is overviewed, the picture would more clear: China has conducted educational exchange and cooperation programs with 50 African countries. Twenty Chinese universities have established exchange programs with dozens of universities from twenty-nine African countries. As an indicator of China's growing influence in the region, by the end of 2005, over sixty schools in about ten African countries offered Chinese language courses and over 6,000 African students were studying Chinese. China has invested in other cultural projects in Africa. China donated \$34 million to build the largest theatre in Senegal, the largest cultural project it has been involved in Africa.<sup>285</sup> State-run China Radio International launched its first overseas radio station in Kenya in January 2006 to provide 2 million Kenyans with 19 hours of daily programming in English, Swahili, and Chinese on major news from China and around the world, including China's exchanges with African countries.<sup>286</sup> These figures clearly indicates the Chinese cultural diffusion in Africa.

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<sup>283</sup> Kirby, William C., "Traditions of Centrality" in Robinson, Thomas W. and David Shambaugh (eds), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, New York, Oxford, UP, 1994, p. 14.

<sup>284</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 21.

<sup>285</sup> Xinhua News Agency, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/06/content\\_10775161.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/06/content_10775161.htm), accessed on February 20, 2009.

<sup>286</sup> Chinese Government Official Web Portal, [http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-02/28/content\\_212957.htm](http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-02/28/content_212957.htm), accessed on February 12, 2009.

### 3.3 African Perceptions of China:

China has intensified its efforts in Africa by means of Action Plans, Summits and frequented visits to Africa. China seems eager to engage in the affairs of Africa. The diplomatic events, documents, promises and realizations of these statements clearly indicate the approach of China. But African perspective of China should be searched to understand whether China's aforementioned attempts succeeded or not. If the purpose of China is to wield soft power in Africa, the reaction of African governments and also public should be taken into consideration. From the African perspective, China offers an alternative development approach in comparison to the West that has historically demanded conditions on trade and aid. China gives fewer lectures and more practical help. In the 1990s, many African countries adopted the "Washington Consensus".<sup>287</sup> But this approach did not improve the economies and living conditions of Africans. China's economic development model essentially refutes Western notions of political liberalization as indispensable for sustained development. China has encouraged African nations to develop their own path of development without any imposed reform of the West. When many developing countries in Africa have grown disenchanted with the so-called Washington Consensus, they show intense interest in learning from China's "Beijing Consensus," which emphasizes innovation and growth through a social-market economy, while placing less emphasis on free markets and democracy.<sup>288</sup>

Donald Kaberuka, the head of the African Development Bank made a speech that presents the general tendency of continent towards China: "[Africa] can learn from [the Chinese] how ... to move from low to middle income status."<sup>289</sup> It can be argued that what Africa needs is capital, development, welfare, and peaceful solutions of the conflicts as well. China pursues a 'smart strategy' of engagement

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<sup>287</sup> Williamson, John, "What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?" *World Bank Research Observer*, 15/2 (2000), pp. 251-264,

[http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/11/10/000094946\\_00102705411757/Rendered/PDF/multi\\_page.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/11/10/000094946_00102705411757/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf), accessed on August 15, 2009. Washington Consensus is first coined by John Williams in *Research Observer*, a publication of World Bank, emphasizing neoliberal policy recommendations to Latin American countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions. The prominent features of the recommendations are fiscal discipline, direction of public expenditure priorities, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, abolishing barriers, and secure property rights. But the critique is that these measures did not bring stability to the economies of Latin American countries.

<sup>288</sup> Zhu, "China's New Diplomacy in Africa and Its Implications", p. 26.

<sup>289</sup> Kurlantzick, "Beijing's Safari", p. 4.

that will address to these problems by specially designed programs and Action Plans. By that way, China's "complete package" of cooperation includes assorted fields of partnership guaranteeing the permanent Chinese presence in Africa. For instance, aid and technical support in agriculture is integrated with education opportunities in China whilst sending Chinese experts to guide. Besides, cultural activities compliment the other fields of cooperation. Chinese military presence in conflict zones is combined with the resource extraction and channelling. High, mid and low level meetings of decision makers and chambers are unified with the procurement of Chinese services by the credits of Chinese Eximbank.<sup>290</sup> The targeted audience is selected in a smart way. If the authoritarian regimes and long term enmities of the African societies are thought, expectation of leaders or certain tribes bear importance rather than vast majorities. Then the one who offers solution to the problems of governing elites will be favoured politically. But huge projects such as Chinese medical support to the majority of the public and infrastructural investment strengthen China's image in the eyes of local public because the one who meets the needs of the publics will shoot to the centre of hearts and minds of the masses. As a result China invests to all strands of society to wield a permanent power.

From this perspective it can be claimed that African elites and people have often welcomed China's presence. African elites perceive China different from Western donors and investors; Beijing is not viewed to be linked to the neoliberal economic model and its structural adjustment programs, as can be seen in the *modus operandi* of Beijing Consensus. China is seen as contributor to the development of continent, canceller of the debts, trade partner, investor to risky infrastructural projects and political supporter in the UN Security Council against sanctions to authoritarian African leaders. This projection of China can be observed in a poll of BBC, which was conducted from November 15, 2004 to January 5, 2005 with a representative sample of 22,953 people across 22 countries world-wide shows that China was viewed as a benign power with its economic power. The poll's conclusion was that China's influence was 20 percent "mainly positive", but 10 percent mainly negative

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<sup>290</sup> UNDP, "China Africa Annual Progress Report (2006)", <http://www.undp.org.cn/monitordocs/43576.pdf> , accessed on February 05, 2010.

in a scale of popularity.<sup>291</sup> The same poll repeated in 2009 and obtained results were challenging especially in Africa. The same popularity was measured as 30 percent “mainly positive”, but 40 percent mainly negative. Both positive and negative feelings sample groups grew significantly. Even though Barack Hussein Obama’s Presidency challenged China’s rising popularity, the polled three African countries, Egypt, Nigeria and Ghana favoured China as having positive influence with high ratings. The positive attitude was measured as 62 percent in Egypt, 75 percent in Ghana, and 72 percent in Nigeria, but negative attitude towards China was only 11, 8, 15 percent respectively. If the popularity results of 2005 and 2009 polls are compared, perceived power and credibility of China were apparently higher not only in Africa, but also for the West and South America. But it ought to be mentioned that the polls are conducted in different African countries in 2005 and 2009.<sup>292</sup>

On the other hand critical resonances were heard from time to time. As a significant example, in 2005, the African Union decided to appoint a Task Force to study Africa’s relations with emerging powers like China.<sup>293</sup> Its final report expressed firmly that Africa needs “to be confident about its own abilities and to look for trading and growth opportunities within itself and to avoid a second colonization under the strategic partnership with the emerging powers”.<sup>294</sup> This cordial warning emanates from the concerns on trade deficits and its unfair structure in terms of exchanging raw materials with finished products, unemployment due to cheap Chinese commodities and involvement of Chinese companies in loan contracts. Actually this conclusion may be conceived as the reflection of fears arising from the colonial history. Chinese presence may be more polite and polished by the mutual

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<sup>291</sup> Program on International Policy Attitudes, March 2005,

[http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China\\_Mar05/China\\_Mar05\\_rpt.pdf](http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf) , accessed on February 12, 2009.

<sup>292</sup> World Public Opinion (Research Institute),

[http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views\\_on\\_countriesregions\\_bt/588.php?lb=btvoc&pnt=588&nid=&id=](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/588.php?lb=btvoc&pnt=588&nid=&id=), accessed on March 04, 2009.

<sup>293</sup> Organization of African Union,

<http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Actualites/2006/sept/Task%20force%20on%20Africa's%20strategic%20partnerships%20with%20Power%20E.pdf> , accessed on February 13, 2009.

<sup>294</sup> Mbogo, Steve, “African Countries Draft Plan for Relations with 'Emerging Powers' Like China”, World Politics Review, October 23 2006, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=279>, accessed on February 19, 2009.

agreements, forums or action plans. But the motivation of China is similar to West in the eyes of some Africans.

As an example to such resentments, the rights of workers in Chinese investments led to disturbances in some African countries. For instance, when Chinese investors purchased a copper production company, Chambishi Mining Plc, miners of Zambia gave them a heroes' welcome. But it was witnessed disagreement and clashes after three years due to poor pay, lack of safety clothing. Miners destroyed property at the mine in a violent protest during which Chinese managers opened fire, wounding five workers.<sup>295</sup> The low standards of Chinese companies, regarding poor working conditions and low wages make Chinese companies repelling and caused corrosion in China's outlook in Africa. But it must be taken into consideration that Chinese companies are presented as private enterprises rather than governmental undertakings, relieving Chinese government from any dispute.

Resentments also exist due to the loss of jobs and growing descent of industrial sectors such as textile. There have been protests in South Africa and Zimbabwe against cheap clothing imported from China. Mauro De Lorenzo remarks that "Chinese textile imports have decimated Nigeria's domestic production, forcing many factories to close. South Africa's textile industry was saved only through a bilateral agreement between the governments to voluntarily limit Chinese imports, though [it was] a temporary measure".<sup>296</sup> So far, Chinese traders in both rural and urban African markets, who can obtain goods from China more cheaply through their networks, are usually able to undercut African traders, which breed resentment.

Another field of resentment against China's African presence can be observed in political affairs. China was accused of involving in domestic politics by African opposition leaders as was allegedly witnessed in Zambia's presidential election in September 2006. Chinese ambassador Li Baodong openly picked his government's favourite candidate and threatened to sever relations with Zambia if the opposition candidate Michael Sata wins. Sata, a critic of foreign investment, claimed that

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<sup>295</sup> Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, "African Resentment against China Grows", August 09, 2006, [http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/510767/link\\_page\\_view](http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/510767/link_page_view), accessed on February 13, 2009.

<sup>296</sup> De Lorenzo, Mauro, "African Perspectives on China", October 03, 2007, [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26917.filter.foreign/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26917.filter.foreign/pub_detail.asp), accessed on February 13, 2009.

“China’s relationship (with Zambia) is very imperialistic and that the attitude of Western donors is also very imperialistic.”<sup>297</sup> Sata vented his fury at China during the presidential campaign in 2006 similar to Latin American populist politicians bashing the United States: “Zambia is becoming a province—not a district—of China,” and “we don’t want another foreign power here, especially one that is not a democracy.”<sup>298</sup> Sata made a significant policy shift in 2008 elections, and announced that he welcomed the Chinese companies in Zambian mining industry.<sup>299</sup> But he lost 2008 Presidential Election with a narrow margin as was in 2006 elections.<sup>300</sup> The question might be what the motivation of Sata’s shift was. The reasons would probably be to present a moderate image not to scare the employees of Chinese companies and Sata’s expectation regarding the voters’ behavioural tendency. Chinese presence in Zambia became a tolerable reality because the employment of Chinese companies can not be ignored. Existence of national or fair stock should be expected to challenge Sata’s views about Chinese presence in Zambia. Then it may be argued that China is not a soft power in Zambia, but a sticky power standing with the inducements to politicians and local public.

Environmental destruction is another issue raising discontent to China’s engagement in Africa. China’s strategy seems to access to the resources that have not been exploited by the western countries as can be seen in Sudan and Zimbabwe. This selection of resources requires vast amount of investments that will cause ecosystem degradation. Chinese investors are not only state-controlled companies but private companies which prioritize larger market share with low costs. But environment protection is always a multiplier of costs. Chinese companies are even encouraged to move some of their investments to Africa due to domestic

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<sup>297</sup> China Institute of University of Alberta (Canada), “China’s African Embrace Evokes Memories of the Old Imperialism”, September 28, 2006, <http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=51162&nav02=43782&nav01=43092> accessed on February 23, 2009.

<sup>298</sup> China Digital Times, “In Africa, China’s Expansion Begins to Stir Resentment”, accessed on February 2, 2007, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/02/in-africa-chinas-expansion-begins-to-stir-resentment-yaroslav-trofimov/>, accessed on February 24, 2009.

<sup>299</sup> IOL (African News Website), [http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set\\_id=1&click\\_id=84&art\\_id=nw20080908120911204C230040](http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=84&art_id=nw20080908120911204C230040), accessed on August 14, 2009.

<sup>300</sup> News Website, [http://zambia.suite101.com/article.cfm/zambias\\_2008\\_parliamentary\\_elections](http://zambia.suite101.com/article.cfm/zambias_2008_parliamentary_elections), accessed on February 05, 2010.



regulations of China to prevent degradation of environment. Despite western accusations of degrading environment both in Africa and rest of the globe, Chinese officials frequently claim that China spends significant attention to the environmental dimension of its investments in Africa since 2006. The Beijing Action Plan on China-Africa Cooperation, endorsed in November that year, enclosed an extensive section on environmental concerns. China vowed to help African countries turning their advantages in energy and resources into development strengths, protecting the local environment and promoting sustainable social and economic development in the local areas.<sup>301</sup> One specific measure was dispatching environmental protection administrators to Africa and the funding of a China-Africa Environment Centre that works under the banner of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). But there are clear examples that indicate the reverse of the Chinese claims. It may be given some examples such as Chinese oil exploration in Luango National Park of Gabon until it has been stopped by Park's Administration, construction of Kongou Dam to power the iron mining in Gabon, Bui Dam of Ghana, Kafue Gorge Dam of Zambia, Merowe Dam of Sudan.<sup>302</sup> Timber trade is another example. Although imports from Africa make up a small proportion of China's total timber imports, China is the main destination of up to 90 percent of timber for some producer countries on the continent.<sup>303</sup> According to western media, China is already importing vast quantities of timber, much of which is illegally harvested.<sup>304</sup> Chinese challenging measure in accordance with the Action Plan of 2006 is the "Green Credit and Insurance Policy" that requires Chinese companies to prepare social and environmental impact assessment and develop suitable courses.<sup>305</sup> But timber case shows that China should do more

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<sup>301</sup> FOCAC (2006), *Beijing Action Plan*, November 16, 2006, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm>, accessed on August 29, 2009.

