

THE ALEVIS IN POST-1980 TURKEY: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
OF OFFICIAL TEXTS

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ABSTRACT

THE ALEVIS IN POST-1980 TURKEY: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL TEXTS

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This thesis analyzes official discursive practices towards the Alevis in post-1980 Turkey. As it is impossible to cover discourses of all state institutions, this study specifically focused on official discursive practices of three official institutions (namely, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Presidency of Turkish Republic). Using the method of critical discourse analysis, I examined official texts including school textbooks of compulsory religious courses, legal dictums, official press releases and the presidential speeches held during the Hacıbektaş Festival. As a result of my analysis, I reached the following general conclusions: Since the official discursive practices were produced by via different state apparatuses, it is hard to identify a homogeneous and stable official discourse. In that sense, I propose the existence of “official discourses” towards the Alevis, instead of one, never-changing and undifferentiated “official discourse.” Because of global (intervention of the European Union) and local factors (political, ethnic and sectarian cleavages of Turkey), it is possible to observe discursive diversities and changes in official texts concerning the Alevis.

Keywords: The Alevis, Official Discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis

ÖZ

1980 SONRASI TÜRKİYESİ'NDE ALEVİLER: RESMİ METİNLERİN ELEŞTİREL SÖYLEM ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışma 1980 sonrası Türkiye'sinde, Alevilere yönelik resmi söylem pratiklerini inceler. Alevilere yönelik söylem üreten tüm resmi kurumları kapsamak mümkün olmadığından, bu tezde yalnızca üç resmi kurumun söylemlerine odaklanılmıştır: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı. Eleştirel söylem analizi metodu kullanılarak, bu üç kurumca üretilen resmi belgeler incelenmiştir. Ulaşılan bazı sonuçlar şöyledir: Devlet yekpare bir varlık olmadığından, resmi söylem üreten birden fazla resmi kurum vardır. Bu yüzden tekdüze, istikrarlı ve tutarlı bir resmi söylemin varlığından bahsetme oldukça güçtür. Bu anlamda, Alevilere yönelik tek, homojen ve süreklilik arz eden bir resmi söylem yerine, farklı resmi söylemlerin varlığından bahsetmek daha doğru olacaktır. Resmi söylemdeki dönemsel farklılıklara ek olarak, aynı dönemde birden fazla söylemin birlikte var olduğu söylenebilir. Alevilere yönelik bu söylemsel çeşitliliğin küresel (Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne uyum süreci) ve yerel (siyasi, etnik ve mezhepsel çatışmalar) olmak üzere başlıca iki belirleyeni vardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aleviler, Resmi Söylem, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the end of 1980s, the Alevis (the second largest religious community in Turkey) have abandoned their accustomed silence and started to question the state-sponsored discriminations from which they have endured for a long time. Sunni-biased compulsory religious courses, discriminatory applications of Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB), undesired mosque constructions in their villages and the status of congregation houses (*cemevleri*, places of worship for the Alevis) have been among the main issues criticized by the Alevis. In 1989, a number of Alevi intellectuals systematized demands of the Alevis and issued *Alevilik Bildirgesi* (Manifesto of Alevism) declaring that the Alevis lack of their basic rights in Turkey, these rights should be given to them, and that the Alevism should officially be recognized. By questioning unjust state applications and demanding official recognition through media channels and their organizational structure, the Alevis have always succeeded to be part of social and political agenda of Turkey.

Emergence of Alevism in the public sphere as a remarkable social movement has attracted attentions of many social scientists. In addition to the religious content and historical development of Alevism, social and political transformation of the Alevis in modern Turkey and transnational dimensions of Alevi movement have been subject matters of numerous academic and popular studies. As a social scientist, I was also charmed by this multi-dimensional and challenging issue; but I preferred to focus on a relatively untouched dimension of the issue: official discursive practices towards the Alevis and Alevism, which were produced by different official institutions in the post-1980 era. To me, this dimension of the issue deserves attention and is interesting for the following reasons. Reassertion of Alevi identity in the public opinion also raised the questions about the legal status of Alevism; and there existed precarious and

conflicting official statements concerning the issue (sometimes there was a complete silence). Especially when Turkey's membership process to the European Union (EU) gained speed, at the end of 1990s, the Alevis' efforts in the direction of gaining official recognition have also mounted up. In the same process, signs of recognition in official discourses towards to the Alevis became hard to ignore. In this context, I indented to conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of official texts to investigate official discursive strategies, regularities and changes towards the Alevis. Below, I present three examples of official discourses which are highly striking to indicate precarious and heterogeneous nature of official discourses on the Alevis:

1- On 16 August 1997, speaking at the Hacıbektaş Festival (major Alevi event in Turkey), ninth president Süleyman Demirel addressed the Alevis, in an apologetic way, and asked them to forget what happened in the past. Emphasizing that the Alevis are first-class citizens of Turkey, he stated:

My dear citizens! You don't need to worry about anything. You are full citizens of this country and no one can humiliate you in these days. The Alevis should hold their heads up high. Take advantage of all the benefactions of this country. Alevism is not inferior than the other beliefs; you can be proud of your tradition. All of you should say to yourselves, "I am recognized as first class in this country and I am a partner here and share all the good things Turkey offers me. This country is mine, this state is mine and this land is mine."¹

2- In 1997, if we examine the school textbooks of compulsory religious courses, Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, DKAB), we can easily realize that Alevism was completely ignored in these textbooks of the same year. In addition, sensitivities of the Alevis and Alevi perspective were neglected in these textbooks.

3- Again, in the same year, we can also encounter humiliation of Alevi

¹ The passage was taken from the documents (containing the speeches of the president Demirel during the Hacıbektaş Festival) which were provided to me by the Directorate of Press and Public Relations of Presidency (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı*).

identity by a member of the cabinet. After the Susurluk scandal² (3 November 1996) a protest campaign was organized under the title of “One minute darkness for permanent light” (*Sürekli aydınlık için bir dakika karanlık*) in the metropolises of the country by different segments of the society against those politicians and bureaucrats who entered into dirty relations with mafia. As a part of the protest, thousands of citizens put out their lights during a specified instant of the night. Şevket Kazan, members of Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) and the Minister of Justice in the coalition government consisting of the RP and right-wing True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP), made a declaration and accused the participants of the event of “making candle went out” (*mum söndü yapmak*) (Hürriyet, 1997a). The Alevis felt offended by this expression of Kazan and they launched demonstrations against him; because “candle went out” refers to a bogus claim which is believed by the Sunnis. According to this baseless claim, by putting out the candles, the Alevis have incestuous relations at a specific instant of their congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*) that is conducted generally at nights.

As well as the heterogeneous nature of official discourse on the Alevis, just exemplified above, the contextual global and local factors which caused these diversities in official discourses will also be subject matters of this dissertation.

1.1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

By means of a CDA of the official texts, this dissertation investigates trajectory of official discourses concerning the Alevis in the post-1980 era, by taking into account main contextual factors influencing the formation of this discourses. Being aware of the fact that there exist many other discourses on the Alevis produced by different social actors, this study specifically focuses on the discourses on the Alevis produced by three official organs (namely DİB, the Ministry of Education (MEB) and the presidency of Turkish Republic), and aims to identify environmental factors that are effective in the production and change of official discourses concerning the specified time period.

² The Susurluk scandal is an event by means of which corrupted relations among some politicians, bureaucrats and mafia were brought to light by a car accident in which a police chief, a member of parliament and a wanted criminal were found together.

There are more than one official institution having discursive practices/activities towards the Alevis such as The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM), the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*, TRT) and judicial organs). Among the others, why were these three official institutions chosen in this study? These three institutions were chosen because the following reasons: If we closely look at the demands or problems of the Alevis, we can realize that the issues of compulsory religious education, the status of congregation houses and sunnification facilities of DİB have been at the top of the list. MEB is the primary official institution responsible for the content and production of religious curriculum and textbooks. In the same way, DİB is the highest official post in the state structure concerning the religious affairs and it has been in the center of sunnification facilities towards the Alevis; in addition, its position concerning the status of congregation houses has been determining the positions of other official institutions (such as provincial governorships and judicial courts). On the other hand, the Hacıbektaş Festival is the most important Alevi event in Turkey, and the state was represented at this festival by its highest post (the presidency of Turkish Republic) regularly since 1994. Content of the presidential speeches held during this festival, including important official statements aiming the Alevis, is hard to ignore in terms of the questions of this study. To reiterate, the content of the official texts produced by these institutions seems highly related with the most prominent problems of the Alevis. In other words, these three state apparatuses have been at the top of the list of official institutions that have official responses concerning the demands of the Alevis.

Another important reason for choosing these three institutions is that they have been eager to help me in providing the official texts used in this study. For example, related personnel of the presidency of Republic immediately responded my request and provided to me full-texts of the speeches of the presidents held in the Hacıbektaş Festival. Similarly, personnel of MEB and DİB have always been very helpful in providing necessary documents to me. At the beginning, I had also planned to do CDA of the speeches of the prime ministers held in the Hacıbektaş

Festival, but I could not realize this aim because of the fact that personnel of the Prime Ministry have been reluctant to help me in providing related official texts.

Using the techniques of CDA, this study will search answer for the following group of questions:

a) What were the official discourses towards the Alevis from 1980 to 2005? What kind of discursive regularities and discursive strategies were employed in official discourses towards the Alevis concerning the period between 1980 and 2005?

b) Is there a consistent, monolithic and incessant position of the Alevis in official discourses in this period? Are there changes or shifts in the official discourse concerning the Alevis? What kind of continuities and changes can be observed in discursive regularities and structures of official discourses concerning the Alevis? If there are any changes, what are the main determinants underlying the changes in official discourses with regard to the Alevis?

In order to answer these general question I will focus on the following more specific questions in the consecutive chapters:

1- What have been main dimensions of DİB's discourses towards the Alevis and Alevism? How did DİB perceive the issue of Alevism? What kinds of discursive statements and strategies and regularities were employed by DİB to legitimize its policies concerning the Alevis? What is the role of DİB in the production and reproduction of official discourses towards the Alevis? What are the continuities and changes in DİB's discourses towards the Alevis?

Being a part of state apparatus, DİB has been among the domains of official discursive practices towards the Alevis. For this reason, I have chosen the official texts produced by DİB as one of the subject of my analysis. In order to answer these questions, I conducted CDA of the following official documents: 1) institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB concerning the Alevis, 2) statements and commentaries of the last three presidents of DİB concerning the Alevis, expressed through press conferences and interviews at different times from 1987 to 2005. The corpus of text, which were analyzed in relation with discourses of DİB, were provided to me by Directory of Press and Public Relation (*Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü*) of DİB upon my request which is based on

the Law Pertaining to Rights for Information Access (*Bilgi Edinme Kanunu*) promulgated in 2004. Through a series of correspondence with the Directory of Press and Public Relations of DİB, I was invited to DİB, and I was given copies of the texts (institutional press releases, legal dictums and statements of the presidents of DİB) used in this study.

2- How were the Alevis included or (excluded) in the school textbooks and in the curriculum prepared by MEB for the course of Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, DKAB)? What kind of discursive strategies and regularities were employed in these textbooks and curriculum concerning the Alevis? Are there any changes in the discourses of MEB towards the Alevis? What kind of continuities and changes can be observed in these official documents concerning the issue?

Similar to the official documents of DİB, school textbooks of DKAB (published by MEB) will be taken as one of the material manifestations of official discourse. Together with the textbooks of DKAB, main curriculum of DKAB prepared by MEB will also be perceived as the domains of official discourse in the educational sphere. In order to analyze the official discourse in the context of religious education, I conducted a CDA of eighth, tenth and eleventh-grade textbooks of DKAB and corresponding curriculum. Why have I chosen these three grades? There are two curriculums prepared by MEB for religious education: the first one was issued in 1982 (Curriculum 1982, from now on) and the second one was issued in 2005 (Curriculum 2005, from now on). In addition to these two curriculums, there are also two sets of textbooks published by MEB for religious education: the first set of textbooks was issued according to Curriculum 1982, and the second set of textbooks was issued according to new curriculum, Curriculum 2005. In order to select the textbooks that form the corpus of this chapter, I have examined both sets of books, from the forth-grade to the eleventh-grade (twenty-two books in total). And, I have chosen eighth, tenth and eleventh-grade textbooks (six books in total) which are more suitable than the others to analyze and to search the answers of my research questions. Because, the issues which are directly related with Alevism and the Alevis were presented mainly in the textbooks of these three grades. In other words, discursive strategies

and regularities of MEB concerning the Alevis and Alevism are more frequent in these books than the others. The issues such as, “different understandings in Islam,” “forms of worshipping” and “principles of belief in Islam” were discussed mainly in these six books.

3- How were the Alevis perceived by the presidents in their official statements expressed during the Hacibektaş Festival? Through which discursive statements and regularities were the Alevis and Alevism defined by the presidents? What kind of fluctuations and stableness can be observed in the official stances of the presidents concerning the Alevis?

I take the Hacibektaş Festival as a platform through which I observed official discourses of the presidents towards the Alevis. Especially focusing on the etatization³ of the festival, I tried to make comparisons between different periods according to the absence or presence of the presidents in the festival. Together with the reasons behind absence and presence of the presidents in the festival, their official interpretations concerning the Alevis and Alevism, will be examined mainly through CDA of the speeches they made during the festival.

This study tries to confirm the accuracy of the following hypothesis:

There is no consistent, monolithic and incessant position of the Alevis in official discourses. It is expected to observe changes or shifts in the official discourses concerning the Alevis. In other words, instead of a stable, invariable, coherent and homogeneous “official discourse,” I expect to the existence of different “official discourses” towards the Alevis. In addition to the chronological variations in official discourses (different official discourses in different times), there exists also variations in official discourse in a specific historical instant (more than one official discourse in the same period).

Increasing impact of the existing local socio-political movements or cleavages (such as rise Kurdish separatism and political Islam questioning the legitimacy of the current system), gave rise to changes in official discourses towards the Alevis. Especially since the early 1990s, the official discourses started

³ The term “etatization” refers to the increasing level of state control over the Hacibektaş Festival. Especially since the 1990, the Ministry of Culture took over the organization of the festival under the excuse of making it an international one. Since then, the presence of the state elites (including the presidents) intensified in the festival.

to evolve towards the recognition of identity of the Alevis. Nevertheless, this recognition has some limits. Although there have been changes from a complete denial to the recognition; this recognition is not completely harmonious with the expectations of the Alevis. In other words, the changes in the official discourses concerning the Alevis do not correspond to a complete acceptance of the Alevi identity with its *sui generis* social and religious content. Claims of the Alevis for religious and cultural authenticity and diversity are not completely recognized by the official statements. Instead, content of this changed official discourses towards the Alevis aim “political incorporation”⁴ of the Alevis to the existing order against the rise of political Islam by defining Alevism as the “essence of Islam” (*İslam’ın özü*), “Turkish-Islam” (*Türk İslamı*) or “real Islam” (*gerçek İslam*). In addition, the second aim of this new discourse of inclusion is to incorporate the Alevis to the existing constitutional order against Kurdish Nationalism by stressing the “Turkish” characteristic of Alevism. Apart from these local political reasons of discursive change in official discourses, it is also expected in this study that there exist global political factors (such as intensification of the relationship between the EU and Turkey) affecting this change.

In Chapter One, I identify research questions of the study, as well as the methodological tools used to answer these questions. This chapter contains also discussions of theoretical concepts, namely, ideology, discourse, official ideology, and official discourse that have been used in the analysis of official discourses on the Alevis. Secularism and nationalism (two important principles of Kemalism) were also discussed in this chapter as two sources of official discourses towards the Alevis. I also presented general characteristics of the Alevis in Turkey (in terms of population, geographical distribution, ethnicity and organizational structure) and fundamentals of Alevi belief system as well as worshiping practices in Alevism.

In Chapter Two, I intend to develop a historical glance at the issue of official discourses produced by the official institutions on the Alevis, which have

⁴ “Political incorporation” is a concept offered by Burton and Carlen (1979:48-51) to refer to the application of knowledge in a way that promotes strategies of state control over diverse segments of society.

always been closely related with the nature of the relations between the state and the Alevis. In developing this general history of official discourses, my main concern is to follow the traces of the official discourses towards the Alevis, starting from the Ottoman period. In other words, I strive to understand how political authorities did recourse to different discursive strategies concerning the Alevis in different times, and what kind of changes happened in these official discursive practices. In addition to tracing history of official discourses, this chapter includes also a brief historical review of development of Alevism, which provide the reader with contextual knowledge that is necessary for evaluating the analysis conducted in this study.

In Chapter Three, I explore official discourses of DİB, an important state apparatus. DİB's discursive strategies on the Alevis are important to understand the overall official discourses towards the Alevis, because DİB is the highest official post in the state structure concerning the religious affairs; and it is among the primary official institutions that produce discourse concerning the Alevis. The official channels through which DİB declares its positions are press releases, legal dictums, and declarations or interviews of its presidents. Because of the fact that the Alevis appeared in these official texts several times concerning to their demands from DİB, in Chapter Three, I have chosen the official texts produced by DİB as the subject of my analysis. Main question of this chapter is that: what kind of discursive strategies and regularities were employed in discursive practices of DİB concerning the Alevis.

In Chapter Four, I examine some of the discursive strategies and discursive regularities of the MEB (as one of the state apparatus) concerning the Alevis in the educational system. To this aims, I conducted CDA of specified portions of textbooks of compulsory religious courses, namely, the grades of eight, ten and eleven, and the related parts of curriculum. The leading questions of Chapter Four are: How were the Alevis included or excluded in the school textbooks and in the curriculum of DKAB? In other words, what kind of discursive strategies were employed by MEB concerning to the Alevis in textbooks and curriculum of DKAB? In this chapter, school textbooks of DKAB (only those ones published by MEB) will be taken as one of the material manifestations of official discourse.

Together with the textbooks of DKAB, main curriculum of DKAB which was prepared by MEB will also be perceived as the domain of official discourse in the educational sphere.

In Chapter Five, I focus on the presidential speeches of two consecutive presidents (namely, Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer), which were held between 1994 and 2003. Through CDA of seven presidential speeches held in the Hacıbektaş Festival, I tried to answer following questions: What kind of discursive regularities and discursive strategies were employed in the presidential speeches held in the Hacıbektaş Festival towards the Alevis? How did the presidents perceive the Alevis in their official statements expressed during the festival? What kind of fluctuations and stableness can be observed in the official stance of the presidents concerning the Alevis?

In Chapter Six, I wrap up and reiterate main conclusions I reached through the analysis conducted previous chapters. This concluding chapter summarizes and highlights the major conclusions reached in each chapter. Specific attention is given to the reasons of changes and diversity in official discourses on the Alevis. Lastly, I point out further questions which can not be covered in this study.

1.2. ALEVISM AND THE ALEVIS IN TURKEY

The term “Alevi,” coming originally from Arabic, literally means “being a member of Ali’s lineage” or “being a supporter of Ali;” but, in Turkish, the term signifies “the one who is a member of a sect that elevates the status of Ali”⁵ (Savaşçı, 2004:19-20). On the other hand, in academic studies, “Alevi” is generally used as a blanket term in order to refer to large number of different heterodox religious groups such as, Kızılbaş, Çelebi, Bektâşi, Nusayri, Tahtacı, Çepni, Ocakzade, Abdal, and Bedreddini (Erdemir, 2004:30; Bruinessen, 1996:7; Şahin, 2001:1). Because of the fact that they differ in their actual religious practices and beliefs, it can be argued that the Alevis are composed of

⁵ Ali is son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad (prophet of Islam). Ali married the prophet’s daughter Fatima, hence the family line of the Prophet Muhammad continued through him. Later, he became the fourth caliph, and he is considered by the Alevis as the founder of the path of Alevism.

heterogeneous groups. They inhabit mainly in Turkey; although in smaller number, they can be found also in Syria, Iran, Bulgaria and Albania. Since this dissertation deals only with official discourses towards the Alevi living in Turkey, I confined myself with portraying the Alevi of Turkey. And, since a historical glance at how Alevism came into being was presented in Chapter Two, I did not focus on historical origins of Alevism in detail in this section to refrain from repetition. Instead, I focused on the population, geographical distribution and ethnic characters of the Alevi, as well as their organizational structure. In addition, I reviewed fundamentals of Alevi belief system and worshipping practices in Alevism. While doing that I tried to emphasize the points where Alevism (as a heterodox Islamic belief system) differ from Sunnism (orthodox/mainstream Islam, dominant religious understanding in Turkey). I hope this review will be helpful for the reader in understanding official discursive strategies and regularities (especially exclusionary discursive strategies) towards the Alevi which were studied in the following chapters.

In spite of the fact that it is hard to delineate the Alevi due to their heterogeneity in many terms, it is still possible to indicate some features that characterize them. The Alevi show diversity in terms of their ethnic identities. In other words, Alevism crosses the ethnic boundaries. Concerning the Alevi living in Turkey, Bruinessen (1996:7) identifies four main ethnic groups in terms of their languages: the ones who speak Azerbaijani Turkish and live in Kars (an eastern province); the Arabic speaking Alevi of Hatay (a southern province) who are “ethnically part of Syria’s Alawis (Nusayri) community” and have no historical relations with the other Alevi groups; Turkish speaking Alevi; and Kurdish speaking Alevi. Kurdish speaking ones also can be divided into sub-groups.

The number of the Alevi living in Turkey is uncertain. We do not have exact information about their numbers in Turkey mainly because of “...the assimilative politics of the state since Ottoman times” and “the tendency of the Alevi to hide their identities” (Erman and Göker, 2000:99) and because of the lack of ethnic and religious categories in the state census (Shankland, 1999:136). However, there exist opinions and estimations about the number of the Alevi ranging from 10 to 25 per cent of total population of Turkey. These estimation

make them a group of 7 to 18 million in Turkey (total population of which is about 71 millions at the end of 2007). It is generally accepted that the largest group of the Alevis is constituted by Turkish Alevis. Again, although there is no exact numbers, it is argued that Kurdish Alevis constitute about 20-25 per cent of the total Alevi population in Turkey (ibid:136).

Before their intensive migration to the major urban regions of Turkey, the Alevis had traditionally inhabited densely rural Central and Eastern Anatolia, especially Çorum, Yozgat, Amasya, Tokat, Sivas, Erzincan, Tunceli, Malatya, Muş, Elazığ, Bingöl, Kahramanmaraş (Zeidan, 1999:1). Although in lesser concentration, they can also be founded throughout Turkey, particularly in Aegean and Mediterranean coast. Along the second half of the 20th century, many of the Alevis migrated from their rural regions to industrialized urban centers of Turkey, particularly to İstanbul and Ankara. In the same period, there are many Alevis who migrated to developed countries of the Western Europe particularly to Germany.

Despite the origins of Alevism is based, by most of the Alevis, on the events took place in the early Islamic period, the community which is identified today as the Alevis did not fully emerge until centuries after the emergence of Islam.⁶ As a distinct belief, Alevism started to develop by the conversion of Turkish groups into Islam in ninth and tenth century during their migration to Anatolia. Some of these Turkish groups interpreted Islam under the affect of their previous religions (Shamanism, Buddhism, and Maniheism) and they reached a heterodox version of Islam (Ocak, 1999:31-51). It is usually agreed that Alevism (in addition to its heterodox character) is at the same time a syncretistic belief system containing elements from Shamanism, Buddhism, Maniheism and Shiite

⁶ These events are mainly related with the schism between followers of Ali (the fourth caliph, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad) and those of the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman). The Alevis, similar to the Shiite Muslims, reject the caliphate of the first three caliphs reigned after death the prophet. They believe that the forth Caliph Ali was the prophet's only legitimate successor because he was the bearer of unique spiritual power. And, according to the Alevis, Ali's right was seized by the other caliphs. Similar to Shiite Muslims, the Alevis also give special importance Ali, *Ahl al-Bayt* (family of the prophet consisting of Ali, Fatima (prophet's daughter and Ali's wife), and Hasan and Husayn (sons of Ali) and Twelve Imams. As will be discussed below, for the Alevis, Ali, having some divine features, is more than a historical personality.

Islam.⁷ Elements from Shiite Islam were added on Alevism mainly in the Ottoman period (16th century) by means of strong influence of Shah Ismail-Hatai (leader of the Safavid State) over the Alevis of Ottoman State (Melikoff, 1998:82). Kızılbaş groups (historical names of the Alevis until last century of the Ottomans, literally means “red head”) of the Ottoman State supported the Safavids in their fight against the Ottomans; and Kızılbaş groups were strongly affected by defeats of the Safavids at the hands of Selim I (Ottoman Sultan) in 1514. As a result of persecutions of this period held by the state, Kızılbaş groups retreated to rural areas and suffered from economic, geographical and social marginalization. In this period, Ottoman State isolated Kızılbaş groups by stigmatizing them as “impious, godless, and heretic” (*rafizi*) (Pakalın, 1946:277). This isolation enabled the Kızılbaş groups to develop their peculiar social and cultural structure many of which survived until now. In other words, their seclusion and alienation enabled Kızılbaş groups to retain some kind of a cultural specificity and a peculiar form of Islam that has survived until now. For the Kızılbaş community, 16th century has been the century of crisis and formation, at the same time. This century is a kind of reference point where an important portion of the belief system of Alevism was formed. Today many discussion, confusion and disputes that define the Alevis stem from this era. In this period, under the strong pressure of state Sunnism, in rural areas, the Alevis created their own closed spheres that restricted themselves and strengthened their isolation from public arena.⁸

Since the beginning of 16th century, there have been deep-rooted prejudices between the Alevis and the Sunnis (orthodox Muslims). There still exist persistent social gaps between Alevi and Sunni groups of Turkey. Even today, the Sunnis and the Alevis remain to be sectarian “others” for each other. As clearly indicated by Erdemir, the Alevis were traditionally branded by their Sunni counterparts (orthodox/conservative Muslims) as “heretics (*sapkın*) and pervers (*sapık*)” (2004:32). According to Erdemir many of the Sunnis believe that (ibid: 32):

⁷ See, Ocak (1999) and Melikoff (1998) for the discussions on syncretistic nature of Alevism.

⁸ See, Chapter Two for more information about historical developments of this period contributed to the formation of Alevism.

[T]he Alevis practice orgies in congregational ceremonies (*mumsöndü*) and practice incest (*ana bacı tanımazlar*). Conservative Sunnis see the Alevis as being filthy and ritually unclean arguing that they fail to perform the bodily ablutions following sexual intercourse. Moreover, some argue that the Alevis are not circumcised and that they eat pork and human meat.

Experiencing centuries-long geographical and social marginalization, the Alevis developed into an endogamous religious community, and they constructed tight socio-religious networks (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996:52). In order to refrain from persecutions (in a Sunni dominated environment) they adopted dissimulation about their belief system (*takiyye*). Because of the fact that prejudices, official exclusions/negligence, and violent attack towards the Alevis continued in the republican era, they preserved practicing dissimulation also in this period.

For many scholars studying on the issue, the Alevis form a heterodox religious community (Melikoff, 1998; Vergin, 1991; Çamuroğlu, 1999; Ocak, 1999; Yavuz, 1995). The Alevis generally emphasize the inner spirituality or the esoteric (*batını*) side of the faith, instead of the external (*zahiri*) side of it (Yavuz 1999a:184). For example, they prefer to interpret Qur'an in an esoteric and symbolic manner rather than "literal manner" (Zeidan, 1999:78). Ali is the most important element of Alevi belief system. The Alevis recognize Ali as the only legitimate successor of the Prophet Muhammad. Both Ali and Muhammad are seen as emanations of Divine Light, and sometimes both merge into one divine figure. Different from Sunnism, in Alevism, Ali is more than a historical figure. It should be noted here that deification of Ali is quite explicit in many *nefes* (Alevi religious poem).⁹ The Alevis venerate *Ahl al-Bayt* (family of the prophet consisting of Muhammad, Ali, Fatima (prophet's daughter and Ali's wife), Hasan and Husayn (sons of Ali). In Alevism, the principle of *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose them) has a special place. Especially, the first three caliphs and the Umayyads were disliked by the Alevis, since it is believed that they imposed Sunnism as dominant religion, and distorted original verses of Qur'an (especially those verses dealing with Ali ritual practices) and true Islam.

⁹ See Melikoff (1998) for more information about deification of Ali in Alevism.

The Alevis' conceptualization of God show important differences from that of the Sunnis. Among the others, it should be stated that the Alevis do not describe God with reference to punishment, fear or torture. In Alevism, God is conceptualized on the general principle of love, instead of fear. Prioritizing the trinity of God-Muhammad-Ali, Alevi tradition offers four gates to reach God (Bozkurt, 1992:91): 1) *Shariah* (the Sunni way of external duties; it is believed in Alevism that this gate was passed over by all the Alevis centuries ago, 2) *Tariqah* (the path, rules of Alevism, the Alevi mode of worship), 3) *Marifah* (the esoteric knowledge of God), 4) *Haqiqah* (eventual truth, union with God, the final level in Alevi path). There are ten *makams* (stations, duties) in every gate which must be accomplished under the supervision of *dede* (religious leader in Alevism).

Another element of Alevi belief system (different from that of Sunnism) is *devriye* (cycle of spirits or reincarnation). As argued by Melikoff (1998:49), the Alevis believe in cycles of the spirits. For many of the Alevis, spirit of Ali reappeared in the body of Hacı Bektaş Veli in 13th century. And, the same spirit reappeared again in 19th century in the body of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Düzel, 2008).

Hacı Bektaş Veli, a sufi (Islamic mystic) lived in 13th century, was accepted by most of the Alevis as their patron saint (*pir*). He has been (together with Ali) main figure or *serçeşme* (the main fountain) in Alevism. Coming from Khorasan (a city in Iran) to Sulucakarahöyük (a village in Central Anatolia), he married Kadıncık Ana who established a religious order (Bektashism) and a dervish lodge (*tekke*) following the spiritual path set by Hacı Bektaş Veli. According to Melikoff (1998:19), Alevism and Bektashism stem from and share same principles of belief. In this sense, these two understanding, referring to same phenomenon, can not be separated from each other. Although there have been some historical and social difference between Alevism and Bektashism (such as while Bektashi groups lived in generally in urban areas, the Alevis groups lived generally in rural regions), today, these two concept have became indistinguishable; because, historical and social differences lost their significance. In this study the term Alevi is used to refer to both Bektashis and the Alevis.

Disregarding “five main pillars of Islam,”¹⁰ which were formulated by Islamic orthodoxy, the Alevis emphasize importance of the following principles for being an Alevi: “Be master of your hand, loins and tongue” (*Eline, beline ve dilne sahip ol*). In other words, unlike the Sunnis (orthodox Muslims), most of the Alevis do not attend to mosques, and do not observe daily prayers (*namaz*) and do not fast in Ramadan (*oruç*); also, they do not visit Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*hac*), and they do not give alms (*zekat*) (Erdemir, 2004:33; Shankland, 1999:142; Eickelman, 1989:289). Instead of these orthodox religious practices, they fast for twelve days during Muharram (first month of Arabic calendar) to commemorate Imam Husayn’s martyrdom in the battle with the Umayyad caliph Yazid (Yaman and Erdemir, 2006:77). They do not give credit to visiting Mecca for pilgrimage, which refers “an external pretense;” for them real pilgrimage is closely related with one’s internal self-questioning (Eickelman, 1989:289). For the purpose of pilgrimage, some of them also visit the shrine of Hacı Bektaş Veli in Hacıbektaş (a town in Nevşehir in the central Anatolia). The Alevis perform circular prayer (*halka namazı*), which is considerably different from prayers of the Sunnis both in terms of meaning and form, during their congregational ceremonies (*ayin-i cem*).

As mentioned above the Alevis do not regularly attend to mosques; instead they pray at congregation houses (*cemevi*). The central ritual of Alevi faith is congregational ceremony which is conducted at *cemevis*.¹¹ *Ayin-i cem* symbolizes the Prophet Muhammad’s ascend to heaven (*miraç*) (where God’s secrets were imparted to him) with the assembly of forty (*kırklar meclisi*).¹² Commemorating

¹⁰ These pillars signify the followings: Islamic declaration of faith to the oneness of God and the prophecy of Muhammad or *shadah* (*şehadet getirmek*), prayer (*namaz*), Ramadan fasting (*oruç*), pilgrimage (*hac*) and alms (*zekat*). As stated above the Alevis do not usually follow the “five pillars” of Islam. Although they perform the principle of *shadah*, they add the principle of “*Aliyyun veliyullah*” to it: “Ali is the companion of God.”

¹¹ It should be noted here that *cemevis* are new type of religious buildings emerged mainly in urban areas as result of massive migration flows of the Alevis from their rural regions. As argued by Shankland (1999:165), *cemevis* emerged as modern places of worshiping as a result of impulses of the Alevis for worshipping in urban settings. Traditionally, in the rural settings or in the villages *ayin-i cem* were held in the largest room of the village; there were no specific building assigned as *cemevi*. Today, declaring *cemevis* as their places of worshiping, most of the Alevis demand official recognition from the governments for their places of worshiping.

¹² *Mirac* is also believed by the Sunnis; but the Alevi version show important difference from the Sunni. See, Bal (1996) for detailed information about *ayin-i cem* and meaning of *mirac* in Alevism.

sufferings of Twelve Imams and mourning the martyrdoms of Hasan and Husayn at Karbala are also among the purpose of *ayin-i cem*. Both men and women attend to *ayin-i cem* together; contrary to Sunnism, in Alevism there is no gender segregation during the performance of religious rituals. *Ayin-i cem*, which is conducted under the supervision of *dede* (the religious leader in Alevism), includes *semah* (a ritual Alevi dance), *lokma* (sacrificial meal) and *nefes* (hymns recited together with music on the lute). Almost all of the Alevis in Turkey (including Kurdish Alevis) use Turkish during their *ayin-i cem*. There are twelve services in an ordinary *ayin-i cem*: *dede*, *rehber* (guide), *gözcü* (watchman), *kapıcı* (guard), *meydancı* (the person responsible for cleaning), *peyik* (the person invites people to the ceremony), *pervane* (service during the ceremony), *sofracı* (the person who prepares *lokma*), *ibrikçi* (the person who serves water), *süpürgeci* (sweeper), *zakir* (minstrel), *delilci* (the person responsible for lightening candle).¹³

During a special kind of *ayin-i cem* (*görgü cemi*), taking place behind close doors, *dedes* dissolve the matters between disciples (*talips*), and decide who is guilty and who is innocent. Guilty persons are punished.¹⁴ *Düşkünlük* (excommunication) is the most severe form of punishment in Alevism. *Düşkünlük* has important functions for the maintenance of social order in Alevi community. The persons who are pronounced as *düşkün* by *dedes* are excommunicated or exiled; these people undergo humiliating attitudes of the members of Alevi community, even members of their family can not help them. However, as argued by Yaman and Erdemir (2006:84), the institution of *düşkünlük* has lost its significance today, it was important in the past.

Among the others, *dedelik* is one of the most important social institutions in Alevism. *Dedes* (literally means “grandfather”) play key role in sustaining Alevi way of life. Their roles in Alevi community are not limited with only

¹³ Although *ayin-i cem* and fast of Muharram (mentioned above) are the most important religious practices in Alevism, there are also some other rituals having special importance for the Alevis: a) *Sultan Nevruz*: Celebrated on every 21 March by a series of folkloric and cultural ceremonies, Nevruz is regarded by the Alevis as the birthday of Ali (Yaman and Erdemir, 2006:77), b) *The Fast of Hızır*: On February 13, 14 and 15, the Alevis fast for three days; they believe that Hızır helps them when they need (ibid: 78). See Yaman and Erdemir (2006) for detailed information about religious practiced of the Alevis.

¹⁴ It should be noted here that after the Alevis migrated to modern urban areas and started to live under authority of state institutions (such as the police, the courts), these functions of *ayin-i cem* and punishing authorities of *dedes* were dramatically challenged.

religious domain; they have also other social roles. They are leaders of religious ceremony and transmitter of sacred knowledge to the community. *Dedes* are accepted to be descendent from the Prophet Muhammad's lineage. The right of being a *dede* passes from one generation to another by lineage. If a man is not born into a *dede* family (*ocak*) he can not be a *dede*. In Alevism, there is a kind of hierarchy between a lay lineage and lineages of *dedes*. In other words, each *dede* possesses religious and social leadership of a number of lay lineages. Those ones accepting the guidance of *dede* are called *talips* (disciple). As well as conducting *ayin-i cem*, *dedes* may perform a number of service for their *talips*: helping out in wedding negotiations, resolving disputes on daily matters and conducting funeral rites. Although they are bearer of an oral tradition, and do not have a formal education, *dedes* are familiar with verses of Qur'an, sayings of the prophet, Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli and poems (*nefes*) of other sacred personalities of Alevi tradition (such as Pir Sultan Abdal, Hatai, Yunus Emre, Nesimi, Kul Himmet and Kaygusuz Abdal).

Musahiplik (ritual kinship or spiritual brotherhood) is another institution of Alevism. Two lay men (without having any blood tie between them) with their wives come before *dede* in an *ayin-i cem*, and they enter into a permanent engagement to watch over the spiritual, social and even economic deprivations of each other and their family (Melikoff, 1998:157). The tie established by *musahiplik* between the couples is as strong as the tie of blood relatives. *Musahiplik* is a necessity for all the Alevis; without having a *musahip*, an Alevi is not allowed to participate in *ayin-i cems*. Traditionally in Alevism, the tie established with *musahiplik* is based on the spiritual relationship between the Prophet Muhammad and Ali. Similar to the case of *düşkünlik*, importance of *musahiplik* has considerably decreased when the Alevis have migrated to the urban areas.

After a brief review of Alevi belief system and religious practices, now it is time to stress on the organizational structure of the Alevis of today and transnational characters of Alevi movement. In Turkey, for many years, the Alevis have felt the need to conceal their identity mainly because of security concerns. They have stayed silent against Sunni-biased compulsory religious courses,

discriminatory applications of DİB, even to the state-sponsored mosque constructions in their villages. But, in the late 1980s, the situation has begun to change. The new era opened new doors for the Alevis; passing through these doors they endeavor to declare their own identity in the public arena. In 1989, a number of Alevi intellectual issued *Alevilik Bildirgesi* (Manifesto of Alevism) declaring that the Alevis lack of their basic right in Turkey, these rights should be given to them, and that the Alevism should officially be recognized. Since then hundreds of books on Alevism were published, Alevi periodicals and radio stations emerged; series of articles and serials appeared in written media; various discussion programs organized on TV channels, and numerous Alevi associations were established. As a result of these, Alevism became one of the main subjects of Turkey's public agenda. This sudden rise of Alevism is often referred as "Alevi revival" (Bruinessen, 1996) or as "Alevi revivalism" (Çamuroğlu, 1998a).

As mentioned above, as an important dimension of Alevi revival at the beginning of 1990s, hundreds of Alevi organizations (generally under the title of association and foundation) have been established. Violent incidents aiming the existence of the Alevis, such as Sivas Massacre (*Sivas Katliamı*, in 1993), accelerated the establishment of those organizations. These organizations have played important roles for the Alevis in demanding official recognition from the state. In addition to the associations and foundations, the shrine complexes (*dergah*) and congregation houses appeared as two other forms of Alevi organizations.¹⁵ Because of the fact that heterogeneity is among the main characteristics of Alevi groups in Turkey, there emerged more than one Alevi group (with their own organizational structure) each of which highlighted different aspects of Alevi identity. In other words, ambiguous nature of Alevism gave way to different interpretations concerning to the content of Alevi identity. Fragmented nature of Alevi identity can easily be traced through competing

¹⁵ Some of the most well known Alevi organizations, whose political aims and demands from the states show considerable differences from each other, are: Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations (*Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Dernekleri*), Cem Foundation (*Cem Vakfı*), Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture and Advocacy Association (*Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Dernekleri*), Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolia Culture Foundation (*Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı*) and World Ahl al-Bayt Foundation (*Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı*). For more information on Alevi organizations, see Massicard (2007), Üzümlü (1999) and Kaleli (2000).

definitions or understandings of Alevisms supported by different Alevi organizational structures (associations, foundations, shrine complexes, etc.). While some of the Alevi organizations defend that “Alevism is outside of Islamic sphere... Alevism is a way of life rather than a religious belief” (these arguments are defended generally Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association), some other of them defend that “Alevism is the essence of Islam... Alevism is Turkish version of Islam” (these theses are proposed generally by circles of Cem Foundation). Organizational structure of the Alevis played important roles not only in transformation of Alevism from a secret oral tradition to a modern identity movement, but also in expression of Alevism in the public sphere and in demanding rights of the Alevis from the state. But, in addition to the lack of agreement on the content of Alevism, there exist also disagreements among Alevi associations and foundations concerning to Alevi demands from the governments. For example, regarding to the issue of DİB, Cem Foundation defends that the Alevis should be represented in structure of DİB and they must benefit from governmental funds (like the Sunnis). On the other hand, rejecting representation of Alevism in DİB, Pir Sultan Adal Culture Association defends that that DİB must be purged completely from the state structure.

As for the transnational dimension of Alevi revival it can be argued that nowadays Alevism is not only a local and national issue but it is a transnational one, which attracts the attention of the states and international organizations in the global arena. As clearly showed by Massicard (2007) and Şahin (2001), development of Alevi diaspora in the Western Europe (especially in Germany) had vital effects on the rise of Alevi identity in Turkey. For some scholars, associational activities started earlier in European Alevi diaspora than in Turkey (Şahin, 2001:7). The rise of public Alevi identity in Turkey and that of in the diaspora are closely related. Apart from the developments in Turkey, a parallel reconstruction process of Alevi identity has taken place in Europe facing with lesser difficulties because of the democratic atmosphere and multi-culturalist policies of the European countries. Like many Sunni workers, a large number of Alevi also went abroad (to the Western Europe, especially Germany) to accumulate capital during 1960s. Together with the increase in the population of the Alevis in

Europe, the social and communication networks (including unions, associations and publications) among them were also established. These networks gave financial and moral support to the Alevis in Turkey. Because of intense abroad migration, today in many parts of the Western Europe there have emerged Alevi diasporas. Today in Germany, there are more than one hundred local Alevi organizations, which have close economic and cultural connections with Alevi organizations in Turkey (Kaleli, 2000). Diaspora organizations played important economic roles in the expression of Alevi identity in Turkey by providing financial support to formation of the Alevi media (e.g. foundation of *Radyo Mozaik*) and Alevi political parties (e.g. Democratic Peace Movement). The Alevi population has realized many of their rights in Germany. For example, as a result of the legal struggles of the Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany, Alevism is taught in the schools of many provinces of Germany. The Alevis have also been one of the important issues in the relationship between Turkey and the European Union since 1998. In short, multiplicity of actors at local, national and international level resulted in the diversity of discourses on the Alevis.¹⁶

1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CDA of the official texts is the main aim of this study. It is among the main assumptions of CDA that “discourses make ideologies ‘observable’ in a sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly expressed and formulated” (van Dijk, 2004a:6). Pecheux (1982:185) also emphasize the same close relationship between ideology and discourse by arguing that political discourses of any sort are produced on the basis of the ideology held. Following the arguments asserted by van Dijk and Pecheux, I will first dwell on the notions of ideology and discourse. This effort will also enable me to discuss the ideological roots and sources of the official discourses of three state apparatuses (namely, DİB, MEB and the presidency) towards the Alevis. In other words, the conceptual relationship between ideology and discourse sheds light on the relationship between the official ideology and official discourses in Turkey; being in line with

¹⁶ See also Demiray (2004) and Zırh (2005) for the European dimension of the Alevi movement.

the assumptions of CDA, I assume that the former controls the latter in many cases.

While discussing the concept of ideology, it will not be my intention to cover, here, all different conceptions of ideology. I will present mainly the Marxist tradition of this concept with the negative and positive meanings of it in that tradition. Development and changes in the meaning of ideology will be traced through the writings of Gramsci, Althusser, Pecheux, Larrain, and Purvis and Hunt. Then, I will dwell on the concept of discourse by referring mainly to Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe who developed their theories on the criticism of Marxist conception of ideology. After stating what these concepts mean in this thesis, I will continue with the relationship between ideology and discourse. In the history of modern social theory, ideology and discourse have been among the concepts that are most difficult to define. Few concepts in social theory are as closely related as the concepts of ideology and discourse. Sometimes these two terms were located in completely different and even opposite positions. Arguing that there are serious fissures between discourse and ideology, the defenders of this position refrain from using the concept of ideology in their theories (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985a; Foucault, 1972). Some other times ideology and discourse are not counter-posed; instead, they are defined in close connection with each other. In the writings of the defenders of the latter position the two terms are used in a supplementary way (see Eagleton, 1991; Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 2004a; Purvis and Hunt, 1993; Heck, 1980; Hall, 1994). While for the former position discourse and ideology can not be used together since they belong to the different epistemological traditions, for the latter position, which has been adopted also in this thesis, the two terms could/should be used together in order to formulate a better model to explain the social meanings.

These discussions will be followed by definitions of the term official discourse and official ideology and their connections for this thesis. Finally, I will focus on theoretical discussions concerning the principles of nationalism and secularism (in their Kemalist sense) as the main components/dimensions of official ideology controlling the formation of official discourse towards the Alevis.

1.2.1. What is Ideology?

The concept of ideology has a long and complex history. At the end of 18th century, Destutt de Tracy (a French philosopher) used the term ideology for the first time to name a new field of study that was going to study ideas of people. For him ideology was, simply, a “rationalist science of ideas that would study how we think and discuss” (cited in van Dijk, 1998:1). In de Tracy’s conceptualization, ideology (science of ideas) could foster a better understanding of human conditions by arranging aspirations, desires and thoughts. Since de Tracy, the term has been used in numerous different meanings. The complex nature of the term of ideology can easily be seen through its sixteen different meanings¹⁷ presented by Terry Eagleton in his famous book, *Ideology*. Despite the existence of too many different approaches to the term ideology, there are some common points in them. For example, as argued by Yeğen, “...ideology has customarily been discussed around the problematical distinction-and-relation between human consciousness and external reality” (1994:14). Van Dijk proposes another common point among the different approaches to the ideology; for him all the “ideologies, like languages, are essentially social; there are no ‘personal’ or ‘individual’ ideologies- only ‘personal’ or ‘individual’ uses of ideologies” (1998:29). He argues that ideology is the link between discourse and society serving as the interface between collective group interests and individual practices; ideologies manage the problem of coordinating the acts of individual members of a social group (ibid: 28-35). In van Dijkian sense, ideologies are social systems and mental representations monitoring acquisition of the knowledge.

It can be argued that as a sociological concept, ideology originated from and developed in the Marxist tradition. In the hands of Marx, initial conception of

¹⁷ They are as follows: “ a) the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life, b) a body of ideas characteristics of a particular social group or class, c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power, d) false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power, e) systematically distorted communication, f) that which offers a position for a subject , g)forms of thought motivated by social interests, h)identity thinking, i) socially necessary illusion, j) the conjuncture of discourse and power, k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world, l) action-oriented sets of beliefs, m) the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality, n) semiotic closure, o) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure, p) the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality” (Eagleton, 1991:1-2).

ideology underwent drastic changes. Contrary to de Tracy (for him ideology was a positive development in the history), Marx introduced a negative sense of the term which is far from being positive and progressive. In *German Ideology*, Marx attempted to explain the social conditions in which ideology emerges:

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. –real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process. If in ideology men and their circumstances appear up-side down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process (Marx and Engels, 1970:47).

In the passage above, Marx has used the metaphor “*camera obscura*,” i.e., ideology is the reality distorted or turned upside down. So, it can be argued that, for Marx, ideology functions in a way that it distorts or inverts the way we look at the social world; and it prevent us from developing a real or adequate understanding of the conditions in which we exist. Again, for Marx, we perceive the things in an “up-side down” manner because of the fact that we are inevitably caught up in ideology to the extent that we remain essentially unconscious of the fact that the real material conditions of social life (the “actual life process” or “historical life process”) actually shape how we think and conceive the social life.

The key point in Marx’s conceptualization of ideology is the role of economy in the formation, development and exchange of ideas in society. He stresses the importance of economic class relations and the influence of ruling or dominant class (bourgeoisie) in modern capitalist society to disseminate and rationalize the ideas that are harmonious with their material interests. In that sense, the function of ideology, for Marx, is to give intellectual, moral and political currency to a deliberately distorted vision of social reality that ensures the dominance of specific class interests. If we quote from *German Ideology*:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby...the ideas of those who lack the means

of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make one class the ruling one... (Marx and Engels, 1970:64).

Marx asserts that “legal relations” and “forms of the state have... their roots in the material conditions of life” and their “anatomy... is to be sought in political economy” (1977:389). This approach is a reflection of his famous “base-superstructure” model of society in which political and ideological phenomena are perceived in terms of economic relations. As clearly stated by Marx, in another text, ideology was considered as part of “superstructure.”

It is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production...and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic --in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out (Marx, 1970:21).

In sum, it can be argued that in classical Marxism, the role of “superstructure” (including the state, politics and ideology) is to maintain domination of a specific class. In this context, ideology appears as the main form of “false consciousness.”¹⁸ As argued by Larrain, Marx described the content of ideology “by referring to ‘the inverted consciousness of the world’” (1983:42). So, for Marx, by concealing contradictions and by distorting the reality, ideology serves the interests of the ruling class. For instance, in the issue of “commodity fetishism,” Marx argues that although value is always produced by labor power, the value of a commodity in capitalist mode of production appears as intrinsic to the commodity itself through its price or desirability in the market place (Marx, 1992:165).

After Marx, the question of what constitutes the central conception of ideology has been the core of debate among the Marxist theorists. An outstanding

¹⁸ Although for classical Marxism, ideology (in capitalist societies) is understood as an agent of coercion and as a form of “false consciousness,” there is no evidence that Marx ever used the phrase “false consciousness.” As shown by Terry Eagleton, this term was used only by Engels (Eagleton, 1991:89).

Marxist analyst, Jorge Larraín, analyzes Marxist theory of ideology by making a distinction between negative and positive conceptions of ideology. According to Larraín, there are “two broad and basically opposed Marxist conception of ideology” in Marxist tradition: The first one is negative conception of ideology which refers to “a kind of distorted thought,” and the second one is positive conception of ideology which refers to the “totality of forms of social consciousness or to the political ideas of social classes” (Larraín, 1983:4).

In Larraín’s view, the negative meaning of ideology is conceived as a “critical concept which somehow distorts men’s understanding of social reality,” and the positive conception of ideology, on the other hand, is conceived as “the expression of the world-view of the class...one can talk about ‘ideology’ in plural, as the opinion, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to defend and promote its interests” (Larraín, 1979:14). Arguing that the positive version has come to have paramount influence in the subsequent trajectory of the Marxist theory, Larraín asserts that the negative version is “always used for the critique of a specific kind of error” which is connected with the “concealment or distortion of a contradictory and inverted reality” (Larraín, 1983:42). It should be noted here that according to Larraín, in Marx’s theory of ideology, “whereas all ideology is made of ideas not all ideas are ideological,” only those that are related to dominant class and conceal the contradictions are ideological¹⁹ (ibid: 21). Larraín reads Marx’s conception of ideology as follows: “Ideology is a particular form of consciousness which gives an inadequate or distorted picture of contradictions, either by ignoring them or by misrepresenting them” (ibid: 27).

Purvis and Hunt (1993) add to Larraín’s this distinction between negative and positive conception of ideology, by arguing that although the distinction is true but also is insufficient. Finding Larraín’s terminology too value laden they, offer a new set of terminology: “critical” and “sociological” conception of ideology. Purvis and Hunt’s approach will be discussed in detail later in this

¹⁹ The first thinker who posed the problem as to whether Marxism is an ideology was Bernstein. His answer is that although proletarian ideas are realistic in their direction, because they refer to material factors, which explain the evolution of societies, they are still thought reflexes and therefore ideological. For more information, see Larraín (1983:62-64).

chapter, because I adopt a position (concerning the relations of ideology and discourse) which has common points with their theory.

It is argued that Marx's theory of ideology is largely negative, reductionist and deterministic in many cases (Howarth, 2000:87). According to Howarth, it is negative because, "it is largely critical of ideology believing it to mystify and deceive people about their true interests;" it is reductionist "in that it explains ideologies by relating them only to more important social process such as the ways human beings organize their economic production;" and it is deterministic in that Marx explains the origin and transformation of ideologies with reference to the changes in the economic structure of society (ibid: 88).

After Marx, the concept of ideology began to lose its negative connotations; and there have been changes in its meaning toward a positive conception which corresponds, in Larraín's words, to "the point of view of all classes" (1983:64). Lenin appears among the thinkers who contributed to the positive conception of ideology. For Lenin, ideology does not necessarily correspond to a distortion that covers the contradictions/oppositions; but it corresponds to a concept that signifies the political consciousness of all classes (not only bourgeoisie but also the proletariat). For example, when Lenin says, "there is the socialism which expresses the ideology of the class that is going to take the place of the bourgeoisie; and there is the socialism that expresses the ideology of the classes that are going to be replaced by the bourgeoisie" (1965:83), he also classifies socialism as an ideology. Also for Lenin, the ideology of bourgeoisie is distorting but not because of it is ideology *per se*, rather because of it is bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1975, cited in Yeğen, 1994:19).

Antonio Gramsci appears as another figure in the Marxist thought, who follows the trend away from a completely negative conception of ideology. He makes a great effort to break with the reductionist and economistic understanding of "base-superstructure" model of society. Identifying the negative concept of ideology with a form of reductionism and economism (Gramsci, 1971:376), he tries to overcome the reductionist interpretation of the concept of ideology.

Discarding its negative connotations, Gramsci uses the term ideology as "system of ideas" or (in a broader context) "as a conception of the world that is

implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life” (Gramsci, 1971:328). It should not be ignored here that for Gramsci, ideology is more than “system of ideas;” it has also capacity to inspire and motivate concrete attitudes. In that sense, rather than being imaginary mental representations disconnected from social practices, ideology has historical functions. In other words, ideologies “...organize human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (ibid: 377). Closely related with this position, Gramsci distinguishes between “historically organic ideologies” and “arbitrary ideologies.” While the former one is “necessary to a given structure” in order to secure its social integrity through defining the necessary forms of consciousness, the later one is simply reflects the individual constructions or speculations (ibid: 376-377). In sum, for Gramsci, “organic ideologies” play vital roles in preserving the ideological unity of entire social block and in providing individuals and groups with their various “conceptions of world” which affect their actions.

Gramsci’s theory of ideology goes hand in hand with his famous concept of hegemony by which he tries to explain the ways in which governing power wins consent to its rule from those it subjugates. As Gramsci argued, the class rule in a capitalist society is not based on only the coercive power of the state. Hegemony necessitates constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes by means of ideological means, to win their consents (Gramsci, 1971:125-133). In that sense, exercising hegemony over other classes is possible only through ideology. In other words, in theorizing the concept of hegemony, Gramsci asserts that in addition to the use of coercive power and ideological misleading, ruling groups in society need to win the consent of those they govern (ibid: 161). By winning the consent of those dominated, the ruling group establishes its authority and legitimacy in society as a whole and not just by virtue of its economic position or control over the state.

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony opens the door for the analysis that rest on the production of consent in the minds of individuals through the ideological processes, instead of coercion. For him the consent is produced and exercised in “civil society” consisting schools, churches and private associations and therefore

the ruling group must achieve “intellectual and moral leadership” if it is govern effectively (Gramsci, 1971:180-5). Ideological dominance and hegemony is achieved when dominated groups cannot distinguish between their own interest and those of dominant groups. According to Gramsci subordinate classes (such as proletariat) must transcend their narrow interests and elaborate a new ideology, based on a new set of beliefs, “by forging a new collective will” (ibid: 1971:125), in order to create hegemony. In that sense, creating hegemony refers to transformation of ideological domains, and ideology is a practice aiming to form subjects. As will be discussed below, this “composited” character of subjects which was elaborated by Gramsci (1971:324), was also discussed by Althusser by means of his famous concept of “interpellation.”

It is argued that on the issue of language “Marxism has contributed very little” (Williams, 1977:21), and language was “relegated to a peripheral role” which is also criticized as “the missing dimension” of Marxism (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:480). Western Marxism tried to overcome this inadequacy of Marxist tradition. Louis Althusser, who presented one of the most influential expositions of ideology in the post World War II period, appeared as a leading figure in western Marxism. Yeğen argues that with Althusser, language and the subject (its constitution through language) became the main themes in the conception of ideology; and these themes brought new perspectives to the comprehension of ideology (1994:20). To overcome the reductionist vision of Marxist definition of ideology, some theorists such as Larrain (19983), Barret (1991), Hall (1996), and Purvis and Hunt (1993) indicate that in Althusser ideology has a material existence which determines the subjects.

If Althusser’s conception of ideology is examined by means of Larrain’s famous conceptual tools (negative and positive meanings of ideology), it can be argued that there are both negative and positive elements in Althusser’s conceptualization of ideology. Althusser makes a radical distinction between science and ideology which refers to a negative conceptualization of ideology. Here, while ideology is conceived as inadequate, imperfect and unrefined knowledge, science is conceived as adequate and true knowledge (Althusser, 1977:191).

On the other hand, in relation to positive conception of ideology, Althusser's main contribution to the theory of ideology is his concept of "interpellation." He introduces the mechanism of interpellation as follows (Althusser, 1971:174):

[I]deology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" among the individuals (it recruits them all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!" Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn around. By this one-hundred-and-eight-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was "really" addressed to him (and not someone else).

As can be understood from this passage, for Althusser, interpellation refers to the process through which ideology constitutes the individual as subject. In that sense, ideology interpellates individuals as concrete subjects (ibid: 162) which means the subject is constituted through ideology. Abandoning the perspective of negative ideology, Althusser argued that apart from bourgeois ideology there exists proletarian ideology which constitutes/interpellates individuals as subjects against the system.

In relation to the distinction between critical and sociological conception of ideology, postulated by Purvis and Hunt (1993), Althusserian conception of ideology and interpellation (which move away from the "false consciousness") can be categorized under the title of sociological variant of ideology theory. Sociological conception of ideology is "real or material rather than delusory...it simply describes the framework of meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their social lives" and at the same time it has a tendency "to blur or to conflate the concepts, ideology and discourse" (ibid: 479). Althusser's notion of ideology as "lived experience" is similar to the sociological conception of ideology. That is to say, for Althusser ideology has a material existence and does not comprise an abstract set of ideas divorced from the social world (Althusser, 1971:150); it "always exists in an apparatus and its practices" (ibid: 155). In addition, ideology has a vital role in the reproduction of society and

produces real material effects (ibid: 126-7). This function of ideology was also understood by some as to secure the cohesion in society (Larrain, 1983:95-96). Providing subjects with particular features (such as a specific social and political identity), ideology is conceived by Althusser as a social “practice” whose function is to turn individuals into subjects. The process of constituting individuals as social subjects, which also means connecting people to reality (Yeğen, 1994:20), takes place within various institutions or “apparatus,” for example: education, family, and the law. Concerning the apparatuses, in which ideologies take shape, Althusser makes a distinction namely: ideological state apparatuses (ISA) and repressive state apparatuses (RSA). RSA such as police, army and legal system function by violence, on the other hand, ISA such as schools, religious institutions, and political associations function by ideology.

At this point, I will focus on the relationship between Althusser’s theory of ideology and theory of discourse. As I mentioned above it is proposed by some theorists that there are striking links between these two. For example, Purvis and Hunt argued that there is “a direct link between the Althusser’s interpellation thesis and the concept of discourse” (1993:483). This link emerges from the fact that there is a shift in Althusserian conception of ideology from the production of ideas to the production of subjects. Starting from the fact that the concept of interpellation is defined by Althusser as “hailing,” Purvis and Hunt states that “the metaphor of being hailed verbally and thereby constituted as social subjects through our recognition/misrecognition of the call” is central to the conception of discourse (ibid: 483). The notion of interpellation constructs subjects that recognize the call of ideological discourse. Under the light of “sociological conception of ideology,” Purvis and Hunt conclude from Althusser’s writings that “it is through discourse that individuals are interpellated as subjects...The discursive practices through which subjects are constituted may have... ideological effects” (ibid: 483-4). Stuart Hall refers to this approximation between Althusser’s conception of ideology and discourse theory as follows (1996:30):

Althusser’s revisions (to the theory of ideology)...sponsored a decisive move away from the “distorted ideas” and “false consciousness” approach to ideology. It opened the gate to a more

linguistic or “discursive” conception of ideology. It put on the agenda the whole neglected issue of how ideology becomes internalized, how we come to speak “spontaneously.”

In my brief summary of the Marxist theory of ideology, it can be seen that there have been important changes from the classical Marxist conception of ideology, which is deterministic, reductionist and based on the idea of false consciousness, toward a more positive conception of ideology. Gramsci’s approach to ideology (together with his new concept hegemony) brought a different model of society in which economic processes and class struggles were no longer the ultimate determinants. Similarly, the Althusserian conception of ideology extended these ideas by arguing that society comprises relatively autonomous systems in which ideological practices accomplish the role of turning individuals into subjects with particular set of identities.

Although Gramsci and Althusser contributed enormously to the positive conception of ideology and to theory of discourse, they are constrained by the basic assumptions of Marxism. According to these Marxist assumptions, there exists a dualism between “the more important” material factors of economic production, on the one hand, and “the less important” ideological and political processes on the other hand. In Marxist tradition, the later sets of processes were generally explained (more or less) with reference to the former set of processes. The post-Marxists such as Laclau and Mouffe reject this Marxist conception of society and theory of ideology. In addition, using the post-structuralist arguments developed by Derrida, Foucault and Lacan, they replaced the Marxist theory of ideology with a new conception of discourse. In the next section of this chapter, I will dwell on the concept of discourse.

1.2.2. What is Discourse?

Before I begin with the more theoretical and complex discussion of discourse, it is helpful to have a tentative characterization of the term. As correctly put by van Dijk (1997:1), “the notion of discourse is essentially fuzzy as is the case for such related concepts as language, communication, interaction, ideology and society.” In the common dictionaries, “discourse” is usually defined as a form

of language use, or as a written or spoken communication. On the other hand, in CDA, analysts do not satisfy with these common-sense definitions of the term. They approach the term by emphasizing the contextual elements in which the discourse produced and by asking following questions: who uses language, how, why, and when it is used. As a discourse analyst, van Dijk argues that “the concept of discourse has three main dimensions: (a) *language use*, (b) the *communication of beliefs* (cognition), and (c) *interaction in social structure*” (ibid: 2). Discourse studies, in general, try to provide comprehensive answers to illuminate the relations between these three different dimensions of the concept. Van Dijk also specifies three different usage of the concept of discourse: (a) discourse “as a communicative event,” (b) discourse as a “specific types or social domain of language use” such as “medical discourse and political discourse,” (c) discourse as “ideas or ideologies” such as “the discourse of liberalism” (ibid: 4). In the last usage specified above, discourse (more than its usage in linguistic term) refers to different ways of structuring social knowledge and social practice. Keeping in mind these main characteristics of discourse, I will continue with a short theoretical review of the term.

As I stated above, post-Marxist and post-structural theorists tend to shy away from the concept of ideology because of its association with Marxism (or limitations of Marxism). These theorists put forward the concept of discourse in order to overcome the deficiencies of the concept of ideology and to realize its potential. Although it originates from the discipline of linguistics, today, discourse has important place in many branches of social sciences such as anthropology, political science and sociology. Although they are highly complex and not among the aims of this short theoretical review, the reasons behind that increasing pervasiveness of discourse and discourse analysis can be explained with references to the following factors: a) the spreading dissatisfactions with the positivist approaches to the social sciences, b) the impacts of so-called “linguistic turn” in social sciences.

Post-structuralist critiques of ideology have developed the concept of discourse as an alternative theoretical model. Like many other complex concepts in social sciences, the meaning and applications of discourse depend on the

broader theoretical system in which it is embedded and on the assumptions of those theoretical systems about the nature of the social world. For example, according to positivists, discourses are “frames” and instrumental devices that provide common perceptions and understandings for specific purposes, and the aim of discourse analyses is to measure the effects of these devices in terms of reaching related aims (Mc Adam et al., 1996:6).

On the other hand, the realist version of discourse theory stresses the ontological dimension of the concept. In other words, the realists argue that social world has an independently existing set of objects with intrinsic causal powers. And, “the contingent interactions” among these objects with their “generative mechanisms” causes the events and social processes (Stones, 1996:26). Thus, discourses are perceived as particular objects, by realists, with their own properties. It is important for them to focus on underlying “material resources which make discourse possible” and the aim of discourse analyses is to unravel these underlying resources (Parker, 1992:1).

The Marxists, sharing main assumptions of the realists (concerning to the issue of discourse), give importance to the way in which discourses have to be explained by reference to the contradictory processes of economic production. In Marxist tradition, as argued by Howarth, discourses are normally perceived as “ideological systems of meaning that obfuscate and naturalize uneven distributions of power and resources” (2000:4). In harmonious with this theoretical position, for Marxists, discourse analysis has emancipatory functions and main aim of discourse analyses is to expose the mechanisms by means of which deceptions operates (Althusser, 1971; Pecheux, 1982; Fairclough, 1992).

The post-structuralists such as Derrida and Foucault and post-Marxists such as Laclau and Mouffe propose much more comprehensive and well-developed theory of discourse. For these perspectives, discourses constitute symbolic systems and social orders, and the aim of discourse analyses is to examine the historical and political construction of these orders. The last two theoretical positions just mentioned above (Marxist position and post-structuralist position) defend distinct theoretical positions concerning the relationship between discourse and ideology. In other words, while the post-structuralists try to

deconstruct Marxist theory of ideology (such as Laclau and Mouffe), and refrain to use the concept of ideology in their analysis (such as Foucault), the Marxists, on the other hand, tend to use discourse and ideology together in their analysis (such as Pecheux, 1982; Fairclough, 1995a; Eagleton, 1991; and Purvis and Hunt, 1993). Before reviewing these two alternative conceptions of discourse, it would be helpful to refer to the role of discussions concerning to meaning and language which played vital importance in the development discourse.

As I stated above, in Althusserian perspective, the subject was perceived as the result of ideology through the process of “interpellation” (Althusser, 1971:174). In other words, it is concluded that the subject is not given, rather it is constituted. According to Purvis and Hunt, Althusser’s contention that the subject is something constituted instead of being constituting has opened the way of a more linguistic or “discursive conception of ideology” (1993:483). Sharing Purvis and Hunt’s reading of Althusser, Yeğen argues that: “The denial of the pre-giveness of the subject was accompanied with a similar contention that meaning is not pre-given either” (1994:28). In sum, it can be argued that together with Althusser, “constituted” nature of subject and meaning has been important dimensions of the discussions of discourse.

The thesis that meaning is constituted and not given, logically, necessitates another basic assumption “that language, speech and writing can never be fully referential” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:485). This assumption has been among the principal assumption of structuralists theory of language which was inaugurated by Ferdinand Saussure (a Swiss linguist). According to Saussurian approach, which breaks with a traditional concern with grammatical rules (representational theory of language),²⁰ “language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (Saussure, 1974:174).²¹ In other words, for structuralist theory of language, the

²⁰ For this theory, words and language refer to a world of objects. That is to say, meaning in this theory of language is the result of the relationship between the words (linguistic symbols) and their extra-linguistic referents. Structuralist theory of language, rejecting the premises of the representational theory of language, has made important contributions to the theory of discourse.

²¹ For Saussure, the basic elements of language are signs which has two elements: the signifier (a sound or visible image of a word) and the signified (the concept or mental image) (Saussure 1974:68). It is one of the key arguments of Saussure that there is no natural relation between the signifier (such as the written and/or vocal form of the word “pencil”) and the signified (the concept

meaning depends on the relations between the different elements of a system of signs. For instance, in order to understand the meaning of “hot” one must also understand the meaning of “cold” and “warm.” Under the effect of structuralist theory of language, Purvis and Hunt define discourse as “individual social networks of communication through the medium of language or non-verbal sign-system” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:485). For them the key characteristic of discourse “is that of putting of in place a *system* of linked signs.”

Assuming that there exist a clear analogy between language and the social relations, structuralist theorists (such as Levi Strauss, Lacan and Barthes) employed structural theory of language to elucidate a wider set of social phenomena and provided an important place for discourse theory in social sciences. In this approach, both societies and languages are seen as systems having similar logical structures and characteristics. For example, Levi Strauss, perceiving societies as complex symbolic orders, applies Saussure’s theory of language to the studies of societies: “Any culture may be looked upon as an ensemble of symbolic system, in the front rank of which are to be found language, marriage, laws, economic relations, art, science and religion” (1993:15). This implies that those diverse phenomena such as social formations, political ideologies, myths, and texts can be understood as systems of related elements (see Barthes, 1977).

After stating that the concern with the question of meaning has always been among the defining dimension of the discussions of discourse, and that Saussure’s theory of language has shaken the convictions that language is a transparent or neutral system of signs through which we can communicate faultless, I will continue with the review of two different conceptions of discourse. According to the first one, discourse is approached in close relation with ideology, and ideological nature of discourse is stressed. According to the second one, discourse is approached as a slightly separate concept from ideology.

or mental images of “pencil”). Because of the “arbitrary nature of the sign,” the relation between the signifier and the signified is conventional and cannot be fixed (ibid: 114). In other words, Saussure argued that the sign is arbitrary combination of signifier and signified, and there is no logical base for this combination. For this reason, what is to be signified by a specific signifier depend on the context. In addition meaning and signification occur entirely within the system of language itself, and meaning of a linguistic symbol depends on its relationships with other symbols.

Thinkers from the Marxist school such as Michel Pecheux, under the strong influence of Althusserian theory of ideology (interpellation and the constitution of subjects), has identified discourse as the material form of ideology (Pecheux, 1982). In this sense Pecheux states that ideology determines the meaning of a text and that “words, expressions, propositions change their meaning according to the positions held by those who use them...by reference to the ideological formations...in which those positions are inscribed” (Pecheux, 1982:111). In other words, meanings are specified in discursive formations by extension of ideological formations. He employed the term discourse to emphasize the ideological nature of the language use. As stated by Macdonell, in Pecheux, discourse shows the effects of ideological struggle within the functioning of language, and, conversely, the existence of linguistic materiality within the ideology (Macdonell, 1986:47). In examining the meaning, Pecheux used the concepts of “discursive formation” which determines “*what can and should be said*” (1982:111, original italics). For him the words take their meaning according to discursive formations in which they produced or “according to the positions of those who use them.” For this reason, same word such as “militant” may have different meanings in a trade union (as a synonym of “activist”) and in a right-wing conservative discourse (as a synonym of “subversive”).

In exploring the relations between the discourses on the one hand and ideological practices on the other hand, Pecheux argues that discourses are not all peaceful; instead, they emerge out of clashes with one another. In Pecheux’s words, “the meanings of discourse are set up in what are ultimately antagonistic relations” (1982:185). For this reason, there is a political dimension to each use of words and phrases. In sum, for Pecheux, it is not the language that determines the meaning of the words in discourses; meanings come from the ideological sphere and discourse is one of ideology’s specific forms (Pecheux, 1982:185). In that case, for Pecheux, as already stated above, the language takes on meaning and discourse are constructed through struggles in its various economic, political and ideological forms. How does struggle in the ideological sphere bear upon discourse? Macdonell answers this question by employing some examples from the distinct areas (Macdonell, 1986:46):

In schools, discourse of a religious character is often used and its placing there tends to both to mask and to endorse dominant educational practices – such discourse is, in effect, as much a part of ruling-class weaponry in the school as in the church.

Although the meaning emerges from the discursive formation, which is embedded in ideological formation, in Pecheux, the relation between the two (discursive formation and ideological formation) is not that of equivalence (Yeğen 1994:23). As stated by Yeğen, this relation in Pecheux approach, can be named as an “imbrication;” imbrication of discursive formation over ideological formation.

Similar to Pecheux, Fairclough, who is among the most influential theorists of CDA, also makes use of the concept of discourse and ideology together in his social analysis. Emphasizing political and ideological dimensions of discourse, he argues that “discourse is a practice not just of representing the world but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (Fairclough, 1992:66). Fairclough perceives discourse as a mode of “political and ideological practice” that “constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations” (1992:67). He elaborates in his studies the “embedded” nature of ideologies in “discursive practices” and the role of these discursive practices in “the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination” (1992:87).

Like Fairclough, van Dijk (who is also among the prominent representative of CDA) also opted to use discourse and ideology in a closely connected manner and tried to link structures of discourse with structures of ideologies. He defines ideologies as “basic frameworks for organizing the social cognitions shared by members of social groups, organizations or institutions” (van Dijk, 1995b:18), and he perceives discourse as social practices (van Dijk, 2004a:3). As for the relationship between ideology and discourse he proposes that “discourses of group members are controlled by group ideologies” (ibid: 3). Van Dijk believes that “ideologies are... expressed and produced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies” (1995b:17). However, for him discourses are not only ways for reproduction of ideologies, but among the many forms of it; and he does

not reduce ideologies to discourse “because obviously they [ideologies] control also other social practices, such as forms of discrimination or violence” (2004a:4). In sum, van Dijk argues that discourse makes ideologies “observable,” and by means of discourses, ideologies are expressed. For this reason, as will be discussed in the methodology section below, he presents discourse analyses as an effort to uncover the ideological content of language and discourse through “close reading, understanding or systematic analysis” (van Dijk, 1995c:135).

The theoretical position, just discussed above, rejects a rupture between ideology and discourse. Retaining the concept of ideology, it employs benefits of the concept of discourse in social analysis. Main theoretical premises behind this position were presented by Purvis and Hunt (1993:474-76) as follows:

...‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ both figure in accounts of the general field of social action mediated through communicative practices... ideology and discourse refer to pretty much the same aspect of social life- the idea that human individuals participate in forms of understanding, comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which they are involved; a conception of the social that has a hermeneutic dimension...

Lastly, in this section, I will review just the opposite position which rejects the imbrication of ideology and discourse. In other words, this position rejecting the idea that there is a connection between concept of discourse and ideology, propose a rupture between these terms. Post-Marxists, such as Laclau and Mouffe, challenging the idea that there are interconnections between the concept of discourse and the concept of ideology (especially with its reductionism and economism emerging from Marxist approach), try to displace ideology by discourse.²² They criticize the dualism in Marxist approach between the more important process of economic production and the less important ideological and political processes; for example, Laclau argues that mental elements and concepts do not necessarily have class implications (1985:172-3). Post-Marxists reject the

²² For Laclau it is not possible to identify the concept of ideology with the concept of discourse. According to Laclau, Althusserian concept of ideology “is a superstructure, a regional category of the social whole –an essentially topographical concept...”, on the other hand, for Laclau, the concept discourse does not correspond to “a topographical concept, but the horizon of the constitution of any object” (Laclau 1990:185, quoted in Yeğen 1994:23).

idea that society can be divided into different types of practices and the idea that economic sphere determine political and ideological one. Instead, drawing upon post-structuralist concepts developed by Derrida, Lacan and Foucault, they replace the Marxist theory of ideology with the concept of discourse.

In Laclau and Mouffe, the concept of discourse contains the following propositions: “all objects and actions are meaningful and their meanings are product of systems of significant differences” (1985a:107); “all practices are discursive, and all the systems of social practice affect each other” (1987:79-106). Because of the fact that all the objects and knowledge are discursive, they reject the distinction between the discursive and non-discursive, on the grounds that a practice is structured along the lines of a discourse; and they argue that all objects are constituted as objects of discourse (1985a:107-8). Although Laclau and Mouffe assume the existence of the external reality that exists independent of consciousness, the meaning of that external reality may differ according to their construction in discourses. They insist also on discursive nature of social relations and constitution of social subjects (together with social order) by discourse that has been among the common assumptions of discourse theory. As argued by Eagleton (1991:219), in Laclau and Mouffe, “the category of discourse is inflated to the point that where it imperializes the whole world, eliding the distinction between thought and material reality. The effect of this is to undercut the critique of ideology...”

Like Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault defends a rupture between ideology and discourse. Trying to set up an opposition between discourse and ideology, he rejects the possibility of making use of these two concepts together. For Foucault, it is not convenient to use the concept ideology because of three basic reasons. First, he argues that historically, ideology “always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth;” according to Foucault, on the other hand, “the important distinction is not to be drawn at the level of true or false statements, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false” (Foucault, 1980:118). In that sense, criticizing the Marxist position, in which ideology and truth exclude each other, Foucault prefers the position according to which

discourse and truth may co-exist together, and discourse constitutes itself by creating claim of truth. Secondly, for Foucault, ideology “refers to...something like a subject” (1979:36) This humanist “subject” being aware of his/her interests, produces ideologies according to his/her objective interests; i.e. subjects exist before the ideologies. On the other hand, Foucault tried to move away from the notion of Cartesian subject in his writings. By refusing to refer to subject as a unitary being, Foucault seems to be part of post-structuralist thinking. For Foucault, discourse does produce the subject; vice versa is not possible (Foucault, 1980:58). Thirdly, ideology necessitates an external determinant (for example, economic processes in classical Marxism) that makes ideology secondary and determined (ibid: 118). As can be inferred from the reasons stated above, Foucault proposes an alternative model (discourse) against ideology (in classical Marxist sense). He argues that the rise of the modern disciplinary society cannot be grasped with the concept of ideology that is limited with the ideas or consciousness (ibid: 118).

Although Foucault clearly places discourse in opposition to ideology, because of his rejection of humanism and truth/falsity dichotomy, Purvis and Hunt (1993) place Foucault’s approach in opposition to “critical ideology.” In other words, Foucault’s position is classified by Purvis and Hunt, as “sociological version of ideology” which is closely connected with the notion of discourse. They argue that Foucault provides significant framework for “sociological account of ideology” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:491).²³

According to Howarth, basic assumptions of Foucaultian model of discourse can be summarized as follows: “Discourse refers to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects; and emerging from usage of language as a social practice; discourse is defined as an autonomous entity having no determinant” (2000:9). According to this constitutive view of discourse, discourse constitutes or constructs society actively

²³ According to these writers “Discourses are characteristically ‘professional’ which emanate from institutionalized sites of production...these discourses are ‘imposed’ in that they generate subject positions into which people are ‘inserted’ through discourse” (1993:489). As I reviewed above, Althusserian notion of ideology (interpellation) refers to generation of subject.

on various dimensions. In other words, it constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and social relations (Foucault, 1972:34).

To Foucault, the question that description of discourse posits is how “one particular statement appeared rather than another” (1972:27). Foucault’s definition of “statement” is not that they are propositions or sentences. Instead, he argues that according to enunciative function (which is contextual), one statement can be differentiated from another one. Discourses are “made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined” (ibid: 117). Foucault argues that statements position subjects in particular ways (ibid: 95-96); and he elaborates this relationship between subject and statement through a characterization of “discursive formations” which has vital importance to understand Foucault’s discourse theory. A “discursive formation is an occurrence that consists of ‘rules of formation’ for a particular set of statements belonging to it,” such as “rules for the formation of ‘objects,’ rules for the ‘subject positions,’ rules for the formation of ‘enunciative modalities’ and rules for the formation of ‘concepts’” (ibid: 32). Through the concept of discursive formation, Foucault focuses on the conditions that make that formation possible, by doing that he stresses the importance of social conditions in which the discourses are formed.

Foucault also proposes that social practices and institutions are not reducible to discourse because those practices and institutions have their own conditions of possibility that cannot be explained only by discourse. In other words, Foucault (1972) makes a distinction between “discursive” and “non-discursive” realms. The latter are conceived as primary relations existing “independently of all discourses or all objects of discourse that may be described between institutions, techniques and social formations” (1972:45). A discursive formation is the result of relations between discursive and non-discursive practices (ibid: 45).

1.2.3. Ideology and Discourse Together

In the previous sections, I have tried to review some of the theoretical literature on the concepts of ideology and discourse. My aim in this section is to

present my theoretical positions concerning definitions of ideology and discourse. In addition, I will state my standing point concerning the relationship between ideology and discourse. In order to state my theoretical principles clearly, it would be helpful to return the Purvis and Hunt's distinction between critical and sociological conceptions of ideology (Purvis and Hunt 1993:478-79):

The critical conception of ideology delimits a realm in which social knowledge and experience are constructed in such a way as to "mystify" the situation, circumstance or experience of subordinate classes or dominated groups...The sociological conception of ideology focuses on plural conception of ideology...In this sociological sense ideology is "real," or material, rather than fictional or delusory, and is thus unavoidable in that it simply describes the framework meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their social lives.²⁴

For the distinction between the sociological and critical conception of ideology, Yeğen (1994:35) proposes a more comprehensible argumentation:

The critical account rests upon a radical distinction between a self-subsistent real and a cognitive faculty which can act to distort that reality. According to this position, when the cognition accurately reflects the real what is produced is the true knowledge, whereas when the real is distorted what emerges is ideology per se. By contrast the sociological account defines ideology as a realm which is merely constitutive of the social and as such simply the realm in which individuals are constituted/interpellated as subjects.

In this study, I will not use the concept of ideology in the negative sense. Following Lenin, Althusser and Gramsci, I will also reject the idea that ideologies are necessarily negative. Instead, I will follow the tradition of positive

²⁴ Purvis and Hunt's sociological and critical conceptions of ideology show significant similarities with Larrain's negative and positive conceptions of ideology. Because of the fact that Larrain's concepts sound "value laden," in Purvis and Hunt's approach the term "negative" changed into critical and the "positive" changed into sociological (Purvis and Hun, 1993). As I reviewed above, while negative conception of ideology refers to distorted thought and "always used for the critique of a specific kind of error" which is connected with the "concealment or distortion of a contradictory and inverted reality," the positive conception of ideology refers to the totality of forms of social consciousness (Larrain, 1983). It is generally conceded that Marx's theory of ideology is largely negative, reductionist and in many cases deterministic. After Marx, the concept of ideology began to lose its negative connotations and there have been changes in its meaning toward a positive conception. Followers of Marx such as Gramsci and Althusser tried to surpass the deterministic and reductionist version of ideology and developed a positive version.

conceptualization of ideology (developed by Lenin, Althusser, Gramsci, Purvis and Hunt). More specifically, the concept of sociological version of ideology (developed by Purvis and Hunt) is more convenient and better express my standing point in this study. I reject the classical idea that all ideologies are categorically negative. Accepting van Dijk's following argument that "ideologies embody the general principles that control the overall coherence of social representations shared by the members of a group" (2004a:2), I will not identify ideologies with specific groups (such as dominant groups). All kind of groups (including dominated ones) may have their own ideologies.

Among the others, the most important reason of my adoption of sociological conception ideology is that: The sociological version of ideology enables me to use the concept of discourse, in my analysis, without discarding the concept of ideology. In other words, as presented by Purvis and Hunt (1993:497), sociological version of ideology proposes "a tendency to blur or to conflate the concepts of ideology and discourse," and indicates ideological nature of discourses. In sum, pursuing Purvis and Hunt (1993), van Dijk (2004), Fairclough (1992), Peuchex (1928) and Yeğen (1994), I will propose an understanding of ideology that supplements the concept of discourse and the features of this type of conceptualization of ideology are titled under the name of sociological version of it. Rather than opposing ideology and discourse, I will employ these terms together and focus on the ideological content of discourse.

To be more specific, my theoretical base relating to the concept of ideology consists of the following principles:

First, ideologies have material existence, especially, in the practices of institutions. Ideologies are not free-floating ideas generated by human beings. Instead, my understanding of ideology is materialized in specific institutions and organizations. This perspective enables me to analyze discursive practices as material form of ideology.

Second, this study shares the argument that ideology "interpellates the subject." That is to say, it is among the functions of ideology to fix or to place an individual in specific subject positions. For example, ideologies interpellate people as Muslims, Turks, Kurds, Alevi, militant, patriot, etc.

Third, similar to the position of Althusser, I shall understand that “state apparatuses” are sites of interpellation, and ideologies are concretized in them. In relation with this, I will accept that ideologies are embedded in the discursive practices of state apparatuses. In this study, I will analyze the official discourses through the state apparatuses. In other words, official texts produced by state apparatuses in various forms such as schoolbooks, legal dictums and press releases constitute the subjects of my analysis while I am doing CDA of official discourses towards the Alevis.

Fourth, the concept of hegemony, which constitutes an important dimension of Gramsci’s theory of ideology, seems functional for the aim of this study because of several reasons: In my opinion, the concept provides a way of theorizing the formation of official discourses and changes in that discourses in relation to the changes in contextual priorities. That is to say, the concept of hegemony is important for this study because I will attempt to analyze official discourses of some state apparatuses (with its ideological content) as an effort to organize the consent of the people and to assemble distinct segments of society around the idea of “national unity.” Pursuing Gramsci, I will stress the importance and the role of “historically organic ideologies” in securing the unity of society. Hegemony is about integrating the masses, constructing alliances and producing consent in the minds of individuals through the ideological means and processes, instead of coercion. In other words, creating hegemony refers to transformation of ideological domains, in relation with that, ideology is a practice aiming to form subjects. In that sense, hegemony and interpellation go hand in hand in this study. Hence, the concept of hegemony may be helpful in understanding how official ideology and official discourse functioned in Turkey, in elimination or minimization of ethnic and religious differences.

In sum, ideology in this thesis will be taken as an instrument of constituting or creating subjects, which refers to sociological version of ideology. Contrary to the approaches that abstain from using ideology in social analyses (because of the reasons discussed above), I will follow the approaches that relate these two concepts and defend the necessity of using them together. Now, I will try to justify my choice and focus on the relationship between these two terms.

As I also stated above, my position concerning the relations between discourse and ideology shows parallelism with that of the following theorists: Pecheux, Van Dijk, Fairclough, Purvis and Hunt. None of these writers places discourse and ideology to opposite positions. Instead, they point out ideological sides of discourses and include these two terms together in their analysis. For example, Purvis and Hunt (searching the contact points between sociological or positive concept of ideology and the concept of discourse) offer a general framework for the analysis of “discursive fields” and “their...ideological effects” (1993:497). Similar to Purvis and Hunt (for them, both discourse and ideology generate “subject positions”), I will perceive discourse as the space where the subjects are constituted; interpellating and constituting the subject positions seems to be the interface between ideology and discourse.

The link between ideology and discourse is important for this study since I will take discourse as the manifested form of (or material form of) ideology. To express more clearly this point, I should refer to Pecheux. Stressing the ideological nature of discourse, he argued that it is not the language that determines the meaning of the words in discourses; meanings come from the ideological sphere and discourse is one of ideology’s specific forms (Pecheux, 1982:185). In addition, for Pecheux, the effects of ideological struggle can be seen in discourse through the functioning of language.

In addition, it is assumed in this study that discourse is used and needed by the owners of an ideology, to persuade the others in the direction of their ideology, to convey their ideologies to others, to propagate and to defend their ideology against opposing peoples. In other words, inspired from van Dijk, the present work argues that in order to know about ideologies (their production, functions, etc.) we should closely look at their material manifestations: discourses. According to van Dijk, ideologies have the function of determining the arrangement and contents of discourses (1998:6), and ideologies and discourses can be reproduced through special institutions such as education (van Dijk, 2004a:3). In order to make my argument clearer I will benefit from some series of analogies. For instance, ideology can be taken as a computer program, and discourse, on the other hand, can be taken as the product that is produced by using

this program. Such a close and direct relationship between discourse and ideology is proposed by also Heck (1980). Heck argues that ideology can be taken as the body of semantic rules that is used in codification of the messages; discourse on the other hand can be taken as the content of the messages. Discourse is what a message says to us; ideology on the other hand determines what can be said by this message (1980:123-7).

Although there are close links between discourse and ideology for the present work, it does not mean that the relationship between the two concepts is not that of equivalence. As discussed above, this relation can be named as an imbrication; imbrication of discursive formation over ideological formation. Instead of reducing ideologies to discourses, this study assumes that discourse is just one of the social practices which are affected by ideologies.

1.2.4. Official Discourse and Official Ideology

To analyze discursive practices of three state apparatuses (DİB, MEB and the presidency of Republic) concerning the Alevis, the present study will employ the conceptual tool of “official discourse,” a concept developed by Burton and Carlen (1979). The official discourses towards the Alevis produced by these state institutions and the relationship between official discourses and official ideology will be studied through the instruments supplied by method of CDA. I examine the official discourses only on the axes of the issue of Alevism. Because of the fact that official discourse is among the key concept of this study, my primary aim in this section is to explore the concept of official discourse with its definition and functions, and to discuss its employment in this study.

Burton and Carlen offer the concept of official discourse in order to form a theoretical base for their study on uncovering the structure of the official documents (such as state publications, state reports and judicial decisions) in the United Kingdom. Burton and Carlen conceptualize and define official discourse as follows (1979:48):

Official discourse is thus the systematization of modes of argument that proclaim the state’s legal and administrative rationality. The

discourse is a necessary requirement for political and ideological hegemony. These hegemonic discourses are a requirement not only to achieve the political incorporation of the dominated classes, their pedagogy also functions to sustain the confidence and knowledge of the hegemonic fractions...One of the political desiderate of official discourse is therefore to retain the intellectual confidence of parties, elites and functionaries within the state apparatuses. To create a discourse of unity and cohesion between parties, the power bloc, through the production of periodic manifestos demonstrates the state's sovereign reason.

Using official discourse and state discourse in the same meaning, Burton and Carlen pursue Althusser's approach and state that state discourse realizes itself through the "discursive mechanisms of state legal apparatuses" (ibid: 34). In that sense, in order to analyze the conditions of existence of state discourse, it becomes necessary to focus on the functioning of the state apparatus. According to Burton and Carlen official discourse is crucial for consolidation of political and ideological hegemony. They also argue that official discourse aims organization of statements that buttress "state's version of rationality." By means of hegemony (which is contributed by official discourse), various segments of society can be incorporated in the political process (ibid: 48). They argue that functions of official discourse include incorporation, legitimacy and confidence. Incorporation refers to "the application of knowledge in a way that promotes strategies of state control" (ibid: 51). The function of legitimation is "to repair its fractured image of administrative rationality and democratic legality." And, discourses of confidence "re-affirm the state's legitimacy" during or following problematic periods by displaying and asserting "hegemonic coherence" (ibid: 51). Through incorporation, legitimacy and confidence, a state aims to establish a picture in which failure is presented as temporary or irrational. In the same way, a state try to re-establish an image of stability and security, of a sense of unity and cohesion is aimed.

Burton and Carlen indicate that recovery of the problems of legitimacy, by the "confrontation and appropriation of unofficial versions of discreditable episodes," is among the functions of official discourse (ibid: 44). They argue that "state discourse uses the language of administrative rationality, normative redeemability and consensual values to indicate itself as functioning within a

democratic mode of argument” (ibid: 46). The idea that official discourse (also known as state discourse) intends to provide legitimacy or justification for state practices shared also by some other writers. For example, Jager (2002:24) argues that such discourses can be viewed as “a technique that can legitimize or strengthen the government in place.” Similarly, Ashforth (in his study on the politics of official discourse in South Africa), perceives official discourse as the “schemes of legitimation” concerning the state activities (1990:8). In addition to relating the official discourse with the problem of legitimacy, Asforth also proposes that official discourse tries to present repressive and exploitative state practices as if they are rational and scientific.

For Burton and Carlen, official discourse is didactic in the sense that it “...sets up its own credentials in such a way that it can both hammer home the point of its own story and adjudicate between the other versions of the story, incorporating some versions, over-ruling others” (1979:77). I will also argue that official discourse towards the Alevis in Turkey is didactic and may allow and encourage certain arguments to be said and prevents some others. Another characteristic of official discourse is identified by Burton and Carlen as the celebration of dominant normative principles in it (ibid: 45). Most importantly inspired from Althusser’s interpellation thesis, they argue that “The ideological practices of official discourse place, fix and orient subjects to desired positions...Official discourse constructs desirably intelligible modes of subjectivity through the rules of its formation” (ibid: 46).

Under the light of the principles stated above, I will argue that official discourses intend to provide legitimacy and justification for state practices through the systematization of arguments. I will examine discursive structures and regularities appeared in official discourses through the official texts, which are the products of official discourses, by taking into consideration their process of production in the state apparatuses where the creation or interpellation of desired subjects takes place.

What makes a text official? According to Burton and Carlen (1979:24), texts are official if “they are produced at the command of the government.” In addition, they also argue that official text’s institutional site is state’s ideological

apparatuses. For this study, I adopt the definition above with the reservation that instead of the expression “command of the government” I will prefer the expression of “the command of the state.” Because, some of the texts that will be used in this study cannot be characterized with the expression of “at the command of the government;” for example the texts emanating from the presidency of Republic. As well as their state-commanded character, in my case, many of the official texts are also produced and disseminated through the communication channels belonging to the state apparatuses such as state schools, the Parliament, the state-owned media, etc. In that sense, press releases and legal dictums of DİB, curriculums and schoolbooks of DKAB issued by MEB and speeches of the presidents have official character for this study.²⁵

In the present study, the utterances of the presidents are also covered an important part the official discourse produced in the state apparatuses. An utterance is a complete unit of speech ranging from a single word to the longest uninterrupted speech.²⁶ It can be represented and delineated in many ways. The presidents, using the discursive mechanisms of state legal apparatuses, express the integral parts of official discourse to place the individuals into desired subject positions. In this study, the social and cultural event of the Alevis (the Hacibektaş Festival) functions as the main platform via which the utterances of the presidents are examined. The official texts, documents, and utterances of the presidents can also be named as “surfaces of emergence” in Foucaultian sense. “Surfaces of emergence” refer to the institutions, areas or texts through which the discourse is designed and expressed by the authorities (Foucault, 1972:41-42). As it is impossible to include discourses of all state institutions and state agents, some discretion had to be used. Thus, only the most relevant to the Alevis were included.

Similar to official discourse, official ideology is also defined with

²⁵ The equivalence of the “official” in English dictionary is that “derived from the proper office or officer, or from the proper authority; made or communicated by virtue of authority” (Webster's Revised, 2001). On the other hand, in Turkish dictionary the equivalence of “*resmî*” is that “1- belonging to sate, related to the state (*devletin olan, devlette ilgili*); 2- something made according to methods prescribed by sate (*devletin öngördüğü yöntemlere uygun olarak yapılan*)” (TDK Sözlüğü, 2005).

²⁶ Webster's Revised Dictionary <<http://www.dict.org/bin/Dict?FormDict3&Database=web1913>> [accessed May 14 2007].

reference to its legitimating function in the state politics. For example, Jing argues that “official ideology is a system of ideas through which the state leaders learn to structure their environment and explain reality. It helps the leadership reflect upon various courses of action and rationalizes the choices they have made” (2003:2). “Legitimizing function” seems to be among the contact points between two concepts. As for the relation between official discourse and official ideology, I should refer to discussion concerning the link between ideology and discourse, presented earlier in this chapter. To summarize, it was proposed that discourse is taken as the manifested or material form of ideology. Stressing the ideological nature of discourse, the present work argues that it is not the language that determines the meaning of the words in discourses; meanings come from the ideological sphere and discourse is one of ideology’s specific forms. The same modes of relationships are also valid to explain the relations between official discourse and official ideology. Official ideology is the name of the ideological sphere (with its principles and doctrines) that directs discursive practices of official institutions and at the same time set the limits of the official discourses. In addition to its guidance to official discursive practices, official ideology also describes the reciprocal positions of the state and the society. That is to say interpellation and creation of individuals as subject is governed by official discourses in accordance with the principles of official ideology.

Analyzing official discourse is a complex task. Although one would like to argue that there is only one set of official discourse in Turkey concerning the Alevis, the evidence suggests otherwise. In other words, instead of a stable, invariable, coherent, homogeneous and continuous “official discourse,” I will propose the existence of different “official discourses” towards the Alevis. It will be argued in this study that changes occurred in “official discourse” parallel to the contextual developments. Although the idea that there have been fluctuations in official discourse is valid for the whole republican period, it is beyond the scope of this study to cover the whole republican history; instead, I will concentrate on the post-1980 period. In addition to the chronological variations in official discourse (different official discourses in different times), this study intends to

show the existence of variations in official discourse in a specific historical instant (more than one official discourse in the same period).

1.2.5. Discussions on Official Discourse/Official Ideology in Turkey

The close connection between official ideology and official discourse, just discussed above and adopted in this study, was also shared by some scholars of Turkish politics; and these two terms were employed hand in hand (sometimes used interchangeably) in their social analysis (see, Yeğen, 1999; Laçiner, 1998; Alpay, 2003a and 2003b). In this section, I will review main axes of the discussions concerning official ideology and official discourse in Turkey, and try to relate these discussions to my topic.

It can be argued that the debate on the necessity and nature of official ideology in Turkey forms one of the main dimensions of the discussion. For some, official ideology is not compatible with a democratic understanding; for this reason, in a democratic country state should not have an official ideology. Being one of the well-known representatives of this perspective, Beşikçi argues that (quoted in Cibran, 2006):

Official ideology is not an ordinary ideology. It is the kind of ideology which is protected and secured by the administrative and penal sanctions of the state... This is not the case in Western countries where states do not have official ideologies, and ideologies are not protected by official authorities...A state having an official ideology is not a democratic one...Criticizing official ideology, by means of scientific and political concepts, is necessary for the realization democratization.

As can be inferred also from the passage, according to this perspective official ideology is perceived as negative phenomenon and placed in opposition to democracy. Beşikçi is not alone with these arguments. Eygi also argues that official ideology is against democracy and rule of law; to him, no country in the EU has official ideology (2005:2). In addition, defenders of this position reach to conclusion that because of existence of an official ideology, Turkey is not a democratic country.

On the other hand, for some others, official ideology is a necessary and natural political phenomenon for all the states in the world, irrespective of its political system (whether democratic or totalitarian) (Alpay, 2003a; Kongar, 2007). Concerning the case of Turkey, it is argued that existence of an official ideology is vital for the development of democracy; and that official ideology guarantees survival of democracy in Turkey (Çelik, 2003; Alpay, 2003b). Especially Çelik attaches positive meaning and roles to official ideology stating that the existence of it prevents the emergence of anti-democratic administrations and defining it as the source of code or frame of social agreement. Similar to Çelik, Kongar (2007) also attributes positive functions to official ideology and argues that keeping citizens together, official ideology supply cohesion for members of the society.

Parallel to my position concerning to ideology and discourse, discussed above, I will not necessarily attribute official ideology a negative meaning. In other words, its “official” characteristic does not make an ideology automatically “wrong” or “anti-democratic.” Contrary to the arguments that attach negative meaning to official ideology, I will argue that an official ideology does not have *a priori* “good” or “bad” characteristic. For this study, it is an analytical concept of social sciences to analyze the relationship between the state and society. This study accepts that the existence of official ideology is not peculiar to Turkey. As in the case of the almost every state in the world whether authoritarian, totalitarian or democratic, Turkey has also an official ideology; and it may be labeled as “negative” or “positive” depending on different worldviews.

Irrespective of their position concerning to official ideology, for most of the scholars of Turkish politics, it is an agreed fact that Kemalism/Atatürkism has been official ideology in Turkey (see Parla, 1991; Beşikçi, 1978; Kongar, 2007; Eygi, 2005; İnsel, 1998; Çelik, 1998; Alpay, 2003b and Başkaya, 2007).²⁷ Especially concerning the post-1980 period, there is enough evidence, in the body of laws and regulations of Turkey, corroborating this opinion. For example, in the preamble of constitution of 1982 Atatürkism is stated as official ideology of the state:

²⁷ Stating that there exist particular nuances between Kemalism and Atatürkism, Parla (1991:17) and İnsel (1998: 21) argues that these two terms signifies nearly same meaning.

In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state... The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk...²⁸

Not only the constitution but also several other laws present Atatürkism as the official ideology of the state. For example, article 4 of Law of Political Parties obligates that political parties have to act according to the principles and reforms of Atatürk;²⁹ in addition, article 4 of Law of Higher Education³⁰ and article 2 of Basic Law of National Education also necessitate bringing up students who are loyal to Atatürkism.³¹

The idea that official ideology excludes or limits alternative ideologies is proposed as a distinctive characteristics of official ideology (and its materialized form: official discourse). In this context, it is argued by Köker (2003:98) that political articulations of ideas and demands, coming from different segments of the society, can be possible if only these demands do not violate the borders that were set by Kemalism/Atatürkçülük. Similarly, Erdem argues that, in Turkey, there is a hierarchical relationship between official ideology and alternative ideologies; and that in this relationship official ideology locates itself always on superior place (Erdem, 2003). Başkaya supports this opinion by arguing that official ideology has monopoly over determining what is “wrong” or “right” (2007). Parla goes one-step further and states that, in Turkey, no ideology other than Kemalism is tolerated by the state, and a kind of “uniformity of ideas” is desired (1991:15). Sharing a similar conviction (especially in terms of my research questions) the present study will argue that official discourse in Turkey (using the advantage of being state-sponsored) allows and encourages certain

²⁸ The text was taken from <<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm>>

²⁹ Full-text of the law can be reached at <<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/2820sk.htm>>

³⁰ Full-text of the law can be reached at <<http://www.yok.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/kanun2.html>>

³¹ Full-text of the law can be reached at <<http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/88.html>>

arguments to be said and prevents some others. For this reason, official ideology sometimes depreciates the counter arguments showing monopolist features in assertion of the “truths.”

In addition to its exclusionary and monopolistic nature, official ideology is also characterized by some writers as “suppressive” against the unofficial one. For many critics of the official ideology in Turkey, it is “coercive” over citizens of the country. For example, according to Beşikçi, official ideology in Turkey is “imposed from above” and “coercive;” and in many case protected by the state by means of penal sanctions (1978:1-13 and 2007:1). In line with this perspective, Parla also points out the “authoritarian” characteristic of official ideology (1991:15). Similar to Beşikçi and Parla, Çiğdem qualifies official ideology as follows: “strategies from above which are based on coercion” (Çiğdem, 1998:28).

Discussing “coercive” and “authoritarian” nature of official ideology, we should not also ignore the bases of official ideology in civil society. In other words, it cannot be argued that official ideology in Turkey is completely based on coercion and suppression; instead, it can be argued that we should also consider hegemonic nature of Kemalism/Atatürkism which managed to organize social consent in the direction of its aims.³² It can be argued that, especially in the 1990s, official ideology has increased its hegemonic capacity; and by expanding its social bases it achieved to mobilize considerable amount of people against the rise of radical Islamism and Kurdish separatism.

Specific to official stance towards the Alevis, it can be argued that the arguments and definitions of the official discourse concerning the Alevis are shared and even exalted by a great deal of the Sunni majority. In that sense, official ideology is hegemonic, and does not need to be coercive over the Sunni citizens since it managed to get the consent of them. Therefore, “coercive” and “over-imposed” nature of the official ideology is partial and disappears when the issue is the status of the Alevis. In Turkey, incorrigible opponents of the official ideology (such as political Islamist), in some cases (such as for the issue Alevism)

³² As I stated above it is not possible to cover whole republican history in this study; instead I will try to focus on the post-1980 period. In this sense, while I am discussing “the hegemonic nature of official ideology” I refer to this time span. Contrary to the early republican period, where Kemalism did not have considerable social bases, during the 1980s and 1990s official ideology gained social support and civil reproduction sources.

become the main supporters of it. Even the Alevis (although they are not happy with the official stance towards themselves and their legal status in Turkey) are far from developing “counter-hegemony” against the existing order. In other words, the Alevis could not organize their discontent efficiently against the official policies, although they have “counter-hegemonic” capacity.

As I discussed above, gaining its strength from official ideology, official discourse is a discourse that has “state-sponsored” characteristics and aims to supply legitimacy for the state and its actions. Therefore, official discourse’s main function appears to support the state policies, general logic of which is provided by the official ideology. As can be seen from the definitions above, these two concepts (official ideology and official discourse) are closely related with each other. In that sense, official discourse concerning a specific issue would probably contain the perspectives stemming from official ideology. Official discourse may also be defined as the manifested form of official ideology and mostly in harmony with it. Legitimacy-providing function of official discourse for the state action is meaningful for this study, which asserts that official discourses concerning the Alevis aims to legitimize the existing situations and state policies related to the Alevis. In other words, official discourse contains set of arguments asserted to provide justification for the arrangements at the expense of the Alevis and for the maintenance of the existing un-just applications.

According to Köker (1996:158) Kemalism is a nationalist project aiming to create a “corporate” and “homogeneous” nation. This perspective was also shared by Beşikçi who argues that Kemalism (as the official ideology of the state) can be defined as “difference-blinded” especially for the case of Kurdish issue (Beşikçi, 1978:43). It is argued in the present study that difference-blinded nature of official ideology in Turkey towards the Kurds has been applicable also for the Alevis, for a long time. It will be proposed that disregarding the *sui generis* peculiarities of the Alevis, official discourses do not give us the exact picture of this community. Proposing that there have been gaps between the official discursive regularities about the Alevis and characteristics and self-perceptions of the Alevis, this study aims to explore those gaps together with their conditions of formation. This study asserts that the answer of the question of “what have been

the reasons behind those gaps between the social realities of the Alevis and the discursive practices developed by some official institutions about the Alevis?” lies in the ideological character of official discourse.

The concepts of official ideology and official discourse have been widely used, especially since the post-1980 period, by the opposing social and political groups in questioning the existing republican system in Turkey. Islamists, members of the Kurdish movement, liberals and socialists criticized official ideology as the main source of problems in the country and attributed negative meaning to it. The opposing circles (Islamists-liberals-socialists-Kurdists) to the official ideology of the Turkish Republic have accused of this ideology for being the source of all problems in Turkey, including lack of democratization, underdevelopment, poverty, violation of human rights, etc. This implies that there has been an omnipotent, never changing, and inflexible conception of official ideology and official discourse. This study aims to problematize the above-mentioned “characteristics” of the official ideology, in terms of the issue of Alevism.

It will be argued in this study that there happened fluctuations and changes in the principles of official ideology governing the general discourses of state. If we look at the official ideology from the perspective of issue of Alevism, the existence of a never changing, single piece, incessant and stable state discourse is highly problematic. The general approach of this study is that perceptions of official ideology concerning the Alevis varied depending on the social and political priorities of the state such as the struggle with communism (in 1970s-1980s) and the prevention of Islamist movements (in 1990s-2000s). For this reason, this study criticizes the arguments suggesting that the “tyranny” of the Ottoman period had completely ended since the foundation of the Turkish Republic and that Alevism gave up its opposition to the state by developing a problem-free mode of relationship with the state. In addition to the lack of a homogeneous body of official discourse through the republican history towards the Alevis, it is highly possible to encounter with extreme heterogeneity of official discourse concerning to a specific time span. That is to say, there existed discontinuities and heterogeneity in state discourses with reference to the different

periods and eras; the same kinds of discontinuities and heterogeneities may be valid for specific instances throughout the republican history of Turkey.

1.2.6. Two Sources of Official Discourse towards the Alevis: Secularism and Nationalism

Although modernization efforts in Turkey can be traced back as early as the late 18th century of the Ottoman Empire, together with the foundation of a new republic, these efforts were transformed into a more comprehensive and determined process. Especially attempts for the secularization of state and society, and struggles in the creation of Turkish national identity, affecting almost all aspects of social and political structure, have constituted core of the modernization projects. The questions of the study stated above make it necessary to focus on mainly two principles of new regime, namely, secularism and nationalism. Being the *sine qua nons* of the official ideology of new state (Zürcher, 2005:51), these two principles have been the most important ones directing the official discourses concerning the Alevis along the republican history. In order to understand these official discourses developed by three state organs (MEB, DİB, the presidency) concerning the Alevis, it is necessary to focus on the circumstances and historical conditions that affected the formation of those discourses. To put this necessity in Foucaultian sense, I will adopt the argument that discourse is made possible by and subjected to particular conditions of existence that govern the “rules of formation” of discourse (Foucault, 1972:38). Foucault claims that a discourse should be dealt with by taking into account the “rules of the discursive formation” and as discussed earlier through the concept of discursive formation, Foucault focuses on the conditions that make that formation possible. By doing that, he stresses the importance of social conditions in which the discourses are formed (conditions of possibility). In that sense the conditions of the discursive formation wherein the official discourses of the state apparatuses concerning the Alevis appeared is important for this study. Here, I will mainly focus on the attempts of nation building (attempts to form a homogeneous national identity) and secularization as two prominent contextual factors behind the formation of official discourses. In addition, the principles of nationalism and

secularism (in their Kemalist sense) will be discussed as the main dimension of official ideology controlling the formation of official discourses towards the Alevis.

Referring to two aspects of the same thing,³³ “secularism” and “laicism” were used “in connection with the problems of duality, opposition, or separation of church and state” in the West since the middle of 19th century (Berkes, 1998:5). Like Berkes, Davison (2003:333) also claims that secularism and laicism refers to “similar arrangements and possibilities concerning the non-theocratic politics.” Although they have different etymologies, these two terms were used interchangeably by most of the scholars of Turkish modernization to describe the Turkish experience of secularism (Mardin, 1981:191; Ahmad, 2003:89; Berkes, 1998:5).

Today in Turkey, most of the debates on the issue of secularism refer to the case of France where the concept emerged from the constitutional practices and referred to “the necessity that the state refrain from lending its positive support to any one religious denomination” (Mardin, 1981:191). Contrary to France, where the separation of state and church were completely achieved in 1905 (ibid: 191), Mardin argues that secularism in Turkey does not refer to “the official disestablishment of religion.” Related with Turkish case of secularism, Berkes (1998:479) points out the existence two myths: “One is the belief that this secularism meant the separation of religion and state after the fashion of France Laicism; the other is the belief that it was a policy of irreligion aimed at the systematic liquidation of Islam.” Following Mardin and Berkes, I will try to debunk these myths related with the nature of secularism in Turkey. In addition, I will discuss how Turkish version of secularism fostered official discourses concerning the Alevis.

In spite of the fact that secularism in Turkey has been inspired by the French case, it never corresponded to separation of religion from state. In early

³³ According to Berkes, in the word of “secularism,” the underlying emphasis is on the idea of worldliness. On the other hand, the concept of “laicism” emphasizes “the distinction of laity from the clergy.” For Berkes, while in the Protestant countries word of “secularism” is preferred, “...the policy of secularism in Catholic countries is more often expressed by the term ‘laicism’...” (Berkes, 1998:5).

republican period, in the direction of secularization, new state elite made a series of legislative arrangements such as: abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundation (*Evkaf ve Şer'îye Vekaleti*) (3 March, 1924); abolition of *medreses* (Muslim theological schools) and unification of education under a secular ministry and creation of nationalist education system (3 March, 1924); abolishment of religious courts (18 April, 1924), prohibition of religious orders (30 November, 1925) and adopting Civil Code (4 October, 1926). Furthermore, the constitutional article stating Islam as religion of the state was abrogated in 1928 and in the principle of secularism was included in the constitution in 1937.

Although these legal arrangements or secularizing moves (many of which were modeled after the European experience) reduced Islam's previous legal and constitutional position in the state structure seriously (Toprak, 1981:40), no attempt were made for a complete removal of religion from the state. In other words, an autonomous religious institution for Islam never developed independent from state. Contrarily, as claimed by Toprak (1995:91) the legal arrangements of the 1920s (some of them were mentioned above) were designed "to establish state control over religion rather than to separate the two spheres." For this aim, the abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundation (*Evkaf ve Şer'îye Vekaleti*) was accompanied by the foundation of DİB in 1924. According to law 429 of 3 March 1924,³⁴ "...all the matters of Lucid Islamic Faith concerning to regulation of religious beliefs, and rituals of worship...and administration of religious institutions" were given under the control of DİB. The law arranged that the president of DİB was to be appointed by the President following the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and be administratively attached to the office of the Prime Minister. Administration of mosques and religious functionaries (including *müftüs* (authorized religious officials for a province or district), *imams* (prayer leader) *vaizs* (preachers), *müezzins* (callers to prayer), all of whom are "paid employees of the state and hence subject to its scrutiny" (Toprak, 1995:91), have been among the duties of

³⁴ For the full text of "The Law about the Abrogation of Ministries of Shariah and Foundation, and General Staff (*Şer'iyye ve Evkaf ve Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiyye Vekâletlerinin İlgasına Dair Olan Kanun*), see Arıburnu (1957).

DİB since its foundation.³⁵ The regulations that determined the functions and the positions of DİB in state structure resulted in the emergence of, as Mardin (1981:180) puts it, “an officially-sanctioned and established religion with tendrils reaching into every aspect of Turkish social and political institutions...”

Although the abolition of the Caliphate and shariah, and the series of legal arrangements (some of them were mentioned above) were presented by the state elite as the indicators of secularism, some scholars do not attribute secular characteristics to the republican era. For example, Tunçay (1983:570) argues that religion was kept under the state control after 1923 alike the Ottoman period. Göle goes one-step further and argues that Sunni Islam remained as the state religion, not legally but implicitly. Stating that: “They [Kemalists] intended to use Islam to further their programme of reform and revolution by having it legitimized, when necessary, by the Directorate of Religion,” Ahmad (2003:84) also argues that what Kemalists practice in terms of the relations between state and religion does not correspond to secularism (separating religion from the state). Being in line with Tunçay and Göle, I will argue that the real picture in republican period has not changed dramatically compared to the Ottoman period, in terms of state control over religion. The legal structure, which was created in the early republican period concerning state-religion relations, gave rise to state control over religion, at the same time qualified Sunni Islam as one, and only officially recognized religion that has been one of the serious sources of discontents for the Alevis.

Apart from the arrangements related with DİB, MEB was also given the duty of “educating high religious specialists...and other religious officials such as prayer leaders, preachers...by founding a Divinity School, at Darülfünun and opening separate schools for these purposes, ” by the Law for the Unity of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*, law # 430). Contrary to its national and secularist education promises, starting from the early republican era, all along the republican history, the state has always been interested in religious education by means of MEB. Among the others (that will be discussed below), compulsory

³⁵ For more information about the duties and facilities of DİB (prevails from organizing pilgrimage services to conducting courses for teaching Qur'an), see its official web page, <<http://www.diyenet.gov.tr/turkish/default.asp>>.

religious courses in the primary education since 1980s (under the title of Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge) and the existence of *İmam-Hatip* schools (*imam* and preacher schools for the Sunnis) beginning from the late 1940s (and with increasing numbers in the following decades) can be seen two important example of embedded position of religion in the state structure. Apart from its legal status (state sponsored religious instruction) that violates the principle of secularism, the content of these compulsory religious courses has always been a good indication of state's perception about the beliefs other than Sunni Islam.

In this context, it becomes hard to defend the second myth (as mentioned above, the belief that secularization in Turkey was a policy of "irreligion" aiming at the systematic liquidation of Islam) which has been voiced mainly by Islamist circles along the republican history.³⁶ I will argue here that rather than irreligionism or state-hostility against Islam, state-sponsorship and state control of over religion would better explain the nature of the secularist applications in Turkey. In relation with this, I will discuss the attempts of the state to create a modern and national form of Islam, because, modernizing and nationalizing Islam has always been the basic rationale behind the Turkish form of secularization and state-controlled form of religion.

The rationale for the secularizing moves can easily be followed in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, starting from the post-Independence War period. It was stated in his speeches that the aim of secularizing reforms (including the abolition of Caliphate) were to promote the "pure" form of Islam, not to "contravene" it (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III, 1961:69-70). Stating "The Turkish Nation must be more religious, I mean religious in all simplicity. I believe in this as I believe in my religion and in reality. It does not contain anything against the conscience nor any obstacle to development" (ibid: 70), Atatürk declares that his secularism has nothing to do with "irreligionism" or anti-Islamic tendencies. However, as will be discussed below, the form or characteristics of this Islam (with its officially recognized form, and neglecting any other interpretation) becomes the source of problem between the state and other religious minorities in Turkey. In other words, official recognition and state-

³⁶ For example, see Üzmez (2005), Eygi (2006) and Bulaç (2005) for interpretation of secular applications as anti-Islamic moves.

support to this version of Islam (even to its “purified” form) stayed as a source of discontent for the followers of alternative interpretation of Islam.

Denying all the interpretations that take secularism in Turkey as an anti-Islamic policy, Bernard Lewis (1961:410) claims that “...the regime never adopted an avowedly anti-Islamic policy...” its desire was “...to end the power of organized Islam...” Turkish secularism did not intent to “destroy” Islam; instead, it intended to give Islam more modern and national form (ibid: 406). This intention was emphasized by Atatürk when he said he was not against Islam; and defined Islam as “the most rational and natural of religions” (Ünan, 1959:90). In his speeches, Mustafa Kemal mostly attacked the role of the traditional Islamic clergy saying “...the Republic of Turkey cannot be the country of sheiks, dervishes, disciples and followers. The most straightforward and the truest religious order is the order of civilization” (ibid: 145). In many case, the anti-clerical discourse of Mustafa Kemal against the “corrupted sheiks” was accompanied with warnings about the danger coming from religious reaction (*irtica*) (Mardin, 1981:216). Arguing that true Islam does not recognize any kind of intermediary between man and God, he was particularly against the influence of “local charismatic leaders who appeared as ignorant and cunning figures exploiting the lower classes” (ibid: 217). Parallel to the statements of Atatürk mentioned above, a similar rationale was echoed by the leaders of Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) in order to justify the secularizing moves. In the 1931 statute of CHP, secularism was closely associated with “science” and “necessities of modern age,” and clearly stated that secularism does not correspond to “be atheist or to demand atheism” (Peker, 1931:9). Abolition of shariah and *medreses* were also presented as the necessities of “true” form of religion.

In order to modernize Islam, Mustafa Kemal decided to Turkify it (Berkes, 1998:484). Turkification of Qur’an, the call to prayer (*ezan*) and the Friday sermons (*hutbe*) in 1931 were the first steps of this project. In addition, in line with this aim, Atatürk defended several times the necessity of clean and tidy mosques and declared that “...mosques were built not only for prayers but also for consultation concerning worldly and other worldly affairs” (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve

Demeçleri II, 1959:94). The critical point here is that Turkified version of these Islamic practices, which were mainly the elements of Sunni Islam, were recognized as the legitimate form of religion by the state. In other words, even the Turkified and modernized version of Islam (in the minds of republican elite) was still a Sunni interpretation, and it excluded the other interpretations. Therefore, the result was far from being satisfactory in terms of the Alevis' expectations. Apart from the fact that mosque (*cami*), sermon (*hutbe*), call to prayer (*ezan*) have been the elements of Sunni Islam, Turkish translation of Qur'an³⁷ was also strictly loyal to Sunni interpretation (Karaman, 2005:4). That is to say, the state dealt with only Turkification and recognition of Sunni Islam; there were no attempt to recognize Alevi version of it.

It is argued by Berkes (1998:483-503), Parla (1995:256-288) and Ahmad (1991:3) that Turkish secularism intended to create a more rational and modern form of Islam. Mardin (1981:213) also proposed that liberating individuals from "the collective constraints of the Muslim community" is the most important aim of the secularizing reforms. Actually, these two arguments signify different but harmonious dimensions of the same aim because freeing individuals from "the collective constraints of Muslim community" would be possible only when Islam was transformed into a more modern form. On the other hand, this intention was not easy to accomplish. Because of the fact that liberating individuals from their traditional ties and (in relation with this) modernizing Islam were challenging tasks, some "anti-democratic and coercive" (Tunçay, 1983:570) measures were taken against religion through strict state control. In this context, to accomplish its aim, the republican elite, preferred to establish a state control of religion, instead of a complete separation of state and religion. In other words, for the state elite it seemed more functional to integrate and institutionalize Islam into the state structure "in the form of a government agency" (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:234), than to discard or destroy it. Through this integration and institutionalization, a docile and silent role was designed for Islam. In terms of keeping Islamic religious scholars

³⁷ The duty of translating Qur'an into Turkish (as one of the important attempt of Turkification of Islam in this period) was given to Elmalı Hamdi Yazır (a Sunni religious scholar) by Mustafa Kemal. Elmalı Hamdi Yazır was also financially supported by Mustafa Kemal, see Karaman (2005).

(*ulema*) in the state structure, republican application reminds the Ottoman pattern of state-religion relations. If I put it with the words of Davison (2003:341) in republican period “Islam was not disestablished; it was differently established.”

In order to displace religion from its previous strong position of influence (as a political instrument or source of legitimacy), strict state control over religion was accompanied by coercive and sometimes anti-democratic measures against the traditional religious structures and activities, some of which also hit the Alevis. Although some scholars argue that “religion was guaranteed freedom and protection so long as and insofar as it was not utilized to promote any social or political ideology having institutional implications” (Berkes, 1998:499); and that “...performance of religious ritual was protected by the Constitution” (Mardin, 1981:210), I do not agree with them. Because, coercive attitudes of republic towards traditional Sunni Islam (especially related with prohibition of religious orders and religious titles such as *baba*, *seyyid*, *dede*, *mürşit*, *şeyh*) were also valid for the Alevis in many cases. Secularist application of the state did not provide the Alevis with freedom of faith that has been their main expectations from the republic and secularism. Especially in the 1930s and 1940s Alevi *dedes* were also targeted because of their “illegal religious and superstitious activities” (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003:64) and congregational ceremonies (*ayin-i cem*, religious ceremonies of the Alevis) were watched closely by gendarme and not allowed especially in rural areas (Yavuz, 2003:80; Aksoy, 2006). To reiterate, republican state’s limitations on religion to create a modern and national form of it have been valid for all Islamic religious groups including the Alevis.

Under these circumstances, the following question deserves close attention: Why have most of the Alevis stayed as ardent supporters of secularism and republican order along the republican history, in spite of the fact that the state failed to provide free and secure circumstances for them and their beliefs? Although this issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, I should state here that despite of the fact that its application quite differs from the Western practice, republican order accepted secularism as the main ideology of the state that reduced the power of Sunni Islam seriously. This relative reduction in the power of Sunni Islam in the republican reign, which caused relative progress in

the conditions of Alevis, played key factor for persistent supports of the Alevis to secular state. In other words, the existing order has not been ideal for the Alevis, but it has been definitely better than an order where Sunni Islam would had absolute domination in every filed of state and society.

As I mentioned above, together with secularism, nationalism constituted the core of the ideology of republican revolutions. The Kemalist revolution attempted to transform “the state from an Islamic empire to a national state, and its legitimizing ideology from Islam to nationalism” (Mardin, 1981). Although the development of nationalism goes back to the 19th century of the Ottoman Empire, it was with the Kemalist elite that nationalism became an ideological tool of modernization (Zürcher, 1998:194-202). Because of the fact that the Alevis were ethnically heterogeneous group, the notion of nationalism has always been one of the determining factors in the formation of official discourses towards the Alevis. For this reason, I will discuss the basic characteristics of Kemalist nationalism and then focus on its repercussions on the Alevis. Before discussing the basic characteristics of nationalism of new republic, a short theoretical literature of nationalism might be useful.

Since the 19th century, nationalism has emerged as an important legitimizing ideology for nation-states in the Western Europe. The form of political organization of Turkish Republic (i.e. nation-state) and its legitimizing ideology can also be seen an example of the spread of ideology of nationalism and nation-state from the Western Europe. It can be argued that there are two major theoretical schools in the field to explain the origins and character of the “nation” and “nationalism.” The first is called primordialism, according to which humanity is naturally divided into different groups and “the roots of modern national allegiances lie in the old and deeply felt ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences” (Seton-Watson, 1977:34).³⁸ In other words, “nations are primordial entities embedded in human nature and history” (Mc Crone, 1998:10). Needless to say such an argument is generally believed by leaders of nationalist movements. In the formation of Turkish nationalism, similar theses were proposed by the nationalist elite. The essence of this thesis was that Turkish nation, as a primordial

³⁸ For detailed information about this approach, see Seton-Watson, Hugh (1977).

entity, has its roots in the Central Asian civilizations and/or Anatolian civilizations such as Hittites; and that people from “the Turkish race” shaped prominent civilizations in all the lands they lived (Çağatay, 2004:88).

On the other hand, according to the second school (that is called constructivism and has discredited the primordial approach seriously), modern nationalisms and nations were produced over the last two centuries by new social, economic and historical circumstances or conditions.³⁹ Although the range of scholars on the constructivist school is broad (from Marxists such as Hobsbawm, to liberals such as Gellner), they all see nationalism and nation-state as “a function of modernization and as a specific product of modern changes” (Mc Crone, 1998:10). For this reason sometimes this school is also called “modernist school” (ibid: 10). They emphasize the role of educated classes in the formation and spread of nationalist ideologies and claims that “nationalism superseded a religious view of the world, and derived its legitimacy from the will of the people rather than from God” (ibid: 10). It is also among the arguments of members of constructivist school that “the convergence of capitalism and print technology...created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (Anderson, 1991:46).⁴⁰

For some scholars, constructivist school is more suitable to explain Kemalist nationalism and its endeavor to create a Turkish nation on the remains of the Ottoman Empire. They defend that it is difficult to talk about the existence of a Turkish nation prior to the construction of the Turkish republic. As claimed by Ahmad (1993:78) and Mardin (1981:208), when the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the republican elite inherited a society in which there was no such thing called Turkish nation. What Mustafa Kemal and republican elite did was that they “took up a non-existent hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it” (Mardin, 1981:208). Gellner has been another supporter of this perspective. He employs an interesting simile

³⁹ For detailed information about this approach, see Cornell, S. and Hartman, D. (1998).

⁴⁰ It is interesting here to think about the role of literature and print technology (through media and education systems) in the formation of Turkish national identity.

of “bride” (*gelin*) and “bridegroom” (*damat*) to explain the Kemalist case: “in the case of Turkish nationalism there was a bridegroom but no bride, while the former corresponds to state and the latter corresponds to the nation” (1998:197).

I argue in this study that Anthony D. Smith’s theory of nationalism is more suitable to explain the Turkish case of nationalism. Smith, in his famous book on the issue of nationalism, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, takes up a position between primordialism and constructivism. He argues that there were “ethnies” in pre-modern times; and these “ethnies” can be seen as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (Smith, 1986:32). According to Smith, nations can not be seen as solely the product of modernity that emerged in the West; modern nations of today emerged on the basis of “pre-existing ethnic identities.” What nationalist movements have done is to manipulate or exaggerate the national histories; to Smith, invention of national histories (from nothing) is not possible (ibid: 33-44). In that sense, it can be argued that there existed a pre-existing Turkish ethnie, at the beginning of 20th century, mainly inhabiting the Anatolia; Kemalist nationalist elite struggled to organize this ethnic entity as a nation-state by emphasizing (sometimes by exaggerating) glories of the Turkish history. Theories of 1930s, like Sun Theory of Language (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*) (asserting that all languages of the world originated from Turkish) and Turkish Historical Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) (defends that Turks had been forced by drought to migrate from the Central Asia to the Anatolia where they created important civilizations such as the Sumerians and the Hittites) (Copeaux, 2000) can be read as part of this exaggeration. To reiterate, there existed a Turkish ethnie in the Anatolia before foundation of Turkish Republic (similar to the existence of the French before the French Revolution or presence of the Germans before foundation of Germany); what is new was a nation-state as form of political organization which was built by Kemalist elite. It seems safe to argue here that leaning on existing Turkish ethnie, Kemalist elite made Turkishness the basis of Kemalist nationalism. As put by Turan (2007:55), “there existed a Turkish nation created by geography and history,” but the idea of national unity was missing which was brought by Kemalist cadres. In addition, the same elite

attempted to utilize memories and symbols of the past to buttress Turkish national identity.

Conceptual discussions in the literature of nationalism on the differences between ethnic and civil nationalisms may also provide us with insights concerning the nature of Kemalist nationalism. To put it in the simple terms, in the case of civic nationalism, national identity is conceived as something established by a legitimate membership to a constituted state. In this type of nationalism, membership of the civic nation is regarded as volitional and political identities of members of the nation are understood as citizens. On the contrary, in ethnic nationalism, the national identity is defined in terms of ethnic ties such as language, common descent (from previous generations) that are distinct from and superior to political citizenship. In this type of nationalism, membership to a nation is hereditary.⁴¹

I believe that, Kemalist nationalism shows characteristics of both civic and ethnic nationalisms. The newly constructed Turkish nation was described by Atatürk as “a political and social entity composed of citizens tied together by a common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals” (İnan, 1969:372). In other words, Turkish nation would be composed of Turkish speaking citizens sharing common ideals, instead of ethnically Turkish ones. In addition, the famous motto of Atatürk “How happy is the one who says: ‘I am Turk’” is generally conceived as the sign of all-embracing characteristic of Kemalist nationalism. This conceptualization of nationalism manifest civic characteristic and seems more inclusive than ethnic nationalism. In this context, Kemalist nationalism, as correctly put by Zürcher (2005:50), “...was much closer to the culturally defined nationalism of Gökalp than to the ethnic nationalism...” Zürcher claims that, except for the element of religion which was regarded among the component of nation by Gökalp, Kemalist nationalism is in complete harmony with Gökalp’s conceptualization of nation according to which a nation had to be based on shared education, and should have common language, emotions, ideals, religion, and morality and aesthetic feelings (ibid: 50). In all of the constitutions of Turkish Republic, the concepts of nation and nationalism were defined without

⁴¹ For more theoretical discussions on ethnic and civil nationalism, see Smith (1991:11-48).

referring to the elements of ethnic nationalism (including race, ethnicity and religion), instead, the definitions of these terms were based on unity on “honor and pride... joy and grief” (Özbudun, 1999:53).

However, contrary to this civic face of official nationalism, elements of ethnic nationalism (such as race, ethnicity and religion) continued to play disguised role from time to time in determining the content of Turkishness. Baskın Oran, one of the ardent supporters of this argument, exemplifies ethnic contents of Kemalist nationalism referring to a series of incidences. He argues that for a long time in Turkey, in order to be accepted by military schools one had to be from “genuine Turkish race” instead of being a Turkish citizen (Oran, 1988:158).

In some cases, religion was also considered as an element of Turkish national identity and “non-Muslims were discriminated against Muslims; and Turkishness was linked closely to Islam” (Kirişçi, 2000:3). As argued by Kirişçi this linkage between Turkish nationality and Islam was apparent especially in immigration policies of the state (2000:3-4). With the words of Kirişçi, “Turkish immigration and refugee policies have been biased in favor of people ‘Turkish descent and culture’ and then only as long as such persons were of Sunni-Hanefi background” (ibid: 4). In early 1930s, the demands of Christian Orthodox Gagauz Turks to emigrate from Romania to Turkey was rejected by Turkish government on the ground that they are not Muslims; but “Muslims who migrated from the Balkans to Turkey during the same period” were accepted easily (ibid: 6).

In terms of secularist intentions of Kemalist state, such a linkage between Islam and Turkish identity might seem paradoxical; but even at the beginning of the republican period Islam (deeply rooted in society) was the most common language among the people living in Turkey. As claimed by Hobsbawm (1990:68) “religion is a paradoxical cement for modern nationalism, which has usually...treated it with considerable reserve as a force which could challenge the ‘nation’s’ monopoly claim to its members’ loyalty.” Concerning the existing Muslim minorities, Ergil (2000:43-62) points out the same paradox:

All existing Muslim minorities were granted a kind of Turkishness. For example, the largest non-Turkish Muslim minority in Anatolia-

the Kurds became Mountain Turks. Paradoxically, however, by forcing all Muslims into a Turkish identity, the new regime was also associating Turkish identity with Islam, which was contrary to its secularization project.

The existence of such a paradox survived not only in the foundation period, but also in the post-1980 period of the republic. The official nationalist discourse has been shaped under the strong effect of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*)⁴² since 1980.⁴³ According to this thesis, Islam and Turkishness were parts of an inseparable whole and form the elements of a harmonious entity since the Turks converted to Islam; and Islam (namely Sunni Islam) was considered as one of the cornerstones of Turkish national identity and culture (Toprak, 1990:13; Zürcher, 1998:303). It is also stated that there are striking similarities between Islam and pre-Islamic cultures of Turks; for this reason it is implied that a model Turk should be a model Muslim at the same time. In this dissertation, compulsory religious education and applications of the DİB were introduced as two important instruments for the state homogenization efforts in favor of Sunni Islam and for the dissemination of the principles of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.”

As a result of the discussions above, it can be concluded that Kemalist nationalism contained elements of ethnic nationalism, latently, (including religious elements) behind its civic face. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the following chapters, its relation with these elements (especially with religion) fluctuated instead of having steady character.

⁴² Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was developed by Aydınlar Ocağı (Hearts of the Enlightened), an organization founded in 1970 by the representatives of political, business and university elite aiming to lessen the influence leftist ideology in Turkey concerning the social, political and cultural issues.

⁴³ As will be discussed in the following pages, in the republican history, Kemalism was interpreted very differently (and sometimes there emerged interpretations which clashed each other). It should be stated here that for many scholars the applications of Kemalist elite after the military coup of 1980 signified an extreme divergence from Kemalism. So, it is not possible to identify Kemalism with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, although it affected policies of Kemalist generals. After the military coup of 1980, Islam was conceived by the generals as an element of maintaining society together and of preventing clashes of pre-1980 period. The generals mandated religious education in the schools; they opened new *İmam-Hatip* schools. As a result of these policies of Islamization, Kemalist military came to oppose Kemalism. Islamization policies of this period were viewed by some scholars as an American plan to block spread of leftist movements in Turkey (for more detail, see Manisalı, 2002).

As argued by many of the scholars of Turkish modernization, the project of creating a homogeneous Turkish national identity was launched by the founders of republic after the War of Independence, and this project denied the existence of ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity in the country (Kirişçi, 2000:1; Oran, 1988). For example, being one of the non-Turkish elements, the existence of Kurdish population was denied. When the victory was obtained, Kemalist elite initiated to establish a centralized nation-state; and the provinces where inhabited by mainly Kurdish population (enjoyed a quasi-autonomous position during the Ottoman period) had no exception from this initiation. For this reason, Kurdish population of Anatolia had become the target of nation-building project and centralizing efforts of the republic. These efforts were encountered with resistance and a series of rebellion (eighteen rebellions) in Kurdish provinces between 1924 and 1938; and the resistances were suppressed with severe punishment and extraordinary legislative measures (Tunçay; 1992:126-130).

The most important result of these rebellions was that they created a fear on Kemalist elite that "...Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines..." (Mardin, 1973:177). As one can logically argue that this fear directed Kemalist regime to take more serious and systematic measures towards the promotion of Turkish national identity, immediately after establishing military control over rebellions. These new measures contained social engineering projects promoting Turkish national identity such as "Turkish History Thesis" (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) and the "Sun Language Theory" (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*), just mentioned above.

The Settlement Law (No. 2510), a law regulating the distribution of population of Turkey, provides another example of ethnic nationalism. Although the law (enacted in 1934), was presented as an attempt to settle the nomadic tribes and immigrants, its main aim has been "the assimilation of non-Turkish elements into Turkish culture" (Yeğen, 1994:95). According to Yeğen, by this law, "Turkification of non-Turkish elements (mostly Kurds)" was implemented by settling Turkish elements in non-Turkish provinces or by settling non-Turkish elements in Turkish areas (ibid: 95). Indeed, if the text of law were closely read, it can be seen that the text frequently mentions the necessity of "reorganization of the demographic structure according to devotion to Turkish culture" (article 1). In addition, many of

the articles contain the expression of “...those ones coming from the Turkish race (*Türk soyu*)” (article, 3; additional articles 33 and 34).⁴⁴

The ethnic natures of official nationalist discourse have not always been implicit; sometimes it was declared directly with threatening tones. The following expressions of İsmet İnönü (the second president, close friend and right-hand of Atatürk) exemplify this kind of official stance: “We are frankly nationalists... and nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks...” (cited in Barkey and Fuller, 1998:10).

In spite of its ostensibly civic and inclusive facade, nationalist ideology of the republic has been source of discomfort and insecurity for the Alevis because of its implicit ethnic (nationalist) characters. This insecurity was related with the official imagination of nation as an ethnically and religiously homogeneous unity (ethnically Turkish, religiously Sunni Islam). As discussed above the main problem with this nation-building model or project was its negligence of the existing differences of culture, ethnicity and religion. Because of the existence of important discrepancies between formal presentation of national identity and its practical applications, the Alevis have been the subjects of the double denial because of the facts that they are not Sunni Muslims and a considerable portion them are not from Turkish origin (Bruinessen, 1996:7).

Apart from the linkage between Sunni Islam and Turkish national identity, the Alevis have been the target of official nationalist discourse because of their ethnically heterogeneous nature is considered. According to Bruinessen (1996:7), the Alevis of Turkey can be classified into four groups in terms of their language as follow: the ones who speak Azerbaijani Turkish and live in Kars (an eastern province); the Arabic speaking Alevis of Hatay (a southern province) who are “ethnically part of Syrias’s Alawis (Nusayri) community and have no historical relations with the other Alevi groups; Turkish speaking Alevis; and Kurdish speaking Alevis. Kurdish speaking ones also can be divided into sub groups. We do not have exact information about the numbers of the Alevis in Turkey mainly

⁴⁴ The full text of the article can be reached at <<http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/2510.13.text>>

because of “...the assimilative politics of the state since Otoman times” and “the tendency of the Alevis to hide their identities” (Erman and Göker, 2000:99) and because of the lack of ethnic and religious categories in the state census. With the same reasons, we do not know exactly the number of Kurdish Alevis. However, there exist opinions and estimations about the number of the Alevis ranging from 10 to 20 per cent of total population of Turkey. Again, although there is no consensus, it is argued that Kurdish Alevis constitute about 25 per cent of the total Alevi population (Shankland, 1999:136; Bruinessen, 1996:7).

To sum up, the Alevis of Turkey have encountered problems with the nationalist perspective of the state along the republican history mainly because of two reasons: 1) the state closely linked the content of Turkish identity with Sunni Islam, 2) ethnically based (difference-blinded and homogenizing) nature of official nationalism has not been harmonious with the identity of non-Turkish Alevis.

Before ending this section, I should state that in this section I generally referred to a literature that is critical on Kemalism in general and Kemalist nationalism and secularism, in particular. This literature is meaningful for my research questions and it provides me important insights; since, I argue in this thesis that the Alevis have suffered from homogenizing efforts of some state organs in the republican period in terms of religion and ethnicity. As I mentioned in the previous paragraph, ignorance of religious and ethnic diversity by these state organs hit the Alevis because of their ethnic and religious diversity. In other words, official ideology and discourse failed to recognize Alevi identity. For this reason, the literature that criticizes difference-blinded and homogenizing nature of official nationalism was mostly referred in this study. But, I am aware of the fact that there exists an alternative body of literature on Kemalism, which is not critical on it. Representatives of this literature advocates completely opposite positions comparing to the representatives of the literature that was referred so far. In the rest of this section, I try to refer briefly to the scholars who take a pro-Kemalist position.

It is generally argued by these scholars that Kemalism must be evaluated under the light of specific or *sui generis* historical conditions of the period it

originated (Akşin, 1989:11-17; Kongar, 1999:292). Çeçen (1999:118) argues that if the specific conditions of the era were considered, it can be realized that Kemalism was the most rational option. Similarly, Güngör (2007:18) argues that those ones who criticize Kemalism from a globalist and post-modernist perspective neglect the conjectural conditions affecting Kemalism; if they considered these conditions, they would not have raised their criticism against it. Unanimously, pro-Kemalist scholars argue that Kemalism signifies a progress from a traditional social system to modern society. According to Kongar (1999:292), Kemalism contains ideological basis of Turkish revolution in it. In other words, Kemalism has been the formula of independence and modernization for Turkey; in reaching the modern civilization Turkey takes her strength from Kemalist ideology. Contrary to the developed countries of the West, in the developing countries starting point of revolutions is ideological not technological (ibid: 292). Same point is emphasized by also Tunaya, for him, Atatürkism is an ideology its main aims have been modernization, progress and development (Tunaya, 1981:6).

Another common theme in this literature is that Kemalism was defined as a flexible, changeable, pragmatic and eclectic ideology, not as a strict doctrine (Çeçen, 1999:21). For Çeçen, Kemalism is a synthesis of 19th century European thoughts; adapting these ideas to the conditions of Turkey; Kemalism presented what Turkey needed (ibid: 24). On the other hand, Tunaya (1981:98) stated that Kemalism has always been open to changes, for this reason it can not be evaluated a strict doctrine. This argument is also supported by the words of Atatürk: “I do not leave an inheritance in the form of a strict doctrine. If I do that, I cause the movement to freeze” (Karaosmanoğlu, 1998:149). Giritli associates Kemalism with democracy; he argues that Kemalism is “a pragmatic and democratic ideology of national modernization” (1980:15). Giritli and Kongar point out that the eventual aim of Kemalism is democracy, although this aim could not be realized during the reign of Atatürk.

Emphasizing positive features of Kemalist principles of secularism and nationalism, Aydemir (1990:13) argues that secularism opened the doors for individual autonomy from traditional ties (such as religion); and nationalism made

it possible to found and to maintain a country against the Western imperialism. Kemalist secularism is praised for creating a convenient social and political climate in which different religions and worldviews can live together (Mumcu, 2001:110). According to Kili (2000:269) and Güngör (2007:16), Atatürk and Kemalist secularism was not against religion; Atatürk, aiming to found a political order under the supervision of science, was against superstitions and bigotry. Kemalist secularism, rejecting traditional functions of religion in political life, prepared Turkish society for a democratic order. In that sense, being a prerequisite of democracy, Kemalist secularism gave way to a “pluralist order” in terms of religious beliefs (Kili, 2000:269). According to Atatürk, principle of secularism was closely related with the issue of social freedom (Kara, 1975:30).

The gist of secularism, for Atatürk, was that political authority in Turkish society should not be based on religion (Kışlalı, 2000:74). Atatürk opposed to religion only when it formed an obstacle against his social and political revolutions (Kongar, 1999:307). For this reason, only those circles who have lost their previous authority opposed to the principles of secularism. Secularism is the key principles of Kemalist revolutions in transforming Turkey from a traditional society of *ummah* (*ümmet*) to a modern national society (Çeçen, 1999:132). By means of secularism, source of political legitimacy was transformed from religion to nation. Coexistence of different religious and sectarian groups is possible only in a secular order which was realized by Kemalism (ibid: 131). Kemalist secularism aims “nationalization of religion” as well as controlling it; for this reason, it includes “supervision of religion by the state” (Kili, 2000:269). Hence, Kemalist elite did not intend complete separation of state and religion. Defending a similar position with Kili, Ateş (2006) argues that defining secularism as “separation of state and religion” does not solve the problems of Turkey. For Ateş, what is important in implementation of secularism is that administrative and legislative realms must not be based on religion. In that sense, existence of DİB in the state structure does not violate principles of secularism; because, DİB is necessary for controlling “militant demands of religious groups” in Turkey (Ateş, 2006).

According to Kili and Kongar the most prominent feature of Kemalism is that Kemalism is a uniting (*birleřtirici*) ideology (Kili, 2000:240; Kongar, 1999:294). Kemalist nationalism is presented as progressive because of its “uniting” nature; in other words, Kemalist nationalism managed to motive large number of people in the direction of founding an independent state against the imperialist powers of the West (Kongar, 1999:317). Contrary to general convictions, Kili argues that Kemalist nationalism can not be perceived as cultural homogeneity/oneness; instead, nationalism can be perceived as “motivation of people” or “togetherness of masses under the same polity” (Kili, 2000:240).

Kemalist principle of nationalism was mostly associated with independence struggle of the country against imperialist powers. To Çeçen (1999:27), to be independent was an important priority for Kemalism; and it was possible only through principle of nationalism. It is argued that the principle of nationalism provided opportunity for the citizens to get individual autonomy from their ethnic, racial, religious and traditional ties (Güngör, 2007:15). Irrespective of their ethnic, racial and religious ties peoples from different segments of society had the chance to live together under the inclusive title of Turkish nation; ethnic, religious and sectarian groups were recognized under the roof of “national unity” (ibid: 15). In other words, Kemalist nationalism was defined as a civic nationalism not an ethnic one. This thesis was supported by referring to Atatürk’s definition of nation: “Turkish nation is composed of people of Turkey who founded Republic of Turkey” (İnan, 1969:18). Neither race nor religion was emphasized in this definition of nation. Contrary to racist and Turanist (*Turançı*) approaches, Kemalist nationalism is not irredentist, and it emphasizes the importance of country (*ülke*) and land (*vatan*) (Çeçen, 1999:118).

Along the republican history there emerged more than one interpretation of Kemalism; and in some cases, there existed drastic differences (sometimes contrarities) among these various interpretations of Kemalism. As argued by Kili (2000:183) these different interpretations of Kemalism emerge from the fact that Kemalism was not systematized clearly during the reign of Atatürk. Apart from Kemalism of 1930s, interventions of Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, TSK) to the political sphere in 1960, 1980 and 1997 resulted in new

interpretations of Kemalism. It is generally accepted that TSK has been main bearer and determiner of official ideology (Kemalism); for this reason, TSK's interventions caused different interpretations/reinterpretations of Kemalism. Main characteristic of Kemalism of 1960s, which was shaped by an ally of military/civil bureaucracy and a group of intellectuals, was that it had been inspired by the leftist ideologies of the era. Anti-imperialism was another features of it. Representatives of this interpretation argue that Kemalism contains a leftist essence. Kemalism of 1980s discards its leftist tones and gets more conservative character. Perceiving Islam as a panacea for many problems of Turkey, military bureaucracy gave way an important divergence from principles of secularism. Starting from 1997, as reaction to the rise of political Islam, Turkey encountered a new interpretation of Kemalism. Kemalism of this period represent a restoration of the system which was damaged by the applications of post-1980 period. While doing this restoration, Kemalism elite obtained considerable support from political realm and civil society. In that sense, it acquired hegemonic nature more than ever.

1.4. THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Because of the fact that ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Turkey was denied for a long time by the state, until the end of the 1980s Alevism remained among the avoided topics. However, since the early 1990s, the Alevis appeared in the public sphere by reflecting the rituals and principles of their beliefs and taboos related with Alevism were broken to some extend. Today Alevism and the Alevis are not among the "dangerous" subjects to write about and they have undeniable places in the political and social agendas of Turkey. Nowadays the discussions on Alevism appear in innumerable publications: books, journals, newspapers, and academic inquiries. Parallel to the Alevi revival, many Alevi journals started to be printed, many books were written and some Alevi radio stations started to broadcast. A great deal of the writings in Turkey produced in the written media on Alevism in the last two decades can be classified as popular works aiming to address the general public readers. Following Vorhoff (1998a:43), we can classify the authors of those popular works into two main groups: 1) religious minded

Sunni authors, in some cases, nationalists (Kırkinci, 1987; Sezgin, 1990), 2) Alevi writers who endeavor the presentation of “true” Alevism according to their view (Bozkurt, 1992; Şener, 1991; Zelyut, 1999). Many of the members of the two groups approach the issue under the light of their ideological positions. Most of the Sunni authors in their study adopt a hierarchical relationship between their orthodox perspective and the Alevi heterodoxy. Without directly accusing the Alevis for immorality, those writers define the Alevis ignorant and misinterpreting Islamic sources. This dialogue is not a dialogue between equal partners.

The issue has also been the subject matter of many academic studies. Until the end of the 1980s, Alevism generally attracted the attention of historians. Although the studies of Köprülü (1929, 1964, and 1966), Ocak (1980, 1983, and 1996), and Melikoff (1993, 1998) are important in many ways, they suffer from Turkish bias by seeing only Turkish elements in Alevism. For example, Melikoff sees continuity from the idea of *Gök Tengri* to the representation of Ali in the Alevi belief system. In addition, some other Turkish scholars generally stressed the Turkish characteristics of Alevism and its pre-Islamic dimensions with the effect of Kemalism, instead of its syncretistic nature (Baha Said, 1926; Türkmani, 1948). However, these studies are also important, since they provide us with valuable historical perspectives about heterodox, tribal and rural characteristics of the Turkish populations living in the period of the 13th and 16th centuries and their relations with the central state authorities (the Seljuk and Ottoman central governments). Although there have been Turkish elements in Alevism predominantly, studies of Bender (1991), van Bruinessen (1996, 1997), and White (2003) giving substantial information on the historical and socio-political dimensions of Kurdish Alevism, deserve to be paid attention.

Studies of historians were not satisfactory to understand the social dynamics and theology of the Alevis. The first comprehensive anthropological studies, dealing with Alevism as a social organization and a system of belief, appeared in 1980s. Kehl-Bodrogi who comes from the German ethnological tradition produced comprehensive body of work on the Alevis as an Anatolian esoteric, ethno-religious community. In her study, Kehl-Bodrogi deals with the

issue as a result of her field-work e research among the central and the western Anatolian Alevi. She also approaches the issue also under the light of Alevi religious poetry (*nefes, gülbank, düaz, mersiye*). Although she paid little attention to the relationship of the Alevi with the state, Kehl-Bodrogi (1991, 1993, and 1996) has also written some articles on the recent developments in Alevism.

Shankland (1993), another anthropologist, comparatively studied the changes resulting from the modernization process in Alevi and Sunni villages and proposed that Sunni villages are more successful than Alevi villages in terms of adaptation to the modern world because Sunnis' ethics, social order and life-style are more convenient with the "national, centralized administrative system." Vorhoff (1998a:40) criticized these arguments by arguing that Shankland's theory is not applicable to the diverse Alevi experience in urban settlements. For Shankland, the Alevi can be a part of the modern world only when they abandon their devotion to beliefs, rituals and ideals. In two other books, *Islam and Society in Turkey* and *Alevi in Turkey*, Shankland deals with the place of the Alevi in Turkish society. These studies are important, since Shankland deals with relations of the Alevi with republican state, their devotion to the republic and its secularist doctrine.

Today, because of the high rate of migration, the Alevi are not a rural community anymore. For this reason, different expression of Alevism in public sphere and the interaction of the Alevi with both national and global political authorities need to be studied within the general context of cultural revivalism and identity politics from a sociological perspective. Since the 1960s, considerable number of the Alevi started to migrate to the industrialized countries of the Western Europe, especially Germany, as migrant workers. Later with the emergence of Alevi diaspora the issue started to be discussed on a transnational scale. I present here only some examples of the studies that investigate the Alevi and Alevism within a global and international framework. Rittersberger-Tılıç (1998) conducted an investigation on Alevi workers who returned to Turkey from Germany and transformation of "*Almanci*" identity into the "Alevi" identity in a Turkish town. Zırh (2005) studied the Alevi as a transnational migrant community also. This study is important, since it perceives the European Union

politics as an important dimension of the issue that is also important for this dissertation. Demiray (2004) exposed the effects of the Alevi movement in Germany on the Alevi movement in Turkey by focusing on the Declaration of Alevism, the establishment of the Peace Party and Constitutions of Alevi-Bektashi Representatives Council.

On the relations between the state and the Alevis there are two prominent studies. Erdemir (2004) studies on “the ongoing transformation of the Turkish state’s incorporative policies vis-à-vis the Alevis and the subsequent faith-based collective action of the Alevis through their non-profit organizations.” Erdemir’s study sheds light also on the effects of Turkey’s EU membership applications on the transformation of state’s incorporative policies toward the Alevis.

Şahin (2002) in her doctoral dissertation studies the Alevi movement from a perspective of “transformation from secret oral to public written culture in national and transnational social spaces.” This study represents the preliminary examples of the studies of Alevism in terms of the role transnational Alevi networks in transformation of the Alevi culture.

İrat (2006) in his master thesis intends to determine “how the ethno-religious Alevi communities in Turkey survive and what are the main sources and factors helping them to sustain their group borders, especially from the mid-1980s when these communities had started to reveal their identity clearly.” This study is important also for that it discusses the relationship between the state and the Alevi population after the 1980 military coup in Turkey.

Bozarslan (2003) and Çamuroğlu (1998b) produced inspiring works for the purpose this dissertation because both of them discussed the relationship between the state and the Alevis and criticized the widespread myths related with the republican state and the Alevis. For example, Bozarslan (2003) deconstructed the “myth of Alevism as a natural ally of the Kemalist Republic.” Çamuroğlu also stressed the unstable character of the relations between the Alevis and the official ideology. In addition, Kehl-Bodrogi (2003) discusses the political and historical developments that made Atatürk appear for the Alevis as a liberator and the advantages and disadvantages of the republican system for the Alevis. This study

supply clues to understand the complex nature of the relationships between the state and the Alevis.

By problematizing the meaning of the annual Hacıbektaş Festival for the Alevis, Massicard (2003), examines the diversity of actors in the Alevi community and the relations with the state. Massicard's study channeled me to choose the festival as a specific case to expose the changes in the official discourses of the presidents concerning the Alevis. On the other hand, Şen and Arslan (2005) discuss the social and political positions of the Alevis in Turkish Republic and the EU demands concerning the Alevis. They also discussed the “tension” between the EU demands and policies of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) government.

In this dissertation, I examine the official discourses of a specific portion of state apparatuses for the period of 1980-2005 concerning the Alevis. I explain how the official discourses changed from a complete denial to a partial recognition with its limits. The inclusive and incorporative nature of official discourses and the main reasons behind this changing discourse towards the Alevis were exposed through the examination of the official texts. As mentioned above, there exist studies in literature, dealing with the relationship between the Alevis and the state, but there is no specific study that makes discourse analysis of official documents and utterances of the presidents concerning the Alevis. This study will also contribute to the literature on Alevism because it uses CDA as the methodological instrument, for the first time.

1.5. METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, as methodological tool, I use CDA that aims to use discourse, ideology and discrimination together as tools of analysis. As argued by Fairclough, “discourse, ideology and discrimination...are embedded in the workings of contemporary societies together” (1995). CDA emerged in the late 1980s as a programmatic development in European discourse studies, and theoretical and methodological basis of it have been developed and refined especially by N. Fairclough, R. Wodak, and T. van Dijk. Since then, it has

become one of the most influential and visible branches of discourse analysis. A short review of extensive CDA literature reveals that CDA, in its simple description, involves the revelation, analysis and critique of discourse-induced discrimination. In this thesis, depending on the general principles of CDA, which have been commonly accepted by the different scholars of CDA, I will mainly use van Dijk's methodological assumptions and methods of analysis to answer my research questions. This study aims to uncover whether there are discourse strategies present in the official discourses that produce and perpetuate discrimination against the Alevis concerning to the post-1980 period. After shortly reviewing the general principles of CDA, I will explore the main components of methods of analysis developed by van Dijk and how will I employ this approach in this study.

1.5.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Structuralist and poststructuralist theory of linguistic philosophy propose that "our access to reality is always through language" (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:9); and that statement signifies the starting point of discourse analytical approaches in general. Through the language, people "create representations of reality which are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality" (ibid: 9). This should not imply that reality does not exist; it exists but it gains meanings through the language. In that sense, language is not a neutral channel through which the facts about the world are communicated, instead the language is an instrument that generates and inevitably constitutes the social world, social identities and social relations.

Among the different branches of discourse analyses, CDA deals with the social problems (such as power abuses, dominations and inequalities) and the role of the discourse in the productions and reproductions of these problems (van Dijk, 2001:96). CDA studies discourse through an analyses of its socio-political and cultural functions and implications. In addition to discourse analysis, there exists alternative ways of text analysis in social science such as content analysis. While content analysis concentrates heavily on observable features of text (words,

sentences, etc.), discourse analysis (especially CDA) focuses on social and historical context that considerably influence the meaning of the text (discourse) (van Dijk, 1997:9). The importance of context for CDA is formulated by van Dijk as follows: “Discourse studies should deal both with the properties of text and talk and with what is usually called the context, that is, the other characteristics of the social situation or the communicative event that may systematically influence text or talk” (ibid: 2).

Parallel to van Dijk, Fairclough (1995a:132) argues that the aims of CDA are: “To systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes.” He argues that for conducting a good CDA it is necessary to focus on “how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” (ibid: 133).