<sup>302</sup> Booshard, Peter, "China's Environmental Footprint in Africa", China in Africa Project of the South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Number 3, April 2008, pp. 3-4, <http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/SAIIA%20policy%20briefing%20508.pdf>, accessed on September 20, 2009.

<sup>303</sup> IUCN (the International Union for Conservation of Nature), non-profit NGO, [http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/forest/fp\\_our\\_work/fp\\_our\\_work\\_thematic/fp\\_our\\_work\\_flg/?731/China-important-to-African-timber-producers](http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/forest/fp_our_work/fp_our_work_thematic/fp_our_work_flg/?731/China-important-to-African-timber-producers), accessed on August 27, 2009. The statistics of Chinese timber import and finished product export is available in <http://www.globaltimber.org.uk/ChinaIllegalImpExp.htm>.

<sup>304</sup> *Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/apr/22/china.jonathanwatts/print>, August 14, 2009.

<sup>305</sup> What does the Rise of China Do for Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of African Political Economy, December 05, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/25/business/worldbusiness/25iht-chigreen.1.10355792.html>, accessed on September 20, 2009.



for environmental protection of overseas investments. If the effects of environmental degradation on China's African policy are examined, there would be adverse developments against China. The opposition leaders and western countries may exploit China's bad image in environmental degradation. They can claim that China pursues a 'trade and economic oriented' African policy to extract the natural resources of the continent, similar to colonial powers of the past. This image will justify the accusations against China to be neo-colonial power in Africa, but not a soft power in Nye's description.

Consequently the perception of Africans towards China is mixed and composed of both applause and resentment pending to the preferred window. Interest-based approach seems dominant while commenting African perception of China. Senegalese President Aboudoulaye Wade paraphrased the words of Lord Palmerston of British Empire in a 2005 letter to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, announcing Senegal's de-recognition of Taiwan and establishment of diplomatic relations with China by a famous saying: "'Between countries, there are no friends, only interests".<sup>306</sup> His remark summons the stance of the most African states. African states' motivation can be assessed as realist rather than liberal while defining the relationship with outer players. Probably, China will not be an exception of this statement in future.

### **3.4 China's Response to Critiques:**

It is a fact that China rises to international prominence, but it remains to be seen how this process will interact with the status of other players in world order. System changes such as shifts concerning the power of a particular state inevitably cause systemic or structural changes in the international distribution of power.<sup>307</sup> Hence the core of the critiques is based on the concern that China will challenge the international system. China's policies and applications in the continent have let the West to claim that "China's increasing involvement in Africa has invoked concerns from major Western powers".<sup>308</sup> In this context, there are three concerns in order of

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<sup>306</sup> Taipei Times, <http://taiwantt.org.tw/taipeitimes/PDF/2005/10-October/20051027.pdf>, accessed on February 28, 2009.

<sup>307</sup> Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 39.

<sup>308</sup> Wang, Zhengxu and Lim, Tin Seng, "China's Growing Influence In Africa", *EAI Background Brief*, 320, p. 1, <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB320.pdf>, accessed on January 20, 2009.

importance. These are: Chinese involvement in violent conflicts, environmental damage and socioeconomic standards.<sup>309</sup> But Beijing has frequently emphasized the common history of exploitation that China and African nations have suffered at the hands of Western colonialists as a defence mechanism to western concerns.

Morality of Chinese investors and support to authoritarian regimes are always located at the core of critiques. For instance the humanitarian catastrophes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan's Province of Darfur and Zimbabwe enkindled the accusations of African opposition leaders and westerners of tolerating and even encouraging the corrosion of democracy and human rights in Africa. Western companies and policy makers stand away from the corrupted regimes not to deal with the domestic pressures. According to western views, "The Chinese are much more prone to do business in a way that today Europeans and Americans do not accept - paying bribes and bonuses under the table. It will be much easier for [some African] countries to work with Chinese companies, rather than American and European companies, which are becoming more and more restricted by the publish what you pay initiative and others calling for better transparency".<sup>310</sup> When asked about China's investment in nations with records of human rights abuses - notably Sudan and the Central African Republic – Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing started up the defence mechanism of China with remarks about different conception of human rights other than universal values: "Do you know what the meaning of human rights is? The basic meaning of human rights is survival - and development."<sup>311</sup> These two proposals clearly depict the diversification of both parties in the attitude towards negative human rights records of African regimes and Chinese approach to them.

China's system of development model is also put forward as an issue of critique. China is frequently accused of having a make up to hide the administrative incapacity, the motivation of her domestic economic needs and cosmetic changes

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<sup>309</sup> Holslag, "Friendly Giant? China's Evolving Africa Policy", p. 4.

<sup>310</sup> Servant, Jean-Christophe, "China's Trade Safari in Africa", *Le Monde Diplomatique English*, May 2005, p. 2, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica>, accessed on March 16, 2008.

<sup>311</sup> Callimachi, Rukmini, "China Courts Africa With Aid, Projects", The Associated Press, January 4, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/04/AR2007010401031.html>, accessed on March 12, 2009.

rather than compliance to international norms<sup>312</sup>. Moreover the West singles out China's activities as "uniquely supportive of illiberal regimes and harmful to the environment, elsewhere, China is accused of especially promoting corruption in Africa and trading in ways that damage African anti-poverty efforts".<sup>313</sup> But Chinese response to these claims is very clear in the declarations after Sino-African Summits and Action Plans which were signed by both Chinese and African leaders. Specific statistical data of Chinese contribution to Africa's development mention the reverse of the western claim. It can be observed a special emphasis to appreciate China in the cooperation efforts with African countries in the introduction sections of Action Plans.

It is common for Western media and scholars to attribute the development of China-Africa relationship mainly to the Chinese demand for resources, in particular energy resources. Actually it is clear that the region's resources resulted with a competition of developed and developing countries, such as the United States, China, India, Brazil, and Canada. One of the initial reactions to these critiques was a rhetorical counter-offensive to the West. Ministers and high-ranking officials hurried to deflect allegations and riposted that the West had no right to lecture China. Wenping analyses the process of Sino-African relations pending to the type of relations in correlation with time frame, such that Chinese desire to build links with Africa is not as new as energy demand, but steadily established after 1949. He determines China's policy that "China's interaction with Africa, both past and present, is not limited only to those countries rich in resources. Most of the African countries that benefit from China's policy efforts, including debt reduction, low or zero-tariff trade agreements and aid are among the least developed in Africa and are not rich in natural resources".<sup>314</sup>

Western accusation of 'neo-colonial' China found supporters from the West and also liberal opposition leaders of Africa as was mentioned in Sata case. The issue of neo-colonialism was taken up for the first time, in April 2006, by the Foreign Ministry, with the spokesman arguing that "China is a responsible country and will

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<sup>312</sup> Holslag, Jonathan, "The European Union and China: the Great Disillusion", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11/4, 2006, pp. 555-581.

<sup>313</sup> Sautman, Barry V., "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa", *Centre on China's Transnational Relations*, 12, 2007, p. 2.

<sup>314</sup> Wenping, He, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy", *China Security*, 3/3, 2007, p. 23.

never follow the same disastrous road of the western colonists who bloodily plundered and violated human rights”.<sup>315</sup> At a press conference in Egypt in June that year, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao dismissed allegations on China’s Africa policy: “The hat of neo-colonialism simply doesn’t fit China. The Chinese nation knows too well the sufferings caused by colonial rule and the need to fight colonialism. This is a main reason why we have all supported the national liberation and resurgence of Africa”.<sup>316</sup> Following the Prime Minister, state-led newspapers started to publish a series of articles that contradicted the ‘cooked-up’ stories of Western media. The first pieces of writing emphasized that the West itself was guilty of imperialism. People’s Daily wrote: ‘Western powers, not China, colonized Africa and looted resources’.<sup>317</sup> Later, another article explained that “China’s energy cooperation with Africa does not target any third party and is built on mutual demands and double wins, which is absolutely different from the fire and sword used by Western colonialists in history”.<sup>318</sup> Apart from historical arguments, the actual practices of the West were taken under fire. The claim of spreading the mutual “win-win relation” to almost the whole of the African continent can be conceived as a response to the critiques of accusing China to be a neo-colonial power.

If China is conceived as a colonial power in Africa, Chinese African policy may collapse suddenly. It may be observed unrest against approximately 800 Chinese companies and no less than 100,000 Chinese nationals working or living in Africa. There will be difficulties in trade and marketing Chinese products. The withdrawal of China from Africa will cause dramatic problems of experiencing raw material and energy sources shortage for soaring Chinese economy. Hence that is a risk not to be faced.

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<sup>315</sup> China People Daily, “China Seeks Responsible Energy Cooperation”, April 27, 2006, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/27/eng20060427\\_261740.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/27/eng20060427_261740.html), accessed on February 14, 2009.

<sup>316</sup> Wen, Jiabao, Press Conference in Cairo, June 19<sup>th</sup>, 2006, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/gjlb/2813/2815/t258665.htm>, accessed on February 14, 2009.

<sup>317</sup> People’s Daily Online, “China Chance, Not China Threat to Africa”, April 26, 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/166978.htm>, accessed on February 14, 2009.

<sup>318</sup> People’s Daily, “China-Africa Energy Co-op, Why the West Pokes Nose”, April 30, 2006, [http://english.people.com.cn/200604/30/eng20060430\\_262310.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200604/30/eng20060430_262310.html), accessed on February 14, 2009.

### 3.5 An Assessment on Chinese Soft Power in Africa:

The first step to assess the soft power of China in Africa is to determine the parameters. These may vary pending to western and Chinese perceptions of soft power. It may be assumed that the approaches of China and the West to the 'soft power' are based on different features and motivations. Hence any Chinese attitude may be perceived as inducement in western thinking or an attempt to gain the hearts and minds of the society in Chinese approach. Nye's methodology may be accepted as one parameter, but it should be enriched with the other power conceptions to describe China's African policy. Chinese soft power approach will be limited by the perceptions as was mentioned in the first chapter. It can be argued that Nye's conception will not be sufficient to understand the Chinese soft power in Africa. Therefore other power conceptions should be utilized to examine the Chinese thinking.

In the light of western scholars' views; power perception of China can easily be tied to soft power conception. The mood of power politics was built on "change"<sup>319</sup> in Chinese thinking indicating the transformation of 'others' into Mao Thought. In this context ideological expansion and transformation of African countries in parallel to Chinese preferences<sup>320</sup> were clearly heading "change". But the "change" strategy never appeared as an overall course of intangible, material and coercive nature. It was rather in 'power with' or 'power to' discourse. Communist China constructed roads, stadiums, dams. African countries are taught how to get rid of dependency and one-product country status. These attempts of transforming Africa could not be conceived as a realist power application, although it is not the same for the Western liberal world. Persuasion was the major course of advertising Mao Thought in Africa.

Two common points have been underlined frequently by the Chinese policymakers to emphasize the unity of fate with Africans and developing countries as well. The first issue is that China belongs to the same (South) club and facing common 'enemies' as African nations do. This joint characteristic let to a collaborative

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<sup>319</sup> Steans and Pettiford, *International Relations*, p. 30. The change is underlined as "The ability to change [the] behavior [of states] and dominate in international realm, either regional or global".

<sup>320</sup> Robinson and Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, pp. 283-289. Robinson and Shambaugh explain the strategy of Maoist China as transforming the states of Africa due to ideological motives.

power application in Africa. There are no single militarily backed enforcements in Africa, contrary to western powers, to urge any country act in accordance with Chinese interests. It can be claimed that China applied integrative power conception prioritizing “win-win” policy towards Africa.

Chinese African policies are challenged to some extent due to the transformation of China during the post Cold War period. China began to apply capitalist policies while adapting to the international system with a smooth slide. Development and growth are perceived as the guarantees of a stable Chinese society and pursued “manufacture and market” based strategy. The need to new energy sources and raw materials along with the will to have power to shape the norms of international system forced China to pursue an active policy in Africa. This suggestion may put forward the meaning as China needs Africa to preserve and enhance Chinese interests. Then China’s policies have two facets: the first is that China should pursue a peaceful and consistent policy in Africa to build a good image and urge African countries to voluntarily feed and support China. The second motivation is that China is benefit-minded and pursues a realist policy whilst bearing a soft mask of liberals conceiving power as the capacity to act collectively to realize a common good. All of the declarations and Action Plans vow the liberal mode of western scholars with Chinese characteristics, although ultimate purpose of the whole relationship can be discussed if it is motivated on realist perception of China. Morgenthau’s “policy of prestige”, along with image building, is consistent with the Chinese power perception in Africa if the ongoing acts are considered. Consequently China’s African power application is like Boulding’s “hug” approach that can be described as constructive, co-optive and integrative, even though the motivation is interest related.

Nye’s soft power that can be summoned as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” finds its way to some extent in China’s African policy. Huge infrastructure projects, cultural exchange, human resource undertakings, media coverage, people to people contact are typical soft power wielding attempts. The overall interaction of China and Africa is clearly based on mutual gains and complimentary structure of demands of both sides. China fits what Africa needs in terms of political power, unconditional aid, low cost technology transfer, products for poor African market and easy pay-back system by

raw materials that can not be processed by African countries. The spill over affect of these fields of interaction will create the “complex interdependence” of Nye and shape Africa to build deep relationship in the conception of Digeser’s “fourth face of power”, even though the probability of regime changes should be expected to hamper China – Africa relations.