It is essential to point out that CDA is grounded on critique. “Critical” means two things in CDA. First, critical means concentrating on discourse that seems “neutral...natural or even sterile” and then “unpacking the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so naturalized over time that we begin to treat them as common, acceptable features of discourse” (Teo, 2000:12). Further, for CDA, “critical” means to go beyond its usual criteria of observational, descriptive and explanatory stance and to take a sociopolitical stance. So, for example, CDA does not simply state “this is how social power, discourse and ideology work in the social world,” it also states “this is how social power, discourse and ideology work in the social world and this is not how it ought to be” (van Dijk, 1995a:19). It is argued by Kress that “CDA brings an overtly political agenda to the study of texts, adding that practitioners of critical discourse analysis reject the scientific neutrality and the non-judgmental, descriptive stance of traditional linguistic analysis” (1990:13). In this study, I will not necessarily stick to a political agenda or a specific socio-political stance. Depending strictly on the first meaning of “critical” in CDA mentioned above, I will confine myself to mention the need for change where/when apparent discriminations and inequalities emerge. This stance is harmonious with “problem or issue-oriented”

dimension of CDA stated by van Dijk (1995a:17). This means that discourse analysts look at "...serious problems that threaten the lives or well-being of many (van Dijk, 1993a:252). This also means that the perspective of CDA analysts, "if possible, is that of those who suffer most from dominance and inequality" and "their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice" (ibid: 252).

Another characteristic of CDA is that it "is a type of discourse analysis that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context" (van Dijk, 1995a). As Luke puts it, "such an analysis attempts to establish how textual constructions of knowledge have varying and unequal material effects, and how these constructions that come to count in institutional contexts are manifestations of large political investments and interests" (Luke, 1995:12). So, critical discourse analysis is conducted to reveal and understand the relationships/connections between discourse and society. According to van Dijk, these connections "between socio-cultural processes and properties of texts are rather complex, and are best seen as indirect or mediated rather than direct" (1997:277). Defining dominance as "the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, resulting in social inequality," van Dijk argues that "CDA seeks for discursive strategies, i.e. every day, natural forms of talk and text, that legitimize control and 'naturalize' the social order and especially relations of inequality" (1993b:302). For him, power enactment is closely related with the control of social and historical context and with "the participants who interact within, and the overall organization of power resources" (ibid: 300).

The existence of close relationship between ideology and discourse is also among the main assumptions of CDA. Ideologies achieve in discourse a real materiality in the linguistic signs. Ideologies locate human beings in specific ways as social subjects.

To summarize the general principles of CDA:

1-CDA is concerned with social problems; it is not concerned with language per se, but the linguistic characters of social and political problems. For this reason CDA is essentially interdisciplinary. This characteristic means that

CDA brings together the macro-level research tradition of sociology with the micro level research tradition of linguistic in order to examine both society and discourse and the connection between them (van Dijk, 1995a:17).

2- Language in its broadest sense is thought to shape the society and be shaped by the society. For the critical discourse analysts, discourse is a social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by the other social practices. As social practice, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions (Fairclough, 1992:66).

3- Discursive practices, through which the texts are produced (created) and consumed (received, interpreted), are viewed as an important form of social practice which contributes to the constitution of social world. It is partly through discursive practices in everyday life (process of text production and consumption) that social and cultural reproduction and change take place. Some social phenomena are not of the discursive phenomena. The aim of CDA is to shed light on the discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena (ibid: 67).

4- Discourse or language use should be empirically analyzed within its social context. CDA engages in concrete, linguistic textual analyses of language use in social interaction.

5- Discourse functions ideologically. In CDA, it is claimed that discursive practices contribute to the production and reproduction of unequal power relations between the social groups (such as between the ethnic minorities and the majority). CDA focuses on how discursive practices (as social practices), events and texts that emerge as a result of “ideologically shaped power relations” (Fairclough, 1995a:15).

6- CDA does not understand itself as politically neutral and in the name of emancipation, it takes the side of oppressed groups. In contrast to the many other methods of the social sciences, “CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own sociopolitical position...and proud of it” (van Dijk, 2001:96).

7- There is no blueprint along which a CDA has to be carried out. A CDA can be made through different levels of linguistic analyses and different linguistic features can be referred. The framework depends on the analyst and the issue to be studied.

1.5.2. Van Dijk's Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis

The present study is conducted within the general framework of CDA. Van Dijk developed one of the prominent approaches in CDA, and I will mainly employ his approach in my analyses. Van Dijk's approach focuses on the properties of the text (such as topics, local meanings, style and rhetoric), and properties of context in which discourse was created (such as genre, access patterns, settings and participants, social and historical background). The following pages deal with the presentation of the discursive structures/features and analytical categories to be looked at in the analysis of official texts in this study. In CDA, analyses of texts never employ identical methodological options. Analyses tend to vary according to the researcher's background, aims, and to the type and content of a text (van Dijk, 1993b:279). Due to the existence of so many overt and covert discourse structures at work in many instance of discourse, actual CDA are always partial (Kress, 1990:84). The list of potential methods of analysis is extensive. For this reason, in this chapter I will present only a sketch of the methods of analysis (developed by van Dijk) that will be used in my analysis of official texts.

My analyses include various properties of "context models;" context, in van Dijk, is defined generally by the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place (2001:108). This category of CDA searches the answers of the following questions: In which culture was the text produced? In what typical social situation was the text used? From what historical period is the text? What category of speakers has produced it? Context models "control all levels of style of discourse, such as lexical choice, pronouns, syntactic structure and other grammatical choices that depend on how situations are defined" (ibid: 108). Context models also include mental representations (results from immediate, interactional situations such as politics, economy) that control many of the properties of discourse production such as genre, access, setting and participants. For van Dijk, context models "allow us to explain what is relevant to social situations for the speech participants" (ibid: 108).

Access analysis, which examines the dimensions of discourse access that

various actors have in a discursive situation, is one of the categories that will be used in this study as a part of contextual elements. Van Dijk argues that “power and dominance of groups are measured by their control over (access to) discourse (1993a:256). Proposing access as an important analytical category, van Dijk argues (2003:356):

In many situations, ordinary people are more or less passive targets of text or talk, e.g., of their bosses or teachers, or of the authorities, such as police officers, judges, welfare bureaucrats or tax inspectors, who may simply tell them what (not) to believe or what to do... On the other hand, members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over one or more types of public discourse. Thus, professors control scholarly discourse, teachers educational discourse, journalists media discourse, lawyers legal discourse, and politicians policy and other public political discourse. Those who have more control over more --and more influential-- discourse (and more discourse properties) are by that definition also more powerful.

Access is important for van Dijk since the ones who have more control over discourse sometimes may restrict comprehensibility of their discourses and by this way they control access to public discourse and exclude public from decision making. Because of the fact that main corpus of this study is composed of official texts, which are generally open to such a restriction of comprehensibility, access analysis of these texts may produce efficient results.

Setting and genre will also be analyzed as other parts of contextual elements. Context appears as “...structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse” (van Dijk, 1993a:271). Van Dijk indicates that there are many different aspects to the setting of a discourse (such as locations, prestigious props/posts, time and place) through which discourse was produced and disseminated. Genre generally refers to a category or type of discourse (such as parliamentary speech, news article, poems, etc.). The creation and interpretation of certain genres is accessible to only a limited powerful few. In addition certain genres of discourse are powerful since the ways in which they are written and interpreted can influence decisions that affect the whole of society (such as laws and regulations) (ibid: 271). In addition

to access, setting and genre, context of discourse also consists of "...participants in various communicative, social or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes and ideologies" (van Dijk, 2003:356).

After focusing on context (in which text was produced), I will examine the properties of the text itself. For this, I will investigate the topic present in the official texts (like textbooks, press releases, political speeches). Topic in discourse can be seen as the element that "defines the overall global coherence that assigns the necessary unity to a text" (van Dijk, 1994:117). Topics also can be defined as "semantic macrostructures derived from local (micro) structures of meaning" or "global meaning that language users constitute in discourse production," and it tells us what a discourse is about, roughly (van Dijk, 2001:101). Embodying the most important or summarizing information of a discourse, topics explain the overall coherence of the text. In order to understand the gist of a text, reading the topics forms the initial step. Generally, topics of a text can be listed through summarizing it. Headings and lexical reiteration contained in the discourse can be examined to determine what topics the discourse deems to be most important.

Together with topic, schemata of official discourse will be analyzed. Schemata refers to the overall superstructure or organizations of a discourse. More specifically, it is defined by van Dijk as "the argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position (1984:105). People generally provide reasons for their actions and positions; and outline, order and built up their argumentations in order to make their opinions "plausible" or "reasonable" (ibid: 106). These efforts, in a text, are analyzed through schemata. The narrative structure of a story, the argumentative structure of lecture, and specific schematic ordering of a political speech are the examples of such global schematic structure (1980:5-6).

The overall contextual features, topics and schemata provide only a very general picture of official discourse. In addition to these categories of macro level analysis, it is necessary to employ categories of micro level analysis. Under the general title of local meanings, van Dijk (2001:103-4) stresses the importance of this necessity as follows:

Local meanings are the result of the selection made by the speakers or the writers in their mental models of events or their more general, socially shared beliefs. At the same time, they are the kind of information that... most directly influences the mental models, and hence the opinions and the attitudes of the recipient...Especially interesting for CDA research is the study of the many forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions, vagueness, and so on. We call information implicit when it may be inferred from (the meaning of) a text, without being explicitly expressed by the text... [I]mplicit meanings are related to underlying beliefs, but are not openly, directly, completely or precisely asserted, for various contextual reasons, including the ideological objective to de-emphasize our bad things and their good things.

Following van Dijk, I will employ implicitness as an important category of my analysis in order to uncover the implications, presuppositions and vagueness in official discourse towards the Alevis. Implicitness refers to the fact that “discourses are tips of the icebergs of the information” and that much of what a discourse signals to its readers is left unsaid (van Dijk, 1994:120).

According to van Dijk, the perspectives and the opinions of the speaker or writers can only be revealed correctly through the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. By means of an analysis conducted at these levels, “bias, stereotypes and prejudices” developed against the minorities are uncovered apparently (1993b:218). Especially in his studies on textbooks and political discourses, van Dijk shows that through micro level analysis it can be seen that criminalization, discrimination and exclusions are the main categories of local meanings. In addition, he argues that same categories (criminalization, discrimination and exclusion) have been the primary characteristics of discourse of dominant groups towards the dominated ones in many cases (van Dijk, 2004b:136; 1993b:218). The categories mentioned above will be examined especially in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this study (while the former focuses on the official texts produced by DİB, the latter dwells on the analysis of textbooks of compulsory religion courses issued by MEB).

“Level of specificity and degree of completeness” appear as an important dimension of van Dijkian CDA. Level of specificity refers to the fact that “discourse may be studied as describing events at several level of specificity...and irrelevant or dispreferred information is usually described at higher levels (of abstraction) and less completely, and preferred information in over-complete, detailed ways” (van Dijk, 1993a:275). I will examine which information is described in a more complete and detailed manner, and which information is described in less complete and abstract level by the writers/speakers of official discourse. By doing that I will follow the general principle stated by van Dijk: “One of the most conspicuous forms of over-completeness in discourse is the irrelevant negative categorization of participants in order to delegitimize or marginalize their opinions and actions” (1993a:275).

In addition to the categories mentioned above, I will also examine the rhetoric and style in the official discourse in order to answer the question “what is the rhetoric and style in this discourse and how do these (rhetoric and style) categories contribute to the formation of official discourse towards the Alevis?” There are numerous devices in CDA to analyze rhetoric of a discourse. Some of these devices are alliterations, metaphors, metonymy, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, parallelism, comparisons, ironies and us/them comparison (van Dijk, 1993a:278; 1980:131). All of these devices are generally used to “attract attention, to highlight, to emphasize, or to de-emphasize specific meanings of discourse” which have already been “expressed and formulated at the semantic, syntactic and lexical level of discourse” (van Dijk, 1994:122). In sum, rhetoric is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient. Style, on the other hand, refers to “the textual result of personally and socially determined variations in language use for the expression of more or less the same meaning or reference...Thus style is linguistic trace of the context in a text” (van Dijk, 1993b:133). For example, certain syntactical and lexical choices in legal or judicial texts; use of technical, legal or political terms may signal the power and prestige of discourse participant.

1.5.3. Selection of Documents

Data sources for this study include official documents that reflect official discourses of three state apparatuses (namely, DİB, MEB and the presidency of Republic) towards the Alevis such as textbooks, curriculums, press releases, legal dictums, and utterances of the presidents.

The textual corpus of Chapter 3 was drawn from mainly two sources: 1) institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB concerning the issue of status of congregation houses, 2) the statements and commentaries of the presidents of DİB concerning the Alevis, expressed through press conferences and interviews at different times. As for the time period, my analysis in this chapter covers the realms of last three presidents of DİB (1987-2005). The corpus of text, which were analyzed in this Chapter 3, were provided to me by Directory of Press and Public Relation (*Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü*) of DİB upon my request which is based on the Law Pertaining to Rights for Information Access (*Bilgi Edinme Kanunu*). Through a series of correspondence with DİB, I was invited to the office, and I was given copies of the texts (institutional press releases, legal dictums and statements of the presidents of DİB) that constitute the corpus of Chapter 3. After examining the institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB (which are composed of more than 250 pages and only a small portion of them were directly related with the issue of congregation houses), I have found three of them eligible for this study.

As for the statements of the presidents of DİB, I received three declarations of Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu (1987-1992) related with the issue. These declarations were composed of 3 pages and 772 words. I received five declarations of Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz (1992-2002), specifically devoted to issue of Alevism and status of congregation houses (*cemevleri*). These declarations were composed of 12 pages and 4,450 words. I received one comprehensive declaration of Ali Bardakoğlu (2005-present), which was analyzed in this chapter; this declaration appeared also in *Kırkbudak* and was composed of about 7,500 words.

The textbooks and curriculums, which were analyzed in Chapter 4, have been issued/printed by MEB for the use of eighth, tenth and eleventh grade

students of DKAB. There are two curriculums prepared by MEB for religious education: the first one was issued in 1982, and the second one was issued in 2005. Both of these curriculums (251 pages in total) were analyzed in Chapter 4 in a comparative manner. In addition to these two curriculums, there are also two sets of textbooks published by MEB for religious education: the first set of textbooks was issued according to curriculum of 1982, and the second set of textbooks was issued according to new curriculum of 2005. In order to select the textbooks that forms the corpus of Chapter 4, I have examined both sets of books, from forth-grade to eleventh-grade (twenty-two books in total). And, I have chosen eighth, tenth and eleventh-grade textbooks (six books in total) which are more suitable than the others to analyze and to search the answers of my research questions. Because, the issues which are directly related with Alevism and the Alevis were presented mainly in the textbooks of these three grades. In other words, discursive strategies and regularities of MEB concerning the Alevis and Alevism are more frequent in these books than the others. The information, concerning the writers and validity periods of the textbooks, was provided to me by MEB upon my request on the ground of Information Provision Law (*Bilgi Edinme Yasası*). According to the information provided by MEB, the textbooks (named as DKAB10-1982, DKAB11-1982 and DKAB8-1983 were written in line with curriculum of 1982) have been valid for twenty-three years (from 1982 to 2005). DKAB8-2005, DKAB10-2005 and DKAB11-2005 are new set of textbooks written according to new curriculum (Curriculum 2005).

The corpus of Chapter 5 is composed of the presidential speeches held in the Hacıbektaş Festival. Concerning to the period between 1994 and 2003 there have appeared seven presidential speeches during the festival (while five of the speeches were held by the tenth president Süleyman Demirel, only two of them were held by tenth president Ahmet Necdet Sezer). Full-text of these speeches were obtained through a series of correspondence with Directorate of Press and Public Relations of Presidency (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı*). The directorate provided me texts of the speeches via e-mail upon my request which is based on the Law Pertaining to Rights for Information Access (*Bilgi Edinme Kanunu*). The directorate sent me seven speeches. It is

stated by the directorate that there is no record concerning the Hacibektaş Festival held in 1995. In addition, it is stated that Ahmet Necdet Sezer participated to the festival only in 2001 and 2003.

While choosing the corpus of this study, in harmonious with expectation of CDA literature, I tried to ensure data heterogeneity. In other words, instead of depending on one kind of official text, I used different sets of official texts (such as textbooks, the presidential speeches, legal dictums and press releases). In addition, in order to ensure authenticity of the documents, I obtained the texts from their original sources (official institutions). Lastly, I can argue that most of the documents used in this study are open to the access of other researchers.

CHAPTER 2

A SHORT HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSES ON THE ALEVIS

Before getting started with a critical analysis of official discourse of the Turkish Republic concerning the Alevis, in this chapter, I intend to develop a historical glance at the official discourses of the political authorities towards the Alevis. Official discourses of the state have always been closely related with the nature of political and economic relations between the state and the Alevis. In developing this general historical perspective, my main concern will be to follow the traces of the official discourses towards the Alevis, starting from the Ottoman period. In other words, I strive to understand how political authorities (the state) perceived the Alevis in different times, and what kind of changes happened in these perceptions. While tracing official discourses towards the Alevis in the past, official ideologies of the related era will be considered as main illustrative and illuminating factors in this effort; because, as discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of “official discourse” is closely related with “official ideology” in this thesis. It was proposed in the theoretical framework that discourse is taken as the manifested or material form of ideology. Stressing the ideological nature of discourse, the same modes of relationships are also valid to explain the relations between official discourse and official ideology. Official ideology is the name of the ideological sphere (with its principles and doctrines) that directs most of the state’s discursive practices and perceptions. At the same time, official ideology sets the limits of the official discourse. In addition to its guidance to the official discursive practices, official ideology also describes the reciprocal positions of the state and the society.

Any attempt aiming to understand the official discourses concerning the Alevis should take into consideration the positions of the Alevis in the corresponding social and political structure. For this reason, the social position of the Alevis starting from the early Ottoman period is to be covered in this historical review. In relation with this, the phases of state formation and consolidation both

in the Ottoman and Republican period will be focused on as a decisive factor in the formation of the official discourse towards the Alevis. In my historical analysis, I aimed to look at the issue through the lenses of a set of terms such as, orthodoxy and heterodoxy, center and periphery, and state formation and consolidation.

Today, many scholars studying on the Alevis and Alevism adopt the terms orthodoxy and heterodoxy to analyze the issue (Melikoff, 1998; Vergin, 1991; Çamuroğlu, 1999; Ocak 2000, 1999; Yavuz, 1995). Although there exists great deal of study employing these concepts, unfortunately only few of them attempt to express theoretical discussions or statements about what orthodoxy and heterodoxy mean, and about the relationships between them. It is obvious that using these terms without adopting any theoretical position or definition may give rise to problematic results in many cases. In order to avoid these traps, I will present the meanings of these words in this study, as well as the relationships between them.

It can be easily observed through the debates over the issue of orthodoxy-heterodoxy that these two concepts are generally defined in close connection with each other; but mostly this connection is characterized by contrariety or incongruity. The other major component of this discussion is that the contents of orthodoxy and heterodoxy were defined by referring to religion and authority. For example, McDonough, locating the two terms in opposite positions, argues that orthodoxy refers to “correct or sound belief according to an authoritative norm,” (on the other hand) heterodoxy refers to “belief in a doctrine differing from the norm” (2005:6909).

Eisenstadt and Burnoff are among the scholars who discuss the issue on the basis of religion and authority. For Burnoff orthodoxy is “[a] collection of ideas, rites and symbols ruled by a more or less complete sacerdotal organization...” (1888:200). Similarly, Eisenstadt asserts that an orthodox religion can be defined “...as one which contains some form of organized church attempting to monopolize the religious (and, at times, political) sphere, and which emphasize the structuring of clear cognitive and symbolic boundaries of doctrine” (1984:6). It can easily be inferred from the quotations above that orthodoxy, in

contrast to heterodoxy, contains authoritative tones implying the exclusion of any other idea that is incongruous with its principles. As for the relationship between the state and orthodoxy it is argued that the alliance between them strengthen the theories of orthodoxy (Burnoff, 1888:225). I will argue throughout the dissertation that this kind of an alliance played decisive roles in the formation of official discourses regarding to the Alevis.

The scholars perceiving the issue of Alevism through the lenses of conceptual pair of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, generally, place the Alevis on the side of heterodoxy and the Sunnis on the side of orthodoxy (Çamuroğlu, 1999:116-142; Vergin, 1991:18). Although this argument is not completely wrong, it seems a little bit handicapped in explaining the some heterodox elements existing in Sunni population of Turkey. In other words, my reservation to such an equation is that there is no complete overlapping between the categories of Alevism/Sunnism and heterodoxy/orthodoxy. The Alevis are not alone in manifesting heterodox character; there exist many heterodox elements in the Sunni folk or rural interpretation of Islam. Today, among the Sunni population of the central Anatolia, one can easily realizes the heterodox elements (originating from the pre-Islamic beliefs) contrary to the orthodox interpretation of Islam.⁴⁵

The other conceptual pair mentioned above is center and periphery. The ones who employ the center-periphery dichotomy in analyzing Turkish social and political history start from the assumption that “Society has a center.” For the history of Turkey, the center was Seljuk administration between the 11th and 13th centuries, and it was the Ottoman administration until the I. World War (Vergin, 1991:11). Vergin is not alone in employing the center-periphery dichotomy to analyze Turkish social history. Mardin also argues that there existed “a lasting center” in the Ottoman Empire with its “sophisticated network of institution” and that center, by firmly controlling the taxation and administration system and by dominating the “religious establishment,” gained strong effects in the area of justice, education and in the “dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy” (1973:169). In addition, there has been always a clash between the center and the periphery; and one of the reasons behind this clash was the “incompatibility of

⁴⁵ For a detailed discussions on the heterodox elements in Sunni Islam, see Aktay (1999) and Ocak (1999).

urban dwellers” with the “nomads in Anatolia” and the periphery was the source of “intractable religious heterodoxy...turbulent sects...syncretic cults...self-appointed messiahs” (ibid: 170). For Mardin, since the 19th century, the political efforts of the state for integration of the peripheral groups have been an important dimension of the modernization attempts. Being inspired from Mardin, I will argue in this dissertation that the state’s policies for integration of the peripheral entities (including the Alevis) have been decisive in the formation of official discourse towards them.

2.1. The Alevis and Official Discourses during the Ottoman Period

Even before the Ottoman period, in the Seljuk era, a series of political and economic developments showed that there existed tensions between the center and periphery. While nomadic Turcomans (*Türkmen*) constituted peripheral side of the equation, Seljuk central authorities (having Sunni cultural codes, and mostly being in agreement with the settled Turks) formed the central side of the same equation (Vergin, 1991:12). For the religious dispositions of the population, it is argued that the settled urban population adopted the Sunni Islam that was taught in the *medreses*,⁴⁶ and was the “official religion” of the Seljuks (Melikoff, 1998:61; Akpınar, 2000:236). On the other hand, nomadic population did not inclined to adopt this orthodox version of Islam. Because of the fact that their beliefs showed heterodox characteristics, nomadic populations were despised by both the state and urban population for being weak in religious matters (Melikoff, 1998:62). “*Etrakin dini zayıf*” (religion of Turks is weak) was a motto used by those circles to define the heterodox and peripheral groups of that time (ibid: 62). These structural differences between the two separate segments of society gave rise to a large-scale rebellion (Babai Revolt) that played vital role in the formation of Alevism.

In Babai Revolt of 1239-1241, generally considered as a movement of peripheral Turcomans against the center (Ocak, 2000:214; Vergin, 1991:12; Cahen, 1979:204), nomadic tribes (under the leadership of Baba İlyas) challenged

⁴⁶ *Medreses* were the higher schooling institutions where theology of Sunni Islam was taught.

the Seljuk central administration. Although there were religious dimensions of that revolt (since most of the rebellions had had heterodox and messianic beliefs and the Seljuk central administration adopted Sunni interpretation of Islam), Ocak portrayed main reasons behind it as economic and political tensions between the nomads and the Seljuk central administration (1996b:76-83; 2000:215). In that sense, it can be argued that heterodox and messianic beliefs prevalent among the rebellious nomads were used as an ideological tool to converge economically and politically unsatisfied nomads against the Sunni center having economic and political dominance over the periphery. To Ocak, the importance of Babai Revolt is that the Kızılbaş⁴⁷ of the Ottoman period and the Alevis of today originate from that movement; and for the first time in their history the heterodox elements of Anatolia band together around a central idea (2000:214). After having a series of successful battles against the Seljuk army, Babais were defeated and seriously persecuted by the Seljuks; and those who managed to escape from the persecutions went towards Western Anatolia where controlled by the emirates of Menteşe, Aydın and Ottoman (Ocak, 1996b:128-137).

Probably the best words to define the scene in Anatolia at the end of the 13th century were offered by Kafadar: “political wilderness and competition” (1995:14). Disintegration of the Seljuks after the Mongol invasion (1246) resulted in the emergence of various small *beyliks* (principalities/emirates) in Asia Minor and the Ottomans were one of these *beyliks*. Babai dervishes, escaping from the persecution, were welcomed by the tribe of Ertuğrul (father of Osman Gazi, founder of the Ottomans), and they developed close relations with Ottomans.⁴⁸ Among many other heterodox dervishes, Sheikh Ede Bali⁴⁹, a disciple of Baba

⁴⁷ Literally means “red head,” historical name of the Alevis of modern time.

⁴⁸ The friendly and tolerant behaviors of the proto-Ottomans to the heterodox dervishes were also a source of conflict between the Ottomans and Germiyans who served Seljuks in the suppression of the Babai revolt. (See Kafadar (1995) for more detail).

⁴⁹ As clearly shown by Kafadar, Şeyh Ede Bali was a heterodox figure. Although Şeyh Ede Bali was a disciple of Baba İlyas, he was presented as an orthodox Sunni figure, and the historical milieu in which he lived was depicted as completely an orthodox scene in the official discourse especially in the post-1980 period. It is possible to encounter with such a discourse in the schoolbooks or in the coverage of official broadcasting. Although Sunni oriented official perspective will be discussed in the following chapters, I should just mention about here a well-known TRT production TV series on the Ottoman history, namely: *Kuruluş* (Foundation). This film was adapted from a novel by Tarık Buğra, *Osmancık* (Little Osman), and directed by Yücel Çakmaklı in 1985 when Turkish society and politics were strongly under the effect of state

İlyas, appears as a prominent figure in the formation Ottomans Principality (ibid: 124). As put by Kafadar, “because they were neither good orthodox Muslims nor zealous exclusivist ones” (ibid: 11), the Ottomans were tolerant in nature and open to the religious heterodoxy. In addition to their advantageous geographical location and unusual commitment to unigeniture, Ottomans’ ability at using the religious diversity is proposed by Kafadar as one of the main factors behind their success in state formation. The heterodox dervishes and their religious leaders (for example, Geyikli Baba, Kızıl Deli, Abdal Musa, Seyyid Ali Sultan) were recruited by the early Ottoman sultans in the 13th and 14th century invasions of the Ottoman State (Barkan, 1942:279-304). Employment of these heterodox groups in the invasion of the new lands was functional also for the sultans to maintain the social order that was open to the violations of the dynamic nature of the dervishes (Ocak, 1998:81). The close relationships between the early Ottoman sultans, who were Sunni Muslims (Ocak, 2000:218), and the heterodox religious leaders mentioned above indicate us that Sunni Islam was not official religion of the state yet and at the same time it had no exclusionist or hostile character against the heterodox entities of the society. In other words, until the mid 15th century there were no clearly defined boundaries and serious conflicts between the orthodox and heterodox entities of the Ottoman principality. Sunni Islam had not been yet an important element of Ottoman official ideology.

This relatively problem-free and sympathetic mode of relations started to disappear parallel to the adoption of imperial policies by the Ottoman rulers. As the Ottoman state spread out, politically centrifugal and religiously heterodox entities (used in the early state formation) of the early period were eliminated in favor of a centralizing ideology and religious orthodoxy (Sunnism). According to Kafadar, exclusion and demarcation of the heterodox groups were closely related with their centrifugal challenges for the Ottoman state (1995:141-150). The settling policies of the central authorities in order to make the nomadic population taxable is presented as the other important reason behind deteriorating relationships between Ottoman rulers and the heterodox Turcomans (Vergin, 1991:15).

sponsored ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In this film, the early Ottoman period and Ede Bali were presented as strictly orthodox Sunni in nature.

In this period, appointments of military judges (*kadiasker*) and creation of the Janissary troops (*Yeniçeri*), chosen among the Christian children of Balkans, were the important elements of Ottomans' "centralizing political technology" (Kafadar, 1995:138-139). The relations between the standing army of the Janissaries and Hacı Bektaş (patron saint for both Kızılbaş and the Alevi) have been among the interesting and highly disputed issues among the scholars. Being one of the disciples of Baba İlyas, Hacı Bektaş was coming from a heterodox circle and later he became the central figure of the Bektaşî order. The Ottoman rulers, as to supply religious guidance for the Janissaries, appointed this order. This appointment is interesting mainly two reasons: while the heterodox centrifugal entities were discarded in favor of the centralizing project, another heterodox order was appointed for the religious guidance of an army that is also founded to serve for centralizing project. The other interesting point is the question of why the Bektaşî order was appointed for this duty instead of any other religious order. According to Hasluck (1929:279), there is no specific reason for this appointment and Bektaşî order was arbitrarily adopted by Janissaries. However, for some other scholars, this choice is not arbitrary and there must be a rationale behind this choice. For example Melikoff (1998:203), argues that because of the fact that the Janissaries were chosen among the Christian children and then converted to Islam, the Bektaşîs (who were recruited before in the conversion of the newly conquered countries to Islam) were the reasonable choice for the Ottomans. The latter position seems more plausible. Tolerant and syncretistic nature of this order must have channeled the Ottomans to this choice.

Uneasiness and discomfort of the heterodox groups against the state policies, which were aiming to push them to the periphery, erupted just after the chaotic social and political conditions of the interregnum period caused by Timur's victory against the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I in 1402. The interregnum period, as well as slowing down the centralizing project of the state (Kafadar, 1995:18), created also a fertile ground for the eruption of social uprisings (Ocak, 1998:136). In these conditions, around the charismatic personality of Sheikh Bedreddin, a religious scholar and mystic, a major revolt had begun against the central government in İzmir and Manisa. The revolt was instigated by Bedreddin's

two disciples Torlak Kemal and Börklüce Mustafa. Şeyh Bedreddin's movement (because of his esoteric and heterodox interpretation of Islam and doctrines on equality) were supported not only by nomadic Turcomans but also by some other discontented non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman state (Kurdakul, 1977:35-76). The Ottoman army suppressed the revolt in 1416 and persecuted many of the participants. Bedreddin's movement was important in several terms. First of all, although the movement had socio-political base at the beginning, then it resulted in the emergence of a belief system called Bedreddinism (*Bedreddinilik*) that has been highly influential in the creation of Balkan Alevism (Ocak, 1998:179). Secondly, by this movement the Ottoman central power "was learning to define as heterodoxy" the oppositions coming from the peripheral entities (Kafadar, 1995:143). Sheikh Bedreddin and his followers, who adopted the unorthodox ideas written in *Varidat* (Bedreddin's famous book), were defined as "*kafir*" (unbeliever) in the Ottoman official documents (*fatwa*, religious decree issued by a religious authority) (Düzdağ, 1998:309). Being the highest religious authority of orthodox Sunnism (official religion of the state), Ebussud Efendi condemned even those people who hosted a follower of Bedreddin in his own home (ibid: 309).

The socio-economic and political tension between the peripheral nomadic Turcomans and Ottoman central power climbed up its peak towards the end of the 15th century. Due to the political instability, impoverishment, high tax burdens and natural disasters these heterodox groups were open to the millenarian ideas (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003:54). In such a context, the emergence of the Safavids, as a new political power in Iran, played a vital role in the development of Alevism. In other words, transformation of large heterodox entities of Anatolia into Kızılbaş (literally means red head, a historical name of the Alevis and was supplanted by "Alevi" after the end of 19th) groups was the direct result of the Safavid presence in this geography. Ottoman-Safavid relations had been among the determining factor in the formation of the official stance against the peripheral nomadic Turcomans of Anatolia at that time.

At the beginning, the Safavids were a mystical order in Erdebil and then turned into a militant movement since the second half of the fifteenth century. After coming into power, Shah İsmail (a mystical religious leader, known also as

Hatayi) took advantage of the discontents of heterodox groups in the Ottoman Empire and started to propagate his messianic ideas through an influential network of missionaries. Because of the reasons mentioned above, the propagandas of Shah İsmail fell into a fertile ground and rapidly accepted by the heterodox Turcomans, thereafter known as Kızılbaş, because of their red headgear (Melikoff, 1998:211).⁵⁰ Shah İsmail claimed descent from Ali, nephew and son in law of the Prophet Muhammed; and the Kızılbaş supporters venerated Shah İsmail as the reincarnation of Ali and as redeemer (*mahdi*).

As a reaction to İsmail's Kızılbaş propagation in Anatolia and his proclamation of Shiism as state religion of the Safavids (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003:54), the Ottoman Empire (being the politically rivals of the Safavids) started to stress orthodox Sunnism as their state religion and treated majority of the religious heterodoxy as political enemy. In this context, Anatolia became the scene of political and military competition between the Ottomans and the Safavids. While some Kızılbaş Turcomans of Anatolia migrated to the Safavid lands and started to serve for İsmail (Sümer, 1992), some others living in the Ottoman territory aimed to spread the Safavids' influence over Anatolia and for this purpose, they initiated a number of uprisings against the Ottoman rule. Although these insurrections were evaluated by popular or amateur writings on the history of Alevism as having only religious bases, indeed many of them had social and economic bases as well (Ocak, 1998:60). Main reason behind the disputes between the state and the Kızılbaş groups (the Alevis) was that the state enforced them to settle down in order to control and collect tax easily but they rejected it. Many rebellions in Ottoman Empire (some of the rebellions of this period were named as Şah Kulu Rebellion, Bozoklu Celali Rebellion, Kalender Çelebi Rebellion, and Pir Sultan Abdal Rebellion) were reactions against the central government that did not take any precautions for existing socio-economic corruption. Ocak (1996b:65) tries to support his thesis about the social and economic bases of those rebellions by arguing that some of the Sunnis like the Alevis, have sometimes participated in some rebellions motivated by an objection to the social and economic policies of the central government.

⁵⁰ As the term "Kızılbaş" carries pejorative meanings, the Alevis of modern times seldom use it. "Alevi" supplanted the term only after the end of the nineteenth century (see Melikoff (1998:319).

Sultan Selim I, successor of Sultan Bayezid II launched a vigorous campaign against Shah İsmail and Kızılbaş groups just after he came to power (1512); and in the summer of 1514 Selim I won the major battle of Çaldıran against the Safavids. Those uprisings against Ottoman rule continued also after the battle of Çaldıran and they were violently suppressed. Selim I tried to legitimize his campaign over Kızılbaş groups by instrumentalizing the *ulema* (the Sunni theologians). He charged *ulema* with the duty of condemning Kızılbaş groups and Shah İsmail as “*kafir*” (unbeliever) and “*mülhid*” (rejecting religion) (Tekindağ, 1967:53-55). The violent suppressions of this era were justified as “‘Holy War’ against the heretics who were aiming to degenerate the religion of Islam” (Shaw, 2000:72). Müfti Hamza, İbn-i Kemal and Ebussuud Efendi were the most well known members of the *ulema* in the 16th century Ottoman state, *fatwas* of whom delineated the borders of official discourse towards the Kızılbaş groups in this era. In order to reflect the official discourse of the Ottoman state at the beginning of the 16th century towards the Kızılbaş groups, it is helpful to look at the *fatwas* issued by the *ulema*.

It is not among the aims of this chapter to do a detailed critical discourse analysis of the Ottoman official documents concerning the Kızılbaş groups. However, listing the most noticeable features of these documents (*ferman* (imperial order) and *fatwas*) may be helpful for a better understanding of the era. First, in the *fatwas* issued by *ulema*, it is observed that unequal power relations or dominance is signaled by “positive self-presentation” and “negative other-presentation” in terms of van Dijkian approach of CDA. In such an approach, “our good things” and “their bad things” are emphasized (van Dijk, 1993a). Members of Kızılbaş community were presented with the following words in Ebussuud Efendi’s *fatwas*: “...*baği* (deviant)...*vücuhi kesireden kafir* (infidel in many terms)...*ef’al-i şeni’aları* (their sinful acts)...*mürted* (renegade)...*şer ve fesad* (evil and disorder)” (Düzdağ, 1998:173-178).

Secondly, as for the context, (the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place), it can be pointed out that “social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge”(van

Dijk 1993a:254). Those who have social power have greater access to the tools of persuasion (such as political office) by which they can use strategies to “change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (ibid: 254). When we look at the *fatwas* it can be argued that power of the texts comes from the author’s (*ulema*) privileged access to the official domain due to being a part of Ottoman state structure. Being the constitutive parts of the decision making process related the Kızılbaş issue; the ideas presented by this official text served for the legitimization of the acts of the sultans concerning the issue. Leaning on the political power, the author speaks with an authoritarian tone, and positions himself as the ultimate sovereign of religious matter capable of determining what is right (permissible) and what is wrong (impermissible), and he closes all the doors to any alternative interpretation of Islam other than his orthodox Sunnism.

Contrary to the early periods of the state when there was no clear-cut division of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and there was no clearly stated official ideology under the strict control of Sunni Islam. Starting from the beginning of the 16th century, Sunni interpretation of Islam became dominant in the state apparatus and legal system. Kızılbaş groups were defined out of Islamic domain as a heretic (*rafizi*) and deviant movement. According to Deringil, in this period, Hanafism (*Hanefilik*), a school of Islamic jurisprudence belonging to Sunni tradition, was chosen as “official belief” of the state (1998:48). Main rationale behind this choice was that according to *Hanafi* interpretation of caliphate, “a strong and able ruler was to be recognized as the legitimate sovereign of all Muslims on the condition that he protected Islam and upheld the Şariat...” (ibid: 48). Ottoman central government appointed *Hanafi* judges even to the provinces that were mainly inhabited by members of the other beliefs (Pakalın, 1946:728). Appearance of Sunnism in the Ottoman system at the expense of the other belief systems was also supported and reproduced by educational system of state. Curriculum of Ottoman *medreses* was mainly based on the Sunni belief system; together with *tefsir*, *hadis* and *kelam*, *hidaye* (*Hanafi* jurisprudence), was among the most important courses taught in the Ottoman in these schools (Uzunçarşılı, 1965:29). In addition to the official denial of a legal and legitimate Kızılbaş identity in the Ottoman State, the Sunni majority also perceived them as the

bearers of “heresy, immorality, uncleanness...” These prejudged and defected attributions have not ceased for centuries; continued even in modern Turkey. The term Kızılbaş was equivalent of impious, godless, and heretic (*rafizi*) (Pakalın, 1946:277) in the Ottoman official language. In one of the 16th century Ottoman official document,⁵¹ the criteria to identify Kızılbaş are listed below:

... [T]hey curse and revile the Four Chosen Friends...they openly address Muslims with the words “Yezid geldi”... they assemble at night bringing wives and daughters to their assemblies, where they have disposal of one another’s wives and daughters...they know neither prayer nor fasting...they never call their sons Abu Bakr, Umar or Uthman and, since none of them bear these names it is clear that they are heretics (cited in Imber, 1979:261-262).

By referring to Goffman (1963), I will argue that attribution of these features to a Kızılbaş by the official discourse can be examined as “stigmatization” of Kızılbaş identity by the state through “stigma symbols.” In his writings on social stigmas, Goffman defines the stigma as an attribute or characteristic that is considered deviant or devalued in certain social situations (ibid: 3). Official attributions to the Kızılbaş community as a whole, have been highly discrediting to their social identities for centuries. The level of social interaction between the Kızılbaş community and the Sunnis had been limited because of the mutual prejudices and taboo on both sides.

Experiencing the intensive persecution during the 16th century, the Kızılbaş groups gradually estranged from the Sunni community and retreated to remote areas to escape from further persecution. The distance between orthodox Sunni Islam and heterodoxy increased and the demarcation line between two interpretations solidified. In addition to intense pressures, their complete exclusion from the political center (prestigious political positions were closed for the peripheral Turcomans) made the state apparatus strange and threatening institution in the eyes of Kızılbaş groups (Vergin, 1991:14). This isolation enabled the Kızılbaş groups to develop their peculiar social and cultural structure many of

⁵¹ This document is an official command (*Mühimme Defterleri* 9.80.83) that was sent to *sancakbeyi* (governor) and *kadi* (judge) of Amasya by the central administration requesting investigation of Kızılbaş in the region.

which survived until now. In other words, their seclusion and alienation enabled the Alevis to retain some kind of a cultural specificity and a peculiar form of Islam that has survived until now. For the Kızılbaş community, 16th century is the century of crisis and formation, at the same time. This century is a kind of reference point where an important portion of the belief system of Alevism was formed. Today many discussions, confusions and disputes that define the Alevis stem from this era. In this period, under the strong pressure of state Sunnism, in rural areas the Alevis created their own closed spheres that restricted themselves and strengthened their isolation from public arena by the state. In this closed sphere of Alevism, introversion, endogamy, oral based culture were the prominent and dominant features (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1993:42). Since the 16th century, the Kızılbaş community reproduced itself by means of endogamy and kept its heterodox and esoteric beliefs as a secret against those ones who were not born into the community. Excommunication (*düşkünüük*) has been a deterrent tool of punishment threatening for those ones who married outsiders. In addition to marriage, "cooperation with the outsiders economically or ate with outsiders" were also punished with excommunication; applying to the Sunni state courts was also forbidden (ibid: 41). *Takiyye*⁵² has become a widespread mode of behavior among the Alevis in a hostile environment. They institutionalized a way of life surrounding the figure of *dede*⁵³ (Shankland, 2003:85).

Although the persecution and pressure were the widespread state policy during the 16th century, the complete history of the relations between the Ottoman state and the Kızılbaş community cannot be explained by "persecution." In contrast to the arguments asserted by some scholars of Alevism (Şener, 1998:56; Doğan, 1999:23; Doğanbaş, 1998:50), persecution policies of Selim I can not be generalized for all the Ottoman centuries. There exist changes and fluctuations in the official stance towards the Alevis. As discussed above, in the early Ottoman era there had been relatively harmonious mode of relations between the heterodox Turcomans and the state. After the 16th century, the typical Ottoman official

⁵² The Alevis went underground in this period using *takiyye*, religious dissimulation permitted by all Shiite groups, to conceal their faith (pretending to be Sunnis) and survive in a hostile environment. For more information, see Shankland (2003).

⁵³ Religious leader or holy men in Alevism.

stance has been “disregarding” the Kızılbaş groups, instead of persecuting them (Ortaylı, 1999:43). The Ottomans that however denied their existence officially as a distinct religious community, tacitly tolerated the Kızılbaş groups, unless they form an obvious threat against the state (ibid: 43). That is to say, after a serious geographical, social and political marginalization, the Kızılbaş were tacitly tolerated by the Ottoman central power. Although the non-Muslim minorities were recognized in the *millet* system,⁵⁴ there were no legal regulations and officially determined status of the Kızılbaş groups in that system. Ortaylı argues that especially in the 19th century, although the Ottoman functionaries made negative (sometimes humiliating) statements against the communities sharing similar conditions with the Alevis in *millet* system (such as Nusayris, Yezidis), they never talked about the Alevis in a humiliating manner. Sharing a similar position with Ortaylı, I will argue that the dominant mode of official discourse towards the Alevis after the 16th century can be defined as ignorance or silence, until the end of 19th century. That does not mean that there has been no persecution after the 16th century, there were infrequent persecutions; but as stated by Imber (1979:261) the number of *fermans* commanding the persecution of Kızılbaş decreased in considerable amount since the 1579. The dominant mode of official stance turned into silence and ignorance until the last quarter of the 19th century (the reign of Abdülhamit II).

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the relationships between the Ottoman state and the Alevis progressed with a relatively low profile manner. Also in this “longest century of the empire,” official stance towards the Alevis was strongly affected from the major political changes in the Ottoman state. Because of the changes that occurred in both global and local scale, Ottoman state had to promote “Islamic nationalism” at the last quarter of the century (Yavuz, 1995:358). Due to the Islamist policies of the reign of the sultan Abdülhamit,

⁵⁴ The Ottoman administration provided religion based identities for its segments of population through the *millet* system. The *millet* system had been an important administrative apparatus of Ottoman State since Mehmet II. The *millet* system emerged because of the efforts of the Ottoman administration to control the various religious-ethnic groups it ruled. The system provided, on the one hand, a degree of religious, cultural and ethnic continuity within these communities, while on the other hand it permitted their incorporation into the Ottoman system. The local leaders of the religiously diverse communities had served the intermediaries between the state and their followers. For more information, see (Karpat, 1982:141-170).

heterodox communities became the target of endeavors of assimilation. Abdülhamit II aimed “to develop among the Muslim subjects of the Empire a political identity based upon their common religious identity” (ibid: 359).

In such a historical context, the state rediscovered the Alevis who were attracting growing interest of the Christian missionaries.⁵⁵ For the integration of the Alevis through assimilation, Hamidian regime launched a series of project including census of Kızılbaş population in different parts of the Anatolia, construction of the mosques by the government in the villages of the Alevis, and appointment of *imams* (prayer leader) to these mosques (Deringil, 1998:82). Moreover, central government ordered the local governors to send *ilm-i hal* (the books explaining the principles of Islam) to the Alevi villages because “the number of Kızılbaş in the area [Sivas], while once quite small, has recently increased day by day as a result of their ignorance” (Başbakanlık Arsivleri Y.Mtv 53/108, cited in Deringil, 1998:82). In addition, *mutasarrıfs* (sub-provincial governor) of the regions mostly inhabited by the Alevis were ordered for sending *nasih* (advisor) to the villages; because “if they are left in the villages for some time they can be more effective in saving these poor pagans who have not had their share of salvation” (ibid: 82). By all of these, the “true” form of Islam would be taught to the Alevis who were “suffering from ignorance.” According to Çamuroğlu (1995:69), these policies of assimilation, launched by the state, resulted in considerable amount of conversions among the Alevis into the Sunni Islam.

At the beginning of 20th century, the reign of Abdülhamit was followed by the Young Turks era (1908-1918). In contrast to the Hamidian period, “secular-oriented Turkish nationalism” of Committee for Unity and Progress (CUP) (political parties of Young Turks) alleviated the tensioned relations between the state and the Alevis (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003:56). The Alevis came closer to the CUP because the Committee tried to secularize the state. In other words, secular oriented and nationalist policies of the CUP served to the limitation of the weight of orthodox Sunni Islam in the state administration. Another source of the sympathy among the Alevis towards the Young Turks has been the important

⁵⁵ The article written by Trowbridge (1909:352) shows early signs of this interest.

roles played by the Bektaşis⁵⁶ in the foundation and organizations of the Young Turks who used the Bektaşis as a kind of shelter (Melikoff, 1998:305). To Melikoff, many members of the Young Turks and CUP were also disciples of the Bektaşî order such as Namık Kemal, Abdülhak Hamid, Rıza Tevfik, Talat Paşa. Since the 1826, Bektaşis continued their active existence through their supporters in the high administrative positions including many prince and Sultan Abdülaziz and Sheikh ul-Islam Musa Kazım (ibid: 307). In contrast to the Islamism of Abdülhamit, which was aiming to assimilate the Alevis, Young Turks tried to preserve the Turkish culture against the foreign influences and perceived the Alevis as real members of the Turkish nation (Birdoğan, 1994).

2.2. The Alevis and Official Discourses during the Republican Period

When Turkish Republic was found in 1923, the Alevis were among the enthusiastic supporters of Mustafa Kemal and his reforms attempting to create a secular nation-state. Experiencing highly problematic and contentious relations with the previous political order (the Ottoman State), the Alevis hoped that their positions would be improved by the new order because of its ostensibly secular arrangements and promises. However, it is difficult to argue that their expectations were completely satisfied in practice.

In the early republican period, the new state (considering that dominant Sunni religious heritage of the ancient regime had been the main obstacle to modernization of the state and society) abolished the sultanate and the caliphate, dissolved the shariah (*şeriat*) courts and office of the Sheikh ul-Islam (*Şeyhülislam*). Dervish lodges (*tekke*), and shrines (*zaviye*) were closed down; religious orders were banned with their peculiar ceremonies and meetings. In addition, religious titles, such as *dede* (religious leader in Alevism), *şeyh* (head of

⁵⁶ The Bektaşism is a syncretic religious order founded in the early Ottoman period. This order gained many followers mainly in rural areas. For more information on the relationship between Alevism and Bektaşism, see the previous chapter.

a group of dervishes), *baba* (religious leader in Bektāşism), *seyyid* (a person coming from lineage of the Prophet Muhammad), *çelebi* (leader of a dervish order) were outlawed together with the religious costume, such as *sarık* (turban) and *cübbe* (cloak). On the one hand, these arrangements were affecting not only the Sunnis but also the Alevis since *dede*, *baba*, and *ayin-i cem* (congregational ceremony) were the important parts of their belief system; on the other hand, the newly established religious institution, Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, DİB) was based on only the principles of Sunni Islam. In other words, while the restrictions launched by the Republican state affected the Alevis as well as the Sunnis, newly established religious institutions were arranged only according to the principles of Sunni Islam. In that sense, principles of Alevism were ignored in the formation of new order. Although the new Republic was promising the end of the Sunni domination, by founding a “secular” political and legal system, these operations were signifying the beginning of uneasy relations between the Alevis and the young state.

However, most of the Alevis have never withdrawn their support for the Republic and especially for Mustafa Kemal. Personality of Mustafa Kemal, and the meanings the Alevis attributed to his personality appear as the main reason behind their unconditional supports. The new order was signifying for them the end of a period that began in the time of Yavuz Selim (Vergin, 1991:19). For the Alevis, entrance of Mustafa Kemal to the political arena signifies the end of the reign of Yezid:⁵⁷ “What they had hoped that the Mahdi Shah Ismail would do was now accomplished by Mustafa Kemal: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the disestablishment of the Islamic ulema” (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2003:58).

The relationships between Mustafa Kemal and the Alevis during the Turkish Independence War have always been a source of myth for the Alevis. The meeting between Mustafa Kemal and the Cemaleddin Efendi, the leader of the Bektāşis, was taken as the proof of the unconditional alliance between the Alevis and Kemalists. A “complete participation” of the Alevis to the Turkish Independence War is generally symbolized by the meeting of Mustafa Kemal with

⁵⁷ A historical person who was responsible for the murder of Husayn, son of Ali and one of the Twelve Imams.

Cemaleddin Efendi during the war. But, according to Bruinessen(1997:16-17), the Turkish Independence War and Kemalist movement were perceived as a Turkish-Sunni movement by the Kurdish Alevis in the Eastern Anatolia, and for this reason gained almost no support from them. It is known from the historical records that the two men met; but this meeting was just a part of Mustafa Kemal's inclusive discourse during the war and should not be interpreted as a sign of strong sympathy of him for the Alevis. As clearly showed by Küçük (2002:79-121), indeed Mustafa Kemal was in a state of alliance not only with the Alevis but also with the Sunnis. In spite of their ever-lasting support to Mustafa Kemal and to his principles, the Alevis' expectations were not fulfilled by state. It is interesting that some scholars writing on Alevism ignored the dissatisfaction of the Alevis from the republican arrangements. What is more interesting is that some of them are Alevi. They portrayed nearly a problem free and smooth mode of relation between the state and the Alevis. For example, Öz argues that the system established by the revolutions of Mustafa Kemal has been the system that the Alevis dreamed of for centuries (1989:47). Depicting a similar scene, Başgöz also argues that Turkish Republic "embraced" the Alevis as the real Turks (1982:25). Neglecting the empirical evidence of dissatisfaction of the Alevis from the Sunni based religious arrangements of the republic, Şener argues that "laicism" of the new order pleased the Alevis more than it did others (1998:56). Regarding all the Alevis as a homogeneous group, Zeidan also presents "...Kemalist republic...as the ideal state" for the Alevis (1999:5).

The arguments suggesting that the problematic and conflicting mode of relations between the state and the Alevis concerning the Ottoman period had completely ended since the foundation of the republic; and there has been a problem free mode of relationship between the state and the Alevis seem a little bit problematic. I will argue that although Turkish Republic aimed to establish a secular order in theoretical level, in practice, it reproduced (more or less) the domination of Sunni Islam in both social and political arena over the other interpretations of Islam. With the foundation of Turkish Republic, the problem of Sunni hegemony remained to be one part of state ideology and structure. Because of the fact that DİB has always acted according to the principles of Sunni Islam

and ignored Alevism, Sunnism remained as the only interpretation of Islam that was recognized and sponsored by the state.

Although the religion was kept out of political domain in this period, this did not mean that Kemalist state ended its interest over the religion (Islam). The state launched a series of projects in order to get a modernized and Turkified version of Islam. Translation of Qur'an, sayings of the prophet (*hadis*), sermons (*hutbe*) and call to prayer (*ezan*) into Turkish, and building clean and tidy mosques were among the aims of Kemal Atatürk to reach this aim (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1959:414). The critical point here is that even the Turkified versions of these Islamic practices were mainly the elements of Sunni Islam; and only this Sunni form was recognized as the legitimate form of religion by the state. For these reasons, secularization has stayed as a theoretical and ideal narrative in Turkey.

As I mentioned above, in order to prevent Sunni domination, the Alevis did not hesitate to give their important unconditioned support to the Turkish Republic. However, the post Turkish Independence War period did not meet all of the expectations of the Alevis. With the words of Çamuroğlu: "the 'Alevi Paradise-Anatolia' of the single party regime is a country of tales which gives enjoyment to the listeners, but it did not give the same enjoyment to those who lived there" (1998:114). As a part of the widespread discourse among some Alevi intellectuals, it is argued that "the state pressure on the Alevis has ended together with the Republic" (Zelyut, 1990:291). The event of Dersim (Tunceli), which was generally underestimated or not referred by those circles, has vital importance to understand the relations between the Alevis and the republican state. Mainly Kurdish Alevis,⁵⁸ which had not been brought fully under state control since the Ottoman period, rebelled in 1937 against the central authority. Depending strongly on their tribal laws, the Alevi tribes of Dersim refused to pay taxes and avoided conscription. Their traditional leaders, landlords (*ağa*) and spiritual leaders (*dedes*), having political and religious authority over people, opposed the to the modernization efforts of the republican government such as buildings of schools, roads, military and police posts (Bruinessen, 1994:145). For Beşikçi the

⁵⁸ For a detailed discussion on the identity of Kurdish Alevis see Bruinessen (1997 and 1994).

reason behind the Kurdish Alevi opposition was the so-called Tunceli Law that aimed displacement of Dersim's population to construct new Turkish cities (Beşikçi, 1990:45). In order to suppress the uprising, the government started a military operation in 1937 that lasted two years. The operations were executed with an "unprecedented violence and brutality" (Bruinness, 1994:146) and in these incidents, for the first time, the state bombed its own lands by the air forces (Çamuroğlu, 1998:114). The events were officially presented "as a struggle against backwardness and the oppression of the people by the feudal lords and reactionary religious leaders" (Bruinness, 1994:149), although the victims of the events were the Alevis.

A closer glance to the official documents related with the Dersim issue may be helpful to understand the official stance towards the Alevis in that period. Before Dersim uprising, General Chiefdom of Gendarme (*Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı*) prepared a report called Dersim Report (*Dersim Raporu*) in which the official perceptions towards the Alevis is clearly stated. It is stated in the report that "The worst side of Alevism is that there exists a deep cliff between its Kızılbaş belief and Turkishness...Kızılbaş does not like Sunni Muslim and feed a grudge [for Sunni], Kızılbaş is the enemy of Sunni since the beginning" (*Dersim: Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı Raporu*, 1998:38). The official perspective simply separates Kızılbaş belief and Turkishness, and implies closeness between Sunnism and Turkishness. The report also defines Dersim as "a boil (*çıban*) for Turkey...that has to be operated" (ibid: 170). "[A]bsolute quarantine...exile...to let them go hungry...bombing" (ibid: 173-174) were proposed to "cure" this "sickness." Defining their beliefs (Alevism) as "superstition" (*batıl inanç*) (ibid: 171), the report advises sending "idealist teachers" (*mefkureci muallimler*) to the region in order to transform these "superstitions" to "love of nation." This official discourse toward the Alevis seem quite similar to that of Hamidian period with one difference that while the latter aimed to integrate the Alevis to a broader Islamic ummah, the former aims to integrate them to a nation.

Another report prepared by Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) at the end of 1940s present us important clues to understand how Kemalist elite perceived the Alevis at that time. It should be remembered that

until 1950, CHP had the ultimate power on the determination of state policies. Analyzing the efficient ways of benefiting from the Alevis in the direction of CHP's political aims, the report criticizes the "mistakes" made by the early Kemalists to acquire support of the Alevis. The report, at the beginning, makes a superficial and insufficient description of Alevism, and then advises to "specify" the places inhabited mainly by the Alevis and their hearths (*ocak*) of *dedes*. The report also advises that members of CHP were supposed to do these activities in order to keep the Alevis in CHP's side in the political arena. When the report says, "If they [the Alevis] are oriented well enough, they provide us great benefits" (Tankut, 1994:299), CHP reveals its pragmatic discourse towards the Alevis without recognizing a legitimate Alevi identity.

In the 1930s and 1940s, because of the rigid application of secularist ideology Alevi *dedes* were arrested due to their "illegal" religious activities such as conducting *ayin-i cem*. For a long time, the Alevis did not make a matter of discussion this situation and remained non-reacting.⁵⁹ After World War II, Turkey was transformed into a multi party system and many of the Alevis hesitated to support CHP for a while. Free elections were an opportunity for them to show their dissatisfaction. In the process of the transition to the multi-party regime, they tended to support Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) and adopted the slogan of "Enough! The word belongs to nation" (*Yeter! Söz milletindir*), in the elections of 1950 (Çamuroğlu, 1998:114). If we look at the dispersion of the votes for the political parties in the regions dominantly inhabited by the Alevis, the supports of them to the DP can easily be noticed.⁶⁰ However, the Alevis have withdrawn their support from DP because of the close relationships between the Sunni Islamic groups and DP; and the Alevis voted for the CHP in the elections of 1957 and 1961 (Yavuz, 2003:48). Despite many unfavorable policies of it, in general, the

⁵⁹ Some scholars argue that this non-reacting attitude can be understood or considered as a break off for the Alevis from their archaic world; for example it is argued that as a traditional institution *dedelik* has lost (or at least has lessened) its esteem in the eyes of the Alevis (Subaşı, 2001:153). Different from this argument, I will argue that the silence of the Alevis may result from the fact that suppressions of the Republic towards the traditional Sunni institutions were supposed to have indirectly been advantageous to the Alevis. But, the new Republic ignored the religious plurality of the society and the suppression of the Sunnis did not bring the expected advantageous to the Alevis.

⁶⁰ The percentage of the DP's vote in Tunceli in the elections of 1950 is over % 58 (see Schöler, 1999 for detailed information).

Alevis have become the supporter the CHP throughout Republican period. Main reason behind the temporal support of Alevis for DP was presentation of their dissatisfaction about the policies of the CHP and expression of their social demands. When DP's pro-Sunni performance became apparent (such as construction of new mosques, increase in the number of *İmam-Hatip* schools (prayer leader and preacher schools), establishing *İlahiyat Fakülteleri* (faculty of theology), religious radio broadcasting and lifting the prohibition on Arabic *ezan* (call to prayer)), the Alevis became anxious and took back their support from DP.

As a result of increasing economic problems and DP's suppressive and religiously oriented policies, Turkey entered into a turbulent atmosphere at the end of 1950s. The tension between the Kemalist elite and DP opened the way of a military coup on May 27, 1960. Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, TSK) overthrew DP and suspended democracy. It is interesting that after the military intervention, in order to secure the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the Sunni majority, TSK perpetuated some anti-secular applications of DP period. Indeed, these applications were presented among the main reasons of the military coup such as Arabic *ezan*, *İmam-Hatip Liseleri* and *İlahiyat Fakülteleri*. Revolutionary council of 1961 military coup, Committee of National Unity (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*, MBK), declared on July 25, 1960 that they are not against Islam. MBK presented its aim as "to rescue Islam, which has always been the source of freedom and conscience, from the political misuses and to render it pure and spotless" (cited in Tunçay, 1983:576). In sum, military coup changed nothing concerning the religious organization in Turkey, from which the Alevis were suffering from.

These applications, not only in the pre-1960 period but also in the post-military coup period, were recognized by the Alevis as threats to their existence. Keeping Sunni Islam as the legitimate state religion, the new period, started with the military coup of 1960, also did not change the legal status of Alevism. For example, in 1963, *İstanbul Şehir Tiyatroları* (İstanbul City Theatres), an official institution, staged a play called "*Mum Söndü*" (Candle Extinguished); and the official circles permitted this play and did nothing to intervene it (Otyam,

2002:111) as an expression of their traditional ignorance towards sensitivities of the Alevis.

In the same year *Cumhuriyet*, a daily newspaper, started a serial on Alevism, called *Hu Dost*. The serial's advertisement was not allowed in the state radio because of the expression of "Alevi" was contained in the advertisement. In addition, the military commander of martial law in İstanbul stopped publication of the serial on the ground that the serial makes "separatism" (ibid: 169). Similarly, in 1966, "*Şah Hatayi Gecesi*" (Shah Hatayi Night), arranged by a group Alevi intellectual, was taken to the court. These unjust applications of the state denying the existence of a separate Alevi identity activated one of the early examples of Alevi reactions against the official stance. In 1966, when President Cevdet Sunay declared, "there is no discrimination of Sunni-Shiite in Turkey" more than two thousands Alevi sent telegrams to governmental offices and argued that they were discriminated in many ways by the state functionaries (Tunçay, 1983:566).

As a result of continuous denial and humiliation of Alevi identity, a group of Alevi student came together in İstanbul and Ankara (1963), and prepared a manifesto taking attention to the unjust application of the state for the Alevis, and rejecting the calumniations about them produced by the Sunni majority (Otyam, 2002:112). This manifesto was important in terms of declaration of Alevi dissatisfaction publicly concerning official attitude toward the Alevis; until that time they stayed silence.

This period has also witnessed the establishment of an Alevi political party in 1966 called Union Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Birlik Partisi*, TBP) as a part of the expression of Alevi dissatisfaction. Because of the fact that it was illegal to be organized in any form under the title of "Alevi," the party flag was composed of a lion figure and twelve star around it (the lion were representing Ali and the stars were representing Twelve Imams). Demanding the free exercise of religious practices, the party emphasized the freedom of belief and religion in its program. TBP was taken to the court on the pretext of being a representative of a specific religious group (Şener and İlknur, 1995:69). The party was never fully supported by the Alevis. It got eight deputies out of 450 in the elections of 1969 and only

one deputy in 1973 (Schüler, 1999:165). That was not convenient with the portion of Alevi population in general population.

Being the owner of an oral culture and mostly a rural community, the Alevis experienced a relatively rapid migration movement from their isolated villages to the big cities of Turkey since the 1950s. The economic and social conditions of Turkey forced those living in the rural areas to migrate to the urban areas. The Alevis' confrontation with the modern values, taking place since the beginning of foundation of the Republic, gained a new phase with this flow of migration. It was a turning point for the Alevis to encounter with modern values in the urban area in terms of their tradition and history. Their closed community structure and traditional relationships changed and the common values of the community were also damaged seriously. While trying to integrate in to the urban society, the Alevis had encountered relatively new modern ideologies for them (Şener, 1989:168) and became increasingly secularized (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2000:1), neglecting their traditional institutions. As a part of their secularization process, solidarity ties among them loosened. The previous significance of rituals and ceremonies has decreased; the spiritual leadership (*dedelik*) and religious hierarchy were seriously damaged.⁶¹ This development reached its peak in the 1970s when the majority of the Alevis devoted themselves to the leftist ideologies. Gradual integration of the Alevis to the urban space brought them into closer contact and sometimes in competition with Sunnis. As Kehl-Bodrogi (1996:90) puts it, through education and migration (which supplied an upward mobility for them), a new "Alevi middle class" appeared (teachers, lawyers, doctors), which would be active in the organization of the Alevis in the future.

In the political polarization of the 1970s, an important portion of the young Alevis reinterpreted Alevism in socialist and Marxist way. While the older generation remained tied with a aged traditions and continued to hope for the official recognition from the state, the younger generation became politicized when they encountered revolutionary Marxist thought in urban space by means of universities, trade unions and political parties. The younger and leftist generation

⁶¹ For a discussion on the changes taken place in a traditional institution of the Alevis: *dedelik*, see Yavuz (2003:91-94).

of the Alevis started to interrogate their own religious hierarchy (including *dede*, *rehber*), by labeling them as “feudal exploiters of the masses” (Zeidan, 1999:6). Motivated by socialist ideas, young Alevi activists defended the necessity of a radical restructuring of state and society. In this direction, they reformulated an oppositional discourse towards state because of its efforts to assimilate the Alevis into Sunnism (ibid: 6). According to Bruinessen (1996:8), in the 1970s, radical leftists of Turkey presented past rebellions of the Alevis as pro-communist movements and chosen Alevism as “natural allies” which made the Alevis target of radical rightists.

Parallel to the spread of Marxists ideas among the young Alevis in the 1970s, struggling with the communism became the political priority of the state; and this priority were shared not only by the ultra-nationalists but also by fundamentalist Sunnis of Turkey. Especially during the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) coalitions, which were formed by right wing parties of that time: National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP), Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) and Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), the formula of “3K” (Kızılbaş, Kürt (Kurdish), Komunist (Communist)) signified the most dangerous type of groups for the state. Because of the identification of the Alevis with the radical leftist, they (the Alevis) had been the target of the violence in Kahramanmaraş (1978) and Çorum (1980). During these incidences, security forces supplied little or no protection for the Alevis that increased the level of Alevi dissatisfaction from the official stance concerning to their status (Bora and Can 1991:441; Bruinessen, 1996:9). Although the violence during the late 1970s was presented as left versus right, according to Bora and Can there was also a Sunni versus Alevi dimension of those clashes (1991:445).

The general violence of the 1970s between the radical leftists (revolutionists, *devrimciler*) and ultra-nationalists (idealists, *ülküçüler*) resulted in the military coup of 1980 the results of which hurt the Alevis more than others because of their double “defects” (i.e. being Kızılbaş and communist at the same

time) and the Hacibektaş Festivals⁶² were forbidden for several years. Concerning the official stance towards the Alevis for both the late 1970s and post-1980s, a closer look at the Hacibektaş Festival may be helpful. Although this issue will be analyzed in the following chapters in detail, it should be stated here that no members of state elite appeared in this festival during the late 1970s; the state appeared in the festivals only as suspicious police power by arresting some participants or banning some parts of the festival (Norton, 1992:189). Contrary to absence of state in the festivals during 1970s, we can witness a regular and intense participation of state elite (at the level of president, prime minister and minister) starting from the early 1990s.

An official document prepared by Turkish General Staff (*Genelkurmay Başkanlığı*) in 1980 presents important clues for the question of “what was official discourse of military administration on the Alevis in that period?” In a “Document of Interior Threats” (*İç Tehdit Dokümanı*), signed by Kenan Evren (Chief of General Staff and head of the National Security Council), the Alevis were categorized under the title of “Elements of Inferior Threats” (*İç Tehdit Unsurları*). They were accused of having divisive and destructive potentials for the “national unity and constitutional order of Turkey” (cited in Pehlivan 1993:188). Giving a detailed dispersion of Alevi population in Turkey the report mentions about them as follows:

With fomentation of external powers, the Alevis, who constitute a closed community, try to permeate to the state institutions to gain political effectiveness. When this is not possible, they try to use local state organ in the direction of their interest and try to push state officials and citizens, who do not belong to the Alevi community, out of region. In addition, they [the Alevis] are in cooperation with Kurds (cited in Pehlivan 1993:188).

According to Pehlivan (1993), “Document of Interior Threats” (*İç Tehdit Dokümanı*) was used as guide after the military take over in cleansing the official posts from their Alevi incumbents. Another sign of official attitude towards the

⁶² Since August 16-18 of 1964, nearly every year, the Alevis comes together at Hacibektaş (headquarters of Bektāşi order since 13th century) for the ceremonies of commemoration (*Hacı Bektaş Veli Anma ve Kültür Sanat Etkinlikleri*).

Alevis, after the military coup, can be observed in the words of Governor of Tunceli. Being a retired general, Governor Kenan Güven (as a part of intense Sunnification activities), declared to the Alevis that “If you demand governmental service, demand mosque, first;” and more than 20 mosques were constructed in Tunceli during the reign of governor Güven (ibid: 189).

Since the military coup of 1980, official ideology of the state has been under the stronger influence of Sunni Islam than has ever been before, which signified a greater deviation from Kemalism and secularization. Official state ideology was re-formulated with strong reference to the thesis of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*). This thesis claimed that Islam and Turkishness were parts of an inseparable whole and they form the parts of a harmonious entity since the Turks converted to Islam.⁶³ Through various ways and instruments (such as compulsory religious instruction in the schools, activities of DİB -including construction of new mosques in Alevi villages- and religiously oriented broadcasting of state television TRT) propaganda of Turkish-Islamic synthesis was disseminated by the state.

Negating the differences of Alevism from Sunnism, and trying to integrate Alevism into Sunnism, the state stated by means of the instruments mentioned above that there is no difference between the Alevis and the Sunnis, and that they (the Alevis) were actually Sunnis just having some divergent customs. As part of policy of assimilation and Sunnification, many of the infrastructure services that should be provided by the state in Alevi villages were made conditional on compliance with mosque construction (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2001:46). Because of this Sunni oriented official perspective, many of the Alevis felt that they had been the target of a state-sponsored assimilation into an officially recognized version of orthodox Islam. In addition, official stance of post-1980 era was interpreted by the Alevis as the exclusion of themselves from the state structure. This feeling was expressed by İzzettin Doğan, a prominent leader of Alevi community as follows, “the Alevis cannot become a governor in the state and also never accepted by the military schools” (Doğan, 1995).

It is generally argued that embracement of orthodox Sunnism by the state

⁶³ For more information about Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, see Toprak (1990).

(especially in the post-1980 period) has been among the main reasons behind the Alevi revivalism that took place in late 1980s (Çamuroğlu, 1998a:80). Especially during the governments led by Turgut Özal (the first prime minister after the 1983 elections), the influence of Islam in social and political life became apparent. Flourishing of religious orders and rise of political Islam made the Alevis feel insecure. In addition to the rise of political Islam in Turkey, the collapse of the socialist bloc, signifying end of the Cold War and the failure of the revolutionary left as an alternative way in Turkey, caused the Alevis to ponder their former sympathies with socialist ideas (Vorhoff, 1998b:232). These developments encouraged the Alevis to re-consider their traditional cultural and religious heritages.

Because of mainly these reasons, under the motto of “We have nothing to hide,” the Alevis started to develop their own *sui generis* identities independent from any other ideology by the end of the 1980s. This assertion was led not by traditional religious elite (*dedes*) and institutions but by a new group of intellectuals among the Alevi community and modern forms of organizations including media and non-profit organizations (foundations, associations). Especially publications (books, magazines, newspapers) played a specific role in not only reviving but also reformulation of Alevi culture and tradition (Vorhoff, 1998b:234). As in the case of many other ethnic, national or religious movements, Alevi revivalism also contained reinterpretation (in some cases invention) of Alevi history and tradition. It is important to note that by this assertion for the first time, the Alevis publicly expressed their collective interests before the state and they demanded equality against the Sunni majority. In the polarized conditions of early 1990s, Sivas Massacre (*Sivas Katliamı*, 1993)⁶⁴ and Gazi Events (*Gazi Olayları*, 1995)⁶⁵ motivated the Alevis to join their newly emerging organizations

⁶⁴ The occasion took place during Pir Sultan Abdal Festival in Sivas on July 2, 1993. In this festival, a speech conducted by Aziz Nesin (who declared that he did not believe in Qur'an and involved in the translation of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* into Turkish) was used by Sunni fundamentalists and they set fire to a hotel where 37 people (most of them were Alevi) were incinerated.

⁶⁵ On March 12, 1995, unknown gunmen riddled teahouses with bullets in Gazi District (a district inhabited mainly by the Alevis) of İstanbul, killing one wounding several other Alevi. The Alevis

both in Turkey and abroad. With these incidences, existing motivations among the Alevis gained a new momentum in the direction of creating their independent identities.

As will be argued in the following chapters in this dissertation, early 1990s signify a turning point in terms of the official perceptions concerning the Alevis. According to some scholars, since the early 1990s, secular cadres in military and civil bureaucracy encouraged the Alevi revival against the rise of political Islam (Bruinessen, 1996:8; Yavuz, 2003:82). As Bruinessen put it, increase of Kurdish Workers Party's (PKK) influence among the Kurdish Alevis during the same period, provided another important reason with these authorities to support the rise of Alevism. Emphasizing Turkish nature of Alevism and presentation of saints of the Alevis as state-loyal figures have been the most conspicuous character of the official discourse in this period towards the Alevis. Parallel to the intensification of the PKK terror, the Alevis had become the target of the inclusive state policies against the Kurdish movement. In 1990, as an expression of state support, the organization of the Hacıbektaş Festival (which were depoliticized during 1980s) festival was taken over by the Ministry of Culture. Since then more and more politicians, including the president, attended to this state-sponsored festivals by stressing the Turkish characteristic of Alevism in order to manipulate the Alevis in the direction of regime's aims. Some segments of the Alevis (Kurdish Alevis) felt unhappy about the state's interference in the Hacıbektaş Festival especially when the state representatives stressed the Turkish elements in Alevism. Massicard argues, "Many Kurdish Alevis, refusing the assimilation between Alevism and Bektashism, boycott the event" (Massicard, 2000:29). This can be read as a sign existence of more than one competitive interpretation of Alevism.

Turkish-centered interpretation of Alevism in the state gained a new momentum especially since the February 28 of 1997 when the National Security Board identified Sunni reactionary movements as the main threat to the Republic. In that era, the Alevis and Alevism were presented as defense line against the

of Gazi took the streets in protest and the demonstrator directed their anger to the police. The police shoot into the crowds and killed 21 people.

influence of Arabic mode of Islam over Turkish culture. During the opening ceremony of Hacıbektaş festival on 17 August 1998 Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz expressed in his speech that:

Today, there are people who want to replace our lucent Turkish-Islam with a reactionary Arabic/Persian form of Islam. They want to take control of our conscience claiming that their reference point is Islam. They want to monopolize Islam claiming, “Only those ones who shares our way of life are the Muslims.” They are the separatists. Turkish Muslims are going to give them necessary answers (Cumhuriyet, 1998).

Hacı Bektaş, Yunus Emre and Ahmed Yesevi were also presented as Turkish nationalists and saviors of Turkish culture from the Arab domination. Because of the fact that Turkish can be used during the worship in Alevism and rituals contain elements from the shamanist culture, Alevism was exalted as Turkish-Islam. Since the beginning of the 1990s, appearance of the Alevis in the public sphere increased and they have been an important actor in social and political domain. With the words of Çaha, “the impact of the Alevis in social and political life became so clear that even the 28 February 1997 was associated with the Alevi-orientated generals in the military” (2004:332). Proclamation of the Alevis as the “liberal interpreters of Islam” during February 28 period (28 Şubat süreci) and parallel efforts of Turkish civil and military bureaucracy to protect the secular system against Sunni reactionaries caused resentments in the conservative circles. It has been clearly written in Islamist/conservative media and it has been stated by some politicians that there were Alevi-oriented generals in the army and there were serious clashes between the Sunni and Alevi groups in the army.⁶⁶

By the late 1990s, entering into the European Union (EU) had become a fundamental state policy. Although the history of the relations between Turkey and the EU goes back to the Ankara Treaty (1963), the European Council has recognized Turkey as candidate country at the Helsinki summit of December 1999. Because of the fact that the foreign and domestic policies of Turkey has

⁶⁶ Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the leader of the conservative-nationalist Grand Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*), frequently claimed during the February 28 period that Turkey would never turn into Syria where the Sunni majority are ruled by the Alawi minority.

been under the strong effect of the EU after the Helsinki summit, approaches of the EU circles to the issue of the Alevism have appeared as one of the determinant of the relations between the Alevis and the state. The parameters and the framework, stated for the issue of the Alevism by the EU, will probably be among the determining factors shaping the solution of the issue unless Turkey gives up its national policy (being a full member of the EU). Interventions of the EU may provide new opportunities for the state and the Alevis to solve the mentioned problems (compulsory religious education, applications of the DİB). That is to say, domestic political initiatives and dynamics of Turkey have not been enough to reach a settlement on the debates between the state and the Alevis so far. In this context, harmonization process to the EU serves as a coercive factor in the Turkish politics to reach a solution. Parallel to the intensification of the relationship with the EU, Turkey declared a National Program⁶⁷ on March 19, 2001, which was prepared under the light of the demands of the EU, mentioned in the regular reports. Although the content of the National Program is far from meeting all the expectations of the Alevis, there have been positive developments in the reform packages for them.

At beginning of the twenty first century, the Alevis increased their political activism in order to get equality and official recognition of Alevism with its special characteristics, for legalization of its religious ritual and practice, for inclusion of Alevism in the official education system.

⁶⁷ National Program (available at <http://www.abgs.gov.tr>) contains the list of the jobs that must be done to meet the Copenhagen Criteria.

CHAPTER 3

DISCOURSES OF DIRECTORATE OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS TOWARDS THE ALEVIS

Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) appears as one of the official institutions which have discursive practices on the Alevis. As discussed in the previous chapter, unlike the secular countries of the West, Turkish Republic never intended to separate the political and religious realms; instead, religion (Sunni Islam) was institutionalized in the form of public office and was integrated into state structure. DİB was established in 1924 and was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister. Since then, DİB has been incorporated in the legal scheme of state apparatus, and since 1961, it has been arranged as a constitutional state institution. I argue that foundation of DİB as a part of state structure, and its functions in that structure appear as key points to understand the *sui generis* features of secularism in Turkey. DİB plays important roles in the expression and implementation of officially accepted form of Islam. Representing strict state control over religion, DİB performs its role through its offices and functionaries all over the country. Stating the principles and borders of officially accepted form of Islam, DİB at the same time states what is acceptable and what is not according to this version of Islam. The official channels through which DİB declares its positions are press releases, legal dictums, sermons (*hutbe*), and declarations or interviews of its presidents. Because of the fact that the Alevis appeared in these official texts several times concerning their demands from DİB, in this chapter, I have chosen the official texts produced by DİB as the subject of my analysis. In other words, being an important part of state apparatus, DİB has been among the sites of official discursive practices towards the Alevis, and this chapter will focus on the question of how were the Alevis defined by DİB in these discursive practices; and what kind of discursive strategies were employed by DİB towards the Alevis?