The question if China has soft power on African countries should be justified by the outcome of the relation: Does China obtained attitude change of African countries on voluntary basis? The answer is yes when the aforementioned political, economic, cultural and to some extent military (by peace keeping operations) undertakings are concerned. Ideological motives of China are hard to claim to be a soft power source in the whole continent, but at least limited. China provided aid to the continent in the past for ideology export but challenged the policy and claimed peaceful coexistence of different ideologies. The amount and duration of aid will probably identify the solidarity of Sino-African relations that will question the efficiency of Chinese soft power in Africa.

On the other hand, the development model itself seems to be a soft power source in Africa due to the presence of development desire. Beijing Consensus displays a course of development free of western influence in Africa. China’s proposals of development with own characteristics address the dreams of most Africans. The visits of African specialists, such as; political party and government cadres, economic management personnel, middle and high-ranking military officers and professional technical personnel, will offer a first-hand observation of China’s development experience. Then an elite thinking will be constructed upon the Chinese interests.

When the Action Plans and commitments are examined, not only the business related cooperation or politically motivated bilateral relations are agreed upon, but also ideational, cultural and value-laden fields. Especially “media coverage” and training the media staff suit the “power over opinion” concept of E.H. Carr. Moreover to media’s involvement; exchange of students and scholars, language teaching and cultural fests provides efficient advertisement via media and erases the question marks in the minds of the society. This process is clearly a “shaping process” if inducement part of the bilateral relation is concerned. Additionally,

military presence, by means of peace keeping operations, will promote the soft power strength of China to smart power strength of Nye. Political involvement in regional crisis and military presence compliment each other on the way to build smart power.

Regarding the soft power sources of Nye, China's soft power strength is complicated and contradicting. The cultural dominance of China can not be the same as the West. China does not have low cultural figures such as Hollywood, black American Jazz or Rage music that can influence the Africans' hearts and minds. But popular culture is intertwined with culture trade and China's appetite in trade will take her to export cultural products for double gains: make money and improve cultural diffusion. Then it should be expected from China to be active in low culture in coming years. Action Plans and commitments are based on high cultural undertakings such as language teaching, academic interactions, scientific and research cooperation. High cultural interactions lead to the diffusion of culture, but among the elite individuals who actively participate to the Chinese programs. China's undertakings to construct efficient cultural links should be assessed along with public diplomacy. Action Plans cover a vast area of cooperation to spread the Chinese influence to Africa especially benefiting from the people to people contacts. Chinese policy of building a pro-China elite and obtaining influence in African public indicate a long term policy and the results will be gathered 20-30 years later.

Domestic policies of China are contradicting with the universal values. Hence it is clear that it will be hard to be source of soft power in the minds of masses in Africa, which makes her vulnerable for long term credibility. It is difficult to claim China to be a soft power model due to Tiananmen and Uyghur incidents, harsh political suppress of minorities, lack of freedom for religious affairs, non-existence of a multi party system that is alternative to Communist Party. The defence mechanism appears to be claiming China's own system of democracy and criteria for human rights. The West is tried to be disregarded as model for political rights and commitments. But the political tenets of western ideology are not built in short period and have a deep background that makes it universal. Hence China's claims cannot be credible for the communities aiming at building democracy in their countries with liberal norms. It is inevitable that the value system of the West is



dominant in domestic policy building, especially freedoms are concerned. Additionally, the working conditions and the rights of the workers in a “communist” country breach the image of China in Africa. These facts cripple the soft power of China.

Foreign policy of China can be claimed as “well designed” to meet the needs of African governments. The veto power in the UN Security Council and membership to the World Trade Organization makes China attractive to protect the ‘rogue’ regimes of Africa. China successfully coordinated the timings of summits and meetings with African leaderships and UN General Assembly to benefit from the African countries’ vote-power to prevent probable western incursions to Chinese interests. Moreover “South” dialogue, as a shared value system, enriches China’s position in the relations with Africa and South American countries as well. Two significant issues contribute to the soft power of China regarding foreign policy. The first is the acceptance of the values of international or regional organizations, such as UN and African Union. International and regional organizations legitimize the universal values and integrate the local values to universal values while justifying the *sui generis* policies. Hence it provides credibility and intense diplomatic efforts. The second is the attribution to global soft threats and the commitments of China to assist Africa in resisting to soft threats. Soft threats, especially for Africa, cannot be managed by African states individually, but requires a leadership and financing to overcome these threats.

At the same time, political tools are dominated to keep the economic gains. China appeared to be an effective player in Africa that is respected by authoritarian African regimes states and have the ability to mediate between authoritarian leaders pending to her interests. China’s Special Envoy for Darfur, Liu Guijin, states that China “[has] been playing a role of bridge”.<sup>321</sup> This position strengthens China’s prominence in international realm and enhances the soft power in global foreign policy affairs. The Chinese government’s special envoy to the 14th Summit of the African Union (AU) confirms the views of Guijin by expressing China’s willingness to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the AU. Even the representation of

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<sup>321</sup>China Daily, “China Urges Peacekeepers in Darfur”, June 16, 2007, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/16/eng20070616\\_384893.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/16/eng20070616_384893.html), accessed on February 13, 2009.

China by a special envoy in African Union's summit clearly indicates the perception of China of possessing the role of mediating among African states.<sup>322</sup>

It may be argued that the strength of China-Africa relations and the source of much of its soft power stems from more than recent growth in trade and investment. Throughout its history of cooperation with African nations, China has emphasized that it has “given what it could” in terms of financial aid and technical support and it continues to do so even as its ability to promote relations through economic incentives—primarily trade, tourism, and investment—has grown. Technical support has remained a significant aspect of China's support for African states without political “strings attached” other than affirmation of a “one China policy”.<sup>323</sup> China officially announced a two-track approach, combining soft power and economic support to ensure the government's survival on the one hand, and clear pragmatic talks on the other”.<sup>324</sup> Undoubtedly China achieved to safeguard its economic stronghold by implementing soft power in liberal way.

Trade and aid issue may bring another debate to assess the soft strength of China in Africa. African countries are suffering from poverty and any offering should be expected to shape their choices. Then the concept of sticky power may fit to define the “happy” relationship between Africa and China. The spring season can be maintained as far as the aid programs of China are sustained. Then Nye's inducement determination can be used to label the current China-Africa relation. But ‘complete-pack’ soft power strategy of China, addressing directly to African society rather than leaders, should be accounted. Inducements will be long term commitments if they are supported by soft power means. On the other hand states will allow the cultural diffusion of China as soon as they are “sticky” to economic commitments of China. This situation ought to be expected to increase the competition of foreign interveners.

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<sup>322</sup> Chinese government Official Web Portal, “Chinese Envoy Pledges Strengthened Dialogue, Cooperation with AU”, February 01, 2010, [http://www.gov.cn/misc/2010-02/01/content\\_1524639.htm](http://www.gov.cn/misc/2010-02/01/content_1524639.htm), accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>323</sup> Thompson, “China's Soft Power in Africa”, p. 2.

<sup>324</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2007, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t335045.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t335045.htm), accessed on March 29, 2009.

### **3.6 Conclusion:**

Nye's framework of soft power can be utilized to identify the Chinese soft power wielding activities in Africa. But Nye's context is inadequate to label the Chinese discourse. China pursues a very well designed, 'conscious' strategy in Africa that can not be justified only by Nye's conception. China claims its own values and methods of soft power with *sui generis* context prioritizing institutionalized empiric power exercises while pushing back the theoretical debates of western academia. This fact makes the difference of Chinese and western perceptions in Africa. China's overall African movement is more than a simple diplomatic, military and political mobilization for economic gains. It is a long term action that is based on detailed planning process. It is a penetration of culture to another culture. Political values of China are not prominent though, mutual relation has political outcomes for both parties, reminding the win-win strategy. China seems successful realizing its interests by "complete packages" of commitments. China institutionalized these packages of comprehensive interactions by official, top level summits and forums while intensifying the people to people contacts, aid, investment and media coverage. Chinese soft power wielding attempt in Africa is a mobilization process of its overall capabilities to tie the whole continent to China not by forceful methods, but attractive discourses. But it is vogue what will happen if China cuts or is not able to sustain the aid and investment programs.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

#### 4.1 Culture and Language in Chinese Thinking:

History proves that there is a tendency of language diffusion of great powers. Roman, Persian and Turkish empires are examples for this proposal. Pax-Britanica is the era where the English was dominant in international realm. The same was witnessed for French in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Then any nominee to be a great power should prepare the background of teaching own language. China, with her claims of having a deep heritage of culture and history, aims to spread Mandarin for similar reasons. As China grows and influence the course of the international relations, Chinese will be more prominent. The trade and economic interconnectedness will attract more individuals to learn Chinese language. It is a fact that business world encourages to learn foreign language to ease the trade opportunities. China has business potential as a production base of the globe, English is still common though. But Mandarin will bear more importance, as the perceived power of China is strengthened.

Aforementioned facts indicate that it is the motivation of dominance in international realm to export language as a brand. There should be self reliance to language and culture to diffuse them targeting any other society. With this reliance, the statements of Chinese leaders, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, indicate that China's soft power perception may be claimed to be based upon the Chinese deep-rooted cultural heritage and a source of pride for all citizens. In the Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)<sup>325</sup>, soft power is directly linked to

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<sup>325</sup> CPPCC, [http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brf\\_intro/jianjie\\_0.htm](http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brf_intro/jianjie_0.htm), September 22, 2009. The CPPCC is the united front and consultative organization of all political parties, ethnic groups, regions, mass organizations, army, religious communities and overseas Chinese. It proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China by adopting the Common Program of Communist China in 1949 and Constitution of the New China in 1954. The CPPCC continued to exist and exercise the power of consultation in country for a united front, although it passed all of its authority to National People's Congress. Its existence and activities is the symbol of unity and democracy, and platform to create harmony in various segments of the Chinese society as a consultative organization.

“promote Chinese culture across the world”<sup>326</sup> although there happened a sense of incompatibility in Chinese perception. Because Chinese language was not advertised to global public by media in comparison to China’s economic growth. The motivation has led to increase the efforts of promoting language diffusion to globe for “rejuvenation” as an essential element of cultural attraction and diffusion in Chinese thinking.<sup>327</sup> According to Levine, Chinese believe that they are great people and therefore, they deserve a much better fate than they experienced in the modern world. Hence China should be compensated since it was insulted in the past and must be treated as Great Power. In this context cultural promotion of Chinese nation is perceived in the nature of the rejuvenation to give birth a challenging nation that is at the peak of her strength. The passion of rejuvenation found its way especially in denouncing the bad memories of Mao’s ‘cultural revolution’ inside China and spreading the Chinese cultural figures outside China. Hence culture is perceived as a method of global “soft competition” complimenting the efforts of Chinese to be dominant in international arena whilst conceiving it as a catalyst of domestic stability to prevent possible social and ideological tensions as was seen in Tiananmen.

On the road of “image building” and “nation branding”, it may be claimed that culture is the essential tool to both in and out of China to conduct an efficient and conscious public diplomacy. As part of desired image, the concept of ‘harmony’ is put forward as guiding principle of Chinese cultural context, the goal of prosperity, internal unity and consistent foreign policy. President Hu Jintao emphasized ‘harmonious society’ inside and ‘harmonious world’ abroad as the essential policy of image building in his 17<sup>th</sup> National Congress speech.<sup>328</sup> The reasons of underlining this conception may be found in the internal problems such as Tiananmen incidents, ethnical domestic conflicts like Eastern Turkestan uprising, Tibet’s desire of secession and religious communities apart from the desired role of

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<sup>326</sup> Minjiang, Li, “China Debates Soft Power”, *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, 2008, p. 289., <http://cjjp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/2/2/287>, accessed on December 12, 2009.

<sup>327</sup> Levine, Steven I., “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy” in Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 43.

<sup>328</sup> People’s Daily, “Hu Jintao Calls for Building Harmonious World”, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92187/6283177.html>, accessed on February 23, 2009.

China in foreign relations. A ‘harmonious society’ will focus its efforts to economic development that is perceived as a ‘must’ for unity inside China. Harmonious world can offer the environment of peace easing trade and politics among nations. In other words, it is the ‘obedience inside and compliance outside’ which reminds Confucianism to promote the Chinese development. Cultural rejuvenation and diffusion is the essential method to reach harmony in and out of China. Peace and harmony is what China needs at home to sustain the stability and continuous growth. The global cultural acceptance and legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the international community can easily cool down the harsh debates of the internal opposition groups and scholars. Cultural diffusion to remote regions and countries will strengthen and protect the internal cultural unity and *sui generis* structure of the Chinese traditions. More people speaking Chinese as a second language will sustain the self confidence of the society and will have impacts both domestically and globally.

In accordance with the conception of ‘harmonious society in and out of China’, Confucius Institutes are built to serve the mission of uplifting Chinese culture “to meet domestic demands and enhance China’s competitiveness in the international arena”<sup>329</sup> while emphasizing “harmony” as the core of the cultural interaction. The essential method of cultural diffusion is identified “in the form of language teaching that has the name of Confucius written all over it”.<sup>330</sup> In this context, the Confucius Institutes that have been established worldwide are intended to make a global and domestic impact.

The discussion would be why the cultural expansion and language teaching activity by these Institutes are tagged with “Confucius”. The response for this question may be found in historical and ideological developments that China experienced for the last 80 years. China’s nationalism in 1920s started to deny the Confucian order of hierarchy and “three bonds” that were the subordination of subject to ruler, son to father and wife to husband.<sup>331</sup> Confucianism was also denounced by Mao’s Cultural Revolution as Confucianism had instilled the loyalty to family, father and emperor

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<sup>329</sup> Mingjiangy, “China Debates Soft Power”, p. 289.

<sup>330</sup> Guo, Xiaolin, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power”, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Asia Paper Series, 2008, p. 28.

<sup>331</sup> Fairbank and Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation*, p. 435.

rather than Maoist preferences that were the people, the Party, and the leader. But Deng's policy of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" challenged Maoist tendency of degrading Confucianism. The motivation behind displaying Confucianism more than ever would be Tiananmen incidents of 1989. The unity of the society had to be maintained. The corrosion of Mao Thought pushed the Chinese authorities to prioritize obedience and compliance culture of Confucianism in the society. Ideological challenges of 1990s also made Chinese communist system questionable. An international image had to be gathered by a world-wide famous philosopher that is identified by Chinese brand as "Confucian Synergism".<sup>332</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick confirms these claims by proposing that the name Confucius Institute betrays no links to communism or to the Communist Party, and actually repudiates Mao, since he tried to wipe out the teachings of Confucianism.<sup>333</sup> As a result, the opening up process reputed the Confucian teaching and made use of its prestige in domestic public and international affairs.

Another motivation behind choosing Confucius as a symbol name may be searched in the Chinese efforts of building internal peace and stability by a commonly accepted Confucius value-system based on harmony. As a "make up" approach to Mao thought, Confucianism addresses to all brands of Chinese political tendencies among overseas due to credibility Confucianism has. Because Chinese people are interacting with world public that can make Chinese regime vulnerable to foreign influences. Mao's image can not be expected as efficient as 1950s-60s. Especially Overseas Chinese population, who are exposed to foreign value systems have the chance to compare and contrast Mao thought with the western approaches. For instance new political and ideological tendencies - such as new left, new right - flourished among overseas and domestic audience while breaching the official ideology of China's Communist Party.<sup>334</sup> Regarding international community Chinese value system is associated with the teachings of Confucianism, but not the other Chinese teachings like Taoism. The term "Confucius says..." is a common expression for emphasizing the ideal way of behaving in human life, and it is used

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<sup>332</sup> Sun, Li-The, "Confucianism and Recent Economic Reform", *Journal of Economic Development*, 12/1, June 1987, p. 8. <http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/12-1/1.pdf>, accessed on February 05, 2010.

<sup>333</sup> Kurlantzick, Joshua, *Charm Offensive*, p. 68.

<sup>334</sup> Leonard, Mark, *What Does China Think?*, London, Fourth Estate, 2008, p. 29.

not only in Chinese overseas community, but also among Westerner. This thinking forms respect and recognition to Confucianism. Uniting language-teaching with Confucianism clearly gives the message of harmony, integration, toleration and a deep cultural adaptation.

The peaceful and harmonious strategies of “lying low” and the rhetoric of “peaceful development” can also be traced in Confucian teachings.<sup>335</sup> This peaceful-cultural methodology cannot be perceived as a threat to the existing international order denouncing the western concerns. Chinese presence and influence in its region and international relations can be tolerated within the frame of respect to different cultures. Deng’s policy of pursuing a peaceful and low-profile image, as was expressed by ‘bide time and hide capacity’ principle, suits to the prioritization of Confucianism. Hence cultural attempts under the auspices of Confucianism serve the foreign policy goals of China.

Other than the title of Confucius, the characteristics of Chinese language should be taken into account. Chinese language writing system, Mandarin alphabet, is one of the oldest forms of writing that remained unchanged although the pronunciation varies in the great Chinese speaking geography. Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia have a vast amount of Chinese speaking population and 100 million of Chinese overseas are Chinese speakers all around the world.<sup>336</sup> The diffusion of Chinese language should be expected to build a common spirit of being Chinese in Far South East Asia geography and various countries. That is for sure the awareness of being Chinese will have impacts on international or regional policy making, economy, trade and perceptions. Confucius Institutes and language teaching will serve to the aim of building a common Mandarin speaking society in the neighbourhood of China. If the identical cultural customs are considered, language teaching ought to be expected easier than teaching it to the other parts of the globe. This fact will ease the cultural diffusion and soft strength of China in its region. Concerning non Chinese population, any individual who steps down for learning

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<sup>335</sup> Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power”, pp. 9-10.

<sup>336</sup> Li, Zhenyi, “Chinese Language and Communication: An Intercultural Perspective”, the National University Network for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Vancouver, 2004, pp. 2-3, [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/1/3/3/9/pages13396/p13396-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/1/3/3/9/pages13396/p13396-1.php), accessed on December 13, 2009.



the first Chinese letter will be faced by a cultural remark that tells the meaning of the character since it is not a letter but calligraphy.<sup>337</sup>

Cultural diffusion may be perceived as a process in parallel to being a great power. Then the spreading of Chinese culture and increasing the number of people speaking Chinese as a second language would be an indicator of being a great power. So, to what extent China is successful to be a great power by cultural attraction? In the light of the facts mentioned above, Confucius Institutes will be examined in this chapter to clarify if these Institutes are serving to the goal of building Chinese soft power. It will be searched if a conscious strategy is pursued that facilitates enhancing a soft strength while building a positive image abroad and delivering concerted messages to both inside and outside the country. Another point that should be identified is if these institutes shape the targeted audience and have them voluntarily to do what China desires by comparing the activities of various Confucius Institutes and also similar Institutes of western powers. Shortly, the conclusion will cover the motivation of language teaching while identifying the existence of any correlation between cultural diffusion and enhancing the soft power.

#### **4.2 Establishment Process of Confucius Institutes and Characteristics:**

If the cultural transformation of China is contrasted with the course of Mao thought, a “cultural fever” can be witnessed in the 1980s. Gu argues that Chinese scholars and intellectuals had engaged with great eagerness in searching for an alternative intellectual framework to replace official ideologies, that were Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. They had examined the cultural prerequisites for China’s modernization to lead a cultural legitimization for modernity in western context.<sup>338</sup> This ideological reform process brought the discussion of intellectual debate offering Neo-Confucian factions as nominee for an alternative intellectual framework to replace the official ideology. For this purpose, some of the elite had been involved in the establishment of the Confucius Foundation in 1984 to promote Confucianism. The foundation was both official and non-official acceptance of the

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<sup>337</sup> Li, “Chinese Language and Communication: An Intercultural Perspective”, p. 4.

<sup>338</sup> Gu, Edward X., “Cultural Intellectuals and the Politics of the Cultural Public Space in Communist China (1979-1989): A Case Study of Three Intellectual Groups”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 58/2, May 1999, p. 389.

cultural era dedicated to the values of Chinese history that was ignored consciously by Mao. As a result, Confucianism found a way to allow the cultural rejuvenation that was previously breached by Maoist exercises. Confucianism was offering a chance to make peace both inside the country and abroad by its respective image and thought as a tool of public diplomacy.

Foundation, that is currently active in China, focuses on high level cultural activities such as conferences and seminars to expand the impact of Confucianism.<sup>339</sup> The website of the Foundation contains lectures, theses and forums to examine the Confucianism in an academic methodology especially for Chinese overseas population<sup>340</sup>. On the other hand Xiaolin Guo determines that the Confucius Foundation promote and engage in education at an elite level rather than addressing popular level.<sup>341</sup> Confucius Foundation can be assumed as a starting engine of building Confucius Institutes even though the Foundation does not have any organic link with the Confucius Institutes. It formed the idea of promoting Confucianism in Chinese society opening frontiers to blend cultural diffusion of China with Confucianism and opening the discourse of awareness to put forward Confucianism. Hence the Foundation contributed to build a perception of Confucianism both in China and abroad to acquit it from the downgrading attempts of Mao era, and inspired the Chinese reform-laden leaders to build Confucius Institutes while prioritizing language teaching in cultural activities. As a result, twenty years after the Confucius Foundation was founded, the program for the creation of a global network of Confucius Institutes was launched in Beijing in 2004.<sup>342</sup>

Regarding language teaching, China did not begin to spread Chinese language with Confucius Institutes. The brief history of language teaching by the Ministry of Education demonstrates the general course of China's language teaching and

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<sup>339</sup> People's Daily Online, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/07/eng20070607\\_381832.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/07/eng20070607_381832.html), accessed on March 30, 2009.

<sup>340</sup> The website - [www.chinakongzi.org](http://www.chinakongzi.org) - contains an online Confucius Institute and sections on Confucius culture, thought and exponents of the schools during Confucius' time, and a forum on Chinese national culture.

<sup>341</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 32.

<sup>342</sup> China.org website, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/photo/206586.htm>, accessed on February 11, 2008.

affiliated cultural activities.<sup>343</sup> Initial efforts were erected on the ideological motivations as was witnessed in African policy. China assigned Tsinghua University to set up a training course of Chinese language for the international students from East Europe in 1950. Zhu Dexi, a famous Chinese linguist, and some of his colleagues went to Bulgaria in 1952 to teach Chinese. In 1962, with the approval of the State Council, the Higher Preparatory School for Foreign Students was set up, which was renamed Beijing Language College later. During the Cultural Revolution (1966—1976), the drive of teaching Chinese suffered a serious setback and Beijing Language College was disassembled. After Deng's opening up policy in 1978, language teaching was put forward as an official policy of China and a great leap was witnessed. In July 1987, the state leading institution for teaching Chinese as a foreign language - The Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) was established including the representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council (former Information Office), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the Press and Publication Administration, as well as the State Language Commission. In 1998, the leading group made adjustments to add three new members from, namely, the State Development Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. The involvement of these agencies to Hanban gives clues to determine for what purpose Hanban is designed, who the targeted audiences are and what policies will be addressed. In this context, centrality of language teaching is maintained that will facilitate a conscious planning, standard methodology of language teaching and drafting the messages to be delivered in accordance with the preferences. Hence various dimensions of the activities are planned directly by the Council in terms of officially pursued policies, foreign policy goals, financial requirements, cultural priorities, educational methods and finally conducted public diplomacy by means of broadcasting agencies and Information Office.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> The Ministry of Education of PRC, [http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international\\_11.htm](http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international_11.htm), accessed on April 4, 2009.

<sup>344</sup> Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/gywm.php>, accessed on March 29, 2009.

Hanban's mission was announced as "making the Chinese language and culture teaching resources and services available to the world, to meet the demands of overseas Chinese learners to the utmost, to contributing to the formation of a world of cultural diversity and harmony".<sup>345</sup> Jia Qinglin<sup>346</sup> delivered a speech in March 2007 at the fifth session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 10th National Committee in which he elaborated on China's soft power. He mentioned two different folds for Chinese soft power: meet domestic demands and enhance China's competitiveness in the international arena. International competitiveness requires not only the international society, but Chinese nationalities living at overseas and Chinese-origin people who are citizens of the other countries. He recommends promoting education by Chinese language for overseas Chinese, encouraging Chinese culture and supporting unity among ethnically Chinese people abroad.<sup>347</sup> The reason for targeting overseas Chinese might be uniting the overseas to form a body of society that has awareness to maintain the Chinese identity and form an interest group in the countries they live in. Hence two targeted audiences of language teaching efforts are world public and Chinese overseas.

Hanban's mission is to teach Mandarin with specifically identified tenets. The mission is underlined as identifying policies and development plans for promoting the Chinese language, providing support to language programs, guiding Confucius Institutes, determining criteria for teaching Chinese and the certification standards, determining tenets for establishing websites of Chinese teaching. Hanban is authorized to prepare proficiency tests of Chinese as a second language.<sup>348</sup> It can be assumed that Hanban is the brain and heart of language teaching and cultural diffusion in the framework of China's public diplomacy. Hence Chinese language teaching and cultural activities by means of various bodies – not only Confucius Institutes – are centralized and evaluated under the authority of Hanban. Hanban has the capability to direct the activities and standardize the delivered messages in

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<sup>345</sup> Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/hbsm.php>, accessed on March 29, 2009.

<sup>346</sup> Jia Qinglin is now member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 16th CPC Central Committee, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee.

<sup>347</sup> Minjiang Li, "China Debates Soft Power", p. 289, <http://219.143.243.5:7777/was40/detail?record=9&channelid=38781&presearchword=soft+power>, March 27, 2009.

<sup>348</sup> Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/hbzn.php>, March 29, 2009.

the curricula of the Institutes. This capacity and authority offers to build a coordinated, central, deliberate language teaching system.

The Confucius Institute, as a non-profit program under the auspices of Hanban, is the hands and feet of Hanban, if Hanban is accounted as heart and brain of teaching Chinese as a foreign language.<sup>349</sup> The goals of the Confucius Institutes are clearly presented in the Constitution of the Institute. United in one purpose, the Confucius Institutes' aim is to promote a better understanding of China and win goodwill in the world.<sup>350</sup> The mission of the Institutes can be summed up as "to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture around the world". The basic goal is built upon satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions who are learning the Chinese language. This goal is attributed to the friendship of people, multi-culturalism, and harmonious world that is expected to produce attraction, respect and liberal mode of interaction. These goals enhance the previously mentioned aim of Hanban by adding the people of different countries as was mentioned like "international competitiveness in Qinglin's report. Hence it can be claimed that the targeted audience are both overseas Chinese and foreign publics while obtaining credibility in domestic and international community.

Confucius Institutes can not be claimed to be autonomous if the Hanban's authority and adherence to State's organs are concerned. The Constitution of Confucius Institutes clearly displays the framework of the pursued policies, strategies and methodology. The Constitution binds all of the Confucius Institutes in terms of general principles, except the constraints and local regulations of hosting countries. So they are subjected to supervision and inspections from the local educational administrative authorities. The Institutes are strictly obliged to use the Standard Chinese Characters of Mandarin rather than any other dialect. The services of the Institutes are specified as language teaching, providing teachers and resources, consulting on education and cultural exchange. Then two dimension of administrating Confucius Institutes are identified. The first is the central command

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<sup>349</sup> The Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate headed by Biden, Joseph R, "China's Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia, and Africa", Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, April 2008, p. 15, [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008\\_rpt/crs-china.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf), accessed on August 12, 2009.