The textual corpus of this chapter was drawn from mainly two sources: 1) institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB concerning the issue of

Alevism in general (and status of congregation houses (*cemevi*) in particular), 2) statements and commentaries of the presidents of DİB concerning the Alevis, expressed through press conferences and interviews at different times. As for the time period, my analysis in this chapter covers the realms of last three presidents of DİB (1987-2005). Firstly, I will do a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the statements of three consecutive president of DİB, namely Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu (1987-1992), Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz (1992-2002) and Ali Bardakoğlu (2003-...). Then, I will focus on the institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB concerning the congregation houses. By doing that I aim to trace changes and continuities in the official discourse of DİB towards the Alevis and make comparisons between different stances (if exist) of its presidents to certain issues.

The corpus of text, which were analyzed in this chapter, were provided to me by Directory of Press and Public Relation (*Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü*) of DİB upon my request which is based on the Law Pertaining to Rights for Information Access (*Bilgi Edinme Kanunu*) promulgated in 2004. Through a series of correspondence with the Directory of Press and Public Relations of DİB, I was invited to DİB, and I was given copies of the texts (institutional press releases, legal dictums and statements of the presidents of DİB) that constitute the corpus of this chapter. Some of these texts (such as the press releases between 2000 and 2005) were also available on the official web page of the presidency. But, some legal dictums do not appear on the web page, and I was given hard copies of these documents by DİB. After examining the institutional press releases and legal dictums of DİB (which are composed of more than 250 pages and only a small portion of them were directly related with Alevism), I have found three of them eligible for this study (the press releases and legal dictums dealing with the issue of congregation houses (*cemevleri*)). These documents were respectively dated as 3.2.2005,⁶⁸ 29.12.2004⁶⁹ and 16.08.1999,⁷⁰ which are composed of 8 pages and 1,935 words.

⁶⁸ This document is a press release and appears on the webpage of DİB. See Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (2005).

⁶⁹ This document is in the form of legal dictums and does not appear on the webpage of DİB.

⁷⁰ Like the previous one this document does not appear on the web page of DİB.

As for the statements of the presidents of DİB, I received three declarations of Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu related with the issue. These declarations were composed of 3 pages and 772 words. These statements were respectively dated as 10.3.1990,⁷¹ 1.1.1991⁷² and 1.1.1992.⁷³ I received five declarations of Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, specifically devoted to issue of Alevism and status of congregation houses (*cemevleri*). These declarations were composed of 12 pages and 4,450 words.⁷⁴ Lastly, I received one comprehensive declaration⁷⁵ of Ali Bardakoğlu, which was analyzed in this chapter; this declaration appeared also in *Kırkbudak* and was composed of about 7,500 words.

Through doing CDA of these texts, I aim to examine the dimensions of DİB's discourse and discursive regularities towards the Alevis and Alevism. How does DİB define Alevism? What kinds of discursive statements and strategies are employed by DİB towards the Alevis?

3.1. The Alevis and Alevism in the Statements of Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu (1987-1992): Discourse of Difference-Blindness

According to the constitution of 1982, presidents of DİB are appointed to the post by the president of Republic upon the advice of prime minister. Yazıcıoğlu was appointed to the post in 1987 by the seventh president of the Republic Kenan Evren upon the advice of Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Yazıcıoğlu

⁷¹ This declaration of Yazıcıoğlu (that will be referred as MSY-1990 from now on) appeared also in *Cumhuriyet* daily on March 10, 1990. See Yazıcıoğlu (1990).

⁷² This statement of Yazıcıoğlu (that will be referred as MSY-1991 from now on) appeared also in *Diyanet Aylık Dergi*, issue: 1, January 1991. See Yazıcıoğlu (1991).

⁷³ Like pervious one this declaration of Yazıcıoğlu (that will be referred as MSY-92 from now on) appeared on *Diyanet Aylık Dergi*, issue: 13, January 1992. See Yazıcıoğlu (1992).

⁷⁴ These five statements were dated respectively as:

- 1- 24.5.1993 (which will be referred as MNY-1993-A, and it appears also in Yılmaz (1996a:81) under the title of "Sünnilik Alevilik Tartışması."
- 2- May, 1993 (which will be referred as MNY-1993-B, and it appears also in Yılmaz (1995:34)
- 3- 13.3.1995 (which will referred as MNY-1995-A, and it appears also in Yılmaz (1996b:8) under the title of "Gaziosmanpaşa Olayları."
- 4- 26.4.1995 (which will be referred as MNY-1995-B, and it appears also in Yılmaz (1996b: 120-122) under the title of "Biz Bir Yüreğin İki Yarısıyız."
- 5- 18.8.2001 (which will be referred as MNY-2001, and it appears also in Çakır and Yılmaz (2001).

⁷⁵ This text is an interview conducted with Bardakoğlu and appeared in *Kırkbudak* monthly in issue: 3 of 2005.

has been a member of Turkish parliament since 2002, and a ministry of state in Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) government, since 2007. The following pages deal with a topical analysis of Yazıcıoğlu's statements concerning the Alevis.

Topics (semantic macrostructure): As proposed by van Dijk, topics may be characterized as the most important or summarizing ideas expressed in a discourse; providing a general idea of what a text is all about, topics control many other component of the text (1984:56). Topics cannot always directly be observed, but are inferred from the text. In that sense, I can summarize the declarations of Yazıcıoğlu by the following topics:

T1- DİB does not discriminate between the Alevis and the Sunnis.

T2- There is no differences between the Alevis and the Sunnis in terms of religion, except for some fine details.

T3- There exist no problem in Turkey originating from religious sects.

T4- Perceiving the Alevis as a separate group from the Sunnis does not correspond to reality.

T5- DİB does not serve on the basis of any particular sect, but serve on the basis of religion which is Islam.

T6- In our country, Islam is the main element that unites and embraces all individuals of society.

T7- Islam is a coherent structure; for this reason, all different interpretations of it aim the same points.

T8- Ensuring the religious and national unity by means of illuminating society according to the principles of Qur'an is the main duty of DİB.

T9- Turkey is surrounded with a fire circle.

T10- Because of geographically strategic and delicate location of Turkey, it is not in favor of Turkey to discuss sensitive issues (such as Alevism).

T11- The existence of compulsory religious education in schools, which is vital and necessary for the development and future of Turkey, does not violate the principle of secularism.

Yazıcıoğlu's statements/arguments were structured mainly around these semantic macrostructures that were defended by a series of supportive arguments in a systematic way.

Schemata: Schemata are defined by van Dijk as "the argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position" (1984:105). I will analyze the reasons and arguments that Yazıcıoğlu provides to defend and justify his opinions and positions, as well as the logical outline, order and built up of argumentations he used in order to make his opinions "plausible" or "reasonable." The schemata that are followed in Yazıcıoğlu's texts can be characterized as follows:

Main argument upon which the others are based on (in the three declarations of Yazıcıoğlu) is that "In our country, there is no difference between the Alevis and the Sunnis in terms of religion." The main reason or rationale behind this argument is justified and defended by several other supportive arguments. For example, it is argued that "Anyone who recognizes Qur'an as the last holy book and Muhammad as the last prophet...and anyone who says 'I am Muslim' are accepted as Muslim...even if they call themselves Sunni or Alevi" (MSY-1990).⁷⁶ "Islam forms a coherent unity; for this reason different understandings in Islam reach the same target, at the end" (MSY-1992). By these and similar arguments Yazıcıoğlu ignores the existence of different interpretations of Islam in Turkey and tries to homogenize a great deal of people in Turkey into one undifferentiated whole, namely, "Muslims" which is indeed a big and general category. These efforts of homogenization under the title of "Muslim" are vital for the coherence of the texts, since in the following part of the declarations Yazıcıoğlu argues that "DİB does not serve on the basis of any particular sect, but serve on the basis of religion which is Islam" (MSY-1990, MSY-1991, MSY-1992). In other words, because of the fact that "DİB serves on the basis of Islam", it is argued that the Alevis, "as a part of Muslim community" are also included in these services. For this reason, the demands of the Alevis from DİB "on the basis of a specific sect" are groundless according to Yazıcıoğlu.

⁷⁶ In the expression of MSY-1990, "MSY" signifies the first letters in the name of Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu; and "1990" signifies the year in which the text was produced.

Another important component of argumentative schemata of the statements is that demands of the Alevis from DİB (in accordance with their beliefs) are not welcomed by Yazıcıoğlu because these demands “endanger” Turkey’s security, since “Turkey is located in a strategic and delicate region, and it is not in favor of Turkey to add new religious delicateness to its delicate situation” (MSY-1990). “Our country is surrounded with a fire circle, and we are passing through a critical era. In such conditions, it is not in favor of Turkey to add new sensitivities to the existing ones” (MSY-1992). Apparently, in these statements, Yazıcıoğlu relates the issue of Alevism and demands of the Alevis with national security concerns. Similarly, the existence of compulsory religious education is also justified with the same arguments that are based on security concerns. According to Yazıcıoğlu a state-sanctioned form of religious education is “beneficial” and “necessary” for “Turkey’s development;” otherwise “the future of our country would be jeopardized” (MSY-1990).

It is also among the mostly repeated arguments in the statements that “DİB provides religious services to all citizens irrespective of their sects and religious understanding and without making any discrimination on the basis of religious sect” (MSY-1990, MSY-1991, MSY-1992). In the texts, current forms and qualities of DİB’s service were justified by Yazıcıoğlu by referring to the existing constitution, laws and regulations. It is clearly argued that what DİB has been doing is harmonious with the legal structure of the state; DİB has to comply with this legal structure (MSY-1991, MSY-1992). Logically, it is inferred that meeting demands of the Alevis is beyond DİB’s will.

Local Meanings: As I discussed in the methodology section, local meanings refer to the analysis of the micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness” (2001:102). For van Dijk, information is implicit when it may be inferred from (the meaning of) a text, without being explicitly expressed by the text.

In that sense, there are several components of implicitness in the texts. For example, when defining the Alevis in the circle of Islam, Yazıcıoğlu says that “Anyone who says ‘I am Muslim’ is accepted as Muslim, even if he/she has some kinds of false beliefs and behaviors” (MSY-1990). By using the expressions of “...even if he/she has some kinds of false beliefs and behaviors” (*Bazı yanlış inanç ve davranışları olsa da*) he implies that the Alevis in Turkey (“although they are Muslims”) have some kind of beliefs and behaviors which are not compatible with Islam. Of course, “Islam” in this implication refers to DİB’s perspective of Islam (Sunni Islam).

In addition, while arguing that DİB serves according to the principles of Islam (MSY-1990, MSY-1992) Yazıcıoğlu states “Basic tenets of Islam concerning to belief and worshipping are apparent...principles of Qur’an are obvious” (MSY-1990). By these statements, he implies that the demands of the Alevis are groundless according to the main principles of Islam and Qur’an. In other words, it is implied that there is no place in Qur’an (principles of which are binding for DİB) for the demands of the Alevis.

Yazıcıoğlu also presupposes that if the demands of the Alevis were met, Turkey’s security would be endangered (MSY-1990, MSY-1992). For this reason, he accuses the Alevis of being insensitive to Turkey’s national security and of being a threat for Turkey’s future by asserting demands that are already “groundless.” In sum, as the head of DİB, Yazıcıoğlu places himself in a position which has monopolistic authority in determining what is acceptable and what is not, not only in the realm of religion but also in the realm of national security.

In his statements, Yazıcıoğlu mentions the “benefits” and “necessities” of compulsory religious education in detail, and provides answers to the question of “why the state has undertaken implementation of religious education?” Ignoring the importance of will and consent of the families for this education, Yazıcıoğlu argues that “Every family may not be at the necessary level of adequacy to give religious education” (MSY-1990). Obviously, he presupposes that every family believes in “benefits” and “necessities” of religious education. As described by van Dijk under the title of “level of specificity and degree of completeness,” sometimes “...irrelevant or dis-preferred information is usually described at

higher levels (of abstraction) and less completely, and preferred information in over-complete, detailed ways” (1993a:275). Similarly, Yazıcıoğlu insistently stress the name of the compulsory religious courses (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*-Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge) and ignores the content of the course. In other words, hiding behind the name of the course, he argues that “instead of imposing specific religion, a general culture of religion is taught in this course” (MSY-1990). Contrary to Yazıcıoğlu’s arguments, it can be argued that principles of Alevism were completely ignored in these books (see Chapter four for a detailed analysis of these books).

Style, Lexicon and Rhetoric: As I discussed in the first chapter, rhetoric is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient by means of devices such as, alliterations, metaphors, metonymy, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, parallelism, comparisons, ironies and us/them comparison (van Dijk, 1993a:278; 1980:131). In the texts, the most conspicuous rhetorical device used by Yazıcıoğlu is rhetorical questions: “If we educate our generations devoid of religious culture, it would be our deficiency, would it not?” (MSY-1990) and “If religious education is abandoned to initiative of the communities, which community, how and according to which criteria will do it?” (MSY-1990). By asking and then providing “appropriate” answers to these questions, Yazıcıoğlu tries to make his words more believable, convincing and coherent.

In addition, Yazıcıoğlu makes use of an inclusive and fatherly rhetoric towards the Alevis when he says, “Without making any discrimination between the Sunnis and the Alevis, it is among the main aims of DİB to embrace (*kucaklamak*) all the citizens...” (MSY-1990, MSY-1991). Contrary to this inclusive rhetoric, in the rest of the text, Yazıcıoğlu makes positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. In other words, he presents DİB in a way that it fulfils its duties in complete neutrality and fairness by taking care of national security and unity. On the other hand he makes a negative presentation of the ones (the Alevis) demanding their rights from DİB, since by doing that they “endanger national unity” (MSY-1990, MSY-1992).

Concerning the style, Yazıcıoğlu makes use of: a) terms of law such as “constitution,” “laws and regulations” (MSY-1990); b) religious terms such as “sect” (*mezhep*), “creed” (*itikat*) and “worship” (*ibadet*) and “religious understanding” (*meşrep*) (MSY-1990, MSY-1992); c) political terms such as “national unity,” “strategic location” (MSY-1990, MSY-1992). He also applies to the statistical data in order to support his arguments when he says “...as persons living in a society %98 of which is composed of Muslims...” (MSY-1990).

Context Models: In van Dijkian CDA, context is defined generally as “the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place;” for van Dijk, context models “allow us to explain what is relevant to social situations for the speech participants” (van Dijk, 2001:108). Now, I will deal with several contextual properties which affect Yazıcıoğlu’s words such as access, setting, and social and historical domains.

a) Access and Setting: As indicated in the methodology section of this study, “power and dominance of groups are measured by their control over (access to) discourse” (van Dijk, 1993a:256). To van Dijk, while ordinary people are passive targets of text or talk produced by the authorities (such as officers, judges, politicians), “members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to the tools of persuasion (such as media, political offices), and control over one or more types of public discourse” (2003:356). In our case, it can be argued that Yazıcıoğlu has some privileges and advantages in accessing to tools of persuasion. First, he is the head of DİB which is the highest official post in the state structure concerning the religious affairs; and the official status and duties of DİB are guaranteed by the constitution. In many cases, presidents and functionaries of DİB legitimize the institution by referring to early republican revolutions of Atatürk. With the amendments made on 3 March 1924, the Ministry of Shariah and Awqaf (*Evkaf ve Şeriye Vekaleti*) was abolished and was replaced with the DİB, an institution attached to the Office of the Prime Minister. Concerning the setting, the President of DİB was given the highest office salary, a red license plate reserved for ministers, and his place in the protocol determined

in accordance with these privileges. Moreover, the statements of Yazıcıoğlu are disseminated by media, which strengthen the power and authority of DİB's discourse all over the country.

b) *Social and Historical Context:* As for specific historical context concerning the statements I will refer to the second chapter in which historical developments of the era was presented in detail. However, it is necessary here to mention about the most important event of early 1990s when the statements were produced. Since the late 1980s, increasing number studies appeared dealing with the issue of Alevism, and the Alevis became the subject of public discussion. The Alevi Manifesto (*Alevilik Bildirgesi*) was written under the patronage of Hamburg Alevi Association in March 1989. It was published in Turkey at the beginning of 1990 with the signatures of more than twenty secular intellectuals coming from both Sunni and Alevi origin. This manifesto constitutes an important step of reassertion of Alevi identity. This manifesto signifies a turning point for the reawakening of Alevism in the post-1980 period. The manifesto was significant since for the first time the Alevis openly declared themselves as a distinct group and asked for their cultural rights from the state. With this manifesto, the Alevis stated that:

This manifesto aims to announce the problems of the Alevis, a branch of Muslimness living in Turkey, and to declare some of their demands...Directorate of Religious Affairs represent only Sunni branch of Islam...The existence of the Alevis is officially denied...The Alevis are demanding congregation houses and schools for their villages, instead of mosques...The principles of Alevism should be available in schools for demanding students...The perspectives of government concerning the Alevis should be changed...(cited in, Zelyut, 1990:1-3).

By this manifesto, the Alevis called for the acceptance of their difference and demanded official recognition from the state.

The statements of Yazıcıoğlu were released under these circumstances. The first declarations of Yazıcıoğlu (MSY-1990) appeared in *Cumhuriyet* daily on 10 March 1990, just after the publication of Alevi Manifesto. Other two

declarations (MSY-1991 and MSY-1992) appeared in *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* (in 1991 and 1992), in relation with specific issues of this magazine dealing with issue of Alevism. For this reason, the texts can be read as a response to demands of the Alevis from DİB; and as discussed above in detail, it claims that DİB represents all the Muslims in Turkey and since the Alevis are Muslims, they do not have right to complain about their conditions.

3.2. The Alevis and Alevism in the Statements of Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz (1992-2002): Discourse of Unity

Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz was appointed to the post of DİB in 1992 and stayed as the president until 2002. In this section, I will analyze five of his declarations. Details concerning these declarations (MNY-1993-A, MNY-1993-B, MNY-1995-A, MNY-1995-B, MNY-2001) were mentioned above (see footnote 7).

Topics: Topics may be characterized as the most important or summarizing ideas expressed in a text/discourse. In that sense, topics provide us the “gist” or “upshot” of a text by telling what a text is about. Providing a general idea of what a text is all about, topics control many other components of the text. Main topics, referred in these five texts, can be summarized as follows:

T1- Since its foundation, DİB has exerted tremendous efforts for unity and fraternity of Muslim citizens in this country.

T2- The discussions on Sunnism and Alevism are artificial; and DİB is impartial in these discussions.

T3- Abrogation of DİB may cause dangerous results for the unity of Muslims living in Turkey.

T4- Among the ordinary people of Turkey, there is no such a problem called Alevi-Sunni distinction. Both the Alevis and the Sunnis love and respect Ali and *Ahl al-Bayt*.⁷⁷

T5- The concepts of Sunnism and Alevism are exploited by some internal and external evil powers for some political and ideological purposes.

⁷⁷ Family of the prophet Muhammad, including Ali (nephew and son in law of the prophet), Fatima (wife of Ali), and their sons Hasan and Husayn.

T6- Discussions on Alevism-Sunnism refer to irritation of religious sensitivities of society, which jeopardize our unity and togetherness.

T7- Anyone who internalizes main principles of Islam (*amentü*) is accepted as Muslim.

T8- Our Alevi citizens accept main principles of Islam; many of them pray (*namaz kılmak*), fast (*oruç tutmak*) and go on pilgrimage to Mecca.

T9- Alevism is not a sect; it is (at the furthest) a mystical interpretation (*tasavvufi yorum*) in Islam.

T10- It cannot be repudiated that Islam is the most important factor that preserves our unity and togetherness.

T11- At bottom, Alevism and Sunnism are the same; there are inconsiderable differences, and they are in detail. The Alevis and the Sunnis come from same origin.

T12- Being in the Islamic circle, Alevism refers to adherence to Ali and family of the Prophet Muhammad.

T13- In Turkey, Alevism is abused by some atheists.

T14- Representation of the Alevis in the structure of DİB is not demanded by all the Alevis, and there are different perspectives among the Alevis concerning this issue.

T15- According to current laws and regulations, representation of the Alevis in the structure of DİB is not possible and at the same time, it is contrary to the project of nation-state which is aimed by Republican willpower.

T16- Congregation houses (*cemevleri*) cannot be assigned as places of worship because this may harm our national unity; mosques are the temples of all the Muslims including the Alevis.

T17- Congregation houses can be categorized as dervish lodges (*dergah*), not as a place of worship. Function of congregation house is different from that of mosque that is a place of worship.

T18- DİB does not aim at sunnification of the Alevis.

As can be seen above, main topics proposed in the statements intensify around following issues: “the importance of social and national unity,” “similarities

between Alevism and Sunnism,” “artificial nature of issue of Alevism,” and “impartial position of DİB against to the problem.”

Schemata: Roughly, schemata refer to the general “argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position” (van Dijk, 1984:105). The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). Text schemata consist of a special order. In other words, they determine what content or argumentative elements come first, second and last; and how arguments will be supported by which sub-arguments. The schemata of the texts (produced by Yılmaz) show the following characteristics:

At first, in the statements, Yılmaz tries to formulate the general opinion that “DİB is neutral against the Alevi-Sunni discussion.” This main argument is defended by means of several sub-arguments. For example, it is stated that “DİB is neutral” because “DİB did not cause the emergence of these kinds of issues; on the contrary, it sheds light on the resolution of such social and religious problems” (MNY-1993-A). “DİB is neutral” because “it is a constitutional institution embracing all the Muslims in this country” (MNY-1995-B, MNY-2001). “DİB is neutral” because “since 1924, it exerted tremendous effort for the unity and fraternity of Muslim citizens.” “DİB is neutral” although “some circles accused of DİB being in relation with these problems (MNY-1993-A).” “DİB is neutral” because “it produces services according to the principles of Qur’an; and no specific sect is represented in its structure (MNY-1995-B).

Arguments defending “neutrality of DİB” were followed by the arguments defending “necessity of DİB.” “Necessity” and “indispensability of DİB for Turkey” is defended by the following sub-arguments: a) “DİB represents the unity of Muslims” (MNY-1993-A), b) “In the absence of DİB, who may guarantee that there would not be a religious anarchy?” (MNY-1993-A). c) “Changing existing structure of DİB contradicts with nation-state project of the Republic” (MNY-2001). In sum, DİB is presented as the assurance of order and unity of citizens living in Turkey; and anyone who criticizes the existing status of DİB is accused of being tools of “ideologically corrupted circles” (MNY-1993-A).

After “proving” “neutrality and necessity of DİB,” Yılmaz tries to substantiate his assertions concerning definition of Alevism, representations of the Alevis in DİB and status of congregation houses. An important portion of the texts was devoted to buttress the following argument that “Alevism is in the circle of Islamic culture.” In order to defend his position, Yılmaz defines Alevism by referring (only) to Islamic symbols and personalities such as “Ali, family of the Prophet Muhammad (*Ahl al-Bayt*), and Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*)” (MNY-1993-A). To this end, Hacı Bektaş Veli (patron saint of Alevism) was also offered to the Alevis as a model Muslim. It is argued that Hacı Bektaş Veli’s way of life or understanding, which involves performing daily prayers (*namaz*), fasting in month of Ramadan and visiting Mecca for pilgrimage, is identical with that of Prophet Muhammad (MNY-1993-B). Yılmaz argues, “We are worrying about those efforts aiming to present Alevism as a separate religion. In our opinion, being a part of Islamic culture, Alevism was effected by Islamic mysticism. Today, the Alevis living in our country...are richness of our people” (MNY-2001). Not being contented with defining Alevism in Islamic circle, Yılmaz also tries to overpass its different aspects from Sunnism. Systematically ignoring many *sui generis* sides of Sunnism and Alevism, Yılmaz tries to identify these two different understanding. He also reduces the differences between two understandings to only some historical disputes “that are not important today:”

Like Sunnis, Alevis are our Muslim brothers. Both Sunnism and Alevism come from same origin (MNY-1995-A). There are important similarities between Alevis and Sunnis. Both of them like and respect Ali and Ahl al-Bayt; like Alevis, Sunnis also name their children after important personalities of our religion such as Ali, Hasan, Husayn and Fatima. Although there were some unimportant controversial issues in the past, none of them was related with principles of belief; these issues emanated from political disputes of the past. Because of the fact that these historical disputes disappeared today, there is no place for Alevi-Sunni distinction (MNY-1993-B).

Concerning the representation of the Alevis in DİB, Yılmaz argues that “representation of the Alevis in the structure of DİB is not possible” (MNY-2001). This idea is justified with the following arguments:

There exist different positions among the Alevis concerning their representations in DİB. We can not say that all of the Alevis demand to be represented in DİB. In practice, it is another problem that who will represent the Alevis in DİB” (MNY-2001).

In addition, Yılmaz supports his argument by referring the existing legal regulations. He asserts that “According to the existing laws and regulations, this representation is not possible. In order to make it possible, DİB must be changed into a ‘Directory of Sects and Religious Orders’ ...which is discordant with Republican will” (MNY-2001, MNY-1995-B).

The argument that “mosques are worshiping houses for both the Alevis and the Sunnis” is another idea of the text that is supported by several connected sub-arguments. The first supportive argument is that: “The arguments, which place congregation houses as alternative worshiping places against the mosques, contradict with historical realities” (MNY-2001). The second one is that: “Defending this historically incorrect idea injures severely the unity of our nation, solidify the divergences among the Muslims and instigate the seditions” (MNY-2001). The third supportive argument is that: “Mosque is open for all persons who define themselves as Muslims whatever their ideas and worldview is” (MNY-1995-B). In addition to these supportive arguments, Yılmaz also asserts that “in many parts of our country there are Alevis who demanded us to built mosques in their villages, or to appoint prayer leader (*imam*) to their mosques”(MNY-1995-B). For this reasons, “mosques are places of worship for all Muslims including the Alevis. Congregation house is not an alternative of mosque; because it is a kind of dervish lodge (*dergah*)” (MNY-1995-B, MNY-2001). Employing these arguments in an organized way, Yılmaz rejects recognizing congregation houses as the worshiping houses of the Alevis, instead he invites them to mosques.

All kind of demands of the Alevis (including demands concerning the congregation houses) are associated by Yılmaz with “separatist and destructive

plans of internal and external shady powers” (MNY-1995-A, MNY-1993-A). It is argued that “evil powers conduct campaigns to create distinction between Alevism and Sunnism; our citizens should not fall into these traps, and should be awake against incitements that aim our unity and togetherness” (MNY-1993-A, MNY-1995-A). According to Yılmaz, it is at the expense of our country to assert Alevi identity independent/distinct from Sunnism; similarly, accepting congregation houses as places of worship injures security and delicate balances of Turkey (MNY-1995-B, MNY-1995-A).

Local Meanings: Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness.” Local meanings are the result of the selection made by speakers or writers in their mental models of events or their beliefs (van Dijk, 2001:103). Vagueness, implicitness, presuppositions and denials appear as the most prominent structures and strategies of local meaning in the discourse of Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz. For example, Yılmaz several times employs the expression of “some circles” vaguely. For example, “...some circles accusing our presidency...some circles always propose abrogation of DİB...some circles demand from us...” (MNY-1993-A). Yılmaz does not specifically explain who these “circles” are, instead he always associate any kind of demands concerning rights of the Alevis with these “some circles” and accuses them being part of “the organized traps and games” set against our citizens” (MNY-1993-A). In that sense, when Yılmaz says “...instead of interrogating themselves, some circles, targets our presidency...” he implicitly blames the victims.⁷⁸ In other words, the Alevis who are demanding their rights are blamed by the source of the unjust applications. In another case, Yılmaz mentions about “some external evil powers who have political and ideological plans on Turkey;” and these external evil powers were blamed by Yılmaz for inciting the Alevis in the direction of damaging Turkey’s national unity and togetherness (MNY-1993-B).

Implicitness: Implicitness can be observed as another feature of local meanings in the statements of Yılmaz. By saying that “The Alevis and the Sunnis are living together in peace and tranquility,” Yılmaz implies that the existing situation is the ideal condition for both the Alevis and the Sunnis (MNY-1993-A). Ignoring the existence of dissatisfactions among the Alevis concerning the applications of DİB, he implies that demands coming from the Alevis will severely injure this existing “peace and tranquility” (MNY-1993-A). The Alevis are advised not to raise any demands, which is the only way of preserving this “peaceful condition.” In another case, Yılmaz implicitly depreciate the fact that belief system of Alevism has been rooted on verbal traditions. In relation with this, he implicitly blames those people who define Alevism with reference to verbal tradition of Alevism. It is stated that “the Alevis do not have written sources that based on Qur’an and sayings of the prophet...Those ones who define Alevism with reference to verbal traditions should not confuse these traditions with main principles of Islam that were set by Qur’an (MNY-1993-B). To define Alevism, Yılmaz gives detailed references from some Islamic disciplines (such as *Tefsir*, *Hadis* and *Siyer*); and he implies that these people (who define Alevism by referring verbal tradition) are uneducated or malevolent because of not referring to written sources of Islam.

Presuppositions: Yılmaz presupposes, several times in MNY-1993-A, that DİB’s stance concerning the issue is the ideal position and most suitable one for Turkey’s “unity and togetherness.” In another case, it is also presupposed that DİB, its functions and perspectives are indispensable for the well-being of this country. And, any argument (including the demands of the Alevis) criticizing the DİB’s position which portrays a homogenous society is “abusive, ideological, separatist and ignorant” (MNY-1993-B, MNY-1995-B). Yılmaz’s perspective can clearly be followed from his expressions:

What will happen if DİB is abrogated? They do not consider the results of this abrogation...Who will represent unity of Muslims...who will guarantee that there will not be a religious anarchy?...The efforts aiming to separate peoples into religious

⁷⁸ This expression is used by Van Dijk (1991:177) in order to unravel the strategies employed by the dominant groups against immigrants or ethnic minorities.

groups and camps have nothing to do with sincerity...these efforts originates from ignorance.

Denials: Existence of a separate Alevi identity, different from Sunni identity, and the problems of the Alevis are denied by Yılmaz especially when he says:

Today %98-99 of our citizens are Muslims...There is no such thing called Alevi-Sunni distinction among the people...But there are efforts aiming to show that there is distinctions...Who is intervening in whose beliefs and worshipping? I am saying: No one (MNY-1993-A). All the citizens of this country were treated equally; there is no discrimination between Alevi and Sunni (MNY-1995-B).

Yılmaz continues to use such a discourse of denial also in MNY-2001. He refuses recognizing congregation houses as worshipping houses of the Alevis and argues that "...mosques are the worship houses of the Alevis, too." He also "fears about the efforts manifesting Alevism as a different religious understanding" and opposes the representation of the Alevis in the structure of DİB. As in the case of MNY-1993-A, also in MNY-2001, Yılmaz defines Alevism only with reference to "Ali, family of the Prophet Muhammad (*Ahl al-Bayt*) and Islamic mysticism (*tasavvuf*)." Implying that these symbols are common among all the Muslims, Yılmaz argues that it is groundless to assert an Alevi identity which "injures the unity of Islam." Just like before (in MNY-1993-A, MNY-1995-B and MNY-1993-B), Yılmaz presupposes in MNY-2001 that demands of the Alevis (such as recognition of congregation houses as their worshipping houses) will inevitably "stroke our nation," and "the Alevis are provoked by some atheists or abusers." Lastly, in MNY-2001, incompleteness appears as an important discursive strategy. Yılmaz stresses the importance of mosque in Islam in over-complete manner. And, less completely, he ignores the meanings and importance of congregation houses for the Alevis; instead, associating them with "abusers and atheists," he tries to marginalize the ones who assume congregation houses as their worshipping houses.

Style and Rhetoric: As discussed in the first chapter, rhetoric is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient.

Style, on the other hand, refers to “the textual result of personally and socially determined variations in language use for the expression of more or less the same meaning or reference...Thus style is linguistic trace of the context in a text” (van Dijk, 1993b:133). For example, certain syntactical and lexical choices in legal or judicial texts, use of technical, legal or political terms may signal the power and prestige of the discourse participant.

In Yılmaz’s discourse, the most conspicuous rhetorical device appears as rhetorical questions. Yılmaz makes full use of rhetorical questions in order to be more convincing; and sometimes he provides answers for his own questions. For example: “What will be the result of abrogation of DİB?...What is the problem? The problem is...Who is intervening in whose belief and worshipping? I am saying: No one” (MNY-1993-A). In addition to rhetorical questions, Yılmaz makes use of us vs. them distinction (positive self- presentation and negative other presentation). In other words, according to him, DİB “has never been the source of the problem...contrarily by staying neutral, it contributed to the solutions of the problems” (MNY-1993-A). On the other hand, “the problems were created” by others who are “abusers, ignorant and atheists” and do not contribute to the “wellbeing” of Turkey (MNY-1993-A, MNY-1993-B, MNY-1995-A, MNY-2001). Comparisons are mostly used with the apparent purpose of comparing features and actions of DİB (us) with that of the others (them): those ones who demand rights for the Alevis. For examples, in the texts, “negative” actions of them are enumerated as “ascribing congregation house to status of place of worship as an alternative to the mosque... injuring our national unity...” (MNY-2001). On the other hand, “DİB protects national unity of Turkey” by not recognizing congregation houses as places of worship (MNY-2001, MNY-1995-B).

Other than rhetorical questions and us vs. them comparisons, didacticism and authoritarianism are the other common rhetorical devices used by Yılmaz in the texts. Behaving like the ultimate authority in religious, legal and social issues, Yılmaz speaks from an authoritarian position and tries to close discussions by imposing what is “right” and what is “wrong” what is “harmful” and what is “beneficial” for the interest of Turkey. Especially in MNY-1993-B and MNY-

1995-B, while defining what is Alevism and status of congregation houses Yılmaz had recourse to authoritarian tones and didacticism; by doing that he gives no place for alternative ideas.

Metaphors appear another rhetorical tool used by Yılmaz to make his arguments more believable. For example, he likens Islam to cement and iron: “Like cement and iron, Islam is a factor that maintains our unity” (MNY-1995-A). In the same text, he also argues that “members of our nation have been living together for centuries like flesh and nail (*etle turnak gibi*) (MNY-1995-A). In MNY-1995-B, Yılmaz states that “We are, the Alevis and the Sunnis, two pieces of same heart; one part can not live without the other.”

Concerning the style, which tells us “what the appropriate use of words is in order to express meaning in a specific situation or discourse” (van Dijk, 1991:209), I observed that Yılmaz employs “statistical data” in expressing his ideas about the number of the Muslims in Turkey and number of the Sunnis in the world. In addition, he refers to the specific dates in history, and to the name of specific historical personalities while presenting his ideas. Some examples illustrating these two features of style that can be observed in the statements:

Today 98-99% of our citizens are Muslims... Since 1924, our presidency...On 13 May 1993, at HBB TV...” (MNY-1993-A). The Sunnis constitute 93% of all Muslims in the world (MNY-1993-B). According to some Islamic scholars such as Abu Hanifa, Shafi, Maliki, Cafer-i Sadık...Some people followed Shah İsmail...99% of villages in Anatolia have mosques (MNY-1995-B).

Other than that, it can be observed that Yılmaz makes use of the religious terminology in his statements, extensively. Sometimes, his word choices approach to the point of esotericism such that meaning of his statements is not understandable for everyone. If “style is linguistic trace of the context in a text” (van Dijk, 1993b:133), esotericisms of Yılmaz’s statements is closely related with his personal features (being a theologian and a bureaucrat at the top of religious bureaucracy). Some examples from the texts: mentioned about *amentü* (main principles of Islam), *ahiret günü* (after-life), *melekler* (angels), *tevhid* (unity)

(MNY-1993-A); *tasavvuf* (Islamic mysticism), *Ahl al-Bayt* (family of the Prophet Muhammad), *mezhep* (sect), *meşrep* (understanding), *tarikât* (religious order) (MNY-2001); *ehl-i sünnet ve'l cemmat* (followers of the Prophet Muhammad and his friends), *selef* (predecessor), *itikadi* (related to belief) (MNY-1993-B); *müçtehid* (religious authority), *müceddit* (reformer in religion), *ilmihal* (catechism), *dergah* (dervish lodge), *dede* (religious leaders in Alevism) (MNY-1995-B).

Because of the fact that the genre of the texts are press conference and interview, Yılmaz uses highly formal language that affects his word choices, too. For example: “Dear members of the press!...I present my respects”(MNY-1993-A). Moreover, I observed that the personal pronoun “I” is rarely used, instead Yılmaz preferred to use “we, our and us.” Similarly, in MNY-2001, Yılmaz prefers to use same formal language and word selection. “I, me and my” are systematically absent in the text, instead “we, our and us” are preferred. By means of the second set of pronouns, it is implied that Yılmaz is speaking in the name of DİB, when he says “We think that...Our presidency...” By means of highly formal use of language and speaking in the name of DİB Yılmaz aims to enhance arguments, tries to make his arguments more believable.

Context Models: As I discussed above, the concept of context refers to the environment or circumstances of an event or discourse. In that sense, context is something that functions as background, settings, surrounding, time and place. Some contextual properties of the Yılmaz’s statement:

a) Access and Setting: As in the case of previous president of DİB, Yılmaz also takes advantage of using mass media in order to transmit his statements. The genre of the MNY-1993-A, MNY-1993-B and MNY-1995-A is a press conference and that of MNY-2001 and MNY-1995-B is an interview. Yılmaz participates to this conferences and interviews as the head of a public office. In several instants of his statements, he refers to the constitutional and legal positions of DİB in the state structure in order to make himself more convincing, and he bases his arguments on the republican principles and the existing legal framework, implying that he represents the existing official order.

Especially in MNY-1993-A and MNY-1993-B he introduces DİB as an indispensable element of republican modernization project that started in early 1920s. Apart from these elements of access and setting which enhance the power and authority of the discourse, it should also be noted that in addition to written media, some portions of the statements of Yılmaz appeared also in TV channels that apparently increased the publicity of his discourses.

b) *Social and Historical Context:* In Chapter Two I have reviewed general historical contexts (concerning 1990s and early 2000s) in which these texts were produced. For this reason, I will not repeat the same historical developments here. However, I will mention some vital points which are directly relate to production of these texts.

It can be argued that there is close relationships between the revival of the Alevi identity and the interest of media on the Alevis and Alevism at the beginning of 1990s. In other words, intensive interest in the written media on Alevism precipitated reassertion of Alevi identity in Turkey. Especially in relation to the statements called as MNY-1993-A and MNY-1993-B, I want to stress the role of private TV channels in publicizing Alevism since the early 1990s. The early 1990s is defined as “the time of media revolution in Turkey” (Yavuz, 1999b:57–85). Many private TV channels and radio stations started to broadcast since that time. Foundation of Magic Box (the first private TV channel broadcasted in Turkey, later entitled as Star TV) in Germany (1990) has been a turning point causing an explosion in the number of private TV channels and radio stations. Following the emergence of Magic Box, many other private TV channels emerged in Turkey in the early 1990s (such as Show TV, Kanal D, Show TV, HBB, ATV, Kanal 6, TGRT and STV). Apart from these national TV channels, numerous local radio stations and TV channels came into the public scene. These privately-owned TV channels and radio stations have become arena where many political and religious identities presented themselves.

The Alevis and their identity were also among the popular issues discussed in these new media channels in Turkey. MNY-1993-A and MNY-1993-B are press conferences arranged by Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz in order to answer the allegations directed to DİB in a TV discussion appeared in HBB TV on May 12,

1993. Although producers of the TV program also invited Yılmaz to the same program (High Tension- *Yüksek Tansiyon*), he preferred not to attend with the excuse that the neutrality of DİB may be damaged. Since the program caused intense discussions all over the country, he necessitated to arrange press conferences to answer the questions directed to DİB. Defining level of the discussion held on the program as “inferior” and status of the participants as “incompetent,” Yılmaz refused all the allegations directed in the program to DİB (see Yılmaz, 1996b and Şener, 1995).

As for the instant historical context of MNY-1995-A, it is necessary to refer to the Gazi Events (*Gazi Olayları*). Gazi Events started on March 12, 1995 with the gunning of tea-houses by unknown gunmen in Gazi District of İstanbul (a district inhabited mainly by the Alevis). Unidentified attacker killed one Alevi person and wounded several others. After this event, a great number of Alevi from different districts of İstanbul came assembled in Gazi to protest the event. The assembled Alevis took the streets in protest. The police have lost the control of the event and shoot into the crowds and killed 21 people. These events were covered by both national and international media; and the event damaged Turkey’s image negatively all over the world (Yaman and Erdemir, 2006:50). After this event, Yılmaz declared a press release addressing both Alevi and Sunni citizens and stressing the importance of protecting unity and togetherness in Turkey.

The historical and social context concerning to MNY-2001 can be summarized as follows. In addition to its religious functions, since 1990s, congregation houses emerged as an important form of institution around which urban Alevi population was organized. However, legal status of congregation houses remained blurry. Although congregation houses continued their (de facto) existence as parts of Alevi associations and foundations, they were not given the legal status of worshiping houses. On the one hand, high state elite (including the president) participated to opening ceremonies of congregation houses, on the other hand DİB insisted not recognizing them as places of worship.

Starting from 1999, the issue has become an important dimension of the relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey. Not only congregation houses, but also other dimensions of Alevi issue were mentioned in the European

Commission's regular reports. In 2000 report of the European Commission, released on November 8, one paragraph was dedicated to the Alevis and their main problems in Turkey in the section of "Criteria for Membership" and under the title of "Civil and Political Rights":

The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and schoolbooks, which would not reflect the Alevi identity, as well as the fact that financial support is only available for the building of the Sunni mosques and religious foundations. These issues are highly sensitive; however, it should be possible to have an open debate about them (European Commission, 2000:18).

In this historical context, Yılmaz rejected to recognize congregation houses as worshiping houses. Arguing that "abusers are provoking the Alevis...they are aiming our unity," he continued DİB's insistent position with the excuse of preserving national unity.

3.3. The Alevis and Alevism in the Statements of Ali Bardakoğlu (2003-present): Discourse of Integration

Ali Bardakoğlu was appointed to the post of DİB in 2002; and as of 2008 he is the president of DİB. In this section, I will analyze his statement⁷⁹ that can be seen on the official web page of DİB. Main topics or macro propositions of the text can be summarized as follows:

T1- DİB, which was authorized to produce accurate knowledge of Islam, performs its duties in accordance with secularism and main principles of the republic.

T2- Serving on the basis of citizenship, DİB was not based on a specific Islamic understanding (such as Sunnism, Alevism). Instead, it was based on a general Islamic understanding that covers all sub-Islamic/intra-Islamic beliefs.

⁷⁹ This statement, consisting 7553 words, is very comprehensive interview that appeared also in *Kırkbudak* (a monthly journal) in July 2005. The interview was completely devoted to the issue of Alevism and problems of the Alevis. The interview will be mentioned as Bardakoğlu-2005 from now on.

T3- DİB produces integrationist and uniting religious knowledge that corresponds to common points among all the Muslims; DİB is not supposed to provide other than these common services.

T4- DİB's main aims are social peace, social integration and national unity.

T5- The Alevis are our brothers and richness; they are free to conduct their rituals, but these rituals are not among the common denominators of Islam.

T6- The Alevis are not different from the majority (Sunni Muslims) in terms of their beliefs.

T7- DİB is not against congregation houses or congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*); but congregation house are not places of worship and congregational ceremony is not a form of worshiping according to Islam.

T8- Demands concerning the status of congregation houses are political in nature, and these demands aim to separate the Alevis from majority. These ideas are imported from abroad, and are instigated under the effect of European Union process.

T9- Even if people define themselves as the members of a separate religion, this does not mean that they automatically belong to that religion; and that does not mean that there exist such a religion.

T10- Alevism is an intra-Islamic formation and congregation houses are cultural centers and mystical places.

T11- The Alevis are not a minority; on the contrary, they are fundamental elements of this society.

T12- Compulsory religious education is a necessity in this country. On the other hand, demands of the Alevis concerning the inclusion of Alevism in these courses are reasonable and acceptable.

T13- Existence of DİB does not contradict with the principle of secularism.

T14- In Turkey's European Union membership process, structure and duties of DİB should be reconsidered on the basis of transparency, civility and inclusiveness.

T15- The Alevis do not constitute a homogeneous community.

T16- DİB does not impose any specific Islamic understanding on the Alevis.

Schemata: Ali Bardakoğlu makes use of particular argumentative moves and statements (including generalizations), to make the conclusion plausible, and credible. Through argumentative moves, Bardakoğlu aims to respond to possible objections or counter arguments coming from real or possible/imaginary opponents. The schemata of Bardakoğlu-2005 show the following characteristics:

As well as the republican revolutions, legal and constitutional structure of the state is referred in the text in order to legitimize the existing status and functions of DİB. In order to stress “DİB’s necessity” for Turkey it is argued that: “DİB is one of the important projects of republic (p.4)...Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave special importance to foundation of DİB (p.20)...Constitutional duty of DİB is to enlighten society correctly about the principles of Islam...” (p.8). Apart from these supportive arguments, Bardakoğlu also searched answers for the question of “what will happen in the absence of DİB?” To answer his own question he argued that “DİB is the source of social peace (p.4)...There are serious problems in other Islamic countries where religious affairs were left to religious communities (p.20).” The “legitimacy” and “necessity” of DİB is based upon mainly these supportive arguments.

After the legitimacy of DİB was “secured,” one of the main propositions of the text, “neutrality of DİB,” is defended by means of a series of sub-arguments. For example, it is argued that:

Leaning on basic Islamic sources, scientific and objective criteria and demands of people, DİB produces correct information...DİB serves on the basis of citizenship...DİB does not refer to any specific sect or understanding, instead it refers to general religious understanding...common points of Islam (p.5).

These arguments, about the “neutrality” of DİB, were organized, at the same time, to contribute to its legitimacy. Similar arguments were proposed in order to justify construction of mosques by DİB in Alevi villages. According to Bardakoğlu, DİB, which has always remained neutral, does not impose a specific Islamic understanding (Sunnism) on the Alevis (p.23). As for the construction of

mosques, he asserts “There are mosques and *imams* in many Alevi villages but we have never been coercive in this issue. Besides, our Alevi citizens are not against the mosques and *imams*. Religion is a fundamental need of people (p.23).”

In the next step of his argumentative schemata, Bardakoğlu explains what he means by “common points of Islam.” He argues that:

Anyone who believes in God, Qur’an, the prophet and the after-life is our Muslim brother. These are the common points of Islam (p.5)...The mosques are the common worshiping houses of all the Muslims in the world (p.7)...The daily prayers are the common form of worshiping among the Muslims(p.8).

On the basis of these “common points,” “the Alevis are in the Islamic circle (p.9).” However, “congregation houses of the Alevis are not in the common points of Islam...For this reason, inclusion of congregation houses as part of DİB’s service structure may damage our efforts in the direction of social integrity and national unity (p.6).” To Bardakoğlu, it is not possible to recognize congregation houses as places of worship according to “Islamic sources, Islamic tradition and history of Islam (p.14).” In addition to these obstacles, “the existing laws and regulations” are also pointed out by DİB as another barrier to the Alevi demands. Even if the Alevis recognize congregation houses as their places of worship, “this does not correspond with historical experience, scientific and objective thought (p.7).”

In Bardakoğlu-2005, demands of the Alevis are closely associated with “purposeful and malicious intervention” (p.18) of the EU. This argument is exemplified by the EU’s definition about the Alevis. Bardakoğlu states that “If strangers define some segments of our society as minority, this means an intervention to our interior affairs (p.18).” In the text, it is also advised “to be careful against the demands aiming to separate the Alevis from the majority (p.12).”

Does the existing status of DİB contradict with principle of secularism? The answer of Bardakoğlu for this question is “No.” He tries to substantiate his position by employing the following supportive arguments:

Turkey has achieved to reconcile religion with secularism...DİB does not intervene to the sphere of legislation, execution, jurisdiction and public administration...On the other hand, the politicians and state elite are not interested in religious affairs, too...We do not let the politics enter into the mosques (p.20).

According to Bardakoğlu, “contrary to the allegations,” Turkey can be presented as a “model country” concerning the relationship between state and religion and DİB contributes to this “model” picture (p.20).

Different from two previous presidents of DİB, Bardakoğlu accepts “reasonableness” of inclusion of Alevism in compulsory religious courses. For him Alevism should be included as a “richness of Islam.” In the text, this “reasonableness” is conditioned by the principle of DİB that “Alevism is an intra-Islamic understanding (p.18).” Again, different from two previous presidents, he accepts the possibility of changes in the structure of DİB, instead of presenting it as an “ideal institution.” Bardakoğlu argues that “in Turkey’s European Union membership process, structure and duties of DİB should be reconsidered on the basis of transparency, civility and inclusiveness” (p.18).

Local Meanings: Although macro level analysis gives main characteristics of Bardakloğlu’s discourse towards the Alevis, it is necessary to make an analysis at micro level of words, sentence and paragraphs to observe possible discriminations, bias, implicitness, presumptions and negligence and contradictions. Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness” (2004b:136).

a) Implicitness: When Bardakoğlu presents DİB as a republican project and associates it with Atatürk, he implies that interrogating DİB and its functions in the state structure corresponds to interrogating Atatürk and his republic. This implication becomes more obvious when Bardakoğlu mentions the foundation of DİB together with the foundation of General Staff (*Genelkurmay Başkanlığı*): “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established DİB and General Staff by the same law...” (p.20). Bardakoğlu also implies that these two institutions were assigned

to similar and vital duties: “social togetherness and peace” (p.20). Similar to the statements of two previous presidents of DİB, in Bardakoğlu-2005 the issue of Alevism is evaluated on the basis of “national security,” and it is implied that demands of the Alevis have the capacity of putting national security of Turkey in danger. Another implied meaning that can be inferred from the text is that: majority of the Alevis in Turkey are happy with DİB’s applications (including the mosques in their villages built by DİB); for this reason any sign of dissatisfaction coming from the Alevis is evaluated as being “imported and created” in nature.

b) Presumptions: Several times in the text “God, the Prophet Muhammad, Ali, Hasan, Husayn, *Ahl al-Bayt*, Hacı Bektaş and Yunus Emre” are referred as the common figures among the Sunnis and the Alevis. In addition, these figures are presented to prove the argument that “The Alevis are not different from the majority [Sunni Muslims] in terms of their beliefs.” It can be argued that Bardakoğlu presume that these symbols carry the same meaning both in Sunni and Alevi traditions. Contrary to this presumption, these figures have different meanings and connotations in both traditions. The Alevis revere these symbols but this does not guarantee existence of a homogenous Muslim society in Turkey. Same with the other two presidents, Bardakoğlu also insist to presume that more than one interpretation of Islam harms Turkey’s national unity.

c) Contradictions: Contradictions appear among the prominent features of Bardakoğlu-2005. For example, at the beginning of the text Bardakoğlu refrains from defining the Alevis by arguing that “...I do not have the right of defining what the Alevis are, do I?... If I define them, it will be a sign of disrespect to them (p.7).” After stating this principle, later in the text, he draws a framework for the Alevis and Alevism, and justifies policies of DİB on this ground. Some of the definitions of Bardakoğlu for the Alevis and Alevism: “Alevism is an intra-Islamic formation... congregation houses are cultural centers and mystical places... Alevism is a traditional differentiation in Islam...”

In Bardakoğlu-2005, “demands of people” is presented among the factors that determine kinds and nature of the services provided by DİB. But, later people (especially the Alevis) are deprived from right of asserting their demands; and “lack of historical experience and scientific and objective thought” were presented

by DİB as an obstacle before these demands. In addition, it is not clearly stated what do “historical experience and objective thought” mean and how they function in the qualifying people’s demands. Instead, these criteria stay as vague expressions.

Style and rhetoric: When Bardakoğlu formulates his opinions about the Alevis and Alevism, he recourses to several rhetorical devices (such as, generalizations, rhetorical questions, us/them comparisons, didacticism and authoritarianism) that aims to make his expressions more plausible and acceptable.

Bardakoğlu makes full use of rhetorical questions in order to be more convincing and to provide reasonable context for his arguments. For example:

They [the Alevis] also believe in God, prophet, after-life and the book...Then, what is the problem? (p.6)...I do not have the right of defining the Alevis, do I? (P.7)... Can we recognize these places as places of worship? (p.7)... I should frankly say that we cannot state this. Why cannot we state it? (p.8)... What is the constitutional duty of DİB? (p.8)... If I accept the requests of every person who ask me to recognize his/her behavior as worshipping, am I counted as loyal to my duties? No (p.9)...What happens if the religious affairs are left to the religious groups? (p.20).

In the text, Bardaoğlu employs comparisons to prove his arguments. In discussing the place of Alevism in “intra-Islamic groups,” he makes comparisons between Alevism and Shiism. While trying to construct ties between Alevism and Sunnism, he obviously tries to distance Alevism from Shiism:

There are tendencies that try to place Alevism and Shiism on the same side. I do not agree with the arguments that assert that Alevism and Shiism are the same. This is completely wrong... There are many differences between them in terms of their historical experience, understanding, positions and stance...(p.16).

Bardakoğlu refers to generalizations by underestimating some part of the picture and overestimating some other parts of it. For example, in explaining “necessity” of compulsory religious education, he argues, “Main body of our

society is religious... The society has a tendency toward religiosity...the society is in search of religiosity...(p.19).” In his other generalization, he implies that Alevis are happy with DİB’s mosque constructions in their villages (p.23). Obviously, he ignores segments of society that are not religious; similarly, he ignores an important portion of the Alevis that are not happy with DİB’s mosque constructions in their villages.

There are features of tolerant and inclusive rhetoric towards the Alevis in the text. For example, Bardakoğlu is tolerant against the Alevis when he said, “Let the Alevis live their religious freedoms... we support them, they are our brothers...we embrace them with affection and respect...we are not against their congregation houses, traditions...” (p.6). But, sometimes this tolerant rhetoric turns into authoritative one:

Look, listen this properly [*Bakın, iyi dinleyin bunu*]...Look, write these exactly [*Bakın, aynen yazın bunları*]...Our Alevi brothers can attend their congregation houses and can conduct their congregational ceremony; but they can not demand us to recognize congregation houses as places of worship (p.12).”

As in the case of previous texts studied in this chapter, my analysis shows that same kind of comparisons between us and them appears also as the frequent rhetorical feature of Bardakoğlu-2005. Comparisons are mostly used for the purpose of comparing properties or actions of DİB (us) and the others demanding rights of the Alevis (them). According to Bardakoğlu, on the one hand, there are “ideological organizations” and “imported” ideas aiming to separate the Alevis from the main body; on the other side, there is DİB “aiming to maintain social integration and national unity.”

Context: The most conspicuous characteristic of the social and historical context where the text was produced was the intervention of the European Union (EU) to the issue. Intervention of the EU provided new parameters and framework through its regular reports concerning the issue. The interview with Bardakoğlu was conducted under the effect of (especially) 2004 Regular Report of the European Commission that mentions about the Alevis four times under the title of “Civil and Political Rights” as follows:

As far as the situation of the non-Sunni Muslim minorities is concerned, there has been no change in their status. The Alevis are not officially recognized as a religious community, they often experience difficulties in opening in places of worship and compulsory religious instruction in schools fails to acknowledge non-Sunni identities. The parents of an Alevi child have a case regarding compulsory religious education pending before the ECHR. Most of the Alevis claim that as a secular state Turkey should treat all religions equally and should not directly support one particular religion (the Sunnis) as it currently does through the Diyanet. (European Commission, 2004:44)

Different from the previous reports, 2004 report of the EU, for the first time, pointed out the difficulties of the Alevis in opening places of worship” (*cemevi*). The report also mentions about a specific legal case (pending before the European Court of Human Rights) of parents of an Alevi child regarding the compulsory religious education. In addition, under the title of “General Evaluation” it is stated that “The Alevis are still not recognized as a Muslim minority” (European Commission, 2004:166). The Alevis were defined in the report as the object of a systematic violation of rights and freedoms. The existence of such an issue was defined among the issues that have to be remedied in the EU accession process. The regular report referred to the shortcomings of minority protection in Turkey; and it demands official recognition for the Alevis from Turkish government. Demands of the EU on minority freedoms have caused fears and prejudices rooted deep in Turkey’s history. Majority of public opinion and Turkish state perceived the debates on minority rights and freedoms as a part of the plot that aims national fragmentation and collapse of the national order established through an independence war upon the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The painful experience of the late Ottoman period, when non-Muslim minorities cooperated with the external powers and declared their independence from the empire, may be one of the reasons behind the Turkish state’s fears concerning the discussion on minority rights. As will be discussed below the concept of “minority” has been main source of resentment for most the Alevis. As argued by Özdalga (2008:195), this frosty attitude of the Alevis and the state towards the

concept of minority is closely related with the negative conceptualization of “minority” in the legacy of the Ottoman period.

The EU has advised Turkey to give the Alevis status of minority that caused anger and mistrust towards the EU circles in the government, the presidency, the bureaucracy (including DİB) and almost all of the opposition parties of Turkey. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer declared that discussions, in Turkey, concerning the minority rights are “destructive;” he also stated that every citizen of the state irrespective of his/her religion is a “Turk” and is bound to the state with tie of citizenship (Radikal, 2004a). Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, ruling out any official recognition of Muslim minorities, stated that “Turkey does not recognize a new definition of minority other than the one recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). The treaty states that non-Muslims are the only minorities in Turkey” (Hürriyet, 2004a). In addition, Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which deems itself responsible for maintenance of unity of Turkey, show its discontent concerning the concept of “Muslim minority rights” via a declaration presented by Deputy Chief of General Staff General İlker Başbuğ. Başbuğ criticized the EU’s definition of minority arguing “This definition contradicted the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey is a unitary state. This is not open for discussion” (Radikal, 2004b). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan evaluated the issue by commenting, “Contentions from the EU appear in front of us making the effort to fragment us” that shocked the EU circles (Zaman, 2005).

Although, the EU explicitly perceives them as “minority” in the regular reports, many of the Alevis do not consider themselves as minority. Indeed, as shown by Erdemir, there is more than one position among the Alevis towards both the regular reports and intervention of the EU circles to the issue of the Alevism (2005:9). Categorically most of the Alevis support Turkey’s EU membership process and aware of the fact that the EU membership process would provide them with legal opportunities to solve their problems in Turkey. On the other hand, they differ in evaluating the level and forms of the EU’s intervention to the issue. While some of them approach positively to the EU regular reports, some others were not satisfied with the conceptualizations and framework presented in

the reports concerning the Alevism, especially the concept of “minority” has been main source of resentment for them. Some examples concerning the two different positions among the Alevis:

For example, Turgut Öker, the executive director of the Confederation of European Alevi Unions, and Ali Doğan, the executive director of the Federation of Alevi-Bektaşî Unions, demanded solutions for the problems of the Alevis from the Turkish government. Öker and Doğan have based their demands on the regular reports of the Commission where the main problems of the Alevis were mentioned (Zaman, 2004). Öker also argued, “All the definitions and citations related with the Alevis in the regular report of 2004 are completely results of our efforts” (Akşam, 2005). On the other hand, many other Alevis reject the title of “minority” arguing that the Alevis are one of the main elements (*ana unsur*) of Turkish society. Öker and Doğan were criticized and accused by many other Alevi intellectuals for accepting the definitions of the regular reports including the expression of “minority” and attempting to bargain with the government in the name of the Alevis (Zaman, 2004).

Sharing the same position with the official stance (presented above) about the minority concept of the regular reports for the Alevis, İzzettin Doğan (Professor at Galatasaray University and the chairperson of the Cem Foundation) argued that the Alevis do not want to acquire minority status or to be protected by the EU. For him the Alevis just want equal rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of worship and equality before the law according to Article 10 of the Constitution. Doğan declared that:

The expression in the reports exceeds the criteria stated in the Lausanne Treaty for this reason it is wrong to discuss the Alevis in the frame of the concept of minority...The EU process of Turkey may provide us a lot of benefits. The EU corresponds some standards concerning the freedom of faith. Inescapably, Turkey has to comply with them. Even if we do not say anything, Europe will discuss the problems of Alevis (Hürriyet, 2004b).

Ali Yıldırım, the president of the Centre for the Researches of Alevism, shares a similar position. He also opposes to the definition of the Commission concerning the Alevis as “non-Sunni minority” but happy with the references

made in the reports about the discriminations and unequal treatments towards the Alevis (Hürriyet, 2004b). Positions of both Doğan and Yıldırım share the same confusion. On the one hand, they seem desirous to resort to the means of European system to obtain the rights of the Alevis, on the other hand they do not want to injure their loyalty to the republican state by accepting the expressions of the regular report on the definition of the minorities that exceeds the principles of Lausanne Treaty. I argue that another possible reason behind the reactions of the Alevis to the expression of “minority” is that the concept has negative connotations in Turkish society. Attribution of the status of minority for themselves was regarded as an insult by most of the Alevis.

The reactions of the Alevis reached its peak when they demanded a change for the expression of “non-Sunni minority” from the European Parliament. The Alevi-Bektaşî Federation has applied to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the European Parliament for the change. European Parliament extracted the expression from the text and decided to mention the necessity of legally recognition of Alevism as a *sui generis* belief system in the forthcoming report (Birgün, 2004). The parliament based this change on the principle of “every belief system has the right of determining itself.” Moreover, it is stated in declaration of the Congress of Alevi-Bektaşî Dedes and Babas of Turkey (held on October, 29-30, 2005 and more than 350 person were participated) that the Alevis are not minority group but founding members of the state.

In the discussions, commenced by the release of the regular reports, the positions of the representatives of the Alevis who do not accept the label of minority surprised the EU circles. Confused with situation, Hans Jörg Kretshmer (representative of the European Commission in 2005) argued that “They [the Alevis] react to the word of minority in the regular reports. But they also react against the words of the prime minister who do not define congregation houses as places of worship” (cited in, Sarıkaya, 2005). According to Kretshmer, on the one hand, the Alevis do not accept to be defined as minority group; on the other hand they are at the same time demanding minority rights.

Another important contextual elements affecting the statements of Bardakoğlu was the judicial process concerning the status of congregation houses.

On July 12, 2003, a series of legislative regulations was made in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM) under the title of the Sixth Harmonization Package (*Altıncı Uyum Paketi*) which was part of the series of reforms towards the full membership of Turkey to the EU. In the Sixth Harmonization Package, one of the amendments was related with the law # 3194, Law of Public Improvement (*İmar Kanunu*). With the changes made on the law, the expression of “mosque” (*cami*) was changed into “worshipping house” (*ibadethane*) aiming to provide freedom of construction of their worshipping houses to the different belief communities (Resmi Gazete, 2003). Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association (*Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği*, PSAKD), which is one of the most widespread and influential Alevi organizations in Turkey, applied to the Head Official of Kartal (*Kartal Kaymakamlığı*) to get a permission for building a congregation house on the plot of the land numbered with 75 and 76. These plots of land were reserved for the place of worship houses in the public improvement plan (*imar planı*). In spite of the fact that the related regulation in the Sixth Harmonization Package states that “...in the provinces and sub-provinces with the permission of the governor (*vali/kaymakam*) the worshipping houses can be constructed” the Head Official of Kartal (*Kartal Kaymakamlığı*) did not give the permission of constructing congregation house to the PSAKD. The Head Official rejected the demand of PSAKD declaring that “congregation houses are partially worship houses” (Milliyet, 2004). Claiming that the decision of the Head Official prevented the right of worship of the Alevis, PSAKD applied to the administrative court and wanted to stop the execution process of the decision on September 9, 2004 (Milliyet, 2004).

A similar incident took place in Çankaya, a sub-province of Ankara. A group of Alevi, under the title of Çankaya Association of Congregation House Construction (*Çankaya Cemevi Yaptırma Derneği*, ÇCYD), applied to the Head Official of Çankaya (*Çankaya Kaymakamlığı*) to construct a congregation house on the land reserved for the construction worshipping houses. Head Official of Çankaya sent the application to the Governor of Ankara (*Ankara Valiliği*) and Governor of Ankara sent it to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (*İçişleri Bakanlığı*) and finally the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs sent the application to DİB.

DİB rejected the demand of the Alevis stating that except for the mosques and small mosques (*mescit*) there is no other place of worship in the history of Islam.

Most of the statements of Bardakoğlu, in the text, were directly or indirectly related with these dimensions of the issue just portrayed above. In Bardakoğlu's arguments, official sensitivities, complaints and reservations can easily be observed, especially concerning the EU's intervention to the issue. As it can be inferred from the text, Bardakoğlu perceived the EU's demands from Turkey related with the rights of the Alevis as sinister interventions that threaten national unity of the country. As for the administrative and judicial cases related with the status of congregation houses, convictions of DİB and Bardakoğlu are decisively important because the administrative or judicial units demand legal dictums from DİB concerning the issue before replying the demands of the Alevis.

3.4. Official Press Releases and Legal Dictums of DİB on the Issue of Congregation Houses

In the following pages, I will do a CDA of three official documents which were provided to me by DİB. Being a part of state apparatus, DİB is the highest official institution concerning the religious issues. In this section, discursive practices of DİB will be analyzed through its one press release⁸⁰ and two legal dictums⁸¹ about the status of congregation houses. Following van Dijkian approach of CDA, I will focus on the properties of the text (such as topics, schemata, local meanings, style and rhetoric), and properties of context in which discourse was created (such as access patterns, settings and participants).

DİB plays important roles in the expression of official discourse towards the Alevis through a variety of official texts. These are press releases, interviews, periodicals, sermons (*hutbe*), and declarations or interviews of the presidents of DİB. Analyzing three specific texts that have similar characteristic in terms of

⁸⁰ This press release (will be referred as DİB-2005 from now on) is available also at www.diyaret.gov.tr (dated as 3.2.2005). In this text, DİB declares its official convictions about congregation houses to public opinion.

⁸¹ The first one of these documents (that will be referred as DİB-1999 from now on) was sent by DİB to the Ministry of Internal Affairs upon the request of the ministry, in 1999. The second legal

form and content, I aim to reveal the regularities in DİB's discourse towards the Alevis and Alevism in general and towards the congregation houses in particular. How does DİB define the Alevis and Alevism? What kinds of discursive statements and strategies are employed by DİB towards the Alevis? What is the role of DİB in the production and reproduction of official discourses towards the Alevis?

Topics: Topics will be my first analytical category in analyzing the DİB's legal documents. As mentioned above, topics can be defined as "semantic macrostructures" or "global meaning that language users constitute in discourse production," and it tells us what a discourse is roughly about (van Dijk, 2001:101). Topics give us the most important or summarizing information of a discourse. In order to understand the gist of a text, reading the topics forms initial step. The topics or "macro propositions" of the three legal documents can be summarized as follows:

T1- DİB is providing religious services on the basis of principles of secularism and citizenship.

T2 – Embracing everyone on the basis of covering identity of Muslimness, DİB does not make any discrimination, and treats equally to all intra-Islamic formations and groups.

T3- Alevism and Bektashism, being important parts of our cultural identity, are intra-Islamic formations.

T4- Because of the fact that worshiping place of Islam is mosque, congregation houses cannot be perceived as place of worship (as an alternative and equivalent to mosques).

T5- In addition to Islamic theory or practice of fourteen centuries, doctrine of Alevism-Bektashism and historical realities also shows that congregation houses are not places of worship.

T6- Efforts of presenting congregation houses as worshiping places, like mosques, would lead to a division threatening our national unity and integrity.

dictum (that will be referred as DİB-2004) was dated as 29.12.2004 and sent to İstanbul Governorship by DİB.

T7- It is inconvenient to build congregation houses for conducting congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*), according to the existing laws and regulations.

T8- Until today, our society managed to maintain its unity and togetherness only because of non-discriminatory policies of DİB.

T9-The efforts of defining Alevism out of Islamic sphere is not compatible with Alevism.

The topics or macrostructures obtained from the texts represent general principles that govern DİB's discourses on the Alevis. One can also reduce these nine topics mentioned above into a more general expression: DİB's perceptions about the Alevis, positioning them as intra-Islamic entities, are harmonious with priorities of official ideology as stated in the constitution. In other words, DİB intends to protect Kemalist form of secularism and tries to guarantee "national unity and integrity." Necessity of maintaining "national unity and integrity" appears as the main governing theme in DİB's discourse towards the Alevis.

Schemata: In addition to topics, complexity of argumentative framework will be analyzed as one of the most obvious formal structure of the texts. Being harmonious with the general priorities of official ideology (namely nationalism and secularism), the argumentative framework used in the texts is based on the illusion of a homogeneous society. As for the general schemata of the texts, I determined a series of propositions and conclusion that was reached as a result of these propositions. In other words, in three texts following statements were proposed:

Proposition 1: "% 99 of our nation is composed of Muslims."

Proposition 2: "Our Alevi and Bektashi citizens are also Muslims... because they have no holy book other than Qur'an and no prophet other than Muhammad."

Proposition 3: "According to fourteen hundreds years-old theory and practice of Islam, mosque is the place of worship for all Muslims..."

After assertion of these propositions, it is concluded that due to the fact that the Alevis are Muslims "...presentation of congregation houses as places of

worship [as equivalent to mosque] is not possible according to scientific criteria and historical experience of Islam.” In addition, it is also concluded that “presentation of congregation houses as places of worship [as equivalent to mosque] threaten our national unity.”

Despite the fact that DİB does not recognize congregation houses as places of worship, it does not, also, completely reject the existence of these places; congregation houses are recognized by DİB as “cultural and mystic richness that should be protected” (DİB-2005:2). The argumentative structure of the texts, several times omits or accuses the counter information or thesis about the status of the congregation houses. In the texts, it is asserted that the arguments presenting congregation houses as sanctuaries of the Alevis “jeopardize our national unity and integrity” (DİB-2005:2), and that these arguments produce “artificial problems for our nation” (DİB-2004:2). Ignoring counter arguments, DİB states that “there is a social consensus about the fact that mosques and *mescids* (small mosques) are places of worship for all Muslims” (DİB-1999:1).

Local Meanings: The next analytical category that will be used in analyzing DİB’s official documents is the local meanings such as the meanings of words, the structures of propositions, implications, presuppositions, vagueness, indirectness, etc. For van Dijk unequal power relations or dominance is signaled by positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (1993a:275). In such an approach, “our good things” and “their bad things” are emphasized. For this reason, local meanings may reflect the trace of such an effort. Local meanings are the results of the choice made by the author of text (under the effects of their ideologies or their socially shared beliefs) and these meanings aim to influence opinions and attitudes of the receivers.

a) In three legal documents, one can easily realize the positive self-presentation of DİB and negative other-presentation. DİB makes a positive self-presentation when it says:

...DİB fulfills its duties in a sound and scientific manner... without making any discrimination... Directorate of Religious Affairs is a public organization... keeping the same distance to all intra-Islamic

formations...not making any comparison or evaluation between them, and providing sound and steady services...to ensure social integrity and unity (DİB-2005:1).

On the contrary, DİB negatively presents the ones (the Alevis) who “would lead to a division threatening our national unity and integrity” by “presenting congregation houses as places of worship like a mosque...” (DİB-2005:1).

In DİB-2005, in addition to the Alevis, the daily *Radikal* was also accused of “...paving the way to certain misunderstandings and misinterpretations” and failing to publish DİB’s statement, thus violating the provisions of Article 19 of the Law on Press. Making strong polarization between the sides of the issue, DİB positions itself on the “positive” side (as a mistake-free actor), and positions the Alevis and some members of the press on the negative side (as the actors threatening the national unity). This polarization and negative other-presentation repeats itself also in DİB-2004 as follows: “Nowadays the efforts of some circles, aiming to define Alevism as a separate religion, sect or culture out of Islamic sphere, contradict with the origin of Alevism” (p.1). Also in DİB-1999, demands of the Alevis concerning the status of congregation houses are considered by the DİB as a treat to the national unity and social togetherness:

Our nation, %99 of it is composed of Muslims, has no sanctuary other than mosques and *mescids* (small mosques). Our Alevi citizens also attend to the mosques to fulfill their prayers (*namaz*)...For this reason, this issue is the basic condition of our religious and national unity and wellbeing (DİB-1999:2).

b) *Implicitness*: In CDA, implicitness, indirect meanings, allusions and vagueness are also among sub-categories of local meanings. The information is called implicit when “it may be inferred from the meaning of a text, without being explicitly expressed by the text” and implicit meanings are parts of underlying beliefs (van Dijk, 2001:104). In the texts, there are some propositions that were implied but not directly expressed. For example, when DİB mentions “the fragility of the subject,” the expression “fragility of the subject” (DİB 2005:1) implies that the issue may be the source of possible conflicts and tensions in the country. DİB implies that attempts of presenting the congregation houses as the

equivalence of the mosques may risk the existing religious order, established in early republican period, with the foundation of DİB as a republican institution. “Fragility” may also imply the existence of the possibility of clashes between Sunni majority and the Alevis, since, in the near history, the Alevis have been the target of sectarian violence in many parts of Turkey.

Note also that, DİB proposes that “attempts of presenting congregation houses as equivalence of the mosques” is not harmonious with “historical practice and scientific criteria” as well as with the doctrine of Alevism-Bektashism (DİB-2005:2, DİB-2004:1, DİB-1999:1). It is implied here that the Alevis are not aware of historical and scientific “facts,” and this unawareness includes their own traditions and doctrine. In that sense, DİB implies its absolute authority in deciding what is scientifically and historically true and what the traditions and doctrine of the Alevis consists of.

In addition, in DİB-2004, when demands of the Alevis about the status of congregation houses were defined as “artificial” (p.2), it is implied that there is no such problem in reality, and these demands are provoked by “some circles” who want to separate Alevism from Islam. In DİB-1999, concerning the content and meaning of congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cems*) it is argued that “In our history of culture and folklore, ‘Ayin-i Cem’ is known as a kind of meeting assembly (*toplantı meclisi*) arranged by the Alevis and Bektashis... During these meetings, lute is performed...” (p.1). It is implied here that congregational ceremony is not religious worshipping; instead, it is a kind of folkloric activity.

c) Vagueness: DİB, through the texts, defends its arguments by making use of the expressions that are devoid of definite meanings and defective with vagueness. For example, meanings and contents of the following expression may change from person to person: “DİB...fulfills its duties in a sound and scientific manner” (DİB-2005:1), “under the supra-identity of Islam,” (DİB 2004:1) “to ensure social /national integrity and unity” (DİB-2005:1, DİB-2004:1), “historical practice and scientific criteria” (DİB-2005:1). What is “scientific” and what is not; what kinds of attitudes may injure “the national unity,” more importantly, what is “national unity,” and how can demands of the Alevis injure this unity? These questions are among cloudy points in the texts that need clarification. In addition,

it is not clearly defined from whom “some circlers” (who are trying to separate the Alevism from Islam) (DİB-2004:2) are composed of.

d) *Presumptions:* It is commonly presumed in three texts that any interpretation of Islam (other than that of DİB) is necessarily harmful for “national unity and social togetherness” of Turkey. In addition, it is also presumed that preventing demands of the Alevis is the only way to prevent “highly delicate social balance” in Turkey. The presidency claims also to be the representative of the majority, including a great deal of the Alevis. This is inferred from the following statements: “Place of worship in Islamic religion is mosque...Alevism is... an intra-Islamic belief and religious conception... An extensive majority of our Alevi citizens also think so” (DİB-2005:1-2, DİB-2004:2).

Style and Rhetoric: These structures of text (such as syntactic styles, rhetorical figures, and lexical styles) are much less consciously controllable ones by the creators (van Dijk, 1993b:133). “These forms generally do not directly express the underlying meanings and hence beliefs, but rather signal pragmatic properties of a communicative event, such as the intention, current mood or emotions or speakers...” (van Dijk, 2001:106). For van Dijk, “whether we call someone a “freedom fighter” a “rebel” or “terrorist” is a lexical choice that is very much dependent on our opinion of such a person, and such an opinion in turn depends on our ideological position, and the attitudes we have about the group that person belongs to” (2000b:42).

Lexical and syntactic style in three texts is much more formal and carries the features of a typical official correspondence. Texts are full of the technical terms relating to law such as the names of administrative and legal institutions, and names, number and dates of the laws and the correspondences related with the issue:

...under its resolution dated as 02.09.2004 and numbered 1261, our directory rejected this request on the grounds that as per Article 1 of the Law numbered 633...(DİB-2005:1)...According to article 174 of the Constitution...the law numbered 677 and named as “The Law about the Prohibition of Dervish Lodges and Shrines and Abrogation of Several Titles”...(DİB-2004:1)

This esoteric narration continues with the use of Islamic terms such as, *dergah* (dervish convent), *tekke* (dervish lodge), *zaviye* (small dervish lodge), *mezhep* (sect), *meşrep* (religious understanding) and *tarikât* (religious order) (DİB-2005:1-2); *içtima* (gathering), *fırka* (division), *dergah* (dervish convent), *tekke* (dervish lodge), (DİB-1999:1). As a result, these terminological expressions result in a highly esoteric and opaque discourse for ordinary recipients. As in the case of the lexical choice mentioned above (declaring someone as freedom fighter or terrorist), the demands of the Alevis concerning the congregation houses were perceived and expressed by DİB as “division.” DİB’s choice of word in defining the congregation houses is also interesting. The presidency defines the congregation house with the following words: “a richness having original, cultural and mystical identity and mission,” “...which merits preservation” (DİB-2005:2). A congregation house is approved by DİB with only these characteristics (congregation house as a cultural institution does not “violate the national unity and integrity”); but not approved with its religious characteristics (that definitely “violate our national unity and integrity”).