<sup>350</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 32.

of Hanban in determining curricula and cultural activities. The second one is to be subjected to the education system of hosting country.<sup>351</sup>

A headquarter of Confucius Institutes under Hanban is set up in Beijing to coordinate and to some extent command the efforts of all Confucius Institutes in 2007. This structure brings a solid control of curricula, education materials, and delivered messages to targeted audience by means of fifteen-member Confucius Institutes' Council. It is remarkable that candidates for the chair, several vice chairs and the executive council members are elected by the State Council. Appointment of high ranking members of Executive Council of Confucius Institutes by State Council indicates the perception of Chinese Government about Confucius Institutes and their central control of practices. It is the Executive Council of Confucius Institutes that decides to build and fund Institutes, and appoint directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes. The Council is responsible to provide the study materials and resources to each Institute. The Council is bound to overview and approves the annual reports of the Institutes, moreover examine and determine the development strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes. Actually this centralization contradicts to the autonomous structure of the Institutes. The decisions on language teaching policy are taken by Hanban that is directly controlled by State Council, elaborated and released by Executive Council of Confucius Institute and applied by Confucius Institute. Hence the Institutes do not have the freedom on taking decisions but apply what is ordered from Beijing.<sup>352</sup>

The path to establish Confucius Institutes are clearly presented in the Constitution. The founding process begins with submission of a proposal and declaration of possessing the required materials clarified in the Constitution. The Headquarter evaluates qualification and appoints a university to build Confucius Institute along with corresponded Institution of hosting country. Both institutions exchange field trips and conduct negotiations before a cooperative agreement is signed. The agreement clearly identifies how to set up the Board of Trustees and the appointment of President and directors of different departments. The significant

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<sup>351</sup> Hanban, [http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy\\_list.php?ithd=xyzc](http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy_list.php?ithd=xyzc), March 29, 2009.

<sup>352</sup> Hanban, [http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy\\_list.php?ithd=xyzc](http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy_list.php?ithd=xyzc), March 29, 2009.

feature is that it is mostly hosting country that demands to establish the Confucius Institute rather than Confucius Institutes Headquarters. This feature is a difference with the other language teaching institutions. The other institutions, such as British Council or Goethe Institute, are established without the proposal of hosting country, but Confucius Institutes do (Appendix B, article 19).

Before all of the aforementioned process is initiated, the feasibility of the Institute will be done regarding the required personnel and facilities, demand for learning Chinese in the region, funding, and legal framework. For instance the location of "Confucius Institute" preferred to be a rather busy business district where there's a large flow of people and a very convenient transportation system. The procedure committed by the applicant to establish a Confucius Institute requires the applicant to prepare an environment for language teaching and cultural activities. Applicant ought to accept operational guidance of the Headquarter, follow relevant teaching standards, and should have experience in language teaching and cultural exchanges. This process may be attributed to guarantee the success of the Institute, once established. The funding is shared by Council and applicant with one to one commitment in general. But Confucius Institutes can be built with direct investment from the Headquarter, partnership between the Headquarter and a local institute, or franchise authorized by the Headquarter. Currently the Confucius Institutes are built mainly through partnership with foreign institutes. The partnership mode is subject to discussion between the Headquarter and its partners from abroad. The Confucius Institute Headquarters has the initiative for conducting assessments of individual Confucius Institutes and reviews to terminate the Institute (Appendix B, article 19).

The offerings of the Headquarter to the Institution of the host country can be summed up as using of the title of "Confucius Institute"; universal logo and emblem used by "Confucius Institute" worldwide; teaching mode and curriculum planning; multimedia courseware, supplementary materials, and web-based courses; training on the operational and teaching patterns of the institute; books to help build a Chinese library; timely communication of information about global Chinese language teaching; and other technical supports.

Each Confucius Institute is governed by a Board of Trustees that is formed by hosting Institution and Chinese part pending to the consultation. The President and

Vice-President are selected through agreement reached by both partners. The main function of the Board is to assess and approve the development plans, annual plans, annual reports, project implementation schemes, budget proposals, final financial accounts, and appointment or dismissal of Director who is expected to assume the main responsibility for the Institute's daily operation and administration. The President of "Confucius Institute" works under the leadership of the Board of Trustees and is responsible for institute affairs. The President needs to sign a contract with the Chair on a regular basis clearly defining the President's mission and goals, working period, responsibilities, rewards, punishments and standard of performance assessment. Hence the director is desired to have the capability to address the features of hosting society and Chinese language and culture. The Board shall also be responsible for appointing and dismissing Directors and Deputy Directors of the Confucius Institute. The process of appointing and dismissal of the managers of the Confucius Institutes clearly shows the centralization in decision making process (Appendix B, articles 22-33)

Beijing opened its first Confucius Institute in Seoul, Korea, in November 2004; as of January 2010, the PRC has 290 Confucius Institutes in 82 countries or regions.<sup>353</sup> Each of the Institutes has a partner Chinese University responsible for sustaining the activities in the host organization. Each university may only be responsible for managing the Confucius Institute at one or two foreign universities. The selection of foreign universities seems to be random. The personal contacts of Chinese visiting scholars clearly play a role and existing exchange programs between Chinese and foreign universities are often instrumental in facilitating ties; nevertheless there is a distinctive regional emphasis for Chinese Universities dedicated to build Institutes in certain geographies of the globe. Hence it is the duty of a Chinese university to operate an Institute abroad. Aside from an extra income, the real incentive for the Chinese universities to undertake Confucius Institute projects is to boost their domestic academic credentials, since "international exchanges" serve as an evaluation index for Chinese Universities of which Confucius Institutes are part of international academic exchanges.<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>353</sup> Confucius Institute, [http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy\\_list.php?ithd=gzky](http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy_list.php?ithd=gzky), accessed on March 16, 2009.

<sup>354</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 30.



If the numbers of Institutions, as of January 2010, are concerned regarding the global distribution, the maximum number of Institutes is run in Europe by 106 Institutes in 27 countries. The United Kingdom (34), Russia (15) and Germany (12) are the top three countries hosting these Institutes in Europe. Asia is the second continent with 91 Institutes in 26 countries and Hong Kong. Thailand (23), Japan (17) and South Korea (15) are the top three countries regarding the number of Institutes. Even though the constitution of Confucius Institutes reflects the priority for Chinese overseas, Singapore has two; Indonesia and Malaysia have only one Institute each, although they have Chinese minorities with vast amounts. The reason might be the fear of the host governments from Chinese influence on Chinese speaking minorities in their countries. American continent presents an interesting distribution of Institutes. The USA has 56 Institutes that forms the largest amount of Confucius Institutes in comparison to all countries. Canada has seven, Mexico has five and the rest seven countries have 12 Institutes.<sup>355</sup> The Chinese language programs in the USA are significant because primary and secondary schools are out of the scope of Confucius Institutes and there is an ever growing demand in the USA to learn Chinese in these schools. US Secretary of Education signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China to commence e-language program to facilitate Chinese teaching for US pupils on web based programs in 2002.<sup>356</sup> The project is realized in 2005 offering language teaching to the students of both countries.<sup>357</sup>

After all, Africa differs from the other continents in terms of establishment procedures. African continent has 23 Institutes in 14 countries. This number does not count the African students sent to China to learn Chinese in the frame of higher Education. The significant feature in Africa is that China encourages establishing Confucius Institutes without waiting a demand from the hosting countries, especially in underdeveloped countries such as Togo, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Botswana. The points of contacts of the Institutes in Africa are China's Embassies. The reasons may be insufficient facilities to teach Chinese and Chinese eagerness to

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<sup>355</sup> Confucius Institute, [http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy\\_list.php?ithd=gzky](http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy_list.php?ithd=gzky), accessed on January 10, 2010.

<sup>356</sup> Concept Paper of the e-Language Learning Project: Conceptualizing a Web-Based Language Learning System, <http://ott.educ.msu.edu/elanguage/about/whitepaper1.pdf>, accessed on April 15, 2009.

<sup>357</sup> Department of Education of the USA, <http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/academic/ells/index.html>, accessed on January 12, 2010.

build these Institutes in these countries to diffuse its culture. Finally, Oceania has two countries to be mentioned: Australia with eight and New Zealand with one Confucius Institutes. The distribution of Confucius Institutes according to the Continents and countries are shown in the Table-1.

In addition to Confucius Institutes, China also launched Air Confucius Institute based on the network of China Radio International in 10 countries.<sup>358</sup> The method is to have people listen and practice Chinese step by step by following the Chinese classes. The radio reaches not only to certain amount of students, but to every house member who are interested in learning a foreign language as an initial step. Radio broadcasting is assessed to be more efficient than classrooms if the quantity of targeted audience who are unable to attend a foreign language course is concerned.

The Headquarter provides teaching materials and curriculum as the main teaching resources for all of the Institute branches. The curriculum is determined and applied by a well coordinated planning while making use of multimedia and web-based Chinese teaching. The tests and examinations for Certificate of Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language are applied like the western type language proficiency tests and certificates. The courses are planned for both basic and intermediate language training or advanced Chinese for special purposes such as translation, tourism, business, finance or traditional Chinese medicine. Academic activities are being encouraged for high level cultural interactions where Chinese movies and TV programs are used for language teaching and low level cultural interactions. Applicants can easily consult for the education opportunities in China and make use of library services (Appendix B, articles 14, 16).

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<sup>358</sup> Chinese Radio International (CRI), Website, <http://english.cri.cn/7046/2009/12/10/167s534682.htm>, accessed on January 10, 2010. Based on the procedures for building on-air Confucius classrooms, which CRI issued in April 2008, ten on-air Confucius classrooms have been established in Kenya, Japan, Russia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Italy and Australia with the approval of the headquarters of the Confucius Institute. Preparations for building On-air Confucius Classrooms in additional countries such as India, Turkey, Croatia and Columbia are progressing steadily.

# WORLD-WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AS OF JANUARY 2010

AMERICA (82)		EUROPA (119)				AFRICA (23)		ASIA (92)			
Argentina	1	Ireland	2	Malta	1	Egypt	3	Afghanistan	1	Turkey	4
Brasil	3	Austria	1	Norway	1	Benin	1	Armenia	1	Uzbekistan	1
Columbia	2	Belarus	1	Portugal	2	Botswana	1	Pakistan	2	Tajikistan	1
Cuba	1	Bulgaria	1	Sweden	1	Togo	1	Philippines	2	Singapore	2
Canada	7	Belgium	3	Serbia	1	Zimbabwe	1	Korea	15	Iran	1
Peru	4	Iceland	1	Slovakia	1	Cameroon	1	Kazakhstan	2	India	2
Mexico	5	Poland	4	Ukraine	3	Kenya	3	Lebanon	1	Indonesia	1
Jamaica	1	Denmark	1	Spain	4	Liberia	1	Malaysia	1	Israel	1
USA	56	Germany	12	Greece	1	Ruanda	1	Mongolia	2	Jordan	1
Chilie	2	Russia	15	Moldovo	1	Madagascar	1	Myanmar	2	Hong Kong	1
OCEANIA (11)		France	13	Hungary	1	Mali	1	Bangladesh	2	Sri Lanka	2
Australia	10	Finland	1	Italy	8	Morocco	1	Nepal	2	Thailand	23
New Zealand	1	Netherlands	1	UK	34	S. Africa	4	Japan	17		
		Czech Rep.	2	Romania	2	Nigeria	2				
						Sudan	1				

290 CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES IN 82 COUNTRIES

Confucius Institute Headquarters also cooperates with universities in setting up Chinese centres to support degree programs in Chinese language or research centres to encourage research activities in Chinese studies. These centres are suited to promote China's public diplomacy by offering materials to scholars and students. The provided facilities and resources suit the Chinese views and culture. Hence these attempts can be perceived as shaping the academic studies in accordance with China's interests rather than leaving the researchers to the "captivity" of western type thinking on Chinese studies.

#### **4.3 Applications and Contrasts of Various Confucius Institutes:**

The general course and doctrine of the Institutes are given above, but the empirical comparison should be made to examine whether all of the Institutes are delivering the same messages and executing similar practices world wide. In theory, any soft power tool should be viable and consistent. If the practices of various branches of the same institution contradict, soft power should be expected diminishing. In this part of the study, sample Confucius Institutes from every continent will be searched by examining its structure and code of conduct to make comparisons.

The Michigan Wayne State University, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, in the USA, cooperates with Huazhong University of Science and Technology to operate Confucius Institute. The mission of the Institute is presented as two fold: enhancing inter-cultural understanding among, first, the students of both universities and, second, the Detroit community in the frame of establishing educational and economic ties between China and the United States, especially between Wuhan and south-eastern Michigan. This mission requires not only language teaching, but cultural rapprochement and facilitating economic interaction. The program covers language teaching blended with Chinese cultural figures. For instance values, Chinese civilization and literature are part of the language curricula. China trips are organized for certain time limits to practice language. Moreover, it should be underlined that the demand for setting a Confucius Institute came from Wayne State University and China, in return, provided support in accordance with the constitution of Confucius Institutes. This multi-dimensional relation is built on the

basis of aforementioned course of establishing and sustaining Confucius Institutes.<sup>359</sup>

One of the 23 Confucius Institutes in Africa is Kigali Institute of Rwanda (CIKIE). The establishment agreement was signed and came into effect on 30 January 2008 after the negotiations between Chongqing Normal University of China and Kigali Institute of Education. The Institute was formally started its functions in Rwanda in December 2008. The goal of the CIKIE is the same as the Institute in Michigan Wayne State University: the promotion of Chinese language and culture along with mutual development while enhancing cultural and academic collaboration. The structure of the CIKIE is consistent with the Confucius Institutes' Constitution in terms of the establishment procedures, management of the Institute and composition of the Board of Trustees. The Institute organizes not only language courses, but also trains people on business, foreign trade, tourism, culture and specific needs of students. It also holds various Chinese cultural activities such as organizing lectures on special topics, contests of Chinese speech, Chinese calligraphy, singing and paper-cutting, as well as holding Chinese film shows, Chinese cooking lectures, Chinese costume and classical music shows, and Summer Camp. It is clear that the motivation of the Institute is more than language teaching and has attendees to practice Chinese traditions that can put a seal on their lives.<sup>360</sup>

Confucius Institute in Singapore is significant since it displays the foreign policy of China to Singapore. The population of Singapore is claimed by China as being Chinese with a percentage of 76. Singapore is, therefore, described as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural by Hanban. Confucius Institute was inaugurated by the cooperation of Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and China's Shandong University under the auspices of the Hanban offering a comprehensive range of Chinese educational programs.<sup>361</sup> The targeted audience was expanded preschool, primary and secondary school pupils, which can be interpreted as addressing the Chinese minorities in Singapore. The funding of the Institute is one of the highest if compared to the similar undertakings by \$2 million which was offered by Chinese

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<sup>359</sup> Confucius Institute of Wayne State University, <http://www.clas.wayne.edu/ci/>, accessed on March 30, 2009.