In terms of rhetoric, the texts also show the typical characteristic of authoritative and didactic discourse. It is didactic when it says:

A sanctuary of a religion should not be confused with the places where academic, moral, cultural or similar activities related to that religion are performed. Alevism is not a division from the main body of Islamic culture, but an integral part of it. Attempt at presenting congregation houses as a place of worship like a mosque, church or synagogue, although they are defined as a dervish convent, dervish lodge or house of supplication in the Alevi-Bektashi culture and traditions, cannot be reconciled with historical practice and scientific criteria (DİB-2005:2)...In history of Islam there are mosques and small mosques but not congregation houses... Dictionary meaning of *cem* is... (DİB-1999:1)... *Makalat* contains the gist of Islamic principles...The titles, such as Alevi and Sunni were given to us later... (DİB-2004:2).

This didactic rhetoric gains authoritative tones and seems not open to the alternative views, when the text says:

The sanctuary of the Islamic religion is mosque. Since our Alevi or Bektashi citizens do not have a holy book other than the Qur'an and they do not have a prophet other than the Prophet Muhammad, Alevism is, however defined in particular, an intra-Islamic belief and religious conception (DİB-2005:2)... This is the historical reality of past and today (DİB-2004:2).

Underestimating some part of the picture and overestimating some other part of it, the texts recourse to generalizations such as, “Our citizens, who define themselves as Alevi and Bektashi, attend to the mosques in order to practice their daily prayers (*namaz*)” (DİB-1999:1); “...Most of the Alevis thinks that...” (DİB-2005:2). Obviously, DİB ignores the existence of a lot of Alevi people who do not attend to mosques, and do not practice daily prayer.

Context Models: Context, in van Dijk, is defined as the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place. He argues that “context models control all levels of style of discourse, such as lexical choice, pronouns, syntactic structure and other grammatical choices that depend on how situations are defined” (2001:108). Context models also include mental representations (results from immediate, interactional situations such as politics, economy) that govern lots of the features of discourse production such as genre, access, setting and participants. For van Dijk, context models “allow us to explain what is relevant to social situations for the speech participants” (ibid: 108).

-Genre, Access and Setting. To van Dijk “social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge” (1993a:254). Those who have social power have greater access to the tools of persuasion (such as the media, political office) by which they can use strategies to “change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (ibid: 254). When we look at the texts of this study, it can be argued that power of the text or DİB’s power (as an author of the text) comes from its privileged access to the official domain due to its status of being a state apparatus/institution. The ideas presented in this official text reflect the perceptions of DİB concerning the Alevis and status of congregation houses. More importantly, the same set of ideas are also constitutive parts of the decision

making process of some other state organs related to the issue. For example, judicial (courts) and administrative (governorships) state organs determine their position under the effect of legal dictums released by DİB. Moreover, the power and authority of DİB's discourse is strengthened by its *sui generis* functions and authorization in the state system. That is to say, DİB is the highest state organ in the system concerning the religious affairs and its position and missions are defined and guaranteed in the constitution. In addition to these elements of setting, DİB also has the advantage of using the media opportunities in order to spread its perceptions. The press releases of the presidency generally appear in all segments of media including the state television, TRT. It should also be taken into consideration that more than sixty thousand of mosques and their religious functionaries, all over the country, function as the channels of dissemination of DİB's perspective concerning any specific issue through weekly sermons.

It can be argued that the overall societal domain in which the texts and the discursive practice take place is that of the civil and political rights (more specifically the freedom of religion). The main actor in the texts is DİB answering back to the demands of the Alevis who tries to realize their freedom of religion. The addressee of the texts, as explicitly set in the texts, is the public opinion in general, but the related public authorities (courts, governors) and the Alevis in particular.

-General Social and Historical Context. Since 1980s, political movements based on religious identities have become visible in the public sphere parallel to the emergence of the identity politics in many parts of the world. In terms of the assertion of the diverse religious identities, the post-1980 period corresponded a new era in Turkey. As one of the groups, newly emerging in social and political arena, the Alevis appeared in the public sphere at the end of the 1980s. By questioning the existing system, the Alevis demanded a series of rights (including the demands concerning their sanctuaries: congregation houses) in line with their group identity.

Parallel to the revival of Alevism at the beginning of 1990s, the density of the relationship between the state and the Alevis increased. Alevi organizations have been at the centre of both this revivalism and the relationships with the state.

For this reason, it is necessary to focus on the organizational structure of the Alevis to evaluate their responses to the state discourse. Sometimes, these responses emerged in the form protesting an official practice, and some other times in the form of demanding official recognition from the state. As an important dimension of the Alevi revivalism in 1990s, hundreds of Alevi organizations (generally under the title of association and foundation) have been established. Violent incidents aiming the existence of the Alevis, such as the Sivas Massacre (1993) accelerated the establishment of those organizations. These organizations have played important roles for the Alevis in demanding official recognition from the state. In addition to the associations and foundations, the shrine complexes and congregation houses appeared as two other forms of Alevi organizations.

But, as I stated above the legal status of the congregation houses has been the matter of dispute between the state and the Alevis. Alevi organizations, in different parts of Turkey, several times applied to the local authorities to get permission for building congregation houses on the plot of the lands that was reserved as the place of worship houses in the public improvement plans. As was mentioned above, Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association (PSAKD), an influential Alevi organization in Turkey, made an application to the Head Official of Kartal in 2004, to get permission for building a congregation house on the plot of the land numbered with 75 and 76. Although the plots of land that were reserved for construction of worshipping house in the public improvement plan, authorities rejected the demand of PSCA and declared that congregation houses are not places of worship. Claiming that the decision of the Head Official governor prevented Alevis' right of worshipping, PSACA applied to the administrative court and wanted to stop the execution process of the decision on September 9, 2004. Before denying the demands of the Alevis, local authorities asked for the opinion of DİB. Upon the request of local authorities, DİB has examined the issue through its related institutions (Higher Board of Religious Affairs) and explained its official convictions. Results of this examination have been forwarded to the relevant state authorities and to the public opinion. The two texts, which were

analyzed in this section of the study, were formed under the effect of mainly these conjectural incidences.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

The press releases, legal dictums, and official statements of presidents of DİB (analyzed in this chapter) can be interpreted (at least) at two levels. First, the content of the documents signify the official discourses of DİB concerning the Alevis. Second, through these documents DİB affects the formation of official practices of other state organs (such as the courts and governorships) concerning the issue. The general perspective or point of view that DİB adopts through the texts is based on the protection and legitimization of the existing legal system and secular order (with its official version that is peculiar to Turkey). Leaning upon its legally defined status and functions in this secular system, DİB tries also to delegitimize the ones who interrogate existing form of secular order and the role of DİB in this order.

As a result of a CDA of official documents of DİB (press releases and legal dictums) and the official statements of its three consecutive presidents, namely Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu (1987-1992), Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz (1992-2002) and Ali Bardakoğlu (2003-present), I identified some set of common and continues discursive strategies and regularities concerning the Alevis and Alevism, as well as some newly emerged discursive practices towards the Alevis.

First of all, without exception, in all of the documents analyzed in this chapter, Alevism and the Alevis were placed in the Islamic circle. However Alevism and Islam were associated differently. On the one hand, identifying Alevism with Sunnism, Yazıcıoğlu and Yılmaz see almost no difference between these two. Reductionism is the main discursive strategy employed by Yazıcıoğlu and Yılmaz; reducing Alevism to love of *Ahl al-Bayt*, they consider that Alevism and Sunnism are the same. On the other hand, Alevism was recognized as one of the specific Islamic understanding or “intra-Islamic traditional differentiation” by Bardakoğlu. But, Bardakoğlu’s recognition is limited with cultural realm. That is to say, congregation houses were recognized as “cultural centers” but not as “places of worship.” In harmonious with this perspective, congregational

ceremony (*ayin-i cem*) was defined as folkloric activity in one of the legal dictums of DİB. In any case, right of self-definition of the Alevis is rejected, which is exclusively stated by Bardakoğlu.

It is also stated unanimously in the texts that functioning on the basis of Islam, not on the basis of a specific sect, DİB does not make a discrimination against the Alevis; for this reason the Alevis are not seen as the victims of any unjust application. Denial of existence of a problem appears as a common discursive strategy in these official texts. DİB proclaims its “neutrality” and chooses to stay indifferent to the issue of Alevism.

It can be argued that DİB perceives Islam as one of the elements that unites society together. In relation with this, role and functions DİB was defined as “protecting national unity and social togetherness.” Especially in the statements of the three presidents it is asserted that by emphasizing common points among all the Muslims and by producing uniting Islamic knowledge, DİB aims to protect social peace, social togetherness and social integration. That is to say, DİB is maintaining national and religious unity by preserving its current Islamic perspective and by sustaining existing order concerning the supply of religious services. For this reason, demands of the Alevis interrogating this order and current perspective of DİB, are perceived as a threat for national unity and social togetherness. In relation with this, the last three presidents of DİB refrained from recognizing congregation houses as places of worship and congregational ceremony as a form of worshiping; they stated this kind of recognition would violate unity of Muslims.

It is another common discursive regularity in the official texts of DİB that the issue of Alevism has always been associated with national security and security concerns of Turkey. Alevism has always been characterized as a “delicate issue” that may threaten “social peace and sensitive domestic balances of Turkey.” It is asserted that separation between the Alevis and the Sunnis may jeopardize security of Turkey which is at the centre of fire circle because of its geographical position. In connection with this, the Alevis have always been accused of being open to manipulations and misuses of both “foreign and internal abusers who aim to injure unity of Turkey, and to separate the Alevis from the

Sunnis.” For this reason, demands of the Alevis (especially related with the status of congregation houses) were considered as “artificial” and closely connected with “malicious purposes of foreign and internal circles.” By proclaiming Alevism as a delicate issue being closely related with Turkey’s vital national security concerns, DİB try to close discussion and try to carry demands of the Alevis away from the field of debate.

Although the three presidents of DİB asserted unanimously that DİB does not aim at sunnification of the Alevis, it is obvious that the peculiarities that differentiate the Alevis from the Sunnis were systematically ignored. Categorizing all the Alevis under the broad title of “Muslim,” they assume the existence of a homogeneous Muslim community in terms of belief and worshipping practices. Their assumptions about the existence of a homogeneous Muslim community are based on the myth of common points among all the Muslims of Turkey. Sometimes this assumption reaches to misrepresentation of the Alevis; in the texts, the Alevis are portrayed as Muslims observing daily prayers, attending mosques and fasting in Ramadan.

In order to make demands of the Alevis groundless, the three presidents of DİB recourse to the discourse of blaming the Alevis for being ignorant of Islamic sources (such as Qur’an, sayings of the prophet) and their own history and tradition. For the same purpose, sometimes the Alevis were accused of having false beliefs and practices. While evaluating demands of the Alevis, the three presidents have always interpreted the existing legal structure at the expense of the Alevis; they generally argued that existing laws and regulations in Turkey do not allow them to meet demands of the Alevis. This strategy also serves in the direction of closing discussions on the issue of Alevism.

Keeping in mind these basic discursive regularities and common points in official discourse of DİB, I should also refer to some newly emerged discursive practices and strategies. Comparing to Yazıcıoğlu and Yılmaz, Bardakoğlu has more moderate approach and recognizes congregation houses as cultural centers. In addition, as partially stated above, Bardakoğlu accepts that the Alevis have some set of rituals (such as congregational ceremony) different from the Sunnis. But, he rejects to accept that these rituals are among the forms of worshipping

recognized by Islam. In other words, he respects the Alevis' rituals, but rejects to provide religious services for the Alevis via the resources of DİB, because these rituals are not among the "common points." Another new discursive practice in Bardakoğlu's statement is that he systematically tries to distance Alevism from Shiism. Stressing differentiating point between Alevism and Shiism, Bardakoğlu tries Alevism to bring close Sunnism.

Different from two previous presidents of DİB, who believed in necessity of compulsory religious education with its Sunni-oriented form, Bardakoğlu accepts "reasonableness" of inclusion of Alevism in the compulsory religious courses. Main rationale behind the positions of two previous presidents was that they (Yazıcıoğlu and Yılmaz) almost identified Alevism with Sunnism. On the contrary, for Bardakoğlu, Alevism should be included in these courses as an "intra-Islamic cultural richness," but not a separate belief system. In other words, "reasonableness of inclusion" is conditioned by the principle that "Alevism is an intra-Islamic understanding." Again, different from two previous presidents, Bardakoğlu accepts the possibility of changes in the structure of DİB, instead of presenting it as an "ideal institution." Bardakoğlu argues that "in Turkey's European Union membership process, structure and duties of DİB should be reconsidered on the basis of transparency, civility and inclusiveness."

DİB's discourses on the Alevis, are harmonious with priorities of official ideology as stated in the constitution. In other words, DİB intends to protect Kemalist form of secularism and tries to guarantee "national unity and integrity." Necessity of maintaining "national unity and integrity" appears as the main governing theme in DİB's discourse towards the Alevis.

CHAPTER 4

DISCOURSES TOWARDS THE ALEVIS IN COMPULSORY RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: THE CASE OF SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS (DKAB) AND RELATED CURRICULUM

As discussed in the previous chapters, main aim of critical discourse analysis (CDA), in van Dijkian sense, is to provide “an account of intricate relationships between text, talk, ideology, power, society and culture” (van Dijk, 1993a:253). Following this principle, this chapter will intend to uncover the implicit arguments and meanings in texts (curriculum and textbooks) which tend to marginalize non-dominant groups (the Alevis), while justifying the values, beliefs, and ideologies of dominant groups (the Sunnis). This chapter examines some of the discursive strategies and discursive regularities of the Ministry of Education (*Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*, MEB) (as one of the state apparatus) concerning the Alevis in the educational system.

The corpus of this chapter is composed of specified portions of textbooks of compulsory religious courses, Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, DKAB from now on), and the related curriculum. The leading questions of this chapter will be: How were the Alevis included or excluded in the school textbooks and in the curriculum of DKAB? In other words, how did MEB define the Alevis? What kind of discursive strategies and regularities were employed by MEB towards the Alevis in textbooks and curriculum of DKAB? In this chapter, school textbooks of DKAB (only those ones published by MEB) will be taken as one of the material manifestations of official discourse. Together with the textbooks of DKAB, main curriculum of DKAB, which was prepared by the MEB, will also be perceived as one of the sites of official discourse in the educational sphere. In this thesis, textbooks refer to the set of state-sanctioned (obligatory) standard books used by the students at elementary and high schools. In order to analyze the official discourse in the context of religious education, I will do a CDA of eighth, tenth and eleventh-

grade textbooks of DKAB and corresponding curriculum. There are two curriculums prepared by MEB for religious education: the first one was issued in 1982 (that will be referred as Curriculum 1982, from now on) and the second one was issued in 2005 (Curriculum 2005, from now on). Both of these curriculums (251 pages in total) were analyzed in this chapter in a comparative manner. In addition to these two curriculums, there are also two sets of textbooks published by MEB for religious education: the first set of textbooks were issued according to Curriculum 1982, and the second set of textbooks were issued according to new curriculum, Curriculum 2005.

In order to select the textbooks that forms the corpus of this chapter, I have examined both sets of books, from forth-grade to eleventh-grade (twenty-two books in total). And, I have chosen eighth, tenth and eleventh-grade textbooks (six books in total) which are more suitable than the others to analyze and to search the answers of my research questions. Because, the issues which are directly related with Alevism and the Alevis were presented mainly in the textbooks of these three grades. In other words, discursive strategies and regularities of MEB concerning the Alevis and Alevism are more frequent in these books than the others. The issues such as, “different understandings in Islam,” “forms of worshipping” and “principles of belief in Islam” were discussed mainly in these six books. Before doing CDA of curriculum and textbooks of DKAB, I briefly discuss some theoretical considerations concerning the curriculum and textbooks some of which were also mentioned in the introduction chapter.

The contents of curriculum and textbooks have been seen by general public as neutral, objective and beneficial for the students for many years; but the studies in the last 25-30 years suggested new perspectives about the nature of curriculum and textbooks. Today the contents of curriculums in general and that of textbooks in particular are not viewed as neutral or value-free by scholars such as, Apple (1982), van Dijk (2004), Whitty (1985), Luke (1988) and Fairclough (1995b). Instead, it is argued that formal education systems and schools (as state apparatuses) are among the significant institutions which take part in the reproduction of the societies (Apple, 1982:1-33); and curriculums together with textbooks are viewed as the sites “legitimizing the ideological forms necessary

for the recreation of inequality” (ibid: 13). Focusing on curriculums, Apple suggests that it should be investigated “[w]hy and how ...particular aspects of a collective culture are represented in schools as objective factual knowledge” (ibid: 19). Likewise, Whitty (1985:20) argues that “an examination of the curriculum will reveal how knowledge is selected and presented in a way that supports the *status quo*.” He claims that “pupils were likely to accept as an immutable fact what was but one ideological version of the world” (ibid: 19). It can be argued that these critical approaches to the content of curriculum and textbooks were strongly affected from the post-structural theories developed by M. Foucault. According to him, language and discourse are not transparent or neutral means for describing or analyzing the social world, instead, they effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relations and institutions. In his famous book *Power /Knowledge*, he focused on historical studies of asylums, governments, prisons and schools and showed how historical configurations of discourse constructed new kinds of human subjects. Foucault's work provided a framework for describing how educational texts construct teachers, students and human subjects.

Leaning on these theoretical bases, the scholars of CDA gives special attention to analysis of textbooks. It is widely assumed that, in textbooks, there may be many implicit, indirect and mitigated ways in which homogenization, negligence, exclusion, positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation were conveyed to the students. Textbooks, which are the most widely read discourse type in society, are obligatory discourse for their readers (millions of students and teachers). Because of these characteristics, textbooks deserve attention about their tremendous influences in society. Children learn their basic knowledge through textbooks and other learning materials. Early studies on textbooks showed that in many cases, these materials were used to contribute creation of homogeneous and mono-cultural societies.

For example, van Dijk (1993b:197) argues that not only transfer of social norms and values but also “the inculcation of the dominant ideologies” are achieved through education systems and textbooks. He points out that the representations provided in textbooks are authoritative and influential especially

for young readers who may lack the knowledge or awareness to reflect critically on how events are depicted. Perceiving education system as a complex set of discursive and ideological practice, van Dijk (1993b:197) asserts that “the results of those practices are embodied in what count as official knowledge.” Similarly, identifying the content of textbooks as “official knowledge,” Apple (1993:46-50) argues that dominant groups in society aim to control “what counts as legitimate knowledge in school” for their own group interests.

From the arguments above, it can be inferred that textbooks and curriculums in schools signify an exclusive construction of reality or a particular way of selecting and organizing knowledge out of a broader universe of knowledge. The leading rationale of this selection and construction is the principles of the dominant ideologies. In that sense, textbooks, as material manifestations of the official discourse, are shaped in line with the principles of the official ideologies by emphasizing certain meanings and knowledge, and neglecting or excluding some others. Being in line with this perspective, this chapter aims to indicate the patterns of omission and exclusion in the official discourse concerning the Alevis in the content of curriculums and of textbooks of DKAB.

As I discussed in the first chapter, the notion of hegemony (in Gramscian sense) may also serve to explain the ideological character of education, educative role of the state and its role in the formation of hegemonic strategies. According to Gramsci, hegemony refers to winning the consent of dominated groups by the ruling group in a “historically specific moment in which the ruling group maintains also its leadership” (1971:161). For him, hegemony is not fulfilled only in the sphere of economy-politic; but the consent is produced and exercised in “civil society” consisting schools, churches and private associations. In that sense, it can be argued that together with the political and legislative apparatuses of state, education systems and schools were also employed to promote particular worldviews or ideologies by which the society is organized according to the interests of the dominating groups. Sharing Gramsci’s point of view, Apple emphasize the following argument: being far from an indifferent actor between contesting social groups, the state refers to “one of the multiple sites of struggle

over ideological hegemony” among classes as well as among gender and racial groups (Apple, 1982:13).

4.1. The Alevis in the Curriculum of Religious Education

Curriculums define main principles, and provide objectives and goals for teaching and learning in schools. It is argued that curriculum is socially constructed and this construction is not arbitrary but selective (Apple, 1993:118-143; Luke, 1988:22-38; van Dijk, 1993b:197). Together with textbooks, curriculums are the basic teaching instruments of educational system. Being officially approved programs, curriculums carry legally sanctioned (obligatory) form of knowledge. In that sense, they constitute the “legitimate/allowed” frameworks which have to be referred by all educational system. As discussed above, it is assumed here that contents of curriculums are not neutral and objective. Instead, I will argue that curriculums of DKAB in Turkey, being a part of formal education systems, aimed to maintain a sense of community that was based on religious and cultural homogeneity by presenting/emphasizing a specific portions of a collective culture as “objective knowledge,” and by deleting some aspects of it. By analyzing curriculums of DKAB, I aim to show that how the knowledge concerning to religion was selected, and with what kind of strategies Alevism was coded or sometimes deleted in this program in order to maintain a sense of homogenous community.

4.1.1. CDA of Curriculum of DKAB for Primary and Secondary Education (Curriculum 1982)

In 1982, two years after the military coup of September 12, the new constitution was enacted in Turkey. The new constitution mandated compulsory religious education in all primary and secondary schools. In other words, since 1982, all the students have to take the course of DKAB starting from the fourth grade until the end of eleventh grade. The curriculum program¹ for these courses

¹ *Temel Eğitim ve Ortaöğretim Din ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersi Programı* (Curriculum Program for the Course of Religion and Moral Knowledge in Primary and Secondary Education).

was prepared by MEB and published in Notifications Journal (*Tebliğler Dergisi*)² on March 29, 1982. This curriculum program, which will be referred as Curriculum 1982 from now on, stayed operative until 2005 when MEB prepared a new one that was widely discussed in public opinion in the context of “inclusion of Alevism in the curriculum program of DKAB” (see Sabah, 2004 and Radikal, 2005).

Keeping in mind the question of “How were the Alevis included or excluded in the school textbooks/in the curriculums of DKAB,” at first, I will analyze Curriculum 1982 and then continue with the analysis of curriculum that is valid after 2005 (which will be referred as Curriculum 2005 from now on). Curriculum 1982 was revised by MEB and republished in Notifications Journal on April 13, 1992. However, the revised version is almost identical with Curriculum 1982 and there are almost no meaningful changes in the revised version in terms of questions of this study. Except for two introductory paragraphs consisting of 142 words, the revised version of the program repeats the previous one word by word. For this reason, my analysis will focus on only two versions (Curriculum 1982 and Curriculum 2005), and compare them on the basis of my questions.

Topics: Topics are defined as “semantic macro-structures” (van Dijk, 1991:72). These global meaning structures of a text consist of hierarchically arranged set of macro-propositions, which are derived from the meanings of the sentences of the text (ibid: 72). According to van Dijk, topic is significant part of CDA because a) it is most prominent or “most noticeable element in a discourse” b) It “manifests social and cultural ideologies” (ibid: 74). Curriculum 1982 consists of the following macro-structural meanings:

T1- Main aim of teaching of religion and morality is to provide students with the basic knowledge of religion, Islam and morality in harmonious manner with the secularism principle of Atatürk (p.156).

T2- Religious and morality teaching considers strengthening of

² Notifications Journal (*Tebliğler Dergisi*) is the biweekly of MEB. Since 1939, all the decisions of MEB (including curriculums) have been disseminated by this journal all over the country.

Atatürkism, national unity and togetherness by means of religion and morality (p.156).

T3- Maintaining secularism principle of our state, freedoms of thought and conscience will never be violated (p.156).

T4- While cherishing our national values, customs and traditions, we will instruct that one of the important components of a nation is religion (p.157).

T5- Apart from the religious knowledge, the concepts of national unity, nation, and national values (such as flag (*bayrak*), ensign (*sancak*), martyr (*şehit*) and war veteran (*gazi*) will be instructed (p.157).

T6- This course will be thought in affectionate, sympathetic and convincing manner; and the subjects will be integrated with principles of Atatürk (p.157).

T7- No one will be forced to religious practices; the student's inaccurate information and their inculcations (obtained out of school) will be corrected with a scientific approach and a kindly manner (p.156).

T8- Presentation of the subjects will be based on verses (*ayet*) of Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) (p.156).

T9- Worshiping, which means manifestation our respect, love and gratitude to God (*Allah*), is necessary for human being; it will be stressed that worshipping strengthens the ties between individual and society (p.156).

T10- It will be instructed that Islam, being free from superstition, is a rationalist and contemporary religion which requires progress every time (p.156).

T11- In addition to main principles of Islamic faith, worshiping in Islam (daily prayers (*namaz*), fasting in Ramadan (*oruç*), pilgrimage to Mecca (*hac*), and alms (*zekat*), and reciting verses from Qur'an for daily prayers (*namaz sureleri*) will also be instructed to the students (p.157).

T12- The students will be taught about the services made by Turks to Islam in history, as well as about national and religious consciousness (based on main sources of our religion and our national self-respect) (p.158).

T13- The students will be taught the concept of religion and information about other religions in a general sense (p.160).

After a careful reading of Curriculum 1982 (by giving special attention to lexical reiterations, headings and sub-headings), I can argue that semantic macro structure of the text was constructed around the notion of “national unity” and the role of religion in solidifying this unity as “an important component of nation.” Apart from that, two sets of values are tried to be compromised in the text. While “principle of secularism, Atatürk, science, rationalism and Turkish nation” constitute the first set of values, “Islam, Qur’an, prophet and principles of Islam” forms the second set of values. When we look at the topics listed above, we can easily observe the traces of two main ideological principles of Republican project. The first one of these ideological principles, as discussed in the first chapter, is the efforts of modernization of religion (under the general title of Turkish form of secularism); the second one is forming a national unity (Kemalist nationalism).

Neither “Alevism” nor “Sunnism” is referred among the topics of the text, but as I will discuss in the following pages, most of pages of Curriculum 1982 were allocated to deal with Sunni interpretation of Islam and to make pedagogical arrangements aiming to instruct pillars of Sunni Islam.

Schemata: The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). Text schemata consist of a special order. In other words they determine what content or argumentative elements come first, second and last; and how arguments will be supported by which sub-arguments. To van Dijk, “the presence, absence or order of specific categories or argumentative orders may be significant and influence the structure of mental models” and may manufacture ideologies in the minds of recipients (1994:119).

The schemata of Curriculum 1982 have the following characteristics. The text was organized on the basis of three main interrelated sections: In the first section, general principles that govern teaching of DKAB were presented. In the second section, main objective of teaching of DKAB were discussed. The third and last section deals with the organization and arrangement of the subjects that will be taught in the scope of this course (i.e. which subject will be taught in which grade and in which chapter or unit).

At the beginning, the general principle governing teaching of DKAB is clearly stated as “...Atatürkism, national unity and togetherness...will be

empowered with the help of religion and morality...” (p.155). This principle is supported by another one, “While cherishing our national values, customs and traditions, we will instruct that one of the important components of a nation is religion” (p.157). It is interesting that “religion” is recognized as one of the component of a nation by Curriculum 1982. Neither Atatürk nor the constitution of 1982 recognizes “religion” as one the component of nation. Nation is defined by Atatürk as “a political and social entity composed of citizens tied together by a common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals” (İnan, 1969:372); and this understanding is clearly expressed at the beginning of the constitution of 1982. The perspective adopted in Curriculum 1982, concerning the relationships between notion of nation and religion, can be understood better if we approach the issue by taking into consideration Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*) (an intellectual movement defending integration of Islamic values and Turkishness). This issue will be discussed in detail during the contextual analysis of Curriculum 1982.

The general principle discussed above is unfolded and supported by sub-arguments several times in the text. For example, inculcation of “a national and religious consciousness based on main sources of our religion and...national self-respect” (p.158) is stated among the aims of DKAB. In addition, separate chapters in DKAB program of seventh, eighth and eleventh grades were allocated to the “services made by Turks to Islam in history” (p.159).

Another significant pillar of the schemata of Curriculum 1982 is made up of the propositions that depict Islam as a religion that is “free from superstitions...rationalist, contemporary...open to progress...and dynamic...” (p.156). In addition, it is defended that there is no contradiction between “Islamic values” and “Atatürk, Atatürkism and Atatürk’s principle of secularism” (p.155, 157, and 161). This perspective is apparently manifested also in the organizations of the chapters and units. In the curriculum program of DKAB, in every grade, separate units were employed to inculcate “a religious perspective that is integrated with the principles of Atatürk” (p.157).

Sometimes, these moves, made for harmonization Islam and Atatürkism, turn into instrumentalization of Islam in order to buttress the state authority. Here

are some examples of headings and titles of chapters in Curriculum 1982 showing this instrumentalization: “Respect to Sacred Values We Fight for... Respect to the Army...Respect to State Administrators...The Sacredness of Military Service (Unit VI/8th grade) (p.159)...Respect to State and Laws (Unit III/8th grade) (p.159).

The largest section of the text deals with arrangement and organization of the subjects that will be taught in the scope of DKAB. This part of the text schemata is important because, after stating that “religion is a component of nation” and “secularism principle of Atatürk is harmonious with Islam,” MEB manifests its understanding of Islam (which corresponds to Sunni interpretation of Islam) by means of content of chapters and units. In other words, through the arrangement of the content of the course, we can observe that there is a strong Sunni bias in Curriculum 1982 that neglects Alevi interpretation of Islam. Arrangements in Curriculum 1982, concerning the content of Islam (such as its main principles and kinds worshipping), fail to recognize the Alevi belief system. Neither under the title of Islamic framework nor as a separate section, Alevism and its rituals were referred. Here are some chapters which arrange Sunni version of Islam (6th grade/p.158):

UNIT II: Principles of Belief and Worshipping in Islam, Evaluation of Behaviors: a) Required religious duties in (*farz*) b) Sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad (*sünnet*), c) Advised duties in Islam (*Müstehap*) d) Incumbent on Muslims (*vacip*) e) Permissible (*mubah*) f) Nasty behaviors (*mekruh*). UNIT IV: Prayers (*namaz*): Requirements of Prayer (*namazın şartları*), Daily Prayers (*vakit namazları*), Friday Prayer, Prayers that are peculiar to Ramadan (*teravih*). UNIT VII: Alms (*Zekat*): Benefits of Alms, Responsible persons for Alms, Donation made in Ramadan (*Fitre*). UNIT V: Belief in the Hereafter: What is Hereafter, Hell and Heaven.

These rituals, just mentioned above, are generally practiced by the Sunni Muslims. For most of the Alevis these rituals are not part of their belief system; or they interpret these rituals or principles of belief quite differently than the Sunnis.

In sum, the schemata of Curriculum 1982 suggest that Islam is an important element of Turkish nation and national unity; and there exists a congruity between Islam and Atatürkism. In addition, Curriculum 1982 intends to produce a cultural

homogeneity in society because it recognizes only Sunni version of Islam and neglects diverse interpretations other than Sunnism. As in the case of Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, DİB), the existence of Sunni bias in Curriculum 1982 and absence of Alevism shows that Sunni Islam appears as the only officially recognized version of Islam.

Local Meanings: Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. In addition to macro-level analysis, micro-analysis at local level is necessary to observe exclusions, negligence, presumptions and implications concerning to the Alevis.

a) Implications: In the text, it is stated several times that “inaccurate information and ideas of the student, obtained out of school, will be corrected with a scientific approach and a kindly manner” (p.156, 157). I will argue that this statement implies that any information or interpretation that does not match with the perspectives presented in Curriculum 1982 (which refers to Sunni interpretation of Islam) is inaccurate. In other words, any other perspective (such as Alevism) other than official one will be defined as “problematic, superstitious or inaccurate” (p.156). As correctly argued by van Dijk (1993a:218), associating the minorities with problems is a prominent discursive strategies employed by dominant groups. The existence of more than one interpretation in the sphere of religion is defined as a problem. This homogenizing and intolerant discourse in Curriculum 1982 becomes more apparent when it is stated “Unity of belief and unity of behavior will be emphasized” (p.156). As easily can be inferred, this “unity of belief and behavior” operates in favor of the Sunnis and at the expense of the Alevis. That is to say, unity is searched on the basis of belief system which exactly refers to the Sunni version of Islam.

b) Presumption: As closely related with the perspective mentioned above, %99 of the people living in Turkey was classified under the general title of “Muslim;” and the same portion of people were assumed to have exactly the same belief in every detail. In addition, it is also presumed that meeting the requirements of Islam (such as “performing daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, alms, etc.”) (p.156, 157) is an indispensable necessity of being a good citizen.

c) **Negligence:** Curriculum 1982 enumerates kinds of worshipping and principles of belief in Islam in several units. None of these units refers to any kind of worshipping or principles of belief in Alevism (such as congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*), ritual Alevi dance (*semah*), ritual kinship or spiritual brotherhood (*musahiplik*), fasting in month of Muharram). Ignoring these elements of Alevism, the text arranges the rituals that are practiced only by the Sunnis (such as daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca). As put by Erdemir (2004:32) most of the Alevis do not attend to mosques and do not observe five daily prayers. The Alevis consider going to Mecca for pilgrimage is not necessary, for them the real pilgrimage “means one’s spiritual journey within his or her soul” (Erdemir, 2004:32). Likewise, while arranging the “the principles of belief in Islam,” Curriculum 1982 deploy a Sunni terminology (such as heaven (*cennet*), hell (*cehennem*), Day of Judgment (*mahşer*), doomsday (*kıyamet*) neglecting the perspective of Alevism. For example, most of the Alevis believe in cycles of the spirits (*devriye*) and, four doors- forty posts (*dört kapı-kırk makam*) which are not included in the program.

Another example of negligence towards Alevism can be observed in the sections of DKAB program of tenth grade. While arranging the issue of what is forbidden (*haram*) and what is permissible (*helal*) in Islam, Curriculum 1982 counts intoxicants (*içki*) among the “forbidden issues” (p.161). But, it is known that intoxicants (in some regions of Anatolia) are parts of congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*) which is the main religious ceremony in Alevism (Aydın, 1997:91-127; Eickelaman, 1989:289). In other word, intoxicants have special meaning in Alevism and are not forbidden.

Style and Rhetoric: Style, refers to “the textual result of personally and socially determined variations in language use for the expression of more or less the same meaning or reference...Thus style is linguistic trace of the context in a text” (van Dijk, 1993b:133). Choices of lexical items may also give clues about ideological positions of the writer or speaker. In that sense, it is interesting that some set of words and expressions were systematically repeated in Curriculum 1982, such as “state, nation, national, national unity, national identity, national consciousness, Atatürk, Turkishness, Turkish history, secularism, flag, homeland,

and military service.” I will argue that iteration of these words is closely related with historical and political context where the text produced. Intervention of Turkish Armed Forces in 1982 and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis are two important factor that affected choice of lexical items in Curriculum 1982.

In terms of stylistic analysis, another important point in the text is that its language sometimes shows esoteric characters by employing following words: nasty behaviors (*mekruh*), advised duties in Islam (*müstehap*), incumbent on a Muslim (*vacip*), permissible (*mubah*), defeatist (*müfsid*), etc.

Because of the fact that the text is a Ministerial decree, it makes use of an authoritarian rhetoric, from beginning to the end. Establishing a hierarchical relation with the recipients, Curriculum 1982 states what must be done and what must not be done in prescriptive manner: “Freedom of religion and consciousness will never be injured (p.155)...The subjects will be based on verses of Qur’an and saying of the prophet (p.156)...This course will be taught in an endearing manner (p.156).”

“Overestimations, underestimations and generalizations” are some of the rhetorical devices offered by van Dijk (1991:220) in doing CDA. In Curriculum 1982, we encounter use of these rhetorical instruments many times. Curriculum 1982 makes use generalization when it says, “Worshipping is harmonious and necessary for human nature” (p.156). Although “religion” was referred as a general category (without mentioning any specific religion) at the beginning of the text, the religions other than Islam were underestimated in the rest of the text. In Curriculum 1982 (which consist of more than fifty units), there are only two units (Unit I of 6th grade and Unit I of 9th grade) that deal with other religions namely, “Christianity, Judaism, Indian Religions, Chinese Religions.” Rest of the units was allotted for Islam. The same instrument of “underestimation or overestimation” can be observed also in the expression of Islam. That is to say, we witness overestimation of Sunni interpretation of Islam and underestimation of other interpretations of Islam during the presentation of principles of belief and kind of worshipping in Islam.

Enumeration appears as another rhetorical instrument used in Curriculum 1982. Propositions/arguments of Curriculum 1982 were arranged through

enumeration. Under the subtitles of “Principles” (containing twenty-six principles), “Aims” (containing thirty-three aims) and “Subjects” (containing arrangements on the bases of eight grades) the information was presented in enumerative way.

Context Models.

a) **Genre:** It is obvious that Curriculum 1982 is an official curriculum document printed in an official biweekly Notifications Journal (*Tebliğler Dergisi*). Curriculum programs define main principles; provide objectives and goals for teaching and learning in schools. Nowadays, as I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, taken for granted assumptions about the neutrality of content of curriculum are rejected by many social scientists. Instead, it is argued that curriculum is socially constructed and this construction is not arbitrary but selective (Apple, 1993:118-143; Luke, 1988:22-38; van Dijk, 1993b:197-240). Together with textbooks, curriculum programs are the basic teaching instruments of educational system. Being officially approved programs, curriculums carry legally sanctioned form of knowledge. In that sense, they constitute the “legitimate/allowed” frameworks which have to be referred by all educational system. Stressing the importance of this legally sanctioned form of knowledge, Apple states that dominant groups in society intend to control “what counts as legitimate knowledge in school” for their group interests (1993:46). As can be inferred from the discussions above, official authorities (through curriculum programs) may dictate a selective and biased reading of social reality, and ignore and in many case forbid the alternative perspectives. Ideologically constructed content of the curriculum is rarely challenged by the members of educational system (such as students and teachers). As correctly put by Raymond Williams, in curriculums “certain meanings and practices were chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices were neglected and excluded” (1973:5). It can be argued that by sanctioning such a selective and biased construction of reality, they (official authorities) aim to form homogeneity in the society at the expense of the minorities.

a) *Social and Historical Context:* Curriculum 1982 was written in 1982, just two years after the military coup of 1980. The military rule (1980-1983) cleansed the political arena from both “extreme” left and right, since the generals believed that ideological divisions in society caused the anarchy and led to breaking down of law and order all over the country. Especially the leftist groups, who were inspired by socialist and Marxist ideas, were held responsible by the generals for much of the disorder and anarchy throughout the country (particularly in high schools and in universities). For this reason, the military government aimed to create politically docile generations who are loyal to the state; and education was seen a significant instrument to serve this aim.

Along with these de-politicization efforts of the military rule, increasing role of Islam in Turkish state and society has been another significant feature of this era. In this historical context, a new ideological formulation (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis- *Türk-İslam Sentezi*) gained credibility among the state elite of the era as the “panacea for social unrest and political instability” of the country (Toprak, 1990:12). The generals of coup started to make use of Islam to enhance the cohesion among citizens and hoped for help from the idea that there is a harmony between religion and nationalism in many segments of social and political structure, including the curriculum. Originally, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was formulated by a group of intellectuals which was called Hearth of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) at the end of 1960s against the Marxist movements (Güvenç et. al., 1991:13). In the post-1980 period, members of Hearth of Intellectuals gained important positions in the government and state bureaucracy, and its political perspective (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) gained acceptance “as part of the official state ideology” in the preparation of new constitution, reformation of educational system and different cultural engineering projects (Toprak, 1990:10-11).

As a result of the close cooperation between the Heart of Intellectual and the generals, many defenders of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis hold the key positions in the State Planning Office (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, DPT), the official institution prepares five years development plan of Turkey, including the

educational sphere⁸⁴ (Ayhan, 1999:256). State Planning Organization formed a commission (under the chairmanship of S. Hayri Bolay and with the memberships of following persons: Ruhi FıĖlalı, Halis Ayhan, Eyüp Sanay, Yaşar Ocak, Ünver Günay) which was called Commission of Religion and Morality (*Din ve Ahlak Komisyonu*) (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1983:509). This commission has stressed “the role of religion for the social cohesion and development,” “the necessity of religion for individuals and society” and “the effects of religion on the Turkish society in the history” (ibid: 509-575). As argued by Güvenç (1991:54), the main view of the commission was that “religion is the essence of culture while culture is the form of religion” (*Din kültürün özü, kültür ise dinin formudur*). The traces of many of these stressed principles can be seen in Curriculum 1982. In addition, S. Hayri Bolay (chairman of the commission) and Ruhi FıĖlalı (member) have been among writers of DKAB textbooks mandated by MEB until 2005.

It is necessary here to summarize the essence of theory of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Pre-Islamic history of Turks was based on value of virtue, truth and justice, love of country, fear of God and obedience to state authority. Because of these characteristic (which were highly compatible with Islam) Turks had chosen Islam as their religion. Islam and Turkishness were parts of an inseparable whole and they form the parts of a harmonious entity since the Turks converted to Islam (Kafesoğlu, 1985:161-212). As a result of the cultural synthesis between Turkishness and Islam, a great civilization emerged. And, this great civilization collapsed because of imitation of the West (ibid: 170). For the followers of Turkish-Islamic synthesis main reason behind the political and social problems of the country was the inappropriate educational policies. According to them, Marxism, Darwinism, humanism and pragmatism were the main variants of positivism which is responsible for the problems of Turkey (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1983:535). For this reason, instead of humanism, Marxism and Darwinism, synthesis of religion and national culture was presented as the only remedy for the country’s problem.

⁸⁴ For more information about the impact of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on Turkish National Education in this era, see Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (1983). *Milli Kültür: Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*; and Aydınlar Ocağı (1981). *Milli Eğitim ve Din Eğitimi İlmi Seminerleri*.

Starting just after the military coup of 1980, supporters of Turkish Islamic Synthesis achieved to affect educational reforms in the country in the direction of their worldview. Under the strong effect of this worldview, the generals launched a new constitution which mandated compulsory religious courses in all primary and secondary schools. Being far from including different interpretation of Islam, the courses were simply the manifestation of Sunnism. As discussed above there was no room in these courses for Alevism. For this reason, the compulsory religious courses have always been criticized especially by the Alevis. Other than mandating compulsory religious education, the generals increased the number of Divinity Faculties (*İlahiyat Fakülteleri*) and high schools for chaplains and preachers (*İmam-Hatip liseleri*). Being in line with the remedy of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the generals of coup aimed to foster social cohesion among the citizens through these religious oriented policies.

Parallel to the contributions of Heart of Intellectuals to the reformation of educational system in the post-1980 era, Advisory Board for Religious Education (*Din Eğitimi Danışma Kurulu*) appeared as another important actor especially in mandating of compulsory religious courses (DKAB). This board came together under the presidency of Osman Fevzioğlu (who was the President of Educational Department of General Staff) on May 28, 1981 and composed of the professors of Divinity Schools and Higher Islamic Institutes (*Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü*) (Ayhan, 1999:251). Compulsory religious courses were accepted in the meetings of the board by the majority votes of the members. Only two members of the board (İbrahim Agah Çubukçu and Neda Armaner) opposed to the compulsory nature of the courses. Çubukçu and Armaner opposed to compulsory religious courses by arguing that these courses violate the principle of secularism and Unity of Teaching (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*) (ibid: 252). In addition, Çubukçu and Armaner pointed out the drawbacks of these courses for the Alevis and non-Muslim minorities of the country, but for the other members of the board (including the president) there were no drawbacks in terms of the situation of the Alevis (ibid: 252). Other than the two institutions just mentioned above, DİB and Divinity School of Ankara University (*Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi*) were two

other important institutions who made advisory studies supporting the compulsory religious education in post-1980 era.⁸⁵

4.1.2. CDA of Curriculum of DKAB for Secondary Education (Curriculum 2005)

Abrogating the previous one, MEB promulgated a new curriculum for DKAB for the secondary education on March 31, 2005 (it will be referred as Curriculum 2005 from now on). Curriculum 2005 was published in Notifications Journal (*Tebliğler Dergisi*) on April 2005; and new series of DKAB textbooks, in accordance with the new curriculum, were prepared since October 2005. At first sight, the most conspicuous characteristic of Curriculum 2005 (compared to Curriculum 1982 that was composed of 16 pages and 5100 words) is that it is more comprehensive and detailed with its 235 pages and more than 50000 words.⁸⁶ In addition, contrary to the previous one, in Curriculum 2005 “Alevism-Bektashism” (*Alevilik-Bektaşılık*) is “included” for the first time. In Curriculum 1982, there were no reference to Alevism.

Topics: Being “the most important” and “summarizing ideas” of a text, topics or macro-propositions can be expressed by several sentences or by larger segments of the discourse or sometimes by the whole text (van Dijk, 1984:55-56). The global, overall structure of the text (semantic macro-structure of Curriculum 2005) can be summarized as follows:

T1- It is among the main aims of Turkish national education/religious education to foster generations which are loyal to Atatürk nationalism, adopting national, moral and cultural and spiritual values of the Turkish nation, and supporting national unity and togetherness (p.4).

T2- Irrespective of their sects and understandings, all the people believing in the principles of Qur’an are named as Muslims. Different formations on the basis of sectarian understandings in a religion are normal and understandable, but none of these sects can be identified with the religion itself (p.5).

⁸⁵ For more information about studies of these two institutions see, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (1981) and Ankara Üniversitesi (1981).

⁸⁶ Curriculum 2005 is available at <http://dogm.meb.gov.tr/program.htm>

T3- Religion is a basic need for human being (p.9).It provides solutions to the problems of human being (p.6). For these reasons, it is among the main duties of education system to provide religious education to new generations and to equip them with the correct knowledge of religion.

T4- The courses of DKAB are necessary and helpful for the students, because it enables them to understand the content of the other courses (p.10).

T5- The education system should aim to cover whole of the reality, instead of an ideological teaching (p.9). Main principles of Islamic worldview should be presented to the students under the light of this principle (p.9).

T6- Compulsory religious education has legitimate legal basis (p.11).

T7- In the curriculum development process, scientific perspective has been main reference point; in addition, superstitions and incorrect information have been neglected (p.12).

T8- In the presentation of Islamic principles, a consolidative, impartial and all-encompassing approach (by stressing the common points) will be adopted before different Islamic formations (p.12).

T9- No specific interpretation of Islam will be inculcated. Different religious formations and sects (which refer to a cultural richness) will not be neglected (p.13).

T10- In order to equip the student with a tolerant understanding, not only national identity and Islam, but also universal values and other religions will be presented (p.13).

T11- In the religious teaching, verses of Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) will be main reference points (p.14).

T12- As a result of religious education, the students should reconcile religion with the reason, and they should realize that secularism guaranties freedom of belief (p.15).

T13- The students should realize that different religious interpretations in our society do not originate from essential religious disagreements (p.15).

T14- The students should be aware of the fact that Turks made great contributions to Islamic civilization (p.16).

T16- The course of DKAB was structured around the following subjects: belief, worshipping, the prophet Muhammad, revelation and reason, religion and secularism, and religion and culture (p.17).

T17- It is to be emphasized that for Atatürk, religion was an indispensable institution. Moreover, he was against degeneration and abuse of religion (p.22).

T18- Hacı Bektaş Veli, Ahmet Yesevi and Yunus Emre were important historical personalities who contributed to Turks' Islamic understanding (p.51).

T19- Alevism-Bektashism (*Alevilik-Bektaşilik*) is one of the mystical (*tasavvufi*) interpretations that appeared in Islamic thought (p.69).

T20- Main forms of worshipping in Islam are prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca, alms and sacrifice; and in Islam, mosques are the places of worship (p.219).

T21- Believing all the principles written in Qur'an and strictly practicing all forms of worshipping in Islam, Ali, Fatima and Hacı Bektaş Veli were model Muslims (p.80-93).

Schemata: As defined by van Dijk, schemata refer to “global maps” or “hierarchical syntactic structures” into which topics were inserted (1988:49-50). That is to say, main propositions of a text appear according to a specific sequence. By means of this sequence, argumentative coherence of the propositions and the logical connections between main arguments and supportive arguments are controlled.

In Curriculum 2005, main propositions (many of which were summarized above) are asserted at the beginning of the text under the sub-titles of “Vision of the Program,” “Basic Approaches of the Program” and “Structure of the Program.” Then, these macro-propositions were elaborated and strengthened by supportive arguments in the following sections of the text: “Subjects and Units in DKAB,” “Achievements” and “Activities.”

Two notions, namely, “aims of DKAB” and “Atatürk's understanding of Islam” are discussed connectedly in the text. At first, it is stated that it is among the main aims of DKAB “to foster generations which are loyal to Atatürk nationalism (p.4)...loyal to principles of Atatürk (p.11)... adopting national, moral and cultural and spiritual values of Turkish nation, and supporting national

unity and togetherness (p.4).” Then, this argument is accompanied and supported several times by the set of arguments stating “importance and indispensability of religion” for Atatürk:

It is aimed to teach that Atatürk was against to degeneration of religion. For this reason, he struggled for the correct presentation of religion...The student should also recognize that Atatürk founded Directorate of Religious Affairs and gave order for preparation of Turkish translation of Qur’an...For the correct presentation of religion, he also demanded addition of religious courses to the curriculum and gave importance to qualified religious men (p.22).

In Curriculum 2005, this “positive stance of Atatürk towards religion” (Islam) was associated with a broader and more general argument: “Necessitating use of reason, our religion supports scientific knowledge (p.15)...Revelation does not contradict with the principles of reason” (p.20). Consequently, the text proposes that it is possible to be a Muslim (as can be seen in the personality of Atatürk) while defending the principles of modernity (at the same time) such as reason and science. Atatürk and his ideas were employed in the text also for legitimating existence of compulsory religious education in the curriculum. In other words, it is argued that the general curriculum of national education includes courses of religion in accordance with Atatürk’s will.

Considerable portion of argumentative structure of Curriculum 2005 is devoted to explication of “neutrality of MEB before different interpretations of Islam.” In order to prove this “neutrality” the argumentative structure was formed in the following way. Contrary to Curriculum 1982, Curriculum 2005 does not neglect the existence of “different religious sects and formations;” instead, it praises and recognizes different interpretations as “cultural richness” (p.13). This perspective was detailed through the arrangement of course subject in the study units. Especially the content of Unit 4 in 11th grade and Unit 4 in 12th grade were allotted to deal with the issue of “different interpretations in Islamic thought” (11th grade/p.77):

UNIT 4: Interpretations in Islamic Thought: 1. Various Reasons of Different Interpretations in Islamic Thought, 2. Political-Creedal Interpretations in Islam: 2.1. Haricizm, 2.2. Shiism, 2.3. Mu'tazila, 2.4. Maturidism, 3. Interpretations on the basis of Islamic Jurisprudence: 3.1. Caferism, 3.2. Hanefism, 3.3. Malikism 3.4. Şafism, 3.5. Hanbelism, 4. Uniting Elements among Different Interpretations of Islam: 4.1. Unity of God, 4.2. Prophecy, 4.3. Qur'an. UNIT 4 (12th grade): Mystical Interpretations in Islamic Thought: 1. Formation of Mystical Thought, 2. Relations between the God and Creatures, 3. Ethical Dimension of Mystical Thought, 4. Mystical Interpretations in Our Culture: Yesevism, Mevlevism, Alevism-Bektashism. 5. Tolerance and Culture of Living Together Reading Part: "Four Gate, Forty Posts" in Hacı Bektaş Veli's *Makâlât*

After recognizing different interpretations in Islam, in the next step, MEB declares its "neutrality" by stating "...doctrine-centered or sect-centered religious education will be avoided (p.9)... no specific interpretation of Islam will be inculcated" (p.13). As will be discussed below in detail, this "neutrality" is violated and the principle of recognition (declared at the beginning) disappears when the issue of "forms of worshipping in Islam" was portrayed in the curriculum. For example, no form of worshipping in Alevism was mentioned; likewise, different interpretations of other sects concerning the prayer or fasting were totally ignored.

In the text, several times (including the units discussing different interpretations in Islam), MEB emphasizes "the uniting elements among different interpretations in Islam" (such as "unity of God, prophecy, Qur'an, afterlife) (p.77). But, we know that even on these "uniting elements" there is little consensus among Islamic sects; almost all of these concepts have different meanings and connotations in different Islamic traditions. Discourse of reconciliation /consolidation, in Curriculum 2005, becomes more obvious when it is stated, "In the presentation of Islamic principles, a consolidative, impartial and all-encompassing approach will be adopted before different Islamic formations and interpretations, by stressing the common points" (P.12).

For example, "Alevism-Bektashism" is defined, in Curriculum 2005, as one of the "mystical interpretations in Islam." Putting Alevism and Bektashism

into same category, Curriculum 2005 makes use of specific passages⁸⁷ from Hacı Bektaş Veli's *Makalat* to show that "how much Alevism and orthodox Islam (Sunnism) have in common." For this aim, Curriculum 2005 also offers poems of important personalities for the Alevis (such as Yunus Emre, Kaygusuz Abdal, Pir Sultan Abdal and Hatai) as "suggested readings." Through these poems⁸⁸ (which are about love of the prophet and Qur'an), MEB tries to emphasize common points between Alevism and mainstream Islam. In addition, sayings of Ali (primary figure in Alevism, nephew and son in law of the prophet) were referred in Curriculum 2005 in order to indoctrinate "true" forms of worshiping in Islam:⁸⁹

Ali was so sensitive about his daily prayers...He was martyred in a mosque...Some advice from him about the importance of worshiping: "Prayer makes every person closer to God...Hajj is jihad for everyone...Do not give up visiting house of God...Fasting is alms for human body (p.89-90).

To summarize, although Curriculum 2005 accepts existence of diverse interpretations in Islam, it emphasizes "common and uniting points" among them, instead of the features that make them different. At least for the case of Alevism, Curriculum 2005 fails to portray a correct picture in many terms. In other words, the proposed "common points" are far from reflecting the content of Alevism. For example, in the text, mosques were presented as the temple for all Muslims (p.212), which is not valid for most of the Alevis. Likewise, "common" forms of worshiping, proposed in the text, do not include the forms of worshiping performed by the Alevis.

The last significant element of schematic structure of Curriculum 2005 that will be discussed here is that contrary to previous curriculum, Curriculum 2005 stresses the importance of universal values. As can be seen above, Curriculum 1982 predominantly emphasized the "national values, national

⁸⁷ This suggested reading appears in the text under the title of "Principles of Unity and Belief in Hacı Bektaş Veli's *Makalat*" (*Hacı Bektaş Veli'nin Makalat Adlı Eserinde Tevhit ve İnanç Esasları*) (p.86).

⁸⁸ Full-text of these poems can be seen at pages 93-94 of the text.

⁸⁹ Title of the reading where these sayings appear is "Model Personality of Ali and His Sayings about Importance of Worshiping" (*Hz. Ali'nin Örnek Şahsiyeti ve İbadetin Önemine Dair Sözleri*).

identity and national culture,” and role of Islam in maintaining and strengthening these concepts; there were no reference to universal values. As well as mentioning the significance of “national values...national unity and togetherness” (p.4) and “national identity” (p.13), Curriculum 2005 mentions also the necessity of “universal values” (p.13). This is more than a cursory mentioning because “universal values” and “tolerance” were mentioned several times in the text and counted among the main aims of DKAB education:

The students should adopt universal values together with their national identity (p.13)...The students should respect to religion, tradition and morality of the others, as well as their own religion and traditions...The student participate in universal values with their own religious knowledge and consciousness (p.15)... Rapid developments in technology and communication made nations closer to each other. Globalization affected religious education, too. These developments necessitated to learn values of other nations (p.10).

This universalist perspective is supported by also the content of several units in which “Rights and Freedoms” and “Features of Living Religions and Their Similarities” were discussed (10th grade/p.78-80):

UNIT VI: Rights, Freedoms And Religion. 1. The Concepts of Rights and Freedom, 2. Some Rights and Religion: Right of Living, Right of Health, Right of Education, Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Belief, Freedom of Worshipping, Privacy of Private Life, Economic Rights, Use of Rights and Freedoms, Rule of Law. UNIT VII: Living Religions and Their Similar Features: A General Perspective over Living Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Shintoism. Similarities among Religions: God, Holy Book, Prophecy, Afterlife, Environmental Consciousness in Religions. Inter-Religion Relations in Globalizing World

Local Meanings: Although global structure of discourse such as topics and schemata have major role in capturing overall picture of the text, the local structures such as implications, presumptions and contradictions may also contribute to this picture by playing strategic role in the description and evaluation of the Alevis. It is possible to make inferences from such local semantics (at the micro level of words, sentences and paragraphs) and formulations about the discursive strategies of MEB concerning the Alevis.

a) Prohibitions: Without directly mentioning Alevism, Curriculum 2005 defines some principles of Alevi belief system as “superstitious” (*batıl inanç*). In addition, some behaviors, which are not forbidden in Alevism, are classified as “inconvenient” or “forbidden.” For example, “reincarnation” (which is an important part of Alevi belief system under the title of *devriye*) is classified as “superstitious” by the following expressions: “It should be pointed out that reincarnation...is a form of superstitious belief and has negative effects on our society” (p.45). In addition, use of intoxicants (*içki*), which is not forbidden in Alevism, is defined as “inconvenient habits” (p.56) in Curriculum 2005.

b) Topic Avoidance and Negligence: Topic avoidance and negligence are observed among the most common strategies of discourse used against the minorities (van Dijk, 1984:119). In Curriculum 2005, discussions about the principles of Islam (such as “belief” and “worshiping”) were built on the terminology and principles of Sunni Islam; terminology and principles of Alevism were completely neglected. For example, the issue of “Basic Principles of Belief” was discussed by using the following parameters: “Believing in God, Believing in Angels, Believing in Prophets, Believing in Holy Books, Believing in Destiny and Believing in Afterlife” (p.74). Together with the Alevis’ conceptualization of God, main elements of belief system of Alevism such as unity of existence (*vahdet-i vücud*),⁹⁰ role and status of Ali, the trinity of God-Muhammad-Ali (*Hak-Muhammed-Ali*), the relationships between God and human being, Twelve Imams (*Oniki İmam*), etc. were not mentioned. These issues stay among the avoided topics of the text. Likewise, the issue of “worshiping” was discussed around the form of worshiping which are generally adopted by Sunni Muslims (p.75). Forms of worshiping accepted by the Alevis were systematically neglected. Diverse sides of Alevism stayed untouched in terms of both “belief” and “worshiping.” The discourse of negligence towards the Alevis, in Curriculum 2005, becomes clearer when the expression of “place of worship in Islam” is used only to refer to mosques (p.219). Likewise, in Curriculum 2005 the concept of “religious functionary” is used to refer to “*müftü*” (religious officials for a province or

⁹⁰ *Vahdet-i vücud* refers to oneness of creator and creatures. This concept proposes that God and universe are identical. According to this understanding there is only one single being in existence which is God.

district), “*vaiz*” (preacher), “*imam*” (prayer leader), “*müezzin*” (caller to mosque for prayers) and “*kayyim*” (caretaker of mosque), all of whom are the religious functionaries for Sunni Islam. None of the religious functionaries of Alevism (such as *dede* (religious leaders in Alevism), *rehber* (religious guide) were mentioned; Curriculum 2005 avoided to mention these personalities. The meaning and functions of congregation houses for the Alevis were completely neglected. Here are some concepts never appear in Curriculum 2005, but vital for Alevism: congregational ritual (*ayin-i cem*), ritual dance (*semah*), ritual kinship (*musahiplik*), cycle of spirits (*devriye*), religious leaders in Alevism (*dede*), holy family of *dede* (*ocak*).

Another domain of negligence, in Curriculum 2005, is the sensitivities of the Alevis; and several times these sensitivities were ignored. For example, in the presentation of “Rights and Freedoms” the name of the suggested reading is “Lofty Umar and His Justice” (*Hazreti Ömer ve Adaleti*) (p.78, 90). Contrary to convictions of the Alevis about Umar (second caliph after the prophet), he was presented as a just and prestigious person; and the concept of justice and fairness are tried to be thought through the personality of him. Most of the Alevis believe that after the prophet, Ali deserved the caliphate but Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman (first, second and third caliphs consecutively) usurped his right. In addition to this negligence, Curriculum 2005 also proposed that there was no disagreement among Ali, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman on the issue of caliphate (p.88), which is completely refused by the Alevis.⁹¹

c) Presumptions: In Curriculum 2005, it is argued that “unity of God (*tevhid*), prophecy (*nübüvvet*), Qur’an and afterlife (*ahiret*)” are the main elements on which “different interpretations in Islam” agree (p.77). It is presupposed that there is no conflict on these concepts. Existing disagreements concerning the meaning and content of these concepts are ignored. For example, contrary to the presupposition of Curriculum 2005, there is no complete consensus on the content of Qur’an among the Muslims. Although for most of the Alevis Qur’an is a sacred text, they believe that some parts of Qur’an were distorted and some other parts of

⁹¹ In Alevism, according to the principle of *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ehli Beyt* (family of the prophet containing Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husayn) and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose *Ehli Beyt*), the first three caliphs were disliked.

it were extracted after death of the prophet. In addition, the Alevis prefer an internal (*batini*) interpretation of Qur'an, instead of an external (*zahiri*) interpretation. As partially discussed above, not only on Qur'an but also on other "common elements" there are important disagreements between the Alevis and the Sunnis.

Other than that, MEB presupposes that religious education constitutes an indispensable dimension of national education. It is assumed that religious education has facilitative effect on national education in reaching its general aims (p.10). This presupposition is followed by another one: it is presupposed that religious education must be provided by MEB in schools because "the correct and neutral interpretation of religion" is possible only with this option (p.12, 13). But, as I discussed above, in spite of the general principle stated by MEB (concerning the neutrality before the sects and recognition of different religious formations), Curriculum 2005 fails to be neutral and neglects alternative interpretations in Islam, in many occasions.

Style and Rhetoric: The choice of words and expressions used in Curriculum 2005 to state the aims of religious education and to define different formations in Islam may signal perceptions of MEB concerning these issues. The features of religious education are enumerated as being the source of "correct knowledge...respectful to other's ideas...open to new developments (p.6)...aware of universal values (p.13)... interrogative" (p.6), "facilitative of communication" (p.5) and "supportive of national unity and togetherness" (p.4). The position of MEB in religious education is defined by following expressions: "independent of sects" (p.12), "not ideological" (p.9), "against superstitious... Qur'an centered, uniting" (p.12) and "tolerant" (p.13).

In Curriculum 2005, sects and religious formations are defined with the expression of "cultural richness" (p.12). By the expression of "cultural richness," it is implied that different interpretations are normal or acceptable. However, it is stated that "different interpretations" may be "harmful," "if they are not understood correctly" (p.20). What is the "correct" form of understanding? "Correct" perspective concerning the sects and religious formations is that: differences are not related with the "essence of religion" (p.15); different

interpretations in religion do not signify “a different/separate religion” (p.20), but they correspond to “richness,” “easiness” (p.20) and “plurality in religion” (p.69). In discussing the issue of “different interpretations in Islam,” Curriculum 2005 systematically and repeatedly makes use of the following couple of words: “living together” and “consciousness of tolerance” (p.15, 69, 77).

As a rhetorical device, examples from life story of the prophet Muhammad and his friends (*ashab*) were used in Curriculum 2005 in order to make the arguments more plausible (p.5, 19). Likewise, verses from Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) the prophets, poems of famous poets were also applied in many places to be more reasonable. For example, in the content of sections which discuss issue of Alevism, poems of Kaygusuz Abdal, Yunus Emre, Pir Sultan Abdal and Hatai were referred in order to support related propositions of Curriculum 2005.

Rhetorical questions were widely used as an effective rhetorical tool; and proper answers were given to these questions. For example: “Why religious education in schools? ... What kind of information do the students need in the content of DKAB? ...How DKAB will contribute to general education?” (p.8).

In the presentation of course subjects, tables, diagrams, schemas, graphics, crossword puzzles and pictures appeared as another important group of rhetorical tools in Curriculum 2005. Without exception, content of every study unit was summarized through these diagrams, tables or schemas (p.142, 144, 146, 154, 155) specific set of concepts were emphasized by means of crossword puzzles (p.152). It should be noted also that utilization of scientific and legal terminology is another element of rhetorical structure of Curriculum 2005. “Necessity and benefits” of religious education were argued with the help of humanities such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy and law. Main basis of DKAB were discussed under the following titles: “Anthropological-Humanitarian Basis,” “Social Basis,” “Philosophical Basis” and “Legal Basis” (p.9-11).

Context Models.

a) **Genre:** Curriculum 2005 is an official curriculum document printed in an official biweekly Notifications Journal (*Tebliğler Dergisi*) on April 2005. As I

discussed above curriculums have social functions. For example, they are used to foster “social integration” (Apple, 1990:68-72) and they are instruments of developing “large group consciousness” (Bobbitt, 1918:131). For Bobbitt, curriculums divert people “to act together for common ends...with common vision” (ibid: 135). It can be inferred from these expressions that homogeneity and like-mindedness are among the aims of curriculum programs in many cases, to eliminate diversity. Concerning to Curriculum 2005, I argue that Curriculum 2005 does not attempt to eliminate all kind of diversity; instead, it attempts to control diverse segments of society by diverting or canalizing them to a position that does not threaten existing social order and status quo. In other words, Alevism were “recognized” as a diverse formation in Islam but this “recognition” does not cover the exact picture of Alevism, and does not meet expectations of the Alevis. Instead of recognizing the Alevis with their *sui generis* features, Curriculum 2005 emphasized their “common features” with the Sunnis (who have official recognition). As I cited in the introductory chapter, Burton and Carlen proposed that “official discourse is a necessary requirement for political and ideological hegemony” and that “...hegemonic discourses are a requirement to achieve the political incorporation of the dominated classes” (1979:48). Following Burton and Carlen, I will argue that by partially recognizing Alevism, Curriculum 2005 intends to incorporate the Alevis into the existing legal and political system.

b) *Social and historical context:* Curriculum 2005 was written in 2005 when the European Union’s intervention on the Turkish politics (in general) and on the issue of Alevism (in particular) were among the main contextual elements. Since 1998, the European Commission mentioned the issue of Alevism and the problem of compulsory religious education regularly in its regular reports; compulsory religious education and its “Sunni” characteristics were seen among the problematical issues in terms of the freedom of religion:

As far as freedom of religion is concerned, religious education (Sunnis) in state primary schools is obligatory (European Commission, 1998:20)...The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and schoolbooks, which would not reflect the Alevi identity... (European Commission,

2000:18)... Particular Alevi complaints relate to compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books, which fail to acknowledge the Alevi identity...(European Commission, 2001:27)... compulsory religious instruction in schools fails to acknowledge non-Sunni identities. The parents of an Alevi child have a case regarding compulsory religious education pending before the ECHR (European Commission, 2004:44)... In February 2005, the Ministry of Education indicated that Alevism ... would be included in compulsory religious education from next year (European Commission, 2005:31).

Apart from the regular reports of the EU, a lawsuit opened by the parents of an Alevi child in the European Court of Human Rights for the removal of compulsory religious instruction in the schools was another contextual development that affected the production of Curriculum 2005. By this lawsuit, the parents of Alevi child asserted that in the courses of DKAB only Sunni Islam is taught, but there is nothing about Alevism. Repetition of the Commission's regular reports concerning the Alevi's complaints about the compulsory religious instruction in schools and schoolbooks, which do not reflect the Alevi identity, encouraged them to open such a case.

Before opening the case in the European Court of Human Rights, Hasan Zengin (father of Alevi child) applied to İstanbul Directory of National Education demanding exemption from the compulsory religious education for his daughter Eylem Zengin. The directory refused the demand based on the basic law of National Education. Then, Hasan Zengin applied to the Second Administrative Court of İstanbul. The court decided that the decision of the directory was legal because the law #1739 (Basic Law of National Education) which necessitated the compulsory religious education in schools. Hasan Zengin appealed to the Council of State (*Danıştay*) and the eighth Department of the Council of State rejected the appeal of Zengin. After exhausting the domestic judicial procedure, Zengin appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on February 2, 2004 (Radikal, 2005). Accepting the appeal of Hasan Zengin, ECHR placed the case on its agenda. The claimant side (Hasan Zengin), in his application, claimed that only Sunni Islam is thought in the schools in a compulsory manner which is against the European Human Right Convention (EHRC) and supported his claim by

presenting the following documents: a) The school books of the compulsory religious courses (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, 4-5-6-7), b) Existing curriculum (Curriculum 1982), c) decisions of the domestic courts. In November 2004, the ECHR send 10 pages text that is confirming thesis of claimant and at the same time requested the defense of the government (59th government headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

As a result of these developments the issue of compulsory religious education was considered by Turkish Government as a part of the harmonization process to the European Union. The Ministry of National Education declared that since 2005 Alevism would be included in the curriculum of the DKAB (Radikal, 2004c). With this regulation, the government aimed also to strength its defense in the ECHR. On April 2005, the General Directory of Religious Education (*Din Öğretimi Genel Müdürlüğü*) prepared a new curriculum for DKAB (Curriculum 2005) only for secondary education (grade 9, 10 and 11 and 12). But, many of the Alevis are not satisfied with the new curriculum. For example, İzzettin Doğan (president of Cem Foundation, one of the leading Alevi NGOs) argued that the content of new curriculum is far from meeting expectations of the Alevis, because they were neglected in many terms; such as their form of worshipping and principles of beliefs were never mentioned. According to Doğan, Alevi children were taught principles of Sunni Islam (Milliyet, 2006).

4.2. School Textbooks of DKAB and the Alevis

In Turkey, until 1983 academic year, religious courses were offered under the title of “Knowledge of Religion” (*Din Bilgisi*). These courses, which covered all the grades between 4th and 11th, were optional. With the constitution of 1982, religious courses were mandated in all primary and secondary schools (for all the students from 4th grade until the end of 11th grade) under the title of “Culture of Religion and Moral Knowledge” (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*). The courses were arranged as two hours in a week in primary education and one hour for the secondary education. In the article 24 of the constitution, religious education was arranged as follow:

Education and instruction in religion and morality shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives

In this section, I will do CDA of tenth, eleventh and eighth grade DKAB textbooks. Concerning to tenth grade, I will focus on two books that are sanctioned as textbooks in schools by MEB. The first one of these textbooks (which will be referred as DKAB10-1982) was written by Süleyman Hayri Bolay according to the principles of Curriculum 1982, and published/sanctioned by MEB as textbook for the period between 1982 and 2005.⁹² The second book for tenth grade (which will be referred as DKAB10-2005) was written by a commission (formed by Hamdi Kızıler, Güner Işıldak, Nihat Koçak and Ömer Öcal) according to the new curriculum program: Curriculum 2005.

Concerning to eleventh grade, again, I will focus on two books. One was written by Mehmet Aydın (will be referred as DKAB11-1982) according to Curriculum 1982 and published as textbook by MEB for the period between 1982 and 2005. The second book (will be referred as DKAB11-2005) was written by a commission (formed by Mahmut Balcı, Turgut Çiftçi, Ahmet Karaçoban, Hüseyin Paşa, Ali Sacit Türker and Muharrem Yıldız) according to Curriculum 2005.

Concerning eighth grade, again, I will focus on two books. One was written by Ethem Ruhi Fırlı (that will be referred as DKAB8-1983) according to Curriculum 1982 and published as textbook by MEB for the period between 1982 and 2005. The second book (will be referred as DKAB8-2005) was written by a

⁹² These information, concerning the writers and validity periods of the textbooks, was provided to me by MEB upon my request on the ground of Information Provision Law (*Bilgi Edinme Yasası*). According to the information provided by MEB, the textbooks (named as DKAB10-1982, DKAB11-1982 and DKAB8-1983 were written in line with Curriculum 1982) have been valid for twenty-three years (from 1982 to 2005). Concerning the same period, for tenth, eleventh and eighth grades, no other textbook was published/sanctioned by MEB. It is stated by MEB that although there existed some other textbooks (which were prepared by private publishers, and approved by the Ministry), DKAB8-1983, DKAB10-1982 and DKAB11-1982 stayed as the most widespread textbooks in this period. DKAB8-2005, DKAB10-2005 and DKAB11-2005 are new set of textbooks written according to new curriculum program (Curriculum 2005).

commission (formed by Mehmet Akgül, Abdullah Albayrak, Abdullah Çatal, Ahmet Ekşi, Ali Sacit Türker, Ahmet Kara, Eyüp Koç, Turgut Çiftçi and Ramazan Yıldırım) according to Curriculum 2005.

By choosing these six books, three of them belonging to pre-2005 era and three others belonging to post-2005 era, I aimed to make a comparison between two separate eras in which two different curriculums have been valid. I am primarily interested in how MEB defined the Alevis in the textbooks of DKAB. For this reason, I have limited my analysis with those chapters or sections (episodes) of the textbooks concerning the Alevis. The structure of my analysis is guided by the principles of CDA developed by van Dijk, details of which were discussed in the first chapter. I will begin my analysis with one of the categories offered by CDA: genre of the textbooks. Analysis concerning to this category (genre) is valid for all the school textbooks that will be analyzed in this section. Then I will continue with basic macro-propositions (topics) of the texts.

As partially stated at the beginning of this chapter, while doing CDA of textbooks, I start from the following assumptions (which also shared by prominent scholars of CDA): in textbooks, there may be many implicit, indirect and mitigated ways in which homogenization, negligence, exclusion, positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation were conveyed to the students. Textbooks, which are the most widely read discourse type in society, are obligatory discourse for their readers (millions of students and teachers). Because of these characteristics, textbooks deserve attention about their tremendous influences in society. Children learn their basic knowledge through textbooks and other learning materials. Early studies on textbooks showed that in many cases, these materials were used to contribute to the creation of homogeneous and mono-cultural societies.

4.2.1. CDA of Tenth Grade Textbooks

4.2.1.1. DKAB10-1982

Genre: As correctly argued by Luke (1989: vii) the school textbooks “holds a unique and significant social function: to represent to each generation of

students an officially sanctioned, authorized version of human knowledge and culture.” It is a widely accepted principle of discourse studies that the power of a text is directly related with the social rules governing the environment of the reader, as much as the structural and linguistic features of the text. Obviously, this principle is valid also for the school textbooks. The most important environmental or contextual factor for the school textbooks of DKAB is that they are legally enforced and sanctioned in public schooling for all the students. This means that these textbooks have legally-guaranteed participants or audiences, that increases the authority of the books for all the students. In addition to the compulsory nature of DKAB textbooks, their presentation in a “neutral” frame (under the label of school knowledge) appears as another feature of them.

These two characteristics of DKAB textbooks (indeed valid for almost all schoolbooks) play significant roles in the formation of thoughts of students in primary and secondary education. As argued by van Dijk, textbooks “play a leading role in the promotion of socially shared values...textbooks and their hidden curricula also play an important role in the dissemination of dominant ideologies ” (2004:133). Because of these features, textbooks form a basic source of instruction or a frame of reference for cultivation of a favored society. By means of school textbooks, those persons in positions of official authority obligate a deliberate selection and organization of knowledge promoting official ideology that was regarded as beneficial for society in general and for all the students in particular. Being closely related with their selective nature, textbooks (in general) are closed to the alternative perspectives of knowledge (van Dijk, 2004:136). I argue below that this is true also for the textbooks of DKAB. As can be seen in the following pages, there is little or no place in these textbooks for the alternative discourses other than the official one. In these textbooks official authorities try to develop a “national identity and a social togetherness” that necessitate promotion of a particular worldview and social homogeneity, instead of heterogeneity and social plurality. For these reasons textbooks of DKAB, in general, chose to stay silent about alternative religious understandings. In this context, I will try to analyze how dominant official discourse in textbooks of DKAB, excluded the dominated perspectives and communities, and ignored their social existence. The

emphasis on homogeneity and social unity, and absence of heterogeneous elements in these books are harmonious with the argument of van Dijk who asserted that educational systems in general and school textbooks in particular aimed ethnic and racial integration of different entities in many parts of the world (1993b:199).

Topics: By topical analysis, I aim to produce data about what information DKAB10-1982 deems important. I will adopt a normative perspective in doing topical analysis. In other words, I am not only interested in what kind of topics were dealt with, but also interested in what information should be included concerning the Alevis (but are absent). The followings are the main topics in DKAB10-1982, in terms of the official perspective concerning the Alevis.

T1- Islam is the name of the religion arranging the relations between absolute creator (*Allah*) and absolute creatures (including human being) through the concept of unity (*tevhid*) (p.1-4).

T2- Believing in God, believing in the angels, believing in holy books, believing in the prophets, believing in afterlife and believing in destiny are the main principles of Islam (p.5-19).

T3- The main principle on which Islam was based on is that Muslims will be punished or rewarded by God according to what they did in this world (p.12).

T4- According to Islam, worshiping refers to daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, alms, pilgrimage to Mecca and sacrificing (p.20-29).

T5- Daily prayers (*namaz*) forms the core of Islam; for Muslims, mosque is the place of worship.

T6- Intoxicants are forbidden in Islam.

T7- Ottoman sultans (including Yavuz Selim) were model Muslims for us.

T8- Religion is an important constructive element of nation (p.58-65).

T9- Dying for God (*jihad*) is identical with dying for the state, and both of them were encouraged in Islam (p.58-65).

In terms of the normative perspective that was discussed above, I will mention some of the topics (concerning the Alevis) that should have been included in DKAB10-1982, but are absent:

A1- While explaining the principles of belief in Islam, the book is silent about the concepts of unity of existence (*vahdet-i vücud*) which are vital for the Alevis in explaining the relations between God and human-being.

A2- It is absent in the book that for the Alevis God does not punish or torture human beings; according to the Alevis, Islam is based on love, instead of fear.

A3- Main forms of worshipping for the Alevis were not mentioned in DKAB10-1982 (such as congregational ceremony (*ayin-i cem*), ritual Alevi dance (*semah*), ritual kinship or spiritual brotherhood (*musahiplik*), fasting in month of Muharram).

A4- Congregation houses (*cemevi*) and their meaning for the Alevis were never mentioned (no words, no picture about *cemevis*).

In sum, it is safe to argue about topical analysis of DKAB10-1982 that religion was instrumentalized for the maintenance of “national unity” and for the “permanence of state.” In addition, DKAB10-1982 neglected Alevism in the presentation of main principles and rituals of Islam by employing a completely Sunni perspective. In the following pages, I will discuss this negligence and Sunni bias in detail.

Local Meanings: Macro topics may provide only a very rough picture of the content of DKAB10-1982. Although at the level of topical analysis some characteristics of DKAB10-1982’s discourse towards the Alevis may be observed, it is necessary to make an analysis at micro level of words, sentence and paragraphs to observe possible discriminations, bias and negligence. Under the title of “local meanings,” I will employ several semantic categories to discuss the content of sentences or passages in DKAB10-1982. Van Dijk proposes a series of category for local level analysis of discrimination in textbooks, such as problematization, stereotyping, prejudice, exclusion, denial, and lacking voice, etc. (2004:136; 1993b:218-233). In addition to these categories, I will also take into account several other categories during my analysis (such as omittance, deleting, avoidance and illegalization/proscription).

a) Omittance or Deleting: One of the most conspicuous examples of deleting or omitting voice of the Alevism can be observed in the pages 96 and 97

of DKAB10-1982. In these pages, the prophet Muhammad's famous Sermon of Farewell (*Veda Hutbesi*) was presented to the students. The last paragraph of the sermon appears in the book as follow:

The prophet said "I leave behind me one thing, which is the book of God. If you follow it, you will never go astray... What will you say when you were asked about me?" They replied, "We will witness that you have accomplished your duty and advised us." Then the prophet said: "Be my witness, O God, that I have conveyed your message to your people (p.97).

It is stated by the writer of the book (Bolay) in the footnote that the text of the sermon was compiled from different sayings (*hadith*) reports such as Muslim, İbn-i Mace (p.96).

It is known that the Sermon of Farewell has more than one version. The most important difference between these versions is about the end of the sermon where the prophet Muhammad states what he leaves behind him. For example, different from the version that was just mentioned above (containing "I leave behind me one thing, which is the book of God"), the other version has the statement: "I leave behind me Qur'an and *Ahl al-Bayt*." Like the first one, the second version was also reported by prestigious saying reports but the writer chooses the first version (which does not have the expression of "*Ahl al-Bayt*") and omits the second version. These two versions of the sermon have always been a matter of discussion among different Islamic sects; while the Shiites believes the correctness of the second version, the Sunnis generally accept the first version. Inspiring from the tradition of Shiites, the Alevis (who believes in holiness and leadership of *Ahl al-Bayt*) also believes the second version of the sermon. By omitting the expression of "*Ahl al-Bayt*," DKAB10-1982 adopted a Sunni perspective and deleted voice of the Alevis.

Other examples of deleting Alevism in DKAB10-1982 can be observed through the citations made from important personalities of Alevism. When explaining the connection between the principles of belief in Islam and the importance of morality, DKAB10-1982 refers to the "words" of Hac Bektaş Veli without mentioning any specific book name or page number. According to Bolay,

Hacı Bektaş advises that “We believe in Qur’an and the prophets...We have to strictly follow up what they do or advice... Or else, we will not be true believers” (p.31-32). Bolay never mentions who Hacı Bektaş Veli was or what specific place and importance he has in Alevi belief system. Likewise, Ali and Yunus Emre were cited in the book without any specific reference their place in Alevism (p.36-37). As in the case of Hacı Bektaş Veli, their meanings for the Alevis were deleted in the text. Contrary, they were positioned to support Sunni perspectives concerning the principles of Islam.

b) Negligence: Sensitivities of the Alevis were neglected several times in DKAB10-1982. The examples that will be mentioned below show that only Sunni perspectives and Sunni sensitivities were concerned in the presentation of course subjects. For example, in a reading part, Yavuz Sultan Selim (the sultan of Ottoman Empire between 1512 and 1520) was portrayed as a model Muslim being respectful to the prophet, Qur’an and other high values of Islam (p.57). In another example, Yavuz Sultan Selim and his teacher İbn-i Kemal were the subject matter of another reading part, which appears in unit seven (a unit on the value of teachers). Again in this reading part, Yavuz Sultan Selim and his teacher were presented as model Muslims having virtues exalted by Islam (p.108).

It is a fact that by almost all the Alevis, Yavuz Sultan Selim was held responsible for the persecution of thousands of Kızılbaş (historical name of the Alevis) in Anatolia during the struggles between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids (which was led by Shah İsmail, one of the seven prominent poets of the Alevis) in the sixteenth century. Because of his brutal application in this period, Yavuz Sultan Selim has been cursed by the Alevis until today. Since he legitimized Yavuz’s persecution by giving religious permissions (*fatwa*), İbn-i Kemal was also damned by the Alevi population. In spite of this apparent dislike of the Alevis about Yavuz Selim, DKAB10-1982 systematically presented him as a model Muslim, which signifies an obvious offence against Alevi sensitivities.

c) Proscription or Illegality: In harmonious with Curriculum 1982, DKAB10-1982 proscribes some behaviors that are not proscribed in Alevism; the book obviously declares illegality of these actions. For instance, five pages of the book (which is an important number when total volume of the book- one hundred

pages- was considered) were devoted to prohibition of intoxicants in Islam. Intoxicants were defined as “work of the devil” and as “nastiness” which was forbidden by Islam (p.82). By referring to several verses of from Qur’an, sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) the prophet and quotations of famous persons, it is argued that intoxicants are the source of all the wrongdoings.

d) Topic Avoidance/Lacking Voice: The Alevis’ point of view, which shows considerable difference from the Sunni perspective, was disregarded in the book. Diverse understanding or interpretation of the Alevis from the orthodox Islam (Sunnism) concerning the sphere of principles of belief and worshipping were systematically avoided being discussed. In other words, Alevi perspective stayed untouched. For example, it is argued in DKAB10-1982 that “Qur’an has remained undistorted” since the prophet’s time until today (p.10). On the contrary, the Alevis believe that current version of Qur’an was distorted, and some of the verses (which were mentioning issues related to Ali, *Ahl al-Bayt*, Twelve Imams and rituals of Alevism) were changed by Uthman (the third caliph) (Onarlı, 2002:9). These objections of the Alevis were never mentioned in the book.

The same avoidance can also be observed in the picture selection of the writer. DKAB10-1982 contains seven pictures in total; five of them are the pictures of several mosques in Turkey: *Bursa Ulu Cami* (two pictures of it) (p.24), *Erzurum Çifte Minareli Cami* (p.63), *Sultan Ahmet Cami* (p.85), *İstanbul Eyüp Cami* (p.98). The pictures were placed in the book context-free manner. In other words, not only the unit that is related with prayers and mosque but also the other units that deal with other topics (such as “Customs and Tradition” (*Örf ve Adetler*), “National Unity and Togetherness” (*Milli Birlik ve Beraberlik*) have pictures of mosques in their contents. DKAB10-1982 implies that mosque is the place of worship in Islam and they also symbolize our national unity and togetherness. Being the place of worship for the Alevis, congregation houses were never mentioned in the book, neither by a picture nor by a single word. The issue of congregation houses remained as an avoided subject in DKAB10-1982. Excluding the Alevis, the pictorial presentations in the book reflects also a Sunni perspective.

“Main Principles of Faith in Islam” is the most conspicuous chapter of the

book in terms of topic avoidance concerning the Alevi belief system. Here are some examples from the content of this unit:

- The principle of “Believing in God” was presented in the book around the concept of “unity of God” (*tevhid*) and absolute separation of creator and creatures (p.5-7). This approach reflects the Sunni perspective. On the other, the concept of “unity of existence” (*vahdet-i vücud*) (which was not mentioned in DKAB10-1982) has central roles in the Alevi’s conceptualization of God and His relations with the existence (Çamuroğlu, 1999:126; Öz, 2006:80-81). Avoiding from reminding the diverse perspectives related with nature of God-existence relations (such as “unity of existence”), the book ignores any other perspective (including Alevism) other than Sunni Islam.

-Main principles of Alevi interpretation of Islam concerning sphere of belief were avoided systematically. None of the following pillars of Alevism (which are different from Sunni Islam) were mentioned in the book: Twelve Imams (*Oniki İmam*), *Ahl al-Bayt*, Four Gates-Forty Posts (*Dört Kapı-Kırk Makam*) and Ali. In addition to ignoring principles of beliefs, main rituals of the Alevi were also avoided being mentioned. Under the title of “Understanding of Worshipping in Islam” (p.20-27), only Sunni forms of worshipping were mentioned such as daily prayers (p.25), fasting in Ramadan (p.26), pilgrimage to Mecca (p.26) and alms (p.27). Forms of worshipping in Alevism were not mentioned.

- The book argues that “...the prophets were sent to this world to inform people about the torment of the God” (p.10)...Duty of some kind of angels is to apply divine punishments” (p.8). This is again a Sunni perspective. In other words, punishment and torment is a dimension of relation between God and human being in Sunni Islam. On the contrary, in Alevism, the relationship between God and human are based on love and tolerance instead of “torments, punishments and fears.” In addition to emphasizing fear of God, DKAB10-1982 also emphasizes some principles of Islam, which are related with militarism and *jihad*, instead of pacifist principles of it. For example, it is stated in the book that “Dying for the sake of the state is as sacred as dying for the sake of God (p.62)... The heaven is under the shadows of the swords (p.63).” Tolerant and clement interpretation of Islam, which is harmonious with Alevism, is not highlighted in

DKAB10-1982.

Rhetoric: Rhetorical elements in a discourse aim to enhance the “persuasiveness of the message” by using several expressive devices such as comparisons, questions, exaggerations and metaphors (van Dijk, 1984:139). Comparisons appear among the most common rhetorical elements of DKAB10-1982. For example, the writer compares the differences between “the believers” (*inançlılar*) and “the deniers” (*inkarcılar*) (p.8); while the first group of people would be helped by the angels, the second group would be bothered (p.8). The reasons of prohibition of intoxicants in Islam also discussed through the comparisons between the one who drinks alcohol and the ones who does not (p.83). Another widely used rhetorical device in DKAB10-1982 is asking questions to the reader. Examples of rhetorical question from DKAB10-1982: “How do the developments in sciences improve our belief in God? (p.7)... How does the integration of state and nation be possible? (p.63)... What do you understand from the indivisibility of homeland?” (p.63).

DKAB10-1982 employs poems and literary texts (all of which written by Sunni writers) in order to make its arguments more convincing. Some of the literary texts and their writers used in the book:

-Passages from *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili* (a famous Sunni-commentary on Qur'an) written by Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, a twentieth century Sunni religious intellectual (p.4).

-The poem of Mehmet Akif Ersoy (a Sunni Islamist thinker and poet) called *Çanakkale Şehitlerine* (p.65).

-A poem called *Mehmed'im* written by Fuat Azgur (p.64).

Especially the last two examples are important elements of military discourse used in the book. These two poems describe heroic characteristics of Turkish soldiers by recruiting a religious terminology and symbols (such as crescent, martyrdom, unity, *Kaaba*) most of which belong to Sunni Islam.

Context: While describing social and historical context in which the book was written, it would be helpful to take into consideration personality of the writer to reach a more accurate picture. As I discussed in the previous pages, Hearth of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) and its ideological program, Turkish-Islamic

Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*) had drastic impact on the policies followed by the generals of coup d'état of 1980. In the post-1980 period, Hearth of Intellectuals made great efforts to mandate religious education in schools. As part of these efforts Hearth of Intellectuals organized a seminar (on May 9-10, 1981) in which necessity of religious education in schools, universities and army were emphasized. The arguments which were emphasized in this seminar (such as presentation of religious education as a part of national education) had been very effective on the main decision makers of the time (the generals) (Ayhan, 1999:256). Süleyman Hayri Bolay (who was the vice-dean of Faculty of Divinity of Selçuk University) was among the participants of this seminar together with Tayyar Altıkulaç (president of Directorate of Religious Affairs, at that time), Mehmet Aydın (writer of DKAB textbook for grade 11) and Salih Tuğ (head of Hearth of Intellectuals at that time) (ibid: 575).

Other than the seminar of Hearth of Intellectuals, Süleyman Hayri Bolay also participated to activities of State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, DPT) as the head of Commission of Religion and Morality in 1982. Under the general framework of Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, the commission studied on the policies of religion and culture which would be followed in the next five years (Ayhan, 1999:255). The commission made a series of advices many of which were taken into consideration in the preparation content of new textbooks of DKAB and that of 1982 Constitution. According to the commission, Turkish history was formed under the strong effects of Islam which played vital role in the maintenance of Turkish national unity and togetherness. For these reasons, cultural heritage of Turks can only correctly be understood under the light of Islam. Commission also presents religion as panacea for the solution of various problems of the Turkish society (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1983:509-575). Both seminar of Hearth of Intellectuals and DPT's Commission of Religion and Morality do not mention about the different interpretations in Islam. In this context, the existence of the Alevis (as a diverse group from the Sunnis) and Alevism (as a different interpretation of Islam) were totally ignored. As a result, Sunnism was highlighted in DKAB textbooks and it was identified with Islam itself. This perspective was the main rationale behind the official discourses

of MEB on the Alevis observed in DKAB textbooks.

As I discussed earlier in this chapter, in the early 1980s, under the strong influence of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, religion was seen as an affective instrument to cope with the social unrest, anarchy and destructive/separatist ideologies” of the pre-1980 era by National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*). Compulsory religious education and textbooks of DKAB were among the most effective ways of inserting a religious worldview to the minds of new generations. For this aim, the military administration mandated courses of DKAB with the new constitution. Not only the mandating DKAB, but also opening thirty-five new high schools for prayer leaders and preachers (*İmam-Hatip liseleri*) shows the religious orientation of the National Security Council at this era. In addition, students of these high schools, who were instructed according to the principles of Sunni Islam, were also given the right of choosing any department in the university entrance exam by the military administration. By means of these moves, the generals aimed to cure social problems of Turkey and to enhance social integrity among the different social groups in Turkey; for this reason, there were no place for religious or sectarian plurality in their minds. Sunni Islam was proposed as a kind of “common value” for all different segments of society to achieve social integrity and togetherness.

4.2.1.2. DKAB10-2005

Parallel to the changes occurred in the content of curriculum of DKAB in 2005, MEB issued new textbooks according to new curriculum program. The book that I will analyze here (which will be referred as DKAB10-2005) was prepared for tenth grade students. DKAB10-2005 was written by a commission (formed by Hamdi Kızıler, Güner Işıldak, Nihat Koçak and Ömer Öcal) according to the new curriculum: Curriculum 2005. Like the new curriculum, the new book claims a supra-sectarian stance. In other words, the book was alleged to be neutral against different interpretation of Islam and to be supra-sectarian. But, in reality there are serious problems in the content of the book in terms of “sectarian neutrality” and “supra-sectarian” position of MEB.

Genre: Obviously, DKAB10-2005 is a school textbook, for this reason it carries all the characteristics of the textbooks which were mentioned above in relation with the analysis of DKAB10-1982. To reiterate, DKAB10-2005 is legally enforced and sanctioned in public schooling for all the students. This means that these textbooks have legally-guaranteed participants/audiences, which increases the authority of the books for all the students. It contains officially sanctioned version of knowledge presented in a “neutral” frame. It is through textbooks that official authorities indoctrinate the official ideology which was regarded as beneficial for society in general and for all the students in particular.

Topics. Topics can be defined as “semantic macrostructures derived from local (micro) structures of meaning” or “global meaning that language users constitute in discourse production,” and it tells us what a discourse is about, roughly (van Dijk, 2001:101). Embodying the most important or summarizing information of a discourse, topics explain the overall coherence of the text. Providing a general idea of what a text is all about, topics control many other component of the text. Topics cannot always directly be observed, but are inferred from the text. In that sense, semantic macro-structures or topics that were systematically defended in the book (DKAB10-2005) may be summarized as follow:

T1- In Islam, the relations between God (which is the absolute creator) and the human-being (which is a creature) should be understood throughout the concept of “unity of God” (*tevhid*), according to which no creature resemble to God and no creature has godlike characteristics in essence (p.9-30).

T2- Believing in God, believing in the angels, believing in holy books, believing in the prophets, believing in afterlife and believing in destiny are the main principles of beliefs accepted by all the Muslims (p.20-30).

T3- Believing in God necessitates performing definite forms of worshiping stated in Qur’an and in the sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) (p.33-47).

T4- Being the sources of social togetherness, daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, alms, pilgrimage to Mecca and sacrificing are the forms of worshiping (in Islam) that are required to be performed by all the Muslims (p.33-47).

T5- Ali (nephew and son in law of prophet Muhammad) has been a common value for all the Muslims (p.48-50).

T6- The prophet Muhammad is the ultimate model for all the Muslims; hence, they should take what the prophet assigns to them (such as prayer, fasting, and fear of God) and should abstain from what he withholds them (p.51-59).

T7- Principles of Islamic belief and forms of worshiping can only be learned correctly by referring to Qur'an (p.60-73).

T8- Freedom of thought, freedom of worshiping and freedom of belief were respected and guaranteed by Islam (p.74-100).

T9- According to Atatürk, Islam (the most reasonable of all the religions) is indispensable for our nation; he was against to bigotry, not to Islam (p.103-112).

According to van Dijk, analysis of topics in textbooks should have normative character (1993b:215). In other words, in addition to what topics were included in textbooks, the analysts must also be interested in which topics should have been included but are absent. Following van Dijk, I will adopt a normative perspective in doing topical analysis of DKAB10-2005. In other words, I am not only interested in what kind of topics were dealt with, but also interested in what information should be included concerning to the Alevis (but are absent). Some of the topics (concerning the Alevis) that should have been included in DKAB10-2005, but are absent:

While explaining the principles of belief in Islam, the book is silent about the concepts of unity of existence (*vahdet-i vücud*) which is vital for the Alevis in explaining the relations between God and human-being. Meaning and place of *Ahl al-Bayt*, Ali, Muhammad and Twelve Imams were not included in the book. None of the main forms of worshiping for the Alevis was mentioned in DKAB10-1982 (such as congregational ritual (*ayin-i cem*), fasting in month of Muharram and ritual dance of the Alevis (*semah*). In addition, congregation houses (*cemevi*) and their meaning for the Alevis were never mentioned (no words, no picture about congregation houses).

Local Meanings: Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is

important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness. Problematization, stereotyping, prejudice, exclusion, denial and lacking voice are main categories for local level analysis of discrimination in textbooks offered by Van Dijk (2004:136; 1993b:218-233). In addition to these categories, I will also take into account several other categories during my analysis (such as omittance, deleting, avoidance and proscription).

a) *Negligence:* It can easily be realized by looking at the pictures appeared in the book that the Alevis and their beliefs were neglected on many occasions. For example, fifteen mosque pictures were scattered throughout the book. The most conspicuous one of these pictures appears in the cover page in a composition that depicts the rise of sun with the silhouette of a mosque inside it. The other mosque pictures appear in the book mostly in an irrelevant manner with the content of the pages (such as at pages: 17, 19, 33, 36, 51, 52, 53, 58, 65, 66, 74, 83, 104 and 121). Not a single picture of a congregation houses appears in the book. This is an obvious negligence of the Alevis, because many of them accept congregation houses as their place of worship, instead of mosques.

A similar kind of negligence can be observed on the pictures which depict people who are performing their religious rituals. The book contains seven pictures (at pages 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 46 and 83) in which Muslim people are performing their prayers (*namaz*). There are two pictures in which peoples performing their pilgrimages to Mecca (at pages 40 and 104). In addition, one picture depicts Muslims who are breaking their fasting in month of Ramadan (p.37). No picture in the book illustrates the Alevis while they are performing their worshipping. Neglecting the forms of worshipping recognized by the Alevis, the book systematically refers to forms of worshipping recognized by Sunni Muslims.

This negligence is not limited with the content of the pictures; the verbal content of the units also manifests the same negligence. It is assumed that daily prayers, fasting in month of Ramadan, alms, pilgrimage to Mecca and sacrificing are common forms of worshipping among all the Muslims in Turkey (p.33). As a result of this assumption, these rituals were presented as the main sources of

“social togetherness and integrity” (p.36). Forms of worshipping other than those recognized by Sunni Islam were neglected in the book. Hence, all of these examples of negligence appeared in DKAB10-2005 results in a difference-blinded discourse of “togetherness and unity” at the expense of the Alevis and their belief system.

The Alevi perspective was neglected not only in the sphere of worshipping but also in the presentation of personalities of Islamic history. In Alevism, according to the principle of *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ahl al-Bayt*, and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams), Umar (the second caliph), Abu Bakr (the first caliph) and Aysha (wife of the prophet; she fought against Ali in the war of *Cemel*) are among the person who should be contempted. DKAB10-2005 glorifies these persons several times and presents them as model for all the Muslims. For example, the book praises Aysha due to her “important services” to Islamic civilization (p.123). She was referred as “glorified Aysha” (*Hazreti Ayşe*), contrary to the convictions of the Alevis about her. Likewise, Umar was portrayed as the symbol of justice and honesty (p.101-102). Contrary to opinions of the Alevis about him, Umar was presented as a person who had always good relations with Ali (p.102):

Before deciding about any kind of matters, Umar had always considered Ali’s ideas related with these issues. In the formation of Umar’s earnest personality, Ali’s advices played vital roles. For this reason, Umar stated that “I would be destroyed without Ali’s advices.”

b) Topic Avoidance/Lacking Voice: The Alevis’ point of views concerning the principles of Islamic belief, which show considerable differences from the Sunni perspective, was disregarded in the book. Diverse understanding or interpretation of the Alevis from the orthodox Islam (Sunnism) concerning the sphere of principles of belief and worshipping were systematically avoided being discussed. In other words, Alevi perspective stayed untouched. For example:

-Although the Alevis (like the Sunnis) believe in God, the prophet and Qur’an, they interpret these elements differently from the Sunni Muslims. These differences, such as concerning the conceptualization of God and the prophet, and

the contents of Qur'an were never mentioned in the book and avoided to be discussed.

- In addition to differences from Sunnism related with "common principles of belief," main elements of belief peculiar to Alevism such as Twelve Imams, Four Gate-Forty Posts were also remained untouched.

- None of the following rituals of Alevism were mentioned in DKAB10-2005 under the title of "Worshipping in Islam:" ritual dance (*semah*), spiritual brotherhood (*musahiplik*), fasting in month of Muharram, and excommunication (*düşkünlik*).

c) Ommittance/Deleting: As discussed above, selection of some portion of knowledge and tradition, and omitting the others were among the techniques employed in the textbooks to transmit dominant cultural values and ideologies. Techniques of omitting and deleting were systematically used in DKAB10-2005 concerning to the principles of Alevism. Different from Curriculum 1982 (in which Alevism was not recognized as a different interpretation of Islam; and it was completely ignored by means of a complete silence), the new curriculum (Curriculum 2005), ostensibly, covered Alevism as a different Islamic interpretation. Being harmonious with the new curriculum, DKAB10-2005 contains the portraits of important figures for the Alevis. But, as I will discuss below, in many cases the book does not present a correct representation of these figures for the Alevis. Instead, these figures were employed in the book in order to buttress the principles of Sunni Islam. In other words, instead of recognizing Alevism as a *sui generis* interpretation of Islam, the book aims to incorporate Alevism to mainstream Islam (Sunnism) by deleting or omitting the exact meaning of these people for the Alevis. Hence, the book's ostensible neutrality and supra-sectarian stance resulted in a Sunni minded and assimilative one.

For example, Ali and his life story were employed in the book in order to emphasize the importance of forms of worshipping which were recognized by Sunni Muslims (p.48-50). Under the title of "Model Personality Glorified Ali and His Sayings about the Importance of Worshipping," it is argued that:

During the reign of first three caliphs, Ali stayed in Madina. He did not undertake any administrative and military duty in this period. Because of his immense knowledge on Qur'an and prophet's sayings, Abu Bakr and Umar [the first and second caliphs, consecutively] had always applied to him to consult about religious and social issues... After Umar's reign, Ali presented his fealty to Uthman [the third caliph]... (p.49).

The Alevis believe that after the prophet Muhammad, the caliphate was deserved by Ali because of his merits and distinguished personality; but Ali's right of caliphate was usurped by Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman consecutively. As can be seen from the passage above, the book never mentioned the contentions on the caliphate between Ali and other three. Disagreements were deleted; Alevi perspective was omitted; instead of conflict, "the congruity" was emphasized in DKAB10-2005 concerning the issue. Ali and the first three caliphs were presented as harmonious friends along their lives.

In addition to deleting unjust attitudes of first three caliphs to Ali, DAKAB10-2005 omits also distinctive meaning and place of Ali in Alevism. For the Alevis, Ali is the successor of the prophet. They do not discriminate God, Muhammad and Ali from each other in a way that this understanding approaches to deification of Ali (Melikoff, 1998). Ignoring these convictions of the Alevis about him, Ali was presented only as a historical personality practicing and advising Sunni mode of Islam. The book by attributing the following words to Ali, tries to consolidate Sunni interpretation of Islam in the eyes of all the students:

Prayer (*namaz*) makes all the Muslims (who fears God) closer to the God. Practicing hajj is a kind of holy war for all Muslims. Fasting is alms of human body...Do not give up visiting Kaaba which is house of the God (p.50).

As in the case of Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli (another important figure in Alevism) and his words were also used in the text to consolidate Islamic principles of belief from a Sunni perspective. It can be argued that Alevism has been strongly influenced from thoughts of Hacı Bektaş Veli, a mystical leader lived in the 13th century. The Alevis believe that the principles stated by Hacı Bektaş Veli is harmonious those ones stated by Ali in many terms. For this reason,

most of the Alevis follow the principles and ideas of Hacı Bektaş Veli. They gave great importance to him as their patron saint. They display his picture in their houses, associations and congregation houses. They often quote sayings attributed to him. Every year thousands of the Alevis visit his tomb in Kırşehir in the middle of August to show their respect. Without mentioning any of these features of Hacı Bektaş Veli, and without citing any of his heterodox ideas, DKAB10-2005 quotes the following sayings attributed to Hacı Bektaş Veli to endorse the principles of belief for Sunni Islam:

You should know that believing in one God, obeying his orders and refraining from what he prohibits are among the principles of belief...Believing in the angels, judgment day, Qur'an and other holy books of the God are among the principles belief...All of these are principles of belief; and living without fear of God is not good for your belief...(p.30-31).

None of the well-known sayings of Hacı Bektaş Veli (which are followed and recognized by the Alevis as their principles of belief) were mentioned in the book; the following sayings of Hacı Bektaş were omitted:

Be master of your words, actions and loin (*Eline diline beline sahip ol*). Even if you are offended, do not offend in return (*İncinsen de incitme*). Whatever you are looking for, look it for inside you (*Her ne arar isen kendinde ara*). Human being is my Kaaba (*Benim Kabem insandır*). Human being is the largest book to read (*İnsan okunacak en büyük kitaptır*).

d) Proscription: According to DKAB10-2005, the Alevis seem to be perpetrators of sins that seriously violence Islamic principles. Although not stated directly, it is implied in DKAB10-2005 that the Alevis are impious in terms of several Islamic rules. Two examples:

1) - Daily prayers and fasting in moth of Ramadan were categorized in DKAB10-2005 as “required religious duty for all Muslims” (*farz*) (p.34-38). This categorization was supported by several verses from Qur'an and by sayings of the prophet (*hadith*):

Set up Regular Prayers; For such prayers are enjoined on believers at stated times...Prayer is the main pillar of religion...(p.34)... Fasting is obliged to you as it was obliged to those before you... Fasting in Ramadan for specific period id obliged. But if you are ill, or on a journey, the obliged number of days must be made up later (p.37).

After the conceptualization of prayers and fasting as “required religious duty for all Muslims” (*farz*), DKAB10-2005 gives definition of what “*farz*” is: “Obligatory behaviors in Islam, which causes sin if not performed” (p.132). In practice, it is known that most of the Alevis do not follow daily prayers and do not perform fasting in Ramadan. In that sense, these Alevis are declared as sinful according to the text.

2) - Intoxicants, which is not forbidden in Alevism and is used as part of congregational ritual (*ayin-i cem*) in some regions, is defined in DKAB10-2005 among the sinful act that is forbidden by Islam (p.90-92): “Intoxicants and gambling... are an abomination of Satan's handwork: eschew such (abomination), that you may prosper... Intoxications are the source of all badness and it is the biggest sin” (p.91). As in the case of prayers, it is implied that the Alevis are performing sinful act by using intoxications.

e) ***Justification of status quo:*** DKAB10-2005 tries to justify existing Sunni-centered religious services provided by the state. Application and sayings of Atatürk were used as the main instrument of these justification efforts. It is argued in the book that:

Atatürk founded the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to ensure presentation of orderly religious service in our country...He also opened the way for Turkish sermons in the mosques on Friday prayers...He supported translation of *Sahih-i Buhari* into Turkish” (p.108).

Rhetoric: As discussed above rhetorical structures are used to attract the attention of readers, to emphasize specific segment of the discourse and to make the arguments more convincing. Making use of verses from Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) are two prominent rhetorical devices in DKAB10-2005. In addition, the writers of the book employed a scientific rhetoric while they are

discussing the subjects such as “the existence of God, creation of universe, benefits of practicing prayers, fasting, hajj and alms.” Several times the writers raise question and provide appropriate answers to these question in order to convince the readers. Numerous pictures of people who are practicing their prayers, hajj, sacrifices, etc were used to present the course subjects effectively.

Context: Turkey-European Union relations and an Alevi citizen's appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (in order to get exemption from compulsory religious education classes for his daughter) were two important elements of historical context where DKAB10-2005 was produced. The principle of 1982 constitution, concerning the compulsory religious education, also stayed at the center of the discussions. The legal status of DKAB courses has been criticized mainly by the Alevis for being against the principle of secularism. DKAB courses were criticized not only for their legal status (violating principles of secularism), but also for the content of the textbook taught during these classes. Again, it is mainly argued by the Alevis that these books do not include the principles of Alevism in their contents. In 2005, when the criticisms toward DKAB course reached its peak, Turkish government tried to justify existing application of compulsory religious education by employing several interrelated arguments which aimed to convince both the Alevis and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) about “neutrality” of DKAB courses. Preparation of new curriculum for DKAB courses and publication of new textbooks, in which Alevism was ostensibly included, were among the efforts aimed to justify compulsory religious courses. In ECHR (concerning the case opened by an Alevi citizen), Turkish government defended its position by arguing that “religion is taught in DKAB classes similar to how chemistry is taught in chemistry classes” (Sabah, 2005). Hüseyin Çelik (Minister of Education) also shared the same position; he argued, “We do not teach religion to students. Rather, we teach them religious culture... It is the religious culture and knowledge of morality classes, rather than the religious education classes that are compulsory in Turkey” (Star Gazetesi, 2005). Under the strong demands of Alevi organizations and pressure from the EU circles, Hüseyin Çelik (Minister of Education) declared that issues

related to Alevism would be included in the textbooks of DKAB high schools starting from the beginning of the 2005 academic year.

4.2.2. CDA of Eleventh Grade textbooks

4.2.2.1. DKAB11-1982

Genre: This textbook (that will be referred as DKAB 11-1982) was written by Mehmet Aydın (a professor of philosophy in divinity school) in 1982, and were mandated by MEB until 2005. Needless to say, DKAB11-1982 is a textbook, and the analysis concerning to its genre is more or less identical with the other textbooks analyzed in this chapter. In order to refrain from repetition, I will not discuss genre of the text in detail; instead, I will confine myself with a few words about the characteristics of textbooks.

Like many other textbooks, DKAB11-1982 presents to the students officially mandated form of knowledge about religion, culture and Islam. The most important environmental/contextual factor for the school textbooks of DKAB11-1982 is that it is legally enforced and sanctioned in public schooling for all the students. This means that it has legally-guaranteed participants or audiences, that increases the authority of the book for all the students. In addition to the compulsory nature of it, DKAB11-1982's presentation in a "neutral" frame (under the label of school knowledge) appears as another important feature of it. Textbooks, which form a basic source of instruction or a frame of reference for cultivation of a favored society, play significant roles in the formation of thoughts of students in primary and secondary education. By means of these features, "textbooks and their hidden curricula also play an important role in the dissemination of dominant ideologies..." (van Dijk, 2004:133). It can be argued that by means of school textbooks, those persons in positions of official authority obligate a deliberate selection and organization of knowledge promoting official ideology that was regarded as beneficial for society in general and for all the students in particular. According to van Dijk textbooks are selective in presenting the knowledge; and in relation with this they are also closed to the alternative perspectives of knowledge (van Dijk, 2004:136). I argue below that this is true

also for the textbooks of DKAB. As can be seen in the following pages, there is little or no place in these textbooks for the alternative discourses other than official one. In these textbooks official authorities try to develop a “national identity and a social togetherness” that necessitate promotion of a particular worldview and social homogeneity, instead of heterogeneity and social plurality. For these reasons textbooks of DKAB, in general, chose to stay silent about of alternative religious understandings. In this context, I will try to analyze how dominant official discourse in textbooks of DKAB, excluded the dominated perspectives and communities, and ignored their social existence. The emphasis on homogeneity and social unity, and absence of heterogeneous elements in these books are harmonious with the argument of van Dijk who asserted that educational systems in general and school textbooks in particular aimed to ethnic and racial integration of different entities in many parts of the world (1993b:199).

Topics: As proposed by van Dijk, topics may be characterized as the most “important” or “summarizing” ideas expressed in a discourse. In that sense topics provide us the “gist” or “upshot” of a text by telling what a text is about.

By topical analysis, I aim to produce data about what information DKAB11-1982 deems important. I will adopt a normative perspective in doing topical analysis. In other words, I am not only interested in what kind of topics were dealt with, but also interested in what information should be included concerning to the Alevis (but are absent). Before starting topical analysis of the text, it is necessary to argue about main subjects of the book. Instead of dealing with specific issues in Islam (such as “history of Islam,” “issue of caliphate” or “worshiping in Islam”), DKAB11-1982 deals with more general and abstract issues (such as “relationship between religion and morality,” “moral duties,” “other religions and Islam” and “universe and human-being”). For this reason, in this book, few passages (comparing to the other textbooks analyzed in this chapter) directly concern the Alevis/Alevism. Not only the Alevis but also no other Islamic sect were directly referred in the book. DKAB11-1982 contains limited number of arguments that are meaningful in terms of main question of this study: how were the Alevis perceived by the MEB? In spite of these shortcomings, I will summarize the book under the guidance of my research

questions. The following statements can be inferred from the text as main topics of DKAB11-1982:

T1- God is the absolute creator of universe, and his existence is separate and independent from the universe/creatures. God is separate from everything, and he does not resemble any of his creatures, including human (p.2-13).

As can be inferred from these arguments, in DKAB11-1982, dominating perspective concerning the relationship between God, universe and human being is based on belief of *tevhid* (unity) which is not enough to reflect understanding/perspectives of Alevism concerning the story of creation and the relationship between God, universe and human-being. While explaining the principles of belief in Islam, the book is silent about imagination of God, universe and human being in Alevism, according to which: a) God, universe and human being cannot be imagined separately, b) human being was created as an appearance of God, c) human being is a divine creature (Keçeli, 1996:97-99).⁹³

T2- A society, which is composed of Muslims, is necessarily a society of brotherhood, unity and togetherness (p.14-15).

T3- In Islam, Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) are two main references in determining what is forbidden (*haram*) and what is permissible (*helal*). In that sense, drinking intoxicants is forbidden in Islam (p.20, 23).

T4- Daily prayers (*namaz*), pilgrimage to Mecca (*hac*), fasting in month of Ramadan (*oruç*) and alms (*zekat*) are main forms of worshiping in Islam (p.21).

Several times in DKAB11-1982, forms of worshiping in Islam were discussed with reference to Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) prophet. However, no form of worshiping of the Alevis were mentioned in the book. As will be discussed below in detail, forms of worshiping in Alevism were systematically ignored.

T5- Mosques, which were/are the worshiping places for all Muslims, have also educational functions in society (p.68, 72, 73, 100).

Parallel to the curriculum of 1982 and DKAB textbooks of other grades,

⁹³ Keçeli classifies Alevism's understanding of God, human being and universe with reference to the concepts of *vahdet-i vücud* which is vital for the Alevis in explaining the relations between God and universe.

DKAB11-1982 also, presents mosques as worshiping houses for all Muslims. The issue of congregation houses (worshiping place for the Alevi) was never touched.

T6- Compulsory religious education in schools is necessary, and does not violate principles of secularism (p.100).

T7- Atatürk was not against Islam. In addition, he advised our nation to be religious, because, there is no contradiction between Islam and science (p.101).

T8- In history, Turkish-Muslims (for example, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Yunus Emre, Fuzuli, Ahmed Yesevi, İbn-i Sina, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Farabi, Mimar Sinan, Atatürk) made great contributions to the civilizations (p.95-125).

Schemata: Schemata refer to the general “argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position” (van Dijk, 1984:105). The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). Text schemata consist of a special order. In other words, they determine what content or argumentative elements come first, second and last; and how arguments will be supported by which sub-arguments.

It can be argued that elaboration/corroborating understanding of *tevhid* (unity) forms an important segment of argumentative structure of DKAB11-1982. At first, the book sets principles of *tevhid* in detail; then it discredits alternative ideas to understanding of *tevhid*. After presenting “weakness” of other theories that try to explain the relationship between God, universe and human being, the writer refuses these alternative ideas (other than *tevhid*) by the following words: “...these kinds of ideas are harmful for our religious life” (p.6).

In addition, the book also relates *tevhid* (unity) with social structure. It is argued that: “Islam intends to create a society based principle of *tevhid* [unity]...and in such a society there is no place for discrimination... Islam takes every measures for a healthy society” (p.15-16). The book associates “unity” with “healthy society” in which there must be no diversity in terms of “world view and aims of people” (p.15). On the other hand, “diversity” is associated with “*fitne*” (incitement) and “conflict” (p.16). As a result of logical sequences presented in the book, the readers were canalized to the following conclusion: any kind of diversity or different demand raising from society may possibly injure unity/healthiness of society.

Discussions about “the relationship between Islam and science,” “Atatürk’s stance against Islam,” and “necessity of religious education” form another main segment of schematic structure of DKAB11-1982. Systematically, these three issues were associated with each other, and discussed together. In the first step, it is proposed that there is no contradiction between Islam and modern sciences:

If God’s order in the universe did not exist, there would be no sciences (p.4)...Science tries to explore what God created (p.7)... No religion in the world gives importance to rationality and science as much as Islam does (p.26).

This “friendly” relationship between Islam and sciences were also supported by a series of sayings of Atatürk. It is argued that Atatürk was not against Islam; in addition, he advised our nation to be religious:

Turkish nation should be more religious, I mean it should be religious with all its sincerity... We have a strong-based religion (p.102)...Our religion is the most reasonable religion, and it is in harmony with science, logic and technique (p.103).

In the second step, it is argued that religious education is necessary, and it must be served/performed by the state. It is strongly argued that this does not violate the principles of secularism (p.100).

Religious education in schools and mosques does not contradict with our principles of secularism. Atatürk also explain this issue arguing that “schools is the most suitable place for our citizens to learn their religions” (p.100).

Local Meanings: Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness. Problematicization, stereotyping, prejudice, exclusion, denial and lacking voice are main categories for local level analysis of discrimination in textbooks offered by Van Dijk (2004:136; 1993b:218-233). In addition to these categories, I will also take into

account several other categories during my analysis (such as omittance, deleting, avoidance and proscription).

a) *Proscriptions:* In DKAB11-1982, drinking intoxicants (which are not forbidden in Alevism) are defined as a sinful act that is forbidden by Islam (p.20-23). The arguments forbidding intoxicants are based on verses of Qur'an and prophet's sayings. Stating, "intoxicants are forbidden in Islam" DKAB11-1982 implies those Muslims (including the Alevis) are performing sinful act by using intoxications.

b) *Negligence:* It can easily be realized by looking at the pictures appeared in the book that the Alevis and their beliefs were neglected in many occasions. For example, there are two pictures of mosque (*Sultan Ahmet Mosque* (p.73) and *Konya İnce Minareli* (p.96)). In addition, on page 107 a picture shows Mustafa Kemal Atatürk praying during *Kurban Bayramı* (sacrifice festival). There is no picture of a congregation house (worshiping houses of the Alevis); and no picture showing performance of an Alevi worshipping in the book. Not only by pictures but also by argumentation "the importance and centrality of mosques in Turkish social life" was highlighted (p.72-73). This is an obvious negligence of the Alevis, because many of them accept congregation houses as their place of worship, instead of mosques.

This negligence is not limited with the content of the pictures; the verbal content of the units also manifests the same negligence. Daily prayers, fasting in month of Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca and alms were presented in DKAB11-1982 as "required religious duty for all Muslims" (*farz*) (p.21). In practice, it is known that most of the Alevis do not follow daily prayers and do not perform fasting in Ramadan; they also do not go Mecca for hajj. No forms of worshipping recognized by the Alevis were mentioned in the book. Forms of worshipping other than those recognized by Sunni Islam were neglected in the book. Hence, all of these negligence appeared in DKAB11-1982 results in a difference-blinded discourse.

The Alevi perspective was neglected not only in the sphere of worshipping but also in the presentation of personalities of Islamic history. In Alevism, according to the principle of *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ahl al-*

Bayt, and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams), Umar (the second caliph), Abu Bakr (the first caliph) are among the person who should be contempted. DKAB11-1982 glorifies these persons and presents them as model for all the Muslims: “Glorified Umar and Abu Bakr were among the great Muslims; they always followed the prophet” (p.87).

b) Topic Avoidance/Lacking Voice/Deleting: The Alevis’ point of views concerning the Islamic history, Islamic rituals and principles of beliefs (which show considerable differences from the Sunni perspective) were disregarded in DKAB11-1982. Diverse understanding or interpretation of the Alevis from the orthodox Islam (Sunnism) concerning the (history, principles of belief and worshipping) were systematically avoided being discussed. In other words, Alevi perspective stayed untouched. As discussed above, selection of some portion of knowledge and tradition, and omitting the others were among the techniques employed in the textbooks to transmit dominant cultural values and ideologies. Techniques of omitting and deleting were systematically used in DKAB11-1982 concerning to Alevism. For example:

-It is argued in the book that “all the Muslims start ‘with the name of God the most beneficial and merciful’ (*Rahman ve Rahim olan Allah’ın adı ile*) in their work” (p.113). But, we know that the Alevis in many instances (for example, at the beginning of their congregational ceremonies, use the expression of “with the name of Shah” (*Şahın adı ile*), instead of “with the name of God.” The book refrains from mentioning about this *sui generis* characteristic of the Alevis, and chooses to identify all Muslims with Sunni practice.

- In page 41, the prophet Muhammad’s famous Sermon of Farewell (*Veda Hutbesi*) was presented containing the following expressions:

I leave behind me two things, which are the book of God and applications the prophet. If you follow them, you will never go astray.

As was mentioned earlier, it is known that the Sermon of Farewell has more than one version. The most important difference between these versions is about the end of the sermon where the prophet Muhammad states what he leaves behind

him. For example, different from the version that was just mentioned above, the other version contains the statement: “I leave behind me Qur’an and *Ahl al-Bayt*.” Like the first one, the second version was also reported by prestigious saying reports but the writer chooses the first version (which does not have the expression of “*Ahl al-Bayt*”), and he omits the second version. While the Sunnis generally accept the first version, the Alevis (who believes in holiness and leadership of *Ahl al-Bayt*) believes the second version of the sermon. By omitting the expression of “*Ahl al-Bayt*,” DKAB11-1982 adopted a Sunni perspective, and deleted voice of the Alevis.

- Under the title of “Muslim-Turkish scientists and thinkers,” the book mentions about Imam Azam Abu Hanifa: “Abu Hanifa...is the founder of sect of Hanefism. Today there are millions of Muslims who behave according to his principles and adopts his ideas” (p.67). As well as his significance in terms of Islamic disciplines, Abu Hanifa’s importance and meaning for his followers were also explicitly stated in the book. Under the same title, some other “important personalities” of Turkish-Islamic civilization were also mentioned in the text: Ahmet Yesevi, Yunus Emre, Hacı Bektaş Veli and Fuzuli (p.78-79). However, all of these personalities were presented as “important figures of Sufi literature.” Their roles in the formation of Alevism and their importance for the Alevis were deleted/not mentioned. Instead of context of Alevism, they were placed into the context of “Islamic literature;” and the connections between these figures and their followers (the Alevis) were systematically omitted in the text.

Rhetoric: As stated above, rhetoric is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient by means of devices such as, alliterations, pictures, metaphors, metonymy, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, parallelism, comparisons, contrasts, ironies and us/them comparison (van Dijk, 1993a:278; 1980:131). Rhetorical elements in a discourse aim to enhance the “persuasiveness of the message” by using several expressive devices mentioned above (van Dijk, 1984:139). Here are some of the rhetorical tools used in DKAB11-1982:

-The arguments stated in the book were explained and supported by direct citations from Qur’an. From its beginning to the end, there are more than 150

references to verses of Qur'an. Not only verses of Qur'an, but also sayings of the prophet Muhammad and Atatürk have been other main resources that were used to buttress the thesis of the book. In addition, poems from some famous poets (such as Mehmet Akif Ersoy, İsmail Hakkı Ertaylan, Yunus Emre), and declarations of some non-Muslim famous persons who exalted Islam in their writings (such as Goethe, Bismark, Bernard Shaw) were employed to defend basic arguments of the text.

-The book contains a series of pictures, photos, maps, miniature and examples of calligraphy that are placed according to the content of each unit.

Context: DKAB11-1982 was written in 1982, just two years after the military coupe of 1980. The contextual elements of DKAB11-1982 are almost identical with that of DKAB10-1982. In order to refrain from repetition I will refer to contextual analysis of DKAB10-1982 and Curriculum 1982 that appeared above in this chapter. Roughly, it must be stated that social and historical context in which DKAB11-1982 was written, were strictly determined by the climate of military intervention of September 12 and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-Islam Sentezi*).

4.2.2.2. DKAB11-2005

Parallel to the changes occurred in the content of curriculum of DKAB, MEB issued new textbooks in 2005. The book that I will analyze here (which will be referred as DKAB11-2005) was prepared for eleventh grade students. DKAB11-2005 was written by a commission (formed by Mahmut Balcı, Turgut Çiftçi, Ahmet Karaçoban, Hüseyin Paşa, Ali Sacit Türker and Muharrem Yıldız) according to Curriculum 2005. Different from DKAB11-1982, DKAB11-2005 mentions about the Alevis and Alevism. As will be discussed below in detail, Alevism were mentioned several times in relation to the following issues: “Love of Muhammad” and “Love of *Ahl al-Bayt* in Our Culture.” Alevism were discussed only in terms of the importance it gave to the prophet Muhammad and *Ahl al-Bayt*. That is to say, *sui generis* side of Alevism in terms of worshiping or principles of beliefs (which differentiate it from Sunnism) stayed untouched. Like

the new curriculum, the new book claims a supra-sectarian stance. In other words, the book was alleged to be neutral against different interpretation of Islam and to be supra-sectarian. However, in reality, there are serious problems in the content of the book in terms of “sectarian neutrality” and “supra-sectarian” position of MEB. For example, forms of worshiping and place of worship recognized by the Alevi were systematically absent in DKAB11-2005.

Topics: Topics are “the most important” and “summarizing ideas” of a text (van Dijk, 1984:55-56). The global, overall structure of the text (semantic macro-structure of DKAB11-2005) can be summarized as follows:

T1- Social, political, geographical and cultural variations among the Muslims gave rise to different interpretations of Islam (p.58-73).

T2- Alevism-Bektashism (*Alevilik-Bektaşilik*) is one of the mystical (*tasavvufi*) interpretations which appeared in Islamic thought (p.53).

T3- In spite of the fact that there emerged numerous sects/groups in Islamic history, there is no fundamental disagreements concerning to basic principles of religion (p.69-72).

T4- Different interpretations of Islam have consensus on main principles of belief and forms of worshiping; but there may be some disagreement on how to perform these worshiping (p.69)

T5- Main forms of worshiping in Islam are daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca, alms, sacrifice, ablution, and the ritual ablution (*gusül abdesti*) (washing whole body to rescue from filthiness) (p.27-38).

T6- In addition to forms of worshiping, Qur'an, judgment day, heaven, hell and divine punishment are matters of consensus among different Islamic interpretations (p.72)

T7- Mosques (which have also social functions) are the places of worship, and *imam* (leader for prayer) and *vaiz* (preacher) are religious personnel for all Muslims (p.88, 92, 105).

T8- Love of the prophet Muhammad and love of *Ahl al-Bayt* (family of the prophet Muhammad including Ali, Fatima and their sons Hasan and Husayn) are two important concepts that unite the Turkish nation (p.50-55).

T9- Leading figures and saints of Alevism had produced magnificent literature products on love of prophet and *Ahl al-Bayt* (p.54-55).

T10- Existence of Directorate of Religious Affairs, founded by Atatürk in order to provide healthy religious services to our people, aims national integration and solidarity; this existence does not violate principle of secularism (p.86-92).

Schemata: As defined by van Dijk, schemata refer to “global maps” or “hierarchical syntactic structures” into which topics were inserted (1988:49-50). That is to say, main propositions of a text appear according to a specific sequence. By means of this sequence, argumentative coherence of the propositions and the logical connections between main arguments and supportive arguments are controlled.

It is possible to delineate schematic structure of DKAB11-2005 as follows: Principally, it is accepted, in the book, that there may be/are more than one different understanding or interpretation of Islam. Possible reasons of this plurality were discussed in detail under the titles of “Geographical Reasons,” “Social Reasons,” “Political Reasons,” and “Cultural Reasons.” In the book, Alevism was evaluated and mentioned together with Bektashism: “Alevism-Bektashism” (p.51, 53). “Alevism-Bektashism” was defined as one of the “Turkish mystic groups” (*Türk sufi zümreler*) (p.53). By means of this expression, ethnic character of Alevism was “elucidated,” as well as its religious status. That is to say, according to the text, Alevism is ethnically Turkish, and it is a kind of mysticism.

Although content and basic principles of some other Islamic groups/understandings (such as Hanefism, Shiism) were discussed in DKAB11-2005, there is no information about the content and principles of Alevism. None of its principles of belief and worshipping was portrayed in the book. Instead of peculiar characteristics of Alevism, “the common elements that unites different Islamic understandings” were stressed. We cannot see any information about what makes Alevism different from the other Islamic understands (such as Sunnism). On the contrary, the book uses “Love of Prophet and *Ahl al-Bayt*” as a fertile ground in order to prove that how much the Sunnis and the Alevis have in common:

Love of Ahl al-Bayt has been a uniting factor for all Turks...Our nation named her children after Ali, Fatima, Hasan, Husayn and Zahra all of whom are members of *Ahl al-Bayt*...Our nation has always exalted glorified Ali, and named him as “lion of God,” “Shah of Heros” and “Combatant Lion” (p.53).

In addition, the book accommodates some poems of “Alevi- Bektashis’ leading figures” (such as Pir Sultan Abdal, Kaygusuz Abdal, Hatai and Yunus Emre)⁹⁴ on love of prophet Muhammad in order to prove that the prophet was respected by also Alevi tradition that make them closer to the Sunnis.

As will be discussed in the following pages, believing Qur’an, heaven (*cennet*), hell (*cehennem*), punishment-rewarding (*azap-mükafaat*) and afterworld (*ahiret*) were systematically highlighted, in the text, as the common points upon which all-different Islamic groups agreed. In addition, it is argued in the book that there is no disagreement about the forms and place of worship among Islamic groups. Several times in the book, it is also argued that mosques are common places of worship for all Muslims. Arguments of the book concerning the mosques were also buttressed by a sermon of Atatürk, given in Balıkesir.⁹⁵ In the following pages, these arguments will be discussed, and it will be showed that there are important disagreements on “the common points” presented in DKAB11-2005 (at least from the perspective of Alevism).

Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB)’s “importance and vitality for Turkey” appears as another subject, in the text, which was defended with the help of Atatürk and his revolutions. In other words, DİB and its functions are presented as an indispensable part of republican revolutions that were launched by Atatürk in early republican era. It is argued, in the book, that: “Atatürk was so sensitive about presentation of religious services...According to Atatürk, foundation of DİB was the only way of providing healthy religious services” (p.87).

Local Meanings: Although global structure of discourse (such as topics and schemata) have major role in capturing overall picture of the text, the local structures such as implications, presumptions, negligence and contradictions may

⁹⁴ We know that these four poets are among the seven-greatest poets of the Alevis together with three others: Fuzuli, Nesimi and Kul Himmet.

⁹⁵ This sermon of Atatürk was held in Zağnos Paşa Cami on February 7, 1923. In this sermon, Atatürk argues about the importance and functions of mosques in Turkish society.

also contribute to this picture by playing strategic role in the descriptions and evaluations about the Alevis. It is possible to make inferences from such local semantics (at the micro level of words, sentences and paragraphs) and formulations in DKAB11-2005 concerning to the Alevis.

I will start with some examples of negligence:

1- It is argued in the book that religious functionaries of Islam are *müftüs* (authorized religious officials for a province or district), *imams* (prayer leader) *vaizs* (preachers), *müezzins* (callers to prayer)) (p.87). These religious functionaries (all of which are paid employees of the state) and their duties were explained in detail in the text. We know that *dedes* are the religious leaders for the Alevis; but there is no information about *dedes* and their functions for the Alevis in the book.

2- The Alevis and Alevism were also neglected in the contents of photos, pictures and diagrams of the book. For example, there are four pictures of worshiping place in the book (p.69, 103), all of which describes mosques from different provinces of Turkey. Congregation houses (*cemevis*) (worshiping places of the Alevis) were neglected in contents of pictures of the book, as well as its textual content. While the authors devote two separate pages to “the functions of mosques, and their prominent functions in the Muslim world” (p.105-105), Congregation houses were not mentioned even by a single word.

3- One of the main principles of belief in Alevism, *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ahl al-Bayt*, and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams), was neglected several times in the book. Umar (the second caliph), Abu Bakr (the first caliph) and Aysha (wife of the prophet, fought against Ali in the war of *Cemel*) are among the person who should be contempted for the Alevis. DKAB11-2005 glorifies these persons several times and presents them as model personalities for all Muslims (p.45, 63).

4- It is stated in the book that ablution (*abdest*) and ablution of whole body (*gusül abdesti*) are compulsory religious duty for all Muslims (p.28). We know that ablution is interpreted differently in Alevism; rather than external cleaning, the Alevis emphasize internal cleaning. For this reason, they differ from the

Sunnis in practicing and theorizing ablution. Obviously, the book neglected Alevi interpretation also in this issue.

There are also examples of deleting/omitting in DKAB111-2005:

Although the book mentioned about some pillars of Alevi belief system (such as *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams), these concepts were not presented in accordance with perspective of Alevism. For example, it is argued that both the Sunnis and the Alevis love the prophet Muhammad, Ali and *Ahl al-Bayt* (p.52-53). The following facts were deleted: Conceptualization of Muhammad and Ali, and the relationship between these two in Alevism are highly different from that of Sunnism. In Alevism, Muhammad and Ali are identified with each other (like same soul in different bodies); and it is believed that Ali is representative (*vekil*) of Muhammad (Keçeli, 1996:119). The concept of Twelve Imam was also presented in relation with Shiism (p.63), but not Alevism. Disagreements between Alevism and Sunnism on many issues such as forms of worshipping, issue of caliphate, missing verses/completeness of Qur'an were systemically omitted in the book.

Style and Rhetoric: Style and rhetoric play important roles in presentation of opinions. Sometimes delicate topics or fragile cases must be subtlety and persuasively formulated in order to both inform and persuade the audiences. Style, as put by van Dijk (1991:209) has to do with the choice and variation of the words in presentation of the ideas. Rhetorical elements in a discourse aim to enhance the “persuasiveness of the message” by using several expressive devices mentioned above (van Dijk, 1984:139).

Concerning the choice of words and expression, it appears among the most distinctive character of DKAB11-2005 that it contains a lot of words and expressions belonging to/originating from Alevi tradition. Here are some example of these expressions/words: *Zülfikar* (name of Ali's sword), *Şah* (leader (*pir*) in Alevism), *Murtaza* (one of the titles of Ali), *nefes* (a kind of poem in Alevism recited during *ayin-i cem*), *Ahl al-Bayt* (family of the prophet Muhammad including Ali, Hasan, Husayn, Fatima), *Allah'ın Arslanı* (lion of God, this expression is used for Ali), *Şah-ı Merdan* (shah of heros, used for Ali), *Haydar-ı Kerrar* (combatant lion, used for Ali). In addition to these words and expressions

of Alevism, the book, also, makes use of names of important figures in Alevi tradition in order to present its arguments effectively. Some of the names of that kind mentioned in the book: Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husayn, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Ahmed Yesevi, Yunus Emre, Hatai (Shah İsmail), Pir Sultan Abdal, Kaygusuz Abdal, and other members of Twelve Imams (Zeynel Abidin, Muhammad Bakır, Cafer-i Sadık, Musa Kazım, Ali Rıza, Muhammed Taki, Ali Naki, Hasan Askeri, Muhammad Mahdi).

-In terms of rhetoric, it can be argued that there are many rhetorical questions at the end of every unit aiming to reiterate and to summarize what has been presented in the related unit.

-The book contains a series of pictures, photos, maps, miniature, schemas and examples of calligraphy that are placed according to the content of each unit, and expected to strengthen the ideas presented in the book.

-The arguments stated in the book were explained and supported by direct citations from Qur'an. From its beginning to the end, there are more than 100 references to verses of Qur'an. Not only verses of Qur'an, but also sayings of the prophet Muhammad and Atatürk have been other main resources that were used to buttress the thesis of the book. In addition, poems from some famous poets of the Alevis (such as Yunus Emre, Hatai, Pir Sultan Abdal and Kaygusuz Abdal) were cited in the book in order to support the arguments presented in the text.

4.2.3. CDA of Eighth Grade Textbooks

4.2.3.1. DKAB8-1983

Textbooks are perceived by scholars of CDA as one of the main instruments in which there may be many implicit, indirect and mitigated ways of homogenization, negligence, exclusion, positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Scholars of CDA do analysis of textbooks in order to reveal the mechanisms that influence millions of students in the direction of creation of homogeneous and mono-cultural societies. Sharing the same perspective, I begin

doing CDA of DKAB8-1983,⁹⁶ with analyzes of genre of the text. Topical analysis of the text will follow genre.

Genre. Obviously, DKAB8-1983 is a school textbook, for this reason it carries all the characteristics of the textbooks that were mentioned above in relation with the analysis of other textbooks. To reiterate, DKAB8-1983 is legally enforced and sanctioned in public schooling for all the students. This means that these textbooks have legally-guaranteed participants/audiences, which increases the authority of the books for all the students. It contains officially sanctioned version of knowledge presented in a “neutral” frame. It is through textbooks that official authorities indoctrinate the official ideology that was regarded as beneficial for society in general and for all the students in particular.

Topics: By topical analysis, I aim to determine “the most important” and “summarizing ideas” of DKAB8-1983. Topics or macro-propositions of the text can be summarized as follows:

T1- Being the most rational religion in the world, Islam does not contradict with principles of sciences (p.2).

T2- Qur'an addresses all people, and sets principles not only for afterlife but also for this world (p.11-14).

T3- Ablution, daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca are main forms of worshiping in Islam (p.36-40).

T4- Religion is among the elements that form a nation; it is also a necessary institution for continuity of nations; hence, state should take necessary measures for providing religious services to society (p.50, 80).

T5- In order to protect religious values, the state has to be powerful. Obeying to orders of the state, respecting to governors and national heroes is a duty for all Muslims, set by the God (p.54).

T6- Some specific days and nights are sacred in Islam; such as, Fridays, month of Ramadan, Ramadan festival, Islamic holy nights (*kandil geceleri*) and day of *aşure* (a special dessert) (p.72-79).

⁹⁶ This book was written by Ethem Ruhi Fırlalı (a professor in Divinity School) for eight grade students according to Curriculum 1982, and it was published as textbook by MEB for the period between 1982 and 2005.

T7- Muslims should always consider rules of good manner such as, to start eating with *besmele* (with the name of God) and to end eating with *elhamdülillah* (thanks to God), keeping quite in mosques, saying “*esselamü aleyküm*” (peace be upon you) for greeting people (p.93-95).

T8- Being a religious person, Atatürk defended that Islam does not prevent development (p.86).

T9- Turks made great contributions to Islam that is the most suitable religion for their nature (p.103-118).

T10- Places of worship in Islam are mosques, small mosques (*mescit*) and dervish lodges (*tekke*) (p.132).

According to van Dijk, analysis of topics in textbooks should have normative character (1993b:215). In other words, in addition to what topics were included in textbooks, the analysts must also be interested in which topics should have been included but are absent. Some of the topics (concerning the Alevis) that should have been included in DKAB8-1983, but are absent can be summarized as follows:

While explaining the content of Qur'an and role of the prophet Muhammad in Islam (p.11-37), the writer does not mention about perspectives of the Alevis concerning to Qur'an and the status of the prophet Muhammad in Alevism. Also, the book is silent about the forms of worshiping in Alevism. None of the main forms of worshiping for the Alevis was mentioned in DKAB8-1983. In addition, congregation houses and their meaning for the Alevis were never mentioned (there is no words, no picture in the book about congregation houses). In addition, the book does not deal with the sacred days in Alevism, except for day of *aşure* (even this day is presented with reference Sunni perspective, meaning of the day for the Alevis is absent).

Schemata: Schemata refer to the general “argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position” (van Dijk, 1984:105). The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). Text schemata consist of a special order. In other words, they determine what content or argumentative elements come first, second and last; and how arguments will be supported by which sub-arguments.

Argumentative structure of DKAB8-1983 was built up around the following ideas: “unity and togetherness” (*birlik ve beraberlik*), and instrumentalization of religion to consolidate state authority over society. For the sake of “unity,” the book ignores alternative interpretations of Islam. That is to say, different Islamic understandings and groups, which differ from Sunnism (orthodox Islam) in terms of principles of beliefs, forms of worshiping and place of worship, were not included in argumentative structure of the book. Instead, the writer draws a homogeneous and monochrome picture of Islamic world by employing a) pictures of mosque (presenting them as the only place of worship in Islam) (p.33, 71, 101, 102, 114), b) reading passages imposing the idea of “unity among the Muslims” (p.32, 33), c) sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) suggesting Muslims to unite (p.33).

Throughout the book, it is stressed several times that there is “a close and harmonious relationship” between Islam and Turkishness. Being harmonious with the principles of Curriculum 1982 (that states, “Atatürkism, national unity and togetherness...will be empowered with the help of religion and morality”), DKAB8-1983 recognizes “religion” as one of the component of a nation (p.54). Needless to say, “religion” refers to only Sunni version of Islam in the text. In addition, instrumentalization of Islam in the book goes on a step further. It is argued that “obeying to orders of the state, respecting to governors is a duty for all Muslims, set by the God” (p.54). The book demands help from religion to ensure state authority, which is highly problematic situation in terms of principle of secularism. Neither Atatürk nor the constitution of 1982 recognizes “religion” as one of the component of nation. Nation is defined by Atatürk as “a political and social entity composed of citizens tied together by a common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals” (İnan, 1969:372); and this understanding is clearly expressed at the beginning of the constitution of 1982. This perspective adopted in Curriculum 1982, concerning the relationships between notion of nation and religion, can be understood better if we approach to the issue by taking into consideration Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*) (an intellectual movement defending integration of Islamic values and Turkishness).

Local Meanings: Although global structure of discourse (such as topics and schemata) have major role in capturing overall picture of the text, the local structures such as implications, presumptions, negligence and contradictions may also contribute to this picture by playing strategic role in the descriptions and evaluations about the Alevis. It is possible to make inferences from such local semantics (at the micro level of words, sentences and paragraphs) and formulations in DKAB8-1983 concerning to sensitivities of the Alevis.

a) Implicitness: It is argued in the book “According to Qur’an this world and after-life make up an inseparable totality...Qur’an addresses all people, and sets principles not only for after-life but also for this world” (p.12). It seems to me that these expressions may be interpreted as violation of principle of secularism. Another expression appeared in page fourteen strengthens my conviction about this violation: “Nations advanced and reached happiness only when they lived in accordance to the principles set by God.”

b) Omitting/Deleting: Roles and efforts of “*Hoca Ahmed Yesevi ve Horasan Erenleri*” (Ahmed Yesevi and Dervishes of Khorassan]” (p.107) in Islamization of Anatolia were presented as a sign of how much Turks contributed to Islam. However, heterodox characteristics of “Ahmed Yesevi and Dervishes of Khorassan” and their meaning for the Alevis are absent in the text. As if they were the members of Sunnism these figures were mentioned in the book in connection with the Seljuk Sultans, the Ottoman Sultans and Selahattin Eyyubi. The author omitted their heterodox nature and their *sui generis* understanding of Islam.

Similarly, DKAB8-1983 cites poems of Yunus Emre in the units dealing with love of the prophet among the Muslims (p.349). Again, the writer never mentions about identity of Yunus Emre and his significance for the Alevis. Being one of the most important figures of Anatolian mystic tradition, Yunus Emre lived in 13th and 14th century; the sources indicates that he comes from Alevi tradition (Yaman and Erdemir, 2006:94).

In the text, another example of deleting or omitting voice of the Alevism can be observed in the page 33. In this page, the prophet Muhammad’s famous Sermon of Farewell (*Veda Hutbesi*) was presented to the students with its Sunni version. The last paragraph of the sermon appears in the book as follow: “O

people, I leave behind me one thing, which is the book of God, Qur'an. If you follow it, you will never go astray (p.33). Inspiring from the tradition of Shiites, the Alevis believe in holiness and leadership of *Ahl al-Bayt*. They argue that the sermon ends with the following way: "I leave behind me Qur'an and *Ahl al-Bayt*." By omitting the expression of "*Ahl al-Bayt*," DKAB8-1983 adopted a Sunni perspective; and deleted voice of the Alevis by refraining from using "*Ahl al-Bayt*."

c) Negligence: Under the title of "Convenience in Islam," it is argued that Islam present lots of convenience in implementation of worshiping. In this context, ablution, daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca are indicated as the main forms of worshiping in Islam (p.36-40). It is known that unlike the Sunnis (orthodox Muslims), most of the Alevis do not attend to mosques, and do not observe daily prayers (*namaz*) and the Ramadan fast (*oruç*); also, they do not visit Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*hac*), and they do not give alms (*zekat*) (Erdemir, 2004:33; Shankland, 1999:142; Eickelman, 1989:289). Instead of these orthodox religious practices, they fast for twelve days during month of Muharram (first month of Arabic calendar) to commemorate Imam Husayn's martyrdom in the battle with the Umayyad caliph Yazid (Yamann and Erdemir, 2006:77). They also consider that pilgrimage to Mecca is not required in Islam, for them the real pilgrimage "means one's spiritual journey within his or her soul" (Erdemir, 2004:32). For the purpose of pilgrimage, some of them also visit the shrine of Hacı Bektaş Veli in Hacıbektaş (a town in Nevşehir in the central Anatolia). The Alevis perform circular prayer (*halka namazı*), which is considerably different from prayers of the Sunnis both in terms of meaning and form, during their congregational ceremonies (*ayin-i cem*). None of these forms of worshiping accepted by the Alevis were mentioned in the book.

-It is argued in the book that "all the Muslims should always consider rules of good manner such as, "to start eating with *besmele* (with the name of God)," "to end eating with *elhamdülillah* (thanks to God)" (p.93-94) and saying "*esselamü aleyküm* (peace be upon you)" for greeting people (p.60). None of these are recognized by the Alevis as rules of good manner. But, we know that the Alevis in some instance (for example, at the beginning of *ayin-i cem*) use the

expression of “with the name of Shah” (*Şahın adı ile*), instead of “with the name of God.” The book refrains from mentioning about this *sui generis* characteristic of the Alevis, and chooses to identify all Muslims with Sunni practice.

- While sacred days and nights of Sunni Muslims were studied in detail (such as, Fridays, Ramadan, Ramadan festival, five Islamic holy nights), the book does not deal with the sacred days in Alevism, except for day of *aşure* (a special desert). Even this day is presented with reference Sunni perspective; meaning of the day for the Alevis is absent (P.72-79).

Rhetoric: As discussed above rhetorical structures are used to attract the attention of readers, to emphasize specific segment of the discourse and to make the arguments more convincing. Rhetorical elements in a discourse aim to enhance the “persuasiveness of the message” by using several expressive devices.

-Making use of verses from Qur’an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) are two prominent rhetorical devices in DKAB8-183.

-The book employs also poems and literary texts in order to make its arguments more convincing. Some of the literary texts and their writers used in the book: The poem of Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (a Sunni nationalist writer and poet) called *Cenge Giderken* (p.92); a poem called *Bayrak* written by Arif Nihat Asya (a Sunni conservative poet) (p.91). These two poems describe heroic characteristics of Turkish soldiers by recruiting a religious terminology and symbols most of which belong to Sunni Islam.

- In addition, using mottos such as “*Her Türk asker doğar*” (Every Turk was born as a soldier) (p.81) and “*Ölürsek şehidiz kalırsak gazi*” (We are martyr if we die, we are veteran if we live) (p.91), the writer recruits a military rhetoric throughout the book.

-Another widely used rhetorical device in DKAB8-1983 is asking questions to the reader at the beginning and at end of every study unit. Some examples of rhetorical question from DKAB8-1983:

What do you understand from the concept of “*tevhid*” (unity)? (p.35)

What is “*teyemmüm*” (religious cleaning with sand or earth)?”(p.46)

How and why should we show respect to our army? (p.92).

Context Models: DKAB8-1983 was written in 1983, just two years after the military coup of 1980. The contextual elements of DKAB8-1983 are almost identical with that of DKAB10-1982 and DKAB11-1982. In order to refrain from repetition I will refer to contextual analysis of DKAB10-1982, DKAB11-1982 and Curriculum 1982 that appeared above in this chapter. Roughly, it must be stated that social and historical context in which DKAB11-1983 was written, were strictly determined by the climate of military intervention of September 12 and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*). For more detail about social and historical context in which the book was written, one must first refer to chapter II of this dissertation, and then to the analysis of DKAB10-1982, DKAB11-1982 and Curriculum 1982 appeared in this chapter.

4.2.3.2. DKAB8-2005

Parallel to the changes occurred in the content of curriculum of DKAB, MEB issued new textbooks in 2005. The book that I will analyze here (which will be referred as DKAB8-2005) was prepared for eighth grade students. DKAB8-2005 was written by a commission (formed by Mehmet Akgül, Abdullah Albayrak, Abdullah Çatal, Ahmet Ekşi, Ali Sacit Türker, Ahmet Kara, Eyüp Koç, Turgut Çiftçi and Ramazan Yıldırım) according to Curriculum 2005. Different from DKAB8-1983, DKAB8-2005 mentions about the Alevis and Alevism in its pages. As will be discussed below in detail, Alevism were mentioned several times as “a mystical interpretation of Islam.”

The writers confine themselves only by classifying Alevism as “a mystical interpretation of Islam;” they refrain from providing a detailed picture of Alevism. That is to say, *sui generis* side of Alevism in terms of worshipping or principles of beliefs (which differentiate it from Sunnism) stayed untouched. Like the mew curriculum, the new book claims a supra-sectarian stance. In other words, the book was alleged to be neutral against different interpretation of Islam and to be supra-sectarian. However, in reality, there are serious problems in the content of the book in terms of “sectarian neutrality” and “supra-sectarian” position of MEB. For example, as can be seen in topical analysis of the book,

forms of worshipping and place of worship recognized by the Alevis were systematically absent in DKAB8-2005.

Topics: Under the category of topics, I will deal with the global, overall thematic structure of the speeches in relation with the issue of Alevism. Such topics or themes, which refer to macro propositions of the text, can be expressed by several sentences in a discourse, by a larger segment of the discourse or by discourse as a whole (van Dijk, 1984:56).

T1- There exist forms of worshipping obligatory for all Muslims such as daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca and alms (p.29-51).

T2- In Islam, mosques are places of worship (p.36).

T3- Being responsible for transmitting God's order to the human being, Muhammad is the prophet of Islam (p.52-72).

T4- Due to social, political, geographical and cultural variations among the Muslims, there may be different interpretations of Islam (p.74-7).

T5- Being one of the mystical (*tasavvufi*) interpretations appeared in Islamic thought, Alevism-Bektashism (*Alevilik-Bektaşilik*) served in Anatolia for centuries to spread love and tolerance (p.82).

T6- In spite of the fact that there emerged numerous sects/groups in Islamic history, there is no fundamental disagreements concerning God, the prophet and principles of Qur'an (p.79).

T7- Different interpretations of Islam are richness rather than being a reason for dispute.

Schemata: Roughly, *schemata* refer to the general "argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position" (van Dijk, 1984:105). The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). It is possible to delineate schematic structure of DKAB8-2005 as follows:

Principally, it is accepted, in the book, that there may be/are more than one different understanding or interpretation of Islam. Possible reasons of this plurality were presented as "Geographical Reasons," "Social Reasons," "Political Reasons," and "Cultural Reasons" (p.77). In the book, Alevism was evaluated and mentioned together with Bektashism: "Alevism-Bektashism" (p.82). "Alevism-

Bektashism” was defined as one of the “mystic groups” (*tasavvufi zümreler*) emerged in Anatolia (p82). By means of these expressions, religious status of Alevism was determined in the text as a kind of Islamic mysticism.

Although possibility of existence of different interpretations in Islam is accepted in the book, limits of this possibility were also set clearly. In other words, it is argued in the book that there may different religious understandings in Islam but these understanding cannot challenge or contradict with the essence of religion (p.77). In addition, it is argued that if the “limits” are jumped over, this may gave way to polarization and conflict among the Muslims (p.85).

Although content and basic principles of some other Islamic groups/understandings (such as Hanefism, Shiism) were discussed in DKAB8-2005, there is no information about the content and principles of Alevism. None of its principles of belief and worshipping was portrayed in the book. Instead of peculiar characteristics of Alevism, “the common elements that unites different Islamic understandings” were stressed. We cannot see any information about what makes Alevism different from the other Islamic understands (such as Sunnism). It can be argued that Alevism is categorized but not explained in detail.

According to the text, mystic interpretations in Islam (including Alevism) deal with moral improvement of the believers. Hence, these interpretations may have differences belonging only to domain of morality. There are strong consensus on other domains (main principles of belief and forms of worshipping); but there may be some disagreement on how to perform these worshipping (p.85).

Local Meanings: Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the “forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness. Problematization, stereotyping, prejudice, exclusion, denial, negligence and lacking voice are main categories for local level analysis of discrimination in textbooks offered by Van Dijk (2004:136; 1993b:218-233).

a) Negligence: It can easily be realized by looking at the pictures appeared in the book that the Alevis and their beliefs were neglected in many occasion. For example, eight mosque pictures were scattered throughout the book. Mosque

pictures appear at pages: 29, 38, 42, 43, 61, 125 and 134. Not a single picture of a congregation houses appears in the book. This is an obvious negligence of the Alevis, because many of them accept congregation houses as their place of worship, instead of mosques. The book contains also two church pictures (at pages 125 and 134) and a synagogue picture at page 134.

A similar kind of negligence can be observed on the pictures that depict people while they are performing their religious rituals. The book contains seven pictures (at pages 29, 34, 45, 78, 86) in which Sunni Muslims are performing their prayers (*namaz*) and performing their hajj. In addition, at page 122, a Jewish person is pictured while he is reading sacred book of Judaism. No picture in the book illustrates the Alevis while they are performing their worshipping. Neglecting the forms of worshipping recognized by the Alevis, the book systematically refers to forms of worshipping recognized by Sunni Muslims.

This negligence is not limited with the content of the pictures; the verbal content of the units also manifests the same negligence. It is assumed that praying, fasting, alms, hajj and sacrificing are the common forms of worshipping among all the Muslims in Turkey (p.29). As a result of this assumption, these rituals were presented as the main sources of “social togetherness and integrity” (p.36). Forms of worshipping other than those recognized by Sunni Islam were neglected in the book. Hence, all of these examples of negligence appeared in DKAB8-2005 results in a difference-blinded discourse of “togetherness and unity” at the expense of the Alevis and their belief system.

The Alevi perspective was neglected not only in the sphere of worshipping but also in the presentation of personalities of Islamic history. In Alevism, according to the principle of *tevella* and *teberra* (cherishing and glorifying *Ahl al-Bayt*, and disliking and contempting the ones who oppose *Ahl al-Bayt* and Twelve Imams), Umar (the second caliph) is among the person who should be contempted. DKAB8-2005 glorifies Umar several times and presents him as model for all the Muslims. Umar was portrayed as the symbol of justice and honesty (p.103). Contrary to opinions of the Alevis about him, Umar was presented as a perfect human being who deserves respect (p.18).

b) *Topic Avoidance/Lacking Voice:* The Alevis' point of view concerning the principles of Islamic belief show considerable differences from the Sunni perspective. This was disregarded in the book. Diverse understanding or interpretation of the Alevis from the orthodox Islam (Sunnism) concerning the sphere of principles of belief and worshipping were systematically avoided being discussed. In other words, Alevi perspective stayed untouched. For example, although the Alevis (like the Sunnis) believe in God, the prophet and Qur'an, they interpret these elements differently from the Sunni Muslims. These differences, such as concerning the conceptualization of God and the prophet, and the contents of Qur'an were never mentioned in the book and avoided to be discussed. As mentioned in chapter I, they do not discriminate God, Muhammad and Ali from each other in a way that this understanding approaches to deification of Ali.

c) *Omission/Deleting:* As discussed above, selection of some portion of knowledge and tradition, and omitting the others were among the techniques employed in the textbooks to transmit dominant cultural values and ideologies. Techniques of omitting and deleting were systematically used in DKAB8-2005 concerning to history and the principles of Alevism. Different from Curriculum 1982 (in which Alevism was not recognized as a different interpretation of Islam; and it was completely ignored via a complete silence), the new curriculum (Curriculum 2005), ostensibly, covered Alevism as a different Islamic interpretation. Being harmonious with the new curriculum, DKAB8-2005 contains the portraits of important figures for the Alevis. But, as I will discuss below in many cases the book does not present a correct representation of these figures for the Alevis. Instead, these figures were employed in the book in order to buttress the principles of Sunni Islam. In other words, instead of recognizing Alevism as a *sui generis* interpretation of Islam, the book aims to incorporate Alevism to mainstream Islam (Sunnism) by deleting or omitting exact meaning of these personalities for the Alevis. Hence, the book's ostensible neutrality and supra-sectarian stance resulted in a Sunni minded and assimilative one. For example, main figures of Alevism (such as Hacı Bektaş Veli, Yunus Emre and Ahmet Yesevi) were not presented directly in relation with Alevism; instead they were presented just as "mystic leaders" (p.82). The direct relationship between Alevism

and these personalities was omitted. In addition, the history of relationship between these “mystical interpretations” (including Alevism) and the state was depicted with reference to “harmony:”

...Alevism-Bektashism is mystical interpretations of Islam... These mystical interpretations played important roles in the foundation and development of both the Seljuks and the Ottoman State... In addition, these mystical interpretations contributed to social togetherness of these states, hence people lived in peace and happiness (p.82).