<sup>360</sup> Kigali Institute of Education, [http://www.kie.ac.rw/spip.php?article298&var\\_recherche=acad](http://www.kie.ac.rw/spip.php?article298&var_recherche=acad), accessed on April 01, 2009.

<sup>361</sup> Nanyang Technological University, <http://www2.ntu.edu.sg/ClassAct/Jul07/CampusNews/1.htm>, accessed on April 01, 2009.

government and private Chinese donors, which are mainly Chinese overseas living in Singapore. The teaching of Confucius is put forward in the lectures while teaching Chinese language and culture.<sup>362</sup> The aspiration might be to promote a conception of common history and culture, if the perception of Singapore Chinese is concerned towards Confucius teaching. So the strategy and motivation of teaching Mandarin and holding cultural activities in Singapore differs from the aforementioned sample cases.

The Mongolian Confucius Institute was jointly established by China's Shandong University and the Mongolian National University in 2008. The institute's goal is reflected to the media as facilitating Chinese language learning and boosting the understanding of Chinese culture among the Mongolian people. The announced aim of the Institute is to assign the institute as a platform for educational and cultural exchanges. Both Mongols and Chinese are intertwined regarding historical background, economy and social dynamics. Mongol ethnical heritage in Chinese territory makes China to be proactive in the affairs with Mongols. Economic attraction of China charms the Mongol youth to learn Chinese language and adapt to Chinese culture that is already akin to Mongol culture. More and more Mongolian students have begun to learn Chinese in recent years and more than 40 schools have started offering lessons on Chinese as of 2008. Landlocked Mongolia's gate to world is affiliated with the business opportunities that require Chinese speaking skills. Poor educational infrastructure and attractive Chinese universities allure Mongolian youth to study in China and be involved in business activities with Chinese companies.<sup>363</sup> As a response to this trend, Confucius Institute in Mongolia arranged a forum entitled by "Studying in China" at the National University of Mongolia on March 5, 2009 to guide the Mongols.<sup>364</sup> Confucius Institute not only suffered to teach Chinese but contributed to the expectation of Mongols. If the activities and their context are examined, Mongolians' Mandarin learning tendency and the tendency of students to attend a university in China due to business opportunities remind sticky power concept of

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<sup>362</sup> Hanban, <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/content.php?id=3185>, accessed on April 01, 2009.

<sup>363</sup> China View News Agency, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/02/content\\_8091236.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/02/content_8091236.htm), accessed on April 2, 2009.

<sup>364</sup> Study in China, website, <http://www.study-in-china.org/ChinaEducation/NewsOpinion/2009126221225420.htm>, accessed on January 10, 2010.

Mead. Mongolians have to be consistent with the economic and educational domination of China on landlocked Mongolia.

The goals of the Confucius Institutes in Europe are enriched with academic links, business interaction and greater awareness of China along with language teaching and cultural introduction. Although the establishment procedures follow the same path as the others, activities are pro-elite and diversified in terms of the quantity and quality of the events. The courses are being organized in three different fields: language, culture and business. Academic lectures, festivals and art exhibitions are more frequenting events in comparison to the Institutes in underdeveloped or developing countries. The reason might be the regional opportunities and capabilities regarding facilities, human resources and lines of communication. It can be claimed that the activities are defined in accordance with the demand of the hosting society. It is clear that capabilities in European continent favour a pro-elite approach that requires facilities and audience. The business will be and is advertised in the activities for the entrepreneurs.<sup>365</sup>

Consequently, if the aforementioned establishment procedures and activities of the Confucius Institutes are compared, it is a reality that the amount of people who want to learn Chinese creates a demand for Chinese teaching organizations. China filled gap of the demand for foreigner's desire to learn Chinese by building Confucius Institutes in a systematic and practical way. If the development course of Confucius Institutes is concerned, fast growing numbers of cultural centres all over the world can easily be witnessed. Apart from volunteer contribution by hosting country's institutions, the cost effective partnership eases to establish the institutions. The revolving fund of the institutes facilitates them to maintain the activities without any financial support after being established. Hence it is a win-win activity that has two edges: teaching language by bearing the cost to the applicant and conducting public diplomacy by means of hosting country's institutions.

If the numbers and amounts of the Institutions are concerned; there ought to be considered two aspects. The first one is that developed and most developing countries are inaugurating the Institutes by their own will and publics' demand to

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<sup>365</sup> The Confucius Institute of Scotland, <http://www.confuciusinstitute.ac.uk/about/>, accessed on April 02, 2009.

learn Chinese. The USA and European countries are significant cases for this proposal. Underdeveloped countries are encouraged by China to open Institutes and materially supported by Hanban more than the other Institutes. That means China should be expected to culturally infiltrate to the societies including the ones that does not have capability to offer environment for language teaching and cultural activities. Then the motivation of establishing Institutes differentiates depending on the interests of China.

China's assignment of Chinese universities to establish and be responsible to operate Confucius Institutes ought to be assessed along with the centralization and authoritarian structure of the state organs. The universities are tasked and evaluated by their achievement to run the Institutes as a criterion. The managers of the Chinese universities should have been feeling themselves to be seen brilliant abroad as a means of credibility to promote in the educational institutions' layer. This race boosted the number of Institutes and 290 Institutes became operational in 4-5 years period. The qualities of the language teaching and cultural activities are measured by Hanban to evaluate performance, meaning that the quality will be higher every year. This race will contribute to the soft strength of China since more activities will be apparently observed and appreciated by growing number of indigenous publics all around the globe.

The Chinese authorities can be claimed to pursue a cultural policy to show that the country has all the attributes of a major power and to have the international society to accept China's perception and vision of the world. But China's aspiration of possessing international influence by means of culture can be conceived as a "soft threat" by the leading members of the globe. China's Education Ministry explains the cultural policy of China briefly: "Teaching Chinese as a foreign language is an integral part of China's reform and opening up drive. To promote Chinese is of strategic significance to popularize the Chinese language and culture throughout the world, to enhance the friendship and mutual understanding as well as the economic and cultural cooperation and exchanges between China and other countries around the world, and to elevate China's influence in the international community". It can be argued from the speech that language and culture is mobilized for not only for universal desired values like peace and friendship, but to build "international



influence”.<sup>366</sup> If the establishment procedures of the Confucius Institutes are taken into consideration, the willingness of the hosting country to build the Institute can be perceived as cultural enrichment of the globe and a way of tolerating the cultural diversity of the globe favouring China’s cultural teaching and language education. But China’s motivation is not only cooperation, but promote Chinese culture as a prominent global actor as can be seen from the justification of Education Ministry.

#### **4.4 Comparison of Confucius Institutes and Western Cultural Organizations:**

A comparison between Confucius Institutes and the other cultural and language teaching activities of western actors ought to be assessed to see the efficiency of the Institutes by objective manner. As a starting point of comparison, the American cultural activities will be compared with the Confucius Institutes. The US government centralized English teaching, as China did, by The Office of English Language Programs under the auspices of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of Secretary of State. All programs are administered through the American embassies or consulates. The office provides teachers, teaching curricula, textbooks, materials, tests and some exchange programs. US programs are based on an integrated language and cultural curricula prioritizing public diplomacy that is centralized and officially carried out via embassies. Business is not included in the curricula as a topic as Confucius Institutes do. But the most striking difference lies in the establishment procedure and structure of their respective Programs. Any institute of a hosting country applies to Hanban to establish a Confucius Institute, and shares costs and offers the environment to introduce Mandarin and Chinese culture. But, US programs are initiated and controlled by the US embassies.<sup>367</sup> Hence China’s Institutions depend on volunteer acceptance and contribution, although the demand for US programs are obviously higher than Mandarin.

The activities of British Council can also be compared with Confucius Institutes. The Council’s works are announced to strengthen understanding and trust between and within different cultures. The emphasis is on the societies to accept, respect and welcome each other. Then language teaching seems to be a tool for succeeding the

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<sup>366</sup> Ministry of Education of PRC, [http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international\\_11.htm](http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/international_11.htm), accessed on April 4, 2009.

<sup>367</sup> Secretary of State of the USA, <http://exchanges.state.gov/englishteaching/index.html>, accessed on April 2, 2009.

“inter cultural dialogue”<sup>368</sup> which remind toleration and welcoming the diversities. The emphasis is international trust, preventing extremism; helping to rebuild post-conflict societies; and increasing the capacity of individuals and organizations around the world to contribute to a positive social change. Hence the messages are political and consistent with western liberal thinking. The messages are delivered by exchanges of students or interaction by joint projects in areas such as literacy, science, history, geography and the environment. These programs bring together the pupils face to face to discuss on the selected topics and exchange ideas. Extremism is clearly announced as the topic that should be prevented while giving the Europe’s position harboring various religious beliefs. At the mean time, the strategic goal for the British Council is to increase the use of English as a tool for international communication and intercultural understanding.<sup>369</sup>

The delivered messages of British Council vary pending to the regions in the globe. The motivation of the messages and cultural activities change depending on the geographies’ necessities in accordance with the British interests. For instance the aim of British Council in China is to contribute to an economic growth that is economically and socially sustainable through social innovation and climate change. Hence the goal is to increase the awareness of Chinese audience that is shaped by the western values and understanding. But the given messages in South East Europe are for economic development and building administrative capacity for a good neighbourhood. This goal surely fits the European interests in parallel to good neighbourhood policy of EU and prioritizes the activities to recommend economic and political stabilization in the South Eastern Europe. Democracy and strengthening links with UK is the goal in the activities in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the messages in the European and North American Continent is based on developing partnership and building networks for youth. Hence Council has different perceptions in China, South Eastern Europe, Africa or North America. It ought to be remarked that the topics of cultural activities such as language teaching, lectures, presentations, exchange programs, web-based-class-to-class discussions among different classes in different continents are selected depending on the

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<sup>368</sup> British Council, <http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/Tabs/Our-goals/cultural-understanding/Intercultural-dialogue/>, accessed on April 15, 2009.

<sup>369</sup> British Council, <http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/>, accessed on April 15, 2009.

predefined aims. Consequently British Council unites the goals of shaping the English learners politically, exporting English as dominating language and commonly accepted culture.<sup>370</sup> The methodology of British Council and Confucius Institutes is assessed as the difference between them. The former delivers messages in accordance with the political agenda of the British government. But the latter presents itself as introducing its culture and suffers to teach its language.

Goethe Institute's structure has its own characteristics defined in the founding articles of the Institute.<sup>371</sup> The Institute acts on behalf of Federal Government and its task is clearly defined as language teaching, cultural activities and image building of Germany. The governing structure is composed of two representatives from Federal government and Parliament, two representatives from local governments, distinguished personalities from different branches of the cultural, scientific and community life.<sup>372</sup> Hence it can be claimed that there is a comparatively democratic management and control on Goethe Institute. Currently 147 Goethe-Institutes in 83 countries provide education and information on the culture, language and other general aspects of Germany.<sup>373</sup> The German language is desired to be a key qualification means for education, employment and understanding. The Goethe Institute is not bound only by providing knowledge and information about Germany, but also bringing important developments from other countries to Germany. European spirit is mentioned as the fundamental perspective where multilingualism and an awareness of European citizenship are perceived as essential for closer unity, as was mentioned by British Council. The range of services covers a vast spectrum of cultural activities such as films, exhibitions, concerts, visual arts, visit programs.

Consequently western great powers followed the path to teach their own language and culture. It seems that language teaching and cultural diffusion is a competition for gaining hearts and minds of the global public. Moreover it became a field of

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<sup>370</sup> British Council, "Corporate Plan 2008-2011", <http://www.britishcouncil.org/new/Documents/7.1.2.4%20Corporate%20Plan%20-%20vision,%20purpose%20and%20values%20-%20Who%20we%20are%20-%20British%20Council.pdf>, accessed on February 12, 2009.

<sup>371</sup> Goethe Institute, "Articles (Constitution) of the Association", <http://www.goethe.de/uun/org/enindex.htm>, accessed on April 17, 2009.

<sup>372</sup> Goethe Institute, "Articles (Constitution) of the Association", p. 3.

<sup>373</sup> Goethe Institute, <http://www.goethe.de/ins/enindex.htm>, accessed on April 15, 2009.

trade. Language teaching requires materials and teachers, that is rather expensive and a source of income for the language exporting country. There can be counted no harm for advertising the culture and promoting the language. Prestige and self confidence of the domestic public are extra psychological benefits. China's Confucius Institutes have the similar benefits as the other Institutes have. Confucius Institute does not pursue any policy to breach the prevailing political system, economic or any other domestic policies, but introduces the Chinese culture and have people voluntarily learn Chinese. The method is indirect and attractive. If the cultural activities of aforementioned countries are examined, the messages of British Council are rather political and oriented with western value system. American cultural activities are directly controlled by US embassies that breach the credibility of the delivered messages. If the structure and activities of the Goethe and Confucius Institutes are compared, similarity is the cultural activities and language teaching with almost identical methods. Both have no political messages in their activities except the Goethe's awareness being European. But the difference is the structure of management. Confucius Institutes are bound by the central authority of Hanban and state mechanism, in fact Communist Party. But Goethe Institute has a participatory management structure of relevant governmental agencies, parliaments and civil society.

#### **4.5. Outcomes of Establishing Confucius Institutes:**

Significant outcomes can be identified in two intertwined sectors that are image building and soft power wielding. Both of the outcomes can contribute to domestic self reliance and strength in international competitiveness additional to positive financial interests by language teaching. Both of the areas of interests will be examined in this section if China has the capacity and also probability to reach these outcomes.

Ni Jianping claims that "China's greatest strategic threat (to China) today is its national image".<sup>374</sup> It is the image that influences minds and hearts. Minds have two different folds: the prestige in international realm and stability in the domestic affairs. An attractive and powerful China will keep the country on the forefront of

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<sup>374</sup> Jianping, Ni, "The Beijing Olympics and China's National Image Building", Shanghai Institute of American Studies, Hong Kong, 2008, p.1, [http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/workshop/14/nizp\\_olympics.pdf](http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/workshop/14/nizp_olympics.pdf) , accessed on February 18, 2009.

great powers and respectful in the eyes of own public. The legitimization of the Chinese leadership and justification of the pursued policies requires an attractive outlook of the Chinese state, regime and government. For instance the leadership's efforts of hosting the Beijing 2008 Olympics can be leaned on the desire to convince both domestic and international public by the context of delivered messages in the ceremonies of Olympic Games regarding cultural depth, the roots of fair, just and continuous state system. The messages clearly indicate the efforts of shaping the international community and domestic public on the positive image of China. The same process runs with the Confucius Institutes.

Hu Jintao, for instance, explained the main purposes of cultural "soft power" by underlying two different issues. The first is to enhance national cohesion and creativity by satisfying the demands of people's spiritual life. The other is to strengthen China's competitiveness in the contest for comprehensive national power within the international arena.<sup>375</sup> Culture, therefore, is like a catalyst in the interaction of internal and external dynamics of self confidence of Chinese. The growth of the Confucius Institutes-net will strengthen the internal belief and external outlook of China as a great power like Americans, French, Britons or Germans. The messages of the Institute are based on "harmony" to push for balanced development in the new century. By that way, Confucius Institutes will prevent the opposing negative claims of international community on China's outlook by their contribution to cultural expansion and language exportation.<sup>376</sup>

The Confucius Institute is an image management project that undermines the belief that China is a threat to existing global order. The delivered messages to international public such as human centered Confucius teaching and harmony of the societies will breach the accusations to China of being a challenger of the ongoing international system. Cultural attraction and sympathy of international public will avert the counter public diplomacy efforts of competing powers to have China on the potential danger scale. Lack of information will exaggerate the bias towards China and push her to the unwanted society category. Hence Confucius Institutes

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<sup>375</sup> Mingjiang, "China Debates Soft Power", pp. 287 – 308.

<sup>376</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 10.

are the places where China can pump up the official imagery of Chinese culture to denounce “China threat” aspirations.

China wants to challenge the prejudice about China by projecting images of a “new China”.<sup>377</sup> While Beijing builds Confucius Institutes as a gesture at public diplomacy, as Cooper underlines, it is important that these Institutes represent new, innovative China and not simply the millennia’s-old culture.<sup>378</sup> The western accusations and efforts to degrade China in the eyes of international community can be thwarted by the introduction of cultural heritage and clear messages of China’s elite. China’s tradition to have the image of a brilliant and distinguished country can be achieved efficiently by cultural interaction. Cultural exchange has long been a principal form of public diplomacy.<sup>379</sup> Instead of being passive to wait the other societies to learn how the Chinese are, image building efforts will contribute to shape the societies and China will have them know China in accordance with her own will. But there must be created an environment where image building efforts are committed. Advertisements are short term and costly methods. Movie industry is sensitive to the expectation of the individuals and risky. But language teaching efforts are long term and permanent activities. Once it has started, the learners will dig more to learn the culture and will try to introduce what they have learned to their surroundings. Hence language and culture Institutes are ideal platforms to penetrate to the minds for image building.

The methods of image export are crucial to obtain the desired goals. If any individual is expected to sit before a TV and watch a propaganda film, it is rare to have him change his or her idea due to awareness. But when an effort to learn something is suffered, there will be a momentum of learning more and more where image building and public diplomacy would be more fruitful. The same can be claimed for language teaching. The purpose of language learning may vary depending on the motivation such as economy, education or job opportunities. But language learning is intertwined with cultural orientation. The more successful language teaching is, the more easy to get used to the foreign culture. By that way

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<sup>377</sup> Jianping, “The Beijing Olympics and China’s National Image Building”, p. 5.

<sup>378</sup> Ramo, Joshua Cooper, *Brand China*, Foreign Policy Center, London, 2007, p. 39, <http://joshuaramo.com/files/pdf/Brand-China.pdf>, accessed on August 23, 2009.

<sup>379</sup> Guo, “Repackaging Confucius”, p. 28.

the meanings of the words and their concepts will be grabbed. Then effort to learn language, as a public diplomacy tool, will ease the culture inhalation, repetition of the cultural features and admiration to another culture. As a result, there is strong correlation between language teaching, cultural interaction and image-building. Confucius Institutes will provide an environment to promote the image of China.

The fact that China sponsors 'Confucius Institutes' throughout the world attests to the country's determination to expand its soft power. As more people engage with Chinese language and culture, credibility and the capacity to urge the masses will expand. There will be no resistance to the presence and policies of China regarding the crucial fields such as human rights, economic policies, trade, and dominance in international organizations that feeds both economic and political growth of China. Confucius Institutes will contribute to nation branding inside, image building abroad and promote the soft strength by language teaching as a step to cultural diffusion. Cultural persuasion is abiding to gain the hearts and minds of the targeted audience. Once enthusiasm is obtained other fields of cooperation is smooth to achieve.

China's ongoing growth and expectation to have China become a future global power will encourage the language teaching and cultural diffusion of China, especially in the neighbouring Asian countries. Business oriented motivation of the language learners make them to select one language that suits their goals in future and satisfy the expectations. China's position has the potential to persuade masses to learn Mandarin. At the mean time, this fact should be expected to have a generation that practices and tolerates the Chinese values. China's political, economic or military decisions will be acceptable, if any of the trainees becomes a regional or country-wide leader one day, as can be seen in Australia nowadays.

Language is a tool to build toleration and mutual understanding in two interacting societies. Language is the most efficient way of telling what is desired, but either by own or the other language. If the language of the other nation is preferred in interactions, then the other culture ought to be binding to meet the needs of the own society and then losing the identity will be a potential danger. But own language will spread a style of understanding, mutual thinking, consumption tendency, and acceptance of the dependency to some extent. Consequently the role of culture

cannot be regretted in the structure of the political, economic, trade interactions. Confucius Institutes can be claimed to be established to teach Mandarin also for shaping the targeted audience to accept what is desired by China.

Ideology is blended with cultural activities while defining the principals of the dogmas. China's official ideology finds its way to propagate in a tolerable method by benefiting cultural and language diffusion. Instead of accusation of the rival ideologies, the official ideology can justify the practices and the reasons in an acceptable way. The language teaching will create a society of volunteers to learn also ideology while understanding the culture. If the establishment procedure is considered, it is Hanban that drafts the curricula and there is a complete control of arranged programs in the Institutes. The indirect justifications of ideological motivations such as "developing socialism with Chinese characteristics"<sup>380</sup> and China's excuses for directed critiques will be expressed more easily but indirectly. Moreover the officially pursued strategies by Chinese government can be portrayed with a less harsh image of socialism. Although, there seems no ideological motivation in the activities of Confucius Institutes, any individual who is interested in Chinese language and culture, will have a curiosity for the ideological background of the regime. The symbols of the regime will be routine for the Mandarin speaking masses. It is clear that the existence of the regime will be more tolerable in the minds without any threat perception. The Deng's strategy of "lying low", Bijian's rhetoric of "peaceful rise" and Hu Jintao's "peaceful development with harmony" can find its way by the cultural activities of Confucius Institutes while conducting efficient public diplomacy.

It is obvious that there exists competitiveness in the international cultural products' trade.<sup>381</sup> The Chinese cultural sector lags far behind its Western counterparts in competing for world business. It is possible to reach vast number of audience to "sell" the traditions and side-products that brings "win twice strategy": Make money while shaping the targeted audience in their own will. Hollywood presents a smart example. There are extensive Chinese efforts to expand cultural trade. The cartoon series of Avatar is one example to see the consequences of cultural trade.

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<sup>380</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 39.

<sup>381</sup> Mingjiangy, "China Debates Soft Power", p. 293.



Avatar ranks 241 out of the 18,088 shows and 15,803 users count themselves in a single TV website.<sup>382</sup> The kids are enjoying not only watching the cartoons on the movie, but purchasing the tools painted with Avatar, software games and more crucially imitating the behaviours and gestures of Avatar. Hence it is possible to see a generation who are tolerating the leadership, cultural presence and acceptance of greatness of China in 20-25 years period. Confucius Institutes will be a tool to spread these kinds of cultural figures that will attract the young pupils.

The prominent feature of the Confucius Institutes is the volunteer contribution of the institutions in the host countries for language teaching and cultural interaction. It is the hosting nation that suffers to build the Confucius Institutes and requests help to carry out the curricula. This approach facilitates and eases the acceptance of the delivered indirect messages. The second feature is the cost efficient structure of the Institutes by sharing budget and revolving fund. Another feature is the central control and coordination of the activities that standardizes the delivered messages. Especially non-political and Sino-centred activities are not expected to fear the recipients, but make them curious to dig more to learn the culture. On the other hand the messages of the equivalent organizations seem to aim politically shaping the targeted audience. This fact makes the Confucius Institutes more attractive.

Consequently, the method of building language teaching and culture institute is way to enhance the soft strength. Confucius Institute is a crucial step to commence a cultural leap both for domestic and global purposes. It can be perceived as a required undertaking to be a global power to have such institutes especially in the eyes of the Chinese population. The “Confucius” tag of the Institute strengthens the interest of both Chinese and international public to the Institutes and promotes her credibility while giving message to all strands of the various societies. Hence Confucius Institutes does not only wield soft power in the eyes of domestic and international public, but public with different ideological, economic and political motivations as a conciliatory approach that will enhance China’s soft power.

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<sup>382</sup> Internet Movie Database, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0938283/>, accessed on April 18, 2009.

#### 4.6 Conclusion:

Institutes can be described as an outcome of coordinated efforts by Chinese government and its bound institutions such as Hanban, Universities, and individuals to raise the awareness of Chinese culture to remind the globe that China is a great power.<sup>383</sup> China becomes a point of attraction by increasing number of Institutes. China's attempt to teach Chinese can not be perceived as the sole motivation but, from an American perspective, "introduce them to a constructed history of Chinese culture and history in which China is uniquely benign and wonderful".<sup>384</sup> Then it is a kind of imposition to accept China's culture in its own realities and characteristics with the sense of toleration. But the establishment of Confucius Institutes cannot be constraint by a simple image building or language teaching effort. The spread of these Institutes, their establishment procedures, methods and themes used in the language courses prove that it has a sui generis way of augmenting its soft power in international arena. China declares its candidacy of being a future super power by building these Institutes.

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<sup>383</sup> Guo, "Repackaging Confucius", p. 33.

<sup>384</sup> Friedman, Edward, "China's Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices, And Tools", hearing before U.S.- China Economic And Security Review Commission, March 18, 2008, p. 50, [http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/transcripts/08\\_03\\_18\\_trans/malik.pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/transcripts/08_03_18_trans/malik.pdf), accessed on August 13, 2009.

## CONCLUSION

China's huge population and its need to reach 'welfare' society require China to pursue a pacifist world politics in and out of country. For this reason, Chinese leadership proposed strategies such as 'peaceful development' and 'harmonious society' policies that underlines the pillars of China's vision of power politics. China does not want to be perceived as a threat for the western hemisphere but wants to benefit from their order to focus on its development and internal progress of prosperity. Then, soft power perception and its western context which can be credited as peaceful, tolerable, integrative and cooperative method suits China's desires of development.

Aiming to be a super power by 2049, China is striving to enhance its world-wide image and augment its power mainly by resorting to non-aggressive and non-military methods. Chinese policy makers and scholars are keen to demonstrate Chinese power wielding efforts as soft power practices and they attribute Chinese traditions, history and culture as the primary source of wielding soft power. China also announces strategies such as "peaceful coexistence, win-win policy, peaceful development, and harmonious society-harmonious world" indicating the ideational background of Chinese soft power as well as serving to prevent a 'China-threat' perception of the West. But, development willingness of Chinese leadership may display China as a threat to existing order in the eyes of western hemisphere that can thwart China's super power projection. Hence Chinese 'leap forward' strategy is built upon peace and stability in and out of country to prevent the 'Chinese threat' claims.