As can be seen in the passage above, deleting/ignoring conflicts between the states and heterodox religious groups having Alevi belief system (especially during the Ottoman State), the writers emphasized only “congruity” instead of “conflict” in DKAB8-2005.

d) Proscription: Intoxicants, which is not forbidden in Alevism is defined in DKAB8-2005 as “impertinence” and among the sinful act that is forbidden by Islam (p.131): “Intoxicants...are abominations of Satan's handwork: Eschew such (abomination), that you may prosper.” It is also stated in the text that intoxicants are forbidden in all religions.

Rhetoric: As discussed above rhetorical structures are used to attract the attention of readers, to emphasize specific segment of the discourse and to make the arguments more convincing. Making use of verses from Qur'an and sayings of the prophet (*hadith*) are two prominent rhetorical devices in DKAB8-2005. In addition, the writers of the book employed a scientific rhetoric while they are discussing the subjects such as “creation of the universe, physical and social laws” (p.10-12).

Context: Turkey-European Union relations and an Alevi citizen's appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (in order to get exemption from compulsory religious education classes for his daughter) were two important elements of historical context where DKAB8-2005 was produced. The principles of 1982 constitution, concerning the compulsory religious education, also stayed at the center of the discussions. The legal status of DKAB courses has been criticized mainly by the Alevis for being against the principle of secularism. DAKAB

courses were criticized not only for their legal status (violating principles of secularism), but also for the content of the textbook taught during these classes. Again, it is mainly argued by the Alevis that these books do not include the principles of Alevism in their contents. In 2005, when the criticisms toward DKAB course reached its peak, Turkish state tried to justify existing application of compulsory religious education by employing several interrelated arguments which aimed to convince both the Alevis and the European Court of Human Rights about “neutrality” of DKAB courses. Preparation of new curriculum for DKAB courses and publication of new textbooks, in which Alevism was ostensibly included, were among the efforts aimed to justify compulsory religious courses.

In the European Court of Human Rights (concerning the case opened by an Alevi citizen), Turkish government defended its position by arguing that “religion is taught in DKAB classes similar to how chemistry is taught in chemistry classes” (Sabah, 2005). Hüseyin Çelik (Minister of Education) also shared the same position; he argued, “We do not teach religion to students. Rather, we teach them religious culture... It is the religious culture and knowledge of morality classes, rather than the religious education classes that are compulsory in Turkey” (Star Gazetesi, 2005). Under the strong demands of Alevi organizations and pressure from the European Union circles, Hüseyin Çelik declared that issues related to Alevism would be included in the textbooks of DKAB high schools starting from the beginning of the 2005 academic year.

4.3. Concluding Remarks

The goal of this chapter was to answer the following research questions: How did MEB define Alevism in the textbooks and curriculum of DKAB? What kind of discursive strategies and regularities were employed by MEB towards the Alevis and Alevism in the textbooks and curriculum of DKAB? How were the Alevis included or excluded in the textbooks and in the curriculum of DKAB? Textual and contextual analysis of two sets of curriculums and textbooks of DKAB belonging to two different periods showed that:

Curriculum 1982 intends to produce a homogeneous society in terms of

religion; because it recognizes only Sunni version of Islam and neglects diverse interpretations other than Sunnism. In the textbooks of DKAB, which were issued according to Curriculum 1982, the Alevis and Alevism were completely neglected. In these textbooks, main discursive strategy towards the Alevis and Alevism is complete silence. The Alevis and Alevism were not mention in these textbooks even with a single word. The absence of Alevi interpretation of Islam in the texts shows that Sunni Islam appears as the only officially recognized version of Islam in DKAB schoolbooks. Contents of both Curriculum 1982 and textbooks written according to it fail to recognize Alevism; neither, under the title of Islamic framework nor as a separate section, Alevism, its principles of belief and rituals were referred.

Apart from silence, negligence and ignoring, the other set of discursive strategy (frequently used towards the Alevis) is composed of deletion or omitting. Especially concerning the controversial issues in Turkish and Islamic history, the perspectives of the Alevis were deleted. What we encounter is a systematic selection of some portion of knowledge, tradition and history, and omitting the others to transmit dominant religious understanding. For the sake of “consolidation of national unity and togetherness by means of religion and morality,” it was instructed to the students that “religion is one of the important components of a nation.” Using religion in solidifying national unity as “an important component of nation” can be read as traces of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in school textbooks. In addition, it is stated in Curriculum 1982 that “unity of belief and unity of behavior will be emphasized.” As can be easily inferred from the analysis above, this “unity of belief and behavior” operates in favor of Sunnism and at the expense of Alevism. That is to say, unity is searched on the basis of a belief system and worshiping practices which exactly refers to the Sunni version of Islam.

Contrary to Curriculum 1982, Curriculum 2005 does not neglect the existence of “different religious sects and formations” in Islam. Instead, it accepts the existence of different Islamic interpretations/understandings. Although Curriculum 2005 and the new set of textbooks (written according to general principles of Curriculum 2005) accept the existence of diverse interpretations in

Islam, they emphasize “common and uniting points” among these different interpretations, instead of the features that make them different. At least for the case of Alevism, Curriculum 2005 fails to portray a correct picture in many terms. In other words, the proposed “common points” are far from being real common points for the Alevis and far from reflecting the content of Alevism. Using discursive strategy of avoidance, the new textbooks refrain from mentioning forms of worshipping or place of worship recognized by the Alevi Muslims. Instead, in the text, mosques were presented as the place of worship for all Muslims; daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca and ablution were presented as “common” forms of worshipping for all Muslims. In that sense, it can be argued the Alevis and Alevism were recognized in Curriculum 2005 ostensibly.

After accepting existence of different interpretations in Islam, Curriculum 2005 and new set of textbooks declare “neutrality” by stating “...doctrine-centered or sect-centered religious education will be avoided... no specific interpretation of Islam will be inculcated.” However, this “neutrality” is violated and the principle of recognition (declared at the beginning) disappears when the issues of “forms of worshipping in Islam” or “principles of belief in Islam” were discussed in the texts. No forms of worshipping or no principle of belief in Alevism (that makes it different from Sunnism) were mentioned. Likewise, different interpretations of other sects concerning the prayer or fasting were totally ignored.

Different from Curriculum 1982 (in which Alevism was not recognized as a different interpretation of Islam; and it was ignored by means of a complete silence), the new curriculum (Curriculum 2005) and related textbooks defined Alevism as one of the “mystical” (*tasavvufî*) interpretations appeared in Islamic thought. Presenting the Alevis as one of the “Turkish mystic groups” (*Türk sufi zümreler*) emerged in Anatolia, the text delete heterogeneous characters of the Alevis in terms of ethnicity and language, and syncretistic nature of Alevism. The new curriculum and new set of textbooks contain some of the important personalities of Alevism (such as Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli). But, in many cases the texts do not present an exact/correct representation of these figures for the Alevis. Instead, these figures were employed in the books in order to buttress the

principles of Sunni Islam. In addition to these, partial or defective presentation of history (as in the case of the issue of caliphate) and negligence of sensitivities of the Alevis (concerning to the principles of *tevella* and *teberra*) are other important discursive strategies in new set of textbooks of DKAB.

Concerning to Curriculum 2005 and related textbooks, I argue that they do not attempt to eliminate all kind of diversity; instead, it attempts to control diverse segments of society by diverting or canalizing them to a position that does not threaten existing social order and status quo. In other words, Alevism were “recognized” as a diverse formation in Islam; but this “recognition” is ostensible and does not cover the exact picture of Alevism, and does not meet expectations of the Alevis. Instead of recognizing the Alevis with their *sui generis* features, the texts emphasized their “common features” with the Sunnis (who have official recognition). As I cited in the introductory chapter, Burton and Carlen proposed that “official discourse is a necessary requirement for political and ideological hegemony” and that “...hegemonic discourses are a requirement to achieve the political incorporation of the dominated classes” (1979:48). Following Burton and Carlen, I argue that by partially recognizing Alevism, the texts intent to incorporate the Alevis into the existing legal and political system.

CHAPTER 5

THE ALEVIS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES HELD DURING THE HACİBEKTAŞ FESTIVALS

In this chapter, I will do a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of seven presidential speeches⁹⁸ held in the Hacibektaş Festival between 1994 and 2003. What kind of discursive regularities and discursive strategies were employed in the presidential speeches in the Hacibektaş Festival towards the Alevis? How did the presidents approach the Alevis in their official statements expressed during the Hacibektaş Festival? What kind of fluctuations and stableness can be observed in the official stance of the presidents concerning the Alevis? The answers of these questions will be searched within the general framework of CDA. Van Dijk developed one of the prominent approaches in CDA, and I will mainly employ his approach in my analyses. Following Van Dijk's approach, my analysis in this chapter will focus on the properties of the text (such as, topics, genre, local meanings, style and rhetoric), and properties of context in which discourse was created (such as access patterns, settings and participants).

Concerning to the period between 1994 and 2003 there have appeared seven presidential speeches during the festival (while five of the speeches were held by the tenth president Süleyman Demirel, only two of them were held by tenth president Ahmet Necdet Sezer). As I stated before, in the introductory chapter, the Hacibektaş Festival and the presidential speeches held during this festival will be taken as one of the platforms/domains through which I observe the official discourses towards the Alevis. These presidential speeches signify one of

⁹⁸ Full-text of these speeches were obtained through a series of correspondence with Directorate of Press and Public Relations of Presidency (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı*). The directorate provided me texts of the speeches via e-mail upon my request which is based on the Law Pertaining to Rights for Information Access (*Bilgi Edinme Kanunu*) promulgated in 2004. The directorate sent me seven speeches (five of them were held by ninth president Süleyman Demirel, and other two were held by tenth president Ahmet Necdet Sezer). It is stated by the directorate that there is no record concerning the Hacibektaş Festival held in 1995. In addition, it is stated that Ahmet Necdet Sezer participated to the festival only in 2001 and 2003.

the materialized forms of official discourses concerning to the Alevis. It is argued that discourses constitute or construct different identities, and people were positioned by discourses to different social positions (Burton and Carlen, 1979:46-48; Fairclough, 1995a:4). In that sense, this chapter aims to observe how these presidential speeches (as one of the important manifestations of official discourses) try to place, fix and orient subjects (the Alevis) to desired positions by means of ideological discursive mechanisms. This discursive effort of fixation and orientation is nourished and circumscribed, at the same time, by the tenets and priorities of official ideology (such as, principle of secularism and preservation of unitary nation-state). It is argued that official discourse, in general, contains “systematization of modes of argument that proclaim state’s rationality;” and official discourse claims superiority over unofficial ones (Burton and Carlen, 1979:48). In that sense, analysis of these presidential speeches important for this study since the speeches (as a form of official discourse) celebrate and polish official perspectives and try to discredit and despise alternative/unofficial ones about the Alevis and Alevism.

August 16 of 1994, when a president (Süleyman Demirel) attended the Hacibektaş Festival for the first time, signifies an important date in terms of the relations between state and the Alevis. Whilst two preceding presidents (Turgut Özal and Kenan Evren) did not attend the festival, Süleyman Demirel and his successor Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended several times. Why? I will argue that the answer of this question, which is closely related with the trajectory of official discourses towards the Alevis, may also provide a fruitful historical context in answering the questions of this study. For this reason, this chapter starts with a short historical review of the Hacibektaş Festival. As can be seen later in this chapter, this historical review shows us the existence of two main periods in the history of the festival (concerning the period covered this study). While the first period (between 1980 and 1994) can be characterized by lack of participation in presidential level,⁹⁹ the second period (between 1994 and 2003), on the other

⁹⁹ Although participation of Demirel in 1994 signifies a real turning point, it should be noted here that since 1989, there existed participations in the level of state ministry. For example, in 1989, Namık Kemal Zeybek (Minister of Culture) attended the festival and he made a speech. In his speech, Zeybek highlighted importance of Ahmet Yesevi and Hacı Bektaş Veli in Turkization of

hand, can be characterized by intense and stable participation of the presidents (together with other state elite to the festival).

5.1. A Short History of the Hacibektaş Festival

Since the early 1990s, the Hacibektaş Festival has appeared as one of the major public events of the Alevis in Turkey, and together with several others, it has been among the main platform in which Alevi culture and Alevi identity are publicized and passed to the current Alevi generation. In that sense, the Hacibektaş Festival, which gathers a crowd of hundreds of thousands every year in a single place, has served as an important site for the process of identity formation for the Alevis. By providing a suitable context for activities and events (such as distribution of consecrated food for the Alevis (*lokma*), performance of spiritual dances of the Alevis (*semah*), conducting congregational rituals (*ayin-i cem*) in Alevism), the festival has played important roles in transmission of the traditional knowledge and patterns of behaviors to the new generations. Starting from 1990s, many Alevi festivals have proliferated in different regions of Turkey. It is argued that most of these festivals, which were associated with an Alevi saint, were modeled after Hacibektaş Festival (Soileau, 2000:93). As important as this one, especially since 1994, Hacibektaş Festival has turned into an arena where statesman, politicians and bureaucrats have come face to face with the Alevis. In other words, the Hacibektaş Festival has become a site that is suitable for political negotiation, expression of demands and making promises. As will be discussed below, through this occasion the Alevis have been targets of inclusive and incorporative official discourses, systematically.

Among many others, the Hacibektaş Festival is the earliest saint-oriented Alevi festival in Turkey. The dervish lodge (*tekke*) at Hacibektaş, which was founded around the name of Hacı Bektaş Veli (the most revered saint for the

Anatolia: “It is thanks to them that today there is an existence of Turk. We will organize the next year’s ceremony as international; do you agree with it? The Culture Ministry is at yours service” (cited in Şener, 1990:55).

Alevis)¹⁰⁰ since fourteenth century, was closed in 1925 together with all other dervish lodges in Turkey. The law of 667/1925 not only closed the *tekke* but also banned its followers from propagating their faith. After having been closed in the early republican period, the restoration of the *tekke* began in 1958; and it was opened as a museum on 16 August 1964 by General Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*), as a result of “a relaxation in anti-religious drive” in Turkey (Norton, 1992:191). Although the *tekke* of Hacıbektaş stayed closed about forty years between 1925 and 1964, it had continued to be a place of pious visits due to its ritual functions and the existence of Hacı Bektaş Veli’s mausoleum (Massicard, 2000:29). Nearly every year since 1964, from 16 to 18 August, ceremonies of commemoration have been held in honor of Hacı Bektaş Veli. It is argued that organizers of the festival, at the beginning, did not acknowledge any religious motives, and had to portray it as a touristic event in order to persuade the authorities to allow their annual festival in every August (Norton, 1992:192; Massicard, 2000:29). The Mevlevis used the same formula in order to persuade the authorities to allow their festival held in every December in Konya.¹⁰¹ For this reason, other than its religious meaning for the Alevis, the

Hacıbektaş Festival has had some touristic features since early years of it. At the level of tourist attraction, the festival included the following various (and sometimes interesting) elements in its history: Janissary bands (in the early years), a show performed by a motorcyclist (1973), a wrestling contest (1978), exhibitions of paintings, photographs and cartoons (since 1970s), performances of *ozans* (folk poets playing *bağlama*: long-necked lute) (almost every year) (Norton, 1992:192). The festival is also included among the annual cultural and touristic events listed in Turkish tourist brochures prepared by Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and many visitors come and see touristic events without any

¹⁰⁰ Hacı Bektaş Veli is one of the foremost figures in thirteenth century. He is regarded by the Alevis as main source (*serçeşme*) of their belief system. After Ali (nephew and son in law of the Prophet Muhammad), Hacı Bektaş has been the most revered personality for the Alevis. Hacı Bektaş Veli was not actual founder of any dervish lodge and/or religious order. The dervish lodge and order were founded by his followers (Kadıncık Ana and Abdal Musa) after his death, and the order was reformed by Balım Sultan at the beginning of sixteenth century (Melikoff, 1998:45-90).

¹⁰¹ Starting from 1953, Mevlevis were allowed to organize annual commemorations and whirl in public.

religious motives. Although even today the tomb of Hacı Bektaş Veli is officially a museum; for the Alevis it is more than that. As it can be seen during the festival, many of the Alevis perform their religious duties by following a set of patterned actions; for many of them, visiting town of Hacıbektaş is an alternative to visiting Mecca for duty of pilgrimage.

During the 1970s, parallel to general political polarization in Turkey, influence of politics upon the festival increased markedly. In this political climate, the control of the festival was taken hold by young Alevi generation who were mainly under the effect of revolutionary Marxist ideology; until that time the festival organization was under the control of those Alevis whose primary motivation was loyalty to Hacı Bektaş Veli and his teachings (Norton, 1992:193). The festival in this period turned into an arena where younger and leftist generation of the Alevis had the opportunity of disseminating their political views. These people also interpreted Hacı Bektaş Veli and his teachings in the direction of their political aims. For these people, Hacı Bektaş was a protagonist in the war against fascism, and he “was not, as many people may think, a religious leader, a saint or a seer... He was a socialist revolutionary thinker and leader who...brought a plan for a new human social system” (Hacıbektaş Turizm Derneği, 1977:8). Compositions of the songs sung by *ozans* (folk poets playing lute) during the festival became markedly political in this period (Norton, 1992:193).

The official stance towards the Alevis (in general) and towards the festival (in particular) in the 1970s was closely bounded with the general political polarization and tension in the country. As shown by Poyraz (2005), the state chose to ignore the Alevis during the 1970s mainly because of the prevalence of revolutionary Marxist ideologies among the Alevis. It can be argued that the state, especially during the late 1970s, appeared in the festivals only as suspicious police power by arresting some participants or banning some activities of the festival. For example, in 1975 the attendance of *Ruhi Su*¹⁰² to the festival was not allowed by the authorities (Sariaslan, 2003:9); *Görgü Cemi*, a play about Alevi philosophy and traditions, was prohibited by the state before its first performance

¹⁰² A famous *ozan* of that time who was known with his revolutionary Marxist/socialist ideas and was classified by the state among the “dangerous” persons. An important portion of his repertoire was composed of the songs that belonged to the Alevi tradition.

in the festival (1977) (Poyraz, 2005:5); performance of another play, *Pir Sultan Abdal*, was also banned by the authorities (Massicard, 2003:126). The following headlines from *Cumhuriyet* daily also clearly show the presence of state in the festival as a police power during the 1970s:

Governor of the province prohibits performances of three singers in the festival's opening ceremony. (16 August 1976)

The festival was curtailed to one day by the security forces (18 August 1976)

Journalists were arrested in the festival. (20 August 1976)

Although general official stance towards the Hacıbektaş Festival in the 1970s can be characterized as “ignorant” and “prohibitive,” level of ignorance and prohibition varied according to the government in power. Norton argued that the degree of freedom the authorities allowed (for the activities in the festival) increased when the government was formed by a leftist party; and it decreased when the government was formed by right-wing parties (1992:193).

Together with the military take-over of 12 September 1980, the festival was interrupted for three years (until the first election after the military intervention). Mainly because of the continuing effects of military intervention, during the 1980s, the festival became considerably apolitical which was welcomed by those of the Alevis who attended the festival chiefly out of their religious devotion to Hacı Bektaş Veli (ibid: 193). Although most of these Alevis inclined the left-wing parties, they preferred traditional interpretation of Hacı Bektaş Veli in order not to jeopardize the future of the festival by creating conflict with the state in any case. Since 1984, the organization of the festival was held by the municipality of Hacıbektaş; this situation was also supported by the state in order to guarantee a-politicization of the festival. In the post-1980 period, political character of the festival decreased considerably comparing to the late 1970s; and the organization turned into again more religious and traditional activity as it was at the beginning.

In terms of the state elites' interest to the Hacıbektaş Festival, 1990s signifies a turning point. In this period, the state emerged as one of the important actors in the festival. Since 1990s, contrary to 1980s and 1970s, increasing

number of politicians (including presidents, ministers, prime ministers and members of opposition parties), and military and civil bureaucrats have attended to the festival. Especially since 1994, there has been regular attendance even at the presidential level. Main reasons behind this change in the official stance towards the Alevis will be discussed in detail below (while I am analyzing the presidential speeches during Hacıbektaş Festival). However, it may be argued here that main reasons of this shift are closely related with dangers brought by the rise of political Islam in Turkey, and intensification of separatist PKK terrorism. In relation to these reasons, etatization of the festival (in terms of both organizational control and participation of political authorities) were also accompanied with official interpretation of Alevism as moderate and tolerant form of Islam and Hacı Bektaş Veli as a state-loyal Turkish-Islamic saint.

Not only official circles but also Alevi associations showed their interest to the festival with an increasing rate during the 1990s. As asserted by Massicard (2003:127), together with “Alevi revival,” the scope of the festival also has increased to the point that for the state and Alevi associations and foundations “Hacıbektaş became a place for political bargaining, offering promises and for making demands and taking positions.” As a result, the festival has been the central event for the Alevis. According to written media, the number of the participants was 50,000 in 1993 (Cumhuriyet, August 16, 1993); and this number exceeded 500,000 in 1998 (Cumhuriyet, August 16, 1998). In addition to its centrality for the Alevis in Turkey, the festival has also become the most well known festival for the Alevis who live abroad.

Since the early 1990s, the Hacıbektaş Festival has been one of the main platforms for the Alevis to manifest their political opinions (in general), and to exhibit their dissatisfactions/reactions about problems concerning to their rights and securities in Turkey (in particular). Since 2 July 1993, Sivas Massacre (*Sivas Katliamı*)¹⁰³ has become one of the main events commemorated in the festival. By

¹⁰³ Sivas Massacre, which is known as *Sivas Katliamı* in public opinion, is an event took place on 2 July 1993 in Sivas. In this event, 37 people (most of them are Alevi artists, poets and musicians) were burned to death by fundamentalist militants. The massacre took place during an Alevi cultural festival called Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Festival. Local authorities, police, troops did nothing to prevent this tragedy.

protesting this massacre, the Alevis demanded apprehension and punishment of the criminals from the state representatives who visited the festival. Posters, photographs and exhibitions reminding the massacre and its victims have continuously been part of the festival. Since 1995, similar activities were conducted in the festival to protest and commemorate the Gazi Event (*Gazi Olayları*).¹⁰⁴ The protestations and reactions of the Alevis during the festival concerning to these massacres were also accompanied by the protestations concerning to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. During the festival, the Alevis showed their discontent and reactions towards rise of political Islam through different ways. For instance, in 1996, İsmail Kahraman (Minister of Culture in the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) government), who visited the festival, had his share from this Alevi reaction against political Islam; he was not welcomed and his speech was booed by Alevi audiences in the festival (Poyraz, 2005:10).

It can be argued that starting with the 28 February process (*28 Şubat süreci*)¹⁰⁵ the festival became more important not only for the Alevis, but also for the secular state bureaucracy who declared war against political Islam in Turkey. In this period, increasing number of politicians and bureaucrats participated to the festival, and manifested/stressed Turkish-centered interpretation of Alevism. In that era, the Alevis and Alevism were presented as defense line/insurance against the influence of Arabic version/mode of Islam over Turkish culture. For example, during the opening ceremony of Hacibektaş Festival on 17 August 1998, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz expressed in his speech that:

Today, there are people who want to replace our lucent Turkish-Islam with a reactionary Arabic/Persian form of Islam. They want to take control of our conscience claiming that their reference point is Islam. They want to monopolize Islam claiming, “Only those

¹⁰⁴ On March 12, 1995, unknown gunmen riddled tea-houses with bullets in Gazi District (a district inhabited mainly by the Alevis) of İstanbul, killing one wounding several other Alevi persons. The Alevis of Gazi took the streets in protest and the demonstrator directed their anger to the police. The police shot into the crowds and killed 21 people.

¹⁰⁵ On February 28 of 1997, the National Security Board (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*) identified political Islam and reactionary movements as the main threats to the Republic, and sent a warning to the coalition government led by political Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*). In the following months, the government had to resign as a result of pressures coming from army, some portion of media, business circles and some NGOs. These series of event started on 28 February 1997 were called as February 28 processes.

ones who shares our way of life are the Muslims.” They are the separatists. Turkish Muslims are going to give them necessary answers (Cumhuriyet, 1998).

Hacı Bektaş, Yunus Emre and Ahmed Yesevi were also presented as Turkish nationalists and saviors of Turkish culture from the Arab domination. Because of the fact that Turkish is used during the worshipping ceremonies in Alevism, and some Alevi rituals contain elements from the shamanist culture, Alevism was exalted as Turkish-Islam.

In addition, in this period, proclamation of the Alevis as the “liberal interpreters of Islam” by the state elite was supported also by several other activities. For example, the Presidential Symphony Orchestra,¹⁰⁶ gave concerts during the festival in 1997. One of the most important educational reforms made against Islamic radicalism (following the resignation of Welfare Party government), known as “Eight Years Uninterrupted Education” (*Sekiz Yıllık Kesintisiz Eğitim*), was presented by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz and vice-prime minister Bülent Ecevit as a gift to the Alevis who were “the guaranties of secularism and democracy in Turkey” (Hürriyet, 1997b). Speeches of both Yılmaz and Ecevit, during the festival, were applauded by the Alevis with enthusiasm; Alevi audiences responded to the speeches by shouting together “Turkey is secular and will stay secular” (Hürriyet, 1997b). During the festival in 1999, Bülent Ecevit promised that the government would provide financial support to Gazi University Research Center of Hacı Bektaş Veli, for the production of a documentary film about Alevi culture and tradition (Hürriyet, 1999).

Starting with February 28 process, as well as political state elite, military bureaucracy also contributed to this flirtation between the Alevis and the state. Following cases are meaningful to illustrate this contribution: Names of the associations, to which members of Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*- TSK) may join, are declared and controlled regularly by Turkish

¹⁰⁶ Being the most prestigious orchestra of the country, Presidential Symphony Orchestra has been the first official institution of Turkish Republic. It was named by Atatürk after the presidential office. Most of the members of the orchestra are counted as state officials according to law#657. The concert given during the festival can be interpreted as the sign of importance given by Ministry of Culture to the event.

General Staff (*Genelkurmay*). As such, in 1999, *Genelkurmay* declared that members of TSK may join to Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Association, an Alevi association founded to disseminate thoughts of Hacı Bektaş Veli and Alevi culture (Cumhuriyet, 2002a). In another case, 149 high-level officers of TSK visited Hacıbektaş town and its newly elected mayor Ali Rıza Selmanpakoğlu¹⁰⁷ in 2004, and they discussed on the illuminating ideas of Hacı Bektaş Veli, visiting made by Mustafa Kemal to Hacıbektaş dervish lodge during the Independence War, and support of the Alevis to the Independence War (Cumhuriyet, 2004a). The Alevis also welcomed the military intervention to the political order of country during February 28 process and resignation of Welfare Party government because of this intervention. Because, they evaluated that, this kind of intervention is inevitable and necessary to protect the republican revolutions.¹⁰⁸ Support of the Alevis to February 28 process was also showed during the Hacıbektaş Festival in 1998; civil and military state elite was met by March of Military (*Harbiye Marşı*) and by the slogans: “Turkey is secular and it will stay secular” (Zaman, 1998).

The festival continued to be a political arena during the early 2000s. Especially in 2001 and 2002 (when the election of parliament was going to be renewed), the number of politicians participating to the festival reached its peak; the Alevis’ demands have been a matter of party politics. Leader of Democratic Leftist Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP), Bülent Ecevit, made a speech in the festival and promised that a new university will be founded in Hacıbektaş (Cumhuriyet, 2002b). Almost a month later, making a public announcement, Ecevit declared that the Alevis will take their share from general budget and Alevism will be included in new curriculum, if he becomes the prime minister

¹⁰⁷ Selmanpakoğlu, a retired general from TSK, became mayor of Hacıbektaş in the local elections of March 2004. He had no connection with any political party, and he won the elections as an independent candidate. Selmanpakoğlu appeared on the written media with his ideas about relationship between Kemalism, Independence War, Hacı Bektaş Veli and the Alevis. Some examples from his arguments: “We disseminate Kemalism from Hacıbektaş to whole Turkey...The Alevis, without exception, supported National Struggle” (Cumhuriyet, 2004b). “The Alevis, who have always been main bearers of democracy, secularism and enlightenment in Turkey, will keep supporting republican revolutions” (Cumhuriyet, 2004c).

¹⁰⁸ Declarations of İzzettin Doğan can be read as a typical example this evaluation. Doğan argued that February 28 process was legitimate and correct; because it was launched against those circles who aimed to move Turkey away from the earnings of republican revolutions and Atatürk (Aydın, 2002:327). In addition, he states that if February 28 process did not take place, Turkey would be transformed into Iran (Ataklı, 2000).

after the elections (Cumhuriyet, 2002c). Mesut Yılmaz, leader of Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), argued that problems of the Alevis cannot be ignored anymore; he will do his best to solve these problems, which is also necessary to maintain social peace in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 2002d). On the other hand, in the festival arena, the Alevis presented their demands to the politicians through speeches or posters. The issue of congregation houses (*cemevleri*), punishment of people responsible for Sivas Massacre and Gazi Event and issue of compulsory religious courses have been main problems the Alevis demanded solution.

Protestation of political Islam, exaltation of secular order and republican revolutions by the audiences were other common features of the festival in early 2000s. In 2003, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was criticized by the Alevi speakers since he did not attend to the festival, and he was booed by the audiences because of his anti-secular activities (Cumhuriyet, 2003a). Erkan Mumcu (Minister of Culture and Tourism in Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) government), who attended to the festival and made a speech, was also booed and criticized. When the names of Erdoğan and Mumcu were announced the audiences shouted together: “We will not be soldiers of USA...Turkey is secular and it will stay secular” (Vatan, 2003). Another reason for protestation of Erdoğan by the Alevis was that the government issued a law (*Topluma Kazandırma Yasası*) that forgives those peoples responsible for Sivas Massacre (Cumhuriyet, 2003a).

On the other hand, 10th president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who attended to the festival twice (in 2001 and 2003), was welcomed with enthusiasm, and his speeches were interrupted by slogans: “Turkey is proud of you” (Cumhuriyet, 2003b). Sezer stressed, in his speeches several times, the idea that secularism is the foundation of contemporary society together with democracy and rule of law that are immutable characteristics of the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic. Because of these argumentations, Sezer was placed, by the Alevis, in an opposite position to government of Justice and Development Party. Another reason for sympathies of the Alevis to Sezer was his efforts in order to eliminate some of the legislative activities of AKP government, which were interpreted in

public opinion as anti-secular. During his reign, Sezer became main oppositional center against government of Justice and Development Party by rejecting to promulgate many laws and regulations adopted by the parliament. Before ending this short historical review about Hacibektaş Festival it is necessary to mention that, since 1999, World Ahl al-Bayt Foundation (*Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı*)¹⁰⁹ organized a series of meetings to commemorate Hacı Bektaş Veli in İstanbul. These meetings were organized every year in the same time with Hacibektaş Festival (August 16-19), which is interpreted in the public opinion that the foundation attempts to create alternative activities to the Hacibektaş Festival. Politicians known as conservative or political Islamist (such as Recai Kutan) have been main participant of these “alternative meetings.”

5.2. CDA of Süleyman Demirel’s Speeches in the Hacibektaş Festival (1994- 1999)

Süleyman Demirel, who has been the first president participating to the Hacibektaş Festival, visited the festival six times between 1993 and 1999, and he made long and fervent speeches in his every visit. In the following pages, I deal with analysis of these speeches according to the principles of CDA. Genre, topic, schemata, local meanings, style, rhetoric and context will be main categories of my analysis.

Genre: Genre generally refers to a category or type of discourse (such as parliamentary speech, news article, poems, etc.). The creation and interpretation of certain genres is accessible to only a limited powerful few. In addition, certain genres of discourse are powerful since the ways in which they are written and interpreted can influence decisions that affect the whole of society (such as laws, regulations and political speeches). The corpus of the text analyzed in this chapter (presidential speeches of Demirel and Sezer in the Hacibektaş Festival) may obviously be defined as political speech that has fundamental roles in both democratic processes and their consequences for citizens (specifically the Alevis). Starting with the rhetorical studies of ancient Greek, political speeches have been

¹⁰⁹ This foundation is one of the well-known Alevi organizations in Turkey. The foundation and its leader Feri Altun is accused of being Sunni-minded by most of the Alevis.

the subject of many scholarly studies. Political speeches belong to the general class of discourse genres that may be named as political discourse (van Dijk, 2000a:45). As can be inferred from this sentence, political discourse itself is not genre, but a collection of genres consisting of political speeches, laws, parliamentary debates, political propaganda, slogans, etc. Different from many other forms of discourse, political discourse is disseminated extensively through various media channels. In addition, this kind of discourse is meaningful for the majority of the population. Since, the following pages deal with some properties of this kind of discourse (both in terms of its internal structure and strategies, as well as in terms of its functions in the social and political context), it may be helpful to dwell on some general characteristics of this genre. As a class of genres, political discourse forms a fuzzy set depending on the definition of the domain of the politics. Although our daily conversations, discussions in the class or academic studies may be about politics, they are not forms of political discourse (despite the fact that their main topic is about specific political policies or practices). For this reason, as argued by van Dijk (2000a:46), “the genres of political discourse are not primarily defined by their meaning and structure, but rather by contextual features such as political setting, overall political interaction being accomplished, and participants and their political roles and goals.” Logically this implies that theoretically political discourse genres may be about virtually any topic in terms of meaning, although in practices these topics are usually relate with important issues such as national economy, ethnic issues, national policies or collective decision making about such issues. In addition, there are few syntactic structures or lexical items at surface level peculiar to political discourse. In that sense, political language is no different from any other language. Many everyday linguistic devices occur in political discourse. Political discourse is predominantly argumentative, oriented towards persuasion. Regarding its rhetorical dimensions, political discourse, consisting of generous promises, is opinion based and persuasive in nature. Political actors using these strategies try to influence public opinion in order to gain votes and thus power. Political speeches or parliamentary debates are the medium par excellence by which political discourse, via the media, reaches and influences the mind of public

at large public. In this study, I classify discourse as political when it is acted out by political actors (such as Demirel, Sezer), in the context of specific political institutions (such as presidency or political parties), and has a direct functional role as a form of political action, such as in meetings or debates (such as the Hacibektaş festival), as part of the political process. It is safe to argue here that speeches of both Demirel and Sezer carry many of the characteristics of political discourse just mentioned above. First, these speeches are full of promises concerning the Alevis. Second, there are a lot of rhetorical elements aiming to persuade the audiences. Third, via the media, the speeches reach millions of people (including both the Alevis and the Sunnis) living in Turkey. Lastly, these speeches have some goals: the speeches try to make the Alevis believe that they are as important as the Sunnis citizens; the speeches aim to encourage and incorporate the Alevis in the direction of protecting national unity and social togetherness.

Topics: Under the category of topics, I will deal with the global, overall thematic structure of the speeches. Such topics or themes, which refer to macro propositions of the text, can be expressed by several sentences in a discourse, by a larger segment of the discourse or by discourse as a whole (van Dijk, 1984:56). As proposed by van Dijk, topics may be characterized as the most important or summarizing ideas expressed in a discourse. In that sense topics provide us the “gist” or “upshot” of a text by telling what a text is about. The following propositions are the main results of topical analysis of Demirel’s speeches:

T1- Hacı Bektaş Veli represents a composition of high values of Turkishness and Islam, at the same time. (1994)

T2- Hacı Bektaş Veli teaches us that in order to reach peace and social tranquility we have to have social unity at first. (1994)

T3- Hacı Bektaş Veli invites us to the path that is illuminated by science and ration. (1994)

T4- The Ottoman State was founded and erected on the high principles represented by Hacı Bektaş Veli; and via these principles, Ottomans spread all over the world. (1994)

T5- Hacı Bektaş Veli advises us to be tied with fraternity no matter we have different religions, sects and races. (1994).

T6- Hacı Bektaş Veli made great contributions to the conquest and Turkization of Anatolia; today his role and spirit is still highly important for us to keep our unity. (1994)

T7- Differences in our society in terms of belief and worshipping do not refer to weakness; instead, these differences refer to social richness. (1994).

T8- Being harmonious parts of the same nation, the Alevis and the Sunnis together form a social unity. (1994)

T9- In this country everyone is free to choose and practice his/her belief and worshipping. (1994)

T10- Although they were tried to be deceived many times in history, the Alevis and the Sunnis struggled against these effort together and stayed loyal to their state and nation.

T11- The Alevis and the Sunnis are in the same boat; they share the same destiny/same future. (1994)

T12- Hacı Bektaş Veli is respected by almost all segments of our society including Turks, Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis. (1996)

T13- As the president of Turkish republic, I am here to set up and to secure social justice. (1996)

T14- The Alevis should resort to legitimate means in pursuing their interests; violence, quarrels and illegitimacy/terror never solve their problems. (1996)

T15- Loving this country, this state and this flag (even more than our lives) is not only a common value for all of us, but also a prerequisite for realizing our rights. (1996)

T16- The Alevis should refrain from abuse of malevolent powers who aim to provoke the Alevis. (1996)

T17- If there are some inequalities, in this country, at the expense of the Alevis, we must find peaceful ways of solving this problem; this is what Hacı Bektaş advises us. (1996)

T18- The Alevis and the Sunnis believe in the same God and the same prophet; everybody in this country loves Hacı Bektaş and Ali. (1996)

T19- Although the Alevis have some problems in this country, their conditions will improve year by year. (1997)

T20- No one can despise the Alevis because of their beliefs and they are as honorable as other citizens of Turkey. (1997)

T21- The Alevis and the Sunnis are brothers. Both groups need to be hand in hand to keep Turkey in peace; because we are in the middle of fire circle. (1997)

T22- There are different belief groups in this country and no one can force them to change their beliefs; everyone is free to practice their belief. (1997)

T23- Both principles of Islam and philosophy of Hacı Bektaş Veli do not allow violence for any purpose. (1997)

T24- Every person in this country loves Hacı Bektaş Veli who is among the common values for Turkish nation. (1997)

T25- Instead of complaining about existing problems, and mentioning about unfortunate disastrous of the past, the Alevis should be more positive for their future and against our state. (1998)

T26- Despite the fact that we have some failures concerning the rights of the Alevis, they must feel that they are first class citizens of this country, and they must protect our state. (1998)

T27- Hacı Bektaş Veli's message about protecting our unity, tranquility, brotherhood and friendship is more valid today than it was before. (1999)

T28- Although there are some differences in this country in terms of race and belief system, we are all brothers, and citizens of this state. (1999)

T29- The Alevis and the Sunnis should recognize each other; and the state should recognize and embrace all of them. (1999)

T30- Do not follow those people who is trying to divide our people in terms of their races; you do not have interest in following these people. (1999)

T31- The state will deal with problems of the Alevis, without destabilizing existing delicate balances of our country. (1999)

Schemata: Roughly, schemata refer to the general “argumentative structures...the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position” (van Dijk, 1984:105). The schemata of a text are the ways in which topics are organized (van Dijk, 1991:118). Text schemata consist of a special order. In other words, they determine what content or argumentative elements come first, second and last; and how arguments will be supported by which sub-arguments. To van Dijk, “the presence, absence or order of specific categories or argumentative orders may be significant and influence the structure of mental models” and may manufacture ideologies in the minds of recipients (1994:119).

Under the light of these theoretical considerations, it can be argued that the main body of argumentative structure of Demirel’s speech was developed around historical personality and importance of Hacı Bektaş Veli. Through following prepositions:

P1: Hacı Bektaş Veli is a sacred personality/saint (*evliya*) for the Alevis.

P2: Hacı Bektaş Veli argued/did the followings: x, y, z...

P3: Hacı Bektaş Veli and personality signifies a common value for both the Alevis and the Sunnis.

It is concluded in the text that

C: If we (the Alevis and Sunnis together) really love Hacı Bektaş Veli, we should follow his footsteps and advices that correspond, today, the followings: x, y, z...

In order to support the first proposition (**P1**), Hacı Bektaş Veli and his ideas were exalted with reference to important personalities of Islam and Turkish history. For example, Ahmet Yesevi, Imam Caferi Sadık, the fourth caliph Ali and the prophet Muhammad were presented as the ancestors of Hacı Bektaş Veli. In addition, Hacı Bektaş was also characterized only with reference to “his services in the Islamization and Turkization of Anatolia;” he was defined as “the main spiritual figure behind the success of the Ottoman State” (1998).

After guaranteeing greatness and holiness of Hacı Bektaş Veli as presented above, Demirel enumerated systematically what Hacı Bektaş Veli said/did in his life, and what kind of lessons should the Alevis take from his life. In relation with this aim, Demirel lists main pillars of Hacı Bektaş Veli's philosophy in the following way:

According to Hacı Bektaş unity is the source of social peace/tranquility... Science is among the main components of Islam... Hacı Bektaş advised that irrespective of our nationality, religion, sect, gender and color we should come together on the bases of brotherhood... Stating, "Do not injure even if you are injured," Hacı Bektaş forbids violence... (1994)

In the last step, Demirel expects the audiences (in particular) and the Alevis (in general) to perform what Hacı Bektaş advised. Demirel legitimizes his invitation by arguing that loving Hacı Bektaş from heart necessitates doing what he advised: being away from violence, refraining from separatist activities, being loyal to the state, being tolerant against people from other beliefs. Hacı Bektaş Veli's ideas were presented as a kind of panacea for the problems of Turkey: ensuring inner peace and national unity, realization of rights and freedoms.

Another argumentative move or structure that is frequently used by Demirel is that contrary to the traditional stance of official discourse in the republican period (according to which Turkey has a homogenous society in terms of ethnicity and religion), he stressed heterogeneous character of Turkey's population. This argument was supported by several sub-arguments, and presented as the strength of Turkey, not a weakness of it. In addition to the Sunnis/the Caferis/the Hanefis/the Alevis were also mentioned as one of the different sub-groups that together form the whole in a harmonious manner:

Diversities of our country in terms of religion and sect can be defined as "multiplicity in unity" (*kesretteki vahdet*). Being parts of the same whole the Alevis and the Sunnis are free to practice and belief, and should be tolerant against each other. That is what Islam demands from us (1994).

Demirel argues that to be different does not necessitate being enemy against each other. Because

These people have been living together for centuries... They have same homeland, same state, same history and same future; they do not allow dissensions; they make up a nation: glorious Turkish nation...

In Demirel's speeches, recognition of existence of diverse groups in society is followed by the recognition of the problems concerning to rights of these diverse groups. Several times it is argued that there are some problems concerning to the situation of the Alevis in Turkey:

Turkey is constitutional state of law, but there may be some inappropriateness, disorders and inequities (1996). I cannot say that there is no problem and everything is perfect for you (1997). I acknowledge that, as state, we have some deficiencies or failures (1998). You are right but we are considering the right time to compensate your loss (1999).

In the next step of this argumentation, it is clearly and strongly stressed by Demirel that, there are legitimate, democratic, legislative ways of correcting these failures, inequities and inappropriateness; these ways open for the Alevis. For this reasons, Demirel argues, the Alevis should not give credit the ways other than legitimate ones (such as violence, provocations and terrorism). In relation with this position, Demirel also argues that by choosing the legitimate ways of pursuing their interests, the Alevis will also show that they are loyal to their state, and respectful to the laws. In the last step, Demirel finalizes his argumentation, stating that staying behind the legitimate line is vital for the Alevis because we are in danger and some sources of dark powers threaten our unity and existence.

In his speeches, Demirel try to provide plausible reasons for the Alevis in order to convince them to own and to protect the state; both the Sunnis and the Alevis should, hand in hand, own and protect this state because:

a) - In addition to believing in the same God and the same prophet, and respecting Ali and Hacı Bektaş Veli together, they also have one common state and one common homeland (1996).

b) - There have been malevolent circles aiming our togetherness and unity; Turkey is circumscribed by fire circles (1996, 1997).

c) - Our state provided us an open regime in which everyone can say whatever she/he wants, can go/inhabit wherever she/he wants, can do whatever she/he wants (1998).

d) - Together with the Sunnis, the Alevis were also recognized by the state as the first class citizens of the country, without questioning no one's belief, age and origin (1997, 1999).

e) - This country gave us wealth and different opportunities; in return, we should protect it; which refers to protect our self and our quality of life (1999).

Demirel's speeches during the festival were always finalized with a series of promises towards the Alevis and their social and legal conditions in Turkey. It is argued by Demirel that there is no reason for the Alevis to be pessimist; existence of some inequities does not necessarily mean that these unjust situations will continue forever. It is promised also that the ideal situation will be created for the Alevis, as long as they stay loyal to their state or as long as they do not be part of illegality.

If you want to reach your aim, you should be patient; and you should continue to express your problems outspokenly. No one has power of doing injustice to you (1996)... Concerning the issues that bother you, the situation will get better year by year. By cleaning out these bothering issues, we will create a country you will proud of being a citizen of it. That will be realized via collective effort (1997)... In the near future, Turkey will overcome the problems it encounters today; no mistake can survive forever (1998, 1999).

Local Meanings: Macro topics and schematic structure may provide only a very rough picture of the content of texts. Although at the level of macro analysis some characteristics of Demirel's discourse towards the Alevis may be observed, it is necessary to make an analysis at micro level of words, sentence and paragraphs to observe possible discriminations, bias, implicitness, presumptions and negligence. Local meanings refer to the analysis of micro level of words, sentences, and individual paragraphs. Especially in CDA of van Dijk it is important to focus on the "forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions and vagueness (2004b:136). Topic

avoidance, omitting, deleting, implicitness and vagueness are some of the main categories for local level analysis of discrimination that will be considered here.

a) *Implicitness*: Implicitness appear as one the most prominent structures and strategies of local meaning in the discourse of Demirel. For example, in his speeches, without directly mentioning, Demirel aims at Kurdish separatism and Islamist political movements in Turkey. In addition, he warns the Alevis about the fallacy of these tendencies:

Look, what I am going to say you. Those people who try to divide our people on the basis of their races are in complete fallacy; do not follow them, you do not have any interest in following them (1999). It is important that religious beliefs of people should not be made a matter of politics... You should not also add political features to this festival (1996).

The other example of implicitness can be observed when Demirel is trying to express the importance he gave to the Hacı Bektaş Festival and to the Alevis. Implicitly he argues that the state is aware of the existence of the Alevis by attaching importance to them:

As the president of Turkish Republic, I am here not because of I do not have anything else to do; instead I am here to convey you important messages (1996). I am here; the prime minister is on my right; vice president of the parliament is on my left... the state is sitting here (1998).

Arguing, "I listened to what the speakers/orators have talked in this festival, and thought that what else can be said if Turkey was more democratic," Demirel implies that today Turkey is democratic enough for different groups (specifically for the Alevis) to express their ideas. In addition, it is also implied that, for the Alevis, this freedom of speech is the suitable way to pursue their interest. When Demirel said, "We can also assure peaceful atmosphere in this country by force; but we prefer to assure it by considering democratic rights," he implicitly warns about what will happen if any group (including the Alevis) abandon democratic ways to express themselves.

b) *Topic avoidance or deleting:* Topic avoidance and deleting are observed among the most common strategies of discourse used against the minorities (van Dijk, 1984:119). When we look at Demirel's speeches at micro level, we can encounter talented use of this discursive strategy. For example, Demirel often refers to history in order to show that "how Hacı Bektaş Veli and his ideas were always in harmony with the state authority." In order to do that Demirel highlights the periods where there were relative harmony between the state and Hacı Bektaş's ideas/followers, and deletes times of clashes. In other words, giving examples from the early Ottoman period (where there were relatively harmonious relations between Hacı Bektaş's heterodox ideas and the state), Demirel systematically avoids from historical periods (such as reign of Selim I, abrogation of Janissaries (1826), and Dersim Events) where followers of Hacı Bektaş and his ideas had serious problems with state authority. Demirel argued that being one of the powerful sources of Turkish nationality, Hacı Bektaş Veli had inspired the Ottoman sultans in their actions. Demirel mentions that the Ottoman civilization was erected on Hacı Bektaş's principles which were also main motivating factor for the Janissaries. Demirel continues with narrating how Mehmed II (Fatih Sultan) and Beyazid II (son of Mehmed II) were impressed by Hacı Bektaş's ideas and behaved in a tolerant and philanthropic manner. Demirel never mentions about actions of Selim I (Yavuz) or Süleyman I (Kanuni) and the persecutions of this period that Kızılbaş groups endured. No sufferings and troubles that the Alevis endured, and no disputes between them and the state were mentioned in Demirel's speeches; instead, the mode of relationship was always defined with reference to loyalty and harmony both in the Ottoman and republican period.

c) *Creating and damning ambiguous enemies:* Demirel's speeches are full of examples of this kind of strategy. Without exactly pronouncing the names of these "dark powers," Demirel systematically creates unknown enemies, and offends them. As can be seen below, in order to describe "the enemies who aims our unity," grammatically, Demirel always use passive voice (without owner of action) or vague subjects which signifies no specific person, group or state:

Peoples of this country have been living together for centuries. Different seditions and instigations were launched against them; but realizing this danger, they stayed together against these plots (1994). We should not be instrument of dark powers (1996). This country is surrounded by a fire circle (1998). If some malevolent people abuse your beliefs, you-the Sunnis and the Alevis should be against this abuse (1998).

d) *Inclusiveness:* Demirel repeatedly employed inclusive discursive strategies towards the Alevis in order to persuade them for that they will not be discriminated anymore by the state; and they are esteemed citizens, like the Sunnis:

My Alevi citizens, do not be anxious about anything. You are full citizens of this country; you are in equality. No one can insult you; you have nothing to hide (1997). Everyone, who embraces the principles of Atatürk and undividable unity of Turkey, belongs to us/this country. You should say yourself “We are first class citizens; and this country is our land” (1998).

Style and Rhetoric: Style and rhetoric play important roles in presentation of opinions. Sometimes delicate topics or fragile cases must be subtlety and persuasively formulated in order to both inform and persuade the audiences. Style, as put by van Dijk (1991:209) has to do with the choice and variation of the words in presentation of the ideas. An analysis of style tells us what the appropriate use of words is in order to express meaning in a specific situation or discourse. Rhetoric, on the other hand is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient by means of devices such as, alliterations, metaphors, metonymy, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, parallelism, comparisons, contrasts, ironies and us/them comparison (van Dijk, 1993a:278; 1980:131). Rhetorical elements in a discourse aim to enhance the “persuasiveness of the message” by using several expressive devices mentioned above (van Dijk, 1984:139).

Concerning the choice of words and expression (style), it appears among the most distinctive character of Demirel’s speeches that the expression of “*Alevi*” was outspokenly pronounced. Sometimes, this word was pronounced alone; some other times it was used together with the expression of “*Bektaşî*.”

Alevi peoples of this country... our Alevi-Bektaşî citizens (1994).
Alevi-Bektaşî community of this country... Who can accuse of you
because of your Aleviness... (1996). My Alevi-Bektaşî citizens...
Alevi citizens of this country... (1997).

As can be seen from the passage, Demirel directly address the Alevis without recouring to any indirect expression, instead of “*Alevi*.” Systematically pronouncing it, he used this word 16 times in his speeches. He also did not refrain from using the following words in order to denote other belief groups in Turkey: “the Sunnis, the Hanefis, the Şafis, Caferis, Malikis, Hambelis” (1994, 1996). Together with the Alevis, Demirel mentioned also these groups in order to show “how this country has diversity and richness in terms of culture and belief.”

The other important stylistic feature of Demirel’s speeches is that Demirel managed to use Alevi terminology in a talented way to express his arguments and opinions. In other words, while Demirel was talking about Hacı Bektaş Veli, his thoughts or Alevi belief system, he recoured to the terminology that is used by the Alevis such as, *hünkar* (repute used for Hacı Bektaş among the Alevis), *veli* (saint), *pir* (patron saint), *mürşid* (spiritual leader), *himmet* (spiritual help), *yol* (way), *ocak* (hearth), *sır* (secret), *tarikat* (religious order), *marifet* (acquirement), *hakikat* (truth), *türbe* (shrine).

...*hünkar* Hacı Bektaş Veli...(1998, 1996) ...Hacı Bektaş is the
mürşid and *pir* of ... with the *himmet* of Hacı Bektaş Veli... Let
God makes your secret sacred (*Allah sırrınızı kutlu kılsın*) (1994)
...the *ocak* of Hacı Bektaş... (1997) ...

As I discussed above under the title of genre, this text can be categorized as a political speech. Resulting mainly from the genre of the text and from the context of the event, Demirel, sometimes, opted to use formal words as follow: “Dear guests...Dear citizens...My reverend citizens...From the bottom of my heart I salute all of you (1996)...I commemorate Hacı Bektaş with respect” (1996, 1998).

In conformity with the most prominent topic of the text, that is encouraging and incorporating the Alevis in the direction of protecting national unity and social togetherness, the text is full of the words that support this general

argument. For example, “*birlik*” (unity) appeared ten times in the text; “*beraberlik*” (togetherness) appeared eighteen times; “*bütünlük*” (integrity) appeared nine times; “*vatan*” (homeland) appeared eleven times; “*devlet*” (the state) appeared sixty-seven times; “*bayrak*” (flag) appeared three times; “*kardeşlik*” (brotherhood) appeared twenty-seven times. While discussing the necessity of maintaining “national unity and social togetherness,” Demirel presented his arguments by highlighting especially two words: Atatürk (which appeared eight times in the text) and Turkishness (which appeared eleven-times).

In terms of rhetoric, Demirel’s speech contains various discursive strategies of persuasion:

a) In order to make his arguments more believable Demirel, systematically, use history as source of persuasion. For example, to support the idea that how Hacı Bektaş and/or his followers were in harmony with the state he refers to Janissaries (who were historically tied to Bektaşî order) or the role of *bacıyan-ı rum* (social group of women in Anatolia formed in 14th and 15th centuries) (together with their close relation Hacı Bektaş Veli) in Turkization and Islamization of Anatolia. In addition, in Demirel’s speeches, Turkish character of Hacı Bektaş Veli and his ideas were stressed with reference to Turkistan (historical homeland of Turks), Ahmet Yesevi (spiritual leader of Hacı Bektaş lived in Turkistan), and Gülbaba (a Bektaşî saint served in Turkization and Islamization of the Balkans).

b) Literature was used another source of persuasion in the text to construct a “state-friendly” figure of Hacı Bektaş. For example, poems of Yunus Emre (another important personality for the Alevis being one of the seven greatest poets in Alevi tradition) were referred to emphasize the role of Hacı Bektaş in the Ottoman era:

Ali Osman oğluna hüküm yürüten
(He made Ottoman family rule over)
Nazar ile dağı taşı eriten
(He melted mountains with his look)
Hacı Bektaş derler veliyi gördüm.
(I saw him known as Hacı Bektaş Veli)

A Poem of Celaleddin Rumi was also used in the same way:

Yüzünde ermişlik nurları gördüm
(Saintliness shines on his face)
O kimdir? İki alem sultanı veli Hacı Bektaş
(Who is he? He is Hacı Bektaş sultan of two worlds)

Demirel also refers to Hacı Bektaş's own sayings in order to make the Alevis believe in what he is proposing. Some of the sayings Demirel attributed to Hacı Bektaş:

Be master of your hand, loins and tongue" (*Eline, beline ve dilne sahip ol*). Even if you are offended, do not offend in return (*İncinsen de incitme*). Educate your women (*Kadınlarınızı okutunuz*). Do not forget that even your enemy is a human being (*Düşmanınızın bile insan olduğunu unutmayınız*). Do not behave the others in a way that you do not want to be behaved (*Nefsine ağır geleni kimseye tatbik etme*).

c) Directing questions to the audiences, and providing "suitable" answers to these questions is another rhetorical strategy in the texts:

We want to live in this country in unity, togetherness, brotherhood and peace, don't we? ...Who does make discrimination in this country because of you are Alevi? (1996). Who does need peace in Turkey? The Alevis need, the Sunnis need.

d) Exaggeration was also used several times in the text in order to make the arguments stronger. For example, to stress the importance of Hacı Bektaş Veli it is argued that "his ideas will bring peace and tranquility; not only to our country but also to all countries of the world where there exist conflict" (1996).

e) Lastly, I will dwell on utilization of discourse of sincerity in Demirel's speeches as a rhetorical tool. Demirel, often, refers to the words and expressions that show sincerity and intimacy towards the Alevis. By using these words, Demirel probably aims to locate himself as close as possible to the Alevis, and tries to show that the state is tolerant and close against them, as it is against the Sunnis. Some of the expressions of sincerity in the texts: "*Sevgili hemşerilerim!*" (My dear countrymen!); "*kardeşlerim*" (My brothers); "*hepinizi sevgiyle kucaklıyorum*" (I embrace all of you with love).

Context: Context, in van Dijk, is defined generally by the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place (2001:108). As I discussed before, this category of CDA searches the answers of the following questions: In which culture was the text produced? In what typical social situation was the text used? From what historical period is the text? What category of speakers has produced it? Context models control all levels of style of discourse, such as lexical choice, rhetorical choices, syntactic structure and other grammatical choices that depend on how situations are defined. Context models also include mental representations (results from immediate, interactional situations such as politics, economy) that control many of the properties of discourse production such as genre, access, setting and participants. For van Dijk, context models “allow us to explain what is relevant to social situations for the speech participants” (ibid: 108).

a) Access and Setting: To van Dijk, while ordinary people are passive targets of text or talk produced by the authorities (such as officers, judges, politicians), “members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to the tools of persuasion (such as media, political offices), and control over one or more types of public discourse” (2003:356).

As mentioned above, Süleyman Demirel conducted his speeches as the president of Turkish Republic. He addressed to the audience by taking advantage of being at the top of the state structure. His power and authority stems mainly from this position that has been the most prestigious and powerful political position of Turkey in the state hierarchy. In the current legal and political structure, the president of Turkey has tremendous duties and power, relating to executive, legislative and judiciary branches, the range of which was clearly stated in the constitution. According to the constitution, the president of the republic is the “head of the state.” In that sense he or she shall represent “the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation;” he or she shall “ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.” In Turkish political system the president share implementation of executive power and function with council of ministers; she/he

also appoints the prime minister and accepts his or her resignation; appoints and dismisses ministers upon the proposal of the prime minister. Being the commander in chief, the president of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces. Relating to judiciary, the president appoints the members of the Constitutional Court, one- fourth of the members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals. Relating to legislation, the president shall promulgate the laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly within fifteen days; and may return these laws to the assembly for reconsideration.¹¹⁰

In addition to these features of the orator (Demirel), there are other factors that affect the power of his discourse. First, it should be remembered that before he became the president, Demirel had become prime minister six times at different times. He had been dealing with party politics since early 1960s. As a result, he spoke at Hacibektaş as an experienced and talented politician, not as an ordinary orator. He took advantage of his experiences about addressing people. This factor can obviously realized, if we closely look at the rhetorical skills that were used in the text: sincerity, direct dialogue with the audiences, exaggerations, comparisons, etc. The role and importance of Demirel's long experiences of politics on the strength of his discourse becomes apparent if we compare his words with that of Sezer who is not experienced on party politics.

The power and authority of Demirel's speech is also enhanced by elements of the setting, such as the presence of other members of state elite at the square where the speeches were held (the prime minister, head of the parliament, vice-prime minister, ministers, military and civil bureaucrats, leaders of political parties, local governors and members of parliament). The festival, which is organized by the municipality of Hacibektaş and Ministry of Culture in cooperation, turns into an official ceremony, and was opened with national anthem. Another factor affecting power of Demirel's discourse is that the speeches have attracted intense attention of media. There existed a lot of journalists and reporters who observed the events. Almost all TV channels

¹¹⁰ Visit the following link for more information about duties and responsibilities of the president in Turkey: <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/kitap/1982ana.doc>

(including TRT-state television) broadcasted the festival and Demirel's speeches in the news bulletins. The festival and some parts of Demirel's speeches appeared on many daily newspapers and magazines all over the country.

b) *Historical Context:* In order to refrain from unnecessary reiteration, in this section, I will not discuss the specific historical context of the period (1994-1999) where Demirel held his speeches. Because, both in the second chapter (historical background) and at the beginning of this chapter, I tried to portray general social and historical context of 1990s where the official discourse of the state towards the Alevis was shaped. Especially at the beginning of this chapter, I have reviewed general historical context where the festival took place. I should mention here that Demirel's visit to the festival signifies a climax in terms of the relations between the state and the Alevis. He had been the first president visiting the festival; his visits opened the way for other upper level state elite. After his visit, increasing number of politicians and bureaucrats including prime ministers, ministers, governors, mayors and generals have visited the festival and entered into direct dialogue with the Alevis. The Alevis also appreciated Demirel's leading role in this process. In 2002, Demirel was given traditional peace price by Hacıbektaş Municipality, because of being first president visiting the festival, and because of his contributions to the social peace.

5.3. CDA of Ahmet Necdet Sezer's Speeches in the Hacıbektaş Festival (2001-2003):

Ahmet Necdet Sezer was chosen to the post immediately after Süleyman Demirel. Following Demirel, Sezer continued to participate to the Hacıbektaş Festival until 2004. Directorate of Press and Public Relations of Presidency specified no reason about why Sezer did not participate to the festival after 2003; I am told that Sezer kept releasing short congratulatory messages every year to the festival.¹¹¹ Under the category of topics, I will deal with the global, overall thematic structure of Sezer's speeches. As discussed above, topics may be

¹¹¹ I came across discussions in conservative Sunni media criticizing Sezer's participation to the Hacıbektaş Festival. It is argued that Sezer makes discrimination by not attending similar ceremonious of Sunni circles such as Mevlana commemoration organized every year in Konya (Dumanlı, 2003).

characterized as the most important or summarizing ideas expressed in a discourse. The following propositions are the main results of topical analysis of Sezer's speeches:

T1- Hacı Bektaş's ideas, which can be understood more clearly under the light of scientific republican tradition, is humanistic and harmonies with universal values such as tolerance, peace and love. (2001)

T2- Hacı Bektaş contributed a lot, in his age, to the formation of social identity and social togetherness; his thoughts are still playing an important role in the consolidation of democratic understanding in Turkey. (2001)

T3- Hacı Bektaş Veli showed next generations the way of living together in peace, brotherhood and unity, despite the existence of diversities/ differences in terms of nationality, religion and sect. (2001)

T4- Secularism is among the main pillars of our national unity. According to this principle, no one can be blamed/despised because of his/her beliefs. (2001)

T5- As necessitated by this principle, no specific race, religion or sect can be given a privileged status at the expense of the others. (2001)

T6- Existing difficult conditions of our country make it compulsory to cooperate and to keep our unity and togetherness. (2001)

T7- Even under difficult situations we should stay loyal to our state, and believe our democracy. (2001)

T8- For better tomorrows, we must prefer compromising and tolerance, instead of conflicting and quarrel; this is what Hacı Bektaş Veli advises us. (2001)

T9- Hacı Bektaş Veli's general perspective in many terms is harmonious with Atatürk's aims and ideals. (2001)

T10- Having universal ideas, Hacı Bektaş Veli is a philosopher. (2003)

T11- Hacı Bektaş's principles are still functional for prevention of violence and consolidation of peace in our country. (2003)

T12- Hacı Bektaş Veli made great contributions to both formation and preservation of Turkish language, culture, identity and social unity. (2003)

T13- Hacı Bektaş Veli's ideas played important role in the formation of democratic and modern characteristics of Turkish Republic, which corresponds an enlightenment movement. (2003)

T14- By converting its differences into a kind of richness, Turkey managed to accomplished national unity. (2003)

T15- Basic human rights and freedoms cannot be used to create separate identities based on religion and sect; and these rights cannot be used to found a state based religion or sect. (2003)

T16- All the citizens of this country are obliged to own and protect this state with its democratic and secular principles; this perspective exists also in the messages of Hacı Bektaş Veli. (2003)

Schemata: As defined by van Dijk, schemata refer to “global maps” or “hierarchical syntactic structures” into which topics were inserted (1988:49-50). That is to say, main propositions of a text appear according to a specific sequence; and organized according to predetermined general logic. By means of this sequence, argumentative coherence of the propositions and the logical connections between main arguments and supportive arguments are controlled.

As in the case of Demirel’s speeches, in Sezer’s speeches too, Hacı Bektaş Veli is the central figure of argumentative structure of the text. However, different from Demirel who portrays Hacı Bektaş with reference to Islamic terminology (such as Ahmed Yesevi, Imam Caferi Sadık, Ali, Muhammad, God, spirituality, miracles, etc), Sezer characterize him within a secular framework. In other words, while Hacı Bektaş Veli appears in Demirel’s speeches as an Islamic saint who served in Islamization and Turkization of this country, in Sezer’s speeches he appears as a philosopher who was known with his universal ideas such as humanism, tolerance and love. As will be seen in the following statements, in Sezer’s speeches, Hacı Bektaş was depicted with reference to mainly philosophical and secular terminology:

Hacı Bektaş Veli is a philosopher whose peaceful perspective, humanism and universal ideas on love of nature and tolerance are still valid today... Hacı Bektaş Veli, who was raised by Anatolia, is the source of a lot of virtue from which humanity can take serious lessons (2001).

As discussed above, Hacı Bektaş Veli was presented by Demirel as the product of Islamic and Turkish traditions in general, and he was referred in relation with the Alevis and in the context of Alevism. Whereas in Sezer, he was mentioned as the product Anatolia, there are no reference to Islam and Alevism in the text in relation to Hacı Bektaş Veli. Personality and prominence of Hacı Bektaş in Alevi tradition is totally absent in Sezer's argumentation. Hacı Bektaş's prominence was systematically stressed in Sezer's speeches not only via his philosophical side but also with reference to his sayings about science:

Hacı Bektaş's following sayings, "All the ways, except for those one opened by science, are full of darkness" and "Our ways were based on science and love of human being," shows us the essence of his ideas (2003).

Contrary to Demirel, Sezer nowhere in his speeches addressed the Alevis. As will be discussed below under the subtitle of "lexical choices," by preferring to use words of "my citizens" or "people of Hacıbektaş," Sezer refrained to stress Alevi identity in his speeches. Although Sezer's participation to the festival, by itself, is important for the Alevis in terms of being addressed by the state, he never mentioned (unlike Demirel) about the demands of the Alevis and inequalities about which they complain. Instead, he systematically, stated benefits of secularism established by republic, and importance of supporting /accepting existing state with its principles stated in the constitution:

Atatürk founded democratic republic of Turkey with a modern and dynamic structure. Secularism is essence and unchangeable character of this republic. According to principle of secularism, basic human rights and freedoms cannot be used to create separate identities based on religion and sect; and these rights cannot be used to found a state based religion or sect. No person, family, group or class has privilege before the laws; according to principle of equality no religion, sect or race may have different status from the others. All the citizens of this country are obliged to own and protect this state with its democratic and secular principles (2001).

As can be seen above, Sezer, by reciting the constitutional principles concerning the secularism and equality, portrays an ideal picture of Turkey for the

audiences. In fact, this portrait is very delicate, and can easily be damaged by the exceptions and inequalities the Alevis have been enduring since the beginning of republican period. As if there is no problem, all the citizens (including the Alevis) are invited to owning and protecting the existing order. In addition, Hacı Bektaş Veli and his system of ideas are used, in Sezer's speeches, to mobilize people in the direction of protecting existing secular order. In relation with this, Sezer highlights duties and responsibilities of individual citizens against the state, instead of dwelling on their rights and freedoms. Again, in doing that he utilizes Hacı Bektaş to persuade the audiences:

Together with the republic, political and social privileges were cleared off, and equality and freedom were settled among all the citizens. In addition, secularism was realized in all segments of life... Hacı Bektaş Veli's ideas contributed a lot to the formation of this modern and democratic structure of the republic, and to the sustainability of this enlightenment movement... Individuals have some duties and responsibilities to society and state; they have to possess characteristics of democracy, which is pre-condition for the survival and consolidation of the regime. This understanding was coded in the messages of Hacı Bektaş Veli, centuries ago (2003)... In every condition, we should protect our beliefs to our state, nation and democracy (2001).

Sezer, several times in his speeches, emphasizes the idea that today (as in the past) Hacı Bektaş Veli's ideas are important for the formation of Turkey's national unity and social togetherness. He also pointed out that Hacı Bektaş Veli, during his life, gave great importance to the preservation of Turkish language and culture. In this sense, parallel to Demirel, Sezer presented Hacı Bektaş Veli as one of the outstanding figure who internalized Turkish customs and tradition, and transmitted these values to next generations.

It can easily be observed from the discussions above that Hacı Bektaş Veli and his system of ideas were instrumentalized by both Sezer and Demirel in order to incorporate¹¹² the Alevis. Another common argumentative strategy that can be

¹¹² As I discussed in the first chapter, incorporation refers "to application of knowledge in a way that promotes strategies of state control" Frank and Burton (1979:51).

seen in the speeches of both Demirel and Sezer is to construct parallelism between Atatürk and Hacı Bektaş Veli in order to secure loyalty and support of the Alevis for the republic. The most obvious example of this parallelism is that both Atatürk and Hacı Bektaş were mentioned, in Sezer's speeches, with reference to the importance they gave to "scientific thought," and their fight against "darkness." By citing sayings of both persons related with scientific thought, Sezer defends that how Hacı Bektaş and Atatürk have together illuminated our future, although they lived in different ages.

The other dimension of the relation between Atatürk and Hacı Bektaş Veli is formulated through the foundation of republic. According to Sezer, Atatürk has founded "a republican order which is modern, dynamic, secular and governed by rule of law" (2001, 2003); and Hacı Bektaş Veli's ideas played important role in the formation of these modern characteristics of Turkish Republic. In sum, to Sezer, these two persons, hand in hand, opened the door of enlightenment movement for the Turkish nation (2003).

Sezer, likewise Demirel, finalizes and justifies his arguments by giving good reasons for the following questions: Why should we own and protect the republican order, "in every condition," together with its modern, secular and democratic characteristics? Why it is "more urgent today" to maintain our national unity and social togetherness than ever? Why should all the citizens fulfill their duties and responsibilities against the state, today "by leaving their personal interest aside?" One can easily find the answers of these questions in Sezer's speeches. Sezer several times argued that:

Today, our country is walking through a critical passage. The difficult conditions we are enduring are growing day by day; and under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to maintain our unity, well-being and solidarity. By leaving our personal interest aside, we should give priority to the interest of our country and society. Maintaining our beliefs, under every condition, to our state and nation is the key factor for the illuminated future of this country (2001). For a better future, we chose tolerance and reconciliation instead of disputing (2003).

Local Meanings: Although global structure of discourse (such as topics and schemata) have major role in capturing overall picture of the text, the local structures such as implications, presumptions, idealizations and ignoring may also contribute to this picture. In terms of local meanings, the most prominent feature of Sezer's speeches is that by refraining from using the expressions such as "Alevi, Sunni, Islam," he, implicitly, tends to put the issue without referring to religious and sectarian parameters. By addressing the Alevis by means of the following words, "dear peoples of Hacıbektaş," "peoples who follow Hacı Bektaş's illuminating ideas," "my dear citizens," Sezer does not emphasize an Alevi identity separate from republican citizenship. Instead of interpellating/labeling people as the Alevis, or the Sunnis, Sezer prefers to call and unite them under the general title of "citizens of secular, democratic republic." We can summarize his underlying logic from the text as follow: there are no Alevis or no Sunnis; instead, there is a state with its secular and democratic characters, and there are citizens (they altogether form Turkish nation) who are expected to obey these rules. As stated several times in the texts, "basic human rights and freedoms cannot be used to create separate identities based on religion and sect" (whether under the title of Alevis or Sunnism). In addition, "these rights cannot be used to found a state based religion or sect;" with these words Sezer also rejects demands of political Islamists.

It can be argued that ignoring a series of existing malfunctions in Turkey (concerning to rights and freedoms of the Alevis, and implementations of secularism), Sezer, several times in his speeches, chose to idealize the current situation. In other words, instead of referring to demands and complaints of the Alevis, Sezer idealized existing order by means of the following expression:

Together with the republic, political and social privileges were cleared off; additionally, equality and freedom were provided for all the citizens. In addition, secularism was realized in all segments of life. Turkey has accomplished its nation-building process/national fusion by transforming its differences; only a few number of nation managed to do that (2003). No person, family, group or class has privilege before the laws; according to principle of equality no religion, sect or race may be treated differently or may have different status compared to the others (2001, 2003).

As can be inferred from the passage, in addition to idealization of contemporary Turkey, in terms of rights and freedoms, ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Turkey was also ignored in Sezer's speeches. He mentions principles of secularism and process of nation-building process as if there is no problem pertaining to these areas.

Style and Rhetoric: Style and rhetoric play important roles in presentation of opinions in a persuasive and euphemistic way. Style, as argued by van Dijk (1991:209) has to do with the choice and variation of the words in presentation of the ideas. Depending on the social context, language users may recourse to specific words, expressions or idioms in order to express a given meaning; in addition to that, context of communication may also impose some verbal patterns to the speaker independent of his/her choices (van Dijk, 1988:72). As I discussed before in the introduction chapter, choice of specific words may signal degree of formality, the relationship between the sides of the speech and especially the ideology of the speaker. For example, speakers/participants most probably chose to use more formal mode of language in courtroom; using "terrorist" or "freedom fighter" to define the same person may indicate ideological background the speaker. An analysis of style tells us what the appropriate use of words is in order to express meaning in a specific situation or discourse. Rhetoric, on the other, hand is concerned with enhancement of understanding and acceptance of discourse by the recipient by means of devices such as, alliterations, metaphors, metonymy, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, parallelism, comparisons, contrasts, ironies and us/them comparison (van Dijk, 1993a:278; 1980:131). Rhetorical strategies are known for their persuasive function. This function may be both intensifying and mitigating in relation to semantic content. Rhetorical means such as metaphors, irony, hyperboles, euphemisms and rhetorical questions may attract attention, enhance interest and thus reinforce the argumentation of the speaker.

Concerning the word choice, it is among the most conspicuous characteristics of the text is that Sezer preferred to use newly produced Turkish words, instead of the words originates from the other languages such as Arabic and Persian. For example, he opted to use "gönenç" (welfare), "erek" (purpose),

“ulus” (nation), “yurttaş” (citizen) and “ileti” (message) instead of “refah” (welfare), “gaye” (purpose), “millet” (nation), “vatandaş” (citizen) and “mesaj” (message). Sezer’s choice in this matter is harmonious with his nationalist stance (in general) and his perspective concerning the purification of Turkish.

As I mentioned above, Sezer opted not to use any of the following words “Alevi,” “Alevilik,” “Sunni,” “Sunnilik,” and refrained from using any words that may connote separate identity other than being the citizen of Turkish republic. In that sense, he used “yurttaş” (citizen) twenty times during his speeches. He opted to present his ideas by emphasizing principles of republic. In this context, the other important set of words that were mostly repeated: “laik, laiklik” (secular, secularism) that appeared fifteen times; “çağdaş” (modern) that appeared nineteen times; “demokrasi” (democracy) that appeared eighteen times; “aydınlanma, aydınlık” (enlightenment, luminous) was used seven times; “bilgi” (knowledge) that appeared six times.

Like Demirel, Sezer also highlights “the importance of togetherness and unity,” which can easily be observed through his word choices: “birlik” (unity) was used seven times; “kardeşlik” (brotherhood) was used six times; “sevgi” (love) was used twenty-four times; “barış” (peace) was used fourteen times; “hoşgörü” (tolerance) was used seventeen times; “dirlik” (tranquility) and “dayanışma” (solidarity) were used twice each. “Türk” and “Atatürk” are other important words, while the former appeared thirteen times and the latter appeared seven times.

In terms rhetoric, it can be argued that Sezer’s speeches correspond to a good example of formal speech. From its beginning to the end, the text is full of the examples of formal addressing such as “honorable quests... I salute you with respect... I present my gratitude...” Expressions of informality, directing instant questions, declamations, using singular pronouns, which were some of the rhetorical strategies in Demirel’s speeches, were completely absent in Sezer’s speeches. Consistently refraining from informality, Sezer always used plural pronouns, and considering grammatical rules, he preferred to use proper sentences, instead of irregular one.

Similar to Demirel, Sezer also refer to historical personalities (such as Mevlana, Yunus Emre, Ahmet Yesevi) in order to be more convincing in presenting his arguments. In addition, Sezer also tried to benefit from sayings of Atatürk and Hacı Bektaş as a rhetorical strategy. For example, the following sayings of these two persons were cited twice in the text:

Gerçek yol gösterici ilimdir.
(The real guide, in life, is science.) Atatürk

İlimden gidilmeyen yolun sonu karanlıktır.
(All the ways are dark, except for scientific one.) Hacı Bektaş

Context: In van Dijkian CDA, context is defined generally by the social, political and historical structures in which the discursive practices take place. Now, I will deal with the several contextual properties of the Sezer's speeches such as access, setting, and social and historical domains.

a) Access and Setting: As indicated in the methodology section of this study, power and dominance of groups are measured by their control over (access to) discourse (van Dijk, 1993a:256). To van Dijk, while ordinary people are passive targets of text or talk produced by the authorities (such as officers, judges, politicians), “members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to the tools of persuasion (such as media, political offices), and control over one or more types of public discourse” (2003:356).

In our case, it can be argued that Sezer has some privileges and advantages in accessing to the tools of persuasion. As I discussed above (relating to Demirel's speeches), Sezer, as a president, is at the top state hierarchy. He has lots of duty and power that were guaranteed by the constitution. Being the head of Turkish Republic, Sezer speaks as the representative of the state. He speaks with a title that is theoretically expected to be neutral position above all institutions of the state and before all the segments of the society. According to the constitution, he represents “the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation;” he or she shall “ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.” In addition, by means of media

channels, his speeches reach all country. The messages of Sezer are available not only for those people in Hacibektaş but also for all the citizens of Turkey (whether Alevi or Sunni). Many television channels (including TRT, the state television), daily newspapers and magazines were interested in the events, and disseminated the Sezer's messages all over the country.

Van Dijk (1996:87) indicates that there are many different aspects to the setting of a discourse event that can be controlled in different degrees by different participants and the resulting setting can be more or less equitable for different discourse participants. Audiences, in our case, are permitted to be passive parts of the setting; the control belongs to Sezer during his speeches. It should be noted that Sezer encountered with very friendly atmosphere in Hacibektaş. The audiences in the square welcomed Sezer by chanting slogan: "Turkey is proud of you" (*Türkiye seninle gurur duyuyor*) (Vatan, 2003). In addition, the festival (especially the opening part) was conducted as an official ceremony: attendance of state elites other than Sezer (the prime minister, ministers, bureaucrats...), presence of thousands of police and gendarmes,¹¹³ performance of national anthem, observance of protocol rules.

b) Historical Context: In order to refrain from unnecessary reiteration, in this section, I will not discuss the specific historical context of the period (2001-2003) where Sezer held his speeches. Because, both in the second chapter (historical background) and at the beginning of this chapter, I tried to portray general social and historical context where the official discourse of the state towards the Alevis was shaped. Especially at the beginning of this chapter, I have reviewed general historical context where the festival took place.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

As a conclusion, it can be argued that, apart from the contents of their speeches, even the participations of two presidents (Demirel and Sezer) to the Hacibektaş Festival is important itself, and carry special meaning for the Alevis.

¹¹³ The number of security forces in the festival varied depending on the number of high-ranking official participants; but almost every year there existed intense security precautions. For example in 1998 there were more than 1000 polices and 200 gendarmes (Cumhuriyet, 1998).

Because it was obvious that the festival was an Alevi event; by participating to the festival and by addressing the Alevis the presidents showed that they are aware of/recognizing existence of the Alevis in Turkey. Via these participations, for the first time in the republican period, the state contacted the Alevis at the highest level. The Alevis welcomed both Demirel and Sezer; because they were addressed by the state at the highest level. The Alevis, who were previously ignored or treated with suspicion during 1970s and 1980s (ignorance or suspicion also refers to a form of official discourse), were discovered (during 1990s) by the presidents as a potential power to buttress republican regime against those who oppose it. As I showed in chapter two, the Alevis (who were defined before as “interior threats” to the state) were considered, in the speeches of two presidents, as important allies of Turkish Republic or as precious treasure that made Turkish modernization possible. It can be argued that main reason behind this change in official stance of the presidents towards the Alevis is closely related with dangers coming from rise of political Islam and intensification of Kurdish separatism in Turkey. Especially, since 1999 (when the European Union (EU) recognized Turkey’s candidacy), the EU process of Turkey emerged as another factor affecting this change.

As for the questions of the study, (How did the presidents define Alevism and the Alevis in their official statements? What kind of discursive regularities and discursive strategies were employed in the presidential speeches on the Alevis?), it can be argued that there are some common points in the speeches of two presidents, as well as differentiating points.

Both of the presidents, tried to emphasize that their presence in Hacıbektaş represents “existence of state” in the festival. Both Demirel and Sezer worked hard to emphasize that Hacı Bektaş Veli and the Alevis (being his followers) are “Turks, and they made great contributions to Turkish culture and tradition.” In relation with this argument, the presidents gave special importance to distance the Alevis and Alevism from Kurdish separatism and political Islam. The Alevis were systematically presented as “tolerant, modern and enlightened face of Turkish-Islam.” The presidents warned the Alevis also for being away from Kurdish separatists who aim to harm national unity of Turkey. Another common point in

these presidential speeches is that the Alevis and their beliefs are portrayed harmonious with the principles of Atatürk and pillars of Turkish Republic.

Both Demirel and Sezer see a close relationship between issue of Alevism and security priorities of Turkey. It is argued that Turkey, being “in the middle of a fire circle,” is experiencing “hard conditions;” under these conditions, the Alevis were asked to stay loyal to the state, and to be respectful to laws and regulations under all conditions that are vital for “preserving national unity of Turkey.” The presidents alert the Alevis against “malicious plans of shady powers who aim division of Turkey.” Instrumentalization of Hacı Bektaş Veli (and his ideas) in order to mobilize the Alevis in the direction of preserving existing order appears as another common point between Demirel and Sezer. In the speeches of both presidents, Hacı Bektaş Veli appears a state-loyal figure who had “always served for unity, togetherness, fraternity and consolidation of the state order.” They argued that Hacı Bektaş Veli and his ideas, that inspired Atatürk in the formation of republican order, are perfect models for the Alevis of today in the direction of owning/protecting existing state order. In the speeches of both Demirel and Sezer, there exist apologetic statements against the Alevis, which want the Alevis to forget traumatic memoirs of the past, and to look at future.

These changes in official stances of the presidents (starting from 1994) do not mean that the identity and existence of the Alevis were completely recognized by them. Although differences in Turkey (such as Alevism) were presented as “our richness,” the presidents presented a partial representation of existing situation by referring to discursive strategy of omitting/deleting. The speeches emphasize the Alevis’ similarities and common points with the Sunnis, rather than highlighting their *sui generis* and different sides from the Sunnis. Both Demirel and Sezer stated that no one in this country (including the Alevis) can be blamed for their beliefs and worshipping. But, none of the problems of the Alevis (including status of congregation houses, compulsory religious education) were mentioned in these speeches. The Alevis were advised to be patient about their problems, and not lost their belief to the state under all conditions.

As for the differentiating points between two presidents, it can be argued that while Demirel addressed directly “the Alevis,” Sezer employed an indirect

discourse such as “followers of Hacı Bektaş Veli.” While introducing the issue Demirel referred to religious terminology and Islamic context, Sezer refrained from doing that; instead he presented Hacı Bektaş Veli and his ideas with reference to universal ideas such as secularism, science and enlightenment. Another difference is that while Demirel is more eager to confess that the Alevis are enduring (and endured in the past) important problems, Sezer, ignoring discontent of the Alevis, tried to portray an ideal picture of Turkey for the audiences (by reciting the constitutional principles concerning the secularism and equality).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Probably the most significant finding of this dissertation, as harmonious my hypothesis stated at the beginning, is that it is safe to talk about the existence of “official discourses” towards the Alevis, instead of one, never-changing and undifferentiated “official discourse.” As I showed by means of the analysis conducted in the Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, it is possible to observe diversities, changes or shifts in the official discourses concerning the Alevis. In other words, my analysis showed that rather than a homogeneous, coherent, stable, and monolithic official discourse there exist more than one “official discourses” towards the Alevis. In addition to the chronological variations in official discourses (different official discourses in different periods), there exists also variations in official discourses in a specific historical instant (more than one official discourses in the same period). While the president of the Republic (Süleyman Demirel) was declaring the Alevis as “the first-class citizens of Turkey” and advising them “to enjoy all the blessings of this country” (on 16 August 1997), there was not even a single word concerning Alevism in the textbooks of religious class (DKAB) prepared by the MEB. In addition, when we reached 2005, absolute denial of MEB concerning Alevism has changed, and there appeared some signs towards the inclusion of Alevism in the textbooks of DKAB.

Before discussing main reasons behind these heterogeneity and changes in official discourses concerning the Alevis, I will briefly restate main conclusions that I reached in each chapter. Since I have already allotted separate sections at the end of each chapter to summarize main conclusions reached in the related chapters, my restatements will be brief here.

The official texts which were analyzed in Chapter 3 showed that discursive strategies and regularities employed in these official documents signify the official discourses of DİB concerning the Alevis; in addition, these strategies and

regularities affect the formation of official practices of other state organs (such as the courts and governorships) concerning the issue. DİB has always placed Alevism and the Alevis in the Islamic circle. Reducing Alevism to the love of *Ahl al Bayt*, DİB consider that Alevism and Sunnism are almost identical. Different from two previous presidents of DİB, Alevism was recognized as one of the specific Islamic understanding or “intra-Islamic traditional differentiation” by Bardakoğlu. However, Bardakoğlu’s recognition is limited with cultural realm. That is to say, congregation houses were recognized as “cultural centers” but not as “places of worship.” Parallel to this perspective, congregational ceremony was defined as a folkloric activity. Right of self-definition of the Alevis is clearly and definitely rejected. Denying the existence of any problem concerning the Alevis appears as another common discursive strategy in these official texts of DİB; for this reason, the Alevis are not seen as the victims of any unjust application. DİB perceives Islam as one of the elements that unites society together. It is regularly stated in the texts that DİB is maintaining national and religious unity by preserving its current Islamic perspective and by sustaining existing order concerning the supply of religious services. For this reason, demands of the Alevis interrogating this order and current perspective of DİB are perceived as a threat for national unity and social togetherness. According to DİB, the issue of Alevism is closely related with Turkey’s vital national security concerns. In addition, the Alevis were presented by DİB as irrational actors who have always been open to “manipulations and misuses of both foreign and internal abusers who aim to injure unity of Turkey, and to separate the Alevis from the Sunnis.” For this reason, demands of the Alevis (especially related with the status of congregation houses) were considered as “artificial” and closely connected with “malicious purposes of foreign and internal circles.” Blaming the Alevis for being ignorant of Islamic sources and of their own history/tradition is a common theme in discourses of DİB. The Alevis were accused also for having false beliefs and practices by DİB. DİB has always presented the existing legal structure as an obstacle that does not allow DİB to meet demands of the Alevis.

Parallel to the intensification of the EU process, there emerged some changes in discourse of DİB towards the Alevis. For example, Bardakoğlu accepts

the necessity of “reconsidering structure and duties of DİB on the basis of transparency, civility and inclusiveness.” In addition, he believes that Alevism should be included in the compulsory religious courses. While Yazıcıoğlu (the president of DİB between 1987- 1992) was hesitating to use the term “Alevi” (“in order not to saw the seeds of discord among the Muslims”), Bardakoğlu (the president of DİB since 2005) came to terms that Alevism is one of the specific Islamic understanding or “intra-Islamic traditional differentiation.

As a result of my analysis in Chapter Four, I can argue that through the religious curriculum of 1982 and related textbooks of DKAB, MEB intends to produce a homogeneous society in terms of religion; because it recognizes only Sunni version of Islam and neglects diverse interpretations other than Sunnism. In these texts (the textbooks issued before 2005), the Alevis and Alevism were completely neglected. Main discursive strategy towards the Alevis and Alevism was complete silence. The Alevis and Alevism were not mention in these textbooks even with a single word. The absence of Alevi interpretation of Islam in these textbooks shows that Sunni Islam appears as the only officially recognized version of Islam in compulsory religious education. MEB fails to recognize Alevism; neither, under the title of Islamic framework nor as a separate section, Alevism, its principles of belief and rituals were referred. Apart from silence and negligence, the other set of discursive strategy (frequently used towards the Alevis in these textbooks) includes deletion or omitting. Especially concerning the controversial issues in Turkish and Islamic history, the perspectives of the Alevis were deleted. What we encounter is a systematic selection of some portion of knowledge, tradition and history, and omitting the other portion, which aims to transmit dominant religious understanding to new generations. For the sake of “consolidation of national unity and togetherness by means of religion and morality,” it was instructed to the students that “religion is one of the important components of a nation.” Using religion in solidifying national unity as “an important component of nation” can be read as traces of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in school textbooks issued between 1982 and 2005. The efforts of MEB to consolidate “unity of belief and behavior” operate in favor of Sunnism and at the expense of Alevism. That is to say, unity is searched on the basis of a belief

system and worshiping practices which exactly belong to the Sunni version of Islam.

In 2005, MEB issued a new curriculum and a new set of textbooks in which there appeared some signs of change concerning the Alevis. Contrary to the previous religious curriculum and textbooks of 1982, the new curriculum and textbooks (2005) do not neglect the existence of “different religious sects and formations” in Islam. Although new textbooks accept the existence of diverse interpretations in Islam, they emphasize “common and uniting points” among these different interpretations, instead of the features that make them different. At least for the case of Alevism, new textbooks (2005) fail to portray a correct picture in many terms. In other words, the proposed “common points” are far from being real common points for the Alevis and far from reflecting the content of Alevism. Using discursive strategy of avoidance, the new textbooks refrain from mentioning forms of worshiping or place of worship recognized by the Alevi Muslims. Instead, in the text, mosques were presented as the place of worship for all Muslims; daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca and ablution were presented as “common” forms of worshiping for all Muslims. In that sense, it can be argued the Alevis and Alevism were recognized in new textbooks ostensibly. Different from the previous textbooks (1982) (in which Alevism was not recognized as a different interpretation of Islam; and it was ignored by means of a complete silence), the new textbooks (2005) defined Alevism as one of the “mystical” (*tasavvufi*) interpretations appeared in Islamic thought. Presenting the Alevis as one of the “Turkish mystic groups” (*Türk sufi zümreler*) emerged in Anatolia, the new textbooks delete not only heterogeneous characters of the Alevis in terms of ethnicity and language, but also syncretistic nature of Alevism. The textbooks (2005) do not present a correct representation of important personalities of Alevism (such as Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli). Instead, these figures were employed in the books in order to buttress the principles of Sunni Islam. Negligence of sensitivities of the Alevis (especially concerning the principles of *tevella* and *teberra*) is another important discursive regularity appeared in new set of textbooks of DKAB.

Concerning the religious curriculum of 2005 and related textbooks, I argue that they do not attempt to eliminate all kind of diversity; instead, they attempt to control diverse segments of society by diverting or canalizing them to a position that does not threaten existing social order and status quo. In other words, Alevism were “recognized” as a diverse formation in Islam; but this “recognition” is ostensible and does not cover the exact picture of Alevism, and does not meet expectations of the Alevis.

It can be concluded from the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 that the regular participations of two presidents (Demirel and Sezer) to the Hacıbektaş Festival carry special meaning for the Alevis. Because by participating to the festival and by addressing the Alevis the presidents showed that they are aware of/recognizing existence of the Alevis in Turkey. The Alevis welcomed both Demirel and Sezer; because they were addressed by the state at the highest level. The Alevis, who were previously ignored or treated with suspicion during 1970s and 1980s (ignorance or suspicion also refers to a form of official discourse), were discovered (during 1990s) by the presidents as a potential power to buttress republican regime against those who oppose it. The Alevis, who were defined before as “interior threats” to the state, were considered, in the speeches of two presidents, as important allies of Turkish Republic or as precious treasure that made Turkish modernization possible. It can be argued that main reason behind these changes in official stances of the presidents towards the Alevis is closely related with dangers coming from the rise of political Islam and intensification of Kurdish separatism in Turkey. Especially, since 1999, when the EU recognized Turkey’s candidacy, the EU process of Turkey emerged as another factor affecting these changes.

The presidents declared that their presence in Hacıbektaş represents “existence of state” in the festival. Both Demirel and Sezer emphasized that Hacı Bektaş Veli and the Alevis (being his followers) are “Turks, and they made great contributions to Turkish culture and tradition.” In relation with this argument, the presidents gave special importance to distance the Alevis and Alevism from Kurdish separatism and political Islam. The Alevis were systematically presented as “tolerant, modern and enlightened face of Turkish-Islam.” The presidents

systematically warned the Alevis also for being away from Kurdish separatists who aim to harm national unity of Turkey. Another common point in these presidential speeches is that the Alevis and their beliefs are portrayed harmonious with the principles of Atatürk and pillars of Turkish Republic.

The presidents see a close relationship between issue of Alevism and security priorities of Turkey. They argued that Turkey, being “in the middle of a fire circle,” is experiencing “hard conditions.” Under these conditions, the Alevis were asked to stay loyal to the state, and to be respectful to laws and regulations under all conditions that are vital for “preserving national unity of Turkey.” Instrumentalization of Hacı Bektaş Veli (and his ideas) in order to mobilize the Alevis in the direction of preserving existing order appears as another discursive strategy in the presidential speeches in which Hacı Bektaş Veli appears a state-loyal figure who had “always served for unity, togetherness, fraternity and consolidation of the state order.” In the speeches of both Demirel and Sezer, there exist apologetic statements against the Alevis, which want the Alevis to forget traumatic memoirs of the past, and to look at future.

These changes in official stances of the presidents (starting from 1994) do not mean that the identity and demands of the Alevis were completely recognized by them. The speeches emphasize the Alevis’ similarities and common points with the Sunnis, rather than highlighting their *sui generis* and different sides from the Sunnis. None of the problems of the Alevis (including status of congregation houses and compulsory religious education) were mentioned specifically in these speeches. The Alevis were advised to be patient about their problems, and not to lose their belief to the state in any case.

As for the reasons behind the heterogeneity and changes in official discourses concerning the Alevis, I identified two set of dynamics, namely, external and internal dynamics, which affected the official actors and institutions in the production of official discourses towards the Alevis. Influences of the EU (via Turkey’s EU membership process) on the formation official discourses can be named as external dynamics. On the other hand, Turkey’s own social and political cleavages (in terms of ethnicity, sect and party politics) can be named as internal dynamics. In many cases, heterogeneity and changes in the official

discourses on the Alevis can be read as extensions of these internal and external dynamics.

Intervention of the EU circles to the issue of Alevism have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 under the title of “contextual elements” affecting the production of the official texts analyzed in these chapters. By the late 1990s, being a full member of the EU had become a fundamental state policy of Turkey. The European Council has recognized Turkey as candidate country at the Helsinki summit of December 1999. Since then the Copenhagen criteria, which states that “membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities,” have become binding for also Turkish governments. Intensification of the relationships between Turkey and the EU has brought wide range of consequences on Turkish politics in general, and on the relationships between the official circles and the Alevis in particular. Since 1998, the European Commission mentioned the issue of Alevism, especially in relation with the problem of compulsory religious education (with its “Sunni” content) and the status of congregation houses, regularly in its regular reports. The Alevis were defined in the report as the object of a systematic violation of rights and freedoms. The existence of such an issue was defined among the issues that have to be remedied in the EU accession process. The regular reports referred to the shortcomings of minority protection in Turkey; and they demand official recognition for the Alevis from Turkish government.

I argue that demands and criticisms raised by the EU circles concerning the rights and problems of the Alevis (especially concerning the compulsory nature of religious instruction in the schools and the content of the religion textbooks neglecting Alevism) can be counted among the main factors which influenced MEB in the direction of issuing a new curriculum and a new set of religious textbooks which allegedly include Alevism. In addition to the criticisms of the EU concerning the Alevis mentioned in the regular reports of European Commission, a lawsuit opened by the parents of an Alevi student in the European Court of Human Rights to get exemption for their daughter from the compulsory religious instruction in the schools forms another dimension of the EU’s influence

on the production of new textbooks by MEB. In this context, the issue of compulsory religious education was considered by the government as a part of the harmonization process to the EU; and MEB declared that since 2005 Alevism is to be included in the curriculum of the DKAB.

Turkey's harmonization process to the EU influenced not only official discourses observed in the religious textbooks but also some other forms of official discourse. For example, as I mentioned earlier, different from two previous presidents of DİB, the last president of DİB (Bardakoğlu) accepts that in the EU process of Turkey there exists necessity of "reconsidering structure and duties of DİB on the basis of transparency, civility and inclusiveness." In addition, he believes that Alevism should be included in the compulsory religious courses. For another example, one should look at the changes made in the Law of Association in 2003. Until that year, the law had forbidden the associations from carrying titles pertaining to any region, race, social class, religion or sect. Because of this law, for many years, the Alevis have been deprived of founding associations under the title of "Alevi." Together with the changes made in the Law of Associations (as a part of broader legislative efforts aiming Turkey's harmonization to the EU) the Alevis reached the rights of organization under the title of "Alevi."

It must be stated here that this dissertation does not cover the analysis of existing laws and regulations of Turkey, which is one of the limitations of this study. In other words, further academic studies are needed on the analysis of official discourse (in the form of laws and regulations) towards the Alevis, and influence of Turkey's membership process to the EU on the body of these laws and regulations. I should also state that dialogic nature of the Alevi discourses on the state and the state discourses on the Alevis should be studied in detail. In this study I mainly focused on the state discourse on the Alevis; I could not focus on in detail effects of the Alevi discourse on the state that may be subject matter of another study.

As for the internal dynamics of Turkey affecting heterogeneous and instable character of official discourses concerning the Alevis, it can be argued that there more than one official institutions that have discursive

practices/activities towards the issue of Alevism. In other words, the state has been part of the issue of Alevism or responded to the demands of the Alevis through its different organs each one of which tried to deal with different dimension of the issue of Alevism. For example, the name of the official institution has been MEB, in general, concerning the issue of compulsory religious education; it has been DİB when the issue was congregation houses and representation of the Alevis in DİB. The presidency of Turkish Republic and Ministry of Culture have been two other state organs which intervened the issue by taking part in the Hacıbektaş Festival, the main event of Alevism in Turkey. Of course we can enumerate several other official institutions which deal with different dimension of Alevism (such as The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM), the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*, TRT) and judicial organs). It is important to emphasize here that the Alevis have more than one official addressee or official collocutor. It is hard to say that the state responds to the demands of the Alevis as a composite actor; and, it is hard to say that there has been coordination among different official institutions concerning the production of official discursive practices towards the Alevis. In many case, these institutions act separately. These features of the state can be counted among the obstacles that prevent formation of a homogeneous and coherent official discourse towards the Alevis. It should be stated here that, in this study, only limited number of official institutions were covered in terms of their discursive activities aiming the Alevis. In order to reveal discursive activities of other state organs concerning the Alevis, further analysis must be conducted. In that sense, records of TBMM and content of broadcasting of TRT deserve attention and wait for the interests of the researchers.

The cleavages and contentions among the political parties have been among the reasons supporting heterogonous and instable nature of official discourses on the Alevis. The Alevis have always been seen by the political parties as a reservoir of votes. Since the end of 1980s, the Alevi movement became impossible to ignore especially for the political parties. Without making any concrete amendments concerning the official and legal status of Alevism,

political parties (both from the right and left-wing) continued to address the Alevis in order to seek vote for the elections. Political parties had alternative perspectives concerning the issue of Alevism, which contributed to emerge different official stances that can be observed in the discussions held in TBMM. For example, in 1999, a member of parliament from the Democratic Leftist Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP, one of the partners of the coalition government in power) submitted a legislative proposal aiming to allocate public resources (money and cadre) to the Alevis that was to be used for the fulfillment of their religious practices. However, two right-wing partners of the coalition government, Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) and Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), did not support the proposal and it was rejected in TBMM (Massicard, 2007:220). There are numerous example of this kind illustrating clashes of opinion among the political parties on the Alevis. It is necessary to mention here that there existed attempts for the rearrangement (in 1963 and 1992) or abolition (in 1994) of DİB (Schüler, 1999:151). But, these attempts did not give result mainly because of disagreements among the political parties which represent deeper socio-political divergences in society (such as Alevi vs. Sunni or secular vs. anti-secular). Especially in the first attempt (1963), the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü intends to found a “Directory of Sects” in the structure of DİB, and he aims representation of the Alevis under the roof of this directory. But, intense reactions of Sunni political parties (primarily from the Party of Justice, *Adalet Partisi*) and newspapers prevented this plan form being implemented. Allocation of public resources has always been another issue in politics discussed with reference to sectarian or ideological cleavages. For example, it is a common theme in Turkish politics that left-wing and right-wing political parties blame each other for making systematic employment or dismissal in the public sector on the basis of sectarian concerns (Alevi-Sunni) or on the basis of ideological concerns (secular, anti-secular).

Parallel to the reassertion of Alevi identity since the end of 1980s, the issue of Alevism was brought to the agenda of TBMM, many times. As argued by Engin representatives of right-wing and conservative parties employed the

following discursive regularities during the discussions on the problems of the Alevis held in TBMM (2006:20-21):

99% of our population is Muslim. There is no discrimination between the Alevis and the Sunnis. There are many common points between them. DİB keeps our society together. Those ones who see any difference between the Alevis and the Sunnis are betrayers or tools of external powers.

On the other hand, representatives of left-wing, and social democrat parties used the following discursive strategies during the discussions held in TBMM: “There are unjust applications in Turkey towards the Alevis. They should be represented in the structure of DİB. DİB should give up activities aiming sunnification of the Alevis” (ibid: 21).

Demands of the Alevis were voiced in TBMM generally by left-wing or social democrat parties; not by right-wing and conservative parties. However, the parliamentarians of the left-wing parties who mentioned the problems of the Alevis in TBMM are only those ones who come from Alevi origin, in general. Taking into account political balances in Turkey, no party desired to be identified as “Alevi party.” Even, the left-wing and social democrat parties refrained from adopting demands of the Alevis as a part of their party politics/programs (Schüler, 1999:135). As argued by Schüler, the social democrat parties considered that if they patronize demands of the Alevis in a systematic manner, they may loose support of the Sunnis who form the majority of Turkey’s population (ibid: 142). There is another important source of hesitation (which is also related with sectarian cleavages of Turkey) for the social democrat parties in defending demands of the Alevis avowedly in political arena. It is generally argued in social democrat circles that if they eliminate legal obstacles from which the Alevis endured for a long time, the anti-secular and reactionary Sunni groups may also have the opportunity of making use of these arrangements in the direction of their aims (challenging the Republican order).

In spite of their chronic problems with the social democrat and left-wing parties, some of which mentioned above, the Alevis continued to support these parties also in the post-1980 era. For most of the Alevis, Islamist parties (AKP

and its predecessors, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party) have always been recognized as their political opponents. Although the Alevis fiercely criticized the left-wing parties for not solving their problems, they have chosen to vote for these parties mainly because of their fear of an Islamic state. In other words, what pushed the Alevis into this political position is the possibility that Islamic shariah may dominate the country. Again, with the similar reasons (fear of an Islamic state or Islamist danger), they have never hesitated to be fervent supporters of the Kemalist regime and Atatürk, although they are not satisfied completely with the conditions they encountered in the republican era. In spite of the fact that the Kemalist order brought some disadvantages to them, it (Kemalism) stays for the Alevis as the only shield against the possibility of shariah order. If we look at the situation from the perspective of the Alevis, this mode of political behavior seems highly rational for them.

Although this study does not cover the official discursive practices produced after 2005, in relation with the considerations just mentioned above, I would like to point out the importance of the following questions that may be the subject matters of another study: Why did the recent initiative¹¹⁴ of AKP (“the Alevi opening”) attract limited support from the Alevi organizations? Why do most of the Alevis politically support CHP in spite of AKP’s “openings” towards the Alevis? It can be argued that for many of the Alevis AKP is not a suitable candidate for recognizing heterodox Alevi belief system and identity, because of its ideological roots and engagements with Sunni Islamist movements (religious orders and communities) in Turkey. AKP’s general political stance and political priorities (such as efforts of constitutional amendments aiming to legalize veiling, promotion of conservative way of life) were perceived by the Alevis as reactionary (*gerici*) and menacing for their way of life. Under these circumstances

¹¹⁴ This initiative, known as “the Alevi opening” in the public opinion, is started by Reha Çamuroğlu, an Alevi member of parliament from AKP, with an *iftar* organization (breaking fast in the Arabic month of Muharram) in January 11 2008. The prime minister and several other members of the cabinet attended to the event, together with a group of Alevi citizens. Majority of Alevi organizations boycotted the event on the ground that this kind of a ceremony is not part of their tradition. For this reason, “Alevi opening” started without support of prominent Alevi organizations. AKP insisted its “Alevi opening” in the following Muharram. In this time, *iftar* organization was supported by a series of TV programs broadcasted by state television, TRT. At the end of 2008, it is voiced in the media that a series of negotiations are taking place between the government and some Alevi organizations about representation of the Alevis in DİB and employment of *dedes* as state officials.

they find enough reasons to think that AKP's "Alevi opening" may be another attempt of sunnification; and they stay hesitant against this "opening." It is necessary to wait and monitor maturation of the process, in order to evaluate the exact results of this initiative.

Another dimension of the internal factors affecting the formation and change of official discourses on the Alevis is the cleavages between the secular military/civil bureaucrats and Islamist and conservative politicians. The "post-modern coup" of February 28, 1997 can be read as a specific instance of this cleavage. On February 28 of 1997, the National Security Board (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*) identified political Islam and reactionary movements as the main threats to the Republic, and sent a warning to the coalition government headed by political Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*). In the following months, the government had to resign. These series of event started on 28 February 1997 were called as February 28 processes which created a context in which the Alevis (who were previously ignored or treated as suspicious citizens) and Alevism were reclassified by the president of republic as a defense line or insurance against the influence of Arabic version/mode of Islam over Turkish culture. As indicated in Chapter 5, the president Demirel portrayed Alevism as "tolerant, lucent, modern and enlightened face of Turkish-Islam" that forms an alternative against "reactionary Arabic/Persian form of Islam." In this period, on the one hand DİB continued to build mosques in Alevi villages and MEB ignored Alevism in compulsory religious education; on the other hand, Turkish General Staff (*Genelkurmay*) declared that members of Turkish army may join to Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Association (an Alevi association founded to disseminate thoughts of Hacı Bektaş Veli and Alevi culture) and the president Demirel attended to the opening ceremony of a congregation house.

Ethnic cleavages appear as another factor affecting official discourse concerning the Alevis. Starting from the end of 1980s, in addition to the rise of political Islam, Kurdish separatism was also perceived by the state elite as threat to the exiting order. Dramatic rise of Kurdish nationalism and the increasing level of confrontation between the military and PKK transformed the Alevis into natural allies especially for the secular military and civil bureaucracy in Turkey.

Although there is no exact numbers, it is argued that Kurdish Alevi constitute about 20-25 per cent of the total Alevi population in Turkey (Bruinessen, 1996:7; Shankland, 1999:136). Within this context, the state intended to distance the Kurdish Alevi from the influences of PKK. The Alevi became the target of the inclusive state policies against the Kurdish movement. Emphasizing Turkish nature of Alevism and presentation of prominent saints of the Alevi as state-loyal figures, in Hacıbektaş Festival, have been the most conspicuous case of the official discourse in this period towards the Alevi. As I argued several times above, the Alevi (who were defined previously as “interior threats” to the state) were considered, in the speeches of two presidents, as important allies of Turkish Republic against the rise of political Islam and intensification of Kurdish separatism in Turkey.

As a final word, I would like to reiterate the most general conclusion of this dissertation. Since the state is heterogeneous in nature, not a composite entity and since the state is an area of conflict, and since the official discursive practices were produced by means of its different state apparatuses, it is hard to identify a homogeneous and stable official discourse. In addition, official discursive practices of the state are subject to change any time under the influences of global and local factors. In that sense, I propose the existence of “official discourses” towards the Alevi, instead of one, never-changing and undifferentiated “official discourse.” As a result of global (intervention of the EU) and local factors (political, ethnic and sectarian cleavages of Turkey), it is possible to observe discursive diversities and changes in the analyzed official texts concerning the Alevi. My analyses suggest that this change is taking place from a complete denial to a partial recognition of Alevi identity by related state organs.

Although I emphasized heterogeneous nature of official discourses towards the Alevi, there are also common points in discursive practices of these three official institutions. For example, not only DİB but also MEB and presidents of Republic approached to the issue of Alevism from the perspective of security concerns and priorities of Turkey. Preservation of “unity of Turkey” has been main purpose of these institutions. Finally, all of these institutions emphasized “Turkishness” of Alevism and the Alevi.

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TURKISH SUMMARY

1980 SONRASI TÜRKİYESİ'NDE ALEVİLER: RESMİ METİNLERİN ELEŞTİREL SÖYLEM ANALİZİ

Alevilik ve Aleviler 1980'li yılların sonundan itibaren Türkiye'de en çok tartışılan konuların başında gelmektedir. Türkiye nüfusunun önemli bir kısmını (yüzde 10 ila 20) oluşturan Aleviler, söz konusu tarihten itibaren örgütlenmeye başlayıp, maruz kaldıkları hukuki eşitsizliklerin giderilmesi, din eğitimi müfredatında yer alma, diğer İslami inanç toplulukları gibi Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı bünyesinde temsil edilme, bütçeden pay alma ve cemevlerine ibadethane statüsü verilmesi gibi konularda demokratik hak taleplerini yüksek bir sesle dile getirmeye başladılar. Aynı dönemde, genel olarak Alevilik hakkında, özelde de Alevilerin hak talepleri karşısında çetrefilli, istikrasız ve zaman zaman birbiriyle çelişen resmi söylemler pratiği dikkat çekmektedir. Aleviliğin tarihsel gelişimi ve teolojik içeriği konusunda sayısız eser yayımlanmasına rağmen, Alevilerle devlet arasındaki ilişkiler ve Aleviliğin resmi statüsü konusunda sınırlı sayıda yayın bulunmaktadır. Bu yüzden, bu tezde konunun göreceli olarak çok az çalışılmamış bir boyutu ele alınacak: 1980-2005 yılları arasında Alevilere yönelik resmi söylem pratikleri.

Toplumsal bir hareket olarak da görebileceğimiz Alevilik, 1980'ler Türkiye'sinde farklılıklarının tanınmasını talep eden (ve küresel ölçekte de benzerlerine rastlanan) kimlik hareketlerinden birisi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Bununla birlikte Alevi hareketi, resmi ideolojiye doğrudan ve kökten karşı çıkmadığı için, sisteme *a priori* muhalefet eden diğer kimlik hareketlerinden (İslamcılık ve Kürt milliyetçiliği) farklı bir yerde konumlandırılabilir. 1980'li yılların sonuna kadar gündemde olmayan belli taleplerde bulunmuş olsa da, Alevi hareketi gerçek anlamda muhalif bir hareket olarak tanımlanamaz; bu durumda devletle Alevi hareketi arasındaki ilişki ayrıntılı bilimsel analizleri hak eden karmaşık bir nitelik arz etmektedir.

Aleviliğe ve Alevilere yönelik söylem üreten çok sayıda devlet aygıtı vardır: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, adli ve idari yargı kurumları, Başbakanlık ve Bakanlıklar, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu, Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve yerel yönetimler. Bu resmi kurumların tümünün söylemsel pratiklerini tek bir çalışmada incelemek pek mümkün olmadığından, sadece üç tanesi üzerinde yoğunlaşmak zorunda kaldım. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB) ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (MEB). Bu üç kurumun Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemindeki söylemsel stratejiler, söylemsel kalıplar, düzenlilikler, değişim ve süreklilikler bu tezin ana konusunu oluşturdu. Tez boyunca bu kurumların Alevilere ilişkin resmi söylemlerinin tam bir inkârdan kısmi bir tanımaya doğru nasıl evrildiğini gözler önüne sermeye çalıştım. Resmi belgelerin analizi aracılığıyla resmi söylemin kapsayıcı ve eklemleyici yönlerine dikkat çekmeye çalıştım.

Peki, neden bu üç kurum? Eğer Alevilerin problemlerine ve hak taleplerine yakından bakacak olursak fark ederiz ki zorunlu din dersleri, cemevlerinin hukuki statüsü ve Diyanetin Sünnileştirme faaliyetleri listenin en başında yer alırlar. Zorunlu din dersleri ile ilgili olarak Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı en yetkili ve sorumlu kurumdur. Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarını ve ilgili müfredatı Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı düzenlemektedir. Benze şekilde Diyanet işleri dini konularda ülkenin en yetkili devlet aygıtıdır. Cemevlerinin hukuki statüsü konusunda belirleyici kararları Diyanet vermekte ve bu kararlar aynı zamanda başka kuruluşların (valilikler, mahkemeler) görüşlerini de etkilemektedir. Alevi köylerine cami inşa etmek gibi Sünnileştirici faaliyetlerden dolayı da Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının söylemlerin önem kazanmaktadır. Cumhurbaşkanlığı'na gelecek olursak: Hacıbektaş Şenlikleri uzun zamandan beri Türkiye'deki Alevilerin en önemli ve kitlesel organizasyonu olarak öne çıkmakta ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti cumhurbaşkanları 1994'ten itibaren bu şenlikler düzenli bir şekilde katılmaktadırlar. Anayasa gereğince en üst düzey devlet aygıtı olan Cumhurbaşkanlığı aynı zamanda tarafsızlık özelliği ile de öne çıkmaktadır. Bu ve buna benzer önemli özelliklerinden dolayı cumhurbaşkanlarının Hacıbektaş Şenliklerinde yaptıkları konuşmalar bu tezin incelediği söylemsel pratiklerden

birini teşkil etmiştir. Yeniden ifade etmek gerekirse bu üç kurumca üretilen resmi söylemin içeriği Alevilerin öncelikli problemleriyle çok yakından ilgilidir. Diğer bir deyişle bu kurumlar ortaya koydukları söylemlerle Alevilerin öncelikli resmi muhatapları konumundadırlar.

Diğer önemli bir sebep ise bu üç resmi kurumun personelinin bu tez için gerekli olan resmi belgeleri sağlama konusunda istekli ve yardımsever davranmış olmalarıdır. Çalışmanın başlangıç aşamasında başka resmi kuruluşların söylemlerini de analiz etmeyi planlamış olmama rağmen (örneğin, başbakanların Hacıbektaş Şenlikleri'nde yaptıkları konuşmalar) söz konusu kurumların ilgili resmi belgeleri sağlama konusunda yardımcı olmamaları sebebiyle bu planımı gerçekleştirmem mümkün olmadı.

Bu çalışmaya yön veren temel araştırma sorularını şu şekilde formüle edebilirim:

a) 1980-2005 arası dönemde Aleviler yönelik resmi söylem ne olmuştur? Ne tür söylemsel stratejiler ve kalıplar istihdam edilmiştir bu söylemsel pratikte?

b) Bu dönemde Alevilerin resmi söylem içinde tutarlı, tek tip ve kesintisiz bir pozisyonları olmuş mudur? Resmi söylemde değişiklikler ve kaymalar olmuş mudur? Ne tür devamlılıklar ve değişiklikler gözlenebilir bu söylemde? Varsa, bu değişikliklere ve dalgalanmalara yol açan temel nedenler nelerdir?

Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemin Osmanlı döneminden itibaren kısa bir tarihsel özetini yapmaya çalıştım. Aleviliğin izlediği karmaşık tarihi güzergâhları, belirsizlikleri ve tartışmalı noktalarıyla birlikte tartışmaya açtım. Konuyu Osmanlı döneminden itibaren ele aldım ve kuruluşundan 16. yüzyıl sonlarına doğru imparatorlukta heterodoks unsurlara karşı hoşgörünün nasıl giderek azaldığına ve Osmanlı-Safavi gerilimine paralel olarak ortaya çıkan Kızılbaşlık olgusunun millet sisteminde nasıl “mülhidlik” ve “zındıklık” olarak kodlandığına dikkat çekmeye çalıştım. 16. yüzyıl ortalarında özellikle Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi'nin fetvaları bu dönemdeki resmi söylemde Aleviliğin nasıl kodlandığına ilişkin önemli ipuçları sağlamaktadır. Bektaşiliğin, Kızılbaşların entegrasyonu doğrultusunda önemli işlevleri yerine getirdiği konusu ayrıca vurgulandı. Aleviliğe ve Alevilere yönelik olarak tüm Osmanlı dönemine hakim tek bir resmi tutum ve söylemin varlığını da

ileri sürmek yanlış olacaktır. Devletin 1500’lü yıllara kadar olan ilk döneminde, yaklaşık iki yüz yıl kemikleşmiş çatışma halinde olan bir Sünni-Alevi yada ortodoks-heterodoks ayrımından söz etmek oldukça güçtür. Alevilerinde içinde olduğu heterodoks unsurlarla devlet arasında görece barışçıl bir ilişkiler örüntüsü mevcuttur. Ancak 16. yüzyılın başından itibaren Osmanlı-Safevi çekişmesinin bir uzantısı olarak Kızılbaş-Alevi unsurlar kırıma uğrar ve izolasyona tabi tutulurlar. Ancak bu tutum imparatorluğun sonuna dek aynı yoğunlukta devam etmez; Ortaylı’ nın da doğru bir şekilde vurguladığı gibi Aleviler devlete karşı bir tehdit oluşturmadıkları sürece devlet tarafından hedef alınmamışlardır. Millet sisteminin de bir parçası olarak görülmeyen Alevi unsurlara karşı son yüzyıllarda devletin tavrı kayıtsızlık olarak tanımlanabilir. Sultan Abdülhamit döneminde Aleviler devletin Sünnileştirme politikalarının hedefi haline gelmişlerdir. İmparatorluğun son dönemlerinde İttihatçılarla birlikte Bektaşilerin ve Alevilerin “ulusal bir renge kaydığını” savunmak yanlış olmaz. Alevilerle yeni Cumhuriyet arasındaki ilişki “çelişkiler içeren sınırlı bir ittifak” ifadesiyle formüle edilebilir. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminden itibaren, Türklükle özdeşleştirilen Aleviliğin kültürel yönleri, (Kemalist elit tarafından) ulusal kimlik inşasında kullanılmış ve bu kültürel unsurlara sahip çıkmıştır. Buna karşılık, Aleviliğin dini yönleri, dini ve mezhepsel açıdan da türdeş bir ulusal topluluk inşa etmek uğruna dışlanmış; İslam’ın Sünni yorumu resmi din konumuna yükseltilmiştir. Bu bölümdeki tarihsel inceleme, 1950’lerden itibaren Alevi toplumunun geçirdiği toplumsal değişimin özetlenmesiyle son bulur. Buna göre, çok partili hayata geçiş, sanayileşme, kırdan kente göç, iletişim ve eğitim ağlarının yaygınlaşması gibi etkenlerle Alevilerin sosyal marjinalliği ve izolasyonu kırılmaya başlamıştır. Sayılan tüm bu etkenlerin bir araya gelmesiyle Aleviler, daha önce dışlanmış oldukları sosyal ve ekonomik olanaklara ulaşmak üzere rekabete girme şansına erişmişlerdir. 1964’te başlayan Hacıbektaş Şenlikleri, 1966’daki Türkiye Birlik Partisi girişimi, 1970’lerde şahit olunan “Alevilik ile solun buluşması” ve 1980 öncesindeki “Alevi katliamları” Alevi hareketine doğru giden yolun kilometre taşları olarak dikkatle incelenir. 1980 öncesinin türbülanslı döneminde Aleviler devlet tarafında bir iç tehdit unsuru olarak kodlanmışlardır. Özellikle Alevi genliği arasında yaygınlık kazanan Marksist ve sosyalist fikirler Alevilerin “yıkıcı

unsurlar” olarak görülmesine yol açmıştır. Bundan dolayı 1980’lerden sonra Aleviler devlet eliyle yürütülen yoğun bir Sünnileştirme kampanyasının hedefi haline gelmişlerdir.

Üçüncü bölümde Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın Alevilere yönelik söylemleri üzerine yoğunlaşıldı. Bu amaçla şu resmi belgelerin eleştirel söylem analizi yapıldı: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın kurumsal basın açıklamaları ve Alevilikle ilgili davalarda mahkemelere sunduğu hukuki görüş bildiren belgeler, son üç Diyanet İşleri Başkanının (Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz ve Ali Bardakoğlu) Alevilikle ilgili açıklamaları, mülakatları. Tüm bu belgeler bana, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı ile yürüttüğüm yazışmalar sonucunda (Bilgi Edinme Yasası çerçevesinde) başkanlık personeli tarafından sağlanmıştır. Belgelerin bir kısmı herkesin ulaşımına açık bir şekilde Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın internet adresinde de yayınlanmaktadır. Son üç başkanın açıklamalarını incelemekle 1987 yılını dek geri gitme imkanı yakalanmıştır. 1987 yılından önceki döneme ilişkin bir belgeye ulaşamadı.

Dördüncü bölümde ise Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nın Aleviliğe ilişkin resmi yaklaşımını analiz etmeyi amaçladım. Bu doğrultuda 1982 yılından başlayarak zorunlu din derslerinde kullanılan ders kitaplarını ve ilgili müfredat programını analiz ettim. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarında Alevilere yönelik ne tür bir söylemsel pratikler bütünü kullanmıştır? 2005 yılında müfredat programında ve ders kitaplarında yapılan değişiklikler sonucu Aleviler ve Alevilikle ilgili söylemleri ne şekilde etkilemiştir? 1982 tarihinde yapılan anayasal bir düzenleme ile zorunlu hale getirilen Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi derslerinde 2005 yılına kadar aynı müfredat programı ve aynı ders kitapları kullanılmıştır. Her ne kadar özel yayınevleri tarafından basılan ders kitapları mevcut olsa da, bu tezde yalnızca Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı tarafından basılan ders kitapları incelenmiştir. 2005 yılından sonra yeni bir müfredat ve yeni ders kitapları kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. İlköğretim dördüncü sınıftan lise on birinci sınıfa kadar toplam sekiz sınıfta bu ders kitapları zorunlu kılınmıştır. 2005 öncesi ve sonrası olarak düşündüğümüzde toplam on altı ders kitabı ile karşılaşırız; iki ayrı da müfredat programı vardır. Bu çalışma da tüm bu on altı kitap değil sekizinci, onuncu ve on birinci sınıf olmak üzere üç sınıfta okutulan

Din Kùltürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitapları (toplam altı ders kitabı) analiz edilmiştir, iki ayrı müfredat programıyla birlikte. Peki, neden bu üç sınıf seçildi? Çünkü Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın Aleviliğe yönelik söylemsel pratikleri daha çok bu üç sınıfın ders kitabında yoğunlaşmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle Alevilikle ilgili olan konular daha çok bu ders kitapları aracılığı ile öğrencilere sunulmuştur/sunulmamıştır. Ders kitapları ve müfredat programlarıyla ilgili bilgiler (yazarlar, kitapların geçerli olduğu dönemler, kitapların orijinal nüshaları) doğrudan Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ile yapılan yazışmalar aracılığı ile elde edilmiştir.

Beşinci bölümde ise dokuzuncu Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel ve onuncu Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer'in Hacıbektaş Şenlikleri esnasında yapmış oldukları konuşmaların analizi yapılmıştır. 1994'ten itibaren 1999' a kadar düzenli bir şekilde bu şenliklere katılan Demirel'in konuşmaları ile 2001 ve 2003 yıllarında katılan Sezer'in iki konuşmasının orijinal metinleri Cumhurbaşkanlığı ile yapılan yazışmalar aracılığıyla tarafıma sağlanmıştır. 2003 yılından sonra Sezer şenliklere katılmamıştır. Bu bölümün ana sorusu Alevilerin hangi söylemsel stratejiler aracılığıyla cumhurbaşkanlarının konuşmalarında yer bulduklarıdır. 1994 öncesi dönemde cumhurbaşkanlığı seviyesinde hiç katılım olmaması ve genel olarak Alevilere yönelik inkâr politikaları göz önüne alınırsa, şenliklerde yapılan konuşmaların ayrı bir öneme sahip oldukları fark edilecektir.

Bu tezin teorik çerçevesi van Dijk'in temel yaklaşımı olan söylemlerin ideolojileri görünür kılacağı ve söylemin ideolojinin en bariz ve kesin bir şekilde ifade edildiği, formüle edildiği alan olduğu kabulüne dayanır. İdeoloji, söylem, resmi ideoloji ve resmi söylem kavramlarını kullanarak Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı'nın Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemin ideolojik kökenlerini ve ideolojik içeriğini tespit etmeyi amaçladım. Bu çalışmada ideoloji amaçsız zihni tahayyüller değil sosyal dünyayı organize etmekte kullanılan düşünce sistemleri ve temel çerçeveler olarak tanımlanacaktır. Bu anlamda ideolojilerin bireyleri belirli özne konumlarına sabitleyen, yerleştiren sistemler olduğu kabul edilecektir. Diğer yandan söylem belirli bir tarihi ana ve konjektüre bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan anlam sistemidir. İdeoloji gibi söylemde kimlikleri ve özneleri inşa eder ve sosyal bir pratik olarak dil kullanımından zuhur

eder. Bu çalışma açısından söylemin anahtar niteliği onun ideolojik bir anlam sistemi olmasıdır ve bu anlam sistemi eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinin örtülmesinde ve tabileştirilmesinde kullanılır. İdeolojilerin (resmi ideoloji dahil) devlet aygıtlarının söylemsel pratikleri içerisinde iliştilirilmiş olduğunu kabul ediyorum ve ileri sürüyorum. Genel olarak söylemin, özel de de resmi söylemin ideoloji (resmi ideoloji) tarafından kontrol edildiğini kabul ediyorum. İdeoloji bir metnin içeriğini kontrol etmektedir bu anlamda. Resmi söylem kavramı bu çalışmada hayati bir öneme sahip. Burton ve Carlen tarafından geliştirildiği biçimiyle resmi söylem devletin yasal ve yönetsel meşruiyetini hedefleyen sistemleştirilmiş argümanlar demeti anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca resmi söylemin siyasi ve ideolojik hegemonya tesis etmek, toplumun değişik kesimleri arasında birlik ve tutunum sağlamak gibi amaçlarının olduğu da söylenebilir. Burton ve Carlen a göre resmi söylem değişik toplum kesimlerin siyasi düzene bağlamayı entegre etmeyi amaçlar. Resmi söylem bilgiyi bu amaca yönelik olarak organize eder, toplum kesimleri üzerinde devlet kontrolünü sağlamaya yönelir.

Teorik çerçevenin önemli bir boyutu olarak Kemalizmin iki önemli prensibi olan milliyetçilik ve laiklik tartışıldı. Milliyetçilik ve laiklik resmi ideolojinin olmazsa olmaz ilkeleri olarak Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemin oluşmasında rol alan en önemli bağlamsal etken olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Cumhuriyetle birlikte tesis edilen laik düzen batıdaki pratiklerden farklı olarak devlet-din ayrımını gerçekleştirememiş, hatta böyle bir girişimde de bulunmamıştır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı devlet teşkilatının önemli bir unsuru olarak kurulmuş, din üzerinde devlet kontrolünü tesis etmiştir. Devlet kontrolü altında bir din düzenini öngörerek Osmanlı pratiğini devam ettirmiştir. Cumhuriyet eliti ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk hiçbir zaman din karşıtı olmamış, ana amaç İslam dininin rasyonel ve milli bir yorumuna ulaşmak olmuştur. Alevilerle ve Alevilikle ilgili olarak böyle bir düzenin en önemli çıkması şudur: Cumhuriyet tarafından kısmen rasyonelleştirilmiş ve millileştirilmiş olsa da devlet tarafından kabul edilen ve finanse edilen din tam olarak Sunni bir İslam yorumuna tekabül etmektedir. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı yapısı itibariyle tamamen Sünni İslam yorumunu benimsemiş ve Alevilik tamamen göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu durum Aleviler için cumhuriyet tarih boyunca önemli bir sorun olarak kalmaya devam

etmiştir. Osmanlı döneminde dini kimlikleri tanınmayan Aleviler benzer bir sorunu yeni devlette de yaşamaya devam ettiler. Diğer bir deyişle yeni düzenden büyük beklentileri olan Alevilerin bu beklentilerinin önemli bir kısmı gerçekleşmemiştir. Buna rağmen Aleviler cumhuriyeti Kemalist ilkeleri ateşli bir şekilde savunmaya devam etmişleridir çünkü bu rejim Alevi kimliğini tanımamış olsa da şeriat tehlikesi göz önüne alındığında tek alternatif olarak olmaya devam etmiştir. Milliyetçilik ilkesi de diğer bir bağlamsal unsur olarak tartışılmıştır. Kemalist milliyetçilik toplumda var olan etnik ve dini çeşitliliği göz ardı ederek tek ve homojen bir millet yaratma hedefine yönelmişti. Bu yönelim kendi içinde etnik bir çeşitliliğe sahip olan Alevileri için Sünni olmamanın dışında ikinci bir sorun kaynağıydı. Diğer bir deyişle Sünni olmadıkları için tüm Aleviler, etnik Türk olmadıkları içinde Kürt Aleviler tek tipleştirici milliyetçilik politikalarının açık hedefi haline gelmişlerdir. Türkiye’deki toplam Alevi nüfusunun yaklaşık dörtte birinin Kürt olduğunu göz önüne alırsak milliyetçi politikalar karşısında Alevilerin durumu daha net bir şekilde anlaşılabilir.

Bu tezde kullanılan ana yöntem eleştirel söylem analizidir. Diğer bir çok söylem analizi çeşitleri arasında sorun odaklı bir yöntem olarak öne çıkan eleştirel söylem analizi ideolojilerin etkisi altında ortaya çıkan eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinin söylemsel pratikleri nasıl etkilediği konusuyla ilgilenir. Eleştirel söylem analizinin Teun van Dijk tarafından geliştirilen bir versiyonunu metot olarak kullanmak yolunu seçtim. Bunun başlıca sebebi az önce de değindiğim gibi bu metodun söylemsel pratiklerin nasıl ayrımcılığın dışlamanın ve eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinin bir aracı olarak kullanıldığına odaklanması, bu amaca yönelik söylemsel stratejileri ortaya çıkarma konusunda etkili analitik kategoriler sunmasıdır. Diğer bir sebepten diğer söylem analizi çeşitlerine göre eleştirel söylem analizinin daha somut ve sistematik bir analiz prosedürü önermesidir. Van Dijk’ın geliştirdiği bu yöntemde iki ana kategori grubu bulunmaktadır. Birinci grup analitik kategoriler metin odaklı kategorilerdir. İkinci grup kategoriler ise metnin ortaya çıkmasına yol açan bağlamsal faktörlerin incelenmesine yönelik kategorilerdir. Bu kategorileri teker teker inceleyecek olursak:

a) Topic (tema veya ana konu): Bu kategori aracılığıyla bir metinde sözü

edilen ana temalar incelenir. Bir metni meydana getiren temel argümanlar temel tezler bu kategori altında incelenebilir. Metin odaklı bir kategoridir.

b) Schemata (argüman örsü veya planı): Yine metin odaklı olan bu kategori aracılığıyla metinde savunulan temel tezlerin fikirlerin birbirleriyle nasıl ilişkilendirildiği, bunun yanı sıra diğer yardımcı argüman ve tezlerle nasıl desteklendiği incelenir.

c) Local Meanings (yerel anlamlar): Metin odaklı bu kategori aracılığıyla metindeki genel ve global anlamlar yerine cümle ve kelime odaklı yan anlamlar, imalar, varsayımlar, ön kabuller incelenir.

d) Style and Rhetoric (tarz ve retorik): Metin odaklı bir diğer kategori olan stil ve retorik aracılığıyla söylem üretenlerin bulundukları kelime ve terminoloji tercihleri ile tezlerini inandırıcı kılmak amacına yönelik başvurdukları retorik teknikleri incelenir.

e) Genre (edebi tür): Bu kategoride metnin edebi türü (politik konuşma, ders kitabı, basın açıklaması) ve bu türün metne getirdiği unsurlar incelenir.

f) Bağlam, sosyal ve tarihi şartlar: Bu kategoriler aracılığıyla da metnin üretildiği bağlamın tarihi ve sosyal niteliklerinin metni ne yönde etkilediği analiz edilmiştir. Hangi tarihi dönemde ve hangi sosyal şartlar altında kim tarafından üretilmiştir söylem?

Şimdi eleştirel söylem analizi yordamıyla incelemiş olduğum resmi söylem unsurlarından elde ettiğim bir kısım sonuçları sıralamak istiyorum. Bu çalışmanın beklide en önemli sonucu Alevilere yönelik tek homojen değişmeyen “resmi söylem” yerine değişken, heterojen ve parçalı bir nitelik taşıyan “resmi söylemlerden” bahsetmenin daha doğru olacağıdır. Alevilere yönelik söylemde dönemsel değişimlerin yanı sıra aynı dönemde birden fazla da söylem bulunmaktadır. Örneğin Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Kitapların’da 2005 öncesi Alevilik yer almazken 2005 ten sonraki dönemlerde Alevilik yüzeysel de olsa yer almaktadır. Buna ek olarak Aleviliğin Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Kitaplarında yer almadığı belli bir tarihi anda (mesela 1997) cumhurbaşkanı Hacıbektaş Şenliklerinde yaptığı konuşmada Alevilerin birinci sınıf vatandaşlar olarak bu ülkenin her türlü nimetlerinden faydalanabileceğini ilan edebilmektedir. Tezin üçüncü, dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerinde ulaşılan sonuçlar üzerinde ayrı ayrı

duracak olursak: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın söylemlerini incelediğim üçüncü bölümdeki analizler sonucu söyleyebilirim ki Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Aleviliği her daim İslami daire içinde tanımlama eğiliminde olmuştur. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın Alevilere yönelik söylemi diğer bazı devlet organlarının da Aleviliğe yönelik söylemlerinin şekillenmesinde son derece etkili olmuştur diyebiliriz. Mesela mahkemeler ve valilikler cemevleri ile ilgili yada Alevi derekelerle ilgili kararlar alırken Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın görüş ve önerilerini dikkate almaktadırlar. Aleviliği Ehl-i Beyt sevgisini indirgeyen Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Alevilikle Sünniliği aynileştirme eğilimindedir. Bununla beraber, önceki iki Diyanet İşleri Başkanından farklı olarak mevcut başkan Ali Bardakoğlu Aleviliği İslam içi spesifik bir anlayış, geleneksel bir farklılaşma olarak tanımaktadır. Ancak Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Ali Bardakoğlu'nun Aleviliği tanıması kültürel alanla sınırlı kalmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle cemevleri ibadethane olarak değil kültür merkezleri olarak, ayin-i cem ise ibadet olarak değil folklorik bir aktivite olarak tanınmaktadır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın Alevilere yönelik söyleminde Alevilerin kendilerini tanımlama hakları açıkça ve kesin olarak göz ardı edilmektedir. Alevilere yönelik devlet politikalarında her hangi bir problem görmeyen Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı bunu söylemsel bir strateji olarak sıklıkla tekrarlamaktadır. Bununla ilişkili olarak Aleviler herhangi bir haksız muamelenin mağduru olarak görülmemektedir. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı İslam dinini toplumu bir arada tutan unsurların başında görmektedir. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı uyguladığı mevcut politikalarla milli birlik ve beraberliği muhafaza etmekte olduğuna inanmaktadır. Bu yüzden Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, din hizmetlerinin mevcut şekliyle sağlanmasını eleştiren Alevileri milli güvenliği tehlikeye atmakla suçlamaktadır. Aleviler Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı tarafından iç ve dış düşmanların manipölasyonlarına ve kötü emellerine kolayca alet olabilen irrasyonel kimseler olarak tasvir edilmektedir. Bu düşmanlar Alevilerle Sünniler birbirlerinden ayırmak peşindedirler ve Alevi talepleri iç ve dış düşmanların ekmeklerine yağ sürmektedir. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'na göre Alevi talepleri kökeni olmayan yapay taleplerdir. Cemevleri ibadethane olarak değerlendirilemez cami tüm Müslümanların dolayısıyla Alevilerin de ibadethanesidir. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Alevileri İslami kaynaklardan habersiz olmakla hatta kendi gelenekleri

ve Aleviliği bilmemekle suçlamaktadır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'na göre Aleviler bir kısım yanlış ve batıl inanca sahiptirler. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı mevcut anayasal ve yasal mevzuatı Alevi taleplerinin gerçekleştirilmesinin önünde en büyük engel ve sığınak olarak kullanır. Mevzuat her zaman Alevilerin aleyhine yorumlanır.

Tam üyelik sürecindeki Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği ile olan ilişkileri yoğunlaştıkça, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın Alevilere yönelik söyleminde de bir kısım değişim emareleri de görülmeye başlamıştır. Örneğin Diyanet İşleri Başkanlarından Bardakoğlu Avrupa Birliği sürecinde Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın dini hizmetleri sunmaya yönelik görev yapısının yeniden düzenlenebileceğini dile getirir. Aleviliğin Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarında yer almasının gereğine de inanıyor. Ayrıca önceki başkanlardan farklı olarak Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın mevcut başkanı Ali Bardakoğlu Aleviliği yok saymak yerine İslam için farklı bir yorum olarak kabul ediyor. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının önceki başkanlarından Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu'nun "ayrımcılık tohumları ekmek için" Alevi kelimesini bile kullanmaktan kaçındığını düşünürsek bu değişim emarelerini daha iyi anlayabiliriz.

Dördüncü Bölüm de yaptığım analizler sonucunda şu sonuçlara vardım: 1982 yılından 2005 yılına dek yürürlükte kalan Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitapları ve ilgili müfredat programıyla Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı dini anlamda homojen bir toplum inşa etmeye niyetlenmiştir. Çünkü, toplumdaki dini heterojenliği göz ardı eden Milli Eğitim Banklığı diğer İslami anlayış ve yorumları göz ardı ederek sadece ve sadece Sünni İslam ekseninde bir içerik belirlemiştir. 2005 öncesindeki Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitaplarında Alevilik ve Aleviler tamamen ihmal edilmiş görmezlikten gelinmiştir. Tam sessizlik olarak da adlandırabileceğimiz bu tutum söz konusu dönemde Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın Alevilere yönelik olarak geliştirdiği başlıca söylemsel strateji olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Alevilik ve Alevilerle ilgili tek bir kelime dahi geçmemesi bu yargıyı haklı çıkarmaktadır. Alevi yorumun yokluğunda Suni İslam Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitaplarında resmi olarak kabul gören tek yorum olarak tüm öğrencilere sunulmuştur. Aleviliğin inanç ilkeleri, ibadet pratikleri, ve ibadet yeri hiçbir şekilde değinilmemiş olup Suni inanç ilkeleri ve ibadet şekillerinin sunulmasıyla

yetinilmiştir. Alevilere yönelik sessizlik birçok durumda (mesela hilafet gibi İslam tarihinin tartışmalı konularında) Alevi bakış açısını ve dünya görüşünü ihmal etmek şeklinde kendini göstermiştir. 2005 öncesi Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarında tarihi, dini ve sosyal bilgi sistematik bir şekilde Sünni bakış açısını yansıtacak şekilde organize edilmiştir. Bu sistematik bilgi organizasyonunun temel amacı “milli birlik ve bütünlüğü tesis etmek” ve bu doğrultuda hakim dini görüşü yeni nesillere aktarmaktır. Milli birlik ve beraberlik din aracılığıyla sağlanmaya çalışılır ve araç olarak kullanılan din Sünni İslamdır. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nın bu dönemdeki resmi söylemi, 12 Eylül askeri müdahalesinden sonra etkinliğini artıran Türk-İslam sentezi teorisini bir uzantısı şeklinde okunabilir. Bu teoriye göre Türklük ve İslamlık bir birini mükemmel bir şekilde tamamlayan unsurlardır.

2005 yılından itibaren Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı yeni bir Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitap seti ve yeni bir müfredat programı hazırlamıştır. Bir önceki ders kitaplarına ve müfredata göre yenilerinde Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemsel değişiklikler olduğu göze çarpar. 2005 öncesi kitapların aksine yeni kitaplar da Aleviliği tamamen yok saymaz; aksine İslam dini içinde farklı dini mezhepler ve oluşumların varlığı kabul edilir. Her ne kadar 2005 sonrası Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarında farklı İslami yorumların ve oluşumların varlığı kabul edilse de, bu oluşumları birbirlerinden farklı kılan kendilerine has yönleri yerine, aralarındaki “ortak ve birleştirici unsurlar” vurgulanmıştır. En azından Alevilik açısından baktığımızda görürüz ki, ileri sürülen bu “ortak noktalar” Aleviler için ortak nokta olmaktan çok uzak olup Aleviliğin içeriğini yansıtmamaktadır. Aleviler camiye gidip namaz kılmadıkları, Ramazan orucu tutmadıkları halde bunlar tüm Müslümanlar için ortak ibadet şekilleri olarak sunulmakta, Aleviliğin kendine has ibadet şekilleri (ayin-i cem, semah) ve ibadet yerleri (cemevleri) hiçbir şekilde Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitaplarında yer almamaktadır. Tüm bunlar göz önüne alındığında ileri sürebiliriz ki yeni Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarına Aleviliğin dahil edildiği iddiası “sözde” kalmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle bu kitaplarda Alevilik kısmen ve çok yüzeysel bir şekilde yer bulabilmiştir. Önceki kitaplarla mukayese edecek olursak yine de Alevi kimliğinin tanınması yönünde adımlar atılmış olduğunu görürüz.

2005 sonrası basılan Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitapları Aleviği “İslam içi tasavvufi bir yorum” olarak tanımlamakta ancak içeriğine yönelik tatmin edici bir adım atmamaktadır. Aleviliği “Türk tasavvufi gruplardan” biri olarak tanımlayan Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitapları, Aleviliğin dini ve etnik açıdan heterojen ve senkretik yapısını da göz ardı etmiş olur. 2005 sonrası Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarında yer alan diğer bir söylemsel strateji de Aleviliğin önemli kişiliklerinin (mesela Hz. Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli) Sünni İslam yorumunu destekleyecek şekilde takdim edilmesidir. Kitaplarda bu şahısların, namaz, zekat, oruç gibi Sünni ibadet pratiklerini övücü sözlerine yer verilmektedir. Hacı Bektaş Veli örneğinden yola çıkılarak, Alevi topluluklar ve kanaat önderlerinin tarihin her döneminde devlete sadık uysal uyumlu figürler olarak sunulmaktadır. Yakın ve uzak tarihte Alevi topluluklarla siyasi merkez arasında yaşanan gerilim ve anlaşmazlıklar sistematik bir şekilde görmezlikten gelinmiştir.

Alevi duyarlılıklarının göz ardı edilmesi diğer bir söylemsel strateji olarak Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitaplarında karşımıza çıkar. Tevella ve teberrâ prensibine göre Aleviler peygamber ve onun ailesini (Ehl-i Beyt) seveni sevip yüceltirler, sevmeyeni hor görüp saygı duymazlar. Bu prensibin bir gereği olarak ilk üç halife, Emeviler, Yavuz Sultan Selim başta olmak üzere bazı Osmanlı padişahlarına saygı duymaz ve hoş gözle bakmazlar. Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi kitaplarında Alevilerin bu hassasiyetleri göz ardı edilmiş ve sözü edilen şahıslar tüm Müslümanların örnek alması gereken örnek şahsiyetler olarak sunulmuşlardır.

Sonuç olarak 2005 sonrası Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitapları için söyleyebiliriz ki, bu kitaplar toplumda var olan farklılıkları ismen de olsa kabul etmekle beraber bu farklı oluşumların nev’i şahsına münhasır niteliklerini “milli birlik ve bütünlüğü” bozabileceği gerekçesiyle vurgulamamıştır. Bunun yerine Alevilik dahil olmak üzere bu oluşumlar “milli birlik ve beraberliği” tehdit etmeyecek şekilde devle kontrolü altında tutulmaya çalışılmıştır

Beşinci Bölüm sonunda vardığım sonuçları ise şu şekilde özetleyebilirim. Ne konuştuklarından bağımsız olarak dokuzuncu cumhur başkanı Süleyman Demirel ve onuncu cumhur başkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezerin Hacıbektaş Şenliklerine katılmış olmaları ve Alevilere hitap etmiş olmaları Aleviler için başlı

başına önemli bir hadisedir. Devletin 1970’li ve 1980’li yıllarda Alevileri iç tehdit unsurları arasında sayıp şüpheyi yaklaştığını göz önüne alırsak, 1990’lı yılların başından itibaren görülen Hacıbektaş Şenlikleri’ndeki cumhurbaşkanlığı seviyesindeki katılımlar daha bir anlamlı hale gelmektedir. Cumhurbaşkanları bu katılımlarıyla Alevilerin varlığını tanıdıklarını ifade etmiş olmkata ve onları muhatap aldıklarını göstermektedirler. Önceki dönemin “tehdit unsuru” olan Aleviler, yeni dönemde cumhurbaşkanları tarafından Cumhuriyet’in ve Atatürk’ün ilkelerinin en önde gelen koruyucuları olarak sunulmuştur. Cumhurbaşkanlığı konuşmalarında Aleviler, düzene tehdit oluşturan hareketlere karşı devletin en önemli müttefiki ve yeri doldurulamaz bir dayanak noktası olarak tanımlanmışlardır.

Devletin en üst düzey organındaki bu tavır değişikliğinin arkasındaki temel sebepler olarak yükselen siyasal İslam’ı ve ayrılıkçı PKK terörünü işaret etmek istiyorum. Cumhurbaşkanlığı konuşmalarında rastlanan ana söylemsel düzenliliklerden biri Hacı Bektaş Veli’nin ve Aleviler’in Türk oluşlarına ve Türklüğe yapmış oldukları büyük katkılara yapılan vurgudur. Bununla yakından ilişkili olarak her iki cumhurbaşkanı da Aleviliği ve Alevileri siyasal İslam’dan ve Kürt ayrılıkçılığından uzak bir yerde konumlandırmaya özen göstermişlerdir. Aleviler birçok kere “Türk İslam’ının hoş görülü, modern ve aydınlık bir yüzü” olarak tasvir edilmiştir. Alevilere, siyasal İslamcılarının ve PKK’lı teröristlerin gittikleri yollardan uzak durmaları ve her durumda devlete sadık kalmaları yönünde tavsiyelerde bulunmuşlardır. Cumhurbaşkanlığı konuşmalarında, Aleviliğin ve Alevilerin değerlerinin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin ve Atatürk’ün ilke ve prensipleriyle çok uyumlu olduğu sıkça tekrarlanan söylemsel bir düzenliliklerdir.

Cumhurbaşkanları Alevilik meselesiyle Türkiye’nin güvenlik öncelikleri arasında yakın bir ilişki görmektedirler. Demirel ve Sezer Türkiye’nin sürekli sıkıntılı günler geçirdiğini veya ateş çemberiyle çevrili olduğunu vurgulayıp bu şartlar altında Alevilerden devlete sadık olmalarını isterler. Türkiye’nin birlik ve beraberliğin koruması için Alevilerin bu yönde tercih kullanmaları son derece önemlidir. Alevilere Hacı Bektaş Veli’yi örnek almaları salıkverilir, çünkü Hacı Bektaş Veli her zaman devletin ve milletin selameti için çaba göstermiş bir figürdür. Hem Demirel’in hem de Sezer’in konuşmaların özür dileyici bir üslup

vardır. Diğer bir deyişle geçmişte devletin Alevilere karşı yapmış olduğu yanlışlar olduğu kabul edilir, ancak Alevilere geçmişte olup biten şeyleri unutmaları geleceğe ümitle bakmaları önerilir. Bundan böyle Aleviler “bu ülkenin eşit ve onurlu vatandaşları olarak, başlarını öne eğmeden bu ülkenin nimetlerinden faydalanabileceklerdir.”

Cumhurbaşkanlarının 1994 ten itibaren Hacıbektaş Şenliklerinde Alevilere yönelik geçmişin hatalarını telafi edici söylemsel hamleleri Alevi kimliğini tüm boyutlarıyla tanıdıkları anlamına gelmez. Ne Demirel ne de Sezer Alevilerin gündemlerin öncelikli olarak meşgul eden cemevlerinin statüsü, zorunlu din dersleri gibi konulara değinir. Bu problemlere çözüm önerileri sunulmaz. Bunu yerine “ülkenin birlik ve beraberliği için” Alevilerin neler yapması gerektiği sıralanır; Alevilerle Sünnilerin ortak noktaları üzerinde durulur.

Yukarıda da değinildiği üzere Alevilere yönelik resmi söylem heterojenlik arz eder. Bu heterojenliğin sebebi olarak iç ve dış olmak üzere iki grup etken üzerinde duracağım. Dış faktörlerin en önemlisi olarak Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği ile olan ilişkilerini görüyorum. Helsinki 1999 zirvesinden sonra Türkiye’ye aday ülke statüsü verilmiş, bu olaydan sonra ilişkiler artan bir ivmeyle yoğunlaşmıştır. Aynı dönemde yayınlamaya başladığı İlerleme Raporları ile Avrupa Birliği Türkiye’ye tam üye olması için yerine getirmesi gereken koşulları düzenli olarak hatırlatmıştır. Bu talepler arasında, bir azınlık olarak tanımlanan Alevilerin problemlerinin çözülmesi de vardır. Avrupa Birliği bir organı olan Avrupa Komisyonu aracılığıyla her yıl düzenlediği ilerleme raporlarında cemevlerinin statüsü, zorunlu din derslerinde Aleviliğin yer almaması, Alevi derneklerinin karşılaştığı problemler başta olmak üzere Alevilerin sorunlarını dile getirmiştir. Alevilerin sistematik bir şekilde yapılan ayrımcılığın mağdurları olarak tasvir edilmiştir. Raporlarda açıkça tam üye olmak istiyorsa Türkiye’nin bu sorunları çözmesi gerektiği dile getirilmiştir. Zorunlu Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi derslerinin içeriğinde yapılan değişiklikler başta olmak üzere Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemdeki değişimlerin birçoğunun arkasında Avrupa Birliği’nin ilerleme raporlarının etkisi olduğu yadsınamaz. Diğer bir deyişler Avrupa Birliği müktesebatına uyum amacıyla yapılan düzenlemeler, Avrupa Birliği’nin Alevilik meselesinde aktif bir taraf olarak müdahil olması, Türkiye’nin resmi kurumlarının

Aleviliğe ve Alevilere yönelik söylemlerinin oluşmasını etkileyen en önemli bağlamsal faktör olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Avrupa Konseyi'ne bağlı olarak çalışan Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nde Alevi bir öğrenci velisinin zorunlu Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi derslerinin içeriğine yönelik açtığı dava da resmi söylemsel pratiğin değişmesinde rol oynayan diğer bir bağlamsal faktördür. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne uyum süreci yalnızca Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi ders kitaplarının içeriğinin değişmesine değil, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı başta olmak üzere diğer bazı resmi kurumlarında Alevilikle ilgili söylemlerini Alevilerin lehine yumuşatmıştır. Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyelik doğrultusunda hazırlanan uyum paketleri adı altındaki yasal düzenlemeler sonucunda, Alevi derneklerin "Alevi" kelimesini de içeren isimler alması yasal hale gelmiştir.

Alevilere yönelik resmi söylem çeşitliliğine yol açan iç faktörlerin başında devletin yekpare bir yapı değil bir birinden ayrı birçok kurumdan oluşan bir yapı olması ve bu parçalı yapının elemanları arasında he zaman bir uyum ve eşgüdüm bulunmaması hatta birçok konuda çatışan perspektifler bulunması gelmektedir. Bürokratik elite siyasal elit arasında çekişmeler, yargı, yasama ve yürütme erkleri arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar bu parçalı ve çekişmeli yapıyı gözler önüne sermektedir. Devlet Alevilerin taleplerine bu parçalı yapısıyla cevap vermiş (bazen sessiz kalmış) bu yüzden birbirinden farklı hatta çelişen cevaplar ortaya çıkmıştır. Alevilerin birden fazla resmi muhatapları vardır ve bu muhataplar Alevilik konusunda bir eşgüdüm içerisinde söylemsel pratikte bulunmaktadır.

Siyasal partiler arasındaki çekişmeler diğer bir iç sebep olarak karşımıza çıkabilmektedir. Alevilerin durumlarını iyileştirme yada Aleviliğin/cemevlerinin resmi statüsünü düzenleme konusunda siyasi çekişmeler yüzünden bir sonuca varılamamaktadır. Örneğin, 1963, 1992 ve 1994 yıllarında Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın yapısında Alevilerin de temsil edilmesi yönünde bazı siyasi partilerce girişilmede bulunulmuş olmasına rağmen, diğer bazı siyasi partilerin meclisteki engellemeleri nedeniyle bu düzenlemeler gerçekleşmemiştir. Siyasi partilerle Aleviler arasındaki ilişkiler her zaman netameli olmuştur. 1950 yılında yapılan genel seçimleri dışarıda tutarsak Alevililerin genellikle Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi onun çizgisindeki Kemalist partilere oy verdiklerini söylemek çok yanlış olmaz. Ancak buna rağmen başta CHP olmak hiçbir Kemalist parti Alevilerin

taleplerini ve problemlerin parti programlarının bir parçası olarak benimsemeye yanaşmamıştır. Çünkü ülkedeki Sünni çoğunluğun oylarını kaybetmekten çekinen partiler kamuoyunda “Alevi partisi” imajıyla bilinmek istememektedirler.

Yukarıdan beri anlatıldığı üzer be tezi ana konusunu üç resmi kurumun Alevilere yönelik resmi söylemi oluşturmaktadır. Ancak söz konusu söylemsel pratiklerde bulunan daha fazla resmi kuruluş vardır. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi bu kurumların başında gelmektedir. Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu, yargı organları diğer iki kurum olarak sayılabilir. Bunlara ek olarak, anayasa başta olmak üzere Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin yasal mevzuatı Alevilere yönelik resmi söylem perspektifinden analize tabi tutulmalıdır. Bunlar bu çalışmanın sınırlılıkları olarak değerlendirilebilir. Diğer bir sınırlılık zaman açısındandır. 1980 öncesi döneme ilişkin söylemsel pratiklere bakılamadığı gibi 2005 yılından sonraki söylemsel pratikler de incelenememiştir. 2005 yılından sonra meydana gelen önemli gelişmeler arasında 2006 yılının Ocak ayında başlayan iktidardaki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi tarafından başlatılan “Alevi açılımı” gelmektedir. Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan son iki yıldır, Kerbela şehitlerinin yasının tutulduğu Muharrem ayında bazı Alevilerin de katılımıyla organize edilen iftar programların katılmış, aynı sürecin bir parçası olarak Alevi dedelerine devlet bütçesinden maaş bağlanması, cemevlerinin desteklenmesi konuları tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu süreçte ortaya çıkan, başbakan ve bazı bakanların ürettiği söylemsel pratikler incelenmeyi beklemektedir. Alevilerin önemli bir kısmınca şüpheyile karşılanan bu açılımların ne gibi sonuçlar getireceği ve Alevilerin konumlarını ne ölçüde iyileştireceğini anlamak için sürecin sonuçlanmasını beklemek gerekmektedir.