If the Nye's frame is applied to China's efforts to wield soft power, Chinese perception of perceiving its culture as a source of attraction should be expected fruitful in Chinese neighbourhood. But a global cultural attraction process has started in 2000s to build its positive image and nation branding. Especially centrally controlled Confucius Institutes by Chinese leadership should be expected to ease the cultural diffusion of China world wide. The second source, political values of China, has not the same impact on Chinese soft strength due to the deficiencies of

human, minority and political rights at home. Other than authoritarian regimes, democratic societies will not be attracted by Chinese political values; even though Chinese ancient teachings will be a point of wonder. The last source, Chinese foreign policy, can contribute to China's soft power, especially for underdeveloped and developing countries because of China's membership to the UN Security Council that offers agenda setting capability to China.

However, it is difficult to analyse and understand this Chinese struggle for power solely by using the "soft power" concept of Nye, which emphasizes non-aggressive and non-military means to acquire power and seeks to convince but not coerce those who are the subjects of power wielding activities. Apart from Nye's framework of soft power, China has *sui-generis* soft power characteristics that can challenge the soft power debate of the Western academia. First among all is the Chinese regime that is a rare model of governance. Another feature is China's economic growth and national belief of rejuvenation for being a medium-developed country and then a super power in the coming decades. In his concept, Nye excludes economic sanctions, investment and aid from his definition of soft power and considers them "hard power" issues. China, however, uses trade, investment and aid in order to increase its influence and power, in, for example, Africa as was discussed in Chapter 3. Similarly, although China's fast-growing world-wide Confucius Institute network can be seen as part of the soft power concept. China, where necessary, imposes these institutions, rather than waiting for the host country to request a Confucius Institute, as in the case of the African states. China's prominent feature of applying its soft power emanates from its pragmatism in accordance with its goal oriented strategies.

Armitage and Nye's "smart power" concept, combining soft power tools with military and economic tools, which they proposed as a remedy for declining American power, can perhaps be beneficial for an understanding of the Chinese case. China, however, defines its route to 'power' according to its own economic, political and historical conditions, and legitimizes it as it wishes, and is on the way to making this power methodology accepted by the rest of the world. Kurlantzick and Ding claims the deficiencies of the Chinese soft power while investigating China's power related approaches in the frame of Nye's conception. But China's empiric approach to wield 'institutionalized' soft strength within the mentality of

‘win-win’ strategy in a ‘peaceful’ course of development differ its soft power conception different from western perceptions. China has its own soft power perception even though western terminology is benefitted to label its policies.

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## **APPENDIX A : CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY PAPER (2006)**

### **Foreword**

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.

The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.

### **Part I:**

#### **Africa's Position and Role**

Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.

Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.

## Part II:

### China's Relations with Africa

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.

The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.

Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.

## Part III:

### China's African Policy

Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as follows:

- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavour for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.

The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one China principle.

#### Part IV

### Enhancing All-round Cooperation between China and Africa

#### 1. The political field

##### (1) High-level visits

China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.

##### (2) Exchanges between legislative bodies

China favours increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of deepening understanding and cooperation.

##### (3) Exchanges between political parties

The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.

##### (4) Consultation mechanisms

Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.

##### (5) Cooperation in international affairs

China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

#### (6) Exchanges between local governments

China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

### 2. The economic field

#### (1) Trade

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organizations.

#### (2) Investment

The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.

#### (3) Financial cooperation

To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.

#### (4) Agricultural cooperation

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.

#### (5) Infrastructure

The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.

#### (6) Resources cooperation

The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole.

#### (7) Tourism cooperation

China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.

#### (8) Debt reduction and relief

China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.

#### (9) Economic assistance

In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.

#### (10) Multilateral cooperation

China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international organizations to pay more attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa.



### 3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects

#### (1) Cooperation in human resources development and education

The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.

Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.

#### (2) Science and technology cooperation

Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa.

#### (3) Cultural exchanges

China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.

#### (4) Medical and health cooperation

China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.

#### (5) Media cooperation

China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.

#### (6) Administrative cooperation

China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.

#### (7) Consular cooperation

China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.

#### (8) People-to-people exchange

China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.

#### (9) Environmental cooperation

China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological exchange.

#### (10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance

China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, encourage and support exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.

### 4. Peace and security

#### (1) Military cooperation

China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.

#### (2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

#### (3) Judicial and police cooperation

China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together with

African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.

China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange.

#### (4) Non-traditional security areas

In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.

#### Part V:

##### Forum on China-Africa Cooperation And Its Follow-up Actions

Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.

China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.

#### Part VI:

##### China's Relations with African Regional Organizations

China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.

China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations.

## **APPENDIX B: CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES**

### **Chapter 1: General Principles**

1. Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.
2. This Constitution and By-Laws is applicable to all Confucius Institutes worldwide.
3. In any other language, the name chosen to represent the Confucius Institutes must be equivalent in connotation and meaning to that of the head institute in Chinese.
4. The Confucius Institutes are non-profit educational institutions.
5. Adhering to the principles of mutual respect, friendly negotiations, and mutual benefit, the Confucius Institutes shall develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities.
6. The Confucius Institutes shall abide by the laws and regulations of the countries in which they are located, respect local cultural and educational traditions and social customs, and they shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations of China.
7. The Confucius Institutes shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not consistent with the missions of Confucius Institutes.
8. A Confucius Institute can be established in various ways, with the flexibility to respond to the specific circumstances and requirements found in different countries.
9. Any corporate entity outside of China capable of facilitating language instruction, conducting educational and cultural exchange activities, and meeting the requirements for application as stated in this Constitution and By-Laws may apply to the Confucius Institute Headquarters for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute.
10. The Confucius Institutes conduct Chinese language instructions in Mandarin, using Standard Chinese Characters.

### **Chapter 2: Business Service**

11. The Confucius Institutes shall provide the following services:
  - a. Chinese language teaching;
  - b. Training Chinese language instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources;
  - c. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers;

- d. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth;
- e. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries.

### Chapter 3: The Headquarters

12. The Confucius Institute Headquarters is a non-profit organization that has the independent status of a corporate body. It owns the proprietorship of the name, logo and brand of the Confucius Institutes. The Headquarters is the regulatory body that provides guidelines to the Confucius Institutes worldwide. The Headquarters is located in Beijing in the People's Republic of China.

13. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall be governed by the Council. The Council shall consist of the Chair, the Vice Chairs, the Executive Council Members, and the Council Members. Candidates for the Chair, several Vice Chairs and the Executive Council Members shall be recommended by the education administrative agency of the Chinese State Council and approved by the State Council. Among the fifteen Council Members, ten shall be the Heads of the Board of Directors of Confucius Institutes overseas. These ten members of the First Council are appointed by the Headquarters, while members of following Councils shall be elected or rotate service on the basis of the founding dates of Confucius Institutes. The other five Council Members shall be representatives of Chinese partner institutions, appointed directly by the Headquarters. The term of service of Council Members is two years. They can pursue reappointment for one term. During their tenure of office, Council Members shall not receive any payment from the Confucius Institute Headquarters. The Council shall establish positions of the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executives. The Chief Executive, who shall also be an Executive Council Member, is the legal representative of the Headquarters.

14. The duties of the Council include: Formulating and amending the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, examining and approving the development strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes, examining and approving annual reports and working plans of the Headquarters, and discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Confucius Institutes.

15. The Council shall assemble once a year, called by the Chair. When needed, the Chair may decide to call for provisional Council Meetings or Executive Council Member Meetings.

16. Under the leadership of the Council, the Confucius Institute Headquarters carries out its own daily operations. The duties include:

- a. Formulating development plans, criteria for the establishment of Confucius Institutes, and assessment standards for the Confucius Institutes;
- b. Examining and approving applications for the establishment of new Confucius Institutes;
- c. Examining and approving the implementation plans of annual projects, annual budgetary items, and final financial accounts of individual Confucius Institutes;
- d. Providing guidelines and making assessments to activities carried out by Confucius Institutes, supervising their operations and doing quality assurance management;

- e. Providing support and teaching resources to individual Confucius Institutes;
- f. Selecting and appointing directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes, and training administrative personnel and instructors for these Confucius Institutes;
- g. Organizing Confucius Institutes Conferences annually;
- h. Constituting regulations and institutions for the management of the Chinese funds.

17. The Headquarters shall establish Special Working Committees that can provide consultative suggestions to the Headquarters. Members of the Committees shall be appointed by the Headquarters.

18. The Headquarters shall invite well-known leaders and visionaries of both China and abroad to be Senior Consultants.

#### Chapter 4: Establishment

19. An application for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute must satisfactorily demonstrate the following:

- a. That the applicant is a legally registered organization or corporation at the place where it is located with resources to conduct teaching, educational and cultural exchanges, and public service;
- b. That there is a demand for learning the Chinese language and culture at the applicant's location;
- c. That the personnel, space, facilities, and equipments required for language and culture instructions are available;
- d. That the capital for the establishment is in place, and that the source of funds for operation is stable.

20. An applicant for the permission to establish a Confucius Institute shall submit an application package to the Confucius Institute Headquarters. This package shall include:

- a. An application letter signed by the principal or president;
- b. An introduction of the applicant site, its registration certificate, and the principal or president;
- c. A floor plan for the required instructional space, and lists of the relevant equipment and facilities available for the proposed Confucius Institute;
- d. A projection of market demand, managerial structure, and operational plans for the proposed Confucius Institute;
- e. A statement detailing the source, regulation, and management of the funds for the proposed Confucius Institute;
- f. Other materials required by the Confucius Institute Headquarters.

21. The Confucius Institute Headquarters will assess the application package submitted by the applicant. The assessment may include verification of the document materials, debriefings and interviews, on-site verification, and consultation with experts.

22. Upon the approval of an application, the Confucius Institute Headquarters will sign an agreement with the applicant, thus conferring the permission for establishment and the official Confucius Institute Plaque upon that applicant.

#### Chapter 5: Funds

23. A newly established Confucius Institute will receive aid to its initial operation in the form of a set amount of funds provided by the Chinese Parties. The funds for its annual projects shall be raised by individual Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Parties together in a ratio of approximately 1:1 commitment in general.

24. The aforementioned funds provided by the Chinese Parties will be managed through project management measures. Detailed measures are stipulated in Regulations for Administering the Chinese Funds for the Confucius Institutes.

#### Chapter 6: Administration

25. An individual Confucius Institute shall establish a Board of Directors. A Confucius Institute established under joint venture between Chinese and overseas partners shall form a Board of Directors consisting of members from both sides. The total number of members and the component ratio of the Board shall be determined through consultation.

26. The Board of Directors shall be responsible for assessing and approving the Confucius Institute's development plans, annual plans, annual reports, project implementation schemes, budget proposals, final financial accounts. The Board shall also be responsible for appointing and dismissing Directors and Deputy Directors of the Confucius Institute.

Appointments and dismissals of Directors and Deputy Directors shall be put on records at the Headquarters. The appointments of Directors and Deputy Directors for joint venture Confucius Institutes shall be decided upon negotiations between the Chinese and overseas partners.

27. An individual Confucius Institute shall adopt a system in which the Director, under the leadership of the Board of Directors, shall assume the main responsibility for the Institute's daily operation and administration.

28. The Director of a Confucius Institute shall have in-depth comprehension of Chinese current national issues, a skillful command of the language of the country in which the Institute is located, suitable administrative experiences in this position, and a strong ability to promote public affiliation and market potential.

29. Instructors appointed by Confucius Institutes shall have professional knowledge and teaching competence required by such positions as teachers.

30. An individual Confucius Institute, in the allotted time, shall draw up executable plans for annual projects and budget proposals, summarizing the implemental efficacy reports of annual projects and final financial accounts, and submit them to the Headquarters for examination and approval. Changes and dispositions made to the assets on the Chinese side shall be reported to the Headquarters for examination and approval. Individual Confucius Institutes shall also submit the working schedules and summaries of their annual projects to the Headquarters for archiving purposes.

31. Confucius Institutes are not profit-making organizations; hence, income drawn from operation of the Institutes shall be used for teaching activities and improving teaching and service conditions. The accumulated income shall be utilized for sustainable development of the Institutes and may not be used for purposes otherwise.

32. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall be responsible for conducting assessments of individual Confucius Institutes. The Headquarters reserves the right to terminate the Agreements with those Institutes that violate the principles or objectives, or fail to reach the teaching quality standards set forth by the head establishment.

33. The Confucius Institute Headquarters shall convene a Confucius Institute Conference annually to provide the opportunity for individual Institutes to exchange ideas and experiences, and to further study issues concerning the construction and development of the Institutes.

#### Chapter 7: Rights and Obligations

34. All Confucius Institutes shall enjoy the following rights:

- a. The rights set forth in the Agreement and this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes;
- b. The right to use the Name and Logo of the Confucius Institutes;
- c. The right of priority for obtaining teaching and cultural materials or resources provided by the Headquarters.

35. All Confucius Institutes shall observe the following obligations:

- a. The obligation to observe the measures and regulations set forth in the Agreement and this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes;
- b. The obligation to uphold and defend the reputation and image of the Confucius Institutes;
- c. The obligation to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the Headquarters.

36. The Confucius Institute Headquarters reserves the right to pursue legal action to affix responsibility and invoke punitive consequences on any person/party for any of the following conduct:

- a. The establishment of a Confucius Institute without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute Headquarters;
- b. Any activity conducted under the name of the Confucius Institutes without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute Headquarters;
- c. Any violation of the Agreement or this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes that causes losses of capital or assets or damages or tarnishes the reputation of the Confucius Institutes.

#### Chapter 8: Supplement

37. Individual Confucius Institutes may constitute their own regulations and measures in accordance with this Constitution and By-Laws and submit to the Headquarters for archiving purpose.



38. This Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes shall be followed as guide for setting up and regulating Confucius Institute Classrooms.

39. The Confucius Institute Headquarters reserves the right to interpret this Constitution and By-Laws.

40. This Constitution and By-Laws shall go into effect from the date of approval set forth by the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters.